Civil Society in Bangladesh: Vibrant but Not Vigilant (New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 46) 9813344032, 9789813344037

Table of contents :
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Core Arguments
1.3 Importance of the Book
1.4 Methodological Issues
1.4.1 Analytical Framework
1.4.1.1 Vibrant and Vigilant Attribute of the Civil Society
1.4.1.2 Positioning the Civil Society in the Political System of a Developing Country Aiming Development and Democratic Consol...
1.4.1.3 Steps for Investigation
1.4.2 Methods
1.4.2.1 Description of the Survey Method Used
1.4.2.2 Qualitative Data Analysis Model
1.4.3 Study Area
1.5 Brief Introduction to Civil Society in Bangladesh
1.6 Propositions of the Book
1.7 Organization of the Book
References
Chapter 2: Conceptual Discourse
2.1 Civil Society Discourse
2.2 Neo-Tocquevillean School (Liberal Democratic Model)
2.3 Neo-Gramscian School (New Left Model)
2.4 Modern Concept of Civil Society
2.5 Civil Society: Democracy and Development
2.6 Studies on Civil Society in Bangladesh in Different Models
2.6.1 Neoliberal Model (Neo-Tocquevillean Model)
2.6.2 Critics of Neoliberal Model (Move to Gramsci´s Model)
2.6.3 Structural Model
2.6.4 Cultural Model
2.6.5 Mixed Model Applied in the Present Research
2.7 Operationalization of Few More Concepts
2.7.1 Politicization of Civil Society
2.7.2 Democracy
2.7.3 Democratic Transition
2.7.4 Democratic Consolidation
2.7.5 Free Market Economy
2.7.6 Good Governance
2.7.7 Corruption
2.7.8 Patron-Client Relations and Vertical Norms
References
Chapter 3: Civil Society in Comparative Perspective
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Influence of Political Structures Upon Civil Society from a Comparative Perspective
3.2.1 Stable But Partly Illiberal Democracy-India
3.2.1.1 Nature of the Political System
3.2.1.2 Profile of the Civil Society
3.2.1.3 Political Structures and Civil Society
3.2.1.4 In Comparison to Bangladesh
3.2.2 Elitist Democracy-The Philippines
3.2.2.1 The Nature of the Political System and Democracy
3.2.2.2 Profile of the Civil Society
3.2.2.3 Influence of the Political Structures
3.2.2.4 In Comparison to Bangladesh
3.2.3 Military Controlled Democracy-Pakistan
3.2.3.1 Nature of the Political System and Regime Style
3.2.3.2 Profile of the Civil Society
3.2.3.3 Political Structures and Civil Society
3.2.3.4 Comparison with Bangladesh
3.3 Position of Bangladesh Civil Society and Democracy in Comparison to Other Asian Countries
3.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Civil Society and Political Structures in Bangladesh
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Level of Vibrancy of Civil Society in Bangladesh
4.2.1 Philanthropy Culture
4.2.2 Donor Policy
4.2.3 Registration System
4.3 Level of Vigilance of Civil Society in Bangladesh
4.3.1 Historical Background for Civil Society and Political Relationship
4.3.2 Confrontational Democracy in Bangladesh
4.3.3 Elite Composition: Politics and Civil Society
4.3.3.1 Civil Society Elites
4.3.4 Internal Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations
4.3.5 Political Party System in Bangladesh
4.3.5.1 Nature of Party Rule in Bangladesh
4.3.5.2 Third Parties
4.3.5.3 Nature of Building Social Support
4.3.6 Political Parties Penetrating Civil Society
4.3.7 Political Polarization Among the NGOs
4.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data
5.2.1 Self-Classification by the CSOs
5.2.2 Policy Interest
5.2.3 Objectives
5.2.4 Geographic Coverage
5.2.5 Members
5.2.6 Resources
5.2.7 Volunteer
5.2.8 Employee
5.2.9 Budget
5.3 Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action
5.3.1 Evaluation of CSOs and NGO Performance
5.3.2 Subjective Influence Score (SIS)
5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs
5.4.1 CSOs´ Relationships with Other Actors in the Political System
5.4.2 CSO´s Relationships with the Government
5.4.3 The Nature of Advocacy
5.4.4 The Nature of Success in Policy-Making
5.4.5 The Nature of Lobbying
5.5 Is Bangladesh´s Vibrant Civil Society Also Vigilant?
References
Chapter 6: Politicized Civil Society
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Civil Society and Political Relation as Revealed in the Survey Data
6.2.1 Most Influential Actors
6.2.2 Personal Relation with Actors
6.2.3 CSOs Relation with Political Parties
6.3 Civil Society and Politics from Newspaper Analysis
6.4 Understanding the Politicized Civil Society Through Case Studies
6.4.1 Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union
6.4.2 PaharPur Adarsho Shomobai Krishok Samity (PaharPur Ideal Farmers´ Cooperative)
6.4.3 Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) [Thengamara (Name of a Particular Area in Northern Bangladesh) Women´s Green Gro...
6.4.4 Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod-RRSP (Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi City)
6.4.5 The Primary School Teachers´ Movement of 2006
6.4.6 Case Study Summary
6.5 Conclusions
References
Chapter 7: Conclusions
7.1 Summary
7.2 Ability of Civil Society in Consolidating Democracy
7.3 Neo-Tocquevillean Assumption and Donor Policies: Implication of the Bangladesh Case
7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh
7.4.1 Nature of Civil Society in 2017
7.4.2 Role of Civil Society During the Election
7.4.3 Civil Society Trends During the Corona Crisis
7.5 Conclusion: Vibrant but Not Vigilant
References

Citation preview

New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46

Farhat Tasnim

Civil Society in Bangladesh Vibrant but Not Vigilant

New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives Volume 46

Editor-in-Chief Yoshiro Higano, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan

New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives This series is a constellation of works by scholars in the field of regional science and in related disciplines specifically focusing on dynamism in Asia. Asia is the most dynamic part of the world. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore experienced rapid and miracle economic growth in the 1970s. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand followed in the 1980s. China, India, and Vietnam are now rising countries in Asia and are even leading the world economy. Due to their rapid economic development and growth, Asian countries continue to face a variety of urgent issues including regional and institutional unbalanced growth, environmental problems, poverty amidst prosperity, an ageing society, the collapse of the bubble economy, and deflation, among others. Asian countries are diversified as they have their own cultural, historical, and geographical as well as political conditions. Due to this fact, scholars specializing in regional science as an inter- and multi-discipline have taken leading roles in providing mitigating policy proposals based on robust interdisciplinary analysis of multifaceted regional issues and subjects in Asia. This series not only will present unique research results from Asia that are unfamiliar in other parts of the world because of language barriers, but also will publish advanced research results from those regions that have focused on regional and urban issues in Asia from different perspectives. The series aims to expand the frontiers of regional science through diffusion of intrinsically developed and advanced modern regional science methodologies in Asia and other areas of the world. Readers will be inspired to realize that regional and urban issues in the world are so vast that their established methodologies still have space for development and refinement, and to understand the importance of the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach that is inherent in regional science for analyzing and resolving urgent regional and urban issues in Asia. Topics under consideration in this series include the theory of social cost and benefit analysis and criteria of public investments, socio-economic vulnerability against disasters, food security and policy, agro-food systems in China, industrial clustering in Asia, comprehensive management of water environment and resources in a river basin, the international trade bloc and food security, migration and labor market in Asia, land policy and local property tax, Information and Communication Technology planning, consumer “shop-around” movements, and regeneration of downtowns, among others. Researchers who are interested in publishing their books in this Series should obtain a proposal form from Yoshiro Higano (Editor in Chief, [email protected]) and return the completed form to him.

Editor in Chief Yoshiro Higano, University of Tsukuba Managing Editors Makoto Tawada (General Managing Editor), Aichi Gakuin University Kiyoko Hagihara, Bukkyo University Lily Kiminami, Niigata University Editorial Board Yasuhiro Sakai (Advisor Chief Japan), Shiga University Yasuhide Okuyama, University of Kitakyushu Zheng Wang, Chinese Academy of Sciences Hiroyuki Shibusawa, Toyohashi University of Technology Saburo Saito, Fukuoka University Makoto Okamura, Hiroshima University Moriki Hosoe, Kumamoto Gakuen University Budy Prasetyo Resosudarmo, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU Shin-Kun Peng, Academia Sinica Geoffrey John Dennis Hewings, University of Illinois Euijune Kim, Seoul National University Srijit Mishra, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Rochester Institute of Technology Yizhi Wang, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Daniel Shefer, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Akira Kiminami, The University of Tokyo Jorge Serrano, National University of Mexico Binh Tran-Nam, UNSW Sydney, RMIT University Vietnam Ngoc Anh Nguyen, Development and Policies Research Center Thai-Ha Le, Fulbright University Vietnam Advisory Board Peter Nijkamp (Chair, Ex Officio Member of Editorial Board), Tinbergen Institute Rachel S. Franklin, Brown University Mark D. Partridge, Ohio State University Jacques Poot, University of Waikato Aura Reggiani, University of Bologna

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13039

Farhat Tasnim

Civil Society in Bangladesh Vibrant but Not Vigilant

Farhat Tasnim Department of Political Science University of Rajshahi Rajshahi, Bangladesh

ISSN 2199-5974 ISSN 2199-5982 (electronic) New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ISBN 978-981-33-4403-7 ISBN 978-981-33-4404-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated To my Parents Muhammad Shahjahan and Shirin Maqsuda. Their dedication, contribution, advice, and guidance towards building my life are simply immense.

Foreword

It has been a great pleasure to receive the invitation to write a foreword for this book title, Civil Society in Bangladesh: Vibrant but not Vigilant. It is authored by Farhat Tasnim. This book is based on her Ph.D. thesis that she completed under my supervision and later updated the contents with recent political changes. Tasnim, in her research addresses theoretical and empirical dimensions of the role of civil society in democracy and development in a developing country like Bangladesh. Bangladesh is often considered a development showcase by aid agencies and the international donor community. However, despite remarkable contribution to social development, the civil society can hardly contribute to democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. Tasnim analyzes the reasons for such paradoxical role of civil society with empirical data step by step, using social survey, case studies, and newspaper analyses. To set the background, she develops her own model where she creates an analytical distinction between a vibrant and a vigilant civil society. This book not only assesses the condition of civil society but also explores its relation to state and politics. The political structures, especially the political parties in their process of expansion and in maintaining their support base through a traditional clientelistic network often manipulate the civil society to their end. Again, in the atmosphere of political rivalry and polarization, civil society itself also tries to adjust or convert itself to survive, often sacrificing their autonomy and independence. The main attraction of the book is where the author addresses and proves some sensitive political facts about the civil society not only through case studies and content analysis but also by using quantitative data gathered through a survey on civil society organizations. Tasnim’s Survey on Civil Society in Bangladesh is part of the Japan Interest Group Studies popularly known as JIGS Data Series, where surveys on civil society organizations were conducted in fifteen countries belonging to different continents. My team and I began JIGS research in 1997 and it has now turned into the world’s largest research project on civil society and state relations, covering 225 cities and 85,000 cases in the world so far. This project is the largest research study in Political Science in the twenty-first century that has been supported by MEXT and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. ix

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Tasnim completed her Ph.D. more than a decade earlier. However, her arguments, about the questioned autonomy of the civil society, its potentials and limitations in the setting of a developing country, constantly struggling for democratic stability and economic development have full relevance to the present Bangladesh in 2020. The author has carefully provided updated information, analysis, explanations throughout the book where it was necessary. Moreover, new researches on civil society have been introduced that only confirm the book’s original propositions— though vibrant, civil society is hardly autonomous, rather controlled by the political structures. Academics, researchers, policy-makers, development practitioners will find the book useful not only to understand the case of Bangladesh but will help them rethink about the civil society in other developing nations too. The book is simply outstanding. Tasnim’s work is the most detailed and insightful among the JIGS Country Monograph Series. I look forward to see more published works on civil society by her. This time from comparative perspectives, revealing new dimensions in civil society research. Tokai University, Hiratsuka, Japan University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan

Yutaka Tsujinaka

Preface

The year 2006 was a turning point in my study on civil society that I began in 2002. This year Professor Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize. This brought world recognition not only to the micro-credit system but also to the grass-roots initiative for social development of the famous civil society organizations in Bangladesh. However, during the same period, Transparency International (TI) rated Bangladesh as the World’s most corrupt country for five successive years from 2001 to 2005. This only leads to the paradox that though civil society is so successful at the grass-roots level for socio-economic development, it has hardly any influence on curbing corruption, ensuring good governance and a consolidated democracy. This situation also contradicts with the mainstream Neo-Tocquevillean School that always claims a positive relation between civil society and democracy. An attempt to uncover the causes to such incongruent outcome has led to this research. The main focus of this book is civil society in relation to politics and democracy in Bangladesh. In this connection, it also qualifies the normative assumption of the Neo-Tocquevillean School that has profound influence on donor policies on good governance and programs for strengthening civil society. This book in its present form is primarily an outcome of my Ph.D. thesis, completed in 2008. As politics and civil society are constantly changing functioning structures, my observations and inquiries on the civil society and democracy in Bangladesh have continued in my post-doctoral study period and beyond. This book reveals that instead of influencing the government and political actors, civil society itself has been penetrated, co-opted, politicized, and divided by the political parties. As the civil society organizations are vertically organized and lack internal democratic practices, they are easily prone to such politicization and polarization. This has reduced their ability to generate democratic norms, articulate interest, or monitor state actions. So the civil society is yet to emerge as a vigilant force to uphold good governance and consolidate democracy. This was true in 2006, so it is in 2020. Such proposition of this book has been developed and proved empirically through survey data analysis, newspaper content analysis, case studies, interviews that were conducted in 2006–2007 as well as in 2018–2019. Thus the xi

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study is based on a combined comparative, quantitative, and qualitative methodology for analysis. As usual, this book begins with theories and model (Chaps. 1 and 2). For investigation into the civil society of Bangladesh, the study first develops a simple analysis model where civil society is considered as a form of collective functions distinct from state, market, and family. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are taken as the basic units of such civil society. Overall characteristics and functions of civil society are divided into two broad aspects—vibrant and vigilant. Vibrant refers to density, collectiveness, and activeness, while vigilant refers to the interactions of civil society with the state and market, its participation in governance, and strength to monitor state actions. Civil society must be both vibrant and vigilant to be able to contribute to democratic consolidation. The analysis model places civil society in constant interaction with the other actors in the political system and democratic consolidation is achieved together with a participatory civil society, political institutionalization, economic development, and democratic culture. Liberal democracy is the ideal goal for democratic consolidation. A comparative discussion of the civil society in contemporary India, The Philippines, and Pakistan with that of Bangladesh divulges that it is the political actors and structures that function as the determining factors to the strength of civil society and dimension of democracy (Chap. 3). Further investigation into the factors that influence the nature and strength of civil society in Bangladesh has revealed that donor policy, economic situation and philanthropy culture, and simple registration rules have contributed to its vibrant nature which is marked by density of collective functions, activeness in providing service, and success so far in social development. Thus far, from the Neo-Tocquevillean assumption, there exists a reasonable condition for improving democratic institutions in the country. On the other hand, political structures, particularly political parties, along with historical background and vertical social relationship—clientelism, patronage, nepotism, corruption, etc., have contributed to low performance of civil society in relation to politics and democracy (Chap. 4). Empirical observation and survey on civil society organizations have supported the inference on high civil society involvement in social service and welfare. The survey data have also revealed a low rate of participation by civil society organizations in actions like advocacy, policy-making, lobbying, exchanging opinions with the government, sending representatives to local councils, etc., and their high tendency to keep contacts with political parties. This implies that the civil society is hardly involved in participatory actions concerning politics and democracy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has a partisan tendency. Naturally, their prospect in contributing to democracy or emerging as a strong, vigilant force is not encouraging (Chap. 5). To find out the reasons for low participation and partisan tendency of the civil society, further investigations combining survey data, newspaper report analysis, and case studies on civil society organizations were made in Chap. 6. This only confirmed the assumptions set in Chap. 1. The study not only answers questions regarding the weak performance of civil society in relation to democratic consolidation but also indicates the impracticality of

Preface

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the donor policies for placing high targets for civil society in a political system that still lacks political institutionalization, democratic consensus, and economic development. International and national policies on civil society should be formulated accepting the social and political reality. Though the civil society may not be able to completely overcome the influence of politicizations, the lure of patronage, and vertical social relations, it has the possibility to improve and gain a stronger position. In this way, whatever positive outcomes are produced may be considered as achievements. The researchs updating the situation of the civil society and its advocacy capability in relation to democracy (Chap. 7), only shows the relevance of my conclusion made in 2008 to be strong in 2020 as well. There had been profound changes in the political party system and in the nature of political polarization, but hardly any change in the civil society and political relations. Civil society is vigilant as to the level as the political structure lets it to be. Consensus is yet to develop among the players in the political field to institutionalize democracy in a sporting spirit. On the other hand, political elites are yet to accept the civil society as the neutral and vigilant force on behalf of the citizens. The complex relations between civil society, advocacy, politics, and democracy have always given rise to new debates and controversies at different ages in history, throughout the world. This work is only a drop to ocean on Civil Society literature. However, it has the potential to lead to concurrence as well as raise debate to a far extent among the readers, who may be conscious citizens, civil society leaders, researchers, politicians, bureaucrats, or development practitioners. Naturally, comments and suggestions from the readers will always be accepted with gratitude. Rajshahi, Bangladesh

Farhat Tasnim

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to a number of individuals and institutions, to whom I am deeply indebted for their continued support and encouragement for shaping my research and this book at different stages. The book is originally based on my Ph.D. thesis. Academically, I am indebted to my research advisor Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka for his continuous, expert guidance and advice in the field of civil society. Moreover, he extended his generous support from his JIGS Project to conduct my survey on civil society organizations in Bangladesh. It is my great pleasure to convey my gratitude to three other members of my thesis committee, Professor Shigeo Osonoi, Professor Motoko Shuto, and Professor Charles Covell from the University of Tsukuba. I would also like to express my appreciation to all the members of the JIGS project team under the leadership of Professor Tsujinaka. Particularly, I am grateful to Professor Jae Young Choe and Professor Hiroki Miwa and to Dr. Yohei Kobashi who helped me at all stages of organizing the survey plan to analyzing the data. While conducting the survey in the field, I received genuine support and cooperation from a good number of individuals, particularly from my 20 sincere and dedicated surveyors. Five of them also helped me in collecting newspaper reports on civil society from different libraries. I also convey my special thanks to two more postgraduate students of mine, Ms. Labonno Saha and Ms. Angura, for their joint researches on the civil society in Bangladesh with me in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Among other academicians who encouraged me greatly with my research project, I would like to particularly mention the name of Professor Robert Pekkhanon of Washington University, and Professor Nathan Gilbert Quimpo and Dr. Leslie M. Tkach Kawasaki of Tsukuba University for their constructive comments and suggestion on my thesis. I convey my heartfelt thanks to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan for awarding me the Monbukagakusho Scholarship that supported my endeavor to Master’s and Ph.D. degrees in Tsukuba. I am also highly obliged to the Japan Society for the Promotion xv

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of Science (JSPS) for supporting my post-doctoral research. I also thank my Department of Political Science, University of Rajshahi for granting sabbatical leave, which has provided me the necessary time to revise and update the thesis to convert it into this book. I also acknowledge that a part of Chap. 5 and a part of Chap. 6 have been published earlier in two research journals—Journal of Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Civil Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal. I express my gratitude to the editors and publishers for granting me permission to republish those journal articles as sections of this book. My gratitude extended to Professor Yoshiro Higano, Emeritus Professor, Life and Environmental Science, University of Tsukuba, Editor-in-Chief of New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, Monograph Series, is far from a customary one. Professor Higano’s strong encouragement motivated me to develop this book manuscript. I am also grateful to Springer Japan for their kind cooperation and patience throughout the publication process. Lastly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Ryozo Noguchi and Dr. Tofael Ahamed, Associate Professor, University of Tsukuba, Professor Wardatul Akmam and Professor Md. Fakrul Islam, University of Rajshahi for their inspiration throughout the entire research work and completion of this book manuscript. Thanks with love to my sons, Abrar and Asrar for being patient and supporting all the time.

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Core Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Importance of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Methodological Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1 Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.3 Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Brief Introduction to Civil Society in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Propositions of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Organization of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 3 5 7 8 14 18 19 23 24 26

2

Conceptual Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Civil Society Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Neo-Tocquevillean School (Liberal Democratic Model) . . . . . . . 2.3 Neo-Gramscian School (New Left Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Modern Concept of Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Civil Society: Democracy and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Studies on Civil Society in Bangladesh in Different Models . . . . 2.6.1 Neoliberal Model (Neo-Tocquevillean Model) . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 Critics of Neoliberal Model (Move to Gramsci’s Model) . 2.6.3 Structural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.4 Cultural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.5 Mixed Model Applied in the Present Research . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Operationalization of Few More Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 Politicization of Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2 Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3 Democratic Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.4 Democratic Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 31 32 33 34 39 39 40 41 42 43 43 43 44 45 46

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2.7.5 2.7.6 2.7.7 2.7.8 References . 3

4

5

Contents

Free Market Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Good Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patron–Client Relations and Vertical Norms . . . . . . . . . . ...........................................

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47 48 49 49 50

Civil Society in Comparative Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Influence of Political Structures Upon Civil Society from a Comparative Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Stable But Partly Illiberal Democracy-India . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Elitist Democracy—The Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Military Controlled Democracy—Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Position of Bangladesh Civil Society and Democracy in Comparison to Other Asian Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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57 60 63 67

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Civil Society and Political Structures in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Level of Vibrancy of Civil Society in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Philanthropy Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Donor Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Registration System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Level of Vigilance of Civil Society in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Historical Background for Civil Society and Political Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Confrontational Democracy in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Elite Composition: Politics and Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Internal Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations . . . 4.3.5 Political Party System in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.6 Political Parties Penetrating Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.7 Political Polarization Among the NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

77 77 78 79 80 83 85

How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Self-Classification by the CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Policy Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4 Geographic Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.5 Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.6 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 86 . 88 . 89 . 91 . 93 . 99 . 102 . 104 . 105 . 109 . 109 . . . . . . .

112 112 113 113 114 114 115

Contents

5.2.7 Volunteer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.8 Employee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.9 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Evaluation of CSOs and NGO Performance . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Subjective Influence Score (SIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 CSOs’ Relationships with Other Actors in the Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 CSO’s Relationships with the Government . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3 The Nature of Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.4 The Nature of Success in Policy-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.5 The Nature of Lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Is Bangladesh’s Vibrant Civil Society Also Vigilant? . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

7

Politicized Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Civil Society and Political Relation as Revealed in the Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Most Influential Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Personal Relation with Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 CSOs Relation with Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Civil Society and Politics from Newspaper Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Understanding the Politicized Civil Society Through Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 PaharPur Adarsho Shomobai Krishok Samity (PaharPur Ideal Farmers’ Cooperative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3 Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) [Thengamara (Name of a Particular Area in Northern Bangladesh) Women’s Green Group] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.4 Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod—RRSP (Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi City) . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.5 The Primary School Teachers’ Movement of 2006 . . . . . . 6.4.6 Case Study Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Ability of Civil Society in Consolidating Democracy . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Neo-Tocquevillean Assumption and Donor Policies: Implication of the Bangladesh Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh . . . . . . . .

xix

. . . . . . .

117 117 119 121 125 126 127

. . . . . . .

127 128 130 132 133 137 138

. 139 . 139 . . . . .

142 142 142 143 146

. 151 . 152 . 153

. 155 . . . . .

157 159 162 163 164

. 167 . 167 . 170 . 172 . 174

xx

Contents

7.4.1 Nature of Civil Society in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Role of Civil Society During the Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.3 Civil Society Trends During the Corona Crisis . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Conclusion: Vibrant but Not Vigilant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

175 178 182 185 186

List of Abbreviations

ADAB ADB AL BELA BDT BGMEA BJP BLAST BNP BRDB BRAC CBA CPD CSI CSO EC GK FNB FEMA FBCCI INC JP JIB JIGS JSPS MEXT NGO NGOAB PKSF

Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh Asian Development Bank Bangladesh Awami League Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association Bangladeshi Currency Taka Bangladesh Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association Bharatiya Janata Party Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust Bangladesh Nationalist Party Bangladesh Rural Development Board Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Collective Bargaining Associations Centre for Policy Dialogue Civil Society Index Civil Society Organization Election Commissioner Gonoshasthaya Kendra (People’s Health Center) Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh Federation of Election Monitoring Agencies Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries Indian National Congress Jatiya Party Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh Japan Interest Group Study Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology: Japan Non-governmental Organization NGO Affairs Bureau Palli karma sahayak foundation (Foundation for Assisting Rural Activities) xxi

xxii

List of Abbreviations

PO

Peoples Organizations (a prominent form of civil society organization in the Philippines) Representation of the People’s Order Rajshahi Rakkhah Shangram Parishod (Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi) Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteers Corps) Sustainable Development Goals Subjective Influence Score Shushashoner Jonno Nagorik (Citizens for Good Governance) Thana (Sub-district) Executive Officer Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho Transparency International Bangladesh Transparency International United Nations Development Program United States Agency for International Development World Bank World Health Organization

RPO RRSP RSS SDG SIS SHUJON TNO TMSS TIB TI UNDP USAID WB WHO

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6 Fig. 5.7

Position of the civil society in the process for democratic consolidation in developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rise of NGOs (registered under the NGOAB), receiving foreign funds in Bangladesh . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . Flow of released foreign grants through the NGO Affairs Bureau in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . Distribution of surveyed CSOs based on their year of establishment .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . Formal and informal relationship between civil society and political party in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of self-classification by the CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scale of individual members belonging to the surveyed CSOs . . . . (a) Scale of volunteers among surveyed CSO working at the national and local level. (b) Scale of volunteers among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds recipient and non-recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (a) Scale of employee among the surveyed CSOs active both at the local and national. (b) Scale of employee among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds recipient and non-recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (a) Scale of budget for the year 2005, among the surveyed CSOs active at both the local and national levels. (b) Scale of budget for the year 2005 among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds receiving and non-receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Subjective influence scores among the CSOs covered by JIGS Survey in five countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CSOs lobbying through political parties and coalition formation: five-country comparison using JIGS survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 81 81 82 100 112 115

118

119

120 126 136

xxiii

xxiv

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

List of Figures

Relationship between CSOs and ruling party and opposition: five-country comparison using JIGS survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Civil society functions in the election process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5

Table 5.6 Table 5.7

Table 5.8

Statistics of registered civil society organizations in Bangladesh . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statistics of CSOs and the total population of selected countries in Asia . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Freedom House rating for four countries in 2006 and 2019 . . . . . . Comparative information about nature of democracy and civil society level in four countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Professions of parliament members in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of share of seats and votes secured by parties in general elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The statistics of the population, sample size, and interviewed CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of surveyed CSOs in four categories and rate of their involvement in different types of grass-roots activities . . . . . . . . . . . Selected grass-roots action among foreign funds recipient and non-recipient CSOs engaged at the local and national level . . . . . . Grass-roots performance evaluation of the civil society by the surveyed CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selected government relationships among CSOs engaged at the local and national levels—foreign fund recipients vs. non-recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CSOs’ political advocacy among foreign-funding recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CSOs’ policy-making and policy-breaking success among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . Selected lobbying activities performed by foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level . . . . . . . . .

21 22 60 71 90 94 111 123 124 125

129 131

133 135

xxv

xxvi

Table 6.1

Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1

List of Tables

Personal relations existing between important actors and CSOs among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political party relations with CSOs among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level . . . . . . . . . CSO types and attributes appearing in news reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Types of CSO and their involvement in different issues in the year 2017 based on newspaper analysis . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .

144 145 149 176

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter provides the background to this research on civil society in Bangladesh, along with its core arguments, objectives, and methodology. The research addresses the paradox found in the nature and function of the civil society in Bangladesh. The book concentrates on exploring the answers to the core question, “despite its vibrant disposition, why the civil society is hardly vigilant, in terms of political participation and democracy?” This chapter sets the scene. Both secondary and primary data were used for this research and the principal methods that were adopted were social survey, case study, and newspaper analysis. The study reveals that though the civil society in Bangladesh gained significant success in social development, in case of political advocacy, the civil society itself has been influenced by the powerful social political structures that have weakened its potentials to generate democratic norms among the citizens, articulate interests, and watch on government actions. This chapter also provides a brief idea about the civil society in Bangladesh and introduces the rest of the book to the readers. Keywords Civil society · Vibrant · Vigilant · Democracy · Developing country · Liberal model · Bangladesh

1.1

Introduction

With the spread of globalization and in the process of the “third wave” democratization, civil society has emerged as an important sector in which to achieve and maintain democracy and pluralism. International development organizations and donor countries have found this civil society to be the best mechanism to ensure liberal economy and democracy besides ensuring social development in the developing countries (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Howell and Pearce 2002; Lewis 2004; Stiles 2002). However, in practice, the process may not be so simple and easy as it may sound in the theories and policies (Tarrow 1996; Armony 2004; Alagappa 2004; Quadir 2003). Bangladesh with a vibrant civil society but a confrontational democracy along with its developing economy may be considered as the best model to analyze and understand the reality. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_1

1

2

1 Introduction

International development organizations and donor countries influenced by the Neo-Tocquevillean school regard civil society as the best instrument for good governance and democratic consolidation in third world countries. The policy of applying Western experiences and theories in non-Western societies while neglecting indigenous settings, local circumstances, and histories has provoked controversy. Often civil societies with large number of associations having good reputation in social development and staging mass protests for democratic change have been found to be ineffective in influencing government policies and consolidating democracy. High profile NGOs and the large number of development projects may partially lead to a vibrant civil society, but not necessarily guarantee a participatory vigilant civil society. Prominent scholars like Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond have emphasized on associational culture to make democracy work (Putnam 1993; Diamond 1996). They have argued for the strong relation between the autonomous, local based, citizen groups and democracy. Higher the number of associations in a country, the higher the likelihood that, democratic institutions will improve. So they pursue that efforts should be made to strengthen such groups to bring democratic transition where there is none and consolidate democracy where there is already an existing one. Efforts to produce democracy through civil society and civic engagement are believed to bring changes in three ways: (a) changes at the micro social level will produce macropolitical results, (b) in a society, disposition, and practices shaped in one association will have spillover effects in other circumstance, and (c) the same associational structures will operate in similar ways in different socio-historical contexts (Armony 2004, p. 7). The idea that a strong civil society fosters democracy holds the state in check, and in turn contributes to the development (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 40), has influenced the formation of donor policies on good governance and greater cooperation with NGOs in the third world. After the failure of the policy of state reform during 1980s commonly known as structural adjustment, donors became more interested in civil society to overcome the problems in the developing world. The Neo-Tocquevillean school supplied the necessary arguments about how active associations and civic engagement contributed to democratic polities and how this facilitated economic progress and prosperity (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 41). International aid policy embracing such liberal, organizational view of Neo-Tocquevillean school intends to promote an “ambitious vicious” circle between state, economy, and civil society in developing countries. Civil society organizations have been highlighted both as service providers and as promoters of good governance and democratization. However, the notion of civil society that has been accepted by the donors is normative and based on Western experiences overlooking the political and social background of the developing countries. In most cases, third world states are weak, limited in their capacity, and have social relations that are embedded in a vertical clientelistic manner. Imposition of a new idea in a very different socio-historical setting may lead to ramifications. Often a third world political systems and societies have been found to be immature in institutional development, lacking necessary conditions for the proper functioning of civil society. Despite the fact,

1.2 Core Arguments

3

Neo-Tocquevillean scholars have emphasized on civil society for the development and maintenance of secure democracy in developing countries. Diamond has mentioned several functions of civil society in consolidating democracy and particularly in developing countries—check and balance of power of the state, ensure pluralism, increasing political participation, teach democratic norms, recruit and train new political leaders, and resist authoritarian rules (Diamond 1992, pp. 6–12). For all these functions, civil society requires a necessary democratic atmosphere where the market needs to be stable as well as the other state institutions to be well institutionalized. Diamond has pointed out the conditions for civil society groups—they must have democratic goals as well as internal democracy, organizational institutionalization, pluralism without fragmentation, etc. (Diamond 1996, p. 212, 1999). These conditions are also normative so as the democratic tasks that have been expected from civil society. No society particularly in a developing country can conform to all these conditions. In fact, where political institutions have emerged in a non-democratic atmosphere and social and political relations are based on strong kinship bond and clientelism, civil society can hardly emerge as an autonomous, pluralistic force. On the other hand, they may be found to be weak, polarized and controlled by the most powerful political forces. If the civil society organizations (CSOs) act in a clientelistic manner, if they are dependent on and are placed under the powerful local elites and politicians in the social stratification, if their organizational strength is overpowered by the state and political forces and autonomy is compromised, vigilant civil society can never be achieved. Foreign donations and loans and supporting state policies can easily encourage and lead to a large number of civil society organizations, this may bring development and vibrancy but not necessarily vigilance. Only when vibrancy and vigilance together are found in a civil society, it may contribute to democracy. Practically combination of both the attributes is hardly found in civil societies in developing countries.

1.2

Core Arguments

Bangladesh represents the most likely case to show the simplicity in the Neo-Tocquevillean assumption and impracticability in the donor policies to strengthen civil society for ensuring democracy. Bangladesh, which is a formal democracy, possesses least the caveats1 that Diamond has warned about (1996, p. 213). At present there is a free market system in Bangladesh. Formal parliamentary system of government has been reintroduced here in 1991. The state does not 1

Diamond (1996, p. 213) has mentioned a good number of caveats that may impede the democratic role of civil society. They are history of authoritarian state corporatism, low level of economic development or the absence of a fully functioning market economy, lack of state autonomy; a hyperactive, confrontational, and relentlessly rent seeking civil society; angry, anomic civil society trying to substitute coherent political parties.

4

1 Introduction

lack any autonomy in relation to other internal actors or institutions within the political system. Moreover the civil society here is not hyperactive and relentlessly rent seeking, trying to penetrate the state. Civil society organizations are also not alienated from the state and the interest groups do not have the power or objectives to substitute the political parties. Rather the state and political forces have emerged as the most powerful actors. In spite of a clientelistic, kinship-based social setting, there is a vibrancy of social organizations, most of which may be considered as civil society organizations from a broad definition. These organizations are mainly local based and welfare oriented. However, contribution of civil society in democratic consolidation is hardly observed. Though they have strong presence in the service providing sector and social welfare, civil society organizations have been found to be rather weak and ineffective in relation to politics, policy-making, and democracy. The important role of civil society may not be denied in different movements for democracy before and after independence in 1971; however, in the day to day life, influence of civil society in government policy and protecting and representing people’s interest and rights can hardly be observed. The present research tries to find the answer to the core question—despite its well-recognized contribution in social development why the civil society in Bangladesh can hardly contribute to democratic consolidation? With the aim to answer the research question, the present study is based on three broad objectives: (a) To explore factors that influence the nature, strength, and actions of civil society, and then to identify the most influential factor that contributes in impeding civil society’s vigilant role in contemporary Bangladesh. (b) To empirically investigate civil society organizations—basic units of civil society to reveal their variety of functions and nature of activities that relates to politics, participation, and democracy. (c) To investigate the civil society and political relation to verify the inferred causes to the weak and less participatory role of civil society which is found to be hardly contributing to democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. The civil society in Bangladesh is the dependent variable and the factors that contribute to the development and participatory nature of civil society are the independent variables in their broadest senses. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars and donors have emphasized on organizational activities and group work through forming associations, particularly at the community level. Such policies have led to a proliferation of grass-roots organizations, i.e., NGOs in the third world societies. However, proliferation of civil society organizations generated through internal and external pressure and policies, just like in Bangladesh, may not always lead to democratic success. The present research attempts to argue with empirical observations that unless the civil society is autonomous, enjoying strong network and is participatory, it can hardly contribute to democracy, though it may have an exemplary success in social development. In case of Bangladesh, though social development activities of civil society are significant, the level of participation is still low.

1.3 Importance of the Book

5

From outside, donor policy aims at strengthening civil society organizations, again from inside new legislations may try to control or enhance the proliferation of CSOs. Such internal and external institutional matters do shape the nature of civil society to some extent but may not be considered as the prime influencing factors. Present research through exploring most of the external and internal dynamics shows that the nature and function of civil society in developing countries like Bangladesh are determined through the combinations of factors like globalization, donor policies, as well as historical development, social culture, and political structures. Though the influencing factors act in a combined way, they may differ in their intensity at different levels of political development and vary from country to country. In most cases political and the vigilant strength of the civil society are highly influenced by the political actors. CSOs developed at the community level are mostly concerned with the local problems of the area. In developing countries, poverty is one of the biggest problems; naturally most organizations are concerned about welfare and economic empowerment. Financial assurance from donors leads to more civil society organization and better nongovernmental services which are ultimately thought to bring good citizenry and more participation in political decision-making. Such participation related goals often remain unrealized. In case of Bangladesh too, large number of civil society organizations active at local and meso levels are mostly concerned with social welfare and poverty alleviation. Majority of CSOs are engaged in service related functions than advocacy and other participation related matters. In spite of its vibrant nature, civil society is mobilized at a very minimum rate towards political and democracy related issues. From the political perspective, with the Bangladesh case, the study argues that, instead of influencing the government and political actors, the civil society itself has been influenced by the powerful social political factors that have weakened its potentials to generate democratic norms among the citizens, articulate interests and watch on government actions. Only a few civil society leaders, elites, and a few factions have personally gained from such politicization.

1.3

Importance of the Book

The nature of civil society has often been explained through mono-dimensional factors. Putnam (1993) argues from a political cultural point of view to explain the contrasting political performance of Northern and Southern Italy, Pekkanon (2006) argues the prominent role of the state policies and laws in shaping the civil society in Japan. Civil society of developing countries has been explained through donor polices and globalization (Stiles 2002; Quadir and Lele 2004) by a group of scholars, again, through history and political development by others (Alagappa 2004). While not underestimating the value of such highly distinguished researches, my argument is that, in case of shaping the nature and strength of civil society in developing countries, multi-dimensional factors like, donor policy, globalization, history,

6

1 Introduction

cultural norms as well as political institutions (not only the state and law but also political organizations and political elites) have a combined effect. Civil society and its nature are the reflection of all these factors. To concentrate on one factor in the expense of the other may not properly answer to inquiries for civil society actions, strength, and contribution to democracy. However, the proportional combination of these factors and their influences may be time and country specific. Here lies the importance of this book. The research clarifies Neo-Tocquivellean argument that claims a positive and direct connection between civil society and democracy. Putnam’s theory has already been contested and critically examined by scholars (Foley and Edwards 1996; Putzel 1997; Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996); however, very few with case studies (Berman 1997) and with empirical data (Armony 2004). Not only Putnam (1993) but Diamond (1996) also advocates the introduction of such Western style civil society in the developing states. This book, using the case of a South Asian State—Bangladesh, points out the weaknesses in applying the theory to development policy. It shows that formal and informal, horizontal associational relations through trust, cooperation, reciprocity, social network generating from organizational memberships (Putnam 1993, 2000) may not always intensify the possibility for civil society to contribute to democracy (Diamond 1996) in the developing countries. If majority of the civil society organizations remain politicized and divided by political actors, civil society cannot act autonomously. Initiating and supporting only a few advocacy and mostly service providing organizations overlooking the existing traditional civil society organizations and other political institutions may not ensure good governance and democracy as expected by the donors. The Bangladesh case may help to provide hints for unresolving civil society and democracy issues in other Asian countries. Western scholars and development agencies are more interested to inquire the outcome of their aid projects contracted to the NGOs. On the other hand, Asian researchers are more concerned with the indigenous nature of civil societies in Asia and the developing world. The case of Bangladesh has attracted researchers from both sides. While a group of scholars are interested mainly with the NGOs and donor projects in Bangladesh (Stiles 2002; Holloway 1998; Amin 1997; Ahmed 2000; Blair 2000; White 1999; Lewis 2004, 2011), others prefer to trace the development and role of the traditional civil society from the perspective of local movements and political developments excluding the modern trend of NGOs (Mamoon and Roy 1998; Siddiqui 2001). In most cases researches are based on historical documents, secondary data, or empirical observations, case study surveys. Some are based on urban areas, while others in rural society. There is hardly any research on labor unions (Azam and Salmon 2004), cooperatives, small welfare groups (Ahmed and Jahan 2002), business organizations, or professional groups considered as parts of civil society. This book attempts to contribute to minimize the existing gap and develop a more integrated model to study civil society empirically, focusing as far as possible on all relevant factors that contribute to a participatory civil society and analyzing different dimensions of civil society, including its different segments.

1.4 Methodological Issues

7

The present book accepts a broad definition of civil society that has given the opportunity to target civil society organizations of different types both rural and urban, national and local, traditional as well as Western oriented, both service providing and advocacy groups. Small local clubs, cooperatives, as well as labor unions, interest groups have been studied as part of the same civil society in Bangladesh. Inclusion of these organizations gives a better picture of the nature and level of group activities in Bangladesh and brings the study nearer to reality. The investigation has been done empirically with the help of a large survey of civil society organizations in Bangladesh. The survey data analysis is also complemented by interviews, case studies, and newspaper reports. Moreover, as the survey is also a part of the broad project named Civil Society, State and Culture in Comparative Perspective (JIGS Survey), surveying on fifteen countries of different continents, the research has the potential to proceed into further comparative study with other civil societies of the developing world, such as India, The Philippines, Brazil, Turkey, etc. Study and observation reveal the fact that only group activities are not enough to bring good citizenry. Economic solvency, education, democratic norms in dealing group activities, and autonomy granted and understood by the political powers which often the local CSOs of Bangladesh lack are also essential to generate civic engagement that may lead to participation and representation of interests. These all make the book important.

1.4

Methodological Issues

The present study relies on two overlapping approaches—Comparative Politics and New Institutional Approach, to study and explain the civil society in Bangladesh. Comparative politics explains different political systems and their institutions and norms, through identification of similarities and differences. It helps us develop explanations and test theories on the way in which political systems work and in which political processes occur. Political scientists cannot design experiments to control and manipulate political arrangements and observe the consequences. However, it is possible to describe and explain the different combinations of events and institutions found in the politics of different societies (Almond and Bingham Powell 1966, p. 26). One of the important questions to apply on political systems is the attitude of the principal organized groups toward each other and toward the system itself. The answer may be found in the studies under the broad heading Political Dynamics as termed by Brown and Macridis (1996, p. 197). It basically includes the performance of political parties and other institutions that influence the public policies. Civil society has been brought under this broad heading. Naturally, studying civil society under such umbrella approach provides flexibility to understand the empirical fact, in comparison to other countries as well as to other institutions within the same political system. For a further understanding and explanation of the role of civil society in the political system and the influence of the state and other actors in civil society, this

8

1 Introduction

study also takes help of multi-faceted institutional approach. Institutionalism in political science is concerned with the political collectivities. It studies reciprocal relations between politics and socio-economic environment, that is, both the options of politics shaping the society as much as society shaping politics. Institutions may be formal or informal structural features of society or polity. Institutions transcend individuals to involve with groups of individuals in some sort of patterned interactions that are predictable based on the specified relationship among the actors. Such institutions are stable, based on some shared values and meanings, and affect individual behavior (Peters 1999, pp. 17–18). Institutional Approach provides the convenience to study the actions and interactions of formal structures like a legislature, bureaucracy, legal framework as well as informal or popular structures like political parties, interest groups, or even a set of shared norms or cultural traditions under the same heading as institutions. This provides scope for explaining combined influences of the structures upon other structures. So under the one institutional approach, international trends, state policies, laws, historical events as well as social norms and cultures may be explained in analyzing the reciprocal interaction civil society has with the political and social system in its own process of development. The study is mostly empirical. A mixed method research has been applied in the study (Brannen 2005; Timans et al. 2019). Both qualitative and quantitative data have been analyzed here to explore the answers to the research question and reach a conclusion. A major portion of the data is primary in nature collected directly from the field through an N size questionnaire survey. Besides, case studies had been done, several interviews had been taken. Another important source of data had been the newspaper. Systematic content analysis of newspaper reports had supported and supplemented the findings that had been analyzed through the empirical data. Before, clarifying the methodological instruments, it is important to explain the analysis framework.

1.4.1

Analytical Framework

With the aim to identify the important factors influencing civil society and its participatory nature and democratic potential, a framework for analysis has been developed that tries to investigate civil society empirically identifying it in the interactive setting with other international, social, political, and economic actors. The analysis framework forms its simplified model of civil society to contribute to democratic consolidation, identifies its characteristics and the actions, and then fixes the strategy for investigation. Present research accepts the broad definition of civil society by Susan Pharr (Schwartz and Pharr 2003, p. xiii), referring to that section of the society consisting of sustained, organized social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family. However, civil society is not confined within a non-political, non-market, non-family atmosphere; rather, a constant interaction between the state, market, and civil society is taken for granted. That is a sort of

1.4 Methodological Issues

9

function within the political system which is at the same time separate as well as interrelated with the different sectors of the system. Such civil society must be both vibrant and vigilant to be able to contribute to democratic consolidation. Civil Society Organizations are considered as the basic units of civil society. This research includes a variety of organizations as civil society organizations (CSOs), such as clubs, local cooperatives, labor unions, sports associations, trade organizations, business groups, charity groups, social welfare groups, religious groups, citizens’ organizations, professional groups, etc. Civil society organizations are considered active in both types of functions—service providing and advocacy. This notion of civil society complements to Neo-Tocquevillean School and NeoGramscian School as well as the idea of civil society adopted by the international development agencies and donors. Explanations about these two schools are provided in the second chapter. It is very rare for a civil society to possess all the democratic, vibrant,2 and strong characteristics that have been depicted by the Neo-Tocquevillean scholars such as density, autonomy, self-regulation (Feinberg et al. 2006, p. 22) as well as internal democracy, compromising attitude, institutionalization, pluralism, (Diamond 1999, p. 227) etc. The present study divides the overall nature of an ideal civil society in two broad attributes—vibrancy and vigilance. These two characteristics together are considered to give the civil society the ability to bring democratic consolidation with other necessary conditions being active.

1.4.1.1

Vibrant and Vigilant Attribute of the Civil Society

Vibrancy refers to rich associational or group activities. Here, the number of different types of CSOs at the peripheral, meso, and central levels, irrespective of their objectives, will be high. In their own arena, these CSOs will attempt to play a dynamic role in achieving their goals, acting in the interests of the people they represent and generating social capital. These characteristics may bring positive results to society for particular matters. On the basis of these characteristics, civil society in Bangladesh has often been termed as vibrant by international scholars (Diamond 1999; Howell and Pearce 2002; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Lewis 2011; Stiles 2002). The attribute of vigilance refers to the political dimension of civil society. Political vigilance in general is considered as citizens’ alertness towards state actions and performance. It is about testing the integrity of the political leaders, in terms of their intention, commitment, and action. CSOs in the process of civic engagement, network-building, and interacting with political and market actors are expected to

2 The term vibrant is commonly used to mean strong, active, autonomous, horizontally networked, dense, etc. and also by the civil society experts, particularly those belonging to the Neo-Tocquevillean school. The present study has its own operationalized meaning of vibrant nature of civil society from the context of developing countries in Asia, particularly for Bangladesh.

10

1 Introduction

play a vigilant role and contribute to democracy. In the process, the CSOs and their members become empowered and develop a value of ownership. Such vigilant attributes are not only about making the state accountable, but also about facilitating further development of policies and actions. de Tocqueville (1873, p. 190) observed the civil society to act in this way in nineteenth century America. A civil society in a developing country may contribute to better governance and democracy in different ways: Through providing civic education, increasing interest articulation, monitoring the state apparatus and markets, and ensuring better participation and representation of all segments of society in decision-making, aside from the polls, these activities are more related to civil society’s vigilant attributes. Vigilant functions of the civil society as described in this section coincide with the roles that Alagappa (2004, p. 53) assigns civil society at a political society level, state level, and political system level. At political society level, civil society is expected to facilitate and monitor development of the political society, build connections between this society and the legislature, and augment the power of democratic parties. At state level, civil society is expected act for intermediation, accountability, and service delivery. At the political system level, civil society is expected to work for system maintenance and reform and system change (Alagappa 2004, pp. 53–54). Precisely, the present study narrows down the vigilant nature of CSOs into five basic aspects based on the basic idea of liberal democracy, and consideration of the political system of Bangladesh: CSOs’ relationship with other actors in the political system, CSOs’ relationship with the government, the nature of their advocacy, the nature of success in policy-making, and the nature of lobbying. Civil society’s interaction with the state and political society had been given preference. The means to interact with the state and with other groups are different types of lobbying. Naturally, the style of lobbying by CSOs has been brought under consideration. Moreover, it is also important to know the issues that the CSOs are most interested in advocating for. Are they more interested in socio-economic problems, or political and democratic issues? Ultimately, it is essential to understand the actual strength of the civil society by counting their success rate in influencing state or local government decisions. A plural democratic society provides space for different types of associations and institutions. Bangladesh society is frequently stated to be rich in associations and local NGOs (Lewis 2011, p. 109). Hence, the level of cooperation existing among the different social-political and economic actors and the CSOs has been considered as another important indicator to understand the level of vigilance of the civil society.

1.4.1.2

Positioning the Civil Society in the Political System of a Developing Country Aiming Development and Democratic Consolidation

Though civil society is the prime target, present study considers it in a broader setting, as this sector has constant reciprocal interaction with the state, market, and culture and community life. To position and to understand the civil society and its

1.4 Methodological Issues

11 Internal Factors

External Factors: • Globalizaon • Donor Policy Legal and Polical Instuon

VibrantandVigilant Civil Society (d) Civil Society

Consolidated Democracy

(a) State & Polical Life

Democrac Culture (b) Market

(c) Cultural & Social Life

Stable Economic Growth

Fig. 1.1 Position of the civil society in the process for democratic consolidation in developing countries

role in consolidating democracy in a developing country, a model figure has been developed (Fig. 1.1). This model is based on the triangle model by Shigetomi (2002) to identify the economic space for the NGOs in a developing country and the space dynamic square model by Tsujinaka (2002) to understand the location of the civil society along with the political life, traditional community, and the market. We may consider the big triangle as the political system. In the upper portion of the system, state and political life (a) is placed, on the left angle of the triangle, it is the market (c) that is placed, the remaining angle is marked for cultural and social life. In the middle of the three angles, resides the civil society (d) always in a constant interaction with the state, market, and cultural life. The state and political life consists of the state authority, constitution, and all the formal and informal political structures like the legislature, political parties, and so on. The market section consists of mostly profit oriented institutions, groups, corporations, industries related to economy, business, and production. The agriculture also belongs here as it is part of the production and economic system. The culture and social life section consists of the traditional culture, norms, religion, historical values, and so on. These three sectors are constantly in interaction with each other within the political system. The three blurry straight-lines within the triangle draw the border for each angles or sectors. The line is blurry because it is not possible to keep these sectors confined into themselves. Rather they are working with each other in a reciprocal way and often through the civil society. The arrows showing different directions have been used for representing these types of both way interactions. It is the civil society that is to be placed in the middle of the free space (oval section) working through service delivery and advocacy. This civil society cannot work in isolation either, rather it is constantly working with the state, market, and the social life. Some CSOs are grass-roots based, originated at the community level for solving and mitigating different needs. As the model is in the background of a developing country, mostly the problems and need are economic. So CSOs begin to

12

1 Introduction

interact with the market too. However, the nature and functions of these organizations are very much shaped and influenced by the traditional culture and norms. CSOs originate from the grass-roots level as well as at different stages and spaces when new problems and new need arise that requires organized collective actions. That is why we see presence of cooperatives, trade unions, business groups working very near the border of the market section. Again, to ensure social, economic, political interests, and human rights, a group of CSOs come in interaction with the political entities. In connection to achieve their group and social interest, CSOs are expected to act as autonomous monitoring agencies ensuring public accountability and transparency, along with the parliament and the opposition. This is why, the think tanks, advocacy groups work very near the state and political life. Nevertheless, none of these different types of CSOs can be away from the cultural and social life and its influence upon them. Not only the social, political economic needs within the political system but also the global influence and donor policies of the developed world affect the formation, size, and nature of the civil society in a developing country. The national and international NGOs are also part of the civil society. These organizations are structured in such a way that they are active in both service delivery and advocacy and their presence is to be observed throughout the oval space of the civil society. It is expected that civil society shall act as a prominent force or factor in consolidating democracy in a developing country. This is because, it has the capacity to organize citizens for collective interest, raise social and political awareness, show the way to solve problems at the community level with minimum involvement of the government authority, and also achieve bargaining power to interact with the state on behalf of the citizens. Besides, the institutions of periodical votes and political parties, it is the civil society that ensures citizens’ rights, their political participation and articulates their interest. For civil society to act and interact in such multidimensional way, it must be at same time vibrant and vigilant as defined in this study. However, democratic consolidation is a more complex situation and requires further conditions to be achieved, than with just an ideal civil society, in a developing country. The concept—democratic consolidation, has been clarified at the end of Chap. 2. Keeping conformity with what is explained in Chap. 2, the Fig. 1.1 reveals that democratic consolidation is possible with proper institutionalization of the political and legal structures, that is, democratic norms shall not only be written in the clauses of the constitution, laws, and rules but it shall be practiced by the political elites, the market will ensure a liberal free market system3 and democratic culture shall be the ideal norm and practice not only among the political elites and market controllers but also among the public. To reach such level of democracy at the national level, civil society has to become both vibrant and vigilant. So, the civil society alone cannot lead to democratic institutionalization (the big arrows toward democratic consolidation in Fig. 1.1). What it can do is generate the process, support

3

This term is clarified at the end of Chap. 2.

1.4 Methodological Issues

13

and influence other sectors towards such goal as well as get involved in more vigilant activities and ensure accountability of the state. Nonetheless, it is very important to mention that the communication takes place in both ways. In its process of interaction, the civil society not only may influence other sections, institutions, and structures of the community, culture, market, and the state but conversely may be influenced by the total socio-economic and political environment. This may enhance its democratic functions or vice versa. In a developing country where the state is new and fragile but the social norms, culture, religion, tradition are old and strong, the likelihood of the civil society to be co-opted by the prevailing norms, practices, and political cleavages is no less.

1.4.1.3

Steps for Investigation

To understand the situation of civil society in Bangladesh and in its relation to democratic institutionalization, the present study proceeds in three broad steps. At first the study identifies the most important group of factors that influence civil society in developing countries. With the aim to understand the situation in Bangladesh, it comparatively discusses the relation between civil society and politics in India (stable democracy), The Philippines (elite democracy), and Pakistan (illiberal democracy). Then it delves deep into the civil society in relation to other actors in the society in Bangladesh. The study argues that development and performance of civil society are determined by a combination of historical, international, cultural, and institutional factors. In the case of Bangladesh, since 1990s, political parties have emerged as important institutions in determining the participation of civil society and their role in consolidating democracy. After identifying the group of factors that influence the nature and development of civil society and pointing out the most important factor that contributes to the participatory attributes of civil society, at the second level, the study empirically investigates the nature of civil society organizations—the basic units of civil society, their basic attributes, objectives, and types of their functions, both service and advocacy and rate of their involvement in participatory activities, besides their endeavor for social welfare and services. Through such investigation directly at the field level in a wide scale, it is possible to infer more precisely how vigilant the civil society is in relation to democratic consolidation. Through the empirical investigation of civil society organizations it had been found that the participation rate of civil society organizations is comparatively very low in contrast to their welfare and service providing actions as well as their network activities. Moreover, they have a tendency to seek help from the political parties directly on organizational matters. This is incongruent to democratic consolidation. So lastly, to understand the reason for such low vigilant attribute of the civil society and the tendency to have direct contact with the powerful political actors, the present study investigates further into the civil society and political relations. This time the analysis is based on interviews, observations, and newspaper reports on civil society. At this stage of analysis, it becomes evident that civil society in Bangladesh has

14

1 Introduction

become politicized, divided, and co-opted by the political parties. This is impeding the civil society to play any effective role in interest articulation, state monitoring as well as ensuring the representation of all segments of the society in policy-making.

1.4.2

Methods

Present research on civil society in Bangladesh uses both primary and secondary data and makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods for analysis. The factors that influence the nature, development, and strength of civil society in Bangladesh have been inquired based on previous literatures, researches, reports, reviews, and personal observation and interviews. Moreover, comparative discussion on other civil societies has been added to develop and strengthen the arguments made on the influential factors upon the civil society. The fundamental characteristics of civil society organizations in Bangladesh and their nature of activities and their relation with different political and social actors have been investigated empirically with the help of a large N-scale survey and analyzed quantitatively using multi-dimensional cross tables. Moreover, supplemented data gathered through interviews, field visits, observations, and from newspaper reports have been collected focusing on civil society and its political relations. These data have been processed and analyzed in a qualitative manner.

1.4.2.1

Description of the Survey Method Used

Survey is a widely accepted method in civil society research. Though civil society is a very old term, research on civil society, particularly in civil society organizations is a relatively contemporary phenomenon. Often necessary information and data are not available from reliable data sources. Again, as civil society, its activity and influences are changing from time to time, to keep trace to such changes, periodic survey becomes essential. Moreover, in case of developing countries, feedback and success of different NGO projects are often inquired and assessed through surveying the NGO beneficiaries. In case of Bangladesh, survey on NGOs and particularly on NGO beneficiaries is a common phenomenon (Amin 1997; Ullah and Routary 2003; Tasnim 2005, and so on); besides every NGO for their self-assessment conduct regular survey on the beneficiaries. The NGO beneficiaries have become used to respond to such structured questionnaire and interviews by researchers and consultants from time to time. However, such surveys on a particular section of the civil society and their beneficiaries have not been able to contribute in developing any large database on CSOs of all categories along with other necessary information that are often inquired and analyzed in civil society research. Except NGOs, integrated or systematically organized information on the profile and activities of CSOs like community groups, cooperatives, social welfare groups at the rural level and labor unions, trade

1.4 Methodological Issues

15

organizations, professional groups, citizens, and cultural groups at the meso or urban level are not available in Bangladesh. The name and address of only those organizations that have registered themselves with a ministry or enlisted them to any umbrella organization do exist, though may not always be accessible by the researchers. Under this situation, for conducting any comprehensive study on civil society in its broadest meaning it becomes necessary to conduct direct survey on CSOs of different types. The present research is first of its type covering a broad portion of civil society, new and traditional, urban and rural in Bangladesh. Naturally, the survey conducted for the present research has focused on a sample that represents civil society organizations, both small and big, active at local and national levels, famous and infamous, representing different sections of society far from the capital. In this research, 504 civil society organizations (CSO) in Rajshahi district in Bangladesh were surveyed in September and October, 2006. Rajshahi district was selected as it best represents Bangladesh civil society at the periphery and local level, from urban, rural distribution, social composition, education, economy, and administrative importance. All registered or enlisted CSOs in the district, representing eight categories—cooperative organizations, voluntary social organizations, NGOs, youth groups, labor unions, trade organizations, professional associations, and university-centric organizations—were regarded as the survey population, totaling 3768 organizations. The information of these 3786 CSOs were not collected from one list, rather collected and compiled from eight different official sources and compiled together as the population. The sample size was selected through a stratified random sampling process: 1227 organizations were selected randomly, representing 30% of each category. Ultimately, representatives of 504 CSOs were interviewed, resulting in a return rate of 41%. Each CSO was directly interviewed using a structured questionnaire that included 30 questions along with sub-questions and long lists of answer options. Questions were specifically designed to reveal the policy influences and interests of the target groups and their relationship with the government, political sphere, and other important sectors of the society and political system. Moreover, informal interviews were conducted with resource persons— scholars, experts, civil society leaders, NGO officials, politicians, government administrators concerning civil society in Bangladesh in April and September, 2006. This survey is a part of a Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups (known as JIGS Project) sponsored by a special project of the University of Tsukuba called Civil Society, the State and Culture in Comparative Perspective, directed by Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka and funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The project has already completed surveys on the CSOs of fifteen countries located on different continents of the world using a similar type of questionnaire along with countryspecific questions. The project had been instituted to face the challenges in the age of globalization. It aims to establish shared values, and public policy frameworks adequate for bringing the different nations and societies together under globally applicable terms and conditions of co-existence, at the same time respecting the individual social and cultural tradition and history of each nation. The collected data

16

1 Introduction

has been processed using descriptive statistics and applying the SPSS program. The database now provides a wide range of information on civil society organizations, their strength, participation, and relation to government, politics, and other actors. The next section describes a model that has been followed to analyze the data for this research. The data gathered from the survey have been numerically analyzed to identify the basic characteristics, and actions and functions of civil society as well as their political relations. The actions and functions of civil society had been divided into two types—Grass-roots actions which are almost synonymous to service providing actions and related to its vibrant nature and the vigilant actions that are more related to politics and democracy and its participatory nature. The second objective of the present research is to empirically investigate the nature of CSOs, their types of actions, and how vigilant they are. Chapter 5 aims at fulfilling this objective and makes use of survey data to identify and examine basic nature, grass-roots actions, and vigilant nature of the CSOs. To understand the basic nature of the CSOs, indicators such as category, policy orientation, organizational objectives, geographic level of activity, sources of financial resources, volunteers, employees of CSOs have been applied. As the present study considers the civil society within the political system, always interacting with other two sectors—the market and the state, the cooperation that exists between the CSOs and other social, political, and economic actors has been considered as an important attribute to understand the basic nature of CSOs. There have been a good number of researches on service providing functions of the civil society. For the vibrant attributes, this study, through the survey data, verifies the prevalent assumption that CSOs are mostly engaged in grass-roots development and as well as aims to measure their engagement rate in civic education and citizenry training at the grass-roots level. The main target for this survey data analysis is to identify the tendency of CSOs on vigilant actions. This is done using indicators like formal relation to the state, advocacy, policy-making, and lobby. To avoid the influences of different attributes of the civil society organizations, participation rate of civil society organizations in different activities has been crosschecked on the basis of four types of attributes—categories, geographic (national or local) level of activity, and on the point of receiving and not receiving foreign assistance. It must be mentioned that the present study limits its quantitative analysis within processes of classification, tabulations, and three-dimensional cross tables. Further statistical applications like hypothesis tests, factor analysis have not been applied here. Rather efforts have been made for the practical significance such as high quality research design, proper random sampling, reliable data sources as well as replicability and proper use of language in the interpretation of the data (Mclean and Ernest 1998, pp. 17, 21). This is a multivariate, large N-size data that represents a target population. Though the survey has been conducted in a non-experimental environment, the research design is replicable with modification, in a different environment, however with the possibility of a similar or a different result (King et al. 1994, p. 27). Moreover; the survey is part of the JIGS project where similar

1.4 Methodological Issues

17

types of survey with same type of questionnaires have been conducted in fifteen different countries from 1998 to 2018. The analysis may be termed as a qualitative treatment to quantitative data. Present research deals with broad political issues that concern not only one variable, civil society, but also a number of other political structures (political party, market, government, law, public policy, history, culture, and so on) as well as democracy. A good number of dependent and independent variables are active here and are in constant interaction with each other (Fig. 1.1). These variables may be considered dependent from one context but independent from another point of view. For example, the civil society is the dependent variable in the relation to shaping its vigilant and vibrant attributes while the political system and political structures are the independent variable. On the other hand, the same civil society becomes an independent variable to ensure consolidated democracy, where democracy is the dependent variable. In similar way it is true for other political structures. In such a complex and complicated environment the mixed method of using both quantitative and qualitative data has been found to be more convenient to generate inferences based on the book propositions. Next we shall focus on the qualitative data analysis methods.

1.4.2.2

Qualitative Data Analysis Model

The third objective of this research is to examine the political relation of civil society to verify causes to its weak and less participatory (less vigilant) role in relation to democracy. To reach this objective, quantitative data have been supplemented with qualitative data. Different data gathered from newspaper reports and editorials and through interviews, field visits and observation notes written by the surveyors have been analyzed. The qualitative analysis is done in two particular ways. First is the systematic search and simplified content analysis on a sample of newspaper reports, the second is doing case studies on selected civil society organizations representing different types. First, newspaper analyses have been made only to reveal an overall view of the civil society, in relation to politics. The three Bangladeshi news dailies had been selected for their neutrality, high circulation, and longevity. The Daily Ittefaq, a Bangla newspaper was selected as it is the oldest daily as well as was reputed for neutrality. The Daily Star had been selected as it was the nationally and internationally accepted English daily. Another Bangla The Daily Jugantor was selected as it was the most circulated daily in 2007. Only issues of these three dailies from January to June in the years of 2001, 2006, and 2007 had been separated for the present research. The year 2001 has been selected as it was the last year of the Awami League (AL) Regime, in the same way 2006 has been selected as it was the last year of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) Regime. 2007 was in between the state of emergency period when all the political corruptions began to come into the light through the press. At this period, a caretaker government backed by the military looked over the state machinery. These newspaper issues then had been rigorously

18

1 Introduction

searched for news and analyses on civil societies. Nine searching words and events had been decided to be used to sort out the news report or articles for the content analysis. They are NGOs, trade unions, cooperatives, professional groups, social and citizens groups, seminars, and press conferences held by CSOs, international organizations, government moves on CSOs, corruption related to CSOs. The news collected in this was then analyzed qualitatively. More detail about the content analysis is discussed in Chap. 6. Second “explanation building through multiple case studies” method (Yin 2003, pp. 121–122) has been adopted for conducting case studies upon the civil society organizations. In a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in their details. The objective is analogous to multiple experiments (Yin 2003, p. 121). To verify the propositions about politicized civil society in Bangladesh, this research systematically uses in-depth observation, newspaper reports, documents provided by CSOs, information revealed through interviews and group discussions with CSO personnel, members and leaders of four CSOs in the district of Rajshahi. These four CSOs were carefully selected for representing the most common types of CSOs as well as both service providing and advocacy groups active at the local level. After going through the answers in the filled in questionnaires, the survey notes submitted by the surveyors and their daily reports during the time of the survey, these four CSOs from different categories, from the consideration of their size, structure, functions, membership, and objectives were purposively selected for further in-depth study among the surveyed CSOs to represent each category. Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union represents the trade union, Pahar Pur Ideal Farmers’ Cooperative represents the cooperatives, Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho represents the NGO sector, and Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi City represents the local advocacy groups. To represent professional CSOs, a nationally based movement was selected, a movement for genuine and logical demands by the society’s most respected but powerless professionals—Primary School Teachers in Bangladesh. Selected supplementary and follow up interviews were conducted in 2012 to confirm the data collected in 2006.

1.4.3

Study Area

Rajshahi District, the center of the Northern Zone of Bangladesh has been selected for carrying out the survey in 2006. The present study qualifies the Neo-Toquevillean school where emphasis has been given on civic engagement and associational functions at the community level. Rajshahi is considered to be the best for representing civil society from the periphery and meso levels in Bangladesh. It is a divisional town, divisional headquarters of all administrative offices, as well as district branch of private companies, banks, educational institutions and NGOs, are found here. Moreover, because the district is the center for higher education in the northern zone and strata, it provides a space for associational

1.5 Brief Introduction to Civil Society in Bangladesh

19

activities. CSOs that are active here, particularly in the urban areas, represent the CSOs active at the meso level of the nation. Again, like almost all of Bangladesh, Rajshahi’s economy, in spite of being a divisional district, is mostly agrarian (19.5%), with little significant industry (7%) or business. Agriculture at the national level contributes 20.4% to the GDP. Seventy-six percent of the national population lives in rural areas; similarly, 67% of households in Rajshahi are farm households. The national literacy rate in 2006 (45%) resembles Rajshahi’s literacy rate (47.4%). Naturally, rural and community-based societies in Rajshahi have a high possibility of representing the peripheral area of Bangladesh (BBS 2005).

1.5

Brief Introduction to Civil Society in Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s civil society has been internationally recognized for its efforts in poverty alleviation and social development (Amin 1997; Dowla 2006; Dowla and Barua 2006; Ullah and Routary 2003; Goon 2002; Riaz 2016). This recognition has primarily arisen from the famous micro-credit system introduced by Professor Yunus and his Grameen Bank as well as the welfare and education programs initiated by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and other large NGOs. Bangladesh’s success in micro-credit and social development at the grass-roots level is the outcome of the combined effort of indigenous initiatives and donor assistance. The 1971 war marks the beginning of NGO activities in Bangladesh. Moreover, Bangladesh’s economy and politics have been dependent on donors’ aid and directions since 1971. The country has gone through the donorprescribed structural adjustment process and has been adapting its policies in accordance with the new good-governance agenda since the 1990s (Quadir 1999). Moreover, government policies and laws also provide the necessary legal framework for NGOs and other social welfare groups to register themselves and function in the country. Bangladesh ranks high among Asian countries in terms of the intensity of NGO activities (Shigetomi 2002, p. 22). Bangladesh is often cited in descriptions of large-scale donor–NGO relationships (Stiles 2002, p. 34). According to international development agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB), Bangladesh scored higher than neighboring India on several key barometers of social development in 2006, including infant mortality (5.6% in Bangladesh compared to 6.2% in India), child vaccination (77% in Bangladesh compared to 56% in India), employment of women, and enrollment in primary school (Perry 2006; World Bank 2007; Daley-Harris 2006, p. 5). Recent data also show that Bangladesh is still on its path to such development. The mortality rate for children under five has been reduced dramatically by 50%. Among the 52 Millennium Development Goals tracked by UNDP, Bangladesh is on track with 19 of them,

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1 Introduction

and its Human Development Index score is also on the rise (Qian 2010).4 Bangladesh is also doing well in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) goals that were targeted by UNDP in 2015.The country is on its way of achieving all the 17 goals steadily and slowly. The number of populations living under the international extreme poverty line has come down to 11.3%, while it was 19.6% in 2010. In 2019, the social safety net services now cover 58.1% of the total government expenditure while it was only 24.6% in 2010. The annual growth rate is also increasing and already became 7.14%. The unemployment rate in Bangladesh has come down to only 3.1% (Alam 2019). The civil society organizations, specifically the NGOs have a great contribution to the SDG achievements, as development partners of the national and local governments. Group-based credit activities and the large size of social welfare organizations, clubs, and other such groups in Bangladesh indicate the rich abundance of social capital generated through horizontal membership structures. The statistics regarding registered or enlisted civil society organizations shown in Table 1.1 indicate a large, vibrant third sector in Bangladesh as it existed in 2006 and in 2019. Aside from these statistics, there exist a number of professional groups registered with their respective institutions and ministries. The NGOs that are registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) are large- and medium-size NGOs that cover the nation or at least a particular region of the country. The NGOs in each union5 organize hundreds of groups composed of 20–50 (in average) members among their beneficiaries. The number increases if unregistered and informal organizations are included.6 At all social levels and classes and among different sections of civil society, the tendency to form a group or small organization is common in Bangladesh. The relative vibrancy of Bangladesh’s civil society in relation to the number of organizations becomes more obvious if we compare its statistics with those of other developing countries in Asia. Table 1.2 was developed based on the statistics gathered from country profiles on the website “Asian Philanthropy Advisory Network”7 although exact and comprehensive statistics regarding civil society organizations or nonprofit groups were not available for any of the countries. This table may not provide reliable statistics, but it does offer an approximation of the facts. If we compare Bangladesh to other countries in terms of the ratio of civil society organizations to the total population, then Bangladesh seems to be the most vibrant after the Philippines. Thus, from the perspective of the international recognition of NGO performance, the statistics regarding the large number of different social organizations, and a 4

For more details consult the following UNDP websites, http://www.undp.org.bd/mdgs.php? id¼report, http://www.undp.org.bd/mdgs/MDGs%20Score%20card.pdf, access on March 3, 2012. 5 Unions are the smallest administrative units (25 to 30 thousand population) run by an elected council. Bangladesh is divided into 4554 unions at present Source: Bangladesh National Portal https://bangladesh.gov.bd/index.php internet access 25 July 2020. 6 Unfortunately, the statistics for unregistered organizations are not available in Bangladesh. No census was conducted in the late 1990s or afterwards on the social organizations. 7 http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/countries/index.html access date 28th November, 2007.

1.5 Brief Introduction to Civil Society in Bangladesh

21

Table 1.1 Statistics of registered civil society organizations in Bangladesh Number of registered CSOs (2004 or 2005) 1997

Number of registered CSOs 2019–2020 2490a

45,508

63,232b

Ministry of Social Welfare

8271

20,622c

6607d 465

21,883e 1477f

Labor unions

6780

7823g

Registered cooperatives

189,847

175,310h

Chambers of commerce and trade/industrial associations Total

299

476i

259,774

293,313

Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs Ministry of Youth and Sports Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms Ministry of Labor and Employment Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries Registered CSOs

Type of CSOs Development NGOs receiving foreign funding Voluntary welfare organizations Registered women’s groups Youth organizations Trade organizations

Affiliated ministry or institution NGO Affairs Bureau—Prime Minister’s Office

Source: Based on the statistics of different types of civil society organizations collected from the booklets of respective ministries and institutions and their websites for 2004 and 2005. The statistical figures for the year 2019–2020 were collected from the official websites of the affiliated ministries mentioned in the footnotes a NGO Affairs Bureau http://www.ngoab.gov.bd/site/page/3de95510-5309-4400-97f50a362fd0f4e6/- internet access 2. 15.11.19. updated 3rd Nov 2019 b Department of Social Services, Ministry of Social Welfare http://www.dss.gov.bd/site/page/ a7389e64-bfd2-4bf1-96ec-f2569bee2b06/%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AC%E0% A7%87%E0%A6%9A%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%9B%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7% 87%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%80-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%8D% E0%A6%A5%E0%A6%BE-%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%A8%E0% A7%8D%E0%A6%A7%E0%A6%A8 internet access 15.11.2019 c It is 870 Adolescent Club Programme of Bangladesh, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs http://adolescentclub-bd.com/ and 19752 Registered Voluntary Women Organizations registered under the Department of Women Affairs. This information was collected directly from the officer concerned as the list is yet to be published in the website d These are Youth Groups listed under the Ministry of Youth and Sports. However, not registered under the ministry e 18352 are the enlisted Youth Organizations upto 2015 while 3631 are the registered Youth organizations under the new rule, Youth Organization Registration and Governance Act 2015, since 2017. Youth Development Department Annual Report 2018–2019, pp. 33 and 34. https://dyd. portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/dyd.portal.gov.bd/go_ultimate/d1c2a6e9_eb67_4bbd_87d0_ 60715cac26bc/3c78277f749fb70be8d2932e974acc1b.pdf internet access on 16 July 2020 f Registered Societies under the Joint Stock Company http://roc.portal.gov.bd/site/page/2f14b59233c7-4931-b276-e16b0a9ded0d/%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%9C%E0%A7%87% E0%A6%8F%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%BF'%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%AA%E0% A6%B0%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%96%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF %E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8, Internet access 18.11.2019 (continued)

22

1 Introduction

Table 1.1 (continued) g

Ministry of Labor and Employment https://dol.portal.gov.bd/site/page/83693dac-41ef-4655-b90e89023dd5d13e internet access on 18.11.2019 h Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives http://www.coop.gov.bd/ site/page/13dac756-a964-4e9f-9834-0471d9ed6aaf/%E0%A6%8F%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6% A8%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%AC% E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%9F, internet access on 18.11.19 i Registered under Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) http:// www.fbcci-bd.org/about-fbcci.php internet access on 18.11.2019. Internet access on 18.11.2019

Table 1.2 Statistics of CSOs and the total population of selected countries in Asia Country India Bangladesh The Philippines Pakistan Indonesia

Number of registered CSOs (year)a 604,800 (2002)c 259,774 (2004/05) 249,000 (2002)d 12,000 (2001)e 12,000 (2000)f

Total populationb 1,094,600,000 145,000,000 84,600,000 155,800,000 223,000,000

CSOs per 1000 inhabitants 0.55 1.79 2.94 0.08 0.05

Sources: Available at http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/countries/index.html (accessed 28 November 2007) b World Bank database. Available at http://devdata.worldbank.org (accessed 28 November 2007) c The website http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/countries/index.html, in 2007, based on Tandon (2002), mentions that there are approximately 1.2 million CSOs while noting that 49.6% of them are unincorporated. Thus, excluding 49.6% from the 1.2 million NGOs, the actual number comes to 604,800 d The website states that the number of non-profit groups in the Philippines range from 249,000 to 497,000 but does not specify whether these organizations are registered. Thus, the lowest estimate has been accepted e These statistics are from CIVICUS (Sattar and Baig 2001, p. 6). The website’s data regarding 45,000 non-profit groups include unregistered organizations as well f This figure is supported by the statistics provided by Shigetomi (2002, p. 164) a

comparison with other countries, a vibrant image of Bangladesh’s civil society emerges. Bangladesh’s civil society is also vibrant in terms of providing services and ensuring social development at the peripheral level where the initiatives of the government alone had never been adequate. Bangladeshi civil society’s performance in terms of politics and democracy is rather insignificant. Civil society has been termed weak and fragmented (Westergaard 1990), poor (Holloway 1998), and partisan (Quadir 2003) in terms of ensuring pluralism, political participation, and democracy. Organizations that conventionally represent civil society, such as labor unions, chambers of commerce, professional groups, bar associations, student groups, small local clubs, and recently development NGOs, have been accused of partisanship, being engaged in manufacturing and maintaining a dominant hegemony rather than advancing the genuine interests of the groups (Stiles 2002; Quadir 2003; White 1999; Jahan 2005).

1.6 Propositions of the Book

23

Some of these organizations are also scarred by corruption, clientelism, and other misdeeds. The traditional civil society organizations may superficially appear to be working in a democratic way, following formal organizational structures and constitutions; practically, however, they are run according to the whims of the leader or group of leaders who are blessed and controlled by the political parties. Horizontal democratic norms may not always be found in the leader–member relationship of such organizations. For example, in most cases, the executive bodies of labor unions or professional groups are constructed through regular elections as per rule, and campaigning and competition occur prior to each election. These groups do exert their demands to the authorities, and their opinions sometimes receive press coverage. However, in practice, the panel blessed by the governing party wins most of the elected posts and acts as an instrument of the ruling party within the CSO. The development NGOs—that is, the CSOs that claim to be the voice of the poor in Bangladesh—frequently fail to follow democratic practices in their relationship with their beneficiaries. The relationship is more like a service provider or credit lender than equal members possessing the same power to exert and implement their opinions and wishes (Haque 2006; Hashemi 1996). The internal governance systems of the NGOs have also been reported to be corrupt, unaccountable, and influenced by nepotism, patronage, etc. (TIB 2007). While civil society is expected to fight against such negative forces within the society and political sphere, in practical terms they are entangled within the current trends of politics and corruption. Poverty, absence of welfare state, and under developing market economy (Nobusue 2002, p. 34) naturally have provided the space for mostly service-oriented CSOs than advocacy groups. However, it is the political confrontation, politicization, and co-optation by the political parties that impede the CSOs to contribute to better democracy and governance (Quadir 2003). A vertical relationship runs through the state, political parties, and civil societies where civil society is placed below the political parties and the state. Civil society seems to have reflected the political and social situation of Bangladesh. It is clientelism, patronage, nepotism, corruption that appears as the operational practices, in all most all institutions in Bangladesh. Formal democracy is yet to be institutionalized; rather it is facing interruptions and deadlocks from time to time due to a non-compromising attitude of the major political parties. While civil society is expected to fight against such negative forces within the society and politics, they are practically found to be entangled within the current trend of politics. The associational culture that exists in Bangladesh and the organizational strength that has shown success in poverty alleviation have not yet reached the level so as to act as the watch-guard to state performance.

1.6

Propositions of the Book

The three main propositions on Bangladesh civil society in this book are:

24

1 Introduction

(a) It is vibrant from the consideration of number, activeness, and success so far in social development. (b) The civil society is mostly concerned with social welfare and service functions than participatory and advocacy functions that are more related to vigilant character and may give it the best strength to contribute to democracy. (c) Instead of influencing government and political actors, the civil society itself has been co-opted by the powerful political parties that have weakened its potential to contribute to democracy.

1.7

Organization of the Book

Following this introductory chapter, the present book develops its research base and reveals empirical findings, supplementary analysis and reaches to the conclusion through six more chapters. Chapter 2 is about conceptual setting. The civil society has been theoretically examined by exploring the two main schools for studying its relation to politics and democracy. Ultimately, the theoretical discussion moves on towards the models that have been used in studying civil society in the developing countries and particularly that in Bangladesh and the mix model that have been followed in this research. All the key concepts that have been used for the research and this book have also been operationalized here. Third and fourth chapters identify factors that influence civil societies in the developing countries and that in Bangladesh. These two chapters are mostly based on previous literatures, researches, reports, reviews, and personal observation and interviews. Chapter 3 is actually a comparative study upon the civil societies in India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, with the aim to understand the patterns and natures of influence by the political system and the political structures upon the civil society in the developing world. This helps to understand that the Bangladesh case is not an only case, but leads the way to delve more to understand the uniqueness of the Bangladesh case. Chapter 4 deals in detail about the civil society in Bangladesh—both from its vibrant and vigilant aspects. In the process, its history, development, nature of activities as well as the relationship, interaction, influence, and control that exist between the civil society and political system have been analyzed. Particularly the political party has been recognized as the prime influencing factor upon the vigilant nature of civil society in Bangladesh. An updated account about the democracy and politics in Bangladesh has also been incorporated in this chapter. Chapter 5 is based on the survey data, numerically discussing the basic attributes of civil society organizations, their grass-roots activities and nature of participation. The first section focuses on the basic characteristics. Moreover, the structural strength of the civil society has been compared between CSOs working at national and local levels and between CSOs those are receiving and not receiving foreign funds. The second section is concerned with the grass-roots action of the civil society and reaffirms the prevalent assumption about high tendency of civil society involvement in grass-roots actions. The third section concentrates on the participatory role

1.7 Organization of the Book

25

of the civil society by analyzing in detail the involvement of CSOs in having formal relations with the government, influencing policy-making and budget, advocating for certain issues, and lobbying for certain interests. The chapter reveals the high participation of the CSOs grass-roots activities, but a very low rate of involvement in functions that are more related to politics and democracy. Moreover, high tendency among the CSOs to rely more on political party contacts than forming coalition among them has been pointed out in this chapter. Chapter 6 concentrates on the relationship between civil society and politics in Bangladesh. This chapter is a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analysis using survey data as well as content analysis of newspaper reports and case studies. The first section of the chapter using the survey data shows the powerful existence of political parties in perception of the CSOs and their high rate of contact with such parties. The second section is based on a sample of newspaper reports during 2001, 2006, and 2007 that reveal the evidences of civil society penetration and politicization by the political party and party government through patronage, corruption, pressure, violence, etc. Third section comprises of five case studies, each representing a civil society sector. The case studies talk about CSOs that are very different in nature and membership, though presented in almost same format. Nevertheless, all the case studies ultimately reveal the evidences of government and political penetration and of a divided civil society that is weakening their horizontal strength and negotiating ability. Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the research along with some brief update about the civil society in Bangladesh based on two new studies conducted in 2018 and 2019. Content analyses of civil society reports in the newspaper in 2017 have shown the new dimensions and maturity in the civil society activities after one decade. Case studies of two prominent advocacy NGOs on their role in the election system, the most prominent indicator of democracy, have reconfirmed the proposition of the book that terms the civil society in Bangladesh- active but not effective. New trends in civil society observed during the Corona Virus Crisis have been discussed concisely too. Besides the updates, the chapter summarizes the book, points out the implication of the study findings in relation to democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. The theories discussed in Chaps. 1 and 2 have been revisited and modified based on the research findings. This book argues that political actors are the decisive factor to democracy and emphasizes the need to have a deep understanding of local circumstances, history, culture, and political trends before adopting development policies that are related to civil society and democracy. Finally, it argues for avoiding the high expectation of democratic consolidation from civil society activities and to formulate policies to improve its participatory functions accepting the social and political facts.

26

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References Ahmed, M. M. (2000). Non-governmental organization in Bangladesh: An assessment of their legal status. Third World Planning Review, 22(4), 379–394. Ahmed, M., & Jahan, R. (2002). Investing in ourselves: Giving and fundraising in Bangladesh. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Alagappa, M. (Ed.). (2004). Civil society and political change in Asia: Expanding and contracting democratic space. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Alam, S. (2019). SDGs implementation: Where does Bangladesh stand? The Financial Express. Dec 7, 2019. Available at https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/views/sdgs-implementationwhere-does-bangladesh-stand-1575730124 internet access on 16 July, 2020. Almond, G., & Bingham Powell Jr., A. G. (1966). Comparative politics: A development approach. Boston: Little Brown. Amin, R. (1997). Development strategies and socio-demographic impact of non-governmental organizations: Evidence from rural Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Armony, A. C. (2004). The dubious link: Civic engagement and democratization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Azam, J. P., & Salmon, C. (2004). Strikes and political activism in Bangladesh: Theory and application to Bangladesh. Public Choice, 119(3–4), 311–334. BBS. (2005). Statistical year book of Bangladesh, 2004 (24th ed.). Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Dhaka: Government People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics, 49(3), 401–429. Blair, H. W. (2000). Civil society, democratic development and international donors. In R. Jahan (Ed.), Bangladesh: Promise and performance (pp. 181–218). Dhaka: The University Press Limited. Brannen, J. (2005). Mixing methods: The entry of qualitative and quantitative approaches into the research process. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8(3), 173–184. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13645570500154642 Brown, B. E., & Macridis, R. C. (1996). Comparative politics: Notes and reading (8th ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Daley-Harris, S. (2006). State of the Micro-credit Summit Campaign Report. Available at http:// www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2006/SOCR06.pdf internet access 29 August 2007. de Tocqueville, A. (1873). American institutions and their influence, with notes Hon. John C. Spencer. New York: A. S. Barnes and Co.. Diamond, L. (1996). Rethinking civil society. In B. E. Brown & R. C. Macridis (Eds.), Comparative politics: Notes and readings (8th ed., pp. 207–216). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Towards consolidation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L. (1992). Civil society and struggle for democracy. In L. Diamond (Ed.), The democratic revolution: Struggle for freedom and pluralism in developing world (pp. 1–25). New York: Freedom House. Dowla, A. (2006). In credit we trust: Building social capital by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 102–122. Dowla, A., & Barua, D. (2006). The poor always pay back: The Grameen II story. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Feinberg, R., Waisman, C. H., & Zamosc, L. (2006). Civil society and democracy in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Foley, M. W., & Edwards, B. (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal of Democracy, 7(3), 38–52.

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Goon, A. (2002). Civil society and social empowerment. In M. R. Khan & M. H. Kabir (Eds.), Civil society and democracy in Bangladesh (pp. 127–163). Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies and Academic Press and Publishers Limited. Haque, S. K. T. (2006). NGO governance in Bangladesh: Quest for accountability and transparency. In M. A. Salahuddin (Ed.), Governance and development, Bangladesh and regional experiences. Dhaka: University of Dhaka. Hashemi, S. (1996). NGO accountability in Bangladesh: Beneficiaries, donors and the state. In M. Edwards & D. Hulme (Eds.), Non-governmental organizations: Performance and accountability: Beyond the magic bullet (pp. 103–110). West Hartford: Kumarian Press. Holloway, R. (1998). Supporting citizens’ initiative: Bangladesh’s NGOs and society. Dhaka: The University Press Limited. Howell, J., & Pearce, J. (2002). Civil society and development: A critical exploration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Hulme, D., & Edwards, M. (Eds.). (1997). NGOs, states and donors. Hampshire: Palgrave in association with The Save the Children. Jahan, R. (2005). Bangladesh politics problems and issues. Dhaka: University Press Limited. King, G., Keohane, R., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Levi, M. (1996). Social and unsocial capital: A review essay on Robert Putnam’s making democracy work. Politics and Society, 24(1), 45–55. Lewis, D. (2004). On difficulty of studying ‘civil society’: Reflection on NGOs, state and democracy in Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 38(3), 299–322. Lewis, D. (2011). Bangladesh: Politics, economy and civil society. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mamoon, M., & Roy, J. K. (1998). Civil society in Bangladesh: Resilience and retreat. Dhaka: Subarna. McLean, J. E., & Ernest, J. M. (1998). The role of statistical significance testing in education research. Research in Schools, 5(2), 15–22. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/252326990_The_Role_of_Statistical_Significance_Testing_In_Educational_ Research, internet access on 5 October, 2020 Nobusue, K. (2002). Bangladesh: A large NGO sector supported by foreign donors. In S. Shigetomi (Ed.), The state and NGOs: Perspective from Asia (pp. 34–52). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pekkanon, R. (2006). Japan’s dual civil society: Members without advocates. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Perry, A. (2006). Rebuilding Bangladesh, Times, 3 April 2006. Available at http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,1179421–1,00.html, internet accessed 10 April 2006. Peters, B. G. (1999). Institutional theory in political science: The ‘new institutionalism’. London: Pinter. Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Putzel, J. (1997). Policy arena: Accounting for the ‘dark side’ of social capital: Reading Robert Putnam on democracy. Journal of International Development, 9(7), 939–949. Qian, J. (2010). Celebrating Bangladesh and Nepal’s Progress in Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, End Poverty in South Asia, World Bank Blog. http://blogs.worldbank. org/endpovertyinsouthasia/celebrating-bangladesh-and-nepal%E2%80%99s-progress-achiev ing-millennium-development-goals, internet access on March 3, 2012. Quadir, F. (1999). Democracy, development and civil society in Bangladesh: The quest for a new praxis for sustainability. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Dalhousie University, UMI Dissertation Service.

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Quadir, F. (2003). How civil is civil society? Authoritarian state, partisan civil society, and the struggle for democratic development in Bangladesh. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, XXIV(3), 425–438. Quadir, F., & Lele, J. (Eds.). (2004). Democracy and civil society in Asia (Vol. I). Hampshire: Palgrave, Macmillan. Riaz, A. (2016). Bangladesh: A political history since independence. London: I.B. Tauris. Sattar, A., & Baig, R. (2001). Civil society in Pakistan: A preliminary report on the CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Project. CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 1 (11) CIVICUS Website http://www.civicus.org/new/default.asp, internet access on 10 March 2007. Schwartz, F. J., & Pharr, S. J. (Eds.). (2003). The state of civil society in Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shigetomi, S. (Ed.). (2002). The state and NGOs: Perspective from Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Siddiqui, Z. R. (2001). Quest for a civil society. Dhaka: Sucheepatra. Stiles, W. K. (2002). Civil society by design: Donors, NGOs and the intermestic development circle in Bangladesh. Westport: Praeger. Tandon, R. (2002). Voluntary action, civil society and the state. New Delhi: Mosaic Book. Available at the website of PRIA http://www.pria.org/publication/Voluntary%20Action%20% 20Civil%20Society%20and%20the%20State.pdf, internet access on 28 November 2007. Tarrow, S. (1996). Making social science work across space and time: A critical reflection on Robert Putnam’s making democracy work. American Political Science Review, 90(2), 389–397. Tasnim, F. (2005). The role of Japanese NGOs in strengthening civil society of Bangladesh: A case study of Shapla Neer. International Political Economy, No. 16, November, 19–52 TIB. (2007). Problems of governance in the NGO sector: The way out. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh. Timans, R., Wouters, P., & Heilborn, J. (2019). Mixed methods research: What it is and what it could be. Theory and Society, 48, 193–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-019-09348-2 Tsujinaka, Y. (2002). Nihon shimin shakai riekidantai (Civil society and interest groups of modern Japan) (written in Japanese). Tokyo: Bakutakusya. Ullah, A. K. M., & Routary, J. K. (2003). NGOs and development: Alleviating rural poverty in Bangladesh. Guerra: Bookmark International. Westergaard, K. (1990). Decentralization of NGOs and democratization in Bangladesh. In L. Rudebeck & O. Tornquist (Eds.), Democratization in the third world: Concrete cases in comparative and theoretical perspective (pp. 173–188). London: Macmillan. White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, civil society and the state in Bangladesh: The politics of representing the poor. Development and Change, 30(2), 307–326. World Bank. (2007). Online database. Available at http://devdata.worldbank.org internet access 20 April 2007 Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Chapter 2

Conceptual Discourse

Abstract This chapter discusses in detail and examines the concept of civil society from its theoretical perspective. The objective of this chapter is to set the conceptual discourse for the research. The two prominent schools, The Neo-Tocquevillean School and the Neo-Gramscian School, in the study of civil society have been brought under consideration for studying developing countries in Asia. The relationship between civil society and the politics, specifically in connection to democracy and development has been focused upon. Moreover, different models for studying the civil society in Bangladesh have been visited and modified leading to a mixed model that is best for the present study. Finally, the key concepts used in this book have been defined and explained. Keywords Liberal model · Left model · Politicization · Democratic consolidation

2.1

Civil Society Discourse

The roots of the idea of civil society are various and scattered. Its history may be traced in different streams of Western political thought over the past two millennia— for example, in classical liberalism, liberal egalitarianism, critical theory, pluralism, Marxism, and democracy. Again, civil society has found its place in the religious traditions of the East and the West—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (Alagappa 2004, p. 27). In the thoughts of Aristotle (384–322 BC) as well as of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), John Locke (1632–1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), civil society was considered as synonymous with the state or political society. Civil society in this conception expressed the growth of civilization to the point where society is civilized. Nonetheless, there was always a connection between citizenship and society in the early thoughts (Kumar 1993, pp. 376–377). In the later half of the eighteenth century ideas, society has been distinguished from the state by thinkers, including Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Adam Smith (1723–1790), Thomas Paine (1737–1809), and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859). While they continued to use the term civil society in its classical sense, their © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_2

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arguments in fact established the separation that brought a radical transformation in the meaning of the concept. Among them, Adam Smith came closest to identifying civil society with the market while reserving an essential role for the state. Civil society was founded on self-interested economic activity and the division of labor with a separate minimal, but active role for a sympathetic state (Davis and McGregor 2000, p. 49). Ferguson argued for a commercial state to end feudal system and ensure liberty and personal freedom. He relied on moral sentiment of the society to defuse to the negative effects of the market (Alagappa 2004, p. 26). Later on, G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) conceptualized civil society as a sphere of market relation, regulated by civil law, intervening between the family and the state (Hegel 1991, p. 220). It is more a market mechanism, where the material interest is the center of associations of members as self-subsistent individuals. Moreover, it also includes classes and corporations concerned with social, religious, professional, and recreational life (Kumar 1993, p. 378). As opposed to Hegel, Marx saw civil society and the state not as counterbalancing forces, but implicated together in promoting the interest of capital (Davis and McGregor 2000, p. 50). Marx considered civil society as a problem, not a solution. This civil society was captive under the state—the most repressive instrument in human society. It is only through a revolution where the labor class will win and the proletariats shall be placed as the authority, the problem will be solved. With the labor’s group in power, civil society would just liquefy into the state. This state before withering away would represent the true public good. Contemporary civil society and democracy studies on Asia, mainly comply with two civil society arguments the Neo-Tocquevillean School (liberal democratic model) and the Neo-Gramscian School (new left model). Though they differ in diagnosis, purpose, and strategy, both new left and liberal democracy school share a positive take on civil society (Alagappa 2004, p. 28). Alexis De Tocqueville (1805–1859) crafted his conception of civil society as a sphere of mediating organizations between the individuals and the state. He showed that associationalism and civil activity preserve individualism, act against despotism, and foster democratic culture (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 44). Most American scholars, for example, Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond, Lester Salamon belong to the Neo-Tocquevillean School. They advocate that coexistence of liberal market and civil society ensures and enhances democracy. The Gramscian (1891–1937) model argues that civil society is the arena, separate from but enmeshed with the state and market, in which ideological hegemony is contested, implying that civil society contains a relatively wide range of organizations which both challenge and uphold the existing order (Lewis 2004, p. 303). Such civil society is capable of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime. European scholars like Andrew Areto, Jean Cohens belong to this group. Civil society in Bangladesh can be explained through a combination of both the models. Traditional civil society in Bangladesh is always honored for its glorious contribution to the social, political movement for independence and democracy (Neo-Gramscian model). The modern western modeled NGOs are contributing to generate social capital and bring empowerment and social development (Neo-Tocquevillean model). Both arguments lead to assume that the combination

2.2 Neo-Tocquevillean School (Liberal Democratic Model)

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of the traditional and modern civil society organizations in Bangladesh is to contribute enormously in democratic consolidation. However, recent studies of civil society in Asia, Africa, and other non-western countries do not support such thesis and show that the nature of civil society is a socio-politico-specific and the boundary between civil society and political society is porous. Though it is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for democratic development in these non-Western countries (Alagappa 2004; Armony 2004; Lele and Quadir 2004). Every region and country have its indigenous political norms and social relations that influence the political institutions as well as the nature and performance of civil society. Donor policy to assist civil society programs ignoring such local circumstances may bring some social development, but may not be able to ensure democracy in the developing nations.

2.2

Neo-Tocquevillean School (Liberal Democratic Model)

De Tocqueville crafted his conception of civil society as a sphere of mediating organizations between the individuals and the state (de Tocqueville 1873, p. 190). This state is a limited one. The state here confines itself within the political sphere. It also guarantees the legal framework and other conditions that are necessary for the successful functioning of civil society. Tocqueville, based on his observation of the nineteenth century American society established the importance of free human association in a society that claims to be democratic not only in theory, but also in practice. Though he did not mention the term “civil society” in his two volume book on “Democracy in America,” he argued that associational culture and civic activity preserve individualism, act against despotism, and foster democracy. He found the associations participated by different sections of the society as the check to the supremacy of the majority, the direction towards mass society, and the end of political inequality. Mutual interest among the members of the associations led to less reliant on the government. This ultimately checked against the despotism of the government and preserved individualism. Associational culture also taught the peaceful means and arts for demanding material equality, which ultimately nurtured a democratic culture. Through such public, civic engagement the citizens of America actually became self-ruled (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 44). Moreover, Tocqueville had found the high potential in the right to association and practice of group networks in forming strong political parties that may represent the people at the central legislatures (de Tocqueville 1873, p. 190). This means he saw the CSOs as the pre-version of political parties. Mainly American scholars like Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond, and Lester Salamon espouse this doctrine. They advocate that coexistence of liberal markets and civil society ensures and enhances democracy. Putnam (1993) in his distinguished research on Italy has reinforced the importance of social capital and its positive connection to democracy. Here he strongly supports Tocqueville’s idea of associational life. Following Tocqueville, he showed how associations and civic

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relations have direct contribution to stability and effective democracy. Internally, it is the cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness that generate through group activities and externally it is the network, enhanced process of interest articulation and aggregation that contributes to democracy. He ultimately goes to the extent of saying, “Tocqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society” (Putnam 1993, p. 182). A reflection of the same idea may be found in the writings and arguments of Larry Diamond (1992, 1996, 1999). These two Neo-Tocquevillean scholars not only argued for the positive link between civil society and democracy, but also advocated for building civil society where it was absent and strengthening civil society where it is existent, in order to bring about democracy and ensure good governance in third world countries. However, there also remain some differences in the idea of Tocqueville and that of the Neo-Tocquevillean School. Tocqueville saw civil society as the key site for governance, decentralization for democratic governance. Conversely, Neo-Tocquevilleans see the civil society as a supporting structure to democratize the state. Associational life is considered as the social infrastructure of liberal democracy. Organized collectivity is to supply the means to limit, resist, and curb the excesses of the state and the market, present alternative when they fail, facilitate service delivery at the local level, assist in conflict management, deepen democracy, offer a voice to disadvantaged groups, and promote economic development (Alagappa 2004, p. 41).

2.3

Neo-Gramscian School (New Left Model)

The alternate model or the European model for civil society is another attempt within the civil society discourse to retrieve the right of the people to reclaim how they should live. It includes search for ways to reconcile socialist solidarity and selfmanagement (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 55). It was Gramsci, who had a strong influence on European scholars and activists like Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik as well as Andrew Areto, Jean Cohen, Robert Cox, and also in the literatures on the process of re-democratization in Latin America. The core idea of the Neo-Gramscian School is that civil society is a sphere of action that is independent of the state and is capable of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime (Foley and Edwards 1996, p. 38). Sometimes, this model of civil society provides a better method to understand its relevance to the state and political forces. Influenced by Marx, Antoneo Gramsci considers the civil society as part of the political superstructure not of the state’s. Gramsci’s hegemony encompasses both the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society and the advancement to a level of class consciousness where class is understood not only from an economic point of view, but also in terms of a common cultural and intellectual and moral awareness (Adamson 1980, pp. 170–171). Gramsci’s conception of civil society includes all social institutions that are non-production-related,

2.4 Modern Concept of Civil Society

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nongovernmental, and non-familial, ranging from recreational groups to trade unions and from churches to political parties, meaning that there is both a separation and overlap between civil society and political spheres. He believes that civil society creates the ideological hegemony in the state’s favor. His analysis is clearly historically specific, and his main interest is the role of civil society in making capitalism politically viable in cooperation with the state’s political apparatus (Khan 1998). Gramsci equates the state to the sum of political and civil society where both parts are in touch with hegemony. In a capitalist society, the state itself oscillates between three positions in relation to civil society, simultaneously contrasting with, encompassing and being identical to it (Anderson 1976, pp. 12–13). With the state’s consent, civil society is the manufacturer of and contributor to the political hegemony that may be considered the state’s ideological control mechanism. Political hegemony is hidden within cultural and ideological discourses and the state’s disciplinary method. In explaining his war of position, Gramsci has described the possibility of counter-hegemony, where civil society fights not only the coercive methods of the state but also its cultural and ideological codification. Gramsci’s framework of the state, civil society, political society, and hegemony, as well as counter-hegemony became suitable in explaining the civil society when it overlaps borderline and becomes entangled with political entities. Researchers studying the development, functions, actions, and outcomes of civil society in Asia have found relevance in explaining their studies from both the frameworks. Most development policies initiated by the international agencies are based on the Neo-Tocquevillean School. However, in assessing the applicability and outcome of such policies in the developing countries, Neo-Tocquevillean model often becomes inadequate. A combination of both the liberal democratic model and the new left model provides a reasonable explanation.

2.4

Modern Concept of Civil Society

As mentioned in the conceptual framework section in chapter one, this book considers the concept of civil society in a broad sense that may include the idea of most scholars and match into the case of Bangladesh. It is the sustained, organized social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family (Schwartz and Pharr 2003, p. xiii). However, civil society is not confined within a non-political, non-market, non-family atmosphere; rather, a constant interaction between the state, market, and civil society is taken for granted. It is a sort of function within the political system which is at the same time separate as well as interrelated with the different sectors of the system. Accordingly, civil society organizations are considered as the basic units of civil society. Schwartz and Pharr’s (2003) definition includes a variety of organizations as civil society organizations (CSOs), such as clubs, local cooperatives, labor unions, sports associations, trade organizations, business groups, charity groups, social welfare groups, religious groups, citizens’ organizations, professional groups, etc. Civil society organizations

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are considered active in both types of functions—service providing and advocacy. In all cases, these organizations must be nonprofit institutions. They may have income generating programs, it may access the market with its productions, however, the profit is used only for the management purpose and further development of the institutions, it is not divided among the members or contributors. As for interest based CSOs, they may be pursuing for only the narrow interest of their members like trade unions, professional groups, cooperatives, and so on. Again, CSOs may be concerned with broad public interests which are commonly found in social welfare groups, citizen’s group, intellectual groups, student organizations. Another connected concept to civil society as well as democracy is social capital. Social capital is the features of social organizations such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated action (Putnam 1993, p. 167). CSOs often generate social capital and vice versa. If we compare the civil society as the structure of a body, then social capital may be considered as the nerves and blood that keep the body alive and healthy. Society in Bangladesh is very rich in social capital which is often informal. World Bank and other development agencies have put emphasis on generating social capital at the grass-root level for economic empowerment and sustainable development. These agencies also use the concept in almost the same meaning, as institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development (Grootaert and Van Bastelar 2002, p. 2). Particularly, all five elements, groups and networks, trusts and solidarity, collective action and cooperation, social cohesion and inclusion, information and communication together contribute to the development. It is expected that such social capital will enhance only horizontal bond, ensure pluralism, and boost the liberal market that will ultimately help in making democracy a success. In practice, considering the particular socio-economic and political background of each nation, social capital can hardly reach its expectation both in quality and strength. Now it is important to explain how social capital and civil society ensure democracy and development.

2.5

Civil Society: Democracy and Development

Development practitioners hold that a strong civil society fosters democracy, checks the state’s power, and contributes to the development (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 39). The Neo-Tocquevillean model connects civil society directly to democracy. Zakaria (1997, pp. 22, 26) views liberal democracy as the combination of democracy and constitutional liberalism. Constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural rights and that governments must accept a basic law limiting their own power that secures such rights. Achieving this level of democracy may be the goal of many democratizing countries. However, most of them have become

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illiberal democracies to some extent. Democracy is flourishing, but constitutional liberalism is not. Democracy is discussed in detail as a key concept at the end of this chapter. Theoretically, to overcome the rise of illiberal democracies and to ensure better constitutional liberalism, civil society may play an important role. If we take as a starting point Tocqueville’s classic argument (de Tocqueville 1873), we find that civil society or free associations contribute to democracy in four ways. First, they ensure liberty and political equality in a capitalist society of economic inequalities. When people associate with one another according to their mutual interests, they ensure that they will care for one another rather than rely on the government to meet all of their needs. Such associational affinity ensures the application of persuasion rather than imposition of one’s own view upon other members. In this way, associations become a means for protecting the individual from despotism and supporting freedom. Second, associations may not only check the despotism of the government, but also the soft despotism of the elected majority. In this way, the individual is ultimately preserved. Third, associations nurture a democratic culture; they teach the art of arguing causes through peaceful means. According to Tocqueville, freedom of association may prevent rather than encourage revolutionary actions. Fourth, associations such as those found in America in the nineteenth century guaranteed active citizenship through an active engagement with politics and also defended against a despotic government (Howell and Pearce 2002, pp. 43–44). Putnam, in his two famous books—Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Putnam 1993) and Bowling Alone: Collapse and Revival of American Community (Putnam 2000)—elaborately demonstrated how the social capital found in civic communities and associational culture is directly linked to the success of democracy. Externally, voluntary associations allow individuals to express their interests and demands of government and to protect themselves from abuses of power by their political leaders. When people associate in groups, their individual and quiet voices multiply and are amplified. Internally, associations and informal networks of civil engagement instill in their members’ habits of cooperation and public spiritedness as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life. Voluntary associations often serve as forums for deliberations and are considered to be microcosms of the nation economically, ethnically, religiously, etc. In addition, such a culture involves people in networks of civic engagement, ultimately fomenting reciprocal relationships between individuals. Along with Putnam, Diamond emphasizes civil society’s strength at the community level. In his words: Effective grassroots development efforts may relieve the burden of expectations fixed on the state and so relieve the intensity of politics. At the same time they build social capital by bringing citizens together to cooperate as peers for their common advancement. A particularly noteworthy example of this is the general phenomenon of microenterprise lending and specific success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Diamond 1999, p. 249).

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Thus, examples regarding Bangladesh and its civil society’s functions, particularly NGOs and the micro-credit system, have arisen in Neo-Tocquevillean literatures. Microenterprise has brought economic freedom and empowerment to a large number of poor people in the country and has resulted in significant social development as well. However, how much microenterprise has contributed to democracy remains a question. Diamond (1999, p. 239) provides a more systematic explanation of civil society’s role in democratic transitions. In the first stage, civil society foments a transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy. During the third wave of democratization (i.e., the 1980s and 1990s), civil society played a strong and influential role throughout the world to effect change and establish democracies. In its second stage, civil society helps to deepen and consolidate democracy, which is necessary to ensure a stable system. Consolidating democracy primarily involves monitoring and restraining the exercise of power by formal democratic states, holding these states accountable to the law and to public expectations of a responsible government. In particular, Diamond (1999, pp. 240–250) has described 13 different ways in which civil society may contribute to consolidating democracy. Noteworthy examples include checking and limiting the power of the state, as new democracies are often compromised by blatant and pervasive corruption and the lack of legal and bureaucratic institutions to control such corruption. Second, civil society often stimulates political participation. Logically then, civil society also plays an important role in democratic education as well as in recruiting and training new political leaders. The next function of civil society is to provide various channels, outside of the political parties, for articulating, aggregating, and representing interests. It also gives voice to excluded and marginalized groups. In this way, civil society is ultimately expected to bring about a transition from clientelism to citizenship at the grass-roots level (Fox 1994, pp. 153–157). This particular point is significant for countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, The Philippines, and other developing countries where the patron–client relationship continues to dominate the social and political power relationship. Autonomous organizations are expected to empower and develop horizontal relationships and establish trust and reciprocity that can break through patron–client relationships, which are based on authority and dependency. Civil society is also expected to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut and ultimately mitigate the principal polarities of political interests. Moreover, civil society may have explicit democracy-building purposes: for example, it’s non-partisan election-monitoring efforts are crucial in building confidence in the system and conferring legitimacy to the government. A vigorous civil society widely disseminates information, thus empowering citizens in their collective pursuits. Again, this mobilization of new information and understanding is essential to the achievement of economic reform in a democracy (Diamond 1999, p. 247). Diamond (1999) and Putnam (1993) have mentioned several caveats regarding associational culture and warned about the environments and structural backgrounds that may hinder civil society’s contributions to democracy, such as triggering political polarization and cynicism instead of mitigating differences. Such types of

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networks and connectedness may benefit only the elite class. Mosse (2006, p. 712) warns us that social capital is both the raw material and a goal of development. It is a public good to be created and protected. How social capital is produced and for what purpose it is used is important before expecting it to contribute to democracy. Bourdieu (1986, pp. 249–251) also mentions that in all groups there is a system of delegation where the single agent or small group becomes the plenipotentiary, accumulating the totality of the social capital gained from the collective endeavor. Not only the delegated small group or leader, but every member enters into social interaction and group membership in pursuit of self-interest and profit. According to Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic capital, even social capital, motivated by self-interest, can result in negative social dynamics (Huda et al. 2008, p. 300). Moreover, Diamond warned that civil society may not function successfully in societies with a legacy of corporatist systems, autocratic rule, lawlessness, lack of an independent judiciary, etc. Nevertheless, it is expected that civil society will surmount these obstacles and ultimately institutionalize democracy. While this theory or discussion may be overly simplistic and naïve, a similar idea had a powerful influence on donors’ policies in developing countries. Donors began with the assumption that civil society is an important check on the government, so civil society assistance could encourage external pressure on the states for reform. With the falling budget for development this strategy had been found to be expedient. The influence of such civil society theory and the democratic assumption was pervasive upon the development practitioners. However, questions arise about the applicability of such theories developed from the experiences of the Western societies, in very different socio-political and economic setting of the developing countries. Researchers agree that associational revolution in developing countries is significantly influenced by external factors, including donor enthusiasm for NGOs as agents of economic and political change. Nevertheless, criticisms to introduce such Western notion of civil society in non-western settings have gained considerable attention in recent scholarly writings due to the ramifications observed in different countries. This may be discussed from two overlapping viewpoints, that is, the imposition of a new idea in a very different social-historical setting and from the consideration of immature institutional development or lack of necessary conditions for the proper functioning of civil society. Without careful and sensitive prior analysis of needs in the social and political contexts, donor intervention in local civil societies can end up distorting and weakening the local processes of association and problem solution (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 121). Such projects based on preconceived notions of civil society and neglecting indigenous settings, local circumstances, and histories provoke controversy. There is no guarantee that the liberal democratic model of civil society will necessarily bring positive outcomes across nations, cultures, history, and political system. This may be considered as a similar endeavor of exporting modernization theory from the developed North to the developing South. Sardamov (2005, pp. 391–394) is of the opinion that failed efforts of social modernization for decades, attempts to create Western-style nation-states, and inter-communal conflicts have paradoxically

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produced; in his words, a partial “retraditionalization” of social life in the developing world. In these societies, most individuals have remained embedded within face-toface and quasi-kinship networks and have tended to pursue social goals through informal associations based on personal or factional loyalty. As a result, beneath the successive social and political changes, societies have remained dominated by tightly knit “mafias” pursuing a narrow agenda. Strong influences of such trends have caused clientelistic and parasitic characteristics among the modern NGOs. Civil society organizations have brought tangible benefits like social welfare, empowerment, education, etc. but they have been generally unable to exercise the multiplying effects often expected of them like pluralism and democracy. The necessary institutional development and environment for a civil society to move for pluralism and democracy is in most cases absent in societies of developing countries. Often, high rate of violence, the marketization of rule of law, privatization of law enforcement, and the wide gap between the poor and the privileged (Oxhorn 2003), as well as concentration of political power in the highest political office constrains civil society’s democratic potential in third world countries. These have caused periodic setbacks to the democratic development in countries like Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia that do have vibrant civil societies (Alagappa 2004, p. 493). These constraints to the performance of civil society and ultimately democracy remind the strong presence and influence of indigenous vertical social forces such as clientelism, patronage, nepotism, corruption, and violence as well as the low level of political institutionalization. The challenge for development practitioners is to understand the meaning and the role of civil society in specific cultural and political contexts. Therefore, it has now become necessary to study why the civil society is often unable to contribute to democracy in Asia and particularly in developing countries, despite the strong reliance and huge effort of the international donors to strengthen the civil society in those countries. Simply studying civil society and the capability of the other sectors may not always guarantee a satisfactory answer. Civil society needs to be understood within the political system where it not only influences other sectors, but is often influenced by the market, state, political institutions, history, and culture. Further investigation into its nature of functions and political relations and dealings may provide a better answer to our query on civil society and democratic relations in developing countries in Asia. Bangladesh receives high international attention in development literatures and by international agencies. From different perspectives and through different models, the civil society of Bangladesh has attracted researchers at home and abroad.

2.6 Studies on Civil Society in Bangladesh in Different Models

2.6

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Studies on Civil Society in Bangladesh in Different Models

The burgeoning literatures on civil society in Bangladesh are mostly on NGOs that have begun their journey since the Independence of Bangladesh in 1971 and those working with foreign funds tagged with conditions. Donor, development and social service, economic contribution are the popular topic for the researchers to investigate in. However, the nature of advocacy, civil society, and political relations are the areas upon which very few literatures are available. National and international changes in the new millennium, especially in the political, democratic, and market arena have made the students of civil society to investigate in new dimensions. Researchers have become more interested in investigating civil society role to bring political stability, protecting or enhancing democracy, and changing social values (Ahmed 2010; Blair 2000; Quadir 2003; Wood 2015). Literatures concerning Bangladesh civil society are mostly written following or criticizing the Neoliberal model. Since the new millennium there has been a sharp rise in empirical researches criticizing the Neo-Tocquevillean School (Blair 2005; Hossain 2005; Huda et al. 2008; Khan 2005; Lewis 2004; Quadir 2003; Sobhan 2000; Stiles 2002; White 1999) which again may be broadly divided into the Structuralist Group and Culturist Group.

2.6.1

Neoliberal Model (Neo-Tocquevillean Model)

After the failure of the policy of state reform during 1980s, commonly known as structural adjustment, donors became more interested in civil society to overcome the problems in the developing world. By the early 1990s, according to Stiles (2002, p. 8), all donor agencies derived by both expediency and value agreed on three mutually overlapping goals: (1) To help developing countries become more financially stable and open to the world economy (Washington Consensus), (2) To make development assistance more effective and efficient, both to bring about more tangible results for target group and to save money in contracting aid budgets. (3) To nurture and develop “civil society institutions” in order to enhance personal freedom and democratic institutions. The Neo-Tocquevillean School supplied the necessary arguments about how active associations and civic engagement contributed to such democratic polities and how this facilitated economic progress and prosperity (Howell and Pearce 2002, p. 41). As Bangladesh homes the Nobel Peace Prize winning civil society group Grameen Bank and world’s largest national NGOs like BRAC, naturally application of such donor policy in different development projects is a common phenomenon here. NGOs are engaged in implementing projects on economic empowerment, community development, health management, as well as good governance for more than a decade. This has brought a vast change at the grass-root level through

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such social development. Naturally, empirical researches on such NGOs and projects are often framed under the Neo-Tocquevillean model. Articles published by development agencies, development consultants mostly belong to this group (Blair 2000, 2005; DFID 2000). Most often these articles support the neoliberal policies and uphold the positive outcome through the projects, at least in the arena of social development, economic empowerment, etc. Often, such policies are evaluated based on the experience gathered during the implementation process. Micro-credit though considered an indigenous system of Bangladesh is actually combined with the idea of neoliberal policy. Often it is said that micro-credit brings the poor directly to the open market, where he/she has the opportunity to loan as well as sell his/her production and skill. Again, this also generates social capital as the process requires the poor to form groups and act as one group in receiving and paying back the loans. Naturally, the literatures that endorse the micro-credit system follow the Neo-Tocquevillean model (Dowla 2006; Dowla and Barua 2006; Goon 2002; Holloway 1998; Lovell 2nd 2001; Nobusue 2002). Moreover, the absence of suitable theory of civil society and development that may correspond with the reality of the third world situation compels the researchers to choose to work in the light of the Neoliberal theory. Even if they consider the Neoliberal model as naive and simple, they begin their work following the structure. Afterwards, they go further to qualify the theory (Amin 1997; Kochanek 1996, 2000; Sobhan 2000; Stiles 2002; Ullah and Routary 2003). Under this group a large number of literatures modifying the model may be piled up. These researches may be termed as critics on the Neoliberal model.

2.6.2

Critics of Neoliberal Model (Move to Gramsci’s Model)

Since the 1990s International Development Organizations (IDO) has initiated large projects to foster development through civil society initiatives in the South. Researches show donor initiative to support civil society has led to grass-roots development, social mobilization, and empowerment (Amin 1997; Dowla and Barua 2006; Fisher 1998; Stiles 2002; Tasnim 2005, 2007). But donor projects have hardly succeeded in pushing forward the issues like participation, democracy, and good governance through civil society effectively. The very idea of the Neo-Tocquevillean School as well as policy arguments of the donor agencies have been criticized and pointed out to be weak and expedient. It is often said that though Bangladesh has a notable history what can be readily described as civil society, it can hardly fit into the Neo-Tocquevillean idea. This fact has also been observed by a good number of researchers who are rather critical of the Neoliberal model (Ahmed 2010; Davis and McGregor 2000; Lewis 2004, 2017, 2019; Quadir 2003; Sobhan 2002; Tasnim 2007; White 1999). They have pointed out the existence of strong clientelism and over politicization within the political system and over donor dependency of the NGOs and moreover, lack of autonomy and internal democracy within the civil society organizations which impede the

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democratic development of the civil society. Moreover, Bangladesh lacks the necessary conditions for well-functioning of the civil society, e.g., strong, responsive state, independent judiciary, and widely represented issue based political parties. In the administrative system, there are very few regularized mechanisms for the CSOs to lobby or influence the politicians and administration. As a civil society leader, Sobhan (2006) has also commented that the citizens of Bangladesh at the grass-roots level are unaware of policy regime and have no participation in policy-making. Among the scholars, a group has found the statist or structural model to be more appropriate to describe the situation. They argue that political structures consisting of powerful political elites ultimately exert the highest influence in determining the nature of civil society and the level of democracy (Quadir 2003; Tasnim 2007). Again, other prominent researchers have been comfortable in explaining the situation from the cultural aspect of the society and state in Bangladesh (Lewis 2004, 2017, 2019).

2.6.3

Structural Model

Political structures, whether it is the state, political party, or bureaucracy, even the military or international agencies are considered here as the independent actors, while civil society is the dependent actor. Decisions and actions of the political institutions may be consciously directed towards civil society organizations or taken for other political purpose that ultimately affects the civil society. Such influence of the political institutions upon civil society actually determines the participatory and democratic role of civil society in developing countries. The influence from such political structures and institutions upon civil society may be profound and multidimensional. Though civil society may not be a direct product of what the state and political institutions want it to be, the political institutions do have an effect upon them through structuring actions. Political structures may influence the nature and function of the civil society in three basic ways, (a) through regulatory frameworks like, registration rules, functioning law etc., (b) political opportunity structures—bureaucratic dominance, influence of the political actors, etc. and (c) other indirect influences that may be country specific (Pekkanen 2006). The political opportunity structural influences, first coined by Sidney Tarrow (1994), may be directed right away to the civil society or to the political environment which either encourages or discourages people from using collective actions. Researchers on Bangladesh belonging to this group may not always explain the civil society following a certain model but often they agree that Civil Society in Bangladesh lacks autonomy from political forces. Moreover, national and international policies as well as political institutions like regimes, political parties are important variables to understand the nature, strength, and influence of the civil society. International donors, registration law, economic development along with the tendency of voluntarism and charity have led to a rather large number of formal and

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informal civil society organizations in Bangladesh. Again, the weak performance of the civil society in relation to politics and democracy may be answered through the analysis of the political history and through the strong influence of the political parties upon the social organizations. Furthermore, long standing social structures like patron–client relations, the system of patronage, and corruption have a grave influence on the civil society. Stiles (2002) remarks that engagement by external donors of indigenous NGOs run the risk of creating rifts and tensions that will be counterproductive to the scheme of the donors. The argument that donor conditions imposed upon the state and NGOs often cause dilemma and more corruption than development is lauded by the civil society leaders and researchers (Sobhan 2006). Western scholars have also admitted the grave influence of the political parties and deeply institutionalized patron–client relation, on the autonomous characteristics of the civil society in Bangladesh (Stiles 2002; Basu et al. 2018). Advocacy and better participation of civil society for better governance and democracy are often compromised due to political polarization, penetration, this is true both for modern NGOs and traditional civil organizations (Quadir 2003; Tasnim 2007).

2.6.4

Cultural Model

Culturist explanation of civil society in general claims that culture determines people’s proclivity to form and join civil society organizations and thus determines the prevalence and type of civil society organizations (Pekkanon 2006, p. 11). It is not only the tendency to join a group and type of groups, but also the nature of the civil society, its autonomy, its success and failure to reach its specific and general objectives and so on may be determined to some extent by the prevailing culture. This is often true, for the Asian and developing countries. However, this does not mean that researches that follow the cultural model totally ignore the influence and importance of the political structures often carving the nature and action of the civil society. Again, there also may be some controversy about terming a particular practice or system as a cultural fact or a structural issue. For example, the system of patron–client relationship prevalent among the Asian countries initially was thought to be the domain of cultural anthropologists. However, when clientelism turns out to be a vicious factor to the political decisions and actions as well as to the civil society, a section of the researchers argues it to be a structural phenomenon rather than a cultural one. David Lewis (2004, p. 299) stresses on understanding the local meaning of the term civil society that derives from the independent struggle and the construction of a Bangladesh State, from local tradition of urban and rural voluntarism and from the organization of religious life. By recognizing and differentiating both the traditional and modern meaning of civil society and civil society organizations conducting in those lines, it is possible to understand the aspects of the changing relationship

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between citizens and the state, the formulation and implementation of public policy, and the shifting dimensions of the institutional landscape. Religion is an important factor in culture. For the construction of state, politics, society, and of course civil society in South Asia that also includes Bangladesh, religion has always played a decisive role. Again observing the development in the last decade, experts like Wood (2007); Lewis (2004) have emphasized on exploring more into religion based civil society in Bangladesh and how the value contrasts and combines with the secular NGOs and their donors. A combination of the structural and cultural model often help in depicting and analyzing the real situation, changes and the outcome caused by different Neo Liberal Policies initiated at the structural level and executed in the cultural reality.

2.6.5

Mixed Model Applied in the Present Research

The present research primarily modifies the Neo-Tocquevillean model. While doing so, it follows the structural model under the umbrella of Comparative Politics and Institutional Approach. In its search to find the nature of the political relationship between civil society and politics and its impact on democracy, the book has borrowed ideas from cultural model while digging into history, tradition, and socio-political relationship. In its further attempt to explain the reason behind the partisan and compromised civil society, Theory of Patryarchy has been consulted. This theory was first developed by Coppedge (1994) and applied to explain the political system of Venezuela. Detailed discussion about the analysis framework and indicators for identifying the vigilant and vibrant attributes of the civil society has already been provided in chapter one.

2.7 2.7.1

Operationalization of Few More Concepts Politicization of Civil Society

Politicization is a common concept often used in a negative meaning to describe the political involvement or exertion to control an institution, organization, or an administrative process, which is ideally thought to be neutral and free from political influences. When a civil society organization takes politically motivated decisions as directed by a party or government and is politically colored by the political affiliation of its members, withholding its original objective and interest on which it was formed, we may term it as a politicized civil society organization. The partisanship of the members of the organizations has a role to play in the politicization process. Partisanship is the party identification of a citizen. Such identification has predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations, and actions of the political process. Faced with a new issue or political controversy, the knowledge of what position is

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favored by one’s own party is a valuable cue in developing one’s own position (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, p. 20). Moreover, government dictates and strong party control upon the organization challenging its autonomy is another feature of politicization. Most often, politicization takes place through ideology, patronage, corruption, and clientelism.

2.7.2

Democracy

The Neo-Tocquevillean model connects civil society directly to democracy. What is the nature of the democracy that is expected to emerge and take root through the functions of civil society? Neo-Tocquevillean scholars such as Putnam or Diamond perceive democracy as embracing both political and economic liberalism. Diamond (1999, p. 11) enumerates 11 components considered to be ideal for a liberal democracy, such as: 1. Elected officials hold government authority and place the military under their authority; 2. Executive power is horizontally checked and balanced by institutions, such as the judiciary, parliament, etc.; 3. Uncertain electoral outcomes allow for an alternation of power; 4. Political and human rights are assured for all groups; 5. Aside from parties and elections, citizens have additional channels to express their ideas and values, through civil society organizations and various movements; 6. Alternative sources of political information; 7. Freedom of religion, speech, publication, demonstration, and petition; 8. Political equality under the law; 9. Individual and group liberties protected by an independent judiciary; 10. The rule of law and minority rights; and 11. The state constitution upheld as the supreme. Three main dimensions of any democracy are competition, participation, and civil and political liberties (Sørensen 1993, p. 13). In such a democracy, institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people (Vanhanen 1997, p. 31). It ensures power sharing by all major groups where common people have some kind of control over decision-making. Dahl (1971) emphasizes the responsiveness of government to the preferences of citizens considered as political equals. Democracy with such a high value may be achieved only through stages and transitions, particularly in a developing country. So, democracy is concerned with political rights as well as the preferences and interests of the people. Citizen’s preferences in a democratic state are not only the political rights and liberty, but also the fulfillment of their varied interests that may include basic needs like food, clothes, shelter as well as a raise in salary, tax cut, and

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other public services from the government. So a democracy with responsive state may have two broad aspects that can be termed as interests and rights. From the aspect of interest and public service in democracy, civil society organizations may be found in a positive position—acting for group interests, community welfare, and sharing in functions for public services. In this way, in the age of privatization and liberal economy, civil society may be rather contributing to democracy by helping the transformation to a smaller state, where different types of public services are contracted out to different nonprofit groups. This is also considered as a way for private participation in state actions, particularly in the Western world like USA, UK, and other parts of Europe. Again in the developing countries, different welfare programs of civil society organizations, particularly NGOs and welfare groups are making a constructive contribution by facing the immediate interest and need of the poor and rural people for their economic empowerment and social development. Interest and service may be crucial to citizen satisfaction and socio-economic development. However, without the insurance of wide scale civic education, participation, equality, political stability, and accountability, a political system can hardly transform into a liberal democracy. For this, civil society organizations need to be not only welfare and service providers, but should actively participate in actions to protect, ensure, and enhance the rights of citizens and their control over the decisionmaking process as well as on governance. The present study in its focus on democracy and civil society relation is concerned with the aspect of rights which is more related to the vigilant nature of civil society.

2.7.3

Democratic Transition

There are rich literatures on democratic transition and consolidation (Gunther and Nikiforos Diamandouros 1995; Hansen 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Przeworski 1991; Sørensen 1993). Accepting the views of Hansen (1996) and Sørensen (1993), the stages of democratic transition turn out to be the following four with democratic consolidation as the last stage: 1. Background condition—Authoritarian regime where national unity is strong among the political communities; 2. Early transition—Political opening where the authoritarian regime gives concessions and a consensus has been developed among the citizens and leaders for democratic change; 3. Late transition—At this stage the regime is more democratic than the previous ones but not fully democratic. Political actors and governance institutions are yet to fully conform to the democratic rule and democratic consolidation. These changes in phases do not occur in a negotiated and linear manner. Often

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democracies in developing countries are found seesawing between authoritarianism and frail democracy (Sørensen 1993, p. 41); 4. Democratic Consolidation—It is the last and final phase of democracy. In the ideal or strict form, at this stage of democracy all the democratic institutions are formed, and the new democracy has proved itself capable of transferring power to an opposition party (Sørensen 1993, p. 45). Bangladesh may be identified as being located at the stage of late democratic transition with frail and formal democracy prioritizing economic development to democratic consolidation. Chapter four discusses in detail about the nature and transition of democracy and the role of the civil society in the process.

2.7.4

Democratic Consolidation

The challenge for democratic consolidation is to ensure the 11 attributes of liberal democracy (Diamond 1999, p. 11) not only through legislation and constitutional amendments, but through practices, ensuring political stability, equality, and representation of all segments of the society in state governance. The idea is very broad, and the process requires involvement and coordination of a good number of actors and factors. Gunther and Nikiforos Diamandouros (1995), p. 7) is of the opinion that democratic consolidation is achieved when a consensus is reached among the key political actors to adhere to the democratic rules and accept political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation. This means an agreement towards democracy from above. Przeworski (1991), p. 51) observes democratic consolidation in a situation where all political conflicts are solved through democratic institutions and all players accept the uncertainty of the democratic game. This means that not only decision by political elites, but also democratic practice among the political groups is essential. Ultimately democratic practices are to become an established part of the political culture (Sørensen 1993, p. 42). Democratic rules are to be transformed into democratic norms, that is, democracy becomes the only game in town (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 14). Linz and Stepan (1996) also discuss the five major arenas of a modern consolidated democracy that together contribute to a consolidated democracy—civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic society. All the five arenas have their specific influence and type of interaction towards and within the democratic system. Such democratic consolidation takes place in a combined way and is not dependent on only one factor. The Linz and Stepan (1996) model is based on the experiences of democracies in Europe and Latin America. This model is applicable in the case of Bangladesh. However, for a developing country like Bangladesh, major achievements in institutionalization of legal and political structures, stable economic growth, development of a democratic culture,

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and a vibrant and vigilant civil society are highly required to reach democratic consolidation. This book concentrates only on civil society, in its ability in consolidating democracy in Bangladesh. The four major vigilant tasks, the vibrant civil society needs to realize in consolidating democracy in Bangladesh, are: 1. Civic education on political and human rights; 2. Generate interest and values of the civil society groups in the political society— interest aggregation; 3. Monitor the state apparatus and economic society; and. 4. Ensure better participation and representation of all segments of society in political decision-making, during the polls and in between the polls, as well as ensure better partnership between government and civil society.

2.7.5

Free Market Economy

If we talk in the very basic language of Economics, an economic system is the network of varied organizations used to solve the economic problems of what? how much? how? and for whom to produce and supply? In a free market system competition dictates how goods and services will be allocated. It is considered suitable for a developing country by the Neoliberal theorists. Though Adam Smith’s free market economy advocates for zero government intervention practically, without proper state interventions and plans, free market cannot work smoothly. However, the state interventions are only for accelerating the market mechanism and prevent monopoly and other side effects of free market, such as income disparity, poverty, violation of human rights, and so on. Practically, the government involvement in depicting and controlling the free economic system is immense. Especially, if it is the case of a developing country. When the government and other political elites decide for a free market system, various measures are taken with the help of both national and international economic entities. For example, we can mention the policies and strategies like structural adjustment of the state enterprises, market reform, revising tax system, breaking hegemony, developing competiveness, forming industrial areas, and ensuring necessary financial assistance for the reform and market flow. Bangladesh is following the free market system (Ayres 2014). Though officially it is still considered as a mixed system, actually it supports capitalism based on long term economic plans set by the government. From early 1980s, privatization and industrialization process began in the country and since 1991, with the reintroduction of the parliamentary system of government, free market system began its journey. The World Bank, IMF, and other western donors and development partners have a significant stake in promoting free market economy in Bangladeshi society (Abdin 2016). Bangladesh is welcoming foreign investment in its territory in any forms. Hundred percent foreign ownership is allowed. Its industrialization, mainly readymade garment (RMG) sector is export oriented. Thus Bangladeshi investment and production both are focusing on outbound

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markets (Abdin 2016). Recently, Bangladesh has become one of the developing world’s economic success stories. Bangladesh’s economy has averaged above 6% annual growth for nearly a decade, reaching 7.86% in the year 2018 (Robinson 2018). When free market development is initiated, it causes significant changes and influences on the entire political system. Corruption, cronyism, and inequality tend to increase. This may cause tension, conflict, instability, and even halt the development process. Bangladesh is no exception. The cure is in the civil society that comes forward in mitigating the socio-economic gap through social services and microeconomic initiatives. Moreover, such civil society ensures popular participation and democratic practice through advocacy and vigilant functions. The ultimate solution to a sustainable free market and prosperous development is in consolidating democracy.

2.7.6

Good Governance

Theoretically, good governance involves an efficient public service, an independent judicial system, and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press (Leftwitch 1994). Good governance marries the new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy (Rhodes 1997, p. 50). This means that, theoretically, the good governance shall involve participatory decision-making process, consensus oriented decisions, and rule of law that ensures equality and inclusiveness in every government actions. Moreover, the governing authority shall be accountable, transparent, and responsive to public needs. Finally, there shall be the efficiency, sustainability, and effectiveness in executing such public decisions and in every action of the government that it performs with other actors in the political system. Through their good-governance agenda, World Bank, ADB, and other development agencies seek to encourage competition and markets, privatize public enterprise, reform the civil service, introduce budgetary discipline, decentralize administration, and greater use of non-government organizations in the third world. Good-governance agenda suggested that a virtuous circle could be built between state, economy, and civil society which would balance growth, equity, and stability. To this end civil society has been considered as the best tool to balance the state and the market in political terms by reducing abuse of power, and in economic terms as by becoming a third source of social service provision (Lewis 2004, pp. 302–303).

2.7 Operationalization of Few More Concepts

2.7.7

49

Corruption

Corruption is a concept that does not come into discussion, when we begin analyzing the naive theories of civil society, democracy, and development. However, the more we delve into the reality and into the processes of democracy, good governance, and development, especially in connection to a developing country, the practice of corruption often comes into central topic for discussion and debate. Frequently, the practice and culture of corruption in a given society and political system are blamed for mal governance and considered as an evil against consolidated democracy. This research considers corruption in the same way and argues that corruption has also impeded the autonomy of the civil society and hampers its potential to contribute more to development and democracy. For corruption here, I follow the definition given by della Porta and Vannucci (1999, p. 16) on the term Corruption as (1) a hidden violation of a contract that, implicitly, states a delegation of responsibility and the exercise of some discretionary power, (2) by a public agent (the bribee) who, against the interests or preferences of the principal (its public organization) (3) acts in favor of a third part (the briber) from which he receives a reward (the bribe). The resources exchanged can be various: the gain can be a direct or indirect one, it can involve money but also other utilities and services, the exchange of commodities may be simultaneous or delayed, the value of goods may also differ. In the developing countries, corruption, especially political corruption involves in a set of exchanges within patron–client networks through which elites in power develop political compromises with their clients (Khan 1998). Moreover, Khan (1998) mentions that political and economic corruption can get interlocked, since the resources to finance political corruption are often generated through the conventional forms of corruption that happens in governance offices and so on. Now it has become necessary to understand what patron–client relationship means theoretically and from the aspect of Bangladesh.

2.7.8

Patron–Client Relations and Vertical Norms

In the same way as the concept corruption, patron–client relation is another anthropological idea that comes into dominate discussions on power relation in developing societies. It is an ancient norm practiced not only in the societies but in the political systems of the developing countries. Patron–client relationships are based on direct, face-to-face encounters between individual elites and poor people and are characterized by little or no formal structure. They may be explained as an exchange of relations between roles; a special case of two persons’ ties involving a large instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits to a person of lower status (client)

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who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patrons (Scott 1972, p. 178). In this book, patron–client relation and clientelism has been alternatively used implicating same meaning. Vertical norms like patron–client relation, patronage, nepotism, corruption are powerful indigenous factors deep rooted in Bangladesh society. Factionalism and patron–client network have formed the base of social organization (Jahan 2005). These cultures have developed through centuries in the rural society and afterwards generated into the urban area with migration of the rural elites and their entrance into politics (Broomfield 1976). While the present ruling elites of Bangladesh have a moral commitment to Western political philosophies such as democracy or socialism, in practice they rely on the patron–client relationship to run the state and political parties (Islam 2001, p. 429). As kinship linkages are influential in Bangladeshi social culture, nepotism is extended not only to direct family members but to lineage, relatives (including those linked through marriage ties), and neighbors and friends. In such informal system, civil society organizations entangle in a vertical relation with political parties, local governments, and bureaucracy undermining their autonomy and ability to articulate their independent interests and demands. The following chapters shall explore the role of the civil society in Bangladesh to such extent using different methods and from different theoretical understandings. Based on such conceptual setting the following chapters move on to explore the civil society, its relation and interaction with the other structures in the political system and the double way interaction that is taking place due to such interactions.

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Chapter 3

Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

Abstract This chapter explores the civil society from a comparative perspective in search for the factors and structures that influences its nature, function, and power. With the understanding of the civil society in Bangladesh, this chapter compares three more civil societies active in the developing nations in Asia. Civil societies of India, Pakistan, and the Philippines have been briefly analyzed considering the diversity in the political environment and democratic nature of each country and then have been compared with the Bangladeshi situation. With the analysis and comparison of the four civil societies, it has become relatively easy to infer that the size as well as the influence and power of the civil society are shaped according to the nature, strength, and strategy of the political structures of the political system. Because of strict laws and unwilling political regimes, though India has a stable democracy, civil society here is not totally autonomous, rather uncivil elements are also active here. On the other hand, due to weak political structures and illiberal democracy, the civil society in Pakistan also remains weak despite their vigilant acts at time of national crisis. While the civil society in the Philippines is more involved in politics and in influencing the government decisions to some extent, they are not strong enough to change the elite oligarchic power structure of the country rather often is entangled within it. Keywords Political structure · Political influence · Culture · Liberty · Freedom · Comparison

3.1

Introduction

Civil society is considered to represent the voice of the society and public as well as influence the process of achieving and maintaining democracy. Most literatures on civil society are occupied with the nature and influence of the civil society towards the state and society. Moreover, the Neo-Tocquevillean literatures are always considering civil society in an ideal term—autonomous, democratic, rich in social capital, civic engagement and network and always enhancing democracy. Unlike the theoretical expectation, the practical world is very different, the attributes and © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_3

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qualities of the civil society are hardly found. Moreover, in practice, the performance and influence of civil society, particularly for institutionalizing democracy, are very much influenced by the environment in which it functions. The history, culture, economic condition, political structures all in a combined way contribute to the nature and performance of civil society in a particular country or nation. However, dimension and magnitude of influence may differ from case to case. In fact, having all the factors active, in most cases, it is the political structures formed by the powerful elites who ultimately exert the highest influence in determining the nature of civil society. These political structures may be the state, political party, bureaucracy or even military as long as political decisions and strategies are concerned. The political, institutional actions may be consciously directed towards civil society organizations or may be taken for other political purposes that ultimately affects the civil society. Such influence of the political institutions upon civil society also determines the participatory and democratic role of civil society in developing countries. The influence from such political structures and institutions upon civil society may be profound and multi-dimensional. Pekkanon (2006, p. 15) in his study on Japanese Civil Society divides the influence of political structures into three basic sections—a. regulatory framework like, law, regulations, etc. b. political opportunity structure—bureaucratic dominance, influence of the political actors, etc., and c. other indirect influences. His model does not claim that civil society is a product of what state agencies or politicians want to happen, but institutions have an effect through structuring actions. Among the three parts, the first-regulatory framework has an immediate and clear impact on civil society organization’s viability such as legal status, direct financial flow and tax benefits, etc. This is a universal fact for all civil societies in the modern world. The second part of institutional influence-political opportunity structure is the consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national-dimension to the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective actions. The term was first coined by Sidney Tarrow (1994, p. 85) to the study of collective action and social movement. Pekkanon’s model broadens it to include the study of the institutions and the opportunity that political actors provide for collective action. The third part of Pekkanon’s model-other indirect influence has been developed particularly in the context of Japanese civil society, pointing out important state actions that indirectly have contributed in shaping the civil society. The present study is concerned mainly with the second section of Pekkanon (2006) model—political opportunity structure that functions along with influences of the external and internal factors upon the civil society. Through the political opportunity structure, the present study has investigated the influences of political structures upon the style and strength of collective actions of the civil society in Bangladesh. By structures, I do not mean just the formal machines like cabinet, legislature, or administration, but also political parties, political leaders and elites, and other political practices, in conformity with the Institutional Approach. Moreover, the culture, political culture, informal social network, history, sentiment, ideology all are under consideration for understanding the civil society pattern.

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During 2006 when the core study and survey were organized, it was found that political structures, political parties, and their leaders in Bangladesh had the most influence on civil society, however, not excluding the other external and internal factors like donor policy, history, cultures, social norms, state institutions that have also a profound influence in shaping the vibrant and vigilant nature of the civil society. To explain this point, present chapter, analyzes the civil societies of three developing countries—India, Pakistan, and the Philippines in comparison to Bangladesh. In all four cases (including Bangladesh), it has been found that the ruling elites and political entities have a powerful influence upon the nature, strength, and vigilant power of the civil society. India has been selected as it is considered the most stable democracy and geographically is adjacent to Bangladesh. Pakistan is another developing country in South Asia, unlike India, its democracy is unstable and fledging. Often it is termed as a failed or illiberal democracy. The South-eastern archipelago, the Philippines has been selected as it also has a vibrant civil society like Bangladesh and moreover, it has also moved forward to enter the political space. In Chap. 4 the case of Bangladesh is dealt in details.

3.2

Influence of Political Structures Upon Civil Society from a Comparative Perspective

The influence of political structures upon the society and civil society is not a new phenomenon, but rather a hard fact that can hardly be avoided. It is not only formal rules and registration laws with which the state and the administration may regulate the development and strength of civil society, but through different informal means, pressures, favoritism and even corruption, civil society are often controlled by the political forces. The problem is very common and immense in developing countries where the economy is poor, the state is weak, and citizens lack the necessary political education. However, it may not be a setback, particularly in the developing countries. It often had happened in developed countries in the past and present day too. In the nineteenth century USA, the very period when Tocqueville traveled to the land and praised its democracy, the machine politics was to be found in the big cities. In the presence of political democracy and voting rights and poverty as well as the absence of well-organized state programs for citizen’s welfare and employment security, hierarchically organized party machine had become the all controlling social forces having a strong influence in every sector of the local government and society. The machine provided the favors, jobs, necessary welfare to citizens in exchange for political support and votes for them. However, the interaction took place in a vertical way through patronage and corruption (Encyclopedia of Britannica 2019a: Political Machine). It is said that introduction of the welfare state and civil service reform, reduced the amount of patronage available to the political parties and ultimately urban party machine declined. However, such parties patronizing influences still endure in

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different forms in the USA. Democratic clubs based on the support by politicians were scattered throughout the cities. New York in the last twentieth century functioned in the classic machine style. In return for helping with problems like threatening landlords, broken streetlights, finding a lawyer, etc., the club asked the people to circulate nominating petitions and distribute campaign literatures, which most did willingly. So, the clubs gained workers and voters by providing legal assistance and using their political connections (Tager 1988, p. 31). Vertical machine politics still remain as a valuable resource for the politicians as well as citizens. In the contemporary age, it is the nonprofit community organizations that are found in the core center for distribution of public services to the needy in the USA. Such nonprofit groups form an important section of the American Civil Society. These organizations have been found to be involved in reciprocal services with their clients and government executives. Through the exchange of basic services to the community they engage in producing reliable voting constituencies. Naturally, government officials (Mayor, Governor) are interested to allocate public service funds to community organizations that can ensure their necessary votes. It is a three way indirect exchange among the community organizations, their clients who are also voters and the elected officials (Marwell 2004, p. 178). In this way the non-political, nonprofit groups in America also serve as the fulcrum through which patronage resources are distributed and voters are organized. Besides, political party’s control over specific types of civil society organizations is evident in USA politics. For example, religion and religious groups have always played an important role in politics and elections. During the Presidential elections, it has been seen that the Churches though they are officially nonprofit and non-political organizations, have been used as an important mean to raise voters’ support for the Republican candidates (Krirkpatrick 2004). Republican campaign officials cultivate conservative leaders belonging to Evangelicals and other religious traditionalist from Mainland Protestant and Catholics and sought to link their communities with the electoral machine (Guth et al. 2006, p. 224). Despite their non-partisan and tax-exempt status, churches in America are found actively involved in registering their members as voters, driving them to the polls, distributing bumper stickers and campaign materials and inviting Republican speakers. On the other hand, for long it was taken for granted that majority votes from the labor unions will go to the Democrats (Prewitt et al. 1991). Labor unions in the USA had subordinated themselves to the Democrat Party. In the same Presidential election when churches campaign for the Republican candidate, the labor unions contribute a large amount of funds to the Democratic campaign (Aronowitz 2005, pp. 276–277). Naturally, the labors and their unions can hardly execute their different demands for labor reform or minimum wage raise, etc. under a Republican regime. Not only in the USA but also in Great Britain the labor union members are found to be bound to pay the Labour Party in the name of the political levy. Political levies mean the contribution, the labor union members pay to the union’s political fund separately or as part of the normal union subscription (Pyper 2013). Though each union member has the right to personally contract out from paying such political

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levy, he/she hardly can do so, as he/she has to consider the collective interest and personal interest from the union and its leader that may stop due to such decision. So, through rules and norms, union members in Britain have been found to be compelled to pay a part of their hard-earned wages to the Labour Party, besides their vote. In an old estimate, a handsome portion of the income of the national headquarters of the Labour Party comes from the trade union affiliation fees (Chris 2009). When Labour Party ran into debt in 2006, the contribution of the trade unions had become vital. However, there is no guarantee that the labor party will always go for policies that assure the interest of labors in the age of liberalization and privatization. So, the socio-political democratic environment that is considered to be the ideal for the emergence of autonomous, vigorous CSOs face the same type of vertical political controls directly or indirectly. The situation becomes severe and distinct in developing countries where the political institutionalization is at a low level, so is the capacity of the state. This chapter compares the situation with that in India, Philippines, and Pakistan, and tries to relate to the case of Bangladesh. All the four countries have colonial legacies and experience the presence of strong kinship and clientelism, corruption in the social and political life and they have a multiplicity of registration and regulation laws (especially in South Asia). In all four cases, donor policy to strengthen civil society has shown both success and failure with ramifications. But they vary in their performance in achieving democracy. Political institutions have played different roles in shaping the civil society and influencing its nature of democracy. The comparative focus on other three developing democracies demonstrates how political actors in different guises or forms hold the actual control of the civil society and democracy. This helps to proceed further with the analysis of political, structural influence that the civil society of Bangladesh faces. Before entering into the main discussion, it will be helpful if readers have some idea about the general environment where these civil societies are performing. To get an overall understanding the democratic situation of the four country ratings by The Freedom House on political and civil liberties has been consulted. The two years 2006 and 2019 have been selected here, because, it was 2006 when the basic civil society survey of the research was conducted and 2019 when the updated manuscript for the book was written. The rating is based on the interplay of both governmental and nongovernmental actors upon the political rights and civil liberties of the citizens of each country. Democracy and civil society are concerned with both these political rights and civil liberties and the rating does support the position of each country made in the comparative figure. India has been termed free both in 2006 and 2019. This reflects stable democracy in India, though there have been remarkable political changes in India. On the other hand, the civil liberties of India and that of partly free Philippine were same (3) for both 2006 and 2019, this refers to almost the similar working environment for the CSOs. The weak state and powerful political elites have caused political rights of the Philippines to come down to 3. The rating for Pakistan in 2006 reflects the failed democracy and weak civil society, however, the political and social condition has changed in Pakistan and the country has been promoted to a partly free

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Table 3.1 Freedom House rating for four countries in 2006 and 2019 Score indicator Political rights score Civil liberties right Status

India** 2006 2019 2 2

The Philippines** 2006 2019 3 3

Bangladesh** 2006 2019 4 5

Pakistan** 2006 2019 6 5

3

3

3

3

4

5

5

5

Free

Free

Partly free

Partly free

Partly free

Partly free

Not free

Partly free

Source: Freedom house website http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page¼1, internet access 25th November, 2007. (The methodology of the freedom house survey is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development. The survey operates from the assumption that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies. The survey ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm? page¼351&ana_page¼298&year¼2006).) and https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-worldfreedom-2019 internet access on 26.01.2020 **The rating is done on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means the highest degree of freedom and civil liberties and 7 means less degree of freedom and civil liberties

country in the recent years. Bangladesh’s position from the point of political rights and also civil liberties are lower than both India and Philippines. This naturally refers that the space for the civil society to act independently and participate in government actions and influence policies is limited. Though general elections have been conducted timely in Bangladesh since 2008, and there have been a stable rule of a political bloc, the political liberty and civil rights situation in Bangladesh have deteriorated. In both cases it has been rated 5 in 2019, while they were rated 4 in 2006 when the country was facing political turmoil (Table 3.1).

3.2.1

Stable But Partly Illiberal Democracy-India

3.2.1.1

Nature of the Political System

In comparison with the experience with other South Asian countries, democracy in India has proved resilient (Hasan 2002, p. 1) though India lacks a homogenous population and it is geographically a large state. Since independence, there is a stable parliamentary system of government. So far, seventeen general elections for the lower house, followed by the peaceful handover of power, have been conducted. Though an advanced industrial economy, high level of education, shared civic culture—are generally expected preconditions for democracy, democracy had been endured and grown in the country since 1950s. The most important political institutions, state and political parties are well institutionalized as well as the Indian citizens are considered to be politically cultured. Such combination is said to have

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brought democratic stability in India (Hasan 2002). A common prediction is that the Indian National Congress Party (INC)1 with its secular ideology has been able to bond and bring unity among heterogeneity existing in the different provinces that ultimately brought stability and democracy in India. However, it is not the only bonding forces behind the powerful India in the recent years. Another, powerful and popular pro-Hindu political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is now ruling India for the last six years. BJP had come to power before from 1998 to 2004. The civil society has been found to be in different states due to the regime change in India. Though democratic, India remains a developing country with a poor human development index and low literacy rate.2 Again, the gap between the rich and poor, social stratification, communalism, ethnic and religious violence all reflects the existence of uncivil elements in the society. Zakaria (2003, pp. 110–114) also mentions corruption, control of the judiciary, and taking opportunity of social divisions and went to the extent to term India an illiberal democracy.

3.2.1.2

Profile of the Civil Society

It also must be admitted that India has associational culture long before the Indian state came into being. The modern organizational forms began to emerge around 1870s in the form of social movements (such as Brahma Samaj, Arya Samaj), naturally they had political and social contents. Gandhism generated peaceful political protest and independence movement. The Congress Party itself was a civil society organization during the last half of the nineteenth century. It is only in the 1980s and 1990s; India saw the predominance of the non-political NGOs (Sen 1993, p. 11). Contemporary researchers consider Indian civil society to be robust, occupying significant space in the dynamic of the political landscape of the country (Behar and Prakash 2004). It is not only religious philanthropy or charity organizations and development NGOs, but, Indian civil society is rich in indigenous welfare organizations, cooperatives and they are supported by research organizations formed and nurtured through local initiatives. Non-Party social movements like Narmada Bachao Andolan and Chipko Movement, are also found at local level of the society in different parts of the nation. The identity movements, which often turn violent and enter the political realm, in most cases originate in the civil society arena. The movement against corruption led by Anna Hazare that have tapped a large constituency of citizens belonging to the middle and upper class (Kishwar 2011) formed a national character. Vibrancy in associational tradition was present in India before. The vibrancy is also found today in different forms. 1

Indian National Congress at the beginning of twentieth century pioneered the movement against the British that brought independence to India in 1947. This party has led the central government altogether 54 years. On seven general elections the party won outright majority and on three more elections though it did not have the majority but formed coalition government with the support of other parties. 2 However, India has developed itself as a world leader in information and technology.

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3.2.1.3

3 Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

Political Structures and Civil Society

However, in a contrary opinion, prominent researcher on political parties in India, Chibber (1999), terms the Indian democracy as a democracy without associations. His way of analysis follows the Neo-Tocquevillean model. Naturally, he terms the associational life in India as weak. The traditional associations like trade unions and student groups are often directly linked to political parties. To him rural organizations are few and are outcome of state policies and have no influence on rural or agricultural policy of the state. Though the business organizations are large in number they are not the outgrowth of interest group activity. There are strong informal caste organizations, but Chibber (1999, pp. 58–62) do not consider those as associations and have mentioned that other religious sects and associations have stayed out of the electoral politics. He considers most of the civil society organizations in India as ad hoc—lacking bureaucratic organizations, with a tendency of excessive multiplication and fragmentation. As INC was not tied to any particular type of association, it easily converted itself into a catch-all party. Weak associational life made room for patronage politics and provided the parties larger role in Indian politics. As the associations were weak, the INC’s links to social cleavages were constructed via the distribution of state resources rather than by establishing links to associations of social groups. This means that though theoretically India has a vibrant civil society, it has not yet been to flourish as a vigilant one due to powerful political influences. The vigilant nature of the civil society has turned into a more vulnerable situation under the BJP rule. BJP has targeted civil society even before it came to power, rather used it as a mean or tool to gain power. A hierarchically ordered communal social organization named Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Volunteers Corps (RSS) through their social, cultural, religious, military, and political programs gathered massive support from the majority Hindus in Northern India. This resulted in electoral victories in several states for its political wing—BJP, which ultimately formed the national government in 1998. RSS has formed its mass support and mobilized public opinion to their chauvinist aim, mainly through building bonding social capitals. Such social capital was developed through holding religious mass processions, working through affiliated welfare groups in the guise of NGOs, consolidating Hindu bloc vis a vis the minorities and developing a non-Indian identity for the Muslims, and ultimately mobilizing RSS supporters to vote for BJP (Behar and Prakash 2004, pp. 211–218). RSS can hardly be termed a civil society organization from its modern definition or just a political organization. Rather, such force is termed as “dark side of civil society.” However, through a fully democratic process in the 2004 general election BJP lost to the Congress Party and Congress lead coalition formed the new government. Despite its communal and uncivil character the RSS respected the national consensus on democratic and peaceful institution of changing power and accepted the democratic rule of the political game. A democratic culture has developed among the political actors that have brought stability.

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An update about the civil society and the influence of political structures is not an optimistic one. In 2014, the BJP came back to power and the political party also won the 2019 disputed election (Britannica, 2019b: BJP).In its second and third term in power, BJP regime has become tougher on the modern civil society organizations, mainly NGOs and civil rights groups. There have been always surveillances on the flow of information. The inflow of foreign money to the NGOs and its application are strictly scrutinized by the government. Registration of several NGOs has also been canceled. Advocacy groups protesting discrimination, religious racism, human rights violation are always facing government persecution in different ways (Chaney 2019; Vaid and Shetty 2018; CIVICUS 2017).

3.2.1.4

In Comparison to Bangladesh

So from a democratic liberal model the civil society situation in India is not satisfactory and to some extent resembles with that of Bangladesh where the democracy is unstable. With a strong and stable democracy, the civil society is expected to be strong, vigilant. However, the fact reveals that partially the civil society is politically controlled as shown by Chibber, moreover, it contains uncivil forces. But at the same time, there are the presence of associational culture among the society and the presence of autonomous non-partisan civil society movements and NGOs working for social development. Such civil society can hardly be given the major credit to the democratic stability in India. Rather the political consensus that exists among the political actors may be considered the main reason. On the other hand, civil society, in spite of the historical tradition of associations has turned weak, politicized, and even communal due to the political forces. The condition of the civil society in India is no better than that of Bangladesh, though India’s level of liberty and political rights is much better, and the democracy is much stable.

3.2.2

Elitist Democracy—The Philippines

3.2.2.1

The Nature of the Political System and Democracy

The Philippines is a republic with a presidential system of government, where the powers are equally divided among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The country is well known for its vibrant civil society as well as for mass democratic movements, especially the movement against President Marcos in 1986. However, democracy is yet to be institutionalized in the country. Rather, scholars often term it as Elitist Democracy (Franco 2004) or Undemocratic Democracy (Rocamora 2004, p. 1996). Elite domination in politics has contributed to weak state and low level of effective political participation. Strong landed capitalist and financial interests and other political rent-seekers have penetrated the Philippine state and influenced the national and local government policies (Angeles 2004, p. 196). They enjoy monopolistic control over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial

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jurisdictions. Corruption is rampant among the public officials who have ranked the Philippines as the 113th least corrupt state out of 183 states with a score of 34 out of 100 (TI 2020). In contrast to India and even Bangladesh, the major political parties of the Philippines are not well organized rather found under oligarchic control. There are more than 100 political parties which often form coalition centering around a particular political leader and become active only during the election season. Political parties have been rather considered as vast national coalitions of local political organizations, bound together by the vertical hierarchy of public offices and their rewards and social hierarchy of wealth. Many parties in fact are just vehicles for presidential ambitions and turncoats (Rocamora 2004, pp. 207, 211). Dynastic politics is a common culture in the political system. These elite oligarchic groups who control the electoral process may broadly be divided into two groups: Traditionalist (Trapo) and Populists. The traditionalists are the long established political elites with control over land and economic wealth. The populist came into the political arena, challenging the traditionalists in 1998. However, this group also undermined the impartial democratic institutions by concentration of political power in their own hands (Lorch 2017, p. 5). It is only the left bloc that constitutes significant organized political force resisting the rule of the oligarchic elite (Quimpo 2007). However, they are also divided, sometimes co-opted, and have often reentered into politics in the form of civil society to confront the state, mobilize the public, and also assist development.

3.2.2.2

Profile of the Civil Society

In the absence of well organized, programmatic, and national based political parties in the Philippines and with the opportunity of the 1991 Local Government Code3 and the Party List act 1995 (RA 7941),4 it was naturally expected that the civil society in the Philippines shall come out in the front line as an important political actor (Kawanaka 2002). The Philippines is reputed to have the world’s densest NGO network. Not only in numbers, but the vigor and scale of activities are also vast. Moreover, large group of NGO coalitions do have actually entered electoral politics. However, the civil society can hardly be termed successful in consolidating democracy or bringing political stability in the country.

3 1991 Local Governmental Code (LGC) operationalized the provision for strengthening local autonomy through decentralization. It devolved power and resources to local government units at the provincial, city, municipal and barangay level and allowed for people’s participation in local government and development. Civil society groups saw the law as a real opportunity to influence the local political process (Franco 2004, p. 115). 4 It is a complicated law that introduced proportional representation (Franco 2004, p. 116). The law attracted or rather provided a legal opportunity for the civil society groups to enter electoral politics. The most glaring instances is the Akbayan political block formed by likeminded civil society groups including the progressive development NGOs and also some factions of the left politicians.

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Mostly two broad formations of civil society are observed in the Philippines— indigenous left based movement and foreign funded associations. Left based people’s organization has been actively involved in the struggles for peasants issues, agrarian reform, land grabbing, recognition of land titles, and land conversion besides their direct moves for democracy. But in the process, they have been found to be factionalized and some sections became co-opted by the political elites. Foreign funded NGOs were meant for advocacy work and were considered as non-partisan, which was opposite of the fact. The two different formations of civil society groups have moved on simultaneously, but not in a parallel way but through alignment and contestation. A distinct section of the foreign funds receiving PO/NGOs was aligned to the left.

3.2.2.3

Influence of the Political Structures

Since 1990s, the PO/NGOs have become increasingly assertive, not only in development effort, but also in the democratization process acting as powerful interest groups. Along with different left parties, the progressive NGO coalitions formed themselves into Akbayan, as a loose non-Party formation, but acting as a precursor of a party. Based on the party list law 1995, Akbayan began electoral politics (Rocamora 2004, p. 218; Quimpo 2007, pp. 7–8). A project for electoral movement of the NGO community was launched in 2001, where it was proposed that the NGO alliances and the left bloc shall intervene in four ways—raising political awareness, lobbying for electoral reform, developing people’s platform, and giving actual support to specific candidates. However, Quimpo (2007) considers such electoral movement of civil society as faulty as it became divided and factious and has not been able to emerge as an important political force against the corrupt politics and elite democracy. The fact, is multi-layered, fractious civil society has been both bane and boon to the democratization in Philippine. Civil society interactions have helped to extend the reach of democratic rights and freedoms to previously excluded populations and have expanded political competition. But unintentionally they have also served to revive or reinforce anti-reform elite interest (Franco 2004, p. 127). Civil society actors have become successful in influencing the policies only by allowing themselves to be co-opted by either the traditional or populist elites. Different types of CSOs have formed part of different coalition and supported the presidential bids of both traditional politicians and populist. In return, the civil society leaders received membership in the cabinet of the successful president and access to his/her patronage system. Over factionalism and contestation within the dominating elites had even led several civil society leaders to reach out to military camps, causing unsuccessful coup attempts in 2006 (Lorch 2017, p. 5). Moreover, though the civil society has entered electoral politics in the Philippines, the capacity building and strengthening of organizations at the grass-roots level are still in their infancy. Their intervention is limited with low sustainability and marred by petty politics (Angeles 2004, p. 199).

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Clarke (2013) in his extensive research has shown that civil society in the Philippines is controlled by the elites and working for the benefits of this class, moreover, causing anti-developmental impacts of the political system. Civil society here has developed in a distinctly non-linear manner, independent of the regime type or development, rather it is dependent on the change and involvement in the political economy. From the brief discussion, it becomes clear that the Philippines is very rich in different types of civil society organizations and enjoys strong network. Though such civil society is very active and often successful in staging movements to topple down corrupt regimes, it fails to influence the state policies in day to day politics. In the absence of well-organized and competitive parties and with the introduction of new laws for widening people’s presentation, civil society coalitions have entered the electoral politics and earned a significant position in the political society. However, such processes are also not free from the strong elite influence that have divided and fictionalized the civil society. Moreover, the state is also weak and controlled by political elites and society is marred by nepotism, patron–client relations, violence, etc. So, the relatively free, well networked and politically advanced civil society in the Philippines has a long way to go to contribute effectively to change the brand—from elite democracy to liberal or participatory democracy. And again, though not in the form of political party or national leaders, but as oligarchs, the elite community controls the nature and level of democracy and also the strength and success of civil society in the Philippines.

3.2.2.4

In Comparison to Bangladesh

The civil society strength, network, and political environment of the Philippines, in contrast to Bangladesh, are in a much better position. However, from the consideration of democratic stability, both the countries face similar types of unrest, upheavals, and instability. Again, from the consideration of the political actors, Philippine state, bureaucracy, and society, under the Presidential system of government, are controlled by the political elites. On the other hand, in the Bangladeshi parliamentary system, it is the political parties who control the state. In a comparative study on the two civil societies using the Tsukuba –JIGS survey data (Blair 2015, pp. 174–175), it has been revealed that, civil societies of both the countries are vivid and active. While civil society in the Philippines is more concerned with advocacy, their counterpart in Bangladesh is busy in providing services. But in both cases, their performance depends on the nature of the political structure. The civil society in the Philippines is involved in politics, sometimes they even act as the kingmaker or supporters of the opposition block. Civil society organizations have even entered the election battle. These facts can hardly be expected in Bangladesh in the near future. Moreover, just like the civil society in Bangladesh, the civil society in the Philippines has a glorious past for engaging in movements against autocracy. Despite the fact, civil society here can hardly contribute to positive change to the democratic process. Rather, the civil society is acting at the wish and interest of the political elites and their leaders. At the end of the day both the civil societies in

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Bangladesh and the Philippines are found to be controlled and co-opted by the political structures, compromising their autonomy.

3.2.3

Military Controlled Democracy—Pakistan

3.2.3.1

Nature of the Political System and Regime Style

Pakistan is an instance of failed democracy among the modern nation-states in the developing world. All attempts for the democratization since its independence in 1947 have failed and always the state power went back in the hands of the autocratic rulers. The military has ruled Pakistan for 30 years in its political history. Conflicting relations with its neighbors like India and Afghanistan also has a grave influence upon its national security and democratic health. The country had been under the long spell of military rule with only a short period of democratically elected governments (1988–1999, 2009 to present) which were again scarred by instability, corruption, misrule, political confrontation, and regional violence. The political system poorly differentiates between political democracy and autocratic rule. It is the feudal lords, military generals, and bureaucrats that form the political elite structure in Pakistan. They may have apparent modernist outlook, but too often have resisted measures such as decentralization, accountability, media freedom, land reform, and independence of the judiciary (Malik 1996, p. 681). Anti-pluralism and rigid administrative machinery have contributed to the undemocratic development in Pakistan. Political parties in Pakistan are ideologically and organizationally weak (Malik 1996) and never had been well-integrated to be able to mediate between the state and society (Adeney and Wyatt 2004, p. 11). These parties remain desperate to maintain their traditional bases of support, always under the domination of the old feudal and big business interests (Shah 2004, p. 378). Alike the political parties of Bangladesh, political parties in Pakistan prefer to engage in conflict, making use of populist political appeals for street agitation tress passing the parliamentary norms. They are vulnerable to official manipulation and are always accused of impotence and corruption by the central state authorities. Even during the civil era, the army has a strong control over the strings of politics. Though, the party governments are sworn in after a general election, they cannot win or form the government without the blessings of the army and the party can stay in office as long as the army is satisfied. The incumbent regime of Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-eInsaf (PTI) is also considered to be backed and controlled by the army (Fair 2018). Lack of democracy and constitutionalism have also kept the various regional and ethnic forces outside of the mainstream politico-economic institution while often co-opted and used by the state for political gains. The state policy is imposing and establishing one Pakistani identity than ensuring autonomy and pluralism. Naturally under such centralized rule where the political process is often suspended and opposition is suppressed, civil society can hardly gain strength to influence political change and democracy.

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3 Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

Profile of the Civil Society

Civil society in Pakistan from consideration of the number of NGOs, associations, and voluntary groups does not fall behind other developing countries, however, they are mostly urban-based and are not spread across the country in a balanced way (Sattar and Baig 2001, pp. 6–7; Shah 2004, p. 367). However, political uncertainty had led to a weak civil society in Pakistan. Overall, civil society participation and impact on state policies are insignificant. Low levels of institutional development, weak organizational skills, and poor internal transparencies characterize most of the prominent NGOs which are often foreign funded (Shah 2004, pp. 367–368; Sattar and Baig 2001). Membership is low for all types of organizations. Just like Bangladesh and India, there exists a multiplicity of registration laws. The nature of the application of the law by the authorities is more important than the nature of rigidness or flexibility in the rules themselves. In contrast to the Philippines, NGOs in Pakistan lack strong network and coalition among themselves. Civil society in Pakistan has moved in two very different trends. One trend represents the urban, modern, liberal/secular, cultured, and conscious groups consisting of lawyers, reporters, professionals, students, associations, and well-known families. The other trend represents the peripheries consisting of ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and clan-based organizations (Bhattacharya 2016, p. 28). While considering the case of Pakistan, local religious organizations like madrasas, shrine, seminaries, and jirgas need to be included in the mapping of civil society, as these organizations are pretty large in number and have profound influence in the society and politics in both positive (voluntarism) and negative (violence) ways. Such civil society has failed to play any important role in promoting harmony among multiplicity of religions, castes, ethnicities, and cultures (Sattar and Baig 2001). However, it has been observed that the faith based organizations have higher influence on government policies than the NGOs and advocacy groups. Along with their alliance, national security elites, religious groups, continue to restrict the socio-political space available to weaker civil organizations and often try to replace and subvert opponents in civil society. Pakistan’s role in international politics and its policies with the neighboring Afghanistan and its jihadist forces have made the Pakistan case serious and severe. The conflict is so violent that protesting means death. Survival of the teenage girl named Malala from such brutal violence in retaliation for her initiative to educate women, leading her to the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014, only indicates the graveness of the situation. The role of civil society in the context of terrorism is dual faceted, as there are groups and organizations supporting as well as condemning the terror activities. Run mostly by religious-political parties, few so-called welfare associations are actually teaching centers for the militants (Bhattacharya 2016, p. 27).

3.2 Influence of Political Structures Upon Civil Society from a Comparative. . .

3.2.3.3

69

Political Structures and Civil Society

Necessary political institutionalization and social flexibility for the development of both vibrant and vigilant natures of civil society are absent in Pakistan. Moreover, in contrast to Bangladesh, civil society in Pakistan is non-partisan (Shah 2004, pp. 378, 386). In fear of losing autonomy, civil society groups hardly collaborate with political parties. The civil society does not trust the political elites in Pakistan, because of their impotencies, nepotism, corruption, and their politics of polarization and confrontation (Hassan and Sabir 2011, p. 339). This has been further reinforced by the depoliticization of the society by the military rulers. Moreover, these civil society organizations, both NGOs and advocacy groups, partly depend on the state for their economic survival. Far from resisting autocratic rule or altering the political system, a large section of this depoliticized civil society has taken the policy to derive privilege and benefit from the state whether military or civilian. The civil society that avoids political parties to avoid losing autonomy gives up their independence and economic freedom to the state apparatus. Civil society is rather embedded in the state via both co-optation and coercion. It is only the bar association and the press who often unites, gain strength to protest the violation of constitutional norms. The lawyers of Pakistan during 2007 and 2008 had shown extraordinary instances of non-violent struggle, civil society participation that had changed the political landscape of the country in unexpected ways. The lawyers movement began as an appeal for the restoration of an independent judiciary that moved well beyond lawyers and reached the heart of the civil society. This non-violent civil movement had two scale successes to make the regimes bent to its demands. The lawyer’s movement led to the resignation of the autocratic rule of General Pervez Musharraf and also made the successive democratic government to restore the independence of the judiciary (Ahmed and Stephan 2010; Phelps 2009, p. 7). However, such unity, mass participation, and non-violent success lost its continuation in the following years, though the incident was considered as the glowing instance of the civil society potential to influence democratic change (Zaidi 2008). During the short-lived democratic regimes under the party rules in Pakistan (1988–1999 and 2009 to present) civil society organizations did have some opportunity or space to act freely and even protest against the party regimes (Shah 2004, pp. 363, 371). Nevertheless, Shah (2004) also has mentioned about the state-civil society friction during this period, for example, NGO Bill 1996 to control their activity, harassing the press, etc. However, here also, civil society has been found to be rather politicized and co-opted. What is different is that, civil society is not co-opted by the state apparatus, but by the political parties who often use their governmental powers. From the instance of Bangladesh, the possibility of Pakistani civil society to emerge as a strong political force under Democratic Party rule also remains under question. The post Pervez Musharraf regimes(Jardari regime, Sarif regime, and Khan regime) have also been accused of oppressing the opposition and bending to the demands of the religious organizations and indulging into corruption (Siddiqui 2019; DW 2015).

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3.2.3.4

Comparison with Bangladesh

It becomes clear that though not matured and vibrant as that of in Bangladesh, the civil society in Pakistan is active and has democratic potential that have shown once with the leadership of the lawyers. They have succeeded, though followed non-violent methods. Despite this positive attribute and happening, the civil society in Pakistan could hardly contribute to the consolidation of democracy here. In comparison to Bangladesh, the service providing ability of the NGOs for social development in Pakistan is far behind. The reasons behind the weakness of the civil society to work for democracy, human rights as well as social services are to be found in the mentality of the ruling elites whether political or military. The political actors have been found to be uncomfortable and intolerant with the civil right activists as well as NGOs, especially receiving foreign donations. Another reason is the rightist religious forces rooted deep inside the society. This section has powerful influence both upon the society and as well as the political elites. Modern civil society is yet to form the strength to overcome this influence. Though civil society in Bangladesh has ended dealing with the status-quo and religious local elites long ago, the case of Pakistan continues for ages and Indian civil society now have begun fighting with its dark side too. Ultimately, it is the political structures and social forces that determine the nature and success of the civil society despite its vibrancy and democratic potentials.

3.3

Position of Bangladesh Civil Society and Democracy in Comparison to Other Asian Countries

From the abridged discussion about the civil societies of India, the Philippines and Pakistan and the brief introduction of the civil society in Bangladesh made in Chap. 1, few points become evident. Civil societies in all four countries have wonderful past, where they have contributed to movements for independence, and against autocratic regimes. But their success and strength to act as a watchdog upon the State, during the peaceful time can hardly be observed. More or less, associational culture is part of these old and strong societies. Social service and social development have always been an important agenda for these civil society organizations. However, they are very much prone to be influenced by the uncivil or dark forces in the society that may drive these CSOs to behave totally contrary to what they are expected to do in the Neoliberal and Neo-Gramscian model. Ultimately, it is found that the strong political status-quo or the political structures are responsible for the performance of the CSOs. How, they grow, how they gain strength, to what extent their autonomy is preserved or respected, totally depend on what the social forces and political structures will. In all cases, civil society to some extent has been directly or indirectly controlled and co-opted by the political powers, whether it may be the political parties, or political elites or the state (in case of Pakistan) itself. But

3.3 Position of Bangladesh Civil Society and Democracy in Comparison to Other Asian. . .

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Table 3.2 Comparative information about nature of democracy and civil society level in four countries Countries India The Philippines Bangladesh Pakistan

Nature of democracy Stable but partly illiberal Elite dominated Confrontational and illiberal Military controlled

Vigilant nature of civil society Partially vigilant, partially politicized, partially uncivil Politically active with strong network but divided Less participatory, politicized and polarized Weak, fragile, but with democratic potential

Prime influencing factors Political party and uncivil forces Political elites-land owners, business class Political parties and political leaders Political elites, military rulers, and the cultural-religious sentiment

the nature of civil society and democracy has been found functioning at different stages and level in these countries. The brief discussion on Bangladesh in Chap. 1 and more details to be found in Chap. 4 also points out the strong influence of the political forces in determining the nature and strength of civil society as well as the type of democracy that is confrontational and illiberal. Table 3.2 provides a simplified idea of the nature of democracy and the strength of civil societies of four Asian countries having political actors as the prime influencing factor. All four states officially declare themselves as democracy. However, they are in different stages and levels in the process of democratic consolidation. Column two of Table 3.2 provides democracy labels for each country based on the nature and stages of their democratization process towards achieving democratic consolidation. Column three labels the nature of the civil society and column four points out the most influential structure in shaping the nature of the civil society for the four Asian nations. Such labeling has been done based on our discussion in this chapter. In case of India, civil society has been used by the parties in both ways for democracy and communalism. India is the largest and oldest democracy in Asia. Congress Party emerged powerful in the absence of strong civil society organizations pushing for important strategic policies while BJP came to political power by using the civil society for motivating the voters with their communal sentiments. Only a few environmental movements have been able to show their independent strength and confronted the state and political power. This is why the democracy of India has been labeled stable but illiberal too. On the other hand, in the Philippines, a strong network may be observed among civil society groups which has reached the extent to form political blocs, joined by left politicians and has entered electoral politics. However, they have also been found to be factious and influenced by political oligarchs, thus yet to overcome the elite democracy. Though the Philippines enjoys the status of democracy for a pretty long time, it is yet to be consolidated and most scholars agree unanimously that the democracy is elite dominated and so is the civil society (Rocamora 2004; Quimpo 2007; Franco 2004; Clarke 2013; Lorch 2017).

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In case of Pakistan, it is the military state that has controlled the development and nature of the action of the civil society and the democratic political governments have always oppressed them. Similar to India, here is also a nexus between the evil forces of the civil society, military elites, and the political actors. The democracy in Pakistan is very fragile and has a very short history of democratic governments which also had been disrupted by military takeovers from time to time. Though in the last one decade there had been civilian rule with parliamentary democracy in Pakistan, no regime could stay in power unless the military approved them from behind the scene. Naturally it has been labeled as military controlled democracy in Table 3.2. Bangladesh also shows the strong influences of political parties upon the society where the citizens and civil society groups have become co-opted and divided and acting for the political end of these parties. Though apparently, the Bangladesh has a parliamentary system of democracy with numerous civil society organizations active in both local and national levels, these civil society organizations hardly can play any vigilant role.

3.4

Conclusion

Civil society and its potential to contribute to democracy are determined not by any single factor. However, in combination of different factors like history, culture, external influence, regulatory framework, it is the political structures that influence the civil society most and simultaneously the nature of democracy. Stable democracy may not necessarily facilitate strong civil society (as it may have been observed in the case of India), so as to strong civil society may not always lead to consolidated democracy (evident from the Philippine case). Rather, it is the political structures and actors, whether they are political parties, or the elites or even the military dictator, who determine the strength of civil society to act in relation to society, politics, and democracy. So, the ultimate power to change the society, bring democracy, and strengthen civil society is in the hands of the political decision makers from above not in the people from below. Despite the fact, Bangladesh is formally a democratic country with a constitution that provides all the necessary provisions to ensure civil freedom and political rights to its citizens, practically, neither the civil society nor the democracy may be termed as autonomous and institutionalized. A better idea of the nature and strength of civil society in Bangladesh, in relation to politics and democracy, may be understood, through a detailed analysis of its vibrant and vigilant nature, tracing the most important influencing factors to such attributes. The following chapter focuses on the civil society and political situation in Bangladesh to reach to a better understanding of the critical arguments made for the present research in the first two chapters.

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Chapter 4

Civil Society and Political Structures in Bangladesh

Abstract This chapter discusses in detail about the vibrant and the vigilant nature of the civil society in Bangladesh. Revealing the civil society’s development and its interaction with other political structures in the political system and identifying the most influencing structure in relation to civil society’s participatory performance are the prime objective of this chapter. The impacts of culture, registration system, donor policy, and the flow of foreign funds have been discussed to understand the vibrant attributes. The political structures like elites, patron–client relations, political parties, as well as the internal features and divisions found within civil society organizations and the civil society networks have been discussed in connection to the vigilant attribute of the civil society. Special attention has been given to the political parties to understand how these structures develop their social support and use the civil society as a mean to achieve their political ends. The chapter ultimately sorts out the political structures that are mostly responsible in shaping the civil society, its strength, network, and its capacity to influence politics and democracy. Keywords Structural influence · Political party · History · Polarization · Vertical relation · Corruption · Patron–client norms

4.1

Introduction

The focus of the book is the civil society of Bangladesh, particularly in relation to politics. In the last chapter, we compared the civil societies in India, Philippines, and Pakistan. Unlike other countries, the Bangladesh case reveals that the political structures in formal and informal ways do shape the civil society and decides its capacity to influence politics and democracy. However, the factors influencing the civil society may not be the same for all countries. Again, within a state, the level of influence of particular political structure upon the civil society may not be the same. I would like to mention again that, for structures, this research considers both formal machineries of the government as well as the informal practices and socio-political

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_4

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systems. This means that, executive, legislature, courts, administration, International society, political parties, political leaders, elites as well as culture, political culture, history, sentiment, ideology, social networks are all under consideration for understanding the civil society pattern. This chapter shall focus on the civil society, both from its vibrant and vigilant nature while inquiring the factors that have contributed to its present shape and nature of influencing the political system. Civil society in its present meaning was active in Bangladesh through its history so far known. Raja Ram Mohan Roy’s social reform movement or Nawab Abdul Latif’s Education Movement lead the society to progress and development during the colonial rule. Again, the formation of Congress, Muslim League ultimately brought Independence from the British colonial rulers. Socio-political history of Bangladesh since then to the present always provides evidence of an active and vibrant civil society, contributing in 1952 Language Movement, in Six Point Movement for autonomy in 1966 and for independence in 1971 as well as for restoring democracy in 1990. Despite such glorious role of civil society in present and past, Bangladesh still remains a developing country struggling for democratic consolidation.

4.2

Level of Vibrancy of Civil Society in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, where the state has failed to provide the necessary social security to all its citizens, most of the CSOs are social welfare based, trying to solve the social and materialistic needs in a private way or in cooperation with the state agencies. Such trend of the civil society inspired the way for well-organized NGOs and cooperatives, welfare groups, and so on. The density of such CSOs and the success of the NGO sector give Bangladesh civil society a vibrant outlook. With the help of such initiatives of domestic and international NGOs, the poor, uneducated, unaware rural inhabitants of Bangladesh have gained economic empowerment to some extent, have learned to read and write, and gain awareness about sanitation, health, and social rights. Naturally, this must be considered as a progress for rural citizens of Bangladesh. Such welfare based success of the civil society in Bangladesh attracts publicity and world recognition. It must be remembered that this is just one side of the civil society function that showcases success. I term it as the vibrancy of the civil society. Such vibrant nature of civil society organizations can be explained mainly from three perspectives—Philanthropy culture, Donor Policy, Simple registration process.

4.2 Level of Vibrancy of Civil Society in Bangladesh

4.2.1

79

Philanthropy Culture

The large size of welfare NGOs in Bangladesh and their service providing character find their origin and inspiration in the long tradition of religious donation, social voluntarism and this has been accelerated through the events of natural disaster and the Independence War in 1971. The tradition of charity and voluntarism is deep rooted in the religious and social culture of Bangladesh. Even today the family holds the primary responsibility for kin in need (Robinson 1989, p. 391). Such trend is common in both the two prominent religions—Islam and Hinduism, in Bangladesh. Charity has always been cherished as the ultimate form of good deed. Social leaders like Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar (the famous Hindu social reformer and philanthropist of the nineteenth century Bengal) or Muhammad Muhsin (the famous Muslim philanthropist of the nineteenth century Bengal) have been eulogized for their generous help to others and for funding educational endowments (Ahmed and Jahan 2002). Besides, associational culture is another commonly seen in Bangladesh since centuries. Trend to form groups in Bangladesh is common among the urban and rural people living in both the upper and lower social stratifications. We may not find well-organized neighborhood associations like that in Japan (chyonaikai) or other developed countries, but every village in Bangladesh consists of a small society (group) formed by all the dwellers of the village, or a section of the village and led by the village head or local elite (elected member of the local council or school teacher, Imam [prayer leader] of the Mosque, etc.). These informal societies known as shomaj have full control over the social life of the dwellers living within their domain and often perform small arbitrations. Based on this somaj system in the rural areas and mohollas (small area-based neighborhood) at the urban areas, local government system in Bangladesh have been developed. Poverty and natural disaster also have played a big role in encouraging voluntarism and proliferation of service based private organizations. According to Asian Development Bank, in Bangladesh, in 2018, 21.8% people lived under the national poverty line (ADB 2020) and among them 12.9% have been identified as extremely poor by World Bank (World Bank 2017). Naturally the state alone cannot do for their betterment. As Bangladesh is a delta, every year a good portion of the country is inundated by flood. Besides, cyclone and hurricane often blow over the coastal belt. The modern NGO sector can trace its origins to two key events—the 1970 devastating cyclone that left over half a million people dead and War of Independence in 1971 (Goon 2002, p. 142). Not only foreign aided NGOs, but formal and informal community-based groups show their strength during emergency floods and disasters, as often the government and NGO assistance are delayed (Stiles 2002, p. 55).

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4 Civil Society and Political Structures in Bangladesh

Donor Policy

Developing countries rely on donor aid and loan for economic mobilization and development. Donor policy and directions have a profound impact on the economy, politics, and also civil society in a third world country. Since the 1980s, International donors have begun to cooperate with NGOs, bypassing the government on issues like social development, health, educations, etc. During the 1990s, such civil societies have been targeted by Western International development agencies with the aim to generate development and consolidate democracy. This had an impact on their aid distribution and instructions to the state and NGOs (Lewis 2004; Stiles 2002; White 1999). A substantial portion of International aid money has been air marked for development of civil society (Alagappa 2004, p. 4; Hulme and Edward 1997, p. 7; Stiles 2002, p. 1). Since the 1990s with change in donor policy to assist NGOs, Bangladesh has seen a mushrooming growth in its NGO sector. If we consider the statistics of only those NGOs receiving foreign funds and registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) in Bangladesh, then we may observe a constant high rise in the number of NGOs both local and foreign since the 1990s. It has become more than four times higher than it was in 1991 (Fig. 4.1). NGOAB is the sole official entity that controls the flow of foreign grants that are tunneled only for NGOs in Bangladesh. The number of NGOs who enter into subcontracts with the big NGOs for implementing the large development projects has also proliferated. Such indirect foreign funding is sometimes considered as a lucrative opportunity to collect resources for these NGOs. In the fiscal 2004–2005, that is the year before our field survey was conducted, foreign assistant covered 15% of the national budget (113.3 Billion Taka). Among this 113.3 Billion Taka, 13.7% (15.6 Billion Taka1) was disbursed through the NGO Affairs Bureau. If we consider the flow of money, again, dramatic development may be observed (Fig. 4.2). Since 1990, in every five fiscal years, the amount of money has just increased by big leaps. While in 1990–1991 the amount was only 106 million US $, it proliferated up to 323 million US $ in 2005 and in 2019 the yearly amount reached up to 955 million US $. Such flow of foreign funds also had an indirect influence in the rise of other CSOs related to social welfare who do not directly receive foreign funds. In the present research, a steady rise since the 1990s has been found among the sample of CSOs surveyed. Figure 4.3 shows the year of establishment of the CSOs. We may observe that there is a fluctuation in the rise of the curve in the period from 1990 to 1994. But in the following 10 years the rise is pretty rapid. The period of 1990–1994 may be considered as a transition period. After 9 years of autocratic

1 US $ ¼ 68 BD Taka (according to Yahoo Currency converter) http://finance.yahoo.com/ currency? On May 152,007 and in 2019, 1US $ ¼ 83 Taka.

1

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3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Before 1990 1991-1995

1995-2000

2001-2005

2005-2010

2010-2015

2015-2020

Fig. 4.1 Rise of NGOs (registered under the NGOAB), receiving foreign funds in Bangladesh. (Source: NGOAB 2020a, b: List of all NGOs) Released Foreing Grants in Million USD 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 before to 1990

1990-1991 to 1994-95

1995-96 to 1999-2000

2000-01 to 2004-05

2005-06 to 2009-10

2010-11 to 2014-15

2015-16 to 2019-20

Fig. 4.2 Flow of released foreign grants through the NGO Affairs Bureau in Bangladesh. Source: NGOAB (2020a, b): Statistics

military rule, in 1991 the democratic system had been reintroduced in the country and since then the donors also took the policy of relying more on NGOs for their social development projects. Naturally, between these 5 years the necessary structures and rules were developed for further NGO activities. On the other hand, it took time for the civil society organizations other than the NGOs, such as the professional

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Number of CSOs

100

80

60

40

20

0

1910- 19351934 1939

19401944

19451949

1950- 19551954 1959

19601964

19651969

19701974

19751979

19801984

19851989

19901994

19951999

20002006

Period of Establishment

Fig. 4.3 Distribution of surveyed CSOs based on their year of establishment. N ¼ 504, No answer rate ¼ 1 (0.2%)

groups, university based groups, citizens groups to understand the democratic environment and how to move on with more organized activities. This is the reason for the down trend in the curve in 1990–1994 (Fig. 4.3). It must be kept in mind that, Fig. 4.1. shows the number of only NGOs that receives foreign funds and that are registered with NGOAB and Fig. 4.1 shows the trend mostly since 1990. However, the surveyed sample, with which Fig. 4.3 is formed, contains eight types of CSOs that not only include foreign funds receiving NGOs (19%) but also NGOs that do not receive foreign funds, as well as cooperatives, labor groups, trade groups, professional groups, university circles. Though the rest of the CSOs surveyed (81%) do not directly receive foreign funds through the NGOAB, my argument is that, the donor policy to assist the CSOs does have an indirect influence in the steady rise of their establishment number from 1995 to 2006. According to Governance Report 2006 (BRAC 2006, p. 94), between 1995 and 2000 the proportion of rural communities with at least one NGO program doubled. At that time, there was an average of 15 NGOs or NGO branch offices in each sub-district across the country. Such NGO activities are overwhelmingly microcredit programs with education and family planning. Foreign donors have prioritized social welfare, economic development, and other service providing objectives for the NGO projects they finance. Naturally, most organizations grew here with such purposes of social welfare rather than for asserting citizen and human rights and for advocacy. Only, few organizations have adopted right based advocacy projects as instructed by good governance agenda (Lewis 2004, p. 310), but are facing pressure from other actors in the political system. Critiques of foreign aid have pointed out that aid dependency and gradual

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privatization have enhanced political patronage and corruption (Sobhan 1996, p. 16). Sobhan (2004, p. 15) has also termed the foreign funded NGOs as aid contractors. Heavy dependence on external aid is compromising NGOs’ role as social mobilizers and advocate of the poor. Moreover, researchers have revealed different drawbacks and immature development made out of such NGO projects. They have mentioned the problems of commercialization of micro-credit, low level of education, inadequate leadership training, lack of independence among the credit groups from the NGOs, etc. (Ullah and Routery 2003, p. 118; IOB 1998, p. 251). Though there has been a good affluence of NGOs due to donor policies it has been found that they have not been able to develop the habits of group networks and better autonomy, necessary to contribute effectively to good citizenry, politics, and democracy. Four basic impediments have been identified in this connection. First, the donor policy is based on Western theory and experience, second, the influence of the local elites and vertical norms upon the NGOs, third, politicization and bureaucratization of NGOs, and lastly, neglect towards the local collectivity and voluntarism in the international development policy (Tasnim 2007, p. 176).

4.2.3

Registration System

Constitutional Rights and State Law for association formation and regulation has been considered as an important determinate in the nature and shape of civil society in any country. The constitution of Bangladesh guarantees the fundamental freedom to assemble, participate in meetings and processions (article 37), form associations (article 38). Moreover, the constitution assures the freedom of thought, conscience, and speech (article 39) (Government of Bangladesh 2016). Therefore, constitutionally, the basic rights for forming and functioning of civil society organizations are well established in Bangladesh. The legal framework for civil society organizations (CSOs) in Bangladesh is based on a set of old and new laws for incorporation, management structure, responsibilities and liabilities, and regulations. There are diverse registration options and no harmonized nonprofit registration procedure. Two distinct sets of laws in Bangladesh pertain to nonprofit organizations. One set of laws concerns the formation of nonprofit organizations, among them the most important are Societies Registration Act 1860, the Trusts Act 1882, Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration) Ordinance 1961, and the Companies Act 1994, The Waqf Ordinance 1962. The other set of laws regulates these organizations such as the Volunteer Social Welfare Agencies (control) Ordinance 1961, the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Ordinance 1978, 2016, the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Ordinance 1982 (Khair and Khan 2004, pp. 53–55), Microfinance Regulatory Law 2006. The NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) has also been established in 1989 to facilitate the process of bringing foreign funds in a simpler way. Intially NGOAB was conducted under the two acts of Foreing Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulations Ordinance 1978 and Foreign Contributions (Regulations) Ordinance 1982, However, from 2016, NGOAB is guided by Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activties) Regulations Ordinance 1916.

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In addition to these laws, there are particular laws for certain category of civil society organizations under the authority of concerned ministries. For example, all the cooperatives are established according to the rules of Cooperative Act 1984 and 2001 and registered under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.2 Trade Unions are formed and registered, under Labor Law 2006 (revised 2015), registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Bangladesh (Ministry of Labor and Employment 2020). Most of the registered professional organizations are officially formed under the rules of the concerned institutions and ministries. Though it seems that there are a web of laws and regulations upon the civil society in Bangladesh, practically, they are not unified and harmonized, this variety of laws rather ensures less government control and provides better independence to the nonprofit and philanthropy organizations. This has inspired a good number of social groups to register. The conditions for forming groups and register in Bangladesh seem to be much easier than that in Japan or other developed countries. It is the application of the law that is more important to consider in the case of Bangladesh. The loopholes and archaic nature of the laws often provide the opportunity to misuse those by both the government administrators as well as the NGOs. Although existing laws and procedures seek to protect the public from abuse, registration officials exploit their positions to take advantage of those rules (Khair and Khan 2004, p. 66). Moreover, with some controversial provision and rules prepared through circular for NGOs registered with NGOAB, the government can often impose its control on NGO activities and in sanctioning their foreign funds. For example, a circulation mentions that, “no such project would be approved if it offends the feelings of the people of any religion, had adverse effects on the culture and values of the country, or if the project is based on a political program” (Ahmed 2000, p. 389). The interpretation of such rule may be made in different ways. Often, social welfare and civic education programs of certain NGOs are identified as political or anti-cultural and accordingly prosecuted by the government when it thinks that NGO programs are serving against the regime’s political interest. After the 2001 general election, certain NGOs had been blacklisted by the BNP-Jamat coalition government. These NGOs had experienced administrative harassment, even arrests of employee and executives and also blockade of foreign funds (Hossain 2006, pp. 242–245). Again, after the 2008 election, same initiatives had been taken by the new regime (who were the opposition in 2001–2006). NGO laws are being threatened to be revised and reformed time to time, that menace civil society’s autonomy. On the other hand, NGOs have also been accused of misusing the provisions (Ahmed 2000) of the laws and taking opportunity of the weak manpower of the NGO Affairs Bureau (Nobusue 2002, p. 46) and their strong backing from the donor agencies. For example, according to Foreign Donations Regulations Law 1978,

2 Cooperative Law 2001 and Cooperative Rules 2004, collected from the office of the Joint Registrar Directorate of Rural Development and Cooperatives, Rajshahi Division.

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section 3 (1), NGOs must receive state approval before accepting and spending foreign grants. Yet, another law named Exchange Control Regulation Act 1947 allows any person or organization to bring any amount of foreign currency into Bangladesh. Such dual system has provided NGOs the opportunity to bring foreign money without the knowledge of the government. Moreover, while 1860 Registration Act restricts societies to engage in business functions, the 1961 Ordinance allows organizations to gain profit in order to create jobs. At present, both the Laws apply to the same types of civil society organizations. As a consequence, some large NGOs in Bangladesh have flourished simultaneously as service providing and profit oriented organizations. Due to the loopholes in the regulations, the state is also deprived of large amounts of tax (Ahmed 2000, pp. 385–386). Besides, researchers have found that NGOAB is far from strong enough to keep full control over all the NGOs. Even, after audit and inspection, if a complaint is lodged against an NGO, virtually no appropriate actions are taken. Owing to the strong support for NGOs by their donors, the state has had to refrain from its desire to cancel the registration of a number of NGOs and had to even change the head of the NGO Affairs Bureau, who had appeared tough with those that had indulged in regulation at the beginning of the 1990s (Hashemi 1995). After the revising of the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Ordinance 1978 in 2016, NGOAB has become more powerful and gained the ability to cancel registration of the NGOs not only for irregularities in their funds and projects but also for anti-state functions, expressing malicious and decretory statements against the constitution and constitutional bodies of Bangladesh, for subversive activities, financing or sponsoring terror or trafficking of women and children by the NGOs (Sect. 14, Foreign Donation (voluntary) Regulation Act 2016). Since 2002, the NGOAB has canceled registration of 680 NGOs (NGOAB official website).3 Rules and regulations for NGOs and CSOs are not strict but often used and selectively applied in the interest of powerful sides whether it is the government or the big NGOs. Besides, civil society does not consist only of big NGOs; there are other professional groups, small NGOs, welfare groups, clubs, labor unions and cooperatives. Overall, the performance of the civil society in Bangladesh has been found to be weak in relation to politics and democracy. In this context, the present study identifies the more powerful institutional influence upon the civil society in Bangladesh.

4.3

Level of Vigilance of Civil Society in Bangladesh

Civil society from its vigilant aspect is expected to be more concerned with interest articulation, influencing policies, making demands, advocating for certain interest and bringing accountability to the government. These require civil society to come into interaction with the government, upholding their autonomy, engage in

3 http://www.ngoab.gov.bd/site/page/6b921a50-8192-4da3-942d-338870990333/, internet access 9 June 2020.

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advocacy, political educational activities and form strong network among themselves. From these aspects, the CSOs in Bangladesh may be considered weak. Network among the civil society organizations is not strong; they hardly are able to influence policies and often work for the status-quo than the people they represent. Performance of civil society in Bangladesh from vigilant aspect is not satisfactory. The answer to the weakness may be found in the discussion on the contemporary political situation in Bangladesh, the party rule and also to some extent in the history and vertical cultural norms of Bangladesh. However, to understand the contemporary political interrelations and conflicts, it is important to briefly know about the background of political party and civil society relations, nature of their cooperation and conflict in the context of political and social history.

4.3.1

Historical Background for Civil Society and Political Relationship

During the British colonial period the relation between the state and the emerging civic groups rising against the colonial power was naturally confrontational. Western educated local elite in Bengal both Hindu and Muslims introduced educational and social reform movements which subsequently became associated with anti-colonial resistance. Ultimately, these movements led to the formation of Indian National Congress—an official platform for expressing growing national consciousness in 1885 and Muslim League in 1906 in Dhaka, to lobby for Muslim political rights. It is these two organizations, sometimes in parallel ways, sometimes through alliance, and sometimes competitively led the anti-British movement for independent India and Pakistan (Baxter 1984, pp. 17–28). In course of Pakistani rule (1947–1971), the secondary political actors (civil society leaders) of East Pakistan launched numerous protests and movements against what they termed as attempts by the ruling circle of Pakistan, consisting mainly of Punjabs, to impose cultural-economic-political domination upon Bengalis (Mamoon and Roy 1998, p. 16). There was always a coalition between the civil society and politicians, for instance, in the language movement of 1952, Six Point Movement for autonomy in 1966, Mass movement against the General Ayub’s autocratic rule in 1969, and finally the War of Independence 1971. The language movement was first initiated by the student groups and intellectuals backed by the political leaders and afterwards gained support from all sections of the Bengali society in East Pakistan (Jahan 1972, p. 44). On the other hand, the Six Point Movement was initiated by the political party Awami League with necessary theoretical and technical assistance provided by economists and support from different sections of the civil society like businessmen, labor, bureaucrats, even the rural poor (Jahan 1972, pp. 87–89). The War of Independence was a full-fledged movement that gained support from the whole nation and affected almost all citizens of Independent Bangladesh in 1971. Now it is important to know the back ground of the political and social leaders who

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led these historical movements and showed the path to the present generation leaders of Bangladesh. Historically, the roots to the modern political actors in Bangladesh may be found in feudal kinship-based society. Agrarian society of Bengal was always a hierarchical society. The agriculture based vertical patron–client and kinship network that developed in the rural area was extended to the urban area. The same rural elites who had influence upon the social and economic life of the peasants also became the urban political leaders. During the British colonial period and afterwards, the Bangladesh society has been penetrated by the formal political institutions headed by these politicians who had used their vertical networks to maintain their reign upon the society. So the mobilization that has been taken place among the local and rural level has been for the causes of status-quo and urban politicians (Broomfield 1976). The hierarchical rural social system provided the base for the urban political elite structure that continues to the contemporary period. History has also played a role in developing and influencing ideologies that have provided the bases to Bengali Nationalism to realize the much cherished dream of an Independent Bangladesh. However, the same history and ideology have also provided the fuel for identity crisis in Independent Bangladesh. Instead of creating a common purpose and identity, history has created mutual antagonism and distrust among the various political groups (Huq 2011). The role of different groups for and against the causes of Independent Bangladesh during the Liberation War in 1971 and their activities afterwards have provoked ideological division within the nation. Whether citizens should identify themselves as Bengalees or Bangladeshi was central point for debate for a long time. These two identities polarized the nation into two brands of groups. In the 1972 Constitution, the citizenship of Bangladesh was defined as Bengalees (article-6) where language and culture formed the nucleus of an identity separate from Pakistan (Iftekharuzzaman and Rahman 1986, p. 18). In course of events, doubts were raised as to the criterion of a separate identity as distinct from the millions of Bengali speaking people living across the border in West Bengal of India with undistinguishable culture. Obviously, the choice was religious factor. Thus, secularism which formed one of the four state principles was replaced by “Faith in God.” The national identity was changed from Bengalee to Bangladeshi to project the image of Bangladesh as a distinctive Muslim nation. The controversy whether we should call ourselves Bengalee or Bangladeshi went on fire in the 1990s as then both the groups were equally strong and proceeding in a parallel way. It was the historical conflicts tempered by ideological belief that affected consensus building on such a fundamental issue. Besides, the beneficiaries in lingering this identity crisis which polarized the nation were political elites on both sides (Tasnim 2002, pp. 60–61). However, through the 15th Constitutional Amendment, the debate has been brought to an end. After 2011, according to article 6 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, People of Bangladesh shall be known as Bengalees as a nation and as citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis (Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh 2016). However, in 2006, when the survey on civil society organizations was conducted, identity issue was a vital point of ideological conflict between the two blocks. Now we shall delve

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more into contemporary politics with the aim to understand more about the vigilant nature of the civil society.

4.3.2

Confrontational Democracy in Bangladesh

After a successful mass movement against the autocratic military regime in 1990, parliamentary system of government had been reintroduced in Bangladesh. However, after 15 years, in 2006, when the survey took place, democracy was yet to be consolidated in Bangladesh.4 Rather behind the façade of democracy exist instability, weak political institutions, patrimonial politics, personalized political parties, patron–client relation, and absence of political consensus (Kochanek 2000, p. 530). Researchers and scholars have termed such democracy rather partial or quasi-liberal or illiberal democracy (Kochanek 2000; Hossain 2000; Zafarullah 2003). They have pointed out the personality rule of the political leaders of the two major parties and the existing confrontation between them, as well as the mentality of playing a zerosum game in politics. During this democratic era (1990–2006 and afterwards to date), political legitimacy rested on free and fair elections. However, democratic rule in Bangladesh had been subverted by the majoritarianism of the winning party (or the coalition) and as well as by the pique of the losing party (Zafarullah 2003, p. 288). During the 1990s the major political blocks had become divided over conflicting definitions of Bangladeshi identity, national heroes, and liberation war symbols (Kochanek 2000, p. 531). Such division did not remain confined within the political elites but have influenced all social groups willingly or unwillingly. This division had become compounded when dynastic political leaders of the two major parties engaged in bitter, personal struggle to restore their dynastic right to control over the state and polarized the whole nation. Ultimately, such polarization has been used for political expedience that affected the democratic growth of civil society. This was just the opposite to democratic culture that was expected to develop through the reintroduction of democracy in 1990. At the administration level, political factors often determined the choice of people for key positions in the governmental hierarchy, while personnel were shuffled within the civil service and statuary bodies according to partisan agendas, not skill or experience. Policy domain has always been bureaucratized or maneuvered by the ruling party dictates to serve vested political and economic interest. There is very little scope for the policy networks integrating state and advocacy coalition (Zafarullah 2003, p. 285). Intrusion of civil society into policy arena is looked at

In 2020, the year of finalizing this book manuscript, the situation has not improved. The informal bi-party system has changed to dominant party system (Riaz 2016). The present parliament as well as the previous one lacks strong credible opposition from any standpoint. 4

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suspiciously. Though Zafarullah had explained the situation in 2003, the situation is more or less same in 2020. Civil society organizations were discriminated based on their links to ruling party or the opponents, and educational institutions, especially universities and colleges, had been used by the major political parties to further their political objective. The press and private electronic media were relatively free but each newspaper has tilt to either side of the political coalitions and often the private television channels are owned by the political business magnates. Though democratic, practically no regime has provided the enough space and showed responsiveness to the participation of civil society organizations in Bangladesh. The law, society, donor initiative, social tradition have led to the proliferation of civil society organizations. However, confrontational politics played by the two major political parties through the instruments of clientelism, patronage have co-opted, politicized, weakened, and polarized the civil society groups and undermined their ability to participate in the political process, contribute to governance and democracy. In a nutshell, it may be agreed that, with the retreat of the army and subordination of the bureaucracy, Bangladesh had entered Partyarchy5 (BRAC 2006, p. 20). The winning party enjoys a monopoly of power for the duration of their elected term, political decision-making power centers around the Prime Minister’s office (the Prime Minister herself and her closest political advisors). The society and civil society are politicized according to the political line. And such party-society relation is based on clientelistic incorporation. The features are common in regimes with either of the two major political parties and their coalitions who are constantly confronting each other.

4.3.3

Elite Composition: Politics and Civil Society

A brief introduction to the socio-political status of the political elites as well as civil society elites may provide a clear picture of the democracy, politics, and civil society in Bangladesh. The four main actors in Bangladesh politics are the political leaders, bureaucrats, military, and rural landowners. Table 4.1. shows the percentage of parliament members belonging to different occupations in the year 1973 that is just after the independence of Bangladesh and 1991—beginning of the democratic age and also of 1996, 2001, and the latest in 2018. Table 4.1 shows a clear entrance and steady presence of the rich business class in politics and the decline of the politics of the landholders and lawyers. However, the lawyers have been able to keep their steady proportional presence in 2018 too. Retired civil servants and high-ranking army officials have also entered the electoral

5 A democratic political system in which political parties monopolize the formal political process and politicize society along party line (Coppedge 1994, p. 18), discussed in details in Chap. 6.

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Table 4.1 Professions of parliament members in Bangladesh Year 1973 1991 1996 2001 2018

Business (%) 24 61 49 60 61

Lawyers (%) 27 18 19 12 13

Landowners (%) 15 6 10 7 4

Politicians or retired govt officialsb (%) 13 10 7 3 5

Other (%) 23 5 15 18 16

Total 102a 100 100 100 99a

Source: BRAC (2006, p. 14), Shujon (2019, p. 2) a Due to round figure percentage, total did not add up to or exceeded 100% b Politician means a person, who from very young age is involved in politics and that is also his/her main source of income. By retired government official means, a person who had been in the government service as a bureaucrat or a high-ranking army official but now have retired and entered into full-time politics

politics, who also consider themselves as businessmen (Maniruzzaman 1994, p. 151).

4.3.3.1

Civil Society Elites

Civil society in Bangladesh is rich in associations and group working both at the local and national level. However, all civil society organizations, working at different geographic levels do not have the same power, influence, connection, or network, nor do they receive the same type of attention from the other actors in society and political system. Civil society consists of elite and non-elite civil society groups. Naturally, intellectuals, large development NGOs, apex organizations and their leaders form the elite section of the civil society. At the national level, civil society elites are the group of intellectuals related to the think tanks and citizens groups— like, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Shujon (Citizens for Governance), Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), Ain O Salish Kendra, Federation of Election Monitoring Agencies (FEMA). Another group of civil society elites is the advocacy organizations like human rights groups, environmental groups formed by lawyers practicing in the capital and divisional towns, for example, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) and the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA). However, the honor as civil society leaders is given to the chairmen of the large NGOs like Grameen Bank (Muhammad Yunus), BRAC (late Fazle Hasan Abed), Proshika (Kazi Faruque Ahmed), GonoShastaKendra (Dr. Zafarullah Chowdhury), and so on. As, mentioned before, businessmen are an important force in Bangladesh politics, and naturally their national apex associations like Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI) receive important attention from the government and political parties. Moreover, the leaders of the apex organizations of trade unions and other professional groups also emerge as powerful actors influencing the state and being influenced by the political elites.

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Both tension and cooperation exist among the different groups of civil society actors active at the national level. However, the network among these actors is rather weak and factious. The Apex body of each group is divided along party line, albeit having strong links to higher ups within the government, bureaucracy, and political parties. In case of large development NGOs, powerful connection is also maintained with the foreign donors. Nevertheless, in all cases, the relation is not as equal partners but in a vertical manner, where the civil society leaders are considered as the less powerful and placed in a lower position and the politicians, administrators, and donors as the powerful, located in a higher position. Furthermore, though the development NGOs are considered as a political and pro-market and horizontally organized, the relationship between larger and smaller NGOs is more like patron– client ties. Smaller local NGOs may receive funding through, or on the recommendation of, or as a result of advice from, larger NGOs; and this relationship may continue with broader ties of reciprocal but unequal exchanges (White 1999, p. 314). Elite presence may also be observed, among the CSOs working at the local level where their number is vast. Local civil society elite group is rather a combination of NGO leaders active in the local area and rural elites who often are landlords or businessmen as well as elected local government representatives. In most cases, these local government representatives are either landlords or businessmen with strong political ties with the central government and the ruling party. While the NGOs have become very much aligned with the local status-quo, the local elites are again entangled in a reciprocal but vertical relation with political elites and administration. They are the brokers between the urban political leaders and poor villagers. NGOs specially those having development projects with foreign funds enjoy an important position among the community and also administrators as they bring resources to the area. On the other hand, local clubs, cooperatives, and self-help groups are either dominated by the political elites or act as their supporter and musclemen.

4.3.4

Internal Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations

After understanding the identity of political and civil society elites, it is important to understand how the internal situation of CSOs in Bangladesh is. Civil society organizations are here of different types, so this section will try to provide a general idea about the leader and member relationship in their most common types found in CSOs. Well-known CSOs are the development NGOs working at the rural level of Bangladesh having their headquarters at Dhaka or a metropolitan city. These NGOs act as the service provider and micro-credit giver and collector to their beneficiaries. The beneficiary groups and their members formed by these NGO are not regarded as member of the NGOs but as beneficiaries or service receivers. On the other hand, NGO field worker acts in most cases as office, representative, or banker to them. In a report on the internal governance of the NGOs conducted by the

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Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB 2007) a few hard facts about the internal situation of the NGOs have been revealed. The governing bodies are formed by relatives of the executive officer, such members just attend meetings, but never visit NGOs, and beneficiaries are hardly included in the governing board. In case of governance, the executive head often takes decisions unilaterally. NGO authority has no accountability to the other officers and workers as well as the beneficiaries on matters of financial management. Often NGOs are very rigid in providing information about their organization to the public. Besides, NGOs are also involved in bribing the government officers and they themselves are also corrupt. Besides NGOs, at the rural level, there are cooperative and small local clubs. Here in the case of cooperatives, they are organized and often controlled by the BRDB officials. Elections are regularly held for the central cooperative committee; however, the BRDB officers conduct the process. This happens mostly in the case of cooperatives formed by very poor farmers or destitute women who hardly understand the whole system and are more interested in receiving the loans. In case of cooperatives for land farmers and small businessmen, members are more concerned about the system. In this case, the leaders of the cooperatives with the help of the cooperative officer or a local political leader try to keep his own control over the loan and savings of the cooperatives and distribution of the loan. Cooperative members have not yet gained independence of managing their groups by themselves. This is partly due to their ignorance and partly due to the all controlling attitude of the leader. The same comments may be made about the beneficiary group or microcredit groups formed by the NGOs. In case of local clubs and welfare groups, the situation differs from group to group. There may be a few well-organized clubs holding elections regularly and taking decisions unanimously. However, more common is that these organizations are run by a permanent committee where there is hardly any rotation in the posts of chairman and members. So internal environment of the group solely depends on the organizing skill or wish of the leader. Often leaders of such clubs are the local elites or their sons. In most cases the rural local elites belong to either of the two national political coalitions. Reflection of such political support is found in the club’s activities. In case of professional groups, interest groups, and citizens association as well as labor unions at the urban and meso level, elections are held regularly, and the process takes place so far in a democratic way. But often it becomes political. During elections different panels of candidates contest and each panel represents each major political party or coalition. This means that organization members are all divided into different blocks supporting a political party or its ideology. Naturally the panel that is elected to the executive committee works for only those who voted for them and acts as the representative of the political party it supports and introduces party ideology and agenda within the organization. In case of labor unions the circumstances are more complicated as the union leaders often act as the muscle man for the political leaders and use violent means to negotiate with the authorities. From our discussion on the internal relationship of CSOs there are hints of corruption, nepotism, non-democratic culture, clientelistic attitude, and

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politicizations. As the organizational structure and performance style of the CSOs are not horizontal or democratic, it has a high possibility to be influenced by the vertical social relations and confrontational political atmosphere. They just reflect the clientelistic socio-political atmosphere that exists in every socio-political stratum in Bangladesh. Question arises how participatory can these civil society be to earn a vigilant role in strengthening democracy. At this stage, I would like to focus on the political parties in Bangladesh with the aim to understand clearly the nature of political party and civil society relation.

4.3.5

Political Party System in Bangladesh

Since the last half of the twentieth century, we may observe a steady growth of rich literatures on Political Parties—their types, system, organization (Duverger 1978; Kirchheimer 1966; Lapalombara 1966; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988; Gunther and Diamond 2003). The nature and performance of political parties in Bangladesh are transforming and often partially fit in and sometimes differ from established classifications developed by experts on political party. From the consideration of political opportunity structure, nature and performance of civil society and the level of democracy have been mostly influenced by the character and activities of political parties in contemporary Bangladesh. Along with strong influence of culture, autocratic rule and of course donor policies, and formal institutions of laws, it is the political parties that have played an important role in shaping the participatory nature of civil society and style of its political involvement. Bangladesh politics in the first 18 years of its independence have faced government turnovers and military coup d’etats with no party competition. So there was a monopoly of some sections of politicians, bureaucrats, military and their parties. Insecure political and economic institutions led the political parties to use patronage and clientelism to build and maintain an organizational base. After the end of the autocratic rule in 1990 and the reintroduction of parliamentary system of government, a competitive but confrontational party system could be observed in Bangladesh up to 2006. The results of the parliamentary election of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008 indicated that the multi-party system has moved towards a de facto two-party system (Table 4.2). However, the following elections show the trend of one party or party alliance dominance in Bangladesh. By () empty cells, it is meant that the political party either did not contest in the election, or was not formed yet when the election was held. For example in 1973, the Political Parties BNP and JP did not exist. In 2014 BNP and JIB boycotted the election. Before the election of 2018, registration for the party JIB was canceled. So the party could not participate. Political parties in Bangladesh are divided into two major blocks—right centric and left centric. The major two parties are Awami League (AL) the left centric party aligned with other left minded small political parties and Bangladesh Nationalist

– – – 0 – 0.6 21.5 1.7 5.3

1973 97.7 73.2

1979 13.0 24.5 69 41.2 – – 6.7 10.1 6 14 5.3 10.2

1986 25.3 26.2 – – 51 42.3 3.3 4.6 9.7 10.6 10.7 16.3

1988 – – – – 83.7 68.4 – – 8 18 8.3 13.6

1991 29.3 30.1 46.7 30.8 11.7 11.9 6 12.1 5.3 10.7 1 4.4

1996 48.7 37.4 38.7 33.6 10.7 16.4 1 8.6 0.6 2.9 0.3 1.1

2001 20 40.1 65 41 1.3 1.1 5.6 4.3 6.3 9.4 2.3 4.1 4 4.9

2008 79 50 10 33 9 7 2 4.6 – – 11 – – – 2 – – –

2014 79

2018 86 77 2 13 7 5 – – 1 – – –

Seat (%) Vote (%) Seat (%) Vote (%) Seat (%) Vote (%) Seat (%) Vote (%) Seat (%) Vote (%) Seat (%) Vote (%)

Source: Ahmed (2003, p. 56), Firoz (2015, p. 106, 139), Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020), BBC (2018). Shujon official website for election results. https:// shujan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/centerwise_analysisx.pdf

Independent candidates

Other parties

Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB)

Jatiya party

BNP or BNP coalition (excluding JIB)

Political parties AL or AL coalition (excluding JP)

Table 4.2 Percentage of share of seats and votes secured by parties in general elections

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Party (BNP) aligned with other Islamic minded parties (Hossain 2000, p. 520; Ahmed 2003, p. 60). Bangladesh Awami League, established in 1949, is the vanguard party that led the independence movement against the Pakistani rulers. Under the leadership of the charismatic leader Bangabandhu Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the party realized the dream of an Independent Bangladesh through a 9 months bloody battle in 1971. Despite the fact that socialism and secularism were the main party ideology at the beginning, AL, at present moves on with the idea of liberal democracy supporting market economy. Though initially a vanguard party, at present it is also acting as a catch-all party, under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Sheik Mujibur Rahman who was brutally assassinated along with his family members, in a military coup in 1975). Since 2008, AL is the incumbent party in Bangladesh. Besides, AL had formed its previous governments from 1996 to 2001 as well as from 1972 to 1975. On the other hand, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is basically a personalistic party (Gunther and Diamond 2003, p. 187) established by the military ruler, General Ziaur Rahman in 1978, with the objective to advance his national political ambitions and civilize his military regime. However, at present, alike AL, it is acting as a catch-all party. Ideologically, BNP also embraces liberalism and open market economy. However, using its anti-Indian sentiment and religious sympathy, BNP attracts support from the centrist and rightist section of the society. After Ziaur Rahman’s assassination through a military coup, his wife Khalida Zia took the leadership of the party. Since 1990, BNP has served two terms in the office from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006. Ever since 2008, BNP acts as the opposition, both inside the Parliament and outside in the streets, however, presently in a weak and disorganized condition. So it can be understood that, both the major political parties’ are centrist, apparently they have converged into catch-all parties (Katz and Mair 1995; Kirchheimer 1966). Kirchheimer (1966, p. 185) argued that class line parties and integrating mass parties (Duverger 1978) have gone through a transformation and become more effective in electoral terms. These parties have turned into catch-all parties embracing nationwide clientele. They began to make broader appeals, trying to catch supports from all classes (Katz and Mair 1995, p. 12). Only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. The catch-all party finds its permanent clientele among the interest groups, though they also represent citizens beyond group activities (Kirchheimer 1966, p. 194). Both AL and BNP have no radical ideology from each other from the point of national and foreign policy. Both the parties now attract supporters from all segments of the society showing allegiance to their policies. The principle of market economy and democracy has been embraced by both the parties. However, they differ fundamentally in their interpretation of the emergence of Bangladesh and the identity of the nation. The Awami League and the left bloc Communist Parties

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believe in the national identity termed Bangalee for the citizens of Bangladesh and show their faith in the fundamental principles of the 1972 Constitution—Nationalism, Democracy, Secularism, and Socialism, and also accept capitalistic economy (Huq 2011). On the other hand, BNP and its other Islami religion based political party (Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh) and also General Ershad’s Jatiya Party believe in the national identity of Bangladeshi which accepts the four fundamental principles— trust and faith in all mighty Allah (God), nationalism, democracy, and socialism meaning economic and social justice, and accepts capitalistic economy that was replaced with the originals through the fifth Amendment of the Constitution. However, in 2011, with the 15th Constitutional Amendment, the original four fundamental principles of the 1972 Constitution had been restored in the article 8 of the constitution by the AL Coalition Government (Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh 2016). Therefore, the ideological difference is not about liberalism or socialism, but based on history and on the debate on including the religion into politics or not. However, such use of national identity, and Islam in politics in most cases have only rhetoric and strategic value to influence the society, penetrate social institutions and groups, win elections and establish party dominance in all walks of social, economic, and political life.

4.3.5.1

Nature of Party Rule in Bangladesh

AL and BNP, both as the incumbent party and the opposition, constantly infringed the rule of the democratic game as partisan interests got priority over national concerns. Personalities were favored over principles in the party decisions (Jahan 2015). The ruling party had always persecuted the opponent parties unjustly and arbitrarily. The ruling and opposition, irrespective of which party was in position, were always confronting each other. Instead of resolving problems and ventilating their grievances at the floors of the parliament, opposition parties have always gone to the streets and created disorder that had wide social and economic ramifications (Firoz 2015). Political culture or practice has yet to reach the level where the parties are ready to engage in political games played within democratic rules and norms. Therefore, these parties always underestimate each other’s political strength and urge to establish their monopolistic rule by simply knocking out the other believing that the losing party will simply fade away (Hossain 2000, p. 521). A participatory democratic practice was absent in either AL or BNP since their inception and always the policy of co-optation, patronage, and charisma have been the force of integration within these parties. The same policy has been used to build political support. The dominant tendency of both the supreme leaders of AL and BNP is to define politics in a zero-sum manner. The political upheavals during 2006

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and early 20076 indicates that there is hardly any scope for growing cooperation, understanding, and accommodating norms in their interaction in near future. In the following years, after the crisis of 2006–2007 was over, highly cherished democratic understanding and cooperation never developed among BNP and AL. Rather the conflict and crises intensified in a violent way before and after the tenth Parliament election in 2014, that ultimately ended in a parliamentary democracy with a very weak opposition in Bangladesh.7 Moreover, internal organizations of each party and their decision-making process are neither democratic nor decentralized (Jahan 2015, pp. 137–150). Parties have official units at division, district, and sub-district and also at the union/ward level (BRAC 2006, p. 17). Their informal link and control go down to the grass-roots level. The local branches are just extended agencies by the parties. Practically parties are organized centering the symbolic leader using the charisma of her predecessor. Chairman of most of the parties enjoys widespread powers, including the power to take unilateral actions (Ahmed 2003, p. 61; Riaz 2016, pp. 159–162). The constitution of each party provides huge control of power to the party chairman that ultimately leads to concentration of power in one hand (Jahan 2015, p. 148, 150). Party councils are hardly held in case of either BNP or AL and always the same leader is elected without any contestation. Other members of the steering committee are often selected by the personal choice of the chairman and her associates (Jahan 2015, p. 134).

6

On January 11, 2007 a state of emergency had been declared in Bangladesh and the ninth general election to the parliament had been called off. A non-political, non-elected, technocrat government, strongly backed by the army, came in charge of the state affairs in Bangladesh. Such outcome was the direct consequence of the politics of confrontation, politicization, corruption, and nepotism. This had led to a halt to the democratic process in Bangladesh (Firoz 2015, p. 106). The situation was resolved after 2 years when the ninth general election was finally held in December 2008 conducted by this caretaker government. The election was more or less free and fair and AL and its allies won the election and formed the government. 7 Within 3 years of coming back to power, the AL government passed the 15th Constitutional Amendment in 2011, dropped the provision of a caretaker government during the election season for ever, with the intension to prevent any type of army intervention and dominance of non-political and non-representative sections over the state system. This also meant no hope for the opposition, BNP to win the next election. The small opposition, took their protest outside of the parliament and to the streets (Firoz 2015, p. 138). Despite the violent and unruly situation, the government moved on with the tenth Parliament election. Regardless of the biggest opposition BNP and its allies boycotted the election, the election was held in early 2014, marked by severe violence, taking away 44 lives out of which 23 persons were non-political commuters in the public transports (Firoz 2015, p. 142). The government dealt the problem with strong hands. The opposition’s appeal lost the public support as citizens were tired of violence and disruption of their daily lives and economy for months.

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4 Civil Society and Political Structures in Bangladesh

Third Parties

As both political parties used to enjoy popular support among the citizens almost equally, neither AL nor BNP has been able to form a government on its own from 1991 to 2008.8 They required alliance and support from other political parties and blocks. The most important kingmakers that emerged during the democratic age are—Jatiya Party (JP) and Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB). According to Riaz (2016, p. 183) JP and JIB together had about 12% of the popular support. This had led them to the kingmaker’s position. Jatiya Party is a personalistic party like BNP, formed by Late General Ershad to give legitimacy and civilian face to his military rule and did not differ with BNP in ideology or policy. Despite the loss of power and imprisonment of General Ershad, the party managed to win a significant number of seats in the 1991, 1996, 2001 elections as well as in 2008, 2014, and 2018. This gave JP the power to negotiate with the majority parties and gain strategic favors in turn of giving them support to form governments. Up to 2006, Jatiya Party had continued its tactics of changing its support to either AL or BNP based on negotiations (Riaz 2016, pp. 180–183). After 2008, JP has always supported the AL and acted according to the wish of the party in power AL. In 2014, JP participated in the election as part of the big alliance of AL but after the election, an official opposition became necessary to maintain constitutionality of the system. The BNP had boycotted election then. JP during 2014 to 2018 simultaneously acted as the official opposition in the parliament and a coalition partner in the cabinet. In 2018, JP also participated in the election and is now acting as the opposition party to give legitimacy to the system. Using the same strategy of playing the role of the kingmaker, Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB), different from other secular political parties, aiming to establish an Islamic state, have emerged as a major political broker and since 1999 (Riaz 2016, p. 181) became a coalition partner with the BNP led four party alliance. JIB is the continuation of the Jamat Islami party of former East Pakistan, which finds it origin in the Jamat Islami Party formed in 1941 under British India. Though the party had substantial support strength at the grass-roots level and its student wing was quite strong in comparison to other parties and had two full ministers in the BNP cabinet (2001–2006), JIB does not have acceptability to a large section of the Bangladeshi citizens, for their controversial role during the independence movement. The party leaders are accused of collaborating with Pakistani Army in conducting atrocities that were not only just human rights violation, but genocide (Akmam 2002), during the Independence War in 1971. A good number of JIB leaders had been tried since 2010 and received capital punishments for their actions, under the International Crimes Tribunal (BBC 2016). The strong tie between BNP and JIB has also become loose as both the parties are now fighting for their own existence.

8 In 2014 and 2018 elections, AL in their quest for bringing legitimacy to the elections, formed allegiances with their like-minded left parties.

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However, accommodation, co-optation, and integration of Islamist elements and forces in politics have always been a strategy of expediency by the political leaders in Bangladesh to gain legitimacy and popular support (BRAC 2006). The small Islamic groups are still negotiating with ruling party, as no party can ignore the religious sentiment of the voters.

4.3.5.3

Nature of Building Social Support

Jahan (2005, p. 200) comments that political parties do not emphasize in building party platform on the basis of specific socio-economic programs nor do they address their party platform to specific socio-economic group. They never concentrate on developing a group of supporters genuinely dedicated to the party’s goal. This happens because of the presence of patron–client network, factions, charismatic leadership in party organization. The political leadership of the country, irrespective of ideology and party belong to the intermediate class that has links both at the urban and rural level. They imply patron–client network in ensuring their political support at the grass-roots level. Political parties co-opt patrons in various localities, who in turn divert their client’s votes or support to the particular political parties. Since clients owe allegiance to the patron and not to the party; various parties compete with each other to increase their support group of patrons (Jahan 2005, p. 200). Who are these, patrons? In most cases, local elite, local council chairman or member and recently the civil society organizations and development NGOs. They are the clients to the political parties, the brokers between the government and people through the parties. In this manner every segment of the society is politicized both at the rural and urban level. Civil society organizations are no exception to the process.

4.3.6

Political Parties Penetrating Civil Society

Civil society has always existed and often became strongly active in Bengalee society long before the Bangladesh state came into effect. Since then, there has been the strong aligning relationship between the civil society and political parties. For historical context, it is often difficult to evaluate the role of the civil society totally separating it from political parties. However, in British Colonial period and Pakistani period the relationship between these two sectors was of alliance but not co-optation. On the contrary, contemporary situation is of penetration by the politically powerful parties upon the weak and divided civil society. In contemporary Bangladesh that is after the 1990s very few civil society organizations may be termed neutral. Political party loyalty and class distinction tend to split most of the civil society organizations. No institution in the country seems to be able to stay above the partisan conflict and confrontational politics (Jahan 2015, p. 262).

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State Ruling Party Political Parties Opposition Party

Legal and illegal patronage to CSO leaders

Financial Support Ensure party influence and dominance

Easy access to administration and relaxing red tapism for funds and approvals

Strengthen grass-roots party support Ensuring CSOs leaders from political harassment and sheltering their misdeeds

Strengthen the base for street politics

Interest Groups

Civil Society

NGOs Traditional CSOs Others

Fig. 4.4 Formal and informal relationship between civil society and political party in Bangladesh

In the survey conducted for this research, CSOs were asked to rate the influence of 15 types of actors in politics on a scale from 1 to 7. Among the 15 types of actors, political parties were rated the highest with a mean of 6.48 (Standard Deviation ¼ 1.19). But when they were asked to rate the cooperation that existed between them and political parties on the same scale from 1 to 7, they rated very low with a mean of 2.61, but a standard deviation of 1.74. Moreover, the survey data reveals that the percentage of civil society organizations contacting the ruling party and opposition party is 64% and 51%, respectively.9 So there is a relatively high percentage of contact with powerful parties, though low rate of formal cooperation. This implies a lack of formal or horizontal relationship between civil society and political parties which may lead us to infer a vertical (powerful and weak) relationship existing between them. Such relationship is rather complicated. However, it may be explained through a simplified model (Fig. 4.4). At the top of the Fig. 4.4 is the state. Just underneath the state within the same box the major Bangladeshi political parties are placed. They have the same possibility to win a general election and form coalition cabinet as well as enjoy full control over the state, administration, and judiciary or become the opposition in the parliament and engage in violent street politics as in 2006 or 2014. In the lower portion of the figure are the civil society organizations of different categories. At the mid-section of

9

Survey results have been discussed in detail in Chap. 5.

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the diagram, two contrasting paradigms may be observed. The civil society organizations and leaders from their lower position are sending different types of rational and irrational support up toward to political parties and acting in favor of the political interest of those particular parties. For example, establish party control and dominance within the CSOs and its area domain, ensure political party strength at the grass-roots level, providing organizational base for street politics, providing financial support to the party, etc. While in turn, the political parties from above, with their available state resources, distribute legal and illegal favors to CSOs or to the CSOs’ leaders. Such as, providing legal and illegal patronage in cash and kind— jobs, license, tender, ensure easy access to the administration and relieve bureaucratic complicacies for fund sanctions and approvals, protection from harassment from any government agencies, and so on. In this process, the CSOs lose their independent status and become divided, determined by their members’ party affiliation. Naturally, the co-optation and division of the civil society that had been developed through history and controversies before, turns out to be intensified by patronage, clientelism, corruption, etc. This vertical patron–client link existing in the political system of Bangladesh reaches up to the highest post of the government machine and may go down to a poor farmer or a laborer. The local leaders and civil society organizations, NGOs are clients of the state and patrons to the citizens and villagers (Islam 2001, p. 213). It has been revealed through discussion with the resource individuals that, interests of the clients cover group favors such as project sanctions, financial grants, and creating job options as well as personal favors including government loans, employment, promotion, business grants and licenses, government contracts, legal matters, and simple favors such as medical help. In return, the government and political parties receive loyalty and support from different sections of the social strata, ensure vote banks, financial and logistic support during elections, execute party control over different institutions such as education, industry, business, welfare, government institutes, and even the media and ensure necessary organizational base for staging mass meetings, violent protests, and strikes. Patronage and nepotism take place in the same vertical give-and-take process. This also explains the fact that development NGOs have turned into new patrons to the poor, both in relation to providing them with micro-credit and mediating with other power structures on their behalf. In interviews, executives of well-established NGOs admitted the fact that under the present circumstances, the NGOs also need to show their political affiliation or at least maintain good informal relations with government and incumbent political parties to get their projects accepted or release their foreign funds through the NGOAB. Traditional organizations like labor unions, professional associations, university groupings, chambers of commerce and even newspapers are identified primarily for their political affiliations. Ruling parties, whether AL or BNP, have directly shown through their decisions and actions that they give special support and rewards to those CSOs that positively helped them in winning elections and act directly against those selected CSOs that have collaborated with their opposition party. Labor union leaders, rather than promoting workers’ interest, are motivated to take undue

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advantage from their position or links with political parties or higher government functionaries (Zafarullah 2003, p. 295). Violence and violent expression of demands are another weak point for Bangladeshi civil society, especially for the labor unions and anomic groups suddenly developed on urgent issues. As the government and political leaders hardly pay attention to peaceful protests of the opposition or petitions and advice from CSOs, often demands are expressed through violent strikes and demonstrations. Such violent civil society mobilizations are then utilized by the opposition to their political ends. This finally turns into a political issue involving the two contesting political blocks. Not only in traditional or urban based organizations, but also in the rural society, political penetration is observed. There has been a change in the rural social structure, power relation as well as social interaction which have been very much influenced by the changes and policies of political actors at the capital. In their study on the change in the contemporary rural power structure in Bangladesh, Faruque et al. (2007) have revealed interesting changes where links with the political parties have turned out to be the most important factor in rural power sources while before it was the possession of landed property, family heritage, wealth, etc. Another significant change in the rural society is the new type of grouping and rivalry within the rural society reflecting the polarization and confrontation found in national politics. Modern development NGOs were considered neutral or apolitical at the beginning of their journey of social development. However, since 1990, Association of Development Agencies of Bangladesh (ADAB) entered into political conflict which became severe in 2000. This has ultimately led to the division among the NGO community.

4.3.7

Political Polarization Among the NGOs

The NGO community of Bangladesh has been classified into three sections—Major NGOs, Intermediary NGOs, and mid-size and small NGOs (Stiles 2002, p. 50). The Major NGOs are big well-organized NGOs having nationwide network. The world class NGOs like BRAC, Grameen Bank, Proshika, TMSS belong to this group. Mid-sized and small NGOs provide either a wide range of services in one region or a narrow range of services nationwide. Intermediary NGOs are like umbrella agencies to direct and coordinate NGOs, such as ADAB, Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB), NGO Forum for Public Health, and Campaign for Popular Education. Though before NGOs were regarded as comparatively neutral, after the 1990s, such NGOs have become politically colored and lost their non-political character. Besides development, economically NGOs have brought foreign resources to the country and politically through their social awareness program and micro-credit gained the ability to control the decision of a large section of voters at the grass-roots level. These two economic and political facts are important causes for political parties and ruling regimes to become interested in co-opting this sector.

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ADAB from 1974 to 2003 was the only apex organization of development NGOs in Bangladesh with a membership reaching 1388 NGO10 members. Up to the late 1980s, it functioned so far neutrally. In the late 1980s the incumbent chairperson of ADAB, Zafarullah Chowdhury of the NGO GonoShastaKendra, was accused of cooperating with the Military dictator General Ershad, as an informal policy advisor.11 As soon as the regime changed after a mass movement and the new elected government came to power in 1991, Zafarullah was forced to step down by a faction of NGO groups led by Kazi Faruque Ahmed of Proshika (Hossain 2006, p. 242). However, it is in 2001, when the clear political division and conflict emerged in ADAB leadership with one group led by Kazi Faruque Ahmed alleged to be an ally of AL and other group led by Kushi Kabir, chairperson of a leading Human Rights NGO named Nijera Kori (we do by ourselves) thought to have a special link with (BNP). Though none of the NGO leaders are formally members of any political party, the NGO community since 2001 has become divided into these two groups maintaining political links with the BNP or AL. The polarization became distinct when a large section of ADAB members with the leadership of Kushi Kabir12 and Fazle Hasan Abed of BRAC came out of the apex organization and formed a new umbrella organization named Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB) which claimed to represent 944 NGOs (944 members) and known as representing the BNP front (Hossain 2006, p. 245; Blair 2010). Newspaper reports on the events of internal clashes among ADAB during 2001, 2002, and 2003 clearly show the political link or affiliation of both the sections. The BNP and its allies often used to accuse Kazi Faruque and his NGO to be active allies of AL. Naturally, NGOs with such political allegation was not acceptable to the then BNP government that came to power in October 2001 with the help of another right wing party JIB (Hossian 2006, p. 242; Stiles 2002, p. 120). Consequently, Proshika and its leader were charged with political activities, fund embezzlement, and conspiracy against the state. The NGO faced severe government repression, arrests, and blockade of foreign funds in 2004.This happened after the break of ADAB. It becomes clear that, it is the political links of the NGO leaders and exploiting attitude of the political parties and regimes that had actually brought final division or polarization among the national NGO leaders.13 Since then, NGOs have become careful not to act against the interest of the ruling regime and be tactful in dealing with political matters. After 2001, donor backing was not enough for NGOs to 10 According to the Directory of NGOs 2003–2004, Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh, Dhaka. 11 However, there were clear and reasonable causes for Dr. Zafarullah’s closeness to the autocrat. One of them was for introducing a proper Drug Policy to ensure the cost of medicine within the reach of people of all classes. 12 Personally, Kushi Kabir is sister-in-law of ex-parliament member and ex-minister of BNP. 13 It needs to be mentioned that though Grameen Bank is considered as an NGO in research papers and new reports, it is by law a private bank. So it remains outside the events and conflicts of ADAB and FNB.

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perform their projects uninterrupted. Moreover, at the local level, political divisions have created a panic among the small NGOs at the local level. Under such situation the NGOs have to please their patron-donors, as well as the ruling and opposition parties and avoid all actions that may go against the interest of either of the parties. Naturally, this limits the freedom of the NGOs and their actions—especially that are related to participation and democracy. In 2006, during the survey (September and October), which was the last month of the BNP-Jamat regime; the NGOs have shown reluctance about answering questions that may reveal their political link or identity. The surveyors had to put more effort to agree the NGOs to cooperate and respond to survey inquiry. Politics, NGO, and civil society relations have become more complicated in the following years in the AL regime. The 2 years (2007–2008) rule of the military backed caretaker government had been considered to be supported by a section of the elite civil society group and the media. During this period civil society leaders like Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus took failed attempts to launch political parties under their leadership (Blair 2010). After 2008, such incidents were heavily retaliated by the political regime. Civil society personalities had to face different types of political and legal actions initiated by the government and by the rebels within their organizations that they had established and developed for years (Almahmood 2012). And as usual, the NGOs that had linked to BNP and its allies also had to face retaliation from the AL government, in the same way the BNP regime had done to Proshika and Mr. Kazi Faruque. For example, human rights group leader Adilur Rahman Khan of Adhikar, had been arrested on different charges, during political unrest and street violence was going on in 2013 (CIVICUS 2013), After 2008, ADAB was revived again, however, as an umbrella body of small and medium NGOs receiving foreign fund, maintaining a good liaison with the NGOAB.

4.4

Conclusion

Political structures influence the civil society most. Simultaneously it also affects the nature of democracy. With such understanding from Chap. 3, the present chapter has further investigated the civil society in Bangladesh, from both aspects of vibrancy and vigilance to point out the prime factors that determine the nature and strength of civil society in relation to democracy. It had been found that philanthropy culture, donor policy, and web of laws for registration have furthered the development of civil society organizations in Bangladesh and led towards service and welfare functions rather than advocacy. The civil society, vibrant from such consideration, has brought a silent revolution at the rural level of Bangladesh and brought better economic life, empowerment, and social awareness among the poor and uneducated citizens. However, besides such vibrancy, a civil society has to be involved in participatory activities, form networks, gain strength to contribute to its ultimate aim democracy as decided by the Neo-Tocquevillean school of

References

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arguments and the international donors. This means it also needs to become vigilant. Review of previous researches, observation of present political and democratic situation of Bangladesh show that civil society is yet to reach such vigilant nature. This chapter has discussed and pointed out the most important factor that has led to such weak position of the civil society in Bangladesh. It is the political parties and their all-powerful penetrative control over all socio-political organizations and institutions. This has receded the participatory strength and strong voice of the vibrant civil society to contribute to democracy. Historical developments have helped the political parties to emerge as such powerful and penetrative position as well answers the reason why they have been able to succeed in their endeavor to divide and control the social groups. Cultural traditions of vertical social relationship explain the nature of political co-optation that has taken place. Even foreign donation has been accused of providing the necessary resources for corruption and patronage. Political parties have control over different traditional, professional groups, labor unions, chambers of commerce, NGOs, and so on at the central and meso level. The parties have also divided and politicized the rural society, according to partisan line. Link with the political parties has become the main source of power for the rural elites. Local civil society organization groups, both indigenous ones and small NGOs had to develop good relation with such political local elites. The NGOs have also turned into the new patrons to the poor. Moreover, such NGOs with development projects nationwide have lost their unity influenced by partisan politics. Next chapter shall empirically focus on the basic nature and functions of civil society concerning both grass-roots development and participation based on the survey data.

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BBC. (2018). Bangladesh election: PM Sheikh Hasina wins landslide in disputed vote. BBC News. Retrieved Jan 1, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46718393 Blair, H. (2010). Party over institutionalization, contestation, and democratic degradation in Bangladesh. In P. R. Brass (Ed.), Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal (pp. 98–117). Abingdon: Routledge. BRAC. (2006). The state of governance in Bangladesh 2006: Knowledge, perception, reality. Dhaka: Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division. Broomfield, J. H. (1976). Peasant mobilization in twentieth century Bengal. In J. Spoilberg & W. Scott (Eds.), Forging nations: A comparative view of rural ferment and revolt (pp. 41–60). East Lansing Michigan State University Press: East Lansing. CIVICUS. (2013). CIVICUS. Retrieved June 17, 2019, from https://www.civicus.org/index.php/ media-resources/news/take-action/1082-adilur-rahman-khan Coppedge, M. (1994). Strong parties and lame duck: Presidential partyarchy and factionalism in Venezuela. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Duverger, M. (1978). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state translated by Barbara and Robert North; with a foreword by D.W. Brogan (3rd ed.). New York: Science Editions. Faruqque, U., et al. (2007). Bangladeshergrameenkhomotakathamorekdoshokerporiborton: Ekti math projaerbishleshon (Change of rural power structure in Bangladesh in one decade: A field observation) (Vol. 14, pp. 111–126). Banglanagar: Bangladesh Unnoyon Shamikka (Bangladesh Development Survey)/Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. (Written in Bengali). Firoz, J. (2015). Bangladeshershanghorshikrajniti o parliament (Conflict politics of Bangladesh and Parliament). Dhaka: Moula Brothers. (written in Bangla). Goon, A. (2002). Civil society and social empowerment. In M. R. Khan & M. H. Kabir (Eds.), Civil society and democracy in Bangladesh (pp. 127–163). Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies and Academic Press. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (2016). Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Legislative and Parliamentary Division. Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliament. Retrieved July 30, 2020, from http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367.html Gunther, R., & Diamond, L. (2003). Species of political parties: A new typology. Party Politics, 9 (2), 167–199. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688030092003 Hashemi, S. M. (1995). In M. Edwards & D. Hulmes (Eds.), NGO accountability in Bangladesh: NGO, state and donors, non-government organizations-performance and accountability beyond the magic bullet (pp. 103–110). London: Earthscan. Hossain, A. (2006). The changing rural local power structure: Elite and NGOs in Bangladesh. Journal of Health Management, 8(2), 229–250. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from Available at, http://jhm.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/2/229 Hossain, A. (2000). Anatomy of hartal politics in Bangladesh. Asian Survey, 40(3), 508–529. Hulme, David, Michael, Edwards eds. (1997). NGOs, states and donors. Hampshire: Palgrave Huq, A. F. (2011). Bangladesh politics: The problem of stability. Dhaka: Hakkani Publishers. Iftkaruzzaman and Mahbubur Rahman. (1986). Nation building in Bangladesh: Perception, problems and an approach, in Nation building in Bangladesh, retrospect and prospect by M. A. Hafiz and A. R. Khan eds. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies Inter Parliamentary Union. (2020). Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament): Last elections. InterParliamentary Union. Retrieved June 10, 2020, from http://archive.ipu.org/english/parline/ reports/2023_e.htm IOB (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (1998). Bangladesh: Evaluation of Netherlands funded NGOs, 1972–1996. The Hague: Policy and Operations Evaluation Department. Islam, N. M. K. (2001). Patron-client culture in Bangladesh and the resulting weak state and stubborn rural socio-economic stagnation. Unpublished PhD thesis, North Carolina State University

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Jahan, R. (2005). Bangladesh politics problems and issues. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Jahan, R. (1972). Pakistan: failure in national integration. New York: Columbia University Press. Jahan, R. (2015). Political parties in Bangladesh: Challenges of democratization. Dhaka: Prothoma Prokashan. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organizations and party democracy: The emergence of Cartel party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1354068895001001001 Khair, S., & Khan, S. R. (2004). Philanthropy law in Bangladesh. In M. Sidel & I. Zaman (Eds.), Philanthropy and law in South Asia. Manila: Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium. Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The transformation of the Western European party systems. In J. La Palambara & M. Weiner (Eds.), Political parties and political development (pp. 177–203). Princeton University Press: Princeton. Kochanek, S. (2000). Governance, patronage, politics and democratic transition in Bangladesh. Asian Survey, 40(3), 530–550. La Palombara, J. (1966). Origin and development of political parties. In L. P. Joseph & M. Weiner (Eds.), Political parties and political development (pp. 375–395). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lewis, D. (2004). On difficulty of studying ‘civil society’: Reflection on NGOs, state and democracy in Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 38(3), 299–322. Manuruzzaman, T. (1994). Politics and security of Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2020). Labour Law 2006 (revised in 2015). Department of Labour, Ministry to Labour and Employment, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Retrieved July 31, 2020, from http://dol.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/dol.portal. gov. bd/legislative_information/b037d72f_8111_437a_a3cb_c24dcd6f0c77/Labour%20Rules% 202015.pdf Muntasir, M., & Roy, J. K. (1998). Civil society in Bangladesh: Resilience and retreat. Dhaka: Subarna. NGOAB. (2020a). List of all NGOs. NGO Affairs Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved Mar 3, 2020, from http://wwwngoabgovbd/site/page/3de95510-53094400-97f5-0a362fd0f4e6/ NGOAB. (2020b). Statistics. NGO Affairs Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved Mar 3, 2020, from http://wwwngoabgovbd/site/page/2cf5ab46-53a44126-a948-fef63a5d0e7a/ Nobusue, K. (2002). Bangladesh a large NGO sector supported by foreign donors. In S. Shinichi (Ed.), The state and NGOs: Perspective from Asia (pp. 34–52). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties: Organization and power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Riaz, A. (2016). Bangladesh: A political history since independence. London: I B Tauris. Robinson, F. (Ed.). (1989). The Cambridge encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shujon. (2019). EkadoshJatiyoNirbachoneBijoidertotthouposthapon (presentation of the information of the winners in the 11th Parliament election). Retrieved Feb 2, 2019, from https://shujan. org Sobhan, R. (2004). A macro policy for poverty eradication through structural change. EGDI and UNU-WIDER Conference (Unlocking Human Potential: Linking the Informal and Formal Sector). 17–18 Sept, 2004, Helsinki Sobhan, R. (1996). Aid dependence and donor policy the case of Tanzania: With lessons from Bangladesh experience. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Stiles, W. K. (2002). Civil society by design: Donors, NGOs and the intermestic development circle in Bangladesh. Westport: Praeger.

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Tasnim, F. (2002). Crises of political development: Bangladesh perspective. Journal of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, XXV, 53–70. Tasnim, F. (2007). Civil society in Bangladesh: Rich grass-roots actions but poor participation. Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Political Science., 43, 160–192. TIB. (2007). Problems of governance in the NGO sector: The way out, transparency International Bangladesh. Retrieved Nov 13, 2007, from http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/research/NGO_ Study_Report_Full_Draft.pdf Ullah, A. K. M., & Routary, J. K. (2003). NGOs and development: Alleviating rural poverty in Bangladesh. Guerra: Bookmark International. White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, civil society and the state in Bangladesh: The politics of representing the poor. Development and Change, 30(2), 307–326. World Bank. (2017). Bangladesh continues to reduce poverty but in a slower pace. Feature story. World Bank. Retrieved June 8, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/ 10/24/bangladesh-continues-to-reduce-poverty-but-at-slower-pace#:~:text¼Almost%201% 20in%204%20Bangladeshispopulation%20live%20in%20extreme%20poverty Zafarullah, H. (2003). Globalization, State and Politics in Bangladesh. South Asia. Journal of South Asian Studies, 3, 283–296.

Chapter 5

How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

Abstract This chapter, based on empirical survey data, investigates the nature and trends of civil society, focusing on their resources, behaviors, relations, nature of activities, etc. The survey data reveal rich involvement of civil society in grass-roots actions while indicating their low participation in politics and state related affairs. This means that civil society organizations are vibrant in grass-roots social services. However, they lack the necessary participatory attributes for proper interest articulation and monitoring of the state, resulting in a less vigilant civil society. Data based analysis accelerates the mainstream argument of the book that civil society in Bangladesh may be noteworthy for its contributions to the development and social welfare but it can hardly contribute to democracy. Keywords Grass-roots action · Participation · Advocacy · Lobby · Network

5.1

Introduction

Chapter 4 focused on the main factors that have contributed to the development of civil society in Bangladesh which is mostly service and welfare based and weak from political context. The chapter also pointed out the strong influence of political parties that have emerged as powerful institutions through historical and political development and have penetrated and politicized the civil society through vertical relations based on traditional norms of clientelism, nepotism, etc. The present chapter based on empirical survey data investigates the nature and trends of civil society focusing on their resources, behaviors, relations, nature of activities, etc. The survey data reveals rich involvement of civil society in grass-roots actions while indicating their low participation in politics and state related affairs. The data also point out to a

Some sections of this chapter are derived in part from an article by the author, titled How Vigilant is the Vibrant Civil Society in Bangladesh? A Survey-based Analysis, published in Journal of Civil Society in 8(2), 155–183, June 2012, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/. https:// doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2012.726548. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_5

109

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5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

partisan and vertical trend in CSOs’ interaction with the political actors. Chapter 6 concentrates more on civil society and political party relations. The present study has tried to understand the civil society functions through a large-N scale survey as it provides empirical data directly gathered from the CSOs and the sample data randomly selected that includes all types of CSOs-rural, urban, modern traditional, elite as well as infamous organizations. For understanding the actual situation at the periphery and meso level, this method of gathering data directly from the field is considered better than only focusing on leading national coalitions of CSOs or elite organizations working near the state authority (Tsujinaka, 2002, p. 34). The broad range of CSOs involved in various types of functions and issues helps to make a better prediction about the tendency observed in the civil society organization and their inclination in interacting with other political actors. Moreover, the survey is based on a model that provides the opportunity to enter into the further comparative study of civil society with other countries (Tsujinaka, Choe, Ohtomo, & Miwa, 2006, p. 4) to understand the uniqueness of civil society in Bangladesh and the common structures or tendency among CSOs in developing countries. Details about the sampling methodology and survey process have been described in Chap. 1. The present chapter is broadly divided into three sections: the first section is concerned with the basic characteristics of the CSOs surveyed. The second section is concerned with the involvement of civil society in grass-roots action that is linked to its vibrant attribute, while the last section gives a more detailed emphasis on the participatory role of the civil society. The first section focuses on the basic attributes like classifications, objectives, policy interest, geographic level of activity, membership, resource sources, volunteers, employees, etc. of the CSOs. Moreover, the structural strength of the civil society has been compared between CSOs working at national and local level and CSOs receiving and not receiving foreign funds. This section provides an overall idea of civil society organizations which are found to be mostly welfare and service oriented working at the local and meso level. Besides membership fee and nominal government grants, they receive funds from various non-government organizations and donors, and they may have direct or indirect foreign connections. CSOs receiving foreign assistance are better equipped with handsome budget and skilled manpower, but with a few volunteers. About cooperation between civil society organization and other social, political, and market actors, it is revealed that the cooperation is mostly common with local government and other civil society actors than the market and political leaders and bureaucratic actors. Bangladeshi civil society is service and welfare oriented. Most researches on civil society and NGOs focus mainly on this section of civil society. The present survey also reveals the high involvement of CSOs in grass-roots actions. Civil society organizations have mentioned their activity mainly in the field of economic empowerment, women empowerment, education, health, joint projects with government, network building, legal and political training, social awareness, local representation, etc. It has been found that CSOs participation is high in service providing functions and relatively low in the functions that relate to advocacy training. Vigilant actions of the civil society to which so far little concentration has been paid by the

5.1 Introduction

111

Table 5.1 The statistics of the population, sample size, and interviewed CSOs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Categories Different types of cooperatives Registered voluntary social welfare organizations NGOs based on ADAB directory 2003 Organizations listed under youth department Labor organizations listed under labor directorate Chambers of commerce and trade organizations Professional groups Rajshahi University based cultural, educational, and professional groups Total (answer rate 41%)

Total population 2540 793

Sample size 838 260

Interviewed CSOs (% of the total population) 193 (7.6%) 243 (31%)

129 108

35 33

22 (17%) 13 (12%)

99

32

9 (9%)

45

6

6 (28%)

21 33

11 12

6 (18%) 9 (20%)

3768

1227

504 (13%)

researchers occupy most attention in the present book. This is understood mainly in five ways: cooperation with other actors in the political system, formal relations with governments, policy-making, advocacy, and lobby. Complicated but interesting participating patterns of the CSOs have been revealed through the survey. However, none of them may be considered healthy or convenient to democratic institutionalization. Introduction to the survey has been provided in the first chapter. Here a more detailed information about the population, sample size, and the number of interviewed CSOs has been provided in Table 5.1. For the survey, nonprofit and non-government organizations registered or enlisted by any ministry or institution and active in Rajshahi District, Bangladesh, have been considered as the target population. However, full statistics of all these organizations are not available at one office or directory. Accordingly, eight types of organizations (Table 5.1 first column) were targeted with their list being collected from the affiliated government offices or institutions. In total the target population was 3768. With an expectation of 30% answer rate, the sample population was made 1227 through random sampling with three as the random number. Every third organization from the population list was included in the sample list. Out of them 504 organizations of different categories responded. The survey represents 13% of the total population with an answer rate of 41%. Surveyors personally visited the offices of the CSOs and interviewed the representative of each CSO. The survey took place in September and October of 2006.

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5.2

Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data

Through the survey on civil society organizations, 504 CSOs of different categories were interviewed with the aim to understand the structure, value of the CSOs and their relation with state, politics, and other actors of the political system. They were also asked about and to evaluate the role of civil society as a whole in Bangladesh. This section provides a few facts from the survey that reveals civil society’s basic characteristics and tendencies of CSOs.

5.2.1

Self-Classification by the CSOs

The present survey was based on eight types of organizations—cooperative, voluntary social organizations, NGOs, youth groups, labor unions, trade organizations, professional associations, and university-centric organizations. After indicating their status on the meta level, the 504 responding CSOs were again asked to categorize themselves in terms of 13 subcategories that best illustrate the nature of their organizations. About 43% had identified themselves as social welfare organizations. Besides NGOs, different professional groups, university based clubs, local clubs, cooperatives also consider them as social welfare organizations. Only 2 (0.4%) CSOs identified them as citizen groups. 50 45

Percent of CSOs

40 35 30 25 44.2

20 15 10 5

18.3 11.1

3.2

3.4

3.2

.2

0

Answer Rate= 100%, N=504 Fig. 5.1 Distribution of self-classification by the CSOs

1.6

.4

6.5

.6

6.3

1.0

5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data

113

Figure 5.1 shows the nature of self-classification by the civil society organizations. Another noticing feature is that though Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country where religion plays an important role in the social life of the citizens, only 3 (0.6%) organizations have identified themselves as religious group. CSOs including the NGOs prefer to be identified as social welfare organizations than their other identity.1

5.2.2

Policy Interest

The CSOs were asked to select the government policies that relate to their objectives and functions from a long list of 25 policies. CSOs concentrated their policy interest mainly on a set of overlapping policies like poverty alleviation (72%), social welfare (59%), rural development (59%), health care (25%), and education (47%) that is mostly related to their service providing projects. But other important policies that also relate to development, but require advocacies and more negotiation with the authorities attract the CSOs relatively in a low scale like environment (8%), human rights (19%), law and order (6%), labor policy (6%), consumer protection (5%), etc.

5.2.3

Objectives

CSOs were asked about their objectives. They were free to choose as many answer options that comply with their organization’s objectives. Most of the CSOs have been found to be more interested in providing services. CSOs aimed at providing information to their members, beneficiaries, and also the public in general (50%) than advocating and interacting with the government in the interest of the members like making policy recommendations (7%) or assisting in licensing and registration (6%) or even advocating for gaining government subsidy (24%). The civil society organizations had the tendency to work for the society beyond their members or

1

In further analysis of the activities and nature of participation of civil society, these 13 categories have been compressed into four broad categories: economic, education and culture, pressure group, and welfare and development. Under Economic heading, all CSOs that have identified themselves as economic organization, agriculture organization, and labor unions and also CSOs in the other categories. This is because economic and labor groups are related to industry and business and micro-credit, the farmers organization are also cooperatives concerned with loan and micro-credit, again the 5 CSOs that have selected the other options identified them as either micro-credit groups or business and income related groups. Under the heading of Education and Culture all the CSOs that have identified them as education and research groups, cultural organizations, religious organization, and recreational and sports organizations shall be brought together. All CSOs that think they are government or administration related organization, professional groups and citizen’s group have been named together as Pressure group. Lastly, all the social welfare groups and NGOs have been brought under the heading Welfare and Development group.

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5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

beneficiaries, 75% had mentioned about their purpose to provide service to the general public; moreover, 36% were also interested in educating and informing people for the good of the general public. The data so far reveals a civil society that is overwhelmingly social welfare based and eager to serve the society. This implies that the CSOs are mostly involved at local levels of the society which is in need of welfare assistance due to the socio-economic situation.

5.2.4

Geographic Coverage

The geographic level by which the civil society organization limits its activities reflects to some extent the nature of its participatory role. Naturally, CSOs working in larger geographic areas have better networks, stronger links with the political actors, and possess broader social goals, larger budgets, and better organizing skills than those working at the local level. Locally based CSOs are primarily concerned with the well-being of the residents and lack of network and other logistic facilities. However, local CSOs may have a better relationship with the local government and communities. From the survey data it has been found that majority (82%) of the CSOs surveyed are concentrated at the periphery (union and sub-district) level. Only 10% function at district level, 6% throughout the nation, and 2% globally. The local based CSOs are in most cases highly localized and primarily concerned with poverty alleviation. Some may have a political identity, while others do not. For further analysis on the structural strength, grass-roots action, and participatory functions, CSOs working at five geographic levels had been brought under two headings— local and national. Those CSOs working at the union/ward level and the sub-district level shall be deemed local CSOs (82%), while those working at the district, national, and global level shall be deemed national CSOs (18%).

5.2.5

Members

The most important characteristics and strength of civil society from the viewpoint of Neo-Tocquevillean School are its membership. The survey also inquired about the membership pattern of the CSOs. It was very common for the CSOs to have members within 1 to 1000 persons, where 26% had members within 20–40 persons and 21% had members within 100–1000. This reveals that in most cases the CSOs are small in respect to the number of members (Fig. 5.2). This is natural for CSOs who’s more than 80% are local based. Only a few districts or nationwide professional groups have been found to have members of more than 1000 persons. Again, a few well-established NGOs that are working throughout the Rajshahi district as well as the whole nation have included their beneficiary group members as their organization members. With such large membership these NGOs have entered the last two bars of the figure representing CSOs with members from 1000 to more than 5000

5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data

115

30.0

Percentage of CSOs

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0

Percentage of CSOs

0.00

1-19

20-39

0.4

14.0

26.0

40-59

60-99

100-999

17.0

11.0

22.0

10004999 7.0

5000-~ 2.0

Number of Members

N=504, Answer rate=100% Fig. 5.2 Scale of individual members belonging to the surveyed CSOs

persons. However, in case of large NGOs, observation and previous literatures do not confirm that these large numbers of NGO beneficiaries are considered or treated as equal members of the NGOs. Rather the relation between NGO officials and beneficiaries may be termed as a relation of powerful, resourceful towards dependents, and obliged (Tasnim, 2005). However, in case of Bangladesh as well as other developing countries, membership alone can neither provide any real picture of the civil society nor the strength of the civil society organizations. For this we also need to know about their source of income as well as their budget, number of volunteers, employees, etc.

5.2.6

Resources

Bangladesh is a developing country, naturally membership fee; in most cases this do not provide the necessary financial need for the CSOs. They have to look for other resources. As mentioned in Chap. 4, donor policy and funds have direct influence on the vibrant nature of civil society. The world reputed large development NGOs are very much dependent on foreign funds. Besides, all registered social welfare organizations, youth groups and women’s groups are supposed to receive a certain amount of yearly government funds. Though nominal that is about 30–150 USD

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5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

(Ministry of Social Welfare, 2002),2 the government grant inspires the local people to form organizations. Moreover, different government ministries and related semigovernment and autonomous institutions provide loan to cooperatives and small NGOs. Loan and relief providing organizations like PKSF (Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation meaning funds to help rural works), BRDB (Bangladesh Rural Development Board) mainly distribute government loans. However, big projects of these institutions often receive foreign funds too. For example, BRDB loan project for the Women Destitute Cooperatives is financed by Asian Development Bank. PKSF that provides loans to small micro-credit NGOs also receives funds from different international development agencies like the World Bank, USAID etc. Besides direct financing from international donor and agencies and foreign NGOs, domestic NGOs provide funding to small NGOs. These funds are basically foreign funds received by a large NGO distributing to the small NGOs against the sub-contracted projects. Among the 504 CSOs surveyed, 310 (61%) CSOs receive funds from government or non-government sources and 96 (19%) CSOs admitted of receiving foreign assistance through money or service, directly or indirectly. However, a large portion 194 (39%) has mentioned that they do not receive any types of funds. These are small local groups and cooperatives at the local level and pressure groups at the national level. However, there is a possibility that a few CSOs simply did not want to mention their sources of income and avoided the question by saying they do not receive any funds outside membership fees. Again, few cooperatives, who may receive loans from BRDB or cooperative’s office, do not consider those loans as financial assistance, as they are loans not donations. Moreover, few CSOs had said, though, that before they did receive government funds, they do not apply for such funds because of the bureaucratic complicacy and bribing that is involved in the process which makes the nominal amount of money non-worthy of them. More than 50% CSOs receive government funds, though it may be nominal. In the survey, it has been observed that registered or enlisted CSOs hardly receive any personal benevolence or donation from domestic foundations. In another survey on personal giving in Bangladesh, by Ahmed and Jahan (2002) it has been found that more than 80% of philanthropists belonging to the middle class give away their alms to religious charities, orphanages, or individual needy persons than to any civil society organization. Moreover, corporate giving is not yet a common practice in Bangladesh, though they may consider it as an implicit responsibility. Objectives and policy interest of the CSOs show a strong tendency towards social welfare and service providing than advocacy or policy recommendation and the majority of CSOs rely on outside financial sources—mainly government and foreign funds besides their membership fees. The data also indicate that whether the organization acts at the local or national level and whether it receives foreign

This booklet provides the rules for providing financial grant and loan to the voluntary social welfare organizations and cooperatives that were followed in 2006. This amount has increased in the last one decade. 2

5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data

117

assistance or not are the most important factors that determine its nature and membership, besides its category. To get a better view about the structural strength and nature of civil society organizations (CSO), the following three important characteristics of CSOs—volunteer, employee, and budget, are analyzed by considering the differences found among CSOs on point of acting at the local or national level and foreign fund recipient and non-recipient. As the term civil society in its modern sense had been publicized in Bangladesh primarily through donor agencies’ policies to support NGOs, some differences may exist between CSOs that receive foreign funds or assistance (which may also be considered modern) and those CSOs that do not (which may also be deemed indigenous CSOs).

5.2.7

Volunteer

If we consider volunteer as manpower strength and employee as skill strength, then, we may find the civil society organizations working at the local level (Fig. 5.3a) and with no-foreign assistance (Fig. 5.3b) are rich in manpower. In case of CSOs acting at the local and national level, 37% national CSOs do not have any volunteers, while only 16% local CSOs work without volunteers. Relatively, the trend is high among national CSOs to have volunteers more than 100 persons. Nevertheless, the stable volunteer force is possessed by local CSOs. About 77% of the latter type of CSOs have volunteers ranging from 1 to 50. While only 42% of national CSOs have such patterns of volunteers. Figure 5.3b shows the richness of volunteers among the small non-recipient CSOs. In most cases their number of volunteers ranges from 1 to 50 persons, and the most common among such CSOs (65%) is to have 1–19 volunteers. Only 12% of such CSOs have mentioned that they do not have any volunteers, while such absence of volunteers is very common among foreign fund recipient CSOs (52%). As the number of volunteers rises higher than 100, we may observe rather steady presence of foreign fund recipient CSOs. This is because large NGOs belong to this group and some of them have identified their large number of beneficiaries as their volunteers too.

5.2.8

Employee

Employees are mostly found among CSOs that are well organized and affluent with financial resources. Reasonably, CSOs working at the national level are well organized and run with more professionals. Figure 5.4a shows that 63% national CSOs have employees, while only 25% of local CSOs have employees. Among the national as well as local CSOs, it is most common to have employees within 30 persons. However, large NGOs working nationwide may have several hundreds of employees working in a district.

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5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

a

70%

Percentge of CSOs

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

0

1-19

20-49

50-99

100-499

500- more

Local

16%

63%

14%

5%

3%

0%

National

39%

31%

11%

3%

8%

8%

Number of Volunteers

N=504, No answer=1 (0.2%)

b 70%

Number of CSOs

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0

1-19

20-49

50-99

100-499

500more

Non Recipient of Foreign Funds

12%

65%

15%

5%

3%

1%

Recipient of Foreign Funds

52%

26%

7%

4%

7%

3%

Number of Volunteers

N=504, Answer rate= 100% Fig. 5.3 (a) Scale of volunteers among surveyed CSO working at the national and local level. (b) Scale of volunteers among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds recipient and non-recipient

Figure 5.4b shows that 78% of the CSOs that do not receive any foreign assistance, do not employee any regular staff. Rather the tendency to have employee is common among the CSOs that do receive foreign funds. Among foreign fund recipient CSOs, 68% have full-time employees ranging from 1 to 30 persons. Remaining 9% have much larger personnel.

5.2 Nature of Civil Society in Bangladesh as Revealed through the Survey Data

a

119

80%

Percentage of CSOs

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

0

1-9

10-29

Local

75%

20%

5%

30-more 1%

Naonal

36%

36%

21%

7%

Number of Employees

N=504, Answer rate = 100%

b

90% 80%

Percentage of CSOs

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

0

1-9

10-29

30-more

Non Recipient of Foreign Funds

78%

18%

3%

0%

Recipient of Foreign Funds

23%

41%

27%

9%

Number of Employees

N=504, Answer rate = 100% Fig. 5.4 (a) Scale of employee among the surveyed CSOs active both at the local and national. (b) Scale of employee among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds recipient and non-recipient

5.2.9

Budget

Figure 5.5a, b comparatively shows the budget of the CSOs in 2005, both from their geographical level and on the point of receiving foreign assistance. A significant portion of the sample CSOs refrained from providing their budget. However, with the available data, it is clear that CSOs with various ranges of budgets are working at the local level (Fig. 5.5a). The most common situation among the local level NGOs to have a budget is within 100 thousand to 1 million BDT (35%). However, 34% of

120

a

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

40%

Percentage of CSOs

35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1000-24999 BDT

25000-49999 BDT

50000-99999 BDT

100000-999999 BDT

Local

18%

19%

20%

35%

8%

National

11%

11%

9%

34%

34%

1000000- more BDT

Amount of Budget in BDT

b

45%

Percentage of CSOs

40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

100024999 BDT

2500049999 BDT

5000099999 BDT

100000999999 BDT

1000000more BDT

Non Recipient of Foreign Funds

19%

19%

21%

35%

6%

Recipient of Foreign Funds

8%

13%

6%

33%

41%

Amount of Budget in BDT

Fig. 5.5 (a) Scale of budget for the year 2005, among the surveyed CSOs active at both the local and national levels. (b) Scale of budget for the year 2005 among the surveyed CSOs both foreign funds receiving and non-receiving. * 106 (21%) CSOs did not provide their budget statistics. So the valid N here is 398. **The budget is provided in Bangladeshi currency Taka (BDT). 1 USD ¼ 69 BD Taka in 2007

5.3 Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action

121

national NGOs also have budget within the same amount, while another 34% have budgets exceeding 1 million BDT. Figure 5.5b shows among the non-recipient CSOs, almost 60% have a very small annual budget ranging between 1000 and 100,000 BDT only. Less than 6% of such CSOs use a budget over 1 million BDT. Not surprisingly, 32.5% of foreign fund recipient CSOs’ budgets range from BDT 100,000 to BDT 1 million, while 41% of such CSOs have budgets that even exceed BDT 1 Million. Highest budget among these 41% is 120 million BDT. With the six comparative figures on volunteers, employee, and budget, distinct gaps between the financial and human resources of the local and national as well as foreign fund recipient CSOs and the non-recipient CSOs have been revealed. CSOs working at the national level and NGOs receiving foreign assistance may be well equipped with handsome budgets and skilled employees, but it is the small local groups, the non-recipient CSOs, that are rich in spirited volunteers.

5.3

Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action

Grass-roots actions refer to CSO programs such as micro-credit, literacy, skill training, relief, health, women empowerment, group network building, as well as social mass-awareness, humanitarian, and legal aid carried out at the rural level and within poor communities. In most cases, these programs are service based targeting the poor villagers. Seventy-six percent of the organizations indicated that they were somehow involved in grass-roots development. Table 5.2 shows the involvement of CSOs in different categories of grass-roots activities. Respondents were free to choose multiple answers if they were involved in more than one way in grassroots development. Among them, the most popular activities were found to be health (46%), education (44%), and economic empowerment (44%), or micro-credit. Progress took place mainly through development NGOs. Table 5.2 also shows the high involvement of social welfare groups and NGOs in those service based programs. Besides these three functions, welfare and NGO groups have been found to be highly involved in social and political awareness (43%). In different studies also, it has been evident that villagers who receive microcredits for income-generating activities from the NGOs or who participate in NGO programs are more likely to undertake new income-generating activities, raise their income and productivity, empower themselves, adopt family planning, reduce infant and child mortality, prevent childhood diseases, and attain self-reliance in meeting their socio-economic and other welfare needs than those of their comparable non-beneficiaries (Amin, 1997, p. 116). Besides material development, the poor have heightened their self-confidence over time (IOB (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1998, p. 3). NGOs have also been successful in inspiring these poor, uneducated people learn, become socially and politically aware, and even participate and win in local council elections. In the 1996 general parliamentary election, the turnout of women voters was

122

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

77%. Civil society efforts for education have ensured 82% primary school enrollment in Bangladesh. No doubt these are important achievements in strengthening civil society in rural Bangladesh. Thus, it may be stated that where there was nothing, now there is at least something. However, if we again go back to Table 5.2 it may be observed that the involvement of CSOs in building group networks (24%), local representation and ventilation of grievances (18%), and educating and helping in social and political rights (17%) are relatively less than in other areas of involvement, though we may consider these programs to be more important in citizen building and advocacy training. Previous studies have also revealed that often rural micro-credit debtors do not have full control over their money. NGO workers place priority on the commercial value of micro-credits vis-à-vis its welfare potential. In most cases, the education level as well as the management and leadership qualities of NGO beneficiaries is below the standard to gain independence (Ullah & Routary, 2003, p. 118). Village organizations or groups formed by the beneficiaries of NGOs seem to act like sub-branches of the particular NGO instead of articulating members’ needs and preferences (Hulme & Edwards, 1997, p. 276; IOB (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1998, p. 251). Now we can infer that while they have achieved something, it may not be enough for the overall development of the grass-roots sector. So it becomes evident that except political, social awareness (30%), CSOs’ involvement (that includes both the NGOs, welfare groups, traditional pressure groups, and economic groups) at the grass-roots level is mostly concerned with service providing development and welfare activities than politics and democracy related actions. To have a closer look on the tendency of the CSOs on grass-roots action, two service related and two advocacy training related actions have been selected and civil society involvement has been analyzed considering both the geographic level of activity of CSOs and their condition of receiving and not receiving foreign assistance. Table 5.3 is a three-dimensional cross table showing the involvement of foreign assistance receiving and non-receiving CSOs working at the local and national level upon four types of grass-roots actions. The first two are service providing (Health and Economic empowerment), while the last two are advocacy training (Group networking and Rights related). In all 4 cases we may observe the overwhelming participation rate of CSOs that receive foreign funds, especially working nationwide. This is because these CSOs or NGOs are large, well skilled, and financed and have multi-dimensional grass-roots programs than the small foreign assistance receiving CSOs who may have limited projects in a certain locality (Table 5.3). The participation rate for CSOs that do not receive any foreign assistance is high too. In case of the first two services providing activities more than 50% of these CSOs are active both at the local and national level. For network building, it is the CSOs working at the local level (both foreign assistance receiving and not receiving CSOs) that are comparatively active than the national level CSOs. While in the case of legal aid and political human rights education, it is the national CSOs that are more involved as they are equipped with specialized manpower.

20.7 6.1

0.0

24.1

81 (16%)

116 (29%) 49 (12%)

8 (2%)

224 (56%)

397

Frequency

122 (24%)

36.2

12.5

30.2 10.2

Active in developing group network*** (%)

158 (31%)

54.5

12.5

25.0 12.2

Active in women empowerment*** (%)

90 (18%)

27.2

25.0

20.7 6.1

Active in local representation and ventilation of grievances to the authorities*** (%)

222 (44%)

62.5

50.0

32.8 81.6

Active in education and literacy*** (%)

235 (46%)

66.5

50.0

46.6 57.1

Active in health education and health service *** (%)

90 (17%)

28.6

25.0

12.1 20.4

Active in legal, political, and human rights*** (%)

222 (44%)

57.6

37.5

65.5 28.6

Active in economic empowerment*** (%)

149 (30%)

42.9

50.0

26.7 36.7

Active in social and political awareness and participation** (%)

a

*** Sig. P < 0.01, **Sig P < 0.05, N ¼ 504, No Answer ¼ 1 (0.2%), Not Applicable ¼ 106 (21%) Though 76% that is 384 CSOs said they are involved in grass-roots action, 79% that is 397 CSOs have mentioned about their involvement in particular grass-roots programs. This means 13 CSOs though do not think they are involved in over-all grass-roots action have mentioned their involvement in particular programs that are grass-roots based. This difference may be because of their way of thinking about grass-roots action or their misunderstanding of the question, “Are you involved in any grass-roots actions?” However, when they found the name of particular actions they are involved in they have mentioned about their participation, in the questionnaire. As involvement of these 13 CSOs in different grass-roots action is fact, they have been included in the counting of the particular actions and counted in the tables

Economic Education and culture Pressure group Welfare and development Total

Categories of the CSOs

Active in GO-NGO cooperation for rural development *** (%)

Types of grass-roots activities

Table 5.2 Distribution of surveyed CSOs in four categories and rate of their involvement in different types of grass-roots activitiesa

5.3 Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action 123

78 63 50 37

52

54

27

15

18

30

55

(LT ¼ 325) 56

a

Total (%)

31

10

52

59

52

48

64

88

Active national level Non-recipient Foreign fund recipiCSOs (%) ent CSOs (%) a a (NR ¼ 29) (NR ¼ 42)

44

32

59

(NT ¼ 71) 76

a

Total (%)

17

24

44

(T ¼ 396) 46

b

Overall total (%)

***P < 0.01, P < 0.05, N ¼ 504, No Answer ¼ 2 (0.4%), Not Applicable ¼ 106 (21%) a NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column, but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading b The total includes only those CSOs that have mentioned their involvement in the mentioned four types of grass-roots programs

Active in health education and health servicea Active in economic empowerment Active in developing group network*** Active in legal, political, and human rightsb

Selected grass-roots activities

Number of involved CSOs Active at local level Non-recipient Foreign fund recipiCSOs (%) ent CSOs (%) a a (NR ¼ 279) (FR ¼ 46)

Table 5.3 Selected grass-roots action among foreign funds recipient and non-recipient CSOs engaged at the local and national level

124 5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

5.3 Vibrant Involvement in Grass-Roots Action

125

As the foreign assistance receiving CSOs are mostly NGOs and they receive foreign funds mainly for grass-roots projects development and poverty alleviation, their high rate of involvement in these activities is obvious. But what is more striking is the high rate of involvement of local CSOs that do not receive any foreign assistance for social welfare. From the consideration of grass-roots actions, the data show that all most all types of CSOs are active in both local and national level and with varying amounts of resources. This indicates a vibrant nature of civil society in terms of Neo-Tocquevillean model.

5.3.1

Evaluation of CSOs and NGO Performance

Concerning performance and effectiveness of the grass-roots action, the CSOs were asked to evaluate (1) their own performance, (2) overall NGO performance nationwide, and (3) the success of International NGOs, development agencies, and donors, separately on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is very little success, 4 is medium success, and 7 is highest success. The three types of rating results are illustrated in Table 5.4. CSOs engaged in grass-roots activities evaluated their performance as 4.3 (standard deviation ¼ 1.28), while the average of the overall national performance of NGOs has been just 4.1 (standard deviation ¼ 1.16). Average rating 4 refers that evaluation is positive, but they are not claiming high performance. Similar to the NGO efficiency evaluation, in case of international NGOs, agencies, and donors, the evaluation mean is only 4.1 (standard deviation 1.599), indicating that CSOs accept the reality of constructive contributions by foreign actors but they do not highly appreciate their role. However, if we calculate the number of CSOs that have rated performance from scale 4 to 7 which means, they think such CSOs are encouragingly successful, we find, in all three cases, a strong majority of CSOs have rated positively (column 3 of Table 5.3).

Table 5.4 Grass-roots performance evaluation of the civil society by the surveyed CSOs Types of evaluation Self-performance Performance of all NGOs Performance of international NGOs and agencies

Mean 4.3 4.1 4.1

Standard deviation 1.278 1.159 1.59

Percentage of CSOs (that rated within 4–7)a 68% 61% 74%

N ¼ 504, Not applicable ¼ 99 (20%) and Invalid Answer ¼ 7 (1%) a The evaluation was made on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is very little success, 4 is medium success, and 7 is highest success

126

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

3.5 3

Score mean

2.5 2

3.5

3.2 1.5

2.6

2.7 2.2

1 0.5 0 Japan (Ibaraki, 2006- Korea (Kyengi, 200708) N 114 07) N 286

Phillipines (Cebu, 2004-05) N 159

Turkey (Istanbul, 2003-04) N 507

Bangladesh (Rajshahi, 2006-07) N 504

Fig. 5.6 Subjective influence scores among the CSOs covered by JIGS Survey in five countries. Data source: JIGS, Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups, University of Tsukuba, Japan

5.3.2

Subjective Influence Score (SIS)

Moreover, the respondent CSOs were asked to score their influence from one to five in the geographic area where they were active.3 The data show that CSOs in Bangladesh have a better subjective influence score (SIS) than their counterparts in other Asian countries, namely Japan, Korea, Turkey, and the Philippines (Fig. 5.6). Among the five Asian countries, both developing and developed, that enjoy a multi-party democracy, the CSOs of Bangladesh rank top in SIS scoring. So, the civil society has been found vibrant not in their actions for social development and performance evaluation, but also in their confidence about their influence upon the society where they work in. But how much effective is their influence? And to what extent they have been able to utilize their confidence and influence in ensuring good governance, healthy politics, participation, and democracy? That is the next story to investigate. From our analysis and discussion so far on civil society actions at the grass-roots level, we find that high percentage of CSOs are involved in grass-roots level, though their involvement in service providing than advocacy training (accept social and political awareness) is higher. Again, it has been found that involvement of local based, domestically financed CSOs is also significant and the performance of CSOs—traditional, modern, and international—is also positive. This confirms again the well-accepted supposition that civil society in Bangladesh has contributed significantly in social development, poverty alleviation. Moreover, through the survey, it is revealed that not only well-recognized NGOs, but local CSOs are also 3 Respondents were asked in the questionnaire, “when a policy related problem or an incident occurs in the geographic area where your organization is active, how much influence your organization has in resolving these problems? Please rate your influence from 1 to 5 where (1) No influence, (2) Hardly any influence, (3) Little influence, (4) Some influence, and (5) Strong influence.”

5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs

127

active in such endeavor. Civil society is involved in solving the local problems of poverty, literacy, sanitation, also to some extent for good citizenry. CSOs, though not to the full extent, are satisfied with their performance in relation to social development and service delivery. They have been found to pose a high score in SIS in comparison to the CSOs of other Asian States. This picture rather provides a healthy, vibrant picture of civil society that may form the basis for further involvement and success in politics and democracy related matters according to the Diamond model. However, the fact is not so simple and straight. In the next section, the vigilant nature of the civil society organizations is examined according to their five types of action, on the basis of the survey data.

5.4

Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs

As mentioned above, the vigilance aspect of CSOs relates to the networking, participation, and political dimensions of civil society. This chapter assesses civil society’s vigilance according to five dimensions: its relationship with other actors in the political system, its relationship with the government, its influence in policymaking, the nature of its advocacy, and the nature of its lobbying efforts.

5.4.1

CSOs’ Relationships with Other Actors in the Political System

Civil society cannot act alone if its goal is to develop enough strength to monitor the state and to advocate for national policies and decisions; it needs to develop networks and cooperate with other sectors and actors in the political system. In the survey, CSOs were asked about their level of cooperation with 15 types of actors in the political system, including the administration, local government, political parties, and other social and market actors, such as academics, the mass media, welfare organizations, trade unions, business groups, and other civil society organizations. The responding CSOs were asked to rate their level of cooperation with those actors on a scale from one to seven, with one meaning no cooperation, four meaning a medium level of cooperation, and seven meaning the highest level of cooperation. The data reveal that the highest level of cooperation among civil society organizations is with the local government (mean 3.99). Ranked second are welfare organizations and NGOs (mean 3.27), third are agricultural organizations (mean 3.18), and fourth are consumer organizations (mean 2.74). All of these actors are actors in the social sphere. On the basis of the CSOs’ responses, the most influential political actors—political parties (mean 2.61)—hold the fifth-place ranking in relation to formal cooperation. The levels of cooperation with scholars (2.41), professional groups (2.40), and the mass media (2.39) are almost the same. Another noteworthy

128

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

feature is that market actors (business groups—mean 1.45, corporations— mean1.42) have hardly any relationships with the CSOs. This very limited relationship corresponds to the low level of private enterprise’s contributions to civil society groups; the rate of cooperation with trade unions is also low (mean 1.64). Observation of the mean levels of cooperation may not lead to optimism about the situation. On a scale from one to seven, the highest cooperation mean (with local government) is less than four, which indicates that the level of cooperation is scarcely at a medium level. The overall level of cooperation with the 15 kinds of actors by civil society organizations is less than medium. The levels of cooperation are lowest with market actors and highest with social actors.

5.4.2

CSO’s Relationships with the Government

In the assessment of the level of cooperation with various actors, the strength of the interaction and the relationship that civil society has with the government are particularly important to measure. CSOs were asked to describe what type of formal relationship they have with the national and local governments. The survey data reveal that top-down relations with the local government are at a higher level than bottom-up relationships. Aside from CSOs’ dependence on the government for registration or licensing, 57% of the CSOs noted that they receive guidance from the government. This may be considered a top-down relationship. However, CSOs are considered important stakeholders vis-à-vis government policies and decisions. The rate of CSOs’ involvement in exchanging opinions with the government is 38%, which is 19% lower than the rate of government guidance. If relationships that may be described as bottom-up are considered, for example, relationships that involve participation, the rates are even lower. For example, only 20% noted that they send representatives to government councils or committees, and only 8% have cooperated in supporting government policies and budget activities. The data already cited indicate the tendencies of all 504 CSOs in their relationships with the government. This formal relationship between the government and CSOs is now examined more intensively. The CSOs are divided according to two characteristics: first, their geographic coverage, and second, whether they receive foreign funds. Only three types of relationships between the civil society and government—top-down, bottomup, and participatory—are analyzed here (Table 5.5). The data in Table 5.5 make it clear that all of the CSOs, irrespective of their geographical coverage or financial capacity, receive guidelines from the government at a high rate. However, CSOs active at the local level receive a bit more instruction from the government (by 2%) than CSOs active at national level. The rate of exchanging opinions and sending representatives to government councils among the national CSOs is significantly higher (by 22%) than the rate for local CSOs. Local CSOs that do not receive foreign funds show the lowest rate of sending representatives (14%). The data in Table 5.5 confirm that bottom-up style interaction with the government is relatively low. Moreover, the results also indicate that local CSOs participate

N ¼ 504

33 16

32 14b

42 29b

(LT ¼ 415) 59

a

Total (%)

50 32

59 43

Active at national level Non-recipiForeign fund ent CSOs recipient CSOs (%) (%) a (NR ¼ 44) a (FR ¼ 44) 48 48

55 37

(NT ¼ 88) 48 a

Total (%)

37 20

(T ¼ 503) 57 a

Overall total (%)

a

NB based on survey data; **Difference across local and national level groups was statistically significant for all variables shown, sig P < 0.05 NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading b Difference across receiving and not receiving foreign funds CSO groups was statistically significant for the particular variable shown, sig P < 0.05

Administrative guidance provided by the government Exchange opinions with the government Sends representative to council and/or advisory bodies of the national government No Answer ¼ 1 (0.2%)

Selected formal relationship with the government

Number of involved CSOs Active at local level Non-recipient Foreign fund CSOs (%) recipient CSOs (%) a (NR ¼ 363) a (FR ¼ 52) 57 67

Table 5.5 Selected government relationships among CSOs engaged at the local and national levels—foreign fund recipients vs. non-recipients

5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs 129

130

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

less than other kinds of CSOs, which may be in a better position in relation to their finances, skills, organizational base, education, and geographic coverage. However, the higher levels of involvement of the foreign funded CSOs were found to be statistically significant only in cases where a representative or representatives were sent to the government council or administrative advisory bodies at the local level (29%). There is a possibility that the high rate of foreign funded CSOs’ exchange of opinions with the government at both the local and national level occurred by chance, as such actions were not found to be statistically significant. However, in real life, from interview and observation, it had been found that the government officials do give more importance to foreign fund recipient big NGOs.

5.4.3

The Nature of Advocacy

Besides their formal relations, CSOs often interact with the government on various issues through advocacy. Advocacy refers to negotiating and pressuring the government in various ways regarding different political and social issues and problems, as well as regarding the particular interests of the CSO itself. Moreover, in the socioeconomic context of Bangladesh, public education regarding political and human rights and large-scale awareness raising are also considered forms of advocacy. CSOs’ advocacy functions may serve as an important barometer of their vigilance. In the survey, CSOs were asked whether they were involved in these kinds of advocacy regarding ten different issues. It was observed from the overall data (N ¼ 504) that CSOs were mostly involved in advocacy regarding social welfare, such as women’s rights (32%), education (40%), public health (39%), the environment (30%), labor rights, and unemployment issues (20%). On issues that are more connected to democracy and political stability, CSOs seemed less interested in engaging in advocacy for example, political and human rights (20%), law and order (17%), corruption (12%), street politics and violent strikes (3%),4 and separation of the judiciary from the executive branch (4%).5 All of these issues were urgent from the perspective of Bangladesh at the time of the survey in 2006. The data show that the overall rate of participation in advocacy is low; none of the issues attracts the attention of more than 50% of the CSOs, unlike the high rate of their involvement in service and development functions. Such non-involvement by

4 The confronting political parties prefer to engage on the streets instead of air their grievances at the parliament. Often the street politics, mass protests, etc., are accompanied by day-long nationwide strikes instigated by violence which is known as Hartal. 5 In Bangladesh, although the Supreme Court is independent from the government, lower divisions of the court are still controlled by government-recruited magistrates. This issue is long-standing, and the political parties always promise in their election campaigns to separate the judiciary from the government. However, no such separation has actually taken place under either regime. The Supreme Court has ruled on this issue and in 2007, under the emergency rule, the separation process began.

5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs

131

civil society led to the inference that either the CSOs are indifferent to political problems or that they are avoiding any confrontation with powerful political actors. Moreover, it may be assumed that the vibrant CSOs are barred from meddling in such sensitive issues. Using Table 5.6, it is possible to further analyze the nature of CSOs’ participation among those active at the local and national levels and among those receiving and Table 5.6 CSOs’ political advocacy among foreign-funding recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level

Advocacy on political issues Involvement in political and human rights by advocacy Campaign for better law and order Involvement against corruption Campaign against street politics and hartal (strike) culture Campaign for separation of the judiciary from the executive branch of the government

Number of involved CSOs Active at local level Foreign Nonfund recipient recipient CSOs CSOs Total (%) (%) (%) a c (NR ¼ a (FR ¼ (LT ¼ 362) 52) 414) 16 27ª 17

Active at national level Foreign Nonfund recipient recipient CSOs CSOs (%) (%) a (NR ¼ a (FR ¼ 42) 44) 24ª 48ª

Total (%) c (NT ¼ 86) 36

Overall total (%) a (T ¼ 500) 20

15

17

15

29

25

27

17

9b

17b

10

21

18

20

16

1

2

1

14

2

9

3

2

4

2

21b

5b

13

4

No Answer ¼4 (1%)

N ¼ 504

NB Based on survey data NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading b Difference across receiving and not receiving foreign funds CSO groups was statistically significant for the particular variable shown, sig P < 0.05 c Difference across local and national level groups was statistically significant for all variables shown, sig P < 0.05 a

132

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

not receiving foreign funds. Among the small number of CSOs active on political issues, national level CSOs are more involved than local CSOs (for human rights issues, their involvement is higher by 3%; for law and order issues, street politics, and an independent judiciary, it is higher by 2%; for corruption, it is higher by 6%; p < 0.05). However, in the case of advocacy against street politics and for judicial independence, the contribution of both local and national level CSOs is negligible (for both the variables, the level of participation is less than 5% for local and national level CSOs). Human rights and corruption affect the whole society—urban and rural, local and national. Moreover, donor policies regarding good governance have begun to emphasize those issues. For this reason, advocacy around such governance issues has attracted more CSOs from varying sectors than advocacy related to street politics and an independent judiciary has attracted. However, considering the social consciousness and political awareness that NGO projects have generated throughout Bangladesh, the penetration of political parties in rural societies, and the high voter turnout at the polls since the 1990s to 2008, civil society’s overall advocacy record, as revealed through the data, is not satisfactory.

5.4.4

The Nature of Success in Policy-Making

Another indication of a vigilant civil society is its success in influencing the policymaking process. The survey data on policy-making reveal a more frustrating picture of CSOs’ activity at the peripheral and intermediate levels in Bangladesh. The respondent CSOs were asked whether they have ever been successful in influencing the government/local government in any decision, policy, or budget that affected the CSO’s interest positively (policy-making) or in preventing any decision, policy, or budget that went against the CSO’s interest (policy-breaking). Respondents were asked to consider only the cases that had had successful results. Only 13% of the total number of CSOs surveyed had success in influencing a government decision, policy, or budget, and only 6% were successful in blocking government decisions or policies that went against their interests. Although the CSOs’ rate of success in the sphere of policy is poor overall, it is important to note which section of civil society has been the most successful. Table 5.7 shows the success rate of CSOs working across different geographic levels and with foreign or non-foreign funds. Once again, it becomes significantly clear that although more than 80% of CSOs are locally based and the majority of CSOs do not receive any foreign funds, the nationally based CSOs (24%) and national CSOs that receive foreign assistance (34%) are the most successful among the very small community of CSOs that influence national and local politics. This finding indicates–that large NGOs have accomplished the most in terms of influencing policy-making.

5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs

133

Table 5.7 CSOs’ policy-making and policy-breaking success among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level

Policy participation

Success in policymaking Success in policybreaking

Number of involved CSOs Local NonForeign Total recipient fund (%) CSOs recipient (%) CSOs (%) a c (NR ¼ a (FR ¼ (LT ¼ 363) 52) 415) 10 15 11

3

4

3

National Nonrecipient CSOs (%) a (NR ¼ 44) 14b

20

Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) a (FR ¼ 44) 34b

20

Total (%)

Overall total (%)

(NT ¼ 88) 24

a

c

21

(T ¼ 503) 13

6

NB based on survey data No answer rate ¼ 1 (0.2%) N ¼ 504 (based on survey data) a NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading b Difference across receiving and not receiving foreign funds CSO groups was statistically significant for the particular variable shown, sig P < 0.05 c Difference across local and national level groups was statistically significant for all variables shown, sig P < 0.05

5.4.5

The Nature of Lobbying

Civil society organizations were asked to rate the frequency of various activities that they engage in when they attempt to draw the government’s attention to certain issues or to appeal to the authorities on behalf of their interests or demands. In other words, this question aimed to probe the nature of the CSOs’ lobbying efforts. Through the structured questionnaire, CSOs were asked about both vertical and horizontal forms of lobbying, as well as about formal lobbying methods. By vertical lobbying, I am primarily referring to “inside lobbying” (Tsujinaka, 2002, p. 167), which involves the CSOs’ direct contact with those in power or authority regarding their interests or demands. The negotiations may result in a compromise. The term “horizontal lobbying” refers to methods used to attract government attention or to make demands through joint efforts, such as the formation of coalitions, the arrangement of meetings, or the staging of press conferences. In this way, the CSO articulates its interests to the public and gains social and moral support from other like-minded stakeholders. After they build strength in this horizontal way, the CSOs jointly present their demands to the higher authorities. The overall rate of engagement in lobbying is rather low. The most common methods of the CSOs are contact with the government administration (77%), the

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5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society?

political party in power (54%), and the political party in opposition (29%). The least common methods are sending a petition or a letter (6%), arranging a press conference (14%), or forming a coalition of CSOs to advance their demands (12%). Vertical lobbying seems to be popular among CSOs. Among the horizontal lobbying efforts, the most common is to hold roundtable meetings and conferences (58%). Other popular horizontal lobbying methods include holding mass protests or rallies (18%), staging press conferences (14%), and forming coalitions (12%). The discussion of lobbying tendencies to this point is based on the general results. Table 5.8 further analyzes the lobbying tendencies among the CSOs surveyed by dividing them according to their geographic coverage and whether or not they receive foreign assistance. Here again, a higher tendency towards vertical lobbying is present among all CSO sectors. However, small CSOs that work at the local level (not receiving foreign funds, 58%, or receiving foreign funds, 46%) seem to be the ones that most often contact political parties in order to advance their programs. The practice of signing petitions (writing letters) has nearly the same low rate among both local and national CSOs. While the arrangement of meetings is popular among all CSO sectors, the national CSOs (73%) with no-foreign assistance are engaged in this practice more than other types of CSOs (Table 5.8). The staging of press conferences is more common among national CSOs (38%) than among local CSOs (9%). This difference occurs because local CSO officials may have to travel and make efforts to contact journalists in order to hold such conferences. Among the few CSOs that do form coalitions, the tendency is highest among national CSOs that receive foreign assistance (41%). The data on lobbying make it clear that there is an overall tendency to lobby the state vertically rather than horizontally or formally among all types and sectors of civil society organizations. Among the horizontal lobbying methods that CSOs employ, the staging of public meetings and rallies is the most popular. This method may support a healthy civil society if the CSOs simultaneously form coalitions, display unity, and thereby gain the strength needed to assert their demands and resist pressure from the state. Instead, the CSOs’ involvement in forming coalitions is low (12%); this tendency ultimately leads to weak networks among civil society organizations. Among vertical lobbying measures, direct contact with the government ranks the highest (77%). This finding is not surprising, given that, for registration, permissions, licenses, and other official matters, all CSOs must contact the local or national government. However, the tendency for CSOs in Bangladesh to have direct contact with political parties and the government for the sake of civil society’s interests is rather high. This finding indicates a partisan tendency among civil society organizations. CSOs that maintain a low profile in advocacy vis-à-vis political issues display a high rate of direct contact with political parties regarding their interests and demands. An inference regarding the partisan or politicized nature of the vibrant civil society, along with the low rate of networking, becomes stronger if the situation in Bangladesh is compared with the situation in the other four Asian countries, as was done regarding SIS in Fig. 5.6. Figure 5.7 displays the comparative nature of

5.4 Assessing the Nature of Vigilance among CSOs

135

Table 5.8 Selected lobbying activities performed by foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level

Different types of vertical and horizontal lobbying

Number of involved CSOs Active at local level

Active at national level

Nonrecipient CSOs (%)

Total (%)

Nonrecipient CSOs (%)

(NR ¼ 363) 58b

Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) a (FR ¼ 52) 46b

c (LT ¼ 415) 57

a

31

31

76

Total (%)

Overall total (%)

(NR ¼ 44) 43

Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) a (FR ¼ 44) 36

c (NT ¼ 88) 40

a (T ¼ 503) 54

31

30

16

23

29

87

78

77

68

73

77

5

8

6

11

9

10

6

57

67

58

73ª

48ª

60

58

6b

29b

9

41

34

38

14

7b

21b

8

16b

41b

28

12

a

Contacting the parties in the cabinet Contacting the opposition parties Contacting governmental departments and agencies Asking members to write letters or make phone calls to political parties or the government administration Organizing seminars, roundtable meetings, rallies, etc. Holding press conferences to publicize ideas and the organization’s position on various issues and events Forming coalitions with other organizations or NGOs No answer ¼ 1 (0.2%) for foreign assistance (Based on survey data)

N ¼ 504

NB based on survey data a NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading b Difference across receiving and not receiving foreign funds CSO groups was statistically significant for the particular variable shown, sig P < 0.05 c Difference across local and national level groups was statistically significant for all variables shown, sig P < 0.1

136

5 How Vigilant Is the Vibrant Civil Society? Japan (Ibaraki, 2006-07)) N 286

Korea (Kyengi, 2007-08) N 114

Turkey (Istanbul, 2003-04)) N 507

Bangladesh (Rajshahi, 2006-07)) N 504

Phillipines (Cebu, 2004-05) N 159

60% 55% 53%

50% 40%

40%

37% 35%

Lobby rate

33%

32%

30%

29%

30% 21%

20%

16%

17% 13%

14% 12%

10%

0% Lobbying through Ruling Party

Lobbying through Opposion

Coalion-Building for Lobbying

Fig. 5.7 CSOs lobbying through political parties and coalition formation: five-country comparison using JIGS survey. Data Source: JIGS data, Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups, University of Tsukuba, Japan

lobbying via the ruling party, the opposition party, and coalition building in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, and Bangladesh. The same question regarding lobbying activities was posed to civil society organizations in those countries in similar surveys. Figure 5.7 depicts the greater tendency of Bangladeshi CSOs to prefer partisan lobbying methods and their lower rate of forming coalitions in order to make their demands, as compared with CSOs in other countries. Civil society in the Philippines is most comparable with the Bangladesh case. However, a totally opposite trend may be observed for the Philippines in Fig. 5.7, which suggests that Filipino CSOs are more than twice as likely to form coalitions than to contact the political parties (40% coalition, 16% ruling party, 13% opposition party). By contrast, Bangladeshi CSOs are four times more likely to contact the party in cabinet than to form a coalition. Korean civil society is often considered more or less strong in the context of Asia, as is also evident in the data. Korean CSOs score the highest in the formation of coalitions (55%), and their rate of contacting competing political parties is also not low (33%, 35%) from a general point of view. However, the Bangladeshi CSOs outscore Korean CSOs in contacting political parties that are in power by 20%. This tendency leads towards divisions among the CSOs and a weak position in relation to the state. It is logical that when civil society fails to participate in advocacy, policy-making, and coalition-forming processes, it can hardly bring about pluralism, aggregate the interests of communities, or represent all sections of the society. Civil society may also fail to gain sufficient strength to monitor the state’s functions.

5.5 Is Bangladesh’s Vibrant Civil Society Also Vigilant?

5.5

137

Is Bangladesh’s Vibrant Civil Society Also Vigilant?

Bangladesh does have local groups and associations engaged in social development that may comply with the Diamond model or form the basic structure for generating the social capital discussed by Putnam. However, the survey data also reveal that most of these local groups do not engage in networks or functions that generate the kind of social capital that leads to a stronger civil society and a functioning democracy. Their rate of interaction with the government is low; they often avoid engagement in sensitive but important political issues and prefer to adopt vertical rather than horizontal methods for lobbying the state. Their rate of success in influencing the government is rather low. Most of the traditional, indigenous CSOs are not even oriented towards such issues. Only a select few NGOs have received foreign assistance to engage in social development as well as good governance issues, and these NGOs enjoy the skilled personnel, resources, and organizational strength needed to engage in various social and political endeavors. However, their better performance in relation to government, advocacy, or lobbying techniques has not been found statistically significant for all variables. This finding implies that even skill, solvency, and organizational strength may not be enough to ensure vigilant CSOs. The survey data also revealed that although the rate of involvement in the vigilance-related functions of CSOs is higher among those with a nationwide organizational base than it is among small, indigenous CSOs at the local level, the overall vigilance rate of CSOs is much lower than the rate of their activities related to social development and service provision. The CSOs’ prospects for contributing to democracy or emerging as a strong and vigilant force are unconvincing. Through the survey questionnaire, the CSOs were asked if they thought that Bangladesh’s civil society was successful in influencing the government regarding national policies. Only 32% responded positively, and the majority (68%) answered negatively. Thus, approximately 70% of the CSOs themselves believe that they have no influence on government decisions. What causes such a low level of success? The cause is not political apathy, which may serve as an explanation in the case of developed democracies (Putnam, 2000, pp. 35, 46–47). In describing the reasons for such failure, 52% of the CSOs noted the problem of lack of unity among the CSOs themselves, and 43% pointed to the problem of the CSOs’ politicization. The primary data on the opinion of individual CSOs lead to further analysis of the reasons for a less vigilant civil society and its inability to contribute to democracy, despite its vibrancy. Moreover, the assumption may be made that over-politicization rather than political disinterest is to blame. I have mentioned the powerful role of the political parties and their confrontational attitude in the Bangladeshi political arena in Chap. 4. Often, these political parties penetrate civil society. Such politicization polarizes civil society, seizes its autonomy, and restrains its vigilant and participatory role in national policies and decisions.

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References Ahmed, M., & Jahan, R. (2002). Investing in ourselves: Giving and fundraising in Bangladesh. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Amin, R. (1997). Development strategies and socio-demographic impact of non-governmental organizations: Evidence from rural Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Hulme, D., & Edwards, M. (Eds.). (1997). NGOs, states and donors. Hampshire: Palgrave in Association with the Save the Children. IOB (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (1998). Bangladesh: Evaluation of Netherlands funded NGOs, 1972-1996. The Hague: Policy and Operations Evaluation Department. Ministry of Social Welfare. (2002). Rules for distributing grant to voluntary organizations 2002 (Shecha shebi protistaner modhe onudan bitoron nitimala 2002). Bangladesh National Association for Social Welfare. Dhaka: Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of Bangladesh. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: Collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Tasnim, F. (2005). The role of Japanese NGOs in strengthening Civil Society of Bangladesh: A case study of Shapla Neer. International Political Economy, 16, 19–52. Tsujinaka, Y., Choe, J.-Y., Ohtomo, T., & Miwa H. (2006). Which civil society organizations in which countries are enjoying policy-making processes and why: Comparing 7 countries (Japan, South Korea, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines) in JIGS Survey, in Paper presented at the 20th International Political Science Association World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, July 9–13, 2006. Tsujinaka, Y. (2002). Nihon shimin shakai riekidantai (Civil Society and Interest Groups of Modern Japan) (Written in Japanese). Tokyo: Bakutakusya. Ullah, A. K. M., & Routary, J. K. (2003). NGOs and development: Alleviating rural poverty in Bangladesh. Guerra: Book Mark International.

Chapter 6

Politicized Civil Society

Abstract The survey data analysis in chapter five indicated that, though we may term the civil society in Bangladesh vibrant, it may hardly be considered as vigilant. The aim of this chapter is to point out the reasons for a non-vigilant rather a politicized civil society. This chapter uses three types of method and data, that is, survey analysis, content analysis, and case studies to specify the nature of politicization and co-optation by political parties. In a typical scenario in other countries, civil society can provide a counterbalance or even monitor the state both at the national and local levels. However, in Bangladesh, often CSOs have compromised their autonomy and politicized themselves to certain political parties or political blocs. In such a vulnerable position, civil society can hardly play its expected role to ensure good governance and strengthen democracy. Keywords Political relation · Political control · Partyarchy · Autonomy · Content analysis · Case study

6.1

Introduction

Chapter five based on survey data revealed the basic trends of the civil society in Bangladesh, particularly at the periphery and meso levels. It has also been clearly comprehended that the overall rate of participatory activities, that are more related to democracy and politics, by the civil society is rather low. Moreover, a partisan tendency has been found among all types of CSOs. The present chapter shall investigate deeper into the political relation of civil society through both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The focus shall be mainly on civil society interaction with

Case study section of this chapter is derived in part from an article by the author, titled: Politicized civil society in Bangladesh: Case study analyses [online]. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2017: [99]-123.https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5247. However, the author retains the copyright of the paper. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_6

139

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6 Politicized Civil Society

state and society. Before entering to analysis, it is important to explain the necessity for such analysis from theoretical point of view. According to Diamond (1996, p. 209), the basic two functions of the civil society are to monitor and retain the over exercise of power by a democratic state and to democratize the authoritarian state. The present study is concerned with civil society actions under a democratic (at least formally) state, particularly a new democracy. For a new democracy, Diamond gives emphasis on the necessity of vibrant civil society to bring institutional reform and fight against corruption. In case of Bangladesh, among a large number of CSOs, we have seen that very thin section of civil society organizations (12%) is engaged in such a campaign against corruption, rather CSOs are often accused of corruption (TIB 2007). Another important role of civil society is to supplement political parties by stimulating political participation, building better citizenry, providing leadership training. Moreover, experience with associational life may enrich other democratic values like tolerance, moderation, compromise and respect for opposite views. These ideal theories give the impression that such democratic norms and practice are driven from civil society and directed towards society and political parties and their leaders. However, practically, directions of such flow of political norms and practice are present in two ways traffic. In Bangladesh, it is found that conflict and intolerance within and among the political parties are often generated in civil society that often may become polarized, corrupt, and ineffective in democratic terms. Civil society have also been stated to be a necessary condition for transition from clientelism (Diamond 1996, p. 210), but practically, civil society organizations including the development NGOs in Bangladesh have been found to have entered the long patron–client chains running from the top government leader down to the periphery level of Bangladesh and often NGOs have been accused of becoming new patrons to the poor (Tasnim 2007; Lewis 2004; White 1999). Moreover, issue oriented pluralistic civil society is considered to cut-cross social cleavages and divisions and bring unity among the nation. Berman (1997) had already shown how rich civic engagement in Pre-World War II Germany led to rather a dictatorship than democracy. In case of the ethnically homogenous and mostly casteless society in Bangladesh, the society still have been found to be vertically constructed and politically polarized. Civil society here instead of forming bonding and bridging social capital among different groups are rather helping in sharpening political division, which had originated in historical circumstances and strategically used and generated by political parties.1 In all four crucial points, the civil society in Bangladesh has been found to be behaving in the opposite direction than what is ideally expected from it. Moreover, in each point, Bangladeshi case shows the links or the presence of the strong influence of political forces deterring civil society from playing its democratic role. Bangladeshi political situation as discussed in chapter four, resembles much with the Patryarchy as depicted by Coppedge (1994) based on the experience of Venezuela.

1

Discussed in chapter four.

6.1 Introduction

141

Partyarchy as termed by Coppedge (1994, p. 18) is a democracy in which political parties monopolize the formal political process and politicize the society along party line. In an extreme ideal type of Partyarchy, the political parties control the government recruitments, elections, parliaments, social organizations, and media. In Coppedge’s (1994, p. 19) words, Citizens are free to form and join organizations, but most existing organizations are deeply penetrated by political parties. Politically relevant organizations besides parties are either affiliated with a single party or are split into party factions that compete for control. New organizations that seek to be independent become targets for party takeover, by co-optation or infiltration, or by the creation of competing party-affiliated organizations. One way or another political parties dominate organizational life (Coppedge 1994, p. 19).

Though the statement is for an extreme type and used to describe the politics of Venezuela in the beginning of the 1990s, it resembles with the situation of Bangladesh since 1991. The two powerful political parties and their allies have controlled the Bangladesh politics. Whoever came to power winning elections have monopolized the state apparatus, tried to control all sections of the society, market, and political life. In the process, civil society has been violated, penetrated, polarized, controlled, and weakened by the political parties. Since 2008 Bangladesh is experiencing Dominant Party System instead of Bi-party System (Riaz 2016), as Awami League is in office for three consecutive terms. This situation also matches well with the conditions for Coppedge’s Partyarchy. With the aim to bring to light the reasons behind the less participation rate of the civil society and its inability to contribute positively to democratic consolidation, the present chapter systematically uses survey data, newspaper reports and analysis and conducts case studies on selected CSOs. The first section of the chapter uses direct survey data to understand the perception of the civil society organizations about the influential actors of the political system, the nature of their relationship with important actors in society and tend to have contact with political parties. Second section of the chapter, using sample newspaper reports and editorials on civil society tries to understand the nature of political links, vertical links, bureaucratic links, violent connections to civil society as well as the rate of interest articulations by civil society on those issues. The third section focuses on some selected, but important sections and actions of civil society. It is comprised of case studies upon five CSOs representing different sections and sectors of the civil society.

142

6.2

6 Politicized Civil Society

Civil Society and Political Relation as Revealed in the Survey Data

This section tries to understand who the most influential actors in Bangladesh are from the perception of CSOs. Moreover, the civil society relation with political actors and political parties is also analyzed in this section based on the data gathered through a questionnaire survey upon 504 CSOs of Rajshahi District of Bangladesh.

6.2.1

Most Influential Actors

CSOs were requested to rate the influence of 15 types of social, political, and market actors in the political system of Bangladesh from a scale from 1 to 7 where, 1 means least influence, 4 means medium influence, and 7 means the highest influence. From the data, political parties emerged as significantly influential actors with distinctly high points (mean 6.48) than other actors. Political Parties score higher than government bureaucrats (mean 4.66) and also foreign donors (mean 4.45). Mass media has been ranked 2nd (mean 4.88) in relation to influence. Though the civil society had the highest cooperation with local government (as mentioned in Chap. 5) they ranked its influence as 5th (mean 4.28). Again, though CSOs had very little cooperation with market actors, large business organizations, labor unions and employers’ organizations, these actors have been ranked as 6th (mean 4.20), 7th (mean 3.99), 8th (mean 3.45) in order of influence, respectively. On the other hand, the social and civil society actors like scholars and intellectuals (mean 3.06), welfare NGOs (mean 3.04), women’s movement (mean 2.86), professional organizations (mean 2.84) those who are considered the most important section of the civil society in relation to development and democracy have been rated very poorly. Though this is the perception of only 504 CSOs, it does reflect the influence pattern of different social, political, and market actors and indicates the low position of the civil society actors and high influential position of the political parties. Next, we shall try to understand which type of actors (political or social) CSOs prefer to keep personal relation with.

6.2.2

Personal Relation with Actors

Civil society organizations (CSOs) surveyed have already mentioned the political parties as the most influential actors in the political system. However, for a civil society organization to function and interact with the state, it also needs to come in contact with other political and social actors. CSOs were inquired about having a personal relation with the different important actors. It is noteworthy that 15.5% of the total sample refrained from answering such question. This means that these

6.2 Civil Society and Political Relation as Revealed in the Survey Data

143

CSOs were nervous in revealing such information about personal relations. This attitude in refraining from answering such questions reflects rather lack of freedom and presence of some type of fear among CSOs and citizens. This is rather inconsistent with liberty and democracy that the constitution of Bangladesh ensures to the citizens. As the society is politically polarized and the political parties had always fought against each other, the CSOs did not want to expose their personal relation with important persons and political leaders in fear of persecution by the followers and members of the opposite party. However, with the data available, it becomes clear that CSOs keep personal relation more with political actors like leaders of political parties (ruling party 54%, opposition party 36%), elected Mayor or chairman (44%), etc., than a journalist (32%) or magistrate (4%). As the CSOs are mostly working at local level, they hardly have a chance to meet the parliament members (33%) who prefer to be in the capital than spending more time in their constituency. If we use the same data to analyze the responding style of CSOs working at the local and national levels and those receiving and not receiving foreign funds, then again, the same type of political tendency is revealed (Table 6.1). However, it is clear that, the rate of having relation with party leaders is higher among local CSOs than national CSOs, while the rate of having personal relationships with the Mayor or local council chairman is higher among national CSOs. Relatively, non-recipient CSOs have a higher tendency to maintain a political connection than those foreign funds recipient CSOs with the exception of having relation with opposition party at the local level (44%). This means that small NGO receiving foreign resources tries to keep good relationship with all types of political forces to continue their projects in the local area. And the non-recipient CSOs receiving no funds, whether local or national, are bound to keep a good relationship with the political power structure. Next, we shall try to reveal the relationship that CSOs have directly with political parties.

6.2.3

CSOs Relation with Political Parties

CSOs were directly asked about what type of relations they had with specific political parties and how often they contacted them. CSOs were very careful to answer such questions that had the possibility to expose their relation to political parties or their political ideology. Only those who genuinely did have relation had replied in the positive. Table 6.2 shows the rate of CSOs, both national and local, recipient or non-recipient of foreign funds, having contact with five types of political parties—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),2 Bangladesh Awami League (AL),3

2 3

Ruling party in 2006. Opposition party in 2006.

13

40 5

10 1

1

Total (%) (LT ¼ 346) 32 59 38 38 25 32

16

21.6

National Nonrecipient CSOs (%) (NR ¼ 37) 46 38 30 81 46 57

17

60

Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) (FR ¼ 40) 35 30 23 60 80 145

17

42

Total (%) (NT ¼ 77) 40 34 26 70 64 51

4

18

Overall total % (T ¼ 423) 33 54 36 44 32 35

**Sig . P < 0.01, *Sig. P < 0.05 N ¼ 504, No Answer ¼ 78 (15.5%), Not Applicable ¼3 NR is the number of Non-recipient CSOs, FR is the Foreign Fund Recipient CSOs, and LT is the Local CSO. NT is the number of National CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading

CSOs or its members having personal relationships with important actors An elected parliament member A leader of the ruling party A leader of the opposition parties Mayor/union chairman A journalist* A chief or a section chief from a department of government/local administration A chief or a staff of an international organization, international NGO** A judge or a magistrate of the national or local court

Number of involved CSOs Local NonForeign fund recipient recipient CSOs CSOs (%) (%) (NR ¼ 303) (FR ¼ 43) 32 26 59 54 37 144 40 35 23 37 30 40

Table 6.1 Personal relations existing between important actors and CSOs among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level

144 6 Politicized Civil Society

National Non-recipient CSOs (%) (NR ¼ 44) 57 52 41 30 23

Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) (FR ¼ 44) 55 43 39 32 28

Total % (NT ¼ 88) 56 48 40 31 25

Overall total (%) (T ¼ 500) (65) (51) (34) (26) (10)

N ¼ 504, No Answer ¼ 4 NR is the number of non-recipient CSOs, FR is the foreign fund recipient CSOs, and LT is the local CSO. NT is the number of national CSO, these numbers do not represent the numerical total of the column but the total number of CSOs sections mentioned in the column subheading

CSOs relation with political parties BNP AL JIB JP Communist Party

Number of CSOs having contact with political parties Local Non-recipient Foreign fund recipient CSOs (%) CSOs (%0 Total (%) (NR ¼ 360) (FR ¼ 53) (LT ¼ 413) 68 62 67 52 54 52 31 39 32 25 25 25 6 10 7

Table 6.2 Political party relations with CSOs among foreign fund recipients and non-recipients engaged at the local or national level

6.2 Civil Society and Political Relation as Revealed in the Survey Data 145

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6 Politicized Civil Society

Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh Party (JIB),4 Jatiya Party (JP), Communist Party (any faction). Each CSOs have the possibility to contact more than one Party.5 Naturally, the highest rate of contact is with the ruling party BNP (65%) and such high rate is constant among all types of CSOs. So is the case of contact with the powerful opposition AL (51%) which is also contacted by different categories of CSOs with almost same average. Table 6.2 shows that, the rate to have contact with the position and opposition party is more or less same and high for all types and sections of CSOs. Such high contact with political parties is rather inconsistent for CSOs whose 76% are mostly engaged in grass-roots action, only 15% of them have admitted that, they are somehow related to politics. However, it may be argued that, CSOs organizations for many genuine, formal, and organizational reasons may contact the political parties. So these numbers are not enough to prove the partisan tendency among CSOs. However, if we try to understand the data from a comparative perspective, using survey results done in other Asian countries in the JIGS Survey, the following figure (Fig. 6.1) can be formed. Japan and Korea also show a higher tendency of CSOs and political party relationship than other two developing countries—Philippine and Turkey, however, it is less by at least 10% than that of the case of Bangladesh. CSOs of Philippine noted for entering the national electoral politics have low rate of relationship with political parties than civil society in Bangladesh. The comparative figure let us at least to infer that political party relations of civil society in Bangladesh are unusually higher than other developed and developing countries in Asia. Comparative data on high tendency of CSOs in Bangladesh to contact the ruling party and oppositions lead us to engage in further investigation of the political relation of the civil society to reveal the actual partisan situation in Bangladesh and identify the most important factor that impedes civil society from contributing to democracy. Next sections investigate civil society and political relation through other data besides survey results.

6.3

Civil Society and Politics from Newspaper Analysis

Among the large number of dailies in Bangladesh, three (one English and two Bangla6 newspapers) have been selected for analysis in the present study. As Bangladeshi media and press are also politicized, special care has been given to select comparatively neutral newspapers. Among the very few neutral dailies, The

4

Part of the ruling coalition government with two Ministers in the cabinet in 2006. CSOs were actually asked [question 2.3] to rate their nature of contact with political parties on scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is no contact at all, 2 is medium contact, and 5 is the highest contact. For simplification, in Table 6.1 CSOs that rated their contact with political parties from 2 to 5 have been considered as the CSOs that have contact with a particular party. 6 Bangla is the national language spoken and written in Bangladesh. 5

6.3 Civil Society and Politics from Newspaper Analysis Japan (Ibaraki, 2006-07)) N 286

Korea (Kyengi, 2007-08) N 114

Phillipines (Cebu, 2004-05) N 159

Turkey (Istambul, 2003-04)) N 507

147

Bangladesh (Rajshahi, 2006-07)) N 504

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Contact Ruling Party

Contact Opposion party

Data Source: Special Project on Civil Society, State and Culture in Comparative Perspective, University of Tsukuba (JIGS Data) (CSOs of Japan, Korea, Turkey and Philippines were separately asked about their relation and contact with certain political parties and were given the 1 to 5 scale to rank such relation and contact. This figure sums up percentage of CSOs that have ranked from 2 to 5 on both questions and show the average percentage as the political link for those countries. In case of Bangladesh the relation and contact, that is link with political parties, was inquired through one question. All the surveys had been conducted within the years 1998 to 2006)

Fig. 6.1 Relationship between CSOs and ruling party and opposition: five-country comparison using JIGS survey

Daily Star (36 news reports) was selected as a nationally and internationally known English language daily in Bangladesh. The Daily Ittefaq (46 news reports) was selected because it is the oldest newspaper in Bangladesh, in print since 1953 and is considered to be relatively a neutral Bangla daily. The Daily Jugantor (40 news reports) was also selected because it was the mostly circulated paper in Bangladesh in 2006 and 2007. Newspaper issues from January to June of 2001, 2006, and 2007 have been targeted for searching reports on civil society. The year 2001 (15 news reports) was selected because it was the last year of the Awami League regime, and 2006 (48 news reports) was selected (the same year that the CSO survey was conducted) because it was the last year of the BNP regime. The last years of the two regimes have been selected because at the last stage, political corruption and nepotism tend to reach its highest point when different stakeholders begin to press the government to fulfill the various unrealized promises made by the party in its election manifesto. Simultaneously, with the election ahead, new interests are generated and articulated for the political parties to include in their new party manifestos. In 2007 (59 news reports), an army-backed emergency interim government came into power. This interim government, although it was not elected, made an attempt to be a responsive government and provided the media some freedom. This regime began investigating political corruption by previous regimes and related reports came out in the dailies. Moreover, in this period, CSOs working at the national level, mainly in economic groups and thinks tanks, also became active in articulating different national interests because some of their leading members had

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entered the governments as technocrat advisors. In total 122 newspaper reports have been selected for the content analysis. The targeted issues sought were reports on NGOs, trade unions, cooperatives, professional associations, social and citizen groups, seminars held by CSOs and international organizations, government moves on CSOs, and corruption related to CSOs. Through a manual search,7 a total of 122 news reports were selected for analysis. When all three newspapers reported the same news, only the newspaper story with the most detailed reporting was considered for analysis. These reports were selected based on their mention8 of the types of CSOs and their links to the administration, parties, corruption, and violence,9 and they have been coded with statistical processing software named SPSS (version 14), with the aim of finding a simplified picture of the reports and verifying whether they support our inference concerning the politicization of civil society and its relationship with powerful political actors. Before beginning the news analysis, it should be mentioned that politicization is a phenomenon present throughout society. This is taken for granted by the media and citizens of Bangladesh. Only truly serious incidents that affect social and political life or issues that are brought to the media’s attention by elite civil society groups and large NGOs are published in the press. The news reports about CSOs that we have analyzed did not become news solely through the actions and efforts of those CSOs; however, the news reports still provide evidence of politicization, division among CSOs along party lines, and the dominance of ruling party supporters among all institutions, offices, and associations. Table 6.3 shows the presence of different attributes found with varying rates among six types of CSOs. The term “economic group” refers to all types of businessand trade-related associations and their apex organizations; “Education and cultural” groups include think tanks, intellectuals’ associations, and advocacy and citizens’ groups arranging meetings and formally articulating interests; “pressure groups” refer to professional and anomic groups formed ad hoc to support a particular demand. “NGOs” include all types of small, large, and apex nongovernmental organizations whose main aim is development; similarly, “cooperative” and “labor” include all types of cooperatives and labor groups. Table 6.3 shows that in the majority of cases or reports there are mentions of corruption, patronage, and so on (57%), party links (59%), and violence (47%). The newspaper reports either mentioned such attributes in connection with particular events, or as such matters have been protested by different social organizations. Mentions of donors are found 7 Manual search refers to searching the reports individually from the hard copy of the newspaper issues and not through any machine-based search algorithm. 8 By mentioning these links and CSOs, I do not mean the use of these specific words but the mention of these attributes through the reports; this is more related to latent content analysis. 9 By violence, I mean unruly public functions, pressure, or force created by CSOs and parties through hooligan extortion, and strikes accompanied by violence. However, armed violence or bombings carried out by criminals as well as by the fundamentalist groups have not been considered because they do not confirm the definition used in this book or the Neo-Tocquevillean model.

50 100 87 69 (57%)

20 6 23 122

45 33 74 72 (59%)

71

32

34

Sig. **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01 N ¼ 122

CSO types Economic Education and culture groups Pressure group NGOs Cooperatives Labor union Total

Party links** % 61 76

Number of newspaper reports Corruption, nepotism, Total patronage*** frequencies % 18 39 21 71

Table 6.3 CSO types and attributes appearing in news reports

55 83 65 69 (57%)

53

Bureaucratic links % 61 43

25 50 91 57 (47%)

59

Violence, strike, extortion*** % 39 5

50 50 83 47 (39%)

24

CSOs or leader identified as a corrupt *** % 33 5

35 0 0.0 10 (8%)

3

Donor backing report, seminar, instructions*** % 0 11

35 17 17 70 (57%)

82

Interest articulation for particular and public interest*** % 56 95

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mostly in the case of NGOs (8%). However, the percentage of interest articulation by CSOs (57%) is also not insignificant. The high rate of interest articulation may be explained by two different dimensions, both of which are equally likely. A high rate of interest articulation is a positive sign for a nation and the health of its democracy. However, such tendencies lose their attraction when pluralism is lacking. Among the 70 reports on interest articulation, 20 (or 33%) concern roundtable meetings arranged by two particular civil society groups, the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), a well-known think tank, and Shujon, a famous citizen’s group. CDP for government policies, mainly finance policies and Shujon for citizen’s rights. Moreover, these two organizations are likeminded CSOs believing in pluralism, democracy, and liberalism. They are considered as the elite section of civil society and are often termed by the media and the press as “The Civil Society.” Other formal articulations have been made by a handful of NGOs and business groups. This may be considered as the monopolization of the civil society advocacy space by a few CSOs in the arena of the press and the media. Despite these groups’ honest objectives, there will be no pluralism unless the ideas of other citizens’ groups and intellectuals are given appropriate, proportional media attention. The situation is more or less same in 2019. Another method of articulation in Bangladesh is violence and strikes that naturally attract the media and press. Among the 70 cases referring to articulation, 20% involve violence and 19% strikes. In most cases, trade unions and desperate anomic and professional groups resort to such techniques to express their demands and force the government to listen to their problems. The state’s weakness and incapacity to meet the needs of diverse interest groups and the party government’s negligence regarding rightful demands often lead to violent expressions of civil society. Violent street politics on the part of the parties themselves have also influenced attitudes towards violence as a method of promoting interests. Table 6.3 also shows that 39% of the analyzed news reports mention corruption allegations against CSOs or their leaders. Corrupt CSOs have been found in all types of civil society groups, though they are the most prevalent in labor unions (economic ¼ 13%, education and culture ¼ 2%, pressure groups ¼ 17%, NGOs ¼ 21%, cooperatives ¼ 6%, labor unions ¼ 40%). There have also been cases of fake NGOs. For labor unions, the 2007 reports document the arrests of union leaders for their rampant corruption, extortion, and illegal properties accumulated with the help of the ruling party’s benevolently blind eyes. The simplified presentation of the 122 news reports on civil society shows clear relationships with corruption, patronage, party links, and bureaucratic contacts in high proportions, generally over 50%. It has also been revealed that through the process of political co-optation, CSOs themselves have become corrupt. News reports reveal how leaders of civil society become corrupt and violent, working directly against the interests of their members and the nation, with the backing and blessing of those in power. Moreover, it has been found that there is a high tendency among the pressure groups and other CSOs to articulate their interests through strikes and violence.

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Through the analysis of newspaper reports, we have gained an overall idea of the relationship between civil and political society at the national level. Civil society has worked for its own and the public’s interest in very few organizations. Conversely, CSOs have also worked for the interests of the powerful political blocs or parties, often giving up their own independent identities and enmeshing themselves within a party’s political ideology. Moreover, according to newspaper reports, negative forces (e.g., corruption, patronage, nepotism, and violence) that civil society is expected to confront to create a better society and democracy are often practiced by the CSOs themselves.

6.4

Understanding the Politicized Civil Society Through Case Studies

This section provides brief case studies of five types of CSOs: trade unions, cooperatives, development NGOs, citizen groups, and professional groups. All five CSO types are very different from one another in nature, function, size, and membership, and each represents the interests of a different segment of society. Each case study among the first four (trade union, cooperative, development NGO, and citizen group) focuses on four main points: an overview of the CSO, membership patterns and election, the relationship between leaders and members, and the nature of its interactions with politics and/or the government. These points were selected with the intent to understand the democratic nature of CSOs, their autonomy, and their positions in relation to local or national politics and democracy. The fifth case study is about a movement of a professional group, primary school teachers, at the national level that is responding to some very basic demands that they have yet to fulfill. The movement reached its peak in 2006. This case study is mostly based on content analysis of newspaper reports and articles published on the movement and the issue raised in 2006 and later. Through these very different case studies, it has been revealed that, at whatever level civil society is working and with whatever degree of human and financial resources, political links are always important for an individual CSO’s existence, maintenance, and success. In the process, CSOs often lose their independence and compromise their watchdog roles.

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Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union10

The Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor and Workers Union has been registered under the Ministry of Labor and Employment since 1967 and represents 1234 members. Its main objective is protecting the workers’ interests and bargaining with the authorities for improved wages, pensions, financial security, and insurance for ill and injured workers, which they achieve through a variety of methods, including striking. The union’s major funding sources are membership fees, entrance fees, monthly fees, special fees, subsidy from the authorities, and income from union property. The union liaises with the other sugar mill labor unions, which are joined under a federation, and the labor unions of other industrial sectors. All laborers and workers at the Rajshahi Sugar Mill, with the exception of security guards and office assistants in the confidential section, are eligible to become voting members of the union with the right to run in union elections. The union is run by a 23-member executive committee, 17 of whom are elected directly by the general membership every 2 years. The committee, following constitutional rules, works to implement union objectives. The executive committee is responsible for the union’s financial affairs and recruiting necessary staff to run the union office. Financial decisions are made by a majority vote of the committee; they also have jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the union constitution. However, the most important responsibility of the committee is bargaining with the mill authorities. The elected president of the executive committee is called the collective bargaining leader. He is very powerful and has immense influence over the workers and other mill officers. Upon election, he no longer works in the mill and maintains a well-furnished office superior even to the office of the mill’s general manager. The status of the elected leader and committee members is very different from that of a normal worker. Members of the committee bargain on behalf of the rest of the workers for higher wages and other perks. However, the voting system brings a democratic atmosphere in the union, especially during elections, which are conducted by secret ballot. Practically, it has been observed that the labor leader who supports the ruling party or those who are supported by the ruling political leaders usually takes over the actual power of the union and sometimes control of the whole mill management. Even if these leaders do not hold an elected post within the union, their influence and power are found everywhere. The de facto presence and power of these politically linked elected and non-elected labor leaders often challenges the de jure legitimacy of the elected committee. Each department of the mill administration has to move according to the wishes of the labor leaders. It has been found that this particular trade union is neither totally controlled by the political parties nor is it independent of them. During an executive committee This case study is based on field visits, interviews with the labor union leader, group discussions with other workers and officers and union documentation (e.g., union constitution, election results) provided by the Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union Office.

10

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election, slates are formed based on party lines that reflect national politics. However, although one slate may be marked as BNP and another as AL, candidates supporting other political parties (like some communist factions, for example) may also be found on these slates. In most cases, the ruling party slate has significant influence among union members and the administration. However, there is no permanent voters’ bank for each slate. The voters’ decisions change with changes in national politics and the performance of the union president.11 Examining the list of elected members and their political affiliations for 2001, 2003, and 200512 shows that the election results reflected national politics: in 2001, when AL was in power, 10 of the elected members were from the AL while 6 were from the BNP. Conversely, when the BNP was in power in 2003 and 2005, the distribution was just the opposite, with 9 BNP and 7 AL candidates elected in 2003 and 13 BNP and 4 AL candidates elected in 2005. Central political leaders of the Rajshahi District such as parliament members and local Mayors have a direct influence on the recruitment process, determining sugar prices and calling tenders for selling sugar. Naturally an oligarchic tendency, intensified by high profile political links, develops within the executive committee. The Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor and Workers Union represents a medium-sized, hardly profitable government industry labor group that is active in a region far from the nation’s central production zone. Their financial power is far inferior to that of labor unions working in the political and economic center; however, they are still highly politicized and controlled by political powers. Power and control of those labor leaders blessed by the ruling party (which has alternated every 5 years since 1990) indicate its lack of autonomy. When government-supported leaders control the administration, their bargaining power for the common workers and labor is lessened. These leaders are often found to be more concerned with their own (close inner circle’s) personal benefits and patronages than with the collective interest of the labor community.

6.4.2

PaharPur Adarsho Shomobai Krishok Samity13 (PaharPur Ideal Farmers’ Cooperative)

In Bangladesh, there are several varieties of cooperatives with different statuses and financial power at different levels of rural and urban society, although their most common purpose is to provide loans. These cooperatives are generally organized in

Group discussion with mill workers and mill engineer during a field visit on 26th September 2006. As provided by the office of the labor union. 13 The case study was developed based on a field visit to Bagmara, during September 2006, information provided by the chairperson in a survey questionnaire, and through personal interviews, participation at the cooperative meetings as well as observation note provided by the surveyor responsible for surveying this particular CSO. 11 12

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two tiers, with village cooperatives at the periphery and a central cooperative located in each sub-district. The central cooperative committee is elected by the periphery cooperatives. Such cooperatives are mostly made up of farmers, and also by poor laborers, workers, fishers, small businessmen and even the destitute. Primary cooperatives are formed by 20 to 40 members at the village level; these groups each elect one member to the college of electorate, which ultimately elects the members who are sent to the central committee at the union level.14 In rural areas, a prime objective of cooperatives is providing small loans (5–20 thousand BDT)15 to farmers, fishermen, and small businessmen. The cooperative examined here is a typical periphery cooperative of 35 members, all of whom are male farmers. The cooperative is active in the Bhobanaigonj union under the Bagmara sub-district in Rajshahi. It was established and registered in 1984. Paharpur Cooperative is supervised by the local officers of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). It is a stable and long-running cooperative with a yearly budget of 150,000 BDT, approximately USD 20,205. This is rather a large budget compared to the budgets of other cooperatives in the area. First, the 35 farmers had to form a common capital stock with their personal savings, at which point they began to receive loans from BRDB with the supervision of the BRDB officers. Members use their loans mainly for agriculture and irrigation purposes. Election rules specify that a 6-member committee for the cooperative shall be elected every year. However, there have been no elections for some time, and the cooperative has been run by the same chairperson for many years; the chairperson is a popular figure and was elected by his fellow members to the Electoral College. He was ultimately elected as the chairperson to the central cooperative active at the Bagmara sub-district, Rajshahi. The cooperative is involved in social activities unrelated to granting loans, such as planting seedlings and sending members for skill training etc. Compared to other members of the cooperative, the chairperson, an active supporter of the ruling political party, is relatively better off economically and socially. With the help of BRDB officials and his personal connections to political leaders, the chairperson brought significant sums of money and social projects to the cooperative, something that has been possible chiefly due to his position in the central cooperative and his relationships with outside political figures. Because the chairperson of the Paharpur Cooperative is directly involved in politics, he also led the cooperative into political participation. The cooperative chairperson and members were involved in different election related functions, such as supporting and campaigning for a particular candidate and participating in programs to raise political awareness. However, their activities and functions never lead them to participate in policy-making. Rather than forming coalitions with other cooperatives or sending petitions, they prefer to take their problems directly to the leaders of the ruling party, the BRDB office, or the sub-district administrative office.

14 15

Interview with the BRDB Officer, Poba Sub-district, ninth October 2006. Approximately USD 70–300.

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The cooperative members have virtually no network or understanding with other local social or economic actors, even with local NGOs. The chairperson admitted that before they were politically connected, the cooperative faced problems such as corruption, a lack of government cooperation, and bureaucratic obstructions over loans and registration. These problems were solved when they showed their political support to the ruling party. The chairperson admitted frankly that the political identity of the cooperative and/or its leader does matter in official decisions to sanction loans and provide other government services. In most cases, cooperatives represent the farmers who contribute the most to the agrarian economy of Bangladesh. However, their associations hardly act as any strong pressure or professional group. Cooperatives are scarcely involved in advocacy activities because their members’ main objectives are economic benefits, not networking or civic engagement. According to the Cooperative Rule of 2004, in its initial 2 years of existence, no cooperative has the right to make any demand to the government. In addition, farmers’ ignorance and the strong political pressure on cooperative leaders have led to weak cooperatives in relation to participation, vigilance, and democracy. Local CSOs, such as cooperatives and local welfare clubs, have the potential to develop collective unity, social and political consciousness among citizens, but they lack the necessary resources and guidance. Civil society researchers and donors have hardly considered them as a force for civil society, but they have been successfully targeted by political parties as a means to penetrate rural society.

6.4.3

Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) [Thengamara (Name of a Particular Area in Northern Bangladesh) Women’s Green Group]16

Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) is a well-established development NGO. It was first formed in 1980 by local organizers and later received foreign funding and support. TMSS is neither as large nor as famous as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) or the Grameen Bank, but is one of the top 10 NGOs of Bangladesh (Stiles 2002, p. 50). Although it has its origins in the northern region of the country, it is now working nationwide in traditional microcredit and other social welfare activities, including health, micro-finance, business promotion, education, and human rights and gender equality. Among its 47 development partners, 16 are international development agencies or foreign embassies.

16

The case study is based on a visit to the TMSS Rajshahi Zonal office, an interview with the officer in charge on 12th October 2006, the 2005 TMSS Annual Report, and the TMSS website, http:// www.tmss-bd.org/index.html (accessed 5 August, 2007). The updates are made from visiting the NGOs website and information collected from the electronic media.

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At the local level, like other development NGOs, micro-credit and other social services are provided collectively to a small group of beneficiaries. Each basic group is made up of 10–30 women. Weekly meetings are held where micro-credit as well as other social issues such as sanitation, the environment, and women’s rights are discussed. TMSS is centrally governed by an executive committee of 15 members who are elected by the general members of TMSS every 3 years; the general committee includes the chair of every TMSS basic group that has been active for at least 3 years, plus one or two local elites from each area in which TMSS is active. Members of the general committee representing all zones vote for the members of the executive committee. Although the process seems to be reasonably democratic, a closer look at the member list in the 2005 TMSS Annual Report shows that only two genuine beneficiaries working at the periphery have been able to enter the executive committee. Practically, regardless of what the system is, the charisma of the founding director, Professor Hosne Ara Begum, plays an important role in managing and expanding the NGO, which is true of many other large NGOs in Bangladesh. Charisma plays an important role in the health and development of large organizations in Bangladesh, just as it does in Bangladeshi party politics. As understood from conversations and field visits, TMSS works similarly to other development NGOs, with a hierarchical management system in which field workers are trained in the central or zonal offices and then sent to the fields. At basic group meetings, the assigned TMSS field worker coordinates the meeting agenda, decides how the meeting will proceed, and collects the members’ weekly contributions and loan installments. NGO staff functions do not provide any scope for considering the beneficiaries as equal members of the NGO staff, nor can staff consider themselves equal to members; the relationship is more akin to that of a service provider and receiver. Theoretically, it is expected that through the efforts of the NGO staff over time, the economic empowerment and development awareness of the beneficiaries will allow groups to function autonomously. Practically, there are very few instances of such independence. The same comment may be made for the basic unit groups of other development NGOs. TMSS maintains all of the necessary formal relationships with the government, participating in monthly coordination meetings with administrative district and sub-district heads and also at the national level with the NGO Bureau. The NGO often exchanges opinions and share problems and advice on rural development with the administration, as well as submitting formal reports. However, this is done in a hierarchical way: field workers convey their opinions to the branch managers, who pass them on to their managers. In this way, opinions are carried to the zonal and central offices and finally into consultation with the relevant government agencies and donors. TMSS belongs to a group of NGOs known as Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB). From the point of view of national politics and the politicization of NGOs, according to NGO officials interviewed, TMSS tries to remain neutral. They admitted, however, that it has become difficult to work in a politicized and polarized environment. Parties cannot carry all the blame here; NGO leaders have also made politicized decisions, and there are tensions between different NGOs themselves.

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Moreover, NGOs are neither totally transparent nor free from internal problems. Taking all these together, it may soon become impossible to run a NGO without the shelter of a major political party. Interviews were originally undertaken during the BNP regime. Under the present AL regime, when the TMSS website was revisited, it was found that TMSS is maintaining good relations with the present regime and inviting ministers and top AL leaders to their workshops and other events in 2012. In a televised popular Talk Shaw (TritiyoMatra 2016),17 TMSS leader Hosne Ara Begum, who is considered as a highly successful NGO personality, through her conversation, has reaffirmed the same position of the NGOs and situation of politics and politicization and corruption at the national level. After 2001, donor backing was not sufficient for NGOs to pursue their projects uninterruptedly. Moreover, at the local level, political divisions have created a panic among the small NGOs. In this situation, NGOs must please their patron-donors as well as the ruling and opposition parties and avoid all actions that may go against the interest of either party. Naturally, this limits the NGOs’ freedom of action, especially in regard to participation and democracy. In the meantime, the NGOs have entered their new phase of marketization and hybridization where the small NGOs depend more on their micro-credit business and big NGOs have entered the private sector in the name of social business (Lewis 2016, pp. 26–27). Such finance-oriented professionalism has brought the NGOs away from their advocacy and participatory performance. TMSS, like other big NGOs (ASA, BRAC, etc.) have entered into social business like tertiary education. TMSS runs a good number of private tertiary educational institutes, colleges, and university in the fields of medicine, nursing, vocational, IT technology, commerce, and so on.

6.4.4

Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod—RRSP (Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi City)

Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod—RRSP (Movement Group to Protect Rajshahi City) is a local citizen’s group organized by the middle class and elites of Rajshahi City with the aim of protecting the interests of the area, particularly Rajshahi City. The movement began in 1997, and the group advocates for the provision of basic services, including medical treatment, water supplies, power supplies, and gas supplies for the people of Rajshahi, as well as for concerns over local environmental degradation and against government decisions to move important offices and building out of Rajshahi. The groups also indicate irregularities, corruption, and administrative failures. They articulate their interests through petitions, press conferences, roundtables, seminars, public meetings, rallies, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and all-out

17 Also available on YouTube. Retrieved Oct 20, 2016, from https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼4hPqMWsOrN0.

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strikes.18 In addition to membership fees, other sources of finance include donations from prominent local businessmen and sponsor organizations such as banks, enterprises, and national dailies. Originally, RRSP was formed by a few merchants in the town, but it has come to attract members from all types of professionals, including teachers, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and other educated citizens. The membership pattern, executive committee, and advisory committee are governed by a written constitution. The executive committee is elected every 2 years by the members. Any citizen of Rajshahi may become a member of RRSP, although only 140 citizens are formal members (in the year 2006). It also has a 20-member advisory committee comprised of local elites from Rajshahi City. In addition, RRSP is able to ensure the participation of a considerable number of members and prominent citizens in the different events and activities organized by RRSP. RRSP is a group of like-minded citizens belonging to the same social class, and the relationship between the leaders and members is thus mostly congenial. It has been observed that many members are not active within the organization. The executive committee makes decisions to organize seminars and rallies and stage protests. All petitions sent to the authorities are also decided by this committee. When the RRSP faces any difficulty, it seeks help, using the networks that it maintains through its organizational capability and through the personal netrworks of it’s influencial members. But first they consult the matter in their advisory committee. In 2006, it was the convener and not the chairperson who was the most active in the name of RRSP. The same person has been found to be the most active leader in 2012 and 2019. Although this citizen group is working in the interest of Rajshahi, in 2006 it had found itself in an antagonistic position in relation to the Rajshahi City Corporation, governed by the elected Mayor, who was a member of the ruling BNP party. In 2005 and 2006, RRSP had become active in pointing out the irregularities found in the administration and protested against government policies concerning Rajshahi. It further came into direct conflict with the administration by protesting patient maltreatment in private clinics. The convener was even arrested and tortured by law enforcement forces,19 which attracted the attention of the national media. The organization claims that they have relationships with neither political parties nor any political blocs; rather, they say they have come forward in the interest of the citizens of Rajshahi because the political parties have failed to do so. To counteract the popularity of RRSP, the ruling party in 2006 has supported the formation of new citizens’ groups; however, those groups lack proper organizational strength and the necessary citizen support. RRSP has an excellent relationship with the press and other non-political groups. The organization has gained recognition and media attention for its efforts to bring natural gas supply to the city.

18

Interview with the convener, Rajshahi Shohor RokkahShongramPorishad, Rajshahi, 28th September 2006. 19 As admitted by the convener of Rajshahi Rakkha Shangram Parishod, interviewed on 28th September.

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If we examine the RSPP’s advisory committee membership lists, we see the presence of well-reputed citizens of Rajshahi City who represent both the BNP (but not Jamat-e-Islami) bloc and the AL and left wing bloc, although most members belong to the latter (Khan 2006). The secretary of RRSP, despite claims of being non-political, was an elected member of the Board of Directorates of the Rajshahi Chamber of Commerce during the AL regime (Annual Report 2002) and had relationships with left wing organizations during his youth. In 2006, he was in a position of confrontation with the BNP and Jamat-led administration. During conversations with other citizens about RRSP, it was discovered that the organization and its actions have been praised by the citizens, but the presence of larger numbers of AL and left bloc members has discouraged BNP-aligned and right-minded citizens to engage with the group directly. For example, in the seminars organized by RRSP, significant numbers of AL-left bloc university professors participated as presenters. Additionally, the elites and civil society leaders who supported the ruling coalition are already favored by the government and administration and, due to the loyalty they sold for personal benefit, have prevented them from joining any movement that protest government policy. The polarization that has divided society has also barred citizens from organizing systematic, united movements. Unless there is a balance among both the blocs and truly non-political citizens groups are established, there can be no real change. In 2012, under the AL regime RRSP is still active; however, it now enjoys the blessing of the local parliament member representing the left wing (Bangladesh Worker’s Party) coalition of the AL block (Prothom Alo 2012). The citizen group enjoys same type of blessing in 2019 as the same party is in power and the member of the parliament for the local area is also the same person. This RRSP has been found to be active at the street, media and facebook in 2020, on issues related to virus spread, irregularities in the treatment of the corona patients in the hospital, and about the breakdown of the health system.

6.4.5

The Primary School Teachers’ Movement of 200620

In Bangladesh, movements formed by people and groups taking to the streets and agitating to make their demands heard have always been considered democratic and as an important way of establishing rights and bringing about change. This Gramscian tradition in Bangladesh is older than its birth. The government and administration in Bangladesh have failed to develop into responsive institutions. Among the political and social movements taking place from 1990 to 2006, this section shall focus on a particular professional organization’s fight for its interests: A search of the Ittefaq, Daily Star, and Jugantor newspapers from May to August 2006 finds 69 reports and editorials on the primary school teachers’ movement. 29 of these reports were removed from the sample due to their duplicate reporting, leaving a sample size of 41 reports. This newspaper analysis is based on hardcopy newspaper reports collected from Rajshahi University Central Library in 2007. The updated section is based on newspaper reports available online. 20

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the primary school teachers’ movement of 2006. The movement’s uniqueness lies in its polarized character and the way it was handled by the government. The primary school teachers’ association is considered to be a highly organized and well-networked group in Bangladesh. Such associations are found in every sub-district, district, and division, all the way to the national level. They also have geographically based ranking leadership within the various primary school categories, including government schools, non-government schools, community schools, and madrasas. Elections are held regularly among these organizations, and each group is factionalized along party lines. Since independence, the school teachers’ community has engaged in movements of varying scales on different issues, though most often for pay raises. Bangladeshi school teachers are poorly paid, with little or no allowances for housing or medical treatment. However, because school teachers’ groups are active and networked from the national to the local levels and because teachers are the traditional opinion leaders in rural areas, they have attracted the attention of local elites and national political parties. The 2006 protests focused on demanding better salaries and facilities and the nationalization of non-government primary schools. After the reintroduction of democracy in 1990, the school teachers first approached the government (at that time, the BNP) with their demands in 1994. The opposition leader, the chairperson of the AL, promised association leaders that the AL would fulfill their demands if elected to power. Once the AL was elected in 1996, however, no initiative was taken to solve the teachers’ problems; consequently, teachers began agitating for change in 2000 as the AL’s tenure was drawing to a close. The authorities entered into negotiations with the teachers, which ultimately ended in the authorities’ favor. Thus, the teachers began protesting again, staging large demonstrations and hunger strikes (Ittefaq, 6 June 2001). The opposition leader, then the chairperson of the BNP, promised to fulfill teachers’ demands if the BNP was successful in the 2001 election, and in September 2001, the BNP formed the government. In 2006, the final year of the BNP-Jamat government, the teachers’ groups were still engaged in negotiations with the government for providing higher salaries and other facilities, but they found that the draft national budget (the last budget before the election) had not allocated the necessary funds for meeting their demands, leaving the teachers once again as little more than tools used by a party to win the next election (Jugantor, 18 June 2006). This time, however, the teachers were prepared for an all-out movement. Organized by 41 apex teachers’ associations, about 800,000 teachers were involved, directly or indirectly, in the 2006 movement. They arranged enormous demonstrations at the capital and sit-ins in front of the secretariat, hunger strikes at important squares of the city and lastly, went on a full-fledged strike, keeping 25,000 schools closed throughout the country for 30 days and depriving 15 million children of their school time. They also attempted to block the roads and waterways in every district, which is a tactic common to violent labor unions, students, and anomic groups. The teachers’ key demands, which by this time encompassed primary, secondary, and madrasa teachers, were (1) the nationalization of non-government primary teachers’ jobs; (2) matched government salaries for teachers in non-government secondary schools

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and colleges; (3) the elimination of wage discrimination in favor of government primary school teachers; (4) the nationalization of community primary schools; and (5) the incorporation of ebtedayee (a type of small private madrasa) teachers into the national pay scale (The Daily Star, 5 July 2006). Different groups within the teachers’ coalition also harbored specific demands. The teachers’ coalition included groups linked to both the BNP and AL, and daily news briefings on the protests indicate that each of the different associations harbored factions that leaned towards the ruling party or the opposition. Although these factions were all fighting for the same cause, they announced programs separately and carried out events in different public squares in the capital. For example, when the community school teachers declared a hunger strike to the death, the pro-BNP faction observed it in Muktangon (Open Square), while the pro-Awami League faction started their strike in the central Shaheed Minar (Monument Square) (Daily Star, 20 June 2006). -These all-out protests were the result of teachers’ long neglect by the party government, both the BNP and AL. The teachers’ demands gained strength when they were supported by the opposition party, which made electoral promises that it never kept. During the 2006 movement, the opposition AL and its aligned left bloc backed the teachers, giving more force to the movement, they promised to realize all their demand if elected. For its part, the BNP-Jamat government allowed the violent movement to continue unchecked for months, hampering national education throughout the country because 2006 was the final year of its five-year term. The government could not meet all the teachers’ demands, the costs of which ran to approximately 1 billion 500 million BDT,21 a sum that the state exchequer was not ready to provide. The government instead took the policy of delaying through dialogue with the protesting groups. The Education Minister took the approach of meeting with different factions separately and agreeing to demands conditionally. Naturally, BNP-linked factions accepted the government’s halfhearted response to negotiations, while others did not. Some sections of the teacher’s group went back to school empty-handed after their long strike; others lost the strength to remain in the streets. The unity of the movement was broken. A handful of non-government primary school teachers’ groups linked to the AL remained in the streets until September, but the movement had lost its force. Media attention refocused on more violent protests by other anomic groups on different issues and the street politics that the opposition had just begun when the eighth Parliament had only a few remaining days. Update: From January 2009, the newly elected AL formed the government, however, this new AL regime failed to fulfill their election manifesto to regularize the jobs of the non-government primary school teachers. Naturally, again the primary school teachers of 24,000 schools had to call for a strike, and came down to the streets with long processions, which was met with brutal police obstruction leading to injuries. Finally, dialogue took place on 23 September 2012 between the

21

Bangladeshi Currency named—Taka.

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Ministry of Education and school teachers with no tangible result (The Daily Star, 16 January, 16 May, 17 May, 18 May, 5 October 2012). However, on 10 January 2013 the announcement came from the Prime Minister’s side, the government decision to nationalize 26,193 primary schools within 2013 (The Daily Star 10 January 2013). It is to mention that at this stage, in 2013, it had become an interest for the government to nationalize the primary schools for the sake of reaching the UN Millennium Development Goal on education and it was the final year of the National Parliament and the government had to begin its preparation for the general election that was held less than a year later. This update only ensures that, there is no improvement to the situation in civil society and its political relations. From 2013, the process of nationalizing the private primary schools is going on face by face. However, there are allegations on the process of selecting and inspecting these schools. The salary of government primary school teachers has also increased. However, the teachers and head masters still rank very low (third class gazette officer) in the national pay scale system for which they have again began different types of symbolic movements (The Daily Star 2015).

6.4.6

Case Study Summary

The case study findings may be summarized by the following observations related to politics and democracy found among the CSOs at the periphery of Bangladesh, despite their widely varying composition, functions, budgets, and membership. 1. Whether the CSO is a traditional labor union, a modern development NGO, or even a small cooperative, it requires informal political connections to survive and manage its organization. Further political blessings, especially from the government party, are essential for the CSOs to proceed with their interests and expand their functions and projects. 2. In all cases, there are specific, well-structured and seemingly democratic systems to elect executive committees and ensure member participation. However, in reality, these written systems are only de jure formalities. Practically, in most cases, internal democracy and equality among all members are poorly maintained. For example, in the case of the labor union, the leaders supporting the government party actually enjoy most of the union’s power. Elections are not held regularly among the cooperative members or the citizen groups. Even for a development NGO, the driving force is the charisma of the founding leader. It is more important than elections at different levels. 3. In all cases, there seem to be differences between the position, power, and status of the CSO leader versus the general membership. The leader always enjoys a greater status in relation to political links, financial resources, and social position. 4. Violence and protests are more common among conventional CSOs like labor unions and citizen’s groups. Conversely, the presence of government pressure,

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“red tapeism,” and political control are found among all types of CSOs, particularly among those organizations that are engaged in state monitoring, address large budget projects, or control a large number of general voters such as citizens’ groups, labor unions, or large development NGOs. 5. Political interventions often lead the professional groups to factionalism. The faction leaders often compromise their group interest to the interest of the political bloc they affiliate with. Only when the government interests and CSOs’ interest have some common proponents; civil society advocacy and movements may reach a positive outcome. Otherwise, civil society in most cases is controlled and used by the political blocs. After the field work in 2006, a decade has passed. In the meantime, there have been changes in nature and function of the NGOs and some other civil society organizations as well as their relationship with the government. The conclusion chapter restates and re-establishes the arguments of the present research about the politicized civil society on the basis of new case studies analyzed and with the updated information available from the press and recent references.

6.5

Conclusions

Analyzing three different data sources shows that different political and vertical factors, such as patron–client relations, corruption, and violence, are behind the weak position of civil society in Bangladesh in terms of civil society contribution to democratic consolidation. The survey data cited in this chapter have shown that CSOs perceive political parties to be the most influential actors in the political system. The survey data also showed CSOs’ tendencies to maintain personal relationships with political leaders and political parties. Newspaper analysis indicates tendencies of civil society to have political, vertical, and bureaucratic links, as well as the CSOs’ use of violent means as their style of interest articulation. Articulations of interests through violence and strikes do not imply a strong civil society. Rather, it implies a lack of proper harmony between the state and civil society and the presence of deprivation, extremism, and a sense of emergency in the political system. The reason behind the emptiness of civil society is the presence of the dominant influence of political parties in social, economic, and political life of Bangladesh, which largely resembles Venezuela’s partyarchy system, as described by Coppedge (1994). CSOs themselves have also been found to be corrupt and politically colored in many cases. Moreover, for interest articulation at the national level, it had been found that few CSOs play a vocal role, while others are silent or fail to attract the attention of the media and public. There seems to be a lack of balance among the few advocacy groups in relation to reputation, influence, and action, which also reflects the necessity for better networks and alliances among CSOs. For professional groups such as the school teachers’ association, it has been shown that political parties have exploited these CSOs’ national networks to win elections. Because these

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professional groups are already penetrated and polarized, their united movements often fail to reach their goal; the government, thus uses the groups’ internal divisions to weaken their strength and conclude negotiations in the state’s favor. Through the other four case studies, the politicization of the CSOs, the influence of the ruling party, the divisions within civil society, and the societies’ alignments along party lines have been shown to be factual. It was revealed that for CSOs, whether rural or urban, large or small, survival requires political connections. Without the political blessing, it is not possible for CSOs to move forward. Personal and political interest of the CSOs leader had gained priority to the interest of the group or democracy. Systems for internal democracy are often fractured along national party lines. Any advocacy that may go against the regime is generally met with strong resistance from the state. Due to this polarization, NGOs now seek the shelter or patronage of one party when they fear persecution from the other. Local CSOs, such as cooperatives and rural clubs, have been neglected by development practitioners. However, organizational strength and the ability to form collective and individual opinions have attracted local elites and political parties to CSOs. The leaders of the central cooperative are often targeted by political leaders because of the large amounts of loan money they manage and the influence they enjoy with their members. Patterns of membership and participation in non-political citizens’ groups also reflect the political divide in the society. Newspaper analysis gave us an idea of what is happening at the national level, while case studies show us the makeup of the local level; they do not paint contradictory pictures. Our data analysis supports our inference about the reasons behind the weakness of civil society in Bangladesh. Political links, corruption, violence, and patron–client relations have all been found in the functions of political society and their high influence among CSOs, bringing civil society’s autonomy into question and compromising its watchdog status. Political penetration is evident both at the periphery and at the core of civil society. Wherever financial resources and votes (opinion formation) are in some way under the control of CSOs, they have become targets for political penetration. Instead of monitoring the state apparatus, they are contributing to the misdeeds of the government and political parties. If they continue to bend under political pressure and remain divided among themselves along party lines, CSOs can hardly gain the necessary independence and strong character to emerge as vigilant forces. Lacking such vigilant power, a civil society, no matter how vibrant, cannot contribute to democratic consolidation.

References Annual Report Book. (2002). Rajshahi Chamber of Commerce, Rajshahi. Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics, 49(3), 401–429.

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Coppedge, M. (1994). Strong parties and lame duck: Presidential partyarchy and factionalism in Venezuela. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Diamond, L. (1996). Rethinking civil society. In B. E. Brown & R. C. Macridis (Eds.), Comparative politics: Notes and readings (8th ed., pp. 207–216). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College. Khan, J. (2006). Proceeding of a round table meeting on development of Rajshahi. Rajshahi: Rajshahi Rokkah Shongram Parishad. Lewis, D. (2004). On difficulty of studying ‘civil society’: Reflection on NGOs, state and democracy in Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 38(3), 299–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 006996670403800301 Lewis, D. (2016). Non-governmental organizations and civil society in Bangladesh. In A. Riaz & M. S. Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh (pp. 119–128). Oxon: Routledge. Prothom, Alo. (2012). teishdofadabiteRajshahibashirmanobbondhon’ (human chain by Rajshahi residents for 23 demands). Retrieved Nov 13, 2012, from http://www.prothom-alo.com/print/ news/305046 Riaz, A. (2016). Bangladesh: A political history since independence. London: I B Tauris. Stiles, W. K. (2002). Civil society by design: donors, NGOs and the intermestic development circle in Bangladesh. Westport: Praeger. Tasnim, F. (2007). Civil society in Bangladesh: Rich grass-roots actions but poor participation. Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Political Science, 43, 160–192. The Daily Star. (2012). 16 January, 16 May, 17 May, 18 May, 5 October, 2012, 10 January 2013, 5 October, 2015. Retrieved Nov 27, 2017, from http://www.thedailystar.net/ The Daily Star. (2015). Primary school teachers suspend movement. 5 Oct, 2015. Retrieved Mar 4, 2017, from http://www.thedailystar.net/country/primary-teachers-suspend-movement152227 TIB. (2007). Problems of governance in the NGO sector: The way out. Transparency International Bangladesh. Retrieved Nov 13, 2007, from http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/research/NGO_ Study_Report_Full_Draft.pdf Tritiyo, Matra. (2016), Television Broadcast, Channel I, Dhaka, 9 Oct 2016 White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, civil society and the state in Bangladesh: The politics of representing the poor. Development and Change., 30(2), 307–326.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

Abstract This chapter first answers the research question, “why the civil society in Bangladesh can hardly contribute in democratic consolidation” based on the findings in the previous chapters, then moves on to the discussion on implications of the study in liberal democratic theory, donor policies, and democracy in Bangladesh. The core thesis of the book is that, civil society in Bangladesh may be termed vibrant from its activities and success in social development, but it can hardly be termed vigilant because of its low participatory nature and politicized and divided attributes. This also qualifies the prevailing assumption of the liberal democratic model often incorporated in donor policies, which emphasizes the positive and the direct relation between civil society and democracy. Unless political consensus grows among the political actors to accept politics as a game, democratic consolidation is hardly possible with the efforts of a few civil society organizations. This also requires concomitant institutionalization of political structures and economic development. Moreover, this chapter provides a brief update about the nature of civil society activities and their style of advocacy observed recently. The update findings only strengthen the inferences, thesis, and conclusion of this study. Keywords Vibrant · Vigilant · Politicization · Donor policy · Liberal model · Development · Democracy

7.1

Summary

Political actors do play a powerful role in shaping civil societies’ vigilant nature. This study shows how civil society in Bangladesh is less involved in actions that are related to politics and democracy. The study also identifies the powerful influence of the political actors in deterring ability of civil society, in contributing democratic consolidation. Civil society in Bangladesh, its nature, action, and political relation have been investigated through three different attempts that ultimately support the inferences on its vibrant nature considering social development; its high rate of involvement in social welfare and low performance in participatory activities; and its weak, divided, and politicized nature in respect to democracy. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh, New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives 46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4404-4_7

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The third chapter based on comparative discussion on civil societies in India, the Philippines snd Pakistan with that of Bangladesh, argues that it is the political actors who determine the nature of democracy and level of civil society strength in developing countries. Chapter 4 shows that, in Bangladesh, political parties and leaders are the prime reasons for a weak civil society. However, donor policy, social circumstances, historical development, culture and law also have combined effect on the development and nature of civil society here. Donor policy, natural disaster, poor economy, and culture of philanthropy and charity, web of registration laws have led to vibrant civil society consisting of both world class development NGOs working with nationwide organizational base as well as small welfare groups and cooperatives, active at the local level. Such vibrant civil society does show evidences of civic engagement and collective activity and a high orientation towards service provision and social welfare rather than participating in local government or exerting the people’s right. Moreover, though the culture of group formations and collective activities is very common in Bangladesh society, the internal nature of the CSOs has been found to be reflecting the vertical social relations like kinship, clientelism, etc. Democratic and horizontal relationship between civil society leaders and members is hardly found in those organizations, whether it is a cooperative, NGO, labor union, or a professional group, while most of the CSOs may possess very much democratically organized written constitutions and rules. Vigilant nature of the civil society that is more related to politics and democracy has been inferred to be highly influenced by political history, by political structures, and particularly by political parties since the 1990s. Political parties and the party governments have maintained their control over the civil society organizations vertically through corruption, patronage, nepotism, special legal and illegal favors, extortion, etc., for attaining control on different institutional domains, ensuring organizational base at the rural level and confirm their vote banks at all levels of society. Moreover, the historical legacy of civil society and political party coalition of different movements, and the ideological divide between the citizens due to the historical roles of different sections of the society have provided the necessary background and logic to divide the society and civil society along the partly line. Previous literatures and interviews with resource persons identified such penetration of political parties at all stages of civil society, both at the core level and the periphery level. This has receded the participatory nature and strong voice of the vibrant civil society. Based on such inferences on civil society in Bangladesh, in Chaps. 5 and 6, its participatory activities and political relations have been investigated empirically using hard evidences and direct information that supports our inferences about a less participatory politicized civil society in Bangladesh. Literatures on Bangladesh civil society is rich in analyzing and evaluating the social welfare functions, on the contrary, this research has investigated its participatory functions and political relations based on a wide range of primary and secondary data. Chapter 4 partially answers the question regarding the inability of civil society in consolidating democracy by distinctly showing the lowest rate of involvement in participatory and advocacy functions by civil society organizations. Besides, the primary data also

7.1 Summary

169

reveal a tendency among the CSOs to avoid issues that are more related to politics and democracy and that may lead them to a confrontational situation with the government and political parties. The data have also shown a partisan tendency among the CSOs, as they have a high rate in contacting directly the political parties to lobby the government and on other matters too. The high contact with the political parties by CSOs in Bangladesh has been verified comparatively with other Asian countries, the Bangladeshi case shows the abnormally high rate. The data have also shown the low rate in coalition formation among civil society organizations. Logically, when civil society has a low profile in participating in democracy related advocacy, policy-making, and forming coalition, but has high vertical contact with political parties, it can hardly bring pluralism or aggregate interests of the communities and represent all sections of the society. Among the 504 CSOs surveyed, 80% are active at the local level. Among them most organizations are cooperatives, local social welfare groups, and small NGOs working in a limited area. These organizations are formed mainly for the welfare and economic purpose and most of the members are poor farmers and destitute women. Their level of education is also very low. Naturally, they are interested in the materialistic gain from such collective actions like agriculture loan, micro-credit, employment training, etc., rather than showing interest in the policy matters of the local government or the change in national politics. Local NGOs are also concerned with these types of persons as their beneficiaries. Some of the welfare groups are formed by local elites or the educated persons in the area. However, they lack the necessary resources and donor attention. Moreover, lack of internal democracy makes these CSOs often prone to political co-optation. In Chap. 6, findings based on qualitative analysis of newspaper reports have supported the inferences made in Chap. 4 on the politicization of civil society organizations, penetration of civil society by political parties using vertical means like corruption, patronage, special favor, nepotism, etc., and also that the political divide existing at all levels of the civil society. Moreover, from the data and information, high rate of using violent means and extortion, strikes by both political parties and civil society organizations have been revealed. This implies strong presence of a Gramscian model of civil society and it does not refer to a vigilant civil society, but indicates the presence of deprivation and extremism in the political system. In case of advocacy, lack of pluralism has been noticed, rather it may be termed a monopoly of a few liberal and secular minded think tanks and citizens’ groups attracting the media and government and channeling their ideas and advices claiming to represent the whole civil society in Bangladesh. Sector wise case studies on civil society organizations have exposed such political links, co-optation, and polarization of the civil society at the top elite level as well as the local level. The same tendency has been found in CSOs with a nationwide network like NGOs, Citizen’s group, primary school teachers, labor unions, as well as those enjoying local networks like cooperatives. It has been found that, where there is control of vote and resources in the hands of civil society organizations, they have become the target of political parties. CSOs, instead of mobilizing such power towards

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bargaining with the political forces and controlling state actions have been found to be penetrated by the political parties for their valuable resources. In a nutshell, service and welfare related activities have been found to be popular among CSOs than actions that are more related to policy-making, governance, and democracy. Moreover, these civil society organizations have been found to be neither horizontal nor democratic internally. In consequence, they have been found to be prone to politicization, polarization, and co-optation. These are the weak points for the civil society to gain a vigilante character. On the other side, the political environment in which the civil society functions have also been found to be uncongenial to democratic consolidation and a strong civil society. Though Bangladesh is formally a democracy, the political atmosphere is always (at least in the period from 1991 to 2014) confrontational played by the two major political coalitions engaged in a zero-sum game. Politics is played by the rules of clientelism, corruption, patronage, and extortion. The social, political interaction is also based on a vertical give and take relation. In the process the civil society is co-opted and divided by the political parties. Naturally the civil society loses its independent strength to emerge as a strong third force to contribute to democracy.

7.2

Ability of Civil Society in Consolidating Democracy

As discussed in Chap. 2, for Bangladesh to achieve democratic consolidation, it is necessary to ensure the combined effect of four major interacting factors, e.g. Political institutionalization, stable economic growth, formation of a democratic culture, and a vibrant and vigilant civil society. It has also been identified that a vigilant civil society has four main tasks to realize democratic consolidation. These are civic education on political and human rights, interest aggregation, monitoring of state apparatus and economic society, and ensuring better participation and representation of all segments of society in political decision-making process. With the data and analysis revealed through the present study, it is now possible to point out to a considerable extent the ability and potentials of civil society in consolidating democracy in Bangladesh. On civic education, the performance of the civil society is satisfactory so far. At the grass-roots level, it has been found that CSOs are involved in some types of civic education and advocacy trainings like developing group network (24%), local representation and ventilation of grievances (18%), providing education and service in exercising legal and political rights (17%), and raising social and political awareness (30%). However, such activities have been found to be performed at a far lower rate than the CSOs’ involvement in service providing functions like education (44%), economic empowerment (44%), etc. Though low in rate in comparison to other service providing functions, raising political awareness has become a part of the grass-roots projects of civil society organizations, particularly among NGOs as the donors have put emphasis on such activities. The high rate of voter turnout (over 70%) during the 1996 and 2001 elections is said to be partly due to

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such awareness programs. Naturally, this must be evaluated positively for the citizens of Bangladesh and its democracy. However, as discussed in Chap. 6, awareness programs provide the NGOs the opportunity to influence a large section of the voters’ decision regarding to whom to vote. Naturally the contesting political parties have considered this as a means to ensure a large vote bank. This led to political deals among the political parties and NGO leaders, which ultimately brought partisan allegations against some NGOs and their coalition. This divided the largest umbrella organization of development NGOs—ADAB (see Chap. 4). In case of interest aggregation, civil society has been found to be inefficient due to its low level of network and lower rate of participatory actions. Though the civil society in Bangladesh has strong links with the political parties, it is not for channeling grievances and pursuing for the collective interest of the civil society members. Rather, political link has been found to bring about division among the civil society organizations and their coalitions. In case of civic engagement at the local level, the Bangladesh case supports the observation made in the CIVICUS project (2006) where it has been found that often in the South, the local initiatives for social welfare and collective actions, voluntarism, charity, etc., are not coupled with a strong organized civil society in terms of levels of organizations, networks, infrastructure, and resources. Excluding the foreign funded NGOs, most of the CSOs particularly at the local level lack the necessary resources, organizational skills, and technical assistance that may help them form network, write petitions, or engage in other forms of lobbying or advocacy. Moreover, Bangladeshi citizens do not enjoy social liberty as much as developed countries. Small local NGOs also try to avoid playing political roles in public, though they have to maintain political links informally for their mere existence and for execution of their programs. At the capital level, only a minority of like-minded think tanks, citizens’ groups, and NGOs have emerged as the voice of the civil society attracting the media and debating with the state. These few CSOs belong to a certain bloc and ideology (liberal and market economy) group and with International backing; they cannot represent the whole civil society that consists of different views and ways of thinking. However, it is only these organizations that possess the necessary technical, intellectual, and financial support to attract the media, press, and the government. So the interest aggregations are not taking place in a bottom-up manner, but by a few elite organizations at the center. Among the CSOs surveyed, 68% thought that the civil society in Bangladesh could not influence government and national policies. The survey also found that only 13% of the CSOs had succeeded in influencing the government or local government for a certain decision, budget, or policy that they supported. Besides, participation rate through the lobby, advocacy and other means like sending representatives to local council and advisory bodies have also been found to be low.1 Such

1

However, in different literatures, NGO reports, and analysis of the international development agencies, the civil society particularly the NGOs have been praised for inspiring the poor villagers not only to vote, but to participate and win in local council elections. According to BRAC Annual

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findings rather refer to a low potential of the civil society to ensure participation and representation of all segments of the society. This also indicates to a less vigilant civil society. Lastly the most important activity of the civil society is to monitor state actions. Low rate of participatory activities of the civil society at the periphery and meso levels has already been mentioned. Moreover, analysis has shown that there are rather vertical links between the political actors and the civil society. Political parties have penetrated the civil society. When the civil society organizations are already co-opted and controlled by the political actors, they can hardly act independently and stand against the excesses of the state.

7.3

Neo-Tocquevillean Assumption and Donor Policies: Implication of the Bangladesh Case

The present study not only pointed out the reasons behind the inability of civil society in Bangladesh to contribute to democratic consolidation, but also made attempts to qualify the assumption on civil society and democracy by the main stream Neo-Tocquevillean school. The school presumes that the more associations there are in a country the greater the possibility that democratic institutions will improve. It is believed that efforts to produce democracy through civil society and civic engagement may bring about macro social outputs from micro social efforts. It is assumed that, the democratic practices shaped in associational activities will have spillover effects in another context and the same associational structures will operate in similar ways in different socio-historical background. Such supposition has profoundly influenced the donor policies on developing countries. The Bangladesh case has shown that despite the existence of a good number of civic groups and local associations and clubs at the community levels, civil society hardly influenced or contributed in local government decision-making, national policies, and democracy. A good number of CSOs are working not only at the local level, but also at the meso and central levels; but these organizations can hardly be considered as autonomous or well networked. Rather, most though not all CSOs have been found to be politicized and controlled by political actors and local elites, acting in favor of the status-quo rather than the people they represent. Moreover, a very few of them have been found to be active in actions that are related to politics and democracy. Report for 2003 (BRAC 2004), that year among 4484 Unions of Bangladesh, 3945 women candidates for union council election were among BRAC beneficiaries and among them 2388 succeeded. This is the effort of only one NGO—the largest NGO in the country. However, very few CSOs in Bangladesh are as large, well organized and networked and resourceful as BRAC. Majority of the CSOs do not have the necessary resources to support their members for such activities. This has become evident through the main survey of the research that has interviewed large NGOs as well as small local NGOs, small welfare groups, and cooperatives both at the local and urban levels.

7.3 Neo-Tocquevillean Assumption and Donor Policies: Implication of the Bangladesh. . . 173

That, civil society is an essential but not enough condition for democratic consolidation—is a fact, broadly accepted by the contemporary researchers in civil society. Alagappa (2004) in his project on Asian civil society has pointed out to the same reality. Diamond (1996, 1999) has also mentioned the necessity of internal democracy within the CSOs, and some ideal characteristics for a civil society to be able to contribute to democracy. At the same time he emphasized the necessity of political institutionalization and liberal economic growth. Such ideal condition and characteristics of civil society may provide a strong theoretical base for the study of civil society, but in reality it turns out to be impractical. Empirical investigation in developing countries like Bangladesh reveals its inapplicability. For civil society to work well and emerge as a powerful sector to bring and maintain democracy, requires a proper democratic environment that most of the developing countries fail to provide. But Diamond (1992, 1996) is optimistic that civil society movement and actions may make through the undemocratic environment and contribute to a better democratic atmosphere in multiple ways like fighting against corruption, nurturing democratic values, bringing an end to clientelism, bringing unity among social cleavages, and so on. The Bangladesh case has proved such expectations from a civil society to be unrealistic and normative. CSOs have been found to be in no position to generate democratic values, reduce corruption or clientelism. Rather the civil society leaders have been found to become corrupt, NGOs have been found to be incorporated in the patron–client network, and most of the CSOs to be under the control of the political parties. Under a situation of low level of economic development, vertical social relations, instable political system and weak state, civil society alone cannot struggle through. Rather on its way it becomes influenced by the negative forces existing in the environment. International development agencies and bilateral donors have used such Neo-Tocquevillean assumption to support their policies on good governance and strengthening civil society. The Bangladesh case reveals that such theory has been adopted half-heartedly and not from a well empirical understanding by the donors. First, local, indigenous CSOs that have the highest potential to generate social capital, civic engagement and participation have been totally neglected from the development projects, emphasizing only on a few selected NGOs formed and functioning according to the Western notion of civil society. Second, the traditional trade unions, professional groups, trade organizations, student groups, etc., have also been overlooked in the civil society strengthening program mentioning them as politicized (Hansen 1996). So, the close connection between the political parties and such CSOs and the lack of institutionalization within the political parties themselves are in the knowledge of the donors to some extent. In spite of such information, the donors are still targeting the symptom of the problem by forming and supporting new CSOs but neglecting the real causes that may ultimately inactivate the fresh few organizations too. Sprinkles of assistance and support for social capital and civic engagement can hardly reach the goal of democratic consolidation. Third, donors have placed high targets for civil society organizations overestimating their ability and underestimating the powerful influence of the

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indigenous environments like history, culture, politics, etc. It must be realized by the donors that, developing countries are not plain lands where proper nurturing of new CSOs may bring new democratic culture, good governance, and corruption-free country that is, an all prepared ground for market economy and liberalization. These are old societies possessing their own indigenous social and political culture, tradition, political and economic trends. History, culture, and politics must be considered more carefully and sensitively before taking any policy that targets not only social development but also democracy. High expectation from a few civil society organizations may hardly bring in any projected outcome in relation to democracy. Before undertaking civil society related policies, donors must consider to (a) set achievable targets for the civil society organizations, (b) take into account the potentials of local civil society organizations, and (c) make continued efforts simultaneously for concomitant economic development and political institutionalization. Unless initiatives are taken to bring about a consensus among the social, political, and economic actors on democracy, democratic culture consolidation can ever be achieved. This may be accomplished mainly through an indigenous process and through the realization of democratic practice among all the stakeholders. Responsibility lies more with the powerful actors that is, the political parties and their leaders.

7.4

A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh

The present research is largely based on the survey and observations upon the civil society organizations and other political structures in the background of the year 2006 and 2007. Since then, there have been changes in political regimes and in the nature of party politics. Updates about the political landscape and political structures in Bangladesh have been provided in Chap. 4. In the meantime the NGOs and other civil society organizations have grown to their next stage of maturity. It has become necessary to update about their vibrancy and vigilance. From recent case studies and newspaper analyses, we may grasp some idea about the present state of the civil society in Bangladesh and their nature of advocacy. Though there had been some positive changes in the media focus upon the civil society news and in their advocacy nature, the recent developments only support and strengthen the core arguments of this book on civil society, in relation to politics and democracy in Bangladesh. This section briefly discusses about two studies, one is a newspaper analysis upon the state of the civil society organizations in Bangladesh in the year 2017 and another is a case study upon the pattern of election advocacy of two prominent NGOs during the election season in Bangladesh.

7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh

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175

Nature of Civil Society in 2017

In a study conducted under my supervision, the state of the contemporary civil society organizations in Bangladesh has been explored through newspaper analysis.2 Civil Society related news published in the most circulated newspaper “Prothom Alo” and in the oldest and so far most neutral newspaper Ittefaq in the year of 2017 (January to December) had been considered as the primary data for analysis. Both the newspapers are published in Bangla Language. The hardcopy of the newspapers stored at the archive section of the Central Library, University of Rajshahi, was used for the study. So far 419 news reports or sub-editorials had been gathered. Duplication of the same news had been controlled, keeping only the news that was published in Daily Prothom Alo. Ten different civil society related terms (NGO, professional group, trade union, think tanks, women’s group, chamber of commerce, environmental movement, international organization, regional and community-based group, social and culture based group) were used to explore and identify the news on civil society. The following Table 7.1 provides a synopsis of the study and clearly shows the new trend and tendency of the civil society. If we just consider the number of news, then, there has been a great advancement in providing media coverage to the civil society in a decade.3 This ensures that, better network or understanding has developed between the media and the rest of the civil society. Moreover, the rich number of civil society related news indicates that, the civil society is pretty active on issues that attract the media. From Table 7.1, it becomes evident that, in 2017, the largest portion of news on civil society were about the advocacy groups (24.8%), next is as usual about NGOs (22.1%). A good relationship between media and NGOs and advocacy groups is also not uncommon in the third sector. Different types of environmental movements have also attracted the media attention (10.3%). Most of the civil society related news were about the articulation of group interest (19.3%). Articulation of group interest is a basic function of Civil Society. However, the most optimistic data is that, 14.3% of the news has been on good governance and on criticizing the public policies. Whether the government pays attention or not, problems of good governance and public policies are being spoken out by the CSOs. This is absolutely encouraging. The universal drive for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) by the UNDP and its adoption by the government of Bangladesh may have a role to play in such positive development. Similar to social development, the SDG goals are the common goals for which both the government and NGOs are working together. However, civil society involvement rate in political participation (5.5%), corruption (7.9%), and election (3.3%) from the newspaper analysis only confirms that, just as in 2006, most

2 This study though independent from the newspaper study that was conducted in 2007 discussed in Chap. 6, is more or less based on the same idea and method. 3 In 2007 study, 122 news reports were gathered for three particular years (first 6 months of 2001, 2006, and 2007) from three dailies, while for only 2017 (all 12 months) from two news dailies, 419 news were gathered.

Types of CSOs Advocacy group (%) Think tank (%) Professional groups (%) NGO (national, international (%) Trade union/chambers of commerce (%) Environment groups/ movements (%) Women’s group (%) Social movement (%)

Issues

0

0

0

0

35 (8.4%)

43 (10.3%)

17 (4%)

13 (3.1%)

0

7.5

23

88.2

0

0

26.9

7.3

9.8

6.5

6.7

Women and children rights (%)

9.6

93 (22.1%)

104 (24.8%) 41 (9.8%) 40 (9.5%)

Total

Participation in the media and politics (%)

0

0

69.8

0

2.1

0

7.3

4.8

Environment (%)

0

0

0

0

0

2.5

2.4

11.5

Election (local and national (%))

15.4

5.9

4.7

2.9

10.8

12.5

19.5

23

On governance and public policies (%)

15.4

0

4.7

5.7

10.8

0

4.9

14.4

Against corruption and social problem (%)

0

0

0

0

3.2

0

0

7.7

Against communalism (%)

Table 7.1 Types of CSO and their involvement in different issues in the year 2017 based on newspaper analysis

0

0

7

0

16.1

2.5

9.8

2.9

Human rights (%)

15.4

5.9

4.7

60

3.2

2.5

24.3

4.8

National economy, business, and international relations (%)

23

0

7

22.9

16.1

70

4.9

11.5

Group interest (%)

7.7

0

2.3

8.6

4.3

2.5

9.8

2.9

Others (%)

176 7 Conclusions

0

0

23 (5.5%)

26 (6.2%)

7 (1.7%)

419

53 (12.6%)

0

0

43 (10.3%)

14.2

7.7

Source: The table is based on the information presented in (Saha 2018)

Regional and Sectoral group (%) Cultural and others (%) Total 14 (3.3%)

0

0

60 (14.3%)

57.1

11.5

33 (7.9%)

0

0

21 (5%)

0

38.5

27 (6.4%)

0

3.8

47 (11.2%)

7.7

81 (19.3%)

28.6

30.8

17 (4%)

0

0

7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh 177

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Conclusions

of the CSOs avoid the political issues in 2017 too. CSOs are still avoiding direct confrontation with the government. The violent political party confrontation has come to end by 2016, this means a total dominance of one-party bloc in the political and administrative environment. This has narrowed down the congenial environment for the civil society to function autonomously. Despite, such unfriendly situation, the newspaper analysis indicates a certain level of maturity in the civil society activities, especially on advocacy related issues. Nevertheless, advocating and protesting on politics related issues still remains an act for only a few strong NGOs and citizen’s groups, who receives their strength, not from its members or the public but from the International Community and from the personal reputation of the CSOs’s leaders. Next, we shall focus on two such CSOs in relation to the election process in Bangladesh.

7.4.2

Role of Civil Society During the Election

Despite being the year before the general election, the number of news about election and civil society was very few in 2017. According to Saha (2018) it was only 3.3%. In 2018, the activities of some prominent think tanks, NGOs, Citizens Groups, and registered independent observer groups increased in relation to election. This year, mayor elections in a number of city corporations and in December, the 11th general election were held. Two prominent advocacy non-government organizations (NGOs),—Shushashoner Jonno-Nagorik (Shujon) and Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) have been focused in a joint study, conducted in 2018 and 2019, to understand their role in the election process. When elections are held under the administration of the incumbent government, acting as the interim government and the provision of a neutral caretaker government is abolished,4 and the neutrality of the Election Commission is under question, high expectation develops about the third sector—the civil society to play a neutral, non-political role for the cause of democracy and justice. The question remains, how far the civil society is able to play such crucial role? In Bangladesh, there is a group of CSOs who are formally registered with the Election Commission (EC) as an election observers and they have the permission to directly observe the polling booths on the election day following the RPO (Representation of the People’s Order). However, NGOs, receiving foreign funds need clearance from different ministries and NGOAB for registering with the EC, which may only increase their dependence upon the administration and compromise their independence. The NGO-TIB and the citizen’s group—Shujon strategically decided not to register as a formal election observer organization to remain free and they do their election related observation and advocacy independently. Systematic study easily reveals the nature and style of their functions in relation to the election process in Bangladesh. These two CSOs are

4

For details see Chap. 4.

7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh

179

CSOs’ Functions in the Election Process Pre-election Season (Before declaring the schedule)

• Raise awareness among the public through round table meetings, press conferences, election quizzes and so on • Advocate for a level playing ground • Advocate for free and fair election governance

After Declaring Schedule

• Develop comparative statements about the candidates • Analyze the party manifestos

Election Season

• Observe the polling centre • Assessing Credibility of the election • Collect opinion from the candidates and voters about election environment • Publish reports evaluating election

Post Election Season

• Develop pressure upon the EC to resolve the post-election cases. • Suggest EC for better free, fair election in future • Advice political parties and citizens for logical change.

Participatory Competitiveness Transparency Neutrality

Final Goal

Free Fair and Credible Election Election result accessibility and peaceful transfer of government

Necessary Conditions in the Political Environment Stable democracy, Neutral EC, Acceptable and Credible Interim Government, Active and Vigilant Voters, Free Press Media, Competitive Political Parties, Active, Neutral Civil Society

Fig. 7.1 Civil society functions in the election process. (Source: Tasnim and Angura 2020, p. 433)

considered as comparatively neutral by the educated middle class in Bangladesh. Shujon is a citizen’s group, while TIB is a Bangladeshi chapter of a Germany based famous International NGO. However, Shujon is not totally independent from foreign influence and support. Professor Badiul Alam Majumdar (secretary of Sujon) is also the Country Director of another foreign NGO—Hunger Project. Socially and publicly both NGOs are prominent, receive considerable media coverage, and have acceptability among the educated citizens. However, both are advocacy CSOs with international back up (Tasnim and Angura 2020). In the study, both the CSOs had been observed following a model that shows what role a CSOs may play in the election system of a developing country at different stages before, during, and after the election process (Fig. 7.1). For conducting the study, the election year has been divided into three seasons; (1) Pre-election season that is before declaring the election schedule, (2) Election season that is after declaring the schedule, and (3) Post-election season that is after the election is held and the results are declared. The CSOs organization acts in different ways in each season. In the pre-election season, the civil society is active, mainly in two ways, first, in raising voter awareness, second, in advising, pursuing, and pressurizing the government and related institutions to take necessary steps to ensure a free and fair election. When the election schedule is already declared and

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Conclusions

nomination and candidacy process has begun, the civil society keeps a keen eye on the profile of the candidates and also analyzes the election manifesto of the political parties and acts as watchdogs upon the administration of the election process. During the post-election season, civil society evaluates the whole election process. They point out the weakness and strength and pursue for improvement for the next elections. The objectives for such actions are to ensure free, fair elections as well as establish a stable and acceptable electoral system for peaceful transfer of power. To gather the necessary documents and information, both the CSOs’ offices were visited, the official websites were analyzed. NGO officials were interviewed. Moreover, to understand the perception of voters and that of the politicians about the performance of these CSOs, University Students, scholars, and political leaders from both AL and BNP were interviewed. It has been found that, both the CSOs are active in all three seasons during the election year but are following only the conventional techniques, such as organizing round tables meetings, election related olympiads, analyzing the manifesto, updated websites and social media platform, press conferences, criticizing and advising the government and EC moves, arranging face the candidate forums, presenting research reports before and after the election, critical protests about conducting the election with wide media coverage, and so on. Both Shujon and TIB follow the conventional and peaceful methods, just as the civil society and democracy theorists expect them to do. Though they could not prevent the candidates, the EC, and the administration to stay away from unfair and unbiased moves, their time to time criticism, press conferences, and research based publications had kept the administration aware that, they are under watch and criticism by the neutral civil society, besides the media and press. It had been found that field level awareness activities of both the CSOs are limited to only a few districts in Bangladesh. They need to enhance their public activities at the local level throughout the country to bring positive and significant changes in the voting behaviors and candidate selection. These forerunner NGOs also need to nurture more like-minded local NGOs. Only a rich network of such NGOs will show the hope to bring the cherished democratic cultural change to ensure democratic consolidation. Moreover, it has been observed in the research that the political leaders who were interviewed are also very sensitive about the suggestions or criticisms from such NGOs that are neutral and have international support. These prominent NGOs also must come forward to act as the registered formal election observers. The presence of heavy weight NGOs’ at the polling centers do make a positive influence upon the EC and the government to maintain fairness. However, this research does not consider the role or effect of such NGOs as a failure or futile at present. Though not powerful as expected, Shujon and TIB and other neutral NGOs keep the EC and government under some pressure. The image and credibility of the EC and government to the international community depends to a large extent on how the civil society is evaluating the election system. So, from an optimistic point of view, it is expected that if the NGOs go on steadily with their programs and expand the projects throughout the country, in the coming decades, the civil society shall be able to contribute better in ensuring free and fair elections in Bangladesh. For this, intensive actions at the field level are necessary. If the citizens realize the necessity of the

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181

presence of a neutral third sector, ultimately, the politicians will also accept the role of a civil society, for the sake of winning the heart of their voters and gain legitimacy in the true spirit (Tasnim and Angura 2020, p. 444). The two studies about the civil society in the recent years lead the readers and researchers to some optimistic view about the civil society in Bangladesh. The newspaper analysis about the civil society related reports hints that despite the division, politicization, and uncongenial atmosphere continues in the country, the civil society is in a process towards maturity. CSOs are more active in advocacy and have the ability to attract better media attention for their causes. The second research on civil society’s role in the election process in Bangladesh, hints that, despite politicization and higher chances of co-optation by the political forces,5 a neutral group of prominent CSOs, dedicated to the causes of justice, good governance, participation, environment friendly and corruption-free society, is emerging. The basic ideology of these CSOs and the ruling party do not conflict, rather are the same, such as democracy, good governance, development, justice, human rights, secularism, and so on. It is the conflict of interest and demands for justice, transparency, corruption-free society, human rights, political co-existence, and freedom of speech, that are bringing them in a conflict situation with the ruling administration. Theoretically, the civil society is to keep constant surveillance upon the government, while practically, these CSOs are under constant watch by the government agencies. What is the matter for optimism is that, despite the odds, the civil society is moving forward. There has been also a profound change in the development NGOs, but hardly any transformation for democratic consolidation. The development NGOs that have brought world recognition to Bangladesh now present themselves primarily as a social business rather than NGO or civil society. These NGOs have transformed into a hybrid form of private organizations. The large-scale local NGOs that are still operating as NGOs are mostly focused on microcredit, business development, and services, rather than social mobilization or democracy. These organizations, besides social service and development are involved in businesses like formal banking, transport, dairy farm, boutique, apparel industry, private tertiary educational institution, and so on. David Lewis (2019, p. 11) has termed the present situation as “post-NGO” civil society landscape. However, such social service and humanitarian functions have decreased during crisis and unexpected situation while they are in most need. The presence of the formal and wellstructured NGO sector in crisis management is hardly felt in the COVID-19 Crisis situation in Bangladesh. However, new trends and changes may be observed in the civil society in such unforeseen situation.

5

As one party dominance is established in the political system.

182

7.4.3

7

Conclusions

Civil Society Trends During the Corona Crisis

The Novel Corona Pandemic Crisis in 2020 is an unprecedented event for individual countries as well as the whole international community. The pandemic not only caused a great blow to human mortality, world health system, but also to the world economy, governance, and way of living. The severe effects were felt at the personal and government level, as well as at the social level. The manuscript for this book was finalized when COVID-19 stroke the hardest, throughout the world. Both the developed and developing countries were struggling with the virus at different stages. Bangladesh had been severely hit by the virus since March 2020. Dense population and developing economy combined with low-level sanitation culture, weak and corrupt central governance, as well as the fragile national health system had complicated the crisis in several dimensions. According to World Health Organization (WHO), on 6th July 2020, Bangladesh had 165,618 Corona positive cases, 2096 deaths due to the virus, with a recovery rate of 45.9% and death rate of 1.27% (WHO 2020). There had been over a month long lockdown since March, however, due to the severely affected economy, the lockdown had been withdrawn gradually with only the educational institutions closed. Bangladesh’s rapid economic growth had been severely disrupted. Two million more people had joined the rank of the poor. Ten to 15 million people became unemployed in 2020, while the number of such unemployed was only 2.7 million in 2017 (Khuda 2020). How did the civil society in Bangladesh react in such situation where social distance was the formula rather than collective action? The crisis was on going and as it is a health hazard, here I provide a quick observation based on the information and understanding gathered from the digital media and the press from March to July 2020. The regular NGOs have been found to be silent and calm at the beginning of the epidemic. Hardly any NGO activity related news came out in the media. The websites of the famous NGOs like BRAC, Grameen Bank, TMSS, ASA showed what adaptations they had taken at the advent of such outbreak. These adaptations are about the changes within their personnel system and their dealing with their clients and then what they are doing for the community. In most cases it is about raising social awareness against the virus. These NGOs have been found to realize their social responsibility by donating a handsome amount of money to the government’s aid fund or to the administrative organizations (Police and Army) that are in the run to manage the pandemic. Later on, the research wing of BRAC had been contributing to the decision makers by publishing quick surveys on slum dwellers and analyzing the best way to reach them and help them with new livelihood. The project based mid-range NGOs could not respond well as they had no project for such unseen, unpredicted virus epidemic and the donating countries or agencies that would finance their projects were also virus affected and struggling for their own survival. It had been the middle class with the local youth volunteers who first came forward using the social media network to collect donations and help the poor working class who could not find any work, money, or food due to the lockdown in the big cities. Facebook became viral with pictures of initiatives taken by these

7.4 A Brief Civil Society Advocacy Update in Bangladesh

183

loosely organized small groups distributing the food and disinfecting items. They received cooperation from the police force and journalists working in the field. These activities expanded with the entrance of a 7 year old, but well-organized popular foundation name Biddanondo Foundation.6 Unlike the established NGOs, this foundation, with local origin and private donations, spirited volunteers, is basically working for the education and food for the street children. With the beginning of the Corona Crisis, Biddanondo expanded its activities to setting hand washing booths at street sides, sanitizing public transports, making and distributing free masks, providing cooked food and raw fruits and vegetables for the poor and unprivileged people all around the capital city Dhaka and other big cities. The endeavor of the Biddanondo volunteers came into limelight as they acted even before the central and local government did. This also increased their donation funds and led them to the path of establishing a hospital for treating COVID-19 patients at Chittagong, the biggest port city in Bangladesh. Biddanondo represent the very old trend of donating and helping the poor, enmeshed in Bengalee culture that has roots in both Islam and Hindu religion. However, it appears in the most modern and digitalized structure attracting and appealing all sections of the society—spirited youth, wealthy entrepreneurs as well as the corporate society. The administration provides cooperation to the foundation. It seems that, the political authority so far supports philanthropic social activities of the foundation that are totally non-political. Another famous and sometimes criticized NGO, better to be now termed as a social business organization, attracted attention of the media, middle-class citizens, and also the government and international medicine companies. As a problem responsive CSO, the Gonoshasthaya Kenrda (GK) after almost three decades came to limelight during the Corona Health Crisis. Leader of GK, left minded freedom fighter, Dr. Zafarullah Chowdhury, is well known for his efforts in the National Drug Policy, that ensured locally produced low priced medicine, for the masses, during the 1980s (Lewis 2011). This time a COVID-19 test kit was developed by a group of researchers of GK. Such encouraging initiative gained positive public support from the media and citizenry. Naturally, the GK required government approval for further trials on human before it could be professionally applied. It is to be mentioned that, Dr. Zafarullah, though a left activist and a dedicated freedom fighter during the 1971 War, in the last one decade, had to take political shelter under the umbrella of the opposition party–BNP. Naturally, Dr. Zafarullah and his COVID-19 anti-body test kit had not been met with pleasure by the government, even under the crisis situation. Rather, GK had to face bureaucratic red tapism and finally was disapproved for registration in 26 June 2020 (BD News 24.com 2020). However, Dr. Zafarullah gained a position of a hero in the mind of the public. The political conflict is so deep rooted in Bangladeshi culture that, even at the time of unprecedented crises the political structures could not come out of it or is not ready to give any positive credit to the opposition. Dr. Zafarullah in

6 The official website of Biddanondo Foundation is https://www.bidyanondo.org/. internet access 10 July 2020.

184

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Conclusions

his 80s, with the pre-kidney condition, became a COVID 19 patient himself. With his health condition changing and becoming complicated, the government sent gesture for his treatment and promised to help with developing the test kit for reaching the standard for registration (GK 2020). In response to Putnam’s Balling Alone (Putnam 2000), young researchers argued for a social media based virtual social capital. Internet based network, specially using facebook media is highly popular in Bangladesh. During the corona crisis, under lockdown, the Internet network emerged as the most powerful avenue to build connections among the people. Sometimes, facebook became the first source for news and developments about corona. Loads of corona related information, awareness, advice came in the facebook. Facebook provided the platform to keep the citizens connected and informed under the lockdown situation. As the medical treatment system had almost collapsed, doctors began providing online medical help. Thousands of facebook groups had emerged where medical advice, hospital information, blood search, Corona Patient’s plasma search became possible. The social capital developed from these groups has saved lives and treated patients who were denied of medical attention at the clinic and hospitals. The online group discussions and analyses on corruption, mismanagement, administrative difficulties and then suggestions to overcome them, this time came from the field level and from the educated middle class, instead of TV talk shows. Though not well organized, the voice of the citizen and their network had been strongly observed online during the corona crisis. Not only in Bangladesh, it has been the same throughout the virtual world. However, the government authorities have not kept the digital networking and the opinion articulation flow, overlooked and uncensored. The government servants and officials had been warned and asked to be careful about what they post, like, or comments on the social media. Recently passed digital security act is often used in controlling the unruly social media and the online press when the government deems necessary (Human Rights Watch 2020). Lastly, the social groups that require mention with the highest respect and gratitude are the voluntary groups and foundations that came forward to help with the burial activities of the corona patients. This virus has brought the society in such extreme situation when the closest friends and family members avoid and sometimes denies the responsibility of burying their loved ones. Sometimes the Imam (prayer leader of a Mosque) also fears to lead the funeral services. In such situation, besides, the regular charity foundations like Anjuman Mufidul Islam,7 Quantum Foundation,8 who always burry unidentified corps, other anomic volunteer groups also came into seen. They are some spontaneously formed youth volunteers, mostly students of madrasa (Islamic Religious Schools). These foundations and groups with the help of the administration not only did the burial services but also often faced the rage of the local residents who were against burial of corona patients in their area in the initial months.

7

It is a well-known traditional religious charity organization. Quantum Foundation is actually a yoga group for teaching and conducting group meditation. Burial of unidentified corps is one of its several social services. 8

7.5 Conclusion: Vibrant but Not Vigilant

185

We may wrap up the observation about the corona crisis and civil society in one sentence, by saying, while corona crisis leads to physical social distance, it has strengthened digital collectiveness. However, political structure still reigns and controls its development.

7.5

Conclusion: Vibrant but Not Vigilant

There is a civil society in Bangladesh, embedded in the country’s culture, history, and political developments and it conforms to the idea of civil society, both from the Neo-Tocquevillean model as well as the Neo-Gramscian Model. Dividing the characteristics of civil society in two broad aspects—vibrant and vigilant, helps to understand and analyze civil society from both its social (service providing) and political (participatory actions) aspects. First, focusing on factors that influence civil society and then examining civil society organizations themselves as units of civil society followed by analyzing their nature of political interaction have brought the study closer to the critical arguments with which the research begins. The nature and dimension of Bangladesh civil society have been found to be determined by a number of factors. Donor policy, economic situation and culture of voluntarism and charity, and easy process for registration have led to a rather large number of formal and informal civil society organizations. They have been found to be active at local level and mostly concerned with social welfare and services. Indigenous initiative and donor support have even led to the establishment of world class NGOs on social development and micro-credit. Survey data also supported such fact by showing the high rate of civil society involvement in the grass-roots development. From such consideration, the civil society of Bangladesh may be termed vibrant. Nevertheless, the majority of the CSOs are concerned with immediate needs and material aspects like poverty, disaster relief, health, etc., rather than with the related policies and decisions of the local or the national government. However, historical background and political institutions have also profound influences in the nature and function of the civil society, particularly for its weak performance in relation to politics and democracy. This is what the present study was concerned largely about. Political parties have been identified as the most influential factor in the politics related activities of the CSOs. Empirical investigation has revealed a low profile in the participatory nature of the CSOs. Further analysis on their political relation has indicated that instead of influencing the government and political actors, the civil society itself has been penetrated, co-opted, politicized, and divided by the political parties and party governments. This has reduced their ability to generate democratic norms, articulate interest, or monitor the government. So the civil society has fall short to emerge as a vigilant force to uphold good governance and democracy. Democracy, particularly democratic consolidation, relies on a combination of conditions, where a participatory civil society is only one factor. However, more important is the consensus that grows among the political, social, and economic

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actors and particularly the competing forces on democracy and political practices. Under such consensus and compromise, civil society may emerge as an effective force. So the performance and influence of civil society in consolidating democracy depends on the culture and consensus of other actors. Nevertheless, this must also be accompanied with a strong but accommodative state, economic growth, equal social distribution, administrative reforms, good governance, sustainable development programs, and so on in case of a developing country. For Bangladesh it would require a drastic change in its social, political, and economic system. Even if the civil society had all its ideal characteristics as expected by the Tocquevillean school, it can hardly contribute positively for a consolidated democracy under the contemporary situation, this was true in 2006 and it is the fact in 2020. The present research has shown that the civil society is rather weak from the view point of politics and often prone to be influenced by negative elements in politics and society. Any revolutionary change in government policy to bring democratic reform in the administration, political institutions and judiciary accompanied by desperate drives against political corruption, as well as other forms of illegal dealings may ensure a better order in the political system. Based on the discussions about the present political environment in Bangladesh, there is hardly any possibility of adopting such reforms in the near future. Moreover, the culture to rule or decide from above, vertical social relations, method of building social support in give-and-take manner and political culture of opportunism or taking advantage of religious belief, ideology, and historical legacies shall continue to exist. This implies that the hope for an autonomous, horizontally networked, policy oriented civil society that is a civil society both vibrant and vigilant is still an utopia. This does not mean that civil society has no chance to contribute to society and politics. Policies should be undertaken to strengthen civil society accepting the social and political facts and it should not be accompanied by high expectations like democratic consolidation. Civil society in Bangladesh has already shown its success to a recognizable extent in social development, economic empowerment. However, for further development, it requires more formal interaction with the government, better network, and stronger voice in other words, more vigilant activities than it has been found in the present research. Though civil society may not be able to overcome totally the influence of politicizations, the lure of patronage, vertical social relations, the use of coarse state power and legal domination, it has the possibility of improving and gaining a stronger position. International and national policies should aim to get better output from such civil society organizations accepting the influence of the negative social and political forces. In this way, whatever positive outcomes are produced may be considered as achievements.

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