Churchill and Roosevelt, Volume 1: The Complete Correspondence - Three Volumes [Three Volumes ed.] 9781400875740

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Maps
List of Photographs
Preface
Acknowledgments
Editorial Procedures
Bibliographical Note
Initials of Message Drafters
Digest of Documents
Addenda
Introduction: Churchill and Roosevelt: Their Relationship, Their Correspondence
Correspondence: October 8, 1933 - November 14, 1942
Editorial Commentary: Lend-Lease
The Mediterranean Theater and the Balkans
ULTRA Intelligence
The Atlantic Conference (RIVIERA)
The United States and Japan
The First Washington Conference (ARCADIA)
India
Organizing the Pacific Theater
Early Plans for a Cross-Channel Invasion
The Second Washington Conference (ARGONAUT)
Strategic Bombing
Politics in French North Africa
Addenda and Errata to the Paperback Edition

Citation preview

Churchill fc? Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence

1. "A Righteous Comradeship"

Churchill fcf Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence I. Alliance Emerging O C T O B E R 1933 - N O V E M B E R

1942

EDITED WITH C O M M E N T A R Y BY

Warren F. Kimball

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Copyright © 1984 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book First Princeton Paperback printing, 1987 Crown copyright records in the Public Record Office are reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office This book has been composed in Linotron Baskerville Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

DEDICATED TO

Winston Spencer Churchill, 1874-1965 AND

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1882-1945

Now that we are together, now that we are linked in a righteous comradeship of arms, now that our two considerable nations, each in perfect unity, have joined all their life energies in a common resolve, a new scene opens upon which a steady light will glow and brighten. Winston S. Churchill before a joint session of the United States Congress December 26, 1941

Contents VOLUME

I

List of Maps

ix

List of Photographs

x

Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

xiii

Editorial Procedures

xvii

Bibliographical Note

xxvii

Initials of Message Drafters

xxxii

Digest of Documents

xxxiii

Addenda

clxv

Introduction: Churchill and Roosevelt: T h e i r Relationship, T h e i r Correspondence

2

Correspondence: October 8, 1933 - November 14, 1942

23

Editorial Commentary: Lend-Lease The Mediterranean Theater and the Balkans ULTRA Intelligence T h e Atlantic Conference (RIVIERA) The United States and Japan The First Washington Conference (ARCADIA) India Organizing the Pacific Theater Early Plans for a Cross-Channel Invasion The Second Washington Conference (ARGONAUT) Strategic Bombing Politics in French North Africa

87 144 214 227 274 292 373 409 458 513 596 635

A d d e n d a a n d Errata to the Paperback Edition

675

VOLUME

II

Correspondence: November 15, 1942 - February 29, 1944 Editorial Commentary: T h e North African Invasion and the Darlan Deal Postponing the Second Front in Europe T h e Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL) Poland and Russia

4 3 48 117 192

VlIl

CONTENTS

De Gaulle and the Free French The Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT) The First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) Italy The Political-Military Relationship Yugoslavia and Greece T h e Cairo and Teheran Conferences (SEXTANT AND EUREKA) Great Britain and Yugoslavia T h e Polish Boundary Dispute

VOLUME

208 212 429 455 479 548 605 660 684

III

C o r r e s p o n d e n c e : February 29, 1944 - April 13, 1945

3

Editorial C o m m e n t a r y : T h e Big Three Powers in Iran De Gaulle versus the Allies The Pacific Theater Disputes over Strategy in Europe De Gaulle's Visit to Washington The Warsaw Uprising British Policy in the Balkans T h e Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON) Organizing the United Nations T h e Moscow Conference (TOLSTOY) Anglo-American Disagreements Trouble in Greece Confusion of Policy toward Poland Roosevelt and Eastern Europe Competition for Iranian Oil T h e Malta and Yalta Conferences (CRICKET and ARGONAUT) A British Reversal on Eastern Europe

139 169 191 197 237 259 274 315 330 348 436 449 461 481 511 521 545

Glossary of Codenames, Acronyms, a n d C o m m o n Abbreviations

639

List of Sources Cited

647

Index

655

List of Maps VOLUME I The North Atlantic

55

The Western Desert (North Africa) (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

271

Initial Japanese Attacks 7—8 December 1941 and Limit of Advance (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

288

The ABDACOM Area, January-February 1942 (United States Army in World War II series; hereafter U.S. Army history)

311

The Pacific Areas, 1 August 1942 (U.S. Army history)

410

Persian Corridor Supply Routes (U.S. Army history)

573

Convoy Routes to Northern Russia

601

The Battle of El Alamein, 23 October - 4 November 1942 (Campaign Summaries, USMA) 658 Landings in North Africa 8—11 November 1942, and Advance into Tunisia November-December 1942 (Campaign Summaries, USMA) 668 VOLUME II Russian Winter Offensive 1942-43 (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

16

Lines of Communication in China-India-Burma Theater, December 1942 (U.S. Army history)

111

Campaign in Italy, 1943—45

453

Polish Boundary Proposals

685

India-Burma Theater, 1944-1945 (U.S. Army history)

758

VOLUME I I I Campaign in Northern France

184

Situation in the Pacific, 12 March 1944 (U.S. Army history)

192

Campaign in Southern France, 15 August - 15 September 1944 (U.S. Army history)

277

Situation in Europe, 15 January 1945 (U.S. Army history)

525

List of Photographs VOLUME I 1. (frontispiece) Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference, November 25, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

ii

2. Churchill and Roosevelt, Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, August 9, 1941 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

2

3. Churchill, aboard HMS Kelvin (destroyer), June 12, 1944 (US Army, SC 435965) 4. Roosevelt, Quebec, August 1943 (US Army, SC 178036) 5. Churchill, aboard HMS Kelvin (destroyer), June 12, 1944 (US Army, SC 190284) 6. Churchill and Roosevelt, Casablanca, January 1943 (US Army, SC 152334)

See individual volumes for other photographs

132 230 291 337

Preface When I first thought of editing and annotating the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill, an idea I came up with a few years before the opening of the British and American wartime archives, I planned to select the most important items, identify the key persons and events, add a few useful appendices, and then get on to other "real" research. Such a collection would have been a useful, standard "editing job." But along that road I was waylaid by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt! Early on I realized that their correspondence was a special, unique whole, not only because it occurred in the maelstrom of World War II, but because of the style, intellect, and personality of each man. Regardless of whether one approves of their plans and actions, both are endlessly fascinating and undeniably important as historical figures. For me to "selectout" some of their exchanges seemed wrong, for it would inevitably distort a major historical skein. And so I have gone in the other direction, trying to include every scrap that could conceivably be considered ChurchillRoosevelt correspondence. But as I began to put it all together, I found myself trying to think like an historian—evaluating evidence, setting a broad context, drawing conclusions. The traditional approach would have been to edit the documents and then, afterward, write a monograph based on them. Instead, I have tried to combine the two in one set of volumes. Without question, the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence can be read and consulted independently of what I have done, and presenting that collection in a form usable by scholars was a primary goal. But I have also tried to use the headnotes as far more than just a vehicle for bare-bones identifications and facts. The headnotes are intended to be read along with the documents. IfI have succeeded, the documents and headnotes, taken together as a whole, comprise an interpretive history of Anglo-American strategy and diplomacy that is based both on the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence and on the other sources that are available on the Second World War. Those who dip in and out of this collection to find specific items will likely miss its broader purpose. For those who read these volumes like a book instead of a documentary collection, my intention is for the headnotes to provide the broad context and interpretive scheme that distinguishes analytical history from mere story-telling. Warren F. Kimball

Acknowledgments In the course of completing such an extensive a project, an editor receives help from hundreds of people. I have tried to keep track of all those favors, but inevitably I have forgotten some. To those whose help I have failed to acknowledge, I offer an apology and a heartfelt thank-you. An author's fullest and warmest acknowledgements traditionally come last. For once, however, the first shall be first. My wife, Jacqueline, has encouraged, praised, pushed, and supported me from the outset. Her help has been much more than just putting up with my preoccupation; she has assisted directly in countless ways, big and little, as have my children, Paula, Tom, and Donna. Three friends—and colleagues—have performed far above and beyond the call of both professional courtesy and friendship. Charles C. Alexander of Ohio University and George C. Herring of the University of Kentucky have both read the entire manuscript, cover to cover, and have saved me from more errors of fact and style than I care to admit. Their willingness to provide a thorough, painstaking critique has contributed immeasurably to the final result. Lloyd C. Gardner, of Rutgers University, not only read and criticized large portions of the text, particularly the essays on the major conferences and controversies of the war, but also offered constant encouragement as well as responses to my endless stream of questions. Their help and enthusiasm were indispensable. Were they not my friends, I would owe them an enormous debt. Two other scholars read much of the manuscript and shared with me their vast knowledge. Forrest C. Pogue, Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute, has already provided a series of guideposts for historians of the Second World War in his writings, particularly his biography of George C. Marshall. His help at various stages of this project was of great benefit. William M. Franklin, for years the Director of the Historical Office in the State Department, either worked on, edited, or supervised the editing of all the volumes in Foreign Rehtions of the United States dealing with the wartime years. That series, which is the best and most up-todate collection of its kind (and which I hope will remain so), sets a benchmark for editors. I was indeed fortunate to have the benefit of Bill Franklin's advice, though I suspect he thought trying to correct my errors was a chore that had ended once I completed his courses in graduate school. Since the most complete archival collection of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges is in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, the constant and cheerful cooperation of the staff there—particularly

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

William Emerson, William O'Neill, William Stewart, Frances Seeber, Joseph Marshall, and Robert Parks—was essential, and always forthcoming. Anyone who works there soon comes to understand the wisdom of the planners who created the presidential libraries, places where scholars can escape the impersonal bureaucracy of huge archives and get involved with dedicated experts who understand and care about individual projects. At the Public Record Office in London, England (at what used to be the Portugal Street branch), an expert and cooperative staff made my research fruitful. I am particularly grateful to Alice Prochaska for her help in untying some red tape. Distance made it impossible for me to visit the Public Record Office whenever I needed to examine the documents, but I found I could depend upon another colleague, David Reynolds of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, who spent freely of his own time to dig through those files for me. His perceptiveness and diligence proved enormously helpful. He also graciously permitted me to consult the manuscript of his now published excellent monograph on Anglo-American relations, 1937-42. I must also thank Henry B. Ryan, then a student at Cambridge University, now with the USICA, for performing similar chores, as well as for sharing with me the results of some of his own research. The day-in, day-out support provided by a researcher's home library is always critical. I am deeply grateful to a group of scholar-librarians at Rutgers University who invariably gave me the help I needed. People at both the New Brunswick and Newark campuses—particularly George Kanzler, Francis Johns, Gil Cohen, Myong Chung, Mary Fetzer, Natalie Borisovets—were unfailingly efficient, prompt, and courteous. I could not have made it through without their kindness and expertise. Rutgers University Library has developed an extensive microfilm collection of documents relating to British foreign policy, particularly for the twentieth century, and without those materials my work would have been much more difficult. A number of other libraries and archives provided important support. The staff of the National Archives Diplomatic Branch in Washington, D.C, headed by Milton O. Gustafson, helped me locate a number of items and assisted me ably in my general research in those files. Dean Allard at the Navy Historical Center, John Taylor at the Modern Military Records Branch of NARS, and Maurice Matloff at the Office of Military History, all in Washington, D.C, Randall Rakers at the Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Directors of the Harry S Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower libraries answered specific inquiries as did the curator at Chartwell, Kent, Winston Churchill's country estate. Finally, I

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xv

managed to find all sorts of hard-to-get books at the Naval War College Library in Newport, Rhode Island, which has what may be the most complete collection of secondary studies on World War II available in the United States. A number of people assisted me in large and small ways—Henry H. Adams, Rear Admiral Ernest Bell, John Costello, Robert Dallek, David Dilks, Taras Hunczak, David Kahn, Joseph P. Lash, Richard W. Leopold, James Leutze, William Loveland, Herbert P. Meritt, Fred Pollack, Brian Porter, Robert Price, Basil Rauch, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Paul Rosenfeld, Louise Sieminski, Mark Stoler, Christopher Thorne, John Toland, and Donald Cameron Watt. The willingness of people like these to share their experiences and research and to dig out answers to other people's questions is one of the most rewarding aspects of the historical profession. In the summer of 1980,1 was privileged to participate in a joint meeting of the American and United Kingdom Committees for the History of the Second World War, held at the Imperial War Museum in London. The papers presented and the full, frank discussions which followed provided detail and, more important, context which I have endeavored to write into my headnotes. Some of these scholars have been thanked above, but the others deserve recognition: Louis Allen, Ralph Bennett, Philip Bell, Martin Blumenson, William Casey, Harold Deutsch, John Gaddis, Margaret Gowing, Michael Howard, David Lance, Ronald Lewin, Maurice Matloff, Nigel Nicolson, and Samuel Proctor. Special acknowledgement goes to Arthur Funk and Sir William Deakin both for organizing the conference and for their own contributions. I extend particular thanks to Martin Gilbert, Churchill's official biographer, for sharing the results of his exhaustive research in the Churchill papers; to Winston Churchill, M.P., who helped me to locate several elusive items; to Professor M. Medina, of the Universities of Madrid and La Laguna, and to Edward ElIy, then the Cultural Attache at the American Embassy in Madrid, for helping me to continue my research while I was a Fulbright Lecturer at the University of Madrid; to Aida Lahood, who constructed just the right maps from my crude sketches; and to Joan Baily, who compiled the index with skill and patience. Research requires money, an important supply of which was provided by the Rutgers Research Council. The American Philosophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies granted the funds I needed for an extended visit to the Public Record Office in London, and the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute awarded me a grant which made possible repeated trips to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My editors at Princeton University Press, Sandy Thatcher and Bill Hively, operating with what seemed an inexhaustible supply of patience, gave excellent advice and firm support from start to finish. It is a pleasure to work with a publisher that puts scholarship at the top of its priorities. The late J. Joseph Huthmacher—a true friend, teacher, and scholar— offered good counsel and encouragement from the first day I began as an apprentice historian. This is affectionately dedicated to his memory. Of course, Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt helped a little. Warren F. Kimball Somerset, New Jersey March 17, 1983 (#24)

Editorial Procedures HEADNOTES The headnotes serve three purposes. They provide identifications and facts needed to understand the document they precede. They also are intended to bridge the gaps between documents so that the entire collection can be read rather than just consulted. Finally, they offer an opportunity for interpretive comments. Although citations have been omitted except for quotations and hard-to-locate information, editorial comments are based upon research in archives and literally hundreds of secondary sources; still, they remain unabashedly subjective. Taken all together, the essays and headnotes are intended to offer a broad and comprehensive interpretation of the politics of strategy in World War II, particularly as viewed by Churchill and Roosevelt. Those who prefer the "unobtrusive editor" can rest easy, secure in the knowledge that the intrinsic identity and value of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence can withstand any editor's assault. SOURCES Whenever possible, the archival text of a document (whether an original or a carbon copy) has been used in this collection, though in a few cases only a printed version could be located. In all cases the source text is the first one cited following each document; the other citations indicate other manuscript or printed versions of that item. The main source for this compilation has been the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt located at the Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York. The staff of that library has searched its files and put all of the ChurchillRoosevelt exchanges into one collection. That new file is based primarily on the Map Room papers but includes items from a number of other files at the Roosevelt Library as well as a few exchanges found in the State Department materials at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. In addition to examining the Map Room papers, the editor has systematically checked the other presidential files as well as additional collections at the Roosevelt Library, such as the Harry Hopkins papers and the diaries and papers of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., for Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges and/ or supporting documentation. The State Department's vast decimal files for 1939—45 are set up according to subject, making it impractical to conduct a document-by-document search for Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges. Nevertheless, a careful search of relevant subject files was conducted, and finding-aids, including

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EDITORIAL PROCEDURES

the card file, were consulted. National Archives personnel have also searched many of the State Department records and have placed copies of any messages exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Roosevelt Library files. A valuable check on the completeness of the American materials, and a source for a number of documents not available elsewhere, was the Public Record Office in London, England. The Prime Minister's Operational File (PREMIER 3) and the Prime Minister's Confidential File (PREMIER 4) contain most of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges as well as unsent drafts and related correspondence. Filing is by subject, necessitating a systematic check of the files in order to locate the ChurchillRoosevelt messages, which dealt with a wide variety of unrelated subjects. The PREMIER 3 records contain a separate collection of the ChurchillRoosevelt telegrams (though that compilation is far from complete), does not contain letters or other non-telegraphic exchanges, and has little supporting documentation. The Foreign Office files, also at the Public Record Office in London, frequently provided important background material not available in the PREMIER 3 files. According to Churchill's official biographer, Martin Gilbert, no additional Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence has yet been located in the private Churchill papers, although Mr. Gilbert's own detailed research into the Second World War period is not completed. Portions of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence appear in many printed sources, but only those collections which were primarily or significantly devoted to publishing such documents have been cited in the list of sources following each message. The printed sources regularly consulted, as well as the archives used, are given below in the Bibliographical Note. In a number of cases the printed version is incomplete, and that is indicated by the letter "p" preceding the citation. The most valuable and reliable of those printed sources are the wartime volumes in Foreign Regions of the United States. Nevertheless, that series is not intended to be definitive, and the choice of selections was occasionally influenced by diplomatic considerations at the time of publication. During the late 1940s and the 1950s, Winston Churchill's The Second World War served as the primary source of documents and interpretation for British strategy and diplomacy during the war years. Even after other memoirs and the official British History of the Second World War appeared, Churchill's documents remained the only extensive source of primary material on Britain's wartime policies, at least until the opening in 1972 of the British Foreign Office papers for the period through 1945. Churchill had apparently intended to publish a long series of documentary volumes plus a narrative, but his personal finances and his publisher's insistence on a limit of six volumes prompted him to change that plan.

EDITORIAL PROCEDURES

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Instead, he built a narrative around the collection of documents, which may account for some of the disorganization in those six books, published between 1948 and 1953. Scholars have learned to treat that narrative with caution, as is proper with any memoir. Now it is also possible to evaluate Churchill's selection and editing of the documents. Some of the exchanges with Roosevelt which Churchill did not print are either repetitive or relatively unimportant, but he also chose to present British policy and his own role in the most favorable light. As befits a statesman concerned with contemporary foreign relations, certain abrasive issues were largely ignored. Anglo-French-American relations are one example, though there are others, particularly where the British government proposed actions which might later have been considered high-handed. According to the testimony of persons who assisted Churchill with his memoirs, some documents were omitted by accident, owing to the chaotic nature of the records. One of those associates, Sir William Deakin, relates the story of Churchill going up to various wartime public figures and asking them if they remembered this or that message and how the Prime Minister reacted to it. Omissions within the documents are not always indicated by ellipses in the Churchill volumes (or, for that matter, in some of the other collections of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence), and on a few occasions the document printed by Churchill differs significantly from the actual message sent. Although that could reflect his conscious editing, it seems more likely that Churchill unwittingly selected an early draft of the message. Because he frequently wrote harshly worded drafts in full expectation that his assistants would tone them down, such documents present a misleading picture of Anglo-American relations (this is again the testimony of William Deakin), though not of the Prime Minister's personal feelings. (See, for example, the headnote to document C—5Ox, draft A, below.) Frequently the documents in The Second World War differ from the source text in the use of synonymous words and phrases or in word order. Such variations were usually due to paraphrasing, a common practice designed to prevent codes and ciphers from being broken by the enemy. Normally, copies of decoded messages exchanged directly between Churchill and Roosevelt were delivered as received, but paraphrased versions were often sent to other offices, particularly the State Department and various British ministries. Churchill also eliminated message numbers and the names of minor figures from the exchanges printed in his memoirs. COMPLETENESS All source texts have been printed in their entirety, including enclosures and appendices. This collection includes all letters, cables, telegrams,

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memoranda, notes, and telephone transcripts found to have been exchanged between Churchill and Roosevelt. Internal evidence (references within one message to another message) plus an examination of those memoirs which frequently refer to Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence (particularly Churchill's memoirs and Robert Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins) lead me to conclude that this compilation is complete, although a few stray messages or written exchanges may turn up (see, for example, the headnote to R-I Ix and C-294). At a less formal level, however, some gaps exist. Churchill and Roosevelt spoke frequently with each other on the radiotelephone, but only a few transcripts of those conversations have been found. The significance of such telephone exchanges is diminished by the knowledge that (according to Robert Sherwood) trans-Atlantic telephone connections were frustratingly poor. Moreover, both British and American security experts constantly warned the two leaders that the telephone was the most insecure means of communication. "Scrambler" devices were installed in both the White House and 10 Downing Street, but that provided only privacy from eavesdropping, not protection against recording and "unscrambling" the conversation. In fact, two of the telephone messages in this collection come from German intercepts of presumably "scrambled" talks (C-R/tel.-4, July 28, 1943; C-R/tel.-5, Feb. 1944). For all these reasons, Churchill and Roosevelt apparently limited their use of the telephone largely to casual conversations, emergencies, and simple answers to questions raised previously in telegrams or letters (see, for example, C—353), at least until late 1943. At that time, the installation of new equipment made it possible for the two leaders to speak on trans-Atlantic telephone with complete security. The new system, developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories and called variously X-Ray, the X-System, SIGSALY, and the "Green Hornet," could not be broken by crypt-analysis (see Bennett, "Secret Telephony," Price, "Further Notes," and Fagan, ed., Hntory of Engineering, pp. 296-317). Even with this technological advance, Churchill and Roosevelt used SIGSALY only occasionally to talk to each other, despite the fact that extensions were put into the White House and Churchill's War Rooms (see CAB 120/768). That was most likely due in part to their reluctance to discuss secret strategy on the telephone, even though communications experts assured them that the system was completely secure; and in part because such frequent direct contact could trivialize their relationship and result in hasty decisions, a particularly important consideration for Roosevelt, who regularly resorted to procrastination as a problem-solving technique. However, an early incident may also have contributed to Churchill's preference for cables and letters. Shortly after the SIGSALY system had been set up, he placed a call to the President. Upon hearing the Prime

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Minister's voice, Roosevelt giggled. After the call, Churchill made inquiries and found that voice distortion caused by the equipment prompted Roosevelt to think that the Prime Minister sounded like Donald Duck. At that point Churchill muttered that he would never use "that damn thing" again, but the testimony of a handful of communications personnel who operated SIGSALY demonstrates that, by May 1944, the two men were using it to speak to each other. By that time, engineers had managed to make adjustments so that Churchill sounded more like Churchill. Despite those occasional Churchill-Roosevelt conversations, a search of the War Department Classified Message Center files (Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) turned up no transcripts of such talks, although a number of conversations between the Prime Minister and other officials were transcribed. From the fragmentary evidence, it seems clear that little if anything was said over SIGSALY that did not appear in written and telegraphic correspondence. The one exception might be when, according to one witness, the President called Churchill "Winnie" and in return was addressed as "old pal." (Much of the information in the preceding paragraph is courtesy of Robert Price.) Another gap in this collection concerns intelligence material, particularly that which fell under the broad classification of ULTRA and MAGIC. A few references to MAGIC (intelligence gleaned from the breaking of certain Japanese codes) occur in the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence (see C-190, C-545, C-550/1, and R-446/1), but there is no direct mention of ULTRA (intelligence obtained from the breaking of certain codes/ ciphers used by the German High Command—see C-103x), although Churchill does refer to BONIFACE (for example, C-412/2, C-441, C 721, C—789), an earlier codename for the same intelligence, and one telegram, R—647, was stamped "Top Secret ULTRA" on the source text. In addition, intelligence materials released by 1981 demonstrate that Churchill occasionally ordered summaries of ULTRA-related material passed directly to the President, and presumably vice-versa (see C-737/ 1). Such material may technically fall under the rubric of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges, but it is likely that any comments the two leaders made on the intelligence came in separate correspondence. ULTRA and other intelligence data were routinely passed to President Roosevelt in much the same manner as the daily British military summaries, without being considered as formal messages from Prime Minister Churchill. Nevertheless, the special handling given one intelligence-related paragraph in a Churchill-to-Roosevelt message raises nagging suspicions, for nothing in the basic telegram indicates that one paragraph had been sent separately (see C-545). These suspicions might be either confirmed or laid to rest if scholars could examine the relevant files now controlled by the National Security Agency in the United States and by the British gov-

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ernment. Some ULTRA/MAGIC materials have been released, but intelligence files in both countries are exempt from the usual declassification schedules (see R-442 headnote). A minor category of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges which appears incomplete is formal letters of introduction. A few have been located and printed, but others seem to be missing. (For example, see C—283/1.) Since such letters were normally filed under the name of the visitor, finding them is frequently a matter of luck. This collection does include a number of "indirect" exchanges. These are letters or telegrams which Roosevelt or Churchill sent to a third party, but which were clearly intended for delivery to the President or Prime Minister. In almost all such cases in this collection the intermediary was Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's special adviser, for both Churchill and Roosevelt routinely gave messages to Hopkins when he was visiting the Prime Minister. (For example, see R—111, R-132, and C-68/1.) D O C U M E N T NUMBERS Churchill and Roosevelt did not begin to number their telegrams sequentially until February 7, 1942. At that time, Churchill arbitrarily began with number 25 and Roosevelt, following the Prime Minister's suggestion, started with number 101 (100 was drafted but never sent). In order to retain that original numbering as the basic reference system for all the documents in this collection (particularly important since Churchill and Roosevelt themselves used those numbers as references), the following procedures were used: (a) The sender or intended sender of a piece of correspondence or a draft is indicated by a C (Churchill) or an R (Roosevelt) supplied by the editor and preceding the document number (for example, C— 123). (b) Exchanges sent before February 7, 1942 (before the adoption of a formal system of sequential numbers). In all cases, numbers for these messages have been supplied by the editor, and are followed by a lowercase "x." For Roosevelt, the last of these editorially assigned numbers is R-82x; for Churchill it is C-165x. Occasional unsent messages drafted during this period have also been sequentially numbered by the editor. (c) Exchanges after February 7, 1942. 1. Telegrams. All are printed with the sequential number assigned by communications personnel at the time the message was sent or received. Churchill arbitrarily chose to begin with 25, and suggested to Roosevelt that the presidential messages start with 100 (see C—25).

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Roosevelt actually began with number 101. (This means that numbers C-I through C-24 and R-I through R-100 were not assigned.) Telegrams which were not assigned sequential numbers (usually messages which related to intelligence, the atomic bomb, or which were sent when the originator was away from regular communications facilities) are numbered according to the procedure outlined for letters, memoranda, and notes (see the next paragraph). 2. Letters, memoranda, notes, and unnumbered telegrams. Such exchanges are assigned the number of the immediately preceding document which was sent by the same person, followed by a slash and the number 1—for example, R—150/1. If a second originally unnumbered item follows immediately, it is numbered sequentially after the slash as in R-150/2, and so on. Note that R-150 and R150/1 may be completely unrelated messages. (d) Unsent Messages. Such items are numbered in accordance with the procedures outlined above in paragraphs (b) and (c). All are labeled "not sent." (e) Message Drafts. Early drafts of a message are normally included with the final version which was actually dispatched, and they have the same number plus a capital letter, "A" for the first draft, "B" for the second, and so on. For example, C-75/A is a draft of C-75. Occasionally, when the date of a draft precedes the dispatch date of the message by a few weeks or more, the unsent draft has been inserted in its own chronological place and assigned a number of its own in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c) above. All are labeled "not sent." The occasional use of letter designations by U.S. or British communicators is noted in the headnote preceding such cases. (f) Telephone Conversation Transcripts. These are separately numbered by the editor and are preceded by the legend "C-R I telephone—" plus the assigned number—for example, C-RI telephone—5. MESSAGE F O R M A T The exchanges are arranged in chronological order, with the exception of a few unsent drafts. The wording of introductory data has not been changed, but all messages have been made to fit the standard format outlined below. (a) Message number. This is centered at the top of the document, followed by the type of message (letter, memo) if not a telegram. The majority of Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges were telegrams, and the absence of notation after the document number indicates that it was sent by wireless.

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PROCEDURES

(b) Sending/receiving data. 1. First line. The location of the sender plus the channel of communications, if known—for example, [via U.S. Embassy]. The location given is not necessarily the place the message was sent from, but rather the place where Churchill or Roosevelt was at the time he wrote or approved the message. 2. Second line. The date of the exchange: Occasionally a message was actually sent on a date different from that in the heading. If known, that date is included. Next come the time of dispatch and time of receipt, if known. The military frequently used Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), abbreviated as Z (Zulu). GMT messages used a twenty-four-hour clock. Otherwise, messages are assumed to bear the local time and are followed by either A.M. or P.M. The time of receipt (TOR) follows the time of dispatch. 3. A sample of the sending/receiving data follows: London [via U.S. Army] J u n e 1, 1942, 1450Z / T O R 3:30 P.M.

This message was drafted or approved in London on June 1, 1942, and sent at 1450 Zulu time by way of U.S. Army communications channels, and received at 3:30 P.M. local (Washington) time. (c) Heading. The exact language of the actual message heading is retained, minus any special forwarding instructions inserted by communicators. The actual word order within the headings was apparently shifted now and then by communications personnel in order to make cipher-breaking more difficult. In any case, the heading found on the source text has been printed. If the source text had no heading, the editor has supplied one in brackets. (d) Message. The message appears in exactly the same language as in the source text, including transmission errors, misspellings, incorrect punctuation, and similar mistakes. Only obvious transpositions of letters have been routinely corrected. Since many of the errors occurred as a result of coding, decoding, and/or wireless transmission garbles, a few corrections have been inserted by the editor whenever the meaning of an exchange became obscured. Such insertions are indicated in either the text or the headnote preceding the document. Apostrophes indicating the possessive are almost always a casualty of radio-communications, and they have not been supplied. Bracketed words without a question mark indicate that an alternative source text (usually the version found in the British files) used the bracketed word in place of the word immediately preceding. If a question mark is included within the brackets, the word has been supplied by the editor. References supplied by the editor are also included within

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xxv

brackets. Churchill and Roosevelt frequently included reports, quoted other messages, or added lengthy summaries of conversations with third parties in their messages to each other. Such items have been extracted (set off by extra space) for the convenience of the reader, regardless of whether they were set off in the source text. Fuller explanations are frequently found in the headnotes. (e) Sender/drafter. 1. The name or initials of the sender follow the main text if included in the message as drafted. If the source text for a letter or memorandum was signed or initialed by hand, that is so indicated. Roosevelt's telegrams usually included the sign-off "Roosevelt" as part of the message. Churchill's messages frequently had "Prime" (for Prime Minister) at the end, but that was apparently added later by communications personnel and has not been included. 2. The initials (or name) of the drafter of the message, if known, follow the sender's name and are enclosed in brackets. (See the Initials of Message Drafters, below.) A message closing "Roosevelt [HLH]," for example, indicates that Roosevelt included his name as part of the message and that it was drafted by Harry L. Hopkins. (f) Sources. Just below the message will be found the sources for that document. The first item cites the source text for the message as printed in this collection, followed by a period. Subsequent entries designate other manuscript or printed versions of that document and are also separated by periods. (See the Bibliographical Note and List of Sources Cited.) A sample follows: [MR*. FRUS, 1941, I, 12 pWSC, I, 123.]

The source text for this document would be in the Map Room papers of the Roosevelt Library (MR). Other versions could be found in the PREM 3 papers (*), in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and in Churchill's memoirs (WSC). The lowercase "p" before the last citation indicates that only part of the message is printed there. (g) Use of brackets. All material enclosed in brackets has been supplied by the editor. In the case of dates, channel of transmission, drafter's initials, and the like, the information was found in papers which accompanied the source document or was located along with other copies of the document. The use of question marks within the brackets indicates an assumption by the editor. (h) Editing of draft language. Changes made by Churchill or Roosevelt to draft messages have frequently been included. The words deleted are indicated by a line through the words (for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt); the new language is shown by underlining (for example,

XXVl

EDITORIAL PROCEDURES

Winston S. Churchill). In the event of extensive changes, the entire draft is printed separately. If the identity of the person who made the changes is known, it is given in brackets or in the headnote. Italics are used in a document only if they appeared in the source text, except for the names of ships and aircraft, which are italicized regardless of how they appeared in the source. (i) Codenames. All codenames are printed in capital letters regardless of how they appeared in the source text. See the Glossary for abbreviations, acronyms, and codenames. B R I T I S H AND AMERICAN SPELLING/PUNCTUATION/USAGE Purists will quickly realize that British source texts do not consistently follow British spelling, punctuation, or usage (for example, "honour" vice the American "honor," etc.), and vice-versa. The clerical staffs in both countries frequently but not consistently reverted to the spelling and punctuation with which they were familiar, probably without realizing that they were, ever so slightly, altering the messages they typed. Occasionally, both British and American spellings of the same word will appear in the same text. In all cases, the editor has tried to follow the source text as precisely as possible. Chinese-language transliterations have been made in the Wade-Giles system, which was used in Britain and the United States during World War II. Misspellings of proper names in documents are usually given correctly in the headnote. ILLUSTRATIONS Picasso may have dismissed portraits as mere photography, but that does not mean that photographs tell the truth. One has only to study the varied poses of Roosevelt photographed during the Yalta Conference—ranging from a look of slack-jawed imbecility to robust health—to know that the camera proves little beyond the physical presence of the subjects. Photographs may not reveal the genuine mood and feelings of those pictured, but they can be used to represent the genuine interpretation of the photographer or, in this case, the editor. The photographs have been selected and the captions added with that purpose in mind: to illustrate the editor's judgment of the true mood and atmosphere during a given period of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. The only exceptions to this are four photographs of things specifically mentioned in the documents. For those who like their illustrations unadorned by comments, the List of Photographs provides the bare-bones identifying data.

Bibliographical Note LIST

OF SOURCES AND SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS

T h e archives a n d p r i n t e d sources given below provided source texts or additional versions of the source text. T h e y are listed in the alphabetical o r d e r of their abbreviations, since that is the way they a p p e a r in the notations a n d headnotes. CAB DS

FDR LTRS FO

FRUS

HLH

MD MR

MR* OF ρ PPF PREM 3

United Kingdom; War Cabinet. Papers. Public Record Office, London. This is followed by file identification numbers. United States, Department of State. Decimal files. National Archives, Washington, D.C. This is followed by the file and document number (for example, DS 800.12/3). F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945. Elliott Roosevelt, ed­ itor. Vol. II. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950. United Kingdom, Foreign Office. Foreign Office files. Public Record Office, London. This will be followed by other ref­ erence numbers indicating the storage file, folder, and paper (for example, F.O. 371/222/12 paper AN2131). United States, Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1865—. This will be followed by the year, volume number, and pages; or in the case of the Conference Series for World War II, the location of the conference and, if necessary, the year (for example, FRUS, 1941, I, 123-24, or FRUS, Quebec Conf., 1944, pp. 112-13). Harry L. Hopkins. Papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL), Hyde Park, New York. This is usually followed by a reference to the file or folder. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Diary. FDRL. References to the socalled Presidential Diary are so designated. Map Room papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. Un­ less otherwise noted, references are to the Churchill-Roose­ velt correspondence files in that collection. See PREM 3. Official File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the file number. Indicates that the immediately following citation is to a printed source which contains only a partial text of that document. President's Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the name of the file. United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Operational File (PRE­ MIER 3). Public Record Office, London (also available on microfilm at the Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick,

XXVlIl

PREM 4

PSF

PSF:GB:WSC

R&C

R&H Stalin/FDR

StalinlWSC WSC

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE New Jersey). This is followed by the file/folder/and page numbers (if any), except as below: The asterisk indicates that the document is found in PREM 3/ 3/467 through 473, the Churchill-Roosevelt telegrams. Since documents in those files are arranged in chronological order, pages and precise file numbers are omitted. United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Confidential File (PREMIER 4). Public Record Office, London. This is followed by the file/folder/and page numbers. President's Secretary's File, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers. FDRL. This is followed by the name of the file, except as noted below: President's Secretary's File, Great Britain, Churchill folder. Occasionally the reference is just to the GB (Great Britain) folder. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. Manfred Jonas et al., editors. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975. Since the selections are in chronological order, page numbers are omitted. Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. Revised edition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945: Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman. New York: Capricorn Books, 1965 (originally published by State Political Books Publishing House, 1957). This is followed by the document number. . Ibid.: Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee. This is followed by the document number. Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. 6 volumes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948—1953. Followed by the volume number and the pages (for example, WSC, II, 234).

SECONDARY

MATERIALS

T h e basic source for this collection has been the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence itself, found in archives in both Great Britain and the United States. I also m a d e extensive use of the archival collections in writing the headnotes. Nevertheless, completing the headnotes still entailed research in literally h u n d r e d s of secondary works. In The Last European War, J o h n Lukacs estimated that t h e r e are 60,000 books and articles written on various aspects of World War II. Even when that n u m b e r is pared to only those dealing with the issues that concerned Churchill and Roosevelt, it remains intimidating—and grows larger every day. T o attach a long list

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

XXlX

of sources consulted in preparing this collection would serve no useful purpose; to compile a complete, fully annotated bibliography on the strategy and diplomacy of the Second World War is a project unto itself. The purpose of this collection is to present the complete correspondence between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt within its historical context, not to provide a definitive bibliography. Instead, at the risk of slighting all too many of my friends and colleagues, I have chosen to mention only those few works which I have found indispensable: that handful of books which have sat next to my typewriter for the past eight years. This is not to say that other studies were not important to my work, nor does it even suggest that these are somehow better than some other books. It is just that the works mentioned below were so broad in their coverage and/or so scholarly in their approach and documentation that I found myself constantly referring to them. I may not have always agreed with them, but I always used them. Some additional citations are given in the headnotes when the material discussed is unusual, difficult to find, or involves direct quotation (see List of Sources Cited), but the bulk of the hundreds of books and articles I consulted go without the recognition they deserve. Casual readers will not care, serious scholars will know where to find them, and individuals will recognize their own contributions and understand my gratitude. Two official series are invaluable to anyone trying to understand the strategy and diplomacy that engaged Churchill and Roosevelt: the United Kingdom, History of the Second World War, and United States, Department of the Army, The United States Army in World War II. The British History of the Second World War is divided into a number of sub-series, one of which, the United Kingdom Military Series (J.R.M. Butler, editor), in six volumes titled Grand Strategy (London: HMSO, 1956—76), offers a unique insight into the politics of strategy. All six volumes were most useful, but one deserves special recognition. Volume IV (August 1942—August 1943), by Michael Howard, is a model of scholarship, completeness, and candor. It is everything an official history should be. No other single book better explains the British view of the complicated relationship between military operations, grand strategy, and AngloAmerican diplomacy during a most critical period of the war. Another sub-series in the British History of the Second World War consists of the five volumes written by Sir Llewelyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1970-76). Woodward is carefully uncritical of British policy, and his organization does not lend itself to research in Anglo-American relations, but he provides a wealth of detail as well as citations to the British archives. The United States government did not sponsor a broad history of the

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Second World War comparable to the British effort, but the individual services did commission studies of their wartime roles. Those written for the Navy and the Army Air Force are narrowly conceived and proved of little use. Not so in the case of the Army's history. The longer one works with this series, the more clear it becomes that these books are the product of remarkably extensive and perceptive research, frequently well beyond the confines of the military archives. Broad issues are often subordinated to detail, and the authors often avoid critical analysis, but almost every important question is touched on and usually explained. The entire series, The United States Army in World War II (Kent Roberts Greenfield, general editor), was useful, but certain sub-series were of particular value, specifically The European Theater of Operations, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and The War Department. Within those series, three volumes rate special mention: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: OCMH, 1954), Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Pfanning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington: OCMH, 1953), and Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington: OCMH, 1959). The useful Chronology, 1941-1945, Mary H. Williams, compiler (Washington: OCMH, 1960), is part of the Special Studies sub-series. Two secondary works fall into the same "indispensable" category as the official histories. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943—1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) is in the same class as Michael Howard's Grand Strategy, although the focus on Marshall necessarily limits coverage of some issues. Nevertheless, it is a complete and persuasive presentation of grand strategy, making full use of both British and American sources. Unfortunately, the publisher limited the length and scope of Pogue's citations, where he originally discussed many issues peripheral to Marshall, but that does not detract from the value of the book as it stands. The second invaluable book is the combination memoir/ narrative by Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, revised edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). In spite of its age, the book continues to be one of the best surveys of Anglo-American wartime relations, and consistently provides detail and insights not available elsewhere. Some other less comprehensive studies proved valuable. B. H. Liddell Hart, The History of the Second World War (London: Cassell, 1970), remains the best short history of the war, particularly for the European/Mediterranean/North African theaters from 1939 through 1943, although I regularly had to consult the more detailed and less opinionated military studies found in the British and American official histories. Two narratives by Roger Parkinson, Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat (New York: David McKay, 1973) and A Day's March Nearer Home (London: Hart-Davis,

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

XXXl

MacGibbon, 1974), based largely on the British War Cabinet papers, provided a convenient source of information on British decision-making at the highest level. Although The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, Alfred D. Chandler, Stephen E. Ambrose et al., editors, 5 volumes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), are most valuable as a documentary collection, they also contain extensive and comprehensive footnotes, many of which deal with issues that concerned Churchill and Roosevelt. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) proved a gold mine of information on the war in the Pacific, and Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932— 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), which Professor Dallek was kind enough to send me in manuscript, was a valuable guide to the broad outlines of Roosevelt's military-political strategy.

Initials of Message Drafters The staff of the White House Map Room and the State Department frequently indicated the identity of the drafter of a message on accompanying papers. Churchill's messages, on the other hand, usually worked their way through a routine vetting process within the Prime Minister's office; hence no single individual was listed as the drafter. The initials of message drafters, listed below, have been used in the documents to avoid clutter. AAB CB CH DA EJK ES FDR GCM GE HHA HLH HLS HM JCS OWI SW WDL WEB

Adolf A. Berle Charles Bohlen Cordell Hull Dean Acheson Admiral Ernest J. King Edward Stettinius Franklin D. Roosevelt General George C. Marshall George Elsey General Henry H. Arnold Harry L. Hopkins Henry L. Stimson Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) Office of War Information Sumner Welles Admiral William D. Leahy Admiral Wilson E. Brown

Digest of Documents 1933 Inscription, Oct. 8. An inscription to Roosevelt written by Churchill in volume I of Churchill's Marlborough biography. 1939 R-Ix, Sept. 11. Proposes a personal correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt. C-R I tel.-l, Oct. 5. Surmises that the Germans may have planted a bomb on board the merchant ship Iroquois; suggests public disclosure of the German warnings about such a bomb. C-Ix, Oct. 5. Asks that the non-belligerency zone around the Western Hemisphere be effectively enforced; expresses concern over the unknown location of the German warships Scheer and Hipper. C—2x, Oct. 16. Provides a summary of British naval actions; offers ASDIC to the U.S. Navy; suggests that a lack of oil limits German options. C—3x, Dec. 25. Defends the British violation of the Western Hemisphere security zone during the Battle of the River Plate; discusses magnetic mines. 1940 C—4x, Jan. 7. Forwards an Admiralty report on the Battle of the River Plate (the report is included as an enclosure). C—5x, Jan. 29. States that American merchant vessels will not be diverted into the combat zones around the British Isles. C—6x, Jan. 30. Partly retracts the assurances given in C-5x; claims such diversions can be avoided only if the United States guards against contraband shipments. R—2x, Feb. 1. Acknowledges receipt of C—4x; warns against offending the American public by needless search and seizure at sea. C—7x, Feb. 28. Acknowledges receipt of R—2x; complains of evasion of navicert procedures by American shippers. R—3x, Mar. 5. Indicates that navicert procedures are under study. C—8x, May 7. Forwards the recently published Battle of the River Plate.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1940

C—9x, May 15. Mentions Churchill's new position as Prime Minister; expresses fear of an invasion of Britain and a declaration of war by Italy; requests forty or fifty old U.S. destroyers; mentions economic warfare, Irish neutrality, and the possibility of American presence in Singapore as a challenge to Japan. R—4x, May 16. States that a loan of U.S. destroyers requires congressional approval; discusses British purchases of aircraft and arms; indicates that the U.S. fleet will remain at Hawaii. C—1Ox, May 18. Expresses fear of a German attack, but promises to continue the fight; emphasizes the urgent need for aid from the United States. C - H x , May 20. Asks for more airplanes; promises to continue the fight against Germany but cannot guarantee the policies of a new ministry should Churchill's government fall. R—5x, May 30. Acknowledges receipt of C—8x. C—12x, June 1. Requests permission to purchase more aircraft in the United States. C—13x, June 11. Praises Roosevelt's Charlottesville speech; assumes France will not surrender; again asks for a loan of U.S. destroyers. C—14x, June 12. Expresses fear that French resistance will collapse; asks that Roosevelt do what he can to bolster French morale. C—15x, June 13. States Churchill is leaving for France; repeats a plea for a public statement by Roosevelt; expresses concern over Ireland. R— 6x, June 13. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's message to Reynaud; states that the United States cannot send a naval squadron to Ireland; indicates the U.S. fleet will remain at Pearl Harbor. C—16x, June 14. Reports a French request for permission to negotiate a separate peace with Germany; again requests permission to publish Roosevelt's message to Reynaud. R—7x, June 14. Refuses to permit publication of the message to Reynaud; echoes Churchill's concern about the disposition of the French fleet. C—17x,June 15. Warns that the United States has to take action; expresses fear that a different British government might negotiate with Germany; indicates a desperate need for U.S. destroyers. C—18x, June 15. Echoes Reynaud's plea that the United States commit itself to an early entry into the war. C-19x, July 9. Notifies Roosevelt that the Duke of Windsor will become Governor of the Bahamas. C—20x/A, not sent; July 5. Requests additional aid, especially destroyers; asks for stronger American pressure on the Irish government. C—20x, July 31. Describes British naval losses and asks for destroyers; claims the air war is going well.

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R—8x, Aug. 13. Offers to send fifty old destroyers in return for a pledge that the British fleet will not be surrendered to Germany and permission to establish bases on certain British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. C—2Ix, Aug. 15. Thanks Roosevelt for message R—8x; warns that public disclosure of promises not to surrender the British fleet could stimulate defeatism. R—9x, Aug. 19. Forwards a copy of a letter to Roosevelt from the U.S. Charge in Berlin (Alexander Kirk) in which Kirk opposes any concessions to Germany as a threat to civilization itself, and urges full American support of the British war effort. C—22x, Aug. 22. Expresses Churchill's desire to avoid the appearance of a deal of destroyers for bases; reiterates British need for destroyers. C—23x, Aug. 25. Offers a compromise designed to avoid the appearance of exchanging destroyers for bases. C—24x, Aug. 27. Agrees to the American offer of destroyers and other materiel in return for bases; indicates concern over probable Italian invasion of Greece. C-25x, Aug. 27. Formal offer to the United States of leases for British bases in the Western Hemisphere. R—1Ox, Aug. 30. Formal inquiry by the President about the fate of the British fleet in the event of a German conquest of the British Isles. C—26x, Aug. 31. Formal assurances from Churchill that the British fleet will continue to fight even if Germany occupies Great Britain. R—Hx, Sept. 22. Warning from Roosevelt about impending invasion of French Indo-China by Japan (taken from memoir sources). C-27x, Sept. 22. Request for speedy transfer of small arms promised as part of the destroyers-for-bases deal. C—28x, Sept. 22. Informs Roosevelt of planned invasion of Dakar. R—12x, Sept. 24. Informs Churchill that small arms requested in C-27x are being shipped. C—29x, Sept. 24. Thanks Roosevelt for supporting British/Free French invasion of Dakar; asks for American pressure to prevent a declaration of war by French government in Vichy. C-30x, Sept. 25. Thanks Roosevelt for small arms; explains failure of Dakar invasion. C—3 Ix, Oct. 4. States Burma Road will be re-opened; expresses confidence regarding air defense, though the threat of a German invasion is not over; mentions the Dakar operation. C—32x, Oct. 21. Expresses concern that the Vichy French will permit the Germans to use French ships and troops in an invasion of England; mentions heavy losses due to German submarines.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1940

R - 1 3 x , Oct. 24. Passes the substance of an American warning to the Vichy government concerning German use of French warships; cautions that in such an event the United States will not help France retain its overseas territories. C—33x, Oct. 25. Reports struggle for power between Petain a n d Laval; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy not to collaborate with Germany. R—14x, Oct. 25. In answer to Churchill's request in C—33x, refers him to R-13x; states he will reiterate the warning. C—34x, Oct. 25. Asks Roosevelt to warn Petain that the American warning applies to German use of bases as well as ships; expresses cautious optimism about the threat of a German invasion; requests supplies. C—35x, Oct. 26. Acknowledges receipt of R-14x. C—36x, Oct. 27. Discusses overall British military commitments as an a r g u m e n t for speeding u p deliveries of American supplies, particularly aircraft. C—37x, Nov. 6. Congratulates Roosevelt on winning the election of 1940. C—38x, Nov. 10. Expresses fear over rumors that two French battleships u n d e r construction will fall into German hands; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy government against such an eventuality. R - 1 5 x , Nov. 13. Tells Churchill that the United States has warned Vichy about the two French ships and has offered to purchase them. C—39x, Nov. 16. T h a n k s Roosevelt for warning Vichy about the two French ships; briefly mentions British attack on the Italian Navy at T a r a n t o . R—16x, Nov. 18. Forwards the text of message from Vichy government assuring Roosevelt that n o n e of the French fleet will fall into Germ a n hands. C—4Ox, Nov. 2 1 . Forwards a brief Admiralty report on the attack on the Italian fleet at T a r a n t o . R—17x, Nov. 23. Reports further assurances from Petain that he will give prior notice to the United States of any movements of French naval units. C—41x, Nov. 23. Suggests the United States offer to supply food for Spain as a means of keeping Spain neutral. C—42x, Nov. ? Letter of introduction for Sir Walter Citrine. C—43x/A, Nov. 12. An unsent draft of C—43x p r e p a r e d by Lothian. C—43x/B, Nov. ? An unsent draft of C - 4 3 x printed for circulation to the British War Cabinet. C—43x, Dec. 7. A letter (sent by wireless) outlining Britain's extensive worldwide commitments; refers to the challenge posed by J a p a n and Germany, and the lack of cooperation from Ireland; argues

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XXXVIl

that Britain is fighting America's war, and closes with a strong plea for a solution to Britain's inability to continue to pay cash for war supplies; includes an enclosure with statistics on Allied shipping losses. C—43x, Dec. 20. Minor corrections to the original version of C—43x. C—44x, Dec. 13. Expresses grief at the death of Ambassador Lothian. C—45x, Dec. 13. Mentions British military successes in Libya; expresses concern about G e r m a n submarine activity; threatens to cut off food subsidies and special shipping to Ireland. C - 4 6 x , Dec. 14. Proposes Lloyd George as Ambassador to the United States. R— 18x, Dec. 15. Agrees to accept Lloyd George as Ambassador. C—47x, not sent; Dec. 17. Withdraws the nomination of Lloyd George as Ambassador; discusses Britain's inability to pay cash for war supplies; requests additional war materiel. C—48x, Dec. 2 1 . Announces the appointment of Lord Halifax as Ambassador to the United States, p e n d i n g Roosevelt's approval. R—19x, Dec. 3 1 . Offers a plan for supplying food, clothing, a n d h u m a n itarian supplies to children in Vichy France. C—53x/A, Dec. 25. Forwards an Admiralty m e m o r a n d u m explaining why the U.S. destroyers loaned to Britain are not yet in service. 1941 C—49x, J a n . 1. Extends New Year's greetings; thanks Roosevelt for the "Arsenal of Democracy" speech. C-50x/A, not sent; Dec. 28 (1940). Expresses strong opposition to the transfer of gold by ship from Cape Town, South Africa. C—50x/B, not sent; Dec. 31 (1940). Opposes the gold-transfer scheme; asks about the problem of interim finance for war supplies. C—5Ox, J a n . 2. Agrees to the transfer of South African gold to the United States; expresses concern over Britain's inability to pay cash for war supplies. C—5Ix, J a n . 3. Agrees to permit humanitarian aid to children in Vichy France. C—52x, J a n . 6. Reports a British victory over the Italians at Bardia. C—53x, J a n . 9. Explains that the delay in utilizing U.S. destroyers is d u e to the need for extensive reconditioning. C—54x, J a n . 11. Asks Roosevelt to repeat to Petain a British offer of military assistance if Vichy government flees to North Africa and resumes the war against Germany.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1941

R—2Ox, J a n . 13. Complies with request made in C - 5 4 x . C—55x, J a n . 13. Expresses pleasure that Roosevelt sent Hopkins as a personal emissary. R—21x, J a n . 16. Predicts passage of lend-lease bill; warns of r u m o r s of pending invasion of England. R—22x, J a n . 18. Responds to C—53x; indicates the United States has no destroyers to spare. C—56x, J a n . 20. Informs Roosevelt of arrival of Lord Halifax aboard HMS King George V at Annapolis; invites Roosevelt to visit ship. R—23x, J a n . 20. Forwards "Ship of State" verse to Churchill via Willkie (letter). C—57x, J a n . 2 1 . Uses U.S. diplomatic channels to forward message to Marshal Petain indicating Britain will permit French naval units interned at Alexandria to depart if Vichy government moves to North Africa and resumes war against Germany. R—24x, J a n . 22. Answers C—56x; Roosevelt will meet Halifax if possible. C—58x, J a n . 28. T h a n k s Roosevelt for "Ship of State" verse and discusses strategic situation in eastern Europe. C—59x, J a n . 29. Brief birthday greetings to Roosevelt. C—6Ox, Feb. 15. Reports rumors of Japanese plans to go to war with Britain; asks Roosevelt to indicate that the United States will support Britain; expresses grave concern over such a war forcing Britain to over-extend her naval strength. C—61x, Feb. 20. Reports that new intelligence indicates J a p a n will not attack Britain; refers to lend-lease bill and Roosevelt's need to avoid any public support of Britain in the Pacific. R—25x, not sent; Feb. 25. Expresses concern over arguments and delays in arriving at formal agreements on base leases in the West Indies; proposes compromises. C—62x, Mar. 1. Requests additional assistance in convoying ships along the northwest route in the Atlantic. C—63x, not sent; Mar. 6. Sets forth the British position regarding the base leases and asks Roosevelt to compromise on certain issues. C—64x, not sent; Mar. 8. Offers additional British arguments regarding the West Indian leases and proposes compromises. R—26x, Mar. 8. Reports passage of lend-lease bill by Senate; expects to sign bill on March 11. C—65x, Mar. 9. Brief message of appreciation for the Lend-Lease Act. C—66x, Mar. 10. Tells of British decision to reinforce armies in Greece in hopes of getting Yugoslavs to hold out against Germany; mentions base-leasing problems again.

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C—67x, Mar. 12. Suggests that Roosevelt warn Admiral Darlan against use of French warships against the British blockade; expresses worry over the leakage of U.S. supplies designated for France but getting into German hands; mentions that base-leasing agreements have been reached. C—68x, Mar. 17. Praises Roosevelt's speech of March 14. R—27x, Mar. 19. Acknowledges C—67x and informs Churchill that the United States has cautioned Vichy government about the seriousness of any drastic action. C—69x, Mar. 19. Reports sighting German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; warns of heavy strain on British naval forces; requests U.S. aid in tracking German raiders. C—7Ox, Mar. 23. Reports further sightings of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; requests permission for HMS Malaya to undergo repairs in U.S. shipyard. R-28x, Mar. 25. Agrees to repair HMS Malaya. C—7lx, Mar. 27. Tells Roosevelt that Britain will recognize and assist the new Yugoslavian government, and asks the United States to do the same. R—29x, Mar. 29. Informs Churchill of the transfer of ten Coast Guard cutters. R—3Ox, Mar. 29. Lists war supplies being transferred to Britain, including a significant number of aircraft. C-72x, Mar. 29. Notifies Roosevelt that in response to agreements between Germany and Vichy, Churchill has instructed the Admiralty to tighten the British blockade of unoccupied France. C-73x, Mar. 30. Reports successful results of the Battle of Cape Matapan against the Italian fleet; responds to Roosevelt's messages about repairing the Malaya, the sending of ten Coast Guard cutters, and German surface raiders (R-28x, R-29x); protests leaks in blockade of Germany. R—31x, Apr. 2. Announces expansion of U.S. ship-building program. C—74x, Apr. 2. Reports intelligence that French plan to move Dunkerque to Toulon for repairs; Churchill fears the Germans will then take control of the ship; asks Roosevelt to warn Vichy that such actions will not be permitted. C—75x, Apr. 2. Requests that any U.S. message to Vichy be worded to avoid disclosing source of British intelligence. R—32x, Apr. 3. Acknowledges C-74x; says U.S. Ambassador will make appropriate protests. R—33x, Apr. 4. Reports that Dunkerque will not leave Oran for ten days.

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R—34x, Apr. 4. Recommends the British adopt a suggestion from Count Sforza calling for the British to return all Italian civilians taken in Ethiopia to their families; Sforza believes that could undermine Mussolini's authority in Italy. C—76x, Apr. 4. Rejects Sforza's proposal because of the possibility of continued Italian resistance in East Africa and lack of shipping. C—77x, Apr. 4. Thanks Roosevelt for R-31x; summarizes problems of protecting the northwestern Atlantic sea lanes. R—35x, Apr. 6. Reports the substance of a conversation between Petain, Darlan, and Matthews in which Darlan guaranteed that no French warships would fall into German hands. C—78x, Apr. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for assistance regarding French warships; discusses U-boat attacks on Atlantic convoys; repeats message from Duke d'Aosta thanking British for humanitarian treatment of Italian prisoners in East Africa. R—36x, Apr. 11. Reports extension of security zone in Atlantic to long. 25° W; U.S. sightings of aggressor ships or planes will be forwarded to British; removes the Red Sea from the list of combat zones. R—37x, Apr. 11. Forwards a copy of a message from the U.S. Embassy in Vichy reporting a note from the French government stating that it will not move the Dunkerque to Toulon. C—79x, Apr. 13. Expresses gratitude for the increase in American assistance in the Battle of the Atlantic; thanks Roosevelt for intervening with the Vichy government; discusses strategy in North Africa. C—8Ox, Apr. 16. Discusses naval coordination in the Atlantic; mentions deteriorating situation in the Balkans; expresses optimism about holding Tobruk and Libya. C—8Ix, Apr. 24. Summarizes the Anglo-American joint naval planning for the Battle of the Atlantic; expresses concern over possible Spanish and Portuguese cooperation with Germany; suggests possibility of need to occupy Azores and Cape Verde Islands; requests American naval force in the area as a warning. C—82x, Apr. 24. Expresses pleasure at the Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 2 adopted by the United States; admits Greece is lost; is optimistic about Tobruk and North Africa; suggests disclosure of U.S. naval actions in the Atlantic as a means of influencing Turkey and Spain. C—83x, Apr. 29. Summary of deteriorating situation in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean; asks Roosevelt to influence Vichy government to oppose German use of French colonies and bases in the Middle East.

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xli

R—38x, May 1. Explains that Portugal will not permit a visit of U.S. Navy ships to the Azores, but countenances a British occupation of the islands if necessary; calls British efforts in the eastern Mediterranean a "delaying action" and asserts that the war will be won by control of the Atlantic and Indian oceans; refuses to take strong action to prevent German use of Vichy colonies in the Middle East. C—84x, May 3. Responds to R—38x; reserves right to intervene in Azores and Cape Verde Islands in advance of an actual German takeover; disagrees with Roosevelt's willingness to give up eastern Mediterranean as lost; agrees to follow U.S. lead regarding Vichy government. C—85x, May 10. Hopes that plans to train British pilots in the United States will not be delayed by legal problems. R—39x, May 10. Assures Churchill of American support for efforts in Middle East/eastern Mediterranean; mentions promises from Vichy government but discusses French inability to resist Germans; mentions Atlantic patrols. C—86x, May 14. Brief reiteration of previous statements regarding Middle East, Vichy government and Darlan, and the problem of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. R—4Ox, May 14. Requests information concerning the interrogation of Rudolf Hess; mentions negotiations with Vichy government. C—87x, May 17. Summary of the interviews of Rudolf Hess. C—88x, May 19. Sends a copy of a message from Willkie to Churchill on the question of confusion over British needs in the Battle of the Atlantic; includes proposed reply from Churchill summarizing the naval situation. C—89x, May 21. Complies with President's wishes regarding the Willkie message; mentions opening of the battle for Crete and other Middle Eastern problems; mentions seriousness of continued German submarine action in the Atlantic. R—41x, May 21. No legal difficulties in the way of training British pilots in the United States; additional supplies forthcoming. C-90x, May 23. Brief summary of the battle for Crete; reports sighting of German surface raider-force including the Bismarck; forwards two Admiralty papers concerning the Battle of the Atlantic. C-91x, May 25. Thanks Roosevelt for R-41x. R—42x, May 27. Mentions Pan-American Day speech; congratulates Churchill on the sinking of the Bhmarck. R—43x, May 28. A list of additional supplies being sent to the British in the Middle East.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1941

C—92x, May 28. Thanks Roosevelt for Middle East supplies; discusses impact of the sinking of the Bismarck; hopes it will restrain the Japanese. R—44x, May 29. Informs Churchill that U.S. military pilots will ferry new aircraft from the manufacturer to the point where British pilots can pick them up; requests that R.A.F. control activities of the ferry pilots. R—44x/A, not sent; May 23. Requests that R.A.F. take over control of ferrying planes to England. C—93x, May 29. Endorses U.S. intention to assume defense of Iceland; discusses probable policies in case of a German penetration of Spain and Portugal; welcomes U.S. occupation of Dakar. C—94x, May 31. Accepts suggestion made in R—44x regarding ferrying service; mentions evacuation of Crete and effect of the defeat. C—95x, June 3. Discusses the necessity of building a larger logistics organization in the Middle East; asks permission for Averell Harriman to join the planning mission traveling to the Middle East. C-96x, June 7. Announces that British and Free French troops will occupy Syria and asks the United States to try to restrain Vichy. C—97x, June 8. Proposes a meeting of the British dominions and allies and hopes that the United States will send a representative. C—98x, June 8. Text of the formal resolution to be discussed at the meeting mentioned in C-97x. C—99x, June 11. Supports suggestion of Elliott Roosevelt to use Bathurst as a staging point for the ferrying of planes. C—10Ox, June 14. Expresses pleasure at U.S. takeover of British bases in Iceland; tells Roosevelt of impending offensive in Egypt; predicts German attack on Russia and states Great Britain will provide all possible aid to Russia in that event; mentions Roosevelt's health. R—45x, June 17. Expresses willingness to build landing facilities in West Africa for ferrying planes to Middle East; is concerned over delays between Takoradi and lower Egypt. C—10Ix, June 20. Discusses problems of ferrying aircraft from Takoradi to Egypt; reports failure of offensive in Egypt and hopes for an improvement in Syria. R—46x, June 25. Announces accelerated merchant ship-building program. C—102x, June 26. Suggests joint Anglo-American tank board to avoid unnecessary maintenance problems. C—103x, July 1. Summarizes efforts in the Battle of the Atlantic.

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C—104x, July 4. Explains reasons for the relief of General Wavell and the staff reorganization of the British Middle East Command. R-47x, July 6. Acknowledges receipt of C-102x. C—105x, July 7. Discusses the Battle of the Atlantic; expresses pleasure over impending implementation of U.S. Defense Plan No. 3. R—48x, July 10. Disagrees with Churchill's proposal for an Anglo-American tank board. R-49x, July 12. Announces expanded tank production goals. R—5Ox, July 14. Cautions against promises by Britain regarding postwar political settlements; suggests plebescites to revive small states as in Versailles Treaty. R-51x, July 19. Mentions effect of U.S. occupation of Iceland. C-106x, July 25. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill will be able to meet with him (Atlantic Conference). C—107x, July 25. Discusses tank-building program; suggests that heavy bombing of Germany be supplemented by plans for tank-landing ships. R—52x, July 26. Relates substance of an offer to Japan to neutralize IndoChina. C—108x, July 27. Names persons who will accompany Churchill to the Atlantic Conference (see p. clxv for R-51x/l and R-52x/l). C—109x, Aug. 5. Reports departure of Churchill and Hopkins for Atlantic Conference. C-11Ox, Aug. 9—12. Informs Roosevelt of the sinking of a German submarine. C - I H x , Aug. 12. Farewell to Roosevelt after the Atlantic Conference. R—53x, Aug. 18. Discusses recent Japanese-American negotiations. R—54x/A, not sent; Aug. 20. Discussion of ways to control retransfers by Britain of articles obtained under lend-lease. R—54x/B, not sent; Aug. 20. Another draft of a letter discussing the need to control retransfers of articles obtained under lend-lease. C-112x, Aug. 29. Discusses plans for occupation of the Canary Islands. C-113x, Sept. 1. Asks for shipping in order to send reinforcements to Persia and the Middle East. R—55x, Sept. 5. Agrees to supply the transports requested in C-113x. C-114x, Sept. 5. Forwards a message from Stalin requesting a second front; also forwards Churchill's negative reply to Stalin; expresses fears that the Soviets are considering a separate peace with Germany.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1941

C-115x, Sept. 7. Thanks Roosevelt for supplying shipping to Middle East; mentions aid to Russia. R—56x/A, not sent; Sept. 8. Outlines an extensive aid program to Russia; proposes an Anglo-American conference on aid to the Soviet Union (later sent as a Hopkins-to-Churchill message). R—56x, Sept. 12. States that Lieutenant General S. D. Embick will represent the United States at the Anglo-American supply conference on aid to Russia. R—57x, Sept. 17. Provides information about U.S. tank production. C-116x, Sept. 22. Thanks Roosevelt for information about tank production. R—58x, Sept. 25. Additional data regarding U.S. tank production. C-117x, Sept. 30. Thanks Roosevelt for data on tank production; mentions losses in the Atlantic and upcoming talks with the Russians on supply matters. R—59x, Sept. 30. Provides additional data on doubled U.S. tank production and the supply of combat planes to Russia. C-118x, Sept. ? A note forwarding one of Churchill's books. C-119x, Oct. 5. Informs Roosevelt that Attlee will be in Washington and will discuss Middle Eastern matters of importance with the President; mentions success of talks with the Russians. R—6Ox, Oct. 7. Withdraws offer of U.S. transports for British reinforcements to the Middle East and suggests a different method which will not offend American public opinion or jeopardize plans to amend the Neutrality Act. R—61x, Oct. 8. Expresses pleasure at the chance to talk to Attlee and at the outcome of the Moscow talks. Mentions proposal made in R6Ox. C—120x, Oct. 8. Protests U.S. policy regarding postwar regulation of European wheat production. C—121x, Oct. 9. Accepts proposal made in R-60x to transport troops to Middle East via Halifax, Nova Scotia. R—62x, Oct. 11. A letter proposing joint atomic research (MAYSON). R—63x, Oct. 15. A letter expressing pleasure at the work of Admiral Mountbatten and informing Churchill that Mountbatten has information concerning possible operations in Africa; mentions possible Japanese move northward. R—64x, Oct. 18. Explains U.S. position regarding postwar wheat controls; notes that the talks have only been exploratory.

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C—122x, Oct. 20. A letter summarizing the military situation and strategic plans, particularly in the Middle East (with enclosures on artillery, air defense, and army strengths). R—65x, Oct. 24. A letter informing Churchill of the appointment of William Donovan as Coordinator of Information, a new intelligence position. C—123x, Oct. 27. Acknowledges receipt of R-64x. C—124x, Oct. 28. Congratulates Roosevelt for his speech of October 27. C—125x, Nov. 2. Informs Roosevelt of the transfer of the Prince of Wales to the Indian Ocean; mentions sinking of the USS Reuben James. C—126x, Nov. 5. Supports a request from Chiang Kai-shek for aircraft and pilots; discusses ways to prevent further Japanese aggression. R—66x, Nov. 7. Doubts that the Japanese are in a position to attack Yunnan and cut the Burma Road; generally agrees with Churchill's advice on a stern policy toward Japan; will expedite lend-lease aid to China. C—127x, Nov. 9. Reports sinking of two Axis convoys in the Mediterranean and expresses optimism about the Russian front. R—67x, Nov. 11. Tells Churchill of some critical U.S. Army reports regarding the condition of defenses on the British Isles. C—128x, Nov. 18. Expresses pleasure at the proposed amendment to the U.S. Neutrality Act; operations mentioned in C-122x to start immediately. C—129x, Nov. 20. Reports successful start of offensive in Libya, and concern over the possible replacement of Weygand by a more proGerman officer. R—68x, Nov. 20. States the United States had protested to Vichy about any actions in North Africa which would aid Germany and is reviewing its policy toward France. C—13Ox, Nov. 21. Report on the offensive in North Africa. C—131x, Nov. 23. Forwards report of General Auchinleck on North African offensive. C-132x, Nov. 24. Report on the offensive in North Africa. R—69x, Nov. 24. Explains the Japanese offer to the United States of a modus vivendi and the American counter-offer. R-70x, Nov. 25. Informs Churchill that William C. Bullitt is going as the President's personal representative on an inspection trip of the Middle East; mentions settlement of coal-miners' strike in the United States.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1941

C—133x, Nov. 26. Indicates concern that the Chinese are not receiving enough aid. C-134x, Nov. 27. Acknowledges R-70x. C—135x, Nov. 30. Suggests the best way to restrain Japan would be an announcement that Roosevelt will ask for a declaration of war if their aggression continues. C—136x, Dec. ? Indicates British willingness to cooperate on atomic research (MAYSON). C—137x, Dec. 7. Asks for Roosevelt's comments on the proposed draft declaration from Britain and the British Commonwealth to Japan. C—R/tel.—2, Dec. 7. Summary of a telephone call from Churchill to Roosevelt after the Pearl Harbor attack. R—71x, Dec. 8. Asks Churchill to delay asking for a declaration of war against Japan until after Roosevelt speaks to Congress to make a similar request; approves of Churchill's message to the Irish government. R—72x, Dec. 8. Reports U.S. declaration of war against Japan. C— 138x, Dec. 9. Suggests a conference between himself and Roosevelt (ARCADIA). C-139x, Dec. 10. Dismisses question of personal danger and reiterates desire for a meeting with Roosevelt. R—73x, Dec. 10. Agrees to a meeting with Churchill in Washington; assures that production and allocation problems can be worked out. R—73x/A, not sent; Dec. 10. Asks for a delay of a few weeks before any meeting while an assessment is made of the new situation following the Japanese attack. R—73x/B, not sent; Dec. 10. Suggests one week delay before any meeting. C—14Ox, Dec. 11. Asks United States not to break its relations with Vichy France. C—141x, Dec. 12. Asks Roosevelt to divert U.S. transports carrying British troops to Bombay instead of Middle East. R—74x, Dec. 12. Informs Churchill that his request in C-141x has been followed. C—142x, Dec. 18. Forwards a proposed agenda for their upcoming meeting. C—143x, Dec. 18. Accepts Roosevelt's invitation to stay at the White House. C-144x, Dec. 21? Gives estimated time of arrival in the United States and suggests additional transportation arrangements. C—145x, Dec. 16-20. Four long reports from the Prime Minister assessing the strategic situation on all fronts.

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C-146x, Dec. 30. Discusses Joint Declaration of the United Nations and Unity Plan formulated during the ARCADIA Conference. 1942 C-147x, Jan. 1. A personal inscription in a collection of Churchill's speeches. C—148x, Jan. ? A personal inscription in Churchill's book The River War. C—149x, Jan. 1? Requests that two Burmese nationalists be put on a plane going to West Africa. C—15Ox, Jan. 3. Suggests timing of the press release regarding the unified command for the South West Pacific area (with proposed draft statement). C-151x, Jan. 5. Requests supplies for Spain. C—152x, Jan. 6. Memo enclosing a newspaper cartoon. C—153x, Jan. 7? An extensive draft summary of the strategic situation for 1942 and 1943 in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. C—154x, Jan. 14. Requests public assurances from Roosevelt that the destroyers-bases agreement does not involve any transfer of sovereignty over the West Indies colonies. C—155x, Jan. 14. A suggested joint statement regarding the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon. R—75x, Jan. 16. Informs Churchill that Roosevelt has approved General Wavell's proposal to take command of the South West Pacific area, excluding the Philippine Islands. C-156x, Jan. 17. Supports Roosevelt's action regarding the South West Pacific Command; reports Churchill's return to London. C-157x, Jan. 23. Reports de Gaulle's acceptance of Churchill's proposed statement on St. Pierre and Miquelon (C-155x) without insisting on secret conditions. C—158x, Jan. 23. Reports the reaction of the British government to various supply arrangements and the establishment of two supplycoordinating boards; expresses doubts over treating China as an equal in supply matters. R—76x, Jan. 26. Proposes a press release regarding the supply arrangements mentioned in C—158x, plus some minor changes in the documents. C—159x, Jan. 27. Forwards protests from Australia and New Zealand over Great Britain's role as broker between them and the United States in formulating strategy in the Pacific. C-160x, Jan. 29. Requests American intervention to prevent Chiang Kaishek from withdrawing the Flying Tiger Squadron from Rangoon.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

R—77x, Jan. 29. Forwards a copy of American promises to Petain and Weygand aimed at bringing French North Africa to the Allied side; reports apparent failure of this move. C—161x, Jan. 30. Birthday greetings to Roosevelt. R—78x, Jan. 30. Discusses command problems in the ABDA area; agrees that Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch proposals should be coordinated in London (C-159x). R—79x, Jan. 31. Requests that Churchill appoint Sir John Dill as the British representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. C-162x, Feb. 1. Agrees to R-79x. C—163x, Feb. 1. Forwards Wavell's proposals for restructuring the ABDA Command. C-164x, Feb. 3. Forwards Wavell's response to R-76x, along with Churchill's own suggestions about the ABDACOM structure; agrees with Roosevelt's proposals regarding Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff committees; comments on China's role. R—8Ox, Feb. 4. Asks Churchill to prevent further delay in British acceptance of the proposed Master Lend-Lease Agreement. C—165x, not sent; Feb. 5. Asks Roosevelt not to press the "no discrimination" article of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement. R—81x, not sent; Feb. 5-6. Disagrees with Churchill's draft of a joint statement regarding the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon (C-155x). R—82x, Feb. 7. Suggests that Admiral Helfrich replace Admiral Hart as Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces; mentions German submarine activity in the Atlantic. C—25, Feb. 7. A long discussion of the ABDA Command, coordination of Australian and New Zealand proposals, and the use of Chinese forces; expresses the hope that no guarantees will be given to the Vichy government about Madagascar since Britain plans to occupy the port of Diego-Suarez; also discusses MAGNET and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement negotiations; suggests a numbering system for their telegrams. C—26, Feb. 8. Forwards a query from Wavell concerning appointment of Helfrich as Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces. R—101, Feb. 9. Informs Churchill that Helfrich has been designated Acting Commander in Chief of ABDA naval forces. R—102, Feb. 11. Comments on various items raised in C—25.

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R—103, Feb. 10. Forwards a copy of a message to Petain strongly protesting the use of French ships to transport supplies to German forces in Africa. C—27, Feb. 11. Suggests other command appointments in ABDA area; states that Singapore will be held to the bitter end. R—104, Feb. 11. Asks Churchill to delay announcement of Peirse's appointment as commander of ABDA air forces. R—105/A, not sent; Feb. 10. A strong defense of the American version of Article VII of the interim Master Lend-Lease Agreement. R—105, Feb. 11. Defends the American position regarding Article VII but in more conciliatory language with a fuller explanation than in the draft. R—105/1, Feb. 11. A letter teasing Churchill about his use of an assumed name (Charles Morin) when painting. C—28, Feb. 12. Accepts the American position on the Master Lend-Lease Agreement; agrees with Roosevelt's protest to Vichy; mentions problems with Chiang Kai-shek, battle at Singapore, ABDA Command appointments, and the escape of the German ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. C—29, Feb. 16. Discusses command appointments in ABDA area; discusses the strategic implications of the fall of Singapore; expects a battle soon in North Africa; claims the shift of the German warships to Norway actually lessens pressure on the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. R—106, Feb. 18. Discusses the effect of the loss of Singapore; promises increased American aid and efforts in the Pacific; agrees that the shift of German warships to Norway eases Anglo-American problems in the North Atlantic. C-30, Feb. 20. Thanks Roosevelt for the support expressed in R-106; mentions resignation of Beaverbrook. C—31, Feb. 20. Requests Roosevelt's assistance in persuading the Australian government to authorize the diversion of an Australian division to Burma. R—107, Feb. 20. Supports the British request for a diversion of an Australian division and promises extra American troops for Australia. R—108, Feb. 21. Forwards a copy of a message from Roosevelt to Australian Prime Minister Curtin asking that the Australian government permit the diversion of the leading Australian division to Burma; promises increased American aid for Australia.

1

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

C—31/1, Feb. 21. Repeats the gist of a Pacific War Council message to Wavell authorizing him to take the steps required to evacuate certain personnel from Java; also asks the United States to continue sending heavy bombers via India. R—109, Feb. 22. Claims that Wavell now has sufficient instructions; doubts the possibility of getting naval reinforcements to the ABDA area. R—110, Feb. 22. Repeats a message to Curtin asking that Australian forces returning from the Middle East be diverted to Burma; mentions forthcoming Washington's Birthday speech. R - H l , Feb. 23. (Sent by Hopkins.) Claims in answer to C-31/1 that U.S. bombers continue to be sent to Java. C—32, Feb. 24. Congratulates Roosevelt on his Washington's Birthday speech. C—32/1, Feb. 25. A letter calling for increased cooperation in the sharing of military ciphers. C—33, Feb. 27. Suggests prior U.S.-British consultation before allowing any government to sign the United Nations Declaration. R—112, Mar. 3. Agrees that French National Committee could sign the United Nations Declaration but no others without prior AngloAmerican consultation; raises question of consulting the Soviet Union. C—34/A, not sent; Mar. 2. A response to Roosevelt's inquiry about the possibility of granting independence to India. C—34, Mar. 4. Asserts that the British government is considering a statement giving India dominion status with the right to secede after the war; expresses concern over the effect such a declaration could have on elements of the Indian Army, particularly Moslems. C—35, Mar. 4. Forwards reports from authorities in India, one of which argues that a grant of independence would have adverse effects upon the morale of the Indian Army. C—36, Mar. 4. Discusses the overall shortage of shipping; suggests postponement of GYMNAST; notes that increased needs in the Far East and Russia have depleted Britain's stock of supplies at home. C—37, Mar. 5. Outlines Churchill's evaluation of the strategic situation, particularly in the Far East and the Indian Ocean. Expresses hope that the United States can keep Japan occupied in the Pacific and prevent any move by Japan into the Indian Ocean; surmises that the shortage of shipping is the major problem. C—38, Mar. 6. Forwards a proposal from the Australian government for the establishment of a joint war council in Washington to direct the war in the ANZAC area.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

Ii

C—39, Mar. 7. Forwards comments by British military authorities about the adverse effect of any promise of Indian independence upon the morale and effectiveness of the Indian Army. R-113, Mar. 7. An extensive outline of U.S. troop and materiel allocations for the Pacific area during 1942; agrees on the cancellation of GYMNAST; supports invasion of Europe in 1942. C—40, Mar. 7. Asks that the United States drop its objections to an AngloRussian treaty recognizing Russian territorial claims, particularly in the Baltic area; mentions India and hints at British support for some sort of second front in Europe. C—41, Mar. 7. Forwards reports from the Viceroy of India and Governor of the Punjab, both recommending against any declaration giving India the right to secede from the British Empire. C—42, Mar. 9. Acknowledges receipt of R—113 and promises an early response. R-114, Mar. 9. Requests Churchill's concurrence in appointing Admiral Stark as the personal representative of the President in London; informs Churchill that Admiral King will become Chief of Naval Operations. R—115, Mar. 9. Proposes a simplification of the military command structure by dividing the world into three theaters. C—43, Mar. 10. Expresses pleasure over the appointment of Admiral Stark. R—116/A, not sent; Feb. 25. Strongly suggests that Britain establish a temporary dominion-style government in India as a first step toward postwar independence; warns that the days of colonialism are over and draws an analogy between the United States after the American revolution and India. R—116, Mar. 10. Suggests the same thing as the unsent draft of Feb. 25, but in less vigorous, critical language. C—44, Mar. 14. Informs Roosevelt that Britain has decided to invade and occupy Diego-Suarez on northern Madagascar (BONUS); asks for U.S. naval assistance to relieve the Gibraltar Squadron. R—117, Mar. 15. Indicates desire that Stilwell continue to command Chinese forces operating in Burma, with British to retain command over forces in southern Burma. C—45, Mar. 15. Indicates that BONUS, the codename for an invasion of Madagascar, has been changed to IRONCLAD. R-118, Mar. 16. (Sent from Hopkins to Churchill.) Promises a quick answer to Churchill's query about heavy losses of tankers; asks for answers to R-115 and R-117.

Hi

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

R-119, Mar. 16. Agrees to support IRONCLAD by sending U.S. ships to reinforce the British Home Fleet. R—120, Mar. 16. Gives number and type of ships being sent to reinforce the Home Fleet; discusses reasons for U.S. inability to provide adequate protection against submarine attacks in U.S./Gulf of Mexico waters; mentions departure of R. G. Casey. R—121, Mar. 17. Informs Churchill of the appointment of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander in the Australian region. C—46, Mar. 17. Agrees with the broad concept outlined in R—115 but offers some suggestions on specifics; aims at retaining a British voice in strategy in the Pacific. C—47, Mar. 17. Indicates pleasure at General MacArthur's becoming Supreme Commander in the South West Pacific area. R—122, Mar. 17. Reports a successful air attack on a Japanese task force in the Salamaua-Lae area of New Guinea. C—48, Mar. 17. Suggests specific types of ships for reinforcement of British Home Fleet in connection with IRONCLAD. C—49, Mar. 17. Indicates a preference for complete British command over all Allied forces fighting in Burma. C—50, Mar. 17. Suggests that Roosevelt send the new battleships to the Pacific rather than to reinforce the Home Fleet. C—51, Mar. 18. Expresses pleasure at American action in New Guinea (R-122); suggests establishing channels for the regular reporting of military actions. R—123, Mar. 18. Informs Churchill of the specific numbers and types of ships being sent to reinforce the Home Fleet. R—123/1, Mar. 18. A long letter in which Roosevelt discusses criticism from the press, the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, his hopes of a second front in Europe, and the submarine war off the U.S. Atlantic Coast. R—124, Mar. 19. Insists that Stilwell retain command of Chinese armies operating in northern Burma; claims Stilwell and Alexander are cooperating effectively. C—52, Mar. 19. Thanks Roosevelt for the reinforcements being sent to the British Home Fleet. R—125, Mar. 19. Suggests British air raids on German submarine bases. C—53, Mar. 20. Agrees to StilwelPs maintaining independent command in northern Burma; states that the R.A.F. will take every opportunity to attack German submarine bases.

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C-54, Mar. 20. Informs Roosevelt that New Zealand Prime Minister Fraser had agreed to the American proposal for a South West Pacific area with MacArthur as Supreme Commander. C-55, Mar. 21. Responds to R-113; accepts U.S. proposals for allocation of shipping and air resources. R—126, Mar. 22. Informs Churchill of plans to resume shipments of food to children in France and to send various forms of economic aid to French North Africa. R—127, Mar. 22. Expresses annoyance over the publicity surrounding the Anglo-Australian argument about the appointment of R. G. Casey to the Middle East. C—56, Mar. 23. Presents Churchill's view of the reasons for the dispute with the Australian government. C—57, Mar. 24. Forwards the Australian government's comments on Roosevelt's proposals for theaters of operation (R-115). C—58, Mar. 24. The text of the Australian government's comments on Roosevelt's theaters of operation; suggests changes designed to enhance Australian/New Zealand participation in strategic planning. R-128, Mar. 26. Informs Churchill that the United States has told Australian Prime Minister Curtin that American reinforcements will be sent immediately to Australia; Curtin was asked to consider leaving the Australian division in the Middle East. C—59, Mar. 27. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposal to resume shipments of supplies to French North Africa; asked for American permission to call the attack on Madagascar a joint Anglo-American expedition. C—60, Mar. 29. In answer to Roosevelt's request (R-125), promises air attacks on various U-boat bases; asks Roosevelt for heavy bombers as soon as possible. C-61, Mar. 31. Requests use of the USS Wasp to ferry fighter planes to Malta. R—129, Apr. 1. Informs Churchill that Hopkins and Marshall will go to London to present the American long-term plan for military action; proposes asking Stalin to send two representatives to Washington. C—62, Apr. 1. Answers R-123/1; mentions commando raid on St. Nazaire; discusses probable Japanese strategy; mentions IRONCLAD and convoys to Murmansk; reports increased British bombing of Germany and German-held cities.

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R-130, Apr. 2. Answers C-61 in the affirmative but also proposes using HMS Furious for the job of ferrying planes to Malta, rather than a U.S. carrier. C—63, Apr. 2. Expresses pleasure at the planned visit of Hopkins and Marshall; suggests Admiral King should also come. R—131, Apr. 3. Refuses to label the invasion of Madagascar a joint AngloAmerican expedition lest it cause a break with the Vichy government. R—131/1, Apr. 3. Emphasizes the need of a second front to take pressure off the Russians. C—64, Apr. 4. Acquiesces to Roosevelt's refusal to make IRONCLAD a joint venture. C—65, Apr. 7. Reports the presence of a major Japanese fleet in the Indian Ocean and requests diversionary action by the U.S. fleet in the Pacific. C—66, Apr. 7. Revises estimates of Japanese naval strength in the Indian Ocean; reports the loss of two British cruisers. C—67, Apr. 11. Forwards a message from Stafford Cripps reporting the failure of his negotiations with the Congress Party in India; informs Roosevelt that Cripps has been called back to England. R—132, Apr. 11. Requests Churchill to postpone the departure of Cripps from India; asserts that U.S. public opinion would strongly oppose any break in the negotiations. C—68/A, not sent; Apr. 12. Rejects Roosevelt's arguments on Indian independence and offers to resign if that is best for Anglo-American relations. C—68, Apr. 12. Informs Roosevelt that the British military and Churchill agree in principle on future operations in western Europe; defends the Cripps mission to India and says he will consider message R— 132 private rather than official. R—133, Apr. 14. Explains the ways in which the United States can reinforce British forces in India. C-68/1, Apr. 14. A message from Hopkins reflecting British recommendations that the United States refrain from sending merchant ships into the Atlantic until a new convoying scheme becomes effective. C—69, Apr. 15. Repeats request for American naval and air assistance in the Indian Ocean area; mentions lack of Anglo-American naval cooperation. R—134/A, not sent; Apr. 16. Bluntly urges Churchill to accept the proposals set forth in message R—133.

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R-134, Apr. 16. Recommends the measures set forth in R-133; indicates that the United States opposes any mixed fleet in the Indian Ocean and that Roosevelt does not expect any major battles there in the near future. R—135, Apr. 16. Agrees to the suggestions in C-68/1 concerning keeping U.S. shipping in port until coastal convoys can be established. R-135/1, Apr. 16. Forwards a report of negotiations between Japanese and Burmese leaders. R—136, Apr. 17. Notifies Churchill that Roosevelt has agreed with a proposal by Mackenzie King for a conference at Ottawa regarding joint training of pilots. C-70, Apr. 17. Reports a favorable British reaction to the American proposals for a cross-channel invasion; mentions problems in the Indian Ocean; agrees that Stalin be asked to send representatives to discuss the new plans (R-119). R—136/1, Apr. 17. (Sent to Hopkins.) Instructs Hopkins to discuss Laval's return to power in Vichy; mentions apparent withdrawal of Japanese ships from the Indian Ocean; raises possibility of reconsidering GYMNAST. C-71, Apr. 18. Discusses naval and air reinforcements for the Indian Ocean area; mentions complaints from Chiang Kai-shek. C—72, Apr. 18. Forwards a note by Air Marshal Portal regarding U.S. plans for reinforcing the India theater. C-73, Apr. 20. Proposes the establishment of a single combined agency to deal with supply matters. C—74, Apr. 20. Suggests that the United States offer support to Petain and Darlan if they will move the French fleet to North Africa. R-137, Apr. 21. Provides additional information about the number and types of aircraft being sent to India. R—138, Apr. 21. Suggests waiting before taking any action following Laval's return to power in Vichy France. R—139, Apr. 21. Expresses pleasure at Anglo-American agreement over plans for a cross-channel attack; mentions air raid on Tokyo and the forthcoming visit of Molotov. C—75, Apr. 24. Asks if Laval's return in France has changed Roosevelt's refusal publicly to associate the United States with Operation IRONCLAD. C—76, Apr. 24. Asks for the use of the Wasp for another ferrying mission to Malta; mentions Atlantic fleet dispositions.

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C—77, Apr. 24. Forwards a memo from the British Defence Committee regarding the use of the British fleet to support Malta, IRONCLAD, and Indian Ocean operations. R—140, Apr. 24. Agrees to permit Wasp to ferry planes to Malta; acknowledges receipt of C-77. C—78, Apr. 24. Informs Roosevelt that Molotov is scheduled to come to London before visiting the United States. C-79, Apr. 25. Acknowledges receipt of R-140. R—140/1, Apr. 24. From Hopkins to Churchill; expresses concern over the accumulation of supplies scheduled for transshipment to Russia. C-79/1, Apr. 26. Answers Hopkins' questions (R-140/1); notes that Britain has asked Russia for increased protection of convoys. R—141, Apr. 26. Expresses strong concern over the curtailment of large supply convoys to-northern Russia; indicates worry over the Soviet reaction. C—80, Apr. 28. Explains plans for future convoys to northern Russia. C—81, Apr. 28. Requests that America publicly support and participate in the invasion of Madagascar (IRONCLAD). R—142, Apr. 28. Forwards the text of a public statement regarding Allied occupation of any territory controlled by the Vichy French government; agrees to warn Vichy of American support for IRONCLAD. C—82, Apr. 29. Mentions the escape of General Giraud; mentions attempts to sink Tirpitz and German retaliation; asks if a request from Curtin for additional forces and supplies, forwarded as a request from MacArthur, had been approved in Washington. R—143, Apr. 29. Asks Churchill to accept American proposals designed to accelerate the size and number of convoys to northern Russia. R—144, Apr. 30. Informs Churchill that Curtin's requests for reinforcement were made after conversations with MacArthur but were not approved by the chain of command; Roosevelt agrees with the British demurral and states MacArthur will make all requests via the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. C—83, May 1. Acknowledges receipt of R-143. C—84, May 1. Passes on the time schedule and substance of an appeal to the Governor of Madagascar relative to IRONCLAD. C—85, May 1. Indicates that American proposals for convoys to northern Russia are unworkable because of a lack of escort vessels and warships.

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R—145, May 2. Acquiesces to Churchill on the matter of convoys to Russia; states that the Russians will be told the reductions are needed in order to prepare for the invasion of France (BOLERO). C—86, May 7. Expresses pleasure at news of the Battle of the Coral Sea. R—145/1, May 7. A memo forwarding an envelope postmarked on the USS Augusta during the Atlantic Conference. C—87, May 12. Asks for an increased allotment out of American aircraft production, particularly fighters and transports, the latter for airborne forces; suggests joint training of airborne forces in England. R—146, May 16. States that U.S. requirements make it impossible to provide additional fighter aircraft; passes on the schedule for delivery of transport planes; agrees to joint training for airborne forces. R—147, May 19. Abrogates the Arnold-Portal agreement regarding the allocation of American aircraft, indicating a desire to build up American air forces and have a greater use of American air crews on American planes; suggests discussions in London to work out new policy on aircraft allocation. C—88, May 20. Expresses grave concern that American emphasis on using American air crews will limit the effectiveness of present air power. R—147/1, not sent; May 22. Encourages the British to allot six of their aircraft to the Polish High Command in London. R—148, May 26. Asks that Mountbatten visit Washington; mentions forthcoming luncheon with the Duke and Duchess of Windsor and the visit of Lyttelton. C—89, May 27. Mentions the successful negotiations with Molotov regarding an Anglo-Russian alliance; comments on talks with Arnold and Towers concerning aircraft allocations; requests that the USS Washington remain in the Atlantic; thanks Roosevelt for allocating seventy tankers to Britain. C—90, May 27. Forwards a collection of Churchill's books for Roosevelt's personal library. R—149, May 27. Asks Churchill for a summary of his talks with Molotov as they related to BOLERO. R—150, May 27. Proposes inviting Smuts and Curtin to Washington and asks Churchill for his reaction. R-151, May 28. Adds to R-150 that Curtin would not be invited until after Evatt returns to Australia. C—91, May 28. Expresses pleasure at the cordial talks with Molotov; mentions problems of any major invasion in 1942 and suggests an invasion in Norway; mentions convoy to Russia; expresses pleasure that the battle in Libya has begun.

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C—92, May 28. Forwards a report on the Churchill-Molotov talks regarding the second front; indicates very strong British reservations about any cross-channel invasion in 1942. C-93, May 28. Approves Roosevelt's suggestion of talks with Smuts and Curtin (R-150). C-94, May 28. Agrees with R-151. C—95, May 30. Comments on Evatt's visit to England. C—95/1, May 31. (Sent to Hopkins.) Expresses concern over rumors that Pandit Nehru will be invited to the United States and that Louis Johnson will return to India. R—151/1, June 1. (From Hopkins.) States that Nehru will not be invited to the United States and that Johnson is not returning to India. R-152, May 31. Thanks Churchill for the books (C-90); mentions the invitation to Smuts and Curtin; claims that Molotov's visit was a real success; expresses concern over Russian morale and military strength; strongly pushes for an invasion of western Europe in 1942. C—96, June 1. Doubts that the Allies can invade western Europe in 1942; mentions the beginning of a battle in Libya and a mass air attack on Cologne. C—97, June 2. Thanks Roosevelt for leaving the USS Washington in the eastern Atlantic. C—98, June 3. Thanks Roosevelt for the souvenir envelope (R-145/1). C—99, June 4. Compliments Ambassador Winant for his role in helping negotiate the Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance. R—153, June 5. Reports Molotov's departure from Washington. R—154, June 6. Asks Churchill if he approves the concept of a Combined Production and Resources Board as worked out by Nelson and Lyttelton. R—155, June 6. Reports minor changes in the joint protocol of supplies given to Molotov; expresses concern over the situation on the Russian front; mentions the Battle of Midway. C—100, June 7. Approves the proposed Combined Production and Resources Board. R-156, June 10. Agrees to a visit to Washington by Churchill. R—157, June 12. Endorses the new Slessor-Arnold agreement regarding the allocation of American aircraft. C—101, June 13. Provides information on Churchill's plans to visit the United States; congratulates Roosevelt on the victory at Midway Island.

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C—102, June 13. Indicates concern regarding Slessor-Arnold agreement. R—158, June 13. Suggests that Churchill come to Hyde Park; thanks him for the set of books. C—102/1, June 14. A letter informing Roosevelt that the Bundles-forBritain will have to be cut back because of a shortage of shipping. R—159, June 16. Asks Churchill to bring Air Chief Marshal Portal with him to Washington. C-102/2, June 17. Informs Roosevelt of expected arrival time in the United States; says Portal is unable to come. C—102/3, June 20. Argues against any cross-channel invasion in 1942 and suggests an invasion of North Africa as an alternative. C—103, June 27. Passes on General Auchinleck's thanks for additional American artillery and tanks. R—160, July 2. Congratulates Churchill on the defeat of a motion of censure in Parliament. C—104, July 2. Agrees to the American proposal to offer the French squadron interned at Alexandria the opportunity to accept transfer to the Western Hemisphere under U.S. custody. C-105, July 4. Requests the diversion of forty light bombers enroute to Russia to British forces in Egypt. C-106, July 6. Proposes more precise meanings for various codewords. R-161, July 7. Passes on news of Stalin's agreement to the diversion of the forty A-20 bombers. C—107, July 8. States that the British military cannot recommend SLEDGEHAMMER as practical in 1942 and claims the attempt would delay a major cross-channel invasion; recommends GYMNAST as the best alternative for 1942. R—162, July 8. Recommends they propose that the French warships interned at Alexandria be given safe passage to Martinique and reinterned there. R—163, July 8. Agrees with Churchill's suggestions (C-106) for precise definitions of BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP. C—108, July 8. Proposes General Marshall as commander for BOLERO. C—109, July 8. Expresses the hope that the appointment of a U.S. commander for BOLERO will not jeopardize more current operations such as GYMNAST. R—164, July 9. Asks that various escort/anti-submarine ships built or building in Canada be temporarily assigned for use by the United States. C-110, July 9. Thanks Roosevelt for arranging the transfer of Russiabound planes to the Middle East.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

C—111, July 9. Agrees with and offers minor additions to Roosevelt's proposal for interning French warships in Martinique. R—164/1, July 9. Memo expressing Roosevelt's personal feelings about having to cut back on the Bundles-for-Britain program; offers to send Churchill a martini. R-164/2, July 9. A formal letter thanking Churchill for his letter [C-102/ 1] concerning the Bundles-for-Britain program. R—165, July 12. States that messages C-108 and C-109 have not been received. C-112, July 13. Explains that C-108 and C-109 had been sent via the British Embassy. C—113, July 14. Reports heavy losses suffered by convoy P.Q. 17 to northern Russia; suggests that convoys temporarily be discontinued and reports that a proposed message to Stalin will follow. C-114, July 14. Strongly reiterates opposition to SLEDGEHAMMER and support for JUPITER and GYMNAST. C—115, July 14. Forwards a proposed message to Stalin which explains why the convoys to northern Russia had to be suspended. R—166, July 15. Agrees to the cancellation of the next scheduled convoy to Russia; suggests American railway personnel take over operation of the rail line in Persia. R—167, July 15. Informs Churchill that Marshall, King, and Hopkins are leaving at once for London. R-167/1, July ? A letter of introduction for William C. Bullitt. C—116, July 15. Reports the impending departure of a heavily guarded convoy to Malta which, if successful, could indicate the best way to protect future convoys to Russia. C—117, July 16. Suggests that Hopkins, Marshall, and King spend the weekend at Chequers. R—168, July 16. Requests that Hopkins, Marshall, and King go directly to London. C—118, July 16. Reports delay in sending an agreed-upon message to Stalin (C-115) in hopes of making it more optimistic. C—119, July 16. Accepts suggestion to bring the American Mission directly to London. C—120, July 17. Forwards changes made in the final version of the telegram about convoys to northern Russia sent to Stalin. The new version is more optimistic about resumption of convoys and proposes discussions between Russian and British military officials on how to do that.

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C—121, July 21. Proposes a common pool of newly built escort vessels. R—169, July 24. Agrees with Churchill's suggestion of a pool, providing that ships are in constant use and not held in reserve. R—169/1, July 24. A letter forwarding photographs of Churchill taken in Washington in June 1942. R—169/2, July 25. (Sent via Hopkins.) Reports rumors in Madrid of peace feelers between Britain and Germany and between the United States and Germany. C—122, July 26. Agrees that any pool of escort vessels refers only to ships not yet ready for service. C-123, July 27. Reports the agreement between British and American military conferees on questions of long-term grand strategy in Europe; an invasion of North Africa (TORCH) was agreed upon, although preparations for SLEDGEHAMMER-BOLEROROUNDUP were to continue. R—170, July 27. Reports the return of Hopkins, King, and Marshall and indicates Roosevelt's pleasure with the results of the conferences. C—124, July 29. Reports Stalin's angry response to the suspension of convoys as well as Britain's apparent unwillingness to open a second front in Europe in 1942; suggests a vague but non-argumentative reply to Stalin. R—171, July 29. Proposes telling Stalin more details of Anglo-American plans for future grand strategy; strongly endorses the plan for sending Anglo-American air forces to fight on the southern Russian front. R—172, July 29. Forwards a message from Chiang Kai-shek which asks that Roosevelt intercede with the British to obtain promises of independence for India; asks for Churchill's comments. C—125, July 30. Disagrees with Chiang Kai-shek's interpretation of the problems in India and asks Roovevelt not to press Britain about Indian independence. C—125A, July 31. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill has told Stalin of a resumption of convoys to northern Russia in September and has suggested a meeting with Stalin; tells Roosevelt he is leaving for Cairo. C—125A/1, July 31. Suggests Marshall be appointed Supreme Commander of ROUNDUP with Eisenhower as his deputy. C—126, Aug. 1. Endorses recommendations of the Combined Shipping Boards. C—126A, Aug. 4. Asks Roosevelt to let Harriman accompany Churchill to Moscow.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

R—173, Aug. 5. Agrees to send Harriman to Moscow. C—126A/1, Aug. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for sending Harriman to Moscow. R—174, Aug. 6. Agrees with the British proposal to appoint General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief for TORCH. C—127, Aug. 8. Recommends advancing the date for TORCH; explains the reorganization of the Middle East Command. R—175/A, not sent; Aug. 7. A draft message setting the date for TORCH as November 7, 1942. R—175, Aug. 8. Suggests advancing the date for TORCH by three weeks. R—176, Aug. 9. Informs Churchill that Chiang Kai-shek has been told that the United States will not do anything to undermine the authority of British officials in India. C—128, Aug. 9. Asks to see any message Roosevelt might publish on the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter because of OWI forecasts that such a message would criticize colonialism. C—128/1, Aug. 10. Thanks Roosevelt for not backing Chiang's protest regarding India. R—177, Aug. 11. Passes the text of a protest from Chiang Kai-shek about the arrest of leading Indian nationalists by the British. R—178, Aug. 13. Forwards the text of Roosevelt's press release on the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter. C—129, Aug. 13. Reports on the talks between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow. C—130, Aug. 14. Strongly protests Chiang Kai-shek's interference in the domestic situation within India. R—179, Aug. 14. Expresses pleasure at Stalin's cordiality and understanding; indicates Roosevelt's desire to meet with Churchill and Stalin. C—131, Aug. 15. Reports on the talks between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow; includes an aide-memoir from Stalin protesting the failure to establish a second front in Europe during 1942 plus Churchill's formal reply to that protest. C—132, Aug. 16. Indicates satisfaction with Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter statement (R-178); suggests that Roosevelt send a message to Stalin designed to console the Russians over the decision not to have a second front in 1942. C—133, Aug. 17. Reports on the final formal dinner meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow. C—134, Aug. 18. Reports on an informal meeting with Stalin shortly before leaving Moscow; indicates strong optimism about Soviet relations with the Allies.

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R-179/1, Aug. 21. A letter of introduction for Daniel Tobin. C—135, Aug. 22. Agrees to Roosevelt's suggestion that U.S. personnel operate the Trans-Persian Railway (R-166). C—136, Aug. 26. Suggests that a firm date for TORCH be set; discusses the likely political effects on Spain, Vichy France, and French North Africa. C—137, Aug. 26. Thanks Roosevelt for sending pictures of Churchill in Washington (R-169/1). C—138, Aug. 26. Acknowledges receipt of the revised American proposals for TORCH. C—139, Aug. 27. Argues strongly against the American proposal to limit the scope of TORCH to assaults on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. C—140, Aug. 30. Proposes a method of establishing an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus (Operation VELVET). R— 180/A, not sent; Aug. 29. General Marshall's draft of a message objecting to any landing in North Africa east of Gibraltar. R—180, Aug. 30. Proposes that TORCH consist of American landings at Oran and Casablanca followed a few days later by a British landing at Algiers; argues that there is a shortage of shipping and that the French would oppose the British but not the Americans. R—181, Aug. 30. Acknowledges receipt of C-140 and promises quick response; supports Operation VELVET. C—141, Aug. 31. Informs Roosevelt that Rommel has begun his expected attack in North Africa. C-142, Sept. 1. Argues strongly for simultaneous landings at Oran, Casablanca, and Algiers as part of TORCH; agrees that the entire operation should be distinctly American. R—182, Sept. 2. Agrees to a landing at Algiers as well as on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; emphasizes that the United States will control relations with French civil and military authorities in North Africa. C—143, Sept. 3. Requests that assault troops be transferred from the Casablanca landing to strengthen the one at Algiers; expresses a desire for haste since the Free French suspect such an attack and might leak the information. R—183, Sept. 4. Agrees to transfer some troops from the Casablanca assault to the one at Algiers. R—184, Sept. 4. Forwards a list of U.S. naval vessels available for TORCH. C—144, Sept. 5. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposals for the allocation of troops for TORCH; states that Admiral Ramsay will come to Washington to coordinate naval details.

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R—185, Sept. 5. Congratulations on the agreement over TORCH. C—145, Sept. 6. Returns the congratulations. C—146, Sept. 6. Informs Roosevelt that the tanks and artillery promised in July have arrived in the Middle East. C—147, Sept. 12. Additional information about the arrival and use of American tanks and artillery in Egypt. C—148, Sept. 14. Requests final U.S. plan for the takeover of the TransPersian Railway; mentions VELVET and the problems of further recruitment in Russia of Polish officers and men for Polish divisions fighting with the British; discusses TORCH and the need to keep de Gaulle from getting involved; reports bad news about the P.Q. 18 convoy to northern Russia. C-149, Sept. 15. Gives the projected date for TORCH. R—186, Sept. 15. Promises delivery of plans for the U.S. takeover of the Trans-Persian Railway and Operation VELVET. C—150, Sept. 16. Discusses the use of U.S. B-17 bombers and the effective bombing offensive by the British Bomber Command; requests that Roosevelt do whatever possible to increase U.S. production of bombers; mentions the U.S. campaign in the Solomon Islands. R—186/1, not sent; Sept. 16. Discusses TORCH; agrees that de Gaulle should be kept out of the operation; proposes a radio statement by Roosevelt just prior to the landing in North Africa; passes on tentative proposal for an Allied air force in the Caucasus (VELVET). C-R/tel.-3, Sept. 18/19. A telephone call from Churchill to Roosevelt on the occasion of Elliott Roosevelt's birthday. C—151, Sept. 22. Discusses the overall problem of Allied relations with the Soviet Union following the cancellation of P.Q. 19 until January 1943; suggests an invasion of northern Norway (JUPITER); notes that, in discussions with Eisenhower, everyone assumed that a crosschannel invasion would not be possible until 1944 and feared effect of that announcement on Stalin. C-152, Sept. 22. Gives the date for TORCH as November 8, 1942. C—153, Sept. 22. Gives the codename for the British offensive in Egypt: Operation LIGHTFOOT. C—154, Sept. 22. Forwards the suggested text of a message to Stalin explaining the reasons for cutting back convoys to northern Russia and suggesting JUPITER. R—186/2, not sent; Sept. 24. A draft proposed by Hopkins suggesting that the air force to be established in the Caucasus (VELVET) be composed solely of British units with U.S. replacements going to the Middle East.

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R-186/3, not sent; Sept. ? A draft answer to C-151 proposed by General Marshall and Admiral King; strongly opposes JUPITER and similar drains on BOLERO; asserts that sending small amounts of aid to Russia just to boost morale is unnecessary. R-187, Sept. 26. Requests Churchill to delay cabling Stalin about the postponement of P.Q. 19 until that decision is final. C—155, Sept. 28. Agrees to R-187; mentions VELVET and operations in Madagascar. R—188, Oct. 2. Informs Churchill of his return to Washington. C—156, Oct. 4. Expresses concern over the failure of the combined Production and Resources Board to solve certain planning problems. Indicates particular concern over production goals for tanks and ammunition which are too high and which would limit AngloAmerican production of ships and aircraft. R-189, Oct. 5. Opposes Churchill's suggestion to tell Stalin that the next convoy, P.Q. 19, will not sail; indicates deep concern about Russian morale; suggests specific changes to Churchill's proposed message to Stalin (C-154). C—157, Oct. 6. Forwards a cable from Stalin and argues that they should meet Stalin's requests. C—158, Oct. 6. The text of the Stalin-to-Churchill cable mentioned in C— 157; Stalin requests additional supplies, particularly modern fighter planes, in view of the German advances toward Stalingrad. R—190, Oct. 6. Requests that the Chicago Tribune be denied a license to publish a daily newspaper for American troops in England; proposes the printing of a daily newspaper published by the American government. R—191, Oct. 6. Informs Churchill that the United States will send a heavy bomber group to the Caucasus for the joint air force (VELVET). C—159, Oct. 7. Rejects the American proposal for a modified form of convoys to northern Russia and forwards a note from the Admiralty explaining his reasons; argues that VELVET has to await the outcome of the battle in Egypt; states that he doubts the Russians are threatening a separate peace. C—160, Oct. 7. The text of Churchill's proposed message to Stalin: indicates that aid to the Soviet Union will have to await the outcome of the battle in Egypt and the invasion of North Africa; that Britain will send additional fighter aircraft as soon as possible; and that no more large convoys can sail to northern Russia until escort vessels become available early in 1943.

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R-192, Oct. 7. Agrees to Churchill's proposal for a drastic curtailment of convoys to northern Russia; suggests minor changes to Churchill's message to Stalin. C—161, Oct. 7. Agrees that the Chicago Tribune should not be granted a license to publish a paper for American troops in England; promises assistance in the establishment of a daily paper for American troops published by the Army. C-162, Oct. 7. States that three telegrams about ASPIDISTRA will follow; asks if Roosevelt will prepare recordings as propaganda to be used with the North African invasion. C—163, Oct. 7. Explains the capabilities and proposed use of the ASPIDISTRA radio transmitter in England. C—164, Oct. 7. Gives the technical requirements for recordings to be used on ASPIDISTRA. C—165, Oct. 8. Requests six radio tubes as spares for ASPIDISTRA. C—166, Oct. 8. Informs Roosevelt that the message to Stalin included all of the President's suggested changes. C—167, Oct. 8. Forwards the text of Churchill's message to Stalin regarding the postponement of the large convoys to northern Russia and additional British aid. R—193, Oct. 8. Transmits a copy of Roosevelt's message to Stalin promising additional American aid to Russia. R—194, Oct. 9. Agrees to Churchill's proposal that the President record a statement to be broadcast at the time of the invasion of North Africa. R-195, Oct. 12. Replies to C-156 noting that production programs for tanks, ammunition, etc. will be periodically re-examined in the light of wartime developments; suggests that the Combined Production and Resources Board should simply respond to requirements set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C—168, Oct. 18. Indicates concern over the supply of 100-octane fuel and asks Roosevelt to increase production capacity. R—196, Oct. 19. Promises to monitor carefully the supply of 100-octane fuel. R—196/1, Oct. 19. A letter sent via Eleanor Roosevelt; expresses concern over the Guadalcanal campaign; complains about newspaper owners. C-169, Oct. 21. Suggests that four U.S. destroyers take part in TORCH operations inside the Mediterranean in hopes of guaranteeing neutrality on the part of the French fleet.

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R-197, Oct. 23. Rejects as impractical Churchill's proposal to transfer U.S. destroyers to the Mediterranean for TORCH. C—170, Oct. 24. Informs Roosevelt that the British attack in Egypt has begun. C—171, Oct. 24. Reports the safe arrival in London of Mrs. Roosevelt; mentions the proposed visit of Smuts to the United States. C—172, Oct. 24. Expresses concern over Stalin's failure to reply to earlier messages regarding the cutoff of convoys and the establishment of an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus. R—198, Oct. 24. Summarizes the new production goals set for escort ships, merchant vessels, and aircraft; mentions Guadalcanal. C-173, Oct. 25. Recommends that Roosevelt meet with Swedish Secretary General Erik Boheman during the latter's visit to the United States. C—174, Oct. 26. Disagrees with Roosevelt's suggestion that no mention be made of British participation in TORCH in the messages being sent to the Spanish and Portuguese governments. R—199, Oct. 26. Forwards the draft of a press release to be given to American reporters immediately following the invasion of North Africa. R—200, Oct. 26. Agrees with Churchill's argument that British participation in TORCH should be mentioned to the Spanish and Portuguese. R—201, Oct. 26. Agrees to meet with Swedish diplomat Erik Boheman. C—175, Oct. 27. Reports on Mrs. Roosevelt's activities in England. R—202, Oct. 27. Discounts the significance of Stalin's failure to respond to recent cables; insists that Anglo-American commitments to the Soviet Union must be fulfilled. R—203, Oct. 28. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's response to a complaint by Australian Prime Minister Curtin about the lack of forces needed to defend Australia; Roosevelt promises additional U.S. forces will be dispatched to the southwestern Pacific and hopes the Ninth Australian Division will stay in the Middle East. C-176, Oct. 29. Thanks Roosevelt for his message to Curtin (R-203). C—177, Oct. 30. Informs Roosevelt that the planned winter operation behind German lines in Roumania and Norway and Italy (PLOUGH) is not possible in 1942—43, but suggests that the special vehicles be developed anyway. C—178, Oct. 30. Agrees to the President's suggested press release to accompany TORCH; proposes two minor amendments.

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C—179, Oct. 31. Forwards a report from General Montgomery about the high performance of American tanks and guns in the battle in Egypt. R—204, Oct. 31. Agrees to the amendments suggested for the U.S. press release announcing TORCH. C—180, Oct. 31. Agrees to emphasize the American nature of TORCH to the Spanish and Portuguese governments. C—180/1, Oct. 31. A letter which outlines the crisis caused by U-boat sinkings of British merchant ships; requests a larger share of U.S. ship construction; forwards a memo about plans for the disposition of British Army forces during 1943 (printed as an attachment); mentions other supply and production questions. C—181, Nov. 1. Reports on Eleanor Roosevelt's trip to the United Kingdom; indicates that General Smuts might be willing to visit the United States; mentions the battle in Egypt. R—205, Nov. 2. Thanks Churchill for assisting Eleanor Roosevelt during her visit to the United Kingdom; reports that a quick decision regarding TORCH had been made without consulting Churchill. C—182, Nov. 2. Mentions military successes in Egypt; requests Roosevelt to rewrite his proposed message to P£tain to avoid antagonizing de Gaulle and others; reports that General Giraud will be picked up and taken by submarine to Gibraltar. C—183, Nov. 3. Reports a probably decisive victory in Egypt; congratulates Roosevelt on the good news from the southwestern Pacific. R—206, Nov. 4. Agrees to tone down the message to Petain to be sent at the time of the TORCH invasion. C—184, Nov. 4. Passes a report from General Alexander about the victory against Rommel's forces in Egypt. C-185, Nov. 5. Indicates that de Gaulle will be told about TORCH one day before the invasion; Churchill will, as a consolation, permit de Gaulle to announce the appointment of a Gaullist as Governor General of Madagascar. R-207, Nov. 5. Requests that de Gaulle not be told of the TORCH operation until after it begins. C—186, Nov. 6. Requests Roosevelt to reconsider and permit the use of a leaflet mentioning the employment of British troops in the invasion of North Africa; regretfully accepts Roosevelt's view that de Gaulle should not be brought into the TORCH operation. R—208, Nov. 6. Opposes Churchill's request for the release of a leaflet mentioning the joint nature of the TORCH operation. C—187, Nov. 6. Passes on a report from the Egypt/Libya front concerning the size of German losses.

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R—209, Nov. 7. Forwards a report from the American Ambassador in Spain about a conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs during which the Spanish cautioned against any invasion of any portion of Morocco and the Americans warned Spain not to assist the Germans. C—188, Nov. 11. Appeals for an Anglo-American policy designed to unify the various anti-German French forces. R-210, Nov. 11. Indicates that the next step after TORCH should be toward Sicily, Sardinia, Italy, and Greece, and calls for a conference of military planners to work it out; agrees on the need to unify the French, but wants to know de Gaulle's intentions. C—189, Nov. 13. Strongly endorses Roosevelt's suggestion about operations in the Mediterranean area; agrees that efforts should be made to bring Turkey into the war; mentions the victory in Libya and the U-boat problem in the Atlantic. C—189/1, Nov. 13. Forwards the text of two "friendly messages" to Churchill from Stalin and the text of Churchill's reply; the messages indicate the Soviet need for immediate dispatch of Anglo-American air forces to the Caucasus. R—211, Nov. 14. Suggests that once Anglo-American discussions about future operations in the Mediterranean are completed, an AngloAmerican group should go to Moscow to talk to the Russians, since those operations will bring the Allies close to the Black Sea and the Soviet Union. C—190, Nov. 15. Supports Eisenhower's decision to make a deal with Darlan in French North Africa, though he expresses serious doubts. R—211/1, not sent; Nov. 16. A draft of an unsent message to Churchill which includes a copy of an unsent message to Eisenhower in which Roosevelt warns Eisenhower not to trust Darlan. C—191, Nov. 15. Agrees with Roosevelt's proposal to consult the Russians about future operations in the eastern Mediterranean. C—192, Nov. 17. Congratulates the Americans on the naval victory in the Battle of Guadalcanal. R—212, Nov. 17. Informs Churchill of Mrs. Roosevelt's arrival in Washington and thanks the Prime Minister and his wife for their courtesies to her. C—193, Nov. 17. Expresses concern over the public opposition to the Darlan deal; hopes that it is merely a temporary expedient. R-213, Nov. 17. Agrees that severe opposition to Darlan exists; forwards a copy of a press release explaining the deal. R—214, Nov. 17. A copy of a press release explaining why the Darlan deal was expedient and that the arrangement is only temporary.

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C—194, Nov. 17. Forwards a copy of a note sent by Churchill to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding military strategy in the Mediterranean; thanks Roosevelt for the statement about Darlan. C—195, Nov. 18. A lengthy summary of Churchill's plans for future Allied operations in the Mediterranean area—the "under-belly of the Axis"; places particular emphasis on bringing Turkey into the war. C—196, Nov. 18. Suggests sending a convoy to northern Russia in late December provided the United States can supply twelve additional escort destroyers. C—197, Nov. 18. Forwards the text of a message from Stalin which congratulates the Allies on actions in North Africa and reports that the Soviet Union will soon begin a winter offensive. C—198, Nov. 18. Requests permission for Cadogan to attend a conference being held by Eisenhower at Gibraltar. R—215, Nov. 18. Has no objections to Cadogan's attending the Gibraltar conference, but cautions that no political matters should be discussed. C—199, Nov. 18. Agrees that no decisions should be taken on political matters at the Gibraltar talks. R—216, Nov. 18. Notes the improved tone of Stalin's last message and hopes that will continue. C—200, Nov. 18. Claims that Roosevelt's public statement about the Darlan deal has settled the matter; agrees that the military situation should take priority. R—217, Nov. 19. Informs Churchill that the Combined Chiefs in Washington are studying his recommendations regarding future operations in the Mediterranean and lists the various assumptions being made in such discussions. R—218, Nov. 19. Explains why it is impossible for the United States to provide additional escort vessels needed for the resumption of convoys to northern Russia. C—201, Nov. 19. Informs Roosevelt that Cadogan will not go to Gibraltar. R—219, Nov. 19. Suggests appointing a British and an American political representative to supervise civil affairs in French North Africa; notes that Eisenhower has been instructed to make sure all political prisoners in the area are released. R—220, Nov. 19. Discusses a request from Australian Prime Minister Curtin for the immediate return to Australia of their Ninth Division. R—221, Nov. 19. Forwards a copy of the actual request sent by Prime Minister Curtin of Australia.

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C—202, Nov. 20. Requests thirty Liberator (B-24) aircraft with newly developed radar for use in anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic. C—203, Nov. 20. Forwards a summary by Field Marshal Smuts of the political/military situation in North Africa; Smuts suggests that additional anti-Darlan statements would be unwise. C—204, Nov. 21. Concurs with Roosevelt's instructions to Eisenhower to avoid anything beyond a military agreement with Darlan. C-205, Nov. 22. Reports that de Gaulle had not been permitted to broadcast an attack on Allied cooperation with the Vichy regime in North Africa. C-206, Nov. 22. Forwards the text of the broadcast de Gaulle had asked to deliver. C—207, Nov. 23. Asks Roosevelt to delay answering the Australian request for the withdrawal of Australian troops from the Middle East; expresses concern over shipping problems and the effect on New Zealand of the Australian request. R-221/1, Nov. 23. A letter which reports that Lyttelton's visit has been successful. C—208, Nov. 24. Indicates that, although Britain opposes the withdrawal of Australian and New Zealand troops from the Middle East, the requests cannot be refused; states that the United States should feel free to express an opinion. C-209, Nov. 24. Contains the text of Churchill's messages to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia expressing the British government's regret at having to return Australian and New Zealand troops from the Middle East. C—210, Nov. 24. Contains a copy of the New Zealand request for the return of its troops from the Middle East. C—211, Nov. 24. Protests an apparent American decision to abandon ROUNDUP; emphasizes the bad effect such a move would have on the Soviet Union. C-212, Nov. 24. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposal (R-219) to appoint political representatives to assist Eisenhower in North Africa; cautions that such representatives should not be accredited to Darlan's government. C-213, Nov. 25. Informs Roosevelt that Major General Smith has explained that the United States has not abandoned ROUNDUP. R-222, Nov. 25. Assures Churchill that the United States does not intend to abandon ROUNDUP; explains that delays in BOLERO are necessitated by TORCH and operations in the southwestern Pacific; mentions that Lyttelton will take letters for Churchill to England.

lxxii

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

C—214, Nov. 26. Suggests that a tripartite staff meeting in Moscow would not be productive since the Russians would only ask about a second front in Europe for 1943; proposes instead a Churchill-RooseveltStalin meeting in Iceland in January. R-222/1, Nov. 30. In a letter sent to England with Oliver Lyttelton, Roosevelt promises to provide most of the shipping requested by the Prime Minister (C-180/1); he also discusses providing additional bombers to England and the Soviet Union. R-223, Dec. 1. Reports that the vehicles for Operation PLOUGH will be ready on schedule and that training for the project is underway. C—215, Dec. 2. Notes that Australian Prime Minister Curtin has requested the return of supplies with the Australian Ninth Division, but those supplies had been intended for the Polish Corps. C—216, Dec. 2. Forwards the text of an exchange between Churchill and Stalin in which convoys to northern Russia, a possible Big Three meeting, and the entry of Turkey into the war are explored; Stalin continues to insist on a second front in Europe and Churchill suggests to Roosevelt that ROUNDUP should be re-examined for implementation in 1943. C—217, Dec. 2. Responds to an American request for carrier reinforcements in the Pacific by proposing to send two British carriers and to have the USS Ranger go to the British Home Fleet. R—224, Dec. 2. Agrees to a Big Three conference but prefers meeting in Africa; indicates reluctance to meet Churchill beforehand; expresses a desire to concentrate on military questions. C-218, Dec. 2. Acknowledges receipt of R-223. C—219, Dec. 3. Agrees to a Big Three conference in Africa but prefers an Anglo-American meeting prior to any talks with Stalin. R—225, Dec. 3. Asks Churchill to arrange for the Gaullists in French Equatorial Africa to release Vichy/Darlan supporters so that similar steps will be taken by the Governor General of French West Africa, Pierre Boisson; indicates particular concern about controlling the port of Dakar. C—220, Dec. 3. Forwards portions of telegrams exchanged by British officials in London and Moscow which indicate that Stalin no longer favors Operation VELVET but prefers instead that the Allies simply give the planes to Soviet forces; Churchill is willing to carry out VELVET only as originally conceived and proposes that they delay making any response. R—226, Dec. 5. Accepts the British offer to send the carrier Illustrious to the Pacific, but turns down the exchange of an American carrier to the Home Fleet and a second British carrier to the Pacific.

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C—221, Dec. 6. Substitutes the carrier Victorious for the Illustrious as the carrier going to the Pacific. C-222, Dec. 6. Asks Roosevelt to thank New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser for the decision to leave the New Zealand division in the Middle East. R—227, Dec. 6. Agrees to hold off any decision regarding Operation VELVET, but hopes that the project will be carried out primarily because of its political advantages. R—228, Dec. 6. Forwards a copy of the thank-you message sent to Prime Minister Fraser. C-223, Dec. 6. Agrees with Roosevelt's comments about VELVET. C—224, Dec. 7. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin indicating the Russian's unwillingness to meet in January because of intensive military activities; Stalin asks about the second front in Europe for 1943. C—224/1, Dec. 7. A general statement, intended for public release, about joint efforts in the Pacific; sent on the first anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. R—228/1, Dec. 7. Acknowledges C-224/1 and promises the destruction of Japan's aggressive power. C-225, Dec. 8. Suggests that Stalin be informed that VELVET will be carried out only as an Anglo-American operation as originally conceived. R—229, Dec. 8. Agrees that VELVET must be a joint Anglo-American air force, not merely an increased supply of planes to Russian forces. R—230, Dec. 8. Informs Churchill that a second message to Stalin will be sent in hopes of arranging a Big Three meeting; opposes any staff discussions in Moscow about the second front or other major operations for 1943; suggests military talks in Africa among lesser staffs of the three countries, with all decisions referred to the home governments. R—231, Dec. 8. Forwards the text of the message to Stalin about a meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Russian leader. C-226, Dec. 9. Requests permission to read R-214 (about Darlan) to a secret session of the House of Commons. R—232, Dec. 9. Grants permission for R-214 to be read to the House of Commons and adds language which indicates that there was no agreement to let Darlan take charge in French North Africa. C—227, Dec. 9. Indicates concern about the continued persecution of antiVichy elements by Darlan's administration in French North Africa; suggests that this shows the need for sending immediate political/ administrative assistance to Eisenhower.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

C—228, Dec. 10. Reports support from the House of Commons for the arrangement with Darlan; surmises that Stalin chose not to come to a meeting since a postponement of a second front in Europe seemed to be in the offing; suggests a meeting between British and American military leaders in London. R—233, Dec. 11. Reports passing C—227 to Eisenhower for his comments. C—229, Dec. 11. Indicates his intention to appoint Harold Macmillan as the British political representative in North Africa. C—230, Dec. 12. Opposes Anglo-American talks with the Russians unless all three heads of government are there since the Russians are interested only in the second front. C—231, Dec. 14. Thanks Roosevelt and Eisenhower for arranging the release of British internees in French West Africa. R—234, Dec. 14. Reports that a courier is bringing a letter about future plans. R—234/1, Dec. 14. A letter (delivered Dec. 23) which agrees to a ChurchillRoosevelt meeting in Northwest Africa and outlines a tentative schedule and itinerary; opposes bringing foreign-affairs personnel to that meeting; suggests early March if Stalin changes his mind and agrees to a meeting. R—235, Dec. 16. States that Robert Murphy will be appointed Minister and the President's personal representative on Eisenhower's staff. R—236, Dec. 16. Forwards Eisenhower's reply to accusations that Vichy sympathizers control the administration of North Africa; supports Eisenhower because of the military situation. C—232, Dec. 17. Indicates eagerness to see Roosevelt's letter (R-234/1) so joint planning can begin; thanks Roosevelt for the letter about the Lyttelton mission (R-222/1). R—237, Dec. 17. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin which indicates that Roosevelt is still willing to implement project VELVET. C—233, Dec. 17. Suggests procedures which would permit Britain to build up its dangerously low stocks of petroleum. C—234, Dec. 17. Forwards full details on tanker utilization in reference to C-233. R—238, Dec. 17. Forwards a message from Stalin explaining why the Russian cannot attend a tripartite meeting and again raising the question of a second front in Europe; also indicates Stalin's support for the deal with Darlan. C-235, Dec. 18. Points out that Stalin's reference to the second front only emphasizes the need for a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1942

lxxv

R—239, Dec. 18. Largely rejects Churchill's request for special procedures to build up United Kingdom petroleum stocks. R-240, Dec. 18. Reports that the courier carrying a letter (R-234/1) will arrive on December 20. C—236, Dec. 18. Proposes that Harold Macmillan be Agent General in North Africa and not be attached to Eisenhower's staff. C—237, Dec. 19. Opposes making any new commitments to Darlan in order to get Admiral R. E. Godfroy to permit the French squadron at Alexandria to join the Allies. R—241, Dec. 19. Prefers that Macmillan hold a title equivalent to that of Robert Murphy in North Africa, and be attached to Eisenhower's staff. R-242, Dec. 21. Forwards a summary of the long-delayed letter (R-234/ 1) agreeing to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in or near Casablanca. C—238, Dec. 21. Agrees to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting as soon as possible; suggests SYMBOL as the codename. R—243, Dec. 22. Proposes a program for the American and Swedish Red Cross to provide food and clothing for children in Norway. C—239, Dec. 23. Argues that because of differences in the two systems of government, the titles for Murphy and Macmillan in North Africa cannot be precisely the same; argues that Eisenhower should be relieved of the burden of political problems. C-240, Dec. 23. Acknowledges receipt of Roosevelt's letter (R-234/1) and endorses its suggestions regarding a conference at Casablanca. C-241, Dec. 25. Christmas greetings. R—244, Dec. 25. Christmas greetings. R—245, Dec. 26. Suggests that Macmillan's departure for North Africa be delayed until the confusion caused by the assassination of Darlan is cleared up; asks that de Gaulle's visit to the United States be delayed. R—246, Dec. 26. Forwards a copy of a message from Roosevelt to Eisenhower authorizing the provisional appointment of General Giraud to take charge of French civil and military authorities in North Africa. C—242, Dec. 27. Informs Roosevelt that de Gaulle's visit is being delayed for forty-eight hours; asserts that a unified French leadership is needed; asks that Macmillan's appointment be approved. C-243, Dec. 27. Forwards a copy of a message from de Gaulle to Giraud which proposes a meeting to discuss unification of French forces.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—244, Dec. 28. Reports a meeting with de Gaulle and d'Astier at which de Gaulle argued that Giraud is better suited to lead troops than to be a political leader. C—245, Dec. 29. Acknowledges receipt of a book from Roosevelt, a Christmas gift. C—246, Dec. 29. Proposes calling Macmillan Minister Resident at Allied headquarters instead of British representative or H.M. Government's representative; mentions that French Somaliland has formally joined the United Nations. R—247, Dec. 29. Agrees to the newly suggested title for Macmillan; emphasizes Eisenhower's authority. C—247, Dec. 30. Thanks Roosevelt for the agreements negotiated during the Lyttelton visit to Washington but warns that the shipping crisis is far from over; outlines the way in which British civilians will be utilized; comments on the need for more naval aircraft and transport planes. C—248, Dec. 30. Discusses arrangements for the Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL); agrees that Eisenhower has the ultimate authority in North Africa. R—248, Dec. 31. Agrees to Churchill's suggestions for SYMBOL and suggests dates. C—249, Dec. 31. A lengthy discussion of the political situation in North Africa in which Churchill suggests that, although the Allies are clearly in charge until the end of the war, local French authorities should shoulder the political burden, leaving Eisenhower to concentrate on the dangerous military situation in Tunisia; predicts that the British will take Tripoli by early February. C—249/1, Dec. 31. Forwards a copy of the instructions given to Macmillan before he left for North Africa. 1943 C—249/2, Jan. 1. Denies the accuracy of a reported conversation between Churchill and a foreign Ambassador. R—249, Jan. 1. Forwards a copy of a release U.S. censors will give the press just prior to Roosevelt's departure for Casablanca asking for a blackout on such news; asks Churchill to take similar measures to ensure secrecy. R—250, Jan. 1. Argues that French politics in North Africa are subordinate to winning the war; criticizes de Gaulle but agrees that Giraud should handle only military affairs.

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C—250, Jan. 1. Refuses a request that the Red Cross be allowed to send supplies to Norwegian children, but informs Roosevelt that a secret means of getting such supplies to children has been worked out. R—251, Jan. 2. Discusses more effective utilization of tankers in the North Atlantic so as to meet Britain's oil-supply needs. C—251, Jan. 2. Agrees on the need for secrecy regarding SYMBOL (Casablanca Conference) and proposes codenames and press restrictions; asks if de Gaulle should come to Washington before SYMBOL. C—252, Jan. 2. Gives Churchill's codename regarding SYMBOL. R—252, Jan. 2. Proposes codenames for Roosevelt and Hopkins and agrees to Churchill's suggestion to exclude the press; states that de Gaulle should not visit Washington until after SYMBOL. C—253, Jan. 3. Suggests different codenames for Roosevelt and Hopkins and proposes a code for Willkie if he should also come to Casablanca; agrees the time is not right for de Gaulle to visit Washington. R-253, Jan. 4. Asks Churchill to bring Averell Harriman to SYMBOL. C—254, Jan. 5. Agrees to bring Harriman to SYMBOL. R—254, Jan. 7. Forwards the substance of a message from Chiang Kaishek in which the Chinese leader complained of inadequate support for a planned offensive in Burma (Operation ANAKIM). C—255, Jan. 7. Proposes setting up Marrakesh as an alternative site for SYMBOL. R—255, Jan. 7. States that Churchill's suggestion about Marrakesh ( C 255) has been referred to Eisenhower. C—256, Jan. 8. Congratulates Roosevelt on his State of the Union speech. R—255/1, Jan. 8. A letter asking Churchill to consider allocating from British supplies the aircraft requested by Polish General Sikorski. C—257, Jan. 10. Agrees to the tanker-utilization proposals in R-251; notes that the shortage of escort vessels continues. C—258, Jan. 10. Explains why the British Eastern Fleet cannot support any amphibious operations in southern Burma during 1943; mentions that Operations CANNIBAL and RAVENOUS are all Britain can support. C—258/1, Jan. 16. A copy of a message from Churchill to the British War Cabinet summarizing military developments in Tunisia and emphasizing the need to exploit that victory with further operations in the Mediterranean area.

lxxviii

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—258—A, Jan. 27. Informs Roosevelt that Churchill will leave Egypt shortly for talks with the Turks. C—259, Jan. 30. Birthday greetings to Roosevelt. C—259—A, Feb. 2. An optimistic report of Churchill's conversations with President Ιηόηϋ of Turkey. C—259—A/1, Feb. 2. Churchill's "Morning Thoughts" regarding the struc­ ture of the postwar world; mentions the formation of some sort of United Nations world organization; admits that Russia will get its June 1941 boundary with Poland; discusses the benefits of Turkish intervention on the side of the Allies. C—260, Feb. 3. Forwards an outline of a proposed joint message to Stalin which would provide more information about future Anglo-Amer­ ican operations, especially in the Mediterranean, and about the cross-channel invasion. R—256, Feb. 5. Revises Churchill's message to Stalin (C-260); eliminates mention of an attack on Italy and further limits the conditions for a second front. R—256/1, Feb. 6. Requests that the exchange rate of francs to dollars be raised in the areas controlled by the Gaullists. C—261, Feb. 8. Informs Roosevelt that the British Eighth Army, with the conquest of all of Libya, should now come under Eisenhower's command; suggests they should also announce the appointments of Alexander and Tedder to Eisenhower's staff. C—262, Feb. 8. Forwards a copy of General Alexander's report of victory in Egypt and Libya. R—257, Feb. 8. Agrees to the announcement of command changes in North Africa; asks that the American role in North Africa be em­ phasized in order to gain cooperation from French forces. C—263, Feb. 10. Forwards exchanges of cables between Stalin and Church­ ill regarding the discussions at Casablanca and Churchill's sugges­ tion that there be Soviet-Turkish talks; warns that continued em­ phasis on the American role in North Africa is bound to bring criticism in the British press. R—258, Feb. 10. Forwards a copy of public remarks Roosevelt will make which emphasize the need for the French to concentrate on military unity against Germany rather than political problems in North Africa; indicates to Churchill his dislike of de Gaulle's call for elections in North Africa. R—259, Feb. 10. Agrees to Churchill's proposed announcements of com­ mand changes in North Africa. C—264, Feb. 11. Forwards the text of those portions of a Churchill speech which would deal with command changes in North Africa.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

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C—265, Feb. 11. Forwards minor amendments to C—264. C—266, Feb. 11. Suggests that Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visit the United States for talks with Roosevelt and the State Department. R—260, Feb. 11. Agrees to Eden's visit; congratulates Churchill on his speech to the House of Commons. C—267, Feb. 11. Discusses a broad range of problems relating to the French in North Africa, Martinique, and Alexandria; agrees that parliamentary elections in North Africa are not needed. C-268, Feb. 17. Suggests that the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY) should be moved up to the "June Moon." R—261, Feb. 19. Proposes discussions in Washington which would lead to a third lend-lease protocol with the Soviet Union. C—269, Feb. 27. Reports Churchill's improved health and hopes that Roosevelt is over his fever. C-270, Mar. 2. Designates Colonel J. J. Llewellin as the British representative for discussions about the third lend-lease protocol with the Soviet Union. R—261/1, Mar. 2. Forwardsaphotographof a portrait of General Sylvester Churchill. C—271, Mar. 4. Forwards a proposed cable to be sent jointly to Stalin which fully explains the Allied offensive in North Africa and mentions other future operations; also discusses the conditions for a cross-channel invasion in the summer of 1943. R—262, Mar. 5. Passes on the text of a message to Stalin sent by Roosevelt on February 22 regretting the delay in taking Tunisia and promising a second front as soon as possible. C—272, Mar. 5. Congratulates Roosevelt on the American victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. C—272/1, Mar. 5. Forwards a copy of the film Desert Victory and expresses concern about Roosevelt's health. R—262/1, Mar. 17. Thanks Churchill for the film Desert Victory; expresses pleasure with the visit of Anthony Eden and cautions Churchill to take care of his health. C-272-A, Mar. 18. Indicates that the preparations for HUSKY and the large concentration of German warships in northern Norway make further convoys to Murmansk impossible; includes two attachments: (1) a proposed message to Stalin explaining why no convoys can be sent until after HUSKY, and (2) a British Admiralty minute which provides a full discussion of the naval situation as it relates to convoys to Russia.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C-272-A/1, Mar. 19. A letter which acknowledges receipt of R-261/1 and the photograph. R—262/2, Mar. 19. A letter forwarding a story about Churchill having visited Amenia, New York, as a baby (with enclosure). R—263, Mar. 20. Agrees to hold up the convoy to northern Russia scheduled for March; recommends a delay in telling Stalin that HUSKY could interrupt further convoys. R—264, Mar. 20. Mentions reports of German troop movements toward the Spanish border; recommends establishing a committee to study Wellington's Iberian Peninsula campaign. C—273, Mar. 24. Advises that reports of German troop movements toward Spanish border are rumors put out by the enemy; notes that German troops and materials have been shifted to the Russian front. C—273/1, Mar. 24. Outlines Churchill's concern about the unforeseen effects of the shortage of shipping; includes a memo on Britain's domestic shipping requirements. C—274, Mar. 25. Reports talks with Archbishop Francis Spellman; suggests informing Stalin of the delay in northern convoys as soon as events in Tunisia turn in favor of the Allies. C—274—A, Mar. 25. Indicates it is impossible to follow the suggestions made in R-263 that a convoy be run either as a blind or as bait; argues strongly in favor of telling Stalin about the delay in convoys to Russia; includes a draft cable to Stalin for Roosevelt's approval. R—265, Mar. 28. Approves Churchill's draft telegram to Stalin after deleting references to any convoys before September; also adds promise of additional supplies to Vladivostok. R—266, Mar. 29. Promises to examine the question of a shortage of ships; surmises that some military operations will have to be curtailed. C—275, Mar. 30. Reports sending the cable to Stalin as amended by Roosevelt. (See R-265.) C-276, Mar. 30. Notes that Churchill first visited the United States in 1895, when he was too big for a baby carriage. R-267, Mar. 30. "SOME BABY!" (full text). R-268, Apr. 1. Indicates how the shipping shortage could affect future military operations planned for 1943. C—277, Apr. 2. Forwards Stalin's response to the news that convoys to northern Russia will be postponed until September; interprets Stalin's response as honest and not a veiled threat. C—278, Apr. 2. Reports the Soviet rejection of a German offer of reciprocal prisoner repatriation; interprets that as a Soviet reassurance that they will fight on against Germany.

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R-269, Apr. 3. Places a favorable interpretation on Stalin's message ( C 277); indicates that Roosevelt is preparing a message to Stalin. C—278/1, Apr. 3. Forwards the gist of a report from Stalin about an American offer to mediate between the Russians and the Finns; summarizes the British reply which encouraged the Soviets to pursue the offer. C—279, Apr. 5. Suggests that Hopkins and Marshall come to London to discuss strategy to follow HUSKY; includes a copy of a minute to the British Chiefs of Staff advocating a speedy follow-up in Italy, Yugoslavia, or the Aegean Sea. R-270, Apr. 11. Suggests postponing any Anglo-American conferences about post-Sicily operations until respective staff planning is complete; recommends continuing the buildup for HUSKY; mentions the possibility of a small-scale invasion of Burma; expresses pleasure at the successful bombing raids against Germany. C—280, Apr. 11. Asks if American public opinion would still oppose conscription in Northern Ireland. C-281, Apr. 12. Reports the capture of Sousse in Tunisia. C-282, Apr. 13. Proposes that the administration of occupied Sicily should be set up with the British as the "senior partner." R— 271, Apr. 14. Rejects Churchill's suggestion for a British-led occupation government in Sicily and instead asks for joint Allied control and a predominance of Americans in the lower echelons. R—272, Apr. 14. Reports his departure from Washington on an inspection tour of U.S. defense facilities; expresses pleasure at the capture of Sousse. C—283, Apr. 15. Agrees that any occupation of Sicily should be joint but wants equality, unlike North Africa; suggests formulating a joint outline of occupation policy; mentions hopes of ferrying aircraft to the Soviet Union to offset the postponement of convoys. C—283/1, Apr. 16. Reports that George McCullagh's visit to England is completed. R—273, Apr. 19. Agrees that American public opinion would no longer oppose conscription in Northern Ireland. C—284, Apr. 25. Forwards copies of cables sent by Churchill to Stalin concerning Polish accusations against the Soviet Union regarding the Katyn Forest massacre. C-285, Apr. 25. Forwards a copy of a Stalin-to-Churchill message in which the Soviet Premier insists on breaking relations with the Polish government in exile.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—286, Apr. 25. Summarizes British attempts to get the Turks to cooperate in the war; defends the shipment of supplies to Turkey as worth the gamble. C-287, Apr. 26. Identifies Operation HANDCUFF as an attack against the Italian-held Dodecanese Islands. R—274, Apr. 26. Forwards a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message asking the Soviet Union not to break relations with the Polish government led by Sikorski. C—288, Apr. 27. Expresses approval of Roosevelt's message to Stalin (R274); indicates annoyance that the Katyn Forest matter has aided German propaganda. C—289, Apr. 28. Forwards a copy of another plea to Stalin asking the Soviets not to cut off relations with the London Poles; promises to restrain anti-Soviet propaganda coming from Polish exiles. C—290, Apr. 28. Forwards a copy of the Polish government's statement concerning Soviet-Polish relations. C—291, Apr. 29. Requests a meeting with Roosevelt and their respective military staffs beginning in Washington on May 11; expresses a desire to discuss the operations to follow the Sicily invasion. R—274/1, not sent; Apr. 30. Praises Churchill's response to the PolishSoviet crisis over the Katyn Forest massacre; emphasizes the need for wartime unity. R—274/2, not sent; Apr. 30. Proposes delaying any Anglo-American conference about future European operations until early June; agrees that a British military mission should come to Washington immediately to discuss operations in Burma. R—275, May 2. Indicates pleasure at Churchill's forthcoming visit. C—292, May 3. Requests Roosevelt to cable New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser expressing appreciation for the decision to keep the New Zealand Army division in North Africa during the Tunisian campaign. C—293, May 4. Expresses pleasure at the forthcoming conference in Washington; congratulates U.S. troops on a victory in Tunisia. R—275/1, May 8. (Possibly not delivered.) A memorandum summarizing the American position regarding political control in the liberated French territories and expressing extreme annoyance with de Gaulle. C—293A, May 10. Warns of a slight delay in arrival at New York and suggests traveling by train to Washington. C—294, May 10. Thanks Roosevelt for the naval escort; indicates pleasure at the prospect of spending the weekend at Hyde Park.

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R—275/2, May 20. A memorandum discussing a report from London that various non-Gaullist French officials are disturbed about de Gaulle's attempts to gain complete control over the entire French government in exile as well as in the liberated sections of the French Empire. R— 275/3, May 21. A brief memo stating that a report on Libya and Tripoli is coming in and will be ready by May 23. C—295, May 27. Reports Churchill's safe arrival at Gibraltar. C—296, May 26. Forwards a draft of the proposed joint statement to Stalin on the results of the TRIDENT Conference. R—276, May 27. Expresses pleasure at Churchill's safe arrival in Algiers; states that the agreed-upon one-sentence announcement about the TRIDENT Conference has been given to the press. C—297, May 28. Reports Churchill's safe arrival in Algiers. R-276/1, May 28. A letter informing Churchill that the United States has decided to transfer additional merchant ships to Britain for wartime use. C—297/1, May 28. A memorandum summarizing a luncheon discussion during which Churchill outlined his views on the best structure for peace and security in the postwar world; includes suggestions for close Anglo-American cooperation, the creation of a number of European confederations, and a rough alignment of the world into three major spheres of influence. C—298, May 31. Informs Roosevelt that Eden will come to Algiers to assist in arranging an agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud; assures Roosevelt that Britain wants any French council to have the power to restrain the ambitions of any single individual. R—277, June 3. Suggests that public information about anti-submarine warfare be limited to a monthly joint Anglo-American statement; this to avoid helping the Japanese effort against American submarines. R—278, June 4. Expresses pessimism about the value of any de Gaulle— Giraud agreement; emphasizes the need to keep Dakar under the control of Boisson and the need for de Gaulle to cooperate with the war effort. C—299, June 4. Agrees to a monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare; reports that discussions between Marshall and the British had been useful; mentions an agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud.

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C—300, June 6. Reports the creation of the French Committee; states that this ends the British connection with de Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French; promises to try to keep Boisson as Governor of West Africa and to cut down on Gaullist propaganda in the press; expresses pleasure over the meetings with Marshall. C—301, June 6. Thanks Roosevelt for deciding to transfer additional merchant ships to Britain; asks permission to publish Roosevelt's letter (R-276/1). R—279, June 7. Turns down Churchill's request to publish R-276/1. R—280, June 9. Reports the return of Joseph Davies from Moscow; promises to forward Stalin's response to the report of the TRIDENT Conference. C—302, June 10. Requests American concurrence in a request from Tedder and Eisenhower for permission to conduct air attacks on the railroad marshaling yards at Rome. R—281, June 10. Repeats a message from Murphy describing the political struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud plus a message from Roosevelt's instructions to General Eisenhower indicating strong American opposition to the removal of Boisson as Governor General of West Africa; indicates Roosevelt's fear of de Gaulle's gaining full control over French military forces in North Africa. C—303, June 10. Outlines British proposals for occupation and administrative policies in liberated Sicily; requests that Macmillan continue as a British political representative at Eisenhower's headquarters. C—304, June 10. Forwards a British memorandum, apparently written by Eden, establishing Macmillan's position at Eisenhower's headquarters and outlining the channels of communication for Eisenhower and Macmillan. C—305, June 11. Proposes that the British Ambassador in Lisbon open discussions with the Portuguese government in order to obtain bases in the Azores; indicates that planning for a military operation against the Azores is continuing, should discussions fail. R—282, June 11. Agrees with Churchill's proposal to conduct talks with the Portuguese about the Azores. C—306, June 11. Concurs in Roosevelt's support for Boisson and the general assessment of the situation in North Africa contained in R-281. C—307, June 11. Reports the surrender of the Italian island of Pantelleria. R—283, June 11. Expresses pleasure at the capture of Pantelleria.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

lxxxv

C—308, June 11. Passes on a report from the British Ambassador in Lisbon that Salazar no longer fears a German invasion of Portugal and seems eager to cooperate with the British. R—284, June 12. Repeats a message from Eisenhower indicating that Giraud agreed that Boisson should not be removed, while de Gaulle rejected the advice as interference in French internal affairs. C—309, June 12. Discusses Stalin's angry response to the further postponement of a cross-channel attack; requests information about Roosevelt's letter to Stalin; expresses willingness to go anywhere for a tripartite conference, but suggests Scapa Flow. C—310, June 13. Forwards for Roosevelt's approval a draft of a message to Stalin which argues that the elimination of Italy from the war would contribute greatly to the defeat of Germany. C—311, June 13. Proposes the creation of a South East Asia Command as well as a number of command changes in the India-Burma area. C—312, June 13. Forwards a cable from the British Ambassador in Lisbon recommending that Portugal be approached as a full ally; requests guidance regarding assurances about the Portuguese colonies of Timor and Macao. R—285, June 14. Agrees that military requirements justify the bombing of rail facilities in and around Rome; pilots should be instructed to avoid bombing the Vatican. R—286, June 14. Agrees that Macmillan and Murphy should continue as political advisors at Eisenhower's headquarters, but that Eisenhower will remain in charge of occupation policies. C—313, June 15. Reports that Jan Smuts agrees with the method of approaching the Portuguese about bases in the Azores; the Union of South Africa will associate itself with assurances to the Portuguese about Portuguese East and West Africa. R—287, June 15. Repeats a reply by Roosevelt to the Pope regarding the bombing of Rome; the message insists that military requirements are overriding. C-314, June 16. Acknowledges R-282. C-315, June 16. Thanks Roosevelt for sending additional aircraft to Australia. R—288, June 17. Claims that de Gaulle is a threat to Anglo-American war efforts and recommends a complete break with the French leader; passes on instructions sent to Eisenhower that the United States will not permit de Gaulle to control the French Army in Africa.

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C—316, June 18. Agrees that de Gaulle should not gain control of French military forces in North Africa, but recommends avoiding an open break while still working to isolate de Gaulle politically. C—317, June 18. Warns that the message to Stalin will be sent unless Roosevelt indicates otherwise. (See C-310.) R—289/A, not sent; June 14. Approves Churchill's draft of a cable to Stalin (C-310). R—289/B, not sent; June 14. Draft of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin cable in which Roosevelt reiterates the commitment to launch a cross-channel attack in the spring of 1944 and suggests a meeting between Churchill, Stalin, and himself. R—289, June 18. Approves Churchill's message to Stalin; forwards a copy of a message to Stalin from Roosevelt in which the President associates himself with Churchill's cable. C—318, June 18. Notes that the British Cabinet did not approve an earlier suggestion by Churchill that they break with de Gaulle. C—319, June 19. Reports Salazar's favorable response to the suggestion that the Azores be made available for British and American use; mentions that the Portuguese ambassador in London supports the British proposal. C—320, June 19. Proposes the East Asia Command be modeled after that in North Africa, only with a British commander; suggests the structure and British personnel for the new command. C—321, June 19. Suggests instructing pilots to avoid bombing Papal buildings outside the Vatican, particularly the Church of St. John Lateran. C-322, June 20. Repeats the final version of the message from Churchill to Stalin explaining the strategic decisions taken at the TRIDENT conference. R—290, June 21. Appeals for support against de Gaulle on military grounds. R-291, June 21. Agrees with C-321. R—292, June 21. Suggests that Australia might wish to purchase Portuguese Timor; indicates willingness to deal with the disposition of Timor and Macao after the end of the war. C-323, June 22. Endorses Eden's invitation that Hull visit England and suggests late summer or autumn. C—324, June 22. Agrees with Roosevelt's outline of the administrative structure in liberated Sicily and suggests a policy regarding the use of Italian officials. C—325, June 23. Expresses hope that the newly established French National Committee will not be dominated by de Gaulle; agrees that it would be unwise to grant recognition to the committee at present.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

lxxxvii

C—326, June 23. Forwards a paraphrase of a Churchill cable to Stalin requesting that the Soviet Union postpone any move to recognize the French National Committee. C—327, June 23. Dismisses the importance of the claim made by the French National Committee to control all French military forces. R—293/A, not sent; June 22. Suggests that the proposed command reorganization in South East Asia cannot take away from the authority of Chiang Kai-shek in China; indicates that Chiang will not support military operations not directly related to China. R-293, June 24. Agrees that unity of command in South East Asia is important, but disapproves of Sholto Douglas as commander of that theater; indicates doubts that Chiang Kai-shek will support operations in Burma; states that General Chennault will still have to report directly to Chiang. R-294, June 24. Agrees with C-327. C—328, June 25. Disapproves of Roosevelt's proposal for meeting Stalin without Churchill being present. C—329, June 25. Suggests that Giraud's visit to the United States be postponed lest de Gaulle take advantage of his absence. R—295, June 25. Agrees that Giraud's visit should be postponed. C—330, June 26. Suggests that the codename for air raids on the Ploe§ti oil fields be changed from SOAPSUDS to TIDAL WAVE. C—331, June 27. Agrees that questions regarding the disposition of Timor and Macao should be left until after the war; cautions of Portuguese touchiness on Timor. R-296, June 28. Agrees to change SOAPSUDS to TIDAL WAVE. Suggests that Churchill meet with General Devers. C—332, June 28. Outlines the proposed boundaries for the new South East Asia Command and again asks that all forces within that area, including Chinese or American air forces attached to the Chinese, come under the area's Supreme Commander. R—297, June 28. Denies that Roosevelt had proposed a Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, but defends such a meeting as potentially useful; proposes a meeting with Churchill at Quebec in August, following the proposed meeting with Stalin. C—333, June 28. States that he has already seen General Devers. C—334, June 28. Expresses concern at a recent message from Stalin (C335) and states that a Roosevelt-Stalin meeting might be a good idea; indicates concern at the possibility of a Russo-German rapprochement.

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C—335, June 29. Forwards the text of Stalin's strong protest at the postponement of a cross-channel invasion until 1944 along with Churchill's equally strong defense of the decision; also forwards Stalin's message agreeing to postpone recognition of the French National Committee. C—336, June 29. Agrees to meet with Roosevelt at Quebec in August. C—337, June 29. Expresses admiration for the way Roosevelt bore up under the burden of domestic political problems. C—338, June 29. Requests a "short-snorter" dollar bill for King George VI. C—338/1, June 29. Indicates that the Portuguese are willing to grant bases in the Azores, but only to British forces. C—339, June 30. Inquires if it has become possible to establish a camp in North Africa for Jewish refugees. R—298, June 30. Offers the American proposals for a South East Asia Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff; warns that Chiang Kai-shek will not support operations outside of China and will retain control of U.S. air forces assigned to the China theater. R—299, June 30. Proposes sending Allied forces to Portugal in the event of German action against that country following the Allied occupation of the Azores; suggests consideration of an attack against Germany via the Iberian Peninsula. R—300, June 30. Tells Churchill that the "short-snorter" dollar bill for the King is on the way. R—300/1, July 1. A letter enclosing photographs of a joint ChurchillRoosevelt fishing expedition at Shangri-la. C—340, July 1. Proposes the procedures for issuing joint monthly statements on anti-submarine warfare. C—341, July 3. Doubts it will be necessary to send Allied troops to Portugal to ward off German reprisals. R—301, July 3. Denies any intention of forcing ground troops on the Portuguese. R—302, July 3. Forwards a copy of a proposed American appeal to the Italian people to overthrow their Fascist government. C—342, July 3. Argues in favor of a South East Asian Command reporting direcdy to the British Chiefs of Staff (the MacArthur pattern). C—343, July 4. Agrees that troops could go to Portugal if Salazar raises the question; again suggests it will not be necessary. R—303, July 4. Suggests that any bombing of rail yards in Rome be left to Eisenhower's discretion; opposes the issuing of any "black radio" armistice proclamation.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

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C-344, July 5. Indicates annoyance that Roosevelt intends to make an appeal to the Italian people on his own; suggests amendments to the appeal which give greater recognition to the British role in the war. R—304, July 6. Suggests that any appeal to the Italians should be a joint Churchill-Roosevelt message. C—345, July 6. Again proposes Sholto Douglas as commander for the South East Asia theater; asks Roosevelt to explain his opposition to Douglas. C—346, July 6. Proposes some amendments to the joint appeal to the Italian people. C—347, July 6. Forwards an optimistic summary of the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations concerning bases in the Azores. R-305, July 7. Agrees with C-340. C—348, July 8. Inquires about rumors that the United States plans to recognize the French Committee; suggests that Britain and the United States act together. C—349, July 8. Forwards a Foreign Office formula for recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. R—306, July 8. Forwards a copy of a message to Eisenhower and Murphy in which Roosevelt instructs them not to recognize the French Committee without presidential authority. C-350, July 8. Reports the initiation of King George VI into the "shortsnorter" club. C-351, July 8. Proposes a joint statement explaining the policy of issuing monthly statements on the anti-submarine war. C—352, July 8. Forwards the Admiralty's draft of the first monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare. R—307, July 8. Agrees to Churchill's amendments to the appeal to the Italian people; suggests that Eisenhower be allowed to release it whenever he thinks it appropriate. C-353, July 8. Asks that the timing of the release of the appeal to the Italian people be decided by Churchill and Roosevelt. R—308, July 8. Outlines plans for the establishment of refugee camps in North Africa. R—309, July 8. Agrees to the monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare after the deletion of one paragraph about new weapons. C—354, July 9. Asks for further news about the sharing of information on atomic-bomb research (TUBE ALLOYS).

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R—310, July 9. Reiterates his dislike of having Sholto Douglas as commander of the South East Asia theater and suggests Admiral Cunningham instead. R—311, July 9. Opposes the "MacArthur pattern" for the South East Asia Command; prefers the "Eisenhower model" whereby the commander reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. R—312, July 9. Agrees that the timing of the appeal to the Italian people will be determined by Roosevelt and Churchill. R—313, July 9. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's message to the Pope announcing invasion of Sicily. C—355, July 9. A brief comment about the Anglo-American partnership on the eve of the Sicily invasion (HUSKY). C—356, July 10. Approves Roosevelt's message to the Pope. C-357, July 10. Agrees with R-308. C—358, July 10. Forwards a message from Churchill to Mackenzie King noting there is not enough time to have all the British dominions formally associate themselves with the appeal to the Italians. C—359, July 11. Thanks Roosevelt for the photographs of their fishing trip at Shangri-la. C—360, July 13. Suggests the time has come to release the appeal to the Italians. C—361, July 13. Forwards a minor amendment, suggested by the Canadian government, to the appeal to the Italians. C—362, July 13. Reports the sinking of five U-boats in twenty-four hours. R—314, July 14. Reports additional sinkings of U-boats; suggests a meeting in Quebec around September 1, with or without Stalin. C—363, July 14. Reports more U-boat sinkings and proposes a special public announcement. R—315, July 14. Agrees to the amendment to the Italian appeal proposed in C—361; suggests release of the proclamation on July 16. C—364, July 15. Forwards a summary of the Portuguese proposals regarding the Allied bases in the Azores (LIFEBELT). R—316, July 15. Expresses pleasure at the progress of the Anglo-Portuguese talks. C—365, July 15. Agrees on the time for releasing the Italian appeal (R315). R—317, July 15. Opposes any special press release announcing the success of the anti-submarine war in the Atlantic. C—366, July 16. Agrees to meet Roosevelt at Quebec but suggests midAugust since the successful invasion of Sicily necessitates agreement on future military plans.

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XCl

C—367, July 16. Reports that the total number of U-boats sunk in July has reached eighteen. C-368, July 16. Reports news of low Italian morale and offers by Italian commanders in Greece and the Balkans to surrender. R-318, July 16. Reports no reply from Stalin about a possible meeting; agrees to Churchill's proposed time for the talks. C—369, July 16. Describe the types of aircraft Britain plans to send to the Azores. C—370, July 17. Forwards a message from General Smuts advocating a direct attack on Rome. R—319, July 19. Agrees that Smuts' proposal makes sense and notes that Allied military planners are already thinking along those lines. C—371, July 19. Asks if Stalin has replied to the invitation for a conference; indicates a desire to begin plans for British participation in the Pacific war. C-372, July 20. Reports that Mackenzie King would be happy to have the Churchill-Roosevelt talks take place in Quebec. C—373, July 21. Indicates that recognition of the French National Committee might be the only way to prevent de Gaulle from taking control over all French forces and colonies; suggests that Britain may recognize the French Committee even if the United States chooses not to. C—374, July 21. Gives August 11 as the date of his arrival in Quebec. C-375, July 21. Assigns the codename QUADRANT to the Quebec Conference. R—320, July 21. Informs Churchill that Stalin has not replied and that the QUADRANT Conference can start on August 15. R-321/A, not sent; July 20. A draft, written by Hopkins, opposing recognition of the French National Committee. R-321, July 22. Prefers "acceptance" rather than "recognition" of the French National Committee; suggests that such acceptance be temporary until the French people are free to choose their own government, and that military requirements take precedence. R—322, July 22. Agrees that American intelligence shows Italian morale to be low, but doubts widespread surrenders until Italy suffers major defeats at home. C—376, July 22. Agrees to the rough dates for the Quebec Conference suggested by Roosevelt. C—377, July 23. Forwards a cable from the British High Commissioner in Canada warning that Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King expects to participate in the discussions; includes Churchill's cable

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

to the High Commissioner stating that King and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff can attend all plenary sessions of the conference. R—323, July 24. Disapproves of Canadian participation in the QUADRANT talks since it would stimulate a similar demand from Brazil, China, and other Allied nations; promises to explain the problem to King. C—378, July 25. Asks if Stalin has replied to the invitation to attend the Quebec Conference; discusses travel plans and notes that he will bring Mrs. Churchill and his daughter, Mary, to Quebec; mentions the need for keeping an open mind on post-Sicily operations; mentions successes in anti-submarine warfare. C-379, July 25. Identifies Colonel Warden as himself. C—380, July 25. Paraphrases a Churchill-to-King telegram explaining why the Canadians cannot formally participate in the QUADRANT Conference. C-381, July 25. Identifies PQ as Roosevelt. C—382, July 25. Suggests that the replacement of Mussolini in Italy means peace proposals could be forthcoming. R—324, July 25. Proposes that any peace settlement with the Italians guarantee the use of needed military installations by the Allies and that they follow as close as possible to unconditional surrender. R—325, July 25. Invites Churchill and his family to visit Hyde Park either before or after the Quebec Conference. C—383, July 26. Gives the British view of Anglo-American aims in Italy. R—326, July 26. Informs Churchill that atomic-bomb research data (TUBE ALLOYS) will be shared fully between the United States and Britain. R—327, July 27. Forwards a proposed statement to be made by Eisenhower to the Italian people. C—384, July 27. Asks that Eisenhower's statement include a demand that all British and Allied prisoners be restored to the Allies. R—328, July 27. Accepts the offer of King George VI to use the quarters of the British Governor General during the Quebec Conference. R—329, July 28. Agrees to Churchill's suggested addition to Eisenhower's statement to the Italian people. C—385, July 28. Discusses arrangements for the Quebec Conference and the personnel who will attend; mentions Roosevelt's rebuke to OWI attacks on the King of Italy. C—386, July 28. Forwards a greeting from the Treasurer of Gray's Inn in London.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

XCUl

C—R/tel.—4, July 29. A German intercept of a Churchill-Roosevelt transAtlantic telephone conversation in which they discuss the possibility of an armistice with the Italians. C—387, July 29. Discusses the terms for any Italian armistice and recommends against broadcasting terms before the Italians ask for an armistice, based on unconditional surrender. R—330, July 29. Agrees not to broadcast armistice terms before the Italians surrender but recommends that Eisenhower be permitted to offer the agreed-upon terms immediately upon receiving an armistice request from the Italians. C—388, July 29. Thanks Roosevelt for agreeing to share atomic-bomb research data; states who will represent the British in the talks. R—331, July 30. Forwards a draft of an Anglo-American policy statement regarding Italy which differs only in minor ways from Churchill's proposal (C-383). C—389, July 30. Expresses doubt that any Italian request for terms would be made to Eisenhower, but agrees that they should be prepared; suggests some changes to the proposed terms sent for approval by Eisenhower. R—332, July 30. Forwards a draft of the terms Eisenhower will be authorized to offer the Italians. R—333, July 30. Discusses personnel who will attend the Quebec Conference, and Churchill's trip to Hyde Park. R—334, July 30. Expresses annoyance with persons in the United States who oppose any deal with the Italian monarchy or the Badoglio government. C—390, July 30. Forwards an Admiralty summary of successful actions against German U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. R—335, July 30. Congratulates Churchill on the sinking of three U-boats by the British; mentions that the Americans have just sunk a German submarine off the coast of Brazil, but that bases in the Azores are still needed. C—391, July 31. Agrees with Roosevelt's draft of an Anglo-American policy statement regarding Italy. C—392, July 31. Gives the total of "canaries" (U-boats sunk) since May 1 as eighty-five; suggests delaying the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement until the Quebec Conference. C—393, July 31. Agrees on the terms Eisenhower will be authorized to offer the Italians; asks if Roosevelt has considered the more formal instrument of surrender proposed earlier by the British Foreign Office.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—394, July 31. Opposes any pronouncement about self-determination for the Italians, expressing fear that not working with the existing government could result in civil war and Bolshevization. C—395, July 31. Recommends changes to the Anglo-American policy statement about Italy which make it clear that any German government must surrender unconditionally. R— 336, Aug. 1. Agrees to a delay in issuing the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement. R—337, Aug. 1. Asks Churchill to look at a Hull-to-Winant message about Soviet interest in the terms of an Italian surrender. R—338, Aug. 1. Notifies Churchill that Eisenhower had been instructed to offer the Italians the terms outlined in C—393, providing a request is received from the Italian government; promises to study the longer instrument of surrender. C—396, Aug. 1. Describes arrangements for the Quebec Conference and quotes an arrival announcement. C-397, Aug. 2. Thanks Roosevelt for his R-338. R—339, Aug. 2. Expresses dislike for the long instrument of surrender for the Italians because it restricts Eisenhower's freedom of action; suggests discussing the matter at Quebec. R—340, Aug. 2. Agrees to Churchill's proposed arrival announcement (C-396). C—398, Aug. 3. Discourages moves to have Rome declared an open city. R—341, Aug. 3. Notes that it is too late to stop an air attack on Rome already scheduled for August 3, but thinks further raids should be suspended. R—342, Aug. 3. Claims it would be difficult to refuse a request to make Rome an open city; suggests the proposed terms are acceptable if accompanied by inspections. C—399, Aug. 3. Comments on a proposed formula designed to reconcile the British and American positions regarding recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. C—400, Aug. 3. Forwards the revised draft formula for recognition of the French Committee. R—343, Aug. 3. Requests that no action be taken regarding recognition of the French Committee until the Quebec meeting. C—401, Aug. 3. Continues to oppose open-city status for Rome, fearing adverse British public opinion. C-402, Aug. 4. Notifies Roosevelt of having received the proposed terms for declaring Rome an open city.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

XCV

C—403, Aug. 4. Discusses the military reasons for refusing to declare Rome an open city and suggests discussing it at Quebec; mentions continuing pressure to recognize the French Committee. C—404, Aug. 4. Notifies Roosevelt of a small change, suggested by Mackenzie King, to the arrival announcement (C-396). C—405, Aug. 4. Reports contacts in Lisbon between an Italian diplomat and the British Ambassador indicating that the Badoglio government in Italy fears a German occupation and is requesting Allied support against the Germans; the Italian position is that only the monarchy can save Italy from communism. C—406, Aug. 5. Suggests that any statement of broad Anglo-American policy in Italy include a reference to having kept the Soviet Union informed; suggests an additional amendment and the formal adoption of the statement as a joint directive. C—407, Aug. 11. Reports arrival in Quebec City and discusses the proposed trip to Hyde Park; suggests discussing the anti-submarine warfare statement when they meet. R-344, Aug. 11. Replies to Churchill's inquiry about the type of clothing to bring to Hyde Park. C-408, Aug. 11. A draft of the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement. C-409, Aug. 11. Forwards Eden's proposed reply to an Italian peace feeler made to the British Mission in Tangiers; Eden's draft emphasizes the requirement of unconditional surrender and the release of Allied prisoners. C—410, Aug. 11. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin indicating his desire for a meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill but stating it is impossible for him to leave the battlefront for the time being. C—411, Aug. 12. Contains a copy of Churchill's response to Stalin which congratulates the Soviet armies on their victories and passes on general information about the Quebec Conference and a number of other items. C—412, Aug. 12. Indicates Mrs. Churchill is too tired to visit the United States but that he and his daughter, Mary, will come. C—412/1, Aug. 13. Suggests it would be better for the Churchill party to go directly from Hyde Park to Quebec and not accompany Roosevelt to Washington. C—412/2, Aug. 13. Forwards two papers, the first concerning the Katyn Forest massacre and the second about Partisans in Yugoslavia; suggests providing supplies to the Partisans in the Balkans.

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C—412/3, Aug. 14. Requests Roosevelt to acknowledge a message from Nicholas Macaskie of Gray's Inn (C-386); informs Roosevelt that King George VI wishes the Americans to publish his message of congratulations following the air raid on the Ploe§ti oil fields. C-412/4, Aug. 15. Summarizes a number of topics discussed during their talks at Hyde Park; includes a suggestion for another request to Stalin for a meeting, the writing of a TUBE ALLOY memorandum for their joint concurrence, the question of commands, an appeal to the Irish government for air and naval facilities, and the possibility of separate U.S., British, and Canadian statements about recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. C—413, Aug. 16. Proposes arrangements and schedule for Roosevelt's arrival in Quebec. R—345, Aug. 16. Agrees to suggestions in C—413. C—413/1, Aug. 16. Encloses four cables from London containing information about new approaches from the Italian government; suggests an answer which re-emphasizes unconditional surrender, but indicates a willingness to assist any Italian forces engaged in fighting the Germans. (The four cables are included as attachments.) C—414, Aug. 26. Gives the date of Churchill's arrival in Washington as September 1. R—346, Aug. 26. Concerns arrangements for the Churchill family visit to Washington, Mary Churchill's trip to the Women's Army Corps camp at Oglethorpe, Georgia, and Churchill's fishing trip in Quebec. R—347, Aug. 26. Comments that Stalin's latest message was friendlier and that they should meet to work out an agenda for a Big Three meeting. C—414/1, Aug. 27. Mentions travel plans for his return to Washington; proposes an answer to Stalin's cable; mentions Mountbatten's appointment as Supreme Commander, South East Asia theater, and Roosevelt's speech at Ottawa. R—348, Aug. 28. Agrees with Churchill's proposed message to Stalin; mentions Churchill's travel plans, a proposal for the Prime Minister to receive an honorary degree at Harvard, and the Prime Minister's fishing trip. C—414/2, Aug. 28. Forwards two cables concerning the proposed invasion of Calabria, Italy (BAYTOWN), and the amphibious assault at Salerno (AVALANCHE); indicates a desire for a faster schedule and quicker buildup of troops.

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R—349, Aug. 29. States that Eisenhower has been authorized to accept an Italian surrender based on the short (military) terms, necessary because time is the important factor. C-414/3, Aug. 29. A memo accompanying Mary Churchill, who brought Roosevelt some fish caught by Churchill in Canada. C-414/4, Aug. 30. Asks if Mrs. Churchill may come to Washington. R—350, Aug. 30. Concerns arrangements for the Churchill family visit to Washington. C—414/5, Sept. 4. Comments that a proposed Roosevelt-to-Stalin message confuses the proposed Big Three conference with a Three-Power commission regarding Italy, and proposes changes. R—350/1, not sent; Sept. 7. Proposes cutting aid to the French in North Africa if de Gaulle takes over. C—414/6, Sept. 9. An extensive discussion of the strategic and operational effect of the impending Italian surrender and the transfer of the Italian fleet to the Allies. C—414/7, Sept. 10. A draft of a joint message to Marshal Badoglio encouraging the Italian leader to seize the opportunity to liberate Italy from the Germans; infers that the Allies will assist. R-350/2, Sept. 10. Proposes a minor change to the draft message to the Italian government (C-414/7). C—414/8, Sept. 13. Forwards copies of six cables; thanks Roosevelt for his hospitality. The cables are included as attachments and deal with the following topics: a proposed cable to Stalin; the format outlined by Roosevelt for immediate postwar collaboration; an Anglo-American Emergency Propaganda Committee; Roosevelt's veto of the publication of the Council of Four minutes from 1919; publication of messages to the King of Greece; the postponement of Count Sforza's trip to North Africa. C—414/9, Sept. 13. A memorandum outlining the views on postwar civil aviation procedures expressed by Roosevelt. C-415, Sept. 18. Asks Roosevelt to look at two Foreign Office telegrams regarding the situation in Italy. C—416, Sept. 18. Comments on the improved situation at Salerno; requests Roosevelt's reaction to the Stalin telegram of September 12. R-351, Sept. 19. Expresses pleasure at the news of Churchill's safe arrival in England. R—352, Sept. 20. Asks Churchill to concur in a message to General Eisenhower authorizing the General to negotiate with the Italians on the basis of the short surrender terms.

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R-353, Sept. 21. Makes minor changes to R-352. C—417, Sept. 21. Forwards telegram C-418 regarding Eisenhower's proposals for dealing with the Badoglio government; states that they will keep the Soviet government informed. C—418, Sept. 21. Passes a copy of a Churchill-to-Macmillan message responding to Eisenhower's suggestions for dealing with the Italian government; suggests ways to build up the authority and prestige of King Victor Emmanuel III. R-354, Sept. 21. Notes that R-352 and C-418 apparently crossed in transmission and states that he prefers his own plan for relations with the Italian government. C—419, Sept. 22. Agrees to Roosevelt's plan regarding Italy since their positions differ only on the question of withholding the long surrender terms. R-355, Sept. 23. States that R-352, regarding policy toward the Badoglio government, has been sent to Eisenhower as a directive, with C— 418 appended as commentary. C—420, Sept. 24. Forwards a cable from Stalin agreeing with AngloAmerican policy in Italy and backing Churchill's support for imposing the long surrender terms. C—421, Sept. 24. Indicates that Macmillan believes Badoglio will soon sign the long surrender terms. C—422, Sept. 25. Asks Roosevelt how he has responded to Stalin's cable supporting Allied policy in Italy; mentions the probability of a statement from Count Sforza supporting the Badoglio government; expresses pleasure that Hull might be able to attend the Foreign Ministers' Conference, and suggests he and Roosevelt travel by sea. R—356, Sept. 25. Agrees to having Badoglio sign the long surrender terms if it is done quickly. R—357, Sept. 25. Forwards a message to Stalin requesting that the Foreign Ministers' Conference be held in London so that Hull can attend. R—358, Sept. 25. States he will forward comments on a letter from the King of Italy after Eisenhower expresses his opinion. R—359, Sept. 25. Forwards a report from Murphy indicating serious problems within the French Committee because of Giraud's failure to consult the committee about his command of a French invasion of Corsica. C—423, Sept. 26. Sends a copy of a telegram to Macmillan warning the French that recognition of the French Committee depends upon the maintenance of the dual presidency of de Gaulle and Giraud;

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asks if there is any truth in the report that Maurice Thorez is in Algiers. R—360, Sept. 27. Passes on Eisenhower's request that the terms of the long surrender document be kept secret; forwards a copy of Roosevelt's proposed reply to the King of Italy. R—361, Sept. 27. Reports that Sforza will soon leave the United States for Europe. R—362, Sept. 27. Forwards a copy of a message from the Soviet government expressing support for Allied policy in Italy and asking that the tripartite Military-Political Commission remain the guiding authority; suspects a transmission error in one paragraph. C—424, Sept. 28. Agrees to keeping the long surrender document secret; disapproves of trying to have Rome declared an open city; mentions the exchange rate for currency in liberated Italy and the need for Badoglio to cooperate with Sforza. C—425, Sept. 28. Expresses annoyance at Sforza's public criticism of the Italian King; comments on the unacceptability of any Russian demands to be consulted on minor political matters in an area where the United States and Britain do the fighting; mentions Soviet requests for a resumption of Arctic convoys; indicates that the Tirpitz has probably been severely damaged. C—426, Sept. 29. Opposes any reduction in the exchange rate for the lira in liberated Italy. R—363, Sept. 29. Forwards a proposed joint statement drafted by Eisenhower to be issued when and if the Italians declare war on Germany. R—364, Sept. 29. Informs Churchill that there has indeed been an error in the transmission from Moscow of a message from the Soviet government (R-362). R—365, Sept. 30. Notes some useful public statements made by Count Sforza. C-427, Sept. 30. Suggests that the joint statement following the Italian declaration of war on Germany also be issued by the Soviet government. C—428, Sept. 30. Proposes a new joint statement regarding Italian cobelligerency to be issued by the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. C—429, Sept. 31 (Oct. 1). Forwards copies of an exchange of telegrams between the British Ambassador to Moscow and Churchill, and Churchill to Stalin, in which the question of renewing convoys to northern Russia and the status of British naval personnel stationed there are discussed in detail.

C

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—430, Oct. 1. Discusses the political problems involved in announcing major command appointments, particularly command of OVERLORD and Mountbatten's appointment as Supreme Commander, South East Asia; requests that Roosevelt draft a joint statement on the new appointments. C—431, Oct. 1. Expresses doubt that Sforza can be trusted; requests that he be asked to stop in London before going on to Italy. R—366, Oct. 1. Forwards a copy of a telegram sent to Stalin requesting his concurrence in a number of changes to the Italian surrender document. R—367, Oct. 1. Accepts the text of the joint statement proposed by Churchill (C-427, C-428) and suggests Churchill obtain Stalin's approval. R—368, Oct. 1. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin indicating that only Moscow will be a suitable location for the planned meeting of the Soviet, American, and British Foreign Ministers. C—432, Oct. 2. Agrees to the changes in the Italian surrender document and to the suggestion that Stalin's approval be obtained for a joint statement following the Italian declaration of war against Germany. R—369, Oct. 2. Mentions that Sforza will stop in Britain enroute to Italy; forwards a copy of a message to Eisenhower opposing the inclusion of Dino Grandi in the new Italian government. C—433, Oct. 2. Agrees with Roosevelt's comments about Grandi (R-369); suggests the Italians should be made to declare war at once. R—370, Oct. 4. Proposes a message to Molotov outlining the authority of the Control Commission and the Military-Political Commission for administering liberated Italy. C—434, Oct. 4. Forwards Stalin's agreement to the joint statement to be issued once Italy declares war on Germany. R—371, Oct. 4. Refuses to go along with Churchill's request for a joint statement regarding command appointments until final decisions are made about General Marshall's position; is not surprised that Stalin insisted on the Foreign Minister's meeting being held in Moscow. R—372, Oct. 4. Forwards a message from Stalin concurring in a request to keep secret the long surrender terms signed by the Italians. R—373, Oct. 4. Requests Churchill to investigate a news leak about the Soviet demand that Moscow be the location of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. R—374, Oct. 4. Approves Churchill's plan to suggest that a ChurchillRoosevelt-Stalin meeting be held on ships anchored somewhere in the eastern Mediterranean.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

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C—435, Oct. 4. Suggests that the Italians be forced to declare war on Germany. C-436, Oct. 5. Acknowledges and agrees to R-371, R-372, R-373; notes that he has dropped the idea of a Big Three meeting on ships in preference for Teheran; suggests that Roosevelt could meet with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo after the Teheran meeting; suggests travel arrangements for the Teheran meeting. C—437, Oct. 5. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin suggesting a ChurchillRoosevelt-Stalin meeting at Teheran—codenamed "Cairo 3," and suggesting security arrangements; includes a copy of Stalin's agreement about the necessary security measures. R—375, Oct. 6. Relates American plans for the entry of U.S. naval planes and vessels into the Azores. R—376, Oct. 6. Forwards a copy of a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation regarding additional facilities required by the U.S. military in the Azores. R—377, Oct. 6. Forwards a message from Stalin agreeing to the changes proposed for the Italian surrender docuriient. C—438, Oct. 7. Pleads for military forces to be temporarily diverted from the Italian campaign in order to assist the British in taking and holding Rhodes, Leros, and other Italian-occupied islands in the eastern Aegean Sea. C—439, Oct. 7. Forwards the proposed joint U-boat statement for September. C—440, Oct. 7. Expresses concern over changes in the Italian surrender terms because those changes might diminish Allied control over the Italian fleet; asks Roosevelt to force the Italians to declare war on Germany immediately. R—378, Oct. 7. Raises a question about the number of U-boat sinkings claimed in C-439. R—379, Oct. 7. Opposes any diversion of forces from Italy to the Aegean Sea because of difficulties in the Italian campaign. R—380, Oct. 7. Forwards a copy of a message to Eisenhower instructing him to put pressure on the Italian government to declare war on Germany. C—441, Oct. 8. Makes a strong plea for sending additional forces to aid the British in the eastern Aegean Sea. C—442, Oct. 8. Agrees with Roosevelt's delineation of authority for the various commissions administering Italy, and comments that Molotov should be told that a new overall scheme will be developed. C—443, Oct. 8. Asks again for landing craft to use in the Aegean.

CIl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

R—381, Oct. 8. Explains Roosevelt's continued opposition to any diversion of forces to the eastern Aegean. C—444, Oct. 8. Recommends that the Americans work up gradually toward their full requests (R-375) for using the Azores, lest they cause Salazar to back off. R—382, Oct. 9. Reports sending to Molotov the message contained in R— 370. C—445, Oct. 9. Asks Roosevelt to ensure that the military conference scheduled for that day in Tunis be free and unprejudiced on the question of sending additional forces to the eastern Aegean Sea; again repeats arguments in favor of a larger-scale operation in that area and includes portions of messages from the British commander in the Middle East, General Wilson, summarizing operations in the Aegean. C—446, Oct. 9. Informs Roosevelt of the successful entry of British forces into the Azores. C—447, Oct. 9. Amends the September U-boat statement. R—383, Oct. 9. Forwards a copy of a message to Eisenhower instructing him to examine the question of diverting forces to the Aegean Sea. R—384, Oct. 9. Informs Churchill that American forces will enter the Azores beginning November 6; assures the British that the United States has no desire to remain on Portuguese soil after the war. C—448, Oct. 9. Informs Roosevelt that Anthony Eden will stop at the military conference in Tunis enroute to Moscow. C—449, Oct. 10. Agrees that the decision not to expand operations in the Aegean is correct because of renewed German activity in Italy. C-450, Oct. 10. Congratulates the Americans on their successful daylight bombing raids over Germany. C—451, Oct. 10. Indicates some hope for holding onto the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea. C—452, Oct. 11. Insists on the unconditional surrender of Italian forces so as to guarantee control over the Italian fleet. C—453, Oct. 12. Forwards the draft of a proposed Anglo-Russian-American statement condemning atrocities committed by the Germans and warning that they will be punished. R—385, Oct. 12. Asks if there is anything to the reports of the activities of German General A. von Falkenhausen in Portugal. C—454, Oct. 13. Dismisses as unfounded the reports referred to in R385. C—455, Oct. 13. Reports that the news leak which concerned Roosevelt (R-373) came from the Soviet Embassy in London.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

cm

C-456, Oct. 14. States that Churchill will suggest to Stalin an alternative to Teheran as the site for their tripartite conference. C-457, Oct. 14. Gives the location of the codeword CYPRUS (C-456) as Habbaniya, Iraq. R—386, Oct. 14. Proposes additional changes to the Italian surrender terms. R-387, Oct. 14. Indicates that the United States will carry on direct negotiations with the Portuguese for additional facilities in the Azores. R—388, Oct. 14. Supports Churchill's suggestion of Habbaniya as the location for their conference; forwards a copy of a message to Stalin proposing a number of other possible sites. C—457/1, Oct. 14. Complains about an attack by five U.S. Senators on British imperialism and U.S. policies supporting that empire; outlines his proposed response to those attacks. H—388/1/A, not sent; Oci. 14. Criticizes the British for permitting the disclosure of photographs and other information denied to U.S. news reporters; claims that such actions cause the American press to adopt an anti-British tone. R-388/1, Oct. 15. In stronger language than the preceding draft, criticizes British leaks to the press as causing serious problems for Roosevelt in the United States (formally sent from Hopkins to Bracken). C—458, Oct. 15. Supports the idea of direct American negotiations with the Portuguese regarding additional facilities in the Azores. C—459, Oct. 16. Indicates annoyance with Soviet complaints about the conditions attached to a resumption of British convoys to northern Russia; agrees with Roosevelt's proposals for alternate sites for the tripartite conference. C—460, Oct. 16. Forwards a copy of Stalin's message rejecting British conditions for the resumption of convoys to northern Russia. C—461, Oct. 16. Forwards a copy of a message sent to Eden suggesting the kind of answer to give Stalin concerning convoys to northern Russia. R—389, Oct. 16. Expresses concern over the diversion of supplies from American air forces in China; asks Churchill personally to ensure that sufficient supplies are sent from India. C-462, Oct. 16. Suggests amendments to the Italian surrender protocol and to the Cunningham agreement regarding the disposition of the Italian fleet. C—463, Oct. 16. Expresses strong opposition to Soviet and French equality in the administration of occupied Italy.

ClV

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

R—390, Oct. 16. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin opposing equality for the French on the Mediterranean Commission which would supervise occupation policy in Italy. C—464, Oct. 17. Requests a decision from Roosevelt on changes in the Allied High Command. C—464/1, Oct. 17. A letter forwarding copies of two unpublished works by Rudyard Kipling; notes that they would be controversial if made public. C—465, Oct. 19. Promises to do everything possible to maintain the flow of supplies from India to American air forces in China. C—466, Oct. 19. Suggests that the United States reconsider negotiating with the Portuguese directly about obtaining additional facilities in the Azores. C—467, Oct. 20. Requests a meeting with Roosevelt and the full Combined Chiefs of Staff after the close of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and before any meeting with Stalin. C—468, Oct. 20. Argues that the Political-Military Commission (Mediterranean Commission) should be merely advisory; agrees that if the commission possesses executive and administrative powers France should not be an equal member with the Allies. R—391, Oct. 21. Forwards copies of an exchange of cables between Stalin and Roosevelt (via Hull) regarding the location for the ChurchillRoosevelt-Stalin (EUREKA) Conference; Roosevelt suggested a number of sites in the eastern Mediterranean, but Stalin insisted on Teheran. R—392, Oct. 21. Reports forwarding to Hull (in Moscow) Churchill's suggestion for a joint declaration warning the Germans against further atrocities. R—392/1, Oct. 21. A letter forwarding a Signal Corps movie of the Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference. R—393, Oct. 22. Suggests that General William Donovan, if put in charge of behind-the-lines operations in Yugoslavia and Greece, could prevent the guerrillas from fighting each other and get them to concentrate on fighting the Germans. R—394/A, not sent; Oct. 20. States it would be impossible for Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs to meet with Churchill and the British staff before the hoped-for meeting with Stalin. R—394, Oct. 22. Suggests a meeting with Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow the meeting with Stalin; explains the reasons for that suggestion.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

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C—469, Oct. 22. Agrees to support Roosevelt's request that EUREKA be held in the area of the eastern Mediterranean; acknowledges Roosevelt's support for a warning against atrocities; asks that Roosevelt settle on changes in the High Command as soon as possible. R—395, Oct. 23. Forwards portions of a message to Eisenhower in which changes were made to the Italian surrender terms in accordance with Churchill's requests. C—470, Oct. 23. Discourages the idea of putting General Donovan in charge of Allied contacts with the guerrillas in the Balkans; notes that Stalin has agreed to the bombing of Sofia, Bulgaria. C—471, Oct. 23. Gives detailed reasons why Churchill wants a meeting with Roosevelt before any meeting with Stalin; mentions operations in the Aegean and the question of bringing Turkey and Sweden into the war. C-472, Oct. 23. Forwards a copy of a message sent to Eden in Moscow discussing the advantages of bringing Sweden and Turkey into the war. C—473, Oct. 24. Expresses concern that Roosevelt has influenza. C—474, Oct. 25. Discusses reports of the construction in western France of what appear to be launching sites for rockets; mentions a successful air raid on Peenemunde, Germany. R—396, Oct. 25. Suggests a small Anglo-American meeting in North Africa on November 20 if Stalin does not agree to meet elsewhere than Teheran; proposes that Molotov and Chiang Kai-shek attend such a conference. R-396/1, Oct. 25. Acknowledges receipt of the unpublished Rudyard Kipling books, and agrees that they would be controversial if published. C-475, Oct. 26. Makes another plea for extensive Anglo-American talks before either meeting with Stalin or having Soviet representatives attend their meetings; offers an optimistic view of the Italian campaign. R—397, Oct. 26. Forwards a proposed message to Stalin asking him to send a Soviet military representative to any Anglo-American staff talks. R—398, Oct. 26. Asks Churchill to authorize Americans under British command to construct airfields in the Azores. C—476, Oct. 27. Strongly opposes the presence of a Soviet military representative at meetings of the Anglo-American staffs. C-477, Oct. 29. Suggests a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at ANFA (Casablanca) between November 15 and 20.

CVl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C-478, Oct. 29. Suggests SEXTANT as the codename for the meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and their staffs. R—399, Oct. 29. Forwards a copy of a State Department dispatch to the American Charg£ d'Affaires in Lisbon instructing that no comprehensive request for facilities in the Azores be made at that time. R-400/A, not sent; Oct. 29. Agrees to a meeting with Churchill at ANFA on November 20. R—400, Oct. 29. Eliminates Casablanca (ANFA) for an Anglo-American meeting because the harbor is too shallow; suggests Cairo or Alexandria instead; proposes meeting with Molotov at Basra if Stalin refuses to travel any farther than Teheran. R-401, Oct. 29. Accepts SEXTANT as the codename for the proposed Churchill-Roosevelt talks. R-402, Oct. 29. States that the OWI will forward a draft of the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement; asks that they agree upon the text early to avoid delay. C—479, Oct. 30. Agrees to meet Roosevelt in Cairo on November 20 and volunteers to make the necessary arrangements; suggests meeting Roosevelt in the Mediterranean and traveling together through the Mediterranean to Egypt; suggests the Russians can come to Cairo if Stalin will go no farther than Teheran. R—403, Oct. 30. Proposes that Churchill designate a British Deputy Commander for OVERLORD so that planning can move ahead until General Marshall becomes available. C—480, Oct. 30. Apologizes for previous delays in issuing the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement; comments that they have experienced a very successful month with twenty-two sinkings of Uboats. R—404, Oct. 30. Indicates Roosevelt must await Hull's return from Moscow before leaving for the SEXTANT talks, hence may be delayed until I'-Jovember 22; states Roosevelt will cable Chiang Kai-shek to meet them in Cairo around November 25. C—481, Oct. 31. Agrees to Roosevelt's schedule and the time to meet with Chiang Kai-shek; requests an early announcement of command appointments, including Marshall's designation as Supreme Commander; thanks Roosevelt for the film of the Quebec Conference. C—482, Oct. 31. Explains codenames: Colonel Warden is Churchill, Admiral Q. is Roosevelt, CELESTES is Chiang Kai-shek. C-483, Nov. 1. Forwards a note from the British staff and Foreign Office suggesting procedures to be followed in sending American engineers to survey and construct air facilities in the Azores.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

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R—405, Nov. 1. Forwards the proposed monthly statement on anti-sub­ marine warfare in the Atlantic. C-484, Nov. 2. Suggests that Roosevelt meet Hull in Cairo so as to avoid delay in convening the Anglo-American meetings; proposes be­ ginning Anglo-American staff talks earlier at Malta and suggests an even earlier rendezvous between Churchill and Roosevelt; re­ quests that Soviet and Chinese representatives arrive in Cairo a few days after the start of the official Anglo-American talks there; expresses the belief that Stalin will go no farther than Teheran; comments that the Moscow Foreign Ministers' talks indicate the Soviet Union is considering an early entry into the war against Japan. C-485, Nov. 2. Makes minor corrections to C-484. C—486, Nov. 2. Suggests accommodations for Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-shek in the pyramid district near Cairo. C—487, Nov. 2. Suggests a rendezvous with Roosevelt at Malta on No­ vember 17. R—406, Nov. 2. Turns down the plan to meet Churchill at Malta and states Roosevelt will arrive in Cairo on November 22 or 23. Notes that Hull has been told to ask Stalin to meet Churchill and Roosevelt in Basra, Iraq. C-488, Nov. 3. Agrees to the Anglo-American (SEXTANT) talks starting in Cairo on November 22; suggests that there should be AngloAmerican staff talks before any Soviet observer arrives. C—489, Nov. 3. Proposes Alfred Duff Cooper as British Resident Minister with the French Committee for National Liberation, leaving Macmillan posted at Eisenhower's headquarters. C—490, Nov. 4. Protests American plans to withdraw landing craft from the Mediterranean in accordance with the schedule for building up forces in England preparatory to the cross-channel invasion; requests the shifts be delayed until after the SEXTANT Confer­ ence. R—407, Nov. 4. Agrees to support Anglo-Soviet demands on Turkey for the use of air bases and for the eventual entry to Turkey into the war against Germany so long as no resources needed for OVER­ LORD or the Italian campaign are committed to the eastern Med­ iterranean. C—491, Nov. 5. Suggests a minor amendment to the monthly anti-sub­ marine warfare statement. C—492, Γ « v. 5. Thanks Roosevelt for R—407 supporting Anglo-Soviet demands on Turkey.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

R-408, Nov. 5. Agrees to C-491. R—409, Nov. 5. Agrees to delay the departure from the Mediterranean of sixty-eight LSTs. R—410, Nov. 5. Indicates that Hull will return to Washington by plane and that Roosevelt will leave for the Mediterranean by ship on November 11; suggests that Anglo-American staff meetings begin in Cairo as soon as the Americans start to arrive; promises many meetings before the Soviet and Chinese representatives arrive; suggests that Chiang arrive there on November 22; hopes that Stalin will travel as far as Basra. C—493, Nov. 6. Acknowledges receipt of messages R-408, 409, and 410. Suggests that the allocation of materiel to Turkey should be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, not the responsible commanders; outlines Churchill's travel plans for the Cairo meeting; suggests that Molotov and some Soviet Generals meet with the Anglo-Americans after the Cairo talks; notes that the railroad journey from Basra to Teheran is relatively short. C—494, Nov. 6. Forwards a report from General Ismay regarding travel conditions between Teheran and Cairo. C—495, Nov. 6. Opposes any changes in the existing Italian government of King Victor Emmanuel III and Pietro Badoglio; indicates distrust of Count Sforza. R—411, Nov. 8. Notes that Roosevelt has not received an invitation to stay at the home of the American Minister in Cairo. R—412, Nov. 8. Agrees that materiel allocations in the Mediterranean should be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed in C-493. R—413, Nov. 8. Forwards a copy of a message to Chiang Kai-shek suggesting that the Chinese leader arrive at Cairo by November 22 and stating that Churchill and Roosevelt expect to meet with Stalin in Persia. R—414, Nov. 8. Forwards a summary of intelligence regarding German rocket research. R—414/1, Nov. 8. Announces that the American Charge d'Affaires at Lisbon, George Kennan, will take up with Salazar the question of American requests for air facilities in the Azores, and requests British support. R—415, Nov. 9. Indicates a willingness to retain the monarchy in Italy in the person of King Victor Emmanuel's grandson and to bring in all political parties. C—496, Nov. 9. Promises to make all arrangements for Roosevelt's stay in Cairo.

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C—497, Nov. 10. Explains the delay in Roosevelt's being invited to stay with the American Minister in Cairo; gives Churchill's travel schedule enroute to Cairo. R—416, Nov. 10. States that there was not sufficient time for a meeting in Malta with Churchill. C—498, Nov. 10. Opposes changes in the French National Committee which leave de Gaulle as sole President. C-499, Nov. 10. Hopes that King Victor Emmanuel will not abdicate until the Allies have taken Rome and until Churchill and Roosevelt have met and discussed the question. R—417, Nov. 10. Requests full assistance from the British in India in the construction of air bases there for use by long-range American bombers. C-500, Nov. 10. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin outlining the proposed schedule for Anglo-American-Chinese talks at Cairo and suggesting Anglo-American-Soviet talks there beginning November 25. C—501, Nov. 11. Indicates grave concern that Roosevelt has invited Soviet representatives to attend the Cairo meeting starting on November 22; asks that Molotov's arrival be delayed until November 25. Expresses annoyance that Roosevelt did not inform Churchill directly of the decision to meet Stalin in Teheran. R—418, Nov. 11. Informs Churchill that Roosevelt will go to Teheran and that Stalin has agreed to a tripartite meeting there; expresses a desire to avoid the appearance of ganging up on Stalin, hence Roosevelt's willingness to have Soviet representatives at the Cairo talks. C—502, Nov. 12. Expresses a strong desire for full and frank AngloAmerican discussions at Cairo before any meetings with the Soviets. C—503, Nov. 12. Informs Roosevelt that British authorities in India have been instructed to assist in the construction of the air bases mentioned in R-417. C—504, Nov. 13. Suggests strong Anglo-American action and even British intervention in Lebanon where French authorities have imprisoned Lebanese nationalists. C—505, Nov. 14. Forwards copies of an exchange of messages between Churchill and Stalin in which Stalin indicates that Molotov cannot attend the Cairo talks, apparently in order to avoid being there at the same time as the Chinese. R-418/1, Nov. 17. Suggests changing the site of the SEXTANT Conference to Khartoum because of security leaks regarding the arrangements in Cairo.

CX

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—505/1, Nov. 18. States that security arrangements are excellent in Cairo and that the military commanders in the area recommend keeping the SEXTA.NT conference in that city; indicates that Malta is the only alternative. C-505/2, Nov. 19. States that Malta is also unacceptable for the SEXTANT talks and that the British will proceed to Cairo. R-418/2, Nov. 19. Agrees to stay with Cairo as the site for the SEXTANT meeting. R-418/3, Nov. 21. Acknowledges receipt of C-502 through 505; indicates the Americans will arrive in Cairo on November 22. C—506, Nov. 21. States that the British will publicly announce that Churchill is in Cairo but will not mention Roosevelt's presence until sometime after November 22. C—507, Nov. 21. Refers Roosevelt to a biblical passage. C—508, Nov. 21. Forwards a summary of the military precautions taken to protect the Cairo Conference site. C—508/1, Nov. 25. A memorandum expressing opposition to American proposals for a single Supreme Commander in charge of all operations against Germany; emphasizes American concern for OVERLORD and British support for operations in the Mediterranean as the best reason for splitting the two into separate theaters. C—508/2, Dec. 1. A letter thanking Roosevelt for a birthday present. R—418/4, Dec. 5. A memorandum forwarding a proposed message to Chiang Kai-shek in which Roosevelt explains that operations in Europe precluded any amphibious landings in southern Burma as planned for mid-1944; asks if Chiang wishes to postpone his planned attack in northern Burma (TARZAN). C—508/3, Dec. 5. Agrees to Roosevelt's proposed message to Chiang (R418/4). R—419, Dec. 8. Comments on a Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch regarding command appointments in the Mediterranean. C—509, Dec. 9. Forwards a copy of contingency plans for Turkish entry into the war against Germany; mentions talks with the King of Greece. C—510, Dec. 9. A copy of a paper given to the Turks outlining British plans in the event of Turkish entry into the war. C—511, Dec. 15. Informs Roosevelt that the Prime Minister is staying in Carthage (Tunis) while recovering from pneumonia. R—420, Dec. 17. Expresses concern about Churchill's illness; mentions the problem of stabilizing the Chinese currency; mentions Turkey.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

CXl

C—512, Dec. 19. Suggests major command appointments in the Mediterranean and in the European Theater of Operations. R-421, Dec. 20. Agrees to some major command appointments but asks for a short delay on others until General Marshall can be consulted; comments on Churchill's illness and convalescence. R-422, Dec. 21. Forwards a copy of a message to Harriman indicating that the Soviet Union should receive one-third of the surrendered Italian fleet. C-513, Dec. 21. Angrily reports the arrest of Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin by the French Committee; suggests that Roosevelt protest to de Gaulle. R—423, Dec. 22. Forwards a copy of a message to Eisenhower instructing him to warn de Gaulle not to take any action against the arrested ex-Vichy officials. C-514, Dec. 22. Recommends that General Montgomery command British and Canadian forces in OVERLORD; comments on other command appointments. R—424, Dec. 23. Agrees to a joint announcement of major command appointments in Europe and the Mediterranean, including that of Montgomery to command British and Canadian forces under Eisenho\-er. C—515, Dec. 23. Comments on command appointments and the question of their public announcement. C—516, Dec. 23. Again proposes Montgomery for a command and notes that Eisenhower has agreed. C—517, Dec. 23. Supports Roosevelt's protest about de Gaulle's arrest of Boisson, Flandin, and Peyrouton; criticizes the attempts by the French Committee to gain political control over postwar France. C-518, Dec. 24. Announces additional British command appointments and suggests a change in the wording of Roosevelt's speech about the major appointments. C-519, Dec. 24. Forwards a copy of a public announcement regarding major Allied command appointments. C—520, Dec. 24. Sends Christmas greetings from Mr. and Mrs. Churchill and family. C-521, Dec. 26. Asks for a delay in transferring a number of landing craft from Italy in order to mount an amphibious attack at Anzio (SHINGLE); promises that OVERLORD will not be delayed by such a move.

CXU

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1943

C—522, Dec. 26. Asks for a reply to C-518; notes that he will be traveling (to Marrakesh) and has instructed his government to announce some additional command appointments. R—425, Dec. 27. Forwards a copy of a message instructing Eisenhower to ensure that the three arrested ex-Vichy officials are not tried at this time, but permitting Eisenhower to make informal arrangements if he so chooses. R—426, Dec. 27. Thanks Churchill for the Christmas greeting; comments on the delay in deciding on secondary American command appointments. R-427, Dec. 27. Agrees to delay the shift of landing craft from Italy to England and agrees with Churchill that operations in the Aegean Sea have to be postponed; warns that any delay in OVERLORD has to have Stalin's approval. R—428, Dec. 27. Congratulates Churchill on the sinking of the German cruiser Scharnhorst. C—523, Dec. 27. Asks Roosevelt to delay the proposed visit to Washington of Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk until Churchill can talk with the Polish leader. R-429, Dec. 28. Agrees to tell Mikolajczyk to delay his visit (C-523). C—524, Dec. 28. Thanks Roosevelt for agreeing to provide sufficient landing ships for the Anzio operation; reports his arrival at Marrakesh, the arrival of Lord Beaverbrook in Marrakesh, and the sinking of the Scharnhorst. C—525, Dec. 29. Thanks Roosevelt for the congratulatory message about the sinking of the Scharnhorst. C—526, Dec. 30. Discusses Allied command appointments in the Mediterranean. C—527, Dec. 30. Supports Roosevelt's policy regarding de Gaulle's arrest of three ex-Vichy officials; suggest the three should be paroled, given bail, or residence surveille. C—528, Dec. 30. Thanks Roosevelt for the Christmas tree sent to Chequers as well as for the map case given by the President to Churchill; reports agreement by British and American commanders on a plan for the Anzio (SHINGLE) invasion; mentions receiving telegrams from Tito and Franco congratulating the Prime Minister on the recovery of his health. R—430, Dec. 30. Reports the President is ill with influenza; remarks sarcastically about Franco and Tito. R—431, Dec. 31. Reports that de Gaulle will not bring the three ex-Vichy officials to trial until a National Assembly is properly constituted in France, and that the three will be comfortably housed.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXUl

R—432, Dec. 31. Comments on U.S. command appointments for the Mediterranean. R—432/1, Dec. 31. Comments on an enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of State; strongly opposes putting France on the Allied Control Commission for Italy and sympathizes with Churchill because the British Foreign Office does not agree with the Prime Minister regarding de Gaulle and France. The memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt passes on a recommendation from the American representative on the Advisory Council that France be given a seat on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. R—432/2, Dec. ? An inscription on a book given as a Christmas gift to Churchill. 1944 C—529, Jan. 1. Expresses concern over Churchill's illness; mentions talks with Eisenhower and Montgomery at Marrakesh; extends New Year's greetings. C—530, Jan. 2. Recalls a discussion at Teheran during which Stalin expressed reservations about the vagueness of the unconditionalsurrender policy. C—531, Jan. 4. Announces the appointment of Slessor to command British Air Forces in the Mediterranean; defends Sholto Douglas against the accusation that he dislikes Americans. R—433, Jan. 4. Proposes a draft of the January anti-submarine warfare statement. R—433/1, Jan. 4. A letter with a newspaper clipping which claimed there was a direct link between Churchill and the Mormons. C—532, Jan. 5. Requests that General Wilson assume command of the Mediterranean theater upon arriving in Algiers on January 8. R—434, Jan. 5. Agrees to Slessor's appointment and to General Wilson's taking over the Mediterranean theater on January 8. R—435, Jan. 5. Suggests that the word "invasion" be used only for Allied operations across the German frontier, not those in areas to be liberated from German occupation; passes information about Hopkins' illness. C—533, Jan. 6. Expresses the hope that the shortage of LSTs can be worked out; indicates that Czech President BeneS might be able to mediate the dispute between Poland and the Soviet Union and that the Poles should accept the compromise proposed by Benes. C—534, Jan. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for a copy of the President's addresses. C-535, Jan. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for message R-434.

CXlV

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—436, Jan. 6. Opposes any attempt to define unconditional surrender by giving specific surrender terms. C—536, Jan. 7. Reports on discussions held with U.S. military officers about the size and timing of OVERLORD; suggests that the best date for OVERLORD would be June 2 and that Stalin would not be upset by such a short delay beyond May. C-537, Jan. 7. Gives the Y date (C-536) as June 2, 1944. R—437, Jan. 8. Discusses Soviet requests for a share of the captured Italian Navy; states that he has promised the Russians one-third of those warships although the transfer might have to be delayed since the ships are needed for OVERLORD and ANVIL. R—438, Jan. 8. Suggests delaying the release of the January anti-submarine warfare statement. C—538, Jan. 8. Proposes a joint statement announcing a number of AngloAmerican command appointments. C—539, Jan. 8. Reports agreement on plans for "action as proposed." C—540, Jan. 8. Indicates that the operation mentioned in C-539 is SHINGLE (the Anzio landings) and that the operation can be conducted without interfering with the preparations for OVERLORD. C-541, Jan. 8. Gives January 22 as D-day for SHINGLE. C—542, Jan. 9. Proposes changes to the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement. C—543, Jan. 9. Agrees that they should not break faith with Stalin on the question of the transfer of Italian warships; promises a draft message to Stalin in a few days. R—439, Jan. 10. Agrees to Churchill's alterations in the anti-submarine warfare statement for January. C—544, Jan. 10. Forwards a copy of a letter to Tito in which the Prime Minister promises support but asks that the Partisans understand that Britain cannot cast aside the Royal Yugoslavian Government. R—440, Jan. 12. Indicates the United States will not withdraw its support for General Giraud in favor of de Gaulle. R—441, Jan. 14. Refuses even to mention a slight delay in OVERLORD to Stalin. R—442, Jan. 14. Informs Churchill that the OSS has learned of German intelligence activities in Turkey. C—545, Jan. 16. Proposes a delay in transferring Italian warships to the Soviet Union and possibly lending some British and American ships instead; a separately dispatched paragraph (Jan. 22) contains a MAGIC Summary of the political situation in Italy sent by the Irish Minister in Rome.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

cxv

C—546, Jan. 16. Indicates complete agreement with R-441. R—443, Jan. 17. Claims the Portuguese have reversed an earlier agreement to permit a squadron of U.S. aircraft to operate out of the Azores; proposes sending the American squadron even without Portuguese permission. C—547, Jan. 18. Reports Churchill's return to England; promises messages on the questions of use of the Azores and the problems with the Poles, the Turks, and the Argentines; mentions a British mission to Tito, Roosevelt's State of the Union address, and Hopkins' illness. C-548, Jan. 19. Thanks Roosevelt for R-442 and assures him a complete investigation is underway. R—444, Jan. 19. Agrees with Churchill's proposed cable to Stalin about the Italian fleet (C-545) but. suggests a commitment to transfer some destroyers and submarines from Italy to the Soviet Union as soon as possible. R—445, Jan. 19. Suggests the wording of a recommendation from the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the disposition of the Italian fleet; the newly phrased message would be sent to Stalin. R—446, Jan. 19. Expresses pleasure at Churchill's safe return to England; mentions Hopkins' illness. R—446/1, Jan. 19. Refers Churchill to a MAGIC message of December 23, 1943, as a possible key to understanding a Pravda accusation that the British had planned to hold peace talks with the Germans. (MAGIC intercept WS 5850 of Dec. 23, 1943, is included.) C—549, Jan. 19. Claims that the Portuguese had not intended for American combat forces to operate out of the Azores; suggests that Salazar would not object to American forces wearing British insignia. C—550, Jan. 21. Proposes the elimination of any promise to Stalin to transfer Italian destroyers or submarines in the near future. R—447, Jan. 22. Agrees to Churchill's request in C-550. C—550/1, Jan. 22. Thanks Roosevelt for having drawn his attention to MAGIC of December 23, 1943. R—448, Jan. 22. Declines the offer to have U.S. forces in the Azores wear British insignia and asks that Churchill try to convince Salazar to permit the United States to use those facilities. C—551, Jan. 23. Informs Roosevelt that theirjoint message to Stalin about the disposition of the Italian fleet has been sent. C—552, Jan. 23. Asks that the United States not break diplomatic relations with Argentina lest it disrupt the flow of foodstuffs and other supplies to Britain from Argentina.

CXVl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C-553, Jan. 23. Forwards a copy of a message to Macmillan in which Churchill expresses continued British support for the Italian monarchy and the government of Marshal Badoglio. R—448/1, not sent; Jan. 25. A draft written in the State Department proposing that Victor Emmanuel be forced to abdicate because of his association with the Fascists. R—449, Jan. 24. Informs Churchill that the Argentine government has promised to break diplomatic relations with Germany; suggests that it is time to press the Argentines to eliminate German espionage activities in Argentina; mentions a coup d'etat in Bolivia. C—554, Jan. 24. Asks for news about Hopkins' illness. C—555, Jan. 25. Expresses pleasure that the exposure of German espionage in Argentina has forced the Argentines to cooperate; asks if the British statement about Bolivia was satisfactory. R—450, Jan. 25. Acknowledges receipt of C-545 (par. 6), C-553, and C 555. C—556, Jan. 26. Again asks if Eden's statement about Bolivia was satisfactory. R—451, Jan. 27. Expresses pleasure at Eden's statement about Bolivia; again urges that both Britain and the United States press Argentina to eliminate any cooperation with the German cause. C—557, Jan. 28. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin summarizing talks Churchill conducted with representatives of the Polish government in exile during which the Prime Minister proposed that the Poles accept the Curzon line as the Soviet-Polish boundary and that the Soviet Union recognize the Polish government (London). R—452, Jan. 29. Reports that Hopkins is recovering slowly from a bout of influenza and a recurrence of previous digestive problems. R—453, Jan. 29. Requests information about Churchill's talk with de Gaulle while the Prime Minister was in Marrakesh. R—454, Jan. 29. Complains about inefficiency and delays along the Britishoperated supply route from Calcutta through Assam to Burma and proposes that American military forces take control. C—558, Jan. 30. Extends birthday greetings to Roosevelt. C—559, Jan. 30. Summarizes Churchill's talks with de Gaulle: he warned against punishing Peyrouton, Flandin, and Boisson, and also indicated that the British and the Americans do not have confidence in the French Committee or de Gaulle. C—560, Jan. 30. Argues that the French Committee should be granted representation on the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXVH

C—561, Jan. 30. Acknowledges receipt of R-454 and promises to give the problem of supplying Burma immediate personal attention. C-562, Feb. 1. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin to Churchill and Roosevelt again demanding the transfer of Italian warships or a similar number of American and British warships to the Soviet Union. C—563, Feb. 1. States that Duff Cooper's report of talks with de Gaulle is being forwarded to the President. R—455, Feb. 2. Proposes the abolition of the Emergency Propaganda Committee in New Delhi. C—564, Feb. 3. Argues that the military situation requires that the present Italian government continue in office. C—565/A, not sent; Feb. 1. Suggests that Churchill and Roosevelt not answer the Soviet Premier's message (C-562) for a week to ten days; expresses annoyance that Stalin does not understand the Allied position on transfers of the Italian fleet to Russia. C—565, Feb. 3. Suggests various solutions to meet Stalin's demand for portions of the Italian fleet; recommends as the best solution the transfer of some old destroyers, originally given to Britain by the United States in 1941. R—456, Feb. 4. Indicates that the United States cannot spare any submarines or destroyers to substitute for the Italian ships requested by Stalin; proposes a draft message to Stalin. C—566, Feb. 5. Passes on the substance of a conversation between Stalin and the British Ambassador about Soviet-Polish relations in which Stalin insisted on the elimination of certain anti-Soviet figures from the Polish government. C—567, Feb. 5. Promises to send four British submarines to the Soviet Union until some Italian submarines can be permanently transferred to Russia. C—568, Feb. 6. Forwards a message from Stalin on Soviet-Polish relations. C-569, Feb. 6. Contains the text of the message referred to in C-568. In it Stalin again demands the Curzon line as the Polish-Soviet boundary and the elimination of certain anti-Soviet members from the Polish government. C-570, Feb. 6. Suggests sending the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to London for conversations about overall strategy in Europe and the Mediterranean. R—456/1, Feb. 7. Discusses Soviet-Polish problems and forwards a copy of a cable from the President to Stalin asking the Soviet leader to try to work out the differences.

CXVlIl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—457, Feb. 7. Indicates that the United States will not accept responsibility for policing postwar France, Italy, or the Balkans; insists that the United States will occupy northwestern Germany. R-458, Feb. 7. Registers approval of Churchill's draft message to Stalin (C-567). R—459, Feb. 7. Acknowledges receipt of four messages from Churchill. C—571, Feb. 7. Forwards the proposed anti-submarine warfare statement for February. R—459/1, Feb. 7. Introduces Robert E. Sherwood. C—572, Feb. 7. Acknowledges receipt of R—458 and reports having sent the message to Stalin. R—460, Feb. 8. Offers a minor amendment to the February anti-submarine warfare statement. C—573, Feb. 8. Criticizes Count Sforza and asks that Roosevelt take no action regarding Italy without first consulting the British. C—574, Feb. 9. Accepts the amendment to the February anti-submarine warfare statement. R—461, Feb. 9. Rejects the request for a meeting in London between the U.S. Joint Chiefs and British military leaders; indicates that current plans are satisfactory. R—462, Feb. 9. Acknowledges receipt of C—572 and indicates special interest in Stalin's reply. R—463, Feb. 9. Tells of a report that Bulgaria wants to discuss a peace settlement; suggests a suspension of Allied bombing to encourage such talks. C—575, Feb. 10. Argues that the bombing of Bulgaria should continue. C-575/1, Feb. 11. Forwards a record of lengthy conversations held between members of the Polish government and British officials concerning the broad range of Soviet-Polish problems. R-464, Feb. 11. Notes that he has instructed the State Department not to take any action aimed at changing the existing government of Italy. C—576, Feb. 12. Proposes telling the Bulgarians that they should send a fully qualified mission to discuss peace with representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. R—465, Feb. 12. Agrees with Churchill's suggestions regarding negotiations with Bulgaria. C—577, Feb. 13. Argues that the best interests of the Allies are met by retaining the present Italian government; agrees to support U.S.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXlX

demands that Spain cease shipments of wolfram to Germany; mentions problems with the Poles and the death of Harry Hopkins' son. C-578, Feb. 13. Contains a message of sympathy for Harry Hopkins on the death of his son. R—466, Feb. 14. Agrees to permit a French representative to sit on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. C-579, Feb. 15. Thanks Roosevelt for cable R-466. R— 467, Feb. 15. Reports progress in efforts to cut off shipments of wolfram from Spain to Germany. R—468, Feb. 15. Mentions forwarding Churchill's message (C-578) to Hopkins; mentions better news from Italy, and reports of low morale among German submarine crews. C—580, Feb. 15. Suggests that the United States and Great Britain inform Stalin of the proposals for discussions with Bulgaria. R—469, Feb. 16. Agrees with Churchill's draft of instructions to their Ambassadors in Moscow regarding talks with Bulgaria. C—581, Feb. 16. Opposes any transfer of fighter aircraft from the Mediterranean to China. R—470, Feb. 17. Forwards the text of a message to Stalin in which Roosevelt lists the naval vessels being sent to the Soviet Union in lieu of transferring Italian ships. R-471, Feb. 18. Indicates that the transfer of fighter aircraft to China is necessitated by Operation MATTERHORN, the bombing of Japan from bases in China. C—582, Feb. 19. Agrees to abolish the New Delhi Emergency Propaganda Committee, but suggests that its functions for Southeast Asia be handled by the London committee. C—583, Feb. 20. Suggests postponing a conference on postwar oil policy; argues that such talks should at first be technical and private. C—584, Feb. 20. Asks Roosevelt to send a message to Stalin supporting Churchill's following message. C—585, Feb. 20. Forwards a copy of a cable to Stalin in which Churchill outlines the results of lengthy talks between Polish and British officials on Soviet-Polish relations. C—586, Feb. 21. Recommends accepting the settlement with Spain suggested by the British Ambassador in Madrid; mentions German bomb damage to 10 Downing Street.

CXX

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—587, Feb. 21. Comments on the cable he has just sent to Stalin (C585), indicating that the Poles have made some courageous compromises; summarizes instructions given to the British Ambassador in Moscow to emphasize the bad effect on U.S. and British public opinion which would follow a Soviet refusal to consider the new proposals. R—472, Feb. 21. Agrees to have the functions of the New Delhi Emergency Propaganda Committee handled by similar committees in London and Washington. R—473, Feb. 21. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin in which the President commends Churchill's efforts to work out a settlement of Soviet-Polish problems. C—588, Feb. 22. Acknowledges receipt of R-472 and thanks Roosevelt for sending a message to Stalin (R-473). R—474, Feb. 22. Discusses Anglo-American negotiations about unnecessary lend-lease transfers and asks if Britain can arrange to keep its gold and dollar holdings at about $1 billion. R—474/1, Feb. 22. Discusses Anglo-American competition for petroleum; insists on high-level discussions in Washington regarding postwar oil policy. C—589, Feb. 23. Argues that assigning the northwestern portion of Germany as the American occupation zone would create serious military and postwar political problems; suggests that U.S. forces will not have to be stationed in France for a long time. R—475, Feb. 23. Forwards an exchange of cables between Stalin and the President in which Stalin asks about the transfer of British and American warships and Roosevelt replies that he thought the British were sending them. R—476, Feb. 23. Proposes that Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States begin discussions regarding postwar economic collaboration. R—477, Feb. 23. Suggests that Britain and the United States consider the continuation of their Combined Boards beyond the end of the war as part of a broader scheme of international economic cooperation. R—478, Feb. 23. Thanks Churchill for the information about a possible settlement of Anglo-American disputes with Spain; expresses pleasure that no one in the Churchill family was injured by the German bombs which fell on the Prime Minister's residence. R—479, Feb. 23. Asks for information about British progress in the campaign in northern Burma. C—590, Feb. 23. Explains that delivery of the British promise to send warships to Russia had been delayed because Stalin was out of Moscow; mentions Spain.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXl

C—590/1, Feb. 23. A letter enclosing a photograph of the damage to 10 Downing Street caused by German bombs (the photograph is reproduced here). C—591, Feb. 24. Indicates grave concern over Roosevelt's insistence that postwar petroleum policy be discussed at a high-level, highly publicized conference in Washington. R—480, Feb. 24. Summarizes U.S. strategy in the Pacific and asks that the British exert all possible effort to support the campaign in northern Burma; opposes an attack on Sumatra (CULVERIN). R—481, Feb. 25. Reports giving approval to an agreement reached by Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the allocation of shipping and landing craft for ANVIL and OVERLORD. C—592, Feb. 25. Promises full British support for operations in northern Burma; expresses doubts that the Ledo Road could carry enough supplies to make it worth the effort; mentions the shift of the Japanese fleet to Singapore, Wedemeyer's forthcoming visit to Washington, and the military situation in Italy. C—593, Feb. 25. Asks that Roosevelt continue to support the existing government in Italy in spite of a recommendation from General Wilson to push for the abdication of the King and the replacement of the Badoglio government. R—482, Feb. 25. Forwards a message from Harriman reporting Soviet agreement with Anglo-American plans for negotiations with Bulgaria. R—483, Feb. 26. Reports that General Wilson's message about the Italian government had seemed to have Churchill's approval, but since that was not the case, Roosevelt will continue to support the existing government. C-594, Feb. 27. Thanks Roosevelt for R-483. C—595, Feb. 29. Forwards a report from the British Ambassador in Moscow about Soviet-Polish relations which indicates that the Soviet Union will continue to insist on the Curzon line and a substantial reorganization of the Polish government; also contains a summary of a talk between the Ambassador and Stalin regarding the transfer of Anglo-American warships in place of the captured Italian vessels. C—596, Feb. 29. Suggests meeting a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. R—483/1, Feb. 29. A letter, with enclosures, which argues for short, general surrender terms for Germany and which states that the United States will not become involved in postwar political affairs in France, Belgium, or Italy.

CXXU

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—483/2, Feb. 29. A letter forwarding a memorandum written by General Patrick Hurley which proposes a general approach toward the care and education of less-developed nations, using Iran as the case study. C—R/tel.—5, Feb. ? A memoir report of a German intercept of a ChurchillRoosevelt conversation concerning extensive military activity in England. C—597, Mar. 2. Proposes an item for the anti-submarine warfare statement for February. C—598, Mar. 2. Reports changes in the organization and supervision of the port of Calcutta and the Bengal-Assam lines of communication. R—484, Mar. 2. Forwards a revised draft of the February anti-submarine warfare statement. R—485, Mar. 3. Indicates that conversations about postwar oil policy cannot be long delayed; mentions American reinforcements for British naval forces in the Indian Ocean; expresses disappointment at the Soviet response to British suggestions about the Polish question and states that the destroyers being sent to Russia are valuable. R—486, Mar. 3. Informs Churchill of a statement made at a presidential press conference indicating that a portion of the Italian fleet will be transferred to the Soviet Union. R—487, Mar. 3. Suggests that General Wilson should control talks in Cairo with representatives of the Bulgarian government. C—599, Mar. 3. Inquires about a Reuter's report that Roosevelt has promised to send one third of the Italian fleet to Russia. C—600, Mar. 3. Forwards a copy of a Foreign Office report of the presidential statement mentioned in C-599. C—601, Mar. 4. Expresses pleasure that the United States does not covet British oil concessions in Iran and assures Roosevelt the British feel likewise about American interests in Saudi Arabia; mentions the Polish question, the transfer of the Italian fleet to Russia, and action near the Anzio beachhead; suggests the text of a message to Stalin about substituting Allied warships for Italian vessels. C—602, Mar. 4. Gives the precise figures of what one-third of the Italian fleet would amount to. C—603, Mar. 4. Explains why the planned offensive against Akyab, Burma, had to be canceled. C—604, Mar. 4. Registers disappointment that Stalin rejected British proposals about the problems of Soviet-Polish relations; states that it would now be all right for the Polish Prime Minister to visit the United States.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXlU

C—605, Mar. 4. Forwards Stalin's message rejecting the British suggestions about Soviet-Polish problems. C—605/1, not sent; Mar. 4. Acknowledges Roosevelt's letter of February 29 (R-483/1) but suggests waiting until later to make decisions about France. C—605/2, not sent; Mar. ? States that he looks forward to reading Roosevelt's paper about the administration of France; suggests letting the European Advisory Commission draft surrender terms for Germany. C-606, Mar. 5. Accepts the American draft of the February anti-submarine warfare statement with a minor amendment. C—607, Mar. 5. Suggests that negotiations with Bulgaria be conducted by representatives of the Allied governments, not the military. R—488, Mar. 6. Accepts Churchill's amendment to the anti-submarine warfare statement for February. C—608, Mar. 7. Explains in detail the British objections to transferring one-third of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union. C-608/1, Mar. 7. Thanks Roosevelt for the assurances that the United States has no desire to propose a transfer of British property and interests in the Middle East; suggests a public communique concerning the forthcoming petroleum conference. R—489, Mar. 7. Proposes giving General Wilson a confidential statement to show to Italian naval officers assuring them that the Allies have no intention of immediately transferring any Italian ships to the Soviet Union. R-490, Mar. 7. Suggests that the opposition parties in Italy should be brought into the government and that the King should abdicate. C-609, Mar. 7. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin concerning the Soviet-Polish controversy. C—610, Mar. 8. Strongly disagrees with Roosevelt's suggestion that the time has come for changes in the Italian government; criticizes Sforza and Croce; asks Roosevelt for American support in Italy. R—491, Mar. 8. Indicates that Lincoln MacVeagh will represent the American government in talks with representatives of the Bulgarian government. R—492, Mar. 8. Seems to accept Churchill's opposition to transferring one-third of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union. R-493, Mar. 8. Thanks Churchill for the useful statement of the British position regarding Polish-Soviet problems.

CXXlV

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R-494, Mar. 8. Agrees that Britain and the United States should work together on policy in Italy and repeats a request for suggestions on how to deal with the serious political situation there as reported by General Wilson. C—611, Mar. 9. Acknowledges receipt of Roosevelt's last four cables. C—612, Mar. 9. Agrees on the usefulness of Roosevelt's statement to be shown to Italian naval officers. C—613, Mar. 9. Asks that the United States not insist on limiting Britain's wartime dollar balances. C—614, Mar. 9. Asks that there be no public disclosure of Britain's dollar balances. C—615, Mar. 9. Reports the safe return of a British convoy from Russia. R—495, Mar. 9. Congratulates the British on the successful return of the convoy from Russia. C—616, Mar. 10. Asks that an inscription concerning Harry Hopkins' son, who was killed in action, be forwarded to Hopkins. C—617, Mar. 10. Offers a lengthy summary of the military situation in Southeast Asia and asks if U.S. operations in the Pacific would be hampered if the British concentrate their strength in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. R—496, Mar. 11. Reports on Harry Hopkins' health. R—497, Mar. 13. Agrees with the British proposal to concentrate U.K. naval forces in the Indian Ocean. R—498, Mar. 13. Discusses the political situation in Italy and indicates concern over U.S. public opinion. C—618, Mar. 13. Indicates a preference for continuing to work with the Italian King and Badoglio; expresses fear of a communist takeover in Italy. C—619, Mar. 14. Continues the arguments against cooperating with the forces in Italy which wanted to overthrow the monarchy. C—620, Mar. 14. Relates the story of the Long Range Penetration forces in Burma, led by Major General Orde Wingate. C—621, Mar. 15. States that the British War Cabinet does not view the Italian opposition parties as representative of the Italian people and that the Cabinet believes the Allies should work with the King until they capture Rome. R—499, Mar. 15. Congratulates Churchill on the exploits of Wingate's forces. R—500, Mar. 15. Reports having forwarded the inscription Churchill sent to Hopkins.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXV

R—501, Mar. 15. Proposes the initiation of a program to feed children and nursing and expectant mothers in the German-occupied coun­ tries. R-501/1, not sent; Mar. 16. Suggests that the best course of action in Poland is to make sure there is no Polish opposition to Soviet armies and to let questions of boundaries and the makeup of the Polish government await later discussions. R—501/2, Mar. 16. Forwards a copy of a proposed letter from the Pres­ ident to Turkish President Ιηόηϋ asking that the Turks stop ship­ ping chrome ore to Germany. C—622, Mar. 17. Requests U.S. air assistance to bring supplies and re­ inforcements to British troops holding Imphal against a Japanese attack. C—623, Mar. 17. Forwards a copy of Admiral Mountbatten's report on the Japanese offensive in the Imphal area. R-502, Mar. 17. Acquiesces to the British request not to force the King of Italy to abdicate until the Allies capture Rome, but warns that the Allies should support change if pressure from the six opposition parties becomes too great. C—624, Mar. 18. Proposes a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Bermuda; indicates strong personal support for OVERLORD. C—625, Mar. 18. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin complaining about the disclosure in London of a previous Stalin-to-Churchill cable. C—626, Mar. 19. Directs Roosevelt's attention to a message from the head of the South East Asia Command detailing opportunities for action against Japan in SEAC. C-627, Mar. 19. Suggests that the President withhold his message to the Turkish President (R-501/2) until they have more information about Turkish intentions. R—503, Mar. 19. Promises the air support needed by the British to protect Imphal. R—504, Mar. 19. Reports that the United States has agreed to deliver the USS Milwaukee directly to a northern Russian port. C—628, Mar. 19. Supports U.S. pressure on Ireland and indicates the steps Britain would take to ensure security for OVERLORD. R—505, Mar. 20. Acknowledges receipt of C—626 and informs Churchill of an American request to Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese pro­ vide support for the operations planned by the SEAC commander. R—506, Mar. 20. States that Roosevelt is too ill to meet with Churchill, although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff could attend staff meetings.

CXXVl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—629, Mar. 21. Indicates concern over Roosevelt's health and states that Churchill sees no point in a meeting unless they can both attend. C-630, Mar. 21. Forwards a copy of a Churchill-to-Stalin cable thanking the Soviet leader for dealing gently with the Finns and outlining the British position that the question of Soviet-Polish boundaries will have to await the postwar peace conference since negotiations have broken down. R-506/1, Mar. 21. Forwards a copy of a directive for Eisenhower outlining the Supreme Allied Commander's authority and responsibility in liberated French territory. R—507, Mar. 22. Acknowledges C-629 and expresses a desire to meet with Churchill before OVERLORD begins. R-508, Mar. 22. Thanks Churchill for the explanation of the British position on Soviet-Polish problems as related in C-630. R—509, Mar. 24. Notes that questions of British dollar-balances and the use of lend-lease are politically sensitive and warns they may have to be discussed again. C—631, Mar. 30. Outlines a compromise with Spain regarding wolfram shipments and other dealings with Germany. C—632, Apr. 1. Discusses Stalin's refusal to compromise on disputes with the Poles. C—633, Apr. 1. Forwards copies of Stalin's cables about the Polish-Soviet dispute and about the disclosure of a Stalin-to-Churchill cable. C—634, Apr. 1. Contains the text of instructions to the British Ambassador setting forth the British position regarding the Soviet-Polish dispute. C—635, Apr. 1. Requests that adequate provisions be made for communications during Roosevelt's vacation in South Carolina; mentions a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. R—510, Apr. 3. Reports that the Soviet Union refuses to participate in the International Labor Organization meeting in Philadelphia and asks Churchill to send British Labour Minister Ernest Bevin. R—510/1, Apr. 3. Suggests minor exceptions to proposed British measures against Ireland outlined in C-628. C—636, Apr. 4. Requests an increased allocation of LSTs for the South East Asia Command. R—511, Apr. 4. Mentions Roosevelt's health, the vote in the House of Commons, and the upcoming visits of the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. R-512, Apr. 4. Indicates reluctance to compromise with Spain on the issue of wolfram shipments to Germany.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXVIl

C—637, Apr. 5. Proposes the April anti-submarine warfare statement. R—513, Apr. 5. Supports the British position on the Soviet-Polish dispute; mentions that the visit of S. Mikolajczyk is under consideration. C—638, Apr. 6. Requests that the United States not send an OSS mission to the headquarters of General Mihailovic. C—639, Apr. 6. Thanks Roosevelt for his message 512 about Spanish wolfram shipments. C—640, Apr. 7. Discusses the imposition of tighter security measures on Irish shipping. R—514, Apr. 7. Agrees to Churchill's draft for the April anti-submarine warfare statement. R—515, Apr. 8. Agrees not to send an OSS mission to Mihailovic's headquarters. R—516, Apr. 8. Suggests Stalin should be informed once a new date is set for ANVIL. R—517, Apr. 8. Forwards a copy of Roosevelt's response to a request from Mackenzie King for increased national control over Canadian armed forces, rejecting anything which would bypass the Combined Chiefs of Staff. R-518, Apr. 8. Criticizes French demands for censor-free communication between the French Committee and its military and political units; expresses reluctance to invite de Gaulle to Washington unless the French leader first indicates a desire to make the trip. C—641, Apr. 8. Rejects an American proposal to establish relief programs for children and expectant mothers in German-occupied countries. R—519, Apr. 8. Agrees with the British decision explained in C-641. C-642, Apr. 9. Expresses appreciation for the American decision not to send a mission to Mihailovic's headquarters. C—643, Apr. 12. Discusses the question of the French Committee exercizing civil authority in liberated France; agrees that the French should not be privy to information about OVERLORD; denies the right of the French to any of the Italian fleet; tries to arrange a visit to the United States by de Gaulle. R—520, Apr. 13. Denies the British request for a larger allocation of LSTs for Southeast Asia. R-521, Apr. 13. Complains about the conduct of de Gaulle and the FCNL. C—644, Apr. 14. Suggests a message to Stalin estimating the date of OVERLORD and asking about Soviet military plans. C—645, Apr. 14. Regrets the U.S. decision not to provide additional LSTs for Southeast Asia; agrees that Giraud's dismissal by the French Committee was unfortunate.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—646, Apr. 15. Outlines security measures restricting uncensored diplomatic communications so as to safeguard OVERLORD; suggests the United States should adopt similar procedures. C—647, Apr. 15. Agrees that there should be discussions on postwar Anglo-American economic cooperation. R—522, Apr. 16. Offers a revised draft of a joint message to Stalin regarding the start of OVERLORD. C—648, Apr. 16. Explains the outbreak of mutiny among Greek forces in Egypt as well as the steps being taken by British authorities to restore order. R—523, Apr. 17. Expresses support for British policy regarding the Greek mutiny. C—649, Apr. 17. Argues that the United States should accept the compromise offered by the Spanish on the question of wolfram shipments to Germany. R-524, Apr. 18. Acknowledges receipt of C-647. C—650, Apr. 18. Agrees with Roosevelt's redraft of a joint message to Stalin about OVERLORD; suggests one minor revision. R—525, Apr. 18. Agrees to Churchill's change suggested in C-650. R—525/1, Apr. 18. Notes that security problems are different in the United States but that military authorities are considering the steps needed to protect OVERLORD. C—651, Apr. 18. Thanks Roosevelt for supporting British policy regarding the Greek mutiny. C—652, Apr. 19. States that George Tomlinson will attend the International Labor Organization meeting instead of Ernest Bevin. C-653, Apr. 19. Tries to arrange an invitation for de Gaulle to visit the United States. C—654, Apr. 20. Forwards a copy of a cable to Mackenzie King in which Churchill agrees with the American position that Canadian armed forces have to be controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. R—526, Apr. 20. Expresses regret that Ernest Bevin cannot attend the I.L.O. meeting. R—527, Apr. 20. Requests that any visit to Washington by de Gaulle be delayed for a month. C—654/1, Apr. 20. A letter telling Roosevelt that he will receive copies of a Cabinet committee report on Basic English. R—528, Apr. 21. Acknowledges and agrees with Churchill's message to Mackenzie King (C-654). R—529, Apr. 21. Rejects any compromise on the question of wolfram shipments to Germany.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXlX

C—655, Apr. 22. Presents a lengthy argument in favor of compromise with Spain regarding wolfram shipments to Germany. C—656, Apr. 22. Agrees with Roosevelt's criticisms of de Gaulle but argues for a de Gaulle-Roosevelt meeting after mid-May. R—530, Apr. 23. Denies that de Gaulle and the FCNL have made any significant contribution to the war and warns that de Gaulle will have to ask that a visit be arranged, since Roosevelt refuses to invite him. C—657, Apr. 24. Discusses the Greek mutiny in Egypt, Egyptian politics, military affairs in Italy, and Roosevelt's health. C—658, Apr. 24. Gives the date for an offensive in Italy as May 14. C—659, Apr. 24. Complains about a speech by Rear Admiral Francis Low concerning anti-submarine warfare, since such statements are supposed to appear in the joint anti-submarine warfare statements. C—660, Apr. 24. Reports that British troops have quelled the Greek mutiny. C—661, Apr. 25. Forwards a cable from Stalin promising a Russian offensive at the time OVERLORD is launched. R—531, Apr. 25. Accepts the compromise proposal to restrict Spanish shipments of wolfram to Germany. R-532, Apr. 25. Mentions the Greek and Egyptian political situations; promises to look into the matter of Admiral Low's speech about anti-submarine warfare. C—662, Apr. 26. Expresses appreciation over American willingness to compromise on the matter of wolfram shipments from Spain. C—663, Apr. 26. Requests Roosevelt to send Ivan Subasic, the Ban of Croatia, to England. C—664, Apr. 26. Reports on political problems in Egypt. C-665, Apr. 29. Requests an allocation of U.S. shipping to carry grain from Australia to India. C—666, Apr. 29. Expresses sorrow at the death of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. C-667, Apr. 29. Suggests publication of the message extending condolences at the death of Frank Knox. R-533, Apr. 29. Agrees that Churchill's message about Knox's death should be published. C—668, Apr. 29. Expresses gratitude for Admiral King's offer of additional assault vessels for an invasion of southern or western France; discusses the forthcoming offensive in Italy, codenamed DIADEM. C—668/1, May 1. Thanks Roosevelt for the presidential portrait and forwards to him a portrait of the Prime Minister.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—533/1, not sent; May 4. Draft of a message disagreeing with Churchill's proposed embargo on diplomatic communications to and from embassies in the United States in order to increase security for OVERLORD. R—534, May 5. Forwards the draft of the April statement on anti-submarine warfare. C—669, May 7. Discusses the military and political arguments over the use of Allied air power preparatory to the OVERLORD assault. C—670, May 7. Forwards the gist of a protest from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for the FCNL against Allied bombing in France. C—671, May 8. Asks Roosevelt to meet with Sir Walter Citrine, a leader of the Labour Party, then visiting the United States. R—535, May 8. Agrees to meet with Sir Walter Citrine. C—672/A, not sent; May 7. Protests the use of the phrase United Nations instead of proper recognition to the British Navy in R—534. C—672, May 8. Agrees to the American draft of the April statement on anti-submarine warfare. R—536, May 10. Forwards a proposed message informing Stalin that the attack on southern France will come after rather than in conjunction with OVERLORD. R—537, May 11. Supports continued bombing of targets in France preparatory to OVERLORD. C—673, May 11. Suggests changes to Roosevelt's proposed message to Stalin regarding the invasion of southern France (R-536). C—674, May 12. Proposes inviting de Gaulle to England shortly before D-day in order to come to a working agreement with the FCNL so that they will cooperate fully in OVERLORD. R—538, May 12. Agrees to having de Gaulle visit England but expresses doubts about security within the FCNL; indicates that Eisenhower is not authorized to discuss political questions as they relate to France; approves proposed message to Stalin (C-673). R—539, May 13. Makes a joking reference to the arrival of the Ban of Croatia in England. C-675, May 13. Reports the dispatch of the message to Stalin (C-673). C—676, May 14. Reports the arrival of the Ban of Croatia in Yugoslavia. C—677, May 18. Forwards a copy of a Churchill-to-Tito message reporting changes in the Royal Yugoslavian Government, including the elimination of Mihailovic from the Cabinet.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

CXXXl

R—540, May 18. Supports the thrust of Churchill's cable to Tito and asks that Churchill tell King Peter of the President's position; suggests that the division of Yugoslavia into three confederated states might be a solution to the ethnic problem. R—541, May 18. Proposes a presidential statement to be issued shortly after the invasion of France, designed to wean the German people from the Nazis but without compromising Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender. C—678, May 19. Proposes bringing de Gaulle to England after the start of OVERLORD so as to avoid arguments over censorship; mentions discussions with the Soviet Union about eastern Europe; expresses optimism about the political situation in Greece; indicates pleasure about the recent military events in Italy. R—542, May 19. Reiterates his opposition to the FCNL being recognized as the provisional government of France. R-542/1, May 20. Thanks Churchill for the portrait (C-668/1); discusses his own health, indicating that he cannot come to England at the time of the Normandy invasion. C—678/1, May 21. Discusses Anglo-American relations with regard to Iran (Persia); agrees to look into accusations of British misuse of lendlease supplies in Iran. C—679, May 22. Suggests that Roosevelt's proposed statement to the German people (R-541) needs to be re-examined. C—680, May 25. Expresses concern that Roosevelt's proposed message to the German people (R-541) would be misinterpreted as a sort of appeal for peace and a retreat from unconditional surrender; invites Roosevelt to England. C—681, May 26. Informs Roosevelt that Robert Brand has been appointed the representative of the British Treasury in Washington. C—682, May 26. Hints at the need to work more closely with de Gaulle in order to guarantee French cooperation with OVERLORD. R—543, May 27. Agrees that a statement to the German people is unnecessary; declines Churchill's invitation to visit England and indicates that full staff meetings are not necessary at the time. R—544, May 27. Re-emphasizes the need to restrict cooperation with de Gaulle strictly to military matters. R—545, May 27. Forwards a proposed order to the Combined Chiefs of Staff directing them to instruct Eisenhower to have United States forces occupy the northwestern section of Germany as well as Holland.

CXXXIl

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C-683, May 27. Makes corrections to C-680. C-684, May 27. Discusses the problem of French cooperation during OVERLORD and de Gaulle's presence in England before the invasion; mentions the Italian campaign. C—685, May 28. Repeats the invitation for Roosevelt to come to England; suggests that the United States send someone to England to discuss politics with the French; mentions the Italian campaign. C—686, May 31. Expresses surprise that Roosevelt has returned to demanding the northwestern occupation zone in Germany and requests that the President reconsider. R—546/A, not sent; May 29. Indicates that General Marshall will discuss military matters with de Gaulle; regretfully refuses Churchill's invitation to visit England; suggests postponing any meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. R—546, May 31. States that de Gaulle will have to ask for an invitation to visit the United States; states that General Marshall can talk with the French only about military matters, and that no one will represent the United States at political discussions with de Gaulle; refuses Churchill's invitation to visit England; postpones any meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C—687, May 31. Raises the issue of a divergence of American and British policies regarding the Balkans, particularly in Greece; informs Roosevelt of an Anglo-Soviet agreement whereby.the Russians will, for the duration of the war, control Roumania, and the British will control Greece. R—546/1, June ? Informs Churchill that Hull has been asked to discuss the idea of Basic English with Congress. R—547, June 1. Expresses pleasure at the appointment of Robert Brand to represent the British Treasury in Washington. R—548, June 1. Refuses the British request for additional shipping to bring wheat into India (C-665). C—688, June 1. Outlines a plan whereby the French will be informed of the time and place of OVERLORD without compromising Allied security; discusses the propaganda broadcasts scheduled to be made simultaneously with OVERLORD; suggests meeting with Roosevelt at Quebec or Bermuda. C-689, June 1. Thanks Roosevelt for accepting Robert Brand as the British Treasury's representative in Washington. C—690, June 2. Forwards a draft of a speech written for delivery by King George VI on the evening of D-day. C—691, June 2. Proposes renewing the British convoys of supplies to northern Russia.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

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R—549, J u n e 2. Reiterates the President's unwillingness to have the United States occupy the southern zone of Germany; cables Roosevelt's letter (R-483/1) on the subject of occupation zones. C—692, J u n e 4. Discusses plans for briefing d e Gaulle about O V E R L O R D ; suggests that American newspaper criticism of the Prime Minister's favorable reference to Spain was unfair; mentions sending a postD-day message to Stalin, the successful anti-submarine warfare, Sir Harold Alexander, and Harry Hopkins. C—692/1, not sent; J u n e 5. Proposes and argues for an invasion of western France, in the Bay of Biscay, instead of an attack against southern France. C - 6 9 3 , J u n e 6. Forwards a draft of the May statement on anti-submarine warfare. R—550, J u n e 6. Supports British proposals to resume convoys to n o r t h e r n Russia. R—551, J u n e 6. Indicates his willingness to meet with de Gaulle in Washington; agrees that he and Churchill should send a joint message to Stalin about the results of O V E R L O R D and future military plans. R—552, J u n e 6. (Drafted J u n e 4, cabled J u n e 6.) Offers congratulations on the capture of Rome by the Allies; mentions arrangements for de Gaulle to request a meeting with the President; mentions Franco, Randolph Churchill, and Harry Hopkins. R—553, J u n e 6. Agrees to the British draft of the May anti-submarine warfare statement. R—553/1, J u n e 6. A letter telling Churchill that Roosevelt is sending two typewriters with a typeface which Churchill likes. R - 5 5 4 , J u n e 7. Requests that the British delegates to the Anglo-American meetings on petroleum be sent to Washington as soon as possible. C—694, J u n e 7. Reports on the British political discussions with d e Gaulle; indicates that Churchill will side with Roosevelt if d e Gaulle refuses to compromise. C - 6 9 5 , J u n e 9. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin with congratulations about the N o r m a n d y invasion and outlining plans for a s u m m e r offensive by Soviet armies. R—555, J u n e 9. Comments on the better-late-than-never schedule for the Soviet s u m m e r offensive. R—556, J u n e 9. Complains about d e Gaulle's attitude and indicates that de Gaulle may visit the United States in J u n e or July. C—696, J u n e 9. Discusses the problem of de Gaulle's attempt to use special occupation currency, to be issued in liberated France by the Allies, as a means of gaining recognition as the leader of France.

CXXXlV

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—697, J u n e 9. Further discusses the problem of occupation currency in liberated France. C—698, J u n e 10. Forwards the text of a message from Stalin again congratulating the Allies on the success of OVERLORD and announcing the start of the Soviet s u m m e r offensive. C—699, J u n e 10. Argues against replacing Italian Prime Minister Badoglio with a g r o u p of liberals supported by the United States. R—557, J u n e 10. Expresses strong opposition to Anglo-Soviet agreement to divide the Balkans into "spheres of influence." R—558, J u n e 11. Requests opinions on the Italian political situation from the Italian Advisory Committee and General Wilson, the Allied c o m m a n d e r in the Mediterranean. C - 7 0 0 , J u n e 11. Defends the Anglo-Soviet a r r a n g e m e n t in the Balkans; uses Egypt and Greece as examples where decisive British action prevented political chaos; requests that Roosevelt accept the AngloSoviet agreement for a three-month "trial" period. C—701, J u n e 11. Agrees to seek on-the-scene advice about the political situation in Italy. R—559, J u n e 12. Insists that Allied occupation currency be used in liberated France as previously agreed by the British Treasury; complains about d e Gaulle's attempt to use the currency issue to gain recognition. R—560, J u n e 12. Agrees to a three-month "trial" period for the AngloSoviet agreement in the Balkans. C—702, J u n e 12. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin seeming to support Churchill's position regarding the Italian government and also congratulating the Allies on the scope and success of OVERLORD. C—703, J u n e 14. T h a n k s Roosevelt for agreeing to the temporary implementation of the Anglo-Soviet a r r a n g e m e n t in the Balkans; briefly discusses the political situation in Italy; discusses de Gaulle's planned trip to the front in France; mentions the issue of occupation currency in liberated France; discusses the military situation at Normandy, particularly questions of supply. R—561, J u n e 14. Approves General de Gaulle's visit to N o r m a n d y but reiterates opposition to recognizing the French General as the political leader of liberated France; mentions Italy and Churchill's visit to the front in Normandy. C—704, J u n e 14. Agrees to send representatives to the Petroleum Conference in the near future. R—562, J u n e 15. Defends the changes in the Italian government, noting that any attempt to interfere would upset the American public.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

cxxxv

C-704/1, June 16. Thanks Roosevelt for having sent the two typewriters (R-553/1). C-705, June 17. Agrees not to try to reinstall Badoglio as Prime Minister of Italy but suggests getting Stalin's approval before accepting the new government; suggests publishing the long surrender terms. R-563, June 17. Asks for the advice of General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff before publishing the long surrender terms for Italy. C—706, June 18. Forwards a press release announcing useful negotiations between Tito and the new Royal Yugoslav Government of Subasic. R—564, June 19. Mentions de Gaulle's visit to Normandy and his possible visit to the United States; mentions U.S. military successes in the Pacific and a probable presidential visit to the U.S. West Coast. C—707, June 20. Hopes that Roosevelt and de Gaulle can reach some sort of working agreement; congratulates Roosevelt on U.S. achievements in the Pacific; requests a meeting before October, suggesting Quebec in mid-August; asks Roosevelt to visit the site of the Normandy invasion. C—708, June 20. Proposes sending Lord Beaverbrook to the Petroleum Conference; mentions the V-I (flying bomb) attacks on southern England. C—709, June 21. Discusses the problem of occupation currency in liberated France and who should back it. C-710, June 21. Requests that Allied forces not be withdrawn from Italy until discussions on future strategy are completed. C—711, June 21. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin thanking the British for restoring convoys of supplies to northern Russia and mentioning the Italian political situation, the Normandy invasion, and the Soviet summer offensives. R—565, June 22. Expresses concern about the Anglo-Soviet arrangement in the Balkans, particularly because the United States was not consulted in advance. C-712, June 23. Defends British policy in the Balkans, including Greece and Yugoslavia; mentions Oliver Lyttelton and the excellent performance of American troops in France. R—566, June 23. Insists that forces have to be moved out of the Italian theater in order to prepare for the invasion of southern France, though he agrees that there may have been a misunderstanding about the shift of some units of the U.S. fleet. R—567, June 23. Cautions Churchill against making any political agreements with de Gaulle prior to de Gaulle's visit to the United States. C—713, June 24. Denies any intention of trying to reach any formal agreements with de Gaulle without U.S. approval.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—568, June 24. Agrees that Beaverbrook represent the British during the petroleum talks; mentions bombing raids against the V-I launch sites. R—569, June 24. Acknowledges receipt of C—711. C—714, June 25. Indicates that the British are studying the "grave questions" raised by a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff paper claiming that Italy will not be a decisive theater of operations. R—570, June 26. Agrees to the temporary implementation of the AngloSoviet arrangement in the Balkans; mentions Oliver Lyttelton. R—571, June 26. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin summarizing the talks Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk had had with American officials in Washington, as well as Roosevelt's request that Stalin meet with Mikolajczyk. R—572, June 26. Discusses the question of occupation currency for France, rejecting the suggestion that it be backed by the Allies. C—715, June 26. Thanks Roosevelt for straightening out the question of a premature withdrawal of forces from the Italian theater. C-716, June 27. Acknowledges cables R-570 and R-571. C—717, June 28. Indicates that Anglo-American military chiefs are deadlocked on plans for future military operations in the Mediterranean theater; states he is sending a full explanation of the British position; appeals for compromise. R—573, June 28. Endorses American proposals to withdraw forces from Italy in order to invade southern France (ANVIL) at the earliest possible date. C—718, June 28. A long cable setting forth Churchill's plan for a major thrust toward northern Italy with the goal of breaking through the German lines and gaining Trieste; argues that an invasion of southern France would do little to aid OVERLORD and would tie up resources which could be used to bring badly needed men and supplies to support OVERLORD directly; expresses the fear that ANVIL would draw off so much that victory in Italy could not be achieved. C—719, June 28. Asks Roosevelt to consider carefully all that Churchill had sent regarding future military operations in the Mediterranean. R—574, June 29. Insists that ANVIL be carried out as planned; argues that an advance through the Ljubljana gap into Slovenia and Hungary would be far more difficult than assumed in the British arguments; warns that any change in strategy agreed upon at Teheran would have to be referred to Stalin.

DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

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R-575, June 30. Requests that the British recall their Ambassador from Argentina. C—720, July 1. Acknowledges receipt of R-572 and expresses optimism about a settlement of the occupation-currency question. C—721/A, not sent; June 30. Protests the withdrawal of American troops from the Italian front in preparation for ANVIL; offers to resign as Prime Minister if that would solve the dispute over the future of the Italian front; offers to come to Bermuda, Quebec, or Washington to talk with the President. C—721, July 1. Presents again the British arguments for maintaining a major effort in Italy, even if it means postponing ANVIL; asks Roosevelt to reconsider but agrees to go along with whatever he decides. C—722, July 1. Forwards a copy of a message from Stalin which generally congratulates the Allies on their military successes and specifically praises the value of the Italian campaign. C-723, July 1. Reluctantly agrees to withdraw the British Ambassador from Argentina. R—576, July 1. Acknowledges receipt of C—722 and expresses pleasure at the tone of Stalin's message. R—577, July 1. Thanks Churchill for agreeing to carry out ANVIL as planned and again argues against the British proposal for an offensive into Istria; asks that the necessary directives be sent immediately to General Wilson. R—578, July 3. Proposes the June anti-submarine warfare statement. R—579, July 6. Thanks Churchill for recalling the British Ambassador from Argentina and expresses optimism that the Argentine government will change its pro-Axis policies. R—580, July 6. Forwards a Stalin-to-Roosevelt message expressing skepticism about the intentions of the Polish government of Mikolajczyk. C—724, July 7. Suggests changes to the June anti-submarine warfare statement. C—725, July 7. Proposes a special statement regarding successful Allied suppression of German submarine activity in the OVERLORD area. R—581, July 7. Suggests a minor change to the statement proposed in C— 725. R—582, July 10. Agrees to let the FCNL exercize temporary de facto civil authority in liberated France. R—582/1, July 10. Forwards a copy of a letter from an old acquaintance with some World War I papers for Churchill (two enclosures).

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—726, July 13. Suggests various agreements, based on Roosevelt's willingness to extend de facto recognition to the FCNL, delineating the authority of the FCNL. C—727, July 13. Forwards a copy of the proposed working arrangement between the Allies and the FCNL for the administration of the liberated portions of France. R—583, July 13. Expresses optimism that minor differences between British and American drafts of the working agreement with the FCNL can be worked out; emphasizes the need for Eisenhower to have whatever authority he needs for military reasons; mentions the presidential trip to the West Coast of the United States. R—584, July 13. Suggests a compromise which would make possible a prisoner exchange between the Allies and Japan. R—584/1, July 13. Requests Churchill to cooperate with American pressure on Sweden to eliminate exports to the enemy. C—728, July 14. Agrees with R-583. Wishes Roosevelt a successful trip to the Pacific. C—729, July 14. Reports on efforts to persuade the Australians to agree to the proposed exchange of prisoners with the Japanese. C—730, July 14. Requests that Roosevelt consider Britain's dependence on Argentine beef when pressing the Argentines to cut off support to the enemy. C—731, July 14. Forwards a minute from the British Minister of Food presenting the British arguments in favor of a meat-purchasing contract with Argentina. R—584/2, July 15. A letter requesting Churchill to meet with Morgenthau during Morgenthau's trip to England. C—732, July 16. Requests a meeting with Roosevelt or possibly Roosevelt and Stalin; suggests various locations. C—733, July 16. Proposes a Big Three meeting in Scotland; mentions Quebec as an alternate site. R—585, July 17. Agrees to meet with Churchill in mid-September, probably in Scotland; promises to invite Stalin to the meeting. R—586, July 17. Forwards a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message proposing a Big Three meeting in Scotland. C—734, July 20. Suggests special statements be issued about the effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine protection for OVERLORD convoys. R—587, July 21. Disapproves request made in C-734 lest such statements damage American submarine activity in the Pacific.

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R—588, July 22. Agrees to a new Anglo-Argentine meat contract but asks Churchill to make clear the British displeasure with Argentina's continued pro-Axis practices. C-735, July 25. Indicates that Britain will continue to support the Polish government in London while encouraging its Prime Minister to work for a fusion with Poles supported by the U.S.S.R. C-736, July 25. Forwards an exchange of cables between Churchill and Stalin regarding the visit of representatives of the London Polish government to Moscow. C-737, July 26. Asks Roosevelt to encourage the Polish Prime Minister to be cooperative during talks with the Soviet-supported Poles. C—737/1, July 27. Forwards an ULTRA intercept of a Japanese Army communication. C—738, July 27. Indicates a willingness to put pressure on Sweden to cut off trade with Germany, but cautions that the Allies must take care not to lose certain advantages already obtained in Sweden. R—589, July 27. Expresses pleasure that Randolph Churchill has survived an airplane crash. R—590, July 27. Forwards a copy of a message to Stalin expressing the hope that the Polish question can be worked out. R-591, July 28. Acknowledges receipt of C-738; mentions the presidential trip to the Pacific. R—592, July 28. Forwards a copy of a message to Mikolajczyk expressing the hope that his discussions with the Soviets will be successful. C-739, July 28. Thanks Roosevelt for the message about Randolph Churchill's escape from an airplane crash and fire. C-740, July 29. Repeats a message from Stalin which indicates a willingness to work with the London Poles; forwards a copy of Churchill's response. R—593, Aug. 3. Acknowledges receipt of C-740. C—741, Aug. 4. Suggests inviting Molotov to any Churchill-Roosevelt meeting since Stalin cannot attend; offers an optimistic view of military events in France. C—742, Aug. 4. Proposes canceling the invasion of southern France (DRAGOON) and instead using the same forces to attack German-held ports in Brittany. C—743, Aug. 5. Forwards the proposed anti-submarine warfare statement for July. C-744, Aug. 5. Requests a firm date for their meeting (OCTAGON); mentions Roosevelt's Pacific trip and outlines the Prime Minister's plans for a trip to Normandy and Italy.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

C—744/1, Aug. 5. Thanks Roosevelt for sending a framed copy of the Declaration of the United Nations. R—594, Aug. 8. Agrees to the proposed July statement on anti-submarine warfare. R-595, Aug. 8. Indicates that the OCTAGON meeting should not be in Scotland, and suggests Bermuda instead. R—596, Aug. 8. Refuses to cancel the invasion of southern France (DRAGOON). C—745, Aug. 8. Reluctantly agrees to the execution of Operation DRAGOON. C—746, Aug. 8. Discusses arrangements for OCTAGON. C—747, Aug. 8. Proposes releasing combat stories concerning anti-submarine activities in connection with OVERLORD. C-748, Aug. 8. Cancels proposals for OCTAGON made in C-746. C—749, Aug. 10. Forwards a Stalin-to-Churchill cable summarizing the talks in Moscow with the London Poles. C—750, Aug. 10. Because of bad weather in Bermuda in September, suggests that OCTAGON be held in Quebec; suggests they need to discuss Britain's role in the Pacific war as well as support for Allied forces in Italy. C—750/1, Aug. 10. Thanks Roosevelt for sending some naval signatures and papers regarding the Churchill family. R-597, Aug. 11. Suggests that OCTAGON begin on September 10 or 11. C-751, Aug. 11. Forwards an optimistic report from the British Ambassador in Moscow about the Polish-Soviet talks. R—598, Aug. 11. Acknowledges receipt of C-751. C—752, Aug. 12. Agrees to the dates proposed for OCTAGON; promises to make the necessary arrangements. C—753, Aug. 14. Reports on a discussion with the Yugoslavian Prime Minister and Partisan leader Tito aimed at creating a unified Yugoslav government. R—599, Aug. 14. Congratulates Churchill on bringing together the two Yugoslav factions. R—600, Aug. 15. Agrees to publish combat stories about anti-submarine activity in connection with OVERLORD. C—754, Aug. 16. Reports watching the DRAGOON landings from a destroyer; mentions arrangements for OCTAGON.

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C—755, Aug. 17. Requests approval for making preparations to send a British military force into Athens, Greece, in the event that the Germans evacuate the country; asks for U.S. planes to assist in getting such a force into Greece. C—756, Aug. 17. Reports having had a conversation with Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. C—757, Aug. 17. Expresses concern that the Yugoslavian Prime Minister, Subasic, underestimates Serbian opposition to Tito. C-758, Aug. 18. Reports forwarding R-600 to the British Admiralty. C—759, Aug. 18. Forwards a Stalin-to-Churchill cable which is critical of the Warsaw Uprising and also mentions the invasion of southern France and Churchill's talks with Yugoslav leaders. C—760, Aug. 18. Asks Roosevelt to join in protesting to Stalin about the Soviet refusal to help the Polish Underground. R—601, Aug. 19. Forwards a draft of a proposed message asking Stalin to cooperate in assisting the Polish Underground. C-761, Aug. 19. Forwards a cable from Eden to Churchill reporting Soviet-sponsored radio broadcasts calling on the people of Warsaw to rise up against the Germans. C—762, Aug. 20. Forwards a copy of a message from the British Ambassador in Moscow reporting the Soviet refusal to permit Allied aircraft to land in the Soviet Union after dropping supplies to the Polish Underground. C—763, Aug. 20. A cable to the President of Brazil mistakenly sent to Roosevelt. C—764, Aug. 21. Reports that morale is high in Italy, although there is some confusion because of the constant withdrawals of Allied forces. C—765, Aug. 23. Proposes the establishment of a Jewish brigade fighting under the Star of David flag. R—602, Aug. 23. Suggests limits on the number of participants in the OCTAGON meeting. R—603, Aug. 23. Hopes that the Soviets will agree to assist the Allies in aiding the Polish Underground. R-604, Aug. 23. Acknowledges receipt of C-763 and C-764. C-765/1, Aug. 23. A Churchill-to-Hopkins message intended for Roosevelt; mentions arrangements for OCTAGON, including discussions about atomic energy (TUBE ALLOYS); mentions the proposed offensive in Italy and operations in France. C—766, Aug. 23. Thanks Roosevelt for understanding the British need for a meat-purchasing contract with Argentina; suggests that they give the Argentine government time to react to recent criticisms.

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C-767, Aug. 23. Forwards an eyewitness account of the ruthless German suppression of the Warsaw Uprising. R—605, Aug. 24. Doubts that the Soviet Union will cooperate in providing assistance to the Polish U n d e r g r o u n d . C-768, Aug. 24. States that C - 7 6 3 had been intended for the President of Brazil. C—769, Aug. 25. Proposes sending a cable to Stalin warning that Allied aircraft plan to use Soviet air bases after d r o p p i n g supplies to the Polish U n d e r g r o u n d in Warsaw. C—770, Aug. 25. Requests an answer to C - 7 5 5 . R—606, Aug. 26. Refuses to agree to the joint message to Stalin proposed in C - 7 6 9 ; doubts that Stalin will do anything to aid the Polish Underground. R—607, Aug. 26. Hopes that the British will negotiate a meat contract with Argentina. R—608, Aug. 26. Offers the use of American planes to transport British troops into Greece. R—609, Aug. 28. States that Roosevelt has no objections to the organization of a Jewish brigade. C—771, Aug. 29. Gives the size of the party Churchill will bring to the O C T A G O N meeting; expresses pleasure at the occupation of Paris and the s u r r e n d e r of Bulgaria. C—772, Aug. 29. Outlines Allied military plans in Italy; hopes the offensive will reach Trieste and Istria. R—610, Aug. 30. Expresses pleasure that the British participants at OCT A G O N will be kept to a small number. R—611, Aug. 30. T h a n k s Churchill for the outline of military plans in Italy; suggests suspending a decision on the use of Allied forces after a German s u r r e n d e r in Italy. C—773, Aug. 3 1 . Reports a recurrence of pneumonia but indicates that Churchill will arrive at Quebec City by September 10. R - 6 1 2 , Aug. 3 1 . Expresses concern about Churchill's health; indicates a willingness to postpone the O C T A G O N meeting. R—613, Aug. 3 1 . Asks Churchill to use the British negotiations with Argentina over a meat contract as a lever to force Argentina to adopt anti-German policies. C—774, Aug. 3 1 . Summarizes the current plans, drawn u p by General Alexander, for an offensive in Italy; mentions the success of DRAGOON. C—775, Sept. 1. States that Churchill's health has improved and that the Quebec Conference can start on time.

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C-776, Sept. 1. Requests that Roosevelt withdraw the OSS Mission sent to the headquarters of General Mihailovic; summarizes British attempts to work out an arrangement between Tito and King Peter of Yugoslavia. R—614, Sept. 1. Expresses pleasure that Churchill's health has improved; notes that the Quebec Conference could be held at any time. C—777, Sept. 1. States that Mrs. Churchill will accompany the Prime Minister to Quebec. R—615, Sept. 1. Indicates that Mrs. Roosevelt will come to Quebec with the President. C—778, Sept. 2. States that Churchill will arrive in Quebec on September 11. R-616, Sept. 3. Suggests that plans for the use of Allied forces in Italy be discussed at OCTAGON, but warns that nothing can interfere with the battle on the western front. R-617, Sept. 3. States that the OSS has been directed to withdraw its Mission from Mihailovic's headquarters. C—779, Sept. 4. Asks Roosevelt to authorize American air forces to drop supplies to the Polish Underground and then land at Soviet airfields even without formal Soviet consent. C—780, Sept. 4. Forwards a copy of a formal communication sent by the British to the Soviet government requesting Soviet cooperation in providing aid to the Polish Underground. C—781, Sept. 4. Forwards the text of a message, sent by the "Polish women in Warsaw" to the Pope, pleading for the Pope's blessing and complaining about the lack of aid to the Polish Underground from the nations fighting against Germany. R—618, Sept. 5. Forwards the text of the proposed anti-submarine warfare statement for August. R—619, Sept. 5. Reports that it is too late to assist the Polish Underground. C—782, Sept. 6. Reports Churchill's departure for Quebec. R—620, Sept. 6. Reports that Roosevelt will arrive in Quebec on September 12. C-783, Sept. 7. Requests that U.S. military personnel on the Queen Mary with Churchill not lose any scheduled leave-time because of delays caused by the Prime Minister. R-621, Sept. 7. Assures Churchill that the leave-time mentioned in C 783 will be adjusted if possible. C—783/1, Sept. ? An inscription in a book presented to Roosevelt from Churchill.

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C—783/2, Sept. 12. A letter suggesting that they discuss joint policy toward Italy as well as other items on the OCTAGON agenda. C-783/3, Sept. 12. A letter suggesting a timetable for the OCTAGON talks and a proposed trip to Hyde Park afterward. R-621/1, Sept. 12. A letter stating that either Hull or Stettinius will come to Quebec; notes that Morgenthau will arrive soon. C-783/4, Sept. 14. A letter mentioning stage II lend-lease and UNRRA aid to Italy. C—783/5, Sept. 14. A letter proposing various appointments to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. C—783/6, Sept. 16. A letter suggesting a time for the press conference at the end of the OCTAGON Conference. C—783/7, Sept. 16. A memorandum returning a paper written by the British Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the disposition of the Italian colonies (attachments included). C—783/8, Sept. 17. Draft of a proposed cable to Stalin outlining procedures for punishing the major war criminals. C—783/9, Sept. 19. Requests copies of the texts of a proposed message from Roosevelt to Stalin concerning the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. C-783/10, Sept. 22. A letter of thanks from Mrs. Churchill to Mrs. Roosevelt following the visit of the Churchills to Hyde Park. C—784, Sept. 22. Suggests delaying the publication of a policy statement on Italy, particularly in view of political unrest in that country; mentions the need to review the French situation. R—622, Sept. 23. Insists on releasing the joint statement on Italy on September 25. C—785, Sept. 25. Forwards a cable from Jan Smuts which argues in favor of agreeing to the Soviet demand for great-power unanimity in the proposed international organization. C—786, Sept. 25. Requests a delay in releasing the statement on Italy until September 28. C—787, Sept. 25. Cancels request made in C-786; reports safe arrival in Great Britain. C—788, Sept. 27. Proposes moving closer to recognition of the French provisional government. R-623, Sept. 28. Mentions the favorable reception given the Anglo-American announcement about Italy; refuses to recognize the French provisional government. R—624, Sept. 28. Agrees with Smuts' argument that the U.S.S.R. has to be treated as an equal in any postwar international organization.

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C-789, Sept. 29. Indicates that Churchill and Eden might fly to Moscow for talks with Stalin; suggests that the French provisional government represents all of France; notes that military victory over Germany will not come in 1944. R-625, Sept. 30. Requests information about the Churchill-Stalin talks; states that Harriman will provide any assistance needed; mentions recognition of France. C—790, Oct. 3. Gives the time schedule and agenda for the ChurchillStalin talks. R-626/A, not sent; Oct. 4. Hopes that the Churchill-Stalin talks will be successful; mentions the Dumbarton Oaks talks. R—626, Oct. 4. Indicates that Harriman will act as an observer at the Churchill-Stalin talks, although Harriman cannot make commitments for the United States; asks that discussions about the Dumbarton Oaks agreements be postponed until a Big Three conference. C—791, Oct. 5. Asks that Harriman's attendance at principal conferences not preclude tete-a-tetes between Churchill and Stalin; requests information about American military plans in the Pacific. C-792, Oct. 6. Forwards the proposed anti-submarine warfare statement for September. R—627, Oct. 7. Agrees to the September anti-submarine warfare statement. R—628, Oct. 10. Protests any long-term Anglo-Argentine meat contract and requests that the British purchase Argentine beef on a monthto-month basis. C—793, Oct. 11. Reports the arrival of Churchill and Eden in Moscow; offers a pessimistic appraisal of the Italian campaign; reports a delay in Operation DRACULA because the slow advance in western Europe prevents any shift of troops to Southeast Asia. C-794, Oct. 11. Provides a brief outline of the TOLSTOY talks to that date. R—629, Oct. 11. Acknowledges C-794 and expresses pleasure that Churchill and Stalin are reaching a meeting of minds. C-795, Oct. 11. Offers an optimistic interpretation of the TOLSTOY talks to that point. C—796, Oct. 13. Reports instructing the Food Minister to negotiate only month-to-month contracts for beef with Argentina. C-797, Oct. 14. Revises C-796. C—798, Oct. 14. Tries to persuade Roosevelt to move toward recognition of the French provisional government.

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R-630, Oct. 16. Rejects Churchill's plea (C-793) for the transfer of some divisions from the western front to Italy. C—799, Oct. 18. Summarizes the discussions held between the London Poles and representatives of the Soviet government. C-800, Oct. 18. Forwards the text of a statement on Soviet-Polish relations partly agreed to by Mikolajczyk and Stalin as well as the British. R—631/A, not sent; Oct. 16. A State Department draft cable in which Roosevelt recognizes the French provisional government. R—631, Oct. 19. Refuses to recognize the French provisional government; mentions Churchill's health. C—801, Oct. 22. Discusses the conversations held in Moscow between Stalin and Mikolajczyk; mentions Stalin's views on the treatment of war criminals, the partition of Germany, a future Big Three conference, the Montreux Convention; mentions the problem of recognition of the French provisional government. R-632, Oct. 22. Acknowledges Churchill's messages about the TOLSTOY talks and Soviet-Polish conversations; discusses the arrangements for a Big Three meeting. C—802, Oct. 22. Proposes various appointments to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. C—803, Oct. 23. Expresses surprise that, in view of earlier communications, Roosevelt has decided to recognize the French provisional government. C—804, Oct. 23. Mentions the continued confusion over the recognition of the French provisional government; discusses arrangements for a Big Three meeting in the Black Sea area and suggests Athens or Cyprus as an alternative; mentions Roosevelt's health and the presidential campaign. R-633, Oct. 23. Apologizes for the confusion over the recognition of the French provisional government. C—805, Oct. 23. Changes a joking reference in C—804 to the presidential election. R—634, Oct. 24. Reports that General Stilwell will be relieved of his duties in China and gives other command changes in the China-BurmaIndia theater. R—635, Oct. 24. Mentions the mix-up over recognition of the French provisional government; forwards the text of a cable to Stalin in which Roosevelt expresses pleasure at the atmosphere created in the TOLSTOY talks and solicits Stalin's suggestions about arrangements for a Big Three meeting.

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R—636, Oct. 24. Agrees to the announcement of changes in the Allied Control Commission for Italy and suggests November 10 for the date of the announcement. C—806, Oct. 24. Proposes that British diplomats be permitted to talk officially to Italian diplomats throughout the world and that Italian soldiers interned in Germany be designated prisoners of war. C-807, Oct. 24. Again asks Roosevelt to agree to the announcement of changes in the Allied Control Commission for Italy. (This cable crossed R-636.) R-637, Oct. 24. Agrees to the proposals made in C-806. C-808, Oct. 25. Supports all the positions put forth in R-635. C—809, Oct. 25. Requests permission to publish statistics on merchant shipping losses—Allied, British, and neutral—since the outbreak of war. R—638, Oct. 26. Agrees to the publication of statistics on merchant shipping losses, but not those which occurred after January 1, 1944. C—810, Oct. 27. Agrees to wait until November 10 to release the announcement about changes to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. C—811, Oct. 27. Agrees with the changes proposed by Roosevelt to the American command in the China-Burma-India theater; proposes giving General Stilwell a KCB; suggests minor amendments to the announcement. C—812, Oct. 27. Requests permission to publish the announcement contained in C-813. C—813, Oct. 27. The text of a congratulatory announcement following the American victory in the battle of Leyte Gulf. R—639, Oct. 27. Agrees to the amendments Churchill proposed in C— 811; states he has no objection to Stilwell being proposed for a KCB. R-640, Oct. 27. Agrees to the public release of C-813. R—641, Nov. 2. Reports Stalin's insistence on a tripartite meeting being held on the Black Sea coast; discusses the chances of persuading Stalin to go beyond the Soviet borders. C—814, Nov. 5. Suggests Jerusalem or Alexandria for a tripartite meeting; proposes inviting Molotov if Stalin will not attend. C—815, Nov. 5. Forwards a report from the British Admiralty on the difficulty of having a meeting in the Black Sea and evaluating other possible meeting sites in the eastern Mediterranean.

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R—642, Nov. 6. Expresses sorrow at the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. R—643, Nov. 6. Forwards the proposed October statement on anti-submarine warfare. C—816, Nov. 8. Congratulates Roosevelt on his re-election as President. C—817, Nov. 8. Repeats the congratulatory message sent when Roosevelt was re-elected in November 1940. C—818, Nov. 8. Suggests an amendment to the proposed October statement on anti-submarine warfare. R—644, Nov. 8. Agrees to the change proposed in C-818. C—819, Nov. 9. Requests permission to publish a paraphrased version of Roosevelt's message about Field Marshal Dill (R-642) in order to preserve cipher security. R—645, Nov. 9. Agrees to the publication of a paraphrase of R-642. R-646, Nov. 10. Thanks Churchill for C-816 and C-817. C—820, Nov. 10. Thanks Roosevelt for his message about the death of Field Marshal Dill. R-646/1, Nov. 10. A letter requesting Churchill to prevent disclosures of Allied anti-submarine methods lest it have an effect on U.S. submarine warfare in the Pacific; includes a copy of a press report of a speech by a British officer concerning German submarine technology. C—821, Nov. 12. Protests the increase in the Italian grain ration and requests that U.S. military personnel not be withdrawn from the Allied Commission for Italy. R—647, Nov. 13. Congratulates Churchill on the sinking of the German battleship Tirpitz by the R.A.F. R—648, Nov. 14. Proposes that any tripartite meeting be held after the presidential inauguration in January; suggests Italy or the head of the Adriatic as a site; mentions the presidential election and Churchill's visit to France. C-822, Nov. 16. Thanks Roosevelt for R-647 about the sinking of the Tirpitz; summarizes the Churchill—de Gaulle conversations on French rearmament, on an occupation zone in Germany for France, and on Syria. C-823, Nov. 17. Suggests General H. Maitland Wilson as head of the British Military Mission in Washington; proposes that General Alexander become Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean and suggests other command appointments in Italy. R—649/1, not sent; Nov. 16. An unsent draft bluntly refusing to re-arm the French.

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R—649, Nov. 18. Indicates that the President does not have the authority to re-equip a postwar French army; warns that American forces will have to be brought back, to the United States very shortly after Germany's collapse. R-650, Nov. 18. Forwards a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message proposing a tripartite conference after January 20, 1945, somewhere in the area of the Adriatic, Italy, or the Riviera; indicates a preference for informal discussions; mentions the mission of General Hurley to China. C-824, Nov. 18. Agrees not to publish data on shipping losses suffered since January 1, 1944. R—651, Nov. 18. Requests that the British refuse to sign a long-term meatpurchasing contract with Argentina. C—825, Nov. 19. Expresses disappointment at the delay in a tripartite meeting; doubts Stalin will come to the Adriatic; indicates concern about Britain's ability to occupy western Germany without American forces or rearmed French forces being available. C—826, Nov. 19. Requests Roosevelt to reread the cables they have exchanged on the question of British purchases of Argentine meat. R—652, Nov. 20. Agrees to Wilson as Dill's replacement in Washington and to other changes in military commanders in Italy proposed by Churchill (C-823); includes a draft sentence, later deleted, suggesting General Ismay as Dill's replacement. R—652/1, Nov. 20. An inscription on a Lincoln quotation sent as a birthday remembrance. R—653, Nov. 21. Explains why the United States unilaterally increased the Italian grain ration; agrees that the United States has heavy demands on its shipping and can provide only basic essentials to Italy; insists that military personnel on the Allied Commission for Italy be replaced by civilians. R—654, Nov. 21. States that the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago is at an impasse and asks Churchill to reconsider the British position. R—655, Nov. 22. Suggests a joint statement designed to break the morale of German soldiers and civilians. C-827, Nov. 22. Explains the British position regarding postwar civil aviation and suggests a delay if the United States and Great Britain cannot reach an agreement. R—655/1/A, not sent; Nov. 23. A State Department draft outlining the American position regarding postwar civil aviation.

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R—655/1, Nov. 24. Sent via Winant for personal delivery to Churchill. Warns that, if an agreement on postwar civil aviation cannot be reached, Congress will not be generous in extending lend-lease; asks Churchill to review the situation. C—828, Nov. 24. Disagrees with Roosevelt's proposal to issue a joint statement designed to lower German morale; mentions Allied military successes on the western front. C—829, Nov. 26. Mentions public announcement of the new c o m m a n d appointments in Italy; asks that General Truscott be given the U.S. Fifth Army. C—830, Nov. 26. Forwards a proposed public announcement of c o m m a n d changes in Italy. R—656, Nov. 26. Approves the a n n o u n c e m e n t proposed in C—830. R—657, Nov. 26. Agrees that a public statement aimed at G e r m a n morale is not appropriate at this time. R—658, Nov. 26. Reports that Stalin will not attend any meeting outside of the Black Sea area and that J a n u a r y will be a satisfactory time; suggests re-arming the French with captured German arms. C - 8 3 1 , Nov. 26. T h a n k s the U.S. Army and Navy for showing Lord Cherwell a r o u n d various scientific establishments, including T U V E and the Manhatten Project. C—832, Nov. 26. Provides a full explanation of the British position on reaching a long-term meat-purchasing agreement with Argentina; protests an attempt by the State Department to force Britain to reduce its trade with Argentina. C—833, Nov. 26. Forwards the text of the communication sent to the Foreign Office by the State Department in which the United States d e m a n d s to know Britain's policy regarding trade with Argentina. C—834, Nov. 27. Acknowledges R - 6 5 7 ; mentions the tripartite conference and questions the suggestion that there will be sufficient captured G e r m a n arms to re-equip the French. R—659, Nov. 27. Asks Churchill to call off a planned survey of Clipperton Island by the British Air Ministry. R—660, Nov. 27. Reports that General Truscott has been given c o m m a n d of the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy. C—835, Nov. 27. Indicates that he will reply to Roosevelt's message about the International Civil Aviation Conference by November 28. C—836, Nov. 28. Sets forth the British position regarding postwar civil aviation; argues strenuously against what Britain sees as an attempt by the United States to virtually monopolize commercial air traffic;

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suggests impartial arbitration to settle the dispute; denies that Churchill had advocated "competitive 'bigness' " between their two nations. C—837, Nov. 28. Thanks Roosevelt for sending General Truscott to Italy. C-838, Nov. 28. Pleads ignorance of the Clipperton Island survey, but promises to suspend action pending Churchill-Roosevelt discussions. C—839, Nov. 29. Asks Roosevelt to agree to a joint protest to Chiang Kaishek because the Chinese are planning to shift two of their divisions from India to China. R—661, Nov. 30. Presents the American arguments in favor of opening all ports in the world to the trade, shipping, aircraft, and commerce of all nations; denies any desire to monopolize commercial air traffic; asks Churchill to give Lord Swinton sufficient latitude to permit the negotiation of a civil aviation agreement. R—662, Nov. 30. Offers birthday greetings to Churchill. R—663, Dec. 1. Agrees with Chiang's decision to withdraw Chinese troops from India in order to defend Kunming and southern China against a Japanese offensive. C—840, Dec. 1. Discusses the need to be brought up to date on the issues which have been considered by the International Civil Aviation Conference; promises to submit a British plan after talks with British representatives to the conference. C—841, Dec. 2. Agrees that the Japanese offensive in China necessitates the transfer of Chinese divisions; requests information about air transport requirements needed for the transfer; mentions notification to the Soviet Union of the "bomb line" to be followed by Allied aircraft. R—664, Dec. 2. Requests that the British keep trying to reach an agreement at the Civil Aviation Conference. C-842, Dec. 3. Thanks Roosevelt for the birthday gift. R—665, Dec. 4. Notes that the diversion of air transport to China will be restricted to the minimum so as to avoid affecting the SEAC; states that the Soviets have been informed of the bombing line. C—843, Dec. 5. Expresses concern that the transfer of Chinese forces will take too many aircraft away from the SEAC. R—665/1, Dec. 5. Thanks Churchill for agreeing to keep purchases of meat from Argentina on a month-to-month basis; denies that the State Department had intended to threaten Britain on the matter of trade with Argentina.

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DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS-1944

R—666, Dec. 5. Forwards a proposal for voting by members of the Security Council of the proposed international organization. R—667, Dec. 5. Reports receiving summaries from Stalin on the de GaulleStalin talks and asks for Churchill's views. C—844, Dec. 6. Summarizes the military situation on all fronts; suggests a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in England. C—845, Dec. 6. Bitterly protests a public statement issued by the State Department which criticized British policy toward Italy and, by inference, British intervention in Greece and Belgium. C—846, Dec. 6. Forwards a copy of a cable sent to Stalin in which Churchill suggests a tripartite pact between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union and proposes leaving territorial questions, raised by de Gaulle, to a postwar peace conference; proposes that the European Advisory Commission discuss some of the territorial questions. C—847, Dec. 6. Proposes an anti-submarine warfare statement for November. R-668, Dec. 6. Forwards a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin telegram indicating that the United States has no objections to a Franco-Soviet pact but wishes to postpone any discussion of territorial issues. C—848, Dec. 6. Asks for a delay in reaching any postwar civil-aviation agreement until there is time to restudy and re-evaluate the issues; indicates displeasure with the direction taken at the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference. R—669, Dec. 6. Indicates there are no objections to the publication of the Sforza-to-Berle letter; explains why the United States had to make a public statement regarding the political situation in Italy. R—670, Dec. 6. Disapproves of including de Gaulle in any tripartite conference; rejects the idea of the European Advisory Commission holding discussions on French territorial demands; expresses doubts about the need to conclude a Franco-British-Soviet pact. R—671, Dec. 6. Agrees to the November anti-submarine warfare statement proposed by Churchill. C—849, Dec. 8. Indicates that Macmillan is leaving for Washington and that Churchill endorses the position taken by the Foreign Office regarding Italy. R—672/A, not sent; Dec. 7. Offers a broad overview of the worldwide military situation as seen by General Marshall and Admiral King; rejects the proposal for a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. R—672, Dec. 9. An overview of the worldwide military situation based on a draft by Marshall and King but rewritten by the President; suggests various locations for the proposed tripartite conference.

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C-849/1, Dec. 10. A cable to Hopkins asking him to intercede with the President in support of British intervention in Greece. C—850, Dec. 10. Informs Roosevelt that Macmillan has been sent to Athens and that Ambassador Halifax will discuss the Italian situation. C—850/1, Dec. 11. A letter to Hopkins about the Greek crisis and enclosing the draft of an unsent cable to Roosevelt protesting an order by Admiral King forbidding American ships to carry supplies or reinforcements to the British in Greece; the draft provided a lengthy summary of British policy and Churchill's reasons for believing the U.S. had supported and should continue to support that policy. R—673, Dec. 13. Suggests that public opinion will not permit the Roosevelt administration publicly to support British policy in Greece; suggests the establishment of a Regent in place of the King and the disarming of both left- and right-wing forces. C—851, Dec. 15. Explains British policy in Greece; indicates that George II has refused to consider making the Archbishop of Athens his Regent. C—852, Dec. 15. Forwards a letter from George II of Greece defending his refusal to accept a Regent. R-674, Dec. 15. Asks if a message to Stalin requesting a postponement of any decisions regarding the Polish government would be helpful; indicates that the United States will make public its position on Poland. C—853, Dec. 16. Endorses Roosevelt's proposal to send a cable asking that Stalin postpone any decision on the Polish issue; mentions Greece and Roosevelt's stay in Hot Springs, Georgia. R—675, Dec. 16. Forwards a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message outlining the U.S. position on Poland; asks Stalin not to recognize the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until the tripartite meeting in January. C—854, Dec. 16. Doubts that Mikolajczyk will return as Polish Prime Minister; states that Britain will not recognize the Lublin Committee. C—855, Dec. 17. Indicates that British representatives in Greece have recommended establishing a Regency; states that King George II still refuses to consider that step; summarizes the military situation in Athens and defends British actions there; mentions a speech supporting British policy by E. Bevin. C—856, Dec. 17. Thanks Roosevelt for sending a message on Poland to Stalin. C—857, Dec. 23. Supports Eisenhower's request for a mission to go to Moscow to ascertain Soviet military plans.

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R-676, Dec. 23. Forwards a message to Harriman, for Stalin, agreeing to meet at Yalta and outlining travel plans for that meeting. R—677, Dec. 23. Forwards the text of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message asking for permission to send a liaison mission to Moscow to discuss future military operations. C—857/1, Dec. 24. Christmas greetings. R—678, Dec. 25. Christmas greetings. C-858, Dec. 26. Reports his and Eden's plans to visit Athens and asks that the American Ambassador in Athens contact them. R—679, Dec. 26. Reports that Stalin has agreed to accept a mission from SHAEF. R—680, Dec. 26. Indicates that the American Ambassador in Greece will call on Churchill and Eden. C—859, Dec. 28. Summarizes the situation in Greece; indicates that the Archbishop of Athens seems a good candidate for Regent; requests Roosevelt's comments. C—860, Dec. 28. Forwards a statement to the King of Greece by Georgios Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, expressing support for the appointment of a Regent. R-681, Dec. 29. Forwards a copy of a cable from Stalin indicating displeasure with the new Polish government's makeup and suggesting that the Soviet Union will soon recognize the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland; Stalin accuses the London Poles of instigating terrorism behind Soviet lines. C—861, Dec. 29. Agrees to a tripartite meeting at Yalta and discusses travel arrangements and accommodations. C—862, Dec. 29. Forwards an Admiralty report on conditions at Yalta. C-863, Dec. 29. Thanks Roosevelt for his message to the King of Greece; states that the British government will advise the Archbishop of Athens to become Regent even if the King opposes the move. R—682, Dec. 30. Discusses Roosevelt's travel plans for the trip to Yalta. R—683, Dec. 30. Hopes that a successful solution to the Greek problem can be worked out. C-864, Dec. 30. Reports that King George II has agreed to appoint a Regent; indicates that Britain will continue to press Stalin not to recognize the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland. C-865, Dec. 30. Forwards a statement by King George of Greece appointing the Archbishop of Athens Regent.

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R—684, Dec. 30. Sends a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message in which the President asks Stalin not to extend recognition to the Lublin Committee and to postpone any decision on Poland until the Yalta meeting. R-685, Dec. 31. Details travel plans for the trip to Yalta. C-866, Dec. 31. Thanks Roosevelt for the message regarding AngloAmerican policy toward Argentina. C—867, Dec. 31. Suggests sending General Alexander to Moscow to discuss future Allied plans in Italy and the Balkans. C-868, Dec. 31. Proposes ARGONAUT as the codename for the Yalta Conference; outlines travel plans for the trip to the meeting. C—869, Dec. 31. States that a speech about anti-submarine warfare made by Air Vice Marshal Ellwood contained only information which had previously been made public. C—870, Dec. 31. Suggests that a message from Roosevelt to the King of Greece would help; mentions the Soviet-Polish issue; mentions the Allied success in stopping the German offensive in the Ardennes. 1945 R—686, Jan. 1. Acknowledges receipt of C-865 and C-866. C—871, Jan. 1. Expresses pleasure that Roosevelt will come to Malta enroute the Yalta Conference. R—687, Jan. 2. Thanks Churchill for taking steps to ensure that the Japanese do not gain information from public releases about the antiU-boat campaign. R—688, Jan. 2. Gives Roosevelt's date of arrival in Malta. R-689, Jan. 2. Expresses the desire that an American as well as a British Commanding General lead a mission to the Soviet Union to discuss possible Balkan operations; warns against expecting American support for Balkan operations. C—872, Jan. 3. Thanks Roosevelt for sending some maps. C—873, Jan. 3. States that General Alexander will not go to Moscow, but will attend the Yalta Conference. R—690, Jan. 3. Discusses timetable and arrangements for the Yalta talks; accepts ARGONAUT as the codename for those talks; postpones his projected visit to the United Kingdom. R—691, Jan. 4. Forwards a copy of a Stalin-to-Roosevelt message stating that the Soviet Union plans to recognize the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland.

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R—692, Jan. 4. Offers a draft of the anti-U-boat warfare statement for December. C—874, Jan. 4. Discusses the Yalta arrangements and suggests preparatory talks for two or three days at Malta; mentions discussions with de Gaulle and Eisenhower. C—875, Jan. 6. Proposes talks at Malta between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff. R—692/1, Jan. 6. Declines Churchill's invitation for either a head-of-governments meeting or a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Malta prior to the Yalta Conference. C—876, Jan. 6. Forwards a copy of Churchill's message to Stalin indicating concern over the Soviet decision to recognize the Lublin Committee and suggesting that the matter should be discussed at Yalta. C—877, Jan. 7. Passes on Churchill's impressions of the situation on the western front following talks with Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery; defends British forces against rumors that they have been purposefully kept out of the battle of the Ardennes Forest; indicates that more troops are needed. R—693, Jan. 7. Indicates a desire to bring Anna Roosevelt to the Yalta meeting. C—878, Jan. 7. Suggests a minor change in the December anti-U-boat warfare statement proposed by Roosevelt. C—879, Jan. 7. Expresses pleasure that Anna Roosevelt will come to Yalta and states that Sarah Churchill will also be there. R—694, Jan. 8. States that Eisenhower will receive all available reinforcements and that the French will be re-armed. R—695, Jan. 8. Accepts Churchill's amendment to the anti-U-boat statement. C—880, Jan. 8. Again proposes a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Malta to plan for the Yalta talks; suggests a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three great powers, possibly at Alexandria. C—881, Jan. 9. Again proposes a meeting of the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff, as well as a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting, before the Yalta Conference. R—696, Jan. 9. Agrees to a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Malta; indicates Roosevelt will stay at Yalta for five or six days; states that Secretary of State Stettinius cannot arrive early at Malta. C-882, Jan. 9. Indicates that Admiral H. Burrough will succeed Admiral B. Ramsay as commander of Allied naval forces, Europe. C—883, Jan. 10. Denies that the British had acted in a highhanded manner by conducting a survey of the Clipperton Islands; suggests that they discuss the matter when they meet.

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R—697, Jan. 10. Agrees to wait for a discussion of the Clipperton Island matter. R—698, Jan. 10. Accepts the appointment of Admiral Burrough (C-882). C—884, Jan. 10. Asks that Stettinius come early to Malta for talks with Eden. R—698/1, Jan. 10. A formal letter forwarding a copy of a joint resolution of Congress appreciating the work of the late Field Marshal Sir John Dill. R—698/2, Jan. 10. An informal letter forwarding the resolution mentioned in R-698/1. C—885, Jan. 11. Thanks Roosevelt for a bound copy of his "D-Day Prayer" and three bow ties. R—699, Jan. 12. Indicates that Stettinius cannot arrive at Malta until January 31; states that Hopkins will come to England for talks before the Malta date. C—886, Jan. 13. Discusses procedures for bringing warships through the Turkish straits for the Yalta Conference. R—700, Jan. 13. Gives the procedures the United States will follow for bringing warships to the Crimea through the Turkish straits. C-887, Jan. 14. Asks that Field Marshal Wilson succeed Dill on the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy. R-701, Jan. 14. Accepts Wilson (C-887). C—888, Jan. 14. Discusses British efforts to work out a political settlement in Yugoslavia. C—889, Jan. 14. Expresses pleasure that Stettinius will arrive in time to meet with Eden; wonders if weather might delay Roosevelt's departure from Malta. C-890, Jan. 15. Expresses concern over Soviet actions in Persia (Iran) and suggests that the matter be put on the agenda for the Yalta Conference. R-702, Jan. 16. Acknowledges receipt of C-889. R-703, Jan. 17. Acknowledges receipt of C-888. C—891, Jan. 21. Suggests that the press be excluded from the Yalta Conference. R—704, Jan. 22. Agrees to exclude the press. C—892, Jan. 22. Asks Roosevelt to tell Stalin about the exclusion of the press. R—705, Jan. 22. Forwards the text of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin cable about excluding the press and bringing only service photographers to Yalta.

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C—893, Jan. 23. Discusses arrangements for flying and driving from Malta to Yalta. C-894, Jan. 24. Asks that Eisenhower and Alexander come to both Malta and Yalta, particularly the latter. C—894/1, Jan. 24. Sent via Hopkins; mentions unsatisfactory health conditions at Yalta. C—895, Jan. 25. Proposes Air Marshal K. Park as Air Commander in Chief, South East Asia. C—896, Jan. 26. Forwards a message from a British officer in the Crimea expressing concern at the unfavorable road and weather conditions. C—897, Jan. 27. Expresses deep concern that the United States plans to sign a bilateral civil-aviation agreement with the Republic of Ireland. R—706, Jan. 28. Indicates concern over travel conditions in the Crimea and agrees that Stalin should be notified of a possible delay in convening the Yalta Conference. C-898, Jan. 29. Thanks Roosevelt for the letter (R-698/1, R-698/2) and resolution about Sir John Dill. C—899, Jan. 29. Wishes Roosevelt a happy birthday. R—707, Jan. 31. Acknowledges receipt of five of Churchill's cables. R-707/1, Feb. 10. Asks that they discuss implementation of Article VII of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease Agreement sometime during the Yalta meetings. R-707/2, Feb. 10. A letter asking Churchill's support for a proposal to allow the United States multiple votes in the assembly of the proposed United Nations organization; includes as an enclosure a letter from Roosevelt to Stalin on the same subject. C-899/1, Feb. 11. A letter supporting Roosevelt's proposal (R-707/2) for multiple votes in the international organization's assembly. R—707/3, Feb. 11. A letter suggesting that the armistice regime in Italy be changed and that certain restrictions on the Italians be lifted. C—899/2, Feb. 11. A memo passing on Mackenzie King's appreciation of the decision to unite all Canadian ground forces into one European army. C—899/3, Feb. 13. A letter proposing that discussions about Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement be postponed. C—899/4, Feb. 15. A letter stating that Churchill will give his views on the Italian government after his return to London. C—900, Feb. 17. Indicates that Harold Macmillan will come to Algiers to discuss Italy with Roosevelt, if the President wishes.

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R-708, Feb. 18. Declines the offer to have Macmillan come to Algiers. C—901, Feb. 28. Discusses political opposition within Britain to the Yalta agreements on Poland; stresses the need for an early meeting of various Polish leaders in Moscow; reports that Molotov offered to allow British and American observers into Poland; mentions the death of General Watson, Hopkins' illness, and victories on the western front. R-709, Feb. 28. Reports arrival in the United States; thanks Churchill for C-901. R—710, Feb. 28. Asks that Britain replace stockpiles of food in Holland needed for civilians. C—902, Mar. 2. Indicates that Britain has serious shortages of food supplies and will not be able to provide enough for both British and European relief. R—710/1, Mar. 3. Forwards a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message asking for Soviet cooperation in repatriating German-held American prisoners of war or Americans forced down behind Soviet lines. C-903, Mar. 5. Notes that the First Lord of the Admiralty will refer to anti-submarine warfare in a speech before Parliament, but only in general terms. C-904, Mar. 6. Angrily protests the signing of an Irish-American civil aviation agreement, and asks that it be abrogated. R— 711, Mar. 7. Offers the text of the February anti-U-boat warfare statement. C—905, Mar. 8. Expresses intense concern over Soviet policies in eastern Europe and asks that the United States take the lead in protesting Soviet actions; argues that the Soviets are violating the Yalta agreements on Poland and forwards a proposed message to Stalin giving the British interpretation of those agreements. C—906, Mar. 8. Agrees to the draft anti-U-boat statement for February. C—907, Mar. 10. Disagrees with instructions sent to Harriman in Moscow to ask for a political truce in Poland. C—908, Mar. 10. Withdraws his proposal to have Field Marshal Alexander become Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. C—909, Mar. 10. Forwards a summary of statements made by the London Polish government outlining Soviet violations of the Yalta agreements on Poland. R—712, Mar. 10. Proposes discussions, to be held in the United States, on food supplies for liberated Europe and Britain. R-713, Mar. 11. Disagrees with Churchill's proposals for a tough stance regarding Poland; refuses to take the initiative in Roumania.

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R—714, Mar. 11. Rejects Churchill's proposal for a direct approach to Stalin on the Polish question lest it bring on a repudiation of the Yalta agreements. R—715, Mar. 12. Suggests that they concentrate on implementing the Yalta agreements on Poland via their respective Ambassadors in Moscow. R-716, Mar. 12. Acknowledges receipt of C-908. C—910, Mar. 13. Argues forcefully for an Anglo-American position in favor of a new Polish government including a reasonable number of the more moderate London Poles. R—717, Mar. 15. Dismisses Churchill's protests over the signing of a bilateral agreement on civil aviation between the United States and Ireland. R—718, Mar. 15. Rejects Churchill's claim that there is a divergence between the United States and Britain on the Polish question; urges that both governments continue to work through their Ambassadors in Moscow to promote negotiations and compromise. C—911, Mar. 16. Nominates two British representatives to attend discussions in Washington regarding food supplies. C—912, Mar. 16. Opposes the U.S. call for a political truce in Poland and continues to argue for a firm stand against the Soviets. C—913, Mar. 17. Endorses an arrangement between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer in the South East Asia theater whereby the American general will be kept informed of British plans. C—914, Mar. 17. Apologizes for bothering Roosevelt with so many cables; mentions Clementine Churchill's trip to the Soviet Union; expresses pessimism at the postwar problems which will come; mentions the Rosenman Mission to London. R—719, Mar. 18. Asks Churchill to approve a set of instructions for their Ambassadors in Moscow regarding the Polish question. C—915, Mar. 18. Proposes a proclamation to the German Army designed to encourage a refusal to continue to fight. C—916, Mar. 19. Agrees to the joint instructions mentioned in R-719. R—720, Mar. 19. Asks Churchill to invite Bernard Baruch to England. C—917, Mar. 21. Enthusiastically agrees to invite Baruch to London. R—721, Mar. 21. Disapproves Churchill's suggestion (C-915) for joint Roosevelt-Churchill proclamation to the German Army. R—722, Mar. 21. Discusses the problem of food supplies for England and liberated Europe. C—918, Mar. 21. Gives the date British representatives will arrive in Washington for talks regarding food supplies.

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R-723, Mar. 21. Suggests that a Soviet-American-British economic mission be established in Greece. C—919, Mar. 22. Agrees to drop the idea of a proclamation to the German Army. C—920, Mar. 22. Discusses the problem of German-held prisoners of war and proposes warning the Germans against taking any action against those prisoners. C—921, Mar. 22. Offers the text of the warning proposed in C—920. R—724, Mar. 22. Insists that operations in Indo-China be coordinated by General Wedemeyer. R—725, Mar. 22. Agrees to the text of the warning on prisoner-of-war treatment (C-921), subject to Stalin's approval. C-922, Mar. 23. Acknowledges receipt of R-725. C-923, Mar. 23. Discusses food supplies and states that Great Britain cannot spare additional supplies for the Continent. R-726, Mar. 24. Gives Bernard Baruch's travel schedule for his London trip. C—924, Mar. 25. Agrees to the schedule proposed for Baruch's trip to London. C—925, Mar. 27. Expresses grave concern over the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union; summarizes the controversies in Poland and eastern Europe, and again suggests the time has come for a direct communication with Stalin; deplores the Soviet decision not to send Molotov to the San Francisco Conference. C—926, Mar. 27. Offers an outline of a message to Stalin about the Polish question. R—727, Mar. 29. Forwards copies of an exchange of cables between Stalin and Roosevelt regarding Soviet representation at the San Francisco Conference. R—728, Mar. 29. Asks that the British withdraw their objections to the American use of pilotless bombers over Germany. R—729, Mar. 29. Indicates that Roosevelt shares Churchill's concern over Soviet actions since the Yalta talks; recommends sticking strictly to issues agreed on at Yalta; agrees that the time has come to send a message to Stalin personally about Poland and eastern Europe. R—730, Mar. 29. Forwards a proposed message to Stalin asking that the Soviets cooperate in the establishment of a government in Poland. C—927, Mar. 30. Expresses pleasure that Roosevelt appears vigorous; mentions Bernard Baruch and Clementine Churchill; inquires if Roosevelt received C—914.

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C—928, Mar. 30. Suggests a few changes to R-730 designed to facilitate the participation of the London Poles in the negotiations on Poland. C—929, Mar. 31. Forwards a proposed Churchill-to-Stalin message protesting Soviet actions in Poland. R—731, Mar. 31. Acknowledges receipt of C-914; mentions Baruch, Clementine Churchill, and the satisfactory progress of the war. R—732, Mar. 31. Accepts Churchill's suggestions (R-730) for changes in the Roosevelt-to-Stalin message about Poland; gives approval to the cable Churchill plans to send Stalin. C-930, Apr. 1. Acknowledges R-732 and notes he has sent his own cable to Stalin. C—931, Apr. 1. Expresses distress that Eisenhower communicated directly with Stalin about Allied military plans; indicates annoyance that Eisenhower has changed plans previously agreed upon at Malta; defends the performance of British forces in Europe; suggests that for both military and political reasons the Allies should try to capture Berlin before the Soviets. C—932, Apr. 3. Opposes any tripartite economic mission to Greece because of current Soviet actions in eastern Europe; suggests an AngloAmerican committee to discuss UNRRA and other postwar issues regarding Greece. R—733, Apr. 4. Firmly supports Eisenhower's decisions, including the order for a major attack into central Germany. R—734, Apr. 4. Forwards copies of an exchange between Stalin and Roosevelt about the Anglo-American talks with German military leaders in Bern, Switzerland, concerning the possible surrender of German forces in Italy. C—933, Apr. 5. Regrets that Eisenhower sent a cable directly to Stalin, but accepts the decisions made by the Supreme Commander in Europe. C—934, Apr. 5. Expresses astonishment that Stalin should have been so insulting in his protest to Roosevelt about the Bern talks; suggests that that makes an Allied attack on Berlin even more desirable; mentions the Austrian occupation zones; recommends that the British and Americans take a firm stand with the Soviets. C—935, Apr. 5. Forwards a copy of a Churchill-to-Stalin message protesting the Soviet accusation about Western intentions during the talks in Bern. C—936, Apr. 6. Forwards a minor change to C-935. R—735, Apr. 6. Thanks Churchill for C—933; mentions sending Eisenhower a message of appreciation.

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R-736, Apr. 6. Agrees with C-934 and 935; indicates that they have to be firm with the Soviets and that their armies will soon be in a position to permit them to take a tougher stance. C—937, Apr. 7. Proposes the March anti-U-boat warfare statement. R—737, Apr. 8. Agrees that it is not a good time to propose a SovietAmerican-British economic mission to Greece; turns down Churchill's suggestion for an Anglo-American committee in Greece. R-738, Apr. 8. Accepts the proposed anti-U-boat warfare statement for March. C—937/1, Apr. 8. A letter suggesting that changes in the armistice regime in Italy be fully discussed by the State Department and Foreign Office; expresses concern about British public opinion if the terms imposed on Italy are relaxed. C-938, Apr. 9. Asks for ajoint Anglo-American demand that the German government permit the Allies to provide food and medicine to German-occupied Holland. R—739, Apr. 10. Asks Churchill not to respond to Stalin's message about Poland without first consulting the United States. R-740, Apr. 10. Agrees to demanding that the Germans assist in feeding people in occupied Holland, providing Stalin approves such a contact with the Germans. C—939, Apr. 10. Suggests a text for the demand to Germany about feeding civilians in occupied Holland. C—940, Apr. 11. Indicates that a recent message from Stalin about the Bern talks is as close to an apology as they can expect. C—941, Apr. 11. Forwards a copy of the Stalin-to-Churchill message regarding the Bern talks. C-942, Apr. 11. Indicates that Britain is following the American lead in Roumania; asks if the United States will help the Roumanian King if he seeks refuge. C—943, Apr. 11. Asks Roosevelt to approve an arrangement between Wedemeyer and Mountbatten regarding Indo-China whereby Mountbatten will keep Wedemeyer informed of British plans; argues that they should support the French who are fighting against the Japanese in Indo-China. C—944, Apr. 11. Suggests that a portion of a Stalin-to-Churchill message might indicate a movement toward compromise on the Polish question. C—945, Apr. 11. Forwards the Stalin-to-Churchill message mentioned in C-944.

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R—741, Apr. 11. Sends a copy of a Roosevelt-to-Stalin message about the Bern incident. R—742, Apr. 11. Suggests they "minimize the general Soviet problem," because most of the problems seem to work out, although the Anglo-American policy to date is correct. R—743, Apr. 11. Agrees to Churchill's proposed warning to the German government on feeding civilians in Holland, providing Stalin also approves. Apr. 13. A cable from Churchill to President Harry Truman expressing sympathy at the death of Roosevelt and the hope that Churchill can carry on a similar personal relationship with Truman. Apr. 13. A memorandum from Secretary of State Stettinius to Truman summarizing the major issues in American foreign policy as of Roosevelt's death.

Addenda Messages printed in this section were located after type had been set, although references to them have been inserted in the text at the a p p r o priate places. Message numbers have been assigned in accordance with the editorial procedures for u n n u m b e r e d or unsent messages. The President agreed immediately to Churchill's proposed schedule for their meeting. Roosevelt seemed to be keeping the Prime Minister as much in the dark as presidential advisers, mentioning only Admiral Stark as a member of the American party.

R-51x/l Washington [via British Embassy] July 25, 1941, 8:35 P.M. / T O R J u I y 26, 5:20 A.M.

Following for Prime Minister from President. I am perfectly delighted. Will be there and bring Stark Chief Naval Operations. [FO 371/26151, paper A6654/18/45/2]

R-52x/l Washington [via British Embassy] July 28, 1941, 12:10 A.M. / TOR 9:50 A.M.

Following for Prime Minister. Personal. (PSumner Welles) has sent me following answer from President. Heartily approve your suggestion about Averill and Harry also about staff. Good luck. [FO 371/26151, paper A6654/18/45/3]

Churchill &? Roosevelt T h e Complete Correspondence

7

2. Alliance emerging: Churchill and Roosevelt meet. USS Augusta, August 9, 1941, Placentia Bay, Newfoundland.

Introduction Churchill and Roosevelt: Their Relationship, Their Correspondence For just over five and a half years, Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt exchanged a steady stream of telegrams, letters, and memoranda; a correspondence which comprises a unique historical record. The very extent of their personal correspondence is, in itself, remarkable. Churchill sent 1,161 written messages and telegrams to Roosevelt, and the President responded with 788 of his own.1 But it is the nature, not the volume of their exchanges that makes the collection so special. With the possible exception of Queen Victoria's omnipresent grandchildren, no two national leaders ever corresponded on such intimate and personal terms. Their special relationship was based on many common factors. The English language, interlinked national histories, similarities in class and education, a special love for the navy, and a belief in the demonstrable superiority of British and American institutions all put Roosevelt and Churchill on the same wavelength. But their basic bond was shared enemies—Hitler's Germany and, to a lesser degree, the Japanese Empire. Had it not been for the desperate threat Germany posed to the civilization they had in common, the two men might never have shared the world stage, for it was Hitler that brought Churchill to 10 Downing Street and put Roosevelt in the White House for a third term. Even if they had become Prime Minister and President together, without Hitler more mundane and narrow issues would have commanded their attention. But the Second World War drew Churchill and Roosevelt to broader questions. Initially, they sought to defend their nations, and Western civilization, against Germany and Nazism. Then, as the outcome of the war became certain, they tried to shape the postwar world. A key aspect of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship was the candid, friendly, informal atmosphere that both men worked to create and preserve. Their correspondence is laced with personal touches. They sent each other Christmas and birthday greetings and gifts, swapped wisecracks, developed a series of inside jokes, and regularly added a casual, informal sentence or two to drafts of their exchanges prepared by subordinates. 2 They also enlisted their immediate families. The files are full 1

These figures do not include drafts, telephone conversations, or indirect, thirdparty exchanges even though they are included in this collection. 2 For a few examples see C-161x, R-244, C-508/2 (Christmas and birthday greetings); C-276, R-267 (wisecracks); R-272, C-509 (inside jokes); R-218 (a personal addition); R-224 (chatty, informal tone).

4

INTRODUCTION

of short courtesy notes exchanged between the Churchills and the Roosevelts. The notes are usually handwritten and carefully personalized, although Clementine Churchill and Eleanor Roosevelt made a few comments to others suggesting that they found associating with each others' husbands an unpleasant duty. Churchill's upper-class conservatism and seeming lack of feeling for the downtrodden repelled Mrs. Roosevelt, and the President's cavalier and jaunty approach to issues of state as well as his aggressively informal manner struck Mrs. Churchill as presumptuous and somehow fraudulent. 3 Nevertheless, a letter to Roosevelt from Churchill's daughter-in-law, Pamela, reflected the friendly atmosphere the two men sought. She thanked the President for having sent her a photograph of himself, which she had placed next to a photo of her father-in-law. She then wrote that as her son (also Winston Churchill) was "not yet old enough to distinguish between you and Winston I am afraid that he calls both photographs Grandpa!" 4 There were times when the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship took on the tone of unselfish friendship. The President's offer to divert tanks and artillery to North Africa after the British lost Tobruk in June 1942 was a gesture the Prime Minister never forgot.5 That same year, Roosevelt telegraphed Churchill that "it is great fun to be in the same decade with you," and presidential adviser Harry Hopkins noted that Roosevelt "genuinely grew to like Churchill" during their Washington Conference of December 1941-January 1942.6 Their frequent meetings—they met nine times, usually separated by a period of only four or five months—were characterized by the kind of good fellowship that goes with fishing trips, dry martinis, and mutual respect. But that camaraderie could only mask, not settle their differences. In fact, the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship has been much over-romanticized by historians, largely through Winston Churchill's own efforts. His six-volume memoir, The History of the Second World War, drew a picture of a close personal relationship between the two men, a friendship based upon genuine affection as well as common interests. But Churchill wrote his history with a particular goal in mind: he believed that an entente with the United States was essential to both short- and long-term British interests. In 1953, possibly prompted by news of the impending publication by the State Department of the Foreign Relations volume on the Malta and Yalta conferences, Churchill wrote to President Dwight Eisen3 Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, pp. 660—61, 663—64; Soames, Clementine Churchill, p. 448. See C-783/10 for an example of such family exchanges. (See List of Sources Cited for complete citations.) 4 Pamela Churchill to Roosevelt, July 1 [1942?], PSF:Churchill. 5 See C - 1 0 3 , C-146, and C-914. 6 See R-77x. Hopkins is quoted in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 119.

INTRODUCTION

5

hower about the trouble taken to make sure that the sixth volume of the Prime Minister's war memoirs served the purpose of good Anglo-American relations. That was particularly important since that volume, Triumph and Tragedy, covered the period from June 1944 to the time Churchill left office in the summer of 1945, a time dominated by disputes over the reconstruction of the postwar world. As he told Eisenhower: I am most anxious that nothing should be published which might seem to others to threaten our current relations in our public duties or impair the sympathy and understanding which exist between our two countries. I have therefore gone over the book again in the last few months and have taken great pains to ensure that it contains nothing which might imply that there was in those days any controversy or lack of confidence between us. There was in fact little controversy in those years; but I have been careful to ensure that the few differences of opinion which arose are so described that even illdisposed people will be unable now to turn them to mischievous account.7 Perhaps the reason that Robert Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins so perceptively sets forth the contours of Anglo-American competition, even while the two nations were joined in history's most effective alliance, is that it was written before the appearance of Churchill's war memoirs. William McNeill's America, Britain, and Russia, which also lays out AngloAmerican conflicts as well as those with the Soviet Union, likewise appeared before the publication of the final volume of Churchill's history. Moreover, as McNeill pointed out in a new introduction in 1970, his book was written from a World War II perspective, "asking 'How did the Grand Alliance break up?' rather than 'How did the Cold War begin?' " 8 That Grand Alliance was primarily an Anglo-American partnership in which the Soviets (Churchill always referred to them as Russians or Bolsheviks) were included only so long as there was a common enemy. Yet, in spite of a wealth of evidence that Anglo-American discord punctuated alliance politics {Roosevelt and Hopkins has examples in almost every chapter on the war), historians have been seduced by Churchill's soaring prose and misdirected by the Cold War itself. The documents Churchill chose to include in his history demonstrate that he had done just what he wrote about to Eisenhower. In fact, as the drafts of Churchill-toRoosevelt messages frequently show, the Prime Minister "did take 'great 7

Churchill to Eisenhower, Mar. 28, 1953, Churchill papers: 4/52, as quoted in Martin Gilbert, "Churchill and Roosevelt: The Background of the Relationship and Its Testing Time," presented at the Anglo-American Conference on the Second World War, Imperial War Museum, London, July 29, 1980. 8 McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 4.

6

INTRODUCTION

pains' " to avoid confrontations, even during the war. Those few AngloAmerican arguments that do appear in the correspondence or his History of the Second World War are principally related to wartime strategy and/ or the question of restoring British influence in the eastern Mediterranean (see, for example, the 1944 argument over ANVIL, the invasion of southern France). There are fleeting references to the future of the British Empire, and to postwar trading arrangements and monetary systems— all matters of economic life and death for Great Britain—but they are downplayed to the point of disappearing. Nor does Churchill's presentation of the maneuvering for power in eastern Europe give a full and accurate picture. The Prime Minister's proposals to Stalin for a division of that area into British and Soviet spheres of influence hardly square with Churchill's self-portrait as an early prophet of the dangers of Soviet expansion. One must look beyond the correspondence to find all the evidence of Anglo-American differences. Relations between the two Allies may not have quite been a war-within-a-war; but struggles over the future of the British Empire, spheres of influence, and the postwar economic structure were more than mere skirmishes. We must not over-correct the popular image of Anglo-American harmony by substituting a false picture of overwhelming distrust, dislike, and discord. Churchill persistently sought to establish an Anglo-American entente, and Roosevelt just as persistently assumed that Britain would follow America's lead. That Anglo-American partnership, which Churchill viewed as essential to Britain's survival as a major power and which Roosevelt viewed as the logical corollary to America's new international role, underlay all of their relations during the Second World War. But it was a shifting partnership, as events forced both to reassess their policies and attitudes. Those shifting policies and attitudes passed through a series of identifiable phases. The first phase lasted from September 1939 through May 1940, a time when Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, a British Cabinet position analogous to the American post of Secretary of the Navy. During this period the two men exchanged only a dozen messages. All related to naval matters, particularly the British blockade of Europe and reports of British naval actions that Roosevelt obviously enjoyed reading. That Churchill hit upon sea stories as a means of establishing a personal and informal relationship with the President was not accidental or calculated; rather it sprang naturally from their common interests. As Churchill loved to play with toy and real armies, so Roosevelt enjoyed his model and real ships. Upon receiving the President's initial letter proposing to start a correspondence, Churchill recognized the advantages that exchanges with the President could offer Great Britain. Moreover, it was a chance to cultivate a personal contact, something Churchill had done successfully throughout his career. He quickly wrote to Prime Minister

INTRODUCTION

7

Neville Chamberlain to recommend that they both take up Roosevelt's proposal. The Prime Minister agreed, and appropriate procedures were established.9 Roosevelt also sought a contact, though of a somewhat different variety. An intuitive rather than a thoughtful person, he constantly reached out for impressions and word-pictures from observers abroad. But he also recognized Churchill's political potential. In December 1939 the President told Joseph P. Kennedy, the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, "I'm giving him attention now because there is a strong possibility that he will become the prime minister and I want to get my hand in now."10 The fall of France marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between Roosevelt and the "Former Naval Person," the overly cute term Churchill used for himself once he left the Admiralty for 10 Downing Street. Regardless of how the new Prime Minister signed his messages after June 1940, the gist was the same. In a word—help! The broad outlines of the story are familiar: the steady escalation of American aid from the destroyers-bases arrangement, through lend-lease, to convoying and active warfare against German U-boats. Even so, not everyone in the British government accepted Churchill's premise that an AngloAmerican entente would be beneficial for Great Britain's postwar interests. Some officials worried openly that the end of the war would see the world divided between the Americans and the Soviets.11 But Churchill and his Cabinet saw no reasonable alternative to Anglo-American alliance, even while they recognized the dangers. British dependence upon the United States was uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind when he left unsent a strongly worded message about excessive American demands regarding leases for British facilities as set up in the destroyers-bases deal. Yet he did resist American attempts to obtain an ironclad guarantee that Britain would fight to the death and then transfer its fleet to the United States if faced with a German victory. As Churchill put it to his colleagues, though not to Roosevelt, Britain should keep her options open unless the United States committed itself publicly to a firm alliance.12 9

See R - I x and C-3x. Churchill to Chamberlain, Oct. 4, 1939, Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 7/9/64. 10 As quoted in Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, p. 200. Beschloss' evidence must be used with a good deal of caution since he relies upon Kennedy's retrospective memoir/ diary. Roosevelt's use of his Ambassadors to obtain personal reports is not unique, but he solicited and used such reports with unusual frequency. See, for example, the many such exchanges printed in Nixon, ed., Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs. 1 ' See Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, chap. 4, for a full discussion of such fears. 12 T h e base-lease issue is in R-25x, C-63x, and C-64x, none of which were actually sent. See R-8x regarding the disposition of the British fleet.

8

INTRODUCTION

Even if Churchill was willing to use the vague threat of negotiations with the Germans as a means of gently pushing the United States toward a full-fledged alliance, his true attitude was expressed emphatically in a minute he scrawled on a message sent in October 1941 from the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax. The Ambassador had recounted a suggestion from a temporarily optimistic Secretary of State Cordell Hull that a small, isolated barter with Japan of silk for cotton, for example, might encourage the peaceful elements in that nation without unduly affecting the firm, united front that China, Britain, and the United States had adopted against Japanese expansion. Halifax seemed to think the idea was worth trying, but Churchill warned: "This is the thin edge of the appeasement wedge."13 Churchill's real fear—that the United States would not come to Britain's aid in time—was vividly expressed even earlier. In a telegram sent on May 1, 1941, the President had indirectly predicted continued German victories in the eastern Mediterranean, with the outcome of the war dependent upon control of the Indian and Adantic oceans. Roosevelt's reference to British withdrawals prompted the Prime Minister to comment bitterly to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that "there has been a considerable recession across the Atlantic, and that quite unconsciously we are being left very much to our fate. At any rate whatever may be the final stages of the war this fateful moment is likely to be lost."14 On December 7, 1941, the second phase in the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship came to an abrupt end with the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor. The urgency of the military problems that beset both leaders created an atmosphere of equality that lasted until mid-1943. Roosevelt's courageous decision to carry out the Anglo-American agreement to defeat Germany first (even though the decision was made easier by Hitler's seemingly gratuitous declaration of war on the United States on December 11), the two-front war strategy agreed upon early in 1941 at the ABC-I talks, set the tone for the Churchill-Roosevelt equation for more than a year and a half. While there were occasional irritants—for example, Roosevelt's sincere but inconsistent attempts to prod Churchill into promising independence for India—and hints of more serious disagreements, par13 Churchill's not-so-veiled threats about appeasement forces within England are in C - H x and C-17x. T h e comment on Halifax's message is found in the margin of Halifax to the Foreign Office, Oct. 18, 1941, PREM 3/252/6A/82. 14 Churchill to Eden, May 2, 1941, PREM 3/469/350. That note mentions two documents, though none were attached. One is clearly R-38x. Churchill's response, C 84x, sounded an upbeat note, but Ambassador Winant reported to Roosevelt that R 38x, which had followed close on the heels of a heavy German bombing attack on Plymouth, had depressed the Prime Minister. See Winant to Roosevelt, May 6, 1941, PSF:Safe:Winant.

INTRODUCTION

9

ticularly on the question of a second front in France, the personal relationship between the two men still reached a high-water mark. Perhaps it may be said that no national leader has greater trust in another than when he discloses information about having broken the other's secret codes. In February 1942, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt noting that their two navies were cooperating closely on the question of ciphers and suggesting that similar coordination be developed regarding diplomatic and military (army) ciphers. Then, in a gentle caution about the unsophisticated codes frequently used by the State Department, Churchill indicated that "some time ago, however, our experts claimed to have discovered the system and constructed some tables used by your Diplomatic Corps."15 Even if the Americans already suspected the truth, given the normal character of alliances—tenuous and temporary arrangements based upon short-term expediency—such a disclosure by Churchill becomes all the more remarkable. The scope of Anglo-American cooperation is also evident in far more important matters. In addition to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, organized to handle overall strategic plans and policies, the concept of a worldwide system of unified theater commands—a single officer in each theater commanding the military forces of both the United States and Great Britain—is unique in modern military annals. Despite the reluctance of each nation to permit command of its forces to fall into the hands of foreign officers, shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack British General Sir Archibald Wavell became Commander in Chief of the South West Pacific area (the American, British, Dutch, and Australian or ABDA Command). But the overall Pacific command structure is the worst example of such cooperation. Not only did the Dutch and Australians feel like secondclass citizens, but later attempts to attain effective unity of command fell afoul of Chiang Kai-shek's preoccupation with maintaining his own political power, of British concern over India, and of American interservice rivalry as General Douglas MacArthur and the Navy each demanded and received theaters of their own. Nevertheless, the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence about the establishment of the short-lived ABDA Command under Wavell is characterized by a tangible spirit of friendly trust. It was during these exchanges that Roosevelt told Churchill, "it is fun to be in the same decade with you."16 The eternal triangle is perhaps as much a threat to statesmen as it is to lovers. With the advent of what later came to be called summit diplomacy, the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship began to change. The British had long recognized the need for political discussions with the Soviets— 15

SeeC-32/l. '« See C-146x, C-150x, R-74x, C-156x, R-77x, C-163x, C-164x, R-81x, C - 2 5 . T h e quotation is from R—77x.

10

INTRODUCTION

witness the visits to Moscow by Eden in December 1941 and by Churchill in August 1942. But by the summer of 1943, Roosevelt's increasing concern about the Soviet Union signaled a major shift in American policy and tactics. Certainly the introduction of the Soviets into the equation was not the only factor. By mid-1943 American materiel and manpower contributions had begun to force Great Britain into the status of a junior partner, a position that would inevitably tempt the United States to try to impose its own solutions to Anglo-American problems. In two such cases—British suppression of the rebellion against the Greek monarchy, and the negotiations over a postwar civil aviation agreement—correspondence, including unsent drafts, indicates that both Churchill and Roosevelt came almost to the breaking point.17 Nevertheless, the lure of "summitry," so irresistible to world leaders, was the immediate cause of a subtle but increasingly noticeable change in the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. A hint of troubles to come cropped up when Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov visited London and Washington in the late spring of 1942. He came to talk about two issues, postwar Soviet boundaries and the establishment of a large-scale second front in western Europe. With neither the British nor the Americans willing to make commitments regarding boundaries, the Russian concentrated on the second front, a question that had already found American and British military leaders at odds. For the Soviet Union, the second front was a political as well as a military question, and Molotov made it clear that Soviet leaders considered the matter crucial to relations with the Anglo-American alliance. Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff expressed grave doubts about the chances for a second front in Europe before late 1943, but despite those warnings—given to Molotov in London and telegraphed to Roosevelt as well— the President told the Soviet diplomat that the Allies expected to form a second front in 1942. The American Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, agreed, although he emphasized the difficulty of obtaining enough shipping and spoke of an "all-out air engagement" with the Germans rather than the massive land battle the Soviets hoped for.18 Roosevelt set forth his thinking in a letter to Churchill sent while Molotov was still in the United States: Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success because we have got on a personal footing of candor and as good friendship as can be acquired through an interpreter. . . . He has made very clear his real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not " See C-850/1 and R-655. 18 Memorandum of Conference held at the White House, May 30, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III, pp. 576-77. General Marshall's remarks were not printed in that excerpt but may be found in Cross memo, May 30, 1942, Hopkins papers, 311, Molotov visit. Churchill's report on the talks with Molotov in London is in C-92.

INTRODUCTION

11

put forward to force our hand. . . . Therefore, I am more than ever anxious that BOLERO [the buildup of troops and supplies] proceed to definite action beginning in 1942. We all realize that because of weather conditions the operation cannot be delayed until the end of the year.19 One suspects that Roosevelt's reference to a friendly, candid, and sincere Molotov was largely wishful thinking. The Russian was, after all, known in the State Department as "old stoneface." Undoubtedly the President was concerned that the Russian front might collapse, but equally important was his desire to establish a special and personal relationship with Soviet leaders; a relationship that would, if necessary, bypass the British. As Roosevelt noted later in the same letter to Churchill, "I am especially anxious that he [Molotov] carry back some real results of his Mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin."20 Despite Churchill's reservations about a second front in 1942, the President may have truly believed that the British had accepted that strategy. In April 1942, General Marshall and presidential adviser Harry Hopkins had held discussions with British officials in London on the second-front issue. The British carefully, perhaps too carefully, hedged on any commitment to a 1942 invasion of the European continent, making such an attack dependent upon the stabilization of the Russian front and on an enormous increase in supplies and air transport from the United States. But the Americans seemed to hear only what they wanted to hear, and Hopkins even vaguely threatened the British by mentioning that public opinion in the United States demanded an offensive against Japan. Misunderstanding may have been further prompted by a message from Roosevelt to Hopkins that mentioned changes in the French (Vichy) government and suggested that the Americans and British discuss, though not necessarily revive, the subject of an invasion of French North Africa (GYMNAST).21 Perhaps the precise beginning of this fourth phase of the ChurchillRoosevelt relationship is marked by the President's attempt to arrange a private meeting between himself and Stalin. The entire question of maintaining good relations with the Soviets had long preyed on Roosevelt's 19 See R-152. Roosevelt frequently misused the codeword BOLERO to describe the actual invasion of Europe rather than just the preinvasion buildup. 20 For Roosevelt's thoughts on the military necessity of aiding the Soviet Union with a second front see R—131/1. T h e second-front issue appears throughout the ChurchillRoosevelt correspondence, but the key documents during early 1942 are R—129, R 131/1, R-139, C - 6 8 , and C-70. 21 A transcript of the second-front talks in London is in PREM 3/333/6/373-79. See also Roosevelt to Hopkins, Apr. 17, 1942, Hopkins files, MR, and the headnote to C 70.

12

INTRODUCTION

mind. The pressure he applied on Churchill to continue to send supply convoys to northern Russia, even after staggering losses, is recounted in Churchill's memoirs and amplified by their correspondence. Roosevelt's obvious concern over Eden's trip to Moscow in 1941 and Churchill's talks with Stalin in 1942 and 1944 arose from the President's conviction that personal diplomacy achieved the best results; and he did not like being left out. In May 1943, Roosevelt sent Joseph E. Davies to Moscow on a special mission to arrange a Roosevelt-Stalin meeting and to discuss SovietAmerican relations in general. Davies, who had been Roosevelt's Ambassador in Moscow from November 1936 through June 1938, agreed with the President's assessment that long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union was far more important than short-term disputes, and had warned Roosevelt that the United States should not use Great Britain as the "good broker" in Soviet-American relations. Like the President, Davies believed that Churchill and the British sought to control the European balance of power and to preserve their empire, policies which would be disruptive in the postwar world. Roosevelt's instruction for Davies to set up a private tete-a-tete with Stalin indicates that the President likewise wished to avoid using Churchill and the British as go-betweens. Even though Roosevelt lied to Churchill and denied proposing a private meeting with Stalin, the President's true purpose was revealed in a message he sent to the Prime Minister explaining the benefits of such a conference. What Roosevelt did was to reject the British as brokers by claiming that, with Churchill absent, Stalin would "be more frank" in discussing the Balkans, Finland, and Poland, not to mention China and the war against Japan. More than just an illustration of Roosevelt's belief in personal diplomacy, the message is a strong, clear statement of disagreement with, even distrust of, British goals and policies. Robert Sherwood (and presumably Roosevelt and Hopkins) suspected that Churchill purposefully responded to that statement with a "scorching cable" to Stalin, ostensibly about Soviet complaints regarding the postponement of the second front, but in reality designed to sink any chance of a RooseveltStalin meeting. In a departure from his normal procedures, Churchill sent his cable to Stalin before touching base with the President. When presidential representative Averell Harriman had told Churchill in June about the projected Stalin-Roosevelt conference, the Prime Minister acquiesced, but with obvious bad grace. His warning to the President that the enemy would make much of the exclusion of Great Britain may have been a veiled reference to rumors of a separate Soviet-German armistice; certainly the Americans were worried about such an agreement. But it was the inference of second-class status for the British that most concerned Churchill. He used his talks with Harriman as an occasion to criticize American policy, particularly regarding China and Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, and he warned ominously that the Soviets had de-

INTRODUCTION

13

manded a second front only in order to keep the Western nations out of the Balkans. Robert Sherwood captured the mood that prevailed in both the White House and 10 Downing Street: "It was fortunate that Hitler did not know how bad the relations were between the Allies at that moment, how close they were to the disruption which was his only hope of survival." At the heart of that near-disruption was Winston Churchill and his struggle to guarantee great-power status for his nation. Whether or not Roosevelt was naive, as critics have claimed, and whether or not Stalin was already planning his move into central Europe, as Cold War lore would have it, is not the point. The prelude to the first meeting of the Big Three was a calculated Churchillian temper tantrum. 22 Roosevelt's reluctance to follow the British lead was strongly reinforced by Joseph Davies' report of his "mission to Moscow."23 Davies' reputation for taking Soviet statements at face value and for seeing only the good side of Soviet policies is well deserved, but his written report reinforced some of the President's beliefs. Davies drew a picture of a determined Soviet leadership, willing to cooperate but suspicious that "the United Nations want a weakened Russia at the peace talks and a Red Army that is bled white." He warned of "an appeasement group" that favored "Russian withdrawal into itself, [and] no further acceptance of lend-lease, in order that it may not be hampered by any obligations after it has won the war"; a description that must have brought to mind memories of American "isolationists." Davies emphasized that the Soviets insisted upon a restoration of their historic boundaries—namely the Curzon line, which he believed Roosevelt had come to accept as the Soviet-Polish boundary. Davies suspected that Stalin would modify his harsh dismissal of Polish claims out of consideration for the British, "but only on the surface." Beyond that, Davies wrote, "they insist that they have no further territorial aspirations, including specifically Iran." 24 22 T h e Davies mission is discussed in MacLean, "Davies and Soviet-American Relations," pp. 73-93. For Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges related to the Davies trip see R 280, R-289/B, R-297, C-309, and C-328. Sherwood's impressions are in Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 733-34. For Foreign Office arguments that Great Britain should act as an intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union see T h o m e , Allies of a Kind, pp. 61, 141, 381, 384. T h e Churchill-Stalin exchange on the second front is repeated in C-335. Churchill's reaction to the idea of Stalin-Roosevelt talks is in Harriman to Roosevelt, July 5, 1943, PSF:GB:1943, and partly reprinted inFRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 13-15, but without Churchill's discussion of Soviet motives in the Balkans or his remarks about de Gaulle and China. 23 T h e legend "mission to Moscow," in both English and Russian, was painted on the fuselage of Davies' plane before it left the Soviet Union. Davies had used the same phrase as the title of his memoir of his embassy to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and a motion picture of the same name followed shortly thereafter. 24 Davies to Roosevelt, May 29, 1943, PSF:Russia. MacLean, "Davies and SovietAmerican Relations, p. 88. The Curzon line is shown in Vol. I, page 685.

14

INTRODUCTION

Actually, the Davies report reflected both the hopes and capabilities of the Soviets in May 1943. The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad a few months earlier had guaranteed that the Soviets would regain their 1941 boundaries (which were, essentially, the boundaries of Tsarist Russia before 1917), but until German armored strength was destroyed at Kursk in July 1943 there was no reason to suspect that the Red Army would roll westward as rapidly as it did the following year. Warnings that the Soviet Union might settle for a restoration of its boundaries and not further prosecute the war were, therefore, frighteningly plausible, raising the specter of either accepting German domination of western Europe or of fighting a greatly protracted and costly war with no guarantee of victory. And that still left the Japanese astride East Asia. With the British unenthusiastic about a massive, all-out second front and with the President suspicious that Stalin distrusted Churchill's motives, Davies' report confirmed Roosevelt's belief that direct Soviet-American contacts were needed if the wartime coalition was to lead to postwar collaboration. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' and Teheran conferences later in 1943, Stalin committed the Soviet Union to the full prosecution of the war against both Nazi Germany and Japan, but by then the damage to the ChurchillRoosevelt relationship had been done. For Americans to portray Great Britain as a greater threat to postwar cooperation and peace than the Soviet Union may seem absurd, but Roosevelt and his advisers were not looking at the world from a Cold War perspective. American foreign policy from Wilson to Roosevelt had constituted a radical critique of international relations as conducted by the European powers. Calls for arms control, the elimination of trade barriers, and the establishment of governments responsive to the needs and aspirations of their citizens—thus ending colonialism and "oppressive" spheres of influence—were all based on the belief that European leadership had failed. Bolshevism, Nazism, and Fascism were distrusted and feared, but not blamed for the collapse of the interwar order. Most Americans placed responsibility for the world crisis on Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, France. It was British greed and power politics, so the argument went, that prevented the development of effective international cooperation and thus permitted the dictators to run amok. Even the Wilsonians, who believed that American participation in the League of Nations might have changed things, blamed the British and French for subverting Wilson's position and making it possible for the "isolationists" to defeat the Treaty of Versailles. Only the later development of a Cold War alliance made American foreign policy less radical, both in fact and by comparison to Soviet rhetoric. 25 Moreover, American and, for that matter, British con25

Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 252—53, is a good presentation of this interpretation, although the concept is as old as George Washington.

INTRODUCTION

15

cern about postwar European politics centered on preventing another German attack, not on Soviet expansion—even this late in the war. There is a good deal of irony in all this, for it was the Soviet Union, not the Prime Minister's arguments, that eventually brought the United States into the ranks of the world's conservatives. Roosevelt never held his private talks with Stalin, but the tone of the documents makes it clear that by late 1943 things were different between Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill, and Great Britain, took the role of junior partner in the Anglo-American alliance. Military cooperation aimed at winning the war remained important, but more and more postwar issues appeared that emphasized the conflicting interests of the United States and Britain. By 1944, whether the question was military or political, the Americans usually prevailed. The invasion of southern France—Operation ANVIL (DRAGOON)—which the British vigorously opposed, prompted Churchill to write an angry, bitter message that was never sent. He accused the Americans of ruining the campaign in Italy in order to gain the transfer of "10 divisions, many quite unproved, the French almost entirely black and headed by inexperienced Commanders"; of flinging aside the Mediterranean campaign "like the rind of an orange"; and of proceeding with incontinent haste for "some minor benefice." His closing remark speaks for itself: "I think I have a right to some consideration from you, my friend, at a time when our joint ventures have dazzled the world with success."26 How it must have galled Churchill to redraft the message, delete the harsh wording, insert the British military's oft-stated arguments against ANVIL, and then close almost obsequiously: "It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this sense. . . I send you every personal good wish. However we may differ on the conduct of the war, my personal gratitude to you for your kindness to me and for all you have done for the cause of freedom will never be diminished."27 As Churchill well knew, his Mediterranean strategy had disintegrated long before, as a result of the American refusal to strike out from Italy toward the Yugoslavian and Greek coasts, and because of the rapid and largely unexpected Soviet development of an offensive capability. The American insistence that a few divisions be transferred from Italy to attack southern France merely drove the point home, not that the British military

Perhaps the most active forum for that liberal critique in the 1920s and 1930s was in the pages of The New Republic. Christopher Thorne, like Reynolds an Englishman, offers a similar view of American foreign policy ii: The Limits of Foreign Policy and in Allies of a Kind. 26 See C-721/A (not sent), J u n e 30, 1944. 27 S e e C - 7 2 1 , J u l y 1, 1944.

16

INTRODUCTION

ever had much faith in Churchill's notion that a breakthrough in northern Italy would open an avenue for a major attack into Germany.28 Nevertheless, Churchill had a few small victories he wished to preserve. One in particular was Greece. Although it would be difficult to summarize that complex conflict, which, once the Germans withdrew, found British troops fighting against Greek guerrillas in order to maintain a pro-British government, it is clear that Churchill nearly broke with Roosevelt over the President's desire to oust the British-sponsored King and hold open elections. Roosevelt eventually backed down in the face of Churchill's impassioned demands, but initially he seemed motivated by American public opinion and by America's traditional anti-colonialism. He may even have been tempted to displace British with American influence. That idea is at least suggested by his actions in December 1943, when he convinced the Greek King to reject a British request for a royal commitment to a postwar plebescite.29 Whatever the President's reasoning at that time, by the fall of 1944 he and his advisers were pushing for a public referendum on the monarchy before King George was allowed to return to Greece from Egypt. Although the British believed that the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which they knew came under the direct control of the President, was trying to sabotage British policy in Greece and in Egypt, in fact Roosevelt acquiesced to Churchill's insistent demands. Still, the Americans continued to emphasize cooperation with the Soviets at the expense of British influence in Greece (Churchill's "percentage" agreement with Stalin of October 1944 not withstanding). When in March 1945 the President proposed an Anglo-Soviet-American trade mission to Greece, Churchill replied with obvious concern that it was hardly the "appropriate moment to bring the Russians in," since they were acting so irresponsibly in Roumania. Roosevelt agreed, but his message indicates that he maintained his hope of promoting effective cooperation with the Soviet Union up to the very end of his life.30 There were other elements of Anglo-American discord unrelated to the Soviet Union. Among a number of examples, the dispute over postwar civil aviation produced the sharpest Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges, culminating in a blunt demand from the President: 28

Churchill's Mediterranean strategy and his support for a thrust through the Ljubljana gap are discussed in the headnotes, documents, and all the major secondary studies. His later claim that such a campaign would have prevented Soviet occupation of some of Czechoslovakia and other portions of the Danube basin is dubious at best. It is just as likely that such an effort by Anglo-American forces would have resulted in the Soviets' liberating more of northern Europe, possibly as far west as the North Sea. 2 " See C-509. 30 See R-723 and C-932.

INTRODUCTION

17

I am afraid you do not yet fully appreciate the importance of reaching a satisfactory agreement. Our people have gone as far to meet yours as I can let them go. If the [Chicago] conference should end either in no agreement or in an agreement which the American people would regard as preventing the development and use of the great air routes the repercussions would seriously affect many other things. We are doing our best to meet your Lend-Lease needs. We will face Congress on that subject in a few weeks and it will not be in a generous mood if it and the people feel that the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial air agreement. 31 The threat to cut off lend-lease aid to Great Britain was unusually harsh, for at no time did Roosevelt so blatantly wave the club of economic coercion in his dealings with the Soviets—the recommendations of some of his advisers not withstanding. Churchill felt the heat, but could only appeal for mercy: Let me say also, that I have never advocated competitive "bigness" in any sphere between our two countries. . . . You have the greatest navy in the world. You will have, I hope, the greatest air force. You will have the greatest trade. You have all the gold. But these things do not oppress my mind with fear because I am sure the American people under your re-acclaimed leadership will not give themselves over to vainglorious ambitions, and that justice and fair-play will be the lights that guide them.32 In answer to that plea the President softened his tone but continued to hold Churchill's feet to the fire. Ultimately the Chicago conference failed to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, and the United States began making bilateral civil-aviation pacts, including one with the Republic of Ireland that infuriated Churchill.33 A subtle indication of the change in the Churchill-Roosevelt equation can be found, perhaps, in the headings of their messages. By December 1943 the Prime Minister had largely stopped referring to himself as the "Former Naval Person," and by the end of 1944 the President also discontinued his use of that phrase. Perhaps without realizing it, the two men had returned to more formal forms of address, just as their relationship had lost some of its special flavor. The final phase of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship began with the Yalta Conference and ended with the President's death on April 12, 1945. 31

See R-655/1. See C-836. 33 See R-661 and R-664. The agreement with Ireland is mentioned in C-897, C 904, and R-717. Postwar policy regarding petroleum also generated discord; see C 583, R - 4 7 4 / 1 . C - 5 9 1 . 32

18

INTRODUCTION

The nature of the relationship during that two-month period is best characterized by Harry Hopkins, who pointed out that from February through April the Roosevelt-to-Churchill correspondence was neither initiated nor written by the President. With a few exceptions, Hopkins was essentially correct. There were some important exchanges, but they reveal thinking in the State Department or other American agencies more than Roosevelt's hopes and plans. Using the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence during this last period as a way to assess the President's thinking is, therefore, a risky proposition. One example of the pitfalls can be seen in a message Roosevelt sent to Churchill on April 6, 1945. The statement that Anglo-American armies would soon be in a position that "will permit us to become 'tougher' than has hithertofore appeared advantageous to the war effort" has been interpreted by some to mean that Roosevelt adopted a hard line toward the Soviet Union shortly before his death. But those who claim that the President never abandoned his belief that the Soviets would cooperate can cite the message he sent Churchill five days later, on April 11: "I would minimize the general Soviet problems as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out. . . . We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct." Although the two messages are not directly contradictory, their tone is strikingly different. That difference may be explained by a look at the "log sheet" which accompanied each message.34 The harshly worded message of April 6 was drafted by the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy. The draft was then forwarded to Warm Springs, Georgia, where Roosevelt was trying to shake the deadening fatigue that had plagued him since he had returned from the Yalta Conference. In less than two hours, a sick and enervated President approved the message and sent it back to Washington for release. Leahy had long distrusted the Soviets, and one can speculate that Roosevelt, sick as he was, paid only cursory attention to the draft, not bothering to rewrite it. The "log sheet" for the second, more conciliatory message lends credence to that theory, for the drafting notation reads "President wrote this message." Nor is there any indication of further editing before the second cable was dispatched to London. 35 Moreover, it defies logic to argue, on the basis of a single, brief message, that the President had decided to reverse his long-term policy toward the Soviet Union. 36 34 Such "log sheets," as the Map Room staff called them, gave the drafter of a message, listed related messages, and frequently provided a brief summary of the issues involved. They became a matter of routine in October 1943, apparently at the suggestion of George Elsey, then a naval reserve officer on duty in the White House Map Room. 35 T h e two messages are R-736 and R-742. T h e "log sheets" are attached in MR. 36 T h e Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence provides only a part, albeit an indispen-

INTRODUCTION

19

Despite the two leaders' remarkably close wartime relationship, it is hard to imagine any resuscitation of the Anglo-American partnership if Roosevelt had lived to complete his fourth term in office. Rather, given the President's commitment to avoiding a postwar confrontation with the Soviets, it is likely that he and Churchill would have disagreed with increasing frequency. In Harry S Truman and the new President's advisers, Churchill found a far more sympathetic audience for his dark warnings about Russian expansionism. The exaggerated image of true friendship and selfless cooperation between Churchill and Roosevelt would surely have been, like Soviet-Western cooperation, another Cold War casualty. All this evidence of Anglo-American tension and disagreement does not alter the fact that Churchill, Roosevelt, and their two nations were and remained remarkably close allies. But stripped of romanticized myth, that relationship was made of mutual self-interest, the same stuff as other alliances. Churchill was committed to the extension into the postwar era of the wartime Anglo-American alliance, and maintaining the image of selfless support from Roosevelt was part of that policy. Within a fortnight of the President's death, Churchill was pressing for the erection of a permanent monument to Roosevelt's memory, a memorial that would acknowledge past friendship and promote future partnership. 37 The final volume of Churchill's memoirs, entitled Triumph and Tragedy, begins with this stated theme: "How the Great Democracies Triumphed, sable part, of the overall picture, even for understanding vhe relationship between the two men. Any study of British and American foreign relations requires a careful examination of the records of the Foreign Office and the State Department, as well as files relating to the myriad of wartime agencies, other Cabinet departments, and third countries involved in Anglo-American affairs. Even for a study of the President and the Prime Minister, one must look to and then beyond their direct correspondence. A striking example of such additional facets of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship is their wartime conferences. Two other areas of Anglo-American conflict make only brief, incomplete appearances in the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. Competition for economic advantage in the postwar world, and the overall issue of the disposition of the British (and other European) colonies—matters which were related to each other—crop up, for example, in Roosevelt's complaints about British rule in India and in Churchill's angry reaction to the American position on civil aviation; but the scope of those disputes went far beyond anything discussed in these exchanges. Churchill hoped to create a strong postwar Anglo-American entente and Roosevelt routinely evaded arguments, but their subordinates were not so careful. 37 Churchill was not alone in proposing a memorial to Roosevelt. Among a number of suggestions was one that "a kind of Chequers to be called 'Roosevelt' should be established in England for the American Ambassador." Mockingly, one of Churchill's secretaries called "the idea a silly one because if we adopt it we shall soon have to present Hatfield to the Soviet Ambassador and call it 'Stalin' besides converting other country houses to the use of Yugoslavs, Greeks, etc. with such names as 'Tito' and 'Damaskinos.' We should probably end by calling. Knowle 'Mackenzie King.' " J . Colville to Lawford, May 3, 1945, PREM 4/84/2A/203-4. Eventually, a statue of Roosevelt was

20

INTRODUCTION

and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." As with so much of World War II history, Churchill set forth the most widely accepted interpretation. He had simply replaced the evil of Nazi Germany with the evil of the Soviet Union. Regardless of whether he was right about the Soviets, Churchill failed to acknowledge that the invariable price of victory is the collapse of wartime alliances, no matter how strong the personal bonds. erected in 1948 across from the American Embassy in London's Grosvenor Square. One can only guess what memorial would have been grand enough for Charles de Gaulle.

I. Alliance Emerging

All Mr. Churchill needs is the direction in his life of a great idea. He is a Saul on the way to Damascus. Let him swing clean away from that road of destruction and he might well become Paul on his way to immortality. This is to say, that to be saved from himself Mr. Churchill must be carried away by enthusiasm for some great ideal. A Gentleman With a Duster, in The Mirrors of Downing Street (1921)

ALLIANCE EMERGING

23

The Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence begins with a surprising endorsement of the New Deal from Winston Churchill. Handwritten on the title page of Roosevelt's copy of the first volume of Churchill's biography Marlborough: HL· Life and Times (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1933; also 6 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933-38) is an inscription dated "Oct. 8, 1933." That appears to be the actual day that Churchill penned the inscription, since the President wrote his own name and the year 1933 on another page. This suggests that the two met or corresponded before the outbreak of the European war in September 1939. But except for a brief encounter in London in 1918—one which Roosevelt remembered with distaste and Churchill completely forgot (see C-386 and C—412/3)—there is no record of a prewar meeting, not even during Churchill's visits to the United States, despite his attempt to arrange a meeting in October 1929 with the then newly elected governor of New York State. Nor is there any evidence of an exchange of correspondence before 1939. In 1923, the publisher of Churchill's book The World Crisis had approached several public figures in the United States about reviewing it, hoping to "start a little controversy." Roosevelt had been contacted, but it appears that he did not review the book, although he did acquire a copy that same year (Charles Scribner, Jr., to Churchill, J u n e 22, 1923; courtesy of Martin Gilbert). There were also third-party contacts through various trans-Atlantic travelers, from Bernard Baruch to Roosevelt's son James. At any rate, whatever their earlier contacts, it seems that Churchill sent the new President a copy of the Marlborough book as a routine courtesy, by way of James Roosevelt. Churchill's approval of the early New Deal reflected his liberal support for the President's dropping of the gold standard and for the criticisms of bankers and industrial exploiters. Churchill reserved his warmest praise for the repeal of prohibition.

Inscription [Oct. 8, 19331 T o Franklin D. Roosevelt from Winston S. Churchill With earnest best wishes for the success of the greatest crusade of m o d e r n times. Oct. 8, 1933 [FDRL]

Franklin Roosevelt initiated the correspondence between himself and Winston Churchill with the following letter—written only nine days after Churchill had joined Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty, and eight days after Great Britain and France declared war on

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Germany following the German invasion of Poland. Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy for President Woodrow Wilson during World War I; hence the opening gambit. Although the President could not have known what he began with this letter, he did hope to establish a personal contact with a British leader who seemed a likely candidate for Prime Minister should Chamberlain resign or be forced from office. (See Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, p. 200.) Moreover, in the fall of 1939 and for the next two years Roosevelt clung to the belief that U.S. participation in the struggle against Hitler could and should be limited to naval and possibly air forces. Long before the war in Europe had broken out, the President had suggested that American ships could assist the British in keeping open the sea lanes across the Atlantic, and he hoped that direct contact with the British Cabinet official in charge of the Royal Navy would enhance the already effective cooperation between the American and British navies. (See Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, chaps. 2 - 3 , for additional detail on Anglo-American naval cooperation.) Roosevelt often bypassed normal diplomatic channels; he had sent similar letters to his ambassadors in key nations suggesting that they correspond directly with him. Such actions were not without precedent, but Roosevelt, wishing to maintain personal control over American foreign policy and diplomacy, took them further than did any of his predecessors. One has only to recall the image of Woodrow Wilson, laboriously typing his own letters to his ambassadors and to other governments, to know that this fear of losing control was nothing new. Nevertheless, maintaining personal control has been difficult for twentieth-century presidents. In reprinting this letter in his memoirs, Churchill corrected Roosevelt's misspelling of Marlborough. Roosevelt also claimed to have read Churchill's While England Slept (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1938). See Roosevelt to Frederic A. Delano, J u n e 25, 1938, FDR LTRS, p. 793.

R-Ix, letter Washington September 11, 1939 [TOR Oct. 3] PRIVATE

My dear Churchill:— It is because you a n d I occupied similar positions in the World War that I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty. Your problems are, I realize, complicated by new factors but the essential is not very different. What I want you and the Prime Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about. You can always send sealed letters t h r o u g h your pouch or my pouch. I am glad you did the Marlboro volumes before this thing started— and I much enjoyed reading them. With my sincere regards, Faithfully yours, [Franklin D. Roosevelt] [MR*. WSC, I, 440-41. R&C]

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Churchill's response to Roosevelt's initiative apparently came over the telephone. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax (Edward Wood) and Chamberlain agreed with Churchill that a personal contact with Roosevelt should be cultivated, but while the President's letter, which arrived on October 3, was being discussed by the British government, the U.S. Naval Attache in Berlin reported a conversation in which Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had warned that the U.S. merchant ship Iroquois would be sunk, presumably by the British in an attempt to blame the Germans and thus get the United States into the war. Although the British, when quickly informed by the White House, accused the Germans of trying to spread propaganda against England, it seems more likely that the Germans were the victims of a faulty intelligence report. The important aspect of this bizarre tale is the degree to which Roosevelt cooperated with the British government. He not only informed the British but followed Churchill's advice about publicizing the report. No explosion occurred aboard the Iroquois. (See Capt. Albert E. Schrader, USN, "Diary," Oct. 4—12, 1939; Reynolds, Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 86-87; and Churchill to Chamberlain, Oct. 4, 1939, Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 7/9/64.) Although there are suggestions that other calls took place during this early stage of their relationship, the transcript printed below is the only firm evidence.

C-R / telephone-1 Oct. 5, 1939 [Churchill to Roosevelt] ( T h e substance of the following message was communicated in a telep h o n e conversation with the President on the 5th of October, 1 9 3 9 - ) Iroquois is probably a thousand miles West of Ireland. Presume you could not meet her before 50th meridian. T h e r e remains about a thousand miles in which outrage might be committed. U-boat d a n g e r inconceivable in these broad waters. Only method can be time-bomb planted at Queenstown. We think this not impossible. A m convinced full exposure of all facts known to United States Gove r n m e n t , including sources of information, especially if official, only way of frustrating plot. Action seems urgent. Presume you have warned Iroquois to search ship. [PREM 3/467/10]

At a meeting of Western Hemisphere foreign ministers in Panama, held shortly after the Germans attacked Poland, the American republics, responding to U.S. prodding, established a "safety belt extending outward from 300 to 1000 miles around the hemisphere except for Canada." Belligerent activity within that zone was prohibited—a move which would normally aid the British, who had to patrol there for German submarines. This was the kind of

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move for which Roosevelt had great liking, for though it seemed to satisfy the demands that the United States avoid involvement in the European war, it actually helped those fighting Germany. At informal Anglo-American naval discussions before war broke out the President had suggested the establishment of an American neutrality patrol which could guard against U-boat activity and free British escort vessels for other duty. With that offer in mind, Churchill followed the suggestion of Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax to "feed" the President by pointing out that it would be mutually useful if American naval authorities passed on to the British any information about the location of German submarines or surface raiders. (See Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, pp. 4 5 ^ 7 . ) T h e Scheer was a German pocket battleship and the Hipper a heavy cruiser. Joseph P. Kennedy, a major financial contributor to the Democratic Party, had been appointed United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom in January 1938. Like many of the President's appointees to posts related to Anglo-American relations, Kennedy shared Roosevelt's combination of admiration and distrust for the British. Kennedy also doubted that Great Britain would stand u p to Germany, and his increasing pessimism about British ability and willingness to fight caused him to favor building up American military strength rather than sending military goods across the Atlantic. Since British Intelligence had broken the routine State Department codes (see C—32/1), they were aware of Kennedy's feelings, and Churchill's telegrams were presumably written with that in mind. Churchill referred to himself by the transparent codename "Naval Person" since he was First Lord of the Admiralty. He consulted his naval staff and Ambassador Kennedy when drafting this message to the President. An early draft opened in the style that would later come to characterize their correspondence, although, for some reason, that sentence was eventually deleted (see Gilbert, Finest Hour, p. 53).

C-Ix London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 5, 1939, 4 P.M. / TOR 1 P.M. T h e Following from Naval Person: Your letter takes me back to 1011 and it is certainly a most unusual experience to occupy the same post fighting the same enemy 25 years We quite u n d e r s t a n d natural desire of United States to keep belligerents out of their waters. We like the idea of a wide limit of say 300 miles within which n o submarines of any belligerent country should act. If America requests all belligerents to comply, we should immediately declare that we would respect your wishes. General questions of international law would of course remain unprejudiced. More difficulty arises about surface ships, because if a raider operates from or takes refuge in the American

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zone, we should have to be protected or allowed to protect ourselves. We have mentioned several other instances to Mr. Kennedy. We do not mind how far south the prohibited zone goes, provided that it is effectively maintained. We should have great difficulty in accepting a zone which was only policed by some weak neutral. But of course if the American navy takes care of it, that is all right. Thirdly, we are still not sure whether raider off Brazil is Scheer or Hipper, but widespread movements are being made by us to meet either case. The more American ships cruising along the South American coast the better, as you, sir, would no doubt hear what they saw or did not see. Raider might then find American waters rather crowded, or may anyhow prefer to go on to sort of trade route, where we are preparing. We wish to help you in every way in keeping the war out of Americas. [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1939, V, 85-86. R&C ]

During his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill's messages to Roosevelt consisted of either reports on naval actions or comments on matters relating to American neutrality and the British naval blockade. The British battleship Royal Oak was sunk by a German U-boat while at anchor at Scapa Flow, the Home Fleet's main base located in the Orkney Islands north of Scotland. ASDIC, an underwater sound-detection device which the U.S. Navy later developed as SONAR, was probably the "new apparatus" referred to by Churchill. Although the British Ambassador in Washington suggested swapping ASDIC for the American-developed Norden bombsight, nothing came of the proposed exchange at this time (Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, pp. 48-49). Churchill's reference to a promise to write is a further indication that he and Roosevelt had exchanged a number of telephone calls.

C-2x London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 16, 1939, 10 P.M. /TOR 5:33 P.M. Secret and Personal for the President. The Following from Naval Person. It is very odd that Scheer should have made no other prizes since September 30. As I told you we are taking some pains in looking for him. He may be anywhere by now. We have been hitting the U-boats hard with our new apparatus and on Friday 13th four including two of the largest and latest were destroyed. Sinking of Royal Oak was a remarkable episode of which I will write you more fully. It in no way affects the naval balance. Our accounts of Hitler's oil position make us feel he is up against time limits. This means that either he will make vehement attack on us for which we are prepared or that he is being held back by counsellors

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who see the red light. We propose to see what happens feeling fairly confident that all will be well. We should be quite ready to tell you about o u r asdic methods whenever you feel they would be of use to the United States Navy a n d are sure the secret will go n o farther. T h e y certainly are very remarkable in results and enable two destroyers to do the work that could not have been d o n e by ten last time. We have not been at all impressed by the accuracy of the Germans air bombing of o u r warships. T h e y seem to have no effective b o m b sights. I have not written as I promised because this and my former cable give all my news. [MR*. RUC]

Although the British Foreign Office, particularly the American Department, apparently had no quarrel with the substance of Churchill's next telegram to Roosevelt, officials protested the channels of communication which were used. By sending his messages through the American Embassy in London rather than the British Embassy in Washington, Churchill not only bypassed normal channels and prevented the Foreign Office from vetting (commenting upon) the telegram but also gave American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy a chance to comment before the British Ambassador in Washington even saw the exchange. American Department officials distrusted Kennedy's defeatism, and they may also have been worried that the Germans could read the State Department's codes as easily as British intelligence had read them—although some speculated later that it might not have been a bad thing if the Germans had realized how the United States and Great Britain were growing closer together. Churchill agreed to send copies of his messages to both the British and American embassies simultaneously, but he insisted on keeping the State Department channel open, preventing the Foreign Office from exercising prior control over those exchanges. (See Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 68.) On December 13—14, three British cruisers forced the German pocket battleship Graf Spee to seek asylum in the Uruguayan port of Montevideo on the River Plate in order to make repairs. Afraid that superior British naval forces would sink the ship if she sailed and unwilling to permit the vessel to be interned for the duration of the war, the German High Command ordered the Graf Spee scuttled. T h e naval battle, which took place within the nonbelligerency zone proclaimed at Panama, brought on protests from the State Department and several South American republics. The British heavy cruiser Exeter suffered heavy damage in the encounter.

C-3x London [via U.S. Embassy] Dec. 25, 1939, 12 A.M. / TOR 9:55 A.M. Strictly Secret and Personal for the President from Naval Person: We have always conformed to undertaking not to use British subma-

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rines inside your zone and I am very sorry there seems to be trouble about recent incidents. We cannot always refrain from stopping enemy ships outside international three-mile limit when these may well be supply ships for U-boats or surface raiders, but instructions have been given only to arrest or fire upon them out of sight of United States shores. As a result of action off Plate whole South Atlantic is now clear and may perhaps continue clear of warlike operations. This must be a blessing to South American Republics whose trade was hampered by activities of raider and whose ports were used for his supply ships and information centers. In fact we have rescued all this vast area from war disturbances. Earnestly hope this will be valued by South American States who may likely for long periods enjoy in practice not only three hundred but three thousand miles limit. Laws of war gave raider right capture, or sink after providing for crews, all trade with us in South Atlantic. No protest was made about this although it injured Argentine commercial interests. Why then should complaints be made of our action in ridding seas of this raider in strict accordance with same international laws from which we had been suffering. Trust matter can be allowed to die down and see no reason why any trouble should occur unless another raider is sent which is unlikely after fate of first. South American States should see in Plate action their deliverance perhaps indefinitely from all animosity. Much of world duty is being thrown on admiralty. Hope burden will not be made too heavy for us to bear. Even a single raider loose in North Atlantic requires employment half our battle fleet to give sure protection. Now unlimited magnetic mining campaign adds to strain upon flotillas and small craft. We are at very full extension till the new war-time construction of anti-submarine craft begins to flow from May onwards. If we should break under load South American Republics would soon have worse worries than the sound of one day's distant seaward cannonade. And you also, Sir, in quite a short time would have more direct cares. I ask that full consideration should be given to strain upon us at this crucial period and best construction put upon action indispensable to end war shortly in right way. In case you may be interested in details of recent action am sending various reports by first air mail. Damage to Exeter from eleven-inch guns was most severe and ship must be largely rebuilt. Marvel is she stood up to it so well. Magnetic mines very deadly weapon on account of possibility of varying sensitiveness of discharge, but we think we have got hold of its tail though we do not want them to know this. Generally speaking think war will soon begin now. Permit me to send you, Sir, all the compliments of the season. [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1939, V, 121-22. pR&C]

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C-4x, letter The Admiralty [London] January 7, 1940 My dear Mr. President, In pursuance of the promise I m a d e you in the telegram I sent on Christmas day, I now enclose a precis of the reports we have so far received about the Naval action off Montevideo. Yours sincerely, [signed] Winston S. Churchill [PSFiGB*]

ENCLOSURE TO C - 4 X

Naval Action off Montevideo T h e first sighting r e p o r t from H.M.S. Ajax, at 0615 hours 13th December, stated that the Admiral Graf Spee was in position 34° South 49° West steering a course 275°. H.M.S. Achilles and Exeter were in company with Ajax. T h e Admiral Graf Spee closed, and opened fire at 0618 with one turret on Exeter and the other on the two smaller cruisers. After two salvoes she concentrated fire from her heavy guns mainly on Exeter, with an occasional salvo from one turret on the lighter ships. H.M. Ships attacked according to a pre-arranged plan with Exeter on one flank, and Ajax and Achilles on the other concentrating their gunfire. Flank marking was employed. H.M.S. Exeter o p e n e d fire at 0620, H.M.S. Achilles at 0622 and H.M.S. Ajax at 0623. T h e 6-inch concentration firing by Achilles and Ajax commenced at 0625. Exeter's B turret was hit by an 11" shell at 0624, all the bridge personnel being killed by splinters except the Captain, who then went aft and conned the ship from there. Exeter fired her starboard torpedoes 7 minutes later without effect a n d Graf Spee t u r n e d away u n d e r smoke and zigzagging. An aircraft was flown off Ajax for spotting at 0637, and continued this duty d u r i n g most of the subsequent firing. At 0640 Achilles' director control tower was hit, 3 m e n being killed and 3 wounded. Spotting was affected a n d 6" concentration firing from Ajax and Achilles was r e n d e r e d temporarily ineffective. Exeter's A t u r r e t was hit at 0641, w h e r e u p o n she t u r n e d a n d fired her port torpedoes, resuming a westward course 7 minutes later. She continu e d firing from Y turret u n d e r local control until 0730, when power failed owing to flooding, and the vessel withdrew to eastward very shortly afterwards.

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Meanwhile Ajax and Achilles continued to attack, proceeding at full speed, alternatively closing A arcs to shorten range and then opening to develop maximum gunfire. GrafSpee concentrated on the smaller cruisers from 0720, and Ajax received a hit which put X and Y turrets out of action at 0725. She then fired 4 torpedoes, causing the enemy vessel to turn away. At about 0745, after 81 minutes action at ranges from 19,000 to 8,000 yards, Ajax and Achilles withdrew, the former vessel at this time having only three 6" guns in action. Admiral Graf Spee made off towards the River Plate, shadowed by our 6" cruisers. During this phase the German vessel made very accurate bursts of fire at Ajax (at 1915) and at Achilles (at 1010, 2055 and 2132). The last burst took place well within the River Plate. Achilles replied to the firing at 2057, and is thought to have straddled the GrafSpee. Admiral GrafSpee's 11" firing was very accurate throughout, particularly for line even at 12 miles during shadowing phase, though her 6" gunnery deteriorated considerably during the action. She made considerable use of smoke floats and frequently made large alterations of course to avoid punishment. The British ships were fought with the utmost resolution and skill, excellent work particularly being carried out by repair parties. Casualties in Exeter were severe, amounting to officers, killed and died of wounds, 5, wounded 3; men, killed and died of wounds, 59, wounded, 17. Ajax had 7 men killed and 13 wounded, including 3 seriously wounded. Achilles had 2 officers wounded, 4 men killed and 7 men wounded. H.M.S. Exeter suffered much the greatest damage, the strength of her structure being reduced to 40% forward of 111 bulkhead. Ship's side, bulkheads and frames from the waterline upwards were badly shattered and distorted, upper and lower decks being partially torn away and deflected. Only the two 8 inch guns of Y turret and one 4 inch gun remain fit for action. Two searchlights were riddled. Engines and boilers are undamaged. H.M.S. Ajax suffered the following damage:— X turret out of action, Y turret damaged but in action. Extensive damage to upper deck and all compartments surrounding and above X lobby, but no underwater damage and vessel can steam at full speed. H.M.S. Achilles suffered no major damage and full speed and all armaments are available. Minor damage was caused to vessel above waterline and to electrical leads and apparatus. The Admiralty naturally had incomplete reports of the damage caused to the Admiral Graf Spee. It is believed that her main armament suffered no great harm, though the efficiency of the control tower, which received four hits, was seriously impaired. One 6" gun and one pair of A. A. guns

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were reported out of action, the rangefinder on the fore superstructure probably out of action, and one searchlight damaged. O n e aircraft was reported to be wrecked. A large hole was m a d e on the port side of the fore messdeck, and other small holes elsewhere. It was also reported that the vessel was holed twice below the water line, but this cannot be vouched for. In all she was hit between 50 a n d 60 times. [PSF.GB*]

During Churchill's brief tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty (he became Prime Minister on May 10, 1940), his correspondence with Roosevelt related primarily to British restrictions on trade with Germany, although they did touch on the question of detecting German warships (C-Ix). In 1917, when the United States had entered World War 1, the Americans had expanded their definition of contraband (goods which could not be sold or traded by neutrals to belligerents) to include virtually everything. In 1939, the British took advantage of that precedent and proclaimed "contraband control" instead of a formal blockade. All neutral vessels headed for the Continent were asked to stop at various control ports (Haifa, Gibraltar, Kirkwall, Ramsgate, Weymouth) for clearance or to obtain certification from a British consul abroad that their cargoes were not headed for Germany, either directly or indirectly. Those certifications were called "navicerts." Ships which failed to comply with these regulations would be forced to sail to a British port where they would be searched (including the mails) and any contraband confiscated. T h e British also declared all German goods to be contraband and published a blacklist of neutral companies suspected of trading with the enemy. The "combat zone" around Great Britain had been defined by the President in accordance with the provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939. American citizens, ships, and aircraft were forbidden to enter the zone, and all goods shipped into a combat zone from the United States had to be on non-American vessels and had to be owned (paid for) by a foreign government or person— the "cash-and-carry" provision. Churchill was inclined to make concessions to the Americans regarding those British naval measures, but the Chamberlain Ministry disagreed. As a result, the Cabinet quickly modified his attempt to exempt American merchant ships from seizure on the high seas (C-6x). Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) was the British Ambassador to the United States.

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C-5x London [via U.S. Embassy] Jan. 29, 1940, 7 P.M. /TOR 1:20 P.M. Personal a n d Secret for the President from Naval Person. I gave orders last night that no American ship should, in any circumstances, be diverted into the combat zone r o u n d the British Islands declared by you. I trust this will be satisfactory. [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1940, II, 10. R&C]

C-6x London [via U.S. Embassy] Jan. 30, 1940, 1 P.M. /TOR 8:30 A.M. Personal a n d Secret for the President from Naval Person. I trust that the information I gave you last night about the orders sent to British ships will not be made known until measures have been concerted which will remove appearance of discrimination. It has been pointed out to me that my signal to fleet [C-5x] can only be maintained if measures are taken to ensure in advance of their d e p a r t u r e that United States ships carry no objectional cargo. Moreover, in exceptional cases it may be necessary to divert United States ships if we have definite g r o u n d for suspicion against them. It would be most helpful if same a r r a n g e m e n t could be reached with Lothian on these lanes [lines] and meanwhile all publicity avoided. [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1940, II, 11. R&C]

In one short sentence, Roosevelt summed up the problem that the shipping rights of neutral nations presented to the British: the benefits of the blockade hardly offset the development of anti-British feelings in America.

R-2x, letter [Washington, D.C.] February 1, 1940 My d e a r Churchill Ever so many thanks for that tremendously interesting account [ C - 4 x ] of the extraordinarily well fought action of your three cruisers. I am inclined to think that when we know more about the facts, it will t u r n out that the damage to the Admiral Graf Spee was greater than reported.

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At the time of dictating this, I think our conversations in regard to search and detention of American ships is working out satisfactorily—but I would not be frank unless I told you that there has been much public criticism here. The general feeling is that the net benefit to your people and to France is hardly worth the definite annoyance caused to us. That is always found to be so in a nation which is 3,000 miles away from the fact of war. I wish much that I could talk things over with you in person—but I am grateful to you for keeping me in touch, as you do. Always sincerely, [Franklin D. Roosevelt] [PSF:GB*. FDR LTRS, p. 995. R&C]

The navicert system, an American device to avoid incidents at sea by having neutral American merchant vessels obtain clearances before leaving port, had been operating since November 21, 1939. Kirkwall was a British contrabandcontrol base in the Orkney Islands.

C-7x London [via U.S. Embassy] Feb. 28, 1940, 8 P.M. / TOR 3

P.M.

Strictly Personal and Most Secret for the President from Naval Person. Very many thanks for your most kind letter of February 1. Since on January 29 I gave orders to the fleet not to bring any American ships into the zone you have drawn around our shores, many of the other departments have become much concerned about the efficiency of the blockade and the difficulties of discriminating between various countries. The neutrals are all on them and they are all on me. Nevertheless the order still stands and no American ship has been brought by the navy into the danger zone. But you can imagine my embarrassment when Moore McCormack Line actually advertise in Norway that they do not have to worry about navicerts or Kirkwall, and when all the Scandinavian countries complain of discrimination in American favor. I wonder whether there is any way in which the Moore McCormack Line could be persuaded, in addition to accepting navicerts as a general rule, not to carry mails for Scandinavia until the arrangements we are trying to make at St. Johns, New Brunswick, or elsewhere, are ready. All our experience shows that the examination of mails is essential to efficient control as only in this way can we get the evidence of evasion. I do hope that I may be helped to hold the position I have adopted by the American shipping lines avail-

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ing themselves of the great convenience of navicerts which was an American invention and thus enable American trade to proceed without hindrance. It is a great pleasure to me to keep you informed about naval matters, although alas I cannot have the h o n o r of a talk with you in person. [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1940, II, 29-30.]

At the suggestion of the State Department, Roosevelt held off on any firm answer while the department worked out the details with officials of the Moore-McCormack Line. T h e British were concerned about goods reaching Germany aboard ships calling at Bergen, in southwestern Norway, but MooreMcCormack was about to eliminate that run.

R-3x Washington Mar. 5, 1940, 3 P.M. T o the Naval Person from the President. U p o n my r e t u r n to Washington, I received your message [C-7x.] I deeply appreciate your efforts. I am having the situation thoroughly studied a n d will communicate with you further as soon as possible. Roosevelt [AAB] [PSF:GB:WSC*. FRUS, 1940, II, 30.]

Churchill quickly discovered Roosevelt's love of sea stories, and regularly sent the President summaries of various naval engagements. T h e account mentioned below was published under the title of The Battle of the River Plate (London: HMSO, 1940) and is available at the Roosevelt Library.

C—8x, letter London May 7, 1940 My d e a r Mr. President, In view of the interest you displayed in the Battle of the River Plate, I thought you would like to see an advance copy of the official account of the Battle which we shall shortly be publishing. Yours sincerely, [signed] Winston S. Churchill [MR*]

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For over two months, the Churchill-Roosevelt channel had been uncharacteristically quiet. In Europe, Germany consolidated its gains in the east, and the Soviet Union fought a war against Finland, which ended on March 12 when the plucky Finns, outgunned and outmanned, accepted Stalin's terms. Despite Hitler's public denials of any plan to launch an attack on western Europe, British and French Intelligence reported a massive buildup of German land and air forces along its western borders, forcing the British, and Churchill, to concentrate on the immediate problem of stopping the Germans instead of on the longer-term questions of American aid and participation in the war. T h e resignation of French Premier Edouard Daladier brought in Paul Reynaud, an advocate of strong resistance to Germany, but the British had little faith in their continental ally. Perhaps the "peace mission" of U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, with stops in London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome in February, had also made Churchill more hesitant about working closely with the President. Churchill summed up his feelings and the situation with brusque clarity: "in the war of armies on the ground I was under the thrall of defensive fire-power. On the sea I strove persistently within my sphere to assert the initiative against the enemy as a relief from the terrible ordeal of presenting our enormous target of sea commerce to his attack. But in this prolonged trance of the 'Twilight' or 'Phoney' war, as it was commonly called in the United States, neither France nor Britain was capable of meeting the German vengence thrust.. . . All lay in suspense. . . . Complete immobility and silence reigned behind the German Front. Suddenly, the passive or smallscale policy of the Allies was swept away by a cataract of violent surprises. We were about to learn what total war means" (WSC, I, 581, 585). That total war began on April 9 with a German invasion of Denmark and Norway (the day after the British and French mined Norwegian waters) that brought a quick surrender from the Danes and complete German occupation of Norway within three weeks, despite British attempts to occupy the north coast. On May 9, the same day that British forces occupied Iceland, the German offensive against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg began, quickly followed on the next day by an attack on France. T h e government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain could not survive amidst the wreckage of its policies, and he resigned. Churchill had little support from within the Conservative Party (whose leaders preferred either Lord Halifax or Anthony Eden as Chamberlain's replacement), but his reputation as a staunch opponent of Germany and vigorous proponent of military preparedness made him the choice of the Tory rank and file, and of the country, to succeed Chamberlain. Churchill maintained popular support throughout most of the war, but felt plagued by his lack of any firm political base in the Conservative Party. For the duration of the war, Churchill held the posts of Prime Minister and Defence Minister in a coalition War Cabinet composed of representatives from both major political parties. When Churchill became Prime Minister on May 10, the war had changed dramatically: the Dutch had surrendered and the French lines at Sedan had broken, although the full German breakthrough came a few days later. His plea for American aid, sent under the nom de guerre "Former Naval Person" since he had left the Admiralty, had a tone of desperation.

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C-9x London [via U.S. Embassy] May 15, 1940, 6 P.M. /TOR 12:55 P.M.

Most Secret and Personal. President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Although I have changed my office, I am sure you would not wish me to discontinue our intimate, private correspondence. As you are no doubt aware, the scene has darkened swiftly. The enemy have a marked preponderance in the air, and their new technique is making a deep impression upon the French. I think myself the battle on land has only just begun, and I should like to see tanks [masses] engaged. Up to the present, Hitler is working with specialized units in tanks and air. The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one, like matchwood. We must expect, though it is not yet certain, that Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilization. We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and air borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready for them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone and we are not afraid of that. But I trust you realize, Mr. President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have a completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear. All I ask now is that you should proclaim nonbelligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: first of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war. This time next year we shall have plenty. But if in the interval Italy comes in against us with another one hundred submarines, we may be strained to breaking point. Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, of which you are now getting delivery. These can be repaid by those now being constructed in the United States for us. Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, of which again there will be plenty next year, if we are alive to see it. Fourthly, the fact that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, from North Africa, and perhaps from northern Spain, makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United States. This also applies to other materials. We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same. Fifthly, we have many reports of possible German parachute or air borne descents in Ireland. The visit of a United States squadron to Irish ports, which might well be prolonged, would be invaluable. Sixthly, I am

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looking to you to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient. T h e details of the material which we have in mind will be communicated to you separately. With all good wishes and respect. [MR*. WSC, II, 24-25. R&C]

Roosevelt's response to Churchill's pleas for aid was vague and unsatisfying. Until French resistance to Germany actually collapsed, the Roosevelt administration assumed that Hitler could be stopped on the European continent. T h e Prime Minister's hint that the United States fleet could use Singapore as an advance base in order to challenge Japan more directly went contrary to the President's policy of avoiding a confrontation in the Pacific. Moreover, it would have constituted a much closer relationship with Great Britain than Roosevelt contemplated at that time. Arthur Purvis, a Canadian, was head of the British Purchasing Commission, the agency which coordinated the purchase of war materials in the United States. Purvis worked closely and effectively with American government officials, particularly Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

R-4x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] May 16, 1940, 1 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person. I have just received your message [C-9x] and I am sure it is unnecessary for m e to say that I am most happy to continue o u r private correspondence as we have in the past. I am, of course, giving every possible consideration to the suggestions m a d e in your message. I shall take u p your specific proposals one by one. First, with r e g a r d to the possible loan of forty or fifty of o u r older destroyers. As you know a step of that kind could not be taken except with the specific authorization of the Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment. F u r t h e r m o r e , it seems to be doubtful, from the standpoint of o u r own defense requirements, which must inevitably be linked with the defense requirements of this hemisphere and with o u r obligations in the Pacific, whether we could dispose even temporarily of these destroyers. F u r t h e r m o r e , even if we were able to take the step you suggest, it would be at least six or seven weeks at a minimum, as I see it, before these vessels could u n d e r t a k e active service u n d e r the British flag. Second. We are now doing everything within our power to make it possible for the Allied Governments to obtain the latest types of aircraft in the United States.

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T h i r d . If Mr. Purvis may receive immediate instructions to discuss the question of anti-aircraft e q u i p m e n t and ammunition with the appropriate authorities here in Washington, the most favorable consideration will be given to the request m a d e in the light of o u r own defense needs and requirements. Fourth. Mr. Purvis has already taken u p with the appropriate authorities h e r e the purchase of steel in the United States and I u n d e r s t a n d that satisfactory a r r a n g e m e n t s have been made. Fifth. I shall give further consideration to your suggestion with regard to the visit of the United States Squadron to Irish ports. Sixth. As you know, the American fleet is now concentrated at Hawaii where it will remain at least for the time being. I shall communicate with you again as soon as I feel able to make a final decision with r e g a r d to some of the other matters dealt with in your message and I h o p e you will feel free to communicate with me in this way at any time. T h e best of luck to you. Franklin D. Roosevelt. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, III, 49-50. R&C]

Churchill's reference below to an attack "on the Dutch model" apparently meant he expected the Germans first to use heavy bombing against the British Isles, followed by an attack with paratroops and glider-borne forces to create confusion and distract attention from the main, sea-borne invasion. That technique had worked in Holland.

C-IOx London [via U.S. Embassy] May 18, 1940, 6 P.M./TOR 1:14 P.M.

Secret a n d Personal for the President from F o r m e r Naval Person. Many thanks for your message [R-4x] for which I am grateful. I d o not need to tell you about the gravity of what has h a p p e n e d . We are d e t e r m i n e d to persevere to the very end whatever the result of the great battle raging in France may be. We must expect in any case to be attacked here on the Dutch model before very long and we h o p e to give a good account of ourselves. But if American assistance is to play any part it must be available [soon]. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, III, 50-51. R&C. WSC, II, 56.]

Frequently Churchill's requests for aid and Roosevelt's answers went through the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian. Direct or indirect, the

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answers remained the same, and Churchill intensified the urgency of his pleas, although he hesitated before sending this strongly worded message. His warning that an appeasement ministry might replace him in the event that American aid was not forthcoming was not an empty threat. (See headnote to C 17x.)

C-Hx London [via U.S. Embassy] May 20, 1940, 1 P.M. / TOR 8:40 A.M. Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. Lothian has reported his conversation with you. I u n d e r s t a n d your difficulties but I am very sorry about the destroyers. If they were h e r e in six weeks they would play an invaluable part. T h e battle of France is full of d a n g e r to both sides. T h o u g h we have taken heavy toll of enemy in the air and are clawing down two or three to one of their planes, they have still a formidable numerical superiority. O u r most vital need is therefore the delivery at the earliest possible date of the largest possible n u m b e r of Curtiss P-40 fighters now in course of delivery to your army. With regard to the closing part of your talk with Lothian, o u r intention is whatever h a p p e n s to fight on to the end in this Island and, provided we can get the help for which we ask, we h o p e to r u n them very close in the air battles in view of individual superiority. Members of the present administration would likely go down d u r i n g this process should it result adversely, but in no conceivable circumstances will we consent to surrender. If m e m b e r s of the present administration were finished and others came in to parley amid the ruins, you must not be blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter with Germany would be the fleet, and if this country was left by the United States to its fate n o one would have the right to blame those then responsible if they made the best terms they could for the surviving inhabitants. Excuse me, Mr. President, putting this nightmare bluntly. Evidently I could not answer for my successors who in utter despair a n d helplessness might well have to accommodate themselves to the G e r m a n will. However there is happily no need at present to dwell u p o n such ideas. Once more thanking you for your good will. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, III, 51. WSC, II, 56-57. R&C]

T h e preceding message was the last Churchill-Roosevelt exchange before the arrest of Tyler G. Kent, a code clerk in the American Embassy. Kent vehemently opposed Roosevelt's policy of aiding Britain and had permitted others who shared his views to see copies of several Churchill-Roosevelt messages

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and other cables he had copied and smuggled out of the embassy. Since at least one of those Churchill-Roosevelt messages found its way into German hands, apparently via Kent's friends and the Italian Embassy, Kent may have been used by Italian spies. At the time of his arrest, Kent had in his possession six Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges (C-3x, C-5x, C-6x, C-7x, C - I Ix, and R— 4x). He spent the duration of the war in a British jail, and later became a darling of the anti-Roosevelt revisionists. Kent persisted in claiming (as late as 1973) that he had possessed copies of a large number of Churchill-Roosevelt messages which had never been made public. In fact, all six of the messages found in his apartment were subsequently published in FRUS. An examination of the relevant State Department archives, particularly the records of the investigation made by the U.S. Embassy in London in May, 1940 (DSKent, Tyler G./123), indicates that his claims were without foundation. (See Kimball and Bartlett, "Prewar Commitments.")

R—5x, letter [Washington] May 30, 1940 My d e a r Churchill:— Ever so many thanks for that remarkably interesting story [ C - 4 x , C— 8x] of the Battle of the River Plate—a grand j o b by your three cruisers. You are much in my thoughts. I need not tell you that. As ever yours, [Franklin D. Roosevelt] [MR]

As the situation in France continued to worsen, Churchill worried more and more about the air defenses of Britain. His pleas to Roosevelt were echoed by Arthur Purvis, head of the British Purchasing Commission in the United States, and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who had long supported increased aid to Britain.

C-12x [London] [June 1, 1940] [Churchill to Roosevelt] I h o p e you will not mind if I refer again to the question of aircraft. As you know, we have communicated details of our urgent needs t h r o u g h Mr. Purvis, as you suggested, and are now beginning to receive reports from him. I u n d e r s t a n d your position regarding additional aircraft priorities, as explained by Mr. Morgenthau to Mr. Purvis. Nevertheless, I feel justified

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in asking for the release to us of 200 Curtiss P.40 fighters now being delivered to your Army. T h e courage a n d success of o u r pilots against numerical superiority are a guarantee that they will be well used. At the present rate of comparative losses, they would account for something like 800 G e r m a n machines. I also u n d e r s t a n d your difficulties, legal, political and financial, regarding destroyers. But the need is extreme. [Edward Bridges] [PREM 3/468/175]

Faced with the imminent collapse of French military resistance to Germany, Churchill ordered the evacuation of British armed forces from the Continent. By J u n e 4, over 300,000 British and 25,000 French soldiers had left the French port of Dunkirk and its surrounding beaches. T h e Prime Minister's goal was to save the British Army so that it could defend the British Isles, but many French military leaders felt that the British had deserted France at her moment of greatest need, a feeling which contributed to Anglo-French disputes later in 1940 and in 1941. On the day the evacuation ended, Churchill addressed Parliament and, in a remarkable feat of rhetoric, turned a military defeat into a psychological victory. In an emotional, inspiring speech, he praised the British armed forces and bravely promised that "we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if. . . this Island . . . were subjugated . . . , then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old" (WSC, II, 118). The speech was aimed not only at British morale but also at Americans who might argue that aid to Britain wasted supplies which ought to go toward building u p America's defenses. Ironically, that speech, which received great attention in the United States, was recorded for overseas broadcast by an impersonator, Norman Shelley, because Churchill did not have the time. On J u n e 10, Churchill thought he heard the answer he wanted to hear. In an address to the graduating class at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, the President promised that the resources of the United States would be extended with "full speed ahead" to those struggling against Germany, and against Italy which had declared war on France and Britain earlier that same day. But the new Prime Minister's hope that this meant the United States would soon enter the war proved false. Even if Roosevelt had wanted to join the British, which is highly doubtful, Congress would not have given its approval. Like most Englishmen, Churchill viewed the Italian declaration of war as particularly reprehensible—the "Italian outrage." That was largely because the English had felt betrayed when Mussolini spurned their offers of alliance against Germany and instead sided with Hitler when that seemed expedient. T h e underlined words were added to the draft in Churchill's handwriting.

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C-13x London [via British Embassy] June 11, 1940 For President [from Prime Minister]. Personal and Private. We all listened to you last night and were fortified by the grand scope of your declaration. Your statement that the material aid of the United States will be given to the Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement in a dark but not unhopeful hour. Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of Paris should it occur becoming the occasion of any kind of parley. The hope with which you inspire them may give them the strength to persevere. They should continue to defend every yard of their soil and use the full fighting force of their army. Hitler thus baffled of quick results will turn upon us and we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury and defend our Island. Having saved the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] we do not lack troops at home and as soon as Divisions can be equipped on the much higher scale needed for Continental service they will be despatched to France. Our intention is to have a strong army fighting in France for the campaign of 1941. I have already cabled you about airplanes including flying boats which are so needful to us in the impending struggle for the life of Great Britain. But even more pressing is the need for destroyers. The Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with a much larger number of submarines which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based on Spanish ports. To this the only counter is destroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you have already had reconditioned. We can fit them very rapidly with our ASDICS and they will bridge the gap of six months before our war-time new construction comes into play. We will return them or their equivalents to you without fail at six months notice if at any time you need them. The next six months are vital. If while we have to guard the East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against our commerce the strain may be beyond our resources; and the ocean traffic by which we live may be strangled. Not a day should be lost. I send you my heartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all you are doing and seeking to do for what we now indeed call the Common Cause. [PREM 3/468/167-69. FRUS, 1940, III, 52. pR&C]

The fall of France came with a speed which shocked everyone, including both Hitler and Roosevelt. The series of messages exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt between June 12 and 15 succinctly chronicle that fall and Churchill's

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unsuccessful attempt to obtain some sort of public commitment from the United States. William Bullitt had been Roosevelt's personal choice as Ambassador to France. General Maxime Weygand became Commander in Chief of the French Army on May 19. General Alphonse Georges was C in C of the northwestern front in France. Marshal Henri P6tain was a national hero who had led the victorious French forces against the Germans in World War I, but who believed in 1940 that only a negotiated peace with Hitler could preserve French independence. Paul Reynaud was Premier of France, Admiral Jean Darlan commanded the French Navy, and General Charles de Gaulle—a firm supporter of resistance to Germany—had just been appointed Undersecretary for National Defense.

C-14x London [via U.S. Embassy] June 12, 1940, 9 P.M. /TOR 7:45 P.M. From Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. I spent last night and this m o r n i n g at the French G Q G [General Headquarters] where the situation was explained to me in the gravest terms by Generals Weygand and Georges. You have no doubt received full particulars from Mr. Bullitt. T h e practical point is what will h a p p e n when and if the French front breaks, Paris is taken and General Weygand reports formally to his G o v e r n m e n t that France can no longer continue what he calls "coordinated war". T h e aged Marshal Petain who was n o n e too good in April and July 1918 is I fear ready to lend his n a m e and prestige to a treaty of peace for France. Reynaud on the other h a n d is for fighting on a n d he has a young general de Gaulle who believes much can be done. Admiral Darlan declares he will send the French fleet to Canada, it would be disastrous if the two big m o d e r n ships fell into bad hands. It seems to me that there must be many elements in France who will wish to continue the struggle either in France or in the French colonies or in both. This, therefore, is the m o m e n t for you to strengthen Reynaud the utmost you can and try to tip the balance in favor of the best and longest possible French resistance. I venture to put this point before you although I know you must u n d e r s t a n d it as well as I do. Of course I m a d e it clear to the French that we shall continue whatever h a p p e n e d and that we thought Hitler could not win the war or the mastery of the world until he had disposed of us, which has not been found easy in the past and which p e r h a p s will not be found easy now. I m a d e it clear to the French that we had good hopes of victory and anyhow had no doubts whatever of what o u r duty was. If there is anything you can say publicly or privately to the French now is the time. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, I, 246-47. pWSC, II, 178 R&C ]

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T h e issue of Irish neutrality had troubled Churchill ever since the AngloIrish agreement of April 25, 1938, which had given Eire full sovereignty over the vital ports of Cork, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly (see map, p. 55), all critical to the safety of the western approaches to England. Once the war broke out, the threat of a German attack on southern Ireland (Hitler's generals actually drew up plans for such a move) worried Irish leaders only a little more than the possibility of a British occupation of those same areas. Attempts by Churchill to work with the Irish Republic invariably ran afoul of Irish demands for the unification of the entire island and intense hatred toward the British. Perhaps the British would have responded in kind had they not been acutely aware of the effect their actions would have upon the United States. Pro-Irish sentiment was strong in America, particularly within President Roosevelt's Democratic Party, and Great Britain needed aid from the United States infinitely more than Irish cooperation. As long as the Irish government believed, perhaps wishfully, that Germany would force Britain to negotiate, Irish neutrality was bent in favor of the Germans. For much of the early part of the war, German agents operated inside Ireland with impunity and the Irish government regularly protested against British sea-control measures. Roosevelt avoided any formal involvement in the matter, but he occasionally authorized private diplomatic warnings to the Irish government.

C-15x London [via U.S. Embassy] June 13, 1940, 12 A.M.—noon/TOR 9:10 A.M. Secret and Personal for the President from F o r m e r Naval Person. French have sent for me again, which means that crisis has arrived. Am just off. Anything you can say or do to help them now may make a difference. We are also worried about Ireland. An American squadron at Berehaven would d o no e n d of good I am sure. [MR*. WSC, II, 152. R&C]

R-6x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] June 13, 1940, 1 P.M. T o F o r m e r Naval Person as Quickly as Possible but with Full Secrecy. I have sent the following to Reynaud: "Your message of J u n e 10 has moved me very deeply. As I have already stated to you and to Mr. Churchill, this Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so urgently require, and o u r efforts to d o still m o r e

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are being redoubled. This is so because of our faith in and our support of the ideals for which the Allies are fighting. The magnificent resistance of the French and British armies has profoundly impressed the American people. I am personally particularly impressed by your declaration that France will continue to fight on behalf of democracy even if it means slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and the Atlantic. It is most important to remember that the French and British fleets continue mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that vital materials from the outside world are necessary to maintain all armies. I am also greatly heartened by what Prime Minister Churchill said a few days ago about the continued resistance of the British Empire and that determination would seem to apply equally to the great French Empire all over the world. Naval power in world affairs still carries the lessons of history, as Admiral Darlan well knows." I cannot send squadron to Berehaven as we have squadron off Portugal and another visiting east coast of South America. The Atlantic patrol from Nova Scotia to Trinidad is, in my judgment, important as it continues to provide a wide safety zone. Furthermore, I think you will agree that maintenance of the main fleet at Hawaii is vital. [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/3775A, CF. MR (draft).]

Churchill and the War Cabinet interpreted Roosevelt's message to Reynaud as a virtual commitment to enter the war, but those hopes were soon dashed.

C-16x London [via U.S. Embassy] June 14, 1940, 3 A.M. / TOR 11:30 P.M., June 13

To President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Ambassador Kennedy will have told you about the British meeting today with the French at Tours of which I showed him our record. I cannot exaggerate its critical character. They were very nearly gone. Weygand had advocated an armistice while he still had enough troops to prevent France from lapsing into anarchy. Reynaud asked us whether in view of the sacrifice and sufferings of France we would release her from the obligation about not making a separate peace. Although the fact that we have unavoidably been largely out of this terrible battle weighed with us, I did not hesitate in the name of the British Government to refuse consent to an armistice or separate peace. I urged that this issue should not be discussed until a further appeal had been made by Reynaud to

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you and the United States, which I undertook to second. Agreement was reached on this and a much better mood prevailed for the moment with Reynaud and his Ministers. Reynaud felt strongly that it would be beyond his power to encourage his people to fight on without hope of ultimate victory, and that that hope could only be kindled by American intervention up to the extreme limit open to you. As he put it, they wanted to see light at the end of the tunnel. While we were flying back here your magnificent message [R-6x] was sent and Ambassador Kennedy brought it to me on my arrival. The British Cabinet was profoundly impressed and desire me to express their gratitude for it, but Mr. President I must tell you that it seems to me absolutely vital that this message should be published tomorrow June 14 in order that it may play the decisive part in turning the course of world history. It will I am sure decide the French to deny Hitler a patched-up peace with France. He needs this peace in order to destroy us and take a long step forward to world mastery. All the far-reaching plans strategic, economic, political and moral which your message expounds may be stillborn if the French cut out now. Therefore I urge that the message should be published now. We realize fully that the moment Hitler finds he cannot dictate a Nazi peace in Paris he will turn his fury on to us. We shall do our best to withstand it and if we succeed wide new doors are opened upon the future and all will come out even at the end of the day. [PREM 3/468/152-54. FRUS, 1940, I, 250-51. WSC, II, 184-85. R&C]

Aware that the protection provided the United States by the Atlantic Ocean was only as good as the navy which sailed those seas, Roosevelt frequently expressed deep concern about the disposition of both the French and British fleets in the event of a French surrender or a German conquest of the British Isles. Even though the President would not permit his subordinates even to consider the possibility of a British defeat, Roosevelt appears to have referred to just that eventuality in the final paragraph of this cable.

R-7x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] June 14, 1940, 3 P.M./TOR 1:30 A.M., June 15 [Roosevelt to Churchill] The following message is sent by the President to the former Naval Person in reply to the message contained in your 1645, June 14, 3 A.M. [C-16x]: I am very much impressed by your message and I am grateful to you

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for giving me so frankly the account of the meeting at Tours yesterday. The magnificent courage and determination shown by the British and French Governments and by the British and French soldiers have never been exceeded. You realize as I hope Prime Minister Reynaud realizes that we are doing our utmost in the United States to furnish all of the material and supplies which can possibly be released to the Allied Governments. At the same time I believe you will likewise realize that while our efforts will be exerted towards making available an ever increasing amount of material and supplies a certain amount of time must pass before our efforts in this sense can be successful to the extent desired. As I asked Ambassador Kennedy last night to inform you my message of yesterday's date addressed to the French Prime Minister was in no sense intended to commit and did not commit the Government to Military participation in support of Allied governments. You will know that there is of course no authority under our Constitution except in the Congress to make any commitment of this nature. As Ambassador Kennedy also informed you when I sent the message I had very much in mind the question of the French fleet and its disposition for future use. I regret that I am unable to agree to your request that my message be published since I believe it to be imperative that there be avoided any possible misunderstanding in regard to the facts set forth above paragraph. I have asked the Congress as a first step to appropriate fifty million dollars for the immediate furnishing of food and clothing to civilian refugees in France, and the Senate yesterday unanimously approved this recommendation. I appreciate fully the significance and weight of the considerations set forth in your message. As Naval people you and I fully appreciate the vital strength of the fleet in being and command of the seas means in the long run the saving of Democracy and the recovery of those suffering temporary reverses. It seems logical to assume that in any war if an armistice is asked for, it becomes almost impossible thereafter to avoid inclusion of a fleet in the terms discussed, especially if such fleet is still under the control of the Government asking the armistice. On the other hand, if a General asks an armistice for his land forces, he does not control or include the disposition of Naval forces. Roosevelt [PREM 3/468/148-^9. FRUS, 1940, I, 254-55 R&C]

Although Churchill made one last plea for an American declaration of war as the only means of keeping France in the fight, he believed it a lost cause. Distraught, he found it necessary to warn Roosevelt that Great Britain could

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not be expected to fight on alone without any real hope of American military intervention. His threat that a pro-German government might replace his Ministry was the first and one of the very few times that Churchill ever strayed from his usual strategy of emphasizing Britain's willingness to fight to the bitter end. Churchill's threat was not without substance. A small but significant number of British M.P.s and public figures wanted to work toward a negotiated peace with Germany, fearing that an all-out war would leave the United States and the Soviet Union dominant. (See Reynolds, Competitive Co-operation, chap. 4.) Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, at least, reacted as Churchill had hoped: "After reading this, unless we do something to give the English additional destroyers, it seems to me it is absolutely hopeless to expect them to keep going" (Morgenthau to Roosevelt, J u n e 18, 1940, MR).

C-17x London [via U.S. Embassy] June 15, 1940, 9 P.M. I TOR 6:37 P.M. Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. I am grateful to you for your telegram [R-7x] and I have reported its operative passages to Reynaud to whom I had imparted a rather m o r e sanguine view. H e will I am sure, be disappointed at non-publication. I u n d e r s t a n d all your difficulties with American public opinion and Congress, b u t events are moving downward at a pace where they will pass beyond the control of American public opinion when at last it is ripened. Have you considered what offers Hitler may choose to make to France. H e may say, " s u r r e n d e r the fleet intact a n d I will leave you Alsace Lorraine", or alternatively "if you d o not give me your ships I will destroy your towns". I am personally convinced that America will in the end go to all lengths but this m o m e n t is supremely critical for France. A declaration that the United States will, if necessary, enter the war might save France. Failing that in a few days French resistance may have crumbled and we shall be left alone. Although the present government and I personally would never fail to send the fleet across the Atlantic if resistance was beaten down here, a point may be reached in the struggle where the present ministers no longer have control of affairs and when very easy terms could be obtained for the British islands by their becoming a vassal state of the Hitler empire. A p r o - G e r m a n government would certainly be called into being to make peace and might present to a shattered or a starving nation an almost irresistible case for entire submission to the Nazi will. T h e fate of the British fleet as I have already mentioned to you would be decisive o n the future of the United States because if it were joined to the fleets of J a p a n , France, a n d Italy a n d the great resources of G e r m a n industry, overwhelming sea power would be in Hitler's hands. H e might, of course, use

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it with a merciful moderation. On the other hand he might not. This revolution in sea power might happen very quickly and certainly long before the United States would be able to prepare against it. If we go down you may have a United States of Europe under the Nazi command far more numerous, far stronger, far better armed than the new [world]. I know well, Mr. President, that your eye will already have searched these depths but I feel I have the right to place on record the vital manner in which American interests are at stake in our battle and that of France. I am sending you through Ambassador Kennedy a paper on destroyer strength prepared by the naval staff for your information. If we have to keep as we shall, the bulk of our destroyers on the east coast to guard against invasion, how shall we be able to cope with a German-Italian attack on the food and trade by which we live? The sender of the 35 destroyers as I have already described will bridge the gap until our new construction comes in at the end of the year. Here is a definite practical and possible decisive step which can be taken at once and I urge most earnestly that you will weigh my words. Since beginning of war Britain and France have lost 32 destroyers with displacement of 47,380 tons which were complete losses. Out of these 25, with displacement of 37,637 tons, were lost since 1st February. There is always a large number of destroyers out of action for repairs to damages caused by enemy action and hard service. From outbreak of war up to Norwegian invasion approximately 30% of British destroyers in home waters were in this condition but since then the percentage has greatly increased and for instance, out of 133 destroyers in commission in home waters today, only 68 are fit for service, which is lowest level since war started. In 1918 some 433 destroyers were in service. The critical situation which has arisen in land operations has unfortunately made less apparent the grave difficulties with which we are faced on the sea. The seizure of the channel ports by the enemy has provided him both with convenient bases and stepping off ground for descents on our coast. This means that our east coast and channel ports will become much more open to attack and in consequence more shipping will have to be concentrated on west coast ports. This will enable the enemy to concentrate their submarine attacks on this more limited area, the shipping lanes of which will have to carry the heavy concentration of shipping. This alone is a serious enough problem at a time when we know that the enemy intend to carry out the bitter and concentrated attack on our trade routes, but added to our difficulties is the fact that Italy's entry into the war has brought into the seas another 100 submarines many of which may be added to those already in the German U-boat fleet, which at a conservative estimate numbers 55.

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T h e changed strategical situation b r o u g h t about by the possession by the enemy of the whole coast of E u r o p e from Norway to the channel has faced us with a prospect of invasion which has more hopes of success than we had ever conceived possible. While we must concentrate o u r destroyers o n protecting the vital trade, we must also dispose o u r naval forces to meet this threat. If this invasion does take place, it will almost certainly be in the form of dispersed landings from a large n u m b e r of small craft and the only effective counter to such a move is to maintain n u m e r o u s a n d effective destroyer patrols. T o meet this double threat we have only the 68 destroyers mentioned above. Only 10 small type new construction destroyers are d u e to complete in next four months. T h e position becomes still worse when we have to contemplate diverting further destroyer forces to the Mediterranean as we may be forced to d o when the sea war there is intensified. We are now faced with the imminent collapse of French resistance and if this occurs the successful defence of this island will be the only h o p e of averting the collapse of civilization as we define it. We must ask therefore as a matter of life or death to be reinforced with these destroyers. We will carry out the struggle whatever the odds but it may well be beyond o u r resources unless we receive every reinforcement and particularly do we need this reinforcement on the sea. [WSC] [MR*. FRUS, 1940, III, 53-55. pWSC, II, 188-89. p«6fC]

Afraid the fall of France would encourage defeatists both in Britain and the United States, Churchill made another plea for some sort of assurance from Roosevelt that the United States would enter the war. Roosevelt had already indicated his complete unwillingness to make any such commitment, and the decision in France to replace Reynaud with Marshal Henri Petain—an avowed supporter of an armistice with Germany—made an answer unnecessary.

C-18x London [via U.S. Embassy] June 15, 1940, 10:45 P.M. /TOR 7:00 P.M. Most Secret and Personal for President of the United States from F o r m e r Naval Person. Since sending you my message of this afternoon [ C - 17x] I have heard that Monsieur Reynaud, in a telegram which he has just sent to you, has

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practically said that the decision of France to continue the war from overseas d e p e n d s u p o n your being able to assure the French Government that the United States of America will come into the war at a very early date. W h e n I sent you my message just now I did not know that Monsieur Reynaud had stated the dilemma in these terms, but I am afraid there is n o getting away from the fact that this is the choice before us now. Indeed, the British Ambassador in Bordeaux tells me that if your reply does not contain the assurance asked for, the French will very quickly ask for an armistice, and I much doubt whether it will be possible in that event for us to keep the French fleet out of German hands. W h e n I speak of the United States entering the war I am, of course, not thinking in terms of an expeditionary force, which I know is out of the question. What I have in mind is the t r e m e n d o u s moral effect that such an American decision would p r o d u c e not merely in France but also in all the democratic countries of the world and in the opposite sense of the G e r m a n a n d Italian peoples. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, I, 257. R&C]

His personal appeals to Roosevelt unsuccessful, Churchill lapsed into one of the longest periods of silence in their correspondence. During the summer of 1940, the Prime Minister worked primarily through the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian, to promote the loan of forty or fifty old American destroyers—and the closer Anglo-American relationship such a loan would foster. As the French moved toward an armistice with Germany, Roosevelt indicated to Lothian a desire to aid Britain. Churchill responded indirecty through his Ambassador on J u n e 17: "I am deeply sensible of President's desire to help us. Please tell him that the most effective thing he can do is to let us have destroyers immediately. Our need of them is vital and their addition to our fleet might be decisive. It is most important that not a day should be lost" (Churchill to Lothian, June 17, 1940, FO 371/24240/ 3858). The Prime Minister played to American fears by having British accounts of the armistice negotiations between France and Germany forwarded to Roosevelt via Lothian. Churchill did not communicate directly with the President again until July 9, and then only to inform Roosevelt that the Duke of Windsor would be appointed Governor of the Bahamas. The Duke had been connected with the prewar appeasement faction and had continued to plead for a negotiated peace with Germany, at one point telling some American diplomats that the United States should put an end to a war being fought only to benefit certain politicians. (See Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 199.) His actions were a source of embarrassment, but he could not return to England since, as Edward VIII, he had abdicated in 1936 in order to marry an American divorcee and his

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presence would be awkward for his brother, King George VI. Churchill wanted Roosevelt to know of the appointment before it was announced in London, but transmission difficulties caused a delay and the British Broadcasting Company made the news public before the President received the message.

C-19x London [via British Embassy] July 9, 1940 [Churchill to Roosevelt] T h e position of the Duke of Windsor on the Continent in recent months has been causing His Majesty a n d His Majesty's Government some embarrassment as, t h o u g h his loyalties are unimpeachable, there is always a backwash of Nazi intrigue which seeks now that the greater part of the Continent is in enemy hands to make trouble about him. T h e r e are personal a n d family difficulties about his r e t u r n to this country. In all the circumstances it was felt that an appointment abroad might appeal to him a n d the Prime Minister has with His Majesty's cordial approval offered him the Governorship of the Bahamas. His Royal Highness has intimated that he will accept the appointment. T h e Prime Minister wished the President to have the earliest possible advance information of this decision which has only just been arrived at. [MR]

On July 5, Churchill forwarded to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, a proposed message to Roosevelt. Halifax suggested a number of deletions (indicated below by the line-outs) and corresponding additions (underscored) which Churchill felt so changed the message that there seemed little use in sending it. As he wrote in a note to Halifax: "Why for instance is it wrong to say 'whom they think will win the war'? I should have thought this was another way of showing him the urgency of the business" (Churchill to Halifax, July 7, 1940, PREM 3/462/2-3/151-52). Halifax had shown the draft to Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, but Churchill dismissed Kennedy's criticism that the message was too pessimistic on the assumption that the Ambassador was merely piqued because the cable would not have officially gone through him. Churchill did suggest that further telegrams go through Kennedy so as to enlist his support; a copy could be sent simultaneously to the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian. Churchill did not insist on his views and this draft was shelved—an indication, perhaps, of the uncertainty Churchill felt about his strength within the Conservative Party. Halifax had been kept in the Cabinet largely as a conciliatory gesture to the Chamberlain wing of the party, and Churchill was not prepared to risk losing its cooperation. Eamon de Valera was Prime Minister of Eire.

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C-20x, draft A, not sent London [Simultaneously through F.O. and American Ambassador] July 5, 1940 For the President from F o r m e r Naval Person It has now become most u r g e n t for you to give us t h e destroyers a n d motorboats. T h e G e r m a n s have the whole French coastline from which to launch U-Boat attacks u p o n o u r t r a d e a n d food, a n d in addition we must be constantly p r e p a r e d to repel t h r e a t e n e d invasion by sea action in the n a r r o w waters a n d also to deal with a break-out from Norway towards Ireland. Besides this we have to keep control of the exits from the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d prevent war spreading seriously into Africa. I know you will d o all in your power, b u t when the consequences to the United States of o u r being h e m m e d in or overwhelmed are so grievous, it seems to m e very h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why this modest aid is not if given now at t h e time when it could be p e r h a p s decisively effective. Pray let m e know if t h e r e is « β any h o p e . 2. Situation in Ireland has deteriorated. De Valera a n d his Party are reconciling themselves to throwing in their lot with t h e Germans, whom they think are b o u n d to win. T h e y are in imminent d a n g e r of being invaded by G e r m a n y from the air, or possibly from the sea, if we cannot stop the latter. T h e y a r e quite u n p r e p a r e d . In these circumstances it may be necessary for us to forestall G e r m a n action by a descent on certain ports, a n d I think it right to let you know this, even t h o u g h you might feel unable to make any c o m m e n t on it. [PREM 3/462/2-3/15&-57]

It was almost a month before Churchill again suggested a similar cable to Roosevelt. By that time the Prime Minister had agreed to drop the references to Ireland and de Valera, and had essentially followed Halifax's advice by toning down the belligerent and pessimistic plea for naval vessels. In a separate note to Halifax, Churchill agreed that it might have been best to have withheld the original draft but added that Lothian now advised that the time had arrived to press Roosevelt on the question of destroyers. Churchill closed his note to the Foreign Secretary: "pray let this go now" (PREM 3/462/2—3/134, Churchill to Halifax, July 30, 1940). Although Churchill made no mention of it to Roosevelt, the British held great fears that the new French government in Vichy, which had signed an armistice with the Germans, would permit the Germans to use the French battle fleet. Many French warships were already in British-controlled ports, but the War Cabinet decided that the heavy cruiser and battleship portion of the French fleet, located primarily at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran in Algeria,

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posed so great a threat to Britain's efforts to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open that, in spite of assurances from the Vichy government that France would remain neutral, the British sent a naval squadron to Algeria with an ultimatum that the French ships either sail to British ports or be attacked. When the Vichy government ordered the French Navy to resist, the British attacked on July 3, sinking or disabling three battleships/battle cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and two destroyers. Impressed by British resoluteness, Roosevelt made clear to Lothian even a remote chance of the French fleet falling under German control justified such action. T h e attack nevertheless intensified the bitterness many French military officers already felt toward Britain because of the British withdrawal at Dunkirk. The Battle of the Atlantic likewise preoccupied Churchill. Expecting a German invasion of the British Isles at any time, the Prime Minister feared that German submarines might close off supply lines from the United States. With the fall of France, Roosevelt had expanded the American aid program. The British had been permitted to assume contracts originally signed by the French for the purchase of aircraft, and the President pressed the American military chiefs to certify that a large amount of small arms and ammunition were not necessary for American defense, fulfilling the provisions of a longforgotten statute which permitted the sale of "surplus" arms.

C-20x London [via U.S. Embassy] July 31, 1940, 6 P.M. I TOR 6:37 P.M. Strictly Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. Is is some time since I ventured to cable personally to you, and many things both good and bad have h a p p e n e d in between. It has now become most u r g e n t for you to let us have the destroyers, motor boats and flyingboats for which we have asked. T h e Germans have the whole French coast line from which to launch U-boats, dive-bomber attacks u p o n o u r trade and food, and in addition we must be constantly p r e p a r e d to repel by sea action threatened invasion in the narrow waters, and also to deal with break outs from Norway towards Ireland, Iceland, Shetlands, and Faroes. Besides this we have to keep control of the exit from the Mediterranean, and if possible the command of that inland sea itself, and thus to prevent the war spreading seriously into Africa. Point T w o . We have a large construction of destroyers and anti-U-boat craft coming forward, but the next three or four months open the gap of which I have previously told you. Latterly, the air attack on o u r shores has become injurious. In the last ten days we have had the following destroyers sunk: Brazen, Codrington, Delight, Wren, and the following damaged: Beagle, Boreas, Brilliant, Griffin, Montrose, Walpole, Whitshed, total 11. All this in the advent of any attempt which may be made at invasion.

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Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air bombing, and yet they must be held in the air bombing area to prevent seaborne invasion. We could not keep up the present rate of casualties for long, and if we cannot get a substantial reinforcement, the whole fate of the war may be decided by this minor and easily remediable factor. This is a frank account of our present situation and I am confident, now that you know exactly how we stand, that you will leave nothing undone to ensure that 50 or 60 of your oldest destroyers are sent to me at once. I can fit them very quickly with ASDICS and use them against U-boats on the western approaches and so keep the more modern and better gunned craft for the narrow seas against invasion. Mr. President, with great respect I must tell you that in the long history of the world, this is a thing to do now. Large construction is coming to me in 1941, but the crisis will be reached long before 1941. I know you will do all in your power but I feel entitled and bound to put the gravity and urgency of the position before you. Point three. If the destroyers were given, the motor boats and flying boats which would be invaluable, could surely come in behind them. Point four. I am beginning to feel very hopeful about this war if we can get round the next three or four months. The air is holding well. We are hitting that man hard both in repelling attacks and in bombing Germany. But the loss of destroyers by air attacks may well be so serious as to break down our defence of the food and trade routes across the Atlantic. Point five. Tonight the latest convoys of rifles, cannon and ammunition are coming in. Special trains are waiting to take them to the troops and home guard, who will take a lot of killing before they give them up. I am sure that with your comprehension of the sea affair, you will not let this crux of the battle go wrong for the want of these destroyers. I cabled to Lothian some days ago, and now send this through Kennedy, who is a grand help to us and the common cause. [MR. PREM 3/462/2, 3. FRUS, III, 1940, 57-58. pWSC, II, 401-2. pR&C]

Roosevelt had begun to receive reports that were cautiously optimistic about Britain's ability, given adequate supplies, to repel any German invasion in 1940. Such information offset the growing pessimism of Ambassador Kennedy and apparently helped persuade the President at last to provide the destroyers Churchill had repeatedly asked for. An exchange of over-age American destroyers for strategically important base-rights on certain British possessions in the Western Hemisphere was so favorable to American interests that Roosevelt believed he could give his approval, under the provisions of an existing statute, without raising an undue

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furor in Congress. After all, the bases would be far more vital than the destroyers to the national defense, particularly with the growing threat of a German move into South America. It was a "can't lose" situation for the United States; the destroyers might provide a lift for British morale and even help sink some U-boats, whereas if Great Britain succumbed to the Germans the Americans would be better prepared for Hitler's probable move across the Atlantic. Following Roosevelt's decision, sent directly to Churchill, to arrange the swap, the Prime Minister left the negotiation of the details in the hands of Lord Lothian and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. As part of the overall arrangement, Roosevelt wanted a commitment from Churchill that, in the event of a German conquest of England, the British fleet would neither be surrendered nor destroyed, but would sail to ports in the United States and the British Empire, particularly Canada. Roosevelt did not share the defeatist sentiments of people like Ambassador Kennedy, but he did believe there was still a real possibility that Germany would conquer the British Isles. In that event, he wanted to avoid a Vichy-type settlement. Churchill's repeated references to an "appeasement" ministry replacing him worried Roosevelt, although he never said so to the Prime Minister. Roosevelt apparently supported the establishment of a Canadian-American Permanent Joint Defense Board as a means of gaining increased control over any portions of the British fleet which were sent to Canada. (See Pollock, "Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg Agreement, and the British Fleet.") Actually, Churchill was far less enthusiastic about the destroyer-bases arrangement than were others in his government. Foreign Secretary Halifax had only just persuaded the Prime Minister not to send Lothian a strongly worded message repudiating "any bargaining or declaration about the future disposition of the British Fleet" (WSC, II, 405—6). That Churchill erroneously claimed in his memoirs to have sent the cable is an indication of how strongly he felt (see Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, pp. 109—11, Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 127—28, and Reynolds, "Lord Lothian," pp. 27-30). The Prime Minister later told his Cabinet that he had no intention of making such a broad promise unless Roosevelt publicly committed the United States to a firm alliance (minute by Churchill attached to C-70x, PREM 3/469/485-86). The message from Churchill referred to in the first paragraph of R—8x was actually a cable from Halifax to Lothian that was given to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and passed on to the President as representing Churchill's views (see FRUS, 1940, III, 64—65 and Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, p. 331, n. 34).

R-8x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Aug. 13, 1940, 6 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person. I have been studying very carefully the message transmitted to me t h r o u g h the British Ambassador in Washington on August 8, and I have

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also been considering the possibility of furnishing the assistance in the way of releases and priorities contained in the memorandum attached to your message. It is my belief that it may be possible to furnish to the British Government as immediate assistance at least 50 destroyers, the motor torpedo boats heretofore referred to, and, insofar as airplanes are concerned, five planes of each of the categories mentioned, the latter to be furnished for war testing purposes. Such assistance, as I am sure you will understand, would only be furnished if the American people and the Congress frankly recognized that in return therefor the national defense and security of the United States would be enhanced. For that reason it would be necessary, in the event that it proves possible to release the materiel above mentioned, that the British Government find itself able and willing to take the two following steps: 1. Assurance on the part of the Prime Minister that in the event that the waters of Great Britain become untenable for British ships of war, the latter would not be turned over to the Germans or sunk, but would be sent to other parts of the Empire for continued defense of the Empire. 2. An agreement on the part of Great Britain that the British Government would authorize the use of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana as naval and air bases by the United States in the event of an attack on the American hemisphere by any non-American nation; and in the meantime the United States to have the right to establish such bases and to use them for training and exercise purposes with the understanding that the land necessary for the above could be acquired by the United States through purchase or through a 99-year lease. With regard to the agreement suggested in point 2 above, I feel confident that specific details need not be considered at this time and that such questions as the exact locations of the land which the United States might desire to purchase or lease could be readily determined upon subsequently through friendly negotiation between the two Governments. With regard to your reference to publicity concerning the contingent destination of the British fleet, I should make it clear that I have not had in mind any public statement by you but merely an assurance to me along the lines indicated, as for example, reiteration to me of your statement to Parliament on June 4 [see headnote to C—13x]. I should welcome a reply as soon as may be possible. [DS 811.34544/1*, 6/12. FRUS, 1940, III, 65-66. pifcfC ]

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C-21x London [via U.S. Embassy] Aug. 15, 1940, 1 A.M./TOR 8:44 P.M., Aug. 14

Secret a n d Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. I need not tell you how cheered I am by your message [R-8x] or how grateful I feel for your untiring efforts to give us all possible help. You will, I am sure, send us everything you can, for you know well that the worth of every destroyer that you can spare to us is measured in rubies. But we also need the motor torpedo boats which you mentioned a n d as many flying boats a n d rifles as you can let us have. We have a million m e n waiting for rifles. T h e moral value of this fresh aid from your government and people at this critical time will be very great and widely felt. We can meet both the points you consider necessary to help you with Congress a n d with others concerned, but I am sure that you will not misunderstand m e if I say that our willingness to d o so must be conditional on o u r being assured that there will be no delay in letting us have the ships and flying boats. As regards an assurance about the British fleet, I am of course, ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliament on J u n e 4th. We intend to fight this out h e r e to the e n d and none of us would ever buy peace by s u r r e n d e r i n g or scuttling the fleet. But in any use you may make of this repeated assurance you will please bear in mind the disastrous effect from our point of view and p e r h a p s also from yours of allowing any impression to grow that we regard the conquest of the British Islands and its naval bases as any other than an impossible contingency. T h e spirit of o u r people is splendid. Never have they been so determined. T h e i r confidence in the issue has been enormously a n d legitimately strengthened by the severe air fighting of the past week. As regards naval a n d air bases, I readily agree to your proposals for 99 year leases which is easier for us than the method of purchase. I have no doubt that, once the principle is agreed between us, the details can be adjusted a n d we can discuss them at leisure. It will be necessary for us to consult the governments of Newfoundland and Canada about the Newfoundland base in which Canada has an interest. We are at once proceeding to seek their consent. Once again, Mr. President, let me thank you for your help and encouragement which means so much to us. [MR. PREM 3/462/2, 3. FRUS, 1940, III, 66-67. WSC, II, 406-7. R&C]

Although Roosevelt never responded directly to Churchill's hints that the failure of the United States to increase its aid could bring on a new British

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ministry willing to negotiate with Hitler, that must have been on the President's mind when he forwarded this letter from Alexander Kirk, the United States Charge d'Affaires in Berlin. Kirk had been associated with those in the State Department who had thought Hitler had a right to redress the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, though by 1940 he had become a staunch supporter of the fight against Germany. Roosevelt forwarded the letter through Ambassador Kennedy, an obvious warning and criticism of Kennedy's argument that Britain could not hold out and should negotiate a peace settlement.

R-9x, letter Hyde Park, N.Y. August 19, 1940 My d e a r Churchill:— I think this will interest you. It was over two weeks o n its way from Berlin and coming from an American, long a resident in Germany, it has especial value. T h e writer was, I think, inclined to be pro-Nazi u p to the time of the Munich Conference. We are getting excellent reports of the fine j o b your Air Force has d o n e the past week. As ever yours, [F. D. Roosevelt] [MR]

ENCLOSURE TO R - 9 X

Berlin, July 29, 1940. My d e a r Mr. President: I fully realize that you are not to be i m p o r t u n e d with lengthy or superfluous messages but there is a matter much on my mind and one which I d a r e not treat by telegraphic report. It is p e r h a p s anomalous that at a time when the entire world seems to be concentrated on the mechanics of war the main emphasis in r u m o r and report, at least insofar as Berlin is concerned, has lately been on the subject of peace between England and Germany. It is futile to argue about the possible origin of these r u m o r s for it is as easy to find support for the opinion that they are inspired as it is to believe that they are the manifestation of a natural inclination on the part of war-tired peoples. It is useless also to test the sincerity of these expressions, for again it is not only impossible to place the responsibility for their utterance on any particular source, but also to strike an accurate balance of the relative advantages from the G e r m a n standpoint of an immediate peace with England. T h e fact remains that talk is insistent on this subject and within

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the last few days three private individuals, an American, a Hollander and a Swede, have brought me stories of peace efforts allegedly sponsored by high Nazi officials, but decidedly not by Hitler himself—stories which I could not report in detail owing to the certain danger involved to the individuals themselves. The purpose of this letter, however, is not to evaluate these rumored activities in relation to Nazi aims or policies. My purpose is solely to register my profound conviction that any concession on the part of the British Government now would destroy forever the chance of eradicating the forces which are threatening our own civilization. In saying this I am not thinking of England itself for, if I did, I might hesitate at the thought of the terrific devastation which may well be in prospect and of which the beginning is now being set from week to week. Hitler has always tried to attain his aims at the lowest possible cost to himself and has so far triumphed in that policy, but there has never been any doubt that in the last analysis he would and he must pay any price to attain his ends if they can not be otherwise achieved. There is every reason to believe that he wants to finish this particular phase of the war, whether for the purpose of turning his war machine in other directions or of indulging in expressing his colossal ego through rebuilding in his own way on the ruins of what he will have destroyed. A short war requires, in the first place, the speedy subjugation of England either through the peace he might be ready to negotiate now or through the same or worse methods than those which prevailed in France, and, in the second place, the certainty that with England silenced the forces of democracy would be annihilated. As regards the first requirement, the greatest triumph for Hitler would be a humiliating and unjust peace wrenched from England without a fight, for the hope is justified that even the conquest of the British Isles need not end resistance. As for the second requirement the greatest factor is our own country and, I firmly believe, the controlling factor. Hitler has never lost sight of the United States although there are times when he believes that he can disregard our part on the ground of the time element involved. Within the last few weeks, however, I feel that his anxiety on our account has redoubled. He sees what we are doing and that we shall not stop, and he must know that we constitute a problem which even he can not solve. It is natural to say that there is a limit to a one-man show and that in time Hitler must eradicate himself. That may be true but the rate of his progress reduces the saving grace of the time factor and the force which he has developed can be stopped only by force. The first stand in this struggle is for England to hold out against any peace efforts, and the second is for the British to exert all their material and moral equipment to resist an attack and continue the fight. The greatest part, however, I believe is ours. We must encourage in every way those who are in the first line of battle. We must prove our purpose in fact and

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example a n d we must prove it speedily and unflaggingly. We must hold to the principles which we know are right although their implementation may require newer methods a n d at the right m o m e n t we must be ready to say the word a n d d o the deed that will save from destruction all that we know makes life a good and noble thing. It is the conviction of the significance of o u r part in the struggle, both for o u r own salvation as well as for the benefit of the world, that induces m e to write and I hope that you will consider what I have said in that light. I can not close without expressing to you my gratitude for the consideration which you showed me d u r i n g my stay in Washington and I need not say how gratified I am that the continuity of your policies, of which we ourselves were always assured, has now been brought to the conviction of the governments a n d peoples abroad. Very faithfully yours, [signed] Alexander Kirk [MR]

In order to keep Kennedy out of this tricky business, Churchill worked through Lothian and the State Department in negotiating the exchange of destroyers for bases, but the American insistence that the agreements be publicized brought a direct protest from the Prime Minister to the President. Roosevelt feared the reaction of various anti-interventionist groups in the 1940 election if it appeared that the United States had simply given destroyers to Britain without gaining anything; Churchill feared that any sort of deal in which Britain gave much more than it received would set a bad precedent and engender anti-American sentiment. Moreover, the Prime Minister accurately forecast serious difficulties in working out the details of the various leases. Churchill was correct in pointing out that the Cabinet had proposed giving the United States the bases without formal strings attached, although it expected something in return. Both leasing and refusing to compute the comparative value of goods given and received were later incorporated into the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. The changes indicated appear to have been suggested by Churchill. Churchill's August 20 statement to the House of Commons presented the leasing of bases as a spontaneous offer, not a deal.

C-22x London [via U.S. Embassy] Aug. 22, 1940, 8:25 P.M. Prime Minister to President: I am most grateful for all you are doing on o u r behalf. I had not contemplated anything in the n a t u r e of a contract, bargain or sale between us. It is the fact that we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval a n d

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air facilities off the Atlantic Coast quite independently of destroyers or any other aid. Our view is that we are two friends in danger helping each other as far as we can. We should therefore like to give you the facilities mentioned without stipulating for any return and even if tomorrow you found it too difficult to transfer the destroyers etc. our offer still remains open because we think it is in the general good. 2. I see difficulties and even risks in the exchange of letters now suggested or in admitting in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities. Once this idea is accepted people will contrast on each side what is given and received. The money value of the armaments would be computed and set against the facilities and some would think one thing about it and some another. 3. Moreover Mr. President, as you well know each Island or location is a case by itself. Take Bermuda for instance. There is only one harbour. If, for instance, there were only one harbour or site how is it to be divided and its advantages shared. In such a case we should like to make you an offer at Bermuda of what we think is best for both rather than to embark upon a close-out argument as to what ought to be delivered in return for value received. The same sort of thing would occur at every other point with local modifications. 4. What we want is that you shall feel safe on your Atlantic seaboard so far as any facilities in possessions of ours can make you safe and naturally if you put in money and make large developments you must have the effective security of a long lease. Therefore I would rather rest at this moment upon the general declaration made by me in the House of Commons yesterday, both on this point and as regards the future of the Fleet. Then if you will set out in greater detail what you want we will at once tell you what we can do and thereafter the necessary arrangements technical and legal can be worked out by our experts. Meanwhile we are quite content to trust entirely to your judgment and sentiments of the people of the United States about any aid in munitions etc. you feel able to give us. But this would be entirely a separate spontaneous act on the part of the United States arising out of their view of the world struggle and how their own interests stand in relation to it and the causes it involves. 5. Although the air attack has slackened in the last few days and our strength is growing in many ways I do not think that bad man has yet struck his full blow. We are having considerable losses in merchant ships on the north western approaches now our only channel of regular communication with the oceans and your fifty destroyers if they came along at once would be a precious help. [PREM 3/462/2, 3/74-75 (undated draft). FRUS, 1940, III, 68-69. WSC, II, 409-10. RUC]

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Churchill proposed a compromise which would set up the exchange of destroyers and other military supplies for the bases without involving the British government in what seemed like an unequal swap. Through British Ambassador Lord Lothian, however, Roosevelt had indicated that he could not legally give the British anything unless the appropriate military chiefs certified the material as surplus or the exchange as in the national interest.

C-23x London Aug. 25, 1940 [Churchill to Roosevelt.] Personal and Secret. I fully understand legal and constitutional difficulties which make you wish for a contract, embodied in letters, but I venture to put before you the difficulties and even dangers which I foresee in this procedure. For the sake of precise list instrumentalities mentioned, which in our sore need we greatly desire, we are asked to pay undefined concessions in all islands and places mentioned from Newfoundland to British Guiana "as may be required in the judgement of the United States". Suppose that we could not agree to all your experts asked for, should we not be exposed to a charge of breaking our contract, for which we had already received value? Your commitment is definite, ours unlimited. Much though we need destroyers, we should not wish to have them at the risk of a misunderstanding with the United States, or indeed any serious argument. If the matter is to be represented as a contract both sides must be defined with far more precision on our side than has hitherto been possible. But this might easily take some time. As I have several times pointed out, we need destroyers chiefly to bridge the gap between now and the arrival of our new construction, which I set on foot on the outbreak of the war. This construction is very considerable. For instance, we shall receive by the end of February new destroyers and new medium destroyers 20. Corvettes, which are a handy type of submarine-hunter, adapted to ocean work 60. Motor torpedo boats 37. M.A.S. [motor anti-submarine] Boats 25. Fairmiles, a wooden anti-submarine patrol boat 104. 72 ft. motor launches 29. An even greater in-flow will arrive in the following 6 months. It is just in the gap from September to February inclusive, while the new crop is coming in and working up that your fifty destroyers would be invaluable. With them we could minimize the shipping losses in North Western approaches, and also take a stronger line against Mussolini in the Mediterranean. Therefore time is all-important. We should not, however, be justified in the circumstances if we gave a blank cheque on the whole of our trans-Atlantic possessions merely to bridge this gap, through which anyhow we hope to make our way though with added risk and suffering. This I am sure you will see puts forth our difficulties plainly.

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2. Would not following p r o c e d u r e be acceptable? I would offer at once certain fairly well-defined facilities which will show you the kind of gift we have in mind and your experts could then discuss these or any variants of t h e m with ours, we remaining the final j u d g e of what we can give. All this we will d o free trusting entirely to the generosity a n d goodwill of the American people as to whether they on their part would like to d o something for us. But anyhow it is the settled policy of His Majesty's Government to offer you and make available to you when desired solid a n d effective means of protecting your Atlantic seaboard. I have already asked the Admiralty and Air Ministry to draw u p in outline what we a r e p r e p a r e d to offer leaving your experts to suggest alternatives. I propose to send you this outline in two or three days a n d to publish in d u e course. In this way there can be n o possible dispute a n d the American people will feel more warmly towards us because they will see that we are playing the game by the world's cause and that their safety and interests are d e a r to us. 3. If your law or your Admiral require that any help you may choose to give us must be presented as a quid p r o quo, I d o not see why the British G o v e r n m e n t have to come into that at all. Could you not say that you did not feel able to accept this fine offer which we make unless the United States matched it in some way and that therefore Admiral would be able to link the one with the other. I am so very grateful to you for all the trouble you have been taking and I am so sorry to a d d to your b u r d e n knowing what a good friend you have been to us. [MR. PREM 3/462/2, 3. FRUS, 1940, III, 70-71. WSC, II, 410-12. R&C]

State Department lawyers put together a compromise proposal which retained the language of a direct exchange of bases for materiel but included a specific list of facilities requested by the United States, thus avoiding the appearance of Britain's giving a blank check in return for some over-age destroyers. Perhaps some of the problems were ironed out during Churchill-Roosevelt telephone conversations; at any rate, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox worked out the details with Lothian and the deal was consummated. Lothian drafted letters which would sum up the arrangement, including a commitment Churchill did not want publicized— that the British not surrender their fleet. The Prime Minister's reference to Greece stemmed from the buildup of Italian military forces in Albania, on the Greek border. Italy had occupied Albania in April 1939 and eventually invaded Greece in October 1940. Churchill noted in his memoirs (WSC, II, 412-13) that "beyond a peradventure" (par. 1) and "instrumentalities" (par. 4) were phrases used by President Woodrow Wilson during World War I.

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C-24x London [via U.S. Embassy] Aug. 27, 1940, 3 P.M. / TOR 10:50 A.M. Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. Lord Lothian has cabled me outline of facilities you have in mind. Our naval and air experts studying question from your point of view had reached practically the same conclusions except that in addition they thought that Antigua might be useful as a base for flying boats. To this also you would be very welcome. Our settled policy is to make the United States safe on their Atlantic Seaboard beyond a peradventure to quote a phrase you may remember. 2. We are quite ready to make you a positive offer on these lines forthwith. There would of course have to be an immediate conference on details but for reasons which I set out in my last telegram we do not like the idea of an arbiter should any difference arise because we feel that as donor we must remain the final judges of what the gift is to consist of within the general framework of the facilities which will have been promised and always on the understanding that we shall do our best to meet the United States wishes. 3. The two letters drafted by Lord Lothian to the Secretary of State are quite agreeable to us. The only reason why I do not wish the second letter to be published is that I think that it is much more likely that German Government will be one to surrender or scuttle its fleet or what is left of it. In this as you are aware they have already had some practice. You will remember that I said some months ago in one of my private cables to you that any such action on our part would be a dastardly act and that is the opinion of every one of us. 4. If you felt able after our offer had been made to let us have instrumentalities which have been mentioned, or anything else you think proper, this could be expressed as an act not in payment or consideration for but in recognition of what we had done for the security of the United States. 5. Mr. President this business has become especially urgent in view of recent menace which Mussolini is showing to Greece. If our business is put through on bilateral lines and in the highest spirit of good-will it might even now save that small historic country from invasion and conquest. Even the next forty-eight hours are important. [MR. PREM 3/462/2, 3. WSC, II, 412-13. pR&C]

Churchill then sent a series of statements concerning the leasing arrangement. Roosevelt approved the list of bases and sent back to Churchill a formal

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inquiry that Churchill had drafted (R-1Ox). Churchill followed with the necessary assurances about the disposition of the British fleet in the event of a German conquest of the British Isles. (In his memoirs, the Prime Minister designated C—25x and R—1Ox as Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges, but actually they went from the Foreign Office to Ambassador Lothian in Washington.) Additional correspondence called for leases in Bermuda and Newfoundland to be a gift, whereas the other leases were in exchange for the destroyers. (For the bases, see map, p. 55.) Much to Roosevelt's satisfaction, the Republican candidate for President in the 1940 election, Wendell Willkie, supported the destroyers-bases agreement, although he criticized the administration's failure to work through Congress.

C-25x London Aug. 27, 1940 [Churchill to Roosevelt] His Majesty's Government make the following offer to the President of the United States: We are p r e p a r e d in friendship and good will to meet your representatives forthwith, in o r d e r to consider the lease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establishment of naval and air bases in the following places: a) Newfoundland b) B e r m u d a c) Bahamas d) Jamaica

e) Antigua f) St. Lucia g) T r i n i d a d h) British Guiana.

Subject to later settlements on points of detail, the facilities which His Majesty's Government are p r e p a r e d to offer at the above places are:— a) Facilities to develop naval and air establishments, together with the necessary seaward, coast, and anti-aircraft defences. b) Provision for the location of sufficient military garrisons. c) Facilities for accommodating these garrisons together with stores, etc. d) Such measure of jurisdiction, and of local administrative control in each areas, as may be determined by mutual agreement to be necessary in o r d e r to give effect to the objects of the lease and for the secure and effective exercize by the United States of America of all the above facilities. [PREM 3/463/2, 3/41. pWSC, II, 413-14 ]

Churchill drafted this message when the Americans insisted on a public declaration about the disposition of the British fleet. It was formally sent by the President to the British government.

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R-IOx Aug. 30, 1940 [Roosevelt to Churchill] T h e Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported to have stated on J u n e 4, 1940, to Parliament, in effect, that if d u r i n g the course of the present war in which Great Britain a n d British Colonies are engaged, the waters s u r r o u n d i n g the British Isles should become untenable for British shipsof-war, a British Fleet would in n o event be s u r r e n d e r e d or sunk, b u t would be sent overseas for the defence of other parts of the Empire. T h e Government of the United States would respectfully inquire whether the foregoing statement represents the settled policy of the British Government. [PREM 3/462/2, 3/29. WSC, II, 414.]

Roosevelt's main concern during the negotiation of the destroyers-bases agreement was the disposition of the British fleet in the event of a successful German invasion of England. That question arose time and again in the President's talks with Lord Lothian and with the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, who on this question acted as an intermediary between Roosevelt and Churchill. (See headnote to R-8x.)

C-26x London Aug. 31, 1940 Prime Minister to President. Your telegram No. 1873 [R-IOx] of August 30. You ask Mr. President whether my statement in Parliament on J u n e 4, 1940, about Great Britain never s u r r e n d e r i n g or scuttling her Fleet "represents the settled policy of His Majesty's Government." It certainly does. I must however observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the G e r m a n Fleet or what is left of it than o u r own. [PREM 3/462/2, 3/18. WSC, II, 414.]

The only sources for the following message are references in the memoirs of Anthony Eden, who was British Secretary of State for War, and in the diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, who was Permanent Undersecretary of the British Foreign Office. The message is also mentioned in William Stevenson's controversial study of Britain's intelligence operations in the United

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States, A Man Called Intrepid, p. 146, where he asserts that Roosevelt passed the message through special channels to British Agent William Stephenson (Intrepid) in England. That could account for the absence of any such message from the appropriate files in England and in the United States. T h e northern portion of French Indo-China was occupied by Japan on September 22, 1940. A warning of attack on England was plausible since the Germans had begun their all-out bombing of London—the Blitz—on September 7.

R-llx/A Sept. 22, 1940 O n Sunday, September 22nd, I was working quietly t h r o u g h some papers, when the Prime Minister sent m e a message that President Roosevelt h a d telegraphed saying three o'clock that afternoon was zero h o u r for the G e r m a n invasion. If I thought I should come back, he would give m e dinner. I replied that it was wet and blowing and I felt quite safe. I went to the top of the hill which overlooked the Channel and afterwards sent a further message, reporting it was so rough that any G e r m a n who attempted to cross the Channel would be very sea-sick. T h e next day the puzzle of Roosevelt's warning was resolved. T h e President of the United States used from time to time to send pieces of information which he thought might be useful to us in o u r embattled island. But this time the code had got mixed a n d the invasion of Britain should have read the invasion of Indo-China, which proved true enough, and fateful. (Eden, The Reckoning, p. 160]

Cadogan's report was cryptic and sarcastic. Johnson was Counselor of Embassy at the U.S. Embassy in London.

R-llx/B Herschel J o h n s o n at 1 about a telegram from Washington that Pres. had news that invasion will take place at 3 P.M. this afternoon. It doesn't say whether it's d e p . Calais at 3 o r arr. Dover! [Cadogan, TAe Diaries, Sept. 22, 1940, p. 328]

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With all signals pointing to a German invasion of England before the onset of winter, Churchill desperately tried to secure the small arms promised in the destroyers-bases arrangement. Actually, the large amount of small arms originally agreed upon in the negotiations were not mentioned in the final exchange of notes which constituted the deal. The British claimed that Secretary of State Cordell Hull had purposefully omitted them, and there is some evidence to back u p that accusation. Hull claimed that the failure to include such items had been an oversight but that any attempt to change the agreement would bring on adverse public opinion. T h e Lend-Lease Act, passed six months later, finally ended the argument. (See Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act, pp. 69-70.)

C-27x London [via U.S. Embassy] Sept. 22, 1940, 12 A.M.—noon I TOR 6:30 A.M. Personal a n d Secret for the President from Former Naval Person. I asked Lord Lothian to speak to you about our remaining desiderata. T h e two h u n d r e d a n d fifty thousand rifles are most urgently needed as I have two h u n d r e d a n d fifty thousand trained and uniformed m e n into whose h a n d s they can be put. I should be most grateful if you could a r r a n g e the necessary release. Every a r r a n g e m e n t will be m a d e to transport t h e m with the utmost speed. T h e y will enable us to take two h u n d r e d a n d fifty thousand .303 rifles from the h o m e g u a r d and transfer t h e m to the regular army leaving the h o m e g u a r d a r m e d with about eight h u n d r e d thousand American rifles. Even if no ammunition is available these rifles will b e nonetheless useful as they can draw u p o n the stock which has already reached us. [DS 841.24/322, 1/3 CF. WSC, II, 672.]

The story of the unsuccessful British attempt to capture the port of Dakar in French West Africa (now the capital of Senegal) is set forth in this and messages C-29x, C-30x, and C-31x.

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C-28x London [via British Embassy] Sept. 22, 1940, 4. P.M. For the Personal Information of the President Only. Possibility of establishing General de Gaulle in French territory has been under consideration here for some time. Locality offering best chance of success appears to be Dakar, and latest information has led us to think that [Vichy French] Army and Air Force at that place might not offer serious opposition. Attitude of naval units at Dakar, and their influence on Army and Air Force garrison are difficult to assess, but on balance there seems a reasonable chance that operation can be carried out without heavy casualties on either side. 2. In view of far-reaching political and strategical advantages which would follow from establishment of Free French Flag at this place, we have decided to accept the risk (which we hope is not a grave one) of such action leading to declaration of war by Vichy Government. 3. Combined Franco-British force is now on way to Dakar with object of capturing that place with as little bloodshed as possible and establishing General de Gaulle there. Naval portion of force includes certain French light naval craft. 4. Commanders concerned have been authorised to modify approved plan if events render this necessary, but general idea is that, on arrival at Dakar, ultimatum will be dropped by aircraft, and French emissary will proceed to port in motor boat. British ships will be kept in background and, if reception is favourable, landing will be carried out by French troops from French transports covered by French sloops. If reception is unfavourable, British forces, supported by warships, will be landed to back up French. 5. It is intended that operation shall take place on 23rd September. [PREM 3/468/109-10]

R-12x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Sept. 24, 1940, 7 P.M.

Personal and Secret for Former Naval Person from the President. As soon as your message was received from Lord Lothian [C-27x] arrangements were undertaken for the release of the 250,000 Enfield rifles to the Purchasing Commission. I am informed that the rifles are already underway to New York for shipment. Roosevelt [SW] [DS 841.24/322, 1/3 CF MR (misdated). R&C (misdated).]

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C-29x London Sept. 24, 1940 [Churchill to Roosevelt] I was encouraged by your reception of information conveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar. It would be against o u r joint interests if strong G e r m a n submarine and aircraft base were established there. It looks as if t h e r e might be a stiff fight. Perhaps not but anyhow orders have been given to ram it t h r o u g h . We should be delighted if you would send some American warships to Monrovia, Freetown, and I hope by that time to have Dakar ready for your call. But what really matters now is that you should put it across [to?] the French Government that a war declaration would be very bad indeed for t h e m in all that concerns United States. If Vichy declare war that is same thing as Germany, and Vichy possessions in Western H e m i s p h e r e must be considered potentially G e r m a n possessions. Many thanks also for your hint about invasion [ R - I Ix]. We are all ready for them. I am very glad to hear about rifles [R-12x]. [MR*. WSC, II, 487-88. fifcfC]

C-30x London [Sept. 25, 1940]/TOR 1:48 A.M., Sept. 26 Personal and Secret for the President from Former Naval Person. A m deeply grateful for your action in securing release of rifles [ R 12x]. We will use t h e m well. I much regret we had to abandon Dakar enterprise. Vichy got in before us and animated defense with partisans a n d g u n n e r y experts. All friendly elements were gripped a n d held down. Several of our ships were hit a n d to persist with landing in force would have tied us to an u n d u e commitment when you think of what we have on o u r hands already. [DS 841.24/322, 2/3*. pWSC, II, 491.]

In order to avoid a Japanese declaration of war or similar action which would distract from the British buildup against a probable German invasion of England, the Churchill Ministry had acceded to Japanese demands in July 1940 and closed the Burma Road, China's main supply line, for three months. Churchill's request for an American naval presence at Singapore was an old and frequently repeated British suggestion. Not only would it have deterred the Japanese but it would also have guaranteed American involvement in any Pacific war, and possibly in the European war as well.

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C-31x London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 4, 1940, 9 P.M. I TOR 8:11 P.M. Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. After prolonged consideration of all the issues involved we today decided to let the Burma Road be reopened when the three months period expired on October 17. Foreign Secretary and I will announce this to Parliament on Tuesday 8th. I shall say that our hopes for a just settlement being reached Japan and China have not borne fruit and that the Three Power Pact revives the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1939 and that it has a clear pointer against the United States. I know how difficult it is for you to say anything which would commit the United States to any hypothetical course of action in the Pacific. But I venture to ask whether at this time a simple action might not speak louder than words. Would it not be possible for you to send an American squadron, the bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore. There they would be welcome in a perfectly normal and rightful way. If desired occasion might be taken of such a visit for a technical discussion of naval and military problems in those and Philippine waters and the Dutch might be invited to join. Anything in this direction would have a marked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration of war upon us over the Burma Road opening. I should be very grateful if you would consider action along these lines as it might play an important part in preventing the spreading of the war. In spite of the Dakar fiasco the Vichy Government is endeavoring to enter into relations with us which shows how the tides are flowing in France now that they feel the German weight and see we are able to hold our own. Although our position in the air is growing steadily stronger both actually and relatively our need for aircraft is urgent. Several important factories have been seriously injured and the rate of production is hampered by air alarms. On the other hand our losses in pilots have been less than we expected because in fighting over our own soil a very large proportion get down safely or only wounded. When your officers were over here we were talking in terms of pilots. We are now beginning to think that airplanes will be the limiting factor so far as the immediate future is concerned. I cannot feel that the invasion danger is passed. The gent has taken off his clothes and put on his bathing suit but the water is getting colder and there is an autumn nip in the air. We are maintaining the utmost vigilance. [MR*. WSC, II, 497-98. pR&C]

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T h e specter of the French fleet in German hands continued to haunt Churchill. Both the British and American governments put heavy pressure on the Vichy French to keep their ships out of action. The situation was temporarily resolved when Marshal P6tain assured Roosevelt that the ships would not be moved out of French ports.

C-32x London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 21, 1940 [Oct. 20 in PREM 3], 4 P . M . / T O R 11:25 A.M.

Secret a n d Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. We h e a r r u m o r s from various sources that the Vichy Government are p r e p a r i n g their ships a n d colonial troops to aid the Germans against us. I d o not myself believe these reports, but if the French fleet at T o u l o n were t u r n e d over to Germany it would be a very heavy blow. It would certainly be a wise precaution, Mr. President, if you would speak in the strongest terms to the French Ambassador emphasizing the disapprobation with which the United States would view such a betrayal of the cause of democracy a n d freedom. T h e y will pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning. You will have seen what very heavy losses we have suffered in the northwestern approaches to o u r last two convoys. This is d u e to o u r shortage of destroyers in the gap period I mentioned to you. T h a n k God your 50 are now coming along, a n d some will soon be in action. We o u g h t to be m u c h better off by the e n d of the year, as we have a lot of o u r own anti-U-boat vessels completing, but naturally we are passing t h r o u g h an anxious a n d critical period with so little small craft having to guard against invasion in the narrow waters, with the very great naval effort we are making in the Mediterranean, a n d the immense a m o u n t of convoy work. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, II, 474. WSC, II, 513. pR&C]

R-13x Washington [via State Dept.] Oct. 24, 1940, 7:00 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Very strong representation h a d already been m a d e to the French Ambassador. I have now h a d conveyed to him a personal message from me to the following effect for immediate communication to his Government: In the opinion of the United States Government the fact that the French Government alleges that it is u n d e r duress and consequently cannot act

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except to a very limited degree as a free agent is in no sense to be considered as justifying any course on the part of the French Government which would provide assistance to Germany and her allies in their war against the British Empire. The fact that a government is a prisoner of war of another power does not justify such a prisoner in serving its conqueror in operations against its former ally. The Government of the United States received from the Petain Government during the first days it held office the most solemn assurances that the French fleet would not be surrendered. If the French Government now permits the Germans to use the French fleet in hostile operations against the British fleet, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the United States Government. I further stated that any agreement entered into between France and Germany which partook of the character above mentioned would most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples, would permanently remove any chance that this Government would be disposed to give any assistance to the French people in their distress, and would create a wave of bitter indignation against France on the part of American public opinion. I finally stated that if France pursued such a policy as that above outlined, the United States could make no effort when the appropriate time came to exercise its influence to insure to France the retention of her overseas possessions. I was glad to receive your message [C-32x] and happy to know that the former American destroyers will soon be in action. I fully realize what a need you have at the present moment for small craft. I trust that things may steadily improve for you from now on. [SW] [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6166*. PSF:GB:WSC. pR&C ]

Marshal Petain had agreed to an armistice with Germany fully expecting the British to follow suit shortly. Successful British resistance made it impossible for Petain to negotiate the generous peace with Germany he had hoped for, since the Germans now needed northern France as a base from which to attack England. Within the French government, the main proponent of collaboration with Hitler was Pierre Laval. Petain won the first round in their power struggle and forced Laval's resignation from the Foreign Ministry on December 13, 1940. Eventually, German pressure won out, and in April 1942 Laval became Premier of the French government at Vichy.

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C-33x London [via British Embassy] Oct. 25, 1940 [Churchill to Roosevelt] Our Charge d'Affaires will have told you about the telegrams which we have received from and sent to [Ambassador] Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid and of the views of the French Ambassador there. There seems to be a desperate struggle going on between Petain and Laval. If the French fleet and French bases on the African shore are betrayed to Germany our task will become vastly more difficult and your dangers will grow. I have a feeling that things are hanging in the balance at Vichy. The King is sending a personal message to Marshal Petain appealing to his soldierly honour. Would it not be possible for you, Mr. President, to send a message to him yourself? It would greatly strengthen his position and might make him choose rightly. Anyhow there is no time to be lost as a very disastrous turn may be very easily given to the war by the Vichy Government committing another act of shame. [MR]

R-Hx Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 25, 1940 Strictly Confidential from the President for Former Naval Person. I have received this morning the message you have sent to me through your Charge d'Affaires [C-33x]. I think you will agree that the personal message which I sent through the French Ambassador in Washington last night to Marshal Petain, and which was communicated to you in my last communication [R-13x], coincides completely with the suggestion contained in your message of this morning. To make assurance doubly sure, I have sent instructions to the American Charge d'Affaires in Vichy to obtain an audience with the Marshal and to repeat to him the contents of my message to him. [SW] [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6246A, CF*. PSF:GB:WSC]

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C-34x London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 25, 1940, 5 P.M. /TOR 12:05 P.M., Oct. 26 Personal and Secret for the President from Former Naval Person. Your cable with terms of splendid warning you gave the French crossed mine to you about a suggested message to Petain. Most grateful for what you have already d o n e , but everything still in balance. Foreign Office tell me they have cabled you o u r latest information of G e r m a n terms, which P6tain is said to be resisting. In this connection, the s u r r e n d e r of bases on the African shores for air or U-boats would be just as bad as s u r r e n d e r of ships. In particular, Atlantic bases in bad hands would be a menace to you and a grievous embarrassment to you. I hope, therefore, you will make it clear to the French that your a r g u m e n t about ships applies also to the betrayal of bases. In spite of the invasion threats a n d air attacks of the last five months, we have maintained a continuous flow of re-enforcements r o u n d the Cape to Middle East, as well as sending m o d e r n aircraft and major units of the fleet. I d o not think the invasion d a n g e r is yet at an end, but we are now a u g m e n t i n g o u r eastern transferences. T h e strain is very great in both theatres, a n d all contributions will be thankfully received. [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6246, 1/3, CF*. PSF:GB:WSC. WSC, II, 514-15.]

Churchill's request that Roosevelt send an additional warning to the French about German use of French bases was sent before he received Roosevelt's promise to reiterate his previous strong warnings to the Vichy government. Churchill quickly acknowledged receipt and thanked Roosevelt for his help.

C-35x London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 26, 1940, 6 P.M. /TOR 12:44 P.M. Secret and Personal for the President from Former Naval Person. Your message of October 26 [R- H x ] . T h a n k you so much. I entirely agree. [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6246, 2/3, CF*]

Early in 1940, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had become the coordinator of the entire aid-to-Britain program. Working closely with Arthur Purvis, head of the British Purchasing Commission in the United States, Morgenthau

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effectively organized a buildup of American defense production and, with Roosevelt's quiet but firm support, successfully argued against those who thought that all war materials should go to American military forces. Churchill's request that this message be sent via Morgenthau was probably made at the suggestion of Purvis, who realized that Morgenthau was extremely sensitive about his personal relationship with Roosevelt and would be pleased to act as a conduit for Churchill-Roosevelt messages. Sir Walter Layton, DirectorGeneral of Programmes for the British Ministry of Supply, had visited Washington in September—October 1940 to discuss supply matters and Britain's precarious finances. T h e reference to Vichy stemmed from the meeting of Hitler, Laval, and Petain on October 24, 1940. Churchill had begun to think that the German invasion of England would have to be postponed since the winter season of bad weather had arrived and the English Channel could no longer serve as a highway for invading forces. Still, Britain had to be ready just in case.

C-36x London [via Morgenthau] Oct. 27, 1 9 4 0 , 4 : 1 5 P.M.

Most Secret to the President from F o r m e r Naval Person: We have not yet h e a r d what Vichy has agreed to. If, however, they have betrayed warships and African and other Colonial h a r b o u r s to Hitler, o u r already heavy task will be grievously aggravated. If O r a n a n d Bizerta become German-Italian submarine bases, o u r hopes of stopping or impeding the reinforcement of the hostile army now attacking Egypt will be destroyed, and the heaviest form of Germanorganized Italian attack must be expected. T h e situation in the Western Mediterranean will also be gravely worsened. If Dakar is betrayed, very great d a n g e r s will arise in the Atlantic unless we are able to rectify the position, which will not be easy. O n the other h a n d , the a n n o u n c e m e n t of Vichy's terms may lead to much desired revolt in the French Empire, which we should have to aid a n d foster with further drains u p o n o u r slowly expanding resources. Either way, therefore, immense exertions will be required from us in the Mediterranean d u r i n g the next year. We are e n d e a v o u r i n g to assemble a very large army in the Middle East, and the movement of troops thither from all parts of the Empire, especially from the Mother country, has for some months past been unceasing. T h e campaign which will develop t h e r e certainly in the new year, a n d which may involve T u r k e y a n d Greece, makes d e m a n d s u p o n o u r shipping a n d munitions o u t p u t and resources which are e n o r m o u s a n d beyond o u r power without your help to supply to a degree which would ensure victory.

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All the time we have to provide for the defence of the island against invasion which is fully m o u n t e d and for which sixty of the best G e r m a n divisions and superior Air Forces stand ready. Lastly the U-boat and air attacks u p o n o u r only remaining life line, the northwestern approach, will be repelled only by the strongest concentration of o u r flotillas. You will see, therefore, Mr. President, how very great are our problems and dangers. We feel, however, confident of our ability, if we are given the necessary supplies, to carry on the war to a successful conclusion, and anyhow we are going to try o u r best. You will, however, allow me to impress u p o n you the extreme urgency of accelerating delivery of the p r o g r a m m e of aircraft and other munitions which has already been laid before you by Layton and Purvis. So far as aircraft is concerned, would it be possible to speed u p deliveries of existing orders so that the n u m b e r s coming to o u r support next year will be considerably increased? F u r t h e r m o r e can new orders for expanded prog r a m m e also be placed so promptly that deliveries may come out in the middle of 1941? T h e equipment of o u r armies, both for home defence and overseas, is progressing, but we d e p e n d u p o n American deliveries to complete o u r existing p r o g r a m m e which will certainly be delayed and impeded by the bombing of factories a n d disturbances of work. A m e m o r a n d u m on the technical details is being furnished you t h r o u g h the p r o p e r channels, and having placed all the facts before you I feel confident that everything humanly possible will be done. T h e world cause is in your hands. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, IH, 16-17. R&C]

Roosevelt won a resounding victory over Wendell Willkie, and an unprecedented third term, in the presidential election of 1940. Churchill, who understood American politics (though not as well as he claimed to), had carefully refrained from any public comment about the election campaign. Although Willkie spoke out in support of aid to Britain, Churchill undoubtedly preferred Roosevelt's re-election. Not only was the incumbent a known quantity, but Willkie's Republican colleagues included America's most vehement antiinterventionists. Some have speculated that this message was never received since, as Churchill noted in his memoirs (cited below), Roosevelt failed to respond. There is, however, a copy of the message in the Roosevelt Library files. One historian has suggested that Roosevelt did not answer because he was piqued over Churchill's failure to repudiate Willkie's campaign use of early criticisms of the New Deal by Churchill. That is plausible, but undocumented. (See Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, pp. 246—47.)

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C-37x London [via British Embassy] Nov. 6, 1940 From F o r m e r Naval Person to President. 1 did not think it right for me as a Foreigner to express any opinion u p o n American policies while the Election was on, but now I feel you will not mind my saying that I prayed for your success and that I am truly thankful for it. This does not mean that I seek or wish for anything m o r e than the full fair a n d free play of your mind u p o n the world issues now at stake in which o u r two nations have to discharge their respective duties. We are now entering u p o n a sombre phase of what must evidently be a protracted and b r o a d e n i n g war, and I look forward to being able to interchange my thoughts with you in all that confidence and goodwill which has grown u p between us since I went to the Admiralty at the outbreak. Things are afoot which will be r e m e m b e r e d as long as the English language is spoken in any quarter of the globe, and in expressing the comfort I feel that the people of the United States have once again cast these great b u r d e n s u p o n you, I must avow my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bring us all safely to anchor. [PREM 3/468/63. PSF:GB Reports. WSC, II, 553-54. R&C]

If the two French capital ships, Richelieu and Jean Bart, came under German control, British supply lines in the Mediterranean, already stretched thin, would probably be cut.

C-38x London [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 10, 1940, 10 P.M. /TOR 5:38 P.M. From the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. We have been much disturbed by reports of the intention of the French G o v e r n m e n t to bring Jean Bart and Richelieu to Mediterranean for completion. It is difficult to exaggerate the potential danger if this were to h a p p e n , a n d so o p e n the way for these ships to fall u n d e r G e r m a n control. We should feel b o u n d to d o o u r best to prevent it. We conveyed a warning to French Government t h r o u g h Ambassador Madrid a few days ago on the following lines: Such a step would greatly increase the temptation to the Germans and Italians to seize the French fleet. We doubt not the good faith of the

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French Government, but their physical ability to implement their assurances that they will not let the fleet fall into enemy hands. We particularly wish to avoid any clash between British and French naval forces and therefore hope that if they had thought of moving the ships they will now refrain from doing so. As we said to French Government, we should not question good faith of assurances, but even if we accept assurances we can feel no security that they will in fact be able to maintain them once the ships are in French ports in the power or reach of the enemy, and I must confess that the desire of French Government to bring these ships back, if this turns out to be well founded, seems to me to give cause for some suspicion. It would be most helpful if you felt able to give a further warning at Vichy on this matter, for if things went wrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both. [MR*. FRUS, 1940, II, 484-85. WSC, II, 516. pR&C]

Roosevelt responded quickly to Churchill's warning; he requested H. Freeman Matthews, the American Charge d'Affaires in Vichy, to inform the French that the United States was willing to purchase the two ships and would guarantee that they would not be used in the present war (DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6587, CF).

R-15x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 13, 1940, 4 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person: I have received your message with regard to the possible transfer by the French Government of the Jean-Bart and Richelieu to the Mediterranean for completion. Instructions have been sent immediately to the American Charge d'Affaires in Vichy to obtain a confirmation or a denial of this report and to point out that it is of vital interest to the Government of the United States that these vessels remain in stations where they will not be exposed to control or seizure by powers which might employ them to ends in conflict with the interests of the United States in the future of the French fleet. If the report is confirmed, the Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to convey to Marshal Petain an expression of the grave concern of this Government and to point out that the Government of the United States,

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mindful of the community of interests which has existed for more than a century between France and the United States, believes that if it is necessary, for purposes of reconditioning or repairs, to move the units in question the French authorities will not transfer the Jean-Bart and Richelieu to places where they would be subject to a control inconsistent not only with the best interests of France but with the ultimate interests of the United States as well. It will also be made clear, should the report be confirmed, that such a step on the part of the French Government would inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-American relations. For your personal information only, I am letting the French Government know that this Government would be prepared to buy these two ships if they will dispose of them to us. I will let you know the result. [SW] [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6587, CF*. FRUS, 1940, II, 486-87. R&C]

On November 11, 1940, planes from the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious inflicted heavy damage on the Italian battle fleet lying at anchor in Taranto harbor. Churchill reported more fully on the action a few days later (C-40x). Roosevelt never did reply to the Prime Minister's telegram of congratulations following the election (C-37x).

C-39x London [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 16, 1940, 9 A.M. / TOR 4:05 P.M. Personal and Secret for the President from Former Naval Person. I am deeply obliged to you for the promptness of your action about the two big French ships [R-15x]. I am sure you will have been pleased about Taranto. The three uninjured Italian battleships have quitted Taranto today, which perhaps means they are withdrawing to Trieste. I am writing you a very long letter on the outlook for 1941, which Lord Lothian will give you in a few days [C-43x]. I hope you get [got] my personal telegram of congratulation. [MR*. pWSC, II, 545.]

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R-16x Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 18, 1940, 8 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person: I have been glad to receive your message of November 16 [C-39x]. When he was informed by the American Charge d'Affaires in Vichy of my offer [R-15x] with regard to the Jean-Bart and the Richelieu Marshal Petain made a statement which is textually approximately as follows: "The most solemn assurances have been given by me that the French fleet, including those two ships, shall never fall into the hands of Germany. Those assurances I have given to your Government; I have given them to the British Government and even to the Prime Minister himself. Again I reiterate them. These ships will be used to defend the possessions and territories of France. Unless we are attacked by the British, they will never be used against England. Even if I wanted to: I cannot sell those ships. It is impossible under the terms of the armistice, and even if it were possible, it would never be permitted by the Germans. France is under Germany's heel and impotent. I would gladly sell them, if I were free, on condition that they be returned to us after the war and save them for France in this way. I must repeat, I have neither the right nor the possibility of selling them under present circumstances." The American Charge d'Affaires reports that this statement was made with great seriousness but with no sign of either surprise or resentment at the suggestion. I have sent a further instruction to the Charge d'Affaires to inform Marshal Petain that the offer remains open both with regard to these vessels, as well as with regard to any other vessels in the French Navy. [DS 851.34/163*]

C-40x London [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 21, 1940, 4 P . M . / T O R 1 1 : 4 0 A.M.

Personal and Secret for the President from Former Naval Person. You may be interested to receive the following naval notes on the action at Taranto [which] I have asked the Admiralty to prepare. "(1) This attack had been in Commander in Chief, Mediterranean's mind for some time; he had intended to carry it out on 21st October (Trafalgar day) when the moon was suitable, but a slight mishap to

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Illustrious led to a postponement. During his cruise in the central Mediterranean on 31st October and 1st November it was again considered, but the moon did not serve and it was thought an attack with parachute flares would be less effective. Success in such an attack was believed to depend on state of moon, weather, an undetected approach by the fleet and good reconnaissance. The latter was provided by flying boats and a Glenn Martin squadron working from Malta. On the night of eleventh/twelfth November all the above conditions were met. Unfavorable weather in the Gulf of Taranto prevented a repetition on twelfth/thirteenth. (2) Duplex pistols were used and probably contributed to the success of the torpedo attack. (3) The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported on eleventh November that Italian fleet was concentrating at Taranto in preparation for an attack on Corfu. Reconnaissance of 13th November shows that undamaged battleships and eight inch cruisers have left Taranto— presumably due to the attack on llth/12th." Thank you very much for your help and news about the two big French ships [R-15x, R-16x]. [DS 740.0011, EW, 1939/6803, CF*. pWSC, II, 545.]

Assurances from Petain, followed by the resignation of Laval from the Vichy government, temporarily ended Anglo-American fears of Franco-German collaboration.

R-17x [Washington] Nov. 23, 1940

From the President to the Former Naval Person I believe you will be interested in a report which I have just received from the American Charge d'Affaires in Vichy of an interview which he had with Marshal Petain on November 21 in order to emphasize further the concern felt by the Government of the United States regarding the movements of French warships. Marshal Pitain stated categorically that he would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablanca where they are and if there is any change in this plan he would give the Government of the United States previous notice. Please regard this assurance to the United States as in the highest degree confidential. [PREM 3/468/36. FRUS, 1940, II, 489.]

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Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spain's Chief of State, offered moral support to the Germans and Italians, but his vague hints about Spanish participation in the war were never fulfilled. Although Franco had no liking for the French and British, who had ineffectually but vocally opposed his side during Spain's recent civil war, his goals in diplomacy with Hitler were quite limited. He desperately needed economic and military assistance, and fervently wanted to regain Gibraltar—which had been in British hands ever since 1704. Aware of this, Churchill agreed with those who argued for a moderate policy toward Spain instead of harsh enforcement of the British blockade. Churchill would not discuss the return of Gibraltar, but economic aid was possible if the United States would help. A Spanish-German alliance would have posed a number of serious threats to the Anglo-American cause. Not only did it threaten to close off the Straits of Gibraltar and make the Mediterranean an Axis lake, but such an alliance would probably have forced Portugal to join in against the British. Moreover, German access to the Canary Islands and the Azores, islands belonging to Spain and Portugal respectively, would have brought Axis military strength in the Atlantic too close to the bulge of Brazil for American comfort. (See map, p. 55.) A sarcastic quotation from Churchill's memoirs perhaps best sums up his postwar appraisal of Spanish diplomacy: "It is fashionable at the present time to dwell on the vices of General Franco, and I am, therefore, glad to place on record this testimony to the duplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler and Mussolini" (WSC, II, 530).

C-41x London Nov. 23, 1940 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Secret. O u r accounts show that the situation in Spain is deteriorating a n d that the Peninsula is not far from the starvation point. An offer by you to dole out food m o n t h by m o n t h so long as they keep out of the war might be decisive. Small things d o not count now and this is a time for very plain talk to them. T h e occupation by Germany of both sides of the Straits would be a grievous addition to o u r naval strain, already severe. T h e G e r m a n s would soon have batteries working by radio direction finding which would close the Straits both by night and day. With a major campaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean and need of reinforcement and supply of o u r armies there all r o u n d the Cape we could not contemplate any military action on the mainland at or near the Straits. T h e Rock of Gibraltar will stand a long siege but what is the good of that if we cannot use the h a r b o u r or pass the Straits? Once in Morocco the

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Germans will work South, and U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating from Casablanca and Dakar. I need not, Mr. President, enlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us or approach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere. We must gain as much time as possible. [MR*. WSC, II, 529-30. R&C]

Sir Walter Citrine came to the United States in order to attend the meeting of the American Federation of Labor in New Orleans. He met with Roosevelt on January 28, 1941, following a two-month speaking tour of the United States. Churchill also labeled Harry Hopkins "Lord Root of the Matter" as a tribute to his practicality (R&H, p. 5).

C-42x, letter London November 1940 My dear Mr. President, This is to introduce to you my friend, Sir Walter Citrine. He worked with me three years before the war in our effort to arouse all parties in the country to the need of rearmament against Germany. At the present time he fills a position in the Labour movement more important to the conduct of the war than many Ministerial offices. As he is a Member of the Privy Council, you can count in every way upon his responsibility and discretion. He has the root of the matter in him, and I most cordially commend him to your consideration. Believe me, Yours very sincerely, [signed] Winston S. Churchill [MR]

LEND-LEASE Churchill's famous letter of December 7, 1940 (dated December 8 in the British records since it was sent early in the morning on that date) was a trenchant plea for American aid, particularly for assistance in solving Britain's increasingly serious shortage of money needed to pay for war purchases in the United States. Since the remnants of the neutrality laws of the mid-1930s were still on the books, Britain could not borrow money or obtain credit in the United States, but had to pay cash. The role played by this letter has been

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somewhat exaggerated by Churchill himself and others. Although it may have focused Roosevelt's attention on the problem, the President had already indicated his desire to find a solution to Britain's financial problem. On December 1, in spite of public and private statements by the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, that Britain was "broke," the President authorized the placing of a sizeable number of British orders for military supplies. Since Roosevelt knew the British could not pay for them, he had indirectly committed himself to solving the problem of Britain's cash shortage. For awhile Roosevelt toyed with the idea of converting Britain's assets, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere, into either cash or credit, but Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and the British convinced him that such a move would be both inadequate and unfair. Ultimately the President chose to subsidize the British war effort using the subterfuge of lend-lease, which permitted repayment of such subsidies in whatever manner the President authorized. This may have been the most carefully drafted and redrafted message in the entire Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. By the time it was sent to Washington for forwarding to the President, on board the USS Tuscaloosa for a two-week vacation cruise, the entire British War Cabinet plus Ambassador Lothian and Arthur Purvis had all made comments or submitted proposed revisions. The earliest redraft found in the British records is the one below, by Lothian, dated November 12 (PREM 3/486/1/299-313). Lothian also sent extensive suggestions for revisions from his post in Washington, where he had returned on November 23 following his vacation in England. Because the British Ambassador was an astute and trusted observer of the United States, his draft and suggested changes to the Churchill letter are printed below. Lothian forwarded this to Churchill with the comment: "I find a thistle a succulent morsel, though I am inclined to think that my American friends will wonder at my Scottish taste!" Along with Morgenthau, Lothian had long advocated complete disclosure to the Americans of Britain's dire financial predicament. Irish neutrality and the problems it posed for Britain are discussed in the headnote to C-15x. The phrase "great increment of armament" (par. 5) probably refers to British hopes rather than to goods ordered under the "cash-and-carry" provisions of America's neutrality legislation. The "Hog Island scheme" is a reference to a massive shipbuilding program during World War I at the Hog Island shipyard on the Delaware River near Philadelphia. The yard was constructed by the U.S. government's Emergency Fleet Corporation at a cost of $66 million, and was capable of building one 7,500-ton ship every seventy-two hours. A total of 110 ships were actually constructed there, although its most long-lasting significance may be the addition of a new word to the language—"hoagie," describing a sandwich popular among the Hog Island workers.

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C—43x, letter, draft A, not sent November 12, 1940

Proposed Letter to the President. 1. I feel that now that you have been re-elected to the Presidency for another term, and that the Nazi campaign for the invasion of Britain has apparently been defeated for this winter, I should put in front of you with complete frankness our position as I see it for the next year. 2. I do so with more confidence because, unless I have misread both your own speeches and the attitude of public opinion as disclosed in the recent election, the United States has now reached the settled conviction that its own security and future, as well as the future of democracy, is inseparably bound up with the independence of the nations of the British Commonwealth and with the retention by the British Navy of those bastions of sea power which are essential to the control of the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. The plain fact is that the control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy are now indispensable conditions upon which the security of both our countries depends. There is no other way in which war can be prevented from reaching the shores of the United States and its capacity to provide munitions impaired except by holding impregnably the present ring of sea and air bases, now mostly in the British Commonwealth, which are vital to the control of the seas and its trade routes, and which it is the primary object of the enemy to seize. 3. The first half of 1940 was a period of unparalleled disaster for the Allies. The last five months has been one of extraordinary and perhaps unexpected recovery on the part of Britain. There is therefore perhaps a not unnatural tendency to believe that the future has more assured prospects for us than the facts warrant. 4. I cannot, however, conceal from you my conviction that the next year or eighteen months may be more dangerous for us and more fraught with danger to the United States even than the five months in which we repelled Hitler's attempt to conquer Britain. The dangers I foresee are threefold. The first is our shipping losses and the growing difficulty of protecting our routes of entry to Britain. The figures of the last months are appended. You will see that in one week alone we lost 200,000 tons, which is much more than anything we lost in the last War. If these continue at the present rate they will be fatal. We are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, but we are confronted by the most formidable difficulties. In the last war we had on our side the French, the Italian,

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the Japanese, and, from 1917, the American navies. To-day we are alone. Moreover, the enemy commands the ports all round the North and West of France. He is increasingly basing both his submarines and his flying boats on these ports as well as the Norwegian and Dutch coasts. Before long he may be basing upon them cruisers and even battle cruisers. Owing to the fact that we can no longer use the ports or territory of Eire in which to organise our anti-submarine and air patrols, we have now only one effective route of entry to the British Isles, namely the Northern Approaches. Increasingly, the enemy is concentrating his submarines far out into the Atlantic on this route, and also increasingly patrolling it with long-distance bombing aeroplanes based on North-Western France. If we are to avoid disaster in this sphere in the coming months, three things are essential:— (a) The use of Ireland as a base for our defensive operations. This would not only enable us to protect far better the Northern route, but would probably enable us to re-open the alternative Southern approach to the British Isles. (b) We must find a very large increase of naval vessels and air patrols to patrol and convoy these routes. The 50 destroyers which came from you, which are now rapidly coming into service, are an immense advantage, but are nothing like enough to redress the balance. (c) We need a large and continuing increment of merchant shipping to make good our losses. We estimate that we require an annual import of essential foodstuffs, munitions, and raw materials of 43,000,000 tons a year. Our imports in September were only 3,000,000 and in October 2,750,000 tons. Our wastage in recent months was at the rate of 4,500,000 tons a year. The second main danger which confronts us is that the Vichy Government will either directly or through some manoeuvre, such as forcing us to attack a French expedition going by sea against de Gaulle, or French war vessels convoying food supplies, surrender the very considerable French naval forces still under their control to the Axis Powers. Since the defection of France we have a hard task in dealing with two Navies, the German and the Italian, with the Japanese coming up in reserve. We cannot deal with three by ourselves. If France and the French Navy joins the Axis our position in the Mediterranean, where our forces are already inferior to the Italian and hold their position only by superior seamanship and fighting power, would become extremely grave. Moreover, if the Mediterranean were lost the control of West Africa and its ports by the Axis overland would be almost inevitable, with the gravest consequences not only to our communications from the Northern to the Southern Atlantic, but to South America. The third sphere of danger is the Far East. Here it seems clear that Japan is thrusting southwards through Indo-China to seize Saigon and

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other naval and air bases which will bring it within a relatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. I am informed that the Japanese are preparing five good Divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary force. To-day we have no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation. We are almost entirely dependent on the deterrent effect of the American fleet and diplomacy. If you were in a position to supply the intrepid airmen of Australia and New Zealand with modern machines, without taking them from more urgent theatres, an immense increase in our power to deter Japanese aggression southwards would immediately spring into being. [Someone noted in the margin by this sentence: "Omit. We want them all here".] 5. From this brief summary it must be apparent to you how terribly narrow is the margin upon which we are operating today. Our prospects of victory depend upon our holding all the main theatres we do today, the Adantic, the Mediterranean including Gibraltar and Suez, the passage from the North to the South Atlantic around the Cape of Good Hope, while you hold the Pacific, till the beginning of 1942, when your great increment of armament comes in. If we give up any of these positions, or the enemy break through, then, the positions from which he can attack become immensely extended, the blockade is impaired, and totalitarian power begins to crowd in on ourselves, on South America, and on you. Never was there a clearer case of Napoleon's maxim: "AU war is a struggle for position". But if we can hold these positions during 1941, the effect of the blockade on Europe and on the power of Germany to feed and munition herself, the establishment of air supremacy over Germany which we are confident of establishing next year with the help of aeroplanes from the United States, and the existence of some fifty to sixty well equipped and trained divisions, capable of striking from Britain at any vulnerable front, or to assist and encourage revolt, will I believe give us victory in 1942, partly by the collapse of Italy and perhaps of Japan, and later of Germany itself. But we have no margin at all. At any time an accident, a new method of warfare (such as that recently adopted—the German submarines—) the escape of heavily armed and fast raiders on to the oceans, may destroy that margin and confront us with insoluble problems. We have, we believe, with the growing help of the Dominions and India shirked no responsibility and evaded no challenge. But after the fullest consideration, I am convinced that assistance from the United States on a far larger scale than has yet been discussed is essential, if we and you are to escape disaster, and that, on the other hand, if that assistance is forthcoming, eventual victory is assured. If you want further information in support of my statements, Lothian will supply it or obtain it for you.

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6. In view of these considerations, I am now going to venture to put in front of you the kind of assistance from the United States which I believe would make certain of victory. I cannot, of course, judge of what it is, or is not, possible for the United States to do. That is entirely for you to decide. But I feel that I ought to make plain the kind of thing which I believe is necessary to prevent disaster and assure success. (1) Can the Government of the United States induce the Government of Eire to give us the air and naval facilities necessary for the restoration of our shipping position? I recognise the difficulty of De Valera yielding to pressure from the United Kingdom, though in all conscience we have treated him well in recent years. The existence, too of Britain is essential to the freedom of Ireland. But if by his present policy he is helping to bring down Britain, he is really striking a terrible blow at the security of the United States. It is now the policy of the United States to supply airplanes and munitions to Great Britain in the interests of its own security. Can the U.S.A. sit idly by and watch the enemy forces sinking those munitions because the Government of Eire will not permit us to organise defence from Ireland, for the duration of the war, a defence which would include that of Ireland itself? Or would it be possible for the U.S.A. to lease the necessary areas on our behalf? (2) Is it possible for you in some way to make available the greater part of the 140 ships, which I understand you now have in the Atlantic, to convoy merchant ships across the Atlantic and protect them against illegal methods of warfare? Can your own aerial patrol be so extended as to cover some parts of the Eastern Atlantic and can any of your warships work with this patrol to locate raiders? The first line of protection of the U.S.A. in the Atlantic is now the British fleet. So long as it exists the American Atlantic patrol is of secondary importance in defence. But acting as the protection of the trade route between the U.S.A. and Britain it could be decisive. (3) Is it possible for the United States to cancel the cash-and-carry provision of the Neutrality Act so that it becomes legal for American ships to carry munitions and other goods to Britain? (4) Can you let us have immediately such merchant ships as are available, and set going also immediately a new Hog Island scheme? Our capacity to build new ships is about 1,250,000 tons a year. Can you provide for a further 3,000,000 tons gross, which would ensure the making good of the losses we are now sustaining? (5) Is it possible for you to assist in making the blockade more effective by an export licence system which might eventually extend to South and Central America as well as the British Commonwealth? (6) Can you bring any further pressure to bear on France to compel it to refrain from allowing the Axis Powers to obtain the French fleet?

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Alternatively, would you be prepared to cooperate with us in destroying it and taking steps in West Africa, if Vichy voluntarily or under duress, began to make a further capitulation? (7) The Far East is already in your sector of defence against totalitarian aggression. Our Admiralty Staff, however, believe that if a large part of the American fleet were concentrated at Singapore, leaving only a defensive unit at Hawaii, there would be no risk to the western shores of the United States or the Panama Canal, and that the American Fleet, based on Singapore, would be able effectively to contain the Japanese Fleet and blockade Japan while the Axis Powers were being dealt with in the Atlantic. We should, of course, be very glad to place the Singapore base at your disposal for this purpose. The Admiralty believe that Japan could be held in this way while leaving substantial naval power available for work in the critical European and Atlantic theatres. [The last sentence in this paragraph was added in unidentified handwriting. A marginal notation, also in unidentified handwriting, reads: "This presumably assumes America at war. Omit." A line indicates that the entire paragraph was to be omitted.] (8) There remains the immense and urgent question of finance. Mr. Morgenthau, I understand, has been kept regularly informed of our financial position, and Sir Frederick Phillips of our Treasury is about to start to Washington to disclose all the latest facts. I will not, therefore, burden this letter with figures. But speaking broadly it is only a question of weeks before the resources we have available with which to pay for our requirements and the munitions ordered from the United States are exhausted. Unless we can get financial assistance from the United States on the largest scale, it is obvious that our capacity to carry on the war on the present basis must abruptly come to an end. I feel some hesitation in making a proposal to you in this sphere, which is peculiarly your own to decide, but the only solution I can see is that the United States should supply us with all the munitions we need for the battle, without payment now, leaving the question of repayment to be discussed and settled after the war. We can, I believe, pay for our other needs, such as food and raw materials, but we cannot pay for aeroplanes and munitions as well. On this, may I make two further observations? I can see no other prospect of lasting peace or of a reasonably liberal world after the war than that the United States and Great Britain, at any rate for a number of years, should between them possess unquestionable air and sea supremacy. Peace comes from power behind law and government, and not from disarmament and anarchy. Power in the hands of these two great liberal nations, with the free nations of the British Commonwealth and the American Republics associated in some way with them so as to ensure that that power is not abused, offers the only stable prospect of peace. It is clear

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that we shall be able to build nothing for many years out of the youth of Europe, which has been educated in Nazi and Communist doctrines. If we win victory we shall have to assume the major responsibility for a new world order. If, however, our two countries are to be associated in defending freedom, and still more in rebuilding the world after the war, neither of them should be placed in the position of being the suppliant client of the other. In considering the financial problem, therefore, I would urge you to consider whether it is not in the interests of the United States, no less than of Great Britain, that we should not be denuded of all our gold and available resources, and left without working balances, before the United States comes to the financial rescue. Nothing would be more humiliating and intolerable to the spirit of a Britain which had just successfully fought, at great cost, one of the great defensive actions of history—an action which she thinks will carry with it freedom for much of the rest of the world as well—than that she should have to come week by week to ask the United States for the means by which to carry on for another few days. Whatever arrangement is made should settle our financial relations for the duration of the struggle, so long as we have a common purpose in view. My second observation is this. We are perfectly prepared to dispose of our South American investments and other overseas assets in order to add to our dollar resources with which to pay for munitions, if they can be disposed of for a reasonable price, and you wish us to do so. We are in this war for freedom to our last man and our last penny. But the standard of living of the British working man and his wife has for many decades been largely dependent upon the fact that we can only produce some 40 per cent of our food at home, we have received large quantities of food and other supplies from overseas as a return of capital investments made in earlier years, and our social services have, in fact, been paid for by taxation of these dividends. If all these investments were to be disposed of, it might produce very serious social complications after the war, and we do not want to add these to the problems of the post war world, which we shall have jointly to shoulder. We certainly do not wish to evade any share of our liability in this war. We are in any case in the unenviable position of being in the front line, and spending our blood as well as our treasure to defeat the greatest menace to ourselves and to freedom which the world has ever seen. I feel, therefore, that I am entitled to ask your consideration of these more remote consequences of the financial decisions which will have to be taken in the next few weeks. 7. I feel that I have, perhaps, exceeded the normal limits of international intercourse in thus addressing you so frankly, but not only the future of our nations but of free civilisation is at stake, and this is no time for minimizing the dangers or shirking the logic of events. I believe that

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if the United States is able to give us the kind of assistance I have described we shall win the war and assure mankind a better and nobler future. But I cannot disguise from myself that if the United States is unable to do these things 1941 may bring irreparable disaster to both of us and to mankind. [PREM 3/486/1/29&-313]

Late in November a printed draft of the letter was circulated to the War Cabinet. It differed considerably from the Lothian draft and was quite close to the final version, particularly the first twelve paragraphs, which correspond closely to paragraphs 1—11 in the actual letter.

C—43x, letter, draft B, not sent Printed for the War Cabinet November 1940 My dear Mr. President, As we reach the end of this year, I feel you will expect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941. I do so with candour and confidence, because it seems to me that the vast majority of American citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United States as well as the future of our two Democracies and the kind of civilization for which they stand, are bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth. Only thus can those bastions of sea power, upon which the control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans depend, be preserved in faithful and friendly hands. The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy, is indispensable to the security of the trade routes of both our countries, and the surest means of preventing war from reaching the shores of the United States. 2. There is another aspect. It takes between three and four years to convert the industries of a modern State to war purposes. Saturation point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can be spared from civil needs has been applied to war production. Germany certainly reached this point by the end of 1939. We in the British Empire are now only about half-way through the second year. The United States, I should suppose, was by no means so far advanced as we. Moreover, I understand that immense programmes of naval, military and Air defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly two years are needed. It is our duty in the common interest, as also for our own survival, to hold the front and grapple with the Nazi power until the preparations of the United States are complete. Victory may come before two years

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are out; but we have no right to count upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible. Therefore, I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly consideration that there is a real, solid identity of interest between the British Empire and the United States while these conditions last. It is upon this footing that I venture to address you. 3. The form which this war has taken, and seems likely to hold, does not enable us to match the immense Armies of Germany in any theatre where their main power can be brought to bear. We can, however, by the use of sea power and Air power, meet the German Armies in regions where only comparatively small armies can be brought into action. We must do our best to prevent the German domination of Europe spreading into Africa and into Southern Asia. We have also to maintain in constant readiness in this Island, Armies strong enough to make the problem of an oversea invasion insoluble. For these purposes we are forming as fast as possible, as you are already aware, between 50 and 60 Divisions. Even if the United States was our Ally, instead of our friend and indispensable partner, we should not ask for a large American Expeditionary Army. Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor, and the power to transport munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large numbers of soldiers. 4. The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies and for Europe. The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recovery by Great Britain fighting alone, but with the precious aid in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by the Great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief. 5. The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift, overwhelming blow, has for the time being very greatly receded. In its place, there is a long, gradually maturing danger, less sudden and less spectacular, but equally deadly. This mortal danger is the steady and increasing diminution of sea tonnage. We can endure the shattering of our dwellings, and the slaughter of our civil population by indiscriminate Air attacks, and we hope to parry these increasingly as our Science develops, and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy. The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas. Unless we can establish our ability to feed this Island, to import the munitions of all kinds which we need, unless we can move and maintain our Armies to and in the various theatres where Hitler and his confederate, Mussolini, must be met, and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on till the spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by the way, and the time needed by the United States to complete her defensive preparations may not be forthcoming. It is therefore in shipping and the power to transport across the oceans, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war

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will be found. If, on the other hand, we are able to move the necessary tonnage to and fro across salt water indefinitely, it may well be that the application of superior Air power to the German homeland and the rising anger of the German and other Nazi gripped populations, will bring the agony of civilization to a merciful and glorious end. 6. But do not let us underrate the task. 7. Our shipping losses, the figures for which in recent months are appended, have been as serious as in the worst year of the last war. Were they to continue at this rate they would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time. Although we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the difficulty of limiting losses is obviously much greater than in the last war. We lack the assistance of the French Navy. The enemy commands the ports all around the north and western coast of France. He is increasingly basing his submarines, flying-boats and combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the French coast. We lack alee the use of the ports or territory of Eire in which to organize our coastal patrols by Air and sea. In fact, we have now only one effective route of entry to the British Isles, namely, the Northern approaches, against which the enemy is increasingly concentrating, reaching ever farther out by UBoat action and long-distance aircraft bombing. In addition, there have for some months been merchant ship raiders, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. And now we have the powerful warship-raider to contend with as well. We need ships both to hunt down and to escort. Large as are our resources and preparations, we do not possess enough. 8. The next six or seven months bring relative battleship strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory. Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in service in January. We have already King George V, and hope to have Prince of Wales in the line at the same time. These modern ships are of course far better armoured especially against Air attack, than vessels like Rodney and Nehon designed twenty years ago. We have recently had to use Rodney on Transatlantic escort, and at any time when numbers are so small a mine or a torpedo may alter decisively the strength of the line of battle. We get relief in June when Duke of York will be ready, and are much better at the end of the year when both Anson and Howe will have joined. But these two first-class modern 35,000-ton, 15-inch gun German battleships, force us to maintain a concentration never previously necessary in this war. 9. We hope that the two Italian Littorio's will be out of action for a while, and anyway they are not so dangerous as if they were manned by Germans. Perhaps they might be! We are indebted to you for your help about the Richelieu and Jean Bart, and I dare say that will be all right. But, Mr. President, as no one will see more clearly than you, we have during these months to consider for the first time in this war a Fleet action, in which

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the enemy will have two ships at least as good as our two best and only two modern ones. It will be impossible to reduce our strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey, and indeed the whole position in the Eastern basin depends upon our having a strong Fleet there. The older, unmodernized battleships will have to go for convoy. Thus even in the battleship class we are at full extension. 10. The Vichy Government may either directly or through some manoeuvre, such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against the Free French Colonies, surrender to the Axis Powers the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control. If the French Navy were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass to their hands, with the gravest consequences not only to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, but also to Dakar and, of course, thereafter te South America. 11. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here it seems clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-China to Saigon and other Naval and Air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. It is reported that the Japanese are preparing five good Divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary force. We have to-day no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation should it develop. 12. In the face of these dangers we must try to use the year 1941 to build up such a supply of weapons, particularly of aircraft, both by increased output at home in spite of bombardment, and through oceanborne supplies, as will lay the foundations of victory. In view of the difficulty and magnitude of this task, as outlined by all the facts I have set before you, to which many others could be added I feel entitled, nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects, the Common Cause. 13. You would, I am sure, wish me to put these points plainly before you, and I do so accordingly:— (1) The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous methods of warfare, in accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935. From this, United States ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not an effective legal blockade. (2) It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships, cruisers, destroyers and air flotillas. The protection would be immensely more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for the duration of the war. It is improbable that such action would provoke a declaration of war

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by Germany upon the United States, though undoubtedly sea incidents of a combative character would from time to time occur, without, however, necessarily entailing α state of war. If the United States were to decide upon this policy, or something like it, it would constitute the greatest act of constructive non-belligerency and more than any other measure, would make it certain that British resistance could be effectually prolonged for the desired period. (3) Failing the above, the gift, loan or lease of at least another 50 American destroyers is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. In addition, the United States naval forces could extend their sea control of the American side of the Atlantic, so as to prevent the moles­ tation by enemy vessels of the approaches to the new line of naval and air bases which the United States is establishing in British islands in the Western Hemisphere. (4) We also need the good offices of the United States and the whole influence of its Government, continually exerted, to procure for Great Britain the effective use of the coasts and shores of Eire for our flotillas and, still more important, for our aircraft working to the westward into the Atlantic. If it were proclaimed an American interest that the resistance of Great Britain should be prolonged and the Atlantic route kept open, this might lead Irish elements in the United States to bring pressure upon the Government of Eire, which would be most helpful. It is not possible for His Majesty's Government to compel the people of Northern Ireland against their will to quit the British Commonwealth of Nations and join the Irish Republic, but I do not doubt that, a part of a large policy of the kind outlined, a Council for Defence of all Ireland could be set up, out of which the unity of the Island could probably in some form or other emerge after the war. It must be emphasized that failing any agreement about Eire bases, it may become necessary as a measure of self preservation, to secure these bases. 14. In addition, it is indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great Britain and for the waging of the war by Great Britain with the utmost vigour, should be substantially increased beyond the capacity of British resources. It is asked that the United States should— {