Cities and Climate Challenges in Southeast Asia 9789815011722

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
About the Contributors
1. Introduction
Section I: Climate Risks in the Southeast Asian Urban Context
2. Water Security and Climate Change in the City of Baguio
3. Exploring Agroecology for Enhancing Climate Actions and Food Security in Cities: Malaysia as a Case Study
4. Climate Change and Heritage Preservation: A Case Study of the Complex of Hue Monuments
Section II: Climate Resilience and Urban Governance
5. The Interplay Between Climate Risks and Ten Years of Urban Development in Ho Chi Minh City
6. Building Climate-Resilient Communities: A Cursory Review of Selected Local Climate Action Plans in the Philippines
7. The Role of International City Networks in Advancing Cities’ Climate Ambitions: A Case Study of Jakarta
8. Knowledge Systems Approach to Democratic Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Historic Environments
Section III: Urban Climate Interventions
9. Nature-Based Solution Infrastructure for Flood Mitigation: An Experience from the Jakarta Metropolitan Area
10. Leveraging De-risking Instruments to Scale-up Adaptation Finance in Jakarta
11. The Application of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures Index (TCI) on Malaysian Property and Construction Companies
12. The Role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Advancing Sustainable Climate Adaptation: A Case Study of Japanese ODA in Vietnam
13. Summary and Policy Recommendations
Index

Citation preview

The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), the Singapore APEC Study Centre, and the Temasek History Research Centre (THRC). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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First published in Singapore in 2023 by ISEAS Publishing 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. © 2023 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Name(s): M  artinus, Melinda, editor. | Qiu, Jiahui, editor. | Seah, Sharon, editor. Title: C  ities and climate challenges in Southeast Asia / editors, Melinda Martinus, Sharon Seah, and Jiahui Qiu. Description: Singapore : ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023. | Series: Workshop and compendium series ; Volume 1 | Includes index. Identifiers: ISBN 978-981-5011-71-5 (soft cover) | ISBN 978-981-5011-72-2 (PDF) | ISBN 978-981-5011-73-9 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Climate change mitigation—Southeast Asia. | Cities and towns—Southeast Asia. | Urban ecology (Sociology)—Southeast Asia. Classification: LCC HT169 A9C58 Cover design by Lee Meng Hui Index compiled by Sheryl Sin Bing Peng Typesetting by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd

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Contents

Acknowledgementsvii About the Contributors

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1. Introduction Melinda Martinus, Jiahui Qiu and Sharon Seah

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Section I: Climate Risks in the Southeast Asian Urban Context 2. Water Security and Climate Change in the City of Baguio Alejandro N. Ciencia and Gladys A. Cruz

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3. Exploring Agroecology for Enhancing Climate Actions and Food Security in Cities: Malaysia as a Case Study Ku Nurasyiqin Ku Amir and Bakri Mat

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4. Climate Change and Heritage Preservation:  A Case Study of the Complex of Hue Monuments Nguyen Ky Nam

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Section II: Climate Resilience and Urban Governance 5. The Interplay Between Climate Risks and Ten Years  of Urban Development in Ho Chi Minh City Nigel K. Downes

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6.

Contents

Building Climate-Resilient Communities: A Cursory  Review of Selected Local Climate Action Plans in the Philippines Kristoffer B. Berse and Elton Evidente

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7. The Role of International City Networks in Advancing  Cities’ Climate Ambitions: A Case Study of Jakarta Nila Kamil and Sayel Cortes

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8. Knowledge Systems Approach to Democratic Climate  Change Adaptation in Urban Historic Environments Virajhita Chimalapati

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Section III: Urban Climate Interventions 9. Nature-Based Solution Infrastructure for Flood Mitigation:  An Experience from the Jakarta Metropolitan Area Adiwan Aritenang

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10. Leveraging De-risking Instruments to Scale-up Adaptation  Finance in Jakarta Brurce M. Mecca and Ines Ayostina

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The Application of the Task Force on Climate-Related  Financial Disclosures Index (TCI) on Malaysian Property and Construction Companies Renard Y.J. Siew

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The Role of Official Development Assistance (ODA)  for Advancing Sustainable Climate Adaptation: A Case Study of Japanese ODA in Vietnam Michiyo Kakegawa

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13. Summary and Policy Recommendations Melinda Martinus, Jiahui Qiu and Sharon Seah

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Index

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Acknowledgements

This compendium had its origins in the workshop on “Cities and Climate Challenge in Southeast Asia” held online on 5–6 October 2021. Organized by the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, the objective of this workshop and compendium series was to facilitate knowledge exchange and share best practices to deepen understanding of the complex and multidimensional nature of climate challenges in the Southeast Asian cities context. This workshop and compendium series aimed to provide an accessible platform for early-career scholars, established researchers, policymakers, practitioners and experts to: 1. Analyse climate risks with rigorous arguments and strong evidence in the context of Southeast Asia’s transformation; 2. Shed light on gaps and opportunities of climate transformation for a more resilient and sustainable region; 3. Communicate complex empirical research in a concise style and policy-focused scenarios; 4. Share insights, experiences, best practices, and tools in helping the region achieve its climate mitigation and adaptation targets; 5. Showcase initial findings, part of on-going research projects, or snapshots of urban development trends and climate risks across the region. We would like to thank the contributors for devoting their time to writing and preparing their papers for the workshop. We would like

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Acknowledgements

to thank the Scientific Committee of this compendium and workshop series: Dr -Ing Peter Andreas Gotsch (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Dr Emma Colven (University of Oklahoma), and Mr Joris van Etten (Asian Development Bank) for their invaluable feedback on the contributors’ papers and inputs in improving this publication. We also would like to thank Ms Aninda Dewayanti and Ms Rebecca Neo for their assistance in rapporteuring the workshop. Finally, many thanks to ISEAS Publishing for facilitating the publication with efficiency and professionalism.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Adiwan Aritenang is Assistant Professor and Undergraduate Program Director at the Urban and Regional Planning Program, Bandung Institute Technology (ITB). His research focuses on urban and regional economics, infrastructure and fiscal decentralization, creative city and urban analytics. Alejandro N. Ciencia is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Economics and Political Science, College of Social Sciences, University  of the Philippines Baguio.  He teaches research methods, political philosophy, and Philippine politics. His research interests include urban resilience, water security, judicial decision-making and politics, and issues of justice. Bakri Mat is Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Affairs and Diplomacy (AIIAD), and Associate Professor at the School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia. Brurce Mecca is Analyst at the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Indonesia. His research interests include market-based solutions for climate goals, public policy, carbon market mechanisms, fiscal policy, and green investments.  Elton Evidente is Junior Project Officer at the Research and Creative Work of the Philippines Resilience Institute (UPRI). He is a licensed Environmental Planner and currently completing his Master’s degree in Urban Planning at the University of the Philippines Diliman.

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About the Contributors

Gladys A. Cruz is Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Political Science, College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Baguio. She teaches mathematical economics, econometrics, labour economics, statistics and social research. Her research interests include natural resource management, urbanization, and regional competitiveness.  Ines Ayostina is a Fox Research Fellow at Yale University and a Visiting Scholar at Copenhagen Business School. She specialized in environmental policy and governance in climate solutions, oceans, and circular economy.  Kristoffer B. Berse is Associate Professor at the University of the Philippines’ National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG) and concurrent Director for Research and Creative Work of the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute (UPRI). He teaches courses on public policy, research methods, local government, and special topics in public administration, particularly disaster risk governance, at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Ku Nurasyiqin Ku Amir is PhD candidate in Strategic Studies, School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia. Melinda Martinus is Lead Researcher at the ASEAN Studies Centre and the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research interests revolve around sustainable development, smart city initiatives, digitalization, institutional framework and policies for advancing climate ambition in ASEAN countries. Michiyo Kakegawa is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economics, Soka University. She specializes in international development policies, environment policy and management, environment and social safeguards, and climate adaptation. Nguyen Ky Nam is PhD candidate in Critical Heritage Studies, Griffith University, Australia and an on-leave lecturer in Urban Heritage Studies at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, Hanoi. His research focuses on cultural heritage and climate change, cultural heritage management and conservation and cultural studies. 

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About the Contributors

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Nigel K. Downes is Integrated Expert at the College of Environment and Natural Resources, Can Tho University, a position supported by The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). His work has focused on urban environmental issues, spatial monitoring and indicator assessments, climate adaptation and planning. Nila Kamil is PhD candidate at the Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University & Research. Her research interests include international climate negotiation, climate governance and climate mitigation transparency in developing countries. Qiu Jiahui is Research Officer at the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research focuses on Southeast Asian countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), methane and climate change, and youth’s participation in advancing climate transformations. Renard Y.J. Siew is Climate Change Advisor at the Centre for Governance and Political Studies (CENT-GPS). Previously, he was CoChair of the Global Young Academy’s Climate Change & Disaster Risk Management Working Committee and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative’s (UNEP-FI) Collective Commitment on Climate Action. Sayel Cortes is PhD candidate at the Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University & Research. His research interests include the role of climate city networks in global climate governance and polycentric system of governance. Sharon Seah is Senior Fellow and Coordinator at the ASEAN Studies Centre and the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research covers climate governance, sustainable finance, major power rivalry and the rule of law in ASEAN. Virajhita Chimalapati is doctoral student in Conservation Studies at the University of York, United Kingdom. Her research focuses on exploring the synergies between cultural heritage management, cocreative policy design, and emerging infrastructural interventions in historic port cities of Southeast Asia.

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1 Introduction Melinda Martinus, Jiahui Qiu and Sharon Seah

Even before climate change surfaced as a critical challenge for cities, the stresses of rapid and mass urbanization were already problems facing many countries, especially developing countries. The nexus between the climate crisis and urbanization is so distinct that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) prepared a regional fact sheet dedicated to the vulnerability of urban areas in its Sixth Assessment Report. The impacts of climate change are clearly exacerbated by urban characteristics such as the lack of vegetation, the abundance of dense concrete structures, and intense human and economic activities that raise temperatures, alter water cycles, and increase the risk of flooding. Coastal cities, in particular, face the added threat of rising sea levels (IPCC 2022). In a way, climate change has not only magnified the problems of urbanization but has also added another layer of complexities to the mounting challenges that cities face. Southeast Asia is currently home to four major agglomerations or megacities (cities of over 10 million people); Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, and Ho Chi Minh City (Citypopulation.de n.d.). The speed of urbanization in the region is particularly striking. In the 1960s, only

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a quarter of Southeast Asia’s population lived in urban areas, today more than half live in urban areas, and this number will increase to two-thirds by 2025 (Leggert 2015). Southeast Asia is experiencing some of the world’s fastest changing demographics, and also one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. Three Southeast Asian countries; Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand are among top ten countries that have suffered the greatest economic damage and number of fatalities from climate disasters (Eckstein et al. 2019). On the city scale, the region is also home to the most vulnerable cities to climate risks. A report by consultancy firm Verisk Maplecroft ranked urban centres worldwide based on their environmental and climate risk, revealing that 99 of the 100 most threatened cities are in Asia (Nichols 2021). Topping the list is Jakarta, which experiences land subsidence, heat stress, water scarcity, natural hazards and pollution due to a combination of climate change and human activity. Close behind are other Indonesian cities Surabaya and Bandung, which are similarly plagued with extreme levels of environmental risk. In addition, other Southeast Asian cities such as Kuala Lumpur and Manila are also assessed to have high environmental risks. Yet, climate action is not solely about adapting to the impacts of climate change. Cities, as economic, social and cultural hubs with intense rates of consumption, are also crucial in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC n.d.). With proactive local governance, cities can emerge as leaders by planning and implementing solutions that strengthen climate adaptation and mitigation. On the policy side, cities can make significant decisions on urban planning, land use management, and attract major investment projects that focus on balancing economic growth, livelihood, and sustainability. Climate change research in Southeast Asia often tackles adaptation and mitigation in its intensive agricultural and land-use sectors, which are major contributors to its greenhouse gases and help drive the loss of natural ecosystems, rich biodiversity and massive carbon sinks (ADB 2009). In contrast, research on urban climate solutions in the region is less abundant, yet offers promising possibilities for building adaptive resilience and leading a sustainable transition that could impact millions. In order to respond to those challenges, policymakers and practitioners in the region need to understand climate risks in the urban context,

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coping mechanisms, prediction systems, and tools and interventions to better equip cities with strategies to face climate challenges. It was in this context that the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute initiated a workshop and compendium on Cities and Climate Change in Southeast Asia. Through case studies that hold unique contextual insights, this compendium highlights cities in Southeast Asia that are already exploring such possibilities. The compendium seeks to understand the nexus of climate change and urban development better, share insights and best practices, and promote practical solutions by academics, experts and practitioners as part of their on-going research. The analysis presented in this compendium does not aim to provide meticulous prescriptions on how cities should cope with climate change, but rather provide propositions and brief assessments to help practitioners in the region understand problems, challenges, and opportunities moving forward. The compendium is organized into three sections: (I) Climate Risks in the Southeast Asian Urban Context, (II) Climate Resilience and Urban Governance, and (III) Urban Climate Interventions.

Climate Risks in the Southeast Asian Urban Context This section highlights the manifestation of climate risks in a Southeast Asian city context, particularly understanding the linkages of climate impacts vis-a-vis environmental conditions, livelihood, and cultural assets of cities. The three chapters in this section analyse the interaction of climate change and water security, food provision, and heritage preservation in various urban context. Alejandro N. Ciencia and Gladys A. Cruz discuss the existing challenges of water provision in the City of Baguio, Philippines, that are further exacerbated by climate risks such as drought, heavy rainfall, and mismanagement of water resources. Ciencia and Cruz further recommend the participation of all stakeholders in water provision to ensure adequate, safe, and affordable water provision to the city. Ku Nurasyiqin Ku Amir and Bakri Mat challenge the conventional conception of urban areas as non-food production centres. Drawing from the experience of community agriculture practices in Penang, Malaysia, Amir and Mat indicate that through agroecology, cities can

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address both food supply chain disruption during COVID-19 and improve their resilience in adapting to climate change. Nguyen Ky Nam identifies that climate change has profoundly impacted many heritage sites on Vietnam’s central coast, notably the Complex of Hue Monuments. While the Government of Vietnam has acknowledged heritage preservation as an essential component of Vietnam’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement, strategies tackling climate change at the national level are still too broad and challenging to be implemented in particular heritage preservation sites.

Climate Resilience and Urban Governance The second section of this compendium underlines the role of urban governance in enhancing climate resilience and specifically highlights the need for cities to manage urban development better, strengthen cooperation with national governments and global city networks, and utilize a community-based approach. There are four chapters featured in this section: Nigel K. Downes highlights how the urban expansion of Ho Chi Minh City has reduced the city’s flood detention and retention capacity, which further increases flood risks. Downes further suggests that the city government of Ho Chi Minh City needs to integrate granular and more precise “block-scale” climate adaptation scenarios. Kristoffer B. Berse and Elton Evidente provide an assessment of the local climate adaptation plan in the Philippines. Their research finds a clear commonality among the policy areas to address water sufficiency, knowledge, and capacity development to combat climate change among localities in the Philippines. Nila Kamil and Sayel Cortes discuss the role of international city networks in helping cities to advance their climate ambitions. Drawing from the experience of Jakarta’s collaborations with the C40 Climate Leadership Group (C40), the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and CityNet, their research points out that the collaboration have helped Jakarta to enhance their climate ambitions. Lastly, Virajhita Chimalapati proposes historic urban areas in the region to adopt the knowledge system approach to democratize flood mitigation approaches. The approach acknowledges collective

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knowledge as an asset to encourage co-creation, collaboration, and bridging various stakeholder experiences in managing natural disasters.

Urban Climate Interventions The final section of this compendium seeks to promote instruments and tools to manage urban growth while strengthening their capacity to manage climate risks. This section demonstrates the benefits of scaling up nature-based solutions, adaptation finance, utilizing financial disclosure mechanisms for the private sector, and advocating for more proactive donors in delivering financial assistance for climate adaptation projects. Demonstrating the experience from the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA), Adiwan Aritenang examines to what extent nature-based solution infrastructure can help the city prevent flood occurrences in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. Brurce M. Mecca and Ines Ayostina suggest that the city government of Jakarta leverage de-risking instruments and create bankable project pipelines to stimulate private finance for climate adaptation projects. Renard Y.J. Siew further advances the discussion to involve the property and construction sector in Malaysia to ramp up climate mitigation targets in cities. Utilizing the framework of the Task Force for Climate Financial Disclosures (TCFD), his research finds that the majority of publicly listed Malaysian property and construction companies are still not aligned to the TCFD recommendations and have poor climate disclosures. Finally, Michiyo Kakegawa emphasizes the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in promoting climate adaptation tools. Drawing from the experience of Japanese ODA in Vietnam, her study suggests that the Japanese government must start integrating Ecosystembased Adaptation (EbA), a cost-efficient intervention that is highly impactful in ensuring resilient communities in ODA recipient countries.

Conclusion In the workshop organized by the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute online on 5–6

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October 2021, all contributors noted that climate change research has been gaining ground in the region. However, the climate impacts, development trajectory, and capacity to adapt across urban areas in the region vary immensely. The research findings in this compendium should help policymakers, practitioners, and relevant stakeholders to develop more nuanced ideas and scenarios to balance urban development and sustainability moving forward. References Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2009. The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review. https://www.adb.org/publications/ economics-climate-change-southeast-asia-regional-review. Citypopulation.de. N.d. “Major Agglomerations of the World – Population Statistics and Maps”. https://www.citypopulation.de/en/world/ agglomerations/. Eckstein, David, Vera Künzel, Laura Schäfer and Maik Winges. 2019. “GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2020: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2018 and 1999 to 2018”. Germanwatch, December 2019. International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2022. “SIXTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: Regional Fact Sheet – Urban Areas by Working Group I – The Physical Science Basis”. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/ factsheets/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Regional_Fact_Sheet_Urban_areas.pdf. Leggert, Regan James. 2015. “The Age of ASEAN Cities: From Migrant Consumers to Mega Cities”. Nielsen. https://www.nielsen.com/wp-content/ uploads/sites/3/2019/04/nielsen-age-of-asean-cities-webinar-deck.pdf. Nichols, Will. 2021. “Environmental Risk Outlook 2021”. Verisk Maplecroft, 12 May 2021. https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/asian-citiesin-eye-of-environmental-storm-global-ranking/. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). N.d. “Climate Change and Cities: Second Assessment Report of the Urban Climate Change Research Network”. ARC3.2. https://unfccc.int/files/ parties_observers/submissions_from_observers/application/pdf/787.pdf.

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Section I Climate Risks in the Southeast Asian Urban Context

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2 Water Security and Climate Change in the City of Baguio Alejandro N. Ciencia and Gladys A. Cruz

Summary:  Baguio City receives substantial amounts of rainfall every year but its residents are water insecure. ■  As a result of rapid population growth, the demand for water in Baguio City has outpaced the capacity of the Baguio Water District (BWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation, to supply the water requirements of residents. ■  The Baguio Water District has yet to successfully fulfill its mandate of providing adequate, safe, and affordable water to the city. ■  Addressing water insecurity in Baguio amidst the challenges of climate change will require the participation of all stakeholders such as government, private companies, city residents, and nongovernmental organizations. ■

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Introduction Baguio is a small highly-urbanized upland city located approximately 250 kilometres north of Manila, the Philippine capital, and 1,400 metres above sea level. With a land area of 57.5 square kilometres and an estimated population of 366,358 in May 2020 (PSA 2021), its population density is higher than most Philippine cities and towns. It is labelled the “summer capital” of the Philippines because of its cool highland climate, which draws foreign and local tourists who seek respite from the generally hot and humid Philippine weather, especially during the months of March, April and May. It usually experiences rainy weather for six months every year, from May to October, and dry weather for the rest of the year. The city receives more rainfall compared to other Philippine towns and cities. Baguio holds the Philippine record for receiving the highest annual rainfall (9,006 mm) in the country in 1910 (WWF-Philippines 2014, p. 13). Established in the 1900s, Baguio was originally envisioned to serve as a rest and recreation site for American colonial administrators. Designed by American planners at the time to support a population of 25,000 (Morley 2018, p. 4), it had only 841 inhabitants in 1904 (Estoque and Murayama 2013, p. 246). By 2010, the city had an estimated day-time population of 700,000 and a night-time population of 318,676 (Estoque and Murayama 2012, p. 316). People residing in outskirt areas but working within the city account for the disparity in day-time and night-time populations. The city’s night-time population, which reflects Baguio’s real population, is predicted to double by 2045 (Opiña 2014). Baguio City’s average annual population growth for the period 2000–10 was 2.36 per cent, higher than the average for the entire country (1.9 per cent) and the currently populous National Capital Region (1.78 per cent) (PSA 2010). According to some observers, the city’s growing population has exceeded its capacity to supply basic services and the conveniences associated with urban living (WWFPhilippines 2014, p. 19). Paradoxically, despite its reputation as a city that receives substantial amounts of rainfall every year, water insecurity is an accepted fact of life among Baguio residents. Reports of water shortage in the city is commonplace (Fontanilla 2015; Palangchao 2015; Sunstar 2013). In a country surrounded by water, Baguio City appears water insecure. The

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Baguio Water District (BWD) runs the city’s piped water distribution system. A government-owned and controlled corporation created in 1975, the BWD’s current mandate is “to provide adequate and potable water at affordable rates to all customers” (Baguio Water District n.d.). In 2015, the BWD reported having a “relatively extensive system of water production and distribution that consists of 42 tanks/sump tanks, 57 deep wells, 10 springs/dams, 177 hydrants, 484 valves and 78 water pressure-reducing valves”.1 Two years earlier, it was reported as being capable of producing approximately 50,000 cubic metres of water daily (Mason 2013, p. 19). As will be discussed below, its capacity to provide for the city’s water requirements thus far has been limited. Watershed reserves provide the BWD with the water it distributes to Baguio residents. Groundwater supplies 85 per cent of the BWD’s piped water supply (Gonzales 2007, p. 5). These watershed reserves are located in different parts of the city and in neighbouring areas. In 2002, forest and watershed reserves constituted 9.07 per cent of Baguio’s total land area (Estoque and Murayama 2013, p. 246). Unfortunately, forest areas have increasingly been converted into built areas over the past three decades. A team of scientists recorded a sharp increase of built-areas during 1988 to 1998 and 1998 to 2009 (Estoque and Murayama 2011, pp. 326-35). According to a local news report in 2013, parts of the city’s watershed have already been compromised (Sunstar 2013). In 2015, the BWD reported that human encroachments threatened one of the city’s largest forest reserves, the Busol Watershed.2 Reports of human encroachments and threats to the city’s watersheds persist at present. Meanwhile, the city’s waste water collection and treatment system is inadequate as only 22.2 per cent of Baguio City households, according to a 2015 survey, say they are connected to the city’s sewerage system (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 37). The city needs to upgrade its existing sewage treatment plant and build additional waste water treatment facilities. This chapter seeks to understand the dynamic interplay of climate, water insecurity, and urban growth, a complex challenge often faced by many Southeast Asian cities. Using Baguio City as a case study, this analysis seeks to draw attention to the concept of water security or insecurity and how it affects the daily life of people in Baguio City. This chapter also cites noteworthy examples of initiatives by the

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city government, residents, and other actors to address the issues of water insecurity and climate risks. And most importantly, it presents and provides inputs on existing proposals to address water insecurity in the city. FIGURE 2.1 The Urban Landscape of Baguio City

Source: ©Chema Grenda, Shutterstock.

Urban Planning and Water Provision in Baguio The Philippines became a colony of the United States in 1898. Just a few years thereafter, the American colonial administrators began searching “for a possible site for a rest and recreation station for American colonials in the mountains of Benguet” (Prill-Brett et al. 1998, p. 71). The cool refreshing climate of Baguio had convinced the American colonial administrators that they had found their rest and recreation station. In 1903 the American colonial administrators announced their policy to make Baguio the summer capital of the Philippines. In

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1909, Baguio became a chartered city. Its development entailed—“in addition to the construction of suitable buildings and roads—the need to ‘secure water supply’, essentially to serve officers and employees of the colonial administration during the summer months” (Tolentino 2009, p. 28). Daniel Burnham, an architect who subscribed to the City Beautiful Movement, was tasked with producing the master plan for Baguio. He designed a city for only 25,000 inhabitants, prescribing a strict quota on the number of people allowed to live in Baguio. Sadly, however rational the urban planning developed by Burnham, most of the planning aspects had been overlooked thereafter. Years after Burnham presented his master plan, the city government and its citizens exhibited a laissez faire attitude towards urban development. Morley described this period in his article “Baguio: A Mismanaged Evolutionary Narrative of the City Beautiful to the City Problematic” (Morley 2018, pp. 4–5). Mulata (1971) reports that the first two decades of the 1900s saw the construction of the city’s first piped water distribution and sewerage systems. Steam-powered pumps were installed and mostly served the American administrators’ residences and offices which were located in the central section of the city. In 1914, water was first sold in the city by public utility authorities. The pre-World War II period witnessed the installation of water tanks and electricity-powered pumping stations in other parts of the city. Still, the city’s topography made water distribution technically difficult. For instance, some areas with extreme elevation needed stronger water pressures. The war period saw the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Japanese administrators of Baguio oversaw the rehabilitation of the city’s water distribution system, including the replacement of old water pipes, notably at the Ambiong water source (Tolentino et al. 2009). The city became conscious of its water supply problems after the war and sought ways to address them. In 1951, a water reservoir was constructed on Mt. Santo Tomas to provide more water supply, but it was later on found to have leaks. Quite interestingly, a group of scientists from Japan found the city’s supply to be adequate in 1955 (Mulata 1971, pp. 181–82). The city by this time had already exceeded Burnham’s prescribed population limit. In any case, the Japanese team’s findings apparently encouraged the continuation of the city’s laissez faire attitude towards city planning and development. By the

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1960s, water shortage, especially during the Holy Week, became a regular feature of life in Baguio City. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the city underwent the construction or installation of steel tanks and turbine pumps; the exploration of new water sources; and the drilling of deep wells in different parts of the city. In 1975, the Baguio City Council created the Baguio Water District (BWD), centralizing “the right to capture and distribute water to the local water district” (Ciencia et al. 2017, p. 152). The BWD was designated as the sole entity with the right to distribute water for a fee.

The Concept of Water Security Water security is defined as the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability (United Nations 2013). A careful reading of the definition will suggest that the concept has at least three dimensions, namely, quantity, quality, and accessibility. Quantity refers to adequate amounts of water for human consumption and use. Quality refers to water “of acceptable quality” which often means potable and safe water. Access or accessibility means that water resources ought to be within reach of people. Accessibility can be understood as referring to both physical accessibility and economic accessibility or affordability. Water is physically accessible when water resources are present or available in places where people live and are therefore physically obtainable. Meanwhile, the concept of economic accessibility or affordability draws attention to the possibility that water resources are physically present and available but the lack of money prevents people from obtaining water. The dimension of accessibility and affordability underscores the point that an equitable provision or distribution of water to people is an essential feature of water security. It bears noting at this point that the BWD’s mandate, as mentioned earlier, appears to have been informed by the concept of water security. On 28 July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/292, officially recognizing the “right to safe and clean

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drinking water and sanitation as a human right” (United Nations n.d.). The international body thus made it the duty of governments to provide their populations with potable water. Scrutiny of the resolution and other relevant UN documents would reveal that, apart from the provision of safe and clean water, governments are also mandated to provide adequate, accessible, and affordable water. For the UN, the human right to water and sanitation encompasses the right to be water secure.

Are Baguio City residents “Water Secure”? Baguio City’s rapidly growing population makes the government’s task of delivering social services, including the provision of adequate, safe, and affordable water to residents, highly challenging. Alongside population growth, urbanization, the expansion of economic activity, and increasing water consumption have resulted in a rise in water demand which has outpaced the capacity of the BWD to produce the quantities of water demanded by the population. Official 2015 BWD data on projected water supply and demand (see Table 2.1) shows that by 2022 the local water utility will be able to produce TABLE 2.1 Official BWD Data on Projected Water Supply and Demand Year

Total Population

Served Population

Water Demand (cu.m./day)

Water Supply (cu.m./day)

2013

326,790

307,183

56,688

40,414

2014

332,137

312,209

58,367

41,504

2015

337,435

317,189

60,047

42,594

2016

342,683

322,122

61,727

43,684

2017

347,885

327,012

64,329

44,774

2018

353,040

331,858

66,931

45,864

2019

358,151

336,622

69,533

46,954

2020

363,220

363,220

72,135

48,044

2021

368,246

368,246

74,737

49,134

2022

379,293

379,293

77,804

50,224

Source: BWD Manager Salvador Royeca, Baguio City Water Supply Situationer, June 2015.

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50,224 cubic metres of water daily, far below the projected daily water demand of 77,804 cubic metres. Interestingly, the BWD data also shows that the local water utility predicted that its services will reach 100 per cent of the population by 2022. In any case, the BWD’s projections reveal that the local water utility acknowledges that its supply will not be sufficient to meet Baguio’s rising water demand. In connection to reports of water shortage in the city, one can argue that such reports merely confirm the BWD’s inability to satisfy the water requirements of Baguio City residents. Note that the BWD itself reported that, in 2015, its service did not cover seven of the city’s 129 barangays (communities).3

Baguio’s Consumer Perspectives Surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016 by the main author and his colleagues, among other studies, revealed that only 68.6 per cent of households in the city are directly connected to the BWD’s piped water system (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 37; Mendoza et al. 2016).4 The rest of the city’s households rely on non-BWD sources of water, including springs, private deep wells, community water systems, water delivery services, water refilling stations, and even rainwater. Some households reported forging informal arrangements with BWDconnected households which involved buying water for a fee (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 26). Unsurprisingly, lack of access to water is more evident among the poor as only 27.7 per cent of the city’s poor have a direct BWD connection (Mendoza et al. 2016, p. 12). Among the poor households who are served by water supply, having a direct BWD connection does not mean access to an uninterrupted daily supply of water. The local water utility follows a water distribution (i.e., rationing) schedule. Survey data show that the average BWD-connected household gets BWD water 2 to 3 times a week as reported by 21.3 per cent and 35.3 per cent of such households respectively. Less than 40 per cent of BWD users get water daily but these users do not have a steady and continuous supply of water for the entire day. Only 10 per cent of BWD-connected households reported having the luxury of enjoying a daily supply of continuous piped water (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 29). Quite significantly, however, only 4.4 per cent of BWD-connected households (68.6 per cent of

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Baguio households) said that BWD water is “inadequate” or “very inadequate” (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 31). The BWD attributes several factors to its inability to supply Baguio City residents’ water needs. These are: (1) population growth and the influx of transients who stay in Baguio but do not consider themselves as permanent residents of Baguio; (2) the problem of non-revenue water—e.g., leaky pipes, illegal connections, and water pilferage; (3) declining pumping water levels due to depleting recharge areas of water sources, resulting from the proliferation of private deep wells and urban development, including human encroachment on watersheds and the shrinking in size of the city’s forest reserves.5 Topographical, engineering, technical, and financial challenges are at play. The city’s mountainous terrain poses a considerable obstacle to the BWD’s plans to improve and expand its services. Survey data reveals that BWD consumers generally perceived the water they receive to be clean since “it has no smell” (67.3 per cent) and “no colour” (64.7 per cent) (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 30). Interestingly, there was “the general perception, then and now, that tap water from BWD is not safe for drinking unless boiled first” (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 36). In fact, the drinking water of Baguio residents is supplied mainly by private non-BWD water-refilling stations which purify or filter water for consumption. In all, 85 per cent of both BWD-connected and non-BWD-connected households consider this to be their main source of drinking water (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 36). The actual behaviour of Baguio residents indicates that drinking water is not supplied by the BWD but by private water-refilling stations. The 2013 tests conducted on BWD water samples by the Sanitation Division of the Baguio Health Department provided the preliminary finding that the BWD water quality in 2013 was poorer than that of water bought at water refilling stations. It bears noting here that the water quality of refilling stations also needs to be closely monitored. Regarding the affordability of water, 50.1 per cent of consumers considered the cost of BWD water to be within their means. Meanwhile, 8 per cent of BWD consumers said “it is not affordable” (Ciencia et al. 2015, p. 30). Interestingly, however, data obtained in 2015 showed that the mean price of water for consumers with a BWD connection is cheaper than water bought from other sources, except for those bought from owners

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of private deep wells. In the case of Baguio residents who buy water from BWD-connected households, the fee paid is three times higher than the actual price that BWD charges (see Table 2.2). Considering that most of these non-BWD-connected households belong to the city’s poor, this arrangement appears unequitable. TABLE 2.2 The Affordability of Water from Various Sources in Baguio City Water Source

Mean Price (in Philippine pesos &*; US dollars)

BWD connection (for Residential A consumer)

38 pesos per cubic metre** (0–10 cubic metres) 46.20 pesos per cubic metre (21–30 cubic metres)

BWD water (bought from neighbour)

145 pesos per cubic metre

Water Delivery

140 pesos per cubic metre

Community Water System

75 pesos per cubic metre

Private Deep Well

30 pesos (0–9 cubic metre)

*At current currency exchange rates, 38 Philippine pesos = 0.75 US dollars **1 cubic metre = 5 drums Source: Gladys Cruz, “Characterising Demand for Residential Water in Baguio City”, paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on Cordillera Studies, University of the Philippines Baguio, 19 July 2021.

Now, it bears recalling that the BWD’s mission is “to provide adequate and potable water at affordable rates to all customers”. If water security is indeed the right of citizens and ensuring water security is the duty of governments, one can argue that the BWD, as a government-owned and controlled corporation, has not satisfactorily fulfilled this duty. Again, ensuring water security is not simply about providing adequate quantities of water; it is also about providing safe, clean, and affordable water for all.

Water Insecurity and Climate Change in Baguio A 2014 paper (Nolasco-Javiet et al. 2014) analysing projected climate trends for Baguio City in the next thirty-five to fifty years reported

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the divergent findings of two forecasting studies or models. The Providing Regional Impact Studies (PRECIS), predicted a positive correlation between rainfall and temperature, meaning that the increase of temperature can generate greater amounts of rainfall. Another study provided by the Statistical Regional Climate Model (STAR) predicted the opposite. Indeed, the divergent findings underscore the challenge of predicting climate patterns. In any case, both studies agree that there will be a substantial change in the amount of rainfall that Baguio will experience in the next thirty-five to fifty years. These projections ought to prompt Baguio’s policymakers, its residents, and other stakeholders to make serious preparations for the impacts of climate change on the city of Baguio in the coming years. Increased amounts of rainfall can be detrimental to the city’s water supply especially when it overwhelms water treatment plants and sewer systems. This can result in contaminated or polluted water. Meanwhile, hotter temperatures in the future can mean damage to Baguio’s watersheds and forest reserves. It can also mean more lowlanders moving to the relatively cooler city of Baguio. Such events will further aggravate water insecurity in the city. In 2014, the World Wide Fund for Nature found Baguio to be the “most vulnerable to climate change impacts” among twelve Philippine cities (WWF-Philippines 2014, p. 18). This assessment was based on the following characteristics; the city’s vulnerability to typhoons and extreme rainfall, the increased likelihood of landslides and flooding, the shrinking of the city’s forest cover, its “grossly inadequate” groundwater supply (WWF-Philippines 2014, p. 14), bad urban planning, rapid population growth, high population density, among many others. Extreme hydrometeorological events have indeed impacted Baguio City in recent memory. Among the most devastating are the tropical cyclones Ompong in September 2018 and Pepeng in September 2009. Continuous and heavy amounts of rainfall associated with these weather events caused landslides and flooding in parts of the city and neighbouring areas, resulting in loss of lives and destruction of property. Despite its mountainous terrain, parts of Baguio have experienced occurrences of severe flooding. The general impression that one gets from these examples is that in the case of Baguio City, climate change will probably result in more rainfall than less. As

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mentioned earlier, more abundant rainfall in the future may mean an increase in the quantity of the city’s water supply but it can also mean a deterioration of the quality of water supply; for instance murky water, especially when water sources are not protected from pollution and contamination. Apart from extreme hydrometeorological events, Baguio is vulnerable to earthquakes. The city experienced a massive tremor which reportedly killed more than a hundred people in July 1990. Baguio City’s vulnerability to extreme weather events, disasters, and the impacts of climate change underscores the need for its residents to develop the ability to adapt to disruptions. For the local government, these challenges should prompt more investments in much-needed infrastructure such as waste water treatment plants and an expanded sewerage system. As the main provider of water supply in the city, ensuring access to adequate, safe, and affordable water is more critical than ever for the BWD.

Are the Existing initiatives Enough? As the city continues to experience more acute water scarcity, three of the main stakeholders; Baguio residents, the BWD, and the city government have introduced several initiatives. First, Baguio residents have quite unsurprisingly adopted resilient behaviour. Among them are the following: 1. reliance on natural, non-BWD sources of water in the city; 2.  the forging of water-sharing arrangements between BWDconnected households and non-BWD-connected households; 3. the establishment of community water systems that are mostly independent of the BWD; 4. the practice of rainwater harvesting and storage; 5. the practice of water recycling; 6. reliance on water-refilling stations as sources of drinking water; 7.  reliance on water delivery trucks as sources of household water; and, 8. the digging of private deep wells (Ciencia et al. 2015). The strategies may be seen as part of the survival strategies of Baguio residents, such as behaviours that often require residents to

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be self-reliant or to engage in largely informal arrangements with other individuals. Clearly, self-reliance is commendable, but some practices may ultimately threaten the city’s water supply. For instance, the unregulated proliferation of private deep wells can further drive the likelihood of contamination, over-extraction, and depletion of groundwater sources. The BWD reported in 2015 that “there are more than 1,000 private deep wells in the city… Of the 225 commercial establishments inspected between April and July 2014, 152 (or nearly 70 per cent) had their own private deep well.”6 Second, the BWD has directed its policies on engaging in activities aimed at: 1. dealing with water demand, such as the exploration for new water sources and the rehabilitation of wells; 2. reducing non-revenue water, such as intensified leak detection and repair, elimination of illegal connections, extensive water metre calibration and replacement of defective water metres, among others. 3. protecting and managing watersheds, for instance tree planting activities, fencing projects in watersheds, excavation of ditches in watersheds to maximize groundwater infiltration, etc. 4. developing the city’s water supply through the construction of rainwater harvesting facilities and the establishment of a bulk water supply system7 Meanwhile, the city government has enacted many regulations aimed at protecting the environment, including water sources; regulating extractive activities; regulating the sale of water; mandating the construction of rainwater harvesting, storage and utilization systems, etc. Among these are the Baguio Water City Code (2007) and the Environment Code of Baguio City (2016). In addition to the aforementioned initiatives, Baguio-based scientists and engineers have proposed to test the feasibility of artificial groundwater recharge facilities in the city and neighbouring areas.

Discussion Water insecurity in Baguio City can be attributed to a host of factors, but addressing water insecurity among Baguio City residents will

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basically require, as the preceding sections suggest, the provision of (1) an ample supply of water that meets the needs of the rapidly growing population; (2) potable and safe water to residents; and (3) affordable water. Leading water governance expert, Karen Bakker’s position on sustainable water supply management is useful to present a constructive discussion (Bakker 2007, pp. 430–55; Bakker 2010). Bakker’s position may be characterized as having at least two core claims. The first asserts that an eco-centric or nature-centred approach to water supply management is more sustainable than an anthropocentric or human-centered approach. This essentially means the satisfaction of human needs should not be at the expense of the environment. Environmental degradation is unsustainable. In practical terms and in relation to Baguio City, this means the provision of water to residents should not result in the destruction or depletion of water sources. The second asserts that for water supply management to be sustainable, it should be guided by a judicious mindset that rejects the simplistic and overgeneralizing arguments based on “public” versus “private” or “state” versus “market” binaries. Bakker argues that water supply management should be cognizant of the fact that, apart from government and private (for-profit) companies, there are other stakeholders, namely, communities and non-government (not-for-profit) organizations. Moreover, Bakker rejects the quick and outright dismissal of policies or proposals pushing for either private or government provision of water. She insists that the necessity or appropriateness of water provision proposals should be assessed in relation to the particular circumstances of the site or population in question. Consistent with Bakker’s rejection of simplistic binaries, this section proposes that water insecurity issues in Baguio City be addressed collectively by the local government, business interests, non-government organizations, and the residents. First, in addressing the issue of water supply not meeting water demand in Baguio City, the BWD has, since the 1990s, pushed for the adoption of a “bulk water system” which essentially means the involvement of private water concessionaires as bulk water suppliers. As such, private water concessionaires will assume the burden of finding sources of water.

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It should be noted here that in Baguio City there is scarcely any talk about the privatization of water supply management such as the selling of waterworks assets to the private sector or the private ownership of water-related infrastructure. It also needs to be mentioned that water privatization, in the sense cited above, was implemented in Metro Manila with ambiguous results (Torio 2016; Chia et al. 2007; David 2000), replicating similar argument made by Bakker. While some improvements in the provision of water were cited, there were also reports of a concessionaire going bankrupt, or water becoming more unaffordable, among many others. Moreover, in 2019, the Philippine Supreme Court imposed hefty fines on private water concessionaires for failing to comply with provisions of the Clean Water Act of 2004 which required them to install sewage systems and wastewater treatment facilities in the Metro Manila.8 This development suggests that for privatization to succeed in the Philippines, effective government regulation is an imperative. In Baguio City, private participation in addressing water supply issues is mostly understood in terms of the “bulk water project” (See n.d.). It must be mentioned that in Baguio City there were proposals from private companies that at first were accepted but eventually had to be rejected because the quality of the water could not be guaranteed (Palangchao 2005). Among interested private concessionaires, there is always a lingering question of whether they can actually turn a profit from the venture. The experience of the private concessionaire in Metro Manila that claimed bankruptcy is a sobering reminder. The more pressing issue, however, seems to be finding suitable water sources for a bulk water system. Quite recently, the BWD has reported the operation of mini bulk water projects (Llanes 2021). As such, the mini bulk water systems aim to augment the city’s water supply, particularly during the dry summer months. Finding ample sources to meet present and future water needs remains a critical issue for Baguio City residents. It appears that the proposed bulk water project is mostly aimed at securing water supply. At this point, we may ask: in the event that sample sources are found, will the bulk water system really ensure the provision of ample amounts of water? Will the bulk water system mean the provision of safe and potable water to households? And, in line with the nature-centred approach to water supply management,

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will the operation of the bulk water system avoid the depletion or destruction of water sources? A concomitant question to the issue of water provision is: will water be distributed to households through existing pipelines? Thus far, the city’s uneven and rugged terrain, technical issues, and the costs of installing new pipelines, pumps, and other infrastructures have prevented many households from getting connected to the BWD piped water system. Is a direct water connection necessary to ensure water security in the city? Tori argues that equity considerations dictate that all households should be directly connected to the water utility’s pipeline system (Torio 2016, p. 210). Assuming that water is ample and safe, a direct water connection ensures continuous access to ample quantities of safe water. Still, one can also ask: will this be sustainable in the long run? Or, will it hasten the depletion of the city’s water resources? Surely, access to continuous water will result in higher levels of water consumption. To address issues related to water supply, water quality, and the provision of affordable water, Mendoza et al. (2020) strongly recommend following respectively: the strict regulation of groundwater extraction activities, particularly the construction and operation of private deep wells, in addition to local government efforts to promote rainwater harvesting among residents; the accurate monitoring of water quality, particularly of water purchased from water refilling stations or obtained from the BWD; and the provision of government subsidies to cover the costs of providing piped water connections to poor households. The last recommendation is premised on the finding that obtaining water through a direct BWD connection is cheaper than water obtained from other sources or through alternative arrangements. It must be noted that Mendoza et al. (2020) are arguing for the state to exercise its regulatory powers in relation to water supply management. The Philippines has enacted laws that govern water use in the country. Unfortunately, many of these are poorly implemented. Mendoza et al. specifically proposed that the Baguio City government and the BWD establish a partnership to address the poor households’ lack of access to safe drinking water. In light of Bakker’s work, we suggest that Baguio City residents, non-governmental organizations, and private companies should also be part of this partnership.

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Regarding the equity problem, existing laws frequently prevent informal settlers from applying for a BWD connection. It is extremely challenging to improve water access in informal settlement. But as already noted, 100 per cent water connection can in fact result in higher levels of water consumption and thus hasten the depletion of the city’s water sources. Perhaps, the problem of overconsumption can be addressed by a rational pricing arrangement or policy which would penalize overconsumption and reward prudent water use. In any case, policy must enhance reliable monitoring and strict regulation of water use. Similarly, the city’s water supply needs to be strictly monitored in terms of its quantity and quality.

Conclusion This chapter showcased Baguio City as an example of a Southeast Asian city whose residents have to grapple with the issues of water insecurity and climate. Moreover, it highlighted the dimensions of water security and evaluated some initiatives of different stakeholders in addressing water insecurity and the risks associated with climate change. We propose a nature-centred approach to water provision, instead of an anthropocentric approach. At the same time, we subscribe to the belief that addressing water insecurity issues should involve the participation of all stakeholders, not simply government and business interests. This study strongly supports utilizing various site-specific approaches that look at local conditions and institutional realities carefully in managing water security and provision. The challenges emerge from climate change and urbanization will continue to dampen the water insecurity problems in the city, thus Baguio needs to enhance calibrated approaches to enhance a holistic urban water provision. Participation from various stakeholders is more needed than ever. Notes 1. Salvador Royeca, Baguio City Water Supply Situationer, June 2015. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.

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4. Two surveys were conducted, one in 2015 and another in 2016. The first survey covered the general population of Baguio City, the second focused on poor Baguio households. On issues relating to social identities, class relations, gender, and informal settlement, the survey data offer minimal useful information. 5. Salvador Royeca, Baguio City Water Supply Situationer, June 2015. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. Vs. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), G.R. No. 202897/G.R. No. 206823/G.R. No. 207969, 6 August 2019, https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/6445/.

References Baguio Water District. N.d. “Vision & Mission Statements, Strategic Goals”. https://baguiowaterdistrict.gov.ph/vision-mission-strategic-goals/ (accessed 26 September 2021). Bakker, Karen. 2007. “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: AlterGlobalization, Anti-Privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South”. Antipode 39, no. 2: 430–55. . 2010. Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban Crisis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chia Pei Lin Grace, Chua Chiaco Karen, Kim Fat Clint, Teo Serena and Toh Kai Ling. 2007. “Water Privatization in Manila, Philippines - Should Water be Privatized?: A Tale of Two Water Concessions in Manila”. INSEAD. https://www.circleofblue.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Insead_Water_ Privatization_Manila_Philippines.pdf. Ciencia, Alejandro N., Lorelei Mendoza, Gladys Cruz, Maileenita Penalba, Nimreh Calde, and Michael Cabalfin. 2017. “Water Security and Urban Resilience: The Case of Baguio City, Philippines”. In Responding to Climate Change in Asian Cities: Governance for a More Resilient Urban Future, edited by Diane Archer, Sarah Colenbrander, and Davide Dodman. London: Routledge. Ciencia, Alejandro N., Lorelei Mendoza, Gladys Cruz, Nimreh Calde, Michael Cabalfin, and Maileenita Penalba. 2015. “Towards Establishing Water Security and Urban Resilience in the City of Baguio”. Asian Cities Climate Resilience Working Paper Series 27. https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10754IIED. pdf? (accessed 1 May 2020). David, Cristina C. 2000. “MWSS Privatization: Implications on the Price of Water, the Poor, and the Environment”. Discussion Paper Series No. 2000-14.

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Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). https://dirp4. pids.gov.ph/ris/ris/pdf/pidsdps0014.PDF. Estoque, Ronald and Yuji Murayama. 2011. “Spatio-Temporal Urban Land Use/Cover Change Analysis in a Hill Station: The Case of Baguio City, Philippines”. International Conference: Spatial Thinking and Geographic Information Sciences: 326–35. . 2012. “Examining the Potential Impact of Land Use/Cover Changes on the Ecosystem Services of Baguio City, the Philippines: A Scenariobased Analysis”. Applied Geography 35, nos. 1–2: 316–26. . 2013. “City Profile: Baguio”. Cities 30: 246. Fontanilla, Giovani Joy. 2015. “Water Crisis Looms in Baguio”. Sunstar, 30 June 2015. www.sunstar.com.ph/baguio/local-news/2015/06/30/watercrisis-looms-baguio-416272. Gonzales, Minerva. 2007. “Integrated Water Management in Baguio City, Philippines”. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Baguio_MR.pdf. Llanes, Jonathan. 2021. “Contingencies in Place to Address Water Shortage in Baguio this Summer”. Sunstar, 27 February 2021. https://www.sunstar. com.ph/article/1887253/Baguio/Local-News/Contingencies-in-place-toaddress-water-shortage-in-Baguio-this-summer. Mason, Lisa. 2013. “Seasonal Water Insecurity in Urban Philippines: Examining the Role of Gender, Resources and Context”. PhD dissertation, Washington University. Mendoza, Lorelei, Alejandro N. Ciencia, Gladys Cruz, Maileenita Penalba, Nimreh Calde and Michael Cabalfin. 2016. “Engaging Communities in Addressing Water Security, Sanitation, and Urban Resilience Challenges in Baguio City”. A report submitted to the ICLEI-Southeast Asia Secretariat. Mendoza, Lorelei, Gladys Cruz, Alejandro Ciencia, and Maileenita Penalba. 2020. “Local Policy and Water Access in Baguio City, Philippines”. International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development 11, no. 1. Morley, Ian. 2018. “Baguio: A Mismanaged Evolutionary Narrative of the City Beautiful to the City Problematic”. Asian Geographer 35, no. 2: 1–19. Mulata, Jose. 1971. “The Production and Distribution Problems Encountered in the Management of the Water Supply System of Baguio City”. Saint Louis University Research Journal 2, no. 2: 177–241. Nolasco-Javier, Dymphna, Marino Deocariza, and Victorno Aquitania. 2014. “Climate Change, Vulnerability Assessment and Adaptation Scenarios and Strategies for Baguio City, Benguet Province, Philippines – Final Report (Revised)”. Report prepared for the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives – Local Governments for Sustainability Southeast Asia Secretariat.

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Opiña, Rimaliza. 2014. “When Development Becomes a Bane”. Baguio Midland Courier, 1 September 2014. http://baguiomidlandcourier.com.ph/baguio14_ article.asp?mode=baguio_day2014/supplements/opina.txt. Palangchao, Harley. 2005. “Probe on Baguio Bulk Water Project Reset”. The Manila Times, 18 May 2005. https://www.manilatimes.net/2005/05/18/ news/regions/probe-on-baguio-bulk-water-project-reset/823858. . 2015. “Now at 17,000 m3 per day water supply shortage at 27,000 cu.m by 2022”. Baguio Midland Courier, 28 June 2015. http://baguiomidlandcourier. com.ph/front.asp?mode=%20archives/2015/june/6-28-2015/front1.txt. Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). 2010. 2010 Census and Housing Population: Population and Annual Growth Rates for The Philippines and Its Regions, Provinces, and Highly Urbanized Cities Based on 1990, 2000, and 2010 Censuses. https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/ pressrelease/Population%20and%20AnnuAn%20Growth%20Rates%20for%20 The%20Philippines%20and%20Its%20Regions%2C%20PrProvinc%2C%20 and%20Highly%20Urbanized%20Cities%20Based%20on%201990%2C%20 2202%2C%20and%202010%20Censuses.pdf. . 2021. Highlights of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Population 2020 Census of Population and Housing (2020 CPH), 23 August 2021. https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-cordillera-administrative-region-carpopulation-2020-census-population-and. Prill-Brett, June, Tala Aurora S. Ramos, and Alicia Follosco. 1998. “Tuba Ethnohistory”. A Cordillera Studies Center – University of the Philippines College Baguio Research Report Submitted to the Municipality of Tuba. See, Dexter. N.d. “Bulk Water Project seen as Ultimate Solution to Water Shortage”. The City Government of Baguio. https://www.baguio.gov.ph/ content/bulk-water-project-seen-ultimate-solution-water-shortage. Sunstar. 2013. “Baguio Facing Water Crisis”. Sunstar, 4 April 2013. https:// www.sunstar.com.ph/article/277944/Business/Baguio-facing-water-crisis. Tolentino, Delfin, Ma. Nela Florendo, and Raymundo Rovillos. 2009. Fragments of a City’s History: A Documentary History of Baguio. Baguio City: Cordillera Studies Center. Torio, Philamer Carlos. 2016. “Water Privatization in Metro Manila: Assessing the State of Equitable Water Provision”. A thesis submitted to the University of British Columbia. https://open.library.ubc.ca/soa/cIRcle/collections/ ubctheses/24/items/1.0300017. United Nations. 2013. UN Water: Water Security and the Global Water Agenda, 8 May 2013. https://www.unwater.org/publications/water-security-globalwater-agenda/.

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. N.d. “The Human Right to Water and Sanitation”. https://www. un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-Philippines). 2014. “Business Risk Assessment and the Management of Climate Change Impacts”. BPI Foundation-WWF. https://wwf.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ BPI-WWF-16-Cities.pdf.

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3 Exploring Agroecology for Enhancing Climate Actions and Food Security in Cities: Malaysia as a Case Study Ku Nurasyiqin Ku Amir and Bakri Mat

Summary:  The conventional conception of urban areas as non-food production centres needs to be challenged. ■  Food insecurity has become more alarming due to price instability and disruption of the supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has added further strain on community food security. ■  Agroecological principles in urban agriculture have the potential as an alternative for cities to achieve food security. ■  Through agroecology, the community co-creates farming knowledge and changes the food system to fit their needs and capacity thus they are able to improve their resilience in adapting to the climate impacts. ■

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Introduction In 2022, the state of global food security came under scrutiny due to developments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The significant role that these two countries play in the global food system, specifically as major fertilizer and wheat producing countries, alarmed neighbouring countries in the region and other food importers. This situation certainly put more pressure on the global food system, which has already faced various challenges. Prior to the conflict, there was a continued rise in food production costs that placed more pressure on smallholder farmers and consumers. Add in the impact of climate change, and global food security has become more uncertain than ever, with increasingly likely food shortages and instability in the future. On the other hand, the role of food production has been divorced from cities after waves of industrialization hit nations around the world. Cities have been transformed into administrative and industrial centres, and other economic activities are viewed as more capable of producing higher value output. The agricultural sector as a food producer is lagging (Mat et al. 2019). Similarly, in the context of the agricultural sector, driven by the argument of comparative advantage, countries have given more focus to several high-value crops while importing cheaper agrifood produce. As a result, farm-to-fork distances increased and the interdependency between countries intensified. This business-as-usual form of the food system is argued to be unsustainable in facing the unpredictability caused by climate change (IPES-Food and ETC Group 2021). Thus, agroecology is being tabled as a muchneeded alternative in the food system. This chapter argues that agroecology has great potential as a solution to climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is a methodology brought forward by proponents of the food sovereignty movement as an alternative to conventional farming methods and comprises scientific knowledge and local wisdom, aiming to rebuild how we do agriculture to suit the local community context and culture. As a methodology or a movement, agroecology began to gain acceptance at various levels of discussion, both local and international (Rosset and Altieri 2017). It is argued that the adoption of agroecological principles in food production may be a precursor to sustainable food security (ibid). As such, this chapter explores the practice of agroecology in

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urban areas as an alternative solution to achieving food security and overcoming major climate change obstacles.

Food Security, Food Sovereignty and Climate Change There are two main strands of literature on the global food system: food security and food sovereignty. Food security is defined as “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996). This concept has evolved since its introduction, with the four pillars of availability, accessibility, stability, and utilization being mainstreamed in policy and research arenas. Recent discourse on food security highlights the element of nutrition, hence the acronym food security and nutrition (FSN) (El Bilali 2019, pp. 559–77). Following the shifting nature of the global food system, the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) in the Committee on Food Security of the United Nations proposed that agency and sustainability be included in the food security framework (Clapp et al. 2021). Continuing the argument of this chapter, the element of agency highlights the role of individuals and communities in making meaningful actions. As food is a fundamental right and need, food security is a highlevel agenda of state governments. From the state’s viewpoint, there are various approaches to achieving food security, either to domestically produce it (food self-sufficiency), buy it from other countries (food self-reliance), or receive food aid (Deb et al. 2009, p. 39). Aside from major food producers such as the United States, India, China, and Brazil, other states rely on a mix of domestic production, food import, and food aid to fulfill national-level food security (FAO 2021). However, these approaches only cover the availability dimension of food security. State policies and institutions are needed to ensure that food is also distributed to the citizens efficiently. On the other hand, food sovereignty is defined as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their food and agriculture systems” (La Via Campesina 2007). This concept has been proposed by the transnational farmers’ movement, La

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via Campesina, and other grassroots actors as an alternative to the food security concept by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In comparison to the food security definition which has been mainstreamed in food policy discourses, the definition of food sovereignty is more dynamic to suit local contexts. At the core of the food sovereignty movement is its persistence in protecting farmers’ rights as food producers facing the globalized, corporatized, and financialized food system (Claeys 2013, pp. 1–10). After its conception, this movement attracted support from grassroots organizations worldwide, comprising farmers and activists who see the power imbalance between farmers and corporations in the food system. Despite the notion of viewing food security and food sovereignty as zero-sum options, we are inclined to the argument that both concepts are complementary as food sovereignty is one of the ways to attain genuine food security (Clapp 2014, pp. 206–11; Patel 2009, pp, 663–706). These concepts can also be simplified as a top-down (food security) and bottom-up (food sovereignty) view of the global food system. Agroecology is the “application of the science of ecology (the science of how nature works) to the study, design, and management of sustainable food systems; the integration of the diverse knowledge systems generated by food system practitioners to serve social movements that are promoting the transition to just and sovereign food systems” (Gliessman 2006; FAO 2018). This concept can be viewed as a science, a practice, and a movement within the food sovereignty framework (Gliessman et al. 2019, pp. 91–110). It aims to rebuild the knowledge of sustainable agriculture from traditional farming that the Green Revolution had displaced. This approach relies on several principles which are suggested by Altieri (1995, p. 8): 1.  Enhancing biomass recycling and optimizing nutrient availability, and balancing the nutrient flow. 2.  Securing favourable soil conditions for plant growth, particularly by managing organic matter and enhancing soil biotic activity. 3. Minimizing losses due to flows of solar radiation, air, and water by way of microclimate management, water harvesting, and soil management through increased soil cover. 4. Species and genetic diversification of the agroecosystem in time and space.

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5. Enhancing beneficial biological interactions and synergisms among agrobiodiversity components, thus promoting key ecological processes and services. These principles are not to be followed as exact recipes but to be contextualized based on local needs and translated into strategies (Rosset and Altieri 2017). In comparison to conventional agriculture, agroecology emphasizes biodiversity through polycropping, decentralization, and working with nature. The advantage of agroecology relies on the cocreation of knowledge through the participation of various actors in the food system and collective action (Kerr 2020, pp. 77–82; GarcíaSempere et al. 2019, pp. 1145–73). In the long term, agroecology aims to achieve food sovereignty with the involvement of various actors in the food system. Therefore, researchers proposed a transition framework consisting of five levels (Gliessman et al. 2019): Level 1: Maximize the efficiency of industrial/conventional practice and reduce the use of costly, scarce, or environmentally harmful inputs. Level 2:  Substitution of alternative practices for industrial/ conventional inputs and practices. Level 3:  Redesigning the agroecosystem to suit ecological processes. Level 4:  Re-establish a more direct connection between farmers and consumers. Level 5:  Build a new global food system, based on equity, participation, democracy, and justice, that goes beyond sustainability to help restore and protect the earth’s life support systems on which we all depend (ibid.). In practice, agroecology has been brought forward by nongovernmental organizations as an alternative to conventional practices. There is a growing acceptance of agroecology in Southeast Asia as farmers shifted to organic farming in recent years (Castella and Kibler 2015, p. 94). A recent review of twenty years of research has found considerable evidence of the positive impacts of agroecological practices on food security and nutrition (Kerr et al. 2021). Although the literature and discussion on agroecology had grown extensively, agroecology in the urban area is still a budding field.

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Amid existing challenges, climate change makes food security a more challenging goal. Undoubtedly, the variability caused by climate change directly affects the agriculture sector and food production. It may cause disruptions to access due to extreme weather events, increased competition for food supplies, reduced purchasing power, and lower nutritional intake. If the impacts persist for an extended period, the community may be forced to migrate (Schellnhuber 2008; Kogo et al. 2020, p. 21). These chains of effects demonstrate the vulnerability faced by communities under climate change. In the context of food security, agroecology provides both adaptation and mitigation strategies in facing climate change by emphasizing solutions at the local level (Snapp et al. 2021). This chapter explores the implementation of agroecology by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), specifically in urban areas. We argue that the practice of agroecology may have the potential to build community resilience by improving the local food system’s ability to face climate change. This may be attainable through the co-creation of knowledge in the food system, as well as supporting the agency dimension of food security.

Methodology This chapter is written based on long-term research utilizing several qualitative research methods. Firstly, a literature review was conducted to examine the concept of agroecology in relation to food security and climate change. Secondly, we conducted two in-depth interviews with practitioners of urban agriculture at the Centre for Environment, Technology, and Development (CETDEM) and the Malaysia Institute of Sustainable Agriculture (MISA) to explore the application of agroecology principles. Lastly, we conducted fieldwork and participatory observation during a food sovereignty workshop organized by Forum Kedaulatan Makanan Malaysia (Food Sovereignty Forum) at Pulau Penang in December 2021. During this workshop, we visited the Consumers Association Penang’s (CAP) headquarters and urban farming site. Purposive sampling was conducted by prioritizing informants with extensive knowledge of the subject matter. The selection of the three organizations (CETDEM, MISA, and CAP) was based on their longterm practice of sustainable agriculture in urban food production. The

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interviews were then analysed using thematic analysis before proceeding with reporting.

Malaysia as a Case Study Malaysia is an interesting case study as it has experienced rapid changes in terms of agriculture and industrialization. As of now, less than 200,000 farmers work in the agriculture sector and produce food to meet the needs of its population of 30 million (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries, Malaysia 2019). Food security has been somewhat achieved through domestic production and food imports. However, there are rising concerns about the state’s increased reliance on imported food every year. In 2021, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for food increased, indicating that food prices may become more volatile and thus place additional pressure on consumers (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2021). In the same light, farmers are incurring higher costs per season as agriculture input prices rise; seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides soared amid the subsidy given by the government (Fatimah 2018). Both scenarios point out that Malaysian food security will become more and more costly under a business-as-usual strategy. Climatic and non-climatic (socioeconomic) factors influence food security in Malaysia. In general, the citizens are coping with the economic impacts of COVID-19, which caused more than 580,000 households to lose income and move from the income bracket of M40 (middle 40 per cent of the total population) to B40 (below 40 per cent of the total population) (Dewan Rakyat 2021). Earlier this year, the massive flooding that hit parts of the country served as a second blow to the households in recovery, incurring an estimated loss of up to RM6.1 billion (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2022). Food insecurity experienced in rural areas varies from the cities as resource availability and coping capacity are different (Mat and Ku Amir 2019, pp. 1004–9). Thus, people in cities have fewer coping mechanisms. In addition, the urban poor living in the cities have been experiencing food insecurity even before the pandemic (Sundaram and Tan 2019). Drawing from these circumstances, both socioeconomic factors and climatic factors are causing the households to be more vulnerable and food insecure (Ku Amir and Mat 2021, pp. 175–80). Thus, there is a need for effective adaptation and mitigation mechanisms in terms of food security in facing climate change.

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How is Agroecology Being Implemented in Malaysia? The movement for sustainable farming in Malaysia began in the 1980s in a bid to promote sustainable agriculture. Following this development, more diverse approaches have been initiated in recent years, such as agroecology and permaculture. CETDEM, MISA, and CAP are earlier proponents of alternative farming methods and have been running for more than ten years. It is important to understand that the aim of these organizations in introducing alternative agriculture approaches is to encourage diversity in the food system. Thus, there is minimal motivation to prove that their method is superior to others, aside from encouraging systemic transitions. During data collection with all three organizations, we found that they practised agroecological principles through various activities. Although science played a major part in the food production phase, the next phase of food distribution with community involvement was key to their sustainability. Two themes manifested from our data collection: knowledge co-creation and community engagement. In CAP, CETDEM, and MISA, agroecological knowledge allowed them to gradually transition away from a dependency on inputs. This was done through composting, pest management, and the design of an agroecosystem that fit their land capacity. During the participatory observation at CAP, we observed how education became an important element in agroecology. The principle of farmers-to-farmers, where farmers cooperate to increase production, is translated by training visitors on how to make “pachakavya”, a fertilizer made of cow dung and milk. The importance of education in engaging the community also arose during interviews with MISA and CETDEM. For example, MISA engaged with the community living in high-rise flats in Kuala Lumpur and trained them to plant food in community areas. This project was conducted in collaboration with a university and the local council. We place emphasis on education because it allowed people to see beyond the usual limits of conventional agriculture—that massive land plots are required. Agroecology supports smallholding and decentralized agriculture, to the point that it can be done within our households.

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“Kalau ada guni pun boleh bertanam, ada tanah sikit pun kita boleh tanam – if you have sacks you can plant food, if you have small land spaces you can also plant food” – Hud Sulaiman (MISA)

Co-creation of knowledge happened when the community resolved their problems with the assistance of the organizations. For example, in CETDEM’s kitchen garden programme, support was given in terms of advice and consultation on garden composting. The participating residents were encouraged to discuss and find solutions that suit their capacity. In the long term, all three organizations aim to build local knowledge on ecologically sustainable farming. The engagement of these organizations with local communities is imperative to the communication of their solutions and drove the learning process. For example, CETDEM has been organizing a farmers’ FIGURE 3.1 Implementation of Agroecological Principles through Multicropping/ Polyculture Observed at CAP (left) and the CAP’s Seeds Fair returns after a two-year hiatus (right)

Source: Authors’ documentation and Consumer Association Penang.

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market in Petaling Jaya to serve as a platform for small farmers to sell their organic vegetables. “Our vegetables are a hit because of their taste and it is pesticide free.” – Tan Siew Luang (CETDEM)

The farmers’ market is an important avenue for them to sell products and shorten the distance from farms to consumers. This also improves relationships in the food system by building trust and transparency between farmers and consumers. In the same vein, CAP has been organizing seed fairs to encourage seed-sharing practices among the public. This practice was part of the traditional farming knowledge that is passed down. However, recent trends of moving away from agriculture had caused these practices to be disrupted. Both themes of knowledge co-creation and community engagement demonstrated how the practice of agroecology has potential in building a resilient food system. It shows how the science of ecologically sustainable food production needs to move in parallel with the local community, including the farmers and consumers. During this study, these organizations demonstrated the practical side of agroecology in moving away from a dependency on agricultural inputs and co-creating farming knowledge with local communities. This finding is in the same light as prior research that found advantages of agroecology in changing the food and nutrition security (Kerr et al. 2021). However, it is important to note that these organizations face challenges in terms of sustainability as their resources are scarce. In our interview with Hud Sulaiman, the Managing Director of MISA, he shared that it is critical to ensure that the volunteers that run their activities are compensated. This includes allowances, food, and accommodation. “Although youths are more inclined to participate in this initiative, the lack of funding to pay for basic needs such as food and accommodation may limit their involvement.” – Hud Sulaiman

Through this study, we explored how agroecology is practised in urban areas in Malaysia by CAP, CETDEM, and MISA. It has allowed the producers and community to achieve food security and livelihood security to a certain extent and shorten the food distance. As a climate adaptation and mitigation mechanism, the alternatives offered via these

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organizations showed the potential of agency among individuals and communities in the local food system. Although the level of acceptance of these initiatives is not yet strong, the aspiration of the agroecology movement is a positive trend. Moving on, this movement has to be supported by policy changes. This chapter is part of an ongoing research project. There are several key takeaways worth further exploration when advocating for food security: 1. Smallholder food producers need support in terms of training and market access. With agroecological practices, it may reduce carbon footprints and food distance. 2. The role of social safety nets to advance farmers’ capacity to deal with climate-related events. As agriculture is one of the sectors most vulnerable to changes in the climate, it is worth exploring to what extent social safety nets can further assist farmers in adapting to climate change. 3.  Land tenure and incentives are needed to ensure food production. Urbanization has rapidly changed spatial patterns of land from agricultural to industrial use. There must be incentives in place for urban farmers to maintain the use of their land for agricultural purposes as well as cultivating their land over a long term. 4.  The roles of technology, infrastructure, and science deserve attention. These three fields are rapidly growing and can be further leveraged for advancing agroecology.

Conclusion Food security is in the limelight against the backdrop of climate change and conflicts. This has made the food system more unpredictable and challenging with the risk of food crisis and price hikes hitting consumers. As an alternative brought forward by the food sovereignty movement, agroecology combines science-based solutions with community leadership. This study explored the implementation of agroecology through three organizations (CAP, CETDEM, and MISA) and elaborated their role in the co-creation of knowledge and community engagement. Both themes are imperative in changing the food system. As climate change is causing various changes and unpredictability, the element of

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knowledge co-creation and community engagement may be a precursor towards resilient cities. The authors would like to thank Hud Sulaiman and Ahmad Kamal (Malaysia Institute of Sustainable Agriculture, MISA), Consumers Association Penang (CAP), and Tan Siew Luang and Gurmit Singh (CETDEM) for their insights. References Altieri, Miguel A. 1995. “Agroecology: Principles and Strategies for Designing Sustainable Farming Systems”. http://www.agroeco.org/doc/new_docs/ Agroeco_principles.pdf. Castella, Jean-Christophe and Jean-François Kibler. 2015. Towards an Agroecological Transition in Southeast Asia: Cultivating Diversity and Developing Synergies. Vientiane, Lao PDR: Gret. Claeys, Priscilla. 2013. “From Food Sovereignty to Peasants’ Rights: An Overview of Via Campesina’s Struggle for New Human Rights”. La Via Campesina’s Open Book: Celebrating 20 Years of Struggle and Hope. Clapp, Jennifer. 2014. “Food Security and Food Sovereignty: Getting Past the Binary”. Dialogues in Human Geography 4, no. 2: 206–11. https://doi. org/10.1177/2043820614537159. Clapp, Jennifer, William G. Moseley, Barbara Burlingame, and Paola Termine. 2021. “The Case for a Six-Dimensional Food Security Framework”. Food Policy, October 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102164. Deb, Uttam Kumar, Mahabub Hossain and Steve Jones. 2009. “Rethinking Food Security Strategy: Self-sufficiency or Self-reliance”. Bangladesh: UK Department for International Development. Department of Statistics Malaysia. 2021. “Selected Agricultural Indicators, Malaysia, 2021”. Department of Statistics Malaysia Official Portal. https:// www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=72&bul_id= TDV1YU4yc1Z0dUVyZ0xPV0ptRlhWQT09&menu_id=Z0VTZGU1U HBUT1VJMFlpaXRRR0xpdz09 (accessed 18 April 2022). . 2022. “Special Report on Impact of Floods in Malaysia 2021”. Department of Statistics Malaysia Official Portal. https://www. dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=496&bul_ id=ZlkxS0JnNThiRHk0ZllZajdyVm44UT09&menu_id=WjJGK0Z5bTk1 ZElVT09yUW1tRG41Zz09. Dewan Rakyat. 2021. “Pemberitahuan Pertanyaan Lisan Dewan Rakyat”. Pub. L. No. 12.

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El Bilali, Hamid. 2019. “Research on Agro-Food Sustainability Transitions: Where are Food Security and Nutrition?” Food Security 11, no. 3: 559–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-019-00922-1. Fatimah Binte Kari. 2018. Evaluation of Agricultural Subsidies and the Welfare of Rice Farmers. Malaysia Agricultural Subsidies Report. Kuala Lumpur: IDEAS Policy Research Berhad. https://www.ideas.org.my/wp-content/ uploads/2021/07/Evaluation-of-Agricultural-Subsidies.pdf. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1996. The State of Food and Agriculture: Some Macroeconomic Dimensions. https://www. fao.org/3/w1358e/w1358e00.htm. . 2018. Sustainable Food Systems: Concept and Framework. http://www. fao.org/3/ca2079en/CA2079EN.pdf. . 2021. World Food and Agriculture – Statistical Yearbook 2021. https:// doi.org/10.4060/cb4477en. García-Sempere, Ana, Helda Morales, Moisés Hidalgo, Bruce G. Ferguson, Peter Rosset, and Austreberta Nazar-Beutelspacher. 2019. “Food Sovereignty in the City? A Methodological Proposal for Evaluating Food Sovereignty in Urban Settings”. Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 43, no. 10: 1145–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/21683565.2019.1578719. Gliessman, Stephen R. 2006. Agroecology: The Ecology of Sustainable Food Systems. Third ed. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.1201/b17420. Gliessman, Steve, Harriet Friedmann, and Philip H. Howard. 2019. “Agroecology and Food Sovereignty”. IDS Bulletin 50, no. 2: 91–110. https://doi. org/10.19088/1968-2019.120. IPES-Food and ETC Group. 2021. Long Food Movement: Transforming Food Systems by 2045. http://www.ipes-food.org/_img/upload/files/ LongFoodMovementEN.pdf. Kerr, Rachel Bezner. 2020. “Agroecology as a Means to Transform the Food System”. Landbauforschung: Journal of Sustainable and Organic Agricultural Systems 70: 77–82. https://doi.org/10.3220/LBF1608651010000. Kerr, Rachel Bezner, Sidney Madson, Moritz Stüber, Jeffrey Liebert, Stephanie Enloe, Noélie Borghino, Phoebe Parros, Daniel Munyao Mutyambai, Marie Prudhon and Alexander Wezel. 2021. “Can Agroecology Improve Food Security and Nutrition? A Review”. Global Food Security 29 (June). https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2021.100540. Kogo, Benjamin Kipkemboi, Lalit Kumar, and Richard Koech. 2020. “Climate Change and Variability in Kenya: A Review of Impacts on Agriculture and Food Security”. Environment, Development and Sustainability 23. Ku Amir, Ku Nurasyiqin and Bakri Mat. 2021. “Coping Mechanism in Overcoming Food (in) Security among the Community at the Malaysia-

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Thailand Border: A Human Security Perspective”. Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 42: 89–94. La Via Campesina. 2007. “II International Conference of the Via Campesina Tlaxcala, Mexico, April 18-21: Via Campesina”. Via Campesina, 20 September 2007. https://viacampesina.org/en/ii-international-conference-of-the-viacampesina-tlaxcala-mexico-april-18-21/. Mat, Bakri and Ku Nurasyiqin Ku Amir. 2019. “Socioeconomic Factors, Food Supply and Food Security among Communities at the Malaysia-Thailand Border: A Human Security Approach”. International Journal of Supply Chain Management 8, no. 3: 1004–9. Mat, Bakri, Zarina Othman, and Rashila Ramli. 2019. Food Security Policies and Human Security in Malaysia [In Malay: Dasar Sekuriti Makanan Dan Keselamatan Insan Di Malaysia]. Malaysia: UKM Press. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries, Malaysia. 2019. Agrofood Statistics 2019 [Perangkaan Agromakanan 2019]. Putrajaya: Federal Government Administrative Centre. https://www.mafi.gov.my/ documents/20182/273021/Perangkaan+Agromakanan+2019.pdf/196be0d7e223-46fb-88c3-6a592f52b9fe. Patel, Raj. 2009. “Food Sovereignty”. The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 (July): 663–706. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150903143079. Rosset, Peter and Miguel A. Altieri. 2017. Agroecology: Science and Politics. Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies Series 7. Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing; Warwickshire, UK: Practical Action Publishing. Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim. 2008. Climate Change as a Security Risk. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775939. Snapp, Sieglinde, Yodit Kebede, Eva Wollenberg, Kyle M. Dittmer, Sarah Brickman, Cecelia Egler and Sadie Shelton. 2021. “Agroecology & Climate Change Rapid Evidence Review: Performance of Agroecological Approaches in Low- and Middle- Income Countries”. Wageningen, the Netherlands: CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). Sundaram, Jomo Kwame and Tan Zhai Gen. 2019. Achieving Food Security for All Malaysians. Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Research Institute.

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4 Climate Change and Heritage Preservation: A Case Study of the Complex of Hue Monuments Nguyen Ky Nam

Summary:  Climate change has profoundly impacted many heritage sites on Vietnam’s central coast, notably the Complex of Hue Monuments. ■  Heritage conservation has been acknowledged in more recent climate policies. In particular, Vietnam’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement in 2020 realized that the loss of cultural heritage and local knowledge is among the significant impacts caused by climate change. ■  However, measures tackling climate change at the national level are too broad; hence it is challenging to apply them to particular cases, such as the Complex of Hue Monuments. ■  Vietnamese authorities, including central and local governments, have put different policies and measures into practice to safeguard precious cultural heritage. Existing legislative frameworks might not be enough to support the implementation. Therefore, more detailed technical frameworks are needed. ■

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Introduction Climate change has recently become a common concern for the international community due to its profound impacts on socio-economic growth at the global, regional and local scales (Orr et al. 2021, p. 1; Dastgerdi et al. 2019, p. 4). Given their importance in accelerating economic development, cities can play a crucial role in shaping policies for advancing climate ambitions (Jones 2018, p. 63). According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), cities are regarded as drivers of transformative actions because of their ability to handle sectoral, demographic, spatial and ecological challenges of climate change as well as disaster risks (Bartlett and Satterthwaite 2016, p. xxv). Also, cities are increasingly active in promoting and fulfilling agreements such as the Paris Agreement (2015) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Goals (Paris Agreement 2015). These frameworks highlight the importance of urban communities in responding to climate change. Many nations expend significant efforts in creating policies that help to support the most vulnerable social groups and regions (Phuong et al. 2018, p. 518). Many countries have actively fostered knowledge exchange, produced training and educational programmes, promoted social networks and bridged administrative levels and scales in responding to climate change (Armitage et al. 2011, p. 996). One example is through heritage preservation. Studies have pointed out that heritage preservation is considered a vital source of knowledge and scientific information that can inform various environmental and climate change management and policies (Osipova et al. 2018, p. 156). In particular, heritage can support decarbonization through the adaptive re-utilization of historical buildings (Foster 2020). It can improve community identity, cohesion and sense of place in the events of environmental and societal disturbances and disasters (Ghahramani 2020). Some studies paid attention to people’s understanding of past, present and future impacts on cultural heritage, such as historic structures, archaeological sites caused by climate change and solutions to reduce the impacts via climate change adaptation (Fatoric and Seekamp 2017, p. 236). Many heritage sites have been profoundly impacted by climate change on Vietnam’s central coast, notably the Complex for Hue Monuments,

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home to the final royal dynasty in Vietnamese history (1802–1945), located in Thua Thien Hue Province. Vietnam is among the ten nations most at risk of climate change due to its exposure to extreme weather events and possible sea-level rise (Nguyen et al. 2018, p. 750). Sea levels are predicted to rise from 57 to 73 mm by 2100, which might lead to the inundation of 39 per cent of the coastal land in the Mekong River delta in the south, 10 per cent of the Red River delta in the north, and 2.5 per cent of the area in the central coast of Vietnam without proper adaptation (UN Habitat 2014, p. 1). This chapter seeks to examine how climate change policy is used in the national and local legislative frameworks for cultural heritage conservation. Understanding these complex frameworks will further help to identify the gaps and other strategies needed for embedding climate actions and heritage preservation. This study utilizes a qualitative approach using archival review and in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews were conducted with two heritage experts, one heritage manager, and one legal researcher who have been specializing in heritage management and legislative frameworks. Various materials from 1993 to 2021 were also examined, including heritage management plans, disaster risk management plans, planning policy and regulations, and heritage preparedness plans. National and local policies and strategies, flood action plans, and other documents from the case study were also used to inform the analysis.

Climate Risks in the Complex of Hue Monuments The Complex of Hue Monuments has mostly preserved the intact appearance of the Nguyen monarchy, including many citadels, palaces, temples, tombs and other architectural structures. The complex reflects the harmony between humans, architecture and natural landscapes, thus becoming an outstanding example of an eastern feudal capital. As a result, the Complex of Hue Monuments was inscribed as a World Cultural Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at the 17th session of the World Heritage Committee in 1993 (Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee 2015, p. 8). It is one of Vietnam’s eight World Heritage Sites. Unfortunately, the complex is located in Bach Ma and Thua Luu, regions with an annual average rainfall of 2,700 mm and over 4,000

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mm. Noticeably, there is a large proportion of rainfall in the rainy season from September to February, taking up to approximately 70 per cent of the year’s total rainfall. November has the most extensive rainfall, at around 30 per cent of yearly rainfall, leading to flooding and erosion. Many old buildings of the complex are primarily made of heavy wood and tiles, thus are more likely to be vulnerable to torrential rain and flooding. Moreover, the complex is often impacted by a high frequency of storms in April to August and typhoons from September to October from the East Sea every year. The complex is located in the east of Truong Son mountain range in Thua Thien Hue Province which has relatively extreme slopes. Five rivers from the mountains are short and sloping, with a large number of waterfalls in the province (ibid., p. 124). The reports provided by the Hue Monument Conservation Centre and other materials in the local archives uncovered very serious flooding events in 1999 and most recently in 2020. In particular, from 2 November to 7 November 1999, the whole complex was flooded and many buildings were damaged. Different buildings within the

FIGURE 4.1 An Aerial View of the Complex of Hue Monuments

Source: ©Nguyen Quang Ngoc Tonkin, Shutterstock.

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Citadel (Huu gate, Chanh Tay gate, An Hoa gate, Hau gate, Mang Ca gate, Dong Ba gate, Thuong Tu gate, Ngan gate, Phu Van palace, and Nghinh Luong temple) in the forbidden city (Ngo Mon gate, Hoa Binh gate, Hien Nhon gate, etc.) were damaged. The Minh Mang palace was covered in a 30–70 cm layer of mud and the walls of the palace deteriorated (Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee 1999). The complex experienced heavy rainfall of 1,500–2,000 mm from 6 to 13 October 2020 and another intense downpour from 16 to 17 October 2020, resulting in floods. Many sites in the Hue Monuments were destroyed due to the floods, including Nghinh Luong temple, An Dinh palace, Tang Tho palace, the main gates to the Citadel and the Forbidden Citadel, Gia Long palace and Thieu Tri palace (Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee 2020). Based on an onsite interview, one seventy-two-year-old local man shared that “this flooding [2020] is worse than the 1999 flooding since it lasted longer and caused damage for us”.

Vietnam’s Climate Adaptation and Heritage Preservation The government of Vietnam has a strong development agenda. The Communist Party of Vietnam is accountable for all the administrative and political processes and is the sole leader of the implementation of development plans. With regard to climate change adaptation, the national government drives all policy, including steering and establishing measures, decisions, and strategies according to the Party’s approval (Phuong et al. 2018, p. 521). Local governments are able to adopt different technical measures and policies. In the past decades, Vietnam imposed various national measures and policies and adopted some international agreements to tackle the impacts of climate change. In 2008, for instance the Vietnamese government firstly issued (National Target Programme on Responding to Climate Change). This was an initial step to raise awareness and strengthen capacity to tackle climate change (Vietnamese Government 2008). Three years later, the National Strategy on Climate Change was adopted to achieve various sectoral goals which include food, energy, water, poverty reduction, gender equality, social security, community health, living quality, and

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natural resource protection. The strategy specifically pays attention to low-carbon development through international cooperation (Vietnamese Government 2011). or the Law on Environmental ProIn 2014, tection was adopted (Vietnamese National Assembly 2014), creating a legal framework and strengthening the government’s commitment to environmental protection and climate change adaptation. The Vietnamese government also adopted the implementation of the Paris Agreement in 2016 (Vietnamese Government 2016). These climate policies were also designed to ensure a more coordinated collaboration between ministries, departments, and sectors (Huong 2020, p. 2). However, heritage conservation and management were briefly mentioned in the past legal documents in the fight against climate change. More recently, there has been a substantial shift in the Vietnamese government’s efforts in safeguarding historical and cultural assets from climate change. This transformation stems from the country’s increasing interest in managing heritage properties for tourism. The Vietnamese government considers cultural heritage as an integral part of the national adaptation programme for climate change because reducing the impact of climate change in heritage sites would ensure economic gain in the long term (Logan 2014, p. 65). Heritage conservation has been acknowledged in more recent climate policies. In particular, Vietnam’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement in 2020 acknowledged that the loss of cultural heritage and local knowledge was among its major climate change impacts. As a result, the latest National Climate Adaptation Plan of 2021–2030 underlined cultural heritage with serious consideration (Vietnamese Government 2020). One of its objectives is to manage, conserve and upgrade historical and cultural heritage sites to deal with climate change (see Table 4.1). It is expected that the government will continue to determine more specific tasks and duties to achieve these goals. But comparing the latest climate policies with earlier policies, it is clear that measures to address the effects of climate change in the context of heritage and tourism protection are starting to take shape. Moving forward, the national government must facilitate more technical implementation, management, and promotion of these visions at the local level.

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TABLE 4.1 National Climate Adaptation Plan for Heritage Conservation No.

Targets

Tasks

1

Strengthening the capacity to deal with climate change

• Managing, conserving, and restoring cultural heritage sites

2

Improving tourism in the context of climate change

• Reviewing and adjusting plans for tourism sites to adapt to climate change • Improving the capacity to tackle climate change within the tourism sector, particularly in tourist attraction sites • Improving and upgrading the infrastructure of cultural and historical sites to deal with climate change efficiently

3

Conserving and promoting traditional and folk knowledge as ways to adapt to climate change

• Building up and popularizing models that help to support the local communities’ livelihoods and settlements and safeguarding local cultural entities and traditional knowledge in the context of climate change • Registering, collecting, and studying folk knowledge about ways to adapt and coexist with climate change, assimilating knowledge within communities and paying special attention to the role of archivers to inform climate change adaptation policies • Improving the capacity of local officers to conserve and promote intangible cultural heritage values as strategies for environmental protection

Source: Thua Thien Hue, Management Plan of the Complex of the Hue Monument for the period 2015–2020, Vision 2030, June 2015.

Understanding the Institutional Settings Various institutions have been involved in facilitating the implementation of climate adaptation plans and heritage preservation (see Figure 4.2). The National Commission for Climate Change is responsible for studying and proposing measures to adapt to climate change. They report directly

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to the Prime Minister. This institution also has the power to monitor and direct the work between various ministries in dealing with climate change issues (Vietnamese Government 2021). At the ministerial level, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, particularly the Department of Cultural Heritage, collaborates with other ministries such as the Ministry of Resources and Environment. Guided by policy documents such as the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change (MONRE 2008) and the National Strategy on Climate Change (MONRE 2011), these ministries work together to protect the historical and cultural heritage sites from the impact of climate change. Since the implementation process of these polices tends to follow the top-down and centralized approach, the ministries have the power to direct implementation at the lower levels (Phuong et al. 2018, p. 521). Sometimes commands that come from the national level might force the People’s Committees at the lower levels to implement certain policies and measures. At the provincial level, the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee in consultation with the Department of Culture and Sports holds the responsibility in managing and conserving their heritage sites. Under the broad spectrum of national legislative frameworks, the Thua Thien Hue Province has imposed various policies, measures and other plans to fight against the climate change’s impacts. Once imposed, these policies and measures are applicable to a large system of cultural heritage sites throughout the province, including the Complex for Hue Monuments. Other provincial People’s Committees are also responsible for managing, conserving and promoting cultural heritage within their localities. Consequently, the coordination between national level and other lower levels can happen in two ways: first through a top-down approach from national vision to local implementation; second, through a bottom-up feedback channel from the local to the national level, through meetings, reporting, and workshops (ibid., p. 522). One of the prominent examples of a bottom-up approach happened in 2009 when the Thua Thien Hue’s People Committee issued a direct measure to prevent and tackle the impacts of typhoon and flooding. The purpose of this measure was to encourage localities in Thua Thien Hue Province to build up plans to prevent and address the impacts

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FIGURE 4.2 Institutions Involved in Managing the Complex of Hue Monuments

Source: Author’s analysis

of potential flooding, to provide more freedom and rights for localities to address the impacts of flooding swiftly, and to reinforce resilience in vulnerable areas such as coastal, basin, and low-lying areas. Subsequently, the Thua Thien Hue’s People Committee also adopted measures envisioned at the national level such as the Decision on the Action Plan to Handle the Effects of Climate Change in 2014 which ensure climate measures until 2020. The Action Plan to Deal with Climate Change in Thua Thien Hue Province for the period 2021–2030, Vision 2050 has just been adopted in 2021. Based on these guiding and oriented directives and decisions, the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee (2015, p. 29) approved

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the Management Plan of the Complex of Hue Monuments for the period 2015–2020, Vision 2030. The objectives of the plan are to: 1. Identify risks which potentially affect property and propose strategic objectives, management and conservation policies to mitigate those risks; 2. Propose key tasks and requirements, not only for heritage preservation but also for concerned government agencies and stakeholders in the implementation of the socio-economic development projects in the province; 3. Propose an action plan of heritage preservation which includes the clusters of solutions in the period 2015–20 which will be updated in the next five-year term. It is noticeable that disaster risk management is a significant component of the management plan. It targets to increase preparedness and to minimize the economic loss and fatalities when disasters occur. Various measures and regulations are also imposed to: 1. Prepare and prevent the consequences of flooding in the heritage site, particularly the threats of inundation as a result of prolonged rain which may cause damage to the structures, trees, green vegetation and internal roads in the complex. 2. Propose measures of anti-dampness to tackle the high humidity which may lead to serious damage to various buildings, artefacts and historical structures. This should be attended to in the rainy season of September to November. 3. Prevent the damages caused by extreme weather such as lightning and thunderstorms; respond rapidly to emergency cases along the river banks and coastal areas, such as soil erosion occurring near heritage sites. 4. Promote studies and achieve lessons related to local experience and knowledge on climate adaptation and heritage protection. 5. Conduct the regular restoration and consolidation of structures in the heritage property to minimize the risks caused by natural disasters. 6. Create prevention plans for climate change scenarios in the dry season where there are greater risks of drought and forest fires.

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7. Develop a disaster risk management plan and raise awareness of it. Maintain annual updates and establish a mechanism of coordination at various local levels to engage local community in prevention and post disaster solutions. 8. Strengthen the structure of the Provincial Committee for tackling storms and floods; highlight the roles and legal status of the Committee at all levels, from provincial to local level such as communes and wards. 9.  Organize trainings on knowledge and skills in response to natural disasters for management personnel, organizations and individuals and communities. Challenges of the Legislative Frameworks The intersection of climate measures and heritage preservation of the Complex of Hue Monuments requires a lot of coordination. Policymakers, heritage managers and experts from different environmental agencies and organizations raised some challenges in existing policies and measures, and in the technical process. A heritage expert highlighted that measures tackling climate change at the national level are too broad, hence it is difficult to apply them to particular cases, such as the Complex of Hue Monuments. There is also a shortage of specific mechanisms for evaluation and supervision of climate measures. Cultural heritage policies can focus on understanding different landscapes and scales, so that it could better understand the environmental aspects. A legal expert interviewed in this study confirmed that due to the hierarchical nature of the Vietnamese governance system, some of the works related to climate adaptation policies and heritage preservation are overlapping and time consuming. For instance, there is a chain of command, but specific assignments to different agencies are not in place. It may be difficult for local entities such as the Thua Thien Hue People’s Committee to adjust to the expectations of the national governments. As he puts it: “all climate change strategies and measures have to comply with the higher-level guidelines. There are also various managing bodies. Therefore, it is time-consuming and complicated to put climate change policies and measures into practice.” The heritage manager who works for the Complex of Hue Monuments claimed that some local officials working in the heritage

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preservation side have limited knowledge and awareness of measures which might be taken to handle the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage. He expected to have more access to knowledge and guidelines to better integrate climate adaptation and risk preparedness to heritage conservation. Concerning the policy implementation stage, the heritage manager stated that there is a financial problem in the implementation of climate change adaptation plans in the Complex for Hue Monuments. There are sixteen heritage elements which have many smaller components. These heritage assets have deteriorated due to natural hazards, especially tropical storms and annual flooding. Despite the recognition of these risks, national and local budgets have not been allocated sufficiently. Consequently, the Hue Monuments Conservation Centre has faced financial issues which can also be widely seen at many Vietnamese heritage authorities. Another heritage expert who specialized in heritage protection for about twenty years claimed that there is a wide policy gap between individual measures and legal frameworks. For instance, most of the legal documents have emphasized a need to engage local people in the battle against the climate change; however, few programmes have been undertaken to attract local communities to take part in activities such as heritage complex cleaning and tree planting. The local people have rarely been involved in the decision-making and implementation process. Some local communities who live in the vicinity of the heritage site have been blamed for deteriorating the environment. Some have also argued that relocating people from the heritage site would help protect the heritage site. But to be sure, this draconian policy might not be feasible politically and technically. Therefore, there is an urgent call to integrate local communities’ roles and redefine the cultural heritage concept amid the risks of climate change.

Conclusion Vietnamese authorities, including central and local governments, have imposed different policies and measures with the hope of safeguarding precious cultural heritage. The Complex of Hue Monuments as the last royal citadel of Vietnam has drawn much attention from policymakers in the battle against climate change. But existing legislative frameworks to

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fight climate change might not be enough to support the implementation. Therefore, more detailed technical frameworks are needed. Collaboration between national and local institutions in Vietnam remains problematic due to the hierarchical characteristics of policy implementation. Sometimes, duties and responsibilities may be implemented by more than one agency. Coordinating agencies often overlook the implementation because each managing body would assume that others will take responsibility for it. This problem can result in a lack of policy coordination. Finally, financial resources are another pitfall that slows down and prevents climate change policy implementation. The Conservation Centre for Hue Monuments has started to receive a small amount of investment and technical funding from both national and foreign sources. More funds should be given to the heritage site to secure prompt and effective project implementation, as the project continues to grow in the future. References Armitage, Derek, Fikret Berkes, Aaron Dale, Erik Kocho-Schellenberg, and Eva Patton. 2011. “Co-Management and the Co-Production of Knowledge: Learning to Adapt in Canada’s Arctic”. Global Environmental Change 21, no. 3: 995–1004. Bartlett, Sheridan and David Satterthwaite, eds. 2016. Cities on a Finite Planet: Towards Transformative Responses to Climate Change. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. Dastgerdi, Ahmadreza Shirvani, Massimo Sargolini, and Ilenia Pierantoni. 2019. “Climate Change Challenges to Existing Cultural Heritage Policy”. Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland) 11, no. 19. Fatorić, Sandra and Erin Seekamp. 2017. “Are Cultural Heritage and Resources Threatened by Climate Change? A Systematic Literature Review”. Climatic Change 142: 227–54. Foster, Gillian. 2020. “Circular Economy Strategies for Adaptive Reuse of Cultural Heritage Buildings to Reduce Environmental Impacts”. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 152. Ghahramani, Ladan, Katelin McArdle, and Sana Fatorić. 2020. “Minority Community Resilience and Cultural Heritage Preservation: A Case Study of Gullah Geechee Community”. Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland) 12, no. 6: 2266.

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Huong, Tran Thi. 2020. “Vietnam’s Policies on Climate Change: Practical Implementation and Some Challenges”. Xue Bao (Xi Nan Jiao Tong Da Xue, China) 55, no. 4. Jones, Stephen. 2018. Cities Responding to Climate Change: Copenhagen, Stockholm and Tokyo. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Logan, William. 2014. “Making the Most of Heritage in Hanoi, Vietnam”. Historic Environment 26, no. 3: 62–72. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Vietnam (MONRE). 2008. National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change (Implementing the Government’s Decision No. 158/QĐ-TTg dated 2 December 2008). . 2011. National Strategies on Climate Change (Implementing the Government’s Decision No. 2139/QĐ-TTg dated 5 December 2011). Nguyen, An Thinh, Anh Dung Vu, Giang T.H. Dang, Anh Huy Hoang, and Luc Hens. 2018. “How do Local Communities Adapt to Climate Changes Along Heavily Damaged Coasts? A Stakeholder Delphi Study in Ky Anh (Central Vietnam)”.  Environment, Development and Sustainability 20, no. 2: 749–67. Orr, Scott Allan, Jenny Richards, and Sandra Fatorić. 2021. “Climate Change and Cultural Heritage: A Systematic Literature Review (2016–2020)”. The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice. Osipova, Elena, Tim Badman, and Peter Bille Larsen. 2018. “The Role of World Heritage in Achieving Environmental Sustainability: An IUCN Perspective”. In World Heritage and Sustainable Development: New Directions in World Heritage Management, edited by Peter Bille Larsen and William Stewart Logan. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Paris Agreement. 2015. The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations: UNFCCC. Phuong, Le Thi Hong, G. Robbert Biesbroek, and Arjen E.J. Wals. 2018. “Barriers and Enablers to Climate Change Adaptation in Hierarchical Governance Systems: The Case of Vietnam”. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 20, no. 4: 518–32. Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee. 1999. Report No. 313/BC-DT on 12 November 1999 on the Overview of Damage at the Complex of Hue Monuments caused by the Storms and Flooding. Viet Nam: Hue Monuments Conservation Centre. . 2015. Management Plan of the Complex of the Hue Monument for the period 2015–2020, Vision 2030. Viet Nam: Hue Monuments Conservation Centre. . 2020. Report No. 348/BC-UNBD on 17/10/2020 on the Situation and Work to Tackle and Handle the Damage caused by Serious Flooding from 6 to 17 October and the Storm No. 6 in Thua Thien Hue Province. Viet Nam: Hue Monuments Conservation Centre. UN Habitat. 2014. Hoi An — Vietnam: Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Program.

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Vietnamese Government. 2008. National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change. Decision No. 15/2008/QD-TTg, 2 December 2008. . 2011. National Strategy on Climate Change. Decision No. 2139/QD-TTg, 5 December 2011. . 2016. Decision on Issuing a Plan to Implement the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Decision No. 2053/QD-TTg, 28 October 2016. . 2020. National Plan Adapting to Climate Change during 2021-2030, Vision 2050. Decision No. 1055/QD-TTg, 20 July 2020. . 2021. Chức năng và Nhiệm vụ của Ủy ban Quốc gia về Biến đổi Khí hậu [Functions and Duties of the National Commission for Climate Change] http://www2.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/gioithieubanchi dao?optionId=1&governmentId=2856&organizationTypeId=11&committeeId =673. Vietnam National Assembly. 2014. Environmental Protection Law No. 55/2014/ QH13, 23 June 2014.

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Section II Climate Resilience and Urban Governance

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5 The Interplay Between Climate Risks and Ten Years of Urban Development in Ho Chi Minh City Nigel K. Downes

Summary:  Ho Chi Minh City is a prime example of urban climate risk, with one of the highest assessed levels of (future) risk of all coastal cities worldwide.  ■  The city’s urban expansion into low-lying flood plains reduces flood detention and retention capacity, thus increasing flood risks.  ■  Various climate risks to the city have been assessed in the past. However, previous assessments were often limited to purely future scenarios of climatic hazards and undertaken at a city-wide scale, neglecting the distinct finer, structural, and socio-economic heterogeneity that characterizes the city.  ■  Traditional environmental protection approaches such as climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and flood governance need to be integrated in a local or more precise “block-scale” planning. ■

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Introduction Concern for climate change impacts to the cities and urban regions of Vietnam is rapidly increasing due to the compounding effects of natural hazards, climate change and strong urbanization. Unprecedented changes to its cities and regions have played a key role in the country’s economic growth, modernization and poverty reduction strategies. However, disasters and climate change increasingly challenge the sustainable development trajectory not only for the cities themselves, but also of the national and regional economic system. The emerging megacity of Ho Chi Minh City (10°49´ N, 106°37` E), formerly known as Saigon and often abbreviated as HCMC, is characterized by rapid environmental and socio-economic transformations. As Vietnam’s largest city, HCMC suffers from frequent and chronic flooding. Flood events occur individually, but more commonly in combination with high tides and fluvial flow events. Tides along with overburdened or blocked drainage and sewage systems and channel encroachments exacerbate flood risk. The occurrence of localized urban flash and pluvial flooding, a condition where water not being able to enter the drainage system or ejected from the drainage system, following high intensity or prolonged heavy rainfall leading to overland flow and ponding, is a common occurrence on many of the city’s streets. While the city has a long tradition of living and coping with small floods and has built up a certain degree of resilience, events still cause injury, damage to property and infrastructure, as well as interruption of essential services and business supply chains. Such events also cause substantial personal stress and hardship to affected households, particularly for the more vulnerable groups such as the poor and those who live in slums or along the river banks. Past studies have identified HCMC amongst the global coastal megacities most exposed and vulnerable to adverse climate changeinduced impacts (Nicholls et al. 2008). Thus, there is a need to shift the traditional spatial planning approach from merely coping with floodwaters to reducing overall flood risks. Local policymakers are concerned that the city is faced with a projected increase in both the intensity and frequency of pluvial and fluvial flooding, sealevel rise, and extreme heat-waves, while already being confronted with environmental stresses, such as significant land subsidence and uncontrolled rapid urbanization.

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Both the state and the city level People’s Committees have acknowledged apprehensions about current and future risks. The respective policies are elevated high in the government’s agenda, most specifically in the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change, the National Strategy for Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020, Vietnam’s National Green Growth Strategy, the Urban Development Strategy for Vietnam’s Cities to 2050, and HCMC´s Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Action Plan towards 2015 (currently being updated). These parallel documents prioritize improving environmental sanitation, flood proofing and drainage for adaptation. Often ambitious, these large-scale, hard engineering projects such as the proposed ring dike, have long planning horizons, and are repeatedly delayed due to funding shortfalls, site clearance and relocation issues. Yet, despite increasing risk trends, both Vietnamese planners and policymakers are unprepared to either handle future climatic disasters or reduce the associated risks. Frequently, they struggle to develop, analyse, and evaluate timely and adequate practical adaptation responses which would allow for fundamental risk reduction, whilst still enabling important urban development pathways and options for resilient growth. Figure 5.1 illustrates the spatial changes in population densities for the city between 2009 and 2019. While different areas of HCMC can face similar risks, place-based features and inherent response options can dramatically differentiate solutions from one area to another. Urban risks should be viewed as part of the dynamic urban planning and development process. The structure of urban areas has significant impacts on both the biophysical and socio-economic conditions. There is a need for an integrative, yet multidisciplinary understanding of risk scenarios of both climate change and future urbanization. Various studies have assessed climate risks to Vietnamese cities in the past. However, previous assessments were often limited to purely future scenarios of climatic hazards and undertaken at a city-wide or larger administrative scale, neglecting and overlooking the distinct finer, structural, and socio-economic heterogeneity that characterizes cities (Storch and Downes 2011). This situation has become a missed opportunity, given that such knowledge is needed and should play a leading role in risk reduction and adaptation planning. Against this background, this chapter proposes the use of an urban structure type classification to understand ten years of recent urban development

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FIGURE 5.1 Mapped Population Density at Commune Level in 2009 and 2019

Source: National Census 2009 and 2019, respectively.

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(2010–20) in HCMC. Such classification can help to outline the changes to both the urban morphology and socio-economic fabric of the city at the urban block scale. It can further inform policymakers on the socio-economic assets of the city for enhancing resilience and building more dynamic urban planning strategies.

Block-based Urban Structure Type Mapping as an Approach For urban planning purposes, Vietnamese cities are divided into spatial planning tiers representing different levels of aggregation, such as land parcels, blocks, communes and districts. Urban blocks are the smallest and most functional unit of a city’s fabric, representing discrete ways of constructing and occupying areas. Used for both land-use and urban planning and design purposes, blocks have been shaped incrementally over time according to the current views on design and functional needs. Blocks either comprise of single development parcels or aggregate a number of parcels. As such, they can be understood as consisting of a single building structure, an area with several buildings that vary in size, function, detached structures surrounded by nature, or intricate alleyways. Normally, the street network serves as the boundary surrounding each block and provides a contextual frame. Distinct and subtle variations in built urban structural archetypes, derivations from official planned-land use and transitions in densities are all apparent at this level. For these reasons, the urban block is commonly chosen as the spatial unit of assessment for urban structure type (UST) mapping. The concept of UST mapping was established in Germany in the late 1980s to categorize and differentiate urban settlements into various recurring patterns of urban heterogeneity. It has since been widely used as a main spatial indicator for planning and monitoring actions in support of effective and efficient urban policy, programme and plan development (Schneider et al. 2007; Novack and Stilla 2014; Heiden et al. 2012). The concept allows for the spatiotemporal dynamics of areas to be captured to facilitate investigation, and potentially plan interventions across multiple scales. For the year 2010, the author classified 80 distinct USTs to the 16,292 polygons of the official land-use map 2010 for HCMC (Downes et

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al. 2016). While in this chapter, USTs for the year 2020 were classified and assigned to the 77,476 polygons of the digital version of the most recent official adjusted land use plan for HCMC for the year 2020 approved in 2018 (Government’s Resolution No. 80/NQ-CP dated June 6th 2018). Using the same classification scheme and visual interpretation procedure described by my previous study (Downes 2019), USTs for the year 2020 were classified by (i) the dominant buildings such as archetypes, age, construction materials; (ii) the geometry, density and spatial configuration of buildings; (iii) their functional properties based on land-use such as critical infrastructures and agricultural land; and (iv) their environmental properties, for instance the presence and type of associated open space, vegetation and water bodies. However, instead of commercially available satellite imagery used for the year 2010, for the year 2020, free, publicly available images in high spatial resolution from the Google Earth tool were utilized for the interpretation of each block. FIGURE 5.2 USTs for the Year 2020 on the Geometry of the Adjusted Land Use Plan for HCMC till 2020 for the Core Area of the City

Source: Author’s analysis

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Classified USTs were divided into four utilization categories based on their predominant utilization, either of residential, public and special use, industrial, or green and open space and the remainder of street and water networks. Each utilization category was then additionally further sub-divided into UST classes and finally USTs (see Figure 5.2). Figure 5.3 highlights some of the preliminary findings from the comparison of UST changes for the years 2010–20. In total over 18,000 ha of green and open space was lost in the ten-year period, while 2,601 ha of land was seen to be under development. Most of this development sprawl into the low-lying areas around the urban core. In this ten-year time period, preliminary findings show new planned shophouse developments increased by 1,228 ha, new villa developments increased by 168 ha, and new high-rise apartments increased by developments 480 ha. Interestingly, irregular shophousebased UST were seen to increase by 5,434 ha. The amount of land under construction from 2010 and 2020 decreased by 42 per cent from 4,515 ha in 2010 to 2,601 ha in 2020. FIGURE 5.3 Loss of Green and Open Space between 2010 and 2020

Source: Author’s analysis

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Policy Implications Buildings are the most apparent elements of physical development and economic capital, directly affecting a city’s structure. As the classic tale of The Three Little Pigs shows, one of the primary functions of buildings is to provide shelter and to protect residing populations adequately against climate extremes. Traditionally in Vietnam, residential buildings were multi-generational households, inherited over generations and having undergone incremental improvement by progressive expansion or remodelling over time. More recently, land acquisition or newly built residential property is increasingly seen as a long-term, capital-intensive investment, expected to perform for decades into the future. In both cases, residential buildings are often the largest single financial investment people make over their lifetime, which makes the impacts of climate change on buildings significant, both economically and emotionally. Simply put, current and future exposure, risks, and resilience are all dependent upon the decisions on how to use land and the choices that are made regarding which structures are built, their location and at which densities. Therefore, the exposure and sensitivity pattern of each individual development determines the ultimate risk to climatic hazards for the whole city. The urban block scale also promotes the integration of people-centred and place-specific decentralized adaptation options into formal urban planning frameworks. The granularity of urban block mapping can allow policymakers to re-examine development processes and directions. The extent to which an urban structure type can cope with climate change will be determined partly by its existing physical form. The extent of green space, built densities, the amount and layout such as distribution of space around buildings, construction materials, and so on will all matter. For example, low-density urban structures with a lot of green spaces may cope better with high levels of precipitation. In contrast, denser urban structures with less permeable surfaces may well be more likely to flood. The type of soil in a suburb and its roofscape will also affect drainage and runoff. Hence the “response capacity” of any given setting will be conditioned by the range of natural and built environment characteristics that is present in the urban structure.

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For the vast majority of the inhabitants, urban climate change impacts will be experienced predominantly locally, in their own homes and at the local block level. Whilst, other public infrastructures, such as hospitals, water supply infrastructure and waste management are essential for enhancing overall resilience, residential buildings and local neighbourhoods are far more critical, as these are the spaces where residents are concentrated for the majority of their daily life. This characteristic should propel policymakers to build urban climate adaptation strategies targeted at this spatial scale because the impacts on well-being, liveability and safety are significant and highly relevant. The results presented in this chapter highlight the imbalance between climate change and environmental considerations versus the economic growth aspirations apparent in HCMC’s urban planning. As such, there is a pressing need to re-examine and propose new development orientations suitable to the current city structure, yet also adapted to the underlying geography and future climate risks. Directing both developer-driven and private decisions upon UST type (re)development can aid the identification and implementation of solutions to adapt to climate change in a decentralized and synchronous manner. This smaller-scaled focus development can also allow nature-based solutions (NBS), housing and sustainable urban infrastructure provision to dynamically interact. Internationally, NBS are attracting increasing attention. However, both land use planning and construction planning authorities in HCMC has yet to efficiently integrate and enforce such approaches to manage flood risks systematically. The integration of NBS into development and planning cycles may offer benefits to address the multiple challenges the city faces. However it may be cost effective to protect, restrict zones and safeguard the current urban ecosystem services offered by the existing green and open spaces, while at the same time strategically implementing ecosystem service provision coupled with development. The term “ecosystem services” highlights both direct and indirect benefits humans obtained from nature (Birkhofer et al. 2015). The concept applied, and services inventoried for HCMC, would help draw attention to the current benefits that the natural ecosystems provide, and raise awareness for conservation. Revealing their value should in theory entice policymakers and planners to safeguard those

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functions. Currently, the irreversible losses of ecosystem services through both land use and land cover changes are occurring at an alarming rate. While exact figures are hard to come by, financial considerations, the land and real estate market have all shaped HCMC’s recent urban development. Indeed, the city’s municipal budget is financed largely by management and tax revenues based on land yield and land transactions. Agricultural land has too often been seen as a cheap land reserve for development compared to the redevelopment of already serviced or occupied land, which commands higher prices and is more complicated due to lengthy and expensive compensation and resettlement procedures. Here, influential actors often have strategic access to information outside of the public realm, meaning they can acquire well-located land, while negotiating favourable land-use rights. Nevertheless, land should be seen as a finite resource, and actions should be taken to stop, or at the very least minimize the conversion of agricultural land into land designated for other purposes. Here the economic evaluation of the environmental services offered by green and open land needs to be undertaken and incorporated into the drafting of land use plans and the granting of land use rights. To counteract sprawl, land recycling or brownfield development practices, the reuse of abandoned, vacant, or underused land for redevelopment or repurposing in the city core needs to be promoted.

Conclusion Adaptation is unrealizable without improvements in the usability of scientific results for decision-making and their integration into the planning process. Fine-scaled knowledge of urbanization’s spatial, temporal, and sustainability-related attributes are important for understanding the shifting, complex interactions between climate change and rapid urban growth. Traditionally, environmental protection approaches such as climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and integrated water and flood governance have been framed as external to urban development. This chapter argues that they need to be reframed and fully integrated into local level planning and development patterns. But such an approach would require a fundamental change in how Vietnamese authorities implement strategic responses into planning

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frameworks to achieve long-term pathway resiliency. Here, both naturebased adaptation solutions and improved flood governance should be explicitly included in the next revisions of the Vietnamese Land Law and Law on Construction, respectively. Furthermore, to improve and strengthen the local management of land resources in HCMC, an official shared land and real estate information system should be developed to track and manage future development pathways. References Birkhofer, Klaus, Eva Diehl, Jesper Andersson, Johan Ekroos, Andrea FrühMüller, Franziska Machnikowski, Viktoria L. Mader, Lovisa Nilsson, Keiko Sasaki, Maj Rundlöf, Volkmar Wolters, and Henrik G. Smith. 2015. “Ecosystem Services—Current Challenges and Opportunities for Ecological Research”. Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution 2. https://www.frontiersin. org/article/10.3389/fevo.2014.00087. Downes, Nigel K. 2019. “Climate Adaptation Planning: An Urban Structure Type Approach for Understanding the Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Risks in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam”. Doctoral dissertation, BTU CottbusSenftenberg. Downes, Nigel K., Harry Storch, and Le Thanh Hoa. 2016. “Understanding Ho Chi Minh City’s Urban Structures for Urban Land-Use Monitoring and Risk-Adapted Land-Use Planning”. In Sustainable Ho Chi Minh City: Climate Policies for Emerging Mega Cities, edited by Antje Katzschner, Michael Waibel, Dirk Schwede, Lutz Katzschner, Michael Schmidt, and Harry Storch. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-04615-0_6. Heiden, Uta, Wieke Heldens, Sigrid Roessner, Karl Segl, Thomas Esch, and Andreas Mueller. 2012. “Urban Structure Type Characterization Using Hyperspectral Remote Sensing and Height Information”. Landscape and Urban Planning 105, no. 4: 361–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. landurbplan.2012.01.001. Nicholls, R.J., S. Hanson, Celine Herweijer, Nicola Patmore, Stéphane Hallegatte, Jan Corfee-Morlot, Jean Château, and Robert Muir-Wood. 2008. “Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes: Exposure Estimates”. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 1. OECD Publishing. Novack, T. and U. Stilla. 2014. “Classification of Urban Settlements Types Based on Space-Borne SAR Datasets”. In ISPRS Annals of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, Volume II-7, pp. 55–60. ISPRS

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Technical Commission VII Symposium, 29 September – 2 October 2014, Istanbul, Turkey. Germany: Copernicus GmbH. https://doi.org/10.5194/ isprsannals-II-7-55-2014. Schneider, Thomas, Manfred Goedecke, and Tobia Lakes. 2007. “Berlin (Germany) Urban and Environmental Information System: Application of Remote Sensing for Planning and Governance — Potentials and Problems”. In Applied Remote Sensing for Urban Planning, Governance and Sustainability, edited by Maik Netzband, William L. Stefanov, and Charles Redman, pp. 199–219. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-54068009-3_9. Storch, Harry and Nigel K. Downes. 2011. “A Scenario-Based Approach to Assess Ho Chi Minh City’s Urban Development Strategies against the Impact of Climate Change”. Cities 28, no. 6 (December): 517–26. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2011.07.002.

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6 Building Climate-Resilient Communities: A Cursory Review of Selected Local Climate Action Plans in the Philippines Kristoffer B. Berse and Elton Evidente

Summary: The Philippines Climate Change Act 2009 mandates local government units (LGUs) to plan and prepare for climate change by developing a local climate change action plan (LCCAP).  ■  This study examines the planned climate change adaptation (CCA) and mitigation (CCM) activities of selected cities in the Philippines as reflected in their LCCAPs. ■  The study has shown that the LCCAPs of selected cities have substantially addressed the priority areas identified in the national climate change adaptation plan (NCCAP). ■  There is a clear commonality among the policy areas to address water sufficiency and knowledge and capacity development to combat climate change. On the other hand, actions related to ensuring sustainable energy were the least consistent among the reviewed local governments.  ■

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Introduction Climate change has significant impacts on urban life. Rising global temperatures cause sea levels to rise, increase the number of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts and storms, and increase the spread of tropical diseases. In the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, expansion of urban areas was estimated to be on average twice as fast as the growth of the urban population. Consequently, the expected increase in urban land cover during the first three decades of the twenty-first century will be greater than the cumulative urban expansion in history with more than half of the global population residing in urban areas, compared to only 13 per cent in 1900 (Arias et al. 2021; Seto et al. 2014). This anticipated growth in urban population and development entails exponential growth of urban infrastructure, which directly stimulates the increase of emissions across multiple sectors. As noted above, the average per capita CO2 emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized countries is five times larger than those in developing countries. The Philippine’s archipelagic nature and geographic location have made its cities highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, natural hazards, and environmental degradation. Metro Manila, the national capital region, is at high risk from extreme weather events such as typhoons and floods, as it has exposure and vulnerability. Metro Davao, the largest urban agglomeration in the island of Mindanao, as well as the cities of Cebu, Tacloban, and Iloilo in the Visayas, are likewise exposed to climate change impacts (HUDCC 2016). Indubitably, the effects of climate change are experienced uniquely at the local level. Thus, in the Philippines, local government units (LGUs) are mandated to formulate Local Climate Change Action Plans (LCCAP) for their respective jurisdictions. As provided for in the Philippine Climate Change Act of 2009 (Republic Act 9729), the LCCAP contains the list of programmes, projects, or activities that LGUs intend to undertake over a certain period to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and at the same time deal with the ongoing impacts of climate change. Ultimately, the goal is to mainstream climate action in key local development plans of the Philippines such as the Land Use Plans, Investment Programmes, and Sectoral Development Plans or the Comprehensive Development Plan.

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To date, while most LGUs in the Philippines have developed their LCCAPs, there is little knowledge as to what kind of initiatives cities have identified to combat climate change and how these fit into their development agenda. No systematic assessment has been done so far that could inform academic and practitioner discourses on the link between city-level climate planning and resilient urban development, thus making monitoring and evaluation of achievement hard to do. Therefore, understanding how local climate actions are framed and prioritized could indicate a city’s readiness and fragility to face a changing climate. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to examine the planned climate change adaptation (CCA) and mitigation (CCM) activities of select cities in the Philippines as reflected in their LCCAPs. Through a thematic content analysis of selected local climate change action plans, the study aims to draw lessons to identify gaps and areas for improvement. Policy and planning recommendations are envisioned to be put forward to enhance the overall resilience of cities to climate change impacts in the context of the Philippines. The first part provides an overview of the impacts of climate change on Philippine cities, particularly analysing the difference between sudden and slow-onset climate events. It is followed by a brief description of the legal and policy contexts for local climate change planning in the country. The third and main part then analyses and discusses the contents of the LCCAPs according to the seven priority areas identified in the Philippines’ National Climate Change Action Plan 2011–2028, namely, food security, water sufficiency, ecological stability, human security, climate-friendly industries and services, sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development.

Planning and the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda Planning for local climate action in the Philippines is shaped not only by the country’s internal policies vis-a-vis climate change, it is also influenced by international frameworks, especially the so-called Post-2015 Development Agenda adopted in 2015–16. Formost among them is the Paris Agreement, which was adopted in December 2015 at the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21/CMP1) convened in Paris, France (see Annex 6.1). For cities,

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this means that they need to transition to climate-neutral communities where sustainable initiatives are at the forefront of urban governance with low-emitting urban activities. The Paris Agreement aligns with the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were adopted by the United Nations in September 2015 as a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet from further degradation, and ensure the general well-being of all people to enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. The associated targets of SDG 13 focus on the integration of climate change measures into national policies, the improvement of education, awareness-raising, and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warnings. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Sendai Framework) was the first major agreement of the post-2015 development agenda and provides Member States with concrete actions to protect development gains from disaster risks. It recognizes the collective role of states, sub-state (i.e. local governments) and nonstate actors (i.e. civil society, private sector) in reducing disaster risk and building long-term resilience. The Sendai Framework specifically identifies the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction parameters as an important target, including the impacts of climate change in developing policies and plans.

Philippine Policies on Local Climate Action Planning The primary basis for local climate action planning in the Philippines is Republic Act 9729, otherwise known as the Climate Change Act of 2009. It is the central basis of the requirement of each LGU to plan and prepare for climate change by developing a Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP). The National Framework Strategy on Climate Change further directs LGUs to align their local climate plans with national policies such as the NCCAP and to integrate their LCCAPs into local development plans. The National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) outlines the country’s agenda for adaptation and mitigation for 2011–28. It prioritizes food security, water sufficiency, ecological and environmental stability, human security, climate-smart industries and services,

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sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development as the strategic direction for 2011–28. To facilitate the mainstreaming of climate change in local development planning, in 2014, the Local Government Academy of the national Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) MC 2014-135 or the DILG memorandum circular on the Guidelines on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plan (Local Government Academy 2014) clarified the roles and responsibilities of LGUs in delivering their mandate as provided under RA 9729 (amended by RA 10174). DILG further published the first LGU Guidebook on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plans (see Annex 6.3). DILG has also begun providing capacity building and training services for LCCAP formulation, but it has limited capacity to reach more than a target of 1,500 cities and municipalities across the country. The Climate and Disaster Risk Assessment (CDRA) introduces a systematic process for identifying the climate vulnerability and disaster risks of an area by identifying the characteristics of the people, urban areas, agriculture, forestry and fishery production areas, critical point facilities, lifelines and other infrastructure associated with natural hazards and climate change. This tool allows LGUs to better understand natural hazards and climate change and how these would likely alter the development framework of the locality, and helps them identify priority decision areas and development challenges posed by climate change and natural hazards. While the CDRA was formulated primarily for the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) preparation (see Annexes 6.2 and 6.3), LGUs will also benefit from its findings in the development of their strategies under the LCCAP. It must be noted, however, the CDRA has a limitation. The LCCAP precedes the creation of the CDRA, hence, most cities have developed their LCCAP in the absence of a thorough climate and disaster risk assessment through the CDRA process.

Overview of Local Climate Planning Performance As of 2020, the DILG reported that 1,394 LGUs have formulated their respective LCCAPs, accounting for 82 per cent compliance rate overall. Among cities and municipalities, this translates to

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81 per cent, while for provinces, 85 per cent (see Table 6.1). It must be noted that under RA 9729, provinces are not explicitly mandated to produce their own LCCAP. As provided for in Section 14 of the law, provincial governments are merely expected to provide technical assistance, enforcement, and information management in support of municipal and city climate change action plans. TABLE 6.1 Compliance Rate of Local Government Units in the Philippines in Preparing Local Climate Change Action Plans Local Government Unit

Region

Province National Capital Region (NCR)

City/ Municipality

LCCAP Compliance Record Province

City/ Municipality

Overall Compliance

N/A

17

N/A

15

88%

Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)

6

77

6

68

89%

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)

5

113

4

76

68%

Ilocos (R1)

4

125

4

115

92%

Cagayan Valley (R2)

5

93

4

79

85%

Central Luzon (R3)

7

130

6

117

90%

CALABARZON (R4A)

5

142

5

111

79%

MIMAROPA (R4B)

5

73

6

62

85%

Bicol (R5)

6

114

6

73

66%

Western Visayas (R6)

6

133

4

102

76%

Central Visayas (R7)

4

132

3

89

68%

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TABLE 6.1 (continued) Eastern Visayas (R8)

6

148

4

122

85%

Zamboanga Peninsula (R9)

4

71

2

61

84%

Northern Mindanao (R10)

5

93

5

84

91%

Davao (R11)

5

49

5

43

89%

SOCCSKSARGEN (R12)

4

50

3

46

91%

Caraga (R13)

5

73

5

61

85%

82

1,628

70

1,324

82%

TOTAL

Source: DILG Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) and Direct Submissions to CCC.

It is important to note that although there is some degree of success in the LGU’s LCCAP compliance, the quality of its content and the validation of thematic directions listed on their LCCAP needs in-depth analysis, which is what this study hopes to jumpstart.

Analysis of Priority Areas in Select Local Climate Action Plans The study looked at six cities clustered into three categories, namely, Highly Urbanized Cities, Peri-urban Cities, and Coastal Municipalities. This is to provide a cursory analysis of how local governments of varying characteristics and risk factors design their climate change interventions. The comparative profile of these cities is shown in Table 6.2. By priority area, CCA and CCM interventions were reviewed according to the seven sectors identified in the Philippines’ National Climate Change Action Plan, 2011–2028, namely, food security, water sufficiency, ecological stability, human security, climate-friendly industries and services, sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development. The results of this thematic analysis are described below and summarized in Annex 6.4.

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TABLE 6.2 Comparative City Profiles of Select Local Government Units Name

Type

Category

Population*

Land Area (Has)

Annual Income** (Million)

LCCAP Timeline

Quezon City

City

Highly urbanized

2,960,048

7,355

17,000

2021–50

Caloocan

City

Highly urbanized

1,661,584

5,334

4,380

2017–25

Cavite

City

Peri-urban

100,674

2,480

411

2013–16

Batangas

City

Peri-urban/ Coastal

351,437

28,300

1,885

2018–28

Belison

Municipality

Coastal

14,129

1,978

47

2015–25

Dingalan

Municipality

Coastal

27,878

39,994

98

2019–28

* 2020 Census ** 2016 Annual Revenue Source: Various statistic data

Findings 1: Highly Urbanized Cities (HUC)—Quezon City and Caloocan Attributable to the city’s development history to be the metropolis’ government centre, Quezon City is a prime example of a wellfunded HUC with the capacity to partner with technical experts in the development of its LCCAP. It is the only LCCAP reviewed for this study that has incorporated the seven sectors identified in the country’s NCCAP with corresponding thematic analysis present in the document. Quezon City’s Enhanced Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP) 2021–2050 encapsulates the City’s commitment to ambitious climate actions that deliver mitigation, adaptation, and equitable benefits to all its citizens. It integrates the scientific and evidence-based analyses and methodology followed through the C40 Climate Action Planning (CAP) Programme and ensures the City’s alignment with climate neutrality and resilience by 2050 (Local Government of Quezon City, UK Government, and C40 Cities 2021).

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FIGURE 6.1 Location Map of Quezon City (left) and Caloocan (right)

Source: Adapted from Google Map, authors’ analysis.

The city’s mitigation goal is to reduce GHG emissions by 30 per cent by 2030 compared to the projected business-as-usual scenario which is equivalent to 3.6 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) reduction in 2030, and commit to pursuing net-zero emissions by 2050. Part of its climate change mitigation efforts is the promotion of a circular economy and green, energy-efficient, and resilient buildings throughout the city, especially in government-owned facilities. This is coupled with securing clean and affordable renewable energy access. There are also clear indications to reduce emissions through a clean and efficient local bus rapid transit system and by paying particular attention to the energy efficiency of government-owned vehicles. Active transport through expanded cycling and walking is likewise promoted, which comes with health-related co-benefits. The city’s adaptation measures include urban farming, localized food production, and green and gray infrastructure to curb the impacts of extreme floods, urban heat island effect, and drought. There is also particular attention to safe and resilient housing and public infrastructure to protect the most vulnerable. On the other hand, Caloocan’s LCCAP indicates that the city envisions a climate-risk resilient city with healthy, safe, prosperous, and self-reliant communities; and thriving and productive ecosystems, by building the adaptive capacity of communities and increasing the

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resilience of natural ecosystems to climate change, and optimizing mitigation opportunities towards sustainable development. It did not indicate any GHG reduction target by a certain period. This does not mean, however, that it does not have mitigation measures. Its GHG-reducing activities include installing energy-efficient lighting in government offices, streets, pathwalks and alleys, promoting e-bicycles and tricycles, landscaping and greening of medians and sidewalks, regular maintenance of government-owned vehicles, and improving anti-smoke belching operations (Caloocan City, City Planning and Development Department 2016). In terms of CCA, Caloocan has set its eyes on improving water use efficiency and conservation through technology (e.g. rainwater harvesting systems and water reuse), behavioural and pricing solutions, and incentives. It also aims to promote urban farming by distributing vegetable seeds. Findings 2: Peri-urban Cities—Cavite and Batangas As a city at the fringes of Metropolitan Manila, Cavite’s LCCAP pays particular attention to food security and water sufficiency through research and development on climate-smart cropping, livestock and aquaculture technologies, production systems, climate-resilient crop varieties, livestock management, and best practices. It also identified the need to train farming and fishing communities on CCA and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and to develop new water supply sources based on a viable provincial land use plan, including importing water from nearby provinces. Cavite City also intends to further build its capacity by allocating internal funds for CCAM, institutionalizing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and identifying local champions at both city and community levels. While the city’s GHG emissions reduction target is not indicated in its plan, it aims to review and harmonize policies on, inter alia, trade, investment, environment, tourism, and agriculture, in order to provide a stable and unified policy environment for the development and expansion of climate-smart industries and services (Provincial Government of Cavite 2012).

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In response to the call for climate action, Batangas City has committed to reducing its GHG emissions through mitigation initiatives set in its GHG Management Plan (2014). The overall goals of their LCCAP envision the city to be a carbon-neutral state with a yearly reduction of 25 per cent from 2014 to 2030. Batangas seeks to do this by designing low carbon neighbourhoods by improving building and equipment energy efficiency, such as using LED lights and appliances and other low carbon energy sources for buildings and industry. There is also particular attention to scale up the use of solar energy in Isla Verde, a geographically isolated and disadvantaged island community. Rolling out biogas digesters for pig farms and deploying and utilizing climate-smart transportation has also been a priority there. Batangas City envisions itself to be a city of land management that respects the carrying capacity of natural resources and guarantees that development is within the assimilative capacity for solid waste and other pollutants from human activities. It also seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the city to extreme weather events. As such, their LCCAP identifies as CCA measures the promotion of low-carbon crops and cropland management practices, livestock and pastures management, coastal clean-up drives, and mangrove reforestation. FIGURE 6.2 Location Map of Select Peri-urban Areas: Cavite City (left) and Batangas City (right)

Source: Adapted from Google Map, authors’ analysis.

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Findings 3: Coastal Municipalities—Belison and Dingalan As a coastal municipality, the goals of the Municipality of Belison’s LCCAP are anchored on building adaptive capacities of their local communities; increasing the resilience of vulnerable sectors and natural ecosystems to climate change; and optimizing mitigation opportunities towards gender-responsive and rights-based sustainable development. These include crop rotation in coastal agricultural areas, mangrove reforestation, reef protection, and household water conservation. As an adaptation measure against extreme weather events, the city pushes for the installation of early warning devices, conduct of communitybased training on disaster preparedness, and concreting of climateresilient roads as emergency lifeline services (Local Government of Belison 2014). Similarly, Dingalan’s LCCAP revolves around their vision of being a disaster-resilient community with healthy environment, and thriving and productive ecosystems. The locality intends to achieve this by building the adaptive capacity of their communities and increasing the resilience of their natural ecosystems to climate change. Their adaptation measures encompass improving water use efficiency and conservation, solid waste management, and wastewater infrastructure. The municipality is also keen on ensuring that new settlements are accessible by all-weather roads and located away from vulnerable areas (e.g. waterways, powerlines, road-right-of ways, etc.) (Local Government of Dingalan 2018). The plans of both Belison and Dingalan did not indicate any GHG reduction targets, although they mentioned measures that are meant to reduce emissions. For Belison, the localization of building codes to adjust building design, especially houses, according to local climatic conditions is an identified area for action. Green building designs such as energy efficiency (e.g. natural lighting and ventilation) and construction methods (e.g. prefabrication and off-site construction) are likewise promoted in Dingalan’s LCCAP. Additionally, the municipality seeks to reduce GHG emissions by promoting electric vehicles, planning for an efficient transport system to minimize trip generation, encouraging non-motorized transport (e.g. cycling and walking), and supporting alternative energy

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sources that will minimize the need for transmission and distribution infrastructure. FIGURE 6.3 Location Map of Select Coastal Municipalities: Belison (left) and Dingalan (right)

Source: Adapted from Google Map, authors’ analysis.

Conclusion The study has shown that the LCCAP of cities have substantially addressed the priority areas identified in the NCCAP. There is a clear commonality among the policy areas to address water sufficiency and knowledge and capacity development to combat climate change. On the other hand, actions related to ensuring sustainable energy were found to be the least consistent among the reviewed local governments (see Annex 6.4). It is also interesting to note that only two out of six local authorities have clearly indicated their GHG emissions reduction target, although all have identified climate change mitigation measures in one way or another. This chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the state of local climate action planning and the quality of corresponding plans in the Philippines. It merely seeks to provide a snapshot of the policy areas that are addressed in the LCCAPs of a select group of cities in the country. It would be good to expand the analysis to more, if not all, local governments in the country. Quantitative content analysis may be undertaken to analyse how cities understand each of the policy areas in the NCCAP.

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This study hopes to contribute to current academic discourses on local climate action planning. At a practical level, the findings here may inform the programming and design of technical assistance and capacity building to further enhance the climate change strategies of local governments in the Philippines and elsewhere. References Arias, Paola A. et al. 2021. “Technical Summary”. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Caloocan City, City Planning and Development Department. 2016. “Caloocan City 2017–2025 Local Climate Change Action Plan”. Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). 2016. HABITAT III: The Philippine National Report and New Urban Agenda: Better, Greener, Smarter Cities in an Inclusive Philippines. Republic of the Philippines: HUDCC. Local Government Academy. 2014. LGU Guidebook on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP). Pasig City: Local Government Academy. Local Government of Belison. 2014. “Municipality of Belison Local Climate Change Action Plan 2015–2025”. Local Government of Dingalan. 2018. “Municipality of Dingalan: Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP) 2019–2028”. Local Government of Quezon City, UK Government, and C40 Cities. 2021. “Quezon City Enhanced Local Climate Change Action Plan 2021–2050”. Provincial Government of Cavite. 2012. “Province of Cavite Local Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2016”. Seto, Karen C., Shobhakar Dhakal, Anthony Bigio, Hilda Blanco, Gian Carlo Delgado, David Dewar, Luxin Huang, Atsushi Inaba, Arun Kansal, Shuaib Lwasa, James E. McMahon, Daniel B. Müller, Jin Murakami, Harini Nagendra, and Anu Ramaswami. 2014. “Human Settlements, Infrastructure and Spatial Planning”. In Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Ottmar Edenhofer, Ramón Pichs-Madruga, Youba Sokona, Jan C. Minx, Ellie Farahani, Susanne Kadner, Kristin Seyboth, Anna Adler, Ina Baum, Steffen Brunner, Patrick Eickemeier, Benjamin Kriemann, Jussi Savolainen, Steffen Schlömer, Christoph von Stechow, and Timm Zwickel. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

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ANNEX 6.1 Policy Frameworks for Climate Action in the Philippines Framework

Notable Components

Post-2015 Global Development Agenda Frameworks Paris Agreement

1. It aims to keep a global temperature rise for this century well below 2 degrees Celsius, with the goal of driving efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 2. It also aims to increase the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, and at making finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathway.

17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 11, SDG 13)

Two SDGs stand out, in particular, which call for local action to combat climate change and ensure the sustainable development of cities. SDG 13 aims to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impact” while acknowledging that the UNFCCC is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change. One of the targets under SDG 13 is to integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies, and planning; and to promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in the least developed countries and small island developing states—particularly on women, youth, and local and marginalized communities. On the other hand, SDG 11 sets out the establishment of sustainable, resilient, and inclusive cities and communities. Part of this target is the protection of lives and livelihoods, as well as health, of the people from the effects of disasters, including ones that are aggravated by changing climate. SDG 11 specifically calls for the increase of the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels.

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ANNEX 6.1 (continued) National Legislation and Related Policies Climate Change Act of 2009

Mainstreams climate change into government policy formulations, establishes the Framework Strategy and Program on Climate Change, and institutionalizes the Climate Change Commission (CCC) as the primary agency for national climate action. Local Climate Action Planning

DILG Memorandum Circular on the Guidelines on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plan (DILG MC 2014-135)

Provides guidelines on the steps and processes in the formulation of their LCCAP, and illustrates the process of mainstreaming and integrating DRR and CCA in local mandated plans.

CLUP Guidebook: Supplemental Guidelines on Mainstreaming Climate Change and Disaster Risks in the Comprehensive Land Use Plans (2015)

The then Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) produced a supplementary guidebook for comprehensive land use planning that aims to incorporate climate risk and vulnerability assessment in the process through this CLUP Guidebook where it streamlines CCA-DRR components into the CLUP and eventually the Zoning Ordinances through the Comprehensive Development Plan.

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ANNEX 6.2 Mainstreaming CCA-DRR into the CLUP Formulation Diagram

Source: Adapted from CLUP Guidebook: Supplemental Guidelines on Mainstreaming Climate Change and Disaster Risks in the Comprehensive Land Use Plans (2015).

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ANNEX 6.3 CDP to LCCAP Process Diagram

Source: “LGU Guidebook on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plans (LCCAP)”, Local Government Academy DILG, Pasig City, 2014.

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ANNEX 6.4 Summary of Priority Areas Addressed in the LCCAPs of Select Local Authorities SECTOR

Quezon City

Caloocan

Cavite

Batangas

Belison

Dingalan

Food Security

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

None

Water Sufficiency

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Ecological Stability

✓

✓

None

✓

✓

✓

Human Security

✓

✓

✓

None

✓

✓

Climatefriendly Industries and Services

✓

None

✓

✓

✓

✓

Sustainable Energy

✓

✓

None

✓

None

✓

Knowledge and Capacity Development

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

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7 The Role of International City Networks in Advancing Cities’ Climate Ambitions: A Case Study of Jakarta Nila Kamil and Sayel Cortes

Summary: Global climate governance is shifting from a state-centric to polycentric mode. Cities and city networks play a central role in polycentric climate governance. ■  Cities and city networks cooperate in a symbiotic relationship in pursuing climate goals. ■  This study highlights that Jakarta directly benefits from its cooperation with the C40 Climate Leadership Group (C40), the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and CityNet. At the same time, these city networks’ subsistence and relevance depend on their roles in fostering collaboration.  ■  The question remains on how this cooperation can effectively assist the Government of Jakarta to achieve its climate change mitigation and adaptation targets and develop a more robust and effective climate action policy in the future.  ■

92

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Introduction  For decades, states were seen as the main actors in the concerted global effort to tackle climate change (Kern and Mol 2013). Countries engaged in multilateral forums such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) or the Group of 20 (G20) at the international level. Countries also participate in regional organizations such as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the Economic and Social Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the African Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the regional level. However, scholars argued that state-centric and prolonged negotiation processes yield only incremental progress, if at all. Under the climate negotiation process, decisions were agreed upon at a slow pace (Hovi and Skodvin 2017; Downie 2012; Falkner et al. 2010); mistrust and contested issues exist, for example on differentiated responsibilities and capabilities between developed and developing countries (Dubash 2009; Wang and Gao 2018), and lack of legally binding and accountability mechanism lead to less ambitious commitment by countries (Hovi et al. 2016; Gupta et al. 2021). Under the Paris Agreement, the climate regime has applied a combination of top-down and bottom-up systems based on participating country’s national and sectoral initiatives. The initiatives are translated to mitigation and adaptation measures adopted and implemented by networks of international, regional, national, and subnational public and private actors (Jordan et al. 2018; van der Heijden 2018). This can be characterized as polycentric governance, where multiple independent decision-making processes centre on a common goal, and self-organize through cooperation, competition, and conflict resolution (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 2010). In polycentric governance, political authority is dispersed while independent actors adjust their actions, acting as a system (Dorsch and Flachsland 2017; Jordan et al. 2018). The shift from state-centric to polycentric approach has given momentum to the rise of non-state actors in the climate arena (Cole 2015; Chan et al. 2016), with cities and city networks among the most prominent actors. Cities have been widely considered as an important player in driving climate commitments (Fuhr et al. 2018; Kosovac et al. 2020; Smeds and Acuto 2018; Jordan et al. 2018; Johnson 2017).

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Their involvement in the climate regime is an excellent example of polycentric governance where they act independently in organizing themselves to meet global climate goals (van der Heijden 2018). As cities take on this impactful role, climate city networks have also gained traction by connecting city governments with global climate agendas. The importance of cities in climate action was first recognized in the Local Agenda 21 adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992 (Fuhr et al. 2018). Following this recognition, the number of climate city networks promoting city-to-city and city-to-other-organizations cooperation had increased (Acuto and Rayner 2016). City networks are diverse in form, size, focus and scope (ibid.) with functional differentiation related to geographical distribution, central players, mitigation ambition and monitoring provisions (Bansard et al. 2017). This diversity offers multiple ways and means to support cities’ climate policy, operationalized through city networks’ programmes in which members participate. The programmes offered by city networks may be customized to adapt to cities’ specific needs. As cities participate in these programmes, they are committed to making certain efforts and providing resources in exchange for benefits supporting their climate policies (Cortes Berrueta and van der Heijden 2021).  The relationship between city and climate city networks reinforces the shift toward a polycentric climate regime. However, how cities in the global south cooperate with city networks and how these collaborations advance their climate actions remains understudied. By taking the case study of the City of Jakarta in Indonesia and its relationship with three city networks which are the C40 Climate Leadership Group (C40), the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and CityNet, this chapter explores how city and city networks cooperate and whether this cooperation has improved Jakarta’s climate actions. The data used in this study were sourced from semi-structured interviews with Jakarta’s local government officials, Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment and Forestry officials, and representatives of the three city networks in Indonesia. In sum, nine interviewees participated in interviews conducted between July and September 2021. The interview results were supplemented by and triangulated with analyses of documents and regulations on Jakarta’s various climate plans and policies, and academic and grey literature on cities and climate city networks. The authors manually coded and

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classified the data to interpret and analyse them before systematically presenting the results and drawing conclusions. 

Jakarta’s Climate Actions and Policies Notoriously known as “the fastest sinking city” (Augustin 2020), Jakarta is one of the most vulnerable cities to the severe impacts of climate change. The Greater Jakarta Region is a low-lying delta through which thirteen rivers flow for water discharge to the Jakarta Bay in the north. Due to this topography, flooding has occurred for centuries. However, this problem has gravely intensified over recent decades due to extreme weather events such as rainstorms and higher precipitation rate; seawater intrusion; soil compaction caused by road, housing and building construction; and a lack of water catchment areas in general (Triyanti et al. 2020). About 40 per cent of Jakarta’s northern area has already sunk below sea level due to sea-level rise, combined with land subsidence resulting from excessive underground water extraction (World Bank 2011). Jakarta’s densely populated areas, which houses about ten million inhabitants in the Special Region and about thirty million in the Greater Region, is also prone to the urban heat island effect. Temperature data points out the stark difference of temperatures between urban districts and their surrounding rural regions. Unsustainable urban planning and design, high mobilization within and between the Special and the Greater Region leading to heavy congestion, and lack of green open spaces, have contributed to the increase of surface temperatures (Siti 2016; Manik and Syaukat 2021). These problems also worsen other environmental aspects of the city such as increased air pollutants and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, impaired water quality, compromised human health and comfort and increased energy consumption (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008)—all of which further contribute to humaninduced climate change. To tackle the severe impacts of climate change, Jakarta’s provincial government developed the Jakarta Climate Action Plan in 2012. This development followed Indonesia’s 2009 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26 per cent from the business-as-usual baseline using the national budget and a further reduction of 41 per cent with international support. This pledge, targeted to be achieved in the year 2020, was institutionalized

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through two Presidential Regulations (PR). The first is PR number 61, year 2011, on National Climate Action Plan which underlined that each province in Indonesia should also develop a local climate action plan. The second is PR number 71, year 2011, on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Inventory and Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of the climate action taken (Government of Indonesia 2011a, 2011b). These mandates provided a legal basis for a more ambitious climate pledge by the city of Jakarta. The government of Jakarta stated its commitment to reduce emissions by 30 per cent in 2030 from a businessas-usual baseline, with 2005 as the baseline year. This commitment, regulated through Governor Regulation number 131, year 2012, translates to an equivalent of 34.18 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions reduction. The identification and development of mitigation measures are assisted and supervised by the Ministry of National Development Planning, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. To implement this target, Jakarta’s government cooperates and coordinates with other stakeholders such as local agencies and work units, state-owned companies, business sectors, accreditation bodies, academia, civil society, and most importantly, city networks. Jakarta’s GHG emissions come mostly from transportation (Rayda 2021). Other sectors such as energy generation and waste and land-use change also have a significant impact. Therefore, mitigation measures in the Jakarta Climate Action Plan entail activities that focus on the energy sector, such as reducing emissions from the Bus Rapid Transit, introducing a green building programme, using LED energysaving bulbs for street lighting, and adding biodiesel buses for public transportation. In the waste sector, the government introduced the use of biogas and integrated solid waste management at Jakarta’s largest landfills Bantar Gebang along with the 3R (reduce, reuse, and recycle) programme and integrated wastewater treatment. In the land-use sector, the government focuses on replanting, reforestation, and creating more green open spaces (Sagala 2012; Bappenas 2014). On adaptation measures, protecting coastal areas, promoting awareness of climate and health-related problems, climate-proofing city infrastructure, developing climate-resilient settlements, and sustainable water management are some of the priorities (Boer et al. 2013). Following the ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016, the Indonesian government updated their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The nine strategies for NDC implementation laid

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out programmes to build the ownership, capacity and commitment of cities and other non-party stakeholders (Government of Indonesia 2021). In line with this updated national pledge, the government of Jakarta updated its climate action plan and committed to reach net zero by 2050 (United Cities and Local Governments Asia-Pacific 2021), a decade earlier than the national net zero target planned for 2060. The updates are regulated through the Jakarta Gubernatorial Regulation number 156, year 2018, on Local Sustainable Development Action Plan and the Gubernatorial Instruction number 17, year 2021, on Control of Climate Change impact (Interviews 1, 2, and 3).  However, in 2020, less than 10 per cent of emissions reduction has been achieved, compared to the 30 per cent emissions reduction target in 2030 (Interview 6). Interviewees revealed that the low achievement is due to the many challenges in implementing the Jakarta Climate Action Plan. These challenges include competing systems, regulation and guidelines on actions and MRV between the Ministry of Development Planning and Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The lack of coordination between central and local agencies and among local agencies as well as the lack of personnel’s capacity and number of officials dedicated to carry out the activities and monitor the progress of implementation also hamper the progress. Data unavailability and insufficiency are also one of critical areas that need to be improved (Interviews 2, 4, 5, and 6; Kamil et al. 2021). 

Jakarta’s Relation with C40, ICLEI, and CityNet Despite the identified challenges, Jakarta’s government continues to carry out its climate action plan. Led by Governor Baswedan, who demonstrates a strong commitment to environmental issues and an aspiration to make Jakarta a leading city in the climate arena (Berita Jakarta 2021), the city government strives to achieve its climate action goals and tackle existing challenges. One of the ways to tackle the challenges and strengthen Jakarta’s regional and international position is to cooperate with city networks, such as C40, ICLEI and CityNet. The specific strategies and roles of Jakarta in these networks are adjusted to the characteristics and focus areas of the network. C40 is a network that connects megacities across the globe to address climate change. C40 aims to promote effective collaboration

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among its members, support sharing knowledge and best practices, and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change.1 In line with the Paris Agreement, C40’s current mission is to halve the collective carbon emissions of their members by 2030 while improving the resiliency, sustainability and liveability of cities. In doing so, C40 has supported the development and updating of Jakarta’s climate action plan since 2017. The support includes technical assistance to calculate GHG emissions inventory, estimate mitigation potential and identify adaptation needs (Interview 5). The Ministry of Environment and Forestry has also developed a centralized online system to report GHG emissions. C40, along with academic consultants, helped Jakarta’s government officials improve the quality of GHG data and information, baseline calculations, and uncertainty analysis of the data. The improved inventory is used to update Jakarta’s mitigation activities. C40 also assisted Jakarta’s government officials in setting priorities for the already listed mitigation and adaptation activities considering the cost and “low-hanging-fruit” potential of such actions based on other city members’ experiences and best practices.  Meanwhile, ICLEI aims to support metropolitan and middlelevel cities through coordination, alignment, knowledge sharing and furthering urban agendas. Three role patterns that ICLEI fulfils include (1) knowledge distribution roles, namely translator, educator and integrator; (2) relational roles, particularly connector and mediator; (3) game-changing roles, including path-breaker and co-creator (Frantzeskaki et al. 2019). Since C40 has already provided technical capacity assistance, ICLEI assisted Jakarta in public engagement of climate-related programmes. ICLEI helped in advancing certain components of the Jakarta Climate Action Plan, particularly widening the engagement with relevant stakeholders, communicating and raising awareness of the programmes, and developing guidelines for monitoring and measuring mitigation activities implementation (Interview 6). An online platform for Jakarta’s citizens to state their individual emission reduction commitment called Ikhtiar Jakarta (translated as Jakarta’s Initiative) is among the programmes facilitated by ICLEI.2 The output of this initiative will inform future updates of Jakarta’s climate action plan (Interview 6). Lastly, ICLEI encourages its member cities to disclose their carbon emissions and mitigation measures on the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) online platform.3

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Established in 1987, CityNet is an organization of urban stakeholders committed to sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region that includes over 170 municipalities, NGOs, private companies and research centres.4 With a strong focus on capacity building, CityNet targets small and middle cities under four thematic subgroups: climate change, disaster, sustainable development goals, and infrastructure (Interview 9). Jakarta has a well-established presence in this city network. One of its representatives serves as a long-time Deputy Secretary-General on whom the CityNet Secretariat relies for strategic advice. This position also gives Jakarta preferable access to CityNet Secretariat and partners. Jakarta is also a long-time leader of the Climate Change Cluster, which coordinates at least one activity per year on Climate Change for the cluster members. As of 2021, the Climate Change cluster is the biggest cluster at CityNet, consisting of seventy-one CityNet members (Interviews 7 and 8). Our findings show that the cooperation with city networks has helped improve the Jakarta Climate Action Policy and strategies and address its implementation challenges. The improvements made are two-fold: outward and inward. Outwardly, Jakarta’s cooperation with city networks helped build its brand and position as city climate leader vis-à-vis the rest of the members of the city networks. Depending on which city network it is cooperating with, Jakarta can act as an exemplary model that shares best practices and experiences within smaller networks or as a city that needs support and assistance to implement its climate action plans. This characteristic implies that city networks offer cities different roles and options to position themselves in the international climate arena, facilitating the city’s aspiration to solidify its leadership status. Inwardly, the leadership position that Jakarta holds in CityNet has helped the city to showcase its serious commitments and maintain its brand and status. By engaging as a non-leader in other networks, Jakarta can still gain access, support, and actionable information from other cities. As this chapter elaborates in the previous section, the support may come in the forms of finance, knowledge and technology, capacity building, and widened opportunities for international networking and partnership (Antara News 2021). Such support provides political authority to Jakarta’s leaders and senior government officials to adopt ambitious climate targets and more robust activities so that Jakarta can elevate

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its leadership position to the same level as other global leading cities. Another observable benefit of Jakarta’s relation with the city networks is the knowledge and acknowledgement gained through climate action transparency.  ICLEI and the CDP online platform help foster transparency and understanding of climate action taken or planned to be taken by the city government. Information disclosure may further benefit the government of Jakarta by helping identify the risks and opportunities in tackling climate change, tracking activities implementation progress, and improving stakeholder’s participation. These indirect benefits could, in turn, lead to the improvement of both local and global climate conditions and governance (Mejía-Dugand et al. 2016). On the other hand, city networks also benefit from having Jakarta as their member. Since Jakarta is a megacity, having Jakarta as a member raises the regional relevance of city networks, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As knowledge-sharing platforms, the city networks are enabled to get access, collect, and share Jakarta’s information and best practices with other city members. They have also benefitted from influencing Jakarta’s climate-related projects that support their subsistence and further increase their relevance in the climate arena. To attract more members, city networks must have three types of benefits: prestige, knowledge to share, and opportunity to have an impact on the ground. However, our findings indicate that different city networks engage with Jakarta for different reasons. For example, C40’s support for the city government can be interpreted as making concrete transformation in cities in the global south because it already has many prominent cities as its members. CityNet, on the other hand, benefits more from the prestige and knowledge of Jakarta to attract and help other smaller cities in the region. Cities have different power in different networks to influence the network and benefit themselves. Despite these direct and indirect benefits for both Jakarta and the three city networks, the question remains on the extent to which the cooperation enables Jakarta to deliver its mitigation and adaptation activities, meet its target within the allotted time, and develop a more robust and effective climate policy in the future. Jakarta’s updated climate policy and regulations can be attributed to the leadership of the (present) Governor, the national ambition and commitment, and the global demands for stronger roles of cities. Governor’s leadership role is critical to enhancing green credentials; however, concerns remain

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on how to sustain programmes amid political changes. Jakarta retains direct election for governors every five years, and an elected governor holds tenure for a maximum of two terms. While the cooperation with the three city networks described above has helped to build Jakarta’s image and capacity to improve climate data accounting and monitoring, community engagement and awareness raising, it has not solved the challenge of insufficient resources or inter-agencies lack of coordination significantly. Jakarta is still dependent on the national climate infrastructure with competing systems and regulations. Unfortunately, the project-based cooperation with city networks has much more periodical, irregular, and thematic initiatives instead of a strengthened institutional framework within the city government’s office.

Conclusion The global climate regime shifting from state-centric to polycentric governance makes cities increasingly play a prominent role in tackling climatic change. As one of the largest megacities in the world that is particularly vulnerable to the severe impacts of climate change, Jakarta needs to scale up its climate action plan and policy implementation. For this matter, cooperation with city networks is deemed as timely and vital. City networks offer diverse benefits and opportunities to Jakarta to improve its climate action policy and exercise its agency internationally. While direct benefits are manifested as an improved image and capacity for the city government, indirect benefits come in the form of networking opportunities, access for support, and a platform for exercising leadership, which eventually will advance climate actions and policy implementation. Such opportunities can be seen as a way for cities to overcome limitations from the national government to achieve goals, and exercise their authority by working as a system under the horizontal relations within city networks. However, whether and to what extent cities are enabled to exercise this authority depends on the governance system in their particular country. Does the increased city government’s capacity lead to efficiency in data management, more effective community engagement or well-established international cooperation? Does stronger leadership equal stronger agency and autonomy to adopt, finance, and implement climate actions?

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To respond to those questions, further research that includes wider case studies of city engagements with international networks are needed. More empirical evidence is crucial to be able to develop an understanding of city networks roles and how they function and operate. As the role of city networks in advancing various climate agendas will only increase in the future, it is timelier than ever to critically evaluate the implications of city network cooperation. Notes 1. https://www.c40.org (accessed 18 September 2021). 2. Ikhtiar Jakarta, https://lingkunganhidup.jakarta.go.id/ikhtiarjakarta/id (accessed 24 November 2021). 3. https://www.cdp.net/en (accessed 18 September 2021). 4. https://citynet-ap.org/ (accessed 28 September 2021).

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8 Knowledge Systems Approach to Democratic Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Historic Environments Virajhita Chimalapati Summary: ■

 Historic urban landscapes are complex, dynamic, linear systems with infinite

interconnections and relationships working with, alongside and against each other. ■  Floods or flash floods can be seen both as manifestation of disruptions across multiple intersections that comprise the urban environment and a consequence of the systems behaving exactly as they were designed to. ■  This chapter explores the possibility of using flood mitigation and management strategies and approaches, not just as a means to solve problems but as vehicles of systemic change by looking at flood mitigation and management practices in George Town, Chennai, India and George Town, Penang, Malaysia. ■  The official strategy towards flood mitigation and management in both George Towns has been a technology-centred approach focused on engineering resilience into existing systems to enable them to face perturbations and come back to equilibrium. There is a lack of acceptance of community knowledge and collective intelligences within flood mitigation measures. ■  The knowledge systems approach, envisaged as a five-phase cyclic dynamic feedback loop, recognizes the need to look beyond improving and collating existing knowledges, towards “co-creating” new knowledge systems.

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Introduction Cities are complex systems with “infinite interconnections” (Burns 2007), and contain systems and subsystems, working with, alongside and against each other (Flood 2010). Historical cultural landscapes connect complex knowledge systems, tangible and intangible, of the past in the present. Urban flooding is seen as a systemic problem and a manifestation of disruptions within these complex systems and their connections (Rehman et al. 2019). Article 6 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations 1992) enshrines the promotion and facilitation of “public participation in addressing climate change and its effects”. Mitigation and management of urban flooding demand multi-pronged solutions that include all parts of the government, civil society, media, public and private sector organization and all levels of the community. However, decision-making processes that do not recognize the subtleties and complexities of the social, cultural, political and economic patterns only pay lip service to the idea of the community engagement process. Such simplistic approaches to participatory decisionmaking has resulted in the exclusion of the economically and socially vulnerable frontliner, facing the brunt of urban climate change impacts from participating in the decision-making process. This chapter explores the possibility of using flood mitigation and management strategies and approaches, not just as a means to solve problems but as leverage of systemic change. It explores how flood management strategies can be used to transform existing systems of knowledge and support societal transformations by looking at urban flooding mitigation and adaptation practices within two similar and yet very distinct presidencies of the British East India Company: George Town Penang, Malaysia, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and George Town, Chennai. It observes that the current strategies for and approaches to flood mitigation and management are fragmented and much focused on engineered and structural solutions, and do not take into account “community knowledge and collective intelligences” (Chan et al. 2004; Carpenter et al. 2006) to enable a more effective and holistic solution. This chapter then proposes a need to look beyond improving and collating existing knowledge to co-create new knowledge systems and new ways of acting, that are much more open, democratic and co-define what is good, right and beautiful (Fazey et al. 2020).

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Historical Urban Landscapes as a Complex System A system could be described as a whole, consisting of two or more parts, that cannot be divided into independent parts or subgroups of parts. A social system is described as one that is open (it is affected by external conditions or events), is driven by a purpose of its own and, both contains and is contained by other systems, each of which have purposes of their own (Flood 2010; Ackoff 1994). A complex system is an arrangement of related but various elements, and comprised of intricate relationships and interconnections, between multiple, dispersed and independent systems (Wingmore N.d.). Cities are “agglomerations of social links” (Offenhuber and Ratti 2014). They are results of multiple iterations “of growth, crisis, transformation, renewal” and regeneration (Fiksel 2006; Gunderson, Holling and Light 1995). Urban landscapes are complex structures resulting from the interaction of humans and their environments, and are a physical reflection of urban identity (Kaymaz 2013). Historic

FIGURE 8.1 The Geographic Connection Between George Town, Chennai, India and George Town, Penang, Malaysia

Source: Adapted from Google Maps.

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urban landscapes represent the complex layering of social, cultural, economic, infrastructural, spatial, biological and topographical systems, embedded in space and time (Offenhuber and Ratti 2014). They represent the multiple interconnections created in the past that give a city its current shape and form. Historical urban landscapes are thus constituted by multiple systems and sub-systems of knowledge that embody the complex interconnections between the diverse components and systems within a city. These systems function interdependently, independently or sometimes in contradiction to each other.

The Historic Urban Landscapes of George Town, Chennai and George Town, Penang This chapter examines the historic urban landscapes of George Town, Chennai and George Town, Penang as case studies. In 1639, a chain of events culminated in the construction of a “fortified warehouse” christened Fort St. George in an uninhabited locality known as Muthialpet: the first fortified British trading settlement in India. This warehouse became the nucleus for other settlements and trading activity, making Chennai a lynchpin of the maritime trade networks across South and Southeast Asia (UNESCO n.d.b). Muthialpet and the area around it, was rechristened George Town in 1911, by the British, in honour of King George V, when he was crowned the Emperor of India (Muthiah 2012). George Town is the business, commercial and administrative centre of Chennai, one of the four major metropolitan cities in India and the administrative capital of the state of Tamil Nadu. Meanwhile, by the end of the eighteenth century, increasing investments by English merchants in ships, shipping and trade activities in shipbuilding and other activities centred around Chennai and Kolkata, and the incredible lucrativeness of the luxury goods trade created a necessity to safeguard military and strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca. There was also a need for the establishment of a port-of-call within the Straits of Malacca to cater to the ships traversing these maritime routes (Ooi 2015). This necessity, led to the acquisition of a small turtle-shaped island in the Andaman Sea, by Francis Light in 1786. A town was established, in the north-eastern corner of the island, on a swamp and called George Town after the then Prince of Wales. George Town

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evolved into a “remarkable example of multi-cultural trading towns” and a “living testimony to the multi-cultural heritage and tradition of Asia”, and together with Malacca, has been listed as UNESCO World Heritage Cities on the Straits of Malacca, in 2008 (UNESCO n.d.a). George Town is also the capital city of the state of Penang, one of the most highly urbanized and densely populated regions of Malaysia (Connolly 2020).

Urban Flooding as a Symptom of Complex Systemic Disruption Floods can be described as the inundation of flood plains or terrains outside the major water confined river channels (Rossi et al. 2012). Flash floods are a phenomenon characterized by the massive discharge of water, following five to six hours of heavy rain. Flooding is one of the common hazards in urban landscapes and accounts for one-third of all natural catastrophes in the world (Dewi 2007). Urban flooding is linked to loss of life and livelihoods, destruction of property, severe long term and short term economic setbacks, especially in developing countries (UNDP 2004). Urban flooding is a manifestation of disruption across multiple, intersectional urban systems comprising the urban environment (Fiksel 2006). Historic urban landscapes are usually located at the intersection of coastal and/or riverine flood plains and are prone to extreme weather events. Over recent years, the increased frequency in extreme precipitation events has increasingly affected historic urban areas, leading to physical, social and cultural consequences (Gandini et al. 2018). Interactions between floods and society are complex, multidimensional and increasing in frequency as climate change increases flood risks and are linked to exponentially increasing flood costs, both direct and indirect (Woodruff et al. 2021). Bearing the brunt of these impacts are the economically and socially marginalized and vulnerable communities, living in flood-prone areas and eking out subsistence from climate-sensitive activities and resources. These communities are also custodians of knowledge and participants within systems of knowledge, that have been created and imbibed with generational and experiential information on how to anticipate and cope with extreme weather events.

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George Town, Chennai George Town, Chennai, is located on the banks of the Bay of Bengal, with two major water bodies: Cooum and Elambore, flowing near it. It is bounded on the north by the Buckingham Canal. Seasonal rivers and rain-fed lakes cater to Chennai’s water needs, and Chennai has always been a water-deficient city. Chennai also lacks a natural gradient for free-runoff (Gupta and Nair 2010) and needs well-designed stormwater drainage to deal with existing rainwater run-off. A complex and interconnected network of wells, temple tanks and man-made lakes called “erys” work in tangent with traditional city planning, to direct the substantial seasonal rainfall received during monsoon, forming the traditional mechanism of ground water recharge. This interlinkage also worked to protect the urban fabric from seasonal flooding. Contemporary urban planning processes have turned a blind eye to this system. This disregard, when combined with extreme groundwater extraction, the lack of an adequate storm water drainage, the clogging of existing water channels and construction on existing watersheds has culminated in Chennai being subject to substantial flooding even when exposed to the slightest of rainfalls (Ahmed and Kranthi 2018) and has resulted in a FIGURE 8.2 The Inundation in Chennai in 2015

Source: ©Nikhil Mehare, Shutterstock.

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sinking city that oscillates between intense water scarcity and extreme floods through a calendar year. In November 2015, Chennai witnessed the highest levels of rainfall in a hundred years, resulting in more than 300 people losing their lives and an estimated loss of three billion Indian rupees (INR) in damages. Nearly 56 sq. km. of the built fabric was inundated in this time (ibid.). A lack of understanding of water plains, flood pains and flood sinks within spatial planning policies and decisions combined with ad-hoc construction has resulted in developmental patterns that have shrunken river mouths, encroached on river banks, and blocked natural drainage pathways. This strained system, when faced with unprecedented volumes of rainfall that far exceeded the designed capacities, felt dearly the absence of an effective disaster management plan and an early flood warning system; and resulted in the devastation that saw the city grind to halt for a few months at least (Ravishankar 2016). November 2017 saw a similar waterlogging and flooding situation, associated with loss of at least 340 lives and nearly US$3 billion dollars of losses in damage to property. Indirect costs, associated with loss of livelihoods, inflation and disruption of patterns of life, when included, would push these estimates even higher. George Town, Penang Penang Island is a small island comprising largely hilly terrain. Land reclamation from the sea has been a historical process of addressing the demands of development for the land starved state (Khalil et al. 2011). Floods in George Town, Penang, have been frequent events, especially in the September–November season, coinciding with the inter-monsoon period. When combined with daily tidal oscillations that impede upstream flows, extreme weather events cause an overflow along the floodplain channels and result in floods during heavy rainfalls (Sathiamurthy and Chan 2006). The loss of mangrove swamps, which acted as a natural flood retention area to urbanization and reclamation, when combined with highland topography and high surface runoff from non-permeable surfaces, necessitates the immediate discharge of rain water. However, the tidal intrusions result in impediments to this discharge, and when combined with complex human-induced flow regulation like canalization, tidal gates etc., lead to flooding (Shuy 1989). Each flooding event has been associated with spending on

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mitigation projects and systems of storm drainage being actively put in place or upgraded to ensure speedy recovery and reduce flooding (Khalil et al. 2011; Osman et al. 2021). Penang experienced a total of 119 incidents of flash floods between 2013 and 2017 (Dermawan 2017). Changes in river channel from natural to concrete channels (Shuy 1989), construction on the watersheds, blockages in the storm water discharge drains and storm water inlets have been identified as the main causes of flooding. The flash flood experienced was the worst in the state’s history, impacting 119 areas state-wide and nearly 6,000 people (Osman et al. 2021). In November 2017, two separate storm systems: one from Vietnam, Typhoon Damrey, and another over the Northern Straits of Malacca, converged over Penang. Simultaneously, a second vortex was being created by the cold north-easterly winds from the gulf of Thailand, meeting the warmer winds from the Indian Ocean and the Andaman sea. Penang experienced rainfall of over 900 mm between 3 and 6 November 2017 when 500 mm was the monthly average for the FIGURE 8.3 The Inundation in Penang in 2017

Source: ©Loes Kieboom, Shutterstock.

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month of November. Waterlogging and flash floods were seen all over George Town. Consecutive landslides were seen in Penang Hill, with damage to heritage properties and loss of access to the hill resulting in stranded families (Diong et al. 2018).

Resilience as a Characteristic of Complex Systems Increasing flood resilience demands careful solutions that include as many stakeholders as possible to co-produce incremental, impactful, and intersectional solutions. The official strategy towards flood mitigation and management in George Town, Penang has been a technology-centred approach, with investments focusing on flood control, flood forecasting and early evacuation systems (Chan et al. 2004). Additionally, investments in technology are significant scale investments being made in structural flood mitigation measures, including improved drain systems, alteration in planning and development policies and state-led reforestation and regeneration of coastal environmental systems. In Chennai, over the past years, greater efforts have been invested in clearing flood channels and dredging drains, and helping reduce the intensity of the floods. Civil organizations working with reviving temple tanks and “erys” are gaining traction with city development authorities in recent times, resulting in faster recovery from intense rainfall. Encroachments and construction into existing water bodies and the blocking of river mouths by sand bars have been identified as primary causes of flooding (Warrier 2017). Currently, the Penang City Council (Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang) has nearly thirty-seven flood mitigation projects, following the impact of the November 2017 floods, which includes a drainage master plan, regular dredging of rivers, disaster mitigation programmes and weather monitoring. In addition, large-scale investments are being made in a better early warning system, in setting up a dedicated disaster management unit at the state level and infrastructure modelling and planning within local and structural plans, to minimize the impacts of these weather phenomena. However, a lack of trust between the vibrant, pro-active and engaged community and civil society organizations and the municipal and development authorities has become evident, resulting in them working out of sync with each other.

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Resilience is a multi-dimensional concept and has been recognized as “a critical characteristic of complex dynamic systems” (Fiksel 2006). When resilience is sought to be engineered into a system, the focus remains on building robustness and on increasing capacity towards anticipating perturbations and recovering from them, in order to maintain an existing equilibrium. This focus on engineering resilience and maintaining existing equilibrium has resulted in mitigation measures, and interventions that result in unintended and unfavourable consequences: both direct and indirect, while failing to recognize the collective intelligences of the communities at the frontline of these impacts or involve them within the implementation of these policies. There has been growing realization that focus on anticipation of disasters and resistance to disruptions is only increasing vulnerability and widening inequalities (Carpenter et al. 2006). Malaysia, for instance, has a rich tradition of local adaptation methods, local community support systems and proactive and engaged community and civil society networks (Chan et al. 2004). However, all governmental strategies are focused on communicating “awareness and preparedness”, rather than “in the co-production of knowledge” or in the “co-creation of solutions”. There is also a lag in official communications, especially in the midst of disasters, leading to communities placing greater trust within themselves, than in the state systems and in the new technologies (Reuters 2021). The lack of acceptance of “community-knowledge” and an absence of recognition of the community’s responses to flood mitigation works in tandem with the lack of trust within the communities about the efficacy of the development authorities to create action plans. As a consequence, this lack of trust on both sides result in much fragmented interventions. Meanwhile, studies indicate that disaster preparedness can only work if all the affected groups: the authorities, the affected population, the researchers and civil society organizations work together and join forces to enter into a partnership, working towards the realization of a shared vision (Dewi 2007).

Making a Case for Ecological Resilience The idea of ecological resilience focuses on enhancing the adaptive capacity of the ecosystem and finding new equilibria (Carpenter et al. 2001). Ecological resilience can perhaps help to expand the definitions

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of resilience and “awareness” to include “collective thinking” and more “plural understandings of development”. The pandemic has brought the need for a systemic reset and the finding of new equilibria collaboratively and inclusively. The historic urban landscape approach already looks at the city as a network of knowledge systems associated with tangible and intangible layers that are documented through rich material, written and oral; and traditions and ways of being embedded into people’s lifestyles. They hark back to ways of life that were in sync with the natural environment and a part of a complex ecosystem that recognizes the cyclic rhythms of nature. Traditional knowledge systems are interdisciplinary and managed by local people, who think of and manage their environment as a whole. They are dynamic and represent a continuous process of experimentation, innovation and adaptation (Sillitoe 1998; Jigyasu 2015). While it is recognized that systems of knowledge and ways of life have been constantly been evolving, the knowledge systems approach recognizes the need to look beyond existing ways of being and improving and collating existing knowledge(s) to co-create “new” knowledge systems that are much more open, democratic and co-define what is “good”, “right” and “beautiful” (Fazey et al. 2020).

New Systems of Knowledge Mitigation measures to complex issues like urban flooding demand a full understanding of systemic implications. They need transformational and future looking solutions, that are holistic and depend on a “coproduction of knowledge” and a resetting of existing systems. Such a reset which can lead to societal transformations can only stem from new systems of knowledge that are able to recognize and reject tendencies of hierarchy and exclusion within existing systems of knowledge and build bridges across existing systemic inequalities to create a more equitable dynamic (Systems & Us n.d.). We live in the age of information: information and data is abundant and scattered, generated by the multiplicity of technology. The need of the hour is to transform this data and information into narratives (ibid.). When these narratives are diverse, inclusive, shaped by and draw from lived experience, they transform into knowledge. Such knowledge is not only able to understand the cause and effect relationship between development and change, but is also able to

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break free of the patterns of behaviour that are a legacy of inherited systemic inequalities and systemic suppressions to create action plans that will look beyond stabilizing existing systems and look towards finding a new equilibria (Brody 2003). Drawing from the work of Chin and Forge in Malacca: “We begin by listening: Listening to the young; listening to the old. Listening to the shopkeepers and craftsmen, traders and fishermen (…) We begin by listening to those who are often not heard. And to countless more who often dare not speak” (Chin and Jorge 2006). The knowledge systems approach recognizes that the existing urban environment is a complex interaction of knowledge at multiple levels. It also recognizes that existing disruptions are not just the result of broken systems, but also the consequences of the systems behaving exactly as they were designed to, given the capabilities of their parts and the goals of their agents (Brody 2003). It recognizes the presence of conflict and duplication within flood mitigation plans (Birchall and Bonnett 2021), places people at the focal point of implementation efforts and seeks to establish synergies between lived experiences and technological advantages to allow for a dynamic planning process: where social media and app ecosystems can create instant feedback loops that facilitate continual revisions and adaptations (Brody 2003). It also looks at technology as a disruptor, breaking through inherent patterns of silences and creating new platforms where multiple voices can hold their own and co-create a solution that recognizes this diversity of lived experiences. This standpoint would help in the understanding of the site level implications of planning decisions and the consequential waterfall of systemic repercussions. A knowledge system approach would focus less on modelling and more on “collaborative meaning making” (Checkland and Poulter 2006). It looks at existing systems and asks what platforms and mediums can enable a richer understanding of the complexity of issues and therefore strengthen existing networks, disconnect redundant networks, and generate new capacities for action. It seeks to expand ideas of democracy (My Future York n.d.) to move beyond “awareness generation” to “collective intelligence”, allowing many people to cooperate in one process, leading to reliable action. A knowledge systems approach aims to design and activate a dynamic feedback loop that enables a more pluralistic understanding of the development and creates connections that enable immediate

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understanding of the impacts of an action and course correction as necessary. This loop is envisaged as a five-phase cyclic process, that allows people to effectively collaborate with flood mitigation and management processes, bringing in lived experiences and in-built community networks to work with structural improvement measures, to understand how new ways of “equilibria” can be “co-created”. The five-step process involves the following: Discussions Create platforms and spaces for discussions that will facilitate an understanding of existing lifestyles and daily activity patterns and thus improve understanding of how these patterns contribute to and are disrupted by extreme weather events. These discussions involving diverse demographics and participants can also create platforms for understanding existing community support systems and how governance structures can support and strengthen these systems and networks. It also creates platforms to understand how structural investments in flood mitigation and management measures can also improve the quality of life within urban environments. FIGURE 8.4 Diagram Representing the Knowledge System Approach

Source: Author’s illustration

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Participation Creating platforms for discussion would also encourage participation from different and diverse stakeholders within the environments. It would also help recognize those members of the community who have been traditionally invisible, because of diverse challenges, including caregiving and traditional patterns of exclusion and silence. Technological platforms and the focus on these members within discussions, especially when the focus remains on understanding patterns of life, could also allow diverse voices and multiple perspectives to be included. Empowerment Creating multiple platforms for discussion, allowing the inclusion of diverse voices, and creating opportunities for their inclusion would be a first step in understanding how existing decision-making patterns are exclusionary and how these exclusions can be rectified. Creating spaces for new inclusions and voices within decision-making processes is also the first step within building trust between governance structures and meaningful systemic measures and communities at the forefront of disruptions caused by extreme weather events. Communication The processes of discussion, participation and empowerment allow the opening up of communication channels that facilitate the co-creation of multi-dimensional indicators for improvement and growth. Open channels of communication and the empowerment of diverse community members to participate in decision-making allow for understanding multiple effects of an action and encourage course correction where necessary. Monitoring and Improvement The knowledge system approach focuses on seeking regular feedback and facilitating constant communication. As the process gets increasingly inclusive and plural, diverse voices and dimensions of development and approaches to equilibrium come forth. The strength of collective intelligence and diverse knowledge is in forging new paths, facilitating newer platforms for discussions, and creating multiple modes of participation, thus empowering communities as they shift activity patterns and redefine lifestyles.

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Conclusion George Town of Chennai, India and George Town of Penang, Malaysia are two historic urban cultural landscapes intertwined historically and culturally with each other. This chapter looks at these historic urban environments as complex systems. It recognizes that flooding is as much a consequence of the systems behaving precisely as they were designed to, as it is a symptom of systemic disruptions. This chapter looks at the flood mitigation and management practices in both the cities and observes that current urban flood mitigation and management strategies are fragmented and focused on engineered and structural solutions and do not consider “community knowledge and collective intelligences”. This chapter then identifies that effective flood mitigation and management in historic urban environments could also be leveraged to harness the power of technological platforms that could democratize participation through the facilitation of co-decision making and the creation of opportunities for dialogue. It also proposes applying the knowledge systems approach as a five-stage dynamic feedback loop to enable a more pluralistic understanding of the development, thus creating connections that enable immediate understanding of the impacts of an action and course correction as necessary. References Ackoff, Russell L. 1994. “Systems Thinking and Thinking Systems”. System Dynamics Review 10, nos. 2–3: 175–88. https://doi.org/10.1002/sdr.4260100206. Ahmed, C. Faiz and Natraj Kranthi. 2018. “Flood Vulnerability Assessment using Geospatial Techniques: Chennai, India”. Indian Journal of Science and Technology 11, no. 6. https://doi.org/10.17485/ijst/2018/v11i6/110831. Birchall, S. Jeff and Nicole Bonnett. 2021. “Climate Change Adaptation Policy and Practice: The Role of Agents, Institutions and Systems”. Cities 108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.103001. Brody, Samuel D. 2003. “Are We Learning to Make Better Plans? A Longitudinal Analysis of Plan Quality Associated with Natural Hazards”. Journal of Planning Education and Research 23, no. 2: 191–201. https://doi. org/10.1177/0739456X03258635. Burns, Danny. 2007. Systemic Action Research: A Strategy for Whole Systems Change. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.

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Carpenter, Stephen R., Elena M. Bennet and Garry D. Peterson. 2006. “Scenarios for Ecosystem Services: An Overview”. Ecology and Society 11, no. 1: 29. https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art29/. Carpenter, Steve, Brian Walker, J. Marty Anderies, and Nick Abel. 2001. “From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?” Ecosystems 4: 765–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9. Chan, Ngai Weng, Nor Azazi Zakaria, Aminduddin Ab Ghani, and Tan Yen Lian. 2004. “Integrating Official and Traditional Flood Hazard Management in Malaysia”. Rivers ’04, 1st International Conference on Managing Rivers in the 21st Century: Issues and Challenges: 409–19. Checkland, Peter and John Poulter. 2006. Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft Systems Methodology and its Use for Practitioners, Teachers and Students. Wiley. Chin, Lim Huck and Femando Jorge. 2006. Malacca, Voices from the Street. Selfpublished. Connolly, Creighton. 2020. “From Resilience to Multi-species Flourishing: (Re) imagining Urban-Environmental Governance in Penang, Malaysia”. Urban Studies 57, no. 7: 1485–1501. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018807573. Dermawan, Audrey. 2017. “Penang records 119 Flash Flood Incidences since 2013: State Govt”. The New Straits Times, 2 November 2017. https://www. nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/11/298299/penang-records-119-flash-floodincidences-2013-state-govt. Dewi, Anggraini. 2007. “Community Based Analysis of Coping with Urban Flooding: A Case Study in Semerang Indonesia”. Thesis submitted to International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Netherlands. Diong Jeong Yik, Yip Weng Sang, Nursalleh K. Chang, Fadila Jasmin Fakaruddin, Ambun Dindang, and Muhammad Helmi Abdullah. 2018. “Analysis of the Cyclonic Vortex and Evaluation of the Performance of the Radar Integrated Nowcasting System (Rains) during the Heavy Rainfall Episode which caused Flooding in Penang, Malaysia on 5 November 2017”. Tropical Cyclones Research and Review 7, no. 4: 217–29. https://doi.org/10.6057/2018TCRR04.03. Fazey, Ioan et al. 2020. “Transforming Knowledge Systems for Life on Earth: Visons of Future Systems and How to Get There”. Energy Research and Social Science 70. Fiksel, Joseph. 2006. “Sustainability and Resilience: Toward a Systems Approach”. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy 2, no. 2: 14–21. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/15487733.2006.11907980. Flood, Robert Louis. 2010. “The Relationship of ‘Systems Thinking’ to Action Research”. Syst Pract Action Res 23: 269–84. Gandini, Alessandra, Iñaki Pieto, Leire Garmendia, José T. San-José, and Atzibar Egusquiza. 2018. “Adaptation to Flooding Events Through Vulnerability

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Mapping in Historic Urban Areas”. The International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, Volume XLII-3/W4. GeoInformation for Disaster Management (Gi4DM), 18–21 March 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. Gunderson, Lance H., C.S. Holling and Stephen S. Light, eds. 1995. Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Gupta, Anil K. and Sreeja S. Nair. 2010. “Flood Risk and Context of Land Uses: Chennai City Case”. Journal of Geography and Regional Planning 3, no. 12: 365–72. Jigyasu, Rohit. 2015. “Traditional Knowledge Systems for Reducing Disaster Risk and Building Resilience in India”. In Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Conservation and Management of Asia’s Heritage, ICCROM-CHA (Conservation Forum Series), edited by Gamini Wijesuriya and Sarah Court, pp. 165–75. Rome, Italy: ICCROM. Kaymaz, Isil. 2013. “Urban Landscapes and Identity”. In Advances in Landscape Architecture, edited by Murat Özyavuz. IntechOpen. https://www.intechopen. com/chapters/45403. Khalil, Samihah, Raman Mariyappan, and Mazlan Ismail. 2011. “Environmental and Social Issues of Land Use Planning (LUP) in Property Development: A Case Study at Tg. Tokong, Penang”. Research report submitted to College of Law, Governance and International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia. Muthiah, S. 2012. “Madras Miscellany”. The Hindu, 1 January 2012. https://www. thehindu.com/features/metroplus/madras-miscellany/article2763617.ece. My Future York. N.d. “Systemic Thinking and Whole Systems Change”. https:// myfutureyork.org/deliberative-systems-and-systemic-thinking/systemicthinking-and-whole-systems-change/. Offenhuber, Dietmar and Carlo Ratti, eds. 2014. Decoding the City: Urbanism in the Age of Big Data. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag GmbH. Ooi, Keat Gin. 2015. “Disparate Identities: Penang from a Historical Perspective, 1780–1941”. Kajian Malaysia 33, Supp. 2: 27–52. Osman, Sazali, Lingfang Chen, Abdul Hafiz Mohammad, Lixue Xing, and Yangbo Chen. 2021. “Flood Modeling of Sungai Pinang Watershed under the Impact of Urbanisation”. Tropical Cyclone Research and Review 10: 96–105. Ravishankar, Sandhya. 2016. “Manatees to the Rescue? Cities Offer Ideas to Solve Chennai’s Flooding Problem”. The Guardian, 2 March 2016. Rehman, Junaid, Osama Sohaib, Mohammad Asif, and Biswajeet Pradhan. 2019. “Applying Systems Thinking to Flood Disaster Management for a Sustainable Development”. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36. Reuters, CNN World. 2021. “Chennai comes to a Standstill as Heavy Rains Flood City”, 24 November 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/07/india/ chennai-india-rain-flood-intl-hnk/index.html.

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Rossi, Giuseppe, Nilgun Harmanciogammalu, and V. Yevjevich, eds. 2012. Coping with Floods. New York: Springer-Verlag. Sathiamurthy, Edlic and Chan Ngai Wang. 2006. “Hydrodynamic Behavior Change at Rambai River Outlet, Juru River Basin, Penang”. Malaysian Journal of Environmental Management 7: 59–75. Shuy, E.B. 1989. “Influence of Tides on Land Drainage Areas in Singapore”. In Hydraulic and Environmental Modelling of Coastal, Estuarine and River Waters. Proceedings of the International Conference held at the University of Bradford, England, 19–21 September 1989. Sillitoe, P. 1998. “Knowing the Land: Soil and Resource Evaluation and Indigenous Knowledge”. Soil Use and Management 14, no. 4: 188–93. Systems & Us. N.d. “Embracing Complexity”. https://systemsandus.com/ systems-thinking/?blogsub=confirming#blog_subscription-5. Taylor, Ken. 2014. “Cities as Cultural Landscapes”. In Reconnecting the City: The Historic Urban Landscape Approach and the Future of Urban Heritage, 1st ed., edited by Francesco Bandarin and Ron van Oers, pp. 179-202. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley and Sons Inc. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York: UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2004. UNESCO. N.d.a. “Melaka and George Town, Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca”. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1223/. UNESCO. N.d.b. “Silk Roads Programme, Chennai (Madras)”. https://en.unesco. org/silkroad/content/chennai-madras. United Nations. 1992. “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”. https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_ publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf. Warrier, S. Gopalakrishna. 2017. “Did Chennai Learn Anything from the 2015 Floods?” India Climate Dialogue, 25 October 2017. https:// indiaclimatedialogue.net/2017/10/25/chennai-learn-anything-2015-floods/. Wingmore, Ivy. N.d. “Complex Systems”. Whatis.com. https://whatis.techtarget. com/definition/complex-system. Woodruff, Sierra, Sara Meerow, Philip Gilbertson, Bryce Hannibal, Melina Matos, Malini Roy, Matthew Malecha, Siyu Yu, and Phil Berke. 2021. “Is Flood Resilience Planning Improving? A Longitudinal Analysis of Networks of Plans in Boston and Fort Lauderdale”. Climate Risk Management 34.

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Section III Urban Climate Interventions

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9 Nature-Based Solution Infrastructure for Flood Mitigation: An Experience from the Jakarta Metropolitan Area Adiwan Aritenang

Summary:  The Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) has long struggled to balance environmental protection and economic growth. The problem of flooding in the metropolitan area has been linked to several factors such as urban development, land-use changes and natural disasters. ■  This study examines to what extent Nature-Based Solution (NBS) infrastructure, a cost-efficient intervention to assist cities prevent floods, can reduce flood occurrence in the JMA.  ■  This study suggests the importance of hygiene behaviour and NBS infrastructure as well as a potential correlation between economic performance and disaster in the JMA. ■

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Introduction The Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) has long struggled to balance environmental protection and economic growth. The term JMA (Sadewo et al. 2021; Rukmana and Ramadhani 2021) (6°10‘30”S 106°49‘43’E) is used in this study to analyse the relationship between urban expansion and flooding in nine cities and municipalities. The problem of flooding in the metropolitan area has been linked with several factors such as urban development, land-use change and natural disasters (Wihanesta et al. 2021; Budiyono et al. 2015; Mishra et al. 2018). The decentralization of authorities at the district level has brought further complexity, with variations in interest and policy leading to different environment management strategies between districts within the JMA.  The complexity of environmental management in the JMA begins with the industry re-allocation towards neighbouring districts such as Bekasi and Tangerang regencies in the 1990s. The following figure depicts the JMA region with its core (cities in Jakarta province) and peripherals (several cities and regencies surrounding the core), West Java and Banten provinces, and non-JMA regions (see Figure 9.1). Currently, peripheral districts in the region have the highest employment and value-added shares in Indonesia, whilst the metropolitan cores have declining firm and employment densities (Hudalah and Aritenang 2017). The JMA can be seen as the main economic driver of the country with more than 56 per cent of multilocational industry headquarters located in the metropolitan area, especially in three sectors: electronics; automotive and transportation; and food and beverage. There are limited studies examining the impact of floods on different parts of the metropolitan area and the extent of infrastructure variations that determine these impacts. This study seeks to investigate the role of nature-based solutions (NBS) infrastructure in an urban context in reducing the impact of flooding, selecting environment-friendly urban village infrastructures such as water sanitation, retention pools, clean urban rivers, and tree replanting as case studies. These urban village infrastructures can be considered NBS because they are cost-effective, and their natural features and low-carbon footprint can be easily embedded into urban infrastructure, landscapes, and seascapes. For instance, urban rivers pose natural features such as vegetation rather than concrete water canals. Their locally adapted, resource-efficient, and systemic interventions can also provide environmental, social and

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economic benefits and help to build resilience (European Commission 2021). They emphasize natural processes and ecosystem services for functional purposes, such as decreasing flood risk through waterway restoration, enhancing flood storage in low-risk zones, and preserving watercourses. A recent study shows that NBS can be constructed through natural restoration and green infrastructure methods in the form of biopore infiltration holes, rainwater collection tanks, and multifunctional green open space that works as water retention ponds and permeable pavements (Retno et al. 2021). Furthermore, the government of Jakarta has also initiated a gubernatorial instruction to enhance NBS through green open spaces, vertical drainage, and infiltration wells.1 This follows similar efforts in Singapore to utilize NBS to control storm water and flooding by developing “blue-green infrastructure” project at Bishan Park, where the Kallang River is channelized into a concrete canal bordered by fences (Beyer and Anderson 2020). FIGURE 9.1 Map of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA)

Source: Author’s analysis

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This study examines to what extent NBS infrastructure can potentially reduce flood occurrence in the JMA using public data available in 2015 and 2018, described as follows. This chapter uses three datasets aggregated at the district level: (1) Village-level Infrastructure (Potensi Desa/Podes) released by the Centre for Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS), (2) Number of Disaster Occurrences from the National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/BNPB), and (3) Welfare Distribution Statistics (Statistik Kesejahteraan Rakyat) from the BPS and Retribution Revenue from the Ministry of Finance.

Natural Disasters and Economic Growth in the Metropolitan Context In order to examine how disasters impact metropolitan areas’ economic growth, this study considers two preconditions. First, variations in local governments’ development visions lead to competitiveness among local administrations, resulting in new ideas and innovative policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2005). The government’s focus on economic growth also leads to heightened competition between local governments to attract labour and capital. Inevitably, regional policies could not control local developments. As political power devolves to local authorities, the distribution of finance became uneven and richer regions gained significant influence over central government policymaking, leading to the asymmetry of power between regions (ibid.). Furthermore, rich regions will also have political advantages due to their wider influence over the central government because of their significant fiscal contribution to national revenue. This can be seen in the weakening of the hinterlands due to excessive backlash effects: core regions overflow and experience value-added concentration that results in developing concentration and polarization (Rustiadi et al. 2010). Second, socio-economic analysis can help to calculate the impact of damage and losses due to natural disasters, including the impact of direct and indirect losses. The increasing frequency and intensity of floods and extreme precipitations may cause natural disruptions. Urban green spaces not only help to alleviate damages but can also provide social advantages such as reducing mental health problems. Urban populations exposed to greenery have lower levels of depression,

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anxiety, and stress due to the leisure activities provided by green spaces, such as walking and gardening (European Commission 2021). Several economic models to simulate the impact of natural disasters have been developed, such as econometrics, input-output, Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE). The economic loss of US$8.1 million due to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 was calculated by econometric models (Cavallo and Noy 2010). In the context of developing countries, the losses incurred by natural disasters are sometimes greater due to the lack of institutional capacities to adapt to natural disasters. The role of education and knowledge for adaptation is then important because these assets can help to build up capacities in anticipation of future disasters. For example, the impact of natural disasters on output growth in Vietnam using the BlundellBond General Method found that regions with lower output growth and capital would have higher property damage (Noy and Vu 2010). Similarly, a study in a few Asian countries suggested that a nation’s economic system and macroeconomic policies would determine postdisaster economic growth (Tanaka and Ibrahim 2021).

Nature-Based Solutions (NBS) Infrastructure and Disaster in Jakarta Metropolitan Area This section further examines the role of NBS infrastructure and disasters in the JMA. Table 9.1 shows the amount or coverage of NBS infrastructure in the JMA. The table depicts the limited number of retention pools and tree-replanting in Jakarta and other peripheral cities. Retention pools are mainly found in regencies such as Bogor and Bekasi regencies suggesting its vast and less urban built-up area (BUA). Table 9.1 also shows the community’s usage of sanitation facilities in the villages of each city such as infiltration, drainage and river, respectively. The relatively low share of district villages with infiltration (less than 45 per cent) suggests the community’s high share of bath and wash activities in drainage and river. Not all cities in the JMA are served by rubbish bins, indicating that not all waste goes through appropriate waste disposal. The table also shows the persistent number of houses near the river flow in Jakarta, especially East, South and North Jakarta. Most houses near the river flow are found in Bekasi, Bogor and Tangerang regencies in the peripheral cities. The presence

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of houses near river flows may prevent rainfall absorption and disrupt water run-off into rivers. Overall, the figures may explain why the JMA frequently experiences flooding. TABLE 9.1 Nature-Based Solutions (NBS) Infrastructure Coverages and Sanitation Facilities, 2018

City in JMA

Number of Retention Pools

Number of Houses Near River

Tree Replanting (%)

Bath and Wash (Infiltration) (%)

Bath and Wash (Drainage) (%)

South Jakarta

0

7,930

4.62

40.00

60.00

0

100.00

East Jakarta

4

9,570

29.23

4.62

93.85

1.54

100.00

Central Jakarta

Bath and Wash (River) (%)

Rubbish Bins (%)

0

945

38.64

4.55

93.18

2.27

100.00

West Jakarta

11

2,119

0

30.36

66.07

3.57

100.00

North Jakarta

0

5,202

32.26

3.23

90.32

6.45

100.00

Bogor Regency

35

5,478

41.15

28.74

43.91

15.4

86.44

Bekasi Regency

12

7,255

31.02

10.7

63.64

8.56

86.10

Bogor

0

3,830

58.82

11.76

64.71

22.06

100.00

Bekasi

4

1,405

33.93

26.79

71.43

1.79

100.00

Depok

4

2,263

46.03

44.44

55.56

0

100.00

Tangerang Regency

0

4,981

17.88

6.93

71.17

5.11

90.88

Tangerang

0

1,789

32.69

8.65

89.42

1.92

100.00

South Tangerang 

1

531

20.37

14.81

64.81

0

100.00

Source: Village-level Infrastructure (Potensi Desa/Podes) by the Centre for Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS).

Table 9.2 presents the number of disasters within each district in 2015 and 2018. In 2015, the most common disasters in JMA across districts were landslides and floods that occurred 162 and 494 times, respectively. However, in 2018, the number of landslides surpassed floods with 454 and 221 cases respectively. Bogor Regency, Bekasi Regency, and Tangerang Regency recorded the highest number of disasters in both periods. The table also reveals that flash floods only

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occurred in southern peripheral regions, suggesting that these districts often experienced heavy rainfall. For instance, extreme rainfall in both Bogor Regency and Bogor City exceeded 300 mm between January and May 2018, with the maximum rainfall of 809 mm in February 2018 (Kabupaten Bogor 2018). In comparison, the maximum rainfall in Bekasi regency was 339 mm in February 2018 and only reached 47.5 mm after April 2018 (Kabupaten Bekasi 2018). TABLE 9.2 Number of Disasters by Type, 2015 and 2018 City in JMA

2015 Flash Land Floods Floods Slides

2018 Fire

Flash Land Floods Drought Floods Slides

Fire

Drought

South Jakarta

2

52

0

0

0

57

2

0

0

0

East Jakarta

1

36

0

0

0

33

0

0

0

0

Central Jakarta

0

9

0

0

0

8

0

0

0

0

West Jakarta

0

17

0

0

0

17

0

0

0

0

North Jakarta

0

39

0

0

0

27

0

0

0

0

Bogor Regency

105

51

9

4

40

52

148

7

2

24

Bekasi Regency

6

86

2

0

24

73

3

1

0

19

Bogor City

38

16

2

0

0

16

57

2

0

0

Bekasi City

0

38

1

0

0

35

0

2

0

0

Depok

6

24

1

0

0

26

7

1

0

0

Tangerang Regency

2

93

2

0

26

79

0

1

0

17

Tangerang

0

18

0

0

0

13

0

0

0

0

South Tangerang

2

15

0

0

0

18

4

1

0

0

Source: National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/BNPB).

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Potential Correlation between Disaster Occurrence and NBS Infrastructure and Hygiene Behaviour This study presents a potential correlation between the presence of NBS infrastructure and its importance in disaster prevention. Table 9.3 examines the impact of NBS infrastructure and sanitation facilities on flood occurrence at the village level. Overall, the table indicates the importance of NBS infrastructure and community behaviour to prevent disasters, particularly floods. The percentage of villages with more than three floods per year is low; nevertheless, the hygiene behaviour remains significant to reduce the flood occurrences. For instance, only 0.89 per cent of the total number of villages that did not directly dispose waste into drainage experienced more than three flood occurrences. Meanwhile, the percentage of more than three flood occurrences (1.43 per cent) was marginally higher in the villages that directly disposed waste to drainage. A similar pattern can also be found in villages that disposed waste directly to rivers. Poor hygiene behaviour of improper waste disposal into the river would lead to higher flood occurrence compared to appropriate behaviour, 18.76 per cent and 14.97 per cent, respectively. TABLE 9.3 Cross-Tabulation of Floods Occurrence with Number of Villages that has NBS Infrastructure and Sanitation Facilities, 2015–18

Number of Flood Occurrence

Waste to Drainage (%)

Waste to River (%)

Retention Pools (%)

Tree Re-Planting (%)

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No Flood

82.77

81.92

84.24

79.84

82.55

88.46

82.74

82.29

Number of Flood < 3

16.34

16.65

14.97

18.76

16.43

11.54

16.26

16.67

Number of Flood > 3

0.89

1.43

0.79

1.4

1.02

0

1.00

1.04

Source: Author’s analysis from BPS and BNPB data.

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Table 9.3 also shows that NBS infrastructure is also essential for reducing the number of flood events. The presence of a retention pool would reduce the possibility of a flood. The table suggests the share of villages with a retention pool that experience less than three flood events is lower, only 11.54 per cent compared to 16.43 per cent of villages without a retention pool. Furthermore, among villages with a retention pool, none has more than three floods per year, while 1.02 per cent of villages without retention pools had more than three floods in 2018. Many studies suggest that the presence of tree re-planting activities could also reduce the number of flood occurrences due its ability to improve soil nutrition and regulate the water cycle, which promotes mosaic landscapes and the whole ecosystem (CIFOR-ICRAF 2020). However, the experience from the JMA suggests otherwise: the share of villages with flood occurrence is slightly lower in villages without tree re-planting compared to their counterparts, 17.26 per cent and 17.71 per cent, respectively. Nevertheless, this may be because the long-term impact of tree-replanting is not captured in the data that only spans three years. Overall, this analysis is useful to understand to what extent NBS infrastructure and hygiene behaviour can protect a city from flood. It should be noted that, first, although NBS infrastructure will eventually be promoted, the issue on governance, funding, and budgeting will become a formidable challenge. Various studies point out that limited sources of revenue for district governments resulting from a lack of sources for public finance limits a region’s ability to produce and implement a credible development budget (Lewis 2006, 2013; Suwanan 2015). In particular, this was due to the fact that property taxes remained under the central government, which caused local governments to struggle to generate alternative revenue sources (Aritenang 2020; Lewis 2006). Second, inter-district collaboration to mitigate floods is crucial as nature-based infrastructure often cross village boundaries such as drainage and river flows. Consequently, the extent to which NBS provides benefits depends on the types of features used and the geographic characteristics of the villages.

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Potential Correlation between Disaster Occurrence and Economic Performance Table 9.4 examines the determinants of disaster occurrence and economic performance. Interestingly, flood occurrence is closely related to public health. Data suggests that Bogor Regency has both the highest number of floods and flash flood occurrences and the highest share of the population using health cards. However, the presence of disasters might not correlate immediately with the utilization of social protection cards, implying the share of social protection cardholders may instead depend on the districts’ population size. The table also shows that the higher number of flood disasters reduces the average monthly expenditure for food and non-food items. For instance, Bogor Regency had more than 150 flood disasters, and it has an average consumption of 1.2 million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) per person monthly. Conversely, Bogor City and Depok City, which have relatively low flood occurrences, had higher consumption of 2.3 million IDR per person monthly. Similarly, Bekasi Regency and Bogor City have significant retribution revenues from health services, which could be attributed to the high number of flood disasters in the respective districts. Meanwhile, districts with lower flood occurrence have much lower retribution revenue from health services, including wealthy districts such as South Tangerang, Tangerang City, and Bekasi City. The poor economic performance of cities with high flood occurrences indicates that the magnitude of flood disruption could result from service disruptions, thus limiting people’s ability to access food and services. This is the reason why consumption or spending in Bogor Regency was low. Flood disruption could also potentially trigger government spending for social assistance, although goods and services circulation are disrupted when a disaster happens. Overall, further analysis on the impact of flood on economic performance is needed. Socio-economic variables such as spending, revenue, health card utilization and disbursement are important to understand the impacts of floods on cities, especially for cities in developing countries where poverty is still rampant. The experience from the JMA suggests an indication of low economic performance from a city that experiences frequent flood occurrences.

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TABLE 9.4 Number of Floods and Economic Impact, 2018 City in JMA

Number of Floods and Flash Floods

Average Recipient Percentage Monthly Population social protection that uses Expenditure Health card per person card (IDR) (%) (%)

South Jakarta

2

2.78

61.48

2.717.039

East Jakarta

0

20.63

73.57

1 866 274

Central Jakarta

0

8.47

74.53

2 388 623

West Jakarta

0

16.9

50.42

2.711.612

North Jakarta Bogor Regency Bekasi Regency Bogor

Revenue from Health Services (IDR) 242.452.750

0

14.25

63.08

2.297.793

155

7.35

63.9

1.111.824

14.841.256.788

4

4.08

48.67

3.731.283

126.905.000

59

7.31

35.52

1.720.694

9.129.454.647

Bekasi

2

6.59

39.65

2,347,086

1.534.766.000

Depok

8

4.45

57.17

2.169.732

–

Tangerang Regency

1

8.97

35.5

1.378.780

4.061.362.086

Tangerang

0

3.45

44.17

2.125.467

407.296.000

South Tangerang

5

1.17

64.71

2.152.796

4.242.102.100

Source: Welfare Distribution Statistics (Statistik Kesejahteraan Rakyat) from the BPS and Retribution Revenue from the Ministry of Finance.

Conclusion The study identifies several important issues. First the importance of hygiene behaviour and NBS infrastructure in flood mitigation across the JMA. The exercise presented in this study indicates that hygiene behaviour such as improper waste disposal into drainage systems and into rivers helped the JMA mitigate floods. The presence of NBS infrastructure, especially retention pools, also helps the metropolitan area reduce the number of flood occurrences. However, the impact of tree replanting has not yet proven effective so far due to the limited data. This study also indicates a potential correlation between economic performance and disaster. Cities with a higher number of flood occurrences had relatively poor spending and high retribution revenue from health services in the JMA.

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This study does not mean to analyse the precise impacts of NBS infrastructure to mitigate floods, but to examine important variables relevant for future discussions on NBS infrastructure and urban development. Nonetheless, this study subscribes to the belief that NBS infrastructure is still a cost-efficient intervention to help cities prevent floods and other disasters. NBS mitigative capacity can help cities improve their economic performance. NOTE 1. Governor Instruction No. 52 of 2020

References Aritenang, Adiwan F. 2020. “The Effect of Intergovernmental Transfers on Infrastructure Spending in Indonesia”. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 25, no. 3: 571–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2019.1675352. Beyer, Lisa and James Anderson. 2020. “Collaboration on Nature-Based Solutions is Key to Resilient City Infrastructure”. WRI Indonesia, 9 July 2020. https://wri-indonesia.org/en/blog/collaboration-nature-based-solutionskey-resilient-city-infrastructure. Budiyono, Yus, Jeroen Aerts, JanJaap Brinkman, Muh Aris Marfai, and Philip Ward. 2015. “Flood Risk Assessment for Delta Mega-Cities: A Case Study of Jakarta”. Natural Hazards 75, no. 1: 389–413. Cavallo, Eduardo and Ilan Noy. 2010. “The Economics of Natural Disasters: A Survey”. IDB Working Paper Series 24. https://doi.org/10.4337/ 9781785365980. CIFOR-ICRAF. 2020. “Principles for Successful Tree Planting”. European Commission. 2021. Evaluating the Impact of Nature-based Solutions: A Handbook for Practitioners. Hudalah, Delik and Adiwan Aritenang. 2017. “Industrial Economies on the Edge of Southeast Asian Metropoles: From Gated to Resilient Economies”. Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Development: 120–30. Kabupaten Bekasi. 2018. Bekasi Regency in Numbers (Kabupaten Bekasi Dalam Angka). Kabupaten Bogor. 2018. Bogor Regency in Numbers (Kabupaten Bogor Dalam Angka). Lewis, Blane D. 2006. “Local Government Taxation: An Analysis of Administrative Cost Inefficiency”. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 42, no. 2: 213–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074910600873666.

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. 2013. “Local Government Capital Spending in Indonesia: Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers”. Public Budgeting and Finance 33, no. 1: 76–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12002.x. Mishra, Binaya K., A. Rafiei Emam, Yoshifumi Masago, Pankaj Kumar, Ram K. Regmi, and Kensuke Fukushi. 2018. “Assessment of Future Flood Inundations under Climate and Land Use Change Scenarios in the Ciliwung River Basin, Jakarta”. Journal of Flood Risk Management 11: S1105–S1115. Noy, Ilan and Tam Bang Vu. 2010. “The Economics of Natural Disasters in a Developing Country: The Case of Vietnam”. Journal of Asian Economics 21, no. 4: 345–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2010.03.002. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Nicholas Gill. 2005. “On the ‘Economic Dividend’ of Devolution”. Regional Studies 39, no. 4: 405–20. https://doi. org/10.1080/00343400500128390. Rukmana, Deden and Dinar Ramadhani. 2021. “Income Inequality and Socioeconomic Segregation in Jakarta”. In Urban Socio-Economic Segregation and Income Inequality: A Global Perspective, edited by Maarten van Ham, Tiit Tammaru, Rūta Ubarevičienė, and Heleen Janssen. The Urban Book Series. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Rustiadi, Ernan, Dyah R. Panuju, and Andrea E. Pravitasari. 2010. “Java Island: Regional Disparity and Sustainability Perspectives”. Kinerja 14, no. 108: 94–114. Sadewo, Erie, Ibnu Syabri, Anzhelika Antipova, Pradono, and Delik Hudalah. 2021. “Using Morphological and Functional Polycentricity Analyses to Study the Indonesian Urban Spatial Structure: The Case of Medan, Jakarta, and Denpasar”. Asian Geographer 38, no. 1: 47–71. Suwanan, Ahmad Fawaiq. 2015. “Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparities in Indonesia: A Dynamic Panel Data Evidence”. Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia (Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Universitas Gadjah Mada) 24, no. 3: 328–36. https://doi.org/10.22146/jieb.6310. Tanaka, Kensuke and Prasiwi Ibrahim. 2021. “Growth Resilience to Large External Shocks in Emerging Asia: Measuring Impact of Natural Disasters and Implications for COVID-19”. ISEAS Economics Working Paper No. 2021-05. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Wihanesta, Retno, Dede Sulaeman, Adi Pradana, and Yudhistira S. Pribadi. 2021. “The Reasons for Jakarta’s Frequent Flooding and How Nature-based Solutions (NbS) Can Help Reduce the Risk”. WRI Indonesia, 3 August 2021. https://wri-indonesia.org/en/blog/reasons-jakarta%E2%80%99s-frequentflooding-and-how-nature-based-solutions-nbs-can-help-reduce-risk.

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10 Leveraging De-risking Instruments to Scale-up Adaptation Finance in Jakarta Brurce M. Mecca and Ines Ayostina Summary: The world’s megacities are vulnerable to climate risks; hence investing in climate adaptation is critical.  ■  Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, also has a growing need for adaptation finance, but it cannot always rely on public finance’s political uncertainty and inefficiency.  ■  This study examines Jakarta’s current public finance situation for climate adaptation and suggests practical recommendations for leveraging the city’s public finance to spur private investments in urban adaptation projects. ■  Jakarta can increase its capacity to meet its urban adaptation goals by leveraging de-risking instruments and creating bankable project pipelines to stimulate private finance for climate adaptation projects in the city.  ■  Jakarta should investigate various de-risking mechanisms such as low-cost lending instruments, fiscal incentives, performance-based instruments, risk insurance, and technical assistance.  ■

140

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Introduction Megacities are pivotal for a country’s innovation and overall economic progress. Meanwhile, cities are often confronted with problems such as rapid population growth and increasing environmental risk. Jakarta, the largest megacity in Southeast Asia and the capital of Indonesia, is no exception. It is one of the most vulnerable megacities to climate change. Located in a low-lying coastal area, it faces a range of climate-related impacts such as flooding, sea-level rise, and storm surges (Varrani and Nones 2018; Mario 2011). Low adaptive capacity further exacerbates these impacts, affecting the country’s emerging economy. Looking at one of the worst floods on record that struck Jakarta in February 2007, the disaster displaced over 200,000 people, affected 60 per cent of the territory and incurred an estimated US$1 billion in damage (Akmalah and Grigg 2011; Texier 2008). This phenomenon raises the question of whether urban management strategies and financing for Jakarta’s urban adaptation are adequate against a long-term changing climate and its rapidly growing economy. For a climate-vulnerable urban area such as Jakarta, there is not enough data or evidence to highlight the latest trends in domestic public or private finance flows for financing adaptation efforts. At the country level, however, data suggests that adaptation finance is relatively low—a decade of data from 2009 to 2018 shows that only 2 per cent of development finance in Indonesia flows to adaptationrelated efforts (Atteridge et al. 2019). Moreover, the country reported spending below the allocated funding. Only US$5.82 million of the total of US$11.52 million Indonesia’s adaptation funds allocated between 2012 and 2018 has been recorded as disbursed (Causevic et al. 2021). There is no definite causal explanation for this low disbursement, but reasons such as the lack of bankable project pipelines, the suboptimal capacity of government actors, and regulatory uncertainties could be factors in the low utilization of climate adaptation funds. The lack of reliable data, which leads to a sub-optimal understanding of the adaptation finance needs for climate-vulnerable cities like Jakarta, has made it challenging for government officials to ensure that public finance remains available for improving Jakarta’s adaptive capacity.

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Private Sector Funding for Climate Adaptation Assuming climate adaptation requires 0.15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year (Narain 2011), Jakarta needs approximately US$0.4 billion per year for adaptation finance. Meanwhile, in 2019, the city had spent US$1 billion on capital expenditure and US$0.5 billion on financing expenses (Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2021). While these expenditures are not exclusively flowing to climate adaptation, it still signals that Jakarta possesses an adequate fiscal capacity to finance its adaptation needs. However, having the capacity to finance regular expenditure does not mean that Jakarta has been spending enough for adaptation or has indicated a will to do so. In general, there are many factors that de-prioritize adaptation-related spending from Jakarta’s capital expenditures. These factors could be the shifts in government priorities, such as in 2020 when Jakarta’s municipal government had to reallocate US$0.7 billion of its annual budget for pandemic response (ibid.); lack of familiarity in adaptation projects; or certain preference in public investments outside of urban adaptation; among many other factors. Nevertheless, the lack of prioritization in public finance for urban adaptation shows that relying on the municipal government’s budget is not sustainable, partly because of the uncertainty caused by political situations and external considerations that go into public budgetary decisions. This is where the private sectors must come into play in Jakarta’s adaptation efforts, to improve efficiency and to some extent, certainty. Globally, there is an urgent need to spur greater investment into climate adaptation and resilience, in both the public and private sectors (Micale et al. 2018). In order to ensure financing remains available for climate adaptation, Jakarta needs to attract investment from outside of its public budget, specifically from the private sector.

Objective and Methods This chapter investigates the current state of public finance for climate adaptation in Jakarta and proposes practical solutions for leveraging Jakarta’s public finance to spur private investments in adaptation projects.

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Through a systematic review of Jakarta’s policy documents such as the Mid-term Development Plan, the Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Action Plans, the Regional Spatial Plan, and the Annual Financial Report, this chapter seeks to outline and prioritize potential key financial instruments to increase the risk-appetite of the private sector for adaptation-related investments.

Findings Globally, efforts are being made to test, expand, and deliver finance for adaptation efforts, especially in developing countries where the needs are high, but the financial capacity is relatively low (UNEP 2021). By following this global trend, Jakarta will potentially stand to gain. Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, the centre of the country’s government and economy, which positions itself as being heavily influenced by the central government unlike other cities in Indonesia, including in climate finance. Data shows that the central government has contributed 57 per cent of funding for the capital expenditure of infrastructure projects in the city from 2015 to 2019 (Mafira et al. 2021). Most notably, the central government has financed a few of the city’s most strategic climate mitigation megaprojects, particularly in the transportation sector, such as the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), Greater Jakarta Light Rapid Transit (LRT), and efficient street lighting projects (Kementerian Koordinasi Bidang Perekonomian 2017). They also initiated one of the most controversial urban adaptation projects, namely the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) valued at US$41.2 billion. The project has been criticized for not addressing the root cause of Jakarta’s vulnerability to sinking, such as groundwater over-pumping and suboptimal ecosystem services from watersheds (Octavianti 2019). Jakarta’s development planning lacks sustainability risk disclosure and the tracking of finance-to-impact on climate adaptation In order to understand Jakarta’s existing framework on adaptation finance, it is important to consider the city’s planning framework on urban adaptation. Table 10.1 showcases the assessment of Jakarta’s urban adaptation planning. In general, Jakarta has demonstrated several best practices in urban adaptation, such as on inclusiveness

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and implementation plan. However, actions on comprehensiveness and monitoring and evaluation need to be more defined. TABLE 10.1 Assessment for Jakarta’s Urban Adaptation Planning Criteria for adequate and effective adaptation planning

Jakarta, Indonesia

Notes

1. Comprehensiveness 1.1 O  ptions address assessed risks

Partial

Jakarta’s development priorities contain the environmental risk elements and action plans to support urban adaptation, but there are no clear interlinkages that indicates the relationship between public finance and increased urban adaptive capacity.

Yes

Outlined in the development priorities: • Mission 3.1 on multicultural city, 3.2 on active participation, and 5.1 on bureaucratic reform (Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2004) • Mission 1.1.2 on gender-based city development (Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2016)

2. Inclusiveness 2.1 Stakeholder engagement

2.2 D  edicated process in place

2.3 Gender

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Partial

Yes

Clear strategies on inclusiveness exists, but the planning documents do not contain the methodical process on public participation. Outlined in the development priorities: • Gender mainstreaming and the protection of women and children (Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2004) • Mission 1.1.2 on gender-based city development (Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2016)

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TABLE 10.1 (continued) 3. Implementability 3.1 Central administration in charge

Yes

There is a clear relationship between Jakarta’s development planning documents and the technical policy documents and guidelines.

3.2 Regulatory instruments

Yes

Each of Jakarta’s strategic development plans is underpinned by the municipal-level regulations.

3.3 Incentive-based instruments

Partial

3.4 D  irect instruments/ funding

Large, strategic urban projects usually include a specific incentive mechanism. Example: public transport ticket subsidy, Public Private Partnership (PPPs) guarantee, etc. but those incentives are mostly tied to accessibility and not for urban adaptation performance.

Partial

Jakarta acknowledges several financial instruments: Municipal Budget (APBD), Central Government Budget including Central Government’s Loan (APBN), Public Private Partnership (PPP), Direct B2B Appointment, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Landand-Building Tax/Disincentives, and Municipal Bonds. All these instruments have been used, except for Wijaya et al. (2021).

Yes

A comparison between Jakarta’s development plan and its surrounding cities’ development plans exists, but there is no clear intercities integration on urban adaptation policies.

Partial

There are some clear linkages between the national development plan and Jakarta’s development plan.

4. Integration 4.1 Horizontal integration

4.2 Vertical integration

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TABLE 10.1 (continued) 5. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 5.1. M&E system in place Yes

The central government requires all localities to conduct annual evaluations on their development planning (mandated in Article 344 of Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation 86/2017).

5.2. Monitoring undertaken

Partial

Yes, but the aim is not specific to monitoring the progress on urban adaptive capacity.

5.3 E  valuation planned/ undertaken

Partial

Yes, but the aim is not specific to evaluating the progress on urban adaptive capacity.

Source: UNEP (2021).

Jakarta had underspent its fiscal capacity on adaptation-related investments Analysing the state of adaptation investment in Jakarta requires an understanding of its fiscal capacity. While literatures differ in defining the concept of fiscal capacity, in the context of Indonesian law, the fiscal capacity of a subnational government is defined by the financing ability of a locality after deducting earmarked revenue and routine spending. As a result of this definition, Jakarta has the highest fiscal capacity compared to the other provinces in Indonesia, as indicated by the fiscal capacity index issued annually by the Ministry of Finance. According to Indonesia’s fiscal capacity classification, Jakarta’s fiscal capacity is classified as very high. For every $1 in revenue raised by the government of Jakarta, around $0.71 can be allocated to finance nonroutine spending or investments, including for projects that improve the city’s resilience to climate change. Before the COVID-19 pandemic hit Indonesia, Jakarta’s public financial records in 2016–19 showed that it had an annual fiscal capacity of IDR30.14–97.8 trillion or on average 66.3 trillion (US$4.7 billion) per year, which was around 71 per cent of its annual revenue. During the pandemic in 2020, however, Jakarta’s fiscal capacity plummeted in 2020 to IDR35.8 trillion (US$2.5 billion) or 64 per cent of its total revenue, due to fiscal reallocation for COVID-19 pandemic.

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FIGURE 10.1 The Definition of Provincial Fiscal Capacity, based on Indonesian Law

Source: Article (1) and Article (4) of the Minister of Finance Regulation PMK 120/ PMK.07/2020.

FIGURE 10.2 Jakarta’s Annual Fiscal Capacity and How it compares against the Annual Total Revenue

Source: DKI Jakarta Annual Financial Reports and authors’ calculation.

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Having a high fiscal capacity, however, does not mean that Jakarta has historically leveraged its full potential for capital investment. Jakarta’s relatively low proportion of investment illustrates that the city had been comparatively conservative on investing. During prepandemic years, Jakarta had only spent 11.9–37.3 per cent or on average 23.3 per cent of its annual fiscal capacity for investments, including tangible assets such as land, equipment and machineries, buildings, roads, and networks, among other things. This number fell even lower to 8.9 per cent during the pandemic. Furthermore, Jakarta’s capital investment records are also not climate-tagged, hence there is no clear indication to what extent every Indonesian rupiah that the local government had invested in the past had a direct correlation to an increase in its urban adaptive capacity. It is important to note that Jakarta’s financial records have not tracked its urban adaptation and risk reduction investments. Furthermore,

FIGURE 10.3 Jakarta’s Annual Capital Expenditure and How it compares against the Annual Fiscal Capacity

Source: DKI Jakarta Annual Financial Reports and author’s calculation.

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despite having the highest fiscal capacity in the country, it has been relatively conservative on mobilizing public finance for investments, as only a small fraction of its fiscal capacity goes to investment-related expenses. Further research is necessary to analyse the reasoning behind this trend, but some potential causes why Jakarta has been short on mobilizing investments are the shifts in government priorities, lack of appetite in adaptation-related projects, and/or certain preferences in public investments outside of urban adaptation. The role of private finance in urban adaptation Data shows that Jakarta is currently underutilizing its potential to attract private finance. The city did not access any loans from financial institutions in 2017–18 (Mafira et al. 2021). While it is desirable for the city to minimize liabilities, it also shows that the city has not increased its ambition and leveraged its strong fiscal capacity to mobilize private finance to invest in its urban adaptation projects. Jakarta has a large incentive to fill the gaps on measuring its urban adaptation progress for scaling-up investments that reduce climate risks (Micale et al. 2018). Considering its historically conservative investment spending, Jakarta should not rely on its fiscal capacity alone, but it must be able to mobilize its adaptation finance through private finance. In Indonesia, private financiers’ appetite for urban adaptation finance is limited due to various reasons such as the lack of regulatory certainty, assurance, and common understanding that urban adaptation projects fall under the government’s responsibility—financed exclusively by public finance (Zeki and Meattle 2020). Hence, Jakarta may benefit from private finance by creating various mechanisms that reduce the barriers to private finance investments on adaptation projects. Barriers to mobilizing private investments for urban adaptation Globally, cities have shown limited investment capital mobilized toward building resilience in urban areas compared to the anticipated needs—averaging at only 5 per cent (Morgan et al. 2021). This global trend resonates with Jakarta, as the city currently needs to attract adaptation finance that is not solely from public finance. Jakarta can aim to de-risk adaptation investments using different policy and financial tools (Micale et al. 2018), such as providing regulatory assurance and creative instruments to de-risk.

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Some of the common investment barriers that Jakarta need to derisk are presented in Table 10.2. TABLE 10.2 Common Barriers in Mobilizing Private Investments for Urban Adaptation Common Barriers

Description

Context barriers

Poor policy environment

Municipal policy environment lacks conditions supportive to private adaptation investment (e.g., no requirements for business to measure climate-related risks).

Poor institutional environment

Legal and regulatory infrastructure in the city lacks clarity of purpose towards addressing urban climate risks (e.g., relatively small public finance spent on addressing urban climate risks, lack of capacity on contract enforcement, etc.).

Poor market environment

Market environment is unsupportive towards adaptation investment (e.g., lack of creditworthy partner municipalities for private sector engagement).

Poor value chains and human capital

Environment lacks the organizations and people with the necessary capabilities for investments to take place and succeed (e.g., no sector-specific value chain or local sectoral expertise).

High cost of projects and unknown value add

The value or benefit of urban climate adaptation technology is uncertain; private sector actors do not sufficiently consider climate risk in decisions; upfront costs of technology are high.

Lack of technical capacity

Prospective users of technology do not have technical capacity to implement (e.g., limited or siloed expertise in implementing resilient urban infrastructure solutions).

Limitations of private insurance

Insurance has to date largely not been engaged in cities to efficiently transfer risk or incentivize adaptive action, and the private insurance industry is facing considerable risk associated with the accelerating impacts of climate change in urban areas.

Business model barriers

Source: Valerio et al. (2018); Richmond et al. (2021).

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Jakarta can increase its capacity to meet its urban adaptation goals by leveraging de-risking instruments to stimulate private finance’s appetite for climate adaptation projects in the city. There are various de-risking mechanisms to investigate, such as low-cost lending instruments, fiscal incentives, performance-based instruments, risk insurance, and technical assistance. Some instruments have their own specific functions to reduce investment barriers. For example, lending instruments and tax incentives can reduce the cost of projects and increase value-add while some others, such as risk management instruments and technical assistance, have more general benefits. Ultimately, the goal of leveraging de-risking instruments is to target the use of public resources better for creating more bankable urban adaptation project pipelines. These bankable projects will then improve the appetite of private actors for urban adaptation projects, which will also improve the city’s overall adaptive capacity. Table 10.3 shows the common investment barriers and de-risking instruments common in Jakarta whereas Table 10.4 further explains how de-risking instruments work.

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TABLE 10.3 Jakarta’s Common Investment Barriers and De-risking Instruments Matrix

Limitations of private insurance

Lack of technical capacity

High cost of projects and unknown value add

Poor value chain and human capital

Poor market environment

Poor institutional environment

Poor policy environment

Common Investment Barriers

Lending instruments Municipal bonds for resilient infrastructure Fiscal incentives Tax incentives Risk management instruments Incorporate climate risk in public private partnership      (PPP) contracts Insurance

De-risking instruments

Pay-for-success instruments Leasing to reduce upfront costs Technical assistance Market studies on climate risks and business opportunities City-level climate finance tracking Project Preparation Facility (PPF)

Source: LaSalle and Negreiros (2021); Richmond et al. (2021); Micale et al. (2018).

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TABLE 10.4 Elaboration of De-risking Instruments De-risking instruments

Barriers

How it works

Lending instruments

Municipal bonds for resilient infrastructure

Indonesia has a relatively high interest lending rate (Wijaya et al. 2020) while green projects are not favourable to private lenders.

A bond coupon backed by Jakarta’s public finance. Jakarta is the most trusted municipal bonds issuers (Wijaya et al. 2021).

Fiscal incentives

Tax incentives

Large adaptation infrastructures tend to be costly, while there are incentive mechanisms needed for small-scale adaptation projects.

Jakarta can advocate the central government on tax incentives for large projects, while introducing tax breaks on its own authority such as land-tax break for urban farming.

Riskmanagement instruments

Incorporate climate risk in public private partnership (PPP) contracts

Many public infrastructure projects do not yet incorporate climate risk mitigation measures due to uncertainty around value of these measures.

Jakarta’s PPPs can be designed to reflect the cost of climate risks and incorporate climate risk mitigation responses.

Insurance

Insurance has not efficiently covered urban climate risks nor incentivized adaptation actions.

Jakarta can explore insurance products that cover climate-related extraordinary risks from routine premium. Some examples are catastrophe insurances (Swiss, Caribbean) and post-storm residential improvement insurance (USA).

Pay-for-success instruments

Performance risks are often underrepresented in public infrastructure projects.

Jakarta can render payment from public finance contingent on the performance of green infrastructure, such as in managing flooding.

Leasing to reduce upfront costs

Many green technologies promise a long-term cost-savings but still require a high upfront cost.

Jakarta can leverage leasing arrangements for technologies that require high upfront costs, such as solar PV rooftop.

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TABLE 10.4 (continued) Technical assistance

Market studies on climate risks and business opportunities

Limited information and data platform on climate risks that can inform investment decisions.

Jakarta can provide programmes that help industries in understanding climateresilient investments and adaptation strategies.

City-level climate finance tracking

There is no regularly updated database on adaptation finance flows in Jakarta which makes it difficult to assess financing gaps and develop solutions.

Jakarta should identify adaptation finance flows through citylevel climate budget tagging and impact assessment.

Project Preparation Facility (PPF)

Project preparation develops a project concept to the level needed to secure financing.

Jakarta should actively leverage international assistance on PPFs throughout all project cycles (concepting, pre-feasibility, feasibility, and implementation).

Source: Authors’ analysis

Conclusion Jakarta has a growing need for adaptation finance, but it cannot always rely on public finance, especially because of the city’s historical record of conservative investment spending. Hence, it should actively increase its capacity to meet the urban adaptation goals by leveraging de-risking instruments to stimulate private finance for climate adaptation projects in the city. Several de-risking mechanisms are relevant to Jakarta’s needs, such as low-cost lending instruments, fiscal incentives, performancebased instruments, risk insurance, and technical assistance. Some instruments have their own specific functions to reduce investment barriers. For example, lending instruments and tax incentives can reduce the cost of projects and increase value add while others, such as risk management instruments and technical assistance, have more general benefits. In summary, this chapter highlights alternative ways for Jakarta to increase its adaptation finance efforts, while at the same time reducing the pressure on the municipal budget and delivering wider impacts.

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References Akmalah, Emma and Neil S. Grigg. 2011. “Jakarta Flooding: Systems Study of Socio-Technical Forces”. Water International 36, no. 6: 733–47. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2011.610729. Atteridge, A., G. Savvidou, S. Sadowski, F. Gortana, L. Meintrup, and A. Dzebo. 2019. “All Donors to Indonesia All Donors to Indonesia for Climate Adaptation during 2009–2018”. https://aid-atlas.org/profile/all/indonesia/ climate-adaptation/2009-2018?usdType=usd_commitment. Causevic, Amar, Matthew LoCastro, Dharish David, Sujeetha Selvakkumaran, and Åsa Gren. 2021. “Financing Resilience Efforts to Confront Future Urban and Sea-Level Rise Flooding: Are Coastal Megacities in Association of Southeast Asian Nations Doing Enough?” Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science 48, no. 5: 989–1010. https://doi. org/10.1177/2399808321994437. Kementerian Koordinasi Bidang Perekonomian. 2017. “National Strategic Projects (KPPIP)”. DKI Jakarta. LaSalle, John Michael and Priscilla Negreiros. 2021. “The Landscape of Project Preparation: A Gap Analysis”. Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance. Mafira, Tiza, Luthfyana Larasati, Brurce Mecca, Alke Haesra, and Chavi Meattle. 2021. “Assessing Jakarta’s Climate Investments”. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Micale, Valerio, Bella Tonkonogy, and Federico Mazza. 2018. “Understanding and Increasing Finance for Climate Adaptation in Developing Countries”. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Narain, Urvashi, Sergio Margulis, and Timothy Essam. 2011. “Estimating Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change”. Climate Policy 11, no. 3: 1001–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2011.582387. Octavianti, Thanti. 2019. “The Illusion of Solution? The Politics of Jakarta’s Quest to Achieve Water Security”. PhD thesis, University of Oxford. Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta. 2004. “2005–2025 Long Term Development Plan (RPJPD)”. Jakarta. . 2016. “2017–2022 Mid Term Development Plan”. Jakarta. . 2021. “2020 Financial Report (Audited)”. Jakarta. Richmond, Morgan, Nidhi Upadhyaya, and Angela Ortega Pastor. 2021. “An Analysis of Urban Climate Adaptation Finance”. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Texier, Pauline. 2008. “Floods in Jakarta: When the Extreme Reveals Daily Structural Constraints and Mismanagement”. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 17, no. 3: 358–72. https://doi. org/10.1108/09653560810887284.

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UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2021. Adaptation Gap Report 2021: The Gathering Storm – Adapting to Climate Change in a Post-pandemic World. Nairobi. Varrani, Arianna and Michael Nones. 2018. “Vulnerability, Impacts and Assessment of Climate Change on Jakarta and Venice”. International Journal of River Basin Management 16, no. 4: 439–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/157 15124.2017.1387125. Wijaya, Muhammad Ery, Albertus Prabu Siagian, Brurce Muhammad Mecca, and Alke Rabinsa Haesra. 2021. “Accelerating Renewable Energy Finance in Indonesia: The Potential of Municipal Green Bonds”. Jakarta: Climate Policy Initiative. Wijaya, Muhammad Ery, Alke Rabinsa Haesra, and Brurce Muhammad Mecca. 2020. “Enhancing Decentralized Renewable Energy Investment to Achieve Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contribution”. Jakarta: Climate Policy Initiative. Wilhelm, Mario. 2011. “The Role of Community Resilience in Adaptation to Climate Change: The Urban Poor in Jakarta, Indonesia”. In Resilient Cities: Local Sustainability, vol. 1, edited by Konrad Otto-Zimmermann, pp. 45–53. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0785-6_5. Zeki, Muhammad and Chavi Meattle. 2020. “Uncovering the Private Climate Finance Landscape in Indonesia”. San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative.

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11 The Application of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures Index (TCI) on Malaysian Property and Construction Companies Renard Y.J. Siew Summary:  There has been a proliferation of tools to monitor and measure the impacts of climate change, including the framework of the Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which has been endorsed by leaders in the G7 summit recently calling on mandatory climate disclosures.  ■  This chapter highlights the different elements within the TCFD, such as strategies, governance, risk management, metrics, and targets, to investigate further shortcomings in existing tools and their gaps in carbon reporting.  ■  This chapter explores possible challenges in the Malaysian property and construction sector and proposes recommendations to address them.  ■  A novel TCFD Index (TCI) is recommended to measure the degree of incorporation of four elements (strategy, governance, risk, metrics and targets). TCI will be helpful to both academicians and practitioners involved in city development who are exploring tools to integrate climate resilience. ■

157

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Introduction The impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented, from shifting weather patterns which threaten food security to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding (United Nations 2019; Wheeler and von Braun 2013). This phenomenon is caused by the release of heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs), primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), produced by a wide range of human activities (Nature Conservancy 2007). As populations, economies and standards of living continue to grow, so does the cumulative level of GHG emissions. The Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates the cumulative CO2 emissions since preindustrial times and provides a carbon budget for future emissions to limit temperature from increasing beyond 2 degrees Celsius (United Nations 2019). Given current ongoing emissions, it has been predicted that the global mean temperature will continue to rise above the preindustrial level. With polar ice cap melting and warmer oceans, average sea levels are estimated to rise from 24–30 cm by 2065 and 40–63 cm by 2100 relative to the reference point of 1986–2005 (ibid.). The reality is that the impacts of climate change will continue to persist for many centuries even when emissions have stopped. Given the urgency of the issue, different stakeholder groups have gathered to formulate solutions to address the challenges presented by climate change. There is an emergence of sustainability reporting tools (SRTs) in the past decade to facilitate more transparent disclosures by companies, although with limitations (Siew et al. 2013, 2016; Siew 2015, 2017). The Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), a not-for-profit organization, was formed with the intention of mobilizing the US$100 trillion dollar bond market towards climate solutions (Climate Bonds Initiative 2019). CBI focuses on promoting investment in projects and assets necessary to accelerate the transition towards a low-carbon and climate resilient economy. They deploy a three-pronged approach in terms of strategy: (1) they aim to develop a large and liquid Green and Climate Bonds Market that will help drive down the cost of capital for climate projects in both developed and emerging markets; (2) to grow aggregation mechanisms for fragmented sectors; and (3) to support governments seeking to tap debt capital markets. In the investment sector, the private sectors actively mobilize capital to enhance climate finance. One of the notable organizations

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is Climate Action 100+, an investor-led initiative to ensure that the world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters accounting for twothirds of annual global industrial emissions take necessary action on climate change (Climate Action 100+ n.d.). The banking sector is also increasingly active in heightening climate actions. A group of thirty-two leading banks guided by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) has introduced the Principles of Responsible Banking (PRB) to meet the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and the aspirations of the Sustainable Development Goals (Abubakar and Handayani 2019). A number of key financing institutions in Malaysia have also started aligning themselves to the UN Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI). The Central Bank of Malaysia formed the Joint Committee on Climate Change (JC3) to pursue collaborative actions for building climate resilience (BNM 2019). The four subcommittees formed under JC3 are: risk management; governance and disclosure; product and innovation; as well as engagement and capacity-building. Despite the interesting developments in the climate space and the fact that 40 per cent of carbon emissions come from the property and construction sector globally, there is still a gap in the literature on assessing the progress of property and construction companies in adopting the requirements of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD)—the best-in-class practices in addressing and handling climate disclosures. The implementation of the TCFD is important especially for property and construction companies to ensure that climate resilience is embedded into city development. Therefore, this analysis proposes the use of TCFD Index (TCI) to fill this research gap accordingly.

Background The extant literature has investigated the quality of climate disclosures by companies. De Bernardi et al. (2019) studied the extent to which Italian non-financial companies disclose their climate change risk, the level of depth of their disclosure and readiness to adhere to the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) guidelines. Henningsson (2018) identified three main challenges that the banking industry faces in recognizing risks in their risk management practices properly. These include: (i) practical challenges in integrating the

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understanding of climate-related risks and translating them into quantitative measures of financial risks; (ii) lack of corporate climate information, which creates obstacles for banks getting relevant data for their models; and (iii) a broader risk concept which includes sustainability aspects that could challenge traditional financial logics and cause resistance at a psychological level. Back in April 2015, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors made a request to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to convene public and private sector participants to review how the financial sector can account for climate-related issues. The FSB identified several gaps, including: the need for better information to support informed investment; lending and insurance underwriting decisions; and improved understanding of climate-related risks. In order to price climate related risks and opportunities, the FSB established an industry-led task force: the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD 2019a, 2019b). The aim of the TCFD is to provide guidance for consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures by companies that are meaningful to stakeholders including investors, lenders and insurers among others. The recommendations provided by the TCFD are intended to help companies better understand what financial markets want from such disclosures to monitor and respond to climate change risks. However, a survey conducted by South Pole revealed that while two-thirds of responding organizations recognized the first-mover advantage of early adoption of the TCFD, less than one in ten have decided on a disclosure strategy. Forty per cent of respondents believed that the TCFD would improve the understanding of both physical and transition risks connected with climate change but only 25 per cent have developed scenarios to explore how these risks will impact their business. Another important study by the TCFD revealed that there has been a 10 per cent increase in the number of companies (1,126 sample companies) disclosing relevant climate information between 2016 and 2018 (Henningsson 2018; TCFD 2019a). In general, the TCFD is built around four thematic areas representing the core elements that an organization should focus on, namely (TCFD 2019a, 2019b): 1. Governance: an organization’s governance and climate-related risks and opportunities;

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2. Strategy: actual and potential impacts of climate-related risks and opportunities on an organization’s business, strategy and financial planning; 3. Risk Management: the process of identifying, assessing and managing an organization’s climate-related risks; 4. Metrics and targets: metrics and targets used to assess and manage an organization’s climate-related risks and opportunities. FIGURE 11.1 TCFD Structure

Source: TCFD.

Literature focusing on the level of disclosures that are aligned to the TCFD is still scarce. Therefore, this analysis intends to fill this knowledge gap using Malaysian construction companies as case studies. The construction sector is selected for two reasons. First, it is recognized to be a main contributor of climate change. According to the United Nation’s Environment Programme Global Status Report, more than 40 per cent of the world’s emissions are from the building and construction sector. Second, while the construction industry is known to be a laggard when it comes to the adoption of best-in-class practices (Siew et al. 2013, 2016; Siew 2015, 2017), over the past decade, there

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has been a surge in the number of green building indices which aim to promote better design and development of more environmentally friendly buildings. This could be a sign that the industry is picking up momentum when it comes to embedding sustainability practices. It would therefore be interesting to observe the level of carbon disclosures by companies and how they are managing this issue in line with the recommendations proposed by the TCFD (see Appendix 11.1 for details).

Data and Methods Seven Malaysian property and construction companies were selected from the top 100 companies on Bursa Malaysia—the stock exchange of Malaysia. As these companies are most often under the scrutiny of investors, shareholders and regulatory bodies, it is anticipated that they would have more exposure to and better understand the requirements of the TCFD. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with these sample companies to take a deeper dive into understanding the challenges faced in implementing the requirements.

TCFD Elements Each of these companies was analysed based on its incorporation of the four main elements of the TCFD (strategy; governance; risk; metrics and targets). Reference was made to the companies’ published 2020 sustainability reports, annual reports, and disclosures available on their corporate website. These companies were assessed using two different methods: 1. Binary method: A score of (1) is given where each of the elements is present and (0) if there was no mention of the elements. A combined score from each of these elements form a final TCFD City Index (TCI). 2. Continuous method: A group of twenty Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) analysts (ranging from five to ten years of experience) were given access to the reference materials and asked to score the quality of reporting based on each of these elements using a Likert scale from 1 (very poor disclosure) to 5 (excellent disclosure).

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Table 11.1 provides an overview of the progress of property and construction companies by market capitalization in terms of embedding the requirements of the TCFD. It is observed that while 52 per cent of sample companies has some form of carbon metrics and targets in place, only a small percentage (18 per cent) have integrated climate risk into their business. Meanwhile, only 26 per cent of the top 100 sample companies have some sort of climate strategy in place while 36 per cent have established a governance structure to manage climate change issues. TABLE 11.1 Analysis of Top 100 Property and Construction Companies by Market Capitalization in Malaysia Percentage (%) of companies that has these elements

Elements Strategy (S)

26

Governance (G)

36

Risk (R)

18

Metrics and targets (M)

52

Source: Author’s analysis

For the binary method, it was observed that these property and construction companies have a low mean TI score of 1.32 (variance: 2.26). For the continuous method, it was also observed that the top 100 sample has a lower mean TI score of 2.79 (variance: 17.58). Overall, these results suggest that there is poor adoption and quality of disclosures on the TCFD elements. TABLE 11.2 Comparison of Mean and Variance of TI of Top Property and Construction Companies in Malaysia (Binary and Continuous) Binary

Continuous

Mean TI

Variance TI

Mean TI

Variance TI

1.32

2.26

2.79

17.58

Source: Author’s analysis

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Carbon Metrics Content analysis was used to analyse and compare the carbon metrics reported by the seven sample companies within the top 100 companies on Bursa Malaysia (Mayring 2004). This method involved the systematic evaluation of communication materials (i.e. sustainability reports, corporate websites, public announcements) published in 2019. From the analysis summarized in Table 11.3, it was found that the carbon metrics reported by Malaysian companies (even within similar industries) do vary from one another which suggests that it would be difficult to make a direct comparison in terms of performance. Less than three property and construction companies out of seven samples reported alignment with the government’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). TABLE 11.3 Comparison of Carbon Metrics of Property and Construction Companies in Malaysia Alignment to Government’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs)

Company

Carbon Metrics

1

Amount of carbon sequestered through programmes/initiatives (CO2-e)

Yes

2

Total carbon emissions by source (CO2-e)

No

3

Carbon intensity by built up area and revenue (CO2/m2 and CO2/RM)

No

4

Total carbon emissions (not differentiated by source) (CO2-e)

Yes

5

CO2 generated (kg CO2/litre)

No

6

Carbon abatement per year (CO2-e)

No

7

CO2 emissions from Company Owned Vehicles (CO2-e) CO2 emissions from Purchased Electricity (CO2-e) CO2 emissions from Air Travel (CO2-e)

Yes

Source: Author’s analysis

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Discussion The results from this study indicate that property and construction companies in Malaysia have not fully embedded the recommendations of the TCFD and generally have poor climate disclosures. This is attributed to several reasons based on the semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives from these companies (n=16, the author attempted to conduct interviews with at least one representative at the senior management level from each company but not all responded). Key findings are summarized as follows (Siew 2020a, 2020b): 1. High Cost and Lack of Capability The implementation of the TCFD recommendations covering the core areas (strategy, governance, risk, metrics and targets) is seen as a financial burden or added cost to companies. While some companies may be interested in adhering to the recommendations of the TCFD, many are not familiar with the framework and do not have the right capabilities within the organization to advise on either climate scenario modelling or governance surrounding climate change issues. 2. Limited or No Enforcement The TCFD recommendations are not enforced and are voluntary. Bursa Malaysia recommends adoption as a best practice but does not make it mandatory for companies to adopt them. 3. Herd Mentality Companies tend to follow the majority; that is to say they would put on hold the implementation of climate change plans until there is a strong movement where a majority of companies have clearly embarked on the TCFD recommendations. 4. Rise in the Number of Climate-Based Tools or Frameworks While it is important to recognize that there are nuances and different challenges faced by industries (Siew 2015), the wide range of tools or frameworks, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), MyCrest (low carbon city framework or green township tools (Siew 2017), carbon life cycle analysis, principles of the Climate Governance Initiative (CGI) creates confusion among key stakeholders. Companies, with their limited resources, often struggle to report based on all of these existing frameworks; while the public, which may not necessarily be exposed to

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these frameworks, might struggle to understand the different terms, criteria and benchmarks set within them. Based on the limitations above, the TCFD must strengthen these following activities: 1. Training The TCFD currently offers basic online courses to help participants understand the different elements within the framework. But this is not as effective. The TCFD could consider scaling up this initiative by appointing focal points (i.e. within specific industry groups) that could help facilitate companies to make the transition towards the TCFD guidelines. 2. There should be a stronger push by the capital markets (i.e. Bursa Malaysia) on the adoption of the TCFD framework, either by making it mandatory for publicly listed companies to report based on the TCFD framework or establish incentives to allow. This would help with ensuring higher quality and better comparability on climate disclosures. 3. There is a need to coordinate and harmonize existing climatebased tools or frameworks at the international level. Otherwise, the proliferation of such tools would just continue to add on to the complexities of reporting.

Conclusion The majority of publicly listed Malaysian property and construction companies are still not aligned to the TCFD recommendations and have very poor climate disclosures, which brings into question the level of climate resilience that has been embedded into city development projects. Content analysis of Malaysian property and construction companies in the top 100 revealed that there is variation in the carbon metrics disclosed by these companies which make comparability difficult. Building on this research, it would be interesting to conduct an empirical study to explore the link between the quality of climate disclosures (proxied by TCI) and financial performance. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there are barriers and challenges in implementing the TCFD guidelines such as cost, capability, lack of enforcement, “herd mentality”

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and the existence of too many climate-based tools/frameworks. A few recommendations are provided in this chapter to help improve the adoption of the TCFD guidelines and improve the embedding of climate resilience into city development. References Abubakar, Lastuti and Tri Handayani. 2019. “Implementation of the Principles for Responsible Banking in Indonesian Banking Practices to Realize Sustainable Development Goals”. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Globalization of Law and Local Wisdom (ICGLOW 2019). https://www. atlantis-press.com/proceedings/icglow-19/125920774 (assessed 17 December 2019). Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). 2019. “Inaugural Meeting of Joint Committee on Climate Change”, 27 September 2019. https://www.bnm.gov.my/-/inauguralmeeting-of-joint-committee-on-climate-change (assessed 4 April 2020). Climate Action 100+. N.d. “Global Investors Driving Business Transition”. http://www.climateaction100.org/ (accessed 17 December 2019). Climate Bonds Initiative. 2019. https://www.climatebonds.net/ (accessed 17 December 2019). de Bernardi, Paola, Francesco Venuti, and Alberto Bertello. 2019. “The Relevance of Climate Change Related Risks on Corporate Financial and Non-Financial Disclosure in Italian Listed Companies”. The Future of Risk Management 1: 77–107. Henningsson, Johan. 2018. “Will the Banker Become a Climate Activist”. In Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business, edited by Susanne Arvidsson, pp. 231–49. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Mayring, Philipp. 2004. “Qualitative Content Analysis”. In A Companion to Qualitative Research, edited by Uwe Flick, Ernst von Kardoff, and Ines Steinke, p. 266. London: Sage Publications. Nature Conservancy. 2007. “Global Climate Change: Impacts and Adaptation”. https://www.cbd.int/doc/pa/tools/Impacts%20and%20Adaptation.pdf. Renard Siew (2020a). Renard Siew (2020b). Siew, Renard. 2015. “Briefing: Integrated Reporting – Challenges in the Construction Industry”. Proceedings of the ICE – Engineering Sustainability 168, no. 1: 3–6. . 2017. “Green Township Index: Malaysia’s Sustainable Township Rating Tool”. Proceedings of the ICE – Engineering Sustainability 171, no. 4: 169–77.

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Siew, Renard, Maria Balatbat, and David Carmichael. 2013. “A Review of Building/Infrastructure Sustainability Reporting Tools (SRTs)”. Smart and Sustainable Built Environment 2, no. 2: 106–39. . 2016. “A Proposed Framework for Assessing the Sustainability of Infrastructure”. International Journal of Construction Management 16, no. 4: 281–98. TCFD (Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures). 2019a. “2019 Status Report – Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures: Status Report”. Basel Switzerland. https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/06/2019-TCFD-Status-Report-FINAL-053119.pdf (assessed 14 January 2020). . 2019b. “Recommendations Overview”. https://www.tcfdhub.org/ recommendations/ (assessed 31 December 2019). United Nations. 2019. “Shaping Our Future Together: Climate Change”, 17 December 2019. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climatechange/. Wheeler, Tim and Joachim von Braun. 2013. “Climate Change Impacts on Global Food Security”. Science 341, no. 6145: 508–13.

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Organizations should consider including a discussion of the following: • processes and frequency by which the board and/or board committees (e.g., audit, risk, or other committees) are informed about climate-related issues, • whether the board and/or board committees consider climate-related issues when reviewing and guiding strategy, major plans of action, risk management policies, annual budgets, and business plans as well as setting the organization’s performance objectives, monitoring implementation and performance, and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions, and divestitures, and • how the board monitors and oversees progress against goals and targets for addressing climate-related issues. Organizations should consider including the following information: • whether the organization has assigned climate-related responsibilities to management-level positions or committees; and, if so, whether such management positions or committees report to the board or a committee of the board and whether those responsibilities include assessing and/or managing climate-related issues, • a description of the associated organizational structure(s), • processes by which management is informed about climate-related issues, and • how management (through specific positions and/or management committees) monitors climate-related issues.

Describe the board’s oversight of climate-related risks and opportunities

Describe management’s role in assessing and managing risks and opportunities

Governance

Guidance

Disclosures

Elements

APPENDIX 11.1 Specific TCFD requirements (Adapted from the TCFD Status Report and Recommendations)

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Strategy

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Organizations should discuss how identified climate-related issues have affected their businesses, strategy, and financial planning.

Describe the impact of climaterelated risks and opportunities on the organization’s businesses, strategy, and financial planning

Organizations should also consider including in their disclosures the impact on financial planning in the following areas: • Operating costs and revenues • Capital expenditures and capital allocation • Acquisitions or divestments • Access to capital

Organizations should describe how climate-related issues serve as an input to their financial planning process, the time period(s) used, and how these risks and opportunities are prioritized. Organizations’ disclosures should reflect a holistic picture of the interdependencies among the factors that affect their ability to create value over time.

Organizations should consider including the impact on their businesses and strategy in the following areas: • Products and services • Supply chain and/or value chain • Adaptation and mitigation activities • Investment in research and development • Operations (including types of operations and location of facilities)

Organizations should provide the following information: • a description of what they consider to be the relevant short-, medium-, and long-term time horizons, taking into consideration the useful life of the organization’s assets or infrastructure and the fact that climate-related issues often manifest themselves over the medium and longer terms, • a description of the specific climate-related issues for each time horizon (short, medium, and long term) that could have a material financial impact on the organization, and • a description of the process(es) used to determine which risks and opportunities could have a material financial impact on the organization.

Describe the climate-related risks and opportunities the organization has identified over the short, medium, and long term

APPENDIX 11.1 (continued)

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Risk Management

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Organizations should describe their processes for managing climate-related risks, including how they make decisions to mitigate, transfer, accept, or control those risks. In addition, organizations should describe their processes for prioritizing climate-related risks, including how materiality determinations are made within their organizations. Organizations should describe how their processes for identifying, assessing, and managing climate-related risks are integrated into their overall risk management.

Describe how processes for identifying, assessing, and managing climate-related risks are integrated into the organization’s overall risk management

Organizations should also consider disclosing the following: • processes for assessing the potential size and scope of identified climaterelated risks; and • definitions of risk terminology used or references to existing risk classification frameworks used.

Organizations should describe whether they consider existing and emerging regulatory requirements related to climate change (e.g., limits on emissions) as well as other relevant factors considered.

Organizations should consider discussing: • where they believe their strategies may be affected by climate-related risks and opportunities; • how their strategies might change to address such potential risks and opportunities; and • the climate-related scenarios and associated time horizon(s) considered.

Organizations should describe how resilient their strategies are to climaterelated risks and opportunities, taking into consideration a transition to a lower-carbon economy consistent with a 2°C or lower scenario and, where relevant to the organization, scenarios consistent with increased physical climate-related risks.

Describe the organization’s processes for managing climate-related risks

Describe the organization’s processes for identifying and assessing climaterelated risks

Describe the resilience of the organization’s strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario

If climate-related scenarios were used to inform the organization’s strategy and financial planning, such scenarios should be described.

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Metrics and Targets

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Disclose Scope 1, Scope 2, and, if appropriate, Scope 3 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the related risks

Disclose the metrics used by the organization to assess climate-related risks and opportunities in line with its strategy and risk management process

GHG emissions and associated metrics should be provided for historical periods to allow for trend analysis. In addition, where not apparent, organizations should provide a description of the methodologies used to calculate or estimate the metrics.

GHG emissions should be calculated in line with the GHG Protocol methodology to allow for aggregation and comparability across organizations and jurisdictions. As appropriate, organizations should consider providing related, generally accepted industry-specific GHG efficiency ratios.

Organizations should provide their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions and, if appropriate, Scope 3 GHG emissions and the related risks.

Metrics should be provided for historical periods to allow for trend analysis. In addition, where not apparent, organizations should provide a description of the methodologies used to calculate or estimate climate-related metrics.

Where relevant, organizations should provide their internal carbon prices as well as climate-related opportunity metrics such as revenue from products and services designed for a lower-carbon economy.

Organizations should consider including metrics on climate-related risks associated with water, energy, land use, and waste management where relevant and applicable. Where climate-related issues are material, organizations should consider describing whether and how related performance metrics are incorporated into remuneration policies.

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Describe the targets used by the organization to manage climaterelated risks and opportunities and performance against targets

In describing their targets, organizations should consider including the following: • whether the target is absolute or intensity based, • time frames over which the target applies, • base year from which progress is measured, and • key performance indicators used to assess progress against targets.

Organizations should describe their key climate-related targets such as those related to GHG emissions, water usage, energy usage, etc., in line with anticipated regulatory requirements or market constraints or other goals. Other goals may include efficiency or financial goals, financial loss tolerances, avoided GHG emissions through the entire product life cycle, or net revenue goals for products and services designed for a lower-carbon economy.

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12 The Role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Advancing Sustainable Climate Adaptation: A Case Study of Japanese ODA in Vietnam Michiyo Kakegawa Summary: ■

 As the assistance requests for climate adaptation increase, donor-funded

projects’ approaches will be essential to ensure sustainable and resilient communities. ■  Japan’s ODA strategy shifted from the “quantity” to “quality” of projects in the early 2000s to increase the competitiveness of Japanese infrastructure and expertise worldwide. But the inward-looking nature of Japan’s ODA which emphasizes priority on Japan’s economic growth is hampering the introduction of climate-progressive approaches. ■  Japan’s recent policy change towards infrastructure system export pushes Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategy to provide more technical and infrastructure-based projects in developing countries.  ■  Integrating Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) in Japanese ODA projects will not only ensure the connection between the activities in biodiversity conservation and climate change, but also strengthen the outcomes of the assistance projects to build a sustainable and resilient society.

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Introduction As the global average temperature increases, natural disasters occur more frequently and intensely (IPCC 2021). In order to mitigate such negative impacts from global warming, it is essential to have appropriate and sustainable adaptation measures. How then are the adaptation measures and approaches determined, particularly in donor-funded assistance projects? Japan, as one of the largest bilateral donors among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, has been playing an important and influential role in aiding developing countries since it joined the Colombo plan in 1954.1 As a strategic international assistance policy, the first Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter was enacted in 1992, and it was further revised in 2003. The ODA Charter was again updated and revised as the Development Cooperation Charter in November 2015. Globally, Japan continues to demonstrate its commitment to share its infrastructure capabilities. This commitment was further advanced by the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s flagship assistance, the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future.2 Under such an initiative, Japan committed to provide US$110 billion in infrastructure assistance for Asian countries, including ASEAN.3 Japan has long been praised on its technical capabilities on infrastructure projects, but as the global community is increasingly concerned about climate change impacts on vulnerable communities in developing countries, it is critical for Japan to revisit the ODA Charter and its principles in incorporating climate change and cross-cutting environmental issues, in particular the climate adaptation aspect. To what extent has Japan embedded climate resilience and considerations in its overseas projects? Has it also increasingly introduced a more nature-based approach instead of hard infrastructure in building climate resilience in developing countries? Inspired by those questions, this chapter explores how Japan’s overall ODA policy and national decision-making shape the regional discourse on climate change. This study specifically analyses how the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an important ODA implementing agency, sets its frameworks for climate change adaptation to formulate and implement projects with the client developing

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countries. This study first explores how ODA policies and national interests help to shape Japan’s infrastructural capabilities, and export knowledge worldwide. Next, this study looks at recent projects of JICA in natural conservation and climate change in Vietnam. This study utilizes various qualitative methods; online interviews with senior management of JICA, review of planning documents and government strategy papers, and case studies of Japan-assisted climate adaptation projects in Vietnam.

ECOSYSTEM-BASED Adaptation as a New Paradigm The 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) reaffirmed the need for large-scale assistance and technological support to developing countries by developed countries, which are historically responsible for emitting greenhouse gases (UNFCCC 2021). At COP15 in Copenhagen, developed countries committed themselves to provide US$100 billion funding per year by 2020, but it was reported that this target was not achieved.4 In fact, even at the early phase, the estimated aggregated volume of public and private finance mobilized by developed countries had reached only US$52 billion in 2013, and US$62 billion in 2014 (UNFCCC 2016). As the negative impacts of global warming are escalating quickly (IPCC 2014, 2020, 2021), more assistance and programme support by international donors will be needed to overcome these existential challenges (UNFCCC 2021). It is expected that international donors have been responding to these requests,5 and will continue to provide more funding to developing countries in terms of climate adaptation (UNFCCC 2021). Therefore, it is important for donors to ensure environmental and social standards for the projects. However, ensuring environmental and social standards of planned infrastructure projects will not be enough when donors only consider the broad scope of the climate adaptation principles. Building the connection between biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation and adaptation is essential (CBD 2009). In addition, soft approaches such as ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) will ensure long-term impacts on ecosystem and the livelihood of the local people. A study by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) shows that “biodiversity and climate change interactions” can build up a stronger climate resilience (ibid.). The study highlights that

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“Ecosystem-based adaptation, which integrates the use of biodiversity and ecosystem services into an overall adaptation strategy, can be cost-effective and generate social, economic and cultural co-benefits and contribute to the conservation of biodiversity.” (ibid.). Therefore, when donors adopt measures for climate change, it is essential to consider the potential and contribution of EbA to mitigation and adaptation projects (ibid.). EbA has been a popular strategy advocated by many climate and development experts (Zwierzchowska et al. 2019). For instance, the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) in 2014 adopted a resolution (UNEP 2014) to promote the use of ecosystem services, and proposed that countries include adaptation measures that use ecosystem services. The European Union (EU) also emphasizes the importance of the nature-based solutions to enhance the quality of ecosystem services that will eventually contribute to enhancing human health and wellbeing (European Commission 2015). Similarly, EbA is recognized as providing safety nets and natural buffers to maintain livelihoods in disaster-affected areas (Fedele et al. 2016). In addition, CBD/COP14 in 2018 adopted the voluntary guidelines for the design and effective implementation of ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.6 As EbA is gaining ground and has become a preferred adaptation approach internationally, it is critical for Japanese development agencies to consider and incorporate this approach into practice (Nalau et al. 2018).

Japan’s ODA Approach Japan’s approach to ODA is rather unique. The approach is deeply rooted in the government of Japan in responding to various international and domestic challenges including domestic economic and political situations (Shimomura 2020). Over the long history of Japan’s ODA delivery, the government has emphasized the “quantity” of the projects and technical aspects of project development. However, the transformation from “quantity” to “quality” took place in the early 2000s (Shigeta 2019). Although the shift towards “quality focus” has been praised, the inward-looking nature of Japan’s ODA: putting the priority on Japan’s economic growth, is still hampering Japanese ODA implementing agencies’ introduction of climate-progressive approaches worldwide.

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For instance, the Second Abe Cabinet in December 2012 strongly emphasized the opportunities of ODA as a tool for exporting Japanese technologies and infrastructure worldwide. This was well-aligned with the priority under the Second Abe Cabinet, which was to revitalize the Japanese economy and to remain competitive globally (Prime Minister’s Office 2014). Thus, the Nihon Saikou Senryaku (Japan’s Revival Strategy)7 was approved by the Cabinet in June 2013. As the strategy aimed to promote economic activities, measures and policies to improve the competitiveness of Japanese companies abroad became a significant component. One of the strategies even targeted an outcome to obtain the contract opportunities at infrastructure markets internationally by promoting public and private partnership.8 The goal was reiterated further by the target to realize contracts valued at 30 trillion yen for infrastructure projects abroad, an increase from the target of 10 trillion yen in 2013. The strategy also further suggested that overseas investments and loans, and other measures be used proactively to achieve this goal. JICA as an ODA implementing agency is obliged to follow and work within this national framework. In parallel to the above-mentioned strategies, the Prime Minister’s Office organized Keikyo infra senryaku kaigi or the Economic Cooperation and Infrastructure Strategy Meeting (ECISM)9 in March 2013 which used Japanese infrastructure capabilities and export of expertise as one of its key economic drivers. The ECISM is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary with the support of key line ministers.10 Soon after, the “Infrastructure System Export Strategy”11 was issued by the ECISM, and disseminated to the Ministries concerned, JICA, and Keidanren (Economic Federation). The Infrastructure System Export Strategy includes ODA and assistance by Japanese public institutions as key tools to promote Japanese infrastructure system. In addition, the strategy lays out the major approaches such as Kanmin renkei or public-private partnership, the role of local governments, and global human networks12 to further promote Japanese expertise. Interestingly, Japan was fully aware that the country is the leading expert in establishing international standards on low-carbon technology, disaster prevention, and risk management. Thus, these sectors were promoted intensively in addition to other new frontiers such as medicine, agriculture, and space and satellite technology.

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In the disaster risk reduction sector, the Japanese government pledged to take a leadership role in mainstreaming disaster prevention by using Japan’s long-standing experiences and state of the art technologies for disaster prevention.13 The Japanese government even further emphasized the commitment to provide technical capabilities with a precise approach so that the project can be implemented on the ground.14 The ECISM organized forty-eight meetings from March 2013 to October 2020.15 The meetings specifically discussed ways to promote export of expertise and technical capabilities to main target countries such as Myanmar, India, and Indonesia. Other possibilities to extend target regions and countries such as ASEAN, the Mekong region, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia were also discussed. In addition, the thematic discussion on target sectors was also conducted, focusing on railways, natural resources and energy, information and technology, among others. Overall, the ECISM examined the current economic status of those particular countries, bottlenecks of expanding loaned projects, and the possible ways in adopting the Japanese technical capabilities on technologies for infrastructure development.16 Although the ECISM included the word of “keikyo” or economic cooperation in partner developing countries, the substance of the discussions largely focused on building strategies for Japan to gain more trustworthiness and strategically export their expertise to developing countries. Despite many meetings and conferences conducted to reinvent Japan’s ODA approach as part of its overall export strategy, the updated Infrastructure System Export Strategy17 in 2018 continues to only emphasize the use of Japanese experiences and technologies in disaster prevention and climate change through ODA. The discussions on expanding Japanese expertise on climate change mitigation and adaptation, waste management including waste-to-energy, and air and water pollution management continued to gain tractions without concrete programmes. The conversations on how to use Japan’s ODA effectively remained on building hard infrastructure and technical capabilities18 rather than how best to tackle and solve the issues in a more holistic and sustainable way, for instance, by introducing softinfrastructure approach such as EbA. The fundamental challenge is that the Japanese government still strongly focused on increasing the export of Japanese technologies, and not analysing what would be the best approach using ODA to solve developing countries’ challenges.

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But Japan made significant progress during the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergence of the coronavirus had upended the global health systems. There is increasing concern that health, climate, and economy are deeply intertwined (CBD 2020) such that ODA implementing agencies began to look at development issues comprehensively. Although the latest Infrastructure System Export Strategy (2021)19 mostly remains the same, the Japanese government recently emphasized carbon neutrality and public health response to COVID-19. These measures are new and could dramatically change the overall direction of Japan’s ODA. Another drastic change in Japan’s ODA approach is the adoption of the “quality infrastructure” wording in many guiding cooperation documents, which is a concrete attempt to distinguish Japan’s quality infrastructure from that of other donors or emerging economies including China. The concept of “quality infrastructure” has been promoted through the various international conferences and high-level political meetings including the G720 and G2021 summit meetings. One of the principles included in the “G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment” (G7 2016) is “ensuring alignment with economic and development strategies including aspect of climate change and environment at the national and regional levels”. This principle further explained what a “quality infrastructure investment” means to promote “quality growth”.22 It also mentions climate resilience, energy security and sustainability, conservation of biodiversity and disaster reduction including further promotion of EbA approaches and green infrastructure.23 Based on these principles, Japan is promoting EbA approaches and green infrastructure as part of “quality growth” although the principles include very broad physical and technical aspects from environment to socio-economic outcomes. In the meantime, the review and update of the twenty-year old ODA Charter (2003)24 coincided with the strategic and policy push in export promotion mentioned above. One of the rationales to update the ODA Charter was to adjust to the diversification of ODA’s roles, meaning that ODA should be proactively used to pursue national security, and also should be used as Japan’s economic revitalization strategy by contributing to development of developing countries and internalizing the benefits in the Japanese economy.25 This shows that ODA should be strategically used to meet the objectives of national interests first, rather than directly contributing to the sustainable development of

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developing countries. There have always been discussions concerning how ODA can be used and implemented—whether the purpose of ODA is mainly to contribute to global development issues, or to serve national interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan argues that “economic cooperation can be used as diplomatic strategy”.26 Conversely, there is a perspective that emphasizing global development cooperation should be the main goal, thus ODA should be used to achieve such a goal including the contribution to provide a safety-net to vulnerable people in developing countries (Shigeta 2019). Other rationales for the Charter update include the changes of international discussions and emerging new agendas such as United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the need to link to non-ODA activities such as private sector-led initiatives. Currently, the Development Cooperation Charter27 which serves as Japan’s ODA main objectives emphasizes three core principles: (1) quality growth and poverty eradication, (2) sharing universal values and realizing a peaceful and secure society, and (3) building a sustainable and resilient international community through efforts to address global challenges. The word “quality growth” is a new word which appeared in the Charter, defined as “inclusive in terms of sharing the fruits of growth, sustainable over the generations regarding environment, socioeconomic growth and global warning, and resilient to economic crisis, natural disasters and other shocks”.28 The “quality growth” includes all the aspects that are needed to ensure sustainable development, but it is a very broad approach.

JICA’s Strategies and Approaches As an ODA implementing agency, JICA works based on the Development Cooperation Charter and related policies decided by the government. On cooperation related to natural environment and climate change, JICA focused on three cooperation areas as of 2008:29 (1) Sustainable use of natural resources by local residents; (2) Biodiversity conservation; and (3) Sustainable forest management. In the first area, JICA supports sustainable livelihoods activities and related capacity building. Under the second area, JICA aids in

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maintaining data on biodiversity for effective management of protected areas and national parks. Under the third area, JICA assists their international counterparts in conducting forest monitoring surveys, technological development for afforestation, and awareness-raising activities. In addition, capacity building on operating tools such as the Afforestation and Reforestation Clean Development Mechanism (AR-CDM) was also provided. Five years later, JICA developed a comprehensive strategy in July 2013 considering various global environmental issues30 and adopted the Nature Environment Conservation Strategy31 that adheres to three international conventions: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).32 The Nature Environment Conservation Strategy helps JICA to establish frameworks on: (1) climate change measures and forest management, (2) sustainable use of natural resources for improving the livelihood of vulnerable communities, and (3) conservation of biodiversity by managing protective areas and buffer zones. Despite starting to look at environmental conservation issues comprehensively, JICA has yet to promote EbA explicitly as a potentially effective approach to sustainable development in developing countries. In the meantime, JICA started to adopt increased capacity building activities and set up the frameworks for REDD+ as part of forest management projects.33 JICA also introduced forest management frameworks as tools to prevent disaster as well as climate change adaptation projects such as restoring mangroves34 along the coastlines and restoring forests along watersheds. Through these activities, EbA could have been promoted intensively by JICA. It remains unclear why Japan has never promoted EbA as a core strategy for Japan’s ODA although the approach has become more important globally since its adoption by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2009,35 followed by the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA),36 and the EU (European Commission 2015). A JICA official in the Forest and Natural Environment Group argued that they have been working on nature-based approach, so it is not necessary to promote EbA explicitly in Japan’s ODA strategies.37 The resistance to embrace EbA could be because branding JICA’s cooperation as nature-based solutions and projects would decrease

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its attractiveness as a loan provider. Economic development activities like building infrastructure are still considered much more important for developing countries. Another JICA official also argued that, “the priority of conservation of natural resources by developing countries is low when they make a request of assistance to JICA. It is important to respect the priorities of the client countries, but we, JICA, should present comprehensive tools and offer EbA as an alternative approach.”38 However, this low priority of nature conservation projects by client countries is not the only problem. JICA faced challenges in mainstreaming EbA in its institutional setting. A JICA expert in biodiversity conservation emphasized the importance of mainstreaming the nature conservation strategy within the JICA organizational structure: “Nature conservation is not the strategy of one division, but it is the strategy that JICA should embrace. Therefore, EbA should be mainstreamed in the different divisions of JICA, including their activities. To achieve the harmonization between conservation of natural environment and human activities, projects in nature conservation require close coordination with other projects in agriculture development, for instance.”39 The challenge to coordinate different divisions and to fully mainstream nature conservation has existed in the JICA structural body.40

JICA Cooperation Strategy for Nature Conservation The previous strategy was once again updated in 2017 to reflect the need to support developing countries in working towards the Sustainable Development Goals, and the emerging impacts by global warming. The new strategy, “JICA Cooperation Strategy for Natural Environment Conservation: Working toward a Sustainable Society that Leaves No One Behind” (JICA 2017) identifies the strengths of Japanese experiences and technologies in the field of nature conservation. According to the Strategy, the strengths exist in three areas: (1) forest management technologies and planning systems, (2) sustainable use of natural resources in socioecological production landscapes (called “Satoyama”), and (3) satellite technologies to monitor the state of the forests. The promotion of “public-private partnership (PPP)” was mentioned as one of approaches among others such as the participatory approach.

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PPP is one of the approaches that the Infrastructure System Export Strategy 41 emphasizes. Overall, JICA’s strategic agenda remains almost the same as before, and they are still based on the three UN conventions. Thus, the projects were formulated to contribute directly to the realization of each UN convention, rather than aiming to build a sustainable society as a whole, by using a more comprehensive approach to development. Issues beyond UN conventions such as how economic activities should be promoted and managed, were left to other divisions in JICA to formulate such projects. Eventually, this became part of constraints within JICA to formulate more comprehensive projects towards sustainable development. For instance, although climate mitigation and adaptation are covered, the linkages with climate change, biodiversity conservation and community development are missing because of this conventions-based approach. Although EbA is a potential approach that could help the institution to establish comprehensive linkages and coordination, it has yet to be fully mainstreamed in any of Japan’s ODA guiding documents. Recently, JICA conducted an external evaluation to assess the performance of the projects in natural environment conservation sector and captured the lessons learned as part of knowledge management (JICA 2014). The evaluation report summarized three key lessons for JICA. First, JICA needs to ensure financing mechanisms at the project assessment stage. Second, JICA needs to carefully establish an appropriate coordination mechanism to manage the various partners involved. And third, JICA needs to take heed of relevant laws and systems including those related to land clearance issues in receiving countries. The evaluation also includes some analysis of other international donors’ approaches. However, it did not point out the need to build more integration among climate change, biodiversity conservation, and community development in JICA-supported projects (ibid.).

The Global Agenda as a New Strategy JICA has been discussing and preparing for a new strategy, called the “Global Agenda”, and it will be supported by four goal-based units based on the SDGs.42 The first goal is assurance for economic growth (Prosperity). The second goal is human development that supports basic livelihoods (People). The third goal is sharing the universal value and

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realization of peace and safe society (Peace). And finally, the fourth goal is achieving sustainable and resilient society by addressing the global issues (Planet).43 The shift towards this new initiative will ensure that cooperation projects with developing countries should be implemented based on broad partnerships. In other words, in implementing development projects, Japan should share its expertise with international stakeholders and actors including other international donors, the private sector, local governments, universities, NGOs, and the local communities, and ensure knowledge transfer. The Global Agenda for nature conservation will become a holistic guiding principle for JICA in delivering projects on environmental conservation, and a more comprehensive approach than the three UN conventions-based approach44 that might have limited the project scope when addressing the issues on climate change, desertification, and conservation of biodiversity. Unfortunately, JICA still emphasizes the ecological and physical approach rather than multi-dimensional approach towards sustainable development. Inspired by the concept of Global Agenda for nature conservation, JICA established two big working clusters: (1) terrestrial sustainable natural resources management; and (2) coastal and sustainable natural resources management. Under the terrestrial cluster, there are three subdivisions such as rainforest, dry and semi-arid, and wetland. Meanwhile in the coastal cluster, mangroves and coral reefs became two focus subdivisions. JICA specifically puts integrated management and ecodisaster risk reduction as an important adaptation approach. However, EbA is not specifically highlighted in the Global Agenda.45 The absence of a nature-based approach could be seen in JICA’s projects in Vietnam. JICA has been supporting the government of Vietnam to achieve its development goal which was to become an industrialized country by 2020.46 Under Japan’s Cooperation Strategy to Vietnam47 and JICA’s thematic programmes, various projects including loans, technical assistance and grants have been implemented since 2010.48 These include: 1. Disaster and Climate Change Countermeasures by Using the Earth Observing System (loan) (2011–21)49 2. Building Disaster Resilient Societies (Phase 2) (technical assistance) (2013–16)50

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3. Ben Tre Province Water Management Project (loan) (2017–23)51 4. Forestry Restoration and Sustainable Management Project (forestry sector loan) (2012)52 5. Sustainable Natural Resources Management (technical assistance) (2015–21)53 6. Emergency Reservoir Operation and Effective Flood Management Using Water Related Disaster Management Information System (grant) (2017–19)54 These projects are well-aligned to Japan’s Development Cooperation Strategy and the Infrastructure System Export Strategy which aim to boost the export of Japanese expertise including building infrastructure projects in the borrowing countries. As shown in the list of JICA’s projects, Japan successfully sealed two loan deals that involved hard infrastructure and technologies: the Earth Observing System for disaster countermeasure and a water management project in Ben Tre province, and one grant project on flood management in Central Vietnam. The Disaster and Climate Change Countermeasures by using the Earth Observing System is a project to introduce two sets of Japanese satellites to assist a national satellite centre.55 Meanwhile, the Ben Tre Province Water Management Project targets to assist the Vietnamese government in building eight sluice gates to block and control intrusion of sea water and setting up monitoring systems.56 In addition, the Emergency Reservoir Operation and Effective Flood management project carries with the Japanese technologies and sets of monitoring equipment to observe the water level in reservoirs and a flood forecast warning system.57 Technical support is essential to manage the reservoir and its emergency situation, however, EbA projects as subcomponents could have been considered to strengthen the resilience to flooding in the communities.

Conclusion The Japanese government has been promoting the Infrastructure System Export Strategy and public-private partnership in its ODA projects. There are pressures on domestic ministries involved and on JICA which is the implementing agency for ODA. JICA’s recent strategy incorporates such a direction and the importance of public-private partnership.58 The projects in the area of nature conservation are also offering such

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opportunities although loan and grant projects are more likely to be the target than that of technical assistance. Considering the recent discussions on the positive aspects of EbA (Munang et al. 2013), particularly the opportunity to balance growth and sustainability, more attention should be paid to the linkage of the projects between nature conservation and climate change in JICAsupported projects. JICA and the Japanese government should promote EbA to partner developing countries and mainstream EbA into various policy documents and strategies. EbA will not only benefit the local communities due to the improved ecosystem services and livelihood opportunities, but it will ultimately ensure the achievement of the global agenda to climate change (CBD 2009). As developing countries seek more assistance on climate adaptation programmes, JICA can play a critical role to influence their decisionmaking, introduce various EbA tools in adaptation, and move to more nature-based and comprehensive approach which is both cost effective and sustainable. The issue of giving low priority to the restoration of ecosystems and the use of EbA in developing countries must be addressed. Creating good practices of EbA will strengthen trust in this approach as an effective and viable solution for climate adaptation. To make this happen, JICA and the Japanese government should integrate EbA into their planning systems, institutional frameworks, and ensure the necessary financial and human resources available. NOTES 1. OECD data, 2019. Japan was the 5th largest bilateral ODA donor in 2019, and net disbursement was US$7,477 million. 2. This partnership was announced at the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia, held in Tokyo on 21 May 2015. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015a). 3. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech on “The Future of Asia”, delivered on 21 May 2015. 4. Timperley (2021). See also OECD (2021). According to OECD, climate financing from developed countries to developing countries totalled US$79.6 billion in 2019, up 2 per cent from US$78.31 billion in 2018, but did not reach the target.

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5. For instance, Green Climate Fund (GCF), a multilateral fund that promotes the various schemes to work on measures to tackle climate change is supported mostly by developed countries, and the total contributions achieved was US$14,890.30 million. See World Bank (n.d.). 6. CBD/COP/DEC/14/5, 30 November 2018. 7. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/saikou_jpn.pdf (Japanese version only). 8. Ibid. 9. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/kaisai2.html (Forty-eight meetings were organized between March 2013 and October 2020. Minutes are available in Japanese.) 10. The key line ministers include Minister of Finance, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Minister of Economic Revitalization. 11. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/dai4/kettei.pdf (Japanese version only). It was issued in May 2013. 12. The strategy includes the approach to build the global human networks including the study and training programmes in Japan for government officials in developing countries, and sending young Japanese business persons to the government agencies in developing countries as an internship programme. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/kaisai2.html (Minutes are available in Japanese) (accessed 1 November 2021). 16. Ibid. 17. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/dai37/siryou2.pdf (Japanese version only). 18. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/dai37/siryou4.pdf (Prime Minister’s Office, “Overseas Export Strategy (Environment), June 2018” (Japanese version only). 19. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/pdf/infra2025.pdf (Japanese version only). 20. Japan hosted the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in May 2016, and the statement of “Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment” was adopted. See G7 (2016). 21. Japan hosted the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019, and the “G20 Principles for Quality Investment” was adopted. See G20 (2019). 22. Quality growth emphasizes not only the consideration of the use of the global supply chain, and the use of the latest technology, but also longterm and cross-sectoral perspective. See G7 (2016).

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23. Ibid. 24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ODA Charter Overview, 2003 (Japanese version), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/2003.html. 25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2014, “Review of ODA Charter”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000071299.pdf (accessed 1 November 2021). 26. Director of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2004, “Economic Cooperation as Diplomatic Strategy”, https://www.mofa. go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/annai/50/kiji_1.html (accessed 1 December 2021). 27. Cabinet decision on Development Cooperation Charter on 10 February 2015. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015b). 28. Ibid. 29. JICA’s approach, “Achieving Harmony between Nature and Human Activities: JICA’s Approach to Global Environment”, https://jica-net-library. jica.go.jp/lib2/07PRDM009/pdf/02.pdf. 30. JICA Knowledge Management Newsletter, No. 1, January 2014, https://www. jica.go.jp/activities/issues/natural_env/ku57pq00001leyqb-att/201401.pdf. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. For example, “Sustainable Forest Management and REDD+ Support Project” started in Lao PDR in September 2014. https://www.jica.go.jp/project/ laos/018/outline/index.html. 34. For example, “Sustainable Natural Resource Management Project” started in Vietnam in July 2015. https://www.jica.go.jp/project/vietnam/037/ outline/index.html. 35. Ibid. 36. First United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) in 2014 adopted the resolutions and decisions including “ecosystem-based adaptation”, and UNEA “encourages all the countries to include and improve ecosystembased adaptation and community-based adaptation in their national policies, including those on climate change adaptation…”, in addition to other important aspects in EbA. See UNEP (2014). 37. Online interview with a senior management of Global Environment, and Forest and Natural Environment Group of JICA, 15 November 2021. 38. Then Deputy-Director General of Global Environment of JICA, JICA Knowledge Management Newsletter No. 1, January 2014. In addition, the similar challenge was also mentioned by the current senior management of Global Environment of JICA (online interview on 15 November 2021). 39. JICA Expert in Participatory Biodiversity Conservation Project in Costa Rica, JICA Knowledge Management Newsletter, No. 1, January 2014. 40. Ibid. 41. Prime Minister’s Office, December 2020, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ keikyou/dai49/siryou2.pdf (Japanese version only).

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42. JICA, November 2021, “Current Status of Discussion on New Management of Development Cooperation projects”, https://www.jica.go.jp/chotatsu/ buppin/ku57pq00002o7pr5-att/3_21a00906.pdf (accessed 1 December 2021). 43. Ibid. 44. Projects were formulated based on the scope of UNFCCC, UNCCD, and CBD respectively. 45. Online interview with a senior management of Global Environment, JICA, 15 November 2021. 46. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2016-2020. 47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ gaiko/oda/files/000072247.pdf. 48. JICA, Annual Report 2020. 49. JICA, Project overview and pre-assessment, https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/ evaluation/pdf/2011_VN11-P2_1_s.pdf. 50. JICA, Project overview and outcomes, https://www.jica.go.jp/project/ vietnam/031/materials/ku57pq00001y1feh-att/briefs_notebook_ja.pdf. 51. JICA, Project overview and pre-assessment, https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/ evaluation/pdf/2017_VN17-P2_1_s.pdf. 52. JICA, Project overview, https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/evaluation/pdf/2011_ VN11-P9_1_s.pdf. 53. JICA, Project overview, https://www.jica.go.jp/project/vietnam/037/outline/ index.html. 54. JICA, Project overview, 2017, https://www.jica.go.jp/press/2017/20170810_02. html. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. https://www.jica.go.jp/oda/project/1660580/index.html 58. JICA, Annual Report 2021.

References European Commission. 2015. Towards an EU Research and Innovation Policy Agenda for Nature-Based Solutions & Re-Naturing Cities: Final Report of the Horizon 2020 Expert Group on ‘Nature-Based Solutions and Re-Naturing Cities’. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Fedele, Giacomo, Febrina Desrianti, Adi Gangga, Florie Chazarin, Djoudi Houria, and Bruno Locatelli. 2016. “Ecosystem-based Strategies for Community Resilience to Climate Variability in Indonesia”. In Ecosystem-Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Adaptation in Practice, pp. 529–52. Cham: Springer.

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G7 (Group of Seven). 2016. “G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment”. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/ files/000160272.pdf. G20 (Group of Twenty). 2019. “G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment”. https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/international_policy/ convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC. . 2020. “Summary for Policymakers”. In Climate Change and Land: An IPCC Special Report on Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems. Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC. . 2021. “Summary for Policymakers”. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). 2014. “Thematic Evaluation: Cross-sectoral Analysis of Evaluation Results and the Extraction of Practical Knowledge and Lessons Learned Regarding Natural Environment Conservation Projects”. OPMAC Ltd. . 2017. “JICA Cooperation Strategy for Natural Environment Conservation”. https://www.jica.go.jp/activities/issues/natural_env/ ku57pq00002cubqh-att/position_paper_natural_env_en.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2015a. “Announcement of ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future’”. https://www. mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page18_000076.html#:~:text=On%20May%20 21st%2C%20Prime%20Minister%20Abe%20announced%20“Partnership,in%20 collaboration%20with%20other%20countries%20and%20international%20 organizations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2015b. “Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter”, 10 February 2015. https://www.mofa. go.jp/files/000067701.pdf. Munang, Richard, Ibrahim Thiaw, Keith Alverson, Musonda Mumba, Jian Liu, and Mike Rivington. 2013. “Climate Change and Ecosystem-based Adaptation: A New Pragmatic Approach to Buffering Climate Change Impacts”. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 5, no. 1: 67–71. Nalau, Johanna, Susanne Becken, and Brendan Mackey. 2018. “Ecosystembased Adaptation: A Review of the Constraints”. Environmental Science and Policy 89: 357–64.

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OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2021. “Statement from OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann on Climate Finance in 2019”, 17 September 2021. https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/ statement-from-oecd-secretary-general-mathias-cormann-on-climate-financein-2019.htm. Prime Minister’s Office. 2014. “Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan’s Challenge for the Future”, 24 June 2014. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 2009. “Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation”. Key Messages from the Report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change. Montreal, Canada: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. . 2020. Global Biodiversity Outlook 5. Montreal: Convention on Biological Diversity. Shigeta, Y. 2019. “Changes of Global Development Theories after the War, and Global Contribution”. In Global Development Cooperation Theory during the SDGs era. Akashi Shobo. Shimomura, Yasutami. 2020. Policy History 1: Evolution of the Japanese Model of Development Cooperation, 1945–89. Reconsidering the History of Japan’s Development Cooperation Series, Volume 1. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Timperley, Jocelyn. 2021. “The Broken $100-billion Promise of Climate Finance – and How to Fix It”. Nature 598: 400–402. UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2014. “Resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations Environment Programme at its first session on 27 June 2014”. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/17285/ K1402364.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2016. “Roadmap to US$100 Billion”. . 2021. “The Glasgow Climate Pact” (Advance unedited version). Decision 1/CP.26, 13 November 2021. World Bank. N.d. “Green Climate Fund (GCF)”. https://fiftrustee.worldbank. org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/gcftf (accessed 3 December 2021). Zwierzchowska, Iwona, Katarzyna Fagiewicz, Lidia Ponizy, Piotr Lupa, and Andrzej Mizgajski. 2019. “Introducing Nature-based Solutions into Urban Policy – Facts and Gaps. Case Study of Poznań”. Land Use Policy 85: 161–75.

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13 Summary and Policy Recommendations Melinda Martinus, Jiahui Qiu and Sharon Seah

The varied and contextual experiences of each Southeast Asian city in addressing climate challenges detailed in this compendium are all unique in their own ways. It may be difficult to generalize these experiences but the examination of these cities’ experiences in addressing climate change suggests three principles that are well worth bearing in mind for future research and policymaking. First, understanding the implications of climate change at the local community level is essential. Cities often face financial, administrative, and decision-making constraints in implementing decisions that are adopted by national governments in international climate agreements. Yet non-state actors can and must play a critical role in helping national governments meet international obligations. Hence, it is critical for cities in the region to identify their most pressing needs and priorities to mobilize concerted actions. However, cities in the region also have their unique adaptive capacity to manage various urban issues through their community cohesion, local networks, and localized knowledge. Throughout the

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years, these assets have provided Baguio, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, Georgetown, and Hue with the capacity to moderate potential damage and cope with the consequences of natural hazards. Second, urban planning and city governance play an essential role in shaping cities’ development agendas and embedding environmentally conscious practices in city-making. Through building codes, masterplans, spatial management, and organizational approaches between central, federal, provincial and local agencies, cities can push for new and innovative developments in building climate resilient infrastructure and creative funding to improve adaptation and mitigation actions. Multi-level governance and mutually reinforcing climate networks can form powerful approaches to dealing with complex issues. Third, collaboration among and between different groups of stakeholders is vital to facilitate transformation. While it is true that national governments are expected to direct climate agendas in cities, they often have limited capacity, knowledge, and technical knowhow to identify solutions. The private sector’s support to invest in bankable projects for climate resilience, donors’ assistance in defining project phasing and resource mobilization, and civil society’s role in providing input on impact assessment will advance collaboration across disciplines and realize pragmatic solutions. Climate change causes severe risks to ecosystems, human health, and urban growth. In an increasingly climate-exposed region, Southeast Asian urban communities must continue to balance the need for economic growth and sustainability moving forward.

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index A Abe Cabinet, 178 Action Plan to Deal with Climate Change in Thua Thien Hue Province, 52 adaptation finance, 141, 142, 146–54, 158, 176–77 Afforestation and Reforestation Clean Development Mechanism (ARCDM), 182 agriculture, 37–40, 70. See also farmers agroecology, 33–35, 37–40

biodiversity conservation, 176–77, 181–83 buildings, 68–69 Burnham, Daniel, 13 BWD (Baguio Water District), 11, 14–18, 21 C C40 Climate Leadership Group, 97–98 Caloocan (Philippines), 81–82 CAP (Consumers Association Penang), 35, 37–40 CAP Programme (Climate Action Planning Programme), 80 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) online platform, 98, 100 carbon emissions, 81–82, 83, 84, 95–98 carbon metrics, 164 Cavite City (Philippines), 82 CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), 176, 182 CBI (Climate Bonds Initiative), 158 CCA (climate change adaptation). See climate adaptation CDP online platform (Carbon Disclosure Project online platform), 98, 100 CDRA (Climate and Disaster Risk Assessment), 77

B Baguio City (Philippines) climate risks in, 18–20 urban planning and water provision in, 12–14 water insecurity in, 10–11, 15–18, 20–25 Baguio Water District (BWD), 11, 14–18, 21 Bakker, Karen, 22 bankable projects, 151 banking industry, 159–60 Batangas City (Philippines), 83 Belison (Philippines), 84–85 Ben Tre Province Water Management Project (Vietnam), 186

195

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196

Centre for Environment, Technology, and Development (CETDEM), 35, 37–40 Central Bank of Malaysia, 159 Chennai (India), 109–15 cities and city networks, 94, 97–101 City Beautiful Movement, 13 city governance approach of, 93–94 of Indonesia, 95–101, 129–30, 143 of Philippines, 21–25, 74–79 of Vietnam, 48–55 CityNet, 99–101 Clean Water Act of 2004 (Philippines), 23 Climate Action 100+, 158–59 Climate Action Planning (CAP) Programme, 80 climate adaptation actions and policies for, 2, 74–85, 87–88, 95–101 financing for, 141, 142, 146–54, 158, 176–77 and heritage preservation, 48–55 resilience for, 114–15 risk disclosure for, 143–46 scenarios for, 65–67 See also climate change Climate and Disaster Risk Assessment (CDRA), 77 Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), 158 climate change food security impacted by, 35 greenhouse gas emissions, 81–82, 83, 84, 95–98 intergovernmental panels on, 1, 45, 158 programmes for, 158–59 protecting assets from, 48–55 strategies and approaches towards, 181–83

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Index

urban structure impacted by, 68–69 See also climate adaptation Climate Change Act of 2009 (Philippines), 76, 88 climate change adaptation (CCA). See climate adaptation climate disclosures, 98, 100, 158, 159–66, 169–73 climate resilient infrastructure, 68–69, 161–62, 180 climate risks actions and policies to mitigate, 2, 74–85, 87–88, 95–101 in the Complex of Hue Monuments, 46–48 and urban expansion, 62–65 for water security, 18–20 CLUP (Comprehensive Land Use Plan), 77, 89 coastal municipalities, 84–85 Communist Party of Vietnam, 48–49 Complex of Hue Monuments (Vietnam) climate risks in, 46–48 heritage preservation in, 54–56 management of, 50–54 complex systems, 108 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), 77, 89 construction companies, 162–66 Consumer Price Index (CPI), 36 Consumers Association Penang (CAP), 35, 37–40 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 176, 182 COP26 (United Nations Climate Change Conference), 176 COVID-19 pandemic, 146, 148 CPI (Consumer Price Index), 36 cultural assets, 48–55

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Index

D de-risking instruments, 151–54 Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), 77, 88 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 175 Development Cooperation Charter, 181 Dingalan (Philippines), 84–85 disasters occurrence of, 19–20, 47–48, 51–54, 62–63, 111–14, 130–37 risk management of, 76, 80–85, 87–89, 114–15, 179, 182, 185–86 See also floods donor countries, 175, 177–81, 185–86 E Earth Observing System for disaster countermeasure, 185–86 earthquakes, 20 EbA (ecosystem-based adaptation), 176–77, 182–83 ecological resilience, 115–16 Economic Cooperation and Infrastructure Strategy Meeting (ECISM), 178–79 economic growth and natural disasters, 130–31, 136–37. See also disasters ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA), 176–77, 182–83 ecosystem services, 69–70, 177 Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG), 162 environmental protection and urban expansion, 65–71 European Union (EU), 177, 182 F FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), 33

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197

farm-to-fork distance, 31, 39, 40 farmers, 33, 37–40. See also food farmers-to-farmers principle, 37 Financial Stability Board (FSB), 160 floods consequences of, 19, 47, 48 economic performance, impacts on, 130–31, 136–37 and hygiene behaviour, 134–35 mitigation and management of, 51–54, 114–15, 116–19, 129, 131–35, 186 as systemic disruption, 110–14 and urban development, 62–65 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 33 food security issues, 31–40 forest management, 181–83 FSB (Financial Stability Board), 160 funding, 141, 142, 146–51 G “G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment”, 180 George Town, 109–15 GHG emissions (greenhouse gas emissions), 81–82, 83, 84, 95–98 Global Agenda, 184–86 Global Development Agenda, 75–76, 87–88 governance. See city governance Green and Climate Bonds Market, 158 green building indices, 161–62 green infrastructure, 180. See also climate resilient infrastructure greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 81–82, 83, 84, 95–98 Guidelines on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plan, 77

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198

H HCMC (Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, Vietnam), 62–71 heritage preservation, 45, 48–55 High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), 32 highly urbanized cities (HUC), 80–82 historical assets, 48–55 historical urban landscapes, 108–14 HLPE (High-Level Panel of Experts), 32 Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC, formerly Saigon, Vietnam), 62–71 Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), 88 HUC (highly urbanized cities), 80–82 Hue (Complex of Hue Monuments), 46–56 Hue Monument Conservation Centre, 47, 55, 56. See also Complex of Hue Monuments (Vietnam) hydrometeorological events, 19–20. See also disasters; floods hygiene, 134–35. See also floods I ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives), 98 India, 109–15 Indonesia, 2, 95–101, 128–29, 131–37, 143–49 infrastructure assistance from Japan for, 175, 178–80, 184 climate resilience of, 68–69, 161–62, 180 environmental projects in, 185–86 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1, 45, 158 International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), 98

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J Jakarta (Indonesia) city networks in, 97–101 climate actions and policies of, 95–97 climate risks in, 2, 95 fiscal capacity of, 146–49 floods in, 131–37 metropolitan area of, 128–29, 131–33 urban adaptation planning of, 143–46 Japan, 174–87 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 181–86 Japan’s Revival Strategy, 178 JICA Cooperation Strategy for Natural Environment Conservation, 183 Joint Committee on Climate Change (JC3), 159 K knowledge, 37–40, 49, 116–19 L La via Campesina, 32–33 land resources management, 65–71, 88 Law on Environmental Protection (Vietnam), 49 LGU Guidebook on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plans, 77 Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP), 74–84. See also climate change local government units (LGUs), 74–79

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Index

M Malaysia agroecology in, 37–40 Central Bank of, 159 climate adaptation in, 114–15 food insecurity in, 36 TCFD of property companies in, 162–66 See also Penang Malaysia Institute of Sustainable Agriculture (MISA), 35, 37–40 Muthialpet (India), 109 N NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions), 95 National Climate Adaptation Plan of 2021–2030 (Vietnam), 49 National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) (Philippines), 76–77 National Commission for Climate Change (Vietnam), 50–51 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), 95 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), 49, 96–97, 164 nature-based solutions (NBS), 129, 131–35 nature conservation, 183–86 Nature Environment Conservation Strategy, 182 NBS (nature-based solutions), 129, 131–35 NCCAP (National Climate Change Action Plan), 76–77 NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions), 49, 96–97, 164 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 35

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199

O ODA Charter (2003), 175, 180 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 177–86 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 175 P Paris Agreement, 49, 75–76, 87, 93, 96–97, 164 Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future, 175 Penang (Malaysia), 35, 37–40, 109–10, 112–15 peri-urban cities, 82–83 Philippines climate adaptation in, 80–85, 87–88 climate risks in, 18–20 local government units, 74–79 urban planning in, 12–14, 77, 89 water insecurity in, 10–11, 15–18, 20–25 polycentric governance, 93–94 population densities, 63–64 power, balance of, 33 PPP (public-private partnership), 178, 183–84 PRECIS (Providing Regional Impact Studies), 19 Presidential Regulations, 96 Principles of Responsible Banking (PRB), 159 property companies, 162–66 Providing Regional Impact Studies (PRECIS), 19 public health, 136–37 public-private partnership (PPP), 178, 183–84

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200

Q Quezon City (Philippines), 80–81 R rainfall, 19–20, 47, 48. See also floods Republic Act 9729 (Philippines), 76–77 residential buildings, 68–69 resilience, 114–15 retention pools, 131, 135 S Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), 62–71 sanitation facilities, 131–32, 134–35 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), 76, 87, 159, 181. See also climate change sea levels, 46. See also floods seed fairs, 39 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 76, 87 smallholding farming, 37–40 social safety nets for farmers, 40 social system, 108 spatial management, 65–67 Statistical Regional Climate Model (STAR), 19 sustainability reporting tools (SRTs), 158 sustainable agriculture, 37–38. See also agriculture approaches Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 76, 87, 159, 181. See also climate change T Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), 159–63, 165–66, 169–73 TCFD City Index (TCI), 159, 162

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Index

Thua Thien Hue Province (Vietnam), 51–54 tree re-planting activities, 135 U United Nations Committee on Food Security, 32 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), 176 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), 182 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 46–56 United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), 177, 182 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), 159 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 76, 87, 107, 182 United Nations General Assembly, 14–15 United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI), 159 urban areas expansion of, 62–71 flooding in, 110–14 governance of (see city governance) highly urbanized cities (HUC), 80–82 historical urban landscapes, 108–14 infrastructure of, 68–69 planning of, 12–14, 68–70, 77, 89 risks in (see climate risks) urban structure type (UST) mapping, 65–67

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V Vietnam climate risks in, 46–48, 62–71 environmental infrastructure projects in, 185–86 heritage preservation in, 48–56

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201

W waste disposal, 134–35 water security issues, 10–18, 20–25 Water Act of 2004 (Philippines), 23 World Cultural Heritage Sites, 46–54 World Wide Fund for Nature, 19

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