Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China: From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization [1st ed.] 9789811564413, 9789811564420

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-x
Introduction: Analytical Puzzle, Literature Review, Central Arguments, and Methodological Considerations (Nan Li)....Pages 1-24
Evolving Functions of the Party and Political Work System in the PLA (Nan Li)....Pages 25-61
The PLA and Intra-CCP Leadership Power Struggle in the Eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Nan Li)....Pages 63-97
Top Leaders and the PLA in the Post-Deng Era (Nan Li)....Pages 99-134
Circulation of Elites Across the Civil-Military Institutional Boundaries (Nan Li)....Pages 135-215
Explaining the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations from Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization in China (Nan Li)....Pages 217-239
Major Implications for China’s National Security, Civil-Military Cooperation, and Inter-Agency Policy Coordination (Nan Li)....Pages 241-268
Conclusion: Institutional Changes and Possible Role of the Military in Transition to the Post-Xi Jinping Leadership (Nan Li)....Pages 269-288
Back Matter ....Pages 289-298

Citation preview

Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization Nan Li

Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China

Nan Li

Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization

Nan Li East Asian Institute National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

ISBN 978-981-15-6441-3    ISBN 978-981-15-6442-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1 Introduction: Analytical Puzzle, Literature Review, Central Arguments, and Methodological Considerations  1 2 Evolving Functions of the Party and Political Work System in the PLA 25 3 The PLA and Intra-CCP Leadership Power Struggle in the Eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 63 4 Top Leaders and the PLA in the Post-Deng Era 99 5 Circulation of Elites Across the Civil-Military Institutional Boundaries135 6 Explaining the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations from Symbiosis to Quasi-­Institutionalization in China217 7 Major Implications for China’s National Security, Civil-­Military Cooperation, and Inter-Agency Policy Coordination241

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8 Conclusion: Institutional Changes and Possible Role of the Military in Transition to the Post-Xi Jinping Leadership269 Index289

List of Charts

Chart 2.1

Chart 6.1

Chart 7.1

PPWS within headquarters of each major PLA unit or organization. (Notes: “National Defense Ministry Spokesman Explains in Detail,” Xinhuanet, January 11, 2016, and Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS, “On Innovation of Ways to Realize the Party’s Absolute Leadership of the Military” [“论创新党对军队绝对领导的实 现方式”], China Military Science [中国军事科学], No. 2 (March 2016)) China’s changing defense budget from 1952 to 2017. (Notes: This chart is based on data in National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China: 1949–1998 [1949–1998 年新中国五 十年统计资料汇编] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999), and National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), China Statistical Yearbook 1999–2018 [中国统计年鉴 1999–2018] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999–2018). The author thanks Jane Du for her assistance in developing this chart) Party-state-military structure in China

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 5.8 Table 5.9 Table 5.10 Table 5.11

Six performance categories of military party construction work for examination and evaluation A sample of purged senior PLA officers in the Lin Biao Incident Senior officers prosecuted for corruption between the 18th Party Congress of 2012 and the 19th Congress of 2017 Top officers prosecuted for corruption Civilian members of the 8th Central Committee who had major military leadership experience Civilian members of the 8th Central Committee who had no major military leadership experience Military members of the 8th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experience Military members of the 8th Central Committee who had no civilian leadership experience Military members of the 8th Politburo in 1956 Civilian members of the 13th Central Committee who had major military experience Military members of the 13th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experience Military members of the 13th Central Committee who joined the PLA before 1949 Civilian members of the 15th Central Committee who had military experience Military members of the 15th Central Committee who joined the PLA before 1949 Military member of the 15th Central Committee who had civilian work experience

53 76 119 121 139 147 148 153 154 163 166 167 172 173 174 ix

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List of Tables

Table 5.12 Table 5.13 Table 5.14 Table 5.15 Table 5.16 Table 5.17 Table 5.18 Table 5.19

Civilian members of the 17th Central Committee who had military experience Military member of the 17th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experience Military members of the 17th CCP Politburo Civilian members of the 19th Central Committee who had no military experience Civilian members of the 19th Central Committee who had military work experience Military members of the 19th Central Committee PAP members of the 19th Central Committee Military members of the 19th CCP Politburo

176 177 177 179 197 199 205 205

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Analytical Puzzle, Literature Review, Central Arguments, and Methodological Considerations

This is a study of Chinese civil-military relations in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. It addresses three analytical issues. First, what has changed in Chinese civil-military relations in the post-Deng era? Second, what accounts well for the change? Finally, what are the major implications of the change? Addressing these issues is important for two major reasons. First, because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a Leninist party-­ army, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA is symbiotic. Clear institutional boundaries based on a functional division of labor, for instance, are absent between the two institutions. This symbiosis suggests that the primary role of the PLA is in China’s domestic politics. It is to participate in the intra-CCP leadership power struggle and in defending the CCP regime against the popular rebellions from within the Chinese society. For more than three decades after the massive intervention of the PLA to quell the popular rebellion in Beijing in 1989, however, the PLA has not been mobilized by the top party leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping against major political oppositions from within the CCP senior leadership, or against popular rebellions from within the Chinese society. Instead, the PLA has largely been confined to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Also, the PLA Army (PLAA), which is more appropriate for domestic politics, has been substantially downsized. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive services that are more appropriate for power projection and external missions, such © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_1

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as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), have become more privileged in China’s military modernization drive.1 This study undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle by examining the major change in Chinese civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. Second, China’s civil-military, inter-agency coordination in making decisions and managing crises regarding China’s external security has remained an area of speculation for lack of careful analysis. By analyzing the major change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed light on this analytical puzzle as well.

A Review of Literature In a comparative study of civil-military relations in Leninist regimes, Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande argue that when the relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet military is “coalitional,” such a relationship between the CCP and the PLA is “symbiotic.” In the Soviet case, they explain that “the complexity of governing requires a division of labor among various political institutions. … With this division of labor comes, of necessity, some degree of institutional autonomy.” This institutional autonomy of the Soviet military increases also “as the technologies of war have become more complex.” The complexity of military technologies enables the Soviet military to monopolize technical expertise and specialized knowledge “inaccessible to non-military elites.” Because of these leverages, the Soviet military has become a “coalitional partner,” or a bureaucratic actor in bargaining with the top party leaders over issues that may affect its institutional interests and priorities, such as the defense budget and foreign and security policies, even though the Soviet military never challenges the sovereign role of the party “as the chief arbiter of values, authorities relations, institutional arrangements, political practices, and policy.”2 Unlike the Soviet coalitional party-army relations where regular interactions are rare between the military and party elites except at the top level, according to Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “symbiotic interaction is on all institutional levels” in the Chinese case. These Chinese party-army “symbiotic relationships are characterized by low levels of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites, and (high levels of) circulation of elites between military and nonmilitary posts. The functional and even institutional boundaries between military and nonmilitary structures

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may well be obscure.” This symbiosis also means that in comparison with the Soviet military which is largely focused on external threats, the PLA is much more involved and entrenched in domestic politics and “plays an important role in the politics of leadership transition.”3 Perlmutter and LeoGrande consider the legacy of guerrilla war as a major explanation  of the symbiotic party-army relations in Leninist regimes, because it is “a form of political-military combat in which the fusion of political and military elites is virtually inevitable, and in which the governing of liberated territories is a function performed largely by the guerrilla army itself.” They further propose that “once guerrillas established themselves in power and begin the process of dividing the labor of governing, a symbiotic party-army relationship is difficult to sustain. Institutional boundaries begin to solidify, and circulation between military and nonmilitary elites becomes more difficult. The more professional the military becomes and the more sophisticated its technology, the more likely it is that the party-army relationship will evolve away from symbiosis toward coalition.”4 Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s comparative work offers two major insights for the study of Chinese civil-military relations. One is the assumption implied in the above paragraph, that rather than staying static and fixated, civil-military relations in Leninist regimes do evolve and change over time. This assumption gives credence to the analytical effort of this study, which intends to demonstrate the dynamic evolution of the Chinese civil-military relations over time, from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization. Second, Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s study identifies the legacy of guerrilla war as a major explanation of party-army symbiosis in China. They also suggest that this symbiosis means that the primary role of the PLA is in domestic politics. These observations reflect the mainstream analytical literature on Chinese civil-military relations, which is summarized in the following section. Party-Army Symbiosis and Factionalism Politics Perlmutter and LeoGrande are insightful to argue that the 22-year guerrilla war waged by the CCP and the PLA from their rural bases before they seized state power in 1949 had contributed to the party-army symbiosis. This protracted rural strategy is in sharp contrast to the urban strategy of the Russian Bolsheviks. The latter, for instance, involved an urban uprising that led to the seizure of state power. To establish control over the

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country, the newly established Bolshevik regime waged a brief, three-year civil war against the counter-revolutionary forces in the provinces. After 1949, however, there was a brief period in the 1950s when a military policy of Soviet-style functional and technical specialization was introduced in China. Under this policy, the PLA reduced its role in domestic politics and concentrated on perfecting its functional and technical expertise, which had enhanced the institutional autonomy of the PLA.5 This policy was adopted because China’s civilian and military leaders learned from the Korean War that advanced military technology can be critical in winning battles and lowering human cost. The Soviet-style military modernization of the 1950s is a moment when Chinese party-army relations may indeed “evolve away from symbiosis” as suggested by Perlmutter and LeoGrande. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, CCP Leader Mao Zedong began to mobilize the PLA into domestic politics, particularly after Defense Minister Peng Dehuai was accused of “anti-party” crimes in 1959. This trend gained momentum during China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, while millions of PLA personnel were mobilized directly into domestic politics at both the elite and societal levels,6 thus reviving the pre-1949 party-army symbiosis. Besides restoring order to a society on the verge of anarchy, a major reason for this mobilization was Mao’s concern about class privileges stemming from the Soviet-­ style functional and technical specialization and bureaucratic differentiation of the 1950s. To eliminate these privileges in order to realize his vision of a non-specialized, non-differentiated, and egalitarian communist society, Mao resorted to a populist strategy of mass mobilization associated with the legacy of the guerrilla war. The party-army symbiosis revived by Mao, however, does not imply a high degree of congruence or consensus among China’s civilian and military leaders. On the contrary, political rivalries were rampant among the Chinese leaders during the Cultural Revolution. But rather than bureaucratic politics defined by civil-military institutional boundaries, these rivalries were among the highly personalized leadership factions that cut across the party-army boundaries. A few political-military factions, each composed of a symbiotic cohort of both senior party and PLA leaders and their followers, for instance, engaged in a zero-sum struggle for political power against one another. Such power struggle usually involved mutual accusations of “anti-party” crimes and factional purges. As a result, factionalism

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became the dominant model in explaining Chinese elite politics during this period.7 One prominent factionalism explanation of Chinese elite politics is the “field army” thesis.8 The party’s pre-1949 struggle for power, for instance, was through long years of guerrilla war from several rural, remote, and isolated base areas, which had evolved into five major field armies during the Civil War from 1946 to 1949. In 1955, however, these field armies were abolished and Soviet-style functional and technical specialization was promoted. This specialization was intended to clarify the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities at the expense of the old, cross-cutting field army ties, particularly after the introduction of the military rank system in 1955. But according to this thesis, these informal ties prove to be resilient and stay robust, and five field army factions, each a symbiotic cohort of major party and PLA personalities, informally mobilize support and enlist members from both the civilian and the military bureaucracies, at both the central and regional levels, to engage in a protracted struggle for power against one another. Why are the field armies defining the factional solidarities and rivalries? One explanation is the high level of strength of the field army ties, which was developed and reinforced during the war years by the long and shared experience of life and death and victory and defeat, particularly in one condensed geographical region such as a guerilla base. The rise of Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao in the late 1970s led to the replacement of Mao’s revolutionary agenda with a nation-building project of “four modernizations,” that is, modernizing China’s industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. It was recognized that expertise based on a functional and technical division of labor was indispensable to accomplish such tasks. As a result, the PLA was brought back to the barracks and downsized by a million billets, and functional and technical specialization was promoted. This trend clearly helped to reestablish the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities, so that the latter could enjoy more institutional autonomy to pursue its functional and technical expertise.9 This trend also suggests that the newly clarified civil-military institutional boundaries should make it more difficult for the top party leaders to leverage military support for factional power struggle, because functional and institutional identities and priorities may take precedence over personal and factional identities and loyalties.

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A major exception to this trend of civil-military institutionalization is that at the top leadership level, Deng’s informal and personal influence remained substantial, and institutional constraints were less effective in mitigating this influence. Deng, for instance, served as the chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) that commanded the PLA from 1981 to 1989, though he did not hold the position of the CCP general-­ secretary from 1981 to 1987 or any party or state leadership position between 1987 and 1989. Deng’s command of the military was based largely on his revolutionary and military credentials and his status as one of the founders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the PLA. But more importantly, Deng appointed close allies, including Yang Shangkun, CMC secretary-general from 1981 to 1989 and CMC vice-chair from 1981 to 1992, and comrades from the pre-1949 2nd Field Army where Deng had served as its political commissar for 13 years, to key CMC positions. These comrades included Yang Baibin, CMC member from 1987 to 1989 and CMC secretary-general from 1989 to 1992; Qin Jiwei, CMC member and defense minister from 1987 to 1992; and Liu Huaqing, CMC deputy secretary-general from 1987 to 1989 and CMC vice-chair from 1989 to 1997. Largely because of these close personal allies associated with the old field army ties, Deng was able to leverage the PLA covertly against political opponents from within the party leadership in the late 1980s, such as CCP General-Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and overtly against critical threat from within the Chinese society, such as the popular rebellion in Beijing in 1989. The heavy involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in 1989 led scholars to argue that the emphasis of China’s civil-­ military relations had shifted from military tasks to politics.10 Some also identified the new factional networks among China’s political-military leadership, including the “secretaries’ gangs,” “princes’ parties,” and “old school cliques.”11 Based on similar logic, other scholars argue that Jiang Zemin, serving as the CMC chair from 1989 to 2004, employed the PLA for factional power struggle against opponents from within the CCP leadership, particularly in times of leadership transition such as from 2002 to 2004. In this case, his political opponent was Hu Jintao, who succeeded him in 2002 as the new CCP general-secretary.12 In the final analysis, the premise of party-army symbiosis suggests that the primary role of the PLA is in China’s domestic politics. This politics, however, should not be understood as inter-agency bureaucratic politics but instead as a struggle for political power among several symbiotic

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political-­ military factions that cut across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. These factions are vertical and highly personalized, each composed of a symbiotic cohort of senior party and military leaders and their followers. The rise or fall of a particular leader at the top may mean the political fortune or demise of their followers at lower levels of the party, government, and military institutions. Even though such an analytical paradigm was developed to explain Chinese politics during the Cultural Revolution, its influence on the scholarly understanding of Chinese elite politics in general and party-army relations in particular has persisted. A recent commentary from the Liberation Army Daily on safeguarding the party leadership “core,” for instance, is interpreted as a call on the PLA to defend Top Leader Xi Jinping against real or potential oppositions from within the party leadership.13 A recent United States (U.S.) Department of Defense annual report on China’s military also claims that “the PLA … exists to guarantee the CCP regime’s survival above all else.” This is because, according to the report, most PLA officers are party members, the PLA has a party and political work system (PPWS) in it, the PLA has representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, and Mao, the founder of the PLA, believed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”14 A Critique When the “field army” explanation of Chinese elite politics has merits, its inadequacies are also apparent. William Parish, for instance, shows that representation of the pre-1949 field armies in the post-1955 military elite could be the result of impartiality rather than a deliberate design for factional power balancing, since this representation may reflect the relative sizes of the officer pools that the five field armies could generate. Parish, however, treats the unusual personnel gains of the 4th Field Army at the expense of the 1st and 5th Field Armies in the Cultural Revolution as an indicator of limited factional power balancing, and he attributes this to the breakdown of the bureaucratic structure.15 But even if we assume that field armies had merits in explaining rivalries among major political-military factions during the Maoist period, new developments in the post-Mao period have substantially weakened the pre-1949 field army identities. First, a large number of revolutionary veterans who had served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies were retired during the 1982–1983 and 1985–1987 downsizings of the PLA.16 Since

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then, all those who had joined the PLA before 1949 were retired over a period of more than two decades. This development has clearly made field army ties less relevant for China’s elite politics, since the succeeding generations of ruling elites have had no direct personal ties to these field armies. Moreover, many major units with different field army origins were eliminated during the 1985–1987, 1997–1999, 2002–2004, and 2015–2017 downsizings of the PLA. Meanwhile, smaller units with different pre-1949 field army origins were joined to form the new major units that carry serial numbers not associated with the old field armies.17 These changes were intended to blur the historical origins of these major units, thus making it more difficult to develop personal cliques based on historical unit origins. Also, the new emphasis on developing capitalintensive and technology-intensive services such as the PLAN, the PLAAF, the PLARF, and the PLASSF in the 2015–2017 reorganization of the PLA should reinforce service identities, but not “field army” ties that are mostly associated with the PLAA.18 Furthermore, introduction of the service term and age limits for different grades and ranks and regular rotation of the senior officers to command different units are intended to increase the tempo of personnel turnover and make it more difficult to develop the entrenched personal ties.19 More important, for symbiotic political-military factions to form and solidify, major CCP leaders should have spent a substantial proportion of their careers in the PLA so that extensive and durable personal ties and networks can develop in the PLA. First and second generations of the top leaders such as Mao and Deng, for instance, not only founded the PLA but also spent most of their revolutionary careers in the PLA. As a result, they could count on the political capital, charisma, and extensive and entrenched personal networks that they had accumulated and cultivated in the PLA for political support in times of political and social crisis. In contrast, the third- and fourth-generation leaders such as Jiang and Hu have never served in the PLA, while the fifth-generation leader Xi had only served in the PLA as a junior officer for three years, from 1979 to 1982. The post-Deng top leaders thus may have found it difficult to develop close personal ties and extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. In the early years after they became the top leaders, all tried to consolidate power by currying favor with the PLA.20 But these efforts may not be sufficient to develop durable personal ties and extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA.

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Unlike the era of Mao where “symbiotic interaction is on all institutional levels” between the party and the PLA, as suggested by Perlmutter and LeoGrande, post-Mao relationships between the civilian officials and military officers at all levels have become distant and impersonal.21 This has happened likely because officials on both sides of the civil-military boundaries are vertically circulated within their own chains of command, based on distinctive skill sets and separate incentive structure for upward mobility. As a result, little horizontal or cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites occurs. Few military officers have had experience working in the civilian institutions, and few civilian officials have had service experience in the PLA. This post-Mao development has clearly fostered an environment not conducive to forming symbiotic political-military factions. It may explain why informal networks that the post-Deng top leaders have assembled to support themselves, such as Jiang’s “Shanghai” network, Hu’s “Communist Youth League” network, and Xi’s “Fujian and Zhejiang” network, include primarily civilian officials but not senior military officers. Regarding the PLA’s intervention in domestic politics in 1989, it is correct to point out that the PLA became involved in interrogating demonstrators, restoring social order, and carrying out party propaganda among the populace. It is also true that recalcitrant troops were investigated and educational campaigns were conducted within the PLA on the necessity of party’s “absolute leadership” of the PLA and the need to fight “bourgeois liberalization” and “peaceful evolution.” But the claim that such an involvement represents a “qualitative shift in party-army relations toward politics” is an overstatement.22 The evidence to show political rivalries and purges among the party and PLA leaders, for instance, is sketchy.23 Rather than being remobilized into the domestic politics on a massive scale and in a sustained manner, the PLA, after a brief post-­ Tiananmen intervention, has returned to the barracks and continued its program of military modernization following the 14th CCP Congress held in 1992. The contention that the 1989 intervention revived the political rivalries among several symbiotic cohorts of party and PLA leaders is clearly premature. There is also no empirical evidence to show that the “secretaries’ gangs,” “princes’ parties,” and “old school cliques” have played any critical role in China’s elite politics in the post-Deng era, which suggests that these new factional identities are ephemeral and marginal in terms of both their existence and their political significance.

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Regarding Jiang Zemin employing the PLA in a power struggle against Hu Jintao from 2002 to 2004, a commonly cited example is that Jiang held onto his CMC chair position in 2002, the year he handed over the position of CCP general-secretary to Hu. According to this view, transfer of these two positions should have taken place simultaneously. Otherwise two competing “power centers” would have resulted, indicating that a power struggle may be imminent.24 But Jiang’s holding of the CMC chair position can be explained by reasons other than a preparation for power struggle. Jiang, for instance, wanted to push for transformation of the PLA based on the notion of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), including the 2002 CMC decision to downsize the PLA by 200,000 billets.25 Not yet equipped with the political capital that Jiang had accumulated with the PLA by serving as the CMC chair for 13 years, Hu would have found the task of downsizing the PLA more difficult to accomplish. Such a policy may encounter strong resistance from the vested interests from within the PLA. This suggests that Jiang stayed on to help Hu, and not to compete against him. In September 2004, “after fixing some major issues in army construction” (“在确定了军队建设的一些大事之后”), Jiang resigned from the CMC chair position at a CCP plenum, and Hu became the new CMC chair.26 During the two years while Jiang stayed on as the CMC chair, no major instances of factional rivalries and purges involving the PLA had occurred between Jiang and Hu. This development clearly invalidates the “power struggle” explanation of elite politics based on symbiotic political-military factions in the Jiang era. Regarding the commentary from the Liberation Army Daily on safeguarding the party leadership “core” such as Xi, it is important to note that such a call was initiated by the CCP Central General Office, and not by the PLA.27 This call was really meant for the Chinese party, government, and military institutions and leaders to be fully supportive of Xi’s authority and his policies. It was not meant for mobilizing the PLA into intra-party leadership power struggle. Being a Leninist party-army, however, the PLA’s propaganda organs such as the Liberation Army Daily should be expected to propagate the normative role of the PLA to safeguard the top party leadership against major domestic threats. Empirically, the critical test is whether a major political and social crisis coalesces to the extent that it provides a major rationale for the party leadership to employ the PLA for domestic politics and power struggle. Unless empirical evidence of such behavior can be observed, official discourse on the

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normative requirement of the PLA to safeguard the party leadership against critical domestic threats alone cannot be regarded as evidence of the PLA’s actual involvement in domestic politics and power struggle. In terms of the behavior since Xi came to power in 2012, as discussed in Chap. 4, there is no empirical evidence to show that the PLA has been mobilized for intra-party leadership power struggle or for defending the CCP regime against the popular rebellions from within the Chinese society. Finally, regarding the major reasons for the claim of the U.S. Department of Defense annual report that “the PLA … exists to guarantee the CCP regime’s survival above all else,” it is important to note that most officers of the Soviet military were party members, and the Soviet military also had a PPWS and had representation in the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo. These similar characteristics, however, did not make the Soviet military a more symbiotic and political institution. Therefore, in order to determine whether a Leninist party-army is a more professional or a more symbiotic and political institution, it is critically important to examine whether the PPWS functions to supervise the military for political loyalty and discipline on behalf of the party and mobilize it into party politics, or it is internalized into the military to enhance its organizational cohesiveness, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions; whether the military is extensively involved in intra-party leadership power struggle; and whether there is a high level of circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. Also, Mao’s dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” was advanced in 1927, when the CCP was a revolutionary party dedicated to an armed struggle to “seize political power” from the Kuomintang (KMT) regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. By 2019, however, the CCP has been a governance party in power for 70 years, and its legitimacy to “stay in power” rests on the successful resolution of major governance issues such as an economic slowdown, rampant official corruption, financial risks stemming from the increased debt level, expanding income gap, and environmental pollution. Resolving these issues may require complex civilian governance expertise and skill sets much more than “the barrel of a gun.”

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Central Arguments This study makes two arguments. While the first argument serves to show the major change in Chinese civil-military relations, the second argument attempts to account for the change. First Argument The first argument is that Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from the party-army symbiosis of the Mao and Deng eras to quasi-­ institutionalization in the post-Deng era. This argument borrows the term “symbiosis” from biology, which refers to “the living together in more or less intimate association or close union of two dissimilar organisms.”28 Inferring from this definition, a symbiotic civil-military relationship is understood as a lack of clear institutional boundaries between the party and the PLA stemming from what Perlmutter and LeoGrande define as “low levels of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites” and “(high levels of) circulation of elites between military and nonmilitary posts.” This symbiosis also means that the PLA is extensively involved in China’s domestic politics; it participates heavily in the power struggle among the symbiotic political-military factions among China’s ruling elites or in defending the CCP regime against the popular rebellions from within the Chinese society. Quasi-institutionalization is the opposite of symbiosis. It refers to a condition where clear institutional boundaries have developed between the party and the PLA, which allows the latter more institutional autonomy to pursue its functional and technical expertise. It also means that the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries has become limited and rare. Similarly, rather than domestic politics, the PLA is largely confined to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. This new emphasis has in turn transformed the PLA into a more cohesive bureaucratic actor, particularly in “bargaining with the top party leaders over issues that may affect its institutional interests and priorities, such as defense budget and foreign and security policies.” A major caveat is that what the PLA has gained is quasi- but not full institutional autonomy; it still operates within a Leninist one-party state. Being nominally a party-army, the PLA accepts what Perlmutter and LeoGrande call the sovereign role of the party “as the chief arbiter of values,

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authorities relations, institutional arrangements, political practices, and policy” without challenging it. To evaluate the validity of this argument, this study employs three analytical venues or indicators. The first has to do with the issue of how the party controls the gun, or the PLA. As early as in 1936, Mao stated that “our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party,”29 but he did not explain how the party commands or controls the gun. But according to Political Scientist Samuel Huntington, civilian authorities can exercise control over the military through two major methods: “subjective control” and “objective control.” The two methods, however, are based on quite different premises. Employing the military against the domestic political opponents, or mobilizing the military into domestic politics, constitutes what Huntington calls “subjective control.” Because employing the military for domestic politics is likely to fracture the military leadership, this method is regarded as a “divide and rule” strategy to enhance the civilian power. It is also intended to prevent major military intervention like a coup. “Subjective control” is based on the premise that undesirable military intervention in politics such as a coup is caused by the excessive institutional autonomy of the military. This autonomy fosters managerial ability, internal cohesiveness, and ethos of public service, and it inculcates in the “military mind” the skepticism regarding civilian politics and politicians.30 Socializing the military into domestic politics, however, can mitigate the military mindset by internalizing the norms of civilian politics into it. In contrast, according to Huntington, “objective control” intends to enhance the institutional autonomy of the military. It is based on the premise that coups and the like are in fact caused by weak or failed civilian governance or by the inability of the civilian authorities to resolve major political and social crises. They take place not because of military autonomy and professionalism, since the military is primarily a conservative organization that prefers to focus on its narrow functional and technical expertise rather than on the broad and complex issues of civilian politics.31 In this view, the best strategy to prevent the undesirable military intervention in politics like a coup is to enhance civilian governance but not to involve the military in politics. Because the PLA is a Leninist party-army, it is probably inappropriate to judge whether the PLA is a “politicized” or an “apolitically professional” military. But as Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s work suggests, even

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party-armies of Leninist regimes run the gamut from being more autonomous and professional to being more symbiotic and political. Therefore, Huntington’s concepts of “subjective control” and “objective control” are useful in helping to determine whether civil-military relations in China have evolved from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. For instance, if the PPWS serves primarily as the party’s instrument of “subjective control” of the PLA, that is, if it monitors or supervises the PLA for political loyalty and discipline and reports back to the civilian party authorities, and if it mobilizes the PLA into party politics, party-­ army symbiosis is likely to be high. But if the primary functions of the PPWS have evolved from “subjective” to “objective” control over time, or if the PPWS is internalized into the PLA and functions primarily to enhance the PLA’s organizational cohesiveness, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions, quasi-institutionalization is likely to develop and prevail. The second analytical venue for this study to assess the validity of this argument is to compare major cases of intra-party leadership power struggle between the eras of Mao and Deng and the post-Deng era to determine the levels of the PLA involvement in them. If this involvement is extensive and significant to the extent military force is mobilized and a large number of military officers are persecuted as members of the “anti-­ party cliques,” party-army symbiosis is high. But if intra-party leadership power struggle becomes rare for lack of severe political division among China’s ruling civilian elite, and the PLA involvement in intra-party leadership politics becomes rare and few senior PLA officers are persecuted for “anti-party” crimes, quasi-institutionalization is obtained. The third analytical venue that this study employs to evaluate the validity of this argument has to do with the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities, mainly in terms of personnel appointments and promotions. If the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries at all levels is extensive and frequent, or the majority of the senior leaders are the so-called dual-role elites who have both civilian and military leadership experiences and served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, civil-military symbiosis is likely to be high. But if the cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites has become limited and rare over time, or few senior leaders have both civilian and military leadership experiences and served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, quasi-institutionalization is likely to develop and solidify.

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Second Argument The second argument of this study is that the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-­ Deng leaders account well for the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. The heightened sense of insecurity of these leaders stems from their lack of revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA. This sense of insecurity implies that these leaders are highly unsure that the PLA would follow their orders if it is asked to handle a domestic political and social crisis of a massive scale. These leaders thus are motivated by this heightened sense of insecurity to enhance civilian governance by promoting economic development along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require the massive mobilization of the PLA to avert. This heightened sense of insecurity also drives these leaders to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. The validity of this argument is assessed mainly by examining (a) major independent variables that remain similar and constant over time and therefore cannot account for the change, and (b) other independent variables that do change over time, but are less relevant in accounting for the change in civil-military relations if compared with the variable of the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders.

Methodological Considerations By methodological considerations, this study refers to those regarding the research method, definitions of critical concepts, sources, and organization. Research Method This study employs what Arendt Lijphart calls the comparative method or comparable-cases strategy, mainly because it involves a small number of cases and therefore is inappropriate for statistical method. But as Lijphart points out, partial generalizations through an intensive analysis of a few cases “can be the first step, and may be followed by replications in

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different settings,” thus contributing to more universal generalizations intended by statistical analysis.32 Furthermore, comparative method is where other independent variables are controlled or held constant to fulfill the condition of “other things being equal.” “One cannot be sure that a relationship (between variables) is a true one unless the influence of other variables is controlled. The ceteris paribus condition is vital to empirical generalization.” A major difficulty of this method, however, is to meet the requirement of “other things being equal” or similar. Among others, Lijphart suggests two strategies to alleviate this difficulty. One is to “analyze a single country diachronically” to maximize comparability of the cases, and the other is to focus on “key” variables and omit those of only marginal importance.33 Both strategies have informed the research design of this study. This study, for instance, is a diachronic comparison of civil-military relations in a single country such as China, between the eras of Mao and Deng and the post-Deng era. Unlike the horizontal or cross-national comparative studies, such a longitudinal and intra-national comparison enhances the comparability of the cases. These cases, for instance, share more constant and similar contextual variables, which do not cause variation in the behavioral outcome. At the same time, these cases are “dissimilar with regard to the variables between which a relationship is hypothesized,” that is, the relationship between the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders, and the change in civil-military relations. The control for other independent variables, however, is informed by the second strategy. As suggested elsewhere in this study, these variables are explained mainly in terms of their lesser relevance in accounting for the change in civil-military relations if compared with the variable of generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders. Definitions By Chinese civil-military relations, this study refers primarily to the relationship between the CCP and the PLA.  Analyzing this relationship is important mainly because the CCP is “the chief arbiter of values, authorities relations, institutional arrangements, political practices, and policy” in China, while the PLA is the primary organization in China that controls and manages violence on behalf of the party-state. Because of the political importance of these two institutions, the evolution of the relationship

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between the two may have major implications for China’s domestic politics and foreign policy. When the CCP makes decisions on major policy guidelines and arbitrates on major policy issues, however, it is the Chinese government institutions such as the State Council, or China’s cabinet, that implement policies and manage state affairs on a daily basis. Therefore, the relations between the central and provincial government institutions and the PLA are also analyzed, but mainly in terms of the implications of the changing party-army relations for inter-agency coordination in making decisions and managing crises. This study is premised on the reality that China is ruled by a Leninist regime where the party controls the gun. Within this normative party-­ army context, however, this study argues that there has been a major change in how the party controls the gun, as reflected in the shift of primacy from “subjective control” to “objective control.” This argument, however, is not based on the normative premise of civil-military relations in liberal democracies that the PLA should be “departized” (“非党化”) and “statized” (“国家化”), an agenda promoted by the pro-democracy activists. Departization and statization of the PLA are likely to take place when genuine democratization occurs in China, but not if China remains a Leninist regime. This is because a military loyal to a political party would make democratic elections virtually impossible, but a non-partisan and politically neutral military would be considered a potent threat to the Leninist one-party rule, which may explain why no Leninist state can tolerate a non-partisan military. It is not the priority of this study to address the issue of whether the shift of primacy from “subjective control” to “objective control” fosters institutional conditions that may induce China’s democratization. But this issue is touched on briefly in the concluding chapter. By China’s military, this study refers to the PLA, and not to the People’s Armed Police (PAP). There is a clear division of responsibilities between the two. While the primary responsibilities of the PLA concern “strengthening national defense and resisting aggression” (“巩固国防, 抵抗侵略”) or defense against external threats, the PAP’s primary responsibilities include “domestic security and protection, and maintenance of social stability” (“国内安全保卫, 维护社会稳定”), but both are also charged with the secondary responsibilities of supporting each other in times of need.34 Because of this division of responsibilities, the PAP is conceptualized as an armed police force that carries a different name from the PLA.  For the same reason, the PAP does not share China’s defense budget with the

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PLA, but is funded by China’s domestic security budget.35 A major reason that the PLA has become less involved in domestic politics is the reinforcement of the PAP after 1989. One critical issue that this study investigates is the extent of the PLA involvement in domestic politics. By the PLA’s extensive involvement in domestic politics, this study refers specifically to two types of critical situations. One is the participation of the PLA in the power struggle among two or more symbiotic political-military factions among China’s ruling elites. One of these factions may be accused of forming an “anti-party clique,” thus resulting in the political persecutions of its members, including its military members. The other is the involvement of the PLA in defending the CCP regime against major political oppositions from within the Chinese society, like the popular rebellion in 1989. A major reason for focusing on these two types of situations is that they are critical to the survival of the CCP regime and therefore require the major mobilization of the PLA to handle. The involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in this study, however, does not refer to the annual attendance of the senior military officers in the CCP Central Committee plenums and their monthly attendance in the CCP  Politburo meetings in the post-Deng era. Like their civilian counterparts, military officers attend these plenums and meetings to nominally review and approve the major decisions of the top party leadership regarding the party’s general ideological and policy guidelines. PLA representation in these institutions thus is highly nominal and symbolic in the post-Deng era. Moreover, the involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in this study does not refer to situations where it is employed to provide humanitarian assistance and relieve natural disasters such as flooding, earthquakes, snow storms, and epidemics, mainly because these situations do not directly threaten the survival of the CCP rule. Some argue that the CCP employs the PLA for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in order to prevent major social instability and crisis that may challenge the survival of the CCP rule.36 But militaries in stable democracies are also employed by the civilian authorities for HADR. The primary consideration of the civilian authorities to employ the military for HADR has more to do with compensating for the lack of civilian capabilities in these precarious situations than with politics. Furthermore, the involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in this study does not refer to its heavy participation in business activities from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, or its recent counter-corruption drive. It

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is important to note that corrupt officers are convicted of economic crimes but not political crimes such as organizing “anti-party cliques.” Unlike the “anti-party cliques” that allegedly attempt to “seize political power” (“夺 权”), corrupt officers aim to enrich themselves, their families, and their friends. Ties among corrupt officers, being founded on monetary transactions rather than on the battle-tested historical ties or a common ideology, are fragile and disorganized; they thus do not constitute critical threats to the top leadership that warrant the mobilization of the military force to handle them. The political implications of these economics-related developments, however, are fully discussed in Chap. 4. The involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in this study also does not refer to the PLA’s participation in fighting the so-called three evils of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in the frontier provinces such as Xinjiang and Tibet. The Chinese government does not regard the unrests in these provinces as purely domestic issues. By conducting counter-­terrorism exercises jointly with the countries that share borders with these provinces, for instance, China apparently considers these unrests transnational in origin. Even though these unrests are primarily handled by the PAP, the PLA may get involved because they are also defined as the national and border security issues; these issues fall within the responsibilities of the PLA. Finally, the involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in this study does not refer to the role of the PLA in Hong Kong and Macau. The PLA has maintained garrisons in Hong Kong and Macau to symbolize the Chinese sovereignty after the return of the two former colonies to China in 1997 and 1999. It has not interfered in the local governance because these two “special administrative regions” of China are entitled to “a high degree of autonomy” under the principal of “one country, two systems.” The leaders and governments of Hong Kong and Macau, for instance, are produced and constituted locally. The structure and style of governance in these regions are also distinctively different from those in other regions of China, even though the influence of Beijing is inevitable and may increase over time. In the event of a potential governance crisis in these regions, the Beijing leadership is likely to employ and exhaust all non-military means, primarily through the local authorities, to avert it. This is due to the autonomous nature of these regions and the economic benefits associated with such autonomy that Beijing has enjoyed. The worst-case scenario, however, is that local governance in these regions has failed to the extent that it has

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led to massive, violent unrest. Such a crisis may incentivize the Beijing leadership to leverage the use of force to avert the unrest. In such a scenario, the PAP may intervene for the purpose of “riot” control. The PLA may also get involved because such a crisis is defined as a critical challenge to China’s national sovereignty and security on the margins of China. Xi Jinping, for instance, names Hong Kong and Macau together with Taiwan as constituting such challenges to the Beijing leadership;37 Xi’s view is particularly reflected in Beijing’s recent passage of a national security law for Hong Kong. The PLA intervention in such a scenario bears some resemblance to the role of the Soviet military in quelling the popular rebellion in Hungary in 1956. The Soviet intervention was intended to maintain control of its far-flung and more exposed satellite states. The PLA intervention in these regions thus is different from its act in Tiananmen in 1989 in terms of the underlying rationale. The Tiananmen Incident was regarded as a major domestic crisis because it was located in the capital of the country and directly threatened the survival of the CCP regime. Sources This study draws heavily on primary sources. They include Chinese-­ language books, journal articles, and analytical pieces in magazines and newspapers, authored by the Chinese civilian, security, and military analysts and officials and published by the Chinese institutions and presses, some of which are affiliated with China’s security and military establishments. This study is also informed by the author’s informal conversations with the Chinese civilian, security, and military analysts and officials. There are several reasons why these sources are relatively credible and using them is justified. The post-Mao shift of national policy priorities from “class struggle” to nation-building, for instance, has led to a new emphasis on pragmatic discussions and debates of policy issues and solutions in Chinese publications. This new emphasis has been reinforced by the ascendance of the new generations of technocratic leaders committed to nation-building tasks, the functional and technical specialization of the Chinese institutions required by the more complex nation-building tasks, and the gradual institutionalization of research on policy issues. This new emphasis represents an important departure from the Maoist period while the official discourse was dominated by what Lucian Pye calls “doctrinalism,” where statements were dogmatic and vague and mostly employed for personality-based attacks and factional mobilization.38 Also, the Chinese civilian, security, and military scholars and officials tend to be more forthcoming

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and critical in informal conversations. Finally, past Western analytical literature on Chinese civil-military relations was significantly informed by the materials that came from inside China. Although improvement has been made in the post-Mao era, it is important to note that a Leninist regime still rules China, and it regards information control as critical for its survival. As a result, a range of political factors can distort information and analyses inside China. These include ideological inertia from the Maoist period, suppression of information considered to endanger the regime, manipulation of information for political advantages by the Chinese institutions and personalities that control information, and bureaucratic incentive to cover up policy failures. Also, the PLA is considered as one of the more secretive institutions. To mitigate and alleviate this problem of “imperfect information,” this study also refers extensively to the secondary sources. They include scholarly books, journal articles, and other data and information published on Chinese politics and Chinese party-army relations outside China. Organization This study has eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter are the four empirical chapters. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 show major changes in the functions of the PPWS, in the extent of the PLA involvement in intra-­ party leadership power struggle and politics, and in the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries, respectively. They demonstrate the evolution away of the Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Chapter 6 attempts to explain the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization, and Chap. 7 discusses the major implications of the findings. The concluding chapter (Chap. 8) examines the possible role of the PLA in the transition to the post-Xi Jinping leadership, with particular reference to the major institutional changes that this study analyzes.

Notes 1. For recent PLA reorganization that favors these services, see Nan Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring,” East Asian Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2016). 2. See Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 782–784. Some claim that the “dual-command” system of the

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PLA is used by Perlmutter and LeoGrande as a defining characteristic of the Chinese party-army symbiosis. But a careful reading of the two authors’ analysis shows no reference to such a defining characteristic. For the claim, see Jeff W. Benson and Zi Yang, Party on the Bridge (Washington, D.C.: Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 2020), p. 38. Chapter 2 examines the decision structure and processes of the PLA, including its “dual-command” system. 3. Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” pp. 784–785. 4. Ibid., p. 784. 5. See John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), Chapter 7. 6. See Military History Department of Academy of Military Science (AMS), Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军的七 十年] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1997), Chapter 8. 7. See Andrew J. Nathan, “A factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly, No. 53 (January–March 1973), and Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager Gunn & Hain, 1981). 8. See William Whitson, “The Field Army in Chinese Communist Politics,” China Quarterly, No. 37 (January–March 1969). 9. See Nan Li, “Political-Military Changes in China, 1979–89,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter 1994). 10. See David Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People’s Liberation Army,” China Quarterly, No. 127 (September 1991), and Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 11, 20–31. See also Chong-pin Lin, “The Extra-Military Roles of the PLA: Limits of Professionalism,” Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1992). 11. See Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993). 12. See James Mulvenon, “Party-Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress: The Battle of the ‘Two Centers’?” in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel (eds.), Civil-Military Change In China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2004). 13. See James Mulvenon, “‘Safeguarding the Core and Following Commands’: Party-Army Relations before the 19th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 53 (May 2017). 14. See U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), p. 102. 15. See William Parish Jr., “Factions in Chinese Military Politics,” China Quarterly, No. 56 (October–December 1973). 16. See Nan Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA, 1985–1997,” China Quarterly, No. 158 (June 1999).

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17. For the most recent example, see Minnie Chan, “Why Xi Jinping Is Planning a Historic Move to Rename China’s Army Corps,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), April 24, 2017, and “China’s Defense Ministry Confirms Reports of Corps Downsizing,” SCMP, April 28, 2017. 18. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 19. See Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA.” 20. For currying favor with the PLA as a prerequisite for imposing the will of top leaders on the PLA at a later time, see Nan Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA: Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” in Phillip Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). 21. See Zhiyue Bo, “The PLA and the Provinces: Military District and Local Issues,” in David Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 2006). 22. For citation, see Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 26. 23. See Nan Li, “Qualitative or Artificial Shift toward Politics?” Issues & Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2004). 24. See Mulvenon, “Party-Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress: The Battle of the ‘Two Centers’?” 25. For this motivation, see “Jiang Zemin Reflects on the Years when He Was in Office after Retirement” [“江泽民卸任后回顾在任岁月”], Xinhuanet [新华网], February 9, 2014. 26. Ibid. 27. The notion of “safeguarding the core” first appeared in Li Zhanshu, “Resolutely Safeguarding the Authority of the Party Center” [“坚决维护 党中央权威”], People’s Daily [人民日报], November 15, 2016. Li had served as director of the CCP Central General Office before he became a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee at the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017. 28. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/symbiosis. 29. See Mao Zedong, Problems of War and Strategy [战争和战略问题] (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 13. 30. For this premise, see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.  1, 27–29, and W.  H. Morris Jones, “Armed Forces and the State,” Public Administration, No. 25 (Winter 1957), pp. 411–416. 31. See Samuel P.  Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.  80–85, and Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 193–194. 32. See Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), and

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“The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July 1975). 33. See Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” pp. 683, 689, 690. 34. See Regulations on the Interior Affairs of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军内务条令], retrieved in May 2018 from http:// www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2010-06/07/content_4162971_5.htm, and People’s Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和 国人民武装警察法], retrieved in May 2018 from http://www.gov.cn/ flfg/2009-08/27/content_1403324.htm. 35. For an analysis of PAP funding, see Adrian Zenz, “Corralling the People’s Armed Police: Centralizing Control to Reflect Centralized Budgets,” China Brief, Vol. 18, No. 7 (April 24, 2018). 36. See M. Taylor Fravel, “Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Non-Combat Operations in China,” Asian Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 2011). 37. See “Xi Jinping Names ‘Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan’ as a Risk for the Chinese Communist Party,” SCMP, September 4, 2019. 38. See Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics, pp. 8–12.

CHAPTER 2

Evolving Functions of the Party and Political Work System in the PLA

The central institutional indicator that helps to assess whether the party exercises “subjective” or “objective” control of the PLA concerns the evolving functions of the political commissar system, or the PPWS, in the PLA. If this system functions primarily as the party’s instrument of “subjective control” of the PLA, or if it supervises the PLA for political loyalty and discipline and reports back to the civilian party authorities and mobilizes the PLA into party politics, party-army symbiosis is likely to be high. But if this system functions primarily to promote the “objective control” of the PLA, or if it is internalized into the PLA to enhance its organizational cohesiveness, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions, quasi-institutionalization is likely to develop and prevail.

What Is PPWS? Chart 2.1 shows that the PPWS comprises three major institutional arrangements. First, besides a commander, each major PLA unit or organization at and above the regimental command level is also headed by a political commissar (PC). The PC shares the same bureaucratic grade as the commander of that unit or organization and therefore has the power to cosign orders with the commander. Rather than a PC, a battalion command-­level unit is headed by a political instructor (政治教导员) and a company command-level unit by a political director (政治指导员). These © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_2

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two levels, however, do not have a dedicated political work staff. The arrangement of having a unit or an organization commanded by both a commander and a PC is known as the “dual-command system” (“双首长制”). Second, to provide staff support to the PC in his or her areas of responsibilities and to offer “functional guidance” (“业务指导”) to the party and political work of lower-level units, headquarters of each major PLA unit or organization include a political work department (PWD). Chart 2.1 shows that a PWD consists of agencies or divisions that specialize in major functions of the military party and political work. These functions include party organization work which directs party organization development and membership recruitment in the PLA, cadre work which manages the personnel issues of the commissioned officers, manpower work which handles the personnel issues of the enlisted and the civilian staff, propaganda work which directs political education in the PLA, internet opinion work which manages internet-based opinion and perception, mass work which handles public relations, and liaison work which manages political intelligence and political warfare. The internet opinion work, however, is fused with the propaganda work in major PLA units or organizations below the CMC level. As discussed elsewhere in this study, supervisory agencies handling discipline inspection and judiciary issues were separated from the traditional PPWS to constitute separate chains of command in the post-2015 restructuring of PLA.

Commander and Political Commissar Party Committee Staff Department

Political Work Department: Agencies specializing in party organization, cadre, manpower and civilian staff, propaganda, internet opinion, mass work, and liaison

Logistics Support Department

Armament Department

Chart 2.1  PPWS within headquarters of each major PLA unit or organization. (Notes: “National Defense Ministry Spokesman Explains in Detail,” Xinhuanet, January 11, 2016, and Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS, “On Innovation of Ways to Realize the Party’s Absolute Leadership of the Military” [“论创新党对军队绝对领导的实现方式”], China Military Science [中国军事科 学], No. 2 (March 2016))

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Third, each major PLA unit or organization is presided over by a party committee and its standing committee. The committee members include the commander, the PC, and their deputies. A company command-level unit, however, is presided over by a party branch (党支部) rather than a committee. The PC usually serves as the party committee secretary and the commander as the deputy secretary. In some instances, a commander may serve as the secretary because of seniority. Functioning as a collective decision council, the party committee is not confined to making decisions on party and political work. It meets regularly to “make decisions on all important issues regarding unit construction through collective discussions” (“对部队建设中的一切重大问题集体讨论决定”). The central working principle for the party committee is a “system of division of responsibilities between the commanding officers under the unified and collective leadership of the party committee” (“党委统一的集体领导下的 首长分工负责制”).1 Based on the Leninist notion of “democratic centralism,” such a principle has three connotations. First, deliberation on major issues should involve consultations and discussions among the nominally equal committee members, and decisions should be made by voting. Second, both commander and PC are held accountable for implementing the decisions made and authorized by the committee. When commander is responsible for the decisions on military and operational issues, PC is tasked with the decisions regarding party and political work. Finally, in times of crisis and war, the commander has the “authority to command according to circumstances” (“临机指挥权”) without consultations and discussions at the party committee meetings. He or she, however, has the responsibility to report to the party committee afterward on how he or she exercised this authority and what was accomplished.2 Regarding the origins of the PPWS, when the Red Army, the predecessor of the PLA, was established in the late 1920s, the CCP leadership was concerned about its political loyalty and discipline because many of its officers and men were from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army and the warlord armies. To supervise the Red Army for political loyalty and discipline, party representatives (党代表) were dispatched to the Red Army units; these representatives were required to report back to the civilian party authorities.3 The integration of the civilian party authorities with the high command of the Red Army, particularly after the 1932 transfer of the CCP central authorities from Shanghai to the Jiangxi Red Army Base, however, led to the internalization of the PPWS into the Red Army.

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The political-military nature of the communist revolution in the early 1930s entailed not only armed struggle but also mobilization of the peasant masses. Besides combat missions, for instance, the Red Army was required to carry out the party’s social and political tasks such as carrying out land reform, propagating communist ideologies among the populace, and administrating the established and newly liberated base areas. In the meantime, senior party authorities were heavily involved in formulating military strategies and even tactics. With the socialization of the military commanders into the party values and membership, they became as loyal as political commissars to the cause of the party. One analyst, for instance, observes that “unlike the Soviet Red Army in its early days, there are no instances of leading officers who transferred their allegiance at any time after 1927–1930 from the Red Army to the Kuomintang. … This long tradition of service in the Red Army suggests obvious advantages in terms of loyalty and esprit de corps.”4 For similar reasons, the same analyst asserts that “throughout the period of revolutionary struggle … there was no major challenge on the part of the army against the party leadership. … All the major party leaders were at one time military commanders or political commissars, and conversely the upper echelons of the military leadership were for the most part in the hands of veteran party members.”5 As a result, the supervisory role of the PPWS declined, and its educational and propaganda functions became more pronounced. Besides the party’s social and political tasks, for instance, political commissars and military party organizations were mostly tasked with the educational and propaganda programs to indoctrinate officers and men with the values of the party and to boost combat morale.6 The symbiotic nature of party-army relations during the pre-1949 years does not imply the absence of political conflicts among major party and military leaders. From 1933 to 1934, for instance, a major dispute broke out between Mao Zedong, who served as the political commissar of the 1st Front Red Army, and Party Leader Bo Gu and his Communist International Advisor Otto Braun over military strategies to defend the Jiangxi Red Army Base against the encirclement campaigns of Chiang Kai-­ shek’s Nationalist Army. Similarly in late 1935, a major dispute over the directions of the Long March (1934–1935) erupted between Mao and his supporters from the 1st Front Red Army, and Zhang Guotao and his followers from the 4th Front Red Army which Zhang commanded.7 Because of this incident, Mao warned that “our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the

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Party.” But the lesson that Mao had learned may be based on a misunderstanding of the incident, because rather than between party leaders and military commanders, both disputes occurred between the two symbiotic political-military leadership groups or factions, each including both party leaders and military commanders. The pre-1949 party-army symbiosis, however, was significantly weakened by the major institutional changes after 1949. The post-1949 consolidation of the civilian party and state authorities for civilian governance on the one hand, and Soviet-style military modernization on the other, led to clarification of the institutional boundaries based on a functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities. Such boundaries may serve as the baseline to determine whether the PPWS functioned primarily as an institution of “subjective” or “objective” control after 1949.

PPWS as an Institution of “Subjective Control” of the PLA under Mao Zedong Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, the civilian party and state authorities were gradually institutionalized and consolidated for civilian governance that placed emphasis on economic development, particularly with implementation of the First Five-Year Plan that began in 1953.8 Similarly, with the help of the Soviet advisors, the PLA embarked on a military modernization drive that featured “regularization and mechanization” following the end of the Korean War in 1953.9 As a result, The PLA was required to withdraw from the party’s broad social and political tasks such as land reform, establishing local party and government organizations in the newly conquered provinces, the campaign to “suppress the counter-revolutionaries,” and economic reconstruction. It thus could concentrate on tackling the narrow organizational, technological, and operational issues of military modernization.10 PPWS as an Institution of “Objective Control” Before 1957 As the PLA embarked on the path of military modernization, the role of the PPWS also shifted to resolving practical issues to support “regularization and modernization” of the PLA. For major PLA units and organizations, for instance, 60 percent of the work time was allocated to military training. The other 40 percent was allocated to the PPWS, which utilized

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50 percent of the allocated time for political education and the other 50 percent for literacy and technical education. As a result, promoting literacy education to enhance the educational levels of the PLA became a major function of the PPWS; this function aimed to meet the increasing demands for knowledge and expertise stemming from the technological progress of the PLA. The PPWS also played a critical role in introducing the Soviet-­ style systems of conscription, scaled salaries, military ranks, and merits medals in the PLA. Moreover, major functions of the PPWS during this period included establishing more universal and meritocratic standards for officer appointment and promotion, recruiting the educated youth and skilled urban workers into the PLA, and implementing a policy of “uniting, educating, and reforming” the intellectuals in the PLA.11 The PPWS also stressed political work in military training and exercises during this period. Regular military training, for instance, was defined as the “central task” (“中心任务”) of the military party committees. Major guidelines, principles, and plans of military training were discussed by party committees and then assigned to individual commanding officers for execution. Party committees also regularly conducted inspections, solved problems, and socialized successful lessons to enhance the quality of military training. Moreover, political officers were required to master military skills in order to improve the quality of political work in military training. Political officers also conducted “ideological mobilization” (“思想动员”) intended to enhance unit morale and bring into play initiatives in military training and exercises. Such mobilization refers to education on patriotism, internationalism, heroism, and the necessity of war preparation, and on the purpose, significance, tasks, and favorable conditions and obstacles of military training and exercises.12 Furthermore, political officers were tasked to assist commanders in implementing rules and regulations and enforcing discipline, in mitigating the relationships between the superiors and subordinates to promote unit cohesiveness, and in enhancing coordination among different units in military exercises. Finally, political officers played an important role in coordinating with the civilian authorities to resolve issues of military exercises that may affect the interests of the civilian entities.13 Generally speaking, the PPWS during this period promoted “objective control” of the PLA. It functioned to enhance the internal and external unity of the PLA, to promote its institutional interests, and to assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions. Beginning in 1957, however, the PPWS began to shift its role from

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“objective” to “subjective” control. It played a critical role in mobilizing the PLA into party politics, resulting in severe political division in the PLA and erosion of the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA. Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 In early 1957, Mao initiated the “Hundred Flowers Movement” which encouraged diversity of expression, including intellectuals’ criticisms of the works of the party and government in order to improvise them. By the summer, however, as such criticisms gained momentum, Mao began to regard them as “bourgeois attacks” on the party and launched the Anti-­ Rightist Campaign. The campaign was also carried out in the PLA, and PPWS played a critical role in it. By June, for instance, the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA issued “Instructions on the Education to Fight back the Rightists and Support the Counterattack” (“关于反击右派 的教育和声援反击的指示”), which tasked the PPWS to conduct regular political study sessions on the Anti-Rightist Campaign in all the PLA units. This bureaucratic approach, however, was soon replaced by a more radical rectification campaign where the masses, or the rank and file, were mobilized to expose and denounce the “rightists” in the PLA. Rather than the regular political study sessions, the radical methods of “speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters” (“大鸣, 大放, 大辩论, 大字报,” known as “四大” or “Four Greats”) were extensively employed in the PLA.  Similarly, moderate criticisms of the works of the party and government were magnified as manifestations of the struggle between a “capitalist road” and a “socialist road,” or the “contradictions between the antagonistic classes and opposing lines” in the campaign. These “antagonistic contradictions” (“敌我矛盾”) thus justified the radical methods of the “Four Greats” associated with the “class struggle.” The campaign also reinforced the view that the majority of the intellectuals belong to the “bourgeois class” and may not be easily reformed. The campaign led to extensive political persecution of military officers; it produced 5995 “rightists” and 11,039 “center-rightists” in the PLA.14 The PPWS played a critical role in this campaign, which seriously fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA.

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Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958 The 8th Party Congress held in 1956 defined the “central task” of the party as promoting economic and technological development to resolve the “primary contradictions” between the backwardness of China and the need to modernize and industrialize China, based on the premise that the “class contradictions” between the proletarians and bourgeoisies were resolved by nationalizing private means of production from 1953 to 1956. But the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign caused Mao’s concern about “bourgeois attacks” on the party, which led to a revision of the party line. This revision redefined the “primary contradictions” that the CCP must tackle as those between a “socialist road” and a “capitalist road,” and such contradictions can only be resolved through “class struggle.”15 This new party line led to a rethinking of all the “contradictions” in China, including those in the PLA. As a result, the PPWS began to shift its role from “objective” to “subjective” control; it began to mobilize the PLA into party politics, which severely fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA. A case in point is the Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958. There had been major concerns among the PLA leadership about the excesses of the Soviet-style military modernization by 1958. These excesses included the mechanistic and uncritical acceptance of the Soviet military theory and doctrine that were socialized to guide the PLA operations, the  Soviet teaching methods and materials that were used in Chinese military schools, and rules and regulations of the Soviet military that were employed in the management and training of the PLA. These excesses arose from a lack of sufficient attention that should have been paid to the differences between the Chinese and Soviet armies in historical experiences, in the levels of technological endowment, and in the geographical environments where the two armies had operated.16 But rather than being treated as circumstantial differences that could have been alleviated or resolved by practical improvisation and mitigation, at an expanded CMC conference held between May and July of 1958 and chaired by Mao, these excesses were defined as representing a “bourgeois military line” that challenged and undermined Mao’s “revolutionary military line.” In late July, the GPD issued “Circular to Convey and Implement the Decisions of the Expanded CMC Conference” (“关于传达贯彻军委 扩大会议决定的通知”), which required all major PLA units to carry out a rectification campaign to criticize the Soviet-style “dogmatism” and “pure military point of view” (“单纯军事观点”). This document led to

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mobilization of the masses and employment of the radical methods against those who were accused of representing the “bourgeois military line” in the PLA.17 This campaign led to the political persecution of those who were responsible for professional military education and military training. Marshal Liu Bocheng, a Soviet-trained military theoretician and commander of the pre-1949 2nd Field Army, was severely criticized and removed as president of the PLA Advanced Military College in Nanjing. Others who were criticized and removed from office included General Xiao Ke, director of the PLA General Training Department; General Li Da, a vice minister of defense; and Senior General Su Yu, chief of the PLA General Staff and a major commander of the pre-1949 3rd Field Army. Besides those who were removed at higher levels, many officers in the military regions (MR) were criticized and “organizationally adjusted.” In the Guangzhou MR, for instance, 46 officers at and above the regiment-­ leader grade were severely criticized and demoted or removed from office. In the Jinan MR, 25 officers at and above the division-leader grade were severely criticized and demoted or removed from office.18 The campaign caused severe political division in the PLA. Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959 Another case in point is the Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959. At an expanded Politburo conference held from July to August, Marshal Peng Dehuai, defense minister and commander of the pre-1949 1st Field Army, criticized Mao’s Great Leap Forward policy for inflicting critical damage on China’s rural economy. Such criticisms were immediately regarded by Mao as “bourgeois attacks” on the party. At the 8th Plenum of the 8th CCP Central Committee that followed, Peng and his supporters, including Chief of the PLA General Staff Huang Kecheng, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian, and Party Secretary of Hunan Province Zhou Xiaozhou, were labeled as the “right opportunists” who formed an “anti-party clique.” At an expanded CMC conference that ended in September, Marshal Lin Biao replaced Peng as the defense minister, and Senior General Luo Ruiqing replaced Huang as the chief of the PLA General Staff.19 By October, the GPD issued “Instructions on the Work to Implement the Resolutions of the 8th Plenum and the Expanded CMC Conference” (“关于贯彻八中全会和军委扩大会议决议工作的指示”).

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The Instructions required all the PLA units and organizations to carry out an “anti-right opportunism” campaign to criticize and denounce Peng, not just for “attacking” the Great Leap Forward policy of the party but also for practicing a “bourgeois military line” that privileged military professionalism at the expense of party politics. The masses were mobilized against those who allegedly held right-opportunistic views or were sympathetic to Peng. Subsequently, the campaign produced 1848 “right opportunists” in the PLA, including 195 at and above the regiment-leader grade, and many more “center-right opportunists.” A total of 17,212 military officers were implicated in the campaign and removed from office.20 From September to October 1960, as a response to Mao’s call for vigilance against “bourgeois line and representatives” hidden in the party, the government, and the PLA, Lin Biao held an expanded CMC conference where Senior General Tan Zheng, the GPD director, was severely criticized for his “peaceful coexistence” with Peng Dehuai and for degrading political work to the level of literacy education. The conference led to the removal of the Tan-led “anti-party factional clique” from office, and passage of “Resolution on Strengthening the Army’s Political and Ideological Work” (“关于加强军队政治思想工作的决议”) which highlighted the need for vigilance against a “bourgeois military line” hidden in the PLA.21 By 1964, Lin advanced his concept of “giving prominence to politics” (“突出政治”), which was widely propagated and disseminated in the PLA. The concept required the PPWS to carry out the political and ideological campaigns to resolve the “contradictions” between a “bourgeois military line” and a “proletarian military line” in the PLA,22 which fractured further the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA. Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) At an expanded Politburo conference held in May 1966, Mao revealed what was known as the “Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang Anti-Party Clique” comprised of Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing, Luo Ruiqing, the chief of the PLA General Staff, Lu Dingyi, the director of the CCP Propaganda Department, and Yang Shangkun, the director of the CCP Central General Office. The conference also passed a resolution drafted by Mao and known as the “May 16th Circular” (“516通知”), which ushered in the Cultural Revolution. The circular claimed that a large number of “bourgeois representatives” were hiding in the cultural sphere as well as in the party,

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government, and military organizations. The party therefore must “uphold the banner of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” to “not only criticize bourgeois reactionary ideologies in the cultural sphere, but also expose and criticize bourgeois representatives hidden in the party, the government, and the military, and remove them from the leadership positions.”23 The Cultural Revolution began with mobilization of the masses, including the red guards and the “rebel” mass organizations, to criticize and denounce the “bourgeois representatives” or “those who are in leadership positions and take the capitalist road,” including China’s top “capitalist roaders” such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. As the party-state governance bureaucracies of all levels were paralyzed and swept aside as “headquarters of bourgeois representatives,” Mao had to rely on the PLA to avert anarchy and restore social order. As discussed elsewhere in this study, to implement a policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries,” or for the PLA to “support the leftists, industry, and agriculture,” impose “military control” of the critically important regions and organizations, and conduct “military training” of the students, millions of active-duty officers and men were mobilized into the politics of the Cultural Revolution. The PPWS, particularly its propaganda and arts and literature apparatus, played a critical role in promoting and diffusing Mao’s agenda of the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, a key radical leader of the Cultural Revolution, for instance, wanted to mobilize army support for her campaign to expose and criticize an “anti-party black line in the area of culture” following the publication of an article on Hai Rei by Yao Wenyuan, a literary critic from Shanghai and a close ally of Jiang. Yao’s article, published in Shanghai’s Wenhui News (文汇报) on November 10, 1965, was a criticism of a historical play written by Wu Han, a vice mayor of Beijing, entitled “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office.” Wu’s narrative of Hai Rui, a Ming official wrongly removed from office by the emperor, was regarded as an indirect criticism of Mao’s removal of Peng Dehuai from office in 1959. Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing, attempted to downplay the importance of the issue but was criticized by Mao for suppressing criticisms of Wu and was removed from office. Luo Ruiqing, chief of the PLA General Staff, was removed from office partly because of his refusal to get the PLA involved in the controversy.24 The GPD-based Liberation Army Daily reprinted Yao’s article on November 29, 1965, even earlier than the People’s Daily. Jiang Qing also got approval from Lin Biao and held a symposium on the army’s literature

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and arts work in Shanghai in February 1966, where she formally declared the existence of an “anti-party, anti-socialism black line in the area of culture that opposes Mao Zedong thought.”25 Both events were critical in triggering the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. On May 25, 1966, the GPD issued “Circular to Implement the May 16th Circular” (“贯彻516通 知的通知”). This circular instructed that a cultural revolution should be carried out in the army, particularly in military propaganda, culture, media, educational, and scientific research institutions at and above the corps-­ command level, where a substantial number of intellectuals, technical specialists, and bureaucrats were concentrated. The aim of the revolution was to mobilize the masses and employ the radical methods of the “Four Greats” to expose and criticize the “black line of bourgeois representatives” hidden in the PLA, and “seize power” from them. As a result, an Army Cultural Revolution Group was established in the GPD to lead the Cultural Revolution in the PLA.26 More important, the All-Army Political Work Conference held from December 1965 to January 1966 severely criticized the “bourgeois military line” of Luo Ruiqing and reiterated Lin Biao’s call for “giving prominence to politics,” which stressed “taking class struggle as the key link” (“以阶级斗争为纲”) and “revolutionization of ideology” (“思想革命化”) at the expense of professional expertise. To propagate the concept of “giving prominence to politics,” Liberation Army Daily published seven editorials from February to April of 1966. The socialization and diffusion of the concept of “giving prominence to politics” thus had major implications for the PLA. First, a campaign to “dismiss from office” (“罢官运动”) coalesced, where a large number of professional and technical officers who were critical of “giving prominence to politics” were criticized and removed from office.27 Furthermore, political work was now treated as “higher than all else” (“高于一切”), where all other works must make way for political work if a conflict emerged. In August 1966, for instance, Lin Biao ordered all the PLA units and organizations to increase the work time allocated to ideological education and political campaigns to 50 percent. The work time allocated to military training was reduced to 40 percent for units that were dedicated to military training, 20 percent for units that were engaged in both military training and agriculture production, and 10 percent for units that were fully engaged in agriculture production.28 This change, along with the concept’s premise on the irreconcilability of the contradictions between politics and professional expertise, led to a situation where

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professional and technical officers were disincentivized from doing professional and technical work for fear of being accused of following the “bourgeois military line” and of the political persecution that may have followed. Moreover, the content of political work shifted from tackling the mundane issues of morale, unit cohesion, and military training to handling the ideological issues of “class struggle” in the PLA. Constant vigilance thus was maintained to detect signs of “class struggle” in order to “reinforce proletarian ideology and liquidate bourgeois ideology” through “revolutionary great criticisms.” As a result, the PPWS and political officers became the so-called headquarters and leaders (“指挥部和带头人”) in organizing and leading officers and men to wage “class and lines struggle” in the PLA.29 This change contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity among officers and men, where all must guard against one another for fear that small errors in words and deeds may be magnified as evidence of “bourgeois ideology,” which may result in severe criticism and even political persecution. Finally, the PPWS played a critical role in conducting major political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution that severely fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA. The Campaign to “Cleanse Class Ranks” (“清理阶级队伍”) in the PLA that began in May 1968, for instance, led to removal from the PLA a largely number of officers who had “wrong” class backgrounds. The Party Rectification and Reconstruction Campaign following the 9th CCP Congress of 1969 was meant not just for “ideological” but also “organizational” rectification, where a large number of PLA officers were removed from office for objecting to “giving prominence to politics.” The Campaign to “Uncover the ‘May 16th’ Counter-­ Revolutionary Conspiratorial Group” (“清查‘五一六’反革命阴谋集团”) that began in March 1970 led to persecution of a large number of military officers and their removal from the PLA.30 More than 80,000 military officers were persecuted for various “political crimes” during the Cultural Revolution, including political officers who objected to “giving prominence to politics” and attempted to maintain the institutional cohesiveness of the PLA.31 By mobilizing the PLA into party politics during the Cultural Revolution, the PPWS played a critical role in fracturing the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA and aggravating the party-army symbiosis-­ based factionalism.

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PPWS in Transition under Deng Xiaoping After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he replaced Mao’s revolutionary agenda of “class and lines struggle” with a policy centered on economic and technological development, couched in the notion of “four modernizations”  including  national defense  modernization. The PLA thus was required to disengage from its extensive political and social involvement of the Cultural Revolution and concentrate on national defense and military modernization. As a result, the functions of the PPWS were redefined. Redefining the Functions of Military Political Work First and foremost, the concept of “giving prominence to politics” was officially refuted and abandoned, since it was allegedly responsible for fracturing the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA and undermining military professionalization, a major goal of Deng’s military policy.32 Political work and political officers were now required to step down from the “commanding heights” that they had enjoyed during the Cultural Revolution. When political work was still regarded as the “lifeline” (“生命 线”) of the PLA, it was required to make two major changes. First, political work should not substitute for or equate to the party leadership of the PLA.  The relationship between political officers and departments and their military, logistics, and armament counterparts is based on a division of labor among equals, but does not involve the authority relationship between the superiors and subordinates. All the officers and departments, including political officers and departments, are responsible for implementing the party’s policies in the PLA, and they all report to the party committees of the units they belong to.33 Second, rather than “higher than all else,” political work was required to reorient itself to facilitating “guarantees and services” (“保证, 服务”). It is to provide “guarantees and services” for implementing the party’s policies in the PLA, for regularizing and modernizing the PLA, for maintaining the internal and external unity of the PLA, for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the PLA, and for fulfilling the various missions assigned to the PLA. This means that political officers and departments must learn from the military, logistics, and science and technology professions to understand their concerns, and strive to resolve practical issues that arise from these concerns.34

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Changing Behavior The redefinition of the functions of military political work led to the shift of emphasis of the PPWS work from “subjective” to “objective” control. Rather than mobilizing the PLA into party politics, which had fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA, the PPWS set out to provide “guarantees and services” for military work in the 1980s, which had helped to enhance the unity and combat effectiveness of the PLA.  The PPWS, for instance, implemented a policy to rehabilitate those who had been persecuted in various political campaigns since the late 1950s. Out of 5885 PLA officers who were labeled as the “rightists” in the 1957 Anti-­ Rightist Campaign, for instance, 5799 or 98.5 percent were rehabilitated. A total of 17,212 military officers who were accused as the “right opportunists” in the 1959 Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign were also rehabilitated. Out of more than 80,000 military officers who were implicated in the political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution, 44,200 were rehabilitated. The punishment for those who made “genuine” mistakes in the Cultural Revolution “was properly reduced.” Implementation of this policy led to reconciliation that helped to enhance the internal unity of the PLA.35 The PPWS in the 1980s also functioned to enhance the combat effectiveness of the PLA. It implemented a personnel policy that featured rejuvenation, knowledge, and professionalization (年轻化, 知识化, 专业化). It organized numerous educational and training programs and actively promoted technical specialists and intellectuals to higher positions to improve the knowledge structure and skill sets of the officer corps. It also introduced the Officer Service Regulations that has established the age and term limits for appointing officers to different levels and grades; these limits have contributed to the regularized rejuvenation of the officer corps. College and professional military education as prerequisite for officer appointment and promotion, another requirement of the Regulations, has helped to enhance the educational and professional qualifications of the officer corps. Moreover, the PPWS played a critical role in developing a system for evaluating the performance of officers, in reintroducing the military rank system, in reforming the salary system of the PLA, and in introducing a military retirement system during this period.36 The PPWS also stressed political work in military training, which was defined as the “central task” of the PLA. Such work involved educational programs to explain why military training is not antithetical to politics as

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connoted otherwise in the notion of “giving prominence to politics.” It thus is possible to realize the “dialectical unity” between politics and military work and between “redness” and “expertise.” This is because military training is critical to enhancing the combat effectiveness of the PLA in order to fulfill the task of “defending the motherland by repelling the aggressors,” which is assigned to the PLA by political authorities such as the party leadership.37 Political work was also required to pervade military training to resolve practical problems. Educational programs designed to enhance morale and motivate enthusiasm and initiatives in military training, for instance, were extensively conducted in the basic-level units. Political officers also worked with military officers to implement rules and regulations and enforce discipline and to resolve combined arms and tactical coordination issues that arose from military training.38 Finally, the PPWS set out to improve the relations of the PLA with the Chinese society. These relations were allegedly damaged during the Cultural Revolution when the PLA implemented the policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries.” The PPWS, for instance, carried out a policy of “joint military-civilian construction of spiritual civilization” (“军民 共建精神文明”), which entailed joint construction of civilized villages, streets, towns, counties, and cities by the military units and civilian communities. This policy involved joint programs to promote learning of science and technology, enhance the safety and security of the local communities, improve local hygiene and the environment, and better local economic conditions. By the end of 1986, more than 40,000 joint construction communities were developed in China. It was claimed that the policy had greatly improved the relations between the PLA and Chinese society.39 Exceptions Although the PPWS shifted its emphasis from “subjective” to “objective” control in the Deng era, there are three exceptions to this trend of change, where the PPWS did get involved in party politics. First, because many officers in the PLA, including political officers, were benefactors of the Cultural Revolution, they constituted a group of dissidents who were highly critical of Deng’s policy to shift the central task of the party from “class struggle” to economic development as well as Deng’s harsh evaluation of Mao’s historical role. They were particularly critical of Deng’s policy to decentralize agriculture and liberalize the economy, which they

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believed had led to the “capitalist restoration” and the spread of “bourgeois values and attitudes.” GPD Director Wei Guoqing, a proponent of “giving prominence to politics” and a critic of Deng’s policy, for instance, was dismissed from office in September 1982. This dismissal was followed by an army-wide, multiple-year rectification campaign against the “leftist” influence in the PLA. Both developments had contributed to the gradual disappearance of this “leftist” group for lack of leadership support, lack of access to the military media outlets, and removal of its members from office in the rectification campaign.40 Moreover, as noted elsewhere in this study, following the massive PLA intervention to suppress the popular rebellion in Tiananmen in 1989, the PPWS was extensively involved in interrogating demonstrators, restoring social order, and carrying out party propaganda among the populace. The PPWS was also tasked to investigate recalcitrant troops and conduct educational campaigns within the PLA on the need to fight “bourgeois liberalization” and “peaceful evolution.” Finally, after the military crackdown of 1989, reformers were in retreat and left-leaning hardliners became more powerful in the party leadership, leading to economic stagnation and political impasse. To revive his policy agenda of reform and opening up, Deng made his legendary “southern tour” in early 1992 to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai, the pioneering cities that led China’s economic reform and opening up in the previous decade. PLA leaders, including CMC Vice-Chair Yang Shangkun and GPD Director Yang Baibin, played an overly critical role in supporting Deng’s policy. This case, however, is analyzed in detail in the next chapter. These three exceptions represent the twists and turns in the transition of the PPWS from an institution of “subjective control” to one of “objective control”; they do not reflect the reversal of this trend of change. After the 14th CCP Congress of 1992 where Jiang Zemin consolidated his position as the new top leader, the PLA withdrew from its post-1989 involvement in domestic politics and returned to the barracks. The PPWS was disengaged from domestic politics as well and reoriented toward resolving practical issues arising from the routine military administration. This trend has persisted to date.

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PPWS as an Institution of “Objective Control” of the PLA in the Post-Deng Era Even though there have been nuanced variations in defining the functions of the PPWS under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, the PPWS has largely functioned as an institution of “objective control” in the post-Deng era. It has performed to enhance the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions. It is important to note that the definitions of the PPWS functions by Jiang, Hu, and Xi all highlight the normative requirement of the PPWS to guarantee the “party’s absolute leadership” (“党的绝对领导”) of the PLA. This requirement has three specific connotations. First, it refers to the operational command and control of the PLA by China’s political or civilian authorities, which is the CCP leadership. In this connotation, the PPWS, like the command, logistics, and armament authorities of the PLA, must follow the command of the CCP leadership. The second connotation in the normative requirement of the PPWS to guarantee the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA is requiring the PPWS to implement the party’s policies in the PLA. As noted elsewhere in this study, the “central task” of the party in the post-Deng era is economic and technological development. The party thus requires the PLA, including its command, political, logistics, and armament authorities, to implement a policy of military modernization. The PPWS implements this policy by enhancing the organizational cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of the PLA. As long as the party requires the PLA to concentrate on military modernization rather than on waging “class and lines struggle” inside and outside the PLA, the PPWS is likely to remain as an institution of “objective control.” The third connotation in the normative requirement of the PPWS to guarantee the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA is requiring the PPWS to supervise the PLA for political loyalty and discipline on behalf of the party. As shown in the section that discusses the evolving functions of the PPWS under the leadership of Xi Jinping, since the PPWS has been “internalized” into the PLA and subject to the incentive structure of the PLA, its supervisory or “subjective control” role has largely been compromised. As a result, the PPWS functions primarily as an institution of “objective control” in the post-Deng era.

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Finally, a major ideological theme that the PPWS has propagated in the post-Deng era is for the PLA to maintain vigilance against the alien, hostile forces to “westernize” and “divide” the PLA. This theme highlights the pervasive danger of these forces in their attempt to undermine the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA by spreading the “erroneous views” that the PLA should be “departized” and “statized.” Since there is no empirical evidence to show that any prominent leader or informal group in the PLA advocates these views, the propagation of this theme by the PPWS can be understood as its attempt to justify the continued relevance of the PPWS for the PLA. The political significance of this propaganda thus should not be overstated. PPWS under Jiang Zemin (1989–2004) For Jiang, the “primary contradiction” for military work is the “incompatibility” between the “low technological level of the PLA” and the “high technological requirement of modern war.” Therefore, the “central task” of the PLA is to promote technological modernization to resolve this contradiction.41 Jiang thus wanted the PPWS to “commence to work centered on military modernization construction” (“以军队现代化建设为中心开 展工作”). PLA Political Work Regulations was revised and issued three times under the supervision of Jiang, in 1991, 1995, and 2003. Besides the normative requirement of the PPWS to guarantee the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA, the Regulations particularly highlighted the central role of the PPWS in facilitating the political, ideological, and organizational (政治上, 思想上, 组织上) “guarantees and services” for modernizing the PLA, for maintaining the internal unity of the PLA and the unity between the PLA and the civilian authorities and the people (军政军 民团结), for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the PLA, and for fulfilling the various missions assigned to the PLA.42 Moreover, for the first time in PLA history, the notion that “political work is an important factor that constitutes the combat effectiveness of the military” (“政治工作是构成军队战斗力的重要因素”), which highlights the “operational functions of political work” (“政治工作的作战功 能”), was incorporated in the 2003 edition of Political Work Regulations. To be consistent with this new notion, the concept of “opinion, psychological, and legal war-fares” (“舆论战, 心理战, 法律战”) or “three war-­ fares” was included in the Regulations. Unlike earlier political work regulations where the PPWS was mainly required to support military

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work, this new definition has ushered in an era where the PPWS has gained its own domains of military operations based on “three war-fares.” This change reflects not only the PLA’s attempt to bring the PPWS closer in line with the warfighting role of the PLA but also the adaptation of the PPWS to the changing nature of warfare in the information age.43 In behavior, the PPWS generally functioned to provide “guarantees and services” for military modernization during the Jiang Era. For political education, for instance, the emphasis was placed on contents and examples that can “provide powerful spiritual drivers for ‘fighting and winning’” (“为‘打得赢’提供强大的精神动力”), particularly in “cultivating the spirits of bravery, sacrifice, and dedication; iron discipline; and tenacious combat style.”44 Political education programs also stressed the dissemination of the scientific and technological knowledge. This emphasis served to improve the knowledge structure and quality of officers and men to keep pace with the technological development of the PLA.45 Moreover, psychological counseling and mitigation were extensively conducted by political officers to resolve psychological issues of individuals due to work-related stresses. Finally, besides political education to effect “spiritual motivations,” material benefits were widely leveraged to incentivize positive performance.46 All these policy initiatives aimed to enhance the organizational cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of the PLA. For personnel management, the PPWS strove to cultivate and recruit the so-called new-type composite talents (“新型复合式人才”), or those who are not just professionally educated and technically specialized but also possess the knowledge, skill sets, and ability to integrate technology, command and control, and management effectively for different types of missions assigned to the PLA, including joint operations. The PPWS thus developed and introduced programs aimed to discover, cultivate, and select talents with creative and innovative abilities. Moreover, the PPWS worked to improve the “just and meritocratic” standards and mechanisms for evaluating, selecting, and promoting officers. It also attempted to optimize the “use of talents” through enforcing strict selection criteria, balancing supplies and demands, and managing the exchange of positions. Moreover, the PPWS worked to improve the material benefits of the officers to prevent loss of talents and to enhance supervision of the cadre corps against unethical behavior such as corruption.47 These measures were clearly intended to serve the institutional interests of the PLA and improve the cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of the PLA.

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Finally, the PPWS particularly stressed the role of political work in preparations for the “military struggle.” It introduced political education programs aimed at boosting morale and motivating initiatives in military training centered on science and technology (科技练兵). It war-gamed political work scenarios in different types of contingencies in “local war under high-tech conditions,” from streamlining the decision structure and processes, selecting and appointing competent personnel to constitute operational command and control, to conducting psychological and propaganda warfare in both defense and offense.48 These initiatives clearly served to enhance the combat effectiveness of the PLA. PPWS under Hu Jintao (2004–2012) With minor differences, Hu’s definition of the functions of the PPWS was largely consistent with Jiang’s. For Hu, the “major contradictions” to be resolved in military work included the “two incompatibilities” (“两个不适 应”), or the incompatibilities between “low level of military modernization” and the “the requirement of fighting and winning local war under informatized conditions” and between the “current military capabilities” and the “requirement of fulfilling the new historic missions of our army at the new stage of the new era.” Hu assigned four “new historic missions” to the PLA to fulfill, including (1) serving as a force guarantee for the party to consolidate its governance position, (2) providing a security guarantee for the window of strategic opportunities for national development, (3) offering strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and (4) playing an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.49 The first mission is normative since no critical domestic threats to the party’s governance position existed in the Hu era that warranted the mobilization of the PLA to handle. The other three missions are largely consistent with the post-Deng military policy to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Under Hu’s leadership, the PPWS was largely tasked to serve military modernization by reducing the “two incompatibilities” and to help fulfill the “new historic missions” of the PLA. A new edition of Political Work Regulations, for instance, was issued in 2010 under Hu’s auspices. Besides the normative requirement of the PPWS to guarantee the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA, the Regulations reiterated the central role of the PPWS as facilitating “guarantees and services” for military

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modernization, regularization, and reform; for “scientific development” of the national defense and the military; for enhancing the internal and external unity of the PLA; and for fulfilling the “new historic missions” assigned to the PLA.  The Regulations also reiterated the notion that “political work is an important factor that constitutes combat effectiveness” and included in it the concept of “three war-fares.”50 Similar to the era of Jiang, the PPWS conducted extensive political education in the PLA to cultivate what Hu calls the “combat spirit” (“战斗精 神”). The PPWS also made extensive preparations for the “military struggle” by applying political work to military training and exercises. Moreover, the PPWS implemented a “strategic talent project” (“战略人才工程”) that stressed cultivation and selection of “new-type talents” capable of commanding joint operations, handling well information technology, managing informatization construction, and operating and maintaining new weapons and equipment. In line with Hu’s call for developing a “harmonious society with a humanistic orientation” (“以人为本的和谐社会”), the PPWS also strove to enhance the internal cohesiveness of the PLA. The PPWS, for instance, offered psychological counseling and material incentives to resolve the practical issues of officers and men, provided legal help to defend the interests of the PLA organizations and individuals, and improved the working and living conditions of the basic-level units.51 Under Hu’s leadership, the PPWS largely functioned as an institution of “objective control” by enhancing the internal unity and combat effectiveness of the PLA.

PPWS as an Institution of “Objective Control” of the PLA under Xi Jinping Like Jiang and Hu, Xi has required the PLA to treat preparation for “fighting and winning war” as its “central task.” A major function of the PPWS thus is to facilitate “guarantees and services” for this central task. A major change made by Xi to the PPWS, however, concerns the role of the PPWS to supervise the PLA for political loyalty and discipline. Xi’s ongoing counter-corruption drive in the PLA, for instance, reveals the ineffectiveness of the PPWS as a supervisory agency to monitor disciplinary issues such as military corruption. As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 of Chap. 4 show, there are as many political officers investigated and prosecuted for corruption as non-political officers. This development led to a rethinking of the

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supervisory role of the PPWS.  This rethinking undergirds a decision to separate the agencies dedicated to supervision, such as the discipline inspection and the judiciary authorities of the PLA, from the traditional PPWS to constitute separate chains of command. As a result, the traditional PPWS has become a more “internalized” performing agency that focuses on enhancing the cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of the PLA. PPWS “Internalized” The conventional wisdom is that the PPWS is externally imposed on the PLA by the civilian party authorities to supervise the PLA for political loyalty and discipline and reports back to the civilian party authorities. But as noted elsewhere in this study, as the PLA officers have been indoctrinated with the values of the party and socialized into the party membership over time, the supervisory role of the PPWS on behalf of the civilian party authorities has declined. The PPWS thus has largely been regarded as an “internalized” performing and administrative agency rather than an “externally” imposed supervisory agency. There are major institutional and bureaucratic rationales for this development, particularly in the post-­ Deng era. The PPWS of each level of the PLA hierarchy, for instance, reports to the commanding officers of the unit at that level and receives “functional guidance” from the PPWS at the next higher level in the PLA. As a result, the PPWS has no authority relationship with any external civilian party authorities and does not report to any such authorities. As discussed in Chap. 5, however, commanding officers of the provincial military districts (MD), prefectural military sub-districts, and county-level people’s arms departments, including political commissars, do serve as members of the provincial and local civilian party committee standing committees. But such membership represents inter-agency coordination relationship to handle national defense mobilization issues; it does not reflect the authority relationship between the superiors and subordinates. Commanding officers of the PLA provincial MD system, including political commissars, report to the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department (CMCNDMD), which makes critical decisions about the career advancement of these officers and the financial needs of these provincial and local military authorities. Civilian party secretaries at the provincial and local levels thus have no authority over these issues. For this reason, the

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interactions between the civilian party secretaries and the PLA officers at the provincial and local levels, including political commissars, are limited and nominal. Similarly, political officers are selected and recruited from within the PLA organizations but not from the civilian party organizations. As a result, political officers are subject to the incentive structure of the PLA, including its bureaucratic grades, military ranks, and pay scales. To enhance their promotion prospects in the PLA, political officers are more likely to collude with the commanders of the units that they co-command by reporting good performance to their superiors and covering up deviations and failures.52 As an internal constituency of the PLA, the PPWS cannot be expected to behave as an effective supervisory agency. For a supervisory agency to be effective, according to organizational theory, it must be external to and independent from the performing agency it is tasked to supervise. The supervisory agency, for instance, should offer a career path with an incentive structure that is separate from that of the performing agency, and promote officials for their dedication to detect and report deviations and failures of the performing agency they supervise. “Officials who are extremely aggressive about detecting and reporting deviations can expect to win promotion in a monitoring (supervisory) agency. But in a bureau also responsible for producing outputs, excellent performance must take promotional precedence over zeal in reporting deviations. … Thus, surveillance bureaus that are not staffed by personnel with separate career paths are usually half-hearted about detecting and reporting behavior considered undesirable by top officials.”53 The PLA’s own critical assessment following the corruption scandal that involved both former CMC Vice-Chair Xu Caihou, the highest PLA political officer, and the GPD in selling offices, for instance, illustrates this point. This assessment treats the GPD as an internalized performing agency, or a “player” (“运动员”) that handled major personnel appointment and promotion for the PLA. A major reason for the implication of the GPD in the corruption scandal is that the supervisory agencies of the PLA such as the PLA Discipline Inspection Commission and Department, or the “referees” (“裁判员”), were subordinate organizations within the GPD.  Because of their internalized and subordinate status, the supervisory role of these agencies was compromised. To prevent future corruption, according to this assessment, the “referees” must be separated and

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independent from the “players” and given more authority in order for the “players” to be effectively supervised by the “referees.”54 The PPWS is usually described as “an important institutional guarantee to implement and realize the party’s theory, line, guideline, and policy in the military” (“是党的理论, 路线, 方针, 政策在全军得以贯彻落实的重要 制度保证”). When this description is true, PLA officers and departments responsible for military operations, logistics support, and armament development are also required to implement and realize the party’s theory, line, guideline, and policy in the military. These officers also constitute the majority of the party committee membership of any unit of the PLA. As a result, the majority of the decisions made by the party committees of major PLA units and organizations concern military, logistics, and armament works, but not party and political work. The ongoing counter-corruption drive in the PLA also reveals that political officers and departments are neither more communistic and loyal to the party nor less corruptible than non-political officers and departments. On the contrary, political departments are regarded as equally prone to corruption as the logistics and armament departments, the three functional departments that handle officer appointment and promotion, military real estate and finance, and defense contracts, respectively. PLA corruption, for instance, involves mostly the functional jurisdictions of these three departments, including profiteering from selling offices, selling or leasing military land and properties, embezzling official budget, and outsourcing defense contracts.55 The “internalized” nature of the PPWS can also be demonstrated by the major institutional changes that Xi has introduced. Establishing a Separate “Immune System” When the PLA analysts continue to describe the PPWS as a “central system” (“中枢系统”) to sustain the narrative of the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA, they also understand its limits for such a role. By paraphrasing Xi, they argue that to ensure clarity of “political rules and disciplines” (“政治规矩”) and to “develop institutional checks on power” (“把权力关进制度的笼子”), a separate “immune system” (“免疫系统”) consisting of “discipline inspection, inspection tours, financial audit, and judiciary” (“纪检, 巡视, 审计, 司法”) is needed. Such a new system should “become the basic system for the party’s absolute leadership of the military” (“成为党对军队绝对领导的基本制度”).56

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A major goal of the PLA restructuring that began in late 2015 is to establish such an “immune system.” To enhance the “independence” (“独 立性”) of this system, for instance, supervisory agencies responsible for discipline inspection, criminal investigation, prosecution, and court were separated from the CMC Political Work Department (CMCPWD), the successor to the GPD. As early as in 2014, the PLA Audit Office was also separated from the General Logistics Department (GLD) of the PLA. To enhance the “authority” (“权威性”) of this system, these agencies were elevated to the level of the CMC to form a CMC Discipline Inspection Commission (CMCDIC), a CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CMCPLAC) that runs criminal investigation, prosecution, and courts in the PLA, and a CMC Audit Office (CMCAO). They constitute three separate chains of command that report directly to the CMC leadership. In the meantime, the CMCDIC also reports to the CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC).57 The “separateness” and “independence” of this system are further manifested in how the new system functions. The CMCDIC, for instance, “dispatches and stations” discipline inspection groups to major PLA organizations, including major CMC organizations and PLA service and theater headquarters, on a permanent basis. Major officers and organizations they supervise include secretaries and deputy secretaries of major military party committees, commanding officers at and above the division-leader grade, and departments “where power, resources, and finance are highly concentrated.”58 Being external to the officers and organizations they are tasked to supervise and reporting directly to the CMCDIC, the effectiveness of these discipline inspection groups is likely to be substantially improved. Similarly, the CMCAO follows the practice of “comprehensively dispatching and stationing audit teams” (“全部实行派驻审计”) to major PLA organizations on a permanent basis, without interference from the organizations to be audited. Major areas that the CMCAO audits include defense budget management, weapons and equipment procurement, spending on national defense capital construction projects, and financial accountability of major commanding officers.59 Finally, military courts and procuratorates were separated from the central, service-level, and theater-­ level political work departments. They were reorganized on a geographical basis to “ensure their independent and just exercise of judiciary power according to law.” They include the PLA Court and the PLA Procuratorate in Beijing, seven intermediate courts and procuratorates that parallel major

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CMC organizations and the PLA service and theater headquarters, and 26 basic courts and procuratorates deployed in China’s major cities.60 The introduction of a separate “immune system” to supervise the PLA performing organizations, including the traditional PPWS, has clearly “internalized” the PPWS further into the PLA. Enhancing Combat Effectiveness Even though the PPWS is largely regarded as a performing and administrative agency, it developed what Xi Jinping calls a bureaucratic tendency toward being “divorced from the central warfighting role of the PLA” and indulged in “self-design, self-circulation, and self-examination” (“偏离中 心, 自我设计, 自我循环, 自我检验”),61 an alleged cause of military corruption. To tackle this issue, Xi instructed that “the criterion of combat effectiveness should be implemented in all aspects of military party construction” (“把战斗力标准贯彻到军队党的建设各个方面”). The GPD thus issued “Opinions on Implementing and Realizing the Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Party Committee Leadership Work” in 2015,62 requiring the PPWS to make changes to become more integrated with the central warfighting role of the PLA. First, the party committee-style decision-making based on consultations and discussions among nominally equal members needs to be qualified. In comparison with the civilian party committee, for instance, “military party committee should be less democratic” (“军队党组织的民 主要少于地方党组织”) because “the military is a highly unified and centralized armed group and military commanders must have the credible authority to issue orders for others to obey” (“军队是高度集中统一的武 装集团, 军事指挥官必须具有使人言听计从的威信”). Commander and PC are particularly required to play the leading role in setting the agenda and developing the preliminary plans before the party committee meets and in guiding meeting discussions.63 Moreover, in times of crisis and war, the general principle of “leadership of operations by party committee” (“党委领导作战”) should not be confused with and equated to the specific concept of “commanding operations” (“指挥作战”). To exercise the general leadership of military operations, party committee may hold meetings to discuss the operational missions of the unit, analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, assess battlefield posture, and formulate operational plan. Party committee, however, is not allowed to interfere in the authority to tackle

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the specific issues of commanding operations (作战指挥具体问题), including modifying the operational plan of the party committee, making independent decisions under special and emergency circumstances, making local adjustments to military deployment, and making decisions on personnel appointments to maintain stability of command and control of operations. For these issues, the authority is fully delegated (充分授权) to the unit commander. “Delegating to commander the authority to command operations according to circumstances,” however, does not violate the principle of “leadership of operations by party committee.” It is one form of such leadership because “the commander is a party member and the authority is delegated to him by the party. He represents the party committee to command operations and is required to report back to the party committee afterwards, which reflects his accountability to the party committee.”64 Furthermore, military party committee is required to regard “combat effectiveness construction” as its basic task and primary responsibility (把 抓战斗力建设作为党委的基本任务主要职责) in times of peace. This means that the agenda for military party committee deliberation should shift its emphasis from routinized military administration to military training (议训), to improving the ability of the committee members to command operations (增强指挥打仗的能力), and to enhancing the unity among committee members in order to reach quick consensus in times of war (战时快速达成一致意见). For deliberation on other issues, the fundamental criterion to judge their merits is whether they serve to enhance the combat effectiveness of the unit.65 The “criterion of combat effectiveness” should also be applied to the functional areas of the PPWS such as personnel management, mass work, and party construction. For personnel management, the central criterion for officer appointment and promotion is the ability and skill sets of the appointees to fight and win war. Such criterion is also applied to officer training and education. Similarly, cadre and mass work departments of the PPWS are tasked jointly to promote national defense education among the citizens; to resolve the practical issues such as reuniting officers with their families, finding spouses for the unmarried officers, and finding jobs for the decommissioned officers; and to improve the material benefits and safeguard the legal rights and interests of the military personnel. These tasks aim to enhance the social status and attractiveness of the military profession.66

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Table 2.1  Six performance categories of military party construction work for examination and evaluationa Performance categories Contents Unit combat effectiveness

Political conviction and fighting spirit of officers and men, war preparedness, rigor of military training, unit readiness, battlefield and armament construction, and comprehensive support capabilities

Ability of party committee to command operations

Knowledge of military theory and doctrine, strategizing and managerial abilities for commanding operations, knowledge of new armament, and job training (岗位练兵)

Deliberation of party Overall planning ability (统筹规划能力) of secretary and deputy committee on military secretary of party committee, evidence of investigating and training studying issues and cases by committee members (党委成员调研 课题), and evidence of meeting discussions Effectiveness of party committee leadership

Party committee unity and cohesiveness, and overall planning, decision, and execution abilities

Model role of party member

Ideological conviction, fighting spirit, professional qualifications, motivating and leading role, and work style

Cadre corps construction

Professional qualifications, organizing and commanding abilities, psychological resilience, strategic thinking ability, appropriate qualifications and skills for specific positions, and diversified service backgrounds

a Senior Colonel Chen Fei and Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Entao, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction” [“军队党的建设贯彻战斗力标准研究”], China Military Science, No. 4 (July 2016)

For party construction, a system of examining and evaluating military party construction work (军队党建工作考核评估体系) that reflects the criterion of combat effectiveness is established. Table 2.1 shows that such a system covers six performance categories for examination and evaluation. To ensure the fairness of the examination and evaluation, a relatively independent and authoritative organization is needed. This role thus is delegated to the discipline inspection chain of command to utilize the existing organizations and manpower.67 Similarly, the critical criterion for determining the effectiveness of the PLA’s supervisory system, including the PLA discipline inspection, audit, and judiciary authorities, is whether this system can enhance the combat effectiveness of the PLA.68 To further integrate political officers into the military chain of command, the GPD issued “Opinions on Handling Well the Work of Exchanging Positions among Basic-Level Military and Political Commanding Officers to

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Gain Experiences” (“关于做好基层军政主官换岗锻炼工作的意见”) in 2015, following the pilot projects that had been conducted in a group army since early 2014. This directive requires the company-level political commanding officers to be exchanged or promoted to military commanding positions after serving in the current position for two years, and vice versa for the same-level military commanding officers. Similar exchange of positions is also required of the battalion-­level commanding officers who have not gained both the military and political commanding experiences. All commanding officers should possess the military and political commanding experiences when they are promoted to the full battalion commanding officer positions.69 This policy may have also been applied to higher levels, as several political officers were recently appointed to the position of deputy commander of the military sub-district, a division command-level organization.70 Integrating political officers into the military chain of command helps to prevent the PPWS from being divorced from the central warfighting role of the PLA. It also helps political officers to gain military command experience, which can enhance their prestige and legitimacy as commanding officers.71 Moreover, such a policy expands the channels for the upward career mobility of political officers. The career track that political officers are traditionally confined to has allegedly become narrower over time. Since 1985, for instance, “several rounds of PLA downsizing and reorganization had targeted political departments and officers.” Some newly established forces, including the new-type operations forces, “did not have the institutional arrangements of political commissar positions or political departments” (“没有编配政治委员或政治机关”).72 Lower-level units also do not have deputy political commanding officer positions and political departments. Therefore, the upward career mobility of political officers can be remarkably improved if they can be exchanged and promoted to military commanding and staff positions.

Conclusion This chapter examines the evolution of the functions of the PPWS over time. The PPWS served primarily as an institution of “subjective control” by mobilizing the PLA into party politics in the Mao era. This mobilization severely fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA and aggravated the party-army symbiosis-based factionalism. In the Deng era, however, the PPWS attempted to make the transition to becoming an

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institution of “objective control” of the PLA, but it was inevitably involved in domestic politics because of the inertia and legacy of the Cultural Revolution, and because of the massive intervention of the PLA to quell a popular rebellion in 1989. The PPWS has largely functioned as an institution of “objective control” in the post-Deng era. Even though there are nuanced variations in defining the functions of the PPWS by Jiang, Hu, and Xi, it has largely been internalized into the PLA and functioned to enhance its organizational cohesiveness, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions. This development has contributed greatly to the quasi-institutionalization of party-army relations in China. Major Challenges The PPWS is also faced with major challenges in the post-Deng era. The implication of the PPWS in military corruption scandals and Xi’s decision to divest the discipline inspection and judiciary authorities from the traditional PPWS have undermined the power and prestige of the PPWS. Budgetary and manpower constraints may also reduce the justification for maintaining a sizable PPWS that uses a substantial proportion of the increasingly scarce military resources. These constraints stem from the PLA’s preference for capital-intensive and technology-intensive weapons systems and higher operational costs. The policy to integrate political officers into the military chain of command, which may help to streamline the PPWS, may reflect this concern. A similar and new development is that with “deepening of military reform,” political commanding officer positions for combat support units at the basic level are institutionally abolished.73 Finally, the requirement for quick response in “informatized war” raises critical questions about the effectiveness of the party committee-­ style decision processes. On the other hand, it is politically correct to keep the PPWS in the PLA to justify the narrative that the PLA is under the “absolute leadership of the party.” This narrative is particularly reflected in the PPWS propaganda that there are alien, hostile forces attempting to “westernize’ and “divide” the PLA, or to undermine the “party’s absolute leadership” of the PLA by spreading the “erroneous views” that the PLA should be “departized” and “statized.” Indeed, how to optimally mitigate the contradiction between these two opposing pulls regarding the PPWS may present a major challenge to China’s top leadership.

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Finally, establishing a separate and highly authoritative supervisory or “immune system” that reports directly to the CMC leadership may improve the effectiveness of this system in supervising the PLA for political loyalty and discipline. This effectiveness, however, may be compromised as long as this system remains within the PLA. Like its predecessor the PPWS, subject to the incentive structure of the PLA, this “immune system” may also be motivated to become “half-hearted” in detecting deviations and failures of the PLA over time. How to effectively monitor and control this “immune system” constitutes another major challenge to China’s top leadership.

Notes 1. Qi Chunyuan, et  al. (eds.), Working Rules for Military Party Committee [军队党委工作规范] (Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2015), Chapter 1. Blue Sky Press is a publisher of the PLAAF. 2. Ibid. 3. Military History Studies Department of AMS, Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, pp. 46–47. 4. John Gittings, “Military Control and Leadership, 1949–1964,” China Quarterly, No. 26 (April–June 1966), p. 92. 5. Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, p. 112. 6. For the declining role of supervision and rising importance of the role of education and propaganda for political commissars, see ibid., p. 101. 7. For the two incidents, see Military History Studies Department of AMS, Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, pp.  114–119, 126–130. 8. Ibid., pp. 446–447. 9. For detailed discussions, see Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, Chapter 7, Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 13, 20–24, 27–28, 34–42, 44–45, and Harlan W.  Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 48–51. PLA publications also treat the period between 1954 and 1957 as the “best time of regularization and modernization” of the PLA. See Military History Studies Department of AMS, Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, pp.  446–467, and Li Dianren, et  al. (eds.), Focusing on Major Events of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中国人民 解放军大事聚焦] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2002), pp. 379–388. 10. See Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 265–274.

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11. Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of National Defense University (NDU) (ed.), Political Work History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Socialist Period [中国 人民解放军政治工作史: 社会主义时期] (Beijing: NDU Press, 1989), pp. 45–52, 72–76, 87–92. 12. Ibid., pp. 102–103, 110. 13. Ibid., pp. 111–112, 116–117. 14. For the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the PLA, see ibid., pp.  123–125, 141–142. 15. See ibid., pp. 139–140. 16. See Yao Lianrei, “An Unnecessary Mistake – the Origins and End of AntiDogmatism Campaign” [“一个不应有的错误  – 反教条主义始末”], in Military History Studies Department of AMS (ed.), Colors Are Fluttering-­ Factual Accounts of Major Military Events in 50 Years of New China [军旗 飘飘-­新中国50年军事大事述实] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1999), pp. 218–232. 17. Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 142–145. 18. See ibid., and Yao, “An Unnecessary Mistake.” 19. Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 146–147. 20. Ibid., pp. 148–150. 21. Ibid., pp. 165–167. 22. Ibid., pp. 233–235. 23. Military History Studies Department of AMS, Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, p. 53. 24. For Luo’s refusal, see Liu Zhijian, “Before and after Release of the ‘Summary of the Symposium on Army’s Literature and Arts Work’” [“‘部 队文艺工作座谈会纪要’ 产生前后”], in CCP Central Party History Data Research Office (ed.), CCP History Data No. 30 [中共党史资料第三十期] (Beijing: CCP History Data Press, 1989). Liu was a deputy director of the GPD who was responsible for cultural and propaganda work of the PLA at the time. 25. Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, p. 258. 26. The group was headed by Liu Zhijian, a deputy director of the GPD, who was removed from the position shortly afterward. See ibid., pp. 261–262. In the Cultural Revolution, many political officers did attempt to maintain the institutional boundaries by limiting the scope of the Cultural Revolution within the PLA. However, most of them were attacked as the “loyalists” for such behavior and removed from office as a result.

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27. Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 240–246. 28. Ibid., p. 247. 29. Ibid., p. 248. 30. Ibid., pp. 276–277. 31. Ibid., p. 384. 32. See Jiang Siyi, “Thoroughly Refuting ‘Giving Prominence to Politics’ and Carrying out well Reform of Political Work” [“彻底否定‘突出政治’搞好政 治工作改革”], in Military Political Work Studies Institute of AMS (ed.), Study of Military Political Work in the New Era [新时期军队政治工作研 究] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1987). Jiang served as a vice president of AMS. 33. Yu Qiuli, “Several Issues Regarding Military Political Work in the New Era” [“关于新时期军队政治工作的几个问题”], in Study of Military Political Work in the New Era. Yu served as director of the GPD from 1982 to 1987. 34. Ibid. See also Liberation Army Daily Editorial Department, “Guarantees, Services, and Reforms – A Discussion of the Guiding Thought in Rectifying Political Work” [“保证, 服务, 改革 – 谈谈端正政治工作的指导思想”], in Study of Military Political Work in the New Era. 35. See Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 384–386. 36. Ibid., pp. 434–441. 37. Ibid., pp. 456–457. 38. Ibid., pp.  459–464. See also Zhang Zhenbo, “Basic Tasks and Primary Contents of Political Work in Military Training” [“军事训练中政治工作的 基本任务和主要内容”], in Study of Military Political Work in the New Era. 39. See Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 445–450. 40. See Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 169–179. For the rectification campaign, see Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 474–485. 41. See Wang Hong, “Making an Effort to Resolve the Two Historical Issues – Study of Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Military Construction” [“着力解决好两个历史性课题 – 学习江泽民国防和军队建 设思想”], People’s Daily [人民日报], August 2, 2004. 42. See Political Work Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中 国人民解放军政治工作条例] (1991, 1995, and 2003). 43. See Cheng Baoshan, et  al. (eds.), The Fundamental Statute of Military Political Work at the New Stage of New Century [新世纪新阶段军队政治工 作的根本法规] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2004), pp. 8, 10–11.

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44. See Qiu Keren, et  al. (eds.), Innovations and Development of Military Political Work in the New Century [新世纪军队政治工作的创新与发展] (Beijing: NDU Press, 2002), pp. 41, 70–75, 168–171. 45. Ibid., pp. 177–178, 202–203. 46. Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4. 47. Ibid., Chapter 8. For personnel management, see also Nan Li, “Educating ‘New-Type Military Talent’: The PLA’s Command Colleges,” in Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen (eds.), The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s 80-Year Old Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008). 48. See Qiu, et al., Innovations and Development of Military Political Work in the New Era, Chapter 7. 49. Political Work Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (2010). 50. Ibid. 51. See Li Jinai, “Studying Chairman Hu Jintao’s Important Expositions on Military Ideological and Political Work Construction” [“学习胡锦涛主席 关于军队思想政治建设的重要论述”], Liberation Army Daily [解放军报], November 2, 2012, Wang Jianwei, “Striving to Raise the Scientific Level of Military Ideological and Political Work Construction” [“着力提高军队 思想政治建设科学化水平”], in Study of Military Political Work Theory [军 队政工理论研究], No. 6 (June 2011), and Yin Fanglong, “Striving to Enhance the Scientific Nature of Ideological and Political Work” [“着力增 强思想政治工作的科学性”], People’s Daily, November 3, 2010. Li was director of the GPD from 2004 to 2012. Wang is a former political commissar of National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, and Yin is a former director of the Political Department of Second Artillery, which was renamed as PLARF in 2016. 52. See Nan Li, “Changing Functions of the Party and Political Work System in the PLA and Civil-Military Relations in China,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1993). 53. See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 149. 54. See General Wu Changde, “Adapting to the New System Actively and Performing New Duties Effectively” [“积极适应新体制, 有效履行新职 能”], China Military Science, No. 1 (January 2016). Wu is a deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department. 55. Conversations with senior PLA officials in Beijing in August 2016. 56. See Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS, “On Innovations of Ways to Realize the Party’s Absolute Leadership of the Military” [“论创新 党对军队绝对领导的实现方式”], China Military Science (中国军事科学), No. 2 (March 2016), and Major General Ren Tianyou, “An Exploration of a Number of Mechanisms for Deepening National Defense and Military

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Reforms” [“深化国防和军队改革若干机理探析”], China Military Science, No. 3 (May 2016). Ren is director of Strategy Teaching and Research Department of NDU in Beijing. 57. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 58. “One Year Anniversary Review of the CMCDIC Work to Dispatch and Station Discipline Inspection Groups” [“中央军委纪委派驻纪检组进驻开 展工作一周年述评”], Xinhuanet, May 20, 2017. 59. “Observation on Military Reform” [“军改观察”], Ta Kung Pao [大公报] (Hong Kong), December 2, 2015. 60. “Military Courts and Procuratorates Have Been Adjusted, Reorganized, and Functioning” [军事法院, 检察院已调整组建运行”], The Paper [澎湃 新闻], July 8, 2016. 61. Xi cited in Yang Jun and Chen Hao, “A Study of Xi Jinping Thought on Combat Effectiveness Construction” [“习近平战斗力建设思想研究”], China Military Science, No. 5 (September 2016). See also Major General Wang Xinsheng, Lieutenant Colonel Hang Jinqiang, and Colonel Qiao Xiang, “On the Question of Re-establishing the Prestige of the Political Work of Our Military” [“论重新树立我军政治工作威信问题”], China Military Science, No. 1 (January 2016). Yang is a professor at Military Political College in Nanjing and Chen is a graduate student of the same college. Wang, Hang, and Qiao are researchers at Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS in Beijing. 62. For Xi’s instruction, see Senior Colonel Chen Fei and Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Entao, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction” [“军队党的建设贯彻战斗力标准研究”], China Military Science, No. 4 (July 2016). For Xi’s emphasis on enhancing combat effectiveness as the sole, fundamental criterion for evaluating military political work, see also “Gutian Conference Shines Forever, Xi Jinping Formulates Political Strategy for Army Construction in the New Era” [“古 田会议永放光芒, 习近平擘画新时代政治建军方略”], China Central Television News [中央电视新闻], December 29, 2019. For GPD directive, see “GPD Issues ‘Opinions on Implementing and Realizing the Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Party Committee Leadership Work’” [“总政治 部印发‘关于在党委领导工作中贯彻落实战斗力标准的意见’”], Liberation Army Daily, April 3, 2015. Chen is director of Scientific Research Department of Military Political College in Nanjing, and Zhang is director of propaganda in the Political Work Department of PLA Unit 73091. 63. Chen and Zhang, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction.” 64. Ibid., and Major Xie Hao and Lieutenant Colonel Liu Peng, “Strengthening Party Leadership and Party Construction in Joint Operations” [“加强联合

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作战中党的领导和党的建设”], China Military Science, No. 3 (2019). Both Xie and Liu are lecturers at Political College of NDU in Beijing. 65. Chen and Zhang, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction.” For major examples of how party committees of major PLA units function to enhance the combat effectiveness of their units, see “Functioning as Enhancer and Multiplier of Combat Effectiveness Construction” [“做战斗力建设的增强剂和功放 器”], Liberation Army Daily, July 16, 2018. 66. See Chen and Zhang, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction,” and Wang, et al., “On the Question of Rebuilding the Prestige of Political Work of Our Military.” 67. See Chen and Zhang, “A Study of Implementing Criterion of Combat Effectiveness in Military Party Construction.” 68. See He Xinbo, “Focusing on War Preparation and War Fighting and Strengthening Discipline Inspection and Supervision” [“聚焦备战打仗强 化纪检监察”], Liberation Army Daily, May 15, 2019. 69. “Exchanging Positions: Crossing the Military-Political Boundaries” [“换 岗: 跨越军政‘楚河汉界’”], Liberation Army Daily, March 22, 2017. See also Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS, “On Innovations of Ways to Realize the Party’s Absolute Leadership of the Military.” 70. See “Dezhou Military Sub-District Holds General Meeting to Announce Orders of CMCNDMD” [“德州军分区举行宣布中央军委国防动员部命 令大会”], The Paper, June 26, 2017, and “Hechi Military Sub-District Holds General Meeting to Announce Orders of CMCNDMD” [“河池军 分区举行宣布中央军委国防动员部命令大会”], The Paper, June 26, 2017. 71. See Wang, et al., “On the Question of Rebuilding the Prestige of Political Work of Our Military.” 72. See Military Political Work Studies Center of AMS, “On Innovations of Ways to Realize the Party’s Absolute Leadership of the Military.” 73. See “How to Construct a Party Branch without the Political Director” [“没有指导员, 支部该咋建”]? Liberation Army Daily, November 19, 2018.

CHAPTER 3

The PLA and Intra-CCP Leadership Power Struggle in the Eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping

Besides the evolving functions of the PPWS, another major analytical venue or indicator to determine the degree of party-army symbiosis or quasi-institutionalization is the extent of the PLA involvement in intra-­ CCP leadership power struggle. This and next chapters compare major cases of power struggle between the eras of Mao and Deng and the post-­ Deng era to determine the extent of the PLA involvement in them. If this involvement is extensive and significant, or military force is mobilized into the struggle and a substantial number of PLA officers are persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques,” party-army symbiosis is high. But if intra-party leadership power struggle becomes rare for lack of severe political division among China’s civilian ruling elite, the PLA involvement in intra-CCP leadership politics becomes rare, and few senior PLA officers are persecuted for “anti-party” crimes, quasi-institutionalization obtains. The analysis in this chapter is confined to critical cases of power struggle among the symbiotic political-military factions of China’s ruling elites. These cases result in extensive political purges in terms of the “anti-party cliques” (“反党集团”). The PLA’s extensive involvement in domestic politics at the societal level, such as in the policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries” during the Cultural Revolution, is not intensively examined. Such involvement took place at lower levels and its primary goal was to restore social order rather than to participate in the power struggle among China’s ruling elites.

© The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_3

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The PLA and Intra-CCP Leadership Power Struggle in the Mao Era The first post-1949 intra-CCP leadership power struggle erupted in 1953, between Gao Gang and Rao Shushi on the one hand, and Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai on the other. Gao, who chaired the State Planning Commission, and Rao, who headed the CCP Organization Department, colluded in their criticism of Liu’ land reform policy and Zhou’s economic policy. Mao took the side of Liu, the then vice president of the Central Government, and Zhou, the premier of the State Council, and criticized Gao and Rao for forging an “anti-party alliance” to “split” the party leadership. Both were removed from office at the 4th Plenum of the 7th Central Party Committee held in February 1954. Gao committed suicide in August 1954 and Rao was arrested in 1955.1 Because the disagreement was over economic policies, it was not elevated to the level of “class struggle” or “struggle between the opposing lines” among the party leadership. Gao and Rao thus were not regarded as the “bourgeois representatives” attacking the party, and as a result the struggle was not militarized. Gittings, for instance, observes that even though the two leaders were accused of “splitting” the party and even trying to “enlist army support,” those who were implicated were a few party officials in northeast China, where Gao had served as the party leader until late 1952, and very few from the army units in that region. None of the PLA officers from the 3rd Field Army in East China, where Rao had served as the party leader and political commissar of that field army until early 1953, were implicated. These observations led Gittings to conclude that “the army played no significant or identifiable part in the Gao-Rao case.”2 For the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, those who were labeled as the “rightists” were mostly intellectuals but not party officials. The campaign thus cannot be counted as an intra-CCP leadership power struggle. Ironically, Deng Xiaoping was one of the senior party leaders who actively promoted and implemented the campaign. Morever, the Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958 cannot be counted as an intra-CCP leadership power struggle, since it was an intra-PLA leadership struggle that did not involve senior party officials. Ironically, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai played a critical role in promoting and implementing the campaign. The Anti-­ Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959 was a more serious matter, because

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the Peng Dehuai-led “anti-party clique” allegedly included senior military, party, and government officials and resembled a symbiotic political-­ military faction. Besides the PLA leaders such as Peng and Huang Kecheng, for instance, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and Party Secretary of Hunan Province Zhou Xiaozhou were major members of this “anti-party clique.” But in spite of Mao’s rising concern about “bourgeois representatives” hidden in the party, the government, and the PLA, the Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958 and the Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959 were still defined as aiming to resolve the “contradictions among the people,” but not yet the “antagonistic contradictions” or those between antagonistic classes and opposing lines. Therefore, instead of the zero-sum game where “winner takes all,” these campaigns were treated as variable-­ sum games where “there are gains for losers.” Even though these campaigns produced a substantial number of political victims, sanctions against them were relatively benign and the struggle was not militarized. Senior officers who were implicated in the Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958 such as Liu Bocheng, Xiao Ke, Su Yu, and Li Da were removed from the critically important leadership positions. But Liu remained as a member of the CMC and Xiao stayed as a member of the National Defense Council. Su was transferred to serve as a vice defense minister and Li became a vice minister of the State Physical Culture Commission.3 For the Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959, major members of the “Peng, Huang, Zhang, Zhou Anti-Party Clique” were removed from the critically important military, party, and government leadership positions. But they were allowed to keep their membership in the CCP Politburo and Central Committee. Peng had been given the responsibility to manage the transfer of China’s defense industry to the hinterland provinces till the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Tan Zheng was demoted but he still served as a deputy director of GPD. In 1962, these who were labeled as the “center-right opportunists” in the 1959 campaign were also rehabilitated.4 It was not until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 that campaigns were radicalized and power struggle was waged in terms of the “contradictions between the antagonistic classes and opposing lines.” As a result, such struggle became militarized to the extent that military force was mobilized and a large number of military officers were persecuted for “anti-party” crimes.

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“Peng, Luo, Lu, Yang Anti-Party Clique” As noted elsewhere in this study, at an expanded Politburo conference held in May 1966, Mao accused Peng Zhen, Luo Reiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun for organizing an “anti-party clique” that conspired to undermine and block his intention of launching the Cultural Revolution. The clique, for instance, attempted to prevent publication of Yao Wenyuan’s article and restrict criticisms of the historical play “Hai Rai Dismissed from Office.” This clique thus was allegedly emblematic of a large number of “bourgeois representatives hidden in the party, government, and military organizations” to be exposed, criticized, and removed from the leadership positions. Because major members of this “anti-party clique” also held critically important positions, including Luo who served as the CMC secretary-general and chief of the PLA General Staff, Mao was particularly worried about a military coup that could be launched by the clique involving their followers and sympathizers in the PLA. Mao’s worry was exacerbated by an incident commonly known as the “February Coup” (“二月兵变”) that took place in early 1966. One PLA regiment of the Beijing MR was deployed from outside Beijing to the city in February 1966 to train militia and maintain social order. The unit set out to lease housing from the Peking University and People’s University but was declined. This incident was exploited by Kang Sheng, a radical leader closely associated with Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, to frame up Marshal He Long for collaborating with Luo Reiqing in an attempted coup to rescue Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen. A major commander of the pre-1949 1st Field Army and a CMC vice-chair, He Long had worked closely with Luo to run the PLA after Defense Minister and First CMC Vice-Chair Lin Biao took a long-term sick leave in 1963. The close relationship between He and Luo caused Lin’s suspicion that both wanted to “seize power” from him to control the PLA. Lin’s wife Ye Qun thus lodged a complaint to Mao against Luo in Hangzhou in November 1965, giving Mao another reason to remove Luo from office. He Long was later persecuted to death because of this incident.5 Mao’s worry about a “counter-revolutionary coup” was particularly manifested in a speech delivered by his “close comrade-in-arms” Lin Biao at a Politburo conference held on May 18. Lin discussed extensively about coups in Chinese history and in foreign countries in his speech.6 Even before this speech, major countermeasures were taken against a possible coup following the initial exposure of the “Peng, Luo, Lu, Yang

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Anti-­Party Clique” in late 1965. These countermeasures involved the transfer of military personnel and mobilization of military force to take control of the critically important positions and institutions in Beijing, some of which were previously held and ran by the civilians. As early as in November 1965, for instance, Yang Shangkun was removed as director of the CCP Central General Office. He was replaced by Wang Dongxing, a confidant of Mao who also headed the Central Guard Bureau, the PLA organization responsible for the security of the senior CCP leaders. The alleged followers of Yang Shangkun, including Deputy Directors of the CCP Central General Office Tian Jiaying and Zheng Shan, were also removed from office. A political department was established in the General Office to tighten control, which was headed by Wang Liangen, an active-duty PLA officer transferred from the Nanjing MR. Marshal Ye Jianying, a CMC vice-chair since January 1966, replaced Luo Reiqing as the CMC secretary-general, and General Yang Chengwu replaced Luo as acting chief of the PLA General Staff. Yang also became acting director of the CMC General Office following the removal of Xiao Xiangrong, an alleged follower of Luo, from that office. Lu Yang, a confidant of Yang Chengwu, became the first deputy director of the CMC General Office.7 Similarly, in October 1965, Ding Laifu, the political commissar of the PLA 63rd Corps stationed in Shanxi, was transferred to head the Central Broadcasting Administration (CBA) in Beijing, a government agency that ran broadcasting facilities in China and was previously led by civilian officials. In April 1966, Wang Shouren, the chief of staff of the 63rd Corps, was transferred to become the deputy head of CBA and was given charge of the security of CBA. Military force was also deployed to guard the broadcasting facilities, including those in Beijing that were once controlled by Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing.8 Military officers and force took control of the broadcasting facilities because Mao was worried that many coups in the Third World countries began with seizure of the radio stations to broadcast messages of the coup leaders. Furthermore, the PLA Beijing Garrison District (BGD) was reorganized, and Fu Chongbi and Huang Zuozhen, both confidants of Yang Chengwu, were appointed as its commander and political commissar. Before 1966, the BGD had no operational units under its command because the security of Beijing was not handled by the PLA. It instead was handled by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and its paramilitary Public Security Force (PSF, or 公安军) units, including the

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municipal-­level PSF units that reported to the Beijing municipal authorities headed by Peng Zhen.9 It is also important to note that Luo Ruiqing had served as the minister of public security from 1951 to 1959. Following Lin Biao’s speech against the coups, however, the BGD was drastically expanded. On May 27, the CMC ordered the transfer of the 189th Division of the 63rd Corps stationed in Shanxi to Beijing; this division was placed under the command of the BGD. On June 15, a CMC order was issued to transfer the 70th Division of the PLA 24th Corps stationed in Hebei to Beijing; this division was also placed under the command of the BGD.  In August, the PSF was dissolved and its 360,000 personnel were transferred to the PLA. The PSF units responsible for the security of Beijing were transferred to the jurisdiction of the BGD to constitute the First and Second Capital Garrison Divisions.10 Because of these changes, the BGD now had four PLA divisions, including two heavily armed infantry divisions, under its command. The reinforcement of the BGD reflected Mao’s concern about a coup that might be launched by Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing. Ironically, the reshuffle of the senior PLA officers and mobilization of the military force against a possible “counter-revolutionary coup” in Beijing led to the rising influence of Yang Chengwu, a major commander of the pre-1949 North China Field Army, also known as the 5th Field Army. It was no coincident that Fu Chongbi, Huang Zuozhen, Lu Yang, Ding Laifu, and Wang Shouren all had served under Yang before 1949, not just in the 5th Field Army, but specifically in the 63rd Corps of that field army, a unit where Yang had served as its first commander.11 The appointments of these officers to the critically important positions in Beijing, seemingly based on the factional or field army ties, amounted to what Mao called “mountaintopism.” These appointments caused alarm to both Mao and Lin Biao, which had contributed to the quick removal of this so-called North China Mountaintop (“华北山头”) faction, headed directly by Yang Chengwu but indirectly by Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the commander of the pre-1949 5th Field Army. Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Incident At a Politburo conference held in mid-February of 1967, a fierce debate broke out between a political-military coalition of moderate leaders on the one hand, and Jiang Qing and her radical allies from the Central Cultural Revolution Leadership Group (CCRLG, or 中央文革领导小组) on the

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other. The former included Marshals Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen and Vice Premiers Tan Zhenlin, Li Fuchun, and Li Xiannian; the latter included Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Zhang Chunqiao, and Xie Fuzhi. The coalition of the moderate leaders wanted to reduce the scope of the Cultural Revolution in the army to maintain PLA stability. Jiang and her allies, however, insisted on expanding the Cultural Revolution in the PLA and mobilizing lower levels to “seize power” from those “surrogates of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping line who wear uniform and hold guns.” The marshals and their civilian allies were subsequently criticized by Mao for attempting a “counter-revolutionary restoration.” They thus were sidelined or removed from office. This incident led to the paralysis of the Politburo. The CCRLG thus became the central decision-making body in Beijing. This incident is known as the “February Adverse Current” (“二月逆流”).12 By March, Yang Chengwu, acting chief of the PLA General Staff, was criticized for attempting to reverse the verdict of the “February Adverse Current.” Yang allegedly delivered important documents to the sidelined marshals for them to read, which was against Lin Biao’s instructions. At a CMC conference held on March 24, 1968, Lin accused Yang of conspiring with Yu Lijin, political commissar of the PLAAF, to “seize power” from Wu Faxian, commander of the PLAAF and a close ally of Lin. Lin also accused Yang for colluding with Fu Chongbi, commander of the BGD, to “seize power” from Xie Fuzhi. Xie served as the party chief of Beijing and political commissar of the Beijing MR at the time. Meanwhile, Jiang Qing accused Fu Chongbi of “illegally” entering the compound of the CCRLG with weapons and attempting to “seize power” from the CCRLG. These accusations led to the denunciation of the “Yang, Yu, Fu Anti-Party Factional Clique,” and their removal from office and arrest.13 The downfall of this “anti-party clique” led to major purges of those who were alleged followers of Yang, Yu, and Fu from lower levels. More important, Huang Yongsheng replaced Yang as chief of the PLA General Staff, and Wen Yucheng replaced Fu Chongbi as commander of the BGD. Both had served in the pre-1949 4th Field Army commanded by Lin Biao and were Lin’s close allies. The “February Adverse Current” and the “Yang, Yu, Fu Incident” also led to reorganization of the CMC. Since major members of the CMC such as the marshals were removed from office or sidelined as a result of the “adverse current,” the CMC ceased to function and real power shifted to the CMC Administrative Group (军委办事组) that ran the daily affairs of the PLA.  With the removal

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of Yang Chengwu from office, all major members of this group were close allies of Lin Biao. They included Group Director Huang Yongsheng, Deputy Group Director Wu Faxian, Lin Biao’s wife Ye Qun, Political Commissar of the PLAN Li Zuopeng, and GLD Director Qiu Huizuo. Both Li and Qiu also served as deputy chiefs of the PLA General Staff. It could not be a coincidence that all members of the group had served in the pre-1949 4th Field Army commanded by Lin Biao.14 Lin Biao Incident Lin Biao was designated as Mao’s successor at the 9th CCP National Congress held in April 1969. By the summer of 1970, or before and during the 2nd Plenum of the 9th Party Central Committee held in August 1970, however, a major dispute broke out between Lin Biao and Chen Boda on the one hand, and Zhang Chunqiao and Kang Sheng on the other. Chen was a major architect of the Cultural Revolution and served as the head of the CCRLG. A major CCP propagandist, Chen had served as Mao’s personal secretary for 30 years and led the CCP’s North China Bureau (华北局) before 1949. The dispute was over the content of the state constitution to be amended at a forthcoming National People’s Congress (NPC) session. Lin and Chen insisted that the position of the PRC president, which was held by Liu Shaoqi before 1966, should be retained in the constitution, and Mao, being a genius (天才), should hold this position. Zhang and Kang, however, were opposed to the idea based on Mao’s preference. Mao angrily criticized Lin and Chen at the 2nd Plenum, insisting that he was not a genius and did not want to hold the position of the PRC president and the position should be abolished. Mao suspected that by insisting that Mao hold the position, which he had repeatedly declined to do, Lin himself wanted to hold the position and “seize power” from him. Subsequently, Lin and his close allies including Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo were severely criticized by Mao, and Chen Boda was placed under investigation and arrested shortly afterward. Following the plenum, a nationwide “Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Chen Boda” (“批陈整风运动”) was carried out.15 There were more major disagreements between Mao and Lin than just over whether Mao was a genius and should hold the position of the PRC president. Before the 9th Party Congress, for instance, Lin delegated the task of drafting the political report to Chen Boda, which he was to deliver

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at the congress. The report defined the primary task of the party as “promoting productive forces” and deemphasized Mao’s notion of “continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship.” Mao, however, rejected Chen’s report and asked Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to draft a report that highlighted the “continuous revolution.”16 Moreover, following the Sino-Soviet border clashes of early 1969, Mao was inclined to endorse an analysis conducted by Marshals Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying, which argued that in order to deter the more imminent Soviet threat, China could leverage the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition and the U.S. desire to end the Vietnam War by improving relations with the U.S. Lin, however, preferred a policy to tie down the U.S. in South Vietnam through a protracted guerrilla war fought by the Viet Cong.17 More important, Mao and Lin had major disagreement on the issue of who should “command the gun” or the PLA. Even though Mao served as the CMC chair, Lin clearly had real control of the PLA by having his close allies such as Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu dominating the CMC Administrative Group. These Lin loyalists also became the members of the 9th CCP Politburo. Furthermore, on October 18, 1969, Lin issued the “Order Number One” (“第一号令”), leading to major air defense exercises in China’s major cities and emergency evacuation (紧急疏散) of the civilian population as well as the forces and armament of the PLA. The evacuated PLA forces and armament included 95 infantry divisions, 940,000 PLA men, 4100 military aircraft, and 600 naval ships. It was not until the next day that Mao was notified of the order by the circulated memo of the phone conversations for his perusal. Mao became enraged by the belated notification and the fact that he was not consulted in advance; he reportedly wanted to “burn the Order Number One.”18 Mao also took issue with a Liberation Army Daily editorial published on the Army Day (August 1) of 1970, which claimed that Mao was the founder and leader (缔造者和领导者) of the PLA but the PLA was under the direct command (直接指挥) of Lin. Mao quipped that there are other founders of the PLA and why the founder cannot command the PLA. Mao became particularly concerned about the excessive power and influence of the PLA at the expense of the civilian party and government authorities in the Cultural Revolution. He joked that the Soviet Union called China a “military bureaucratic dictatorship” (“军事官僚专政”).19 Because of these deepening divisions, Mao apparently became uncertain that he could trust Lin Biao as his designated successor, and implicitly

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revealed this uncertainty to Lin on several occasions. As a result, Lin became quite alarmed that he might have lost the trust of Mao and face the prospect of being persecuted like Liu Shaoqi, who was also designated as Mao’s successor. Such a heightened sense of insecurity based on mutual perception of intentions, somewhat similar to the mutual misperception-­ driven dynamics that undergird the “security dilemma” in international politics, triggered the tragic sequence of events that had led to Lin’s death in the infamous air crash in Outer Mongolia. Following the turmoil in the summer of 1970, Mao took a few measures to check the growing power of Lin. Mao, for instance, continued the campaign to criticize Chen Boda, including Chen’s attempt to enlist military support from the Beijing MR under the direction of Lin at the 2nd Plenum. In January 1971, the leadership of the Beijing MR was changed. Li Desheng replaced Zheng Weishan as commander of the MR, and Ji Dengkui replaced Li Xuefeng as its political commissar. Li Desheng served as director of the GPD and was of the pre-1949 2nd Field Army background and Ji was a civilian bureaucrat; both were confidants of Mao. Zheng Weishan and Li Xuefeng were dismissed from office because both were alleged followers of Chen Boda. Furthermore, Li Desheng and Ji Dengkui as well as Zhang Caiqian, a new deputy chief of the PLA General Staff and a veteran of the pre-1949 2nd Field Army, were added as new members to the CMC Administrative Group. This change served to mitigate the dominance of the group by the Lin loyalists, or those of the 4th Field Army background. Mao also severely criticized the Lin loyalists for “not criticizing Chen Boda” in the “Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Chen.”20 As an informal rule, Mao made a yearly inspection tour of the south shortly before the National Day (October 1). The 1971 tour began on August 15, to the cities of Wuhan, Changsha, Nanchang, Hangzhou, Shanghai, and Jinan, and ended on September 12. During the tour, Mao met regional and provincial party, government, and military leaders and implicitly criticized Lin Biao and his loyalists. These criticisms ranged from Lin’s promotion of a personality cult of Mao which Mao disliked, to Lin’s engagement in crafty plots and machinations (搞阴谋诡计) and “mountaintopism” that were intended to “split” the party leadership and “seize power.”21 These criticisms were passed on to Lin and his loyalists by their followers, which had aggravated Lin’s sense of desperation and accelerated his attempt to find a way out.

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At least according to the confessions of those who were directly involved, as early as since February 1971, Lin Liguo, the son of Lin Biao and a deputy director of the PLAAF Operations Department, had plotted with his PLAAF followers to assassinate Mao when the latter took the yearly southern tour. The initial step of the plot was to set fire to the oil depots of Shanghai’s Hongqiao Airport, which were located next to the railway juncture where Mao’s train would park. Under the pretext of putting out fire, Wang Weiguo, political commissar of the PLAAF 4th Air Corps headquartered in Shanghai and a Lin loyalist, would lead a unit to embark on the train to highjack or kill Mao. Had this step failed, Lin’s followers allegedly planned to blow up a major railway bridge between Suzhou and Wuxi on which all the north-bound trains would transit, when Mao’s train reached the bridge.22 If this plan had failed, flamethrowers and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) would be employed to attack Mao’s train. On September 8, Lin Liguo met in Beijing with Guan Guanglie, a former personal secretary of Lin Biao and political commissar of the 127th Division of the PLA 43rd Corp, a unit that was closely identified with the legacy of Lin Biao. Lin Liguo requested Guan to transfer to him a number of light weapons including flamethrowers and RPGs and the associated personnel at this meeting. But his request was refused by Guan for lack of an official order. Guan paid a high price for the meeting; he was expelled from the party and the PLA and spent ten years in prison.23 The last resort if all else had failed was for Chen Liyun, political commissar of the PLAAF 5th Air Corps headquartered in Hangzhou and a Lin loyalist, to employ a modified IL-10 ground-attack aircraft to attack Mao’s train. Chen, however, was not able to find an experienced and politically reliable pilot to carry out the mission in Hangzhou. On September 11, Lin Liguo met with Lu Min, director of the PLAAF Operations Department and one of the best combat pilots of the PLAAF. Lin Liguo showed Lu an order signed by Lin Biao on September 8 at this meeting and asked him to carry out the mission. Lu, however, was hospitalized immediately after the meeting; he tried to stay out of the plot by feigning illness. But because of this meeting, Lu was expelled from the party and the PLA and sentenced to ten years in prison.24 In case this last resort had also failed, Lin Biao and his followers allegedly planned to fly to Guangzhou to establish a separate CCP central leadership to negotiate with Beijing. Had negotiations failed, the Guangzhou leadership would coordinate with the Soviet Union to launch a

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two-­pronged military offensive against Beijing. Guangzhou was selected as the site of the new central leadership because the Guangzhou MR had the largest concentration of senior PLA officers who had served in the pre-1949 4th Field Army, the power base of Lin Biao. For this purpose, five PLAAF transport aircraft were mobilized.25 The official account of the Lin Biao Incident highlights a few reasons for the abortion of the alleged coup, including Mao’s savvy in making his itinerary unpredictable by changing his train schedule and the failure of Lin Liguo to timely deploy the PLA flamethrowers and RPGs and recruit an experienced pilot to fly the ground-attack aircraft. But on the night of September 12, immediately after knowing that Mao had returned to Beijing, Lin Biao and his wife and son hastily boarded an aircraft in Beidaihe that flew toward the Soviet Union but crashed in Outer Mongolia.26 Lin’s decision to flee suggests that the alleged coup plot may have never been seriously conceived, or it was planned so poorly that it was infeasible to carry out. Lin’s decision to flee may have also reflected his despair in realizing that it was futile to challenge the overwhelming power and authority of Mao. Rather than attempting to determine whether a serious coup plot existed or why it had failed if it did exist, this study is only intended to demonstrate how deeply involved the PLA had been in this intra-CCP leadership power struggle. Similarly, the immediate aftermath of the Lin Biao Incident shows that this power struggle had indeed become highly militarized. On September 13, for instance, Zhou Enlai instructed the BGD to deploy forces to secure the Central Broadcast Administration, Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, the Great Hall of the People, and the Zhongnanhai Compound where Mao resided. All Beijing airport runways were blocked by the BGD forces and a no-fly zone was imposed over Beijing. In the meantime, based on Zhou’s order, six divisions of the PLA 38th Corps headquartered in Baoding, including three mechanized divisions, two tank divisions, and one artillery division, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the BGD and moved to the suburbs of Beijing.27 These measures were intended to defend the capital against possible airborne or ground attacks from the directions of the south and the Soviet Union. The BGD forces were also tasked to arrest and detain the Lin loyalists such as Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.28 The Lin Biao Incident led to extensive political persecution of the military and civilian officials who were implicated in the incident and the people who were associated with them. Those who were placed under official

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investigation included close to 900 senior officials at and above the corpsand provincial-leader grade and more than 3000 officials at the divisionand prefecture-leader grade, and more numerous officials were persecuted at lower levels.29 The majority of the purged senior officials were from the PLA. As Table 3.1 shows, among a sample of purged senior PLA officers whose pre-1949 field army affiliations can be identified, more than half were from the 4th Field Army, the alleged power base of Lin Biao. “Gang of Four” Following the Lin Biao Incident, a “Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Lin Biao” (“批林整风运动”) was conducted nationwide from December 1971 to late 1973. Directed by Zhou Enlai and with an emphasis on criticizing Lin’s “ultra-leftist” crimes, this campaign led to reversal of many radical policies of the Cultural Revolution. Rather than the class struggle-based “continuous revolution” and turmoil, for instance, a new emphasis was placed on restoring social order and promoting the development of the economy and science and technology.30 In line with this new emphasis, a large number of officials who were removed from office as the “capitalist roaders” in the early days of the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. By the early 1970s, for instance, about 300 senior officials at and above the vice minister grade in Beijing were removed from office and placed under official investigation for the alleged membership in the “anti-party cliques” and for “taking the capitalist road.” In provinces such as Sichuan, Jilin, Hubei, and Shaanxi, a total of 5557 senior officials were removed from office and placed under official investigation for similar “crimes.” In provinces such as Henan, Gansu, and Jilin, a total of 171,742 cadres were removed from office and placed under official investigation for similar reasons. By the end of 1974, however, the majority of senior officials at and above the vice minister grade in Beijing were rehabilitated. Similarly, from 1972 to 1973, 88.6 percent of the senior officials in Fujian, 97 percent in Shanxi, and 91.8 percent in Hunan were rehabilitated and most were appointed to the leadership positions at the provincial and prefectural levels. Out of about 80,000 cadres in Hunan who were “sent down” to the countryside, factories, and mines, and “May 7th cadre schools” for reeducation through labor, 90 percent were rehabilitated.31 Finally, Marshal Ye Jianying, who was removed from office because of his implication in the “February Adverse Current,” was appointed as the CMC vice-chair in

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Table 3.1  A sample of purged senior PLA officers in the Lin Biao Incidenta Name

Position

Pre-1949 field army affiliations

Huang Yongsheng Wu Faxian Li Zuopeng Qiu Huizuo Jiang Tengjiao Wang Weiguo Chen Liyun Nan Ping

Chief of PLA General Staff

4th Field Army (FA)

Commander of PLAAF PC of PLAN Director of GLD PC of Nanjing MR Air Force PC of 4th Air Corps PC of 5th Air Corps First party secretary of Zhejiang Province and PC of Zhejiang Provincial MD Xiong Commander of 20th Corps and Zhejiang Yingtang Provincial MD Liang Xinchu Commander of Chengdu MR Chen Renqi 2nd PC of Chengdu MR Xie Jiaxiang 3rd PC of Chengdu MR Wen Yucheng Deputy commander of Chengdu MR Liu Jinping PC of Civil Aviation Administration of China Zhou Chiping Party secretary of Fujian Province and PC of Fuzhou MR Cheng shiqing Firs party secretary of Jiangxi Province and deputy PC of Fuzhou MR Yang Party secretary of Jiangxi Province and Dongliang commander of Jiangxi Provincial MD Long Shujin First party secretary of Xinjiang and commander of Xinjiang MR Lan Yinong First party secretary of Guizhou Province and deputy PC of Kunming MR Zhang Deputy commander of Kunming MR Rongsen Wang Xin Party secretary of Henan Province and deputy PC of Wuhan MR Yuan Party secretary of Shandong Province and PC of Shengping Jinan MR Yi Yaocai PC of PLAN North Sea Fleet Wu Zongxian Commander of Jinan MR Air Force Wei Zhuzhen Party secretary of Guangxi Province and PC of Guangzhou MR Pu Zhanya PC of Hunan Provincial MD and deputy PC of Guangzhou MR

4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 2nd FA 3rd FA 3rd FA 3rd FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 5th FA 4th FA 4th FA 4th FA 2nd FA 4th FA 5th FA 1st FA 4th FA 4th FA (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Name

Position

Pre-1949 field army affiliations

Huang Zhiyong Wang Xike Yi Wen Zhang Mingyuan Ding Xianguo Chen Pang Yan Jun Dai Jinchuan Zhao Qimin

Deputy director of GPD

4th FA

Deputy director of GLD Deputy director of GLD Deputy director of GLD

4th FA 3rd FA 4th FA

Deputy director of GLD Deputy director of GLD Deputy director of GLD Deputy PC of GLD Deputy director of National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) Deputy director of NDSTC Chief of Staff of NDSTC Second PC of PLAN

5th FA Unknown 5th FA 1st FA 3rd FA

Deputy commander of PLAN Deputy PC of PLAN

4th FA 4th FA

Vice president of Military-Political University PC of Wuhan MR PC of Yunnan Provincial MD Deputy commander of PLAAF Chief of staff of PLAAF Deputy chief of staff of PLAAF Deputy chief of staff of PLAAF Deputy chief of staff of PLAAF Commander of Nanjing MR Air Force Director of Political Department of Nanjing MR Air Force Commander of 4th Air Corps

4th FA 2nd FA 4th FA 4th FA 5th FA 5th FA 4th FA 4th FA 1st FA Unknown

Second PC of 4th Air Corps Second PC of 5th Air Corps Deputy commander of 5th Air Corps Deputy PC and director of Political Department of 5th Air Corps Chief of staff of 5th Air Corps Commander of Guangzhou MR Air Force

Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

Wei Tongtai Liang Jun Wang Hongkun Wu Reilin Zhang Xiuchuan Li Binling Liu Feng Lei Yuangao Zeng Guohua Liang Pu Bai Yun He Zhenya Zhu Xuzhi Liu Fangong Hu Linxin Zheng Changhua Ji Yingwu Feng Jian Ma Yunhe Wang Shiqiao Wu Yunshan Wang Pu

4th FA 5th FA 2nd FA

3rd FA

Unknown 4th FA (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Name

Position

Pre-1949 field army affiliations

Long Daoquan Gu Tongzhou Xie Yaozong Shen Ke

PC of Guangzhou MR Air Force

5th FA

Chief of Staff of Guangzhou MR Air Force Commander of 12th Air Corps Deputy commander and chief of staff of 12th Air Corps Zhang Shouen Deputy commander of 12th Air Corps Ma Jinxiu Director of Political Department of 12th Air Crops Xie Changlin Deputy commander of Wuhan MR Air Force Za Quanlun Deputy PC of Fuzhou MR Air Force Ma Jiesan Commander of Kunming PLAAF command Zhang PC of 3rd Air Corps Yongliang Ji Shitang Commander of 6th Air Corps Si Zhongfeng PC of 6th Air Corps

Unknown 5th FA 5th FA Unknown Unknown 5th FA Unknown 4th FA 3rd FA 4th FA 3rd FA

a CCP Central Documents No. 77 (1971), No. 14 (1972), No. 16 (1972), No. 17 (1972), No. 26 (1972), No. 42 (1972), and No. 4 (1973), and conversations with Yu Ruxin

charge of daily affairs of the PLA, and Deng Xiaoping was appointed as a vice premier of the State Council in March 1973.32 These policies soon drew fierce criticism from the leading Maoist radicals such as Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen, also known as the “Gang of Four.” Supported by Mao, the Gang launched a new, nationwide “Campaign of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius” (“批林批孔运动”) in early 1974. This new campaign was intended to counter Zhou Enlai’s earlier “Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Lin Biao.” Unlike Zhou’s campaign where Lin was treated as an “ultra-leftist” who had aggravated the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, this campaign treated Lin as an “ultra-rightist” like Confucius, a counter-revolutionary who wanted to “restore ritual and order.” Confucius was employed in this campaign as a metaphor to implicitly criticize Zhou Enlai for reversing the verdict of the Cultural Revolution. This campaign, nicknamed “China’s second Cultural Revolution,” led to another round of turmoil.33 The “Gang of Four” also attempted to divide the PLA leadership by enlisting support from some elements of the PLA in the campaign.34

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Mao, however, had to rely on Zhou, who had apparently designated Deng as his successor, to run the country, but he would not tolerate the reversal of the verdict of the Cultural Revolution by Zhou and Deng. Mao neither trusted the “Gang of Four” fully. He criticized the Gang for engaging in “sectarianism” that would “split” the party leadership. He was particularly concerned that the Gang members lacked the managerial expertise and experience to run the country. By January 1975, Deng had virtually succeeded Zhou by holding the positions of the CCP vice-chair, CMC vice-chair, and chief of the PLA General Staff. Deng leveraged his power to promote an ambitious policy agenda of reforming industry, science and technology, agriculture, and national defense, an agenda advanced by Zhou at the 4th NPC held in January 1975. Deng, however, refused to endorse Mao’s view that the “Cultural Revolution has 70 percent achievements and 30 percent mistakes.” In November, incited by the “Gang of Four,” Mao launched a nationwide “Campaign of Criticizing Deng and Repelling the Rightist Wind of Reversing the Verdict” (“批邓反 击右倾翻案风运动”). Because of this campaign, Deng was placed under house arrest in January 1976, and Ye Jianying, who had supported Deng, was placed on “sick leave.”35 Following Zhou Enlai’s death in January 1976, Hua Guofang, a vice premier and a low-key administrator, was appointed as the acting premier. Hua was neutral in the struggle between Deng and the “Gang of Four” but pledged loyalty to Mao. Beginning in late March, however, people began to gather in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. The crowds grew to more than two million by April 4, the day of the Chinese festival to mourn the dead. Elegiac poems attached to the numerous wreaths laid at the Monument of the People’s Heroes not only commemorated Zhou but also implicitly criticized the “Gang of Four.” By the night of April 5, directed by the Beijing municipal authorities, 10,000 militiamen and 5000 policemen, supported by five PLA battalions, moved into the square to forcefully end the gatherings by dispersing the crowds and detaining about 200 people. A Politburo meeting the next day defined the event as a “counter-revolutionary incident” subversively engineered by Deng and his followers. As a result, Mao stripped Deng of all his official positions and appointed Hua as the first CCP vice-chair and premier.36 Mao died in September 1976, thus signaling the rapidly approaching showdown between the Maoist radicals led by the “Gang of Four” and those who were opposed to the Gang. Hua Guofeng was at odds with the Gang for several major reasons. Labeled as a “capitalist roader” in Hunan

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in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, Hua generally supported the policy of restoring social order and reorienting the party’s priorities to developing the economy and science and technology. Hua also resented the Gang for attacking Zhou Enlai, for whom he had a great respect as an administrator of state affairs. Finally, Hua was averse to the Gang who exploited him as a likely transitory leader by pressing him to sharing more power with the Gang following Mao’s death.37 Hua needed the support of the PLA to consolidate his power. After Ye Jianying was placed on “sick leave” in January 1976, Chen Xilian, a CMC Standing Committee member, was given the responsibility to run the PLA, but Ye was in actual control of the PLA. A victim of the “February Adverse Current,” Ye had been exchanging views on the “Gang of Four” with other senior PLA and party officials who were persecuted in the early days of the Cultural Revolution but were later rehabilitated. They included Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, Li Xianian, Wang Zhen, and Yang Chengwu. There was a general agreement among these senior officials that a final showdown with the “Gang of Four” was inevitable, but no consensus was reached on how to resolve this issue. One proposal was to hold a Politburo meeting or a plenum of the party Central Committee where the “Gang of Four” would be voted out of power and given ceremonial positions.38 Ye Jianying also met Hua a few times in the summer of 1976 to get to know Hua better and to express his support for Hua. In these meetings, Ye particularly advised Hua to regain central control of the militia, or the “second armed force” (“第二武装”) that may be exploited by the “Gang of Four” for an armed uprising. After Mao’s death, Hua consulted Ye again and reached the consensus on arresting the “Gang of Four” by force. Hua believed that holding a Politburo meeting or a plenum of the party Central Committee to vote the Gang out of power may fail. The Gang had substantial political capital and legitimacy and many followers at both the central and provincial levels. Jiang Qing, for instance, was Mao’s wife, while Wang Hongwen was a CCP vice-chair and a CMC vice-chair, and Zhang Chunqiao was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). The Gang also controlled the press.39 Both Hua and Ye also exchanged views with Wang Dongxing, the director the Central Guard Bureau. Responsible for the security of the senior party leaders, this bureau runs the Central Guard Regiment, also known as the PLA Unit 8341. Besides the good relationships with both Hua and Ye, Wang had personal grievances against the “Gang of Four.” He was persecuted by Jiang Qing in the early days of the Cultural

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Revolution but was rescued by Mao.40 At the request of Hua and Ye, Wang worked out a plan with his deputies, where politically reliable personnel from the Central Guard Regiment were carefully selected to form four action teams, each assigned to arrest one member of the “Gang of Four.” Hua also ordered Wu De, the party chief of Beijing and political commissar of the BGD, and Wu Zhong, commander of the BGD, to arrest the major loyalists of the “Gang of Four.” They included Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, the two propagandists who played a critical role in launching the “Campaign of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius” and the “Campaign of Criticizing Deng and Repelling the Rightist Wind of Reversing the Verdict.” The BGD also deployed forces to secure the Xinhua News Agency, the Central Broadcast Administration, and major newspapers in Beijing, and took measures to prevent students of Peking and Tsinghua Universities, where the “Gang of Four” had many followers, from creating disturbances. As planned, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan were invited by Hua to a meeting at the Huairen Hall of the Zhongnanhai Compound on the night of October 6, and were arrested there. Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin, Mao’s nephew and a confidant of Jiang, were arrested at their residences in the compound on the same night. All the arrests were conducted by the PLA Unit 8341.41 To justify Hua’s decision to arrest the “Gang of Four,” official account highlights the Gang’s imminent plan to launch an armed uprising by leveraging the Shanghai Militia. The fact that the Gang was caught by surprise at the time of their arrests, however, suggests that the level of threat stemming from an armed uprising by the Gang may be exaggerated. There is, however, substantial evidence to show that the Gang did make preparations in order to leverage the Shanghai Militia to “seize power,” even though the plan was far from being ready for implementation. Based on the accounts of the major followers of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai, for instance, 74,220 guns, 300 artillery pieces, and millions of munitions were issued to the Shanghai Militia when Mao died. A total of 32,500 militiamen were mobilized and deployed, and a command center was established.42 Moreover, as early as in August 1976, the “Gang of Four” loyalists such as Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen, all party secretaries of Shanghai, met the Commander of the Nanjing MR Ding Sheng in Shanghai and discussed whether he could deploy the PLA forces to support the Shanghai Militia in the event of a political showdown in Beijing. Ding, an officer of the pre-1949 4th Field Army background and a

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confidant of Lin Biao, complained that he was isolated in the Nanjing MR because senior officers were largely loyal to General Xu Shiyou, an officer of the pre-1949 3rd Field Army background. Xu had served as commander of the Nanjing MR from 1955 to 1973 before he exchanged positions with Ding to serve as commander of the Guangzhou MR in 1973. Ding was particularly worried that the PLA 60th Corps, a major column of the pre-1949 5th Field Army which was deployed in Wuxi, Suzhou, and Shanghai, may not follow his order.43 General Ding may have tried to find an excuse to stay out of the plot of the “Gang of Four,” since it was highly unlikely for the PLA units to disobey the order of their commanders. But this meeting doomed General Ding’s career. He was expelled from the party, demoted to the division-leader grade, and later retired. Traditionally, Chinese militia organizations were placed under the command and control of the provincial and local PLA authorities. This authority in Shanghai is the Shanghai Garrison District. The Shanghai Militia, which boasted 30 divisions, seven independent regiments, and three anti-­ aircraft artillery battalions, however, reported to the “Gang of Four”controlled municipal authorities during the Cultural Revolution. The Shanghai Militia could trace its origin to the “rebel” organizations led by Wang Hongwen, who joined Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan in a major “rebellion” known as the 1967 “January Storm.” The “rebellion” was intended to “seize power” from old, “capitalist roaders”-dominated Shanghai municipal authorities.44 As early as in April 1975, Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying tasked Su Yu, a major PLA leader of the pre-1949 3rd Field Army, to travel to east China to investigate the issue of militia commands and units that were separated from the PLA authorities during the Cultural Revolution. In his report to Deng and Ye, Su highlighted the attempt of the “Gang of Four” to develop independent militia units in Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong in addition to Shanghai, and to recruit support from the major active-duty units of the PLA.45 Following Mao’s death, the concern of the PLA high command about an armed uprising by the Shanghai Militia was so critical that, based on a proposition of Liao Hansheng, political commissar of the Nanjing MR and an officer of the pre-1949 1st Field Army background, the PLA General Staff ordered the PLA 60th Corps in Jiangsu and the 1st Corps in Zhejiang to move eastward to encircle Shanghai under the pretext of military exercises.46 These flanking maneuvers were clearly intended to deter and prevent a possible armed uprising in Shanghai and to quell it if it had happened.

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Immediately after the arrest of “Gang of Four,” their loyalists in Shanghai including Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen were summoned to Beijing where they had expressed their support for the decision of the CCP Central to arrest the “Gang of Four.”47 Shortly afterward, they were removed from office and arrested. Their acquiescence suggests that the urgency of an armed uprising by the Shanghai Militia may be overstated, but the intense behind-the-scene maneuvering and mobilization of the armed forces by both sides show that the power struggle between Hua Guofeng and the “Gang of Four” was highly militarized.

The PLA and Intra-CCP Leadership Power Struggle in the Deng Era On October 7, 1976, one day after the arrest of the “Gang of Four,” Hua became the CCP chair and CMC chair based on the decision of a CCP Politburo meeting. Hua endorsed a policy of “two whatevers,” or “we support whatever decisions Mao made and follow whatever instructions Mao issued.” This policy highlighted “taking class struggle as the key link” (“以阶级斗争为纲”) but also stressed economic and technological development. Hua’s endorsement of Mao’s ideas and policies, including the radical ideology of the Cultural Revolution and the mass mobilization-­ based  approach to economic development, prevented rehabilitation of millions of victims of the Cultural Revolution and other major political campaigns, and led to an economic development model resembling the Great Leap Forward of 1958.48 Hua thus was challenged by Deng and his colleagues including Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun. Hu, for instance, put forward the notion that “practice is the sole criterion for testing the truth” to challenge Hua’s Maoist fundamentalism, leading to a great intra-CCP leadership debate.49 In the debate, Deng and his colleagues criticized Mao’s ideology of “taking class struggle as the key link” and proposed a fundamental shift of the party’s policy priorities from “class and lines struggle” to economic development. Deng and his colleagues won the debate. Hua resigned as premier in September 1980 and was succeeded by Zhao Ziyang, a reformer and confidant of Deng. Following nine intense Politburo meetings where Hua made self-criticisms in late 1980, he resigned as the CCP chair and CMC chair at the 6th Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee held

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in June 1981. Hua was succeeded by Hu Yaobang as the new party chief and Deng as the new CMC chair.50 The power struggle between Hua and Deng represents a major departure from those of the Cultural Revolution. Rather than the “barrel of a gun,” for instance, the struggle was waged and resolved through an intra-­ party leadership debate. The fact that Hua held the position of the CMC chair and Wang Dongxing, his close ally, served as director of the Central Guard Bureau did not gain him any initiative against his political opponents. Finally, instead of a zero-sum game where “winner takes all,” the outcome of the struggle resembles a variable-sum game where “there are gains for losers.” Even though Hua lost the power struggle, he continued his leadership role as a CCP vice-chair and a member of the PBSC for more than another year, and as a Central Committee member until 2002. Major members of the “whatever” faction such as Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Wu De, and Ji Dengkui no longer served as members of the Politburo,51 and were removed from the critically important positions that they had held. But Wang, Chen, and Wu served as members of the CCP Central Advisory Committee until 1992, and Ji enjoyed the status and privileges of a full minister. The party’s survival, however, became heavily dependent on the “barrel of a gun” in the next round of intra-CCP leadership power struggle. Tiananmen Incident Deng succeeded Hua as the paramount leader of China. On the economic side, Deng endorsed a policy of reform and opening up, centering on quasi-privatization of agriculture and establishing special economic zones in South China that may help to attract foreign capital, technology, and managerial expertise and get access to foreign markets. On the political side, Deng adhered to the Leninist principle of one-party rule. He counted on Zhao Ziyang, the premier, to implement his economic policy, and on Hu Yaobang, the CCP general-secretary, to uphold the CCP one-party rule. Deng also attempted to reduce the political role of the PLA.  By requiring the PLA to make the “strategic transition” from preparations for an “early, total, nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion to the “track of peacetime construction” in 1985, he was able to downsize the PLA by a million billets from 1985 to 1987 and bring it back to the barracks.52

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Economic liberalization led to the demand for political liberalization, particularly among the college students and the intelligentsia. Government interference in the elections of delegates to the local people’s congresses, for instance, triggered the protests of the students from the China Science and Technology University in Hefei in December 1986. These local protests grew into the nationwide demonstrations calling for democracy and freedom; they lasted for about a month. Because of his sympathy with the demands of the students, Hu Yaobang was replaced by Zhao Ziyang as the CCP general-secretary at a Politburo meeting held in mid-January 1987. Li Peng, a Soviet-trained engineer who took a hardline position regarding the students, succeeded Zhao as the premier. Subsequently, a “Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization” was carried out nationwide.53 Hu Yaobang died of a heart attack on April 15, 1989. His death led to a large turnout of the college students and the people in Tiananmen Square in Beijing to commemorate him. Such a turnout grew into massive demonstrations with as many as more than a million people in the square in peak days. The demonstrators demanded democracy as well as government measures to curb the high rate of inflation and official corruption, both associated with the flawed credit and pricing reforms of the urban economy. Deng and hardliners such as Li Peng and Yao Yilin as well as Yang Shangkun, a close ally of Deng who served as a CMC vice-chair and its secretary-general, supported the imposition of martial law by deploying the PLA forces to Beijing. But Zhao Ziyang wanted to end the demonstrations through dialogue with the students. On May 20, a martial law was imposed on Beijing with deployment of hundreds of thousands of PLA troops, and Zhao was sidelined.54 Days of massive, popular resistance impeded the movement of the martial law forces forward to Tiananmen Square, the city center. But on the night of June 3, the PLA troops forced their ways into the square from four directions. Coming from the western direction were the 38th, 63rd, and 28th Group Armies (GA). The 15th Airborne Corps and the 20th, 26th, and 54th GAs reached the square from the south, and the 39th GA and the First Division of the BGD from the east. Forcing their ways into the square from the north were the 40th and 64th GAs. In the early morning of June 4, the PLA forces cleared and established firm control of the square, with an unknown number of civilian casualties. Liu Huaqing, a deputy CMC general-secretary and a close ally of Deng, served as commander of the martial law forces, and Zhou Yibing, commander of the

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Beijing MR and a veteran of the pre-1949 3rd Field Army, served as Liu’s deputy.55 In contrast to Beijing, Jiang Zemin, the party chief of Shanghai, dealt with the local demonstrations more resolutely but also avoided a bloodshed. Recommended by Li Xiannian and Chen Yun and approved by Deng, Jiang replaced Zhao Ziyang as the CCP general-secretary at the 4th Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee held in late June 1989. At the 5th Plenum held in November, Deng retired and Jiang succeeded him as the CMC chair. At the same plenum, Yang Shangkun replaced Zhao Ziyang as the first CMC vice-chair, and GPD Director Yang Baibin, a veteran of the pre-1949 2nd Field Army and a half-brother of Yang Shangkun, succeeded his brother as the CMC secretary-general.56 The “Yang Brothers” were close allies of Deng and thus may have been placed in the CMC to watch Jiang on behalf of Deng. Liu Huaqing, a veteran of the 2nd Field Army and a confidant of Deng, was appointed as the other uniformed CMC vice-chair.57 The crackdown on the leaders of the demonstrations was swift and heavy. Many were arrested and sentenced for long jail terms and others were forced into exile. Punishment of the party leaders who lost in the power struggle because of their disagreement on how to handle the demonstrations, however, was relatively moderate. Zhao was placed under house arrest. But Hu Qili, who was a close ally of Hu Yaobang and supported Zhao against the martial law, kept his Central Committee membership after losing his membership in the PBSC,58 and later became a vice minister of electronic industry. Wan Li, a close ally of Zhao and chair of NPC, retained his Politburo membership and stayed as the NPC chair. For PLA leaders, except for the very few such as Commander of the 38th Group Army Xu Qinxian who were court-martialed for disobeying the order to enforce the martial law,59 none were persecuted. “Yang Brothers” Incident A Soviet-trained engineer, Jiang was nominated by the conservative hardliners such as Li Xiannian and Chen Yun who also blamed Deng’s policy of economic liberalization for the Tiananmen Incident. Under pressure, Deng had to compromise with the hardliners by accepting Jiang as the new top leader. What followed was the tightening of the Leninist one-­ party rule and intensification of ideological indoctrination against “peaceful evolution” through “bourgeois liberalization.” Similarly, economic

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liberalization came to a halt with the tightening of central control. The economic stagnation as a result and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, convinced Deng that China needed to return to his policy of “reform and opening up.” The hardliners argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by the CPSU’s neglect of ideological indoctrination against “peaceful evolution.” But Deng attributed the collapse to the Soviet economic stagnation and decline, the inevitable result of a centrally planned economy.60 As early as in early 1991, Deng visited Shanghai and conveyed his views to Shanghai Party Chief Zhu Rongji. Liberation Daily, the mouthpiece of the Shanghai Municipal authorities, thus published a series of commentaries to reflect Deng’s views without mentioning his name. But these commentaries drew fierce criticisms from the conservative hardliners.61 The collapse of the Soviet Union later in the year may have added urgency to the issue in the mind of Deng. To mobilize support for his policy of “reform and opening-up,” Deng embarked on a tour of the southern cities such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, and Shanghai from January 18 to February 21, 1992, to speak directly to the provincial and local leaders. As if to ensure that his views would be taken more seriously by the leaders in Beijing such as Jiang Zemin, Deng added to his entourage major PLA leaders such as Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibin. In his speeches during the tour, Deng praised Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang for their earlier efforts to liberalize the economy, and argued that China needed to return to the policy of “reform and opening up” to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union. Deng also highlighted the overriding importance of economic development (发展才是硬道理) and advised strongly against the ideological debate on whether China was going capitalistic by endorsing the role of the market. Deng stressed that China should leverage the role of the market more fully to promote productive forces, grow comprehensive national power, and improve the living standards of the people. Finally, Deng warned that “whoever who does not adopt the policy of reform must step down” (“谁不改革谁下台”), implying that Jiang may step down if he did not change his policies. Deng particularly reminded the provincial and local leaders whom he met during the tour to convey his original views word-for-word (原汁原味) to the authorities in Beijing.62 It was quite clear that Deng became impatient with Jiang for endorsing the policies of the hardliners, and therefore placed pressure on him to change course or be replaced. This pressure also included the influence of

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the PLA.  In Zhuhai, for instance, Deng held a meeting with the major leaders of the PLA. The meeting was chaired by Qiao Shi, a PBSC member who headed the powerful Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. The meeting was attended by major PLA leaders who were also close allies of Deng, including Yang Shangkun, Yang Baibin, and Liu Huaqing. Rather than discussing the national security issues that the meeting was intended for, Deng reiterated his displeasure with the leadership in Beijing for not concentrating on economic development but engaging in the time-consuming but useless ideological debate.63 The implicit message of the meeting was that Deng may consider Qiao Shi, a reformer and a sympathizer of Zhao Ziyang, to replace Jiang. To mitigate Deng’s views that were at odds with the policies of the hardliners that he endorsed, Jiang carefully restricted the press coverage of Deng’s tour and his speeches. Immediately following Deng’s tour, for instance, the local newspaper in Shenzhen published a few commentaries to convey Deng’s views without even mentioning his name and the tour. On February 21, the local newspaper in Zhuhai published an account of Deng’s visit to the city, but was criticized for not gaining higher-level authorization. On February 28, Beijing issued CCP Central Document No. 2 to pass on Deng’s speeches to all officials and party members to study. But the text of the speeches was heavily edited, where the sections that were critical of the current leadership were deleted. At a Politburo meeting held on March 9–10, all members expressed support for Deng’s views, but no concrete steps were taken to translate his views into official policies.64 On March 14, Liberation Army Daily, the mouthpiece of the GPD directed by Yang Baibin, published an editorial endorsing the notion that the PLA should offer “protection and escort for reform and opening up” (“为改革开放保驾护航”).65 On March 23, at a meeting of the PLA delegates to the ongoing NPC annual session, Yang Baibin himself stated that “the PLA will resolutely and consistently uphold, support, participate in, and defend reform and opening up, and provide ‘protection and escort for reform and opening up’.” On July 29, Yang also published an article in People’s Daily explaining the role of the PLA in providing “protection and escort for reform and opening up.” On the Army Day (August 1), commanders and political commissars of the seven MRs published an article in People’s Daily, vowing to provide “protection and escort for reform and opening up.”66 The PLA’s explicit support for Deng’s “reform and opening up” policy may have finally convinced Jiang that he needed to change

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course in order not to be replaced. It is important to note, however, that Yang Baibin called on the PLA to provide “protection and escort for reform and opening up” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader who also served as the CMC chair. On March 26, more than two months after Deng’s visit to the city, with official authorization, the local Shenzhen newspaper published a detailed account of Deng’s tour of Shenzhen. The story was reprinted in major provincial newspapers the following day and by the Xinhua News Agency on March 30.67 In the following months, Jiang operationalized Deng’s views into concrete concepts that could be integrated into the major party documents of the 14th Party Congress to be held in October. On June 9, for instance, Jiang delivered a seminal speech at the Central Party School, where he articulated and advanced the central concept of the “socialist market economy.” This concept reflected Deng’s view that a socialist country like China can also leverage the role of the market to promote productive forces.68 At the 14th Party Congress, the “basic line” (“基本路线”) of the party defined by Deng was integrated into the CCP Constitution. Also known as “one center and two basic points” (“一个中心, 两个基本点”), this line requires the top party leadership to (1) uphold economic construction as the central task of the party (以经济建设为中心), (2) adhere to the four cardinal principles including party leadership and socialism, and (3) adhere to the policy of reform and opening up. In the work report that he delivered to the party congress, Jiang also declared that the goal of reforming China’s economic structure was to develop “a system of socialist market economy.”69 The “basic line” adopted at the 14th CCP Congress, also known as Deng Xiaoping Theory or “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” thus has set the overall tone for the future development of China, making it more difficult for camps of various ideological persuasions to fundamentally challenge the policy of “reform and opening up and developing a socialist market economy.” Major reshuffle of the PLA leadership also took place at the 14th Party Congress. Jiang stayed on as the CMC chair, but the “Yang Brothers” were removed from the PLA leadership. Yang Shangkun retired as the first CMC vice-chair. Yang Baibin became a Politburo member but he no longer held any position in the CMC. The position of CMC secretary-general that he held was eliminated, and he was succeeded by Yu Yongbo, a senior political officer, as the director of the GPD. Liu Huaqing stayed on as a CMC vice-chair, and Zhang Zhen, president of China’s National Defense

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University (NDU) and a veteran of the pre-1949 3rd Field Army, was promoted to fill the position of the other uniformed vice-chair.70 Both Liu and Zhang were considered competent professional officers and charged with the responsibility of running the PLA under Jiang’s leadership. There are several important reasons that may account for Deng’s decision to remove the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership. First, Jiang’s change of policy course satisfied Deng, which made it unnecessary for Deng to replace him with a different leader. Since Jiang would stay on as the CMC chair, the earlier intervention of the “Yang Brothers” in leadership politics against Jiang made it difficult for them to continue to work with Jiang in the CMC. Moreover, just like Mao’s earlier concern about Lin Biao, Deng apparently became worried about the political ambitions of the “Yang Brothers.” Such ambitions may have been boosted by their critical role in deploying the PLA forces to quell the popular rebellion in Tiananmen, and then in helping Deng to press Jiang to change the policy course. Deng, for instance, may have been alarmed by Yang Baibing’s call on the PLA to provide “protection and escort for reform and opening up” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader. Deng’s fear of becoming overly dependent on the PLA support for political survival and policy initiative, a vulnerability that could have been exploited by the PLA leaders for political advantages, may have motivated him to remove the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership. Furthermore, one widely circulated story in the overseas Chinese press claims that as GPD director, Yang Baibin prepared a list of 100 senior military officers for promotion and forwarded it to Jiang for approval. This move, however, was regarded by Jiang as Yang’s attempt to cultivate his personal networks in the PLA to undermine Jiang’s leadership of the PLA.  Helped by “princelings” such as Deputy Director of the CCP Central General Office Zheng Qinghong, Mayor of Tianjin Yu Zhensheng, Mayor of Kunming Liu Jing, and Deng Xiaoping’s son Deng Pufang,71 according to the story, Jiang managed to raise his concerns about Yang Baibin with Deng, leading to the dismissal of the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership. When there is no way to verify or falsify such a story, it is reasonable to assume that because Jiang has never served in the PLA and thus had no close personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA, his power to control the PLA was rather weak. Therefore, Deng’s decision to dismiss the politically powerful “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership could not only help to curb the brothers’ political ambitions, but also assist Jiang to consolidate his power to control the PLA.

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Finally, Deng may have realized that as a retired, ordinary party member without any official positions, his leveraging of his personal networks in the PLA for political support to change the course of party policies may have set two precedents that contradict his original goals of (1) institutionalizing the top leadership transition and retirement, and (2) reducing the political influence of the PLA.  These two contradictions, however, could be mitigated by removing the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership. By keeping Jiang in power but dismissing his close allies such as the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership, for instance, Deng may want to sustain the narrative or the pretense of the institutionalized leadership transition, even though he broke his own promise of no longer getting involved in party politics which he made in November 1989. Similarly, by replacing the politically powerful “Yang Brothers” with the military professionals such as Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen to run the PLA, Deng clearly wanted to shift the PLA away from party politics to perfecting its functional and technical expertise.

Conclusion This chapter shows that the PLA involvement in intra-CCP leadership power struggle in the era of Mao was extensive and significant. Military force was mobilized into the struggle and a substantial number of senior PLA officers were persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques.” Even though Deng attempted to reduce the political role of the PLA after he became the paramount leader in 1978, the political and social upheavals stemming from a major governance crisis in 1989 had motivated him to leverage the PLA for domestic politics. Both instances suggest that party-­ army symbiosis was high in the eras of Mao and Deng. In contrast, however, the next chapter shows that the intra-leadership power struggle has become rare for lack of severe political division among the ruling civilian elite in the post-Deng era. As a result, the PLA involvement in China’s elite politics has substantially declined. There is no empirical evidence to show that military force is employed in intra-party leadership politics and few senior PLA officers are persecuted for “anti-party” crimes. This development suggests that a higher level of institutionalization of party-army relations has developed in the post-Deng era.

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Notes 1. See Yang Shangkun, “Recollecting Gao-Rao Incident” [“回忆高饶事件”], Documents of the Party [党的文献], No. 1 and No. 2 (2001). Yang served as director of the CCP Central General Office at the time of the Gao-Rao Incident. Documents of the Party is a bimonthly journal published by the CCP Documents Studies Office and Central Archives Bureau in Beijing. 2. Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 274–279. 3. Ibid., pp. 289, 291. 4. See Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 146, 161–162, 170, and Zhang Shude, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai [毛泽东与彭德怀] (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2008), Chapter 7. 5. See Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, p. 265. See also Xia Fei, “Beginning and End of Framing up He Long in ‘February Coup’” [“贺龙 遭受‘二月兵变’诬陷始末”], Yanhuang Chunqiu [炎黄春秋], No. 9 (September 2009). Yanhuang Chunqiu is a monthly journal published in China on historical issues. 6. “Speech Delivered by Lin Biao to the Expanded CCP Politburo Conference (May 18, 1966)” [“林彪在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话 (一九六六年五 月十八日)”], Selected Works of Lin Biao, Vol. 3 [林彪文选, 第三卷] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1968). 7. See Yu Ruxin (余汝信), “Anti-Coup Measures before and after Lin Biao’s ‘May 18 Speech’” [“林彪‘5.18 讲话’前后的防政变措施”], Feng Hua Yuan [枫华园], No. 436 (2004). Conversations with Yu in June 2018 in Singapore. Yu is a noted Chinese historian who specializes in the role of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution. He lives in Guangzhou and Hong Kong. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. See Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, p. 269, and Zheng Tao, “Just Resistance  – before and after the So-Called ‘February Adverse Current’” [“正义的抗争-所谓 ‘二月逆流’的前前后后”], in Zhang Hua, et al. (eds.), Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution”: Analysis and Reflections on China’s Ten-Year “Cultural Revolution,” Book Two [回首“文革”: 中国 十年“文革”分析与反思, 下册] (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2000). Zheng is a former deputy secretary-general of China’s National People’s Congress. 13. See Chen Xianrei, “Arrests of Liao Hansheng and Yang Yong and the So-Called Question of ‘North China Mountaintopism’” [“廖汉生, 杨 ­ 勇被

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抓与所谓‘华北山头主义’问题”], Hundred-Year Tide [百年潮], No. 4 (2000), and Qin Jian, “What I Know about the Incident of Fu Congbi ‘Assaulting’ the CCRLG” [“我所知道的傅崇碧‘冲击’中央文革小组事 件”], Aspect [纵横], No. 4 (2009). Hundred-Year Tide is a monthly journal published by the CCP History Press in Beijing, and Aspect is a monthly journal published in China on historical issues. Chen was a deputy political commissar of the Beijing MR at the time of the incident, and Qin was a staff officer in the BGD headquarters at the time. 14. Yin Jiamin, “Beginning and End of the CMC Administrative Group” [“军 委办事组始末”], Exposition of Party History [党史博览], No. 11 (2003). Exposition of Party History is a monthly journal published in China on CCP and PLA history, and Yin is a military historian in China. 15. See Wu De, “Lushan Conference and Lin Biao Incident” [“庐山会议和林 彪事件”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” Wu served as party secretary of Beijing at the time. 16. See Liu Zhinan, “Differences and Contradictions between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao from the 9th Party Congress to the Eve of the 2nd Plenum of the 9th Party Central Committee” [“九大至九届二中全会前夕毛泽东 与林彪的分歧和矛盾”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. See also Su Caiqing, “On Lin Biao’s ‘Order Number One’” [“关于 林彪的‘第一号令’”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 19. See Liu, “Differences and Contradictions between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao.” 20. See Wu, “Lushan Conference and Lin Biao Incident.” 21. See Wang Dongxing, “Chairman Mao in the Days of Crushing Lin Biao’s Counter-Revolutionary Coup Plot” [“毛主席在粉碎林彪反革命政变阴谋 的日子里”], in Zhang, et al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” Wang served as director of the CCP Central General Office and director of the Central Guard Bureau from the 1960s to the late 1970s. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. See also Chi Zehou, “Guan Guanglie Discusses Lin Biao” [“关光烈 谈林彪”], Southern Weekend [南方周末], February 16, 2012. Chi is former director of the Mobilization Department of the Guangzhou MR.  This article is based on Chi’s interview with Guan. 24. See Wang, “Chairman Mao in the Days of Crushing Lin Biao’s Counter-­ Revolutionary Coup Plot,” and Zhang Nie’er, China in 1971  – Storm Clouds of 9.13 [中国1971 – 风云九·一三] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1999), Chapter 5. Zhang’s book is based on extensive interviews with the

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PLAAF officers who were implicated in the Lin Biao Incident, including Lu Min. 25. Wang, “Chairman Mao in the Days of Crushing Lin Biao’s Counter-­ Revolutionary Coup Plot.” 26. For details, see ibid. 27. See Wu, “Lushan Conference and Lin Biao Incident.” 28. See Wu Zhong, “Wu Zhong Discusses the ‘September 13th Incident’” [“吴忠谈‘九一三事件’”], Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 1 (2012). Wu was commander of the BGD at the time of the incident. 29. See “An Analysis of Lin Biao Incident” [“林彪事件解析”], October 10, 2009, retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.linbiao.org/forum/ viewtopic.php?f=2&t=722, and conversations with Yu Ruxin. 30. See An Jianshe, “The Struggle to Criticize the Ultra-leftist Ideological Trend Led by Zhou Enlai after ‘September 13th’” [“‘九一三’后周恩来领 导的批判极左思潮的斗争”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 31. See Wang Yonghua, “Beginning and End of Implementing the Cadre Policy in the late period of the Cultural Revolution” [“文革后期落实干部 政策始末”], Wenshi Jinghua [文史精华], No. 3 (2012). Wenshi Jinghua is a monthly journal published in China on historical issues. 32. See An, “The Struggle to Criticize the Ultra-leftist Ideological Trend Led by Zhou Enlai after ‘September 13th’.” 33. See Wang Haiguang, “The Campaign of ‘Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius’” [“‘批林批孔’运动”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 34. Yin Jiamin, “An Actual Account of the ‘Gang of Four’ Meddling in Army Affairs under the Pretext of ‘Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius’” [“‘四人 帮’借‘批林批孔’插手军队纪实”], Exposition of Party History, No. 7 (2012). 35. See Zhang Tuosheng, “Deng Xiaoping and Comprehensive Rectification in 1975” [“邓小平与1975年的全面整顿”], in Zhang, et al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 36. Jin Chunming, “A Review of the April 5th Movement” [“四五运动述 评”], in Zhang, et al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 37. Li Haiwen, “The Antagonism Developed between the Gang of Four and the Majority of the Politburo Members after the 10th CCP Congress,” [“中共十大后形成的四人帮与政治局多数的对立”], Exposition of Party History, No. 7 (2017). 38. Fan Shuo, “A Record of Complete Collapse of the ‘Gang of Four’” [“‘四 人帮’覆灭记”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution,” Xiong Lei, “How Did Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying Join Hands in 1976?” [“1976, 华国锋和叶剑英怎样联手的?”], Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 10

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(2008), and Li Haiwen, “Hua Guofeng before and after the Crushing of the ‘Gang of Four’” [“华国锋在粉碎‘四人帮’前后”], Southern Weekend, October 1, 2011. 39. Li, “Hua Guofeng before and after the Crushing of the ‘Gang of Four’,” and Ye Xuanji, “Marshal Ye and Crushing of the ‘Gang of Four’” [“叶帅与 粉碎 ‘四人帮’”], Southern Weekend, October 1, 2011. Ye Xuanji is a son of Ye Jianying. 40. See Wu Jianhua, “Private Discussions of Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing on Handling the ‘Gang of Four’” [“叶剑英汪东兴密谈处置‘四人帮’”], Yanghuang Chunqiu, No. 7 (2004). 41. See Ibid., Fan, “A Record of Complete Collapse of the ‘Gang of Four’,” Zhang Gensheng, “Hua Guofeng Discusses the Crushing of the ‘Gang of Four’” [“华国锋谈粉碎‘四人帮’”], Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 7 (2004), Tao Ran, “Wu Zhong Discusses the Arrest of the ‘Gang of Four’” [“吴忠 谈抓‘四人帮’”], Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 5 (2012), and Gu Yubao, “A Special Mission Assigned to Geng Biao” [“耿飙的一次特殊使命”], Wenshi Chunqiu [文史春秋], No. 2 (2009). Wenshi Chunqiu is a monthly journal published in China on historical issues, and Geng served as China’s defense minister from 1981 to 1983. 42. See Ma Kechang, Special Defense [特别辩护] (Beijing: China Changan Press, 2007), Chapter 5. China Changan Press is a publisher of the CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. 43. Ibid. 44. See Ye Yonglie, Deng Xiaoping Changed China [邓小平改变中国] (Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press, 2014), Chapter 3. 45. Li Yigen, “Senior General Su Yu’s Years in the ‘Cultural Revolution’” [“粟 裕大将的‘文革’岁月”], Xiangcao [湘潮], No. 4 (2009). Xiangcao is a monthly journal published in China on historical issues. 46. See Chen Jiexun, “Liao Hansheng’s Struggle against the ‘Gang of Four’ under the Personal Instructions of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping” [“叶 剑英邓小平亲授指示: 廖汉生同‘四人帮’的斗争”], Xiangcao, No. 11 (2012). 47. Ibid. 48. See Ye, Deng Xiaoping Changed China, Chapter 6. 49. Ibid., Chapter 8. 50. Ibid., Epilogue. 51. They resigned at the 5th Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee held during February 23–29, 1980. 52. See Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA.” 53. See Wu Wei, “Sudden Changes: Downfall of Hu Yaobang” [“风云突变: 胡 耀邦落马”], New York Times (Chinese Edition), March 17, 2014, and “The Game Surrounding the ‘Campaign of Opposing Bourgeois

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Liberalization’” [“围绕‘反自由化’进行的博弈”], New York Times (Chinese Edition), March 31, 2014. 54. See Bai Mo, “Beginning and End of ‘June 4th’ Part 1 – Campus Upheavals” [“‘六四’始末之一  – 学潮乍起”], BBC News (Chinese Edition), May 20, 2014, “Part 2 – the Game of Hunger Strike” [“之二 – 绝食博弈”], BBC News (Chinese Edition), May 21, 2014, and “Part 3 – The Capital under Martial Law” [“之三  – 戒严之都”], BBC News (Chinese Edition), May 22, 2014. 55. See Bai Mo, “Beginning and End of ‘June 4th’ Part 4  – Bloodshed on Changan Avenue” [“‘六四’始末之四  – 喋血长安”], BBC News (Chinese Edition), May 23, 2014, Wu Renhua, Martial Law Forces in ‘June 4th’ Incident [‘六四’事件中的戒严部队] (Los Angeles, CA: Truth Press, 2009), and conversations with senior PLA officers in Beijing in January 1998. 56. See “A Record on Major Events of CCP (1989)” [“中国共产党大事记 (1989)”], people.cn [人民网], September 5, 2007. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. “25  Years Later, Details Emerge of Army’s Chaos Before Tiananmen Square,” The New York Times, June 3, 2014, and conversations with senior PLA officers in January 1998. 60. See “Deng Xiaoping’s Speeches during His Southern Tour (Original Edition)” [“邓小平南巡讲话 (原版)”], Sino-Foreign Management Magazine [中外管理杂志], July 19, 2016. The magazine is a monthly published in Beijing. 61. “Why Was Initial Media Coverage of Speeches of Southern Tour Afraid of Mentioning Deng Xiaoping?” [“最初报道南巡讲话为何不敢提邓小平?”], Xinhuanet, April 25, 2013. 62. See “Deng Xiaoping’s Speeches during His Southern Tour (Original Edition).” The original edition is different from the official edition in that the latter deleted Deng’s praise of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and his critical comments on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the policies of the hardliners. For the official edition, see “Deng Xiaoping’s Speeches during His Southern Tour in 1992 (Whole Text)” [“1992年邓小平南巡讲话 (全文)”], people.cn, August 11, 2014. 63. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p.  677, and conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in January 1998. 64. See “Why Was Initial Media Coverage of Speeches of Southern Tour Afraid of Mentioning Deng Xiaoping?” and “1992: Deng Xiaoping Took a Southern Tour and Delivered His ‘Southern Speeches’” [“1992: 邓小平南 巡发表‘南方讲话’”], people.cn, October 9, 2009.

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65. See “Resolutely Carrying out and Implementing the Basic Line, Actively Participating in and Supporting Reform and Opening Up” [“坚决贯彻执 行基本路线, 积极参加支持改革开放”], Liberation Army Daily, March 14, 1992. 66. For citations of Yang and articles in People’s Daily, see Kou Chien-wen, Evolution of the CCP Elite Politics: Institutionalization and Power Transition, 1978–2004 [中共菁英政治的演變: 制度化與權力轉移, 1978–2004] (Taipei: Center for China Studies, National Chengchi University, 2007), p. 138. 67. See Zhang Songping, “Before and After Public Reporting of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Speeches in His Southern Tour’” [“邓小平‘南巡讲话’公开报 道前后”], South Reviews [南风窗], No. 11 (1998). South Reviews is a monthly magazine published in Guangzhou, China. 68. See “Foot-Prints of the Republic – 1992: Establishing the Reform Goal of Developing a System of Market Economy” [“共和国的足迹 – 1992: 确立 市场经济体制的改革目标”], Xinhuanet, September 24, 2009. 69. See “1992: Deng Xiaoping Took a Southern Tour and Delivered His ‘Southern Speeches’.” 70. See “Communique of the First Plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee” [“中国共产党第十四届中央委员会第一次全体会议公报”], people.cn, October 19, 1992. 71. “Princelings” refer to the children of the senior party and PLA officials.

CHAPTER 4

Top Leaders and the PLA in the Post-Deng Era

Deng’s basic line of “one center, two basic points” endorsed at the 14th Party Congress of 1992, or the requirement for top leaders to uphold economic construction as the central task of the party, adhere to party leadership, and adhere to the policy of reform and opening up has set the overall tone for the future development of China. The party’s endorsement of Deng’s “basic line” has two major implications for party-army relations in post-Deng China. First, even though the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have also developed their own concepts about the future development of China, these concepts serve to adapt the changing conditions of their times to Deng’s “basic line” rather than fundamentally challenge this line. Therefore, the “struggle between the antagonistic classes and opposing lines” that severely divided the party leadership in the era of Mao, or the debate on whether the central task of the party should be “class struggle” or “promoting productive forces,” was absent in the post-Deng era. The lack of severe intra-party leadership division along “opposing lines” and thus the absence of the “anti-party cliques” associated with such a division have denied a major rationale for top leaders to leverage the PLA for party politics. Moreover, the requirement of the “basic line” for top leaders to “uphold economic construction as the central task of the party” means that successful economic development is perceived to be central and critical to the survival and legitimacy of the party to rule. Civilian governance © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_4

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that promotes economic development along with political and social stability thus has become the top priority of the top leaders. Effective civilian governance in turn helps to prevent major political and social upheavals that may require the intervention of “the barrel of a gun,” or the massive use of the PLA in domestic politics. In the meantime, all the top leaders have endorsed a military policy that confines the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. As discussed in Chap. 7, military professionalization or what Samuel Huntington calls “objective control” as a result helps to dampen and constrain further the political aspirations of the military. The central driver for the post-Deng  top leaders to follow Deng’s “basic line,” as discussed in Chap. 6, is their heightened sense of insecurity stemming from their lack of revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA. This sense of insecurity implies that the top leaders are highly unsure that the PLA would follow their orders if it is asked to handle a domestic political and social crisis of a massive scale. As a result, they are motivated by this sense of insecurity to concentrate on effective civilian governance to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require the mobilization of the PLA into domestic politics. They are also incentivized by the same sense of insecurity to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Even though the lack of severe political schism among the party leadership and an emphasis on effective civilian governance have made it less likely for the PLA to get involved in party politics in terms of “anti-party cliques,” there are two other types of critical situations that may involve the PLA in China’s elite politics in the post-Deng era. The uncertainty associated with the generational changes or succession of the top party leaders, for instance, may motivate these leaders to mobilize support from the PLA. Moreover, since economic development has become the central task of the party, economic corruption has also become a major concern of the top party leadership. Leadership uncertainty stemming from the party’s anti-corruption drive thus may incentivize party leaders to get the PLA involved in elite politics. Based on a careful analysis of the major cases that have reportedly involved the PLA in elite politics in the post-Deng era, however, this chapter shows that these allegations are largely founded on shaky ground in term of both analytical logic and empirical evidence. Finally, all post-Deng top leaders stress the party’s “absolute leadership” of the PLA and require the PLA to be loyal to the party leadership

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or to themselves. But because they have never served or have served briefly in the PLA and thus lacked close personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA, when they came to power, all curried favor with the PLA, or did what the PLA wants, to build political support from the PLA. Conventional wisdom claims that such power consolidation serves the broad goal of the top leaders to leverage the PLA for intra-party leadership power struggle. The emphasis on effective civilian governance by the post-Deng top leaders, however, has largely prevented a major political and social crisis that may trigger a critical power struggle among the ruling civilian elite and provide a persuasive rationale for top leaders to get the PLA involved in leadership politics. Therefore, this chapter also shows that rather than the broad goal of leveraging the PLA for power struggle, power consolidation by these leaders really serves the narrow goal to strengthen their command and control of the PLA, particularly in combating military corruption and enforcing discipline. This goal is intended to enhance the combat effectiveness of the PLA, which is consistent with the “objective control” of the PLA, or to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise.

Jiang Zemin and the PLA With no service experience and few close connections in the PLA, Jiang was quite successful in consolidating his power by leveraging his position as the CMC chair. The position of the CMC chair, for instance, entails the power to have the final say in all major military decisions, from allocating military budget and appointing senior officers to important positions to deploying troops and controlling employment of nuclear weapons. Jiang was able to win support from the senior PLA officers allegedly because he employed his formal position to promote many of them to higher positions and ranks, and to increase defense budget which translated into higher salaries and better living conditions for the military. Jiang also cultivated and maintained good relations with all the informal groups among the PLA leadership and with lower levels by showing respect for PLA veterans, listening to officers’ concerns on major issues, honoring PLA heroes and traditions, and conducting regular inspection tours of the basic-level PLA units.1

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Leadership Succession and the PLA Some argue that the primary purpose of Jiang’s power consolidation in the PLA was to leverage the military for intra-party leadership power struggle. During Jiang’s 15 years as the CMC chair from 1989 to 2004, however, evidence of PLA intervention in intra-party leadership power struggle was sketchy. The alleged evidence is that around the time of the 16th Party Congress that was held in November 2002, where Jiang was to transfer the top leadership position to Hu Jintao, a group of senior officers offered collective support to Jiang to retain his CMC chair position.2 In this instance, Hu, who succeeded Jiang as the CCP general-secretary, was assumed to be a potential political threat and opponent to Jiang. Such a collective petition of senior officers for Jiang to stay on as the CMC chair, however, is not likely to take place for several important reasons. First, most of the uniformed CMC members, including Vice-Chairs Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou, GPD Director Yu Yongbo, GLD Director Wang Ke, and Deputy GPD Director Wang Reilin were to retire at the 16th Party Congress. They thus had no incentive to sponsor a petition to keep Jiang as the CMC chair, or to encourage other senior officers to do so.3 Moreover, newly promoted uniformed CMC members such as Chief of the General Staff Liang Guanglie, GLD Director Liao Xilong, and General Armament Department (GAD) Director Li Jinai, were too new and junior to sponsor such a petition. More important, like most of the militaries, the uniformed PLA leadership follows the principle of civilian supremacy and is not likely to initiate such a petition without the direction and authorization of the top civilian leader. For similar reasons, both military and party disciplines forbid senior officers, who are also party members, from organizing such unauthorized “collective action” that may “split” the top civilian and party leadership. It is doubtful that any senior military officer would risk his career to engage in such politically prohibitive behavior. What actually transpired is that Hu Jintao, who had served as the first CMC vice-chair since 1999, consulted the remaining uniformed CMC members such as the newly promoted CMC Vice-Chairs Cao Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong and GPD Director Xu Caihou, and gained their support before he submitted the proposal to extend Jiang’s CMC chair position to the PBSC.4 As noted elsewhere in this study, Jiang had stayed on as the CMC chair for two

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more years, not to compete for power against Hu but to push for transformation of the PLA based on the notion of RMA. Regarding the downfall of corrupt party leaders in the Jiang era, the only senior party leader who was investigated and prosecuted for corruption was Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing and a Politburo member. The investigation of Chen was conducted by the CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission and the state procuratorial authority from 1995 to 1998 before he was sentenced to 16 years in prison for “corruption and neglect of duty” by the court in 1998.5 Some argue that the general support of the PLA leadership for Jiang amounts to the PLA intervention in Chen’s downfall.6 But the general support of the PLA for Jiang stemmed from Jiang’s position as the CMC chair or commander-in-chief of the PLA. This support has little to do with Jiang’s specific decision to investigate Chen. To validate the argument that the PLA played a specific role in the downfall of Chen, it is at least necessary to provide evidence of the specific linkages between the PLA leadership and the downfall of Chen. Such evidence, however, has not existed so far. Civilian Governance Since power struggle was not the primary purpose of Jiang’s power consolidation in the PLA, this consolidation aimed to implement a two-­ pronged policy. One was to enhance civilian governance by promoting economic growth along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance would prevent a major political and social crisis that may incentivize the top leader to leverage the PLA for domestic politics. The other was to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise. Both helped to clarify and solidify the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities based on a functional division of labor between the two; such boundaries also helped to strengthen the internal cohesion of the PLA. In his writings, for instance, Jiang particularly stresses the importance of the functional and technical specialization-­ based division of labor as society develops.7 Jiang’s policy was also informed by the major lessons learned from the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The CCP’s dependence on the “barrel of a gun” or military force in Tiananmen for its political survival, for instance, indicated the failure of civilian governance, or the inability of the party and state authorities to resolve a major political and social crisis and to manage social protests by means other than tanks and submachine guns. This failure contributed to

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a drastic decline of the CCP’s legitimacy to rule. Also, there are indications that the PLA was reluctant to get involved in the suppression of the popular rebellion because its image would be damaged.8 Even for Deng, the task of persuading the PLA to intervene was not easy. He had to exhaust much of his political capital to accomplish it. Also, as shown in the “Yang Brothers” Incident, the failure of civilian governance resulted in political vulnerability of the civilian leadership that could be exploited by military leaders for political advantages. The expansion of the PLA’s political role as a result may also make it more difficult to reestablish effective control of the PLA by the civilian leadership.9 These lessons show that the party’s reliance on the “barrel of a gun” or military force for its political survival may have critical drawbacks and may not necessarily guarantee success. Unlike Deng, the new top leaders such as Jiang do not have the revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA. They thus are not confident that the military would take their sides in another crisis similar to the Tiananmen Incident. This concern may explain why the post-1989 policies of military control and ideological indoctrination were soon replaced by Deng’s “basic line” that was endorsed at the 14th Party Congress of 1992. This line requires the top leaders to “uphold economic construction as the central task of the party,” which serves to enhance the legitimacy of the CCP rule by increasing income, improving living standards, and providing employment opportunities for millions of people joining the labor force every year. For the same reason, Jiang developed and endorsed his own theory of “three represents,” which requires the party to “represent the most advanced productive forces.” As a result, for the first time in CCP history, private entrepreneurs, the social group that has contributed immensely to the growth of China’s “productive forces,” have been allowed to join the party.10 Economic development also helps to generate revenue needed for preventing major political and social upheavals. Under Jiang, strategies were developed to manage social protests stemming from the downsides of rapid economic growth such as bureaucratic abuse of power and corruption, massive urban unemployment due to reform of state-owned enterprises, overtaxation of the peasants, wealth stratification, and environmental pollution. These strategies ranged from soft approaches such as investigating the bureaucratic abuse of power, meeting the demands of the protesters, and improvising the institutions for monitoring, expressing, and resolving grievances before they escalate,11 to hard ones such as arresting

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the politically conscious organizers and isolating and containing protests to prevent them from evolving into larger, better organized movements that may challenge the CCP rule. The PAP, for instance, was substantially strengthened, and riot-control units with nonlethal weapons like tear gas and rubber bullets were developed and deployed.12 All these strategies reduced the need to mobilize the PLA into domestic politics. Military Policy On the military side, Jiang aimed to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise. In 1993, he endorsed a new military strategic guideline (军事战略方针) which required the PLA to make preparations for fighting and winning “local war under modern-technology and particularly high-technology conditions.” He further proposed to transform the PLA from a manpower-intensive force to a technology-­ based military in 1995. In 1997, he adopted the concept of “leapfrogging development” (“跨越式发展”), which required the shift of emphasis of military modernization from mechanization to informatization, or from adding new hardware platforms to developing information technology (IT)-based software and networks. Intended to narrow the technological gap between the PLA and the more advanced militaries, this concept led to a decision to downsize the PLA by 500,000 billets. In late 2002, Jiang endorsed the concept of “dual construction” (“双化建设”) of the PLA through mechanization and informatization, leading to a decision to downsize the PLA by another 200,000 billets.13 The two rounds of downsizing centered on manpower-intensive sectors such as the bureaucracy and the ground force, or those that are more appropriate for domestic politics. These downsizings thus reduced the capability structure of the PLA to get involved in domestic politics. In the meantime, Jiang expanded the external role of the PLA.  Following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, for instance, the PLA expanded its naval capabilities by acquiring a substantial number of the more advanced Russian guided-missile destroyers and conventional diesel submarines, and made concrete preparations for a war against Taiwan independence.14 Under the leadership of Jiang, the PLA also became more actively involved in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.15 On civil-military relations, Jiang ordered the PLA to divest itself from its business activities in 1998.16 Back in the mid-1980s, after downsizing the PLA by a million billets, Deng called on “the army to be patient” (“军

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队要忍耐”) by keeping the defense budget low because he wanted to shift scarce resources to economic development. To make up for the shortfall in military expenditure, under a policy of “self-development and self-­ perfection” (“自我发展, 自我完善”) endorsed by a “central leader,”17 the PLA was allowed to go into business. When this policy generated some income for the PLA, its corrosive effects on the PLA were also apparent. These effects included rampant military corruption, the tension and division between the PLA and Chinese society and among different PLA units because of uneven distribution of profits and benefits, the neglect of training and decline of combat readiness, and the erosion of civilian control of the PLA resulting from the diversification of sources of PLA income. Even though there were major loopholes that had implications for military corruption that Xi Jinping had to tackle at a later date, Jiang’s decision to divest the PLA from its business activities significantly reduced the domestic role of the PLA and reinforced Jiang’s control of the PLA. The divestiture policy enabled the PLA to concentrate more on perfecting its functional and technical expertise. Another important institutional change of party-army relations that Jiang introduced is exclusion of senior military officers from the membership of the PBSC, the most powerful decision council in China. The last military officer who served as a PBSC member was CMC Vice-Chair Liu Huaqing, who retired in 1997. This institutional change has three major implications for party-army relations in China. First, this exclusion prevents senior military officers from intervening in the PBSC deliberation on civilian governance issues that are not the concerns of the PLA. It thus reduces the likelihood of developing political-military factions among the PBSC members that could be leveraged for intra-leadership power struggle over these issues. On issues that matter to the PLA such as defense policies and military budget, they would be vetted by the top leader before they are forwarded to the PBSC for deliberation. Second, this change allows the top leader, in his role as the CMC chair, to control the institutional interactions with the senior military officers in the CMC and denies other PBSC members a critical institutional space to interact with the senior military officers. This change reduces the likelihood that other PBSC members may develop close allies among the senior military officers and mobilize their support in the event of a major power struggle among the PBSC members. Finally, rather than party politics, this change helps to channel the attention and energy of the PLA leaders to addressing the

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functional, technological, and operational issues of military modernization. A final issue that needs to be carefully examined is whether the power consolidation of the top leaders serves the factional purpose of intra-party leadership power struggle, or the functional and professional purpose of enhancing the combat effectiveness of the PLA.  When the top leaders came to power, they all attempted to consolidate power by currying favor with the PLA, particularly in increasing the defense budget and promoting officers to higher positions and ranks. Conventional wisdom suggests that the top leaders exploit their CMC chair position mostly for personal and factional gains, because by giving the PLA leaders what they want, they are able to develop entrenched personal networks in the PLA which they could leverage for power struggle against their political opponents. A more careful analysis, however, shows that such a premise is flawed. China’s defense budget, for instance, had enjoyed double-digit growth for most of the years since Jiang became the CMC chair in 1989. This increase was in sharp contrast to the period before 1989 when defense budget steadily declined in real terms. Some argue that this budget increase was intended to reward the PLA for what it did in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and to consolidate Jiang’s personal power by cultivating personal networks in the PLA that could be employed for power struggle. There are, however, functional and professional reasons for increasing the defense budget. The 1991 Gulf War, for instance, showed how large the technological gap had become between the PLA and the most advanced militaries, a gap that could be narrowed down only by increasing the defense budget. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 added urgency to the need to upgrade the PLA capabilities, which would cost money. The post-1997 emphasis on informatization of the PLA meant that acquisition of digitized operational platforms became a top priority. But because these platforms were technology-­ intensive, they were also capital-intensive and required more financial investment. Furthermore, the post-1998 divestiture of the PLA from its business activities led to a shortfall in PLA income that had to be offset by a budget increase. In the meantime, the Chinese economy had grown rapidly since the early 1990s. This growth made it easier to argue for more spending on national defense. All these reasons were articulated and socialized by China’s military leaders in lobbying the civilian leaders for budget increases.

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As early as in 1992, for instance, CMC Vice-Chair Liu Huaqing ordered the military financial analysts to calculate the cost to modernize the PLAN, PLAAF, and mechanized force of the PLAA, reaching the conclusion that the military budget should be doubled or tripled to achieve such a goal. Liu also complained that the salaries and benefits for military personnel were too low compared with the civilian sector. As a result, the “practical difficulties” (“实际困难”) for those from the basic-level units, including poor living and working conditions and the inability to have dependents live with officers and send kids to school, were virtually “unresolvable.” According to Liu, these difficulties made it difficult for the PLA to attract and retain high-quality personnel unless more financial resources were allocated to the PLA. To “present the difficulties of the army,” Liu met with Jiang, Premier Li Peng, and Vice Premier Yao Yilin “several times.” At a later date, Liu and Zhang Zhen, the other uniformed CMC vice-­ chair, had a meeting with Zhu Rongji who succeeded Yao as the vice premier in charge of finance, to discuss the budgetary issue. These lobbying efforts produced positive result. The 1993 budgetary increase enabled a hefty salary improvement for the PLA personnel, particularly for those from the basic-level units, and “played a positive role in preserving the stability of the army.”18 Had Jiang increased the defense budget primarily for personal and factional gains, the budgetary growth would have slowed down or stopped after his retirement from the CMC in 2004. But substantial budgetary growth continued after Jiang’s retirement, suggesting that this policy had broader roots than just a crude ploy by Jiang to develop personal networks in the PLA that he could employ for power struggle. Jiang also promoted a large number of senior officers to higher positions and ranks. Some claim that Jiang did this in order to develop his personal networks in the PLA that could be employed for power struggle. While this claim is not completely groundless, it is also important to note that there are functional and professional reasons for such promotions. PLA Officers’ Service Regulations, for instance, requires the CMC chair to authorize the appointment and promotion of officers at and above the division-leader grade, or the rank of colonel. As a result, Jiang was inevitably responsible for the large number of such appointments and promotions, considering that Jiang had served as the CMC chair for 15 years, that the PLA is a large bureaucracy which had many senior positions to fill during the long 15-year period, and that a higher rate of personnel

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turnover resulted from the new rules such as service term and age limits for different levels of the PLA. Also, the recommendations of the candidates for appointment and promotion came from the military professionals in the CMC, but not picked by Jiang. From 1992 to 1997, for instance, these recommendations were worked out by CMC Vice-Chairs Zhang Zhen and Liu Huaqing and GPD Director Yu Yongbo, and approved by Jiang.19 Jiang interviewed the more senior candidates, but his knowledge of these appointees was limited because the time they spent together was limited. Therefore, personal ties could not be close and strong. The personal networks that Jiang attempted to develop in the PLA thus were not be comparable to those of Mao and Deng in closeness and strength, because the latter were tested by the numerous military and political battles of life and death and victory and defeat. In the final analysis, there is sketchy evidence to show that military officers were involved in intra-party leadership power struggle in the Jiang era, since such struggle became rare for lack of severe political schism among the ruling civilian elite. Therefore, functional and professional reasons offer better explanations for the defense budget increases and promotion of military officers to higher positions and ranks than factional reasons such as developing entrenched personal networks in the PLA for power struggle. These functional and professional motivations clearly helped to enhance the combat effectiveness of the PLA.

Hu Jintao and the PLA Hu succeeded Jiang as party general-secretary in 2002 and as CMC chair in 2004. Like Jiang, Hu has weak military credentials, no service experience, and few close connections in the PLA. Hu thus also attempted to consolidate power by currying favor with the PLA. He regularly increased the defense budget, promoted senior officers to higher positions and ranks, inspected major PLA institutions and basic-level units, and maintained good relations with the senior PLA officers.20 But rather than for power struggle, Hu’s power consolidation was intended to achieve two policy objectives. One was to enhance civilian governance by promoting economic growth along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance would prevent a major political and social crisis that may incentivize the top leader to employ the PLA for domestic politics. The

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other was to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Civilian Governance While treating economic development as the central task of the party, Hu also attempted to correct the excesses of the single-minded economic growth in the Jiang era such as the widening income gap, the lack of basic social security for the marginalized groups, and environmental pollution. Hu’s policy initiatives included diverting investment from the rich coastal regions to the less developed hinterland and west provinces, reducing the tax burden of the farmers, removing the restrictions on migrant workers, developing the basic social and medical safety nets for the poor and the unemployed, and requiring “green” gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a major criterion for the career advancement of the officials. To ensure more optimal and efficient use of resources, Hu also advanced his “scientific development” theory.21 Furthermore, Hu attempted to maintain political and social stability with the goal of creating a “harmonious society.” He required officials to increase transparency, employ persuasion, meet the reasonable demands, and refrain from employing the public security and PAP forces that may escalate disputes in handling the numerous “mass incidents” (“群体事 件”). Beijing’s Central Party School and State Administration College, for instance, established training centers to educate the local party, government, law-enforcement, and legal officials on how to prevent and control “mass incidents” and how to resolve disputes peacefully. In the meantime, domestic surveillance was strengthened and millions of surveillance cameras were installed in China’s rural communities. Similarly, the PAP was reinforced to deal with the domestic security threats.22 Hu’s policy of combining a human face-based economic growth model with the nonlethal methods of handling the “mass incidents” prevented major political and social upheavals that may require the mobilization of the PLA into domestic politics. Counter-Corruption and the PLA The lack of severe political division among the party leadership in the Hu era disincentivized the top leader to employ the PLA for party politics. But because economic development has become the central task of the party,

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economic corruption has also become a major concern of the top party leadership. Two senior party officials, for instance, were investigated and prosecuted for corruption in the era of Hu. Chen Liangyu, the mayor of Shanghai and a Politburo member, was placed under investigation by the CDIC and the state procuratorial authority in 2006, and was sentenced for 18 years in prison for “taking bribes and abusing power” by the court in 2008.23 Bo Xilai, the party chief of Chongqing and a Politburo member, was placed under investigation by the CDIC and the state procuratorial authority in April 2012, and was sentenced to life in prison for “taking bribes, corruption, and abusing power” by the court in 2013.24 In the case of Bo, besides corruption, his attempt to cover up the scandal involving the killing of a British businessman by his wife was a major reason for his downfall.25 As noted elsewhere in this study, to claim that the PLA played a specific role in these counter-corruption cases, it is necessary to show evidence of specific linkages between the PLA leadership and the dismissal of these officials. When no such evidence has existed in the case of Chen Liangyu, there are three claims about the specific linkages between the PLA leaders and the downfall of Bo Xilai. The first is that Hu Jintao decided to investigate Bo only after he had received pledged support from Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, the two uniformed CMC vice-chairs.26 Second, in early February 2012, Bo paid a visit to the museum of the 14th Group Army of the PLA headquartered in Kunming, a unit once commanded by his father Bo Yibo during the Anti-Japanese War; Bo Yibo served as a vice premier of China’s State Council in the 1980s. This visit was interpreted as Bo Xilai’s attempt to mobilize military support in a coup against Hu.27 Third, following the downfall of Bo, Liu Yuan, the political commissar of the GLD, and Zhang Haiyang, the political commissar of the Second Artillery or China’s rocket force, were allegedly under investigation and placed under house arrest for colluding with Bo in a coup attempt against Hu.28 Liu is the son of former Chinese President Liu Shaoqi, and Zhang is the son of Zhang Zhen, a former CMC vice-chair. Both allegedly have known Bo since childhood.29 A more careful scrutiny, however, reveals that these three claims are founded on shaky ground in terms of both analytical logic and empirical evidence. On the first claim, the decision to investigate Bo was made by the PBSC, which has had no PLA representation since 1997. Both Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were members of the Politburo, which is lower than the PBSC in bureaucratic rank and grade. Both thus were excluded from the PBSC deliberation on the decision to investigate Bo. The claim

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also contradicts the view that Xu Caihou colluded with Bo against Hu.30 What transpired is that after the decision to investigate Bo was made by the PBSC, it was transmitted to the lower-echelon Politburo where all its members, including Guo and Xu, pledged support for the decision.31 But this is very different from the claim that military support is a precondition that Hu was required to meet in order to make the decision to investigate Bo. On the second claim, it is a gross exaggeration to treat Bo’s visit to the museum of a military unit that his father once commanded as evidence of a conspiracy for a coup against Beijing. As discussed elsewhere in this study, relations and interactions between military officers and civilian officials at the provincial and local levels are limited and nominal, mainly because they are confined to inter-agency policy coordination on issues of national defense mobilization. They do not involve vertical authority relationship between superiors and subordinates. These relations and interactions thus do not translate into close personal ties and entrenched personal networks for civilian officials in the PLA. It is quite normal for commanding officers of the 14th Group Army to extend a welcome to Bo’s visit out of respect for the historical legacy of their unit related to his father, a major CCP leader. But it is highly unlikely for these officers to assist Bo in a coup plot against Beijing, since Bo belonged to the civilian chain of command which they do not report to, and which has no control or impact on their career advancement in the PLA. On the final claim, there may be some truth that Bo had developed close personal relationships with Liu Yuan and Zhang Haiyang that dated back to childhood years. For Liu and Zhang, however, such personal relationships are not likely to override the organizational or military and party disciplines that forbid the “splitist” behavior such as participating in a coup plot. Furthermore, given that Bo’s chances of winning against Hu in a coup were almost nil, the political cost of such a behavior was prohibitively high. Liu and Zhang thus had no incentive to commit political suicide by helping Bo in a coup that was bound to fail. Instead of remaining under house arrest following Bo’s dismissal, according to one analysis, both Liu and Zhang had been “maintaining the predictably hectic public schedule of a senior military leader,” including visits to foreign countries. As evidence demonstrates that both Liu and Zhang were not implicated in Bo’s dismissal, the same analysis concludes that “the breathless reporting of military purges and coups following Bo’s

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dismissal appears to be the product of the feverish imaginations of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong journalists.”32 Military Policy Besides enhancing civilian governance to prevent the PLA from intervening in domestic politics, Hu also pursued a military policy that confined the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Hu, for instance, endorsed a new military strategic guideline which required the PLA to make preparations for fighting and winning “local war under informatized conditions.” He operationalized the principle into the concept of “information system-based system of systems operations” (“基于信息系统的体系作战”) to guide China’s military modernization. This concept highlights the integration of the various service forces into a PLA “system of systems” that is capable of multi-spatial and variable distance deployment and presence. Laterally networked by a common information system or a C4ISR architecture,33 this operations system helps to achieve the battlefield transparency-based “information superiority.” This superiority in turn allows for synchronized, parallel operations by multiservice forces, thus enabling the “battlefield initiative” against the opponent.34 The new concept aimed to offer remedies for the unintended but serious consequences stemming from the individual service-centered policy of “informatization” in the Jiang era. These consequences included the proliferation of “information stovepipes” or “isolated information islands” (“信息孤岛”) for lack of lateral networking of different services by a common C4ISR architecture, and neglect of the comparative advantages of different services by developing functionally redundant capabilities within every individual service. Both caused substantial waste or inefficient use of scarce resources.35 To enhance the “jointness” of the PLA by leveraging the comparative advantages of different services in strategic planning and decisions, for the first time in PLA history, the chiefs of the three technology-­intensive services such as the PLAN, the PLAAF, and the Second Artillery were accepted as members of the CMC in the Hu era. These chiefs became CMC members not because of seniority but because they represented their services. Moreover, as noted elsewhere in this study, Hu assigned to the PLA the “new historic missions” for it to fulfill. Hu particularly required the PLA to “enhance the capabilities to cope with multiple types of security threat

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and fulfill diversified military missions” (“提高军队应对多种安全威胁、 完成多样化军事任务的能力”), which stressed non-traditional security missions such as the HADR, counter-piracy, and UN peacekeeping.36 Hu’s order to deploy about 117,000 PLA personnel for the Sichuan earthquake relief in May 2008 was a manifestation of this policy.37 But more important, this policy expanded the external role of the PLA. Since 2008, for instance, the PLAN has been conducting naval operations to escort merchant ships against piracy in Gulf of Aden. By the end of 2017, 26 naval task forces had participated in such operations involving 70 major naval surface combatants.38 The PLA naval task forces reportedly escorted more than 6400 Chinese and foreign merchant vessels in 1109 batches, and prevented about 3000 suspected pirate boats from launching attacks.39 In early 2011, the PLAN and the PLAAF also deployed naval and air capabilities to Africa and the Mediterranean to support and protect the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya.40 Moreover, the PLA made major contributions to the UN peacekeeping in the Hu era. As of June 2017, the PLA conducted 24 UN peacekeeping missions involving 31,000 personnel, 13 of whom lost their lives.41 Finally, the PLA reportedly provided HADR in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and dispatched its hospital ship from 2009 onward to provide medical services in 43 countries, benefiting over 230,000 people.42 Some of these overseas missions facilitated opportunities for the PLA personnel to gain invaluable operational experience in the relatively harsh, remote, unfamiliar, and quasi-combat conditions, which is consistent with the policy objective of confining the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise. Involving the PLA in external missions could also be a good strategy for top leaders to control the PLA. As some argue, a focus of the military on external missions may make civil-military relations easier to manage.43 On the other hand, Hu’s control of the PLA was seriously flawed by two important issues that Hu had failed to resolve: one was rampant military corruption, and the other was the planned restructuring and downsizing of the PLA. Because of these two flaws, Hu is largely considered a weak leader in dealing with the PLA.44

Xi Jinping and the PLA Even though Xi had served in the PLA for three year from 1979 to 1982, his service was too short and his grade too low to cultivate close personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. Xi spent most of his

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adult life and career as a civilian official in Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, from 1982 to 2007. Therefore, after becoming the CMC chair in 2012, like his post-Deng predecessors, Xi also curried favor with the PLA by regularly increasing the defense budget, promoting military officers to higher positions and ranks, and inspecting the PLA institutions and basic-level units. Moreover, Xi established a Ministry of Veteran Affairs in 2018 to take care of the welfare of the discharged veterans. This initiative was intended to win support from the PLA, boost the morale of the active-­ duty military personnel, and prevent social upheavals that the disgruntled veterans may cause. Xi also aligned his preferences with those of the PLA, endorsing the “dream of a strong military” (“强军梦”) and supporting a hardline policy over the maritime disputes. Xi made the decisions to establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and build air fields, deep-water harbors, and surveillance and communications facilities on the reefs of the South China Sea that China controls.45 Like his post-­ Deng predecessors, Xi’s power consolidation aims to implement a two-­ pronged policy that helps to maintain the clear institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities based on a functional division of labor. This policy aims first to enhance civilian governance to prevent major political and social upheavals that may require the intervention of the PLA in domestic politics, and second to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Civilian Governance The major lessons that Xi has learned from the collapse of the Soviet Union are somewhat different from those of Deng. Unlike Deng who singled out economic stagnation and decline as the central cause of the collapse, Xi lists bureaucratic corruption, loss of faith in party ideology, and military disloyalty to the party as the major causes.46 Xi’s lessons, however, should be interpreted as complementing rather than challenging or rejecting Deng’s views. The fact that Xi’s lessons have never been officially publicized implies that these lessons are personal and do not reflect a new party policy. In normative terms, the lessons that Xi has learned may have been employed to justify his new emphasis on reinforcing party control, enhancing ideological education, and stressing the loyalty of the PLA to the party.

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In empirical and behavioral terms, however, Xi has continued to regard effective civilian governance, particularly in terms of sustainable economic development along with political and society stability, as the central task of the party, which is consistent with Deng’s “basic line.” Xi, for instance, has attempted to restructure the economy for high-quality growth, promoted poverty reduction to narrow the wealth gap, and endorsed major measures to reduce environmental pollution. He has also tightened up social control to achieve political and social stability, including strengthening the internet and media censorship and intensifying social surveillance that leverages new technologies.47 But because Xi believes that official corruption would “doom the party and the state” (“亡党亡国”), his top policy priority after he came to power was to combat bureaucratic corruption in order to save and enhance the party’s legitimacy to rule. From the early days in office, for instance, Xi has vowed to crack down on “tigers and flies,” that is, corrupt senior officials and low-level bureaucrats alike. Xi’s emphasis on tackling these civilian governance-related issues has prevented major political and social upheavals that may require the intervention of the PLA in domestic politics. Besides numerous “flies,” a few “tigers” were caught in Xi’s counter-­ corruption drive. Zhou Yongkang, a retired PBSC member and former secretary of the powerful Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, was placed under investigation by the CDIC and the state procuratorial authority in late 2013. He was sentenced to life in prison by the court for “taking bribes, abusing power, and intentionally disclosing state secrets” in 2015.48 Ling Jihua, a former director of the CCP Central General Office and a vice-chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was placed under investigation by the CDIC and the state procuratorial authority in 2014. He was sentenced to life in prison by the court for “taking bribes, abusing power, and illegally acquiring state secrets” in 2016.49 Ling’s removal was also attributed to his attempt to cover up a scandal involving the crash of a Ferrari Spider, which caused the death of his son and serious injury of two young women, one of whom died later.50 Finally, Sun Zhengcai, the party boss of Chongqing and a Politburo member, was investigated by the CDIC and the state procuratorial authority in 2017 and sentenced to life in prison for “taking bribes” in 2018.51 There is no empirical evidence to show that the PLA played any role in the dismissal of these “tigers” from office. The decisions to investigate them were made by the PBSC, which has excluded senior military officers

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from serving as members since 1997. The top leader, in his role as the CMC chair, monopolizes the institutional interactions with the senior military officers in the CMC. Both institutional constraints made it difficult for these “tigers” to cultivate close allies among the uniformed PLA leadership. As noted elsewhere in this study, the lack of close allies in the PLA by the “tigers” also stems from the post-Mao development where there has been virtually no circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. All the “tigers,” for instance, have had no military service experience nor held any position in the PLA that could have helped them to develop durable personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. Zhou Yongkang, who had served as the chief of China’s vast and complex domestic security apparatus for about ten years from 2002 to 2012, however, may have developed personal networks in the public security, state security, and the PAP chains of command. But Zhou retired from all the official positions in November 2012. It was not until a year after his retirement that he was placed under official investigation for corruption. Because Zhou is not comparable to Deng in credentials and status, being a retiree, Zhou’s political capital at the time of the investigation may have diminished to the extent where his chances of winning a political battle against Xi, an incumbent top leader whose power grows day by day, became very slim. Moreover, the cost of violating party discipline by joining any unauthorized political opposition against the top party leader is prohibitively high. For this reason, officials that Zhou might have developed close ties with when he was in power were likely to bandwagon on the winning side of Xi, but not to stay on the losing side of Zhou against Xi. Combating Military Corruption On the military side, Xi has pursued a policy to combat military corruption. He has also centralized command and control of the PLA by restructuring the PLA leadership and downsizing the PLA.  Rather than just currying favor or doing what the PLA wants, a major indicator of how successful a top leader has consolidated power regarding the PLA is whether he can impose his will on the PLA or make the PLA do what it otherwise may not want to do, such as combating military corruption and restructuring and downsizing the PLA.  In comparison with his predecessors such as Jiang and Hu, it took much shorter time, or less than two years, for Xi to consolidate power so that he could impose his will on the PLA.52

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In March 2014, for instance, retired CMC Vice-Chair Xu Caihou was placed under investigation for “taking bribes.” He was expelled from the party in June and from the PLA in July. Xu’s case was forwarded to the military procuratorate for prosecution in October 2014, but was exempted because of Xu’s death in March 2015.53 Guo Boxiong, another retired CMC vice-chair, was placed under investigation in early 2015 and was sentenced for life in prison for “taking bribes” by the court in 2016.54 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that besides Guo and Xu, a substantial number of top and senior military officers were investigated and prosecuted for corruption from 2012 to 2017. To reduce the institutional conditions that undergird military corruption, Xi ordered the PLA to comprehensively stop “paid services” (“军队 全面停止有偿服务”), or to close the loopholes of Jiang’s policy to divest the PLA from its business activities in 1998. By June 30, 2018, of the 106,000 PLA projects that offered “paid services” in sectors such as real estates, hotels, telecommunications, construction engineering and technology, storage and transportation facilities, maintenance technology, scientific research, medicine, militia equipment repairs, agriculture and sideline production, drivers’ training, media and publications, culture and sports, talent training, and children’s education, 100,000 had permanently been stopped and terminated. The rest that involve more “complex and sensitive” projects would be terminated within a year.55 The political significance of combating military corruption in the Xi era should not be overstated. It is important to note that corrupt officers are convicted of economic crimes such as profiteering from the sales of offices, sales or lease of military land and properties, embezzlement of official budget, and outsourcing of defense contracts, but not for political crimes such as organizing “anti-party cliques.” Unlike “anti-party cliques” that attempt to “seize political power,” bureaucratic corruption is where corrupt officers aim to enrich themselves, their families, and their friends. Corruption networks thus are founded on monetary transactions, but not battle-tested ties like the field army networks or a common ideology that bound the “Gang of Four.” These networks are isolated within a single functional system such as the PLA or the political and legal affairs system, with minimal mobilization across the institutional boundaries. Corruption networks thus are disorganized and fragile. Major cases of corruption are also defined as disciplinary issues, which do not constitute critical political threats to the top leadership that warrant the mobilization of the military force to handle them. Instead, the primary institutions to

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Table 4.1  Senior officers prosecuted for corruption between the 18th Party Congress of 2012 and the 19th Congress of 2017a Name

Position

Rank

Time of investigation

Liu Hongjie

Deputy director of Management and Support Department of General Staff Department Deputy director of GLD

Major general (MG)

February 2015

Lieutenant general (LG) LG

November 2014 October 2017

MG

August 2016

MG

October 2015

MG MG

May 2014 December 2015

MG

March 2015

MG

February 2015

Liu Zheng

Liu Shengjie Deputy director of CMC Logistics Support Department (CMCLSD) Zhou linhe Director of Military Supplies, Materiel and Fuel Department of GLD Zhou Guotai Deputy director of Military Supplies, Materiel and Fuel Department of GLD Fu Linguo Deputy chief of staff of GLD Li Mingquan Director of General-Purpose Armament Support Department of General Armament Department Dong Director of Joint Logistics Department of Mingxiang Beijing MR Chen Deputy director of Political Department Hongyan of Beijing MR Air Force Wang Dong Chief of staff of Tianjin Garrison District Fang Wenping Huang Xianjun Wang Aiguo

Commander of Shanxi Provincial MD

Director of Political Department of Shanxi Provincial MD Director of Joint Logistics Department of Shenyang MR Kou Tie Commander of Heilongjiang Provincial MD Zhang Deputy commander of Heilongjiang Daixin Provincial MD Zhang Min Chief of staff of Jinan MR Zhang Qibin Deputy chief of staff of Jinan MR Fan Deputy PC of Lanzhou MR Changmi Zhan Director of Joint Logistics Department of Guoqiao Lanzhou MR Zhang Director of Joint Logistics Department of Wansong Lanzhou MR

Senior colonel December (SC) 2016 MG March 2014 MG

January 2015

MG

November 2014 November 2014 December 2014 July 2016 August 2014 December 2014 December 2014 August 2015

MG MG MG MG LG MG MG

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Name

Position

Rank

Time of investigation

Deng Ruihua Zhou Minggui Fu Yi Guo Zhenggang Yang Jinshan Zhu Heping

PC of Joint Logistics Department of Lanzhou MR Deputy director of Political Department of Nanjing MR Commander of Zhejiang Provincial MD Deputy PC of Zhejiang Provincial MD

MG

July 2015

MG

January 2015

MG MG

March 2015 February 2015

LG MG

July 2014 August 2004

MG MG LG MG

May 2015 July 2014 September 2015 February 2015

MG

January 2015

MG MG

October 2014 December 2014 January 2015

Ye Wanyong Wei Jin Wang Yufa

Deputy commander of Chengdu MR Director of Joint Logistics Department of Chengdu MR PC of Sichuan Provincial MD Deputy PC of Tibet MD PC of Guangzhou MR Air Force

Wang Sheng Director of Logistics Department of Guangzhou MR Air Force Chen Deputy director of Joint Logistics Jianfeng Department of Guangzhou MR Yuan shijun Commander of Hubei Provincial MD Zhan Jun Deputy commander of Hubei Provincial MD Lan Weijie Deputy commander of Hubei Provincial MD Wang Yu Director of Armament Department of PLAN South Sea Fleet Cheng Jie Deputy chief of staff of PLAN North Sea Fleet Zhu Hongda Director of Logistics Department of PLAAF Wang Deputy commander of Second Artillery Jiurong Zhang Deputy PC of Second Artillery Dongshui Yu Daqing Deputy PC of Second Artillery Chen Qiang Deputy commander of 56th Base of Second Artillery Duan Tianjie Deputy director of Political Department of NDU Wu Deputy PC of Second Artillery Reizhong Engineering University

MG Rear admiral (RA) RA

January 2015

MG

March 2016

LG

February 2017

MG

January 2015

LG MG

January 2015 May 2014

MG

November 2014 November 2015

MG

October 2015

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Name

Position

Gao Xiaoyan Deputy PC of PLA Information Engineering University Dai Weimin Vice president of PLA Political College in Nanjing Ma Director of Political Department of PLA Xiangdong Political College in Nanjing Huang Xing Director of Scientific Research Guidance Department of Academy of Military Science (AMS) Wang PC of Air Defense Command College Minggui

Rank

Time of investigation

MG

November 2014 November 2014 December 2014 January 2015

MG SC MG

MG

November 2013

a “The State of Affairs on Major Military Corruption Cases Involving Investigation and Prosecution of Cadres at and above the Corps-Leader Grade in 2014” [“2014年军队查处军级以上干部重大贪腐案件情 况”], Liberation Army Daily, January 15, 2015, and “Recent State of Affairs on Major Criminal Cases of the Military Involving Investigation and Prosecution of Cadres at and above the Corps-Leader Grade” [“军队近期查处军级以上干部重大案件情况”], Liberation Army Daily, March 2, 2015

Table 4.2  Top officers prosecuted for corruptiona Name

Position

Xu Caihou CMC vice-chair Guo Boxiong Fang Fenghui Zhang Yang Wang Jianping Tian Xiusi Wang Xibin

Rank

Service status

Time of investigation March 2014

Chief of CMC Joint Staff Department (CMCJSD) Director of CMCPWD

General Retired in November 2012 General Retired in November 2012 General Retired in August 2017 General Active-duty

Deputy Chief of CMCJSD

General Active-duty

August 2016

PC of PLAAF

General Retired in July 2015 General Retired in July 2013

July 2016

CMC vice-chair

President of NDU

April 2015 January 2018 August 2017

February 2017

a “Former Chinese Military Chief of Staff under Graft Investigation,” Xinhuanet, January 1, 2018, “Senior Chinese Military Officer Commits Suicide amid Corruption Probe,” Xinhuanet, November 28, 2017, “Top Legislature Disqualifies Lawmakers,” Xinhuanet, February 24, 2017, “China’s High-Ranking Military Officer under Probe for Graft,” Xinhuanet, December 29, 2016, and “Former Top Officer in China’s Air Force ‘under Investigation by Anti-Corruption Officials’: Sources,” SCMP, July 8, 2016

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deal with the issue of corruption are the discipline inspection commissions, the procuratorates, and the courts. Table 4.2 shows that top PLA officers who were prosecuted in Xi’s counter-corruption drive were mostly retired. They also were investigated and prosecuted individually and separately at different times. This is in contrast to the “anti-party cliques” where the military members of these cliques were active-duty officers who were persecuted together as a group. This difference suggests that unlike “anti-party cliques,” corrupt officers were not regarded as a coherent group that poses a critical political threat to the top leadership. Finally, the prosecution of Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui, as shown in Table 4.2, reveals the limits of the power of the post-Deng top leaders to control the PLA. Both Zhang and Fang were appointed to head the most important PLA departments such as the GPD and the General Staff Department (GSD) in October 2012, the time when Xi succeeded Hu as the top leader. It was not until after five years in late 2017 that Xi decided to remove the two from these critically important positions, after both were found to belong to the corruption networks of the senior military officers. This belated exposure shows that Xi’s knowledge of the senior military officers is quite limited. He lacks entrenched personal networks in the PLA that he could trust. This is understandable for someone like Xi, who spent most of his career in civilian governance in Fujian and Zhejiang. In the final analysis, the dismissal of the corrupt officers should help the PLA to reduce and deter corrupt and wasteful practices, enhance its internal cohesiveness, and confine it to perfecting its functional and technical expertise. Restructuring the PLA Leadership Rampant military corruption attributable to the weak civilian control by Hu Jintao who served as the CMC chair from 2004 to 2012, however, raised important questions about the civilian or party control of the PLA.  To strengthen the party’s “absolute leadership” of the PLA in peacetime military administration, which has critical implications for command and control of the PLA in times of crisis and war, Xi set out to reorganize the leadership and command and control structure of the PLA.  First, he dismantled the four PLA general departments, or the GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD, which constituted an independent and powerful layer of authority between the CMC and the PLA services and

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its regional combatant commands. Xi believes that these general departments “concentrated too much power in themselves,” undermined the authority of the CMC leadership, and served as major venues for corruption.56 In the meantime, Xi established 15 smaller departments, commissions, and offices, mostly associated with the functional responsibilities of the old general departments, and internalized them into the CMC. These downsized agencies are tasked to provide “staff, enforcement, and service” (“参 谋, 执行, 服务”) support to the CMC leadership. They can no longer issue operational orders to the PLA independently like the old general departments, since they were stripped of the power to do so.57 The elimination of the “independent leadership layer” of the general departments between the CMC and the PLA services and its regional combatant commands has particularly enhanced the power of the CMC chair to control the PLA directly.58 Second, Xi reiterates the importance of the CMC chair responsibility system (军委主席责任制), which was codified in the 1981 State Constitution but neglected in the Hu era. Based on this system, the 15 new CMC agencies are required to “report to the CMC chair on all important matters, and decisions on all important issues must be made by the CMC chair” (“一切重要事项向军委主席报告, 一切重大问题由军委 主席决策”).59 Xi also revamped the CMC by appointing as members those officers that he can trust, reducing the number of the uniformed members, and increasing the number of political officers to enhance his control of the PLA.60 Finally, as a precaution, Xi centralized the command and control of the PAP by requiring it to report to the CMC, a modification of the traditional dual-leadership structure where the PAP reported to both the CMC and the State Council. The primary responsibility of the PAP, however, has not changed; it is tasked to maintain China’s domestic security.61 Third, Xi attempts to control the PLA by strengthening the “mechanisms of checks and supervision” (“制约和监督机制”). As noted elsewhere in this study, agencies in charge of discipline inspection, criminal investigation, prosecution, court, financial audit, and training supervision were separated from the major performing organizations of the PLA and elevated to the level of the CMC. By reporting directly to the CMC leadership as separate chains of command, these agencies have clearly gained more “independence” and “authority” in supervising other major PLA organizations without interference from these organizations. By

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deploying the discipline inspection, audit, and training supervision groups (纪检, 审计, 训练督察组) to major central and regional PLA organizations as external supervisors, these agencies should be more effective in supervising the PLA against corruption on behalf of the top leader.62 This change is intended to offer remedies for the ineffectiveness of the old supervision agencies stemming from their “internalization” into the performing organizations such as the GPD, GLD, and GSD. This “internalization” had compromised their supervisory role. Finally, Xi attempts to enhance his control of the PLA by dividing the power between the PLA services and its regional combatant commands, or the regional theaters. The PLA services, for instance, were divested of the power for operational command and control of their forces in times of crisis and war. Their power thus is limited to peacetime force construction and administration. The PLA regional theaters, on the other hand, were divested of the power for peacetime force construction and administration. Their power is confined to operational command and control of all the service forces that are deployed in their theaters in times of crisis and war. This institutional change serves to divide the power that was once fused in the commanding officers of these PLA organizations to the extent these officers became the “lords of their own estates” (“一方诸侯”).63 In relative terms, however, the PLA services may gain more power from this change than the regional theaters. Force construction and administration, for instance, may require more inputs of resources such as finance and manpower, and more interactions between the service commands and the lower-level units. Military Policy Besides combating military corruption and restructuring the PLA leadership to enhance the central and civilian control of the PLA, Xi’s military policy aims specifically to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Xi, for instance, endorsed a new military strategic guideline which requires the PLA to make preparations for fighting and winning “informatized local war.”64 A major difference between “informatized local war” and the earlier notion of “local war under informatized conditions” is that the former requires a higher level of IT network-based integration of the various service forces in military operations. Such an integration helps to optimize the PLA

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preparations for fighting and winning the type of war that is most likely to occur in China’s security environment. To enhance the “jointness” of the PLA, Xi established a PLAA headquarters to take over responsibilities of running the army units from the PLA central and regional organizations such as the newly established CMC agencies and the regional theaters. In the past, the PLA did not have a PLAA headquarters; the PLA general departments and the MRs thus were tasked to run the army units. As a result, these PLA organizations were dominated by army officers, and non-army service officers were marginalized in them. The new PLAA headquarters, however, freed up the new CMC agencies and the regional theaters from running the army units. These agencies and theaters thus can become genuinely “joint” in terms of the composition of their commanding and staff officers, command and control, and military operations. This change should also incentivize the more coherent, long-term development of the PLAA.65 For similar reasons, Xi made the decision to downsize the PLA by 300,000 billets. He replaced the seven army-dominated MRs with five “joint” regional theaters, and reduced the number of the PLAA group armies from 18 to 13. Unlike the army-dominated MRs where non-army service officers and forces reported primarily to their headquarters in Beijing, all theater-level service forces, including the army, naval, air, conventional rocket, and strategic support forces deployed in a particular theater, are now treated as equals and required to report to their theater commanding officers on all operational matters. For the same reason, for the first time in PLA history, non-army service officers are appointed to command the newly established theaters. Yuan Yubai, a naval officer and a nuclear submariner by training, was appointed to command the Southern Theatre in 2017, and Yi Xiaoguang, an air force officer and a combat pilot by training, was appointed to command the Central Theatre.66 Finally, to cope with the growing security challenges from the outer space, the cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, Xi established a PLASSF to develop and manage the PLA capabilities in these three domains.67 By downsizing the PLAA and expanding the capital-intensive and technology-­intensive services that are more appropriate for forward deployment and power projection, Xi’s military policy clearly aims to reduce the domestic role of the PLA and enhance its capabilities for external missions. Besides safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and rights and interests regarding Taiwan and the “near seas” including the Yellow, East, and South China Seas, for instance, China’s 2015 and 2019 Defense White Papers

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highlight the role of the PLA in providing security for China’s expanding overseas interests. These interests include external sources of China’s energy and resources supplies, vital sea lanes, the Chinese institutions and assets that are deployed overseas, the Chinese overseas investment, and the Chinese nationals working and living overseas. These white papers also stress the role of the PLA in safeguarding China’s emerging security interests in the outer space, the cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Finally, these white papers underscore the role of the PLA in carrying out non-traditional security missions such as counter-piracy, UN peacekeeping, and HADR.68 The PLA thus has continued its naval operations to protect the vital sea lanes against piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the era of Xi. It also deployed a naval task force to evacuate 629 Chinese citizens and 279 citizens of other countries out of the civil war in Yemen in 2015.69 Moreover, under Xi’s leadership, the PLA has developed and trained a standby UN peacekeeping force of 8000 troops, including units that specialize in infantry, engineering, transportation, hospital, force protection, quick reaction, air lift, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and naval surface operations. In the meantime, the Chinese UN peacekeeping force has been deployed to 24 overseas locations.70 The PLA also provided HADR in response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa from 2013 to 2016.71 To support its overseas operations, the PLA established its first overseas logistics support base in Djibouti in July 2017.72 In the final analysis, rather than domestic politics, according to China’s military analysts, “Xi wants the PLA to concentrate on two major tasks. One is making preparations for fighting and winning war, and the other is ‘going out’ (‘走出去’),” or fulfilling external missions.73

Conclusion The previous chapter finds that party-army symbiosis was high in the eras of Mao and Deng because the PLA involvement in the intra-party leadership power struggle was extensive and significant. Military force was mobilized into such struggle and a substantial number of senior military officers were persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques.” In contrast to the eras of Mao and Deng, however, this chapter shows that the post-Deng era has witnessed a remarkable decline of the PLA involvement in China’s domestic politics. Intra-CCP leadership power struggle, for instance, has become rare for lack of severe political division among the party

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leadership. There is no evidence to show that military force is employed in party leadership politics and senior military officers are persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques.” Some argue that the political uncertainty associated with the generational changes of the top leaders and investigation of senior leaders for corruption may motivate top leaders to mobilize support from the PLA in elite politics. But based on a careful analysis of the major cases that allegedly involved the PLA in elite politics in the post-Deng era, this chapter shows that these allegations are founded on shaky ground in term of both analytical logic and empirical evidence. In the post-Deng era, effective civilian governance that delivers economic development along with political and social stability has become the top policy priority of the top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent major political and social upheavals that may require the intervention of the PLA in domestic politics. In the meantime, all the top leaders have endorsed a military policy that confines the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. As a result, quasi-institutionalization of civil-military relations has developed and solidified in post-Deng China. Relative Power and Influence of the Retired Top Leaders One related, critical issue that deserves more careful scrutiny is the extent of the informal power and influence of the retired top leaders over their successors in the post-Deng era. After the 14th Party Congress of 1992 where Jiang’s position as the top leader was more consolidated, for instance, Jiang remained cautious and deferential. Deng still attempted to influence military policy by having Wang Reilin, his personal aide, serve as a member of the CMC. CMC Vice-Chairs Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, who were much more senior than Jiang in credentials and status, may have also served to watch Jiang on behalf of Deng, even though they also assisted Jiang to run the PLA. Jiang thus had to defer to Liu and Zhang on all major military policy decisions.74 It was not until after 1997, the year when Deng died, both Liu and Zhang retired, and Jiang’s appointees began to dominate the CMC, that Jiang felt more secure to impose his will on the PLA, or make the PLA do what it otherwise may not want to do. Jiang, for instance, made the unpopular decisions to divest the PLA from its business activities and downsize the PLA twice after 1997.

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Based on similar logic, some argue that Jiang Zemin, after his retirement in 2004, also attempted to exercise informal power and influence over his successors such as Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping by imbedding them in a CMC dominated by Jiang’s appointees such as Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. Because of Jiang’s alleged power and influence, Hu and Xi must be cautious and defer to Jiang and his protégés in the CMC on major military policy decisions. According to this argument, the informal power and influence of the retired Jiang were so pervasive and overwhelming that they prevented Hu Jintao from investigating the rampant military corruption associated with Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both alleged protégés of Jiang, for fear of offending or upsetting Jiang. This argument, however, has critical flaws. Jiang Zemin may have felt more secure by 1997 following the death of Deng, the retirement of CMC Vice-Chairs Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, and Jiang’s appointment of Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian to fill the positions of Liu and Zhang. Jiang’s promotion of Guo Boxiong, a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, and Xu Caihou, a deputy director of the GPD, to the CMC membership in 1999 may have also been treated as a personal favor that Guo and Xu may wish to pay back in loyalty in the future. It is however important to note that Jiang and his CMC appointees are not comparable to Deng and his generation of PLA leaders in credentials and status. The informal power and influence of Jiang and his CMC appointees over Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping thus were much smaller than those of Deng and his generation of PLA leaders over Jiang. Unlike Deng who was regarded as one of the founders of the PLA,75 for instance, Jiang has never served in the PLA. His personal network is largely based on his career experience as a civilian government and party official, particularly as the mayor and party chief of Shanghai. Serving as the CMC chair from 1989 to 2014, Jiang promoted a large number of senior military officers to higher positions and ranks. But as noted elsewhere in this study, most of these officers were promoted for functional and professional reasons, and Jiang’s knowledge of them was limited. Jiang’s relationship and interactions with the PLA thus may not translate into durable personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA that he could leverage for power struggle. Xi Jinping, for instance, was said to be a protégé of Jiang Zemin as well, owing his promotion to Jiang. But if the informal power and influence of the retired Jiang had been so pervasive and overwhelming, Xi should have feared to investigate Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong much more than Hu

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Jintao, who is not known as a protégé of Jiang. However, Jiang’s political power and influence over Xi Jinping, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong proved to be nonexistent as Xi was forthright in conducting an investigation of Xu and Guo for corruption. Moreover, the alleged members of Jiang’s personal network such as Chen Liangyu, Bo Xilai, and Zhou Yongkang were investigated and prosecuted for corruption by both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Jiang’s inability to prevent them from facing investigation and prosecution severely undermined the credibility of Jiang’s political power and influence as the leader of his personal network. Both instances demonstrate that the informal power and influence of the retired Jiang are grossly exaggerated. It is also not true that Hu Jintao had not tackled military corruption. Hu, for instance, dismissed Wang Shouye, a deputy commander of the PLA Navy, from office in 2006, who was later prosecuted for taking millions of dollars of bribes and keeping mistresses.76 Hu also dismissed Gu Junshan, a deputy GLD director, from office in May 2012, whose scandal led to the eventual downfall of Xu Caihou. A major reason for conducting an investigation of Xu, for instance, is that Gu had earlier bribed Xu for promotion, which Xu had attempted to cover up.77 Gu got a suspended death sentence for “graft, bribe-taking, embezzling official funds, committing bribery and abusing power” in 2015.78 To sum up the analysis, rather than Jiang’s patronage of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, Hu’s risk-averse, conflict-avoidance, and hands-off personality style,79 together with a lack of more independent and authoritative agencies to supervise the PLA against corruption, offers better explanations of the rampant military corruption in the Hu era. Finally, uniformed CMC members who were appointed earlier by the retired top leaders may shift their loyalty to the successor, or the new commander-in-chief. Hu Jintao promoted Air Force General Xu Qiliang to become a CMC member in 2007. Hu promoted Xu again to the position of a CMC vice-chair in 2012, the year when Xi was to succeed Hu as the top leader. Xu Qiliang clearly shifted his loyalty from Hu to Xi after the latter succeeded Hu as the CMC chair in late 2012. Xu won the trust of Xi by successfully implementing Xi’s policy to restructure the PLA.80 At the 1st Plenum of the 19th CCP Central Committee held in October 2017, Xi appointed Xu as a CMC vice-chair.81 This example shows that the personal power and influence of the retired top leaders may have become less important than the impact of competent and professional performance on the career advancement of senior military officers.

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Notes 1. You Ji, “Jiang Zemin’s Command of the Military,” The China Journal, No. 45 (January 2001), and James Mulvenon, “China: Conditional Compliance,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 318. 2. You Ji, “Hu Jintao’s Consolidation of Power and His Command of the Gun,” in John Wong and Lai Hongyi (eds.), China into the Hu-Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), p. 59. 3. According to informed sources in Beijing, Zhang Wannian actually complained that he and Chi Haotian had to retire while Jiang stayed on as the CMC chair after the 16th Party Congress. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in August 2003. 4. Ibid. 5. See “Court Throws out Disgraced Chen’s Appeal,” SCMP, August 21, 1998. 6. You Ji, China’s Military Transformation (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), p. 63. 7. See NDU Army Construction Studies Institute, A Reader for Studying Jiang Zemin’s Thought on National Defense and Army Construction [江泽 民国防和军队建设思想学习读本] (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2002), p. 309. 8. See Dennis Blasko, “Servant of Two Masters,” in Nan Li (ed.), Chinese Civil-Military Relations (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 118–119. 9. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in January 1998. 10. For Jiang’s thinking on the relationship between economic development and regime stability, see Li Anzeng, et al., Research on the Issue of Regime Stability in the Process of Modernization in Contemporary China [当代中国 现代化进程中的政权稳定问题研究] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2016), pp. 78–80, 82–83. 11. Ibid., pp. 81, 83–84. 12. See Blasko, “Servant of Two Masters,” pp. 126–127. 13. For the evolution of Jiang’s concepts regarding China’s military modernization, see NDU Army Construction Studies Institute, A Reader for Studying Jiang Zemin’s Thought on National Defense and Army Construction, pp. 56, 232–244. 14. See Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2009), pp. 151–152, 153. 15. See “China’s Responsibility in Safeguarding World Peace” [“维护世界和 平的中国担当”], Liberation Army Daily, May 29, 2019.

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16. See Jiang Zemin, “The Army Must Stop All Its Business Activities” [“军队 必须停止一切经商活动”] (A speech delivered at a CMC meeting on July 21, 1998), in Jiang Zemin, On National Defense and Army Construction [论国防和军队建设] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2002), pp. 321–334. 17. See Zhang Zhen, Zhang Zhen’s Memoirs, Book 2 [张震回忆录, 下册] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2003), p. 399. This “central leader” refers to Zhao Ziyang, who served as the CCP general-secretary and first CMC vice-chair from 1987 to 1989. Zhang was a CMC vice-chair from 1992 to 1997. 18. For lobbying of the civilian leaders by the PLA leaders, see Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs [刘华清回忆录] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), p. 585, and Zhang, Zhang Zhen’s Memoires, pp. 373–374. 19. See Zhang, Zhang Zhen’s Memoirs, pp. 377–378. 20. See Nan Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), p. 19. 21. For Hu’s policy initiatives, see ibid., p. 14, and Li, Research on the Issue of Regime Stability, pp. 88–90. 22. For Hu’s policy initiatives, see Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era, p.  15, and Li, Research on the Issue of Regime Stability, pp. 91–92. 23. “Chen Liangyu Is Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison on Two Criminal Charges in the Trial of the First Instance” [“陈良宇一审两项罪名获刑 18年”], Xinhuanet, April 11, 2008. 24. “The Original Sentence of Bo Xilai on Charges of Taking Bribes, Corruption and Abusing Power Is Maintained in the Trial of the Second Instance” [“薄熙来受贿、贪污、滥用职权案二审维持原判”], people.cn, October 25, 2013. 25. “Chinese Official at Center of Scandal Is Found Guilty and Given a Life Term,” New York Times, September 21, 2013. 26. You, China’s Military Transformation, p. 2. 27. “Bo’s Ties to Army Alarmed Beijing,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2012. See also “Bo Xilai Visits Museum of Group Army based in Yunnan,” news.163.com, February 11, 2012, and “The Uncertain Future of Bo Xilai,” Want China Times, February 25, 2012, both cited in James Mulvenon, “The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 38 (Summer 2012), Note 37. 28. “Bo’s Ties to Army Alarmed Beijing.” See also “Bo Xilai Raising an Army Plotting to Rebel, Hu, Wen and Xi Jinping Putting the King of the Southwest out of Business with One Knockout Blow,” Apple Daily, April 12, 2012, “Bo Scandal Fallout Spreads to PLA Generals,” Strait Times, April 16, 2012, and “PLA Political Commissar Close to Bo Xilai Is ‘Missing’,” Want China Times, April 16, 2012, all cited in Mulvenon, “The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA,” Notes 44, 45, and 56.

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29. For a discussion of the relationships between Bo and Liu Yuan and Zhang Haiyang, see Mulvenon, “The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA,” p. 6. 30. See Joseph Fewsmith, “Authoritarian Resilience Revisited,” paper presented at the East Asian Institute International Conference on China 2035: Xi Jinping’s Vision for Modernization, Singapore, May 24, 2018. 31. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in September 2013. 32. See Mulvenon, “The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA.” 33. C4ISR refers to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 34. See Nan Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era,” in Roy Kamphausen, et  al. (eds.), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: U.S.  Army War College Press, 2014), pp. 270–275. 35. Ibid. 36. See Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era, pp. 17–19, 30. 37. Ibid., pp. 26–30. 38. Ibid., pp.  32–33, and “Facts & Figures: China’s Overseas Peacekeeping Operations,” China Daily, August 1, 2017. 39. See Emanuele Scimia, “Anti-Piracy Mission Helps China Develop Its BlueWater Navy,” Asia Times, January 8, 2018. 40. See Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief, Vol. 11, No. 4 (March 2011). 41. “Facts & Figures.” 42. “Spotlight: China’s Peacekeeping Efforts Hailed at UN Headquarters Exhibition,” Xihuanet (English edition), February 17, 2019. 43. See, for instance, Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1999). 44. See Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi.” 45. Ibid., pp.  128–129, Nan Li, “The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime Strategy,” China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 8 (June 2017), and Nan Li, “China’s National People’s Congress in 2018: Defense Budget Increase and Veteran Affairs,” East Asian Policy, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2018). 46. See Chris Buckley, “Vows of Change in China Belie Private Warning,” New York Times, February 14, 2013. 47. See “Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras,” New York Times, July 8, 2018. For a detailed discussion of the major changes to enhance domestic security in the era of Xi, see Sheena Chestnut

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Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 59 (Spring 2019). 48. “Zhou Yongkang Is Sentenced to Life in Prison in the Trial of the First Instance” [“周永康一审被判处无期徒刑”], Xinhuanet, June 11, 2015. 49. “Ling Jihua Is Sentenced to Life in Prison in the Trial of the First Instance” [“令计划一审被判处无期徒刑”], Xinhuanet, July 4, 2016. 50. “Ling Jihua, Ex-Presidential Aide in China, Gets Life Sentence for Corruption,” New York Times, July 4, 2016. 51. “The Verdict On the Case of Sun Zhengcai Taking Bribes Is Announced in Public in the Trial of the First Instance” [“孙政才受贿案一审公开宣判”], Xinhuanet, May 9, 2018. 52. See Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi.” 53. “Xu Caihou Died of Worsening Cancer and Ineffective Medical Treatment” [“徐才厚癌症恶化医治无效死亡”], Xinhuanet, March 16, 2015. 54. “Guo Boxiong Is Sentenced to Life in Prison in the Trial of the First Instance” [“郭伯雄一审被判处无期徒刑”], Xinhuanet, July 25, 2016. 55. See “The Task of the Military to Comprehensively Stop the Projects for Paid Services Has Largely Been Accomplished” [“军队全面停止有偿服务 项目任务基本完成 “], Liberation Army Daily, July 4, 2018. 56. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. See Nan Li, “Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military Commission,” China Brief, Vol. 18, No. 3 (February 2018). 61. See “Armed Police to be Commanded by CMC,” Xinhuanet (English edition), December 27, 2017. 62. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 63. See “Reconfiguring Leadership and Command System of Our Military Is the Inevitable Choice to Strengthen and Reinvigorate the Military” [“重塑 我军领导指挥体制是强军兴军的必然选择”], Liberation Army Daily, November 30, 2015, and Major General Ren Tianyou, “Firmly Upholding the General Principle for Leadership and Command System Reform” [“牢 牢坚持领导指挥体制改革的总原则”], Liberation Army Daily, February 2016. Ren is chair of Strategy Teaching and Research Department of NDU in Beijing. 64. See “China’s Military Strategy” [“中国的军事战略”], Xinhuanet, May 26, 2015, and “Fighting and Winning Informatized Local War Is the Core Task of the Military” [“打赢信息化战争是军队核心任务”], Liberation Army Daily, July 2, 2018. 65. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 66. See Nan Li, “19th Party Congress and PLA’s Leadership Reshuffle,” East Asian Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April, 2018).

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67. See Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring.” 68. See “China’s Military Strategy” and “China’s National Defense in the New Era” [“新时代的中国国防”], Xinhuanet, July 24, 2019. See also “Xin Jinping: Strengthening the Vigor of Protecting China’s Overseas Interests” [“习近平: 加强中国海外利益保护力度”], Xinhuanet, December 1, 2014. 69. See I-wei Jennifer Chang, “China and Yemen’s Forgotten War,” Peace Brief (US Institute of Peace), January 16, 2018. 70. “Understanding China’s Quick Reaction Capabilities Based on Its Peacekeeping Force of 8,000 Troops” [“从8,000人维和部队看中国快反 能力”], Global Times [环球时报], November 20, 2017, and “China Registers 8,000 Standby Peacekeepers at U.N.,” Xinhuanet (English edition), September 28, 2017. 71. “Spotlight: China’s Peacekeeping Efforts Hailed at UN Headquarters Exhibition.” 72. “China Sets up Base in Djibouti,” Xinhuanet (English edition), July 11, 2017. 73. Conversations with military analysts from AMS at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore on April 25, 2018. 74. Conversations with senior PLA officers in Beijing in January 1998. 75. Deng, for instance, led a major military uprising and founded a major Red Army column in Guangxi during 1929–1930. He was a major party and military leader in the Jiangxi Red Army Base in the early 1930s. He served as the political commissar of the 129th Division of the CCP-led Eighth Route Army during the Anti-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. During China’s Civil War from 1945 to 1949, Deng served as the political commissar of the Second Field Army of the PLA. See Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, pp. 29–36. 76. See “Former Deputy Navy Commander Dismissed from Office” [“前海军 副司令王守业被免职”], Xinhuanet, June 29, 2006. 77. Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” pp. 129–130. 78. See “Gu Junshan Sentenced to Death with a Two-Year Reprieve” [“谷俊 山被判处死刑缓期二年执行”], Xinhuanet, May 8, 2015. 79. See Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi.” 80. Xu, for instance, serves as the standing deputy chief (常务副组长) of the CMC Leadership Group on Deepening National Defense and Military Reform. 81. See Li, “Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military Commission.”

CHAPTER 5

Circulation of Elites Across the Civil-Military Institutional Boundaries

Besides major changes in the functions of the PPWS and in the extent of the PLA involvement in intra-CCP leadership power struggle and politics as discussed in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, this chapter examines major changes in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. Like the previous chapters, this chapter aims to evaluate the validity of the argument that Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. If the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries is extensive and frequent, for instance, party-army symbiosis is likely to be high. But if this circulation has become limited and rare, quasi-institutionalization is likely to develop and solidify. To determine the extent of elite circulation across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities, this study analyzes major changes in the career experiences of the CCP Central Committee members over time. If the majority of the Central Committee members are the so-called dual-role elites who have extensive leadership experiences in both the civilian and military institutions and can be identified with the pre-1949 field army networks, party-army symbiosis can be described as being high; otherwise, it can be defined as being low. This variation helps to determine whether symbiotic political-military factions may develop and become deeply entrenched across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities.

© The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_5

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A major reason for selecting the CCP Central Committee membership as the primary analytical sample is that this membership encompasses China’s top and senior party, state, and military leaders. It, for instance, includes members of the CCP Politburo and its Secretariat, major leaders of the CCP Central departments, major leaders of the State Council and its ministries and commissions, major leaders of the provinces, and major leaders of the PLA. For lower levels, major cases and institutional changes are also analyzed to determine the extent of elite circulation across the civil-military institutional boundaries over time.

High Level of Circulation of Elites across the Institutional Boundaries in the Mao Era Circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities at all levels was extensive and frequent in the Mao era. As a result, party-army symbiosis was high, which contributed significantly to major party leaders’ leveraging of the military for intra-­ leadership politics and power struggle. The high level of cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites is particularly reflected in the high proportion of the CCP Central Committee members who had extensive career experiences in both the civilian and military sectors and who could be identified with the pre-1949 field army networks, in the high percentage of military representation in the CCP Politburos and its Central Committees, and in the extensive circulation of the military elite across the institutional boundaries to fill the civilian leadership positions at different levels. 8th Party Central Committee Mao ruled China from 1949 to 1976. During this period, three CCP Party Congresses were held, which elected the 8th Central Committee in 1956, the 9th Central Committee in 1969, and the 10th Central Committee in 1973. The career experiences of the 8th Central Committee members are presented in detail in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, with particular reference to (1) civilian members who had major military leadership experience, (2) civilian members who had no military leadership experience, (3) military members who had major civilian leadership experience, and (4) military members who had no major civilian leadership

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experience. For those who had military leadership experience, their field army affiliations are also identified. The 8th Central Committee membership is selected as the sample of detailed analysis for a few major reasons. By 1956, for instance, Mao had largely consolidated his position as the top leader of the party and the country, particularly after quelling domestic oppositions and unrests and ending the Korean War in 1953. This consolidation allowed him to select the senior leaders that he trusted for governing and developing China, and most of these leaders became members of the 8th Central Committee elected by the 8th Party Congress held in 1956. Moreover, introduction of the military rank system in 1955, one year before the convening of the 8th Party Congress, led to a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities. Those who did not receive military ranks were considered civilian party and government officials, and those who were conferred military ranks were regarded as military officers. This clarification provides the institutional and analytical baseline that helps to determine the extent of elite circulation across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities, both in the past and in the future. Finally, the career experiences of the 8th Central Committee members reflect well the historical continuity associated with the symbiotic nature of the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle if compared with the other two Central Committees of the Mao era. Both the 9th Central Committee of 1969 and the 10th Central Committee of 1974, for instance, were elected by the Party Congresses held during the Cultural Revolution. The memberships of both thus may not reflect the historical continuity of the CCP. The majority of the 8th Central Committee members, for instance, were unable to enter the 9th Central Committee because most of them were removed from office or persecuted as “those who are in power but take the capitalist road” in the Cultural Revolution. Those who replaced them in the 9th and 10th Central Committees included a number of leaders of the “rebel factions,” or mass organizations that Mao and his radical colleagues had mobilized and relied on to bring down the traditional party-state bureaucracy. But more important, in implementing a policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries,” military officers took over the responsibility of running the country following the collapse of the party-­ state bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution. Military representation thus drastically increased in the 9th and 10th Central Committees. The extensive circulation of the active-duty military officers across the institutional

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boundaries to occupy civilian leadership positions in the Cultural Revolution, however, is examined in the next section. This circulation had generally exacerbated the party-army symbiosis and caused the militarization of China’s ruling elites. The 8th Central Committee has a total of 97 members. Of them 66 or 68 percent are considered civilians because they were not given military ranks in 1955, the year when the military rank system was introduced. As Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show, out of the 66 civilian members, 54 of them or 81.8 percent had major military leadership experience in the Red Army period (1927–1937), the Anti-Japanese War period (1937–1945), the Civil War period (1946–1949), and the post-1949 period. Only 12 of them or 18.2 percent had no major military leadership experience. Because those who had major military leadership experience served as leaders in major guerrilla base areas that had evolved into the five field armies in the Civil War, their field army affiliations are also identified. These affiliations constitute the historical basis for forming symbiotic political-military leadership factions that could be leveraged for intra-leadership power struggle in the future. Some of them had also served as leaders of the MRs and provincial MDs after 1949. Table 5.3 shows that out of the 97 members of the 8th Central Committee, 31 of them or 32 percent are considered military members because they were conferred military ranks in 1955. Out of the 31 military members, 27 of them or 87 percent had extensive civilian leadership experience as heads of the party and government institutions at both the central and provincial levels, both before and after 1949. Table 5.4 shows that among the 31 military members, only 4 of them or 13 percent had no major civilian leadership experience. Since the majority of the military members served as leaders in major guerrilla base areas that had evolved into the five field armies in the Civil War, their field army affiliations are also identified. These affiliations constitute the historical basis for forming symbiotic political-military leadership factions that could be mobilized for intra-leadership power struggle in the future. The biographical profiles of the members of the 8th Party Central Committee reflect the high level of circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities, and as a result the highly symbiotic nature of the party-army relations developed in the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. The majority of the members, for instance, are the “dual-role elites” who had extensive leadership experiences in both the civilian and military sectors and could be identified as

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

139

Table 5.1  Civilian members of the 8th Central Committee who had major military leadership experiencea Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Mao Zedong

CCP Chair

General PC of First Front Red Army in Jiangxi and in Long March PC of New 4th Army in Anti-­ Japanese War; GPD director in Civil War General PC of Red Army in Jiangxi

CCP Central

1921

Normal school

Liu Shaoqi CCP vice-chair

1921

Studied in Soviet Union

Zhou Enlai Premier

1921

CCP Central

Lin Boqu

CCP Politburo member

1921

Deng Xiaoping

CCP general-­ secretary

1924

Chen Yun

Vice premier

1925

Nankai University; studied in Japan and France Studied in Director of Soviet Union General Supplies Department of Red Army in Jiangxi Studied in PC of 129th France and Division of 8th Soviet Union Route Army in Anti-Japanese War; PC of 2nd FA Apprenticeship Deputy PC of in Shanghai Northeastern FA Commercial Press

Li Fuchun

Vice premier

1922

Studied in France

4th FA

PC of 3rd Red Army Group; deputy PC of Northeastern MR

3rd FA

CCP Central

2nd FA

4th FA

(continued)

140 

N. LI

Table 5.1 (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Lu Dingyi

Director of CCP Propaganda Department

1925

Shanghai Jiaotong University

Liao Chengzhi

Deputy director 1928 of CCP United Front Work Department Vice premier 1927

Studied in Japan

Director of CCP Propaganda Central Department of Red Army; director of Propaganda Department of 8th Route Army Secretary-general 2nd FA of GPD of 4th Front Red Army

Director of 2nd Office of State Council

Peking University

Li Xiannian

Lin Feng

1927

Zhang Procurator-­ Dingcheng general of Supreme People’s Procuratorate

1927

Peng Zhen First party secretary of Beijing

1923

Teng Daiyuan

1925

Minister of railway

Normal school

Field army (FA) affiliation

Commander of 5th Division of New 4th Army; deputy commander of 2nd FA PC of a detachment of 8th Route Army; PC of Eastern Manchuria MD in Civil War; PC of Northeastern MR Commander of 7th Division of New 4th Army; commander of Central China MR in Civil War Deputy PC of Northeastern FA

2nd FA

Chief of staff of Front Command of 8th Route Army; deputy commander of North China MR in Civil War

5th FA

4th FA

3rd FA

4th FA

(continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

141

Table 5.1 (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Ke Qingshi Mayor of Shanghai

1922

Wang Shoudao

Vice minister of transportation

1926

Wang Weizhou

Member of Standing Committee of CDIC

1927

Studied in Soviet Union

Deng Zihui

Vice premier

1926

Studied in Japan

Yang Shangkun

Director of CCP Central General Office

1926

Studied in Soviet Union

Liu Xiao

Ambassador to Soviet Union

1925

Li Weihan

Director of CCP United Front Work Department Director of CCP International Department

1922

Shanghai National Chengchi University Studied in France and Soviet Union

Wang Jiaxiang

1928

Studied in Soviet Union

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Director of Political Department of 8th Red Army Corps; PC of Nanjing MR PC of a detachment of 8th Route Army; deputy PC of Central Plains MR in Civil War Commander of a brigade of 8th Route Army; deputy commander of Northwestern MR PC of 4th Division of New Fourth Army; deputy commander of Central Plains MR PC of 3rd Red Army Group; vice-chair and secretary-general of CMC Director of Political Department of 1st Front Red Army Commander of a Red Army column in Long March

5th FA

4th FA

1st FA

3rd FA

CCP Central

CCP Central

CCP Central

Director of CCP Political Central Department of 8th Route Army (continued)

142 

N. LI

Table 5.1 (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Ye Jizhuang

Minister of foreign trade

1925

Law school

4th FA

Liu Lantao Deputy secretary of CDIC Bo Yibo Vice premier

1928

Normal school

Director of Logistics Department of CMC; director of General Logistics Department of Northeastern FA Deputy PC of North China MR

1925

Normal school

2nd FA and 5th FA

Yang Xiufeng

Minister of higher education

1930

Shu Tong

Party secretary of Shandong Province

1926

Normal school; studied in France and Soviet Union Normal school

Lai Ruoyu

Chair of All-China Federation of Trade Union

1929

Zhang Jichun

Deputy director 1926 of CCP Propaganda Department

Commander of a column of 8th Route Army; PC of North China MR Commander of Western Hebei Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force Director of Political Department of New 4th Army; director of Political Department of 3rd FA; vice president of AMS PC of Taihang MD of 8th Route Army; PC of Shanxi Provincial MD Deputy director of Political Department of 8th Route Army; deputy PC of 2nd FA

Peking University

Normal school

5th FA

5th FA

3rd FA

5th FA

2nd FA

(continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

143

Table 5.1 (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Cheng Zihua

Deputy director 1926 of Finance and Trade Office of State Council

Huangpu Military Academy

4th FA

Wu Xiuquan

Ambassador to Yugoslavia

1931

Studied in Soviet Union

Wang Congwu

Deputy secretary of CCP Central Supervision Commission

1927

Normal school

Ma Mingfang

Deputy director 1925 of CCP Organization Department Vice foreign 1925 minister

Normal school

PC of a column of 8th Route Army; commander of 13th Army Group of 4th FA Director of 1st Bureau of CMC; chief of staff of Northeastern MR; deputy chief of PLA General Staff Director of Political Department of a detachment of 8th Route Army; PC of a column of 2nd FA A major founder of Red Army Base in Northern Shaanxi Province PC of Hejiang MD and PC of Eastern Liaoning MD in Civil War Commander of 6th Division of New 4th Army; deputy PC of 3rd FA PC of Taihang MD in Anti-­ Japanese War; PC of Henan Provincial MD; PC of Hebei Provincial MD; PC of Beijing MR

Zhang Wentian

Tan Zhenlin

Vice premier

Studied in Soviet Union

1926

Li Xuefeng Secretary of 1933 CCP Secretariat

Shanxi University

4th FA

2nd FA

1st FA

4th FA

3rd FA

2nd FA

(continued)

144 

N. LI

Table 5.1  (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Chen Shaomin

Secretary of 1928 All-China Federation of Trade Union Vice minister of 1931 hydraulic power

Deputy PC of 5th Division of New 4th Army

3rd FA

Studied in Japan

5th FA

Zheng Shan

Minister of commerce

1926

Studied in Soviet Union

Lin Tie

Party secretary of Hebei Province

1926

Studied in France and Soviet Union

Zheng Weisan

Member of Standing Committee of CPPCC Secretary of Communist Youth League

1925

Technical school

Party secretary of Heilongjiang Province

1924

PC of a column of Jinchaji MD in Anti-Japanese War; PC of Anhui Provincial MD; PC of Nanjing MR A major founder of New 4th Army in Anti-Japanese War PC of Central Hebei MD; PC of Hebei Provincial MD PC of 2nd Division of New 4th Army; PC of Central Plains MR Director of Organization Department of GPD; director of Political Department of 1st Army Group of North China FA; director of Political Department of 1st FA PC of Lushun and Dalian Garrison Command; PC of Heilongjiang Provincial MD

Li Baohua

Hu Yaobang

Ouyang Qin

1933

Studied in France and Soviet Union

3rd FA

5th FA

2nd FA

5th FA

4th FA

(continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

145

Table 5.1  (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Major military leadership experience

Field army (FA) affiliation

Xi Zhongxun

Secretary-­ general of State Council

PC of a brigade of 8th Route Army; PC of Northwestern FA; PC of Guangzhou MR PC of Bohai MD; PC of Shanxi Provincial MD; deputy PC of Beijing MR A major founder of Taiyue Anti-Japanese Base in Shanxi Province Director of Enemy Work Department of GPD of Red Army Major CCP leader who endorsed a military strategy of urban uprisings in Jiangxi Red Army Base Deputy PC of Jinchaji MD; PC of Logistics Command of North China MR PC of a brigade of 8th Route Army; PC of Jinsui FA in Civil War Director of Political Department of 4th Division of New 4th Army; PC of Henan Provincial MD

1st FA

1928

Normal school

Liu Geping Deputy director 1926 of CCP United Front Work Department An Ziwen

Director of 1927 CCP Organization Department Minister of light 1928 industry

Normal school

Deputy director 1921 of Transportation Work Department of CCP Minister of 1st 1932 Machinery Industry

Studied in France and Soviet Union

Li Jingquan

Party secretary of Sichuan Province

1930

Normal school

Wu Zhipu

Party secretary of Henan Province

1925

Agriculture school

Jia Tuofu

Li Lisan

Huang Jing

Normal school

Qingdao University

3rd FA

5th FA

1st FA

CCP Central

5th FA

1st FA

3rd FA

(continued)

146 

N. LI

Table 5.1  (continued) Name

Position in 1956 Year of Education joining CCP

Tao Zhu

Party secretary of Guangdong Province

1926

Zeng Xisheng

Party secretary of Anhui Province

1927

Chen Shaoyu

On sick leave in Soviet Union

1925

Huangpu Military Academy

Major military leadership experience

PC of a detachment of New 4th Army; director of Political Department of 4th FA; PC of Guangzhou MR Huangpu PC of 7th Division Military of New 4th Army; Academy; deputy chief of studied in staff of 2nd FA; Soviet Union commander of Northern Anhui MD of 3rd FA Agriculture Major CCP leader school; studied who endorsed a in Soviet Union military strategy of positional defense in Jiangxi Red Army Base

Field army (FA) affiliation 4th FA

2nd FA and 3rd FA

CCP Central

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

being affiliated with the pre-1949 field army networks. The fact that military members constitute 32 percent of the total membership of the 8th Central Committee, which is relatively high, also reflects this development. Similarly, as Table 5.5 shows, out of 23 full and alternate members of the 8th CCP Politburo, eight of them or 34.7 percent are military members. All these indicators reflect the symbiotic nature of the partyarmy relations that undergirds the revolution that helped the CCP to seize state power in 1949. The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries also took place at lower levels in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as field armies marched southward and westward to seize territories from the KMT control and establish the local governments in the newly captured provinces. The 4th Field Army, for instance, expanded its reaches from the northeastern provinces to the southern provinces of

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

147

Table 5.2  Civilian members of the 8th Central Committee who had no major military leadership experiencea Name

Position in 1956

Year of joining CCP

Dong Biwu

Secretary of CCP 1921 Central Supervision Commission Wu Yuzhang President of 1925 People’s University

Education

Studied in Japan

President of Supreme People’s Court; vice president of PRC Studied in Japan Member of Standing and Soviet Committees of NPC Union and CPPCC Normal school; Chief editor of Red studied in Soviet Flag; Politburo Union Standing Committee member Studied in Vice-chair of NPC France and Soviet Union Studied in None France and Soviet Union Normal school Vice-chair of NPC; chair of CPPCC

Chen Boda

Mao’s personal secretary

1927

Chai Chang

Chair of All-China Women’s Federation Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department Vice-chair of All-China Women’s Federation Alternate member of Politburo

1923

Secretary of All-China Federation of Trade Union Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department

1925

1932

Tsinghua University

Minister of coal industry Vice-chair of All-China Federation of Trade Union Minister of supervision

1925

Studied in the Soviet Union Studied in the Soviet Union

Xu Teli

Deng Yingchao Kang Sheng

Liu Ningyi

Hu Qiaomu

Chen Yu Liu Changsheng

Qian Ying

1927

1925

1925

1927

1927

Major positions held

Shanghai University; studied in Soviet Union Normal school

Normal school

CCP vice-chair; vice-chair of NPC; vice-chair of CPPCC Deputy director of CCP International Department; vice-chair of NPC Mao’s personal secretary; president of Academy of Social Sciences Party secretary of Guangdong Province Party secretary of Shanghai

Minister of interior; party secretary of Guizhou Province

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Position in 1956

CCP vice-chair

Politburo member

Politburo member

Minister of public security

CMC vice-chair

Name

Zhu De

Lin Biao

Luo Rong-­ huan

Luo Reiqing

Xu Xiangqian

Marshal

Senior General (four-­ star)

Marshal

Marshal

Marshal

Rank

1927

1928

1927

1925

1922

Year of joining CCP

Huangpu Military Academy

Qingdao University; Wuhan University Huangpu Military Academy

Yunnan Army Academy; studied in Germany and Soviet Union Huangpu Military Academy

Education

Field army affiliation

Procurator-general of Supreme People’s Procuratorate; vice- chair of NPC Vice premier

Vice premier; CCP vice-chair

5th FA

5th FA

4th FA

4th FA

Secretary of CDIC; CCP vice-chair of PRC; chair of Central NPC

Major civilian leadership experience

Director of Field Political Department of 8th Route Army; PC of 2nd Army Group of North China MR; Chief of PLA General Staff Deputy commander of Vice premier; vice- chair 129th Division of 8th of NPC Route Army; commander of 1st Army Group of North China FA

Commander of 115th Division of 8th Route Army; commander of 4th FA; defense minister PC of 115th Division of 8th Route Army; PC of 4th FA; GPD director

Commander of 8th Route Army; commander-in-chief of PLA

Major military leadership experience

Table 5.3  Military members of the 8th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experiencea

148  N. LI

Defense minister

Deputy chief of Senior PLA General general Staff

Peng Dehuai

Chen Geng

General

Vice premier

CMC secretary-­ general

Ulanfu

Huang Kecheng

Senior general

Marshal

Nie Vice premier Rongzhen

Marshal

Marshal

Politburo member

Chen Yi

Marshal

Politburo member

Liu Bocheng

1925

1925

1923

1922

1928

1923

1926

Normal school

Commander of 3rd Division of New 4th Army; PC of 2nd Army Group of Northeastern FA; chief of PLA General Staff

Frunze Military Commander of 129th Academy Division of 8th Route Army; commander of 2nd FA Studied in Commander of New France 4th Army; commander of 3rd FA Hunan Army Deputy commander of Officers’ 8th Route Army; Academy commander of 1st FA; commander of People’s Volunteers Army (PVA) Huangpu Commander of a Military brigade of 8th Route Academy Army; commander of 4th Army Group of 2nd FA Studied in Deputy commander of France 115th Division of 8th Route Army; commander of North China MR Studied in Commander of Inner Soviet Union Mongolia MD

2nd FA

Party secretary of Inner Mongolia; vice-chair of NPC Party secretary of Tianjin; party secretary of Hunan Province; secretary of CDIC

Mayor of Beijing; vice premier

Governor of Yunnan Province

(continued)

4th FA

None

5th FA

2nd FA

Mayor of Shanghai; vice 3rd FA premier; minister of foreign affairs Vice premier; deputy 1st FA director of “Third Line” Construction Commission

Party secretary of CCP Southwestern Bureau; vice-chair of NPC

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149

Deputy chief of General PLA General Staff

Director of Armed Forces Supervision Department

Li Ke-nong

Ye Jianying

Marshal

Marshal

Politburo member

He Long

Senior general

Chief of PLA General Staff

1927

1926

1927

1927

1927

Vice minister of Senior defense general

Su Yu

1925

Vice minister of Senior defense general

Year of joining CCP

Xiao Jing-­ guang Tan Zheng

Rank

Position in 1956

Name

Table 5.3 (continued)

Studied in Soviet Union

Normal school

Normal school

Studied in Soviet Union

Education

Commander of 1st Division of New 4th Army; deputy commander of 3rd FA Commander of 120th Division of 8th Route Army; commander of Northwestern MR Deputy director of CCP Intelligence Department; director of CMC General Intelligence Department Chief of staff of 8th Route Army; commander of South China MR; defense minister

Commander of 12th Army Group of 4th FA; PLAN commander Deputy director of GPD of CMC; deputy PC of 4th FA; GPD director

Major military leadership experience

Mayor of Beijing; mayor of Guangzhou; governor of Guangdong Province; NPC chair

Vice minister of foreign affairs; director of CCP Investigation Department

Vice premier; director of State Sports Commission

Deputy secretary of CCP Central Supervision Commission; vice governor of Fujian Province Vice-chair of NPC

Vice-chair of NPC

Major civilian leadership experience

CCP Central

CCP Central

1st FA

3rd FA

4th FA

4th FA

Field army affiliation

150  N. LI

1927

Wang Zhen

Deputy chief of General PLA General Staff

1927

1927

Deng Hua Deputy chief of General PLA General Staff

Xiao Ke

1926

Zhang Yunyi

Member of General National Defense Commission Vice minister of General defense

1926

Song Minister of 3rd General Ren-qiong Machinery Industry

Law school

Huangpu Military Academy

Guangdong Army Academy

Deputy director of Political Department of 129th Division; commander of Southern Hebei MD; PC of 4th Army Group of 2nd FA Deputy commander of New 4th Army; deputy commander of East China MR Deputy commander of 120th Division; deputy commander of North China MR; chief of staff of 4th FA PC of a brigade of 8th Route Army; commander of 15th Army Group of 4th FA; deputy commander of PVA Commander of a brigade of 8th Route Army; commander of 1st Army Group of 1st FA; commander of PLA Railway Engineering Corps Minister of agricultural reclamation; vice premier; vice-chair of PRC

Vice governor of Sichuan Province

Party secretary of Yunnan Province; party secretary of CCP Northeastern Bureau; minister of 7th Machinery Industry; director of CCP Organization Department Party secretary of Guangxi; deputy secretary of CCP Central Supervision Commission Vice-chair of CPPCC

(continued)

1st FA

4th FA

5th FA

3rd FA

2nd FA

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

151

1931

Commander of General Kunming MR

Vice minister of General railway

Xie Fuzhi

Lu Zheng-­ chao

North-eastern Military Academy

Education

Commander of a column of 8th Route Army; deputy commander of Northeastern FA; PC of Railway Engineering Corps

PC of a brigade of 8th Route Army; PC of 13th Army Group of 4th FA; PC of Lanzhou MR Deputy director of General Supplies Department of 8th Route Army; chief of staff of North China MR PC of a brigade of 8th Route Army; PC of 3rd Army Group of 2nd FA; PC of Beijing MR

Major military leadership experience

5th FA

4th FA

Field army affiliation

Party secretary of Yunnan 2nd FA Province; minister of public security; vice premier; party secretary of Beijing Minister of railway; 4th FA vice-chair of CPPCC

Minister of 1st Machinery Industry; deputy director of State Economic Commission

Party secretary of Gansu Province; vice-chair of CPPCC

Major civilian leadership experience

a

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

1937

1927

Zhao Erlu Minister of 2nd General Machinery Industry

Year of joining CCP 1930

Deputy director of GPD

Xiao Hua

Rank

General

Position in 1956

Name

Table 5.3 (continued)

152  N. LI

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

153

Table 5.4  Military members of the 8th Central Committee who had no civilian leadership experiencea Name

Position in 1956

Rank

Year of Education joining CCP

Liu Yalou Commander of PLAAF

General 1929

Frunze Military Academy

Xu Guangda

Commander of PLA Armored Corps

Senior general

1925

Huangpu Military Academy

Xu Haidong

Member of National Defense Commission

Senior general

1925

Wang Vice minister Shusheng of defense

Senior general

1926

Major military leadership experience

Field army affiliation

Staff officer in Soviet Red Army in World War II; chief of staff of 4th FA Commander of a brigade of 8th Route Army; commander of 2nd Army Group of 1st FA Commander of a brigade of 8th Route Army; commander of a detachment of New 4th Army Deputy commander of Taihang MD; deputy commander of Central Plains MR; director of PLA General Ordnance Department; PC of AMS

4th FA

1st FA

3rd FA

2nd FA

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. To establish the governments at the prefectural and county levels in these provinces, the 4th Field Army transferred a large number of its officers to fill the civilian party and government leadership positions, which resulted in the concentration of officials of the 4th Field Army background in these provinces. Similarly, a large number of officers of the 2nd Field Army were transferred to become local party and government leaders in the southwestern provinces that it had

Position in 1956

CCP vice-chair

Politburo member

Politburo member

Politburo member

Politburo member

Name

Zhu De

Lin Biao

Luo Rong-­huan

Liu Bocheng

Chen Yi

Year of joining CCP

Marshal 1923

Marshal 1926

Marshal 1927

Marshal 1925

Marshal 1922

Rank

Studied in France

Frunze Military Academy

Qingdao University; Wuhan University

Yunnan Army Academy; studied in Germany and Soviet Union Huangpu Military Academy

Education

Table 5.5  Military members of the 8th Politburo in 1956a

Vice premier; CCP vice-chair

Secretary of CDIC; vice-chair of PRC; chair of NPC

4th FA

CCP Central

Field army affiliation

Procurator-general 4th FA of Supreme People’s Procuratorate; vice- chair of NPC Commander of 129th Party secretary of 2nd FA Division of 8th Route CCP Southwestern Army; commander of Bureau; vice-chair of 2nd FA NPC Commander of New 4th Mayor of Shanghai; 3rd FA Army; commander of 3rd vice premier; FA minister of foreign affairs

Commander of 8th Route Army; commander-in-chief of PLA Commander of 115th Division of 8th Route Army; commander of 4th FA; defense minister PC of 115th Division of 8th Route Army; PC of 4th FA; GPD director

Major military leadership Major civilian experience leadership experience

154  N. LI

Politburo member

Vice premier

He Long

Ulanfu

General 1925

Marshal 1927

Marshal 1928

Studied in Soviet Union

Hunan Army Officers’ Academy

Deputy commander of 8th Route Army; commander of 1st FA; commander of PVA Commander of 120th Division of 8th Route Army; commander of Northwestern MR Commander of Inner Mongolia MD Party secretary of Inner Mongolia; vice-chair of NPC

None

Vice premier; deputy 1st FA director of “Third Line” Construction Commission Vice premier; 1st FA director of State Sports Commission

a

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Defense minister

Peng Dehuai

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

155

156 

N. LI

captured, including Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Tibet. In the meantime, veterans of the 1st Field Army filled similar positions in the western provinces that it had seized, including Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. For similar reasons, the eastern provinces such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian had a large concentration of cadres of the 3rd Field Army background because these provinces were mostly captured by the forces of this field army.1 Finally, in the late 1940s, the CCP Central transferred a large number of “dual-role” cadres from north China where the CCP had traditionally controlled and governed, to  the newly captured southern provinces to develop local governments. Hua Guofeng, who joined a communist guerrilla force in 1938  in the northern province of Shanxi, was among the 50,000 cadres who were transferred from the north to run the newly “liberated” southern provinces. In 1949, for instance, Hua was transferred from Shanxi to the southern province of Hunan and became the party secretary of a county in that province.2 The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries in the Mao era reflects the highly symbiotic nature of the party-army relations developed in the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. Since these elites spent most of their careers as leaders in several remote and isolated guerrilla base areas that had later evolved into five field armies, they are also identified as being affiliated with the extensive personal networks defined by the field army ties. These networks constitute the informal basis for forming symbiotic political-military factions that could be mobilized by the leaders in the power struggle of the future. Elite Circulation in the Cultural Revolution The Cultural Revolution began in 1966 with mobilization of the masses to criticize and denounce the “bourgeois representatives” or “those who are in leadership positions and take the capitalist road.” As noted elsewhere in this study, as the party-state bureaucracies of all levels were paralyzed and swept aside as the “headquarters of bourgeois representatives,” Mao had to rely on the PLA to avert anarchy and restore social order. The CMC thus issued an order to the PLA in March 1967 to implement a policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries,” or for the PLA to “support the leftists, industry, and agriculture,” impose “military control” of the critically important regions and organizations, and conduct “military training” of the students.3

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By September 1968, one-third of the PLA officers had been mobilized to implement the policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries.” A CMC directive issued in November 1970 defined the policy as a “long-term political task” where all PLA officers and men would “be tempered by the experience” of social revolution and civilian governance. By the end of 1970, 2.78 million active-duty officers and men were mobilized to implement the policy.4 This policy thus led to a massive exodus of active-duty military officers from the barracks to take up leadership positions in the civilian party and government institutions of different levels. The extensive circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries as a result had revived and reinforced the pre-1949 party-army symbiosis. By the winter of 1967, for instance, the Cultural Revolution reached the stage where revolutionary committees, which conflated the roles of the traditional party committees and governments, were to be established at different levels based on the principle of “grand alliance” (“大联合”). Such an alliance was supposed to comprise three major groups: “rebel” mass organizations, “revolutionary” cadres, and the PLA. The mass organizations were still highly divided and some were still fighting against one another in the provinces and localities. The veteran cadres lacked the political legitimacy for having “taken the capitalist road.” In comparison, the PLA had a higher level of cohesiveness and political legitimacy for being the embodiment of Mao’s revolutionary ideals, and it possessed weapons. As a result, the PLA became the “leader, organizer, and arbitrator” in promoting the “grand alliance.”5 By September 1968, revolutionary committees were established in all the provinces and in most of the localities and work units. Out of the 29 chairs of the provincial revolutionary committees, 22 or 75.8 percent were active-duty military officers.6 By the spring of 1969, “out of 439 chairmen, vice chairmen, and members of the standing committees of provincial revolutionary committees, 224 or 51 percent were from the PLA, 113 or 25.8 percent were representatives of the Maoist mass organizations, and 102 or 23.2 percent were civilian cadres of the party and state.”7 Revolutionary committees at the prefectural and county levels were also heavily militarized. For the positions of chairs of these committees, PLA officers held 98 percent in Hubei, 97 percent in Yunnan, 95 percent in Shanxi, 84 percent in Liaoning, 81 percent in Guangdong, and 78 percent in Beijing. “If those who held number-one and number-two leadership positions of these revolutionary committees are counted nationwide, the number is 5000. This number reaches 50,000 if those who held positions

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of committee members are counted.”8 In Hunan Province, for instance, for the chair positions of the revolutionary committees of its 15 prefectures, 12 or 80 percent were held by the PLA officers while only three by the veteran cadres.9 As the military elite took virtual control of civilian administration at different levels during the Cultural Revolution, their representation in the CCP Congresses, Central Committees, and Politburos also increased remarkably. Among the delegates to the 9th CCP Congress held in April 1969, for instance, “almost three-quarters … were wearing the uniform of the PLA.” Of the 170 full members of 9th Central Committee, “87 were military men (about 51.2 percent), 53 were veteran officials (about 31.5 percent), and 29 came from mass organizations (about 17.2 percent).”10 In the Politburo produced by the Congress, PLA share of the membership reached as high as 50 percent, or 12 out of 25 full and alternate members.11 In comparison, as noted elsewhere in this study, out of 23 full and alternate members of the 8th CCP Politburo elected in 1956, 8 or 34.7 percent are military men. For membership of the 8th Central Committee, civilian officials and military officers constitute 68 percent and 32 percent, respectively. A Party Rectification and Reconstruction Campaign was carried out following the 9th Party Congress of 1969, with the aim to reestablish party committees at different levels. The campaign was guided by the PLA through three major organizational devises: (1) the party core groups of the revolutionary committees of different levels, which were largely dominated by the PLA officers and were identical with the secretariats of the new party committees to be established, (2) the “Three Supports and Two Militaries” units of varying sizes, and (3) the military representatives of the military control committees that supervised the various work units. Military officers thus made major decisions on how many veteran cadres and representatives of mass organizations were to be recruited into the new party committees. They also held party congresses that elected the new party committees. Finally, they controlled the propaganda apparatus and carried out “ideological education of the new party members, and in many cases, even for that of the entire population. They organized study groups, sent agitators down to basic-unit level and distributed their own educational literature.”12 The party core group of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, for instance, was established on May 4, 1968. Members of the group included Li Yuan, commander of the PLA 47th Corps and chair of

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the revolutionary committee, who also served as head of the group; Hua Guofeng, a veteran cadre and deputy head; Yang Dayi, commander of the Hunan Provincial MD; and Li Zhenjun, deputy PC of the 47th Corps. The party core groups were also established for the revolutionary committees at lower levels; they were largely dominated by military officers.13 For the “Three Supports and Two Militaries” units of the 47th Corps in Hunan, six companies were assigned to Changde Prefecture, five to Yiyang Prefecture, five to Xiangtan Prefecture, six to Qianyang Prefecture, three to Shaoyang Prefecture, six to Linlin Prefecture, six to Hengyang Prefecture, six to Chenzhou Prefecture, three to Yueyang Prefecture, four to Xiangxi Prefecture, one to the City of zhuzhou, and 20 to the provincial capital of Changsha. When Mao asked Li Yuan how an infantry corps could run a province as large as Hunan during a tour of Changsha in June 1969, Li replied that the corps worked with the “Three Supports and Two Militaries” units of the prefecture-level military sub-districts and county-­ level people’s arms departments, whose commanding officers held most of the leadership positions of the revolutionary committees at their levels.14 The Party Rectification and Reconstruction Campaign led to the reestablishment of the party committees at different levels, which were again dominated by the PLA. “The proportion of the military in the secretariats of the new provincial party committees was initially even larger than in the revolutionary committees.” “Of a total of 158 members and alternate members of the secretariats, 98 or 62 percent came from the PLA, and 93 or 58.9 percent kept their positions in the armed forces even after being elected to these secretariats. 58 or 32.9 percent of the members of the new provincial party leaderships were civilian cadres, and only eight or 5.1 percent could be said to be representatives of Maoist mass organizations.”15 Similarly, for the 29 provincial first party secretaries, 21 or 72 percent were military officers, including 11 commanders of the MRs and provincial MDs and 10 PCs of the MRs and MDs. These PCs were full-time military officers who had been conferred military ranks before the rank system was abolished in 1965, but not civilian party secretaries who served as parttime PCs of the MRs and MDs. Moreover, 26 commanders and PCs of the MRs and MDs served as secretaries in the new provincial party committees. “If one includes … those deputy commanders of both MRs and MDs and (deputy) regional political commissars, who had been appointed to the new provincial party committees, then it becomes apparent that regional military had so much influence in the new provincial party leadership that in most of the provinces the leadership of the army and of the party was

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identical.” Also, in 28 of the 29 provinces, the positions of the first party secretary and chairman of the revolutionary committee were held by the same individual. All these “made the share of the PLA in the regional leadership even larger than it had been in the period immediately after the Civil War. At that time only 30.1 percent of all members of regional leading groups were from the army. … Now in 1971, it was more than half.”16 Following the Lin Biao Incident of September 1971, the proportion of military men in the provincial leadership and military representation in the Central Committee and Politburo elected by the Party Congress was somewhat curtailed. “The number of provinces in which the party and administration were led by generals fell from 21 to 19.” By December 1973, among the provincial party committee secretaries, 88 out of 181, or 48.6 percent, were from the PLA, down from 62 percent in 1971. Similarly, the military representation in the Central Committee elected by the 10th CCP Congress of 1973 was reduced from 51.2 percent of the 9th Central Committee to about 37.1 percent, or 70 out of 189. The military membership in the 10th Politburo constituted 36 percent, or 9 out of 25, which was down from the 50 percent of the previous Politburo.17 When these changes were remarkable, the proportion of military men in China’s major leading institutions was still significantly higher than those in the periods before and after the Cultural Revolution. Among the nine members of the PBSC of the 10th Central Committee, for instance, three or one-third of them, including Zhu De, Ye Jianying, and Li Desheng, were military men.18 The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries during the Cultural Revolution exacerbated the party-army symbiosis and reflected the intensification of the power struggle among leaders of a few symbiotic political-military factions. It was not until after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 that cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites had substantially declined, leading to a more settled, functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities.

Declining Level of Circulation of Elites across the Institutional Boundaries in the Deng Era As early as in August 1972, directed by Mao, the CCP Central and the CMC issued a resolution for military units implementing the policy of “Three Supports and two Militaries” to gradually disengage from the tasks of civilian party and state governance and return to the barracks.19 But it

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was not until after Deng became the paramount leader in 1978 that the new policy was more fully implemented. As noted elsewhere in this study, beginning since the early 1970s, most of the civilian cadres had been rehabilitated and returned to staff the civilian party and state leadership positions at the central, provincial, and local levels. This development also made it possible for military officers to disengage from the civilian tasks and return to the barracks. The return of a large number of PLA officers to the barracks and lack of a system of retirement based on term and age limits, however, caused what Deng called the “bloating” of the PLA ranks. To resolve this issue, Deng made the decisions to downsize the PLA in 1980, 1982, and 1985. He also introduced the service term limits and mandatory retirement ages for different grades and levels of the PLA to ensure the orderly retirement of aging officers and upward mobility of younger officers.20 Moreover, Deng put a stop to the horizontal circulation of the military elite across the institutional boundaries to fill the civilian leadership positions. To ensure the orderly retirement and upward mobility of the civilian party and state officials, similar term and age limits have also been introduced to the civilian cadre system.21 Furthermore, Deng introduced a Central Advisory Committee at the 12th Party Congress of 1982 and 13th Party Congress of 1987, the two Party Congresses that he presided over as the paramount leader. A total of 172 senior civilian and military officials, for instance, were elected to the Central Advisory Committee of the 12th Party Congress in 1982, and 200 to the Central Advisory Committee of the 13th Party Congress in 1987.22 Having served as major leaders in both the civilian and military sectors before 1949, the experiences of the members of the Central Advisory Committee reflect the party-army symbiosis rooted in China’s pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. By removing these revolutionary veterans from the CCP Central Committee and placing them in the Central Advisory Committee, the 12th and 13th CCP Central Committees could accommodate as members younger officials whose career experiences were detached from the pre-1949 party-army symbiosis. The Central Advisory Committee thus played a critical role in reducing the party-army symbiosis and promoting a functional division of labor between the civilian and military officials in the Central Committee. The impact of the Central Advisory Committee on the composition of the CCP Central Committee can be illustrated by an analysis of the Central Committee elected by the 13th Party Congress held in 1987.

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The 13th Central Committee has a total of 175 members.23 Out of 175, 142 of them or 81.1 percent are civilian members, or senior officials who hold leadership positions in major civilian party and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. Table 5.6 shows that out of the 142 civilian members, only 21 of them or 14.7 percent had military service or leadership experience, a drastic decline from the 81.8 percent of the 8th Central Committee in 1956. Table 5.6 also shows that among the 21, only four of them joined the communist forces in the Red Army period, including Wan Li, Li Ziqi, Hu Yaobang, and Peng Cong. Except for Hu who served as a senior military leader before 1949, the other three served as middle-level military leaders. Even though the three had field army affiliations, their role in leveraging such affiliations to mobilize symbiotic political-military factions for power struggle is likely to be quite limited; their status in the pre-1949 field armies was relatively low. Among the other 17 civilian members who had military service or leadership experience, 13 of them joined the PLA in the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War periods and served as junior officers in the various field armies or as leaders or officers of the local guerrilla forces. Their ability to mobilize the field army-based politicalmilitary factions for power struggle is likely to be even more limited due either to their junior status in the pre-1949 field armies or to the fact that they never served in these field armies. The other four of the 17, including Li Zemin, Li Tieying, Song Defu, and Liao Hui, joined the PLA after 1949; they had no direct affiliations with the pre-1949 field armies. Out of the 175 members of the 13th Central Committee, 33 of them or close to 18.8 percent are military members, or military officers who are conferred military ranks and hold major leadership positions in the PLA.24 Out of the 33, 28 of them or 84.8 percent had no civilian leadership experience. As Table 5.7 shows, only five of them or 15.1 percent had major civilian leadership experience, a sharp drop from the 87 percent of the 8th Central Committee in 1956. Table 5.8 shows that among the 33 military members, 25 of them or 75.7 percent joined the PLA before 1949 and thus had field army affiliations. Among the 25, however, only 2 of them, including Yang Shangkun and Qin Jiwei, joined the revolution in the 1920s and served as major leaders in the pre-1949 PLA. They thus should possess the ability to mobilize symbiotic political-military factions for power struggle due to their senior status in the pre-1949 PLA. The other 23 joined the PLA in the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War periods. Since they served as junior officers in the pre-1949 field armies, their ability to mobilize the field armybased political-military factions for power struggle is likely to be limited.

Position in 1987

Vice premier

Party secretary of Inner Mongolia

Vice premier

Audit-general of State Audit Office

Party secretary of Tibet

Central Committee member

Party secretary of Hainan Province

Name

Wan Li

Wang Qun

Tian Jiyun

Lu Peijian

Wu Jinghua

Hua Guofeng

Xu Shijie

1938/38

1938/38

1949/49

1944/44

1945/45

1943/44

1936/36

Years of joining work/party

Deputy party secretary of Hubei Province

Party secretary of Anhui Province

Major civilian leadership experience

Field army affiliation

(continued)

None

2nd FA and 5th FA None

3rd FA

PC of a sub-military 2nd FA district of 8th Route Army Accounting officer in 3rd FA New 4th Army; deputy PC of a sub-military district in Hubei Province Logistics officer in 2nd FA 8th Route Army

Major military service or leadership experience

Deputy secretary-­ general of State Council People’s University President of People’s Logistics officer in Bank New 4th Army and 3rd FA Normal school Director of State Staff officer in PLA Ethnic Affairs 184th Division from Commission 1950 to 1952 Occupational school CCP chair PC of a county-level of commerce guerrilla force in Shanxi in Anti-­ Japanese War Party secretary of PC of a guerrilla Guangzhou force in Guangdong Province

Normal school

Education

Table 5.6  Civilian members of the 13th Central Committee who had major military experiencea

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Deputy party secretary 1950/54 of Liaoning Province Minister of electronic 1961/55 industry

Li Zemin

Secretary of Communist Youth League State councilor

Song Defu

Chen Muhua

Vice-chair of CPPCC

Yang Jingren

Li Tieying

Party secretary of Shanxi Province

Li Ligong

1938/38

1965/65

1937

1938/40

1936/36

Party secretary of Gansu Province

Li Ziqi

Years of joining work/party

Position in 1987

Name

Table 5.6 (continued)

Studied in Czechoslovakia

People’s University

Studied in Soviet Union

Education

Vice premier

Director of CCP United Front Work Department Party secretary of Fujian Province

Party secretary of Zhejiang Province Party secretary of Liaoning Province

Party secretary of Beijing

Vice governor of Gansu Province

Major civilian leadership experience PC of a guerrilla force in Shaanxi in Anti-Japanese War Political officer in a guerrilla force in Shanxi in Anti-­ Japanese War PLA political officer in early 1950s Technical officer in 10th Academy of Ministry of National Defense from 1961 to 1965 PC of Hui Cavalry Regiment of 8th Route Army Deputy director of Organization Department of GPD Staff officer in 8th Route Army and 4th FA

Major military service or leadership experience

4th FA

None

1st FA

None

None

None

None

Field army affiliation

164  N. LI

Minister of labor and personnel

CCP general-secretary 1937/38

Politburo member

Party secretary of Shandong Province

Vice-chair of NPC

Director of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Of State Council

Zhao Dongwan

Zhao Ziyang

Hu Yaobang

Liang Buting

Peng Chong

Liao Hui

Party secretary of Qinghai Province

CCP general-secretary

Premier

Vice minister of 1st Machinery Industry

Party secretary of Guangzhou

Major civilian leadership experience

Party secretary of Shanghai Harbin Institute of Vice-chair of Military Engineering CPPCC

Studied in Soviet Union

Sun Yat-sen University

Education

Political Officer in a guerrilla force in Guangdong PC of a military hospital in northeastern China PC of a PLA sub-military district in Civil War Director of Political Department of 1st Army Group of North China FA; director of Political Department of 1st FA Political officer in a detachment of 8th Route Army Deputy PC of a division of 3rd FA PLA Officer from 1965 to 1983; regiment-leader grade officer in GSD from 1980 to 1983

Major military service or leadership experience

None

3rd FA

3rd FA

5th FA

2nd FA

4th FA

None

Field army affiliation

a

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

1960/65

1933/34

1939/39

1933/33

1940/41

1945

Party secretary of Guangdong Province

Lin Ruo

Years of joining work/party

Position in 1987

Name

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Director of Office of CMC Chair

PC of Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) PC of Beijing MR

Wang Reilin

Wu Shaozhu

Commander of Beijing MR

Qin Jiwei

General

None

General

Major general

General

Rank

1929

1926

1938/38

1965/1958

1946/47

Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission Deputy Director of COSTIND

Major military leadership experience

PLA Nanjing Military College

Studied in Soviet Union

Minister of defense

CMC secretary-general

PLA Military PC of Shenyang College MR

Tsinghua University

Years of Education joining army/ party

Ambassador to Albania; vice minister of foreign affairs Party secretary of Guangdong Province; president of PRC State Councilor; vice-chair of NPC

Personal secretary of Deng from 1950s to 1960s and from 1970s to 1980s Director of National Sports Commission

Major civilian leadership or work experience

2nd FA

CCP Central

4th FA

None

4th FA

Field army affiliation

a

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

CMC vice-chair

Yang Shangkun

Liu Zhenhua

Position in 1987

Name

Table 5.7  Military members of the 13th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experiencea

166  N. LI

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Table 5.8  Military members of the 13th Central Committee who joined the PLA before 1949a Name

Position in 1987

Rank

Years of joining army/ party

Director of Political Department of Nanjing MR Wang Hai Commander of PLAAF

General

General

Wang Deputy Chengbin commander of Nanjing MR Wang Director of Reilin Office of CMC Chair

General

Yu Yongbo

Zhu Guang Liu Anyuan

PC of PLAAF PC of GLD

General

Education

Major military leadership experience

Field army affiliation

1947/48 PLA 4th School for Political Officers

PC of 42nd GA

4th FA

1944/45 PLA North-­ eastern Aviation School 1944/45 PLA Military College

Commander of Guangzhou MR Air Force Commander of Beijing MR

4th FA

1946/47

Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission PC of 3rd Air Corps Deputy PC of Guangzhou MR PC of Shenyang MR Commander of 54th GA

4th FA

Deputy commander of 2nd Artillery

5th FA

Lieutenant 1938/39 general Lieutenant 1943/43 PLA general Wuwei Artillery School Liu PC of Beijing General 1938/38 PLA Zhenhua MR Military College Li Jiulong Commander General 1945/45 PLA of Jinan MR Military College Li Xuge Commander Lieutenant 1943/44 of 2nd general Artillery

3rd FA

2nd FA 4th FA

4th FA

4th FA

(continued)

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N. LI

Table 5.8 (continued) Name

Position in 1987

Rank

Years of joining army/ party

Yang Baibin

Director of GPD

General

1938/38 PLA Political College 1926 Studied in Soviet Union 1938/38

PC of Beijing 2nd FA MR

1944/46 PLA Advanced Infantry School Lieutenant 1940/41 PLA general Political College

3rd FA

Yang CMC Shangkun vice-chair Yang Dezhong

None

Chi Haotian

Director of General Central Guard Bureau Chief of General General Staff

Zhang Zhongxian

PC of Guangzhou MR

Zhou Yibin

Deputy Commander of Beijing MR Deputy director of GPD Commander of Lanzhou MR

Zhou Keyu Zhao Xianshun

Zhao Nanqi Jiang Hongquan

Education

Lieutenant 1939/38 PLA general Military College Lieutenant 1947/45 general

Lieutenant 1939/39 PLA general Nanjing Military College Director of General 1945/47 PLA GLD Logistics College Commander Lieutenant 1945/47 PLA of Tibet MD general Military College

Major military leadership experience

Field army affiliation

CMC secretarygeneral Deputy PC of Shaanxi Provincial MD CMC vice-chair

CCP Central

Deputy director of Political Department of Shenyang MR Commander of Beijing MR

4th FA

PC of GLD

3rd FA

Deputy commander of Shenyang MR President of AMS

4th FA

Deputy commander of Chengdu MR

2nd FA

3rd FA

3rd FA

4th FA

(continued)

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Table 5.8 (continued) Name

Position in 1987

Rank

Years of joining army/ party

Qin Jiwei

Commander of Beijing MR

General

1929

Nie Kuiju Commander of PLAN East Sea Fleet Xu Huizi Deputy chief of General Staff Gao Commander Huan-­ of Xinjiang chang MD Fu Commander Quanyou of Chengdu MR

Vice admiral

Wei Jinshan

Deputy PC of PLAN

General

Education

PLA Nanjing Military College 1944/45 Naval Command College

1948/50 PLA Military College Lieutenant 1940/42 PLA general Military College General 1946/47 PLA Advanced Infantry School Vice 1945/45 admiral

Major military leadership experience

Field army affiliation

Minister of defense

2nd FA

Deputy commander of PLAN

3rd FA

President of AMS

4th FA

Commander 1st FA of Southern Xinjiang MD Chief of 1st FA General Staff

Director of Political Department of GSD

3rd FA

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/ a

In comparison with the CCP Central Committees in the Mao era, members of the 13th Central Committee exhibit several distinctive characteristics. Unlike the 8th Central Committee of 1956 where the majority of the civilian members had major military leadership experience and the majority of the military members had major civilian leadership experience, for instance, the majority of the civilian members of the 13th Central Committee had no military service or leadership experience and the majority of the military members had no civilian leadership experience. Moreover, unlike the 8th Central Committee where the majority of the civilian and military members served as major leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, for those civilian and military members of the 13th Central Committee who

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joined the PLA before 1949, most of them served as junior officers in the various field armies. Because of their junior status in these field armies, their ability to mobilize the field army-based political-military factions for power struggle is likely to be quite limited. Finally, unlike the 8th, 9th, and 10th CCP Central Committees where military representation was as high as 32 percent, 51.2 percent, and 31.7 percent, respectively, military representation in the 13th Central Committee declined to 18.8 percent. Similarly, unlike the 8th, 9th, and 10th Politburos where military representation reached as high as 34.7 percent, 50 percent, and 36 percent, respectively, out of the 17 full and one alternate members of the 13th Politburo, only two of them or 11 percent, including Yang Shangkun and Qin Jiwei, were military members.25 Moreover, for the first time in the CCP history, the 13th Party Congress elected a five-member PBSC which did not include any military member.26 In the final analysis, the Deng era witnessed a remarkable decline in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This decline is particularly reflected in a remarkable decrease in the number of the Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership experiences, in a much smaller number of the Central Committee members who served as senior leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, and in a substantial decrease in military representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo. This development helped not only to solidify the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities based on a clear functional division of labor and reduced party-army symbiosis, but also establish a new normal of civil-­ military relations in post-Deng China.

Low Level of Circulation of Elites across the Institutional Boundaries in the Post-Deng Era The post-Deng era has been characterized by the low level of circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This development can be demonstrated by an analysis of the membership of the CCP Central Committees elected under the directions of the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi after they had served as party general-secretaries for five years. Top leaders had largely consolidated their power after five years in office and they thus had more discretion to appoint and promote leaders that they trust. The

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membership of the Central Committees as a result of such appointments and promotion reflects the preference of the top leaders in maintaining or disrupting the civil-military institutional boundaries by reducing or increasing the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. Circulation of Elites under Jiang Zemin Jiang became the CCP general-secretary in 1989. But as noted elsewhere in this study, Deng exerted substantial influence over the policy and personnel arrangements of the 14th Party Congress of 1992. As a result, it was not until after the death of Deng in early 1997 that Jiang’s position as the top leader had been more fully consolidated. The Central Committee elected by the 15th Party Congress held in late 1997 thus reflects Jiang’s preference regarding the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. The 15th Central Committee has a total of 193 members.27 Out of 193, 152 of them or 78.7 percent are civilian members, or senior officials who hold leadership positions in major civilian party and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. Table 5.9 shows that out of the 152 civilian members, only 11 of them or 7.2 percent had military service or leadership experience, a decline from the 14.7 percent of the 13th Central Committee of 1987. Table 5.9 also shows that among the 11, only three joined the communist forces before 1949, one in Anti-Japanese War and two in Civil War. Among the three, only two had field army affiliations. Due to the junior positions the two held in the pre-1949 field armies, their ability to mobilize the field army-­ based political-military factions for power struggle is likely to be highly limited. The other eight civilian members who had military service experience joined the PLA after 1949. They thus had no direct affiliations with the pre-1949 field armies. Out of the 193 members of the 15th Central Committee, 39 of them or 20.2 percent are military members, or military officers who carry military ranks and hold major leadership positions in the PLA. This number represents a slight increase from the 18.8 percent of the 13th Central Committee of 1987. Commander and PC of the PAP are also members of the 15th Central Committee, constituting another one percent of its total membership. Table 5.10 shows that out of the 39 military members, 6 of them or 15.3 percent joined the PLA before 1949 and thus had field army affiliations, a decline from the 75.7 percent of the 13th Central Committee

1960/65

1951/57

Harbin Institute of Military Engineering

People’s University

Medical College of Fudan University People’s University

Studied in Czechoslovakia

Occupational school of commerce People’s University

Tsinghua University

Technical college

Editor-in-chief of People’s Daily Vice-chair of CPPCC

Governor of Jiangsu Province

Party secretary of Fujian Province Minister of health

Deputy party secretary of Liaoning Province Vice-chair of NPC

CCP chair

Vice premier PC of COSTIND

Minister of land and resources

Major senior leadership experience

Technical officer in 10th Academy of Ministry of National Defense from 1961 to 1965 Deputy director of Organization Department of GPD Deputy director of Health Department of GLD Student and cadre in East China Military-Political University from 1950 to 1952 Director of Propaganda Department of GPD PLA Officer from 1965 to 1983; regiment-leader grade officer in GSD from 1980 to 1983

PC of a county-level guerrilla force in Shanxi in Anti-Japanese War PLA political officer in early 1950s

Student in Second Artillery Technical College from 1961 to 1962 Logistics officer in 8th Route Army Deputy Director of COSTIND

Military service or leadership experience

a

Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Liao Hui

President of People’s Daily Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of State Council

1949/54

Party secretary of Jiangsu Province

Shao Huaze

1962/66

Vice minister of health

Zhang Wenkang Chen Huanyou

1965/65

Minister of personnel

Song Defu

1961/55

State councilor

1950/54

1938/38

1945/45 1965/58

1961/70

Years of Education joining work/ party

Li Tieying

Vice-chair of NPC Director of National Sports Commission Hua Guofeng Central Committee member Li Zemin Party secretary of Zhejiang Province

Governor of Heilongjiang Province

Tian Fengshan

Tian Jiyun Wu Shaozhu

Position in 1997

Name

Table 5.9  Civilian members of the 15th Central Committee who had military experiencea

None

None

3rd FA

None

None

None

None

None

2nd FA None

None

Field army affiliation

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Table 5.10  Military members of the 15th Central Committee who joined the PLA before 1949a Name

Position in 1997

Rank

Yu Yongbo

Director of GPD

General 1947/48

Wang Ke

Director of GLD

General 1944/47

Wang Reilin

Deputy director of GPD

General 1946/47

Chi Haotian

CMC General 1944/46 vice-chair

Zhang Wannian

CMC General 1944/45 vice-chair

Fu Chief of Quanyou General Staff

Years of joining army/ party

General 1946/47

Education

Major military leadership experience

PLA 4th School for Political Officers PLA Shenyang Advanced Artillery School

Deputy director 4th FA of GPD

PLA Advanced Infantry School PLA Nanjing Military College PLA Advanced Infantry School

Commander of Shenyang MR

Field army affiliation

3rd FA

Secretary of 4th FA CMC Discipline Inspection Commission Chief of General 3rd FA Staff

Chief of General 4th FA Staff Director of GLD

1st FA

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

of 1987. Because they served as junior officers in the pre-1949 field armies, their ability to mobilize the field army-based political-military factions for power struggle is likely to be limited. Table 5.11 shows that out of the 39 military members, only 1 of them or 2.5 percent had civilian work experience, a decline from the 15.1 percent of the 13th Central Committee of 1987. Finally, out of the 22 full and two alternate members of the 15th Politburo, only 2 of them or 8.2 percent, including CMC Vice-Chairs Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, are military members, a decline from the 11 percent of the 13th Politburo

174 

N. LI

Table 5.11  Military member of the 15th Central Committee who had civilian work experiencea Name

Position in 1997

Rank

Wang Reilin

Deputy director of GPD

General

Years of joining army/ party 1946/47

Education

Major military leadership experience

Major civilian work experience

Field army affiliation

Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission

Personal secretary of Deng from 1950s to 1960s and from 1970s to 1980s

4th FA

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

of 1987. The 15th Party Congress also elected a seven-member PBSC which did not include any military member.28 The PBSC thus has become completely civilianized since the 15th Party Congress. China under Jiang Zemin witnessed further decline in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This decline is reflected in the continued decrease in the number of the Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership experiences, in a much smaller number of the Central Committee members who served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, in a low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, and in the exclusion of the senior military officers from the PBSC membership. This trend helped to consolidate the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities, reduce party-army symbiosis further, and sustain the new normal of civil-military relations in post-Deng China. Circulation of Elites under Hu Jintao Hu succeeded Jiang as the new party general-secretary at the 16th Party Congress of 2002. He had largely consolidated his power by 2007, the year when the 17th Party Congress was held to elect a new Central Committee. An analysis of the membership of this Central Committee reveals that Hu’s administration is also characterized by the low level of circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries.

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175

The 17th Central Committee has a total of 204 members.29 Out of 204, 163 of them or 79.9 percent are civilian members, or senior officials who hold leadership positions in major civilian party and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. Table 5.12 shows that out of the 163 civilian members, only 8 of them or 4.9 percent had military service experience, a decline from the 7.2 percent of the 15th Central Committee of 1997. All eight joined the PLA in the 1960s and 1970s. Except for Xi Jinping who had served as a junior officer for three years and Liao Hui who had served in the PLA for 18 years and become a regiment-leader grade officer by 1980, all others served as conscripts in the PLA. The short length of time they served and the relatively low positions they held in the PLA are unlikely to translate into extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA that they could leverage for intra-party leadership power struggle. Out of the 204 members, 39 of them or 19.1 percent were military members, or military officers who carried military ranks and held major leadership positions in the PLA. This number represents a slight decline from the 20.2 percent of the 15th Central Committee of 1997. Commander and PC of the PAP are also members of the 17th Central Committee, constituting another 0.98 percent of the total membership of the Central Committee. Table  5.13 shows that out of the 39 military members, only one of them or 2.5 percent had civilian work experience, which is similar to the level of the 15th Central Committee of 1997. Finally, Table 5.14 shows that out of the 25 members of the 17th Politburo, only 2 or 8 percent, including the two uniformed CMC vice-chairs, are military members. This level of military representation is similar to that of the 15th Politburo of 1997. The 17th Party Congress also elected a nine-­ member PBSC that did not include any military members. China under Hu Jintao witnessed the low level of circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This low level is reflected in the continued decrease in the number of Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership or work experiences, in the low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, and in a completely civilianized PBSC.  This trend helped to consolidate the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities, reduce party-army symbiosis further, and sustain the new normal of civil-military relations in post-Deng China.

176 

N. LI

Table 5.12  Civilian members of the 17th Central Committee who had military experiencea Name

Position in 2007 Years of joining work/ party

Xi Jinping

Party secretary of Shanghai

Education

1969/74 Tsinghua University

Yang Director-general 1966/68 Yuanyuan of Civil Aviation Administration of China

Major senior leadership experience CCP generalsecretary

Junior officer in CMC General Office from 1979 to 1982 Advanced Deputy Director Student in a Civil of State PLAAF Aviation Administration preparatory Flight School of Work Safety flight school and PLA conscript from 1966 to 1968 Harbin Party secretary PLA conscript Institute of of Xinjiang from 1970 to Technology 1975 Central Party Deputy party PLA conscript School secretary of from 1962 to Shandong 1969 Province Capital Chair of China PLA conscript University of Banking and from 1969 to Economics Insurance 1973 and Business Regulatory Commission Central Party secretary PLA conscript South of Shandong from 1969 to University of Province 1974 Technology

Zhang Party secretary Chunxian of Hunan Province Chen Party secretary Jianguo of Ningxia

1970/73

Shang Fulin

Chair of China Securities Regulatory Commission

1969/71

Jiang Yikang

Party secretary 1969/70 of China National School of Administration Party secretary 1969/75 University of Party secretary of Qinghai Science and of Jiangxi Province Technology Province of China

Qiang Wei

1962/66

Military service or leadership experience

PLA conscript from 1969 to 1975 (continued)

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177

Table 5.12 (continued) Name

Position in 2007 Years of joining work/ party

Liao Hui

Vice-chair of CPPCC

Education

1960/65 Harbin Institute of Military Engineering

Major senior leadership experience

Military service or leadership experience

Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of State Council

PLA officer from 1965 to 1983; regiment-­ leader grade officer in GSD from 1980 to 1983

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Table 5.13  Military member of the 17th Central Committee who had major civilian leadership experiencea Name Position in 2007

Rank

Liu Yuan

General

PC of AMS

Years of joining army/party

Education

Major military Major civilian leadership leadership experience experience

1992/82

Capital Normal University

PC of GLD

Vice governor of Henan Province

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Table 5.14  Military members of the 17th CCP Politburoa Name

Position in 1997

Rank

Years of joining army/ party

Xu Caihou Guo Boxiong

CMC vice-chair CMC vice-chair

General

1963/71

General

1958/63

Education

Major military leadership experience

Harbin Institute of Director of GPD Military Engineering PLA Military Deputy chief of College General Staff

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

178 

N. LI

Circulation of Elites under Xi Jinping Xi succeeded Hu as the new party general-secretary at the 18th Party Congress held in 2012. He had largely consolidated his power by 2017, the year when the 19th Party Congress was held to elect a new Central Committee. An analysis of the membership of this Central Committee shows that Xi’s administration is also characterized by the low level of circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. The 19th Central Committee has a total of 204 members.30 Out of 204, 163 of them or 79.9 percent are civilian members, or senior officials who hold leadership positions in major civilian party and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. Table 5.15 shows that among the 163, 154 of them or 94.47 percent had no military service experience in their career tracks. Table 5.15 also provides the biographical information of the 154 members. Table  5.16 shows that out of the 163 civilian members, only 9 of them or 5.52 percent had military service experience, a slight increase from the 4.9 percent of the 17th Central Committee of 2007. All nine joined the PLA in the 1960s and 1970s, serving as either junior officers or conscripts in the PLA. The short length of time they spent and the low positions they held in the PLA thus are unlikely to translate into extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA that they could employ for intra-party leadership power struggle. Table 5.17 shows that out of the 204 members, 39 of them or 19.1 percent are military members, or military officers who carry military ranks and hold major leadership positions in the PLA. This level of military representation is similar to that of the 17th Central Committee of 2007. Table  5.17 also offers the biographical information of the 39 military members and shows that none of the 39 had civilian work experience. This development represents a decline from the 2.5 percent of the 17th Central Committee of 2007. Table  5.18 shows that commander and PC of the PAP are also members of the 19th Central Committee, constituting another 0.98 percent of its total membership. Finally, Table 5.19 shows that out of the 25 members of the 19th Politburo, only 2 or 8 percent represent the PLA. This level of military representation is similar to that of the 17th Politburo of 2007. The 19th Party Congress also elected a seven-­ member PBSC that does not include any military members. Like his post-Deng predecessors, Xi has continued the policy to keep low the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This is reflected in the low level of the

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179

Table 5.15  Civilian members of the 19th Central Committee who had no military experiencea Name

Position in 2017

Ding Xuedong

Deputy secretary- 1977/84 general of State Council

Ding Xuexiang

Director of CCP Central General Office

1982/84

Ding Weiguo

Party secretary of Fujian Province

1973/75

Wan Lijun

Chair of All-China Federation for Returned Overseas Chinese Vice-chair of CPPCC

1982

Ma Xinrei

Governor of Guangdong Province

1988/88

Wang Jun

Commissioner of 1976/77 State Administration of Taxation

Ma Biao

Years of joining work/party

1972/85

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Bachelor’s degree in math from Anhui Normal University; PhD in finance from Institute of Fiscal Science of Ministry of Finance Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Yanshan University; master’s degree in management from Fudan University Bachelor’s degree in Chinese from People’s University PhD in physical chemistry from Tohoku University In Japan

Vice minister of finance

Bachelor’s degree in political economy from Minzu University of China PhD in aerodynamics from Harbin Institute of Technology

PhD in political theory from Peking University

Deputy director of CCP Central General Office

Governor of Fujian Province President of University of Science and Technology of China Governor of Guangxi

General manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Vice minister of finance

(continued)

180 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Wang Yong

State councilor

1969/74

Master’s degree in technical economics from Harbin Institute of Technology

Wang Cheng

Vice-chair of NPC

1969/69

Wang Yi

Minister of foreign affairs

1969/77

Wang Xiaohong

Vice minister of public security

1974/82

Wang Yupu

Director of State 1982/85 Administration of Work Safety

Wang Zhengwei

Vice-chair of CPPCC

1976/81

Wang Dongming

Party secretary of Sichuan Province

1975/75

Master’s degree in journalism from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Bachelor’s degree in Japanese from Beijing International Studies University; PhD in international relations from China Foreign Affairs University Bachelor’s degree in economic management from Central Party School PhD in oil and gas engineering from China University of Petroleum PhD in ethnic economics from Minzu University of China Bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Liaoning University

Vice-chair of State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department Ambassador to Japan

Wang Dongfeng

Party secretary of Hebei Province

1981/80

Master’s degree in economics from Xian Jiaotong University

Vice mayor of Beijing

Minister of emergency management Director of State Ethnic Affairs Commission Deputy director of CCP Organization Department Mayor of Tianjin

(continued)

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181

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Wang Ercheng

Vice-chair of 1971/80 National Council for Social Security Fund Vice minister of 1976/86 science and technology

Wang Zigang

Years of joining work/party

PBSC member

Wang Guosheng

Party secretary of Qinghai Province

Wang Jianjun

Governor of Qinghai Province

Wang Xiaodong

Governor of Hubei Province

Wang Xiaohui

Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department Minister of 1983/81 housing and urban-rural development Director of CCP 1969/73 United Front Work Department

You Quan

Major senior leadership experience

MBA from China-­ Deputy director Europe International of CCP Business School Organization Department Bachelor’s degree in General manager information theory of China from Xidian Electronics University Technology Group Corporation 1977/1984 Master’s degree in Director of CCP international politics Central Policy from Fudan Research Office University 1974/75 Graduate degree in Governor of politics from Hubei Province Shandong Provincial Party School 1978/84 Graduate degree in Party secretary of political science from Qinghai Province Central Party School 1983/83 Graduate degree in Vice governor of political science from Guizhou Central Party School Province 1986 Master’s degree in Director of State law from Jilin Film Board University

Wang Huning

Wang Menghui

Education

PhD in architecture from Tsinghua University Master’s degree in economic management from People’s University

Deputy party secretary of Liaoning Province Party secretary of Fujian Province

(continued)

182 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Che Jun

Party secretary of 1973/73 Zhejiang Province

Yi Li

Governor of Sichuan Province

1987/83

Bayanqolu

Party secretary of Jilin Province

1976/76

Bater

Director of State Ethnic Affairs Commission

1973/81

Arken Imirbaki

Vice-chair of NPC

1971/80

Shi Taifeng

Party secretary of Ningxia

1974/82

Lu Zhangong

Vice-chair of CPPCC

1969/75

Bai Chunli

President of 1970/74 Chinese Academy of Sciences Vice-chair of 1978/80 NPC

Ji Binxuan

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Bachelor’s degree in economic management from Central Party School PhD in public health from Russian Academy of Medical Sciences Master’s degree in economics from Jilin University Master’s degree in political economy from Fudan University Bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Shaanxi University Of Science & Technology Master’s degree in law from Peking University Bachelor’s degree in architecture from Harbin Institute of Technology PhD in chemistry from Chinese Academy of Sciences Bachelor’s degree in Chinese from Zhengzhou University

Deputy party secretary of Xinjiang Vice minister of health

Vice governor of Zhejiang Province Deputy director of CCP United Front Work Department Vice governor of Xinjiang

Governor of Jiangsu Province Party secretary of Henan Province

Vice president of Chinese Academy of Sciences Party secretary of Heilongjiang Province (continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

183

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Bi Jingquan

Qu Qingshan

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Director of China 1982/78 Food and Drug Administration

Bachelor’s degree in economics from Peking University

Director of CCP Central Party History Research Office Governor of Jiangxi Province

1973/75

Graduate degree in party history from Central Party School

1974/76

Liu Shiyu

Chair of China Securities Regulatory Commission

1984

Liu Qibao

Director of CCP Propaganda Department Governor of Jilin Province

1974/71

Liu Jinguo

Deputy secretary of CDIC

1976/75

Liu Jieyi

Deputy Director of Taiwan Affairs Office of State Council

1977/87

Bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Zhejiang University; PhD in economics from Xian Jiaotong University Bachelor’s degree in engineering from Tsinghua University; PhD in economics from Tsinghua University Master’s degree in economics from Jilin University Master’s degree in engineering from Harbin Institute of Technology Bachelor’s degree in economic management from Central Party School Bachelor’s degree in English from Beijing Foreign Studies University

Deputy director of National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) Deputy director of CCP Central Party History Research Office Party secretary of Jiangxi Province

Liu Qi

Liu Guozhong

Years of joining work/party

1982/86

Chair of Board of Agricultural Bank of China

Party secretary of Sichuan Province Governor of Shaanxi Province

Vice minister of public security

Deputy director of CCP International Department (continued)

184 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Liu Jiayi

Party secretary of Shandong Province

1980/76

Audit-general of State Audit Office

Liu Xigui

Party secretary of Hainan Province

1973/73

Che Dalha

Governor of Tibet

1979/82

Xu Qin

Governor of Hebei Province

1982/82

Xu Yousheng

Deputy director of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of State Council Governor of Hunan Province

1975/85

PhD in economics from Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Graduate degree from Central Party School Graduate degree in economic management from Central Party School Master’s degree in photoelectric engineering from Beijing Institute of Technology; PhD in management from Hong Kong Polytechnic University Bachelor’s degree in Chinese from Xiamen University

Vice minister of industry and information technology

Ruan Chengfa

Governor of Yunnan Province

1975/82

Sun Zhigang

Party secretary of 1971/76 Guizhou Province

Master’s degree in mechanical engineering from Harbin Institute of Technology PhD in scientific socialism from Central China Normal University PhD in economics from Wuhan University

Xu Dazhe

1975/82

Director of State Oceanic Administration Deputy party secretary of Tibet

Mayor of Shenzhen

Deputy director of CCP United Front Work Department

Vice governor of Hubei Province

Vice governor of Anhui Province (continued)

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185

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Sun Jinlong

Deputy party secretary of Xinjiang

1982/86

Deputy party secretary of Hunan Province

Sun Shaocheng

Vice minister of 1984/86 land and resources Director of CCP 1969/73 United Front Work Department Party secretary of 1973/73 Hunan Province

Bachelor’s degree in engineering from China University of Geosciences; PhD in economics from People’s University PhD in scientific socialism from Peking University Graduate degree in political science from Central Party School MBA from China-­ Europe International Business School Graduate degree in economics from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

1975/82

MBA from Tsinghua University

1974/81

PhD in economics from Jilin University

Party secretary of Liaoning Province Governor of Anhui Province

1976/83

MBA from Hong Kong Polytechnic University Master’s degree in nuclear reactor engineering from Tsinghua University

Sun Chunlan Du Jiahao

Li Yi

Li Xi

Li Bin

Li Qiang

Li Ganjie

Vice-chair of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (CFLAC) Party secretary of Guangdong Province Director of National Health and Family Planning Commission Party secretary of Shanghai

1977/83

Minister of environmental protection

1989/84

Minister of veteran affairs Vice premier

Vice governor of Heilongjiang Province Secretary of CFLAC

Party secretary of Jiangsu Province Deputy party secretary of Hebei Province (continued)

186 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Li Xiaopeng Minister of transport

1982/85

Governor of Shanxi Province

Li Yufu

Vice-chair of All-China Federation of Trade Unions Party secretary of Inner Mongolia

1972/75

Bachelor’s degree in electric power engineering from North China Electric Power University PhD in economics from Peking University

Governor of Yunnan Province

Li Keqiang

Premier

1974/76

Li Guoying

Governor of Anhui Province

1984/88

PhD in management from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences PhD in economics from Peking University Bachelor’s degree in engineering from North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power; PhD in environmental science from Northeast Normal University PhD in engineering from Chongqing University Bachelor’s degree in history from Jilin University PhD in political science from Jilin University PhD in history from Nanjing University

Li Jiheng

Position in 2017

1979/76

Li Xiaohong Party secretary of 1985/82 Chinese Academy of Engineering Li Party secretary of 1975/76 Hongzhong Tianjin Li Jinbin

Party secretary of Anhui Province

1974/78

Yang Jiechi

State councilor

1968/71

Deputy secretary of CDIC

Party secretary of Liaoning Province Vice minister of hydraulic power

Vice minister of education Party secretary of Hubei Province Vice governor of Jilin Province Minister of foreign affairs (continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

187

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Yang Zhenwu

President of People’s Daily

1978/75

Graduate degree in law from Central Party School Graduate degree in law from Central Party School PhD in finance from Institute of Fiscal Science of Ministry of Finance Graduate degree in material science from Central South University PhD in CCP history from Central Party School Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from North University of China Graduate degree in law from Central Party School

Editor-in-chief of People’s Daily

PhD in economics from Xiamen University Master’s degree in law from Hangzhou University Bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Peking University

Deputy party secretary of Tianjin Deputy party secretary of Shanghai Vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Yang Xiaodu Minister of supervision

1970/73

Xiao Jie

1976/85

Minister of finance

Xiao Yaqing chair of SASAC

1982/81

Wu Yingjie

Party secretary of Tibet

1974/87

Wu Zhenglong

Governor of Jiangsu Province

1984/87

Qiu Xueqiang

Deputy 1975/80 procurator-­ general of Supreme People’s Procuratorate Director of 1973/81 NDRC

He Lifeng

Ying Yong

Mayor of Shanghai

1976/79

Leng Rong

Director of CCP 1969/83 Central Literature Research Office

Deputy secretary of CDIC Vice governor of Hunan Province

Deputy secretary-general of State Council Vice governor of Tibet Deputy party secretary of Jiangsu Province

Deputy party secretary of Supreme People’s Procuratorate

(continued)

188 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Wang Yang

Vice premier

1972/75

Party secretary of Guangdong Province

Wang Yongqing

Deputy secretary- 1987/85 general of State Council Governor of 1987/84 Hainan Province

Master’s degree in management science from University of Science and Technology of China PhD in law from Jilin University PhD in medicine from Shanghai Jiaotong University Graduate degree in economic management from Central Party School Master’s degree in law from China University of Political Science and Law PhD in computer science from Beihang University

Vice minister of education

Shen Xiaoming Shen Yueyue

Shen Deyong

Huai Jinpeng

Song Tao

Chair of 1977/81 All-China Women’s Federation Vice president of 1977/72 Supreme People’s Court Party secretary of 1987/86 China Association for Science and Technology Director of CCP 1973/75 International Department

Song Xiuyan Party secretary of 1971/78 All-China Women’s Federation Zhang Jun Minister of justice 1973/74

Vice-chair of CPPCC

Deputy director of CCP Organization Department Deputy party secretary of Supreme People’s Court Vice minister of industry and information technology Vice minister of foreign affairs

Graduate degree from Monash University; PhD in economics from Fujian Normal University Graduate degree in Governor of political science from Qinghai Province Central Party School PhD in law from Wuhan University

Procurator-­ general of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

189

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Zhang Qingwei

Party secretary of Heilongjiang Province

1982/92

Director of COSTIND

Zhang Qingli

Vice-chair of CPPCC

1971/73

Master’s degree in aircraft design from Northwestern Poly-technical University; PhD in management from Beihang University Graduate degree in political science from Central Party School Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Wuhan University of Technology; PhD in management from Nankai University Bachelor’s degree in electronics engineering from Changchun University of Science and Technology; PhD in economics from Tsinghua University Master’s degree in law from People’s University

Zhang Jinan Director of Office 1974/78 of Central Commission for Public Sector Reform

Zhang Guoqing

Mayor of Chongqing

Zhang Xiaoming

Director of Hong 1986 Kong and Macau Affairs Office of State Council

Zhang Yijiong

Deputy director of CCP United Front Work Department Governor of Heilongjiang Province

Lu Hao

1985/84

1972/76

Graduate degree in law from Central Party School

1989/85

Master’s degree in economics from Peking University

Party secretary of Hebei Province Deputy director of CCP Organization Department

Deputy party secretary of Tianjin

Director of Liaison Office of Central Government in Hong Kong Deputy party secretary of Jiangxi Province Vice mayor of Beijing (continued)

190 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Chen Xi

Director of CCP Organization Department

1970/78

Chen Wu

Governor of Guangxi

1972/75

Chen Hao

Party secretary of Yunnan Province

1977/76

Master’s degree in chemical engineering from Tsinghua University Graduate degree in law from Central Party School MBA from China-­ Europe International Business School

Chen Wenqing

Minister of state security

1984/83

Chen Jining Mayor of Beijing

1988/84

Chen Qiufa

Party secretary of Liaoning Province

1973/74

Chen Baosheng

Minister of education

1974/84

Chen Run’er

Governor of Henan Province

1975/75

Chen Min’er

Party secretary of Chongqing

1981/82

Major senior leadership experience

Deputy party secretary of Liaoning Province Deputy party secretary of Guangxi Vice-chair of All-China Federation of Trade Unions Bachelor’s degree in Deputy party law from Southwest secretary of University of Political Fujian Province Science and Law PhD in Minister of environmental environmental science from Imperial protection College London Bachelor’s degree in vice minister of electronics industry and engineering from information National University technology of Defense Technology (NUDT) Bachelor’s degree in Vice president of economics from Central Party Peking University; School graduate degree in political science from Central Party School Graduate degree in Deputy party economic secretary of management from Heilongjiang Central Party School Province Graduate degree in Party secretary of law from Central Guizhou Party School Province (continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

191

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Nurlan Abu Dhabi

Chair of Xinjiang Political Consultative Conference Minister of industry and information technology

1985/85

Bachelor’s degree in law from Xinjiang University

Vice governor of Xinjiang

1974/84

Bachelor’s degree in internal combustion engineering from Hefei University of Technology; graduate degree from Central Party School Master’s degree in electronics engineering and PhD in management from Xidian University Bachelor’s degree in missile engineering from Beihang University; master’s degree in engineering from Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology; PhD in economics from Fudan University Master’s degree in law from Southwest University of Political Science and Law Graduate degree in diplomacy from Oxford University

General manager of Dongfeng Motor Corporation

Miao Wei

Gou Zhongwen

Director of 1974/76 General Administration of Sports of China

Jin Deputy director Zhuanglong of Office of Central MilitaryCivilian Fusion Development Commission

1989/84

Zhou Qiang President of 1976/78 Supreme People’s Court Zheng Xiaosong

Director of Liaison Office of Central Government in Macau

1983/86

Vice minister of industry and information technology Deputy director of COSTIND

Party secretary of Hunan Province

Deputy director of CCP International Department (continued)

192 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Meng Xiangfeng

Deputy secretary of Work Committee for Offices Directly under CCP Central Committee Secretary of CDIC

1986/86

PhD in law from Central Party School

Deputy director of CCP Central General Office

1974/75

Bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Peking University; graduate degree in political science from Central Party School Graduate degree in scientific socialism from Central Party School Master’s degree in aviation systems engineering from Northwestern Poly-technical University PhD in environmental engineering from University of Tokyo Master’s degree in law from Southwest University of Political Science and Law Bachelor’s degree in Chinese from Peking University PhD in public administration from Lanzhou University

Director of CCP Organization Department

Zhao Leji

Zhao Kezhi

Minister of public 1973/75 security

He Peng

Party secretary of SASAC

1976/82

Hu Heping

Party secretary of Shaanxi Province

1986/82

Hu Zejun

Auditor-general of State Audit Office

1974/76

Hu Chunhua

Party secretary of Guangdong Province Governor of Ningxia

1983/83

Xian Hui

1975/76

Party secretary of Hebei Province

Governor of Qinghai Province

Governor of Shaanxi Province

Vice minister of justice

Vice premier

Vice governor of Gansu Province (continued)

5  CIRCULATION OF ELITES ACROSS THE CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL… 

193

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Zhong Shan Minister of commerce Xin Chunying

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

1972/74

PhD in economics

Vice governor of Zhejiang Province Deputy director of Rule of Law Committee of NPC Standing Committee Vice minister of science and technology

Deputy secretary- 1973 general of NPC

Hou Jianguo

Deputy director 1976/85 of General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine Lou Qinjian Party secretary of 1973/75 Jiangsu Province

Losang Jamcan

Deputy party secretary of Tibet

1976/78

Luo Huining

Party secretary of Shanxi Province

1970/82

Yuan Jiajun

Governor of 1987/92 Zhejiang Province

Yuan Shuhong

Deputy director 1975/85 of Rule of Law Office of State Council Director of State 1974/93 Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television

Nie Chenxi

Master’s degree in law from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences PhD in physics from University of Science and Technology of China

PhD in computer science from Huazhong University of Science and Technology Graduate degree in Marxism from Central Party School PhD in economics from People’s University PhD in aircraft design from Beihang University PhD in law from Peking University

Vice minister of industry and information technology

PhD in management from Tianjin University

Vice governor of Hebei Province

Governor of Tibet Party secretary of Qinghai Province Vice governor of Ningxia Vice minister of justice

(continued)

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Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Li Zhanshu

Director of CCP Central General Office Vice-chair of China Writers Association

1972/75

MBA from Harbin Institute of Technology Bachelor’s degree in history of international communism from People’s University

Chair of NPC

Qian Xiaoqian

Tie Ning

Ni Yuefeng

Xu Lin

1973/74

Chair of China 1975 Writers Association Deputy director 1987/85 of General Administration of Customs Deputy director 1982/82 of CCP Propaganda Department

Xu Lejiang

Deputy director of CCP United Front Work Department

Guo Shengkun

Minister of public 1973/74 security

Guo Shuqing

Chair of China Banking Regulatory Commission Governor of Gansu Province

Tang Renjian

1974/76

1974/84

1983/91

PhD in automation engineering from Tsinghua University Graduate degree in business administration from Shanghai Normal University Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Jiangxi University of Science and Technology; MBA from Fudan University PhD in management from University of Science and Technology Beijing PhD in law from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Deputy director of CCP External Propaganda Office Vice-chair of China Writers Association Deputy party secretary of Fujian Province Director of Information Office of State Council Vice minister of industry and information technology

Party secretary of Guangxi

Governor of Shandong Province

PhD in economics Vice governor of from Southwestern Guangxi University of Finance and Economics (continued)

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Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Huang Ming

Vice minister of public security

1975/76

Huang Shouhong

Director of Research Office of State Council

1993

Huang Shuxian

Minister of civil affairs

1977/77

Vice minister of emergency management Deputy director of Research Office of State Council Minister of supervision

Cao Jianming

Procurator-­ 1972/73 general of Supreme People’s Procuratorate

Graduate degree in law from Nanjing Normal University PhD in economic management from Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences Bachelor’s degree in liberal arts from Nanjing University Master’s degree in international law from East China University of Political Science and Law PhD in Economics from Xiamen University MBA from Tianjin University

Pang Zheng Governor of Shandong Province Shöhret Governor of Zakir Xinjiang

1982/85

E Jingping

Vice minister of water resources

1973/77

Lu Xinshe

Party secretary of Jiangxi Province

1982/85

Shen Yiqin

Vice governor of 1977/85 Guizhou Province

Peng Qinghua

Party secretary of Guangxi

1970/85

1974/76

Bachelor’s degree in hydraulic power engineering from North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power Bachelor’s degree in irrigation and drainage Engineering from Wuhan University Graduate degree in economics from Central Party School PhD in management from Sun Yat-sen University

Vice president of Supreme People’s Court

Vice governor of Zhejiang Province Deputy party secretary of Xinjiang Minister of water resources

Party secretary of Guangxi

Deputy party secretary of Guizhou Province Party secretary of Sichuan Province (continued)

196 

N. LI

Table 5.15 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Jiang Chaoliang

Party secretary of Hubei Province

1974/81

Governor of Jilin Province

Han Zheng

Party secretary of Shanghai

1975/79

Han Changfu Fu Zhenghua

Minister of agriculture Vice minister of public security

1974/76

Xie Fuzhan

Party secretary of Henan Province

1973/74

Lou Yangsheng

Governor of Shanxi Province

1976/81

Cai Qi

Party secretary of Beijing

1973/75

Luo Shugang

Minister of culture

1971/81

Pan Ligang

Deputy secretary- 1975/76 general of CPPCC

Mu Hong

Deputy director of NDRC

Master’s degree in economics from Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Master’s degree in economics from East China Normal University PhD in law from Tsinghua University Master’s degree in law from Peking University Master’s degree in engineering from Institute of Automation of Ministry of Machinery Industry Bachelor’s degree in math from Zhejiang Normal University; MBA from Zhejiang University PhD in economics from Fujian Normal University Graduate degree in party theory and construction from Central Party School Bachelor’s degree in engineering from Dalian Maritime University Bachelor’s degree in finance from Central University of Finance and Economics

1970/73

1976/84

Vice premier

Governor of Jilin Province Minister of justice

President of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Deputy party secretary of Shanxi Province

Vice governor of Zhejiang Province Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department Deputy director of CCP Organization Department Vice governor of Guangxi

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

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Table 5.16  Civilian members of the 19th Central Committee who had military work experiencea Name

Major senior leadership experience

Military service or leadership experience

Xi Jinping CCP generalsecretary

Governor of Fujian Province; party secretary of Zhejiang Province and Shanghai

Junior officer in CMC General Office from 1979 to 1982

Wang Zimin

Deputy director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of State Council

PLA conscript, student, and junior officer from 1976 to 1985

Bu Xiaolin

Liu He

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

1969/1974 Bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Tsinghua University; PhD in Marxist theory from Tsinghua University Director of 1975 Bachelor’s Liaison Office degree in of Central mapping from Government PLA Survey and in Hong Mapping Kong College; PhD in political economy from Fujian Normal University Governor of 1976/85 PhD in law from Inner Jilin University Mongolia

Deputy director of NDRC

1969/76

Master’s degree in economics from People’s University; MPA from Kennedy School of Harvard University

Vice governor PLA of Inner conscript Mongolia from 1977 to 1980 Vice premier PLA conscript from 1970 to 1973

(continued)

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N. LI

Table 5.16 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Years of joining work/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Zhang Chunxian

Politburo member

1970/73

Party secretary PLA of Xinjiang conscript from 1970 to 1975

Chen Quanguo

Party secretary of Xinjiang

1973/76

Lin Duo

Party secretary of Gansu Province

1974/75

Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Yanshan University; master’s degree in management from Harbin Institute of Technology PhD in management from Wuhan University of Technology Graduate degree in law from Central Party School

Huang Kunming

Director of CCP Propaganda Department

1974/76

PhD in management from Tsinghua University

1970/74

Bachelor’s degree in Chinese from Nanjing Normal University

Cai President of Mingzhao Xinhua News Agency

Military service or leadership experience

Party secretary PLA of Tibet conscript from 1973 to 1977 Governor of Gansu Province

Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department Deputy director of CCP Propaganda Department

Trainee and conscript in PLAN from 1974 to 1979 PLA conscript from 1974 to 1977 PLA conscript and junior officer from 1970 to 1976

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

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Table 5.17  Military members of the 19th Central Committeea Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Yi Xiaoguang

Deputy chief of CMCJSD

General

1974/77

PLAAF Baoding Aviation Academy

Ding Laihang

Commander of PLAAF

Lieutenant 1975/1975 PLAAF 9th General Aviation Academy

Yu Zhongfu

PC of PLAAF

General

Wang Jianwu

Deputy director of CMCPWD

Lieutenant general

Wang Jiasheng

PC of PLARF

General

Commander of Nanjing MR Air Force; deputy chief of General Staff; commander of Central Theater Chief of staff of Chengdu MR Air Force; commander of Northern Theater Air Force PC of Nanjing MR Air Force; PC of Jinan MR Air Force Director of Political Department of 54th GA; PC of Tibet MD Deputy PC of GAD; PC of Second Artillery

Liu Lei

PC of PLAA

General

Liu Wanlong

Commander of Xinjiang MD

Lieutenant general

1974

1973

MBA from People’s University

Bachelor’s degree in electronics engineering from NUDT Graduate PC of 21st GA; degree in joint PC of Lanzhou campaign MR command from NDU Commander of Gansu Provincial MD

(continued)

200 

N. LI

Table 5.17 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Liu Guozhi Director of CMC Science and Technology Commission (CMCSTC) Liu Zhenli Chief of staff of PLAA

Lieutenant general

PhD in physics Deputy director engineering of GAD from Tsinghua University

Lieutenant 1983/84 general

Liu Yuejun Commander of Eastern Theater

General

Master’s degree in military science from NDU Bachelor’s degree in economic management from Central Party School

An Zhaoqing

PC of CMC Armament Development Department (CMCADD) CMC vice-chair

Lieutenant general

Li Fengbiao

Chief of staff of Central Theater

Lieutenant 1978 general

Li Chuan-­ guang

Chief of staff of PLARF

Lieutenant general

Xu Qiliang

General

1969/72

Commander of 65th GA; commander of 38th GA Commander of 42nd GA; commander of Lanzhou MR

PC of Southern Theater Air Force

1966/67

PLAAF 5th and 8th Aviation Academies Graduate degree in Strategic studies from NDU

Deputy chief of General Staff; commander of PLAAF Commander of 15th Airborne Corps; deputy commander of Chengdu MR Commander of 55th Base of Second Artillery; deputy commander of PLARF (continued)

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Table 5.17 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Li Zuocheng

Chief of CMCJSD

General

1970/72

Commander of 41st GA; commander of PLAA

Li Shangfu

Director of CMCADD

General

1982

Graduate degree from Guangxi Normal University Degrees in automation from NUDT and Chongqing University

Li Qiaoming

Commander of Northern Theater

Lieutenant 1976 general

Yang Xuejun

President of AMS

Lieutenant 1979/84 general

Wu Shezhou

PC of Western Lieutenant Theater general

He Ping

PC of Eastern Theater

Lieutenant general

Shen Jinlong

Commander of PLAN

Vice admiral

PhD in computer science from NUDT

Deputy director of GAD; chief of staff of PLASSF

Commander of 41st GA; commander of Northern Theater Army Force President of NUDT

PC of Hubei Provincial MD; PC of Central Theater Army Force Deputy PC of 14th GA; deputy PC of Western Theater Commander of PLAN Lushun Support Base; commander of PLAN South Sea Fleet (continued)

202 

N. LI

Table 5.17 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/party

Song Dan

Secretary of CMCPLAC

Lieutenant general

Zhang Youxia

CMC vice-chair

General

1968/69

Zhang Shengmin

Secretary of CMCDIC

General

1978/79

Miao Hua

Director of CMCPWD

Admiral

1969/73

Fan Xiaojun

PC of Northern Theater

Lieutenant general

Shang Hong

Deputy Lieutenant 1982 commander of general PLASSF

Zhou Yaning

Commander of PLARF

Lieutenant 1976 general

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Bachelor’s degree from Southwest University of Political Science ad Law Studied at PLA Military College and NDU Graduate degree in political science from Central Party School

Deputy director of CMC General Office; deputy secretary of CMCDIC

Bachelor’s degree in management from NUDT

Bachelor’s degree in automation from North University of China

Commander of 13th GA; Director of GAD PC of CMC Training and Management Department (CMCTMD); PC of CMCLSD PC of 12th GA; PC of PLAN

PC of 15th Airborne Corps; PC of Jinan MR Air Force Chief of staff of GAD

Commander of 52nd Base of Second Artillery; deputy commander of Second Artillery (continued)

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Table 5.17 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Zheng He

President of NDU

Lieutenant general

Zheng Weiping

PC of PLASSF General

1970

Zhao Zhongqi

Commander of Western Theater

General

1970

Qin PC of PLAN Shengxiang

Vice admiral

Yuan Yubai Commander of Southern Theater

Vice admiral

Xu Anxiang

Lieutenant general

Commander of Southern Theater Air Force

Years of joining army/party

1977

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Master’s degree in campaign and tactical command from Frunze Military Academy

Deputy commander of Chengdu MR; director of CMCTMD

PC of 41st GA; PC of Eastern Theater Studied Arabic Commander of at PLA 14th GA; Foreign commander of Languages Jinan MR Institute Graduate Director of degree from CMC General Central Party Office; Director School of CMC Reform and Organizational Structure Office Qingdao Commander of Submarine PLAN 1st Academy Submarine Base; commander of PLAN North Sea Fleet PLAAF Commander of aviation Guangzhou MR academy Air Force; deputy commander of PLAAF (continued)

204 

N. LI

Table 5.17 (continued) Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/party

Education

Major senior leadership experience

Gao Jing

Commander of PLASSF

General

1978/80

Commander of 52nd Base of Second Artillery; president of AMS

Sheng Bin

Director of CMCNDMD

Lieutenant 1976 general

Han Weiguo

Commander of PLAA

General

Li Huohui

Director of CMCTMD

Lieutenant general

Master’s degree in engineering from Second Artillery Command College Studied at Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; master’s degree in military science from NDU Master’s degree in military science from NDU Graduate degree from NDU

Wei Fenghe

Minister of defense

General

1970/74

1970/72

Graduate degrees from Second Artillery Command College and NDU

Deputy commander of 39th GA; deputy commander of Shenyang MR

Commander of 12th GA; commander of Central Theater Chief of staff of 12th GA; commander of 31st GA Commander of 53rd Base of Second Artillery; commander of PLARF

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

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Table 5.18  PAP members of the 19th Central Committeea Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of joining army/ party

Education

Wang Ning

Commander of PAP

General

1970

Lieutenant general

1976/78

Commander of 31st GA; deputy chief of General Staff Master’s degree PC of Fujian in military Provincial MD; science from director of Army Political Command Department of College Nanjing MR

Zhu PC of PAP Shengling

Major senior leadership experience

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Table 5.19  Military members of the 19th CCP Politburoa Name

Position in 2017

Rank

Years of Education joining army/ party

Xu Qiliang

CMC General vice-chair

1966/67

Zhang Youxia

CMC General vice-chair

1968/69

PLAAF 5th and 8th Aviation Academies Studied at PLA Military College and NDU

Major senior leadership experience Deputy chief of General Staff; commander of PLAAF Commander of 13th GA; director of GAD

a Biographical information was retrieved in January 2019 from http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people. com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/

Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership or work experiences, in the low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, and in a completely civilianized PBSC. This trend has helped to consolidate the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities based on a clear functional division of labor, reduce party-army symbiosis further, and sustain the new normal of civil-military relations in post-Deng China.

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Conclusion This chapter shows that circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries in the Mao Era was extensive and frequent. An analysis of the membership of the 8th CCP Central Committee of 1956, for instance, demonstrates that the majority of the civilian and military leaders were the “dual-role elites” who had extensive leadership experiences in both the civilian and military sectors, a reflection of the highly symbiotic nature of the party-army relations developed in the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. Because these elites spent most of their careers as leaders in several remote and isolated guerrilla base areas that had later evolved into the five field armies, they are also identified as being affiliated with these pre-1949 field armies, the informal basis for forming symbiotic politicalmilitary factions that could be leveraged by senior leaders for the post-1949 power struggle. The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries is also reflected in the massive intervention of the military in civilian governance in the Cultural Revolution through a policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries.” This policy entailed the virtual takeover of the civilian party and government leadership positions by the active-duty military officers at the provincial and local levels. As a result, the proportion of military officers in the composition of the provincial and local leadership drastically expanded. For the same reason, the military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos elected by the Party Congresses held during this period was abnormally high. The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries reinforced the party-army symbiosis and reflected the intensification of the power struggle among a few symbiotic political-­ military factions of China’s ruling elites. It was not until after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 that the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries had declined substantially. This decline is particularly reflected in the substantial decrease in the number of CCP Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership experiences and who served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, and in the substantial decline of military representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo. This development helped not only to solidify the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military

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authorities and reduce party-army symbiosis, but also to establish the new normal for civil-military relations in post-Deng China. This new normal has been maintained by the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi. The era of Jiang, for instance, witnessed further decline in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This is reflected in the continued decrease in the number of Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership or work experiences, in the diminishing number of these members who served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, in the low level of military representation in the  CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, and in the exclusion of senior military officers from the PBSC. Similarly, Hu and Xi have continued the policy of Jiang to keep low the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. This policy has been reflected in the continued decrease in the number of Central Committee members who had both civilian and military leadership or work experiences, in the low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos, and in the completely civilianized PBSCs. This trend has helped to consolidate the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities, reduce party-army symbiosis further, and sustain the new normal of civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. Institutional Arrangements for Inter-Agency Policy Coordination With the institutionalization and solidification of the civil-military boundaries in the post-Deng era, “symbiotic interaction on all institutional levels” between the party and the PLA as argued by Perlmutter and LeoGrande has largely diminished. As a result, the relationships between the civilian officials and military officers at all levels have become impersonal and formal. As noted elsewhere in this study, this has happened because officials on both sides of the civil-military boundaries are vertically circulated within their own chains of command, based on distinctive skill sets and separate incentive structure for upward mobility. As a result, little horizontal or cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites occurs. Few military officers have had experience working in the civilian institutions, and few civilian officials have had service experience in the PLA. Nevertheless, there are institutional arrangements that help mitigate the tendency toward civil-military bifurcation stemming from a clear

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functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities, particularly in enhancing inter-agency policy coordination. The PLA representation in the CCP Central Committee and its Politburo, however, cannot be treated as an institutional arrangement for inter-agency policy coordination. Military officers in these institutions, for instance, only attend the Central Committee plenums and the Politburo meetings to nominally review and approve the major decisions of the top party leadership regarding the party’s general ideological and policy guidelines. Politburo meetings may also involve collective study (集体学习) of major political, economic, science and technology, military, social, legal, cultural, and historical issues.31 Politburo also meets for “democratic life” (“民主生 活会”) to “promote the political orthodoxy” of the top leader.32 Central Committee plenums are held about once a year and Politburo meetings about once a month. These plenums and meetings are not held more frequently to deal with the specific policy issues that require civil-military inter-agency coordination. Therefore, PLA representation in these institutions is highly nominal and symbolic, and does not involve substantial policy coordination. The PLA institutions that have a high level of interaction with the civilian authorities are the provincial and local military authorities such as the provincial MDs, the military sub-districts at the prefectural level, and the people’s arms departments at the county level. Institutional arrangements for inter-agency policy coordination thus are fully developed at the provincial and local levels. The provincial and local military authorities, for instance, are charged with the responsibilities of military conscription, training and management of the PLA reserve units and militia, national defense mobilization, and job placement of the demobilized military personnel. To fulfill these responsibilities, these military authorities need the substantial assistance and coordination from the provincial and local civilian authorities such as the provincial and local party committee secretaries and government officials. Similarly, the provincial and local civilian authorities may need the assistance and coordination from the provincial and local military authorities, particularly in emergency management and disaster relief. These reasons may explain why after 1949, civilian leaders such as the provincial and local party secretaries were required to serve as the first PCs of the provincial and local military authorities. With the restoration of the military rank system in 1988, however, rather than as the first PCs of the provincial and local military authorities, provincial and local party secretaries are required to serve as the first

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secretaries of the party committees of the provincial and local military authorities. This change is intended to differentiate civilian officials such as the provincial and local party secretaries from the regular PCs of the provincial and local military authorities. Provincial and local party secretaries, for instance, are civilians who do not receive military ranks and are vertically circulated within the civilian chain of command. They are also part-timers in handling the military-related issues. In contrast, the regular PCs of the provincial and local military authorities are full-time, activeduty military officers who receive military ranks and are vertically circulated within the military chain of command. Serving as the first secretaries of the party committees of the provincial and local military authorities, however, provincial and local party secretaries are charged with the responsibility of chairing the meetings of these party committees where “major issues that require the provincial and local party-government-military cooperation and coordination are tackled and resolved.”33 For similar reasons, another institutional arrangement for inter-agency policy coordination is for the commanding officers of the provincial and local military authorities to serve as the uniformed members of the civilian provincial and local party committee standing committees (戎装常委). In most of the provinces and localities, the regular PCs of the provincial and local military authorities occupy these positions. In provinces and localities where the regular PCs are relatively new and the commanders of the provincial and local military authorities are more senior in status, commanders may serve as the uniformed members of the civilian provincial and local party committee standing committees.34 Provincial and local military authorities belong to the military chain of command. They reported to the MRs prior to 2016 and report to the CMCNDMD in Beijing after the 2016 restructuring of the PLA.  But because provincial and local military authorities are nominally defined as the “military work departments of the local civilian party committees and governments” (“所在地方党委和政府的军事工作部门”), they also report to the provincial and local civilian authorities. The relationship between the CMCNDMD and the provincial and local military authorities, however, reflects the authority relationship between the superiors and subordinates. The CMCNDMD, for instance, controls the finance and personnel appointment of the provincial and local military authorities. These authorities thus are institutionalized within the PLA chain of command and incentivized to follow the command of the CMCNDMD.

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In comparison, the relationships and interactions between the provincial and local military authorities and their civilian counterparts are confined narrowly to inter-agency policy coordination. Since the provincial and local civilian authorities do not control the finance and personnel appointment of the provincial and local military authorities, their influence on the officials of the provincial and local military authorities is quite limited. Provincial and local military authorities, for instance, regard the provincial and local party secretaries serving as the first secretaries of the party committees of their organizations as being largely nominal (挂名 的).35 It is also important to note that unlike the provincial and local military authorities, regular organizations and forces of the PLA services and regional theaters are highly insulated from the civilian authorities and do not have the institutionalized relationships and interactions with these authorities. Cooperation and coordination from the provincial and local civilian authorities are indispensable for the provincial and local military authorities to fulfill their responsibilities and missions. They thus are also incentivized to maintain an amicable relationship with the provincial and local civilian authorities. Similarly, the provincial and local party secretaries are charged with the official mandate to coordinate with the provincial and local military authorities for the latter to fulfill their responsibilities and missions. Moreover, the provincial and local party secretaries have the discretionary power to offer assistance to the regular military forces that do not report to the provincial and local military authorities but are deployed in the provinces and localities that they govern.36 While Xi Jinping served as the deputy party secretary and governor of Fujian province from 1999 to 2002, for instance, he allegedly allocated 18 million RMB yuan to build an officers’ training center for the Fujian Anti-­ Air Artillery Division, a reserve unit that reports to the Fujian Provincial MD. Xi also reportedly allocated 15 million RMB yuan in 2002 to help build an operations command center for the 31st GA. This GA, which is headquartered in Xiamen, does not report to the Fujian Provincial MD. Similarly, while Xi served as the party secretary of Fuzhou in the early 1990s, he provided substantial assistance to a division of the 31st GA and the PLAN Fujian Base when both units relocated their headquarters to Fuzhou. Such assistance encompassed land acquisition; infrastructure development for water supply, electricity, and telecommunications services; urban household registration; and job and school placement for the

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military families. These two units, however, do not report to the Fujian Provincial MD.37 Some may argue that Xi’s offer of assistance to the major PLA units in Fujian is motivated by his desire to accumulate political capital and develop entrenched personal networks in the PLA, which he could leverage for power consolidation and struggle when he becomes the top leader. This argument may not be totally untrue in that Xi may have harbored long-­ term political ambitions. But he may just be implementing the officially mandated policies at a time when he would not have known his chances of becoming the top leader. The decisions to allocate funding to help build the PLA training and command facilities were also likely the results of the collective deliberation of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee. The provincial party secretary had the final say in these decisions, but not Xi who served as the deputy party secretary. Moreover, other provincial and local party secretaries may implement similar policies in their provinces and localities. Because Xi is a civilian official whose primary responsibility concerns civilian governance, his occasional handling of the military-related issues and the limited civil-military interactions as a result are not likely to translate into entrenched personal networks in the PLA that he could leverage for power struggle in the future. Institutional arrangements for inter-agency coordination also exist at the central level, particularly in critical policy areas where civil-military coordination is indispensable. China’s defense minister, a senior member of the CMC, for instance, serves as a member of the Central Leadership Group for Foreign Affairs, which has become the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs following Xi’s decision to “deepen the reform of the party and state institutions” in 2018.38 This commission is now tasked with formulating China’s foreign policy guidelines, which necessarily requires the input and coordination from the military. Similarly, one uniformed CMC vice-chair serves as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for State Security. This commission was established in January 2014 based on a decision of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee. The commission convened a symposium in February 2017, which was chaired by Xi and attended by 20 senior officials including a CMC vice-chair and chiefs of the CMC Joint Staff Department (CMCJSD), CMCPWD, CMC Logistics Support Department (CMCLSD), and CMC Armament Development Department (CMCADD).39 It is likely that the chiefs of these four CMC departments serve as the regular members of the commission. Unlike the

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U.S.  National Security Council which handles primarily external crises stemming from the critical threats to the U.S. national security, the Chinese commission operates under the “concept of overall security” (“总 体安全观”), which encompasses “political, economic, territorial, social, and internet security.”40 Since China’s territorial security constitutes the primary responsibility of the PLA, input and coordination from the military are clearly indispensable in ensuring China’s security in this dimension. Finally, one uniformed member of the CMC serves as a member of the Central Leadership Group for Financial and Economic Affairs,41 which has become the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs following the 2018 reform. Because this commission is charged with the responsibility of handling the financial and budgetary issues, input and coordination from the military is indispensable in the commission’s decisions on defense budget. The implications and limitations of the changing civil-military relations for inter-agency policy coordination, however, are discussed in detail in Chap. 7.

Notes 1. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in January 1998. 2. For Hua’s biography, check http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-06/09/content_1335488.htm. 3. For a detailed discussion, see Zhao Guoqin, “On the Practice of ‘Three Supports and Two Militaries’ and Its Objective Effects” ­[“试论三支两军 的实践活动及其客观作用”], in Zhang, et  al., Recollecting the “Cultural Revolution.” 4. See Military History Studies Department of AMS, Seventy Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, pp. 560–564, and Party History, Party Construction, and Political Work Teaching and Research Office of NDU, Political Work History, pp. 284–294. 5. See “The Operation to Stabilize the Overall Situation: ‘Three Supports and Two Militaries’ of the PLA” [“稳定大局的行动: 人民解放军 ‘三支两 军’”], in Military History Studies Department of AMS, Colors Are Fluttering, p. 509. 6. See Ellis Joffe, “The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention,” China Quarterly, No. 55 (July–September 1973), p. 456. 7. See Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Party Congresses (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975), p. 36. 8. See “The Operation to Stabilize the Overall Situation,” pp. 510–511.

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9. See Li Zhenxiang and Li Yuan, An Actual Account of “Three Supports and Two Militaries” by the 47th Corps in Hunan [47军在湖南“三支两军”纪实] (Changsha: Hongfa Press, 2004), p. 178. Li Zhenxiang was the head of propaganda in the Political Department of the PLA 47th Corps, and Li Yuan was the commander of the 47th Corps and chair of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the Cultural Revolution. 10. Joffe, “The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution,” p.  457, and Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pp. 16, 35. 11. See Data Base for Every CCP National Congress [中国共产党历次全国代 表大会数据库], retrieved in January 2019 from http://cpc.people.com. cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html. 12. Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pp. 52–54. 13. See Li and Li, An Actual Account, pp. 184–185. 14. Ibid., pp. 179, 189–190, 309. For the role of the 47th Corps in implementing the policy of “Three Supports and Two Militaries” in Hunan, see also Li Yuan, Li Yuan’s Memoirs [黎原回忆录] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2009), Chapter 9. 15. Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, p. 50. 16. Ibid., pp. 50–51. 17. Ibid., pp. 195, 196–198. 18. See Data Base for Every CCP National Congress. 19. Liu Binfeng, “Before and after the ‘Three Supports and Two Militaries’ of the PLA” [“解放军‘三支两军’前前后后”], Party History Overview [党史 纵览], No. 1 (2006). Party History Overview is a monthly journal published in China. 20. See Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA.” 21. See Guo Tiecheng, “Deng Xiaoping and Establishment of the Cadre Retirement System” [“邓小平与干部退休制度的建立”], Hundred Year Tide, No. 6 (2007). 22. For a detailed discussion of the Central Advisory Committee, see Li Hong, “Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Central Advisory Committee” [“邓小平, 陈云与中央顾问委员会”], CCP History Studies [中共党史研究], No. 1 (2017). Li is a former deputy secretary-general of the Central Advisory Committee, and CCP History Studies is a monthly journal published by the Central Institute for Party History and Literature Research (中央党史 和文献研究院). 23. For a list of the members, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/6416 2/64168/64566/65447/4441806.html. For biographical information of the members, check http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/.

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24. The military rank system was introduced in 1956 but was abolished in 1965. Mao argued that the PLA won past wars without it and the system generated class privileges that contradict his vision of an egalitarian and classless society. The system was restored by Deng in 1988, a year after the convening of the 13th Party Congress. The military members of the 13th Central Committee thus would be conferred the military ranks in 1988. 25. See Data Base for Every CCP National Congress. 26. Liu Huaqing, a uniformed CMC vice-chair, was admitted as a member of the 14th PBSC in 1992. It was not until after his retirement in 1997 that the PBSC has become completely civilianized. 27. For a list of the members, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/6416 2/64168/64568/65445/4429246.html. For biographical information of the members, see http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/. 28. See Data Base for Every CCP National Congress. 29. For a list of the members, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/104019/104098/6410258.html. For biographical information of the members, check http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/. 30. For a list of the members, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/19th/ n1/2017/1024/c414305-29606192.html. For biographical information of the members, see http://www.gov.cn, http://renshi.people.com.cn, and http://www.chinavitae.com/. 31. The 19th CCP Politburo, for instance, held 19 “collective study” meetings from 2017 to 2019. See http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1025/ c414940-29608670.html. 32. See John Dotson, “The ‘Democratic Life Meetings’ of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo,” China Brief, Vol. 20, No. 2 (January 2020). 33. Conversations with senior party and military officials in Beijing in January 1998. 34. See “Return of the ‘Uniformed Standing Committee Members’” [“‘戎装 常委’回归”], Xinhuanet, January 4, 2018. 35. Conversations with senior military officers in Beijing in January 1998. 36. Ibid. 37. See “An Account of Xi Jinping’s Care and Support for National Defense and Army Construction while He Worked in Fujian” [“习近平在福建工作 期间关心支持国防和军队建设记事”], Fujian Daily [福建日报], August 1, 2014. 38. See “CCP Central Prints and Distributes ‘Plan to Deepen Reform of Party and Sate Institutions’” [“中共中央印发‘深化党和国家机构改革方案’”], Xinhuanet, March 21, 2018.

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39. See “Members of the Central Commission for State Security Appear for the First Time” [“中央国家安全委员会亮相”], The Paper, February 17, 2017. 40. “Xi Jinping Chairs and Convenes the Symposium on State Security” [“习 近平主持召开国家安全座谈会”], Xinhuanet, February 2, 2017. 41. See “The Veil of Central Leadership Group for Financial and Economic Affairs Is Lifted” [“中央财经领导小组掀开面纱”], Southern Weekend. June 19, 2014.

CHAPTER 6

Explaining the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations from Symbiosis to Quasi-­ Institutionalization in China

Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 show that Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from the party-army symbiosis of the Mao and Deng eras to quasi-institutionalization in the post-Deng era. Chapter 2, for instance, demonstrates that party-army symbiosis was high in the Mao era. The PPWS functioned primarily as the party’s instrument of “subjective control” of the PLA. It played a critical role in mobilizing the PLA into intra-­ party leadership politics, which had aggravated the power struggle among major symbiotic political-military factions, led to political persecution of a large number of military officers, and caused the severe fracturing of the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA. Beginning in the Deng era, however, Chap. 2 shows that the functions of the PPWS gradually evolved away from “subjective” to “objective” control, with a few exceptions where the PPWS had attempted to remobilize the PLA into intra-party leadership politics. Chapter 2 also shows that the functions of the PPWS have decidedly evolved away from “subjective” to “objective” control in the post-Deng era. The PPWS, for instance, has been “internalized” into the PLA to enhance its organizational cohesiveness, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its warfighting missions. This development represents a major shift of Chinese civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Similarly, Chap. 3 shows that party-army symbiosis was high in the era of Mao because the PLA involvement in intra-party leadership power © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_6

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struggle was extensive and substantial. Military force was mobilized into such struggle and a large number of PLA officers were persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques.” This chapter also shows that Deng had attempted to disengage the PLA from China’s domestic politics, but a major social and political crisis motivated him to employ the PLA to quell a popular rebellion in Beijing in 1989. This crisis led to substantial involvement of the PLA in China’s domestic politics, ranging from restoring social order to the politics of leadership succession. Chapter 4 shows that in contrast to the eras of Mao and Deng, post-­ Deng era has witnessed a remarkable decline of the PLA involvement in China’s domestic politics. Power struggle has become rare for lack of severe political division among the senior party leadership. There is no empirical evidence to show that military force is employed in China’s elite politics and military officers are persecuted for “anti-party” crimes. This development stems from a consensus of the post-Deng top leadership following the 14th Party Congress of 1992. This consensus places emphasis on effective civilian governance that centers on economic development along with political and society stability, the basis of the CCP legitimacy to rule. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent major political and social upheavals that may motivate the top leaders to employ the PLA for domestic politics. In the meantime, these leaders have adopted a military policy to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. As a result, quasi-­institutionalization of party-army relations based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities has developed and solidified in the post-Deng era. Chapter 5 shows that party-army symbiosis was high in the Mao era because of the extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. The majority of the senior party and military leaders in Mao’s China, for instance, are “dual-role elites” who had extensive leadership experiences in both the civilian and military sectors, a reflection of the highly symbiotic nature of the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. Because they spent most of their careers as leaders in several remote and isolated guerrilla base areas that had later evolved into the five field armies, they are also identified as being affiliated with them. These field armies serve as the informal basis for forming symbiotic political-military factions that could be leveraged by leaders for the post-1949 power struggle.

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The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries in the Mao era, according to Chap. 5, is also reflected in the massive intervention of the military in civilian governance in the Cultural Revolution. This intervention entailed the virtual takeover of the civilian party and government leadership positions by active-duty military officers at the provincial and local levels. As a result, the proportion of military officers in the composition of the provincial and local leadership and military representation in the CCP Central Committees and Politburos during this period were abnormally high. The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries revived and reinforced the party-army symbiosis and reflected the intensification of the power struggle among leaders of a few symbiotic political-military factions. Chapter 5 also shows that it was not until after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 that the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries had declined substantially. This change is reflected in the declining number of elites who had both civilian and military leadership experiences and in a much smaller number of elites who served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies. It is also reflected in a substantial decline of military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos, which indicated the declining number of military officers who held civilian leadership positions. This development helped not only to solidify the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities and reduce party-army symbiosis, but also to establish the new normal for civil-military relations in post-Deng China. This new normal has been maintained by the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi. The three administrations, for instance, have witnessed the further decline in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This decline is manifested in the continued decrease in the number of elites who had both civilian and military leadership or work experiences, in the diminishing number of elites who served in the pre-1949 field armies, in the relatively low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos, and in the exclusion of senior military officers from the PBSC membership. As a result, China’s post-Deng senior leadership has been characterized by the replacement of the “dual-role elites” by the specialized technocrats on both sides of the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities.

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In the final analysis, Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from the party-army symbiosis of the Mao and Deng eras to quasi-­ institutionalization in the post-Deng era. This change has specifically been manifested in the shifting of the functions of the PPWS from “subjective” to “objective” control of the PLA, in the lack of severe political division among China’s ruling elites and as a result the substantially reduced role of the PLA in intra-party leadership politics and power struggle, and in the remarkable decline in the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries. What can account well for this change?

“Constant and Similar Variables as Control” As noted in the introductory chapter, comparative method is employed for this study, a method where other independent variables are controlled or held constant or similar to fulfill the condition of “other things being equal”; such a condition is central to establishing the comparability of the cases. The comparability of civil-military relations between the eras of Mao and Deng and the post-Deng era, for instance, stems from the fact that the two cases share major constant and similar contextual variables such as the Leninist party-state and the Chinese culture. These variables thus do not cause the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. In the meantime, these two cases are “dissimilar with regard to the variables between which a relationship is hypothesized,” or the relationship between the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders, and the change of civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Leninist Party-State The Leninist party-state, for instance, has been a constant feature of the post-1949 regime in China. This constant variable thus cannot explain the shifting away of the Chinese civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Some argue that the Leninist partystate may account well for the party-army symbiosis, but it cannot explain the institutionalization of civil-military relations.1 Only a fundamental change of the Leninist regime, according to this argument, can cause major changes in civil-military relations such as “departization” and “statization” of the military. The military thus would shift its political loyalty to a Leninist party toward its new allegiance to the constitution of a

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democratized state. These regime change-induced changes, according to this argument, also help to engender institutionalization of civil-military relations based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities. With the fundamental transformation of the Leninist regimes through democratization, for instance, “departization” and “statization” have transformed civil-military relations in the former Leninist states such as Taiwan, the countries of Eastern Europe, and Russia. But this study shows that even though there has been no regime change in China since 1949, Chinese civil-military relations have shifted away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s comparative analysis of civil-military relations in Leninist regimes also demonstrates that quasi-institutionalization of civil-military relations can take place in Leninist regimes such as the Soviet Union. On the other hand, non-Leninist regimes in developing countries have witnessed numerous military interventions in domestic politics, including coups. Since civil-military relations have shifted away from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization in post-Deng China where the Leninist party-state rule has remained a constant and similar variable since 1949, this change can only be explained by variables other than the Leninist party-state. At a more mundane level, a central feature of a Leninist party-state is that nearly the entire ruling elites, including all the civilian and military officials, are communist party members and hold major leadership positions in the party committees of the institutions they lead. The party identity of the Chinese ruling elites based on party membership and leadership positions in major party committees has been a constant variable. This variable thus cannot explain the major institutional changes such as the change of civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. In the Mao era while party-army symbiosis was high, for instance, a large number of military officers were mobilized into the power struggle among a few symbiotic political-military factions. Many thus were persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques,” or the factions that lost the power struggle. But those who were persecuted were not members of any cliques or groups outside the party. They were all party members and held leadership positions in the party committees of the institutions they led. The “anti-party” crime that they were nominally accused of committing is a misnomer. Their persecutions had much to do with the downfall of the leaders of the political-military or ideological factions that they belonged to. These persecutions had very little to do with any “crime” that they had committed against the CCP.

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It is therefore the idiosyncratic groupings within the party and the PLA leadership, such as competing factional or ideological networks and identities, that drove the intra-CCP leadership power struggle in the Mao era. Such power struggle is clearly not the result of the competition between the party and non-party entities or groups. The party identity of the elites stemming from their party membership and leadership positions in major party committees has remained a constant variable. This identity is shared by all the civilian and military members of China’s ruling elites, including both winners and losers of the power struggle. Another way to illustrate this point is to analyze the appointment of military officers to more senior positions in the post-Deng era where quasi-institutionalization has obtained. The conventional wisdom postulates that because the PLA is a Leninist party-army, loyalty to the CCP based on party membership and holding leadership positions in major military party committees should be the central criterion for selecting and promoting officers to more senior positions. But because all the senior officers are party members and serve as secretaries or deputy secretaries of the party committees of the units they command, this variable remains a constant and therefore cannot explain why some officers are selected for promotion but not others. In selecting and appointing senior officers to the membership of the CMC and to the leadership positions of major CMC agencies and PLA services and regional theaters in 2017, for instance, Xi employed a wide array of criteria for making his decisions. These criteria range from strengthening the central control of the PLA, promoting the military expertise-based professionalism, enhancing the “jointness” of the PLA, possessing experiences in real combat and in commanding major exercises and non-war  military operations  (非战争军事行动), to term and age limits.2 Although Xi is not known to have developed entrenched personal networks in the PLA, he also appointed a few officers whom he knows well and trusts personally but who are also professionally competent in their own rights, to these positions.3 Since there is no empirical evidence to show that Xi has used these appointments for intra-leadership power struggle, Xi’s leveraging of the personal relationships in promoting officers to the more senior positions is clearly motivated by his desire to enhance the effective management of the PLA. The analytical literature on bureaucracy, for instance, postulates that under certain conditions, informal, personal relationships can help to enhance the effectiveness of

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decision-­making and management even in highly institutionalized bureaucratic settings.4 Even though the PLA is nominally required to be “absolutely” loyal to the party, the criteria that Xi employed for appointing officers to the more senior positions do not include party membership and holding leadership positions in major military party committees. This is understandable because the party identity associated with the party membership and holding leadership positions in major military party committees is shared by all the members of the military elite. It is a constant variable that cannot explain why some officers are selected for promotion but not others. Chinese Culture Similarly, Chinese culture is a constant variable which cannot explain the shifting away of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization. Chinese culture refers to the shared characteristics and knowledge of the Chinese people in terms of language, religion or philosophy, cuisine, social habits, music, and arts. Even though culture changes over time, the extent and nature of such change tend to be incremental and slow. The eras of Mao and Deng and post-Deng era encompass a period of over 70 years where there has been no fundamental change of the Chinese culture, but Chinese civil-military relations have shifted away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization during this period. Since the Chinese culture has remained similar in terms of the cultural context within which civil-military relations have changed substantially between the eras of Mao and Deng and the post-Deng era, it is a constant variable which cannot explain this change. Some may argue that certain critical aspects of the Chinese culture such as the social habit of cultivating “connections” (“关系”) may explain the factionalism associated with the party-army symbiosis. This symbiosis incentivizes personal and factional loyalties and identities that transcend and erode the civil-military institutional boundaries. But this study shows that civil-military relations in post-Deng China have shifted away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. This institutionalization stems from a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities, where functional and institutional identities and priorities take precedence over personal and factional loyalties and identities. Moreover, democratization enabled the military in Taiwan to shift away from a personalized loyalty system associated with a Leninist party to its

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allegiance to the constitution of a democratized state. This change took place within a Chinese cultural context. Also, in their comparative study of civil-military relations in Leninist regimes, Perlmutter and LeoGrande identify Cuba, a non-Chinese state, as a case where party-army relationship is fused, a typology that is more personal and indistinguishable than symbiosis.5 All these examples show that major patterns and changes in Leninist civil-military relations cannot be explained by an idiosyncratic national culture which has remained similar over time. These patterns and changes thus can only be explained by variables other than a relatively constant national culture.

“Lesser Relevance of the Dissimilar Variables” As noted in the introductory chapter, the control for other independent variables is exercised by explaining the lesser relevance of the dissimilar or changing  variables in accounting for the change in civil-military relations if compared with the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders. These dissimilar independent variables include China’s changing external security environment, changing defense budget, and changing military technology. China’s Changing External Security Environment Some argue that the more threatening the external security environment becomes, the more insecure a state becomes. To fend off the growing external threat, state leaders refrain from mobilizing the military into domestic politics. They instead choose to confine the military to perfecting its functional and technical expertise for preparations against the critical and imminent external threat. Conversely, a benign external security environment may incentivize leaders to relax the civilian control of the military, which may cause the expansion of the domestic role of the military.6 This explanation, however, may not account well for the changes in Chinese civil-military relations regarding party-army symbiosis and quasi-institutionalization. In the 1950s following the Korean War, for instance, China’s perception of its external security environment was relatively benign. In his assessment of this environment, Mao projected a period of long peace where China could prioritize economic development over military modernization by substantially downsizing the PLA. But Mao also cautioned

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that China should make the necessary preparations against “a surprise attack by the imperialist” (“帝国主义突然袭击”), which implies a U.S.-led offensive against China.7 China felt more secure during this period mainly because it had developed a close alliance relationship with the Soviet Union. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, China’s external security environment had worsened. China’s relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated to the extent that Soviet economic and miltiary aids to China were terminated. China also fought a border war against India in 1962. In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan began to make military preparations for a “counter-attack” to retake the mainland. The U.S. expansion of the war in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 was also perceived as a grave threat to China’s security. Finally, the PLA fought a small-scale border war against the Soviet military in 1969. China thus was faced with critical security threats from multiple directions in the 1960s. While China’s external security environment was relatively benign in the 1950s, the CCP leadership should have felt more secure and therefore more relaxed regarding the expansion of the domestic role of the PLA.  Instead, Soviet-style military professionalization and quasi-­ institutionalization of civil-military relations were promoted. But when China’s external security environment deteriorated seriously in the 1960s, rather than confining the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise for preparations against the critical and imminent external threats from multiple directions, Mao revived the party-army symbiosis by mobilizing the PLA into the domestic politics and power struggle of the Cultural Revolution. This example shows that China’s changing security environment may not account well for changes in Chinese civil-military relations regarding quasi-institutionalization and party-army symbiosis. After Deng became China’s paramount leader in 1978, he set out to improve relations with the major powers. China established diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1979. China also improved relations with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1985, for instance, Deng ordered the PLA to make the “strategic transition in its guiding thought regarding army construction” (“军队建设指导思想实行战略性转变”), from preparations for an “early, total, nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion to the “track of peacetime construction” (“和平时期建设轨道”).8 Deng’s order meant that the Soviet Union was no longer regarded by China as its primary adversary. The “strategic transition” thus led to a decision to downsize the PLA by a million billets.

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Based on similar policy logic, at a CMC conference held in late 1988, Deng requested the PLA to make preparations for fighting and winning “local war” that may arise from the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Largely informed by the ongoing but limited military conflicts along their land and sea borders between China and Vietnam in the 1980s, this new military strategic guideline also called for a smaller but more technology-based military.9 Deng’s diplomatic and strategic moves regarding major powers remarkably improved the external security environment of China. But since Deng’s policy initiatives led to substantial downsizing of the PLA, the domestic role of the PLA also declined. Deng’s policy initiatives thus may not support the view that a benign external security environment incentivizes leaders to become more relaxed regarding the expansion of the domestic role of the military. There are, however, two major exceptions to Deng’s policy objective to reduce the domestic role of the PLA. One is Deng’s decision to allow the PLA to engage in business activities for profits. These profits were used to make up for the shortfall in military expenditure, which stemmed from Deng’s decision to cut defense spending to free up scarce resources for economic development. The other is his decision to employ the PLA to quell the popular rebellion in 1989, which led to the remobilization of the PLA into China’s domestic politics. The first exception is a policy that was deliberately adopted by Deng following the improvement of relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It thus may support the premise that a benign external security environment incentivizes the political leadership to relax control of the military, leading to the growing domestic role of the military. But such a premise cannot explain the second exception. The sudden expansion of the domestic role of the PLA following the Tiananmen Incident was a reluctant policy that Deng adopted to cope with an unexpected crisis. This crisis is the result of the failure of civilian governance, which has very little to do with the changing external security environment of China. China’s external security environment has remained relatively benign in the post-Deng era. China, for instance, settled all its territorial  disputes with Russia through diplomacy under the leadership of Jiang.10 China also has developed a strategic partnership relationship with Russia where China has become a major importer of Russian arms and military equipment. There are ups and downs in China’s relationship with the U.S. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

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in 1999, and the EP-3 Incident of 2001 caused downturns in this relationship. China’s fortification of the reefs it controls in the South China Sea after Xi became the top leader in 2012 and the subsequent U.S. freedom of navigation operations near these reefs also added tension to this relationship. In general, however, both sides have managed these crises relatively well to prevent them from escalating to the level of a military conflict. When these incidents played an important role in driving China’s military modernization, they did not constitute a comprehensive, coherent, critical, and imminent threat to China that may bring about a major change to Chinese civil-military relations one way or the other. Implicitly, the PLA makes preparations for a possible major war that may involve the U.S. military intervention regarding either Taiwan or the South China Sea. Such an intervention is perceived to be a major threat to China’s “core” national security interests. The PLA’s explicit military strategic guidelines, however, have placed emphasis on preparations for fighting and winning “local war,” or military conflict that is rather limited in scope. Such an emphasis has not changed since the 1980s, but the levels of technology to be integrated in these preparations have been elevated from Jiang’s “high-technology conditions” to Hu’s “informatized conditions,” and then to Xi’s “informatized war.” The benign external security environment of the post-Deng era, however, has not given China’s top leaders a sense of security regarding the domestic role of the PLA. They instead feel more insecure in this regard, but for a different reason. For instance, compared to Mao and Deng, the post-Deng top leaders lack the revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA.  The heightened sense of insecurity as a result suggests that these leaders are highly unsure that the PLA would follow their orders if it is asked to handle a domestic political and social crisis of a massive scale. They thus are motivated by this sense of insecurity to enhance civilian governance by promoting economic development along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require the massive mobilization of the PLA to avert. This sense of insecurity has also driven these leaders to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Subsequently, civil-military relations in China have shifted away from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in the post-Deng era, an era where China’s external security environment has also improved

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remarkably. Such a development shows that the critical driver for the declining role of the PLA in domestic politics has much to do with the calculations of the top leaders regarding China’s domestic politics. In comparison, China’s changing external security environment plays a lesser role in these calculations. Changing Defense Budget Defense budget is usually the outcome of the decision made by the top leader to meet the financial needs of the military. It is therefore not a critical and direct reason for the top leader to make decisions regarding whether the military should be employed primarily against the internal or external threat. In other words, it is the decision of the top leader on whether the military should prioritize preparations against the internal or external threat that determines the levels of the defense budget to be allocated, but not the other way round. Defense budget by itself thus does not tell much about how the military should be employed. Chart 6.1 shows the changing annual defense budget as a percentage of the annual GDP from 1952 to 2017. The defense budget as a percentage of GDP was quite high in the Mao era while the size of the economy was small and the growth rate was moderate. The high percentage reflects a substantial diversion of the scarce financial resources to the military. It peaked to 8.51 percent in 1952 and 9.1 percent in 1953; it remained relatively high in the 1950s because of the Korean War and the Soviet-style military modernization, but not because of the substantial involvement of the PLA in domestic politics. It declined moderately in the late 1950s and early 1960s to about four percent, but began to rise afterward. It grew to more than 6 percent of the annual GDP from 1969 to 1972, the peak years of the Cultural Revolution. This growth was clearly intended to meet the expanding expenditure of the PLA stemming not only from its preparations against the external threats from multiple directions but also from its extensive involvement in the domestic politics of the Cultural Revolution. The high defense spendings in the 1950s and in the Cultural Revolution were the results of Mao’s decisions for the PLA to fight a war in Korea and pursue Soviet-style military modernization in the 1950s, prepare against the external threats from multiple directions in the 1960s and 1970s, and intervene in the domestic politics of the Cultural Revolution. It is not the rising levels of the defense budget that drove Mao to make these decisions. Defense budget remained high in both the period

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1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

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Defense Expenditure as % of GDP

Chart 6.1  China’s changing defense budget from 1952 to 2017. (Notes: This chart is based on data in National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China: 1949–1998 [1949–1998 年新中国五十年统计资料汇编] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999), and National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), China Statistical Yearbook 1999–2018 [中国统 计年鉴 1999–2018] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999–2018). The author thanks Jane Du for her assistance in developing this chart)

of quasi-institutionalization of the 1950s and the period of party-army symbiosis of the Cultural Revolution. It thus cannot explain major changes in Chinese civil-military relations regarding quasi-institutionalization and party-army symbiosis. Chart 6.1 also shows that China’s defense budget declined substantially in the Deng era, from 5.4 percent of the annual GDP in 1979 to under two percent in 1986 and under 1.5 percent in 1988. This decline explains well Deng’s decision to allow the PLA to engage in business activities for profits, which helped to make up for the low budget-induced shortfall in military spending. This decision thus caused a moderate expansion of the domestic role of the PLA. But this decline cannot explain the expansion of the PLA in China’s domestic politics following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. This expansion is the result of a contingent decision of Deng to cope with an unforeseen crisis stemming from the failure of civilian governance, which had nothing to do with the decline of the defense budget. Finally, Chart 6.1 shows that China’s annual defense budget remained under 1.5 percent of the annual GDP in the post-Deng era from 1992 to

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2017, but the absolute budget figures skyrocketed during this period. This development validated Deng’s view that excessive spending on the military diverted scarce financial resources away from economic development in the Mao era, causing economic stagnation and decline. But by keeping the defense budget low, more financial resources could be allocated to economic development. Rapid economic development as a result expands the size of the economy in the long run. This economic expansion in turn can sustain substantial growth of the defense budget in the long run, even though this budget stays low as a percentage of the annual GDP.11 Based on similar logic, China’s military analysts claim that the steady decline of China’s annual defense spending, from 4.6 percent of annual GDP in 1978 to 1.4 percent in 2005, contributed significantly to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy at an average annual rate of nine percent between 1978 and 2010. China became the world’s second largest economy in 2010.12 The rapid growth of China’s defense budget in the post-Deng era coincides with the quasi-institutionalization of civil-military relations in this period. This growth, however, is a function of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. It can be explained by Deng’s view on the dialectical relationship between economic growth and the growth of the defense budget. But it does not tell much about whether the PLA should be employed primarily against the internal or external threat. Changing defense budget thus cannot account for the changes in Chinese civil-­ military relations regarding quasi-institutionalization and party-army symbiosis. Changing Military Technology Common sense suggests that “the more professional the military becomes and the more sophisticated its technology, the more likely it is that the party-army relationship will evolve away from symbiosis.”13 In the Chinese case, however, changing military technology does not always lead to the shifting of civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-­institutionalization. During and after the Korean War, the Soviet Union supplied the PLA with a large number of weapons, including light arms, tanks, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and naval surface combatants and submarines.14 The changing military technology as a result did serve as an important driver for the Soviet-style military modernization and quasi-­institutionalization of civilmilitary relations in China in the mid-1950s. But as noted elsewhere in this

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study, such a technological development did not prevent Mao from mobilizing the PLA into China’s domestic politics from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, which had revived the party-army symbiosis associated with the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. This example shows that rather than quasiinstitutionalization of civil-military relations, changing military technology of the 1950s caused a backlash where Mao believed that Soviet-style functional and technical specialization and bureaucratic differentiation generate class privileges and stratification that must be reversed through “class struggle” and a “cultural revolution.” Moreover, Deng wanted to promote the technological development of the PLA after he became the paramount leader in 1978. But because technology-­intensive weapons are also capital-intensive, the lack of funding prompted Deng to prioritize economic development over military modernization. Deng’s intention to modernize the technology of the PLA thus must yield to his decision to keep the defense budget low. To divert scarce financial resources to economic development, Deng had to cancel funding for the research and development (R&D) of numerous new weapons projects in the 1980s, including strategic nuclear submarines and large aircraft.15 To compensate for the shortfall of defense spending, the PLA was allowed to engage in business activities for profits. This development clearly hampered the institutionalization of civil-military relations in China. Similarly, his desire to modernize the technology of the PLA did not prevent him from mobilizing the PLA into China’s domestic politics in and after 1989. This mobilization complicated further the institutionalization of civil-military relations in China. In the post-Deng era, Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from the party-army symbiosis of the Mao and Deng eras to quasi-­ institutionalization. Changing military technology, however, is not a major driver for this change. The technological development of the PLA lagged behind the change in civil-military relations. This gap is particularly reflected in the modernization of the technology-intensive services such as the PLAN and PLAAF. The PLA, for instance, endorsed a new naval strategy of “near-seas active defense” articulated by Admiral Liu Huaqing, the commander of the PLAN, in the late 1980s. Rather than the traditional emphasis on the defense of the coastal waters and supporting land operations, the new strategy required the PLAN to develop new capabilities for independent naval operations to safeguard the newly emerging Chinese interests in the three seas near China, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea.16

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In more than a decade following the endorsement of the new naval strategy, however, little progress was made in developing the new naval capabilities for lack of advanced technology. It was not until after 2000 when advanced technologies critical to naval development had become available through the R&D-based “technological accumulation” (“技术 储备”) that more serious naval modernization had begun. These technologies include advanced stealth design and modular construction of hull, combined diesel or gas propulsion, automatic detect-and-track and multi-directional phased array radar, advanced combat-direction system based on data-links, vertical launching system for missiles, close-in weapons system, and quieting propulsion, techniques, and materials for submarines.17 Similarly, the PLAAF stayed as a fleet of obsolete second- and third-­ generation Soviet-style combat aircraft for lack of advanced technology in the 1980s and 1990s. It was not until after 2000 when critical technologies had become available through purchase and licensed production of advanced foreign combat aircraft, reversed engineering and improvisation and absorption of foreign acquisitions, and more investment in R&D that serious modernization of the PLAAF had begun. The modernization involves the development and deployment of a large number of the fourth-­ generation combat aircraft. These aircraft are based on more advanced design of airframe, better avionics, and better aircraft engine.18 Both examples show that modernization of military technology took place after but not before quasi-institutionalization of civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. Changing military technology thus did not serve as a major driver for the change of Chinese civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. As a matter of general probability, however, it may be true that “the more professional the military becomes and the more sophisticated its technology, the more likely it is that the party-army relationship will evolve away from symbiosis.”

Generational Changes of the Top Leaders and the Associated, Heightened Sense of Insecurity of the Post-Deng Leaders as a Good Explanation The previous sections show that constant and similar contextual variables such as the Leninist party-state and the Chinese culture cannot explain the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization. They also show that dissimilar independent variables

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such as China’s changing external security environment, its changing defense budget, and its changing military technology can neither account well for this change. In comparison, the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders offer a better explanation of this change. The first and second generations of top leaders such as Mao and Deng founded the PLA and spent most of their revolutionary careers in the PLA. They thus accumulated substantial political capital, status, and charisma and developed extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. In times of political and social crisis such as the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, they could leverage these political capital and personal networks in the PLA against major political oppositions either from within the party leadership or from within Chinese society. In comparison, the post-Deng generations of top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi do not possess the similar political capital and networks in the PLA because they have never served or have served briefly in it. Their lack of revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and networks in the PLA implies that they are highly unsure that the PLA would follow their orders if it is asked to handle a domestic political and social crisis of a massive scale. The heightened sense of insecurity as a result has motivated these leaders to enhance civilian governance by promoting economic development along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require the massive mobilization of the PLA to avert. This sense of insecurity has also driven them to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. It is therefore the generational changes of the top leaders and the associated, heightened sense of insecurity of the post-Deng leaders that account well for the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Lessons from Tiananmen Incident, Mao, and Deng Besides the major differences in the career experiences between Mao and Deng and the post-Deng top leaders, the sense of insecurity of the post-­ Deng leaders is also heightened by the lessons that they have learned from the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and from Mao and Deng in managing civil-military relations. As discussed elsewhere in this study, the party’s

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reliance on the PLA for its survival in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident signaled the failure of civilian governance, or the incompetence of the civilian party and state authorities to resolve a major political and social crisis. This failure contributed to a critical decline of the party’s legitimacy to rule. The PLA was also reluctant to get involved in the suppression of the popular rebellion because its image would be harmed. More important, however, the failure of civilian governance created political vulnerability of the civilian leadership that could be exploited by military leaders for political advantages, as reflected in the expansion of the PLA’s political role in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. This expansion also made it more difficult to reestablish effective civilian control of the military.19 Moreover, even though both Mao and Deng accumulated substantial political capital and developed extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA, they still found it difficult to control the PLA. In the Cultural Revolution, for instance, Mao mobilized the masses to attack and bring down the civilian party-state bureaucracy. The political and social upheavals as a result motivated him to leverage the PLA in restoring social order and reconstituting the structure of governance. Mao particularly trusted Lin Biao, the defense minister and commander of the pre-1949 4th Field Army, for such a role and designated him as his successor. Mao’s reliance on the PLA, particularly on Lin Biao and his followers from the 4th Field Army, a unit closely identified with the First Front Red Army that Mao founded in the early 1930s and whose officers Mao particularly trusted,20 however, did not increase his sense of security. On the contrary, Mao’s dependence on the PLA for his personal and the party’s survival enhanced the power and leverage of the PLA leaders and increased Mao’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Mao, for instance, was alarmed by Lin Biao’s issuance of the “Order Number One” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader like himself. The fear of being exploited by the PLA leaders aggravated Mao’s sense of insecurity in dealing with these leaders. This sense of insecurity served as the critical impetus for the sequence of events that triggered the Lin Biao Incident of 1971. This incident demonstrates the extraordinary difficulty that Mao encountered in controlling the PLA. The difficulty of re-establishing civilian control of the PLA is also reflected in the process of dislodging military officers from the civilian leadership positions that they held in the late Cultural Revolution. Similarly in 1989, the popular rebellion in Beijing constituted a major political and social crisis that Deng had to mobilize the PLA to avert. Deng particularly trusted the senior military officers from the pre-1949 2nd Field Army for such a mission. His reliance on the PLA, particularly

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on senior officers from the 2nd Field Army where he had served as its political commissar from 1938 to 1951, however, did not increase his sense of security. On the contrary, his dependence on the PLA for his personal and the party’s survival clearly enhanced the power and leverage of the PLA leaders and increased his sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Deng, for instance, was clearly alarmed by Yang Baibing’s call on the PLA to provide “protection and escort for reform and opening up” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader. This sense of insecurity led to his decision to remove the “Yang Brothers” from the PLA leadership at the 12th CCP Congress of 1992, for the fear that the expanded power and influence of the “Yang Brothers” may undermine the position and authority of Jiang Zemin, his designated successor. This incident shows the immense difficulty that Deng encountered in controlling the PLA. Lessons from the Military’s Role in the Collapse of Communism in Other Countries The sense of insecurity of the post-Deng top leaders is also heightened by the lessons that they have learned from the unpredictable behavior of the military in the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Such behavior reflects the immense difficulty that the party leadership may encounter in controlling the military in a major political and social crisis. Even though the militaries of these countries were Leninist party-armies that were required to be loyal to the party leadership and defend it in times of political and social crisis, none did so when these regimes collapsed. In the popular revolts that ended the communist rule in these countries, for instance, rather than taking the side of the party, the military mostly defied its orders. The military, for instance, may insist on staying out of the dispute between the party and society. Or it may decline to intervene to suppress a popular rebellion and instead join the protesters against the party authorities. Also, the military, disappointed with the ways the party handles a crisis, may even attempt to overthrow the party rule through a military coup. Finally, if the party leadership fractures over how to handle a crisis, the chances are that the military may fracture as well if it is ordered to intervene. This fracture may lead to a civil war situation where different political-military factions fight against one another to seize state power.21

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The execution of the Romanian communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife in late December 1989, for instance, was largely the result of a decision made by the military to take the side of the protesters against the party leader. Similarly, the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union show what serious consequences a fractured military mobilized along different political persuasions may result in. Flawed Conventional Wisdom The post-Deng top leaders have adopted a policy that stresses effective civilian governance to prevent major political and social upheavals on the one hand, and confines the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions on the other. This policy, however, cannot be fully successful without their consensus on Deng’s “basic line” that was adopted at the 14th CCP Congress of 1992. This line requires the top leaders to “uphold economic construction as the central task of the party, adhere to party leadership, and adhere to the policy of reform and opening up.” The “basic line” has provided the legitimizing anchor for forestalling major political division and crisis among the civilian leadership that may incentivize them to leverage the PLA for domestic politics. But the central driver for the post-Deng top leaders to adhere to Deng’s “basic line” is their heightened sense of insecurity in dealing with the PLA. In the final analysis, the conventional wisdom on party-army relations in China may be flawed. According to this view, the CCP leaders are highly insecure in the face of domestic threats from both within the party leadership and from within Chinese society. They therefore attempt to buy off the military with higher ranks and more money. In this way, it is often said, the top leaders can consolidate their power by controlling the military and employing it in the power struggle against the domestic political opponents; they thus may feel more secure. Such a linear thinking, however, neglects the possibility that by relying on the military against the domestic political opponents, top leaders would no doubt reveal their own weaknesses or incompetence that could be exploited by an empowered military. They actually would create a new threat, the military itself, and thus make themselves feel even less secure.

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Roman emperors established the Praetorian Guard to protect them from domestic unrest. Over time, the unit gained independent power and became instrumental in installing and deposing emperors. As its domestic political role increased, its effectiveness in warfighting waned.22 The post-­ Deng generations of the CCP leaders may not be students of the Greco-­ Roman history,23 but their heightened sense of insecurity arising from a lack of revolutionary and military credentials and entrenched personal networks in the military may have convinced them that there are major limits on how far they can go to consolidate power in the PLA and how they can use this power. They therefore have adopted a new strategy to control the military. On the one hand, they attempt to enhance civilian governance to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require the use of the PLA in domestic politics. On the other hand, they try to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. In this way, the chances of undesirable military intervention in domestic politics decline, and as a result the top leaders may  feel more secure.

Notes 1. For a discussion of the dysfunctions of the Chinese regime that retard professional development, see Every Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance of Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp.  64–69, 71–72, 117–120, 130–133. 2. See Li, “Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military Commission,” and Li, “19th Party Congress and PLA’s Leadership Reshuffle.” 3. Li, “Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military Commission.” 4. See Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 109–111, and Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 61–64. 5. See Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform.” 6. See Desch, Civilian Control of the Military. 7. Huang Yingxu, “Adjustment of Military Strategic Guidelines in the 1960s and 1970s of the 20th Century” [“20世纪60-­70年代的军事战略方针调 整”], Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 9 (2017). Huang is former director of Mao Zedong Thought Studies Institute of AMS.

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8. Mao’s call for the PLA to make preparations for an “early, total, nuclear war” was included in the political report of the 9th Party Congress held in April 1969. See ibid. 9. See ibid., and Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving War-fighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995,” China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996). 10. See M.  Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), Chapter 3. 11. For a statistical modeling of Deng’s view, see Cheng King and Jane Du, “China’s First Priority in Post-War State Building: a Wealthy State or a Strong Army?” Journal of Policy Modelling, No. 40 (2018). Major critics of Deng’s view and his policy, however, hold Deng responsible for the delay of China’s military modernization for two decades because he canceled funding for the numerous weapons projects in the 1980s. They also blame Deng for the rampant military corruption as a result of the PLA’s extensive involvement in business activities. Conversations with senior PLA officers in Beijing in September 2013. 12. See Wang Weihai and Jiang Lumin, “On Several Key links in Integrated Development of Economic and National Defence Construction” [论经济 建设和国防建设融合发展若干关键环节], China Military Science, No. 5 (2016). Both Wang and Jiang are professors at Center for Economic Studies of NDU in Beijing. 13. Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform.” 14. For details, see Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War [毛 泽东, 斯大林与朝鲜战争] (Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Press, 2003), Chapter 5. 15. Conversations with senior PLA officials in Beijing in September 2013. 16. See Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities,” pp. 150–152. 17. Ibid., p. 159. 18. See David Shlapak, “Equipping the PLAAF: The Long March to Modernity,” in Philip C.  Saunders, et  al. (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012). 19. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in January 1998. 20. In explaining why he appointed Xie Fuzhi, an official of the 4th Front Red Army background, to succeed Luo Reiqing as the minister of public security in 1959, Mao acknowledged that he trusted officials of the 1st Front Red Army background more and usually appointed them to critically important positions. Mao cited in Wu Dongfeng, “Xie Fuzhi the Person” [“谢富治其人”], Tongzhou Gongjin [同舟共进], No. 11 (2014). Tongzhou Gonjin is a monthly journal published in China that covers historical issues.

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21. Conversations with senior party and PLA officials in Beijing in January 1998. 22. For a detailed discussion, see Boris Rankov, The Praetorian Guard (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1994). 23. The notion of praetorianism, however, has attracted the scholarly attention in China. For a detailed Chinese discussion, see Zhang Xiaoxiao, An Outline of the History of the Roman Praetorian Guard [罗马近卫军史纲] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2017).

CHAPTER 7

Major Implications for China’s National Security, Civil-Military Cooperation, and Inter-Agency Policy Coordination

The evolution of the Chinese civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization has major implications for China’s national security. This change also has major implications for the critical issue of whether the sharpened institutional and functional differences as a result of this change may cause political conflict between the CCP and the PLA. Finally, this change has major Implications for Inter-Agency Policy Coordination between the civilian and military authorities in China.

Implications for China’s National Security As discussed elsewhere in this study, China’s changing external security environment, changing military technology, and changing defense budget are not the central drivers for the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in the post-Deng era. But in attempting to bring about this change, the post-Deng top leaders have committed themselves to enhancing civilian governance by promoting economic development along with political and social stability for about three decades. This commitment has contributed significantly to the growth of China’s “comprehensive national power” to the extent that China has become the world’s second largest economy. China thus can afford a relatively large defense budget that still remains low as a percentage of China’s annual GDP. China’s formal defense budget in 2018, for instance, reached $175  billion, but it constitutes only © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_7

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under 1.5 percent of China’s annual GDP. Moreover, the effectiveness of China’s defense budget is enhanced by substantial waste reduction as a result of the counter-corruption drive in the PLA, the downsizing of the PLA by 300,000 billets, the lower cost of doing business in China, and the limited, regional orientation of China’s defense policy.1 This budget is also augmented by the implementation of a military-civilian fusion policy.2 A budget of such a scale can finance a substantial number of technology-­ intensive weapons systems. The improved military budget and technology as a result have contributed significantly to the improvement of China’s external security environment. China’s military strategic guidelines, for instance, require the PLA to make preparations for fighting and winning “local war,” a type of war that is rather limited in scope. This requirement implies that a major war involving the invasion of China by a major foreign power is highly unlikely due to the enhanced deterrence capabilities of the PLA. Similarly, China’s military strategy stresses the continued improvement of its military capabilities to “effectively shape posture, manage and control crisis, and deter war” (“有效塑造态势, 管控危机, 遏制战争”), or to “shape” its external security environment “in China’s favour” through “active defense.”3 Both demonstrate that China is “gaining initiative” in proactively managing its external security environment because of the improved military capabilities. Similarly, the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization is the result of a deliberate military policy adopted by the post-Deng top leaders, which aims to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. This military policy also helps to optimize the use of the defense budget. As the domestic role of the PLA declines, for instance, the PLA can concentrate its resources on developing capabilities to safeguard China’s external interests. Besides the traditional security tasks such as “deterring and resisting aggression,” “opposing and containing Taiwan independence,” and “safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security,” for instance, the PLA is tasked to safeguard China’s “newly emerging” interests in the post-Deng era. As noted elsewhere in this study, China’s maritime rights and interests have extended from the coastal waters to its “near seas” such as the South and East China Seas and the Yellow Sea. China’s rights and interests have also extended to the outer space, the cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Furthermore, China has developed overseas interests that require protection and security. They

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include external sources of energy and resources, vital sea lanes for shipping goods and accessing resources, and China’s overseas investment, institutions, personnel, and assets.4 To provide security for these “newly emerging” rights and interests, the PLA has logically shifted its resources to developing its naval, air, missile, and strategic support forces and capabilities, or those that help to project power over longer distances. It is also developing capabilities in domains such as the outer space, the cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Moreover, it is investing in quantum computing, big data analysis, artificial intelligence, military drones, and hypersonic weapons.5 The PLA thus is incentivized by its increased technological sophistication to concentrate on enhancing its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. This concentration helps to consolidate further the civil-­ military institutional boundaries.

Political Conflict or Cooperation between the Civilian and Military Authorities? Besides national security, the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization has major implications for the critical issue of whether the sharpened institutional and functional differences as a result of this change may cause political conflict between the civilian and military authorities. The conventional wisdom postulates that with the change of Chinese civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-­ institutionalization, the differences between the civilian and military institutions and authorities may sharpen. These sharpened differences may exacerbate the political conflict between the two. The theory of civil-­ military relations, the empirical evidence of the Leninist civil-military relations in the Soviet Union, and the neo-realist theory of international politics, however, may help to understand why civil-military institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor do not exacerbate political conflict between the two. They actually help to enhance civil-­ military cooperation. Theory of Civil-Military Relations The manifestation of functional and technical specialization in civil-­ military affairs is the institutionalization of the boundaries between the military and civilian institutions and authorities. These boundaries fulfill

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several major functions. First, they ensure that both the military and civilian institutions and authorities concentrate their attention and resources on doing what they specialize in. They thus can effectively perform their different tasks and deliver different public goods and services. Because of the increasing technological and organizational complexities of the modern military, for instance, the specialized knowledge and expertise of the military profession can be acquired “only by prolonged education and experience.”6 The breakdown of civil-military boundaries, however, causes the diversion of attention and resources away from doing what both institutions specialize in. Such a breakdown may lower the functional and technical quality and competence of these institutions, thus increasing the cost of performing different tasks and producing different public goods and services. Furthermore, civil-military boundaries help to sustain the social responsibility of the military that comes with the nature of the military expertise. The behavior of an officer “in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state. … The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society. The discharge of the responsibility requires mastery of the skill; mastery of the skill entails acceptance of the responsibility.”7 The role of the military thus is confined to two specific realms: management of violence in terms of expertise, and military and external security of society in terms of social responsibility. Acquiring the skill of managing violence necessarily imposes on the military the primary responsibility of ensuring the military and external security of society. The breakdown of the boundaries between the military and domestic society, however, may cause the gradual erosion of the social responsibility of the military. Since the expertise of an officer concerns the management of violence, “the employment of expertise promiscuously for his own advantage would wreck the fabric of society.”8 This means that the reorientation of the military violence toward the domestic society may cause the decline of the domestic political and civil order and ascendance of chaos, anarchy, and even civil war. Moreover, the extensive and sustained involvement of the military in domestic politics is likely to cause the gradual decline of its competence in discharging its primary responsibility of ensuring the military and external security of society. Finally, civil-military boundaries are developed on the premise that the military and civilian institutions and behavior are substantially different.

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The military, for instance, is more hierarchical in structure, more homogeneous in outlook, more conservative in ideology, narrower in expertise, more corporate in consciousness and identity, and stricter in discipline. In contrast, civilian institutions are more decentralized in structure as reflected in parliaments and political parties, more heterogeneous in outlook, more mobilizational in ideology, more diverse in awareness and knowledge, more individualistic in consciousness and identity, and less restrictive in behavioral norms.9 The formal civil-military institutional boundaries sustain these differences because these differences have important functions to fulfill. They, for instance, ensure the institutional autonomy of the military and the integrity of the military profession, and enable the military to become more competent and effective in representing, informing, and implementing the military and security objectives of the state and society. Moreover, they allow the normal functioning of the state and society by confining the military to its narrow domain of expertise, and by preventing it from becoming involved in the domains that it is not familiar with and does not specialize in, such as civilian politics. The breakdown of these boundaries, however, is likely to seriously erode the institutional autonomy of the military and the integrity of the military profession, thus impeding the military from serving the military and security objectives of the state and society effectively. Civilian institutions are more heterogeneous and civilian politics are more contentious. By involving itself in civilian politics, the military is likely to become fragmented along civilian cleavages of different political, ideological, and partisan persuasions. As Huntington observes, “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.”10 More important, the collapse of such an organic division of labor between the civilian and military institutions and authorities may turn a fragmented military into tools of political struggle among the civilian factions of different political, ideological, and partisan persuasions, thus entrapping society into militarized civil strife. Some suggest that the differences between the military and civilian institutions and behavior are narrowing down. Modern military managers, for instance, are replacing the traditional authoritarian commanders. When the former rely on persuasion to build consensus and on encouragement to boost morale and initiative, the latter depend on the authoritarian style

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to make decisions and on strict discipline to enforce them. Modern military managers thus are similar to their civilian counterparts in behavior. Moreover, the military recruits a large number of technical specialists such as engineers and health services professionals, who share similar skill sets and expertise with their civilian counterparts. Finally, military officers learn to become discretionary and adaptive, and develop the political skill to relate to the civilian leadership and public institutions and to influence the legislative and executive decisions.11 When these observations are plausible, a closer scrutiny reveals that they also have flaws. For peacetime military administration, military managers may develop behavioral traits that are shared by their civilian counterparts. Decisions, for instance, may be made through consensus-building on issues such as personnel appointment and budgetary allocation. The primary role of any military, however, is to fight war. War takes place in a highly uncertain environment where the cost can be lethal and the opportunity to minimize such a high cost may disappear quickly. Decisions thus must be made fast. The time-consuming process of building consensus is clearly not helpful in reducing the high cost of war. Therefore, the most effective militaries are those where peacetime military administration is separated from military operations. This separation helps to prevent the behavior associated with the former from influencing and interfering in the decision process of the latter. The civilianized behavior of peacetime military administration thus cannot reflect the dominant behavior of the military, which stems from its warfighting role. Similarly, even though the military recruits technical specialists whose skill sets can be found in the civilian professions, these specialists play the supportive role to those who play the primary, warfighting role in the military. They thus are no substitutes for those who specialize in the “management of violence,” and whose duties include “the organizing, equipping and training of land, naval or air force; the planning of its activities; and the direction of its operation in and out of combat.”12 These “managers of violence” constitute the most critical components of the officer corps. Their specialties and expertise are also peculiar and unique to the military profession, and are mostly absent in the civilian professions. Finally, when military officers can become adaptive and develop the political skill to engage the civilian institutions, most of those who do so, including the lobbyists, are either the retired military officers or civilians who work in the defense bureaucracy and defense-industrial complex. Moreover, military politics is usually confined to the narrow, institutional

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issues such as the defense budget and military manpower policy, and it mostly includes subdued, bureaucratic negotiations. In contrast, civilian politics may involve general elections where political parties and candidates mobilize people and resources to run highly publicized campaigns in order to capture the major positions of political power. Since civil-military differences are substantial, some suggest that significant political conflict between the two institutions and authorities is inevitable, and such conflict can be as severe as a military coup to seize political power. As noted elsewhere in this study, there are two major schools of thought on explaining the heavy military intervention in civilian politics including coups: military and political. The military explanation attributes such behavior to the internal characteristics of the military such as its organizational cohesiveness, its managerial ability, its ethos of public service, and the skepticism of the “military mind” about the politicians, all stemming from a high level of institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military.13 Based on such a diagnosis, the solution to the problem of heavy military intervention in politics is to “maximize civilian power” by a “divide and rule” strategy of politicizing the military, or by a socialization process where civilian values are assimilated by the military to mitigate the “military mind-set.” Such a solution, however, may encounter two major difficulties. First, since civilian politics is highly heterogeneous, it may become difficult to determine which government institution, social group, political party, social-economic class, or ideology represents “civilian power and values.” In the end, by yielding to the control of “civilian power” and acquiescing to the influence of “civilian values,” the military may easily become a tool in the political struggle among different civilian institutions and groups. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that countries where clear institutional boundaries exist to sustain the institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military are where military coup is rare and political and social stability prevails. They include all the developed countries, the newly industrialized countries in East Asia, and the majority of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, to account for the heavy military intervention in civilian politics, political explanation may offer a more persuasive alternative to the military explanation. Unlike the military explanation, political explanation attributes heavy military intervention in civilian politics to the low level of political institutionalization, or severe political division and fragmentation of the civilian authorities. Such division and fragmentation cause the inability of the

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civilian authorities to successfully resolve major political and socioeconomic issues and crisis. The failure of civilian governance as a result causes political and social crisis that incentivizes functional groups, including the military, to intervene in politics, thus eroding further the specialization-­ based institutional boundaries. In such a situation, major political intervention by the military also goes hand in hand with the internal fragmentation of the military.14 Based on such an analysis, the solution to the problem of heavy military intervention in civilian politics lies in the institutionalization of the civil-­ military boundaries based on a clear and effective functional division of labor between the two. This institutionalization requires building up the capacity of the civilian authorities for effective civilian  governance. Effective civilian governance prevents major political and social upheavals that incentivize the military to intervene in domestic politics. In the meantime, this institutionalization calls for maximization of the institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military. Maximizing the institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military is what Huntington calls the “objective control” of the military. Politicizing and civilianizing the military by involving it in domestic politics is what he calls the “subjective control” of the military.15 “Subjective control” of the military inevitably turns the military into a tool of domestic political, ideological, and partisan struggle, causing major political conflict either between the civilian and military authorities or among various political-military factions. The institutionalization of civil-­ military boundaries based on “objective control,” however, allows the military to become an instrument of state policy rather than a tool of domestic political struggle. The best way to prevent major political conflict between the civilian and military authorities or among them, according to Huntington, is to exercise “objective control” of the military or allow for a high level of institutional autonomy of the military. Soviet Civil-Military Relations Some may argue that functional and technical specialization and clear institutional boundaries may reflect the behavior and structure of the Western liberal societies. They may not be useful in helping understand major Leninist regimes such as the Soviet Union and China. It is certainly true that the militaries of the Soviet Union and China are loyal to the communist parties that monopolize political power. Compared

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to the West, these militaries are more political because they do not deny the partisan nature of their institutions. Within the context of Leninist regimes, however, there is a significant variation in the extent that functional and technical specialization-based civil-military boundaries have developed, both in the cross-country comparison as in the work of Perlmutter and LeoGrande, and in the diachronic comparison in one country over time as in this study. Both the Soviet and Chinese militaries, for instance, were the products of social revolution and civil war. Due to the political and social nature of the revolutionary strategies and low level of technological endowment, party-army relations at this early stage were highly “symbiotic” for lack of functional and technical specialization. But after seizing state power and establishing effective control over the national territories, the Leninist regimes of large and complex countries such as the Soviet Union and China had to tackle the internal task of economic and technological development and the external task of national defense and security in order to claim the legitimacy to rule. Fulfilling these difficult and complex tasks requires functional and technical expertise. Such expertise can only be acquired through specialization. With a general postrevolutionary trend toward functional and technical specialization, clear institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities gradually emerged in the Soviet Union after the Second World War and in China after the Korean War. As noted elsewhere in this study, this trend was reversed by Mao in China in the late 1950s. In the Soviet Union, however, clear civil-military institutional boundaries solidified to the extent that analysts of the Soviet party-army relations believe that political conflict between the two institutions was inevitable.16 One scholar, for instance, highlights the major differences between the values and prerogatives of the Soviet military and those of the CPSU. These differences include the military’s propensity for elitism in contrast to the party’s advocacy of egalitarian ideals, the military’s inclination toward institutional autonomy and professionalism against the party’s insistence on its subordination to the ideology of the party, the military’s penchant for nationalism versus the party’s promotion of proletarian internationalism, and the military’s tendency toward social detachment as opposed to the party’s insistence on its social involvement. Because these sharp differences may engender significant political conflict between the two institutions, according to this analysis, the party imposed on the military the

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political surveillance apparatus such as the PPWS to politicize and civilianize the military.17 Later scholars on the Soviet civil-military relations, however, observe that rather than acute political tension and conflict, relations between the party and the military remained stable and cordial, particularly after the removal of Khrushchev from office and coming to power of Brezhnev in late 1964. This observation leads to two alternative explanations. One is William Odom’s bureaucratic congruence model, which argues that the values of the military are not substantially different from those of the party. Both are elitist and nationalistic, and the military’s pursuit of institutional autonomy and professionalism is not inconsistent with its subordination to the ideology of the party. Odom thus regards “the Soviet military as an administrative arm of the party, not something separate from it and competing with it.”18 Another explanation is Timothy Colton’s model of contractual or coalitional civil-military relations. A major premise of the earlier “conflict” explanation is that the PPWS was externally imposed on the Soviet military as an agency to monitor, supervise, politicize, and civilianize the military on behalf of the party. The PPWS thus prevented the military from launching a coup against the party. But Colton finds that rather than monitoring and politicizing the military on behalf of the party, the PPWS was “internalized” into the Soviet military. Political commissars shared with commanders the administrative chores of the units, mastered command and technical skills, suffered as much as commanders in the intra-party leadership power struggle such as Stalin’s Great Purge, and lobbied the party on behalf of the interests of the military. Colton also finds that Soviet military politics was narrowly confined to addressing the institutional and internal issues of the military, but not about the broad and complex issues of societal politics.19 The analytical implication of Colton’s findings is that the political acquiescence of the Soviet military could not be accounted for by the imposition of the “subjective control” mechanism such as the PPWS, which was “internalized” into the Soviet military. Such acquiescence, however, could be explained by “objective control.” the Soviet military, for instance, enjoyed a high level of institutional autonomy and professionalism, the outcome of a tacit partnership contract between the party and the military. In this contract, the military accepts the sovereignty of the party as the final arbiter of overall values, institutions, and policy. In return, the party takes good care of the interests of the military and allows

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it to have sufficient institutional autonomy to pursue its functional and technical expertise. Odom and Colton may differ somewhat on the primary reasons underlying the stable and cordial Soviet civil-military relations during the Brezhnev era. Odom apparently believes that as the party evolved into a more conservative ruling entity, it developed values that resemble those of the military. The value convergence explains the congruence of the Soviet party-army relations. Colton, however, suggests that as long as the military is left to pursue its institutional autonomy and professionalism and its interests are well taken care of, mutually beneficial party-army relations would result. What the two authors agree on is that functional and technical specialization and clear institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities do not cause severe political conflict between the two. In the final analysis, functional and technical specialization and clear civil-military institutional boundaries did not cause severe party-army conflict in the Soviet Union. The erosion and collapse of the specialization-­ based institutional boundaries between the party and military authorities in Mao’s China, however, caused severe political conflict among major symbiotic political-military factions. These factions transcended and eroded further the institutional boundaries. The stable and cordial Soviet civil-military relations of the Brezhnev era resembled the stable civil-­ military relations in the developed countries of the West. The symbiotic and factionalized civil-military relations in Mao’s China, however, bore a resemblance to those in non-Leninist developing countries. This study, however, shows that Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in the post-Deng era. This change has contributed to the more stable and cooperative civil-­ military relations in China. Neo-Realist Theory of International Politics Neo-realist theory of international politics can also help to understand why functional and technical specialization and clear institutional boundaries engender cooperation rather than political conflict. In the highly insecure and vulnerable condition of anarchy where there is no overriding authority, according to this theory, units within the system prioritize survival and security through self-help. They thus are incentivized to invest in similarly competitive and versatile capabilities to ensure their own survival

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and security. Units therefore look identical and redundant for lack of specialization. For the same reason, balancing, or competition and conflict, is the dominant behavior among the similar and redundant units. This behavior is associated with the zero-sum game where “winner takes all” and players strive for relative gains. Similar and redundant units and balancing behavior thus stem from the concern for survival and security in the highly insecure and vulnerable condition of anarchy. In an anarchic international system where there is no overriding authority, for instance, units within the system such as the nation-states are incentivized to invest in similarly competitive and versatile capabilities such as a centralized bureaucracy and a standing army to ensure their own survival and security. As a result, these nation-states, which constitute the basic units of the international system, look identical and redundant to one another for lack of specialization. In contrast, in the secure and invulnerable condition of hierarchy where there is an overriding authority, survival and security are no longer in jeopardy and similarly competitive and versatile capabilities are no longer necessary. Units within the system thus can leverage their comparative advantages through specialization. Such specialization makes it possible for the interdependence-based cooperation among specialized and different units to realize mutual and multilateral gains. This specialization enhances cooperation further and raises the cost of breaking up the interdependence. For the same reason, bandwagoning, or cooperation, is the dominant behavior among the specialized and different units. This behavior is associated with the variable-sum game where “there are even gains for losers” and the players strive for absolute gains.20 Specialized and different units and bandwagoning behavior thus stem from the secure and invulnerable condition of hierarchy. In the condition of domestic hierarchy where there is an overriding authority, for instance, units within the system such as functional institutions, business firms, and individuals do not need to develop the similarly competitive and versatile capabilities to ensure their own survival and security. They thus can leverage their comparative advantages through specialization. Such specialization makes it possible for interdependence-based cooperation among specialized and different units to realize mutual and multilateral gains. Formal institutional boundaries are the outcome of functional and technical specialization, the basic condition for interdependence among specialized and different units, a major indicator of hierarchy. “Insofar as a realm is formally organized, its units are free to specialize, to pursue their

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own interests without concern for developing the means of … preserving their security in the presence of others. … Persons and institutions depend heavily on one another because of the different tasks they perform and the different goods they produce and exchange. The parts of a polity bind themselves together by their differences.”21 The neo-realist theory of international politics may account well for the issue of political conflict and cooperation stemming from the evolution of civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in China. The CCP and the PLA, for instance, were the products of social revolution and civil war, a quasi-anarchic condition where the overriding authority was weak. As a result, units within this system such as the competing party regimes, including the KMT and the CCP, strove to develop similarly competitive and versatile capabilities including their own organizational, propaganda, and military capabilities. Both also engaged in the highly competitive behavior of balancing, including a civil war, to defend or seize the ultimate state power. The CCP’s seizure of state power in 1949 and consolidation of this power in the following years, however, ushered in an era of hierarchy where an effective central authority was established. A major indicator of this hierarchy is the functional and technical specialization of the civilian and military institutions to tackle the internal task of economic and technological development for the former and the external task of national defense and security for the latter. The emerging institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the two institutions demonstrated the trend toward the interdependence-based cooperation among specialized and different units. This trend toward hierarchy, however, was gradually reversed by Mao beginning in the late 1950s, as the PLA was mobilized into party politics in the Anti-Rightist, Anti-Dogmatism, and Anti-Right Opportunism Campaigns. Mao’s Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 finally brought about a decade of quasi-anarchy. The mobilization of the masses to attack the civilian party-state bureaucracy, for instance, led to the collapse of an effective central civilian authority. As a result, the PLA was leveraged to run the country, leading to the severe erosion of the civil-military institutional boundaries. The collapse of the institutional structure and boundaries caused the breakdown of hierarchy and the rise of anarchy where similar and redundant units such as major symbiotic political-military factions emerged. These factions engaged in the highly competitive behavior of factional balancing against one another in the new condition of anarchy.

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What can account for the emergence and dominance of informal networks or highly personalized factions in elite politics in this new condition of anarchy? With the erosion and collapse of the formal institutional structure and boundaries, for instance, units within the system such as individuals and groups must look for informal networks to ensure survival in the new, zero-sum power struggle where “winner takes all.” The pre-1949 field army ties constitute the most reliable and secure basis for such networks. These ties were tested by the long and shared experience of life and death and victory and defeat in the war years, and the military members of these networks controlled the military force. As one major party leader leveraged the old field army ties to mobilize support from the badly damaged party, government, and military establishments for power struggle, and persecuted those of other field army backgrounds, other major leaders became gravely concerned about their survival and security. This concern drove them to recruit loyalists and mobilize political support from their own field army networks against their political rivals. The intensified power struggle as a result led to consolidation of several highly competitive, symbiotic political-military factions, and they looked quite similar and identical to one another. Each faction, for instance, covertly possessed the similarly competitive and versatile capabilities, including its own organizational, propaganda, and military capabilities. This study, however, shows that post-Deng China has witnessed the evolution away of civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities have developed and solidified. These boundaries enable the former to concentrate on enhancing civilian governance and the latter on perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Both make it possible for the interdependence-based cooperation among specialized and different units, a major indicator of hierarchy. In short, rather than aggravating civil-military conflict, the change of civil-military relations from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization helps to enhance cooperation between the civilian and military authorities in post-­Deng China.

Implications for Inter-Agency Policy Coordination Some may argue that civil-military conflict does not have to manifest itself in the worst-case scenario like the power struggle of the Cultural Revolution or a coup, but may occur as the low-intensity competition

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such as inter-agency, bureaucratic politics. But bureaucratic politics is not what is meant here by the highly competitive behavior of power balancing, a behavior associated with the condition of anarchy where “winner takes all.” A major difference between bureaucratic politics and power balancing is that while the former is caused by a lack of coordination among specialized and different units or a technical breakdown of the interdependence among these units, the latter is driven by a fundamental concern over the relative distribution of capabilities among the non-specialized, similar, and redundant units in a struggle for power. The problems of the former can be resolved through better inter-agency, bureaucratic coordination and technical maintenance of interdependence among specialized and different units, but those of the latter are much less reconcilable. Indeed, an unintended consequence of the evolution of the Leninist party-army structure and relations from symbiosis to quasi-­institutionalization is the emerging issue of inter-agency policy coordination between the civilian and military authorities, an issue associated with bureaucratic politics. When “objective control,” or allowing for more institutional autonomy for military professionalization, may benefit military modernization, it also reinforces the civil-military bifurcation that may increase the difficulty of inter-agency policy coordination. This bifurcation is particularly reflected in the peculiar evolution of the Leninist party-state-army structure in China, which is quite different from those of the non-Leninist states. In most of the non-Leninist states, for instance, the military reports to a civilianized national defense department or ministry. This department or ministry is internalized in the cabinet where the top civilian leader, or the head of the cabinet, can exercise routine oversight of the military. But China’s State Council, or its cabinet, does not have such oversight power over the military. Even though China has a ministry of national defense within the State Council, this ministry is nominal and ceremonial. It does not have its own staff and organization. The bureaucratic agencies that fulfill the functions of a national defense department or ministry in China are among the 15 agencies of the CMC. These agencies are staffed and headed by military officers and not by civilian bureaucrats. These officers report to the senior CMC leadership including the civilian chair, two uniformed vice-chairs, and the minister of national defense who is also an active-duty military officer and a senior member of the CMC. They however do not report to the premier of the State Council. Since the CMC shares the same bureaucratic rank with the State Council, it is external to the State Council but not a subordinate constituent in it. As

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Party (党): CCP Politburo and Its Standing Committee

Government (政）: State Council State Council ministries, commissions, administrations, and offices

Military ( ): Central Military Commission CMC departments, commissions, and offices

Chart 7.1  Party-state-military structure in China

Chart 7.1 shows, the State Council and the CMC constitute two separate chains of command, one civilian and the other military, and both report to the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee, but not to one another. Since the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee do not meet regularly to manage daily state affairs, and the State Council, which does, has no administrative jurisdiction over the military, routine civilian oversight of the PLA is absent in China’s civilian governance structure. Civilian control of the military in China is solely exercised by the civilian CMC chair, not the premier of the State Council. But because the CMC chair is a part-timer who also runs the CCP and the country as the CCP general-secretary and the president of China, he is likely to be too preoccupied with these civilian responsibilities to exercise routine oversight of the military. Since the PLA is not integrated into any institutional structure of civilian oversight such as the State Council, it usually behaves as a highly autonomous and powerful institution, particularly in making specific decisions and handling specific crises regarding China’s external security. External Crisis Management A few critical incidents may have reflected the bureaucratic dysfunctions in China’s crisis response and management, likely as a result of weak inter-­ agency coordination stemming from a bifurcated civil-military structure.

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In April 2001, for instance, a patrolling Chinese jet interceptor collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft 70 miles off the coast of Hainan Island, leading to the loss of the Chinese aircraft, the death of its pilot, and the crash landing of the U.S. aircraft on Hainan where the crew was detained. The crisis remained unresolved for about 11 days.22 One major reason for the delay appears to be that the PLA took a much harder line than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the State Council. It insisted that the U.S. should terminate its reconnaissance activities in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and compensate for the Chinese losses. This hard line reportedly made it difficult for Jiang Zemin to build a civil-­ military consensus on resolving the issue, whereas a quick resolution was presumably what Jiang desired. Jiang wanted to maintain a stable China-­U.S. relationship so that he could focus on issues of economic development. Similarly in November 2004, a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine was tracked to have intruded and submerged in the Japanese territorial waters southwest of Okinawa for two hours. About a week had passed by before the MFA acknowledged the incident, attributing the intrusion to a technical error, and expressed regret.23 This happened at a time when Hu Jingtao was preparing to attend an Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum summit in Chile, and Hu was to meet the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at this summit to find ways to improve the strained Sino-Japanese relations. The incident seems to have not only caught the MFA by surprise, but added difficulty to Hu’s effort to improve the Sino-­ Japanese relations. It was also suggested that Hu, the new CMC chair, may have not even been aware of the submarine operation. In January 2007, China launched a ground-based ballistic missile carrying a kinetic kill vehicle. The missile impacted and destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite orbiting 537 miles above the earth. The U.S., Japan, Australia, and Britain asked Beijing for an explanation but met with prolonged silence. Only after 12 days did the MFA officially acknowledge the test. Such a belated response suggests that the MFA may not have been initially informed of the test by the PLA, which runs China’s space program. Nonetheless, the test contradicted the image of a rising China committed to peaceful development that Hu had wanted to project to the world. The test produced numerous pieces of debris that could interfere with space activities for years to come, and it might trigger an arms race in space.24 Just before the Thanksgiving holiday of 2007, the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and accompanying ships approached Hong Kong to make a

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long-planned port visit. Without warning, China denied them entry. The decision was reversed abruptly, again without an explanation, but the ships were already on their way to Japan. This incident again indicates a lack of coordination between the PLA and the MFA. Apparently the soldiers wanted to turn the U.S. ships away while the diplomats tried unsuccessfully to neutralize the fallout. This incident happened only weeks after a visit to China by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who wanted to initiate a long-term dialogue with the PLA. Again, the disruption made it more difficult to maintain a stable China-U.S. relationship, which Hu was understood to have wanted.25 In early March 2009, five Chinese ships, including two fishing trawlers, two Chinese Coast Guard patrol vessels, and a naval intelligence ship, blocked and surrounded the U.S. ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable 75  miles south of Hainan. The trawlers attempted to snag the towing cable of Impeccable’s sonar array with a grappling hook. The incident led to the exchange of protests between the two governments. It happened only eight days after the two countries agreed to restore a military-to-­ military dialogue. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had just visited China, and China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jieshi was just about to visit Washington, D.C.26 Once again, the incident made it more difficult to improve the China-U.S. relations as China’s civilian leadership had desired. Finally, during a trip to China by U.S.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in January 2011, the Chinese military conducted a test flight of its new stealth fighter J-20. When the issue was brought up by Gates in his meeting with Hu Jintao, “Hu and other civilian leaders gave their American visitors the impression that they were unaware that the test had been conducted only hours before they received Mr. Gates.”27 This episode not only amounted to a PLA show of force that overshadowed Gates’ visit aimed at improving bilateral defense ties, but also raised critical questions about the civilian control of the military in China. All these incidents incurred substantial cost to China’s diplomacy and its image. A few critical factors may have contributed to the seeming dysfunctions in the Chinese response and management regarding these incidents. Chinese leaders, for instance, may have intentionally delayed the resolution of some of these crises, either because of the lack of progress in bilateral negotiations that favored the Chinese side or in order to create favorable bargaining leverages. Such delay may have also stemmed from the Chinese leaders’ prioritization of domestic political and social pressures to enhance their legitimacy. The peculiar personality styles of the

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Chinese leaders and the accidental absence of the top leader in Beijing may have also contributed to the delayed response to some of these external crises. But weak inter-agency policy coordination between the civilian and military authorities is clearly a major, critical reason.28 Similarly, China’s domestic crisis management also encountered major challenges stemming from weak inter-agency policy coordination. A case in point is the Chinese management of the Sichuan earthquake relief in May 2008. Domestic Crisis Management On May 12, 2008, an earthquake of Richter magnitude 8 hit northern Sichuan Province, a region of about 11 million inhabitants. Authorized by CMC Chair Hu Jintao, the central military authorities deployed a total of 137,000 troops for the earthquake relief, including about  20,000 PAP men. Since the first 72 hours are critical to “saving lives” (“救人”), most of the deployed PLA troops arrived on the quake scene within this time. The PLA helped to transfer more than a million people in distress to safe areas and provided substantial aids including tents, temporary quarters, food, portable water, medical treatment, and disease control. Nonetheless, the central indicator of “saving lives” was not impressive. Only 3336 people were saved from the ruins of the earthquake by the PLA, while over 69,000 people were confirmed killed and over 18,000 were reported missing.29 A major reason for the PLA failure to save more lives is weak inter-­ agency coordination. For command and control of the Sichuan earthquake-relief operations, a two-level PLA command structure was established: the Army Command Group for Resisting Quake and Relieving Disaster (军队抗震救灾指挥组) led by the Chief of the PLA General Staff Chen Bingde at the central level, and the Chengdu MR Joint Command Department for Resisting Quake and Relieving Disaster (成都军区抗震救灾联合指挥部) headed by the Chengdu MR Commander Li Shimin at the regional level. For inter-­ agency coordination, the two PLA commands were required to report to the State Council Command Department for Resisting Quake and Relieving Disaster (国务院抗震救灾指挥部) led by Premier Wen Jiabao, who was at the scene of the earthquake.30 Partly driven by the urgent need to save lives trapped in Wenchuan County, the epicenter of the earthquake, and partly due to a lack of understanding of the PLA stemming from the fact that he has never served in the military, Wen ordered the PLA to reach Wenchuan by all means within

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34 hours after the quake. The PLA commanders on the scene, however, saw reaching Wenchuan on such a short notice as mission impossible. Although only 100  kilometers away from the city of Dujiangyan where most of the PLA troops gathered, Wenchuan is surrounded by impassable mountains. All the roads were now blocked by the massive rock slides and debris. Efforts to clear the landslides and access Wenchuan by air were hampered by minor quakes, a shortage of heavy road construction equipment, incessant rain, and low visibility. To the PLA commanders, Wen’s order amounted to a reckless risking of the lives of the troops. The tension between Wen and the PLA commanders grew to the extent that Hu Jintao had to replace Wen as the commander-in-chief on the earthquake scene on May 16. It became difficult for Wen and the PLA commanders to coordinate the relief tasks as a result of the mutual distrust that had developed.31 At lower levels, a critical difficulty was the lack of inter-agency coordination between the deployed PLA units and the county, township, and village government authorities. Most of the troops deployed, for instance, belonged to the centrally or MR-controlled quick-reaction force (快反部 队) and strategic-reserve force (战略预备队). These forces have no regular and institutionalized relationships and interactions with the local government authorities. Any tasks thus had to go up and down their separate chains of command for approval before critical  civil-military coordination may take place at the local levels. These cumbersome and timeconsuming processes contributed to a situation where some units idled while none were available where urgent relief was needed. These units could not adapt well to the rapidly changing circumstances on the ground. A high cost was incurred as a result of this inability to take timely actions.32 Weak local inter-agency coordination in the Sichuan earthquake relief is also reflected in the post-quake evaluations where PLA analysts proposed to employ the reserve and militia units for disaster relief. These local units are allegedly more familiar with the local geographical, social, and cultural conditions. Militia units are also under the dual leadership of the military and civilian authorities at the provincial and local levels. The regular and institutionalized relationships and interactions between these two authorities would facilitate more effective inter-agency coordination in disaster relief at these levels, thus lowering the cost of the disasters.33 A related inter-agency issue arising from the PLA participation in the Sichuan earthquake relief is whether the deployed forces and equipment

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are suitable for the task of civilian disaster relief. A few combat service support units that were deployed specialize in engineering, road construction, transportation, and medicine. These units thus were appropriate for civilian disaster relief. But the majority of the units that were deployed were armed and trained to fight conventional war. Their arms and equipment thus could not be used for disaster relief. Heavy machineries such as excavators and bulldozers were issued to the deployed units at the last moment, but the troops were not trained to operate them. The majority of the troops were issued light tools such as spades and picks. The attempt to remove large concrete pieces of the collapsed buildings with light tools and bare hands proved to be ineffective. Such attempt also caused the loss of time that was critical for saving lives.34 Inappropriate force structure and equipment and lack of specialized training clearly resulted from a lack of inter-agency coordination in contingency planning. The lack of such coordination contributed to the high cost of the Sichuan earthquake.35 Improving Inter-Agency Coordination and Its Limitations The old party-army symbiosis based on the informal, personal networks may have been characterized by the political infighting among major symbiotic political-military factions. But in times of political and social crisis, such networks enabled charismatic leaders, who held no formal military leadership positions, to employ the PLA to cope with such a crisis. As noted elsewhere in this study, in the aftermath of the Lin Biao Incident, Premier of the State Council Zhou Enlai, who held no formal leadership position in the CMC, issued the order to deploy the PLA 38th Corps to the suburbs of Beijing to defend the capital against possible ground and airborne attacks from the directions of the south and the Soviet Union. Similarly during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou issued the order to deploy the PLA 21st Corps from the city of Datong in Shanxi Province to the cities of Xian and Baoji in Shaanxi Province, to enforce military control and prevent infightings among the “rebel” factions in these cities.36 Zhou also ordered the PLA 47th Corps to establish military control of Hunan Province.37 In all these instances, all the PLA commanders followed Zhou’s orders. Premier Zhou Enlai’s informal, personal relationship with the PLA leaders is in sharp contrast to the relationship between Premier Wen Jiabao and the PLA leaders in the Sichuan earthquake relief. Wen has no informal, personal ties with the PLA leaders because he has never served in the PLA.  Had Wen held a formal leadership position in the CMC and had

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control over the career advancement of the senior military officers, these officers might have been incentivized to follow his order in the Sichuan earthquake relief. But Wen did not hold any formal leadership position in the CMC. Similarly in 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji was frustrated by the PLA participation in smuggling, an unintended consequence of its heavy involvement in business activities. The PLA participation in smuggling disrupted the normal functioning of the national economy and caused a heavy loss of the state tax revenues. But because Zhu had neither informal, personal ties with the PLA nor formal leadership position in the CMC, he was unable to order the PLA to divest itself from its business activities. Zhu resolved this issue with the help of CMC Chair Jiang Zemin, who criticized the PLA for its involvement in smuggling at a counter-smuggling conference of the State Council held in July 1998.38 In October 1998, Jiang made the critical decision to divest the PLA from its business activities. These examples show that with quasi-institutionalization of civil-­ military relations in the post-Deng era, the level of effectiveness of civil-military policy coordination may depend completely on whether a major civilian leader holds a formal leadership position in the CMC. Weak inter-agency policy coordination, particularly in the Hu Jintao era, was clearly a major issue that had incentivized Xi Jinping to enhance and institutionalize inter-agency policy coordination after he became the top leader in 2012. As noted elsewhere in this study, Xi established the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs in 2018 to replace the old, ad hoc Central Leadership Group for Foreign Affairs. Major responsibilities of the new commission include “overall planning and coordination, and supervision of implementation” (“统筹协调, 督促落实”) of foreign policy.39 Xi also established the Central Commission for State Security in 2014. This commission serves as the “policy making, deliberation and coordination institution” (“决策, 议事协调机构”) of the CCP Central. It is responsible for the “overall planning and coordination” regarding major state security policies, and it reports to the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee.40 At the lower levels, the system where civilian provincial and local party secretaries serve as the first secretaries of the party committees of the provincial and local military authorities is reiterated, as is the system where commanding officers of the provincial and local military authorities serve as members of the civilian provincial and local party committee standing committees. Besides handling issues of military conscription, training the

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reserve and militia units, national defense mobilization, and job placement of demobilized military personnel, these inter-agency coordination mechanisms are particularly tasked to support emergency rescue and disaster relief.41 The Guangxi MD, for instance, deployed its reserve and militia units to rescue and evacuate over 350,000 inhabitants affected by serious flooding in May 2019.42 In the meantime, a  Ministry of Emergency Management dedicated to emergency rescue and disaster relief was established within the State Council in 2018.43 Similarly specialized agencies and capabilities thus are established and developed at the provincial and local levels. When newly established institutions such as the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Central Commission for State Security may improve inter-agency policy coordination to a certain extent, they are also quite limited in playing such a role. These commissions, for instance, are confined to formulating general policy guidelines rather than making specific decisions and managing specific crises. They also cover broad and diverse policy areas, including the non-security aspects of China’s foreign policy for the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, and the domestic dimensions of China’s security policy for the Central Commission for State Security. They thus are not dedicated to China’s external security and do not meet regularly to make specific decisions and handle specific crises regarding China’s external security. As a result, the PLA is left as the primary institution for making such decisions and handling such crises. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, for instance, China established an ADIZ covering most of the East China Sea where new air traffic restrictions are introduced. China also embarked on a massive land reclamation project to fortify the reefs it controls in the South China Sea. It built airfields, deep-water harbors, and surveillance and telecommunications facilities on these reefs. Both decisions reflect the institutional interests and preferences of the PLA. As early as since 2009, for instance, the uniformed PLA leaders had advocated infrastructure development to support air and naval operations in the South China Sea.44 In an article commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PLAN, the commander and political commissar of the PLAN also praised Xi for “pushing forward the construction of the reefs in the South China Sea with firm will, which has improved the strategic posture of the military struggle in the maritime direction and demonstrated the strong determination to fight for every inch of the sea.”45 But these decisions draw strong criticisms from China’s maritime neighbors and pose major challenges to China’s civilian

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diplomats who are tasked to improve China’s relations with its neighbors in East and Southeast Asia. These two decisions, however, had not been placed under the careful and coordinated scrutiny of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Central Commission for State Security before they were made. Instead, these two decisions were made by the CMC.46 It has now become apparent that unless the PLA is fully integrated into an effective civilian oversight structure, it is likely to continue to behave as a highly autonomous and powerful institution in making specific decisions and managing specific crises regarding China’s external security. Such PLA discretion may have major implications for the regional security of East and Southeast Asia in the future.

Notes 1. See Nan Li, “China’s Defense Budget: What Everyone Is Missing,” The National Interest, April 24, 2018. 2. For a detailed discussion of this policy, see Nan Li, Why Does Civil-Military Integration Matter to China’s Overall Development? (Singapore: EAI Background Brief No. 1405, November 2018). 3. See NDU Center for the Study of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, “Original Contributions of Xi Jinping Thought On Strengthening the Military” [­ “习近平强军思想的原 始性贡献”], Liberation Army Daily, May 27, 2019, and “China’s Military Strategy.” 4. See Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities,” Nan Li, Major Security Challenges to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Singapore: EAI Background Brief No. 1440, March 2019), and “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” 5. See Tate Nurkin, et al., China’s Advanced Weapons Systems (London, UK: Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018). 6. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 8, 11–14. 7. Ibid., p. 15. 8. Ibid., p. 14. 9. For some of these differences, see also Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 68–71. 10. Ibid., p. 71. 11. For narrowing down of some of these differences, see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), pp. 8–10, 12, and Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,” in Charles C. Moskos, John

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Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19, 21–22. 12. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11. 13. See Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 1, 27–29, and W.  H. Morris Jones, “Armed Forces and the State,” Public Administration, No. 25 (Winter 1957), pp. 411–416. 14. See Samuel P.  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 193–194. 15. For detailed discussion, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 80–85. 16. The advent of these analyses may have been informed by Khrushchev’s criticism of Marshal Zhukov for Bonapartism and the latter’s subsequent removal from office in late 1957. 17. See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 21 in particular. 18. See William E. Odom, “The Party-Military Connection: A Critique,” in Dale A.  Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978). 19. See Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), Chapters 5, 6, 9, and p. 243, and Colton cited in Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” p. 780. 20. The definition of anarchy and hierarchy is informed by Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), pp. 81–82, 93, 97, 109–116, 196–199. For balancing and bandwagoning as reactions to structural conditions such as anarchy and hierarchy, see ibid., pp. 104–106, 125–126. For balancing and bandwagoning as alliance behavior, see Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 17–21, 27–32. 21. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 104. Interdependence here does not refer to the highly integrated and precise interdependent relationship as one may find among the divisions in an automobile factory. Nor does it mean the so-called allocational interdependence, which refers to a situation where two or more units are not related in functions, but are supported by a single pool of scarce resources, and this is where “an increase in the money allocated to one reduces the funds available to support the other.” It only refers to the general and organic interdependent relationship among specialized and heterogeneous units inside a large system such as a nation-­state. Without a national military to ensure public goods such as external security, for instance, other units in the system such as business firms may have to pay for organizing private armies. This not only increases

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the security cost but may also exacerbate the condition of domestic anarchy. As Waltz observes: “in saying that in such situations interdependence is close, one need not maintain that one part could not learn to live without the other. One need only say that the cost of breaking the interdependent relation would be high.” For the first two types of interdependence, see Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 53. 22. See “U.S.  Plane in China after It Collides with Chinese Jet,” New York Times, April 2, 2001, and “Chinese Poker,” Economist, April 17, 2001. 23. See “Beijing Says Tech Glitch Led to Sub Intrusion,” Japan Times, November 17, 2004, and “Hu Warns Koizumi against Going to Yasukuni,” Asia Times, November 23, 2004. 24. See “Space to Maneuverer: Satellite Attack Upsets U.S. Space Supremacy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 7, 2007. 25. See “China Opens Hong Kong to U.S. Carrier,” Reuters, November 22, 2007, and “Looking beyond the Kitty Hawk Incident,” Honolulu Advertiser, December 10, 2007. 26. See “U.S.  Navy Provoked South China Sea Incident, China Says,” New York Times, March 10, 2009. 27. See “Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China” New York Times, January 11, 2011. 28. For a detailed discussion of these incidents, see Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era, pp. 22–26, and Li, “Top Leaders and the PLA,” p. 128. 29. See Chen Bingde, “Recollecting Decision and Command Processes for Wenchuan Earthquake Relief” [“回忆汶川地震救灾决策指挥过程”], Liberation Army Daily, December 9, 2008, and “Ministry of National Defense: PLA’s Four-Level Command System Ensures Highly Effective Earthquake Relief” [“国防部: 解放军四级指挥体系确保地震高效救援”], China News Net [中国新闻网], June 11, 2008. Chen is a former chief of the PLA General Staff. 30. Chen, “Recollecting Command and Decision Processes for Wenchuan Earthquake Relief.” 31. Conversations with the Chinese officials in Beijing in December 2008 and with the Chinese scholars and officials in Shanghai in August 2009. See also “How Were 137,000 Earthquake Rescue and Relief Troops Deployed?” [“地震救援13.7万军队是如何调配?”], China Newsweek [中 国新闻周刊], June 6, 2008, and Chen, “Recollecting Command and Decision Processes for Wenchuan Earthquake Relief.” 32. Conversations with the Chinese officials in Beijing in December 2008. 33. See Colonel Dai Xu, “China Should Establish Permanent Disaster Relief System of Systems” [“中国应建立常备救难体系”], Global Times, July 2, 2008, and Liu Shiqing and Pan Jiechang, “Enhancing the Ability of the

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Reserve Units in Executing Tasks of Handling Contingencies” [“提高预备 役部队执行处置突发事件任务的能力”], Liberation Army Daily, May 27, 2008. Dai is a professor at NDU in Beijing. 34. For issuing different types of equipment, see Chen, “Recollecting Decision and Command Processes for Wenchuan Earthquake Relief.” For inappropriate equipment and lack of training, see “Li Yunzi: Showing Concern for Equipment Construction for Non-War Military Operations” [“李运之: 关 注非战争军事行动装备建设”], Liberation Army Daily, March 11, 2009, and Dai, “China Should Establish Permanent Disaster Relief System.” Li Yunzi is a former deputy political commissar of the Shenyang MR. 35. For a detailed discussion of the PLA role in the Sichuan earthquake relief, see Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era, pp. 26–32. 36. See Geng Geng, “Two Military Operations that Zhou Enlai Commanded Personally  – A Personal Experience of General Hu Wei in the ‘Cultural Revolution’” [“周恩来亲自指挥的两次军事行动 – ‘文革’中胡炜将军的一 段亲身经历”], Exposition of Party History, No. 1 (2005). Hu was commander of the 21st Corp in the Cultural Revolution. 37. See Li and Li, An Actual Account, pp. 31–35. 38. For the conference where Jiang criticized the PLA in his speech and where Zhu did not mention the PLA in his speech, see “National Counter-­ Smuggling Work Conference Was Held in Beijing” [“全国打击走私工作 会议在北京举行”], People’s Daily, July 14, 1998. 39. See “CCP Central Prints and Distributes ‘Plan to Deepen Reform of Party and Sate Institutions’.” 40. “CCP Central Politburo Studied and Decided the Set-up of Central Commission for State Security” [“中共中央政治局研究决定中央国家安全 委员会设置”], Xinhuanet, January 24, 2014. 41. See “Return of the ‘Uniformed Standing Committee Members’,” and “An Overview of the ‘Uniformed Standing Committee Members’ of 31 Provinces” [“31省份‘戎装常委’一览”], New Beijing News [新京报], June 17, 2014. 42. See “Officers and Men and Militia Emergency Units of Guangxi MD Are Devoted to Emergency Rescue and Relief” [“广西军区官兵和民兵应急分 队投入抢险救援”], Liberation Army Daily, May 29, 2019. 43. See “CCP Central Prints and Distributes ‘Plan to Deepen Reform of Party and Sate Institutions’.” 44. See “Former Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff Proposes to Build Air and Sea Ports in the South China Sea” [“解放军原副总参谋长建议南海建机场 港口”], Global Times, June 21, 2009. Hu Jintao, however, did not endorse the PLA proposal while he served as the CMC chair from 2004 to 2012. Conversations with senior PLA officers in Beijing in August 2016.

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45. See Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong and Vice Admiral Qin Shengxiang, “PLA Navy: Setting Sail and Forging Ahead for 70 Years” [“人民海军扬帆奋进 70年”], Qiushi [求是], No. 8 (2019). Qiushi is a monthly journal published by the Central Party School and the CCP Central Committee. 46. Conversations with senior PLA officers in Beijing in August 2016.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Institutional Changes and Possible Role of the Military in Transition to the Post-Xi Jinping Leadership

A final and critical issue that needs to be carefully examined is how the findings of this study help understand the possible role of the PLA in the transition to the post-Xi Jinping leadership. To address this issue, it is important to understand the evolution and change of the institutional conditions that undergird the involvement of the military in domestic politics in China, which is what this study analyzes. In the post-1949 history of the PRC, there are two critical instances where the PLA became heavily involved in China’s societal and elite politics. The PLA, for instance, was heavily involved in the societal politics of the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Mao Zedong. It also massively intervened to quell the popular rebellion in Tiananmen in 1989 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. In both instances, the PLA was also heavily involved in the elite politics of the top leadership transition. Two major institutional conditions drove the heavy involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in both instances. The first is the symbiotic party-­ army relations as evident in the extensive and entrenched personal networks that top leaders such as Mao and Deng, as founders of the PLA, possessed in the PLA.  These networks enabled these leaders to develop symbiotic political-military factions which they could count on for political support in times of political and social crisis. Both Mao and Deng, for instance, leveraged the pre-1949 field army networks for political support in these crises. As discussed in Chap. 3, Mao © The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0_8

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first relied on the 5th or North China Field Army leaders such as General Yang Chengwu in the struggle against the “Peng Zhen, Luo Reiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun Anti-Party Clique” in 1966. But he quickly became suspicious of General Yang’s political ambitions, and leveraged leaders of the 4th Field Army, including Marshal Lin Biao and Generals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng, against Yang and his followers. The downfall of the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Anti-Party Clique” as a result led to the political persecution of General Yang and his followers in 1967. Mao’s subsequent worry about Lin Biao’s growing power and influence, including his frustration over Lin’s issuance of the “Order Number One” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader like himself, triggered a major political crisis. This crisis cost Lin his life in a plane crash in Outer Mongolia in September 1971. This power struggle also led to the extensive purge of the members of the so-called Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique that had followed. Finally, the PLA became heavily involved in the post-Mao power struggle between Top Leader Hua Guofeng and leading Maoist radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” or the “Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique” in 1976. Similarly in the crisis of 1989, Deng relied on his close allies in the CMC such as Yang Shangkun and those from the pre-1949 2nd Field Army where Deng had served as its political commissar for 13  years, including Yang Baibin, Qin Jiwei, and Liu Huaqing, for political support. Mainly because of these close personal allies associated with the old field army network, Deng was able to leverage the PLA covertly against political opponents from within the party leadership in the late 1980s, such as CCP General-Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and overtly against critical threat from within Chinese society, such as the popular rebellion in Beijing in 1989. Deng, however, became worried about the growing power and influence of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibin, or the “Yang Brothers,” stemming from their conspicuous involvement in the politics of the leadership succession in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Deng was apparently alarmed by Yang Baibing’s call on the PLA to provide “protection and escort for reform and opening up” without the direction and authorization of the top party leader. Deng thus removed the “Yang Brothers” from the CMC in 1992. The second institutional condition that drove the heavy involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in the eras of Mao and Deng is the failure of

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civilian governance. Such failure either stemmed from the severe political division among the civilian ruling elite as on the eve of the Cultural Revolution or caused such division among this elite as in 1989. Chapter 3 shows that the failure of civilian governance escalated to the level of a political and social crisis that incentivized top leaders such as Mao and Deng to mobilize the military to avert. Mao’s premise of the irreconcilable contradiction between a “socialist road” and a “capitalist road” and his attempt to mobilize the masses to remove “those in power who take the capitalist road,” for instance, led to the collapse of the party-state governance bureaucracy by 1967. The ensuing chaos and anarchy motivated Mao to leverage the PLA to restore social order and reconstitute the governance structure. Similarly, the high rate of inflation and rampant official corruption as a result of the governance failure in reforming the urban economy led to massive demonstrations demanding political reform in 1989. The severe political division among the civilian ruling elite on how to handle the demands of the demonstrators contributed to the worsening of the situation. Deng thus was motivated to employ the PLA to restore social order.

Major Changes in the Institutional Conditions in the Post-Deng Era This study, however, shows that the two major institutional conditions that undergirded the heavy involvement of the PLA in domestic politics in the eras of Mao and Deng, including party-army symbiosis and failure of civilian governance, have changed significantly in the post-Deng era. These changes have reduced the probability for the PLA to become heavily involved in domestic politics. From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization This study, for instance, shows that civil-military relations in post-Deng China have evolved away from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. One critical change that contributed to the decline of the partyarmy symbiosis is the retirement of a large number of revolutionary veterans who had served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies, the informal basis for forming symbiotic political-military factions, in the 1980s. Since then, all those who had joined the PLA before 1949 were retired

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over a period of more than two decades. This development has clearly made the pre-1949 field army networks less relevant for China’s elite politics, since the succeeding generations of China’s ruling elites have had no direct personal ties to these field armies. Moreover, Chap. 2 shows that party-army symbiosis was high in the Mao era because the PPWS served as the party’s instrument of “subjective control” of the PLA, particularly in mobilizing the PLA into intra-party leadership politics. This mobilization exacerbated the power struggle among major symbiotic political-military factions, caused massive political purges of military officers, and severely fractured the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA.  The role of the PPWS, however, evolved gradually from “subjective” to “objective” control in the Deng era, with a few exceptions where the PPWS had attempted to remobilize the PLA into intraparty leadership politics. The functions of the PPWS have decidedly shifted from “subjective” to “objective” control of the PLA in the post-­Deng era. The PPWS, for instance, has largely been “internalized” into the PLA and functioned to enhance the organizational cohesiveness of the PLA, promote its institutional interests, and assist it in fulfilling its warfighting missions. This change represents a major shift away of the Chinese civil-military relations from party-army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Similarly, Chap. 3 shows that party-army symbiosis was high in the era of Mao because the PLA involvement in the intra-party leadership power struggle was extensive and substantial. Military force was mobilized into the struggle where a large number of senior military officers were persecuted as members of the “anti-party cliques.” Deng attempted to disengage the PLA from China’s domestic politics after he became the paramount leader in 1978, but a social and political crisis of a massive scale in 1989 motivated Deng to employ the PLA to quell the popular rebellion in Beijing. This intervention led to an expansion of the PLA role in domestic politics, ranging from restoring social order to the politics of the leadership succession. Chapter 4, however, shows that following the 14th Party Congress of 1992, top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi have endorsed a policy of enhancing civilian governance by promoting economic development along with political and social stability, the basis of the CCP legitimacy to rule. Effective civilian governance has prevented major political and social upheavals that may motivate top leaders to employ the PLA for domestic politics. In the meantime, these leaders have adopted a military policy to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and

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fulfilling its external missions. Consequently, power struggle has become relatively rare for lack of severe political division among the senior party leadership. There is no empirical evidence to show that military force is employed in the intra-party leadership politics and senior officers are persecuted for “anti-party” crimes in the post-Deng era. Quasi-­institutionalization of party-army relations based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities thus has developed and solidified in the post-Deng era. Likewise, Chap. 5 shows that party-army symbiosis was high in the Mao era because of the extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. The majority of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Mao era, for instance, are “dual-role elites” who had extensive leadership experiences in both the civilian and military sectors, a reflection of the highly symbiotic nature of the pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. Because these leaders spent most of their careers as leaders in several remote and isolated guerrilla base areas that had evolved into five field armies during China’s Civil War, they are also identified as being affiliated with these field armies, the informal basis for forming symbiotic political-military factions that could be mobilized by leaders in the post-1949 power struggle. The extensive and frequent circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries is also reflected in the massive employment of active-duty military officers to occupy party and government leadership positions at the provincial and local levels during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the proportion of military officers in the composition of the provincial and local leadership in China and military representation in the CCP Central Committees and Politburos elected by the party congresses during this period was abnormally high. It was not until after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 that the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries had declined substantially. This change is reflected in the declining number of senior leaders who had both civilian and military leadership experiences; in a much smaller number of senior leaders who served as leaders in the pre-1949 field armies; and in a substantial decline of military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos, which reflects the declining number of active-duty military officers who held civilian leadership positions at the central and provincial levels. This development helped not only to solidify the institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor between the civilian and military authorities and reduce

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party-army symbiosis but also to establish the new normal for the civil-­ military relations in the post-Deng era. This new normal has been maintained by the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi. The post-Deng era thus has witnessed a further decline in the circulation of elites across the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. This decline is manifested in the continued decrease of the number of senior leaders who had both civilian and military leadership experiences, in the diminishing number of senior leaders who served in the pre-1949 field armies, and in the low level of military representation in the CCP Central Committees and its Politburos. As a result, China’s post-Deng senior leadership has been characterized by the disappearance of the “dual-role elites” and the dominance of specialized technocrats on both sides of the institutional boundaries between the civilian and military authorities. The remarkable decline of elite circulation across the civil-military institutional boundaries and the institutionalization of civil-military boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor as a result have significantly reduced party-army symbiosis. The implications of this change are critical for the role of the military in elite politics in China. As noted in Chap. 1, for symbiotic political-military factions to develop and solidify, top leaders should have spent a substantial proportion of their careers in the PLA. First and second generations of the top leaders spent most of their revolutionary careers in the PLA. As a result, they could count on the political capital, charisma, and extensive and entrenched personal networks that they had accumulated and cultivated in the PLA for political support in times of political and social crisis. In contrast, the post-Deng top leaders have never served or served briefly in the PLA, which makes it difficult to develop close personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. In the early years when they became the top leaders, all tried to consolidate power by currying favor with the PLA. But these efforts may not be sufficient to develop durable personal ties and entrenched personal networks in the PLA. The relationships between the post-Deng civilian leaders and the PLA officers, for instance, have become distant and impersonal. Officials on both sides of the civil-military boundaries are vertically circulated within their own chains of command based on distinctive skill sets and separate incentive structure for upward mobility. As a result, little horizontal or cross-institutional boundaries circulation of elites occurs. Few military

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officers have had experience working in civilian institutions, and few civilian officials have had service experience in the PLA.  Such a bifurcated structure has clearly disincentivized the formation of symbiotic political-­ military factions. Informal networks that post-Deng top leaders have assembled to support themselves thus are primarily made up of civilian officials and not military officers. Another critical institutional change in the post-Deng era that works against the formation of symbiotic political-military factions, as discussed in Chap. 4, is in the composition of the PBSC membership. Unlike in Mao’s time when senior military officers served as members of this most powerful decision council in China, after the retirement of Admiral Liu Huiqing in 1997, military officers have been excluded from the PBSC. This institutional change has major implications for party-army relations in China. For instance, this exclusion has prevented senior military officers from intervening in PBSC deliberation on civilian governance issues that are unrelated to the PLA. Issues of concern to the PLA, such as defense policies and military budget, would be vetted by the top leader before they are forwarded to the PBSC for deliberation. More important, while the top leader, in his role as the CMC chair, controls the institutional interactions with senior military officers in the CMC, the exclusion of these officers from the PBSC denies other PBSC members a critical institutional arena for their interactions with senior military officers. This change thus reduces the likelihood for other PBSC members to develop close allies among senior military officers, whose support could be mobilized in the event of a power struggle arising from political divisions among the PBSC members. This change also helps to confine senior military officers to tackling the functional, technological, and operational issues of military modernization. In summary, this study demonstrates that Chinese civil-military relations have evolved away from the party-army symbiosis of the Mao and Deng eras to quasi-institutionalization in the post-Deng era. This change is specifically manifested in (1) the complete retirement of the revolutionary veterans and the diminishing relevance of the pre-1949 field army networks in elite politics, (2) the shifting of the functions of the PPWS from “subjective” to “objective” control, (3) the declining role of the PLA in intra-party leadership power struggle, (4) the remarkable decline in the circulation of elites across the civil-military institutional boundaries, and (5) the exclusion of the senior military officers from the PBSC.

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Elite Consensus on Enhancing Civilian Governance Another major change in the institutional conditions regarding the PLA role in domestic politics is the general consensus of the post-Deng top leaders on enhancing civilian governance, which centers on promoting economic development along with political and social stability. This consensus is particularly reflected in these leaders’ endorsement of Deng Xiaoping’s “basic line” of “one center and two basic points,” which was adopted by the 14th Party Congress of 1992. This line requires the top leaders to (1) uphold economic construction as the central task of the party, (2) adhere to party leadership, and (3) adhere to the policy of reform and opening up. This basic line thus sets the overall tone for the future development of China and helps to mitigate and prevent severe political division among the civilian ruling elite on the critical issue of civilian governance. Post-Deng leaders’ endorsement of this line has two important implications for party-army relations in China. First, as discussed in Chap. 4, even though the post-Deng top leaders such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi have developed their own concepts about the future development of China, these concepts serve to adapt changing conditions of their times to Deng’s “basic line” rather than fundamentally challenge this line. Therefore, the “struggle between antagonistic classes and opposing lines” that had severely divided the party leadership in the era of Mao, such as whether the central task of the party should be “class struggle” or “promoting productive forces,” was absent in the post-Deng era. The lack of severe intra-leadership division along “opposing lines” and the absence of the associated “anti-party cliques” have denied a major rationale for top leaders to leverage the military for leadership politics and power struggle. Moreover, the requirement of the “basic line” for top leaders to “uphold economic construction as the central task of the party” means that successful economic development is perceived to be central and critical to the survival and legitimacy of the party to rule. As a result, civilian governance that promotes economic development along with political and social stability has become the top policy priority of the post-Deng top leaders. Effective civilian governance as a result helps to prevent major political and  social upheavals that may require the intervention of “the barrel of a gun,” or massive use of the PLA in domestic politics. In the meantime, all the top leaders have pursued a military policy that confines the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Military professionalization or what Samuel

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Huntington calls “objective control” as a result helps to dampen and constrain further the political aspirations of the military. The critical driver for the post-Deng top leaders to follow Deng’s “basic line,” as discussed in Chap. 6, is their heightened sense of insecurity stemming from their lack of revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA. This heightened sense of insecurity implies that they are highly unsure that the PLA would follow their orders if it is asked to handle a domestic political and social crisis of a massive scale. These leaders thus are motivated by this heightened sense of insecurity to concentrate on enhancing civilian governance to prevent major political and social upheavals that may require the significant use of the PLA in domestic politics. This heightened sense of insecurity has also driven them to confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions.

Debunking the Allegations of PLA Involvement in Elite Politics in the Post-Deng Era Even though the lack of severe political division among the civilian ruling elite and an emphasis on effective civilian governance have reduced the likelihood for the PLA to get involved in elite politics in terms of “anti-­party cliques,” there are two other types of critical situations that may involve the PLA in elite politics in the post-Deng era. As discussed in Chap. 4, the uncertainty associated with the succession of the top leaders may motivate them to mobilize support from the PLA.  Moreover, because economic development has become the central task of the party, economic corruption has become a major concern of the top party leaders. Leadership uncertainty stemming from the party’s anti-corruption drive thus may become a major reason for the PLA to get involved in elite politics. In a careful analysis of the major allegations about the PLA involvement in elite politics in the post-Deng era, however, Chap. 4 shows that these allegations are founded on shaky ground in terms of both analytical logic and empirical evidence. The First Allegation The first allegation is that when Jiang Zemin handed over the top leadership position to Hu Jintao at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, a group of senior military officers offered their collective support for Jiang

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to retain his CMC chair position. In this instance, Hu, who succeeded Jiang as the CCP general-secretary, was presumably seen as a potential political threat and opponent to Jiang. However, Chap. 4 explains why it is not possible that a collective petition by senior military officers had resulted in Jiang’s extended tenure as the CMC chair. First, most of the senior CMC members, including the two uniformed CMC vice-chairs, were to retire at the 16th Party Congress. They thus had no incentive to sponsor a petition to keep Jiang as the CMC chair or to encourage other senior officers to do so. Moreover, newly promoted uniformed CMC members were too new and junior to sponsor such a petition. Also, both military and party disciplines forbid senior military officers, who are also party members, from organizing such an unauthorized “collective action” that may “split” the top party  leadership. It is doubtful that any senior military officer would risk his career by engaging in such politically prohibitive behavior. Finally, like most of the militaries, the uniformed PLA leadership follows the principle of civilian supremacy and is unlikely to initiate such a petition without the direction and authorization of the top civilian leader. What actually transpired is that Hu Jintao, who had served as the first CMC vice-chair since 1999, consulted the remaining uniformed CMC members and gained their support before he submitted the proposal to extend Jiang’s CMC chair position to the PBSC. Jiang remained as the CMC chair for two more years not to compete for power against Hu but to push for transformation of the PLA based on the notion of RMA, including the 2002 CMC decision to downsize the PLA by 200,000 billets. Not yet equipped with the political capital that Jiang had accumulated with the PLA by serving as the CMC chair for 13 years, Hu would have found the task of downsizing the PLA more difficult to accomplish. Such a policy may encounter strong resistance from the vested interests from within the PLA. This suggests that Jiang stayed on to help Hu, and not compete against him. In September 2004, “after fixing some major issues in army construction,” Jiang resigned from the CMC chair position at a CCP plenum, and Hu became the new CMC chair. During the two years while Jiang remained as the CMC chair, no major instances of factional rivalry and purge involving the PLA had occurred between Jiang and Hu. This case has clearly invalidated the “power struggle” explanation of elite politics based on symbiotic political-military factions in the Jiang era.

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The Second Allegation The second allegation concerns the downfall of Bo Xilai, party secretary of Chongqing and a member of the Politburo, in 2012. There are three specific claims about the involvement of senior military officers in the downfall of Bo. The first is that Hu Jintao decided to investigate Bo only after he had received pledged support from Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, the two uniformed CMC vice-chairs. Second, in early February 2012, Bo paid a visit to the museum of the 14th Group Army of the PLA headquartered in Kunming, a unit once commanded by his father Bo Yibo during the Anti-Japanese War. Bo Yibo was a vice premier of the State Council in the 1980s. This visit was interpreted as Bo Xilai’s attempt to mobilize military support in a coup against Hu. Third, following the downfall of Bo Xilai, Liu Yuan, political commissar of the GLD, and Zhang Haiyang, political commissar of the Second Artillery, were reportedly under investigation and put under house arrest for colluding with Bo in a coup attempt against Hu. Liu is the son of former Chinese President Liu Shaoqi and Zhang is the son of Zhang Zhen, a former CMC vice-chair, and both allegedly had known Bo since childhood. As Chap. 4 shows, a more careful scrutiny reveals that these three claims rest on shaky ground in terms of both analytical logic and empirical evidence. On the first claim, the decision to investigate Bo was made by the PBSC, which has not had a representative from the PLA since 1997. Both Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were members of the Politburo, which is lower than the PBSC in bureaucratic rank and grade. Both Guo and Xu thus were excluded from deliberation on the decision to investigate Bo. What transpired is that after the decision to investigate Bo was made by the PBSC, it was transmitted to the lower-echelon Politburo where all its members, including Guo and Xu, pledged support for the decision. But this is very different from the claim that military support is a precondition that Hu was required to meet in order to make the decision to investigate Bo. On the second claim, it is a gross exaggeration to interpret Bo’s visit to the museum of a military unit that his father once commanded as a conspiracy to organize a coup against Beijing. As noted in Chap. 5, interactions between civilian officials and military officers at the provincial level are limited and nominal, since they are confined to inter-agency policy coordination but do not involve the vertical authority relationship between superiors and subordinates. These interactions thus do not translate into

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close personal ties and entrenched personal networks for civilian officials in the PLA. It would be quite normal for commanding officers of the 14th Group Army to extend a welcome to Bo’s visit out of respect for the historical legacy of their unit related to his father, a major CCP leader. But it is highly unlikely for these officers to assist Bo in a coup plot against Beijing, since Bo belonged to the civilian chain of command which they do not report to, and which has no control or impact on their career advancement in the PLA. On the third claim, there may be some truth that Bo had developed close personal relationships with Liu Yuan and Zhang Haiyang that dated back to childhood years. For Liu and Zhang, however, such personal relationships are not likely to override the organizational or party and military disciplines that forbid “splitist” behavior such as participating in a coup plot. Furthermore, given that Bo’s chances of winning against Hu in a coup were almost nil, the political cost of such a behavior was prohibitively high. Liu and Zhang thus had no incentive to commit political suicide by helping Bo in a coup that was bound to fail. Instead of remaining under house arrest following Bo’s dismissal, according to one analysis, both Liu and Zhang had been “maintaining the predictably hectic public schedule of a senior military leader,” including visits to foreign countries. As evidence has demonstrated that both Liu and Zhang were not implicated in Bo’s dismissal, the same analysis concludes that “the breathless reporting of military purges and coups following Bo’s dismissal appears to be the product of the feverish imaginations of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong journalists.” The Third Allegation The final allegation concerns the so-called political power and influence of Jiang Zemin after his retirement in 2004. A prominent claim is that serving as the CMC chair from 2004 to 2012, Hu Jintao did not dare to investigate CMC Vice-Chairs Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong for corruption because both were protégés of the powerful and influential Jiang. As discussed in Chap. 4, however, there are critical flaws in this claim. For instance, Xi Jinping was said to be a protégé of Jiang as well, owing his promotion to Jiang. But if the informal power and influence of the retired Jiang had been so overwhelming, Xi should have feared to investigate Xu and Guo much more than Hu Jintao, who is not known as a protégé of Jiang.

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But because Xi Jinping dared to investigate Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong for corruption, Jiang’s political power and influence over Xi, Xu, and Guo proved to be nonexistent. Furthermore, major members of Jiang’s personal network such as Chen Liangyu, Bo Xilai, and Zhou Yongkang were investigated and prosecuted for corruption by both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Since Jiang failed to rescue them from investigation and prosecution, the credibility of his political power and influence as the leader of his personal network was seriously undermined. Both instances demonstrate that the informal power and influence of the retired Jiang is grossly exaggerated. It is also not true that Hu Jintao had not tackled military corruption. Hu, for instance, dismissed Wang Shouye, a deputy commander of the PLAN, from office in 2006, who was later prosecuted for taking millions of dollars of bribes and committing adultery. Hu also dismissed Gu Junshan, a deputy GLD director, from office in May 2012, whose scandal led to the eventual downfall of Xu Caihou. A major reason for conducting an investigation of Xu, for instance, is that Gu had earlier bribed Xu for promotion, which Xu had attempted to cover up. Gu got a suspended death sentence for “graft, bribe-taking, embezzling official funds, committing bribery and abusing power.” To sum up the analysis, rather than Jiang’s patronage of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, Hu Jintao’s risk-averse, conflict-avoidance, and hands-off personality style, together with a lack of more independent and authoritative agencies to supervise the PLA against corruption, offer better explanations of the rampant military corruption in the Hu era. Major Differences between Corruption Networks and “Anti-Party Cliques” A substantial number of senior party and government officials and senior military officers were convicted of economic crimes such as “taking bribes and abusing power” in Xi’s counter-corruption drive. As noted in Chap. 4, however, unlike political crimes such as organizing “anti-party cliques” that aim to “seize political power,” bureaucratic corruption involves economic crimes whereby corrupt officials and officers enrich themselves, their families, and their cronies. Corruption networks thus are founded on monetary transactions but not on battle-tested historical ties like the field army networks or a common ideology that bound the “Gang of Four.” Therefore, rather than being based on symbiotic political-military

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factions, corruption networks are largely confined within a single functional system such as the PLA or the political and legal affairs system, with minimal cross-institutional boundaries mobilization. This shows that corruption networks are largely disorganized and fragile. Major cases of corruption are also defined as disciplinary issues, which do not constitute critical political threats to top leaders of the post-Deng era that warrant the mobilization of the military to handle them. Instead, the major institutions to handle these issues are the discipline inspection commissions, the procuratorates, and the courts. The political significance of the anti-­ corruption drive thus should not be exaggerated.

Possible Role of the PLA in Transition to Post-Xi Jinping Leadership The preceding section shows that the two major institutional conditions that drove the heavy involvement of the PLA into domestic politics in the eras of Mao and Deng, including party-army symbiosis and failure of civilian governance, have changed significantly in the post-Deng era. First, civil-military relations in post-Deng China have evolved away from party-­ army symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. Second, post-Deng top leaders have been committed to enhancing civilian governance that promotes economic development along with political and social stability. Effective civilian governance as a result has prevented major political and social divisions and upheavals that may incentivize the top leaders to leverage the PLA for domestic politics. These two critical changes have reduced the probability for the PLA to become heavily involved in domestic politics. The preceding section also debunks the major allegations about the involvement of the PLA in elite politics in the post-Deng era, showing their lack of analytical logic and empirical evidence. Finally, by explaining the major differences between economic crimes such as corruption and political crimes such as organizing “anti-party cliques,” the preceding section cautions against overstating the political significance of the anti-­ corruption drive in the post-Deng era. How then may the findings of this study help understand the possible role of the PLA in the transition to the post-Xi Jinping leadership? Like his post-Deng predecessors, Xi regards successful civilian governance, including sustainable economic development along with political and social stability, as the central task of the party, which is consistent with

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Deng Xiaoping’s “basic line.” Besides fighting corruption, for instance, Xi has attempted to restructure the economy for high-quality growth, promote poverty reduction to narrow the wealth gap, and endorse major measures to reduce environmental pollution. He also has tightened political and social control to achieve political and social stability, including promoting political and ideological education, strengthening media and internet control and censorship, and intensifying social surveillance that leverages new technologies. In the meantime, Xi has limited the role of PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. Like his post-Deng predecessors, the heightened sense of insecurity stemming from a lack of revolutionary and military credentials and the associated political capital and personal networks in the PLA has driven Xi to concentrate on enhancing civilian governance. Effective civilian governance helps to prevent major political and social upheavals that may require the massive intervention of the PLA in domestic politics, which Xi may find difficult to control and manage. Xi stands out from his post-Deng predecessors, however, in that he has also centralized power. He abolished the two-term limit for the top leadership tenure that was codified in the 1981 State Constitution. He also strengthened the authority of the CCP general-secretary at the expense of collective leadership and intra-party democracy. These changes may have important implications for civilian governance. Whether the PLA may get involved in the transition to the post-Xi leadership is likely to depend on the success or failure of civilian governance, or whether this governance delivers decent economic growth along with political and social stability and leadership unity, or economic failure and the associated political and social upheavals and severe leadership division. It may also depend on the degree of influence of the aforementioned changes in the institutional conditions of civil-military relations. Specifically, the possible role of the PLA in the transition to the post-Xi leadership may be manifested in scenarios ranging from “good,” “not-too-bad,” to “bad.” The “Good” Scenario It is generally believed that Xi’s elimination of the term limit for the top leadership tenure may increase the probability of failed civilian governance. Unlimited tenure may incentivize the emergence of an unaccountable and arbitrary dictator who will not tolerate any “checks and balances,”

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even in the minimal terms of intra-leadership debates and criticisms. Such debates and criticisms are intended to correct policy mistakes and avert policy failures. A case in point is Mao Zedong, who had ruled China from 1949 to 1976 and was generally regarded as such a dictator. His disastrous policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, for instance, led to an abject failure of civilian governance. There are, however, other examples where top leaders served for unlimited tenure but delivered impressive success of civilian governance. For instance, Lee Kuan Yew, serving as the prime minister of Singapore from 1965 to 1990, transformed Singapore from a colonial backwater trading post to an economic powerhouse. In this case, unlimited tenure becomes an asset because it extends the office of a competent top leader and ensures the continuity of sound policies. Leonid Brezhnev, being seen not as competent as Lee but not as incompetent as Mao, served as the top leader of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982. With a mediocre governance record, Brezhnev was largely responsible for presiding over a country and an economy that had remained stagnant. The three examples suggest that term limit alone could not account for the bad or good outcome of civilian governance. So far Xi has not behaved like an impulsive and irrational leader like Mao, and his policies are generally consistent with Deng’s “basic line” of treating economic development along with political and social stability as the central task of the party. Moreover, more than half of the seven-­ member PBSC elected at the 19th Party Congress of 2017 cannot be counted as Xi’s protégés. Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, for instance, are identity with Hu Jintao’s “Communist Youth League” network, and Han Zheng and Wang Huning are associated with Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai” network. Age and term limits have also been enforced in appointing senior civilian officials and military officers to critically important positions.1 It thus is possible for Xi to deliver a good outcome of civilian governance. In this scenario, Xi may probably extend his tenure for a third term and remain as the top leader until the 21st Party Congress in 2027. By then, Xi would have completed the complex processes of the party, government, military, economic, and social reforms that he had initiated. Moreover, Xi’s governance would have presumably achieved moderate albeit better-­ quality economic growth, a low level of official corruption, successful poverty reduction, a better environment, and overall political and social stability. Also, Xi would have effectively managed the Sino-U.S. relations by deescalating the trade dispute and preventing bilateral security

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competition over Taiwan and the South China Sea from spiraling into a military conflict. In such a scenario, civilian governance success would lower the probability of the PLA involvement in elite politics. By the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi would have designated a successor-in-waiting, who may become a CMC vice-chair in 2024 to gain experience in managing military affairs, and then succeed Xi as the top leader at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. As the heir apparent may lack military credential and personal networks in the PLA, he may defer succession regarding the position of the CMC chair in 2027. Xi’s extended tenure as the CMC chair as a result would allow some extra time for the successor to gain leadership experience. As evident in both instances, the PLA would be seen to play a minimal role in the leadership succession. The “Not-Too-Bad” Scenario This scenario sets the context in which a limited policy failure such as an economic recession caused by a persisting Sino-U.S. trade dispute and a high level of domestic debt may trigger an intra-leadership debate. For instance, the dissenting voices and criticisms within the ruling civilian elite may attribute the policy failure to Xi’s centralization of authority. Xi’s alleged mistakes may include the elimination of the term limit, abandoning the principles of collective leadership and intra-party democracy, and creating a personality cult around himself, all of which could have discouraged and prevented debates and criticisms intended to correct policy mistakes. Xi’s behavior, according to these voices, would have constituted a serious violation of the norms established by Deng Xiaoping in order to avoid another governance failure like the Cultural Revolution. Unlike the ambivalent nature of political crimes such as organizing “anti-party cliques,” verdicts meted out for major official corruption cases are more irreversible as they are based on concrete evidence. However, Xi’s anti-corruption drive may also face severe criticisms for its worst excesses, including the lack of due process, unchecked power of the supervision agencies, and dereliction of duty (不作为) of officials for fear of making mistakes. In this scenario, the possible outcome of the power struggle may be similar to what had happened to Hua Guofeng from 1978 to 1980. Hua was criticized for making “serious mistakes” but the PLA played a minimal role in the struggle. As Hua’s mistakes were regarded as the

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“contradictions among the people,” the issue was resolved through an intra-­leadership debate rather than via the barrel of a gun. The fact that Hua served as the CMC chair and Wang Dongxing, a close ally of Hua, served as the director of the Central Guard Bureau, for instance, did not gain any initiative for Hua against his opponents. Finally, instead of a zero-sum game where “winner takes all,” the outcome of this power struggle resembles a variable-sum game where “there are gains for losers.” Although Hua lost the top leader position, he continued his leadership role as a party vice-chair and a member of the PBSC for more than another year, and as a CCP Central Committee member until 2002. This scenario would probably play out if an opposing coalition consisting of powerful personalities like Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Chen Yun existed among the ruling civilian elite in today’s China, which however does not seem to be in existence. The “Bad” Scenario The third scenario depicts the incidence of a major failure of civilian governance. In this scenario, massive demonstrations occur in major Chinese cities as a result of massive unemployment and skyrocketing inflation caused by economic mismanagement, a high rate of debt, and an economic decoupling of China and the West. The demonstrators are subsequently joined by the urban middle class who are angered by the intensified control on social media and suppression of other channels of freer expression, by college students who are disgruntled with the hollow political and ideological education and the grim job prospects after graduation, and by rural residents who are frustrated by the widening wealth gap due to the worsening urban-rural divide. The demonstrations cause a severe political division among the ruling civilian elite on how to handle the demands of the demonstrators. Setting up dialogues between the party leaders and the protesters is attempted but futile. The lack of political capital and personal networks in the PLA contributes to the hesitation of the top leader to deploy military force for fear of losing control of the PLA. The delay as a result worsens the situation. The top leader eventually issues the order for the PLA to intervene to restore order. But because some military units insist on staying out of the dispute between the party leadership and the demonstrators when some others join the demonstrators, the PLA becomes highly divided and the order cannot be fully implemented.

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How such a crisis may evolve is uncertain. Ideally China may evolve out of such of a crisis to become a more open and freer society. But the crisis may also cause the disintegration of the regime accompanied by militarized civil strife. This scenario, however, is unlikely to take place since the premise of the scenario has grossly underestimated the capacity of the CCP regime to “muddle through” by preventing and preempting a major political and social crisis. Myth of the “Last Resort” As the PLA is a Leninist party-army, party propaganda stresses the “absolute leadership” of the PLA by the party, and military propaganda calls on the PLA to be “absolutely loyal” to the party leadership. As a result, it is commonly believed that the party leadership can count on the PLA for protection as the “last resort,” particularly in times of political and social crisis. But this belief may turn out to be a myth. In normal times, the PLA has the incentive to pledge “absolute loyalty” to the top party leader because he has the unchallenged power and authority. He is also the commander-­in-chief who has the decisive influence over decisions regarding the budget of the military and the career advancement of senior military officers. But in a political crisis when the power and authority of the top party leader are seriously challenged by major political opponents, rather than taking sides, the military is more likely to stay out of the power struggle among the civilian ruling elite. However, it would pledge loyalty and allegiance to the winner of the power struggle when the dust of the struggle settles. The military may do so particularly when the relationship between the party and the PLA has evolved away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization. From the perspective of the PLA, the party’s “absolute leadership” of the PLA means that the PLA would follow the orders of the top party leaders regarding the narrow institutional, operational, and technological issues of the PLA. But the PLA may hesitate to follow the orders to handle the broad and complex issues associated with a major political and social crisis, partly because its skill sets, technology, and training are no longer appropriate for dealing with such a crisis, and partly because the institutional interests and reputation of the PLA may be seriously damaged by such an intervention. From the perspective of the top leaders in the post-Deng era, the lack of political capital and extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA may compound their sense of insecurity in dealing with the PLA. This

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sense of insecurity may be aggravated by the observations that even Mao and Deng, who had developed extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA, were worried about the PLA leaders’ exploitation of their dependence on the PLA for political survival and policy initiative, as reflected in the downfall of Lin Biao and the dismissal of the “Yang Brothers.” As a result, they have adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they attempt to enhance civilian governance to prevent a major political and social crisis that may require military intervention to avert. On the other hand, they confine the PLA to perfecting its functional and technical expertise and fulfilling its external missions. In this way, the chances of undesirable military intervention in domestic politics may decline and the top leaders may have a greater sense of security.

Note 1. For enforcing these limits in appointing senior military officers to critically important positions, see Li, “19th Party Congress and PLA’s Leadership Reshuffle.”

Index1

A Academy of Military Science (AMS), 26 Active defense, 242 Air defense identification zone (ADIZ), 115, 263 Anarchy, 4, 35, 156, 244, 251–255, 265n20, 266n21, 271 Anti-corruption drive, 100, 277, 282, 285 Anti-Dogmatism Campaign of 1958, 32–33, 64, 65 Anti-Japanese War, 111, 134n75, 138, 162, 171, 279 “Anti-party cliques,” 14, 18, 19, 33, 63, 65, 66, 69, 75, 91, 100, 118, 122, 126, 127, 218, 221, 272, 276, 277, 281–282, 285 Anti-Right Opportunism Campaign of 1959, 33–34, 39, 64, 65 Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, 31, 32, 39, 64

Anti-satellite test, 257 “Authority to command according to circumstances,” 27 B Bo Gu, 28 Bo Xilai, 111, 129, 279, 281 allegation of coup against Hu Jintao, 111–113 Bo Yibo, 111, 279 Bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, 107, 226 “Bourgeois military line,” 32–34, 36, 37 Braun, Otto, 28 Brezhnev, Leonid, 250, 251, 284 C “Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization,” 85

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2021 N. Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6442-0

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290 

INDEX

Cao Gangchuan, 102 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 236 Central Broadcast Administration (CBA), 67, 74, 81 Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs, 212 Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, 211, 262–264 Central Commission for State Security, 211, 262–264 Central Cultural Revolution Leadership Group (CCRLG), 68–70 Central Guard Bureau, 67, 80, 84, 286 Central Military Commission (CMC) Administrative Group (CMCAG), 69, 71, 72 Armament Development Department (CMCADD), 211 Audit Office (CMCAO), 50 Chair, 6, 10, 71, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 101–103, 106–109, 115, 117, 122, 123, 128, 129, 130n3, 256, 257, 259, 262, 267n44, 275, 278, 280, 285, 286 Discipline Inspection Commission (CMCDIC), 50 General Office, 67 Joint Staff Department (CMCJSD), 211 Logistics Support Department (CMCLSD), 211 members, 6, 69, 72, 102, 113, 123, 129, 211, 212, 255, 278 National Defense Mobilization Department (CMCNDMD), 47 Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CMCPLAC), 50 Political Work Department (CMCPWD), 50

Science and Technology Commission (CMCSTC), 200 Training and Management Department (CMCTMD), 202 Uniformed vice-chairs, 255 Central Party School, 89, 110 Changing defense budget as an explanation of change in Chinese civil-military relations, 228–230, 241 Changing external security environment as an explanation of change in Chinese civil-military relations, 224–228, 241 Changing military technology as explanation of change in Chinese civil-military relations, 230–232, 241 Chen Bingde, 259 Chen Boda, 69, 70, 72 Chen Liangyu, 111, 129, 281 Chen Liyun, 73 Chen Xilian, 80, 84 Chen Xitong, 103 Chen Yun, 83, 86, 286 Chi Haotian, 102, 128, 130n3, 173 Chiang Kai-shek, 11, 27, 28 China relations with Russia, 226 relations with Soviet Union, 71, 225 relations with the U.S., 225, 226, 257, 258 China Science and Technology University, 85 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “absolute leadership of the PLA,” 42 Central Advisory Committee, 84, 161 Central Committees; 1st Plenum of the 19th, 129; 2nd Plenum of the 9th, 70; 3rd Plenum of the

 INDEX 

18th, 211; 4th Plenum of the 7th, 64; 4th Plenum of the 13th, 86; 5th Plenum of the 13th, 86; 6th Plenum of the 11th, 83; 7th, 64; 8th, 136–156, 158, 162, 169, 170, 206; 8th Plenum of the 8th, 33; 9th, 70, 136, 137, 158, 160, 170; 10th, 136, 137, 160, 170; 11th, 83; 12th, 161; 13th, 86, 161, 162–170; 15th, 171; 17th, 175–178; 18th, 211; 19th, 129, 178–205 Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), 50, 103 Central General Office, 10, 23n27, 34, 67, 90, 92n1, 116 Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, 116 Congresses; 8th, 32, 137, 158; 9th, 70, 158; 10th, 160; 12th, 161, 235, 236; 13th, 161, 170; 14th, 9, 41, 89, 99, 104, 127, 171, 218, 272, 276; 15th, 171; 16th, 102, 174, 277, 278; 17th, 174; 19th, 119, 178; 20th, 285; 21st, 284, 285; reshuffle of PLA leadership at 14th, 89–90 Politburos; 8th, 146, 158, 170; 9th, 71, 170; 10th, 160, 170; 13th, 170, 173; 15th, 173, 175; 17th, 175, 178; 19th, 178 Politburo Standing Committees (PBSC); 10th, 160; 13th, 170; 15th, 174; 17th, 175; 19th, 178, 284 Chinese culture as an explanation of change in Chinese civil-military relations, 223–224 Chinese nuclear submarine intrusion in Japanese waters in 2004, 257 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 116

291

Civilian governance, 11, 13, 15, 29, 99–101, 103–106, 109, 110, 113, 115–117, 122, 127, 157, 206, 211, 218, 219, 226, 227, 229, 233, 234, 236, 237, 241, 248, 254, 256, 271, 272, 275–277, 282–286, 288 Civil-military bifurcation, 207, 255 Civil-military inter-agency policy coordination, 207–212, 254–264 Civil War, 4, 5, 126, 134n75, 138, 160, 162, 171, 235, 244, 249, 253, 273 Colton, Timothy, 250, 251 Combat effectiveness as the only criterion to measure military party construction, 51–54 “Command of operations,” 51–52 Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), 166 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 2, 11, 87, 249 Comparative method, 15, 16, 220 “Concept of overall security,” 212 Cultural Revolution Campaign of Criticizing Deng and Repelling the Rightist Wind of Reversing the Verdict, 79 Campaign of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, 81 Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Chen Boda, 70 Campaign of Rectification by Criticizing Lin Biao, 78 Campaign to “Cleanse Class Ranks,” 37 Campaign to “Uncover the ‘May 16th’ CounterRevolutionary Conspiratorial Group,” 37 grand alliance, 157

292 

INDEX

Cultural Revolution (cont.) Party Rectification and Reconstruction Campaign, 37, 158, 159 “rebel factions” or mass organizations, 137, 261 red guards, 35 rehabilitation of cadres, 75, 78, 83 revolutionary committee, 157; party core group, 158, 159 Shanghai January Storm, 82 D Defense budget, 2, 12, 17, 50, 101, 106–109, 115, 212, 224, 228–231, 233, 241, 242, 247 Defense white papers, 125 Delegating to commander authority to command operations, 52 Deng Xiaoping, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 35, 38–41, 54, 63, 64, 69, 78–79, 82–91, 99, 100, 104, 105, 109, 115–117, 126–128, 134n75, 160–171, 206, 217–220, 223, 225–227, 229–231, 233–236, 238n11, 269–273, 275–277, 282–286, 288 “basic line,” 89, 99, 100, 104, 116, 236, 276, 277, 283, 284 informal power and influence, 127, 128 southern tour, 41, 87–88 Differences between corruption networks and “anti-party cliques,” 281–282 Ding Laifu, 67, 68 “Dual-role elites,” 14, 135, 138, 206, 218, 219, 273, 274 E “Early, total, nuclear war,” 84, 225, 238n8 East China Sea, 115, 231, 242, 263

EP-3 Incident, 227, 257 Exchanging positions among military and political commanding officers, 53–54 Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 257 F Factionalism, 3–7, 37, 54, 223 Fang Fenghui, 122 “February Adverse Current” of 1967, 68–69 “February Coup” of 1966, 66 “Field army” thesis, 5 Fifth or North China Field Army, 270 First Field Army, 33, 66, 82, 156 First Front Red Army, 28, 234, 238n20 Fortification of reefs in South China Sea, 227 Fourth Field Army, 7, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 81, 146, 153, 234, 270 Fourth Front Red Army, 28, 238n20 Fu Chongbi, 67–70 Fu Quanyou, 102 G “Gang of Four,” 75, 78–83, 118, 270, 281 Gao Gang, 64 Great Hall of the People, 74 Great Leap Forward, 33, 34, 83, 284 Gross domestic product (GDP), 110, 228–230, 241, 242 Gu Junshan, 129, 281 Guan Guanglie, 73 Gulf War of 1991, 107 Guo Boxiong, 102, 111, 112, 118, 128, 129, 279–281

 INDEX 

H He Long, 66, 67, 71, 79, 80, 82, 84 Hierarchy, 47, 252–254, 265n20 Hu Jintao, 1, 6, 8, 10, 42, 45–46, 55, 99, 102, 103, 109–114, 117, 122, 123, 127–129, 174–175, 178, 207, 219, 233, 257–260, 262, 267n44, 277–281, 284 “Communist Youth League” network, 9, 284 relations with the PLA, 109–110 “scientific development” theory, 110 Hu Qili, 86 Hu Yaobang, 6, 83–87, 96n62, 162, 270, 286 Hua Guofeng, 79–81, 83, 84, 156, 159, 270, 285, 286 “two whatevers” policy, 83 Huang Kecheng, 33, 65 Huang Yongsheng, 69–71, 74, 270 Huang Zuozhen, 67, 68 Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), 18, 114, 126 Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 158, 213n9 Huntington, Samuel, 13, 14, 100, 245, 248, 276–277 I Impeccable Incident, 258 “Information system-based system of systems operations,” 113 Information technology (IT), 46, 105, 124 J Ji Dengkui, 72, 84 Jiang Qing, 35, 66, 68, 69, 78, 80, 81

293

Jiang Zemin, 1, 6, 8, 10, 41–46, 55, 86–91, 99, 101–110, 117, 127–129, 170–174, 207, 219, 226, 233, 235, 257, 262, 267n38, 277, 278, 280, 281, 284 informal power and influence after retirement, 127–129, 280, 281 relations with the PLA, 101 “Shanghai” network, 9, 284 “three represents,” 104 Jiangxi Red Army Base, 27, 28, 134n75 “Joint military-civilian construction of spiritual civilization,” 40 J-20 Test-Flight Incident, 258 K Kitty Hawk Incident, 257–258 Korean War, 4, 29, 137, 224, 228, 230, 249 Kuomintang (KMT), 11, 28, 146, 253 L Leadership succession, 102–103, 218, 270, 272, 285 Lee Kuan Yew, 284 Leninist party-army, 10, 13, 222, 235, 255 Leninist party-state as an explanation of change in Chinese civil-military relations, 220–223 Li Desheng, 72, 160 Li Jinai, 59n51 Li Peng, 85, 108 Li Xiannian, 80, 86 Li Yuan, 158, 159, 213n9 Li Zuopeng, 70, 71, 74, 270 Liang Guanglie, 102 Liao Hui, 162, 175 Liao Xilong, 102

294 

INDEX

Liberation Army Daily, 7, 10, 35, 36, 71, 88, 121 Liberation Daily, 87 Lijphart, Arendt, 15, 16 Lin Biao, 33–36, 66, 68–78, 81, 82, 90, 160, 234, 261, 270, 288 disagreements with Mao, 70–71 Incident and its aftermath, 261 “Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique,” 270 Lin Liguo, 73, 74 coup plot, 73–74 Ling Jihua, 116 Liu Huaqing, 6, 85, 86, 88–91, 106, 108, 109, 127, 128, 231, 270, 275 Liu Yuan, 111, 112, 279, 280 “Local war” informatized, 124 under informatized conditions, 45, 113, 124 under modern and particularly high-technology conditions, 105 Lu Dingyi, 34, 66, 270 Lu Min, 73, 94n24 Luo Reiqing, 33–36, 66–68, 238n20, 270 M Mao Yuanxin, 81 Mao Zedong, 4, 5, 7–9, 11–14, 16, 28–38, 40, 54, 63–83, 99, 109, 126, 136–160, 169, 214n24, 217–225, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233–234, 237n7, 238n8, 238n20, 249, 251, 253, 269–273, 275, 276, 282, 284, 288 Martial law, 85, 86 “May 16th Circular,” 34, 36 Military-civilian fusion, 242

Military corruption, 46, 51, 55, 101, 106, 114, 117–122, 124, 128, 129, 238n11, 281 counter-corruption drive, 117–122 Military explanation of military intervention in politics, 247 Military party committee basic task and primary responsibility, 52 decision processes and qualifications, 27, 51–52 “leadership of operations,” 51, 52 working principle, 27 Military party construction, 51, 53 Military professionalism, 34 Military representation in party and government institutions CCP Central Committees, 138, 158, 160, 162, 170, 171, 175, 178 CCP Politburos, 138, 158, 170, 173, 175, 178 CCP Politburo Standing Committees, 160, 170, 174, 175, 178 provincial and local revolutionary and party committees in the Cultural Revolution, 157–160 N National People’s Congress (NPC), 70, 79, 86, 88 “Near seas,” 125, 242 Neo-realist theory of international politics, 243, 251–254 “New historic missions,” 45, 46, 113 Nie Rongzhen, 68, 69, 71, 80 O “Objective control” of the military, 248 Odom, William, 250, 251 “Old school cliques,” 6, 9 “Order Number One,” 71, 234, 270

 INDEX 

P Party and Political Work System (PPWS) in the PLA “internalization,” 27, 47–49 major challenges, 55 origins, 27 redefinition of functions, 38 rehabilitation of persecuted officers, 39 supervisory function, 47–49 under Deng, 38–41 under Hu, 45–46 under Jiang, 43–45 under Mao, 29–37 under Xi, 46–54 what is?, 25–27 Party-army symbiosis, 3–7, 12, 14, 25, 29, 37, 54, 63, 91, 126, 135, 138, 157, 160, 161, 170, 174, 175, 205–207, 217–221, 223, 225, 227, 229–232, 241, 251, 254, 261, 271–275, 282 Peng Dehuai, 4, 33–35, 64, 65 “Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian, and Zhou Xiaozhou Anti-Party Clique,” 65 Peng Zhen, 34, 35, 66–68 “Peng Zhen, Luo Reiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun Anti-Party Clique,” 34, 66–68, 270 People’s Armed Police (PAP), 17–20, 105, 110, 117, 123, 171, 175, 178, 205, 259 People’s Daily, 35, 74, 88 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) absolute loyalty to the party, 287 Air Force (PLAAF); evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, 114; 4th Air Corps, 73; 5th Air Corps, 73; modernization, 232

295

Army (PLAA), 1, 8, 108, 125; downsizing, 125 Base in Djibouti, 126 Beijing Garrison District (BGD); Expansion, 68; role in aftermath of Lin Biao Incident, 74; role in dealing with “Gang of Four,” 81 Central Theater, 125 Chengdu Military Region (MR), 259 county people’s arms department, 208 “departization and statization,” 17 divestiture from business activities, 105, 107, 118, 262 dual-command system, 25–26 14th Group Army (GA), 111, 112, 279, 280 47th Corps, 158, 213n9, 261 Fujian Provincial Military District (MD), 210–211 General Armament Department (GAD), 102, 122 General Logistics Department (GLD), 50 General Political Department (GPD), 31 General Staff Department (GSD), 122 Guangzhou MR, 33, 74 involvement in business activities, 238n11, 262 “jointness,” 113, 125, 222 “mechanization and informatization,” 105 military strategic guidelines, 105, 113, 124, 226, 227, 242 Nanjing MR, 67 National Defense University (NDU), 90 National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), 190

296 

INDEX

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (cont.) Navy (PLAN); counter- piracy operations in Gulf of Aden, 114; evacuation of Chinese nationals from libya, 114; evacuation of Chinese nationals from Yeman, 126; Fujian Base, 210; modernization, 2, 231–232; strategy, 231 Officers’ Service Regulations, 108 participation in counter-piracy, UN peacekeeping, and HADR, 114, 126 prefectural military sub-district, 208 provincial military district (MD), 47, 208 reserve and militia units, 260 restructuring and downsizing, 114, 117 Rocket Force (PLARF), 2, 8, 59n51 role in transition to post-Xi Jinping leadership, 21, 269, 282–288 Second Artillery, 113 60th Corps, 82 63rd Corps, 67 Southern Theater, 125 Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), 2, 8, 125 “strategic transition,” 84, 225 theaters, 50, 51, 124, 125, 210, 222 38th Corps, 74, 261 31st GA, 210–211 21st Corps, 261 24th Corps, 68 Policy of “reform and opening up,” 41, 87, 88, 99, 236, 276 Political commissar (PC), 6, 25–28, 47, 48, 51, 56n6, 59n51, 64, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 81, 82, 88, 93n13, 111, 134n75, 159, 171,

175, 178, 208, 209, 235, 250, 263, 267n34, 270, 279 Political explanation of military intervention in politics, 247–248 Political Work Department (PWD), 26, 50, 60n62 Political Work Regulations operational functions of political work, 43 “opinion, psychological, and legal war-fares,” 43 Power and influence of retired leaders over successors, 127 Praetorian Guard, 237 “Princes’ parties,” 6, 9 “Pure military point of view,” 32 Q Qiao Shi, 88 Qin Jiwei, 6, 162, 170, 270 Qiu Huizuo, 70, 74, 270 Quasi-institutionalization of civil-­ military relations, 127, 221, 225, 230, 232, 262 R Rao Shushi, 64 Retirement of revolutionary veterans, 271, 275 Revolution in military affairs (RMA), 10, 103, 278 Role of military in collapse of communism, 235–236 S Second Field Army, 134n75 “Secretaries’ gangs,” 6, 9

 INDEX 

Shanghai Militia leadership, 82 origin, 81, 82 scale, 82 Sichuan earthquake relief of 2008, 114, 259–262, 267n35 South China Sea, 115, 125, 227, 231, 263, 267n44, 285 Soviet military, 2, 3, 11, 20, 32, 225, 249, 250 Soviet-style military modernization, 4, 29, 32, 228, 230 Soviet Union civil-military relations, 248–251 collapse, 87, 115, 236 State Council lack of authority to exercise oversight of the military, 255–256 Ministry of Emergency Management, 263 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 257, 258 Su Yu, 33, 65, 82 “Subjective control” of the military, 248 Sun Zhengcai, 116 Symbiotic political-military factions, 6, 8, 9, 18, 63, 65, 156, 162, 206, 217–219, 221, 251, 253, 254, 261, 269, 271–275, 278, 281 T Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, 105, 107, 226 “Technological accumulation,” 232 Term and age limits, 8, 109, 161, 222 Theory of civil-military relations, 243–248

297

“Three Supports and Two Militaries” policy, 35, 40, 63, 137, 156, 157, 160, 206 units, 158, 159 Tiananmen Incident, 20, 84–86, 103, 104, 107, 226, 229, 233–235, 270 lessons, 233–235 role of the military, 85–86, 226 “Two incompatibilities,” 45 U United Nations (UN), 105, 114, 126 peacekeeping operations, 105 United States (U.S.) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 107, 226 relations with China, 226–227 V Variable-sum game where “there are gains for losers,” 65, 84, 286 W Wan Li, 86, 162 Wang Dongxing, 67, 80, 84, 93n21, 286 Wang Hongwen, 78, 80–82 “Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique,” 270 Wang Ke, 102 Wang Reilin, 102, 127 Wang Shouye, 129, 281 Wang Weiguo, 73 Wen Jiabao, 259–262 Wen Yucheng, 69 Wu De, 81, 84 Wu Faxian, 69, 70, 74, 270 Wu Zhong, 81

298 

INDEX

X Xi Jinping, 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 21, 42, 46–54, 99, 106, 114–129, 175, 178–205, 207, 210, 211, 219, 222, 223, 227, 233, 262, 263, 269–288 centralizing power and implications for civilian governance, 283–285 “Fujian and Zhejiang” network, 9 relations with the PLA, 46–54, 114–126 Xinhua News Agency, 74, 81, 89 Xu Caihou, 48, 102, 111, 112, 118, 128, 129, 279–281 Xu Qiliang, 129 Xu Qinxian, 86 Y Yang Baibin, 6, 41, 86–90, 270 “PLA offering protection and escort for reform and opening up,” 88–90, 235, 270 “Yang Brothers,” 86–91, 104, 235, 270, 288 Yang Chengwu, 67–70, 80, 270 “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Anti-Party Clique,” 270 Yang Shangkun, 6, 34, 41, 66, 67, 85–89, 162, 170, 270 Yao Wenyuan, 35, 66, 71, 78, 81, 82

Yao Yilin, 85, 108 Ye Jianying, 67, 69, 71, 75, 79–82, 160 Ye Qun, 66, 70 Yellow Sea, 231, 242 Yi Xiaoguang, 125 Yu Lijin, 68–70 Yu Yongbo, 89, 102, 109 Yuan Yubai, 125 Z Zero-sum game where “winner takes all,” 65, 84, 252, 286 Zhang Chunqiao, 69–71, 78, 80–82 Zhang Haiyang, 111, 112, 132n29, 279, 280 Zhang Wannian, 102, 128, 130n3, 173 Zhang Wentian, 33, 65 Zhang Yang, 122 Zhang Zhen, 89–91, 108, 109, 111, 127, 128, 279 Zhao Ziyang, 6, 83–88, 96n62, 131n17, 270 Zhongnanhai Compound, 74, 81 Zhou Enlai, 64, 74, 75, 78–80, 261 Zhou Xiaozhou, 33, 65 Zhou Yibing, 85 Zhou Yongkang, 116, 117, 129, 281 Zhu De, 160 Zhu Rongji, 87, 108, 262, 267n38