Christian Faith (Two-Volume Set): a New Translation and Critical Edition 9781611646757, 9780664226206, 9780664262822, 1611646758

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“This translation of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith is a stunning achievement. It is now not only the definitive edition of this work but the standard for all future Schleiermacher translations. Christian Faith is the most famous theological text of the past two hundred years. The translation, grounded in the translators’ deep learning, renders Schleiermacher’s text in language that speaks with immediacy and clarity to contemporary theological questions and concerns. The translation is so beautiful and faithful that I swear I heard Schleiermacher’s own voice speaking through the text!” —CHRISTINE HELMER, Arthur E. Andersen Teaching and Research Professor, Professor of Religious Studies and German, Northwestern University “This magisterial and authoritative English translation and edition of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith (1830) constitutes a major contribution to the study and understanding of modern Christian theology. Undertaken by the foremost interpreters and translators into English of Schleiermacher’s work, Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler, this superb work will change the way in which the English-speaking world understands how one of the most important modern theologians conceptualized and defined the very nature of Christianity in the modern era. An indispensable achievement of translation and religious scholarship, this work should become a standard in libraries, institutional and personal. Providing an English translation of the 1830–31 reworked second edition of Schleiermacher’s text, the editors make full use of the critical apparatus of previous German and English editions of Christian Faith. Following Schleiermacher’s own theory of translation, the language is clear, expressive, eminently readable, and accurate. In addition, all of Schleiermacher’s own notes in Greek and Latin are translated and, where possible, identified. Inviting the twenty-first-century reader to engage with the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher in an unprecedented way, this work constitutes a magnificent lifelong achievement of philological and theological scholarship.” —KATHERINE FAULL, Professor of German Studies and Comparative Humanities, Bucknell University “The availability, for the first time, of a consistent English translation of Schleiermacher’s masterpiece is a great boon to scholars and students. Tice, Kelsey, and Lawler deserve our gratitude for the almost unimaginable labor required to produce these volumes. Readers will find the substantial notes, which provide orientation and historical context, not only useful but engaging. This marks an important moment in Schleiermacher scholarship.” —THEODORE M. VIAL JR., Professor of Theology and Modern Western Religious Thought, Iliff School of Theology “Until now Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith has been available to English-speaking readers only in its largely outdated 1928 translation. This much-anticipated critical edition provides a discerning, diligently researched, and well-organized new translation that takes special care

to remain faithful to the rich complexities of Schleiermacher’s own prose. The meticulous notes further situate Schleiermacher’s work among his own interlocutors and relate his insights to ongoing and contemporary scholarly conversations. These volumes present a significant and welcome contribution that will quickly become a standard point of reference for Schleiermacher’s thought for specialists and nonspecialists alike.” —KEVIN VANDER SCHEL, Gonzaga University “What a tremendous contribution to twenty-first-century Friedrich Schleiermacher research and studies. This is the ultimate English translation of one of the most important dogmatic presentations of Christian faith and witness in history. The editorial notes, interpretative nuances, and language clarity are a real gift for current and future Schleiermacher scholarship.” —DUMAS A. HARSHAW JR., Shaw University Divinity School

CHRISTIAN FAITH Volumes 1 and 2

CHRISTIAN FAITH A New Translation and Critical Edition Volumes 1 and 2

FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER

Translated by Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler Edited by Catherine L. Kelsey and Terrence N. Tice

© 2016 Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler First Edition Published by Westminster John Knox Press Louisville, Kentucky 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25—10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Westminster John Knox Press, 100 Witherspoon Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202-1396. Or contact us online at www.wjkbooks.com. Scripture quotations marked RSV are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright © 1946, 1952, 1971, and 1973 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and are used by permission. Scripture quotations marked NIV are from The Holy Bible, New International Version. Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984, 2011 by Biblica, Inc.® Used by permission. All rights reserved worldwide. Book design by Drew Stevens and Allison Taylor Cover design by Allison Taylor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1768–1834, author. | Tice, Terrence N., translator, editor. | Kelsey, Catherine L., translator, editor. | Lawler, Edwina G., 1943– translator. Title: Christian faith : a new translation and critical edition / Friedrich Schleiermacher; translated by Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey and Edwina Lawler; edited by Catherine L. Kelsey and Terrence N. Tice. Other titles: Christliche Glaube. English Description: Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. Identifiers: LCCN 2016018624 (print) | LCCN 2016013573 (ebook) | ISBN 9781611646757 (ebk.) | ISBN 9780664226206 (hardback) | ISBN 9780664262822 (pbk.) Subjects: LCSH: Theology, Doctrinal. | BISAC: RELIGION / Christian Theology / General. | RELIGION / Christian Theology / History. Classification: LCC BT75 (print) | LCC BT75.S58513 2016 (ebook) | DDC 230/.044—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016018624 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Most Westminster John Knox Press books are available at special quantity discounts when purchased in bulk by corporations, organizations, and special-interest groups. For more information, please e-mail [email protected].

Full title in 1830:

Christian Faith: Interconnectedly Presented in Accordance with Principles of the Evangelical Church Epigram on 1830 Title page:

Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Anselm, Prosol. 1 Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelligent. Anselm, De fide trin. 2.

“For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe [have faith]; but I believe so that I may understand.” Proslogion 1

“For those who have not believed [had faith] will not find by experience, and those who have not found by experience will not know [understand].” De fide trinitatis 2

Ed. note: Proslogion was written about 1079. The latter, De fide trinitatis, is actually a made-up title for that section in Da incarnatione verbi, written about 1093. ET Anselm (1033–1109), The Major Works (1998), 87 and 236; Latin: Migne Lat. 227C and 264C.

CONTENTS Acknowledgments Guide for Readers Concerning This Translation Abbreviations Title Page (1830) Preface (1830)

INTRODUCTION | §§1–31 [Explanation] §1 Chapter One: Toward a Definition of Dogmatics Introduction to Chapter One §2 I. Toward the Concept “Church”: Propositions Borrowed from Ethics §§3 – 6 II. Regarding the Differentiations among Religious Communities in General: Propositions Borrowed from the Philosophy of Religion §§7 – 10 III. Presentation of Christianity in Accordance with Its Distinctive Nature: Propositions Borrowed from Apologetics §§11–14 IV. Regarding the Relationship of Dogmatics to Christian Piety §§15–19 Chapter Two: Regarding the Method of Dogmatics Introduction to Chapter Two §20 I. Regarding Selection of the Dogmatic Material §§21–26 II. Regarding the Formation of Dogmatics §§27–31

THE DOCTRINES OF FAITH, PART ONE | §§32–61 Explication of Religious Self-Consciousness as It Is Always Already Presupposed by, but also Always Contained in, Every Christian Religious Stirring of Mind and Heart Introduction to Part One §§32–35 SECTION ONE

A Description of Our Religious Self-Consciousness insofar as the Relationship between the World and God Is Expressed Therein

Introduction to Section One §§36–39 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Creation §§40–41 Appendix One: Regarding Angels §§42–43 Appendix Two: Regarding the Devil §§44–45 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding Preservation §§46–49 SECTION TWO

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Refer to Religious Self-Consciousness insofar as It Expresses the General Relationship between God and the World [Introduction to Section Two] §§50–51 First Point of Doctrine: God Is Eternal §52 Second Point of Doctrine: God Is Omnipresent §53 Third Point of Doctrine: God Is Omnipotent §54 Fourth Point of Doctrine: God Is Omniscient §55 Appendix to Section Two: Regarding Some Other Divine Attributes §56 SECTION THREE

Regarding the Constitution of the World That Is Indicated in Religious Self-Consciousness inasmuch as It Expresses the General Relationship between God and the World Introduction to Section Three §§57–58 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Original Perfection of the World §59 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Original Perfection of Humanity §§60–61

THE DOCTRINES OF FAITH, PART TWO | §§62–169 Explication of the Facts of Religious Self-Consciousness as They Are Defined in Terms of Contrasting Features Introduction [to Part Two] §§62–64 The First Aspect of the Contrast Explication of the Consciousness of Sin [Introduction to the First Aspect of the Contrast] §65 SECTION ONE

Sin as a Human Condition [Introduction to Section One] §§66–69

First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Original Sin §§70–72 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding Actual Sin §§73–74 SECTION TWO

Regarding Constitution of the World in Relation to Sin [Point of Doctrine: Regarding Evil] §§75–77 Postscript to This Point of Doctrine [regarding Evil] §78 SECTION THREE

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Relate to Consciousness of Sin [Introduction to Section Three] §§79–82 First Point of Doctrine: God Is Holy §83 Second Point of Doctrine: God Is Just §84 Addendum: Regarding the Mercy of God §85 The Second Aspect of the Contrast Explication regarding the Consciousness of Grace Introduction [to the Second Aspect of the Contrast] §§86–90 SECTION ONE

Regarding the Christian’s Condition insofar as the Christian Is Conscious of Divine Grace [Introduction to Section One] §91 Division One: Regarding Christ [Introduction to Division One] §92 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Person of Christ Introduction to First Point of Doctrine §§93–95 First Doctrinal Proposition §96 Second Doctrinal Proposition §97 Third Doctrinal Proposition §98 [Addendum to This Point of Doctrine] §99 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Work of Christ [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §§100–102 First Doctrinal Proposition §103 Second Doctrinal Proposition §104 Third Doctrinal Proposition §105

Division Two: Regarding the Way in which Communion with the Perfection and Blessedness of the Redeemer Is Expressed in the Individual Soul [Introduction to Division Two] §106 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Regeneration [Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §107 First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Conversion §108 Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Justification §109 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding Sanctification [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §110 First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Sins of the Regenerate §111 Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding the Good Works of the Regenerate §112 SECTION TWO

Regarding the Constitution of the World in Relation to Redemption [Introduction to Section Two] §§113–114 Division One: Regarding the Emergence of the Church [Introduction to Division One] §§115–116 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Election [Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §§117–118 First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Predestination §119 Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding the Grounds for Defining Election §120 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding Communication of the Holy Spirit [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §§121–122 First Doctrinal Proposition §123 Second Doctrinal Proposition §124 Third Doctrinal Proposition §125 Division Two: Regarding the Continuance of the Church in Its Coexistence with the World [Introduction to DivisionTwo] §126 The First Half [of the Second Division]: The Essential and Invariable Basic Characteristics of the Church [Introduction to the First Half] §127 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Holy Scripture [Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §§128–129 First Doctrinal Proposition §130 Second Doctrinal Proposition §131

Addendum to This Point of Doctrine §132 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Ministry of the Divine Word [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §133 First Doctrinal Proposition §134 Second Doctrinal Proposition §135 Third Point of Doctrine: Regarding Baptism [Introduction to Third Point of Doctrine] §136 First Doctrinal Proposition §137 Second Doctrinal Proposition §138 Fourth Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Lord’s Supper [Introduction to Fourth Point of Doctrine] §§139–140 First Doctrinal Proposition §141 Second Doctrinal Proposition §142 Addendum to the Last Two Points of Doctrine: [Regarding the Term “Sacrament”] §143 Fifth Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Office of the Keys [Introduction to Fifth Point of Doctrine] §144 Doctrinal Proposition §145 Sixth Point of Doctrine: Regarding Prayer in Jesus’ Name [Introduction to Sixth Point of Doctrine] §146 Doctrinal Proposition §147 The Second Half of the Second Division: The Variable Characteristic of the Church by Virtue of Its Coexistence with the World [Introduction to the Second Half ] §§148–149 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Plurality of the Visible Church in Relation to the Unity of the Invisible Church [Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §150 First Doctrinal Proposition §151 Second Doctrinal Proposition §152 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding the Capacity for Error in the Visible Church in Relation to the Unfailing Reliability of the Invisible Church [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §153 First Doctrinal Proposition §154 Second Doctrinal Proposition §155 Postscript to These Two Points of Doctrine §156 Division Three: Regarding the Consummation of the Church [Introduction to Division Three] §§157–159 First Point of Prophetic Doctrine: Regarding Christ’s Coming Again §160 Second Point of Prophetic Doctrine: Regarding Resurrection of the Flesh §161

Third Point of Prophetic Doctrine: Regarding the Last Judgment §162 Fourth Point of Prophetic Doctrine: Regarding Eternal Blessedness §163 SECTION THREE

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Relate to Redemption [Introduction to Section Three] §§164–165 First Point of Doctrine: Regarding Divine Love [Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §166 Doctrinal Proposition §167 Second Point of Doctrine: Regarding Divine Wisdom [Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §168 Doctrinal Proposition §169

CONCLUSION: REGARDING DIVINE THREENESS §§170–172 Appendix: Preface to the First Edition (1821) Bibliography

INDEXES Guide to the Indexes Index of References to “Brief Outline” Index of Creeds and Confessions Index of Scripture Index of Persons and Places Analytical Index of Topics: Subjects, Concepts, Themes, Definitions, Word Usage, and Contrasts

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A project this size has had to be a team effort. Each of the translators is grateful for the specific knowledge, gifts, and skills that our two colleagues have brought to the project. Terrence N. Tice has unparalleled familiarity with the breadth of Schleiermacher’s corpus, with his consistent language usage across that corpus and, for the most part, across time. Tice has often reminded us that “Schleiermacher has another word he uses for that meaning.” Catherine L. Kelsey has focused knowledge of how Christology provides the structural framework for this dogmatic work and deep familiarity with the corresponding preaching. She has been the one to insist that the English sentences “make sense” to readers unfamiliar with German academic writing. Edwina Lawler is a Germanist and frequent translator of a variety of Schleiermacher’s works. She has made sure that we noticed every word in the German text and accounted for the grammatical details. Kelsey and Tice have managed the thousands of details that constitute editing the text and bringing it to publication. The three of us could not have completed this project without the help of a larger team as well. We are deeply appreciative of a number of persons who have helped us manage portions of the manuscript. Philippa Anastos, Jeremy Garber, Emily Flemming, Thomas Barlow, Judith Streit, and Rosa Henneke have each contributed to moving the text from one draft to the next through four drafts of each of the 172 propositions. Our commitment to providing a translation into English of every single reference to a Latin or Greek or German text has been a major undertaking in itself. We are grateful for the then-called Robert E. Speer Library at Princeton Theological Seminary and Ira J. Taylor Library at Iliff School of Theology. The skilled assistance of librarians at each has been invaluable. Particular thanks to Laura Harris, Katie Fisher, and Alice Runis (for online database access) at the Taylor Library. Some of the texts to which Schleiermacher referred have never been translated into English. We turned to Kathleen Kienzle, AB, AM, and Beverly Mayne Kienzle, Professor of the Practice in Latin and Romance Languages, Harvard Divinity School, for about 101 separate quotations. We provided them a small amount of context, and asked them to provide translations. Their fine work can be found throughout the footnotes. Near the end we also discovered a couple more items, for which two Iliff School of Theology colleagues provided assistance. Thank you to Alton Templin and Richard Valantasis for help in a pinch. We want to acknowledge several persons at Westminster John Knox Press whose trust that we could accomplish such a large undertaking and encouragement, as it took far longer than we intended, made it possible for this translation to appear. Donald K. McKim and Robert Ratcliff have been patient and sure editors. We are also very grateful for the skill of our production manager, Julie Tonini; copyeditor, Tina E. Noll; and typesetter, Allison Taylor. This project has required extraordinary attention to detail all the way to the end. The volume editors take responsibility for any errors that might remain.

Finally, we want to acknowledge the importance for all forms of Schleiermacher scholarship of the critical editions of Schleiermacher’s work published in the Kritische Gesamtausgabe Schleiermachers (KGA) by the press Walter de Gruyter. We have translated the original publication of Schleiermacher’s second, reworked edition of 1830–1831, but, as you can see in the footnotes from the works to which we refer the reader, we have been in scholarly conversation with English and German editions of many of Schleiermacher’s various works, almost all of which have been published in German by Georg Reimer and its successor Walter de Gruyter. We hope to have matched the quality of textual care that marks the KGA and to have joined our German colleagues in providing an enduring contribution to theologians and pastors for generations to come. The editors Catherine L. Kelsey and Terrence N. Tice August 2015

GUIDE FOR READERS To start with, the translators want you to know two things: Schleiermacher’s theological work has been life-giving to us for decades. And there is no way around it, this book is not an easy read. Schleiermacher sought conciseness, and the result was both clarity and density.1 Following Schleiermacher’s own instructions to translators, however, our translation seeks to offer his exact meaning and intent, so that you can make of it what you will. Perhaps you will find this way of describing the shared faith of communities of Jesus followers sets you free to follow God more fully. Perhaps it will just challenge you to think more analytically about what you see is essential in Christian faith. Either result could be life-giving for you too. Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith is likely the most precise, interconnected account of Christian theology ever written. Schleiermacher focuses on 172 tight propositions, closely related explanations, and carefully shaped arguments. We have added a number of things that could aid the reader of English, and maybe German readers too: explanatory notes, translations of quotations given in other languages, their sources, and a bibliography. We have also broken down his typically long sentences, fortunately aided by his own logical practices (including punctuation and what we call “the little words” that connect and move the argument). We have left no German word unaccounted for and have added in the main text nothing but what a faithful rendering into precise English might require. The result is as exact a transmission of his discourse as possible. Yet it is also an “interpretation,” as every translation is. Our aim, like his, is not to prove, to defend, or to sell his account of Christianity to you but to present it clearly. Things to Notice 1. The word “we” that Schleiermacher continually uses in this book refers to members of his own Protestant, “Evangelical” churches, which specifically meant persons within German churches within the German territories in the 1830s. This means that he assumes that his readers see themselves to be Christians and, for that reason, have their own experience of redemption through Jesus Christ. He is not trying to prove the value of Christian faith to readers. Instead, he is trying to provide language that will help persons from different backgrounds within Protestant and other faith communities see their commonalities, even while they retain distinctive differences. In his 1829 public letter to his colleague Friedrich Lücke, translated as On the “Glaubenslehre,” Schleiermacher calls John 1:14 “the basic text for all dogmatics” (59). That verse is a statement of having experienced redemption: “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father” (RSV). The “we” who have “beheld his glory” is the “we” whom Schleiermacher invokes in Christian Faith. 2. Christian Faith is only half of Schleiermacher’s dogmatic project. It is the half that examines what Christian faith communities experience and think and believe about their experience of God in Christ. The other half is Christian ethics. That is where Schleiermacher

describes the distinctive features of living in the reign of God as redeemed followers of Christ. So you will find few real examples of how to live out shared Christian beliefs in this book. (See the bibliography to find the publication of his lectures on Christian ethics in German.) 3. The table of contents is your best guide to the organization of this book. Notice that the Introduction (§§1–31) and Part One (§§32–61) are each preliminary to Schleiermacher’s account of specifically Christian faith experience in Part Two and the Conclusion. As a result, Part Two is much longer than Part One and is two layers deeper in the outline. If you look carefully, you will see a recurring pattern of analysis built around three features: Christian self-consciousness of oneself, of God, and of the world. In Part Two you will also see a contrast between Christian consciousness of sin and Christian consciousness of grace. You will stay oriented if you know where you are reading in relation to these features and in the outline as a whole. 4. Schleiermacher examines the potential value of many theological ideas that he ends up not adopting. He thinks about their implications, especially if those implications conflict with something more central to shared Christian experience of redemption. He does hold exactly what he says in the propositions themselves. The rest of what he says clarifies what he does and does not mean by the words in the propositions. 5. Plan to read slowly and to think as you go. Schleiermacher refers to confessional statements and many individual theologians of the church. They are all writing in the abstract. Many readers will find it helpful to identify particular examples that fit the abstract language. You might ask yourself: what in my experience of the faith of some Christians is this sentence describing? Frequently Schleiermacher examines a particular theological view in only one (long!) German sentence. In this translation that sentence might be rendered in a short paragraph. Slow reading helps you notice all the different views he considers. Connecting them to your experience helps you recognize those views as they appear around you. 6. The editors’ notes contain several different kinds of information. Schleiermacher himself says in his notes: “see” or “compare” (cf.) in relation to other propositions in Christian Faith. The translators have added additional connections to propositions in our “Ed. notes.” Schleiermacher’s thinking is interconnected between his various writings as well. At many points he said something in another book that might help a reader think about what he says here. He provided some of these connections, and we have provided you with many others, particularly to the third edition of On Religion (OR), both editions of Brief Outline (BO), On the “Glaubenslehre” (OG), and his sermons. If you know German, note that we have given you Schleiermacher’s exact words in the notes when his word choice is important for grasping the specific range of nuances or when the word has become a technical term for him. And we have found English translations for all the quotations that Schleiermacher left in their original Latin or Greek in his own notes. The accompanying editors’ notes tell you where to locate both the translation provided and the original language.

7. We have not attempted to provide biographical information that would help you to think about the context within which Schleiermacher was writing. If this book is your first encounter with him, you may find it helpful to consult one of the fine theological dictionaries or one of the brief introductions to his thought. We also encourage you to generate your own interpretation of this work as you read it rather than relying on that of others. 8. The 1830–1831 edition of Christian Faith has been reprinted many times in German and now in a second translation into English. As a result, scholars have found it more helpful to refer to the proposition (using this sign: §) and subsection number rather than page numbers, which vary from edition to edition. Hence, you will find references such as §97— which refers to the proposition itself. §97.2 refers to the entire second subsection under proposition 97. §97n4 means footnote 4 in proposition 97 and its subsections. §14.P.S. refers to the postscript section found at the very end of the subsections under proposition 14 (most propositions do not have postscripts). The abbreviations list will help you remember such shortcuts when you need them interpreted. 9. There are a lot of footnotes. Three options are open to you for reading. (1) Read the main text alone, ignoring the footnotes. (2) Dip down to the footnotes whenever you feel curious or confused. (3) Read in conversation with the footnotes, which only occasionally overstep sparse explanation and which will lead you into the work’s exquisitely organized interconnectedness. We think you’ll likely come to know what you want or need as you go. That’s it! The rest is up to whatever relation forms between you and Schleiermacher’s ideas as you read and ponder.

1. Cf. §12.1 on his distinct resolutions of difficulties faced throughout this work and §29n9 on aspects of viewing “scientific method,” including procedures of “framing” and pragmatic evaluation.

CONCERNING THIS TRANSLATION Text Chosen for an English Critical Edition 1. Choice of original text. It was time for a fresh translation of Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith. The admirable and portable one-volume translation (1928) edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart had shown scholars the value of Schleiermacher’s detailed arguments, and their translation quickly superseded the translated excerpts published by George Cross in 1911. But the years have also made visible several significant shortcomings that the volume in your hands seeks to remedy. 2. Major reasons for the choice and implications. This translation is a first English critical edition. The editors have chosen to translate the originally published text of 1830– 1831. It was overseen, with his typically rigorous care, by Schleiermacher and possibly by staff of his friend Georg Reimer, the Berlin publisher. We have examined subsequent critical German editions and have found ourselves accepting fewer than ten of the many hundreds of conjectural decisions about words and punctuation appearing in them. Each of these has been discussed in the editorial notes as it appears in the main text. Thus, we have found the original 1830–1831 publication of this second edition of Christian Faith to be a primary source sufficient to provide a carefully annotated critical translation into English. The need for a critical English edition is most evident in three areas. First, the 1928 translation team of eight scholars did not come to agreement about how to consistently translate terms that Schleiermacher himself used with careful consistency. Hence, some of the interconnected thinking providing the backbone of the entire work was obscured. This result was exacerbated by a necessarily incomplete editing of the entire translation before its release in 1928. Some significant errors crept in along with a number of misunderstandings of the text. The present translation has been scrupulous about consistency in translation of such terms and has made visible many of those choices in the footnotes, so that scholars who read German can recognize the range of meanings in Schleiermacher’s own word choices at key points. All three translators have worked in succession with every proposition, challenging and clarifying choices and instilling consistency across the whole. Second, Christian Faith is written in conversation with the New Testament, thirty-two confessional documents, fourteen Greek Fathers, ten Latin Fathers, and at least fifteen theologians of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. Schleiermacher quoted most of them in their original languages of publication, usually Latin or Greek. The 1928 translation left these quotations in those languages, obscuring the ways in which the main text is a direct response to particular formulations proposed in those texts. The two latest, seventh and eighth critical German editions by Redeker and Schäfer (1960 and 2003), have left the original languages too. This present translation has located English translations for every quotation, providing the reader with references to both the translation and an original language source, using widely available sources when possible. The fewer than 120 quotations for which translation was not already available we had translated by Latinists

Beverly Mayne Kienzle and Kathleen Kienzle. These are also specified in the footnotes. The conversation which Schleiermacher created with these texts is now fully visible in English. Third, Schleiermacher himself included footnotes that referred the reader to other propositions within Christian Faith and to several of his other works. His most frequent references are to Brief Outline, which he had recently revised, then reissued earlier in 1830, and to the third, much-revised edition of On Religion (1821), which he also reissued in 1831. This translation has expanded his practice and provided further references to both of those works as well as to his sermons based on New Testament texts that are named in Christian Faith. With these footnotes, several of his technical terms gain clarity, since some of them were developed in other works. Schleiermacher’s Plan and Ours 3. Schleiermacher’s plan for reorganizing. In 1829, as Schleiermacher was about to begin revising the 1821–1822 edition of Christian Faith, he published two open letters to his friend Friedrich Lücke largely containing replies to its critics but also some plans for revising it. The wise, plenteously annotated English translation of these open letters by James O. Duke and Francis Fiorenza (1981) is an indispensable resource for serving both interests. Therein he expresses puzzlement over the flood of misreadings he had faced and is resolved further to refine the passages on which they had focused, but he also doubts that he can succeed in dissuading many of his critics, presumably because of well-ingrained habits and profound differences (our conjecture). He would “like to condense the book,” already shorn of the long altercations with other contemporary scholars which fill other such textbooks, but with certain restraints placed upon him: (1) he has already been so near to aphoristic conciseness in the propositions themselves that he dare not much reduce the explanatory subsections, and (2) although for him, understanding an author’s writings “as a whole” is a strongly held matter of principle, he also believes that this particular work must be “understandable” in and of itself, not “swollen” with references to his other works (OG 73f.). (Believing that this quandary must be resolved, we have chosen to make some of this large body available at least by reference and to supply a great many more cross-references within the work as well.) For educational reasons given, he would also exclude the customary bibliographical material and references to passages (OG 74f.), which have now been supplied in KGA I/7.3 (1984) to a considerable extent. Despite the large number of patristic texts in the present bibliography, he would also restrict them, if possible, to the oldest and most influential (OG 76). Now, Schleiermacher did keep to his promises in these two letters, written as he was also about to enter his fiftieth semester as a university professor (OG 87), including clarifications of doctrinal matters. At the same time, however, he promised not to “simplify,” not to let substantive “philosophical” content creep into dogmatics, and not to resort to “ordinary” language. He also held that the main issues dividing those of rationalist and supernaturalist persuasions were themselves based on “misconceptions,” a claim he did try to substantiate in the new edition. One large quandary that he found no clear resolution for, however, was whether he should try largely to reverse the order of the book itself. This would chiefly

require that he start with Scripture and the core doctrines regarding Christ and the church, then move to using the Part 1 propositions, and somewhere work in the introductory matter. Adopting this arrangement, however, would lead to confusions of its own making and would not obviate difficulties inherent in the matter to be considered. So, he gave up the whole idea (OG 55–60). That leaves us to make only one recommendation to readers, one definitely not for beginners, however. Be sure to identify where the core of doctrine lies (not a set of detailed bits and pieces), then perhaps you really would like to try to read what he gave us, section by section, backward! 4. Our corresponding plan for translating. First, then, as partly indicated in the guide for readers, all three of the translators entered into this project as extensive, long-term scholars of Schleiermacher’s works, including a goodly number already translated by Tice and Lawler. However, we have put into this translation new learnings gathered in the process. We did a four-plus-stage process to assure precision and quality control. Thereby we constantly checked for overall accuracy, sweep, ease of understanding, and supportive details. Much effort was required by the conciseness of the German text itself. Among all his works, Schleiermacher especially strove for strictness of argument and conciseness of statements in this one. This is very much a joint work. First and later drafts were done by Tice, as were all but a few of the notes. Each draft was commented on in countless interchanges among the three of us. Germanist Lawler made proposals for revision on nearly every page. Kelsey suggested revisions, also on nearly every page, to smooth the flow of the English and to clarify theological meanings, based also on her close reading of the German text. Final revisions were then determined by agreement between the two editors. Editorial management of the text through these steps to the final text was handled by Kelsey. Treatments of the Main Text 5. Following Schleiermacher’s rules for translation. We have followed Schleiermacher’s own recommended procedures for producing a genuine, precise translation. His procedures, in our view, offer the best general theory available for rendering a translation and thus interpreting an author’s text. In doing so, we have followed his rules for hermeneutical and critical interpretation as well. Schleiermacher was himself a skilled translator. He translated sermons from English into German (1790–1802), then Plato’s dialogues from Greek into German (mostly in 1804– 1809). The multiple volumes of sermons were by the eminent London pulpit orator Joseph Fawcett and the masterful Edinburgh preacher and teacher of rhetoric Hugh Blair. They surely gave him fine models of English discourse to reflect on. Plato’s dialogues added further to his ability to provide communication using exact presentation and argument. His now highly influential views on hermeneutics and criticism were significantly informed by his experience as a translator. As translators, we are also quite familiar with his writings concerning translation and have sought to follow his principles in our work. Thus, we have paid close attention to grammatical and stylistic details in his writing. We have taken special

notice of his rigorous grammatical and author-related rules, in some respects an effort made easier to fulfill by his example and by his scrupulous, at times almost mathematical style in Christian Faith. 6. The title and German gendered nouns. We have appreciated Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s fine analysis in “On Mistranslated Book Titles” (Religious Studies 20, no. 1 [March 1984]: 27–42), which specifically counseled dropping “The” before Schleiermacher’s title. We have done this in our writings for many years. We have also carefully considered when the English “the” is or is not consistent with Schleiermacher’s meaning. German requires the definite article in situations where English does not. As a result, this work, being one account of faith shared by Christians among many possible accounts in Schleiermacher’s view, translates Der christliche Glaube without the definite article “the” in the title, thus Christian Faith. On the other hand, der heiligen Geist, which refers to one specific place and functioning of one Spirit, is rendered “the Holy Spirit.” 7. Translation of Mensch. In accordance with Schleiermacher’s own views regarding the conventional term Mensch, we translate it as gender-inclusive. Thus we use “humans,” “human beings,” or in a few instances where the word refers to the entire species “humanity.” In rare instances in the singular it specifies “male.” 8. Concise expression in style. We had first to grasp what Schleiermacher had done to shorten Christian Faith as much as he could and still be crystal clear, largely a matter of tracking grammar. We took seriously his shift from carefully measured rhetorical style in sermons and some other works to a scientifically rendered didactic-dialectical style here. As the index will help show, we kept terms of key importance the same in English throughout. The index also shows that, in effect, concepts often take many words to represent, and not only nouns. 9. Shorter sentences and more little words. We broke down his typically long sentences, fortunately guided in his use of “little words” like these: and, but, so, thus, hence, therefore, nevertheless, also, even, though, for, because, since, on account of, for the sake of, in order to. We have always translated doch (nevertheless, nonetheless, etc.) because in Schleiermacher’s usage in this work it is always a logical operator. In short, we used pointers like these, and many others, to identify where and how we could make shorter sentences without diverging from what Schleiermacher’s typically long sentences were conveying. Often we also filled in references proceeding from ever-gendered German nouns that had been replaced by pronouns in the text—sie (she), er (he), and es (it) and counterpart indicators such as diese (this), jene (that). Thereby we have also tried to be sure that the English is as precise as the German. Occasionally Schleiermacher employed kinds of usage requiring such language as “would,” “could,” and “were.” In his German grammar, present tense is often used where writers of English would use past tense, or past perfect—though these are both available for use in German. On rare occasions, Schleiermacher’s discourse might require a future perfect where he is considering an imagined future event within which he is moving backward in time within or before that event but would only specify that turn with some qualifying term

(“before which,” “earlier,” “referring back to,” etc.). We could easily make the past reference clearer to English readers than would be possible using an “is” or “was,” and we regularly did so. Sometimes he can and does use the conditional sense of “would,” and the like, to refer to a condition that specifies an identifying or qualifying meaning, one that might otherwise be missed. He is uneven in this practice, whereas in some cases we could not afford to be so if we were to convey his clear meaning, one already given in context. The subjunctive was not then much in use for specifying various options considered on the way to or from stating one’s own position. Thus, typically he does not employ it, again because he has other ways of separating such views from his own, whereas such stratagems could not be copied or would sound unnecessarily awkward in English. To avoid confusion, we have often needed to resort to subjunctive substitutes for “is,” “was,” “can,” and the like in his explanatory accounts. Through such choices we have sought to achieve in English academic prose the clarity and precision of Schleiermacher’s German. Supplemental Aids to Understanding 10. Editorial footnotes. In the process of identifying translations for Schleiermacher’s quotations in the footnotes, we have handled the original text of almost everything referred to in his notes and have corrected identifying details provided in the 1830–1831 and, on occasion, later editions. The few exceptions were a small number of obscure seventeenthand eighteenth-century Latin texts. These were quoted at length in the third accompanying volume to Hermann Peiter’s provision of the KGA’s first edition (1821–1822), KGA I/7.3 (1984), to a few of which we alert the reader. Throughout the notes we have updated the nineteenth-century spellings when we have quoted the German in order to facilitate the curious reader’s being able to find words in a contemporary dictionary. Not surprisingly, providing the 3,148 footnotes to this translation has engaged about half of the total effort of the project. 11. Schleiermacher’s notes. We have made clear which notes are from Schleiermacher himself, in every case further identified and translated, by explicitly beginning every editor’s note with “Ed. note:”. Where his handwritten marginal notes, added to his copy of the 1821– 1822 edition, were particularly informative, not simply titles to remind him where he was when lecturing, we translated these. Thönes (1873) provided these texts. Almost all of this apparatus was cooperatively contributed by Tice and Kelsey. This huge effort might seem counter to Schleiermacher’s intention to shave down the text. However, it is very much a part of the interpretive-translative task required for this same work now. This is so, because (a) it has been greatly misunderstood in the past, and (b) it is now even more likely not to be grasped accurately, in an atmosphere of many contending interpretations, old and new. We have tried to include only such commentary as would be useful for understanding what Schleiermacher said, though, despite this principle, admittedly not entirely forsaking our own informed slant. 12. Schleiermacher’s sermons. During the period in which this translation was being completed, the Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGA) Abteilung III, to appear in more than

thirteen sizeable volumes containing Schleiermacher’s sermons, was also being published. We regret not being able to identify all of the sermons that we have cited in their KGA edition as well. However, knowing the date on which a sermon was preached will enable a reader easily to locate the KGA volume containing the desired sermon text. Since the KGA includes some sermon transcripts and sermon outlines never before published, there may be a few sermons on New Testament texts referred to in the notes here that we have not been able to cite. This KGA Abteilung is a wonderful resource, one that significantly enlarges areas for scholarly investigation for readers of German. 13. Grasping the arguments. Always we have asked whether we have understood the argument being made in the German and then asked how to render it in English clearly and in Schleiermacher’s own meaning and linguistic intent. To accomplish this second level of translation, we have viewed the work as an interconnected whole, as he both counseled and facilitated. Moreover, we have seen Schleiermacher’s corpus to be internally consistent to a remarkable degree, particularly in his use of terminology throughout his mature work and his frequent cues in this one. We have rendered his terminology in light of his own usage, itself often defined differently and independently of his predecessors and colleagues. To accomplish this goal, we have paid close attention to definitions of terms found within Christian Faith and to definitions in his other works, particularly Brief Outline. We have also used the notes to refer readers to word usage from one portion to another within Christian Faith. We have taken pains to be consistent in translation of all these terms. One of our goals has been to continue conversation about the shared faith of Christians. If this translation initiates further conversations, it will have met that key goal.

ABBREVIATIONS The bibliography contains a complete citation for all works indicated below. §1.1 §97n4 Bek. Luth.

BO, Brief Outline

CF

CG1

chap. Clemen

Cochrane

CR Creeds

DeVries

Proposition 1, subsection 1 Proposition 97, footnote 4 Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelischlutherischen Kirche (1963) Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study (1811 and 1830). Edited by Terrence N. Tice, 2011 Christian Faith (1830–1831). Refers to the 2nd ed. translated here. Der christliche Glaube. 1st ed., 1821–1822; Refers specifically to the first German edition, usually in comparison with the 2nd ed. translated here. chapter Clemen, Carl. Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre. 1905 Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century. Edited by Arthur Cochrane, 1972 Corpus reformatorum The Creeds of Christendom, 6th ed. (1919). Edited by Philip Schaff Schleiermacher, Servant of the

Word. Translated by Dawn DeVries ed. editor, edited by, edition ET English translation KGA Kritische Gesamtausgabe Schleiermachers. Three Abteilungen (series of volumes, some volumes in two bound parts) are referred to in notes in this translation: I: Schriften und Entwürfe; II: Vorlesungen; III: Predigten. Format is Abteilung/volume (e.g., I/1) Kurze Kurze Darstellung Darstellung des theologischen Studiums (1811, 1830). Translated as Brief Outline Luthers Martin Luther. Werke Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 58 Bde. Weimar: 1883– Migne Gr. Migne, JacquesPaul, ed. Patrologia Cursus Completus: Series Graeca Migne Lat. Migne, JacquesPaul, ed. Patrologia Cursus Completus: Series Latina Müller Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche. Edited by E. F. Karl Müller, 1903, 1926 Nicol Schleiermacher, (1997) Reformed but Ever Reforming. Translated by Iain G. Nicol.

Nicol (2004)

Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions, and Church Union. Translated by Iain G. Nicol.

Niemeyer

Collectio confessionum in ecclesiis reformatis publicatarum. Edited by Hermann Niemeyer, 1840 On the “Glaubenslehre.” Translated by James O. Duke and Francis Fiorenza, 1981 On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics (1799, 1806, 1821). Translated by Terrence N. Tice, 1969. Roman numerals are the discourse numbers. Der christliche Glaube 1821–1822 (1st ed.). Vols. 1 and 2 edited by Hermann Peiter, 1980. Vol. 3 edited by Ulrich Barth, 1984. Postscript (Zusatz). These are attached to the end of some propositions. Der christliche Glaube (1830– 1831), 7th ed. Edited by Martin Redeker, 1960 Der christliche Glaube (1830– 1831). Edited by Rolf Schäfer, 2003. KGA 1/13.1–2 Sämmtliche Werke, Schleiermacher.

OG

OR, On Religion

Peiter

P.S.

Redeker

Schäfer

SW

Three Abteilungen (series of volumes) are referred to in notes in this translation: I: Theologie; II: Predigten; III: Philosophie. Format is Abteilung.volume (e.g., I.1) Symbole

Thönes

trans.

Walch

Wilson

Die drey ökumenischen Symbole. Edited by August Twesten, 1816. Schleiermachers … Anmerkungen (notes on the margins of Schleiermacher’s copy of the 1821– 1822 edition of Der christliche Glaube). Edited by Carl Thönes, 1873. Translated by, translation, translator Historische und Theologische Einleitung, Martin Luther. 5 vols. Edited by Johann Walch, 1733–1739. Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher. Translated by Mary Wilson, 1890.

*Christian Faith: Interconnectedly Presented in Accordance with Principles of the Evangelical Church **For English translations see the epigrams on page v.

PREFACE (1830) Today I am looking at the preface with which I accompanied this work at its first appearance,1 nearly nine years ago now. Precisely because I have no desire to reissue it, I much prefer to dwell on the wish with which I closed it, which was that the book might contribute to an ever clearer shared understanding as concerns the content of our Evangelical faith—where possible in and of itself, where not in and of itself then by means of disagreement that its imperfections would stimulate. This wish, thank God, has not stayed unfulfilled, except that I am unable to distinguish how much of the stir it has engendered in the theological public and of the disagreement it has suffered is to be reckoned to the truth it contains and how much of that stir is to be reckoned to its imperfections. The subject matter itself will show this distinction as the controversy that is strongly aroused by it proceeds now. May this controversy continue only upon a path fitting to that subject matter, and may no one suppose that acts of brute force, even if perpetrated within the church itself, would be the fire in which it would be most surely proven who will have built with straw and who with choice stones.2 That is to say, never does the outcome of such extraneous battles yield warranty for the quality of the subject-matter itself. Elsewhere3 I have already essentially explained how I am proceeding in this new edition. Even so, even beyond the Introduction many readers will perhaps find the difference between the two editions more significant than they had expected. Yet, however great that difference might be, no major proposition has been abandoned or altered in its actual content. No matter how hard I tried, on the whole I have not succeeded in expressing myself more briefly. It was also scarcely possible to do this, since experience has shown that explanations themselves still required much more explanation. Yet I have done my utmost in this revision, in the hope that although the results are not briefer, much will have been brought to greater clarity and misunderstandings will have been remedied or obviated. For the most part, this effort has thus bolstered my confidence that the time may not be very far off when it will no longer be necessary to write at length on much that will have become antiquated by then, likewise on much that is still misconstrued. When that time comes, a later theologian who proceeds from the same point of view will also be able to write a far shorter dogmatics. I have no doubt whatsoever that such a dogmatics will exist one day, though I must most definitely protest against the honor some have afforded me here and there in recent years by putting me at the head of a new theological school. I protest against this honor, because I lack both of the characteristics requisite for it. That is, by my recollection I have not devised anything new except in the way I have organized the material and occasionally described things. Just as little, moreover, have I ever intended anything with my thoughts than to communicate them in a way that would stimulate each reader to use them after one’s own fashion. Only in this sense, furthermore, am I publishing this book this second, and certainly last, time, not as a storehouse of formulations in which members of a school could recognize one another by

repeating them. It is indeed the last time, for if more time should be allowed to me, I would rather communicate at least brief outlines concerning other theological disciplines. Now, if in the first edition I presumed too much in declaring my book to be the first faithdoctrine4 composed with a view to union of our two Evangelical communities of the church,5 joyfully I extend this wreath of honor to my dear friend, G. K. R. Schwarz in Heidelberg.6 I would simply note that it is to be viewed as a basic condition for the church union that has been accomplished thus far in these territories that it requires no dogmatic adjustment between the two parties, much less any new confessional symbol. Thus it was quite properly incumbent on me not only to proceed based on this presupposition but also to realize it as an established principle to the best of my powers, through a free and conciliatory treatment of writings that are in dispute. In conclusion, I would only add this note: that since the two volumes of the first edition turned out to be of very unequal length, I have placed a portion of the former second volume into the first volume of the present edition. This external switch, however, bears no effect on the internal organization of the whole. As I wish and hope, within a short while the second volume is to follow this first one. Berlin, on the Thursday after Quasimodogeniti 1830 [April 22, 1830].7 Dr. Friedrich Schleiermacher

1. Ed. note: The 1821 Preface to which he refers is provided in the Appendix. 2. Ed. note: Compare the admonishment and promise in 1 Cor. 3:12–15. 3. Ed. note: In his 1829 essay On the “Glaubenslehre”: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke, ed. and trans. by Duke and Fiorenza (1981). See bibliography as well as references to this essay (OG) in editorial footnotes. 4. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: Literally, this term means a work of faith-doctrine (doctrina fidei), and it was the shorthand expression for a work in dogmatics. 5. Ed. note: By custom, the two communities called “Evangelical” at that time were Lutheran and Reformed, though other churches were also surely entitled to that description. On Palm Sunday, March 31, 1822, Schleiermacher’s own congregation was the first to celebrate achieving such a union in Prussia or elsewhere in the German territories. 6. Ed. note: The person was Friedrich Heinrich Christoph Schwarz (1766–1837), thus the initials given are mistaken. He was indeed a friend and correspondent, and the review of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre in which Schwarz’s remark about precedents appeared was his third review of a work by Schleiermacher since 1812, all in the same periodical. The review was in Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur, Bd. 15 (1822) and Bd. 16 (1823). The reference here is from the very beginning of this lengthy review: “Indeed, the reviewer could count his own name and that of others with that of the author when he declares himself (Preface, viii) to be the first to set forth a Glaubenslehre in accordance with the principles of the Evangelical church, as if his were the only one, and thus declares that for him no dogmatic dividing wall would appear to exist between the two churches. Actually, not only the reviewer’s Grundriß der kirchlich-protestantischen Dogmatik (Heidelberg, 1816) but also other books on doctrine have done this, before and since.” In this context, however, Schwarz proceeds to distinguish Schleiermacher’s work from loosely organized collections and from the works of mostly rationalists and traditional absolute supernaturalists. Whether or not Schwarz’s own 1816 work would qualify as genuinely looking forward to celebrating a united church, Schleiermacher would be generous enough to acknowledge value in any generally Evangelical and not party-driven dogmatics, as he does at this point. 7. Ed. note: In its original 1821–22 printing, volume 1 was 350 pages and included only the introduction and part 1 (§§1–76). Volume 2, containing the entire part 2 and conclusion (§§77–190), was 780 pages. In contrast, the second edition (1830–1831) closed the first volume with the end of the first aspect of part 2, on sin (§§1–85, 522 pp.), and the main text of volume 2 covered the second aspect of part 2, on grace, running through the conclusion (§§86–172, 594 pp.).

INTRODUCTION [Explanation] §1. The sole purpose of this Introduction is twofold: in part, to set forth the definition of dogmatics that underlies the work itself and, in part, to give preliminary notice of the method and arrangement followed within it. 1. To begin the treatment of a discipline1 with a definition of it can be superfluous only if complete agreement on that definition is already reliably presupposed. Such an agreement, in turn, obtains only when no controversy has ever arisen as to how the discipline is to be put to use or when it belongs to a larger scientific whole that is delimited and subdivided in the same fashion throughout.2 Now, as concerns the first of these two conditions, we surely can proceed from the fact that in most Christian ecclesial communities use has been made of dogmatics3 in what they pass on internally and in their external dealings with other such communities. Only with difficulty, however, might people gain agreement on what then actually makes statements that have Christian religious content into dogmatic propositions. As pertains to the second condition, dogmatics might well be placed within the domain generally designated by the term “theological sciences.” Yet, one need compare only the most highly respected among the encyclopedic overviews of this field, the theological sciences, to see how variously it is subdivided and how differently authors conceive, interrelate, and assess the individual disciplines—and this is true of dogmatics to a preeminent degree. It would indeed be natural to use the definition of dogmatics that appears in my own overview4 as the basis of that to be offered here; however, that work is too brief and aphoristic not to necessitate supplementing what is stated there with some further elucidations. The very title of the present work, wherein the name “dogmatics” has been avoided, contains features that serve toward a definition, but, in part, they lack in completeness and, in part, the particular components given there are not beyond all need of clarification. Hence, this first part of the Introduction will take its own independent course, and only as its explication advances, step by step, will the reader be referred to pertinent passages in Brief Outline. After all, since what precedes a science5 by way of defining it cannot belong to the science itself, it self-evidently follows that none of the propositions that will appear here can themselves also be dogmatic propositions. 2. To be sure, the method of a work and its arrangement are best justified by their outcome—that is, to the extent that the nature of the subject matter permits of variations in method and arrangement. To a high degree, moreover, this is the case in dogmatics, as the very matter it addresses shows. Yet, the most favorable outcome can be reached only if readers are acquainted with both the method and the arrangement of a work in advance. This is so, for by this means readers are enabled to command a view of each proposition directly

and in its manifold relations. Further, under this condition it can also be instructive to compare particular sections of a work with sections that have the same content in works that are similar but are differently organized, a process that would simply have to be confusing otherwise. The greatest variations in arrangement and method would indeed be those that interconnect with a distinct way of grasping the concept “dogmatics,” such that they could no longer find room within a dogmatics that has a different way of grasping that concept. In addition, however, lesser variations also exist that one can choose among even if one is proceeding from the same definition.

1. Disciplin. Ed. note: Schleiermacher uses this term for the subdivisions of a field of study, in this case theology. In 1829, OG 56, Schleiermacher described this Introduction as only “preliminary”; cf. §15. It refers to dogmatic contents but contains none, unlike most traditional introductions. 2. Ed. note: In typical German usage, theology is such a whole, as are the academic fields of psychology, economics, education, and law. Schleiermacher had developed a systematic account of “science” (Wissenschaft) that explains what the sciences have in common and in what respects they may be divided into two parts: physical and ethical sciences. His meaning is much tighter than “field of scholarship,” which is often used as a synonym. His usage, however, includes the humanities and “positive” professional fields (theology, medicine, and law, in his time) as well as the natural and social sciences. See §§17 and 9. 3. Dogmatik. Ed. note: As will be seen, this discipline is itself divided into two theoretically inseparable parts: faithdoctrine (Glaubenslehre) and ethics (Sittenlehre). 4. Brief Outline (1811), §3. Ed. note: See Brief Outline (2011), under §195 (1830), at note 145, for the 1811 definition: “§3. That theological discipline which is known under the name of thetic or dogmatic theology has to do with the systematic presentation of the whole body of doctrine that now has currency in the church.” In §195 (1830) the corresponding phrase reads: “Here we have to do with dogmatic theology (see §§94–97), as the knowledge of doctrine that now has currency in the Evangelical church, and with church statistics, as information regarding the existing social condition in all the different parts of the Christian church.” See also Brief Outline, introduction, §§1–31. The lectures on “Church Geography and Statistics” are in KGA II/16 (2005). 5. Ed. note: Here “science” chiefly refers to the presentation of known content. This usage lies in contrast to its general designation as a science of a particular kind that uses method, in part, general to science and, in part, both delimited and ordered in accordance with its subject matter.

Chapter One

Toward a Definition of Dogmatics Introduction to Chapter One

§2. Since dogmatics is a theological discipline and its reference is thus solely to the Christian church, one can also define what it is only if one has come to a clear understanding of the concept “Christian church.”1 Cf. Brief Outline (1811), Intro. §§1, 2, 5, 22–23; Part I, Intro. §§1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and Section I, §§1 and 3. See also Karl Heinrich Sack (1789–1875), Christliche

Apologetik (1829), Intro. §§1–5.2 1. Here the expression “theological discipline” is taken in the sense explicated in the first passage cited.3 It already follows from that account that this presentation of faith-doctrine wholly dissociates itself from the task of setting forth a doctrine of God4—or even an anthropology and an eschatology—that is based on general principles from which use is to be made in the Christian church, despite their not having distinctively arisen within it,5 or in which propositions regarding Christian faith are to be demonstrated by means of reason.6 That is to say, what can be stated on these subjects by reason, viewed in and of itself, can stand in no closer relation to the Christian church than it does to any other community of faith or life. 2. Thus, here we have to start off with a concept of the Christian church suitable for defining, in accord with that concept, what dogmatics is to be and to accomplish within it. Consequently, the concept itself will be attained correctly only by means of a general concept of “church” that is applicable anywhere, and this is conjoined with a proper conception of what makes the Christian church distinctive.7 Now, if there is really to be a general concept of “church,” it must be drawn from ethics above all, since in any case a church is a community that arises only through free human actions and that can continue only by means of such actions. What is distinctive about the Christian church cannot be grasped or deduced in a purely scientific manner, nor can it be conceived in a merely empirical manner.8 This is so, for no science can reach or produce what is of an individual nature by means of pure thought; rather, science must always stop at reaching or producing something general. Just as all so-called a priori constructions in the historical domain have proved unavailing in the effort to show that what is somehow deduced from a higher standpoint would then really appear as the same thing as what is given historically, the same is undeniably the case in this context too. A strictly empirical apprehension, on the other hand, has no criterion nor any formulation for distinguishing what is essential, and in itself it remains ever the same from what is changeable and contingent. Now, let us suppose, however, that ethics is going to set forth the concept of “church.” Then, to be sure, it would also have the capability of separating what is everywhere the same in the basis for these communities called “church” from whatever is related to each one as a changeable quantity. By producing a classification of the entire domain in this way, it would be possible to determine on what spots the particular formations of church could be placed as soon as they are located historically. Further, in this manner it would be possible to present the totality of all ecclesial communities that are separated from each other by the distinctive difference in their bases as one self-contained whole that exhausts the concept, communities classified according to their affinities and levels of development. This would be the occupation of a particular branch of scientific research providing historical information, which should be designated exclusively by the name “philosophy of religion.” Likewise, the name “philosophy of law”9 would perhaps best be reserved for an analogous critical

discipline that, with respect to the general concept of “state” explicated in ethics, would have to accomplish the same thing regarding the various particular formations of civil unions. To be sure, quite varied efforts have been made to fulfill the special task of philosophy of religion, but these have not tended to rest on a generally valid scientific procedure, nor on one balanced in its speculative and historical work, such that we could appeal to these efforts in our theological disciplines as something recognized to be sufficient. Most directly, apologetics would have to incorporate these results from philosophy of religion as bases for serving its purpose of describing the distinctive nature of Christianity and its relationship to other churches. Now, if in fact apologetics were to be properly recognized as a theological discipline, one that is to be reshaped for our own time, it would not be advisable to suspend its appearance until a satisfactory development of philosophy of religion had occurred. Rather, in the meantime, it would have to strike an abridged procedural pathway for itself. It would then have the same point of departure as philosophy of religion does and would also strike the same path, but it would lay aside, untended, everything that does not directly contribute to sorting out what constitutes Christianity.10 However, since this discipline is only just now beginning to be revived, the explication that follows will have to perform this service itself. 3. Thus, this first part of our Introduction has simply to compile and utilize only lemmas11—that is, borrowed propositions that belong to other scientific disciplines, and indeed they are propositions from ethics, philosophy of religion and apologetics, respectively.12 Naturally, the outcome of an investigation pieced together from such components also cannot lay claim to any general acknowledgment, except in instances where the formation of ethics and of philosophy of religion that underlies those investigations would also bear recognition of this sort. This situation makes it clear how already here, at the very beginnings of our exposition, there are plenty of occasions for quite diverse definitions and conceptions of dogmatics to appear. Each of these can be viewed simply as preparatory work for some future dogmatics, at such time as the scientific disciplines to which reference must be made are more firmly established, even though Christianity will meanwhile have remained wholly the same. Postscript 1. In no way, however, is it to be claimed thereby that these propositions would have to take the same shape in some independent treatment of the sciences to which they belong as that in which they are set forth here. Rather, their having the same shape would be unlikely, since in this place everything is missing that would have preceded their formation there. Postscript 2. Here “ethics” is taken to mean the speculative presentation of reason over the entire compass of its efficacious action, parallel to that of natural science. “Philosophy of religion” is taken to mean a critical presentation of the various given forms of religious13 communities to the extent that in their totality they comprise the complete appearance of piety in human nature. The term “apologetics” is defined in Brief Outline (1811) Part I, §14.14

1. Ed. note: On separations in the church, see §152. On the nature and origin of sects, see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 3. The only direct reference to sects or sectarians is at one point in the first edition of CG1 (1821), §5.1 there. Cf. his relevant conceptual language in BO, §§57–62, 251–56. Such passages contain preference for directing processes, hence, “separation” versus actual “schism” in polity and “heterodoxy” vs. “heresy” in doctrine. In his usage, sects are smaller Protestant communities most of which derive their ecclesial existence from separation. Schleiermacher recognizes a place for some aspects of speculation in religious studies and in theology, as he does for largely empirical work. See OR (1821) I, supplemental note 1, and BO §§5n, 32, 55, 180, 209n, 226, and 255–56. In the CG Introduction see also §9.5. 2. Ed. note: ET of these 1811 Kurze Darstellung propositions are placed in footnotes in Brief Outline (2011) under §§1– 2 and 21–22, 32 and 35, and 43 and 48, respectively (all from the 1830 edition). The ideas are more fully stated in the 1830 propositions, which were published just before the first volume of the second edition of Christian Faith was that year. Further explanations were also attached to the 1830 propositions. These 1811 propositions read as follows: §1. Theology is a positive science, the parts of which join into a cohesive whole only through their common relation to a distinct mode of faith, that is, a distinct formation of God-consciousness. Thus the various parts of Christian theology belong together only by virtue of their relation to Christianity. This is the sense in which the word “theology” will always be used here. [The explanatory paragraph also contrasts this definition with that of “rational” (speculative, natural) theology; see also CF §§3.4 and 10.P.S., and compare Brief Outline §226.] §2. Whether any distinct mode of faith will give shape to a definite theology depends on the degree to which it is communicated by means of ideas rather than symbolic actions, and at the same time on the degree to which it attains historical importance and autonomy. Theologies, moreover, may differ for every mode of faith, in that they correspond to the distinctiveness of each both in content and in form. [See also On Religion IV, note 14.] … §21. If one tries to make do with a merely empirical apprehension of Christianity, one cannot really know it. Instead, one’s task is to endeavor both to understand the nature of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other modes of faith and to understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in relation to all the other activities of the human spirit. [Wesen is a necessarily ambiguous term in that one seeks out the essence of something in order to determine what its overall nature is; thus, all five discourses in On Religion are about the Wesen of religion, not only the second discourse.] §22. Unless religious communities are to be regarded as mere aberrations, it must be possible to show that the existence of such associations is a necessary element for the development of the human spirit. [In CF §§2–6, ethics retains this role, as in Brief Outline §§23–24, 29, and 35. In large part, On Religion, though written in popular style, represents an application of “ethics” (as the human sciences) to the concerns of religion and theology (cf. Brief Outline §169n). In the sense defined in Brief Outline §23, “philosophy of religion” could be strictly applied only to the fifth discourse of OR on religion in the religions.] … §32. The distinctive nature [eigenthümliche Wesen] of Christianity no more allows of its being construed purely scientifically than of its being apprehended in a strictly empirical fashion. Thus, it admits only of being defined critically (compare BO §23), by comparing what is historically given in Christianity with those contrasts by virtue of which various kinds of religious communities can be different from each other. [On “criticism” in this sense, see also Brief Outline §§35– 37, 59, and 255–56. In Brief Outline §23 the latter task is said to be pursued in philosophy of religion. CF §§7–9 “borrow” findings from that discipline.] … §35. It should be made clear that ethics, as the science of the principles of history, can also present the manner in which a historical whole has come into existence only in a general way. Likewise, it is only critically, by comparing the general differences exposed in ethics with what is historically given, that it is possible to discover what within the development of Christianity is a pure expression of its idea and what, on the contrary, must be regarded as a deviation from it, consequently as a diseased condition. … §43. The concept of religious communities, or of church, is realized solely in a body of historical phenomena existing side by side and before and after each other, which phenomena possess some unity in that concept but display differences among themselves. Thus, it must also be demonstrated, by setting forth both that unity and those differences, that Christianity belongs within this compass. This is accomplished by advancing and employing the correlative concepts of “natural” and “positive.” … §48. The concept “church” is admitted into a scientific context only in connection with the common life of all other organizations developing out of the concept “humanity” (compare §22). Thus, it must be demonstrated that, in accordance with its distinctive nature, the Christian church is able to exist along with all these other organizations; and this must result from a correct exposition of the concepts “hierarchy” and “church authority.” [Sack’s somewhat different statements in the Introduction to his 1829 work, §§1–5, are quoted both by Redeker (1960) and by Schäfer in KGA I/13.1 (2003), 14n.] 3. Ed. note: That is, Brief Outline §1. 4. Gotteslehre.

5. Ed. note: Cf. Brief Outline §2, quoted in §2n2 here. 6. Ed. note: The term is Vernunftmässig, the process claimed by what was then called a “rational theology,” which is lacking in its not referencing what is contained in the actual experience of faith. 7. Ed. note: For what follows, cf. Brief Outline §§21–22, 32, 35, 43, and 48, quoted in §2n2. 8. Cf. Brief Outline (1811), Intro. §22, and Philos. Theol. §1. Ed. note: ET (1) Intro. §22, see §2n2 above; (2) Philos. Theol. §1 (1811) appears under §32 (1830; ET 2011). It reads: “The distinctive nature of Christianity no more allows of its being derived purely scientifically out of its idea alone than of its being apprehended in a strictly empirical fashion.” The portion italicized here was omitted in 1830; “idea” (Idee) referred to the general nature of concepts, whereas empirical investigation focuses only on what is given by sense perceptions (Wahrnehmungen). 9. Rechtsphilosophie. Ed. note: Recht refers multivocally to “rights,” “justice,” “laws,” and processes of government; in the latter case, it refers to “politics” (i.e., rules for governing a civil society, such as a city [polis] or a state [civitas]). 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher lays down principles regarding several key problems that can arise in relations between church and state in OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 18. He also devoted numerous lectures and essays to such political problems and adverts to them less directly in some sermons. 11. Ed. note: In mathematics, lemmas are preliminary or auxiliary propositions taken to be true and borrowed in the process of demonstrating one or more other propositions. As used by analogy here, lemmas do not themselves bear the truth, meaning, or import of other propositions. Thus, there they do not belong to the substance of dogmatics itself. They simply serve, in a preliminary way, to carve out what the territory of dogmatics is. Among the three disciplines borrowed from, only apologetics is a theological discipline, on a par with biblical exegesis, church statistics, practical theology, and dogmatics, but not a part of dogmatics per se. 12. Ed. note: See also CF §11.5 and OR II, supplementary note 13, regarding the many points of contact between On Religion and main features of philosophy of religion, e.g., the distinction between aesthetic and teleological types of monotheism and aspects of any self-conscious observation. Furthermore, all this, viewed as involving either nature or historical life, might affect “actual disposition of our spirit.” Thus, he indicates that the special focus of Christian Faith does not require the broader treatment of “religious emotions” necessarily offered in On Religion. 13. Ed. note: Here, as elsewhere in this work, fromm is translated “religious.” In his entire critical, comparative analysis of religion in On Religion, as here, Schleiermacher intends to focus on “piety” (Frömmigkeit) over its entire range, extending from its presence in individual experience (perception and feeling, or faith), thence to its development historically and in persons, thence to its expression in thought and action in and through communal life (church), and therefrom out to its varied manifestations among the religions. 14. Ed. note: See under §39 (1830) in Brief Outline. There §14 (1811) reads: “An individual’s being vitally active in church government also consists in the effort to gain external recognition of its internal validity or to defend it.” §39 (1830) itself reads, more fully: “Every person is really a part of the Church community to which one belongs only by virtue of one’s conviction of the truth of the mode of faith propagated there. Thus, that aspect of church leadership by which the vitality of the community is maintained must have as its aim to communicate this conviction so that it can be clearly recognized. The foundation for this task is formed by investigations concerning the distinctive nature of Christianity, and likewise of Protestantism; and these constitute the apologetical side of philosophical theology. The one set of investigations relates to the general Christian philosophical theology, and the other to the special philosophical theology of Protestantism.” A lengthy explanation from Schleiermacher’s 1831/32 lectures is appended in Brief Outline at §39, showing that apologetics has arisen historically not as a defense of religion in general but as self-defense against attacks on Christianity or on particular Christian communities by other religious communities. In this respect, the term apologia has derived from legal praxis, referring to pleading a case in defense. Its purpose “is not to make people into Christians” or even to serve as “an introduction to dogmatics” but “to bring others to the point where they can let Christianity run its course.”

I. Toward the Concept “Church”: Propositions Borrowed from Ethics §3. The piety1 that constitutes the basis of all ecclesial communities, regarded purely in and of itself, is neither a knowing nor a doing but a distinct formation of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness. Cf. On Religion (1821), discourse II.A. Initial Clarifications.2

1. For us Evangelical Christians, it is posited well beyond all doubt that the church is nothing other than a community in relation to piety. This is the case, since we reckon a church to be well-nigh degenerate when it chooses to occupy itself with something else, whether it is then the concerns of science or of external organization. Likewise, we also constantly struggle against actions of leaders in the state or in scientific institutions when, at the same time, they also want to direct the concerns of piety. In contrast, we would not wish to guard against these leaders in science acting from their own standpoint to observe and appraise either piety itself or the community that relates itself to piety and to determine their proper place within the whole arena of human life, inasmuch as both piety and church also present matters for knowing. Rather, in this very place we ourselves are engaging in such activity. Similarly, we also do not guard against leaders in the state who establish certain external circumstances of religious communities according to the principles of civil order, with the proviso that they do not in any way imply that such a community proceeds from the state or is a component of the state. Yet, not only we, but also ecclesial communities that do not so exactly hold to separation of church and state or to ecclesial and scientific community as we do, will still have to assent to our definition. This is so, for they can nonetheless only indirectly assign an influence of the church on either of these other communities, just as they can also regard the essential occupation of the church to be simply that of preserving, ordering, and furthering piety.3 2. If “feeling” and “self-consciousness” are placed side by side in this proposition as equally acceptable, the aim in doing this is not to introduce a language usage in which the two terms are in general absolutely equal one to the other. In the speech of ordinary life the term “feeling” has long been customarily used in our domain. However, for scientific language it requires a more specific determination, and this determination is to be afforded by the other word, “self-consciousness.” So, suppose that someone takes the term “feeling” in such a broad sense that it also includes unconscious states. Then the other term used here will serve as a reminder that unconscious states are to be excluded from this usage. In turn, when the qualifier “immediate”4 is to be attached to the expression “self-consciousness,” no one would think of this as referring to anything but feeling. That is, if one were also to use “self-consciousness” for a consciousness of oneself, this phenomenon would be more like an objective consciousness, and it would be a notion regarding oneself, which, as such, would be mediated by observation of oneself. If such a notion of ourselves as we find ourselves at a particular element—thinking, for example, or choosing—were to come quite close to or even flash through the particular features of a given state, then this self-consciousness would actually appear as something that accompanies the state itself. In contrast, one would not ever consider that other, actually unmediated self-consciousness—which is not a notion but is feeling, in the proper sense—to be a mere accompaniment, in any way. Rather, in this regard a twofold experience is to be expected of each person. In the first place, our experience tells us that there are elements in which all thinking and willing retreat behind a given selfconsciousness, however it may be determined. In the second place, however, our experience

indicates that on occasion the same determination of self-consciousness persists unchanged during a whole series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, consequently not referring to them and thus, in the proper sense, not accompanying them either. Accordingly, joy and sorrow, two important features in the religious domain throughout, are states of feeling, corresponding to the first meaning. On the other hand, self-approval and self-reproach—apart from their passing into joy and sorrow later on—belong, in and of themselves, more to objective consciousness of oneself, in that they are outcomes of some analyzing reflection. These two forms of self-consciousness perhaps never do come closer to each other than in this example; precisely for this reason, however, this juxtaposition of the two puts their difference in the clearest light.5 3. The proposition might appear to presuppose that there would not be any fourth element in addition to knowing, doing and feeling. Still, it lays these three out not with the intention of carrying out an apagogic proof;6 rather, it simply places the first two forms next to the third one, feeling, in order, at the same time, to take up and deal with other explanations that diverge from this one. In consequence, we could entirely set aside the question as to whether such a fourth form would exist in the human psyche were it not necessary, in part, to convince ourselves as to whether yet another location presents itself to which piety could be assigned. In part, we must also set about conceiving with clarity the relationship that obtains between Christian piety, viewed in itself, and both Christian doing and Christian “faith,” to the extent that the latter word can be applied to the form of knowing. Now, if the relationship of those three forms with each other were somewhere exposited in a generally recognized fashion, we would need only to refer to that account. Here, however, we must say only what is necessary for our purpose, and what we say, in turn, is to be viewed only as something borrowed from psychology.7 Moreover, it would be well to notice that the truth of the matter, namely, that piety is8 feeling, remains wholly independent of the accuracy of the discussion to follow. Life is to be conceived as an interchange between a subject’s remaining-within-oneself and stepping-out-of-oneself. Both forms of consciousness we have just mentioned constitute the subject’s remaining-within-oneself, whereas actual doing consists in stepping-out-ofoneself. Thus, to that extent, knowing and feeling stand together over against doing. Yet, although knowing, viewed as being-cognizant-of something, is a remaining-within-oneself of a subject, nevertheless, when it is viewed as a cognizing process it really comes into being through the subject’s stepping-out-of-oneself, and to that extent it is a doing. In contrast, feeling is not only a remaining-within-oneself in its duration as a having-been-stimulated, but also in its being-stimulated it is not effected by the subject but comes to pass only in the subject, and thus, in that it belongs to receptivity in every respect whatsoever, it is also entirely a remaining-within-oneself. Moreover, to that extent it stands alone, over against those other two forms, knowing and doing.9 Now, suppose that the question arises as to whether there is some fourth form in addition to those three—feeling, knowing, and doing—or a third form in addition to remainingwithin-oneself and stepping-out-of-oneself. In neither contrast, however, can anyone pose

such a third or fourth form, respectively, given how the first member or members of the two sets are in themselves. Rather, in each set the stated unity of the first member or members comprises the very nature of the subject itself, which nature announces itself in these very forms that exist over against each other. Thus, if one may say so also in this particular connection, this unity of the subject is the common ground of all these forms. Likewise, on the other hand, every real element of life is, in accordance with its total content, something comprised of those sets of two or three forms, even though the second form or forms in each set will always be present only as a trace or seed. For a third set of forms to exist, however, wherein the one side would be further divided in two, is hardly possible. 4. So, if in positing these three forms—feeling, knowing, and doing—the already oftrepeated claim is once more set forth here that of these three forms feeling belongs to piety, it is also true, as already follows from what was said above, that this claim is not at all meant to exclude piety from all connection with knowing and doing. Suppose instead that, in general, immediate self-consciousness always functions as a mediating factor in the transition between instances wherein knowing is predominant and those in which doing is predominant. For example, consider instances when the very same bit of knowing also engenders a different doing in one person than in another person whenever a different determination of self-consciousness enters in. In such a way, piety too will enter into the picture, arousing knowing and doing as well. Moreover, every instance in which piety stands out preponderantly will include either both or one of the two as a seed or seeds within itself. Precisely herein lies the truth of our proposition, however; it is in no way an objection against it. This is so, for if it were not so, religious elements could not combine with the other elements to form one life; rather, piety would exist as something wholly of itself, lacking all influence on the other functions of mental life. Our proposition, however, enters into this very truth, for by this proposition the distinctive domain of piety is secured for it in connection with all the other functions. In doing this, our proposition is contrary to claims issuing from other places, to the effect that piety is a knowing or a doing or both, or is a state that is some mixture of feeling, knowing, and doing. Having seen this polemical relation, moreover, we are now in a position to consider our proposition more closely. Now, suppose that piety should consist in knowing. Then it would surely have to be precisely that knowing in its entirety or in its essence which would be set forth as the content of faith-doctrine, and so we would be completely mistaken here in our searching out the essence of piety as something separate from knowing for the purpose of forming faithdoctrine. If piety is then comprised of this knowing, then the quantity of this knowing in a human being must also be the criterion for the amount of one’s piety. This would be the case, for whatever in the rising and falling of a given object is the criterion of its degree of reaching toward perfection cannot fail to constitute the very essence of that object; accordingly, given the presupposition posed here, the best master of Christian faith-doctrine would, at the same time, also unexceptionably be the most pious Christian. Moreover, even if we should directly add the premise that this best master would simply be the one who also

holds most to what is essential, not forgetful of this in being occupied with incidental and external matters,10 still, no one would accede to this position. Rather, one would hold that, given the same degree of perfection in that knowing, very different degrees of piety could obtain and that, given the same degree of perfection in piety, very different degrees of knowing could accompany it. Yet, someone could perhaps object that the claim that piety is comprised of knowing actually does not refer to the content of that knowing but to the surety attendant upon the notions themselves, so that the information provided in faith-doctrines would be piety only on account of the surety that accompanies them and thus on account of the strength of one’s conviction. In contrast, mere awareness of such information without conviction would not constitute piety at all. Thus, at that point, strength of conviction would be the criterion of piety, and this is surely what people also especially have in mind who would quite happily substitute “holding firm to one’s convictions” for the word “faith.” In all other more proper areas of knowing, however, conviction itself bears no other criterion than clarity and integrity of thinking itself. Now, suppose that the situation with this particular conviction were the same. Then we would nonetheless revert to the aforementioned claim, that the person who thinks out religious propositions with greatest clarity and integrity, both individually and in their interconnectedness, would have to be the most pious as well. If this claim is then still rejected but the presupposition focusing on conviction is nonetheless to be retained, here “conviction” would have to be something else and would have to have a different criterion. However closely piety may then be interconnected with this state of surety, it cannot on this account cohere with that knowing11 in the same fashion. If the knowing that forms faithdoctrine is still to be related to piety, however, then this knowing can be explicated most naturally in such a way that piety is, to be sure, the object of that knowing, but this knowing can be explicated only insofar as a degree of surety indwells the determinations of selfconsciousness.12 Suppose, on the other hand, that piety should consist in doing. Then it is obvious that the doing constituting it cannot be determined by its content. That is to say, experience teaches that alongside the finest also the most foul, alongside the most abundant and profound also the most inane and meaningless things are done in the name of piety13 and out of piety. Thus, we must resort only to the form or manner in which doing comes about. This form or manner, however, can be grasped only at the two extreme points in the process of doing: at the impetus14 that underlies action, viewed as its starting point, and at the expected outcome of action, viewed as the point that is its goal. No one, however, would then term an action more or less pious on account of the greater or lesser degree of perfection with which its expected outcome is reached. That fact, however, leaves us with no other option than to consider the role of impetus. It is obvious that a determination of self-consciousness underlies every impetus for action, whether it is then pleasure or the lack of pleasure, and that it is on the basis of this determination of self-consciousness that any given single impetus to action is most clearly distinguished from another one. Accordingly, a particular doing will be pious to

the degree that the determination of self-consciousness—namely feeling, which will have become affect15 and will have passed over into being an impetus to action—is a pious one. So, the two supposed positions we have been examining both lead to the same point: that there does exist a knowing and a doing that pertains to piety but that neither one constitutes the essence of piety. Rather, they pertain to piety only insofar as an aroused feeling then comes to rest in some thinking that focuses on it and, after that, flows forth in some action that gives expression to it. Finally, no one will deny that there are feeling states, such as repentance, remorse, trust, and joy in God, that we term pious, or religious, in and of themselves, without reference to any knowing and doing that emerges from them. To be sure, we do expect, however, that these feeling states would continue to operate in actions otherwise called for and also that the drive to reflect16 would be directed toward them. 5. How the other claim is to be judged—namely, that piety is a state in which knowing, feeling, and doing are combined—doubtless already follows from what we have said up to now. Naturally, we would reject this claim if it means that feeling is to be derived from knowing or that doing is to be derived from feeling. However, if it is not meant to imply any subordinate relation whatsoever, then it might as well be the description of any other entirely clear and living moment as of a pious one. This is explained as follows. First, even though the aim of a given action already precedes the action itself, it still accompanies the action right along, and the relationship between the two is expressed in self-consciousness at the same time through a greater or lesser degree of satisfaction and confidence. In consequence, here too all three are combined within the content of that state taken as a whole. Second, in a similar manner, the same situation obtains with respect to knowing. That is to say, as an operation of thinking activity that is brought to a successful close, knowing expresses itself in self-consciousness as a confident surety. Yet, at the same time, it also becomes an effort to combine the truth thus recognized with other truths or to seek out cases where they can be applied, and this effort is the ever simultaneously present onset of a doing, which doing then fully unfolds at the first opportunity that arises. Consequently, here too we find knowing, feeling, and doing collected together in the same state. Now, third, we notice that just as the first-described state, the combination notwithstanding, is still essentially a doing and the second state is essentially a knowing, so too, in all its various expressions, piety remains essentially a state of feeling. Accordingly, this state of feeling is also taken up into thinking, but in this case only in the measure as a given person who is determined by piety within oneself is inclined toward thinking and practices it. Moreover, only in the same manner and by the same measure, this same inner determination of the person also issues forth in lively movement and presentational action.17 The present account has already made it clear that “feeling” does not mean something confused or something nonactive, since, on the one hand, it is most strongly present in one’s most lively elements and directly or indirectly underlies all the expressions of one’s will and, on the other hand, can also be stirred up by reflection, and what it is can itself be thought about.

Suppose, however, that certain other persons want to exclude feeling from our domain altogether and, on that account, want simply to describe piety as a knowing that engenders actions or as a doing that is generated from some sort of knowing. It would then be incumbent on these persons not only first to settle among themselves whether piety is then to consist essentially in knowing or in doing, but they would then also have to point out to us how a certain doing can arise out of some sort of knowing without an intervening determination of self-consciousness. Moreover, if they finally have to concede the presence of this latter feature in the process, then, as a result of the foregoing account, they will have been convinced that when such an interweaving of features bears the character of piety in itself, knowing within it is not yet piety and doing within it is no longer piety regarded in and of itself. Rather, piety is precisely the intervening determination of self-consciousness. The situation just outlined, however, can always be regarded in the reverse direction as well, in such a way that doing is not yet piety in all those cases in which a determinate selfconsciousness is yet to ensue from what has been done, and knowing is no longer piety in and of itself when it has no more content than that determination of self-consciousness which has been taken up in thinking.18

1. Frömmigkeit. 2. Ed. note: The reference is to some initial clarifications within the second discourse. See On Religion (1821) II, 67– 176, especially 77–90, 94f., 130–33, and 156–62. To summarize, using Schleiermacher’s own words there in the Tice 1969 translation (with some revisions): For understanding my whole view, no recommendation to the reader could be more important than to suggest that one compare these discourses with my other book, Christian Faith. In form the two are quite different. Their points of departure lie far apart. In overall content, however, they can be completely assimilated. (161) At the very outset, religion waives all claims to anything belonging to the two domains of science and morality. It would return all that has been either found or pressed upon it from these sources. … Religion is essentially contemplative, to be sure. … The contemplation of religious persons is simply the immediate consciousness of the universal being of all finite things in and through the infinite, of all temporal things in and through the eternal. To seek and to find this infinite and eternal factor in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all action and passion, and to have and to know life itself only in immediate feeling—that is religion. Where this awareness is found, religion is satisfied; where this awareness is hidden, religion experiences frustration and anguish, emptiness and death. And so religion is, indeed, a life in the infinite nature of the whole, in the one and all, in God—a having and possessing of all in God and of God in all. Knowledge and knowing, however, it is not, either of the world or of God; it simply acknowledges these things without being either. For religion, science is also a movement and revelation of the infinite in the finite. Religion, however, further sees this movement and revelation in God, and God sees it in religion. (77–78) Although piety dwells with pleasure on every activity by which the infinite is revealed in the finite, it is nevertheless not identical with this activity. It maintains its own domain and character only by steering clear of science and praxis as such. Only insofar as piety takes its place beside them both, moreover, will the field they hold in common be completely filled out and this aspect of human nature be fulfilled. Piety presents itself to you as the necessary and indispensable third to science and morality, as their natural counterpart, one no less endowed with that dignity and excellence which you attribute to them. … True science is perception truly achieved; true praxis is art and culture created of oneself; true religion is sense and taste for the infinite. (79–80, 82) Try to enter with me into the innermost sanctuary of life. There perhaps we can find our way to common ground. Only there will you find the fundamental relation of feeling and perception by which their sameness and difference is to be understood. I must ask you, however, to look at yourselves, at your own apprehension of this vital aspect of human experiences. You must understand it by listening to yourselves, as it were, in the presence of your own consciousness—or at least you must be able to reconstruct this state of experience for yourselves out of what consciousness you have. What are you to notice? The coming into being of your own consciousness. (85)

Yet, what if you cannot do this? Try to indicate, then, what every act of life is as an act, without specific distinction from all the other acts. Ponder this in the most general and strictly fundamental way. What is an act, considered just as a simple act or element of life—as nothing else? It has the same character as the whole of your life has. It is a coming into being of its own and a coming of a being into some whole—both together; it is a striving to return to the whole and a striving to stand on its own—both together. Isn’t it? These are the links out of which the entire chain of being is fashioned, because your whole life is a being separately existing within the whole of being. But then, by what means do you have your existence within the whole? By your capacity for sense, I should hope you would say, because in order to exist in the whole you must have possession of your senses. And by what means do you have your existence on your own? Surely it is through the unity of your own self-consciousness. This identity of awareness you have, first of all, in your capacity for sentience, in your discrimination of comparative degrees in experience. It is easy to see how each factor can only arise together with the other, if both together form every act of life. In this case, you become the contributor of sense, and the whole becomes your object. This intermingling and unifying of sense and object—before each returns to its place and the object as torn loose from sense becomes attached to perception and you as torn loose from the object become identified with feeling—this prior element of experience is what I am referring to. You are always experiencing this element, yet you never thoroughly experience it because the phenomenon of your life is only the result of its constant fading and returning. This element of experience passes so swiftly that it is scarcely in time at all. It is so little observable that it can scarcely be described. … This is how each new element comes to belong within your life’s domain. Out of such a beginning, moreover, arises every religious stirring. (85–87) The penetration of existence within this immediate union ceases as soon as it reaches consciousness. Then a vivid and clear perception arises before you …, or feeling works its way out from deep within you and spreads over your whole being. … Now, the same sort of relation that exists between perception and feeling also holds between knowledge, as something that deals with both, and conduct. Through the constant interplay of these two contrasting factors, your life stretches out in time and gains its distinct positioning. From the very outset, both knowledge and conduct represent your will to become one with the universe through an object. If the power of objects holds sway over you, pressing you into the circle of their existence by entering into you through perception or feeling, some sort of knowledge always emerges. If the predominate force is on your part, so that you give objects the impress of your existence and reflect yourselves in them, then there arises what you call conduct in the narrower sense: external effect. … Only in the interchange between knowledge and conduct, only in their mutual stimulus, can your life endure. … Here, then, you have these three things… : knowing, feeling, and conduct. And now you understand what I mean by asserting that they are not identical and are yet inseparable. If you will simply gather all that belongs to each grouping together and consider each one by itself, you will discover that all those elements in which you exercise power over things and place your stamp upon them make up what you call the practical life—or in a narrower sense the moral life. In contrast, you will no doubt call those more or less frequent elements of observation, in which things generate their existence within you through perception your scientific life. … And what name will you give to this third category having to do with feeling? What sort of life is this to form in relation to knowing and conduct? The religious life, in my view. … This is the distinctive domain which I would assign to religion, alone and in its entirety. Your feeling is your piety, with two qualifications: first, insofar as that feeling expresses the being and life common to you and the universe in the way described and, second, insofar as the particular elements of that feeling come to you as an operation of God within you mediated through the operation of the world upon you. The details that make up this category consist neither of your knowledge nor of its objects, neither of your works and deeds nor of the various spheres of conduct. They consist simply of your experiences of receptivity and the influences upon you of all that lives and moves around you accompanying and conditioning those experiences. These and only these are the exclusive feature of religion—all of them. (86–90) Elsewhere in On Religion II and in the rest of that book, as in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher makes clear that insofar as basic religious perception and feeling are genuinely expressed in knowing and acting, the life of piety is completed, yet even theology is not of itself religion, just as conduct divorced from religious stirrings is not religion. A vital faith cannot ever be reduced, however, to correct belief or prescribed behavior, as such. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher held that whereas what is religious issues from individual life, the ethical/moral domain issues predominantly from collective life. See his discussion of this contrast in OR (1821) V, supplemental note 13. 4. Ed. note: In the proposition, the adjective unmittelbar (“immediate”) before “self-consciousness” means without any mediation, direct. It does not mean instantaneous. For the latter sense of “immediate,” several other words are available in German usage (augenblicklich, etc.), but never this one. 5. Henrich Steffens’s (1773–1845) depiction of feeling is very closely related to mine and can easily be rendered in terms of it. See his book Von der falschen Theologie (1823), 92–100, where he speaks of “the immediate presence of undivided existence in its entirety,” etc. In contrast, Ludwig Friedrich Otto Baumgarten-Crusius’s (1788–1843) depiction, for one thing, does not encompass the whole of feeling but includes only the higher region of feeling. For another thing, by using the

expression “sense perception” (Wahrnehmung) his depiction also seems to pull “feeling” way over into the domain of objective consciousness, not to speak of the opposition it draws between “feeling” and “self-consciousness.” Dogmatik (1820), 56. 6. Ed. note: In logic, this is a proof showing—indirectly, not by direct demonstration—the absurdity of denying a given claim. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s own “Psychology” lectures (SW III.6, 1863) essentially covered only certain basics in philosophy of mind. 8. Ed. note: The word here is sei (is, be, would be). That is, as in On Religion II, in its very nature, the roots of “piety” (or “religion”) lie in “feeling” (and “perception”), so that piety distinctively consists in feeling; however, as he outlines his case there and explicates it in the remaining three discourses, a lively piety is also necessarily expressed in thinking and acting; piety takes shape and itself develops in particular communities and social contexts and in relation to other religions. It is not, and cannot claim to be, vital if it is simply a matter of stimulation within some isolated sector of the psyche (or brain, as some might say today). 9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “All that piety consists of lies to be recovered in feeling. Sharper distinction in feeling [comes] from self-disapprobation [rather] than [from] judgment and shame” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Ed. note: At this point in the first edition, §8.2 (KGA I/7.1, 27), Schleiermacher quotes from Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis 2.2; cf. Migne Gr. 2:117f. 11. Ed. note: As it happens, the word for “surety” (alternatively, for “certainty”) is Gewissheit, and that for “knowing” is Wissen. The word for “science” is Wissenschaft. Schleiermacher, however, was not engaged in a search for unqualified, absolute certainty; in contrast, “surety” more exactly conveys his sense for degrees of reliability in one’s knowing, hence in the clarity and integrity of one’s conviction concerning what one “knows.” See his writings on dialectic. 12. Ed. note: Cf. OG 40, where he explains that “pious feeling” proceeds not from any notion (Vorstellung) but from “an immediate existential relationship” (ein unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis). 13. Ed. note: The phrase “in the name of piety” translates als fromm. In this context, fromm (literally, “pious”) means the same thing as “piety” (Frömmigkeit); see §3n1 above. Within this work as a whole, however, when it modifies words such as “feeling” or “self-consciousness,” fromm is always translated “religious.” The reason is twofold. First, in ordinary usage “pious” has come to bear a strongly pejorative connotation, which Schleiermacher does not at all intend. Second, for him fromm points to what religion (Religion) is at its base, at its very roots, in religious feeling and perception, thence also in its more extended expression into thinking, acting, and communal life (in Christian Faith first explicated in §§3–6). In this broader sense, then, what is fromm basically is that base, and only then does it lead to and become a component of all else that is distinctively “religious” (religiöse). Schleiermacher’s fullest account of this continuum of religious life is given in On Religion I–V, though further, more precise details are provided throughout the present work. Accordingly, in Christian Faith the noun Frömmigkeit serves both functions, depending on context, referring either to the roots or base of all genuine religion or to its necessary expression in religion through thought and action. Far more often than not, however, Frömmigkeit refers to the broader life, thus rooted. The adjective fromm almost always refers to the basic religious experience (Erfahrung), hence to “faith” in that sense, which he also contrasts with belief and customary action (Sitte, including but not restricted to morals). 14. Antrieb. Ed. note: Or, “motive,” “motivating factor.” Here “impetus” is chosen so as not to confuse what moves one to action with a “reason,” which is often presupposed in using “motive.” In any case, the impetus is viewed as internal, not strictly external. Just below, pleasure (Lust) and the lack of pleasure (Unlust) are given as internal determinations of selfconsciousness that can, in turn, underlie an impetus to action (see §4n13). 15. Ed. note: The term Affekt, in Schleiermacher’s usage, refers to a stirring in the body, literally an “emotive” stirring component by which feeling consciously rises and is registered somewhere in the body (in what we call the brain and nervous system today). In his psychology lectures, the human psyche is always body-mind, never separably body and mind. Thus, an “affective” state, such as an experience of joy or a mood of depression, is an expression of body-mind/mind-body. 16. Trieb zur Betrachtung. Ed. note: Betrachtung can mean reflection, observation, or contemplation. 17. Ed. note: This presentational action (darstellende Handlung) is the chief feature of Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics, over time closely interconnected with and critically codetermined by propagative (or broadening) and purifying (or corrective) action. 18. Ed. note: Here “determination” translates Bestimmtheit, which points to some definite and distinct (bestimmte) qualities of experience that are being held in the “self-consciousness” of an individual. In §§3–6 Schleiermacher develops the accompanying position that this given form or quality must, in large part, be drawn from some collectivity, just as all human language, thought, and action is, though in the process made distinctively (eigentümlich) one’s own. Piety, held in a person’s “immediate self-consciousness” as “feeling,” consists in such a determinate form or quality of experience (definite, no doubt to some considerable extent shared with others but made distinctly one’s own—see §3n14 above and in its

context). The actual content of Christian experience that “intervenes” between thinking and doing, as between doing and thinking, is yet to be more precisely defined in this work. Here, Schleiermacher is simply seeking to indicate in what domain of experience this feature of it essentially occurs versus those of thinking and acting, which, in the religious domain being discussed here, are themselves authentically a part of the pious life only as attempted “expressions” of piety and only as created by the “impetus” (Antrieb) of piety (see §3n13 and n14 above). This account will continue to unfold in the remaining propositions of the Introduction.

§4. However diverse they might be, what all the expressions of piety have in common, whereby they are at the same time distinguished from all other feelings—thus the selfsame nature1 of piety—is this: that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent or, which intends the same meaning, as being in relation with God. I am indebted to Professor Delbrück for the word “absolute” (schlechthinig), which often appears in the explanations that follow. At first, I was not inclined to use it, and I have no knowledge of its having already been employed elsewhere, but now that he has offered this adjective, I am very pleased to follow him in its use.2 1. In no real instance of self-consciousness, no matter whether it accompanies only a piece of thinking or of doing or whether it fills a moment of itself, is anyone conscious of one’s self alone, in and of itself, in its selfsameness. Rather, one is always conscious, at the same time, of a changing determination of one’s self. The “I” can be objectively envisaged in itself. Every instance of self-consciousness, however, is, at the same time, that of a changeable being-in-such-and-such-a-way. Already implied in this distinction of the two states, however, is the fact that the changeable state does not issue from the selfsame state alone, for in that case it would not be distinguishable from it. So, present in every instance of self-consciousness are two features: a being positioned-as-a-self and a not-having-beenpositioned-as-such, so to speak, or a being and a somehow-having-come-to-be.3 Thus, for every instance of self-consciousness, something other than one’s “I” is presupposed, something whence its determinate nature exists and without which a given self-consciousness would not be precisely what it is. Still, this “other” would never be objectively depicted in immediate self-consciousness, with which alone we have to do here. This is so, for the twofold nature of self-consciousness is indeed the reason why we are continually trying to find objectively an other to which we may trace our being such-and-such. This effort, however, is an act different from that with which we are concerned here. Instead, in selfconsciousness only two features are joined: the one feature expresses the being of a subject4 of itself, and the other feature expresses the coexistence of a subject with an other. Now, receptivity and self-initiated activity5 in the subject correspond to these two features, as they coexist in temporal self-consciousness. If we could imagine coexistence with an other to be nonexistent, yet could imagine ourselves as otherwise being exactly as we are, then no self-consciousness that would express preponderantly a being-affected that belongs to receptivity would be possible.6 Rather, in that condition self-consciousness would thus be able to express only self-initiated activity. Such activity, however, not being related to

any object, would consist only in a desire to step forth on one’s own, an indistinct capacity to act7 that is without shape or color. However, just as we always do find ourselves to exist only in coexistence with some other, in every instance of self-consciousness that arises of itself it is also true that the feature of somehow having come to have receptivity comes first. Moreover, even the self-consciousness that accompanies an instance of doing—an instance that can also include cognition—although it does predominantly give evidence of a selfinitiated activity on the move,8 will always have been referred to an earlier element of receptivity already met with. By that element the originative capacity to act would have received the direction it took, except that often even this prior reference can have been quite indefinite. Assent to these statements can be expected without qualification. No one would gainsay them, moreover, who is capable of self-observation to any degree and who can deem the distinctive object of our investigations to be of interest. 2. What is common in all those determinations of self-consciousness that predominantly give evidence of a having-been-encountered-from-somewhere that belongs to receptivity9 is that in them we feel ourselves to be dependent. On the other hand, what is common in all those determinations of self-consciousness that predominantly give evidence of a selfinitiated activity on the move is that we have a feeling of freedom. We feel dependent not only because we have come to be from elsewhere but chiefly because we could not come to be in this way except by some other. We do feel free, because something else is determined by us and could not be determined in this way without our own self-initiated activity. Yet, these two explanations could still seem to be inadequate, in that a capacity of the subject for movement10 also exists that does not interconnect with another, a capacity to which the same contrast appears to apply. However, even if we were to come into being somehow selfgenerated from within, absent any being coposited on the part of some “other” in the process, then this would be the simple situation of a temporal development of one who eventually remains self-identical,11 and this situation could only very improperly be referred to the concept of “freedom.”12 On the other hand, if somehow we could not come into being from within ourselves, then this situation would designate only the boundary of one’s self-initiated activity, a characteristic that belongs to the very nature of oneself as a subject, and only very improperly would the existence of this boundary be called “dependence.” In any case, this contrast between freedom and dependence is in no way to be confused with a contrast between melancholic or depressive feelings versus elevating or joyful feelings, which will be taken up later.13 That is to say, a feeling of dependence too can be elevating if one’s accompanying state of having come to be in such-and-such a way were to make itself known as full blown. Likewise, a feeling of freedom can be depressive, in part, if the element of receptivity to which one’s doing is traced were overweeningly of that nature and, in part, if the manner of one’s self-initiated activity were expressed in a more disadvantageous coexistence. Now, suppose that we imagine a feeling of dependence and a feeling of freedom to be one, in the sense that not only the subject but also the coposited “other” would be the same in

both feelings. In that case, the overall self-consciousness that is composed of the two feelings would be one of reciprocity of the subject with the coposited “other.” If we take the further step of positing the totality of all elements of feeling that belong to these two kinds to be one, the result is that the coposited other is also to be posited as a totality, or as one. Moreover, the expression “reciprocity” is thus the right one for our self-consciousness in general, this to the extent that our self-consciousness gives evidence of our coexistence with everything that engages our capacity for receptivity and that is exposed to our self-initiated activity as well. Indeed, all of these considerations apply not only to the extent that we particularize this other and ascribe to each particularized other a relationship to that twofold process within us, even though this is done in varying degrees; they also apply to the extent that we posit the totality of what lies outside us as one, indeed, also because additional receptivity and self-initiated activity to which we also have some relationship is included therein as one, existing together with ourselves—that is, as world. Accordingly, our self-consciousness, viewed as a consciousness of our being in the world or as a consciousness of our coexistence with the world,14 exists as a series in which we have feelings divided into those of dependence and freedom. In this entire domain, however, there is no such thing as a feeling of absolute dependence—that is, a feeling of dependence without a feeling of freedom related to the same codetermining factor—and no such thing as a feeling of absolute freedom—that is, a feeling of freedom without a feeling of dependence related to the same codetermining factor. Suppose that we are observing our circumstances in nature or are observing those in human activity. In doing this, we can discover a great mass of objects in relation to which freedom and dependence have very much the same weight, and these objects constitute the area of parity in the process of reciprocity.15 Still other objects exercise a far greater effect on our receptivity than does the effect of our self-initiated activity on them, and vice versa. In consequence, one of the two factors can be restricted by an imperceptibly small amount,16 but neither one of the two would ever entirely disappear. The feeling of dependence is predominant in the relationship of children to their parents or of citizens to their fatherland. Yet, individuals can still exercise a counteractive effect or a leading influence on their fatherland even without dissolving that relationship. Moreover, just as children’s dependence on their parents is soon felt to be a dependence that gradually diminishes and fades, so, from early on, it is also not without an admixture of a self-initiated activity directed toward their parents, just as even in the most absolute autocratic situation the one who gives orders is never without some slight feeling of dependence. The same thing is true with regard to nature, as we then exercise the tiniest bit of counteraction toward all natural forces ourselves—indeed, one can say, even on world bodies—in the same sense in which they influence us. So, accordingly, our whole self-consciousness in relation to the world or in relation to its particular aspects is always contained within these bounds. 3.17 Accordingly, there can be no such thing as a feeling of absolute freedom for us. Rather, anyone who claims to have that feeling either deludes oneself or separates factors that belong together. This is so, for if the feeling of freedom gives evidence of a self-initiated activity that issues from ourselves, then this activity must have an object that has somehow

been given to us, but this process could not have happened without having an effect on our receptivity; hence, in every such case a feeling of dependence that belongs to the feeling of freedom is coposited, and thus the feeling of freedom is limited by the feeling of dependence. The opposite case could arise only if the given object were in every respect to come into being only by our activity; but this is always only relatively, and never absolutely, the case. Suppose, however, that the feeling of freedom gives evidence only of an inner self-active movement. Then, not only does every such particular movement interconnect with the actual state of our aroused receptivity, but also the totality of our inner free movements, viewed as a unity, cannot be represented by a feeling of absolute freedom, because our entire existence18 does not come into consciousness for us as having arisen from our own self-initiated activity. Therefore, no feeling of absolute freedom can have its locus in any temporal being.19 Now, suppose, as our proposition states, that, on the other hand, a feeling of absolute dependence is possible, despite all these considerations. Then, this feeling of absolute dependence can in no way proceed on the same basis. That is, it cannot proceed from the effect of some object somehow given to us, for some counteraction to such an object would always take place, and even any voluntary refusal to react in this way would always include a feeling of freedom with it. Therefore, strictly speaking, this feeling too, if viewed in this way, is not possible in any single element of life. This is so, because this element, in accordance with its overall content, would always be determined by something given, thus by something toward which we could have some feeling of freedom. This being said, however, precisely this self-consciousness—which both accompanies all of our self-initiated activity, thus also our entire existence20 because this self-initiated activity is never at zero, and also negates absolute freedom, as just explained—is already in and of itself a consciousness of absolute dependence. This is so, for it is the consciousness that our entire self-initiated activity likewise issues from elsewhere, just as anything in relation to which we would be thought to have a feeling of absolute freedom would have to issue entirely from us. If we were to have no feeling of freedom, however, no feeling of absolute dependence would be possible. 4. In our proposition “absolute dependence” and “being in relation with God” are made equivalent. This affirmation is to be understood in such a way that precisely the whence21 coposited in this self-consciousness, the whence of our receptive and self-initiated active existence, is to be designated by the term “God,”22 and for us “whence” holds the truly primary meaning of the term “God.” In this connection, it remains only to recall, first of all, based on our previous considerations, that this “whence” is not the world in the sense of the totality of temporal being, and still less is it any one part of that totality. That is to say, the feeling of freedom, limited though it is, that we have in relation to the world—in part, as components complementary to the world and, in part, in that we are continually engaged in affecting particular aspects of the world—together with the possibility afforded us to have some effect on all aspects of the world, permits only a feeling of limited dependence but excludes the feeling of absolute dependence. It is also to be remarked, next, that our proposition would inveigh against the opinion that this feeling of dependence would itself be conditioned by any

prior knowing about God. This position, moreover, may well be all the more called for since many people—people who already consider themselves to be sure of having a completely grasped, primary concept of God, that is, a concept independent of all feeling, in this higher self-consciousness, which higher self-consciousness may well border closely enough on a feeling of absolute freedom—also set way aside precisely that feeling which we consider to be the basic form of all piety23 but which they take to be something almost subhuman. Now, on the other hand, in no way does our proposition intend to dispute whether there can be such a primary knowing. Rather, it intends only to set it aside as something with which we could never have anything to do in a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine. This is so because, obviously enough, that sort of knowing has nothing directly to do with piety. Yet, if the word “God” is in general originally at one with its attendant notion, and thus the term “God” presupposes some notion of it, then the following is to be said. This notion, which is nothing other than simply a declaration of the feeling of absolute dependence, or the most direct possible reflection24 of it, is the most primary notion with which we have to do here, completely independent from the primary knowing proper just mentioned. Moreover, the notion we have to do with here is conditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence, with the result that for us “God” signifies, first of all, simply that which is codeterminant in this feeling and that to which we push back our being, that being viewed as what we are. Any content of this notion that would be derived from some other quarter, however, has to be explicated based on the fundamental content just specified. Now, precisely this basic content is especially intended by the formulation that feeling oneself to be absolutely dependent and being conscious of oneself as in relation with God are one and the same thing. This is so, because absolute dependence is the fundamental relation that all other relations must include within themselves. The second expression includes Godconsciousness25 in self-consciousness at the same time, and it does so in such a way that the two cannot be separated from each other, entirely in accordance with the above discussion. The feeling of absolute dependence simply becomes a clear self-consciousness, in that this notion of it arises at the same time. To the extent that this happens, one can also well say that God is given to us in feeling in an originative fashion. Suppose, moreover, that one were to speak of an “original revelation of God”26 to human beings or in human beings. Then precisely the following meaning would always be intended by it: that what is given to human beings, along with the absolute dependence inherent in all finite being no less than in oneself, is also the immediate self-consciousness of that absolute dependence arising to the point of being God-consciousness. Now, in whatever measure this combined sense really arises during the temporal course of one’s personal existence,27 we ascribe piety to that individual to the same degree. On the other hand, any sort of givenness of God’s being28 remains completely excluded. This is so, because everything that is externally given must also always be given as an object to which some counteraction is directed, to whatever small degree that may occur. The rendering29 of that notion to any sort of sense-perceptible object is always a corruption, unless one is and remains conscious of that notion as a purely incidental symbolization. This is true whether

what is given may then be a transient rendering, thus a theophany, or a constitutive rendering, in which God is imagined to be a sense-perceptible, constant individual being.30

1. Wesen. For Schleiermacher, the “nature” of a thing or concept is its very being, its essence, to which all else is related as its expression, not as an incidental, merely secondary attribute. It is also true for him, however, that all other characteristics that may be applied, however necessary for a full definition, are comparatively only approximations to the basic characterization in which they are considered to be rooted. 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Schlechthinig is the same [gleich] as absolut” (Thönes, 1873). Thus, the word schlechthinig is a simple Germanizing of the Latin adjective “absolute.” On occasion words like “utter” and “unexceptionably” could also translate it. 3. Ed. note: The pairs of concepts here are ein Sichselbstsetzen and ein Sichselbstnichtsogesezthaben, then ein Sein and ein Irgendwiegewordensein. The first of each pair refers to an awareness of oneself simply as an existing being, the second to an awareness of one’s having come into being and being changeably sustained in a process of being and becoming by some agency outside oneself. 4. Subjekt. Ed. note: That is, what is meant here is not a “topic” but an individual viewed as a “subject,” an active being with one’s own agency. 5. Empfanglichkeit und Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: Sometimes elsewhere Schleiermacher uses the Latinate terms Receptivität und Spontaneität. 6. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates this consequence: “Then an effect [Affekt] would be regarded as if it were also produced by ourselves” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Agilität. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s German usage, as in Latin, this word means simply an ability or tendency to move or act. For the nimbleness or quickness of movement contained in English usage of the word, German writers would use words such as Beweglichkeit or Flinkkeit. 8. Ed. note: Here the qualifying adjective is regsam (on the move). In such passages, where exact definition is especially important, Schleiermacher takes great care over his choice of terms. In other contexts regsam would normally mean “active,” but here he is already using Tätigkeit for activity. The refined question, then, is What kind of activity is this act, and at what stage does it occur within a very complex process? 9. Irgendwohergetroffensein der Empfanglichkeit. Ed. note: These longer verbal inventions and combinations are intended to take the reader into imagining (or recalling) a specific element in one’s experience for which there is no ready concept. They represent an instant of self-perception to which he thus invites close attention. See On Religion II.A.1 (1821). Thus far, the analysis states only that “we feel ourselves to be dependent.” Then he takes the further step of specifying a “feeling of absolute dependence” (schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl). If the phrase were literally rendered “absolute feeling of dependence,” it would be grammatically distinct from our “consciousness” or “feeling” of ourselves “being absolutely dependent” (Gefühl der schlechthinige Abhängigkeit), which he says is “identical” to our “being in relation to God” (e.g., §4.2 below). In §§5–10, as with different language in the third and fifth discourses of On Religion, Schleiermacher does posit many stages in a development from a mere feeling of being dependent on some “perceptible object” (e.g., successively a fetish in fetishism, figures, or images in polytheism, or the world as a whole in pantheism) to “this highest stage” wherein the “whence” (woher) of the feeling of absolute dependence is God. However, the first, shorthand phrase is used for this highest meaning throughout Christian Faith, notably at the most critical points: e.g., §§30.1, 36.1, and 62.2. 10. Beweglichkeit. 11. Ed. note: That is, as Schleiermacher’s brief marginal comment indicates, it would simply point to “the constant feature” of one’s being as one develops over time (Thönes, 1873). Thus, in this respect we can see, as an implication, that some other would have to be “coposited” toward which or toward whom one could exercise some impression or influence for one to act freely at all. This observation implies that without the presence of some other, one’s action would be automatic, not free. 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Self-development nevertheless belongs entirely to the category ‘constant feature,’ yet it also operates only as something co-posited” (Thönes, 1873). 13. Ed. note: See §5.4, also discussions of similar contrasts between joy and feelings far in the other direction in §§82.2, 85.1, 108.3, and 146.1. Such contrasted feelings, as Schleiermacher’s marginal note here suggests (Thönes, 1873), fall under the “general form” of self-consciousness that he calls “pleasure and the lack of pleasure” (Lust und Unlust) (cf. §§62 and 66). In his account, human beings are constitutionally interactive and interpersonal and communal beings, thus coposited in all these ways. Accordingly, he adds in this same note the intention of discussing the mistaken view “that dependence would

effect an absolutely depressive [niederdrückend] result,” countering with the thought that “having confidence in another does not occur without dependence.” On these grounds, then, shared feeling, sympathy, or compassion (Mitgefühl), each of these with or toward others, can be oriented in the direction of pleasure or of the lack of pleasure, i.e., as shared joy (Mitfreude, e.g., §156.2) with or toward others or as shared sorrow, or as compassion (Mitleid, e.g., §163.P.S.), all of these with or toward others. 14. Ed. note: In a marginal note (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher marks these two modes of self-consciousness vis-à-vis the world as “twofold.” That is, the two are distinguishable, so that neither can be substituted for the other, but the two can be simultaneous. We exist both as being inextricably embedded in the world and as separate entities in relation to the codetermining factors that make up the rest of the world, coexisting with these factors, all being conceived both as particulars and as the totality of what lies outside us. 15. Ed. note: Affixed here is Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “This is where dreams of having a countering influence on God are to be considered” (Thönes, 1873). 16. Ed. note: In a marginal comment, Schleiermacher adds: “The inclination to deify natural bodies (e.g., stars) and natural forces (e.g., elements), against which our feeling of freedom is at a minimum, is understood on this basis” (Thönes, 1873). 17. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “How can the feeling of dependence be absolute? It can be so only in an exclusive sense, not in contrast to the feeling of freedom. It also follows that if objects are not created by our own activity, then they exist in the way they do independent of us. Thus, even our influence on them cannot contradict their given being, and, consequently, our power over them is broken” (Thönes, 1873). 18. Dasein. Ed. note: That is, our literally “being there,” where we can be seen to be. 19. Sein. 20. Dasein. 21. Woher. 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Here the word ‘God’ is presented as meaning nothing else, in our language domain, than what is co-posited in the feeling of primary [ursprünglichen], absolute dependence. Accordingly, all narrower definitions must be explicated only on this basis. Hence, the anthropopathic approach is yet to be explained. The customary view moves in the reverse direction, claiming that the feeling of dependence would first arise based on a knowing about God that is given from elsewhere. This move, however, is mistaken, for if we ascribe such a knowing even to philosophers, the God-consciousness of the mass of people cannot be considered to come from that source, since all attempts to popularize speculative God-consciousness (e.g., proofs for the existence of God) proved unsuccessful. Now, if we accede to that customary approach, we ought not in any case also to imagine that the two approaches are split in such a way that some people have piety only because they cannot have the fruits of speculation and that others either never had piety or would have had to have forgotten it if they come to a speculative consciousness of God. Rather, both approaches are alike primary, each in its own way, and they can also exist alongside each other on that account. It is almost inconceivable how people can have ascribed pantheism to me, since I completely sunder the feeling of absolute dependence from any relation to the world” (Thönes, 1873). 23. Ed. note: In this context the reference of “all” can only be to “Christian piety” (see how the next paragraph begins), or at most to any that rests on the feeling of absolute dependence, though Schleiermacher does also claim that all genuine “piety” is based on feeling, not on “knowing.” See also On Religion I, supplemental note 18. Discourse II briefly reiterates what had been said in that work regarding the “strivings” of piety/religion as “the immediate being of God in us through feeling,” now placed “in a clearer light” in Christian Faith. On “religious feeling” (fromme Gefühl) see the entire presentation in CF §§3–5, especially §3.4 and §5.P.S. and indexes in both works. In all three editions of OR the combination of Anschauung and Gefühl (perception, beholding, or intuition with feeling) is the basis for all religious feeling, reaching greater articulation and strength in “higher feelings” within religions as they rise up the developmental scale. In CF this pair comes to a focus in schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl (the feeling of absolute dependence), which for Schleiermacher has to arise among the monotheistic religions and to be reaching its height in Christianity. On this basis, it is especially instructive to trace the uses of this concept through the whole works. Closely related feelings, attitudes, and dispositions such as awe, reverence, gratitude, love, joy, trust, contentment, and peace are best indicated in other forms of discourse. 24. Reflexion. Ed. note: This word here refers to such phenomena as a mirror reflection of light or of sound (an echo), not to contemplative reflection (Betrachtung, Contemplation). 25. Gottesbewuβtsein. Ed. note: This is to be a key term throughout this book, and it grows in fullness of meaning the whole way. See BO §1 and index. 26. Ed. note: The phrase is von einer ursprünglichen Offenbarung Gottes. In this immediate context, ursprünglich is translated with both “original” or “originative,” and “primary,” to indicate the fundamental, bedrock role of both the feeling of absolute dependence and the ever accompanying notion (Vorstellung) of one’s being in relation with God. In the Christian

context, the only context to be considered in this work, the notion of being in relation with God is taken to exist on a degree scale from rather vague and tentative to very strong, steady, and compelling. In dogmatics this notion is to be filled in conceptually through the presentation of doctrine, but it is not ever to be separated from, or to take over from, the primary, originative sensibility described here as the “feeling of absolute dependence” or from closely associated feelings expressed in faith. 27. Persönlichkeit. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term never carries the mostly later meaning of “personality.” 28. Gegebensein Gottes. Ed. note: That is, any claim of knowing God’s being in God’s self, as it were, apart from God’s distinct work of creation and preservation, redemption, and reconciliation in history, is strictly a matter of speculation, not of faith-doctrine. 29. Übertragung. Ed. note: Besides the more literal sense of “rendering” or “carryover,” Schleiermacher also uses this word to describe the overall process of “translation,” viewed as a “transference” from one sphere of language usage into another such sphere. 30. Einzelwesen. Ed. note: Here the anthropomorphic error, or “corruption,” to which Schleiermacher points would be that of translating “the Supreme Being” (das höchste Wesen) into such an individual, thus making “God” into “a person” rather than the Creator who, as it were, chooses to be and is in relation to persons in a way appropriate to their existence as persons, as would be true, respectively, of God’s relation to everything else. As will be seen, the only place Schleiermacher (very carefully) selects use of the word “is” in anything like either a strictly identitative sense or a strictly predicative sense is in §167: “God is love.” This “is” is itself still being used symbolically even there, for it is still appropriate to ask even in that case: In concrete terms, what is that? Love is both an attitude and act directed toward someone and an experience of what some other gives, in a relationship. As such, even God’s “love” cannot be translated into a merely abstract concept.

§5. What has just been described forms the highest level of human self-consciousness, which level in its actual occurrence is still never disconnected from the immediately lower level. Moreover, through its conjunction with the lower level in a distinct unity within a given element, the highest level also partakes in the contrast between what is pleasurable and what is not pleasurable. 1. Two formations of self-consciousness have been presented: the feeling of absolute dependence and that self-consciousness which, in expressing that relation to finite being which can be perceived by the senses, is split into a feeling of partial dependence and a feeling of partial freedom. We will best see how these two formations of self-consciousness relate to each other if we add yet a third formation to them. That is, suppose that we go back to the initial, more obscure period of the life of human beings. Everywhere therein we would then find the animalistic life to be almost alone predominant, but the spiritual1 life would still be entirely suppressed. As a result, moreover, we would have to imagine the state of a human being’s consciousness in that obscure period also to be very much akin to that of the lower animals.2 To us, the state of lower animals is indeed actually quite alien and hidden. Yet, it is nonetheless generally denied that, on the one hand, there is any actual knowledge3 in that state as well as any complete self-consciousness that would combine the separated elements of consciousness into a constant unity of life; yet, on the other hand, a total lack of consciousness is not attributed to them either. Now, this matter is hardly to be settled except by our assuming that there is a consciousness such that what is object-oriented and what is ever-originating-in-oneself, or perception and feeling,4 respectively, do not, properly speaking, become distinctly separate from each other; rather, when they are as yet undeveloped, they are entangled in each other. This is the third formation mentioned above,

and it patently comes close to the consciousness of children, above all before they have gained any mastery of language. From then on, however, this state increasingly diminishes and draws back into those dreamy elements of consciousness which mediate the transition between wakefulness and sleep. In contrast, during times when we are clearheaded and alert, perception and feeling do plainly separate from each other, and in this way they form the entire fullness of the sensory life of a human being, understood in the broadest compass of the word “sensory.” In sticking purely with consciousness and viewing it quite apart from action proper, we embrace two things by this word. On the one hand, we embrace the gradual process of getting filled up with sense perceptions,5 which constitutes the whole domain of “experience,”6 in the broadest sense of that word. Likewise, on the other hand, we embrace all the determinations of self-consciousness that develop out of relations with nature and with humankind, including even those which we have set forth above (§4.2) as the determinations of self-consciousness that come closest to the feeling of absolute dependence. In consequence, we also include social and moral feelings7 no less than self-oriented feelings within the meaning of “sensory,” in that, taken as a whole, they too are still located within the domain that consists of all that is separated apart and involved in contrast. Now, the first of these two locations of consciousness, which is that of sense-oriented consciousness, we skip over in the present context, since it does not belong to this second location.8 However, among those feelings which are designated as sensory, taken as a whole, there is something coposited and codetermining therein that belongs to the domain of reciprocity, something to which we trace back our state of being in every instance. Thus, whether we are then conscious of ourselves in the process as more dependent or more free, in a certain sense we nonetheless place ourselves both on a par with and in contrast to it. Moreover, we do this in such a way that as an individual or as caught up in some other larger individual entity—for example, in patriotic feelings—we are positioned over against some other individual being. Now, what has just been indicated is how all such feelings are most definitely distinguished from the feeling of absolute dependence. This distinction is displayed in the following ways. First, if in this feeling of absolute dependence any feeling of absolute freedom is essentially negated (§4.3), then this negation does indeed occur under the form called self-consciousness. Yet, second, this self-consciousness is not of ourselves as individuals who exist at the present instant in a certain way and not in another way but is only of ourselves as individual finite being overall. Third, in consequence, at this juncture we are not positioned over against any other individual being; rather, herein all contrast between one individual being and another such being is transcended. Hence, in the fourth place, it appears that three levels9 of self-consciousness are undeniably to be distinguished: (1) the level of entangled self-consciousness after the manner of lower animals, in which the contrast we have just discovered cannot have been called forth as yet, as the lowest level; (2) the level of sensory self-consciousness, which totally rests on this contrast, as the middle level; and (3) as the highest level, the level of the feeling of absolute dependence, in which this contrast

fades away, in turn, and everything over against which the subject would be set at the middle level is, as a whole, apprehended to be identical with the subject. 2.10 If there were such a thing as a feeling of absolute freedom, then the contrast discussed above would also be transcended in that very feeling, except that such a subject could never stand in any kind of relation to others of the same sort; rather, everything that would exist for that subject would have to exist for that subject only as receptive material.11 For this reason, however, such a feeling is never present in a human being.12 Thus, at the same level, even in that subject no immediate self-consciousness can persist other than the feeling of absolute dependence described here. That is to say, every element of consciousness that is composed of a feeling of partial freedom and a feeling of partial dependence places us on a par with and over against another such subject. The only question that now remains is whether there would be another self-consciousness that is not immediate but that, as such, accompanies knowing or doing of some kind, a selfconsciousness that is to be placed parallel to the one we have been considering. Suppose that we then imagine, as an act or state of an individual, a supreme knowing in which all subordinate knowing is encompassed. Indeed, in its domain this knowing would, in any case, rise above all contrast. Yet, its domain would be that of objective consciousness. To be sure, it would be accompanied, however, by an immediate self-consciousness that expresses surety or conviction. On the other hand, in that this self-consciousness would refer to the relationship the subject has as one who is knowing to what is known, viewed as an object, this self-consciousness accompanying supreme knowing would nevertheless lie within the domain of contrast. Suppose that we likewise imagine a supreme doing in the form of a decision encompassing the entire domain of self-initiated activity, a decision from which all subsequent decisions would unfold as particular parts13 already contained in it. Then, in its domain this supreme doing would, in any case, stand above every contrast, and it would, in any case, be accompanied by some self-consciousness. Yet, when the subject is viewed as the one performing an action, this supreme doing too would refer to the subject’s relationship to that which could be the object of one’s action, and it would thus have its location within that of contrast. Suppose, further, that the same condition would have to hold for every accompanying self-consciousness that is related to any instance of knowing or doing that is separated off. It follows that no other self-consciousness exists that is raised above the subject-object contrast. Rather, this characteristic attaches exclusively to the feeling of absolute dependence. 3. Now, suppose that the lowest level of self-consciousness, similar to that of lower animals, were gradually to disappear. Then, even though the middle level would develop but the highest level14 could not develop at all as long as the lowest level were present, so, conversely, the middle level would have to continue undiminished even if the highest level would already have reached its full development. In and of itself, the highest selfconsciousness does not depend at all on externally given objects that can stimulate us at one time and then not at another time, and as a consciousness of absolute dependence15 it is also

an entirely simple consciousness and remains ever the same in all conditions that are otherwise changing. Thus, it cannot possibly be one thing in one element of life and a different thing in another element,16 or even be varyingly present in one element but not so in another element. Rather, it is either not present at all or, as long as it is present overall, it is also always present and always the same. Suppose, then, that the highest level could no less coexist with the second level of selfconsciousness than with that of the third, lowest level. In that case, either it should never come up in any instant but would remain in the same obscurity in which it existed as long as the lowest level was predominant, or it would have to be present all alone after the second level were driven out and indeed be inalterably self-identical. Now, the latter option is controverted by all experience. This option also shows itself to be impossible unless our ideation17 and our doing were to be entirely stripped of self-consciousness, whereby the interconnectedness of our very existence18 would be irretrievably destroyed for us. A claim of perseverance for highest self-consciousness can be set forth only on the presupposition that sensory self-consciousness would also be posited with it at the same time. Naturally, this being posited at the same time cannot, however, be thought of as a fusion of the two kinds of self-consciousness, which would be totally contrary to the concept of each that has been set forth here. Rather, what is meant by this being posited at the same time is a simultaneous being of the two in the same element. To be sure, this would imply a mutual being-referred of each of the two kinds of self-consciousness to the other, if the “I” is not to be split apart. Even in certain elements of life, no one can be exclusively conscious of one’s relationships as being in a state of subject-object contrast and, conversely, in other elements of one’s feeling of absolute dependence in and of itself and in general terms. Rather, one is conscious of one’s absolute dependence as one who is already determined for a given element in a certain way within the domain of that contrast. This being-referred of what is sensorially determined to higher self-consciousness in the unity of the given element is the consummatory apex of self-consciousness. That is to say, for a person who has once recognized piety and has taken it up into one’s very existence as a summons, every element of a purely sensory self-consciousness is a defective and imperfect state. Even if the feeling of absolute dependence were generally the entire content of an element of self-consciousness, however, this would still be an imperfect state, for it would be lacking in the boundedness and clarity that arises from being referred to the definiteness of sensory self-consciousness. Yet, since that very consummation consists of the relation of these two features of selfconsciousness to each other, it can also be described in a twofold fashion. Starting from below, that consummation can be described in the following way. Suppose that sensory selfconsciousness had entirely expelled subject-object entanglement similar to that of the lower animals. Then a higher tendency would unfold over against the subject-object contrast, and the term for this tendency in self-consciousness would be “the feeling of absolute dependence.” The more a subject would then posit oneself in every element of sensory selfconsciousness to be absolutely dependent, alongside one’s partial freedom and partial dependence at the same time, the more religious19 one would be. In contrast, starting from

above, that consummation can be described in another way. The very same tendency just described, now viewed as a primary and congenital20 tendency in the human soul, would strive to break through within one’s self-consciousness already from the very outset on. This cannot happen, however, so long as the subject-object contrast is still decomposed and entangled in self-consciousness similar to that of the lower animals. Eventually, however, this tendency does emerge. Moreover, the more it then slips into every element of determinate sensory self-consciousness, without passing over any such element—so that as a human being one continually feels oneself to be partially free and partially dependent over against other finite beings, yet, at the same time, one also feels oneself to be absolutely dependent, equally so along with everything toward which one has those other feelings—the more religious one is. 4. In accordance with its nature and of itself, sensorially determined self-consciousness breaks up into a series of elements that are different in content. This happens because our activity toward another being is a temporal one and influences of another being on us are likewise temporal. In contrast, the feeling of absolute dependence, always being self-identical in and of itself, would not evoke a series of such distinguishable temporal elements. Rather, if it were not to relate with sensorially determined self-consciousness precisely in the way described, then either it could not be a real time-filling consciousness at all or it would have to resonate in unison alongside sensory self-consciousness but lacking any relation to that sensory self-consciousness in the latter’s manifold changes as the latter rises and falls. Now, in contrast, our religious self-consciousness is actually formed in neither one of these ways. Rather, it is formed in a way that fits the description we have already offered. That is, it comes to be a particular religious stirring only in its being related to a datum that is viewed as a co-constitutive element,21 as an element made up of a feeling of partial freedom and a feeling of partial dependence, and in another element it comes to be a different religious stirring only in relation to a differently constituted datum. This process occurs, however, in such a way that what is essential in both elements, namely, the feeling of absolute dependence, is the same and remains so throughout the entire series of temporal elements. Moreover, the differentiation involved arises only from the fact that this essential aspect—namely, the feeling of absolute dependence—comes to be a different element in its being accompanied by some different sensorially determined self-consciousness, yet it ever remains an element of higher potency. In contrast, where there is no piety at all, sensory selfconsciousness comes apart, in the manner likewise already described, and it is thus divided into a series of elements of lower potency; in contrast, in the period of self-object entanglement similar to that of the lower animals, no distinct separation and apartness of elements takes place for the subject itself. The same process occurs with respect to the other part of our proposition. That is, in accordance with its nature and in and of itself, sensory self-consciousness also falls apart into contrasting features, into what is pleasurable and what is not pleasurable or into pleasure and the lack of pleasure.22 It is not as if the feeling of partial freedom were somehow always one of pleasure and the feeling of partial dependence were somehow always one lacking in

pleasure, as people seem to presuppose who are mistakenly of the opinion that the feeling of absolute dependence would, by its very nature, be depressive. For example, a child can be found to be completely well-disposed in the consciousness of dependence on one’s parents and likewise—thank God!—a subject in one’s relationship to a governmental authority; also, others—indeed even parents and governmental authorities—can be found to be ill-disposed in consciousness of their freedom. Thus, as a result, either sort of consciousness can give one either pleasure or the lack of it, depending on whether life is being advanced or obstructed thereby. On the other hand, higher consciousness does not bear any such contrast within it. The very first emergence of higher consciousness is, to be sure, an enhancement of life,23 at a point when a comparison is offered between self-consciousness at this level and a state of isolated sensory self-consciousness. Suppose, however, that we imagine the latter, sensory self-consciousness in its being-selfidentical, apart from any relation to higher self-consciousness. Then what would also happen is simply an unchanging sameness of life, one that would exclude any such contrast with higher consciousness. Now, to this state we would apply the term “blessedness,”24 that of a finite being viewed as at the very apex of one’s perfection.25 As we actually observe our religious consciousness, however, it is not like this. Rather, we see it to be subject to a fluctuation, in that some religious stirrings lean more toward joy, while others lean more toward sorrow.26 Thus, the contrast here relates to nothing other than how the two levels of self-consciousness relate to each other in the unity of the given element of life. Accordingly, in no way is it as if whatever is pleasurable or unpleasurable that is already posited in sensory feeling then, by that token, imparts the same characteristic to the feeling of absolute dependence. Instead, when the two levels of self-consciousness are being bound to each other in one and the same element, this occurrence manifests a clear sign that the two levels of selfconsciousness have not been fused together and have not been neutralized by each other either, also that thereby they have come to be a third phenomenon, namely, a sorrow belonging to lower self-consciousness and a joyousness belonging to higher selfconsciousness—just as occurs, for example, whenever trust in God is conjoined with some feeling of suffering. Rather, this contrast attaches to higher self-consciousness by virtue of its way of becoming temporal and making an appearance—namely, in that it comes to be a temporal element in its being-referred to the other, second level of self-consciousness. That is, just as the emergence of this higher self-consciousness is, in every instance, an enhancement of life, so too whenever it emerges with ease, so as to be referred to something distinctly sensory, whether this be pleasurable or not pleasurable, it then consists in an easy process of that higher life. Moreover, if it comes to a point of sense perception through this encounter with something distinctly sensory, it then bears the impress of joy. Further, just as the disappearance of higher consciousness, if this process could be an object of sense perception at all, would amount to a diminishment of life any time this higher selfconsciousness emerges with difficulty, so this is an approximation to its not appearing at all. This phenomenon, moreover, can be felt only as a restraint placed upon the higher life.

Now, this fluctuation undeniably forms the feeling-content of every religious life, so that it would seem superfluous to make these formulations clearly perceptible by giving examples. Thus, we can go right on to ask how this familiar process relates to what was presented earlier, admittedly only in a problematic way,27 as its ultimate climax.28 Suppose that we then imagine that these contrasting characteristics are constantly being strongly imprinted on particular religious stirrings, so that the two characteristics would alternately rise to a high degree of enthusiasm.29 Such a process, then, would give the religious life an instability that we could not deem to be of highest value. Suppose, however, that we imagine that the difficulties that we have been facing are gradually disappearing, consequently that the quality of ease that can adhere to religious stirrings has become our steadfast state and, at the same time, that the higher level of feeling has gradually gained predominance over the lower level of feeling. In that case, in immediate self-consciousness the sensory determinations that are becoming the occasion for the temporal appearance of the feeling of absolute dependence would emerge more strongly than the subject-object contrast that exists within the sensory domain itself, and therefore the subject-object contrast would pass over more into the sphere of sheer sense perception. Thus, indisputably, this almost-redisappearance of that subject-object contrast from the higher level of life would, at the same time, consist in its strongest feeling-content.30 5. Now, at the same time, it follows from the above account that an uninterrupted sequence of religious stirrings can be set forth as a summons and also in what sense it can be viewed in this way—as indeed Scripture too actually sets this forth.31 Moreover, every element of grieving by a religious mind and heart32 over an element of life that is entirely bereft of any God-consciousness33 confirms this summons, in that no one indeed would mourn over the absence of something known to be impossible. To be sure, in that respect it is self-evident that the feeling of absolute dependence in its combination with some sensorially determined self-consciousness, thus viewed as a stirring within, must also be differentiated according to its strength. Yes, there will be elements of life, of course, in which one is not directly conscious of that feeling in any distinct fashion, but it is nonetheless possible to demonstrate indirectly that this feeling has not died away in such instances. This is possible, for example, when such an element is followed by another one in which this feeling of absolute dependence has strongly arisen without that element’s being sensed as of a different kind from the preceding one—without its being viewed, that is, as an element distinctly divorced from the preceding one. Rather, it would be sensed simply as a quiescent joining upon and continuation of a state that is, in its essential character, still the same. The situation would be quite different if the preceding element were one in which that feeling of absolute dependence was definitely excluded. Accordingly, it is indeed true that even the various formations of sensory self-consciousness, which contain the most multifarious mixtures of the feeling of freedom and the feeling of dependence, are dissimilar in the way they more or less draw forth or are favorable to the attachment of higher selfconsciousness to them. Furthermore, in elements where these various formations of sensory self-consciousness are less effective in this way, even a weaker emergence of higher self-

consciousness is, at that point, not to be sensed as a hindrance to one’s higher life. Instead, no determination of immediate sensory self-consciousness34 is incompatible with that higher life. As a result, from neither aspect of immediate self-consciousness does any necessity arise that either one would have to be interrupted at any time, except in elements where both aspects sink back behind a rapidly increasing subject-object entanglement of consciousness. Postscript: Now, suppose that the immediate internal articulation of the feeling of absolute dependence is God-consciousness, as has been asserted here. Suppose too that every time that feeling attains to a certain degree of clarity it is accompanied by such an immediate, internal articulation but at that point is always conjoined with some sensory selfconsciousness and is referred to it. Then, in all its particular formations, God-consciousness, having emerged along this same pathway, will also bear determinations within it that belong to the domain of contrast in which sensory self-consciousness is activated.35 This consciousness of God, moreover, is the source of all anthropomorphism.36 Anthropomorphism is unavoidable in statements made about God within this domain. It also forms an obvious pivot in the unending controversy between those who acknowledge the basic presupposition that such statements are unavoidable and those who deny it. This is made manifest in the following way. On the one hand, there are those who are glad to possess a primary concept of Supreme Being from elsewhere but have no experience37 of piety. Those persons do not want to admit that the articulation of that feeling of absolute dependence is the same thing as what is posited as active in what their primary concept states. Also, in claiming that the God of feeling would be only a fiction, an idol, they can perhaps even insinuate that such a poetic product would also be acceptable under the form of polytheism. On the other hand, those who do not want to accede either to a concept of God or to a feeling that is representative of God base their position on the observation that any notion composed of assertions wherein God appears in a human fashion does itself in. Meanwhile, religious people are aware that they cannot avoid using anthropomorphism only in acts of speaking, but in their immediate consciousness the object involved remains firmly separate from any mode of presenting it. Moreover, they make every effort to show their opponents that without this quality of completeness that belongs to feeling,38 no surety could arise, not even for the most strongly supported instance of objective consciousness or of action issuing from oneself, also that, in order to be consistent, persons making these claims would have to restrict themselves entirely to the still lower level of life.

1. Ed. note: The word geistig refers to a higher set of mental functions versus those dominated by sensory functions, as will be explained below. 2. Ed. note: In referring to the animalistic (animalistisch above, tierisch at this spot) aspect or level of human life, Schleiermacher appends this marginal note: “The characteristic of the lower level of consciousness: In that object and subject do not really become distinctly separate from each other, freedom and dependence too cannot become so” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Erkenntnis. Ed. note: This statement does not deny that there is some sort of consciousness, hence some storing and using of bits of information (Kenntnisse). True knowledge, in contrast, would require much more complex mental functioning, including consciousness of oneself as an “I” (a knowing subject) and as a “me” (the object of others’ knowing,

as of one’s own). These matters he sorts out further in his ordered notes and lectures on psychology (mostly philosophy of mind) and dialectic (on the art of doing philosophy, with special attention to “the aim of knowing”). See bibliography. 4. Anschauung and Gefühl. Ed. note: This distinguishable but inseparable pair of concepts is used to describe the root feature or essence of religion throughout all editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821) and was even added in key passages throughout as that work grew larger. See Tice, “Conception of Religion,” 1984. 5. Das allmähliche Angefülltwerden mit Wahrnehmungen. 6. Erfahrung. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes the following marginal comment here: “Here it is indeed paradoxical that moral feeling would be counted as among sensory feelings. However, this also has to do only with moral feelings in their social relation. What is taken to be absolutely moral is also what is absolutely imperative and thus belongs to the arena of absolute dependence” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: The “second location” Schleiermacher here identifies as “reciprocal” with respect to the self ‘s relation “in self-consciousness” and in “feeling” to nature and to other human beings. 9. Stufen. Ed. note: Since, as Schleiermacher shows, a “finite being” or “subject” cannot exclusively sustain the third, highest level but must remain functional at the second level as well, it seems preferable to use “level” here rather than “stage,” or “grade,” “phase,” or “degree.” Some of these levels, as he defines them, are on the same footing as the others, but the second and third levels are also not simply a matter of degree either. 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “At its level piety stands alone” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “‘Only as receptive material because everything, to the extent that it is action, would have to come from that subject, in that otherwise it would serve as an obstacle to that subject” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher certainly knew persons (e.g., Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel) who could sometimes act as if they had this feeling, which had been described by philosophers as “solipsism” (then, after his time, as an advanced state of narcissism). Here, however, the claim seems to be that this state is inconsistent with what reality brings to (is “given to” or “exists” for) human beings and is therefore at base episodic only and unsustainable. It would be entirely out of place at the third, highest level described here. 13. See pp. 4–6 in my essay on the concept of duty (1824). Ed. note: Particularly pertinent is this statement in SW III.2 (1838), 383, and KGA I/11 (2002), 420: “Nevertheless, we cannot deny that that expression—act in every element of life with one’s entire concentrated moral strength and striving to achieve the undivided moral task in its entirety—presents the one resolve that conditions the whole moral life. Under that resolve, all particular duty-bound actions are already encompassed in such a way that no new resolve need ever be formed whenever that action is properly to occur but also in such a way that this resolve will certainly be broken by every action contrary to duty.” This essay, yet to appear in translation, was read on August 12, 1824. The entire essay is in SW III.2, 379–96, and KGA I/11, 415–28. 14. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher states: “The highest level would have no basis for achieving a difference in itself, hence its interconnection with the middle level’s conditioning of its temporal existence” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Ed. note: This concept will accrue meaning, especially as it applies to the highest stage of religion (cf. §2) and to Christianity in particular. See OG 70f. 16. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Indeed, neither the middle level nor the highest level could come to the fore if it were impossible for them to exist together at the same time” (Thönes, 1873). 17. Vorstellen. Ed. note: That is, our ideation in general, including our imagining, forming of notions, and more complex cognition, this alongside all our activity, or doing (Tun). 18. Daseins. Ed. note: That is, of our actually “being-there,” not necessarily of our being (Sein) itself, if we could imagine our ever existing divested of being in a location. 19. Ed. note: As usual here, fromm is the word translated “religious.” The same meaning can be carried in the word “pious,” if both words are referring to the very roots of “piety” (Frömmigkeit), which in the broader sense, also used by Schleiermacher, also includes expressions in thought and action. 20. Ed. note: Here “primary” translates ursprüngliche, which usually means “original” in Schleiermacher’s discourse. “Congenital” translates mitgeborene, betokening some form of interrelation arising after or from the point of one’s birth, whereas “innate” (angeborene) would refer to an inborn capacity, one already functional before or at one’s very birth. This distinction does not always seem to be so significant in Schleiermacher’s usage as it is here. 21. Moment. Ed. note: In this subsection the word seems to be used to refer both to a “moment” in time and to an “element” of a process. The regular meaning, however, is taken to be “element.” 22. Angenehm/Unangenehm and Lust/Unlust. Ed. note: Since “element” regularly translates Moment, “feature” regularly translates Element. A neighboring synonym, “character” or “characteristic,” translates Charakter.

23. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment at this place is “‘Enhancement of life’ because a higher factor is internally co-posited” (Thönes, 1873). 24. Seligkeit. 25. Ed. note: Here the marginal comment is “‘Blessedness’ not as a maximum of pleasure but as simply pleasure concerning what has happened” (Thönes, 1873). 26. Freude … Schmerz. Ed. note: That is, “sorrow” as more of a mental pain (Leid) than of a physical pain (Pein). 27. Problematisch. That is, only under a supposition. See §5n25 and n26 above. 28. Ed. note: That is, blessedness. See the statement at §5n25 just above. See also the unfolding of this concept in Part One §§63 and 80, then in Part Two §§87, 91, 101, 108, 119, 137, and 159.3. 29. Begeisterung. 30. Gefühlsgehalt. 31. Ed. note: Examples might prominently include Gal. 5:13–26; Eph. 1:16–23; 4:1–3; 5:18–20; 6:23–24; Phil. 4:4–9; and Col. 3:12–17. 32. Gemüthes. Ed. note: “Mind and heart” captures the more complex nature of this concept in Schleiermacher’s usage than does either term alone. 33. Ed. note: See §§59–61 and 62–63. To his critics, see OG. 45f. 34. Ed. note: What would characterize an “immediate” sensory self-consciousness? The first sentence of the following postscript would seem to provide part of the answer. That is, it is held internally, however much it might have been determined by external, objective features of experience. Second, it is not directly mediated by external, objective features of experience at the given elements and instances; thus, it is sensed within the body as affect, as in many of the experiences to which the scriptural passages point in §5n31 just above, e.g., “peace” and “joy.” Such experiences certainly do include awareness of the subject-object contrast, as is amply illustrated in these passages, but many, insofar as they purvey and articulate the feeling of absolute dependence in relation to God, also both accompany and transcend that awareness, at the same time. 35. Ed. note: On God’s “immediate being … in us through feeling,” presented in §§3–5, see also OR (1821) II, supplemental notes 16 and 18. 36. Menschenähnlichen. Ed. note: Sometimes Schleiermacher uses the Latinate word Anthropomorphismus, as he does in his marginal note at this point: “Connection of this relation to anthropomorphisms” (Thönes, 1873). Cf. §172n5 and index. 37. Erfahrung. Ed. note: “Experience,” a term subsequently used prominently in works by William James, John Dewey, and many others, is one used quite naturally by Schleiermacher in key statements like this one, if not frequently. Ordinarily he replaces it with variations on the theme of Anschauung (“perception” or sometimes “intuition”) and Gefühl (“feeling”), a twofold theme that is prominently displayed in key passages provided anew in each of the successively enlarged editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, and 1821). See Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), chap. 2. 38. Vollständigkeit des Gefühls. Ed. note: That is, feeling tends to be utterly clear, pure, or focused; otherwise, reference to a feeling that is unusual in its not carrying this complete surety tends to be qualified as vague, wishy-washy, confused, mixed, indefinite, and the like.

§6. As is true of every essential feature of human nature, in the development of religious self-consciousness it necessarily becomes community as well, and indeed community that is, on the one hand, uneven and fluid, and, on the other hand, distinctly circumscribed—that is, church. 1. If the feeling of absolute dependence, in the way it expresses itself as Godconsciousness, is the highest level of immediate self-consciousness, it is also a feature essential to human nature. This claim cannot be controverted by the fact that for each individual human being there is a time when this feature does not yet exist. The reason is that such a time is also one in which human life is not completely formed, as can be recognized, in part, from the fact that then the subject-object entanglement of consciousness, similar to that of the lower animals,1 has not yet been overcome and, in part, from the fact that then other prerequisite functions of life are also only gradually unfolding. The claim also cannot be controverted by the fact that societies of human beings still continue to exist in which this feeling has not yet awakened, for on a large scale these societies likewise simply present that undeveloped condition of human nature which is also discoverable in other functions of life among them.2 A supposed incidental character of this feeling just as little follows from the fact that individuals positioned in the midst of a fairly developed religious life take no part in it. This is so, for they themselves would have to admit that the matter itself is not so alien to them that they were not seized by such a feeling in certain elements of life, even though they might also have designated it by some name or other that does not reflect honor on them. Instead, only if someone could prove either that this feeling would not have a higher value than sensory feeling, or prove that yet another feeling of equal value would exist besides this feeling, could one be warranted in holding it to be a merely incidental form of selfconsciousness, one that would indeed perhaps be found at all times among some people but that would still not be counted toward the completed status of human nature in all.3 2. The fact that every essential feature of human nature also comes to be the basis of a corresponding community can be fully explicated only in connection with a scientific account of ethics.4 Here we can only point out the essential elements of this whole story, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, request that each reader acknowledge this account as a given fact. Now, the account that we summarize here is required by the species-consciousness5 that indwells every human being. This consciousness finds satisfaction only in one’s stepping out from the narrow confines of one’s own personal existence6 and in one’s taking up the given facts of others’ personal existence into one’s own. This process is carried out in the following way. At a certain point of its building strength or ripeness, everything of an internal nature also becomes something external and as such becomes perceptible to the senses of others. In this fashion feeling, viewed as the mind and heart’s self-contained state of being determined, nevertheless does not bear the intention of existing exclusively in and of itself. This is true of it simply as feeling and solely by virtue of one’s species-consciousness, just as would be true,

on the other hand, as it passes over into thinking or doing, which is not our present concern. Rather, this feeling, existing exclusively in and of itself, originally and also without any distinct aim or reference, comes to be something external by means of facial expression, gesture, tone of voice, and indirectly by means of the spoken word; in this way, moreover, for others it becomes a manifestation of what occurs internally.7 This unadorned articulation8 of feeling totally adheres to one’s being moved internally.9 It can also very definitely be distinguished from every instance of doing that it may pass into and that issues from somewhere else and, more likely than not, is breaking loose from it. Indeed, initially it arouses in others only a mere notion of the mental state of the person expressing it. This notion, however, then makes a transition into lively imitation by virtue of species-consciousness. Further, the more the person perceiving these signs is ready to transfer into the same state—in part, for general reasons and, in part, on account of a greater liveliness of the expression10 and a closer affinity with the expression—the more readily will this state be reproduced by means of such imitation. Based on experience, anyone must be conscious of this transmission of feeling from both sides, that of the one expressing a feeling and that of the one taking notice of it. Thus, anyone must also concede that one constantly finds oneself, in harmony with one’s own conscience, within a manifold community of feeling, viewed as a state consonant with one’s nature. Consequently, one must also concede that if such a community had not existed already, one would have joined in its founding. As concerns the feeling of absolute dependence in particular, anyone would also know that it has first been awakened in oneself, on that same pathway, through the communicative and stimulative power of utterance. 3. The claim that this community is, first of all, uneven and fluid follows from what has just been stated. This is the case for two reasons. First, individuals are unevenly similar to one another everywhere, both as concerns the strength of their religious stirrings and in relation to that region of sensory self-consciousness within which God-consciousness most readily unites in each one. Second, thus the religious stirrings of any one person have a greater affinity with those of some persons than with those of other persons, and therefore a community of religious feeling also proceeds more readily with the first group than with the latter group. If the difference between the two is very great, one will then find oneself to be attracted to the first set of persons and repelled by the others. Yet, it is not as if one were repelled from the start or absolutely, so that one could not enter into any community of feeling with them whatsoever. Rather, one is repelled by the others only insofar as one is drawn more strongly to the first set than to them, thus in such a way that one could have community of feeling with them too if the first set were not present or in circumstances wherein one were placed especially close to them. That is to say, it would be hard to find any person in whom one could not recognize any religious state of mind and heart11 whatsoever as being to a certain degree similar to one’s own and whom one would discern to be completely incapable of stirring or being stirred by oneself. Yet, the more stable a given community of feeling is taken to be in every instance—that is, the more closely the likestimulated elements of life within it follow upon each other and the more readily the resultant

stirring is taken to be reproduced there—the lower is the number of persons who can share in it. However far apart we may choose to imagine the end points of this continuum to be between the most intimate community of feeling and the most weakly formed, the result would be that those who would experience the most paltry and feeble religious stirrings could sustain a most exactly defined religious community of feeling only with those who are just as little capable of being stirred by, or in a position to imitate, the utterances of those whose religious stirrings arise in elements of a kind that they themselves can never enter into. A similar relationship exists between persons whose piety is more pure—that is, in that in every element of life one quite definitely distinguishes the religious content of one’s selfconsciousness from the sensory content to which it is referred—and persons whose piety is less pure—that is, in that it is still very much entangled in sensory self-consciousness. Now, the interval between these two end points we also then consider to be filled with any number of intermediate stages for every human being, and precisely this array is what is meant by the “fluidity” of such a community. 4. This is how the exchange of religious self-consciousness appears to us when we consider the relationship of isolated human beings to each other. However, if we look at the actual situation of human beings, what nevertheless presents itself is also comprised of wellestablished relationships within this fluid community, a community which, strictly taken, is on this account without borders. That is, in the first place, as soon as human development has come to the point of forming a household, even if this household is regulated only to a certain extent, in its internal life every family will also set up a community of religious selfconsciousness such that it has distinct boundaries with respect to what lies outside it. This is so, in that family members are bound to a distinctive way of life, in part, by a distinct solidarity and affinity and, in part, also by the sameness of occasions in which religious12 stirrings are tied into the mix. As a result, outsiders can have only an incidental, ephemeral part in its life, thus only a very uneven part in it as well. Now, we also find, however, that families tend not to be completely isolated. Rather, they also exist en masse in distinctly limited associations, bound together by language and customs that they hold in common, knowingly or by presentiment. In this way, moreover, a distinct religious community then comes to be settled among them. This occurs, on the one hand, due to the predominant formal similarity among the particular families themselves. It occurs, on the other hand, in such a way that one family that has become especially receptive to religious stirrings has gained predominance as the one chiefly exercising self-initiated activity in this regard, and the other families present to this family only receptivity to their influence, being scarcely come of age, as it were. The latter process occurs, for example, in situations where there is an hereditary priesthood. We designate every such relatively selfcontained community of piety by the term “church.”13 The reason is that, within distinct boundaries such a community forms an ever-renewing circulation of religious selfconsciousness and a propagation of religious stirrings ordered and disposed within those same boundaries, with the result that telling which individuals belong to it and which do not can come to be recognized in some fashion.

Postscript. This would be the best place to explain why, based on our standpoint, the term “religion”14 tends to be used here in a sense different from customary usages, though, as far as possible, in our own circle we do not utilize the term except in a cursory fashion and only for variety’s sake. First of all, then, if one is speaking of a distinct religion, this always happens with reference to a distinct church. Moreover, in general terms one takes this to mean the whole of the religious states of mind and heart that underlie such a community and that, accordingly, can be recognized as identical among its members. All of this is in keeping with its particular content, as it can be expounded by deliberating on both the religious stirrings and the reflections on them that are in evidence there. Now, connected with this usage is the fact that any individual’s susceptibility to being stirred by a given religious community varies in degree, as does the effect of an individual’s action upon the community. Thus, the part an individual plays in the circulation and propagation of religious stirrings is designated by the term “religiosity.”15 Now, suppose that one wanted to say “natural religion,” just as people say “Christian religion” and “Muhammadan religion.” In that case, one would, in turn, be abrogating the given rule and would be confusing language usage, because there is no such thing as a natural church and thus also no distinct environment in which one could inquire as to the features of natural religion. Suppose, in turn, that someone chose to use the term “religion plain and simple.”16 Then again, this term could not refer to any such whole. Rather, the only thing that could fittingly be understood by it would be the general tendency of the human mind and heart to produce religious stirrings, yet their movement outward and thus their striving for community would also always be implicated in them from the outset. That is, the possibility of particular religions would have to be considered but without thereby making a distinction between fluid and circumscribed communities. That tendency alone—that is, in general terms, the religious susceptibility to being stirred on the part of an individual soul— would then be religiosity plain and simple. Rarely, however, have these various terms been properly sorted out in their actual usage. Now, to the extent that the makeup of an individual’s religious states of mind and heart is not exactly identical with what has been recognized to be homogenous within a given community, customarily that purely personal factor, considered in accordance with its content, is termed “subjective religion,” whereas what is held in common is termed “objective religion.” This language usage too becomes highly troublesome as soon as a large church is split up into any number of smaller church communities but without completely surrendering its unity—as is the case among us today. That is to say, what is distinctive of the smaller church communities would then also be subjective religion in comparison with what is recognized to be held in common within the church at large. Likewise, the church at large would then also be objective religion in comparison with what is distinctive in its particular member church communities. Finally, just as in religious stirrings themselves the internal determination of selfconsciousness and its mode of external expression can be distinguished from each other, even

though these inner and outer features are closely interconnected, so too, people customarily term the organization of communicative expressions of piety in a community “external religion,” while they then term the overall content of religious stirrings, as they actually arise in individuals, “internal religion.” Suppose that these definitions are taken to be easily the best for conceptualizing the various, quite arbitrary modes of usage we have noted. If this is true, then all one needs to do is compare these various terms with the explanations given here in order to convince oneself of how very shaky all this usage is. Hence, it is probably better to avoid these designations in scientific usage, not least in that use of the term “religion” within the realm of Christianity is very new in our language.17

1. Ed. note: The simpler phrase here, tierähnlichen Verworrenheit des Bewuβtseins, refers to the subject-object entanglement (Verworrenheit) discussed in §5. 2. Ed. note: On rather core “new revelations” occurring in a religion only when the desire arises within it “to discover something of what is divine as yet unknown [or at least not clearly understood] within itself,” see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 11; also CF §10.P.S., §§12, 24, and 93.2. 3. Vollständigkeit der menschlichen Natur in allen. Ed. note: See §5n39. In both editions of CF (1821 and 1830), this first subsection of this proposition presents presuppositions and reasons for accepting them that also underlie all editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821). Just as §§3–6 represent, in an introduction to a system of faith-doctrine, content similar to that in the second discourse there, though in the somewhat different language that befits Christian monotheism, so too §6 forms a transition to §§7–10, which represent here content on the communal aspect of all Christian life similar to that in the third discourse. In both instances, the lengthy notes Schleiermacher appended to each discourse in the 1821 edition of On Religion are also to be regarded as presupposed here. Cf. §3n2 and §5n4. 4. Ed. note: In referring to a wissenschaftliche Sittenlehre here, Schleiermacher denotes that very broad field of human (vs. physical) sciences. This field includes more philosophical investigation (philosophical ethics) and nonphilosophical inquiry that is “scientific” in a more specialized sense. Schleiermacher tends to use both Ethik and Sittenlehre for the broader field and to use Sittenlehre also for any intensive or systematic account of Sitte (custom, morals), including the nonphilosophical field he called “Christian ethics.” 5. Gattungsbewuβtsein. Ed. note: That is, the consciousness every human being has of belonging to the human species, to humanity as a whole. See also §§60.2 and 121.3 on human “species-consciousness” as “consciousness of humankind,” in the CF and OR indexes, respectively. Cf. esp. OR (1821) II, supplemental note 14 regarding how religious emotions like “humility” within a Christian community of faith combine one’s self-consciousness as to one’s being within that “organic whole” with one’s possessing “distinctive” contributions to that whole. Thus, any mediatory role is seen to be humbly present to some degree in all other members, this “in light of” that “higher mediatorship” which the Redeemer gives one. Here Schleiermacher is speaking of mediation of a kind that combines what is “most familiar” in human nature with what is “most foreign or repugnant.” The positive “counterpart” to humility in one’s feeling contains the perceptive consciousness that each individual is “indispensable to the rest.” 6. Persönlichkeit. Ed. note: In the German usage uniformly adopted by Schleiermacher, this term does not carry the connotation of having a “personality”; rather, it simply denotes one’s sheer existence as an individual human person. He also sometimes refers to social entities as “persons” in this sense. 7. Offenbarung des Inneren. Ed. note: At some places in the present work this word is taken to mean “revelation,” at other places “manifestation,” as here. 8. Diese bloβe Äusserung. 9. Innerlichen Bewegtheit. 10. Äusserung. Ed. note: This same word is used here for all the various steps of “expression” that lie along the pathway from (a) internal “articulation” of feeling (of what Schleiermacher occasionally calls Affekt—cf. §3n15), through (b) the various signs mentioned, which further make that feeling externally perceptible to others’ senses and thereby discernible to them, this depending on their varied degrees of readiness, to (c) “utterance” through signs such as tone or inflection, gesture, speech-acts, and use of actual words to convey meaning. 11. Gemütszustand.

12. Ed. note: In every other instance here, the adjective has been frommen; here it is religiösen, no doubt because now we are being asked to imagine communities that are at least incipiently institutions. 13. Kirche. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “This extension of the term ‘church’ is necessary for scientific usage” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Religion. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher notes that for isolated entities the term “religion” “is not at all adopted for usage in this book, because in them piety and community tend to be in competition with each other” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Religiosität. Ed. note: As usual, in these paragraphs “religious” has translated fromm, the meaning of which in English is much more often and more accurately conveyed by “religious” than by the narrower, more likely pejorative word “pious” (meaning self-righteous in that narrower sense and referring more often just to practices in the somewhat broader sense). 16. Religion schlechthin. Ed. note: As an alternative to this more colloquial expression, one could say “religion in the absolute sense”—that is, pure and unalloyed. The concept “feeling of absolute dependence” (schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl) bears the same meaning. 17. Ed. note: The terms examined here are all nouns. Comparatively, the use of the noun “religion” has a more longlasting usage, albeit an equally indefinite one, in English than does “piety” for the same objects. Hence, in this translation the noun Frömmigkeit, which Schleiermacher often uses as an alternative for Religion, is always translated “piety,” but the adjective fromm is translated “religious.”

II. Regarding the Differentiations among Religious Communities in General: Propositions Borrowed from the Philosophy of Religion §7. The various distinctly circumscribed religious communities that have gained some prominence in history are related to each other, in part, as different stages of development and, in part, as different kinds.1 1. Religious community that is formed as household worship within a particular family cannot very well be regarded as one that has gained historical prominence, because it is hidden within an inner circle. The transition from that situation to an actually historical phenomenon, however, is also often very gradual. The beginning of this process already lies in the expanded style of life to be found in the patriarchal household and in the enduring association among the families of sons and grandchildren living near each other. The two basic forms of church mentioned earlier (§6.4) can originally unfold on this basis alone.2 If one compares a number of these two transitional configurations with each other, one can see that the two different forms of church can already be contained in them, at least the kernel of them. Now, first, as concerns the different stages of development, gaining historical prominence3 is itself already a higher stage and stands above simple, isolated household worship, just as the civic4 situation, even in its most incomplete forms, stands above the formless gatherings of people in the pre-civic situation. Yet, in no way does this differentiation betoken the structure or even the compass of the community itself. Rather, it concerns the makeup of its actual underlying religious states of mind and heart, in each case as that state is elaborated to a point of clarity in conscious contrast with the motions of sensory self-consciousness.5 Now, on the one hand, this development is also dependent on the overall development of mental powers,6 with the result that already, on this account

alone, many a community cannot continue to exist any longer in its original distinctive mode of existence. For example, many forms of idol-worship, even if they lay claim to a high degree of mechanical skill, do not tolerate even a moderate scientific and artistic formation and would have to perish therein. Thus, on the other hand, sometimes this development also simply continues, in turn, on its own path despite these influences. Moreover, it bears no contradiction that, within a given collectivity, piety will develop to its highest potential while other mental functions of life7 lag far behind. However, not all differentiations are to be understood as such stages. This is the case, for formations of piety held in common do exist—as one can well say of Hellenic and Indian polytheism—that, if considered in terms of the developmental series, seem to have as many stages beneath or beyond it as other formations do but that are, nonetheless, very distinctly different from each other. When a number of such formations belonging to the same stage are then present, it would always seem most natural to designate them as “species” or “kinds.” Even at the lowest stages, moreover, it can be demonstrated indisputably that most religious communities that are geographically separated from each other are, at the same time, divided from each other by internal differences. 2. Yet, both of these differentiations—that into developmental stages and that into species or kinds8—are, to be sure, not to be so firmly held to or so confidently arrived at here as they would be in the domain of nature.9 This is also the case both generally within the historical domain and in that of so-called moral persons.10 That is to say, here we do not have to do with unchanging formations that are constantly reproduced in the same fashion. Rather, each community of an individual nature is also capable of a greater or lesser development within its species-character. Now, suppose that one were to imagine that just as an individual can indeed move from a more deficient religious community into a higher one, so too along this pathway a particular community could develop beyond its original stage without losing its species-character. Suppose, moreover, that this change could happen in any religious community equally well. In that case, naturally the concept of stages would then recede entirely, for the final instance at the lower stage and the first instance at the higher stage could form a constant interconnection, and at that point one would be more correct to say that each species would be formed upward through a series of developments from an incomplete to a more nearly complete status. Conversely, suppose that one posits that just as we can also say of an individual, in a certain sense, that one would become a new person by passing over into a higher form of religion, so too the species-character of a given community would have to fade away if it bore the intention of rising to a higher stage. In that case, even within the same stage, if its internal development were to continue along that route, the speciescharacter of a religious community would then become unsettled and thus generally unsustainable; but then the stages would be all the more emphatically and sharply distinguished. The fluctuation, just described, however, does not at all inveigh against the reality of these two sorts of distinction. The reason is that every religious community that comes into

prominence historically will always actually stand in this twofold relationship to the rest, so that it is coordinate with some but subordinate or superordinate in relation to others, thus distinguished from one given religious community in the first way and from some other religious community in the second way. Furthermore, if those who occupied themselves most with the history and critique of religions have paid less attention to fitting the different forms of religious community into this framework at all tightly, this can have occurred, in part, for the reason that they have concentrated almost exclusively on what is of an individual nature and, in part, for the reason that in examining particular cases it can be difficult to sort out these relationships and properly to contrast and compare what is coordinate and what is subordinate. Here it can suffice simply to have established this twofold distinction in general terms, since our task is solely to examine how Christianity relates to other religious communities and modes of faith in both respects. 3. Indeed, our proposition does not assert but does, nonetheless, tacitly presuppose that there could be certain other formations of piety that stand in relation to Christianity, just as still others would, but that are positioned at the same stage of development as Christianity is, thus being of similar form to that extent. Yet, this tacit presupposition bears no contradiction to the conviction of Christianity’s exclusive excellence11 that is presupposed by every Christian. This is shown in that even in the domain of nature we distinguish between complete and incomplete animals as comprising, as it were, different stages of development in animal life, and in each of these stages we distinguish various species, in turn, which are thus viewed as similar to each other, each being an expression of the same developmental stage. This practice, however, presents no obstacle to viewing a given animal species existing at a lower stage as coming close to a higher stage and, to that extent, being more nearly complete than other animal species are. Now, likewise, even if a number of species of piety do occupy the same stage of development as Christianity does, it can also, nonetheless, be more nearly complete than any of the others. However, the notion that at the very least Christian piety is supposed to relate to most other formations of piety as true to false,12 a claim indeed heard frequently enough, does not comport with our proposition. This is so, for if other religions at the same stage as Christianity were false throughout, how could they bear so much that is similar to Christianity as being at that stage calls for? Moreover, if religions that occupy lower stages were comprised of pure errors, how would it be possible for people to pass over from them into Christianity, since receptivity for the higher truth of Christianity could, nevertheless, be grounded only in truth, and not in falsehood? Rather, underlying the entire presentation of doctrine that is being introduced here is the maxim both that error never occurs anywhere in and of itself but always exists only in relation to what is true, and that error will never have been completely understood until one has found its connection with truth and with whatever that is true to which the error is affixed.13 The apostle’s expressions are also in accord with this understanding when he depicts even polytheism as a perversion of the primary consciousness of God that underlies it and when he finds a dim, if foreboding, presentiment14

of the true God in some evidence of a longing for God, albeit one as yet unsatisfied, in all those fictive images15 he saw in Athens.16

1. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher states: “The principle of combination and distinction. Both stages and kinds are everywhere to be found. Compare the domains of the state and of the arts, and in the physical domain compare the complete and incomplete development of animals and plants and their species” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “The basic forms are these: aristocratic and democratic” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s note provides the following definition: “Historical prominence occurs when communal piety comes to have a public life” (Thönes, 1873). 4. Ed. note: The term bürgerlich conjures historic images of places offering relative safety, such as castles (Bürgen) and towns, each with its surrounding agricultural provisions, themselves the progenitors of the city (civitas). 5. Bewegungen des sinnlichen Selbstbewuβtseins. Ed. note: Gemütsbewegungen, rarely used by Schleiermacher, refers to emotions or affections (the latter from affectus, referring to that which makes an effect). In his usage, Affekt refers to the actions of the senses within a person, at the lowest and middle levels of self-consciousness, which he calls “sensory selfconsciousness” (cf. §5.1). Affection refers to the result of one’s being affected in this way. Wahrnehmung refers to “sense perception.” Gefühl refers to feelings produced in sensory consciousness, notably at the middle level, then also at the highest level, which latter level he calls basically religious or “immediate self-consciousness.” In turn, Gemütserregungen refers to stirrings of the psyche (soul, spirit), or mind and heart (intellect and feelings), differentially associated with both feelings and perceptions (Anschauungen), which are intentional at those same two levels of consciousness, higher than the lowest, purely animal level of sensory consciousness. The three levels he calls “general” ones, there being potentially many admixtures in and between each general level. For him, the Psyche, viewed as embodied mind and heart, is full of motions, of many kinds and at several levels. See §§5–6 here and his Psychology lectures. 6. Ed. note: The concept geistige Kräfte refers to all the internal movements, forces, functions, and active capacities of the human psyche or Geist. Hence, it refers to all that Schleiermacher refers to as stirrings (Erregungen) and other motions of one’s Gemüth (here translated “mind and heart,” to avoid a purely intellectual connotation of mental capacities or functions). 7. Ed. note: This phrase translates geistige Lebensfunktionen. 8. Gattungen oder Arten. Ed. note: In the biological sciences of that time, as subsequently, Gattung referred to a “species” and Art to a “genus” (kind); hence, these two terms are used in the translation here from this point on, though for most purposes “kind” is the only category Schleiermacher ordinarily needs, as will become evident. 9. Ed. note: That is, physical nature (Natur) as contrasted with human historical nature, within which humans are inseparably mind-body, according to his psychology. 10. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s ethics moralischen Person is a term applied to individual social organizations. 11. Ed. note: The phrase ausschlieβenden Vortrefflichkeit does not, as such, necessarily imply superiority in every respect, for which a number of other German terms could be utilized, notably Erhabenkeit, Vorrang, Überlegenheit. Rather, it opens the way to comparative investigation of certain aspects in other forms that can be shown to be similar or different in varying degrees, e.g., of those at the monotheistic stage of faith or communal life (cf. §8.4 below). 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note compares and contrasts the claim of “exclusive excellence” to that of “exclusive truth” (Thönes, 1873). See also §8.3 and OR (1821) II, supplementary note 8 on “the contrast between true and false religion” and OR (1821) V on “religion in the religions.” 13. Ed. note: Schleiermacher established similar maxims in his lectures on dialectic, to the effect that one is to expect truth in every error and error in every truth, that there is no absolute error, and that it can be very difficult to distinguish what is false from what is simply incomplete truth. See his 1811 Dialectic (Tice), 55–59 and passim; Brief Outline §209n; and on “the Spirit of truth” in Christian experience above in §§116.3 and 153–55. For another example and further explanation of the status of a maxim among many kinds of rules or principles, see §100n21. On similarity among all religions, see OR (1821) II, supplementary note 1, and OR (1821) V. 14. Ed. note: dunkle Ahndung is translated “dim, if foreboding, presentiment,” whereas Ahnung is always translated “presentiment.” Cf. §159n3. 15. Dichtungen. Ed. note: Notably “idols” and “representations by both … art and imagination” (Acts 17:16 and 29). In these passages the German Bible has it that Paul saw the city so gar abgöttlich and of various Bildern (“so greatly idolatrous” and full of graven “images”), which together could suggest the word Schleiermacher uses here.

16. Rom. 1:21ff. and Acts 17:27–30. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 17:22–31, “On the Relationship of That Which All Religious People Have in Common with One Another to What Is Distinctively Christian,” 23rd Sunday in Trinity, Nov. 18, 1810, in SW II.7 (1836), 528–37.

§8. Those formations of piety in which all religious states of mind and heart express the dependence of all that is finite on one supreme and infinite being—that is, the monotheistic formations—occupy the highest stage, and all others are related to them as subordinate stages; from these subordinate formations human beings are destined to move into those higher ones.1 1. In general terms, we posit actual idol-worship, also called fetishism, and polyolatry as such subordinate stages. The first stage, in turn, is situated deep underneath the second stage. The idol-worshiper could very well have only one idol without this monolatry having any similarity whatsoever with monotheism, for in such a case one would be ascribing to the idol only a single influence on a restricted area of objects or changes, beyond either of which one’s own interest and any feeling one shares with others would not extend. Adding further idols would be only an incidental matter, ordinarily resting as it does on the experience of an incapacity in the original idol but altogether lacking in any expectation of completeness thereby. Rather, not moving above this stage chiefly rests on the fact that a sense for any totality2 has not yet developed. The ancient ξόανἅ3 of the original Greek tribes were probably still idols proper,4 each one standing in and of itself alone. The combining of these various objects of veneration, whereby a single being5 would be substituted for a number of such idols and the emergence of a number of mythical circles, wherein these images would be brought into connection with each other, was a development by means of which the transition was made from idol-worship toward actual polyolatry.6 In the meantime, the more the notion of a manifold of local dwelling places was still attached to the beings formed in this way, the more polytheism still smacked of idol-worship. Polyolatry proper would be present only where local references have wholly faded into the background and the gods, now spiritually defined, had formed an organically structured, homogenous plurality, one that is not exactly shown to be a unified assembly7 but is nevertheless presupposed and striven after as if it were. Thereupon, the more some particular of this nature8 is referred to their entire system and, in turn, this system is referred to all being9 that is taken into people’s consciousness, the more definitely will the dependence of all that is finite be given utterance in religiously stirred self-consciousness, except that this dependence would not be on one supreme being but on precisely this highest collectivity. In this state of religious faith,10 however, there cannot fail to be at least a sporadic presentiment that there should be unity of a supreme being behind the plurality of higher beings. At that point, moreover, polyolatry is already also in process of disappearing and the way is being cleared toward monotheism. 2. At first, this differentiation—between having faith in one God, before which God the religious person positions oneself as a component part of the world and as absolutely dependent with this world, or having faith in a circle of gods, to which one stands in varied relations as they take part in dominion over the world, or, at bottom, having faith in particular

idols, which are proper to a family or to a locale or to some particular occupation in which one has one’s life—would indeed seem to be simply a differentiation belonging to modes of notions and thus, in accordance with our outlook, merely something deduced. Furthermore, for us only a difference in immediate self-consciousness could then fit the purpose of our being able to measure the development of piety by that immediate self-consciousness. However, it is also very easily shown that these different notions would, at the same time, depend on different states of self-consciousness itself. Idol-worship proper is grounded in an entanglement of self-consciousness that marks out human beings’ lowest state. This is so, in that higher and lower states are so little separated that even the feeling of absolute dependence is reflected as stemming from a singular, sensorily apprehended object. In that the capacity for being stirred religiously in polytheism unites with various states of being affected in sensory self-consciousness, it too exhibits a predominance of this diverse admixture of states. In such a predominance of diverse states the feeling of absolute dependence cannot yet be manifested in its full unity and in its indifference toward all that sensory self-consciousness can contain; instead, a plurality of sense-oriented objects is located therein, and the feeling of absolute dependence proceeds from that plurality. In contrast, suppose that higher self-consciousness will have developed to the full in its differentiation from sensory self-consciousness. Then—to the extent that we are capable of being sensorily affected overall, that is, insofar as we are actually component parts of the world, thus inasmuch as we take up this being component parts of the world11 into our self-consciousness and extend it to the point of our being conscious of universal finitude— we will have become conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent. Now, this latter form of self-consciousness can be exhibited only in monotheism and indeed only as it is expressed in the proposition being explained here. This is the case, for if we are conscious of ourselves in our finitude, without adding anything else, as absolutely dependent, then the same thing goes for all that is finite, and in this connection we also take up the entire world into the unity of our self-consciousness.12 Thus, the various ways of forming a notion of that which is outside ourselves, to which the consciousness of absolute dependence is referred, is interconnected, in part, with how far self-consciousness can variously extend itself. This is so, in that, as long as a person still identifies oneself with only a tiny portion of finite being, one’s god will still be a fetish. In part, the various ways of forming such a notion are also interconnected with how clearly higher self-consciousness is distinguished from lower self-consciousness. As is natural, in both respects polytheism exhibits an amorphous middle stage. On occasion this stage is scarcely distinguishable from idol-worship. On occasion, when a hidden striving toward unity shows up in the way its multiple features are treated, this stage can border very close on monotheism, whether this hidden striving is then manifested in that its gods tend to be depicted more as powers of nature, or in that they symbolize human attributes that appear in actual social relationships, or in that the two features are combined in the same cultic practice. Otherwise, how, in and of itself, what is coposited in the feeling of absolute dependence was to have been reflected as a plurality of entities13 could not be explained. Suppose, however, that higher consciousness

were not yet entirely separated from sensory self-consciousness. Then, what is coposited could also be apprehended only in a sensory manner, and at that point it would already bear the seed of multiplicity in itself. Thus, only when one’s religious consciousness is capable of being combined without distinction with all states of one’s sensory self-consciousness, yet also bears a stamp definitely separated from those states, such that in one’s actual religious stirrings no stronger differentiation arises than that of a joyful versus a downcast tone—only at that point will a person have fortunately moved beyond those two stages defined above. Only at that point, moreover, can one’s feeling of absolute dependence refer simply to one Supreme Being.14 3. Now, on this account it can also rightly be said that once piety would have developed anywhere to the point of faith in one God over everything, it may also be foreseen that eventually no human being will remain at any of those lower stages at any locale on this earth. This end can be predicted, for at every time and place this monotheistic faith quite prominently endeavors to spread itself further and to open up receptivity of human beings to it, even if not always in the most proper manner. Also, this very effort, as we can now see, ultimately succeeds even among the least developed of tribes, and it succeeds in such a way that they sometimes move directly from fetishism to that higher stage without passing through polyolatry. In contrast, as far as our history has extended up to now, retrogression from monotheism, strictly considered, has never actually occurred. Among most Christians who during persecutions reverted to heathenism, this relapse was only a seeming one. Where this relapse happened in earnest, those very persons could only have been swept away previously by some general movement in their conversion to Christianity, without having taken up the actual nature15 of this faith into their personal consciousness. It should not be inferred from this claim, however, that in order to explain the existence of fetishism it would be necessary to insert a still lower stage, namely one in which there is a total lack of any religious stirring. Although some people have already depicted the original state of human beings as such a brute existence,16 even though one cannot deny all traces of such an existence it is, nevertheless, not possible either to demonstrate historically or to get a general notion of how something of a higher nature can have developed of itself from this brutish state.17 No more is it also to be demonstrated that polyolatry has anywhere been transformed into genuine monotheism purely from within itself, though admittedly this process is at least conceivably possible, as has been indicated above. In general, however, we must ward against the demand that because we have distinctly displayed such a gradation in the formations of piety, it is, on that account, incumbent on us to add in some distinct original state of religion as well. After all, in other matters too, we do not ever return to such an original state of things. As long as these findings hold, we will stick solely with our presuppositions, not appealing to any historically shaped sayings about an entirely prehistorical age. These presuppositions permit to us a choice between two kinds of notion. Either that quite dim and entangled form of piety that we have discussed is to be viewed as the first formation everywhere, and it has subsequently risen to the level of polytheism through the gathering of

a number of small tribes into a larger community. Or a more childlike monotheism, yet precisely on that account one that was still an entangled admixture of higher religious consciousness and subordinate lower religious consciousness is to be viewed as the original formation of piety, and then among some people it fully dimmed down into idol-worship and among other people it was cleared up to the ultimate point of being an unalloyed faith in God.18 4. At this highest stage, which is monotheism, history shows us only three great communities—Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism. The first formation is almost in a process of extinction; the other two formations are still contending for dominion over the human race. By its restriction of Jehovah’s love to the Abrahamic tribe, Judaism still displays its affinity with the stage of fetishism, and its many veerings in the direction of idol-worship shows that during the political heyday of the Jewish people monotheistic faith was still not firmly rooted among them at that time. Only after their Babylonian exile had that faith emerged in an unalloyed and complete form. Despite its strictly held monotheism, by its passionate character and by the strikingly sensory content of the notions it holds, Islam, on the other hand, nonetheless betrays a strong influence from that sway of sensory orientation on the marked quality of its religious stirrings, which usually holds people fast at the stage of polyolatry. Hence, Christianity already presents itself as beyond those two forms of monotheism on account of its keeping free of both those deviations, and it lays claim to being the purest formation of monotheism that has gained any prominence in history. Hence, if strictly considered in large terms, there is also no retrogression from Christianity into Judaism or Muhammadanism any more than there is any reversion from any sort of monotheistic religion into polyolatry or idol-worship. Particular exceptions will always be interconnected with diseased states of mind and heart. Alternatively, instead of a change in piety, one form of impiety is simply exchanged for another, as is indeed generally the case with renegades. In this way, moreover, the comparison of Christianity with other religions of its kind given here already provides warrant for the claim that Christianity is, in fact,19 the most complete among the most developed forms of religion.20 Postscript 1. The presentation given here is not in agreement with a view that would recognize no piety at all but only superstition in religions at the subordinate stages, primarily because they are seen to have had their source in fear alone. In no way, however, does doing credit to Christianity require such a claim, for since Christianity itself claims that only love that is full and entire casts out all fear,21 it must also concede that imperfect love is never fully free of fear.22 Generally, moreover, it also obtains even in idol-worship that when an idol is prayed to only with a view to its protective role and not as one possessing the quality of an evil being, any fear expressed would in no way be wholly divorced from all stirrings of love; rather, it would be simply a foreshortening23 of the feeling of absolute dependence coordinated with an imperfect love. Suppose that someone wanted to seek out an entirely different organ for these subordinate religions, quite apart from the fact that many of them are far too cheerfully disposed to be able to be conceived out of fear. It would surely be difficult

to demonstrate what sort of tendency in the human soul, different from that proposed here, this would then be or what its inner intention would be. That is, what would it be by which idolatry is engendered and which, if religion proper should arise in its place, would have to disappear in turn. If this effort fails,24 then our only recourse is not to deny a certain homogeneity in all these products issuing within the human spirit, and we must also do no less than acknowledge the same root25 for all these lower potentialities. Postscript 2.26 Were it not for the similar sound of its name, there would scarcely be any occasion expressly to note that it does not at all belong to our subject to say anything about the peculiarly formed notion called “pantheism.”27 This is so, for this peculiarly formed notion has never been the confession of any religious community that has gained any prominence in history, and this is indeed all that we have to do with here. Actually, not once have even individuals originally designated their own outlook with this term. Rather, it has slipped in as a term of insult and teasing. Moreover, whenever this has happened, it has in every case remained difficult to make out any unity of meaning. The only thing that can be done with this subject here—but also at such a remote locus—is simply to raise the question as to what sort of relationship this mode of forming a notion has to piety. Now, it has already been granted that in contrast to the three types of monotheism pointed out here, this peculiarly formed notion, “pantheism,” has not arisen from religious stirrings in the form of immediate reflection on them. Suppose, however, that the question arises as to whether this notion, “pantheism,” might still be compatible with piety if it once arose in a different way—that is, along the path of speculation or even that of simply reasoning things out.28 Without a doubt, this question is to be answered in the affirmative—that is, inasmuch as pantheism is supposed, nonetheless, to express some mode and manner of “theism” and inasmuch as the word “pantheism” would not be solely and in general terms merely a masked materialistic negation of theism.29 If we look at idol-worship and consider how it is everywhere combined with an extremely limited acquaintance with the world and is therewith full of magic and sorcery of every kind, it is surely very easy to grasp that a distinct division between what is posited as world and what is posited as God is least conceivable at this stage. Moreover, why should a Hellenistic polytheist, ill at ease with the entirely human shapes given to the gods, not have been able to identify one’s own great gods with the more advanced gods of which Plato had spoken, also without accepting along with them that single god whom Plato had speaking to those gods but including, in addition, only the throne of necessity?30 The piety of this Hellenistic polytheist would not have changed with that alteration, but the notion held by this person would have become a pantheistic one.31 Yet, let us keep the highest stage of piety in view, and let us correspondingly also hold pantheism to the customary formulation “One and all.”32 In this regard, God and world would still be separate, at least as to the different functions of the two, and thus such a thinker could conceivably feel oneself to be dependent on what the One is in relation to that all, in that such a thinker could reckon oneself to be part of the world. States of this sort would then be hardly distinguishable from the religious stirrings of many a monotheist. At

the very least, the always rather odd and, if I may say so, crude, delimited distinction between an extra- or superworldly God and a God within the world scarcely adds anything to this matter. This is so, since, strictly taken, nothing can be said of God in accordance with the contrast between what is outside and what is inside the world without in some way endangering divine omnipotence and omniscience.33

1. Ed. note: “All that is finite” means “everything” in the universe. All things and processes and changes produced by divine causality are effected by the “One in the all.” Schleiermacher largely stopped using these exact expressions, “the One” and/in “the all,” after 1822, in view of critics’ still mistakenly referring to it to accuse him of pantheism. See his mere allusion to it in Der christliche Glaube (1821–1822) §133.3. In the present work, however, the meaning of it is repeated in slightly different forms, including separate use of “One” for God and of “all” for the whole of nature or the whole world. The relation of God to nature includes human nature, hence the entire ongoing process in creation and preservation of both the entire interconnected process of nature (Naturzusammenhang) and of the process of redemption within the human part of nature. Actually, it appears that his express intention all along had been to refer to God’s eternal, omniscient, omnipotent omnipresence (cf. §53) in the world. In his talk of God’s relation to human beings in Part One, “One” (Ein) is still attributed to God and “ all” (Alle) to the world, offered in a set of “presuppositions” that are themselves expressions of Christian religious immediate self-consciousness. In Part Two, expressions of what comprises the nature (Wesen) of God are used to sort out how to define God’s attributes of holiness and justice, each comparatively limited, as the earlier set of attributes was. This time, however, the expressions are limited by their necessary reference to the contrasting features of sin and evil. Then, finally, expressions regarding God’s nature are used, without such limitations, to define God’s attributes of love and wisdom, for reasons given where such attributes are discussed below. In both On Religion and Christian Faith, however, God’s benevolent love is differentiated from the other attributes, in that it is received in one’s immediate feeling, or immediate selfconsciousness. That receptivity to God’s love is itself an internal state, one that constitutes elemental faith and piety. None of the other attributes has this characteristic. See §8n12. 2. Totalität. Ed. note: When referring to a wholeness or totality among things, Schleiermacher normally uses another term: Gesamtheit. 3. Ed. note: Carved images. 4. Ed. note: That is, literally visible representations, single figures carved of wood, not invisible phantoms of the imagination. 5. Wesen. 6. Ed. note: That is, the equivalent of idolatry but positioned within the stage of polytheism. To maintain consistency, these translations are used: “idol-worship” (Götzendienst), which is within the stage of “fetishism” (Fetischismus), “polyolatry” (Vielgötterei) and “monolatry” (Monolatrie), which are within the stage of “polytheism” (Polytheismus). Moreover, what is distinctive about each of the stages of “monotheism” (Monotheismus) is marked by this one word, despite any carryover in them from these other subordinate stages. 7. Allheit. Ed. note: Versus a Vielheit (homogenous plurality), which would be a mere collection of gods, not yet either fully organized or belonging together. 8. Ed. note: dieser Wesen. See §8n4. 9. Sein. 10. Ed. note: The expression des frommen Glaubens indicates that piety (Frömmigkeit), at all these stages and in between, is rooted in a feeling that rises through the various levels of self-consciousness to an utter, unexceptionable feeling of absolute dependence, which is then given utterance in thinking and acting. Within each developing stage, this specific process is called “religious (or pious) faith” in contrast to intellectual faith (belief). In marginal comments (Thönes, 1873) to §8.1 and §8.2, Schleiermacher builds an “analogy” between the three general stages of self-consciousness within a continuous spread from more sensory-oriented to more fully spiritual-oriented, with the stages of religion all rooted in some kind of faith. The different stages from worshiping one or more idols through worshiping a “system” of many gods to simply worshiping one God, he states, lie “not simply in objective consciousness but in self-consciousness. Here,” he adds, “the analogy consists in the unbroken spread between partial and total dependence.” Schleiermacher held that the contrast between personalism and pantheism “runs through all three stages” in the development of religion, the gods/God coming to be regarded as “psychic entities” only in the later stages. For examples, see On Religion (1821) V, supplemental note 4. See also §36.1–2. For Schleiermacher’s further answer to the false charge of pantheism, see also §§32.2, 46.2, 49.2, and 53.2.

11. Ed. note: In context, consciousness of one’s being a “component part” involves more than that of being a distinct and separate part for Schleiermacher. To be a “component part” entails one’s being interconnected and interdependent with other parts of the world, ultimately with all parts, taken as a whole. 12. Ed. note: In On Religion (1821) I, supplemental note 5, he cites the 1821 version that corresponds to both §8.2 and §36 of Christian Faith (1830), partly described in §8n1 above. Other affirmations in successive discourses help to round out the very same picture as that evident in Christian Faith. Hence, in On Religion, discourse II, in a section to which the heading “God” has been added editorially, Schleiermacher states: “What I have been presenting is precisely the immediate and original being [activity of God’s being, not a divine identity for humans] of God in us through feeling. Isn’t God the sole and highest unity? Isn’t it God alone before whom and in whom all that is merely particular loses that status? If you regard the world as a universal whole, moreover, can you do this otherwise than in God? If you do not, then tell me something else that would enable us to differentiate Supreme Being, original and eternal being, from particular, temporal, and derivative being! We do not claim to have God in feeling other than through these stirrings, which the world brings forth in us. This is why God has not been spoken of in any other way.” Cf. CF §36. 13. Ed. note: Wesen. This term is also used for “human nature” and for “supreme being,” i.e., for those two entities and modes of being. 14. Ed. note: Cf. §36. 15. Wesen. Ed. note: That is, what characterizes it as distinctively Christian. This sense of the word does not imply an essence versus relatively incidental attributes. Rather, its use here seems to imply one’s missing the nature of Christianity, its “essence” with all its defining attributes, altogether. 16. Brutalität. Ed. note: Among other depictions, that of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1674) is particularly memorable. In his Leviathan (1651) 1.13 he presents that original state as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” 17. Ed. note: On this point, see §60.1. 18. Ed. note: In marginal notes to subsections 3 and 4, Schleiermacher further expresses his intention to offer a summary historical account of rather broad scope here, one based on information available at that time—see On Religion, discourse V, also his lectures on the current geography and statistics of the church worldwide in KGA II/16 (2005). Thus, here as in these sources, he offers sample exceptions to his general depiction. In the marginal notes (Thönes, 1873) he indicates that citizenship has been a major force in people’s becoming monotheists, at least nominally, and he points out exceptions to be analyzed. For example, he mentions the inroads of Buddhism on Muhammadanism, which he attributes especially to deficiencies in the latter religion. The religion called Christianity is also depicted as not appearing historically with perfect purity. As an example, he cites a transition of Christians backward into Jewish ways, which he attributes to “a misunderstanding of the Old Testament.” This general point he drives home in §§148–56, in comparing the “visible” with the “invisible” church. In his Christian ethics lectures, what he calls “purifying” or “restorative” action addresses itself to deficiencies in Christian life, just as “polemics” does in philosophical theology (Brief Outline §§54–62). In his view, because of the historical embeddedness of all theology, evinced throughout Brief Outline, such analysis and critique is an ongoing task, never complete, as is the formation of Christianity itself (BO cf., notably, §§69–85). 19. Cf. §7.3. 20. Ed. note: Schleiermacher focused on love of God for human beings and their loving response, but he rejected any strictly human-to-human-like reciprocity between God and the world, also any independence of the world or “World Spirit” from God. (See OR (1821) II, supplemental note 12.) The term Weltgeist popularly used at the time, was not specifically Christian, but it was best understood in a Christian context versus Judaic and Muslim contexts. This view and this term appear in On Religion (1821) II, supplemental note 12. There he especially argues that our attitude of religious “reverence” toward what Weltgeist stands for is to be found in “all the various forms and stages of religion.” In addition, those who emphasize “personalism” in their metaphysics and view of God have acknowledged that Schleiermacher coined the term, though he eschewed referring to God as a person. See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 4, where Schleiermacher applies the contrast between “personalism” and “pantheism” as running through all three major stages in the development of religions: fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. 21. 1 John 4:18. Ed. note: See the sermon on 1 John 4:16–18, Trinity Sunday, June 16, 1822, “The Perfection of Love,” originally published in 1825, also in SW II.4 (1835), 482–94, and (1844), 535–46. ET Tice in The Triune God (forthcoming). See also closely related sermons on John 16:21, Dec. 31, 1831, and on Rom. 5:7–8 from 1822, ET Wilson (1890). 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher gives an additional account in On Religion (1821) II, supplementary note 11. It rejects the notion of any stage of religion growing from fear and concludes: “All growth toward perfection in religion is simply a progressive purification of love.” See also OR (1821) V, supplementary note 14, for an allied use of this statement. 23. Umbiegung. Ed. note: Literally, a bending back, presumably to preshape it, like the folding back of a leaf before it fully unfolds.

24. Ed. note: “If this effort fails” translates vielmehr, a linking term Schleiermacher occasionally uses to convey more than a single word could in English. 25. Wurzel. Ed. note: Also, “potentialities” translates Potenzen. Although this postscript serves largely to address certain theories that separate supposedly false religion from true religion, it also confirms and clarifies Schleiermacher’s argument regarding what constitutes religion as such, this time aided by metaphors drawn from the life sciences, chiefly from botany. 26. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher writes of this postscript on the relationship of pantheism to monotheism: “This opus supererogativum has done me no good” (Thönes, 1873). This allusion to a scholastic doctrine of an act of grace beyond any ordinary act is an ironic recognition of his earlier efforts to clear up the point, which merely served, it would seem, to invite further calumny. 27. Ed. note: Apparently, some had read phrases like “the One and the all” as if they presented a pantheist identification of “the One” and “the all.” However, among such passages, the following from On Religion is typical, and the two are clearly not identified. In On Religion (1821) III D, divine love and the concept of “One” and/or in “all” appear in the same passage, under the heading “Rhythms of Sensitivity/Sensibility.” There he states: “Now, this recognition of the alien other and this denial of what is purely private, both of which are everywhere thrust upon a person of developed sensibility, this ever-present rhythm between love and scorn of all finite and limited things within oneself—all this is impossible unless one has at least a dim presentiment of the world and of God. It must increasingly call forth a clearer, more definite yearning for the One and all.” In Schleiermacher’s view, a process does indeed develop within oneself via images and imagination. Philosophy, science, and art all play a role in the mind’s discovery of a “resurrection” of all past religion, whether one likes it or not. Under the immediately following headings “Discovering the Universe” and “Resurrection” within OR (1821) III D, he refers first to currents of the day, freshly stirred by art, washing away both “vulgar scientific subtilties, lacking in true principles,” and “ruinous influence from false and fanciful intellectuality.” Then he avers that philosophy will teach one “to know oneself not as an individual only but as a living, co-creative member of the whole as well.” He adds: “All things shall be the reflection of one’s own spirit just as one’s spirit shall bear the impress of all things. One may search for oneself in this reflection then without losing or passing outside oneself, because all that is may lie within oneself.” At their entranceway, he imagines, all the human sciences (ethics) will hand one “a heavenly lyre and a magic looking glass.” By the latter “one may catch in countless forms the still and serious image of the Spirit, ever the same throughout the entire unending compass of humanity [elsewhere called by him “species-consciousness”], and using the lyre one may accompany what one sees with heavenly music. … One shall measure the might of nature from the bounds of world-creating space to the center of one’s own self. Everywhere one shall find oneself in unending strife and tenacious unity with nature, discovering in oneself both its innermost center and its furthest bounds. … One’s sight shall be firm and one’s outlook bright, under all disguises detecting the same reality and resting at last in nothing but the infinite and the One.” Now, all of these musings are addressed to persons whose sensibility has not yet recognized the supernatural force that exists, waiting to be opened to within one’s natural self, perhaps through an accompanying, deeply probing ministration of God’s gift of faith through the divers influences coming from communities of faith, which he here alludes to as “sanctuaries.” These influences, in turn, are aided by a theology based on receptivity to grace through faith. The theology itself is largely hidden among these more philosophical and rhapsodic discourses, except for their 1821 supplementary notes. Yet, insofar as these discourses are correct and clear in their own right, Schleiermacher regards them to be appropriately consistent with the philosophy and scientific knowledge and theological perspective that he brings to them. As conditions change over time, revisions would have to be made on all sides. Meanwhile, their distinct and different aims must be kept separate unless or until their findings entirely cohere in the end. See Brief Outline (1830, ET 2011), 150–55; also Dialectic (1811, ET 1996), xv–xvi, 38. 28. Spekulation … Raissonements. 29. Ed. note: Against the charge of “materialistic pantheism” and in a careful account of where it is appropriate to conceive Supreme Being as “personal,” see On Religion (1821) II, supplemental note 19. There he also indicates preferring the concept “living God,” one especially incapable of passivity. This preference does not seem to exclude God’s acting in other “personal” ways with human beings. He also states: “The conception of a personal God is required where it is necessary to interpret for oneself one’s immediate religious experience or others’ or where one’s heart is engaged in direct communication, or dialogue, with Supreme Being.” On his other responses to the charge of pantheism, see OG 47–53 and his lengthy supplemental note 21 to OR (1821) II. There the discussion of “immortality” turns into one on an expectation of eternal life in the human need for communion with the living God. 30. Ed. note: At this juncture Schleiermacher affixes a marginal note: “This point too has been misunderstood, as if I had called Plato himself a pantheist” (Thönes, 1873). References to a singular god above the other gods are strewn throughout Plato’s writings, but such references are not identifiable as pantheism. For centuries, among the Hellenists the major alternative to any of these positions was an overall force called “Necessity.”

31. Ed. note: In further response to his critics, Schleiermacher adds this marginal note: “Thus, supposing that I were a pantheist, that position (since it bears no dogmatic character whatsoever) would, nevertheless, belong only to my philosophy, of which I would have to believe that it is compatible with my dogmatics. If this were the case, in accordance with my own viewpoint, I would just have to guard against mixing it into my dogmatics all the more” (Thönes, 1873). 32. Ed. note: Under the heading “Immortality” (Erstreblichkeit) in On Religion (1821) II, Schleiermacher states: “The usual conception of God as an individual being or outside and beyond the world is not the whole story for religion. It is only one way of expressing what God is—a way seldom unalloyed and always inadequate. The true nature of piety, however, is neither this nor any other concept. It is our immediate consciousness of the deity as we find the deity to be present in ourselves and in the world alike. Moreover, this is precisely why the aim and character of a religious life is not immortality, as so many wish and believe—or as so many pretend to believe, for their longing to know more than is allowable of immortality makes their belief highly suspect. It is not that immortality which is outside and beyond time—or rather after this time but still in time—but only that immortality which we can already possess in this temporal life of ours. It is an aim to fulfill, a problem we shall always be seeking to solve. In the midst of finitude to become one with the infinite, and to be eternal in every instant—this is the immortality of religion.” Cf. CF §163 and §§117–20; also his 1819 essay On the Doctrine of Election. Being “eternal’ here cannot mean being equivalent to God but means partaking of what is eternal in God, in that the experience is less time bound, yet being in communion with the deity, with “the supernatural become natural” in human life (see index). 33. Ed. note: See §§53–54. With God’s eternity and omniscience, these are two of the four general attributes that Schleiermacher adopts from monotheism as the highest stage of talk about God, which is outlined in a purely introductory way here and which he takes to be “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness in expression of “the general relationship between God and the world.” He also holds that no attribute, strictly speaking, can express what can be said of God in Godself, apart from the world. Moreover, only our affirmation “God is love” (§§166–67) can be used fully to express what, in that consciousness, God is felt to be creatively, redemptively (thus, “economically”), in relationship to the world. The term “economic” refers to the Greek concept οἰκουμένη, the whole inhabited earth—a “household” (οἶκος), as it were, in which God dwells with human beings. The entire system of doctrine is to comprise an unfolding argument, the climax and conclusion of which lie in the affirmation that the God we can know wisely loves and is triune in relationship to both human beings and the world.

§9. In their reference to religious stirrings, those formations of piety display the greatest dissimilarity from each other that contrastingly subordinate what is natural in human situations to what is moral1 and subordinate what is moral to what is natural. 1. Here we are attempting to make a conceptual division between coordinate formations of piety,2 one that thus relates as a cross-section to the division of the entire area. This we also do chiefly for the sake of identifying Christianity and thus for the highest stage. Whether the same division would also apply to the subordinate stages is a question that does not belong to the matter being treated here at all. For the highest stage, however, the attempt is necessary for us to make. This is so, for even if that stage turns out to be entirely occupied historically by the three communities designated here, we would, nevertheless, still have to find a more closely defined location so as to grasp where Christianity fits in. Otherwise we would be able to distinguish it from the other two communities only in an empirical fashion, wherewith we could reach no surety as to whether even the more essential differences were being made to stand out or as to whether perhaps only incidental features were being picked up. Hence, this attempt is to be regarded as successful only when we find a ground for this division by which Christianity is definitely separated either in and of itself from the other two formations of piety or even simply together with one of the other two formations from the third.

Now, considered of itself alone, the feeling of absolute dependence is entirely simple, and the concept of it offers no basis for any differentiation. Thus, we can derive that basis only from the fact that for the feeling of absolute dependence to occupy any element,3 it must first be combined with some sensory stimulation of self-consciousness. These sensory stirrings, however, are to be viewed as endlessly multiple.4 Now, considered in and of itself, the feeling of absolute dependence bears an equal affinity with all those stirrings and is quite susceptible to being stimulated by all of them alike. Apart from all that, it can be assumed by analogy that in reality this affinity is variously differentiated not only in individual persons but in larger masses of people as well. In consequence, either it is the case that in some people a certain class of sensory-oriented feelings is formed easily and surely into religious stirring and another contrasting class of sensory-oriented feelings hardly does so or does so not at all, whereas in other people exactly the reverse relationship obtains; or it is the case that the same states of sensory self-consciousness are formed into religious elements in some people under one given condition but in other people under a contrasting condition.5 As concerns the first option, one could, first of all, divide these sensory-oriented feeling states into more spiritual and more physical ones, into those that arise through the influence of human beings and their actions and into those that arise through the influence of external nature. This division, however, could apply only to individual human beings, in that some tend to be religiously stirred more easily by impressions from external nature, whereas others tend to be religiously stirred more easily by social circumstances and by resonances6 that have arisen from that source. It is not possible, however, to explain a distinction between one religious community and others on this basis, in that every single one includes such differences within itself and none of them excludes either way of getting stirred religiously from its compass or even significantly places either source behind the other. One could notice, further, that just as life as a whole is comprised of an interweaving of doing and undergoing and a succeeding of each from the other, so too a human being is conscious of oneself as sometimes being more active and sometimes being more passive. This notion, moreover, already permits of being construed more easily as the way greater masses of people are constituted in common, in that in some situations the active form of self-consciousness will rise more easily to the point of religious stirring and the passive form would stay back more at the sensory level, whereas in other situations the relationship would be just the reverse. Yet, it is surely the case that this distinction, simply conceived in this way, remains solely a fluid one, flowing between more and less, with the result that the very same element is to be conceived as more passive in comparison with one given element and as more active in comparison with yet another element. If a wide-ranging classification is to be made among the various formations of piety, one that is applicable within the whole scheme of things, the fluid distinction just outlined has to be converted into the sort of contrasting subordination that is indicated in our proposition. In the one direction, this subordination is most strongly marked when passive states—whether pleasurable or not pleasurable, whether occasioned by social circumstances or by external nature—bestir the feeling of absolute dependence, but only to the extent that they are referred

to self-initiated activity.7 That is, in this case passive states are referred to self-initiated activity only to the extent that we know the following: precisely because we find ourselves to be in relation to the totality of being, a relationship that is expressed within a given passive state, what we are to do is thus to be done in such a way that the action that is there for us to do, which action interconnects with that passive state and emerges out of that passive state, has precisely this sort of God-consciousness as its impetus. Thus, wherever piety takes its shape in this way, passive states raised to the point of religious stirring come to be simply an occasion for some distinct activity to unfold, an activity that can be explained only on the basis of a God-consciousness that is modified in just this way. Within the domain circumscribed by such religious stirrings, moreover, all passive relationships of a human being to the world appear only as means whereby the totality of one’s active states are called forth. In this manner, the contrast between what is sensorily pleasurable and not pleasurable is overpowered within that domain and fades into the background, though that contrast does indeed remain predominant in instances where sensory feeling does not rise to the point of religious stirring. This subordination of passive to active states we designate by the term teleological piety. Admittedly, in other precincts this term is used somewhat differently. Here, however, it is to mean simply that the predominant relation to a moral8 task forms the fundamental typus of religious states of mind and heart. In this case, if action that is prefigured in religious stirrings is an actual working action9 that contributes to advancement of God’s reign,10 then the state of mind and heart is uplifting,11 whether the feeling that occasions it is pleasurable or not pleasurable. In contrast, if an action that is here prefigured in religious stirring is a retreat into oneself or a seeking for help in overcoming some hindrance to the higher life, a hindrance that has become markedly apparent, then the state of mind and heart becomes one lowly in nature,12 whether the feeling that occasions it is pleasurable in that case or not pleasurable. In taking the second, contrasting direction, the subordination of active to passive states is fully manifested when one’s self-consciousness regarding a state of activity is taken up into one’s feeling of absolute dependence only with respect to how that very state appears as the result of ongoing relationships between oneself as subject13 and the totality of all other being, thus this subordination of active to passive occurs when it is specifically referred to the passive aspect of the subject. In this case, however, every particular state of activity is simply a distinct expression of one’s ongoing relationship to commonly held human powers, a relationship that exists within the subject and that forms the personal distinctiveness of the subject. Consequently, in every religious stirring of this sort, that same relationship is itself posited as the result of the influences of all things on the subject, influences ordained by Supreme Being. Accordingly, in one’s uplifting states the relationship is posited as harmony —that is, as the beauty of an individual life—and in the not-pleasurable or lowly states, respectively, it is posited as discord or ugliness. Now, this second formation of piety, in which every element of self-initiated activity is taken up into the feeling of absolute dependence only as an individual’s being determined by the totality of finite being— thus, in

which every element is referred to the passive aspect of one’s life—we choose to call aesthetic14 piety. By virtue of the contrasting subordination of what is alike posited in each basic form of monotheistic piety in relation to the other basic form, the two basic forms are also in contrast to each other. Moreover, every shared religious feeling15 is naturally fashioned in both formations of piety, as is true of personal religious feeling. This is so, in that the first kind of monotheistic piety consists of a broadened self-consciousness, whereas the second kind consists only of a self-consciousness rather narrowed down.16 2. Now, a general demonstration concerning whether the modes of faith that have arisen in history can best be distinguished using this contrast would be the business of a general critical history of religion. Here the only question is whether the classification is warranted to the extent that it enables one to distinguish Christianity from modes of faith that are coordinate with it and to facilitate our separating out its distinctive nature by a closer determination of its location. In any case, the mode of faith that most comes to our minds, present as sharply contrasted to Christianity in this respect, is not coordinate with it but belongs to a lower stage, namely, Hellenistic polyolatry. In this mode of faith, the teleological tendency is entirely recessive. Neither in their religious symbols nor even in their mystery cults is there any significant trace of the idea of a totality of moral ends17 or of a relation of human situations in general to those ends. On the other hand, what we have called the aesthetic outlook pre-dominates most distinctly, in that even the gods are chiefly defined so as to depict various circumstances within the activities of the human soul and thus in a distinctive form of inner beauty. Now, even apart from Christianity’s occupying a higher stage, no one would readily deny that Christianity offers resistance to this characteristic in the sharpest way. Whatever comes to be God-consciousness within this Christian domain is also referred to the totality of all situations of activity within the idea of a reign of God.18 In contrast to this view, the notion of a “beauty of the soul,”19 which has been supposed to be conceived as the result of all the influences on the soul from nature and the world, has constantly remained so alien to Christianity—despite its massive early assumption of Hellenism into itself—that within its course of common parlance it has never taken up this notion within the domain of Christian piety or has given it currency in any treatment of Christian ethics at all. In contrast, that image of a reign of God, which is so significant, indeed is all-encompassing in Christianity, is simply the general expression of the fact that in Christianity all pain and all joy are religious only to the extent that they are referred to activity within God’s reign, and also of the fact that every religious stirring in Christianity that proceeds from a passive state ends up in consciousness of some transition into activity.20 Now, however, it should also be decided herewith whether or not the designated contrast between the teleological tendency and the aesthetic tendency might still perchance stand in a necessary connection with a distinction between the two stages, with the result that all polytheism would necessarily belong to the aesthetic side of the contrast and all monotheism would belong to the teleological side. To make this decision, we must stick with only the

highest stage itself and ask whether or not the two other monotheistic modes of faith relate to that stage in the same way Christianity does. Accordingly, even if Judaism directly relates passive states to active ones, it does so more in the form of divine rewards and punishments than in the form of divine summonses and means for growth.21 Thus, the predominant form of God-consciousness in Judaism is, nevertheless, that of a commanding will, and thus even when it proceeds from passive states it turns to active ones. Islam, on the other hand, does not display the same subordination of passive states to active ones in any fashion. Instead, this formation of piety comes to a complete standstill in the consciousness of unchanging divine ordinances of fate. The result is also that consciousness of self-initiated activity is at one with the feeling of absolute dependence only in such a way that its determination is posited as resting in those acts of fate. A subordination of what is moral to what is natural is thus most clearly revealed in this fatalistic characteristic of Islam. Based on this analysis, the monotheistic stage appears to be divided up as follows. The teleological typus is most clearly marked in Christianity, less completely so in Judaism, whereas Muhammadanism, though likewise fully monotheistic, unmistakably bears the mark of the aesthetic typus. Accordingly, for the fulfillment of our task, we are already directed to a distinct domain, and what we would like to set forth as the distinctive nature of Christianity should no more diverge from the teleological tendency than descend from the monotheistic stage.22

1. Ed. note: dem Sittlichen. Throughout his writings, Schleiermacher assigns this domain to what involves human mentation and action (Ethik) in contrast to what is strictly nonhuman and physical (Physik), a distinction he draws from ancient Greek philosophy. Thus, in his ethical discourse, Moral (“morals”) refers to only part of the domain of morality (Sittlichkeit) and is not even restricted simply to moral custom (Sitte). In his lectures on Psychologie and elsewhere, moreover, he deems the human psyche to be inextricably body-mind in human life on earth. Thus, the Christian in this aspect of dogmatics concerns the whole of Christian life, individually and communally, not any diminished domain of human behavior. Sittlich was the only term he had available for this larger domain, despite its faulty associations. 2. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher issues the reminder that “formations of piety” means “only church, not piety itself “ (Thönes, 1873). At this particular point, moreover, “church” is largely an “empirical” category, as he will indicate below, not yet one that is adequate for locating the essential nature of Christianity from the other two prominent modes of monotheistic faith. Note that the scale from predominantly natural to predominantly moral becomes a vertical “cross-section” for the three major monotheisms that can be identified historically, which, in turn, also form a scale that could also include other monotheisms. Although this vertical scale could also apply to the three-part subdivision of major formations of piety from the lowest stage to the highest stage, this possibility is not at issue in this work. 3. Moment. Ed. note: This same term, also used for chemical elements, appears in the final sentence of this paragraph. 4. Ed. note: In a marginal note here (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher refers to the sensory stimuli as providing a “material” condition, whereas the separation of more prominent modes or types of monotheism refers to differences in “tendency” (Tendenz). Below, the latter concept is relayed by the word Richtung (meaning either “direction” or “tendency”). 5. Ed. note: In his marginal note at this point, Schleiermacher identifies his “procedure” here as a “critical” one, i.e., as one that sets up alternatives for the critical purpose of examining them comparatively (Thönes, 1873). 6. Stimmungen. Ed. note: Here “resonances” is intended to capture a variety of voices—spoken, or expressed through music, moods, and dispositions—all of which can be present in social circumstances. 7. Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: Particularly in earlier texts, such as the Brouillon (1804–1806), the equivalent term used is Spontaneität. Both are contrasted with Receptivität or Empfänglichkeit. Constantly, he takes both states, otherwise called

“more active” and “more passive,” to be consistent in every human state of mind and heart (Gemütszustand). 8. Ed. note: Here “moral” (sittliche) refers to the formation of actions (Handlungen) in human relationships of any kind, including treatment of oneself. They are not restricted to morals in any narrower sense, but they do relate to an ideal end point (τέλος). 9. Ed. note: Here “actual working” translates werktätiger, as in the expression “working class”; it also means “practical” in the sense of praxis, but Schleiermacher’s usual word for that concept is praktisch. The phrase “prefigured in religious stirrings,” in turn, refers to the rooting of religious action in feeling, thus in religious stirrings (cf. §8n10 and n20). 10. Reiches Gottes. 11. Ed. note: Or “edifying” (erhebender). 12. Ed. note: Here the contrasting word is demütigender, which means being in a reduced, more humbling state of mind and heart, hence a lowly one in the context of “the higher life.” 13. Subjekt. Ed. note: As a “subject,” a person is literally “thrown under” (sub-ject), that is, in the language of contrast, this one undergoes and is relatively passive in reference to that with which one is fundamentally in relationship. Thus, within this typus of monotheism overall, one tends to be in a more lowly (demütigend) and more submissive state rather than in a state of self-initiated activity, in relationship to the Supreme Being, as in relation to all that occasions what the feeling of absolute dependence leads to in one’s life. By implication, in the latter case one tends not to be so predominantly active in the advancement of God’s reign. 14. Ed. note: The term Schleiermacher uses here draws especially from epistemological approaches like Eberhard’s that root mental functions in sense perception and attendant feelings at that level. (This is the basic meaning of the Greek word αἰσθητικός, often by extension applied especially to the study of art as well.) During his two student years in the University of Halle (April 1787 to May 1789), Schleiermacher had taken several courses in philosophy by Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809), a pastor and much-published philosopher from 1763 to 1778, then from 1778 onward a professor at Halle. These courses included one on Aesthetik, chiefly an empirical, epistemological investigation into how sense-oriented experience comes to function generally and then particularly in art. Schleiermacher’s subsequent lectures on the subject considerably diverged from Eberhard’s but were clearly stimulated by them. Eberhard had already published most of his noted philosophical works by 1788, including Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens (Berlin, 1776) and Theorie der schönen Künsten (Berlin, 1773), and he later issued a four-volume Handbuch der Aesthetik (Halle, 1803–1805). 15. Ed. note: “Shared religious feeling” translates fromme Mitgefühl, referring to the basic feeling shared in common within a community of faith. This word also has other meanings—namely, “sympathy” and “compassion”—which do not seem to fit almost anywhere in the present work. Cf. On Religion (1821) IV and supplemental note 10. 16. Ed. note: Here “rather narrowed down,” expressing a state of construction, translates zusammengezogenes. 17. Ed. note: Again, the concept sittlicher Zwecke (ends or purposes toward which human life should be tending) refers to the “telos” in “teleological” but not to a narrower conception of morals for which moralischer Zwecke might have been a more appropriate expression. Here “human situations in general” (menschlichen Zustände im Allgemeinen, over the entire compass of them) indicates the larger scope meant by sittliche in Schleiermacher’s ethical writings. 18. Ed. note: At this point Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Opponents have totally overlooked passages such as this one” (Thönes, 1873). 19. Ed. note: The marginal note claims: “Not once has even Platonic thought brought κάλλος [the idea of such “beauty”] into circulation” (Thönes, 1873). 20. Ed. note: On Jesus’ awakening of the reign of God in his early disciples, Schleiermacher describes this event as “a divine impetus and inspiration” that existed in him alone, one freely received by them, however. See OR (1821) III, supplemental notes 1–2. In OR (1821) III supplemental note 3, Schleiermacher links some positive relations of letter to spirit with this phenomenon. What does it mean to be politically free in this connection? See supplemental note 4, in which he analyzes the German social and political situation then current. See CF index on “reign of God,” on “spirit and letter,” and on “freedom, personal and political.” 21. Aufforderungen und Bildungsmitteln. Ed. note: That is, the Christian understanding of God suggested here is of one who by grace invites and calls, then provides the means and communal arrangements necessary to facilitate formation in a life of piety. 22. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher’s 1821 accounts of this distinction, see On Religion I, note 2, on a base in “sensation”; On Religion III, note 2, on an initial “sacred spark”; On Religion II, notes 12–13, and CG1 (1821) §16.3, on the main classification of monotheistic formations of piety.

§10. Every particular formation of communal piety has its unity, in part externally, as something historically constant, arising from a distinct beginning, and, in part

internally, as a distinctive modification of all that also appears within every developed mode of faith of the same kind and stage. Moreover, the distinctive nature of each formation is to be observed on the basis of these two modes of unity taken together. Cf. On Religion (1821), V.1 1. The first part of this proposition would be false if one could show, or even simply consider it to be possible, that Christian piety could somewhere emerge of itself, as it were, entirely apart from any historical connection with the impulse that proceeded from Christ. The same would then also be true of Jewish piety and Muhammadan piety in relation to Moses and Muhammad. No one, however, would claim this possibility. To be sure, such an external unity2 would not be so firm at the subordinate stages. This is the case, in part, because there the starting point often falls into prehistoric times, as is also true of preMosaic, monotheistic devotion to Jehovah, also, in part, because many of the historical forms at these stages such as Hellenistic polytheism and, even more, Roman polytheism, present themselves as wholes that were gradually woven together, or even that grew together of themselves, out of a number of very different starting points. Certainly, something similar could also be asserted regarding systems of piety stemming from within Nordic and Indian regions. These systems of piety may seem to be exceptions, but they rather serve to prove the rule given in our proposition. This is so, for the less it is possible definitely to show what the external unity of a system of piety is, the more unstable its internal unity is as well. It appears, moreover, that just as in the domain of nature even species are more indistinctly sustained at the subordinate stages of life, so too in the domain of piety a uniform consummation of external and internal unity remains to be reserved only for the higher stage of its development. Thus, even in the most complete formation of piety—which we ourselves would like to designate in advance to be Christianity—its internal distinctiveness must be intimately bound to that by which its external unity is grounded historically. The second part of this proposition would be false if one could claim that, essentially, the various religious communities had come to be separated from each other only by time and space, without having any actual internal differentiation. Three things would be attached to this claim. First, it would imply that if two of these communities should come into contact with each other at some locale, they would also have to recognize each other to be identical and thus would have to come together as one. Second, it would imply that this outcome could be delayed, to a certain degree, purely by the foolishly stubborn desire to carry the given founder’s name. Third, it would likewise imply that, without any prior internal change, a person could transfer from a given religious community into quite another religious community solely by dissolving one’s prior historical ties and attaching oneself to another one. All experience, however, contends against these things. Indeed, given our presupposition, it would also be impossible for a religious community3 to arise within a given one and then cut itself loose from that community. This is so, for if nothing new were ever to

have come into a given religious community, where everything would have been the same beforehand, no new beginning could ever occur there either. 2. Now, there is no need for any further discussion here concerning the proper beginning of any religious community. That is, it is a matter of indifference whether a new modification of the feeling of absolute dependence would first be formed in one individual or simultaneously in more than one, except that in each formation of communal piety the second case is generally found to be less probable than the first case. Likewise, it would be unprofitable at this juncture to seek to distinguish the various ways in which such a new cultivation of piety can emerge in the soul, since community always emerges only by means of communication and translation. Some discussion does need to be added, however, regarding internal differentiation between formations of communal piety, which differentiation is expressly featured in the proposition. That is, this proposition asserts something that, in any case and in accordance with our purpose here, is to be applied only to religious communities at the highest stage: that indeed something of the same would exist in all these communities, but in each community everything would exist in a different fashion. In contrast, the prevailing outlook4 is that most of what would exist in all communities at the highest stage would be the same, also, that in each community something particular is still added to all that is held in common. Thus, to give a rough depiction of how this other view might work out, faith in one God would be what is held in common by all these communities, but, as to what is appended to that faith, in one community obedience to the law would be added, in another community faith in Christ instead of that obedience, and in the third community faith in the prophets. Suppose, however, that faith in Christ were to have no influence on God-consciousness, viewed as already existing without it and prior to it, also that it were to have no influence on the way in which God-consciousness unites with sensory stirrings. In that case, either this faith in Christ would stand entirely outside the domain of piety and, consequently, since no other domain whatsoever could be assigned to it, this faith in Christ would have no importance whatsoever, or Christ would be merely a solitary figure who could also produce impressions that could unite with God-consciousness, and in this case too, any faith in him would be out of the question. Yet, suppose that the opinion should be that faith in Christ bears some influence, to be sure, but only on certain religious stirrings, the most of which, however, would be formed in Christianity exactly as they are in other monotheistic modes of faith. Then this opinion would nonetheless imply the claim that this faith in Christ would bear less of an influence on God-consciousness, which would indeed also have to be the same in all religious stirrings of the same person at the same time—that is, as long as that person would belong to the same religious community. Rather, it would consist only in an influence on sensorily aroused selfconsciousness, which influence thus could not serve to ground any unique mode of faith. Hence, all that remains is the position adopted in our proposition, which position carries the implication that in every really distinctive religious community self-consciousness itself has to be one differently determined, in that only under this condition can any and all of its religious stirrings also be differently determined. Now, if it is true that God-consciousness is

itself differently determined in two given modes of faith, then it must be possible to show in every particular example that might be brought forth that only seemingly can one thing be entirely the same in either one of these modes of faith as in the other. Likewise, it would also have to be only a seeming matter if something should exist in either of these two modes of faith that is entirely lacking in the other.5 That is to say, if it were true that God’s becoming human and communication of the divine Spirit were both also present6 in other modes of faith, what should be absolutely new about Christianity? The same thing, however, can also be discerned in general. That is, if, under the presupposition of a fully realized, likedetermined God-consciousness, something is to be a feature in one mode of faith that does not exist in another, then this feature could rest only on a different domain of experience. Moreover, if the given experiences should turn out to counterbalance each other, then, accordingly, the entire distinction would have to disappear.7 3.8 Now, although we were able to set forth the concept “kind” only in a more indefinite sense for our domain, nevertheless that of an “individual entity”9 is more firmly established here. Moreover, the formulation set forth in our proposition is the same as that which applies to all differences of an individual nature that appear within the same genus and species. That is to say, every human being has everything that others do, yet every thing is differently determined, and the greatest similarity is merely a diminishing or, at most, relatively vanishing difference. Accordingly, every kind has the same characteristic as every other kind of its species has, and, in the proper sense, all that is added is merely incidental. Yet, the discovery of this differentiation in some distinctive existence10 is a task never totally resolvable in words and sentences; rather, that end can only be reached for by approximation. Hence, even those who do research into physical nature and those who write histories tend to highlight certain features as indicators, without wanting to claim that these features would express everything that is decisively differentiating and characteristic, and in most instances those who describe religion would also have to be satisfied with this process. If, in the meanwhile, something of a general nature is to be offered on this subject, in an attempt to keep apologists who are focusing on a particular mode of faith from falling too far off the mark, we would do well simply to stick with the position that is advanced here. In sum, we would say that in every distinctive mode of faith, God-consciousness, which is in and of itself the same overall at the same stage, adheres to some particular reference11 of selfconsciousness, whatever it may be, in such a preeminent way that this God-consciousness can be united with all other determinations of self-consciousness only by means of that primary one. As a result, therein all other references that self-consciousness may have are subordinate to this one, and this reference communicates its color and tone to all these other references. If it should seem as if simply a different rule for connecting religious elements of life were expressed by this position, more than a differentiation of form or content, it is only to be noted that every religious element is itself a connection, namely, as a transition from a previous element to the one that follows, and so it would also have to become quite another element if religious self-consciousness were placed under another mode of connection. Postscript.12 Only based on the two points set forth in our proposition—namely, based on

the special beginning to which each religious community refers and based on the distinctive formation that religious stirrings and utterances concerning those stirrings assume in each such community—can linguistic usage of the two well-known expressions “positive” and “revealed” be regulated in theological language. It is also well-known that these rather variously entangled expressions are often used wholly in the same way, whether they refer in one place to particular doctrines and in another place to modes of faith wherever they may be, also in contrast to what is “natural” in one place and to what is in accord with “reason” in another place. On this account, it might also be difficult to fix their meaning in such as way as to form a uniform, univocal usage for them in the domain of scientific theology. We have a good lead toward examining the expression “positive” in the use made of it in the domain called “doctrine of law,”13 wherein positive law is contrasted with natural law. If one compares these two concepts of law, one finds that “natural law” is never used in the same sense as “positive law,” namely, as the basis of a civic community. Even the originative and simplest relationships, such as those of paternal authority or marital union, are defined in a distinctive way in every society. In the state they are defined by acts of legislation written down, before that by prevailing custom.14 In contrast, natural law is simply that which permits of being abstracted in the same fashion from the legislation of all societies. Indeed, even if natural law were to be established in a different way, as a matter of pure knowledge, anyone would admit nonetheless that if the issue were to become one of how to apply it, natural law would still have to be more narrowly defined at that point and thus, when viewed as applicable, would likewise be capable of being traced back only to the act of producing this narrower definition. Now, it is also the case with “natural religion” that when it is viewed as the basis of some religious community,15 it is actually nothing but whatever permits of being uniformly abstracted from the doctrines of all religious communities of the highest rank as something present in them all but differently defined in each one.16 Such a notion of “natural religion” has roughly indicated the common locations for all those religious states of mind and heart that are present in ecclesial communities. Suppose that one were to imagine all possible religious communities to have existed already. Suppose, too, that the various philosophical systems had smoothed out their differences with each other even with respect to the terminology to be used for such a teaching. Then the content of natural religion would have to be the same everywhere and self-identical at all times. Even then, however, natural religion would always and everywhere be simply a property possessed by certain select individuals from the various religious communities. These select individuals, aside from their distinct type and mode of piety and aside from the expression of that piety in doctrine, would also be able to view what is in reality divided as brought together in a higher unity, recognizing from their own standpoint what the other religious communities share in their interconnection with them as well. It would also not be difficult to show, on the one hand, that what people designate by the word “natural religion” has also actually arisen in this fashion and, on the other hand, that particular attempts to make this secondary product into the basis for an ecclesial community

have always failed17 and would always have to fail. Still, this matter has less of a place here. Suppose, however, in accordance with this analysis, that in any case such a natural entity were viewed as a sheer combination of doctrinal propositions18—not so much a religion as, more properly speaking, a set of faith-doctrines,19 even if it had arisen in yet another way— and as such would simply comprise what is held in common among all monotheistic modes of faith. On that condition, what is positive in each of these modes of faith would prove to be what is individualized20 in it. As we have shown above, what is individualized is not present in a given monotheistic mode of faith only here and there, by happenstance. Rather, although it comes more to the fore in one place and less so in another place, it is, exactly taken, still constantly present throughout that mode of faith. It is also simply a misconception when someone wants to distinguish actually existing religious communities by supposing that what is positive in one of them is lodged at one place, whereas in another among them it is lodged in another place—claiming, for example, that in Christianity it would be lodged in doctrines, in Judaism it would be lodged in commandments.21 That is to say, if in one given community commandments are more worked out and doctrines less so, and in another community the reverse is done, then in the first case doctrine is simply hidden in commandment, viewed in the guise of symbol, and in the second case doctrine itself appears in the guise of a commandment to express and to confess that doctrine. It would also be just as incorrect to deny that the prescriptions contained in Christian ethics would be what is positive as to deny that doctrine regarding Jehovah is what is positive in Judaism. In any case, neither commandment, viewed as the expression of a shared mode of action, nor doctrine, viewed as the expression of a shared kind of notion, is something originative in any mode of faith. Rather, both features are grounded in the shared distinctiveness of religious stirrings.22 Now, without these specific religious stirrings even a given distinct religious community itself could not have arisen; however, this religious community will have continued to exist based on the fact that marks its beginning and with reference to that same fact. Thus, the distinctive stamp of its religious stirrings is also necessarily grounded in that fact. Its distinctive stamp, thus conceived, is then to be designated by the term positive.23 This term signifies that content of an individual nature24 comprised of the totality of religious elements of life within a given religious community,25 to the extent that this content is dependent on the originative fact from which the community itself has emerged as an interconnected historical phenomenon. The expressions reveal, revealed, revelation proffer still more difficulties, in that already as they originated they sometimes meant more an illumination of what was obscure, confused, or unnoticed, and sometimes they meant more an uncovering and unwrapping of something that had previously been concealed and held secret. Still more entanglement, however, has come into them by means of the distinction made between mediated and immediate revelation. For all that, probably everyone will readily unite in recognizing that neither what is uncovered by one person in the domain of experience and passed on to others, nor what is devised by one person’s thinking things out and in that way acquired by others’

learning, will ever be designated as “revealed”—nor, moreover, that any divine communication or making known26 will be presupposed to occur in these ways. Further, in this sense we do find this expression to be quite generally applied to the very inception of religious communities. That is to say, of what religious mysteries or special devotion to God would it not have been claimed by the Hellenes or by the Egyptians and Indians, that they originally came down from heaven or that they had been proclaimed by the deity in some manner lying outside an interconnection with things human? Indeed, not infrequently we also find the beginning of civil societies—just as from the outset onward what is moral and what is religious often make their appearance undivided—traced back to some divine sending of the one who initially gathered a given tribe into a civil union and thus find the new ordering of life grounded on a revelation. Accordingly, we would be able to say that the concept “revelation” designates the originative character of the fact that underlies a given religious community, insofar as this fact, viewed as conditioning those contents of an individual nature27 regarding the religious stirrings that are coming forth within that community, is not itself to be understood, in turn, simply based on the earlier interconnected historical context referred to just above. Now, awareness that here a divine causality is posited in what is originative requires no further discussion,28 nor does its being in an efficacious action that aims at and advances the salvation of human beings. Yet, I would not wish to accept the definition that divine causality would be a working on humans in their role as cognitive beings, for in that case revelation itself would also be originatively and essentially doctrine. I do not believe, moreover, that we could stick with this definition either if we are looking at the entire domain covered by the concept “revelation” or if we want to define the concept in advance chiefly in relation to Christianity. That is to say, if a combination of propositions can be understood based simply on their interconnection with other propositions, then nothing supernatural would even be necessary for their production. If this is not the case, it directly follows, before all else, that such a combination of propositions can also be comprehended—if we simply appeal, concerning them, to the first principles of hermeneutics29—only as parts of a different whole, which whole is viewed, in turn, as an element in the life of a thinking being who originatively has an effect on us as a distinctive existence,30 by means of the total impression made on us by this thinking being. This effect, moreover, is always an effect on selfconsciousness. Thus, the originative fact will always be the appearance of such an existence, and the originative effect will always be that made on the self-consciousness of those in whose sphere of life that existence enters. It is quite clear that doctrine is not excluded hereby but is coposited. As for the rest, it ever remains very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to place definite boundaries on this definition of “revelation” and, if it is distinctly grasped in this way, to explain how it emerged and where it spread. This is so, for everywhere in the mythological domain—for Hellenes as well as Orientals and the Norse—these divine communications and proclamations border so closely on the higher states of heroic as well as poetic inspiration that it is hard to separate the first set from the second set. At that point, moreover, it is scarcely possible for a broader

application of the concept to be held in check. That is, every prototype that becomes apparent in people’s psyche, and that is neither to be understood as a mere imitation nor to be explained satisfactorily based on either external stimuli or preceding internal states, may be regarded as revelation, whether the prototype is referred to a specific deed or is referred to a work of art. This is bound to occur, for in this arena the claim that one revelation is comparatively greater and another one is smaller can generate no distinct boundary between them. Moreover, an inspired inner production of a new and distinctive depiction of a god and an emergence of a special sort of devotion to a god have often been one and the same thing. Indeed, it would hardly be possible to set a secure boundary along some natural pathway anywhere between what is revealed and what has come to light through inspiration, unless one is willing to revert to the claim that revelation is to be assumed only where an entire existence is determined by31 such a divine communication, not some particular element, and to the claim that what would then be made known32 by such an existence would be deemed to be revealed. Such features are present in the polytheistic religions as divine selfproclamations33 and sayings tied to distinct holy places that have been declared to be specially chosen habitations for deity; certain persons are also present there, who, because they are descended from the deity, proclaim34 what is divine, in an originative manner incomprehensible based on historical context alone, prototypically in a human life. In the same sense, Paul refers to the world itself as an original revelation of God.35 Even this approach, however, could lead, in turn, to the claim that in and of itself nothing particular should be regarded as a divine revelation, in that what is particular does, after all, always belong to the world. The reason is twofold. First, the emerging of a prototype within an individual psyche, even if it is not to be comprehended based on the previous states of that very psyche, would still have to be capable of being comprehended based on the overall condition of the society to which that individual belongs. Second, likewise also those human beings upon whom divine descent is bestowed would nonetheless always appear as persons socially determined—consequently, in their very existence would be comprehended based on the overall strength of their people. Accordingly, as we have already seen, a relationship of the concepts “revelation” and “revealed” to the concept “positive,” standing as it does for the total domain of religious communities that have a continuing existence in history, must indeed be firmly established. Even so, of course, at the same time we would still unavoidably find that application of the concepts “revelation” and “revealed” to the fact that underlies a distinct religious community would be contested by all other religious communities, while each religious community would claim these same concepts for its own basic fact. Finally, the following observation is also to be added: that if a given mode of faith should want to validate the explication it makes of the concepts “revelation” and “revealed” over against that made in all the other modes of faith, it could in no way carry out this intention by claiming that its divine communication is the whole truth, unalloyed, but the others’ supposedly divine communications contain falsehood. This is so, for it would belong to an acquisition of complete truth that God would make known how God is in and of Godself.36 Such a truth, however, could not be derived externally from any sort of fact; indeed, even if

such a truth were attained in some incomprehensible fashion within a human psyche, it could not be grasped and firmly held therein as thought. Moreover, if it could in no way be perceived by the senses37 and firmly held, it could also have no efficacy. Only God can articulate in God’s relationship with us a self-proclamation38 of God that is to have efficacy toward and in ourselves. This phenomenon, moreover, does not betoken a lack of awareness39 concerning God among human beings; rather, it indicates the nature of human limitation with respect to God. Another thing that interconnects with this observation, on the other hand, is that within a sphere marked by totally crude states and states of being wholly sunk into reverie, an emergent consciousness of God could truly be a revelation; and yet, in the very way in which that consciousness would come to be grasped hold of and held fast, it could, by some fault of mind and heart, come to be quite incomplete. Hence, it should then be possible rightly to say even of incomplete formations of piety40—to the extent that they are, wholly or in part, to be traced back to particular starting points and to the extent that their content is not to be comprehended based on anything that lies outside the confines of these starting points—that they rest on revelation, irrespective of how much erroneous matter might also be admixed with whatever truth they bring.41

1. Ed. note: In various editions the pages Schleiermacher cites are as follows: Pünjer (1879), 256ff.; SW I.1 (1843), 402ff.; and KGA I/12 (1995), 265ff. On Religion (1821) V is organized into seven sections, in ET (Tice) called (A) The Multiplicity of Religion, (B) Positive Religion, (C) Natural Religion, (D) The Study of the Positive Religions, then (E) Judaism, (F) Christianity, and (G) The Coming Renascence of Religion. The 1821 passage cited here, somewhat revised from the first edition (1799) in both the second and third editions (1806, 1821), opens section B. It reads: “In sum, accordingly there is only one way left by which a religion of a genuinely individual nature can have been realized. One or another of the great relationships of humankind in the world and with Supreme Being is made the focal point of religion in its entirety in a distinctive fashion, and all the rest is referred to that one relationship. If one looks only at the general idea of religion, this process can appear to be purely arbitrary. In contrast, if one looks at the distinctive nature of its adherents, then the process bears within itself a strictly necessary character and is simply the natural expression of their very beings. Hereby a distinct spirit and a communal character come to suffuse the whole at the same time. Everything that was previously ambiguous and indefinite now gains firmness. Through the process of formation, one among the endless number of views and relations between particular features will be fully realized. All of these views and relations could have been developed, and all of them were to have been presented in history. In any case, all the particular features are, at that point, to be viewed from one perspective, which is directed to the focal point, and precisely in this way all relevant feelings sustain a certain harmony, more fully interlocking with each other and in a more lively fashion. From this point of view, religion can be given as a whole only in the totality of all possible forms. Moreover, it can be exhibited, therefore, only in an unending succession of forms, which are gradually developing at various points of time and space. Furthermore, nothing can contribute to its complete manifestation that is not contained in one of these forms.” In the 1806 edition, “some one of the great relationships of humanity in the universe [Universum]” replaced “a particular perception of the universe [Anschauung des Universums]” in the first, 1799 edition. In 1821, this phrase was further clarified to read (as above): “One or another of the great relationships of humankind in the world and with the Supreme Being.” 2. Einheit. Ed. note: Or “identity,” that which marks an entity as one single, distinctive whole. 3. Religionsgemeinschaft. Ed. note: Ordinarily, “religious community.” For a somewhat different meaning, which refers only to the internal roots of a religion, Schleiermacher uses fromme Gemeinschaft; he never uses religiöse Gemeinschaft for this restricted meaning. 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Note well that this outlook would suffice only insofar as there is no third alternative, which is also inconceivable, however. (a) If anything that is attached to such an outlook is isolated [from God-consciousness], it would be merely a solitary object, thus would also stand outside the domain of piety. (b) If it were to be combined only with certain features, it would then be only a solitary piece available for union with those features” (Thönes, 1873).

5. Ed. note: In a marginal note here, Schleiermacher adds a third step in his argument: “Here, however, it is not a matter of anything being attached to one place that is lacking in another.—If this were the case, Indian religion and Christianity would then be distinguished only by their locale. All modes of piety that had adopted something similar would then have to flow together, as particular forms of idolatry have done” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Menschwerdung Gottes vorkommt und göttliche Geistesmitteilung. 7. Ed. note: On the principle of maximum flexibility among Christian communities and that of obviating against those communities’ becoming “wholly separated,” see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 6. In note 7 there he emphasizes two other prime goals: (1) respect among different organized forms of religious association and (2) awareness contained in this affirmation: “In the strictest sense there is only one universal religious community.” Here he further addresses the issue of “conversion” from one mode of faith into another and that of nullus salus (no salvation outside … ). Cf. §113.3. 8. Ed. note: The marginal note beginning this subsection is this: “The task here is to discover what the particular individuality [Individualität] is: transition into the domain of apologetics” (Thönes, 1873). Cf. Brief Outline §§32–39. 9. Individuum. 10. Dasein. 11. Beziehung. Ed. note: That is, at a particular stage (e.g., monotheism) religious self-consciousness’s being specifically related to (being referred to, or its having reference to) some particular object or objects, which are themselves different in form and/or content, would serve to create other possible objects of piety. This statement is a prolepsis; that is, it anticipates the bold statement articulated in §11. 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note qualifies the content of the following examination of traditional terms as follows: “Remarks parallel to what was said about religion. These terms too are not to be regarded as essential” (Thönes, 1873). See the complementing pages in On Religion (1821) V, subsection A. 13. Rechtslehre. Ed. note: In German usage, this term (referring to mostly theoretical, always practically oriented teachings regarding law, now otherwise contained in philosophy of law and jurisprudence) roughly parallels Glaubenslehre (“faith-doctrine”) and Sittenlehre (ethics or “morals-doctrine,” doctrine regarding Christian life or action in theology)—the two parts of dogmatics. Schleiermacher also takes these two terms to be inadequate (cf. BO §223). 14. Sitte. 15. Cf. §6.P.S. 16. Ed. note: Accordingly, Schleiermacher appends this note at the margin: “One could ask whether redemption and original sin would not be missing in natural religion. These are themselves only expressions of a general nature, however” (Thönes, 1873). 17. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note is “For example, attempts in France and England. Why do the Unitarians continue to exist alone?” (Thönes, 1873). 18. Lehrsätzen. Ed. note: This is the meaning adopted here. Alternatively, the word could simply mean sentences containing teachings. 19. Glaubenslehre. 20. Ed. note: Here das Individualisierte is used, not the usual word Eigentümlich (“distinctive”). As is the case here, the two concepts do not ordinarily have the same meaning for Schleiermacher. 21. See Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem. Redeker note: Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Berlin, 1783), Zweiter Abschnitt, 31ff. See esp. 31. Ed. note: ET Tice: “I believe that Judaism knows nothing of any ‘revealed religion’ in the understanding that Christians have. The Israelites have divine legislation (Gesetzgebung) … but no doctrines, no saving truths, no general propositions of reason. These things the eternal God reveals to us as to all other human beings, always through nature and circumstance, never through word and letter.” In Schleiermacher’s textual reference to Mendelssohn, the word used is “commandments” (Gebote), not “legislation.” 22. Eigentümlichkeit der frommen Erregungen. 23. Positive. 24. Ed. note: Consistent with the expression noted in §10n20 just above, the expression here is der individuelle Inhalt. Above, “content” translates Gehalt. 25. Ed. note: As per usual, in this sentence frommen modifies Lebensmomente (religious elements). Moment in this case refers specifically to “elements” in the life of piety, as it does to what are called “elements” in English, rather than to temporal moments. Gemeinschaft (community) is modified by religiösen (religious), referring, as in discourses II–V of On Religion, taken together, to all aspects of its nature as a distinctive religion. 26. Kundmachung. Ed. note: See §10n32, n33, and n34 below. 27. Ed. note: See §10n24 just above. Here too the reference is to the individual nature of a community, not to individual human beings, though the shared stirrings referred to are held within persons who take part in that community.

28. Ed. note: In quite general terms, these two statements are slated for discussion only in Part One and Part Two of the actual presentation of doctrine. 29. Ed. note: These principles can now be accessed in several of Schleiermacher’s works in English translation. 30. Ed. note: That is, what achieves an effect on us does so als eigentümliche Existenz. 31. Ed. note: As would often be the case in contexts like this one, the word bestimmt has two or more contingent meanings here: for example, if by Jesus’ life “an entire existence” is so “determined,” it is likewise to be “defined by” that same divine communication, and being so defined marks out his “destiny.” 32. Ed. note: Here the word for “made known” is kundgemacht. For Schleiermacher, the concept “known” usually, but not necessarily, means an offering of either actual or complete knowledge, though it certainly does include either having a presentiment of, or having an acquaintance with, or having incomplete information concerning, or even having an inchoate knowing of—all short of having complete knowledge. 33. Kundmachungen. Ed. note: More literally, “acts of making known.” See notes 25 and 31 here. Usually Kundgebung and Kundmachung are idiomatic equivalents, but Schleiermacher seems to use them differently here. 34. Ed. note: The word “proclaims” here translates kundgeben, the giving out, announcement, or declaration of something to be known in one or more of the senses just indicated in §10n32. 35. Cf. Rom. 1:19. Ed. note: This verse, running into the next one, reads very differently in the Luther Bible than in standard English translations. Hence, both are given here. “For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them” (RSV). An English translation of the Luther Bible text would read: “For what is known of God is revealed to them, for God has revealed it to them.” Verse 20 RSV: “Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.” Again, an English translation of the Luther Bible text would read: “Therewith that God’s invisible nature is made manifest—that is, God’s eternal power and deity—thus is perceived in what is made, namely, in the creation of the world.” 36. Ed. note: The wording is daβ Gott sich kundmachte, wie er an und für sich ist. 37. Ed. note: Here “grasped” translates aufgefaβt, “perceived by the senses” translates wahrgenommen, and “firmly held” twice translates festgehalten. 38. Kundmachung. 39. Unwissenheit. Ed. note: Or lack of any knowing (Wissen), i.e., a total ignorance. Cf. §10n32. 40. Ed. note: The proposition has directed attention, first and foremost, to “communal formations of piety,” not to strictly personal adaptations. 41. Ed. note: The phrase is wieviel Unrichtiges auch dem Wahren darin beigemischt sein mag. See §§153–155 and §116.3 on the admixing of error (Irrtum) and truth (Wahrheit) in the visible church. See also Brief Outline §§201–2 and 207n. See also summary of §10P.S. in §11n7.

III. Presentation of Christianity in Accordance with Its Distinctive Nature:1 Propositions Borrowed from Apologetics2 §11. Christianity is a monotheistic mode of faith3 belonging to the teleological bent of religion. It is distinguished essentially from other such modes of faith in that within Christianity everything is referred to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth.4 1. The task of finding out what is distinctive about a given mode of faith and, as much as possible, to bring that result to a formulation is to be properly resolved only in the following way. One must demonstrate what is the same within the same community, even in the most varied religious states of mind and heart,5 whereas that same feature is lacking in analogous states within other communities. Now, the less it is to be expected that precisely this distinctiveness is marked with equal strength among all the various religious stirrings6 one finds, the more readily can one err in this attempt and ultimately arrive at the opinion that no firm internal difference exists but only the external difference determined by time and space. It is possible to infer with reasonable surety from what was said just above,7 however, that one will least miss what is distinctive when one also chiefly holds to what most exactly interconnects with the basic fact of a mode of faith, and this procedure also underlies the formulation of the proposition set forth here. Christianity offers particular difficulties, however, already in the fact that it is more multiply formed than other modes of faith and is split into a multiplicity of smaller ecclesial communities. In consequence, a twofold task has to be posed: first, to discover the distinctive nature of Christianity overall, collectively held in common among these different ecclesial communities, but then also to discover the distinctive nature of each particular ecclesial community, the justification for which is to be demonstrated or its doctrine of faith is to be set forth. Still greater difficulty, however, lies in the fact that in each individual ecclesial community almost every doctrine arises, in different times and locales, with the most multiply varied deviations possible. Therein it constantly occurs that even when there is not such a great multiplicity in religious states of mind and heart themselves, a great difference does nevertheless underlie at least the way they are conceived and appraised. Indeed, the worst thing is that by virtue of these deviations the very compass of the Christian domain itself comes to be disputed among Christians themselves. This happens in that one party asserts regarding a given form of doctrine that it has indeed been engendered within Christianity, and another party asserts the same thing regarding another form of doctrine, but each is nonetheless actually non-Christian in its content. Now, suppose that someone who intends to perform this task is oneself entrenched in one of these parties and firmly establishes at the outset that only what is present in the domain of one of these views need be taken into account in the process of sorting out what is decisive in Christianity. In that case, one is presupposing in advance that matters in dispute are already decided, for which decision one simply wants to find the right supportive conditions. That is

to say, only when the distinctive nature of Christianity is sorted out can a decision be made as to the degree to which this or that thing is compatible with it or not. Suppose, in contrast, that someone can lay all preference aside and, precisely for that reason, takes everything into account, even what is most in opposition, insofar as it merely purports to be Christian. In that case, one stands in danger in the other direction—that is, one confronts the danger of reaching a result far more meager and colorless in its contents, consequently a result also less appropriate for what the task aims to achieve. This contrast demarks the present situation and is not to be obfuscated. Now, every person, the more religious one is, will, to that degree, ordinarily bring along one’s own individually marked piety to this investigation as well. Thus, the number of those who form their notion of the distinctive nature of Christianity in accordance with the interest of their party is greater by far than the number of those who do not. Contrary to this tendency, it seems more advisable in the interest of both apologetics and of faith-doctrine to be satisfied with a less ambitious result at the beginning stage and to expect fulfillment of the task to come as one proceeds further, rather than to start off with a narrowly defined and exclusive formulation. Such a formulation is bound to have at least one contrary formulation or even several of them set over against it, over which another controversy will be forthcoming sooner or later. So, the formulation contained in the present proposition is set forth with this process in mind. 2. Now, indisputably, all Christians refer the community to which they belong back to Christ. Thus, it is presupposed here that the expression “redemption”8 is also of a kind with which all Christians confess their faith—and indeed not merely in such a way that they all actually use it, though each perhaps does so in a somewhat different sense, but in such a way that there is also something held in common that all have in mind, though each more closely defines it in a somewhat different manner. In this domain, the expression itself is only figurative and in general signifies a crossing over9 from a wretched state, which is depicted as constrained, into a better state, and this is the passive aspect of it; but then it also depicts help10 rendered by another, and this is the active aspect of it. In the ordinary use of the word, it is not an essential component that a better state must already have preceded the more wretched state, so that the better state that follows would essentially be only a restoration; rather, provisionally, this possibility can remain entirely undecided. Now, if the expression is to be applied to the domain of piety, then, the teleological bent of piety being already presupposed, the wretched state could consist only in the fact that the vitality of higher selfconsciousness is blocked or snuffed out, with the result that unification of that higher selfconsciousness with various determinations of sensory self-consciousness, and thus actual elements of religious life, would come into being very little or not at all. If we should then want to designate this wretched state at its most extreme level with the expression “ungodliness”11 or, better, “obliviousness as to God,”12 at that point we still must not consider this state as one in which a vitalization of God-consciousness is not a total impossibility. That is to say, when a person is in that state it is possible, on the one hand, that the lack of something that lies outside nature would not be felt to be such a bad thing; on the

other hand, it might be thought that in order to overcome this lack one would have to be transformed into another being,13 in the literal sense, and this notion is not contained in the concept “redemption.” This possibility is likewise held as a proviso in instances where a wretched state of actual God-consciousness is portrayed in darkest shades of color.14 Hence, all that remains is to designate this wretched state as not having available the readiness to introduce and establish God-consciousness into the interconnected process of the real elements of life.15 Accordingly, it surely does seem as if the two states, that which exists before redemption and that which comes into effect through redemption, could be distinguished only as a less and more of something, thus distinguished in an indeterminate manner. Moreover, if the concept of redemption is to be at all firmly established, the task arises of referring that indeterminate distinction back to some contrast that pertains to it. That contrast, however, is lodged in the formulations that follow.16 That is, assuming an activity of sensory self-consciousness for the purpose of filling a given element of life and of attaching itself to another element, the exponent17 of that activity will then be greater than the exponent of higher self-consciousness for the purpose of uniting with that given element; and, assuming an activity of higher self-consciousness for the purpose of filling a given element of life through its unification with a determination of sensory self-consciousness, the exponent of higher self-consciousness will be smaller than that of the activity of sensory selfconsciousness for the purpose of completing that element of life for its own sake alone. Under these conditions, satisfaction of the bent toward God-consciousness would not be possible. Thus, if a bent toward God-consciousness is to be activated, an intervening redemption will be necessary, in that the state just described is nothing other than a constraining18 of the feeling of absolute dependence. These formulations, however, do not imply that in all elements of life determined by that constrained state either Godconsciousness or the feeling of absolute dependence would be reduced to nothing. Rather, the formulations imply only that, in one relation or another, neither of these two states would dominate a given element of life and that, to the extent that this is the case, the abovementioned designations of “ungodliness” or of “being oblivious of God” would also apply to that given element of life. 3. Undeniably, the recognition of such a state is to be found in all religious communities, for all expiations and purifications bear the aim of removing the consciousness of this state or of directly removing the state itself. In our proposition, however, two markers are set forth as those whereby Christianity is distinguished from all other religious communities in this respect. In the first place, in Christianity neither of these two factors, people’s incapacity and their redemption, viewed in correlation each with the other, simply happens to be a particular factor of a religious sort as a number of other factors would also be; rather, all other religious stirrings are referred to these twofold factors, and they are thus what is coposited in all other religious stirrings. They are coposited in such a way that thereby all these religious stirrings become especially, distinctively Christian. Second, however, redemption is posited as something generally and completely accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth. Moreover, these twofold factors are not to be divorced from each other but are each essentially

correlated with each other.19 By no means do these factors operate as if one could say that Christian piety would still have to be ascribed to every individual who might be conscious of being caught up in redemption in all the religious elements of one’s life, even if that individual would not refer to Jesus’ person at all or were not aware of anything about him— which, to be sure, would never come to be the case. No more than this do these factors operate as if one could say that a human being’s piety would be Christian if one referred it back to Jesus, positing, however, that even this individual would not be conscious therewith of being oneself caught up in redemption at all—a situation that, to be sure, would then also not come up. Rather, reference to redemption exists in every Christian religious consciousness only because the one who originated the Christian community is the Redeemer; and Jesus is the founder of a religious community only as those who are members of that community are becoming conscious of redemption through him. The foregoing explanation already ensures against someone’s understanding this situation as if all Christian religious consciousness could have no content other than simply “Jesus” and “redemption.” Rather, the situation is simply that all these religious elements are posited, to the extent that the feeling of absolute dependence is freely expressed in them, as having come about through that redemption; and, insofar as this feeling appears to be as yet constrained in them, all these elements are thus posited as reflecting one’s need of that redemption. Likewise, it is also understood that these two factors of incapacity and redemption, which are coposited overall, can and will also be coposited in varying degrees of strength or weakness within various religious elements of life without losing their Christian character thereby. It would indeed follow from what has been said here, however, that if we were to imagine elements that are of a religious nature in which all reference to redemption would be blotted out and the picture of the Redeemer would be altogether absent in it, one would have to say of these elements of life that they do not belong any more closely to Christianity than they do to any other monotheistic mode of faith. 4. A more exact explication of this proposition, showing how redemption is effected through Jesus and comes into consciousness within the Christian community, devolves to faith-doctrine itself. It is in place here, however, to discuss further, with reference to what was said earlier20 in general terms, the relationship of Christianity to the other chiefly monotheistic religious communities. That is, each of these communities is also referred back to a founder of its own. Moreover, just as it is the case that if the differentiation in founders would be the sole difference, then this would be a sheer external matter, the same would be true if every religious community were to posit its founder as redeemer in the same way and were likewise to refer everything to redemption. This is so, for in that case the purely religious elements of life would have the same contents in all these communities, except that the personal existence of each redeemer would be different. This is emphatically not the case, however. Rather, we have to say that only through Jesus, and thus only in Christianity, has redemption become the focal point of piety. For example, when individual religious communities have ordered those expiations and purifications mentioned just above for particular purposes and when these observances take up only particular areas of their doctrine

and polity, the working of redemption does not appear to be their main occupation but seems much more to be only something of a derivative nature. Their main occupation consists of founding the community on a distinct doctrine and under a distinct form. Yet, if a significant difference in the free unfolding of God-consciousness does persist in the community, then there are some, in whom that consciousness is most constrained, who are more in need of redemption, and there are others, in whom that consciousness is freer, who are more ready for21 the workings of redemption. Thus, there does follow from the influence of those more ready some approximation to redemption in the lives of those more needy, but this is so only up to the point where the distinction between the two is somewhat evened out for the simple reason that some community does persist there. In contrast, in Christianity the redemptive influence of its founder is what is originative, and the community persists only under this presupposition and only as communication and spreading of that redemptive activity takes place. Hence, within Christianity these two features also constantly exist proportionately in relationship to each other. That is, on the one hand, the redemptive efficacious action of Christ is seen to be preeminent, and considerable value is placed on what is distinctive about Christian piety. Correspondingly, on the other hand, Christianity itself is viewed only as a means of advancing and propagating piety in general, in which process its distinctiveness is only incidental and subordinate, Christ is viewed particularly as teacher and organizer of a community, and redemptive activity fades into the background. Hence, within Christianity the relationship of the founder to members of the community is also entirely different from the relationship that obtains in those other monotheistic religious communities. This is the case, for their founders are depicted as having been elevated out of the crowd of equal or less different human beings, arbitrarily as it were, and what they have received as divine teaching and rule for life is received no less for themselves than it is received for others. Furthermore, even one who professes those modes of faith will not easily deny that God could just as well have delivered the law through someone else as through Moses and that revelation could just as well have been transmitted through another as through Muhammad. In contrast, within Christianity all other persons stand in contrast to Christ, viewed as the sole Redeemer and as the Redeemer for all and as one who is not thought to have been in need of redemption in any way, at any time. Hence, as general opinion has it, he was originally different from all other human beings and was supplied with redemptive power from his birth on. It is not as if we would want here to exclude from Christian community in advance all those who deviate from this depiction—itself already capable of manifold gradations—even going so far as to have Christ supplied with redemptive power only later, as long as this power is taken to be something different from a mere communication of teaching and a way of ordering life. In contrast, if someone were to think of Christ wholly on an analogy with other founders of religion, at that point the distinctiveness of Christianity could be established only on the basis of the content of its teaching and its rule of life,22 and the three monotheistic modes of

faith would simply remain divorced from each other inasmuch as each would hold unswervingly fast to what it has received. Then suppose, however, that all of the monotheistic modes of faith were together still capable of improvement and were themselves, sooner or later, also very likely able to discover the improved teachings and rules of life belonging to Christianity. At that point, the internal distinction among the three modes of faith would then be entirely overcome. Finally, suppose that even the Christian church were likewise to move beyond what it received from Christ. Then nothing would remain regarding Christ than that he would be regarded as an outstanding point in development, yet only such that there would be just as much a redemption from him as a redemption through him.23 Moreover, since in these cases the only principle of improvement can be that of reason, and inasmuch as reason is supposed to be uniform across all instances, every distinction between what is by way of advancement in Christianity and what is by way of advancement in the other monotheistic religions would gradually disappear, and, all of them being taken together, only a limited currency24 would be applied to them in their distinctiveness, and only for a distinct period. In taking this route,25 a distinction can be determined between two vastly different conceptions of Christianity. At the same time, however, transitions from each conception to the other also become evident. Suppose that the view we have just been tracing should ever appear as a collectively held doctrine. Then a community sharing the doctrine would itself perhaps separate from the remaining Christian communities, but it could still be recognized as a Christian community unless it had already gone so far as really to declare itself not to be in need of any adherence to Christ in order to be redeemed. Much less would individuals who entertain such a view be denied participation in Christian community as long as they would desire to maintain themselves in the liveliness of God-consciousness with and through this community. 5. Hopefully, the explication of this series of moves will serve to corroborate what has been set forth here for the purpose of determining what is decisive about Christianity. What we have done, by way of experiment, as it were, is to seek to draw out of all that is found to be held in common in Christian piety that whereby Christianity is, at the same time, externally abstracted from other religions in the most distinct way. In using this process, we have been led by the necessity of viewing its internal distinctiveness and its external boundaries interconnectedly. Perhaps it would be possible in a general philosophy of religion to present the internal character of Christianity in and of itself in such a way that thereby Christianity’s special domain within the religious world would be secured. Then, if that discipline were given proper recognition, apologetics could appeal to this finding. In that case, it would meanwhile have belonged to that discipline to systematize all the main elements of religious consciousness and, based on their interrelationship, to show which elements among them are such that other elements can be referred to them and they can themselves be coposited in all the other elements. Suppose that what we designate by the term “redemption” were to become such an element as soon as a fact liberating it would enter into a region wherein God-consciousness is constrained. Then Christianity would have a

secure place as a distinctive form of faith and in a certain sense would be construed as such. This status, however, would not itself be termed a proof of Christianity, in that even philosophy of religion could not set forth any compelling reason to acknowledge that a given distinct fact is redemptive or even really to accord to a given element that can be centrally positioned as this central place in a person’s own consciousness. Still less can what is offered in the present account claim to invite any such proof, since in accordance with the process we have proposed, and given that we could proceed only on the basis of historical observation, it has been necessary to foreswear even doing as much as could occur in a thoroughgoing philosophy of religion.26 It is clear in and of itself that an adherent of some faith strange to Christianity could perhaps be completely convinced by the above presentation that what was set forth here would therefore be the distinctive nature of Christianity without its thereby accruing truth for this person, with the result that this person would find oneself drawn to accept it. Rather, just as everything in the present context relates to dogmatics and this is meant only for Christians, so this presentation too is meant only for those who live within the bounds of Christianity. Moreover, it is to be offered strictly as a preliminary introduction.27 Its purpose has been simply to distinguish things that are said concerning any given religious consciousness as to whether these things are Christian or not and as to whether what is Christian is either strongly and clearly or more unreliably expressed in them. Accordingly, here we totally renounce any so-called proof for the truth or necessity of Christianity; and, before one gets involved with any investigation of this sort, we counter it with the presupposition that any Christian already bears within oneself the surety that one’s piety can take on no shape other than that of Christianity.

1. Eigentümlichen Wesen. Ed. note: One task of the apologetic aspect of philosophical theology is to get clear on what the distinctive nature of Christianity is, in comparison with other modes of faith. Correspondingly, the task of the polemical aspect is to detect what is diseased within it. On the general characteristics of philosophical theology, see esp. CF §2 and Brief Outline §§32–40 and 63–68; on apologetics and polemics, see esp. BO §§41–42, 63–64, 222, and 253. 2. Ed. note: In this proposition, Christian “higher self-consciousness” is first introduced in terms by which what is “distinctive” about it is to be compared with other modes of faith (in §11.1–2), then initially explicated in relation to Jesus the Redeemer (in §11.3–5). In §§12–14 the original historical setting and activity of the Redeemer and his continuing efficacious action in the community of Christians are further clarified, also in general terms. Thus, in a marginal note at this spot Schleiermacher indicates the following headings for this account, in succession: “§11. What Is Characteristic of Christianity in Its Individual Nature [Individuelle Charakteristik]. §12. Christianity’s Relationship to Judaism. §13. The Relationship of Its Basic Fact to Historicity in General. §14. How Christianity Is Spread.” He then adds the intention to discuss “Apologetics in ancient times and in the present” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Glaubensweise. 4. Ed. note: Occasionally, especially when he is not simply placing Christianity among other religions or marking in which “stage” (Stufe) it appears, Schleiermacher refers to a “living Christianity,” as in OG 66: “Living Christianity and its progress do not need any support from Judaism.” He also indicates there that Judaism had still not progressed far enough to offer such support. Nearly two hundred years of scholarship on the Old Testament and on early Christianity as well as Judaic-Christian relations might well cause him to qualify or even somewhat alter his opinion on this matter. No doubt he would now consider values from other religions contributive to its core clarity, if not necessary to support it. 5. Frommen Gemütszuständen. Ed. note: Frömmigkeit refers to piety. For Schleiermacher, piety as a whole is comprised of both religious stirrings within persons and their expression in thought and action, within and through a community of faith. Taken together, all these features comprise the nature of a religion. This way of identifying a religion is laid out in all

five discourses of On Religion. It is defined as a general and specific historical-critical task in Brief Outline §32 and §§43– 53, and this account is summed up in CF §§11–14. 6. Erregungen. Ed. note: Stimuli produce stirrings. Thus, Gemütserregungen would be stirrings of mind and heart, not “emotions” in the usual sense, though an affective component is to be presupposed in one’s registering or taking in any such stimulus. 7. §10.P.S. Ed. note: Formally, the lengthy discussion there can be boiled down to the following features. A relative “truth” (vs. error) is to be found within the internal and external aspects of “identity” in any given form of religious community. Its “revealed” nature (via God’s “relation to us” in and through the world) and its “positive” nature (its communal shape) are thus determined in terms of what can be found to be “distinctive” at its very beginning and in the form religious stirrings take within its common life. In the individual these original events and subsequent stirrings are registered in self-consciousness. See also §11n2 and §11n5. 8. Erlösung. Ed. note: Accordingly, Schleiermacher everywhere refers to Jesus as “the Redeemer” (Erlöser), or as the “Christ,” through whom God brings redemption to the world. See also §11n23. His usage of the term refers literally to being released, liberated, or delivered, in this case given God’s response to the need for it. The term does not refer to any particular view of “atonement” on the cross. See §§100–105. 9. Übergang. Ed. note: This word itself bears several other connotations: a passage, a transition, or a conversion (for the last of which the word Bekehrung is ordinarily used in a Christian context, though it too suggests several ways of “turning”). 10. Hülfe. Ed. note: Now usually spelled Hilfe, this word too bears several other connotations: aid, succor, relief, support, or assistance, any of which a person of faith could have in mind in repeating, “God is … an ever-present help in time of trouble” (Ps. 46:1 NIV) or “my help comes from the Lord” (Ps. 121:2 RSV). It also immediately suggests certain allied concepts: deliverance, release, salvation, strength, mercy, grace. 11. Gottlosigkeit. Ed. note: Literally, “being without God,” “godlessness.” 12. Gottvergessenheit. Ed. note: This word could be rendered literally as “Godforgetfulness,” but in German Vergessenheit means “oblivion,” i.e., left completely out of mind. Something simply “forgotten” (vergessen) would have to have been somehow in mind, somehow consciously noticed and acknowledged, in the first place. This is not a requirement here. Nor is it required that the person in this wretched state would thereby, because of it, be without God, which would place an unnecessary, perhaps even implausible, limit on God. 13. Umschaffung. Ed. note: Literally, a transcreation, in contrast to the biblical image of a “new creation” or re-creation (Neuschöpfung, Neuerschaffene). 14. Rom. 1:19ff. Ed. note: Already referred to twice (§7.3 and §10.P.S.), Rom. 1:19–22 links with Paul’s speech at the Areopagus in Athens, reported in Acts 17:27–30. Rom. 1:18 already speaks broadly of “ungodliness” and “wickedness.” Then 1:21 refers to “senseless minds” being “darkened,” 1:25 of having “exchanged the truth about God for a lie.” In subsequent verses the depiction gets still more graphically detailed, whether regarding Jews or Greeks. The premise is that “from the creation of the world … God’s invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made” (RSV). In §10.P.S., however, Schleiermacher argues against presupposing any “natural theology.” 15. Wirklichen Lebensmomente. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, ordinarily Momente refers to “elements” of life within a process, not specifically to brief moments (Augenblicke), regularly translated “instants” in time. In contrast, Elemente ordinarily refers to factors (or functions, features, components) in any process, though not always to quite basic elements, or rudiments, in a process. Such usage is reflected throughout this work as well. 16. Ed. note: The formulation that directly follows is mathematical in form. The two basic elements, or constant factors, operative in Christians’ God-consciousness are one’s incapacity, or need for redemption, on the one hand, and redemption itself, on the other hand. 17. Ed. note: On a scale of more and less, an “exponent” rises or falls in its relative weight with any tipping of the scale in favor of (in this case) sensory self-consciousness relative to higher self-consciousness, which is then “constrained.” On a sliding scale, where “a” is a “factor” representing either the higher consciousness or sensory consciousness, an “exponent” of “2” or more, for example, could be added along this line to show a comparatively greater amount. This exponential progression could be infinite, never arriving either at a final absolute amount or at zero, in either approach taken in Schleiermacher’s illustration. At no point, then, is either sensory self-consciousness or higher self-consciousness at zero. 18. Gebundenheit. Ed. note: Here, then, redemption is presented as a release or freeing from this constraining influence, from this condition of bondage. 19. Wesentlich zusammengehörig. Ed. note: That is, in their operation they mutually condition each other. 20. In §10. 21. Erlösungsfähiger. Ed. note: This language could mislead, as if some persons would have better qualifications or credentials for receiving redemption. Rather, here and consistently elsewhere in Schleiermacher’s discourse, the issue is the

degree of one’s readiness to attend to the proclamation of redemption, given by word and deed, and to be open to receiving, using, and growing in its gifts, fruits, or benefits. In the more general perspective intended here, some persons are more ready, having a greater capacity for receiving the workings of redemption. On a sliding scale, others are less so, are in greater need of its gifts, fruits, or benefits, especially if they have experienced them very little or not at all. In this way, Christianity could present a model for other communities of faith. However, as he states repeatedly, Schleiermacher does not presume to prove that Christianity is either necessary or superior. Dogmatics is addressed only to those who are inquiring into their own Christian faith. 22. Ed. note: Thus, presumably, theology itself would then be simply a direct purveying of that teaching about what is to be believed and how one is to live, no matter how well ordered it might be. 23. Ed. note: Again, at its root Erlösung (redemption) does not mean payment or exchange so much as release (becoming freed or loosed from) in contrast to the typical meaning of the English word. Both denotations are used prominently in the Latin redemptio. Although both meanings are frequently used in the Old Testament, the second meaning is carried in the eleven occurrences of ἀπολύτρωσις in the New Testament (notably, Luke 21:28; Rom. 3:24; 1 Cor. 1:30; Col. 1:14), though there are a few other instances where variations of the verb λυτρόω are used, including suggestions of a blood atonement. 24. Gültigkeit. Ed. note: “Limited currency,” in contrast to a final validity. See §19n1. 25. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher identifies this route and the resultant conceptions as “rationalist” (Thönes, 1873). 26. Ed. note: Since religious studies were not at that time as yet broken down into numerous subspecialties, mirroring the later customary structure of academic disciplines, this “thoroughgoing” philosophy would for Schleiermacher encompass a great many of those historical, empirical, and analytical-theoretical concerns, including psychology of religion, sociology of religion, and comparative studies. 27. Anleitung. Ed. note: Or “propaedeutic,” leading into but not comprising the actual doctrines of dogmatics, as was initially explained in §§1–2.

§12. Christianity does indeed stand in a special historical interconnection with the Jewish mode of faith. Yet, as to its historical existence1 and its aim, the way it is related to Judaism and heathen modes of faith is the same.2 1. Here “Judaism” will be understood, first and foremost, to refer to the Mosaic institutions, viewed as preparation for Judaism, but also all that had already been operative in earlier times that then fostered detachment of this people from other peoples. Now, Christianity was historically interconnected with Judaism by Jesus’ being born among the Jewish people, since a redeemer of all humanity could not then very well spring from any other than from a monotheistic people once such a people had arisen. However, one should not envisage even that historical interconnection too exclusively. The reason is that at the time of Christ’s appearance the religious turn of mind among this people was already no longer based exclusively on Moses and the prophets but was multiply transformed by nonJewish features that it had adopted during and after the Babylonian diaspora. Accordingly, Hellenic and Roman heathenism was also monotheistically prepared in manifold ways, and there too expectation of a new formation was extremely intense, just as, conversely, the messianic promises had come to be, in part, given up and, in part, misunderstood among the Jews. As a result, if all the historical circumstances of that period were comprehended, the distinction between Jesus and heathens would turn out to be much less pronounced than appears at first glance. Further, Christ’s being of Jewish descent is considerably offset, on the one hand, by the fact that so many more heathens than Jews went over to Christianity and, on the other hand, also by the fact that Christianity would not have had this reception from

among the Jews at all had they not been permeated by those alien features to which we have alluded. 2.3 Rather, Christianity is related equally to Judaism and to heathen modes of faith,4 inasmuch as there was to have been a passing over to Christianity from both modes of faith just as there might be to any other. To be sure, the leap actually made appears to be greater from heathen modes of faith, to the extent that they would first have had to become monotheistic in order to become Christian. However, these two processes were, nevertheless, not divorced from each other; rather, monotheism was eventually offered directly to heathens in the shape of Christianity as it had earlier been offered to them in the shape of Judaism. On the other hand, the demand placed on the Jews that they not rely on the law and that they understand the Abrahamic promises differently was also not any more modest. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to assume that as Christian piety took shape right at the outset, it is not to be conceived as based on Jewish piety at that time or at any earlier time. Thus, Christianity is also not to be regarded, in any way, either as a modification of Judaism or as a reforming continuation of Judaism. Indeed, Paul does view Abraham’s faith as the prototype of Christian faith, and he does depict the Mosaic law simply as something inserted in between.5 Thus, to be sure, one could conclude from these statements that he wanted to present Christianity as a renewal of that original, pure Abrahamic Judaism. Yet, his view was also simply that Abraham’s faith would have related to the promise given to him, just as our faith relates to the ultimate fulfillment of that promise. In no way, however, did he believe that the promise would have meant exactly the same thing to Abraham as its fulfillment does to us. Rather, when he expressly spoke of the relationship of Jews and heathens to Christ, he also presented that relationship as exactly the same.6 He presented Christ as the same for both and both as equally quite alienated from God and thus equally in need of Christ. Now, if Christianity relates equally to Judaism as to heathenism, then it can no more be viewed as a continuation of Judaism than as a continuation of heathenism. Rather, if one should come to Christianity from the one mode of faith or from the other, as far as one’s piety is concerned one becomes a new person.7 However, the promise to Abraham, inasmuch as it has been fulfilled in Christ, would nevertheless be presented simply as having had its own reference to Christ solely in the divine decree,8 not in the religious self-consciousness of Abraham or of his people. Moreover, since we are able to recognize the selfsameness of a religious community only where this consciousness is uniformly shaped, we can also no more recognize an identity between Christianity and Abrahamic Judaism than between Christianity and later Judaism or heathenism. Furthermore, one cannot say that that so-called purer, original Judaism would have borne the seed of Christianity within it in such a way that it would have unfolded from that seed by naturally progressive steps without the introduction of anything new in between, nor even that Christ himself would lie in this progression, so that a new common life and existence9 would not have been able to begin with him. 3.10 The widespread assumption of a single church of God, existing from the very beginning of the human race until its end, contradicts our proposition more in appearance than in actuality. This is the case, for if the Mosaic law also belongs within this one

interconnection with the divine order of salvation, then it is necessary, in accordance with ancient and trusted Christian teachers,11 likewise to count within this one interconnection the Hellenic wisdom of the world,12 especially that wisdom which strove toward monotheism. And yet, one cannot assert, without entirely abrogating the distinctiveness of Christianity, that the teaching of Christianity forms one whole with the heathen wisdom of the world. If, on the one hand, this doctrine of the one church were especially to intend to articulate the unlimited effective relation of Christ to everything human, even in the past, this would be an aim concerning which no judgment can as yet be made here, though our proposition comports with it very well.13 In this respect, moreover, prophecy has also already attributed to the new covenant a character different from that of the old covenant,14 just as precisely this contrast between the two covenants expresses their internal split most decisively. Hence, two rules are to be set forth: first, that for Christian usage almost everything else in the Old Testament is but a shell around this particular prophecy, and second, that what has the least value for this purpose is what is most definitely Jewish. As a consequence, in Old Testament passages we are able to find reproduced, with any exactness, only those among our own religious stirrings that are of a more general nature and that are not formulated in a very distinctively Christian fashion. Even for stirrings that are distinctively Christian, however, Old Testament sayings would provide no proper expression unless we were to disregard some things in them and add other things into them. Taking this possibility into account, moreover, among utterances from heathenism of a nobler and purer sort, we would certainly also meet with echoes equally as close and congruent, just as more ancient apologists were, in their time, no less glad to cite messianic prophecies that they took to be heathen, thus recognizing a striving of human nature toward Christianity there as well.

1. Ed. note: geschichtliches Dasein. In contrast, Existenz (being) refers to an entity (a Sein or being anywhere or an individual Existenz in this world, e.g., Jesus), one that is really existing (seiende) “there” in this finite world (Da-sein). Sein can simply identify a being (anything up to Supreme Being); or it can be active in its meaning (Sein meaning seiendes, being, e.g., God’s be-ing in Jesus, in relation to his self-consciousness). 2. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher supplies the concept “indifference [Indifferenz] of Christianity regarding the relative status of Judaism and heathenism [Heidentum].” He also registers the intention to show “how Judaism’s advantage” in relation to Christianity is limited (sich … begrenzt) (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s view of the Old Testament and the basic relationship of Judaism to Christianity, see §§8–9, 11.4, and 14. See also OG 65f and BO index. This is all Schleiermacher thought he would need for introductory purposes: How Jesus has accomplished redemption, and still does so, has to do rather with his impact as a perfect and blessed person, chosen and sent by God, and possessed of his own distinctive gifts for that purpose, than with any marks that identify him specifically as a Jew. Yet, he certainly was a Jew, and the “Old Covenant” of God with that people was in certain respects closer to what he offered as “Christianity” than other religions were. However, at the “highest stage” of religion in its own most complete state, guaranteed by actual conversion and participation in community with God in Christ and others in the reign of God, persons are seen to be in a continually developing process of renewal toward the ideal goal that God has decreed for all of humanity. Humanity would still hold to much of its great diversity at any consummatory point that can be prophetically imagined. Apart from Jesus’ person and what that inspires by the “divine Spirit,” there can be no Evangelical doctrine regarding Judaism or the Old Testament writings, as such, or those of any other religion. Careful, critically guided use of them for purposes of religious discipline is a matter for practical theology, still best guided by further comparative study. None of these more advanced studies, however, are necessary for one to become an Evangelical Christian. All of these points are elucidated within his writings on faith-doctrine and Christian ethics, taken as a whole.

4. Christentum … Judentum … Heidentum. Ed. note: It happens, perhaps not entirely by happenstance, that these words have different endings in English. For Schleiermacher, the emphasis is placed on modes of faith in all three social contexts in which these religious phenomena have appeared, so that, strictly speaking, none of them is, as such, an “ism,” and the heathens (Gentiles, pagans) are not treated as if they were wholly nonreligious or without any faith. See On Religion, discourse V. 5. Gal. 3:9, 14, 23–25. 6. Rom. 2:11–12; 3:21–24; 2 Cor. 5:16–17; and Eph. 2:13–18. Ed. note: Sermon on 2 Cor. 5:17–18, Oct. 24, 1830, with respect to the Augsburg Confession, SW II.2 (1834), 725–38. ET Nicol (1997), 141–54. 7. Ed. note: Find “a new man” in Eph. 2:15; “a new creation” in 2 Cor. 5:17 and Gal. 6:15; “a new nature” in Col. 3:10. 8. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher anticipates his later arguments regarding the one eternal divine decree. See §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2. 9. Dasein. 10. Ed. note: On Christ as Redeemer but not a progression from Judaism or from heathen sources, see OG 46f. and 62– 65. 11. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215), Stromateis (n.d.) 6: “To the Jews belonged the law and to the Greeks philosophy, until the Advent; and after that came the universal calling to be a peculiar people of righteousness.” Ed. note: ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1903), 517–18; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 9:391–92. 12. Weltweisheit. Ed. note: In some quarters, this word is used as a synonym for “philosophy,” but for Schleiermacher it would seem to have had a cultural extension beyond teachers of philosophy. 13. Ed. note: See the discussion on “prophetic doctrine,” §§157–63. 14. Jer. 31:31–34.

§13. As divine revelation,1 the appearance of the Redeemer in history is neither something absolutely supernatural nor something absolutely superrational.2 1. As concerns revelation, it was already granted above3 that no starting point of a distinctively formed way of existing and, still more, of a community, especially of a religious community, is ever to be explained based on the condition of the circle in which it arose and progressed, in that it would then be no starting point but would be simply the product of some intellectual surrounding. Now, although the actual existence of the starting point surpasses the nature of that surrounding, nothing gets in the way of our assuming, nevertheless, that the emergence of such a life would be the effect of the force for development4 that indwells our nature as a species. This force, even if hidden from us, is expressed, in accordance with divinely ordained laws, at particular points in individual human beings for the purpose of advancing the rest further through those individuals. Actually, if no such assumption were made, no progress of the human race would be conceivable, either in part or in the whole.5 Every outstanding endowment of an individual through whom any sort of spiritual accomplishment takes a new shape within a distinct circle is such a starting point.6 It is simply the case, moreover, that the more expressions of this kind are spatially and temporally limited in their effects, even if they are not explicable in terms of present circumstances, the more they also appear to be conditioned by those circumstances. Hence, suppose that all of these specially endowed individuals, each in the individual’s own sphere of influence, were designated as “heroes” and that a higher inspiration is ascribed to them. Then precisely the following would be intimated of them: first, that they are made fruitful7 from the general wellspring of life and for the benefit of that distinct circle in which they appear; second, that we have to regard the fact that such

individuals do appear from time to time to be a natural occurrence,8 if we want, without exception, to stick with human nature in its higher meaning. Accordingly, all such individuals present analogues to the concept “revelation,” which concept is especially applicable only to the domain of higher self-consciousness.9 Probably no one would refuse to assume such an endowment in all founders of religion, even in those who are seen to be founding religions at subordinate stages, but with the condition that the teachings and communities that proceed from them would have to bear something distinctive and original. However, if this assumption is to be applied to Christ in the same sense, it would have to be said, first and foremost, that in comparison with him everything that could otherwise be taken to be revelation would have to lose this characteristic, in turn. This is so, because everything else is limited to distinct times and places, also because all that proceeds from such points of origin is, nevertheless, already destined in advance to be submerged, in turn, in Christ. Thus, in relation to Christ himself, each one of these things is not yet the being that is destined to be but is, in that respect, nonbeing,10 and only Christ is in a position gradually to enliven the entire human race to its higher state. The reason is that a person who does not accept Christ as divine revelation in this generally extended sense also cannot intend Christianity to be a permanent phenomenon. Quite apart from this assumption, however, it would have to be asserted, nonetheless, that even the most rigorous view of the distinction between Christ and all other human beings presents no obstacle to one’s saying that his appearance, even as the becoming human11 of the Son of God, would be something natural.12 This is so, nevertheless, for two reasons. In the first place, given that Christ was certainly a man, even in human nature there must lie the possibility of taking up what is divine into oneself, as has happened precisely in Christ. In consequence, also in this regard the notion that divine revelation in Christ would have to be something absolutely supernatural does not stand the test at all. Rather, even the so-called proto evangelium,13 in that it does indeed tie prophecy regarding Christ directly to the fall, declares itself wholly against the notion that human nature would somehow be incapable of taking up into itself what is restoratively divine and that the capacity in human nature for doing this would first have to be built into it. In contrast, suppose that even the simple possibility for doing this should lie in human nature. Consequently, the actual implanting of what is divine within human nature would have to be a divine act alone, thus an eternal one.14 Nevertheless, in the second place, even the very emergence of this act in time and within a distinct individual person15 has to be regarded, at the same time, as a deed grounded in the original equipment of human nature and as a deed of human nature prepared by all that had preceded it,16 and therewith as the highest development of its spiritual power. It is also posited that we could never penetrate so deeply into these innermost mysteries of spiritual life in general that we would be able to unfold this general conviction to the point of having a clearly defined perception of them.17 That is to say, if it were otherwise, the fact that what is restoratively divine has made its appearance in Jesus and in no other would always have to be explained simply as an instance of divine arbitrariness. To assume divine arbitrariness in

particular instances, however, always manifests an anthropathic18 outlook, for which even Scripture does not declare itself. Scripture seems instead to indicate the conditionality set forth here.19 2.20 Now, however, as concerns what is “superrational,”21 in no way could Christ stand over against the totality of human beings as their Redeemer if those elements of his life by which he accomplishes redemption were to be explained based on reason that uniformly indwells all other human beings. This is the case, because then these states would have to be present in the others too, and they could thus effect redemption as well. Now, suppose that states of mind and heart would likewise also be positioned in the redeemed, but only as they are conditioned by Christ’s communication or influence, and suppose that without this conditioning one could not say that any redemption would have been accomplished in them. Consequently, in that case even these states would not be explicable only on the basis of reason that was indwelling them from their birth onward, though such reason absolutely indispensably belongs to such states, in that they could never exist in a soul bereft of reason. Accordingly, something superrational is, to be sure, posited as present in the Redeemer and the redeemed, consequently in the entire compass of Christianity. Moreover, anyone who would not want to acknowledge this characteristic in any fashion also would not be able to understand what redemption is in its proper sense and would take Christianity to be validated simply as an institution, enduring only until a better one should come along, one that serves the purpose of transmitting the influences of human reason but that is stirred especially in the form of self-consciousness. Almost without exception, this superrationality is also acknowledged in the declarations of those who confess Christ. Moreover, it is expressed by them, in various forms, as an indwelling of God or of the λόγος22 in Christ—both of these as an original indwelling of God, or as a persisting indwelling of God that entered his life later, or as an indwelling of God restricted to a single element of his life—and as the redeemed’s being moved by the Holy Spirit. Supposing, however, that we posit the greatest possible difference between this superrational state and whatever reason human beings might have in common, this superrational state can never be set forth as absolutely so without falling into selfcontradiction. This is so, for the supreme goal that is posited regarding these workings of redemption is, nevertheless, always a human state that would contain not only the fullest acknowledgment of human reason but would also be a state in which what the divine Spirit effects and what human reason effects cannot be distinguished overall, even in the same individual.23 Thus, in that after reaching that point reason would be entirely at one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit could itself be conceived of as the greatest height to be reached by human reason, and the difference between the two could be conceived of as overcome. Likewise, however, already at the very beginning, everything exists that runs counter to the movements of the divine Spirit, also everything that conflicts with human reason. This is the case, in that if it were otherwise, a consciousness of the need for redemption could not even have arisen within a human being before those workings of the divine Spirit had entered in—and indeed a consciousness such that the need would be satisfied by those same

workings of the divine Spirit.24 Thus, if, in a certain fashion, what is to be brought forth by the divine Spirit is already present within human reason itself, then, in at least this respect,25 the divine Spirit does not go beyond human reason. Now, what applies to those who are redeemed is likewise to be said of the Redeemer as well. This is the case, in that even those who do not accept any sort of divine indwelling in the Redeemer do nonetheless extol, from where they stand, the very same activities, notions, and rules for living that others explain in terms of that divine indwelling in him, viewing them to be supremely reasonable. Thus, with their human reason they apprehend these things approvingly; and, in turn, that apprehension does not find fault with or reject divine indwelling. Instead, they likewise acknowledge it approvingly. Postscript.26 In consequence of the underlying outlook on piety presented here, the distinctive being of the Redeemer, and of the redeemed in their interconnection with him, is the original site of that issue regarding what is supernatural and superrational in Christianity. As a result, there is no ground whatsoever for tolerating anything supernatural or superrational that would have no interconnection with the Redeemer’s appearing but would be a different originative factor in and of itself. Ordinarily, this issue is treated, in part, with reference to particular facts for which a supernatural character is especially claimed. At this point we cannot yet deal with these cases. In part, this issue is ordinarily treated with reference to Christian doctrines, which for us include nothing other than what is said concerning that self-consciousness which we have indicated above27 and its interconnection with the Redeemer’s appearing. Suppose, however, that what is superrational in Christian self-consciousness consists in the impossibility of its being generated, given the way it is, by the activity of reason. If this is so, it does not at all imply that what is said about this self-consciousness would also have to be superrational. The reason is that nature as a whole is also superrational in the same sense as Christian self-consciousness is so; and yet, we likewise do not call what is said about nature as a whole superrational. Instead, we call it purely rational.28 On the other hand, the whole procedure for taking up what is said about our religious self-consciousness is just as much a purely rational one as is that for taking up what is said about nature as a whole. Moreover, the difference between those two procedures simply lies in the fact that “objective consciousness” is given originatively only to one who is affected by nature, whereas Christian religious self-consciousness is given only to one who is affected by the Redeemer in the manner distinctive to those who profess faith in him.29 Now, this account plainly indicates of itself what is to be retained in the current prevailing view, as if Christian doctrine would consist, in part, of rational propositions and, in part, of superrational propositions. It is indeed already self-evident, first, that this could be only a side-by-side arrangement at best, yet second, that the two kinds of propositions could not form a whole in any fashion whatsoever, for no effort to combine them in a tight interconnection could hold up. One also sees the truth of this observation rather clearly in all those treatments of Christian doctrine which are divided into two parts, consisting of a natural theology,

purporting to be valid purely rationally and to be so not only within Christianity but also outside it, and a positive superrational theology that is supposed to be valid only within Christianity, for on that basis the two parts would be totally divorced from each other and would remain so. Hence, although it may appear as if such a union would be possible, this deceptive appearance arises from the fact that propositions of a Christian sort do indeed exist, in which what is distinctively Christian significantly fades into the background, with the result that they could also be taken to be purely rational in comparison with other propositions that count as superrational. Yet, if that distinctively Christian factor were altogether absent from these propositions, obviously they too would not be Christian propositions at all. Hence, what truth there is regarding this matter is the following: that all propositions of a Christian sort are superrational in one respect, whereas in another respect they are all also rational. However, they are superrational in the very same respect in which all that is experientially based is also superrational, since all of them are also traceable to an internal experience—namely, that they rest on a given—and without what is given,30 propositions of a Christian sort could not have arisen by deduction or synthesis from generally recognized and communicable propositions. If this were not so, then it would indeed also have to be possible to instruct and demonstrate every person into being a Christian, apart from that person’s having encountered and received anything experientially.31 Hence, also inherent in this superrationality is the fact that a true appropriation of propositions of a Christian sort cannot be the result of using scientific means; thus, this appropriation lies beyond the use of reason in any case. Instead, this appropriation occurs only inasmuch as each individual has actually wanted to have the experience involved, just as everything of an individual and distinctive character can indeed be apprehended only through a love that wants to perceive it.32 Thus, in this particular sense the entirety of Christian doctrine is superrational. Accordingly, suppose, however, that the question arises as to whether those propositions which express Christian states of mind and heart and their interconnectedness were not subject to the same laws governing concept-formation and the combination of concepts that apply to all spoken discourse.33 In consequence thereof, the more fully a person would fulfill these laws in such a presentation of doctrine, the more it would also be incumbent on the person rightly to conceive what is thought and meant—this even though one would not be able to gain a conviction of the truth of the matter because one is lacking in the related basic inner experience of it. If such were the case, then in this particular sense everything in Christian doctrine would have to be rational through and through. Given this account, the superrationality of all particular Christian doctrinal propositions is the criterion by which one can adjudge whether they also manage to express what is distinctively Christian; and, vice versa, their being in accordance with reason is the test of the degree to which this undertaking of translating internal stirrings of mind and heart into thought has succeeded or not. In contrast, the claim that it could not be required for one to present what goes beyond reason rationally would appear to be a mere evasion by which to cloak whatever defects might be present in the procedure used. Likewise, the reverse claim,

that in Christian doctrine everything, in every sense, would have to be grounded in reason, would simply convey the intention of covering up a deficit in one’s own basic experience. The customary formulation, to the effect that it is not necessary that what is superrational in Christianity should run counter to reason, seems intended to mean the same thing as our proposition does. That is to say, it implies recognition of what is superrational, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it implies the task of demonstrating what does not run counter to reason therein, something that can be achieved only by means of rationality in the presentation.34

1. Ed. note: See §§4.4, 6.2, 10.5, 168.2, and index. See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 11. 2. Ed. note: Despite custom, it might be clearer to say “supra” (above and beyond) rather than “super” (which could mean “heightened”). Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “Relationship of the basic facts of divine revelation to factuality in general. Nota bene: Discuss Twesten’s explanation of the revelatory expression of divine grace for the salvation of human beings in its original effect on human knowledge.—Nitzsch (System, 47) also ascribes an originative character to revelation (namely, that it makes a new beginning in the life of human beings) but holds that in my definition this is as much blurred as recognized. He misunderstands me, however, when he claims that I directly find revelation in Christ only as he is a cognizing person. Actually, I refer not to that particular function but to the whole Christ” (Thönes, 1873). August Detler Christian Twesten and Karl Immanuel Nitzsch were two younger friends of Schleiermacher. Contrary to his introductory discussion of revelation in the first edition (1821), both were mistaking his concept of revelation in Christ as if it pointed to a purely cognitive event. Nitzsch also mistook the concept as if it were not only strictly philosophical, and therefore nonbiblical, but also as if it were full and final, and therefore not simply preliminary in either that introductory discussion or the present one. 3. §10.P.S. 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here elaborates on this point: “This is the case, just as a single human existence [Existenz] can be far more closely observed in this way, but as a single particular activity cannot possibly be viewed in this same way. Beyond all particular activity, that single existence, in turn, comes to be human nature and nothing but that nature. Human nature itself is thought of as something self-developing, consequently as a force, not as an abstraction. That a still higher stage is not to be expected is attested by the predicates applied to Christ. Christ has his company of followers [Gemeinde] in his own self-consciousness, viewing that company as fully satisfactory as it is” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: On differences of meaning for the words “naturalism” and “naturalist,” see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 5. See also the closing pages of OG, 85–89. On “naturalism,” see CF §74.4; on “supernaturalism,” §22.P.S. and index. Schleiermacher affirms “supernatural” for the being of God and God’s activities in nature, but not “absolute supernaturalism” (§13; cf. §92.4). 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher refers to this specific individual agency, which could be more spiritual or more intellectual in nature (i.e., geistig in both cases), as a specific “existence” or way of existing (Existenz). Hence, his marginal note here states: “These subordinate cases too would be traceable to a beginning in some distinct mode of existence [Existenz]” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Ed. note: The verb is befruchtet, the basic image of which is to be made fertile, as in the biblical phrase “Be fruitful and multiply.” 8. Gesetzmäβiges. Ed. note: That is, not a supernatural occurrence, as such, not itself outside the natural order, even if the wellspring of life (Lebensquell) is deemed to be super-natural (cf. Prov. 18:4 and the allied expression “dayspring from on high” in Luke 1:78). 9. Ed. note: Cf. §10.P.S. 10. Ed. note: This highly abbreviated segment reads: kein Sein ist, sondern ein Nichtsein. 11. Menschwerden. Ed. note: Not once, in either edition of this work, does Schleiermacher use the Latinate term Inkarnation; he discusses a historical reference to incarnatio only in a note appended to §119 in the 1821 edition, where Menschwerdung itself is actually used only twice (§§17.1 and 20.1), both times presenting the notion of “the becoming human of the Son of God.” In the present edition, he first uses it in §10.2, where he says that the concept Menschwerdung can also be applied in some other modes of faith. As in the passage here, all the other uses refer to Christ; §110.3 states that from the very beginning on, it was naturgemäβ (“natural,” or “in accordance with nature”), as he does here; elsewhere in this

edition it is related to “the new creation” in Christ (§109.3), thence is discussed in “parallel” to “emergence of the divine life in us” (§108.6), i.e., as corresponding to “rebirth,” or “regeneration” (Wiedergeburt) of individuals and of the entire human race (cf. §§113.3, 116.2, 118.1), as the beginning of the whole process of reunion with God in justification (§120.2), and as conditioning the new, also originative “outpouring of the Holy Spirit” (§124.2), as well as in discussions of the nature of Christ (§§96.3, 99.P.S., and 105.P.S.) and in discussions of divine election relating to it as God’s “good pleasure” relates to “the divine government of the world” (§120.3). 12. Ed. note: The outline in Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads, “Christ as Revelation: (a) in relationship to other revelations; (b) nevertheless, not absolutely supernatural, without any preceding (supernatural) determination of nature, [thus] presented as going forth from nature [again, cf. §10.P.S.; also §§54.4 and 92.4]; (c) also in accordance with reality, naturally conditioned” (Thönes, 1873). 13. Ed. note: The claim had been that a provisional statement of the gospel, the proto evangelium, appears in the Old Testament, or Hebrew Bible, including the poem in Gen. 3:14–19, in which God proclaims an accursed existence for Adam and Eve because they followed the serpent’s temptation to eat of forbidden fruit in the garden of Eden. Schleiermacher’s marginal note here indicates that “the christological interpretation” of this material “is not to be vouched for by that Old Testament account” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Ed. note: ewiger Akt. That is, one beyond temporal constraints. 15. Ed. note: Here Person is used, indicating that what was termed an Existenz earlier in his account is in Christ an actual human being, thus both one who has a distinctive “personal existence” (Personlichkeit; cf. §§92–99) and also one who represents the “original” and final “completion” (or “perfection”) of human nature (cf. §§60–61). 16. Ed. note: Regarding this “equipment” (Einrichtung), cf. §§57–61. Eventually, the “preparatory grace,” to be seen especially in and through the church in its “community with Christ” (see index), is also seen to be operative in the world at large, particularly in light of “the divine government of the world” (cf. §§164–69). 17. Ed. note: bestimmten Anschauung. 18. Ed. note: anthropopathische. That is, as an expression of human will or desire (thus, πάθος), an aspect of what is usually called “anthropomorphic.” 19. Gal. 4:4. Ed. note: See a sermon on this verse, Dec. 25, 1790, SW II.7 (1836), 54–64. Gal. 4:4–5 RSV reads: “When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to release those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.” 20. Ed. note: The original text incorrectly identifies this as “3.” 21. Ed. note: See also §§47.1 and 89.4 on divine revelation in Christ in relation to human rationality, and §83.1 on conscience itself as revelatory. Against common usage in his day (perhaps in ours too for some), “naturalism” or nonpersonalist and polytheist “nature worship” is very different from “naturalism,” the latter sense often being distortedly used as a synonym for “rationalism” over against supernaturalism. See his explanation in OR (1821) V, supplemental note 5. There he states: “There is some point in opposing reason and revelation. … But there is really no pretext at all for opposing nature and revelation.” On natural and supernatural, see OG 64f. and index, also “supernatural become natural” there. 22. Ed. note: The key locus for traditional discussions of the “word” (λόγος) in Christ appears in the prologue to the Gospel of John, especially including the issue over whether the λόγος in Christ was a preexisting entity, as Christ, before Jesus’ appearance on earth, which Schleiermacher denies. John 1:14 RSV states: “And the Word [λόγος] became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father.” In §96.3, he explains: “The ‘word’ is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and ‘flesh’ is the general designation for what is organic.” In §103.4 he states that having faith in Christ, thus described, is “based only on the immediate impression made by his person.” These are the only places in this work that use λόγος or “word” with reference to Christ. Note too that the noun λόγος is never capitalized in a Greek text, whereas, as a noun, Wort is always capitalized in German, so that any distinction between a lowercase and an uppercase for this particular word is made in translation only. In English, a “logos Christology” tends to treat “word” as an honorific title. Schleiermacher nowhere subscribes to such a Christology. He regards the “word” to be the Redeemer’s communication of divine grace through the Redeemer’s words and deeds, not to be a preexisting “Word,” though he also regards him to be the quintessential expression of God’s “one eternal divine decree” in relation to redemption (see esp. §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2), i.e., of God’s love (§§166–67). 23. Individuum. 24. Ed. note: The “very beginning” mentioned is apparently that of the life of faith in community with Christ (cf. §14.1, also §71.3–4 and §83). Schleiermacher’s discussion in §§91 and 108 establishes that consciousness of the need for redemption always follows upon awakenings stirred by workings of divine grace. 25. Ed. note: Here “this respect” refers to that which reason, in its own rigorous and orderly fashion, can potentially and ideally think about concerning redemption, as in dogmatics. It does not refer to the full activity and reach of the divine

Spirit. Nor is he claiming that what reason produces can ever be equivalent to faith or to its roots in feeling. Cf. §§3–4 and 14–19. See the index for other discussions regarding both “reason” and “the divine Spirit.” 26. Ed. note: “The anti-improvising nature [Das Antiphantastische] of Christianity” is the heading that Schleiermacher once indicated here. What is opposed is any practice of deciding issues based on mere whim or on sheer fantasy or on pure speculation, which could be tantamount to assuming absolutely nonnatural or absolutely nonrational divine acts. 27. Ed. note: This “higher self-consciousness,” to which reference was made in §13.1, was introduced in §§3–6 and is to be used or implied throughout the Introduction and in all the remaining propositions of CF. 28. Ed. note: Cf. §§40–41, which, like all of Part One, presents doctrines that are “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness. God’s creation of the world is taken to be superrational, but the natural order is rational; that is, in principle, human reason potentially has access to that entire order in its ongoing process. 29. Bekennern. Ed. note: Implied in this concept of professing faith, for Schleiermacher, is a redeemed, regenerated person’s experience of faith in community with Christ and by being immediately “affected” by Christ’s continuing influence. The concept does not point to a nominal confession of belief. This orientation will become more directly apparent in the rest of the present postscript. This point, only anticipated at this juncture, is further explained in §§107–9. The verb here is affiziert. 30. Ed. note: auf dem Gegebenen. In “the experience involved,” God’s efficacious redemptive activity is the given, revelatory of God’s love. See §56.2 and other propositions on divine attributes as they are experienced in divine-human encounter. 31. Ed. note: ohne daβ ihm irgendetwas begegnet sei. To make the dynamic, interactive concept begegnet (“encountered”) clear in this context, the words “and received” have been added in the translation. In Schleiermacher’s meaning, what a Christian is encountered by today is Christ, opening and sustaining a new relationship with God by the Holy Spirit. As he indicates in many places (notably, in §11, to begin with), the entire system of doctrine is constructed so as to show what this divine-human encounter both requires and signifies. 32. Ed. note: In an equally dynamic fashion, this phrase reads durch die anschauenwollende Liebe, which form of love literally implies an attentive reaching out in one’s love both outwardly to behold some “other” and inwardly to experience what that “other” has to bring into one’s life. Cf. §13n30 just above. 33. Ed. note: Regarding these “laws,” or technical rules, see Schleiermacher’s 1811 Dialectic (1996). 34. On rationalists in relation to Christianity and philosophical systems, see OG 68–73, 76–85, also 85–87 on the relation of religion to philosophy and CF §89 on relations between rationalism and absolute supernaturalism.

§14. There is no way to obtain participation in Christian community other than by faith in1 Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer.2 1. To have “participation in Christian community” means to seek in what Christ instituted an approximation to the state of absolute ease and constancy of religious stirrings described above,3 for no one can want to be in the Christian church for any reason other than this. Now, it is also true, however, that a person can enter into the Christian church only by means of one’s own free resolve. Since this is the case, for any given person this act must be preceded by one’s surety4 that through the influence5 of Christ the state of being in need of redemption is overcome and that other state of ease and constancy, just mentioned, is produced; and this surety is precisely what “faith in Christ” is.6 That is, everywhere in our domain this expression designates only that surety which accompanies a state of higher selfconsciousness, and this is different from but, precisely on that account, is also no less than that surety which accompanies objective consciousness. Already above,7 talk of “faith in God” was meant in the same sense. This faith in God was nothing other than surety concerning the feeling of absolute dependence as such—that is, referring to nothing other than our being conditioned by a being8 positioned outside ourselves and expressing our relationship to that same being. The faith that we are talking of here, however, consists of a

purely factual surety, yet it is a surety regarding a completely internalized fact. That is, it cannot exist in an individual until, through an impression that one has received from Christ, a beginning, a real presentiment9 of one’s being released from the state of being in need of redemption is in place, even if only an infinitesimally small one. However, here “faith in Christ” consists of the relation of one’s state, viewed as effect, to Christ, viewed as cause, as did “faith in God” in the other context.10 This is how John also describes it. In this way, from the very beginning onward, only those persons were attached to Christ, within his newly created community, whose religious self-consciousness had been stamped by the state of being in need of redemption and who had now become assured among themselves of Christ’s redeeming power.11 As a result, the more strongly these two features of religious self-consciousness emerged in anyone, the more that person could also help to call forth that same inner experience12 in others by declaring that internalized fact, to which the portrayal of Christ and of his efficacious action belonged as components. Those within whom this process then occurred would become persons of faith,13 whereas others would not.14 Now, also since that time the nature of all direct Christian proclamation has always consisted in this process. Such proclamation can never be formed otherwise than as witness15 —witness regarding what one has oneself experienced, which witness should arouse in others the desire also to have that same experience. Yet, the impression that all subsequent persons would obtain from what was effected through Christ—that is, would obtain from the common spirit communicated through Christ and from the entire community of Christians, supported by the historical presentation16 of Christ’s life and work—would be precisely the same impression that his contemporaries directly received from him. Hence, those who have continued not to be persons of Christian faith were complained of not because they would not let themselves be moved by reasons, as it were, but solely on account of their deficiency in self-knowledge. This deficiency has to be the underlying factor wherever there is exhibited an inability to recognize the Redeemer as the Redeemer, once he has been truly and properly presented. However, Christ himself already presented this deficiency in self-knowledge—that is, in the consciousness of one’s being in need of redemption—as constituting the boundary beyond which his own efficacy does not go. Accordingly, at all times the basis for not having faith is the same, just as the basis for faith is also the same. 2. That it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity for redemption to anyone is probably clear in and of itself. Moreover, on that account, one is not required to cite the many attempts to do so, which are always undertaken in vain. Rather, anyone who is able to obtain consolation17 through one’s own effort will also always find a way to sidestep such attempts. Furthermore, once one’s self-consciousness has been awakened in this regard, there can be no more possibility of demonstrating afterward that Christ is the only one who can bring about redemption than there was before that awakening. Rather, just as in his own times many people did hold a belief18 in an impending redemption, but they still did not accept Christ, so even when a more proper notion is available as to what is to be aspired after, it is

impossible to grasp how it could then be proven that a given individual is in a position to achieve the desired effect. This is the case, since at this juncture everything depends on the magnitude of spiritual force, which we have no way to compute; and even if such a way existed, some other quantity would have to exist in terms of which such a calculation would be applied.19 Indeed, it cannot be proved, even in general terms, that such redemption would have to come, even if there were some common knowledge not only of how human beings exist but also of how God exists. Rather, no matter what the view of what God’s end for human beings might be, every sophistical method would have the fullest possible room to draw counterarguments from the very same stipulations. Now, suppose, however, that we have to stick with the mode of surety that has just been described, and also suppose that faith is nothing other than the incipient experience of the stilling of one’s spiritual need for redemption by Christ’s agency. Then there could still be various ways in which that need and its succor could be experienced, and they would all constitute faith nonetheless. It is also possible, moreover, both that often consciousness of this need could already be present, even a long time in advance, and also that often it could be fully awakened only by means of the contrast that Christ’s perfection forms to one’s own state. Furthermore, the most elevated consciousness of the need and the onset of its being gratified could thus both have emerged at the same time. 3. Now, in Scripture itself lines of demonstrative argument are, nevertheless, repeatedly mentioned that witnesses to the gospel have made use of.20 Yet, it is never claimed there that faith would have arisen based on a line of demonstrative argument. Rather, the claim is that proclamation has given rise to faith. Those proofs were never employed except with Jews,21 in relation to notions of a promised Messiah that were present among them and in order either to rebuff opposition that had arisen from those notions, against witness to the gospel, or to forestall such opposition. This line of defense was indispensable to those witnessing to Christ among the Jews and in their encounter with Jews. Now, suppose that these witnesses liked to claim that they had always expected no redemption other than one such as this, or, alternatively, that their expectations would have been transformed by the appearance and influence of Christ. In that case, they would have had either to renounce Judaism in its entirety, for which they had borne no indication of doing, or to demonstrate that prophetic depictions were applicable to this Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer. Suppose that we were to take a different view of the matter. Then the faith of Gentile Christians would not have been the same as that of Jewish Christians, and, accordingly, the two could also not have become truly one. Rather, the Gentiles would have had to become Jews first so that they could then be brought to Christianity under the authority of the prophets. Postscript.22 In that our proposition says nothing further about any mediation between faith and participation in Christian community, accordingly the proposition also intends to be regarded as immediately combining the two and to do so in such a way that, of itself, that participation is also given along with faith. This twofold process is seen to occur, not only to the extent that it depends on the self-initiated activity of one who will have become a person

of faith, but also to the extent that it depends on the self-initiated activity of the community, viewed as that from which witness has indeed proceeded so as to awaken faith. However, in closing any supposed gap between these two points, at which witness is given and has its effect, as a whole our proposition intends, at the same time, to exclude anything in the form of demonstration that might customarily be brought to the aid of witness or be intended as a substitute for it.23 Now, what is to be excluded, then, is chiefly of the following three modes of demonstration: wanting to induce recognition of Christ (1) by pointing to the miracles he performed, or (2) by referring to the prophecies that proclaimed him in advance, or (3) by indicating the special attribute of witnesses that were originally set forth concerning him— namely, that they are taken to be works of divine inspiration. Accompanying all these attempts, however, the illusion seems more or less to prevail that somehow or other the efficacy of these occasions always presupposes an already existing faith and thus cannot engender it. (1) Now, first of all, as concerns miracle, suppose that we take that word in the narrower sense, in such a way that prophecy and inspiration do not belong within this category, thus as phenomena that are in the domain of physical nature but that are not thought to have been brought about in a natural manner. These miraculous phenomena cannot engender a recognition of Jesus as the Christ at all, whether we then stick with miracles that Jesus himself performed or also add to them miracles that occurred in relation to him. This is so, for, on the one hand, given that in Scripture miracles reported in flawed sources are never adduced for the purpose, we are acquainted with these miracles only from those same Holy Scriptures that also report similar miracles performed by persons who did not adhere to Christianity at all but are rather to be numbered among its opponents. We noted this phenomenon quite apart from the fact that Scripture does not give even the slightest indication of how probative miracles would be distinguishable from nonprobative ones. Yet, on the other hand, Scripture does attest, first, that faith had been wrought without miracles and, second, that miracles were performed that did not produce faith. Based on these reports, it can be inferred that even when faith arose in some association with miracles, it was wrought not by miracles but in that originative way of which we have spoken. Thus, if miracles had had the purpose of producing faith, God would have broken through the natural order ineffectually. Hence, it is also the case that many have sought the purpose of miracles simply in their drawing attention to Christ. Yet, this notion, in turn, is countered by Christ’s frequently reiterated prohibition against casting notice of miracles more broadly, at least inasmuch as their efficacy would have to be limited to immediate eyewitnesses, with the result that even this efficacy would no longer apply today. Finally, however, one cannot fail to notice the question of what the following distinction is then based on. Consider that outside all connection with such a domain of faith we are continually encountering so much that we are not able to explain naturally, we do not think of miracles at all there but simply think of the explanation as deferred until we have more exact information both about the dubious fact and about the laws of nature. Why is it, then, that

where such a phenomenon occurs in connection with some domain of faith that is to be established people do indeed immediately think of miracles, yet, nonetheless, they actually claim a given miracle only for their own domain of faith, but they declare the others to be false? Now, this question hardly permits of any answer other than this: that, in general, we assume a connection between miracles and the formation of a new domain of faith, perhaps even so exclusively that we admit miracles only for this kind of case, but that the state of each person’s faith itself determines one’s judgment concerning whatever is declared to be miracle and that miracle thus does not actually bring forth a person’s faith. In contrast, the general connection seems to have the following character, namely, that where a new point of development in spiritual life—and indeed an original, new point of development within selfconsciousness—is assumed, new phenomena in physical nature, as it were, could also be expected, phenomena that are mediated by self-manifesting spiritual power. This interconnectedness would obtain precisely because both observing24 states and spiritual states that have their effect externally always proceed from self-consciousness and are determined by its stimuli. Thus, once Christ would be recognized to be the Redeemer, consequently to be the beginning of the highest development of human nature in the domain of self-consciousness, it would be natural to presuppose that precisely because at points where such an existence25 is communicated most strongly, spiritual states would also arise that cannot be explained on the basis of earlier being26 of which we were previously aware. By virtue of the general interconnectedness of all nature, the very same person who would exercise such a distinctive efficacious action toward the rest of human nature would work a distinctive power on the physical aspect of human nature and on external nature. That is, it would be natural also to expect miracles from any person who is taken to be the supreme divine revelation. Suppose, too, that, without exception, such events could, nonetheless, also be called “miracles” only in a relative sense. This is the case, since our notions both regarding the susceptibility of physical nature to the influences of spirit and regarding the causal efficacy of will on physical nature are no more settled than are our notions of the physical forces of nature themselves, and they are just as capable of being continually expanded through new experiences. Now, in their interconnection with divine revelation in Christ phenomena did appear that could be brought under the concept “miracle.” Thus, it was natural that these phenomena would also actually be placed in this perspective and would be adduced as confirmation that at this juncture a new point of development was coming to pass. This confirmation would also have gained efficacy, however, only inasmuch as a beginning of faith was already in existence. Otherwise, claims of miraculous events would have been declared to be false, or understanding them would have been postponed to some future time when they could be explained naturally. Still less, however, could it be proved from the miracles that accompanied Christianity that it would be the supreme revelation. This would be the case, in that, on the same basis, something similar would have to be expected in connection with subordinate modes of faith as well, yet miracles themselves do not, as such, permit of being divided into lower and higher forms. Indeed, the claim that similar phenomena can show up

that would also exist without any connection with the religious domain remains unsettled, whether they would accompany developments of another sort or are alleged to be deeper stirrings within physical nature itself. In contrast, it likewise seems to be self-evident that supernatural phenomena of the sort that accompany revelation fade away, in turn, in the same degree as the new development itself breaks away from its starting point in external appearance, has got organized and, in this way, has become nature. (2) The situation is no different with prophecies, if someone should want to attribute to them a power greater than what has already been granted above. That is to say, suppose that we stick with prophecies among the Jewish prophets regarding Christ, just as in a later period Gentile prophecies were generally laid aside. Suppose, too, that at this point the prophecies of Christ and of the apostles could not be of primary interest, and that we would want to assign a stronger use of these prophetic utterances to the Jews themselves. Then we might very well imagine that a given Jew could have become a Christian precisely because this Jew attained to the insight that those prophecies are to be related to Jesus. Despite this insight, if perchance this Jew thought something quite different about the matter, in that he or she still did not entertain any need for redemption whatsoever, this Jew would not have had properly Christian faith and consequently true participation in Christian community. Suppose, in contrast, that these prophecies were generally held up to persons not of Christian faith, so as to effect in them the desire to enter into community with Christ. At that point, it might already have been agreed in advance that all of those prophecies are to be regarded as belonging in a single package and that all of them have one individual entity in view and, indeed, one and the same subject.27 This agreement might be made, for otherwise the supposed fulfillment of them all in one and the same person28 would actually not be a fulfillment of them. Further, it might already have been agreed in advance that they all gained fulfillment in Christ and indeed each one as it was meant to be—not perchance the prophecies meant figuratively in a literal sense and those meant figuratively in a symbolic sense—for that would also not be a fulfillment. The matter always comes down to this: It is to be assumed that Jesus would be the Redeemer because the Redeemer would have been foretold in terms of defining properties that were actually to be found in him. Already presupposed in this assumption, however, is indeed a faith in the ones who prophesied as such, and it is impossible to conceive how a person not of faith who comes from outside Judaism should come to such a faith in this way, except inasmuch as the inspiration of those prophets would first have been proven to that person, a subject matter to be discussed just below. Without such a faith, the compilation of prophecies and their fulfillment would be a sheer memorandum, which could contain an inducement to seek community with Christ only for those in whom some need for redemption would already be present. Indeed, this would be the case only to the extent that the need expressed in the prophecies would be analogous to their own but, at the same time, what is prophesied would stand in a perceivable association with their need.29 That is, this association would apply only to the extent that each one could also have made the same prophecy regarding redemption out of one’s own need for it. However, the inducement could, nonetheless, only intend having the experience itself,30 and

faith would then occur only once this seeking had succeeded. Today, moreover, when deeds speak with such a vibrant voice, this inducement can, in any case, certainly be given far more strongly and surely in ways other than use of prophecies. This latter point becomes abundantly clear when we consider how things actually stand, given the presuppositions that were set forth just above—namely, that it will never be possible to demonstrate that those ancient prophets had foreseen Christ exactly as he really was and the messianic reign even less as it has really developed in the form of Christianity. Once one realizes this point, one must concede that it is impossible to establish proof that Christ is the Redeemer based on these prophecies. In particular, moreover, the zeal for serving this purpose by seeking out prophecies or prototypes that might relate to incidental, secondary situations in the story of Christ must take on the appearance of mere blundering. Hence, one might very well have to distinguish between apologetic use of prophecies that the apostles made in their relationship to Jews and a general use that people wanted to make of them as means of proof. In contrast, when faith in the Redeemer is already present, we can dwell with great good pleasure on all expressions of a longing for redemption that has been awakened by earlier revelations that were in themselves insufficient. Furthermore, this is the actual significance—to be sure, also the fortifying and confirming significance—of the messianic prophecies, wherever they may be registered and in however dim a presentiment they may be shrouded: that they disclose to us a striving of human nature after Christianity. At the same time, moreover, when these prophecies are viewed as declaring the confession of the most advanced and inspired from among earlier religious communities, their significance lies in their being regarded as accouterments of those communities that are simply preliminary and transitory. Now, suppose that the discussion is turned to prophecies in Christianity itself. In that regard, it is indeed natural that as a new mode of existence begins to unfold, people’s glance would be very much directed toward the future—that is, toward its consummation. The disciples’ questions can be understood in this way, questions to which answers could not entirely be denied them; and afterward they made further predictions of their own on the basis of these answers. However, Christ’s prophecies in these answers cannot, in any case, serve as proof of his wholly distinctive dignity or of his exclusive destiny as the Redeemer, because others besides Christ are recognized also to have prophesied, nevertheless, and even earlier than he did. It is likewise natural that the more the new order of salvation31 came to be established as a historical phenomenon, the more interest in the future would dwindle and prophecy fade away. From all these considerations, it further follows that if faith in the revelation of God in Christ and in redemption through him had not already arisen on the originative path through experience, viewed as the demonstration of the Spirit and of power,32 neither miracles nor prophecies could have engendered it. Indeed, it also follows that this faith would be just as unshakable even if Christianity were to have neither miracles nor prophecies to show for it. This is so, for the lack of these things could never refute that demonstration of the Spirit and of power, and experience of need that is stilled in community with Christ would dispel any

charge of illusion. Rather, from the lack of miracles and prophecies nothing would follow other than that those natural presuppositions just referred to would not always be corroborated. Rather, precisely the origination of the most complete formation of religious self-consciousness would have appeared more suddenly and would have borne an effect more strictly contained within its immediate domain. (3) Finally, regarding inspiration, in Christianity this concept bears a thoroughly subordinate meaning. This is the case, for reference of the concept to Christ finds no place in Christianity at all, in that divine revelation through him, however it might be conceived, is always taken to be identical with his entire existence,33 not as appearing in a fragmentary manner in scattered instances. What the Spirit gave to the apostles, however, Christ himself spoke of as derived entirely from his own instruction. Moreover, those who became persons of faith through the apostolic witness did not become so because this witness had arisen through inspiration, for they knew nothing of that. Hence, the concept relates only, on the one hand, to the prophets of the old covenant and, on the other hand, to how the holy Scripture of the New Testament was written.34 Thus, at this point we have to deal with the concept, moreover, only to the extent that people want to exact35 faith in a demonstrable fashion by using Holy Scripture once they have come to assume that it is inspired. In contrast, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, prophecy recorded there is not to be understood of itself, apart from history and the law. Yet, taken as a whole, the Old Testament is so theocratic throughout that two consequences result. First, we can indeed distinguish two poles within it, of which the one pole draws us to the New Testament and the other pole repels us from it. Second, however, if, apart from the New Testament, making prophetic inspiration credible to a person were successful—which, however, could scarcely be accomplished other than by the prophets’ own testimony that the word of God had happened to them—nevertheless, no faith in Christ, viewed as the end of the law, could have developed on this basis alone. Much more accurately, we would speak the whole truth, in turn, only if we were to say that we have faith in prophetic inspiration only on account of what use Christ and the apostles made of the prophetic sayings. As for the New Testament, however, faith had been communicated over the length of two centuries before any agreement was set forth as to its distinctive currency.36 Moreover, in the meanwhile this communication of faith was not actually carried out, as did indeed happen, in such a way that faith would have been mediated everywhere by people’s having faith in the Old Testament.37 Among the great mass of Gentiles who went over to Christianity without having been Judaized beforehand, this mediation was in no way the case. Even today, however, and provided that inspiration of the New Testament writings were provable by statements made within the writings themselves, this move would, nevertheless, presuppose the most nearly complete understanding of these writings possible. As a result, on the one hand, we would, nevertheless, need yet another way for faith to arise, because this understanding would be possible only for a few, and thus we would have a twofold faith. On the other hand, it would also remain ever difficult to realize how such an objective conviction could be an impetus38 exerted on self-consciousness in such a way that this assertion would

instantly obtain some inner truth for anyone, based on the mere knowledge39 that those persons were inspired who asserted that human beings are in need of redemption and that Christ is their Redeemer. Instead, all that this sort of conviction can do, in any case, is give a nudge toward the awakening of a more filled-out self-consciousness and toward one’s acquiring a total impression from Christ,40 and only once this process has occurred will faith then emerge.41

1. The words “faith in” (Glaube an) literally mean “faith directed toward.” This “inner experience” can come to be expressed as a “belief that” Jesus is the Redeemer, but that belief would be an outcropping from the root, not the root itself. Accordingly, this work of dogmatics (Glaubenslehre, doctrine regarding faith) critically articulates—as “description,” “presentation,” and “explanation”—what this inner shared faith means, according to particular “principles” held within the Evangelical church. In this respect, it produces “propositions,” with further explications, critiques, and arguments, but it does not seek to bind the roots themselves or presume to be the same thing. In this light, §14 is a prolepsis of, or prelude to, the entire system of doctrine, and it serves the same, limited purpose for the ethical half of dogmatics as well. Here, moreover, as through the entire system, the inner experience of Christian faith is a process, which begins not from inside but from outside. Faith is transmitted through others—proclaimed by word and deed. Consequently, it is a gift of God that occurs in and through community among persons of faith. Dogmatics, on the other hand, can set more or less firmly defined expectations for that transmission—in Schleiermacher’s view, leaving open considerable space for diverse exercise of “free discretionary power” (see the index for Brief Outline). 2. Ed. note: In OG 67, Schleiermacher indicates that even if he had reversed the present ordering of his system of doctrine, he would have started with the “doctrine of Scripture and the proper ground of faith.” 3. §5.4. 4. Gewiβheit. Ed. note: This word can mean “certainty,” but in Schleiermacher’s usage it refers to a relatively firm and sure feeling, stirring, or conviction, not to a bedrock cognitive certainty. Thus, it is always subject to further selfexamination, renewal, and accruals of growth. It thereby is a firmly based, if ever developing, surety approaching that utter, unexceptionable “ease and constancy” just mentioned. It is closer to the certainty accompanying trust within a relationship than it is to the certainty accompanying cognitive knowledge. 5. Einwirkung. Ed. note: In contrast to the English word “influence” (literally, an “inflowing affect” on oneself from outside), in Schleiermacher’s usage Christ’s “operation-toward-and-within” cannot imply that it is a “mere” influence. Rather, it denotes a strong, irremovable cause-and-effect situation. In itself, this state, created in this way, would not be possible if it were thought to be necessarily admixed with other factors, even though other influences can be present on account of sin. This state, which he calls “faith,” is the working or effect (Wirkung) of what God does in Christ. In the language of tradition, Christ’s working is the sole ground, reason, basis, or foundation (Grund) of one’s being a Christian. “Inspiration” (Eingebung) also represents that process. “Inspiration” means marking of God’s Spirit, not human inspiration (Begeisterung), a term not used in CF. See §§3.4, 111.1, 128.2, and 130.1–2. See OR (1821) III, supplemental note 1. There he states: “The truth of Christ’s words [in saying, ‘You did not choose me, but I chose you,’ in John 15:16 RSV] rather lies chiefly in the fact that the inspiration originally existed in him alone. In them there was only the receptiveness to being awakened by him.” See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 8. 6. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher cites Twesten, Vorlesungen (1829—cf. §13n2), 21, where he accurately takes Twesten to define faith as “the determination of our notions and cognitions that religious feeling immediately produces” (Thönes, 1873). To expand on his note: In general, for Twesten faith is indeed a kind of belief (Fürwahrhalten), one that is based on feeling. In Schleiermacher’s own usage, Fürwahrhalten tends not to be employed, for it can suggest outright belief, as if religious feeling would not be authentic, distinctive, or reliable unless it were strengthened and clarified by the activity of intellect (as it was for Twesten). This is not to deny either that the various aspects of Gemüth interact or that piety can be expressed in and filled out by both belief and action. See also On Religion, discourse II and its essential connection with discourses III–V in his describing the complete religious life. 7. §4.4. 8. Wesen. 9. Ahndung. Ed. note: Apparently Ahnung was intended here, for at that time Ahndung generally referred to a foreboding presentiment. 10. Ed. note: See §4, to which Schleiermacher has already referred in §14n7.

11. John 1:45–46 and 6:68–69; Matt. 16:15–18. 12. Ed. note: innere Erfahrung. Thus, the vollkommen innerlichen Tatsache (“completely internalized fact”) that that evocation produces, the “purely actual surety” of religious faith indicated in the previous paragraph, is a distinctly internal event although it has external components—two of which are singled out here as the continuing influence of Christ’s person and work. It is comprised of an interactive process undergone in relation to a community among persons of faith and with Christ. 13. Ed. note: wurden gläubig. Even though the same word (Gläubiger) is sometimes (perhaps mistakenly) translated “believers,” even in translation of Scripture, Schleiermacher plainly does not intend this meaning here. Thus, the translation is “person of faith” in this work. Faith, for him, is neither a rationally grounded belief nor a mere opinion; rather, its surety is based on an experience in relation to God that is first processed and held inside a person, then expressed and shared, in turn, both within and beyond a community of faith. Cf. §14n1 above. 14. Acts 2:37, 41. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 2:41–42, June 10, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 216–30. 15. Zeugnis. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, Christian proclamation (Verkündigung) is always by word and/or deed, as Christ’s was, whether directly expressed as immediate testimony or example, or indirectly expressed. All preaching (predigen) is supposed to be such proclamation, but not all proclamation is done through preaching, not by far. 16. Darstellung. 17. Ed. note: The direct reference is to an anodyne for assuaging pain. It seems also to allude to The Consolation of Philosophy, written during a period of great duress in prison and the best known of many works by the Roman philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480–525). Like Schleiermacher, Boethius was a well-versed, prolific translator of Greek philosophy—into Latin in his case—especially Aristotle’s Oraganon and several of his works on logic. A Neoplatonic thinker, Boethius included an account of the apparent incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human free will among the themes of his Consolation. Overall, Boethius’s translations and commentaries on Porphery’s (ca. 232–304) Isagoge and on works attributed to Aristotle bore a marked influence on philosophy and theology in the medieval Latin West, particularly on its terminology. 18. Ed. note: The only word Schleiermacher could use here is glauben, at this point meaning to believe or hold a belief. 19. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher seems to be alluding, for example, to definitions of “God” that use no such comparative measure but refer to qualities in God “greater than which there is no other.” Such language, he is claiming, can offer no proof, notably, of God’s omnipotence, but refer only to God’s incommensurability, by definition. Thus, it cannot prove anything of importance by reference to “miracle,” “prophecy,” or “inspiration” either (see §14.P.S.). 20. Acts 6:9–10 and 9:20–22; also 18:27–28. 21. Ed. note: Cf. §27.3. 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “Nitzsch and Twesten also present miracles only as an aid to proof of the Spirit and of its power” (Thönes, 1873). To trace Schleiermacher’s account of miracles, see §§34.2, 47.1, 76.2, 93.3, 99.2, 103.1, 103.4, 108.5, 117.2, 123.2, 124.3, and 130.4. In OG 61 he refers to stories about miracles as belonging to “fable” and states that they cannot retain any status as a subject for faith-doctrine much longer. See also OR (1821) II, supplemental note 16, for his further explanation of the miraculous character of every natural event. 23. Ed. note: Also particularly noteworthy in the present context is that God’s grace is always deemed to be temporally prior. Thus, temporally speaking, consciousness of “the need for redemption” is at best second, as Schleiermacher indicates repeatedly (cf. esp. §§62–64, which introduce Part Two). Hence, in this book Schleiermacher begins Part Two with sin, because sin points to a state of being in need of redemption that predates one’s being conscious of God’s grace in Christ, if only in an infinitesimally small fashion, as he says here, and only then, and to that extent, does one come to have an actual consciousness of being in need of redemption. Therefore, if the two features of Christians’ faith and life mentioned here— namely, sin and grace in “contrast” to each other—are to be regarded as phases, they are so in reverse order: consciousness of grace and consciousness of sin comprise the conversion process (cf. §108), then the two continue as intermingled thereafter. It has indeed proved to be misleading to have the introduction to Part Two and the doctrine of sin in volume 1, a decision with which Schleiermacher appears to have concurred only so as to make the two volumes more nearly equal in size. Likewise, the monotheistically oriented “faith in God or directed toward God” presented in Part One is taken to be only conceptually prior for Christians—i.e., “presupposed”—though some Christians, like early Jewish converts, may have started out holding monotheistic beliefs of some other kind. Hence, Schleiermacher does not conceive Part One to be a natural theology of any kind, i.e., a phase of theology different from what is, in terms of God’s decisive activity, supernaturally grounded. 24. Ed. note: Here the word betrachtende does service for all levels of observation, directly correlated to the various kinds, levels, or degrees of self-consciousness. These range from the most strictly sensory operations of mind to the purest states of contemplation, including any organic admixtures that may arise in between. Likewise, in Schleiermacher’s frequent

use of the verb betrachten and the noun Betrachtung in his sermons, only the context can reveal what shorter range is meant within this scale. Often his religious discourse stems from, and invites, the more nearly supreme levels of contemplation. 25. Dasein. 26. Ed. note: aus dem früherem Sein. 27. Subjekt. Ed. note: In general, and particularly in Schleiermacher’s usage, this term refers to a person, not to some subject matter, and, for him, ordinarily but not necessarily an individual person, though he does also refer occasionally to a social entity as a Person—as some of those prophecies might seem to do. 28. Person. 29. In this sense, the prophecy quoted in Matt. 12:19–20 is perhaps the most fraught with meaning. Ed. note: The quote in Matt. 12 is from a “servant” passage, Isa. 42:3–4. 30. John 1:41, 46. 31. Heilsordnung. Ed. note: That is, God’s arranging the means and conditions for accomplishment of salvation, notably in the form of redemption and reconciliation (§§100–101), but also more broadly in view of God’s “one eternal divine decree” (cf. §§117–20, also his 1819 essay On the Doctrine of Election, ET Nicol and Jorgenson, 2009). 32. Ed. note: “The demonstration [Beweis, or “proof “] … power” is a direct quote from 1 Cor. 2:4. 33. Existenz. Ed. note: Whereas Dasein is the term used for “existence” (literally, being-there), earlier in the Introduction (cf. §13n4, n6, and n15), as elsewhere here. Existenz is the term used for Christ’s entire existence (his “being-there” in its entirety). Schleiermacher takes Christ, and also Christianity as well, to be a new existence in this second sense. The phrase that follows, “not as appearing … in scattered instances,” is of key importance, not to be hurriedly passed over. In his Christology, Schleiermacher views the entire “life of Jesus” and what he must accomplish in this light. 34. Ed. note: On the New Testament canon, see CF index and OG 66f., also BO index. 35. Ed. note: “Exact” translates erzwingen, a meaning in currency at the time and still used to convey situations such as exacting a confessional agreement and the like. All the word’s meanings contain an image of forcible action: In this case, Schleiermacher is describing a position that he opposed, wherein it is assumed that if certain conditions are met, listed here, faith should follow from one’s demonstrating those conditions, as if this “faith” were rational assent, or belief. 36. Gültigkeit. Ed. note: That is, as an agreed-upon set of writings that would have general currency for the churches represented in the decision making. This observation is not to exclude authoritative, canonical validity (another, stricter sense of Gültigkeit) for versions of certain writings here or there. In Schleiermacher’s view, establishment of the “canon” (i.e., the exact and properly authoritative) text and shape of the New Testament writings is still ongoing through critical work both historical and philological, already taking now-familiar shape during his own lifetime. See Brief Outline, where he singles out this particular task as one for a relatively “higher” criticism (§§110–24). 37. Ed. note: Writing in response to Karl Heinrich Sack’s monograph Von Worte Gottes: Eine christliche Verständigung (1825), in a letter of April 9, 1825, to Sack, Schleiermacher said the following in dissent: “Of necessity, however, faith could not have arisen from Scripture, because no faith would have existed over the span of two centuries on that basis, and because as a result, faith could also have arisen over and over again without Scripture.” He continued: “Text set down in pen and ink is too inessential. In and of itself, Scripture is nothing, but it is something continually present for people to view, as in a painting of Christ, who bears witness to himself in Scripture as he does orally, and his witness is true.” (Cf. Rev. 22:6.) Dilthey, Aus Schleiermacher’s Leben, 334. Schleiermacher then mentioned a point in Braniss’s critique of Christian Faith in a book (Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, 1824) to which Sack had referred. Schleiermacher had not yet carefully read the book, but he intended to do so. The point affirms something “objective” versus merely “being affected” (Affection). His response was “If being affected were a dream …, it could have no objective truth. Actually, however, being affected refers precisely to the impact [Wirkung] upon us of what is divine in Christ, and indeed what is objective. The word spoken in John 1:14, ‘We have seen his glory,’ etc., is the kernel of all dogma, and this word presents itself from nothing other than the state of being affected that is transmitted in the discourse. Indeed, even what Christ said regarding himself would not have become Christian truth if it had not forthwith proved itself to be so through this being affected by him. Thus, for me this being affected is what is originative in Christianity. All else is simply derived from it and remains so.” Affekt and Affection have had a range of meanings in German usage. Schleiermacher rarely uses these words, or other forms of their root, replacing them instead with Gefühl (feeling). When he uses Affekt it refers to a sensory impact. Like the English word with the same spelling, Affection can convey a fondness for or attachment to another on account of certain qualities—a feeling no doubt included in people’s response to Jesus as their Redeemer. Here it is taken to refer predominately to an overall feeling (i.e., affective state) prominent in the first disciples’ encounter with Christ, eventually passed down to others through the ages. In this continuing encounter, people are affected by Christ’s impetus within and thus his presence with them. In faith, they feel that impetus, registered as an impulse within them, and thereby they sense his presence with them in and through Christ’s community of faith.

38. Impuls. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s psychological understanding, an Impuls (impetus from without or impulse registered within) arises within a person, whatever external components might impact that process from without. Thus, any process of being convinced that is strictly objective, as in a demonstrative argument or attempt to prove that is, by definition, directed solely to intellect, would produce only a reasoned agreement, thus an “objective conviction.” In contrast, the impetus that engenders an impulse in self-consciousness, as he has emphasized in his introductory presentation thus far, is “faith,” not “belief “ (cf. §13.P.S.n26). The outcome that is belief requires a pure process of reasoning, one not alloyed with or swayable by nonrational factors. The source that impacts faith is clearly external and in that sense implies an originating objective reality (here God in Christ, viewed as the historical existence named Jesus), but it is not strictly the objective process called a “proof.” 39. Erkenntnis. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, Erkenntnis is the strongest cognitive result one can have. He regularly uses other words for other gradations, e.g., Kenntnis and Kennen for information, mere cognition, or acquaintance with (vs. knowing that it is the case that), Erkennen (any process of cognition), and Wissen (a knowing, or moving toward a more nearly exact, consummate knowledge). Wissenschaft, or “science,” is defined as that last process in his writings and lectures on “dialectic.” There are many other gradations of consciousness (Bewußtsein) besides these. 40. Totaleindruck. Ed. note: Some ambiguity may well lie in this word, which refers to an overall immediate impression, not to the fullest possible impression. Even the disciples would not have received the latter totality, yet others’ impressions from and of Christ that were acquired from much less direct contact with him were sufficient for faith. “Total” is retained here, however, because in the present discussion Schleiermacher has attempted to obviate one’s trying to draw one’s faith from fragmentary instances. Rather, one seeks a broader, overall impression from (von) and of or regarding (von) him. (On reason and the divine Spirit, cf. §13n25, n26, and §13.P.S.). 41. Ed. note: This section (§11–§14), borrowed from the apologetic aspect of philosophical theology, is itself quite systematically interwoven. In particular, §14.P.S. carries forward the examination of these concepts—miracle, prophecy, and inspiration—already introduced in §13. Together, the four propositions serve not only to define and place Christianity in comparison with all other religions but also seek to clear out much excess baggage and, if carefully examined, can provide an outlined anticipation, or prolepsis, for the entire system of actual doctrine. The discussion of even these three only partially serviceable concepts here is far from finished, however (see also Brief Outline §45 for reference to all three). The elaborate treatment of miracle, which sets the stage for consideration of “prophecy” and “inspiration,” can be fruitfully traced from §§13–14, through esp.§34.2–3, the whole of §47, then §§76.2, 93.3, 99.2, 103.1 and 4, 108.5, 117.2, 123.2, 124.3, and 130.4. His view that miracles cannot be accurately conceived as “absolutely supernatural,” isolated events bears significant ramifications throughout, as do his eventually articulated views that in one sense every natural event is a miracle and, in the sense of the supernatural’s breaking into the natural order and becoming natural, that Jesus’ becoming the Redeemer and establishing the new, redeeming reign of God in humanity is the only true miracle. This entire account is meant to show that “the basis of faith must be for us the same as for the first Christians” (§128.2) —namely, not by any rational, demonstrated proof but by experiencing the immediate indwelling power of Christ himself through the proclamation, by word and deed, of “Christ’s own word” (§108.5). Prophecy, in the predictive sense, is consistently treated in the same way, even in the domain of Christianity. (Above, see §13n11, n12, n20, and n21, certain anticipations of a presentation regarding Christ’s roles in the “new creation,” later treated in §§102–5 as Christ’s three offices, analogous to those of prophet, high priest, and king among the ancient Jews; see also §§159–63 on “prophetic doctrine” and BO §§45–46.) Certain claims of “inspiration” are likewise treated consistently in the same way, this in relation not only to Scripture (cf. §§127–32, esp. §130.3–4, and also Brief Outline §134) but also in relation to everything else that is authentically Christian. In order fully to grasp Schleiermacher’s understanding of this concept, however, one cannot stop short of realizing what he meant by divine “revelation” (only tangentially referred to in §14), why he conjoined the doctrine of election to aspects of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, what constitutes the basis of his ecclesiology, which presents still further aspects of that doctrine throughout, and how he conceived “the divine government of the world” by what he calls “the divine Spirit.”

IV. Regarding the Relationship of Dogmatics to Christian Piety §15. Propositions regarding Christian faith1 are conceptions of Christian religious states of mind and heart2 presented in the form of discourse.3 1. All religious stirrings, to whatever kind and level of piety they might also belong, have the following in common with all other modifications of self-consciousness when it is moved. Once they have reached a certain point and a certain distinct resolution, they also become manifest externally. They do this most primitively and directly in mime, by means of facial features and movements both of voice and gesture, which we regard to be their expression. Already at that early point, moreover, we definitely distinguish an expression of devoutness4 from that of a merely sensory mirth or sadness—this by analogy to that within oneself with which each person has some acquaintance. Indeed, we are able even to imagine that for the purpose of holding these religious states of mind and heart firm and—especially if they are shared among a number of people—of spreading them in some manner that can be repeated, the various features of that natural expression would be combined in the form of sacred signs and symbolic actions, without any perceptible interposition of thought whatsoever. However, we can scarcely imagine such a low point of development in the human spirit, such a deficient mode of formation, and such a parsimonious use of language that, at the same time, each person should not already, in accordance with the stage of mental functioning5 one had attained, have also been making oneself an object6 within one’s diverse states, so as to form some notion of these states and to hold them firm in the form of thought. Now, from time immemorial this endeavor has also been directed, in particular, to religious stirrings of the mind and heart.7 Moreover, in its inner character, considered in and of itself, this endeavor is what our proposition means by one’s conception of religious states of mind and heart. However, although thinking never does proceed, even internally, without use of language, as long as thinking remains purely internal, certain wavering states of this procedure would exist in it nonetheless. To some extent, these wavering states do indeed designate some given object, yet only in such a way that neither the shaping nor the combining of concepts would be firm enough to permit their being communicated—even if the word “concept” were taken in its broadest meaning. Only a cultivation of this procedure so advanced that it could also be presented externally in well-defined discourse would bring forth an actual proposition regarding faith, by means of which the utterances of that religious consciousness referred to would come into circulation more securely and in greater compass than is possible by means of immediate expression. No matter whether the expression were actual or figurative, whether it would designate its construct immediately or only by means of comparison and delimitation, it would still be a proposition regarding faith, however. 2.8 Now, Christianity everywhere presupposes this developmental stage of consciousness. The entire efficacious action of the Redeemer himself was co-conditioned by the communicability of his self-consciousness by virtue of discourse. In the same fashion, moreover, Christianity has always and everywhere been spread by means of proclamation

alone.9 Every statement that can be a feature of Christian proclamation (κήρυγμα) is also a statement regarding faith, because it bears witness to the definite resolution of religious selfconsciousness, viewed as inner surety. Moreover, every statement regarding Christian faith is also a part of Christian proclamation, because every such statement also expresses as a surety the approach to a state of blessedness10 that is to be wrought by means of what Christ has founded. Very quickly, however, this proclamation split into three different domains of language, which proffer three correspondingly different formations of statements regarding faith: the poetic domain; the rhetorical domain—which, on the one hand, turns outward more by way of dispute and commendation, and, on the other hand, turns inward more by way of ascetic language and invitation; and finally, the presentational-didactic domain.11 The relationship of communication through discourse to that through symbolic action is already a very different one, however, according to time and place. The first kind of communication has increasingly receded in the Eastern church, for in its mode of operation adherence to a letter12 that has become firm and inalterable also comes much closer to symbolic action than to free discourse; and this first kind of communication, through discourse, has been ever more prevalent in the Western church. Thus, even in the domain of discourse itself, the situation is the same with respect to those three different modes of communication. The relationship that obtains among them, also how abundantly overall and in what vital interchange they are unfolded, and how they nourish each other and are multiply changed into each other—these characteristics testify not so much to the degree of piety as they do to the character of a society and to its readiness for more reflective mental functioning and contemplation.13 Thus, on the one hand, this communication is already something different from piety itself, though piety can no more be divorced from all communication than can anything else that is human. On the other hand, however, propositions regarding faith, in all their forms, are ultimately grounded so exclusively in the stirrings of religious self-consciousness that where the stirrings are not present, the propositions also cannot arise.

1. Christliche Glaubenssätze. Ed. note: In this work, doctrines, or statements regarding faith, are first presented as doctrinal propositions (Lehrsätze) and then explained in two or more numbered subsections. The doctrines themselves, however, are not about doctrines, or teachings, but are about “faith” (§14). That is, they are presented as “propositions regarding faith” (Glaubenssätze), faith that is itself distinctively Christian. The treatment as a whole Schleiermacher calls Glaubenslehre (faith-doctrine, or doctrina fidei). Schleiermacher’s marginal note at the general heading above reads: “§§15 and 16: Dogmatic propositions [Dogmatische Sätze] developing out of doctrines regarding faith [Glaubenssätzen]. §§17 and 18: The value [Wert] to be assigned to dogmatic propositions and their being combined. §19: Definition” (Thönes, 1873). Cf. OG 59: “These propositions are something merely derivative, and the inner state of mind and heart is what is originative.” 2. Gemütszustände. Ed. note: To indicate how the terms used are translated and relate to each other: These states (Zustände) are, at base, affective, about one’s being affected in feeling (Gefühl) by God, attended by one’s equally internal perceptions (Anschauungen, which some interpreters have called “intuitions,” following Kant’s rather different usage) directed toward what is divine (“God”). Hence, the work in its entirety is about how human beings are reached by God in this way. The result is a body of doctrine (Lehrbegriff) containing conceptions or apprehensions (Auffassungen) of these states. The way in which God’s activity in Christ is to be apprehended in doctrinal concepts (Begriffe) and is to be ordered and displayed here is its “method” (Methode, §§20–31). The “definition” (Erklärung) that precedes it (§§2–19) could be

described as comprising explanations regarding the focus and boundaries of its mode of apprehending, viewing, or conceptualizing (Auffasungsart) the presentation of Christian faith to be offered here. The focus, however, is God’s activity in Christ reaching human beings in our finite natural state, in our Gemutszustände, and then in our piety (Frömmigkeit), taken as a whole. 3. Cf. §3.5. 4. Andacht. 5. Besinnung. Ed. note: Since Schleiermacher uses other terms for sensibility (Sinn, Sinnlichkeit), consciousness (Bewußtsein), and mental disposition (Gesinnung), “mental functioning,” which rises toward higher stages of reflection, seems to be the preferable translation here. Nonetheless, in this context he is also referring to stages of consciousness, including those of self-consciousness. 6. Gegenstand. Ed. note: Or a subject for observation—that is, to view oneself as an “I” who takes notice and acts, also as a “me” to whom things happen, including things that one has initiated oneself—as an interactive, not a merely static, object. 7. Gemütserregungen. Ed. note: That is, to the affective domain, and within it in particular to stirrings, excitations, or what some refer to as emotions (alternatively, to Gemütsbewegungen). Affekt is the term Schleiermacher occasionally uses for stirrings chiefly determined sensorily. 8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal heading for the preceding subsection reads: “The General Extension of Reflection [Allgemeinheit der Reflexion]” (Thönes, 1873). This “procedure”(Verfahrung) extends from the more primitive, unsteady sort of observation Betrachtung) to the most precisely conceptual. The heading for this second subsection is “The General Conditions of Christian Proclamation” (Verkündigung). 9. Verkündigung. Ed. note: “Proclamation” means communication by word and/or deed, in the same fashion as is reported of Jesus. In contrast, Schleiermacher generally restricts “preaching” (Predigten) to producing sermons and homilies. See his four 1821 sermons on the “seeds” of proclamation, translated by Tice and Lawler in a forthcoming volume. 10. See §5.4. 11. Ed. note: The third, darstellend belehrende domain is explained in §16. The concept “presentational action” is the most important formal category in Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics, being an extension of Christ’s own self-presentation both in his discourse and in his other actions. “Didactic” refers most broadly and aptly, for present purposes, to a near synonym of instruction, though here it goes beyond the usual connotation of providing information to the fuller meaning of “education” or fostering personal growth (Bildung, Ausbildung, Erziehung) to be found in his various lectures and discourses on education. On matters “dogmatic” versus “ascetic,” see OR (1821) II, supplemental note 4; also OR index on “asceticism.” The characterization given here refers, in part, to various practices of inner religious devotional life and the figurative language used there. See also §§85.2, 87.2, 109.3, 112.4, and 124.2. 12. Buchstabe. Ed. note: English uses the same figurative expression in the phrase “the letter of the law.” 13. Besinnung und Betrachtung. Ed. note: Cf. §15n5. At their higher reaches, both of these characteristics represent higher levels and stages of development in self-consciousness, a greater receptivity to corresponding religious stimuli, and a cultural groundwork for both contemplative and intellectual “reflection.” Betrachtung, in Schleiermacher’s usage, especially betokens a more contemplative bent within the domain of religious discourse. In his sermons, therefore, he often invites his listeners to take notice, observe, or consider what is being proclaimed in Scripture in this more contemplative manner.

§16. Dogmatic propositions are statements regarding faith, propositions of the presentational-didactic kind in which the intention is to attain the highest possible degree of distinct resolution.1 1. Originally, poetic expression is always based on an element of life that is raised purely from within, on an element of inspiration; rhetorical expression is always based on an element of life raised from without, or an element of aroused interest that issues in some distinct, particular result. Poetic expression is purely presentational in character and, within broad contours, sets forth images and formations that its hearer fills out in one’s own distinctive fashion. Rhetorical expression is purely persuasive in character and, in accordance with its nature, has mostly to do with features of speech that, in taking up matters on a scale of more and less, can be conceived in greater or lesser compass. It is satisfied if, at the

decisive instant, these features of speech can but lead the listener to its highest goal, given also that they might seem to bear less value subsequently, having exhausted themselves in the process. Thus, both modes of expression are suited to a kind of completion that is different from the logical or dialectical sort described in our proposition. Nevertheless, we can well imagine both of them to be originative in every religious community, thus also in the Christian church, to the extent that we attribute to everyone in such community some participation in the calling of proclamation. That is to say, on the one hand, when a person finds oneself in a state of unusually heightened religious self-consciousness, that person will feel called to exercise poetic presentation, viewed as that mode of expression which most immediately proceeds from that state. On the other hand, when a person finds oneself to be especially challenged by either oppressive or favorable external circumstances to undertake an act of proclamation, the rhetorical mode of expression will be the most natural one for the purpose of drawing the greatest possible benefit from those given circumstances. Suppose, however, that we also take what is apprehended and appropriated in what is originally given in these two modes of expression to be tied to language and communicable by means of language. Then this material, in turn, will not be able to have either a poetic or a rhetorical form. Rather, in becoming independent of what was the momentary feature in each of these forms, and yet expressive of a consciousness that remains the same and being less a matter of proclamation than of confession (ὁμολογία), it would then become precisely that third form, the didactic, or presentational and educative,2 form, which form both in being what remains from those other two forms and in combining certain features of the two, is to be viewed as a derivative and secondary form. 2.3 Suppose, however, that we restrict ourselves exclusively to Christianity and focus our thought on its most distinctive beginning—namely, the self-proclamation of Christ, who, as subject of divine revelation, could not carry within himself a distinction between stronger and weaker stirring but could participate in such a distinction only by virtue of his life in common with others.4 Given that condition, we can also posit neither poetic nor rhetorical expression as the predominant form of his self-proclamation nor even as the actually originative form of it. Rather, in parabolic and prophetic discourses these two forms are present only subordinately. In contrast, what was essential in his self-proclamation lay in the fact that he had to bear witness to his constantly steady, ever identical self-consciousness, issuing from its composed state. Consequently, he did this not in a poetic form but in a strictly calm and reflective5 form. Thus, his task was to present himself, in that at the same time he would thereby communicate his objective consciousness of the condition and constitution of human beings in general—a consciousness belonging properly to him alone. Thus, he would be didactic in this presentation. Moreover, he would, indeed, be didactic in such a way that sometimes the educating that he did was subordinate to the presentation and sometimes vice versa. Our proposition, however, does not include this presentational-didactic expression of Christ; moreover, such utterances of the Redeemer will not readily be set forth as dogmatic propositions anywhere. Rather, they are handed over, as it were, only as text for such

propositions. This is the case, for even in such essential components of Christ’s selfproclamation the distinct resolution6 contained in them was absolute. Moreover, only a completely reproducible apprehension and appropriation of that proclamation can be designated by the phrase “the endeavor to attain the greatest possible definiteness.” Meanwhile, in Christ’s own discourses dogmatic propositions proper are subordinately present as well—namely, where he had to start with partly erroneous and partly entangled notions at hand among his contemporaries. 3.7 With regard to poetic and rhetorical expression, it already ensues from what was said of them above that they can fall into seeming contradiction, both each of them within itself and the two of them with each other. This can happen even when the self-consciousness designated by diverse expressions is the same in its content. Moreover, a resolution of seeming contradictions would be possible only under two conditions. First, it would be possible to the extent that one could orient oneself, concerning a given set of seemingly contradictory statements, to Christ’s own original utterances. This situation, however, would exist very rarely in any direct fashion. Second, it would be possible to the extent that a given presentational-didactic expression that had coalesced from the three original forms of expression would be entirely, or in large part, free of those seeming contradictions. This situation, however, would not obtain so long as the given presentational-didactic expression were still wavering between a stirring and a didactic type of expression, as would occur in its being proffered to catechumens or to a congregation, thus repeatedly being sometimes more akin to rhetorical expression and sometimes more akin to figurative expression. Rather, this second situation would obtain only to the degree that the endeavor indicated in our proposition would underlie the further cultivation of the given presentational-didactic expression and its more distinct separation from rhetorical and poetic expressions. Both of these processes essentially cohere with the need to settle conflict.8 Now, to be sure, in language-formation it is undeniably in the interest of knowing that figurative expression either be substituted with a literal expression or be converted into such an expression by definition, also that what is boundless in rhetorical expressions obtain its well-defined measure. Moreover, here our concern is chiefly with the formation of religious language. Hence, even dogmatic propositions are significantly explicated and gain currency only in religious communities that belong to a cultural milieu in which science is organized as something divorced from art or occupation and only to the degree that persons friendly to the knowing process are present within a given religious9 community and bear influence within it, so that the dialectical function may operate upon the utterances of religious selfconsciousness and guide the process of marking out their clear meaning. Now, such an alliance with an organized process of knowing has found a place in Christianity ever since the earliest times of the church. For this reason, moreover, it is also true that in no other religious10 community has the form of dogmatic propositions also been developed in such a strict separation from the remaining forms of discourse and unfolded in such fullness.

Postscript. This presentation both of dogmatic propositions’ emergence and of the fact that they have sprung only from logically ordered reflection11 on the immediate utterances of religious self-consciousness finds its confirmation in the whole sweep of history. The earliest proclamations made available to us in the New Testament writings already contain such propositions. Moreover, on closer consideration one recognizes in each of them, in part, their stemming from Christ’s original self-proclamation and, in part, their affinity with figurative and rhetorical features that for their continuing circulation were to be brought nearer to the strict shape of a formulation. In the succeeding period, it is clear that figurative language, which is constantly poetic by its very nature, bore the most decisive influence on dogmatic language and always preceded its development. Likewise, most dogmatic definitions were called forth by contradictions that rhetorical language had occasioned. However, if the transformation of original expressions into dogmatic propositions is ascribed to logical or dialectical interest,12 this transformation is to be understood as occurring only as to their form. This is the case, for a proposition that would turn out to have proceeded originally from speculative activity, however akin it might be to our own propositions in content, would no longer be a dogmatic proposition. If purely scientific effort that has the task of perceiving being13 is not to come to nothing, it must, in any case, either begin or end in Supreme Being. Thus, when considered in their details, forms of philosophizing that say something speculatively about Supreme Being, despite their having sprung from work of a purely scientific character, can hardly be distinguished from corresponding propositions that have simply arisen from reflection on religious stirrings of mind and heart but thereafter have been formed dialectically. If these are viewed in their respective contexts, however, the two kinds of propositions certainly do always diverge from each other in a most determinate fashion. That is to say, originally dogmatic propositions never arise except in trains of thought to which religious mentality has provided the impetus. In contrast, not only do speculative propositions concerning Supreme Being appear, for the most part, in purely logical or natural-scientific trains of thought, but it is also the case that even where they appear in ethical discourse, be it as fundamentals or as corollaries, a tendency toward taking the logical or the natural-scientific line of thought is unmistakably present. Even in dogmatic formations within the first centuries, if one discounts the entirely nonecclesial gnostic schools, the influence of speculation on the content of dogmatic propositions amounts to nothing. Indeed, later on, after classical organization of the knowing process had disintegrated within the Christian church, as the conglomerate philosophy of the Middle Ages had been formed, and, at the same time, once the formal influence of that philosophy was supposed to be exercised in formation of dogmatic language, what was speculative was mistaken for what was dogmatic. Consequently, an admixture of the two came to be almost unavoidable. However, this process also spelled a deficient situation for both approaches. Worldly wisdom14 retracted itself from this situation by making the ever clearer confession that in earlier times it had been placed under the guardianship of ecclesial belief and, consequently, confessing that it had stood under an alien law. Yet, having begun

all over again so often in its own distinctive development since then, it was also able to spare itself the trouble of inquiring into exactly what sorts of speculative propositions at the time had been taken to be dogmatic propositions, and vice versa. In contrast, for the Christian church, which is not in a position to make repeated fresh starts in the development of its doctrine, this separation is of greatest importance. The aim of this separation is to ensure, on a regular basis, against what is speculative—to which neither poetic or rhetorical expression of religious self-consciousness nor popular expression of religious self-consciousness can be oriented—being offered as something dogmatic.15 The Evangelical church, in particular, is of one mind in bearing within itself the consciousness that the shaping of dogmatic propositions that is distinctive to it does not depend on any philosophical form or school, or has not proceeded from any speculative interest in any respect. Rather, it has proceeded only from the interest of satisfying immediate self-consciousness, which is mediated by the genuine and unadulterated foundation endowed by Christ alone. Thus, in any consistent fashion, it also can accept as dogmatic propositions that belong to it only those that stem from that same source. However, our dogmatic theology will not so securely stand on its own foundation and its own soil, as worldly wisdom has already long stood on its own independent grounds, until the separation between the two kinds of proposition will have become so nearly complete that, for example, such an astonishing question as the question of whether the selfsame proposition could be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and vice versa, could not arise any more. This would be the case, because the positioning of a proposition in one of these fields could not find any place in the other field; rather, however similar a ring they might have, a differentiation between the two would always have to be presupposed. However, as long as people still take pains over dogmatic propositions for the purpose of grounding or deriving them in a speculative manner, or simply proceed to process the products of speculative activity and the results of reflecting on religious states of mind and heart so as to form them into a single whole, we will still be far from reaching such a high goal of separation.

1. Cf. §§3–5 and §13.1–2. Ed. note: See also OG 80–82. Here Bestimmtheit, which can also mean “definiteness,” is translated “distinct resolution,” to represent not only definiteness of statement but also a fine resolution of pertinent details and an exact resolution of difficulties to be faced. All three qualities are amply in evidence throughout CF, which has contributed to an impression of density that readers often have. This impression can be overcome only in part by stratagems adopted in this English edition. See OR (1821) I, section on “Emergence and Communication of Religion,” regarding limitations met with in ongoing development of full doctrine and formation of systems. His concept of revelation (cf. §46.P.S.) involves principled restrictions against substantive or system-borne contributions from philosophy into dogmatics, which are discussed elsewhere in both works, are briefly expressed here, and a more ample account of these matters is implied. 2. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher uses the descriptors das Didaktische, darstellend Belehrende. Cf. §15n1 and n11. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixed a marginal note at this point: “Christ’s self-proclamation was presentationaldidactic” (Thönes, 1873). 4. Ed. note: See §§93–105 for full explanation of these descriptions of Christ in his person and work. On the religious writings that ensued, see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 1, which outlines differences between the Quran, the Judaic codex, the New Testament, and other forms.

5. Ed. note: The words “strictly calm and reflective” translate streng besonnener, the latter word alluding to a more composed meditative, contemplative, or reflective state of mind and heart. 6. Bestimmtheit. See §16n1 above. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “3. Presentational-didactic expression is dogmatic in combination with a knowing [Wissen] that is organic” (Thönes, 1873). Entangled notions would have organic features in them. Schleiermacher then uses the expression “organized knowing,” with a different meaning, near the end of this subsection. 8. Ed. note: “Didactic” refers not simply to teaching but rather to rules that govern its terms and formulations in the service of precision, correlation, and cohesion in presentation, and in its use of dialectical method in the process. The doctrinal and ethical aspects of Christian dogmatics are to follow the same basic principles regarding their proper subject matter and didactic form. See also BO §§223–31. On didactic as a form of discourse (language usage) in particular social contexts, see BO §§213–14, 219, and 236n. See also OR (1821) IV, supplemental notes 3 and 4. There he compares conversation in free sociality with didactic discourse and religious poetry (the latter provides a standard for hymnody). He also contrasts the ideal of a “true church” with “the existing church” and states: “In the existing church all discourse, no matter what its subject, must bear a didactic character.” The main reason he offers is that the speaker’s aim must be to draw people’s attention to something that might not yet have developed in the form mentioned. This is “on the basis of an original equality for all,” priest or laity, preferably in “plain speech.” 9. Ed. note: In this context, frommen (used at this point and throughout the rest of this proposition) and religiösen could be viewed as virtually interchangeable. However, Schleiermacher consistently uses frommen for inner states and religiösen for the outward manifestations of a religious community and its identity as a religious institution. The status of “piety” (Frommigkeit) belonging to such an institution itself, as well as within and among its members, can vary greatly, though in identifying any of it one expects to find some notable degree of commonality. 10. Ed. note: frommen. After this point in the text, the modifier is never religiösen. 11. Reflexion. 12. Ed. note: Concerning “dialectical interest”: In his 1811 notes and subsequent lectures on dialectic, matters of logic are treated as an integral part of dialectic, itself conceived as “the art of doing philosophy” or of being philosophically minded in any inquiry or discourse that is pursued with the aim of knowing. 13. Anschauung des Seins. Ed. note: This level of perception is a rational, metaphysical, specifically ontological aim, not the nonrational experience in which authentic religion or piety is rooted. 14. Weltweisheit. Ed. note: In common usage, this term came to be used for “philosophy” freed from direct ecclesiastical influence or control. 15. Ed. note: The background in Schleiermacher’s scholarship for this short paragraph and the next can be ferreted out especially in his history of philosophy lectures (SW III.4.1, 1839) and in his material on church history. For a full account of the latter, see Boekels, Schleiermacher als Kirchengeschichtler (1994).

§17. Dogmatic propositions have a twofold value, an ecclesial one and a scientific one; their degree of completeness, moreover, is determined by both of these values and by their relationship to each other. 1.1 The ecclesial value of a dogmatic proposition consists in its relation to actual religious stirrings of mind and heart. To be sure, for purposes of description every such religious stirring is something infinite2 in its singularity. Moreover, all dogmatic concepts, as well as all psychological concepts, would have to be put to use to describe one single element3 of life. Yet, just as in any such element of life the religious disposition of a person’s mind and heart4 can be the dominant feature, so too, in each such religious disposition of one’s mind and heart, some relationship of a person’s higher self-consciousness stands out, in turn, as the determinative feature, and dogmatic propositions uniformly refer to this dominant religious disposition across all the analogous elements of a person’s religious stirrings. Thus, in all fully expressed dogmatic propositions, relation to Christ must also appear in the same measure as it is evidenced in religious consciousness itself. Naturally, this cannot occur with

the same degree of emphasis in all the elements of a religious life, any more than what distinguishes the life of polity in any kind of state can appear with equal strength in every one of its elements. Accordingly, the more weakly relation to Christ is expressed in a given dogmatic proposition—as, for example, would ordinarily occur in religious stirrings mediated by our relationship to the external world—the greater the likelihood that the proposition can resemble a doctrinal proposition of some other religious community, even if what is distinctive about that community might, in large part, have receded in its own proposition. The same thing then happens within the Christian church as well, in relation to distinctive modifications of Christian consciousness in various groups, larger and smaller, modifications that separate them from one another. Now, suppose that a given dogmatic proposition has been constructed in such a way that it suffices to express Christian consciousness for all alike. Then it would actually have currency within a larger compass, yet that proposition would not be well suited to draw notice to differences that are thus indirectly designated thereby as insignificant or in process of disappearing. In contrast, suppose that a given dogmatic proposition relates only to one of these various modifications of Christian consciousness. Then it would also have currency only within this narrower compass. Occasionally, the first kind of dogmatic proposition can seem to be a matter of indifference, and the second kind can be viewed as in the right. Occasionally, the second kind can seem to be of a partisan nature or to be sectarian, and the first kind can be viewed as in the right. However, differences of these sorts, which are contained in dogmatic propositions that deal with the same subject matter but represent5 no differences at all in immediate religious self-consciousness, also bear no decisive weight whatsoever as to their ecclesial value. 2.6 The scientific value of a dogmatic proposition rests, on the one hand, on the definiteness of the concepts present within it and their conjoining. That is to say, the more this definiteness is achieved, the more a proposition will emerge from the indefinite domain of poetic and rhetorical discourse and the greater will also be the likelihood that it cannot run into apparent contradiction with other dogmatic propositions that belong to the same formation of religious consciousness. Yet, the forming of dogmatic concepts will not have succeeded—indeed, also on account of its subject matter one probably should say that it could not succeed—in substituting the proper expression for the figurative one in every instance. Moreover, in this respect the scientific value of dogmatic propositions thus rests, in large part, simply on providing the most exact and distinct possible definition of figurative expressions that present themselves. The matter can also be left at that, all the more readily since even if the proper expression could always be substituted for a figurative one, on account of the latter’s being the original expression, the identity of the two expressions with each other would have to be demonstrated, which would come down to the very same requirement in the end. On the other hand, the scientific value of a dogmatic proposition consists in its fruitfulness7 –that is, in how versatile it is in alluding to kindred propositions. It does this not

so much in a heuristic respect, in that no dogmatic proposition has its ground in any other proposition but each one can be founded only in the contemplation8 of Christian selfconsciousness. Rather, it does this in a critical respect—namely, because using critical procedure makes it easier to test how well a given dogmatic expression harmonizes with other dogmatic expressions. That is to say, among a number of dogmatic expressions that are to refer to the selfsame fact of Christian consciousness, undeniably the one that throws light on the largest circle of others that refer to kindred facts and combines with them will deserve preferred status. Moreover, wherever we find a precisely combined and self-contained domain of dogmatic language, such a domain is where we will also find a conception of the facts of Christian consciousness that carries the presumption of correctness in and of itself. A proposition that is lacking in the first attribute discussed here, so much so that it still belongs entirely to the poetic or rhetorical domain of language, is not yet a dogmatic proposition. As concerns the second attribute discussed here, a proposition that moves beyond the bounds set forth here and purports to ground anything in an objective fashion, not tracing it to higher self-consciousness, would no longer be a proposition regarding faith and would not belong within the domain that we are covering at all. 3. Now, since every proposition regarding faith, as such, already has ecclesial value and since propositions regarding faith become dogmatic in character in that they take on scientific value, dogmatic propositions are the more complete the more their scientific character affords them an outstanding ecclesial value and also the more their scientific contents bear traces of their having proceeded from an ecclesial interest.9

1. Ed. note: In a marginal note here, Schleiermacher wrote: “1. Ecclesial value. One could say that this is the actual value of propositions regarding faith. See subsection 3 below. However, in that they come to be dogmatic propositions regarding faith, they come to be more special in character, at the same time” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Here “something infinite” translates ein Unendliches, not strictly finite or merely bounded and discrete— thus, strictly speaking, not wholly describable. 3. Moment. Ed. note: This is the term also used for chemical elements. Although on occasion it might also refer to an instant in time, this does not seem to be the main reference here or elsewhere in CF. 4. Gemütsstimmung. Ed. note: Were it not for marked differences of meaning in the different language contexts, this word (“disposition of mind and heart”) could mean “mood” and the similarly combined word Gemütserregung could mean “emotion,” which in any case betokens a “stirring” within. A rendition closer to each word’s root has been chosen to convey Schleiermacher’s meaning more exactly. 5. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, repräsentieren consistently means to re-present, ordinarily in some other mode or form. Two other verbs and their noun derivatives that could appropriately be translated as “represent” (then as “representation”) are darstellen (Darstellung) and vorstellen (Vorstellung), by which Schleiermacher consistently means “present” (“presentation”) and “have a notion of “ (“notion”), respectively. 6. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher stated: “2. Scientific value—not for science but by means of it. (a) Providing definiteness [or distinct resolution among] various features [Elemente] and their conjoining.—Working in this way, the purpose is to ward against and make comparisons with particular propositions carrying apparent contradictions and consequences drawn from poetic and rhetorical discourse … ” (Thönes, 1873). For (b) see §17n7 just below. 7. Ed. note: In the marginal note that Schleiermacher began above (in §17n6), he here continued: “(b) Providing critical fruitfulness. This task already relates to the interconnected character of dogmatic discourse” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Betrachtung. Ed. note: In his sermons, using some form of this word, Schleiermacher often invites his listeners to contemplate a certain fact or story with him. In this meaning, “contemplation” means attentively to observe something told or proclaimed that is somewhat in accord with what is held within one’s own self-consciousness.

9. Ed. note: For more on ecclesial and scientific interest or spirit, see Brief Outline, esp. §§9–13, 193, 209–17, 247–48, 257–62, and 329–31.

§18. The interconnecting of dogmatic propositions, done for the purpose of conjoining them and relating them to each other, proceeds from the very same need that leads to the forming of such propositions themselves and is only a natural outcome of this effort. 1. We distinguish Christ’s actual proclamation, itself the starting point for everything else, from what is dogmatic in character. We do this chiefly because wherever he went into detail in his teaching, he also bordered on poetic and rhetorical discourse, but wherever he proclaimed himself in a nonfigurative, proper manner, the presentation of his existence1 and of his work remained quite summary in nature.2 Within each time frame in given contexts of life, however, every religious stirring that was the immediate effect of Christ’s presentation has become a particular stirring. Moreover, precisely on that account, the conception of that stirring in thought, when that conception is viewed in terms of and is appropriate to that original self-proclamation, has become simply a partial, incomplete conception of itself. As a result, the overall mass of thoughts that has arisen in this way and that has also formed to the point of a greatest possible definiteness, thus becomes a mass of dogmatic propositions regarding faith. When this mass is simply taken together, it comprises the development of that original proclamation, a development increasingly being replenished. Hence, with every particular proposition that has arisen in this fashion, a desire to include the rest, thus an endeavor to connect each proposition with the others, has to be posited. Moreover, the more distinctly particular each proposition is, the more it obtains its locus only on the presupposition that it has other more or less kindred propositions next to and around itself. 2. Let us begin with the rhetorical and poetic proclamation both of Christ and of his witnesses, proclamation that was already going into some detail. Thus, from that point on out, didactic expression has indeed arisen, to a great extent, from the task of resolving apparent conflict between particular images and figures. However, it has also arisen, in part, from the need to release didactic expression from the vagueness and ambiguity that attach to it outside a given context and to specify in it what is more independent than those other expressions, didactic expression itself viewed as meaning the same for all concerned. Lying in every apparent contradiction of that sort, however, is the disquieting thought that a number of others might show up. This is so, because as each contradiction arises, by means of that contradiction suspicion is cast on the entire domain of language to which it belongs. Thus, suppose that in a given case a more proper and instructive expression is set forth so as to orient oneself thereby in relation to seemingly opposing statements. Then assurance, nonetheless, does not lie simply in the expectation that within itself what is smoothed out will not stand in contradiction all over again. Rather, assurance lies in the thought that the entire domain of language is itself not wholly immune from such a danger. This situation, however, permits of being brought to a point of surety only by way of relating a number of such expressions to each other and, through repeated efforts, to conjoin them with each other.

Now, let us suppose that didactic expression is, at the same time, more distinct and more comprehensible in and of itself. Nevertheless, in every instance didactic expression would involve a combining of general notions that are completely defined only when thought of in conjunction with higher notions above them and with lower notions below them. Likewise, every such notion, viewed as a subject, would be completely perceived3 only in the totality of its predicates and would be perceived as a predicate only in the entire range over which it could be applied. As a result, every such proposition points to other propositions wherein, in part, kindred notions and, in part, the same notions having different connections would be present. 3. Thus, it is not possible to imagine that religious self-consciousness would be lively enough to express and communicate itself without the further forming of didactic expression, whether in the looser form used in the popular domain or in the stricter form used in the schools. It is no more possible, moreover, to conceive of the particular features of this didactic expression within a religious community without conceiving that they would have to be shaped into a richly arrayed series of thoughts. Such a series of thoughts, in turn, would, in part, look to the original purpose of describing religious stirrings of mind and heart themselves in an actual sequence or in their natural interconnectedness. It would also, in part, bear the aim of completing any didactic expression in and of itself to the point of greatest possible clarity. Now, if by the expression “Christian proclamation” we chiefly designate immediately stirring utterance and presentation, then we understand “Christian doctrine” to mean more that communication which makes use of didactic expression. This is so, whether such communication then occurs also in order to stimulate people by means of notions that are brought to clear consciousness, as happens in homiletic usage, or whether, by means of achieving clarity in the notions used, it occurs in order to sort out immediate religious selfconsciousness more distinctly and in order reliably to substantiate its independent character, which is the business of schooling in dogmatics. Patently, this latter task would be satisfactorily carried out only in bringing the structured body of doctrine to an integral whole, wherein a fully formed dogmatic expression would not be lacking for any essential element of Christian religious consciousness and wherein all dogmatic propositions would be brought into relation among themselves. Hence, it is not at all praiseworthy if respected theologians —perhaps confusing the very matter of dogmatics itself with its corruption—regard it to be a degeneration of Christian community or a consequence of such degeneration when doctrine is pursued in a scholarly manner. Rather, on the one hand, it is necessary for the office of proclamation itself—all the more so when modes of presentation multiply in a great variety of languages—that a body of doctrine be available that is worked out in dialectical precision. Moreover, it is natural, on the other hand, that the more Christian community expands, based on its own activities, and is renewed, the more proclamation itself also takes on the form of popular teaching. Then, in turn, this popular form of teaching, which itself requires scholarly doctrine to be its norm and limit, becomes the most significant means for promoting vital circulation of consciousness that is of a genuinely religious4 sort.

Postscript. If we now survey the overall procedure to be used with dogmatic propositions from this viewpoint, which effort is precisely the subject of dogmatic theology, it is obvious that this procedure can begin at any point, depending on where exigency calls for it most, here or there. At that juncture, what then ties the doctrinal propositions together is, in part, chiefly occasional propositions that are immediately positioned to serve primary communication of religious consciousness. Thereby, moreover, only the ecclesial value of the propositions is of concern—that is, these are doctrines that belong to the domain of proclamation and edification. In part, what ties doctrinal propositions together pertains more to the scientific value of the propositions and to the fact that they are situated entirely within the domain of dogmatic theology itself. This is the case, whether they are then (1) monographs—that is, each being an explication of a particular proposition in its various relations, which can be surveyed based on its own content—or (2) congeries of doctrinal propositions called loci theologici, which can be complete, to be sure, with the result that the totality of all propositions that can be tied to each other are included in it, but in which this process appears to be simply random in that the complete character of the work is not conditioned by the form it takes, or, (3) finally, a complete system of doctrine,5 just as has already been described. Yet, such a structured body of doctrine can be purely thetic6 and at that point be either purely aphoristic or provided with an apparatus of elucidations. At the same time, however, the thetic type can also be polemical,7 in that it takes notice of other modifications of Christian religious consciousness or of other utterances concerning those modifications. Finally, the thetic type can be historical at the same time, in that it offers an account concerning how the forming of a given dogmatic proposition has unfolded over time and concerning changes in the domain of dogmatic language.

1. Existenz. Ed. note: cf. §14n33. 2. Cf. John 3:17; 8:12; 10:30; and 12:45. 3. Ed. note: The verb is angeschaut, from anschauen. If it were referring to something already perceivable directly by the senses, without much further processing, Schleiermacher would use the verb wahrnehmen. 4. Ed. note: Whereas usually the word translated “religious” is fromm, referring to firmly rooted religious consciousness and community, here the word is religiösen, referring to the full scope of religious institutional life and mission. 5. Lehrgebäude. Ed. note: Actually a structured body of doctrine, roughly equivalent to what is regularly called a “system of doctrine” or a “constructive theology” in English usage. As Schleiermacher indicates in this postscript, such a structured presentation can be composed in a number of ways. 6. Ed. note: The word thetic refers to the use of positive assertions or theses (e.g., dogmatic propositions) or thematic statements. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher defines “polemical” activity, viewed as a major part of what philosophical theology would bring to dogmatics, as a discovery within Christianity of what does not correspond to its “idea”—thus, of whatever is “diseased” in it. See Brief Outline, esp. §§40–42, 54–64, 222, 247, and 253.

§19. Dogmatic theology is the science concerned with the interconnection of whatever doctrine has currency1 in a given social organization called a Christian church at a given time.

See Brief Outline, 1st ed. (1811), Part II, Section 3, §3,2 and compare Part II, Intro., §3,3 and §15,4 and §§18–19,5 and Part II, Section 3, §§26–27.6 1. This definition appears not to exclude the possibility that anyone could master dogmatics, thus could communicate it as well, without having a faith of one’s own in what one is expounding, just as one does indeed have scientific knowledge of the interconnection of propositions in philosophical systems, propositions that one does not oneself accept. However, procedures utilized in dogmatics refer entirely to proclamation7 and are there only for the sake of proclamation. Thus, we must also presuppose that same faith among all who pursue dogmatics if they are to proffer anything of benefit, because otherwise what is supposed to relate to each other in dogmatics would, nevertheless, not actually belong together. Furthermore, given this presupposition of faith, the subject matter itself could not even be conceived if one expounding it had no consciousness at all of any stirrings of a religious sort, not even of those differently modified. This would be the case, for otherwise no one could conceal the contradiction between what one expounds, viewed as interconnected in itself and as derived from the very nature of Christian consciousness, and what one actually accepts without doing violence to oneself; and in this way a dogmatic presentation that is purely historical, without itself taking sides, always adequately distinguishes itself from one that is simultaneously apologetic,8 which process is alone intended here. Even so, it would be difficult to deny that even in our own church are to be found, perhaps not rarely, dogmatic presentations that hold tight to what has ecclesial currency without conveying any firm conviction of the presenter’s own, thus either lacking in rigor with respect to how doctrines are interconnected and with respect to their internal congruity or, nevertheless, unwittingly betraying the presenter’s own divergent conviction.9 2. Limitation to the doctrine of a distinct ecclesial organization is not a criterion of currency to be applied generally, because Christendom has not always been divided into a number of communities definitively separated by difference in doctrine. This criterion is indispensable for the present time, however, since—to stick just with the Western church—a presentation of doctrine belonging to Protestantism cannot possibly be the same for Roman Catholics as well, in that no interconnection obtains between certain doctrines of the one party and those of the other party. A dogmatic presentation that wanted to set itself the task of eventually finding no contradiction between these two parties would end up deficient in what would be of ecclesial value for either party. This would be the case in almost every particular proposition. Now, the proposal that every presentation of doctrine would do well to limit itself simply to doctrine that is at hand at a certain time is indeed seldom expressly acknowledged, yet it would appear to be self-evident; in large part, moreover, the great quantity of dogmatic presentations that follow upon each other can be explained only on this basis. It is quite obvious, for example, that today doctrinal treatises from the seventeenth century can no longer serve the same purpose as they did then but that much that was purveyed by them belongs now only to a presentation of the history of doctrine, and that only dogmatic

presentations different from them can possess the same ecclesial value today that they had then. Likewise, such a time will come for presentations of our own day as well. The only proviso is that, to be sure, the greater alterations in doctrine proceed only from more general nodes of development. In contrast, alterations continually going on tend to be broadcast so little that it takes longer for them to be noticeable. 3. Now, “doctrine that has currency” is not at all to mean just statements contained in creedal and confessional symbols. Rather, it is meant to include all doctrinal propositions that are a dogmatic expression for what is heard, within the church’s public proceedings,10 to be a presentation of shared Christian piety, even if only in particular regions of the church—if, that is, such an expression is not giving rise to schism or division. Consequently, this criterion already allows for a significant diversification among dogmatic presentations. Yet, someone could still hold the definition to be too restricted on account of this criterion. This might be the case, in part, because it would appear as if no alteration at all among dogmatic presentations could ever enter in unless it were something not yet having currency that would already have been taken up in them at some point, also, in part, because on this basis everything that bears a distinctive character would also seem to be excluded. However, something may be noted, first of all, that everyone might well concede. That is, any body of doctrine, however interconnected it might be, composed of views and opinions that plainly bear an entirely distinctive character and that, though genuinely Christian, have not at all been tied to expressions used in communications of Christian piety within the church, would always be reserved only for some private confession. It would not be considered to be a dogmatic presentation, moreover, until such time as some like-minded social organization were attached to it, one that would find its norm to lie in that doctrine. Consequently, one could also say that, in general, the less publicly received content there is in such a presentation, the less it would correspond to the concept of a dogmatics.11 All the same, this observation would not get in the way of the presenter’s bearing a distinctly singular influence on the form of a presentation and on one’s mode of handling it, or even get in the way of one’s stepping forward in particular matters by way of deliberately correcting customary statements. Thus, already on this account, our definition in no way excludes improvements and new developments in Christian doctrine. This point becomes even clearer, however, if we add to it that such changes almost never come to the fore directly on the basis of dogmatic discussions themselves. Rather, in large part the occasion for such changes is, in one way or another, offered in observances contained in public worship or in popularly written religious communication.12 4. The correctness of the definition given here is also made clear based on the following considerations. First, if a presentation of Christian doctrine fails to meet one of the criteria set forth above, it also falls out of the actual domain of dogmatics. Likewise, the most materially significant mistakes that occur within the domain of dogmatics appear when any one of these requirements is torn from its natural context so as to be adopted as the sole guideline for treatment. Accordingly, popular presentations of doctrine in catechisms and in similar works for the purpose of common instruction in the church certainly require completeness and

interconnectedness, but they make no claim to scholarship or to arrangement and connection of a systematic kind. For these reasons we separate even this doctrinal domain from the proper domain of dogmatics. Many religious writings that strive to reach mystical depths or rational clarity are also more descriptively didactic than directly stimulative; and, though they even treat doctrine with a certain completeness, they are lacking in historical bearing and in reference to the public understanding of the church. As a result, they tend to purvey only what is strictly individual in nature, consequently only some isolated fragment torn loose from the whole. For this reason, moreover, we do not call these writings dogmatic, however exactly everything they deal with may fit together. Finally, we may take note of certain determinations of doctrine that focus on the Scriptures of the canon or on the creedal and confessional symbols, determinations that have entered into dogmatic interchange from time to time. These determinations, to be sure, have always been supposed to presuppose scientific efforts to attain a complete interconnectedness of doctrine, and to that extent they do indeed belong to dogmatic theology. However, they do not bring this interconnected whole into a complete presentation but have to do only with particular points of doctrine. Likewise, the most materially significant mistakes in the domain of dogmatics are themselves accounted for based on one-sided tendencies toward a particular criterion among those set forth here. Note, for example, that from time to time dogmatic presentations appear that predominately purvey a single tradition that has become stationary. This phenomenon occurs when people want to set forth doctrine that has already attained public currency, and that doctrine alone, and thus consider that doctrine to be an absolute given. Suppose, conversely, that there is also no lack of dogmatic presentations that in their own time enjoyed widespread currency but, when viewed from a distance and compared with earlier and later ones, appear wholly arbitrary. These are of a sort that, having sprung from a transitory, aberrant movement within the domain of the church, simply apprehended this movement one-sidedly. Thus, they stuck wholly with one isolated element whereby arbitrary and sophistical thinking could also quite easily take the place of scientific rigor. Finally, suppose that presentations come into existence that do indeed treat of Christian doctrine and want to be considered as dogmatic in nature but that do not refer back to religious states of mind and heart at all. These are of a sort that want simply to meet the requirement of scientific interconnectedness, as if having this interconnectedness could effect, at the same time, what a genuine dogmatics has to presuppose, namely faith. As a result, either even that which is most distinctively Christian is then supposed to be deduced and demonstrated, based directly on reason in general; or, viewed as something less complete, it is supposed to fade away within a purely reason-driven theory of religion that possesses only a general currency. Postscript. Now, many theologians are fully in agreement with the definition of dogmatic theology set forth here, but they set this very dogmatic theology down to a rather low level, viewing it as having to do only with exposition of ecclesial opinions, and they claim that yet another, higher theology must stand over and above it. What is more, this higher theology, they say, would set aside those ecclesial opinions by ascertaining and elucidating the actual truths of religion.13

However, the Christian science regarding godliness14 cannot possibly acknowledge such a distinction between ecclesial doctrine and actual truths of religion. The latter truths are indeed supposed to be Christian as well, for the simple reason that otherwise there could be no mention of them at all in this connection, either as if these religious truths would have a different source or as if their content would be of a wholly different kind. This is so, for there is only one source from which all Christian doctrine is derived, namely, Christ’s selfproclamation, and there is only one way in which Christian doctrine is pursued, whether it is more complete or less complete, namely, based on religious consciousness itself and on the immediate expression of it. Suppose, therefore, that the ecclesial doctrine of any given time and place were to be termed “mere opinion” because it does not always remain selfconsistent and is not unadmixed with error. Then it would still be true that in the knowledge domain of Christianity nothing stands over and above it except the more purely and completely framed ecclesial doctrine belonging to another time and contained in other presentations. This purification and improvement of doctrine, however, is precisely the work and the task of dogmatic theology. Suppose, however, that we imagine even this task to be wholly fulfilled, so that dogmatic theology would have thus reached its consummation. Even in this case we could not agree with those other theologians who declare that dogmatics comprises the entirety of Christian theology, with the result that they would regard all the other theoretical disciplines of theology—including both interpretation of Scripture and church history in their broadest compass and all the disciplines accessory to them—simply as sciences auxiliary to that overall discipline. We could not agree with them, for although both of the disciplines just indicated are necessary to the work of dogmatics, their value is not exhausted in the service they provide it. Rather, each of these two disciplines also has its own distinctive value directly for the furtherance and leadership of the church, which is the final aim of all Christian theology, consequently that of dogmatic theology as well. We would rather wish to say the following, then. It is true that both interpretation of Scripture and church history, each in its own distinctive work, are at the same time dependent on the study of dogmatics. They suffer, moreover, when this study is neglected. As a result, these various branches of theology are collectively able to move toward consummation only by means of their mutual influence on each other. Nevertheless, it would be a very dubious thing if precisely dogmatics were primarily to set the tone in this advancement, because this discipline depends on wisdom concerning the world15 more than the others do, though only with respect to the form it takes. This search for wisdom often begins radically anew, and the most of these revolutions16 also produce new modes of connection and new terms for that sphere of inquiry, from which dogmatics is furnished with terminology of its own. Thus, most readily a multiplicity of language usage arises in this particular theological discipline, which multiplicity arouses controversy that does not belong to its own subject-matter. Then transformations occur there that do not exactly make for progress but impede rather than advance its theoretical17 development.

1. Ed. note: In theological contexts such as this one, geltend seems to bear neither the general meaning of “valid” (cf. Brief Outline [1830, 2011 ET], §210) nor the special meaning of being “current” or even “prevalent.” Instead it has the more neutral, historically, and critically oriented meaning of “having currency,” in ways that can readily be supplied in each context. To have currency, moreover, a doctrine need not be adjudged to be the best; its inclusion would normally rest on its being widely used or acknowledged within a range of doctrines. One task of dogmatics is to sort among such doctrines critically in order to find which ones are more supportable or more expendable on grounds that reflect faith experience. In this Evangelical dogmatics, every such result must be shown to refer to the redemption accomplished by God through Jesus of Nazareth (Christian Faith, §11). See also CF §27.P.S., 39.3, and 64.1. 2. Ed. note: ET: See footnotes containing these propositions from 1811 in Brief Outline (2011 ET) under §§195, 3, 5, 14, 18–19, 82, and 213–14, respectively. Notes 2–6 here begin with the successive quotations from the first edition, where numbering is by section, not consecutive throughout as in the second edition (1830). Information or a quotation is then given from the second edition (1830, 2011). Brief Outline (1811) Part 2, Section 3, §3, also under §195 (1830, 2011 ET) : “That theological discipline which is known under the name of thetic or dogmatic theology has to do with the systematic presentation of the whole body of doctrine that now has currency in the church [mit der zusammenhangenden Darstellung des in der Kirche jetzt grade geltende Lehrbegriffs].” Brief Outline §195: “Here we have to do with dogmatic theology (see §§94–97), as the knowledge of doctrine that now has currency in the Evangelical church, and with church statistics, as information regarding the existing social condition in all the different parts of the Christian church.” See Schleiermacher’s further explanation in place. 3. Ed. note: Brief Outline (1811) Part 2, Intro., §3 (under §3 in 2011 ET): “Theology is not the responsibility of everyone who is a church adherent, or to the degree that they are so, except as they are church leaders. The contrast between leaders and ordinary members [der Masse] and the rise to prominence of theology mutually condition each other.” Some ambiguity persists in this proposition, carried over almost unchanged in Brief Outline §3, though some explanation is added. That is, church leaders included some lay members, not only pastors, though normally from among more educated folk, princes, the aristocracy, and other social leaders. However, Schleiermacher also made no hard-and-fast distinction between clergy and laity in the church and pointed toward an egalitarian, communal conception of both leadership and ministry (e.g., cf. BO §§15–17, also §§267–70). 4. Ed. note: Brief Outline (1811) Part 2, Intro., §15 (under §82 in 1830, 2011 ET): “The present, however, can be understood only as a result of the past, and thus its presentation presupposes information concerning the past.” §82. “The present, however, can be understood only as a result of the past, and thus the information concerning the entire previous career of Christianity forms a second division of historical theology.—This statement is not to be understood as though the second division noted here were a kind of auxiliary science for the first. Rather, both are related to church leadership in the same way and are not in a subordinate relation but are in a coordinate relation to each other.” 5. Ed. note: Brief Outline (1811) Part 2, Intro., §18. “The final aim of all theology is to represent the nature of Christianity more authentically in every approaching instant of its history; thus it must give special prominence to that wherein this is to be most purely perceived [am reinsten anzuschauen ist].” §19. “Accordingly, historical theology is divided into information about the beginning of Christianity, information about its further career, and information about its state at the present time.” Compare §§84–85 in 1830: §84. “Now, since the Christian life has also become increasingly more variegated and complicated, while the final aim of its theology consists in presenting its distinctive nature more authentically in every approaching instant of its history, information concerning primitive Christianity therefore naturally arises as a third special division of historical theology.—Admittedly, primitive Christianity is also included within the total career of Christianity. It is one thing, however, to treat it as a series of elements, and another thing only to bring that material into consideration from which the pure concept of Christianity can be presented, even if the latter is done based on different elements of history.” Note that in his usage here, as in a few cases elsewhere, certain elements of life can be especially treated temporally, thus historically and in series. Other cases do not readily lend themselves to such treatment. See CF §30n7 for some types of cases. §85. “The whole of historical theology is included within these three divisions: information about primitive Christianity, information about the total career of Christianity, and information about the state of Christianity at the present time.—The proper order in which to study them, however, does not correspond to the order in which their derivation has been shown here. On the contrary, information about primitive Christianity, as most immediately connected with the work of philosophical theology, ought always to be the first stage in one’s study, and information about the present time, as constituting the direct transition to practical theology, ought to be the final stage.” 6. Ed. note: Brief Outline (1811) Part 2, Section 3, §§26–27: §26. “A rather different articulation of particular doctrines arises through their relation to various philosophical systems, without the identity of the original religious affection of mind and heart [die Identität der ursprünglichen religiösen Affektion des Gemütes], which is supposed to be represented [repräsentiert] by these doctrines, being abrogated [aufgehoben] thereby.” §27. “The presentation of the body of doctrine may join onto any philosophical system that has veracity [wahrhaft].” Compare the corresponding §§213–14 in 1830: §213.

“The strictly didactic form of expression, which, by contributing toward showing how the individual doctrinal formulations belong together, gives the dogmatic procedure its scientific frame, is dependent at any given time on the existing condition of the philosophical disciplines.—This is partly on account of the logical relation of these formulations to each other and partly because many definitions of concepts refer to psychological and ethical factors.” §214. “The dialectical feature of the body of doctrine may join onto any philosophical system that does not exclude or deny the religious feature by its assertions, either in general or in that special form of it to which Christianity especially professes adherence.—Hence, regarding all decidedly materialistic and sensualistic systems, which, however, one could indeed hardly let pass as genuinely philosophical (and all genuinely atheistic systems will also have this character), none of them is to be employed in doing dogmatics. For general purposes, it is difficult to set limits any narrower than these.” See also Christian Faith §16 and §28 on these topics. 7. Verkündigung. Ed. note: Throughout Schleiermacher’s theological discourse, “proclamation,” beginning with Jesus’ own activities, occurs by word and deed. Proclamation is also a process in which the entire community of faith participates, not only its leaders and not only in preaching or other activities of a pastor. 8. Ed. note: Cf. §§11–14 above. Apologetics, as one of the two parts of philosophical theology, seeks an authentic differentiation of the distinctive nature of Christianity from any other mode of faith but does not seek either to defend or prove that finding to those who do not share in this mode of faith. 9. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher at the University of Berlin—and likely in his pastorates in Berlin from 1796 to his death in 1834, perhaps earlier—theology, its dogmatics discipline above all, was a positive ecclesial science. By 1811 he was referring to an “ecclesial spirit,” identified especially as held within specific, largely extended social sets, each congregation of which he called “communities of faith.” His primary orientation in doing theology was not that of doing merely individualized thought projects. In his view, dialectic, conceived as “the art of doing philosophy” (1811) and science conceived, in part, as its practical outcome, provide theology aspects of methodology tailored to its requirements, including those in its various disciplines, some of which are ancillary to the field. In turn, theology presents its own division of sciences and can draw judiciously from other sciences strictly to serve its own purposes—in dogmatics solely for introductory framing. For forming his investigations into Christianity and for applying responsible method to that task, theology shares with all the sciences the need to develop its own methods of rigorous inquiry and correspondingly precise definitions and presentation of findings, ways of capturing and analyzing real empirical experiences. All of these components are to be executed, wherever appropriate, by logic, heuristics, epistemology, and critical examination of metaphysical premises and presuppositions—all supplied by dialectic. Added to these are evaluations of what might well be termed multiply staged “pragmatic” processes. Such evaluations would leave behind or reconstruct what has been known, new knowing, and question-formation for future inquiry, technical and other practical applications, and the like. This is, of course, an incomplete list, but it includes the sorts of components that he deemed to be definitive of science. In dogmatics, as in some other fields of inquiry, the long-term efforts of scientific work are brought into systematic accounts of the whole harvest of learning among pertinent theological disciplines. This is what Schleiermacher attempts to do for Evangelical churches in his time and place. Thus, when he states, in OG 67, that he wishes to “free Christology itself “—the core of doctrines of faith to be presented—“from entanglements with science,” he is excluding only ill uses and performances of such for “science.” Not carefully to attend to them is to produce Verirrungen, to effect “entanglements” and (another meaning) confusion. 10. Ed. note: That is, presumably, all nonprivate meetings and observances of the church, most notably but not solely public worship, which is singled out in the first edition. 11. Ed. note: In Brief Outline Schleiermacher insists on taking individual responsibility in theology. See Brief Outline (1830), §§89, 179, 199, 201–2, 251, and 210n, also §17 and §19 (re: doing one’s own work); §§62, 97n, 138n, and 139 (re: exegesis); and §§323 and 332–34 (re: innovation and development). Nevertheless, even in these contexts he regularly inveighs against dogmatic presentations that are markedly individualistic in content, thus not properly reflecting the faith of a given Christian community or serving the task of leadership within it. 12. Ed. note: Thus, regarding the shorter-term effect of his own efforts, Schleiermacher placed greatest stock in his own immensely popular writings On Religion and Christmas Eve and in his hundreds of published sermons. See especially Brief Outline §210n and On the “Glaubenslehre” (1821, 1981 ET), at the close of the first letter to Lücke, on longer-term expectations regarding his work on dogmatics. 13. See, among other things, Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider’s (1776–1848) Versuch (1825) §25, 159ff., and his Handbuch der Dogmatik, Bd. 1 (1822) §5, 12–16, where one becomes doubtful in the end whether dogmatics belongs to Christian theology at all. Ed. note: In §5 of the latter work, Bretschneider does distinguish between Christian theology, which is the systematic presentation of biblical teaching, and dogmatics, which is “the subjective view of individual parties or teachers on biblical or Christian theology.” 14. Christliche Gottseligkeitswissenschaft. Ed. note: That is, regarding blessedness, or piety, that comes from God.

15. Weltweisheit. Ed. note: Or, less accurately, “worldly wisdom.” This term is sometimes used instead of “philosophy” to designate a broad characteristic of “philosophy,” which from early on was used, in turn, literally to designate that “love of wisdom” (both theoretical and practical wisdom) which impels the field. See §19n6 here. 16. Umwältzungen. Ed. note: Or “radical turns,” upheavals. 17. Ed. note: The word “theoretical” appears in the original and subsequent editions. Although Schäfer selects “theological” from the unedited original manuscript, it seemed to make less good sense in this context, where theoretical development and practical ends are distinguished.

Chapter Two

Regarding the Method of Dogmatics [Introduction to Chapter Two]

§20. Every system of doctrines of faith, as a presentation of dogmatic theology, is comprised of a self-contained and exactly conjoined whole of dogmatic propositions. Thus, with respect to the present mass of such propositions, the first task is to lay down a rule according to which some will be adopted and others excluded, but then to set forth a principle for their combination and arrangement as well.1 1. This proposition presupposes that the particular doctrinal propositions presented are what is original, indeed that they are in existence prior to the systematic tendency2 itself, and this affirmation is completely in keeping with the foregoing discussion as well.3 Thus, in no way is it the case that, first of all, a principle would somehow have been available externally or would be especially devised by any theologian and thereupon that the particular doctrinal propositions presented would emerge only on the basis of an explication of such a principle. This practice is indeed conceivable in the speculative domain, but it is not conceivable here. The reason is that Christian self-consciousness must already be developed in the community of faith before properly dogmatic features are formed, and only once fragmentary, perhaps even chaotic, features of this sort are in existence does the task of conjoining them in an orderly fashion arise. That task, however, fulfills its purpose only in a completeness of their combination, through which one can come to be sure of having indicated all the shared loci of Christian consciousness in doctrinal form. Hence, attaining such completeness is the task of every structured body of doctrine.4 That is to say, if one were lacking such completeness one would, on that account, also not be at all sure that the dogmatic expression used for what is most distinctive about Christianity would be correct, in that precisely a locus that had been passed over could furnish proof of just the opposite.5 Such a conviction of completeness and correction, however, can proceed only from a basic design6 of the whole, in one’s achieving confidence that a comprehensive and exhaustive arrangement of doctrine is clearly exhibited within that organized representation of the whole.7 2. Now, the undeniably great variety of structured bodies of doctrine, even at the same time and in the same ecclesial community, is based, at least in part, on the varied procedures used for their inclusion and for the conjoining of doctrine. Accordingly, general rules for the two kinds of procedures can be set forth only in very indefinite formulations. Any particular structured body of doctrine, however, would best characterize itself if, within that body of doctrine, its distinctive viewpoint is displayed with the greatest possible definiteness.8 A twofold method9 springs forth of itself from these considerations. On the one hand, based on a general apprehension of Christian consciousness, one can sketch out a basic

design directed to the multiple ways in which that consciousness can be expressed in accordance with both the nature of the human psyche10 and of human life and then thereafter can try to fill out the basic design with existing doctrinal material. In this case, then it would simply be incumbent on one to be sure that one has included only features that are in harmony with each other. On the other hand, one can also draw together what has formed within a distinct region of Christianity, in accordance with one and the same type of it, as a statement concerning religious stirrings.11 At that point, the only thing left to be done is to order all this material in the most accessible and perspicuous way. Viewing these two methods together already clearly shows that one must conjoin the two methods, because only in the other method does each method find warranty regarding what is lacking in itself.12

1. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, “rule” (Regel) implies some practical setting or (regulative) consideration regarding practice, whereas “principle” (Prinzip) has one of two meanings: (1) a set of rules and/or considerations that are seen to guide or govern a domain of conduct that extends over a wide range, as here, and (2) something within nature that is taken to provide motion, hence the term “moving principle.” 2. Ed. note: On systematization of doctrine, see also CF §30.3, OG 69f., and BO §§20 and 97–101. 3. Ed. note: See CF §28 and Schleiermacher’s discussion on the functions of dogmatics in OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 14. In OR (1821) I, supplemental note 6, regarding his rhetorical concluding section there, Schleiermacher indicates, against critics, that his original intention “was to defend the equal rank of morality and law with piety in human nature.” All are “basic functions” at the same time, but none may be “subordinate to every other basic function,” and “they are equal” in this respect. All three, moreover, predispositions for morality, government under law, and piety, respect each one being indispensable and unimaginable without each other. He also refers to CF §§19 and 28 and to BO §§1–20 there. Thus, he explains, instead of providing how living out the “idea” of each corresponding institution, he was chiefly (a) taking how those he was addressing tended to view them into account and (b) especially inveighing against reducing faith to customary morality and governmental institutions denominating the name of theocracy. 4. Lehrgebäude. Ed. note: The metaphor contained in this word is of a building. How distinctly systematic a body of doctrine would be, and on what basis, are precisely the two main topics of discussion here. 5. Ed. note: In OG 85–87 Schleiermacher repeats his often stated opinion that philosophy should not affect the “contents” of Christian dogmatics. Here he adds that the two disciplines can indeed coexist in one person and still remain separate—as he doubtless believed he had done as to doctrinal statements. In OG 88–89 he addresses the major division between rationalists and various brands of supernaturalists, which was of great concern to him. On what comprises a genuine “theological dogmatic system,” see OR (1821) II, note 7. 6. Grundriβ. 7. Ed. note: Cf. OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 9. On the “prime tendency” of the present “systematic” work: to fill “two functions,” namely, by two “factors” in the process: (1) “to avoid delivering the spirit unto death along with the letter, it secures the vital mobility of the letter and seeks within the overall structure of doctrine not merely to tolerate a variety of distinctive positions but to build that variety in,” and (2) “it does not profess that notions and concepts are the original, constitutive factors in this domain.” For key determinants of Christian Faith’s system, see §§96.3, 105.P.S., 110.2, 144.2, 169.3, and 172.5. 8. Bestimmtheit. Ed. note: This term directly presents the issue of how properly defined and well defined a given structured body of doctrine is to be. 9. Methode. Ed. note: Here Thönes (1873) reports this marginal note by Schleiermacher: “The basic design [Grundriβ] will be sketched out in Section Two below.” 10. Ed. note: Seele. Often this word is also translated “soul,” here and in other works. At this point, it seems to correspond more exactly to “psyche,” viewed as the subject matter of Psychologie. In his lectures on psychology, Schleiermacher always presents Seele and Leib (body) as inseparable, at least in this life. 11. Ed. note: The concept “religious stirrings” here is frommen Erregungen, those inner affective states that are at the root of piety and that give rise to the full life of piety, hence are both the root of piety and come to serve as the overall nurturance of all piety. In these two inseparable ways those states are basically definitive of the “religious” formation of

human nature, in Schleiermacher’s view. See also On Religion (1821) for his fullest account prior to the more tightly organized general account in CF §§1–19. 12. Ed. note: On proper versus false attention to dogmatics in part depending on the degree of historical importance and autonomy that a church has, see explanation in BO §52, also in 4, 26, 45, 149, 207, and 271. See also OR (1821) IV, supplementary note 14. There Schleiermacher insists that dogmatics should not be “the exclusive concern” of clergy or scholars, nor should uninformed laity be embroiled in all their hassles. This CF proposition cannot possibly be fully understood in isolation from all those that preceded it (esp. §§15 and 18–20) or the entire section it introduces. See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 9.

I. Regarding Selection of the Dogmatic Material §21. In order to realize a structured body of doctrines of faith, it is necessary, first of all, to excise everything heretical from the totality of dogmatic material and to retain only what has ecclesial merit. 1. Suppose that we consider the Christian church from the viewpoint that it is what we call a “moral person”—that is, one put together out of many who exist as persons but one that nonetheless has a genuinely individual life. Then it is already to be conceded in advance that in any such individual life there exists a contrast between more healthy and more diseased conditions, just as is the case in individual lives taken in the narrower sense. Diseased conditions, however, are always such that they do not arise from the inner ground or the pure course of that life but are to be explained only in terms of influences alien to that inner ground and pure course. Accordingly, suppose that among a people individuals should enter who present an entirely alien physiological type, with the result that they also come to be on less friendly terms with the majority and its mode of life. Suppose, too, that citizens who have monarchical dispositions rise up within a republican state, and vice versa. In each case, we would regard this condition to be a disease of the whole1 and would also presuppose that it is to be explained only on the basis of alien influences. Now, not everyone would immediately agree, even with that last indicator. Nonetheless, within the domain of Christian doctrine anyone would call “heretical” only that which one cannot explain based on one’s notion of the distinctive nature of Christianity and cannot consider to be in harmony with it. This is so, inasmuch as what is heretical gives itself out to be Christian nevertheless and will also be regarded as such by others.2 Now, as a matter of fact, during the period in which church doctrine was actually developing, a great number of doctrinal features came to light that the majority was persistently staving off as of an alien nature, whereas it was giving recognition to the rest as self-consistent and as forming a harmonious continuum under the name of “catholic,” or what is held in common by the church as a whole. Indeed, while this process is going on, it sometimes occurs that religious stirrings of mind and heart3 that are presented in doctrine themselves stand in contradiction to the true nature of Christian piety. Also, sometimes the contradiction arises only during the formation of doctrine, in such a way that the religious conditions of mind and heart are not themselves diseased, and a semblance of heresy is evoked only by misunderstanding or by faulty method. Now, to be sure, seldom have these

two cases been properly distinguished from each other, hence much has been declared to be heretical very overhastily. Yet, there has also been no lack of doctrine that is of a genuinely heretical nature. One would also be glad to admit that alien influences attach to heretical doctrine once one considers that, at first, the Christian church arose among people who had previously adhered to other modes of faith, with the result that features of an alien nature could readily creep in unawares. 2. Undeniably, in accordance with what was just pointed out, determination of what would be heretical, and should thus remain excluded from the accepted body of doctrine, does appear as a very precarious business, and everyone who proceeds from a different basic formulation for articulating the actual nature of Christianity will pose that determination differently. The situation also cannot be otherwise, however, and the whole course of events within the Christian church proves this. That is to say, brand new heresies do not emerge anymore, in that the church we know expands out of itself, and actual influence of alien modes of faith, even in frontier areas and on the mission field of the church, must be reckoned to be nil as concerns formation of doctrine. It is true, however, that for a long time much that has crept into the piety of new converts from their previous religious conditions would be recognized to be heretical once it would have come into clear consciousness and would have been uttered as doctrine. On the other hand, quite varied judgments exist concerning earlier heresies, just as actual ways of conceiving the nature of Christianity vary among themselves. Hence, anyone who would set forth a structured body of doctrine can follow even the rule of our proposition only in such a way that one will include nothing that, according to the basic type of Christian doctrine one has already laid down, can be traced back only to an alien source. If, however, in this process everything is to be done not haphazardly but with proper surety, then one must not retain that contrast between catholic and heretical as it has been posed historically up to a certain point in time, all the less so in view of the fact that since then further championings of one or the other, such positions have gained a hearing. Rather, one must try to construe what is of a heretical nature, present in its manifold forms, in distinction from the nature of Christianity. One must do so by asking in how many ways the nature of Christianity can be contradicted in such a way that a semblance of Christianity remains nonetheless. By being carried out in this way, investigation concerning heresy serves to complement that concerning the nature of Christianity, and the two investigations become mutually confirming. The more what is set forth in such a problematic way as to be heresy is also found to exist historically, the more reason one has to regard the formulation on which its construction rests as a correct expression for the nature of Christianity. The more naturally a doctrinal formulation that Christendom has constantly confessed has developed based on that same formulation, the more reason one has also to hold anything that stands in contradiction to that formulation, in whatever aspect that may be, to be truly diseased and worthy of rejection.

1. Ed. note: Here Thönes (1873) reports this marginal note by Schleiermacher: “This is all the more the case the more complete Christianity is in itself. An ethical diseased state is something different.—Nota bene: Since this separation [between what is alien and what is distinctive] is not yet established, it should have been treated in a more general fashion.” 2. Ed. note: On what “heresy” means, see also OR (1821) II, supplemental note 10, and V, supplemental note 7, and BO §§58–62. 3. Gemütserregungen. Ed. note: Or affection, emotive stirrings within one’s spirit.

§22. In Christianity the natural heresies are the Docetic and Nazarean, the Manichean and the Pelagian. 1. Given these expressions, if one were simply to think about the historical phenomena to which these same names are applied, the choice of these expressions to stand for the whole range of heresies can seem quite arbitrary. They can also seem very disproportionate, in that the last two have indeed been very widespread and have often recurred, but the first two have been very transitory and of limited compass. In contrast, other names for heresies have much greater weight and are far more likely to be on everyone’s lips. Here, however, these names are to stand only for general forms that are to be explicated precisely in this place. Moreover, the definitions that they are to recall spring from the actual features to which they refer— even if Pelagius, for example, was never a Pelagian in our sense. An actual set of such facts, however, bears the following character above all: no matter in how many ways the distinctive basic typus of Christian doctrine may be placed in opposition by that set of facts, some semblance of what is Christian remains, nonetheless. Now, the question arises as to from what sort of alien influences these deviations would have emerged. This question requires a purely historical investigation, which actually no longer belongs here once it is raised. Yet, it is the case, to be sure, that [for us] to be convinced that anything alien, if it wants to lay claim, albeit divergently, to the name “Christian,” has to fit into one of these forms of heresy, would constitute an initial full-scale guarantee for the truth of our presentation of doctrine. 2. Suppose, now, that the distinctive nature of Christianity consists in the fact that all religious stirrings to be considered here are referred to the redemption that has occurred through Jesus of Nazareth.1 This being so, and if this basic formulation has indeed been retained in general terms, then what is heretical will have been able to arise in a twofold fashion, as will be shown. Indeed, quite apart from heresy, a position that contradicts this basic formulation would be both obvious and total, with the result that not once could participation in Christian community have been desired. Accordingly, heresy could arise in that either human nature would be defined in such a way that, strictly speaking, no redemption could be accomplished, or the Redeemer would have to be defined in such a way that he could not accomplish redemption. However, either of these two cases, in turn, can arise in a twofold fashion. That is, as concerns the first case, if human beings are to be redeemed, they would have to be both in need of redemption and capable of receiving it. If the need of redemption is overtly posited, but the capability of receiving it is covertly denied, then this contradiction would directly go against our basic formulation itself, though this fact would not become immediately clear.

Now, as concerns the first track by which heresy can arise, let us suppose, on the one hand, that the very needfulness of human nature for redemption—that is, its inability to bring the feeling of absolute dependence into all human states—is posited unexceptionably in such a way that thereby the capability for receiving redemptive influences would in fact disappear. The result would be that human nature would not be in need of redemption and capable of receiving it at the same time. Rather, the latter feature could enter the scene only after a total transformation of human nature, and thereby our basic formulation would then be immediately abrogated. Now, this very consequence would unfailingly follow, however, if one assumed that something exists that is in itself evil, originally so and set against God, and if one thought of human nature, in that incapacity for receiving redemption it would have, as under the dominion that this original evil being exercises over it. On this account, we call this deviation the Manichean heresy. Likewise, let us suppose, however, that, on the other hand, the capacity to receive redemption is assumed to such an uttermost extent—consequently that any hindrance to the introduction of God-consciousness would be so infinitesimally small—that in each person and at every particular element of life that hindrance could be effectively wiped out by an infinitesimally small counterweight. At that point, then, one’s need for redemption would be nullified, at least inasmuch as the need would no longer be the need for a particular redeemer but would be only the need for some other stronger individual that arises at a weak element of life in each person, though only in an element such that someone else’s calling forth one’s God-consciousness is needed. In that case, redemption would not need to be the work of a particular redeemer. Rather, it would be a work effected in common by all upon all, a work in which only a certain number of others at best would always have a more prominent role to play. This deviation, moreover, we can rightly call the Pelagian heresy, much in the same way as we did for Manicheism. Let us now turn to the second track by which heresy can arise, that Jesus is to be regarded as the Redeemer—that is, as the actual starting point of a constant and vital, thus unrestrained, calling forth of God-consciousness, such that the participation of all others in this process is mediated only by him. If this affirmation is to be upheld, it would be necessary, on the one hand, that he should enjoy an exclusive and distinctive precedence2 over all other persons. On the other hand, however, an essential likeness must also exist between Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer, and all other persons, because otherwise what he could communicate could not be the same thing as what they need. Hence, in this respect too our general formulation can be contradicted in a twofold manner, because each of the corresponding pair of heresies can be conceived in such an unrestricted way that thereby the other heresy could no longer be coposited but would simply disappear. Suppose, moreover, that Christ’s difference from those who are in need of redemption were indeed posited in such an unconditional way that no essential likeness between them could be compatible with that difference. Then his participation in human nature would also disappear into a mere semblance, and in consequence our God-consciousness, thus viewed as something essentially different from his, could not be derivable from his own God-consciousness, and redemption

would also be a mere semblance of what it really is. Now, the actual so-called Docetics directly denied only the reality3 of Christ’s body. Nevertheless, on account of that inseparability of body and soul by which they can alone exist for us, this position does likewise exclude the reality of human nature anywhere in his person. Hence, it is fitting that we should call this deviation the Docetic heresy. Finally, suppose that, contrariwise, the Redeemer’s likeness with those who are to be redeemed were posited in such an unrestricted way that thereby no distinctive precedence that serves to constitute the Redeemer’s very existence could be upheld any longer. Suppose, instead, that the Redeemer’s existence were to be conceived wholly under the same formulation that applies to all other human beings. Then, in the end the need for redemption would have to be coposited of him as well, even if it were to an infinitesimally small degree, and by its very nature the basic relationship between the Redeemer and the rest of us would likewise be abrogated. Now, this deviation we call after the name of those who were first said to have regarded Jesus wholly as an ordinary human being: the Nazareans or Ebionites.4 If the concept of Christian piety is to remain the same, however, it is not possible to conceive of any heresy other than those that can be placed under one of these four formulations. This is the case, for there are not any more points at which that concept of piety could be even indirectly5 attached. If, however, the concept of redemption were denied outright or if yet another redeemer were set forth, thus if the outright claim were made either that human beings are not in need of redemption or that no redemptive power is to be found in Jesus, then such a claim would no longer be heretical but would simply be non-Christian. 3. From our point of view, these concepts of natural heresies stand, at the same time, as points of demarcation6 for the construction of every body of Christian faith-doctrine. One must not even come close to these points of demarcation if, in agreement with particular instances of doctrine, one is to avoid violating their being in one accord with the remaining faith-doctrine. Also cohering with this requirement is the fact that no formulation, in whatever point of doctrine it may reside, that avoids each pair of contrasting deviations may be regarded as heretical. This is true however much one part of a formulation may lag behind another in this respect, as long as it does not fall out entirely. Rather, every such formulation is to be regarded as properly ecclesial, or catholic. On the other hand, every formulation must be regarded as questionable7 that permits of being identified8 with any one of these deviations. May every inquirer, however, guard against those illusions which amount to foreshortenings. These sorts of illusions do naturally occur, as our forming perspectives of distance can so readily produce. That is to say, the closer one stands to the Pelagian end of a line, the more readily will one believe that one sees another who actually stands almost at the midpoint as already at the Manichean end, and the same thing would be true with respect to the other pairs. This is why it is so highly important, if such aberration is not to wax ever stronger, that one attend to this work with the greatest of caution when it comes to the point of declaring something to be heretical. For the rest, every two among these four heresies can be seen to stand in a particular combination with each other. That is, in relationship to the nature of Christianity the

Manichean heresy belongs together with the Docetic heresy, and so, in turn, does the Pelagian heresy belong together with the ebionitic heresy. These combinations are shown in that if human nature is essentially afflicted with positive9 original evil, then even the Redeemer can have no genuine participation in human nature; moreover, if in Christ higher self-consciousness is hindered by lower self-consciousness in the same way as it is in all other human beings, then even his contribution to redemption can relate to that of others only as a greater quantity relates to a lesser quantity. Suppose, on the other hand, that one views anything that cannot be conceived on the basis of the nature of Christianity as having to have arisen from influences of an alien sort; also suppose that within the early period in which its doctrine developed Christianity came into contact almost exclusively with Judaic and Hellenic-Gentile influences, as it did. In those contexts the Manichean and Nazarean heresies seem to be rather closer together, affected as they are by Judaic sources—the first in a purer form and the second being more suffused with Eastern10 sources. In contrast, Docetism and Pelagianism seem to lean toward the Hellenic side, in that mythology would have led to the first heresy and, in contrast, the ethical tendency in the mystery cults would have led to the second heresy. Postscript. Far be it from us to draw into this account the contrast between supernaturalism and rationalism, a contrast that is so greatly strained at this time. Yet, it would be worth noticing the following tendencies. First, since, as a result of the accounts given above, we have to admit that various approximations to these heretical extremes do appear, even within doctrines of the church, these approximations may also be parceled out between those two ways of treating doctrine. Second, then, just as many echoes of Docetic and Manichean heresies are to be found in supernaturalist presentations—not only in actually dogmatic presentations but in popular presentations as well—as approximations to Ebionite and Pelagian heresies are rightly to be reproached in rationalistic presentations. Third, the fact that every treatment of doctrine that does not remain free of all one-sidedness necessarily leans toward one of these two sides— Docetic and Manichean or Ebionite and Pelagian— does seem to bear witness to the correctness of the way heresy is conceived here.11

1. Ed. note: The content of this stipulation, to be laid out only in the actual presentation of doctrine, is made in §11, where “accomplished” (vollzogen), also used just below, rather than “occurred” (geschehene) is the verb used. Otherwise the statement is exactly the same. 2. Ed. note: eigentümlichen Vorzuges. 3. Realität. 4. Ed. note: In OG, Schleiermacher indicates that ebionitic Christology “leaves very little of Christ” (62f.). 5. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher uses indirekt, as in a flanking action in a battle. 6. Grenzpunkte. 7. Ed. note: Here verdächtig would also mean, variously, held in suspicion of doubt, or taken to be suspect or doubtful— in short, must be inquired into further so as to avoid its having an heretical cast. This becomes Schleiermacher’s regular practice throughout the present system. 8. Ed. note: The term used here is identifizieren, which implies a correct, well-supported labeling of a stated position as heretical in cast, or at least obviously tending in a heretical direction more than some alternative formulation offered. Again, in this systematic presentation Schleiermacher routinely attempts to leave room for a variety of formulations as long as they do not clearly encroach upon heretical territory in one of the four forms laid out in preliminary outline here. Thus, he

regularly evinces an effort not ardently or overhastily to attach a heretical label, while accepting the responsibility to offer the most accurate doctrinal formulations he can find. 9. Ed. note: The term positiven here refers to an actual, unavoidable social condition of humanity. 10. Ed. note: orientalischem. This name typically referred more to what would be called the Middle East domain today, not the Far East. In a marginal note, Schleiermacher refers to a like distinction within Judaism between λαός (the people of Israel) and ἔθνη (the neighboring Gentiles). 11. Ed. note: In his second letter to Lücke, “Über die Glaubenslehre” (1829), KGA I/10 (1990), 357–59, Schleiermacher wrote: “I have no concern that there might be schism among us over the claim I have made that it is neither Christian nor salutary to urge that so-called ‘rationalists’ be expelled from our ecclesial community, even in a friendly and good-natured fashion. It is painful, moreover, to see men of tender character and well-grounded reputation deny the true interest of the church in such a way that they let themselves be drawn into such an aggressive war” (ET Tice). Since 1825, when the faculty at Leipzig at first declared that rationalists should be expelled from the church, later softening this hard requirement to suggest simply that they leave on their own recognizance, there had been a “storm of controversy” (Duke and Fiorenza, n. 22) over this issue. The Traulsen and Ohst edition of On the “Glaubenslehre” indicates here that probably Schleiermacher was referring especially to August Hahn, De rationalismi (1827). Schleiermacher immediately continued: “Now, when a lopsided tendency emerges as strongly as has occurred in this case, it is my habit—or perhaps my bad habit—to shift my meager weight as much as possible to the other side, out of a natural fear that the little boat in which we are all traveling might capsize. Moreover, since I am not then satisfied simply to declare in some fashion that I am obligingly ready for these worthy men whom people call by this name to remain in our ecclesial community, I would also wish to show that they can be there and remain there entirely on their own right.” Schleiermacher further continued: “My attempt to construe and delimit what is heretical as well as definitely to distinguish what is heterodox from what is heretical—a subject usually almost entirely neglected, almost as if the now completely obsolete investigation into ‘fundamental articles’ were already settled—and much else besides that I have stated elsewhere have all been aimed at fulfilling this very same purpose.” As Duke and Fiorenza state in their note 23, during the period of Protestant orthodoxy Nikolaus Hunnius (1563–1643) instigated this fundamentalist effort at Wittenberg (1617– 1623) and Lübeck (1624–1643), especially in his long-used dogmatics for laity, Epitome credendorum (1625) and in his Theologicae fundamentali (1628), wherein he distinguished between foundational doctrines, belief in which he deemed necessary for salvation, and other true doctrinal statements, belief in which were not required for that purpose. Formally, without reference to specific norms or other content, in Brief Outline (1811, 1830) Schleiermacher distinguishes between the more orthodox (“holding fast to what is already acknowledged” and to any inferences therefrom) and the more heterodox (“the inclination to keep the conception of doctrine mobile and to make room for still other modes of apprehension”) (§203, then §§204–8, and, in relation to New Testament exegesis and creedal symbols §§210–11). In his letters On the “Glaubenslehre” he then directly adds (358): “I, however, have wanted generally to leave plenty of room within the ecclesial domain in contrast to these two parties, each of whom, based in its own focus, seeks to narrow that domain more and more, with the result that the danger arises of the church’s actually being divided. Not only that, but in the particulars my aim has also been to show as much as possible not only how much space there may be between theses that are ecclesially acceptable and contrary heretical positions but also how much amiable agreement is allowable by what is held in common between orthodox and heterodox positions within this space. The more we hold to this attitude, the easier it will then be truly to discover how much of a controversy might actually emerge over what basic mode of thinking is to be adopted. As it seems to me, in these days this issue often tends to be fought over rather too hastily on both sides.” In 1818, close younger colleagues of Schleiermacher and admirers of his general approach as a theologian—including Hochschule theologians Karl Immanuel Nitzsch (1787–1868) and Friedrich Lücke (1791–1855), who was also a New Testament scholar; church historian Johann Carl Ludwig Geiseler (1792–1854); Hochschule theologian Carl Christian Ullmann (1796–1865); and Old Testament scholar Friedrich Wilhelm Umbreit (1795–1860)—founded the periodical Theologische Studien und Kritiken, to be an organ of their “mediating theology” movement. This group, not itself a school, sought to support unity between Lutherans and Reformed churches and to combine Christian faith and science in ways that would obviate the then-current split between rationalists and supernaturalists. Nonetheless, tendencies could be found among them either to border on or to overstep the protections against “natural heresy” that Schleiermacher had carefully set. In 1822 the congregation in which Schleiermacher had served since 1808 as a Reformed pastor was the first in all of Prussia to unite. Some united churches have continued to be so.

§23. A set of faith-doctrines1 to be drawn up at the present time within the Western church cannot be related indifferently to the contrast between the Roman Catholic and

the Protestant churches but must appertain to one of the two branches.2 1. Here the contrast between the Western and the Eastern church is made superordinate3 to that between the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and is then passed over. Both moves would seem to require some justification. That the antipapal view of the Eastern church appears to place it on the side of Protestantism might seem to be contrary to the first move. However, if that first contrast were conceded to be superordinate, it would appear to be inconsistent to pass over it, and it would seem to be necessary to specify what the common character of the Western church is so that one could discern within it the principle underlying the subordinate contrast between Romanism and Protestantism. Against this view, it is to be noted that this cannot at all be the place fully to construe these contrasts in their various gradations. What can be done, however, is to indicate their relation to faith-doctrine. Now, how little importance the antipapal view of the Eastern church has in this respect is already clearly displayed in the ease with which individual portions of that church acknowledge the Roman primacy without giving up their Eastern typus or, more specifically, altering anything significant in their doctrine. Precisely in relation to our concern here, however, the East-West contrast is the more superordinate inasmuch as a brisk activity in the domain of faith-doctrine has remained common to both of the Western churches even after their separation, whereas since the Eastern church broke away, it has grown increasingly more rigid4 in this domain. Within that church, moreover, the connection of knowing, as concerns piety, with any properly scientific mode of organization has been almost entirely snuffed out. Yet, precisely on account of this purely negative character of the Eastern church with respect to doctrine, here too there is all the less to be said about that church as it is also not possible to determine whether it will have the strength, as it takes more steps to resume an interconnection with the world’s intellectual conversation,5 to call forth and give shape to a contrast within itself analogous to that in the Western church.6 2. This contrast between Roman Catholic and Protestant has not affected the entirety of faith-doctrine. Rather, alongside those doctrines over which the two churches are known to be in conflict, there are others concerning which they set forth the same formulations and still others concerning which analogous differences are to be found in both churches. Furthermore, however, the contrast itself must be regarded as destined to disappear somehow and at some point, as is true of every similar contrast within the Christian community. All this being said, it is indeed possible to conceive of a very different process in construction of a set of faith-doctrines whether one believes that the contrast has not yet reached its point of culmination or believes that it has already surpassed it. This is so, for in the latter case, it would be a true advance if one were to seek out or prepare for mediating formulations in contested doctrines for the purpose of facilitating and introducing the impending dissolution of the contrast from all points. Likewise, moreover, that case would then be in order to establish what is jointly held in the uncontested doctrines quite firmly for the purpose of making it as hard as possible for zealots—perhaps well meaning yet failing to recognize the

church’s overall situation—so that they could not put off union of the two parts further than is necessary by stirring up useless new controversies. On the other hand, in the first case, in which one believes that the contrast has not yet reached culmination, it is likely to be presupposed that if the tension between the two parts is still to increase in general, this would be the case in the domain of doctrine as well. Where that situation obtains, however, the opposite activity would necessarily occur in the same spirit—that is, acting to the greatest extent possible to expedite the entire process along a steady course toward union. Then a set of faith-doctrines produced from the Protestant side would have to set itself the goal of pointing out the contrast even in those points of doctrine wherein it had not yet come to light previously. This effort would be necessary, for only once the contrast would be worked out in all points of doctrine could one be fully confident that it had reached its point of culmination in doctrine as well. Now, rarely is the course that such a contrast takes entirely smooth. Rather, from time to time its main trend is interrupted by reactions from one or both of the two opposing sides toward the other. Thus, in one half of the contrasting pair it can easily appear as though one were standing within the other half, and vice versa. Hence, customarily the two modes of treating doctrine are also to be found standing in close proximity at the same time, yet in each mode a consciousness of an actual point at which they have placed themselves also exists to a greater or lesser extent.7 3. Accordingly, the proposition set forth here excludes neither of the modes of treating doctrine. That is to say, even a person who views this tension as already on the wane and is preparing means for settling past disputes cannot do otherwise than to set forth the actual difference as still having currency, not if the person wants to stay within the precincts of dogmatics, and thereby to profess belonging to the side that corresponds to the rest of the person’s presentation of Christian dogmatics.8 In points of doctrine under dispute, a set of faith-doctrines could take a neutral position only if it reverted back to older formulations; but, in every instance, that means relying on more indefinite formulations from which what is better defined will have developed only through controversy. In addressing the issues scientifically, however, it is not possible to rest satisfied with something ill-defined if something well-defined is already available. We, however, cannot consider the tension in this contrast to be already on the wane. This is the case, for whenever a multiplicity of views concerning any point of doctrine has opened up within the Evangelical church,9 the result has never been a greater approximation to Roman formulations; likewise in the Roman church too those movements which take an antiProtestant direction have appeared to have the greater success. Hence, it is rather to be presumed that even among doctrines that have the same ring to them, hidden differences are still there, than to suppose that where formulations significantly diverge, the distinction between actual religious states of mind and heart10 is, nonetheless, only insignificant.

1. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: This term comes from the Latin doctrina fidei. On the contrast between Protestant and Roman Catholic, see CF §4, BO §53, and also BO §§39–41, 60–61, 122, 134, 216–19, 228, and 338. 2. Ed. note: See OR (1821) II, supplemental note 10, for additional discussion regarding the four heresies and the view that Roman Catholics have by far done more toward doctrines’ degenerating into “dead letter” by their “receptivity to strange cults” than by heresy hunting. See his understanding that proofs can easily veer off into making statements that appear to be heretical without actually being so, in §22.3 and 22.P.S., also in §25.P.S. 3. Ed. note: höher gestellt. 4. Ed. note: At this point in the first edition (§26) the text reads: “has for several centuries remained as good as stockstill.” 5. Ed. note: In stating in den Zusammenhang des geistigen Weltverkehrs zurücktretend here, Schleiermacher is assuming both this church’s isolation from the rest of the world and its not being engaged with intellectual (and perhaps spiritual) currents there, thus lacking in its Wissen um die Frömmigkeit (“knowing as concerns piety”). As here, this process would combine “religious interest” with a “scientific spirit” (Brief Outline §9). 6. Ed. note: That is, to have a reformation. See Schleiermacher’s account of the key role of the universities in the rise of the Protestant Reformation in his 1817 Oratio, in Nicol (2004), 45–64. 7. Ed. note: Thönes (1873) reports the following marginal comment by Schleiermacher: “One side can be the main trend, but the other can be present as the exception,” to which Schleiermacher subsequently adds: “The two features can exist in combination: the vigorous reaction and the tension, one of these two being the main trend and the other an exception. Most dogmaticians seem to have no distinct consciousness of this relation.” Then, in another comment, he offers (historicalcritical) use of scriptura as a possible exception. 8. Ed. note: The description of this approach given here comports exactly with what Schleiermacher seems consistently to do in his theological work overall, even when he makes no explicit reference to the Roman Catholic side, except that he does not see differences to be on the wane in his context. For him, the nub of the matter at that time is indicated in §24. Today some theologians, on both sides, would dispute whether the contrast need be so sharply stated in dogmatics, whatever the institutional praxis of the two communities of faith might often be. 9. Ed. note: The present work offers a set of faith-doctrines specifically for the Evangelical church in Germany, a church that bears Lutheran and Reformed heritage. Thus, it does not claim to represent the larger class of Protestant churches there or elsewhere, except by possible union or integration later on. 10. Ed. note: frommen Gemütszustände.

§24. Insofar as the Reformation was not merely a purification and an aversion against abuses that had crept in, but it is, rather, the case that a distinctive formation of Christian community has emerged from the Reformation, the contrast between Protestantism and Catholicism can be grasped in a preliminary way as follows. Protestantism tends to make the individual’s relationship to the church dependent on that person’s relationship to Christ. Conversely, however, Catholicism tends to make the individual’s relationship to Christ dependent on that person’s relationship to the church.1 1. To be sure, if one confines oneself only to the way Protestantism arose, it is not to be denied that the reformers and their initial adherents were conscious only of a purifying effort. In no way, however, did they intend to form an ecclesial community of their own. Rather, they were simply forced into it. Suppose, on the other hand, that we just stick to the present time and consider that the Evangelical church never does exercise any organized missionary activity toward the Catholic church. Indeed, it never even expresses the wish to draw over the entire Catholic church into the Evangelical church, as if it would belong to its very nature to do so. Suppose that we consider, moreover, that this would still have to be the case if we were to view all those features which are both alien to us and distinctive to Roman

Catholicism simply as corruptions of Christianity, be they doctrines or arrangements and practices. Then the following would flow from this consideration. First, we do not cease by word and deed to exercise polemics against what we truly reckon to be among the corruptions of Christianity. Second, we nonetheless presuppose, at the same time, that other matters that are indigenous to Roman Catholics and that are likewise alien to us are such that we think we may let them stand as they are, alongside matters of our own, thus viewing them as taking a shape different from our own matters but just as Christian. Third, it will surely be just as vividly clear2 to us that even though the Catholic church were to lean toward our definitions in all those doctrines that have been in dispute, still no reunion would ensue therefrom. This phenomenon could be explained only in terms of a spirit existing there that is alien to our own and that would be repulsive to us. Patently, two points immediately follow from this conclusion, however. The first point is that just as we ascribe such a distinctiveness of character to the Catholic church, we do so to our own church as well. To this point a second one is added, that should we want to stick solely with the concept of purification, we must observe, on the one hand, that already, in general terms, what has existed earlier never returns in exactly the same form at a later date and, on the other hand, that in every respect it is impossible to assign any distinct point in the past to which the church should have been brought back through the Reformation itself. That is to say, we cannot return to the apostolic age, in part because we cannot sacrifice the dogmatic precision of the notions we now hold and in part because we can no more reestablish its relationship to Jewish and Gentile positions than we can adopt its political passivity. Now, in the Evangelical church some things point to earlier eras, others to later ones. Thus, even its self-reproducing unity is of a kind that never did exist heretofore, though the piety of certain individuals in the past can already have been analogous to what would constitute that unity now. 2. Based on these considerations, for the Evangelical dogmatician there then quite naturally arises the task of bringing to clear consciousness the distinctive character of Protestantism in contrast to Catholicism and thus, wherever possible, the task of ascertaining in some formulation that wherein the contrast itself would consist. Otherwise, the Evangelical dogmatician would no more be able to carry out one’s work with any surety and comprehensiveness than the Christian dogmatician would generally be able to do by not likewise establishing what constitutes the distinctive nature of Christianity. Now, it is probably very natural that such a formulation could not arise out of the actual controversy between the two parties. Unfortunately, however, even we Protestants are, as yet, in no way agreed among ourselves as to what the formulation expressing the contrast would be. Instead, ordinarily the contrast is referred to some point or other that happens to stand out but that still does not serve to explain everything, and this is done in such a way that one of the two parties seems to be defined only negatively, or the contrast is treated as a rather arbitrary aggregate of particular differences. Some have, perhaps, believed that for Evangelical dogmatics such a formulation would have, alas, already come into being too late, because our church’s doctrine is entirely encompassed in our creedal symbols and so nothing

more is to be gained for the purpose. Others have, perhaps, believed that the time to state such a formulation had not yet arrived, because the spirit of Protestantism would not yet have come to be fully explicated doctrinally on all sides. Today, however, the relationship between the two churches is such that, on the one hand, it is now not only possible but already necessary to get fully oriented regarding that relationship and is such that, on the other hand, we also have to provide well against unprotestant elements creeping into our further development unawares. However, since so little has accrued thus far toward carrying out this task, even the attempt to be made here can claim to be only a provisional one. 3. The distinctive nature of Protestantism could no more be located based on the general expression that we have set forth for Christianity than the distinctive nature of Christianity could be located based on the sheer concepts of piety and religious community. Furthermore, just as the distinctive nature of Christianity could scarcely be discovered on a purely empirical basis, it would be just as difficult to attain to the principle of the inner unity of the Evangelical church by taking this route. Indeed, here the difficulty would be still greater, for two reasons. On the one hand, in the emergence of Protestantism the effort to purify came to the fore as alone decisive, and the distinctive spirit that began to unfold at that time lay hidden, unconscious, behind that effort. On the other hand, even the external unity of the new church is much harder to determine, since unity at its starting point was lacking, and yet it is also true that not so many new communities emerged as there were starting points. Hence, even now—given the great mass of very differently formed, mutually independent, personally distinctive characteristics3 that have arisen—it has then had to be almost impossible to determine how these communities would ever be united and to what extent they would all belong together in the absence of those purifying efforts. Now, perception of this contrast4 is to be drawn most clearly from the consolidated, continuing existence of the two churches alongside each other. Thus, it has also seemed best to try to fulfill this task by observing what kinds of attribute belonging to each community arouse consciousness of the contrast in the shared feeling of the other community. Accordingly, the most general charge lodged by the Roman church against Protestantism is that it has destroyed a great deal that was present in the old church, and yet, by virtue of its principles, it is not in a position to rebuild a firm and sustainable community. Instead, according to this charge, everything in Protestantism is left unresolved, wavering to and fro, so that every individual is left to stand on one’s own. For the most part, we, on the other hand, lodge the reproach against Catholicism that in its attributing and referring everything to the church, it deprives Christ of the honor due to him, placing him in the background, indeed in such a way that to a certain degree Christ himself is subordinated to the church. Suppose that we then add to these points that the ecclesial aspect of Protestantism can no more be held to the charge against it than Catholicism can be held to the charge against it. Suppose too that we consider that each part of the Christian church nonetheless wants chiefly to designate in the other part that whereby the other part could most readily veer outside the general domain of Christianity. Accordingly, it would then obviously be the opinion of Catholicism that although we Protestants have held fast to our relation to Christ, we would still be in danger of

giving up the principle that drives Christianity by dissolving community. Likewise, our opinion regarding the Roman church would be that however much it might hold fast to that same community, it would still be in danger of becoming non-Christian by abandoning the relation to Christ. Suppose that we then further affix to this conclusion the observation that the spirit of Christianity that holds sway in both parts of the church does not permit either of these two parts ever to reach that extreme point, nonetheless. The formulation set forth here actually arises from this affirmation. This formulation can come gradually to be warranted within the very doctrines currently contested only in their further construction, unless a great part of the faith-doctrine of the future is to be anticipated in some fragmentary fashion now. What can be done at this point is simply to make some preliminary remarks in favor of the formulation and then to indicate some things that follow from it in the way Evangelical dogmatics is treated. 4. It can be said in favor of our formulation that, despite our not being able to make it our own starting point, it does, nonetheless, attribute to each of the two parts of Christianity contrasting characteristics that modify the nature of Christianity in contrasting ways. That is to say, since in no individual does Christian piety arise independently, in and of itself, but arises only from and in the community, thus there is no such thing as an adherence to Christ except in combination with an adherence to the community. The possibility that the two features could be subordinated to each other in a contrasting fashion rests only on this observation: that it is the same bare fact5 that we Evangelicals regard to be the institution of the church on behalf of Christ’s efficacious action that is regarded by Catholics to be a transfer of Christ’s efficacious action to the church. This observation, too, speaks in support of our formulation, namely, in that in this context—where we are seeking, first and foremost, to define what this contrast means for the theoretical aspect of doctrine—the formulation is chiefly attached to the concept “church.” That is to say, on this basis it becomes probable that even what takes place in starkest contrast within the customs6 of the two churches, and in their principles regulating polity, would permit of being further developed on the basis of this same formulation. Yet, what follows from this formulation for the way dogmatics is treated is this: On the one hand, in points of doctrine to which the formulation can be most directly applied, the treatment must also be most careful not to overstep the parameter of this contrast, lest the treatment should deteriorate into being non-Christian. Thus, on the other hand, in doctrines wherein this contrast is most recessive,7 the treatment must also take the greatest care not to set forth formulations that have not yet discarded the contrasting characteristics identified here or that have perhaps put into them something of those characteristics anew. In this fashion, the extent to which the distinctive Evangelical spirit is or is not already widely developed in doctrine can then also best be ascertained. At the same time, it naturally appears that any church that tends to place the community above a relation to Christ will also most readily take on something from earlier religious communities, consequently that everything carrying a certain flavor of Jewish or Gentile characteristics will be more in keeping with the

Roman church, just as any likewise earlier opposition to those characteristics will already have included within it something akin to Protestantism. Postscript. What has been said regarding the indeterminate nature of the Evangelical church’s external unity also refers in particular to its various branches and especially to the separation between the Reformed and Lutheran communities of the church. It does so, for their original relationship was such that, despite their different starting points, they could just as well have grown together to a point of external unity as have issued in a separation. Now, already in its title this presentation of doctrine professes to relate only to the Protestant church in general, not naming either of those two branches in particular. Thus, it proceeds based on the presupposition that the separation between these two branches has not been sufficiently grounded, in that the differences in doctrine to be found in them are not in any way to be traced to an actual difference in religious conditions of mind and heart.8 Neither branch, moreover, deviates from the other branch— either in their customs and ethical theory9 or even in their polity—in a manner that interconnects somehow or other with those doctrinal differences. Hence, we cannot then treat these differences other than in the same way that people also look at otherwise divergent presentations made by various teachers—in short, solely as a matter of the school.10

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher left tasks of Roman Catholic theology entirely to its own scholars. However, he did release a number of statements contrasting Roman Catholic to Evangelical beliefs and practices. In BO what Schleiermacher calls “polemics,” half of philosophical theology, is wholly directed to “diseased conditions” within the church. Insofar as it would represent Christianity universally, in relation to the Roman church it would be directed only against that which is alien to its particular form and is thus to be regarded as a diseased condition of Christianity (§41). In student notes to his 1831 lectures, he says that he had always been for a “purified Catholicism within a radical contrast” with Protestantism, and not for a transition into Catholicism (§52n). This writing is further underscored and elaborated in §60n, including a certain “indifference” as between the two forms due to differences in their development. A Roman Catholic theologian could easily sort out what would be relatively the same and relatively different in its more inwardly direct “special polemics” by consulting remaining comments in this work: §§122, 212, 216–22, 228 (comparisons of developments at various times and currently in faith-doctrine and ethics) and 338 (the final proposition in BO, indicating the historical contrasts between the two traditions regarding church service and church government in their practical theology). In the first edition of Christian Faith (1821–22), §146.3 cites part of what is covered in the last BO proposition, §338. In Christian Faith (1830–31) this proposition sets up Schleiermacher’s entire irenic position on Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, which are to be related to each other as two forms of Christianity possessing two differing emphases. Consistent with assessments of that relationship elsewhere in his lectures and writings are (1) what he reports in BO and (2) additional considerations in the present work. (3) On those who switch from Evangelical to Roman Catholic churches, see OR (1821) Epilogue, supplemental note 3. (4) On the issue of which church might take the upper hand in Germany at the time and the necessity for the Evangelical church to maintain its freedom from the state, see Epilogue, supplemental note 4. See also his Lehre von Staat, KGA II/8 (1998). 2. Ed. note: The word is anschaulich. Schleiermacher’s marginal comment here reads: “Nota bene: It is not strictly correct to mention only doctrine here. The reason for doing this is that doctrine is alone being dealt with in this context” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: The phrase persönlicher Eigentümlichkeiten seems to refer to collective human entities, in this instance communities of faith, as socially formed “persons.” Schleiermacher occasionally displays this usage in his socioethical writings. In his Christian ethics, what is called “purifying” action here is placed in an interdependent triad referring also to the presentational and propagative actions of both ecclesial communities and individuals in the Christian life overall—that is, in how people of faith together live out their relationship with God in Christ. Here the emphasis is on faith as the specific concern of doctrine, faith viewed as people’s actual relationship with God in Christ. 4. Anschauung des Gegensatzes.

5. Faktum. Ed. note: Since ordinarily Schleiermacher would use Tatsache for a factual claim, this term is here taken to refer to a “bare fact,” however the claim about it may be formed. 6. Sitte. Ed. note: As Hermann Peiter (2010) has decisively demonstrated, in Schleiermacher’s usage Sitte refers to customs practiced throughout the entire ethical domain versus the purely physical domain (thus, within the church this domain includes customs regarding morals, worship, and polity), hence the general root meaning of Sitte used here. 7. Ed. note: dieser Gegensatz … zurücktritt. Here the fast-moving succession of descriptions calls for some unpacking. First, “contrasts” come in many forms. Second, in the form used here the “contrasting characteristics” are identified as relationships between “Christ” and “church” in a comparison of Evangelical and Roman Catholic churches. Third, these contrasting relationships tend to be more or less reversed. Fourth, in some views and actions, as in the underlying faith experience that people express through them, aspects of these two major characteristics and of how they are defined or take form on each side can be “discarded” and others added “anew.” Fifth, with respect to various doctrines, the various contrasting characteristics of “Christ” and “church” and of their contrasting relationship in each church can come to vary in their degrees of “dominance” or “recessiveness.” Hence, sixth, the comparison made produces no hard-and-fast rule. Rather, it opens up major tendencies only, and it indicates the possibility of quite varied changes and results on both sides. Seventh, by implication, in the present situation of the Christian churches, the more accurately comprehensive a purely descriptive study of faith-doctrine would be on either side, the more likely it would be that the general contrast identified here would be found to hold up uniformly throughout either side. For Schleiermacher, however, this does not necessarily diminish the value of utilizing the contrast, as it is carefully qualified here, for either descriptive or comparative purposes. Finally, it will be noticed that Schleiermacher makes little direct use of the contrast in his presentation of faith-doctrine in the German Evangelical church. Other theological disciplines are more appropriate for doing that. However, throughout there are more than enough indications to show that his treatment of doctrine is guardedly using this relative contrast at every turn, confident that it is well grounded historically. 8. Gemütszustände. 9. Sittenlehre. 10. Schule. Ed. note: That is, merely scholastic or academic in nature, not strictly ecclesial, not addressing real differences between communities of faith.

§25. It is appropriate that every Evangelical dogmatics contain something distinctive, except that this will be more the case in some than in others and that what is distinctive will sometimes be more prominent in some points of doctrine and sometimes more prominent in others.1 1. We could never concede the term “dogmatics” for a presentation of purely distinctive faith-propositions.2 Even the first interconnected presentations of Evangelical faith could carry that name, moreover, only insofar as they connected with earlier material, and most of that material would be held in common with what had already been present in the church. Thus, even a body of faith-propositions that would not hold claim to any connection with what, on the one hand, took shape in the epoch of the church’s Reformation and, on the other hand, had also been acknowledged anew within the Evangelical church could not in any way enjoy currency as a body of Evangelical faith-doctrine.3 This would be true no matter how much everything in it were opposed to Roman doctrine. Furthermore, if we had nothing more to show than a body of doctrine4 of this sort, then, in fact, the unity and self-identity of our church would not appear in this doctrine at all,5 and in this respect it would provide no warranty whatsoever for those calling themselves Protestant to belong together. Suppose, taking the other direction, that our body of doctrine were so completely and exactly defined that no deviation from it could take hold unless someone desired to be excluded from the community of the church at the same time. Then it would be something wholly superfluous

and meaningless to have new presentations of faith-doctrine within our church. If repetitions of a fixed letter were to have any status, linguistic expressions and usages would have to be different, in any case, or the arrangement of propositions would have to be different. Either of these two moves, however, would still point to distinctive alterations. This would be the case, since there is no such thing as two expressions that bear exactly the same meaning and since any sentence placed in a different context is bound to take on a somewhat different meaning. Consequently, where even but a slight trace of variety were to appear in several presentations of doctrine, in every case divergent and distinctive doctrines would also be there. Now, our own body of doctrine, however, is quite far removed from having any such thoroughgoing definiteness, since even in our various confessional documents the same subject matter is not always phrased in literally the same way. Moreover, these unique, official, perhaps generally recognized presentations nevertheless always have as their subject matter only particular portions of our body of doctrine. Also, just as this kind of common statement arose during that Reformation epoch, based only on the free agreement of certain individuals, so too in the period since the Protestant church established itself, something can have come to be held in common and can have gained currency in no other way than by the free concurrence of results on the part of individuals engaged with the same subject matter. The fact that despite this process there is no lack of commonly held doctrine sufficiently demonstrates that a shared distinctive character of doctrine binds individuals together. Moreover, as concerns unity of doctrine, we have nothing more than this to expect within the Evangelical church, nor are we in need of anything more. 2. So, suppose, first, that we proceed based on the fact that overall the body of doctrine in our church is not something firmly established but is in a process of becoming. Suppose, second, that the claim can well be made that in doctrine what is distinctive in our church has not yet appeared in all its fullness. Then we will not be able to presuppose anything other than that, in the future too, in the further development of our body of doctrine overall, expressions that are held in common—that is, what gains currency as a pure and generally recognizable expression of the distinctive Protestant spirit—and expressions that are distinctive—namely, what expresses the personal view of anyone presenting doctrine—will come to the fore with and through each other. Moreover, every particular presentation of the body of doctrine that lays claim to having ecclesial status will be the more complete the more integrally expressions held in common and expressions personally distinctive are bound together and refer each to the other. What is held in common naturally is based on and most strongly comes to the fore in those points of doctrine which are most akin to the original efforts to purify faith. Now, this effort did not transform the entire body of doctrine in the epoch of the Reformation itself. Rather, at that time much was simply taken over from earlier determinations without alteration. Thus, naturally this very domain would become one that is disputed over, and much that had been valued in common would gradually become obsolete. What is distinctive had its original placement in the arrangement of particular doctrines, wherefore as good as nothing would exist or could exist that could be recognized as necessarily held in common.

Adjacent to that domain, however, all those points of doctrine—even those that reside within the generally acknowledged expression of doctrine—can in many ways still be more exactly defined. Everyone contributes something, moreover, who brings this modifiability of doctrinal expression to the point of gaining recognition and who exercises one’s right to do this in one’s own fashion. Finally, distinctiveness of presentation also encroaches on the region that is gradually becoming antiquated, this for the purpose of reshaping particular doctrines to correspond more to the Protestant spirit. Yet, even the liveliest distinctiveness can strive for nothing higher than putting common doctrine in the clearest light. Likewise, the other way around, there is no higher purpose for doctrine held in common than to facilitate the distinctive unfolding of doctrine without disrupting community, this by establishing its Protestant character as distinctly as possible. The more these two features6 come to suffuse each other, the more ecclesial and, at the same time, the more serving of its further advance the presentation of doctrine will be. The more these two features are divorced from each other and simply persist, standing side by side as if they do not belong together, the more what is tied to historical accounts and is set forth as having common currency is merely paleological7 and what is advanced as distinctive is merely neo-modish. Postscript. The terms “orthodox” and “heterodox,”8 which etymologically also do not form a properly contrasting pair, fluctuate too much in their meaning for me to have wanted to make use of them. However, one may recall how much within our church was initially decried as heterodox that was nonetheless admitted to be orthodox later on, yet always only to the extent that what was earlier deemed to be of an orthodox nature had already become antiquated. In recalling this, one can well see how this contrast would be referred solely to doctrines that are intended to be held in common. As a consequence, whatever unmistakably conforms with what is established in our confessions would be termed “orthodox,” but what does not conform would be termed “heterodox.” Now, suppose, however, that something of a heterodox nature should prove to be in better accord with the spirit of the Evangelical church than does the letter of these confessional documents. At that point, the latter will become obsolete and the former will become orthodox. Now, in our church such alterations of status can never be declared to have general currency by a particular act. Thus, the use of these two terms for matters still being dealt with is always off the mark. Occasions for such usage will not readily cease to arise at any time, however, for the simple reason that what is established in our confessions contains scriptural interpretations at the same time, and thus the advancing art of interpretation9 can also render a given point of doctrine stated in such a confessional symbol quite unsteady. Likewise, to take the other direction, what is heterodox—even if in its content and mode of expression it could not permit of being definitely distinguished from what was taken to be heretical in ancient times—may nonetheless not be regarded to be heretical10 if it intends only to gain currency in connection with the shared features of our church’s body of doctrine. That is to say, among those who do not want to separate themselves from our church’s body of doctrine, we ought to presuppose only that they are misconceiving doctrine, even in the case

of such heterodox deviations, and that the mistakes they are making would, in turn, also have to be resolved by means of scientific exchange within the church itself. This approach is all the more necessary as there is to be no thought of any hidden influence from principles that are peculiar to other religious communities.11

1. Cf. Brief Outline (1811), 56ff. Ed. note: See Brief Outline (1811), footnotes I: §§1–30 and 40–42 under §§195–222 (1830, 2011 ET). Clemen (“Schleiermachers Vorlesung,” 1905) indicates that in his further explanations here in 1831–1832, a “recent event” that Schleiermacher discussed then had been instigated by August Hahn in his book An die evangelische Kirche zunächst Sachsen und Preußen (1827). Student notes quote Schleiermacher as saying: “If the most recent event had reached the conclusion that the rationalist academic teachers had lost their positions, that would have been an official opposition. However, that opposition would have been related strictly to the Prussian territorial church, which in that action would have been separated from the other Evangelical churches. Or the action would have opened a wider discussion, including whether the entire Evangelical church is prepared to do the same, and there it would have gained currency. Or the Prussian territorial church could have reversed its decision. Since none of this has happened, rationalist and supernaturalist thinking have currency side by side in the Evangelical church, thus they have no official opposition.” 2. Glaubenssätzen. Ed. note: Indirectly from doctrina fidei, doctrinal propositions (or “sentences”) regarding faith, presenting what it is and means. 3. Glaubenslehre. 4. Lehrbegriff. Ed. note: Historically, such collections have been termed loci (an array of sentences or points of doctrine) or epitomes (sum-ups), and they have not tended to display much clear interconnectedness within the body of doctrines treated. 5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “At that point, the Roman church would have had only sects over against it” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Ed. note: That is, (1) distinctive individual contribution to what comes to be (2) distinctive doctrine held in common. 7. Ed. note: The distinction here is between paläologisch (just digging into the past) and neoterisch (just fancifully offering something new that really does not belong there). 8. Ed. note: See Brief Outline (1830) §§203–8 and 210. On heresy as an honorable word and “heterodoxy” vs. “orthodoxy,” see OR II, supplemental note 10, and OR V, supplemental note 7. See also CF §§22, 32–61, 89.4, 113.2, 126, and 132.2; BO §§203–2; and OG 70f. On “anathema,” see his Augsburg sermons in Reformed but Ever Reforming (1997), 127–40. Although rationalist theologians might be deemed “heretics” on occasion, they would surely fall into Schleiermacher’s definition of “heterodox” and should not be repelled from the church (OG 68). 9. Ed. note: fortschreitende Auslegungskunst. According to Schleiermacher, in Evangelical theology this art would focus on the biblical writings and would employ the interactive general rules of both hermeneutics and criticism and of the closely allied art of translation. See his Academy addresses on these three subjects (1829–1830 and 1813, respectively, in KGA I/11). 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “Presupposition: In the spirit of Evangelical freedom” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Cf. §22.3 above.

§26. In the Evangelical church Christian doctrines of faith and Christian ethics1 have been treated separately for a long time now. Likewise, for our presentation we too separate out from the totality of dogmatic material those propositions of faith that are features of Christian ethics. Cf. Brief Outline (1811), §31ff.2 1. In the sense given above, the propositions offered in Christian ethics are also faithpropositions. This is so, for the modes of treatment that the two terms describe in the form

either of doctrinal propositions or of prescriptions—for the two forms amount to the same thing—are, in either case, statements concerning religious states of mind and heart that are Christian. That is, every religious stirring is essentially a modification of human existence, and if a given stirring is conceived as in a quiescent3 state, a proposition thus arises with reference to that state, and in that manner that proposition belongs in a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine. Every religious stirring, however, also proceeds just as essentially into activity—on condition that this stirring is not interrupted in its natural course or is too weak to register, neither of which cases can be taken into account here. Moreover, if different modifications of Christian religious consciousness are thus conceived as activities that variously come into being in terms of the summons by which they would be determined in each instance, in that manner propositions arise that belong to Christian ethics. Rules for living, however, and formulations that refer to modes of action that have not been constituted in this way would also not belong to Christian ethics but would belong either to ethics of a purely rational sort or to some special technical or practical discipline of one kind or another. 2. Now, it is self-evident that only these two disciplines, taken together, present the whole reality of Christian life. This is so, for no human being can be imagined who would be constantly stimulated overall in one’s self-consciousness in the same manner in which the expressions of self-consciousness make up Christian faith-doctrine. Moreover, no human being can be imagined who would not also constantly behave overall as Christian ethical teachings present that life. Likewise, it is easily conceivable how, for such a long time, the two disciplines can have been conjoined in their presentation, in such a way that they formed only one discipline. The reason this happened is that the various issuings of religious stirrings into activity, if brought together at certain convenient points, could always be described by way of a postscript in presentations of faith-doctrine too, viewed as natural outcomes of the very states that are described there. For example, what are called “duties to God” could be placed just after the doctrine of the divine attributes. Likewise, doctrines do exist that already of themselves belong, as it were, to both forms of treatment and thus offer a locus within a presentation of faith-doctrine wherein particular aspects of ethics or even the whole of it could easily be fit in. Points of doctrine regarding sanctification and regarding the church4 are of this kind. In contrast, by the nature of the matter a presentation of faith-doctrine could also just as well have been fitted into one on Christian ethics. Indeed, this could have been done in the same twofold manner, in that religious states of mind and heart would be described, each as something coming into being in these activities but also as something coposited and also as reverberating, as it were, in these activities. If this procedure were adopted, the material would also be variously added at particular loci of ethics. This could be done for the reason that the articulation of self-consciousness is also a moral5 activity. Thus, where moral activity is treated of, faith-doctrine as a whole could be fitted in, viewed in this case as an unfolding of Christian religious self-consciousness outward. Actually, the relationship between the two disciplines has always been one-sided, Christian ethics being handled within the presentation of Christian faith-doctrine. In this fashion, presentations of Christian faith-doctrine would become unwieldy in its unevenly

distributed ethical postscripts. Moreover, the need to envisage the two modes of treatment that have had currency within the Christian church being joined together was never satisfactorily met. On this account, sooner or later ethical interest had to effect a divorce between the two disciplines.

1. Glaubenslehre und … Sittenlehre. 2. Ed. note: For §§31–39 from 1811, see Brief Outline notes under §§223–230 in the 1830 editions in German or English. In his 1830 explanation of §223 there (corresponding to §§31–32 in 1811), he states: “Neither the designations ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ nor the terms ‘faith-doctrine’ and ‘ethics,’ or ‘moral doctrine,’ are fully adequate. This is so, because rules for Christian life are also theoretical propositions, as explications of the Christian concept of what is good; and they are also faith-propositions, statements of faith, no less than those which are dogmatic proper, since they too have to do with the same Christian religious self-consciousness, only in its particular manifestation as motivation [Antrieb]. “Now, it cannot be denied that the treatment of the two together belongs to a period in the history of theological sciences that was in many respects incomplete. Nevertheless, it is also true that a progressive improvement of this area of study may well be conceived apart from such a separation. §224. “This separation does afford to both sorts of proposition the advantage of being more easily apprehended in their respective interconnected structures. Thus, it has brought to Christian ethics the further advantage of undergoing a more elaborate treatment. “The latter advantage, however, is not essentially a consequence of the separation. The reason is that a treatment in which the two are conjoined is also conceivable, one in which the relationship would be just the reverse of what actually existed before the tendency to separate them arose; and then the separation would have led to the same advantage on the side of dogmatics. In contrast to the first advantage mentioned, a well-ordered, vital conjunction of the two would appear to provide special security against the ease with which dogmatic propositions proper can degenerate into lifeless formulations and ethical propositions into bare, external prescriptions.” See §26n4 below. “Student notes on the 1831/32 lectures: Schleiermacher referred here to Karl Immanuel Nitzsch’s System der christlichen Lehre (1829), then added: ‘The new mode of treatment is entirely opposed to this. Frequently Christian ethics is thoroughly blended with rationalist or philosophical thought. That, however, is completely wrong. The two [aspects of dogmatics] can only be subject to the same rules and can only be evaluated by the same standard.’ §225. “The division of this area of study can very easily give rise to the opinion that among entirely different interpretations of faith-doctrine there could still be the same interpretation of ethics, and vice versa. “This error has already penetrated very deeply into the common life of our church. It can be effectively countered only by doing both aspects of dogmatics scientifically.” “Student notes on the 1831/32 lectures, at §225: ‘The supernatural and rational interpretations of faith-doctrine are entirely different. By the same measure, does each have a different ethics? No one could claim that. To be sure, there are differences, so that one can say that in ethics supernatural theology has greater strength at certain points than rational theology has; but that applies only to details, not to the system.”’ Finally, in §230 Schleiermacher states that the more Christian ethics meets the same standards he set forth for the whole of dogmatics and for presentation of faith-doctrine, the more likely that each of the two aspects will aid the further explication of the other (cf. §§196–216) and the easier it will be to reinstate their interconnection via cross-references. He had already emphasized this point in §39 of the 1811 edition. 3. Ed. note: Here rühender means at rest, in stasis, not active, and not referring to a state of action (or conduct), which latter state is the occupation of Christian ethics. 4. Ed. note: Under §223 of Brief Outline is Schleiermacher’s comment, from his 1831–1832 lectures, where he places Christian ethics on exactly the same nonphilosophical basis as Christian doctrine. He does so in direct contrast to Karl Immanuel Nitzsch (1787–1868), System (1831), 198–251. Regarding this work by Nitzsch, Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this place cited it as putting the bulk of Christian ethics in sections on “sanctification” and “the church” (Thönes, 1873). To “sanctification” Nitzsch affixed basic ethical concepts under three headings: “Law of the Spirit,” “Spiritual Discipline and Practice,” and “The Fruit of the Spirit.” In his third section, “The Community in a State of Grace [im Heils],” he inserted the basic ethical concepts of “Calling” and “Social Standing.” See also §26n2 above. 5. Ed. note: In this context, sittliche activity, translated by the more limited English term “moral,” would have to include activities, such as worship and spiritual practices, that are usually not included in a strictly defined moral domain. In Schleiermacher’s conception, however, Christian Sittenlehre includes the entire range of human activities.

II. Regarding the Formation of Dogmatics §27. All propositions that claim a locus within a body1 of Evangelical doctrine must gain warranty, in part, by appeal to Evangelical confessional documents and, where these are found wanting, to Scriptures of the New Testament.2 In part, they must do this by showing how these propositions belong together with other doctrinal propositions to which recognition has already been given.3 1. It could seem strange that here the Evangelical church’s confessional documents as a whole are assigned their place, as it were, before the New Testament Scriptures themselves. In no way, however, can this procedure provide any ground for giving those documents precedence. To do this would indeed be self-contradictory, since they everywhere appeal to Scripture. Thus, it is rather the case that indirectly an appeal to Scripture always lies already in the assigned appeal to those confessional documents as a whole. Using direct reference to Scripture, however, it can always be demonstrated only that a posited doctrinal statement is Christian, whereas, with few exceptions, the distinctively Protestant content of such a statement continues to reside where it could be demonstrated that the Catholic church has sanctioned a different use of the same scriptural passages. Thus, for the Protestant content only the two modes of evidence4 mentioned above remain, and between these two modes the requirement generally set for dogmatics, namely, that it has to present a doctrine that has currency in the church, secures the initial spot for evidence from the confessional document.5 The reason is that these writings obviously comprise the first Protestant documents held in common. Moreover, the totality of Protestant congregations have grown together to form the Evangelical church primarily by subscribing to these confessions. Accordingly, every structured presentation of doctrine6 that would declare itself to be Protestant must endeavor to attach itself to this history. Indeed, this requirement applies no less to its distinctive features than to those it holds in common, except that for the first kind it naturally suffices to show indirectly that propositions of this kind can be compatible with statements in those symbols.7 Thus, immediate appeal to Scripture is then necessary only for two kinds of instance. The first kind of instance arises when the use that the confessions make of the books of the New Testament cannot be sanctioned. Even then, one must at least entertain the possibility that in particular cases all the testimonies cited in evidence, though not falsely applied, can still be unsatisfactory, since other scriptural passages would need to be adduced as means of evidence. The second kind of instance arises when propositions contained in the confessions themselves do not appear to be sufficiently scriptural or Protestant, thus are obsolete and are to be replaced by other expressions that would then surely find all the more entrée as it could be demonstrated that Scripture shows overwhelming support for them or perhaps even postulates them. Hence, in every area of doctrine this method of referring first to the confessional writings has, at the same time, the advantage that the relationship of every proposition to the church is

thereby at once made clear. Consequently, the significance of the entire presentation for the further development of the church’s body of doctrine is also made much easier to recognize. It already follows from these considerations that if one is looking at particular propositions, giving warranty to a proposition by explaining its relation to other propositions that have already been given warranty in some other way is but a subordinate matter. Moreover, such a procedure is appropriate only for second-order propositions, which are those that are neither immediately present in the symbols nor in some way distinctly represented in Scripture. Yet, on the other hand, whenever such a reference to the aforementioned original warranty is added to that subordinate warranty at any given point, only then is the appropriateness of the way a given structured presentation of doctrine is arranged placed in the right light, as is true of the system of terminology that prevails within it. 2. Now, in that we here embrace all the confessions of the Evangelical church in its two main branches as equally entitled, for us there is not a single confession that would have proceeded from the entire Evangelical church or would indeed even have been simply recognized by this entire church. Therewith, moreover, all distinction between a greater and more general authority of some confessions and a more doubtful and lesser authority of others disappears, being viewed as entirely meaningless. Indeed, since it must be said, at least regarding the confessions at the second stage of their formation, that Reformed modes of presentation were directed against Lutheran ones, and vice versa, it must be granted right at the outset, then, that within these confessions only that wherein they collectively agree can be really essential to Protestantism. Indeed, it must also be granted that for the totality of the Evangelical church the right to have differing notions in all nonessential points has itself already gained symbolic status, as it were, by means of this disagreement between particular confessions, each taking sides8 against the other. Further, it is not to be denied that in a certain sense all of our symbols are but occasional writings,9 some more than others. Hence, much within them is stated only with reference to the time and place, precisely in this way and not otherwise, and one has no cause to assume that the authors themselves have intended to offer an expression they chose as the only and completely right one. At this juncture, another closely related point is that the writers themselves were repudiating opinions held to be heretical at that time and that in all points of doctrine that had not yet exactly become controversial, they were testifying to their agreement with doctrine that was prevalent at the time. Certainly these actions were entirely in conformity with their convictions at that time, but since the writers were still in the throes of inquiry into these matters, their actions were too overly hasty to have the character of a confessional document. That is, such judgments of condemnation10 can have befallen many a divergent view that had arisen from the same spirit as the Reformation itself did, except that this spirit itself, in turn, could not yet be immediately recognized. Likewise, many an older doctrinal opinion could have been carried over along with other opinions, and people simply did not yet notice how even these doctrinal opinions would not conform with the nature of Protestantism. It then follows from these observations that if referring back to the symbols is not to hinder healthy further

development of doctrine, two things must be done. In part, greater attention must be paid to the spirit of these symbols than to clinging onto their letter. In part, attention must also be paid to the fact that the letter itself likewise requires application of the art of interpretation if the correct use of it is to be made. 3. Here only the New Testament writings are included, not the entire Bible. Accordingly, this decision is, in part, already prefaced in what was said above11 about the relationship of Christianity to Judaism. In part, anyone must also surely grant that if a doctrinal proposition would find neither indirect nor immediate warranty in the New Testament but would find it only in the Old Testament, then no one could summon up the proper courage to hold it to be a genuinely Christian doctrine. On the other hand, if a proposition is given warranty by means of the New Testament, no one would then raise an objection on the basis that nothing whatsoever concerning that proposition is found in the Old Testament. Consequently, it would appear that for dogmatics the Old Testament is only a superfluous authority. Now, admittedly, even by means of New Testament passages only the Christian character of a proposition can be exposed. Yet, it is already proper form for a Protestant doctrine to refer back to Scripture itself in regard to every faith-doctrine and to draw upon additional human remarks only insofar as they are warranted by Scripture—for these remarks, however, permitting to each person free use of the art of interpretation as it is grounded in linguistic science.12 However, use of Scripture is itself naturally quite varied in accordance with the varied makeup of propositions. Where the original tendency toward purification of the church prevails, being in accord with Scripture must be so exact that Scripture can also be used polemically against what has been set forth by the Roman church. Where the concern is focused more on the distinctive character of Protestantism, it suffices to demonstrate that this more distinct formation of doctrine is contained among things that Scripture says without one’s needing to show that the definition one offers is the only one that is compatible with Scripture. Likewise, as for what is set forth as something distinctive, it need be possible only to claim with surety that nothing in it can be shown to be contrary to Scripture, whereas what is held in common must definitely be tied to Scripture. In no way, however, are these different approaches to be understood as if biblical language usage were to be taken up into the actual structural presentation of doctrine. That is to say, the New Testament has a didactic form only in part, but it is never actually systematic in form. Thus, in most cases an expression that is completely appropriate there would nevertheless only very incompletely suit the demands that are made on a structured presentation of doctrine. Furthermore, the didactic portions of Scripture are mostly occasional discourses and writings, and, on that account, they are suffused with special references that would, in any case, have to evoke only confusion within a dogmatic presentation. Hence, to pursue our task by citing particular passages of Scripture under each proposition would then suit only very incompletely. Rather, in manifold ways this procedure has become disadvantageous to dogmatics, on the one hand, and to interpretation of Scripture, on the other hand. Hence, the relation of particular passages of Scripture to particular dogmatic propositions can never be more than an indirect one, such that it would

be shown that the same religious stirring underlies a given passage that a given dogmatic proposition presents, also such that the expressions used markedly differ only as the various contexts in which they come up entail those differences. These different phenomena, however, can be got at only by elucidating each context. Thus, in our discipline of dogmatics there should be an increasing use of Scripture in larger wholes. Thereby one would not be bent on applying individual passages torn out of context but on taking stock of larger, particularly fruitful sections so as to reveal, in the course of thought taken by the writers of Scripture, the same combinations of thought on which dogmatic results also rest. Meanwhile, such an application of Scripture must always be merely alluded to in the actual structured presentation of doctrine, and the success of this procedure rests entirely on agreement as to hermeneutical principles and methods. Accordingly, in this aspect dogmatics can complete its task only as the theory regarding interpretation of Scripture reaches completeness alongside it. 4. There is ample room for diversity in this aspect of dogmatics too. As a result, structured presentations of doctrine that are Protestant can bear a very different stamp without losing anything of their ecclesial character. For example, appeal to the confessions and to analogy could be comparatively quite recessive in a given dogmatics, whereas reference to Scripture is generally dominant. Thus, I might call this a scriptural dogmatics,13 in large part. How such a dogmatics is arranged would be its least notable feature, but this dogmatics would be completely ecclesial in nature unless (1) what is recognized to be Protestant in common happens to be sacrificed to what is only local and temporary in Scripture or, worse, sacrificed to a deviant interpretation of Scripture, or unless (2) it happens to abandon dialectical comparison of alternative notions in referring back to the often indefinite and multivocal language usage of the Bible. In contrast, I would term it a scientific dogmatics, in large part, if, in proceeding from certain well-recognized main points of doctrine, it were to shed light, based on the logic of its ordering, on parallelism that exists among its constituent parts and on the common bond that exists among its particular propositions in relation to each other, wherewith proof from Scripture and applying the symbols would recede of themselves. Naturally, those main points of doctrine in a scientific dogmatics would still have to be nothing other than the basic facts of religious selfconsciousness, set forth in the Protestant spirit. This is the case, for if they were speculative in nature, then the structured presentation of doctrine could indeed be very scientific, but it would not be a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine at all. Finally, suppose that a given dogmatics is principally tied only to the confessions and is satisfied to demonstrate everything based on what they say and to make every part dependent on them, without referring any details to Scripture or without binding everything together in a more exact manner by means of a strict ordering of its doctrine. The work of this kind would be a dogmatics of commentary on creedal documents.14 To be sure, in this kind of dogmatics a certain approximation to Roman Catholic dogmatics is not to be denied, since it lays all value on every detail’s being recognized by the church. However, its Protestant character would not be endangered unless it were, on the one hand, to set forth as a principle the assertion that

interpretation of Scripture stands under an authority and, on the other hand, it were simply to assign a value to its propositions independent of their expressing the inner experience of anyone. However, the farther any one of these forms of dogmatics distances itself from another form, the closer that form will come to its distinctive danger. Likewise, it would indeed appear that the aim of all these forms of dogmatics must be that each form would distance itself from the others as little as possible. Postscript.15 Now, our proposition is totally silent regarding the very widespread custom in structured dogmatic presentation of doctrine of also appealing to the statements of other teachers of faith-doctrine, from the church fathers right up to the most recent. Thus, thereby our proposition does indeed declare this custom to be something nonessential. That admission notwithstanding, these allusions could also bear some value, though not generally of the same rank as the two sources we have considered here. To the extent that certain contents of our confessions that are established also pass over to a given structured presentation of doctrine, quotations from what later dogmaticians said cannot augment one’s conviction as to the ecclesial status of propositions. They have value, moreover, only in compendia, for the purpose of indicating the finest among further comments made. In this case, patristic citations can be of use only in apologetic or polemical arguments16 forged in the church’s relationship to the Roman church. The situation changes, however, where there are deviations from the creedal symbols, whether this is then a matter only of denotation or of actual content. This is so, for a proposition has all the more claim to gain currency in the church the more it has already been heard in various sectors. In particular, however, when a structured presentation of doctrine decidedly adheres to one of the three forms of dogmatics indicated here, it enlarges its effectiveness the more it places itself in close association with those that have likewise strongly borne the stamp of one of the other forms.

1. Inbegriff. Ed. note: Thomas Aquinas called his presentation of such a body or collocation of doctrine a summa. The 1580 Lutheran summary of its Book of Concord, itself containing its main confessions, was called an epitome, while the differing titles of Melanchthon’s three organized presentations all began with the word loci, referring to a succession of points of doctrine, also a medieval custom. In the post-Reformation’s “scholastic” period, others somewhat systematically gathered together the various points of doctrine, called “dogmas,” or generally acknowledged teachings, into works that some then referred to either as doctrina fidei or as “dogmatics.” Following this latter custom, which by his own time was prominent in the German Evangelical church, Schleiermacher then placed both Christian ethical doctrine and Christian faithdoctrine within one integrated but two-part discipline, which he too called “dogmatics.” 2. Ed. note: See also §§8.P.S.2, 33.P.S., 108.5, and 131. Consistently, Schleiermacher holds that any use of creedal documents must be derived from the biblical testimony to what occurs in the process of redemption in Christ, including what comes to be presupposed regarding divine attributes in Part One. Thus, the only way to ascertain the full meaning of these principles is to examine how they are employed throughout this work. On the requirement that clergy strictly adhere to creedal statements, see Schleiermacher’s critique in OR IV, supplemental notes 12 and 15. 3. Ed. note: In a marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates that for the purpose of shaping such a work, the first twofold task required offers an “indirect” (indirekte) contribution toward showing “the interconnected structure of propositions,” while the second task offers an “immediate” (unmittlebare) contribution to that same end (Thönes, 1873). 4. Beweisarten. Ed. note: Since the proposition indicates that reference to confessional and biblical writings serves to give “warranty” to dogmatic propositions, Schleiermacher’s opposition to use of proof texts (see §27.3 below, also §§128 and 131.2; cf. Brief Outline §§209–10) is already secured here. What is produced in evidence does not of itself necessarily provide a proof positive.

5. Bekenntnisschriften. Ed. note: Ordinarily to be translated with the word “confessions,” other words more clearly indicate their role as written “documents” recording positions taken or simply as pieces of “writing,” just as the Scriptures literally are. All three uses are illustrated at this point. By 1831 Schleiermacher was politically free to propose openly that all true Protestants, such as the Brethren and other Anabaptist, nonconfessional churches, should be welcome in the Evangelical church, and did so. 6. Lehrgebäude. 7. Ed. note: It is clear from marginal notes at this place (Thönes, 1873) that the confessions are included among the “symbols.” Elsewhere Schleiermacher sometimes restricts the term “symbol” to the early ecumenical creeds, as is done in the Lutheran Book of Concord. 8. Ed. note: The word is partiell, which points to being a respecter only of one’s own position, or being partial to it, rather than to being only partially, i.e., less fully, developed. 9. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher sharpens this point by saying “affected by certain occasions” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Verdamnungsurteil. Ed. note: This term refers especially to what were then called “anathemas.” See Schleiermacher’s Oct. 10, 1830, sermon that opposes such practices (ET Reformed but Ever Reforming, 1997). 11. See §12.2–3. 12. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, exegesis of the Bible, which has no special rules of its own, must follow only the general rules of the art of interpretation (Auslegungskunst), both aspects of which—the more hermeneutical and the more philologically critical—are, in turn, grounded in the general work and procedures of linguistics (Sprachwissenschaft). See his Academy addresses (1813, 1829–1830, KGA I/11) on translation, hermeneutics, and criticism. See also Brief Outline §126 on translation; see index there for discussions on hermeneutics and criticism elsewhere in that work. His lectures Hermeneutics and Criticism include some examples of biblical interpretation in the translation available and more in the German edition. 13. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In another sense, biblical dogmatics” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Ed. note: symbolischen Dogmatik. See §27n7 above. Such a “symbolic” treatment refers only to creeds or symbolic documents such as the Nicene Creed. Elsewhere here, to keep the distinction clear, “creedal symbols” translates Symbol. See Schleiermacher’s related essays in Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions, and Church Union (2004). 15. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Use of dogmaticians themselves in a dogmatics: In order perchance to provide an overview of the symbolic or the progressive stance, the overview itself would have to be done in a comprehensive fashion” (Thönes, 1873). 16. Ed. note: These materials would be borrowed, then, from the two parts of philosophical theology and, by the same token, from the history of doctrine.

§28. The dialectical character of its language and its systematic arrangement give dogmatics the scientific status that is essential to it. Cf. §13. P.S., also §§16 and 18. 1. Here too the term dialectical is taken entirely in the ancient sense. The dialectical character of language, therefore, simply consists in its being formed in a skillful manner so as to be used in any exchange for communication and rectification pertaining to knowledge. Those functions cannot then be commended either for poetic or for rhetorical expression or even for presentational-didactic expression, which latter has actually stemmed from those two modes of expression and is not purely cut off from them. The expressions with which a presentation of faith-doctrine is occupied thus form, inasmuch as they refer back to religious feeling, a special domain of language of the didactic-religious type—that is, they form the most rigorous region within that domain. Yet, insofar as that domain of language through which religious feeling is reproduced and to which religious feeling refers infringes on the territory of what is psychological, ethical, and metaphysical, genuinely dogmatic language is

definitely distinguished from didactic-religious language in general by its affinity with the scientific terminology of those domains. This terminology is as eagerly sought in dogmatic communication of religious consciousness as it is assiduously avoided in homiletical and poetic communication of religious consciousness. Hence, given the great variation of outlooks and thus also of their expressions in all of these philosophical domains,1 the appropriate handling of language in dogmatic presentation is one of its most difficult tasks. Yet, the main outlooks that are not fit to be utilized in dogmatic language are simply those that are totally unable to keep the concepts “God” and “world” separate from each other in any way, that do not permit any contrast between what is humanly good and evil, and that thus also do not definitely distinguish what is spiritual from what is sense-oriented2 in human beings. The reason these distinctions are so important is that they are the primary presuppositions of religious self-consciousness, because without them even a self-consciousness expanded to the point of world-consciousness could not be set over against God-consciousness.3 Just as little, moreover, could there be any talk of a distinction between free and bound higher self-consciousness, consequently of a distinction between being in need of redemption and redemption itself.4 Now, the more often philosophical systems shift within these boundaries, the more often do marked transformations in dogmatic language appear. To be sure, these transformations are unavoidable only when a given system has become antiquated5—that is, when thinking in the discipline no longer accords with the typus of that system. Ordinarily, however, those changes have begun to arise even earlier through the more forceful zeal of theologians gripped by a freshly surfacing system, hoping that this new system will be more suited than any previous one to make an end of all divisions and misunderstandings in the domain of faith-doctrine. Now, if over against these theologians, others, on the basis of this very zeal, create concern lest a distinctly philosophical system might presume to be lord and judge in matters of theology, as a rule this concern turns out to be as unfounded as was that hope. The hope is illusory, because misunderstandings that bear some weight have always been present already, before an expression concerning a given point in contention has risen to strictly dogmatic status. Consequently, in and of itself, a revision that results from the influence of a different system does not touch upon the origin of these errors, unless the language used gains a higher degree of clarity and definiteness thereby. The same thing is true regarding the concern. That is to say, in the first place, the sole dominance of a system tends not to last long enough, at least not in our day. Second, however, even in general terms, as long as interest in that Christian piety which calls forth dogmatic presentation is really present, those errors can never turn against that interest, despite all else. Rather, such a danger can emerge only if its whole mode of proceeding would not arise from this interest but some alien interest would have supplanted it. In addition, one hears two other contrasting complaints6 about the language faith-doctrine makes use of in relation to its connection with philosophy. More frequently, one hears the complaint that its language is too abstract and is too far removed from immediate religious communication, despite the fact that dogmatics actually exists only for the sake of that

communication. One hears the other complaint less frequently—namely, that the language itself does not disclose from what philosophical system the dogmatician is proceeding. Both complaints seem to be unfounded, for the following reasons. As to the first complaint, within the community of our church it is only scientifically educated people who are expected to orient themselves to the domain of popular religious communication by means of dogmatics, and they would not lack in keys for this purpose. As to the second complaint,7 if the language is but rightly and cohesively formed, an acquaintance with whatever philosophical system a dogmatician might adhere to would be neither necessary nor even useful for understanding it. In all the sciences, the schools do more or less depart from their specialized language to adopt the more generally cultured language of the world; yet, always inherent in sticking with specialized language is the desire, nevertheless, to distinguish itself from that other language. The more a dogmatician then adheres to the strictest scholastic language, the more such a person will give occasion for the first complaint, whereas the more the dogmatician makes use of features taken up into the cultured language of the world, the more such a person will give occasion for the second complaint. To be sure, a colloquy of components derived from various times and systems would have remained within this broader language, long enough to be troublesome. However, an entirely suitable linguistic whole for dogmatic use can be formed from these components with skillful selection and by means of proper discussion. Thereby, the danger of an influence deleterious to the very substance of Christian piety can vanish altogether, and a certain balance can be maintained by the interweaving of different contemporaneous systems. 2. Suppose, however, that dogmatics is actually to fulfill its own destiny, namely, in part, to dissolve those confusions that tend repeatedly to arise in the collective arena of communications based on immediate Christian religious consciousness and, in part, also to ward off as much confusion as might appear in this arena by the norm that dogmatics sets forth. Thus, in that dogmatics sets forth the church’s body of doctrine, a most rigorous possible systematic arrangement of doctrine is indispensable, this quite apart from any dialectically formed language it might employ. Such is the case, for the less definitely and less completely formed language that is to be found in any fragmentary communication can be properly appraised only in comparison with what is fully definite and organized within a self-contained body of doctrine, and this language can be rectified only once that evaluative comparison is done. This is true, in that even the most well-defined notion and the most purely formed proposition would lose all their unstable qualities only if they are placed, at the same time, within a tight, absolutely interconnected whole,8 because the sense of any given proposition is fully given only within such a context. Now, it is simply the nature of systematic arrangement that, by comprehensive coordination and exhaustive subordination, every proposition is placed within a fully defined relationship along with every other proposition. A structured dogmatic presentation of doctrine, however, is capable of such an arrangement only to the extent that its subject matter forms a self-contained whole. That is, it is capable of such an arrangement only inasmuch as two conditions obtain. On the one hand, all Christian religious stirrings that are in accordance

with the Protestant typus, from wherever they might appear, would have to permit of being presented within a complex of formulations that belong together. On the other hand, facts of consciousness that could be subsumed within these formulations would not be derived from outside this community. Now, in this sense the Evangelical church is, to be sure, not so completely self-contained that it should not offer doctrinal propositions that the Roman church declares as well. Likewise, on the other hand, the Evangelical church is not so selfcontained that, for the most part, its doctrinal propositions should not be found in anti-Roman communities that also do not, nevertheless, form one whole with it. The latter condition, however, is simply grounded in the fact that external unity does not depend on doctrine alone; rather, as concerns these doctrines, for us those small communities actually comprise one whole with the Evangelical church. In contrast, the first condition would be resolved, in turn, if the doctrinal propositions were considered not of themselves alone but in their interconnection, and if a presentation of Evangelical faith-doctrine could thus also set itself the task of undertaking to dissolve this apparent difference at suitable places. The arrangement of a dogmatic presentation, however, can bear no similarity with that arrangement in any science which sets forth a principle that can be explicated based on the science itself, also no similarity with any science that encompasses a distinct domain of external sense perception and that is thus in this sense historical9 in nature. Rather, instead of such a self-engendered principle the arrangement of dogmatic presentation has before it only the internal basic fact of Christian piety, which it postulates. Moreover, what it has before it to put in order are simply the various ways in which this fact appears as modified in its diverse relationships to the other facts of consciousness.10 Thus, the task of arrangement11 in dogmatics is simply that of combining and separating out those diverse relationships in such a way that the various modifications themselves can appear as a complete whole. Consequently, by means of the totality of doctrinal formulations, the unending multiplicity of details will be presented synoptically in some distinctly plural fashion. However, these two features, dialectical language and systematic arrangement, both require each other and advance each other. Dialectical language is too sharply defined for any other mode of religious communication. Apart from a fully structured presentation of doctrine itself, moreover, it is admissible only in explanations that are elaborated portions or outflows from such presentations. In contrast, a systematic arrangement would never stand out so clearly, and would all the less be able to gain recognition, if it did not use a language that did not permit of a procedure so precise as to be calculus-like for the purpose of trying out and testing every nexus12 of thoughts. No further explanation is required, however, for one to see how greatly the systematic arrangement is facilitated when every particular is already present within a uniformly executed dialectical language and likewise to see how the most precise expression for each particular is the more readily found when a sharply discriminating and highly binding schematic arrangement13 is already available for the purpose.14 3. Given all that has already been said on the matter thus far, it would seem superfluous to elaborate on or demonstrate further that no connection between Christian faith-doctrine

and speculative philosophy would hold that is different from the one exhibited here. This is all the more the case inasmuch as in any treatment of faith-doctrine that is developed in the sense expounded above, scarcely any spot would remain through which speculation could squeeze its way into any presentation of faith-doctrine. Rather, it would appear that in carrying out this treatment, all traces of scholastic modes of treatment would most easily vanish away. To be sure, ever since Christianity had spread out and as philosophy was transformed by Christianity, it is not rare that by the use of scholastic modes of treatment both philosophy and actual Christian faith-doctrine have been mixed together in the same work. Only one further point might still be brought up here. That is, the very same members of the Christian community by whom the scientific form of faith-doctrine has arisen and persists have also been those in whom speculative consciousness has awakened.15 Now, just as speculative consciousness is the supreme objective function of the human spirit, in contrast religious self-consciousness is its supreme subjective function, so too a conflict between the two functions would run up against the very nature of human beings, and thus a conflict between them can never be anything but a misunderstanding. Now, on the one hand, it is indeed not enough that such a conflict would simply not exist. Rather, for one who has an aim to know,16 the task arises of coming to be positively aware of any harmony between speculative consciousness and religious self-consciousness.17 Presentation of faith-doctrine, however, has no more to do with this process than it would be necessary, given a selfsame religious position, to adopt a different procedure for every different way of philosophizing.18 Then suppose, on the other hand, that such a conflict has indeed arisen and that in this instance someone or other either rightly or wrongly finds the source of the misunderstanding to lie on the religious side of it. When this happens, it can, to be sure, lead to one’s giving up piety altogether, or at least Christian piety. Moving, in turn, from the side of religion, to secure against this occurrence—other than by taking care not to occasion such misunderstanding by offering unconsidered formulations—is not the concern of faith-doctrine, which also has nothing to do with those who do not admit to its basic fact. It is, rather, the business of apologetics.19 Postscript. Those modes of treating Christian doctrine that have been in fashion for some while and have gone under the name of “practical dogmatics” or “popular dogmatics” certainly do dispense, in part, with dialectical language and, in part, with systematic arrangement. However, they also lie outside the circle for which we adopted the name “dogmatics.” In some cases they are something intermediate between a structured presentation of doctrine and a catechism; in other cases, they are adaptations of dogmatics for homiletical purposes.20 Indeed, the first kind largely bears the aim of communicating the results of dogmatic explications, in a certain interconnected form, even to people who would not be able to follow a scientific course of presentation with any ease. Yet, since the aim is itself rather arbitrary, it would seem that the undertaking would arouse more confusion and lead to greater superficiality than achieve any true benefit. The second kind would be completely supplanted if the necessary prescriptions, both those concerning the content of

religious communication and those concerning its form, were brought to the fore in practical theology.21

1. Ed. note: Just as the PhD (doctorate of philosophy) had been customarily awarded in many fields (or “domains”) of scholarship, so too “philosophy” stood for both breadth and depth of learning. Here Schleiermacher singles out especially psychology (regarding selves), ethics (regarding the broad human domain of social interactions vs. physical science), and metaphysics (including discourses about “God”). Correspondingly, all of his dogmatic propositional structures chiefly touch (or “infringe”) on matters of “self,” “world,” or “God.” See §30 above. 2. Geistiges und Sinnliches. Ed. note: See §§6–7 above. 3. §8.2. 4. §11.2. 5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “Split into parties for and against philosophical monarchy, beginning with Christian Wolff (1679–1754). The rise of a shared feeling [Gemeingefühl] against scholasticism” (Thönes, 1873). Wolff, drawing heavily on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), also held closely to a scholastic method. His views gradually gained dominance in the eighteenth century but were also hotly contested from the very outset. His student Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) came to emphasize and radically revise the critical aspect of Wolff ‘s philosophy. At Berlin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), whom Schleiermacher himself brought to Berlin in 1818, had been attempting to accomplish a similar hegemony there. A major adherent of Hegel’s thought at the time was Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780–1846), from 1811 Lutheran copastor with Schleiermacher at the Dreifaltigkeitskirche and his colleague at the university. His own speculative dogmatics had already appeared in two editions (1819, 1827), before each edition of Schleiermacher’s own dogmatics. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873) referred to these as complaints of Unpopularität and Inkonstanz (failure to fit together in a logical or meaningful way). 7. Ed. note: See KGA I/10, 378–82 notes for the entire passage in Fries (1828). OG 80–83 and notes at 126–27 provide both Schleiermacher’s discussion in 1829 and Fries’s immediate response in a periodical dated 1828 but appearing in the following year. In a marginal note here (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher recalls a reference to detecting the influences of philosophical systems. This appeared in Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), Bemerkungen über das Aristoteles Religionsphilosophie (1828; see the KGA passage for the lengthy quotation), where he uses philosophical schools related to Wolff, Kant, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) as recent examples. Reared among the Herrnhuter Brethren, like Schleiermacher, Fries came to reject the more speculative aspects of these philosophers’ systems, also those of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1743–1819) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), and to focus instead on a descriptive empirical psychology emphasizing positive functions of feeling, presentiment, and faith as well as both immediate (“intuitive”) and reflective knowing (Wissen). Ironically, this Jena philosopher came to establish a long-lasting school of his own, a feat Schleiermacher studiously avoided. Although on the surface their philosophies seem similar, they also diverge at critical points. Both men won the conservative scorn of Hegel and of the Prussian royal family. 8. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, the phrase in einen absoluten Zusammenhang betokens a whole well-organized context of discourse, with tightly interconnected indications of meaning. This he attempts to provide in Christian Faith, with a strict minimum of aids contributed from even his own philosophical views. These views, he indicates here and in the next three propositions, are meant to serve merely preliminary, methodological, organizational purposes, which he announces chiefly in this Introduction, for they are not intended to comprise theological content, i.e., actual doctrine, at all. In a marginal note here (Thönes, 1873), he refers to this placement within a “tight, absolutely interconnected whole” as “full constraint” or, literally, “complete boundedness” (vollkommene Gebundenheit). 9. Ed. note: That is, historisch only in the sense of being oriented to the sensory consciousness of human beings within certain well-marked-out domains of experience. “Sense perception” translates Wahrnehmung. 10. §10.3. Ed. note: The locales of these other facts of consciousness are outlined in §§29–31. 11. Anordnung. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “Accordingly, the explication [Entwicklung] of the whole takes place partly in ethics [Ethik]” (Thönes, 1873). Elsewhere he refers to the ethics vs. physics side of philosophical and scientific investigation as itself “the science of the principles of history [Geschichte]” (Brief Outline, §§29 and 35). 12. Verknüpfungen. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “Calculus: exact definition and reducibility of signs” (Thönes, 1873). This is a definition of computation in general terms, not specifically of differential or integral calculus, yet not excluding them either. 13. Schematismus.

14. Ed. note: Hence, in the present systematic presentation the factor of “reducibility of signs” mentioned in §28n12 refers to the reduction of everything to the redemption that the creator God accomplishes in Jesus of Nazareth (§11). This is not seen to be a diminishment of perspective but rather makes possible an inclusive, broadening vision of relationships among God, human beings, and the world as a whole, as is outlined in §§29–31. 15. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher points to a twofold function of theology (doppelte Funktion der Theologie) (Thönes, 1873). As he shows here, as in numerous other places, this seeming “conflict” (Widerspruch) is certainly to be taken seriously in beings that are historically limited and as long as what their spirits can grasp is still under development. For examples, see here §6, also the 1811 Dialectic (Tice, 1996), 16n and 19, where the two functions are called “correlates,” and On Religion (1821) II, the passages just before and after the indication of supplemental note 3. However, the accompanying misunderstandings to which he refers are not all to be dealt with in dogmatics; nor is the seeming conflict itself to be treated as if it were incapable of any degree of resolution now but would have either to be denied, avoided, simply left unexamined, or inappropriately restated and then resynthesized (for the latter notion, cf. Hegel’s dialectic). 16. Ed. note: The phrase für den Wissenden refers to anyone who uses dialectic, viewed as one who has the aim of knowing, wherever this aim and procedure might be directed. Thus, such a person is philosophically minded and might also operate in one or more of the sciences. 17. Ed. note: “This task is an unexceptionably personal one” (schlechthin persönliche), says Schleiermacher in his marginal note (Thönes, 1873). Cf. the Introduction to Brief Outline (1830), §§1–30. Throughout that work, emphasis is placed on (a) the individual freedom of every religiously committed theological inquirer, who must also be working within a mutually serving communal and collegial context, and (b) the responsibility of each individual to work on the tasks of theology for oneself, not depending solely on any one tradition (note esp. §19 there). Within the section on the faith-doctrine aspect of dogmatics in BO (§§213–22), see esp. §213; see also §§67, 89, 202–3, 251, and 332 in that work. What he says of individuals, he also applies to churches and congregations. 18. Ed. note: This phrase is Schleiermacher’s way of defining what “dialectic” is about (cf. his 1811 Dialectic, 1996). The “art” (Kunst) of doing philosophy does not necessitate a different “way” (Art) of doing it in every system. 19. Ed. note: Cf. Brief Outline (1830), §§39 and 43–53. 20. Ed. note: “They are rising toward dogmatics or descending from it,” states Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873). 21. Ed. note: Schleiermacher himself reserves considerable room for this task in his lectures on practical theology (SW I.13). See also Brief Outline (1830), §§267–69 and 280–85.

§29. We will have exhausted the entire compass of Christian doctrine once we have examined the facts of religious self-consciousness: in the first place, just as these facts are already presupposed by the contrast that is expressed in the concept “redemption,” but then also just as they are defined in terms of that contrast. Cf. §§8, 9 and 11. 1. First of all, it is clear that the contrast between the lack of any capacity for engraining1 the feeling of absolute dependence in every element of one’s life and the capacity for having this feeling communicated to us by the Redeemer already presupposes that very feeling and a knowing of it.2 This is the case, for since that feeling is never present in us other than as in a human being, we can also never know of it except inasmuch as it is present in ourselves; and without knowing of it, we could know neither of a lack of capacity for it nor even of a distinction between the Redeemer and ourselves. Thus, the condition that precedes the communicated capacity for having this feeling can be neither an absolute forgetfulness of God3 nor a sheer, contentless striving after God-consciousness. Rather, God-consciousness must be present in self-consciousness in some fashion. Yet, someone could say that such facts

of religious self-consciousness as precede having community with the Redeemer could not have any place within Christian faith-doctrine but would belong only in some sort of general faith-doctrine or only in and of whatever religious community there might have been from which something of it can have passed over into Christianity. To this suggestion the rejoinder is to be made that, nevertheless, these earlier religious states of mind and heart4 would not disappear when one’s mind and heart will have been grasped in a Christian way. Rather, they would be mitigated and fostered precisely proportionate to that very capacity which will have been communicated. Thus, they would, to be sure, also belong to Christian religious consciousness, and they also could have been designated as states of mind and heart that are not defined in terms of that contrast but that rather remain unaltered at every stage of that same contrast. Yet, those facts which are themselves defined in terms of that contrast would also have to be different, in accordance with their content, when the lack of capacity is predominant and when the communicated capacity has the preponderance. However, just as those facts would continue to remain as they were, unaltered within the domain of Christian piety, they would never alone fill a religious element of life. Rather, they would be only a component of such an element.5 Moreover, the expression used in the proposition has been advanced precisely because, on account of their different makeup, as compared with facts defined by the contrast,6 we still have to consider them in and of themselves. 2. Let us suppose, then, that this first portion of our proposition also belongs to Christian piety, because it is necessarily present in combination with the second portion. Then we will also need to assert that the entire domain of Christian piety is encompassed in these two parts taken together. This becomes clear, for even if we assume that the lack of capacity that we have discussed would gradually disappear completely, at that point, then, no new modifications of religious self-consciousness would arise. Rather, reality will simply be approached more closely by those formulations which convey the state of Christian religious consciousness in its purity. Thus, it will simply be incumbent on us to survey exactly and thoroughly the territory covered by each part, so as to gain surety regarding what the complete status of the whole consists of. To be sure, however, the two parts will have to relate to each other in such a way that Part One contains those doctrinal propositions the possibility of which has already been granted in general terms and in which what is distinctively Christian is less strongly manifested, thus the expression of which can more readily coincide with other modes of faith. Even so, however, those doctrinal propositions are in no way components of some general or so-called natural theology. Rather, they are not only in every instance declarations concerning religious self-consciousness— thus, genuinely dogmatic propositions—but are also distinctly Christian by means of their reference to what is distinctively Christian, something that lies in the arrangement of the whole presentation of doctrine and that is repeatable in every single proposition. Suppose that someone wanted to disregard these last stipulations. Then that person would indeed be able to say—particularly in that what belongs within the domain of Christian ethics would remain excluded—that some dogmatic propositions would simply be expressive of

monotheism in general, quite apart from whether they adhere to a teleological or an aesthetic outlook. Hence, the necessity arises that if general allusions to Christian ethics are not given in a presentation of faith-doctrine, one would still always have to keep one’s eye on the fact that to any presentation of Christian faith-doctrine, however it may be formed, there also essentially belongs a Christian ethics that is developing in agreement with it. 3. Now, suppose that these two things are of comparable value in the sense indicated: facts that are already presupposed with respect to the contrast that we have identified and facts that remain unaltered over the entire development of this contrast. Suppose, moreover, that it is further asserted that these two sets of facts, joined together with the facts that are determined by this contrast, encompass the entirety of Christian doctrine. Strictly taken, then, it follows that nothing belonging exclusively to a time preceding the Christian explication of that contrast can be taken up within the scope of Christian doctrine in its proper sense, no more than would be the case with anything belonging to a time that should begin only once the lack of capacity mentioned here will have come to be totally vanquished and nonexistent. Instead, only inasmuch as something stands in a definite and demonstrable association with the religious states of mind and heart existing within this contrast would it belong there. Now, since all Christian piety rests on the appearance of the Redeemer, the same thing goes for the following, namely, that nothing touching upon the Redeemer can be set forth as genuine doctrine that is not tied to his redemptive causality and that does not permit of being traced back to the original and distinctive impression that his actual existence made. Thus, whatever steps are taken outside these bounds must either actually belong to some other locale or can claim a place within them only for the sake of a particularly demonstrable, if more remote, relation of some kind.

1. Ed. note: This phrase translates der Unfähigkeit … einzubilden. 2. Ed. note: ein Wissen um dasselbe. 3. Ed. note: absolute Gottesvergessenheit. 4. Ed. note: diese frommen Gemüthszustände. 5. Ed. note: For example, based on this tie between a distinctly Christian experience and Scripture, BO contains the sharpest summary regarding exclusion of the Old Testament from the Christian canon of Scripture especially in §115, in the context set by BO §§103–24. Accordingly, both editions of Christian Faith have little to say about the Hebrew Bible. Indeed, what is conveyed through depictions of Christ as the Redeemer becomes the all-determining “canon within the New Testament canon.” On this focal canon on which dogmatics rests, see also CF §§11, 96.1, 97.2–4, and 99.1. On his response to critics of his excluding the Old Testament, see OG 65–68. 6. Ed. note: That is, as compared with those facts immediately presented in Part Two, which are not simply presupposed. The division between predominance of the lack of capacity communicated by Christ (which is the state of sin) and the preponderance of the capacity that is actually communicated by him (the state of grace) comprises the two main sections of Part Two.

§30. Without exception, propositions that are to be set forth in Christian faith-doctrine can be presented either as descriptions of situations in human life or as concepts regarding divine attributes and modes of action or as assertions regarding the

constitution of the world. All these three forms, moreover, have continually existed alongside each other.1 1. Even in the domain of redemption, the feeling of absolute dependence always comes into appearance—that is, becomes an instance of self-consciousness actually filling an element in time—only insofar as it is stirred by some other determination of selfconsciousness, thereby becoming one with that other determination.2 Thus, every formulation treating of such an instance of that feeling is a formulation treating of a distinct state of mind and heart.3 Consequently, all propositions of faith-doctrine must also be capable of being set forth as formulations expressing such a state. Yet, every such sensory determination of selfconsciousness refers, at the same time, to something that is determinative4 from outside selfconsciousness. Now, this determining factor, on account of that general interconnectedness which is always already postulated in every instance of human consciousness, also constantly makes its appearance as a part of that interconnected whole. Thus, every single modification of the feeling of absolute dependence that has arisen in this fashion can also come to be known if that determining factor within the totality of being5 on which a given state of consciousness rests is described. Consequently, when conceived in that way dogmatic propositions become utterances concerning the constitution of the world. They are so, that is, only with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence and in reference to that feeling. In the last analysis, however, not only is the feeling of absolute dependence in and of itself a copositing of God in self-consciousness but also the totality of being, from which all determinations of self-consciousness proceed, in accordance with the subject’s6 place within it, is comprehended under that feeling of dependence. Thus, all modifications of higher selfconsciousness can also be presented in this way, in that God is designated as the one grounding this interconnected being in all its diverse parts. 2. If we compare these three possible forms with each other, the following becomes clear. First, descriptions of human states of mind and heart containing any of this content can be drawn only from the domain of inner experience. Second, under this form nothing alien can infiltrate Christian faith-doctrine. In contrast, admittedly, utterances regarding whatever constitutes the world can be in accord with natural science, and concepts regarding divine modes of action can be purely metaphysical. At that point, moreover, both of these expressions spring from the soil of science, thus belonging to objective consciousness and to whatever basically conditions it; but they are independent of that inner experience of which we just spoke and of the facts of higher self-consciousness. Thus, in and of themselves, these two forms, regarding the world and God, thus offer no guarantee of surety that all propositions crafted in either fashion are genuinely dogmatic propositions. It is also true that under the other form, mentioned first, propositions that bear a generally anthropological content also naturally belong.7 Hence, we must declare the description of human states to be the basic dogmatic form, whereas the second and third forms are permissible only to the extent that they can be explicated on the basis of propositions of the first form. This is so, for

only under this condition can they count as expressions of religious stirrings of mind and heart8 with any surety. 3. Let us then suppose that all propositions that belong to Christian faith-doctrine could be expressed in that basic form, without dispute; let us also suppose that any speaking of the attributes of God and of constituent elements of the world would have first to be referred back to that basic form if one’s aim is to stand secure in face of any insinuation of assertions that are of an alien, purely scientific kind. It would seem, then, that Christian faith-doctrine would have consistently carried out only that basic form for the purpose of completing its analysis of Christian piety. It would also seem, however, that the two other forms could be entirely shunted aside, being viewed as superfluous. However, suppose that anyone should want to treat Christian faith-doctrine in this way at the present time. In that case, such a work would stand isolated in its being without any historical orientation, and it would not only lack in an actually ecclesial character but would not fulfill the actual purpose of all dogmatics, no matter how completely accurate it might always be in reproducing the content of Christian doctrine. The reason is that since dogmatic language has been formed only gradually out of language that has prevailed in public religious9 communications, the rhetorical and hymnic features contained in these communications especially had to foster the forming of concepts for the divine attributes. Indeed, these features came to be necessary for the purpose of bringing those expressions into their proper scale. Partly on the basis of those expressions and partly on the basis of the need to establish the relationship between the reign of God and the world, utterances likewise then arose concerning the constitution of the world. Moreover, both sorts of proposition were augmented by similar statements of alien provenance as adaptations from metaphysics were taking the upper hand in conjunction with dogmatics, whereas the basic form faded naturally into the background and found its place almost exclusively in less scientific presentations. Hence, a fashioning of dogmatics that would intend to restrict itself entirely to the actual basic form would not attach itself at all to previous formulations but, precisely on that account, would also be of little use either to purify faith-doctrine of alien components or clearly and properly to preserve any oratorical or poetic communication.10

1. Ed. note: The three successive terms Beschreibungen, Begriffe, and Aussagen refer to the primary aims of those three forms of dogmatic propositions and to their corresponding content. Any other content is meant to be only auxiliary. 2. Cf. §5. 3. Gemütszustand. 4. Ed. note: ein Bestimmendes. That is, something from outside gives the feeling of absolute dependence a distinct referent and a distinct—or definite, or more or less welldefined—shape, filling an element of life in time. What may have been mysterious also becomes real. 5. Gesamtsein. 6. Subjekts. 7. Ed. note: This sentence was a parenthetical expression within the previous sentence, as such seeming to admit that statements regarding human beings could also be inappropriately imported from alien sources such as science, perhaps sometimes unavoidably so (natürlich). 8. Gemütserregungen.

9. Ed. note: Here not frommen but religiösen, i.e., religious in the broadest sense, not necessarily immediately expressive of piety. 10. Ed. note: Since so many of his critics had misunderstood what he was doing in the Introduction, Schleiermacher considered reversing the order and presenting core doctrine first. Instead, he kept the original order and tried to make the whole work even more precise and clear. See his report on this process of reconsideration in OG 55–62.

§31. Thus, the structural feature1 just outlined will be accomplished in full in accordance with these three forms of reflection2 on religious states of mind and heart. Indeed, this must be done in such a way that, in every instance, basis for this structure lies in the direct description of these states of mind and heart themselves. 1. The various features of dogmatics have been formed in a fragmentary fashion, and thereafter the discipline itself has been more externally pasted together, drawing from these fragmentary features, than organically engendered. Accordingly, it is easy to see that, for the most part, propositions of all three forms have been combined without distinction, but that none of them has been conveyed in a complete and clearly arranged manner. In no way, however, does such a situation in any science satisfy the requirement that can be rightly assigned to it. Moreover, even though it is not possible to stick with the basic form alone, it is still necessary to adopt the standards of completeness indicated in our proposition, for the present need can be met only by means of these standards. Now, the general description of Christian piety set forth above3 provides the basis for this entire presentation of doctrine in such a way that its very structure relates to that description. Accordingly, a similar general description will be placed at the head of each individual portion, to which the further organization of that presentation will likewise relate. Moreover, in each portion those ecclesial doctrines which belong to that same area will be affixed to it: first those which come closest to being an unmediated exposition of the state of mind and heart addressed there and then those which speak of that same state of mind and heart under the form4 regarding divine attributes and that regarding ways in which the world is constituted.5 2. It does indeed follow from these considerations that the doctrine of God, to the extent that it is presented in the totality of divine attributes, would not be completed until such time as the whole set of these attributes is completed. This is why they are ordinarily offered without their being broken up and before all the other points of doctrine. However, the diverse placement6 of these attributes intended here can hardly be regarded as a disadvantage. That is to say, in general it is undeniable that the usual arrangement is particularly adept at hiding the relationship of these doctrines both to the feeling of absolute dependence overall as well as to the basic facts of Christian piety. Furthermore, the usual arrangement is particularly adept at supporting the illusion that these doctrines could be a speculative theory wholly independent of these factors. One can see this quite apart from the fact that those divine attributes and modes of action which relate exclusively to the explication of human states—which can be said of all the so-called moral attributes of God— could not possibly be understood without prior acquaintance with these human states.

Contrary to customary practice, then, our method not only places this interconnection in the clearest light but also places closer together features that can be understood only in and through each other. Postscript. Further comparisons of the schematic arrangement set forth here with the more customary ones to be found in our books on doctrine and systems of doctrine, both old and new, would overstep the boundaries of this Introduction, since it has no call to polemicize at all and since vindication of the method used here also cannot be provided other than through the actual execution of it.

1. Einteilung. Ed. note: That is, the way it is divided up and arranged, its thoroughgoing design or architectonic. 2. Reflexion. 3. See §11. 4. Gestalt. Ed. note: That is, those that give shape to the given state of mind and heart in those two particular ways. 5. Beschaffenheiten der Welt. 6. Verschiedenheit.

THE DOCTRINES OF FAITH PART ONE Explication of Religious Self-Consciousness as It Is Always Already Presupposed by, but also Always Contained in, Every Christian Religious Stirring of Mind and Heart1

Introduction to Part One §32. Without exception, in every occurrence of Christian religious self-consciousness the process of finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent in immediate self-consciousness is already presupposed, and is thus also contained therein, as the only way, in general terms, that one’s own being and the infinite being of God can unite in selfconsciousness. 1.2 That in this proposition the entirety of Christian religious self-consciousness is assumed in advance is wholly without risk. That is to say, the assertion is entirely without reference to the particular content of any distinct Christian stirring of mind and heart, and what is stated is posited as not determined by any differences among these stirrings whatsoever. Thus, nothing of any kind can be deduced from our proposition for or against any dogmatic presentation of such particular content. Moreover, only if someone wanted to claim that Christian religious elements could exist in which the being of God could not be coposited in this way at all—that is, that would contain no God-consciousness3 in selfconsciousness at all —would our proposition exclude that person’s claim from the domain of Christian faith to be further described in this work. On this account, the present proposition appeals to Christian religious self-consciousness against such a claim. It appeals to that self-consciousness as it is everywhere present and recognized in the Evangelical church. That is, it appeals to the fact that in every stirring of mind and heart there, however much particular contents might be predominant therein, Godconsciousness would nonetheless be coposited there and could not be cancelled out by anything else, with the result that there could be no relation to Christ that would not be a relation to God as well. It is also asserted, at the same time, however, that this Godconsciousness, as it is described in this work, does not constitute a really religious element in and of itself alone. Rather, it is present only in combination with other more specific determinants. As a result, this identical feature, present in all the phenomena of Christian piety, is related to particular elements of that piety only as everywhere in life each individual’s positing of an “I”4 occurs in relation to the particular elements of one’s existence. Hence, in no way does the claim that in every Christian religious stirring there would also have to be some relation to Christ stand in contradiction to our proposition.

Suppose, on the contrary, that in some real element of one’s life religious feeling is distinctly marked as pleasure or the lack of pleasure.5 In this case, however, within any given mode of Christian faith one’s posited incapacity, lodged in a religious lack of pleasure, is to be ascribed to a deficiency in one’s community with the Redeemer; and, in contrast, one’s posited readiness to realize religious feeling—a readiness lodged in religious pleasure—is to be regarded as a communication that has occurred within us based on that community with the Redeemer. Thus, it is patent that within Christian community there is no element of piety in which a relation to Christ is not also coposited. 2.6 There is also a nonreligious explanation of this process of finding-oneself-to-beabsolutely-dependent, namely, as if it would actually declare only the dependence of finite beings on the entirety and totality of all that is finite and, consequently, would affirm that what is coposited therein, as well as what is referred to, would be not God but the world. However, we cannot regard this explanation as anything but a misunderstanding. That is, we do also have acquaintance with a way the world is coposited7 in our self-consciousness, but this factor is something different from the way God is coposited8 in that same selfconsciousness. This is so, for even if one posits the world as a unity, this is nevertheless a unity divided and split apart within itself—a unity that is, at the same time, the totality of all contrasts and differences—and everything that is determined by it is something multifaceted. Every human being is also a unity within that manifold and participates in all those contrasts.9 Thus, being at one10 with the world in self-consciousness is nothing other than our being conscious of ourselves as a living part that coexists within that whole,11 and this cannot possibly be a consciousness of absolute dependence. Rather, since all coexisting, living parts are in a state of reciprocal action among themselves, in every such part this being-one-withthe-whole essentially bears a twofold character. It contains a feeling of dependence, to be sure, inasmuch as the other parts bear an effect on oneself out of their own self-initiated activity, but it likewise contains a feeling of freedom, inasmuch as one also bears an effect on other parts out of one’s own self-initiated activity. The two factors, moreover, are not to be separated from each other. Thus, the feeling of absolute dependence is not to be explained as a way the world is coposited but is to be explained only as a way God is coposited, viewing God as the absolute12 undivided unity. That is to say, in relation to God there is no immediate feeling of freedom, nor can there be even the slightest feeling of dependence in relation to God such that a feeling of freedom could be attached to it as its counterpart. Rather, even at the highest level of Christian piety and given the clearest consciousness of having the most unhampered self-initiated activity, the absoluteness13 of the feeling of dependence would still remain undiminished in relation to God. Moreover, this expression is meant to designate the fact that the process of finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent would be the sole manner in which God and “I” could be together in anyone’s self-consciousness. Thus, if someone wanted to abolish this distinction and mistake self-consciousness that refers to God as if it could be nothing other than that self-consciousness which refers to the

world, then in the latter mode of self-consciousness one would also have to challenge the reality14 contained in the feeling of freedom. In consequence, one would have to abolish entirely that mode of self-consciousness which refers to the feeling of freedom. This is so, since no self-conscious element of life exists in which we do not also posit ourselves to be at one with the world. In any case, moreover, even this nonreligious explanation, which rejects as an illusion the distinctiveness of religious self-consciousness that is claimed here, comes, in part, from those who also declare all feeling of freedom to be an illusion and, to be sure, it comes, in part, also from those who reject all efforts to keep separate from each other all ideas regarding “God” and “world,” in that they claim that nothing would exist on which we could feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent.15 3. Now, in this Part One we are definitely not moving outside the domain of Christian piety any longer. Thus, it is self-evident that we are also not concerning ourselves with the not yet thoroughly developed and differentiated religious feeling that constitutes polytheistic modes of faith. This is the case, for only what is monotheistic can be coposited in Christian piety. Suppose that someone objects, on the other hand, that what is set forth in our proposition does not belong here, because it is not only not distinctively Christian but also refers only to what is commonly held among monotheistic modes of faith. Then the answer has to be that there is no such thing as a purely monotheistic piety, in which Godconsciousness, in and of itself, would have to be the content of religious elements of life from the very outset on. Rather, just as a relation to Christ is always present with Godconsciousness in Christian piety,16 so too a relation to the Lawgiver17 is always present in Jewish piety and a relation to revelation by the Prophet is always present in Muhammadan piety. On this account, in our Holy Scriptures “God” constantly bears the surname “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,” and Christ’s own declaration concerning himself18 also implies that every relation to Christ also contains God-consciousness within itself.

1. Ed. note: In OG, Schleiermacher describes Part One as “only a portal and entrance hall” (57) and “an external work” compared to the wholly Evangelical Christian propositions of Part Two (59). See also CF §29.2. 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “§32. The feeling of absolute dependence, viewed as a general foundation. §33. The absolute surety [Gewißheit] of that feeling in its general reference [Allgemeinheit]. §34. The coexistence of that feeling with world-consciousness. §35. The extension of that feeling by means of the three forms.” That is, in all three forms of dogmatic proposition (cf. §30). “The three initial propositions were already discussed in the Introduction. Here they are presented chiefly in their relationship to what is distinctively Christian” (Thönes, 1873). The reference seems to be to the entire Introduction, but cf. esp. §§6–14, 19, and 30–31. Notes to the Introduction and elsewhere in this work have sought to clarify the meanings of key terms also featured in Part One. The index provides indications of where these clarifications appear. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “That is, no God-consciousness whatsoever, or God-consciousness that does not include absolute dependence. In contrast, here we have assuredly grounded this absolute dependence in God alone” (Thönes, 1873). 4. Ichsetzen. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates that “positing God [Gottsetzen] operates like [wie] positing an ‘I’” (Thönes, 1873). The word “like” implies only a similarity of process, not a similarity or an identity of “God” and oneself, a point to which Schleiermacher consistently holds. He maintains the same point regarding worldconsciousness in relation to immediate religious self-consciousness (again, cf. §30 and the analyses of self-conscious process that precede it).

5. Cf. §5. Ed. note: In this sentence, as usual, “religious” translates fromme, referring to the rootedness of all piety, thus of every genuinely religious experience, in feeling, lodged particularly in a lack of pleasure (Unlust) due to sin and one’s need for redemption and in pleasure (Lust) on account of one’s redemption. In Part One the general distinction between Unlust and Lust is “presupposed” as pointing to the admixture of the two aspects in “religious” (religiöses) life. In any authentically Christian context, then, both aspects are experienced in community of faith with Christ and of life with Christ. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “2. Improper confusion of a positing of God [Gottsetzen] with a positing of the world [Weltsetzen]” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Mitgesetztsein der Welt. 8. Mitgesetztsein Gottes. 9. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note further explains: “If I posit myself to be dependent on the entire world, in doing this I posit myself as, in part, dependent on myself—that is, to be, in part, free. Hence, if I were to remain dependent [on the world as a whole], at that point my feeling of freedom would have to be dissolved [aufgehoben]” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Das Einsein. 11. Ed. note: eines in diesem Ganzen mitlebenden Teiles. 12. Ed. note: absoluten, not schlechthinigen, the latter of which suggests being bound in some fashion. That is, God is to be taken as indissolubly one, both in God’s being as Supreme Being, and in God’s be-ing, as active in the world, not participating, as human beings do, in those organic contrasts and differences by which the world can alone be defined and described, and therefore not dependent on or bound to the world in any way. By implication, God is sovereign over the world and free in relation to the world. 13. Schlechthinigkeit. 14. Realität. 15. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher adds to what is presented at this juncture in his argument: “The aim is also to show that this [nonreligious explanation] does not comport with Christian piety, partly because Christian piety has a basis in the feeling of freedom and partly because there is no incapacity in that world-consciousness discussed here, except for [that which could be accomplished] by a lack of development” (Thönes, 1873). 16. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) I (“On God”): “In all knowing and invoking of God our minds seek to behold Christ,” and so forth. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin CR 21:612; cf. Manschreck’s rather different translation from the 1555 German edition (1965), 5. See the bibliography for a note on the various editions. There is no English edition of the Latin texts of 1543–1559. In references through §71.1, general comparisons with the Manschreck edition are given, but not thereafter. 17. Gesetzgeber. Ed. note: According to the general understanding of Jewish religion in Schleiermacher’s time, Moses was taken to be the original lawgiver, having received from God the Ten Commandments and the Pentateuch (first five books in the Hebrew Bible, still called “The Books of Moses” in German Bibles). Moses was viewed as the prototype of all subsequent lawgivers. 18. John 14: 7, 9. Ed. note: There Jesus says: “If you had known me, you would have known my Father also,” and anyone “who has seen me has seen the Father.” See Schleiermacher’s expository sermon on John 14:7–17, May 21, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–42.

§33. Doctrines of faith carry the recognition that this feeling of absolute dependence, in that therein our self-consciousness acts as a surrogate for recognizing1 the finitude of our being in general terms (cf. §8.2), is not something accidental or even something that varies from person to person but is a general feature of life. This recognition completely supplants all the so-called proofs for the existence of God.2 (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) I (On God): “It is the nature of God to command obedience in accordance with the distinction between what is upright and what is unseemly that is engraved upon human minds.”3

(2) Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1551), Commentary on True and False Religion (1525) 3 (On God): “All, therefore, is sham and false religion that the theologians have adduced from philosophy as to what God is.”4 (3) Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150—ca. 215), Stromateis (n.d.) VII.10: “Faith is an internal good and, without searching for God, confesses his existence and glorifies him as existent. Whence by starting from this faith and being developed by it through the grace of God, the knowledge respecting him is to be acquired as far as possible.”5 1.6 One cannot admit to the self-consciousness postulated here in its described content and want to assert, nonetheless, that it is something nonessential—that is, that it could be present in any given human existence, or even that it could not be present, in each case according to whether one met with this or that circumstance over the course of one’s life. That is to say, in no way does the emergence of this mode of self-consciousness depend on any sort of distinct factor being externally given to a subject7 who has developed to the extent described, indicated in our proposition; rather, it depends only on one’s sensory selfconsciousness having been stimulated, in some fashion, from outside oneself. What is presupposed internally, however, is simply intelligence8 in its subjective function, on which function a tendency toward having God-consciousness is bestowed, and this is something absolutely held in common among all these9 persons. In and of itself, the feeling of absolute dependence is also the same in all who hold it, and it is not different from person to person. This claim already follows, however, from the fact that it is rooted not in any sort of distinct modification10 of human existence but in the absolutely shared nature of human beings. This absolutely shared human nature includes within itself the possibility of all those differences by which the special contents of individual personal existence are determined. Now, suppose that, in any case, a differentiation between completeness and incompleteness is granted herewith, in accordance with the criterion of greater or lesser development. Then this distinction would rest on the fact that the appearance of this feeling of absolute dependence also depends on something further: that a contrast would be taken up into consciousness, to the effect that a given lack in development would lie precisely in distinct functions remaining undifferentiated.11 That is to say, consciousness would, as yet, be nowhere actually developed as human consciousness now if consciousness that holds objects in mind12 and self-consciousness were not yet definitely separated out from each other, in such a way that they could also be related to each other; moreover, the development that we have been considering would not yet be completed if sensory self-consciousness and higher self-consciousness were not likewise separated from each other and capable of being related to each other. 2. Now, it follows that within Christian community all lack of a godly state13 in selfconsciousness can be grounded simply in lower-stage or arrested development. If that lack

were to appear even in a completed development, however, we could explain that phenomenon only as a delusion or a mere semblance. In contrast, one can chiefly divide all lack of a godly state into three kinds. The first kind is the childlike complete lack of Godconsciousness. As a rule, this lack disappears during an individual’s14 course of natural development. Only exceptionally, moreover, does it pass over into the raw lack of a godly state, this among those who antagonistically resist their own further development. To a great extent, outside Christian community both lower-stage and arrested development are to be found among peoples who, either innocently or by their own free choice, remain stuck at the lowest stage of development, nonetheless, though this lack of a godly state is difficult to identify historically. The second lack of a godly state is sensory in nature.15 That is, it occurs when a feeling of absolute dependence does indeed appear, and yet what is coposited in it is, nevertheless, such that there can be no absolute dependence on what is thus coposited, for there can be no absolute dependence on something that is envisaged to be capable of having an impassioned state, because some self-initiated activity of bearing an influence on it is then possible. Faced with this contradiction, at that point one can be doubtful as to whether the tendency toward having God-consciousness has, in fact, been operative, the semblance of it having been itself distorted by some contorted mirror-reflection of it, or whether the reflection is compatible with an original internal fact, which, as such, would not actually belong to the domain of piety. However, a comparison with the way in which God-consciousness always actually first manifests itself in childhood clearly shows that, in any case, within the domain of piety the tendency toward having God-consciousness is operative, and it clearly shows that only on account of some incomplete development of self-consciousness can this process not be carried through to that end unalloyed. Patently, this state is akin to that in polytheistic piety.16 This is so, for the same kernel of multiplicity also exists here, except that it is suppressed by countervailing developments, and even this anthropopathic17 conception is sometimes of a more purified and spiritual sort, and sometimes it borders on fetishism. Finally, the third kind of lack of a godly state is actually the so-called denial of God: atheism. This kind is propounded as a speculative theory right in the midst of Christians and at the complete stage of religious development, indeed at the highest stages of culture. Atheism is then twofold in nature. On the one hand, atheism is a wanton dread of any strictness18 that can attach to God-consciousness. Moreover, at that point, even though lucid intervals may be interposed, atheism is clearly produced by a lack of restraint; thus, it is then a disease of the psyche, usually a disease accompanied by contempt for all that belongs to use of one’s intellect. In this form, one can quite fittingly assert that atheism is nihilistic,19 because it is entirely lacking in inner truth. On the other hand, it is actually but a reasoning20 opposition to prevalent, more or less improper depictions of religious consciousness. For the most part, even the atheism of the eighteenth century was simply a battle against petrified, anthropopathic notions in presentations of faith-doctrine, a battle provoked by ecclesial tyranny. Nevertheless, supposing that beyond such lacks in doctrinal presentation the inner facts of self-consciousness itself would also have come to be completely

misconstrued, this deep misapprehension would still be simply a sickness of people’s understanding. From time to time, this sickness can indeed be sporadically revived but, even then, never engender anything lasting, historically speaking. Hence, even this fact can be no detriment to our claim that the feeling of absolute dependence on which we have expounded and the God-consciousness that comes with it comprise an essential element of human life.21 3. Let us suppose that someone could dispute the general nature of this essential element of human life. Even so, no obligation for a presentation of faith-doctrine to prove the existence of God would emerge from such a challenge. Rather, trying to do that would be a wholly superfluous effort. This is the case, for inasmuch as even in the Christian churchGodconsciousness is first to be developed among its youth,22 even if these young people were in a position to grasp proofs, those proofs could still bring forth only an objective consciousness, which is not at all our aim here. In no way, moreover, would piety automatically arise from such an objective consciousness. The question as to whether there would be such proofs or not, if God is not an immediate surety for us, does not belong here at all. The subsequent question, as to whether such an immediate surety, on the basis of which God’s existence could actually be proved, would not have to be God, does not belong here either. Rather, what belongs here is simply the realization that these proofs can never be a component of a presentation of faith-doctrine, which is directed only to those who possess the inner surety regarding God already described, a surety of which they are able to become immediately conscious at any moment. Now, in accordance with our explanation of Christian faith-doctrine, it would not be at all necessary to carry on this discussion in particular if it did not seem necessary to protest, nevertheless, against the general practice of furnishing dogmatics with such proofs at this juncture, or at least of appealing to them as something well-known from other sciences. By now, it is self-evident that this appeal is completely useless for the purposes of dogmatics. That is to say, neither in catechesis nor in homiletic communication nor in missionary work is any sort of use to be made of such proofs; moreover, experience also shows how little is accomplished by doing battle with theoretical atheism, as it was described above. Thus, in every part dogmatics must presuppose a condition of immediate surety, faith; and, accordingly, as concerns God-consciousness in general, its task is not to effect recognition of God-consciousness but simply to explicate its content. Already, that proofs of this sort are not at all pertinent to dogmatics also springs from the fact that it is impossible to give these proofs a dogmatic form. This is shown, in that in offering them one cannot refer back to Scripture or to symbolic books at all, because they do not themselves provide any proof whatsoever but only provide assertions, and a person for whom such assertions are already an authority requires no proof. The prevailing method of inflating presentations of Christian faith-doctrine with such proofs from reason and with accompanying judgments is based on the practice of mistaking philosophy and dogmatics for each other,23 which practice has been continually affecting people from the patristic age on. Very much akin to this confusion, thus also something to be specified here, is the likewise erroneous view that Christian theology—to which dogmatics

does indeed also belong—is also distinguished from Christian religion by its epistemic ground.24 Namely, what is held is that religion would draw from Scripture alone, whereas theology would also draw from the Fathers and from reason and philosophy. This view, however, cannot apply to Christian theology, since theology draws directly from Scripture, and Scripture itself first arose through Christian religion, but what draws on reason and philosophy cannot be Christian theology. It is surely a great gain, here and elsewhere, to banish all materials of this kind from the domain of Christian faith-doctrine. This is so, because only by this means is any uniformity of procedure to be put in place. Moreover, it is not the business of anyone presenting faith-doctrine to discharge the difficult task of choosing between moral proofs, geometric proofs, and probable proofs,25 not even simply for one’s own satisfaction. Postscript. At this spot, it might well not be improper to notice the following, even though it lies entirely outside the scope of our present procedure: that just such a copositing of God can be present in objective consciousness, even if it does not appear, in and of itself, in the form of a consciousness that takes place over time but can be similarly awakened and brought to light through sense perception. Moreover, this copositing of God can be seen to underlie all scientific construction, both in the domain of nature and in the domain of history. However, just as it could only do injury to science if one wanted to appeal to the pronouncements of religious self-consciousness for the sake of scientific construction or to admix into science anything from that other domain, likewise it could only be a disadvantage to faith and to faith-doctrine if one were to riddle the latter with scientific statements or wanted to make it dependent on foundational principles of science. That is to say, faithdoctrine immediately has as little to do with objective consciousness as pure science has to do with subjective consciousness.

1. Ed. note: The phrase “acts as a surrogate for recognizing” translates vertritt. As is shown in §8.2 and here, the two expressions have the same referent, though they function somewhat differently, thus cannot be simply substituted for each other. 2. Dasein Gottes. Ed. note: That is, proofs that purport rationally to demonstrate by argument that God as such—as an entity in itself—really “is there” versus God’s revealing something of who God is in history, notably in Christ. Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates what is recognized here as “the absolute surety [schlechthinige Gewißheit] of that feeling of absolute dependence in its general character [Allgemeinheit]” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; cf. Manschreck’s quite different translation from the 1555 German text (1965); Latin: CR 21:607. See §32n16. 4. Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 62; Latin: CR 90:643. In the margin here, Schleiermacher notes that quid sit (in “as to what God is”) “is not entirely the same wording [as “the nature of God”] but is easily to be applied to it” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885), 538; Migne Gr. 9:477; part of this passage is quoted in KGA I/7.3, 116. In his marginal note, Schleiermacher places emphasis on “an internal good” and indicates that the direction one takes here is “only from faith (πίστις) to knowledge (γνῶσις)” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Ed. note: On the margin, Schleiermacher notes: “It cannot be anything accidental. In that case, one’s lack of capacity [to have the feeling of absolute dependence] would also simply be an arbitrary factor, to which every person would have to learn how to resign oneself. (This is not the kind of situation I have in mind here [Nicht mein genre])” (Thönes, 1873). Here “accidental” translates zufälliges, or arbitrary versus a general and unvarying, i.e., “essential,” feature of human life. 7. Subjekt. Ed. note: That is, a human being is capable of consciously registering external stimuli.

8. Intelligenz. Ed. note: That is, mental functioning that possesses both objective and subjective characteristics that are developed to the extent indicated here and that are fully intact to that extent. 9. Ed. note: Here “these” is permissibly added to point back to those among the “our” mentioned in the proposition who give “recognition” to the finitude of all that exists and thereby identify their “feeling of absolute dependence” on God with that fact. In Schleiermacher’s view, the feeling of absolute dependence on God cannot come to be fully present to a person until the stage of monotheism is reached. Before that happens, a person’s feelings can emerge and grow only in the direction of that orientation. This is why he refers back to §8 here. 10. Modifikation. Ed. note: That is, in any alteration made in the very “nature” (Wesen) of human existence. 11. Ungesondertsein der Funktionen. 12. Ed. note: The word here is gegenständliches—that is, a consciousness distinctly directed to and containing in itself any observable “object.” Schleiermacher sometimes uses objektive for this function, versus subjektive, a distinction that can easily be misleading. Thus, in using gegenständliches he apparently wants to be as clear as possible at this juncture. 13. Gottlosigkeit. Ed. note: This state does not imply an absence of God, only a complete or partial lack of Godconsciousness. Hence, the customary translation, “ungodliness,” can easily be misleading in that respect or suggest some resistance to God or godly influence in every case. On the other hand, here “godly” means not that one becomes divine in the sense of actually being God or a part of God, but that one lives in a conscious relationship of communion with God. 14. Individuum. Ed. note: In the human domain, Schleiermacher tends to use this term for a distinctive person, one who bears some capacity for development, not simply for a mere particular specimen of the species. 15. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Special emphasis must be placed on this sensory kind, viewed as an actual lack of a godly state. Herein redemption would be taken to be the appeasement [Stillung, or “staunching”] of an impassioned state aroused in God or of an involuntary righteous reaction [Gerechtigkeit] aroused in God, in which God is viewed as acting in love [Liebe]” (Thönes, 1873). 16. See §8.2. 17. Ed. note: That is, attributing human affective states, or sensory-oriented stirrings, to God, just as “anthropomorphism,” in general, attributes various sorts of human change to God. 18. Strenge. Ed. note: This word can refer to “strict requirements” of God-consciousness, either at its deeply religious roots or in its various expressions. Thus, it also would refer to “stringency” of religious life and to “rigor” of one’s use of intellect for understanding and then of one’s presenting one’s faith in words. 19. Ed. note: The term is nicht, of or pertaining to nothing, destructive to the point of total negation. 20. Ed. note: raisonierende—that is, reasoning out what is more or less true or more or less in error. See his 1811 Dialectic (1996), 78, 55–62, and 73n, on this relation between truth and error. 21. Ed. note: ein wesentliches menschliches Lebensmoment. As Schleiermacher has indicated once again here, this means not that this feeling and this God-consciousness are in evidence at every stage of development. Rather, it means that the natural tendency toward them will reach its “essential” goal, especially within the context of Christian community of life with Christ, if it comes to be relatively unimpeded. By and large, according to his account, impediments to the perfection that lies ahead are not likely to be totally removed for any Christian in every moment of one’s mature life—certainly not at the present point in history. A person can still be redeemed and live a new, regenerate life, however, quite short of attaining that goal. To show what this means comprises most of the task of Part Two. 22. Jugend. Ed. note: That is, not fully developed among younger children. 23. Augustine (354–430), Of True Religion (ca. 388–395), 8: “So it is taught and believed as a chief point in man’s salvation that philosophy, i.e., the pursuit of wisdom, cannot be quite divorced from religion.” Ed. note: ET Of True Religion (1966), 10; Migne Lat. 34:126. 24. Erkenntnisgrund. 25. Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1821), Dogmatik (1818), §7, 50ff., and §50, 91ff. Ed. note: Appropriately, Redeker quotes especially the following: “1. Religion and theology are different from each other and indeed (a) as to the authority of their epistemic basis. Religion draws strictly from Scripture. In contrast, theology draws for assistance from philosophy, history, writings of the church fathers, acts of councils, confessional writings of various religious bodies, antiquities, etc. and therefore requires an apparatus reflecting very broad scholarship.” (20) “The proofs for the existence of God that are adduced in natural theology are indeed very diverse, but precisely for that reason they are also of very different value. In general terms, these proofs can be divided into three kinds: geometric, probable, and moral. The geometric proofs are either a priori, based on concepts of the most perfect being, or a posteriori, based on the fortuitousness of the world. Both sorts of proof are subject to great difficulties and are purely for learned persons, because they presuppose acquaintance with the entire compass of philosophy. The probable proofs are, again, of various sorts. Especially notable are proofs that are derived from an inborn sense and knowledge of God, from concord among all peoples in this conviction, and finally from the final causes or designs of the world. … Finally, the moral proof is based on the moral law that resides in the nature of reason and

deduces from that law the necessary requirement of presupposing the existence of a highest intelligence and of believing in it” (92f.) [ET Tice].

§34. The feeling of absolute dependence is contained in every Christian religious stirring. It is so contained to the extent that within that stirring, by means of that whereby the stirring is codetermined, we come to the consciousness that we are placed within a general interconnected process of nature. The feeling of absolute dependence is so contained, that is, to the extent that, within that stirring, we are conscious of ourselves as part of the world. 1. Being-conscious-of-oneself-as-part-of-the-world is one and the same thing as findingoneself-placed-in-a-general-interconnectedness-of-nature. Either our being’s being-related to what is set over against it or our comprehension of our both being and having is present in every real state of being self-conscious.1 Of course, what appears to us as set over against us must decrease the more we extend our self-consciousness. If we extend self-consciousness to a being conscious of the human species or if we are absolutely conscious of ourselves as finite spirit,2 then nothing more is set over against us, in that respect, than simply what our spirit does not have. Now, this particular extension of spirit takes place,3 however, only by virtue of a partial identity,4 this by virtue of a given interconnectedness of nature. Thus, in every such operation we find ourselves to be placed within an interconnectedness of nature by means of our spiritual being. Yet, in that in our self-consciousness we constantly distinguish organization5 from the spirit within us, this organization is situated in self-consciousness as what we have first of all —that is, what we have originally, precisely by virtue of some interconnectedness of nature.6 However, it is always situated in our self-consciousness as affected by other being, thus likewise as also coexisting with this other being within the interconnectedness of nature. In contrast, this interconnectedness of nature is not set with any boundary. Thus, all finite being is together contained7 within it, except that all finite being is so contained only as something relatively unexplicated.8 When we extend our self-consciousness to that regarding the human species, then the entire earth on which the species exists9 is likewise relatively unexplicated, coposited as the earth is alongside the earth’s own external interconnectedness,10 the latter interconnectedness viewed both as a having and as a being set over against the entire earth. However, in this case what is set over against the earth exists in self-consciousness only inasmuch as it affects us, consequently only as it exists as standing with us within the interconnectedness of nature. Thus, in this way the whole interconnectedness of nature, or “the world,” is coposited in our self-consciousness, inasmuch as we are conscious of ourselves as part of the world. By virtue of the copositing of sensory self-consciousness in all Christian religious stirring, however, this must be the case every time such a stirring arises. Suppose that we are also conscious of ourselves simply as active in forming notions— thus, to the extent that we are the locus for concept-formation—at that point selfconsciousness would also be the locus for attaining truth. In consequence, an

interconnectedness of being would be contained in self-consciousness that corresponds to the interconnectedness of concepts in objective consciousness.11 2. To be sure, frequently one does come upon the view that the more prominent the interconnectedness of nature would become in self-consciousness, the more the feeling of absolute dependence would recede and then, inversely, that when the feeling of absolute dependence would arise most strongly, something that suspends the interconnectedness of nature would be in place—that is, something miraculous.12 However, we are able to designate this view as simply an error. It is rather the case that we most suspend the interconnectedness of nature when we posit either a dead mechanism therein or something that is a matter of accident and mere chance. In both instances, moreover, God-consciousness also recedes at that point, and this clearly goes to show that God-consciousness is not in an inverse relation with consciousness regarding the interconnectedness of nature. In contrast, obviously what is miraculous actually presupposes the interconnectedness of nature, for any general spread of mere chance events would exclude all miraculous activity. Thus, if what is miraculous really served chiefly to arouse God-consciousness, the reason for this eventuality could be sought only in the fact that many people have come to be conscious of a rule only by way of its exception. Yet, in and of itself, this claim would provide warranty toward the conclusion that this general consciousness of God would emerge far more strongly and frequently in the religious stirrings present in the Roman church than in our own church. It would do so, that is, because there virtually everyone is constantly immersed in miraculous activity and can expect it at any moment. The relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and the interconnectedness of nature, however, is rather the reverse of that advanced in the view we have just examined. Our proposition, however, can also be validated with reference to particulars. For example: On the one hand, the daily succession of changes in the atmosphere often appears to us to be a mechanism. On the other hand, the atmosphere is the preeminent site of seemingly chance occurrences, and, conversely, the periodic renewal of life-functions affords us a most lively feeling for nature. It is plain to see that even in these latter particulars Godconsciousness tends to be more strongly coposited than in the phenomena first mentioned. 3. No Christian religious stirring is imaginable, however, in which we would not find ourselves to be placed in some interconnectedness of nature. No matter how it may choose to express itself, whether to move into action or into reflection,13 we must always be conscious of our religious stirring in this way, and this consciousness must also be united with Godconsciousness, because otherwise a given element of our life would be both altogether a religious one and altogether a nonreligious one. The only thing on which we would still have to focus our attention is the following: that as to its content this component of the religious elements of our lives is the same thing at all stages of Christian development. To be sure, it will occur more frequently when a given mind and heart that is in community with Christ will already have gained a very great facility in the unfolding of one’s God-consciousness, and this will happen very little in a mind and heart in which the sensory drive passes so quickly from one element of life to another that such an

unfolding can result only in rare instances. Yet, the content always remains the same, because it does not depend on any distinct sort of relationship or condition; rather, each individual14 takes one’s absolute dependence to be exactly the same as that of any other finite being. Thus, in Part One of our presentation we have the task of describing, to the best of our ability, nothing but this religious feeling for nature, viewed in general terms. This describing we do quite apart from any particularly Christian content, to which this religious feeling for nature is, nonetheless, attached in every instance.

1. Selbstbewußtsein. Ed. note: An unpacking of the concept of “being [sein] self-conscious”—that is, of selfconsciousness—is occurring here, conceived as a state of being, which, in turn, gives rise to the question Being within what? The answer varies as our state of being within some larger category can come to be identified over a scale extending in sizes including very particular circumstances, family, the society, or state, all that the earth is comprised of itself, including its atmosphere, and the entire universe. Between each such category regarding the interconnected processes of nature are many other possible categories, e.g., between the first three just mentioned, categories such as friends, intimate social circles where “sociality” (Geselligkeit) takes place, educational schools and programs, and church. These particular categories are all often used in Schleiermacher’s writings. What one “has” in one’s self-consciousness is to be determined in terms of such extensions as these. 2. Ed. note: endicher Geist. “Spirit” encompasses “mind” or “soul” (Seele) as distinguished from “body.” In Schleiermacher’s psychology, however, the human spirit is always in connection with, not strictly separable from, body. It is an embodied self (selbst). 3. Ed. note: The word here is stattfinden—that is, “taking place” is envisaged as a “finding” of a placement, as in the first sentences. 4. Identität. Ed. note: That is, between self and other, in this case as being with and within an interconnectedness of nature (Naturzusammenhang)—within a content called “nature,” including human nature. 5. Organization. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term automatically implies the existence of something intricately “organic”—that is, variously organized in process and extent—in relation to one’s finite self. He regularly refers to what is organic as an “entanglement” (Verwirrung) in that to which human senses are oriented (in sensory selfconsciousness), with that to which higher levels of self-consciousness are oriented, up to the level of nearly pure religious immediate self-consciousness. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher regularly, consistently recognizes this “interconnection” to be not static but a process. Thus, in this work the same term is often translated “interconnected process of nature.” Accordingly, both “first of all” and “originally” translate ursprünglich, referring to something temporally primary in our consciousness. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note summarizes the main point as follows: “The relationship of intellect [Intelligenz] to organism [Organismus] posits interconnectedness of nature” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Ed. note: Usually, mitgesezt is translated “coposited” in this work, with the same meaning as “together contained.” 8. Ed. note: This last word, unentwickelt (“unexplicated”), is the same word that carries the meaning “undeveloped.” The root meaning these uses have in common is at once “untwisted,” “unrolled,” and “unwrapped.” 9. Ed. note: For clarity’s sake, here the words “on which the species exists” are added, because this sentence begins a series of extensions from the interconnectedness of the human species in itself to a further, external interconnectedness to which it belongs within the earth, and onward. 10. Ed. note: Also for clarity’s sake, “external” is interjected here, “the entire earth” having set over against it an additional, external interconnectedness popularly referred to, successively, as “the atmosphere,” “the sky,” and “the heavens,” and, finally, “the entire universe.” In all the editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821, and the virtually unchanged edition of 1831), the term Schleiermacher uses for the latter, including all the other increments, is Universum. 11. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note succinctly reiterates this point: “The being that is situated in being self-conscious as objective consciousness” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Ed. note: See the further development of this point in §47 below. 13. Betrachtung. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, the same word serves for observation, consideration, and contemplation as well. In sermons, lectures, or writings he invites his hearers or readers to engage in this activity with him. 14. Einzelne.

§35. Thus, in accordance with the three forms1 of doctrinal propositions set forth above, our task here is threefold. First, we are to describe the relationship that is posited in that self-consciousness2 between the finite being of the world and the infinite being of God. Then, in the second section, we are to describe how, in that self-consciousness, predicates are attributed to God-in-relation-to-the-world. Finally, in the third section, we are to describe how, in that same self-consciousness, the world is taken to be constituted by virtue of its absolute dependence on God. 1. This consciousness of oneself considers oneself to be finite being; thus it occurs on behalf of all finite being. As a finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent, it is a state of mind and heart, viewed as something always given internally that can be brought to light in every element of one’s life. Thus, this first section that is indicated in our proposition exactly corresponds to what we have advanced as the basic form of dogmatic treatment. Now, in this section the task is necessarily that of expressing the relationship of the world, viewed as that which is dependent, to God, viewed as that on which the world is absolutely dependent. If the various propositions to be set forth in this section keep within the boundaries indicated here, one cannot imagine how they could overstep the proper domain to be covered by dogmatics. 2.3 To be sure, however, that danger of overstepping the proper domain of dogmatics does exist in the other two forms of dogmatic proposition. This is the case, for those two forms no longer immediately render religious self-consciousness in which only the contrast and relation between what is set over against oneself, each to the other, is posited. Rather, in that the one form makes God and the other form makes the world the subject of its propositions, it is necessary to be meticulously attentive lest each form might declare regarding its subject something that tends to supersede the immediate content of that self-consciousness. Now, the second form of dogmatic proposition, which expounds divine attributes, is most closely grounded in poetic and rhetorical expressions that are present in hymnic and homiletic presentations. Moreover, in that these expressions are not sufficiently assimilated to dialectical language usage, the second form of dogmatic proposition can very easily assert something regarding infinite being that would no longer conform to the contrast between world and God that is contained in self-consciousness but that would make what is infinite itself appear to be dependent on something finite, even though in self-consciousness all finitude was posited to be absolutely dependent on what is infinite. Thus, at that point, these expressions would no longer correspond to religious self-consciousness, of which they were, nevertheless, supposed to be expressive.4 The third form is hazardous from another point of view. It is so, because when the world is made the subject of dogmatic propositions, statements that have a strictly objective reference can very easily get entangled, even in catechetic and homiletic communications, out of compliance with certain mistaken requirements, and then, even in somewhat altered form, these statements can pass over into dogmatics. Such requirements can be introduced, in part, on account of a customary admixing of speculation into dogmatic discourse5 and, in part, also because those who have remained out of touch with the domain of science might

prefer to draw general notions that seem particularly worthwhile for their purposes from that same source which, for them, elucidates their higher self-consciousness. 3. Now, if propositions of these other two forms will have come to over-step the domain of dogmatics in this way and if they will have gained the upperweight in practice, it will then come to be all too natural for propositions of the first form to be accommodated more and more to those two forms and, in this manner, to partake of deviations that would, for the most part, have remained alien to them, in and of themselves. The following presentation will show to what extent such hazardous intrusions have occurred in the development of dogmatics to date.

1. Cf. §30. 2. Ed. note: jenem Selbstbewußtsein. As in all the propositions beginning with §32, “that self-consciousness” refers to Christian immediate religious self-consciousness in particular. 3. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates, first, the “advantage of the first form over the two others,” then proposes that “in order to guard against this danger [of overstepping the boundaries of the proper domain of dogmatics] it must be handled ex professo” (Thönes, 1873). The discussion that follows indicates what this means—namely, that one should constantly and carefully examine how faith is actually professed, from its very roots up. 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here is more specific. It states: “Otherwise, it could also easily come to the point of dishing out something quite different—namely, metaphysics” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher provides an example of what he is referring to: “Hence, the natural philosophical theologizing by Böhm and others like him” (Thönes, 1873).

SECTION ONE

A Description of Our Religious Self-Consciousness insofar as the Relationship between the World and God Is Expressed Therein Introduction to Section One §36. In ecclesial doctrine the original expression of this relationship, namely, that the world exists only in absolute dependence on God, is divided into two propositions: that the world is created by God and that God preserves the world. (1) “I believe in God the governor of all” is also the oldest simple expression of the Roman Symbol.1 (2) Confession of the Bohemian Brethren (1535), Art. III: “They teach … that God … must always be worshiped … as the Lord of all and the highest king reigning over all time, and all things depend on him alone. He holds all things under his hand and power.”2 (3) Calvin’s Geneva Catechism (1541) III: “has all things under his power and will.”3 1. The statement that the totality of finite being endures only in dependence on what is infinite is the complete description of the basic principle that is to be set forth here regarding every religious feeling. Without exception, we find ourselves to exist only in our continuing to endure; our very existence is always in process. Consequently, inasmuch as each of us posits oneself to be but a finite being, distinguishable from all other being, even our selfconsciousness is able to represent this finite being only in its continuing to endure. Yet, because the feeling of absolute dependence is such a general component of our selfconsciousness, this description also so fully applies that we can say the following. No matter in what locus of our whole being or in what point in time we might be placed, in every instance of full consciousness,4 we would always find ourselves to be only absolutely dependent, also that we would transfer this same status to the whole of finite being.5 Considered in and of itself, the statement that “God preserves6 the world” is wholly the same as the “original expression” indicated in our proposition, that “the world exists only in absolute dependence on God.” It only slightly seems to have acquired a different and lesser set of contents by the fact that, even though we are accustomed to thinking of the activities of “preserving” and “creating” together, the very beginning of the process remains excluded from the scope covered by the concept “preservation.” On the other hand, the statement that

“God created the world,” considered in and of itself, does indeed also imply absolute dependence, but it does so only with respect to the very beginning, excluding creation’s continuing to endure. Now, whether the very beginning of the world’s creation is supposed to have occurred all at once or successively, part by part, it is nonetheless something that is not at all given immediately in our self-consciousness. Thus, this second statement would seem to be a dogmatic statement simply inasmuch as “creation” is a supplement to the concept “preservation,” provided in order to regain the sense of unconditional, all-encompassing dependence.7 2. Thus, if this hard and fast distinction were also to be taken into a presentation of faithdoctrine, there would be no sufficient reason for retaining this split instead of using the “original expression” indicated in our proposition, which is so obviously fitting, and there could have been no correct reason for a fresh introduction of it into a presentation of faithdoctrine, other than the following. For some while, this split had already been widely used in religious communication, and the suitability of these expressions could be watched over all the better, as well as the criteria for their use set forth, over time. That is the correct reason. Accordingly, at the outset this split did not arise along a purely dogmatic pathway.8 Not only is this true, but this split is also not the product of pure religious interest, which would have to find full satisfaction only in the simple original expression given here. Thus, left to itself, religious interest, in turn, would bring the split between “creation” and “preservation” into oblivion. Yet, given an only somewhat awakened human power of imagination, the very beginning of all spatial and temporal being is a topic that faith-doctrine cannot ignore. As a consequence, even the treatment of any issue regarding this beginning goes back to a time before the separated emergence of scientific speculation and belongs already to the time in which myths were being produced. In the end, even for us the topic is attached to the Mosaic story of creation. Yet, by itself that story can no more have become a purely religious feature, especially a Christian feature, than have other things in those same Five Books of Moses that have been delivered in the same mythical fashion, coming from prepatriarchal, prehistorical times. Rather, for a long time, that presentation regarding creation had to submit to being used, even for purposes of speculation and natural science, and, indeed, to substantiate the most contrasted views or even to have such views derived from it.

1. Ed. note: The Roman Symbol was developed and adopted in the early 700s as the received text of the Apostles’ Creed, in content exactly as it has been known in modern times. Schleiermacher’s text most accurately reflects the Creed of Marcellus (340), but the Greek text is contained in the Interrogatory translation of Hippolytus (ca. 215). Hippolytus might have drawn from an earlier, briefer form in a late second-century Roman creed, no longer extant in writing: “Do you believe in God the Father, governor of all?” See the text in Leith (1982), 23, which uses the term pantocrator, and Leith’s discussion on 20–26. ET also in Book of Concord (2000), 21f.; Latin and German, Bek. Luth. (1930), 21f. 2. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 789. The quite different version of 1609 is in Müller (1903), 453–99. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Torrance (1959), 8, whose conflation of several phrases reads: “He disposes all things by His Providence, governs the world by His will, ruling all as it seems good to Him.” Latin: Niemeyer, 128.

4. Ed. note: Here Besinnung (usually to be translated “consciousness,” as here, or to mean any form of “mentation”) refers to being fully awake, able to exercise one’s mind, i.e., to be fully awake and thus able to contemplate, for any given purpose, what is going on in or through oneself. 5. Ed. note: Here it is of critical importance to recall that unless Schleiermacher is explicitly referring to “us human beings in general,” the “us” or “we” or “ourselves” whom he was addressing or mentioning in this entire book are Christians —in fact, more specifically persons of faith then within the Evangelical church in Germany—as is the case here. Likewise, the ascription “general” or “whole” that he applies here is attached to them. At the same time, logically he does not have to deny that such references might apply to other human beings, given whatever qualifications he offers. Here the most pertinent qualification is that the feeling of absolute dependence is at most potentially, inchoately present, as a general “end” of human existence, at lower stages of development, though not actually present. Wherever it is actually present, it is always the same, even if it is registered, felt, or expressed somewhat differently from person to person. 6. Ed. note: The verb erhalten can mean either “to preserve” or “to sustain.” Since Schleiermacher conceives erhalten to be a process, it seems to be almost a matter of indifference which shade of meaning is chosen as long as one does not suppose that God is not just keeping the world in stasis, i.e., simply and exactly as it once was. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Nota bene: Suppose that someone raises the objection that parts of the world’s creation arose, then that process stopped but was meant to have occurred in connection with the world’s continuing to endure. In that case, ‘creation’ would also entirely include in itself what was claimed in the original statement” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “‘Purely dogmatic’ means: using a ‘presentational-didactic procedure’” (Thönes, 1873).

§37. The Evangelical church has adopted both doctrines but has not given any distinctive form to either one in its confessional documents. Thus, it behooves us to treat them in such a way that, taken together, they exhaust the meaning of that original expression.1 (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “… one … creator and preserver of all things, visible and invisible.” XIX (on sin): “… although almighty God has created and preserves all of nature,” etc.2 (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) III: “We believe … in God … creator of all things, both visible and invisible, … quickening and preserving all things.”3 (3) Gallican Confession (1559) VII: “We believe that God, in three coworking persons, … created all things, not only the heavens and the earth and all that in them is but also invisible spirits.”4 (4) Anglican Articles of Religion (1562, 1571) I: “There is but one living and true God, … the maker and preserver of all things both visible, and invisible.”5 (5) Scots Confession (1560) I: “… one God … by whom we confess and believe all things in heaven and earth, both visible and invisible, to have been created, to be retained in their being,” etc.6

(6) Hungarian Confession (1562): “We confess that the one and true God is the author and conserver of all things.”7 1. The placements of “creation” and “preservation” side by side in these confessional statements all stem from the Roman Symbol’s later additions to the simple original Greek expression cited above8 and expanded during the fourth century in the Constantinopolitan symbol.9 Now, since nothing is definite in these statements concerning the way in which God brought forth everything, nothing is to be noted as to this division of creation and preservation except the intention that nothing—no point in space and no point in time—is to be excluded from that sovereignty over all.10 Even the expressions related to the triune God11 are not peculiar to the Gallican Confession, nor do they first belong to this era. Rather, the same expressions are also present in the Augsburg Confession, in that there the subject to which “Creator” and “Preserver” refer is the triune God, and they already had their origin in the Symbolum Quicunque vult,12 where omnipotens (omnipotence) and dominus (lord) were predicated of all three persons, which obviously amounts to the same meaning. Yet, since the doctrine of the triune God13 is in no way presupposed, or even simply contained, in every Christian religious stirring of mind and heart, these definitions in no way belong to our present reflection. Unmistakably, however, a step-wise formation was occurring in these expressions with the result that the original expression contained within the Roman Symbol and within the Gallican Confession form the outermost members of the formation. This is so, in that in the first member there is no split between “creation” and “preservation” at all, but in the last member that split is so complete that “preservation” is not treated in combination with “creation” at all. Rather, thereafter “preservation” was hidden within treatment of “the divine government of the world.” The Bohemian Confession14 and Scots Confession are closest to the first member, and the Augsburg Confession and the Second Helvetic Confession, cited here, are closest to the last member.15 Otherwise, these confessions all belong to the form that we have adopted, even if they do not all refer back to bestirred Christian religious selfconsciousness so distinctly as the expression used in the Bohemian Confession does, in that they no more assert attributes of God than they do of the world, but regarding God they assert only relational concepts16 and actions. That is to say, in any case it is not possible to express the relationship that obtains between the state of absolute dependence and God in any way whatsoever other than to ascribe all originative activity to God alone. 2. It already follows from this disposition of the matter17 that in the Evangelical church not only do we have very wide latitude for working out this point of doctrine in manifold ways, but we are also bidden to make use of it. That is to say, in that we are returning to the first source, we are not only freed to comply more with the oldest and simplest expression and to explicate this expression, as far as the purpose for presenting faith-doctrine requires, without any split between creation and preservation. It is also the case, however, that in the Evangelical church, even when

employing the form of a split between the two points of doctrine, everything must be able to have currency, viewed as a range of free opinion, simply to the degree that, along with the rather wide-ranging and indefinite expressions of the various confessions, it can be traced back to the simple expression of our basic feeling. Moreover, suppose that we bear in mind that the attention of the Reformers would not have been directed to these doctrines, on account of their being far removed from doctrines that were especially controversial as our church first came into being. Then, particularly since those doctrines are exposed to so many sorts of alien influences that have to be resisted, it is our duty earnestly to examine whether formulations in the symbols themselves might carry traces of these influences. Also, if they do not carry such traces, it is still our duty to examine (1) whether they still correspond to our need today and (2) whether different definitions might perhaps be called for by further development of the Evangelical spirit and by many sorts of transformations in the philosophical domain as well as in the real sciences.18 In the latter case, it would be entirely unobjectionable totally to abandon the expression of the doctrine to be found in the creedal symbols. 3. Now, in this respect the norm set forth for treatment of this doctrine seems to be not only appropriate for that purpose but also sufficient. The reason is as follows. Suppose that the purpose of dogmatics indisputably calls for explicating the simple expression of this doctrine to such an extent that the language usage of popular religious communication concerning the basic relationship of the world to God can be both regulated and protected. Then it would still be appropriate for present purposes to consider a separation of “creation” from “preservation. The danger that arises in doing so, however, is that of losing ourselves in alien territory and of moving beyond the actual religious domain into speculation. This danger would not be more securely averted than by constantly referring all the particular propositions regarding the doctrine, however they might be arrived at, to that “simple expression”19 which renders our immediate religious self-consciousness most reliably. However, suppose that each of these two points of doctrine were completely to devolve into that “original expression,” with the result that just as what is essential is present in that expression, it would also be present in each of them, in the doctrine of creation equally as in the doctrine of preservation and vice versa. Then, at any time that point is reached, one or the other of the two doctrines would be superfluous. Thus, at that juncture either one would have to present the total content of that “basic feeling” two times over, or one would have to arrange the two doctrines in such a way that only in combination with each other would they bring into account what the “original expression” would contain if it were left unexplicated. The latter option, then, is much to be preferred.

1. Ed. note: The “original expression” has been given twice, in two slightly different forms: in §32 and in the first sentence of §36.1. Here Schleiermacher’s note adds: “Either taken together, or each of the two doctrines in its entirety and then once more in twofold form [doppelt]” (Thönes, 1873). The tactic he has taken in §§40–49 is the latter one, accompanied in each case by this “twofold” enfolding of the other of the two doctrines into each other, culminating in the view that “preservation” is the more accurate and all-encompassing doctrine and by far the less problematic. On this last

point, see esp. §46, then §§48.1–2 and 49.1–2, also the climactic pulling together of all his subsequent uses of this doctrine in §164. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 37 and 52; Latin and German, Bek. Luth. (1963), 50 and 72. 3. Ed. note: This confession is also titled Confessio et expositio simplex orthodoxae fidei. ET cf. Cochrane (1972), 228; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 249f. Schleiermacher regularly refers to this work as Confessio simplex from its opening words. The full title is Confessio et expositio simplex orthodoxae fidei, et dogmatum catholicorum syncerae religionis christianae. The author is Henry Bullinger (1504–1575). 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 363, also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 331. 5. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 487, containing also the original Latin edition (1562) quoted by Schleiermacher and the American version of the original English text (1571) adopted by the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. (1801). 6. Ed. note: Quoted in Latin. ET drawn from the original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 439, also Cochrane (1972), 166; cf. an inferior Latin version in Niemeyer (1840), 341, and a closely related ET by Bulloch (1960). This is the first Scots Confession, written by John Knox (ca. 1513–1572) and three other persons; the second appeared in 1581. 7. Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 542. 8. Roman Symbol (so-called Apostles’ Creed, 8th cent.): “… in God, the Father [εἰςθεὸν πατέρα] Almighty [παντοκράτορα or “governor of all”], maker of heaven and earth [ποιτὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς].” Ed. note: For further information, see §36n1 and §37n12 just below. In his note here, Schleiermacher simply gives the several centuries earlier, original Greek, as transcribed here. He does not use the Latin of the Roman Symbol, which was borrowed from the original Greek and is often cited by its initial words, Quicunque vult. 9. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “… Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible [ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων],” etc. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher cites the original Greek of the last phrase, as is transcribed here. ET Book of Concord (2000), 22; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26. 10. Allherrschaft. 11. Ed. note: An alternative expression in German, as in the name of the church Schleiermacher long served as pastor in Berlin, is Dreifaltigkeit, literally, “the threefolded God.” The English word “Trinity” simply emphasizes God’s “threeness” (Dreiheit), at most pre-supposing God’s “oneness” or “singularity” (Einheit). 12. Ed. note: This is the so-called Creed of Athanasius or Roman Symbol (ca. 5th cent. version), originally in Latin. For further explanation of the major versions that had evolved from the early third century onward to the early eighth century, cf. §37n8 just above, also Book of Concord (2000), 28; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28. 13. Dreieinigkeitslehre. Ed. note: This word spells out “three-in-one,” as Trinitätslehre does not. 14. Ed. note: See the Bohemian Confession, §36n2. 15. Ed. note: The rough succession, not necessarily direct borrowing, is as follows: The first line, using the “original expression,” is found in (1) Hippolytus (ca. 215) and in a late second-century Roman creed (cf. §36n1); (2) Bohemian (1535), cf. §36n2; and (3) Scots (1560). Then the second line is found in (1) Augsburg (1530); (2) Second Helvetic (1566), first drafted in 1562; and (3) Gallican (1559), at the most extreme point. 16. Verhältnisbegriffe. 17. Cf. §27.2. 18. Ed. note: realen Wissenschaften—that is, according to Schleiermacher’s account of “science,” those areas of study that deal especially with “real,” empirically accessible phenomena, not so directly with speculation, however valuable a degree of speculative investigation might be for theory formation. 19. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this point offers this simple heading: “The advantage accruing to reduction [Reduktion]” (Thönes, 1873).

§38. Everything that is contained in the original expression1 can be explicated based on either of the two doctrines, provided that in each one God alone is conceived to be just as determinant as in that original expression. (1) John Calvin (1509–1564), Institutes (1559) I.16.1: “We must differ from profane men especially in that we see the presence of divine power, shining as much in the continuing state of the universe as in its inception.”2

(2) Nemesius of Emesa (4th cent.), On Human Nature (ca. 390): “For if anyone contends that it is out of accordance with its original genesis that a thing progresses through a succession of stages, this is not different from saying that providence and creation go together hand in hand. For, if what was created makes progress through its own successive stages, it is clear that providence, also, originated at the creation, [thereafter] to continue its work. … The inference to be drawn is simply this, that the maker of all things is, at the same time, their providence.”3 1. Let us suppose that, with the expressions used in the creedal symbols, which collectively speak not of one All but of all things, we relate the concept of “creation” chiefly to particular things. Then whatever comes to our consciousness that is seen to be the emergence of these particular things would always be seen to be nothing other than the preservation of species that is conditioned by the reemergence4 of particular things.5 Suppose, then, that the referent of our underlying self-consciousness here in this context acts as a surrogate for the entirety of finite being. In that same way, then, our speciesconsciousness would also lie just as close to us as consciousness of an individual life, because in our self-consciousness we always posit ourselves to be human beings. Consequently, the expression that “continuing renewals of things6 persist by God” would also just as completely correspond to the content of that self-consciousness, as concerns the object called “self,” as does the expression that “particular things emerge by God.”7 Now, suppose also that, in accordance with our expanded acquaintance with the world, we would be able to regard the heavenly bodies,8 with any life that might have developed on them, also as particular things, which would not all necessarily emerge at the same time. Then it would be obvious, nonetheless, that their successive emergence would also be regarded as the effective continuance of formative forces that would have to be emplaced within finite being. In this way too, only as far as our consciousness reaches, we would find nothing the emergence of which could not be bought under the concept “preservation.” As a result, the doctrine of creation would be entirely merged into the doctrine of preservation. Suppose likewise, however, that we regard particular things as created and then move on down from there. Then preservation of those things would still be just as much the changing stream of alterations and movements in which those things would run their course. However, in that these alterations and movements would always more or less form homogenous series, something new would be put in place with every beginning of a series of activities or effects proceeding from the same subject, something new that was not present beforehand in the same individual entity. In consequence, this would be a new emergence. Moreover, it could be regarded as a creation, all the more surely so, the more such a beginning appears as a significant node of development. However, the “more” and “less” in this process could not make for a distinct section of our treatment here. Now, since in itself every particular activity forms, in turn, a series, and since its very beginning actually comprises an emergence, so, only as far as our consciousness can reach, all that we customarily regard to be an object of divine preservation also falls under the concept “creation.” Thus, this concept, taken in its

entire compass, makes the concept “preservation” superfluous, exactly in the same way as we have seen previously the other way around. This outcome occurs precisely for the reason that whatever will not have been absorbed into one or the other of the two doctrines would not be given for us in the other doctrine either. Hence, popular religious communication cannot be held to blame for holding on to this freedom and observing this set of occurrences as new creation at one time and as regular, law-oriented preservation at another time. Devout reflection, moreover, would hardly agree to establishment of a rank-order between them, as if one of the two doctrines were to correspond to the feeling of absolute dependence more completely or in a higher style than the other doctrine would. 2. Yet and still, this equivalence between the two doctrines is, to be sure, conditioned by the fact that the divine grounding of the world, on the one hand, and the dependence of finite being on God, on the other hand, would be thought of in exactly the same way, whether one might envisage something to be created by God or to be preserved by God. Suppose that one imagines the creation of the world and, along with this, the entirety of the interconnectedness of nature to be one divine act. Then this whole process could be a complete expression of the feeling of absolute dependence. It could be so, that is, if one does not simply think of this one divine act as having ceased—consequently, think of this act of creation in God as involving a change from activity in relation to the world to a state of rest, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, think of that act in the world as involving a switch from the creation’s being conditioned by God to particulars’ being conditioned, each particular by other particulars. Likewise, suppose that one imagines preservation to be a divine activity relating to the entire course of the world, touching upon its very beginning just as it touches upon every subsequent condition of it. Then this whole process too could be a complete expression of that same feeling of absolute dependence. It could be so, that is, if, prior to and besides this activity, one does not think of something else conditioning the beginning of the world. That is to say, otherwise in every situation only some particulars would be dependent on divine activity, whereas other particulars, be they ever so few, would be conditioned by what had occurred before them, and as a consequence even divine activity, the object of which is supposed to be the entire world, would always be admixed with passivity. The same admixed result would obtain in yet another way, supposing that one would think of the creating divine activity not, indeed, as occurring in a single segment in time but as being repeated only at particular points and at certain times. That is to say, even if preserving activity were taken to intervene between these points, so that divine activity would never alternate with divine inactivity anywhere, preserving activity would still enter in as distinguishable from creating activity. Moreover, in that each of these activities would exclude the other in a limiting fashion, the world would indeed remain entirely dependent on God, yet it would be this way heterogeneously and dependent on divine activities that would mutually hamper each other. This would be no less the case, moreover, if one were to think of preserving activity as indeed not admixed with passivity but only as following upon some

purely creating activity, this either in such a way that it would have to conquer some resistance that would have unfolded from that earlier creating activity or in such a way that the activity of creating, in turn, would enter into the scene as an altogether different activity at particular points. Nevertheless, in fact, the inclination to present such absurd formulations, which do not express the feeling of dependence in any way but distort it in every possible manner, has unmistakably shown up in almost every era to date. This inclination, however, naturally has its roots not in Christian piety but in an entangled outlook on the world, one that is all too commonly seen in ordinary life. This outlook simply draws aid from the concept “dependence on God” as a basis for explaining the world’s course where the interconnectedness of nature seems to be hidden, thus, for the most part, where something torn from what happened earlier and divorced from its surrounds seems to be something beginning in time or isolated in space.

1. Ed. note: See §32 and §36.1 first sentence for his full statement of the original expression. 2. Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 197; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1957), 187, and CR 30:144. 3. Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 4 (1955), 428; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 40:787–88. 4. Wiederentstehen. 5. This is also how Nemesius of Emesa puts it: “How, then, is it that … each kind of plant grows from its own particular seed, and from no other, in the absence of any providence?” Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 4 (1955), 428; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 40:787–88. 6. Ed. note: The term Erneuerungen suggests a continuing process of renewal, which could also carry the connotations of continual preservation and, in turn, revival, resumption, replacement, repair, restoration, and renovation. 7. Ed. note: These phrases are derived, if not in the exact same form, from Calvin and Nemesius of Emesa, quoted at the outset. 8. Weltkörper.

§39. The doctrine of creation is to be explicated, first and foremost, with a view to warding off anything of an alien sort, so that nothing of the way in which the question of how the world has emerged is answered elsewhere will slip into our domain and stand in contradiction to the pure expression of the feeling of absolute dependence. In contrast, the doctrine of preservation is to be explicated, first and foremost, so as fully to present that basic feeling itself. 1. Our self-consciousness, in the general way in which both points of doctrine relate to it, can represent finite being overall only inasmuch as finite being is of an enduring nature. This is so, because we find ourselves to be of such a nature, but we have no self-consciousness of a beginning of being. Hence, as we have seen above,1 it would indeed not be impossible to explicate the beginning of being predominately or exclusively in the form of a doctrine of creation, but great difficulties would underlie the effort nonetheless. Such an attempt, moreover, would be just as arbitrary as it would be unsuitable for the purpose of dogmatics, since even in popular religious2 communication the doctrine of preservation bears a much greater meaning. Furthermore, generally inquiry into the beginning of all finite being arises

not in the interest of piety but in that of curiosity and thus can be answered only by such means as curiosity offers. Hence, piety too can show only an indirect3 interest in the question, for two reasons. First, piety would not give recognition to any answer that would bring a given religious person into contradiction with one’s basic feeling. Second, the doctrine of creation itself has such a contradictory position wherever it appears, both in the New Testament and in all proper confessional documents as well. In contrast, the Old Testament fundament for this doctrine lies in the beginnings of a history book, the contents of which beginning thus preponderantly serves the interest of curiosity. 2. In considering the doctrine of creation we then have, above all, to guard against anything of an alien nature slipping into it from the domain of knowing.4 To be sure, the opposite danger is then also to be held in view—namely, that the explication of our religious self-consciousness would be formed in such a way that a person motivated by curiosity would be placed in contradiction with the principles of the person’s own investigation within the domains of nature or of history.5 However, self-consciousness, which is to be reflected on here, already includes within itself that we are placed within an interconnectedness of nature. Thus, the doctrine of preservation, which can immediately proceed on this basis, would find no occasion within its pure explication of this self-consciousness for wanting to wipe out that presupposition. Even mistakenly, this is all the less likely to occur, moreover, if treatment of the doctrine of creation, as it was specified above, will already have preceded it. 3. Now, it has been established here that the immediate higher self-consciousness that is to be presented in the two points of doctrine here is simply one and the same in both. The task of presenting Christian faith-doctrine, however, is twofold. On the one hand, its task is to recapitulate in a clear and standard fashion,6 and in accord with their essential context, presentations in the diverse areas of religious7 communication that have currency within our church. On the other hand, its task is to set forth safeguards so as to avoid anything’s slipping into any given context unawares that could contradict what genuinely belongs to it. Then, taken together, the two points of doctrine would exhaust the dogmatic presentation regarding the absolute feeling of dependence that underlies them here, provided that in the doctrine of creation we chiefly produce precautionary rules and in the doctrine of preservation, however, we predominantly hold its positive explication in view.

1. Ed. note: See §38. 2. Ed. note: The word for such popular communication—in the broader public domain, not just among persons of mature piety or faith—is religiösen. 3. Ed. note: Here “indirect” translates mittelbares, the little-used negative of “immediate” (unmittelbares). In keeping with mittelbares, then, one could say that this interest is only “moderate,” in that it is only “indirect.” 4. Ed. note: des Wissens. For Schleiermacher, “the domain of knowing” is formed by the rules of dialectic, which he defines, in turn, as serving any “aim of knowing.” See his 1811 notes on Dialectic (1996). Within carefully defined limits, the “science” of dogmatics is also to rely on such rules (§§17–19). 5. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s division of the sciences, the more physical side deals with “nature,” including human nature, as such; ethics, in a very broad sense, provides “the principles of history” (see Dialectic, 37n). 6. Ed. note: anschaulich und normal zusammenzufassen. That is, to combine and summarize the material to be described in such a way that the matter can be plainly perceived and grasped in a properly regularized, consistent fashion.

7. Ed. note: religiösen—that is, covering all areas of piety within the church, including direct expressions of the basic feeling that arises in relation to God and indirect expression in thought and action (see esp. §§1–19; see also Brief Outline §21 and then §§55–57, where some preliminary weeding out of weak or diseased materials is indicated, and, finally, §§168– 83).

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Creation

§40. Every notion concerning the emergence1 of the world by means of which anything whatsoever is excluded from having been originated by God, or by means of which even God is placed under those definitions and those contrasts that have originated only in the world and through the world, is contradictory to our underlying religious selfconsciousness. Acts 17:24, Rom. 1:19–20, Heb. 11:3.2 1. The New Testament passages just cited take the lead in our dismissing every more closely defined notion of creation. Even the expression ῥήματι3 is only a negative factor for any closer definition, namely, to exclude any notion of any sort of instrument or means. It is also possible to say, in agreement with this expression and with equal correctness, that the world itself, viewed as having come into being through speaking, is that which has been spoken by God.4 On this ground, moreover, we may be satisfied to set forth those negative characteristics as rules of judgment regarding whatever has intruded in faith-doctrine, but by our own conviction unjustifiably, viewed as any closer definition of this concept. This is so, for since our immediate self-consciousness represents finite being only in the identity of emergence and continuing endurance, we find in that self-consciousness neither occasion for explication of emergence by itself alone nor any lead toward it; thus, by virtue of that selfconsciousness, we also can take no special part in such an explication.5 The further explication of the doctrine of creation in dogmatics comes from a time when people wanted to draw even the material for natural sciences from Scripture and when the features that belong to all the more advanced sciences still lay latent in theology itself. Hence, it belongs to the subsequent total separation of the two fields of inquiry that we now leave this subject to natural science investigations that go back in time and space, whether they can lead us up to the formative powers and masses of world bodies or take us still further. Moreover, it also belongs to this total separation that, given the above presupposition, we calmly await the results of these investigations. We do so, in that every scientific endeavor that works with the concepts “God” and “world” without being dependent on any Christian faith-doctrine, or thereby becoming so, must be bounded by the same definitions of them if these two concepts are not to cease being two different ones.6 2. Now, we acknowledge that the New Testament passages offer no material whatsoever toward any further explication of the doctrine of creation. We also acknowledge that even when inquiries into faith-doctrine were caught up in that confusion of their task with that of philosophers to which we have adverted,7 they still always referred back to Scripture. Accordingly, we have, first of all, to look at the Mosaic narrative and at Old Testament

passages that are, to a certain extent, collectively dependent on it. Now, it is undeniable that the Reformers took that narrative to be an actual historical account.8 Yet, what Luther says is primarily directed against allegorical explanation, and Calvin’s outlook forthwith excludes any use of this creation narrative toward formation of an actual theory. It is in every way advantageous for this subject that nothing from this material has gained entry into the creedal symbols, especially since the difference between the two narratives in Genesis is so significant—if one does not want forcibly to regard the second one as a recapitulating continuation of the first—that one can hardly attribute a genuinely historical character to them. Suppose that we then add to all these considerations the fact that in those Old Testament passages which mention creation, in part the same simplicity prevails as in the New Testament passages that do so,9 and in part the Mosaic statements do indeed underlie them but are nonetheless very liberally handled.10 Let us also add the observations that a purely didactic use of this account never appeared and that Philo, who thoroughly rejected interpreting the “six days” of creation in the literal sense, would surely have had predecessors. On these grounds, we can rather securely conclude, first, that the literal account was never generally held to at that time but that a dim but healthy feeling has always lingered to the effect that this old monument should not be treated in accordance with our notions of history. Hence, we have no reason to maintain a stricter historical appreciation of it than the Jewish people itself did in its best times. Suppose that it were granted, however, that people were fully justified in assuming that the Mosaic description was a historical account communicated in an extraordinary way. The only implication would be that in this way we would have attained a natural scientific insight not to be gained differently; yet, in accordance with our usage of the term, in no fashion would the particular aspects of that insight be “faith-doctrines” on that account, since our feeling of absolute dependence would obtain neither a new content nor a different formation nor any sort of closer definition thereby. Hence, not even an interpretation of that insight providing commentary nor any assessment of such interpretations can be a task for dogmatics in any way whatsoever. 3. As concerns the various definitions that have been proposed, it is quite clear that our feeling of absolute dependence could not be referred to the general constitution of all finite being if anything within it were, or ever had been, independent of God. It is also just as certain, however, that if within all finite being, as such, there were anything at all that would have entered into it at its emergence that could be viewed as independent of God, then because precisely this thing would also have to exist in us,11 the feeling of absolute dependence could itself have no truth in it, even in relation to ourselves. Suppose, on the other hand, that God were imagined to be limited in any way as the one creating, thus similar in God’s own activity to that which is nonetheless to be absolutely dependent on God. Then the feeling that gives evidence of this dependence likewise could not be true, in that this likeness and dependence would cancel each other out, and thus finite being, inasmuch as it would be like God, could not be absolutely dependent on God.12

Except under one of these two forms, however, a contradiction between any theory of creation whatsoever and the general foundation contained in our religious self-consciousness is inconceivable. With the Christian characteristic of our religious self-consciousness, however, given that this characteristic already presupposes an actual experience, a doctrine of sheer creation also cannot stand in contradiction. It cannot do so because that doctrine, as such, does not take the continuing endurance of that creation into consideration. Thus, Christian piety can have no interest in these investigations other than to steer clear of these two shoals. Now, whether pursuing this interest is easy, or whether here too whoever would want to avoid the one shoal would all too readily steer close to the other shoal, in both cases the results would have to be discovered based on a closer observation of additional items that are accepted in faith-doctrine.13

1. Entstehung. Ed. note: This term indicates a process, thus “emergence” is thought to be more appropriate than “origination.” However, Entstandensein and entstandenen, which follow, are less awkwardly rendered by “having been originated” and “that have originated,” respectively. 2. Ed. note: Sermon only on Acts 17:22–31, Nov. 18, 1810, “On the Relationship of That Which All Religions Have in Common with Each Other to What Is Distinctively Christian,” SW II.7 (1836), 528–37. These verses contain Paul’s speech at the Areopagus in Athens. Verse 24 RSV reads: “The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by man.” In Rom. 1:16–25, Paul also argues against idol worship. Verses 19–20 RSV read: “For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.” Heb. 11:3 RSV reads: “By faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made out of things that do not appear.” 3. Ed. note: “by the word” (Heb. 11:3). 4. Luther, On Genesis (1535), on Gen. 1:5 in 1, §51: “What else, then, is the entire creation than a word of God said and expressed by God, … thus so that creating is no more difficult for God than naming it is for us.” Ed. note: ET cf. also Luther’s Works (1958) 1:22; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:17. 5. Ed. note: Everything up to this first point of doctrine in the system is introductory. All of that material is indeed intended to be wholly consistent with the system and its conclusion but is also intended merely to assist the explication of it. Here, §§32–35 are introductory to Part One of the two parts (cf. also §§30, 65, and 90), and §§36–39 are introductory to the first section of Part One, which section presents “A Description of Our Religious Self-Consciousness as the Relationship between the World and God Is Expressed Therein.” Yet to come: 11 propositions presenting points of doctrine in Part One and 50 in Part Two; so, the remaining 62 of the 123 propositions in the system of doctrine itself are themselves either introductions or appendices, though they are also essential to an adequate understanding of the others. Already highly important for what is begun in §40, therefore, are the matters referred to in §§29–39. 6. Ed. note: Cf. §29, where Schleiermacher stated that as “doctrines of faith,” or “faith-doctrines” (cf. §§15–20), reflection must be based on “the facts” to which Christian “religious self-consciousness” (cf. §§3–6) refer, whether these facts are “already presupposed” by the “contrast” between sin and grace “expressed in the concept ‘redemption”’ (Part One) or whether these facts “are defined in terms of that contrast” (Part Two, cf. also §65 and §90). 7. Ed. note: See esp. the whole argument in §33; cf. §§8.P.S.2, 10.P.S., 12.3, 16.P.S., 19.P.S., 28, also 50. 8. (1) Luther, On Genesis (1535) on Gen. 1:3: “For Moses wrote a history and told of things that had happened.” (2) Calvin, Institutes (1559) 1.14.3: “To be sure, Moses, accommodating himself to the rudeness of the common folk, mentions in the history of the creation no words of God other than those which show themselves to our own eyes.” Ed. note: (1) ET cf. Luther’s Works (1958) 1:19; German: Luthers Werke (1883–) 42:15. Above, “Mosaic” refers to the “Five Books of Moses,” or the Pentateuch; the creation narratives appear in Genesis, the first of these books. (2) ET: Battles (1960), 162; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1967), 154, and CR 30:119. 9. Isa. 45:18 and Jer. 10:12. 10. Ps. 33:6–9; Ps. 104; and Job 38:4ff. 11. Ed. note: Here the assumption is that everything in nature is interconnected; thus, if anything in it were independent of God, our own dependence would be compromised too.

12. Ed. note: Cf. §32, where Schleiermacher indicated that the being of God can be known—the “supernatural” can be grasped as “natural”—only in and through the world. Thus, it can be known only insofar as we ourselves are conscious of being part of the “interconnectedness of nature,” and thereby—in every “Christian religious stirring of mind and heart” (§32)—only as we feel ourselves to be “absolutely dependent on God.” These characteristics of our faith are the only general basis on which we can have a relationship with God, i.e., our own being and the infinite being of God can exist as one in self-consciousness (§§32–35). Consequently, the presentation given here supplants all so-called proofs for the existence of God (§33). In church doctrine, the original expression of this relationship, namely, that the world exists only in absolute dependence on God, is divided into two propositions: “that the world is created by God and that God preserves the world” (§36). Schleiermacher has pointed out that new work has to be done here, for the Evangelical church has affirmed both doctrines but has not given a “distinctive form” to either one in its confessional writings (§32). 13. Ed. note: In earlier propositions, all introductory, Schleiermacher developed a conceptual framework for what this final paragraph points to, as well as for what is to follow in the rest of Part One. Thus, in §§30–31 he stated that reflections on the “direct description” of the “religious state of mind and heart,” or “dispositions,” that constitute this religious selfconsciousness have always come in three forms. “In every instance,” the “basis” for all three forms of reflection lies in these religious states. Whether the form may primarily concern (1) “descriptions of situations in human life” or (2) “concepts regarding divine attributes” or (3) “assertions regarding the constitution of the world” (cf. also §35), their presentation throughout is to be interdependent (cf. §§19 and 28). Also, every doctrinal proposition, each proposition being both “ecclesial” and “scientific” (cf. §§2–17), strictly refers to “divine revelation” as expressed in “the redemption accomplished in Jesus of Nazareth” (§§11, 13–14); thereby, they are all meant to represent the highest of the monotheistic modes of life or religious community (cf. §§7–12). These doctrines are all to be systematically arranged (§§20–21), to present in Evangelical perspective faith-doctrine for a united (especially Lutheran-Reformed, Protestant) church (§§22–25). They exclude Christian ethics only for reasons based on tradition and convenience, not for any essential reason (§26). They “appeal” to Scripture and to confessional writings, but they do not use either source as proof texts (§27).

§41. If the concept of creation is to be further explicated, the emergence of the world must indeed be traced back entirely to divine activity, yet not in such a way that this is defined after the manner of human activity. Moreover, the emergence of the world is to be represented as that realization of time which conditions all change, yet not in such a way that divine activity would itself become a temporal activity. (1) Belgic Confession (1561) XII: “We believe that the Father by the Word—that is, by his Son—created of nothing the heaven, the earth and all creatures, as it seemed good to him.”1 (2) John of Damascus (ca. 675–749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743) II.5: “He brought all things from nothing into being.”2 (3) Martin Luther (1483–1546), On Genesis (1535) II.2, §7: “In short, God exists beyond all the means and occasions of time.” Ibid.: “All that God has willed to create he has created at that time when he spoke, even though not everything then appeared all of a sudden before our eyes. … I am indeed something new … but … for God I have been procreated and watched over directly at the beginning of the world, and this word that he spoke, ‘let us make human beings,’ has also created me.”3 (4) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), On the Trinity (356–360) XII.40: “Even if the strengthening of the firmaments [etc.] … are done according to their proper order,

there is not even a moment of time discernible in the work of creating the heavens, the earth, and the other elements.”4 (5) Anselm (1033–1109), Monologion (1076) 9: “For by no means can anything reasonably be made by anyone unless before-hand there is in the maker’s reason a certain pattern, as it were, of the thing to be made—or more fittingly put, a form or likeness or rule. … Therefore, although it is clear that before they were made, those things which have been made were nothing—with respect to the fact that what they are now and that there was not anything from which they were made—nevertheless they were not nothing with respect to their Maker’s reason, through which and according to which they were made.”5 (6) Photius (ca. 820–ca. 891), Biblioteca (late 9th cent.): “Origen … said that the universe is coeternal with God, who is singular, wise, and lacking in nothing. He said, in effect, that there is no such thing as the creator without creatures. … It is necessary that things exist in principle by the operation of God and that there is no time when they do not exist.”6 (7) Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity (356–360) XII.39: “It was present with God when the heavens were prepared. Is the preparation of the heavens a matter of time for God, so that a sudden movement of thought crept into his understanding, as if it had been previously inactive and dull, and in a human way God searched for material and instruments for the building of the world? … The things that shall be although they are yet to be insofar as God is concerned, for whom there is nothing new and unexpected in things to be created, since it belongs to the dispensation of time for them to be created, and they have already been created in the activity of the divine power that foresees the future.”7 (8) Augustine (354–430), The City of God (413–426) XI.4.2: “There are those who say that the universe was indeed created by God, denying a temporal but admitting a creational beginning, as though, in some hardly comprehensible way, the world was made, but made from all eternity. Their purpose seems to be to save God from the charge of arbitrary rashness. They would not have us believe that a completely new idea of creating the world suddenly occurred to God or that a change of mind took place in God, in whom there can be no change, etc.” Ibid. XI.15: “But when I consider what God could be the Lord of if there was not always some creature, I shrink from making any assertion.” Ibid. XI.17: “but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will he effected regarding the things he created both that formerly, so long as they were not they should not be, and that subsequently, when they began

to be, they should come into existence.” Ibid. XI.6: “then assuredly the world was made not in time but simultaneously with time.”8 (9) Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees (391) I.2: “Hence, we cannot say that there was a time before God made anything.”9 1. The expression “out of nothing” denies that before the emergence of the world anything at all would have been in existence besides God, anything that would have entered as material into forming the world. Indisputably, moreover, the assumption that there would have been any material at hand independent of divine activity would destroy the feeling of absolute dependence and would present the real world as a mixture made up of what existed by God and of what did not exist by God.10 Now, however, this formulation undeniably recalls the Aristotelian category ἐξοὗ11 and imitates it. In this way, it is reminiscent, on the one hand, of the human way of forming, which gives form to some material already present, and, on the other hand, of how nature proceeds to assemble bodies out of a number of elements. Inasmuch as all that is already in the course of nature is then strictly distinguished from the initial arising of it and likewise, inasmuch as the creation is raised above its sheer formation, the expression “out of nothing” is also beyond reproach. Yet, one does see from Hilary and Anselm how easily a preexistence of forms before things appear can be concealed behind one’s negation of matter—not outside God, of course, but in God. In itself, this position too would seem to bear no risk. However, in that the two members of this contrast, matter and form, still do not then relate in the same way to God, God is drawn away from a status of indifference with respect to that contrast and is thus, to a certain degree, placed under it. Of course, it is also true that the forms’ being in God before things exist, viewed as already nevertheless relating to existing things, can be called a “being prepared” for them. Doing this, however, immediately violates the other rule, so that, on the other hand, we would then have to grant validity to what Luther stated. This is so, for then God would no longer be thought to exist beyond all God’s engagement with time if there were two divine activities that, as preparation and creation, could be conceived as occurring only in a distinct temporal sequence. In his fashion, most dryly and impartially, Anselm expresses this sort of temporal similarity.12 Hilary wanted to cancel out all temporal distinctions whatsoever; yet, he succeeded in this only with respect to what now still arises, albeit in its particularity, in time, but not with respect to the original creation, for one cannot say of this creation that it would have been made in God’s foreknowing efficacious action already before it came into being. Here it can be remarked only incidentally that the expression “out of nothing” has also frequently come up in order to distinguish the creation of the world from the begetting of the Son.13 Now, if the begetting of the Son were generally acknowledged to be an eternal one and the creation of the world were likewise generally acknowledged to be a temporal one, then it would not be necessary to set forth yet another distinction; or, even if people were in

complete agreement only in this domain on the distinction between acts of generation and creation, it would not be necessary to make any distinction beyond that one. Yet, even in this respect the expression “out of nothing” is not necessary for this purpose, in that even if one does not identify “word and Son” at all, the expression “are made by God’s Word”14 already adequately safeguards against any confusion between “Word” and “Son” even if one does not call special attention to the distinction between “creation” and “generation.”15 2. Now, suppose that, as is indicated above, we separate out the initial generation16 so strictly that we already reckon everything that is not absolutely primitive to the course of nature, which is involved in a process of development, and thus place it all under the concept of “preservation.” Then the question as to whether the creation itself occupied a given period of time would already be settled in the negative. The distinction between a first and second creation or between an indirect and a direct creation would always revert either, in general terms, to a becoming of what is complex out of what is simple17 or to a becoming of what is organic out of what is elemental.18 Here however, to let another creation enter in means either, in turn, to lift the distinction between creation and preservation entirely or to presuppose different “matter” in each case, without all the forces that are inherent in it; and the latter is a completely empty thought. If, instead, one first imagines “matter” even in the case of creation—even though one might just as well imagine “forces” instead—from that point on, being that is alive and in motion must have persisted and developed further. Otherwise, creation of sheer matter would also have been simply a preparation, an external, material creation corresponding to that internal, formal creation we have already noted here. Hence, we have no recourse but to refer these definitions back to a time when people could take pleasure in such abstractions, because then the question of a dynamic outlook regarding nature had not yet arisen.19 Another question that also does not at all belong within the domain of faith-doctrine concerns the relationship of the world’s creation to time. It is this: whether there was any time before the world was created or whether time would have begun only along with the world. Suppose, however, that we take “world” only in the broadest sense. In that sense we cannot affirm that there was any time before the world was created, because such a time could have referred only to God and therefore God would be displaced into time. With its quando ipsi visum20 the Belgic Confession plainly falls into this mistake, however, and we must again refer back to Augustine’s formulation in opposition to it.21 In fine, the controversy over a temporal versus eternal creation of the world, which can be referred back to the question as to whether a being of God can or must be imagined without creatures, is in any case of no concern whatsoever to what the feeling of absolute dependence immediately contains, and therefore it is, in and of itself, a matter of indifference how the controversy will be decided. Only to that extent need we be aware that one must combine with the notion of a creation in time that of a beginning of divine activity outward or that of a beginning of divine dominion, as Origen presented the matter.22 In the latter case, God would thereby be placed within the sphere of change, thus displaced into being

temporally. Consequently, the contrast between God and finite being would be diminished, and in this way the purity of the feeling of dependence would then indeed be endangered. Although Augustine,23 in order to avoid such a danger, sets forth only a single act of the divine will with respect to the earlier nonbeing of things and the later being of things, this move is hardly a satisfactory solution either. In that case, an equally effective divine act of will that the world not exist earlier would belong to this one. Thus, one would have to assume that the world would have come into being earlier without this particular act of divine will, consequently that a capacity to move into existence would have been present independent of God. Suppose, however, that this same single divine will were also an ineffective will during the nonbeing of things, in that God no more blocked than brought about anything. Then what would still remain is the transition from nonaction into action— even if one expresses this transition differently as one from willing into efficacious action24 —against which it may be said that it is impossible to imagine how the notion that God does not exist apart from what is absolutely dependent on God should be able to weaken or confuse religious self-consciousness in any way. The same observation applies, then, to another approach not to be dealt with here at all, namely, the referring of the word by which God is said to have created the world back to that word which was “eternally with God,” for this claim can never be properly clarified25 unless the creating by the eternal word was also eternal. Postscript. To these considerations can be added the claim that God created26 the world by a free decree. Now, it is self-evident that one on whom everything is dependent is absolutely free. Yet, suppose that by “free decree” one is thinking of a prior deliberation from which a choice follows. Alternatively, suppose that one expresses that “freedom” in such a way that God could just as well not have created the world, because one opines that the only options are either that it was possible for God not to have created or that God would have had to create the world. In this way, one would already have been thinking of freedom only in contrast with necessity and thus, in that one was ascribing such a freedom to God, have displaced God into the domain of contrasts.27

1. Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 395; Latin: Niemeyer, 366. 2. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 210; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:880. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Luthers Werke 42:57f. 4. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 529; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:458–59. 5. Ed. note: ET and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 84–85; cf. ET only: Williams (1996), 9; Latin only: Migne Lat. 158:157. 6. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Greek and French in Bibliotheque (1967), 109. Schleiermacher used the edition by J. Bekker (1824–1825), 302; Henry’s more recent edition comprises seven volumes (1959–1974); cf. Migne Gr. vols. 101–4. 7. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 327–28; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:457. 8. Ed. note: (1) ET Fathers of the Church 14 (1952), 191f., and cf. the somewhat different reading in Nicene and PostNicene Fathers, Ser. 1, 2:450; Latin: Migne Lat. 41:319. (Items 2–4) ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 1, 2:508, 513, 452; Latin: Migne Lat. 41:363, 367, 322. 9. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 84 (1991), 50; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:175. 10. Ed. note: Cf. §§38–39. The doctrines of creation and preservation must be understood and explicated in such a way that “the original expression” can be fully presented based on either doctrine (§38). “The doctrine of creation is to be explicated, first and foremost, with a view to warding off anything alien, so that nothing of the way in which the question of

how the world has emerged is answered elsewhere would slip into our sphere and contradict the pure expression of the feeling of absolute dependence. In contrast, the doctrine of preservation is to be explicated, first and foremost, so as fully to present that basic feeling itself “ (§39). 11. Ed. note: “out of what is not.” In the views cited above, John of Damascus and the Belgic Confession both present this view, though differently. 12. Zeitgleichheit. Ed. note: That is, Luther’s statement was: “God exists beyond all the means and occasions of time.” Anselm asserted that “before” things were made there was “nothing,” except that there was already a “pattern” or “form” in the Maker’s reason, hence the temporal similarity just mentioned between the “beforehand” and the act of creation itself. Hilary had held that all things were originally made simultaneously, without even an instant’s distinction in time. Without explanation, Schäfer has Zeitlichkeit (“temporal state”) here. 13. Augustine, Confessions (ca. 397–401) 12.7: “Thou didst not make heaven and earth out of Thyself; otherwise, it would have been equal to Thy only begotten Son. … And, apart from Thee, there was nothing else from which Thou mightest make them. … Therefore, Thou hast made heaven and earth out of nothing.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 21 (1953), 372f.; Latin: Migne Lat. 32:828. 14. Luther, Psalm 90 (1534): “For this all things are made by God’s Word, so that they may more reasonably be called born than created or renewed, for no instrument or means was attached thereto.” Ed. note: ET Tice: cf. also Luther’s Works (1956) 13:92; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 40, pt. 3, 509. An example of this “confusion” might be given in item 1 above, in the Belgic Confession, where creation is said to be by the Son named as “the Word.” 15. Ed. note: The words used here and just above are Schaffen and Erzeugen. 16. Erste Entstehung. Ed. note: Here this act corresponds to that of “creation” (Schöpfung), strictly comprising only that which is “absolutely primitive” (alles schlechthin Primitive). 17. Hippolytus (ca. 170–ca. 236), Fragments in Genesis: “On the first day God created as much as God wanted from that which did not exist. On the other days God created not from that which did not exist but from those things created on the first day, changing course as God wanted.” Ed. note: ET Valantasis/Tice; Greek and Latin: Migne Gr. 10:585–86. 18. John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–) 2.5: “Some [things], such as heaven, earth, air, fire, and water, [he made] from no preexisting matter, and others, such as animals, plants, and seeds, he made from those things which had their existence directly from him.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 210; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:880. 19. Ed. note: Schleiermacher, in contrast, could and did regularly think at least of Newtonian “forces” (Kräfte) in general and, in biology and psychology, of vital, organic, developmental forces; and he could and did think of all these forces as inherent in all created being. This outlook was of great assistance to him in his also thinking of how enactment of “the divine causality” was possible in the nature of human beings, as under conditions of “the world” in general, this as an expression of “the one eternal divine decree” of creation and of its special fulfillment in redemption. 20. Ed. note: “as it seemed good to him.” See item 1 cited under this proposition. 21. Ed. note: See item 9 under this proposition. 22. Ed. note: Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254) was a great exegete, a doctrinal theologian, a devout ascetic, and a noted preacher, initially in his native Alexandria, Egypt, and successor to Clement (ca. 150–ca. 215) as head of the Catechetical School there. Later (231–250), after some years of persecution and private study, he founded another famous school in Caesarea, Palestine, where he thrived until he was imprisoned, underwent extended torture, and eventually died from it. With few exceptions, only fragments of his large corpus of writings have survived; otherwise, Schleiermacher might well have made greater use of them. Notably, though perhaps dubiously attributed to Origen, is the thesis that Almighty God was always accompanied by the world, which he eternally created, and that God was also finite, not infinite, else God could not have had thought even of Godself. 23. Ed. note: See item 8 under this proposition. 24. [In Latin:] “Let us add that God willed it from eternity, for whatever God wills he has willed it from eternity. What he had already willed from eternity was finally done at some time.” [In German:] “Thus he did work and was active in such a way that the world came into being.” Friedrich Nathanael Morus (1736–1792), Commentarius exegetico-historicus in suam theologiae christianae epitomen, ed. K. A. Hempel (Leipzig, 1797–1798), Tome 1, 292. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; quoted also by KGA I/7.3, 439. 25. Cf. Luther, Sämtliche Schriften (Walch, 1740) 1, 23–28, and 3, 26–40. Redeker note: Cf. especially Walch 1, 25f.: “Here reason commits sacrilegious blunders with its stupid questions. ‘If,’ it says, ‘the Word was always in existence, why didn’t God create heaven and earth through this Word at an earlier time?’ Likewise: ‘Because heaven and earth came into existence only when God began to speak, it appears to follow that the Word had its beginning at the same time the creature had its beginning.’ But these wicked thoughts must be banished. Concerning these matters we cannot establish or think out anything, because outside that beginning of the creation there is nothing except the uncovered divine essence and the

uncovered God. And so, because He is incomprehensible, that, too, is incomprehensible which was before the world, because it is nothing except God.” “It seems to us that He begins to speak because we cannot go beyond the beginning of time. But because John and Moses say that the Word was in the beginning and before all creatures, it necessarily follows that He always was in the Creator and in the uncovered essence of God.” Ed. note: ET Luther’s Works (1958) 1:17f. (the entire passage is on 16–19, corresponding exactly to Walch, 23–29); cf. also Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:13–15. 26. Ed. note: Here, as above, the verb form “create, created” translates schaffen, geschafft (which can also mean “make, made”). Schleiermacher does not use the verb schöpfen in this doctrinal discussion, only the noun Schöpfung (or the “creation”—except when it is noted that he uses Schaffen to refer to the process rather than the product). 27. Ed. note: The real, organic world, for Schleiermacher, was always defined in part by the existence of contrasts within it, none of them absolute (as is possible in the logic of mathematics). As infinite—not caught up in finitude—“God” is different, wholly other, in not admitting of internal contrast, by definition. See his various notes and lectures on Dialectic. In the strictly theological domain, God is viewed in the same way, though now always within the divine “economy”—i.e., engagement in and with the world—not in se, not in Godself apart from that economy. Of God in se the only thing that can be said with perfect confidence is “God is love” (§167). Now, it is also true that theologically little or nothing can be said with any great specificity about what may lie outside the reality of this world in which we meet God, hence the following two appendixes on angels and the devil. The criteria regarding Christian “religious self-consciousness” in relation to God and to the coinciding “absolute dependence” of the entire interconnected process of nature discussed in §46n6 are to be used for all doctrinal propositions. The notions of “angels” and “the devil” do not seem to meet these criteria. Nevertheless, with the same critical and analytical care exercised in §§40–41, Schleiermacher examines these two notions in §§42–43 and §§44–45, respectively, with a view to deciding whether any authentic use can be made of them. In sum: The first appendix thus discusses references to angels in the Old Testament, taken somewhat into the New Testament, yet notes that the notion of angels has not been taken into “the sphere of genuine Christian doctrine,” at least in Evangelical theology. Its continuing presence in Christian language, he there argues, does not obligate us to hold that it refers to anything real. Whether angels exist or not should, therefore, not bear any influence on our own way of acting; nor are we to expect any further revelations of their existence. The second appendix notes the frequent references to the devil in the New Testament but indicates that neither Christ nor the apostles make any use of the notion or draw any implications regarding belief in the devil. Nor has the Evangelical church made any use of the notion. In sum, this belief is so “unsupportable” that no conviction of its truth can be imputed to anyone. Thus, belief in the devil “may in no way be laid down as a condition of faith in God or in Christ, and … there can be no talk of his bearing influence in the reign of God.”

Appendix One: Regarding Angels1 §42. This notion of angels, indigenous to books of the Old Testament, has also carried over into the New Testament. On the one hand, it does not in itself imply something impossible, nor does it contradict the foundation of any and all consciousness that contains faith in God. On the other hand, however, it has not been taken into the sphere of genuine Christian doctrine anywhere. Thus, it can continue to appear in Christian language, yet without obligating us to establish anything as to whether it refers to something real. 1. The narratives regarding Abraham, Lot, and Jacob, regarding the call of Moses and Gideon, and also regarding the proclamation of Samson, all very clearly bear the stamp within them of what we customarily call “legend.”2 Indeed, in a great many of these tales God and the angels of the Lord are interchanged in such a way that the whole narrative can also be thought of as a theophany, wherein what is acquired through sense perception does not at all need the added appearance of some being that is differentiated from and independent of God to be what it is. Thus, what is envisaged in this indefinite flow is older than these narratives. Indeed, it perhaps even predates the events told of. At that point,

moreover, it might not be exclusively Hebraic in the narrower sense, as would also seem to have arisen from numerous other traces—for example, from the story about Balaam. Many sorts of poetic discourse carried out in the Psalms and the prophetic literature also lead to the view that whatever is a bearer of some divine command can also be called an angel. As a result, sometimes particular, distinct beings are to be placed in this category and sometimes not. Now, we can probably not explain those supposed beings otherwise than in terms of how various peoples have generally tended to generate spiritual beings of multiple sorts, viewed under diverse forms. That is, these beings have always been generated because of a consciousness of spirit’s holding sway over matter. The task of explaining this consciousness then arises, and the less it is resolved, the greater is the inherent tendency to presuppose the existence of more spirit than is manifested in the human race, also to presuppose that such spirit is different from the vital forces and mating instincts in animals, which do hold sway over matter but are themselves to be regarded as matter to be controlled, in turn, by us. Then, we, being acquainted with the existence of a plurality of heavenly bodies beyond our own earth, satisfy that same craving to understand by the presupposition, current among us, that these bodies are all, or for the most part, filled with beings animated in accordance with their various levels of being. In earlier times, there was no alternative left than to people either our own earth or heaven with spiritual beings hidden to us. The Jewish people seem to have decided to hold to the latter, heavenly option, especially since Supreme Being had been thought, at the same time, to be the King of that people. Thus, that king would have to have servants around him to send at his bidding to every spot within his realm and to have them intervene in every branch of his governing activity, and this is certainly also the most advanced notion of what angels might be. Accordingly, we would have to divorce this notion entirely from our notion of spiritual life on other world-bodies, life developed in union with some organism, in accordance with the nature of those other world-bodies. This is so, for one cannot get to the biblical notion from this starting point.3 Rather, this more recent notion sets something entirely alien to the biblical notion in its place. Instead, we would have to imagine them to be spiritual beings that do not belong to any distinct world-body. Each of these spiritual beings, for their work on some world-body, would be constituted in such a way that they could take on the form of some organism, albeit only temporarily, just as they are supposed to have appeared, simply in a temporary manner, in our own world-body from time to time. It is quite clear, moreover, that we know much too little about the space between worlds as well as about the possible relationships between spirit and bodies to be obliged absolutely to deny the truth of any such notion. Indeed, suppose that we would regard the appearance of such spiritual beings to be something to be marveled at. Then this marveling would occur far less for the reason that we would be forced to claim that such an incursion of alien beings into the sphere of our lives would in itself transgress the interconnectedness of nature than for the reason that their appearance—in Christianity overall, but also in the Old Testament for the most part—has been tied instead to certain points of human development or points of new revelation.4 In the

New Testament, angels are said to have appeared at the annunciation of Christ and of his forerunner, also at Christ’s birth—all in more or less poetical narratives that were retained from outside the actual tradition of the Gospels. To a certain measure, the latter characteristic also obtains regarding the “strengthening” angel in Gethsemane5—for which no witness is cited, at the very least. In the re-surrection and ascension, as well as in the conversion of Cornelius and in Peter’s being set free, one can be doubtful as to whether angels or human beings are meant. Moreover, in the story regarding Philip the expressions “angel of the Lord” and “Spirit” alternate in the manner of the Old Testament. After these narratives, however, angels totally leave the scene, even in the Acts of the Apostles. 2. In our Holy Scriptures overall, however, angels are simply presupposed, but nothing is ever taught in reference to them. Apart from poetic descriptions of the Last Day, likewise to be found in the domain of prophetic utterance, Christ himself mentions them only in his warning against despising “the little ones” and on the occasion of Peter’s useless defense of him.6 If someone would want to take these instances to be didactic in nature, then one would have to set forth as doctrine that children, or perhaps all human beings, have special angels, that angels see the face of God, and that they can be deployed in legions.7 The same thing applies to apostolic passages, if someone would want to refer those vague and ambiguous expressions concerning “thrones” and “principalities” to angels. Indeed, even in the Epistle to the Hebrews angels are not so much topics for dogmatic use as occasions for presentation of the kinds that Christ and the apostles made.8 In the latter case, for example, it is also claimed that Christ is “much superior” to all the angels told of in the Old Testament stories as in the prophets and psalms, but there is no mention there of actual appearances of angels drawn from the Old Testament.9 Thus, Christ and those men who were apostles could have said all this without having had any real conviction of their own regarding the existence of such beings or having wanted to pass on any such conviction, in the same way as people everywhere tend to appropriate popular notions. That is to say, people make occasional use of them in treating of other topics, just as we too can speak of fairies and ghostly appearances, without these notions being posited as having had any kind of definite relation to those notions that structure our actual convictions. Thus, this usage is in no way meant in the same manner as what people presuppose in what is ordinarily called “accommodation”—namely, that persons who condescend to use prevailing notions themselves hold a different conviction, one that actually contradicts those notions. Even the confessions of the Protestant church have only occasionally taken this notion of angels into them, and these expressions show clearly enough that they place no value on teaching anything about angels.10 This does not at all mean that the Reformers were lacking in familiarity with the subject itself or that they had doubted the literal truth of appearances of angels told of in Scripture, for their ecclesial hymns prove the contrary. It simply means that they in no way placed any great value on angels within the domain of piety.

1. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher refers to a pertinent remark by Johann Christian Friedrich Steudel (1799–1837): “Why [treat of ‘Angels’] here and not after the second point of doctrine?” Steudel [(1829) supplies the answer]: “strictly cosmological.” Schleiermacher then adds: “Since angels are not included in creation, they hover somewhere between being eternal (theophany) and not being at all ([the notion of their being] bearers of God’s commands)” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Sage. 3. Cf. Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), §50. Ed. note: Redeker quotes from 181: “Now, the remaining heavenly bodies, the number and size of which is almost boundless, surely cannot possibly have been left empty by God. Rather, they will undoubtedly have been filled with creatures suited to those bodies’ constitution. So, one is indeed warranted in assuming a multitude and multiplicity of creatures that endlessly exceeds all human notions” [ET Tice]. 4. Ed. note: Cf. §43n7. 5. Ed. note: Luke 22:43, the only Gospel narrative mentioning that an angel came to Jesus while he prayed at Gethsemane, “strengthening him.” 6. Matt. 16:27 and 25:31; Matt. 18:10 and 26:53. Ed. note: These passages refer successively to the three instances cited in the sentence. One tradition supposes that Peter was the one who tried to defend Jesus with his sword when Jesus was seized and arrested, though his name is not mentioned in this passage. 7. Obviously, John 1:51 is figurative. 8. Col. 1:16 and Heb. 1:4ff. 9. Ed. note: The third edition contains a conjecture that Schleiermacher’s text intended to refer to appearances indicated elsewhere in the “New Testament.” Schäfer found “New Testament” in Schleiermacher’s draft text but found “Old Testament” in the corrected original printing, then chose the draft text. Here “Old Testament” is retained, as in all previous editions, for it seems to make somewhat better sense. 10. (1) Apology Augsburg (1531) 21: “Besides, we also grant that angels pray for us.” (2) Schmalkaldic Articles (Luther, 1537) 2.2: “Although the angels in heaven pray for us (as Christ himself also does), and in the same way also the saints on earth and perhaps those in heaven pray for us, it does not follow from this that we ought to invoke angels and saints, pray to them, keep fasts and hold festivals for them, celebrate masses, make sacrifices, establish churches, altars, or worship services for them in still other ways, and consider them as helpers in time of need, assign all kinds of assistance to them, and attribute a specific function to particular saints, as the papists teach and do.” Ed. note: (1) and (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 238 and 305; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 318 and 425.

§43. The only theme that can be set forth as doctrine concerning angels is this: that the question of whether angels exist ought to have no influence on our way of acting and that today revelations of their existence are no longer to be expected. 1. A Christian’s trust in the protection of angels is not to be referred to without divers misgivings. This is so, for several reasons. First, the suggestion that angels fend against the mighty blows of evil spirits1 could hardly be proposed without detriment to anyone but small children, in that we are to use the spiritual “armor” that Scripture recommends to us2 against all that is customarily ascribed to the devil but are not to rely on any angelic protection. Second, it is no less dubious to teach even some external protection by means of angels.3 That is to say, if one would not want to assume a continual efficacious action by angels, thus entirely abrogating the interconnectedness of nature, one would no doubt have to teach that God has no need of angels for that purpose. Third, in contrast, suppose that it were to afford greater consolation if God were to make use of angels than if our protection were secured along a natural path, with the result that, for the sake of our weakness, God would prefer to use angels and to reveal this preference to us. On the one hand, this consolation could not be conveyed without very limited, indeed almost childish notions about God. On the other hand, it could only feed our vanity if one were to

assume that an entire species of beings actually higher than we are would exist only to serve us. Hence, in our confessions—though actually in opposition to the view of saints in the Roman church, angels’ intercession for us is wisely substituted for their active engagement in influencing us, except that we cannot attribute any probative force to the biblical passage4 on which this position is based. That this notion has been losing its influence among Christians is also plain to see, since it belongs to a time when acquaintance with the forces of nature was still very minimal and when mastery of human beings over them stood at its lowest level. By today, at every such suggestion our observations have automatically been taking an entirely different course. As a result, we do not readily have recourse to angels in our daily life anymore. Even what Luther5 propounded concerning angels especially bears the tendency to suppress all thoughtlessness that people might gladly be lured into by supposing angels’ supernatural intervention. Yet, the confidence that he wished to undergird would remain the same, even if we would have no thought of angels but would expect divine protection along the usual path. Our church, however, has declared itself against veneration of angels. Thus, we can rightly say that it would be the worst sort of veneration if we were to believe that, with a view to their obscure service to us, we ought to relinquish any caring for ourselves and others that we are enjoined to do.6 2. Yet, more closely considered, nothing can be concluded, for our present time or for the future, from all the appearances of angels that we have reports of. This is so, in part, for these appearances belong to that primitive age when the interconnectedness of human beings with nature was not yet sorted out and human beings themselves had not yet developed very far. Moreover, since obtaining education through higher beings was not alien to a number of philosophers who held forth in that primitive era, these warning and comforting appearances could also be an echo of that connection between human beings and the whole of nature. Later on, we find angels almost exclusively at certain great points of development,7 when other amazing events were also usually occurring. Moreover, even when ancient teachers of the church8 claimed that traffic between angels and human beings, which had been interrupted for such a long time, had been restored by Christ to a greater extent than ever, this claim too would have to be understood in the same way, for this supposed restoration did not actually extend beyond apostolic times. Now, since angels do not come into our province at all, there is also no reason to set forth any more precise investigations into the creation of angels, as such or in relation to the Mosaic creation story, likewise into other accounts of their qualities, modes of life, and functions.9 Rather, this subject remains wholly problematic for the actual domain of dogmatics, and only a private and liturgical use for the notion of angels is to be recognized. Even so, private use would always be restricted to a sensory representation10 of higher protection insofar as it does not employ conscious human activity. In liturgical use, people have long held in mind that God is to be depicted as surrounded by pure and innocent finite spirits.11

1. Luther, Small Catechism (1529): “Let your holy angel be with me, so that the wicked foe may have no power over me.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 363; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 521. Here “wicked foe” translates diabolum. This passage is contained in Luther’s recommended Morning Prayer. 2. Eph. 6:11ff., 1 Pet. 5:8–9. Ed. note: The first passage is about putting on “the whole armor of God” to fend off all sorts of devilish forces, including “hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places,” but what is taken to shield against all this are truth, righteousness, peace, and faith, also alertness, blessedness, perseverance, and prayer, all in that Spirit by which the gospel is proclaimed. The second passage speaks of being “sober” and “watchful” in faith, resisting the devil, viewed as an “adversary,” prowling about like a “roaring lion.” 3. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 1.14.6–11. Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 166–71; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1957), 158–63, and CR 30:121–25. 4. Zech. 1:12. Ed. note: There an “angel of the LORD,” who is said to have been talking with this son of a prophet at the time, asks God how long “the Lord of hosts” will yet withhold mercy from the people. Then the LORD replies with “gracious and comforting words” (v. 13). 5. Luther, On Genesis (1535), Gen. 2: “Surely the angels are to be our guardians and are to protect us, but only so far as we remain on our own paths. Christ refers to this outcome in that he holds up to the devil the command from Deut. 6:16 [“You shall not put the Lord your God to the test”]. Thereby he indicates that it is not the way of human beings to fly in the air…. Consequently, if we exist in our office or calling by command from God or from persons who are properly competent in that office, we are to believe that protection of loving angels cannot be lacking to us.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. also Luther’s Works (1958) 1:107f.; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:81f. 6. Ed. note: Looking ahead, Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “2. Lack in justification for the belief. Back to Steudel (1828) once more. All these passages have the character of proverbial phraseology. Steudel opines, nevertheless, that belief in angels would have been closely associated with Christ’s God-consciousness and that Christ made that belief valid for purposes of the highest order. If that were the case, then angels would have to belong within our reign of God, but I find nothing to that effect. It is truly odd that he wants to derive the existence of angels from [the Lord’s Prayer]: ‘Thy will be done … as it is in heaven.’ Nonetheless, he also wants to argue against the historical Christ on the same basis” (Thönes, 1873). See Steudel, 12, and §42n1. 7. Ed. note: See §42, in the main text at note 4. 8. Cf. John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407), Homily on Colossians, Homily 3 (on Col. 1:20). Ed. note: ET Nicene and PostNicene Fathers, Ser. 1, vol. 13 (1889), 272–75; Migne Gr. 62:321–24. 9. Cf. Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), §§53–54, 190ff. 10. Ed. note: versinnlichen. 11. Cf. Heb. 12:22. Ed. note: The image here is of coming to “Mount Zion,” “the heavenly Jerusalem,” where “the living God” is accompanied by “innumerable angels in festal gathering” (RSV).

Appendix Two: Regarding the Devil §44. The notion of the devil, as it has taken form among us, is so unsupportable that a conviction of its truth cannot be expected of anyone. Our church has also never made doctrinal use of it, in any case. 1. The main elements in this notion are these: spiritual beings, possessing an elevated sort of perfection, who had lived in close association with God, have passed over, by their own free will, from this condition into a condition of antagonism and rebellion against God. Now, no person can be required to perceive what this notion refers to unless that person can be helped to surmount a great many obstacles. That is, first, regarding the so-called fall of the good angels, the more nearly perfect they are supposed to have been, the less could any motives be assigned other than such as would presuppose a preexisting fall, e.g., haughtiness and envy.1 Then further, suppose that after the fall the devil’s natural strengths would have remained just as they had been.2 Then it would be inconceivable how

unwavering evil could be taken to persist alongside superbly outstanding insight. That is to say, this very insight would have to have depicted any battle against God as a wholly vain undertaking. Indeed, for one who is lacking in true insight, moreover, only momentary satisfaction can be imagined, whereas for any being that is full of insight to venture into such a battle and to persevere in that conflict, it would be necessary for that being to want to be lacking in blessedness and to remain so. Now, if this were a human being, the favorite explanation would be that one is “possessed,” because no explanation is to be found in the actual subject. Would it not be even less explicable, given the more perfect status of angels, by whom would they then have to be possessed? Suppose, however, that at his fall the devil would have lost his finest, purest capacity for understanding, since it would indeed be the greatest derangement to “change from being God’s friend into being God’s bitterest and most obdurate enemy”? Then, on the one hand, it would be incomprehensible how one’s capacity for understanding could be considered to be lost forever by means of a single aberrant act of will, unless that very act would already have rested on a lack in that capacity for understanding? On the other hand, it would be inconceivable how, upon such a loss in his capacity for understanding, the devil could be considered to be such a dangerous enemy, since nothing is easier than to contend against an evil perpetrated by one who lacks all understanding of what one is doing.3 Now, it is also just as difficult to account for the relationship of the fallen angels to the other angels. This is so, for if they were all alike and no special, personal motives could be assigned to any one group of them, how is it possible to conceive that one group has sinned and the others did not? Certainly it would be no less difficult, moreover, if someone were to assume4 that before the fall of the one group all the angels would have been in “a variable state of innocence,” but that just as that one group would have been “judged and condemned forever” on account of a single misdeed, likewise the other angels, on account of a single act of resistance to it, would thus have been “forever approved and secured,” so that thereafter they would never have been able to fall anymore. Finally, let us consider the state of the fallen angels after the fall. In that case, it is difficult to find any coherence between the following two thoughts. The first thought is that these fallen angels, already distressed by evils that have befallen them and expecting still greater ones, and yet, at the same time, out of their hatred toward God, also so as to assuage their feeling at suffering such ills, would then engage in some active resistance against God. The second thought is that they would, nonetheless, not be able really to achieve anything except by God’s will and permission,5 in which case they would indeed find far greater relief from their ills and contentment in their hatred toward God by retreating into total inactivity. Suppose, as a last consideration, that the devil and his angels were to be thought of as comprising a single reign, consequently one in which all of them would be working harmoniously yet always outwardly and, in particular, within the domain of human affairs. Then, on the one hand, such a reign would not be thinkable, given the generally recognized limitation that was just set forth, unless its overlord were omniscient and would have foreknowledge of what God would permit. On the other hand, moreover, not only would the

most evil6 that is wrought in one human being serve to repel the same evil in other human beings, but also a given evil wrought in every human being would serve to repel some other evil. 2. In the main, doctrinal use of this notion could be made in two places: first, where the human evil in human beings would be traced back to prior evil in Satan and would be explained on that basis; and, second, where an active role of the devil in punishment for sin would be specified. However, our confessions are too wary to base anything in the present point of doctrine on such a risky notion. Accordingly, as concerns the first maneuver, at most they place the devil together with “the evil ones” only as the one fronting their ranks.7 By this route, nothing is to be set forth by means of a supposed preexistence of evil in the devil for explaining human evil in human beings. Rather, the devil’s evil remains just as much to be explained as is the evil of human beings. Even though in some confessional passages human evil is taken to have its origin in Satan’s temptation,8 moreover, the following is also true. First, in some passages the aim is less directed to explanation than to mitigation against the view that the devil would have substituted an entirely different creation for the original one. Second, on the one hand, letting oneself be tempted does indeed also presuppose some deviation and evil, already and always, with the result that such an attempt at explanation would be no explanation at all. Third, suppose, on the other hand, that the might and sway of the devil were posited among punishments for sin. Then, in part, this inclusion would bear no other influence on all that belongs to deliverance of human beings from sin and from punishment for sin than would be the case when influence of evil is declared apart from any supposed overlord. In part, if the devil’s might were taken simply to be the result of sin—and the tempting activity of the devil were taken to be the greatest exercise of that might—then when the devil accomplished his supposedly most effectual temptation, he would yet have to have been powerless to counter what belongs to human deliverance, and this too would be contradictory. In other passages, however, even punishment is presented as something that the devil and wicked human beings have in common.9 There too, the notion, which rather frequently appears in still other passages, that the devil is God’s instrument for punishment of the wicked inveighs against the devil’s supposed opposition to the divine decrees.

1. Luther speaks quite rightly in On Genesis (1535), Gen. 1:6: “And Bernard had these thoughts, that Lucifer had beheld God and that human beings were suffered to become higher in their nature than the angels and so this haughty spirit grew envious that humans would have such a blessedness and thus fell. However, even if such thoughts retain some worth, I would, to be sure, not want to persuade anyone to fall for such opinions.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. also Luther’s Works (1958) 1:23; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe 1883–) 42:18. 2. Cf. Luther, On Genesis (1535), Gen. 3:1: “Therefore it is a cause for great errors when some people exterminate or minimize this evil and speak of our depraved nature in the manner of the philosophers, as if it were not depraved. Thus, they state that the natural endowments have remained unimpaired not only in the nature of human beings but also in the devil. But this is obviously false. … But how much more impudent it is when the sophists assert this very thing about the devil, in whom there is even greater enmity against God, greater hatred and fury, than in human beings, in spite of the fact that he was not created evil but had a will in conformity with the will of God. This will he has lost; he has also lost his very beautiful and excellent intellect and has been turned into an awful spirit that rages against his Creator. Is this not the utmost depravity,

to change from a friend of God into the bitterest and most obdurate enemy of God?” Ed. note: ET Luther’s Works (1958) 1:141–43 (with changes, including gender reference); German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:106f. 3. Ed. note: In ordinary usage, to which Schleiermacher subscribed, unverständige Böse means an evil or wicked act that, by definition, is to be perpetrated by a being possessed of some intellect or capacity for understanding (Verstand), but wherein that capacity has come to be lacking—that is, has been lost. It does not mean that the act is, to all intents and purposes, incomprehensible (unverständlich) from someone else’s point of view. 4. Cf. Luther, On Genesis (1535), Gen. 2:16–17: “… so it is certain that the angels were also in a state of innocence that could be altered. However, since the bad angels were thus judged and condemned, correspondingly the good angels were approved and secured, so that they were no longer able to sin.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. also Luther’s Works (1958) 1:112f.; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:85. 5. Mosheim, Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764), 417ff., and Calvin, Institutes (1559), 1.14.16. Ed. note: Mosheim’s 1758 edition, 366ff. Calvin: ET Battles (1960), 175; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1967), 166f., and CR 30:117ff., also KGA I/7.3, 144ff. 6. Böse. Ed. note: In the human domain, Böse is normally to be translated as “human evil,” but in this context evil wrought by the devil and other fallen angels possessed of intellect is also done by free will, in contrast to evil in general (Übel). Above, the “evil,” “distress” or “ills” (all translating Übel) that is suffered by the fallen angels is taken to occur by the sovereign decree or will or permission of God. It would have to be presupposed that if “free will” is to be attributed to God, it cannot be either simply arbitrary or subject to deviation from what is good. Otherwise, God could become either wavering and frail in expression of God’s will or fall into making bad decisions. To complicate matters further in this imaginary scenario, it also appears that a measure of steady-state conditions would have to be presupposed as well. It is already assumed, in this case, that if any additional human evil were to be introduced into humanity from outside its own domain, it would have to be permitted by God. Then, however, the effect would necessarily be that of repelling some other evil by equal measure. Otherwise, the new, added amount of evil would be permitted by God, and God would be the original perpetrator of evil. This is exactly the sort of “scholastic” speculation that Schleiermacher has already deemed to be meddlesome and useless in earlier discussions of miracles. Typically, he uses such conditional arguments to subvert positions that seem to have got off track, showing that they lead either to dead ends or to places to which practically no one would want to go. In subsection 2 here and in §45, similar tactics further serve to clarify difficulties inherent in various other beliefs regarding the devil. 7. Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: “The cause of sin is the will of the devil and of evil ones [malorum] … that turn away from God.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Book of Concord (2000), 55; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 75. 8. (1) Belgic Confession (1561) 14: “… giving ear to the words of the devil.” (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 8: “… at the instigation of the serpent and by his own fault.” (3) Solida Declaratio (1577) 1: “As a result of Satan’s seduction through the fall, human beings … have as their punishment lost the original righteousness with which they were created.” Ed. note: (1) ET and French: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 598; Latin, quoted here, in Niemeyer (1840), 368; (2) ET Cochrane (1972), 235; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 247. Cf. note at §37n3. (3) ET Book of Concord (2000), 536; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 852; on ETs of that document, which comprises the second part of the Formula of Concord, see §111n6. 9. Augsburg Confession (1530) 17: “… but to condemn the ungodly [impious] and the devils to hell and eternal punishment.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 50; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 72.

§45. Now, the devil is indeed frequently brought up also in the New Testament Scriptures, yet neither Christ nor the apostles set forth any new doctrine concerning him, much less implicate this notion in our economy of salvation. Thus, for our presentation of Christian faith-doctrine the only thing that we are permitted to establish on this matter is the following: that whatever is asserted concerning the devil is subject to the condition that belief in him may in no way be laid down as a condition of faith in God or in Christ and that there can be no talk of his bearing influence within the reign of God. 1. Among all the New Testament passages that definitely and undoubtedly treat of the devil, there is not a single one of those in which Christ or the apostles would perchance want

to say something new or of their own concerning this topic, not even if it be either corrective or supplemental. Rather, they make use of this notion in its then-popular form. Now, suppose that someone would still want to set forth a Christian doctrine regarding the devil. Then that person would still have also to assume that this notion, as Christ and the apostles found it, would have been exact and irremediable, in complete accord with the truth. Moreover, anyone would have to presuppose this view all the more, the more disinclined one is to assume what is customarily called “accommodation”1 on Christ’s part. Further, such completeness regarding this notion would be all the more unlikely as it can be shown that its main features have no basis even in the Old Testament, thus that its origin is wholly apocryphal. Now, it is plain to see, based on the whole way in which this topic was broached, that Christ, and likewise the apostles, made use of the notion only to serve other purposes, not wanting to provide any new support or warrant for it, this without Christ’s having been given any particular occasion to do so. That is, without exception, he referred to the notion only in parables or epigrammatically or in brief adages, all of which, however, unexceptionably treated of some other topic. In the parable of the sower, the expressions used2 are of dubious interpretation. Moreover, the enmity of human beings directed against the divine word would be just as close to what is meant as is the devil. Now, if this parable were to be addressing at least the devil’s relation to the human soul and the devil’s way of affecting it, then the lack of surety that we have noted would be overcome, and it would be possible to set forth a doctrine regarding the devil. Then, however, the devil would, at most, have the status of a totally unknown cause of rapid transitions to an opposing state of mind and heart. Now, an attempt to set forth a doctrine regarding the devil based on the parable of the weeds in the field would yield just as minimal a result. There the sower is contrasted with the Son of Man, who sows quite overtly by means of teachings, whereas the sower of weeds performs the same activity but under cover of darkness—that is, covertly—and in this way one can also easily be led here to the proper meaning of the name “slanderer”3 when used for the devil. However, the apostles, at least, did not understand as a teaching that it would have been the devil that sowed weeds in the field tilled by Christ. We can see this, because when speaking of false brethren or totally unworthy members of the community, they never cited the devil as the cause but, at the very most, consigned them to the devil. Yet, if one considers that the devil’s “seeds” are declared to be the children of “the evil one,”4 then this passage does recall one of the weightiest passages on this topic,5 in which Christ tells hostile-minded Jews that they are “of your father the devil.” In the latter passage, it is obvious that, in accordance with the distinctive character of Hebrew language usage, expressions of this kind are employed only to convey the relationship of resemblance and solidarity. That is to say, no one would actually want to take that claim literally, because the Jews could not be descended from the devil in the same sense as they took pride in being descended from Abraham, nor could they be descended from the devil in the sense in which Christ, whom they had been mocking, had said that he had God for his father. As a result, one

cannot strictly interpret this passage overall under the presupposition that reality is to be ascribed to “the devil” without either placing the devil opposite to God in an entirely Manichean fashion or, on the other hand, calling Christ “Son of God” only in exactly the same broader sense in which those Jews could really be named “sons of the devil.” To be sure, a story regarding the devil is alluded to here, but also only as a well-known story and even then, as in the previous case, only in relation to the proper expression to the effect that they were “not of God.”6 The expression that “Satan demanded to have” the disciples “that he might sift” them7 bears the stamp of a proverbial usage, wherein one is obviously not to think of the devil as “the overlord” of the wicked. Rather, the entire phrase is derived from the book of Job. Here, as there, moreover, Satan’s relation to God is depicted in the same way. As a result, the only use made of that genuinely biblical notion is to warn, but there can be no underlying intention to teach anything about Satan or to provide confirmation of that notion. Similar proverbial usage also belongs to the phrase “Satan … gaining the advantage.”8 It is indeed used in connection with the thought of someone’s having been given over to Satan, but apart from that it is certainly usable in any case wherein something meant to be good actually turns out to be detrimental to what is good. Yet, here one would have to think not perchance of Satan, who would bring to light only what is bad, but only of someone who does battle with what is good. Clearly, hovering between these two meanings is the “roaring lion” of Peter,9 for there “to devour” signifies the activity of one’s deadly enemy, but “adversary” signifies one’s accuser. In consequence, these three passages belong together, and, viewed as a useful adoption of a figurative notion that is supremely variable, they completely supplement each other. If passages that belong together are compared, the expression “ruler of this world,” of which Christ frequently makes use,10 permits of a different interpretation just as well. It does so, at least, for even if Christ’s disciples did use this aphoristic phrase for the devil, it is uttered in passing without anything else having been advanced as distinctively Christian teaching over against popular tradition. That is to say: First, a few New Testament books do reckon Satan to have been kept away11 already from early on, whereas other indications,12 which are also, admittedly, only of dubious interpretation, assume a still ongoing war with Satan. Second, as a result, if Christ had wanted to set forth a teaching concerning the devil by means of the expressions cited above, he would have fallen short of his purpose in every respect. The temptation story is just as little suited for the purpose. Suppose that this story had also been taken to be accepted literally, as a fact, though a great deal could be marshaled against this possibility. Nevertheless, the story itself permits neither of constructing a complete notion of the devil nor of making any sort of broader use of it. In the two passages wherein special occasion is given Christ to mention the devil,13 the matter has to do with socalled possessions by the devil, thus with the natural significance of those possessions, which also generally have nothing to do with faith. However obscure the first passage might be, it does nevertheless interconnect most closely with “casting out demons.”

The second utterance, which concerns “the divided reign of Satan,” includes that same reference. Therein the figurative depiction of the return of a cast-out evil spirit, which interconnects with that utterance, is in no way meant to arouse suspicion regarding the surety of sanctification. Rather, it too has as its topic that same natural domain of possessions by the devil. Above all, moreover, it points out the distinction between the effectual and lasting healings of Christ, on the one hand, and the seeming and evanescent healings of Jewish exorcists, on the other hand. In these and all similar cases that might have occurred but that have not been passed down to us in any record, there has been just as minimal occasion to subject popular notions of the time to close examination as there could also have been any aim to employ the use that has been made of them to sanction them as divine doctrine. Now, let us consider that in his letter14 John views the interconnection between the devil and those who sin exactly as Christ did in his discourse with the Jews cited above. On this basis, one would have also to explain John’s ascribing Judas’s betrayal of Jesus to the devil in the same way—something Christ never does, however. The few apostolic passages that still remain15 are not, in any case, to be employed for didactic purposes any more than those already considered are to be. Suppose that Christ and the apostles had ever wanted to interweave “fear of the devil” into Christian piety and therewith to set forth teaching derived from this distinctive feature of religious consciousness and corresponding to this feature. Then they would, nevertheless, have had to grant proper room for this notion. This would have been the case, in the first place, whenever they were really teaching about the origin and spread of human evil in human beings in general, teaching about times when sin still remains in persons of faith, or even treating of the way in which it does; and, in the second place, whenever they were speaking of the necessity for redemption, in which case the devil’s possibly having held sway over human beings would itself somehow have necessitated sending the Son of God to deal with the situation. However, nowhere is even the slightest trace of such a case16 present, nor is any mention of the devil whatsoever to be found where sin is treated of, not even where such treatment would have been most expected.17 Nevertheless, this total silence in all actually didactic passages should itself have been attended to in a major way. 2. Thus, even if only a few scriptural passages treat of the devil, or even if all the passages actually cited here and those otherwise still reputable for the purpose treat of the devil, all grounds for taking up this notion as an enduring component in our presentation of Christian faith-doctrine would be lacking to us. Accordingly, all grounds would also be lacking for defining the notion so much more closely that everything that is ascribed to the devil could also really be considered together. This is so, for in Christ and his disciples this notion was not used as one that would be derived from the Sacred Scriptures of the old covenant, nor even as one that would be acquired from divine revelation by any pathway whatsoever. Rather, it arose from the common life of that time, thus in the same way in which it more or less arises in all of us, despite our complete ignorance as to the existence of such a being. Moreover, that wherefrom we are to be redeemed remains the same, whether the devil

exists or not, and that whereby we are redeemed also remains the same. Thus, the very question concerning the existence of the devil is also no question for Christian theology at all. Rather, it is a cosmological question, in the broadest sense of the word, exactly the same as that concerning the nature of the firmament and of heavenly bodies.18 Moreover, in a presentation of faith-doctrine we actually have just as little to affirm as to deny on this topic, and likewise we can just as little be required to hold a dispute over that notion in a presentation of faith-doctrine as to provide a grounding for it. What the biblical deposit shows is nothing more than that the notion was a confluence of two or three very different components among the Jewish people themselves. The first component is the servant of God who locates the whereabouts of wickedness,19 and who has a certain rank and work among the other angels, but of whom there can be no talk of being cast out from being near God. The other main component is the basically evil being of oriental dualism, modified in such a way that the Jews alone would have been in a position to adopt the new version. Now, to a certain degree the work attached to the first component already borders on taking some satisfaction from wickedness. Thus, by means of some such fiction as the angels’ apostasy, the first kind of work could easily transpose into the second kind, or rather the same name could easily pass over and be attached to the second kind. It can be plainly seen that sharp-minded Calvin composed his formulations based on these two features.20 Nonetheless, these formulations would also not fit together into one clear perception of the matter.21 The third feature, perhaps not quite so securely fixed but also composed of both native and foreign material, is “the angel of death,” which can also be depicted as having its realm in the underworld. On the other hand, the beings that are taken to be active in those who are “possessed” are constantly being designated differently, and they are only indirectly combined with the notion of the devil. Now, apart from the fact that this notion of the devil would have advanced by the same mode of reflection on these conditions—this by means of manifold conundrums that sudden changes of mind and heart would also have presented to us for self-observation—it has gained such a strong hold in people that one could almost say it has constantly and repeatedly been produced of itself, notably within all those who are not fit to engage in deeper investigations. This claim is plausible, in that all too often wicked stirrings do arise within us in a highly unusual and abrupt fashion, stirrings that have no connection with our main tendencies. Indeed, up to a certain point these stirrings do increase in us, without resistance. As a result, we also do believe that we have to regard them not as our own but as something alien, indeed without being able to point out any actual external stimulation. Then, just as such a largely unexpected good, the emergence of which is not traceable, would have been chiefly ascribed to the ministration of angels, so too wickedness and evil, the primary source of which would not be discoverable, has been explained based on the malicious pranks and influences of the devil and of wicked spirits. In this way, moreover, the notion of the devil is repeatedly

proffered, chiefly in relation to wickedness and at times when we reach the limit of our ability to observe. Now, in this respect, however, even Scripture then also refers us to our inner self alone, and, accordingly, our capacity for observation is also to be advanced ever further. In this way, more and more should cease to be viewable as due to the devil’s influence, thus the notion of the devil would gradually become obsolete from this point on as well. The same process applies to that interplay and cooperation of wickedness,22 whereby it seems to be revealed as a reign and a mighty force in significant instances wherein it operates as a counteraction to some sudden development of what is good. Actually, the more what is good would be established as a historical whole, the more rarely could such counteractions recur and the more they would split into tiny bits, with the result that, here too, the devil would eventually be thought of no more. On the other hand, suppose that someone should still want to set forth as Christian doctrine a belief in ongoing influences of the devil within the reign of God itself or in an enduring reign of Satan over against the reign of God.23 That person would not only be set in direct contradiction to many of the scriptural passages cited here but would also be setting forth extremely dangerous assertions. This is so, for in making the first move, at every difficult spot the person would be blocking every effort to understand all the pertinent phenomena—even the most peculiar ones—in the individual psyche, based on its own distinctiveness and on the influences of life shared in common, an effort that cannot be recommended highly enough for the sake of being blessed by God. Moreover, it would, at the same time, be providing dubious support to the already great inclination of human beings to shift blame for one’s actions from oneself. Now, it would already be bad enough if anyone wanted to neglect any care of self or others that is entrusted to oneself on account of one’s confidence in the protection of angels. Likewise, it would be still more dangerous if, instead of exercising vigorous selfexamination, one were to prefer to ascribe one’s own increase in wickedness to influences of Satan, since distinct marks and boundaries could indeed not be assigned in this regard and, consequently, unrestricted space would open up for making hugely arbitrary choices. Indeed, in the strict sense, influences of Satan could not be other than immediately internal, thus could well be magical in nature. Therefore, any real belief in such influences would have to put a stop to one’s joyful consciousness of having a sure inheritance within the reign of God. This would be the case, in that all that God’s Spirit would have effected would be surrendered to the opposing influences of the devil, and all assurance in the capacity of one’s own mind and heart to exercise care and control24 would be abrogated. Even if one were to believe only in the occurrence of such influences outside the Christian church, genuinely Christian treatment of individuals, to whom the gospel is to be proclaimed,25 would be impeded. In contrast, belief in an enduring reign of Satan, within which individual human beings would always have to be regarded as his instruments, would not only weaken the joyous tenor of one’s heart and endanger the reliability of one’s conduct but would also be injurious

to one’s Christian love. However, those who go so far as to claim that living faith in Christ would be conditioned in some way by belief in the devil might well be watchful lest they thereby debase Christ but excessively exalt themselves. This is so, for this belief always amounts to the result that redemption through Christ would have to be less of a necessity if there were no devil. Seen in this way, moreover, redemption would appear to be but a means of rescue from an external enemy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it would follow that human beings would likely know how to rescue themselves if wickedness were to have its seat in human nature alone, without any devil. Postscript.26 Yet, suppose that the discourse intended is to be not that of interconnected doctrine but of particular employments of now this, now that line of thought, all based on this same fluctuating image. Then, as long as that is the case, no Christian should be denied the following entitlement—just as everything that is contained in the actual New Testament writings would indeed also have to be present in our religious communication27 as well. That is, not only would one be entitled to visualize elements of one’s actual Christian religious28 consciousness by means of similar lines of thought, staying within the boundaries defined above. One would also be entitled to make use of this notion of the devil in religious communication. In the latter case, one can speak of the notion of the devil if one finds it to be either opportune for the purpose, or seemingly indispensable for the purpose, of making clear the positive state of being without God, thought of in and of itself. Alternatively, one can speak in this way so as to drive home the point that only with some higher assistance can one find protection against wickedness, protection here being viewed as against some force holding sway over oneself that is, in accordance with its origin, beyond the reach of one’s will and of one’s capacity for understanding. Now, as long as this notion will, in this manner, have found its bearing enduringly within the living tradition of religious language, there will also be a liturgical usage of it, here and there. In all its various relations, however, this usage must all the more necessarily hold to the typus29 of Scripture as any deviation from that typus would engender greater confusion. This holding to that typus all the more strongly, on the one hand, the more people’s receptivity to the notion will have abated over time but, on the other hand, the more liturgical communication of it will have come closer to a rigorous, scientific character, in part, and, in part, come closer to the kind of authority that is invested in creedal symbols. Hence, the freest usage of the notion of “devil,” also the least objectionable usage, is that of the poetic kind. This is the case, for in poetic discourse personification of notions is entirely appropriate; hence, in and of itself, making robust use of this notion to express certain religious dispositions cannot readily arouse much concern lest it be to some disadvantage. Thus, it might be considered not only pointless if someone should want to banish the notion of the devil even from our Christian treasury of songs but also not readily supportable.30

1. Akkommodation. 2. “The evil one” in Matt. 13:19, “the devil” in Luke. 3. Ed. note: Only in 1 Tim. 3:7, one of the many words used very rarely in the New Testament that Schleiermacher found in his critical study 1 Timothy (1807), this time referring to the devil. 4. Matt. 13:38: “sons of the evil one.” 5. John 8:44. Ed. note: See sermon on John 8:39–45 in the series on John, June 5, 1825, in SW II.9 (1847), 108–22. 6. John 8:47. 7. Luke 22:31. Ed. note: In a marginal note (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher refers to this usage as “paronomyous”—that is, a word having an allied root or derivation. 8. 2 Cor. 2:11. 9. 1 Pet. 5:8. 10. John 12:31: “Now shall the ruler of this world be cast out”; John 14:30: “The ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me”; John 16:11: “The ruler of this world is judged.” Ed. note: Or “prince” (Fürst). 11. 2 Pet. 2:4, Jude 6. Ed. note: Gebundensein. In both passages, the fallen “angels” are taken to have been kept “in chains” and sequestered—eternally or “in the nether gloom” until judgment day, respectively. 12. 2 Cor. 12:7; Eph. 6:11–12. 13. Luke 10:18 and Matt. 12:43//Luke 11:14[–26]. 14. 1 John 3:8. 15. 2 Cor. 4:4 and 11:14; 2 Thess. 2:9. 16. Surely the passage in Heb. 2:14–15 is little suited to this purpose, for neither does it say of the devil that he holds sway over human beings—rather, only over death, so that here one thinks above all of the angel of death—nor does it say of human beings that they would slavishly succumb to the devil—rather, only that they would slavishly succumb to the fear of death. 17. Cf. Matt. 15:19; Rom. 5:12–19 and 7:7ff.; Jas. 1:12. 18. Ed. note: At that time, both of these terms were used only in devotional or wholly speculative contexts, regarded to be things not closely observable. The “firmament” was the entirety of the night skies, the “heavens,” and those could as yet be only minimally penetrated through primitive telescopes. What shone could be considered to be “world bodies,” but all but a few were therefore totally unobservable “heavenly bodies.” In the view Schleiermacher was representing, evidences of a devil were no less obscure; in fact, they seemed to be even more obscure. 19. Böse. 20. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 1.14.17–18: “As for the discord and strife that we say exists between Satan and God, we ought to accept as a fixed certainty the fact that he can do nothing unless God wills and assents to it. For we read in the history of Job that he presented himself before God to receive his commands and did not dare undertake any evil act without having obtained permission. … 18. Now, because God bends the unclean spirits hither and thither at will, he so governs their activity that these exercise believers in conflict.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 175–76; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1957), 167– 68, and CR 30:128. This quotation is somewhat longer than Schleiermacher’s but contains the same elements. 21. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “How is an impius [nonreligious] being to be distinguished [from a religious being] prior to its deliverance?—The ‘deliverance’ is a figure of speech, otherwise the condition could not have been removed by forgiveness” (Thönes, 1873). The deliverance mentioned is to Satan—1 Cor. 5:5 RSV: “You are to deliver this man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.” 22. §43.1. 23. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here offers material not included elsewhere here. “The dangers inherent in setting forth any dogmatic presentation of this notion. Nota bene: Can we say that belief in the devil would be implicated in Christ’s God-consciousness?—Nothing about that in discourses that Christ directed to the apostles; nothing in his highpriestly prayer, also nothing in his singling out Judas; nothing where he applies the prophets” (Thönes, 1873). 24. Ed. note: Leitung. “Care and control,” or “to lead, guide, and govern.” The corresponding category for the community of faith is “church leadership” (Kirchenleitung), which is the purpose all theology is meant to serve, in Schleiermacher’s view (cf. BO §§3–20). Such leadership, in both “ministry” and “governance,” he expected to become increasingly more nearly equally shared among theologically competent clergy and laity (cf. Brief Outline §§3, 236, and 267–70). Seelenleitung (“care of souls”) is the focal aim of Kirchenleitung in both ministry (or service—both translate Dienst) and governance (or polity and administration, Kirchenregiment). Hence, both care and control, especially selfcontrol, are involved at the individual level. 25. Ed. note: When Schleiermacher uses the word “proclaim” (verkündigen), in general terms, he always means by word and deed, beginning with the self-proclamation of Jesus (cf. §§91–93 and 100–101).

26. Ed. note: “Good advice for nondogmatic treatment” heads this postscript in Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873). 27. Ed. note: The broader concept “religious communication” (religiösen Mitteilung) is used here, not frommen (“pious,” or “religious” in the narrower sense that refers to the deeper roots of the entire scope of piety and religious communication in feeling and perception). 28. Ed. note: Here the word frommen serves for the narrower sense of “religion” or “piety” just indicated in §45n27. 29. Ed. note: The Latinate German word Typus is also a term of use in English, though one rarely seen. Here it refers to the standard kind of meaning generally to be found in the New Testament—in this case ordinarily figurative and not part of any teaching, as Schleiermacher has taken some pains to show in §§44–45. 30. Ed. note: Schleiermacher no doubt faced this practical problem during the several years he had just devoted to a new revision of the Berliner Gesangbuch (Berlin, 1830), a major, much-celebrated contribution to German hymnody.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding Preservation

§46. Religious self-consciousness—by virtue of which we locate all that bestirs us and influences us within our absolute dependence on God—wholly coincides with our discernment that precisely all of this is conditioned and determined by the interconnected process of nature.1 1. In no way is it to be asserted that the “religious self-consciousness” just referred to also actually arises with every stirring of sensory self-consciousness. This is no more the case than that every sense perception also actually brings “the interconnected process of nature” to mind. In contrast, whenever some objective consciousness arrives at the degree of clarity indicated in our proposition, we also posit2 the interconnectedness of nature, in turn, as something entirely general and as something no less determinative even of all that in connection with which the “discernment”3 of this interconnected process of nature, mentioned above, has not reached consciousness in us. By the same token, in those instances in which religious self-consciousness does occur, we recognize that those instances in which it has not occurred are incomplete states. Moreover, we posit the feeling of dependence, because we also refer that feeling of dependence to our own being already, inasmuch as we are parts of the world, just as we regard it to be true of all other such being, without exception. It is also no more the case, however, that our proposition should fall short of the concept of preservation, though in accordance with the nature of self-consciousness it is limited to what affects us and, to be sure, in a direct sense is limited only to those movements and changes of things which stir us, not the things themselves and their internal being. That is to say, every stimulus that is directed to sense perception and knowledge, both of which do have the properties and being and nature of things for their objects, also starts off with some stirring of self-consciousness. This stirring then also accompanies the operation of cognition from that point on. In this sense, then, the being and nature of things do also indirectly belong to that which affects us. Now, within these bounds our proposition admits of no distinction. Rather, with respect to each and every thing we are to feel their absolute dependence on God, and to share that feeling, to the same extent that we conceive each and every thing to be completely conditioned by the interconnected process of nature. In relation to this view, however, we do find the entirely opposing notion—that these two states do not coincide but are rather mutually exclusive—to be very widespread. That is, it is asserted that the more clearly we conceive something in its complete conditionality4 to exist through the interconnected process of nature, the less are we able to arrive at a feeling of its absolute dependence on God; and, conversely, the more lively this feeling of absolute dependence is, the more we would have to leave the role of that interconnected process of

nature in this feeling undecided. It is plain to see, however, that from our standpoint and in agreement with all that has been established thus far, such a contrast between the two states cannot be validated. This is so, for in that case, if we were to reach consummate knowledge of the world, the development of religious consciousness in ordinary life would have to cease entirely, because at that point everything would constantly present itself in terms of the interconnected process of nature, which would be entirely contrary to our presupposition that piety is an essential component of human nature. Moreover, on the other hand, our love of piety would, conversely, have to strive against all zeal for research and all advancement of our knowledge of nature, which would be wholly opposed to the proposition that sense perception regarding the creation leads to consciousness of God. Furthermore, already, even before the consummation of both tendencies, every person most knowledgeable about nature would always have to be religious least of all, and vice versa. Now, in the human psyche the tendency toward having knowledge of the world, however, is just as essential as is the tendency toward having God-consciousness. Thus, it can only be a pseudo-wisdom that would want to cancel out piety, and it would be a misconceived piety for love of which the advancement of knowledge would be taken to be obstructed. The sole pretext that can be given for the assertion we are now examining is simply the circumstance that as a rule, to be sure, the more strongly objective consciousness comes to the fore in a given instance, the more self-consciousness will be suppressed in that same instance, and vice versa. This happens because, in the second case, in being more occupied with ourselves we tend to lose touch with any object affecting us, just as, in the first case, we tend toward being totally absorbed in the object. Emphasizing one activity over the other activity, however, does not prevent either of these activities’ stimulating and passing over to the other activity once it has been satisfied. Patently, moreover, one would wrongly rely on the claim that as a general experience what is not comprehended would, as such, always stimulate us more than what is understood to be a stirring of religious feeling. As an example for this claim, people most love to cite the prodigious natural phenomena produced by elemental forces; yet, even the greatest confidence with which we accept any sort of hypothetical explanation of these impressive phenomena still does not put a stop to that religious feeling. The reason why those phenomena so prominently and readily stimulate religious feeling lies rather in the inscrutable complexity of their effects, both beneficial and destructive, on human existence and on the works of human art, thus in the aroused consciousness of our own efficacious action being conditioned by powers5 of a general nature. Precisely this consciousness, however, is indeed the fullest recognition of the allencompassing scope of the interconnected process of nature, and so this observation too could be used in just the opposite way, to support our proposition. In another way, it is indeed a sign of human laziness to favor referring what is not understood directly to the supernatural. At that point, however, this referral to the supernatural does not belong to the tendency toward piety at all. Rather, in that Supreme Being is then thought to substitute in place of the interconnected process of nature, one finds oneself in the tendency toward knowledge, just as, in this sense too, not everything but only

what is incomprehensible is then placed in such an immediate dependence on God. Hence, based on this attitude, people have just as easily invented morally evil and destructive powers holding sway over them as they have traced certain events back to powers of the highest good. This fact directly suggests that this sort of linkage to the “supernatural” has not proceeded from the interest of piety, in that by such a juxtaposition the unity and wholeness belonging to the relationship of dependence is unavoidably destroyed. Still further, in that we posit everything that bestirs us as an object of this religious consciousness, even what is in itself miniscule and least significant is not excluded from the relationship of absolute dependence. On this point, however, the following comments are to be made. On the one hand, not infrequently an improper value is placed on an explicit referral to this relationship even of the tiniest particular. On the other hand, often we resist such a reference with no greater justification. The first mistaken maneuver occurs in the opinion that even the smallest item must be expressly ordained by God, particularly because very often the most prominent item arises from the smallest. This opinion is mistaken, for the saying, so frequently heard, that great events issue from small causes, seems to be but an empty play of fantasy, though by no means an unquestionable one. This is so, in that thereby attention is simply distracted from the general interconnected process of nature, in which the true causes do actually lie. A pure calculation can be drawn up only on the basis of equivalence between cause and effect, whether this be in the historical domain or in that of nature, and in each instance only in well-defined relations may particular changes, along with their own causes, be extracted from the general interconnected process of nature and put on their own hook. As soon as religious feeling is combined with such an observation, however, it must revert to the general interconnected process of nature, this, as it were, so as not to impute to God an activity that is segregated off and partitioned,6 in the way human activity can be. The second mistaken maneuver, which lies in a sense of resistance to referring the relationship of absolute dependence to the tiniest particular, is grounded in one’s worrying that piety could become sacrilegious if reduced to arbitrariness in insignificant matters—for example, over which foot one should put down first—and to mere happenstance in matters that have no serious import—such as winning or losing in games and competitions—by considering that they too must be ordained by God. Yet, what is disproportionate in both kinds of instance lies not in the given object but simply in the way it is observed—that is, in the isolating of particular cases, since in cases of the first kind seeming arbitrariness is always simply a particular expression, in part, for an overall situation from which many things of the same kind follow and, in part, for a more general law by which a manifold set of similar things is regulated. Moreover, in cases of the second kind, the outcome is always subsumed under a single will that they are taken to share. Neither of these kinds of cases can be regarded as insignificant. Thus, there will be nothing against their also being considered to be included within the concept “absolute dependence on God.”

2. Now, if we consider our proposition purely in and of itself, in its entire compass, it must also be directly evident to anyone who grants in general terms, as a settled rule of experience, that the feeling of absolute dependence can be aroused by influences on our sensory self-consciousness. This is so, for that feeling rises to its fullest extent when we identify ourselves with the entire world in our self-consciousness and feel ourselves also to be no less dependent, so to speak, than this world is as a whole. This identification, however, can prosper in us only to the degree that we combine in thought all that is divided and segregated off in appearance and, by means of this conjoining, posit everything as one. Within this all-oneness of finite being the most complete and most all-encompassing interconnected process of nature is posited at this point. Thus, if we feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent, as this whole complex is, then these two things wholly coincide: the fullest conviction that everything is completely conditioned by and grounded in the totality of the interconnected process of nature and the inner surety regarding the absolute dependence of all that is finite on God. Now, from this overall condition follow, at the same time, the possibility of religious selfconsciousness for every element of objective consciousness and the possibility of a consummate world-consciousness for every element of a religious self-consciousness. That is to say, as concerns the second possibility, wherever a religious feeling has truly arisen, an interconnected process of nature is also always posited there already. Accordingly, without detriment to that feeling, the effort to pursue this posited interconnected process of nature further, as well as the effort to bring it to the point of having a notion of the whole world, can be effective to the degree that generally the tendency toward piety7 is dominant. Likewise, as concerns the first possibility, wherever an objective notion is present, an aroused selfconsciousness is always present there as well, and on this basis, without detriment to that notion, religious self-consciousness can develop, along with the notion of the whole world that is more or less clearly coposited within it, to the degree that the tendency toward cognition generally dominates in each person. Now, if we imagine both tendencies to be fully formed in one human being, then each tendency would also call forth the other with complete ease. As a result, each thought, viewed as part of the concept “world,” would lead that person toward the most unalloyed religious feeling possible, and each religious feeling, viewed as called forth by some part of the world, would lead that person toward the fullest notion of the world possible. Conversely, if either tendency would not call forth the other, but either tendency would curtail the other in some fashion, then the more completely developed one tendency would be, the more it would have to cancel out the other tendency. Now, it has constantly been recognized by the most rigorous dogmaticians8 precisely that divine preservation, viewed as the absolute dependence of all occurrences and changes on God, and natural causation, viewed as the complete conditionality of all that happens through the general interconnected process of nature, are neither sundered from nor curtailed by each other; rather, they recognize that the two are the same thing, only regarded from different viewpoints.

Anyone who nonetheless wants to find a semblance of pantheism in this position might simply consider the following. As long as wisdom concerning the world9 sets forth no formulation generally recognized to be valid for expressing the relationship between God and the world, so in the domain of dogmatics too, as soon as its talk is no longer about the origination of the world but is about its coexistence with God and its being related to God, a wavering cannot be avoided between formulations that approximate more toward a blended identity of the two and formulations that approximate more toward a contrasting severance between them. Further, so as not to confuse oneself in this manner, one ought simply to pay better attention to the difference between general and particular causes. This is so, for within the totality of finite being only a particular and partial causality befits each individual item, in that each is dependent not on one other item but on all other items; general causality exists only in that source whereupon the totality of this divided causality is itself dependent. Postscript. The method of division10 in forming faith-doctrine, originally employed among the medieval scholastics, has broken up our simple proposition into a mass of distinct parts and specified sections, this in a most multiply categorized fashion. Moreover, there are so many of these components that it becomes rather a matter of indifference which we choose so as to try to show in what sort of relationship they stand to our own presentation. Now, some scholars have divided the concept “preservation,” which our proposition expresses as one undivided whole, into three parts: general preservation, which refers to the entire world, viewed as a unity, special preservation, which refers to the species, and most special preservation, which refers to particular things. For the purpose, this classification already seems not to be formed in the interest of piety, from which everything is nonetheless to proceed here, because it leads to the question, which entirely belongs to natural science, as to whether there might be something in the world that is not to be brought under the concept of “species.” However, suppose that this question has to be answered in the affirmative, so that the classification would also have to be expanded. Then, for all that, “general” preservation would still encompass everything else, and, since our basic feeling would rest only on the finitude of being in the world overall, any strict division11 of categories would be superfluous for us. Another aim to be served by this sort of classification can be anticipated, however, if one takes note of the addition that is usually made to the third member indicated here, namely, that God preserves particular things in their mode of existence and their powers as long as God wills to do so. The reasons given are threefold: First, species, viewed in terms of the reproduction of particular things, are intransitory in a way. Thus, people have wanted to establish a distinction between what is relatively permanent and what is transitory. Meanwhile, for those who assume a beginning and end of the world, there is no reason at all to make a sharp distinction between the world and particular things. In any case, however, our proposition has just as well to hold true of the world’s beginning and of its end. Second, we pretty much know, regarding our world, that species have existed that are no longer present and that present species have not always existed. Thus, our proposition must extend to all of these species as well. It thus expresses nothing other than that finite things’ being

temporal or enduring is also to be thought of only in their being absolutely dependent on God. Third, the endurance of particular things, as well as of things that are of a general nature, is nothing other than the expression of the sum total of their power in the coexistence of each with all the rest. Thus, nothing is contained in the addition to the third member that we just referred to, observed in and of itself, that our proposition would not also say. As it is formulated, however, it could very easily provoke an opinion that, at some point or other, God’s will to preserve would begin or cease to operate. Thus, against that opinion, the prefatory answer must be given that in preservation as much as in creation, God would have to remain apart from all the means and occasions that belong to time. Another allied classification lies in people’s distinguishing between God’s preservation and God’s cooperation. This distinction, however, is not made in the same way by all teachers of faith-doctrine who use it, in that some refer the term “preservation” only to matter and form, reserving “cooperation” to refer to powers and actions, while others relate “preservation” to the mode of existence and powers of things and relate “cooperation” only to activities. Yet, it is not to be overlooked that a suggestion lies hidden in the term “cooperation” that within what is finite there might be an efficacious action existing in and of itself, therefore independent of God’s preserving activity. This suggestion must be entirely avoided and not, as one might suppose, be retained simply under the cover of its indefiniteness.12 Thus, let us suppose that such a distinction is not made and that the powers of things are something no more apart from the divine activity of preservation than is their being, which latter could still be split up, by means of an abstraction that does not belong here, into matter and form. Then the distinction between preservation and cooperation would also be rooted only in an abstraction. This is the case, for any being that is to be posited in and of itself actually exists only where there is power, just as power unexceptionably exists only in the activity of some being. Thus, a preservation that does not, at the same time, include in itself the fact that all activities of any finite being of any sort are positioned under the concept “absolute dependence on God” would, by the same token, be just as empty as a creation lacking in any preservation. Likewise, if one should imagine a cooperation without the being of things over their entire duration being dependent on God, this being of things could also have been independent at its very first instant, and this status would indeed amount to a preservation such that it would not include creation within it but such that the creation would not be posited in it either. Now, the following observation also belongs here, that even teachers of faith-doctrine who have, as a whole, very correctly framed the subject have nonetheless been led to depict cooperation as something more direct than preservation.13 They do this in such a way that they still separate activities of finite beings from any preservation of powers that is engendered from some divine efficacious action. Thereby, strictly speaking, they, in turn, trace preservation of powers back to nothing, since in the domain of the interconnected process of nature this preservation is still repeatedly dependent on the activities that issue from the rest of things. Thus, in the domain that pertains to absolute dependence on God, one

can only say that everything is directly mediated and directly unmediated, the first in the one relation and the second in the other relation. Some then directly combine the concept “divine government” with these two concepts. To a certain extent, however, the intended meaning is a fulfillment of divine decrees14 or a guidance of all things toward meeting divine ends, and by these assertions is to be understood something different from the view that, by means of all powers that are distributed and preserved in the world, everything happens or can happen as God originally and continually willed it—for the latter view is also already contained in our proposition. To that extent, then, we cannot treat of the concept of divine government at this point.15 This is so in that here, where we have to do only with an overall description of the feeling of absolute dependence, a reflection based on the contrast between purpose and means must be completely excluded, this quite apart from the issue of whether such a contrast can apply to God. That is to say, on the one hand, for our Christian religious self-consciousness it could be only the reign of God that is to be grounded by redemption, in any case, thus something that lies beyond our present reflection, whereto everything else is related as to its purpose. On the other hand, however, if our self-consciousness is nonetheless to represent finite being overall at present, herewith purpose and means would be related as that-which-is-posited-for-its-own-sake versus that-which-does-not-exist-for-its-own-sake, thus actually as that-which-is-willed-byGod versus that-which-is-not-willed-by-God16—herewith a contrast that would have to be taken up into our religious self-consciousness but of which our present reflection knows nothing. Thus, the only thing that this concept of divine governance could offer us here would be the following. To the extent that divine preservation, viewed as cooperation, is referred only to the powers and activities of every being that is to be posited as operating of itself, we require a counterpart to stand for the passive conditions of finite things. Now, these passive states are components just as essential for the attaining of divine purposes, and thus the absolute dependence of these passive states is also included within the concept of government. Yet, at this point even this consideration is superfluous. Such is the case, for, in the first place, passive states are already also assumed under the concept “absolute dependence” and, in the second place, they are also included in our general proposition. The first reason is applicable, since preservation has the being of things as its object, but in this being of things is contained the contrast between self-initiated activity and receptivity—this insofar as these things are a locus for exercise of powers and the passive states are also already assumed under the concept “absolute dependence.” The second reason is especially applicable, since these states belong to what affects our self-consciousness, both under the form of sense perception and under that of compassion,17 thus they are also included in our general proposition. In addition, however, on the one hand, the passive states of one thing are simply what has proceeded from the active states of other things; and, on the other hand, the way in which the active states of things successively arise from each other and in what strength they appear depend on two things. They depend not alone on the distinctive mode in

which a given thing exists but also on the actual engagement of each thing with others, consequently on the influences of other things and on the given thing’s passive states. Hence, one could imagine that one would perhaps form a still better differentiation if one were to say that if placed under the concept “absolute dependence on God,” it would be a matter of indifference what arises from each thing’s being posited as existing of itself in accordance with its distinctive nature and what arises from its coexistence with everything else. Even this claim, however, would simply be an abstraction without any significance for our religious self-consciousness, for there the two processes, each viewed as a source of stimulation, are not distinguished from each other at all. Moreover, we would therefore do better to garner everything that bestirs our consciousness into the notion of finite being that is only relatively posited as existing of itself and that is itself conditioned through the general coexistence of things even in its being segregated from the rest. This notion is simply the very same thing as what our proposition designates by the expression “interconnected process of nature.”18

1. Ed. note: In what guiding and protecting activity can God be seen to engage in the world God has created? The basis for further exploration of this question is set forth in the remaining propositions of Part One (through §61). The whole of Part One deals with what is presupposed in Christian religious self-consciousness regarding God’s activity in and through the world, taken as a whole. This whole, of course, includes the nature and history of human beings, to be taken up more directly in Part Two, where the focus is placed on redemption accomplished in Christ, thus on the contrast between sin and grace. Where, then, does the traditional doctrine of “divine providence” lie in all of this? The answer has to be: everywhere! This would appear to be the main reason for Schleiermacher’s rare use of the term itself. In his view, there can be no separate locus for this doctrine (cf. §164.3). In Part One it is represented especially in his accounts of God’s activity with respect to “preservation” (Erhaltung). See also §46n18. 2. Ed. note: “Posit” (setzen) stands for what Christians are thought to “presuppose” (voraussetzen) in their religious selfconsciousness, or affective states. In §32 Schleiermacher affirms that this positing is “the only way that in general terms, our own being and the infinite being of God can exist as one [eines sein kann] in self-consciousness.” 3. Einsicht. 4. Bedingtheit. Ed. note: That is, in the unexceptionable restriction that it places on our existence, by virtue of which we are dependent on it. 5. Potenzen. Ed. note: This term appears to be one borrowed from mathematics, a field in which Schleiermacher was quite adept; otherwise Kräfte would have been used. The term suggests higher and higher exponents of power, beyond ordinary comprehension, perhaps beyond any at present. 6. Vereinzelte und geteilte. Ed. note: That is, split off from the exquisite interconnectedness of the whole and split up into arbitrary divisions. In the next paragraph, “isolated” (Isolieren) seems roughly to stand for both descriptions, a word now chiefly used in the nominative for operations like “insulating,” “screening,” and “quarantining.” 7. Ed. note: In this sentence all the texts have Erkennen (cognition) here; but at this exact spot in the first edition of 1821 the word is quite appropriately Frömmigkeit (piety), in counterpoint to Erkennen in the contrast being offered here. In turn, development of each of the two tendencies is dependent on that of the other tendency, even when the other tendency is dominant. 8. Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), Theologia didactico-polemica, sive systema theologicum (1685–1690), Tome 1, 761: “Thus, that the same effect is produced not by God alone nor by creation alone but by one and the same efficient power from God and creation at the same time. … I say that this (concurrent) act is not prior to the action of a secondary cause nor subsequent to it, … but the act is such that it is included most profoundly in that very action of creation rather than that same action’s being of creation alone.” Page 762 states: “One action is not on its own the influence of God and the other the work of creation, but there is one indivisible action regarding both and depending both on God as the general cause and on creation as the particular cause.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice. 9. Weltweisheit. Ed. note: This word is a familiar substitute or synonym for “philosophy” (which is itself literally “the love of wisdom”).

10. Spaltende. Ed. note: This important, generally authentic method of dividing up (spaltende Methode) subject matter for closer examination was an analytic tool first laid out and demonstrated by Socrates. By the period of the scholastics it had sometimes reached an extreme, artificial form, later widely associated pejoratively with their name, called “hairsplitting” (Haarespaltende). Here Schleiermacher seems to leave the extent of its value itself open to examination, though ironically giving examples of the more extreme kind. 11. Zerteilung. 12. As does Friedrich Nathanael Morus (1736–1792), Commentarius exegetico-historicus in suam theologiae christianae epitomen (1797–1798), Tome 1, 306: “For limits are not set by the extent to which the sun has an effect, or the farmer, or where God may begin. … God effects by aiding and by setting bounds, so that his plan may be carried out.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 13. Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), Theologia didactico-polemica, sive systema theologicum (1685–1690), Tome 1.c, 760: “It should be observed that God not only gives the power of acting to secondary causes and also preserves it but that he directly influences the action and effect of creation.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 14. Morus, Commentarius, Tome 1, 319: “Governance is the work of God, effective in such a way that his plan may be carried out.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 15. Ed. note: Thus, a discussion of the divine government of the world is postponed to a point in the presentation of doctrine by which it has been fully prepared for, under the rubric of “the divine wisdom” (§§168–69). Regiergung may be translated either as “government” or as “governance,” as may Regiment for administrative activities in the church (Kirchenregiment vs. Kirchenleitung, the latter word meaning overall “church leadership”). 16. [W]ie das um sein selbst willen gesezte und das nicht um sein selbst willen, eigentlich also wie das von Gott gewollte und nicht gewollte. 17. Ed. note: That is, both sense perception (Wahrnehmung) and compassion (Mitgefühl—literally, a feeling with or for another or shared with another). The first is a precondition for all other types, and levels of perception (Anschauung) are included. The second becomes a critically important component in Christ’s redemptive work and in the life and work of the church. Mitgefühl can also be translated “sympathy,” but in Schleiermacher’s theological usage it is more than what is usually meant by that. It reaches out, empathically and actively, to the other. 18. Ed. note: Part One only begins to present what some have called the doctrine of divine providence, which is present everywhere in the system, not in any special place (see §46n1). In Part One it appears in his explication of the following sets of concepts: (1) for Christians the fundamentally important, advanced “feeling of absolute dependence,” which always includes a sense for “the interconnected process of nature” (Naturzusammenhang) (§47); (2) “stirrings within selfconsciousness” that express either “restraints against life” or “promotions of life” and the tracing of both either to “the mechanism of nature” or to the exercise of “freedom,” each of these being “ordained by God” (§§48–49); (3) God’s “absolute causality” as activity to which the feeling of absolute dependence refers, a causality equal in scope to the whole interconnected process of nature but to be distinguished from it (§51), and, couched in these terms, God’s “eternity” (re: time), “omnipresence” (re: space), “omnipotence” (realized within though contrasted with all “finite causality”), and “omniscience” (re: spirituality) (§§52–56); (4) belief in an “original perfection” of human nature and of the rest of the world (a concept holding that all conditions for the development and expression of the human spirit are at hand, not conditions of a golden age, as well as conditions for the experience of “God-consciousness”) (§§57–61). Thus, in neither part of the system of doctrine is there any suggestion of a divine providential activity that is independent of “the divine government of the world” as a whole—no pipeline-grace, as it were, and no miracles of the sort that would deviate from the natural order. See also §46n1 and §47n5.

§47. Based on the interest of piety, it is never possible for a need to arise to conceive a fact in such a way that the fact’s being conditioned by the interconnected process of nature1 would be absolutely annulled by its dependence on God. 1. This proposition is so much a direct consequence of the preceding one that achieving a natural progression would not at all have required expressly setting it forth. However, notions that are, to a certain degree, still widely held in the Christian church have to be carefully examined at the appropriate place in every systematic account of faith-doctrine. Now, regarding “miracles,” a notion of miracles that are implicated in the origination of Christianity, or that are at least somehow reported in Scripture, is still quite familiar, and the

notion is that they are precisely events of the sort that our proposition describes. Moreover, teachers of faith-doctrine have long treated the issue in a general way, since if the notion is itself untenable, it also cannot be assigned to this or that particular fact. Here we do not have to adjudge the possibility of miracles in and of itself, however, but have only to consider the relationship of accepting the possibility of miracles to the feeling of absolute dependence. That is to say, if the matter stands as our proposition states, then in our domain we will seek to apprehend every fact, as long as may be possible, with reference to the interconnected process of nature and without detriment to it.2 Now, some have presented miracle, defined in this way, to be necessary for providing a complete exposition of divine omnipotence.3 However, on the one hand, it is difficult to grasp how omnipotence was ever to be more fully demonstrated in relation to interruptions within the interconnected process of nature than in the original unchanging course of it that is yet indeed also in accordance with divine order. This is difficult to grasp, since indeed the capacity to change things within what is ordered is only a prerogative of one who effects order in instances where the orderer faces a necessity to change. This necessity to change, in turn, can be grounded only in an incompleteness both in the orderer and in the orderer’s works. So, suppose that someone wanted to postulate such an intervention as a prerogative of Supreme Being. In that case, one would first have to assume that something not ordered by Supreme Being would exist that could be placed in opposition to Supreme Being and thus could intervene in the very being and work of Supreme Being. If we assumed this, our basic feeling would then be entirely contravened. On the other hand, yet to be considered is the fact that our basic feeling appears to be most weak and ineffectual precisely when such a notion of miracles is most often employed—that is, in circumstances where there is as yet little acquaintance with nature. In contrast, the more widespread authentic information about nature is—thus, the more sparingly such a concept of miracle is employed—the more does that honoring of God which is an expression of our basic feeling arise. It then follows from this consideration that the most comprehensive exposition regarding divine omnipotence would occur in terms of a conception of the world that would make no use of this notion of miracle at all. Along this line, others4 have more shrewdly, but hardly more tenably, defended the matter in such a way that, in part, God would have needed miracle in order thereby to countermand the influences of free causes in the course of nature and, in part, God could generally have had reasons to remain in “direct” contact with the world. Now, the latter position, in part, presupposes an entirely lifeless view of divine preservation; in part, it presupposes an overall contrast between indirect and direct activity in God, which contrast cannot be conceived without lowering Supreme Being into the sphere of limited intelligence. The first position almost sounds as if free causes were not also objects of divine preservation —and indeed, they are objects of divine preservation, just as the concept of preservation also implies the concept of creation, in such a way that they are both included and sustained within all that is absolutely dependent on God. That is to say, if free causes thus came to be and are sustained, then for God there can no more arise a necessity to countermand their

influences than to countermand the influences that one power of nature that has no will exercises on the area of another one. Neither, however, does anyone understand by the world that is the object of divine preservation the mechanism of nature alone; rather, this world includes the intertwining of this mechanism and freely acting beings, with the result that each of the two is inclusive of the other. Furthermore, the biblical miracles, for the sake of which this whole theory has been set forth, are much too isolated and encompass too little in their content to have a usable theory in relation to them, a theory that has posed for these miracles the task of restoring what free beings would have altered in the mechanism of nature. Rather, only one miracle, the sending of Christ,5 definitely bears the purpose of restoring6 what free causes have changed, but in their own area, not in that of the mechanism of nature and also not against the course of nature originally ordered by God. Nor does it serve the interest of piety to insist that any restorative free cause that occurs within the domain of phenomena must relate to the interconnected process of nature differently than other free causes do.7 Still, it is possible to advance two other reasons for the sake of which there can be an interest of piety in an absolute abrogation of the interconnected process of nature by miracle. Moreover, it cannot be denied that it is precisely for these reasons—even though they have never actually been set forth as ecclesial doctrine—that this notion of miracles has, nonetheless, kept at least a practical hold on many Christians. The first reason is “prayer being heard,”8 because this very act would really seem to mean something only if, on account of the prayer, an outcome ensues that is different from what would have arisen otherwise, thus an outcome wherein there appears to lie an annulling of an event that would have resulted in accordance with the interconnected process of nature. The other reason is “regeneration,”9 which tends to be presented as a “new creation” and thus, in part, may require an annulling of the same sort and, in part, may import into the interconnected process of nature a principle10 that does not comport with preserving activity. These two subjects cannot be fully discussed at this point. However, it will suffice to remark with respect to the first subject, which has more to do with piety in general terms, that our proposition also places prayer itself under divine preservation. As a result, prayer and its fulfillment or nonfulfillment are only aspects of the same original divine ordering; consequently, to think that a “being would otherwise have been different” is simply an empty thought. As concerns the other subject, here we need only to rebuff something already mentioned above. That is to say, if God’s revelation in Christ must not be considered to be something absolutely supernatural, then Christian piety too cannot be defined in advance to hold that anything that is associated with that revelation or that emerges from it is absolutely supernatural.11 2. The closer determinations, by which the assumption of such miracles is to be brought into connection with statements and concepts that designate the total dependence of the interconnected process of nature on God, very clearly give rise to the recognition of how little that notion of miracle is required by our religious stirrings. This is so, for the more definitely these stirrings intend to establish the existence of an absolute miracle, the farther

away it is from being an expression of any religious stirring and the more something of a very different stamp enters in the place of genuine dogmatic content.12 In general, this topic can be most readily surveyed if one proceeds from two observations. The first observation is the following. Since anything in relation to which a miracle would come about would be bound together with all finite causes, every absolute miracle would severely disturb the entire interconnected process of nature. The second observation is that one can look at such a miracle from two points of view: a positive one, which extends into the whole future, and a negative one, which in a certain sense affects the entire past. That is, the latter would be the case in that what would have resulted from the totality of finite causes in accordance with the interconnected process of nature would not actually occur. Thus, an effect that would have happened would be blocked, and indeed this blocking would occur not by the influx of other finite causes countering it in a natural fashion, and thus present within the interconnected process of nature, but in spite of all effectual causes working in accord to bring about this effect. Therefore, everything that ever contributed to this end would, to a certain degree, be annihilated, and instead of installing at that spot within the entire interconnected process of nature only a single supernatural event, as one would actually want to have it, one would have to cancel out the concept of “nature” entirely. Now, the positive point of view is that something would have to result that cannot be comprehended based on the totality of finite causes. However, in that this result of an absolute miracle would enter into the inter-connected process of nature as an active component, in all future time everything would become different than it would have been if this particular miracle had not occurred. Moreover, not only would this absolute miracle annul the entire interconnected process of nature that belongs to the original ordering for all future time, but every subsequent miracle would also annul all earlier ones insofar as they had already entered into the series of effectual causes. Then, however, in order to describe the origination of what would follow, one would have to introduce the possibility of a divine influence apart from any natural causes.13 Yet, at whatever point one would also want to introduce this divine efficacious action as toward something particular—which action would always have to appear to be something magical—at that point one would conjure up a number of possible ways in which the same result could have been effected by natural causes if they had been arrayed to that end at the opportune time. The outcome would be that either one would be led to a purely epideictic14 intention behind miracles, for the sake of which God would intentionally not have arranged the interconnected process of nature in such a way that the entirety of what God wills would proceed from it—against which the above discussion concerning the relationship of omnipotence to this concept of miracle was directed. Or, if the totality of finite causes could not be arranged in this way, the outcome would be that then even what is not to be conceived as coming from the interconnected process of nature could never rightly arouse in us a feeling of the absolute dependence of all that is finite. Now, others believe that they can more readily establish this notion of absolute miracles if from the very outset they classify divine cooperation into an ordinary type and an

extraordinary type—which is only seemingly different from a subordinate type—and then they would assign the ordinary type to natural operations and the extraordinary type to supernatural operations. As a result, the negative aspect of miracle would consist in the withdrawal of ordinary cooperation.15 In contrast, the positive aspect would consist in the entry of extraordinary cooperation. On the one hand, then, ordinary cooperation would, nevertheless, no longer be ordinary if it could be withdrawn and would no longer be at all distinctly different from extraordinary cooperation. Rather, we would then call more frequent occurrences “ordinary” and rare occurrences “extraordinary,” a relationship that could just as well be reversed. Suppose, on the other hand, that miracle is still chiefly accomplished by finite causes, though by means of some divine cooperation, even if it be an extraordinary one. Even so, in that something would come to pass by finite causes that could not have come to pass in accordance with their natural constitution, alternative consequences would then follow. First, they would not be causes in this case, and then the expression “cooperation” would be incorrect. For, second, they would have become something different from what they once were, and then every such extraordinary cooperation would truly be a “creation”; after this creation the restoration of a given active thing to its original status would be a reiterated creation that would, in turn, annul the previous one. It is not to be denied, moreover, that of these two explanations the one is more suited to one class of biblical miracles, and the other is more suited to the other class,16 and thus the different makeups of these purported events have borne significant influence on the construction of these different formulations. So, if someone should not find it easy to profess belief even in this notion of absolute miracle, one must still concede to the following. That is, first one notes that earlier theologians did hold fast to this notion of miracle, in its totality17; more recent theologians,18 however, do not want to afford exclusive currency to this hypothesis but also find it reliable to hypothesize that, in a way inconceivable to us, God would have prepared for miracles in nature itself. Thus, in the interest of piety we also have to regard this position as a real step forward. 3. Accordingly, even in relation to what is wondrous19 overall, the general interest of science,20 particularly investigations into nature, and the interest of piety appear to meet at the same point. That is, that point is where we let go of the notion of what is absolutely supernatural, because in no instance would we really know anything to be such, nor is such an acknowledgment ever required of us. Before long, in part, it will be generally agreed that because our acquaintance with created nature is only in the process of growing, we have very little grounds for holding anything to be impossible. In part, it will also be admitted, in particular, that since by far the most New Testament miracles do lie within this broader area, we can indeed also neither exactly define what the boundaries are in the fluctuation of relationship between body and mind, nor even simply assert that they are overall and always completely the same, not being able to undergo expansions or to be exposed to unsettled variations. In this way, everything remains a task for scientific investigation to tackle, even the most wondrous thing that occurs or has occurred. At the same time, however, wherever that wondrous event would stimulate religious feeling, whether on account of what it aims at

or for some other reason, the value of that event would not find itself to be detracted from in any way by pointing out that some future knowledge concerning it is possible. In addition, we are entirely released from the difficult and highly dubious task on which dogmatics has so long labored in vain,21 namely, that of discovering secure marks for distinguishing false and diabolical miracles from miracles that are divine and true.

1. Naturzusammenhang. Ed. note: In this context (§§46–47) especially, this characteristic of the natural order is indicated as a “process” by the translator, simply as a reminder that for Schleiermacher this order is far from static; it is a process in which the creative-preserving activity of God is taken to be very much engaged. In earlier, introductory discussions, the two points of special importance for Christian piety were that this intricately interrelated process is, in principle, ultimately to be grasped as natural and as accessible to human reason, including whatever may be affected by human, relatively free choice. Whatever “chance” may be defined as included in this process, this sort of event is not taken to abrogate the divine ordering, in view of which ordering the feeling regarding the absolute dependence of everything on God is seen to arise. 2. Ed. note: See §14.P.S. for the introductory discussion on miracle, where the rejected notion would define miracle as an “absolutely supernatural” event. In §13.1, Schleiermacher had already explained that even “divine revelation” in Christ’s appearance, though of a uniquely general nature and bearing significance for all humanity irrespective of time and place, is not an “absolutely supernatural” event; nor (§13.2) is it an “absolutely superrational” one. The corresponding proposition in the first edition (§61, 1821) itself phrases this issue in terms of the needless notion of “absolutely supernatural” events. Regarding Christ’s life and work in this regard, see §§93.3, 99.2, and 103.1; for the same considerations regarding the Holy Spirit, see §§117.1–2, 123.2, and 124.3; on the Holy Spirit and the forming of Scripture, §130.3–4. Such discussions do presuppose “the supernatural becoming natural” but not the supernatural’s absolutely annulling or abrogating the interrelated, interwoven laws of nature. 3. Ed. note: See §54. 4. See Gottlob Christian Storr (1746–1805), Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik (1803) §25. Redeker note: Page 319 reads: “It is very possible that God either had to have bound the interaction of natural causes to laws such that the freedom of beings possessed of reason would have done injury to them and precisely therewith would have countermanded his purpose or, if he did not will this, that the course of nature would have come to contradict his other purposes to the extent that he would not have brought them into harmony with his aims now and then through direct influences.” Ed. note: Redeker quotes from the first (1803) edition of Storr’s work. In KGA I/7.3, 635, exactly the same passage is quoted from the 2nd ed. (1813), §35, 333. [ET Tice] 5. Ed. note: Even in Christ, who is, for Schleiermacher, the greatest so-called miracle, revelation, therefore, is always about “the supernatural becoming natural,” not about breaking through the natural order. With respect to Christ, however, viewed as the completion of God’s creation of human nature (§§89, 91, 93, 98)—in this sense as the prototypical “second Adam”—we may discern two roughly distinguishable but not strictly successive phases of God’s activity in human history: a phase of “preparatory and introductory” activity before Christ appeared and a phase of spiritual “development and fulfillment” by God’s grace in Christ (§164.2). By the Conclusion, then, we can have seen that the God on whom Christians are enabled to feel absolutely dependent is the triune God, manifested only from our temporal and finite perspective in a relatively successive way as Father/Creator, Christ, and Holy Spirit—expressed in three circumscribed roles, as it were, as one God (μόνος). Thus, the entire systematic presentation of faith-doctrine has been organized so as to make as clear as possible what this one divine reality is. Cf. §46n1 and n18. 6. Ed. note: Cf. §93, also §163.1 and the end of §163.P.S.1. The term here is Wiederherstellung. In §162.1 the word translated “restoration” is Wiederherbringung; both words used in these later contexts refer to a concept of ἀποκατάστασις (universal salvation). 7. Ed. note: Cf. use of the same categories for this subject in §34.2; cf. also the distinction between being absolutely dependent and relatively free, explicated in §4. 8. Gebetserhörung. Ed. note: See §§147.2 and 157.2. Implicit in the interpretation being discussed is the belief that what is asked for (petitioned) will presumably be answered in some fashion. 9. Wiedergeburt. Ed. note: Or “rebirth.” See §§106–7, also 110–11 and 118.1. 10. Prinzip. Ed. note: That is, a moving or motivating factor. On the sins and good works of the regenerate, see §74.4 and §112. The contrast referred to is between the start-off factors of creation and regeneration and the otherwise not very strictly differentiated factors of preservation and sanctification.

11. Ed. note: See §47n2 above and its immediate context. 12. Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), in his Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764) 1, §8, 462, calls the divine activity by which miracles are performed “immediate” or “nonarranged government” (gubernatio immediata or inordinata) whereby a contrast is made between miracles and God’s preserving activity, to the advantage of the latter in the second formulation but to its disadvantage in the first formulation. However, pious feeling will likewise shy away from putting something in the middle between that which is and the divine activity by which it is, just as it shies away from ascribing something to the divine activity while at the same time wanting to call it subordinate to that activity. Moreover, the expression conflicts with the general definition that Mosheim gives of government (gubernatio), that it is to be a directing of power over alien forces (direction virium alienarum), if a miracle is not to permit of being construed as based on pertinent natural forces. Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), in his Dogmatik (1818), 236, calls this same divine activity “extraordinary providence” and explains it in terms of “divine care in which God accomplishes some alteration or other that is quite inconsistent with the ordinary course of nature.” If one may seek opposing elements in divine care, as here, preservation would then be a lack of care, or if it is to be sought in the normal course of nature, the latter would appear as something not dependent on divine care, and pious feeling would necessarily pronounce against both. Ed. note: See KGA I/7.3, 450, for the Mosheim passage to which Schleiermacher refers. 13. The formulation that God is active in this case without being linked with any intermediate causes is, on this account, already in contradiction to our basic feeling, because therein God is presented as linked with the normal course of nature. In a hidden way, however, this very terminology, which describes natural causes as intermediate causes, is infected with the fundamental error of thinking that the dependence on God of that which happens is of the same sort as dependence on particular finite causes, only lying further back. Accordingly, then, where Storr intends to show how God can influence the world directly and alter the course of nature without abrogating natural laws (Dogmatik, 336), he, in fact, seems to represent God after the manner of a finite free cause. Ed. note: Cf. Gottlob Christian Storr (1746–1805), Dogmatik (1803), 320. 14. Ed. note: In rhetoric, discourse for mere show or mere persuasion, not strictly a result of reasoning. 15. Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), Theologia didactico-polemica, sive systema theologicum (1685–1690), Tome 1.c, 760: “If God removes his concurrent action, the action of creation stops.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 16. Friedrich Nathanael Morus (1736–1792) puts the distinction this way: “For indeed, mention is made of natural support, or such mention is indeed made but the thing was done with the word having preceded it.” See Morus’s Commentarius exegetico-historicus (1797–1798), Tome 1, 98f. Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 17. Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729), Theses theologicae (1717), 291: “Operations that, in truth, are the laws of nature, by which the order and preservation of all this world are supported, are suspended.” According to Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274), Summa theologica (1772–1774), 1, q.10, a. 4: “It is for this reason that a miracle is defined as an event that happens outside the ordinary processes of the whole of created nature.” Ed. note: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Latin text and ET in Charlesworth (1970), 17. 18. See Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), 238, to see how the expression “ordinary course of nature,” adduced above, was already prudently chosen in this respect as well.—Morus treats of the matter in the same sense, albeit superficially, in his Commentarius (1797) Part 1, 97f. 19. Das Wunderbare. Ed. note: In German usage, this is usually a broader concept than that of the absolutely miraculous, referring rather to what is wondrous, wonderful, marvelous, amazing, or astounding. 20. Ed. note: Wissenschaft, then Naturforschung. Cf. §17, which articulates the twofold interest in dogmatics as “scientific” and “ecclesial,” the latter interest focusing on piety. 21. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 23, §271. Ed. note: Apparently, Schleiermacher has derived some of the positions examined under this proposition from this source, or he has found them to be conveniently cataloged there.

§48. Stirrings belonging to self-consciousness that express restraints against life are to be located completely within absolute dependence on God, just as much as are those that express some promotion of life.1 1. This proposition has actually to do with the contrast between cheerful and troubled elements of life. However, it follows so immediately from our main proposition,2 or rather lies so completely contained within it, that we would have had no occasion at all to set it

forth as something special if long experience had not taught us otherwise. This experience tells us that, at all times, incomplete piety has found it difficult to unite the presence of more troubled and unhappy elements of life with God-consciousness, whether it then be because such piety is itself overwhelmed by restraints of life or because such piety is entangled in presentations that are skeptical or do not apply to faith. This experience also tells us that, on this account, almost every teaching about religion, thus also especially almost every presentation of faith-doctrine, has had to undertake the special task of depicting how these two states can be reconciled. Usually, pursuit of this task has ended up in faulty complaisance regarding those deficient stirrings of mind and heart. This overly pliable effort has taken the form, in part, of coming to the defense of Supreme Being concerning the presence of such conditions of life and, in part, as may be, of granting some alteration in the feeling of absolute dependence with reference to these same conditions of life. Here it is thus fitting only to protest against two things: both against falsification of the feeling of absolute dependence and against the overly pliant and unclear treatment of it, so that provision of a full and simple conception of this basic feeling does not run into danger. Now, suppose that troubled conditions of life were to come about only in isolated fashion, however frequently, and in such a way that no inter-connection among them could be detected. In that case, they could hardly have brought about such an effect. Instead, this effect depends on there being conditions that carry with them a constant, regularly renewed consciousness of life’s restraints. These restraints are then what we are accustomed to designate by the word “evil.”3 Moreover, it is thus all evils, in the entire scope covered by the word, of which it is to be asserted that they relate to absolute dependence of everything on God in the same way as does their opposite, namely, all good. Obviously, however, we must also count wickedness under the category “evils,” for everywhere that wickedness is, it shows itself to be an inexhaustible source of life’s restraints—except that here we are to consider it not as human activity but as a human condition. Hence, whereas later on, in a different mode of reflection, we will have occasion to treat of evil in ways it connects with wickedness,4 here, in reverse order, wickedness is to be reckoned as subsumed under the category of “evil.” Thus, at this point it is to be considered apart from ethical reflection, and it appears simply in its existence as a condition that influences self-consciousness as a restraint on life. As a result, after this matter has been discussed here it will not be lifted out for any further separate treatment. Meanwhile, another classification of evil does exist, one, however, that we need also to bear in mind only to a certain extent. That is, just as we claim that what is evil and what is good are equally grounded in dependence of everything on God, likewise it would become clear that in this same respect there would be no difference, in any case, between two kinds or classes of evil that are spoken of. The one kind, which is comprised of those conditions in which human existence is partially done away with, we call “natural evils.” The other kind, which we call “social evils,” is comprised of those conditions in which a given human

activity is partially overcome in conflict with some other human activity, and to these activities the influence of wickedness also belongs above all else. Patently, however, not only do these two kinds of evil lead reciprocally to each other, in that when human existence is diminished, human activity is all the more easily overcome and in that when an overcoming of human activity occurs, this always has a diminishing effect on the whole of human existence. It is also true, accordingly, that conceptually they also elide into each other, since human existence is comprised, nonetheless, of the totality of human activities and vice versa. Hence, the distinction between these two kinds of evil consists, first and foremost, in the fact that the one kind is predominantly determined by the totality of natural forces, the other kind by the overall condition of human activities. 2. Now, in order to fulfill our task within the prescribed limits, we are not at all required to delve deeply into teleological reflections or to look over and beyond the concept “evils” to what might perchance be effected by them and—something that cannot ever be proven in any case—that it could not have been effected in any other way. We have no more reason to move backward from the concept “preservation” to that of “creation,” or beyond it, in order to show perchance that evils would have been unavoidable. Rather, remaining quite strictly within our domain, we have only to demonstrate the compatibility of certain processes, which might seem at first to be opposed to each other, once they are viewed in terms of the dependence of everything on God. Now, in this perspective, two points are to be made regarding the two kinds of evil. The first point refers to the relationship of what is changing and transitory to what is persistent in all finite being. To what is transitory then also belong all individual beings, first in the form of a progressive development of life up to a certain peak but from then on a gradually diminishing activity of life until death. Regarded in large scale, all circumstances that condition the individual development just mentioned stir up consciousness of a life in process of advancement; and, in reverse, all that fosters coming nearer to death is conceived as a restraint on life. Thus, an incidental shift also exists between the two processes all through the life course of an individual. Clearly, it is the same overall human relationship with nature, on the one hand, that conditions both advancements of life and restraints on life, with the result that the one process cannot exist without the other process. The same is true, on the other hand, of the social domain, where, for example, a later formation of life held in common could also not grow and expand without some earlier formation’s being pushed back and degenerating. As a result, since each is a form of life, even here advancements of life and restraints on life are conditioned by each other. The second point refers to the relationship between what is only relatively existent, in and of itself, and the corresponding reciprocal conditionality of what is finite. That is, there is nothing absolutely isolated in anything finite. Thus, everything finite subsists, in and of itself, only insofar as other finite being is conditioned by it, and everything finite is conditioned by other finite being only insofar as it also subsists in and of itself. Then, however, another finite being is conditioned by me only if it can be advanced in some fashion only by me, which

implies, at the same time, that it is also possible for me to bear a restraining influence. Moreover, the entire relationship between the two of us comes into consciousness only inasmuch as both parties come into consciousness and indeed as they are subsumed under both forms—that of being posited in and of oneself and that of being conditioned by another. Consequently, restraints on life are arranged5 by God just as much as are advancements of life. Now, in the same way this very claim is true regarding personal feeling as regarding sympathy and feeling held in common.6 Thus, short of some far-reaching misconception, no one can find difficulty in positing even what appears to oneself to be an evil—whether it be one’s own evil, another’s evil or an evil held in common—to be present as a result of actual absolute dependence, and, consequently, to be arranged by God. That is to say, if one were not to make this claim, one would nowhere want or be able to take what is transitory and conditioned to exist by God—that is, one would not at all want or be able to conceive of any world as dependent on God—and thus our main proposition would itself also be denied. Now, this misconception rests, in the first place, on people’s conceiving actual conditions apart from the way they are naturally combined. This misconception is then also enhanced by people’s erroneously depicting those influences from which enduring restraints on life emerge as if they comprised a special, self-contained sphere, thus could be isolated and eliminated—in short, as if the world could exist without evil. However, the truth of the matter is rather this: that the very same activity or constitution of a thing whereby it might enter into human life as an evil, on the one hand, could also work for good, on the other hand. As a result, if someone wanted to take away that from which restraints on life emerge, conditions for advancements of life would then be missing as well. This is the case even of human wickedness, which does indeed work simply as evil to the extent that it appears in some external deed. Moreover, this is truly the case not only incidentally—that is, because human wickedness sometimes has a beneficent effect on individuals and sometimes produces historical leverage—but also in an entirely general sense, in that human wickedness becomes a specific deed only by virtue of that capacity of human beings to step out with one’s inner being,7 by virtue of which capacity all that is good is actually brought about. Now, in the second place, however, it is likewise possible to claim in general terms that within the general interconnectedness of nature—even in that from which most advancements of life proceed—evil can, in turn, also be present nevertheless. It can be present in any aspect whatsoever, precisely by means of that factor whereby something can also be helpful—which can be said of all natural forces and of all social circumstances that arise from the exercise of intelligence, though it cannot even approximately be said of intelligence itself. Thus, in another sense, it can be completely correct to say that evil, in and of itself, is not, as such, arranged by God. The reason is that no evil is ever present in pure isolation, and the same thing is true of things that are good. Rather, everything is arranged by God so that it can be either one.8 Now, what is implied above all for our domain9 is this: that when a restraint on life, as such, completely and exclusively fills some element of life, this constitutes a deficiency in

self-consciousness, whether it is then a deficiency of immediate self-consciousness or a deficiency belonging to the activities of objective consciousness. Likewise, moreover, when the causality for such restraints is posited as the actual nature of some object or other that stands in dependence on God, this constitutes a faulty mode of reflection. Further, even the latter kind of deficiency disappears as development of what is good increases, just as every evil passes over into what is itself good—that is, into a receptivity of sensory selfconsciousness overall for union with God-consciousness. 3. Customary definitions of good and evil that seek to shed light on this subject within the doctrinal loci of divine preservation and cooperation might indeed seem to hold the above fulfillment of our task in mind, but they actually end up far short of the goal. That is, for this purpose some distinguish, in part, a divine cooperation that is helpful from a divine cooperation that is not helpful and, in part, a divine cooperation that is simply of a material nature from one that is also of a formal nature. Now, originally these expressions seem to have been gauged chiefly to the contrast between good and evil. Moreover, for evil, divine cooperation would neither be helpful or of a material nature. Yet, apart from the considerations that “cooperation” and “help” are inseparable notions and that nothing definite can be discerned in a cooperation that is not helpful, we might also observe the following. First, if we are talking about divine cooperation in activity, there is no such thing as an activity that has no form—consequently, there is also no cooperation that is instigated for the purpose of activity that has not cooperated with respect to its form. As a result, a cooperation that is of a purely material nature would amount to nothing other than a divine preservation without divine cooperation, and by this means all activities that are described in this way would thus be set outside the relationship of absolute dependence. Hence, second, in accordance with those two formulations that have been proposed, if what is good is still taken to be accomplishable only with helpful divine cooperation or also with access to formal cooperation, whereas evil is taken to be accomplishable without either one, then what is humanly wicked would appear to be stronger and mightier than what is good. Apart from all this, I would only say that on these grounds there can be no talk, in this locus of doctrine, of any human wickedness considered, purely internally, to be a disposition identifiable prior to any actual deed. This is so, because, so conceived, this supposed evil could not even bestir one’s own self-consciousness, much less then bestir anyone else’s. However, if we consider evil to be active in nature, then it also follows that not only are all humanly wicked actions done by means of the natural forces of human beings, but they are also done in a manner appropriate to them, just as good actions are. As a result, there remains no basis for making such a distinction.10 Now, if it is posited that all social evils would be interconnected with human wickedness in some way or other, the distinction just indicated would not be applicable to social evil in any way. Yet, how would the distinction relate to natural evils? Since destructive events are precisely the strongest expressions of natural forces, they would thus have less capacity to occur without helpful cooperation than would other events. Moreover, they would have no

more capacity to occur without cooperation of a formal sort than would any other events, in that no distinctive form can be attributed to them. Thus, suppose that the intention moves right on to the claim that inasmuch as some cooperation would already be assumed, evil too is to be placed under dependence on God, but that inasmuch as the cooperation involved would not be helpful or would be only of a material sort, God is not to be taken to be the author of evil. Then, strictly speaking, this intention would not be achieved at all. Accordingly, it would appear to be more properly informative if it were said that, without exception, all that is real occurs by means of divine cooperation and that this cooperation can suffer no diminution, but also that all evil—including human wickedness, as such—is based in some sheer lack11 and that no divine cooperation can extend to such a thing as a partial nonbeing. That is, suppose that every finite thing is of such and such a size, arranged by God with its own dimensions at the same time. It would not be posited thereby that a given thing would exercise activities that lie beyond what its dimensions could accommodate. Rather, divine cooperation would be missing as regards any such activities, and, consequently, against external influences this thing could also mount no resistance that would extend beyond the thing’s dimensions. However, restraints would not arise from the fact that resistance could not be mounted, against which divine cooperation would be missing in any case. Rather, they would arise from the fact that the thing is attacked in a manner that surmounts its capacity to resist, for which situation of attack, divine cooperation would, nevertheless, be at hand.12 Thus, nothing remains except, on the one hand, to relate divine cooperation in proper proportion13 to everything that occurs and, on the other hand, to assert that, in and of themselves, evils are not arranged by God but are arranged only as a co-condition of what is good and only in relation to what is good.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The same placement of what is pleasurable and what is unpleasurable. This proposition actually has more within the ethical aspect [of dogmatics]. Because God is love, which is taken to be what is good, some believe that God’s activity could not be the same [in relation to each of the two aspects]” (Thönes, 1873). 2. §46. 3. Übel. 4. Böse. Ed. note: Alternatively, Böse (“wickedness”) is sometimes translated “human evil,” in contexts where other supposed entities (the devil, nonhuman spirits) are not entertained as possible agents of wickedness. Human wickedness is not restricted to a domain of experience that some thinkers identify as “moral.” Rather, it covers the entire scope of more or less “bad” (vs. more or less “good”) behavior in human life, both individual and collective, moral, intellectual, and all that can be termed “spiritual.” In Schleiermacher’s view, all of this behavior is examined by “ethics.” Below see esp. §§66–77. 5. Ed. note: geordnet. Schleiermacher tends to use other words for a direct order, arrangement, or determination by God; this ordering is of the general scheme of things. The closest theological concept is göttliche Weltregierung (“divine government”—or governance—“of the world”). The word “ordered” could be used but is suggestive of distinct command (Befehl); “ordained” also suggests a separately special act. 6. Ed. note: The three terms are persönliche Gefühl, Mitgefühl, and Gemeingefühl. 7. Ed. note: The phrase is mit seinem Inneren hervorzutreten. This literally means to “exist,” really to “be” precisely “there” (Dasein), above all to have “an existential relationship” (ein Existentialverhältnis) with what is outside oneself. Cf., notably, the inner-outer dialectic expressed in the second discourse of On Religion. To see how this schema works in Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics, see Hermann Peiter’s 2000 essay “Hinaus! On Going Out, Getting Out, Moving Out:

What Does Schleiermacher Mean by ‘an Immediate Existential Relationship’?” in Peiter (2010), 350–433. See also Peiter’s edition of Schleiermacher’s 1826/27 lectures, Christliche Sittenlehre (2011). 8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “Nota bene: This is a canon for ethics” (Thönes, 1873). That is, this entire paragraph, especially after “correct to say,” is a basic principle for the sake of the other aspect of dogmatics: his Christian Ethics. This is a key instance of ways in which the first aspect provides understandings of use for the second aspect. In this respect, his Christian Ethics is likewise designed to provide canons that illuminate Christian Faith-Doctrine (this work.) These two works are thus meant to be largely complementary. 9. Ed. note: That is, dogmatics. 10. Ed. note: Here the unnecessary distinction seems to be that between natural and active human wickedness (Böse). 11. Mangel. Ed. note: Hence the traditional term “shortcoming” and the earlier translation of Unvollkommenheit as “deficiency.” Here occasionally the adjectival form unvollkommen is translated (more literally) “incomplete” or “uncompleted” to render the same meaning. “Deficient” would also work, “defective” less so, because it suggests something organically permanent or a pattern so deep-seated that it cannot be altered or improved but can be only overlooked or forgiven or substituted for by divine fiat. 12. Ed. note: That is, divine cooperation would be at hand, based on this analysis. To what extent it would actually be present and on what grounds it would be active and efficacious remain to be specified. 13. Ed. note: Here gleichmäßig (“in proper proportion”) does not mean exactly the same in every instance but commensurate to each situation, equally applied, and not so as to disturb the natural order that God has arranged and continues to preserve. All these characteristics are yet to be laid out in full, as is the task of distinguishing, as far as may be possible without improper speculation, between God’s flexibility and constancy in relation to the natural processes of development and in the “supernatural becoming natural” in the process of redemption.

§49. Whether that which stirs our self-consciousness and, as a consequence, influences us is to be traced back to some aspect of the so-called “mechanism of nature” or to the activity of free causes, either one is completely arranged for by God, each no less than the other. 1. In and of itself, this proposition is simply an expression of a fact that is surely generally granted: that we feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent on God no less when something happens to us by virtue of the actions of other human beings than in any other case. Thus, this proposition is likewise already fully contained in the main proposition of this second point of doctrine.1 It is set forth in particular, moreover, only as an elucidation for the purpose of guarding against a not infrequent mistake—namely, that consciousness of our free will is taken to be incompatible with the feeling of absolute dependence. Furthermore, consciousness of our free will2 chiefly concerns only the effect of free actions, above all in the lives of others but then, to be sure, in our own life as well. Now, suppose that however much freedom might consist in determination of one’s will and in one’s resolve, then, nevertheless, action will always arise directly by means of whatever is already given from outside oneself. Thus, action would be codetermined in such a way that it comes to be what it becomes only as it belongs to that same general interconnectedness which is the actually indivisible object of the feeling of absolute dependence. Moreover, this feeling would lose its significance within the entire domain of history if we wanted to think of free causes as excluded from that interconnected whole. Instead, we have now reached the very place to set forth in its full value what was already stated on this matter more incidentally earlier.3 Here, however, we notice that precisely because free causes join in forming the interconnectedness of everything, we also have to be able to say the same thing regarding the element called “action” itself and regarding the self-

consciousness that accompanies it. In this sense, moreover, already in our initial explanations,4 the basic feeling was also discussed in terms of how the feeling of relative freedom and the feeling of absolute dependence exist interwoven within and alongside each other, with the result that the latter feeling could not endure at all if the former feeling were not present. As concerns the element “action,” let us then proceed from the fact that every other free agent would have taken action somewhat differently in the same given locale than does any free agent who is actually found to be there, just as surely as the latter free agent would act differently in some other locale, and proceed from the fact that in no matter what locale any given free agent might exist, this process would still be grounded in the interconnectedness of everything. Thus, no one can doubt that even the effects of free actions occur by virtue of one’s absolute dependence. Further, as concerns one’s accompanying self-consciousness, it is surely to be said that we are capable of having the feeling of absolute dependence only as we freely initiate our own activity. This implies, moreover, that we are conscious of our freedom as something received and gradually developed within the interconnectedness of everything. Thus, even in every religious element of freely self-initiated activity, self-consciousness must combine both features: the feeling of absolute dependence and the feeling of relative freedom. Now, in our proposition the term “free causes” obviously involves a distinction between freedom, on the one hand, and causality in general, on the other hand, and it presupposes causes that are not free. Yet, free actions are still taken to be causes. In contrast, within the usual notion of a general mechanism of nature, there would be, strictly speaking, no causality whatsoever, except that of free causes. This is so, for people imagine thereby a coexistence and interaction among such things that only to the extent that they themselves are moved do they move in turn. On this basis, moreover, in its operation5 each of these things could then be regarded only as a point of transition. As a result, the term “causality” would then apply only to an initial moving force outside this domain. That is, in terms of this notion, with the exception of free causes, there could be no causality at all within the finite domain, but besides these free causes there would be only a free, infinite cause—namely, divine causality, which is depicted as originally placing that entire domain in motion by an initial push. Now, suppose that someone were to corral all subordinate life, that of animal and vegetative life, within this mechanism of nature. Then, according to this notion, apart from this subordinate life there could be no talk of a life generally shared among various world bodies. As a consequence, based on this notion, free causes—which, for us who actually live in this world, would be those of human beings—would comprise the sole finite causality. It would take only one further step to restrict causality to divine causality alone—namely, to hold that human beings would also regard themselves to be only a part of this mechanism of nature, and they would treat consciousness of self-initiated activity simply as an irremediable illusion. As has already been shown, this move, however, would annihilate the feeling of absolute dependence and all piety along with it.

Fortunately, however, only a few persons have ever been ready to perform this selfannihilating renunciation, also sacrificing themselves to the integrity of this mode of forming notions after they have killed off the rest of the living world. That is to say, by this mode all finite causality would be reduced to mere illusion, thus no reason would be left even for regarding any particular finite being as enduring in and of itself at all, thus to remain more at some given points than at other points within this general process of change from being moved to moving, in turn. Rather, everything would be regarded either as indivisibly one or as an unquantifiable mass of isolated points of transition, namely, atoms. Now, suppose that, at the same time, we do attribute to ourselves free causality along with absolute dependence but also, nonetheless, attribute some causality to all living things, just as surely as we posit each living thing as something that endures in and of itself. Suppose, moreover, that a total lack of freedom exists only where each thing, without moving itself, moves, in turn, only to the extent that it is moved. Then we would be able to regard the causality of living things simply as a diminished freedom. Moreover, we would have to say that true causality exists only where there is life, but that a total lack of freedom exists only where there is also a total lack of causality. This would be so, in that the impetus that would set what is lifeless into motion, so that it could move, in turn, would always proceed from what is alive. Now, our proposition also does not use the term “mechanism of nature” as its own, because we would simply not be right to trace anything that stirs our self-consciousness, and thus bears an influence on us, back to some mechanical force—that is, to anything that works only as a point of transition. However, to inquire as to how far the domain of true causality extends, thus also that of life, and to get into how the true cause is to be discovered in each case—these are investigations that lie outside our area of inquiry. Our self-consciousness, however, is a different matter. Insofar as our self-consciousness is that of finite being—and insofar as we are able to distinguish within it between the feeling of partial freedom and the feeling of partial dependence, on the one hand, viewing the two as belonging together, and, on the other hand, between those two feelings and the feeling of absolute dependence, itself viewed as embracing both—every stirring of our self-consciousness requires some finite causality within the domain defined by the general interconnectedness of nature. This causality, viewed as an event within that domain, is likewise included within the state of absolute dependence. That is to say, the feeling of absolute dependence would not remain ever the same under the following condition. Suppose that there would indeed be a domain, namely, that of “natural causes,” in which finite and divine causality would be compatible but there would also be two other domains: on the one hand, a domain of “mechanical”—or, rather, that of seeming—“causes,” where only divine causality would hold sway but finite causality would not occur, but, on the other hand, also a domain of “free causes,” where only finite causality would hold sway but divine causality would not occur. To be sure, a correlative of this situation, however, would be that in relation to absolute dependence no strict contrast would be assumed between freedom and natural necessity within finite being as a whole. This

would be the case, for the following reason: Suppose that something that endures only in and of itself really exists, even if it were to have no part in mental life, yet, in some sense or other it would move itself. Even then, the range of its freest causation would be arranged by God. 2. Now, in the dogmatic language that prevails today, precisely this position is expressed, in part, by the concept “preservation” and, in part, by the concept “cooperation.” The most used formulation of the first sort is that God would preserve every single thing just as it is, thus also preserve free causes, as such. We can rediscover in this formulation everything that has been established here—namely, that without prejudice to absolute dependence, itself designated by means of the term “preservation,” the activities of free beings are, nevertheless, determined from within themselves. If considered only in and of itself, however, this last formulation might well be open to the complaint that it seems, in a superficial manner, more to obscure than really to resolve the inherent difficulty that has been identified. In a similar manner, in using the concept “cooperation” people distinguish between a cooperation after the manner of free causes and another cooperation after the manner of natural causes.6 At the very least, however, this term “cooperation” needs to be employed with great caution, lest the differences that exist within finite being be transferred over to Supreme Being itself, with the result that God is actually made to be the embodiment of these differences. This result might be difficult for one to be able to distinguish from the pantheistic view. What is meant, however, could be simply that in each case God cooperates in activities that are proper to the nature of the caused thing, yet only in accordance with God’s own causality, which is entirely different from that which lies within the domain wherein reciprocal activity occurs. Postscript to this Point of Doctrine. It was granted that these two additional propositions are actually contained already in the main proposition of this point of doctrine. It was advisable to set them forth separately, nonetheless, for two reasons. First, it was advisable to do so, because it is quite easy to set forth definitions concerning these subjects that blur the proper relationship between creation and preservation. This happens with what is miraculous when people depict it as purely supernatural, since in this manner an act of creation is taken to arise after the original creation, which creation would partially suspend the process of preservation and would thus partially stand in opposition to it. The same thing happens when people think that evils have been less arranged for by God than other things, because then among things that God has actually created just as much as God has created other things, God would indeed be leaving some things in the lurch more than other things. Finally, the same thing happens when people contrast free causes with natural causes so much that in their efficacy free causes would appear to be less dependent on God. That is to say, then, in part, they would have their efficacy from elsewhere, since likewise they do, nevertheless, have their existence from God. Consequently, here too a disparity is put in place between creation and preservation. Second, here, above all, it was important to show what harmony exists between moral interest, on the one hand, and the interest of piety and scientific interest, on the other hand.

That is, moral interest would always have to be endangered or, on its part, would have to endanger religious interest if absolute dependence were conceived in such a way that free self-determination could not continue to exist along with it and vice versa. In contrast, scientific interest is twofold: that of research into nature and that of historical study. By any assumption regarding absolutely supernatural events amid the course of nature, inquiry into nature would find itself to be so constrained that it could not be referred back to anything. Historical study has to do, above all, with the contrast between good and evil, so that, given the way in which the two would show themselves to be intertwined, it would have necessarily to become fatalistic. That is, it would have to relinquish reference to the idea of what is good if evil were not taken to be arranged for by God at all, or were taken to be only less so than good, viewed as the opposite of evil. Our two propositions, however, preserve their purely dogmatic contents chiefly by the fact that they are entirely contained in the main proposition. For the same reason, moreover, they do not slide over into the domain of speculation in any way, despite the various relations that we have discussed. The relationship to the main proposition that they hold in common, which does not everywhere lie on the surface in equal measure, is the following. In the area it covers, each of the two propositions sets forth things of greatest and least magnitude, and, in showing that the feeling of absolute dependence relates equally to both extremes, then establishes this equivalence as the rule governing religious expression.7 The contrast between what is usual and what is miraculous has been traced back to what is greatest and least in the course of nature, based on which each of them, respectively, has had to be explained.8 Then the contrast between good and evil was traced back to what is greatest and least, respectively, within the harmony of general reciprocal activity in its relation to the enduring-in-and-of-itself of each particular. Further, the contrast between freedom and mechanism was traced back to what is greatest and least, respectively, within individualized life. Hence, it has had to be shown that if the equivalence would be invalidated at any of these points of comparison, then the main proposition regarding this point of doctrine would itself also be invalidated, and neither the conditioned feeling of dependence nor the conditioned feeling of freedom could then ever be compatible with the feeling of absolute dependence. No difficult cases are to be detected besides these.9

1. Ed. note: Throughout §§46–49 (regarding divine preservation), the “main proposition” referred to is §46. 2. Ed. note: Whether there would, in fact or indeed, be some degree of free will in nonhuman animals or other living species is a question that Schleiermacher tends to refer to physical science and the philosophy of physical science. His focus is on human phenomena that are a matter of the human psyche and, at base, comprise a subject for psychology and other studies of a relatively nonphysical, “ethical” sort. The psyche, or body-mind, of human beings is, for him, always a combination of mental functioning (not by wholly separable faculties, counter to faculty psychologists of his time) and of generally physical plus specifically bodily functioning. Thus, on this earth the sensory consciousness and self-consciousness of human beings are always components in one’s mental functioning to some degree. The more developed one’s religious consciousness, moreover, the less impact of merely sensory factors would be and the more nearly completely would spirit (Geist, also the word for “mind”) function of itself, including the “common spirit” (Gemeingeist) of a community of faith. Thus, someone might suppose that other animals might possess a feeling of partial freedom and of partial dependence. In Schleiermacher’s reasoning, however, it would seem

to be impossible for any nonhuman animal to have the feeling of absolute dependence, applied, as it can come to be in monotheistic faith and especially in Christianity, to the entire interconnected process of nature (Naturzusammenhang). All of these considerations have already been presented in the Introduction to this work and further elaborated in Part One, though not in the closely interrelated fashion that consideration of “the original perfection of humanity” requires in the present proposition. 3. See §47.1. 4. See §4.3. 5. Wirksamkeit. Ed. note: Or in its “efficient” causation, as distinguished from a “first” or “final” cause. 6. Concursus ad modum causae liberae and ad modum causae naturalis. Ed. note: These Latin phrases are equivalent to the distinction between two kinds of cooperation that Schleiermacher makes here. Cf. the quotation from Storr in §47n4. 7. Ed. note: Here “religious expression” translates religiösen Ausdruck. 8. Ed. note: This first treatment is presented in §47. The next two are presented in §48 and §49, respectively. Just below, the “main proposition” is §46. 9. Ed. note: That is, three equivalences, equations, are present just above, each naming comparative concepts on a sliding scale between two end points (greatest and least). If these equations, as it were, hold firm and are not invalidated, Schleiermacher holds that no other serious problems should arise. In each case, all items for the entire scale are taken by him to be compatible with one’s being absolutely dependent in relation to God and with one’s feeling so.

SECTION TWO

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Refer to Religious Self-Consciousness insofar as It Expresses the General Relationship between God and the World [Introduction to Section Two] §50. None of the attributes that we ascribe to God is to designate something particular in God; rather, they are to designate only something particular in the way in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be referred to God. 1. If the feeling of absolute dependence that is indicated in this proposition has already found its corresponding expression in the points of doctrine presented in the previous section, then we also cannot believe that the theory regarding divine attributes would have proceeded originally from a dogmatic interest.1 In contrast, regarding the work of speculation,2 history teaches us that ever since speculation made divine being into a subject of inquiry,3 it has entered the same protest against all description of divine being that goes into details, and it has simply confined itself to designating “God” as the prime existing being4 and the absolute good. Even these notions, moreover, of which only the first one would belong here, were indeed formed in such a way that something inadequate has frequently been recognized in them, inasmuch as some sort of contrast or a different analogy with what is finite would be coposited therein as well. Hence, this mode of treatment owed its origin, above all, to works of religious poetry, especially to hymnic and otherwise lyrical works, but then it also owed its origin to proceedings of ordinary life that were indeed less artful but yet, in their essentials, did completely harmonize with those works. The latter process sought to enliven and consolidate the simple notion of “Supreme Being”5 so that it could be treated in expressions that we make use of also in considering what is finite. Both approaches proceed from the interest of piety, and they bear far more the aim of reproducing immediate impression, in its various formations, than of offering grounds for any knowledge. Now, precisely because both approaches would still be handed down from Judaism, it was the task of presenting Christian faith-doctrine, from the very beginning onward, to put these notions in order. It was to do this in the following way: such that, first, whatever was anthropomorphic— something that was to be found, more or less, in all of them—and, again, what was oriented to the senses—something that was admixed into many of them—would be rendered as harmless as possible, also such that retrogression toward polytheism would not emerge from those sources. Even the scholastic period had contributed much serious and exquisite thought to this task. Eventually, however, as metaphysics came to be handled in and of itself alone and in isolation from Christian doctrine, as is natural to its own tasks, for a long time people came to overlook—as customarily occurs quite readily with such

partitioning of tasks—that these notions with respect to divine attributes are of religious origin, not of philosophical origin. Thus, they were taken over into that philosophical discipline which people designate with the name “natural theology.” In natural theology, however, the more science developed a genuinely speculative character, the more these notions, which did not originate on speculative soil, had to be treated in a critical and skeptical manner. In contrast, dogmatic theology had to try to systematize these notions more and more. It had to do so—if it understood itself correctly— to arrive not at the consciousness that knowledge of God would be fully offered in them, but simply at the consciousness that our indwelling God-consciousness would be included in them—in accordance with all the permutations in which God-consciousness is realized from stimulation within the varied elements of life. Yet, the separation between philosophy and dogmatic theology had not been completely accomplished, and the traffic between the two disciplines was constantly lively and multifarious. Because of these two factors, continually thereafter in philosophical treatment of the subject, a great deal has remained that would have belonged only to dogmatic treatment, and the same is true the other way around. Hence, it is still continually necessary to preface our accounts in such a way that we will have remained entirely within the bounds of purely dogmatic procedure, as regards both the contents of particular definitions and method. This purpose must be served not only without making speculative demands but also without applying speculative aids. 2.6 Now, precisely in this connection, in general terms our proposition disclaims the speculative contents of all divine attributes that are to be located in presentations of Christian faith-doctrine—this already on that account and inasmuch as they are plural in nature. That is to say, if attributes were, as such, to present knowledge of the divine being, then each of them would have to express something in God that the other does not express. Moreover, if that knowledge were appropriate to the object, then this object would also have to be composite, just as the knowledge obtained would be composite.7 Indeed, even if these attributes were to articulate only certain relations of divine being to the world, in God’s very being God would nevertheless have to be engaged simply in a multiplicity of specific functions, just as finite life is. Furthermore, since these functions, viewed as different from each other, would also have to be opposed to each other in certain respects, and, at least partially, would have to exclude each other, God would likewise be placed within the domain of contrast. Now, this account of the divine attributes would scarcely meet the requirements of speculative rationality. As a result, definitions conceived in this fashion could not even pass muster for speculative assertions. The interest of piety would be satisfied just as little if someone wanted to understand dogmatic definitions in this fashion. That is to say, if such a difference were posited in God,8 the feeling of absolute dependence also could not be considered in and of itself, nor could that feeling itself be always and everywhere the same. In that instance, there would have to be certain differentiations within that feeling that would not have had their ground in differences among elements of life, by which the feeling actually comes to appear in a person’s mind and heart. Thus, in that we attribute to those

definitions only the meaning stated in our proposition, anyone is, at the same time, left free to subscribe to any form of speculation that would admit of only one object to which the feeling of absolute dependence can refer, and to do so without prejudice to one’s assent to Christian faith-doctrine. 3. As concerns method, however, a twofold method is found to be predominant in the treatment of faith-doctrine heretofore. Formerly, prescriptions were set forth as to how one is to attain correct notions regarding divine attributes. Then certain rubrics were set forth, according to which the various concepts of divine attributes are to be apportioned. Now, since both parts bear the aim of systematizing these notions, in this respect the same prefatory move is to be made, in general terms. This is to be explained as follows. If it is supposed that the list of these attributes is to be regarded as a complete body of definitions, which are to be related specifically to God, then it would have to be possible to obtain a complete knowledge of God based on concepts. Moreover, a rule-bound9 explanation would have to supplant that ineffability of the divine being which in Scripture—to the extent that divine attributes are even named in it—is, nevertheless, so markedly recognized on every page that to cite passages indicating that ineffability would be superfluous. Accordingly, the only completeness in our account that we actually have to strive after is that of not letting any of the diverse elements of religious self-consciousness pass by without our searching out the divine attributes that correspond to them. Using this procedure, moreover, will of itself yield the appropriate classification. This is so, in that within each division only those attributes which actually belong to it could get so far as to be presented there. It is all the more necessary to discuss, at this very place, how little is lost for our topic, given that the procedure we have adopted takes the earlier apparatus, though widely employed, to be superfluous. First of all, as concerns the methods used, three paths have been struck by which one can arrive at divine attributes: that of removing limits, that of negation, and that of causality.10 Now, it is well-nigh self-evident that these three paths are not at all of the same sort or, as such, coordinated with each other. This is the case, for to take the first two paths, something already posited as an attribute apart from God has to be given first. The posited attribute would then be assigned to God after it has been freed from limitations, or its negation would have been assigned to God. In contrast, the concept of causality stands in the closest possible interconnection with the feeling of absolute dependence itself. Now, if the first two paths are considered in their relation to each other, it is clear that negation, understood in and of itself, provides no path whatsoever for positing any sort of attribute unless something positive behind that negation is still left. At that point, however, the negation would consist precisely in those limits being negated, limits which would be indicated by these same positive features. In the same manner, however, the way of limitation too would have become a negation. The reason is that something is supposed to be posited in God, but the indicated limits, which would indeed be coposited elsewhere, are not supposed to be posited in God.

What marks the lack of difference between these two methods becomes completely clear11 in the concept “infinity,” which, at the same time, consists of the general formulation for being free of limitation. That is to say, what is posited as infinite is also a being free of limitation,12 but, in addition, the concept “infinity” also shows, in entirely general terms, that by means of negation we actually posit an attribute only insofar as something positive is left behind the negation. It shows this, in that it is a negation by means of which nothing is immediately posited but by which everything may also be posited that can just as well be thought of as limited as thought of as without limit. Thus, these two methods can be applied in only two ways. Either they would be applied willfully—whether or not one would want to posit as a divine attribute something raised to the status of being free of limitation but that could be absolutely negated only regarding God. Or, if one should want to avoid this usage, application of these methods would have to be preceded by a determination as to what kind of attributive concepts would be suited overall to being applied to God in an unlimited fashion, also as to what kind would have to be absolutely negated regarding God. In contrast, the third method is, to be sure, one that stands on its own. Let us suppose, moreover, that we would not want to claim that all those divine attributes which correspond to some sort of modification of our feeling of dependence can be derived directly from the concept of causality, without further ado. Rather, let us suppose that what would have to be prefaced forthwith here are the following two things. In the first place, the other procedure would have to be applied precisely to this concept. That is, anything finite in what is meant by “causality” would have to be negated, but the productive activity13 therein would have to be posited as unlimited. In the second place, insofar as a number of attributes are unfolded, based on divine causality, the differentiations between these attributes would, in any case, correspond to nothing that is real in its nature14 within God. Indeed, taken either individually or in combination, such attributes would also not express the nature of God in Godself,15 just as it is then also the case that the very nature of anything else can never be known based on what it has effected.16 Thus, all this being said, this much can still be affirmed with surety: since all divine attributes to be discussed in a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine are meant simply to explicate17 the feeling of absolute dependence, all of them must somehow be traced back to divine causality. Finally, as concerns classification of the divine attributes, the sizeable multiplicity of them already shows how little surety obtains in the entire procedure, also how little any sort of classification has been able to secure any general agreement. Here, however, we can provide only brief indications concerning a few of those classifications. Some of them18 set forth, as a main division, that between “natural” attributes—also called “metaphysical” attributes, which would indeed have to be identical with reference to God—and “moral” attributes, which concept, on that account, does indeed have a markedly forbidding sound to it already, because it permits of the inference that what is moral does not belong to God’s nature in the same way.19 Others initially divide all the divine attributes into “active” and “inactive,”20 which is difficult to grasp even if God can, nevertheless, be envisaged to be

simply “living.” This is so, since, in whatever is living, as such, everything is comprised of activity as well. Now, regarding this division between active and inactive attributes, suppose that the one kind of attribute were indeed described as remaining within God, as comprising determinations of the most perfect substance, which would include no efficacious action outside of God. Then this would enable one to imagine a sort of activity, one that is purely internal, even of the “inactive” attributes. In this case, moreover, the classification would then coincide with another one, divided into “absolute” and “relative” attributes. If a creation in time is presupposed, then the active attributes would also have either to have arisen only with time or to have been inactive prior to that event. Consequently, this classification would be of no value for this presupposition of a creation in time. Use of it, however, would, nevertheless, always yield a duality in God: a purely internal life, mediated by the inactive attributes, and an external life in relation to the world, mediated by the active attributes. Moreover, just as the two sets of attributes would appear to be entirely separated from each other in this fashion, so too, one might sorely miss having yet a third set of attributes for combining the two with each other. Further, suppose that someone asks which attributes would comprise those inactive ones. Then, there would indeed be no internal life in these attributes, when taken together, none whatsoever. Rather, in part, they would be simply formal in nature—as “unity,” “simplicity,” and “eternity” would be; in part, they would be strictly negative—as “independence” and “inalterability” would be; and, in part—as would be the case with “infinity” and “immeasurability”—they would simply have to do with the extent and makeup of the active attributes.21 Then, in addition, these classifications would also be demonstrably inexhaustive. This is so, in that in many instances particular attributes would be advanced beyond a given system of classification as inferences from others already established—as would be “blessedness,” “glory,” “majesty,” or even the inference that God is “the Highest Good.” Thus, to avoid such a pass, for some it might seem opportune, at first glance, to classify the divine attributes from the very outset into “original” and “derived” attributes. Moreover, even if one could not readily see how such a classification could be made if the attributes themselves had not already been at hand, thereby it could simply seem to be all the more likely to be a genuinely dogmatic classification. However, if it were generally granted that diversity among attributes would not identify anything that is real in its nature22 within God, every attribute would then be simply another expression for the entire, ever-selfsame nature23 of God; consequently, all the attributes would be “original,” and at that point the “derived” attributes would in no case be attributes in the same sense. Suppose, however, that attributes classified in this way were to be explicated based on religious self-consciousness and, in this sense, the classification would be appropriate for dogmatics. In that case, there would still be no “original” attribute; rather, all of them would be equally very much “derived.” Yet, even then, the classification would not have arisen from this particular mode of contemplation24; rather, it would have arisen from the sort in

accordance with which one could also say, in a different respect, that the divine nature alone would be original, whereas all attributes would be derived. Such a derivation of divine attributes from the divine nature would presuppose a knowing acquaintance25 with the divine nature, and the procedure used would be a purely speculative one. To be sure, however, even purely dogmatic procedure cannot be formed in any other way, except that nothing can be assigned as the ground of purely dogmatic procedure but that within Supreme Being on the basis of which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be explained. Suppose, then, that the simple expression that “everything depends on God” were extended by its negative counterpart, that “God in Godself, however, is dependent on nothing.” Then, in turn, an opportunity is opened to provide a classification divided into “positive” and “negative” attributes. Moreover, at this juncture, the relation between Supreme Being and all other being would already be presupposed in the basis for the classification. Accordingly, one does see how, from this point on, “absolute” or “inactive” or “natural” or “metaphysical” attributes could only turn out to be negative ones—thus, strictly taken, without any distinct contents. 4. Now, two things follow from this discussion. On the one hand, the very same presupposition by means of which those attributes which express God’s relations to the world appear as though they were simply add-ons and incidental in nature—namely, the presupposition of a division of what God is in and of Godself from God’s relation to the world—is also the ground on which the purely internal attributes could be set forth only negatively. On the other hand, the criteria for securing an arrangement of all the divine attributes within a single locus of doctrine would, in part, also lead to concepts that would be quite foreign to the interest of piety, and, in part, concepts that the criteria would intend to distinguish from each other would, nonetheless, be entangled with each other, in turn. Thus, we may hope that we might resolve the task just as well without this apparatus and without such an arrangement. We might do this by affording the best possible treatment to each special Part of our overall outline. Yet, we too will, nonetheless, be able to make use of a number of these formulations, in our own fashion. For example, let us suppose that in Part One we would not yet have to do with the actual phenomenon of religious self-consciousness in the form of pleasure and the lack of pleasure. Rather, let us suppose that we would have to do simply with whatever uniformly underlies these phenomena—with the internal productive tendency26 toward God-consciousness, quite apart from whether it were found to be either hindered or advanced. Then, we would also be able to call those attributes which ensue in Part One “original,” to the extent that the tendency toward God-consciousness would be the original one, and we would be able to call those which ensue for us in Part Two the “derived” ones. Let us suppose, further, that, in contemplating religious self-consciousness through the phenomena that belong to it, we would find that certain attributes, by means of which God’s being posited as within us would be abrogated, would then have to be negated, for the most part, and that certain attributes, by means of which God’s being posited within us would arise most freely, would be posited as, for the most part, in God. Then, in accordance with our own

way of working, we will be able to say that, in this manner, divine attributes would be formed in accordance with the method of removal of limits and the method of negation, whereas those divine attributes which would arise for us in the process of immediately current contemplation— and given that there would be such there—would arise in accordance with the method of causality. Still, this sort of application would diverge widely enough from the customary usage of these formulations to manifest more of an analogy with speculation.

1. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher writes: “Nota bene: Only ‘not dogmatic,’ not, for example, ‘not religious [religiös]’” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: On distinctions between speculation (Spekulation) versus empirical study and philosophy, rational and natural theology, and dialectic, see his 1811 notes on Dialectic (1996), 1–5 and notes, also BO §§1–9 and notes, finally OG 63–65. For Schleiermacher, speculation itself is not necessarily a bad practice, but it must be used very consciously in theology and has led to practices there that he largely deplored. For example, see reference within this proposition’s subsections 1, 2, and 4 on speculation regarding divine attributes. In Schleiermacher’s day, speculation was still rife in theology as a whole. Schleiermacher also depicted Roman Catholic theology as a “hierarchy of speculation” in OG 6. 3. Since here the subject can, of course, only be that of Christian speculation, it is sufficient to refer to the following: (1) Dionysius the Areopagite (ca. 5th–early 6th century), On Mystical Theology (n.d.) 4 and 5: “So this is what we say. The cause of all is above all substance (αἰτία) and is not inexistent, lifeless, speechless, mindless. … [It] has neither quality, quantity or weight. … It is not soul or mind. … It does not live nor is it life. … It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.” And (2) to Augustine (354–430), The Trinity (409–416) 5.1.2: “Accordingly, let us think of God, if we are able, and insofar as we are able, in the following way: as good without quality, as great without quantity, as the Creator who lacks nothing, who rules but from no position, and who contains all things without an external form, as being everywhere without limitation of space, as eternal without time, as making mutable things without any change in Godself. … ” See also (3) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), On the Trinity (356–360) 2.7: “The perfection of learning [scientia] is to know God in such a way that although you realize God is not unknown [non ignorabilem], you perceive that God cannot be described.” (4) Cf. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), Proslogion (1079), chaps. 18 and 22. Ed. note: (1) Pseudo-Dionysius ET The Complete Works (1987), 140–41; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 3:1040, 1044, 1048. Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates: “αἰτία is the main concept here” (Thönes, 1873). More specifically, this term means “(first) cause,” thus also “origin (of all things),” “ground (of being),” or, in the Latinate philosophical meaning applied in this translation, “substance” (that which underlies all). (2) ET Fathers of the Church 45 (1963), 176; Latin: Migne Lat. 42:912. (3) ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 42; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:57. (4) ET Anselm, The Major Works (1998), 97f. and 99f., cf. Williams (1996), 110–11, 113; Latin: Migne Lat. 158:236 and 238. Schleiermacher’s note in the first edition, §64.3 reads: “Regarding the distinction between attributa and proprietates, since it relates to the triune nature of God, we take no notice of it at this point, rather using the German word Eigenschaft for the Latin word attributum.” The same usage is adopted here, versus Eigentum (proprietates: a property of some other object or “properties” that are owned by some person or social entity). 4. Ed. note: das ursprünglich Seiende, or literally, “the one that was be-ing originally”—alternatively, in Aristotle (384– 322 BCE), the “prime mover.” 5. Ed. note: Historically, höchsten Wesen is always translated “Supreme Being,” but the definite article “the,” necessary in German grammar, does not have to be used. In Schleiermacher’s usage, “the” should not be added, because he does not think of God as a specific being, circumscribed analogously with finite beings, but considers God to be infinite. The closest analogy would lie in the notion of Universum, which, as an endlessly interconnected whole of “nature,” he deems to be “infinite” in a somewhat different sense. Conceptually, he consistently designates “the universe” as that within which all finite being is contained, however infinite it might be from a merely finite point of view and in its ever-changing, in that sense boundless, processes. In contrast, God, theologically conceived as its Creator, is not contained at all. A view that strictly identifies the world and God would be pantheism, which he always vigorously opposed—in his early writings in philosophy to his later writings, both philosophical and theological. God is active in the world but is not of it. God is therefore “supernatural.” Accordingly, Schleiermacher’s characterization of religion as “a sense and taste for what is infinite,” included in all three editions of On Religion (discourse II, 1799, 1806, and 1821), can be present at a more sensory level of mental functioning,

but it can also advance in scope and quality through all the higher levels. Thus, what is divine can be felt to be contained in fetishes, for example, in varied forms, throughout the wide range of polytheism on his sliding scale, and in Supreme Being, at the monotheistic segment of the scale, within which current forms of Christianity are largely to be found. Moreover, it can be found within contemplative visions of God as totally infinite and uncontained, the highest as yet conceivable stage. In discourse V, this last stage he describes as existing beyond Christianity as we ordinarily know it, but he thought that it would never supersede the love of God revealed in Christ. The “feeling of absolute dependence” is only foreshadowed in the successive forms of religion up to that marked conceptually by monotheism. See also §§3–6. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this subsection: “This proposition necessarily follows from the plurality [Pluralität] of the attributes. (a) God would become a manifold of power [Kraft], (b) or, at least, a manifold of function [Funktion]” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764) 1:232: “If the essence [essentia] of God truly differed from God’s attributes and if the attributes differed in reality among themselves, God would be a compound nature [natura].” Nonetheless, many theologians brush very close to granting that such differences exist in God. For example, Samuel Endemann (1727–1789), in his Institutiones theologicae dogmaticae (1777), distinguishes “those attributes without which God is not able to be God and the internal determinations of God which can be absent without violation of his essence and actuality,” which he hence also terms analoga accidentium. Ed. note: ET of both quotes Kienzles; KGA I/7.3, 415, also cites the Endemann passage and quotes it in full. 8. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “The basic feeling would then lose its unity” (Thönes, 1873). 9. Ed. note: Here the term schulgerecht (normally to be translated “methodical” or “according to the rules” today) is an allusion to what Schleiermacher regularly described as an unfruitful aspect of traditional “scholastic” method for producing overly refined distinctions by means of arbitrary contrivance. 10. Via eminentiae, negationis et causalitatis. Ed. note: The mode of each is immediately explained here. 11. Ed. note: vollkommen anschaulich. This is one of those instances in Schleiermacher’s usage where anschaulich obviously refers to a mode of perception that involves intellectual functioning, so that the translation could just as well be “fully perceived.” 12. Ed. note: The “limiting” occurs in “infinite” when it denotes “limited to being not finite,” and, in turn, it occurs when it denotes sheer negation, “not finite.” 13. Productivität. 14. Reelles. Ed. note: That is, individually or collectively (as Schleiermacher goes on to say), such attributes would not be able directly to describe any clear differentiation in God. As he consistently holds throughout, they might provisionally indicate something of how divine activity in the world is experienced and perceived (as, for example, he also claims, in “economic” terms, regarding God’s activity in God’s own world, the οἰκουμένη—that is, regarding the triune nature of God’s activity—in §§170–72). Yet, no attribute could properly describe God in Godself (in se). Thus, the closest he ever finds himself coming to such an affirmation, itself based on Scripture, is on repeating the widespread apostolic testimony to God’s love (§167). 15. Ed. note: The phrase “the nature of God in Godself “ translates das Wesen Gottes in sich; in Latin: in se. 16. Wirkung. Ed. note: That is, based on either what its “working” is seen to be or based on its “effect,” on what its working actually effects, brings about. The reference is to what can be observed in the relation of discernible “cause” (Ursache) and “effect” (Wirkung). If anywhere in Part One, here, above all, the concern has to do with what Schleiermacher claims can actually be “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness. 17. Ed. note: The term erklären, translated “explicate” here, is taken to mean several actions at once: to declare, to define, to clarify, and to explain, for he does all of these things and all are proper meanings. Sometimes Schleiermacher uses the term entwickeln for the same summative purpose, a word that means both to develop, to unfold, and, most literally, to explicate. 18. Instead of my citing any particular passages, the reader may compare the doctrine of the divine attributes as given by Mosheim, Reinhard, and Schott. Redeker note: Cf. Mosheim, Elementa (1758), 210f.; Reinhard, Vorlesungen (1818), 100f.; and Heinrich August Schott, Epitome theologiae (1822). Mosheim categorizes the attributes of God into negativa and positiva, Reinhard and Schott into quiescentia (absoluta) and operativa (relativa). [ET Tice] 19. It would then belong to this locus that some designate attributes as analogon accidentium (incidental, by analogy). Ed. note: See §50n6 above. 20. Ed. note: Literally, “being at rest” (ruhende). 21. Ed. note: That is, “infinity,” or “the lack of finiteness” (Unendlichkeit), is both beyond measure in “extent” (Maβ) and “constitution” (Beschaffenheit), as is “immeasurability” or “boundlessness” (Unermesslichkeit), e.g., as applied most notably to God’s “love.” 22. Reelles.

23. Ed. note: Wesen, or entire, ever-selfsame “divine being” (göttlichen Wesens), as in the expression “of Supreme Being” (hochsten Wesens). 24. Betrachtungsweise. Ed. note: Thought based on and arising from “religious self-consciousness” could represent a state of self-consciousness that would range somewhere between purely sensory “observation” and highly cognitive “reflection.” With that understanding, both of these words could translate Betrachtung, just as well as “contemplation” does here. 25. Ed. note: The term translated “a knowing acquaintance” is als bekannt, which itself presupposes some direct encounter. Since Schleiermacher deems a direct encounter with God in se to be impossible, any such “knowing acquaintance” would be just as “purely speculative” as highly reflective “knowledge,” for which als erkannt would be the appropriate word in Schleiermacher’s usage. 26. Ed. note: innern produktiven Richtung. That is, the tendency would still be internal, yet would be only along the path that leads to God-consciousness and that could also remain as God-consciousness is fully realized.

§51. The absolute causality to which the feeling of absolute dependence refers can be described only in the following way: on the one hand, it would be distinguished from the causality that is contained within the interconnected process of nature and would thus be in contrast to that causality, and, on the other hand, it would be equated with such causality in terms of its compass.1 1. We have the feeling of absolute dependence, viewed as something that can fill an element of life, both in conjunction with one’s partial and conditional feeling of dependence as well as in conjunction with one’s partial and conditional feeling of freedom. In this process of interaction between conditional dependence and conditional freedom, or between partial causality and partial passivity, our self-consciousness represents2 finite being as a whole. Yet, it always does so wherever dependence or passivity is set within some aspect of finite being, and, at that point, is set within a different self-initiated activity and causality, to which the first process is related. Moreover, precisely this entire process of being-reciprocally-relatedto-each-other regarding variously apportioned causality and passivity is what comprises the interconnected process of nature.3 Thus, it necessarily follows that what is ever grounding our feeling of absolute dependence—that is, divine causality—also extends as far as does the interconnected process of nature and the finite causality that is contained therein. Consequently, the interconnected process of nature is posited as in accordance with the same compass as that over which divine causality extends. Further, the feeling of absolute dependence relates to the partial feeling of dependence exactly in the same way as it does to the partial feeling of freedom, consequently the contrast that exists between the latter two feelings vanishes in relation to the feeling of absolute dependence. In addition, finite causality, however, is what it is only as it is mediated by its contrast to finite passivity. From these two premises, it thus follows that divine causality is also placed in contrast to finite causality.4 Divine causality, when viewed as the same in its compass as the totality of natural causality, is set forth in the expression “divine omnipotence,”5 which, as such, places all finite being under divine causality. Divine causality, when viewed as set in contrast to causality that is finite and natural, is set forth in the expression “divine eternity.” That is, by divine causality the being-reciprocally-interrelated of variously apportioned causality and

passivity shapes the interconnected process of nature to the domain of reciprocal activity and thus of change everywhere, in that all change and all alteration can be traced back to that main contrast. Thus, precisely in the relation in which natural causality is set in contrast to divine causality, it is the very nature of natural causality to be temporal and, consequently, inasmuch as “eternal” is the opposite of “temporal,” “the eternity of God” will also be the designated expression for this particular contrast. The following further explication of these two concepts will leave out what the two expressions seem more to contain—namely, what goes beyond divine causality or what goes beyond the compass of finite causality in accordance with ordinary language. At this point, it is simply to be noted, in general terms, that precisely because the two concepts here relate only to divine causality, it is also possible to prove of them straightaway, in accordance with their differences from each other, that even in them these two attributes, regarded singly, denote nothing that is of a real nature in God. It is always a matter of inaccuracy—to which one must, at the very least, call attention—when we set them forth as two different attributes. This is the case, for divine causality is like finite causality in its compass only insofar as it is opposite to finite causality in its kind. That is to say, if it were like finite causality after its kind, as is often expressed in all-too-human anthropomorphic notions of God, it would then likewise adhere to the domain of reciprocity, and it would thus be a part of the interconnectedness of nature as a whole. Just so, however, if divine causality were not like finite causality as to its compass, it also could not be opposite to finite causality without, at the same time, abrogating the unity that the interconnectedness of nature has. This would be so, because otherwise divine causality would be operative on some finite causality, and it would not be operative on other finite causality. Thus, instead of saying “God is eternal and omnipotent,” we would do better to say “God is omnipotent-eternal” and “God is eternalomnipotent,” or even “God is eternal omnipotence” or “God is omnipotent eternity.”6 Yet, already on account of comparisons to be made with narrower definitions of each attribute that have held currency up to now, we would still have to handle each one in particular. 2. Since people have always proceeded from a comparison of divine causality with finite causality, it is natural, however, that two further concepts have been associated with these two concepts—this in religious poetry as well as in religious conversation. That is, the concept “omnipresence” has been associated with that of “eternity,” and the concept “omniscience” has been associated with that of “omnipotence.” Let us suppose that the two expressions we have considered thus far were fully to correspond to the two members of the relationship set forth in our proposition. Then we would not have to deal with omnipresence and eternity in the same manner as we would deal with omniscience and omnipotence. Rather, it would be necessary only to set forth precautionary measures to ensure that nothing would slip into consideration of them that would contradict our proposition and the two main concepts contained in it. However, this is not entirely how the matter stands. The concept “eternity” does, to be sure, express a contrast to the causality that is contained in the interconnected process of nature. Yet, it does so, in the first instance, only inasmuch as this causality is temporally conditioned, and it is also conditioned spatially just as much—and

this is indeed no less true of spiritual causation as it is of physical causation. Admittedly, if one thinks of time and space as equal in their compass, then, to be sure, this implies that in spatial terms finite causality is everywhere dependent on divine causality. Yet, the concept that expresses this specific contrasting relation falls short in referring to spatiality alone. Moreover, the complete expression of this relation between divine causality and finite causality is first achieved in affixing “eternity” and “omnipresence” to each other. Further, as concerns the concept “omniscience,” this concept first arose, perhaps, within the domain of popular and poetic and religious communication, so as to designate the relation between God and what occurs in the inner life of human beings. In presentations of faithdoctrine, however, it is always discussed in the present locus of doctrine, and, considered in its widest compass, it belongs here. This is so, because in the domain of finite causality we are accustomed to forming a contrast between living forces and dead ones. Moreover, despite the fact that conscious finite causality is placed under the aegis of divine causality in the doctrine of preservation as well, its treatment is still actually placed under the concept of omnipotence. This is done, even though once the concept of “dead forces” is assumed, whether rightly or wrongly, the possibility of thinking about the concept “omnipotence” itself after the analogy of dead forces is not excluded. Since consciousness is the highest form of life that clearly exists to our minds, the possibility of such a concept is then averted by utilizing the concept “omniscience.” However, in and of themselves, each of these additional concepts of attributes, of course, no more designates something of a special and different sort in God than do the two that were set forth initially. Moreover, just as the best expression in relation to those two attributes seemed to be to say that in God’s causality God is “eternalomnipotent” or “omnipotent-eternal,” so too this second pair of attributes would best be embraced in such a compound expression.7 Yet, each of these two concepts, in and of itself, would also have to be an expression for the divine nature. This is so, because while it is true that no such concept can signify something different in God, it is also true that “omnipresence,” in being attributed to divine causality, is itself already “omnipotence” as well, and “omniscience” is itself already “eternity” as well. For the purpose of expressing the identity8 of all these four attributes in the most concise manner, however, it is possible to set forth yet another term of use. Note that, overall, what “time” and “space” present to us is “externality,” and by externality we always presuppose something or other that first comes into being by its being extended in time and space. It is also possible, then, to designate what is opposite to time and space as something “absolutely internal.” Likewise, note that by the expression “omniscience” what is to be presaged, first of all, is that “omnipotence” would not be thought of as a dead force. The same meaning is to be arrived at by using the expression “absolutely living.”9 Moreover, this pair of concepts, “internality” and “livingness,” would thus also be an exhaustive way to put the matter, perhaps being even more protective against all alien admixture.

1. Ed. note: Here Umfang (“compass”) means the entire territory that absolute divine causality is taken to cover.

2. Ed. note: Typically, Schleiermacher uses the term repräsentiert, as here, to mean literally re-present, i.e., to be something (in this case self-consciousness in possessing the specific characteristics mentioned) that as a part of the whole of finite being repeats characteristics present within that whole and/or in some domain of it (e.g., humanity), even if (e.g., as a human being) in one’s own distinctive way. 3. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this technical term stands in for Universum or for some part of it that makes up a “world” (Welt). In this work it is sometimes translated “the interconnected—or interrelated—process of nature,” to capture the kind of mutually effecting movement of all that is constantly going on, as it is described in the present discussion, or, in shorter form, “the interconnectedness of nature.” If it is to be thought of as an “order” (Ordnung)—which he sometimes calls it, viewed as ordered by God—or “system” (System), a term he never uses for this, it is an intricately dynamic, everchanging one. 4. Ed. note: That is, divine causality is not mediated by its contrast to any state of passivity in God. Schleiermacher takes God to be solely and constantly active in relation to all of created nature. 5. Allmacht. Ed. note: As in the biblical name “Almighty God.” 6. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note makes this point in yet another way: “In what manner is God eternal? As omnipotence. In what manner is God omnipotent? In an eternal manner” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher states in two adjacent marginal notes: “God’s omnipresent causality is omnipotent” and “God’s omniscient causality is eternal” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Identität. Ed. note: That is, among several meanings of this term, here Schleiermacher is selecting this one: what would constitute a set of them as a unity—not, for example, what would substitute for them all or, in the end, make them all superfluous. 9. Ed. note: schlechthinige Lebendigkeit, literally “absolute livingness” or “being absolutely alive,” as in the biblical name “the living God,” precisely not “dead.”

First Point of Doctrine

God Is Eternal

§52.1 By the “eternity” of God we understand God’s absolutely timeless causality, which as it conditions all that is temporal also conditions time itself. 1. Suppose that someone chose to separate the eternity of God from God’s omnipotence, which is here simply circumscribed2 in a particular relation to eternity. Then “eternity” would remain in use simply as a so-called passive3 attribute, and in this manner eternity is often described as God’s “infinity” or “immeasurability” as applied to time. To set forth eternity only as such an attribute, however, would be to support a notion that does not interconnect with religious consciousness at all. Consequently, for us it would foster using a completely empty notion regarding a being of God that is wholly apart from demonstrations of God’s power, a notion that would always imply a contrast between being “at rest” or “at leisure” and being “active,” a contrast that is ever and always suspect already in relation to God but is wholly inapplicable within the domain of Christian piety. Christian religious consciousness, however, really comes into being as a consciousness of God’s eternal power,4 only in that in every instance we relate the world to God. Contrariwise, certain poetic presentations do express the eternity of God as simply a being of God before all that is temporal.5 This imagery cannot likewise be taken up into didactic discourse without injury, in that in this domain a comparison of more and less can be contrived only between things of the same sort. In contrast, since even time itself is indeed

conditioned by divine causality,6 divine causality has all the more to be conceived of as completely timeless.7 This so-called timelessness of divine causality is arrived at by means of expressions that designate what is temporal and are thus figurative, as it were, in that when the two are set side by side, the temporal contrasts between before and after, younger and older, would be cancelled out in relation to God.8 However, in that we do refer the eternity of God to God’s omnipotence and posit it to be the same as and identical with God’s omnipotence, this move in no way implies, in and of itself, that the temporal existence9 of the world would have to relapse back into infinity, with the result that no beginning of the world could possibly be conceived of.10 That is to say, just as what emerges in time today is, nonetheless, also grounded in God’s omnipotence, consequently has also been willed and effected by God in an eternal—that is, timeless— manner, so too the world could have been willed timelessly and yet have come forward, as is said, at the beginning of time. On the other hand, if the world were posited as without beginning or end, we also need have no greater concern that, on account of this, the distinction between divine causality and that within the interconnected process of nature would be cancelled out and the world would then be eternal too, as God is. Rather, for all that, the eternity of God would remain unparalleled, in that the contrast between temporality and eternity would not be diminished in the least, even by this endless duration of time.11 2. This relationship, however, is, to be sure, very much obscured by all those explanations of God’s eternity which, in part, equate it with that seeming eternity, namely, endless time,12 or, in part, also simply compare it with the endless duration of time.13 Even the familiar formulation, which describes God’s eternity as that attribute by virtue of which God would neither have begun nor have ended, is of the latter sort. That is to say, in that here only the beginning and end points that are present in temporal duration are denied, yet between these two extreme points, the being of God is taken to be coextensive with temporal being; as a consequence, temporality is not in itself denied, nor is the measurability of divine being— thus also God’s working through time—denied, but, instead, these characteristics are all indirectly affirmed. Therefore, we must toss out, viewed as inappropriately applied to God, all clarifications that dismiss for God only certain limitations of time, not time itself, and all those that would form the concept “eternity” based on that of temporality—of which it is, nevertheless, the very opposite—and that would do so through negation of limitations. Even if certain poetic passages14 cannot describe eternity otherwise than as subsumed under the image of endless time, the New Testament itself teaches us15 how these passages are to be supplemented for didactic purposes. Hence, regarding some theologians it must be granted that, with Socinus, they have totally rejected the wholly scriptural clarifications of Augustine and Boethius, this simply for the sake of their holding different dogmatic views. Yet, among other theologians this rejection is to be explained as coming from their worry that if eternity would be posited as timelessness, nothing would actually be posited of it at all. This consequence can arise,

however, only if eternity is positioned among the passive attributes and if it is still thought that every attribute, of itself alone, is to express the nature of divine being.16 In contrast, this consequence disappears when one combines this concept, eternity, with that of omnipotence, just as we require. This is so, for in that some divine efficacious action is posited, something can indeed be posited that is unfamiliar and perhaps something that is not to be clearly presented, but in no way can nothing be posited. Indeed, finite being itself does offer us some aid toward gaining clarity17 regarding this concept, in that time predominately adheres even to finite being only to the extent that finite being is caused, less so to the extent that finite being is causal. So, imagine instead that, in the first place, a given finite being, viewed as self-identical, were to produce a complete series of temporal events. Thus, imagine, in the second place, that this finite being, viewed as remaining self-identical—for example, as does an “I,” viewed as the constant ground of all the changing phenomena of its mind and heart,18 including all its decisions, each of which decisions, being viewed as a constitutive element, in turn, produces a complete set of temporal events—were the constant causal agent for changing caused events, relatively with respect to all that is caused. Insofar as these two conditions were fulfilled, this “finite being” would also be posited as something that is itself timeless.19 In this connection, moreover, we will have to rest content with our having arrived at such an analogical point of contact.20 Postscript: Regarding the Inalterability of God. If the concept of eternity is conceived in this way, no occasion is left for bringing “inalterability” forward as yet another particular attribute. Rather, it is already contained in the attribute eternity. This is the case, for if God is wholly timeless in God’s relationship to the world, a relationship that conditions the world’s absolute dependence, within that relationship there is also no manifold of successive actions between the two. Suppose that someone were to proceed from a distinction between “substance” and “existence” in God.21 Then the situation might seem to be different, for that person would be presenting “eternity” as only one aspect referred to in the concept “inalterability.”22 For us, however, this case would come down to the same thing, since the other aspect would be a passive attribute in God, which attribute would not stand for anything that could be present in religious self-consciousness. Thus, one can preferably hold that God is inalterable simply as a canon23 for protecting against interpreting any stirring of a religious mind and heart in this way and against understanding any utterance from God24 in such a way that any sort of change in God has to be presupposed therewith.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes a marginal note here: “1. Explanation: (a) Not separated off, viewed as a passive attribute. Nota bene: Such a procedure could … perhaps have a speculative value” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: umschrieben. Or “located.” This analogy is borrowed from geometry. That is, think of omnipotence as if it were a geometrical figure that is located within a circle that represents eternity. A “circumscribed” figure would touch the circle only at the points of the figure’s angles. The figure would then be located within the general imagined space thus circumscribed by the circle, but it would not be identical with all the space defined by the circle. In precisely this way omnipotence is indeed fully defined only in terms of eternity, not time alone. This diagram can only be a metaphor, however, because neither the exercise of power by God nor the process of time that God enters into can be mapped out (defined) in

strictly spatial terms. Both God’s omnipotent activity within finite, spatial, and temporal conditions and God’s eternal nature are infinite. 3. Ed. note: ruhende. That is, it would be an attribute by which one imagined God “at rest,” not active in the world. 4. Rom. 1:19. Ed. note: Here Paul writes that even among those who wickedly “suppress the truth,” “what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them” (RSV). Understandably, Clemen conjectured that Schleiermacher might have meant to cite 1:20, for there Paul goes on to explain: “Ever since the creation of the world his [God’s] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made” (RSV). What is shown is God’s “eternal power,” the source of which lies in God’s “invisible nature.” Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “The eternal power of omnipotence. Being before all else is an Old-Testament-type notion but is thereby not of any use. That is to say, it still bears a temporal character if it comes into being as before or with or after anything else arising in time” (Thönes, 1873). See §41 and notes there, also §51n6. 5. Ps. 90:2. Ed. note: This verse states that God existed “before” the “earth and the world,” thence everlastingly. 6. Augustine (354–430), On Genesis against the Manichees (388/389) 1.3: “For God also made time. … For how could there be a time that God has not made since he is the maker of all time?”—The same thing also seems to be indicated in the expression ἄφθαρτος βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων (“To the King of ages, immortal, imperishable”) in 1 Tim. 1:17. Ed. note: ET of the first item, Fathers of the Church 84 (1991), 50. Latin: Migne Lat. 34:174. 7. (1) Augustine, Confessions 11.16 (in chap. 8): “Nor dost Thou precede in time the periods of time. Rather, Thou dost precede all past periods in the sublimity of an ever-present eternity.” (2) Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (ca. 480–524), The Consolation of Philosophy (523–524) 5, prosa 6: “Eternity, then, is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of boundless life. … [It] must necessarily both always be present to itself, possessing itself in the present, and hold as present the infinity of moving time.” Ed. note: (1) ET Fathers of the Church 21 (1953), 342. Latin: Migne Lat. 32:815. (2) ET and Latin: Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy (1973), 422–23 and 424–25; Latin: Migne Lat. 63:858f. 8. Augustine, Genesis Literally Interpreted (ca. 404–417), vol. 2, books 7–12: “Without any distance or unit of time, by His immutable eternity He is more ancient than all things because He is before them all, and newer than all things because He is also after them all.” In another form this is the same statement as that in 2 Pet. 3: 8. Ed. note: ET The Literal Meaning of Genesis (1982), 67; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:392. 9. Dasein. Ed. note: In the present context, Sein (being) is referred to God alone, but viewed as “Supreme Being,” that which is above, supreme over, and qualitatively different from the world’s way of being. 10. Cf. John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), Dialogues against the Manicheans 6: “Not desiring at first, later God did desire but always willed to create all things in God’s own designated time.” Ed. note: ET Valantasis/Tice; Greek and Latin: Migne Gr. 94:1511–12. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Here only the possibility of a temporal beginning is to be intimated, because someone could easily believe that the explanation would rest quite properly on the opposite presupposition.—Compare the analogue of conceiving something [Konzeption] occurring before it is carried out [Ausführung]” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Augustine, On Music (387–391) 6.11.29: “From where times are made and ordered and changed, imitating eternity …” See also his work Against the Manichees (391) 1.4: “We do not say that this world has the same duration as God, for this world does not have the same eternity that God has.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 4 (1947), 355, and vol. 84 (1991), 50–51; Latin: Migne Lat. 32:1179, and 34:175. 12. (1) Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), Praelectiones theologicae 8, 545: “In truth the first time did not exist at the creation of the world. … For that reason, with respect to God himself there exists something past, something in truth present and also something future.” (2) Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764) 1, 254: “Eternity is infinite duration.” Cf. Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), Systema intellectuale (1733), 781. [Redeker note: In Mosheim, op. cit., 221: “… infinity with respect to duration, or time … is called eternity in the language of Holy Scripture.”] (3) Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), 104. [Redeker note: 104f. reads: (German:) “One can also distinguish the infinity of God in God’s existence, and this is then called eternity.” (Latin:) “The eternity of God is that attribute whereby the being of God neither begins nor ends at any time,” (German:) or, further, it is (Latin:) “an existence of the divine that continues infinitely.”] Ed. note: (1) KGA I/7.3, 625, prints the full context of chap. 8; ET German: Tice; Latin: Kienzle. (2) KGA I/7.3, 458, includes the first quotation. Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) was translated by Mosheim into Latin (Jena, 1733). 13. In his dogmatics Eckermann terms it to be something necessary in that he makes it parallel to the immortality of the soul and the imperishability of powers. Ed. note: Jakob Christoph Rudolph Eckermann (1754–1837), Handbuch zum systematischen Studium (1801–1803). 14. Job 26:36; Ps. 102:27. Ed. note: The Psalms passage is also quoted in Heb. 1:12. In a marginal note, Schleiermacher adds this quotation of the Psalms verse and a comment on it: “‘but thou art the same, and thy years have no end.’ The first clause in this passage has diminished content, because it is clarified by the second one” (Thönes, 1873).

15. Compare 2 Pet. 3:8 with Ps. 90:2. 16. Ed. note: das Wesen des göttlichen Seins ausdrücken soll. 17. Anschaulichkeit. 18. Ed. note: als beharrlicher Grund aller wechselnden Gemütserscheinungen. 19. Ed. note: Here zeitlos seems to mean “not bound by time.” That is, as a free causal agent, the Ich (the constant in this admittedly relative, not absolute use, thus what we call a human “self “) is a relatively free agent. Cf. §§4–5, on the relation of the self ‘s partial freedom to the self ‘s feeling of absolute vs. partial dependence. 20. Ed. note: In other words, Schleiermacher’s claim is that forging an analogy, however unsatisfying this might be to one’s reasoning mind, is actually the best we can do here. Philosophically, one could examine this mere analogy further. Theologically, one would be entering a domain of rapidly diminishing returns. Here, he is claiming to have established that the concept of God’s “eternity” becomes clearer when it is affixed to that of God’s omnipotently efficacious action within our knowable temporal domain, even if one cannot perfectly identify God’s eternal, not time-bound causation in strictly temporal terms. 21. Substanz und Existenz. 22. Cf. Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), 105: “If one considers inalterability as to God’s nature [Wesen], it is called ‘simplicity,’ if to God’s existence [Existenz], it is ‘eternity.’” Previously, however, Reinhard had also already taken simplicity to be a particular attribute of God, whereas eternity was equivalent to that infinity which is applied to God’s existence. 23. Kanon. Ed. note: That is, a subordinate, merely procedural or technical rule, not a separate attribute of God. 24. Exod. 32:14; Jer. 16:13 and 42:10.

Second Point of Doctrine

God Is Omnipresent

§53. By the “omnipresence” of God we understand God’s absolutely spaceless causality, which as it conditions all that is spatial also conditions space itself. 1. In form, this proposition sounds entirely like the last one, and the concept of omnipresence itself has been taken up here only because the contrast between divine causality and finite causality in the term “eternity” has been predominately referred to time. Accordingly, it might seem that nothing else would be necessary than to transfer, in the exact same form, everything that was applied to the previous proposition to this one, exchanging the concept “space” for that of “time.” It is true that, already from of old,1 eternity has been celebrated in religious poetry and, in an exquisite manner, far more often than has the concept “omnipresence.” Accordingly, in general terms, it would also have to be said that far more elements of piety have evoked the concept “omnipresence,” thus that this concept has greater vitality and enjoys a more nearly general currency. In contrast, God’s relation to time, as expressed in the concept “eternity,” bears on religious life to a lower degree, and hence is distinguished by its colder tone. This phenomenon might well lie in the fact that, along with their consciousness, religious persons are mostly held tight to the present. Thus, this copositioning of divine causality with the entire content of finite causality entitles every act to bestir religious consciousness—that is, every act in which we take up into ourselves a part of the interconnected process of nature or identify ourselves with it, thus, every element of our self-consciousness that is extending so as to encompass the whole world.2 Thus, moreover, wherever any human being is moved, from within or from without, that person is also summoned consciously to take hold of that power of the Highest which is immediately

imminent to oneself in every bit of finite causality.3 It is natural, then, that in this respect we would tend far more often to transfer our attention to remotest spaces, which would, nevertheless, immediately arise in our sense perception, than that we would retreat to remotest times. Given our standpoint, however, this unevenness, no matter how natural it might be, still does not seem reasonable, and it is incumbent on a presentation of faith-doctrine, viewed as employing scientific procedure, to see whether it can harmonize what is to be effected by immediately juxtaposing these two concepts in this manner. At the same time, however, it must take care lest the greater vitality inherent in the concept to be treated at this point be tightly interconnected with some strongly sensory admixture and lest it adopt anything from that admixture. Now, it can quite easily seem that divine causality, viewed as eternity, is distributed differently at various times, nevertheless, if someone were to posit a nonbeing of finite causality before finite causality existed. Likewise, this also seems easily to be a consequence with reference to space, if someone were to have to concede that finite causality would, nevertheless, be greater or less at different places—that is, least where space is filled only with so-called dead forces and greater where there is a greater unfolding of life, and thus greatest where unsullied human consciousness would be active and, in this way, raised to a higher level. To the contrary, it would then have to be said, first of all, that, as is generally well understood, in this way no difference would be posited in the omnipotent presence of God. Rather, difference would be posited only within the receptivity of finite being, and divine presence is referred precisely to the causal activity of finite being.4 That is to say, the receptivity of human beings to divine presence is greater than that of any other earthly being, but among human beings it is greatest among religious persons. Yet, even this fact first becomes entirely clear when one recalls that, as our proposition explains, divine omnipresence is also nonspatial,5 and consequently, may also not be thought of as greater or less at different places. 2. Suppose that, despite these considerations, people would still choose to carry over poetic and popular descriptions directly into the dogmatic arena, descriptions that almost always depict spatially conditioned causality in God, even given the overlying image of unlimited space. Yet, it would be very difficult successfully to get around all determinations that waywardly place something spatial into divine omniscience. It would be just as difficult, moreover, if people were to start off contemplating divine omnipresence without reference to divine causality, viewing it as a passive attribute. In the first case,6 it is possible to employ to some advantage two expressions ordinarily used in Greek theology to designate omnipotent presence, namely ἀδιαστασία (the state of not-being-separate-from-each-other) and συνουσία (coexistence).7 That is, the negation of all separateness-from-each-other expresses the contrast of divine causality with finite causality, which latter causality—indeed, mental as well as bodily—is weakened by any distancing from its original locale or center, with the result that each force is no more at all where it bears no more effect, just as, in general, it is less wherever its effect is less. This

differentiation of status is denied regarding divine causality, thus a self-identity-of-being-nomatter-where is claimed for it. In the second case, regarding what is spatial, however, the notion “space” does lie in the expression “not-being-separate-from-each-other” and, in the same way, also in the expression “being-self-identical-no-matter-where,” and “space” does apply only to what is finite, viewed as what is effected, but it does not apply to God. The same thing is to be noted of the term συνουσία (coexistence), which can simply say that finite causality is nowhere without divine causality, but it does not say, at the same time, that just as finite causality exists in space, divine causality does too. This is so, for not only συνουσία ἐνεργητική (energizing coexistence), which imparts energy, is referred to finite causality, but ὑποστατικὴ (hypostatizing coexistence), which makes things into separate and distinct substances, inasmuch as the latter expresses divine omnipresence as preservation of things in their own being and powers, is also referred to finite causality. Any other type of explanation would find it difficult to avoid the suspicion of its blending divine being with finite being, consequently to avoid having a pantheistic appearance.8 The determination that God would be everywhere not circumscriptively but repletively9 also starkly bears this pantheist appearance. That is to say, when the talk is of “filling space,” we cannot move away from applying an analogy with expansive forces, and at that point the notion of ascribing unending extension to God lies only too close at hand. Moreover, even the improvement one might effect in saying that such an explanation of omnipresence is not to be understood in a corporeal fashion—as if, perchance, the being of something finite in space would be blocked by God’s filling that space—but in a divine fashion would rarely be couched with proper caution.10 Then, further, suppose that the explanation is fashioned in such a way that God would encompass all locations in Godself.11 That move could easily lead to the very opposite result, namely, the formulation that even in terms of space God is that which includes everything, without exception. If, still further, this omnipresence were thought of as passive in contrast to active, almost nothing would remain than the formulation that God is that which is in itself totally empty. Thus, precisely on this account, the allied expression, that God, as such, would be the locus for everything,12 should also be employed only with great caution. Hence, in this respect, what remains is the most fundamental improvement, the formulation that God is in Godself,13 which abrogates what is spatial altogether, though, to be sure, this has to stand alongside the formulation that the effects of God’s causal being-in-Godself would exist everywhere.14 Indirectly and, as it were, figuratively, the same outcome would be reached by abrogating the spatial contrasts themselves.15 The other respect to be considered here, namely, the distinction between divine omnipresence as a passive and as an active attribute, almost unfailingly abrogates the essential being-self-identical of divine causality and thereby produces nothing but confusions. Suppose, for example, that a distinction were made between omnipresence of God as far as it relates to Godself and omnipresence of God in relation to creatures,16 and suppose that a creation in time is assumed. In that case, before the creation in time there

would have been only the first kind of omnipresence, and then the second would have been added to it. Alternatively, suppose that the world were posited as finite in space and thus at the world’s edge a space outside it were posited that would, to be sure, always be empty. In this case, the reverse would occur: the first omnipresence would stretch farther than the second, and then it could very easily be said that God, in and of Godself, would also be outside the world, but in relation to creatures God would be present only within the world, whereby a similar disparity would enter in. The Socinians have gone farthest in taking this view as well,17 but they did so, nonetheless, chiefly in order to avoid that aforementioned pantheistic appearance,18 which aim they thought could be achieved only in this way. They held this thought, because they could not entirely detach themselves from spatiality in considering the being and working of God. Moreover, this tendency came most strongly to the fore when, in vindication of their view, they would adduce the argument that a kind of perfection would adhere in finite things should they reach farther with their force than with their nature. In contrast, they held, the being-everywhere of God would indeed have to be related equally to God’s nature and to God’s might.19 Postscript: Regarding the Immeasurability of God. It is already self-evident that if this term is taken to designate a particular attribute of God, we really need no further consideration of it. Great difficulties are also attached to usage of this term.20 On the one hand, it is equated with God’s “infinity,” and, on the other hand, it is deduced from it, in that if infinity is regarded in terms of substance, it implies immeasurability, whereas if infinity is regarded in terms of existence, it implies eternity.21 Yet, just as time, when taken in this way, is not abrogated in the concept “eternity” but only its limits are abrogated, so too in the concept “immeasurability” of space is not abrogated but only its limits are abrogated.22 Moreover, in this case we would then simply have omnipresence separated from omnipotence, consequently a passive attribute but one still always thought of spatially. Suppose, however, that immeasurability is thought of as the same thing as infinity itself, which is then, in turn, frequently presented as an attribute of all the attributes of God. As such, we could then have no recourse to that term here at all. In fact, it would also never come up, because it could not be a true attribute, even of the attributes, but, on account of its negative content, would serve only as a reservation23 concerning them. At that point, however, it would, nevertheless, have to dismiss in each and every proposed attribute all traces of an analogy with anything finite, thus would be the general anti-anthropomorphic and anti-somatomorphic formulation. It has served us precisely in this way here, moreover, and will also do so in the future, but without our finding it proper to set forth the concept as an attribute of God. That is to say, since here we have to do only with the causality of God, the concept of God’s infinity itself also contains only one task: that of staving off any analogy with finite causality. Now, all finite causality, however, is measurable simply by means of time and space. Consequently, we have posited divine causality, in its most distinctive sense, as infinite, in that we always do posit it to be absolutely nontemporal and nonspatial.24 Furthermore, the term “immeasurability” can also easily be turned round to an equivalence with this proper

content of “infinity,” if one meant only lacking in measurability.25 This equivalence works, because all measuring, whatever else might be associated with it, can be traced back to determinations in accordance with time and space. Now, as “immeasurability” is customarily defined, a being-everywhere of God is applied to it, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, a warning is attached that it is not to be understood in the way an extension would be. However, once talk about the efficacious action of God has been separated from talk about the being of God, and the latter is alone under consideration, then, to be sure, all that remains for the concept “immeasurability” to perform is a negation, without any kind of positive underpinning that could have emerged from religious stirrings of mind and heart.26 On the other hand, it easily becomes self-evident that the contrast between the feeling of absolute dependence and a feeling of partial dependence or of partial freedom—it being all the same whether the latter two feelings are temporal or spatial to the same degree—implies precisely the following affirmation: the causality that evokes the feeling of absolute dependence in us cannot be temporal and cannot be spatial.27

1. In Ps. 139, among other places. 2. Ed. note: There the “copositioning” (Gleichsetzung) cannot rightly be taken to mean literally to equate God’s causality with finite causality. Rather, the extent of divine causality that can foster “religious consciousness” is the same as that which encompasses “the whole world,” that is, “the entire interconnected process of nature” and every part of it, with both of which—the entirety and some part—we too are able to “identify” (identifizieren) ourselves. As usual, “act” translates Akt, “element” translates Moment, here referring both to objects of self-consciousness (e.g., the world, parts of the world, such as the species, the self or other human beings, and God) and to various conditions of self-consciousness. In the present context, even apart from considerations that ordinarily arise, the spatial analogy to chemical elements (Momenten) would seem preferable to the temporal notion of “moments” (also Momenten), the latter of which is rare in Schleiermacher’s usage. 3. Ed. note: Unpacked, the phrase ihm unmittelbar nahe Kraft des Höchsten uses a biblical name for God, “the Highest” (or Supreme Being), to make the claim that God’s power (Kraft) and the corresponding strength (also Kraft) it offers is already so close (nahe) in every bit of finite causality as to be termed “immediately imminent” (unmittelbar nahe) under the right circumstances. 4. John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–), 1.13: “Now, God does pervade all things without becoming mixed with them, and to all things he communicates his operation in accordance with the fitness and receptivity of each.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 197; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:851– 52. 5. (1) Augustine (354–430), Eighty-three Different Questions (388–396), 20 (On the Place of God): “God is not anywhere. For what is somewhere is contained in a place. … Nevertheless, since he is and yet is not in a place, all things are in him. … Still, they are not in God as if he himself were a place.” (2) Also his Latin: Migne Lat. 40:15 (411–430), Letter 187:11: “Although in speaking of him we say that God is everywhere present, we must resist carnal ideas … and not imagine that God is distributed through all things by a sort of extension of size as … air or light are distributed.” Ed. note: (1) ET Fathers of the Church 70 (1982), 47; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:15. (2) ET Fathers of the Church 30 (1955), 229; Latin: Migne Lat. 33:836. 6. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Namely, regarding the carrying over” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Divine omnipotence also brings about any separation-fromeach-other [Auβereinandersein] (the state διάστασις), but it does so not-after-the-manner-of-being-separated-from-eachother (ἀδιαστάτως). Συνουσία [coexistence] expresses the ‘being with finite causation’ of divine causality, but only in an absolutely nonspatial manner. ’Ενεργητική [energize or impart energy] implies cooperation [Mitwirkung], whereas ὑποστατική [hypostasize, or make into a separate and distinct substance] implies preservation [Erhaltung]” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: einen pantheistischen Schein. More literally, “a pantheistic sheen to it.”

9. Ed. note: “Circumscriptively” (circumscriptiv) means in an all-encompassing manner but in a manner that especially befits the activity. Historically and in this work the term is also applied to “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” in the special activities of God, viewed as triune. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “‘Repletively’ [repletiv] means: always filling the same space with what is finite” (Thönes, 1873). 10. One can commend this caution in John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–) 1.13: “However, there is also an intellectual place where the intellectual and incorporeal nature is thought of as being and where it actually is. There it is present and acts; … and it is also said to be in a place; and this place where God is said to be is there when his operation is plainly visible.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 197; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:851–52. In his marginal note, Schleiermacher explains: “The caution lies not in the words ‘there where his operation is’ but in the words ‘there when … plainly visible’” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), The Trinity (356–360) 1.6: “There is no place without God, nor is there any place which is not in God.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 8; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:30. In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher characterizes this formulation as “in former times, already a very fine formulation” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Theophilus of Antioch (late 2nd cent.), To Autolycus, book 2.3: “God is not contained but is himself the locus of the universe.” Ed. note: ET Grant (1970), 25; Greek in Grant (1970), 24; and Migne Gr. 6:1049D. Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states, with respect to “all things”: “Cf. Augustine [in §53n5 above]: ‘Still, they are not in God as if he himself were a place”’ (Thönes, 1873). 13. Augustine (354–430), Epistolae classis (411–430), 3.14, Letter 187:14: “not confined in any place, but wholly in himself everywhere.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 30 (1955), 231; Migne Lat. 33:837. In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher adds: “That is, causally. This is so, for otherwise the attribute would be only a passive one” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Ed. note: “Everywhere” translates überall, which here means, more precisely, absolutely in all places altogether, or, more colloquially: in the whole universe, all over the place. 15. (1) Augustine (354–430), On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (393) 8.38: “By his immutable and transcendent power he is interior to all things because they are all in him and exterior to all things because he is above them all.” (2) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), The Trinity (356–360) 1.6: “That in all these beginnings of created things God might be recognized as in them and outside of them, that is, poured about everything and permeating everything. … God with God’s whole being contains all things that are within God and outside of God, nor is God, the infinite One, separated from all things nor are all things not present within God, who is infinite.” Ed. note: (1) ET Ancient Christian Writers 42 (1982), 67; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:391. (2) ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 7; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:30. 16. Radicaliter and relative. See Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 3, 136. Ed. note: That is, in a “radical” sense, in which God is purely passive, at rest, and omnipresence is simply an attribute literally “rooted” (radicaliter) in God, versus a sense in which God is active, in “relating” (relative) to whatever God has created. 17. Valentinus Smalcius (1572–1622), Refutatio thesium Wolfgangi Frantzii (1614), 4: “The essence and presence of God in all places is considered null, for in error is God said not to be in heaven.” Ed. note: This Refutation came from Rakov. As indicated in a marginal note to the first edition, in KGA I/7.3, 182, Schleiermacher drew this quotation from Johann Gerhard’s (1582–1637) Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 3, 130; ET Kienzles. 18. Thomas Pisecius (ca. 1580–ca. 1650), Responsio ad 2. rationem Campaini 24: “All Scriptures testify that the infinite power of God, not God’s being, permeates all things; as we understand it, by God’s infinite power the plan of the whole world permits of the world itself being divine.” Ed. note: Cf. KGA I/7.3, 182. ET Templin/Tice. 19. Ed. note: Here the contrast is sharpened by Schleiermacher’s use of “force” (Kraft) for finite things and “might” (Macht) for God, though both terms can be used for divine and human activity. 20. (1) Cf. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 3, 122. (2) Cf. Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753– 1812), Dogmatik (1818), 101–4. Redeker note quotes: “Thus, infinity is a determination that has to be applied to all of God’s attributes, which collectively exist without limits. Here, however, where we go through the divine attributes quiescentia, we can still consider it especially (a) with respect to God’s substance [Substanz], where it is called “immeasurability” [Unermesslichkeit]. That is to say, immensity [Immensitas] is that attribute by which God is everywhere but not constrained by any spatial limits. … Yet, it is to be noted in this connection that it is not possible to figure out in which way God’s substance would be overall, because we have no clear concept of it in itself, also that one must very much guard against bringing the notion of corporeal extension into the concept of God’s immeasurability. So as to prevent this error, some define this immeasurability not extensively in relation to God’s being-everywhere [Überallsein] but intensively in relation to God’s great perfections in general, perfections that cannot be gauged by any finite quantities. Given this understanding, God’s immeasurability is completely one and the same thing as God’s infinity. For all that, it seems to be more conformable to the scriptural passages cited above to refer God’s immeasurability to God’s substance and to understand by this referral God’s being-everywhere, and one is not to enter into any further definition of that.” Ed. note: (1) quoted in KGA I/7.3, 430. (2) Several similar terms used conventionally for God, such as incomparable greatness, immensity, boundlessness, and

immeasurability, are all amply reflected in this discussion, all suggesting references to spatiality in some fashion. Also, what Schleiermacher has been calling a “passive” attribute (ruhrende—God at rest), Reinhard here similarly refers to as “quiescent.” 21. Substanz … Existenz. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher recalls in a marginal note: “Nota bene: Above, it was inalterability, regarded in terms of existence, that implied eternity” (Thönes, 1873). Cf. §52 P.S. 22. See Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologicae dogmaticae (1764) 1, 247: “When infinity is considered with respect to location or dimension, it is called immensity [immensitas].” Ed. note: See KGA I/7.3, 458, for this quotation in context; ET Kienzles. 23. Kautel. Ed. note: That is, used as a cautionary note regarding concepts purporting to present God’s attributes, not saying anything positive about God’s causality, as Schleiermacher further seeks to demonstrate. 24. Ed. note: schlechthin zeitlos und raumlos. That is, without, or lacking in, anything conceivable as “time” or “space,” thus rather conceivable only negatively as “eternal” (ewig, zeitlos) and “infinite” (unendlich, raumlos). 25. Unmesslichkeit. Ed. note: Whereas the root verb ermesslich can mean calculate, assess, or comprehend as well as measure, the root messen strictly refers to measuring, hence, collaterally, to gauging or sizing up. Cf. §53n20 for other nuances that have been associated with God’s proposed Un-er-messlichkeit (here, therefore translated only “immeasurability”). 26. Ed. note: The phrase translated “religious stirrings of mind and heart,” by now quite familiar in this work, is frommen Gemütserregungen. 27. Ed. note: In On Religion (1821) I, supplementary note 4, Schleiermacher explains why the terms Universum and Weltall are not to be substituted for “God,” referring to Christian Faith for “further explication.” There he does state that once surrender to the universe becomes habitual, “we are enabled as each occasion arises to take notice of God and of God’s eternal power and divinity through the works of God’s creation, not in some merely general way. It is not by any one thing of itself, moreover, but only insofar as any given thing is taken up into that unity [Einheit] and fullness [Allheit] apart from which God is never directly revealed to human beings.” See also §8 (notes throughout) and §36.

Third Point of Doctrine

God Is Omnipotent1

§54. The concept of divine “omnipotence” contains two assertions. The first assertion is that the entire interconnected process of nature, encompassing all spaces and times, is grounded in divine causality, which, since it is eternal and omnipresent, is set in contrast to all finite causality. The second assertion is that divine causality, as expressed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and, in consequence, everything for which there is a causality in God also comes to be realized and does occur.2 1. The interconnected process of nature is nothing other than the two-fold totality of finite causing and finite caused, mutually conditioned by each other. Thus, the first part of our proposition implies, first and foremost, that by virtue of its being grounded in divine omnipotence, every finite entity, posited in and of itself, brings about all that which the causality implanted within it, existing as it does within the domain of causality in general, has the capacity to effect. Likewise, however, this first part also implies, by virtue of its being arranged by divine omnipotence, every single thing that is caused within the interconnected process of nature is also the unalloyed result of every entity that is causative within the interconnected process of nature, this in proportion to how it stands in relation to each one.

Now, every entity that we are able to posit as something particular, in and of itself, within the totality of finite being has to be not only causative but also caused. Likewise, never and nowhere does anything exist that could be introduced as an object for divine causality that would already have existed previously—in consequence, somehow independent of God and placed over against God. Rather, the basic feeling of piety would be abrogated by any such assumption. This would be the case whether the assumption were then to mean that the efficacious action of divine omnipotence would everywhere start to operate on already existing things in such a manner or to mean that this efficacious action would be interrupted by some such thing confronting God—it matters not whether seldom or often. That is to say, suppose that the basic feeling of piety were not abrogated immediately; still, once we were to extend our self-consciousness to that of the totality of finite being, under that assumption we would be representing precisely that other thing that is independent of God in addition. In this way, moreover, there could no longer be any absolute dependence but only a partial dependence. Further, since divine omnipotence can be thought of only as eternal and omnipresent,3 it is insupportable, on the one hand, to think that something should first come into being by means of it only at some particular time or other. Rather, everything that is first to come into being by means of finite causality—which, to be sure, would happen in time and space— would always be posited as occurring by divine omnipotence already. On no account, moreover, would any particular thing be any the less posited as coming into being by divine omnipotence because it could already be recognized as having come into being by means of finite causality. Nor, on any account, would it be any the more posited as having come into being by divine omnipotence because it could not be traced back to finite causality. Thus, in no way could divine omnipotence step in the place of natural causes as a supplement to them, as it were, in that at that point divine omnipotence would also have to work temporally and spatially, in the same fashion as natural causes do. That is, at one time it would be working in that way, and at another time, in turn, not in that way but unlike itself, in consequence being neither eternal nor omnipresent. Instead, the situation is this: Everything is and comes to be entirely through the interconnected process of nature, with the result that each part persists by means of all and everything persists entirely by divine omnipotence, in such a way that everything persists indivisibly by that “One” source.4 2. Now, the second part of our proposition rests in the fact that within our domain we arrive at a notion of divine omnipotence only by means of an apprehension of the feeling of absolute dependence. Thus, we lack any point of connection for making any claims for divine causality that go beyond the interconnected process of nature, which is what precisely that feeling encompasses. It might indeed seem possible, however, to say that what we call “All” persists based on what is actual and what is possible, and that omnipotence would thus also have to encompass both. Yet, if omnipotence is supposed completely and exhaustively to present itself in the totality of finite being, then it would encompass only what is actual and not what is possible as well. However, how little the distinction between possible and actual could be applicable to God will be very clearly shown if we simply take notice of cases in

which we ourselves mainly apply it. To begin with, we may recall that much is possible in a given thing due to the general concept of the species to which it appears to belong, but some possibilities do not become actual, because the particular determinacy5 of that given thing excludes precisely these possibilities. In contrast, in other particular members of the same species other determinations6 that are also possible by virtue of the concept of that same species remain excluded for that same reason. In these cases, however, to us something seems to be possible only because finding the full determinateness of a given individual member of a species is a task that we are never capable of carrying out completely. Such a distinction between general and particular, however, is not available for use in relation to God. Rather, in God’s case a given species originally exists as the totality of all the individual entities that belong to it, and, on the other hand, these members are, at the same time, located and grounded in their species. As a result, whatever has not become actual therein is also not possible in relation to God. Likewise, we say that much is possible due to the nature of a thing—putting together its internal determinateness as part of a species and as a particular entity—that, nevertheless, does not become actual in and with the thing, because it is hindered by the placement of the thing within the domain of general interaction. We justifiably make this distinction and ascribe some truth to what is thought to be possible, precisely as we would do in other cases. We do this, because only by means of this indirect procedure, stepping beyond the domain of fruitless abstraction, do we compose a perception regarding the conditioned status7 inherent in the unfolding of each particular entity. On the other hand, suppose that for every point within the whole we could have taken into account the influence of all interactions, in their totality. Then, likewise we would have had to say that what would not have become actual would also not have been possible within the interconnected process of nature. In the case of God, however, what has taken place is not, in and of itself, grounded merely in some particular, and the whole process of interaction is also not merely grounded in some particular, neither of the two being separated from each other. Rather, the two are grounded with and by each other. As a result, in relation to God only that which is grounded just as much in the one case as in the other case is to be designated as “possible.” In contrast, everything that has some truth for us can be traced back to these two cases. This is so, for the notion of something possible outside the totality of what is actual8 has no truth whatsoever for us, because not only does religious self-consciousness not lead us to this point, but also, no matter how we might have arrived at it, we would thereupon have to assume a limitation in God regarding divine omnipotence. Such a limitation in God can never be present to us, nor could we form a notion regarding any ground for it, for then what is thought to be possible would have to be able to come into existence9 not as an increase of what is actual but only as a diminution of it somehow. Thereby the whole presupposition of such a possibility would be wiped out.10 3.11 Now, given that in relation to God no distinction between what is possible and what is actual takes place, a judgment regarding the popular definition of omnipotence is easily self-evident, even though it is often taken up in scientific discussions, namely, the

explanation that it is the attribute by virtue of which God is able to bring about everything that is possible or everything that contains no contradiction in itself. That is, suppose that people were to take contradiction in real terms12 and were to call whatever can find no place in the totality of being “contradictory.” Then the claim would be correct, for there divine omnipotence would certainly be held to bring forth all that is conjointly possible. Suppose that people were to say, in addition, that God can bring anything about by virtue of omnipotence but does not do so. Then only precisely this one claim would remain to find fault with. This would be the case, for a distinction between being able and willing would be posited in making this claim, and the definition would be narrowed down to a different one, namely, that omnipotence would be the attribute by virtue of which God can do anything that God wills to do.13 Yet, in God a distinction between being able and willing is no more possible than that between actual and possible.14 That is to say, whichever of the two, willing or being able, might also be thought to be the greater, this situation would always imply some limitation, a limitation that could be eradicated only if one were to identify the two as the same in their extension. However, the very separation of the two— namely, as if being able were a condition entirely different from willing—is, in and of itself, already a state of imperfection.15 This is the case, for if I were to think of a state of being able without a state of willing in this instance, the willing would have to proceed from some particular impetus, thus one that would itself also be unexceptionally occasioned, and if I were to think of a state of willing without a state of being able in this instance, the state of being able would, of necessity, not be grounded in God’s own inner power but would itself be something given externally. Hence, because in God no willing permits of its occurring by means of some merely particular impetus and no state of being able permits of its growing and decreasing from somewhere outside God, even in thought the two states also cannot be separated. In consequence, because willing and being able, when taken together, necessarily comprise a doing, in this instance it is also the case that in this same instance neither willing and doing nor being able and doing are to be separated. Rather, the entirety of God’s omnipotence is such that its doing and bringing about everything is undivided and not curtailed. To choose to say anything further on this matter, however, would, in turn, come to naught, precisely on account of the irremediable variance between being able and willing that is continually associated with the two concepts.16 4.17 Now, several distinctions and divisions within divine omnipotence that cohere with the misunderstandings found fault with so far and that are chiefly derived from scholastic treatments could be taken out of circulation without damage. Bearing, first and foremost, on such distinctions and divisions is the contrast between immediate and mediate or absolute and specially ordered18 exercise of divine omnipotence—that is, when it is active without intermediary causes and when it is active by means of such causes. Now, whenever some particular effects are to be referred only to this second category and others are to be referred only to the first category, the distinction made is false. This is so, for everything that happens temporally and spatially also has its conditions in the totality of what is outside it and before it, however much these factors might be hidden from us thus far, and to that extent everything

that happens falls under the category of a specially ordered use of power.19 Furthermore, if any such thing should be traced back to some immediate exercise of power, to the exclusion of something else, this would imply abnegating the whole interconnected process of nature. In contrast, suppose that we consider the world itself, not any particular event, to be the effect of divine omnipotence. In that case, we could simply refer back to God’s immediate exercise of power. Hence, to the extent that we could go into any particular event bringing the concept “creation” to bear on it, to that same extent and for the same reason, we could also do that with the concept of an absolute exercise20 of omnipotence. However, given that view of the matter, we could also do so, to that extent, with the concept of “cooperation” or “preservation,” rightly understood.21 Then, to that extent, everything would belong to the specially ordered exercise of power that has established eternally the dependence of every particular on the totality of being and that serves the purpose of continuing that general interaction among the forces22 which is inherent in particular things. For us, however, there is no point at which we could refer only to absolute exercise of power—which, to maintain a strict contrast, one would have to call “ordering” and not use the roundabout expression “unordered”23—but not to specially ordered exercise of power, or the reverse. A similar usage, almost everywhere employed, has to do with the distinction between an absolute and a conditioned divine will.24 That is, in adopting this usage, “being able” is likewise posited as of greater force than “willing” is,25 because in “being able” no such distinction is made. Furthermore, in “willing” a gradation is formed with the result that with regard to what God can do, God is taken to will one thing absolutely, to will another thing only under certain conditions, and to will yet another thing not at all. In actual circumstances, however, it is never the case that God would will something absolutely and something else conditionally. Rather, just as it is the case regarding anything that happens that something is present there of which we can say that if something else were not there, that thing would also not be there, so too it can be said regarding all particulars that the fact that it exists and how it exists God wills only conditionally, because everything is conditioned by something else. Here, however, we can also say that whatever conditions that other thing is itself conditioned by divine will, and indeed in such a way that the divine will on which what is doing the conditioning rests and the divine will on which what is being conditioned rests is not different in each case but is simply one and the same divine will encompassing the entire mutually conditioning domain of finite being. Moreover, this will is certainly the absolute26 divine will, because nothing conditions that will. Accordingly, all that is particular would be conditionally willed by God, but the whole, viewed as one, would be absolutely willed by God. Suppose, on the other hand, that, at some point, we lift some particular thing from the whole interconnected process of nature and refer to divine will in this respect. Then we would have to say the following. First, to the extent that we consider each thing that persists, viewed in and of itself, not as conditioned but as co-conditioning the whole, each persisting thing is willed by God just as much as that which this thing is in itself is conditioned by God. Second, all other things must also come into being by God in this way; furthermore, all other

things cannot come into being otherwise than by the way in which this persisting thing influences them all. All this indeed amounts to saying that it is all absolutely willed by God. Thus, in this regard it can be said that all that is particular, inasmuch as each one has to be affected by other particulars, is also only conditionally willed by God, and indeed not as if it were less willed on that account or were to come into reality any the less; yet, everything that is particular, inasmuch as it is itself active and is conditioning other particulars in numerous ways, is something absolutely willed by God. The whole concept of divine omnipotence seems most badly endangered, however, when an “active” and an “inactive” divine will and a “free” and a “necessary” divine will are placed over against each other. That is, God’s necessary will is supposed to refer to that which God wills by virtue of God’s nature, whereas God’s free will is supposed to refer to what God could also just as well not will as will on account of God’s nature,27 wherewith it is presupposed that it does not belong to God’s nature that God would reveal Godself. Accordingly, by virtue of God’s necessary will God would be taken to will Godself, and by virtue of God’s free will God would be taken to will what is other than Godself. However, “God’s willing of Godself “ ever remains a sorely troublesome formulation, and when it comes up one can scarcely forebear to raise the hairsplitting question as to whether, just as the world would exist by virtue of God’s free will, so too God would exist as Godself because God wills Godself by virtue of God’s necessary will, or whether God wills Godself because God exists. Or, to express the matter somewhat differently: The issue is whether God’s willing-of-Godself is more after the manner of self-preservation, or more after the manner of self-approval, or, if these two notions are conjoined, after the manner of selflove.28 Now, it is scarcely possible to think of self-preservation as an actual will unless something has to be striven for or repelled,29 and self-approval almost necessarily presupposes a cleft consciousness. Thus, it is easy to see that this willing of Godself cannot signify anything but the being of Godself posited under the form of will. However, this purely internal relation to Godself within God can never be present in our religious selfconsciousness, and so, since this necessary will of God would be viewed, in any case, as something not belonging here at all, it would be restricted to the domain of purely speculative theology instead. Furthermore, it would seem that this contrast of God and Godself cannot be applied to God, nor can even what people have included under each contrasted member be separated from each other. The reason is as follows. First, wherever such a contrast exists, what is necessary must be unfree, and what is free must be grounded in no necessity, thus must exist by one’s own choice.30 Second, neither of these two options, however, is unqualifiedly perfect, so this contrast has its place only where being is co-conditioned by something else. Hence, third, we must not think anything to be necessary in God without, at the same time, positing it to be free, and we must not think anything to be free in God in such a way that it is not, at the same time, necessary. Fourth, just as little can we also think God’s willing of Godself and God’s willing of the world to be separated from each other.31 This is so, for if God wills Godself, God also wills Godself to be Creator and Preserver, with the

result that God’s willing of the world is already included in God’s willing-of-Godself. Likewise, if God wills the world, God also wills in the world God’s eternal and omnipresent omnipotence, wherein God’s willing of Godself is thus included. That is, the necessary will of God is contained in God’s free will, and the free will of God is contained in God’s necessary will.32 Fifth, plainly nothing in the way God comes to be present in our religious self-consciousness corresponds to this contrast, and so the contrast itself fails to have any dogmatic content. Finally, as concerns the contrast between an active and an inactive divine will:33 First of all, it contradicts the generally acknowledged statement that God’s willing does not extend beyond what God can do.34 That is to say, how indeed is a real and proper will supposed to be inactive if it is not lacking in the ability to act? It is to be noted, in contrast, that the one all-encompassing divine will is the same thing as eternal omnipotence. If divine will is then timeless, viewed as eternal, then the contents of no determinate time can ever entirely correspond to God’s will, and only in this respect would God’s will ever be inactive.35 Yet, God’s will is always active, because every stretch of time runs its course only in fulfillment of God’s will.36 Moreover, whatever might seem to resist or repulse God’s will is always simply contributing toward its temporal fulfillment.37 Now, if we firmly hold to this position, and if the distinction made is simply that between God’s will and God’s command, it is not at all necessary to deal here with an antecedent and a consequent will of God,38 for the expressions “antecedent” and “consequent” would indeed bear no semblance whatsoever of any change in the will of God. Postscript: Regarding God’s Independence. Now, given that the feeling of absolute dependence contains some indication of divine omnipotence, it is no longer necessary to lift up God’s independence as a special attribute. That is to say, if a person remains at all faithful to the derivation of the word “independence,” one sees it to be the exact opposite of “dependence,” in which case we will, nevertheless, have found ourselves to be left with only a negative attribute and, as it were, a shadow image of omnipotence. Suppose, moreover, that someone were simply to assert that God has no grounding or cause for God’s existence beyond Godself, an assertion that coincides with what the scholastic term aseitas means— which is to say, “self-generated-being.” Suppose, too, that someone then exchanges this formulation for another formulation of the same kind, that in relation to God there can be no question whatsoever concerning an underlying ground for God’s existence. Then it can be seen straightaway how “independence” is already fully contained in our main concepts “eternity” and “omnipotence.” Admittedly, however, the usual treatment of the expression “independence” is very dissimilar. Some place within the concept the claim that “God is Lord over all.”39 Yet, lordship coheres with independence only on the presupposition that one who is independent is in need at the same time, for otherwise one could be wholly independent without having the slightest lordship. Accordingly, if, nevertheless, divine attributes are supposed to be separated from each other, this interconnection of lordship and independence is wholly

unfeasible. Now, suppose that the expression “being beholden to no one for anything” were, nevertheless, to bear only a moral sense and were to disclaim, with respect to God, applicability of the concept of God’s having any obligation. Then the concept would be split in two thereby. Moreover, in accordance with customary modes of procedure, a distinction could be made between a physical independence and a moral independence. At this spot we would have nothing to say concerning the moral kind. Suppose, moreover, that being-Lordover-all can only be an expression regarding God’s omnipotence—that is, that we leave out what is of a moral nature in advance, what is moral having also adjoined, at the present spot, the claim that, even as Lord, God cannot be obligated—that is, God stands under no law. Then there is nothing left to us but the expression “self-generated-being-of-God” introduced above. In the domain of dogmatics we can only transpose this purely speculative formulation into the canon40 that for any given thing in God no ground of determination outside God is to be posited. This canon already lies so distinctly within our first explanation of the matter,41 however, that it is not necessary to take it up in particular within this context.

1. Ed. note: As in §52, where this divine attribute is already closely tied to that of God’s being “eternal,” thus having eternity, the word used here is “almighty” (allmächtig), thus “omnipotence” (Allmacht, might over all). For consistency’s sake, here the words “omnipotent” and “omnipotence” are used throughout. 2. Ed. note: In the first edition (1821), “natural causality” (natürlichen Ursachlichkeit) is used instead of “finite” in the first assertion here, and “productivity in God” (Produktivität in Gott) instead of “causality in God” in the second assertion. Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this point states: “Might [Macht] and indwelling causality are one and the same thing. The second half of this proposition is new and will be taken to be heretical by some” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: Cf. §§52 and 55, respectively. 4. Ed. note: The final phrase is ungeteilt durch Eines. 5. Ed. note: Here the segment “the particular determinacy” translates die besondere Bestimmtheit—in other words, the full definition or complex set of all that determines the nature or life of a given individual or particular member of a species. 6. Bestimmungen. 7. Ed. note: Anschauung (perception, or vision) … Bedingtheit (conditionedness, or overall dependence and restricted character). 8. Basil of Caesarea (“the Great,” ca. 330–379), On the Hexameron (the six days of creation, n.d.), Homily 1: “The creator of the universe, possessing creative power not commensurate with one world but infinitely greater …” Statements such as this one we must explain by the paltry character of information regarding the universe (Weltall) at that time, to which we are already alerted by the word ἀπειροπλάσιον [infinitely forming]. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 46 (1963), 6; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 29:7–8. 9. Dasein. Ed. note: That is, actual existence, an actually being there, not Sein (being). 10. Hence (1) Peter Abelard (1079–1142) is correct in his Introduction [Introductio ad theologiam] 3.5 (1135 or 1136): “God is able to do what he finds suitable, and it does not suit him to do whatever he would leave undone. Therefore, he is able to do only that thing which he does whenever he does it, for he is not called all powerful for any reason except that he can do whatever he wills.” See also (2) Augustine (354–430), Enchiridion (421) chap. 24, par. 96: “Unless God can do what God wishes, … there is no ground for truly calling God omnipotent.” Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: Migne Lat. 178:1098. Schleiermacher’s omissions in the quote have been restored to clarify the meaning. The title given in early editions was Theologiam scholarium; that in Migne is Introductiones parvulorum. For somewhat more context, see KGA I/7.3, 186, item 1118. (2) ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 449; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:276. 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “Critiques of the Usual Explanation. Nota bene: Here the critique splits into two discussions: (1) Omnipotence is a constant [Allmacht gleich], and all that is possible is enabled to happen by it [alles Möglichen können]; (2) Omnipotence is a constant [Allmacht gleich], and all that is willed by God is enabled to happen by it [alles Gewollte können]” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Ed. note: The word Schleiermacher selects for use here is realiter.

13. Ed. note: Speaking colloquially, the claim boils down to saying this: God can do whatever God wants to. This statement would suggest, more directly, that God is free to do whatever God wants. 14. John of Damascus (ca. 675–749), in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–) 1.8, does indeed term God a “power which no measure can give any idea of but which is measured only by his own will.” However, this is meant only one-sidedly, for in 1.14 he states, “All that he wills he can do [dynatai, has the power to do], even though he does not will all the things that he can do.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 176 and 202; Greek: Migne Gr. 94:808 and 860f. 15. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “This statement is supposed to mean: In God both a difference in willing and being able [ein Differenz von Wollen und Können] and a separation [Trennung] would be an imperfection [eine Unvollkommenheit]” (Thönes, 1873). 16. This is true of all formulations, such as the following one: “God is able to effect many things through his absolute power, things that he does not will and perhaps will not ever will”; or “God never brings about so many and such great things but that he can always bring about more and greater things.” See Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764), 1, 132f. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice. 17. Ed. note: Schleiermacher placed a marginal note here describing what is to follow in this subsection: “4. Critique of formulations that are continually connected with discussions of God’s omnipotence and that are continually to be assigned an antiquated status” (Thönes, 1873). 18. Ed. note: unmittelbaren und mittelbaren oder absoluten und geordneten. E.g., some claimed that miracles or inspired Scripture are “absolute,” not involving any “intermediary causes,” versus ordinary, “mediated” events, which are divinely governed and “mediately ordered,” which do involve such causes. 19. Ed. note: Here “specially ordered use of power” translates die geordnete Macht, i.e., might, which in Schleiermacher’s usage suggests uses of power, power (Kraft) that is exercised but that does not, of itself, hold sway (Gewalt) in such a way that little or no resistance is possible. Throughout this discussion Allmacht is translated “omnipotence”; in its adjectival form “almighty” and “omnipotent” mean the same thing. 20. Ed. note: absoluten Ausübung. 21. Cf. §38.1 and §45.P.S. 22. Kräfte. 23. Ed. note: The expression ungeordnet can mean unordered, disordered, or lacking in order. 24. Ed. note: “absolute” (schlechthinigen) versus “conditioned” (bedingten). 25. Können … Wollen. 26. Ed. note: Here and for the rest of the proposition, the scholastic Latinate word absolute is clearly being replaced by schlechthinige, as also in the concept schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl (feeling of absolute dependence). Cf. §54n18, n20, and n24. Generally, Schleiermacher uses the first term for some supposedly absolute, supernatural event or state, whereas the second term refers to something unexceptionable or all-encompassing. 27. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 3, 203: “Based on the necessity of his nature, he wills the things that he wills from his very self, moved by no thing either beyond himself or within himself. Freely he wills the things that he wills concerning creatures, the things that he was able both to will and not to will.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice. 28. Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider (1771–1849), Institutiones theologiae (1819), §67: “Necessary will, i.e., that act of the will which is said to emanate from necessary knowledge, doubtless the love by which God … necessarily loves himself.” Ed. note: For the context, placed in a marginal note to the first edition, see KGA I/7.3, 650; ET Kienzles. 29. Yet, this is the way many still do describe divine will, such as Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764), 277: “Divine will is the act, interminable in God, of seeking all things that are good and of shunning those that are evil.” Ed. note: For the context of this quotation, see KGA I/7.3, 455; ET Kienzles. 30. Ed. note: The German word for “by one’s own choice” is willkürlich, usually to be translated as “arbitrary.” Actually, the word governs all choice at will over the entire span from use of careful discretion to willful imposition to willy-nilly caprice. 31. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “To will Godself and to will the world come to be at one in the phrase ‘to will oneself to be creator’” (Thönes, 1873). 32. Ed. note: Throughout §§50–56, Schleiermacher offers definitions and interrelations among these attributes, all of which Schleiermacher decreed to be “presupposed” in the “stirrings that appear in Christian religious self-consciousness,” as in the whole of Part One. 33. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Regarding active and inactive [divine will]: Johann Gerhard (Loci 3, 202) wrongly faults Augustine for making this distinction. Augustine does not assume a voluntas inefficax [inactive, ineffectual, nonefficacious] will, though he did designate [God’s] praeceptum [prescriptive command] as voluntas [will]” (Thönes, 1873).

34. See Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764), 1, 154: “The almighty will is always invincible, and he does not do anything without willing it, and he does all things whatsoever that he wills. Nevertheless, let us not be compelled to believe that Almighty God willed that anything was to be done and that it was not done.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice. 35. Ed. note: Here the built-in multivocal meanings of unwirksam conflate: For Schleiermacher, to be “inactive” means that, for one reason or another, including the will and actions of what may be called “free causes”—what God wills as creator and preserver of the world can be exercised, as such, independently. Thus, at those points God’s will is, in part, active and effectual, perhaps even efficacious in producing redemptive acts, and, in part, just to the contrary—that is, inactive, ineffectual, and either nonefficacious or lacking in efficacious action. 36. Ed. note: Here “stretch of time” translates Zeitteil. Since the effectual ending of any portion of time tends to be indefinite, even if it is distinctly brought about spatially for some assigned purpose, time can run its course more or less indefinitely, depending on the criteria used. As Schleiermacher indicated in several places, in that God has created human beings to be finite, “free causes,” and only in that respect, God can even be said to be “the originator of sin” (§79) and the originator of evil (Übel) “by virtue of its connectedness with sin” (§82)—all of which exists by God’s “permission” (Zulassung). Even while consistently holding that all creation is felt by Christians to be “absolutely dependent” on God, he also consistently maintains a clear distinction between “absolute divine causality” and “finite causality,” including free human causality. His explanation of this distinction can be traced especially through §§30, 41, 48, and 51, climaxing in §§164–69. 37. Augustine’s formulation, to which we must constantly return in this context, is grounded on this same affirmation. It appears in his Enchiridion 26, 102: “… the will of the Almighty is always undefeated … and never does anything [unfairly or] unwillingly, and [God] does everything that he wills.” 27, 103: “… provided we are not compelled to believe that the Almighty willed anything to happen that did not happen. …” Ed. note: ET The Works of Saint Augustine 1/8 (2005), 332f.; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:280 and 281. 38. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher states: “Antecedent and consequent construction: the ‘antecedent will’ would be taken to mean the will that all human beings will be blessed [saved]: the ‘consequent will’ would be taken to mean that persons not of faith will be damned” (Thönes, 1873). 39. (1) Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818), 106: “Independence is that attribute whereby God is bound [debet, or beholden] to no one whatsoever and is of Godself alone Lord of all things.” (2) Though with difficulty, John of Damascus (ca. 675– ca. 749), in An Exact Exposition of Orthodox Faith (743–) 1.14, has imagined “acting on his own power,” which largely corresponds to “independent” as one predicate along with “self-ruling” and “wanting in nothing.” Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note at Reinhard states: “‘Bound [debet, or beholden] to no one’: In this part of the sentence this characterization refers strictly to God’s independence. Here [in the second part] omnipotence is included as well” (Thönes, 1873). (1) ET Tice. (2) ET Tice, cf. Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 201; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:860. In order, the Greek words are αὐτεξούσιος, αὐτοκηατής, and ἀνενδεής. 40. Kanon. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, a “canon” is a basic rule or principle to be used as a guide in forming other rules and statements, though more by way of further exploration or explanation than by strict deduction. This term is regularly used in Schleiermacher’s Brief Outline and elsewhere for the canon of Scripture or for interpretative statements found to be most authentically derived from the changing core canon within the broadly accepted New Testament canon. Hence, certain statements, though not taken word for word from Scripture, become especially helpful guiding “principles” or basic “rules” in this context. In his view, every field of study generates an ever-changing set of such basic “rules of art,” or technical rules. In many instances, it would be difficult to make any hard-and-fast distinction between merely “technical” rules and “explanatory” rules, for the subject matter itself defies any such effort. The above Kanon presents an example of such a basic rule. 41. Cf. §4.4.

Fourth Point of Doctrine

God Is Omniscient

§55. Divine “omniscience” is to be understood as the absolute spirituality of divine omnipotence. 1. This definition is entirely commensurate with the way in which we arrived at the concept “omniscience” above.1 Yet, it is, nevertheless, still to be especially prefaced that wherever it is used in the present work, the main purpose of this concept points in the following direction: namely, that divine causality would be thought of as absolutely “living,” far more than that a similarity between God and what we designate as “spirit” in the being afforded us would be established in some distinct fashion. Divine causality, viewed as absolutely living, is an essential property of the concept omniscience,2 if the feeling of absolute dependence, or piety, is to be considered veracious and genuine. That is to say, a lifeless and blind necessity would not, in fact, be something with which we could stand in relation. Moreover, such a necessity, if viewed to be equal in extent to all finite causality but also to exist over against the whole of finite causality, would actually mean simply to posit the latter alone. Thus, it would also mean to declare a feeling of absolute dependence to be something fictitious, because as self-causal beings we are indeed not absolutely dependent on finite causality. In contrast, to desire to define similarity between God and what is spiritual within finite being is a task surely to be accompanied only by an unending approximation.3 This is the case, in that unavoidably, on account of the admixture, be it only unconsciously, of receptivity and passivity4 in every such term—which admixture is ever-present to some degree in this context—we do coposit something, which, in turn, will have to be supplanted by yet another term. Now, suppose at this point—where we are reflecting on the feeling of absolute dependence only in accordance with its nature and thus also have to do with divine causality only in accordance with its own nature—that spirituality is designated by the function of knowing. Then, accordingly, our first canon5 must be to exclude everything from the spirituality of God’s nature that would necessarily contain in itself any receptivity or passivity.6 Thus, God’s will may no more be thought of as a capacity for desire than God’s omniscience may be thought of as a becoming aware or an experiencing, a coming to think alike or coming to see alike.7 Again, consider the following: We are acquainted with no knowing other than that wherein self-initiated activity and receptivity are comingled,8 except that this happens in differing degrees, in each case in accordance with how much one of the two capacities predominates, so that we distinguish between something more formative within ourselves and something more received from outside ourselves. Also consider, more importantly, that the largest portion of our thinking presupposes being as its object and refers comparatively

little to what we ourselves generate within being—that is, we distinguish between, first, the intentional activity of thinking, after which activity a generating activity follows, and, second, the reflective activity that refers to something already present to us. Given these considerations, however, this last distinction, above all, is not applicable to God at all,9 because for God no objects of reflection exist unless they continue to exist by God’s will; rather, all divine knowing10 is simply knowing concerning what is willed and generated by God, not a knowing to which any object could be given from some other source.11 Indeed, since for God there can be no succession from willing to generation, so too one can never say that God’s intentionally formative activity of thought precedes God’s activity of willing.12 Moreover, in consequence of the above considerations, in God a distinction cannot take place even between resolving and executing what is being resolved—by virtue of which distinction purposive concepts themselves remain merely ideal for us, either entirely or partially. This claim about God is so, in that otherwise God’s omnipotence would not fully present itself in finite being.13 In contrast, just as little may anything be somehow attached to God’s thinking with the aim that its object would become genuinely real: neither any sort of activities that are more analogous to bodily activities nor anything material.14 Thus, God’s thinking is entirely the same as God’s willing, and omnipotence and omniscience are of one sort. Further, it is a given that no discrepancy between word and thought is to be found in God— indeed, the very expression “word” can mean simply the effective action of thought directed outward. Accordingly, precisely the statement just made about God’s thinking and willing being the same and about omnipotence and omniscience being of one sort is pronounced in all formulations of this matter that present God’s word as itself creating and preserving. Moreover, as has also been said in multiple ways, it is completely correct to aver that everything exists by God’s speaking or thinking it.15 Now, in the way just shown, God’s knowing is recognized to be identical with God’s very productivity, viewed as both creating and preserving.16 Accordingly, it follows, first of all, that it is this wholly the same divine knowing which constitutes God’s omniscience and God’s wisdom.17 If these two attributes were split off from each other, then something from our own being would be transferred to God. Even if one were to posit that this something is also infinite, it could, nevertheless, connote an imperfection in God.18 This is the case, for since the tiniest portion in the being that surrounds us issues from our own activity, admittedly any cognition19 we might have regarding our own activity that would be independent of our actual influence on things might, to be sure, be something good and perfect in our view. Suppose, however, that in thought we were to bracket out the domain of our forming and bringing forth, however diminutive it might be, in and of itself. Accordingly, it would always bear evidence of some flaw20 if subsequent knowledge held by a given artist regarding the totality of the artist’s works were to contain something other than what was in the artist’s plan.21 This would be so, whether it were the prototype or the figurative activity that was

flawed, or whether the domain in which it was composed were not so self-contained that nothing alien could have gained any influence on the artist’s works. Now, however, the world, being viewed as the entire body of God’s process of forming and bringing forth, is so self-contained that nothing exists outside it that could gain any influence on it. Thus, in accordance with their content, any distinguishing between God’s wisdom and omniscience would have to presuppose some flaw in God. Yet, even in accordance with their form, a distinction between the two attributes could hardly be granted. This is the case, for two reasons. First, neither of the two can have more of an internal origin and the other more of an external origin, and, second, neither of the two can be more closely tied to God’s willing and the other less so. Rather, if God’s omniscience is already nothing other than the absolute living character22 of God’s omnipotence, this is just as true of God’s wisdom, if it is, nonetheless, to be the whole body of what God intends. Hence, it could only be a particular mode of reflection for the sake of which wisdom would still be posited as a particular attribute of God. To what extent this would be so will be discussed elsewhere.23 At this point, however, it also follows, further, that finite being must be just as completely encompassed in God’s knowing as in God’s omnipotence and that God’s knowing also presents itself just as entirely within finite being as does God’s omnipotence. This happens in such a way that when these two attributes are placed side by side, nothing remains in God’s knowing for which there is not something corresponding to it in finite being or which would stand in some other relationship to being. As a result, God’s omnipotence would already have to be presupposed so that God’s knowing could be posited. Or, to put the matter briefly: God knows everything that exists, and everything that God knows exists, and these two claims are of one sort, not of two sorts, because God’s knowing and God’s omnipotent willing are one and the same. 2.24 Now, further definitions concerning God’s omniscience, mostly advanced later on, must be adjudged in accordance with what has been said thus far. Regarding these definitions it is, to be sure, possible to say, in general, that they transfer to God human activities conceived in such a way that they already contain imperfection within themselves, the result being that the imperfection is in no way eliminated by a procedure of limitation. Now, this procedure pertains, first and foremost, when perception, memory, and prescience are distinguished in God’s knowing about being.25 At that point, moreover, God’s omniscience, viewed as the very most complete knowledge of things, would be assembled from these three factors.26 This would be the case, first, since the same thing that is present now is past hereafter, just as it was future previously. Thus, in God either these three kinds of knowledge would have to be simultaneous, even as regards the same object, but at that point the distinctions would have to be entirely neutralized in their simultaneity; or, if they were to remain different, nevertheless, and be apart from each other, then the three kinds of knowledge would have to fall into successive order in God too every time the things known would pass over from the future into the past, whereby a difference would be brought into divine knowing—contrary to the canon that there is no change in God.27

Now, suppose the following. First, suppose that we simply say—just as we have already frequently sought to present what is divine by summarily examining contrasts to show that what is divine is placed above and beyond all contrasts—that perfect knowing concerning the being-in-and-of-itself of a given thing would be the same as knowing concerning the inner law of its development. Second, suppose, too, that perfect knowing concerning the placement of a given thing within the domain of the general interactive flux of things would be of one sort with knowing regarding the influence of all other things on this thing. Third, suppose, however, that in God both modes of perfect knowing would be one and the same knowing, which is nontemporally defining28 the being of each object, whereas, for us the two modes, because they are flawed, would hence also become a differentiated, temporally bound knowing, and this would be true because our knowing does not define the being of things but is defined by the being of things instead. In taking that route we have at least an indication of how we might avoid, as much as possible, that excessive tendency to anthropomorphize God’s knowing.29 Now, it brings no improvement to contrive a division between divine knowing that is free or perspicuous30 and some necessary knowing or pure thinking.31 This is the case, for the first member of the contrast embraces all three modes of knowing just considered, whereas the second member embraces divine knowing, which is supposed to have both God and all that is possible as its object.32 Here it must strike anyone as irksomely peculiar to hear that both God’s knowing about Godself and God’s knowing about all that is merely possible would be embraced under a single name. That is to say, whether by “possible” one were thinking only of what would never become real or even of what would come into existence but quite apart from whether it is real, God would always remain the most veritable and most original of all, whereas what is merely possible would be the most shadow-like and most inconsequential of all. As a result, to hold to such a combination would come close to presupposing that God would also know about Godself only through some abstract, shadowlike notion.33 Consequently, in addition one would have to assume a divine selfconsciousness that is inherent in perspicacious knowledge and similar to it. Perspicacious knowledge in God would be the living consciousness of God in God’s efficacious action, but God’s self-consciousness would be a quiescent and, as it were, passive consciousness of God’s being.34 However, by common consent, all would claim that God’s being and God’s attributes, consequently even the active ones, would be one and the same. Thus, this differentiation too, consequently this latter aspect of pure thinking in God as well, would come to nothing. Furthermore, suppose that the one designation were also to appear to be formed very much as, among us, the indefinite notion of something merely possible has to have an immediate sense-impression attached to it if that notion is to pass over into consciousness of an object, viewed as something real. Then suppose that, in any case, perspicacious knowledge would be richer in content than pure thinking, since some being would, nevertheless, correspond to perspicacious knowledge, but not to pure thinking. Finally, suppose that finite being does, nonetheless, depend on God’s thinking. Then the following question is not to be dismissed, namely: Why would God, who must surely will to

place the maximum of knowledge within Godself, know only a certain kind of possibility— namely, a possibility, eventuating in perspicacious knowledge, whenever that possibility is somehow coming to be real—and not all possibilities? Moreover, if one would not want to resort to sheer arbitrariness—which in thinking would, nevertheless, also unexceptionably be a flaw, and consequently would be a self-diminution of God—there can hardly be any answer to this question other than this: that there is a certain possibility that, nevertheless, would lack in the possibility of coexisting with the rest. That kind of possibility, however, the being of which would conflict with the being of all the rest, is also contradictory within itself. Thus, no divine knowing of it could exist, even in accordance with the traditional explanation of God’s omniscience handed down to us. This is the case, because what is self-contradictory is not a thing nor is it knowable. Suppose, however, that we reflect on the subject more from the view-point of the other designation, considering that perspicuous knowledge is the free kind and that the other kind is necessary knowledge. Then, because the free kind is different from the necessary kind, God would be placed under this contrast. Moreover, necessity, by virtue of which something nonfree would exist in God, would not be something within God, otherwise necessity would be God’s very freedom. Rather, it would be something outside and over God, which would be in conflict with the concept of God as Supreme Being. Now, based on what we have considered thus far, it would be very easy to conclude what is to be held regarding the so-called intermediate knowledge35 of God. By virtue of that knowledge God is supposed to know precisely what would have resulted if something had happened that did not happen. Intermediate knowledge entirely rests on the presupposition of something being possible outside what is real, a presupposition that we have already put aside. Accordingly, as soon as we then express this presupposition in such a way that God would know what would have followed if, at any point or other, something impossible would really have come into being, then this whole kind of knowledge would dissolve into nothing. This would be so, because what would rest only on the becoming real of what is impossible would itself be impossible. Suppose, however, that, quite apart from this finding, it were also the case that, in general terms, for God too, something would be possible outside what is real and thus it would follow that at every point there would also be an infinite number of possibilities. Suppose, as well, that since each point would be codetermining for all the rest. Then, in every case a different world would arise from each point. Given this result, the infinite-times-infinite many worlds would be forming, infinitely often, so that the real world would be lost within them, viewed as infinitesimally small. If one considers that necessary knowledge would already, in and of itself, contain an infinite quantity of worlds that are originally different from the real world, worlds for each of which there is likewise an intermediate knowledge just as abundant as that which relates to the real world, all these worlds would thus be the object of this intermediate knowledge, which would itself still be multiplied into infinity. Thus, measured in this way, in God’s omniscience itself the works of God’s omnipotence would appear to be something infinitesimally small in comparison with what the latter does not bring into reality. Consequently, in God there would

appear to be, eternally and imperishably, a mass of rejected thoughts. Moreover, if we assume God’s intermediate knowledge, then the human artist’s imperfection—because the human artist’s formative capacity is something fluctuating and unsure, and in various ways, the artist thinks out particular parts of the artist’s work differently than the artist forms them later on— would be transferred over to God, viewed as something infinite thus freed from all limitation. Considered in and of itself, this entire apparatus of rejected thoughts is simply a knowledge of nothing. It could obtain a meaning, moreover, only if one could assume that God too decides and brings forth by choice and deliberation, a position to which, from of old, every doctrine that is at all consistent has, however, declared itself to be opposed.36 Hence, were someone still to proceed based on human behavior, it would have been far safer to transfer over to God the surety of the consummate artist, albeit complete and shorn of limitation. Such an artist, in a state of inspired discovery, would think of nothing else, nor would anything else be offered, than what this artist is actually bringing forth. This procedure also comports very well with the ancient story of creation, which recognizes nothing of any intervening deliberation and decisive choice, rather putting off reflection entirely to the story’s end. There it comes out simply as absolute approval,37 without ascribing to God any reflection regarding anything he did not do or any comparison of the real world with those so-called possible worlds. Suppose, however, that special attention is drawn to the edifying and reassuring effect contained in that notion of such an intermediate knowledge held by God.38 Essentially, what that claim would, in fact, lead to is the following. If, given the lack of pleasure over dashed expectations, we elevate ourselves to the level of religious consciousness, we would be obliged to think that our wishes too would have been in the thought of God but among those rejected. Yet, truly religious surrender would surely not require that God would have had our foolish thoughts as God’s own. Rather, such surrender would be satisfied to see, based on the ensuing result, that what we had planned was not included in that aforementioned original, or rather eternal, approval uttered by God. However, the name “intermediate knowledge”—a name that can only refer to what the other two forms of knowledge are named—does, nevertheless, still call forth some special consideration. If that knowledge were simply to refer to an intermediate knowledge between necessary and free knowledge, then God would be more constrained, as it were, in thinking out what is possible from a given point than in thinking out what is real, despite the latter activity’s presenting, nonetheless, the largest constraint of all—namely, the whole interconnected process of nature. Alternatively, suppose, nonetheless, that God’s free knowledge were, at the same time, God’s bringing-forth kind of knowledge. Then, through God’s intermediate knowledge, a transition would be provided from productivity to the idle, ineffectual activity of pure thinking. Thus, God’s intermediate knowledge, viewed as a diminishing process of bringing-forth, would be, as it were, God’s preservation and cooperation. These divine activities would themselves be self-restrained in all directions, just as, within us, the ever-vivid and ever-moving notion of what is real actually shades off into the also still vividly colored notion of what is probable. This notion regarding what is

probable moves us by hope and by fear. Thereafter it loses itself in indiscriminate, shadowy images of what is merely possible. However, it is surely reasonable for one to hold back from transferring such notions from ourselves to God. Yet, if this kind of knowledge is to be that which is intermediate between perspicuous knowledge and pure thought, and if, thus positioned, it is to mediate the transition from the free to the necessary kind of knowledge in God, which transition is not to be imagined without some diminution of God’s living activity,39 then, here too, the final result that arises from these considerations is this: that what is possible outside what is real cannot be an object of God’s cognitive activity. 3. Now, suppose that someone adds to this result the claim that undeniably God’s cognitive activity includes at least a strong semblance of having such an object, as if, on the one hand, a twofold self-consciousness should also be attributed to God—an original selfconsciousness and a reflective self-consciousness40—and, on the other hand, as if a knowing of isolated bits and pieces were to be presupposed in God. If this were true, then the result would be that the previously prevailing theory regarding these divine attributes would transfer all the lack of completeness to be found in our consciousness over to Supreme Being. The first mistake, attributing the semblance of a twofold self-consciousness to God, springs from the following supposition. That supposition holds, first, that God’s entire knowing concerning Godself, which is taken to be of the same sort as God’s knowing concerning all that is possible, can be thought of only as an objective knowing, since it would then also remain entirely separate from God’s activity, and indeed it can be thought of only after the manner of our own most abstract knowing. Second, however, the supposition holds that, as such, reflective knowing cannot possibly be the only kind; rather, an original knowing would then necessarily attend it.41 Indeed, this original knowing did not emerge from scholastic language directly, but it did emerge indirectly, nevertheless, and it was everywhere presupposed, specifically where stirrings of an affective kind42 attributed to God in popular religious communication of a rhetorical and poetic sort are treated for dogmatic purposes. In those instances, Supreme Being’s being similarly affected43 is all too easily slipped in, one that is destructive of the basic relationship that belongs to absolute dependence. As for the second mistake, such a being-stirred on God’s part also pre-supposes in every case the other lack of completeness pointed out here, one that remains to be tested for ourselves: namely, the isolated knowing of bits and pieces in God. The following considerations lay out this task. First, we notice that only the working of a distinct element in our lives by which we feel ourselves to be evoked serves to arouse affect and serves in such a way that something has to occur in relation to that element. Second, as a result, to obtain a proper theory regarding this transaction between God and other being, nothing remains to be added but the formulation that God relates to the object involved in an eternal and omnipresent fashion, whereas in us any stirring of affect relates to a transitory impression. Third, at that juncture no further factor would have to be brought into account—neither the contrast we have been examining between an original and a reflective self-consciousness in

God, nor between God’s self-consciousness itself in any contrast with objective consciousness. Fourth, the formulation already set forth above44 serves to avoid the latter contrast, whereas the other claim—namely, regarding God’s knowing isolated bits and pieces —is still peculiarly hidden in treatments of the question as to whether even what some might take to be negligible would be an object of divine knowing. That is to say, this question could not have been raised if one had proceeded based on the already given formulation that just as God knows every single thing within the whole, so too God knows the whole in every single thing—a formulation that fully abolishes the contrast between great and small and that is, nonetheless, justified solely by the idea of a stable interconnected process of nature. This understanding, however, already follows from taking the customary path of limitation, for we do indeed also take a human consciousness to be all the more complete the more comes to be present to it in each instance. In addition, this understanding offers a further occasion to consider, from the point of view of this divine attribute, a matter that is actually to be viewed as already covered45— namely, whether God’s knowing concerning the free actions of human beings can exist alongside this freedom. Surely, most commentators—perhaps even the Socinians—would have felt ashamed to answer this question in the negative, indeed even simply to raise it, if they had taken into account that at that point not only could there be no further discussion regarding any eternal divine decree concerning redemption but also that, from that point on, in every instance history would be something that God would experience only gradually and, in consequence, the concept of providence would have to be wholly given up.46 Now, suppose that the stimulus for answering the question in the negative, as well as the need to raise it, were grounded in the interest of preserving human freedom. Then one would have to take into consideration that people’s foreknowledge regarding their own free actions and their foreknowledge of others’ free actions would be still more destructive of human freedom than God’s foreknowledge would be. Also suppose, nevertheless, that we regard a person to be precisely the least free who is not even in general able to have foreknowledge of the person’s own actions—that is, the person is not conscious of taking any distinct course of action. Such persons, however, are in this state, wherein any special foreknowledge is missing, only because foreknowledge is missing regarding pertinent external conditions and regarding the especially pertinent internal conditions that are brought forth by what is external. Suppose, furthermore, that we likewise gauge the exact closeness of relationship two persons have in terms of the foreknowledge each has regarding each other’s actions, without believing that either one’s freedom is endangered by either one. If all these conditions are met regarding God’s relationship to the world, then God’s foreknowledge could not endanger any freedom.

1. §51.2. Ed. note: Clemen aptly corrected this reference from §50.2. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “In practical and popular discourse, similarity with what is human dominates overall. In the present context, the main content is this: that God has no need to experience some one thing in particular [etwas]” (Thönes, 1873).

2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “This analogy has the following against it, that for didactic use the main protest against it [Hauptprotestation] lies in its employing the contrast between spontaneity [Spontaneität] and receptivity [Rezeptivität]” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “Perhaps this claim goes too far. Surely, it is correct only inasmuch as something remains, over and over, to be eliminated” (Thönes, 1873). That is, something within the admixture mentioned here. 4. Empfänglichkeit und Leidentlichkeit. 5. Kanon. Ed. note: Cf. §54n38. 6. Ed. note: That is, God’s “spirituality” or spiritual nature (Geistigkeit), thus reflected on or contemplated, would not necessarily bear any “receptivity or passivity” (Empfänglichkeit oder Leidentlichkeit) in it. 7. Ed. note: ein Vernehmen oder Erfahren, ein Zusammendenken oder Zusammenschauen. All of these verbal nouns refer to a process of change within a person’s mind, in the last two characteristics mentioned a process undergone with one or more other persons. 8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “No contrast applies between something self-formative from within a priori and something that comes from without a posteriori, between intentional formation [Zweckbildung] and reflection [Betrachtung]” (Thönes, 1873). Betrachtung refers to observing, reflective, and contemplative activity— here all at once. 9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates here: “With reference to the claim that nothing is something that should first come into being only by God, we can simply say that God’s knowing [Wissen] is [identical with] God’s productivity [Produktivität] but never with what is generated—or even in a roundabout fashion [wie umstehend]” (Thönes, 1873). Grimm indicates that this usage of umstehend had, at that time, umschweifend (“using circumlocution” or “digressively”) as a close synonym. 10. Ed. note: Wissen (knowing). In Schleiermacher’s usage, the verb wissen always indicates an active process, whereas Erkennen refers to “cognition” and Erkenntnis alone refers to “knowledge,” viewed as a product of this knowing and cognition. Of course, for him any of these three things can be expected to be faulty or in error, thus capable of either change or improvement. See his Brief Outline and his Dialectic, passim. 11. (1) John Calvin (1509–1564) holds this view in Institutes (1559) 3.23.6: “Since he foresees future events only by reason of the fact that they take place, they vainly raise a quarrel over foreknowledge, when it is clear that all things take place rather by his determination and bidding.” Here only the “fore” is somewhat awkward. (2) Hence a better formulation is that of John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810–ca. 877), in De praedestinatione (851): “Therefore he sees the things that he willed to do, and he does not see anything but those that he did.” Ed. note: (1) ET Battles (1960), 954f.; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1959), 401, CR 30:704. (2) ET Kienzles; Latin: cf. Migne Lat. 122:347ff. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In using the verb videre (to see) one must be thinking first and foremost of some inner seeing [Sehen]” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Erigena, John Scotus (ca. 810–ca. 877), De praedestinatione (851): “For in God vision [visio] does not precede work [operatio], because work is coeternal with vision [visioni operatio].” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: cf. CR 122:347ff. Schleiermacher’s marginal note directly adds: “Nor, however, does work precede vision [operatio visionem]” (Thönes, 1873). 13. Cf. §54.2. 14. Cf. Anselm, Monologion (1076) 11: “The creating substance’s inward [internal] utterance of the work he is going to make differs from that of the craftsman in this respect: the Creator’s utterance was not collected from or assisted by some other source; rather, as the first and sole cause it was sufficient for its Artisan to bring his work to completion.” Ed. note: ET Williams (1996), 24; English and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 88–89; Latin only: Migne Lat. 158:159f. 15. (1) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), in Psalms 118, sec. 4, states: “Therefore, all from which or in which the body of the whole world was created takes its origin from what was said and begins to subsist in that which issues from the word of God.” (2) Anselm writes in Monologion (1076) 12: “that (a) whatever the Supreme Substance made, it made through no other than through itself and that (b) whatever it made, it made through its own inmost expression (whether by uttering different things with different words or else by uttering all things at once with a single word).” Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles; Latin: Migne Lat. 9:565. (2) ET and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 88–91; cf. ET only: Williams (1996), 26; Latin only: Migne Lat. 158:160. Schleiermacher’s marginal note here, drawing from Anselm’s Proslogion, adds: “The quotations from Anselm [in §55n14 and n15] are scarcely to be cut off from each other. God’s internal utterance [interna locutio] suffices to bring God’s work to completion” (Thönes, 1873). Nevertheless, Anselm does grant that “as the first cause, sovereign in himself, God fashions the whole creation by his very utterance—by way of a prelude, as it were.” 16. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this history and explanation: “Identity [Identität] of divine omniscience and wisdom. Usually the two attributes are distinguished from each other. This practice, however, presents no obstacle to treating wisdom in a special way” (Thönes, 1873). In §§168–69 on creation by God’s word, wisdom is indeed treated in a way not separated from divine omniscience yet in a special way. See also §41.1–2 and P.S.

17. Augustine (354–430), On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus (ca. 395–397), book 2.3: “Nonetheless, when it comes to human beings themselves, it is customary to distinguish knowledge from wisdom. … In God, however, the two are indubitably not different from each other but are one and the same.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 158–59; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:140. Fathers of the Church translates only Book 1. 18. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “(a) In God nothing regarding God’s influence on things can be independent of God’s cognition [Erkennen]. This cognition, however, is [what is usually defined as] wisdom. (b) The same is to be said in relation to God’s will” (Thönes, 1873). In this context, the note marked “(b)” was placed where the next paragraph begins. 19. Erkennen. 20. Unvollkommenheit. Ed. note: or imperfection. 21. Ed. note: Zweckbegriff (plan, or intentional concept)—that is, by implication the total intention that the artist, if it were God, had put into the entire process, in the case of God the artist’s creation and preservation of the world. 22. Ed. note: absolute Lebendigkeit. 23. Ed. note: See §55n16. 24. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873): “2. Kritik.” Frequently, after an initial introductory subsection, the next subsection, or more, is devoted to exercise of some critical art in service of some specific constructive purpose. Here the purpose is announced: to use analysis of one prominent contrast to show that God is above and beyond all contrast. 25. Anschauung, Erinnerung, und Vorherwissen. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note emphasizes his negative conclusions from this critical investigation: “[God’s knowing is] not composed of temporal dimensions” (Thönes, 1873). The three dimensions laid out in the text as examples are present, past, and future, respectively. 26. Thus Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), §35, 110f., where he states: “The divine omniscience is an attribute wherein knowledge of all things contains the most perfect extension (habet longe perfectissimam).” However, this superlative expression already includes a comparative element and thus posits divine knowledge that is like that of finite being, consequently is temporal. All three of Reinhard’s notions—praescientia, visio, and reminiscentia—appear accordingly. Redeker note: Cf. §35, 112: “Now, since existing things can be divided successively into past, present, and future, God’s free knowledge [scientia libera], is either reminiscentia, by which God optimally recalls things of the past, visio, by which God perceives things in the present, or praescientia, by which God has foreknowledge, knowing things of the future in advance.” [ET Tice] 27. Augustine (354–430), On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus (ca. 395–397) 2.2: “What else is foreknowledge if not knowledge of the future? Yet, what is that future for God, who surpasses all times? That is to say, if God’s knowledge has things in themselves, then they are present for God, not future. It follows from this that one can no longer speak of foreknowledge but only of knowledge. If, however, for God too, as in the ordering of temporal creation, future things do not yet exist, but he simply anticipates them by his knowledge, he thus perceives them in a twofold manner. In the one way he does so in accordance with his foreknowledge of things yet to be, in the other way in accordance with his knowledge of things present. Therefore, in the course of time something comes to be accrued to God’s knowledge that is nevertheless completely absurd and false.” Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 152–55; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:138f. 28. Ed. note: In this immediate context the verb bestimmen is always translated “define,” though here too it bears the additional meaning of “determine.” 29. Augustine, An Simplicianus 2.3: “If I remove from human knowledge the mutability and inevitable transitoriness of thoughts to thoughts … and so by frequent acts of memory jump from one fragment to another … and retain solely the vital power of sure and unshakable truth, which embraces all that is spiritual in a single and eternal reflection—or rather do not retain, for indeed human knowing is incapable of that, but simply have a notion of such powers, then in some fashion I can infer from this a knowledge held by God. In any case, on this basis the term ‘knowledge’ can be used for both sorts in common.” Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 156–59; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:140. Schleiermacher’s marginal note summarizes what he is doing here: “To obviate against [bringing any difference (Differenz) into God’s knowing] by identifying [Identifikation] it with anything manifesting difference within ourselves. Here points already shown are surveyed in clearer fashion” (Thönes, 1873). 30. Ed. note: Here anschaulich (perspicuous, or clear-seeing) seems to connote the presence of something to be looked at and contemplated, or when God is said to have looked at the world God had created and pronounced it to be good. 31. Scientia libera or visionis and scientia necessaria or simplicis intelligentiae. Ed. note: Here libera (free) connotes discretionary, visio (visionary) connotes looking at, with perfect clarity. The second phrase was translated into bloß Denken (pure thinking or thinking pure and simple).

32. Cf. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 1, 148n. Ed. note: See also §47n21, and §55n33 just below. 33. This is but very little softened by an expression like this one by Thomas Aquinas: “God sees himself in himself, because he sees himself through his essence; and he sees other things, not in themselves, but in himself, inasmuch as his essence contains the likeness of things other than himself.” This is so, for the reference here is more to what is real, and the assertion is actually that God knows concerning finite being as he does concerning himself without reference to what is possible. Ed. note: Schleiermacher cites the statement by Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) from Johann Gerhard (1582– 1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 1, 148n. It comes from Summa theologica (1274) 1, q.14, a.5. ET in Pegis (1948), 135. 34. Ed. note: des göttlichen Wesens, as in the expression “Supreme Being” (das höchste Wesen). 35. Scientia media also futuribilium or de futuro conditionato. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher goes on to explain, this socalled knowledge, which he rejects, is of something that has not yet come to pass, thus is “intermediate,” referring to some supposed future condition. 36. John of Damascus (ca. 675–749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–) 2.22: “One should note that, while we speak of wishing in God, in the strict sense we do not speak of choice. For God does not deliberate, because deliberation is due to ignorance. No one deliberates about what he knows.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1959), 250; Greek: Migne Gr. 94:945. 37. Ed. note: Here again Schleiermacher uses absolute, not schlechthinig, to indicate a characteristic or action, of “absolute” approval in this case. 38. Reinhard, Dogmatics (1818), 112. Redeker note: On p. 112 Reinhard states: “Very reassuring consequences also flow from this, for it is certain that what God causes to happen has to be the wisest and best among all that could happen, because otherwise by virtue of the nature of God’s omniscience God would indisputably have arranged something differently.” [ET Tice] 39. Lebendigkeit. Ed. note: Here this special term directly refers to Schleiermacher’s support for the concept “the living God.” 40. Ed. note: “Original” translates ursprüngliches and “reflective” translates reflektiertes. The second kind would be contingent on transitory factors in the world of which God would have had no immediate consciousness in Godself. 41. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here succinctly states the point: “This original knowing is that which would underlie stirrings of mind and heart [Gemütsbewegungen], which would likewise be ascribed to God” (Thönes, 1873). As is indicated just below, in Schleiermacher’s view these inner stirrings include those of a largely sensory kind (Affekt), on up the emotive scale of feelings and perceptions. See On Religion (1821) for other representations of these latter two paired categories, notably in passages retained through all three editions (1799, 1806, 1821) and in those added in 1821. See also his psychology lectures. 42. Ed. note: “Stirrings of an affective kind” translates affektartigen Erregungen, a concept reserved for the more sensory content of one’s mental state and language meant to convey it. 43. Affiziertsein. Ed. note: Here use of this term seems to refer to a large range of ways in which God would be affected, as human beings are, not only by the more strictly sensory aspects of discourse. Cf. prayers affixed to many of Schleiermacher’s sermons and §§146–47 on prayer. 44. In §54.4. Ed. note: See the main text paragraphs there containing notes 28 and 29, themselves citing Wegscheider and Mosheim. 45. §49. 46. Yet, in its entire application the Socinian rule seems actually to include this consequence within it. People would place over against it, as the counterposing formulations: (1) Augustine’s statement in The City of God (413–426) 5.9: “… from the fact that to God the order of all causes is certain there is no logical deduction that there is no power in the choice of our will.” (2) Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), Praelectiones theologicae 8, 545: “For nonentities there are no qualities; rather, the things that neither were nor are and certainly will not be in no way exist, and thus they cannot be present for God. … The voluntary actions of human beings are of this sort, and they have not yet truly existed.” Ed. note: (1) ET Fathers of the Church 8 (1950), 259; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:150. (2) ET Kienzles/Tice; KGA I/7.3, 624, presents the full context for this quotation.

Appendix to Section Two

Regarding Some Other Divine Attributes

§56. Among the divine attributes customarily adduced, the oneness, infinity, and simplicity of God would be particularly pertinent here, though they bear no relation to the aforementioned contrast that takes place in the stirrings of religious consciousness. They cannot, however, be regarded as divine attributes in the same sense as those treated thus far. 1. In contrast to those attributes which will show up in Part Two of this presentation of faith-doctrine, the three attributes just named—oneness, infinity, and simplicity—do not refer to the ease or difficulty with which God-consciousness develops within us in its various elements, and to this extent they would belong in this Part One if each and all of them bore dogmatic content. This content is lacking in them, however, because, unlike the four that we have presented, they have not arisen from the relationship that exists between the feeling of absolute dependence and sense-stirred self-consciousness and because they are not utterances concerning that relationship. However, these three incidentally treated concepts attributed to God do also stand in close relationship with those four, at least insofar as they deny any similarity between divine and finite causality, although only in a figurative manner. Yet, even such a locus as this cannot be afforded them within a presentation of faith-doctrine. Thus, what arises is simply the question as to whether we are to banish these expressions entirely from our domain and, by some chance, to return them to purely speculative discourse about God or whether some sort of significance is to be gained from them that would serve the purposes of dogmatics. However, since we cannot claim in advance that in this respect the matter stands the same in each of these concepts, each has to be examined separately. 2. Now, first as concerns the oneness of God: strictly taken, it can never be the attribute of a thing that it is present only in a specific number. For example, it is not the attribute of a hand to be two-handed but only of human beings to be so, whereas simians have four hands. Likewise, for only one God to have dominion over the world could also be an attribute of the world, but it would not be an attribute for God to be simply one. Hence, if “oneness” is supposed to be a divine attribute, we would have to abandon its being a sheer number and then stand by the more general assertion that God has no equal.1 To be sure, our language can express this concept more discriminately by the word “singularity.”2 Now, suppose that a number of things that are the same are deemed to be of the same kind, or species, and then the individual members are taken to present the existence of the species, whereas the species presents the nature of its individual members. Inasmuch as this is the case, one would be able to say that the oneness or singularity of God would be that attribute by virtue of which no distinction would exist in God between God’s “nature” and God’s “existence.”3 Now, this argument, viewed in and of itself, would belong only to purely speculative theology. Suppose, on the other hand, that what “attribute” is strictly to mean is taken out of account and we consider that stirrings of religious consciousness are particular elements but that in those stirrings what we feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent on is not present to us as objects would be. Then the following would be expressed by the term “oneness”: that

all of those stirrings would be meant, and would be conceived of, as indications of one God and not of a plurality of gods. Indeed, if we then go back to the earlier clarification concerning the original meaning of the term “God,”4 what is pronounced in the expression “oneness of God” is that this homogeneous connection among these religious stirrings is present with the same surety as these stirrings have themselves.5 Now, the concept “divine attribute” could be developed only on the presupposition of this homogeneous connection based on contemplation6 of the contents of religious elements. Thus, this expression, “oneness of God,” points less to a particular attribute than to the monotheistic canon.7 This canon has always underlaid all investigation concerning divine attributes, and it can no more be proved, in any fashion, than can the very being of God. Indeed, any attempt to discuss this oneness of God further or to prove it could hardly completely evade making a distinction between the concept “God” and the concept “Supreme Being.” Every time this attempt is made, it is also found to be in some struggle against polytheism,8 and it is, nevertheless, based on the presupposition that the same concept actually underlies both positions. This presupposition, however, we have already renounced from the very beginning. The term infinity9 is likewise too negative to be a proper concept for an attribute. Moreover, when it has been used as if it were a proper concept, it has been treated in very diverse ways. The customary definition,10 “negation of limits,” is extremely indefinite, a feature to be explained as follows. Suppose, first, that a prior description of Supreme Being were already available. Then there would have to be no occasion whatsoever of being able to speak as if it were possible to envisage Supreme Being to be bound by anything.11 Second, suppose, however, that this description of Supreme Being were to be formed by means of the term “infinity.” That term would then also be simply a precautionary rule for formation of concepts regarding divine attributes—namely, that concepts must not be ascribed to God that do not permit of being thought of as without limits. At that point, infinity would come to be an attribute of all divine attributes. Hence, every discussion regarding infinity would lead from there to other attributes of God that partake of infinity.12 Third, it would simply be a sign that even this canon, which has the purpose of forming divine attributes, is not being properly applied if, instead of presenting omnipotence as the infinity of God’s productivity and omniscience as the infinity of God’s power of thought,13 one would rather distinguish between an infinity of substance and an infinity of existence.14 In this way, moreover, a distinction that simply comes down to something finite is made to underlie one’s description of God’s nature. This is the case, for infinity is, nevertheless, not actually to be “what is without end” but “what is placed over against whatever is finite”—that is, “over against whatever is codetermined by anything else.” Furthermore, if set forth in this manner, the term “infinity” proves to be in the most exact connection with the aforementioned basic monotheistic canon, and, under the form of a protective predicate, pronounces the marked difference15 of divine causality from all that bears a finite character. That is to say, more often than not, it has repeatedly been shown how this formulation only leads to confusion16 if

it is treated as a directive for transferring over to God, using a procedure of limitation, attributes that essentially attach only to what is finite. Despite its not being viewed linguistically as a negative concept, even the concept simplicity17 is, nonetheless, treated as a negative concept. This is the case whether what is of a material nature is also to be removed from God therewith or whether anything that suggests partition or composition is to be excluded.18 As regards the first option, it is surely clear, in and of itself, that if God and world were only to be distinguished from each other in some fashion, then all that is of a material nature would have to belong to the world. Strictly taken, however, simplicity excludes not only materiality but also excludes taking part in everything that we designate as “finite spirit.” In the strict sense of the word, finite spirit also cannot be called simple19 but must belong to the world just as much as what is of a material nature does. This is so, for a relative separation of functions already conflicts with simplicity.20 Moreover, each temporal element of spiritual manifestation21 is just as much a result of their being intertwined in what is in relative contrast as, in this same sense, we also declare whatever is of a material nature to be composite only insofar as we are able to explicate contrasts that we find within it. Hence, on the one hand, just as infinity is an attribute of all the attributes of God, so simplicity is only the nonseparated and inseparable being-intertwined of all divine attributes and of all divine activities, just as they are being presented here, both in general and each in particular. In addition, on the other hand, just as infinity is to ensure that nothing is to be ascribed to God that can be thought of only as limiting God in some way, so simplicity is to ensure that nothing would be included that essentially belongs to the domain of contrasts. Postscript to this Second Section:22 The entire sphere of divine attributes dealt with here purely bears in itself the character of this Part One of our presentation of doctrine regarding Christian faith. That is, it bears the character of being derived from religious selfconsciousness, just as the whole of what it proposes is taken to be presupposed already in every element of Christian religious life. This arrangement is still further illuminated based on the following considerations, among others. First, given the teleological character of Christianity, we can think of no completely formed religious element in it that is not either itself to pass over into something active or to bear influence on activities at hand in some distinct fashion and to combine with these activities. It would have to be possible, however, for every such element to be described under the form of this second section just as well as under the form of the first or third sections.23 Thus, suppose that a particular one among these attributes, or all of them combined, were to condition a single distinct religious element. Then it would have to be possible to derive from this element either a disposition or a so-called duty toward God or at least a mode of action required by this God-consciousness, in general or in relation to other modes of action. Second, none of this latter set of maneuvers is the case, however. Moreover, no proposition of Christian Ethics can be grounded on the attributes treated in this section, not singly nor combined. Rather, there would always be still other factors that belong among them.

Hence, third, even these concepts regarding attributes, however completely they may also be synoptically presented and related to each other, would in no way pass for a description of God’s nature.24 Here, however, it would be well to establish in advance that whatever divine attributes might also arise in treatments to follow, those described here will always have to be in mind with them. As a result, an activity that does not admit of being thought of under the form of eternal omnipotence must not be posited as a divine activity.

1. Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764), 241: “Therefore, when we say that there is one God, we affirm that God has no equal [socium].” Ed. note: See context in KGA I/7.3, 457; ET Kienzles/Tice. The German concept chosen is nicht seinesgleichen, which could also be conveyed as “none like God” or, more loosely, by the assertion “There is none like God, who is distinctly different, one of a kind,” as it were. 2. Ed. note: Einzigkeit—“singularity” versus Einheit (oneness). 3. Ed. note: Here “nature” translates Wesen and “existence” translates Dasein (literally, “being there”). Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “This acknowledgement is a purely speculative one, by which, properly understood, it would also be established that God is not a thing [Ding]” (Thönes, 1873). 4. See §4.4. 5. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “This comprises the actual dogmatic nature [Wesen] of the concept” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Betrachtung. Ed. note: “Contemplation” would seem to capture the contemplative, inward-searching character of Schleiermacher’s dogmatic enterprise better than either “observation” (as if simply of objects) or “reflection” (which usually connotes a more rationalistic exercise, though it need not do so). This mode of seeing is the defining characteristic of a focally contemplative treatment of Christian faith and life. The fact that Schleiermacher’s approach invites a person at the same time (1) to consider God to be Supreme Being, not a thing, an object, or a being, and (2) to look inward for homogeneous stirrings from that infinite and eternal source, a process that does not entail that God is unreal—a figment of imagination—or that God lacks externality, or otherness—or that God does not act, creatively and redemptively, within the world in ways that we can experience. In sum, it cannot reasonably lead to the conclusion that what we contemplate must be purely “subjective,” a claim often lodged against him. Nor does it entail a “mysticism” that excludes a really experienced communicative objective “word” between God and human beings. This is indeed a key passage on the matter, but its outlook and understanding suffuses the entire work, as it does his companion writings on “Christian Ethics.” 7. In his Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed (regarding the Roman Symbol, ca. 307–309), Rufinus has correctly stated this definition, as follows: “We say that God is one not numerically but absolutely [universitate].” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, vol. 3 (1892), 545; Latin: Migne Lat. 21:343. In Schleiermacher’s sentence “homogeneous connection” translates Zusammengehörigkeit. This term carries with it both a close bondedness among those stirrings and a common source (“one”) to which the stirrings refer. 8. Lactantius (ca. 240–ca. 320), Divine Institutes (ca. 304–311) 1.3: “The nature of power … is to be perfect in that in which it resides as a whole. … God, then, if God is perfect, … cannot be unless God is one, that everything might be in God.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 49, (1964), 22; Latin: Migne Lat. 6:123. 9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “Infinity: It is a salutary canon that all attributes that are ascribed to God in order to express God’s infinity must have a character different from what they are when they refer to something finite: namely, that attributes must not be ascribed to God that do not permit of being thought of as without limits” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Mosheim, op. cit., 1, 246: “Thus, infinity, so absolute, is nothing other than the absence of limits [finium] in God.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. See context in KGA I/7.3, 457. 11. Ed. note: umschränkt—that is, versus being either circumscribed or limited by anything else, spatially or temporally or, possibly, as if against God’s infinite and eternal will. On the relation of human freedom to such seemingly deterministic claims, see §§4–6. 12. See Mosheim, op. cit. (1764), and Reinhard, op. cit. (1818) §33.3. Redecker note: Cf. Mosheim (1764), 219: “Infinity of space and dimension is termed immensity. Infinity of time is called eternity in Holy Scripture by theologians.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. See KGA I/7.3, 458, for the general context; this statement does not exactly correspond to that in Mosheim. For Reinhard’s view, cf. §53n20 and §56n18. 13. Produktivität … Denkkraft.

14. Substanz … Existenz. Ed. note: As immediately explained, this distinction contrasts what could be discerned of God’s infinity within finite conditions (Existenz) with what could be claimed of “God’s nature” (Substanz) in this respect. 15. Differenz. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this word, which does presuppose qualifications, expresses a “marked difference,” without any significant qualification, in contrast to Verschiedenheit, which does presuppose qualifications. 16. Ed. note: Here “confusion” translates Verwirrung, which, for Schleiermacher, also normally carries the root connotation of “entanglement” in contrasting factors or features of organic life (hence, on some occasions, “getting confused”). Thus, the English word ordinarily used is “entanglement.” 17. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note is “Simplicity. The main subject here is [God’s] indivisibility in [God’s] nature [Wesen] and attributes” (Thönes, 1873). 18. The first position is held by Reinhard, op. cit. (1818), §33.2, 102f., the latter by Mosheim, op. cit. (1764), 240. Redeker note: In his Dogmatik (1818), Reinhard states 102f.: “To be sure, we are not in a position to indicate in a positive way how God’s substance would be constituted and what its simplicity would be. However, reason and Scripture teach this much, that nothing that is of a material nature, no corporeal properties, no extension, no composition, form, etc. can occur in God.” Mosheim, 240, states: “Everything among the multiplicity of things is subject to causation at some time, and everything alike requires causation as to its composition or substance. In contrast, God’s existence has no cause; thus, any thought of multiplicity or composition in God ought to be rejected” [ET Tice]. Ed. note: See KGA I/7.3, 471, for the Reinhard quote in context and 453 for the Mosheim quote in context. 19. This “simplicity” the ancients called μονοειδές (of one kind) and ἀμερές (undivided). 20. Hence the Socinians are not wrong when they assert that in general a composition exists wherever there is a conjoining or uniting of functions. (See Conradus Vorstius [1569–1622], Parasceve [1612], 50). They are wrong only in their separating the nature and will of God. 21. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John (416–417) 23.9: “God is not a mutable spirit. … For where thou findest alternation, there a kind of death has taken place.” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 1, 7:305–6; Latin: Corpus Christianorum 36, 238. 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Now, this postscript leads to an understanding that this section [Teil] could have formed the conclusion to Part One—all the more as its entire course comports with the corresponding section of Part Two, just as the abstract divine attributes brought to the close of this section comport with those that preceded them” (Thönes, 1873). This note appears to contain Schleiermacher’s typical affirmation that the chosen structure of the work is so intertwined as to be far from sacrosanct. The corresponding section in Part Two is actually its third and last section, concluding with treatment of the two summative divine attributes: love and wisdom. There the final statements have to do with Supreme Being’s providing an orderly world as the “theater for redemption,” the Holy Spirit as the final “worldshaping power,” and pointing directly to the basic grounds for Christian Ethics, itself the other indispensable aspect of dogmatic work. 23. Ed. note: In Part One, the first section describes religious self-consciousness, the second section describes divine attributes, and the third section describes the world. 24. Ed. note: des göttlichen Wesens. Or “the divine being,” as in the concept des höchsten Wesens (Supreme Being).

SECTION THREE

Regarding the Constitution of the World That Is Indicated in Religious SelfConsciousness inasmuch as It Expresses the General Relationship between God and the World Introduction to Section Three §57. In its general character the feeling of absolute dependence implies faith1 in an original perfection of the world. 1. Here perfection of the world is not at all to be understood to mean anything other than what we have to use that name for in the interest of religious self-consciousness. That is, the totality of finite being as it influences us—including human influences on the rest of being that arise from our position within it as well—harmonizes in such a way as to make possible2 the continuity of religious self-consciousness within that totality. That is to say, first, this religious self-consciousness can fill an element of human life only in union with a stirring of sensory self-consciousness, and each such stirring is an impression of the world on persons. Thus, second, the claim that God-consciousness could be united with every sensory determination of self-consciousness3 would be null and void unless all impressions of the world on persons—and these are indeed simply expressions for the relationship of all the rest of finite being to the being of a person—were to harmonize in such a way that the turning of a person’s spirit to God-consciousness would be compossible with them. Third, the same thing also applies to the other aspect of the relationship of all the rest of finite being to the being of a person—namely, the capacity of the being that is given to us for determining occasions by means of our own self-initiated activity. This is the case, because in every instance this very self-initiated activity is always accompanied by a selfconsciousness that has the capacity to receive that stimulus. We have also posited, however, that the feeling of absolute dependence does not decrease, still less does it stop, when we also extend our self-consciousness to selfconsciousness of the entire world4—thus, inasmuch as we represent5 finite nature in general in this self-consciousness. In that we do this, two implications then follow: first, that all the various gradations of being are comprehended in this feeling of absolute dependence and, consequently, that no more nearly exact definition of this feeling abrogates that coexistence of God-consciousness with world-consciousness and, with it, the process of being stirred by God-consciousness through world-consciousness. In the present context, use of the term original, however, is to be understood, in a prefatory way, as not referring to some sort of distinct original condition of the world, not even such a condition of human beings or of God-consciousness in human beings. All of these three referents would have a perfection that will have come into being and that would

permit of their having more or less of what moves toward that end. Rather, here the term “original” refers to a perfection that both remains the same and precedes all temporal development and that is grounded in the internal relations of whatever finite being is referred to. Thus, what our proposition asserts is perfection in the aforementioned sense—that is, the expression “original perfection” posits that inasmuch as all finite being codetermines our self-consciousness, this process can be traced back to eternal omnipotent causality. Moreover, all impressions from the world that we receive, as well as all those ways and means that are placed in human nature and by which any tendency toward God-consciousness comes to be realized, would include in themselves the possibility that God-consciousness will be formed into a being at one with every given impression received from the world within whatever element of our lives is involved.6 This process is implicit in the surety that is immediately connected with God-consciousness, for if God-consciousness were not grounded in such an internal manner, it would be something incidental; consequently, it would be something arbitrary and lacking in surety. What these considerations yield, at the same time, is an understanding of how this faith that is grounded in an internal manner naturally and necessarily coheres with faith in the eternally omnipresent and living omnipotence of God. This is so, in that both modes of faith are related in entirely the same way to our basic presupposition,7 and for the following reasons. First, on the one hand, the faith grounded in an internal manner attests to the fact that in all stirrings of religious consciousness, God-consciousness, viewed as at one8 with world-consciousness, has one as its referent.9 On the other hand, in every such stirring of religious consciousness, the faith in God’s eternal omnipresence and living omnipotence likewise attests to the fact that world-consciousness, viewed as at one with Godconsciousness, has all as its referent. Thus, at the same time, on the one hand, the recognition that the world comprises the entire revelation of God’s eternal omnipotence is implied in faith that is directed to God’s eternal omnipotence. Therefore, on the other hand, the following is likewise implied, at the same time, in faith that is directed to the original perfection of the world. That is, by means of the feeling of absolute dependence, divine omnipotence is revealed, in its entire living character, as eternal, omnipresent, and omniscient throughout the entire world. This revelation occurs without any distinction of more or less and without any contrast whatsoever that might be taken to exist between one part and another with respect to their dependence on God. 2.10 Now, let us suppose that the terms selected for this discussion are meant to be taken in the sense just given. It already follows of itself that in this context any content of an actual element of life11 that is defined in terms of some distinct impression of the world should be left out of the account. This is the case, since here we have to do only with the original, inner will-to-enter12 of lower and higher self-consciousness, which will is ever advancing and enduring in the same way, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with the constitution of all being that is given to us,13 viewed as the ever-advancing effective cause of the world’s impressions that codetermine that very tendency toward being at one.

Accordingly, what is immediately dealt with in this context is not any one temporal situation whatsoever that is in the world and among human beings—in particular, not any situation that is past or present or that is deemed to be future. Rather, the only topic to be directly dealt with regards those circumstances that uniformly underlie the entire unfolding of what is temporal and that remain ever the same while this unfolding is occurring.14 Regarding what we call “perfection” or “imperfection” in the domain of experience,15 “perfection” is simply that which has already come to be so by virtue of original perfection, whereas “imperfection” is that which has not yet become so by virtue of original perfection. The two combined, however, comprise that which is on the way to being perfect. Hence, we can say that, for every given element of life, original perfection would be in whatever, viewed as pure finite causality, underlies it, but definitive perfection would be within the totality of all effects within finite causality which is an advancing unfolding of perfection, itself thought of as contained within that element of life. Now, what underlies every element of life, viewed as finite causality, however, is nothing other than the totality of all enduring forms of being and of all contrasted functions of being. In consequence, original perfection is the cohering of all these forms and functions of being by virtue of which they have the same compass as divine causality and, on account of the presence of contrast, call forth consciousness of that divine causality. The primal expression of this faith, though in a different form, is the divine approbation of the world.16 This approbation, which is referred to the act of creation, as such, has for its object no temporal situation, which would have arisen from something that had come into being earlier. Rather, it is referred only to the origination of finite being, though, admittedly, this source would have been viewed as that of all temporal development. Hence, just as this divine approbation cannot be abrogated by anything temporal, no more can the truth of our proposition be impaired by various contents inherent in temporal elements of life. It matters not whether they are viewed, at one time, more as displaying perfection that has come into being and then, at another time, as imperfection in process of improvement. Yet, let us recognize, on the one hand, that what is customarily dealt with precisely under this title in faith-doctrine17 is historical elements of life—that is, a state of paradise in the world and a state of moral perfection in human beings, both of which would have lasted for some period. It is clear, then, that such a doctrine could not occupy the same locus of doctrine as that set forth here. This is so, for a real situation—thus, one that is, in any case, subject to change—cannot refer to divine omnipotence in the same way as that in finite being which underlies the whole succession of situations. Least of all can a situation that is supposed to have disappeared altogether refer to divine omnipotence. This is so, because at that point divine omnipotence too could no longer have remained what it was. On the other hand, suppose that we ourselves were to take up into the concept of original perfection something that, on closer scrutiny, was shown to be variable in nature. This case would involve only an oversight, itself resting on an improper subsumption,18 which, as soon as it would be discovered, could be corrected without anything’s being changed in a given doctrine. To be sure, the course of our presentation has definitely not led us to include in it anything of the

sort. However, this feature of an actual perfection occurring in history, viewed as placed at the very beginning, has at times been included in presentations of faith-doctrine. Thus, it is incumbent on us to investigate where there is any locus for such a doctrine or whether it simply rests on a misunderstanding wherever it appears.

1. Glauben. Ed. note: This is another way of saying that the feeling of absolute dependence, as defined in a Christian context, may be seen to “presuppose” what can only be conceived as an original perfection of the world. The task of the next five propositions is to articulate and explain what it can mean to claim that Christian faith is held, first of all, in the Christian religious self-consciousness of persons who exist in community with Christ (have “faith”) and is held also in their feeling concerning God’s relationship with the whole world, including the interactively human part of it. As throughout this work, “faith,” rather than “belief,” translates Glaube, because the feeling of absolute dependence, which is oriented to God, carries within it faith regarding God’s activity in the world, viewed as its referent, shape, and context. Naturally, as he has been stating and explaining all along, this faith is an experience that can be conceptualized—that is, interpretively expressed by using concepts, i.e., put into the form of beliefs, including what Schleiermacher calls “presuppositions,” but what is being expressed in this way is the experience itself. Within the domain of history, moreover, anything human, including feelings, can change, thus whatever beliefs used to express their meaning can too, as will be seen. The world in which we live can change as well, but, as presupposed in this presentation of Christian faith, God is constituted in what God wills and does. In general, God can be counted on not to change in relationship to God’s own world, even though in some particular circumstances God might, mistakenly, seem to change. Use the index to see how he accommodates his position to human freedom (use of free will). Although we are accustomed to thinking in terms of real changes on both sides of a relationship, Schleiermacher interprets God’s steady holiness and justice, love, and wisdom to be infinite, inalterable, and unchanging. Regarding the creation as a whole, he has also attempted to show, earlier in Part One, that this exquisitely interconnected, continually changing process can also be counted on, since God preserves it (§§36–49). 2. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Without this possibility, the claim that follows could not be set forth” (Thönes, 1873). The claim contains several successive points. 3. See §5.5. 4. See §8.2. 5. Ed. note: repräsentieren: that is, in our self-consciousness to re-present, to have “finite nature in general” stand in for “the entire world,” not simply envisage or imagine or have a notion of such (vorstellen). 6. Ed. note: daß sich mit jedem Welteindruck das Gottesbewuβtsein zur Einheit des Momentes bilde. That is, in every instant and location where this “being at one,” or combination, takes place, it occurs within some particular element (Moment) of human life. Just below, Schleiermacher calls this juxtaposition “inner faith.” 7. Ed. note: See §§50–51 for a statement and initial account of this “basic presupposition,” which Schleiermacher deems to have been derived historically not from “a dogmatic interest” but from the communal experiences of Christian communities of faith over time. 8. Ed. note: Here “at one” translates geeinigt. 9. Ed. note: Here “one as its referent” stands for the term Einen. 10. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher marks the first of three subheads: “2. Relationship to temporal perfection. (a) [The feeling is] immediate; [we are] not affected [affiziert] by it,” i.e., by temporal perfection, which would involve some impression from the world (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Here “of an actual element of life” translates eines wirklichen Lebensmomentes, referring to any constituent part of life, no matter how large or small. In Schleiermacher’s usage, out of these constituent parts are formed every general (allgemeines) distinctive (eigentliches) feature (Element) and every larger part, segment, or portion (Teil) of life. Almost always, when he uses the term Moment by itself, he is referring to an “element of life.” 12. Eintretenwollen. Redeker note: In the first edition (1821), p. 319, Einswerdenwollen. Cf. An Lücke (1829), SW I.2 (1836), 583: “What I call the conjoining [Einswerden] of sensory and higher self-consciousness.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. OG 37. Schäfer prints Eintretenwollen but shares with Redeker the conjecture that Einswerdenwollen is intended. The original handwritten manuscript and published text of this second edition (1830) changed Einswerdenwollen (1821) to Eintretenwollen (1830), apparently so as to obviate the much-embattled term used in 1821. In OG 37 Schleiermacher had explained Einswerden (to be at one) by asserting that in CG1 (1821) §16.3 he had already shown that the much-different, approaching-complete, identity of sensory and higher consciousness is a defining characteristic of the “Mohamedan”

conception of monotheism, which he calls aesthetic, not teleological. The nearest counterpart to that 1821 passage in the present 1830 text is §9.2, where Einswerden is no longer used. See also §8.4. 13. Ed. note: Here “all being that is given to us” translates alles uns gegebenen Seins, a familiar ambiguous concept that also means “all that can ever be present to or exist for humans to observe or understand,” in this case including all that might be hidden from observation and understanding at any given time or place but that is yet to be revealed. Consistent with this observation is Schleiermacher’s affirmation that God is one. What God reveals ever occurs “originally” by this one God in what he refers to in On Religion and some other places as both Universum and Weltall. 14. Ed. note: Here “circumstances” translates Verhältnisse, as usual; however, in Schleiermacher’s usage it normally refers much more to relationships among elements, features, or parts, all somehow interconnected, rather than simply to the surrounds of something. A Verhältnis is a relation or, more particularly, a relationship. Also, in this context, to obviate any false impression that Schleiermacher is presupposing a notion of steady progress, “unfolding” is chosen to translate Entwicklung, which is usually rendered by “development,” as in the more neutral phrase “as things develop, or unfold.” This choice is not intended to detract from his teleological understanding of a potential development of human beings toward a more nearly “complete,” or “perfect,” end (τέλος, Vollendung). At this point, Schleiermacher’s marginal note continues that in §57n10 above: “Here the temporal differences [Differenzen] between perfection [or completeness, Vollkommenheit] and the lack of perfection [or being flawed, or lack of completeness, Unvollkommenheit] are neutralized [neutralisiert]” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Erfahrung. 16. Gen. 1:31: “And God saw everything that God had made, and behold; it was very good.” Ed. note: The word Schleiermacher uses for this pronouncement by God is Billigung (approbation). 17. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: In this work Schleiermacher presupposes this term but rarely uses it. It is a historical term for more or less systematic, constructive presentations of faith-doctrine, especially for the more strictly doctrinal half of Schleiermacher’s own dogmatics. It is a term that he himself used especially in that he had chosen, for practical reasons, to separate this presentation from the other half, that of Sittenlehre (Christian ethics). The two halves together present an understanding of Christian faith and an account of its active expression in all aspects of Christian life, communal and individual, in the community of faith and on the rest of the world. 18. Subsumtion. Ed. note: This is a term largely familiar only in logic—a minor premise in a syllogism that is used in a more general way to indicate something that is placed under a category of some kind. More broadly, the act of subsumption is any placement of something under some larger name, as in labeling. In Schleiermacher’s case, he is referring to an act that is done mistakenly.

§58. The faith described is to be presented in two points of doctrine. One deals with the perfection of the rest of the world in relation to human beings. The other deals with the perfection of the human being as such. 1. The faith described in this proposition is nothing other than testimony concerning something that is commonly featured among the religious stirrings involved. This testimony refers only to certain finite factors that codetermine these stirrings, namely, to impressions that we have received from the world, though even this set of factors is contemplated only in its general character. Thus, the division into the two parts follows entirely of itself. This is so, for, on the one hand, God-consciousness could not be aroused through these impressions from the world if they were constituted in a manner at variance with God-consciousness. On the other hand, this could not happen unless human beings were so constituted that these impressions would likewise reach up to the level of their higher consciousness and unless human beings were so constituted that the relation of lower and higher self-consciousness to each other, by which the entire process of God-consciousness being stirred occurs, were also constantly present in them. This is how the two conditions to be dealt with here come into consideration, each in and of itself.

To be sure, it could be said that, given this constitution of human beings, they are themselves an integral part of the world and that only by virtue of this constitution are they the integral part that they are, consequently that the original perfection of humankind is already included in the original perfection of the world. This observation is also entirely proper. Moreover, in a purely scientific procedure, wherein perception of finite being in itself1 would be dealt with, such a division would be permissible only inasmuch as other divisions were contrived, and the concept “perfection of the world” were to be divided into the perfection of its various constituent parts and into the perfection of their relationships with each other. The case is different within the dogmatic domain, however. There the original subject addressed is not objective consciousness at all but self-consciousness. Moreover, in this domain the subject is self-consciousness especially insofar as a human being places oneself over against the world and stands in a relationship of interaction with the rest of being. 2. For the same reason, here too there can be no talk of an original perfection of the world in itself and with respect to the concept of finite being. Rather, there can be talk only of original perfection of the world in relation to humankind. Suppose that, at the same time, it were also claimed that there would be no other perfection of the world and that this one perfection would thus be considered entirely teleologically, in the usual sense of the word. This claim would then require a more exact explanation, so as to avoid any appearance as if humankind were to be presented as the center of all finite being, in relation to which alone would all else have any perfection. This explanation would also not be difficult to offer. This would be the case, because, on the presupposition of an organic composition of the whole, all could just as well be for the purpose of each part, just as each part could be so for all. Consequently, this could be true, nonetheless, even of the remotest part. That is, just as its arrangement would interconnect with the totality of its mediate and immediate relationships,2 so too it would not only stand in relation with humankind but also, given a full insight into the matter, precisely this set of relations3 could become the expression used for the distinctiveness of that remote part’s own existence. We need not get mixed up in such explanations, however, because we do not at all have to set forth an exhaustive doctrine regarding the perfection4 of the world, as if it were a cosmological task. Rather, the faith to be expounded here is not to extend farther than that domain containing stirrings of a religious sort5 in which only relationships of the world to humankind are of decisive influence. However, in that we are referring back to the overall ground of these relationships, it is posited, at the same time, that no further, forthcoming development of these relationships could ever contain anything that would cancel out this faith. Now, as concerns the perfection of humankind, it would not have been appropriate to this subject if one were to add that it is likewise to be understood only with respect to the world. Instead, the original perfection of humankind means, first and foremost, in its relation6 to God. That is, the concept relates to the placement of God-consciousness in humankind. Moreover, humankind’s natural inclinations in relation to the world belong in this connection only to the extent that they also serve toward the awakening of God-consciousness. To be

sure, the whole position of this proposition does, however, include the recognition that all of those natural inclinations, by virtue of which humankind is this distinct integral part of the world, belong in it along with the rest. The proposition itself will become an important canon in the domain of Christian ethics, for the purpose of setting aside a great many misunderstandings. 3. Without further ado, these considerations shed light on how natural it is that doctrine regarding the distinctive, original perfection of humankind is far more abundantly elaborated in dogmatics than is that regarding perfection of the world with respect to humankind. When the latter is entirely lacking, however, this lack not only certainly cannot redound to the advantage of the former treatment, but also, not seldom at that point, doctrine that is treated under the title of “divine providence,” or that considers what otherwise comes up in treatment of how perfection has come into being, also goes amiss. This happens because a proper concept of original perfection has not been established first. Yet, it does make sense to have as an introduction the less urgent, hence also less elaborated matter—the original perfection of the world—precede the matter that is more important and more fully composed —the original perfection of humankind.

1. Ed. note: Here “perception of finite being in itself “ translates Anschauung des endlichen Seins an sich—that is, without consideration of God or of the relationship of any part of the world, even humans, to God, its creator. In contrast, in all editions of On Religion the phrase Anschauung des Universums (perception, or vision, of the universe) stands for a religious mode of beholding all of finite being in its relation to God. Dogmatics, or the field of inquiry that considers this relationship in Christian faith and life in the form of an integrally ordered, scientific presentation to serve religious interest, is thus a different subject from that of strictly natural science in that respect. See §§27–31 above and Brief Outline throughout, especially on the comparative valence of religious interest and of the scientific spirit in §§9–13, 146–48, 193, 205f., 247f., 258, 262, 270, 313n, and 329–31. 2. Verhältnisse. Ed. note: “relationships” or “circumstances.” 3. Ed. note: diese Beziehung. 4. Ed. note: All along “perfection” seems to be the most suitable word for Vollkommenheit. However, given that Schleiermacher has shown by now that the word is not meant to refer to a primeval condition of the world or of humankind, nor is it meant to refer to some ideal end point (τέλοἰ) in either one, this word could easily be replaced everywhere in closer accordance with the root meaning of Vollkommenheit, namely, “completeness” or even “completed reality.” In contrast, the other German word commonly used for “completeness,” Vollständigkeit, bears the connotation of something’s either having come to its fullest state or being viewed with regard to that state and enduring in it as a whole, if only for a time. In his “prophetic doctrine” (§§157–63), in referring to “consummation” (Vollendung) of the church, Schleiermacher indicates a necessarily vague, imagined attainment of the church’s ultimate ideal state (τέλοἰ). Christianity, in turn, is a “teleological” religion, not because its adherents could now properly imagine precisely how that final condition of the church would look, but because humankind has already been reaching its original, divinely intended, and ordained state in and through Jesus the Redeemer, manifested in the Christian church’s faith and life (cf. §§11 and 91). 5. Ed. note: “The domain containing stirrings of a religious sort” translates das Gebiet der religiösen Erregungen. This unusual wording apparently appears here because in large part these stirrings would be shared by adherents of other monotheistic religions. Otherwise, Schleiermacher uses fromm for “religious stirrings” and “experiences” (Erfahrungen) that are distinctively Christian—that is, in accordance with the roots of Christian piety (Frömmigkeit). 6. Beziehung.

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Original Perfection of the World

§59. Every element of life in which we confront being that is given to us externally contains two presuppositions. In part, it contains the presupposition that the world offers to the human spirit an abundance of stimuli toward development of those conditions in which the consciousness of God can be realized. In part, it also contains the presupposition that at multiple levels the world lends itself to being handled by the human spirit so as to serve the human spirit as an organ of it and as a medium of presentation.1 1. Already above,2 it has been presupposed that God-consciousness can develop in all states of consciousness that have surmounted the muddled3 state animals can have. This process happens in such a way that the contrast between the self and whatever being is given to the self, as well as that between self-consciousness and objective consciousness, is expressed therein. That is, in this process both members of the contrast simultaneously intermingle with each other. The same process also occurs regarding the contrast between what is passive in the self and what is active. On account of the teleological character of Christian piety,4 however, in our domain God-consciousness can be at one with the passive factor only as this factor operates in relation to the factor of self-initiated activity. Nevertheless, an intervening of the passive factor is necessary for the purpose of clearly identifying which are the elements of self-initiated activity. This is so, because clarity of consciousness is rooted only in the ever-successive contrast between variously identified elements of life. Passive states, however, can come into being only by beings’ exercising influence. Accordingly, moreover, the original perfection of the world with respect to humankind consists, first and foremost, in this: that the stimulus of passive states is grounded temporally in that perfection, and out of those passive states active states are to come into being, which latter states we call stimuli,5 alternately expressed: that these passive states sufficiently determine the receptivity of human beings to the point that their own selfinitiated activity is stirred up and determined.6 Now, suppose that, first of all, we conceive human beings to be engaged in self-initiated activity in a wholly internal fashion, in which state God-consciousness would be possible— that is, that we conceive them to be engaged as “spirit.” Then the bodily aspect of one’s life, which is not self-initiated activity itself, would belong originally to this world-body, into which spirit enters. Moreover, the bodily aspect only gradually becomes the spirit’s organ and its medium of self-presentation,7 just as subsequently all else also gradually becomes this mediately, by means of the body. Early on in this process, however, and of primal importance, one’s body mediates the stimulating influences8 of the world on one’s spirit.

Accordingly, this entire aspect of the original perfection of the world can be summarized by saying that in that original perfection, in living connection with everything else, an organization that is human9 is put in place for the spirit, an organization that transmits all other being to the spirit. Now, clarity of consciousness is also conditioned, however, by the contrasting distinction of self-consciousness from objective consciousness. It essentially belongs to this distinction that various sorts of influences can also be related to the same self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness can be defined as one being-in-process,10 which is thereby independent of any given particular influence. In its turn, all experience depends on this independent selfconsciousness, as all science eventually does as well. Nevertheless, in this place science interests us only for the sake of experience. Thus, given all these considerations, we can sum up this whole aspect of the original perfection of the world under the concept of its “knowability.”11 The two aspects essentially belong together.12 This is the case, for without an organization such as we have, there would be no interconnected process between finite spirit and bodily being, however suitably arranged even our bodily being might be for that process. Moreover, without such an orderly identification of different elements of being, the organization that human beings have would be an ineffective phenomenon. Thus, the two modes of being then comprise one being, except that therein knowability of being is the ideal aspect of the original perfection of the world, whereas its real aspect is the natural subsistence of human organization, constantly related immediately to the human capacity for receptivity. 2. Now, this same sequence of aspects is, however, also to be laid out in reverse order, for the following reasons. Suppose, first, that all self-initiated activity of human beings were strictly conditioned by influences from the world. Then this self-initiated activity would be simply a reaction,13 and all feeling of freedom, even if partial in nature, would be a mere illusion. Then suppose, in contrast, that human receptivity were, at the very least, something lively and distinctive, the result being that the very same influence would not have the same effect in all human beings. Alternatively, suppose, even further, that some original selfinitiated activity, of a kind that is independent of any influence from the world, were attributed to the human spirit; suppose, too, that this self-initiated activity is not taken to be one of sheer immanence in someone’s individual, mental14 existence as a person; and, finally, suppose that this very self-initiated activity might, nevertheless, lie at the very root of all species-consciousness, which is so essential to human beings. Then, considered in and of itself, an unlimited receptivity of the world to influences from the mental self-initiated activity of human beings would also belong to the perfection of the world. Naturally, this particular receptivity would have to begin with the way human beings are organized, to the degree that this organization can be considered as a constitutive part of the world. From this starting point, however, this particular receptivity would extend more and more broadly to the point of reaching those constituent parts of the world toward which no other influence

would be in place other than that they are known. This consideration brings us to the boundaries identified in the preceding points of doctrine.15 Now, we may sum up the nature of this receptivity of the world under the two headings “organ”16 and “medium of presentation.” Doing this is in no way meant to indicate a split between the two, as if some given thing could be the one and something else the other. Rather, the two together—the most immediate organ and the most immediate medium of presentation—equally comprise the actual organization that human beings have. In this fashion, moreover, in being the one thing it is, each of the two always comes to be the other as well. Yet, these two categories do indeed comprise the two relations by which the selfconsciousness that accompanies human self-initiated states becomes a medium of stimulus for God-consciousness. That is to say, only in accord with one’s organs does a human being present dominion over the world,17 which world, in this perspective, can itself come to consciousness only as being grounded in divine omnipotence.18 Moreover, only in that the simple activity of spirit would be presented through temporal and spatial mediation would this sense of human dominion awaken consciousness of divine causality, this activity of spirit being viewed as a likeness of divine omnipotence.19 3. It is self-evident that these two main elements of the original perfection of the world essentially belong together. This is so, for the first-mentioned element would simply be something lacking in perfection—that is, an arrangement that would be without result—were it not for the second-mentioned element, and the knowability of the world would be an empty matter if it were itself not to include presentation regarding our being known as well. Furthermore, even if the organization of human life were taken to include the inner life of spirit within it, that organization would be lost among whatever is less incompletely realized, being viewed as of the very same sort, if a new level of exponential power20 for organizing activity were not to proceed from it, in which power all else can be taken up along with it. Yet, even receptivity of the rest of being for influences of spirit would be an empty matter if spirit could not be filled by this receptivity. Now, on the other hand, these two elements together also completely encompass the world’s relations to spirit, viewed as the seat of God- consciousness. This is the case, in that for development of God-consciousness the human spirit can have nothing but these two elements within the being given to it. Moreover, in this relation to passive human states arising through influences of being—these states being viewed as completely the same in and of themselves—the human spirit does indeed bear these same two elements. This is the case whether these states, viewed as elements of life, are pleasurable or lacking in pleasure, elevating or depressive. Furthermore, the same observation also applies to acquired organs and to collected means of presentation, to the extent that, viewed as external being, they too are able to have a return effect on human beings, in one way or another, and to stir up passive states. This is the case, in that by such return effects neither is the relationship of these two factors to the self-initiated activity of human beings changed in general terms, nor is even God-consciousness, viewed in and of itself, stirred up with any greater difficulty by what is lacking in pleasure than by what is pleasurable.

Postscript.21 Two notions are to be distinguished from the proposition set forth here: on the one hand, the teaching that is known by the name “doctrine regarding the best world” and, on the other hand, the claim regarding “the perfection of the world” that is indeed also called its “original perfection” but not in the same sense as that set forth here. The second notion is rather framed in such a way that a period is supposed to have existed prior to the present makeup of the world, but thereafter it changed into the present imperfect world. Originally, especially since Leibniz,22 the doctrine regarding the best world had its locus in so-called “natural” or “rational” theology. Thus, it has not emerged as a pronouncement concerning some religious consciousness but is a product of speculation. Hence, there could also be no mention of it here at all, had not a number of persons learned in theology23 taken it over, in the same form, into Christian faith-doctrine as well. However, this doctrine regarding the best world has to do not only with something that underlies fulfillment over time but also with fulfillment of time itself. Therein what is historical, namely, the efficacy of the human spirit, cannot be separated from what is natural, namely, the efficacy of physical forces. The doctrine claims, moreover, that despite all that is hazy and lacking in history, no greater sum of being and well-being would ever have been attained. Our two points of doctrine here do indeed likewise include the following three-part claim: First, the entire course of time can only be an unbroken efficacy of the overall original perfection of the world. Thus, second, the finite outcome of that entire course of time has to comprise an absolute satisfaction of its aim. Third, likewise every element of that entire course of time, viewed as a whole, must reach satisfaction by way of approximation. Yet, this claim, proceeding only from religious consciousness as it does, bears no desire to be carried over into speculative theology in like manner as people have taken that other claim into Christian faith-doctrine. Rather, in forming Christian faith-doctrine, we must stick with the appraisal that the world is good, and we can make no use of the formulation that it is the best. Indeed, we can make no use of it because to say that the world is good signifies far more than to say that it is the best.24 That is, the latter expression not only refers to the notion of plural worlds, which would originally have been equally possible as that which became the real world, a notion that we have already rejected. It also bears the intention of presenting the total course of time within the real world as the outcome of mediate knowledge—something we have also rejected—with the result that the overall productive activity of God is presupposed to be of a critical, hence secondary, character.25 The other claim is found in the traditions of most peoples as the tale of a golden age that had run out before actual history began. What is essential in that tale is always that the world had been constituted in such a way that human beings were afforded satisfaction without mediation of any developed self-initiated activity. Now, something similar was laid down even in the brief Old Testament indications of life in paradise26—except that something else was added to the tale, namely, the claim that if that state had continued, human beings would also not have died. However, those indications depict not an age but only a relatively short period in the life of the first human beings. Thus, it would be necessary, first of all, to settle a controversy over how to interpret such tales, a controversy long left in the balance as to

whether some history was really meant to be told there and thus whether the telling is to be of some fulfillment over time or not. Now, if the first possibility were found to be the case, then the subject matter, being viewed as a historical statement, would have no place in the present account at all, except to the extent that either some other original perfection would underlie such a fulfillment over time—but in that case, this original perfection would have been transformed into the state of perfection just described, from which such a fulfillment over time would no longer be possible—or that the original perfection described here would underlie that history—but in that case precisely this perfection would no longer underlie it today. The latter claim has not been made anywhere and would of itself be contradicted by the observation that the course of history presents only functions of the original perfection described above. However, the first claim has to be taken under consideration here. Now, let us grant that this first claim necessarily presupposes the following: that the original perfection of the world did not remain exactly as it was. If this were so, then already at that point of change there would fail to be any unity in the way the whole world is arranged as this process is related to creation of the world and as it is related to the constancy belonging to divine preservation of the world. Beyond this undeniable basic failure, however, it further follows that God would have approved of that initial arrangement also in relation to that portion of the world which was capable of changing for the worse and was also to experience changing for the worse.27 Furthermore, it would seem contradictory, however, that those basic circumstances under which the Redeemer was, nevertheless, destined to enter the world and to establish the invincible reign of God should be any less perfect than those under which the first human being entered the world, since far greater things were supposed to occur in that later case than in the first. If we closely examine that supposed initial arrangement, we find it to be in contradiction with God’s supposed mandate to the first human beings. This is so, for two reasons. First, humankind could attain to dominion over the earth only by means of a development of its own powers. Second, the constitution of the world, which would have occasioned this development and which would, at the same time, have implied receptivity for the influence of these developed powers, would have to have been reciprocal with that divine command. Finally, suppose that history is inseparable from cultivation of the world by human beings. Then, in this sense that narrative would indeed contain only things that are prehistoric, and its actual content would be only the following: first, that a capacity of nature adequate for continuance in the organization of human beings would have preceded all development of human powers and, second, that the detrimental differences in this adequate capacity that are so significant on our planet could be unveiled only with the spread and further development of the human race. Suppose, moreover, that it could perhaps be inferred from the narrative that at that time no hostile circumstances would have existed within the animal domain28 and nothing injurious or useless to humankind anywhere.29 In no way does it follow that this condition would also have prevailed outside the space human beings originally inhabited or even that this space would then have lost its distinctive advantages.

In contrast, suppose that hermeneutical investigation were to find that no real history was to be told in these passages and that the narrative were thus to be regarded as some sort of poetry. Then it would belong in the present context inasmuch as it was either to contain or be occasioned by immediate utterances of religious self-consciousness. What it might then utter concerning the emergence of sin does not belong here. Even the relation between sin and evil and between sin and death, from which the narrative plainly does proceed, is not, in and of itself, to be investigated here. Instead, the following is to be noted, but only in view of the doctrine regarding the original perfection of the world set forth above. Suppose, then, that we wanted to assume, without qualification, that neither evil nor death would have existed without the presence of sin. It would not in any way follow from that assumption that originally the earth would have to have been arranged to a continuing state of being without sin. Rather, evil and death could have been predetermined, in any case, just as surely as God would have foreknown sin. Now, suppose that we add in the assumption that if we were to have subtracted from our consideration any gradual diminishment of organic powers, also the possibility that any organism would be destroyed through external potencies within nature, and, finally, any utter disappearance by death, then we would have had no more thought of a being30 such as ours. Moreover, real human history would have begun, nonetheless, only where all of these conditions were in place. Suppose, further, that care for preservation of life and prevention of all that might disturb that life, both being conditioned by the presence of mortality, belongs among the most mighty motivating factors for any development. Suppose, too, that consequently, given the presence of mortality and the evils interconnected with it, more human activities occasioned by our relationship with the external world would be developed with those things than could be expected without mortality. Presupposing, moreover, that the totality of human life would sooner increase than decrease, suppose that by the death of individual human beings neither would the receptivity of the world for the dominion of human beings be diminished nor would the world be hindered in the plethora of its means for offering stimuli. Finally, suppose, in addition, that a continuing state of sinlessness would have come to the fore more strongly and splendidly if a human being, unimpeded in the development and use of one’s powers, would have endured evil and, by combining Godconsciousness with love of the human race, would have vanquished clinging to one’s own life and submitted to death.31 Given all these considerations, no reason can well remain for doubting that the original perfection of the world in relation to human beings was already at the very beginning nothing other than what has been described here. Moreover, neither the Old Testament account32 nor indications tied to it within the New Testament33 require us to assume that humankind was created immortal and/or that along with human nature the entire arrangement of the planet in relation to humankind would have been altered as well.

1. Ed. note: In marginal notes, Schleiermacher indicates the following subheads under this proposition: “1. First Half [of the proposition]; 2. Second Half; 3. Optimism,” the latter subsection being a critique of two notions: “the best possible world” and “a golden age” (Thönes, 1873). This proposition also especially prefaces all later propositions that present

doctrine referring to “the world,” especially §§75–78 and 113–63. Based directly on the presentation in §59 subsections 2 and 3, the P.S. here reflects the pronouncement attributed to God in Gen. 1:31 that everything God had created was “very good” (RSV). In §169 Schleiermacher simply says “good,” then immediately cites §59.P.S. In the corresponding proposition of the first edition (1822), Schleiermacher used the phrase “is the best world.” 2. See §5.3. 3. Ed. note: Here “muddled” translates Verworrenheit. Elsewhere in this work this term is usually translated “entanglement,” for a state characterized by an intricate involvement with the complex, organic world, itself full of confusing contrasts, according to Schleiermacher’s typical way of describing it. Such entanglement lacks the clarity and expression of consciousness that is required if God-consciousness is to arise at any stage of human development—even if that consciousness is only a little directed toward it. His entire understanding of the development of religious selfconsciousness (cf. §3–13) presupposes this more entangled starting point, which can never be entirely shed in any finite person who is still living in this world. In any case, the point of religious development, for him, is not to leave our sensory consciousness behind but to rise beyond its constraining influences, eventually in relationship with God, thus not to reject that consciousness or any other mode of consciousness, as such, but rather to enhance all consciousness at all levels of development. In one fashion or another, Schleiermacher explicates aspects of these matters throughout his corpus of writings and lectures, more and more systematically over the three decades of his university appointments. 4. See §9.1 and §11. 5. Ed. note: Here “stimuli” translates Reize. Elsewhere in this work, the term for God’s or Christ’s or the Spirit’s stimulus is Impuls, translated “impetus,” whereas the same word, Impulse, is translated “impulse” when a human being is stimulated to exert self-initiated activity. When such activity, from any source, is exercised, Schleiermacher tends to call that “influence” (Einfluβ, Einwirkung) or uses some other word denoting some form of power (Kraft [force], Macht [might], or Gewalt [holding sway]); hence, also Herrschaft (lordship, dominion) and Regierung (governance, government, e.g., through “the reign of God” or “the divine governance [or government] of or regarding the world”). 6. Ed. note: Here the words “determines” and “determined” (bestimmen, Bestimmung) explicitly refer to a “grounding” by God, in the sense of defining a range of real possibility and thus a destining of such a range. Nowhere does Schleiermacher claim that either free will or multiple options for its exercise are to be excluded by God’s determinative action. On the other hand, it is also not necessary, in his view, to hold that God is limited by any other supposed factor in God’s doing what God wills, as if alternate or competing forces could have their way independent of God. This much, he is claiming, can be presupposed based on an Evangelical Christian understanding of “faith.” 7. Organ und Darstellungsmittel. Ed. note: This presupposition regarding the bodily, “external,” “mediate,” organic, and self-presentational functions of a person’s physical body, which are inseparable from the gradual development of one’s mental functions, or “spirit” (Geist), is derived from basic understandings of the human psyche in Schleiermacher’s psychology. In human beings “spirit” is always embodied, and the “body” is always a medium for presentation of oneself in the world. The concept of “presentation” (Darstellung) becomes particularly significant in his accounts of Christ’s “selfpresentation” and likewise of his “communication” (Mitteilung), by word and deed. Accordingly, these mediatorial concepts then become highly important in his showing how Christ’s person and work continues through the Holy Spirit in and through the church, its “common spirit” (Gemeingeist) as a community of faith. 8. Ed. note: The result of “stimulating influences” (reizende Einwirkungen) is “stirrings” (Erregungen), which, in Schleiermacher’s psychology, have both sensory content and emotive content (feelings, Gefühle) in every domain of one’s life, including the religious domain. 9. Organisation wie die menschliche. 10. Seiendes. 11. Erkennbarkeit. 12. Ed. note: In the proposition, the two aspects are presuppositions regarding the world’s providing, first, stimuli sufficient for the human spirit’s gradual realization of God-consciousness and, second, the world’s lending itself to being an organ of the human spirit and a medium of its presentation. The first aspect is taken to refer to what enables development of self-consciousness, thus to the operations of spirit itself. The second aspect is taken to refer to objective consciousness, thus to spirit’s relation to anything that is or contains what is physical, thus to body. These two aspects of consciousness and of what the world brings to their respective operations exist in relative independence from each other, though the bodily and spiritual functions of human beings can influence each other, within a given psyche. This is a point of paramount importance in Schleiermacher’s Psychologie. 13. Reaktion. Ed. note: That is, an automatic, mechanical reaction, without any free response activated in the event. Schleiermacher does not use this term in any other way. 14. Ed. note: Here the word “mental” (geistigen) covers whatever human mentation might apply, not only what is often regarded to be distinctly “spiritual” in current English usage. In German, both Geist and Gemüth can stand for the entire

range of activity in a human being’s “mind” (cognitive functioning, intellect) and “heart” (the stirring up of one’s senses and “feelings”). 15. Ed. note: §§52–55, on presupposed attributes of God with respect to God’s relationship to the world. 16. Organ. Ed. note: The multiple valences of this word include biological organs, agents and agency, and organization. 17. Gen. 1:28. 18. Ed. note: In this rare instance, to remind the reader that all of this discourse in Part One is addressed to what may be seen to be “presupposed” in Christian immediate religious self-consciousness, the translation inserts the words “in this perspective” here, without which a more literal text could be misleading. Obviously, not everyone who exercises any form of dominion over the world would have come to a consciousness of divine omnipotence in the sense presented in this work. Even those who generally have this consciousness would not likely hold to it consistently. 19. Gen. 1:26. Ed. note: In this biblical verse “likeness” or “image” (Bild) is used to compare human dominion within the earth with God’s dominion over it. In Schleiermacher’s discourse here the term is Ebenbild (likeness). 20. Potenz. Ed. note: Another use of a mathematical term, Potenz refers to the power of exponents, such as squared or cubed (zweite Potenz, dritte Potenz). 21. Ed. note: Cf. §59n1 above for the marginal heading here. 22. Ed. note: Theory regarding “the best of all possible worlds” was based especially on metaphysical and rationalistic theological grounds, first tightly formulated and made prominent throughout Europe in his day by the great polymath, mathematician (including an apparently independent codiscovery of infinitesimal and differential calculus with Isaac Newton), philosopher, and advocate of church union (a major motivating force behind his philosophical work), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). His voluminous writings and correspondence are still being laid out, as are Schleiermacher’s, in a collected critical edition (by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin). An implicit dialogue between Schleiermacher’s mathematically informed thinking and Leibniz’s rationalist-mathematical metaphysics has yet to be accomplished. Both also display a detailed sense for the mind’s complex perceptual apparatus and related functions that presage much so-called phenomenological thinking that had arisen by the mid-twentieth century. In each markedly different case, however, it is already evident that numerous provisos must be applied to reflect especially identifiable divides between Leibniz’s heavily metaphysical rationalist tendencies and Schleiermacher’s “critical realist” skepticism regarding strictly rationalist claims. 23. Among others, see Johann David Michaelis (1717–1791), Compendium theologiae dogmaticae (1760) §55: “With the philosophers we understand the world that God created as a series of things all connecting or as all things not necessary, which could have been able not to exist and at some time did not exist, fitting and depending on a perpetual nexus, form themselves. However, if that nexus of all things, demonstrated by the philosophers and exceedingly necessary to us for inquiry in theology, should offend anyone, truly it would condemn not only the more recent philosophers but Solomon himself as well. Inasmuch as this series could have been different, the wisdom and holiness of God brought about that he chose and made that world, than which a better could not be thought and which was most suitable for his purpose, for demonstrating the divine glory and for the happiness of many citizens.” Ed. note: This quote cited by Schleiermacher was quoted by KGA I/7.3, 438; ET Kienzles/Tice. Redeker found a related passage in Michaelis’s Dogmatik, 2.Aufl. (Göttingen, 1784), 257f.: “If God is good, the world that God has created must be the best world among all that God knew; … that means … it is … the world in which the greatest sum of good is present for sentient creatures with the smallest sum of evil that is perchance necessary for the purpose. This notion of a best world is a … faith-proposition of philosophy, … though revelation also confirms it” [ET Tice]. 24. Cf. §54.2. 25. Ed. note: kritische, folglich sekundäre, that is, making selective comparative judgments, which implies that God’s decision to create this real world would be secondary as compared with God’s primary purpose to create a plurality of worlds. The main point here, however, is that mere speculation about whether plural worlds exist or about which is the best one does not belong to faith-doctrine and could not do it any good as long as it remains purely speculative. 26. Gen. 2:8ff. 27. Ed. note: Cf. §§79–82. 28. Gen. 2:19 contains very little that is applicable here. 29. Gen. 2:16, that is, if the tree mentioned in Gen. 2:17 were not itself subject to destruction. Ed. note: This was “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” 30. Wesen. 31. Ed. note: This comparison can be seen to presage the path Schleiermacher deems actually to have been taken by humankind in general, yet also to presage a new attitude to be recognized both in the Redeemer and in the Christian life, as will be seen throughout the rest of this work. Moreover, explanations provided in the introductory propositions thus far in Part One (§§32–39, 50–56, and 57–58) have all prepared the way for a more focused presentation of presuppositions in successive “points of doctrine.” In turn, through points of doctrine §§59–61, which close Part One, all this subject matter is

brought together in ways that will nondeductively infuse all the introductory considerations set forth in Part Two regarding how relations between God, human beings, and the world can be viewed through the eyes of faith. 32. Gen. 2:17. 33. Just as little does Rom. 5:12, based on Gen. 2:17, exclude the possibility that Adam can have been created mortal, and 1 Cor. 15:56 likewise indicates that, in and of itself, death was already in place before sin arose.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Original Perfection of Humanity

§60. The bent toward having God-consciousness includes two things. First, as an internal driving force it includes consciousness of a capacity for reaching, by means of the human organism, those states of self-consciousness in which God-consciousness can be realized. Second, and inseparably from the first feature, the driving force to give expression to the consciousness of God likewise includes the interconnecting of speciesconsciousness1 with personal self-consciousness. Together, these two features comprise the original perfection of humanity. 1.2 Suppose that in the form of the feeling of absolute dependence3 God-consciousness can become real only in a process of interconnectedness with some sensory determination of self-consciousness. It follows, then, that the bent toward that God-consciousness would be something wholly in vain if the underlying condition for it in human life were not to be called forth to that end. Moreover, we would no more be able to imagine this sensory determination to be something real than we could presuppose its presence in mere beasts. This would be the case, because the entangled state of human consciousness would not supply the conditions necessary for that feeling to be able to gain prominence. In contrast, however, piety consists precisely in our being conscious of this bent toward Godconsciousness, itself being viewed as a living impulse.4 Yet, in every instance such an impulse can spring forth only out of what is internally true regarding one’s very being,5 the impulse sharing in the constitution of that being. Hence, as surely as we are religious, we do also reckon the entire range of states with which God-consciousness can be united to belong to this inner truth.6 Suppose, moreover, that an absolute imperfection of human nature were to exist—namely, an entire lack of any internally interconnected determination of it—if it were the case that the bent toward God-consciousness were indeed bordering on consciousness7 but could not break through. Thus, precisely the following would essentially belong to the original perfection of nature: that, onward from the point where the mental functions8 emerge, those states which condition the phenomenon of God-consciousness would be able to fill the clear-headed and waking life of human beings. Suppose, in turn, that we regard it to be the imperfect state of piety in individuals when many elements of clear, sense-determined self-consciousness are present but without any God-consciousness being

combined with them. Then, we would likewise reckon the following to belong to the original perfection of humanity: that in our clearheaded and waking life a steadiness of Godconsciousness is possible, viewed in and of itself. Accordingly, on the contrary, we would also have to sense it to be an essential imperfection of humanity if the feeling of absolute dependence were to come forth, quite apart from its overcoming any feeling of partial dependence or partial freedom, yet were thus far, in and of itself, limited solely to scattered elements of human life.9 As to remaining concerns, suppose that God-consciousness unites not only with those sensory stirrings of self-consciousness which immediately evidence furtherances of life or hindrances to life, each arising from impressions of the world on human beings, but also with stirrings that accompany activities of knowing and, finally, also with stirrings that stand in a process of interconnectedness with every sort of outwardly directed, effective action. Accordingly, all these mental functions of life and the arrangement of any human organism that bears upon those functions also belong to the original perfection of humanity. This is the case, however, only inasmuch as the claim that we set forth regarding God-consciousness is conditioned by those mental functions and in such a way that first place always falls to Godconsciousness. Thus, to begin with, we concern ourselves with the physical basic conditioning10 of mental life—that is, with the fact that spirit, which will have come to be soul11 within the human body, then bears influence within the rest of the world in the most manifold ways, making its existence felt therein,12 just as other living forces make their existence felt to the human spirit. As a result, the general feeling for life13 takes form as consciousness of interaction. In this perspective the following also then belongs to the original perfection of humanity: that the two contrasting elements of life—namely, hindrances and furtherances— are related in equal fashion to arousal of God-consciousness.14 Next we then concern ourselves with a basic conditioning of an intellectual nature— namely, first, such that spirit is able to put its stamp on what arises within the most manifold stages of general and particular notions,15 achieving this for the purpose of reaching realitybased16 consciousness. This it does by drawing on sense impressions in such a way as to achieve knowing regarding being, which knowing itself co-constitutes the very nature of spirit,17 and knowing regarding what we ourselves are able to produce through our own activity in and from that same being. Second, this intellectual basic conditioning is also such that thereby spirit attains the accompanying consciousness of an interconnected process of nature, in relation to which context God-consciousness unfolds. Finally, everything rests on some agreement of these notions—and judgments made regarding them—with the nature and circumstances of things. Yet, all of this process is more than an instinctive sort of influence of human beings on external nature. Consequently, the process of interconnection between knowledge and active life rests on such agreement as well. Suppose, however, that in this domain God-consciousness were chiefly and most originally to combine itself with the notion of an interconnected process of nature. If this

were the case, God-consciousness, once evoked, would not be imperiled at all if particular notions were not in conformity with the nature of whatever object were to be depicted by them. By the same token, the all-around connectedness of all being would not be reproduced in any notion we might have concerning it if we were not to presuppose the following: that so long as less than all of being is represented in our thinking, every act of thinking would also still continue to have something erroneous admixed in it.18 2.19 Now, as concerns the drive to express God-consciousness: there is no inner factor here that would not also become an outer one, and thus expressions of God-consciousness do also exist in which no reference to species-consciousness may be immediately demonstrable. In the present context, however, the discussion focuses on those expressions which have community in view and which underlie each particular community. Accordingly, suppose then that a given community—one without which no strong, living piety is afforded us— were conditioned by those very expressions of God-consciousness. Then that community would also be conditioned by an intimate union of species-consciousness with personal selfconsciousness. This union, like community, generally mediates all recognition of other human beings as sharing the same nature, so too it alone gives rise to the following presupposition and comprises that presupposition as a whole: that, in each case, the inner factor is also recognized and taken up with the outer factor and is grounded in that outer factor.20 Furthermore, thus we rightly assign these two factors, in this way of belonging together, to the original perfection of humanity. This inclusion of species-consciousness within personal self-consciousness, as well as the communicability of what is internal through what is external that is connected with it, actually comprises the basic conditioning of all that is social in nature, in that every human community rests on this conditioning alone. Moreover, even in this broader compass this basic conditioning is inherent in our present case. This is so, because in every other community, whatever object one might choose to focus on, the actions of a human being can also contain a communication of one’s Godconsciousness, this, by virtue of a particular sensory stirring of one’s self-consciousness. Still further, however, the freely moving outward manifestation of a human being, in its entire compass, must be able to serve this communicating expression of God-consciousness, even if this does not occur in every individual in and of oneself alone but only in association with others. This is the case, in turn, because if it were not so, there would have to be a sensorily moved self-consciousness with which God-consciousness could indeed combine internally but in combination with which it could not also move out21 externally. Accordingly, moreover, were the situation different, the range of expression and communication would be more meagerly marked out than the range of inner stirring, a disparity that we would have to call an original imperfection. 3. Now, all the conditions are contained in the statements set forth in our proposition. This is true both for the process of furthering God-consciousness toward a steady state in any individual human being and also for the process of transmitting22 God-consciousness from each individual to others in a manner commensurate with the various levels of human community. Moreover, this is indeed also the case at the stage of perfection, as God-

consciousness can be transmitted from the Redeemer outward and through him to the redeemed. Thus, the challenge of this Section is satisfactorily met by the statements set forth in our proposition.23 In our knowing24 concerning the features of this original perfection of humanity as they are present in every human being, moreover, the original requirement regarding steadiness and general availability of God-consciousness25 is justified at the same time. Furthermore, human nature, viewed as being repeated as the same nature in every single human being through the hereditary process, does appear to be adequate for the fulfillment of that nature.26 Yet, in that we had to construe the two main points in this proposition as comprising one integral whole in themselves, scientific treatment for the domain of God-consciousness, a treatment viewed as proceeding throughout toward totality of coverage and as possible only on condition that it does this, is thereby justified anew. It is so justified, moreover, for three particular disciplines: faith-doctrine proper, which has to trace back to the whole gamut of religious stirrings in forming its points of doctrine,27 as also Christian ethics, which bears the responsibility of distinguishing those modes of action which display the influence of Godconsciousness on what we aim at doing, likewise also practical theology in general, which has to do with designating and sorting out the various forms of community wherein Godconsciousness is operative. These applications, furthermore, are natural, since the entire procedure of dogmatics—to which the last-mentioned discipline also belongs, even though the title “dogmatics” must be taken in a somewhat broader sense than is usually applied to it —rests on holding a belief in what we have laid down here as the original perfection of humanity.28

1. Ed. note: This critically important concept is paired with personal consciousness throughout the remainder of this work. Whether with respect to sin or redemption, doctrine of the church or prophetic doctrine, the origin, condition, and afterlife of humankind as a whole is constantly held in view. Usually, however, the term itself is not directly present in these accounts. On the necessity for species-consciousness in a Christian teleological religion, thus not for a nature religion, as such, see OR (1821) II, supplemental note 14. 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal notes at the beginning of subsections §60.1 and §60.2 read: “First driving force [Trieb]: consciousness of the capacity [stated in the first part of the proposition]” and “Second driving force: speciesconsciousness as the bent toward community.” Throughout this discussion, the word Mensch is taken to mean “humankind,” “humanity,” human beings as a whole, or one human being within the whole. 3. Cf. §5.1–3. 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s usage throughout indicates that this “living impulse” (lebendigen Impulses) of which we may come to be conscious has two aspects to it: an initial “impetus” that we inwardly receive from outside ourselves and a responding “impulse” (same German word) that we emit from within by our own self-initiated activity. 5. Ed. note: aus der inneren Wahrheit des Wesens. 6. Ed. note: In all three editions (1799, 1806, and 1821), the basic structure of Schleiermacher’s five discourses titled On Religion uses the same inner-outer dialectic that is employed here to define the entire scope of religion. The full scope of religion includes (1) the deepest, most determinative, and truly determinative internal states of feeling and perception that root the very being of a religious (fromm) person, (2) all the inner sensory components that help to shape one’s inner faith, and (3) all those further states of intentional, externally oriented thinking and doing that serve to express that faith in a life of piety (Frömmigkeit) or of the “religion” (Religion) of a person or community of faith, regarded in their full compass. External elements can fade away and be replaced, and even those internal factors that are less “immediate” can also change somewhat. The “bent” (Richtung) toward God-consciousness is felt and expressed, however, in a potentially ever-developing state of “relationship with God.” See §§3–6 and their further development in the above Introduction. Theoretically,

according to the present account, for Christians the question as to whether that relationship can ever fade away cannot be fully answered empirically unless or until the perfect or complete and consummate end toward which humanity is meant to tend were to be reached by all human beings. See the way he crafts “prophetic doctrine” near the end of Part Two. 7. Ed. note: “bordering on” translates angelegt, suggesting an as yet latent but preconscious potential for Godconsciousness, as is presupposed in some doctrines regarding human depravity, or total sinfulness. 8. Ed. note: Here the whole set of human “mental functions” is the referent of geistigen Funktionen, not “spiritual” or “intellectual” functions. 9. Ed. note: For a general account of how the feeling of absolute dependence could relate to feelings of partial dependence or partial freedom and yet be present in every element of human life, see §§5–6 above. 10. Grundbedingung. 11. Seele. Ed. note: or “psyche.” 12. Ed. note: “Making its existence felt therein” translates sein Dasein geltend macht. This customary usage contrasts only slightly with that of the concept geltend machen when applied to various doctrines’ “gaining currency.” They too have a prevailing influence, and make their presence felt. 13. Lebensgefühl. 14. Ed. note: This statement directly points just ahead to the contrasting treatment of sin and grace in Part Two. It refers in general terms to what contributes, respectively, (1) to feeling the need for redemption, because of one’s sinfulness, and (2) to experiencing redemption, because of God’s gracious action. This action occurs (a) in and through Christ, (b) in and through the church in its coexistence with the world, (c) in and through its “common spirit” (Gemeingeist, Holy Spirit), and thus within and through each self. In all sections of Part Two, these three forms of dogmatic proposition interdependently provide a direct, immediate presentation of doctrine, just as they have, indirectly, provided elements “presupposed” in immediate Christian religious self-consciousness in Part One. Likewise, Schleiermacher intended these materials to be implicated in his presentation of “Christian Ethics” (or of “the Christian Life”), even though that account is differently organized. The 1826–1827 version of “Christian Ethics” (Sittenlehre), however, is also organized into an introduction and two parts, these parts being titled “Effective Action” and “Presentational Action,” respectively. Schleiermacher also intended this half of dogmatics on ethics to be interdependently related to the materials in Christian Faith. 15. Ed. note: “Notions” translates Vorstellungen. In Schleiermacher’s usage, notions are ideas or representations that are produced chiefly by imagination and/or that have not yet undergone strict critical scrutiny by realistic, well-grounded reason. This scrutiny leads them either to be regarded as merely fanciful, preliminary, or untested proposals or to be replaced by concepts, which he takes to be more fully appropriate to the process of knowing. Hence, “concepts” translates Begriffen. 16. Ed. note: Here “reality-based” translates wirklichen, i.e., it refers to real, not simply imagining or fanciful consciousness. 17. Ed. note: In this context “spirit” (Geist) refers especially to intellect but does not exclude either objective or subjective consciousness from the process of knowing. 18. Ed. note: In tightly outlined fashion, this entire subsection borrows from conceptual structures prominently contained in Schleiermacher’s philosophical work, including especially his philosophy of mind and action (psychology and ethics) and his dialectic (including epistemology, metaphysics, and logic). Every claim made, therefore, has been examined and scrupulously set forth there. The question thus arises as to how he can, at the same time, claim that philosophical content does not belong in a presentation of Christian doctrine and, nevertheless, do such borrowing from his philosophical work here. Although this subsection does not directly address this question, its content is, in part, self-answering. That is, just as the material presented in the Introduction openly borrows from philosophy but does not claim to be doctrine, so too, Part One contains conceptual structures that help to frame his discourse, but he claims no more for these presupposed conceptual structures than that the reader weigh whether, and to what extent, two tasks he sets forth matter. The first task is to weigh which of these presupposed conceptual structures are pertinent to an actual presentation of doctrine. The second task is to weigh which, or all, of them are to be “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness in our own time and place— on “real,” not merely “notional,” grounds. This second task would be conditioned on what philosophy and science can be taken to provide thus far to help us examine what can occur within our own “real” world. Among these presuppositions are claims that pragmatic theories would assert today (e.g., the impossibility of absolutely certain knowledge and the everpresent admixture of error in comparatively valid truth claims, and future confirmation or disconfirmation of such claims as empirically grounded theoretical and practice-oriented work continues). Moreover, some scientific observations and theories, which he relied on or foresaw, he thought might well be consistent with particular scientific and philosophical examinations of “reality” up to now. For example, his sense that if God cannot be known in se, there is evidence in faithbased experience that God does, nevertheless, reveal something of God’s creative, sustaining, and redemptive work in this “real” world, and that this inspiration and revelation can sufficiently inhabit the feelings and perceptions, and the thinking and doing of human beings, to be found among members of Christian communities of faith.

Such presupposed conceptual structures, he believed, can help Christians in the process of coming to understand and improve upon their own “faith” experience (cf. Anselm’s Proslogion, from which this work takes its motto: “faith seeking understanding”). However, as beliefs, whether firmly or tentatively held, they are not identical with that faith. Like all scientific or philosophical claims in other domains of investigation, they are to be constantly subject to critical investigation and consequent change. Nevertheless, in his view, if they come to us wholly from outside Christian experience of God’s grace through faith, they must not be allowed to intrude upon doctrine that can validly claim “reality” for such Christian experience and explain why to persons of faith. This approach, taken in all his works, emphasizes a critical realist mode of proceeding. Schleiermacher deemed this approach to be most desirable for all “science,” including those more philosophical or more theological in character. Finally, as Schleiermacher indicates and demonstrates in numerous of his writings, should there ever be a τέλος (final end, consummation), it would be one in which the findings of reason and those of faith and religious doctrine would cohere. Hence, even in his time he did not fear that faith or genuine faith-doctrine would necessarily be endangered by any progressive findings of science or philosophy. Meanwhile, some folks are bound to disagree. 19. Ed. note: See §60n2 above. 20. Ed. note: Cf. §60n4 above. 21. Ed. note: Here “move out” translates heraustreten, which, in turn, suggests a basic meaning of the term “ex-ist,” literally, to step out. 22. Ed. note: Here übertragen is translated “transmitted.” Generally, Schleiermacher takes this interpersonal process to require virtually the same ingredients as a hermeneutically and critically sound translation (Übertragung) from one language into another, though in the latter case the medium, tools, and outcomes might be different. See his Academy address of 1813 on translation and his Academy addresses of 1829–1830 on hermeneutics and criticism. 23. Ed. note: See the title of this third and final section of Part One and its introduction (§§57–58). 24. Wissen. 25. Ed. note: Stetigkeit und Allgemeinheit. “Steadiness” refers to the continual constancy of God-consciousness as God gives impetus to it and as it comes to be received by human beings, under all the conditions outlined above. “General availability” refers to the unexceptionable sameness of God in that consciousness of God’s relationship with human beings, God being viewed as potentially present to all despite all variability of particular selves, communities, or physical circumstances. In Schleiermacher’s thinking, however, this analysis implies that a virtually infinite scale of actual degrees of God-consciousness could be present within the species, ranging, as it seems, from not yet present to the slightest hint or seed to a full manifestation of it. The analysis does not imply that all human beings have that consciousness. In fact, the basic conditionings that he has outlined have to be operative for God-consciousness to exist at all. This outlook is consistently held in his sermons and in his discourses in On Religion, as in his occasional references to “God” in his philosophical writings. 26. Ambrose, De vocatione omnium gentium (450) 1.7: “All of us have been created in the first man without blemish.” Ed. note: By some editors this work was mistakenly attributed to Ambrose in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is now known to be by Prosper of Aquitaine (ca. 390–ca. 463). ET The Call of All Nations, Ancient Christian Writers 14 (1952), 33; Latin: Migne Lat. 51:653. Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “To be sure, this statement is applicable to what has been said above. It refers to individuals supposedly existing prior to any temporal determination” (Thönes, 1873). 27. Ed. note: Here “points of doctrine” translates gemeine Örter, which, in turn, refers to the traditional organization of doctrines into loci communes, i.e., commonly identified areas of belief and concern, such as doctrines of sin and redemption, doctrines of God, the person and work of Christ, the Holy Spirit, ecclesiology, and ethical teachings. “Faith doctrine” translates Glaubenslehre (doctrina fidei), and in what immediately follows “Christian ethics” translates Sittenlehre. Sitten refers, at its root meaning, to all pertinent customary behavior or action, in Schleiermacher’s understanding, not only to an isolated “moral domain,” separated from the rest of the Christian life. For him, the two disciplines together comprise the two interdependent halves of what he calls “dogmatics.” See Brief Outline (1830), §§213–31. 28. Ed. note: See Brief Outline (1830) §310, also “Editor’s Postscript” in the Tice edition (2011), 134–38.

§61. The abundance of experience in the domain of faith discloses how, by virtue of this original perfection of human nature, every human life that comes into the light by means of procreation develops. However, history fails us as to how, given the same presupposition, the first human beings have actually developed; moreover, available intimations about this cannot form a doctrine of faith in our sense of the word “faith.”

1.1 To set forth the basic circumstances of human life in the way this is done in the above description of the original perfection of humanity—that is, in such a way that everything is referred to God-consciousness—is a matter of faith, to be sure. This is so, for Godconsciousness itself entirely depends on that surety accompanying religious stirrings by dint of which surety a surety attaches to all other states of human life, but only by virtue of their participation in those religious stirrings. Suppose that, to the contrary, we could indeed also imagine religious stirrings to be present in a given human being, but without any accompanying surety, with the result that this person could as easily take this experience to be illusion as to be truth. In that case, the person would not arrive at the notion of an original perfection of humanity. Rather, the person would either coordinate2 God-consciousness with other features of life, or perhaps strictly reckon to original perfection only the possibility of being released, in turn, from Godconsciousness. In this latter case God-consciousness itself would be viewed as an offspring of human imperfection. As a result, moreover, this person would then experience that same God-consciousness to be a hindrance to life that another person would experience as a furtherance of life. Now, what is taken to be a matter of fact within human development is nowhere a matter of faith. Rather, it is history.3 Statements concerning matters of fact, whether they are general or particular, are historical statements, not faith-propositions. This is so, even when the state of God-consciousness within an individual or some company of individuals is the object they refer to. In this respect, moreover, there also can be no distinction between the first human beings and us. Rather, everything that we might know regarding the real states of those first human beings and regarding their course of development would be not faith at all, but history —unless we should want to alter the usage of the word “faith” entirely and might choose to call history mingled with uncertainties “faith.” This distinction between faith and history would hold, even if we have shown how a bent toward God-consciousness that is inherent in nature could have been realized within them without the stimulating, driving force of tradition. Otherwise, such “faith” could never be anything but bits of historical information. Moreover, faith would be maintained and spread to others by means of historical statements and presentations.4 In contrast, suppose that we were also to view as advances only those among the various states of the first human beings that express an expanded value of God-consciousness. To be sure, that would be a matter of faith. Yet, it would be only that same faith which is enunciated in the above-mentioned concept regarding the original perfection of humanity. Distinctive faith-propositions concerning the first human beings could be offered5 in any case only inasmuch as that mode of coming into being which is exclusively theirs—and thus, also temporally considered, their very mode of being—would modify any application of our concept to them. In addition, we would then indeed always have to restrict application of our concept to the domain of reproduction. Moreover, we would be able to set aside what was instituted in their case in place of our procreative process, except insofar as the corresponding relation between them and us that would arise from this discontinuity would

also differently shape our God-consciousness in its combination with our speciesconsciousness. Thus, the question arises as to whether their story is communicated to us in such a way that it would be necessary for us to set forth such statements at all. 2. Now, it is obvious, however, that the Old Testament narrative,6 the only one to which we are directed here, is far removed from setting forth such a story. That is to say: Suppose, first, that the question as to whether this whole narrative was meant to convey something historical in nature were decided completely in the affirmative. Even so, the particular points that the narrative sets forth already presuppose the greater part of what we might chiefly want to come to know concerning those first human beings. Most notably, on the one hand, speech is already generally presupposed,7 and the form of consciousness is conditioned by speech. The appropriation of speech-conditioned consciousness among human beings, after birth, most surely demonstrates that a state of sensory entanglement8 similar to that of beasts was already in process of fading away. Likewise, it also appears that God-consciousness was already present by that time, and we receive nothing within the narrative that tells of the way in which God-consciousness had developed. Further, even what is related there regarding God’s spoken interchange with a human being brings up only a new and more difficult problem, instead of facilitating the solution of other problems. That is to say, in this narrative we receive nothing whatsoever as regards the way in which God would have made Godself audible to human beings—except that we do get the claim that bodily form was very clearly ascribed to God.9 It is just as inexplicable, however, either as to how an already present notion of God could have been transferred to such an appearance of God, viewed as the object of that appearance, or as to how a true God-consciousness could have arisen on the occasion of such an appearance. Indeed, on the other hand, even as regards the external circumstances, the description of a paradisial state of life would probably be helpful in a negative fashion.10 That is, it would be helpful to the extent that the question as to how human beings could have gained subsistence for life from the very beginning onward poses no special difficulty. However, a depiction of how they filled their time and of how results of that activity would have affected a broadening of both objective consciousness and self-consciousness is totally missing from this narrative. Even what is said regarding the naming of animals11 leaves us entirely lacking in any surety as to whether and to what extent this designative activity would already have taken into account any relationship regarding these kinds of animals to their species or to larger classifications. What their customs were is likewise indistinct, for their innocent lack in shamefulness12 as well as their initial obedience to the divine command permits a considerable variety of likely conceptions. Now, besides these considerations, no mode of measuring time is indicated in the narrative either, none at all. That being the case, it lacks in everything that would be necessary for forming a historical picture.13 One can only say, moreover, that everything that is reported to us in this narrative regarding the first human beings from the period before the fall is very likely explained based on the concept regarding the original perfection of human beings set forth here.

3.14 Suppose that someone were to regard this narrative not to be history but to be simply an ancient attempt to make up for the lack of a historical report on the beginnings of the human species. Then its particular declarations would bear as much inner truth for us as they are in accord with the concept we have set forth. However, all attempts to form a historical picture of the early beginnings of human existence are necessarily bound to miscarry. This is the case, because just as no absolute beginning is given to us in general, all analogy is also lacking to us whereby we could make an absolute beginning of rational consciousness intelligible to ourselves.15 We have no clear perceptual notion16 even of a child’s consciousness within the initial phase of life. Nevertheless, it still proves useful to us to grasp, first, that the dawning of their consciousness out of a nonconscious state coincides with detachment and separation of a child’s life from communion with what is maternal17 and, second, that the already developed spirit surrounding the child bears influence on the child’s spirit right along, from the first moment of the child’s gaining awareness.18 In contrast, the first human being would be precisely one who is only to be described as entirely lacking in this mediating process. The formulation, namely, that the first human beings are to be viewed as good-natured, grown-up children,19 does indeed come closest to this analogy. Thus it is also most compatible with our experience regarding the state of such human societies as those that still have most stages of development ahead of them. However, it affords no clear perceptual notion. This is so, first, because we can no more easily imagine mental development purely from within outward than we can imagine mental development of a child in this way and, second, because from the very outset the physical maintenance of an adult first human being would require self-initiated activity, which we can imagine to be gained only through processes of memory, association, and repetition.20 Now, suppose that someone wants to assume the following claim: that initially the first human being would be led only by instinct, in a more bestial fashion. Then it would be inconceivable how the transition from this state to a state of consciousness and awareness could occur without assistance from some already existing intelligent life. This is so, in that this so-called first human being would be at the beginning of a new existence, one not interconnecting with any previous existence at all. People have sought to remedy this difficulty by means of two notions, for which there is at least some slight suggestion in the Old Testament narrative. The one notion, also familiarly lodged in many presentations of faith-doctrine, is the formulation that the needed capacities would already be innate in the first human being, which capacities could be extended, as one might wish at that point, from providing what is necessary to prolong life even further and on up to the properly spiritual domain. This notion, however,21 simply means that the first state of this so-called first human being could be thought of only in the way the later states are thought of, which later states would, in turn, be conditioned by earlier states. That is, an absolutely first state cannot be imagined at all. If we do not choose to go back to instinct, a consciousness of these innate capacities is also not thinkable before they are put to use, and, in turn, in the case of an actual human state, no impetus that could set these innate capacities in motion is thinkable without

consciousness of them. Yet, those teachers of faith-doctrine22 who want to set forth a real state of the first human being but describe those personal perfections which they attribute to those human beings as sheer capabilities23 and exclude from their number all that would already require their exercise do not diminish the difficulty we have just discussed. Rather, they turn right back to the first point, and they describe the task more than they fulfill it. The other way of providing information on the matter is the following: that someone would imagine that what would secure to any human being, once born, community with those who are already developed and grown-up, and also imagine that this newly existing human being would have obtained this community through some revealing and educating community with God or with angels. More closely examined, however, this notion unfailingly leads us, in one way or another, back to the first notion. That is to say, suppose, on the one hand, that this educating revelation were taken to have been a purely internal influence. Then, for us this influence, being immediately attached to creation24 of human beings, would be indistinguishable from that creation itself. Moreover, the actual distinct life of a given human being would not begin much differently from how that human being’s innate capacities arose. Suppose, on the other hand, that the community with God or angels that is imagined were an external community, mediated by human words. Then the grown-up child, thus encircled and as the child acquired the ability to speak, would also learn to think, by virtue of innate human reason. Suppose, as well, that this grown-up child were also to be motivated to such distinct actions as self-preservation would require. Then those higher beings would also have to be leading a wholly human life, so that the drive to imitate could cooperate with that life, or the capacity for understanding would, nonetheless, have to be presupposed to have developed already, so that teaching and command, both of which are supposed to work in a formative manner, could be comprehended. 4. Accordingly, it appears that we do not know how to form any clear perceptual notion regarding the initial developmental states of the first human beings. Consequently, we are also not able to indicate anything that we would need so as to modify in any particular way application of the concept concerning the first human beings that has been set forth here. Thus, we have no occasion to set forth any faith-doctrine that would treat of the first human beings as its object. Only this much follows from our analysis here: that we are able to present the currency of our concept of the first human beings only within the shared being of earlier and later generations. There, human existence would begin in a manner that is a given for us, and that in its development rests on a human process of transmission from generation to generation.25 Now, in this relation, the following presupposition is grounded in our surety concerning the original perfection of human beings as it has been set forth here: that even the first human beings, as their influence on a second generation began, would have stood at some sort of point in a line of development—even though, for us, that point cannot be more exactly defined—and consequently that they would also have been in a position to effect26 development toward God-consciousness in the succeeding generation. That is, the piety that

they could pass on27 would be as old as the human generation that was reproducing itself.28 This presupposition lies in the consciousness that piety is a general feature of human life. Now, following an analogy with the Mosaic narrative regarding creation, which constantly views all organic being in “their kind,”29 that expression of the divine will in creating30 the first human being31 cannot refer only to the first human beings in their differentiation from other kinds. Rather, it refers to them only inasmuch as they would have been the first expression of the human species. Moreover, this observation gives rise to the question as to whether the designation “image of God,” by which the nature of a human being is indisputably supposed to be depicted in its advantage over the other creatures described in the Mosaic narrative, would be fittingly applied to the concept we have set forth. This question can be answered affirmatively only with great caution, for the following reasons. First, even if we were able to describe the vitalizing characteristic of Godconsciousness as a being of God in us, which would indeed seem to be far more than some similarity with God, this vitalizing characteristic would be something different from either concept, nevertheless. Moreover, that efficacious action of God-consciousness within us is given only in a process of interconnectedness with our physical and bodily organism.32 Since this is the case, one of two alternatives would have to be accepted regarding the notions that human beings are made “similar to” or “in the image of “ God—such as each notion is and as it is presented even here —if someone wanted to infer the meaning backward to God as such. In the first alternative, the claim would be that the whole world would relate to God as our total organism relates to the highest mental power within ourselves. Given this claim, however, it would also be difficult to represent how God could not be one with the world.33 In the second alternative, the claim would be that something would also exist in God that would at least correspond to our psychical organism, something particularly like the so-called “lower powers of the soul,” that would also help to constitute what is in God. In that case, the notion of God would take on an overly thick cast, a heavy admixture of human characteristics that would significantly contaminate it. Moreover, attributes would have to be ascribed to God by means of which, taken as divine, nothing actually divine could be imagined,34 or attributes would also have to be ascribed to a human being that could not be thought of as human.35 Hence, this second alternative is also an example of how biblical expressions, especially when they do not appear within a purely didactic context, are seldom to be taken into dogmatic language without further examination. Many of our theologians regard what follows that divine pronouncement in the biblical narrative to be the proper explanation of it. Thus, it is no wonder that they have, with the Socinians,36 referred that pronouncement more to the relationship of human beings to external nature through molding and dominating it than to human beings’ own inner nature. The other customary expression, “original righteousness,” though not so much derived from Scripture, presents different troublesome characteristics. This happens not only because in the usual sense “righteousness” refers only to more extended social circumstances, which a first pair of human beings could not have encountered at all. Moreover, it indeed chiefly

refers to the domain of actual law,37 which could develop only in later generations, starting with the simple situation of families. Rather, this kind of reference happens chiefly because we are accustomed to placing the word “righteousness” under the general category of “virtue,” and this never means a fundamental state of a person; rather, the word “righteousness” simply names as virtue some quality that arises from one’s own self-initiated activity. Here, however, the discussion has to do with just such an underlying or inborn state38 from which some development among human beings would have arisen that could enable them to receive divine summonses. Moreover, it is this fitness for receiving divine summonses, acquired through an ongoing referral to them, which the Scripture of the Old Testament so often calls “righteousness.” As a result, a very undesirable duality in the word’s meaning has arisen. This duality would only too easily lead to the notion of innate capabilities, a result that could be avoided only by the most definite explanation regarding it, namely, one to the effect that in this context the word “righteousness” would have an entirely different meaning. This meaning, to be sure, we could also trace back to a usage lodged in a life people have in common, since we call something “right” that fits its definition.39 Let us then think on the divine decree regarding the overall development of the human race by means of redemption. Further, let us consider that redemption would already have lain enclosed in the idea of human nature from the very beginning, even though human beings themselves might not have been conscious of it. If we do this, it would be the attributes of human beings set forth precisely in the proposition just before this one in which their fitness for redemption would be rooted. 5. In accordance with these considerations, people would find it to be very natural that both our books of creedal symbols and later teachers of faith-doctrine who adhered to their precedent have wavered in their use of the expressions we have just examined. On the one hand, sometimes they have tended more to designate the original advantages of human nature, advantages that underlie all human development.40 On the other hand, sometimes they have tended more to set forth a distinct perfect state of the first human being and thus statements of faith concerning the first human being,41 in which statements this perfect state can then sometimes tend to be thought of more as innate and sometimes more as acquired in part. Now, suppose that we were to understand passages of the first kind in such a way that human “nature” in the second kind of passage would be called “good” and “holy” because perfections set forth in the first kind of passage would have developed based on that early human nature, just as the first kind of passage presented those same perfections as what would be completely formed in the future. If we did so, then an explanation of how and by what means all this could occur would be provided, based on our proposition. This prospect is shown by the following considerations. To begin with, consider that, in any case, the constant balance of bodily functions can itself signify as well an even slight dominion of the soul over them in all directions, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, also indeed belonging to that constant balance is the equally adequate resistance that the human organism makes in all directions against external

influences, thereby keeping itself steady in its original makeup.42 Only, this second usage is not definitely contained in our formulations, because the force of God-consciousness does not immediately depend on such resistance. Instead, this force shows itself to be so indifferent with respect to favorable or unfavorable relationships of bodily life to external nature that it has even often been claimed that piety flourishes best under conditions of illness and poverty. Indeed, this adequate responsiveness of the human organism—and of all that belongs exclusively to the natural aspect of humanity43—in the struggle with other natural powers would be handled better under the heading “Perfection of the World in Relation to Human Beings.” This could be done, based on the same reason for which we have also handled the question as to human mortality, not in the form of whether such mortality would conflict with a human being’s own perfection but simply in the form of whether the perfection of the world in relation to humanity would be diminished by the mortality of human beings. However, as particularly concerns the obedience of the lower powers of the soul to the higher powers, which obedience is everywhere reckoned to belong among the essential ingredients of original righteousness, the following can be said here, where we are still not looking at real states of the first human beings, as individuals, nor at any particular states, nor at their states taken as a whole. First, we can discuss this obedience here only to the degree that a receptivity to impulses from the higher functions would have resided in the lower functions—and this receptivity would not only embrace the state of these functions’ quiescence but would also take place during these functions’ distinctive living process. Second, this receptivity is expressed within our proposition, to be sure, in that the very activities in which this influence of God-consciousness is manifested do condition all communications to and from it.44 Yet, when Augustine uses the term “desire,”45 and means by it simply the distinctive process of life in those functions, he holds, nevertheless, that it cannot be thought of as existing with original righteousness at the same time. When he does this, however, he might well be as open to blame as the Pelagians were when they considered an opposition of humans’ lower capacities against their higher capacities to be the original state of human beings and placed all acquired perfection under the rubric of overcoming this opposition. This is so, for Augustine’s opinion also presupposed a contradiction between spirit in human beings and what is necessary for their life as animals. Nevertheless, this consideration leads us right over to the other aspect of the matter, namely, presentation regarding human beings’ original righteousness or their being created in the image of God, viewed as a real state of the first human beings.46 Now, suppose that in this sense nothing is to be understood by the expression that humanity is created good, righteous, and holy by God other than this: that, in contrast to that Pelagian assertion, the first real state of humankind could not have been one of sin. This contrasting claim is thus to be unreservedly affirmed, for the following reasons. If sin has to be preceded by information regarding the divine will and by acknowledgment of that divine will, then free actions in which no sin was positioned would have to have preceded sin. Suppose, however, that what

is to be understood by these conditions is the operation of some real might that would have enabled human beings’ higher capacities to control their lower capacities. Then the greater this might would be posited to be, even if we were not to affix to this exercise of might Augustine’s claim indicated just above, from this point onward only a progressive increase of this might could be thought of in the same relation. Now, this is probably the actual reason why the Roman church has preferred to explain the original state of sinlessness in the first human beings based not on the original perfection of human nature but rather based on an extraordinary divine intervention,47 a move that the Pelagian notion of human nature, considered in and of itself, clearly underlies. This Roman position might be said not to be entirely so disadvantageous in its implications. However, it does, nevertheless, confuse the concept of original perfection no less when the claim is made, even by our own teachers of faith-doctrine, that in their original state the first human beings would have been partakers of the Holy Spirit.48 Accordingly, the effort to define the initial states of the first human being more closely seems to be to no avail. This is the case, whether that first human being is to be thought of as entirely in accord with what we are given to know in later human beings, viewed as being in a progressive development of an original perfection, or as entirely in accord with what proves to us to be a retrogression in development. That is to say, on the one hand, the Pelagians, who proceed from the latter presupposition, gain a twofold advantage, in that they assume no original perfection, which would then have been lost, and in that a progressive development could have taken place from the very starting point onward, which development they do assume. However, they gain this advantage with a twofold disadvantage, in that what is good would not comprise the original state of humanity, according to them, and in that the Redeemer would appear to comprise only a particular step in the development of what is good. On the other hand, the ecclesial doctrine gains a twofold advantage, in that it posits what is good to be something immediately engendered by God, and in that the Redeemer could make his appearance as the turning point in that development, because after the loss of this early state development would have been broken and a new starting point would have become indispensable. However, it does this with a twofold disadvantage, in that in spite of the sustaining activity of divine omnipotence, what would be posited as good that is already real in the appearance of that first human being could, nevertheless, have been lost, and in that the sole aim for the sake of which we could be tempted to imagine an original state of the first human being—namely, to have a starting point for the genetic notion regarding all that would follow—would, nevertheless, not be attained. Hence, it probably serves the purpose better to determine nothing more nearly exact concerning the first states of the first human beings and simply to explicate the ever selfidentical perfection of their nature, based on higher self-consciousness in its general character. However, if everything were to be synoptically presented that can be explicated based on such an original perfection in the appearance of one individual human being, then

this is not to be sought in Adam, in whom it would have to have been lost, in turn, but in Christ, in whom all of this has produced all gain.49

1. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Concerning the relationship between faith and history: Present development is also a matter of faith, but only inasmuch as it is not history. That is, God’s [alleged] intervention [Vermittlung] effecting humans’ being dispossessed of God [Gottesberaubung] [in the ancient story] is itself a hindrance to life” (Thönes, 1873). It appears that the logic in these statements, otherwise perhaps puzzling in its short form, was to be made clearer in the explanation that would follow here, though it is all implied in the published text. Obviously, present faith and its expression, and in doctrine regarding it, is part of “historical” (historischen) theology, in Schleiermacher’s view (cf. Brief Outline §195). However, “faith” is not simply a story told (Geschichte); rather, it is an inner experience of life. A story can indeed be told of faith in its external expressions. The historical-theological question to be considered here is this: Can our current inner experience of relationship with God accept the story’s proposal that God would and did withdraw from that relationship, since for us today, according to Schleiermacher’s claim, God would never directly produce any hindrance to life, notably to our further development in life, either in its internal or in its external aspects? Anticipating his later exposition regarding sin, in effect Schleiermacher also seems to be placing a condition on his later claim that, in a certain sense, God is “the author of sin” (cf. §79), but also to be prefacing what Schleiermacher calls “a series of adjustments” to the traditionally accepted story regarding the origin of sin and evil (esp. in §§61, 62, 64.2, 66.2, 67–69, 71.1, 72.2 and 72.4–5, 74, and 77.3), since God created nature as it is and the ability to exercise human free will as it is. 2. Ed. note: This is a rare instance of Schleiermacher’s using the word koordinieren, which leaves open the actual nature of the relation formulated. 3. Ed. note: Here “a matter of fact” translates das Tatsächliche and “history” translates die Geschichte, what can comprise occasions for making factual claims. Tat is the German word for “deed,” or “what is done,” or “the doing of something.” Tätigkeit is the word for “activity.” Selbsttätigkeit, here translated “self-initiated activity,” refers primarily to spontaneous exercise of free will by a human self. This juxtaposition of “fact” and “history” thus alerts readers to a careful distinction in Schleiermacher’s usage between “fact” viewed as directly observable external behavior or activity, and any mere assertions or suppositions, unsupported by fact, as to what is the case. For example, for Schleiermacher “the supernatural becoming natural” in Christ bears the character of historical fact, though it can also be the subject of what is the case in historical theology. Occasionally, in accordance with German grammar, he conveys the latter, second-order meaning, which conveys an assertion that something occurring in history is or was indeed a fact, by simply using the word daβ (“that”) to begin a dependent clause, without prefacing “the fact” before “that” at all. This is a practice not usually available in English grammar. The present translation attempts to make that distinction between observable fact and making factual claims, as in historical writings, clear wherever possible. This becomes particularly important in view of a tendency in some modern theology to search after basic “facts” of Christian experience or belief as if they were ascertainably of the first observable and verifiable kind, namely, directly observable behavior or “truths,” i.e., historically verifiable truths. In contrast, for Schleiermacher what is basic in the life of Christian faith or in other faith experience is “immediate,” not directly, publicly observable though conformable if held in common, and thus internally experienced, in “religious self-consciousness.” In his view, the expressions of those experiences of faith in gesture, tone, and verbal modes of language, as well as in communication and/or in effective and presentational action, also belong to Christian life. Thus, they are matters both of faith and of faith-related expression. The latter, inner-faith-related, outer expressions are indeed facts of an “outer” sort, of history. Assertions as to what is the case, in contrast, can refer either to inner or to outer facts. In fact, i.e., actually, in Schleiermacher’s view such assertions should be understood always to refer to both inner and outer components in “religion” writ large, as they would also do in descriptions and accounts of other features of life. Cf. his account of the basic inner components in the second discourse of On Religion (1821). Their complementary outer components are outlined in the third and fifth discourses. All of these structural presuppositions are accounted for either in the Introduction or in Part One. All of them are further manifested in the laying out of Part Two. On inner and outer facts in the exercise of free will, cf. §49n2. 4. Ed. note: In his Christian Ethics lectures, Schleiermacher discusses this aspect of Christian life under the heading of “broadening action.” 5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here indicates: “Under what conditions faith-propositions concerning the first human beings would be possible. Even if these conditions were met, however, providing faith-propositions on the matter is scarcely to be entertained” (Thönes, 1873).

6. Gen. 1:26ff. and 2:7–3:24. 7. Ed. note: More generally, here Schleiermacher’s heading in a marginal note indicates: “(a) What is sought is [actually to be] presupposed [instead]” (Thönes, 1873). What is presupposed, presumably, is an understanding of how the ability to tell stories through language arose. 8. Ed. note: Here “sensory entanglement” translates Verworrenheit—meaning, here and throughout this work, the state in which beings can be caught up in stimuli that are predominately sensory, in which the mental processing among other animals is more instinctively processed. In various other contexts Schleiermacher quite similarly refers to “organic” rather than to “sensory” entanglement. For him, the psychological result, with either usage, is a particular form of confusion, or lack of self-conscious clarity. To say “confusion,” often used to translate the same word, would not seem to point with sufficient directness and clarity to what this form of confusion specifically involves. 9. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “If this ascription is [were supposed to be simply] figurative but the other ascription was supposed to be literal [i.e., of something actually occurring], it is not possible to indicate any differentiating boundary between the two” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s second marginal note in this context states: “(b) Description of the circumstances of life in this narrative is unsatisfactory.” 11. Gen. 2:19. 12. Schamhaftigkeit. Ed. note: Given the Genesis narrative, the reference is especially to gender-related shame or modesty, though the word itself also carries the broader connotations of “shame” with regard to any social status, opinion, or behavior and with regard to one’s countering any rule or authority. See Schleiermacher’s 1800 essay on this subject. A great many among his earliest unpublished essays, most now available in English translation, were written between 1789 and 1803, through age thirty-five. All are essential for understanding the development both of his ethics, generally described, and of his psychology and sociopolitical philosophy. In the present passage, as usual, Sitten refers, literally, to “customs” within any social domain, i.e., to all customary behavior, not somehow narrowly restricted to “morals” but referring to all of life within the human species. 13. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher focuses on the following explanation: “Namely, because nothing comes into the narrative that would presuppose that any strength of God-consciousness would have emerged” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Ed. note: Schleiermacher appends this marginal note: “3. Viewing the narrative as a historical supplement: (a) Only to the degree that it contains truth can such a supplement do any service to our concept. (b) Using analogy also fails to serve” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Ed. note: “Rational consciousness” translates des vernünftigen Bewuβtseins, meaning a consciousness of one possessed of reason. In Schleiermacher’s usage, “reason” is a component of human beings’ overall consciousness but does not itself define all conscious human behavior, though its presence did seem to him—as to most others—to differentiate humans from beasts, given knowledge available in his time. What constitutes “rationality” overall and the roles of rationality was still in dispute, as is true today. What is obtainable by reason is “intelligible” (verständlich) by human beings, as possessed of reason. He expected the results of reason to be ultimately consonant with what can eventually be expressed concerning “faith” and its communicated expressions in terms of “belief.” 16. Ed. note: “Clear perceptual notion” translates anschauliche Vorstelling. Such a notion would be graphically presented or carried in memory more or less as what could be identified and made clear perceptually. In some philosophies, such as Kant’s, this kind of clearheaded experience could be called “intuitive,” as if it were a special faculty or mental power, but not in Schleiermacher’s usage. Throughout the years from at least 1799, in the first edition of his discourses On Religion, and even up to and beyond 1821, he continued to use the closely related pair “perception and feeling” (Anschauung and Gefühl). In the third edition of 1821, when he also issued the first edition of his presentation of faithdoctrine, he kept on using the pair in a considerable number of passages and even added the pair in several new passages. (See the forthcoming Tice translation containing all editions.) From at least 1821 onward, Schleiermacher’s analysis of the stages of religious immediate self-consciousness always carried the same pair of components, Anschauung being contrasted, usually implicitly, with Gefühl at the same level of mentation. In accordance with his analysis, two additional features are also found: (a) an inclusion of sensory and of other elements less entangled in organic reality and (b) more nuanced developmental analyses of both perceptual and affective aspects of those several stages. The record of his usage seems also to show that even before 1799 he had been forming a developmental account of all types of human experience that held room for a theoretically infinite diversity within any stage, each stage being rather broadly and somewhat provisionally marked out historically by epochs of change and periods of more or less sustained communal experience and by similar understandings of individual development. See features of individual development in §61n1, n3, n5, n8, and n15 just above. As he saw this process of analysis, he set forth a challenge for later generations to do the same, based on what can be known at any given time or place.

17. Ed. note: This clause indicates daβ das Aufgehn des Bewuβtseins aus der Bewuβtlosigkeit zusammenfällt mit dem Sich-Losreiβen und Absondern des Lebens aus der Gemeinschaft mit dem Mütterlichen. This careful wording seems to depict a gradual process of dawning from the child’s initial life in the maternal womb, thence through birth into the child’s early life, not a sudden outburst of consciousness at birth. Whatever belongs to “what is maternal,” not simply the birth mother and the mother’s womb, is what Schleiermacher sees to be happening in these early months. Otherwise he would have referred just to “the mother” herself. As chaplain of a general hospital for six years (1796–1802), he would have witnessed babies being literally “torn” from their birth mothers after birth and placed with others to provide maternal care. In the next century, through infant studies this process would have been described in terms of “attachment,” viewed as a basic relational drive, versus “detachment,” and in terms of “separation-individuation,” viewed as a process of individual growth that has further phases throughout the life cycle. The initial phases, however, were to be viewed as of critical importance for formation of life patterns. On child rearing, see Schleiermacher’s “Christian Household” sermons and his writings on education. 18. Ed. note: Here “awareness” translates Besinnung, which refers to any use of mind, from a sensory level on up. 19. Among others, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette (1780–1849), in Christliche Sittenlehre (Berlin, 1819) 1, §38, 129ff., and his article “Über die Lehre von der Erwählung”(1889), 84–88. Ed. note: Both quoted in KGA I/7.3 (1984), 398– 401 and 401–3. In a marginal note, Schleiermacher characterizes De Wette’s view as “untenable. Grown-up children are feebleminded” (blödsinnig, which can be translated by the more pejorative terms “imbecilic” or “idiotic”) (Thönes, 1873). 20. Ed. note: Thus begins anew Schleiermacher’s oft-repeated argument that species and accompanying community come first, even in the mother’s womb and observably after birth. He also continually held that one’s very existence, including every part of it, involves interaction and interconnectedness with what is outside oneself and especially with other life, potentially with the living God. Free will, in Schleiermacher’s view, leads not to self-creation and preservation but to self-initiated activity embedded within a life shared in common. This argument likewise obviates, for him, the narcissistic fantasy of creating one’s own life, of a purely subjective beginning and preservation of one’s own life, signs of which he had witnessed close at hand in pronouncements of his friend and onetime roommate Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) and especially in the philosophy of his short-lived Berlin colleague, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1764–1814). 21. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes this marginal note: “Innate capacity is instinct [Instinkt]” (Thönes, 1873). 22. See Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818) §§70 and 73, pp. 253ff. and 264. Cf. esp. p. 255: “Furthermore, from this one sees that Moses ascribes nothing more to the first human pair than excellent capacities and dispositions of mind and heart that also began to unfold and develop with the most felicitous rapidity, because they … were greatly stimulated and fostered by external conditions.” See also p. 265: “The knack for sanctity and virtue insofar as the first human beings possessed it cannot be assumed to be a component of the likeness of God, since as yet they had had no practice, and precisely for that reason the innocence declared of them here was so easily lost and turned into evil at the first enticement to it.” 23. Vermögen. 24. Erschaffung. Ed. note: See §61n30. 25. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher refers to this possibility as “the sole positive presentation that could be of help to us” (Thönes, 1873). A positive concept is one that has been set forth historically, for a given time and place. The finding he reports is no small thing. For Schleiermacher, it provides a conceptual structure for declaring, in Part Two, under what conditions the supernatural activity of God becomes natural within discernible human circumstances. Viewed in retrospect, it also comes as far as might be necessary to affirm human evolution, viewed as occurring within the whole interconnected process of nature. The analysis that he was able to perform in this account of the first human beings would seem to have taken him there, even though what science could show at that time could do no more than suggest such a theory. 26. Ed. note: Here “effect” translates wirken, which likewise means to “cause” or “bring about,” presumably in a mediating fashion—that is, as an effective cause, in this case, leaving room for divine causality. 27. Ed. note: Here “pass on” translates sich mitteilende—that is, literally, “communicate” in some fashion. In Part Two this term will also be used for what God or “the divine Spirit” does and what Christ does and what the Holy Spirit does, all in and through communities of faith. In Schleiermacher’s accounts, this process is constantly purveyed, only in varying degrees, along a path toward the original goal of perfection (Vollkommenheit), literally, “coming to completion.” This ultimate state would be one he calls “consummation” (Vollendung). 28. Ed. note: The phrase translated “reproducing itself “ is sich fortpflanzende, which means, similarly, to regenerate, spread, or transmit itself. The corresponding theological terms used in Part Two are “communication” (Mitteilung) and, more specifically, “regeneration” (Wiedergeburt, or “rebirth”). 29. Gen. 1:11, 21, 24.

30. Ed. note: Here again, the word for “creating,” or “creation,” is Erschaffung, whereas the overall “creation” referred to just above translates Schöpfung. Erschaffung suggests a more specific constitution (Beschaffenheit) of human nature within the whole sweep of creation. 31. Gen. 1:26. Ed. note: In the phrase that follows, “differentiation from other kinds” translates Besonderheit. 32. Ed. note: In other contexts within this section where “physical” has been linked with “bodily,” Schleiermacher’s intention has also been to point to both general circumstances of nature and our own bodies, both being external features belonging to the “organism” of our life and both in interaction with the internal aspect of our lives. In contrast, what Schleiermacher calls “psychical” in his psychology involves a combination of several kinds of internal processing: of influences from external nature, of our bodily sensations, of our special interactions with other people, and of other aspects of mental activity, including feeling, thinking, and willing. All of these relationships and aspects of personal, social, and mental functioning potentially link with what might come from what he calls (OG 40) “an immediate existential relationship” with God. This relationship is contained in what he also variously calls a move toward “God-consciousness,” an advanced, monotheistic “immediate religious self-consciousness” and “the feeling of absolute dependence” by virtue of one’s relationship with the universe, viewed as itself absolutely dependent on God, as are we, and with related aspects of ourselves as religious persons. Some degree of linkage between such modes and aspects of mental processing can occur at every stage of religious development. Here Schleiermacher emphasizes physical and bodily features of life to obviate any suggestion of pure subjectivity in religion itself. Like the self, religion is also emplaced, embodied, and in relationship with some divine presence. As he viewed the matter, “the wholly Other” who is God comes to life for us in our own personal existence and circumstances. That very God is, as it were, part and parcel of our own biographies, but we cannot fully capture or control what this living God is. 33. Ed. note: Here “be one with the world” translates eins sein mit der Welt. To be avoided is a pantheistic position, wherein God is viewed as either identical with the world or totally inseparable in God’s being from what can be said of the world. Schleiermacher repeatedly faced charges of being a pantheist. Here is one point at which he distances himself from any such position. 34. This is how Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688) puts it in his Theologia didactico-polemica (1685–1690), Tome 1, 843: “The conformity of the senses’ appetite with the chastity [castitate] of God.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 35. Quenstedt, Theologia didactico-polemica (1685–1690), Tome 1, 844: “The image of God shone forth in the body of the first human being … through impassibility.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 36. Ed. note: By Schleiermacher’s time, “the Socinians” had especially gotten a bad reputation among their opponents for anthropomorphizing attributes of God, the focus of his reference here. Their early sixteenth-century Reformation controversies, at the beginning chiefly with Polish Reformed and Roman Catholic clerics, then with Calvin and others in Switzerland and elsewhere, centered on their penchant for unitarian views, though they were also noted for their brand of rationalist, tolerant, brotherly outlook on the church. From the seventeenth century on, these latter characteristics have made their ideas particularly attractive to Unitarian associations in Britain and North America, though some Congregationalist and Presbyterian congregations were also open to their ideas in Schleiermacher’s day. Their typical doctrinal stance stems from two much-traveled Italians, Fausto Paulo Sozzini (Faustus Socinus, 1539–1604) and his uncle Lelio Francesco Marina Sozzini (1525–1562). See their nonconfessionalist Racov Catechism (1605 in Polish; later in German, Latin, and English). 37. Ed. note: The word for “righteousness” is Gerechtigkeit; the word for sociopolitical “law” is Recht. 38. Ed. note: In this sentence, the same word, anerschaffene, is translated “inborn” instead of “innate,” for Schleiermacher is now shifting meanings. The discussion has started with a fundamental state totally independent of any development, namely, to one normally called an “innate” one. Now he is moving to a state that is congenital. That is, this state is interactive, with varying degrees of nurturing adults. One is definitely dependent on their prior development of social habits and influences, by virtue of one’s being born into human society, starting with one’s “family,” however that setting might be constituted. That is, one then has, congenitally, an “inborn fitness” virtually from birth. 39. Ed. note: Here “right” translates gerecht, and “fits” represents the adjective angemessen. In certain contexts of laworiented behavior, the word “just” could also be used. Here Schleiermacher appends this marginal note: “In this approved meaning, the notion agrees with our usage. The word rectitudo [“rectitude”] points to this meaning” (Thönes, 1873). 40. (1) The Apology Augsburg 1 (1531) leans more in this direction: “Original righteousness was intended to include not only a balanced physical constitution but these gifts as well: a more certain knowledge of God, fear of God, and confidence in God, or at least the uprightness and power needed to do these things,” though even this is not without confusion. (2) The Solid Declaration 1 (Formula of Concord, 1577) also states: “In Adam and Eve this nature was created pure, good, and holy at first.” Ed. note: (1) and (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 114 and 536; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 150 and 852. Cf. §111n6. 41. (1) The Solid Declaration 1 (1577) belongs here insofar as it calls original sin “a complete absence or ‘lack of the original righteousness acquired in Paradise’ (Apol. 2, 15) or of the image of God, according to which the human being was

originally created in truth, holiness, and righteousness,” and (2) the Belgic Confession 14 (1561): “We believe that God created man out of the dust of the earth, and made and formed him after his own image and likeness, good, righteous, and holy, capable in all things to will agreeably to the will of God.” (3) Second Helvetic Confession 8 (1566) belongs less clearly: “… man was made according to the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, good and upright.” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 533; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 848; (2) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 398; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 368; (3) ET Cochrane (1972), 235; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 247. 42. Ed. note: All this language about a steady, even balance in the human organism, particularly with respect to the normally slight (leicht) influence of mental functions on bodily functions within it and the continual restoration of bodily functions when some of them go awry, seems to be used with reference to the complex set of relations in which that overall organism is always sustaining itself within and is also constantly dealing with, or even contending with, externals outwardly. That is, relations are operative, both inside and outside, “in all directions.” The language also suggests human beings’ state of being embedded within “the interconnected process of nature” or “interconnectedness of nature” (Naturzusammenhang), which Schleiermacher has often used in earlier sections of this book (see index). Finally, it does not seem to require particular resolutions of issues regarding psychosomatic relations in this context or to provide any particular resolutions of specific situations. As usual, the account is set in rather general terms, themselves of a scope sufficient to help only with the task at hand. 43. Cf. Luther, On Genesis (1535), Gen. 1:26: “To these inner qualities came also those most beautiful and superb qualities of body and of all the limbs.” Ed. note: ET Luther’s Works (1958) 1:62; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:46. 44. According to the general account just offered here, a potentially infinite amount of knowledge and information is allowed for, including bits of information that are infinitesimally small. Not all of the information—especially that which might bear on a given task or that might prove to be sufficient to fulfill it, or to solve a given problem—is actually available at any given time and place. Nor would all of that potentially pertinent information be necessary to use for such purposes. Much that relates to Part One depends on further developments in science and philosophy, not on those in theology alone. In short, in Schleiermacher’s view much could be considered, even within the boundaries set by this tactic within a given context and either at the present or at some perhaps distant future. Far from all of them, moreover, are strictly cognitive in nature. As the seventeenth-century Christian thinker Blaise Pascal had said: “The heart has reasons”—in Schleiermacher’s language, has feelings and perceptions, impulses and motivations, pleasures and lacks in pleasure, creative images and presentiments, desires and enjoyments, discriminations of value and acts of will—“that reason does not know.” All such added considerations could, in turn, lead to modifications of what is stated. In Schleiermacher’s typical way of thinking, this basic, historically oriented tactic is identifiable within what could now be called a strongly “pragmatic” approach to accounting for the meaning and truth that resides in natural phenomena. This tactic is, perhaps, most obviously pertinent in Part One, where the entire discourse is devoted to presenting material that is, within boundaries that Schleiermacher tends to identify, consonant with, and thereby “presupposed” in, Christian religious immediate self-consciousness. Thus, this Part One material simply points toward description of the proper experience, the elements of which—likewise in relation to self, God, and world— are to be presented in Christian faithdoctrine proper, i.e., in Part Two, wherein what is supernatural is taken to have entered into and become what is fully natural in and through God’s activity in Christ. Yet, in Part Two as well, Schleiermacher regularly utilizes this same structural, “scientific” tactic, now within a specifically “ecclesial” setting. This time, it is used throughout in service of two interests: (a) supporting the effort of readers to work out theological matters for themselves, though never by themselves alone (cf. Brief Outline (1839) §§14–20 and 329–34) and (b) in service of a tolerant entertaining of diverse procedures and points of view by church leaders, both laity and clergy, within a united church (cf. BO §§1–8 and 260, also §§52–53, 203–8, 271–76, and 315–28, in the last one of which passages “free spiritual power” is emphasized—that is, a use of mind that refers especially to functions of theologically well-trained leaders and theologians). Usually at that time, theologians were also trained as pastors, but Schleiermacher envisaged that some lay leaders would also attain to such training. Cf. Brief Outline (1830), §§1–10 and related notes in the Tice edition (2011), also the index on “clergy and laity” there. 45. Concupiscentia. The passages in Augustine’s writings that use this concept are too numerous to cite them individually, but his use of the word is also so unstable that it might be difficult to determine whether and to what extent his assertion oversteps the proper bounds. Ed. note: Schleiermacher uses the German Begierde here. In Latin and English, this word also has many meanings, e.g., not only “desire” but also “longing,” “appetite,” “hunger,” and “craving.” Augustine also uses concupiscentia for it prominently and often. 46. Ed. note: Schleiermacher supplies this opening statement in a marginal note: “Sin cannot have been the initial state of human beings” (Thönes, 1873).

47. Frenum extraordinarium (extraordinary restraint). See Roberto Francesco Romolo Bellarmino (1542–1621), De gratia prima hominis, chap. 5. Ed. note: Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos (1586–1593), Tome 9.1. Cardinal Bellarmine was among the most reasonable among the Counter-Reformation theologians. However, in large part because of limits he thought should be placed on papal authority, he was canonized only in 1930 and named a Doctor of the Church in 1931. 48. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) (On Actual Sin): “Adam and Eve were chosen, nevertheless in their fall they did in truth lose the Holy Spirit.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 21:682; cf. Manschreck’s somewhat different translation from the 1555 German edition (1965), 73; see also §32n16. Regarding the mistaken doctrine that posits such an early presence of the Holy Spirit, see §116n1. 49. Ed. note: Here “gain” translates Gewinn, whereas in this subsection the verb “gain” has translated erkaufen (literally, to buy or obtain). In the German text of the New Testament, Gewinn is used prominently in two Synoptic Gospels with the same meaning, to gain (gewönne) the whole world only to suffer severest loss (Schaden), to lose one’s soul (Mark 8:36; Matt. 16:26) and, more significantly, in two passages in Philippians (1:21 and 3:7–8), wherein “to live is Christ and to die is gain” (Gewinn), and then Paul confesses: “Whatever gain I had, I counted as loss for the sake of Christ. Indeed I count everything as loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord.” Two other passages speak, respectively, of our being given (gegeben) “victory” (Sieg) over sin, death, and the law in Christ (1 Cor. 15:57 and 1 John 5:4): “For whatever is born of God overcomes [überwindet] the world; and this is the victory that overcomes the world, our faith [Glaube],” a passage that is reminiscent of Christ’s saying: “I have overcome [überwunden] the world” (John 16:33). Taken as a whole, this final statement of Part One could function as a tightly focused motto for Part Two. In the first edition (1821), the final statement was simply and succinctly as follows: “However, the presentation of that original perfection in the appearance of a single human being we will do better to seek in Christ, in whom it has not been lost, than in Adam, in whom it has to have been lost.” For a comparison of the first Adam with the second Adam in the person of Christ, see §94 in Part Two. See also the following three untitled, expository sermons, in two series covering Mark and Philippians: (1) Mark 8:36 (on 8:31–29): March 17, 1833, in SW II.5 (1835), 435–48; (2) Phil. 1:21 (on 1:21–24): March 24, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 426–43; (3) Phil. 3:7–8 (on 3:4–9): Oct. 27, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 509–26. A general theme, stemming from Jesus’ announcement of his death and ongoing presence to his disciples in the first sermon and shared by all three, serves to explain the core meaning of “gain”: Being in a community of love with Christ and following him casts out fear within our present life and in facing death.

THE DOCTRINES OF FAITH PART TWO Explication of the Facts of Religious Self-Consciousness as They Are Defined in Terms of Contrasting Features

Introduction [to Part Two] §62. The God-consciousness described thus far occurs as an actual filling of an element under the general form of self-consciousness, namely, under the contrast between pleasure and the lack thereof. Compare to §5. 1. One can have a notion of the tendency for God-consciousness as something constantly coming to be established, but established only by value-increments that are infinitesimally small. As a result, the transition from this tendency to a definite factor perceptible by the senses would indeed always remain conditioned by some other fact1 of consciousness. Now, suppose that this transition in self-consciousness were to occur detached from the form of contrast, viewed accordingly neither as advancement of God-consciousness nor as hindrance to it. Thus, this process could occur only if it were unbrokenly constant and uniform. This situation would be conceivable if God-consciousness were noticeably to rise above that infinitesimally small presence from being no fact of consciousness at all. Moreover, this transitional process would amount to a continuous suppression, to an unresponsively dull uniformity of God-consciousness within an existence in which any lively exchange of place above a very low sector of life would be contributed only by aspects coming from other facts of consciousness. However, a constant uniformity of God-consciousness would also be conceivable in an existence that could be distinguished by an absolute facility for evoking God-consciousness in its absolute strength, evoking that God-consciousness based on any other fact of consciousness, and this would comprise the blessed uniformity of a continuous supremacy of God-consciousness. Patently, however, our religious self-consciousness is such that no simple more or less would be posited of it. Rather, our religious self-consciousness wavers within the space between those two extremes. It does so in that it participates in the disparities that belong to our temporal life. Now, suppose that this more and less, viewed in and of itself, appears to be comprised more of a fluctuating differentiation than of a contrast. Then, the latter would, nevertheless, be evoked by a contrary movement between more and less. This would be the case, for the movement from less to more would indicate that the tendency for God-consciousness is developing more freely, and, on the other hand, the movement from more to less would point to a hindrance to it and would indicate a greater sway being held by other impulses.2

However, in this domain as well, the two factors of pleasure and the lack thereof are in no way to be thought of as so separate from each other that, strictly speaking, the one would exist without the other anywhere or at any time, because there is no absolute blessedness and no absolute absence of God-consciousness anywhere. Now, suppose that the determining force of God-consciousness were sensed to be limited. Then, the lack of pleasure would also be coposited, thus would be coposited even in the greatest pleasure. However, suppose that this consciousness were hampered, as a lack of pleasure. Then, God-consciousness would be desired as such a force, nevertheless, and consequently, it would, in and of itself, be an object of pleasure. 2. However, suppose that, at the same time, our proposition is to be understood in such a way that what then moves into actual consciousness as God-consciousness—under whichever of the two forms of the contrast it may also exist—would always be what has been described heretofore, namely, the feeling of absolute dependence. Suppose, too, that no modification of God-consciousness were to be shown in which this feeling may be lacking or also to which something would be added other than that which relates to the contrast being discussed here and that constitutes it. Take into account, moreover, what we have said above:3 that in Christian religious consciousness—the same also holds, however, regarding every religion stamped in accordance with some other mode of piety—the feeling of absolute dependence, viewed in and of itself, never alone fills a single element of religion; thus the two elements, God-consciousness and the feeling of absolute dependence, are explained by means of each other, and in the following way. First, what was described in our First Part— taken together with what is explicated differently in other forms of religion based on how often its indwelling God-consciousness actually wants to come out, this function seems to be either advanced or hampered—also constitutes the entire compass of God-consciousness. Second, the entire content of every single religious element presenting itself anywhere has to be grasped on this basis. This twofold claim lands in contradictions, especially because for absolute dependence we have canceled out any distinction between human freedom and subordinate forms of finite being,4 yet God-consciousness—even though one’s own affirmation of the divine will and one’s own love for God also belong to God-consciousness, nevertheless—has some contents that relate exclusively to human freedom and pre-suppose it. Consequently, these features could not be derived either from the feeling of absolute dependence or from this contrast, if the contrast itself were to refer solely to that feeling. Now, it is beyond our business here to set aside this contradiction in general terms and thereby to verify our claim, at least for all forms of monotheistic modes of faith. However, a point common to all modes of faith, inasmuch as all of them participate in this contrast, has already been set forth here. That is, an absolute facility for the development of Godconsciousness proceeding from each given stirring and in each situation, a facility that has been set forth as the point to aim at, is itself a constant communion with God,5 but retrograde movement is a turning away from God. Now, suppose that, by virtue of an acknowledgement of piety, viewed as an essential feature of life, only communion with God, but not a turning away from God, could be willed.

Then this communion could also be taken up into consciousness only as what would be the original harmony with the divine will. However, in Christianity this point is already expressed most generally and most fruitfully in positing that redemption is God’s work and dispensation, thus even belief6 in it is posited as an assent to the divine will. 3. Thus, in the religious consciousness of a Christian everything that relates to the Redeemer belongs to the distinctively Christian expression of the contrast that comes up for discussion here. Moreover, already above we have prefaced the point that none of those propositions which describe the feeling of absolute dependence without regard to this contrast are descriptions of the total content of a religious element, in that in each such element that feeling occurs only as a being relatively turned away from God or a being relatively turned toward God. In consequence of this point, we likewise have to maintain no less that all those propositions which describe only the situation of an individual life with respect to this contrast are also not descriptions of the total content of a religious element. This is the case, in that in each such religious element the situation described must be manifested in a coming forth of the feeling of absolute dependence. Thus, in the reality of Christian life the two cases are always one, each being implied in the other. No general Godconsciousness without a reference to Christ would be coposited, but no relationship to the Redeemer would also be coposited without its being related to general God-consciousness. Accordingly, the following two positions are incorrect. First, regarding the propositions of the First Part here, because what is distinctively Christian came out less immediately, they are often treated as original and generally valid natural theology, and as such they are overrated by those who themselves are less permeated by the distinctiveness of Christianity. Second, in contrast, others place little value on those propositions as such, at which one could also arrive from outside Christianity, and they want to let only the propositions that express a relation to the Redeemer have currency as distinctively Christian propositions. These two positions are incorrect, for the first kind of propositions are in no way the reflection of paltry, purely monotheistic God-consciousness but are abstracted from what has developed through communion with the Redeemer. As to propositions of the second kind, moreover, likewise all propositions that express a relation to Christ are truly Christian propositions only insofar as they acknowledge no criterion for the relationship to the Redeemer other than the extent to which the constancy of that very God-consciousness is engendered thereby. Accordingly, a relationship to Christ by which God-consciousness would be placed in the background—or, as it were, would be antiquated, in that what were coposited in self-consciousness would be Christ alone and not God as well—could, indeed, be very intimate but, strictly speaking, it would not belong in the domain of piety.

1. Ed. note: Every fact (Tatsache), in this case, is something, formal or material, that is present in someone, even if not consciously. The fact becomes a factor as it comes out at some level of mental activity, and is captured by perception, hence rises to consciousness. 2. Ed. note: Here most noticeably Schleiermacher’s continual use of mathematical imagery can best be accessed by visualizing spatially the various dimensions and relations he is reporting. For example: God-consciousness’s being conceived as in a state of being so infinitesimally small as to play no part in one’s consciousness and growing, if at all, in

increments as small as to be imperceptible even by the senses; then, among Christians these increments would become quite apparent advances (“more”) and diminishments (“less”) of God-consciousness (hence, the word “fluctuating”). 3. §29. 4. §49. 5. Ed. note: Here “communion” with God could also be rendered “community,” the more familiar translation of Gemeinschaft. Schleiermacher frequently uses this word. It means virtually the same thing when characterizing Christians’ relationship with the divine Spirit—that is, with God in any fashion—with Christ, and with other human beings. When this communion/community appears among Christians, its spirit is constituted by “Holy Spirit.” Further, Christians join in this same spiritual fashion with other members of the species in communion/community perhaps—albeit differently, but certainly holistically—with the entire world/universe. In the latter, broadest sense, what he termed Anschauung des Universums in On Religion and Abhangigkeitsgefühl in Christian Faith both refer to a conscious interconnectedness with God (Gottesbewußtsein) in and through the world (Naturzusammenhang). See index. See also §8.2 and §36.1–2 and On Religion (1821) I, supplemental note 4, where he advances a nonpantheistic view of God as “One in All,” and II, supplemental notes 2, 3, and 19. Finally, see OR (1821) III, supplemental note 5 (and Christian Faith §9), on contemplation of self and world in relation to God. 6. Ed. note: Here the immediate context and the formulation Glaube an (in) indicate that this noun now means “belief,” not “faith.”

§63. In general terms, we are then able to trace the way in which Godconsciousness takes shape in and with stirred self-consciousness only to the deed of an individual. Thus, what is distinctive in Christian piety consists in the following. We are conscious that whatever turning away from God might exist in the situations of our lives is a deed originating in ourselves, and we call this sin. However, we are conscious that whatever communion with God might exist there rests upon a communication1 from the Redeemer, and we call this grace.2 1. Suppose that we posit an aesthetic mode of faith.3 This mode of faith could trace both hindrances and positive developments, including such developments of God-consciousness, equally as well as it would all other changes in a human being, namely, back to passive states. Consequently, it would present them as a result of external influences, and it would do so in such a way that these influences would appear simply as fateful events. However, in their true sense the concepts of merit and fault would find no place in it. Hence, one could say that the conflict concerning freedom, as it is usually conducted in this aesthetic domain, is nothing but a conflict over whether the passive states should be subordinated to the active states or the other way around. Moreover, one could say that in this sense freedom is the generally held premise regarding all teleological modes of faith, which, in that they proceed based on the preponderance of human self-initiated activity in human beings, can find fault only in all hindrances of the tendency for God-consciousness and merit in all its advancement. Closer determinations concerning the how of each direction taken, however, are in this case not found to lie in some characteristic that these modes of faith have in common. Instead, what comes to be self-evident is simply the following. Suppose regarding the two directions taken—namely, hindrance of the drive to God-consciousness and its quickened development—that the very same individual were taken to be the one who does both deeds and to perform them in the same way. Then, the task would consequently arise on

that same basis, namely, that of explaining why each of these two directions would have to stop being referred to correspondingly different sources.4 2. In Christian piety, as it is described here, we do not first have to overcome this difficulty. Rather, the description given here is entirely the same as the general explanation set forth above.5 This is the case, for if the feeling of absolute dependence that was previously bound tight came to be free only through redemption,6 then the easiness with which we are able to think God-consciousness to be linked with the various sensory stirrings of self-consciousness also has its ground in the facts of redemption, and it is thus a communicated easiness. Moreover, the having been tightly bound by the feeling of absolute dependence would not have entailed its actual nullity, since certainly, in this case, there also could not be such a deed as sin is described to be here. Thus, in each part of life that can be considered to comprise a whole in and of itself, God-consciousness would also have been something—even if only something infinitesimally small—and thus, as often as such a part of life would have come to a close, a deed with respect to God-consciousness would also have taken place. However, it would not have been a deed whereby God-consciousness would be posited as codetermining the given element of life. Thus, it would not have been a turning toward God, from which, viewed in and of itself, a communion with God would always arise, but a turning away from God.7 The result would be that given an acceptance of such a redemptive process, a looking back at sin as something that existed earlier would always be linked to it. Now, the claim that here communion with God rests on an act external to humans8 in no way hinders the subsumption of Christianity under the common character of teleological modes of faith. This is so, for, on the one hand, communication and deed do not exclude each other, since then, for the most part, deeds done in common have their beginning in one individual, but for that reason they are also a deed performed on the other individuals involved; on the other hand, the appropriation of redemption is presented everywhere as a deed, as an embracing of Christ, and presented in similar ways.9 In reverse order, however, suppose that a given religious consciousness were to posit disturbances as coming from elsewhere but to posit communion with God, when those disturbances are not introduced, as arising from the spiritual force of life in an individual. Then, only what would stop the external sources for disturbances could be called redemption, and in a very subordinate sense indeed.10 In that case, however, redemption accomplished in Jesus has never been thought of in this way. Moreover, if one proceeds further in this sense, then the more a lack of communion with God were posited to be merely accidental, the less would sin and grace be viewed as definitely apart from each other, both in and of themselves and also as what has occurred earlier versus what has occurred later, and the more would the concept of redemption recede to a point where all three results would disappear in concert. This disappearance enters into the picture when one assumes that a unity of sensory and higher self-consciousness is the natural basic state of every individual, wherewith absence of God-consciousness in any particular element of life would remain something that is merely accidental and that would have to be quickly smoothed out in a given community, inasmuch

as not all would be suffering from the same accident at the same time. Strictly speaking, this outlook comprises that specifically non-Christian notion which recognizes no need for redemption, for within Christianity sin and grace take place only by means of redemption and on the presupposition that redemption is appropriated. 3.11 Furthermore, the proposition cannot be understood as if in an immediate Christian self-consciousness sin and grace would be referred to different elements of life and would be kept entirely apart, viewed as incompatible with each other. Rather, the energy12 of Godconsciousness is never at its absolutely greatest point, no more than its formation within the stirrings of sensory self-consciousness is at an absolutely constant state. Thus, a limiting weakness of God-consciousness is also coposited. This lack of force is certainly sinful. Just as little, however, can the interconnection with redemption be fully at the null point in an actually Christian consciousness, because otherwise it would be a non-Christian consciousness until the interconnection were restored, contrary to the presupposition we hold. Moreover, since this interconnection originally proceeds from the Redeemer, its communicated act is also coposited everywhere. Hence, here the discussion is simply about these two contrasted features, which are combined, however, only in varied measure within each element that belongs to Christian religious life.13

1. Mitteilung. 2. Ed. note: An outline is provided in Schleiermacher’s marginal note : “Referring to ‘deed’ [Tat], one’s own deed is sin, whereas the communicated deed [Tat] is grace. 1. How difficult it is when both [sin and grace] are to be explained on the same grounds. 2. How this fluctuation exists only outside Christianity (the Pelagian extreme)” (Thönes, 1873). Actually, what is communicated by God, Schleiermacher usually calls an “act” (Akt). Cf. OR (1821) II, supplemental note 17, which distinguishes two aspects of “the operations of grace”: (1) inspiration, emphasizing productivity and effectiveness in grace and (2) revelatory, emphasizing receptivity in its operation. It also indicates something of how the two aspects complement each other in a Christian context, interpreted in a purely nonspeculative manner. Grace is the main subject of Part Two, though the term itself is used only occasionally. Instead, focus is placed on how God is at work in the redemptive process, effecting what, where, and why. See esp. §§86–90, in particular §§87 and 89 (in connection with §137 on grace and blessedness), also §§108.2, 11, 120.P.S. (preparatory grace— see index), and §125. In BO see §§213–14, 219, 223–31 (grace in the two halves of dogmatics: Christian Faith and Christian Ethics), and §286 (on its social aspects). 3. See §9. Ed. note: Among monotheist modes of faith, Schleiermacher terms the Muslim an “aesthetic” mode, which places it more in the domain of the senses. In contrast, Judaic and Christian modes of faith he terms “teleological,” quite differently placed—that is, more in the ethical domain and defined by ideal aims. 4. Ed. note: Here what is in question is whether Christianity, as a monotheistic mode of faith, would have to explain shifts of direction within an individual in a way different from, say, Judaism or “Muhammadanism.” In the next subsection, the need and necessity of redemption in Christianity explains why hindrances to God-consciousness and taking hold of what Christ offers both occur within an individual and yet refer to two different sources, oneself, viewed as a human being who is a sinner, and Christ, who, sinless and by divine grace, freed one from sin. 5. See §11.2–3. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “The teleological character [of a mode of faith] exists only if Godconsciousness is not posited to be a nullity. As something [really existing], God-consciousness can also be a cooperative deed [Mittat]” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Cf. Rom. 3:23; Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: “Their will turned away from God.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 53; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 72. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In Rom. 3:23 the phrase ‘fallen short of the glory’ is not to be taken literally but is tied to the word ‘sinned’” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: Here fremden Tat is taken to refer to an act done not by humans but by God, viewed as wholly Other (fremd).

9. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 20: “On that account Paul intends that people have to take hold of God’s promise through faith.” (2) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) (On the Term Faith): “If faith [fides] is not reliance [fiducia] on Christ, … we do not partake of his benefits in beholding him.”—“The pious mind … understands that this mercy must be embraced by faith, that is, by trust [fiducia].” Ed. note: (1) ET from a German version in Bek. Luth. (1963), 83; cf. Book of Concord (2000), 52–57. (2) ET Tice; Latin CR 21:749 and 890; cf. Manschreck’s somewhat different translation of the 1555 German text (1965), 159. See §32n16. 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “An effort to advance redemption by stopping external disturbance is always pursued in a non-Christian sense” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note offers this heading and affirmation: “3. [On the] relationship between sin and grace. Hence, by sin [we mean] equally so, [whether] earlier or later. However, there is no such thing as pre-Christian grace” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Energie. Ed. note: Kraft (force) is usually the term used with God-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, strength in that consciousness of God’s gracious presence in the corresponding relationship with human beings is shown by a shift of energy stirred up within. This divine activity thus becomes a distinctly greater force within. 13. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage and, with very rare exceptions, throughout the present work, Moment means “element.” In some exceptions it might mean “moment” of time, for which the strictly temporal meaning Augenblick is used more often. In German mathematical terminology, Moment is also occasionally used, along with Faktor (factor), which terms, in turn, can be applied in the ordinary language usages of both words for something that is codetermining. Next, the chemical periodic table of elements (Momenten) did not begin to get formed until late in the nineteenth century, yet it represents the best example of Moment’s meaning “element.” This meaning (1) stands for a long-term prior use in mathematics and (2) marks an at least imaginably quantifiable, real placeholder (thus a “marker”) within a spatial and/or temporal series or scale, etc. As in this immediate context, Element is always translated “feature.” Element also has several other meanings, which are more nearly parallel to those in English. For example, the word indicates environmental elements, being in one’s element, elementary (level), relative weakness. In the adjectival form, elemental, it can also refer to some original capacity to hold sway (Urelementalgewalt)—that is, to have power in one’s reason. Here, to keep meanings straight and clear, the translation for Element is always “feature,” partly also to reserve for the term Charakter (characteristic or character) its own use for an allied but somewhat different array of meaning. Finally, although Schleiermacher does not employ the word Faktor, occasionally it is implied and is thus used in translation: “factor,” as referring to an ingredient in the making of a product, a making, for example, that factories do.

§64. Our proposition requires dividing these two aspects, dealing with sin first, then with grace, and with each in accordance with all three forms of dogmatic propositions. 1.1 In our proposition all genuine doctrines of faith have to be based on Christian religious self-consciousness or, in other words, taken from the experience of Christians. Now, every Christian is indeed conscious of sin and of grace as well, but never in separation, rather always in relation to and along with each other. Thus, doubt could well arise as to what would warrant their ever being treated apart—because if either one were described in and of itself, this would be no description of any Christian consciousness whatsoever. Rather, for us a consciousness of sin viewed as excluding grace and also described as solely comprising a particular aspect of life, would be simply a historical2 depiction, the correctness of which would have to be demonstrated somehow but could not find its verification in Christian consciousness itself. That is, it could not be a doctrine of faith at all. Likewise, a description of a fully efficacious strength of God-consciousness, one by its very nature absolute and stable, would simply be a presentiment. However, no one could trace such a state to its being in itself alone wrought by redemption; consequently, this state too could not comprise doctrine of faith at all. Now, having granted both points, inasmuch as in each case the negative feature especially attached to it is to be entirely excluded, it is still necessary to divide the two accounts in our

presentation, except that we would have to be aware that this division is not given in any Christian consciousness; rather, the division is made arbitrarily and only for the sake of achieving tidier reflection3 on each matter. That is, we recognize, first of all, that our dogmatic propositions, taken as a whole, do present only doctrine that has currency in this period within the Evangelical church.4 Nevertheless, it is Christian self-consciousness for which they are intended to provide the most accurate possible expression for our time. Moreover, this Christian self-consciousness is not, as it were, simply that of a distinct stretch in time; rather, it includes whatever generally remains self-identical and everywhere the same within the Christian church—that is, to the extent that dogmatic propositions would not refer to differences among communities of the Christian church. The latter situation of difference is not the case wherever the contrast between sin and grace would be the topic being addressed. Thus, we must describe Christian consciousness with reference to its persisting contents, which are themselves based on these two contrasting features. We must also do this in such a way that it is possible to combine with and under our description the initial element by which this Christian consciousness would have arisen and everything within later elements that represent this first element.5 Now, suppose that we consider those who, without being born within Christianity, do turn toward it. In their case, some recognition of their own need for redemption has to precede their grasping hold of redemption, thus also their grasping hold of grace, and this need arises only as it is accompanied by consciousness of sin. Accordingly, some consciousness of sin would have existed in such persons prior to their consciousness of grace. Moreover, suppose, nevertheless, that all that is sinful in their later life were to cohere with that sin which had once existed prior to grace. Then, in that later point in time as well, they would have had the consciousness of sin within them in such a way that sin would have existed in them prior to grace. Indeed, all those born into Christendom6 itself must share this consciousness of sin with those others, even if only by virtue of their common feeling. This is so, in that this formulation, namely, that sin would have occurred before grace, is simply an alternate expression for the human species’ need for redemption and for its relationship to Christ. Thus, to verify our proposition, in no way do we need to decide the question as to whether or not even every individual who is born into Christendom would at first be divided off from grace for some time and then, like those not born there, would succeed in moving toward grace only by moving through just such a consciousness of sin as they would. 2.7 Accordingly then, in our presentation we are going to separate consciousness of sin and consciousness of grace from each other. Thus, we first describe separately that feature of Christian self-consciousness which is increasingly to disappear by means of the other feature. The first feature is thus identified as having its basis in the collective condition of humankind before the redemptive process enters into it and, at the same time, represents that condition. At that point, moreover, the second feature, which is thereafter still separable and which is to be limited less and less by the first feature, is identified as having its basis in the redemptive process. It is identified as representing, at the same time, the whole force of this redemptive process. Separation of these two features common to all Christian states of mind

and heart, in which the contrast between them has been presumed to exist, is of itself already depicted as possible. By the same token, without that separation relations of each to the other could hardly be fully exhibited.8 It is still harder, however, to demonstrate that and how this separation can also be carried out in the other two forms of dogmatic propositions without detriment to their content. Now, suppose that initially we were to speak only of the world in and of itself and not in relation to human beings. Then, whatever in the world does influence human beings would always remain the same, whether the aforementioned contrast between sin and grace would have initially developed in them or not. Consequently, no particular relation could be taking place in the world to either member of the contrast, to sin or grace. Suppose, however, that what is placed in the world by human activity were for the world simply the work of one human being taken as a whole. In that case, moreover, to some degree at least, the differences that would relate to God-consciousness would have to be taken into account. Now here, however, the subject could then never be other than components of how the world is constituted in relation to human beings, and in that respect it is obvious that the world would have to be very different to a human being if one were to conceive that being as in a totally disabled state of God-consciousness or as in an exceptionally supreme state. Precisely on this basis, then, in the very life of Christians it would also be possible to distinguish in our conception of the world between what is to be accounted to sin and what is to be accounted to grace. The same thing is also true of the influences of human beings on the world to the extent that they have an effect on oneself and come into one’s consciousness. This is so, for the greater value this contrast bears for one-self, the more whatever comes by sin, consequently as without impetus from God-consciousness, will appear to oneself as something also proceeding from oneself that is of the same kind and as homogenous. Likewise, on the other hand, whatever is conditioned by the efficacious process of redemption must also bear the stamp of redemption. Yet, finally, as concerns divine attributes, it is obvious, to be sure, that no statement concerning God can proceed from a condition that comprises an alienation from God. Rather, in this circumstance testimonies concerning God first occur only if one who has been alienated has somehow turned once again toward God. This is the case, for all testimonies concerning God presuppose such a turning toward God. Even, however, if sin is observed based on a condition wherein God-consciousness is predominant, divine attributes that relate to sin but without regard for its disappearance through the process of redemption would be inconceivable. That is to say, since all divine attributes are activities, in this context activities of sin itself could only be about the preserving and confirming of sin. However, to assume such attributes would be contrary to Christian piety. Likewise, moreover, suppose that we wanted to posit a divine efficacious activity in which God-consciousness is grounded but is not viewed as unfolding from sin and limited by sin. Even this activity by God could not simply be presented in a set of concepts conveying divine attributes in which their Christian character had receded, for at that point, in the domain covered by this form of attribute, the

Christian character of what is attributed to God would never come to light. In contrast, just as surely as Christian piety would acknowledge redemption to be a process instituted by God, it would, of course, set forth those statements of witness concerning God that refer to Godconsciousness. Indeed, such statements are exactly of a sort that would express the direction and aim of divine causality as it is mirrored, in general terms, in our concept of a feeling of absolute dependence. As a result, those notions that underlie our Part One first attain to a fuller definition and a more vivid perspicuity9 in connection with that set of concepts conveying divine attributes the Christian character of which has not receded. Now, in order to find out what these various statements stand for, it is indeed by no means necessary to split the two members of our contrast apart.10 Nevertheless, a proper and perhaps, on account of what has been worked out just above, also an excellent method for describing that divine efficacious activity by which God-consciousness attains dominance, might be to do the following. First, we would ask: What sort of divine attribute would give itself to be known in the condition of sin but, to be sure, to be known only inasmuch as redemption were expected and prepared for therein? Then, the other way around: “What sort of divine attribute would refer back to the growth of God-consciousness toward dominance as it would be formed by the process of redemption, which moves away from the condition of sin? Even though these questions might then lead only to abstractions—notwithstanding which this would yield a result less true regarding the second question than of the first one. At any rate, as viewed in tandem they would provide a lively vision of the Christian life. Indeed, they would do so in the same way that the interwoven character of those two features shape what is true of the Christian life. Moreover, if we were to view them together with the divine attributes set forth in Part One, then, upon our doing so, the depiction of our Godconsciousness would have to be fully accomplished under this form. 3.11 Based on these considerations, it is possible to think of two alternate ways of arranging Part Two of our presentation of faith-doctrine.12 We could make the three forms of dogmatic proposition into the main divisions, and under each heading treat first of sin, then treat of all that refers to grace. As an alternative, we could set forth these two features of our self-consciousness, sin and grace, to be the main headings and first handle sin in accordance with all three forms of dogmatic proposition and then grace in the same way. The second option seems to be preferable, because the main division would comprise what is divided in immediate Christian self-consciousness. Accordingly, this Second Part is then to be split into two Aspects, in that consciousness of sin is first explicated in accordance with the three forms of dogmatic proposition, then grace is explicated in the same way.

1. Ed. note: There being few footnotes by Schleiermacher in the next five propositions, his marginal notes prove especially helpful. The following ones cover the first subsection: “1. Demonstration: (a) Sin and grace are conjoined in selfconsciousness. (i) By itself, sin would be simply historical [historisch]. (ii) Grace, by itself, would be simply prophetic. (b) For the presentation given here, their separation is necessary. It is already necessary, because … our discourse is about God” (Thönes, 1873).

2. Ed. note: In contrast to the marginal note, “historical” renders geschichtliche here, hence Schleiermacher either corrected it later in the margin or took it to mean the same thing in this context. The second option is adopted at this point. The word “depiction” (Schilderung) indicates that it would be only a representation once removed, not directly derived from a Christian experience of faith. 3. Ed. note: That is, Schleiermacher chooses to treat each relatively by itself for expedience’s sake, in order to observe each otherwise inseparable part—first, on the need for redemption by grace alone on account of sin and, second, on redemption by grace alone because of sin. As he soon indicates, sin is dealt with first only by convention, grace actually having prior status throughout. The sole purpose is clarity of exposition, giving each aspect clearer focus—each largely, not totally, cleaned of overly complicating references to the other. This enables a neater, purer, thus “tidier” process of observation and further “reflection” (reineren Betrachtung). The expedients taken are thus rather like outlining a sermon. A sermon he often calls a mutually observing, contemplative “reflection.” Both activities are alike in the design of their actually inseparable components rather than either like cleaning up one’s act or like whittling down to the bare essentials. 4. Ed. note: See the subtitle for this entire work, which also includes the restrictive phrase “in Germany.” 5. Ed. note: Lest they be forgotten, these two “elements” (Momenten) are sin and grace. In Schleiermacher’s views, temporally speaking, sin is that social evil which, once consciousness of divine grace arises in the form of redemption, arouses a need for redemption from sin. This happens whether sin is viewed chiefly as “original”—i.e., originating as habits or influences within contexts of human interaction—as by an individual’s “actual” sin effected, at least in part, by oneself and then either wholly of oneself or on one’s own. See other propositions on sin for such details. 6. Ed. note: “Christendom” always translates Christenheit, which refers to a large sociopolitical domain that is mostly held to be under “Christian” control. “Christianity” always translates Christentum, which refers to a shared faith and life, sometimes including all its various permutations. 7. Ed. note: Here are Schleiermacher’s marginal notes for this subsection: “2. Relationship of both [sin and grace] to each other. (a) [Either each] in and of itself or in [its] primary form [Grundform]. (b) Other forms in the two of them. (i) Constitution of the world. [Then:] Conception of the world and influence on the world. (ii) Divine attributes: [They] do not permit of being derived from sin as viewed in itself alone.” 8. Ed. note: Here the final phrase reads: schwerlich … vollständig könnten zur Anschauung kommen. In Schleiermacher’s usage, for something to be fully exhibited means for it to rise from merely sensory imagination and sense perception to the level of unconfused, plain, and clear perception to one’s “mind and heart” (Gemüth). Thus, on occasion coming to have an insight can be called a “beholding” and its result a “vision.” This is not the same function as would be proposed as an intuitive form of knowledge (Kant) that would register within oneself as a level of knowing. In contrast, Schleiermacher’s account of perceptual experience is chiefly allied with a form of feeling, not with a form of intellect, as such, though it does appear to contain at least a dim cognitive frame, as would be true of every feeling. The closer the feeling function and the knowing function seem to be, the more difficult it might be to discriminate between the two. Hence, an interpretive conflict has arisen as to whether “perception” or “intuition” is typically operating in Schleiermacher’s discourse. It is definitely important to try to differentiate between these two levels of meaning, if one can. He tries to make his usage clear, using “perception” (Anschauung) for a function that more nearly pairs with “feeling” (Gefühl) than Kant’s use of Anschauung. Schleiermacher almost never used the then current but vague Latin term Intuition, which Kant often used in his philosophy but only to qualify which form of several types of Anschauung he was assigning a specific meaning to. See Rudolf Eisler, Kant Lexikon (1930), 15–35. In that the two men brought different presuppositions to their psychological and epistemological concepts, Eisler demonstrates in his lexical account of Kant’s usage of Anschauung, that it would be very different from Schleiermacher’s. Kant’s main meaning Schleiermacher would call a “notion” (Vorstellung) but, unlike Kant, not an “intuition” or a mere “notion,” which is indeed indispensably attached to “sensory consciousness,” as Schleiermacher would also claim. Yet, for Kant an “intuition” that is a “notion” is also on a path of adding further characteristics of knowing on the way to being a viable “concept.” In contrast, for Schleiermacher, at this level of the knowing functions an Anschauung is not a mere notion, though it can eventually take a similar path, e.g., in contributing to one’s formation of a “worldview” (itself first present in the elemental form of Anschauung des Universums, then greatly filled in and ultimately expressible in a fully knowledgeable Weltanschauung). Rather, Anschauung has a definite and solid functioning of its own, one that is not merely transitional and that is both quite distinguishable from notions and independent of them as well. Such pains are taken seriously, because the choice of terms greatly matters in theology, where spiritual components of faith can, as in Schleiermacher’s work, go very deep. For Schleiermacher, the pair Anschauung (perception) and Gefühl (feeling) function at the same deep level as one’s internal relationship with God in “faith,” and they are major contributors to how he sees that basic faith function. See also §61n16 and index. 9. Ed. note: The phrase “a fuller definition and a more vivid perspicuity” translates völliger Bestimmtheit und lebendiger Anschaulichkeit. The two nouns could as well be rendered “definiteness” and “perceptual clarity.” However, Schleiermacher has already indicated that (a) the definitions of the three sets of divine attributes given in this work are all expressions

inadequate to convey who God is in se and, by themselves at least, are perhaps about the best that can be done, thus far, to offer conceptually the nature of God’s activity in the world, and (b) these definitions of the three sets build on each other, though not strictly deductively, right up to the summative conceptions of divine love and wisdom. With the latter indication in view, he here designates the initial set in Part One to be comparatively “notions” (Vorstellungen). Moreover, because this same set depicts more nearly generalized characteristics of monotheism, they are to be seen as only approximations on the way to the final set of definitions to the extent that they do not so directly convey the process of redemption in relation to sin given in Part Two. The Conclusion, then, examines the doctrine of the Trinity, a traditional doctrine that cannot be conveyed in Christian religious immediate self-conscious but that is already roughly presented in all that accompanies the three sets of divine attributes, successively, regarding a Christian experience of God, of self, and of world in each of the three portions. They, in turn, present the Threeness of the divine, at work in this world first, but worshiped and followed as One, also as Creator/Preserver, as Redemptive, and as Spirit, especially where communities of faith receive God and act appropriately by and in accordance with that Spirit. The problem with triune doctrine, for him, arises as soon as the “three” are perceived as both separate entities and as a single entity, both of which he tries to avoid—also, to some extent, tries not to embrace insofar as scholars try to peer into what God is beyond the universe itself. Throughout the work, he stays within the limits of human existence within the finite world and God’s entrance into the world. In a deeply felt and perceived relationship with God, however, he views God’s activities in the world to be infinite and eternal, from beyond yet within conditions and processes of the world itself. Each portion of this systematic treatise contributes more to the vision that he holds on behalf of the church, including this portion concerning sin. 10. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher adds: “But [it is necessary] to separate off [the condition of ] sin inasmuch as redemption would be expected or prepared for therewith” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note for this subsection reads: “3. Concerning arrangement [of what follows, in Part Two]. The arrangement not taken would be too greatly disjointed. The various forms to [be treated] do shed light on each other; therefore [it is] good also to place together what belongs together in accordance with their contents” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Ed. note: “Faith-doctrine” translates Glaubenslehre, which is the German translation of the Latin doctrina fidei. Glaubenslehre has also become a shorthand title for the present work.

The First Aspect of the Contrast

Explication of the Consciousness of Sin [Introduction to the First Aspect of the Contrast]

§65. All the propositions to be set forth in this First Aspect of Part Two must be in accord with and refer to those of the same form in Part One. Likewise, however, they must also look ahead to the propositions that belong to the Second Aspect of Part Two, which explicate the concept of grace and, in doing so, these propositions must remain in provisional status. 1. Here a contradiction threatens, probably one arising within itself once sin is to be considered in and of itself. This would be the case if, based on our own standpoint alone, we should have to view every hindrance of the efficacy of God-consciousness simply as a human deed. Then, as a turning away from God, sin’s status would be contrary to the tendency to have God-consciousness, a tendency that befits human beings as a vital drive and, as such, is presupposed by us. Moreover, it would seem difficult for the actual persistence of sin to be regarded as compatible with divine omnipotence, in that if it were so, then a human being’s turning away from God would still have to be no less ordained by God than all the other human characteristics are. This would be the case, because in the state of sin humans are indeed also placed within the interconnectedness of nature, and only in proportion to that placement—with which divine causality is indeed to be directly associated1 over its entire compass—can sin expand within them. Suppose, furthermore, that divine attributes were to exist that relate to sin yet did not include any preservation and confirmation of this sin. How, then, should something come into being in connection with all else that has come into being through eternally omniscient divine omnipotence, something that in accordance with its nature, should not survive? Suppose, finally, that sin were to exist only where an incapacity2 for God-consciousness does, and suppose that sin were to expand in a human being only based on some occasion of certain impressions that one would have received from the totality of finite being. How, then, would what we have posited to be the original perfection of humankind and also the original perfection of the world in relation to humankind not be dissolved? 2. Now, this contradiction can be only apparent, since the two statements about original perfection do indeed equally refer back to our immediate self-consciousness, which, viewed as containing the truth concerning our very existence, cannot be in contradiction with itself. This being so, what then, nevertheless, comes to the fore within the relationship being referred to here is the following: that the locus here is one that offers a host of difficulties. This is the case, for several reasons. Suppose, first, that someone were too much inclined to

exclude sin from an area of absolute dependence on God. Then, one would unavoidably be bordering on the Manichean position. Suppose, moreover, that someone then wants to displace going that far with affirmation of the original perfection of humankind. Then, the Pelagian position would scarcely be avoidable. Indeed, one could say that in development of ecclesial doctrine, vacillation between these two contrasting positions has never entirely come to rest. Today, however, even this vacillation has not been managed, and no formulation is to be detected that does not appear more in agreement with the Pelagian position, whereas alternative ones appear to lie more on the side of a Manichean position. Thus, at least in general terms, the second section of our proposition is just as suited to even out such difficulties as the first section necessarily stirs them up.3 That is to say, suppose that in statements concerning sin we were constantly to have future statements of witness concerning grace in view. Accordingly, then, we could contemplate sin, on the one hand, only as that which would not exist were not redemption to have existed as well. At that point, moreover, every apparent necessity for approaching the Manichean position would vanish. On the other hand, we could contemplate sin as that which as it should vanish could do so only through the process of redemption, and if we were to proceed based on this understanding from here on out, then we would fall into a Pelagian position only well-nigh too wantonly. Suppose that this danger of falling into either extreme were constantly and repeatedly renewed but not by any necessity to refer to expressions that have currency in the church. Then we would have to claim the right to interpret the church’s expressions in such a way that either type of situation would be most securely avoided.4 Alternatively, if these expressions do not lend themselves to such a use, then other expressions could be exchanged for them. Under all three forms of dogmatic propositions, we would have to reach for one or the other of these two tactics in order to come at least close to a complete resolving of our tasks.

1. Ed. note: The word gleichgesetzt used here means that the entire interconnected process of nature is caused by God. Thus, cause and effect are not literally equated or identified with each other but are “directly associated,” the effect (Natur) being implied by this divine cause irreversibly so. 2. Unkräftigkeit. Ed. note: This word means a lack in force or a weakness, hence “incapacity” to a large degree. This word does not necessarily imply a total lack of all capacity for God-consciousness, though some might (wrongly) suppose that it would. 3. Ed. note: The first section of the proposition looks back in part, to Part One, whereas the second section emphasizes the rule for propositions already set forth in §64, thus looks ahead to what the second aspect of Part Two emphasizes, namely, the activities of divine grace. Thus, propositions that are provided in the second aspect, chiefly on grace, are addressed earlier here through concepts of “God-consciousness,” “need for redemption,” and the like, particularly when the actual doctrines of sin are covered in §§66–85. Such necessarily anticipatory and provisional concepts here reflect his introductory insistence on a Christian orientation and on indications of this sort that are further explicated in doctrinal introductions to this point. Throughout his systematic presentation, such terms are ordinarily meant to refer specifically to human relationships with God in Christian religious immediate self-consciousness. As a whole, this proposition only begins to handle what is announced in its second sentence, which does not exclusively correspond to the second subsection of its explanation. 4. Ed. note: That is, each extreme, as well as tendencies moving very much in their direction, are termed “heresies,” thus holding doctrinal meanings to be avoided. See index.

SECTION ONE

Sin as a Human Condition1 [Introduction to Section One] §66. We have consciousness of sin whenever God-consciousness, coposited within or somehow joining upon some condition of mind and heart, determines our selfconsciousness to be in a state lacking in pleasure. This is why we conceive sin as a definite conflict of flesh against spirit.2 1.3 Even regarding sin, we cannot set forth an objective elucidation of it without straying from our method.4 Instead, we have to go back to an individual’s own self-consciousness, which declares such a condition to be sin. This approach has all the less against it, moreover, since sin cannot arise in the life of a Christian without such a consciousness.5 This is so, for this lack of consciousness would itself be simply a new sin, which would, nevertheless, also have to come into consciousness as such later on. Our next task would then be to set forth what is characteristic in one’s consciousness of sinfulness. If we do this, we may not seek this characteristic within the domain of Christian piety, then, apart from its relationship to God-consciousness. Accordingly, what remains, moreover, is simply for us to posit as sin all that has hindered the free development of Godconsciousness. Now, suppose a somewhat dubious element of consciousness in which God were coposited to be present but the aforementioned God-consciousness would have no capacity to permeate the other effective features of consciousness and in this way to be determinative of that same element. At that point, then, sin and consciousness of sin would occur simultaneously. Moreover, in that case any pleasure would lie in sensory self-consciousness, this by dint of one’s satisfaction in having pleasure. Yet, in the case of higher selfconsciousness a lack of pleasure would be experienced, this on account of a lack of force in God-consciousness.6 In contrast, suppose that God were not coposited to be present in a given element of consciousness at all. Then, if bringing that element of consciousness to mind were to expel God-consciousness, in that case consciousness of sin would follow one’s having the sin itself. This would happen, in that patently God-consciousness could not assimilate itself to that element of consciousness, and consequently God-consciousness could not be even acquiescently presupposed as being within that element in such a manner as to concur with it. Suppose, however, that God-consciousness would actually have determined a given element of consciousness and that pleasure would actually be present at the level of higher self-consciousness. Then, nevertheless, in every feeling of exertion therein some consciousness of sin would be present—consequently, a consciousness of sin that is partially overcoming that sense of pleasure. This would be the case, because we would be conscious

that if the currently overwhelming sensory features were to have been strengthened from external sources, from that point onward Godconsciousness would not have had the capacity to be determinative of the given element. Now, in this sense, an unceasing consciousness of sin does exist, of a kind that at times simply precedes sin itself as a warning presentiment, and at times accompanies sin as an inner reproach, or at times succeeds sin as penitence. Yet, all this occurs only because a living seed of sin exists that is constantly at the point of bursting forth. How would any Godconsciousness ever be directed toward such an element of consciousness as was just described? None could be so directed if no relationship at all were to exist within an agent between an element of consciousness and the class of actions just indicated, in which case the agent would find oneself in a state of innocence—or if God-consciousness were no longer effectual at all within an agent, this would comprise a state of hardness of heart. 2. Now, suppose that we think of a condition such that flesh, that is, the totality of the soul’s so-called lower forces, bears only receptivity for impulses that proceed from the locus of God-consciousness, this without the receptivity being itself an independently self-moving principle. In this condition, a conflict between flesh and spirit would not be possible. Yet, then we have to think of a sinless condition as well. The two potencies would be completely at one in every element within self-consciousness, in that every one of those elements in selfconsciousness would begin in spirit and also end in spirit. Moreover, flesh would proceed only as a living intermediary, as a healthy organ. It would do this without ever bringing anything into appearance that is not something begun and accompanied by spirit, whether this something be viewed as flesh’s own act or be viewed as an admixed, extraneous component of an act proceeding from spirit. Now, so long as flesh and spirit have not come to be at one in this sense, they persist as two agents struggling against each other.7 Moreover, inasmuch as spirit presses toward that complete unity of the two, this condition can be assessed only as a lack in capacity of spirit. In addition, in treatment regarding the original perfection of humankind,8 we also left aside considering the possibility of complete unity of spirit and flesh, except that in that proposition exclusively those relationships were to be conveyed which contained in themselves the principles for progressive development. Now, in contrast, in the soul of a Christian a consciousness of sin is never in place without consciousness of the force present in the process of redemption.9 Furthermore, that consciousness of sin is also never realized without its other, complementary half.10 This other half we have yet to describe more fully later on. Here we may simply add that of itself alone, consciousness of sin simply represents a condition outside the domain in which redemption is the predominant force. That is, it represents a hopelessly incapacitated condition of spirit. Explanations that describe sin itself as a turning away from the Creator11 are indeed compatible with the present explanation of sin in terms of a hindering of spirit’s determinative force, a hindering that is caused by autonomous activity of one’s sensory functioning. The present explanation of sin is less compatible, however, with explanations that declare sin to be transgression of divine law.12 Even so, little can be gained by trying to

establish agreement with the latter position. This is the case, because in the sense in which God and eternal law permit of being differentiated—as if one could possibly turn away from eternal law, viewing this action as turning away from a particular, perhaps arbitrary act of God, without actually turning away from God—“law” is no original Christian expression, and on that account it would have to be taken up within some higher-order expression. One would then have to extend that expression of “law” in a very indefinite and arbitrary manner, in order to include all that could count as sin not only in works but also in thoughts and words. Our explanation, however, provides the most natural unity for the present classification of sin in this work.13 This is the case, for when a thought or a word that is not considered to be a deed completely fills out some element of consciousness, it would also be incorrect to call it a sin. An explanation that is more Christian in its origin and that is also immediately in harmony with our own explanation, however, is one that says: Sin exists when we desire what Christ holds in disregard, and vice versa.14

1. Ed. note: Appended here is Schleiermacher’s marginal note regarding §66–§69.P.S.: “Discussion independent [of ecclesial doctrine]: 1. §66. Explanation of sin as self-consciousness. 2. §67. Prior presence [Priorität] of sin before Godconsciousness [actively emerges in us]. 3. §68. That sin is, nevertheless, only a distortion of nature. 4. §69. Sin’s being doubly grounded. Discussion in conformity with ecclesial doctrine regarding two points of doctrine” (Thönes, 1873). Thönes himself adds: [This brief heading] “refers to §69.P.S.” 2. Ed. note: Three terms in this proposition require some explanation: (1) Gemütszustand ordinarily means “disposition”; however, a clearer translation for a presentation of Schleiermacher’s meaning is “a state or condition (Zustand) of mind and heart (Gemüth),” especially in this context, which seeks to explain a transition from a relatively simple state of feeling and perception (though not merely sense-perception), with its potential for wavering or hesitancy between staying put and venturing out (itself a condition comprised of both confusion and irresolution) to a more complex involvement of cognitive attentiveness and resolve of will. (2) Unlust could mean “displeasure,” which indicates a definite attitude against something instead of feeling pleasure; however, wherever Schleiermacher uses this term, he clearly intends to indicate only some varying possible degree in one’s “lack of pleasure,” on a scale between uttermost pleasure and uttermost lack of pleasure. (3) Widerstreit connotes a degree of mildly to markedly assertive to aggressive struggle against something; thus, adding the qualifier positiven indicates reaching a degree of “definite conflict” of one condition, namely flesh, militating against another, namely spirit, as will be explained below. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Explanation. Note: It might appear that when God-consciousness enters into the picture, sin would be gone. However, seen thus, this explanation too is only a description of sin as it existed in the past. In its bare immediacy sin is too entangled [with other factors to be clearly noticed, as such]. Yet, [in the presence of such factors as] punishment or reform efforts, a state of internal irresolution conveys the same thing, even where no Godconsciousness is as yet taking place” (Thönes, 1873). Schleiermacher’s additional marginal note here reads: “1. Elucidation of this first proposition. As soon as a condition is declared to be sin, God-consciousness is there; it is hindered, however, when its immediate influence on a deed [of sin] is hindered” (Thönes, 1873). 4. Ed. note: See §64 for the “method.” 5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note further marks this reverting back to self-consciousness to imagine sin’s arising from within it: “Sin in conflict (with consciousness). Sin’s precipitating [in der Übereilung] ([doing so] without an accompanying consciousness)” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Seeking out sin [is] also a good” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:18–23. 8. See §60. 9. Rom. 7:25–8:2. 10. Ed. note: Namely, the divine activity of grace and thereby consciousness of grace. The two together are the subject matter throughout Part Two.

11. Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: “… their will turned away from God.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 53; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 72; cf. §63n7. 12. For several holding such a view, see Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 5, 2ff. Redeker note: “Among others Gerhard names Augustine, Ambrose, John of Damascus, and Melanchthon.” 13. Ed. note: In §§70–74 sin is presented in two forms: original sin and actual sin. 14. Augustine (354–430), Of True Religion (390), chap. 15, at par. 31: “Indeed, no sin can be committed except as things are desired that he [Christ] holds in disregard or things [like suffering] are sought after that he has [simply] undergone.” ET Tice, cf. Library of Christian Classics, vol. 6 (1953), 240; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:135.

§67. We are conscious of sin as the force and work of a time when the bent toward Godconsciousness had not yet come to the fore within us.1 1.2 Actually, it already lies in the relation that this proposition has to all those preceding it that in that time to which consciousness of sin is traced back, sin was not placed in us as sin, not in the way that we are now conscious of it. This is the case, for now sin can have its place within us only at the same time as God-consciousness is present and also in relation to Godconsciousness. If God-consciousness has not yet developed, there is also not yet any resistance to it; rather, what is present is only a self-focused activity of flesh.3 By the nature of the matter, in the future this self-focused activity of flesh will indeed become resistance to spirit, but beforehand it cannot actually be observed as sin, but only as a seed of sin at best. In general, we also make judgments concerning individuals at early stages of their development in this way, as we do concerning entire peoples and eras.4 The proposition is not to be understood, however, as if all sin, even as to its content, is to be assigned to that past. Rather, it speaks of a sinful state only in general terms, for not all functions of human beings’ lower life that can get into conflict with spirit are already developed before Godconsciousness develops. In that these lower functions develop in their initial onset without God-consciousness being directed toward them, the same result arises in either case, however. 2. Resistance, viewed as an activity by which a counterposed activity is to be overcome, is predisposed to being more or less in magnitude. In consequence, it bears an intensive magnitude5 that is conditioned by its position in time. Moreover, if taken to occur within a living being, this activity of resistance, through repetition over time, would be growing toward proficiency. Now, our proposition reaches back to a general experience, one indicating that in every person flesh has been shown to bear a certain magnitude already before spirit had any magnitude. Hence, it follows that as soon as spirit enters into the domain of consciousness—and it belongs to an original perfection of humankind that the self-focused activity of flesh, nevertheless, cannot, in and of itself, prevent spirit’s coming to the fore—resistance to it also comes to be present. This means that we become conscious in such a way that just as God-consciousness is awakened in a human being, sin will also come into consciousness. Now, in contrast, the activity of spirit, both overall in the form of human living and also especially in its effort to attain dominion over flesh, then likewise bears a certain intensive magnitude, and as a living activity would also grow toward proficiency through repetitive

exercise over time. Thus, the strength that spirit gradually accrues is itself the work and force of the time that would have occurred since the awakening of Godconsciousness—though, to be sure, in connection with a previously given spiritual force through the stimulus of which that very awakening will have ensued. In contrast, the strength of resistance that flesh produces and that is expressed in consciousness of sin depends on the head start which flesh would already have gained at that earlier time.6 Yet, by all means, the extent of that head start also would have its basis in connection with collective life. Now, let us suppose that collective relationship makes its start based on an awakening of God-consciousness, conceived as spirit’s gradual gain in force over flesh. Then, selfconsciousness could hardly have had the same character as consciousness of sin did. On this account, moreover, consciousness of sin would have to have receded the more our apprehension of spirit’s gain in force were to gain currency and vice versa. Yet, we do constantly find ourselves in an uneven development of spirit and flesh. In its activity spirit is hindered by flesh, and it is precisely one’s consciousness of sin that is conditioned thereby. To begin with, this unevenness is twofold in nature. First, it is uneven inasmuch as spirit’s development succeeds by fits and starts and in instances of extraordinary illumination and animation that are at some distance from each other. Now, suppose, that after such an instance has occurred, the spirit’s activity seems to be more diminished than it was during that instance, or suppose that, already from the very beginning of that instance on, the animation did not correspond to the illumination. Then, we would be conscious of that condition as sin, because in fulfillment of an element of consciousness, flesh would have become victorious over spirit’s effort.7 The other factor of that uneven development between flesh and spirit is this: Before long we are conscious of spirit as one, whereas flesh is something manifold, and this manifold is dissimilar within itself. As a result, even spirit cannot engage flesh in a uniform manner. In that spirit’s claim upon people, however, is everywhere the same in such a way that it also appears everywhere, anywhere spirit is able to make less of an effect, spirit appears to be repulsed and subdued; consequently, the human being involved appears to be in a condition of sin. Now, the more we were to trace the condition of spiritual life back to a conscious beginning of it, to a general self-governing-of-oneself, as it were,8 one that is represented in every particular spiritual bent of will, the more would we also be conscious of flesh’s holding sway over us wherever the deed done does not comport with that prior resolve. Moreover, then we could not do otherwise than to refer this deed back to the time before that conscious beginning of the condition of spiritual life.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note is “The prior existence of sin’s force” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note marks this spot as follows: “1. The proposition [is] explained [in this way]: Sin, as such, is not based on [the existence of ] Godconsciousness. The force wherewith flesh will have been able to resist [spirit] later on has [indeed already] come into being” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Fürsichtätigkeit des Fleisches. 4. Ed. note: At this juncture, Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “[As to the content of sin, here interpretation is] also not [placed on its form] but is material in nature. Both [formal and material aspects], however, depend on a capacity for

passivity of one’s will over against sinfulness” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: That is, to exist as a Größe, or in Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873), to be a Quantum. In accordance with Schleiermacher’s dialectic (or, his way of thinking philosophically), the contrast here is between inner and outer forces in time and/or space. Thus, an “intensive” quantity (magnitude or quantum) in anything that appears or is taken to be an object represents an immediate/unmediated internal quantity, and an “extensive” one represents a mediated, external one. He often identifies an object as having a “unity” composed of a “multiplicity” of elements or features. In general form, distinctions of this kind are all familiar in Immanuel Kant’s critical writings, but in Schleiermacher’s writings they tend to be used with somewhat different analytical organization, functions, and meanings. Cf. Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (1995), and Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon (1930). Schleiermacher’s own manuscript notes for lectures on dialectic and select student notes, both from 1811 and 1832, are published in KGA II/10.1–2 (2002). Thus far, notes, glossaries, and indexes within the Schleiermacher literature are the closest one can get to a well-formed lexicon of his terminology. 6. Gen. 8:21. 7. Rom. 7:18. 8. Rom. 7:22. Ed. note: The actual text referred to here would appear to be Rom. 7:22–23.

§68. Although sin is based on an uneven development of discernment and force of will,1 we can conceive the presence of sin in such a way that the concept of the original perfection of human nature is not invalidated through the presence of sin, yet sin is apprehended only as a distortion of nature. 1. Our proposition does seem to place the entirety of spiritual life under the contrast between understanding2 and will. However, in no way, precisely here, does it bear the intention of putting into the shadows a third feature alongside these two, namely, immediate self-consciousness. Instead, we proceed on the basis of immediate self-consciousness throughout our presentation. The relationship of self-consciousness to those two features quite properly provides the measure of unevenness in their development. If we think of the above-mentioned3 governing-of-oneself in its general characteristics, then this consists of nothing other than discernment of the exclusive, superior status of those states which are at one with God-consciousness and do so without hindering it. Yet, this discernment cannot arise without an individual’s appropriating it, which occurs by an act of self-consciousness, one in which this discernment, in the form of approbation and recognition, then becomes a governing command.4 When this stirring up of self-consciousness then follows this particular discernment more quickly than it is able to determine stirrings of will, this phenomenon comprises precisely that unevenness which accompanies the existence of both sin and consciousness of sin. We can think straightaway of this unevenness as eradicated in a twofold manner. In each case, moreover, no consciousness of sin would then exist.5 That is to say: Suppose that one were gradually to reach discernment concerning the relationship of various states of sin to God-consciousness but only to the same degree as one’s recognition would also be able to set one’s will in motion. Then, one could not reach a consciousness of sin, just as one could also never think of a more godly life than what a person would actually present in each discrete moment. In addition, suppose likewise that the contrast between discernment and force of will were evenly present and observed over the entire compass of one’s life but in every case one’s will were also equally strong enough to resist all stirrings of flesh.6 Then, in no way could even such a person arrive at any consciousness of sin, viewed as one’s own state.

Yet, we find neither of these cases in our experience. Indeed, it is conceivable that we could not find them there. This is so, for, to begin with the second case, the contrast between discernment and force of will is presented to understanding after the manner of an image or of a formulation that in any particular case would already be recognized from far afield.7 In this way, moreover, an immature child too, soon after one’s own stirrings arise, receives this discernment from adults. However, the impact that a governing recognition affords to will must be a particular one in the case of every individual child, precisely because flesh has to do only with what is individual and knows nothing of what is general.8 In this situation, then, in its “members”9 flesh, of itself, has habit for its actual law. However, only very gradually do earlier, happier elements in life prove useful to spirit. In contrast, suppose that we go back to the first case: Attaining discernment concerning the relationship of the various states of sin to Godconsciousness and to the same degree as recognition could indeed set the will in motion. Nowhere, however, would a complete balance of factors exist even then. Instead, what would be present is an alternating process of advancing and retreating. One could indeed think that this would somehow be possible for an individual, but it would not be possible within a life shared in common.10 The reason is that not everyone in a shared life would move along in the same pathway; instead, each one would have to take a look at others’ process and then recognize why, for all that, one lacks their same force of will in the same instance. Now, consciousness of sin could not emerge without some occurrence of this unevenness. To be sure, one could also think of understanding’s lagging behind will as a counterpart to this unevenness, even though this lag would only seem to be so. If this main assertion about consciousness of sin in connection with unevenness is true, however, then that consciousness of sin is to be conceived directly on that same basis of unevenness. As a result, no one could claim to reach consciousness of sin in any other way. Even the indisputably worst situation would be of the same kind, namely, one in which resistance of flesh to spirit also bears a reactive effect on understanding.11 The result would be that, in part, understanding would try to gloss over states of sin that had been brought about in this way, as if they had, nevertheless, been compatible with God-consciousness.12 In part, already in its first seeds God-consciousness itself would have been so altered and split, being held in sway by flesh, that each state of Godconsciousness would be compatible with some aspect or another of flesh, and in this way the moral contrast between sin and God-consciousness would have got lost.13 Now, if in this manner idolatry would seem rightly to have the same origin as sin,14 then, with equal right, all notions of God tending to be anthropopathic would be viewed as residues of idolatry that weaken this moral contrast or reduce to a human legal situation. 2.15 All this notwithstanding, one cannot say that sin, as it has been conceived here, stands in contradiction to the original perfection of humanity, with the result that the original perfection of humanity would come to be vanquished thereby. Nevertheless, we must stick with our affirmation that, in general terms, sin exists only insofar as a consciousness of sin also exists. Thus, this consciousness of sin is conditioned by what is good, which must precede it and which is simply a result of that original perfection. That is to say, we only have

a bad conscience, in part insofar as we discern the possibility of a better conscience and an image of this better conscience is impressed upon us in some other way, and in part insofar as we have a conscience at all—that is, to the extent that the demand for harmony with Godconsciousness is set forth within us. Hence, what is lacking in perfection16 and under the dominion of flesh appears to us17 not as sin but rather as rawness and a lack of formation, if a better conscience is not even imagined in an individual at a period of life when God-consciousness could yet be developed or in a people at some earlier period when they do not yet imagine a better conscience in that way at all. As a result, sin must be revealed only within some good that has already come into being and by virtue of that good; it is revealed to be sin simply as that which hinders future good. Likewise, if sin comes to consciousness by God-consciousness’s exercising less efficacy on one sensory tendency than on another one, then consciousness of sin also comes to the fore based on a comparison with something that has already come to be good. Moreover, this consciousness is also confirmed by the counterpart to the foregoing account, namely, in that some trace of a consciousness of sin is sheltered within even a peak instance of piety. This would occur precisely because, nevertheless, God-consciousness would not yet have evenly permeated our entire nature. Furthermore, this minimal amount of a consciousness of sin would then be planted over into the time that follows, because an element such as this consciousness of sin also could not leave behind effects that are distributed evenly in all directions. Thus, over its entire compass the condition of sinfulness presupposes original perfection of humankind and is conditioned by it. As a result, just as this concept of original perfection expresses the unity that is present in our ongoing development, so sin expresses what is broken up and isolated from the whole in that development. However, that unity is never eradicated thereby. 3.18 Now, suppose that just as we have the capacity to conceive sin in its being connected with the original perfection of humankind, we could also have a full surety concerning the impossibility of avoiding sin.19 Thus, nothing would remain for us but to reassure ourselves in face of it. At that point, the most natural thing would be to say that in its entire compass— also including a vitiated God-consciousness that by being shattered is deprived of its distinctive character—the consciousness we designate as consciousness of sin would be nothing but the consciousness we picture to ourselves regarding whatever good is still lacking to us, that good having been disrupted by particular human actions and conditions. This view,20 along with truth regarding sin, does also raise the need for redemption.21 However, as a whole it actually leaves so little room for the distinctive activity of a redeemer that it can scarcely be taken to be a Christian view. Now, suppose a surety in which we would be conscious of some good, one that would have been placed within us at some extraordinary instant. Suppose too that this surety would, indeed, be simultaneously a surety of our capacity for avoidance of sin in all elements of consciousness in which an equally matching level of one’s force of will were not made evident. Moreover, suppose further that every retrogressive movement would be a distortion

of what was originally designed in nature. Accordingly, to the extent that these suppositions are the case, the experience of a decline in force of will and of a decline in consciousness of a capacity to avoid sin, as well as the conception of sin as a distortion of nature, would all be one and the same thing. In contrast, what would belong to positing the possibility of a total capacity to avoid the actual resistance offered by flesh is this: surety regarding a constantly advancing dominion22 of God-consciousness, from its very first emergence up to its reaching an absolute strength— that is, a sinlessly developed human perfection. Two characteristics would thus be equally rooted in this surety: full consciousness of sin, viewed as a distortion of nature, and faith in the possibility of a process of redemption through communication of spiritual force, a process of redemption that would be authenticated by this communication. This would be the case, for even if a trace of sin were still to adhere to our most nearly perfect states and this situation were the expression of our common consciousness of sin as human beings, then only the one person to whom we would not assign this common consciousness and inasmuch as we would rightly not assign this common consciousness of sin to this person—in a manner expressed precisely in the formulation given just above—could exercise a truly redemptive activity.23 To be sure, consciousness of sin does come from the law.24 Yet, this law, itself being a multiplicity of prescriptions, is only an incomplete presentation of what is good. Moreover, an accompanying possibility of the law’s being adhered to is not exhibited, not even in the unity of an all-encompassing formulation of it. Thus, even the knowledge of sin that arises from the law remains, in part, deficient and, in part, dubious; and complete knowledge of sin comes to us only in and through the Redeemer’s utter lack of sinfulness25 and his absolute strength of spirit. Sin can appear to us, moreover, only as a distortion of nature, since the possibility presents itself to us that based on the above-described presupposition of an original perfection, Godconsciousness could have developed steadily from the first human being right on up to the pure and holy state it had in the Redeemer.

1. Ed. note: Einsicht (discernment) is understood as a property acquired through examination of what sin is in relation to human nature, hence “discernment,” not the more literal “insight.” In this context, Willenskraft (force of will) is understood more literally than is customary in English usage of “willpower.” Indeed, it means a force that is inherent in will, to match that present in other agents of will, that is, individuals and communities. 2. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, gaining discernment is a mode of “understanding” (Verstand), itself a general term not for a strictly differentiable faculty, as if it had set boundaries and only one mode of activity; rather, it is a versatile feature of intellect that can alter its operations to fit different contexts. 3. Ed. note: See §67.2 closing paragraph. 4. Ed. note: As just above, where “governing” becomes “self-governing-self “(sichselbst Gebieten), the term used here is “command” (Gebot). In both cases the choice could as well be “ordering” and “order,” except that the form of the selfconscious act is one of “approbation and recognition” of what one has discerned to be something received from God. Thus, either term could wrongly suggest governing by rigid demands. Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “The feeling of approbation, thus the command given to oneself, is fixed earlier and stays long before feeling would obtain the force [Kraft] to determine will” (Thönes, 1873). In Schleiermacher’s usage, “force” is energic, hence need not be an exercise of power that is rigid, harsh, coercive, or overly demanding in what it orders or commands. In fact, it can be quite loving; if firm, it would not be “tough love” in any of these ways.

5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes this marginal note: “Consciousness of sin does not come to pass (a) when discernment goes slowly [retardiert]” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Ed. note: According to Schleiermacher’s marginal note here, consciousness of sin would also not come to pass in a second of two ways: “(b) when the relationship between feeling and will accelerates [akzelereirt]” (Thönes, 1873). 7. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher emphasizes that the second case “cannot arise, because discernment works only as a [shared] formulation, but impulse adheres to a particular individual [as such]” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher tends to indicate in his discourses on child development, ordinarily children take in concrete matters, until they learn to feel, think, and act more maturely. This is another contrast that presents a sliding scale of comparatively less or more of two characteristics: a less formed, secondhand, narrower, and restrained consciousness and a generally formed consciousness that is broader in scope. Perhaps the broader consciousness would consist in increasing proportions of certain general characteristics and would expand to the extent that the same individuals actually grow into maturity and keep on growing. In a Christian setting, in particular, attaining more of a generally focused “feeling of absolute dependence” (a key formulation throughout Part Two) and a broader perception of the “interconnected process of nature” in a universe that is created and preserved by God (see what is “presupposed” in Part One) would be subject to such development. 9. Rom. 7:23. Ed. note: Here Paul refers to the “members” of his person being subject to “the law of sin.” 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note forthrightly claims: “The first case is not imaginable within a life shared in common” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Postscript: Also a reactive effect on discernment” (Thönes, 1873). 12. Rom. 2:15. 13. Rom. 1:18, 25. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s understanding, the term “moral” is unavoidable in many instances but is also problematic. For him, “moral” refers to customary behavior across the entire spectrum of human life, not just to that more restricted sense that sorts out “moral” from all the rest of human life (all human life and behavior being studied by Ethik) versus all physical aspects of the world (studied by Physik). In offering this distinction, he was borrowing from ancient Greek nomenclature. For him, psychology studies Psyche, which he defines as inseparably bodily and mental. See index. 14. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note marks this sentence as follows: “Practical application of this observation” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note regarding this subsection states: “Sin does not stand in contradiction with the original perfection of humanity” (Thönes, 1873). 16. Ed. note: Unvollkommne, a term that conveys a lack of completeness, somewhere short of a wholly good, ideal state —in these cases that of an individual, of a whole people, or, ultimately, of the entire human race. Thus, Schleiermacher’s familiar emphasis on “development” is based theologically on this awareness of the contrasts between grace and sin, spirit and flesh, God-consciousness and consciousness of sin. 17. Ed. note: At this point, Schleiermacher’s marginal note offers this reminder: “Cf. above [§61.5], the point that sin cannot be our first state” (Thönes, 1873). 18. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note carries this slight admission, to be modified forthwith: “The just previous presentation sounds as though sin would be something [purely] natural” (Thönes, 1873). 19. Ed. note: As usual, “surety” is used for Schleiermacher’s meaning of Gewißheit. By his own report in his dialectic manuscripts from 1811 onward (ed. and trans. Tice, 1996) and in the general Introduction here, the closest he could get to absolute certainty was a currently reliable conviction of truth. Even then he might well retain at least a smidgen of critical doubt. Full, reliable surety would be sufficient for his pragmatically oriented grasp of knowledge and for attaining a thoroughly grounded, high degree in the direction of certainty in one’s convictions. Of the presence of divine grace he held the near “certainty” of immediate experience in feeling and perception (Gefühl and Anschauung) but, as such, not reliant on observations at the level of sense perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) alone. In the full, overall life of piety (Frömmigkeit), conviction could be bolstered, cautiously but with temporary firmness, by further efforts of observing, contemplating, thinking, and doing. These four forms of human activity could gain theological surety if rooted in the fundament of Christian immediate self-consciousness that may be afforded those activities. This entire work, then, is a result of that specific process, carried out in a limited use of philosophical mindedness, which is not intended to determine or define content, and use of corresponding scientific methods of investigation and hermeneutical interpretation. This is why Schleiermacher takes great pains to formulate appropriate questions, propositions, and explanations under each proposition, as well as organizing the whole, aiming at the greatest accuracy and critically apt entertaining of many different views on the subject. All of these features, with careful uses of formative-evaluative judgments in the process, are well illustrated in the propositions on sin. As a set, these propositions do not simply indicate degrees of surety, all short of certainty. They also provide new information and knowledge as a result, especially regarding what goes on within a person whose life is genuinely rooted in

Christ, thus in Christian faith in a relationship of God with oneself. These same observations apply to propositions mostly regarding grace in the following portions of the work. Introductory propositions tend to clarify both grounds and intent regarding all of these features, which are then summarized, with further explanations and arguments, in the strictly doctrinal propositions that follow in each instance. 20. Ed. note: Schleiermacher penned this lengthy marginal note here: “The purely negative view is not the Christian one but extends only so far as one puts one’s mind at rest with it. This is the case, for when one’s longing for what is good is strong enough, a longing for a remedy has to arise” (Thönes, 1873). 21. Ed. note: Here it is important to recall that the face value of the term “redemption” (Erlösung)—that is, its most obvious value face-to-face with the German word—is “release,” or “freedom from,” the shattering effects of sin. For Schleiermacher, the word does not so much conjure images of release from debt or from jail (punishment or satisfaction of God’s commands), fulfillment of which Jesus is said to have substituted for us by his sacrifice, as is held in most traditional views of atonement by Jesus on the cross, but release by God’s sending the incarnate Jesus for what remedy from sin he could offer by all his words and deeds, including the way he suffered unto death and God’s raising him up from death to eternal life. See esp. §§11, 86–91, 100–101, l04, and 106–15. 22. Gewalt. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term connotes a power too lacking in love or wisdom to be attributed to God or to good human behavior, for it is too unremitting and domineering, hence the word “dominion.” Ordinarily the word connotes “holding sway,” as what can happen to otherwise free agents who come into bondage under the dominion of sin. The action of God is not at all like this latter rule. Thus, here what is investigated is the possibility of God-consciousness’s holding sway over sin. This relative impossibility, in turn, underscores the need for redemption through a perfectly sinless redeemer. 23. Rom. 7:24–8:2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher adds this marginal note: “The actuality of the Redeemer precedes full consciousness of sin, all the more so the lower one’s estimate of the value of the particular foregoing element of consciousness would be” (Thönes, 1873). 24. Rom. 7:7. 25. Unsündlichkeit.

§69. We are conscious of sin, in part, as grounded in ourselves, and, in part, as having its ground somewhere beyond our own individual existence.1 1. In a particular manner, unevenly operative within each individual, the way various tendencies and functionings of one’s sensory orientation stand in relation to the higher activity of one’s spirit2 is grounded in an “innate difference”3—as we want to say provisionally—among these tendencies, which innate difference helps to constitute a personal existence distinctive to each one. However, in part, we see such differences as they are propagated within the same lineage and so also as they coalesce in the forming of new families out of different lineages; and, in part, we find these differences in large masses of human beings, established as the distinctive character of tribes and peoples. Thus, by virtue of this dependence of a particular formation of individual life on some large type held in common, as well as by virtue of the dependence of later generations on earlier ones, the sin of each individual has its source in an earlier existence above and beyond one’s own existence. Hence, even if someone, denying innate differences, were simply to ascribe these differences to education,4 the matter would remain the same, in that any given mode of education is grounded in leanings and experiences that have preceded the existence of the one who is to be educated. On the other hand, inasmuch as the urgent movement of some sensory stirring toward its goal, without placement in more elevated self-consciousness, is still undeniably the deed of any given individual, every particular sin of that individual has to be grounded in oneself.

By means of the first mode of observation we distinguish our good-naturedness5—in that many an inclination of our senses also makes no effort to strive beyond what is demanded of them by spirit itself—from our ill-naturedness, and we are conscious of both kinds of attitude as both received and obtained in company with other human beings. By virtue of the other mode of observation, however, we recognize our sin even in our ill-naturedness. That is, we do so because instead of having already surmounted that attitude by some deed of ours, we rather propagate it from one moment to another by our own self-initiated action. 2. To take two examples, one person may incline more to reflection, wherewith the person’s external efficacy may then be either weak overall or even if it is strong may still be raw and uncultivated. In contrast, another person may apply oneself entirely to external efficacy, whereas, generally speaking, thinking either may rarely enter into the process or may at least remain obtuse and confused. Both of these cases we also count as innate differences. Now, even the first person is indeed drawn into the domain of efficacious action by life shared with others; and results of reflection that have currency within the domain one shares with others will somehow come into the imagination even of the second person. Yet, those original differences in disposition continue to have an effect nonetheless, and in the first person awakening piety will more readily unite with thought, but modes of action will remain of a fleshly nature, whereas in the second person awakening into piety will be more readily resistant to understanding. As a result, sin will take a different shape in each of these persons. Now, to the extent that this differentiation coheres with the predisposition that is natural to each person and precedes every deed, to that extent the sin of any given person is, as to the shape it takes, also grounded beyond the person’s own life. In contrast, to some extent every element of consciousness, be it filled with some notion or action in the narrower sense, nonetheless always comes to pass only by one’s self-initiated activity. To that extent, even in an element of consciousness that does not bear God-consciousness within it, whether or not God-consciousness has already been aroused, in the same fashion the sin of each person would, in accordance with its reality, also be grounded in oneself. 3. The same thing is true of the development of sensory life, which in all human beings enters in before spiritual development,6 namely, that it is not dependent on the individual person oneself. That is to say, the entrance of “I”7 into this world through conception and birth can in no way be recognized by our immediate self-consciousness as our own deed, even though occasionally speculation has tried to present precisely this entrance of “I” as the most primordial falling away of which the self can be guilty. Rather, just as this entrance of the “I” is for every later generation everywhere conditioned by the deed of the previous generation, in the same way the sin-ridden self-reliance8 of orientation to the senses, itself being conditioned by its earlier development, is also grounded beyond the separate existence of any individual. However, once God-consciousness is in place as a distinct, active factor and as one capable of growth, then every element of consciousness in which it does not come to light as that factor and with a surplus, even if infinitesimal in comparison with previous

similar instances, is a restraint upon higher activity, a restraint that is founded in one’s own agency and is truly sin. Postscript. This twofold relation, which on all sides we simply find once more, in varying degrees, within every consciousness of sin, is the most authentic and innermost ground on account of which explication of the Christian consciousness of sin in our ecclesial doctrine is split into two points of doctrine—namely, regarding original sin9 and actual sin.10 The true sense of this division also clearly emerges from the explication given here thus far. That is, in the doctrine of original sin the state of sin is viewed as something received and brought along prior to any deed; yet, at the same time one’s own fault also lies hidden within it already. In the doctrine of actual sin, that state is depicted as appearing in one’s own sinful deeds, which themselves have their foundation in each individual; yet, that sin which is received and brought along is also disclosed within them. In either case, only the conventional terms used for these sins are troublesome. The reasons are as follows. In the second formulation, “actual sin,” the word “sin” is indeed posited of a person’s own actual deed,11 entirely in accordance with ordinary usage. However, the addition of “actual” to it easily occasions the confusing subordinate thought to the effect that original sin would not be anything actual, or at least that, in the same sense, next to actual sin there would be a kind of sin that is a mere semblance or that lies apart from one’s deed. On the other hand, in the first formulation, “original sin,” to be sure, the word “original”12 does rightly express the connection of later generations with earlier ones and with the way the entire species is preserved. However, it is erroneous to add the word “sin,” as if it would be taken in the same sense as that in the other formulation. In that case, moreover, only some actual sins would have had to be founded in some earlier occurrence but others would not. This cannot at all be what is meant, however, since the term “original sin” points to the inherited constitution of the acting subject that coconditions the actual sins of every individual and has done so prior to any deed.13 Hence, an alteration of these inexact terms, which are not at all to be found in Scripture, is greatly to be desired. Such an effort, however, must be introduced with considerable caution, to which the treatment to follow will provide some contribution. Moreover, the task ought to be carried out only by gradual adjustments if one does not want entirely to sever the doctrine from its historical connection and simply call forth new misconstruals and misunderstandings.14

1. Ed. note: Within the introduction to Part Two (§§62–64), sin was defined as “turning away from God,” originating in acts within ourselves. In the introduction to the doctrine of sin (§§65–69), it has been stated that everything in Part Two is to refer to “the contrast between sin and grace.” For the sake of convenience only, sin is to be the first of two “aspects” to be presented; however, the other aspect, grace, is that occurrence we experience in accordance with which sin is always to be recognized—grace having been defined (in §63), in general terms, as a relationship (or communion) with God that for us as Christians wholly rests on “a communication from the Redeemer.” Accordingly, sin was then further defined (in §66) as “a positive conflict of flesh against spirit.” This conflict, occurring within some “disposition” of ours, first becomes clear to us when such Godconsciousness as has developed within ourselves “determines our self-consciousness” in a way that causes it to be “lacking in pleasure.” Still further (in §68), sin is defined as “a distortion” of our nature that arises from “an uneven development of discernment and force of will,” yet not such as to abrogate “the original perfection of humanity.”

2. Richtungen und Verrichtungen der Sinnlichkeit zu der höheren Geistestätigkeit. For Schleiermacher, Geist (spirit) always refers to any or all functions of one’s mind. Thus, it is never wholly restricted to one’s intellect. 3. Angebornen Differenz. Ed. note: Or “inborn.” Actually, though echoing tradition, in Schleiermacher’s usage here this term means not in the baby’s control and presupposes possibly prenatal and definitely postnatal impacts of a sinful nature from other human beings. Today those impacts and corresponding influences that serve to form an infant’s tendencies and dispositions in relation both to other humans and to the world are called “congenital.” 4. Erziehung. Ed. note: In German this term stands for both child rearing and any type of education outside the home, hence the general issue here is the familiar one of “nature vs. nurture.” 5. Gutartigkeit. Ed. note: The concept points to an attitude of kindliness, goodwill. In contrast, Bösartigkeit points to an attitude of unkindliness, ill will. Böse means ill behavior as distinguished from evil (Übel) that is brought about through human agency—that is, wickedness. 6. Ed. note: See §69n2 above. Here geistige eintretenden Entwicklung refers to development of the entire mind, in any or all of its interconnected functions. 7. Ich. Ed. note: In his structural theory of the self, Freud later used Es (it), Ich (I), and Überich (above I); the Latin terms Id, Ego, and Superego were contributed by his English translators. “Ego” was not much used for “I” before that. 8. Selbständigkeit. Ed. note: Or strict autonomy, independence. 9. Peccatum originis. Ed. note: Erbsünde. 10. Peccatum actuale. Ed. note: wirklichen Sünde. 11. Ed. note: Here eigentlichen Tat, referring as it does to a person’s own (eigen) deed, further explains the interpretation of actuale (wirklich) given here. In contrast, the term actuale could mean simply that the sin is actually happening, at present, not just being passed down as a consequence of another’s original act (Adam’s). 12. Ed. note: Erb (original), without any further qualification, strictly means “heir,” hence “inherited” sin, a property that could be gained only genetically in this case. Ordinarily ursprünglich would be the word translated as “original.” In some cases Ur is attached to a word to mean a “cause of something” (Ursache), a “judgment” from some person or persons (Urteil), but the similar-sounding Erbsünde is not typically used, apparently never by Schleiermacher. 13. Epitome (Formula of Concord, 1577) 1.10: “Original sin is not a sin that a person commits [aliquod delictum quod actu perpetratur]; rather, it is embedded in the human being’s nature, substance, and essence.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 490; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 774. 14. Ed. note: Indeed, the discussion of every proposition that follows concerning the operation and consequences of sin in human life (§§70–85) consists of a succession of adjustments to this doctrine. Thus, this treatment presents a continuous, highly refined argument, impossible to grasp without closely following Schleiermacher’s “cautious” (vorsichtig), careful analysis. Still, it can be helpful to get an overall picture of what he comes to in the process. Accordingly, §70 begins by using several sample statements in confessions and dogmatics in order meaningfully to assert that the individual’s “complete incapacity for good,” which can be removed only by redemption, precedes any deed performed and in part comes from a source, to be called “the collective life of sin” (cf. §71), that is beyond (jenseits) one’s own existence. Yet, this incapacity does not obviate the capacity inherent in the original perfection of humanity to appropriate grace. Both capacities are still in us to some degree. Thus, we all have some ability to do good, and the regenerate can do ill, both within the reign of God and outside it. In both places, inseparably, the question is How are we to do “spiritual” good?

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Original Sin

§70. In any given individual a susceptibility to sin that is present in that individual before any deed of the individual’s own, one that is even based beyond the individual’s own existence, consists of a complete incapacity for good, which incapacity is removed, in turn, only through the influence of redemption.1 (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) II: “We teach that … all human beings who are propagated by nature are born with sin, that is, without fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence. … This disease or original fault (vitium) is truly sin, which even now damns and brings eternal death to those who are not born again through baptism and the Holy Spirit.”2 (2) Apology Augsburg (1831) II: “This passage [from the German confession] testifies that we deny to those conceived and born according to the course of nature not only the act of fearing and trusting God but also the ability or gifts needed to produce such fear and trust. For we say that those who have been born in this way have concupiscence and are unable to produce true fear and trust in God. … So when we use the word ‘concupiscence’ we understand not only its acts or fruits but the continual tendency of our nature.”3 (3) Gallican Confession (1559) IX: “We affirm, notwithstanding, that the light he has becomes darkness when he seeks for God, so that he can in no wise approach him by his intelligence and reason. … He has no other liberty to do right than that which God gives him.”4 (4) Second Helvetic Confession (= Expositio simplex, 1566) VIII: “By sin we understand that innate corruption of man … by which we are immersed in perverse desires and averse to all good, … unable to do or even think anything good of ourselves.” IX: “Wherefore, man not yet regenerate has no free will for good, no strength to perform what is good.”5 (5) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) X: “The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing

us, that we might have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.”6 (6) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “And this depravity is the lack of God’s light or of God’s presence, which would have existed in us, and it is the turning of our will from God …; and the human being is not the temple of God but a wretched mass without God and without righteousness.”7 1.8 This view of the susceptibility to sin, a susceptibility already imparted to every individual,9 is likewise in complete harmony with what has been explicated earlier here. That is to say: strictly and rigorously speaking, in the life of a human being received into community marked by redemption, on condition that this self-consciousness were clearly and fully evident,10 there would also be no instant in which consciousness of sin would be absent, itself viewed as something present and operative that is an essential component of one’s selfconsciousness. If this is so, then a susceptibility to sin that is not fully overcome even by dint of redemption would, for that very reason, have to be considered, in and of itself, to be already truly infinite. Moreover, suppose that the tendency to have Godconsciousness were to become darkened and defiled11 by this susceptibility to sin. In that situation, then, by dint of such an impure and insecure Godconsciousness, though it be the very best of all that exists within a human being, one would have to be thoroughly incapable not only of simply developing states within us that would be congruent with states whereby the tendency to have God-consciousness would be properly directed, but even incapable of consciously aspiring to those states. Now, Christian piety traces everything that is in any way connected with Godconsciousness back to either sin or grace.12 If this is so, then we must also ascribe everything within our inner states that is not sin simply to our sharing in the process of redemption. Moreover, we must acknowledge grace alone to be that whereby the susceptibility to sin announced in this proposition can be overcome. 2.13 Now, suppose, however, that we also admit unreservedly to this incapacity for good between the two boundaries of willing and accomplishing,14 between which boundaries all actual self-initiated activity is enclosed—that is, inasmuch as “good” is understood to mean only what is determined by means of God-consciousness. Yet, accordingly, one ought not also to extend the congenital susceptibility to such an extent that even the capacity to receive redemption within oneself would have to be denied to a human being. This is the case, for this capacity to receive redemption is the smallest piece that can be posited of the tendency to have Godconsciousness that is inherent in the original perfection of humankind.15 Thereupon nothing of those higher gifts would consequently be present which constitute the advantages of human nature and in which everything by which human beings are distinguished from beasts has to have some part. Rather, these gifts would be so totally moribund that one would

actually have to say that humans were born without human nature, and yet this assertion would be contradicted as soon as it is uttered. However, the claim that even this very capacity to receive redemption would have vanished16 conflicts with our faith in redemption. This is so, for the capacity to receive grace that is proffered to us is the indispensable condition of all efficaciousness of that grace. The result of living without this capacity would be either the impossibility of human improvement or, once improvement were somehow made possible, a quite different presupposition would arise, namely, that of a transformation of humankind proceeding with total passivity on its part, a transformation necessary for that capacity to receive redemption to be generated. At this point, however, the transformation produced could just as well be directed to the whole of human life, and in the same manner humankind’s complete sanctification could be effected. By this means, redemption would then be rendered superfluous. Hence, we could relate the aforementioned incapacity for good only to self-initiated activity in the narrower and proper sense. We could not relate it in the same fashion to human receptivity, however. Moreover, if one wanted to call the beginning of cooperative activity with God a living internal acceptance17 of grace, then we would not unconditionally accede to the proposition that in spiritual matters original sin would also hinder human beings at every beginning and every point of cooperative activity.18 In contrast, moreover, the work of vital receptivity is no beginning; rather, first that which is to be received must draw near. Further, this process would also actually not be a cooperative activity but rather a surrender of oneself to what is being done. Our claim would also have all the Redeemer’s invitations in its favor, viewed as invitations directed to this receptive capacity. No less favorable would be the general practice of those who have proclaimed the reign of God, who were constantly calling people to receive God’s grace within themselves. Indeed, even if one proceeds based on a presupposition of humankind’s ceaselessly producing changes for the worse, with Augustine19 one must still admit that some residue of its original goodness has to remain in human nature continually, nonetheless. 3. Even within the domain of self-initiated activity, however, people have constantly and with care limited the concept “incapacity for good” to that which Christian piety alone recognizes to be good in the strictest sense. Given this limitation, people have granted, at the same time, that a contrast exists between what is praiseworthy and what is blameworthy that does not at all depend on one’s being in relationship to the redemptive process. Rather, just as those who have not been blessed by grace can have what is praiseworthy in itself, so too those blessed are aware of having earned it without the aid of grace.20 It is also entirely fitting to designate the entire domain of activity directed to what is good with the expression “civil justice,” the word being taken in a broad sense.21 This is to be explained in two parts as follows: Suppose, first, that everything that is close to what is determined and effected through God-consciousness were to have a popular reference and that instances that could be advanced against this situation would always be merely illusory. Second, suppose that likewise public spirit could not apply the standard of Godconsciousness to those human behaviors and conditions which are related to a commonwealth. Rather, at most, public spirit could require only a patriotic mindedness in the

purest and fullest way possible. Yet, suppose that this patriotism were able to engender the fullest possible abnegation of an individual’s personal existence. Even so, this entire situation would still always comprise simply self-love by a state or a people, either one viewed as if it were a composite person. Moreover, this self-love could be tied to animosity and injustice of any sort against those who exist outside this union, if self-interest—or love of honor on the part of the commonwealth, which in turn would still be self-love—were not to demand the opposite.22 Hence, inasmuch as it exists independently of the force wrought through Godconsciousness,23 even the best in this civil domain could be accounted only to fleshly mindedness, fleshly wisdom, and fleshly justice. Much too much would be conceded, however, and a main piece of Christian piety would be greatly obscured, if that incapacity for good were limited merely to the so-called “works” of the Ten Commandments’ first tablet, as if without these works’ being connected with redemption human beings could not accomplish them. In contrast, the works of the second tablet would be entirely the same as those of civil justice, which human beings would be able to perform even without the divine Spirit. Yet, only a Christian could view any of these works to be a fulfillment of a divine command,24 in no way whatsoever viewing them as merely external and fleshly works. Rather, a Christian would see them as truly spiritual works, which are possible only by virtue of a purified and efficacious Godconsciousness, with the result that in this relation no distinction would be made between duties to God and duties to neighbor.25

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal headings here are “[§70.] Explanation. §71. Clarification concerning Fault [Schuld] [with regard to susceptibility (Sündhaftigkeit) to sin.] §72. [Clarification] concerning its Origin in the Behavior of the First Human Beings” (Thönes, 1873). Here and wherever else Schleiermacher uses Sündhaftigkeit instead of the usual Sündlichkeit, contexts indicate that Sündhaftigkeit (susceptibility to sin) comprises an inner tendency that one has not entirely appropriated or that has gained some degree of one’s force of will (Willenskraft) to resist. Thus, one could have reached even so far as to be tempted, as Jesus was reported to have been, and yet not be grasped by temptation. Accordingly, susceptibility is a last step, often strongly conditioned by habit on the way to actually committing sin. See also §70n9 below regarding Jesus’ not acting on, or perhaps having no, susceptibility to sin. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 38f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 53. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 112; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 146. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 365; also Cochrane (1972), 147f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330. 5. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 235; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 247, 251. Cf. §37n3. 6. Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 493f. See §37n5. Here “preventing” refers to God in Christ “turning to us before we turn to God,” in “prevenient grace,” which Schleiermacher substitutes with the term “preparatory grace” (see index). 7. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 28:379. Schleiermacher here refers to the Repetitio, without giving the source or pagination. 8. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates two reasons for claiming congruity between the present account and those he has given above: “l. Congruity with [my] accounts above [Übereinstimmung mit dem Bisherigen] [perhaps, to some extent, also with earlier confessional accounts cited above]: (a) On account of the ubiquity of sin, and (b) On account of sin’s darkening [Verdunkelung, or obscuring] of God-consciousness” (Thönes, 1873). 9. Ed. note: That is, susceptibility to sin is already imparted before one actually sins, viewed as a step toward sinning, followed by one’s being sinful (sündig). Once one has activated that capacity to sin, viewed either as derived from an effective influence upon oneself or as one’s relatively independent action, one has entered the condition of “sinfulness” (Sündlichkeit). Schleiermacher holds fast to this distinction throughout the present work. By implication, Jesus, if perfectly

lacking in sinfulness, might have registered within himself potential influences from others toward actually sinning, or he might have taken in some susceptibility to sin but have rejected all influences toward further embodying or expressing or acting upon any susceptibility to sin. This would be an ostensive definition of his resisting all temptation, thus being wholly like other human beings but without sin. Gradually, then, by his influence as Redeemer he would release regenerate persons from sinfulness by himself passing on his “sinlessness” (Unsündlichkeit) and possibly release regenerate persons from all susceptibility to sin. There seems to be no clear reference in CF, however, to a literal insusceptibility to sin (Unsündhaftigkeit) in passages about Jesus, Christ, or the Redeemer. See further developments toward insusceptibility to sin in §§71–72; see also developments of its connection with the process of redemption in §§83–84. In discourse concerning “the sinlessness” of Christ in §§98, the term susceptibility to sin is not used at all with reference to Christ, and, later on, Sündhaftigkeit is used only in a “general” reference to human beings vs. the particular Sündlichkeit of an individual (in §98.1). The special distinction of the Redeemer in comparison with the rest of humanity began with Schleiermacher’s general characterization in §13. 10. See §62.1 and §64.1–2. 11. See §8.2. Ed. note: There the development of religious self-consciousness is explicated from the standpoint of a relation of higher to lower self-consciousness (therewith consciousness of the world and of God in relation to sensory consciousness). This phenomenon is demonstrated in the relation of monotheism to polytheism and fetishism, respectively. The more development is held back, the more are all higher functions of self-consciousness obscured and despoiled. 12. See §62. 13. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates: “Restriction [of the human incapacity for good]: necessarily, the human capacity for being receptive is yet to be considered” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Phil. 2:13; cf. 4:13. Ed. note: Sermons on Phil. 2:12–13, June 23, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 527–44, and on Phil. 2:12–16 in KGA III/7 (2012), 215–24. 15. Compare these two statements from the Belgic Confession (1561) 14: “And thus become wicked, perverse, and corrupt in all his ways, he hath lost all his excellent gifts which he had received from God, and only retained a few remains thereof, which, however, are sufficient to leave man without excuse,” and “there is no will or understanding conformable to the divine will and understanding but what Christ hath wrought in man.” Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 399–400, for clarity stated somewhat more extensively from the French text; cf. Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 368f. 16. Solid Declaration (1577) 2: “In this human nature after the fall and before rebirth, there is not a spark of spiritual power left or present with which human beings can prepare themselves for the grace of God or accept grace as it is offered. Nor are they capable of acting in their own behalf or applying this grace to themselves.” Nevertheless, even this statement, however noticeable it is, at least insofar as it is in contradiction to our claim is, in turn, withdrawn by way of the following statement: “A person who has not been converted to God and been reborn can hear and read this Word externally, for in such external matters, as stated above, people have a free will to a certain extent even after the fall, so that they may … or may not listen to the sermon [Word].” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 544, 554; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 874, 892. 17. Intussuszeption. Ed. note: Meaning a fully understood, internal acceptance. This is a rare, improbable usage of the term by Schleiermacher himself. 18. Solid Declaration (1577) 1: “We repudiate … those who teach that … there is nevertheless something good left from our actual birth, such as the capability … to begin doing something or to cooperate in spiritual matters.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 535; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 851. 19. Augustine (354–430), Enchiridion (421), 4.12: “So long as a being is in a process of corruption, there is present in it a good of which it is being deprived. … For this reason corruption cannot consume good without consuming its being.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 377–78; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:237. 20. Ed. note: To summarize the theological claim made here and certain major implications of it. (1) Schleiermacher’s general claim is this: being or not being blessed by grace is not connected to what is praiseworthy or blameworthy. (2) At this point a contrast ordinarily meaning “not being pardoned” vs. “being pardoned,” a contrast otherwise little used by Schleiermacher, enters into his brief explanation. Thus, in usage within a genuinely Christian context, Unbegnadigte, as he indicates here, more literally means “not blessed by grace.” Forgiveness of sins might well be present as an aspect of God’s redeeming love (cf. §§164–167). However, unlike an executive or judicial pardon, it is not an event “for cause” (persuasive reasons given) or one that an individual “gets by with,” also not something even “at the mercy of “God (cf. §85). Rather, at God’s gracious invitation a person then sees one’s “need for redemption” and makes a positive receiving response. (3) In this process one is then turned (“converted,” cf. §108) to greater freedom in one’s new life with God vs. bondage to sin (cf. §§4.2, 74.3–4, 75.1, 80.1, 97.3, and 112.1). In the same process, one gets “redeemed” or “released” (erlöst) from sin. (4) As a “person of faith” (Gläubiger; cf. §100), one enters into a vital “relationship” (cf. §§35.2 and 63) or “communion” or “community” (cf. §§64, 90–91, 103.2, and 164) with God through Christ (cf. also §141). One is first inaugurated into a new,

internal state of “justification” (Rechtfertigung; cf. §§l04.4, l07, 109, and 119) or of developing in one’s “being right with God,” and, accordingly, of “righteousness” (Gerechtigkeit; cf. §104.4, 107, and 109). In terms advanced in all three editions of Schleiermacher’s discourses in On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821), the faith one holds is internally perceived and felt (Anschauung und Gefühl), terms not directly used as a pair in Christian Faith, in which Gefühl stands for the pair. (5) In such community, which is shared also with other human beings, one can then come to grow in “sanctification” in one’s entire being everywhere one is present (§§98–112), thus also in one’s externally directed thought and action as well. This situation Schleiermacher calls “piety,” or one’s overall life, itself always to be internally rooted in faith. 21. Ed. note: Here the two terms are Gerechtigkeit and bürgerliche Gerechtigkeit. Just below related terms applied to a “civil union” refer to a civic “common spirit” (Gemeingeist), which Schleiermacher subsequently applies to a distinctly different community called a church or community of faith versus a “commonwealth” or general “well-being” (Gemeinwesen) of a civic union. 22. Ed. note: Self-love of one’s own people or country against another folk (Volk) was something Schleiermacher witnessed earlier against the French during Napoleon’s invasion of German territories, including his native Prussia (1806– 1813). Cf. Johannes Bauer’s (1908) account of his “patriotic sermons” during that period. The present passage, like them, would provide evidence against an assumption that he took civic animosity and injustice to be consistent with Christian God-consciousness. In contrast, he had indeed long held a strong distaste for prominent tendencies in French intellectual culture and education, and he argued against them. However, these inclinations would not seem to be the same thing as he is at least implicitly warning against here, namely, hatred and injustice among Christians anywhere, especially against persons who exist outside one’s local ecclesial institutions, one’s country, or the domain of one’s own state. In accordance with his sizeable lectures on “the state,” in KGA II/8 (1998), this would be true whether it were ruled by a monarchy or were a putative republic or an empire. He continually argued against adverse imbalances and inequalities in face of other kinds of diversity elsewhere within his corpus of writings. These include letters, sermons, ecclesial papers, Christian ethics lectures, academy addresses, and various works on philosophical ethics. As he did propose, harmful controls and animosities against others can indeed be prominent, hence ethically improper, in all these postures of a state. For him, they are never appropriate from a Christian point of view, though even within Christian communities of faith, susceptibility to sin and outright sinfulness are sure to occur until their consummate end. 23. Ed. note: The process described here, and often elsewhere in the present work, calls for some unpacking, namely: Schleiermacher views God-consciousness as entailing a meeting within one’s internal feeling of faith. Once this event rises to the level of conscious operations regarding its original formation, operations that hold in mind the meeting between God and human beings, the force (Kraft) of this event is seen to have originated from God, to be received and held in mind by a human being. Thus, it is viewed in self-consciousness as an actual force wrought through the divine-human encounter itself and, as such, it comprises “God-consciousness.” 24. Matt. 22:37–39, complemented by John 13:34 and Col. 3:23. Ed. note: See sermon on John 13:34, Feb. 10, 1833, SW II.3 (1835), 470–82. 25. Hence, Philipp Melanchthon’s (1497–1560) entirely general expression in the section on free will in his Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) is to be adhered to: “The will is not able to fend off the perversity we have from birth, nor is able to satisfy the law of God.”—In the section on original sin he states: “Original sin … is offspring from the male seed, a loss of light in the mind and an aversion of the will from God and an obstinacy of the heart so that they cannot in truth obey God’s law. … On account of that corruption they are condemned from birth.” ET Kienzles/Tice; cf. Manschreck’s trans. (1965) from the German edition of 1555, where the same positions are given, and more, but no exactly corresponding statements; Latin: CR 21:655 and 669. See §32n16.

§71. At the same time, however, original sin is so much the personal fault of every individual who takes part in it that it is best represented as the collective act and collective fault of the human race and that recognition of it is at the same time recognition of the general human need for redemption. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) II: “This disease or original fault (vitium) is truly sin, which even now damns and brings eternal death to those who are not born again.”1

(2) Apology Augsburg (1531) II: “What becomes of original sin if human nature by itself has the power …? What need will there be for the grace of Christ?” IV: “Therefore, … all are under sin … what has been given us is the promise of the forgiveness of sins and justification on account of Christ.”2 (3) Basel Confession (1536) VIII: “This inherited disease (Erbsucht, lues) called original sin, pervades the entire human race, in such a way that nothing can cure it save God through Christ.”3 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) XI: “We believe, also, that this evil is truly sin, sufficient for the condemnation of the whole human race, even of little children in the mother’s womb, and that God considers it as such.”4 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XV: “We believe that … original sin is … vile and abominable in the sight of God.”5 (6) Smalcald Articles (Luther, 1537) Part III.1 (On Sin): “If these teachings were right (namely, that the human being is able, by using natural powers, to keep and carry out every command of God), then Christ has died in vain, for there would be no defect or sin in humankind for which he had to die.”6 (7) Confession of the Bohemian Brethren (1535) in Art. IV: “It is necessary that … all … know their infirmity …, and the fact that in no way are they able … to protect themselves … nor do they have anything besides Christ …, by whose trust … they may redeem and free themselves.”7 (8) Epitome of the Articles (Formula of Concord, 1577) I: “We affirm that … the damage is such that only God alone can separate human nature and the corruption of this nature from each other. … Therefore, we reject and condemn the teaching that original sin is only a reatus, that is, guilt which results from someone else’s fault.”8 (9) Solid Declaration (1577) I: “… after the fall of our first parents … our entire nature and person … God’s law accuses and condemns … if we are not redeemed from them through Christ’s merit.”9 (10) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “On account of that corruption [Adam’s sin], they were born condemned.”10

1. In not a few of these symbolic passages and among many teachers of faith-doctrine, the thesis does indeed obtain the appearance as if the susceptibility to sin that shows up in all human beings from birth,11 precisely inasmuch as it is something received from elsewhere, is nonetheless to be regarded as the fault of each one, in fact a fault that implies unlimited deserving of punishment. As a result, even the greatest abundance of actual sins could not add anything to the culpability for sin to which everyone is thought to be subject already on account of this so-called disease. Moreover, one must find it to be a natural consequence that in this form the proposition is denied by many who would rather declare original sin to be an “evil” so as not to recognize as a fault something that is entirely beyond one’s own doing. The proposition also acquires this twist into something unbelievable, bears this repellent and hostile tone, moreover, only when one tears original sin from its connection with actual sin. This move runs contrary to what would be natural, and it would inveigh against the quite generally recognized, correct rule.12 Furthermore, all this does not intend to be understood in the sense that original sin would not be a fault until it breaks out into actual sins. This is the case in that indeed the sheer circumstance in which there is no opportunity for sin or any external enticement to it cannot be regarded as enhancing the spiritual worth of a human being. Rather, it is to be understood in the sense that original sin is the sufficient reason for all actual sins in any individual. In consequence, the individual needs only something outside oneself, and nothing new added within oneself, for actual sins to unfold. Original sin is something purely received only in the measure that the self-initiated activity13 of the individual has not yet arisen. Original sin ceases to be something received strictly in the measure that the individual’s self-initiated activity is developing. Until then, and only to that degree, original sin is rightly called “originated”14 because it has its cause outside the individual. However, just as every aptitude in a human being gains proficiency through exercise and grows in this way, so too an individual’s susceptibility to sin from birth grows through exercise proceeding from one’s self-initiated activity. Now, although in this way this susceptibility to sin is the effect of actual sin, this growing added component of self-initiated activity, of the same nature as that originally brought along from birth—that is, this persevering inner ground of sinful actions—is thus, nonetheless, consequently also still original sin. It is so in this same relation but viewed as strengthened sinfulness repeatedly preceding the actual sin that will emerge from it. Yet, in this relation it is no longer purely “originated” but is self-effected and “originating original sin,”15 exactly the same expression as is customarily applied to the first sin of the first human beings. That is, it is applicable in both instances because this self-effected original sin pushes up and increases actual sin in each individual self and thereby in others as well. Now, suppose that this subsequent susceptibility to sin, having grown out of an individual’s own self-initiated activity, would be one and the same thing as the original susceptibility to sin that appears from birth, then two things also follow. First, the added susceptibility to sin would have emerged in the individual by one’s free acts of life that are affixed to original susceptibility to sin. Second, as this occurs, it holds just as well that original susceptibility to sin, which in any case would recede more and more in comparison

to that added susceptibility to sin but with which one would always have started off, would not advance in oneself without one’s will and would therefore also have emerged by one’s own agency. Consequently, this advance of original sin in actual sin is rightly called the fault of each individual. To be sure, from this point on one could say that this fault could only be assigned to human beings to the extent that they themselves have already acted but not in the same way to children and not at all to the unborn; and here a distinction is indeed not to be denied. However, if the matter has always rested in the claim that actual sin inevitably proceeds from original sin, then everywhere that human life is present actual sin is grounded internally, and the connection on account of which original sin is one’s fault likewise exists in children and the unborn as well, even if it has not exactly emerged in them as yet. As a result, one can say of them that they will be sinners by means of that tendency which already exists in them at a given time. It has probably never been seriously doubted that they are not yet sinners in that same sense and degree as are those in whom actual sin has already become constant, especially since here the issue is only one of fault.16 However, this distinction does not apply to susceptibility to sin at birth, and to the degree that the symbolic passages in which reference is made to children are intended especially to shed light on the degree of fault, we can also fully adopt them. 2. Now, if, on the one hand, the susceptibility to sin that precedes every deed is effected in each individual by the sin and susceptibility of sin of others, but if, at the same time, it is also both propagated in others and secured in them by each individual through one’s own free actions, then sinfulness is of a thoroughly collective nature.17 Indeed, whether one were to consider susceptibility to sin more as a fault and as a work or more as a motivating principle of life and as a condition, in both respects it is of a thoroughly collective nature, not present separately in each individual and not related to each individual alone; rather, in each individual susceptibility to sin is the work of all, and in all individuals it is the work of each. Indeed, susceptibility to sin is to be understood rightly and fully only in this commonality. Hence, the doctrinal propositions that treat of original sin and susceptibility to sin are in no way to be conceived as expressions of personal self-consciousness, with which, in contrast, the doctrine of actual sin has to do; rather, these propositions are expressions of collective consciousness. This collectivity of sin and susceptibility to sin comprises an inclusive solidarity18 of all times and places in relation to what is set forth in these propositions. With respect to its shape, the distinctive formation of original sin in each individual is simply an integrating component of the formation of it in the sphere of life to which the individual belongs most closely. In consequence, that distinctive individual formation of original sin, not intelligible of itself alone, points to the remaining components as its complement. This whole complementary process, moreover, goes through all the gradations of shared feeling19 that run through families, relatives, genealogy, peoples, and racial identities of human beings. In consequence, the formation of susceptibility to sin in each of these gradations of shared feeling points to that present in the others, viewed as its complement. Moreover, the collective force of the flesh in its resistance against the spirit,

inasmuch as this force is the basis of all that is incompatible with God-consciousness in human actions, can also be conceived only in terms of the collective existence of all who are living in association with one another20 but never wholly in one part of that collective force of the flesh. Moreover, even that of the collective force of the flesh which appears in a single individual entity, be this a personal or a composite individual entity, is not to be described in relation to this individual entity alone nor to be explained from this individual entity alone. The same, however, is also true of times. What appears from birth as the susceptibility to sin of a generation is conditioned by the susceptibility to sin of earlier generations and itself conditions the susceptibility to sin of generations yet to come. Moreover, only in the whole series of these formations, as that series interconnects with the advancing development of humanity, is the entire relationship expressed in the concept “original sin” given. Likewise, the inclusive solidarity of times and of places also both mutually condition each other and refer back to each other. Probably anyone would readily testify, moreover, that only in relation to that collective existence does either the notion of the susceptibility to sin of individuals or one’s feeling of also having that susceptibility to sin in common21 reach the level of surety and satisfaction. Precisely by virtue of this interconnectedness, however, each individual is, in relation to that collective existence, a representative of the entire human race. This is so, because the susceptibility to sin of each individual refers back to the collective susceptibility to sin of all, spatially as well as temporally considered, and also helps to condition that collective susceptibility to sin both around and after oneself. Now, the various ways original sin is customarily designated, all of which have a relative truth in them, are most easily united in this view of it. First, it is called a fault22 with complete correctness only if it is absolutely considered to be the collective deed of the entire human race, in that it cannot likewise be a fault of an individual, at least to the extent that it is engendered in that individual. It is called natural corruption23 in contrast to original perfection insofar as the state of original perfection is in part overcome by original sin in the real unfolding of that state. It is also called original defect24 insofar as it is the irremediable basis for malformations of the relationship between spirit and the particular functions of sensory life, and original disease25 insofar as a feature of death is posited to occur through it in all acts of spiritual life. Further, it is called original evil26 insofar as it is within the individual a persistently effective basis of obstacles to life that are independent of the individual’s own doing. How difficult it is, however, to depict original sin as punishment27— I do not want to say exclusively but even if only at the same time—is doubtless self-evident. This is so for two reasons. In the first place, punishment is always something inflicted, but sin can never be something inflicted; thus punishment must always be something that is not sin in the person who undergoes it. In the second place, in every sin for which original sin is supposed to be punishment, original sin must itself always be presupposed to exist already, so that in the final analysis the punishment would have to exist before the sin. 3. Suppose that the self-consciousness, the expression of which is the concept of original susceptibility to sin developed up to now, were no collective feeling but were rather a personal feeling in each individual. Then a consciousness of a general need of redemption

would doubtless not be necessarily bound to it, in that each individual would have believed it to be necessary to rely above all on the collective body to which one belongs for strengthening of one’s spiritual force. This is why denying that original sin is collective in nature and underrating the value of redemption through Christ usually go together. This connection of the two attitudes would also not be any firmer, moreover, if original susceptibility to sin could be present within us without our having any consciousness of it. That is, in that case either consciousness of sin would be quite feeble if it emerged at all or it would emerge only each time an actual sin were committed and would be referred only to this actual sin. That is to say, each individual would have to rely on one’s own resources, in weaker moments drawing from supposedly stronger resources available in the past. Such a lack of consciousness regarding one’s susceptibility to sin, however, is possible only where God-consciousness has still not developed at all or where a tendency to have God-consciousness has not been awakened by communication. Thus, this is not possible within the domain of Christianity and of Christian proclamation. Only where Godconsciousness has once been taken up will preeminence also be afforded it among the various features of self-consciousness and will its dominion be sought. Where this happens, moreover, the resistance of flesh must also come into consciousness as something constant and as something that conditions the reality of particular sins. Now, suppose that we first become quite clear about the resistance when we observe it to belong to our self-consciousness expanded to consciousness of the human species. Then either all hope of gaining preeminence for God-consciousness must be given up or the need must arise to obtain succor that comes from outside the domain of that expanded selfconsciousness. Consequently, there must also arise either a surrender to the insurmountable futility of that striving or a presentiment of that succor. These alternatives display the appropriateness of that presentation which would also link an initial presentiment28 of redemption with the initial consciousness of sin that appears as God-consciousness arises. Now, the passages cited above make clear how, from the very beginning on, these two features of consciousness have been bound together in the Evangelical church too. Likewise, however, they also make clear how these two features of consciousness actually interconnect: first, the conviction that forces that surpass the human consciousness of sin already held in common from time immemorial could not be set in motion for us and among us and, second, the resolve to make do with this shared consciousness of sin. Moreover, without any boost for the purpose from actual redemption, they overcome the resistance of flesh, if only to a certain degree. 4. However, this natural interconnectedness between consciousness of general, original susceptibility to sin and consciousness of a necessity of redemption29 from it would be disrupted and misdirected, not without considerable detriment to genuine Christian piety, if consciousness of deserving punishment30 for original sin were thrust into the mix. This is so, for suppose that by “punishment” one understands not the mounting intensity of sin itself but an evil that has been unfolding from sin or is governed with reference to sin. In a teleological mode of faith the mounting intensity of sin can be comprehended only as fault and as still

more sin. As a result, in this instance the relation between consciousness of sin and consciousness of a need for redemption that we have discussed would not be a natural one here. If all this is true, then a feeling regarding the necessity of redemption that would first be mediated by consciousness of deserving punishment would no longer be so strictly unalloyed as what has been described up to now. That is, this is plainly the case when “to be deserving of punishment” is set forth only to draw attention to punishment itself and when the opinion is that the need for redemption from sin is to be awakened, or even simply enhanced, by fear of punishment. Furthermore, for at that point, removing the condition of susceptibility to sin could not be desired for the purpose of doing away with restraint to God-consciousness and making room for God-consciousness. Rather, the purpose would be to secure distinct states of sensory self-consciousness and to guard against opposing states. Not wanting resistance of flesh would be simply for the sake of fleshly consequences, and redemption would likewise be willed simply for the sake of fleshly consequences, whereby actual piety would thus entirely recede from the scene. Now, one could indeed also imagine that what is to be considered is not so much punishment itself as being deserving of it, and one could imagine that what is to be aroused is not so much fear of punishment as dread of deserving it. Even then, however, the relation to what is of a sensory nature would always be set forth as the criterion for what is spiritual. This would be so in that it would be presupposed that if a person were not in and of oneself disposed to have God-consciousness in control of one’s life, then one could at least be led to this point by reflecting on the fact that otherwise one would appear to be someone who is unworthy of sensory well-being. By this route, moreover, Christian piety would be no less endangered than by the other route. For this reason, we have not adopted even this notion here, not at all. In contrast, one can see, based on the passages cited from creedal symbols, in comparison with what has just been explicated, how essential it is for these symbols to derive the need for redemption from the consciousness of susceptibility to sin. One can also see, however, how easily the one can skip over the inserted notion of being deserving of punishment for original sin without doing damage to the interconnection we have discussed. Treatment of this notion, however, is reserved for another place.31

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 39; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 53; cf. §70n2. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 113, 126; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 149, 167f. 3. Ed. note: Helveticus prior sive Basileensis posterior confessio fidei (1536), written first in German, then, in a shorter Latin version, the text quoted here. Niemeyer (1840), 116. This translation (Tice) draws from both texts, titled Von der Erbsünde and Originale Peccatum. It is also known as the First Helvetic Confession; see §145n3. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 366; also Cochrane (1972), 148; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 332. 5. Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 400; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 370. 6. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 311; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 435. 7. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 790. See §36n2. 8. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 489; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 772f. 9. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 533; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 847. 10. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 21:669. See §32n16. 11. Mitgeborene. Ed. note: This word indicates a condition that can be observed, whereas the concept oft used, angeborene (innate), indicates a condition that must be implied or presupposed.

12. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559), in the section on actual sin, states: “Accordingly, actual sins are always accompanied at the same time with the evil of original sin.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; this statement continues: “which are all mortal in those who are not reborn”; cf. the corresponding section in the translation of the 1555 German edition by Manschreck (1965), 80–82, where the same meaning is given but not this statement; Latin: CR 21:680. See §32n16. 13. Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s psychology, self-initiated activity (or spontaneous action) is always wrapped in a continually oscillating engagement with receptivity, though in a given moment one of the two elements may be predominant. 14. Verursachte Ursünde: Peccatum originis originatum. Ed. note: Or “caused.” 15. Verursachende Ursünde: Peccatum originis originans. Ed. note: Or “causing.” 16. Schuld. Ed. note: Here this is the term regularly translated “fault.” In German, the same word is also used for “guilt” or “blame.” See §71n22. 17. Ein durchaus Gemeinschaftliches. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s much-used concept of the “collective life [Gesamtleben] of sin” and that of its “commonality” (Gemeinsamheit) both also refer to the same shared processes over against “the collective life of grace” in the reign of God, and they are likewise brought to consciousness by participation in the latter. See related accounts in §§63.3, 64.2, 67.2, and 68.2–3, then carried forward with respect to original sin in §§69– 70, further discussed in terms of divine grace in Christ in §89.1 and of sanctification in §112, and finally in the context of the doctrine of the church, beginning with §§115–16. 18. Zusammengehörigkeit. Ed. note: Here, a broad solidarity, as in “We’re all in this together” versus an exclusive, selfcontained solidarity. 19. Gemeingefühl. 20. Gesamtsein aller Zusammenlebenden. 21. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: Eventually in this work, this concept not only conveys the satisfaction of knowing that one is not anywhere near being solitary in one’s susceptibility to sin, in one’s being out of touch with God and in need of redemption, but also takes on compassion for others who lack the joy and solace of redemptive blessedness. 22. Schuld. Ed. note: Schleiermacher supplies the word reatus here, one that bears the same range of meanings as Schuld (see §71n16). In classical Latin it literally referred to the condition, offense, or appearance (e.g., dress) of a person who stands accused. 23. Verderben: Corruptio naturae. A different meaning of this expression from that assumed in this location will be considered below. 24. Urgebrechen: vitium originis. Ed. note: In some prayers it is called “shortcoming,” as with the familiar phrase “forgive us our shortcomings and offenses.” 25. Urkrankheit: morbus originis. On morbus and vitium, compare Cicero (106–43 BCE), Tusculan Disputations (45 BCE) 4.13. Ed. note: There Cicero states: “Disease [morbus] is the term applied to a breakdown of the whole body, sickness [aegrotionem] to disease attended by weakness, defect [vitium] when the parts of the body are not symmetrical with one another and there ensue crookedness of the limbs, distortion, ugliness.” Latin and ET in Loeb Library (1960), 356–57. Accordingly, in medical language “morbidity” refers to an incidence of death and dying, becoming moribund, in a person or population. 26. Urübel. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s view, this concept would include the natural consequences of human wickedness (Böse), even if these are either not immediately intended or within the nonhuman areas of nature. 27. Apology Augsburg (1531) 2: “The deficiency and concupiscence are both penalty and sin.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 119; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 156. 28. Ed. note: Ahndung (presentiment) and Ahnung (presentiment). On the two spellings and basic meanings of Ahndung and Ahnung, see §159n3, where both are used, also §159n8–9. The older sense, Ahndung, Schleiermacher can generally use to mean both “foreboding” and a presentiment of something positive (cf. §§7.3, 14.1, 27.4, 64.1, 66.1, 73.2, 74.3–4, 80.2), and he uses Ahnung only in a positive sense (also in §§14.P.S. and 45.1). Both terms express an imaginal anticipation of events yet to appear. On public spirit, patriotism, and religious presentiment, see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 2. See index for all three experiences. 29. Erlösung. Ed. note: This concept literally refers to a process of being loosed or liberated from, hence there is no prima facie, built-in sense of substitutionary payment made in punishment sustained or sacrifice offered on behalf of sinners, as in customary atonement theories, even though the same concept is often used for those theories. 30. Strafwürdigkeit. Ed. note: Or, as some say, “penal desert.” 31. Ed. note: See §76. This first point of doctrine regarding original sin closes with an argument showing that “original sin,” as explicated thus far, cannot be attributed in the same sense to any alteration in the person of the first human beings due to their first sin (§72). The second point of doctrine, which deals with “actual sin,” establishes that actual sin is

continually issuing from original sin, thus defined (§73), and that although “sin does not stand in the same relationship to redemption in everyone,” the “worth” of every human being is exactly the same in regard to sin (§74). The second section then considers how the “world,” viewed as “the locus of our existence,” is to be regarded in relation to sin, i.e., the existence and effects of evil (§75). There all “social evil” is taken to be a direct punishment for sin, whereas “natural evil” is so only indirectly (§76). However, the “experiential basis” for this effect is solely communal; in no instance are evils that affect an individual to be causally attributed to that individual’s sin (§77). A postscript to this second point of doctrine (§78) refutes three implications that might be drawn, namely, that because of sin (a) passive endurance “of evil would be required,” (b) “a striving to call forth sin,” or (c) “a striving to get rid of evil in and of itself.” Finally, section 3 presents two divine attributes that refer especially to consciousness of sin. God’s causality is conceived to be holy, by dint of which holy causality “conscience” is found to be conjoined with existence of the need for redemption in all collective human life (§81). God’s causality is conceived to be just, by dint of which just causality “a connection of evil with actual sin is ordained in the condition of susceptibility to sin held in common” (§84). Among introductory claims set forth here (in §§79–82) are these: (a) In view of the relation of sin to redemption God is seen to be “the originator of sin” (§79); (b) God is also the originator of grace, but not in the same sense; yet, because neither sin nor grace is ever without the other in our self-consciousness, sin’s “having its being with and alongside grace is ordained for us by God” (§80); (c) human freedom does indeed have its role to play in humans’ sinning, yet the following must also be said: “God ordains that spirit’s dominion not yet being achieved in any instance should become sin for us” (§82). In an appendix (§85) Schleiermacher asserts another candidate for consideration here: “To attribute mercy to God is more suitable to the domains of homiletics and poetic language than to that of dogmatic language,” and explains why. These considerations constitute a bridge to the entirety of Part Two, which explicates the contrasting “consciousness of grace” (§§86–172) right through to the attributes of divine wisdom and the concluding doctrine of the triune God.

§72. Even though we cannot apply in the very same way the notion of original sin explicated thus far to the first human beings, nonetheless there is no reason to explicate the general human susceptibility to sin based on some alteration that has taken place within human nature in the very person of the first human beings by the first sin. 1. This proposition is meant solely to fend off error and promises no intention of establishing anything concerning the way sin emerged in the first human beings. It presupposes, in keeping with our initial explanation,1 that we are not able to set forth any proper doctrine of faith concerning this subject. The reason is as follows. Suppose that we were even able to expand our self-consciousness to that of the entire human race and were able in that way to bring self-consciousness into a combination with God-consciousness. Then we could not include the first human beings in this community of self-consciousness. We could not do so even directly in relation to that within them which would definitely and exactly connect with this community, namely, that they were created but not born, because to that extent their self-consciousness would be quite different from our own. Now, if we were talking about sin in the further course of their lives, then this difference would disappear, the more so the longer they lived. The situation would be different, however, in regard to susceptibility to sin, which is supposed to precede all deeds whatsoever. Suppose that we would then be unable to have any shared feeling2 with the first human beings in relation to susceptibility to sin and that we would thus have no self-consciousness to expound on this subject. Then there would be no statement of faith to set forth on the matter either.3 Suppose, however, that we had some information from some other quarter as to how susceptibility to sin in them related to their having been created, be this information then speculative in nature or more historical. Then we would indeed have to look into how this information would stand in relation to our propositions regarding our faith. Moreover,

inasmuch as this information would not be purely historical in nature but would be interlaced with presuppositions and combinations of its own, at that point safeguards could be set forth, as is done here, so that a Christian would not unwittingly produce doctrinal opinions that do not comport with the Christian’s faith. Now, in direct terms our consciousness of sin and its conjunction with the longing for some redemption from it will always remain the same whatever the situation might have been with the first human beings—unless, of course, it is claimed that they had not yet sinned at all during the period in which their work was to reproduce and raise offspring. Given this proviso, after that period anything they did further would be excluded from the domain of our expanded self-consciousness, in that the separate features of original susceptibility to sin could have meshed only gradually. Suppose, however, that they had already sinned in that earlier period. Then their next of kin too could already have had some sinfulness in their own lives, just as we do, even before they had done any deed, a susceptibility to sin that would have had its basis outside their own existence. This latter scenario, moreover, is sufficient to support our proposition, even if we could not also bring up any graphic image of how the susceptibility to sin of the first human beings would have been transmitted to their offspring and would have continued to be transmitted. Our creedal symbols also lay no special value on any such graphic image. Even though they derive the loss of sinlessness for all subsequent generations from the emergence of sin in the first ones,4 nevertheless, in part they do not get into further elucidations on the way this influence happened at all and, in part, they dismiss the question outright.5 2. On the other hand, the question as to how sin would have emerged in the first human beings after God-consciousness had developed is an eminently natural one nonetheless, even though it does not directly arise out of the interest of Christian piety. Obviously, however, we cannot answer it in regard to their situation with the same surety as we can in regard to our own situation in the propositions expounded here. This is so, in the first place, for we cannot form any graphic image of how sensory functions would have held a grip6 on them earlier than the higher, spiritual7 functions would, since from the beginning their status would have had to be at the same level as that of newborns, in whom spirit also holds some grip already. Now, suppose that we think of God-consciousness developing in them from within or even by means of some imaginable communion with God, though we simply do not know exactly how to picture it. In either case, there is no basis for imagining why Godconsciousness should have formed more strongly and quickly as a consciousness at rest but more sluggishly and weakly as an impulse. This is true especially since in any such supposed development from within we can find no reason at all to assume, in general terms, an unequal progress of intellect and will such as could accrue where there would be an unequal support of intellect through communicated notions and of will resulting from preestablished customs. Moreover, we cannot picture to ourselves any innate one-sidedness in the first human beings —with the exception of those associated with gender—either in this respect or in any other. This is the case, in that the plenitude of contrasting formations that experience offers us today could not have developed out of them otherwise than as a conglomeration of human nature.

Suppose, now, that by the very nature of the matter analogy fails us here. Then it all comes down to an attempt to explain the onset of sin in the first human beings without their having any susceptibility to sin in them beforehand. This attempt too seems doomed to failure, however, whether the biblical narrative regarding the first sin is taken literally or whether some significant general characteristic is assigned to it. The prevailing explanations are that humankind first sinned by Satan’s enticement8 or by misuse of its free will.9 In this instance, the two explanations hardly permit of being entirely separated, because sin is always a misuse of free will. However, the more that sin is ascribed to Satan’s activity, the closer Satan’s enticement comes to being either magic or sheer force and the less there is of any human deed, consequently of any sin as well. In contrast, the less there is of Satan’s enticement, the less likelihood there is of there being an act of sin apart from a susceptibility to sin already present. The latter is the case, in that misuse of free will in and of itself nevertheless offers no ground for explanation; rather, something must be assumed that has impelled one to that misuse. Suppose that at this point someone wants to go right back to the whispering innuendos of Satan. These promptings still could not have worked unless something were already present in the soul that contained a readiness to succumb to merely sensory desire. Moreover, such an inclination toward sin would therefore have to have existed in the first human beings already before the first sin, because otherwise no susceptibility to temptation10 could have taken place. It also does not help if one splits the first sin into several elements so as to arrive at the tiniest possible element to be viewed as its very outset,11 for if one is talking about one specific deed, then one must also inquire as to what could serve to explain the deed as a whole. The answer could never be found, moreover, if one were to presuppose a state in which there was no self-initiated activity of flesh but God-consciousness alone had dominance. This is so, because then no sinful desire could itself have arisen in a person, nor could Satan have made it credible that God could have forbidden something out of bearing a grudge; rather, trust in God would have had to be destroyed beforehand. However, if this trust had already been destroyed, then existing in the likeness of God would also have to have been lost already,12 and consequently a susceptibility to sin would also have been present already, whether it would then be thought of as in the form of pride13 or in some other form. Thus, the last recourse would be to explain the first sin as based on a misuse of free will such that it would have had no ground in a human’s inner being—that is, that this human being would have chosen to do wrong14 without any bases for deciding to do so. Here we are faced with two alternatives. The first of these alternatives is that the first sin would have to have occurred prior to all practice of what is good, because even through the briefest such exercise a skill for it would already have been produced that, given the absence of any countering grounds for deciding, would have to have proved to be fully active. In consequence, sin would thereupon have to have been the first free deed, which cannot in the least be acceded to. The second alternative is that throughout the lives of the first human beings there could not have arisen any ability to do good through repeated action. In that case, however, any consolidation in their doing good or any increase in God-consciousness having a grip on them would have been impossible.15

This outcome, in turn, is in contradiction to every notion of an original perfection16 in humankind. This difficulty of bringing to mind the emergence of the first sin without any underlying susceptibility to sin is increased to the utmost degree by the circumstances in which we catch sight of the first human beings according to the Mosaic narrative.17 That is to say, on the one hand one can least envisage an enticement or a misuse of free will given a great simplicity of life and a considerable ease in satisfying natural needs, because in such a state no stimulus coming from one particular object can be of any outstanding effect. On the other hand, one can certainly not in any way imagine keeping any direct company with God without one’s having developed an intensified love toward God and without one’s having formed an increased knowledge of God. By both means, human beings would have to have been secured against influences of nonsensical misrepresentations.18 This situation has also been recognized already from long, long ago.19 On account of that great “ability not to sin,” moreover, the more one holds to that narrative in literal terms, the more one also has to assume a correspondingly greater inclination toward sin to be present already. In an indirect fashion, this point also seems to be assumed by those who express themselves in such a way that “God did not will human beings to be confirmed in what is good prior to any voluntary obedience.”20 That is to say, suppose that confirmation in what is good would have to have been a special work of God and not a work of practice by virtue of forces that are located within human nature. Then, to be sure, this special work of God would presuppose the incapacity, already mentioned above, to acquire such abilities necessary to practice what is good. At the same time, however, this work of God would also presuppose, nevertheless, that without that special divine succor the spiritual force exercised by a human being could, in any given instance, just as well have been too slight to withstand a given sensory impulse. §3.21 That nothing new or special in the first human beings resulted from the first sin does indeed cohere with what has just been indicated. This is the case apart from that deteriorative force by which, even based on our own human condition of innate susceptibility to sin, the tendency to commit actual sin is strengthened by habit. However, what is presented also in our symbolic books concerning the first sin of the first humans22 must be presupposed already before that sin would have occurred. That is to say, human understanding would have to have been “darkened” already, entirely after the manner of heathens, if one were to take up the lie that God would have envied humans’ knowledge of what is good. The human will, moreover, would already have to have had no force left in it to withstand even the weakest enticement if the sheer sight of the “forbidden fruit” could have held such sway over it. Indeed, Adam would have to have been broken away from God already before his first sin, viewed as one who, when Eve handed him the fruit, ate of it without even taking notice of God’s forbidding it. This act, moreover, would thus already have presupposed a corruption of nature since uncorrupted nature also could not have indulged in that greediness, in express rejection of God’s command. Further, it can hardly be claimed that to form this conclusion is simply to adhere to a literal exegesis of the Mosaic narrative. Rather, however one might also think of the first sin, one would always have to presuppose something of a sinful nature to be

sinful in advance.23 If, moreover, one wanted to get a notion of how the first sin came about, its genesis, one would have to utilize a procedure similar to that which is followed here. Now, suppose, in contrast, that in advance of the first sin human nature in the first human beings had already become just as it appeared afterwards in themselves and in those born after them.24 Then, given this supposition, one could not say that nature had been altered by the first sin. Rather, we would have to distance ourselves from that claim in the symbolic books. That is to say, no one can be expected to offer the notion that the nature of one’s species could be changed in an individual being and, nonetheless, that being would remain the same. This is so, since the terms “individual being” and “species” would lose their meaning unless virtually everything that is to be discoverable as existing in an individual being, successively as well as at the same time, could be defined and conceived based on the very nature of the individual being’s species.25 That is to say, on the one hand, if in an individual being within the given species something showed itself that would contradict the earlier definition of the species, then the species would have been wrongly defined all along, and it would have to be defined differently. Or, on the other hand, the identity of the given individual being would simply be mistaken. Even less, moreover, is it possible to think that such a transformation of nature should have been the effect of the given individual being’s own deed, since that individual could, of course, behave only in accordance with the nature of its species but could never act to change it.26 Hence, it is also hardly possible to maintain this notion without thereby granting some participation to the devil, but at that point it is just as difficult if the devil’s participation is granted, to avoid the Manichean aberration.27 This is the case, for the following reason. First, suppose that it is definitely established that an alteration of something that is already defined as to its nature cannot be effected all by itself. Then any alteration that is due to one human being and to the devil could also be apportioned only in such a way that thereby the activity is ascribed to the devil and only passivity or receptivity is ascribed to the human being. In that case, however, it would have to be granted, further, that it would be simply a linguistic mistake to call the result of this activity simply an alteration of nature if individuals involved in this activity were to have remained exactly the same. Moreover, the more correct thing to say would be this: Through the first sin the very human nature which God originally created would have been destroyed by the devil, and in the same measure, the new nature of the species would also have been the work of the devil. This would be so in this case, because the nature of humans that was created by God would have retained a purely passive character so as to enable it to be entirely permeated by the alteration effected by the devil. In comparison, some people hold the view that thereupon the contrasting turnabout to be effected by redemption is, in turn, naturally a destruction of the nature that preceded it. To this view those would have little to object who, nevertheless, claim that the current nature of human beings would never have the capacity to take redemption into itself.28 All of these positions, however—both regarding human beings’ passive relation to the supposed fact of their nature’s being destroyed as well as also attributing to the devil sway over God’s work sufficient to replace that work with the devil’s own, with the result that an

entire inhabited world would come to be governed by the devil in addition to God’s own rule —comprise the most clearly defined transitions possible into the Manichean position. And yet, what others oppose in order sharply to refute its interconnection with Flacian doctrine seems to have almost no purchase at all.29 This is the case, for the following reasons. On the one hand, the sheer possibility of that position constitutes nothing other than a transition within reality, and so, if human beings today can only behave sinfully and perversely and the self-determination to behave wickedly is taken to be the work of Satan, so that the stillexisting work of God is also placed in motion only through the work of Satan, as an organ of Satan, then the work of God would be only seemingly the same now as before. On the other hand, suppose that the original work of God were not only the capacity to think, speak, and act but also free will, viewed as that which sets these capacities in motion. If free will were then lost, none of this work of God would persist any longer. This difficulty arises from the attempt to avoid treading the path of everything Manichean. It probably results from that way of looking at things which indeed also assumes an alteration within human nature wrought through the first sin, but which enables this effect to occur more along a physical pathway.30 In order to avoid positing that this alteration—namely, that of losing the might31 of human Godconsciousness—would not have to have been presupposed as occurring before the first sin, no express prohibition from God was included in the account before that happened. At that point, however, there would also be no ground for complaining that the first human beings would allow obscure sensations no sway over them, nor could the resolve to suppress these sensations, no matter what the occasion in which that resolve would have been made, count as sinful. Consequently, the spiritual deterioration of a human being that would have followed from eating the fruit by way of its effect on the human body would have happened without commission of any sin whatsoever. Moreover, general susceptibility to sin would then be derived from evil itself,32 which in its inveighing against the very nature of a teleological mode of faith cannot be regarded to be Christian.33 Hence, it is necessary to adhere to the following: the notion that an alteration of human nature that has arisen by means of a first sin committed by the first human beings does not belong in the series of those propositions, which are expressions of our Christian selfconsciousness.34 Now, the less we have already earlier35 found any basis for attributing a higher degree of customary religious actions36 and of religious illumination to the first human beings before the first sin, and the less successful we are in trying to explain the first sin as occurring out of an entirely sinless condition, the more does all occasion to assume a foregoing alteration in human nature also fall away, and the more reason there is to let this notion go away since it cannot, despite all these efforts, be brought to a point of clarity.37 Furthermore, the notion begets only that Manichean deviation we have noted, on the one hand and, on the other hand, out of fear aroused by this deviation it drives many Christians over to the Pelagian deviation instead, holding that they would prefer to disclaim a general incapacity of all human beings

for good apart from redemption than to derive the incapacity for good from such an alteration in human nature. In a special way, the untenable character of that Manichean deviation becomes evident when we refer back to the rather strict formulations used by the older dogmaticians to give tidy expression to theory held in the ancient creedal symbols.38 That is to say, the very first of the formulations used by Quenstedt—namely, “the individual being corrupts nature”— remarkably brings to clear perception39 how, provided that the nature which would have been corrupted by this act were previously good, in the act itself the individual being no longer could have been good. This would be the situation, because what is good cannot corrupt what is good. In contrast, suppose that nature would already have been bad. Then it would also be the case that the corruption of it would not have been initiated by the person’s action. Likewise, in another case, suppose that the individual being were good no longer, because, in that it had corrupted nature, it would have acted badly, but nature would still have to have been good, because later it was to be corrupted. Then it follows that all bad action would also have to be explicable without nature’s already needing to have been corrupt. Thus, all corruption would remain within the domain covered in the third and final formulation that Quenstedt used—namely, that individual beings corrupt themselves and one another—and this is also patently a satisfactory description of all sin that has ever appeared within the human race. However, therewith nature remains entirely out of play. Suppose, on the other hand, that nature were assumed to be corrupt already. Then there could be no more talk of its corrupting an individual being, which being, as such, would already have to bear corruption of nature within itself. Finally, suppose that the second formulation that Quenstedt used—namely, that “nature corrupts the individual being”—refers to the transmission of original susceptibility to sin. Then, to be sure, it would be true that individuals could become what they are only as nature is, but they would have been so from the very beginning. Moreover, the expression that Quenstedt used would still be incorrect, because the individuals in question would have to have been incorrupt initially if they were to become corrupt. This observation, moreover, arouses new objections to the first formulation, because it is inconceivable that an individual being should be able to affect nature more than nature affects it. In contrast, suppose that someone also wanted to assume, and indeed in general terms, that nature would corrupt individual beings. Then, since nature never exists, nevertheless, other than in the totality of individual beings, a fourth formulation would follow—namely, that nature would corrupt itself—which hardly anyone would be able to prove, regardless of what one might think. 4. Thus, suppose that no alteration in human nature would have occurred in the person of the first human beings through the first sin. Suppose too that, instead, what was to have taken form from that sin would have to be in place already prior to that sin.40 Suppose as well, however, that the supposition just made would not only apply in the case of some distinct first sin, whatever it might have been, but that this very same situation41 would always take place for every individual human being as well, from wherever one’s first sin might also have arisen. If this is deemed to be so, then that general susceptibility to sin, which does

subsequently precede every actual sin committed by future generations, would also be derived not so much from the first sin of the first human beings as rather from what already existed within themselves before their very first sin. As a result, then, through their own first sin, the first human beings would have been only the firstfruits of being sinful.42 To be sure, our books of creedal symbols do assume that derivation.43 In such circumstances, however, we can be all the less obligated to follow them in this regard when our consciousness of general susceptibility to sin, viewed as we have explicated it above,44 is a directly internal matter. Yet, this presumed parentage of susceptibility to sin by our creeds and confessions can be only an external memorandum at best, one on which that internal factor can neither depend nor be reinforced by it in any way. Instead, it must be said that our consciousness of redemption also depends on that internal factor, and thus, that presumed derivation of our susceptibility to sin45 is in no way a feature that comes from faith.46 Moreover, since, for the most part, the confessions themselves permit of no more nearly precise pronouncement concerning the manner or means of this derivation,47 for this reason we could only become rather dubious if this sort of derivation were to crop up within Scripture, and then be placed in connection with genuine statements of faith. Yet, this does not appear to be the case in the key passage that is customarily cited in this connection.48 That is to say, this passage speaks of the emergence of sin only for the purpose of elucidating the doctrine regarding the restoration of life through Christ, and the point of comparison also lies simply in the claim that both events stem in and proceed from one single origin.49 To be sure, the author of this passage does present all sin as dependent on the first beginning of sin, consequently as something continuous, with the result that, first, the entire continuous process of sin was already taken to be included along with Adam’s sin, and, second, that if Adam had been knowingly able to avoid sin, we would also have been able to avoid sin. Now, suppose that one were to add the following to this result—namely, the earlier pronouncement that death has come to prevail over all humans, because all have themselves sinned. Suppose further, that one were to observe the following: first, that Paul did indeed distinguish between Adam’s sin and that of those who have not sinned after the pattern of Adam, but that, second, although Paul nonetheless combines all these parties into one condemnation, Paul presents what Adam contributed to that condemnation as rather small in comparison with what Christ did for the overcoming of sin. It then follows from these added observations that they all comport very well with the view that the totality of sin is the collective act of the whole human race from the very first human being onward. Moreover, this collective act could be overcome only through Christ’s efficacious activity also being spread across the entire human race. In a similar manner, Paul elsewhere50 also places Christ over against Adam, just as he likewise testifies that in the same manner as occurred in Eve,51 sin still emerges in us and sensibility can be despoiled. From this observation it then follows that we gain nothing special for explaining susceptibility to sin by referring back to the first human beings. It also

follows that what really matters in regard to the biblical passages cited is also simply to take note of the relationship between earlier and later events. Hence, we can be glad to dispense with all of those artificially constructed theories, which also chiefly bear the tendency to focus on divine justice in the imputing of Adam’s sin to his descendants and thereby on assigning punishment for it. To dispense with them is all the more warrantable for two reasons. First, they can be dispensed with, in part, insofar as they would also have added to their account of all human beings’ participating in Adam’s sin by referring to a specific theory concerning how individual souls originated—as in that which assumes that all human beings are included in the very existence52 of Adam53— whereas in our own domain of existence we would lack all grounds or means for setting forth such a theory. Second, they can be dispensed with, in part, insofar as, in an extremely arbitrary manner, these theories consider God’s command to be a covenant contracted with the entire human race but embraced in the person of Adam. In these theories, thus the judicial consequences of violating the covenant would fall on Adam’s heirs as well, a process that subsumes human beings’ relationship with God and God’s reckoning under the concept of an external, judicial relationship, and thereafter that view has also borne a most deleterious influence on people’s conception of how redemption works. This latter view has reached its peak when people have assumed, at the same time, something that is, to be sure, often said and generally widespread but is, nevertheless, entirely arbitrary and wholly groundless—namely, that if the first human beings had laudably withstood the first test, no second one would have been laid before them, but at that point they, and we with them, would have remained exempt from all temptation forevermore. Rather, it is the case that just as the temptation indicated in the Mosaic narrative is very skimpy, it also represents only the simplest and most primitive circumstances, and it lies in the nature of the case that the more multifaceted a given human being’s powers that would come into play would be and the more complex one’s circumstances, the more dangerous the temptations arising for that person would have to be. Moreover, nothing seems more contradictory than to claim that the Redeemer could have been tempted in his life but that if Adam and Eve had triumphed in their first trial, they would have become impervious to temptation. Furthermore, already in itself this claim also stands in a most glaring contradiction with all that can be made conscious concerning how God operates: that is, the claim that within one small sphere of activity God should have made the destiny of the entire human race depend on one solitary element of life, an element placed in the hands of two inexperienced individuals,54 who would also have had no presentiment whatsoever regarding any such importance of that event. 5.55 Now, suppose that, on the one hand, we let go of this notion of an alteration within human nature itself in the distant past but that, on the other hand, we stick with the view that the general condition of human beings would be a lack of capacity for what is good. It would follow, then, that a lack of this capacity would already have been present in human nature before the first sin. It would follow too, that therefore what is an innate susceptibility to sin

today would also have been something native to the first human beings. Supposing that we also accede to these conclusions, then it is simply to be determined how that view is compatible with a likewise inborn original perfection, in such a way that for all time the original condition of the first human beings would have come to be analogous to our own condition, as we have already described above.56 Thus, in no way, on this account, are we transmuting the notion of a longer or shorter condition of a complete, vital piety into a notion holding that sin would have come to be the first free deed after achieving an awakened Godconsciousness. The latter notion was, in any case, already negated by what was said above.57 Rather, the beginning in human beings of something good—which also could not remain without continued consequences,58 as would have been shown to be still effective even after the first sin—is also posited with the awakening of Godconsciousness. After that point, however, for those first human beings there would have to have come a time when one aspect or another of their sensory characteristic59 would become so strong that it could just as easily gain the victory or be conquered. That is to say, even if we cannot be expected to form a graphic image of a first human being who would have been necessarily distinguishable from ourselves, there are, nonetheless, two pieces of the picture wherein that human being would have been like us and to which we could tie the emergence of sin in that human being as well. First, although there would have been no one-sidedness of personal constitution between them, there would, nonetheless, have been aspects of one-sidedness as to gender in them as well. Second, although it is unthinkable that they would undergo a recession of will behind understanding in exactly the same way as we do, like us they would, nonetheless, have been subject to an occasional shift in their moods60—perhaps, given their simple life, also only to a smaller degree—in which shifting at least a dissimilarity as to willpower would be revealed intermittently in various directions, from which an emergence of sin and of a consciousness of it would be completely conceivable. Now, suppose that in the first human beings the first appearance of sin, conditioned by this original susceptibility to sin, both were, in and of itself, an individual and a meager influence on human nature and were also especially lacking in any altering influence on human nature. Then, a growth of sin by means of an increase of the human race in the form of procreation would, nevertheless, be grounded in the initial breaking through of sin, consequentially in the original susceptibility to sin itself.61 In relation to redemption, moreover, this process is to be conceived in such a way that without the introduction, within the totality of human life, of a feature of that life that is free of that susceptibility to sin, nothing would have been expected other than that the indwelling tendency toward Godconsciousness within human nature would repeatedly have been defiled as to its efficacy, and everything developing spiritually would repeatedly have been dragged downward into a dominion of flesh. Finally, as concerns the Mosaic narrative: In staying within the boundaries we have set for the work of presenting faith-doctrine, no subject can belong to it such as that of establishing either how that document is to be interpreted or of whether that document offers history or a traditional legend. In contrast, without engaging in this business of the art of interpretation and of criticism, we can make use of this document just as ancient teachers

of the church also did already in their time.62 That is, we can exhibit63 the general story regarding the emergence of sin in view of how it has always and everywhere had the same features. For us, moreover, the general and valid currency of this document adheres to the symbolic attribute of the story itself. That is to say, what we find clearly presented in Eve, on the one hand, is her own activity, which is easily developing at each external stimulus, and therewith a revolt of the sensory aspect of her life, which aspect is made wholly evident by means of her opposition to a divine command. Yet, in this light it is made clearly noticeable, at the same time, how the defiling of her already developing God-consciousness, a defiling that can be effected only too easily, would have been bound to these characteristics. What is shown in Adam,64 on the other hand, is how sin comes to be taken up in an imitative process, even without a special overpowering by the senses, and yet how this activity presupposes a God-forgetfulness, even if it be based on a mere distraction. Suppose that we go on to bring the story into association with the concepts of original perfection and original susceptibility to sin set forth here. Then, at the same time, in general terms, it presents, by an interconnection of the earlier and later parts of the story, how, outside the domain of redemption, what is good develops only alongside what is wicked. It also presents how knowledge of the contrast between human good and human evil, a knowledge that is indispensable to human development, belongs under this human good.65 This is so, for it is sufficiently indicated in the story that this knowledge had not been given before sin arose, and this part of the tale can easily be extended to the point of affirming that only insofar as this lack of knowledge lasted, could humankind remain without sin. 6.66 Now, suppose that for the contrast between an original nature and an altered nature, we were to substitute the notion of a nature apart from the process of redemption, a human nature that is exactly the same throughout, with no exception. Suppose, too, that for the contrast between an original righteousness that would have filled a period of initial human existence and a sinfulness that arose in time, a sinfulness with and by which original righteousness would have disappeared, we substitute a primordial sinfulness. This sinfulness would be one that is timeless throughout and always incident to human nature alongside a coexisting original state of perfection that persists simultaneously. Yet, this would happen in such a way that, given the concomitance and continual development of each state, no express righteousness, regarded in and of itself, could have arisen but only a vacillation between despoiled spiritual endeavors and sin that is growing and fully formed instead. Finally, suppose that for the contrast between an original fault and an imparted fault, we were to substitute the simple notion of a fault that is the same for all and is absolutely held in common. Then, in the following manner, we could define and extend the ecclesial expressions in which this point of doctrine has been most succinctly recapitulated in relation to the point of doctrine on actual sin that follows it. Assuredly first of all, we do admit to a general attribution of the first sin67 such that this attribution is indeed taken to rest on the following consciousness: that to whichever human individual the lot may have fallen also to be the first to commit sin, sin would have begun with that individual.68 Thus, likewise if that first human actually to commit sin would have

been among those born after the first human beings, he or she would have contributed to the deterioration of righteousness just described and would have borne fault for it and thus would have done so just as surely as any other individual would have done.69 Further, note that in ecclesial doctrine the first sin of the first human being is called “the occasioning original sin,” whereas what is sinfully constitutive in all other human beings is called “the occasioned original sin.”70 That is, the latter is so in that the predisposition and inner tendency are named by the same term, “sin,” as is the act itself. Accordingly, we transfer this same term over to the general relationship between each earlier generation and each generation succeeding it and claim that, always and everywhere, actual sin by each earlier generation is the bringing about71 of original sin for the next succeeding generation. However, we also now claim that the susceptibility to sin by individuals in the later generation is also original sin because it engenders actual sins thereby, but, on account of sin depending on the sin of their forbears, consequently it is also brought about as original sin at the same time. Finally, we are making up for what is still a lack in ecclesial doctrine, in that we are, in any case, dividing actual sin’s relation to original sin into the causing of sin and into caused sin. That is to say, on the one hand, this distinction presents the relationship of people living at the same time, in that the actual sin of any who are more causal and stimulating in their selfinitiated activity upon entrance into community life is occasioning sin, whereas the actual sin of those who are more passive is occasioned sin. On the other hand, however, the collective sin of each generation is, in turn, also occasioning for the susceptibility to sin in the future generation, just as that very collective sin is itself rooted in the occasioned original sin of the earlier generation.72 Moreover, this enclosed circle of concepts designated here the whole compass of sin, especially of original sin, is also now displayed as the collective act and collective fault of the whole human race.

1. Cf. §15. Ed. note: Thus, here for the most part Schleiermacher critically examines a long string of positions that might be held. This examination leads to several general, more formal affirmations in §72.3–6 (see §72n21). 2. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: Depending on context, this word is also translated “feeling held in common,” “common feeling,” and “compassion” in this work; in each instance it is a feeling that connects individuals or groups with each other. 3. Cf. §61.1. 4. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 2; (2) Apology Augsburg (1531) 2; (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 8; (4) Belgic Confession (1561) 15; (5) Schmalkaldic Articles (1537) Pt. 3.1. Ed. note: (1, 2, 5) Bek. Luth. (1930), 53, 146, 433; ET Book of Concord (2000), 37, 111, 300; (3) Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 247f., cf. §37n3; ET Cochrane (1972), 235– 37; (4) Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 332; ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 400f. 5. Gallican Confession (1559) 10: “It is not necessary to inquire how sin was conveyed [propagari] from one man to another.” Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 365, also Cochrane (1972), 148; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 332. 6. Macht. Ed. note: Or “some power in them,” as in the reference to newborns just below. 7. Ed. note: The contrast is between lower, sinnlichen (sensory) functions and higher, geistigen (spiritual) functions. In Schleiermacher’s psychology, the latter functions include various levels of self-consciousness contained in the immediacy of feeling and an associated perception that also moves higher than sense perception does and the mediate qualities of cognition and action, both sets rising above mere sensation and sense perception. Geistige refers to all mental functions that gain control over merely sense-originated functions, hence they cannot always be “spiritual,” strictly speaking. The same word has to do service in German for both spiritual functions and their expression through use of intellect and through willed, intelligent action.

8. Belgic Confession (1561) 14: “… giving ear to the words and impostures of the devil.” Cf. Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 4, 294f. Ed. note: “Impostures” is found only in the Latin version quoted here, Niemeyer (1840), 368, not in the French edition, Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 398. 9. Augustine, Enchiridion (421) 9.30 “A human being misusing one’s free will destroys both oneself and it.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 395; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:246. 10. Verführbarkeit. 11. Luther, On Genesis (1535) 3:3, finds the onset of sin in Eve’s falsifying God’s word and attaching the little word “perhaps” to God’s command, as if this act would have been sinful if the preceding outbreak of lustful desire had not been its basis.—Others like Lyra focus more on sensory lust itself and view looking at the tree as the onset of sin, which amounts to the very same thing. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. also Luther’s Works (1958) 1:155; German: Luthers Werke (Weimar Ausgabe, 1883–) 42:116f. In his exegetical work On Genesis Luther drew heavily from Nicolaus de Lyra’s Postilla fratris Nicolai de lyra de ordine minorum super Genesim Exodum Leuiticum Numeri Deutronomium Josue Judici Regum & Paralyppomenom. Cum additionibus pauli episcopi Burgensis (1493). See Jaroslav Pelikan’s Luther the Expositor, xi. 12. Ambrose (ca. 339–397), Hexameron (The Six Days of Creation) (ca. 389) 6.8: “Is not that, therefore, in which God is ever-present made to the likeness of God?” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 42 (1961), 258; Latin: Migne Lat. 14:260. 13. Augustine, Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees (388) 2.15.22: “We see from these words that they were persuaded to sin through pride.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 84 (1991), 118; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:207. 14. Böse. Ed. note: Here, this term is translated “wrong,” usually “wickedness” in this work, meaning human evil in contrast to other kinds but not only moral evil. 15. Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), Commentary on Matthew (246–248) 10.11: “Again, if he had been of a good and unchangeable nature, he would not have turned away from the good after being called righteous so as to commit unrighteousness.” Ed. note: ET AnteNicene Fathers 9 (1885), 420; Greek: Migne Gr. 13:861. 16. Ed. note: This “perfection” lies specifically in the relation of human beings to God. See §58.2, also §§60–61 and 68. 17. Ed. note: In the “First Book of Moses” of the Pentateuch, Genesis 3. 18. Ed. note: E.g., from Satan or some other delusive source. In Schleiermacher’s view, the very figure of the devil stands for such a delusive source. Cf. §44 and references to Evangelical confessions in §81n2, n4, n5, n6, and n10. 19. Augustine, “Admonition and Grace” (427) 12.35: “Adam, with the use of his free will, affrighted by nothing, and actually in the face of God’s fear-inspiring command, did not stand firm in his great happiness, in his ability not to sin.” ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 287; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:937. 20. See Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 4, 303. Ed. note: In KGA I/13.1, 444, Schäfer quotes Gerhard’s Latin text to this effect. 21. Ed. note: As with other doctrines, whenever the functions of immediate religious self-consciousness have to be considered, in §73.3–6 Schleiermacher draws from what he knows from psychological investigations (viewed as a discipline basic to all other philosophical disciplines and to the human element in all sciences). This knowledge is combined with what he calls “dialectic” (another basic discipline, which includes the various kinds of logic) in a historical-critical scrutiny of both familiar and relatively unfamiliar views regarding sin. In this case his presentation leads, step by step, to his considerations of the interconnected elements of “actual sin” and “original sin.” By the end of subsection 6, his analysis of features both internal and external to a self becomes integral to an understanding of both elements of sin within the human species. Thus, selectively as needed, footnotes are affixed referring to marginal notes by Schleiermacher (Thönes, 1873) that mark his progress here. 22. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 9: “After the fall … the understanding is darkened and the will which was free has become an enslaved will.” (2) Belgic Confession (1561) 14: “… giving ear to the words of the devil, … by sin separated himself from God, who was his true life, having corrupted his whole nature.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 237; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 249; (2) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 398, also Cochrane (1972), 198; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 479. 23. Ed. note: Here as always, “something of a sinful nature” translates Sündliches, meaning actually succumbing to sin. In contrast, “susceptibility to sin” translates Sündhaftigkeit, meaning the ability to attach oneself to and be responsible for (haften), then possibly to receive or take up (empfangen, aufnehmen) sin, whether one succumbs to temptation or not. Sinfulness (Sündlichkeit) implies one’s being in the state of sin. 24. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The species would already have been exactly as it was thereafter” (Thönes, 1873). 25. Ed. note: As usual in Schleiermacher’s discourse, the translations here are “the nature of one’s species” for die Natur seiner Gattung, “individual being” for Einzelwesen, and the “very nature of the species” for Wesen der Gattung. In this same context, “virtually everything” translates ebensogut alles, to signify that there is still room for distinctive features also to exist in particular individuals, all the more so if they are human. The “nature” or “very nature” of God, in contrast, cannot

be demarked in this fashion; hence, in his view it would be pointless to insist that one would capture it in any set of attributes, though “love” and “wisdom” seem to get as close as we can in view of Christ’s God-consciousness and other attributes presupposed in monotheism, and still other attributes related to sin and grace, serving as they do to point to Christians’ experience of God in Christ. We cannot reach so far, however, as to grasp the nature of God altogether, irrespective of humans’ communion with God. Thus, for Schleiermacher neither the traditional separation of “essence” from distinct “attributes” nor an attempted definition of “essence,” viewed as a total sum of attributes, enables us to know God in Godself, not even if God can be viewed as acting, in part, in a personal way with persons. Likewise, in either meaning it is, for him, more nearly consistent and appropriate to speak not of the “essence” of religion or of Christianity but of their “nature” or “very nature” (Wesen), then, accordingly, to name their respective characteristics, which are actually discoverable in nature. Usually Schleiermacher is satisfied to indicate God’s “being” (Sein). Inescapably, Menschen is typically translated “human being” or occasionally “humans” or “humankind” (mostly for menschlichen Geschlecht, the species or race) in this translation, never “men” unless it means males. 26. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Denial of an action upon nature [Natur]. What follows from a Flacianic doctrine regarding this presupposed action upon nature” (Thönes, 1873). Ed. note: Matthias Flacius (1520–1575) was a notably erudite Lutheran theologian, eventually at least bordering on Manichean principles, therefore spurned by Melanchthon and by Lutheran academies and unable to found his own school. 27. See §22. 28. Solid Declaration (1577) 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 543f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 873f. 29. Solid Declaration (1557) 1: “We assert that … it is God’s work that the human being can … think, act, and accomplish anything. … That this nature is corrupted and that our thoughts, words, and deeds are evil is in its origin [originaliter et principaliter] a handiwork of Satan.” Ed. note: ET here is drawn from Book of Concord (2000), 538, and from the Latin and German in Bek. Luth. (1963), 857. 30. Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), §§75–80. Redeker note: Cf. p. 270ff., esp. the following sentences: “The sole likely cause for this prohibition, by which everything becomes understandable and clear, consists in the assumption that the forbidden tree had borne poisonous fruit that was harmful to the human body. … Perhaps, however, the savory poison also had the power to inflame certain desires unduly and thereby made it necessary for the first humans to have to cover themselves in front of each other,” etc. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates that the “physical pathway” proposed in this conjecture by Reinhard (poison) is itself an “effect” of an exercise of human “freedom” (Thönes, 1873). 31. Ed. note: Macht is used here, not Kraft (force or power) or Gewalt (holding sway), referring to a capacity to exert strong influence or dominance overall, in this case not either an especially directed force or a power that exacts total compliance and allows no freedom. 32. Ed. note: Übel, not Böse (human evil, or wickedness). 33. Ed. note: See §§7–11. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Herein lies no basis for sin having become mightily ascendant [mächtig], especially given that a material antidote, proffered at the right time, could have rendered redemption superfluous” (Thönes, 1873). 34. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “That this heterodox position does not imply any diminution of redemption” (Thönes, 1873). 35. See §61. 36. Ed. note: “Customary religious actions” translates frommer Sittlichkeit. By the same token, Christian ethics (Sittenlehre) deals with customary human actions motivated by what God is doing in Christ, the Redeemer, and thereby continues to do. For Schleiermacher, these customary actions are not restricted to any one domain of life among or in Christians but encompass all domains. In parallel, he also uses Erleuchtung here to indicate learning that illuminates the mind through thinking and use of language regarding Christian faith (a matter of the “heart,” or of a “heart-full mind,” so to speak) and of its doctrinal expressions. These two sets of functions together comprise the two halves of Christian dogmatics (see BO §§6, 69, 183, 223–31, and 305). 37. Ed. note: Anschaulichkeit, or clarity of perception. 38. Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), Theologia didactico-polemica, sive systema theologicum (1685–1690) Tome 1, 913: “Moreover, sin occurs in three ways: when an individual corrupts nature, as was done by Adam and Eve; when nature corrupts an individual, as occurs in the propagation of original sin; and when an individual corrupts an individual, as happens in actual sins.” Ed. note: ET Tice/Kienzle. 39. Ed. note: bringt recht zur Anschauung. The latter term is used in On Religion and elsewhere to refer to a mode of perception that is paired with feeling (Gefühl) to refer to a registration of what appears to one’s mind and heart (Gemüth) that arises in a more complex fashion than does mere sense-perception (Wahrnehmung) but that does not reach to the level of thinking. Some use the term “intuition” for this process, but this alternative usage can more easily identify the cognition

involved with that which comes to be more prominently displayed in thinking, whereas in perception paired with feeling, cognition functions more as a frame for recognizing what is perceived or felt. 40. Ed. note: schon vor ihr vorausgesetzt werden muß. In Schleiermacher’s usage, ordinarily vorausgesetzt means “presupposed” and refers to a concept or notion, but not here, for here he is exploring what could be empirically observable, thus real in that sense. In contrast, in the divine attributes he has laid out in Part One, what is already in place within what the monotheistic name “God” generally means in Christian experience is indeed to be “presupposed,” though it does not comprise all that is to be said about God in Christ, given that we cannot know God in se. Thus, these attributes are indeed “in place” in what can be experienced and also handled prior to his later accounts in Part Two. However, in relation to his order of doctrinal presentation they are also “presupposed.” Within the present context, Schleiermacher simply asks whether one is ready to accept what his arguments in subsection §72.3 and earlier have attempted to show regarding how committing any actual sin is to be seen in relation to an initial susceptibility to sin. If one agrees, one would then be presupposing only what is found within the next stage of his overall argument regarding sin. 41. Ed. note: Verhältniß (situation, circumstance, relation, relationship). As will be seen, this word can also be translated “circumstance,” likewise suggesting something external to oneself; yet it also carries the more nearly literal meaning of “relationship,” which is Schleiermacher’s more usual choice (vs. Zustand, situation or condition). “Situation” works well here. “Relationship” does indeed refer to a characteristic that God is taken to have created in humans—namely, free will for action within a real personal relationship. In this situation, however, he takes God to be personal but without being a person —that is, not restricted in ways we know persons to be. 42. Ed. note: In this sentence, “being sinful” translates Sündigkeit, whereas in the previous sentence “general susceptibility to sin,” which refers to something all human beings would seem to share in all “future generations,” translates Sündhaftigkeit. Jesus, in contrast, either did not share even this general susceptibility to sin, though it generally lacks sameness (Gleichheit) and is quite “differentiated” among humans (cf. §125.1), or he did share it and was indeed tempted, but did not succumb to it. See §91, in which the Redeemer’s “absolute sinless perfection and blessedness” are featured. The distinction between susceptibility to sin and actually being sinful is established in §§66 and 70. See §70n9. 43. Augsburg Confession 2, Apology Augsburg 2, Second Helvetic Confession 8, Belgic Confession 15, Schmalkaldic Articles 3.1, among others. Ed. note: See §72n4. 44. §70. 45. Ed. note: In this context, das Innere and an jenem Inneren are translated “internal factor,” since external factors are also present always. However, for Schleiermacher “the inner” (das Innere) is literally and always a process within us where the loving and redeeming relationship with God is registered. What is called “inner faith,” as distinguished from what may be called “outer faith,” external expressions of faith—which may be verbal, gestural, and, by way of conduct—resides in and carries stimuli from this divine-human encounter. For both kinds of faith, especially when combined, Schleiermacher has only the one word available to use: Glaube. As has been noted before, the word also means “belief,” which may or may not convey the meaning “inner faith.” Thus, in his theological work, even in talking about sin and susceptibility to sin as something shared, Schleier-macher constantly reflects a chiefly internally registered reality, hence a reflective process that begins with contemplation. 46. Glaubenselement. Ed. note: As elsewhere, Element is generally translated by the word “feature,” whereas a Moment des Glaubens, or of anything else, is like an “element” in the table of chemical elements. Thus, here the classic account of how sin and susceptibility to sin arose does not stand even to have the quality of a feature, much less of a basic element, of one’s internally held faith. 47. This point is expressly stated in the (1) Gallican Confession (1559) 10: “And we consider that it is not necessary to inquire how sin was conveyed from one man to another.” (2) Calvin speaks similarly, Institutes (1559) 2.1.7: “For the contagion does not take its origin from the substance of the flesh or soul, but because it had been so ordained by God that the first man should at one and the same time have and lost, both for himself and for his descendants, the gifts that God had bestowed upon him.” Here one clearly sees that for him the issue was especially to steer clear of explanations that could be bound to something that is not Christian. Ed. note: (1) ET and French, Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 365–66; Latin quoted by Schleiermacher, cf. Niemeyer (1840), 332. (2) ET Battles (1960), 250; Latin CR 30:182; and Calvin, Opera selecta 3 (1957), 236. 48. Rom. 5:12–21. Ed. note: Sermon on Rom. 5:19, April 5, 1833, in SW II.3 (1835), 524–36. 49. Ed. note: “beides … von einem.” “Events” and “single origin” are added to make Schleiermacher’s point clear. 50. 1 Cor. 15:21–22. 51. 2 Cor. 11:3. 52. Dasein. 53. (1) Ambrosiaster (dates unknown), Epistolam ad Romanos, 5.12: “It was demonstrated in Adam that all human beings sinned, all together as it were. … Consequently, therefore, we are all sinners because we all descend from him.” (2)

Jerome (Hieronymus, 342–420), Commentariorum Osee 2 (406) [on Hos. 6:7]: “And there in paradise all transgressed against me in likeness to Adam’s transgression.” Ed. note: (1) Typically in the Middle Ages and often thereafter, this work was falsely attributed to Ambrose (339–397). Erasmus gave the author the name “Ambrosiaster.” ET Kienzles. Latin: Ambrosius, Opera (Paris, 1631–1632), vol. 3, 269, and Migne Lat. 17 (1845), 92; also Ambrosiaster, Epistulam ad Romanos, 81.1 (1966), 165. (2) ET Kienzles; Latin: Migne Lat. 25:870. 54. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher makes one of his few uses of the term Individuen within this subsection, very likely to emphasize that they were not just particular entities but were distinctively different from all others (eigentümlich, as he usually means by that term), or at least stood out from others in some respects. 55. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “5. Relation to [the concept] original perfection. (a) Just when would weakness of spirit in the first [human beings] have to have been manifested in a detrimental disposition [ungünstiger Stimmung]” (Thönes, 1873). 56. Cf. §§60, 61, 65, 66. Ed. note: This is Clemen’s apt correction from the printed §§80, 81, 85, 86. 57. §67.2. 58. Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1141), Dogmatica (ca. 1134): “Paradise is the place of those beginning and advancing for the better, and for that reason the sole good ought to be there, because creation was not initiated from evil yet creation is not itself the highest good.” It naturally coheres with this statement that as soon as sin has appeared, the paradisial condition would have to cease. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Migne Lat. 176:28. 59. Ed. note: Sinnlichkeit means “sensory characteristic,” “of or pertaining to the senses,” sometimes “sensibility,” not “sensuousness.” Gesinnung means “disposition” or “sensibility,” and Sinn can also mean “sensibility,” as it can in referring to one’s “sense” of things. Even before his early years of translating (1798–1805), these distinctions were well established, afterward strictly so. In addition, Sündhaftigkeit (“susceptibility to sin”) means, at base, being restricted to some degree to the sensory aspect of one’s nature, or held back to it, from which that same “susceptibility to sin” can spread out to all the functions of the psyche and is no longer merely sensory in its functions. In Schleiermacher’s usage, the word Sinn itself can refer to a great many aspects (unlike Kant, never to discrete and independent “faculties”) of one’s mental equipment—for example, in his usage of Sinn the word can refer to (1) “sense” as “meaning” or (2) “sense” as in one’s seeing, hearing, and other sensory processes, and (3) rarely, “mind,” taken as a whole. In contrast to others’ usage, for him Sinn does not denote “sensation” (Empfindung) or “sense-perception” (Wahrnehmung) or what is “sensuous” (for which meaning, of “marked sensuality,” sinful or not, he tends to use other concepts with other roots). Nor does Sinn mean “feeling” (Gefühl) or “perception” (Anschauung, which some questionably translate as “intuition”), which he does not regard to be the same function as senseperception (Wahrnehmung). Also in contrast to others, it does not mean “intellect” or “intelligence,” for which he rarely uses even Intellekt and ordinarily uses other words that denote special functions of intelligence, or for which he uses “reason” (Vernunft) instead, or “understanding” (Verstand). Rarely, still in contrast to others’ practices, he uses “intuition” (Intuition) for a particular phenomenon that he rarely finds, or he uses other words that suggest aspects of this process, like Ahnung (“presentiment”) for looking ahead, and uses the subjunctive for trying partially to recapture or reconstruct past items, events, and processes. Throughout this work, for example, he sometimes uses the subjunctive directly, but since general German practice is to imagine past and future events by using present tense, whereas translation must use the pluperfect tense for each—usually when he is laying out suppositions. This practice is purely grammatical, not a matter for intuition. Just below he uses the biblical word “flesh” (Fleisch) for the more physical aspects of the interconnecting of mind and body, for which interconnection he usually employs the term Psyche, the subject of his psychology lectures. He also uses Gemüth, translated “mind and heart,” for states in which both cognition and noncognitive features are present, so that Gemüthzustand is to be translated “conditions of mind and heart,” not “emotions,” though “heart” does include affective and certain perceptual elements. The more strictly mental or spiritual (not so much physical, bodily) aspects he calls “spirit” (Geist). In time and space, he holds, ordinarily human beings never lack that interconnection of body and mental or spiritual functions, so that in principle he always presupposes influences from the sensory level at every higher level of mentation. 60. Ed. note: Here “moods” translates Stimmungen, which for Schleiermacher includes not only moods of an emotive sort (more complex or overpowering than feelings) but also tempers, and even frames of mind. 61. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The growth [of sin] grounded in the succession [Sukzession] [of the human race from its susceptibility to sin to a committing of sin] but not to the point of a forfeiture of God-consciousness” (Thönes, 1873). 62. Augustine, Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees (388) 2.21: “Even now nothing else happens in each of us when one falls into sin than occurred in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church. 84 (1991), 117; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:208. 63. Ed. note: Here the idiomatic phrase zur Anschauung bringen (“exhibit”) literally means to bring the story into a graphic shape that can be readily perceived or beheld.

64. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates a significant distinction between what Schleiermacher sees to be emblematic in this narrative, namely: “In Eve’s sin the positive form [of sin is found], whereas in Adam the negative form [is shown]” (Thönes, 1873). 65. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The conception of this contrast is conditioned by sin. The question arises as to whether for that reason the fall into sin is a gain” (Thönes, 1873). 66. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “General critique of the ecclesial formulations in relation to this subject. 1. Deviation. (a) No alteration in nature. (b) No succession [Sukzession] of righteousness and sinful deed. (c) No contrast of original and imparted fault. 2. Assimilation [Assimilation]. (a) Attribution [Zurechnung]. (b) Contrast between occasioning and occasioned [verursachend und verursacht] with respect to the twofold nature of each generation. (c) The same goes for actual sin” (Thönes, 1873). 67. Ed. note: This is the first consideration under part 2 (“assimilation”) indicated in the outline laid out within §72n66. Part 1 (“deviation”) referred to the issue of whether sin brings about any divergence from or alteration in human nature, answered in the negative, and to other related issues indicated in the outline. 68. Individuum. Ed. note: This term, frequently used in On Religion, is meant to mark one among the entire set of human beings, each of which is deemed to be distinctive while sharing the same nature of that species, for all their differences, and to be ethically regarded and loved as equals. 69. Ed. note: A reminder: Throughout his entire account of sin, Schleiermacher uses the term Schuld, and it is translated “fault” or “being at fault,” because, as in this portion of the account, the issue is to whom and how fault for a sin is to be attributed. Thus, no feeling of “guilt” is involved. Just as one can feel guilty either for doing something wrong that one should have done or for not doing what one should have done, one can fail to feel guilty either way, and that is a separable issue. So is the issue as to really attributable fault and any attached feeling of guilt in contrast to falsely attributable fault and any attached feeling of guilt. For him, dealing with a person’s feeling of guilt, self-attributed or not and either genuine or false, is a matter for “care of souls” (Seelsorge, thereby Seelenleitung, or “guidance of souls” by any leader among clergy or laity). This is the main concern of practical theology, not of the concern for faith-doctrine per se, regarded as a part of dogmatics. See Brief Outline §290. By extension, for him the entire Christian life also involves care of souls, insofar as one can exercise or receive it. Hence, this is indeed a concern for Christian ethics, regarded as a part of dogmatics. 70. Ed. note: The term verursachte can be translated “occasioned” or “caused.” Here is Schleiermacher’s marginal note, which generally outlines what follows, also under “assimilation,” already begun in §72n66 above: “(b) The contrast between the process of ‘causing’ sin and the state of being ‘caused by sin’ is related to the twofold character of its generation [Generation] [that is, to the change from mere susceptibility to sin into really sinning]. (c) The same contrast applies to actual sin. (d) §73. Actual sin is present wherever original sin is. §74. Apart from the process of redemption, all human beings have the same relationship to sin” (Thönes, 1873). 71. Ed. note: Here hervorbringende becomes a partially explanatory synonym for verursachte. 72. Ed. note: Here a basic distinction in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary is introduced, between more self-initiated activity (selbsttätig, self-initiating or spontaneous in their activity) and a more passive stance (here leidentliche, passive, more often empfänglich, receptive). For him, both characteristics reside in every person; in any given moment there is comparatively more or less of each one.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding Actual Sin

§73. In all human beings actual sin is continually issuing from original sin. (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1492–1560), Loci praecipi theologici (1543–1559): “Actual sins are always accompanied by original sin.”1 (2) Augustine (354–430), Against Julian (427) III.5: “This law … which is in the members … remains in the mortal flesh, … because it produces desires against which the faithful struggle.”2 (3) Gallican Confession (1559) XI: “We declare, further, that it is a perversity always producing fruits of malice and rebellion, so that the most holy men, although they resist it, are still stained with many weaknesses and imperfections while they are in this life.”3 1. This proposition is to be understood in its broadest generality,4 in that in no way do we acquit even Christ of actual sin other than inasmuch as we also extract him from the interconnected process of human beings’ general susceptibility to sin. Within this broadest general range, however, Christ is an expression of our Christian self-consciousness. This is the case, for in oneself everyone knows Christ’s exclusion from the general rule. Each one knows all the more surely the more vivid one’s picturing of the Redeemer to oneself is, that one is not free of sin oneself, not for an instant. Yet, it is not one’s own personal distinctiveness that affords one this view. Rather, one knows this in a general way, insofar as one is a constituent part of humanity as a whole. That is, one knows this general characteristic by way of one’s self-consciousness, itself widened to one’s speciesconsciousness, consequently knowing this of every other person just as well as of oneself. This consciousness, moreover, refers back to humankind’s general susceptibility to sin, though it is itself simply a view of that susceptibility from another perspective. That is to say, the tendency toward sinning, which we conceive as both internal and lasting, would not be anything real unless it were also constantly occurring and, conversely, unless such appearing were simply something adhering to us from outside us. Thus, the tendency toward sinning would be no sin at all unless it were to be a part of the appearance and temporal emergence of original sin. Furthermore, just as all that has been laid out in defining original sin has to appear somewhere or other after the measure of its varied distribution among human beings, so it has also to have some part in every movement that occurs within every human being in which it exists, and it has to turn something in each movement that occurs into an actually appearing sin. The result is that within the entire domain of sinful humanity5 there is no

single entirely and perfectly good action, no pure action presenting the force of Godconsciousness, and there is no entirely pure element in which something or other would not, nevertheless, stand all the same, in some hidden contradiction to God-consciousness. 2.6 Suppose that someone wanted to restrict actual sin to cases in which our susceptibility to sin breaks forth in deeds issuing from what is human, up to and including outwardly in a manner that is also perceptible. Such an account would not correspond to this general consciousness at all. That is to say, this account would always depend on external conditions that have been quite distinguishable from conditions that occasion a clearly identifiable state of being susceptible to sin. Now, just as these latter states, called external temptations, can also call forth only internal movements within human beings, which are already prepared for within the personal existence of particular individuals,7 just so sinfulness in one’s given state cannot depend in any further fashion on whether circumstances might favor or disfavor external emergence of sin. Indeed, the sinfulness belonging to a human state is not, in and of itself, enlarged or extended by its becoming externally noticeable, not even once. Rather, actual sin remains entirely what it is even where what is only internally susceptible to sin makes an appearance and takes part in a given element of consciousness as thought or desire.8 That is to say, just as love, also surely viewed as inner movement, is said to be fulfillment of the law, because in every available opportunity it unfailingly breaks forth into external deed, so too a corresponding desire, although it is stirring in its function only internally, is already actual sin on the same basis. If, moreover, we simply take the word “desire” in its broadest compass, this is a formulation regarding desire that could be said to fit all actual sin. Perhaps with the exception of cases where the efficacy of God-consciousness seems to us to be obstructed simply by one’s sheer inertia, although even this condition can well permit of its being traced back to desire that simply wills not to miss any opportunity that arises.9 Every definition of actual sin, however, be it then more nearly general or less, is correct only insofar as it goes back to an underlying susceptibility to sin and when it can easily combine with consciousness of the need for redemption.10 Now, suppose that we are at once mindful regarding that original sus-ceptibility to sin, from which all actual sin proceeds, as the collective deed and collective fault of the human race, yet not the same and not uniformly among individuals under the conditions of time and space but distributed unequally. Then, what this statement means is only this much: that in one individual one given sin readily comes to the fore, another sin arises less often, whereas in another individual the description would be in the reverse; in each case only a weaker stimulus would be needed for one given sin to arise as compared to others, in conformity with each personal natural tendency. In no way is this stimulus to be understood in such a way that it is as if, apart from the process of redemption, one or another human being would be so secured by one’s personal existence against one or another sin among the various forms of sin that one could not possibly fall into it.11 Rather, each individual consciousness declares to oneself that if anyone is left to one’s own resources, neither that individual nor anyone else can bear within oneself complete

surety against any given kind of wickedness.12 This is so, in that every attentive individual discovers in oneself so many presentiments of human evil and, as it were, seeds of all that is wicked, such that the stimulative attraction alone—an attraction that must everywhere be attached to original human susceptibility to sin—could come to be placed strongly enough in an individual to bring forth actual sin. Thereupon any human evil could arise in any human being as actual sin, even though any given sin would not have appeared habitually in every one but only in particular cases.13

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 39; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963) 54; cf. §70n25. 2. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church. 35 (1957), 61; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:675. 3. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 366; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 332. 4. Ed. note: Here is Schleiermacher’s marginal note for subsection 1, including the explanation that “broadest generality” refers to people’s christliches Gesamtbewußtsein: “1. Dogmatic contents: (a) The entirety of Christian consciousness; (b) Identical [Identisch] with general susceptibility to sin [Sündhaftigkeit]; (c) Throwing out the opinion that one could come to a state of sinlessness [Sündlosigkeit]” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s rare use of sündig appears in the phrase “sinful humanity” (sündigen Menschheit). In fact, Menschheit is only somewhat more frequently used, for synonyms were available to him. Here it refers to what is constitutive of all humanity thus far in human history, with the one exception of Christ’s sinless perfection. 6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this point instructively begins the outline of subsection 2: “2. Compass [of these Contents]: (a) Nothing [is] strictly Transitive” (Thönes, 1873). A psychologically important point that is partially derived from grammar is embedded in the term “transitive” here. In grammar a verb or construction is transitive where its designated subject or agent moves to an object, which, in turn, is sometimes referred to as (or as it were) “external” (thus, “outer”) or expressive of the force (Kraft) of a subject or agent transitioning toward or onto an object that could be inclusive of the same but not limited to it (e.g., when the subject is “we”). The opposite force of action is called “intransitive”—that is, an action or state of the subject or agent wherein its force makes a transition not to an object but only to itself, thus an internal (“inner”) action (e.g., to exist, to seem, to huddle). This distinction is reflective of a larger category—“inner” and “outer” features—which Schleiermacher had formed by the time he introduced his analysis of religion in his discourses of On Religion (1799) and carried forth in all his subsequent thought. 7. Ed. note: Here the locution is in der Persönlichkeit der Einzelnen. In Schleiermacher’s usage, the first term always refers not to the identification of one’s “personality” but to the totality of one’s “personal existence.” The second term is used, more generally, for any “particular” item within a whole, thus to any such “individual,” or, as in this case, to a “particular individual”(human being) within the human race (species). In other grammatical contexts, he uses the Latin term Individuum within that species, on the earth or in the universe taken as a whole (Universum), and places German endings on that word to indicate dative or plural (-em, -en), apparently not the genitive (-es), where he turns to the word Einzeln, which can take all cases. 8. “An action in conflict with the law of God”—cf. the section by this title [Actio pugnans cum lege Dei] in Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559)—can surely also be termed an entirely internal movement. Ed. note: ET Tice; see this Latin subtitle in CR 21:680. 9. Ed. note: That is, in such cases of inactivity, the active condition would be called laziness or sloth. 10. Therefore, Christian self-consciousness is found to be least satisfied with definitions such as that given by Franz Volkmar Reinhard in his Dogmatik §75: “Sin is whatever causes us to stray from simply possessing true happiness.” Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), 271. 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates this is the second main idea of this subsection: “(b) everything is possible in each individual. Every human being is acquainted with one’s own price [Preis],” i.e., threshold for giving in to sin (Thönes, 1873). 12. Ed. note: Böse is never translated in this work other than as “human evil” or “wickedness.” In contrast, for Schleiermacher plain “evil” (Übel) is the larger category that refers to every sort of evil or ill that might befall anyone or anything anywhere, naturally including evil that is done by human beings, both to other human beings or themselves and to other things in the world, including the global environment itself. He could scarcely have imagined humans possibly doing harm elsewhere in the universe, but the principles that are involved in these definitions and that one either presented or presupposed in his writings would in no way curb or discount environmental concerns that have currency today.

13. John Calvin, Institutes (1559) 2.3.3: “Every soul is subject to such abominations.” Ed. note: ET Battles, vol. 1 (1960), 292; Latin: CR 30:212, Calvin, Opera selecta 3 (1957), 275. Here Calvin refers to Rom. 3.

§74. Irrespective of sin’s not standing in the same relationship to redemption in everyone, no differentiation of value among human beings exists in relation to sin.1 1. In consequence of those previous accounts, all actual sins must be viewed as equal, as to both their nature and character, also as to their emergence. This is so, for every actual sin is an appearance2 of the general susceptibility to sin,3 and every actual sin is a victory of flesh over spirit, even if it is only a momentary or partial victory. To be sure, the determinative force of God-consciousness that is hindered in sin can be a greater or a lesser one.4 Now, if this force of Godconsciousness is greater, on the one hand, the spiritual life5 in which such a God-consciousness comes to be present is also stronger, and, by virtue of this force, in such a life God-consciousness is more in process of vanishing, consequently is smaller. Contrarywise, one can say, on the other hand, that if that spiritual force is greater, resistance that comes from flesh, by which the spiritual force is overcome, has to be stronger, consequently the sin is greater. Thus, if upon examining this same case from various points of view, we arrive at contrary results, then it follows that we either have to declare all sins to have the same status, because each sin, coming from one given viewpoint, is greater, and coming from the opposite viewpoint it is smaller, or we first have to refer both points of view back to each other. At that point, what happens is that as regards any one determination of value assigned to sin along this scale of greater to lesser and as to any particular element of sin, only one thing can be the subject of our discourse—namely, the total situation to which the agent of action belongs, whether it is then a growing or a waning of the agent’s susceptibility to sin. That is, in the domain of Christian consciousness, our discourse must turn to the state of grace belonging to any individual agent, just as our proposition affirms.6 Irrespective of that situation and observing each element of sin in and of itself, it remains correct that the self-standing activity of flesh draws one into sinning, without any distinction as to how contents of flesh are grounded. This is the case, for all activities of flesh are good when they are obedient to spirit, and all activities of flesh are wicked when torn loose from spirit. The same7 also obtains when we observe that sinful contents of human activities are all the greater in their amount, the more meager have been those external demands which simply needed to be surmounted. That is to say, even these factors are not the same for everyone. Rather, for someone who is more skilled at coping with them, a particular demand is comparatively meager, whereas for others it is huge and is difficult to handle. Accordingly, there are, to be sure, greater and lesser sins, but for us only in relation to the efficaciousness of redemption. Now, in this domain, moreover, ecclesial doctrine has thus tended to ban any statement affirming the equality of all sins.8 Yet, in and of itself, it might be possible to defend such a statement. That is to say, although the most customary classifications of sin, which do not refer to that relationship to redemption, do indeed express a differentiation

among sins as to their form and process of emerging, yet they do not establish any inequality in their proper value as sins. 2.9 Now, suppose that we look at the differentiations among actual sins, so as to separate them into distinct groups. Then, what we encounter, first, are the two main forms that relate to the two main features of original susceptibility to sin,10 in that sometimes actual sin comes to be more of an expression of desire, sometimes more a positive darkening—that is, a defilement and obscuring of God-consciousness. We cannot entirely separate the two, because in every instance one of the two features evokes the other, for within a given whole wherein a distinct form of desire becomes predominate, an alteration or metamorphosis or transformation of Godconsciousness also soon emerges,11 for the purpose of internally concealing one’s resistance to God-consciousness. Paul too sets these two features apart,12 indicating how each reciprocally enhances the other. Suppose, moreover, that one brings to mind the two processes at their highest peak, a superstitious frenzy that heaps up all the products of idolatrous delusion, on the one hand, and a passionate frenzy of totally unrestrained desires, on the other hand. At that point, moreover, we can certainly imagine an equal measure of condemnation regarding each process. Accordingly, then, the two features would also have to be equal already in their original reciprocal effect on each other. As relates, further, to the classification of sin into inner and outer sins, what was said above13 concerning dismissal of this supposed differentiation between types of sin would still be open at most to the following objection. The full external perpetration of a sinful deed takes up a specific period of time, and, for the most part, it can be broken down into a series of elements. Now, if a counteraction of one’s God-consciousness were to ensue within this very same period of time, obviously a different value would enter into this series. Just so, all else being equal, the sinful value of an action would also be all the greater, the greater the interval of time in which no such counteraction of God-consciousness were to have entered into it thus far. What follows from this objection, however, is simply that sinful actions do occur that point to a greater holding sway of sin in those actions than others’ actions point to. However, in no way does it follow that a person would have to be incapable of committing actions of the same value as to sin, even if these actions are not of the same kind. On the other hand, it also remains true, in turn, that in anyone certain sinful internal movements, or those akin to sin, do take place that never take form in a given individual as external sins. This is so in these cases, because even as inner movements they are in play more as movements foreign to oneself than as one’s own thoughts and stirrings, and hence they also attach more to the collective life of human beings than to any one individual. Yet, no one will be found who exhibits, as it were, only such movements foreign to oneself, and, once any such cases are discounted, the distinction between internal and external sins remains more an incidental than an essential one, nevertheless.14 Even when people distinguish between intentional and unintentional sins, customarily they would hold the first to be generally greater. However, this claim would be incorrect, for insofar as unintentional sins are really still actions and are not merely consequences,15 they are either sins of incomprehension16 or of hastiness.

Now, suppose that incomprehension is to be taken as grounded in a lack in one’s prizing the value of moral17 significance regarding our actions in general and that one’s hastiness is to be taken as grounded in a passionate tendency, of whatever kind it might be. Suppose, on the other hand, that a transient incapacity, in an instant that is especially unfavorable to one’s resisting a given sensory impulse, can be thought to be a completely isolated element, which exercises no influence beyond that instant. In that case, then, intentional sins of the latter type, namely, that of an isolated transient incapacity,18 would be lesser19 than unintentional sins of the former type would be. Now, if one of these two sins can be the greater sin in one instance and the other the greater sin in another instance, they are still equal, considered in and of themselves. Indisputably, the most significant classification of sins among those considered in this respect is that of mortal sins and venial sins. Yet, it is very difficult to determine the meaning of this differentiation, since the expressions do not themselves contain any strict contrast. Some20 give to them exactly the sense that is set forth in our present proposition as the sole tenable distinction, and so the only option left here would be to discuss to what extent the concept of punishment has or has not to be defined in the process of defining these two sins. Apart from taking this option, it would indeed be established by the definitions given to them that the distinction rests simply on a given agent’s relationship to redemption. Yet, this supposed agreement would, in turn, appear to vanish should it be asserted, at the same time, that those received into the interconnected process of redemption could commit mortal sins, but at the point of committing mortal sin this interconnected process of redemption would cease for them.21 The question as to whether this closure is to be assumed to be possible or not cannot yet be dealt with here. Now, for all that, the possibility of being rejoined to this interconnected process of redemption should not, however, be summarily excluded.22 On the one hand, this understanding refers back to the older stipulation,23 in accordance with which only those nonvenial sins, between the commission of which and death no rejoining of the interconnected process of redemption would have ensued, would be full-fledged mortal sins. On the other hand, this consideration does make a further distinction among venial sins necessary, in that mortal sins would also become venial sins under certain conditions, whereby the inherent distinction would then entirely disappear. Now, suppose that we add to this mix a notion advanced by many that is called “the sin against the Holy Spirit,” a sin such that it makes any reattachment to the process of redemption impossible. In that case, instead of the simple contrast of venial and mortal sins, we would obtain the following gradation. In and of themselves, venial sins would come to be those sins of the blessed which can hardly be avoided in this life24 and which bear their remission with them at all times.25 However, all the sins of those not blessed, in cases where they have converted, as well as all intentional sins of the blessed, in cases where they have reconverted, would also be venial sins. In and of themselves, mortal sins would be those two last-mentioned sins,26 in cases where one’s connection with redemption had not entered in or

had not been restored, respectively. Absolute mortal sin would then be restricted to “sin against the Holy Spirit,” presupposing that the usual explanation of that concept is correct. Patently, however, the distinction between venial sins, in themselves, when they nevertheless require repentance and prayer for forgiveness, and mortal sins of the blessed, which would come to be venial sins, in that the state of grace they had lost they would have regained through repentance, would also be all the less appreciable27 the smaller the interval between sinning and repenting. By virtue of the criterion against conscience,28 the distinction could also be traced back to that between intentional and unintentional sins. Yet, even in the state of grace, if one’s knowledge concerning sinfulness under ordinary conditions were to reach well-nigh to perfect knowledge, still one’s willpower would continually lag behind this insight. Accordingly, intentional sins would also crop up, sins which, because they would be associated with real progress in one’s life, could, nevertheless, not effect a total fall from grace. Some claim, albeit not taking this stepwise mode of development into account, that regenerate persons can no longer sin knowingly. They make this claim rashly, for at least a tiny degree of intentionality would already be present. To the contrary, one should actually claim only the following, after an analogy with what we have stated concerning the relationship of an individual human being to nature.29 That is, an individual human being would not be able wholly to deprive oneself of one’s entire state of grace by one particular action, on which divine grace would also have had an influence in any case. Accordingly, the only essential distinction that remains is one that has its ground in the relationships of an agent of action to redemption. As concerns the supposed sin against the Holy Spirit, that would indeed constitute a class all by itself. However, as long as proper interpretation of the two scriptural passages on which this whole concept rests30 is in dispute, a presentation of faith-doctrine must leave resolution of this matter to the discipline of exegesis.31 Likewise, the handling of certain cases, wherein persons believe that they have committed this sin, a presentation of faith-doctrine cannot presume to determine what this sin is or in whom it would appear. Thus, this matter must be given over to specialists in care of souls.32 In general, however, presentations of faith-doctrine must reject any proposition to the effect that any kind of sin of which one repents in connection with the process of redemption could fail to be forgiven, since it would be limiting the general scope of redemption. 3. Closely observed, the various gradations of human states in relation to sin lead to the same rejection, in this sense rejection of propositions that have been taken over into presentations of faith-doctrine, in part, directly from passages in Scripture and, in part, indirectly from popular exposition of Scripture. For example, the state of freedom33 is understood in contrast to bondage. Of itself, freedom is viewed as that state in which, if one is thinking of it in its perfect state, only venial sin, regarded in and of itself, would be held to occur anymore. This would be the case by virtue of such a sturdy and vital interconnection with the process of redemption that unintentional sins would always have lesser impact than any intentional sin would have. In contrast, the designation of bondage for the state wherein sin is predominant would presuppose that by virtue of an internally acknowledged appropriation of God-consciousness,34 a person would not carry out the demands of the flesh

with complete acquiescence. Yet, suppose that one were to consider this possibility: that in consequence of its interconnection with redemption, freedom could emerge only out of bondage. Then it would also be conceivable that freedom, only gradually growing as it is exercised, would also still be blended with traces of bondage. Now, some still do distinguish from the state of bondage the states of false security, hypocrisy, and obduracy, themselves viewed as worse. Suppose, however, that a state even worse than total bondage were introduced. At that point, that internally acknowledged appropriation of God-consciousness just mentioned would have to be silenced altogether. Yet, even in the state of freedom this very recognition of God-consciousness would itself be momentarily silenced by the sins of hastiness. Thus, only if one could regard this stilled, silenced state to be a stable one, and only if the inner voice were to have died away irrevocably, could an entirely distinctive state be grounded by this silencing process. This, moreover, would also surely be the sense of the expression obduracy,35 a state that is most definitely presented in a fixed and conscious will not to effectuate one’s Godconsciousness. Yet, [only approximations] to this state can [take place].36 This is the case, since a tendency toward having God-consciousness forms an integrating constituent aspect of human nature.37 It does so, in that even in a defilement of this consciousness, such that human vices have been attributed to the gods, the soul would not have been entirely without any presentiment of the claim that something exists which is incompatible with God-consciousness. Suppose, however, that God-consciousness were to be regarded as having died away irrevocably,38 consequently that the hardened person were considered to be wholly inaccessible to grace. This state, then, would have placed a particularistic limitation on the domain of redemption itself. Accordingly, consciousness of this law [of God]39 could fail entirely only so long as God-consciousness would not have developed, thus at a time before bondage had appeared. In the individual soul this earlier state could have been one of raw brutal existence, as at a time when the sensory aspect of that existence held sway, blocking the development of Godconsciousness. However, this state too belongs to the state of bondage, for what would hold God-consciousness back would be simply the very same thing, whereby even what would already have developed would have been arrested in its capacity for effective activity. The states of false security and hypocrisy40 that lie between these two end points of freedom and bondage, however, do not each stand in distinctly different relationships to freedom and bondage, nor are they mutually exclusive in any sense whatsoever. Rather, they both belong to the state of bondage, and they are compatible with all the various stages of bondage, except for that secondary stage in which bondage comes to be present within some stage of freedom. Accordingly, here too all that is left is simply the contrast between freedom and bondage, which contrast expresses precisely their divergent relation to redemption. 4. The distinction between sin and redemption set forth in our proposition is viewed as the sole essential one. It can be most distinctly grasped if, at the same time, we take the relationship of actual sin to original sinfulness into account. That is, the actual sin of those who are placed in a steady interconnection with the force of redemption would no longer be taken to be originating in its function, either within them or by any fault incurred from

without. This is the case, for actual sin is interrupted by the force of God-consciousness that is planted in them personally and spontaneously,41 with the result that when actual sin does come to light, it also appears as something that is dimming and no longer exercises any kindling force of its own. Hence, all sins of regenerate persons are such that they do not block spiritual life, not in them individually nor in their collectivity. In contrast, the sins of unregenerate persons are always originating within the unregenerate, because each sin thereby adds something to the might of custom and likewise to the defilement of Godconsciousness. Sins also originate from outside the regenerate as well, because like repeatedly stirs like and because defiled God-consciousness too is spread and established through communication.42 Hence, consider what of spiritual life, as it were, persists within a collectivity still separated from the domain of redemption; consider further that this element of spiritual life contained within it the desire to be augmented and elevated by some subordinate points of development—whether it were then life in the state or in science and the arts. This element of spiritual life would be repeatedly hindered in its progress by this sin and therewith dragged down into its former maelstrom. As a result, it could rightly be said of that sin that it reduces the spiritual life of that collectivity—that is, robs it of spiritual life. Suppose, in addition, a desire to give up this contrast between bondage and freedom and simply to assume a distinction between the greater freedom of some and the lesser freedom of others, without reference to any distinct turning point at which a state of bondage, as yet tempered only by a presentiment of freedom, passes over into a state of freedom, as yet carrying only traces of bondage. This passing over would mean abandoning the domain of Christianity, more strictly speaking at least, and by means of a Pelagian view of it, ending up playing into the hands of sheer naturalism. This would happen in that once this contrast were abolished, no specific internal working of redemption would remain anymore. Moreover, such a working of redemption is, nevertheless, made so generally evident, viewed as the original consciousness of Christians that is presented in holy Scripture, that it cannot be necessary first to go back to such particular expressions and formulations as “being buried in the death of Christ” or becoming “new creatures” or the contrast between someone’s being of “the flesh” versus of “the spirit.” In the latter case of flesh versus spirit, suppose someone held that the contrast could be phrased in such a way that there would indeed still be some sin in one state but in another state all would be full of sin. In part, this distinction would be distorted, because no exact contrast of the kind is actually to be found; in part, it would be crude to designate everything lovely and noble that has developed in heathen life to be sin. At this juncture, however, we can only consider supplying what is lacking in this way of setting a strict contrast between flesh and spirit.43 That is, in accordance with what has been shown above, venial sin, in one form or another, is a remnant in all good works done by a regenerate person. However, it is but the shadow of sin, as it were—namely, if one looks at the complete inner state of the person, this remnant of venial sin is the not-willed but repulsed aftereffect from a force of habit, a force that is only gradually to be overcome.44 Likewise, however, lying everywhere in the sins of a natural human being, even in sins not yet forgiven in and of themselves, is, at

the same time, the now darker, now dimmer shadow of what is good as well. That is, this shadow is the acknowledging presentiment of a state without internal contradiction—only a shadow, to be sure, because these notions never lend themselves to embodiment or to some steadily efficacious activity. Similarly, nothing of a better character in heathen life has had the power to form collective life there—this, also chiefly on account of the defilement of God-consciousness, with which consciousness it would have to be associated. Likewise, much that belongs to Christianity does appear even within an unilluminated person who stands in some external interconnection with Christianity, but in this person a certain vital force would be lacking, nonetheless. Instead, what exists there is merely the reflection of what is clearly positioned in other persons.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Equality of all, irrespective of redemption” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Here Erscheinung (appearance) is an appearance of something now made noticeable. It is a manifestation, if only potentially to oneself. That is, it is an expression of one’s susceptibility to sin, even if still held internally, and in that full sense now made actual. 3. Sündhaftigkeit. Ed. note: This term (susceptibility to sin) suggests one’s adhering to such sin as has already come to exist around one’s life, impinging on and attracting a person, so that one can scarcely escape being complicit in some of it (original sin) or adding to it (actual sin). 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “1. equality of sins. A. contrasting views of the differences. (a) in accordance with the strength of God-consciousness” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: As was explained in §73, geistige Leben (spiritual life) refers to the entire life of the human spirit, to both more passive and more active ingredients and to all parts of it as well. In Schleiermacher’s thinking, the agent of a spiritual life can also be individual or communal. Moreover, each individual is, in part, to be regarded as a representative of the entire human race, an insight that he announced first in ca. 1796, when he was a pastor, aged twenty-seven, at Landsberg an der Warthe. 6. Ed. note: Cf. §63 as well. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “(b) in accordance with the strength of external demands” (Thönes, 1873). 8. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 8: “We also confess that sins are not equal; although they arise from the same fountain of corruption and unbelief, some are more serious than others.” (2) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “And those Stoic arguments should be detested to which some disputants pay heed, that all sins are alike.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 236; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 248. Cf. note at §37n3. (2) ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:680. See §32n16. 9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “2. Critique of the formulations for differentiating of sins” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Apology Augsburg (1531) 2, from Hugo of St. Victor: “Original sin is ignorance in the mind and concupiscence in the flesh.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 116; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1930), 152. 11. Ed. note: It takes three words here to display the range of meanings obviously intended for Umgestaltung, ranging from a slight change to a major disruption or “transformation.” 12. Rom. 1:21–26. 13. §73.2. Ed. note: Clemen (1905) rightly identified “above” as this cited location in the previous proposition, not §74.1. 14. Ed. note: Proposing “an incidental” (ein zufälliger) distinction versus “an essential” (ein wesentlicher) distinction seems to apply more to what adheres to human nature as it relates only to one individual member of the human race than to what incidentally or accidentally occurs in relation to an individual’s own nature, even if the movements foreign to someone’s nature happen to be registered internally. Hence, the more or less influence on sin from what Schleiermacher calls “original sin” is not compromised by his emphasis on “actual sin” in the present context. The two kinds are themselves each more or less present in any given element of life, also at any given period of time as the process of sinning occurs. Thus, each too has a different degree of value assignable to it, respectively, both as sin and in relation to God-consciousness. This passage can be difficult to grasp, chiefly because so many variables are being entertained, some rejected, and so many factors remain at the end of any process of sinning that it may well be difficult to disentangle them all. In accordance with Schleiermacher’s account of sin, it is possible that somewhere before or just after the process in which sin arises out of

human beings’ susceptibility to sin into actual sin, God-consciousness may have weighed in heavily, or in a given element of life God-consciousness may even have ended up winning the victory. As will be seen, in the case of Jesus the Redeemer, the result of a total win, despite temptation, is called “sinlessness,” hence also “blessedness.” More intellectual puzzles like these remain to be solved before his entire account of sin and redemption is accomplished within the whole of Part Two. Schleiermacher clearly expects that some real problems and quandaries might remain. Hopefully, none remain that cannot be left for further investigation and debate and none that would greatly affect unity in the united Evangelical Church in the German territories of his time. 15. In the latter case, they would not be sins at all, hence the rule that Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) mentioned in Loci principui theologici (1543–1559) is, accordingly, to be restricted. The rule was “Nothing is sin if it is not done voluntarily. This statement is one handed down,” he then states, “regarding civil officers. … However, this dictum is not to be transferred to evangelical doctrine on sin.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. the very different translation from the 1559 edition by Manschreck (1965), 81; Latin: CR 21:675. See §32n16. 16. Unwissenheit. Ed. note: This term is to be distinguished from sheer ignorance (Unkenntnis), in that these terms denote some lack in knowing something (wissen) or in having some acquaintance with something (kennen), respectively. If both terms describe general states, sinful or not, then two examples of sin could be: (a) willful refusal to be open to grasp elements of redemptive process where some element or other is plain to see, and (b) rash misappropriation of an element of the redemptive process. In contrast, sheer nonwillful ignorance would mean having no opportunity to sin either way—that is, a simple lack of knowing or being acquainted with something, whether intentionally or not. 17. Ed. note: Here “moral” means “customary conduct” in all areas of life, not in some separable “moral” part of it, as is made clear throughout his Christliche Sittenlehre (1826–1827). See Hermann Peiter’s first German edition of these lectures (2011), and see the German text and the Tice/Lawler ET of Peiter’s essay “Why Does Schleiermacher Take the Term ‘Sittenlehre’ Not to Be ‘Wholly Accurate’? Against the Confusion of Theological Ethics with Church Statistics” (1968, 1975, 2006), in Peiter’s collected essays on Christliche Ethik bei Schleiermacher / Christian Ethics according to Schleiermacher (2010), 51–99. 18. Ed. note: Here vorsätzliche Sünden (“intentional sins”) might seem to be a strange relation to “hastiness” or “hastiness” to be in a strange relation to “incomprehension.” However, the more nearly literal use of “premeditated” for vorsätzlich could more clearly identify what is meant in this context, among the many meanings for this word, and what is still used for various purposeful activities. This would be true especially if a sinful purposeful activity is unintentional and is stopped in midstream, as in the case Schleiermacher suggests here. The implicit question is How quickly could these activities be halted or sped up before they would become full-blown actions, conduct, or behaviors, all of which would bear an unavoidable “influence” either on one’s own self, internally or externally speaking, or elsewhere. Thus, the case imagined offers an instantaneous sin in one’s capacity for knowing (Wissen) that is so minimally exercised that it is minuscule compared with any example of intentional “hasty action,” which presumably has to be directed outward, even if it involves only one’s own self. The hastier one’s activity is within, the greater is the pertinent, intentional, and sinfully rash impact on recipients, potentially including one’s own self. Thus, insofar as that hastiness is intentional, as in this case, it would be greater than an unintended sin of incomprehension, or unpremeditated sin, would be on the moral/immoral scale. Finally, if, in another case, an act of internal rashness were highly impetuous but had no effect but on oneself, presumably it would still be greater in the same way, for the effect on oneself would also have moral/immoral value. 19. Ed. note: That is, presumably lesser with respect to the value of “moral significance” indicated just above. 20. (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci principui theologici (1543–1559): “These evils exist in the reborn, … but because a person has been received, … these evils occur with respect to this person as venial sins,” and “actual sins that are in those who have not been reborn are all mortal sins.” (2) In his Untersuchung theologischer Streitigkeiten (1762–1764) Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten (1706–1757) expresses this point most precisely: “However, since we cannot concede such a point, namely, that mortalia and venialia (mortal and venial sins) would have to be distinguished by a discrimen objectivum (objective criterion) but assume instead that the relationship of the person performing the given act to Christ’s atonement is the ground for deciding,” etc. Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles/ Tice; Latin: CR 21:818, 680. See §32n16. (2) ET Tice. 21. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci principui theologici (1543–1559): “It is necessary to differentiate sins that in this life remain in the reborn from those sins on account of which grace … and faith are lost.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:681. See §32n16, and cf. §111n5. 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “This distinction can be an essential one if it openly manifests the tie mentioned earlier [being rooted in redemption]” (Thönes, 1873). 23. Augustine, “Admonition and Grace” (427) 12.35: “I say that sin consists in forsaking faith, which works through love [dilectionem], even unto death.” Ed. note: Also quoted in §111n6. ET Kienzles/Tice, cf. also Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 288; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:938.

24. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter (412) 48: “The righteous man [justum] is not held back from eternal life by those venial sins by which some in this life there must be.” Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 8 (1955), 232; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:230. 25. Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706–1757), Untersuchung theologischer Streitigkeiten, (1762–1764): “For … we say that they are called venialia because remission always accompanies them.” 26. Melanchthon, Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “Therefore, actual mortal sin in one’s falling after reconciliation is an inner or an outer action conflicting with God’s law and done against conscience. … It is not possible to counter the conscience of faith with an evil design.” Ed. note: ET Kinzle/Tice; Latin: CR 21:681, 780; cf. note 15 above, and cf. the identical reference in §111n5. See also §32n16. 27. Ed. note: Here “appreciable” translates merklich, i.e., noticeable along the graded scale of how sins would relate to the status accorded to sins of the blessed (Begnadigten) and those not blessed (Unbegnadigten). Here “blessed” means those forgiven and thus in the state of grace (their Gnadenstand) along that same scale of value (Wert). 28. Gewissen. Ed. note: Note the cognitive features in Schleiermacher’s appropriation of “knowing,” “conscience,” and “incomprehension” or “lack in a knowing of something” (in order: Wissen, Gewissen, Ungewissenheit) versus “being acquainted with” or “obtaining information about,” “learning” (either kennen or kennen lernen), and having “knowledge” (Erkenntniß). Between the two sets, for him (cf. his Dialektik notes and lectures) “knowing” (Wissen) is a process admitting of several kinds and gradations, one of which is “science” (Wissenschaft), which aims at “knowledge” (Erkenntniß), albeit always provisional, if relatively reliable. The various sciences themselves also have many parts and gradations. The other set, about “learning,” etc., is also a process ending in some provisional bit of knowledge, more or less reliable but never totally objective, though one is then knowing with respect to some object more or less ascertainable. For him, redemption is naturally beheld and felt, which requires some process of knowing and of expressions that are learned and actionable for able agents (in both cases, via cognitive registration and some degree of knowledgeable expression). Thus, the process of redemption itself grounds the possibility of doing theology as well. However, for Schleiermacher, God can be “known” only insofar as God’s supernatural activity is registered naturally within and among human beings, whereas God in se cannot be known. In this context, then, one’s process of knowing also registers sins, but it does so only in relation to one’s being personally attached to God’s redemptive activity. Outside this relationship, or communion, with God’s grace, one can have sin but not know of it in this specific way or even learn of it in either a purely subjective or a purely objective manner. The more subjective registration involved in beholding and feeling the stimulus of God’s grace has a cognitive frame to it, in that, for him, the various functions of mind (or spirit) never operate altogether separately, as if they were “faculties.” However, having knowledge or acting aright are distinguishable from the roots of religious, or pious, experience, as was already made clear in the first edition of On Religion (1799), though the same subject of grace cannot faithfully divide the functions of one’s spirit (or “mind and heart”) by splitting them into obtaining knowledge, action, and even a combination of beholding and feeling that is then bereft of any expression. For him, even Christian theology, which he takes to be a complete and legitimate science, is not to feature a splitting off of cognitive functions from the full experience of faith, which rationalism tends to do. No part of this work on “Christian faith” is wholly separable from this understanding of what is going on in redemption, not even sin. Cf. §62. 29. Ed. note: The relationship is simply “to nature” (zur Natur). In Schleiermacher’s discussions, under this proposition and elsewhere, this is a general term that both subsumes human nature within it and also distinguishes the individual distinctiveness of any kind of individual or particular from the overall characteristics that a given kind or species, such as all human nature/humankind/human beings as a whole, possesses. In contrast, he never uses Natur for God, for he does not take God to be a natural being. God exists, has being itself (Sein), but is not a being as anything in nature is. Thus, when the “nature” of God is spoken of in the present translation, it has a different meaning, because it renders the word Wesen. This second term suggests an overall nature of being, a process which can also be assigned attributes as a whole, without any distinction of those attributes from the so-called essence of a being-in-itself. Humans try to ascribe attributes to individual things or kinds, scientifically as accurately as possible. Throughout his writings, Schleiermacher thus allows himself to offer only approximations to God’s Wesen, all of them based on what can be gleamed from God’s activity within nature, religiously rooted in what is registered of “divine activity” within immediate self-consciousness. That activity is partly indicated with reference to humans’ susceptibility to sin and humans’ sinning—that is, with reference to humans’ need for redemption. Similarly, by his account, within nature one can speak of the Wesen (nature) of religion or of Christianity, as he does, but insofar as each bears within it a relationship or communion with God, or the divine, the result can have attributes, but they all help only to offer an approximate definition of what each of these subjects consists of. In a complete account, all the attributes designated would define what is taken to be essential (wesentlich). Hence, the story regarding the process of human redemption in this world (= Part Two) is to be essentially defined by both sin and grace and by what that process is

taken to presuppose (= Part One). The genuine action of Christians is to be defined in the same terms, and their elements should reflect the same basic presuppositions. His “Christian Ethics” material aims to do precisely that. 30. Matt. 12:31; Luke 12:10. 31. Ed. note: As here, for Schleiermacher Auslegungskunst refers to a general art of interpretation, the tasks of which are not restricted to what he means by “hermeneutics” but include “philological criticism” and might fold in the other critical arts as well. Especially in theology, Exegese (exegesis) is a more literal synonym. Neither term refers to sheer exposition of Bible verses, without benefit from these arts. 32. Ed. note: Seelsorge, which in Schleiermacher’s practical theology chiefly defines the roles of church leadership. Today special roles in this respect are often assigned mainly to pastors or lay specialists. In principle, Schleiermacher did not strictly distinguish clergy from laity in exercise of such roles. See Brief Outline, esp. §§263 and 290. 33. Rom. 6:18–22 and 8:2. 34. Ed. note: See §74n28. Here acknowledgment (Anerkennung) is taken to presuppose one’s having appropriated Godconsciousness internally and recognizably, hence the qualifying word “appropriation” is added in the translation. 35. See Franz Volkmar Reinhard’s (1755–1812) definition [of obduracy] in his Dogmatik (1818) §88: “The condition of the human being who sins a long while and finally is influenced by a proposing of incentives for virtue.” This definition needs, first, to be referred more to the standpoint of piety; at that point, however, it would yield the same result. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: Dogmatik (1818), 327. In Scripture “obduracy” is also called “hardness of heart.” Further, to the definitions of “false security” and “obduracy,” see also note 40 below. 36. Ed. note: In this sentence the bracketed words were added by Clemen (1905) to fill a caesura, in accordance with the first edition at this place, §96.2. Cf. §80.2. 37. Augustine, The Spirit and the Letter (412) 48: “At the least, there remained the essential rationality of the human soul—so even here what is undoubtedly that law of God which was never quite effaced by unrighteousness.” Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 8 (1955), 231; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:230. 38. This consequence is implicit neither in Heb. 3:8, 13, in reference to Exod. 17:7, nor in 2 Cor. 3:14. Ed. note: These passages speak of being “hardened” by sin. 39. Ed. note: Further regarding this citation of the lex dei from Augustine, Redeker refers to the first edition (1821) §96.2. Here see also §74n32 just above. 40. Among other sources, cf. Reinhard, Dogmatik, loc. cit. Redeker (1960) note: “Page 326f. reads: ‘The situation of security [securitatis] is the condition of the human being in which one has been so given to sin that one perceives neither its foulness nor the need for correction.’ The situation of hypocrisy is of a different sort. By that situation people understand: ‘the condition of a human being who has only an external appearance of virtue.”’ Ed. note: ET of the Latin portion in quotes: Kienzle. Schleiermacher accepts these definitions. Thus, he renders securitatis with Sicherheit, here translated “false security.” These translated definitions also display the rather different meanings of the German word Zustand, which, in accordance with Schleiermacher’s usage, is also variously translated “state,” “situation,” or “condition” throughout the present work. Sometimes it could easily mean “condition,” which carries a more inclusively external reference, or “state,” which refers more to internal processes. Usually the “situation” addressed is a combination of both—for example, as in cases of freedom and bondage. 41. Ed. note: Mostly images of a physical nature are used here, in a way that highlights biblical images of a redeeming “light” that shines in the darkness, through Jesus, the selfidentified “light of the world,” bringing “light” to those who are reborn (regenerate) in “the light that cometh” from on high, itself set upon a hill, where all can see it, etc. Hence, the neutralizing force of redeeming grace that breaks to pieces, thus interrupts (gebrochen), the force of sin, is manifested in a person’s God-consciousness by a spontaneous (selbsttätig, i.e., self-initiating), divine kindling force of light. In contrast, the force of sin itself no longer bears such a force. Instead, it can be seen only as a factor that is gradually disappearing (im Verschwinden), dimming, even when it does show up, i.e., come to light (ans Licht tritt). Although, like all languages, the German language itself constantly utilizes images in the forming of words, including more abstract technical words, this is a rare instance in the present work of his using ordinary parlance to help make an important point. Even here, however, what could then be said in terms of physical analysis is used for a scientific purpose in theology. He seems to be saying, by analogy: God’s redemptive process enters into human beings as a force (Kraft) somewhat like this. 42. Ed. note: This key term “communication” (Mitteilung) is adeptly placed near the analogy to a transmission of light. To his Enlightenment-imbued colleagues he seems to be saying: Not all transmission or impartation of light is to one’s intellect (Aufklärung) or by one’s capacity for action. By analogy, some light is communicated inwardly, and in faith all subsequent communications have their base in such light. Elsewhere Schleiermacher uses this same key term to speak of how regenerate persons are brought to an intimate relationship with God, with Christ, and with one another in community (Holy Spirit). God’s activity thus commingles with their own inner being in these tri-unitarian ways, one God in three mixtures or facets, as it were. Similarly, each regenerate person is placed by God in a position to stimulate, or stir (aufregen),

others in their likeness (Gleichheit, both similarity and equality) and to band with others in relationship. Accordingly, another key term that indicates how those relationships serve to communicate Godconsciousness is this same concept in all its forms: the verb aufregen, noun Aufregung (a stirring or stimulus), and gerund aufregend (stirring). Closely associated is the term Impuls, which means “impetus” when it is introduced by an agent and “impulse” when it is carried by a recipient. In each case, members of the conjoint (co-, con-, or com-) process, each being distinctively different, do not become wholly merged. That is, God remains God, and the spirits of humans are stirred by God’s activity, but they do not become divine by being recipients of divine impetus, nor do humans become identical by joining in that same divinely stirred movement (Bewegung, another key term used for this stirring interchange) which occurs through one another. At the same time, they are “one in Christ,” through this dynamic process, itself coming to function both inwardly and, in turn, outwardly. At base, then, the point of contact lies in this continual, internally registered movement. 43. Ed. note: See, first, the context in which this contrast was first mentioned here, in the initial paragraph of §74.1. 44. Ed. note: The primary word for “habit” in German is Gewöhnheit, literally, “custom” or “customary behavior.” In Schleiermacher’s ethics, both philosophical and theological, “custom,” which stretches across the entire sphere of human life, is the subject of that field of inquiry. The main questions, therefore, could be these: In any given domain within that entire sphere, what behavioral habits have been formed, how are particular habits/ customary behaviors to be attended to, and on what grounds are they to be added to, excised or otherwise changed? Within the Christian domain, the questions pertain only to, or chiefly dwell within, wider-ranging aspects of comparative or contextual studies, to a given Christian domain. This is also true of the rest of dogmatics, namely, investigation into Christian doctrine. In both, Schleiermacher chose to focus on the immediate context of the various German Evangelical churches, especially on those facing possible union of the traditionally Lutheran and Reformed churches. At the same time, he kept his eye out for participation in similar inquiries by a broader array, including the Roman Catholic Church and other churches that are gospel-centered in varying aspects and to varying degrees. “Custom” and “habit” across the entire spectrum of human customary behaviors, actions, and contexts are, for him, embraced within the all-inclusive subject of ethics, wherever that discipline might be pursued. Accordingly, to some extent ethics also belongs and pertains to every discipline among the arts and sciences as well. An allied discipline that he long pursued was “Church Geography and Statistics,” itself global in its orientation. Thus far, no university in the world is anywhere close to covering all the branches of customary behavior that would be quite worthwhile to investigate. Thus, in accordance with Schleiermacher’s Christian approach to recognizing sin, this understanding of habit and of the overcoming of bad habits might well be another way of saying the following: In some ways and to some extent, sin and the susceptibility to sin are present in every habitation of the human species, though not everything that humans do is absolutely sinful.

SECTION TWO

Regarding Constitution of the World in Relation to Sin1 [Point of Doctrine

Regarding Evil]

§75. Given that sin is present in human beings, one also finds in the world, as the locus of one’s existence, causes that hinder one’s life to be persistently at work—that is, one finds evil. Hence, this section forms the point of doctrine regarding evil. 1. It is self-understood that in a presentation of faith-doctrine the world cannot be a subject for discussion except insofar as the world is related to human beings. Thus, even if the world were altered by sin outside this relation to human beings, with the result that new component parts of it would have emerged or old ones would have been altered in their very nature, these features still could not belong to a presentation of faith-doctrine in any way whatsoever. Hence, only incidentally, and only because this matter has frequently been mixed into religious communications, can it also be mentioned here that this is an entirely untenable notion, derived along with other features from a few Mosaic passages2 and without sufficient reason. However, even in relation to human beings, the world can take on other constituent features only in the manner stated by our proposition—that is, only in two ways: insofar as the world seems different to them and insofar as what results from sin destroys the original harmony between the world and human beings. That is, in the concept of an original perfection of the world,3 if we relate it to an original perfection of humankind, this would not include the notion that the world is the locus of evil. The reason is that there must always have been a relative contrast, to be sure, between the overall being that is given to us as humankind and the bodily being of each individual entity,4 a contrast that comes forth relatively stronger in one place and weaker in another. This contrast exists, because otherwise these individual lives could not have been mortal.5 Yet, as long as every instant of human self-initiated activity would have been simply a product within humankind’s original perfection, and consequently every instant would have been determined by Godconsciousness and all that is sensory and bodily would simply have been referred to that source, that contrast could not be admitted into the collective consciousness of human beings as a hindrance to life. This would have been the situation, because the activity of Godconsciousness could in no way be hindered by that contrast. Rather, results of the activity could simply be formed in a different manner. This situation would obtain even regarding natural death and any bodily hindrances to life in the form of illness or disability that preceded death, in that whatever could no longer serve the guiding and determining functions

of one’s higher consciousness could not be intentional either. Similarly, even according to Scripture,6 we are in bondage not on account of death but from a fear of death. On the other hand, suppose that flesh were to gain dominion within a human being instead of God-consciousness. Then, every bit of influence that the world would exert on a human being that includes a hindrance of bodily and temporal influence7 in it would also have to operate as follows. The more a given element of human life would tend to be contained by the dominion of flesh alone, without higher self-consciousness, the more that element would be categorized as an evil. This would happen, because this tendency would repress the very principle that alone could have established harmony between flesh and higher self-consciousness even in the particular case being examined. Now, the relative contrast between that mode of being which is external to a given human, on the one side, and one’s human temporal existence,8 on the other side, persists in general and necessarily so. Accordingly, evil is placed at the same time that sin is placed in the first of these two forms, that is, the world with sin appears to be different to human beings than it would have seemed without it. As concerns the second form, however, a form that has to be grounded, first of all, in human activity that bears some affinity with sin, obviously an activity that would be nothing but a pure product9 of a human being’s original perfection, would never be able to burst forth bringing any restraint to spiritual life.10 This point is to be explained as follows. In a first case, suppose that, against one’s own intention, the activity that bears affinity with sin had burst forth through some error and that even this same error would, nevertheless, be simply a hindrance to the sensory aspect of one’s life. Thus, on account of a stimulus to correct the error that would necessarily be built into this mistake, it would in no way be viewed as an evil. In a second case, then, the activity of one individual toward another could no more amount to a hindrance to life than it did in the first case, in that by virtue of a shared supremacy of God-consciousness in all, each individual could only want to share each activity with another.11 However, suppose a third case, in which the prevalence of God-consciousness is then suspended in some instance. Then, a contrast between individual modes of existence12 would be introduced, and what benefits one individual would thereby already have turned out to be a hindrance to another, even often so. As a result, here too evil is first introduced with the advent of sin, but once sin has appeared it arises inevitably. 2. Now, inasmuch as it is independent of human activity, all of that from which hindered states of life emerge among us we call natural evil. In contrast, all that has come about among us as a result of human activity and that becomes the basis for hindrances to life we call social evil. This last expression is to be preferred to so-called moral evil, because by this usage wickedness,13 as such, is also customarily designated as subsumed under the concept “evil.”14 Now, all social evils likewise presuppose sin, to be sure, with the result that what proceeds from sin for one individual does become evil for another individual—or might well become evil for the first individual as well. Yet, it simply seems to be all the more necessary

also to retain by name the essential difference in what these activities refer to. Now, suppose that this classification were not to seem wholly to suffice—that is, inasmuch as in many cases —illness, for example—something can be a natural evil, whereas in other cases it can be a social evil, for this ambiguity simply adheres to some general term’s being assigned to each of them. Indeed, even in a given particular case we must often regard as one and the same evil what is partly to be traced to one source, partly to another source, and perhaps it would thus be more correct to say that all evil consists of these two features together or from one or the other of them. Nonetheless, nothing would be altered regarding the matter itself—that is, the difference of the two features in relation to sin. However, if we return to the concept of original perfection,15 both features of evil would be evil only in these two ways: either by their diminishing the fullness of stimuli through which the development of a human being would be advanced or in that they would limit the world’s adaptiveness by means of human activity. Natural evil issues in the evils of being in more or less dire need and deficiency, and social evil issues in the evils of being in more or less dire hardship and adversity.16 Moreover, everything that can be regarded to be evil from our point of view must be traceable to these two types, including all the blunting and derangement of spiritual forces that stem from sin.17 3. Thus, to summarize the account thus far, lying in our proposition is the assertion that nothing in this world could rightly be deemed to be evil without sin, but whatever immediately correlates with the transitory nature of individual human life would at most be conceived as an unavoidable imperfection. In addition, manifestations of natural forces confronting human efforts would be conceived simply as stimuli toward subjecting these manifestations more fully to human control. Still further, our proposition also contains the assertion that evil is to be placed at the same level and proportion as sin is placed. In consequence, just as humankind is the locus of sin and sin is the collective act of this species, so, in the exact same sense, in its being related to humankind the entire world is indeed the locus of evil and the overall effects of evil amount to an affliction of the whole human race. Finally, our proposition asserts that nothing beyond evil, thus defined, follows from sin with regard to the relationship of the world to a human being, and also that our Christian religious self-consciousness cannot make any claim to show that in its initial origin sin would have to have brought forth evil on the entire world by any somehow magical effect.18

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “§75. Evil in its connection with sin. §76. Evil viewed as punishment for sin. §77. But not for the individual. §78. Ethical postscript” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Gen. 3:14, 16–18. Ed. note: In these verses God is depicted as changing the original nature of the serpent, women’s experience of childbirth, and the effort required to gather food from the earth. 3. See §59. 4. Einzelwesen. Ed. note: In this context, Sein is “being” in careful distinction from the bodily aspect of an individual member of the human species. Thus, whereas “entity” (Wesen) is used here just to designate each distinctive member of the race, all bodies are different in some respects, but we human beings are also spiritually different, i.e., different in various aspects of our overall mental functioning. 5. On this point, see §§59–60.

6. Heb. 2:15. Ed. note: In this verse the role of Christ is to “deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong bondage.” 7. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, the categories “bodily” and “temporal” denote the natural limitations of living in conditions of space and time (thus, finite existence, not infinite, and temporal existence, not eternal), and here the term for existence is Dasein, one’s being precisely here and now, there and then (da-sein). 8. Ed. note: Here “being” (Sein) that is external to an individual comprises any or all things and not necessarily a singular being, whereas “temporal existence” (zeitlichen Dasein) refers to an individual, i.e., a singular being. 9. Produkt. Ed. note: Clemen (1905) conjectures Ausdruck (expression) to be consistent with the first edition §97.1. The second edition, however, has Produkt (product). 10. Ed. note: In the context of this doctrine of sin, such expressions are clearly intended to provide the negative aspects of what will become an account of the Redeemer’s “sinless perfection” and “blessedness” alongside the chief ends of human life later on. See esp. §§86–90. 11. Ed. note: Here the expression nur mitwollen könnte (“could only want to share”) is taken to match the reference to Absicht (“intention,” or aim) in the first case. Hence, the two cases would still bear the same desire to have any given error corrected. 12. Ed. note: “Individual modes of existence” translates den einzelnen Existenzen, literally, “individual existences.” 13. Ed. note: Here das Böse is translated “wickedness,” elsewhere sometimes “human evil,” though in the latter instance calling it “evil” at all might seem to abrogate its distinctive character as compared with all else that is called evil, but in §48.1 this was done intentionally, in a context where sin, viewed as a “human condition” and as “an inexhaustible source” of evil, is “subsumed” under the category of evil. In contrast, the present context focuses on sin, or wickedness, in relation to evils either caused by humans or experienced by them but having nonhuman causes. Thus, the center of attention is “in reverse.” In the earlier context, moreover, “restraints to life” translates Lebenshemmungen, in the present context “hindrances to life” to mark the nuanced difference, though either word could be used in both places. 14. Cf. §48.l. Ed. note: In this important passage, intentionally paired by Schleiermacher with the present one, he does the following: he considers both evil and good to be absolutely dependent on God; and he characterizes good and evil more as states than as activities in comparison to the present account. States include the collective state of humankind. Moreover, in distinguishing between hindrances to life and advancements of life, he also introduces the contrast between natural and social evil, both of which can bring “troubles,” some not from sin, as contrasted with those brought about by sin. Both accounts seem to imply that some troubles wrought by human beings might not be from sin but are simply natural evils, since human beings are also natural beings, able to make errors unintentionally. 15. Cf. §59. 16. Ed. note: Since, like all of Schleiermacher’s general descriptions, his terms for these human conditions exist along a scale presenting “more or less,” hence in this rare instance these words, plus “dire,” have been added in translation. The general concepts are also difficult to render for all cases, respectively, Dürftigkeit (need, e.g., poverty) and Mangel (deficiency, want, e.g., lacking in necessities), then Druck (hardship, e.g., political oppression) and Widerstand (adversity, resistance, e.g., mutually damaging conflict). 17. Ed. note: As is immediately to be explained, this final feature would exclude, by definition, natural forces that do not negatively affect spiritual (geistige) functions. Hence, viewed in and of themselves, not all natural forces are to be deemed evil, and hence the world is not evil in itself. 18. Ed. note: Hence, historically it has taken only one quick association with Christ’s passion (his ailing and suffering on the cross) to suppose that this single one among his acts accomplished “atonement” for all the sins committed by all humans and perhaps all the evil suffered by humankind. In Schleiermacher’s view, this step, however, was not sufficient to explain what Jesus’ mission of redemption was or how it was accomplished, though he did regard the actual correlation between sin and redemption to be exact. The question remains as to whether any or all evils are to be included in this understanding as well. For a structural reminder of how he is proceeding, cf. §§11, 57–61, 64–66, 70, all preparatory for his account of relations between evil and sin vis-à-vis redemption in §§75–85. Then the rest of Part Two and the summary, climaxing Conclusion, are framed in terms of the doctrine of the triune God. His doctrine of atonement is relayed especially in §§100–112 and 118– 20. It is also worth noting here that under “Grace” the section “Regarding the Constitution of the World in Relation to Redemption” also handles relations between sin and redemption, covering 50 propositions (§§113–63) of the 172 total, including introductory points of doctrine on election and “Regarding Communication of the Holy Spirit,” then chiefly a general depiction of the doctrinally significant characteristics of the church from its origins to its then-present operations as an institution to its consummation (the latter offered via “prophetic” doctrine, the expected events being beyond current empirical scrutiny). This entire story leaves the details to other disciplines in “historical theology” that treat of ever-changing

varieties and details of the church’s history, but its structure too is historical, as is the directly complementary structure of Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics.

§76. All evil is to be regarded as punishment for sin. Yet, only social evil is so directly, and, in contrast, natural evil is so but indirectly. 1. It would be completely contrary to our proposition if anyone were indeed to assume an interconnection between evil and sin, yet were to do so in such a way that evil would be the original factor and sin the derivative one—that is, that sensory hindrances to life would first draw out wickedness1 and would suppress God-consciousness. Frequently enough, the same thing is claimed in particular instances, and wickedness is deduced from natural imperfections, be they then bodily or psychological2 in nature. Yet, if this position were held to, Christian self-consciousness could only be in contradiction to itself. This would be so, in that this self-consciousness would already view one element as a hindrance to life, an element in which only sensory self-consciousness is disturbed, which would then presuppose a weakening of power in God-consciousness and thus sin. Accordingly, this presupposition could always have truth in it, especially in those particular instances where certain evils would also facilitate development of certain formations of sin, but only after those evils had been themselves grounded in sin. Now, suppose that someone wanted to set forth this view exclusively and in general terms. Then, in all cases, sin would have to have its ultimate ground entirely beyond human activity, in the original order of evil, independent of human activity. Consequently, it would also not be the collective act of humankind but would, above all else, be the work of external nature, in which evil would have had its ground but, if raised to a higher level, would comprise acts of divine fate.3 However, this assumption would not only take us entirely beyond the distinctive domain of Christianity, insofar as redemption too would then have to be essentially a total release from evil. It would also take us altogether beyond the domain comprised of a teleological formation of piety,4 the properly ethical form of piety, into the aesthetic form, or nature-oriented faith. In these latter domains the trust that guides adherents would simply be this: that a joyful coming forth of God-consciousness would be possible only if and when we would have come to be happy.5 Over against this entire perspective, we now express the consciousness that in the interconnectedness between sin and evil agreed to, sin is, above all and overall, the first and original feature, but evil is the derived and secondary feature. This assertion is to be explained in that the term “punishment” contained in our proposition implies, first of all, that some evil does exist in relation to some previous wickedness. To be sure, this is not the whole meaning of the term “punishment,” however. Rather, in accordance with ordinary usage, we refer this interconnectedness between sin and evil back to an originator6 and posit its origin in a free action of this originator. Further, we tend to use the term punishment when some evil befalls a person, but not on account of one’s perpetrating wickedness. We do this either simply in a figurative sense or in that we refer the interconnection between sin and evil back to divine causality. Thus, the proposition set forth here is an expression of our religious

self-consciousness inasmuch as we refer this interconnected process back to absolutely living divine causality, as this causality has been described above.7 We also make this reference without intending to implicate divine causality, perchance in some special fashion, in the contrast between what is free and what is necessary in regard to causality. Precisely in that way, moreover, this consciousness, which probably none among us can evade, must be distinguished from the partly one-sided and partly perverted way in which it has already occurred in Judaism and even more among heathens. This is so, for since this ordering of evil in relation to sin, quite apart from the general world order and from the entire interconnected process of nature, would be presented in these precincts as something particular or disparate or presented as something that Supreme Being8 could regard to be contrary to itself; hence, underlying such notions a contaminated God-consciousness would also then be present that would itself partake in sin. 2. Now, we distinguish social evils from natural evils in this connection, because social evils are alone immediately grounded in sin. Someone could indeed object that to say “grounded in human activity” and “grounded in sin” are not one and the same thing, in that very often it is error rather than sin which underlies human activity. Yet, suppose that we entertain the case of a completely faultless error. In that case, we would soon become aware that we must restrict that sphere much more narrowly than people customarily believe. Indeed, we would be aware that, strictly taken, we would have to be going back to passive states, not to free human activity any longer. These passive states themselves already belong to natural imperfection. Consequently, evils that are grounded in these states, to the extent that they are not grounded in sin, are to be assigned not to social evils but to natural evils instead. However, the connection of natural evils with sin would be only a mediated one. This is so, because we do also find death and pain, or at least analogues to natural inadequacies within life of an individualistic nature in relation to one’s environing world, in instances where no sin is involved. Thus, objectively considered, natural evils would not arise from sin. However, since without having any sin a human being would not take what hinders merely one’s sensory performances to be evil; the fact that some people do, nevertheless, then take it to be evil is grounded in sin and thus, subjectively considered, does take evil to be a punishment for sin. Yet, on the occasion of the man born blind9 Christ himself taught that, both in and of themselves and regarded solely from the standpoint of human natural perfection,10 even the most strongly disparate inadequacies of this sort are not punishments. Rather, they are stimuli toward an unfolding of the human spirit. That is to say, what Christ states above all on that occasion, and only in relation to the distinctive miraculous force he could exercise, allows, at the same time, for an entirely general application, nevertheless. Yet, suppose that someone wants to say in addition, rising over and above this consideration, that the hindrances of our lives, already in and of themselves and before they become evils through sin, are indeed grounded in the same factors that sin is also grounded in, this in accordance with an account given above,11 namely, in the temporal shape and

spatial isolation of existence12 to which all the beginnings of sin are attached. In that case, for us—even in their holding in common this same interconnectedness in their being grounded— sin would continue to come first and evil second. This is just as certainly the case as, for us, human beings are originally agents, and their actions are not absolutely conditioned by their passive states. 3. Now, suppose that the value of the Mosaic narrative is conditioned by its not being able to offer an actual history of the first human beings. Suppose too that a situation of abundant satisfaction proffered to the first human beings without any exertion by them can be no pure expression of an original perfection of the world. Accordingly, the true meaning of that symbolic picture is perhaps shown in reference to the contrasted condition that it provides.13 That is, in the tale when, after the fall into sin, the first man had to till the soil in the sweat of his brow—which was no evil, in and of itself, and thus also not punishment for sin—the tilled soil now bore thorns and thistles. To be sure, this second feature is meant to indicate that nature’s counteraction to his cultivating influence is to be thought of only as in connection with sin. Likewise, when death, previously unknown to him, is held before him as payment14 for transgression and the first instance of death is presented to him as a product of sin, this might seem to indicate that only by sin do natural imperfections take form also as social evils. Now, the Pauline presentation15 regarding the relationship of death to sin, consequently also of all subordinate natural evils to sin, entirely comports with that figurative tale, and his presentation can be interpreted only in conformity with it. Thus, exactly on an analogy with how sin is treated, his account also presents to us the evil which touched the first human beings after their fall into sin, as the originating primal evil. This account can then be applied to every contribution that every individual makes to a deterioration of the world by one’s sin.

1. Ed. note: As before, the preferred translation of Böse, though, somewhat contrarily, the term “human evil” can be used. The latter is rather off the mark, however, for two reasons. First, there is no such thing as evil not related to human beings, either directly or indirectly. The created world is good, and its sustaining or preserving activity by God is also good. See §§32–61. For Schleiermacher, all that is evil is commensurate with human sin, thus with any consequences of sin as well. Second, to use “human” as a modifier of “evil” can be misleading for another reason as well. That is, it could be assumed that the sin which humans do directly is the only sin, whereas consequences for the world’s functioning would not be. Actually, for Schleiermacher, ill that is done to the world can come back into human experience secondhand from the world. In current language, the environing world too can be damaged, by virtue of our exercise of free will. Hence, sinful actions from within the human race can produce what humans properly experience as “evil” from whatever within the rest of nature has been harmed or distorted, thereby coming as its secondary source. This process runs alongside purely natural challenges to human activity that are independent of sin (e.g., wild animals and some storms), which he has above called “natural evil” versus “social evil.” Thus, serious damage to the environment that causes it to be dysfunctional in itself is, emphatically, a social evil for him. 2. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s psychology lectures, the subject of that field is defined as comprised of two interlocking and mutually dependent elements: mind (Geist) and body. The two together comprise the functioning psyche. Here he distinguishes between them with the terms “body” and “psyche” per se (leibliche, psychische). 3. Ed. note: Here “divine fate” (göttliche Schickung), not “providence” (Vorsehung), which Schleiermacher does not consider useful in any case, in part because he deems many views of it to be at least magical, representing an absolutely supernatural perspective in which instances of divine activity could be interpreted as sudden interventions absolutely

intervening against God’s own natural order. See index under “providence,” “foreseeing,” “magic,” “miracle,” and “supernatural, absolute.” 4. Ed. note: Cf. §4, §11, and contexts. 5. Ed. note: glücklich. Contained in ordinary usage is the connotation of being “lucky,” or “fortunate,” which, in turn, suggests the hedonic non-Aristotelian, noneudaemonistic conception of happiness (Glücklichkeit). For Schleiermacher, to the degree that such a view comports with the notion of ethics as reflecting on customary social behavior, it too is ethical (sittliche) to a certain degree, and in some respects it may be monotheistic (most notably to him, within much Islamic faith). However, it would not be a highly teleological piety such as that of the typically Judaic faith and Christianity. See §§5–11, some introductory propositions “borrowed from ethics,” as a way of defining the distinctive nature of Christianity. 6. Ed. note: Here “originator” translates Urheber, not “author.” Within Christian tradition the actual author was sometimes taken to be the devil/Satan, not God, even to the point of falling into the Manichean heresy. This heresy was borrowed from a gnostic bifurcation of reality into light versus darkness, good versus evil, by Manes (ca. 216–270), whose Christian sect was based on his elaborate teaching, from about 240 CE on. Reared as a Christian, Manes was also deeply influenced by writings of the apostle Paul, which he and members of the Manichean sect thought were congruent with Manes’s teachings. Augustine (354–430) was a member of that sect for nine years before his radical shift to a more Roman orthodoxy in 386, and he seemed always to have honored its seeking to achieve moral perfection. Other sects subsequently held similar metaphysical twofold splits in doctrine, eventually charged with Manicheanism (as if his name had been Manicheaus), and Augustine himself contributed to critiques of that extremely heterodox heresy. Here Schleiermacher is contributing to a critique of remnants that had remained and still do remain. 7. Ed. note: In Part One this absolute divine causality is explicated, especially in §§51–54, as from “the living God” revealed in Christ. Thus, its operation is a vital reality for Christians, not an independently philosophical concept. It is introduced in contrast to finite causality, with which it cannot be either identified or confused, whether it be free causality (as in humans) or necessarily in accordance with the interconnected processes of world order that God creates and preserves. Hence, he applies the term “absolute” to it. There he states that for Christians this divine causality, “expressed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and, in consequence, everything for which there is a causality in God also comes to be realized and does occur” (§54). In Part Two, the corresponding summative statements regarding humans’ restored communion with God in redemption are these: Christians can express Jesus’ fulfillment of God’s eternal divine decree of redemption (cf. §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2) in that they “posit the planning and spreading of the Christian church as an object of the divine government of the world,” and this divine causality herein “presents itself as divine wisdom and as divine love” (§§164 and 165). 8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher thus regards the idea of a devil countering God to be “unstable,” also to be without scriptural warrant and to lie outside the confines of a genuine presentation of Christian faith-doctrine. Cf. §72.2 and §§44–45. 9. John 9:3. Ed. note: Sermon on John 9:1–7, July 17, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 138–52. 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher later designates Christ’s own sinless perfection, or completeness of human development, as a stimulus toward this unfolding and an enablement for seeing that sin, or wickedness, can be overcome and for experiencing this promise in the process of redemption (§§93–94). 11. Cf. §69. 12. in der zeitlichen Gestalt und räumlichen Vereinzelung des Daseins. 13. Ed. note: In this passage Zustand is translated both “situation,” in which people are placed, and “condition,” pointing to one or more aspects of the situation, internal or external, of which the word can also point to inner “states.” In general usage, only context can indicate which meaning is intended. In Schleiermacher’s usage, his occasional use of a cognate term Gemützustand is translated “state of mind and heart,” in which he takes intellect, on the one hand, and sensations, feelings, and certain associated perceptions, on the other hand, to be both interactive and combined. 14. Ed. note: “Payment” translates Lohn here, elsewhere Belohnung stands for “recompense,” also a punishment thought to be exacted for sin. Compare this account especially with those in §§77 and 84. It is to be recognized, at the same time, that apart from Schleiermacher’s entire highly complex account of the connections between types of sin and types of evil in their relation to each other, by itself the statement in §76 is almost sure to be misunderstood. Cf. OR (1821), II supplemental note 20 and IV supplemental note 20. There he argues that the notion of divine recompense (Belohnung) for sinning threatens both human freedom and morality. 15. Rom. 5:12ff.

§77. The dependence of evil on sin, however, admits of being demonstrated on an experiential1 basis only if a life held in common is kept in view in its entirety. Yet, on no

account may the evils that affect an individual be referred to that individual’s sin as their cause. 1. Given that in its entire interconnected process, sin is to be conceived correctly only as the collective act of the human species, its causality in relation to evil is to be understood only in this same manner. Everyone, moreover, certainly finds the purest expression of that consciousness in the general statement that in whatever degree sin increases within the human species as a whole, evil must also increase—except that since the effect of sin naturally sets in only gradually, often the children and grandchildren first suffer and make amends for the sins of the fathers2—but likewise, as sin decreases, evil would also decrease. Now, since community within the human race is still rather restricted even today, however, and since many groups existing, as it were, outside the range of other groups’ sin do form an enclosed whole for themselves, the same analysis then applies to them as well. Following this track, we will be able to say the same thing of every folk, indeed of every class within such, insofar as each respectively appears as a self-enclosed entity, that the amount of evil in them will be commensurate with the amount of sin. This parity of evil with sin, moreover, extends perchance not only to social evils. Rather, it extends to how great masses of human beings not infrequently also affect each other totally, after the mode of natural forces, and also, in turn, to how external nature hinders their common endeavors. Likewise, in every sizeable association in human life, it extends to how all of this is sensed the more strongly as evil the more sin is found within a given association. Indeed, not infrequently even collective evils obtain their distinctive tone and character by means of how the predominant sin of a given collectivity is constituted. All these characteristics are to be observed with surety only when we remain for a time within a circle of homogeneous life that is not too small for a fraction of the whole. 2. Suppose that we should desire to set forth the same sort of view regarding each individual human being, though such a view was firmly rooted in Judaism and among heathen societies. It would be not only a narrow and erroneous view but a dangerous one as well to hold that, for every individual, evils suffered would be commensurate with one’s sin. This would be so, in that the following result already issues from the concept of human community in life and that of human association—as is also almost self-evident already based on the manner in which sin gives rise to evil—namely, that it can quite easily be the case that a tiny portion of the evil suffered in common strikes at the very point from which much of the damage or corruption held in common has in fact proceeded. In this respect, moreover, Christ also explained what initially had to do with natural evil, explicitly in saying that, on the one hand, those influences of nature, in which the original perfection of the world is mostly presented, are no less active in accordance with the divine ordering of the world where sin exists than where righteousness exists.3 On the other hand, Christ says that natural evils,4 and accidental evils such that one can almost associate them only with natural evils,5 may not be tied to the sin of an individual, to the degree that such sin

can be isolated at all, with the result that an individual’s sin could be commensurate with some corresponding evil. Suppose, moreover, that we go back to the point at which susceptibility to sin and natural imperfections are grounded in the same source. Then, an individual’s part in either sin or evil would seem to be independent of the individual’s part in the other of the two. Likewise, only in this manner can our presupposition then also be insisted on without destroying the completeness and steadiness of the interconnected process of nature. As to what thereupon concerns social evils, in a magical fashion people would often have to seek out justice in injustice itself if such evil is to be allocated to each individual according to one’s part in collective fault.6 Indeed, Christ does predict persecution and suffering of his disciples as a consequence of their work on behalf of the reign of God, but not in proportion to their sin. How could such an assumption even coexist with the notion—one that runs through the entire New Testament and, only if correctly understood, that is essential to Christianity itself —that in a shared domain of sin one individual can suffer for others, with the result that all the evil that is grounded in the sin of many would often converge on one individual and, what is more, that penal evils can primarily afflict an individual who is the most free of shared fault and who has most vigorously labored against the sin in question.7 Postscript. Having reached this point, we can now take into consideration a particular position, which, in general terms, I should like to call a cynical one. Even in notably Christian eras, however, this position has also been repeated often enough and in various forms. It may be summarized as follows. First, all evil is taken to have arisen from human sociality8 and from efforts, formed by combining forces, better to disclose and gain dominion over nature. Second, it is held that in a so-called state of nature evils would virtually not have developed at all. Now, on the one hand, it might appear that this position is simply a continuation of what is stated in our proposition. This is so, for if in a communal setting an individual can have to suffer for the many, evil cannot possibly be the same in a solitary state as in a social setting.9 It is obvious, moreover, that the less activity a human being choses to execute and, on account of this attitude, the less one puts oneself in contact with the rest of humankind and with external nature, all the less can evils also develop in one’s life out of such contact. On the other hand, however, suppose that this situation is not only a matter of observation but is also a counsel and warning that a human being would do well to engage in less action so as to suffer less also. In that case, in contradiction to the spirit of Christianity, it recommends the maxim regarding the lazy, slothful servant10 and elevates passive states over self-initiated states as one’s purpose.

1. Ed. note: “Experiential” (Erfahrungsmäßig) is not a major term in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary, since he ordinarily breaks down “experience” into its components instead, so as to gain greater precision. Here, however, it quite fittingly represents his view that the elements that go into a Christian life, including sin and evil, must be experienced if they are to be rightly understood and that, as Anselm famously declared, theology is about “faith seeking understanding.” Schleiermacher chose this phrase as the epigram fronting the entire present work.

2. Exod. 20:5. 3. Matt. 5:45. 4. John 9:3. Ed. note: See §76n9. 5. Luke 13:5. 6. Cf. Luke 13:1–3. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “To repeat once more how the moral connection stands in relation to what is physical. Essentially, social evils have a physical connection with sin. Precisely on that account, however, they have a moral connection as well. Naturally, there is a physical connection with one half of sin, namely, inertia, a lack of activity [Trägheit]” (Thönes, 1873). 8. Ed. note: Here “sociality” translates Geselligkeit. In his ethical writings, Schleiermacher has lifted this term up in a very positive way by referring it especially to the freer, more intimate domain of social interchange, modeled in the salons for conversation and for musical and literary enjoyment. Hence, he ordinarily used the concept “free sociality” for this kind of engagement. In general terms, however, the word could also be translated “modes of forming social relations in their entirety.” From the onset of his long residence in Berlin in 1796, Schleiermacher joined in these Berlin salons at the invitation into their homes especially by two highly educated and cultured Jewish hostesses, Rachel von Varnhagen and Henriette Herz, the latter among his closest lifelong friends from then on. See his “Toward a Theory of Sociable Conduct” (1799). In Christmas Eve Celebration (1806, 1826) he offered a version of this special model within a Christian household. In this postscript, however, he examines a much broader philosophical conception of engagement (or rather, disengagement) within social contexts, dating from a Hellenic school of thought among people called “Cynics” that gained notoriety within the period of early Christianity alongside Stoic and gnostic schools. 9. Ed. note: As usual, “society” or “social setting” translates Gesellschaft, whereas “community” translates Gemeinschaft. In Schleiermacher’s usage, “community” has either a general provenance or an ideal, teleological connotation within a process of becoming, whereas “society” refers either to peoples’ societal relations in general, whether the participants are in community or not, or to a specific social setting in some specific time and place. 10. Ed. note: In German, this idiom refers to “the ready reckoner,” from a series of folktales stemming from Jesus’ parable telling of a master who was to go on a journey variously entrusting a very valuable coin called a “talent” (5, 2, and 1) to each of three servants (Matt. 25:14–30; cf. Luke 19:21). There the only reference to a faulen Knecht (“idle, sluggish servant”) in the Luther Bible (“wicked” and “slothful” servant in the RSV) appears. This is what the master calls the onetalent servant who, knowing of his master’s wasteful ways and out of fear, hid and returned his coin, whereas the other two had gained, respectively, double the amount with theirs. The master wished one of the most memorable punishments on him ever uttered in Scripture: being “cast into the outer darkness,” where he would live endlessly in agony, weeping and gnashing his teeth. Over time, this scene was transported into popular tales and eventually into an idiom focusing on this one servant. At least two hundred tales eventually emerged from this source, occasionally introducing the additional descriptor of the servant’s being “clever.” A degree of such irony seems to have become attached to these tales, so that today German/English dictionaries translate the biblical and traditional German phrase der faule Knecht into “the ready reckoner,” pointing to the lies and artful reasons for idleness given in the various imaginative stories regarding various numbers of such servants. The growing Wikipedia account highlights a charmingly artful tale presenting twelve idle servants added in the seventh edition of the Grimm brothers’ Kinderund Hausmärchen (1857), Stelle 151. In turn, they cite a three-volume collection of fifteenth-century Fastnachtspiele (1853) by Adelbert von Keller, which includes the tale of Die drei Faulen. Already in Schleiermacher’s time, however, the idiomatic reference was in common usage, bearing an ironic twist for English readers as well. This is a rare, though apt, use of such idiomatic expressions in his sermons and scientific works despite his occasionally more frequent allusions to more popular language in early essays and reviews from 1789 to 1806.

Postscript to This Point of Doctrine [regarding Evil] §78. Consciousness of this connection between evil and sin does not require a passive endurance of evil on account of sin; nor, however, does an effort either to call forth evil because of sin or, in reverse, to get rid of evil, viewed in and of itself, follow from such consciousness.1 1.2 This proposition makes no further provision regarding origination of the consciousness elucidated thus far, nor more precisely defines or further enlarges on its

content. Thus, if viewed as nonessential, it could be treated only as a postscript. However, since the proposition has to do with the aim of this consciousness, inasmuch as such consciousness can issue in an impetus to repercussive actions, this proposition actually comprises a boundary before crossing over into Christian ethics, but only this and not a proposition borrowing from Christian ethics. This is the case, for an independently fashioned Christian ethics—that is, one not simply related to a distinct system of faith-doctrine already at hand and in the form of practical corollaries based on that system—would hardly be able immediately to connect the points summarized in this postscript with each other. Rather, the following questions would probably arise at entirely different spots in Christian ethics: (a) whether a passive submission is enjoined by Christian religious consciousness in all cases of evil; (b) or whether, on the contrary, every other assigned activity ought to be set aside until an evil under which we suffer is eliminated and (c) those other questions as to whether any arbitrary penal code would have an immediately religious source; and then (d) whether consciousness of one’s own sin would lead to inflicting evil upon oneself. However, this proposition rightly finds its place here for the sake of the distinctively dogmatic connection afforded it.3 2. In every instant of suffering, consciousness of the connection evil has with sin accompanies us and is indeed combined, along with our God-consciousness, into one united element. This being so, precisely this relatedness of the feeling of absolute dependence to the state of suffering is thus seen to comprise religious submission, which accordingly is, to be sure, an essential aspect of piety. This suffering, submissive aspect of piety goes away when one imagines away the connection of evil with sin or subsumes hindrances to life already experienced, in deference to corresponding advancements of life expected in the future. Likewise, however, suppose that this submission were to assume a positive character, by one’s desire that the given evil continue or one’s not desiring that it cease—say, on the pretext of not infringing on what God has disposed or not wanting to be found in resistance to it. In that case, submission would also no longer be grounded in the connection of evil with sin set forth here. Such delusion, stemming from misunderstanding as it does, has always been repudiated by the Christian church, setting itself against any superstition and fanaticism that might appear at this point. It has done so, for a continuation of evil cannot be desired when it is viewed as a hindrance to life, in that, in every instance any activity that proceeds from God-consciousness is also restricted by every such hindrance to life in whatever aspect that activity may be pursued. Still less, however, can a continuation of suffering within the domain of redemption4 be desired on account of the connection set forth between evil and sin, for we believe in sin’s disappearance in the domain of redemption. We cannot want this continuation of suffering, in that if we did we would indeed either want the continuation of sin itself or we would, in any case, not want confirmation of that faith as a result of sin’s disappearance. On the other hand, it is just as certain, however, that no activity especially devoted to supplying an element of piety that is directed to cessation of suffering, as such, can proceed from Christian religious consciousness. This is so partly because this element of piety,

already viewed in and of itself, would then, nevertheless, be determined by the interest of a lower level of life. However, it would also be so partly in that, by virtue of this connection of evil with sin, suffering necessarily stirs up consciousness of sin. Even more, the tendency to move against sin must then be awakened. At the same time, moreover, the task of giving this mastery proper currency does arise, because every restriction of self-initiated activity points to this mastery as not yet operative. Thus, this suffering would appear to but does not comprise the two consistent and practical outcomes of our consciousness. To the contrary, any activity solely directed against suffering must be a sensory one, already on account of its aim, and it will also assume a fanatically enthusiastic character all too easily. Moreover, by these considerations something non-Christian, or rather broadly irreligious, about another view comes to light, namely, the view that, from its very outset on, only evil would have drawn forth both activity of mastery over nature and activity of forming social life. In contrast, suppose that these two activities had constantly been directed only against evil, thus would have arisen only as a reaction against life-hindering influences and would not have proceeded from self-initiated activity. Then, this entire domain of action would be simply that of sensory nature, and God-consciousness would not have provided impetus toward those activities. In that case, those who do not permit piety to issue in outward actions at all would then have come to be right. Yet, given that attitude, they would have divorced this entire domain of action, viewed as worldly and as solely a matter of necessity, from that of piety, splitting up life in an irreversible manner. 3. Finally, suppose, on the one hand, that sin is essentially something communal, in that in every sin proceeding from an individual the fault of others also constantly lies hidden. Consequently, only collective evil could be related to collective sin. Suppose, on the other hand, that every increase of sin is, already of itself, to be viewed as increasing evil as well. Then, in a consciousness of this divine arrangement, no basis could exist anywhere for anyone’s bringing forth evil by oneself in response to any observable sin, in that automatically thereby this divine order could simply be rear-ranged. Naturally, whether there could be any other basis for this alteration’s being done, however, would not be a subject for investigation here.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The direction [of our striving] must go against sin, not against evil” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal notes head the first two subsections as follows: “1. Placement of the proposition in relation to ethics and dogmatics. As to content, ethical, as to form … 2. Discussion of a material nature: (a) Submission, (b) Resistance, (c) Evil as cause of formative activity. 3. Not participation in any evoking [of evil]” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: According to Schleiermacher, Christian ethics and Christian faith-doctrine are always presented as the two halves of dogmatics. However, although the two halves share basic presuppositions that bear on both conduct and doctrine, some matters legitimately brought up in one of the two, like those in §78 here, would be neither warranted nor appropriate in the other, because the questions that lead to them, like those just listed, do not arise in the same way, if at all, in the two halves. See indexes in Brief Outline and in his notes and lectures on Christian Ethics for further discussions on how the two halves of dogmatics can and cannot or had best not relate directly to each other. 4. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “or at least a [form of ] Christianity” (Thönes, 1873).

SECTION THREE

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Relate to Consciousness of Sin1 [Introduction to Section Three] §79. Divine attributes that refer to consciousness of sin, even if this is done only with respect to redemption’s being conditioned by sin, can be set forth only inasmuch as God is, at the same time, considered2 to be the originator of sin.3 1.4 First, we can take it to be established that we can attain notions regarding divine attributes in no way other than in our combining the contents of our self-consciousness with the concept of absolute divine causality, corresponding as it does with our feeling of absolute dependence.5 We can then anticipate that something is given to every Christian in one’s Christian self-consciousness, namely, the overcoming of sin by redemption and in such a form that it refers back to divine causality. Yet, divine attributes that would herewith be thought to be active would, nevertheless, be active in the process of redemption first of all, and they would be related to sin only by means of redemption.6 Now, if there were to be divine activities related to sin other than those that overcome sin, then sin would somehow have to persist7 by divine causality, and this divine causality would have to be defined, in particular, in relation to sin’s persistent presence. This is the case, for already above,8 discussion has shown that in general even sin viewed as deed is, at the same time, subsumed under divine cooperation, this besides its being established that in every instance sin is grounded in the interconnected process of nature—a phrase that is taken in a sense of including what is historical within it as well.9 However, this phrase points us only to the creating and preserving omnipotence of God. Now, suppose that a special divine activity were to be posited here, this because and inasmuch as sin persists. If we do this, then we should not forget that in using this detached reflection on consciousness of sin we also find ourselves in a state of abstraction. Hence, we should also not forget that we would not act correctly in seeking divine activities even in relation to sin, taken in and of itself. Instead, it must be possible to demonstrate somehow that sin in its relation to redemption persists by virtue of special divine activities—if this section is to have any content at all.10 In addition, it must indeed be possible to do this in view of our having explained regarding divine causality that every hard and fast difference in it between carrying out and permitting, as well as between creating and preserving is inadmissible.11 2.12 Thus, we have the following question to answer: Whether and to what extent God is to be viewed as the originator of sin as it has been described. Consequently, this question does indeed not arise simply in relation to the material nature of a sinful deed but is always, at the same time, to be viewed in light of redemption. Now, if it is possible to answer this question in the affirmative, then doing so will also yield divine attributes by virtue of which

sin is ordered by God, yet not in and of itself but inasmuch as redemption also persists through God. Subsequently, these attributes will then be the counterpoint to those attributes which we will have to seek under the same terms in the second half of Part Two, in which part God is the originator of redemption. These attributes will be a counterpoint only insofar as sin persists through God and does not persist in and of itself. Accordingly, the concepts of divine attributes set forth here will, on the one hand, be posited only under the presupposition of their being interwoven with concepts that arise for us from reflection on consciousness of grace. As a result, we posit in advance the impossibility of the two kinds of concepts truly being able, as it were, to diverge in the same way that the two features of our Christian selfconsciousness, sin and grace, stand opposite to each other in their present abstraction. On the other hand, these divine attributes are to be thought of only in terms of divine omnipotence, just as it, in its turn, has been described as eternally omnipresent omnipotence.13 This is so for the very reason that this is the most general expression of the feeling of absolute dependence, which is considered, precisely here, to be its underlying basis, just as it is the underlying basis for the first aspect of the contrast between sin and grace.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here provides an outline for §§79–82: “Introduction: §79. [Divine attributes of this sort are] possible only if God is the originator in the same manner [as with all else in the world]. §80. However, [God is the originator] of sin and grace in different ways. §81. Relationship to ecclesial, negative propositions. §82. [Here the same things bear currency] for evil as for sin” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, the verb betrachten (“consider”) used here bears other important connotations, namely, to observe and devoutly to contemplate or reflect. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Condition under which divine attributes are possible. Relationship to the task of Part One” (Thönes, 1873). 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “The task is not directed, as it were, to a concept of sin that is of a strictly material nature, for this approach would yield no connection with redemption whatsoever” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: See §§50–51. 6. Ed. note: See esp. §§32–35 and 38–39. 7. Ed. note: In this context, bestehen and Bestehen are translated “persist” and “persistent presence.” In German, both words connote an existence that is continual, that exists or subsists as an ongoing process. The current question then is How is the ultimate cause of sin to be attributed to God, as both its author or originator (Urheber) and as the agent of its overcoming (Aufgehobenenwerden)? 8. See §48. 9. Ed. note: This passage, in which the word (Wort) is itself used in an active sense (as, for example, in a more Hebraic sense, as in God’s active word creating and preserving the world), offers unusually clear, direct warrant for translating the word Naturzusammen-hang more generally as “the interconnected process of nature.” 10. Ed. note: In case the point made here be lost, the qualification “if … at all” (wenn … anders) has to indicate an only apparent difference between the attributes “presupposed” in the construction of Part One and attributes included in the exposition of grace and sin in accordance with “the redemption accomplished” in Jesus of Nazareth (§11). Any “detachment” from God’s gracious activity in Christ, thus of sin in relation to redemption, would be an inadmissible “abstraction.” The full and proper description of sin must therefore be placed only in Part Two, including, of course, God’s attributes in relation to sin. 11. Ed. note: See §81.4. The treatments of divine attributes in Part One do not admit any splits in God’s nature or regarding what God wills and does, thus effects, or carries out, and permits. Regarding the distinction without any real difference (Unterschied) between creation and preservation, see esp. §§36 and 49.P.S., also §§39.2 and 41.2. 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here announces how this subsection will carry over into the remaining discussion of attributes in propositions to follow: “Relationship to the task of the second aspect [of this proposition].” That is, the two attributes to be considered here are those interwoven aspects which, first, relate to sin in our consciousness of

grace and, second, take God to be the originator of sin—namely, justice and holiness, respectively. These two attributes, in turn, he relates to the set previously advanced in Part One. The second task is framed as answering a given question. Cf. §56n22. 13. Ed. note: See §54.1.

§80. Inasmuch as sin and grace are in contrast to each other in our self-consciousness, God cannot be thought to be the originator of sin and the originator of grace in the same way. Yet, inasmuch as we never possess a consciousness of grace without a consciousness of sin, we must also assert that for us sin’s being with and alongside grace is ordained by God.1 1.2 Suppose that we term the mighty power of God-consciousness in our souls “grace,” precisely because we are not conscious of grace as our own deed. Suppose, moreover, that we ascribe grace to a particular divine communication3—this apart from that general divine cooperation with human beings without which even sin could not be committed. In addition, suppose that we term a moment’s being filled without any determining activity of that consciousness of grace “sin,” precisely because we are conscious of sin as our own deed, torn from that particular divine communication to which grace is ascribed. All this being so, the first part of our proposition would already be justified thereby. That is to say, the general divine cooperation is the same in both grace and sin, but sin lacks that particular divine communication which makes precisely every nearing toward blessedness into a nearing by grace. Perhaps someone might wish to say, nevertheless, that since it is the case that the more grace enters in, all the more does sin fade away, then the two are to be regarded in the same way that in animal nature there can be a relationship between two species, one of which is being consumed by the other; but both would have persisted in this relationship by one and the same coextensive will of God. Given this observation, however, that special divine communication just mentioned would be denied, consequently redemption would be brought to fruition only by the self-initiated activity of human beings. As a result, this human activity would be related to divine cooperation in the domain of grace exactly as it would be in that of sin. Now, in and of itself this view does not have to be regarded as non-Christian right off, inasmuch as it can, nonetheless, still leave room for some influence from the distinctive selfinitiated activity of the Redeemer. Yet, it would not be the doctrine that has currency in the church; thus it would not be a doctrine that expresses the common feeling of the church.4 Thus, if this contrast between grace and sin within our self-consciousness does include in itself a particular divine communication, then, on the other hand, we can answer the question as to what kind of divine activity underlies the reality of sin as such—that is, as the activity that would call forth redemption—only in a way such that an activity of this kind would not permit of being detected at all. 2. Yet, all things considered, the second half of our proposition too is neither more nor less true than the first half is. That is to say, when we are conscious of being determined by this divine force,5 a force communicated to us by means of our God-consciousness, we are always conscious of this only in company with an incapacity of our own, albeit one that ever

turns out to be codetermining. In consequence, that divine force does indeed overcome the accompanying resistance, but some residual of that resistance also continually remains. Accordingly, we can only conceive the divine will communicating that divine force to us in such a way that therein, at the same time, sin’s existence is coposited as disappearing alongside grace.6 This would be the case, for if the divine will were to be directed wholly against sin, without contents of such a kind being attached to its activity, then sin would also have to disappear entirely, indeed instantly. This second aspect of our proposition, however, rests wholly on the presupposition that everywhere human wickedness is attached only to what is good and sin is attached only to grace. If it were possible to direct our discourse to a sin that has no interconnection with redemption, it would not be possible to assume a divine activity directed toward the persistence of such a sin. In contrast, if it is correct to claim that the state called hardness of heart is, in the strict sense, no human state at all,7 then a sin of this sort does not exist at all within the narrower domain of Christianity, a domain in which everyone is already received into some communion with the process of redemption. Nor, however, would it any more likely exist outside this domain, for there even the weakest and most defiled Godconsciousness always, nonetheless, belongs to some collective life in which, at the same time, a better life exists, one proclaimed by use of doctrine and law. Moreover, even though every such collective life is itself incomplete and sinful, it is, nevertheless, in some internal connection with the redemptive process through presentiment and longing. Least of all, however, would it be possible to think, given God’s productive process in arrangement of the world,8 that sin could be posited without redemption. It would be most unlikely to think this, since in the divine will directed to the very existence of the whole human race, both sin and redemption are ordained in relation to each other.9 That is to say, it in no way follows from the assertion that the appearance of sin would have preceded redemption’s entering the scene that sin was ordained and willed for its own sake alone. Rather, to say precisely that the Redeemer appeared when the fullness of time had come10 already makes it clear that, from the very beginning on, everything11 would have been related to his eventual appearance. One could then still add to this assertion the claims that sin which endures outside any direct interconnectedness with redemption would not cease to generate more sin12 and that frequently only when a certain measure of sin has been reached does the efficaciousness of redemption enter in. In that case, one could bear no hesitation from saying that God is also the originator of sin, albeit only in relation to redemption. 3.13 The contradiction lodged in these two positions, both of which are, nevertheless, expressions of our religious self-consciousness, is all the more difficult to resolve since they are not spoken in terms of two different relations but are advanced in terms of one and the same relation, namely, insofar as we refer the strength of God-consciousness back to its special communication. To be sure, the two positions are explicated based on only the consciousness of a Christian who has been taken up into the actual community of redemption. Moreover, in this narrower domain the contradiction would seem easy to resolve if someone were to add the following claim: that since sin would be both posited and persist

at a time prior to redemption and since, all things considered, divine communication could work only in forms supplied in human life, thereby it would already be given that even by divine grace in this domain, sin could be vanquished only over time. However, we cannot also say, at the same time, that we are willing to manage without bringing the presence of sin within the human race into combination with our God-consciousness right along. Rather, already because this narrower domain is in a constant process of broadening, and indeed through cooperation of those blessed by God, a constant look outward to that external domain also becomes indispensable for us. Hence, in relation to this external domain our species-consciousness is expressed only in the contrast between the reign of God and the world. In the most general way possible, this contrast then presents both the contrast between sin and grace and their combined existence as well. As a result, we rediscover exactly the same contradiction in this absolutely indispensable broadening of our consciousness. Thus, this contradiction must be resolved for this broadened consciousness as well.14 4.15 Every attempt to remove the contradiction, however, by letting only one of the two statements in this proposition have currency but casting the other away, unavoidably leads therewith to a result that is incompatible with the character of Christianity. This happens in that we would end up recommending either the Pelagian or the Manichean deviation.16 The Manichean deviation would occur when one puts the first half of our proposition in such a way that the latter half is wholly excluded. That is to say, if sin were not grounded in a divine will in any way and if sin, viewed as such, were, nevertheless, to be regarded as a deed, then one would have to assume another will, albeit one in this respect completely independent of the divine will, a will in which all sin, viewed as such, would have its ultimate ground. At that point, it would make little difference whether this basis for sin were a human will itself or were another will. This would be the case, for if one were still to assume that—as is indeed given in our self-consciousness—an existence combined of both sin and grace is in the same individual, then this combined existence could be viewed only as a battle between two opposing wills. Consequently, any divine will regarding this matter would be vanquished by every instance of effective action by flesh—a notion by which divine omnipotence would have been restricted in every case, and consequently abrogated—and the feeling of absolute dependence would be declared an illusion. In contrast, suppose, against all inner experience, that someone should want to presume the opposite and plainly fanatical proposition, which would take sin, as it truly is, to disappear entirely with the entrance of divine grace and would regard only a semblance of it to remain. In that case, wherever sin were still to appear as it truly is, divine omnipotence would indeed remain excluded from the entire domain of freely chosen deeds as such, and the domain of divine will and the domain of that which is contrasted to it17 would seem, even viewed externally, to stay positioned over against each other in the most decisive way possible. We would stray just as surely, however, into the Pelagian deviation if we let the second half of our proposition stand alone, with the result that all distinction in divine causality would be abrogated, and, both in effective activity of flesh and in strength of God-

consciousness, divine causality were to be the same. This is the case, for thereupon human self-initiated activity would also have to be the same, and the contrast between original incapacity of human beings and a communicated strength of God-consciousness would cease. Furthermore, since in this situation even the strongest God-consciousness would be a work of our own self-initiated activity in the same way as is the holding sway of flesh, so then the consciousness of incapacity that is a co-constituent of our inner experience could indicate only a transitory state, one that is already dwindling in human collective life. Unavoidably, in such a fluid merging more-and-less of flesh and spirit, redemption would obtain a very unsure place. It would be almost arbitrary how much or how little distinctive influence one could ascribe to the Redeemer—here more as originator of the redemptive process, there more as an occasion of it. This weakening of the specific distinction between Redeemer and the redeemed—this being just barely short of a figurative use of the term “grace”— designates the Pelagian deviation. Now, suppose that this deviation is, on the one hand, a sacrifice of practical religious interest to theoretical interest. Practical religious interest somehow or other postulates that there is a completely pure impulse to action among the redeemed. Theoretical interest requires the same relationship of every living activity among them to divine causality. Yet, the Pelagian deviation is, on the other hand, a weak surrender, arising from a dulled or deadened state, of any complete satisfaction thereby. Correspondingly, then, the Manichean deviation is, instead, a sacrifice of theoretical religious interest to the truth of divine omnipotence, this in order to gain for practical interest an understanding that wickedness is real, in the fullest way possible. Such a position makes it all the more necessary to show that perfect good should work against wickedness in a redeeming manner. This purpose, moreover, also ever carries with it despair over whether it is possible to combine the real existence of sin with divine omnipotence.

1. Ed. note: In short form, Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “In Christian self-consciousness each of the two accompanies the other in a different way” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s next marginal note describes §80.1 as follows: “Justification of the first aspect [of the proposition].” In turn, that at §80.2 reads: “Justification of the second aspect” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Mitteilung. Ed. note: This term and the corresponding verb are used consistently by Schleiermacher to designate the mechanism for how Christ’s own God-consciousness appears and is shared with others. 4. Ed. note: In §§121–25 “the common feeling” (Gemeingefühl) of the church accompanies its “common spirit” (Gemeingeist). Both are identified with the activity of Holy Spirit. (See both terms in §§118.1 and 145.1; cf. 120.P.S.–124.3 on the Holy Spirit.) In his version of the doctrine, Schleiermacher simply identifies the divine Spirit working in and through the Christian community of faith as Holy Spirit but not as strictly identified with everything that goes on in what he calls “the visible church” or by certain authorities in the church. Instead, he considers what is “invisible,” not immediately, empirically observable in itself, to be at the core of Christian community. Moreover, he circumscribes the area of activity of Spirit as that in which God’s Spirit in Christ continues its corresponding activities within Christianity, not simply within one individual entity alone. In the church, grace comes to be activity within a collectivity, just as in the human species sin is especially to be viewed as a collective phenomenon, not only an individual one. This view infuses the whole of Part Two, already anticipated in the Introduction by general concepts borrowed from a more general concept of “church,” applied in a distinctively defining way to the Christian church (§§2–6). The Conclusion (§§170–72) then deals with this doctrine in relation to the overall “economic” activity of God among human beings but focused especially on the activity of redemption. 5. Kraft. Ed. note: Given the way this force is communicated, it is presumably a force of grace.

6. (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologica (1543–1559): “Concerning reborn adults, I reply that all must agree that sins still remain in them. See 1 John 1:8: ‘If we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves and there is no truth in us.’” (2) Anglican Articles of Religion (1562) 15: “That all we the rest, although baptized and born again in Christ, yet offend in many things.” Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 21:677. See §32n16. (2) In Anglican Articles, the quoted passage is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 496. See §37n5; Latin: cf. Niemeyer (1840), 604. 7. Cf. §74.3. 8. Ed. note: Here Schäfer (2003) chooses not hervorbringenden (“productive,” meaning even procreative) from the original publication but hervortretenden (standout process of, or process coming to the fore in) from Schleiermacher’s uncorrected draft. It would seem to make less sense, however, to emphasize the obvious prominence of God’s order where the discourse is about redemption and improvement. 9. Ed. note: Here it would be appropriate to consult §§117–20, on the one eternal divine decree, a particularly Reformed contribution to doctrine stemming from the Reformation that Schleiermacher brings to the table. This decree, he avers, must hold true for the triune God in all aspects of God’s activity in creation and redemption, including God’s present spiritual activity toward and within Christian communities of faith. Thus, for him, nothing that God arranges in the world lacks purview or activity from God, even sin. 10. Gal. 4:4. Ed. note: See note under §13.1. 11. Ed. note: Since Schleiermacher is here speaking of certain major features of human life, sin and redemption, presumably by “everything” he means all that pertains to those two major features. 12. Cf. §71. 13. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note has this heading for the third section: “Difficulty in combining [the two halves, or aspects, of this proposition]” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Ed. note: In his Christian ethics (Christliche Sittenlehre), Schleiermacher’s conception, in language used especially in the 1822/23 lectures on the subject, includes broadening action, addressed in seeing one of three main categories of Christian action as participation in God’s mission to the entire world inhabited by human beings (missio Dei … οἰκουμένη, in traditional terms). The other two aspects of a Christian life are (1) presentational action (later called efficacious action), which includes proclaiming and sharing of faith, and (2) purifying action (variously referred to as critical, corrective, restorative, and reforming action), naturally leading to (3) broadening action. The three aspects are closely intertwined in his presentation of them. Thus, this passage is one of many occasions spread throughout his presentation of faith-doctrine (Glaubenslehre) when terminology (here “broadened consciousness”) itself closely links meaning shared between the two works. See James Brandt’s selection from 1822/23 (2011). 15. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s marginal note the heading he offers is this: “Protection against one-sided procedure” (Thönes, 1873). 16. Ed. note: These are two of four “natural heresies” (natürlichen Ketzereien) defined in §22. Typically, as in the present discussion, Schleiermacher also refers to them as “deviations” (Abweichungen). In Brief Outline §58 he characterizes heresies as “extraneous elements” with respect to “the distinctive nature of Christianity” expressed in doctrine, whereas in polity such elements are called “schism.” The two sets do not always go together, he finds. He also places them among “diseased conditions,” all of which require experienced, caring, and careful, critical attention in theology. This task belongs to the part of “philosophical theology” called “polemics” (always inner-, not outer-directed), as is the other part, called “apologetics,” which explains general features of Christianity to insiders. Cf. also §§59–62. In §62 selection of the term “deviation,” instead of presupposing that doctrines called heresy are entirely wrong in every aspect, is explained, in part, by his counsel to pay close attention “(a) to false tolerance of diseased elements, on the one hand, and (b) on the other hand, to the responsibility to maintain reasonable freedom for what stands to produce fresh differentiations within the whole” (§58). Accordingly, in BO §§203–10 he specifies “procedures” necessary for assuring authentic developments in doctrine—all followed with meticulous care in Christian Faith. These procedures hold fast to what is “generally acknowledged” to be orthodox, with natural inferences that follow from it. There he also offers the rule that “every element construed in the inclination to keep the conception of doctrine mobile and to make room for still other modes of apprehension,” which he terms “heterodox.” The positions considered in the doctrine of sin illustrate both inclinations and are considered with a precision of argument that might otherwise seem superfluous. It is also clear that, for him, the terms “heterodox” and “heretical” are never to be conflated. 17. Ed. note: Having chosen not to take much notice of a devil in §§44–45, the contrasted domain here could be that either of human free will or of the devil’s will. Cf. also §§72.3, 81.1, and 167.2.

§81. Wherever ecclesial doctrine seeks to smooth over this contradiction by proposing that God is not the originator of sin but that sin is grounded in human freedom, then that statement, nevertheless, needs to be supplemented by this one: God has ordained that dominion by the Spirit that has not yet come to pass in any given instance becomes sin for us.1 (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) XIX: “Although God creates and preserves nature, the cause of sin is, nevertheless, the will of those who are evil, that is, of the devil and the ungodly. Since it was not assisted by God, their will turned away from God.”2 (2) Solid Declaration (1577) I: “God is not a creator or author of sin.”3 (3) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1544–1545), in the section on “The Causes of Sin … ”: “Therefore, God is not the cause of sin, nor is sin a thing established or ordained by God.”—“Sin sprang from the will of the devil and of man, and was not made by God’s will.4 (4) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) VIII: “We also know that what things are not evil with respect to the providence, will, and power of God but in respect of Satan and our evil opposing the will of God.”5 (5) Hungarian Confession (Confessio Czengerina, 1562), §51 (On the Cause of Sin): “Just as in an opposite manner it is impossible for things fighting among themselves … to be the efficient and formal cause of darkness of sin, … but Satan and human beings are the cause of all these. Whatsoever God forbids and on account of which he condemns he cannot make from himself and through himself.”6 1.7 That people have used the expressions “creator” and “created” as referring to what sin is and has done has become possible only through scholastic misuse of abstract words. This misuse took an odd turn in the fight over original sin as to whether such sin is a substance or an accident. In and of itself, however, it is totally inadmissible to take that turn, since sin is not a self-contained mode of existence nor does sin form a self-contained process. Furthermore, just as little—least of all inasmuch as some people do distinguish between “creation” and “preservation”—can one use those expressions for sinful nature. This is so, because even in sinning nature, sin does not form any beginning but first enters in during life’s course. Suppose, however, that we were to stick with the expression that God is not the cause or originator of sin. Thus, strictly taken, two different thoughts would underlie this denial. The

initial thought is predominant in the first two passages cited above, the second thought in the last three passages cited. The first thought is this: In God, thinking and producing are one and the same,8 but sin cannot be a divine thought or aim.9 Thus, one could conclude that there can also be no productive will of God in relation to sin and to sinning nature. Yet, one could say the same thing of anything that has a finite nature, for sinning nature is a blending with regard to the being and not-being of God-consciousness, but every instance of finite nature is likewise a blending of being and not-being, and, one could assert, not-being likewise cannot be a divine aim in any case whatsoever. In contrast, in relation to each case of finite nature a productive divine will does indeed exist, yet it is not a will in and of itself but exists as divine will producing the collectivity of finite God-consciousness, which indeed includes redemption in itself as well. Accordingly, the initial, denying part of the ecclesial proposal requires a limiting adjustment above all—namely, in that its denial is not to be understood in such a way that sin must then be referred back to some other productive will that would actually be productive in the same sense in which God is simply originator everywhere. That is, in this general sense, God is originator by means of a timeless, eternal causality. This limitation is to be made, for otherwise the same causality would have to be the case for every single differentiated being, consequently for the collective whole of them ultimately. As a result, the only choice remaining open would be one between, first, a demiurge, viewed as a creator of the world distinct from God, one which would also have created precisely a sinning nature, as such, or, second, an evil primary being10 opposed to God, one in which a timeless causality of sin would also reside and which would, nevertheless, also have to have been the creator of finite being and indeed not only partially—as some have made a fable of the matter —but wholly so.11 Thus, the only thing remaining regarding this first part is either to decide that no eternal cause is to be posited for sin at all or to decide that this cause must, for all that, be found in God. A transition from the first main thought of our proposition to the other is still made available when one traces the collective sinful state12 back to a situation in which what Godconsciousness had originally been imparted13 to human nature by God would have been lost. That is to say, otherwise, to be sure, just as there could then also be no temporal being whatsoever, the cessation of something would be grounded in that same divine will wherein its beginning had also been grounded. However, it would seem that the situation must be different with regard to God-consciousness, the cessation of which, when God-consciousness is viewed as God’s being within human beings, could not be grounded in divine causality. This could make sense, to be sure, if sin were a total cessation of God-consciousness and sinning nature were comprised entirely of sin. In sinning nature, however, evil exists only connected to what is good, and no instant can be completely filled with sin. This is the case, because precisely sin itself presupposes God-consciousness, with the result that this nature always holds communication of God’s being-present, even if in the most limited way possible. Consequently, even in this relation, a shrinking of God-consciousness can also be grounded in that same divine will, just as communication of God’s being-present is.

The second thought from which our discussion began is this: God cannot possibly effect, thus also cannot be the originator of, what God forbids. Now, it must indeed be granted that the will of God that commands other beings, though we call it God’s will, is not identical with the producing will of God.14 This is so, for God’s command is not shown to be, at the same time, a will effecting what is acceptable to God in all cases that belong under the category of God’s command. Rather, Scripture even offers an expression15 to the effect that what is acceptable to God does not exist by virtue of the commanding will of God. Moreover, we are all clearly conscious of the difference between God’s commanding will alone being given to us and God’s productive will being added to it afterward.16 Just as clearly, we are also conscious that the difference between God’s commanding will and God’s will to produce what is commanded is entirely other than the difference—taken only as an example—given in the creation narrative, which itself differentiates between a declaration announcing the decision to create and the will to bring the decision to create toward its completion. In this story the commanding divine will, however, would also not have been an effecting will at that point, because sin would have been committed only inasmuch as a commanding divine will was actually present, with which such an expression of human life would then have been in conflict.17 This would have been the case, for if sin were committed with an intention of bringing divine will to completion, then also not the action itself but only this false intention would have been sin, and only inasmuch as the supposed sin would have arisen in a struggle against a commanding will of God. Moreover, the same situation would also be the case if something sinful had occurred by way of just overlooking something. As a result, all sin occurring between the boundaries of innocence and hardness of heart18 would have presupposed consciousness of a commanding will of God. Now, however, if a commanding will of God19 and a productive will of God are not the same thing, then, despite all this talk, the productive will also cannot be set over against the commanding will. This is so, in that God’s prohibition could have no truth in it if God actually were to bring about transgression of it. Yet, hereby we may not neglect to notice also that the divine commanding will had been posited simply as an absolutely completed will never also corresponding to what would have been effected by divine grace, viewed as occasioned by productive divine will. This is the case, to be explained as follows. Suppose that this shortcoming in us were also to be designated as sin that is still adhering to us, nonetheless.20 Then the denying part of the ecclesial proposal would have to be limited.21 This denial would be understood to mean only that what is incongruous with the divine commanding will could, nevertheless, be posited of the divine productive will—in consequence, to the extent that sin would be grounded in divine causality. 2.22 Now, as concerns the second, affirming aspect of the ecclesial proposal, certainly this statement is completely correct. However, it cannot be adapted to overcome the limitations of the first aspect, limitations that we would have to lay claim to on behalf of our religious selfconsciousness. Rather, in consequence of those limitations, we will be able to conceive the juxtaposition of both aspects only in such a way that insofar as there would be no divine causality for sin, sin would also not be grounded in human freedom either. This recognition

alone also agrees with the contrast that was set forth by us between divine eternal causality and finite, temporal causality.23 Yet, along with sin’s being grounded in our freedom, there is a further rooting of sin in divine causality, nonetheless. This other rooting of sin in divine causality could persist all the more as, in relation to the feeling of absolute dependence, we recognize no difference in that feeling between the greater or lesser liveliness of temporal causality.24 At this point, only temporal cause is specified. Thus, to be prefaced above all else in this regard is an understanding that consciousness of sin may not be considered to be only a sheer illusion, as it were, inasmuch as no divine causality could be assumed to exist for for consciousness of sin. For this reason, sin would be referred to that supreme degree of inner liveliness which constitutes what is distinctive in our nature. Thus, what is asserted by this understanding is as follows: In between the state of the Redeemer, in whom no interruption in the dominion of God-consciousness could emerge based on his supreme spiritual liveliness, and those states of human derangement in which spiritual functions are placed under the exponential sway of disease,25 the result would be a deficiency in freedom. Thereby the attribution of supreme spiritual liveliness would cease. Moreover, sin would also be posited both throughout and alongside free development of one’s self. Thus, if this entire shape of human existence26—that is, the natural human being—persists in consequence of the divine arrangement of things, then sin is also coposited, having proceeded from the experience of human freedom within this divine arrangement. What is next expressed by our proposition, also regarding the domain of finite causality, is that in a sinful state we can in no way be truly viewed as simply passive and determined from some other quarter.27 This is the case, for by “freedom of the will” we express a denial of all external coercion and the very nature of conscious life—that is, that no influence from outside determines our collective condition in such a way that even reactiveness would already be codetermined and present but that every stirring that we have would contain its own determinacy at its onset, issuing as it does from the innermost center of life. At that point, reactiveness too proceeds from that innermost determinacy. Thus, sin, viewed as proceeding from this center, is the sinner’s own deed every single time and not another’s deed.28 Likewise, the following notion is also denied by the expression “freedom of the will”: that, as it were, any given individual is already determined in all cases by the common nature of human beings. Instead, in reality everything held in common is, first, something that has come to be, and by this same expression every individual is deemed to be an originally distinctive being, different from all other individuals. As a result, no one can cast blame for sin from oneself onto this common nature. Rather, particular sinful selfdeterminations are each one’s own deed. This is the case both since these self-determinations proceed from one’s susceptibility to sin—which is also constitutive of the formula29 for the distinctiveness of one’s will—as well as inasmuch as one’s sinful state comes to be increasingly consolidated by these self-determining factors. However, the possibility of a relation of sin to divine causality is abrogated by none of these determinative factors. Besides these considerations, however, the proposition ought also to be understood only in such a way that it coheres with the statement that sin is a state of servitude.30 Now,

suppose that cessation of this servitude takes place when the efficaciousness of redemption enters in. This efficaciousness is not, however, to be thought of without divine causality, but is to be thought of in such a way that servitude is only gradually set aside by the efficaciousness of redemption, which is thus limited by it as servitude is continuing. Then, in turn, there must accordingly be a consideration left over to the effect that well-founded sin, attached to31 a freedom that is burdened with powerlessness, would, even as such, be ordained by God, unless the claim is to be taken absolutely that divine efficaciousness could be limited by something that is not dependent on divine causality. 3.32 Now, suppose that an ecclesial proposal, viewed as a correct expression of our selfconsciousness, were not to exclude the possibility that in some sense or other God could be the originator of sin. However, suppose too that we are drawn to both sides of that issue by interests contrary to each other. Then, in order to solve the contradiction, the only thing that remains to do, in order to keep divine omnipotence unconfined and uncurtailed, is to claim the following. We must claim, first, that inasmuch as sin cannot be grounded in divine causality, to that degree it also does not exist for God; second, that, in contrast, inasmuch as consciousness of sin belongs to the truth of our existence33 and sin is thus real, sin is also ordained by God, itself being viewed as that which makes redemption necessary. It will be all the more possible to eliminate all related difficulties completely, the more the following conditions are met. This can more nearly happen, first, the more exactly the two sides permit of being combined in the very subject itself, precisely as within ourselves the various features present in our Christian self-consciousness are one. The second condition is that in our reflection we more definitely distinguish the two sides from each other in such a way that each no longer seems to require the converse of the other position. The more these conditions are met, the more the result will be neither to ascribe to sin being independent of and opposed to God, a Manichean approach, nor gradually to attenuate and resolve the opposition between sin and grace, a Pelagian approach. Now, the last part of our ecclesial proposal affirms the reality of sin as our deed, whereas the first part affirms that sin is not wrought by God.34 Suppose that we then compare this proposal and the task still set before us with the cited passages from confessional documents. Then, in some of these documents sin’s being temporally grounded in human freedom stands out, but there is no word of an eternal divine causality also belonging to it. In others among these documents what stands out is that sin cannot be grounded in the divine will, but they do not say that insofar as God’s will for it is lacking, sin also would not exist for God. Now, the more these two one-sided positions are cultivated, the more difficulties accumulate. Moreover, either people would have to resort to crafty differentiations in which our immediate religious self-consciousness does not recognize itself and that can just as little be combined to form vital perceptions35; or, they would have to renounce that deeper inquiry, without which presentations of faith-doctrine would be hampered in their explication.36 Suppose, for this reason, that we should want to remove the one-sidedness37 examined here by combining the two viewpoints. If so, proceeding from one of the two sides, we might ask

this question first: What, then, is it in sin for which, inasmuch as it is grounded in human freedom, we can also anticipate an eternal divine causality? Now, in every self-contained sinful element there is, on the one hand, an expression of a natural sensory drive, whereby eternal divine causality is thus in place, itself viewed as cooperative. On the other hand, God-consciousness is in place that is viewed as relatable to that sensory drive, for otherwise there would be no talk of sin at all. This God-consciousness refers back to divine causality in God’s original revelation. Yet, just as those two features together do not yet constitute sin, so too this divine causality is not directed to sin either. Further, inasmuch as sin would have persisted in some lack of capacity in Godconsciousness, it would also be only a negative factor, and such could not be a divine thought and also not a divine productive activity.38 However, such a sheer negation of force would also not be sin, just as then our consciousness would never be content if sin were declared to be a sheer lack of some capacity.39 For us, however, that lack comes to be sin only by a certain process. In that process, a God-consciousness that is relatively lacking in power over against sensory-driven impetus, is viewed as containing some consciousness of the divine will but denies that this state of a lack in God-consciousness is itself God’s will. Whether this consciousness of God’s will happens at the same time or afterward does not matter in this case, for without such a denial, which lies precisely in recognition of a commanding or forbidding divine will, there is no sin. Accordingly, we will be able to say this:40 Inasmuch as recognition of the commanding divine will is wrought in us by God, it is also wrought by God in that the nonefficacious result of God-consciousness will have come to be sin. Furthermore, this result is indeed wrought in relation to redemption.41 This is the case, for consciousness of a still meager force of God-consciousness would be consciousness of a state that has to be surpassed, but consciousness of a state that includes some resistance against the divine will is consciousness of a state that has to be abolished. Suppose that we now take the other standpoint into account and ask:42 What sort of view could it be that would hold sin not to have been grounded by God and yet permits of being combined with the claim that sin would be our own deed? Suppose in this account that sin were not referred back to divine causality, because sin is a denial of God’s will. Then, sin would have this characteristic in common with all finite being, in accordance with an aforementioned claim, and thus sin could nonetheless be our own deed, just as finite being is the embodiment of our overall experience. However, sin would, nevertheless, also be wrought by God, in an eternal manner, in and with the collective development of Godconsciousness wrought by God. Yet, suppose that no divine causality43 could be assigned to sin, because sin would directly correspond to no commanding will of God. Then, sin would, nevertheless, certainly have something in common with all that is good, namely, being wrought by God. Sin would indeed still exist with respect to what is good, just as sin, in turn, would even in this way exist with respect to what is good and hence still itself be our own deed, albeit something distinctly different from a connection with the process of redemption.44 Only when sin would be an absolute resistance against the commanding will of God, with the result that it would entirely cancel out that will within us, could a productive

will of God in relation to sin not be conceivable at all. However, this is also not the situation of sin, because this would be a state of an absolute hardness of heart, which we have already excluded from the human domain. Accordingly, the supplementary statement in our proposition seems to be completely justified. This is so, in that it is precisely the commanding will of God appearing within us by which any lack of power in our Godconsciousness comes to be sin for us. Thus, although reference to a divine causality belonging to any particular sinful action cannot be made by the commanding will of God, sin is ordained by God, nevertheless. This is so, because otherwise even redemption could not be ordained by God. Thus, sin, viewed in and of itself, also could not be ordained by God. Instead, only sin viewed in its relation to redemption can be ordained by God. 4.45 It is not to be denied, however, that our proposition does not obviate the difficulties that arise if sin should be thought to have emerged from a sinless state marked by morally perfect activity. That is to say, given this presupposition it would be necessary either to appeal to a withdrawal of God’s hand—a special, divine activity actually producing sin—or to present sin as a revolt arising out of such a sinless state, and directed to a complete suspension of God’s commanding will, which would be still less explicable than a revolt would be otherwise. Therefore, based on this presupposition, people would ordinarily rest satisfied with the additional makeshift explanation that because God would not have been the originator of sin, and sin nevertheless exists, sin exists by God’s permission. Yet, the term permission is borrowed from human government and the circumstances that adhere thereto; thus it has its proper location only in a domain wherein causality is divided. In contrast, eternal divine causality is not at all like this, and all that is temporal causality must relate to eternal causality in a uniform fashion. Still more perplexing46 than assuming sheer permission of sin by God is the claim that, instead, God would surely have ordained sin but only as an indispensable means to other important ends.47 On this view, God would have done this in that God would have made evil arising from sin a source of overweening advantages but, through Christ, God would have wholly eradicated the damage done by sin itself.48 This claim is even more perplexing quite apart from the fact that the contrast between end and means cannot be present for an absolute, all-producing will.49 The claim also does not make it any easier to imagine a more misguided presentation of Christianity than the claim that Christ would have come into the world simply in order to fix the damage that had emerged from sin, in that God could not ever do away with sin itself simply out of regard for all sorts of advantages that would accrue to it. Contrary to this claim and in accordance with our presentation of the matter, sin would have been ordained only for the sake of redemption, and this redemption does appear to be an advantage that is linked with sin, against which advantage there can be no talk of any damage done by it. This is the case, since what is only a gradual and incomplete development of the force inherent in God-consciousness belongs to conditions of that stage of existence50 in which the human race stands at any given time.

1. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note supplements the text as follows: “God is not author [Autor] [of sin], inasmuch as sin is grounded in freedom. That is, by virtue of the divine order [of the world], we posit as a positive resistance that which we could have posited only as an incapacity. This incapacity is grounded in our freedom, inasmuch as our freedom is grounded in God. “Inherent in the ‘us’ is the recognition that, for God, sin does not exist except in the way in which this ‘us’ also applies to all human beings beyond-each-other and beside-eachother. The first assertion abrogates what is moral [das Sittliche] just as little as the second assertion abrogates what is natural [das Natürliche]” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 53; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 75. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 539; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 856. 4. Ed. note: Melanchthon, ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 211:644, 647. See §32n16. 5. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 237; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 249. Cf. note at §37n3. 6. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin in Niemeyer (1840), 549. 7. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note begins the discussion in this way: “1. The denying aspect of the ecclesial proposal. What is ‘grounded’ consists in the following” (Thönes, 1873). 8. §§40.1 and 55.1. 9. Ed. note: The word Zweckbegriff (“aim”) literally denotes a “concept” directed to a purposeful end-in-view. Other words for holding an aim, such as the more familiar Absicht, tend to do so less directly. 10. Ed. note: This is an oblique reference to a devil, here called a Grundwesen (“primary being”) over against Supreme Being (höchstes Wesen). 11. It is clear enough that by mixing in the devil our confessions did not have this thought in view. This is so, for the devil is combined with human beings under the same concept of a finite free being. The result is that the devil’s sin was likewise supposed to be thought of as grounded in his freedom, but his relationship to the sin of a human being would not be supposed to impair sin’s being grounded in one’s own freedom in any way. The result here is that nothing Manichean intrudes on this ecclesial doctrine by mixing the devil into it; consequently this doctrinal deviation is also no easier to avoid if the devil is left out of it. 12. Cf. §72. 13. Ed. note: It would seem that, in this context at least, Schleiermacher is supposing that this “imparted” (mitgegebenen) God-consciousness could not have been “communicated” (mitgeteilt) in that early era, in the same way as he describes it when human beings were in relationship with God through their community, or communion, with God in that same community with Christ and the church’s “common spirit” (Holy Spirit) later on. This would be in accordance with his regular usage of the term mitteilen theologically. Instead, in the original case here, he has God-consciousness being directly “imparted” to them (mitgegeben)—that is, without interference from their having gone astray in sinning and thereby losing their God-consciousness by degrees. 14. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 1.18.4: “His will is wrongly confused with his precept: innumerable examples clearly show how utterly different these two are.” Ed. note: ET Battles, vol. 1 (1960), 235; Latin: CR 30:172, Opera selecta 3 (1957), 225. In his marginal note, Schleiermacher reports: “This contribution is to Calvin’s merit, not Augustine’s” (Thönes, 1873). 15. Rom. 7:8–9, 16–18. Ed. note: There Paul writes that even if he wills to do what God commands in the law, sin that is working within him can stifle obedience. Hence, God’s command requires a free human acceptance in order to work its way, and this acceptance does not always come automatically. 16. Phil. 2:13. Ed. note: Paul writes there: “For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.” See sermon on Phil. 2:12–13, June 22, 1822, SW II.10 (1856), 527–44. It is also to be noted that, in accordance with Schleiermacher’s own rule not to use proof texts, both of these biblical “expressions” are cited, where creeds and confessions do not already give expression to them in largely alternative language. Occasionally he uses more than one biblical passage, as here, where the desirable exactness is not present in any one biblical text alone, while ever holding to ultimate authority within the New Testament witness itself. See index here on use of Scripture. See also BO §§103–8, 136, 148, 181–82, and 219. 17. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note clarifies the meaning of the sentence just completed: “Sin could not otherwise have existed, since it presupposes the commanding [will of God]” (Thönes, 1873). 18. Cf. §§66.1 and 74.3. 19. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note marks a second section of the argument that began with identifying the commanding will and the contrasting productive or effecting will of God. It states: “This commanding will also does not correspond to the productive will in the reign of grace” (Thönes, 1873). 20. Cf. §63.3. 21. Ed. note: Here a third step is indicated in Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Hence, the limiting adjustment [a maneuver indicated in the text after footnote 9 above]” (Thönes, 1873). In both of these passages Beschränkung is the word,

which is usually translated “limited,” “restricted,” “restriction,” or “restraint,” depending on context. 22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “The affirming aspect of the ecclesial proposal” (Thönes, 1873). Throughout above, the negating aspect of the proposal in ecclesial documents, translated as “denying” (verneinende) that God is the author, or cause, of sin, was taken up. Now to be discussed is the “affirming” (bejahende) aspect, namely, that freedom is the cause of sin, though it is not, as such, an agent but is only a state or condition of sin. 23. Cf. §51.1. 24. Cf. §49. Ed. note: At this point, Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “This claim might seem to be contrary to what was said earlier, but it means only this much: No eternal causality [Kausalität] could exist for something for which no temporal causality exists” (Thönes, 1873). 25. Ed. note: Because this is a compact use of mathematical terms to describe mental functioning, here is the entire phrase in German: wo die geistigen Functionen unter die Potenz der Krankheit gestellt sind. In scientific discourse, and to some extent in other kinds as well, Schleiermacher used what he had learned, especially from calculus, as a way of describing complex and scalar patterns in reality, reaching out toward infinity. Moreover, since all “spiritual” functions are also “mental” and, in the fullest sense, start inside, he uses these patterns not only in philosophical psychology but also in describing religious, or pious, functioning as well. Here we find a rare outbreak of mathematical terms: “function” (Function) and “power” and the allied notion of “exponential” power (Potenz), all three terms being directed to a very wide span of free versus diseased functioning. The Redeemer is at the supreme end of freedom, aspired to in “the glorious liberty of the children of God” (Rom. 8:21), and “derangement” (Zerrüttung) is near the other end of the scale that he has in mind. In the sentence that follows, “imputation of “ translates Zurechnung, which, as a kind of reckoning, also carries at least the metaphor of working with numbers. 26. Ed. note: The phrase diese ganze Gestalt der Existenz is rare and instructive. He could have written “form” (Form, Bild, Ordnung) but meant to refer to a complex whole. He could have used Dasein for “existence,” as he usually does (meaning, literally, really being-there), or even Bestehung, meaning a continuing existence but usually translated “persistence” in this work, but he used the more comprehensive Latinate term Existenz instead. From Sören Kierkegaard (1813–1855) on, “existentialism” referred to a rather diverse but influential school of philosophy that, not accidentally, followed major elements of Schleiermacher’s leading. 27. Cf. Gen. 3:12–13. 28. Ed. note: In every case throughout this work, “deed” translates Tat, to distinguish it especially from Akt (“act”) but also from Tätigkeit (“activity”) and Handlung (“action” or “conduct”). In both German and English usage, a deed can be good or bad or some mixture of the two. Schleiermacher’s choice for “center,” among many possibilities, as here, is usually Mittelpunkt, at the very midpoint, as of a line or circle. 29. Ed. note: Here Formel (“formula”) refers to a formative element that determines the direction of a phrase or sentence in Schleiermacher’s grammatical usage or, as in this case, that serves as a similar rule or patterning influence within one’s distinctive inner life. Usually, however, it means simply a “formulation.” 30. Cf. §74. 31. Ed. note: This claim, for Schleiermacher unfounded, is that sin is founded on a freedom that is in a state of bondage such that sin is (a) attached to or (b) within that freedom. Actually our text has an, as is true right through the seventh edition (1960). There Redeker notes that an alteration is present in Schleiermacher’s earliest manuscript (in) and even at the same place in the 1821–1822 edition, but he does not choose it, whereas Schäfer (2003) does. Our belief is this. The originally published text is correct (an), but it makes little difference to Schleiermacher, since he would reject both positions at issue. That is, for him, divine causality is present despite either claim. 32. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “3. Relationship of the being of sin to the ‘beingordained-by-God’ of the same” (Thönes, 1873). 33. Ed. note: Here the term for “existence” is Dasein, referring to all of human life that involves our really being-there. 34. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873) marks this two-part affirmation as having a “two-sided” character (Duplicität), but, despite the appearance of the German word to an English reader, it does not mean lying by speaking differently out of two sides of one’s mouth. It does indicate, however, that more needs to be said. See §81n37 below. 35. Ed. note: Here lebendigen Anschauungen. That is, such fine points do not accompany and are not grounded in actual, deep perceptions (or acts of beholding, as in John 1:14) in Christians’ own deeply held life experiences. Not only did Schleiermacher continue the pairing of Anschauung and Gefühl from his 1799 first edition of the discourses On Religion onward, but he also provided new instances of that paired usage in its third edition of 1821 and with the same meaning of these two terms in both editions of Christian Faith (1821–1822 and 1830–1831), though not directly paired. See index. 36. Ed. note: Both options had been variously adopted since the Reformation, but especially in the overly “scholastic” procedures of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Protestant scholasticism and of rationalism in the eighteenth- and early

nineteenth-century German Enlightenment. Both of these habits can be found in rationalist and absolute supernaturalist theologies of that time and since. In the present work, therefore, much of the space Schleiermacher uses is devoted to obviating doctrinal proposals that had been grounded in such procedures, among gospel-centered churches, chiefly those among Lutheran and Reformed thinkers within the German territories, and never in greater detail than in examining doctrines regarding sin in its relation to redemption. Having to do this here is the primary reason for his prefatory remark that he hoped presentations of faith-doctrine could be much shorter in the future. 37. Ed. note: Here “one-sidedness” translates Einseitigkeit. See §81n34. Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this point announces that he now intends to raise a “Question” (Thönes, 1873)—as it turns out, more than one—in order to overcome the one-sidedness by combining the two sides, of Lutheran versus Reformed emphasis, into one conjoint affirmation, not rationalist and absolute supernaturalist extremes but supplying an alternative to both. 38. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “For although he sustains … nature, nevertheless those defects in the mind are not made by him.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:647. See §32n16. 39. Cf. §68. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, Kraft essentially means “force” but can also bear the connotations of one’s “strength” (usually rendered Kräftigkeit) or “energy,” viewed as a power to move or cause, effect, affect. As a type of power, it is not strictly equivalent to “might” (Macht), usually translated “power” as also in “powerless” (ohnmächtig), “holding sway over” (Gewalt), “strength” (Stärke), or “potency” (Potenz). Thus, in accordance with the Newtonian physics available to him, he tends to view force as any mode of energy. In a human being, then, force is exercised, exerted; however, comparatively it can be either more active or more passive. Openness to God in one’s God-consciousness can be a combination of both features, being in a state of both feeling dependent on God and in an active, cooperative relationship with God at the same time. Here, however, a lack of force or capacity, in and of itself, cannot constitute sin. 40. Ed. note: “Answer” is the heading Schleiermacher’s marginal note gives here (Thönes, 1873). 41. Gal. 3:22. Ed. note: Sermon at Advent on Gal. 3:21–23, “Christ, Who Liberates Us from Sin and the Law,” Dec. 10, 1820, SW II.2 (1834), 21–33. 42. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “Second Question” (Thönes, 1873). 43. Ed. note: This is one of the rare uses of the word Kausalität for this concept. 44. Only in this sense can we consent to the following formulation in the Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: voluntas … non adiuvente Deo avertit se ad alias res (“the will … not assisted by God, turned away to other things”). To be sure, the original German expression, which, however, has been altered in the improved German confession, does indicate a more positive sense: “alsbald so Gott die Hand abgetan” (“in this way God forthwith withdrew God’s hand”), for as a special divine action this withdrawing of God’s hand [abandonment] by God would then be the initial condition of sin. Ed. note: see Bek. Luth. (1930), 75; and Book of Concord (2000), 53. These sources do not include the original expression quoted first, but Bek. Luth. does give the second quotation. 45. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note supplies this heading: “4. Appeal to a cast-off, positively primordial justice” (Thönes, 1873). 46. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage verwirrend, here “perplexing,” usually means “entangled” in conditions of this finite and temporal world, including sensory aspects of experience; it can also mean “complicated” and “confusing.” Here “perplexing” seems to be the best choice, but for him and as he shows readers, the reason for this response derives especially from the complex entanglements that he takes pains to point out. 47. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note appended here: “Given the appearance of redemption, in no way would what this claim asserts be alleged to have come up first” (Thönes, 1873). 48. See Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818), §75. Redeker note: There p. 272 reads: “(c) By the divine government moral evil becomes a source of innumerable advantages. Also, as will be shown in what follows, through Christ, God has created institutions that with exceeding abundance compensate for all the damage that sin gives rise to.” Ed. note: The term Schaden, used by both Reinhard and Schleiermacher, can easily mean not only “damage” but also a corresponding “disadvantage,” here compensated for. 49. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher often indicates, God does what God wills, and God has willed what God does, both without exception. Hence, in this respect God does not need to utilize intermediate means to reach an end. God’s activity, therefore, is immediate, not mediated by some intervening activity. This position underscores his claims regarding the immediate presence of God’s supernatural, supreme being in God’s own world through immediate religious selfconsciousness, where God and humans are closely, internally in touch. However, this position does not obviate God’s becoming present, really and directly, in Jesus of Nazareth and subsequently within communities of faith, perhaps invisibly, by God’s own holy Spirit and, by “preparatory grace” through other mediating instruments of communication, including broader circles within the visible church and on out into the rest of the world. In these different respects, which do not necessarily have anything to do with a separation of end and means from a supernatural point of view, it would be quite natural to conceive of such a separation for any activity within the world, even for whatever God wills to do within it. This

observation by itself, however, would not seem to resolve the problem of “miracles” occurring, or being used as proofs of divinity, within an orderly world or to support similar claims made by an absolutely supernatural doctrine of occasional divine interventions. See index on these topics. 50. Ed. note: “Stage of existence” translates Existenzstufe. Schleiermacher holds that the consummation of this process of redemption has to be treated only proleptically—that is, by hints and presentiment, at best—through what he calls “prophetic doctrine.” See §§157–63. In accordance with those propositions, as long as more stages, or levels, of development are incomplete, that final destination will not be reached by the species of human beings as it has existed throughout history; and before death none can absolutely know how that process might be completed for all human beings after death. Schleiermacher also preached on death, dying, and the afterlife, especially at funerals and at the Todtenfest, a celebration of the dead within the official church year.

§82. What has been stated in ecclesial doctrine regarding divine causality in relation to sin also has currency in relation to evil by virtue of its connection with sin.1 (1) Solid Declaration (1577) I: “The punishment and penalty for original sin, which God laid upon Adam’s children and upon original sin, is death, eternal damnation, and also other corporal and spiritual, temporal and eternal miseries.” XI: “For as God is not the cause of sin, so he is also not the cause of punishment. …”2 (2) Confession of the Bohemian Brethren (1535), Art. IV: “Furthermore, they teach that all the misfortunes and affiliations by which we are shaken here—and we contend with them by God’s most just law— are inflicted on human beings on account of sins.”3 1.4 The parallelism expressed in our proposition is indeed generally acknowledged among us, and without dissent. However, just as it is only sparingly considered in our creedal symbols, it is likewise seldom followed through logically in systems5 of faith-doctrine. This lack of attention is likely connected, more or less, to people’s having mixed two extraneous ingredients into their presentations, which we will want to exclude here straightaway. That is, first, playing a role throughout these documents is the confusingly entangled presupposition that God would have conjoined evil with sin in an arbitrary manner, patterned after the way human legal penalties are exacted, and, upon agreeing to that presupposition, people directly mix in eternal evils of punishment.6 Such punishing evil is indeed possible7 based on this point of view. However, it cannot be copied by us, since here we are engaging only with what is given to us in our self-consciousness, and still today all conditions are lacking to us for the purpose of dealing with this question. Just as little, however, do we have here any kind of occasion that would lead toward thought of an arbitrary divine penal legislation. Suppose that someone wanted to direct the Mosaic passages already cited above8 for explanatory purposes here. If so, it would then be necessary, at the same time, to bring in the hazardous notion that the constitution of earthly things would have been altered by the introduction of sin. In the arrangement of the world as it traces its source in divine causality, it would not be possible anywhere for one thing to be

more arbitrary and another thing less so. Rather, everything would have to be either equally arbitrary or equally very much not so. 2.9 Now, if we stick with what is present in our self-consciousness on this matter, then we find two contrasted conceptions of evil. The first consists in our ascribing evil to ourselves, viewed as the result of our sin. Wherein, at the same time, it is denied that for human beings God is the originator of evil in the same manner as God is the originator of the world’s original perfection,10 this is sufficiently justified by there not being posited in that concept that the world would be the locus of evil. What is posited in that concept instead is that everything having to do with the relative contrast between our being and other interconnected being would also still be effectual in us only as stimuli. The other conception is this: that we submit to all the evils that come in life as due to a divine decree issued upon us.11 This conception would be justified to the fullest extent in all those cases wherein we would be able to regard evils that affect us as belonging to the reconciling suffering of Christ, just as it would have to be possible to have viewed every instance of community with Christ as communion with his suffering.12 Yet, evils to which we simply have to submit, examined exclusively and as a whole, could be conceived as not evil at all. Rather, they could be conceived merely as summons and stimuli, with which one is joyously to comply in their moving us to some distinct spiritual activity. However, therewith we would, nevertheless, become conscious of evil, and the conception of actual evil would also be found in instances where a special connection of evil with our participation in redemptive activity is not present. Thus, the presupposition regarding a divine origination of evil, as such, is plainly present in such instances, though this evil is observed not in and of itself but only in relation to sin. This very presupposition conflicts with that aforementioned correct and pure conception of hindrances to sensory life, which conception views them merely as stimuli. Thus, here too the correct adjustment13 could not be one that would deny evil’s flowing from God for the reason that evil is grounded in our freedom by means of sin. Instead, it would rather be the case that since we posit that eternal causality exists along with temporal causality everywhere, evil too, precisely inasmuch as it would be grounded in our freedom, would have to be, at the same time, ordained by God, whereas inasmuch as evil would not be ordained by God, actually it also could not exist at all. Evil could not be grounded in God inasmuch as it would appear as a conflict between separate beings existing in this world,14 because these very conflicting beings would not be ordained by God as beings each of whom exists for oneself alone, but they could be ordained only in their belonging to one another and to the extent that they are doing so.15 Consequently, to that extent evil would not even exist in this case. Rather, for us evil would be a mere sham, which would emerge only from our sticking with the notion of isolated beings. In contrast, for evil to be ordained by God means that we conceive natural imperfections to be evil in the measure that God-consciousness does not yet have dominion in us. Likewise, in the measure that sin has dominion in us, it is formed into social evil, precisely as these two features are both grounded in freedom. 3.16 However, the connection of evil with sin that is grounded in our freedom and God’s

grounding of evil in relation to sin are both well understood only inasmuch as sin is considered to be a collective deed and evil is considered to be something suffered collectively. This is so, for the following reasons. First, no individual can say, except quite arbitrarily, that the evils one suffers are grounded in one’s own freedom. Rather, every time a sin occurs in connection with evil, that freedom by which this sin will have been engendered is also a factor. Since no sin is entirely one’s own, this connection of evil with sin can be shown only within some collective life, and the more self-standing and self-contained a collective life is, the more clearly is the connection shown. Now, strictly taken, therefore, even this explanation actually covers only those persons who were procreated and who depend on a given collective life from their very beginning onward. In contrast, regarding the first human being—as such, having no collective life—it would be difficult to form an account of divine causality of evil tied to its being grounded in this one human being’s own exercise of freedom—the more difficult indeed, the more necessary it would be for one to believe that one must first posit an initial state without any natural imperfections. Surely, at that point it would scarcely be possible to avoid imagining an arbitrary divine decree by which evil would be bound with sin—indeed, just as impossible as it would be not to oppose an attempt to explain today’s human evils by tracing them to the natural properties of the apple that Adam ate. Accordingly, then, the proposition contained in the two creedal symbols cited above has no more chance of persisting than that. Postscript. We are able to set forth divine attributes only as modalities17 assigned to divine causality. Thus if God were in no manner an originator of sin and of evil, there could also be no divine attribute by the force of which sin and evil would have persisted. On the other hand, if we were to have demonstrated such a causality satisfactorily, then particular divine attributes, differentiated from those divine attributes or modes of activity18 set forth thus far, would also very well have to be set forth here. To do so is all the more called for in that sin and evil are, in any case, ordained by God, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, they are, nevertheless, to be overcome by redemption. Now, suppose that such concepts regarding divine attributes should have to be formed only at this point. Then someone could raise a question as to whether it would be better to set forth two of these concepts, one for sin and the other for evil, or only one, the latter because, for all that is said about it, evil is indeed conditioned only by sin. Yet, religious consciousness has long since gained clarity concerning this relationship and has come to express this divine causality in the two concepts of attributes termed holiness and justice. Here it could be objected, of course, that in ordinary language usage the first concept relates not so much to sin alone as to the contrast between good and evil, and likewise that the second concept relates not so much to evil alone as to the contrast between reward and punishment. However, elsewhere these last two expressions, especially the first, have also been so variously defined and explained and, in turn, even brought so close to each other in meaning —in that reward and punishment are, nevertheless, nothing but what comes of good pleasure and displeasure—that only by the treatment that follows can it best be shown to what degree

they are suited for this place and how it is that no other meaning of them can be established than that which we assign them here.19

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873) refers to these two relations as in “parallel” (Parallele). 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 534, 653; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 849, 1086. 3. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 790f. See §36n2. 4. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “General Reservation. Exclusion of arbitrariness from eternity [of causality]” (Thönes, 1873). 5. Ed. note: Systemen (systems) is a term Schleiermacher applies to his own presentation of faith-doctrine (Glaubenslehre). He chooses to be systematic because he saw considerable use of so-called logical argument to be based on false premises or to be illogically organized, both so as to preserve nonbiblical and isolated, nonauthoritative assertions and implications drawn from the biblical texts within Evangelical dogmatic treatises. Yet such assertions were still enjoying currency in his own period. See §§1 and 19 above, also Brief Outline (2011), p. 136f. and §§97 and 196, also the index there under “dogmatics.” This term he did not favor for more genuine, organic presentations of faith-doctrine. Nevertheless, he did apply it to the genre recognized as such in his own day. 6. Ed. note: Strafübel. That is, as the choice of this term indicates: “evils” are then strictly identified with God’s exacting punishment for sin, including punishment of those “children” and other descendants mentioned in the confessional statements quoted just above. 7. Ed. note: The injunction that “for God all things are possible” (Matt. 19:26 and Mark 10:27) has been a contributive premise in positions being critiqued here. On what is “possible” for God, see the discussion under §54. The present proposition contains the most directly anticipatory aspect within his introduction (§§79–82) to the divine attributes of holiness and justice. All previous “presuppositions” regarding God’s having attributes, including the more focused discussions in Part One (§§50–56), likewise underlie this upcoming discussion (§§83–85). 8. Gen. 3:14, 16–18. Cf. §75.1. Ed. note: The verses in Genesis depict God’s punishing the serpent, the woman, and the man in response for their having disobeyed God’s command not to eat from one of the trees. 9. Ed. note: In this subsection, a series of headings is given in Schleiermacher’s marginal notes, beginning with this general one: “Content of self-consciousness: (a) Our own attribution [of evil to ourselves] with justification by God” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s next marginal note reads: “In accordance with the manner [of God’s originating] the original perfection [of the world]” (Thönes, 1873). 11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “(b) Divine decree with [our Christian] submission [to it]: divine origination [of evil] in relation to sin” (Thönes, 1873). Throughout this treatise, the pronouns “we,” “our,” and “us” consistently refer solely or chiefly to Evangelical persons of faith in Germany at that time, unless otherwise qualified, almost always when the subject is comprised of members of the human species. 12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Analogy of the two formulations with the two just previous ones above” (Thönes, 1873). See index for his frequent use of the concepts “community/communion [Gemeinschaft] with Christ” and “community with God in Christ.” All of these phenomena are, for him, most fully experienced in and through actual communal experiences, individually held in one’s mind and heart but not conveyed or capable of being sustained most fruitfully without ingredients of communal life among persons of faith. For an account of Christ’s reconciling work, see §§100–112, esp. 101, and index. These accounts and other related accounts of redemption are accomplished with a grasp of Christ’s whole life and work versus one that focuses exclusively on the cross, thus without an isolated theory of an atonement (Versöhnung, “reconciliation”) that is taken to be achieved at Jesus’ death. Instead, Schleiermacher sees redemption to be a process stretching over Jesus’ whole life, death, and resurrection and extending his influence through justification and sanctification, regeneration, and the continuing life of the divine Spirit in and through the church—in other words, through all that is described in Part Two concerning the life of the triune God with and through Christian communities of faith and on behalf of the entire human species. Regarding the latter aspect, see index under “speciesconsciousness,” “redemption, of the world,” and “human race/species.” 13. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note calls the results of this adjustment a “definitive [Definitive] analogy” (Thönes, 1873). 14. Existenzen. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher: (1) God is not, in Godself, apart from existence in and of this world, a singular being, so that God could not take part in a conflict between “existing beings” and would not ground such evil. (2) Human beings are actually grounded in God as a species, not merely as isolated individuals. (3) God does ground free

temporal causality (freedom) for the human species, thus for all members of it, but God’s activity among human beings does not involve being a party to conflict. (4) Hence the translation “separate beings existing in this world.” 15. Ed. note: Cf. Luke 6:38 and the larger context in 6:27–38 and similar passages elsewhere in the New Testament offering Jesus’ teachings on love and blessings toward and with (belonging to one another) those alienated from or doing violence to oneself. In the eighth of ten sermons celebrating the handing over of the Augsburg Confession in 1530, on October 10, 1830, Schleiermacher used the beginning of the same sentence in Luke 6:37 to proclaim a closely related theme on forgiving, not judging and condemning: “On the Condemnation in Our Confession of Those Who Believe Differently.” KGA III/12 (2013), 346–57; ET Nicol (1997), 127–40. 16. Ed. note: To open this subsection, Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Here too [an account] not related to the individual [alone]: In every case, one’s own evil, based on one’s own sin, is also collective evil” in every case (Thönes, 1873). 17. Ed. note: In logic, modalities are properties of propositions by which they assert or deny the possibility or impossibility, contingency or necessity of their content. In the propositions to follow—“God is holy” and “God is just”—the copula alone, “is,” is the modality, yet to be qualified in the explanatory subsections, as by earlier and subsequent discussions of divine attributes in this work. The copula itself can bear several rather different meanings. Schleiermacher tends to be very careful about which meaning he intends, if only by adding further qualifying terms such as “inasmuch as” (sofern als), “insofar as” or “to the extent/degree that” (insofern als), “indeed” (zwar, ja, inviting assent), “to be sure” (allerdings, requiring further explanation or supposition), “surely” (gewiß, meaning assuredly, probably to be taken for granted, but rarely apodictic or unchangeable certainty, given changing conditions; when referring to specific instances, as in “certain persons, places, or things, thus translated as “certain” only as a direct pointer to them, not a modality of a proposition), or “not” (nicht, simply a negation, perhaps to be further qualified), or “not at all” (gar nicht), and “if … then” or “suppose that … then” (wenn … so). He was surely undergirded in his precise usage of these and numerous other such words in his translations of Plato’s works (1804–1805, etc.), which contain many of them, though such careful selection of modalities is also typical even in his earliest writings. 18. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher specifies what a divine attribute would be, namely, a “mode of activity” (Tätigkeitsweisen), not a strict descriptor of God in se, apart from an activity in the world where humans dwell and can and in some manner do receive or apprehend, undergo, or suffer from what God does. This qualification directly points to the difference between what has traditionally been called “the immanent Trinity,” in se, versus “the economic Trinity,” where humans dwell. 19. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s presentation of a limited use of the concept “divine recompense” (Belohnung) to Christian morality (Sitte), see OR (1821) II, supplemental note 21. This becomes a term for issues regarding “recompense” as punishment versus positive reward in CF §84, then §§101 and 112.3, earlier regarding the concept’s use in Judaism (§9.2).

First Point of Doctrine

God Is Holy

§83. We understand the holiness of God to refer to that force of divine causality by which conscience is found to be conjoined, at the same time, with the state of needing redemption in every instance of human collective life. 1. By the term “conscience” we understand precisely this: that all modes of action issuing from God-consciousness and subject to its stimulus are also set forth as requirements, not theoretically, as it were, but claiming currency in self-consciousness in such a way that all deviations of life’s expressions from them are conceived as hindrances to life, consequently as sin. In focusing solely on God-consciousness here, in every respect we do so in the spirit of faith-doctrine. However, in that we can presuppose it to be known that elsewhere conscience is explained in the very same relation to the idea regarding what is good, it is but a passing matter for us to say that the two approaches are not at all different from each other. This is so, for the following reasons: First of all, let us suppose that, wherever we might look, we find that with reference to the idea regarding what is good, natural conscience presents requirements for the very same given collective life different from those that would be given currency therein by a prevailing God-consciousness, with the result that the two sets of requirements are in conflict. Despite the difference, then, this outcome is likewise to be ascribed simply to a lack of perfection in development or in application. The situation is the very same as that in which natural conscience appearing in one period and place is not the same as that in another period and place, or as that in which different modes of faith do not present the same requirements. In the Evangelical Church,1 however, we are not engrossed in such a conflict. Rather, there the identity of modes of action issuing from our Godconsciousness with those unfolding from our idea regarding what is good is granted readily enough. Now, no proof is needed anywhere, however, to demonstrate that wherever these requirements, or this command, are referred back to God-consciousness, conscience too is preeminently traced back to a divine causality, and, viewed as the voice of God in one’s mind and heart, it is taken to be an original revelation of God. Instead of a proof, these things belong to inner experiences that we can presuppose to be generally present within our domain. For all that, in general conscience is not the same thing as the appearance of Godconsciousness in a human being—not if this appearance is viewed as what constitutes the original perfection of human nature. That is to say, without disparity in the appearance of God-consciousness, as such unevenness emerges with understanding and will, and indeed without this disparity’s being linked with a tendency toward evenness,2 there would be no conscience. Likewise, without conscience all deeds3 that might emerge out of this disparity would not be sin for us. The divine causality by which conscience is posited also belongs entirely within the domain of this same contrast between sin and grace in which we find

ourselves existing today; and it is just as surely the divine causality by which sin is posited, because only through conscience4 does a given state of existence come to be sin for us, and indeed as our own deed alone. In addition, suppose that someone wanted, on the other hand—beyond our own deed and God’s general cooperative activity—to set forth yet another divine causality by which sin were to have come into existence. At that point, of course, two mutually contradictory divine activities would have to be assumed. In fact, the implication would then be that the causality posited in reality is the entire and singular divine causality which sin, as such, refuses to accept. 2.5 Now, when our explanation states that conscience is posited only along with the state of needing redemption, this is, to be sure, the purely Christian expression for the matter. In no way, however, is this statement to be understood as if we wanted to assume the existence of a conscience only where a need for redemption is recognized. Rather, in that here we are dealing with divine causality, we proceed based on the presupposition that redemption through Christ is ordained for the entire human species, and this whole species is also found to be entirely within the state of needing redemption. Suppose that instead of this state we were to think of a gradual development in the force of God-consciousness. The aforementioned disparity could indeed then persist there as well. At that point, however, even in that situation progress would indeed closely approximate the character of practicing an art. On that analogy, then, setting forth a requirement such as conscience expresses would be superfluous, in that art of every sort does indeed progress without any such requirement. In consequence, moreover, since conscience also ever brings pains with it, setting conscience forth as a requirement would be a cruelty. In contrast, within the process of redemption, human beings are held together by their shared conscience, which always includes consciousness of their incapacity, and, because conscience continues to stimulate consciousness of their sin, subsequently, they also likewise stick with the redemptive process.6 Suppose, however, that in every instance we could imagine our will to be completely united with God-consciousness, with the result that nothing would be endeavored that was not instigated through that God-consciousness. Yet— given that certain remainders of imperfection would still be left in our accomplishment of what we are to do, but that these remainders would have come to have their ground only in our organism, in service of will either psychically or somatically—at that point our conscience would have ceased to exist in its true distinctiveness. Hence, it is also the case that—saying what can be said here only in passing or provisionally—even if we believe it is adequate to describe the state of the Redeemer in the formulation that he always bore a completely satisfied conscience, we would, nevertheless, have to mean thereby that his conscience was always in a state of silence. As a result, the Redeemer would have been able to have conscience only empathically,7 not as his own personal conscience. In part, these considerations already serve to explain why we regard collective life to be the proper locus for conscience. That is, if we set forth even a generation that would have

come to the complete strength and purity of will that we see in the Redeemer, nevertheless, conscience that is operative in one generation would have to work at awakening each successive generation as it is growing up. This process would then likewise apply with respect to the more extended differentiations in respective development within the same generation. In turn, and in part, these observations also would serve to explain why a conscience appearing in each individual merely for oneself would also be too fluctuating for it not to compromise surety of judgment and surety of its attribution to divine causality. In contrast, conscience, to the extent that it emerges in a given collective life as the same in all and for all, is called “law,”8 the moral law above all, from which, however, civil law is also to flow in every instance. Accordingly, in the collective life of human beings, divine holiness is the law-giving divine causality. Therein, moreover, for us law is always something absolutely holy, especially when traced back to its inner source, and divine causality ordains the entire historical course of it. Since this is the case, likely no objection is to be made against our setting forth law-giving causality as a particular divine attribute and our designating it as holiness and not by any other name. 3.9 In contrast, the most frequent customary and most popular definition for use of our term “holiness” in the liturgical and homiletic domain is this: asserting that the holiness of God consists in God’s being well pleased with what is good and displeased with what is wicked. This definition can be understood in a twofold manner. Certainly, it can be meant in such a way that good and wickedness are to be understood, namely, in terms of the actions of finite, free beings.10 However, in this sense the definition is not permissible for use in a scientific domain without sizeable modifications at the very least. This is so, for the following reasons: First, in their contrast to each other, pleasure and displeasure would not be without an admixture of passivity on God’s part. Moreover, if this passivity were not eliminated in advance, then as a divine attribute holiness would include a divine disturbance of humans’ feeling of absolute dependence. It would do this, in that a state of God would be determined by human actions, consequently a relationship of reciprocal activity would arise between God and human beings. Second, and what is more, in God this attribute would turn out to be a purely internal quiescence, the likes of which immediate religious self-consciousness affords us no occasion to set forth. These two difficulties could be obviated only if it were possible to transfer what is self-initiated activity in these human states to God, that is, activities of striving for and repulsion against, in active utterances of pleasure and displeasure, respectively. However, these two features would have to be found exclusively in the process of redemption itself, and it would, nevertheless, be entirely divergent from all ecclesial usage to say that redemption is grounded preeminently in divine holiness. Hence, if we were not to dispense with the term displeasure altogether from this point on out, we would have to revert to saying that as something separate from the efficacious activity of what is good, a divine expression of divine displeasure would be nothing other than a divine effectuation of this displeasure within the agents of action and by means of conscience and the law. However, if the definition of divine holiness is to be

understood in such a way that divine productivity11 is to underlie and determine divine pleasure in what is good and displeasure directed against what is wicked,12 then what follows from this view, above all, is this: that what is wicked, inasmuch as it would be, as the object of divine displeasure, set over against what is good, also could not exist for God and thus also could not be posited as a thought of God.13 That is, it could not provide either what is the nature of wickedness or the very idea of wickedness. We can establish this point without hesitation, and indeed with the necessary consequence that in the same sense even finite being could not generate wickedness out of itself.14 That is, wickedness, on this basis and viewed as a real contrast over against what is good, could nowhere have any existence; and in consequence, strictly speaking, displeasure in wickedness—a displeasure wrought in us by divine causality— would also simply be displeasure over any falling short of the effective force of God-consciousness behind one’s clarity in conceiving of divine holiness. Accordingly, what is tenable in the two explanations, taken together, entirely corresponds to what we have set forth, and in this manner we can also immediately refer the concept back to divine omnipotence and divine omnipresence and are thus able to posit each of these attributes as bearing the characteristic of holiness.15 Now, along with this account those explanations which ascribe to God’s holiness the requiring of what is completely good of creatures are also in accord with this account.16 This is so, in that this requirement is, nevertheless, delivered to them only by virtue of the law planted within them or their moral feeling. In part, these same explanations also include the inner purity of God as a theme of that requirement that belongs within the concept of holiness. In contrast, explanations that stick with this purity of God alone, or refer back entirely to God’s perfect self-love,17 perhaps might belong in some speculative or so-called natural theology but find no room in a presentation of faith-doctrine.

1. Ed. note: The reference, as throughout—and in view of pending efforts at church union between Reformed and Lutheran branches—is to those churches in Germany in that early nineteenth-century period. 2. Ed. note: The logic of the sentence leads to disparity and likely conflict, hence of conscience, given the existence of both understanding and will. Both understanding and will express one’s inner faith in thought or in action. When there is disparity of content, both understanding and will can disrupt Christian God-consciousness. Disparity of content can also trigger Christian conscience. Accordingly, in human life inner conflicts and unevenness of behavior do exist as a major feature of sinful life, not simply in conflicts between understanding and will. In consequence, the two parts of dogmatics, i.e., those chiefly dealing with activities of Christian understanding and will that emerge in beliefs and actions respectively, function either together or separately as Christian doctrine and ethics. With respect to God, however, Schleiermacher consistently holds that there is no such disparity or stepwise difference in God, between thinking, then willing and doing, on the one hand, and between thought and action, on the other. Nor does God need a conscience. If God were to feel as well as separate these other two functions, God would presumably be totally “personal,” after the pattern of personal existence known to humans, but this is something we cannot know about God in se. However, in Schleiermacher’s terms, it would appear to Christians as though God were indeed sufficiently able to be “in relationship” with individual humans and our communities, by “God’s Spirit,” whose chief ontological designation is “Supreme Being,” not “a being.” This would be the case, in his view, despite God’s activity be-ing vastly broader, more complex, in fact absolutely independent and more wondrous than any individual human being could ever be. Apparently, this distinction applies to Jesus, who is for him not an object for prayer, even in his sinless, resurrected (and possibly ascended) state, and given his own perfect God-consciousness for purposes of his being the Redeemer. The object of prayer

is the Tri-une God, approached as the One on whom we, as part of the universe, are absolutely dependent, as are all things. Cf. §§146–47 on “Prayer in the Name of Jesus”; also §47.1. All these matters are parceled out over the rest of Part Two. 3. Tatsachen. Ed. note: That is, all fait accompli (accomplished fact—Tatsache) of thinking or doing. As usual, “for us” refers to Christians, who could thus consider certain activities of others, Christian or not, or matters of fact (Tat) related to their existence, also to be sinful, not theirs alone. 4. Even in 1 Pet. 1:14–16, the holiness of God is tied to the fact that we no longer live in ignorance regarding lusts (Lüsten). Ed. note: Although this word can bear the general reference to pleasures, in context it can also carry a negative carnal meaning. Thus, the RSV rendering of this passage reads: “As obedient children, do not be conformed to the passions of your former ignorance, but as he who called you is holy, be holy yourselves in all your conduct.” Verse 16 then quotes from Lev. 11:44–45. 5. Ed. note: The subject of this subsection is given in Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “2. Concerning the general spread of conscience” (Thönes, 1873). 6. Ed. note: For the human and the divine aspects of the redemptive process, see especially §108; in Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics, note especially the human aspects in what he variously calls “critical,” “corrective,” and “purifying” action in this relational, developmental process of redemption. In all aspects on both sides, he sees the roles that worship and education play as components of Christian communal life, described notably in his practical theology lectures and in Brief Outline. For him, personal meditative and contemplative practices lie behind and within his sermons and his dominant theme of Seelsorge (care of souls), usually spoken of as a component of leadership in the church among lay and clergy but open to all Christians in all circumstances, as a way of participating in and passing on God’s love. A key additional component in his own case was comprised of the practices of meditation and contemplation, within himself privately and with others—for example, in private preparatory moments and when preaching or counseling or sharing in some administrative process. His theological work included both, and thus can be characterized as essentially contemplative in character. Working with Scripture in such work, as in preparing and delivering sermons, also includes meditation on biblical texts. The evidence lies not so much in what he says about such practices as in what he is found to have done in the quality of the work itself. As tradition has it: orare et labore (pray and work). As presumably with the Redeemer, to pray is itself a work, as in part to work, first within, then out of one’s relatively contemplative silence. 7. Ed. note: This concept, als Mitgefühl, will appear elsewhere in Schleiermacher’s writings, as in Christian Faith, as meaning a shared or common feeling, as sympathy, or as compassion, an entering into another’s feeling but without inner turmoil of one’s own, hence “empathically” in this context. On his accounts, other human beings can empathically share the Redeemer’s sense for what is right, but not without some organic residue at the very least. See esp. §§108–12. 8. Ed. note: An important descriptor of what he is doing here shows up in Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Conscience as analogous to law” (Thönes, 1873). That is, the two concepts are only analogous in common usage, especially within the Evangelical church. They are not exactly the same, except in their being enunciated as proper conduct. In this respect, within the wide range of views characteristic of these churches, law (however conceived) always follows gospel. The functions of law were then, and still are, in dispute. 9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “3. Comparison with the customary definition [of this attribute]” (Thönes, 1873). 10. Heinrich Philipp Conrad Henke (1752–1809), Lineamenta institutionum (1795), 66: “God, purest from any defect or vice, irreconcilable loather of everything perverse, greatest lover of what is good and upright.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. In the main text, “beings” translates Wesen. 11. Produktivität. 12. (1) Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755) turns in this direction in his Elementa theologicae dogmaticae (1764) 1, 292: “Holiness is the immutable intent of God’s will, acting in a way congruent with his perfections.” (2) So does Christoph Friedrich Ammon (1766–1849), Summa theologiae Christianae (1816), 92, [who refers to]: “the most perfect agreement of the most free will, with the laws of the wisest intellect.” Ed. note: (1) See KGA I/7.3, 451, for exact wording; ET Kienzles. (2) ET Kienzles. 13. According to §55.1. 14. According to §67.2. 15. Ed. note: Cf. §54 and §55, respectively. 16. Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologiae (Wittenberg, 1685– 1690), Tome 1, 420: “The holiness of God is supreme, and all purity in God is wholly lacking in defect or vice, exacting from creatures the cleanliness and purity that are due.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 17. (1) Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729), Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae (1724), 237–38. “When God himself is conceived to love with pure love, the love is called holiness, since [God is] at the same time considered to be isolated from all imperfection.” (2) In a certain way, Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), who wanted to have divine holiness understood

especially as the absence of all selfishness in God, already said this in regard to Ps. 144. Ed. note: (1) ET Kelsey. (2) See Migne Lat. 9:854–64.

Second Point of Doctrine

God Is Just

§84. The justice of God is that divine causality by the force of which a connection of evil with actual sin is ordained in the state of susceptibility to sin held in common. 1.1 Undeniably, this definition is far narrower and far more limited than the manner in which other teachers of faith-doctrine convey it and in such a way that it requires special justification. That is, at the outset we notice here too that some have brought into their account that there is a twofold justice, one that is law-giving or distributive and one that adjudicates and produces judgments.2 The first kind, however, cannot be included in our definition in any way whatsoever. Yet, it seems that thereby one would have overlooked the condition that a relation to something given lies in the terms “right” and “justice.”3 For that reason, every human product of law-giving and distributive action would have to be and should be just, because, in that case, something acknowledged as given is always already in existence, something that is arranged in proper sequence and to which it is traced back. However, divine legislation and distribution are the original and creative legislation and distribution from which all entities, themselves and with their interrelations, proceed simultaneously. Divine legislation and distribution do not have to be attached to anything, and their perfection therefore also cannot be described as justice. Instead, it is rather the case that they would be designated as wisdom,4 a divine attribute that can be discussed only at a later point.5 Accordingly, divine justice can be only that which dispenses rewards.6 Even so, our definition also embraces only one-half of reward. That is to say, whereas people have reckoned thereto the reward of good outcomes7 no less than the penalty of bad outcomes, our definition says nothing regarding the connection between well-being and the force of Godconsciousness. Instead, it speaks only of the connection of evil with sin. This connection is, to be sure, precisely what we call punishment. This lack in the account, moreover, we could both concede and, at the same time, excuse—as a natural consequence of the limiting abstraction we find ourselves applying, in that we are speaking only of one feature of our Christian self-consciousness, namely, consciousness of sin, but are disregarding the other feature here. Thereby, an inconvenience of our method would simply have come to light, a method that necessitated splitting a divine attribute into two parts. In fact, however, our Christian self-consciousness recognizes no recompense that would proceed from divine justice. Rather, any sort of thing that can be named is, for us, something unmerited that is to be traced back to divine grace.8 The recompense-giving tendency of divine justice can find no object other than Christ,9 and indeed only inasmuch as he is the one who is different from

all other human beings. Accordingly, based on our own religious self-consciousness, we can be acquainted only with divine punitive justice and must leave divine recompense in relation to us undecided at this point.10 Meanwhile, then, it is a given that Christ himself appears to depict compensatory divine procedures, more so and with greater multiplicity.11 If this is so, then an increase of one’s strengths and the expansion of one’s circle of influence—the two of which are, in turn, quite exactly interconnected—can no more be viewed as a recompense, in the proper sense, a recompense that could be contrasted with a linking of evil with sin, than we could have assented to viewing an increase of wickedness, in the proper sense, as being a punishment for sin. 2.12 Now, suppose that the concept of divine justice were related only to the linking of evil with sin. In that case, it could well appear natural that justice could extend only over the domain of sin, and to that degree the Postscript13 could appear to be superfluous. It is clear that then we would not introduce this specific divine causality at all if we were to find ourselves within a collective life that is sinless, for we arrive at the notion of divine justice only by means of a consciousness of sin. At the same time, however, the term “divine justice” does include in it recognition that to the extent that sin disappears, this linking of divine justice with sin would also be annulled. This process would be independent of whether something would have changed in the material nature of the human state or not. Moreover, this annulment—that is, forgiveness of sins—would belong precisely to that same divine causality,14 in that, at the same time, the recompense of Christ would also be present herein. That we have restricted the connection of evil with sin to actual sin alone has its ground, in part, in that as long as the original susceptibility to sin within human collective life would remain unaltered, an annulment of this connection would be impossible, given that the connection would itself still be grounded in this original susceptibility to sin. In part, this connection of evil with actual sin also has its ground in that wherever this connection generally persists, it does so only inasmuch as it occurs in our consciousness, but we have a consciousness of original susceptibility to sin only in and with our actually sinning. Furthermore, these two factors in our consciousness connect only with our actually sinning by dint of two conditions in human collective life: first, in that social evil does exist there— for in individuals, as such, there are only certain distinct sinful tendencies which develop into unyielding causes of hindrances to that collective life—and, second, various natural imperfections are also conceived to be evils. Hence, in the same measure as sin is overcome, not only would the latter natural condition not be present anymore, but even sins that had actually come into being within human collective life would also operate only as stimuli toward improving that life15 and no longer as hindrances to it. Accordingly, two sorts of consideration belong to the positing and breaking of this connection between evil and actual sin: The first is that the entire arrangement of the world, insofar as evil is conditioned within it, would be related in a distinct manner to human freedom, viewed as that in which sin is grounded. That point being established, however, the second consideration is that in our consciousness this conjoining of evil with actual sin would be constituted not merely accidentally but essentially and in a thoroughgoing manner.

Now, if conceived in this way, divine justice would, to be sure, always be an ever-thesame continuing divine causality, operative across the entire domain of our experience, and it would stretch over the entire domain of finite intelligence that is familiar to us.16 This being so, the result is that divine justice, taken together with divine causality, regulates all that relates that which originates in this side of our contrast between sin and grace to the ethical domain of human existence. Thus, setting forth justice as a special divine attribute appears to be completely justified. Now, as concerns the first feature of divine justice, namely, the relation of the whole world order17 to freedom, anyone would grant, of oneself, that this relation is to be found only within human collective life. Only in the measure that such a collective life is selfcontained, thus, is so most completely only in the totality of human existence. Only in the measure that such a collective life is self-contained does this specific divine causality reveal itself in a world order such that hindrances to life that unfold from sin can be averted or removed by no relation to the external world, however favorable that might be. Suppose, to the contrary, that someone were to regard the individual human being to be the actual object of divine justice. In that case, the concept of divine justice would be devalued to the point of its being a mere image of civil justice, which we, of course, so often sense as lacking in justice. Indeed, suppose that someone wants to claim that divine justice is consummated only in punishment given for each particular sacrilegious misdeed, and perhaps also consummated in reward given for each particular virtue held or every virtuous action accomplished by an individual. Yet, it is obvious that not only is not every act of impropriety or falsehood always punished by contempt or disease, for example. Instead, even the very same evil that is interpreted to occur as punishment for the sin of one individual could confront other individuals for whom this evil would not be assigned without glaring injustice. Thus, by applying this concept one would be pressed into such straits that at that point there would be virtually no way out but to claim that here divine justice could unfold only imperfectly and would reach completion only in the life beyond. This notion, however, is one that, even if one might want to clear it of imagining God to be caught in a temporal process of development, nevertheless, it only further delays facing the difficulty in that no indication has been given of such a differential in the suffering to be undergone in the life beyond that would counterbalance the differences between conduct and suffering in this present life. In contrast, if we attach the concept of collective punishment to the concept of collective fault, the formulation that the totality of sin is reflected in evil suffered and that the totality of evil suffered is to be explained as coming from sin would be fully justified, and this is the connection proffered above. As relates to the second feature, however, namely, that in our consciousness this relation between sin and evil is actually formed, and indeed in general terms: this is the consciousness of being deserving of punishment.18 In the human soul this kind of consciousness is the product of divine justice, just as conscience is the product of divine holiness. The general sweep of this consciousness is shown most obviously, however, in that household, civil, and social penalties do arise, right across the board, from this consciousness of deserving

punishment. Moreover, divine justice is represented as correlating both the placement of the connection between sin and evil, as well as the gradual diminishment of sin and evil in collective life through the overcoming of that connection.19 3.20 Here we find no occasion whatsoever for a classification that distinguishes between natural and arbitrary punishments. Such a classification also could not be fully demonstrated and applied even once within the whole domain of finite and temporal causality. This is the case, for the following reasons. First, natural punishments, in the sense in which the word can be attributed to God, are arbitrary, in that they are grounded in divine creative and worldordering causality. Moreover, punishments that we could come closest to calling arbitrary, namely, all those evils which can have confronted individuals who have been affected by them but whose behaviors do not correspond to them, are plainly natural punishments, because this disparity is grounded in the total array of the interconnected process of the world.21 In another sense, we call those punishments natural which happen by means of the relation of the world-order to our freedom and, on the other hand, we call those punishments arbitrary which are generated from exercise of human freedom itself. However, if each of the two kinds of punishment were viewed as divine, this distinction would vanish, in that punishments suffered by human beings would still be commensurate with the spiritual development of humans that is ordained by God. Better said, the two kinds together intrinsically belong to the divine order. This is so, in that to separate presence of either kind from that of the other kind would be lacking in truth, and to adopt arbitrary punishment and not natural punishment would be lacking in meaning.22 Regarding punishment in the afterlife, there can be no discussion here whatsoever. Thus, there can also be no decision regarding the extent to which they would be viewed more as arbitrary or as natural. This is so, for such exacting of penalties could not be drawn immediately from our selfconsciousness, and hence only in a different locus could an investigation be carried out as to how the distinctively Christian shape given to this notion, which had already come to be very widespread in pre-Christian times, might relate to that general grounding of it which, to be sure, is being presupposed. Only in a different locus, moreover, could such a decision making refer back to the concept of divine justice and consider whether it could be modified as it is in the present context or otherwise.23 The situation is different with other classifications that have also gained currency within our domain, namely, those crafted in accordance with various purposes for punishment.24 First, it is quite clear, however, that punishments cannot be ordained by God as means for improvement. This is the case, in that a given overweening physical sensibility is countered only by physical sensibility itself, and accordingly, if fear can gain dominion over pleasure, it is not possible in such an instance for a greater sway of God-consciousness and a greater freedom of spirit to arise thereby. Rather, only a different distribution of sensory motives can be brought about in this manner, which, in accordance with the nature of an individual entity,25 is less adverse. It is also obvious that if a strengthening of God-consciousness were to have been possible by means of punishment, thereupon a most perfectly possible

appointed system of divine punishments would necessarily have been able to be substituted in the place of redemption. Second, in contrast, it is also just as little to be assumed that a sheer vengeful or retributive purpose of divine punishments exists. This is so, for originally wickedness, or injustice, and evil were not at all measurably differentiable. Rather, only once what is evil was inflicted on another human being by someone else’s injustice was the latter evil differentiable from retributive evil. Yet, even this very act of retributive evil would have been inflicted, nevertheless, only insofar as the one injured would have considered pleasure in the subsequent woe of the original perpetrator to serve as a removal or sweetening of one’s own woe. Hence, also everywhere within that ancient period, making the most of punishing evil against another was customary, thus granting pleasure to the one injured. In part, civil jurisdiction over exacting penalties had its origin in such practices, in that in a milder tenor it substituted for private acts of revenge. In contrast, divine punishments of this kind could be taken up only at a very much lower stage of development. There the deity would have been thought of as susceptible to a feeling for suffering and for other conditions of this sort and not exalted above these states. Moreover, what has constantly been declaimed with the appearance of thoughtfulness ever since then—regarding the mysterious character of divine wrath26 and the primal necessity of divine retaliation—cannot be retrieved in any clear consciousness today. Furthermore, we will be able to put this matter to rest all the more surely when consciousness of one’s deserving punishment as a product of divine justice is thoroughly explained by the third, remaining purpose that is assigned to punishment, namely, that of fending it off or being induced to fear the prospect of it.27 Actually, this punishment involves a necessary intermediate intervention. It does so wherever and insofar as no force of Godconsciousness as yet vitally manifests itself as moving in one who is sinning. Accordingly, the purpose of any necessary intervention is to assure that predominating sensory tendencies do not then grow sinful to the extent of being overweening through unchecked habit. Moreover, what has been said regarding a people’s being held together under law, notably in relation to Mosaic legislation, applies in general to all criminal jurisdiction among all peoples, but likewise also applies to natural punishments promulgated in that Mosaic legislation as well. What all these considerations lead to is our recognition that divine justice is to be fully understood only in relation to the domain of redemption and insofar as redemption is still coming to be operative in that domain. 4.28 Now, these considerations do shed light on precisely how divine holiness and justice interconnect, on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, on how necessary it is to keep the two attributes apart. They most definitely belong to each other as expressions regarding divine causality with respect to sin in its relation to redemption. Consider the formulation already given, according to which we say of sin that in the very same sense in which sin cannot be grounded in God and thus it also cannot exist at all, we also say of evil that inasmuch as it cannot be grounded in God—namely, evil conceived as a real contradiction to the original perfection of the world for human beings—evil too cannot exist at all. Moreover,

just as we also assert of evil that as it really does exist, it must also be grounded in some divine causality, the same is true of sin. In addition, just as consciousness of sin’s being deserving of punishment, viewed as a product of divine justice, is possible only by presupposing conscience, viewed as what results from divine holiness, so too without consciousness of sin’s deserving punishment, there could be nothing whereby conscience could firmly secure itself in a human soul that is still subjected to the dominion of flesh.29 Thus, there would be nothing that could develop consciousness of a need for redemption under this dominion. Yet, it is also necessary, for the same reason, to keep the two concepts of divine holiness and divine justice apart here—here, where even if we have to do with features of religious self-consciousness that we use to abstract details from the whole process of redemption, we must, nevertheless, always presuppose redemption as that to which all these details are related. Two things are to be said on this proposal then. First, imagine that we could have been brought to a point when both natural imperfections as well as sins of the world were no longer evils for us but were still merely means of stimulating us in such a way that we would no longer take everything in relation to ourselves to be evil, thus also in such a way that in our purely personal religious states the justice of God would not be immediately present. Yet, nonetheless, we would always still be constantly in need of conscience and thus would also be repeatedly renewing consciousness of divine holiness within ourselves. Likewise, even while we still need both consciousness of God’s holiness and conscience, we would, nevertheless, strictly separate the two, for a lack of pleasure in wickedness, that is, the impression of God’s holiness, would be completely pure and satisfying only if it were not affected by a premonition of punishment at all. Moreover, the consciousness of being deserving of punishment would be so firmly rooted in our communal feeling that we would always consent to punishment even if not only our personal moral feeling about the object in question had not already been completely purified but also our very will had already not completely escaped from the servitude in question. Now, for precisely this reason, this form of God-consciousness would also in no way be one that is more transient in us than is the one represented by the concept of divine holiness, since that holiness always retains the same truth for our communal feeling to which it especially, also originally, belongs. Yet, suppose that one wanted to say that the two concepts were, nevertheless, not divine attributes in the same sense as were those treated in Part One, because these attributes relate solely to the natural lack of perfection of a human being. These attributes, moreover, would be absolutely nothing in God outside this human domain, and even within this domain they would cease asserting themselves as soon as the imperfection were fully abrogated. Thereupon the following is to be said. First, at that point the same thing would also have to be valid for divine attributes that are soon to be explicated regarding the second aspect of the contrast between sin and grace, in that reference to the first aspect, sin, is also essential for them. Accordingly, the same thing would have to be valid for all the socalled moral attributes of God, insofar as some reference to the contrast between sin and grace attached to them as well. Yet, since on the whole we have not adhered much to this general nomenclature, I want

especially to offer for consideration the following with respect to the concepts of the two attributes. First, with respect to the holiness of God—irrespective of the recognition that although that whereby sin does not exist for God, also belongs to God’s holiness and that, thus far, it does form a general characteristic of God’s consciousness30 regarding God’s own works, consequently of God’s omnipotence and omnipresence, for God’s holiness is an essential component of our consciousness of God. This is the case, because we are also able continually to be conscious of an absolute sway of God-consciousness only as a consciousness of sin’s status being overcome by redemption. Second, the same situation would be the case regarding divine justice, this insofar as the Redeemer’s deserving positive rewards would be simply the other side of sin’s deserving punishment. Moreover, just as being in the state of sin’s deserving punishment always retains presentiment of the Redeemer’s state of deserving positive rewards, so too, sin’s deserving punishment is always retained as memory in the Redeemer’s state of deserving reward. No less, moreover, the relation of the divine world order to our freedom is, in the same manner, one with the relation of the divine world order to redemption, and it follows that this whole interconnectedness of what is spiritual with what is sensory is the locus of divine justice, which, in consequence, is likewise omnipresent and eternal.31

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “1. Comparison of this definition with the customary one” (Thönes, 1873). 2. Ed. note: eine gesetzgebende oder verteilende und eine vergeltende. Ordinarily, the first would consist of legislative acts, including assigned distribution of goods or penalties, the job of legislatures; the second would do the job of courts and judicatories, via exercise of evaluative or factual judgments, some retributive, providing proper currency for positive rewards or blessings, on the one hand, and negative rewards such as punishments or retributions, on the other hand. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note signals the division of topics in his text, namely: “Distributive [justice],” with the comment: “This designation does not fit God, on account of God’s original enactment [of God’s legislative and, if any, God’s distributive activity]” (Thönes, 1873). 3. Ed. note: In German, both terms contain the same root and reference: Recht and Gerechtigkeit. In English, the Latinate terms used are “just” and “justice,” the latter also meaning both “righteousness” and “justification” regarding something or someone. On the other hand, in doctrinal usage Rechtfertigung means “justification,” or “made right [with God],” just as Heiligung means “sanctification,” or “made (more nearly) holy.” These two paired doctrines regarding divine activity with humans are presented in §§106–12. In §§106–9, under the general heading “regeneration,” justification refers to a “changed relation to God,” conversion refers to a “[continually] changing relation to God.” In §§106 and §§110–12, “sanctification” refers to a life of the regenerate, or reborn, “in community with Christ,” therein growing in holiness and blessedness. 4. Certain doctrinal theologians (Glaubenslehrer) seem to have something similar in mind, namely, those who describe divine holiness as internal justice but, in turn, call justice itself external justice. This similarity obtains, for, given that distinction, either (1) holiness is itself God’s law-giving activity or, (2) if external justice is itself divided, in turn, into lawgiving and reward-giving or retributive reward-giving activity, then the first, nevertheless, refers to holiness, when viewed as that supreme perfection which underlies the law, and, in contrast, the second thereupon refers to holiness, when viewed as displeasure with wickedness. Ed. note: In both respects, one presumably receives what is called one’s “just reward.” See note 6. 5. Ed. note: See §§164–69, where, in the process of redemption through the Redeemer, “the divine government of the world” is linked in God’s one originating divine decree with “the reign of grace” in and through the church, by way of using another two paired concepts: “love” and “wisdom.” In §168 wisdom is defined in terms of an active “principle” that is manifested in God’s ordering and determining the world so as to manifest God’s very “communication” of Godself, not in se but in that process of redemption. 6. Ed. note: Here the gerund vergeltende (“reward”) becomes the noun Vergeltende, designating the next section in Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873). This term, “reward,” encompasses both tendencies of judgment: positive

reward under law (in favor) and negative reward under law (against), with accompanying judicial sentences of (1) affirmations and positive (positive) rewards and (2) negative (verneinde) rewards and penalties (hence the phrases “to one’s just desert” and “to one’s just reward,” an idiom in both German and English). It refers to providing currency (Geltung, geltende)—not total “validity,” as might be correct, even if qualified, in other contexts—i.e., currency via a judge’s evaluative and factual judgments, and possibly, like legislation, offering some advancement of what is then to be considered lawful or not, still under some conditions set as precedents within previous law. It does not necessarily include outright “retribution,” if interpreted in accordance with the language given in this context or elsewhere in this work. For details, see the index for Schleiermacher’s various discussions regarding “punishment.” Now, much biblical and doctrinal language on God’s justice is derived from ways that legal institutions have done their work among a people and in the state. Moreover, since relations between “law” and “gospel” had always been a contentious issue within and between both Lutheran and Reformed theologians, Schleiermacher would also surely have found it necessary to examine to what degree these derivations work for describing God’s redemptive work with regard to sin. Presupposing such knowledge among readers, this is what he is doing here. See his allied work in practical theology and essays on administrative work in communion with God in the church, as well as his extensive philosophical lectures on Lehre vom Staat in KGA II/8 (1998) and related material on that subject elsewhere. 7. Belohnen des Guten. Ed. note: In a judicial system, this “recompense” could also include judgments of positive reward, monetary recompense or some other in kind, and requital, all of which could be accommodated by this same term. 8. Rom. 4:4 and 16; cf. Matt. 20:14–15. When in 2 Tim. 4:8 the distribution of reward is ascribed to God as judge, God is presented there under the image of a referee, which does not belong here. 9. Phil. 2:9–10; Heb. 2:9–10. 10. Ed. note: Divine recompense (Belohnung) is treated again in the consideration of reward for works §112, 116.2, and 118.2, and in the consideration of recompense §158.1 and retribution §159.1. 11. Matt. 25:21. 12. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s marginal note he announces the subject of this subsection: “2. Clarification of the proposition” (Thönes, 1873). 13. Ed. note: The postscript appended to §83. 14. On this account, in 1 John 1:9 forgiveness is also referred back to the justice [or righteousness (Gerechtigkeit)] of God. Ed. note: This verse reads (RSV): “If we confess our sins, he [God] is faithful and just, and will forgive our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness.” In that context, it is also clear that as sin is overcome and one grows in righteousness, the positive reward that Jesus provides brings the sinner repeatedly to the point of divine forgiveness and, more and more, into a holy and just life. 15. Rom. 8:28. Ed. note: Sermon on Rom. 8:28, “On Making Use of Public Disasters,” given in Schleiermacher’s second published collection (1808); also in SW II.1 (1834), 251–65; and in KGA III/1 (2012), 278–94. Schleiermacher’s note on the sermon: “Given soon after the enemy had occupied the city of Halle [an der Saale].” Delivered at the Domkirche, 25th Sunday after Trinity, Nov. 23, 1806, with opening prayer. 16. Ed. note: Then, as usually now, the term Intelligenz that is “familiar to us [uns bekannt]” is human, tending to exclude any use of Intellekt—use of brains or intellectual aptitude—in other species. It is also not limited to capacities to engage thinking or understanding in Schleiermacher’s usage. 17. Ed. note: Here “whole” (gesamten) stands for the world order (Weltordnung) that both constitutes and surrounds the “totality” (Totalität) of “human existence”—that is, of the species viewed as itself a “collective life” (Gesamtleben). The “entire arrangement of the world” (ganze Welteinrichtung), referred to two paragraphs back, includes that which relates to all the conditions of human existence, such as human free causality leading to sin and its evil consequences. Thus, the collected works of God, as it were, comprise all that God does that relates to the whole human species, all that relates to the entire career of humanity. It is God’s project for humanity—in what Schleiermacher calls “the one eternal divine decree” of creation and redemption, viewed as a sustained and developing process tending toward consummation for human beings. See index. 18. Ed. note: The term both for the normal, ordinarily serviceable use (“penal desert” in juridical language) and for ethical use (or moral use, in the broadest sense, namely, “being deserving of punishment”) is Strafwürdigkeit. Schleiermacher’s note here reads: “This is the ethical derivation of exacting legal penalties. [Consider] how the ethical derivation [of being deserving of punishment] is distinguished from that in normal use [nützlichen]. [Also consider:] Influence on the Christian conception of [penal desert], which came from talk regarding the Jewish people’s God, [viewed as] Lawgiver” (Thönes, 1873). 19. Ed. note: This “diminishment” translates Entsündigung. 20. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here has this heading: “3. Classification of penal evil [Strafübel]: On natural and arbitrary punishments” (Thönes, 1873).

21. Ed. note: Gesamtheit des Weltzusammenhanges is the expression used here. In Schleiermacher’s previous uses of the more familiar term Naturzusammenhang, it is clear that the overall process is, for him, relatively consistent, persistent, and unified. Yet he also takes it to be diverse in its interlocking features and impacts, as would be expected of any complex process. Therein as yet unpredictable causes and effects are involved, as are causation and receptivity among free agents. For him, all of this is occurring in a world where perceived developments and setbacks, losses and newly formed gains are constantly occurring. 22. Ed. note: In other words, in the first case, it would be unrealistic, thus false versus what is true, to consider events that might selectively be called either “natural” or “arbitrary” as if the two terms were not correlative in every instance, given a single world order created and preserved by God’s eternally, inseparably, and consistently enacted will. In particular, in the second case it would be meaningless to consider all events not evidently caused by sin to be arbitrary, thus absolutely supernatural, in relation to God’s world order—for example, as some were wont to do in thinking of ocean swells as God’s holding back the sea from the seashore or breaking through the world order in creating absolutely supernatural miracles— instead of natural events in which God is still working within the circumstances of God’s world order, for all its changes. Such dense passages, taken by themselves, would be even more difficult to interpret if, in Schleiermacher’s view, they did not serve as reminders of how other doctrines had been presented. In this case, the issue concerns how the entire doctrine of divine creation and preservation and how God’s overall work in the world can be received, felt, and acknowledged by human beings within natural circumstances. Looking ahead to the rest of his interconnected doctrinal presentation, as Schleiermacher was constantly doing, the arising of sin, characteristics of sin, and consequences of sin would also be relatively false and meaningless without God’s single, eternal divine decree of creation and redemption, itself not wholly explainable in only one locus. In this work, therefore, he is constantly attempting to show, as a theologian, how extreme mistakes in interpreting both human and divine freedom and human and divine determinacy can be avoided. Thus, he is also trying to demonstrate how positive fruits in previous traditions of theological inquiry can still contribute through Christian inquiry into both freedom and determinacy with respect to consciousness of God, self, and world. This subsection of §84 brings a special focus on this large thematic area. Like many of the footnotes, the index is also designed to help remind one of such interwoven elements and features. It is indeed hard to keep them all in mind without deep, prolonged investigation. Schleiermacher himself tried to help. First, he added endnotes to On Religion (1821), referring to Christian Faith at a time when the first two editions (1799, 1806) of that initial work on religion had already mistakenly come to be regarded by many as his chief work in theology. Second, he formed Christian Faith in the scientifically tight way he did in both editions. Third, he published his remarks to his friend Lücke regarding early interpretations of it in his very important, oft-neglected work On the “Glaubenslehre” (1829) before its second edition was issued (1830–1831). Passages like this one are clearly written but difficult to get clear in the reading, in no small part because of Schleiermacher’s own apparently strong desire not continually to repeat everything. In the process, he makes what room he can for disagreement rather than pushing for a single, thoroughly delineated orthodoxy, as had been done in forming creeds and confessions, as well as in forming certain systems of theology. He does this, in part, by constantly advancing properly organized arguments, themselves meant to be contributions to ongoing multilogues among leaders of the church and especially among theologians whose vocation is to serve them. 23. Ed. note: The primary locus referred to is the third “main point” of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the church titled “Regarding the Consummation of the Church,” which focuses on “prophetic doctrine” (§§157–63). This main point of doctrine also lies within the larger second half of a second “main half “ regarding “The Constitution of the Church in Its Relation to the World” (§§148–63). It is directly followed by a final, third “section” of his doctrine of the church: “Regarding the Divine Attributes That Relate to Redemption” (§§164–69), namely, divine wisdom and love. Therein divine love is characterized as the attribute that sums up most authentically what all the other attributes point to: (1) God’s activity (2) in individual selves and (3) in community as it coexists with the world. All three complement each other as places where that activity of redemption lovingly and graciously occurs. Throughout the two parts of this work, God, human beings, and world (including collective life and, where applicable, community of life among human beings) are introduced, then presented in terms of the three interlocking kinds of “dogmatic proposition”: “descriptions of human life states,” “concepts of divine attributes,” and “assertions regarding constitutive aspects of the world” (cf. §30). Now, doctrines regarding the church make up by far the largest portion of this work. Here is how the concept of divine justice is referred to in propositions leading up to and then present early in Schleiermacher’s presentation of doctrines regarding the church, roughly in six steps: (1) §86.2: God’s gracious activity in relation to collective sin is directed to God’s attributes of holiness and justice. (2) §§87–89: God’s justice and blessing occurs in and through human beings’ community with Christ within the new collective life. (3) §92.3: Christ plays a redemptive (justifying and reconciling) role in revealing all of God’s attributes (cf. §§93.1–2, 101.4, and 104.2–3; see also §108.2 on the relation of God’s justice to repentance in the

process of conversion). (4) §118.1: God’s justice closely relates to a possible life after death. (5) §§121.1–3 and 123.1–3: God’s justice closely relates to the redemptive presence of Holy Spirit in and through the church. (6) §128.1: A relationship of faith in what Jesus, viewed as the Christ, has continued to bring in his justifying activity as the actual ground of any authority that resides in Christian Scriptures, this from the very beginning onward. Only words that have the same root (gerecht), not Gerechtigkeit (justice), appear in most of these passages, but the reference to God’s being just in God’s justifying activity is made clear in each case. 24. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note has these headings: “Classification [of punishments] according to purpose. 1. Neither (a) means of improvement, nor (b) means of recompense [or reward], rather: 2. Means of arousing fear [Territionsmittel]” (Thönes, 1873). See note 26 just below. 25. Natur des Individuums. Ed. note: Whether this term refers to any sensorially equipped living being or only to human beings, the observation is consistent with his analysis of how pleasure and some relative lack of pleasure operate in the human psyche. See §5. 26. Ed. note: See sermon on 2 Cor. 5:17–18, “That We Have Nothing to Teach concerning the Wrath of God,” in his series regarding the Augsburg Confession, Oct. 24, 1830, first published in his sixth collection (1831), also in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 723–38; ET DeVries (1987), 152–65; and Nicol (1997), 141–54. 27. Ed. note: This purpose of being induced to fear (einschreckenden) is apparently the meaning of the rare term Territionsmittel (see §84n24). Both terms leave open what degree of fear is incited or otherwise aroused in a child or adult whose God-consciousness is as yet not much developed or is not yet a vital force. Such fear might range from a mild responsiveness to a rather vague presentiment of punishment to being somewhat afraid to experiencing a mood of lingering anxiety, thus being rather frightened and needing protection or reassurance, and ultimately to a state of high anxiety, or trauma, carrying with it deep-set feelings of terror. Schleiermacher’s educational writings and all of his work on care of souls (Seelsorge), viewed as at the essential core of all the work that practical theology is to prepare leaders in the church, offer principles for not inducing undue fear and anxiety in anyone. See especially his 1818 Christian Household sermons (published 1820), in SW II.1 (1834); ET Seidel and Tice (1991). 28. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this heading: “Concerning the relation between [divine] justice and holiness” (Thönes, 1873). 29. Ed. note: Here “dominion” translates Botmäßigkeit, which in this context means being under the sway of and living according to carriers of sin (products and apostles of bad news, as it were, coming from “flesh”) versus according to carriers of faith. The word Botschaft means “message” or “news,” and the word Bote refers to a messenger, carrier, witness, apostle. In Rom. 7:5–25 and summary statement in Rom. 8:5, the apostle Paul plays similarly with images of life in the flesh, stimulated by the Mosaic law to have a conscience but not sufficiently strengthened by it truly to live by the divine Spirit. He also tells of inner conflicts of this kind in his own life. Schleiermacher’s language here seems to borrow chiefly from these passages in Romans, leaving out Paul’s metaphor of dying to law or sin. 30. Bewußtseins Gottes. Ed. note: This rare formulation “God’s consciousness” is noteworthy because it is contrary to what Schleiermacher thinks God has and because it is differentiated from Schleiermacher’s frequent reference to Gottesbewußtsein, “God-consciousness,” which is a feature of human immediate religious self-consciousness. 31. Ed. note: See how divine omnipresence and eternity operate in connection with each other and with divine omnipotence and omniscience in what Schleiermacher presupposes within Part One §§50–56, esp. 50.3–4 and 51.2. Further interconnections regarding the identity of all divine attributes, despite the necessity of distinguishing them from each other, as well as regarding the single locus from which their operations can be understood by Christians, are further explicated in that earlier section and subsequently wherever divine attributes are discussed in this work. See OG 56f. on placement of the divine attributes of holiness and justice in relation to the other attributes, especially those of wisdom and love. See CF §§75– 78 on ways in which divine causality can work in relation to sin and to the struggle between sinfulness and Godconsciousness. See CF index on divine attributes and on relations between what is spiritual (Geistigen) and what is sensory (Sinnlichen).

Addendum

Regarding the Mercy of God

§85. To ascribe mercy to God is more suited to the domain of homiletic and poetic language than to that of dogmatic language.1

1. Given their drawing on anthropopathic expressions,2 the homiletic and poetic domains both require less precision than does the domain of dogmatics. This is the case, for any expression such as “mercy” is especially such an anthropopathic expression since in things human we are accustomed to make use of the word only with respect to a state at the level of sensation3 that is especially stirred by a stranger’s4 suffering, which then passes over into one’s providing relief. To be sure, at that point providing relief5 is a moral activity, but here it is subject to a sensory level of shared feeling,6 namely a lack in pleasure, even if in a stranger’s hindered states of life. This is the case, in that when this compassion is not an underlying factor, we do not call the activity of providing relief “mercy.” Conceived in this way, mercy would be a counterpart to kindness,7 viewed as an offering of relief. The contrasting sensory level of shared feeling to kindness, namely, that of joy, would cooperate in advancement of life, even though it were of stranger’s lives. This is so, for offering relief is not designated even by the term “kindness” without such a foundation. Hence, we cannot transfer either attribute, either kindness or mercy in this sense, to God without thereby placing God in the position of being subject to the contrast between what is pleasant and unpleasant. Suppose that we should want to overlook this term and use these two expressions only regarding God’s offering relief. Even this move, however, would, nevertheless, inveigh against what is characteristic of teleological modes of faith.8 It would do so, for it would assume, within a strictly formed presentation of doctrine, that a certain divine causality would be intent on producing some purely sensory furtherance of life, viewed in and of itself alone. This difficulty in finding a place for the concept “mercy of God,” however, cannot be due to our seeking it precisely in this spot. The reason is that since mercy plainly presupposes the presence of evil and consciousness of evil, discussion of mercy cannot be done prior to discussion of evil. Yet, since mercy always assumes a certain distance between two parties, in that people do not speak of mercy within a more closely knit community such as within one between father and children, those who already enjoy their part in the process of redemption, and inasmuch as they do, also cannot be the object of God’s mercy. 2. Proceeding from a somewhat different point of view, the “merciful” God is mostly contrasted to the “jealous/zealous”9 God. Now, since wrath and jealousy/zeal are obviously related to abuse10 and sin, mercy would then be the suppression of jealousy or zeal by compassion. If, even in this case, we were then to disregard the implication of one’s having an affective state thereby and think only of a withholding of punishment, then, here as well, this would, nevertheless, mean setting aside the fact that punishment, which is directly related to the process of redemption, is to be lifted solely for the sake of a suffering or a deficiency that has already been sustained in some other quarter. Now, suppose that this consideration were also to be set aside. Then, all that would remain is God’s readiness to accomplish remission of sins altogether. Moreover, at that point too it would not be possible for us to let mercy count as a particular attribute of God. This is so, because this remission of sin has already been adjoined to the attribute of divine justice along with God’s regulation of punishment.

Should this connection be spurious and mercy should be a particular attribute even with this limited content, then at that juncture these two attributes would delimit each other. This would be the case, for where justice would end at its border, mercy would begin, and vice versa, and this would be a relation that cannot be admissible between divine attributes. Yet, the New Testament passage11 that is most decisive for use of this word largely agrees with this conclusion. This is so, for kindness toward those not grateful is indeed comprised of the suppression of one’s jealousy/zeal by compassion. However, the main subject in this maxim is also Jesus’ summons to those listening to him, and in this fashion it was natural within such an ascetic discourse12 that the analogy in God to which Christ directed them would also be designated by him with the same word: “Be merciful.”

1. Redeker note: Cf. OR (1821) II, supplemental note 6, also CG1 §106.P.S.2. Ed. note: In the same edition of OR (1821) II, supplemental notes 1, 2, and 5 are also important here for comparisons of different types of language usage in each of these two works and elsewhere. Peiter’s indispensable edition of Schleiermacher’s “Der christliche Glaube,” 1st ed. (1821–1822), is in KGA I/7.1–2 (1980). In the present work, Schleiermacher introduces these distinctly different types of language usage in §28, whereas in §30 he indicates three other distinctly different uses among his presentations of faith-doctrine itself, each based on one of three primary sources of orientation: God, selves, and world. In Brief Outline he distinguishes between similar kinds of religious discourse (§§280–89), speaks of “church poetry” (§282), deals with “preaching” and “homiletics” (§§284f. and 286n) and defines far more rigorous, scientific discourse, particularly “didactic” discourse (§§178, 213, 219, and 286n). In BO summaries and citations are to be found regarding his application of “dialectic,” itself an essential feature of philosophical work and required for both pursuit and communication of all sciences, and of any pertinent information from the sciences, to theologically scientific work (§§209–13, also pp. 143f. and 146–48); cf. his 1811 Dialectic (1996) as well. For concise accounts and citations on “dialectic” and “discourse,” see Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), 55f. 2. Ed. note: These expressions have to do with applications of human affective (hence, “pathic”) states to notions about who God is in relationship to human beings, supposing figuratively that God has such states exactly as human beings do. Mercy (Barmherzigkeit) is one of those for Schleiermacher. It is quite usable both in prayer and worship and in rhetorical and poetic expression, but not for didactic use in presentations of doctrine and ethics. For two other occasional meanings for which the word “mercy” can be used, he chooses other words instead: “compassion” (Mitleid) or, much more often, “shared feeling” (Mitgefühl), and “charity” (Wohltätigkeit) or “kindness” (die Güte) or “offering relief “ (Hülfleistung). “Love” (Liebe) he does use as closest to a sum-up of how God must be experienced by human beings, but he uses that term for characteristics embedded in how God relates to and has community with human beings, without ascription of any affective state to God. He is admitting that it is difficult to conceive of God as not having sensations, feelings, and emotive moods in the way we do, but he insists that (a) God, being infinite and eternal, is not limited or time-bound as we are, and (b) God does not have to be conscious of and “affected” by events and circumstances as we are, though (c) God does come across as “affecting” us and as inspiring affects in us, nevertheless. See §§164–67 and index. In effect, Schleiermacher presupposes having dealt with this problem area in dogmatics, so that Christians can be viewed as learning how to love precisely as they feel and see God loving them, in and through the church. All areas of “church government” and “church service,” the two parts of Christian ethics and practical theology, largely cover this domain. On loving leadership by laity and clergy, see esp. BO §§277–338, and notice how he indicates a particular kind of love even in philosophical work on p. 147. Special difficulties in long-held practices that he addresses include traditional “catechetics” (ibid., §§291–97), which should seek to combine any purely instructional, thus didactic, purposes with care of souls directed to beginners in their development of faith and life as Christians. Such difficulties are prominently dealt with in all of his famed pioneering educational work—shown in his numerous, broader educational writings, as well as here. 3. Ed. note: Empfindungszustande, in contrast to a “state of mind and heart” (Gemütszustande). In its use of Empfindung (sensation or perception largely registered and rooted in one’s senses), it is closer to Wahrnehmung (mere “sense perception”) than to Anschauung (perception as a near or quite conscious beholding) in Schleiermacher’s usage. 4. Ed. note: “Stranger” translates the concept fremd, in ordinary German usage also meaning someone alien, strange, unknown, or unfamiliar. Later in this subsection, Schleiermacher therefore indicates a criterion of significant distance between the two parties of such a relationship, and he indicates that an ideal community between a father and his children

would be exempt. Thus, this too becomes a condition of applying “mercy” (wrongly) to God, particularly when God and a community of redeemed, regenerate souls comprise a closely knit community encompassing both sides. See index on “community.” 5. Ed. note: Hülfleistung, as in being kind to strangers, helping them out. 6. Ed. note: Here sinnliche Mitgefühl is pointing to a shared sympathy of feeling, passing more directly from the level of, or chiefly characterized by, the senses, hence that of sensation vs. empathy and compassion. 7. Ed. note: “Kindness” (die Güte) can also be translated “goodness.” According to Schleiermacher’s analysis, each of these meanings carries a specific attitude toward what another is going through (something pleasurable or relatively not pleasurable to the beholder) and an underlying feeling toward another, here called “joy” and “compassion,” respectively. 8. Ed. note: In §11 Christianity is classified as “a monotheistic mode of faith belonging to the teleological bent of religion,” differing from any other such modes of faith by its referring everything “to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth.” In explanation, he sees that differentiation especially in contrast to Judaic faith. Both modes of faith are aimed especially at some high ideal (τέλοσ) within the domain of human life and human action, which is ethics in the broadest sense versus treatment of the purely physical domain. They are distinctly different, however, in what they aim at, hence in their “teleological bent.” Accordingly, for him being “monotheistic,” moreover, cannot mean that the two modes of faith view God in exactly the same way, though certain characteristics, such as those presented more abstractly and as “presuppositions” in Part One, might well be very much alike. 9. Ed. note: The term eifrig primarily means “zealous,” though it is equivalent to “jealous” in Scripture, meaning “very needy and passionate in one’s zeal,” directed to or against others. 10. Ed. note: Beleidigung, which refers to an assertive, aggressive, or violent act that causes suffering, hence an act of affronting, offending, abusing, assaulting, harming, doing wrong, doing violence to, etc. In contrast Mitgefühl means shared feeling, sympathy, or (as here) compassion. 11. Luke 6:35–36. Ed. note: These verses begin, “But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return,” and end, “for he [the Most High] is kind to the ungrateful and the selfish. Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful” (RSV). See a correlative account in On Religion (1821) II, supplemental note 6, where Schleiermacher indicates that certain more rigorously formed doctrines regarding certain divine attributes are “mythological,” and he claims: “For example, the concept of divine mercy, as it is usually treated, depends on separating the divine will that has instigated evil from the divine will that has ordained it. That is to say, if the two are regarded as one, then neither can ever limit the other. Rather, the divine will that determines the existence of evil is then believed to do so only to a certain degree, which then cancels out the concept of mercy completely.” On divine attributes, see complementary notes 1 and 3. On the relation between concepts of divine mercy and divine justice, from 1822, see also CG1 §106.P.S.2, and from this second edition see §86.2, 100.3, and 118.2. See a series of sermons on successive passages from Luke, from Sept. 30, 1832, to late in 1833, a year when a great many of his sermons used Gospel texts and he was giving lectures five hours weekly on Matthew, also lectures five hours weekly on hermeneutics and criticism of the New Testament. These sermons are soon to appear in KGA III/14 and III/15. One of the closest to Schleiermacher’s cited passage here is that on John 13:34, Feb. 10, 1833: “How Our Community as Brothers and Sisters Has Already Been Founded and Sustained among Us through the Love of the Redeemer,” in SW II.3 (1835), 470–92; ET DeVries (1987), 215–27. A companion sermon already preached on Luke 6:32–35, June 23, 1833, was “On the Rule of Our Redeemer concerning Love,” in SW II.3 (1835), 615–26, and (1843), 625–46. In 1832 he had come closer to defining God’s love in a sermon on Rom. 5:7–8, on Good Friday, April 20, 1832: “Christ’s Death as the Most Sublime Glorification of God’s Love,” in SW II.3 (1835), 242–52; ET Wilson (1890), 372–84. A decade earlier, on Trinity Sunday, June 16, 1822, on 1 John 4:16–18, the theme was “The Perfection of Love,” in SW II.4 (1835), 482–94, and (1844), 535–46. Among the six sermons preached in 1834, the last four were on his Mark series, the last one a farewell sermon on Jesus’ farewell on Feb. 2. The first of these was on Mark 12:28–34, Jan. 12, 1834: “What Kind of Relationship the Redeemer Presupposed between Love of God with One’s Whole Soul and Love for One’s Neighbor as One’s Self,” in SW II.3 (1835), 765–78, and (1843), 790–84. That from 1830 on Luke 6:37, which began “Judge not … , ” did not directly deal with love or mercy. The one verse in that Luke 6 succession that he might never have preached on was the one he cited here: Luke 6:36, on our mercy patterned after God the Father’s mercy. It is quite significant, however, that, suffering greatly from pneumonia and not knowing whether he could survive, he spoke on one’s love of God and neighbor on Jan. 12, the First Sunday in Epiphany, as he grew weaker in the main service of the damp, cold Dreifaltigkeitskirche. The gift of God’s love was already held fast in mind and heart, proclaimed and presupposed, and it was so right up to his death on Feb. 14, 1834. Mercy, however, held no place at all. 12. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, “ascetic discourse” is about devotional activities that are not divorced from the shared life of the church. See §87.2, where he casts doubt on ascetic practices that are purely private. His take on them is that they

would include blessedness if not exclusively private yet refer at least to one’s calling within the collective life of sin and grace. See also Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), 48–49. For him, “merciful” could be appropriately used in Luke 6:36 because it appeared in clearly rhetorical discourse, was not strictly didactic or dialectical in nature, and met the conditions noted for these kinds of discourse.

The Second Aspect of the Contrast

Explication regarding the Consciousness of Grace Introduction [to the Second Aspect of the Contrast]

§86. The more distinctly we are conscious that no lack of blessedness that is attached to our natural condition can be removed, either by the acknowledgment that sin is inevitable or by the presupposition that it is of itself on the wane, the more highly the value of redemption rises.1 1. Clear attestations to the consciousness of this inadequacy are found in almost all other modes of faith at every stage, insofar as they all either prescribe sacrifices and purifications or prescribe castigations and penitential practices or prescribe both. Obviously, all of these activities are arrangements for disposing, from time to time, of the lack of blessedness that arises out of sin, as these arrangements are variously shaped in accordance with the standards of each mode of faith. Moreover, at any stage in which these activities actually occur, those who are more nearly persons of faith are distinguished from those who are less so. That is to say, with the exception of sacrifices that have no relation to human evil2 at all, the following factor underlies every instance of sacrifice and purification, if one does not simply want to refer them to the most grossly entangled of superstitions: namely, that a certain acknowledgment of sin, even though it may take the form only of a symbolic act, would have to be attached to the two admissions indicated in our proposition, so as to overcome the lack of blessedness3 that arises out of sin. This situation, however, does not obtain in a teleological mode of faith that posits the very inefficacy of a person’s God-consciousness to be an act of that person and thus finds therein only a contradiction. No effect can proceed from a contradiction. As a result, only an attestation to the condition of one’s lacking blessedness itself remains.4 Thus, in every instance people may well have the aim of holding dominion over the flesh through observances that have the task of making up for the incompleteness of this dominion over the flesh within the ordinary course of life. This effect, which actually does not arise automatically over the course of one’s life, would be superfluous if a sense of the inevitability of sin afforded sufficient reassurance. Furthermore, the wildest superstition shows up wherever the conduct of these exercises does not correspond to the given context. Yet, in every element of life held in common, various tasks do develop that obligate us as

duties. Thus, in that these arbitrary, supplemental observances require an investment of time, they have to elicit some gap in the fulfillment of our duties, and, in turn, a new lack of blessedness arises through the very observances that are supposed to remove the lack of blessedness. However, even quite apart from the question as to whether both sorts of performances are customarily intended more to obviate punishment than to remove guilt, their futility as means of reassurance5 is unmistakable. Thus, every unsatisfied longing that still remains in that process is the expression of an inclination toward Christianity. It expresses this inclination in that the likelihood is expressed therein that a redeemer would be accepted in whom the substance of the matter would be offered instead of its mere shadow. 2. Now, if we consider how the religious consciousness of a Christian is definitely composed based on an unfolding of the consciousness of sin, yet comes to be known of only through a consciousness of grace that is to be presupposed, we do also find the same two elements mentioned in our proposition to be present within this religious consciousness. The first element is the recognition that for us sin is inevitable, at least inasmuch as being without sin in any given instant does not depend on us. Likewise, however, the second element lies in the presupposition that sin is in the process of being on the wane, admittedly only inasmuch as this presupposition essentially coheres with the consciousness that the strength of Godconsciousness is on the rise. Yet, despite this second combination of factors, the two elements do not belong to the consciousness of grace, nor do they belong to the consciousness by which the lack of blessedness is overcome. Rather, they belong to the consciousness of sin, or to the lack of blessedness itself. That is to say, to be conscious of sin’s disappearing, viewed as a process yet to occur, simply means actually to have it present still. Moreover, the consciousness of sin’s inevitability is even more fully formed then than is the consciousness of its dominion over us. Thus, both of these two elements express the need for redemption, and consequently they cannot carry within themselves any actual overcoming of the lack of blessedness. Otherwise, the claim that the consciousness of sin could be overcome by itself would have to be grounded and be demonstrable in some special way. Suppose, on the other hand, that we imagine the lack of blessedness to be overcome from some source other than redemption, and suppose that we add the claim that even consciousness of the inevitability of sin’s remaining as it gradually disappears does not impede that overcoming of it. Then the value of the overcoming of sin would rise precisely in this gradual way. However, this very process could be properly recognized only if we were to observe the two elements in the natural condition of human beings as one belonging to the collective life of sin. Yet, in this natural condition the opinion that because sin is inevitable it neither bears fault6 nor deserves punishment cannot be explicated based on Godconsciousness. Instead, consciousness of God would first have to be destroyed—that is to say, for this opinion to hold the consciousness that God is holy and just7 would first have to be eradicated, which would introduce a new kind of fault. It is no more the case that faultlessness and impurity could be implied from the future state of human beings, who are already simply existing in their present state, than that the disappearance of sin would be

posited in its continuing existence. The reason is that if the temporal content of selfconsciousness is to be transcended, one would have the same right, consequently also the same necessity, to say that in the present state of human beings their lack of blessedness would thus also be coposited in their future state. Hence, we cannot assert otherwise than that all similar propositions—such as the one that God would forgive sin on account of its inevitability but only if it were on the wane—do indeed intend persuasively to claim an overcoming of the lack of blessedness, but they cannot provide a foundation for that claim. Such propositions always amount to a selfforgiveness of sins on people’s own authority. Moreover, at best they would refer to divine mercy8 but without redemption’s having been posited in advance, thus also without divine mercy’s being identified with divine justice. This is the case, for even if we were to grant that some increase in the strength of God-consciousness does occur in the natural state of human beings, even if we were to grant this increase only to the extent that it would also cooperate with a striving after civil justice,9 then this too would have to imply that the more sin would decrease, the sharper the feeling for right and wrong would become. Consequently, even to a limited extent no increasing satisfaction would arise that could also guarantee an overcoming of the lack of blessedness. In that connection, it may also be noted that persons who think that the lack of blessedness is to be overcome along this separate path, thus even without redemption, are least of all agreed, first, as to whether human life would develop on the whole toward a greater degree of perfection, so that wherever the raw, unrefined state were overcome it would also not reappear, or, second, as to whether the human race would partly be destined, by whatever upheavals there may be, repeatedly to be thrown back to beginning this same course all over again. 3. Suppose that similar accounts regarding forgiveness of sin were nevertheless asserted to be authentically Christian. Then what is distinctively Christian would already have to have been set aside for a long while and over a wide compass before notions with such little Christian content could have crept in. Alternatively, it would have to have been assumed that the efficacious action of redemption would begin only after the lack of blessedness were already overcome, which process could no more be carried out than that the reassurance mentioned earlier could presuppose a prior waning of sin and consequently an increase in activity pleasing to God. As a result, it would not be incumbent on the Redeemer even to point out these things or to evoke them. Meanwhile, it may also be imagined, on the other hand, that even where there is a truly Christian piety, a non-Christian semblance of truth can still be disseminated on this point. That is, suppose that it is actually preferable to set forth yet another explanation, advanced so as to combat putatively false notions regarding how the lack of blessedness is to be overcome by redemption, an explanation that retains the reservation that the efficacious action of Godconsciousness, from which action the waning of sin would be taken to arise, is conditioned by the Redeemer. In that case, the closest thing to that false self-reassurance of which we spoke just above would be the view that accordingly places the lowest conceivable value on

redemption itself. That is, this view would assert that an increasing efficacious action of Godconsciousness is possible simply based on the natural condition of humanity and without any special divine assistance. It would also claim that, despite the inevitability of sin, the sinner would still have no right to bear any reassurance concerning what sin remains behind without some special divine assurance10 regarding it. Accordingly, the Redeemer would essentially be depicted as only the herald11 of this divine promise. No argument is required to show how little this view can be justified as having any historical currency in the Christian church. Rather, it suffices to point out how little motivated the challenge to have faith in such a mere harbinger12 could be, and how little it could be conceived why such a guarantee13 should have taken place only after such a “fullness of time”14 and in such a fashion. From this lowest value upward, the content of redemption would surely rise all the higher the greater the part played by the Redeemer is thought to be, both in the cessation of the lack of blessedness as well as in the emergence of some approximation to the condition of blessedness.

1. Ed. note: This proposition is comprised of a brief backward look at the doctrine of sin (§§65–85). It is designed to remind readers that within the confines of that doctrine alone there is no way to look ahead to redemption beyond the present need of it, except as consciousness regarding God’s efficacious action of grace in Christ is already “presupposed” (cf. §§63– 65). That is, in no way can the condition of sinfulness be alleviated or overcome by any factor already defined by that condition. Any anticipation of redemption, in fact, is a “mere shadow” of the redemption accomplished by Christ. The doctrine of sin itself explores (1) how, within the “condition” of all humanity (§§62–65), sin is “original” by virtue of human beings’ ability to exercise free will, and is thus inevitably transmitted through interpersonal interactions and social means throughout one’s conscious life among other human beings (§§70–72). Hence, sin does not issue automatically in and through a single moment, traditionally called “the fall” from a paradisical condition of pure innocence, but it exists continually and inescapably throughout human history. As a result, it is called “original” only in this sense. Moreover, sin is also “actual” (§§73–74) in each individual by virtue of one’s own exercise of free will in one’s participation in “the collective life of sin.” The doctrine of sin also considers (2) how the wider world is constituted, with its own natural evil (Übel) in relation to human evil (Böse) and (3) how Christian religious consciousness bears a sense, albeit imperfectly, of God’s justice and holiness by virtue of its consciousness of sin, a sense to be filled out only as one is able to grasp the love of God as expressed in God’s all-wise ordering of creation and redemption (§§164–69). These three explanations together comprise the doctrine of sin, not any one part of it alone. In this view, there has never been any perfect consciousness of God except in the one absolute “miracle” of Christ. All approximations to that sort of relationship with God occur thus far only on a scale of more or less of two components. These components are found in an admixture of (1) an entrapment within and domination of sense-oriented consciousness with (2) higher spiritual consciousness in human beings’ relationship with God. Our senses are not in themselves humanly evil, hence (as will be seen) Christ’s existence is possible and one’s development in faith as a Christian is made possible as a supernatural intervention of grace wholly within the conditions of nature, including human nature as it is created and preserved by God (Part One, §§32–61). To understand why Christ was the only absolute “miracle” for Schleiermacher—and remains so through the ongoing influence of Christ’s person and work by the Holy Spirit in the witness of Scripture and in the church—it is necessary to trace his exposition regarding miracle, at least in those passages where it is treated directly: esp. §§47.1, 93.3, and 103.1 and 4, but also §§14.3, 76.2, 99.2, 108.5, 117.2, 123.2, 124.3, and 130.4. For a summary, see Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), p. 64. 2. Böse. Ed. note: That is, evil caused by human beings, usually taken to be of a moral nature, vs. Übel, evil in general, including nonhuman evil in the rest of nature. For Schleiermacher, however, Böse implies the entire range of human action, not only moral action and culpability. 3. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, just as Unlust means “the lack of pleasure,” not “pain” (Schmerz), so too Unseligkeit means “the lack of blessedness,” not “misery” (Elend). Accordingly, in his view one does not have to feel miserable to be lacking in blessedness or before one can be converted (cf. §108). Now, the word Seligkeit can also mean

“salvation,” and the phrase selig machen can mean either “to make one blessed” or “to save.” Schleiermacher tends not to use the second meaning, which in some traditional doctrine bore the strict meaning of being saved from eternal damnation. In his view, it is not possible, in either case, to be a little bit saved or saved by degrees. See §§109–12. 4. No one will doubt that this is also the sense of Heb. 10:1–3. Ed. note: In that passage the “law” is called “but a shadow of good things to come,” and the sacrifices it prescribes do not “make perfect” those who “draw near” and are “cleansed” but simply, and repeatedly, leave them with “a reminder” of their sin. Thus, here, insofar as teleological modes of faith such as Judaism rely on such arrangements, in contrast to the teleological mode of faith of Christianity that Schleiermacher wishes to represent, they are left with a mere “contradiction,” which to that extent cannot produce the desired “effect” of redemption. See §§11–12. Thus far, there is no published sermon of his on Heb. 10:1–3. However, there is one on the extension of the same theme in Heb. 10:8–12, “The Death of the Redeemer, the End of All Sacrifice,” Good Friday, April 16, 1824, first published in 1826, then in SW II.2 (1834), 161–75; ET Wilson (1890), 250–65. 5. Beruhigungsmittel. Ed. note: In slightly different usage, this is a sedative or palliative, which serves either to calm one down or to alleviate a condition. 6. Schuld. Ed. note: In German, this word does triple duty for “fault,” the state of guilt that follows from one’s bearing fault, and the feeling of guilt. Ordinarily in Schleiermacher’s discourse it refers to one’s being at fault. 7. Ed. note: Cf. §§83–84. 8. See §85.2. 9. Cf. §70.2–3. 10. Versicherung. 11. Herold. Ed. note: In contrast, Schleiermacher consistently emphasizes Jesus’ “selfproclamation” (Selbstverkündigung) as the Redeemer by whom God establishes God’s reign for the sake of all humanity. As such, he was the proclaimer of that reign as “at hand,” not a mere herald. 12. Verkündiger. Ed. note: This word could conceivably mean “proclaimer” (Verkünder in the sense of one who speaks as a “forerunner,” Vorlaüfer); but Schleiermacher clearly does not use it here in that way. Elsewhere, he tends to use only the noun Verkündigung (“proclamation”)—or the verb verkündigen (to proclaim)—exclusively in the sense of a “declaration,” as in the Greek noun κήρυγμα, for which there is no other counterpart in German. The closest verb would be “to declare” (erklären). 13. Zusicherung. 14. Ed. note: See Eph. 1:10.

§87. We are conscious of all approximations to the condition of blessedness that are present in the Christian life as being grounded in a new, divinely wrought collective life. This new collective life works against the collective life of sin and the lack of blessedness that has developed within it. 1. To be sure, our proposition does not yet appear as a complete expression of distinctively Christian piety, because it is not yet coposited therein that every approximation to the condition of blessedness essentially includes a relation to Christ. Nevertheless, it undeniably declares the content of the consciousness of divine grace to be that such consciousness is contrasted to the consciousness of sin. This is the case, for approximation to the condition of blessedness comprises the real opposite to the lack of blessedness, and this approximation is received as divine grace in the same sense and measure that the collective life in which elements of that kind emerge for us is posited as something divinely wrought. Hence, all further explication, even of what is distinctively Christian, can easily be attached to our proposition. To be sure, the relationship between approximation to blessedness and removal of the lack of blessedness can be set forth in a twofold fashion. On the one hand, this relationship can be set forth in such a way that not even the slightest approximation to blessedness can occur as long as the slightest lack of blessedness is still present, which amounts to saying as

long as sin, consequently evil too, is still present in the domain of human life, or the other way around. Moreover, although fortunately this view is never consistently carried out, it is, to be sure, that of people who choose to see the earth only as a vale of tears, even as it is under the influence of redemption. This view, according to which, when strictly taken, all effects of redemption can develop only after this life is over, is not to be anticipated here. As the express language of our proposition already indicates regarding the second option, since unfolding blessedness1 is already ascribed to the new collective life, inasmuch as it simply counters the collective life of sin, blessedness is thus still present within the circle of the new collective life’s efficacious action. In contrast, the first option does not even express the truth of Christian consciousness attested from the very beginning.2 In contrast to that first notion, whatever the strength of God-consciousness may be, blessedness is also present in it in the same measure, and already this unfolding blessedness overcomes the lack of blessedness, which can indeed reemerge with sin but only to be overcome in turn.3 As a result, one can say two things, viewed as completely identical: overcoming of the lack of blessedness, insofar as we consider people in their relationship to the collective life of sin, and unfolding blessedness, insofar as it belongs to the new collective life, are the same condition. 2. Suppose that we assign these approximations their place within the Christian life only in quite general terms. Then the first thing we should do is guard against all one-sided notions that view such approximations to blessedness as capable of being present only under a certain form of activities or conditions and, as it were, as being restricted to elements of devotional meditation or of ascetic practices. Instead, elements of devotion contain some blessedness in their contents only when they issue in thought or deed, and ascetic practices contain some blessedness in their contents only insofar as they are not actually ascetic, at least not exclusively so, but somehow or other interconnect with activity that people are called to do. In fact, the elements of blessedness exist just as much in persons who are actually thinking and in persons who are actually engaged in conduct. To be sure, however, these elements do exist in persons who are engaged in conduct, but only insofar as that conduct does not proceed from motives rooted in world-consciousness or from motives with which civil justice would be satisfied. Likewise, these elements do, to be sure, exist in persons who are thinking, but only insofar as that thought does not simply explicate worldconsciousness. In both instances, the elements of blessedness exist only insofar as these persons are grounded in vital, reawakened God-consciousness, for without that consciousness the religious person4 cannot recognize unfolding blessedness. 3. Now, suppose that someone wanted to say that, viewed in itself, our proposition is actually endemic to all forms of faith, and that this is so to the extent that those forms of faith postulate the existence of only one community of faith. That would be correct, but only insofar as they are all thereby obligated to demonstrate that their own collective life is divinely wrought. In no way, however, is a distinction to be assumed thereby between the arising of unfolding blessedness in the Christian community at any given time and that which directly proceeded from Christ himself. That is to say, in the first place, we will come to the view that our collective life, equally seen to be something divinely wrought and seen to be

something divinely derived from Christ, is wholly one and the same thing. Likewise, in the second place, at that early time too it was one and the same thing to have faith that Jesus is the Christ and to have faith that the reign of God has come—that is, the new collective life that is to be wrought by God has come. Consequently, in those early days too all unfolding blessedness had its ground in this collective life. Likewise, one cannot in the least view it to be an approximation to the Roman Catholic way of thinking to ascribe this reversal of a personal condition, as it were, to the collective life in any direct fashion. Still, our opposition to this viewpoint cannot yet be brought to light at this point. Rather, this can be done only once we have more closely described what happens in the individual, on the one hand, and how the community is constituted, on the other hand.5 In general terms, then, the proposition is one shared among the most varied conceptions of Christianity, except that two views are thereby excluded. The first view supposes that a person could take part in redemption and become blessed through Christ outside the collective life founded by him, so that a Christian could do without this collective life and, as it were, be alone with Christ. To be sure, we have to designate this separatism as fanatic. It is fanatic because it fails to consider that what God originally wrought could be taken up only as a historical phenomenon and would also have to continue to have an effect only as a historical phenomenon. Moreover, logically, such separatism, which can arise only as something isolated and in this way must also repeatedly disappear, destroys the very nature of Christianity. It does so, in that it postulates Christ’s having an effect without mediation in time and space, and, at the same time, it isolates itself in such a way that no continuing effect of what has been accomplished in him can ever occur. The second view that is excluded lies in the assumption that superior individuals could attain an approximation to blessedness that overcomes the lack of blessedness within the collective life of sin itself and without any new intervention. If this view is strictly taken, two options must follow: either a different purpose has to be imputed to Christ’s appearing, apart from the condition of humans with respect to blessedness, in which case that purpose would not be religious in nature,6 at the very least, or it would have no distinctive meaning whatsoever, and then it would be incorrect to frame anything after Christ. Viewed from our standpoint, the testimony of Christian consciousness concerning this assumption can only be that it is based on an inadequate consciousness of sin. That is to say, when sin is posited as collective act and collective fault, two things follow. First, all individual activity remains a joint producing and reviving of sin, even if it nonetheless includes within itself a strong counteraction against individual sinfulness. Second, at the same time, every gathering of relatively superior individuals to counter sinfulness remains only an organized entity within that collective life of sin itself. However, if this assumption is not to be understood in a strict manner, it can be Christian to the extent that it regards Christ as a new intervention and the collective life as one set apart from the collective life of sin.

1. Ed. note: The words werdende Seligkeit (“unfolding blessedness”) literally express blessedness that is gradually coming into being, in process of becoming so, hence the accompanying language suggesting an unsteady but unfolding rise

of blessedness over time. 2. John 1:16; 1 John 3:14, 21; Phil. 4:4. Ed. note: See sermons on (1) John 1:14–18, May 11, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 29– 42; (2) John 1:12–17, Dec. 5, 1830, separately published in 1831, then in SW II.4 (1835), 195–208; (3) 1 John 3:14, Nov. 25, 1821, first published in 1823, then in SW II.4 (1835), 331–41; (4) Phil. 4:4, Dec. 22, 1822, SW II.10 (1856), 418–36. 3. Cf. §74.1. 4. Ed. note: der Fromme. 5. Ed. note: These descriptions are presented, successively, in §§91–112 and 113–63. The Introduction also addresses this set of issues between the Evangelical and Roman churches, esp. in §§23–24, also §§19.2, 27.1, and 28.2. In the first two of three sections in Part Two, see discussions of Roman Catholic positions especially (1) regarding Christ’s three offices in §§102.3, 103.4, 104.4–6, and (implicitly) 105, also in §§108.1, 109.1, and 111.2; (2) §§127.1, 128.1, 140.2–4, 141.2, and 143–45. There is no explicit discussion of Roman Catholic positions in the third section’s account of divine love and wisdom or in the Conclusion. See also Schleiermacher’s 1821 supplemental notes to On Religion: in discourse IV, notes 6, 14, 16, and 20, and in the Epilogue, notes 3–4. General indications of how the contrast shows up in all parts of theology are given in Brief Outline (1830) §§212, 215, 217–19, 228, and 338. 6. Ed. note: “Religious in nature” translates religiöse. In Schleiermacher’s view, distinct religions always have some historical founding.

§88. In this collective life, a life extending back to the efficacious action1 of Jesus, redemption is wrought by him by virtue of the communication of his sinless perfection. 1. At the present time, it cannot be claimed that this way of conceiving of redemption is the only one that has currency in the Evangelical church. Moreover, in no way do we wish to refuse to recognize also as Evangelical Christians those who do not assume such a communication. We do give them such recognition if they refer all approximation to blessedness to Christ alone and, on this account, wish to find themselves in a community that makes it a rule not to look for anything outside Christ’s efficacious action but also makes it a rule not to neglect anything regarding it. However, we do hold to this conception, viewing it as the one that has been taken over originally from the early church into our own and, at the same time, as the one that both excludes most distinctly all insidious self-reassurance and is singularly fitting even for the stricter way of conceiving the collective life in sinfulness, a point clearly illumined by the presentation made just above.2 The two conceptions3 cohere with each other as closely as can be. The less we ascribe distinctive and absolute perfection to the founder of the new collective life, while also expecting nothing new that would surpass him, the more easily conquerable that collective life of sin, against which no greater equipping is required than his, must seem to us to be. Also, the more readily this new collective life is identified with what develops from within the natural human condition, the less cause there is to presuppose something distinctively different in the one who begins its improvement. To explicate either one of these two views does not at all entail refuting the other. All that is required is that the prevailing relationship between the two also be presented and, in turn, be brought to light at the most important points. The task of presenting faith-doctrine does not go beyond doing that, for one view’s gaining greater currency must simply be an outcome of its presentation. Nor can there be any more reason to speak of actual proofs here. To be sure, this is not because Evangelical faithdoctrine as an undertaking within the Evangelical church already presupposes Evangelical faith but because not even a particular modification of that faith is provable. Rather, each

modification is simply a statement concerning the stronger or weaker impression that one fact makes in relation to another fact. Generally, the case of such theological diversity presents to us our own historical sphere, and generally it does so in such a way that each person can have a quite firm conviction that one’s own impression is the right one, yet in a way that no one is able to prove it to be so. 2. Suppose, however, that any thought of providing proof is given up. This decision would then also apply to scriptural proof, not simply because most expressions there have multiple meanings but also because, in that respect, the only claim that would be demonstrable is that precisely this multiplicity lies in the original shape that Christian faith took. In this case, what is indispensable here remains difficult enough, namely, to explicate the way in which faith has originated, together with its content. That is, it is difficult enough to show—without having to resort to miracles or prophecies, viewed as something entirely alien—how, both originally and even today, the conviction could arise that Jesus would have a sinless perfection and that a communication of it would exist in the community founded by him. That is to say, it is self-evident that at that juncture the overcoming of the lack of blessedness and the unfolding of blessedness would consist in a homogeneous and mutually referring surety concerning the two points. First, then, our proposition is not at all intended to be understood as if, at a time when the consciousness of sin, viewed as both personal and collective consciousness, would have been powerfully aroused in many people, only extraordinary moral excellence, suitably made manifest in someone’s public life, would have been needed for the purpose of attributing to such an individual entity4 the sinless perfection longed for as the only rescue possible—as if such an individual entity would permit of being expressed in such a way that faith would have recognized Jesus to be the Redeemer. The reason is as follows. In this sort of faith arbitrariness would increase through every instance of its transmission in which the original impression of the person5 would no longer be of help. Consequently, the surety concerning it would also have lessened and gradually would have had increasingly to give room to the thought that another person could come, one on whom that notion could have been bestowed with greater justification. The result would be that on this path only a decreasing faith in Jesus, consequently an increasing lack of faith, could emerge. Furthermore, this lack of faith could be obviated only if the immediate impression of the community were such that in it, and then for its sake, sinless perfection were posited in its founder as well. Indeed, it also would not suffice that a pure and perfect strength of God-consciousness actually existed in Jesus but that faith in it would simply be the work of that longing which hastens to its contentment, for in that case too, Jesus would have become Redeemer only through those who have faith.6 Instead, our proposition refers back to the presupposition that even the recognition of Jesus’ perfection was the very work of his perfection itself. As a result, even the full consciousness of sin, and the longing for rescue that accompanies it, could be developed in some individuals first by means of that recognition,7 just as it could well have been present in others earlier. In this manner alone, even the founding of the new collective life is also not, as

it were, a particular act, without which that extraordinary distinctiveness Jesus had could have existed in him nonetheless. Rather, since this distinctiveness can appear only as a deed,8 so too that deed is also its essential work. Now, it must be possible to have the same experience9 today too if the faith of later generations, consequently our own faith as well, is to be the same as the original faith and not, as it were, another faith—but in the latter case not only would the unity of the Christian church be endangered but also any appeal to the original witnesses of faith as well. Moreover, the recognition of sinless perfection in Jesus Christ, which itself decisively leads to the new collective life, must likewise be his work. For us now, however, instead of his personal efficacious action there is only the efficacious action of his community, insofar as the picture of him still present in the Scriptures has likewise originated and endures only through this community. Thus, our proposition refers back to the presupposition that this working10 of the community to bring forth the same faith is also simply the working of that personal perfection of Jesus himself.11 3. The second part of our proposition is no less difficult to explicate: namely, that in the collective life founded by Christ there exists a communication of his sinless perfection, in that we do indeed attribute this communication to no individual within the community other than Christ. In fact, since Christ’s companions in his lifetime are no longer alive, we also do not wish to vest any assembly of individuals, however well chosen so as to complement one another, not even with the right simply to set forth doctrines, thus rules of faith or of life, with any kind of claim to unfailing reliability or persistent validity. Rather, given the view also underlying our historical conception, namely, the view that the influence of outstanding individuals on the mass is to be considered on the wane, also underlies our historical conception, the question arises as to where and in what fashion this communication of sinless perfection is to be thought of. That is to say, if one observes the mass as a whole, this mass displays a rich and, particularly at certain times, an intensified and powerfully arising to share in general sinfulness, so much so that one has to doubt whether sinfulness is less in evidence here than somewhere else. One has to wonder, moreover, whether it would therefore not have been better for the formation of things human if Christianity had not become so widespread a historical factor. Against these failings, advanced by opponents with much pretense, faith has to stand up without assistance, and consequently faith has to assume that all this is simply due to the nonexistence of the new collective life, that is, the existence of sinful collective life in which the new one does indeed exist but only obscurely. This is why our proposition refers back to the presupposition that in the Christian community, a community that is externally constituted, communication of the absolutely strong12 God-consciousness in Christ nevertheless exists as something internal, though capable of being experienced,13 to be sure, inasmuch as faith rests only on an impression people have received. This experience consists of two features, of which one belongs to personal consciousness and the other belongs to consciousness held in common. Personal consciousness consists in the fact that the individual even now, based on the image14 of Christ that endures as a collective deed and as a collective possession in the

congregation, contains the impression of the sinless perfection of Jesus. At the same time, for that individual this impression comes to be a full consciousness of sin and of the overcoming of the lack of blessedness, and this process is in itself already a communication of this perfection. Consciousness held in common consists in the following fact: namely, in all those persons in whom, even though they may still experience entanglements15 similar to the ones that occur in a sinful collective life, there is nevertheless posited a tendency that proceeds from the sinless perfection of Jesus. In its every occurrence this tendency does indeed also repeatedly devolve, more or less, upon that nonexistence of sin whenever the concepts of what is true and of what is good are being depicted. However, this tendency, viewed both as something happening deep inside and as an external impetus, is appropriate to its origin. Moreover, it is increasingly being reinvigorated precisely on that account and despite all reactions that may also arise in a given occurrence. Furthermore, this completely pure impetus of historical life, when viewed in its entirely internal aspect, is a true and efficacious communication of Christ’s perfection, just as the first feature, personal consciousness, is. 4. Now, an unfettered strength of God-consciousness in Jesus cannot be conceived on the basis of the collective life of sin, because sin is naturally propagated in that collective life. Rather, Jesus can have become as strong in his God-consciousness as he himself made evident, only apart from the collective life of sin. Moreover, since this collective life of sin embraces the whole human race, people have come simply to have faith in him as in one who became supernatural, though only in the sense already taken into account earlier.16 Likewise, the new collective life in relation to the Redeemer is itself also no miracle, to be sure, but is the supernatural becoming moral nature,17 for every outstanding force does indeed draw mass to itself and holds it fast. However, in relation to the collective life of sinfulness, which has previously encompassed everything and dominated all the formations of human life, the new collective life has also become something supernatural. That process is true also of every individual’s passage from the old collective life into the new. That is to say, in relation to the new collective life itself such a passage is not supernatural, for it produces the effects it does in accordance with each individual’s nature, but it is something that has come into being supernaturally in relation to the earlier life of individuals themselves. If we now put all these considerations together, then, on the one hand, we posit throughout an initiating divine activity as being something supernatural, but, at the same time, we posit a vital human receptivity by virtue of which that supernatural activity can then become something historically natural. Now, if this is the link that conjoins the collective life that existed before the appearance of the Redeemer and the collective life that exists in community with the Redeemer, with the purpose of bringing to recognition the sameness of human nature in both, then, for this collective sphere, the appearance of the Redeemer in the midst of this course of nature is also no longer a supernatural thing but is only the emergence of a new stage of development conditioned by what has gone before. To be sure, the interconnection of this new stage with what has gone before lies only in the unity of divine thought.18

1. Wirksamkeit. Ed. note: Throughout the work, this oft-used term is ordinarily translated “efficacious action.” In nontheological contexts, “efficacy” or “effectiveness” might well seem more appropriate. 2. Ed. note: §87. 3. Ed. note: The two conceptions are these: (a) in §87, what develops from within the natural human condition in the new life of Christians as “approximations to … the condition of blessedness,” approximations that are “grounded in a new, divinely wrought collective life,” and (b) in §88, “communication of Jesus’ sinless perfection.” 4. Individuum. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term is used for someone or some entity that is distinctively different, not just one particular possessing the same qualities as other particulars do. 5. Person. 6. Against Christ’s pronouncement in John 15:16. Ed. note: Sermon on that verse, Feb. 13, 1825, SW II.4 (1835), 586– 601. This verse states “You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide; so that whatever you ask the Father in my name, he may give it to you.” 7. Cf. §14.2. 8. Tat. Ed. note: Just above, “act” translates Akt. See index regarding the origin and nature of that continuing deed and its relation to Jesus’ distinctiveness as the Redeemer. 9. Erfahrung. Ed. note: In both languages, “experience” is something one undergoes or goes through oneself. It cannot be at second hand, as it were. That is, it cannot exist for oneself, as sheer acquaintance with or knowledge of something could be, apart from one’s own firsthand interactions. 10. Wirkung. Ed. note: Or “effect.” Just above, “work” translates Werk. Cf. §88n1 above. 11. Cf. §14.1. 12. Ed. note: The modifiers absolut kräftigen refer to the eventual development of Jesus’ God-consciousness to the uttermost strength possible in a human being for redemptive purposes, an idea already introduced in §87.3, in the conditions set forth in §87 and more directly in §88.1 just above. 13. Ed. note: Here the term erfahrbares (“capable of being experienced”) is further defined as an impression that a person receives internally. An “impression” can run all the way up the scale of mental functioning from mere basic sense impressions to the feelings and perceptions that Schleiermacher identifies with the highest stage of religious selfconsciousness. 14. Bilde. Ed. note: Above Bild was translated “picture.” The meaning is intended to be the same. 15. Verwirrungen. Ed. note: These “entanglements,” Schleiermacher explains here (as he often does elsewhere), may nonetheless be less distorted by sensory factors than they ordinarily are, precisely because the “depiction” (Aufstellung) of Jesus’ sinless perfection is held in common by individuals who share in the new collective life. Thereby, the new collective life rises toward the kind of life that Jesus brings about and models. 16. See §13.1. Ed. note: See also §§89.4, 100.3, 103.4, 113.2, 117.2, and 120.1–2. 17. Ed. note: sittliche Naturwerden. Understandably in the given context, this appears to be the only place in the book where “becoming natural” is modified by “moral” (sittlich). While Schleiermacher does divide the sciences into Ethik (ethics, or human sciences) and Physik (physical sciences), for him the human psyche is unexceptionably and interdependently both spirit, or mind, and body. Hence, in itself sittlich refers to both, though it also focuses on the so-called moral domain in the broadest sense, or on the domain where human custom (Sitte) is formed. This domain comprises all modes of Handlung (action, conduct, observance) and therefore includes all religious action. 18. Ed. note: On this “unity of divine thought,” expressed most often in the concepts of “the one eternal divine decree” and “the divine government of the world,” see esp. §§89.1–2, 90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 119.2, 120.3–4, 147.2, and 164.1–3. It is, of course, summed up in the ultimate account of the divine attributes, regarding God’s love and wisdom (§§164–69). Also implicated here is Schleiermacher’s claim that what God thinks or wills (intends) God does (enacts).

§89. In the sense in which it can be said that sin is not ordained by God and does not exist for God,1 the expression “redemption” also would not be in keeping with this new communication of a strong God-consciousness. Based on that viewpoint, the appearance of Christ and the founding of this new collective life would thus be considered as the creation of human nature which was first being completed from that time on.2 1. It requires no further elucidation to show that the concept of redemption relates most exactly to the consciousness of sin and that, if it holds good as an expression for the overall

effect of Christ, unfolding blessedness is also coposited under “the overcoming of the lack of blessedness,” which alone can actually be designated by the expression “redemption.” Now, if this expression is already insufficient to that extent and if this expression is inappropriate in its being used to designate the whole, namely, the communication of blessedness, by using a word that actually expresses only its beginning, then there is nothing to object to once one really understands the matter. That is to say, certainly in our Christian consciousness divine grace as such is always related to sin, but this sin is always posited, at the same time, as the incapacity for what is registered in and striven for in our God-consciousness. Thus, nothing in divine grace is left out when it is designated as the overcoming of sin, insofar as sin is that incapacity. However, if that expression is no longer used only for the working of grace but is also used to designate the aim of Christ’s appearance, insofar as this appearance is ordained by God, then, because the expression is not to be separated from the relation to sin and consciousness of sin, using the expression to designate Christ’s appearance is possible only insofar as consciousness of sin can also be regarded as ordained by God. Now, the degree to which this is possible was already discussed earlier,3 but it is illuminated even more clearly now, namely, in indicating that God has ordained that the earlier insurmountable lack of strength in God-consciousness is to become consciousness of sin as our own deed, so as to sharpen that longing without which the qualities of Jesus also would not have found any vital receptivity for taking up what he communicated. Now, this consciousness of our sin vis-à-vis God’s actual ordaining of it is not only strictly true but is likewise presaged in the ecclesial doctrine that God is not the author of sin, the actual basis for which is best stated in the formulation that human evil cannot be a creative thought of God. It also follows, however, that the expression “redemption” is not suited to designate the divine decree in the same way that it designates the effect of that decree, because Almighty God cannot ordain one thing for the sake of something else that God has not ordained. For this standpoint, which is also ecclesial, the divine decree does not then seem to permit of being denoted better than by another expression, a biblical one that, at the same time, points to the totality of God’s working. That is, just as everything in the human sphere that is established by Christ is depicted as “the new creation,”4 so Christ himself is then depicted as “the second Adam,”5 the originator and author of this more complete human life, or the completion of the creation of humanity. At the same time, this expression indicates in the most definite way possible that this higher life was not to be attained through the interconnectedness of human nature6 that has developed from Adam on. 2. Now, these two formulations are completely alike in content, and the same distinctive dignity and character is attributed to Jesus viewed as the one in whom the creation of humanity would be completed, as to Jesus viewed as the second Adam. If the first formulation is fully understood, no great elaboration is required. This is so, for if the second Adam is completely the same as all who are descended from the first Adam, except that in the second Adam an absolutely strong God-consciousness is originally given, and if he enters within the continuing historical interconnectedness of human nature as such a person by virtue of a creative divine causality,7 then, according to the law governing this historical

interconnectedness of human nature, his higher perfection must work in a stimulating and communicating way upon this same human nature. It does so, first of all, in order to bring the consciousness of sinfulness to completion by virtue of the difference between the first and second Adam, but then, in the second place, in order to overcome the lack of blessedness as well through assimilation between the two. Now, this second Adam is placed within the historical interconnectedness of human nature, and indeed simply as an individual human being, though not from within this earlier interconnectedness of human nature but in relation to it as a supernatural phenomenon. This being the case, he, as well as his entire efficacious action, stands under the law of historical development, and that development is completed through its gradual spread outward from the point of his appearance over the whole of humanity. That in this fashion the creation of humanity is, as it were, divided into two moments has analogy enough in history,8 and this point has always been made regarding the material creation when people have distinguished between a first and second creation.9 At the same time, moreover, the formulation that Christ is the second Adam serves as a corrective to the entanglements that all too easily arise from faulty use of the formulation that “Christ completes the creation of humanity.” This is so, for how easily and continually the view disputed by Paul returns, namely, the view that sin is salutary10 if, in fact, Christ had to be sent on account of sin and, at the same time, the communication of blessedness depends on this fact. More exactly considered, moreover, the “second Adam” formulation is no doubt just as correct and immediate an expression of our Christian self-consciousness as “the completion of creation” formulation is. This is so, for before that event the most correct expression for the condition of being outside community with Christ would indeed be that of the consciousness of sin and of the need for redemption, because and inasmuch as this too is ordained by God. In contrast, in community with Christ everything that belongs to sinfulness that is no longer productive is also no longer in the same sense a consciousness of sin, precisely because it no longer sets the mind on the flesh11 but is only an incapacity belonging to the recent present, while consciousness of the Redeemer is consciousness of the one who strengthens us.12 3. To be sure, however, a claim regarding this expression is not to be dismissed at this point, namely, that here too the concept of creation must be referred to that of preservation.13 Accordingly, not only is the human being Jesus called the second Adam, which can only mean the second one created by God, but all the regenerate are also called new creatures. Thus, that process is also set forth as creation, which we quite rightly present from the outset as preservation. That is, we present it as preservation of the power of Christ to redeem and make blessed, a power that is ever more widely authenticating itself. Likewise, in reverse order, the appearance of Christ is itself to be viewed as preservation, that is to say, preservation of the receptivity of human nature to take up such an absolute strength of Godconsciousness into itself, a receptivity that was implanted in human nature at its very onset and that has been continually developing since then. This is true, for although only an incomplete condition of human nature could appear right at the first creation of the human

race, the appearing of the Redeemer was already implanted in it before the time was ripe. Accordingly, the unity of the divine decree is viewed in the sense according to which the decree has always had to be in the process of its fulfillment. This view makes it quite clear that the result is the same whether we say that God has ordained sin for human beings in relation to redemption or whether we say that God has placed human nature under the law of earthly existence also in the sense just explained. That is, just as sensory self-consciousness develops earlier in every individual whereas God-consciousness comes into one’s life only later and gradually appropriates and subdues that sensory self-consciousness up to a certain degree, so too, in the human race early on, God-consciousness was weak and inadequate, and it completely broke forth only later in Christ. From Christ onward God-consciousness extends his dominion ever more widely and preserves his power to bring human beings to a state of peace and blessedness. This consideration also more clearly resolves a question that has ever been an important one for Christian reflection: the relation of Christ to those who lived before he appeared or who are separated spatially from the collective life into which he breathes life. That is to say, if the first period of creation is ordained only in relation to the second, obviously this must also be true for everything that forms one and the same interconnectedness of nature with the first period of creation. Accordingly, in this perception14 of what God is ordering, everything that belongs to the first age of the world has a share in whatever relation to the Redeemer obtains. At the same time, it appears all the more natural that this otherwise obscure relation would also especially move out of obscurity at particular points, a presupposition that motivates the search for prototypes and prophecies.

1. Cf. §81. 2. Ed. note: The phrase is als die nun erst vollendete Schöpfung der menschlicher Natur. As Schleiermacher will indicate, this finishing process would first have been completed personally in Jesus himself, then by the divine Spirit’s working through the community that Jesus founded. The end point of the “new creation” is not designated at this point, if it ever can be. The question as to whether any other personal existence can be thought to be completed before humanity itself becomes a consummately redeemed community is discussed only under the heading of “prophetic doctrine” (cf. §163 and the postscript to those doctrines). On Christ as the Vollendung (perfection, completion) of the creation of human nature, see §§91.3, 94.3, 101.4, 109.3, and index. For Schleiermacher’s take on the then-current controversy over Jesus’ teaching versus his role as mediator, see OR (1821) V, supplemental notes 15 and 16. There he warns: “It is always rather dangerous to attach faith in Christ to any single thing in him” (n. 15). Then, while admitting only that “there may be some validity” in the distinction, he states: “If so, then most still think of the idea of mediation as something belonging to the teaching of Christ in every respect. Moreover, such teaching about Christ is still nothing but the confirmation and application of the teaching of Christ as it was first fashioned through faith but then subsequently sealed through history.” 3. See §80. 4. 2 Cor. 5:17. 5. Ed. note: See also §§94.1–3, 96.3, and 97.4. 6. Naturzusammenhang. 7. Ed. note: einer schöpferischen göttlichen Ursächlichkeit. Cf. §§51 and 164. 8. What was said in §13.1 also belongs here. 9. Ed. note: The word materiellen refers to the creation stories in Gen. 1–2, in which God is said to have created everything and then proceeded to create human beings (and in the second version there, a garden to put them in). 10. Rom. 6:1. 11. Ed. note: Rom. 8:6.

12. Phil. 4:13. Ed. note: Sermon on Phil. 4:10–13, Mar. 28, 1823, SW II.10 (1856), 781–93. 13. Ed. note: See §§36.2 and 37.1. 14. Anschauung.

§90. The doctrinal propositions that explicate what the consciousness of grace contains, offered here in accordance with the three viewpoints set forth in §30, at the same time complete the presentation of Christian doctrines of faith within the boundaries staked out for it in this work. 1. If, in the content to be worked out in what follows, we hold to those three forms, then no objection is to be made concerning the first and original form in and of itself. Moreover, it is self-evident that in using any correct procedure nothing of any importance regarding Christian doctrine will be able to elude us. However, it may well seem problematic to have to separate the second form from the first form—that is, to separate description of what takes place in the world as a result of redemption from an immediate description of the state of grace of the redeemed. The reason is that nothing is posited in the second description other than the collective life founded through Christ and its relationship to that part of the human world which finds itself to be excluded from it. Yet, the state of grace of the redeemed is none other than their activity in precisely this collective life and the way in which they are directly affected by whatever contrast to it yet remains, so that the two forms do appear to coincide entirely. Now, connected with these observations is the fact that it is less obvious, at this point, that a description of the state of grace must come first. The reason is that, on the one hand, the communication of divine grace comes to each individual only out of this new collective life, hence it might appear that this collective life has to be recognized first. On the other hand, this collective life consists only of the redeemed as such, and thus it seems that it could not be understood at all if the distinctive constitution of the redeemed were not examined beforehand. Nevertheless, upon closer reflection on the matter, the two difficulties can be settled at the same time. That is to say, the collective life does indeed consist only of redeemed individuals, but what it means in the world happens through its organization. Considering it in its organizational aspect, the collective life devolves upon the second mode of presentation. On the other hand, the states of the individual as such, viewed as these states form a contrast to the individual’s states in the collective life of sinfulness, are to be explicated from the first point of view. If, in doing this, acquaintance with the collective life is in a certain sense also to be presupposed, such acquaintance would certainly not comprise dogmatic knowledge of that collective life. This presupposition cannot even be claimed at all inasmuch as individuals’ states of grace were being called forth by the first proclamation at the same time as the new collective life was—indeed, even before it. Consequently, these first few modes of presentation permit of being placed in order and divided from each other, even though reciprocal references are unavoidable in the process.

2. Finally, as concerns the divine attributes to be explicated in the last section, it would prove a very strong counter to the accuracy of our entire design if, after completion of that section, any divine attributes were to remain left over that both represent an element of our Christian self-consciousness and could be distinctly differentiated from those treated here. Thus, we want provisionally to deny this possibility. However, we also want to regard it as a good sign if, on the one hand, we would have been able to trace back the large quantity of inexact expressions of this sort to a smaller number of definite formulations but also, on the other hand, if we would definitely have excluded everything that is purely speculative. Now, all this the matter itself must show. The task here, however, is not simply to make up for what is deficient. Rather, as has already been noted above,1 since only now have we come into the domain of a powerful God-consciousness, all those stirrings of the feeling of absolute dependence that were to be described only indefinitely in the first part must also obtain their full content here. This is the case, in that in Christianity there is no consciousness of the divine omnipotence and eternity, and of attributes attached to them, except with reference to the reign of God. However, it is another question whether the entire doctrine of God that corresponds to Christian faith really can be treated by enumerating divine attributes and whether, instead, an aggregate2 of divine decrees would not also have to be set forth in addition. Yet, this question arises only as other treatments of doctrines of faith are being surveyed, for a proposition that expresses a divine decree is not an expression of immediate self-consciousness. However, once what is posited in the world through redemption is correctly and completely brought to consciousness, then the aggregate of divine decrees will also have been precisely given thereby.

1. §29.1 and §84.4. 2. Inbegriff. Ed. note: Here “aggregate” is used because Schleiermacher is noticing a traditional plurality of decrees, whereas for him there is only “one eternal divine decree,” of one “substance” (Inbegriff) in all its permutations. See also §§109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2. The decree of redemption, he indicates, presents a single predestination for redemption and is eternally at one with the divine government of the world.

SECTION ONE

Regarding the Christian’s Condition insofar as the Christian Is Conscious of Divine Grace [Introduction to Section One] §91. We have communion with God1 only in a community of life with the Redeemer. Within this community of life, the Redeemer’s absolutely2 sinless perfection and blessedness manifests a free activity proceeding directly from himself, but the need for redemption within the recipient of grace3 manifests a free receptivity in the process of taking up the Redeemer’s activity into oneself. 1. This is the basic consciousness of all Christians regarding their pardoned status,4 even where there is the most disparate conception of Christianity. That is to say, if a person does not refer the strength of God-consciousness that one finds within oneself to Jesus at all, then that person’s consciousness is also not a Christian consciousness. Alternatively, if a person does indeed refer the strength of God-consciousness to Jesus but without recognizing this contrast between sin and grace to any degree, then such a person must be finding in oneself not only no sin but also no imperfection. In that case, given that one’s activity is coming entirely out of oneself, one would also have to have left one’s pardoned status behind and would oneself have to have become a Christ.5 On the other hand, one might indeed refer to Jesus one’s state with respect to community with God but without finding in oneself a vital receptivity for him. In that case, one would indeed have faith in Christ, inasmuch as one presupposes an efficacious action from him that accords blessing, but one would not yet find oneself to be a recipient of grace, in that one still cannot have experienced any change through Christ. This is so, for in a person who has any vitality no change is devoid of the person’s own activity, hence also no influence from another can really be taken up without that activity—that is, in a completely passive manner. Alternatively, if one’s own activity had been entirely opposed to such influence—that is, had been in outright resistance—then any communication from another would have to have ensued against one’s will—that is, forcibly—and in such a case it would not produce blessedness. All real interconnection of life6 with Christ in which he can be posited as Redeemer in some way thus depends on there already being a vital receptivity for his influence and on that influence’s continuing to be present. Moreover, this twofold dependence holds good in equal measure for all the elements of that interconnection, because as that interconnectedness of life with Christ would reach its boundaries, it would have to dissolve of itself. Just as little, however, is it to be denied that our proposition still permits great leeway for all those conceptions concerning this relationship, however greatly varied they may be, as

long as they stay within the boundaries that have been set forth. That is to say, one person could consider the relationship to be completely the same even in every one of its elements, so that no previously experienced influences of the relationship would alter its geometric expansion7 one whit. In contrast, another person could believe that a cooperating selfinitiated activity8 would gradually arise in those who have received grace, so that the new “I,” considered in its self-identity, would be an “I” that would initiate one’s own activity and would continue to develop as such. In the latter view, generally speaking, only the person considered as a changing subject would be the seat of sheer receptivity, hence such a person would be conscious of the strength of God-consciousness as steadily one’s own, though it is, to be sure, derived from Christ. Indeed, suppose that someone wanted to refer back to the distinction between personal self-consciousness and consciousness held in common, and suppose that this person wanted to take our proposition to be an expression of the consciousness that Christians share. Suppose, further, that this person wanted to say, however, that every mature Christian could and should be conscious of oneself personally as one who is free and exercises self-initiated activity in the reign of God, also, at the same time, that one could become such a person only in that collective life, for which consciousness our proposition offers the correct expression. Then this entire conception would also lie within the boundaries set by our proposition. Admittedly, however, not all conceptions of this kind have equal currency in the church. 2. Now, if this statement is equally applicable for all the still widely divergent elements in the collective life founded by Christ, then no other division is indicated therein than the one to be explicated first—namely, how the Redeemer is posited by virtue of this consciousness, but, at the same time, how the redeemed are posited by virtue of this same consciousness. Accordingly, the order of presentation arises of itself, since what in the state of the Christian is contrasted with the earlier state in the community of sinfulness can be understood only as a result of the efficacious action of the Redeemer. Thus, the content of this section is to be fully accomplished in two main divisions. To the first division9 belong all propositions concerning Christ that are immediate expressions of our Christian self-consciousness. Moreover, what appears in treatments of Evangelical faith-doctrine regarding Christ elsewhere but does not appear here is not to be explained as an arbitrary omission, as one might suppose; rather, this nonappearance is selfexplanatory in that purely dogmatic content is lacking in it and, as a consequence, it can have only a subordinate explanatory or combinatory value here. This is so, for if it could be present in accordance with our design, then it would also have to find a place for itself in our procedure, but it does not. The second main division10 has to contain all propositions that immediately describe the relation of grace to sinfulness in the human soul and indeed as mediated by entry of the Redeemer. Just as this main division has already been marked off from the second section in an earlier place,11 so here everything must indeed be present whereby the individual receives and appropriates participation in the continuing existence of Christian community, but included only as regards one’s personal constitution or mode of action.12

1. Cf. §63. Ed. note: See also §§62.3, §164, and index. See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 18, on locating the crucial spot “in humans’ communion with God” versus efforts of his own time by “fiery intellects of contemporary culture” who in Germany possess “the itch for innovation” already shown to be “fruitless” in England and France to find a new “natural religion.” People engaged in these innovative efforts he describes as rejoicing “in seeing the crucial spot,” namely, “the passionate, enthusiastic Christ vanquished by the calm prosaic Zeus and … dreamed of returning to some symbolical or gnostic heathenism.” 2. Ed. note: Here schlechthin is translated “absolutely,” exactly as in the phrase “feeling of absolute dependence,” in both cases meaning “utterly and unexceptionably.” It is Schleiermacher’s preferred synonym for the Latin absolut, which he also uses occasionally. 3. Begnädigten. Ed. note: In ordinary usage, this word is used for one who is freely, unconditionally pardoned. 4. Gnadenstande. Ed. note: In some quarters this “pardoned status” is called a “state of grace.” 5. Christus. Ed. note: In contrast, a “Christian” translates ein Christ. 6. Lebenszusammenhang. Ed. note: The broader, richer term used in the proposition itself is Lebensgemeinschaft (“community of life”). 7. Exponenten. 8. Ed. note: The expression is mitwirkende Selbsttätigkeit. 9. Ed. note: §§92–105. 10. Ed. note: §§106–12. 11. §90.1. 12. Beschaffenheit oder Handlungsweise.

Division One

Regarding Christ [Introduction to Division One] §92. The distinctive activity and exclusive dignity of the Redeemer refer to each other and are inseparably one in the self-consciousness of those who have faith. 1. Now, whether we prefer to call Christ the Redeemer, or whether we prefer to view him as the one in whom the creation of human nature has been completed, human nature that until then had existed only in a provisional state, each designation has significance only to the extent that a distinctive efficacious action is attributable to him—indeed, one that is also connected with some distinctive spiritual content of his person. This is so, for if he has an effect only in a manner others do, even though his is much more complete and far-reaching, then the result too, namely, that human beings are made blessed, would simply be a work done in common by him and others, even if his share in that work were the greater. Moreover, there would not be one Redeemer in relation to the redeemed, but many, among whom only one would be the first among equals. Furthermore, the creation of humanity would then be completed through him no more than that. Rather, it would be completed collectively through those who uniformly differ from the rest, inasmuch as their work would presuppose a distinctive overall condition1 in them. However, the case would also be no different if his efficacious action would have come to him exclusively but would have had its

ground less in an inner overall condition belonging to him alone than simply in a distinctive circumstance in which he had been placed. The second expression, that the creation of human beings was completed in him, would then have no content at all, in that it could more likely be presupposed that there are many people who are like him but who simply did not come into the same circumstances. However, then he would also not actually be the Redeemer, even if one could say that human beings had been redeemed through his deed or through his suffering, as people have held. The reason is that the result, making people blessed, could not be something communicated2 by him but could only be aroused or released by him, because he embodied nothing distinctive. Just as little, however, could people’s approximation to the state of blessedness be traced back to him if he had been present in exclusive dignity but had passively held back with it, and if he had not exerted any efficacious action corresponding to that dignity. This is the case, for, to begin with, it would be impossible to see how his contemporaries, and we after them, should then have come to assign such a dignity to him, especially given the manner of his appearance. Quite apart from that fact, in case blessedness could perchance be communicated through the simple perception3 of this dignity, even without any activity having been linked with this blessedness, in perceivers4 of this dignity more than receptivity would nonetheless have to have been present. Rather, his appearance could then be viewed only as the occasion for that notion, which perceivers would have brought forth independently of him. 2. Accordingly, if the approximation to blessedness that emerged out of people’s state of having a lack of blessedness cannot be explained as a fact that is mediated by Jesus based on only one of these two features, distinctive activity and exclusive dignity, without the other, it also follows that both features must entirely merge into each other and be the mutual measure of each other. As a result, it is futile to assign to the Redeemer a dignity higher than the efficacious action that is simultaneously ascribed to him calls for, in that nothing whatsoever is explained by the surplus of dignity. Likewise, it is futile to ascribe to him a greater efficacious action than can result from the dignity that one is willing to grant him. This is the case, for what follows from any surplus of efficacious action can certainly not be attributed to him in the same sense as efficacious action that results from his dignity. Hence, every doctrine regarding Christ in which this equivalence is not essential is deemed to be incoherent. This is so whether this doctrine would then seek to disguise the deprivation of dignity through great but certainly alien effects with which the doctrine credits him or, in reverse, whether the doctrine might grant less influence to him, thereby seeking to establish that the doctrine exalts him highly, though in an unfruitful way nonetheless. 3. Now, if we hold fast to this rule, we are able thereby to deal with the entire doctrine regarding Christ, whether it is presented simply as the doctrine regarding his efficacious action, for his dignity would then have to follow automatically therefrom, or whether it is presented simply as the doctrine regarding his dignity, for his efficacious action would then have to result automatically from his dignity. Both of the general formulations stated above already indicate this, as follows. The statement that the creation of human nature was

completed in his person is, in and of itself, simply a description of his dignity—greater or lesser, according to whether one sets a distinction between earlier and later—yet his efficacious action follows of itself, provided that this creation is to continue. Likewise, the statement that he is the Redeemer describes his efficacious action in the same manner, yet his dignity follows of itself in the same measure. All the same, it is not advisable to choose between the two modes of treatment, unless we wish, at the same time, to relinquish ecclesial language and to make comparison of our expressions with other treatments of doctrines of faith more difficult. This is the case, for since some ecclesial formulations have to do with the efficacious action of Christ and others concern his dignity, the most secure warranty for their being in accord consists in the matter’s being viewed from both points of view separately. Moreover, the more what is distinctive in each is related to the other, the more probable it is that the propositions set forth will render an original self-consciousness purely. The common criterion for both, namely, the extent to which efficacious action and dignity are embraced in any given presentation, is then found in the presentation of the effects first in individuals but then also in the presentation of the church, which must likewise be the complete manifestation5 of the dignity of the Redeemer, just as the world is the complete manifestation of the attributes of God. Accordingly, for us this main division falls into two points of doctrine, that regarding the person of Christ and that regarding his work. In the individual propositions the two points of doctrine are entirely different; however, their overall content is the same, with the result that the content of each of them, as well as that of the second main division of the second section,6 can be understood as that which has come into being through Christ.

1. Beschaffenheit. Ed. note: The reference is to their makeup, or constitution, hence to their particular overall condition. 2. Mitgeteiltes. Ed. note: This word can also mean “imparted,” but only in the same sense of a passing on, not an infusion. Hence, throughout his Christology Schleiermacher speaks of Christ’s sinless perfection and blessedness being “communicated” to his immediate followers and then from generation to generation afterward. 3. Ed. note: The words “simple perception” (bloße Anschauen) could denote perception at any level, not just sensory perception (Wahrnehmung). 4. Ed. note: Correspondingly, Schleiermacher then uses the phrase “in the perceivers” (in den Anschauenden). 5. Offenbarung. Ed. note: Or “revelation” in that sense, i.e., ideally the church and the world, respectively, are the full and adequate means through which what is to be attributed to Christ and to God is to be shown. 6. Ed. note: “Regarding the Continuance of the Church in Its Coexistence with the World” (§§126–56).

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Person of Christ

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine]

§93. The self-initiated activity of the new collective life is taken to be original in the Redeemer and to proceed from him alone. Thus, he must, at the same time, have been prototypical1 as an individual entity in history. That is, what is prototypical2 had to have become completely historical in him. At the same time, moreover, every historical element in him had to have borne what is prototypical within it.3 1. Suppose that the distinctive dignity of the Redeemer can be measured only by the overall efficacious action stemming from it but that this efficacious action is to be perceived completely only in the collective life established by him. Suppose further, on the one hand, that all other religious communities are destined to pass over into that collective life with the result that all religious life outside those religious communities would be something incomplete. On the other hand, within that religious life, however, completion would exist at all times—thus, even in the highest development of this collective life toward the Redeemer —only as the relationship referred to above,4 that is, in its being all that it is only by virtue of its receptivity to his influence. If this is true, then the dignity of the Redeemer must be conceived in such a way that he is able to make that happen. Yet, his efficacious action, such that it can be attributed immediately and exclusively to his person, is then to be considered, first of all, in his own public life. Here, however, particular acts in no way stand out that distinctly set themselves apart from the rest. Thus, the true manifestation5 of his dignity, which is identical with his efficacious action in establishing community, exists not in particular elements of it, but in the entire course of his life. Now, these two features are what is not only set forth but also fully and thoroughly related to each other in our proposition. 2. Now, we live in Christian community with the conviction, shared by all Christians, that no more complete formation of God-consciousness is forthcoming for humankind, yet that every purportedly new formation would be only a regression, also with the conviction that any increase in the efficacious action of God-consciousness proceeds not from any kind of newly supervening power but always simply from an ever alert receptivity to his influence. Thus, it is clear that every given state of this collective life must remain only an approximation to what is posited in the Redeemer himself, and this is precisely what we understand by his prototypical dignity. However, in this collective life it is not then a question of the myriad relations of human life, with the result that he would have to be prototypical for all knowing or all art and skill that develop in human society as well. Rather, all that is at issue is the strength of God-consciousness for giving impetus to all the elements of life and for determining them all. Moreover, we do not extend even the prototypical character of the Redeemer any more broadly than this. To be sure, one could object, on the other hand, that since the strength of God-consciousness in the collective life itself always remains only incomplete, then, in any case, an exemplary dignity would have to belong to the Redeemer. In contrast, his prototypical character, which the very nature of the concept itself actually declares, thus his absolute perfection, would also not belong to him, even according to the rule stated above,6 since such perfection would not be necessary in order to grasp a result, which result would always be only incomplete. Rather, this image would be the

original hyperbole used by persons of faith when they view Christ in the mirror of their own imperfection. Moreover, this hyperbole would also constantly persist in the same manner, in that over the ages persons of faith have placed in Jesus what they were capable of apprehending as prototypical in this domain. Two things, however, are to be observed in this regard. First, if this view of the matter is to be clear in itself—unfailingly at least a wish, because something absolutely perfect is nevertheless always aspired to at the very least—indeed, in this view the more an individual would subordinate one’s personal consciousness to species consciousness,7 the more a hope would also have to develop that the human race, even if only in its noblest and finest members, would eventually surpass Christ and leave him behind. This wish, however, obviously places a limit on Christian faith, which, to the contrary, knows no way toward a pure apprehension of what is prototypical in Christ other than an understanding of him that is constantly being improved. On the other hand, if this eventuality does not come into consciousness, or if it is resolutely denied, then this restriction of what is prototypical to an exemplary status could also be only a faultily understood precautionary measure, and the seeming ground for this maneuver would be offered only afterward. The second thing to be observed is that if one considers, on the one hand, that as soon as one concedes the possibility of a constant progression in the strength of God-consciousness but denies that the completion of that progression exists anywhere, then one also could no longer maintain that creation of the human being is or will become complete. This is so, because in the constant progression of God-consciousness completion always, of course, remains posited only as a possibility, and as a consequence less is asserted regarding human beings than regarding other creatures. That is to say, one can affirm regarding all of the more constrained kinds of being that their concept really becomes complete in the totality of individuals supplementing one another. However, this cannot hold true of a freer, selfdeveloping species if the completion of an essential life function is posited in the concept but exists in no individual, for what is incomplete in a species cannot itself be made up for among its members to reach completion. Moreover, on the other hand, suppose that one then adds how difficult it would have to be to specify a distinction between a true prototype and an exemplar, which exemplar would, at the same time, have to have the power to effect every possible heightening in the totality of individuals. Without doubt, since productivity resides only in the concept of “prototype” and not in the concept of “exemplar,” it clearly follows that being prototypical is the only suitable expression for the exclusive personal dignity of Christ. Meanwhile, as concerns the first assertion considered above—the assertion that the thought of intending or being able to surpass Christ marks the limit of Christian faith—in this connection it is also not easy to distinguish, among conceptions of Christian faith that allow for a perfectibility8 of Christianity, those conceptions which are indeed still Christian, even though they do not appear to be so, from conceptions that are not Christian but might serve as Christian all the same.

Very likely, everyone sees this much, that a great divide exists between those who hold one of the following two views. Those holding the first view say that it is not only possible but it is also incumbent on us to surpass much of what Christ taught his disciples, because, in that there is no such thing as human thinking without words, he himself was essentially hindered by the incompleteness of language from fully realizing the innermost content of his spiritual nature in precise thoughts. On this view, moreover, in another sense the same reasoning would also apply to his actions, in which the circumstances by which these actions are determined then also always reflect imperfection. So, given this view, it can still be the case that an absolutely prototypical character belongs to him in accordance with his inner nature, with the result that the supposed surpassing-of-his-appearance referred to could, at the same time, always become simply a more complete unfolding of his innermost nature. Those holding the second view, moreover, are of the opinion that even in accordance with his inner nature Christ was not any more than what could have been seen in his appearance but that the community of teaching and life that was proceeding from him, with the testimonies to Christ preserved in it, has, by virtue of special divine care, a very fortunate organization. This organization is so fortunate, they think, that both doctrine and life, in accordance with that more complete prototype which later generations could set forth, can easily be recast without the community’s needing to renounce its historical self-sameness. As a result, given this second view, the necessity of originating new religious communities would then be removed thereby for all time. That is to say, in this view, even in order to retain the initial presuppositions of Christian faith, there would simply fail to be a single member of the community that one could claim as originator with total consistency. That is, if Christ were thus squeezed into the limits of what was given at the time of his appearance, then he too, as well as all that he engendered, would have had to be comprehended based only on what was given to him historically. Thus, the entirety of Christianity would have had to be comprehended based on Judaism at the stage of development at which it then stood and at which a person such as Jesus could emerge from its bosom. As a result, Christianity would have been merely a new evolution9 of Judaism, though one saturated with foreign wisdom current at the time, and Jesus would have been merely a more or less original and revolutionary Jewish reformer of the law. 3. However, even if it were so very firmly held that the source of a collective life that is always increasing in the strength of God-consciousness can exist only in what is prototypical, even then it would be no more conceivable how precisely what is prototypical should have come to be perceived by the senses and experienced10 in an actual historically existing individual being. This is so, for already in general terms we cannot help but distinguish between the two, and we consider each individual only as complementary to others, each one in need of completion through others, whether the concern is undertakings of skill or formations of nature. Yet, given that sin is posited strictly as a collective act of humankind, how can the possibility then remain that a prototypical individual being could have developed out of that sinful collective life? Indeed, even the way out which claims that the prototype could be conceived and conferred upon Jesus with only greater or lesser

arbitrariness is already precluded. The reason is that if Christianity were grounded on an imperfect prototype, then it would have to abandon claims to take all modes of faith into itself and to develop out of itself an increasing perfection and blessedness. Suppose, however, that someone wanted to leave room for a capacity to produce a prototype that is pure and perfect in itself within human nature before Christ and without him. Then human nature could not have existed in the state of general sinfulness on account of the natural interconnection between intellect and volition. Hence, suppose that the human being Jesus was prototypical, or that the prototype became historical and was realized in him, given that either expression bears the same currency as the other one does. Then, in order to originate a new collective life within the old life and out of it, he would indeed have to have entered into the collective life of sinfulness, yet he would not have to have emerged from within it. Rather, he would have to be recognized as a “miraculous appearance” in that collective life, but, of course, only in the meaning of the word already set down here once and for all, following the analogies applied in the Introduction.11 That is, his distinctive spiritual content cannot be accounted for based on the content of the circle of human beings to which he belonged. Rather, it can be accounted for based only on the general source of spiritual life through a creative divine act, in which act the concept of the human being as the subject who holds God-consciousness is completed to an absolutely greatest extent.12 Now, strictly speaking, we never comprehend the beginning of life. Thus, complete satisfaction is also afforded to the demand for complete historicity in this completely prototypical life, on the condition that he would have developed from that point on only in the same manner as all others do. As a result, from birth onward his strengths would gradually have unfolded and would have formed in their appearance from a null-point on to proficiencies in the order natural to humankind. This complete historicity would also then apply regarding his God-consciousness, which is principally in question here. That Godconsciousness would indeed be just as little instilled in others as in him, first through upbringing,13 whenever it might occur. Yet, the seed of God-consciousness would already have lain in all human beings originally. This God-consciousness would first have had to develop in him too, however, as in everyone, gradually in a human fashion up to the consciousness that was actually appearing in him. Earlier it would have existed only as a seed, though in a certain sense always as a force of some efficacy. Hence, also during this time of development, ever since it would have become a matter of consciousness, it also can have itself exerted its authority14 over sensory self-consciousness, but only to the degree that various functions of sensory self-consciousness would already have arisen. Thus, even viewed from this aspect, in him God-consciousness would appear as something unfolding to its full extent only gradually. Suppose that someone erroneously thinks that, on account of his prototypical character, one has to deny this account, and perhaps believes that one has to assume that the Redeemer had already borne God-consciousness, as such, within himself from the very beginning of his life. Then originally he would have to have posited himself as an “I” already. Indeed, it would be very easy to infer that originally, at least as regards the more abstract part of

language, and before he spoke out loud, he would also have to have mastered language. Consequently, his entire early childhood would have to have been a mere pretense. In that case, no real human life could be imagined; rather, the docetic aberration would be fully confirmed. Then one would have to separate temporally everything wherein Christ was the same as all human beings from what was prototypical in him, thus to concede to that pretense of sameness the entire period of development up to the beginning of the very age of masculine maturity, and only then would have to let what was prototypical be added to it. At that point, however, a case cannot be made for what is prototypical without an absolute miracle. Indeed, at that point sin too would have been at least possible in him previously, and would thus also undoubtedly have been really present, even if as the tiniest element of his life. Moreover, Jesus would therefore be Redeemer and redeemed in one person, and this would also be true of whatever else would result from this situation. However, the following would also belong to the pure historicity of the Redeemer’s person, that he could have developed only in a certain affinity with his surroundings, thus in the general culture of his people. That is to say, first, his sensibility and intellect15 would have been nourished only based on this world surrounding him. Second, even his free, selfinitiated activity would have had its distinct locus only in that specific world. Third, thus his God-consciousness would have been able, as at first the higher power of his sensibility and intellect would nevertheless also have been, to express and communicate itself only in notions that it had appropriated for itself from this domain, also in actions that were predetermined in this same domain accordance with the possibility contained in those notions.16 If someone would want to deny this dependence of his development on those surroundings, then logically one would have to assume an empirical omniscience in Christ, by virtue of which all human ways of looking at things,17 hence languages too, would have been directly known to him and fluent in him. As a result, he would likewise also have lived in the genuine and proper way that is peculiar to each human being, just as he did among his own people, and one would also have to add this same omniscience in relation to all the various human conditions and how they are to be handled. The Redeemer’s true humanity, however, would also have been lost thereby. 4. In contrast, whatever the prototypical character of the Redeemer’s personal spiritual content brings with it would also have to be compatible with this purely human conception of his historical existence. Thus, in the first place, his development would have to permit of being thought of as wholly free from everything that can present itself only as struggle. The reason is that when an inner struggle would have occurred at some time or other, the traces of it could not possibly disappear entirely, and no more than that could his prototypical character have been perceived where even the slightest traces of this struggle would have become evident. Accordingly, the might18 with which God-consciousness determined each element of his life, to whatever extent that God-consciousness would have developed in each instance, could never be hesitant or clouded by the memory of some earlier struggle. He could never even find himself in a condition through which a future struggle could be grounded. That is, there

can have been no inconsistency in him, even at the outset, in the way the various functions of sensory human nature relate to God-consciousness. Thus, in every element of his life, even at each of his developmental stages, he would also have had to be free from everything whereby the emergence of sin is conditioned in any individual human being.19 At the same time, two situations would also very well be possible. First, all his powers,20 the lower ones that are to be controlled as well as the higher ones that lead, would have come to the fore only gradually and progressively, in such a way that these higher powers could gain mastery over those lower ones only to the degree that they had developed. Second, the mastery itself would have been complete in every instant, in the sense that something could never be positioned in the organization of his senses that would not already have been positioned as an instrument of his spirit also,21 with the result that neither a sheer sensory impression—that is, an impression before it would be taken up into his innermost consciousness and without God-consciousness having been assimilated into any given element of his life—nor even an action—one that could really have been viewed as such and indeed could have been viewed as a complete action—would ever have originated from the organization of his senses alone and not from God-consciousness. Earlier22 we set forth a sinless development of an individual human life only as something possible. That life would have to have really occurred in the person of the Redeemer by virtue of that uninterrupted continuity of relations to which we have referred, in such a way that we can conceive the growth of his personal existence from his earliest childhood up to the completion of his masculine maturity as a steady transition out of the state of purest innocence into that of a fully developed strength23 that is purely spiritual, a strength that is at a far remove from everything we call “virtue.”24 That is, in the state of innocence there also exists an efficacious action of God-consciousness, but it is only indirect,25 in that it arrests, though still latently, every movement in the organization of the senses that would necessarily lash out in opposition. The approximation to this state, which occurs not infrequently in our experience, we are accustomed to designate with the expression “a happy childlike nature.” The fully developed strength of the adult male, however, though also having grown gradually and thus also having arisen through practice, is distinguished from virtue by its not being the result of a struggle, in that it would not have needed to work its way through either error or sin, indeed, not even an inclination to either one. Moreover, this purity must not be viewed at all as a result of external protection; rather, it must be grounded in the Redeemer himself—that is, in the higher God-consciousness originally given in him as he was sent.26 Otherwise, what was prototypical in him would be more produced in him than productive through him, since the external protection just mentioned nevertheless originates in the actions of others, and he himself would be not only the first among a totality of the redeemed but subsequently also the Redeemer himself. Now, in the second place, as concerns the characteristics of his people that existed in his person: to be sure, Christ could hardly have been a complete human being if his personal existence had not been determined by characteristics of his people. However, this determination would in no way have affected the actual principle27 of his life but would have

affected only its organism. The characteristics of his people would in no way be the typus28 for his self-initiated activity but are only the typus for his receptivity to the self-initiated activity of spirit. The characteristics of his people also could not have been a forbidding or excluding principle in him; rather, they would simply have united with his most open and unclouded disposition toward everything else that is human and also with his recognition of the identity of nature and of spirit in all human forms—thus, also without any effort to enlarge the characteristics of his people beyond the boundaries assigned to them. Moreover, only by regarding the matter in this restricted way can one say that the characteristics of his people in him were also determined in a prototypical fashion both in themselves and also in their relation to the whole of human nature. 5. Here it can be only parenthetically pointed out in advance what influence the notion of this prototypical character of the Redeemer in the completely natural historical course of his life exercises on all Christian doctrines that have currency in the church, all of which would also have to be framed differently if one decided to start off more or less from that notion. This is so, for, first of all, two conditions are grounded only on his perfect prototypical character in everything connected with the strength of his God-consciousness: that all those doctrines and instructions which develop in the Christian church obtain a generally valid standing29 only thereby, and that they are traced back to Christ. To the degree that these two conditions are set aside the possibility must also be conceded that there could be doctrines and prescriptions in the domain of piety that surpass the declarations of Christ. Likewise, preaching of the written word, insofar as it comprises only glorification30 of Christ, as well as the sacrament of the altar, can be viewed as eternal institutions in the Christian church only if it is presupposed that all development and maintenance of Christian piety must always proceed from community of life with Christ. Furthermore, Christ could not have been set forth as a general exemplar if he had not related to all original differences among individuals in the same manner. This exemplary action was possible only through his prototypical character, in that if it had been otherwise he really would have had to be more of an exemplar for some than for others. Just as little, however, could he have been a general exemplar if every element of his life had not been prototypical, for otherwise his prototypical character would first have had to be separated from what is not prototypical, which then could have occurred only in accordance with some alien law that would therefore have been superior to him. The same thing would enter in if the characteristics of his people in him had not been restricted, as his prototypical character requires, for then one would, nevertheless, have to be willing also to take up into what is normative for Christian life everything from his life that is exclusively Jewish. Now, these main points held by the Christian community are not perchance doctrines that are first given currency through later developments; rather, they exactly cohere with the original teachings of his disciples in the way in which they applied the idea of “the Messiah” to Jesus, and they are easily linked with utterances of his own that are still accessible to us as well.

1. Ed. note: urbildliche. 2. Urbildlich. Ed. note: Throughout, in all their forms, Urbild = prototype, Vorbild = exemplar. 3. Ed. note: In OG 84f. Schleiermacher also writes: “Christ is supernatural” and that Christ becomes natural, as the Holy Spirit also does in the church. These two themes underlie everything that follows in the present work, right through the Conclusion, where the “triune” God (vs. “Trinity”) is the subject. 4. In §91. 5. Manifestation. 6. Ed. note: The closest things to a rule earlier in the subsection seem to be “Every given state of this collective life must remain only an approximation to what is posited in the Redeemer himself, … his prototypical dignity,” and, in the first subsection, “The dignity of the Redeemer must be conceived in such a way that he is able to make [receptivity to his influence] happen.” 7. Gattungsbewußtsein. 8. Perfektibilität. 9. Evolution. 10. Ed. note: zur Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung. These are given as two marks of Jesus’ real appearance (Erscheinung) in history. 11. Cf. §13.1. Ed. note: The “analogies” are between miracle and revelation. 12. Ed. note: The phrase “to an absolutely greatest extent” translates als einem absolute größten, thus meaning to the maximum degree possible in natural circumstances. 13. Erziehung. Ed. note: This term refers to upbringing in general, referring first to child rearing, thence more particularly to more formal education. 14. Ansehn. Ed. note: At its root, this conventional word for “authority” includes the images of oversight and lookingdown-at, from an elevated position. See also §93n9. 15. Sinn und Verstand. 16. Probably everyone knows this for its having been contained in the expression in Gal. 4:4 that Christ is “born under the law.” Ed. note: One of Schleiermacher’s earliest Christmas sermons was on this text: Dec. 25, 1790, in SW II.7 (1836), 54–64. Two sermon outlines on the text are also extant, from Dec. 26, 1795, and Dec. 26, 1802. 17. Vorstellungsweisen. Ed. note: Literally, all modes of forming notions. 18. Macht. 19. Cf. §§67–69. 20. Kräfte. Ed. note: This word carries built-in ambiguity. It could also refer to the “forces” active within him or to the “strengths” he had attained. Here “powers” seems to be the better choice, since the issue is about which ones would gain dominance. 21. Ed. note: In this clause, “the organization of his senses” is used for Sinnlichkeit (otherwise to be translated “sensibility”), and “spirit” is used for Geist. 22. §68.1. 23. Vollkräftigkeit. 24. Tugend. Ed. note: In Latin and English, “virtue” literally means “manly strength.” In Greek too, “virtue” (ἀρετή) means a force or strength. Hence, Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics treats of virtue alongside duty and aiming toward the highest good. In his Christian ethics, however, he rejects using any of these categories, since it aims at strengths that are “purely spiritual,” which he here identifies as present in the Redeemer. 25. Ed. note: indirekte. 26. Ed. note: What is mitgegebenen (“given in him as he was sent”) is like a gift, bestowal, or dowry that goes with a traveler, emissary, or bride. 27. Prinzip. Ed. note: This word does not mean a moral or intellectual principle but refers to what decisively underlay and drove that for which he was sent and became in his very person. 28. Typus. Ed. note: This Latin word is derived from the Greek τύπος and also exists in both German and English. It is used in biology, mathematics, and printing, today usually represented by the spelling “type.” As used here, it appears to mean both the stamp of Christ’s distinctive being and his taking on the form of human existence that presages how it is to exist as it does, eventually transformed into being by “the new creation” through the impression (Eindruck) of Christ in his role as the Redeemer. 29. Ansehn. Ed. note: See also §93n14 above. 30. Verklärung. Ed. note: This word alludes to the story of Christ’s transfiguration, in which his disciples saw him in all his glory. In the New Testament and in Schleiermacher’s preaching, being transfigured and having glory or glorification

(Verherrlichung) are closely associated. For example, see his sermon on Acts 6:15, July 22, 1810, first published in 1810, also in SW II.4 (1835), 14–22; (1844), 42–51.

§94. In accordance with this understanding, the Redeemer is the same as all human beings by virtue of the selfsame character of human nature, but he is distinguished from all other human beings by the steady strength of his God-consciousness, a strength that was an actual being of God in him.1 1. Since it has already been established2 that sin belongs so little to the very nature of human beings that we can never view it except as a disturbance of nature,3 to conceive that the Redeemer is entirely free of all sinfulness in no way interferes with the complete identity of human nature. From this it follows that the possibility of a sinless development is not, in and of itself, incompatible with the concept of human nature. Indeed, this possibility is included as something acknowledged in the consciousness of sin as fault, as it is generally understood. However, this uniformity of human nature is to be understood in such a general way that even the first human being before the first sin stood no nearer to the Redeemer than all others do, nor was this human being like him in some higher sense. This is the case, for even if we must accept a time in the life of the first human beings when no sin appeared, any initial appearance of it nonetheless traces back to a state preparatory to sin.4 Even the Redeemer, however, participated in the same uneven characteristics without which we could think only with difficulty of the emergence of sin in a distinct element of life even in Adam, because these uneven characteristics are intrinsic to human nature. What is more, the first human being was originally free from all contagious influences of a sinful social life. In contrast, the Redeemer had to enter into a collective life already in advanced deterioration, so that it would hardly be possible to ascribe his sinlessness to an external conserving factor of some kind, which, to be sure, one must concede in a certain sense regarding the first human being if one does not wish to become entangled in contradictions. Regarding the Redeemer, however, one must concede that he did not obtain the ground of his sinlessness from outside himself. Rather, it had to be something intrinsic to him, grounded in himself, if he were to overcome the sinfulness of the collective life through what he was. Therefore, as far as sin is concerned, Christ is then no less differentiated from the first human being than he is from all others. The following also belongs to the sameness of human nature, however, that even the manner in which Christ is distinguished from all others has its locus in this sameness. This would not be the case if it did not form part of human nature that individuals are distinguished from each other in an original way with respect to the measure to which various functions exist in each one. This means that in every self-contained collective life, viewed both in space and in time, those who possess more and those who possess less of those various functions still belong together, and one arrives at the truth of such a collective life only when one relates persons, all of whom are distinguishable from one another, to each other in this way. In the same measure, therefore, those persons who in some connection characteristically define an age or locale belong together with those who are deficient in the

same connection and over whom they extend their formative influences, just as Christ belongs together with those persons whom his preponderantly strong God-consciousness binds to the collective life designated by that consciousness. Now, the more certain persons stand out over the rest and the more distinctive their efficacious action is, the more even they would have to have secured themselves against obstructive influences from negative environments. Moreover, they are to be understood only on the basis of this self-differentiating capacity of human nature5 and not on the basis of the circle in which they are situated. Nevertheless, by divine ordinance they do belong together with this human nature, just as the Redeemer belongs together with the entire species.6 2. By acknowledging, however, that even what is distinctive in the manner of the Redeemer’s efficacious action belongs to a general locus in human nature, we in no way wish to attribute this efficacious action and the personal dignity that provides the condition for this efficacious action to others to the same degree. This is already made clear by the fact that with faith in Christ a relation between Christ and all humankind is posited intrinsically, whereas in every case everything analogous is valid only with respect to specific individual times and places. The reason lies in the fact that no one has succeeded, nor will anyone ever succeed, in claiming recognition in any realm of knowing or of art as a generally enlivening leader adequate for all humankind. The expression used in our proposition, however, is the only one suitable for this distinctive dignity of Christ, understood in the sense in which we have already traced the prototypical character of his person back to this spiritual function of God-consciousness that is coposited7 in self-consciousness, in that to attribute an absolutely strong8 Godconsciousness to Christ and to ascribe to him a being of God in him are entirely one and the same thing. In every instance, the expression “a being of God in some other” can only express the relationship of God’s omnipresence to this other. Now, it is a given that God’s being can be conceived only as pure activity,9 and every singular being is simply an intertwining of both activity and passivity. However, it is also a given that on each such being the active aspect is found to be apportioned to this passive aspect which is present in all other singular beings. Thus, to that extent, there is no being of God in any individual thing but only a being of God in the world. Moreover, only if passive states are not purely passive but are mediated through vital receptivity and only if this receptivity is placed over against finite being as a whole—that is, to the extent that one can say of individual being, viewed as something alive, that it represents10 the world in itself by virtue of its taking part in the world’s general interaction—could one assume a being of God in that individual being. Accordingly, this characteristic certainly is not valid for anything that is a singular being but is without consciousness, for in that this being does not present any vital receptivity, in contrast to all the strengths that inhere in consciousness, it also cannot represent these strengths in itself. Just as little, however, and for the same reason, what is indeed conscious but not intelligent11 also cannot represent these strengths. As a result, a being of God can be granted to occur only in rational individuals.

Now, the extent to which this account might be correct—in the same way and without distinction, when we look at reason in the functioning of objective consciousness—lies outside our inquiry. With regard to rational self-consciousness, however, it is surely the case that whatever God-consciousness was originally present in human nature along with selfconsciousness prior to the Redeemer and apart from all connection with him cannot properly be called a being of God in us. This would be the case not only because it was not a pure God-consciousness in polytheism nor even in Jewish monotheism, given their being tainted with materiality12 throughout—albeit sometimes more crudely, sometimes more refinedly. It would also be the case because this God-consciousness, as it was, would not have made itself felt13 as something in response to activity but was always being overpowered by sensory self-consciousness. Now, if this God-consciousness is neither able to portray God purely and with true accuracy in thought, nor even able to show God to be pure activity, then it cannot be presented as a being of God in us. Rather, just as natural strengths without consciousness and living things without reason can become a revelation of God for us only insofar as we convey the concept of God with that revelation, so too that clouded and incomplete Godconsciousness is, in and of itself, no being of God in human nature; rather, it can be so only insofar as we convey Christ with it and relate it to him. As a result, Christ is deemed to be the sole and original locus for the being of God in human nature, and he alone is the “other” in whom there is an actual being of God—that is, he does so inasmuch as we posit Godconsciousness in his self-consciousness as determining every element of his life steadily and exclusively. In consequence, he has this status inasmuch as we also posit this complete indwelling of Supreme Being as his distinctive nature and his innermost self.14 Indeed, thinking in reverse order, we must now simply say that if human Godconsciousness first becomes a being of God in human nature only through him, and if the totality of finite powers can first become a being of God in the world only through rational nature, then in truth he alone mediates all being of God in the world and all revelation of God through the world, inasmuch as he bears the entire new creation, comprising and developing the full strength of God-consciousness in himself. 3. Now, if, as such a person, he is to have all of human development in common with us, however, with the result that this being of God would have to develop over time in him too and could have become manifest as the most spiritual15 aspect of his personal existence only later than the subordinate functions, then he certainly could not appear in life as one for whom sin would already have been established on the other side of his public appearance. Now, we ourselves have brought to consciousness this earlier established existence of sin for us all,16 without going so far as to get into investigations of natural science concerning the origin of individual life and the coming together, so to speak, of soul and body, but have simply stopped at the general facts of experience. Thus, here too we wish to place the relatively supernatural features, the role of which we have already acknowledged in general terms with respect to the Redeemer’s entrance into the world, only in connection with these general facts of experience.

Every emergence of a human life can be viewed in a twofold manner: as an event within the small circle of parentage and sociability, which it immediately inherits, and as a fact of human nature in general. The more definitely the weaknesses of that small circle are repeated in an individual, the more the first view has validity. The more the individual is raised above that circle by means of the form and degree of one’s gifts, and the more the individual brings forth something new within that circle, the more one is thrown back to the other explanation. Consequently, in accordance with his distinctive nature, the beginning of Jesus’ life is not to be defined by the first view at all but is to be defined exclusively by the second one. As a result, from the very beginning onward, he would have had to be free of every influence from earlier generations that would propagate sin and that would disturb his inner Godconsciousness, and he is to be understood only as an original feat17 of human nature—that is, as a feat of human nature not affected by sin. Now, the beginning of his life is deemed to have been, at the same time, a new implanting of God-consciousness, one that exhausted the capacity for receptivity in human nature. Thus, this content and that manner of emergence belong together in such a way that they mutually condition and define each other. Because that new implanting occurred through the very beginning of his life, this beginning had to have been raised above every detrimental influence of his closest circle. Moreover, because he was such an original and sinless feat of nature, through that feat of nature a saturation of his nature with God-consciousness could also result. As a result, this relationship too is most fully illuminated when we regard the beginning of Jesus’ life as the completed creation of human nature. The appearance of the first human being constitutes, at the same time, the physical life of humankind; the appearance of the second Adam constitutes the new spiritual life for that same nature, which life is communicated and further unfolded through spiritual insemination.18 Moreover, just as in that spiritual life his originality, with which the appearance of his human nature was first given, and his having proceeded from divine creative activity are the same thing, so too the two features are also the same in the Redeemer: his spiritual originality, which has broken loose from every detrimental influence of natural inheritance, and that being of God in him which likewise shows itself to be creative in character. If the communication of spirit19 to human nature that occurred in the first Adam was insufficient, in that the human spirit remained engulfed in a sensory orientation and scarcely a single instant20 of his life entirely looked forward as a presentiment of something better, and if the work of creation was first completed through the second, equally original, communication21 to the second Adam, then both elements nevertheless refer to one undivided eternal divine decree,22 and also, in a higher sense, they form only one and the same interconnectedness of nature,23 even if the full grasp of that interconnectedness is unattainable for us.

1. Ed. note: The phrase is ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm. See §94n7 below. 2. §68 above.

3. Ed. note: Wesen (“very nature” of human beings) is followed by “disturbance of nature” (Natur). 4. Cf. §72. 5. Cf. §13. 6. Geschlecht. Ed. note: Or “the entire human race,” “humankind.” 7. Ed. note: mitgesetzt. That is, God-consciousness is taken to be something that can be present in and with selfconsciousness as a natural function, even though it is, as in this one case, made complete, perfect, by God’s creative, supernatural intervention. 8. Ed. note: Here the words are schlechthin kräftiges. 9. Ed. note: rein Tätigkeit. That is, in the world, God’s being (Sein) is conceivable not as either passive or receptive but only as it is active (Seiendes, be-ing) and is thus received by one acted upon by God, hence the explanation that follows. God is always both Sein and Seiendes. 10. Ed. note: repräsentiert. That is, it re-presents some feature or factor that would be present everywhere in the interchanges that make up what Schleiermacher frequently calls “the interconnectedness of nature” (Naturzusammenhang) elsewhere in the present work. 11. Intelligente. 12. Versinnlichung. Ed. note: That is, emphasis was placed on “sensory self-consciousness” (just below: sinnlichen Selbstbewusstsein), to which the countering emphasis would be “spirituality” (Geistigkeit) or, more fully, “religious [frommen] self-consciousness.” 13. Ed. note: sich geltend machte. Or “been registered as having any currency,” in their experience. 14. Ed. note: Cf. the statement at this place in the first edition (KGA I/7.2, 29): “God was in him [the Redeemer] in the highest sense in which God can ever be in anyone” (dass Gott in ihm war in dem höchsten Sinne, in welchem überall Gott in Einem sein kann). At this place in this second edition, Schleiermacher clarifies the point that no one else actually reaches the same level of God-consciousness that is to be seen in Christ. A logical corollary would be that no one has to reach that same level to be considered as among the redeemed. 15. Geistigste. 16. Cf. §69. 17. Tat. Ed. note: Just above, the word used was “fact” (Tatsache). 18. Befruchtung. Ed. note: That is, in the “spiritual” (geistige) aspect of his life it is the counterpart, metaphorically expressed in biblical language, of the ordinary physical process of “making fruitful” through sexual intercourse. 19. Geist. Ed. note: In German der Geist can have any one of the following meanings: spirit, Holy Spirit, mind, and intellect. Typically, Schleiermacher uses der heilige Geist when he specifies the Holy Spirit and uses der gottliche Geist for “the divine Spirit” overall. 20. Ed. note: The expression is kaum auf Augenblicke. 21. Mitteilung. Ed. note: Throughout this work, this term is translated “communication,” for the process to which it refers here is always the same. Accordingly, the sense of a mere “impartation,” which bears the likely implication of a merely passive reception, would seem misleading. 22. Ed. note: On this one decree, see §109.3, also §§90.2, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2. 23. Naturzusammenhang. Ed. note: See esp. §§46–47, also §14.P.S. and index.

§95. Ecclesial formulations regarding the person of Christ require an ongoing critical treatment. 1. Ecclesial doctrines are, on the one hand, products of conflict, in that even if the original consciousness was the same in everyone, the thought that expresses it would nevertheless have been differently formed within different persons. In each case, in order to present something new one person would have drawn upon some particular notion already given and another person would have drawn upon some other notion already given. In this way, features or presuppositions, in part Jewish and in part Gentile, can have slipped in, even unconsciously, and they can have called forth opposing views that were intended to be correctives. However, even the further development of original formulations would, in part, have taken the same course, in order to prevent misunderstandings that could emerge from

rhetoricizing or poeticizing expressions in doctrinal usage of language,1 and, in part, the development of these formulations would have continued to wrap itself up in an inquisitiveness that was later on brought to its highest peak in scholasticism, which, in a total failure to appreciate genuine dogmatic interest, brought up difficult questions solely for the purpose of defining concepts. By these means, these ecclesial doctrines had to end up being overladen with a mass of qualifications that stand in no relationship whatsoever to immediate Christian self-consciousness, except as traces of this mode of consciousness can be demonstrated through the history of doctrinal conflict. Based on this historical ascertainment,2 an aversion to everything that has originated out of conflict then developed among those who in such aversion want to grant currency only to expressions that not only lie beyond all conflict but also want, where possible, to cut off all prospective conflict in advance. This aversion, moreover, also stands most rigorously in opposition to the tendency of others who want to hold fast to tradition, however it might have come into existence. As a result, neither settlement nor forward progress is possible without a sifting and mediating procedure. 2. Now, in relation to these two opposing parties it would be difficult to set forth any other canon3 for use of this indispensable critical procedure than the following two. The canon that applies to the one party4 is that, despite all its efforts, in reality its procedure no longer holds but has simply fallen victim to history, because a different situation to which it once exclusively referred has changed and is no longer present and thus it can also bear no further efficacy. In contrast, the canon that applies to the other party is that if one resorts to formulations that are quite simple but that are, precisely on that account, too indefinite to serve within the domain of didactic discourse, one achieves only a seeming satisfaction, and this satisfaction lasts only so long as the discord that had remained riddled under a given formulation’s identity breaks through at some point. In contrast, the task of the present procedure consists in holding propositions of ecclesial doctrine to the standard provided by the above analysis5 of our Christian self-consciousness. This is done, in part, so as to assess the extent to which it accords, at least in all essentials, with that self-consciousness. In part, as concerns the details, it is done so as to investigate what among customary modes of expression is to be retained and, on the other hand, what would be better to give up, whether in that it is an incomplete fulfillment of the task or in that it is dispensable in and of itself but a harmful appendage by its occasioning continual misunderstandings.

1. Ed. note: See §§15–18, 28, and 61 on dogmatic language in contrast to these two kinds. 2. Wahrnehmung. Ed. note: This is an unusual but proper use of the word in Schleiermacher’s discourse. It is unusual, for it almost always means “sense impression” for him. It is proper, however, for in this context it stands for a sheer historical discernment, one that is not so much thought out as merely observed, hence “ascertainment.” 3. Kanon. Ed. note: That is, a basic rule. 4. Ed. note: Presumably, the temporal order is reversed, though both rules could apply to each of the two parties. 5. Analyse. Ed. note: The parameters for such analysis were set up in the Introduction but are carried out in fact only in the presentations of doctrine to follow. Even the analyses provided in Part One are found to be but presupposed in Part One,

and the preceding analysis of sin itself arises out of an understanding of what is analyzed regarding grace. The Introduction alone makes clear that the analysis is to be thoroughly historical, encompassing psychological, social, and specifically spatial-temporal components. The latter includes authoritative original and later factors, up to and including current situations in and between churches, especially within the Evangelical church.

§96. First Doctrinal Proposition: In Jesus Christ divine nature and human nature were joined in one person. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530): “… that the two natures, the divine and the human, are so inseparably united in one person that there is one Christ.”1 (2) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) II: “… so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, etc.”2 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XI: “We therefore acknowledge two natures or substances, the divine and the human, in one and the same Jesus Christ our Lord. … And we say that these are bound and united … or joined together in one person. … Thus we worship not two but one Christ the Lord. … With respect to his divine nature he is consubstantial with the Father and with respect to the human nature he is consubstantial with us men.”3 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) XV: “We believe that in one person, that is, Jesus Christ, the two natures are actually and inseparably joined and united.”4 (5) First Helvetic Confession (1536) XI: “This Christ, … taking on true human nature in its entirety, body and soul, has two distinct, unmixed natures in one person and … has become our brother.”5 (6) Solid Declaration (in Formula of Concord 1577) VIII: “We believe … that there are now, in this one, inseparable person of Christ two distinct natures, the divine, from eternity, and the human, which was assumed into the union of the person of God’s Son in time.”6 (7) Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “Jesus Christ, … begotten of the Father before all ages … true God … for us … came down … and was incarnate.”7 (8) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.): “… our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is at once God … begotten from the substance of the Father before all ages and … of his mother in this age.”8

1. Although what this presentation of the distinctive personal existence of the Redeemer intends is indicated, at the same time, in only a few of the creedal passages cited here, it is nevertheless unmistakable that the orientation is the same as in the propositions set forth here up to now. That is, the point is to describe Christ as brother, consubstantial with us9 in such a way that in the new collective life a community of life is possible between ourselves and him but, at the same time, also that the being of God in him would be expressed in the clearest way. From this orientation it already follows that the most unqualified respect and intimate company10 in our relationship to him are formed into one. However much we assent to this depiction, there is, on the other hand, almost nothing in the execution of it against which no protest would have to be lodged, whether we are inclined to look at the scientific quality of the expression or at its suitability for the church’s use. Now, to begin with what concerns scientific quality: first of all, we must beware of a very entangled designation of the individual subject11 whenever the expression “Jesus Christ” is used not only to denote the subject of the union of the two natures, whereat the first four passages cited rightly stop, but also to describe the divine nature of the Redeemer from all eternity, before its union with the human nature, with the result that this union no longer appears at all as one element co-constituting the person Jesus Christ but already appears instead as an action of this person himself. This confusing admixture was transferred most glaringly from the two ancient creedal passages cited here into the Helvetic Confession.12 In contrast, the New Testament writings are not familiar with this usage at all. Indeed, the New Testament, where it speaks independently, employs even the expression “Son of God” only for the subject of this union13 and not for the divine therein before the union. On this account, our proposition has also adhered to correct usage. To be sure, the expression “Jesus Christ” was itself fused into a single proper name, though very early on nevertheless, at first only through misuse, since, strictly speaking, “Christ” is only a designation for the distinctive dignity that is appended to the proper name. Yet, in this fusion what is historical and what is prototypical in this person are nevertheless unmistakably intended to be combined. However, far worse still than this unsteady designation of this individual subject is this, and it cannot survive a more rigorous scientific judgment at all: that the expression “nature” is used commensurately14 for what is divine and what is human. Doubtless every other expression that would be employed with the same meaning for both of these natures would raise the suspicion that such a formulation would have to become the source of many confused admixtures. That is to say, how can the divine and the human be brought together under any concept in such a way that the two features named could be mutually coordinated and more exact determinations made of one and the same general category? For example, even divine spirit and human spirit could not be combined in this way without confusion. The word “nature” is especially ill suited for such a combined usage, however, even if one entirely sets aside Latin and Greek etymology and simply sticks with our manner of using it. The reason is that in one sense we posit God and nature15 as directly over against each other, and thus we cannot attribute a “nature” to God in the same sense. In this sense, nature is for

us the aggregate of all finite existence, or, as we contrast nature with history, it is the aggregate of everything that is bodily, going back to what is rudimentary in its diversely divided appearance, in which everything that we designate thereby is mutually conditioned by each other. Moreover, precisely what is divided and conditioned we contrast with God, viewing God to be unconditioned and absolutely simple.16 Precisely for this reason, however, we also cannot attribute a nature to God in the other sense at all. That is to say, if we intend then to use “nature” in a general way, as in animal or vegetable nature, or for an individual entity, as when we ascribe a noble or an ignoble nature to a person, we always use it only of some restricted being, which is engaged in some contrast. In this restricted being the active and the passive are combined and this being is disclosed in a multiplicity of occurrences, at one point regarding individual entities, at another point regarding elements of life. In this way, moreover, with more exact deliberation it would be difficult to deny that this expression, where one traces it back to the original Greek word,17 bears in itself the traces of an influence from heathen notions, even if it were an unconscious influence. For example, in polytheism —which envisages deity just as cleft and divided as finite existence displays to us, the term “nature”18 certainly has the same meaning in the expression “divine nature” as one in which it is also used elsewhere. One should have been warned all the more thereby in noticing that heathen sages themselves already rose above this incomplete notion and said of God that God is to be placed above all being and nature.19 Moreover, it fares no better with the relationship between nature and person that is set forth here, for in complete contradiction to other usage, according to which the same nature is characteristic of many individuals or persons, here one person is to participate in two entirely different natures. Now, the claim is that “person” actually denotes a stable unity of life and that “nature” denotes an aggregate of modes of conduct or a body of laws according to which life circumstances not only change but are also contained within a distinct course of life. How, then, is the unity of a person’s life to endure with the duality of natures without the one yielding to the other when the one offers a larger and the other a narrower course of life, or, without the two natures blending into each other, in that the two systems of law and conduct actually become one in the one life? How is that to happen when one person—that is, an “I”—which is the same in all one’s successive elements over time, is at issue? Hence, even with the attempt to make this unity intelligible with that duality, rarely does anything come of this, other than one’s showing the possibility of a formulation that comprises a juxtaposition of indicators from which, however, one can in no way construe one figure.20 On the other hand, not infrequently the same author, immediately upon avoiding this formulation regarding two natures, does say something that one can follow and that can be copied.21 So, whenever an attempt was bound to this expression, all results of the effort to attempt a true-to-life presentation of the unity of the divine and human in Christ have always wavered between opposing mistaken paths. The one path would fuse the two natures into a third that would be neither of the two, would be neither divine nor human. The other path would keep the two natures distinct. On the one hand, it would diminish the unity of the person in order to separate the two natures all the more distinctly. On the other hand, in order

to hold to the unity of the person quite firmly, it would prefer to disturb the necessary balance and slight one nature in favor of the other, thereby limiting the one nature by the other. This second path is already apparent in people’s wavering between the expressions “to combine” and “to unite,”22 of which “to unite” inherently contains an inclination to blur the dissimilarity of the two natures, whereas “to combine” makes the unity of the person doubtful. The total fruitlessness of this mode of presentation is especially conspicuous in treatment of the question as to whether Christ, the one person in two natures, would also have two wills in conformity with the number of natures or only one will in conformity with the number of the person. That is to say, if Christ has only one will, then his divine nature is incomplete if this will is human, and his human nature is incomplete if this will is divine. However, if Christ has two wills, then the unity of the person is really always simply fictitious, even if one intends to protect that unity by Christ’s always willing the same thing with both wills. This is the case, for only agreement, not unity, arises thereby, and, in fact, by this answer one returns to splitting Christ in two. Moreover, if either one of the two wills were merely to accompany the other, it would always remain simply superfluous, no matter whether the divine will is supposed to accompany the human or vice versa. It is patent, however, that since we are nevertheless accustomed to place understanding and will together, one can also raise the same question in relation to understanding, since everything just said repeats itself here. This can be seen, in that each nature is incomplete without the understanding that belongs to it, and a unity of the person no more exists with a twofold understanding than one does with a twofold will. Moreover, it is just as unthinkable that divine understanding, which, viewed as omniscient, directed to everything all together, would think the same thing as a human understanding would think, which latter comparatively knows any one particular only in accordance with some other particular and based on some other particular. It is also equally unthinkable that a human will, which always strives only for some particular and for one particular for the sake of other particulars, would will the same as a divine will, the object of which is simply the entire world in the totality of its development. Finally, the following also belongs to the scientific completeness of dogmatic expression: that it must be possible to comprehend related doctrines easily in their relation to each other. Thus, our customary formulation will prove to have little to recommend it in the way in which it is placed alongside the formulations used in the doctrine of the triune God.23 There the expression “unity of nature within the threeness of persons” has been avoided and “unity of being”24 has been substituted. Yet, however much that is to be commended because the expression “being”25 is, nevertheless, far better suited for the deity than the expression “nature,”26 the question inescapably intrudes as to how that in Christ which we call his divine “nature” relates to that “unity of being” which all three “persons” have together, also as to whether each of the three persons also has a “nature” of its own apart from their participation in the divine being or whether this is something distinctive to the second person. Yet, we find a satisfactory answer to this question neither here nor in the doctrine of the triune God.27

The matter becomes still more entangled, however, through the other use of the word “person” introduced into the doctrine of the triunity throughout the activity of Western dogmatics, according to which we then maintain in the one place three persons in one being and in the other place one person out of two natures. Now, suppose that one takes the clarifications that are customarily given in the doctrine of Christ concerning the word “person” across into the doctrine of the triunity as well—and there is occasion enough to do that if it is said, nevertheless, that not only would Christ first have become one person through union of the two natures, but also that the Son of God would simply have taken up the human nature into his person. Then the three persons would have to subsist and be present independently in and of themselves. Suppose, moreover, that, given those suppositions, each person is also taken to be a nature.28 Then we come almost unavoidably to three divine natures for the three divine persons in the one divine being. On the other hand, if the same word, “person,” is to denote something different in the one doctrine than in the other, with the result that in the person of Christ yet a different person is posited in another sense of the word, the entanglement would be no less great. 2. It lies in the nature of the matter that after this formulation had once gained currency as a foundation for all other determinations29 concerning the person of Christ, a complicated and artificial procedure had to be introduced in order to apply these indefensible expressions with as little error as possible. Moreover, it could also scarcely occur otherwise than that because this foundation itself embodies an apparent contradiction, the entire development could not be anything but a justification in response to this reproof, given in a series of expressions in the negative. These expressions no more state and reproduce the real content of one’s immediate impression than they are also able to embody a knowledge of Christ under the form of perception, thus of objective consciousness.30 For us, however, “knowledge” would be less of a recommendation for these expressions than it would be for others. Accordingly, we can also assess the value of this theory for use of the church as only very negligible. It cannot give guidance for the correct preaching of Christ, since it is executed only in a negative fashion. Rather, at most it could serve in the domain of language usage in homiletics as a test for whether or not features are found in the glorification or in the depiction31 of Christ that overstep the boundaries drawn. Even in this regard, however, the determinations of the schools have already long since become a dead letter, to which no one can take recourse any more. This is so, for ascetic32 language—even of the most orthodox teachers, insofar as they are not only satisfied to transmit a traditional letter but seek edification and strengthening in living faith—is so remote from scholastic terminology that workable middle terms between the two would scarcely be found. This development appears just as unfruitful if one looks at the divergent opinions that are current among us: some of them are docetic, in that they identify the Redeemer so closely with God that the truth of his human aspect cannot persist alongside them; some of them are ebionitic, in that they leave no substantial difference between Christ and some excellent human being. That is to say, in both respects these divergent opinions are thoroughly unsuitable to use for finding the boundaries

between what is Christian but appears to be unchristian, either as a result of its own awkwardness or as a result of hostile misrepresentation, and between what is no longer Christian because it is simply naturalistic or fanatical. 3. In addition to this consideration, it also happens that the only thing that occurred in the original form of an Evangelical body of doctrine for this article of faith was a repetition of the older formulations. This is so, for if the question had been taken up afresh by one side right away within the disputes that arose between the two Evangelical parties, even so this effort could neither have led to a new exhaustive study, because the matter would have come up only at some other point of disagreement, nor would what would have been settled on that occasion even have achieved creedal standing within the entire area covered by the Augsburg Confession. Hence, if faith-doctrine is increasingly to be purifying itself of scholasticism, the task arises of organizing a scientific expression for this doctrine too, one in which the impression that we have obtained regarding the distinctive dignity of the Redeemer from testimonies about him is reflected in more than formulations that are in a negative form. Moreover, at the same time, the expression, at the very least in that same relationship which enters into other dogmatic determinations, would be brought closer to what can be present in religious communications concerning Christ to Christian communities. Now, above33 we hope to have laid down the ground for a treatment that seeks to denote the interrelation of what was divine and what was human in the Redeemer in such a way that the two expressions—most troublesome, to put it mildly—namely, “divine nature” and “duality of natures in the same person,” are avoided entirely. We may hope this, for suppose that the difference between the Redeemer and us is established in such a way that, instead of our clouded and weak God-consciousness, in him there was an absolutely clear Godconsciousness, one that was exclusively determining every element of his life, hence one that must be regarded to be a steady living presence, consequently to be a true being of God in him. Then, by virtue of this difference, everything that we lack exists in him, and also, by virtue of his likeness with us, a likeness limited only by his absolute sinlessness, everything is such that we are able to grasp it. That is, the being of God in the Redeemer is posited as his innermost primary strength, from which all his activity proceeds and which links all the elements of his life together. However, everything human simply forms the organism for this primary strength and relates itself to that strength as its system both for taking this strength in and for presenting it, just as in us all other strengths have to relate to our intelligence.34 Thus, if this expression departs greatly from the former scholastic language, nonetheless it rests in equal measure on the Pauline expression “God was in Christ” and on the Johannine expression “The Word became flesh,” for “word” is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness and “flesh” is the general designation for what is organic. Now, to the extent that all human activity of the Redeemer in its every connection depends on this being of God in him and presents it, the expression that God became human in the Redeemer is justified since the expression befits him exclusively. Likewise, every element of his existence,35 to the extent that one can isolate it, presents this new Godbecoming-human and God-having-become-human, because always and everywhere all that is

human in him came from what is divine. Moreover, one could scarcely wish to prove that there is something docetic or ebionitic in this description too. Rather, only someone who believes, as it were, that one has to insist on an empirical emergence of divine attributes in the Redeemer if one is to acknowledge something in him that is more than human could want to call the above description ebionitic. Further, only the claim that there is no imperfection of God-consciousness in the Redeemer could someone find to be docetic. However, neither attempt would find any support, even in the literal statements36 of ecclesial doctrine that have currency. Hence, in the ecclesial propositions that follow, our assessment will refer to the preliminary statement expressed in the present proposition. The purpose of this procedure is to show successively the extent to which the intent of these propositions agrees with what is set forth in that formulation and the extent to which the unsuitability and difficulty of such ecclesial formulations as this one has, in part, thwarted the possibility that their elaboration could not correspond with their aim throughout and has, in part, also opened an arena for futile hairsplitting.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 38; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 53. 2. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 488. See §37n5. Here Schleiermacher notes that for the Reformed confessional writings he was using Johann Christian Wilhelm Augusti (1771–1841), Corpus librorum symbolicorum (1827), and its corresponding page numbers. Later volumes by other editors are used here. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 243f.; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 255. Cf. note at §37n3. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, also Cochrane (1972), 149; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 335. 5. Ed. note: ET Tice, drawn from the original German and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 216; cf. Cochrane (1972), 103. 6. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 617; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1019. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher cites the original Greek; ET cf. Book of Concord (2000), 22f. (from the Greek); Greek: Schwartz, Acta conciliorum oekumenicorum 2.1.2 (1922), 80; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26. 8. Ed. note: ET cf. Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 29. Schleiermacher quotes the original Latin. 9. Ed. note: These words translate frater, consubstantialis nobis. 10. Ed. note: Here “intimate company” stands for brüderliche Genossenschaft, an intimacy of brethren, both brothers and sisters, reminiscent, in Schleiermacher’s experience, of the Herrnhuter Brethren among whom he had lived as a youth. 11. Subjekt. 12. The Belgic Confession (1561) in 10 also gets itself involved in the same confusion: “It must follow that he—who is called God, the Word, the Son, and Jesus Christ—did exist at that time when all things were created by him.” Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 394; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 366. 13. Probably no one would want to cite John 1:18 or 17:5 as evidence against this claim. Ed. note: See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 14, regarding his view of the Gospel according to John and its “Son of God” ascription to Jesus. For his use of “Son of God” in CF, see §§99.1, 99.P.S., 124.1, 128.1, and 172.3. 14. Ed. note: The plurivocal term gleichmäßig is used here, in this instance meaning that each of the two so-called natures bears exactly the same weight, as if the same term could do for each one. 15. Natur. 16. Unbedingten und schlechthin Einfachen. 17. ϕύσις. Only one piece of Scripture is implicated in this flaw, and this is but a deuterocanonical piece, 2 Pet. 1:4, where the expression Θέιɑς ϕύσεως κοινωνόι (“became partakers of the divine nature”) is present. However, the immediate context already shows that it cannot be taken so strictly as has to be required here, where a principal dogmatic determination is involved. 18. Natur. 19. Sein und Wesen. Ed. note: That is, even as might be seen in writings attributed to Aristotle (384–322 BCE). 20. Figur.

21. One may simply compare John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.9: “It is unnecessary for natures hypostatically united to each other to be provided each with its own subsistence. For they can concur in one subsistence without being nonsubsistent, yet not having each its own individuating subsistence but both being one and the same.” And 3.2: “He became hypostatically united to the … animated flesh which he had.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 286, 270f.; Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1017, 988. 22. Ed. note: The two verbs are verknüpfen und vereinigen. 23. Dreieinigkeit. Ed. note: When Schleiermacher refers to the classic doctrine, he simply uses the familiar term Trinität (e.g., in §170), which literally means “threeness” (Dreiheit). The subject of the concluding propositions (§§170–72) is the problem of the Dreieinigkeit (literally, “the three-in-oneness”). 24. Einheit des Wesens. Ed. note: “being,” but presumably not strictly in the sense conveyed by Sein (also to be translated “being”). God is taken by Schleiermacher and others to be “Supreme Being” (höchste Wesen). 25. Wesen. 26. Natur. 27. Dreieinigkeitslehre. 28. These formulations are taken from Reinhard’s Dogmatik (1818) §92, 347. Redeker note: Page 347 reads: “Each person is one nature, but each nature is not one person, because it is possible for there to be one nature that does not exist alone and in and of itself but in its subsistence depends on some other. So, we assert that the two natures that are found to exist in Christ constitute but one singular person that exists in and of itself, and thus his human nature does not exist in and of itself but in its subsistence is bound to the divine nature” [ET Tice]. 29. Bestimmungen. Ed. note: This word doubles for “definitions” as well. 30. Der Form der Anschauung, also des objektiven Bewusstseins. Ed. note: This usage of Anschauung, preceded by Erkenntnis (“knowledge”) and modified by objecktiven Bewusstseins, makes it clear that Schleiermacher is using Anschauung in the philosophical sense of “perception” rather than as referring to “intuition.” Schleiermacher is very consistent in his use of technical terms. Thus, based on this instance—and many other like instances—it is reasonable to anticipate that “perception” is his meaning for Anschauung throughout Christian Faith. 31. Veranschaulichung. Ed. note: That is, making clear the figurative actions and words of Christ, also making the hearers’ visualization and registering of them possible—in short, making them perceptible. 32. Ed. note: Ordinarily, asketische Sprache stands for “devotional language,” as here, but that too can become remote from a living faith (cf. §87.2). 33. See §94. 34. This is exactly how the Symbolum Quicunque vult (= the so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.) has it, on line 35: “For, as the rational soul and the flesh are one human being, so God and the human being are one in Christ.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 25; Latin and German in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 30. Intelligenz is the term, above translated by “intelligence,” used in this creed for “rational soul.” 35. Dasein. 36. Buchstaben.

§97. Second Doctrinal Proposition: In the uniting of divine nature with human nature, the divine alone was active or communicating itself,1 and the human alone was passive or in process of being taken up; during the union of both, however, every activity was also an activity of both in common. 1. If one conceives the task as that of objectively and clearly presenting Christ to be such a unity of the two natures, then it is natural and unavoidable to separate from each other the act of unity and the state of being in union. This is the case, for that act of uniting would have been only the very beginning of the person of Christ’s appearing in the world, and thus it must also be expressed by means of some relation to the earlier nonexistence of that person, whereas the state of being in union, viewed as the distinctive being of the person itself, must also be expressed by a formulation that is equally in keeping with all elements of that person’s existence. However, for our task the description of the very first beginning appears to be an excessive undertaking, because we are not immediately affected by it at all. Accordingly, the undertaking would be best omitted, because things of that kind are always dubious, and so the adoption of this proposition requires a special justification. First of all, however, it is entirely in order to attribute such a difference as that between Christ and all other human beings to its beginning as well, because it is one thing if the difference is recognized to be an original one, and, on the contrary, the impression received is shaped quite differently if the difference is something additional and thus is only a later state of a person who was originally wholly like us. We can only deny the latter position, moreover, if we return to the impression as it was first received. Thus, the task arises of depicting the first observed element in continuity with every later element observed. Hence the two propositions above do indeed distinctly establish the difference between beginning a person’s life and its further course; nevertheless, they can be conceived only as they simultaneously merge into each other. This is so, for, on the one hand, the beginning of the person is, at the same time, the beginning of the person’s activity; on the other hand, every element, to the extent that it can be isolated and observed in itself, is simultaneously a new coming into being of this distinctive personal existence. Furthermore, every activity of Christ must display the same relationship which the act of uniting expresses, given that this act would indeed have been a uniting only for such activities, such that the impetus would have stemmed from the divine nature; so also, in reverse, the act of uniting must display the same relationship through which every activity of Christ exists, namely, that both natures would work together as one, because every activity is indeed only a particular appearance of this uniting. Both formulations that are set forth in our doctrinal proposition, and likewise all other formulations yet to come up and those derived from them, must necessarily be evaluated and applied in accordance with this canon. 2. The expression by which the active communication of divine nature in that act of uniting is to be more precisely designated is subject to manifold reproof. Specifically, the assertion that in the act of uniting, the divine nature would have taken up the human nature in the unity of its person.2 This is the case not only by virtue of the expression “divine nature” but above all because it makes the personal existence of Christ entirely dependent on the

personal existence of the second person in the divine being. The Sabellians have denied this position, but they have still had no less belief in the uniting of the divine and human in Christ than do orthodox Christians. Thus, it appears to be an injustice against all who perhaps might approach the Sabellian position to attach the expression for this belief to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. This is so, particularly because the original impression that constitutes faith, which the disciples received and did so in such a way that they conceived and rendered it in thoughts, was not connected with any acquaintance with a trinity. The worst feature of the orthodox position, however, is that in this manner the human nature could only become one person in the sense in which this befits one person in the Trinity, with the result that the following dilemma then arises: either the three persons would have to be like human persons, wholly independent, self-standing individual beings, or Christ, viewed as a human being, would be no such thing, with which assertion the picture of Christ as a human being would then entirely dissolve into something docetic. Hence, it is much more reliable to establish the doctrine of Christ in a way independent of that doctrine, since an analogue to the emergence and formation of faith is also available. To be sure, someone could still also find our first proposition to be docetic—that is, as if the true reality of the human nature in Christ would already be lost through it as well. This finding would imply that in emergence of Christ’s person, the human nature would have to be entirely passive, since human nature would plainly exercise activity in the emergence of every other human person, given that the body-forming force of human nature is shaped into a new unity of human existence in the full integrity of all one’s life functions. Yet, suppose that we accept the help of the canon set forth above, in consequence of which the act of uniting would also have to have been, at the same time, a common activity of both, of the divine nature communicating itself3 and of this distinct human nature’s beingtaken-up.4 Then the matter would be disposed in such a way that the human nature could surely not have been active for the purpose of being taken up by the divine nature, with the result that, as it were, the existence of God in Christ would have been developed based on his human nature, or even simply in such a way that a capacity to draw the divine to itself would have existed in human nature. On the contrary, to be sure, only the possibility of this union would have been created along with human nature, and this possibility would have had to remain conserved during the dominion of sin in order to be taken up in such a uniting with the divine. However, this possibility would consist by far, neither in capacity nor in activity. On the contrary, in pursuance of our canon we must add to it that the human nature could be taken up by the divine only in the process of some person-forming activity, with the qualification that the divine activity is not person-forming in the manner of procreation. Hence, if the discussion regards the emergence of Christ’s distinctive personal existence— that is, concerning the planting of what is divine into human nature—then human nature would only have been taken up thereby and could only behave passively, in that in each case the person-forming activity of human nature could always simply be brought about by an ordinary human person without that planting activity of the divine nature. However, inasmuch as Christ was also a completely human person, so too the forming of this person

must also have been an act of the human nature of Christ; thus the whole must have been one act in communion between the two.5 All dogmaticians also recognize this point who, along with rejection of the opinion that the body of Christ was formed entirely in one instant6 or the opinion that he came from heaven with everything essential,7 accord the gradual formation of how his life was organized from its very first beginning onward with the true reality8 of human nature. However, just as over the course of this development Christ’s human nature would not have been entirely passive, there would also have been a physical activity of his human nature at the first beginning of life, this, with and alongside physical activity, being a purely passive behavior in his relation to divine activity. On the other hand, one could raise entirely contrary doubts against positing a special divine activity with the beginning of the person of Christ. That is, this activity would have to be either an activity in time—which conflicts with the first canon that God would have to remain strictly identical beyond all the means and measures9 of time—or this activity would then have been nothing special and immediate, wherewith, in turn, God’s supernatural character, already agreed to, would be endangered. In addition, one sees, based on this consideration, how even given a genuinely Christian disposition, two false paths could be chosen. In order not to implicate what is eternal in temporality, one could decide to condition presentation of the distinctive dignity of Christ in such a way that he could still be viewed as a product of human nature as every other person would have to be. Moreover, in order to gain room all the more surely hereby for some immediate divine activity, one could set forth the view that even the humanity of Christ would not have first begun at some point or other in time. This view would necessarily border on holding a docetic position, however, and thereby the genuinely historical character of Christ would be no less threatened than his prototypical character is threatened by the contrary position. Yet, it would completely obviate the oscillation between these two positions if one were to grant that the uniting activity of God is also an eternal activity, but only in that there is no difference in God between decision and activity. This is to say, for us the divine activity is only decree,10 and, as such, it is also already identical with God’s decree of humanity’s creation, and it is contained in that decree. However, the aspect of this decree turned toward us as activity, or the appearance of the decree in the Redeemer’s actual beginning of life, is temporal. Through the Redeemer that eternal decree is actualized in one point of space as well as in one period of time. As a result, the temporal character of this process relates entirely to the person-forming activity of human nature in the course of which human nature was taken up into the uniting, and one could also just as rightly say that already Christ was also always coming into being, even as a human person, at the same time as the world was coming into being.11 Two further formulations also are classed with the presentation of this act of uniting and of the relationships of the two natures in this act. The one formulation expresses the nonpersonal existence of human nature in Christ before its uniting with the divine. The other formulation asserts his supernatural procreation. As concerns the first formulation, the proposition is that the human nature of Christ would be nonpersonal, in and of itself, or would have no subsistence of its own but rather

would subsist only by means of the divine nature. This formulation is very vague and clumsy in its scholastic dress. If one were to picture something as the human nature of Christ but, nevertheless, in a nonpersonal way, the task of showing this would not be easy to fulfill. This is so, since the nature belonging to us all can designate the nature of an individual only insofar as that nature has become personal in the individual. If one were to entertain these thoughts, however, the new predicament would unavoidably arise as to how, given its not being specifically personal, the human nature in Christ would, nevertheless, not be less complete in him than in all the rest of us. Yet, removing this confusion simply requires having a correct conception. The expression “human nature” can properly signify this form of life only when it is viewed as a unity—that is, as it is person-forming in accordance with its very being12 and has its actual existence13 in the changing course of personal life. Hence, then the emergence of every individual being of our species is to be viewed as a deed14 which human nature, viewed as a vital force, brings to completion by its own means.15 Then, the opinion would be that, because by this deed a person could have been bestowed only with the seed of a God-consciousness that is incomplete and clouded, it is not yet Christ’s absolutely strong God-consciousness. Yet, in the person of Christ precisely this absolutely strong God-consciousness would have to have been in process in his development already from the very beginning of life on. Precisely on that account, the person of Christ would not have come to pass without addition of the uniting divine activity. However, the expression that the human nature of Christ would not have been specifically personal would always remain absurd. Moreover, it would always simply signify that the human nature would not have become this specific personal existence of Christ. Instead, that divine influence on Christ’s human nature would occur simultaneously and constantly and would be viewed as the same in both cases: that is, God becoming human16 in Christ’s consciousness and human nature coming to be shaped into the personal character of Christ. Likewise, even the expression that Christ’s human nature would have remained nonpersonal—which would also be only seemingly negative—would designate only the constancy of that selfsame divine influence and of that which proceeded from it in the person of Christ. This formulation, however, is constructed especially with a view to those who want to unite the term “personal” with the person of Jesus only later, after the person of Jesus had been long since culturally formed to completion, consequently with a view to those who assume that a personal existence would belong to his human nature without this uniting. Now, just as it already lies in this formulation that in the emergence of the person of Christ a supernatural influence did occur, a second formulation is then connected with this influence. This second formulation appends to this influence a further, supernatural factor, namely, the entire exclusion of male activity in the procreation of Christ. That is to say, this factor is indeed a different one, in that the being of God in Christ cannot possibly be explained based on its claim that male activity did not take part. One must reflect on this definition from a twofold viewpoint, first in relation to evidence present in the New Testament, and then in relation to its dogmatic value.

Those accounts17 are not returned to anywhere in the wider course of the story of Christ and also appeal to no apostolic passage. They also contradict both genealogical accounts of Christ, which accounts refer directly and without artifice back to Joseph and without any reference to that allegation. As concerns the Gospel of John, those accounts contradict, in part, not only its silence on the subject itself but also the manner in which it narrates, without any amending remark, that Jesus was called Joseph’s son by acquaintances and by people of his country.18 Further, something similar is found in both of those other Gospels too.19 Now, admittedly, whoever takes those accounts quite literally has something miraculous yet to advocate. However, surely no one would want to claim that by this assumption a feature contrary to Christ’s true nature would have come into our faith, although, to be sure, those accounts do report the addition of certain forces to such a feature, delighting in parallels between these reports and many kinds of Jewish and pagan sayings regarding highly reputed men’s being conceived supernaturally. Likewise, under these circumstances, suppose that others would have had mental reservations about grounding doctrine on those accounts alone and about setting it forth perhaps even as indispensable doctrine of faith. Suppose instead that they would find it acceptable to conclude from the available evidence that among the original disciples of Christ neither was great value placed on this circumstance nor was even an entirely fixed and generally recognized tradition available concerning it. Then, one could in no way deny to them that whoever would not also believe in Christ’s supernatural procreation, in this sense, could still very well believe in Christ as Redeemer. Now, as concerns what pertains to the second viewpoint, namely, the dogmatic value of this assumption: first of all, not only were passages in ancient creedal symbols20 composed in such a way that they betray virtually nothing whatsoever of a dogmatic aim, but the same is also valid for newer ones that are derived from them.21 Additions to expressions of the old creedal symbols,22 expressions in part readopted and, in part, granted and presupposed, scarcely have a faint dogmatic hue now and then, whether in relation to original sin or to an implanting of the divine into human nature. This is the case, for these additions are, nevertheless, the only ones for the sake of which the alleged fact of a supernatural procreation can have any importance for Christian faith. However, a more exact examination will show that this alleged fact is a matter of indifference in both respects. That is, since we have already explained that what is supernatural, in our sense of the term, is claimed for the person of the Redeemer in respect to both relations, it has also been explained—even though it was not said explicitly—that natural procreation as a deed of the person-forming force of human nature, mediated through reciprocal sexual activity, is insufficient for the purpose of Christ’s emergence. This is so, for as a result of what was said about the susceptibility to sin of every individual being grounded in earlier generations,23 natural procreation could not produce the Redeemer, if he himself should not belong to the collective life of susceptibility to sin. The same is valid regarding the other point. This is the case, for the reproductive force inherent in the species cannot be sufficient to produce an individual being through whom something could be first brought into the species that did not exist in it previously. Rather, in

addition to this reproductive force, yet another activity must be supposed, a divinely creative activity that combines with the activity of that human force. Moreover, only such a divinely creative activity can also remove that influence of sexual activity in procreation which is conditioned by some participation in susceptibility to sin in general. Furthermore, it is in this sense that everyone who assumes a natural sinlessness in the Redeemer, and a new creation by means of the uniting of what is divine with what is human, postulates a supernatural procreation as well. By itself, natural procreation is insufficient for this purpose, and a partial suspension of natural procreation must likewise be insufficient for the purpose. The reason is that the being of God cannot be established in a life that is generated within a young woman24 without cohabitation, and, were the motherly share to remain entirely natural, just as little could the absence of a fatherly share in a new life free that life from community with the collective life of susceptibility to sin. Accordingly, the supplementary notion that, in the same fashion, Mary too would have to be free of hereditary susceptibility to sin, was also formed quite early. Yet, on the one hand, at that point the same would have to be claimed for the mother of Mary on the same basis, and so forth on back. On the other hand, indeed, even every actual sin of Mary, inasmuch as every element from her psyche would also have a physical aspect, would nevertheless have exerted some repercussion on the child as long as his life were enclosed within her own life. Now, there is no doctrine or tradition of a continuous line of mothers conceived and remaining without sin. Thus, the suspension of male participation in the Redeemer’s being conceived is insufficient in both respects. Consequently, any supposition regarding a suspension of any natural participation by both genders would be superfluous. Therefore, here everything is based on a higher influence which, viewed as a divine creative activity, could have modified the fatherly and the motherly influence alike to that divine purpose, even if the procreation had been completely natural, so that no susceptibility to sin would have been established, since only the divine creative activity would have been able to make up for the natural incompleteness of this offspring. Thus, the general concept of supernatural procreation remains essential and necessary if the distinctive superiority of the Redeemer is to remain undiminished; however, the further determination of the concept as procreation without male assistance25 in the process does not cohere at all with the essential features regarding the Redeemer’s distinctive dignity. Thus, in and of itself the further determination of the concept is also definitely not a component of Christian doctrine. Accordingly, whoever embraces further determination of the concept does so only on account of the narratives containing it in the New Testament Scriptures. Thus, belief in it belongs only to doctrine regarding Scripture, as is the case with many factual issues that cohere to just as little degree of necessity with the dignity and work of the Redeemer. In addition, everyone has to decide on the matter for themselves in accordance with proper application of basic principles of criticism and of the art of interpretation that they have found trustworthy. Now, it would be difficult, at the very least, for anyone who embraces a supernatural procreation in our sense to find in the supernatural features that it contains any ground to deny a historical character to these narratives or to depart from literal explanation. In the same way, those who cannot

accept these narratives as reliable, when they are viewed as literal and historical, are still free to remain true to the actual doctrine regarding supernatural procreation. However, if it is deemed superfluous to set forth an actual doctrine concerning virginal conception, then this choice too is open to question, because one can become all too easily entangled in investigations of the natural sciences, which lie entirely outside our domain.26 Now, in order to guard against misunderstandings, only the following is yet to be observed concerning this notion that has become generally predominant in Christendom.27 First, however little this physiological supernatural character already of itself includes that within itself which we claim regarding divine influence in procreation of the Redeemer, just as little does it also have an influence on the character of popular culture in Jesus’ personal existence, either in order to eradicate already in itself that wherein communion with susceptibility to sin would lie, or in order to deprive him of what belongs to his historical character. Second, on the same grounds one must also beware of further enlarging upon the notion beyond what evangelical narratives require, since the notion indeed has no other ground than these narratives to call for such effort. In accordance with these narratives, the claim that Mary remained perpetually a virgin is to be dismissed as completely groundless. Now, third, the notion also cannot be grounded on nor intend to suggest that sexual urge is thoroughly bad, as if its satisfaction were something sinful and generative of sin. Finally, even if one takes the narratives literally and historically, a precise didactic terminology is, nevertheless, not presupposed therein. It is particularly to be borne in mind that at that time the angel could not speak to Mary about the Holy Spirit in the more precise New Testament sense.28 Therefore, all forced explanations29 thereof, on account of which this effect is particularly attributed to the Holy Spirit, are anachronistic. However, against all admittedly typical usage among teachers of the church,30 it could only be a complete desecration to confuse the relationship to such an extent as to call Jesus the son of the Holy Spirit. 3. The second formulation in our proposition, which describes the condition of the two natures being united, can also be correctly understood only if we use the previously mentioned canon for assistance. Otherwise, one could easily hold the mutual participation31 of the two as an equal participation, and also assume, in turn, a preponderance on the aspect of human nature, because an absolutely equal weight is not to be presupposed. In every element of Christian life, however, the characteristic of mutual participation32 has to be such that the activity proceeds from God’s being33 in Christ, and the human nature is only taken up into the mutual participation that comprises this activity. In this connection, if we think about the unmistakable contrast between predominantly active and predominantly passive elements in human life, one could indeed bear some concern that in this way the fullness of the human existence might, nevertheless, be lost to Christ. This might be the case, since passive states could indeed not proceed from what is divine within him, and yet everything ought to proceed from precisely this divine source; consequently, passive states would have to be absent in him. If we conceive this very same human existence in the most general way, then we would find a passive state to be necessary—indeed, to be posited as constantly present in Christ, as it were—such that, in a manner of speaking, all his actions would

depend on that passive state, namely, a shared feeling regarding the condition of human beings.34 At the same time, however, in everything that would have proceeded therefrom, we would most definitely discern the impetus of the reconciling being of God in Christ.35 Thus, this reconciling impulse would appear to be conditioned by a passive state that could have begun only in human nature. Now, suppose that passive states were genuinely present and Christ could have come to enter upon all those activities—thus, strictly speaking, even to the entire work of redemption —only by means of a sense perception occurring by chance, so to speak. Then unmistakably, by that supposition our entire notion regarding the Redeemer would no longer be the same as what we have visualized up to now. However, our canon obliges us to consider the human nature of Christ, even while those sense perceptions are occurring, not to be animated of and by his human nature itself but simply as it is taken up in a shared participation in an activity directed by what is divine in Christ. Now, the divine factor here is the divine love in Christ, which love gave to human nature once and forever, or in every element of it—however one might express the matter— alignment of sense perceptions to the spiritual states36 of human beings. By virtue of these sense perceptions and as a result of them, impulses leading to particular beneficial actions were then to develop in turn. As a result, in this interrelation in Christ every original activity was due only to what is divine, and everything passive was due only to human nature. This is so, for human activities that were conditioned by those impulses to do beneficial activities were also to carry the character of passivity in themselves. To be sure, however, there must also have been other passive states in Christ’s life, states that did not proceed from any kind of spiritual impulse but that were proceeding only from the natural interconnected process of human organization with external nature. Now, likewise in accord with our canon, a formulation that was originally determined for the act of uniting is to be applied to these states, namely, the formulation that the human nature of Christ was not his personal nature before its being taken up into uniting with the divine nature. That is to say, in Christ all such states were still nonpersonal as long as they were merely passive; however, their being taken up into his innermost personal consciousness and their being penetrated by a divine impetus were so much at one that before the latter occurrence they would be taken up only as something external and foreign. As a result, we could summarize everything by saying this: In Christ, no active state could have existed that, viewed as a state persisting of itself, would not have been started by the being of God in him and then been completed by the human nature in him; and, likewise, in Christ no passive state could have existed in which the being of God would not first have taken the same course to a transformation that elevates the passive state into a personal one in activity. To be sure, against this position the objection would be made that if one distinguishes particular elements of Christ’s life from each other and in this way ascribes to what is divine in Christ the beginning of all activities that temporally follow upon each other in this manner, then this process would surely be described as something temporal, including originating and passing activity, in contradiction to what can be said of any being of God. Yet, all this

conflict is also resolved if we simply repeat, continuing in accordance with the guidance of our canon, the answer already given above37 to the same reservations regarding the act of uniting: that even while being united, the divine being in Christ, in itself invariable, became active only in a temporal38 manner, and only that aspect of this activity was temporal which was already crossing over into the domain of appearance clothed in human form. The result is that in Christ himself the original divine activity of taking up what is human and the divine activity during the being united are not distinguishable; however, all activities are also simply developments of what is human inasmuch as they are temporally distinguished. Every active element of Christ became, in a human fashion, a result of temporal development, whether a given element is then to be viewed more as an activity of understanding or more as an activity of will. Moreover, only to the extent that every activity of Christ that occurs is to be conceived just in this way can one justifiably ascribe to him a completely human soul, yet one put in motion internally by this special being of God in him. This being of God in him, itself remaining constant and invariable, pervades that completely human soul in the multiplicity of its functions and elements as this multiplicity is developed ever further.39 Now, this is also the sense of the scholastic expression that the union was a personal one. It is not that a single nature were to occur thereby, a nature that could and would then have to be distinguished from other human modes of being; rather, everything that comes into being through God’s being in Christ would be completely human. Furthermore, taken together it would all constitute a unity of one natural life process in which everything that appears would be purely human, and one aspect could be surmised from another, in that each element would presuppose earlier ones, but everything could be entirely understood only under the presupposition of that unity, itself the only means by which Christ’s person could come into being. As a result, each element of his life would also make manifest the divine in Christ, viewed as what would be the all-conditioning function. Moreover, if we were to measure out the domain of our two affirmations40 over against each other in accordance with everything discussed thus far, then we would have to say the following: first, that the first affirmation is applicable only and exclusively to the absolutely first beginning of Christ’s existence, when his life would have come into being as a simple, singular life. Consequently, we would also have to say that all this would occur before the ongoing appearance of Christ. Likewise, the second affirmation is applicable only and exclusively after this appearance of Christ, for only if what is human in Christ were absolutely complete and if nothing more were to enter into coexistence41 with God’s being in Christ could what is human in him be exclusively cooperative. In this way, moreover, it would be conceivable that there are two different ways of looking at the time of this appearance. Those two approaches, though congruous, jar against each other, based on a lack of information regarding their true relationship. In every element the one affirmation looks so exclusively at the inaugurating divine factor that it stands in danger of losing sight of the human connection. The other affirmation generally intends to grasp the human connection so fully that nothing is left out resulting in the underlying divine factor’s being lost from sight.

4. The old standards also agree with both formulations of our doctrinal proposition. They were preserved intact, of course, but do not constitute any sort of new standards. The old standards were attendant upon proceedings from previous councils then laid out in the oldest systems of doctrine.42 In the first threesome of these standards,43 the thought that in Christ the divine nature was in no way divided from the human nature in him is plainly laid as a foundation, to avoid anyone’s being able to sunder the two natures from each other. That division, in case someone would also intend to form it spatially or temporally in accordance with the guidance of those formulations, could, all the same, only have been a division of activities. Moreover, if there were then such a division, in Christ there would have to have been, on the one hand, human activities that were not dependent on the divine impetus, and, on the other hand, divine activities that would have been manifested through nothing in the human nature. However, these activities could also not have demonstrated their origin in the act of uniting, because in themselves they would have borne no similarity with that act, and therewith that generally held formulation wards off the same thing as our canon also wards off. The other threesome of standards44 quite clearly has the aim of setting aside any notion regarding modification of one of the two natures by the other. Now, through any such modification that would indeed have to have proceeded from what is human, what is divine would have been something limited temporally and spatially. Likewise, if the human nature would have been changed by what is divine, the person would have moved away from identity with the rest of humanity. Thus, in both cases the uniting of what is divine with what is human would not have had lasting existence. Here too, then, the aim is also the same, which is why we seek to conceive what is divine in the uniting in such a way that it can exist on its own along with completeness45 of what is human and vice versa. In no less a way, these earlier formulations are not to be taken up again, since they rest throughout on the notion of divinity as a nature, which can function generally only in a confusing manner. Given these negative formulations it would also be time to give extremely empty formalistic theory over to the history of dogma, since affirmations regarding Christ, if they were to be proper, would have to be formed differently depending on whether discourse is about the whole person of Christ or only about one of the two natures. If the same standards are to serve as a norm for expression in the domain of edifying communication so that the expression moves only within those bounds, then the communication could only be helpful in times of epidemic charges of heresy, which would, nevertheless, scarcely recur in this form. In general, we may not put ourselves on the same footing as those ancient times when the more strict doctrinal expression was formed only gradually out of the popular presentations of distinguished men. Since the early system of doctrine is complete and the development of the schools has run its course, now, in contrast, Christian speakers as well as poets must have freedom even to employ expressions that cannot be fit into the terminology of the schools at all, provided only that these expressions are unobjectionable in the immediate connection, out of which they should not be extracted, and provided that nothing lays the groundwork for diminishing the dignity of the Redeemer or infringing on people’s feeling for that dignity. On

the other hand, suppose that these standards were to serve only the schools themselves, for the purpose of assuring more easily the congruity of particular formulations with general propositions at every point. Then they are based too much on use of the expression “nature” for what is divine as for what is human compared to the possible advantage if one were to relinquish this mode of presentation. Moreover, we have a far better canon in the formulation that the creation of human being is first completed in Christ. This is the case, since what is his most inner core distinguishes him from all others; then the being of God dwelling in Christ46 has to relate to human nature taken as a whole in the same way as the prior innermost core of being a human being related to the human organism taken as a whole. This analogy has already run through the entire presentation up to now, though not explicitly articulated. 5. Based on the properties of God’s being in Christ laid out here and the necessity of giving up treatment of Supreme Being as a nature, as well as based on what has already been taught about the divine attributes, it already follows of itself that the theory regarding a mutual communication of attributes of both natures to each other is likewise to be banished from the body of doctrine, as is the whole history of its being handed down. This is so, for two reasons. First, inasmuch as we have arrived at our notions of divine attributes by using only analogy, the assignment of divine attributes to human nature expresses nothing other than absolute human excellence, if this human nature is not to be destroyed by the infinity of those attributes. Second, inasmuch as each individual attribute is only a negative expression regarding divine being47 and the attributes can present the divine being only if they are beheld synoptically as one, so too the human nature of Christ does not carry any picked-out members of this synoptic picture. If someone wanted, for example, to assign the identity of omniscience and omnipotence to Christ’s human nature, with the result that the one and the same omniscient omnipotence and omnipotent omniscience of the divine nature would have permeated the adopted human nature, as heat permeates iron,48 then during this communication nothing human could have remained in Christ anymore, because everything human is essentially a negation of omniscient omnipotence. Thus, if someone were to revert to thinking that the divine attributes are entirely or in large part quiescent—in which case then the first option is alone consistent, so that even miracles could not be traced back to an efficacy of the divine attributes occurring as an exception49—in this way the emptiness of this entire theory would be shown most distinctly. Given that the divine attributes are simply activities, what would constitute the communication of them if they were inactive? Then the uniting of the two natures would have entirely ceased to be a dogmatic notion in the narrower sense, since the uniting could not be an expression concerning an impression received from Christ at all, in that quiescent attributes could not come to sense perception even indirectly. The same would be true of communication of human attributes to the divine nature. This is the case, for, on the one hand, all expressions concerning our God-consciousness are such an attribution, inasmuch as all divine attributes are drawn from human attributes. If those attributes were not formed in that manner, however, the divine being50 [in Christ] would also have to be suspended,51 given that what is human were also to be assigned to the divine

nature in this way. Moreover, both what the divine being is and how it is would have had to be eliminated in the formation of that other set of divine attributes. For example, if the divine nature of Christ were to have communicated something human in the form of a capacity for suffering, then in such a communication nothing divine could be found any longer. This would be the case, since every outstanding human excellence would indeed already be a decrease in the capacity for suffering, and since the innermost godlike quality of what is human would not only not so much suffer as simply determine its activity as a counteraction. However, if it were believed, in part for this reason, that one would also have to attribute a capacity for suffering to the divine nature in Christ, because otherwise the redeeming force would be absent from Christ’s suffering,52 then this suffering would have just as many early pronouncements against it,53 since it rests on incorrect notions regarding the work of redemption, as will be shown below.54 Thus, one could doubtless say that this doctrine regarding the reciprocal communication of attributes, when followed through clearly and truthfully, would have to abrogate anew the uniting of the two natures, in that as a result of this communication each nature would cease to be what it is. The discarding of this theory in no way implies promotion of the Reformed school over against the Lutheran school. This is the case, for if the Reformed school55 speaks of attributes of two natures set over against each other in one person, instead of the theory examined above, then the Reformed school, not without justification, encounters the reproach that they totally divide Christ in two, because neither can being set over against each other also be one thing, nor can the two natures be one if their attributes are also held to be divided. Albeit, the Lutherans too do not avoid a similar total split. This is the case, for if the communication of attributes were to be a real communication, then through it two kinds of activities would originate in each nature, activities that could not form one series. For example, notions of activities within the human nature of Christ could not be formed either in accordance with the mode of limited consciousness or in accordance with the communicated omniscience that they propose. Hence, both modes of doctrine are equally objectionable, since they both do indeed trace back to a false notion of divine nature, one to which a range of attributes would really belong.

1. Sich mitteilend. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term virtually always carries the nuance of self-impartation, which never requires but may include verbal communication. Thus “communication” is the corresponding word used throughout here. 2. Particularly infelicitous is Franz Volkmar Reinhard’s (1755–1812) expression in his Dogmatik (1818) §91, 340: “the one (the son of God) who produces a single person with a sort of human nature that he has added to himself.” Ed. note: ET from Latin, Kienzle. 3. To be sure, after having explained how fully disapproving I am of the expression “divine nature,” I have, nonetheless, let the expression stay in the proposition itself, indeed solely for convenience’ sake. Here, as I discuss the details, however, this consideration does not enter in and therefore at this point I have returned to the simplest expression. Ed. note: Here, göttlichen Wesen is used, as in “Supreme Being,” not göttlichen Natur, though this second expression (Natur) can also be taken to mean “the divine nature” (Wesen). 4. Ed. note: This key phrase is und der zum Aufgenommenwerden von dieser bestimmten menschlichen Natur.

5. Ed. note: Here the last phrase, ein gemeinschaftlicher Akt, reflects Schleiermacher’s frequent characterization of the relationship between God and Christ, God and a human being, and also God and the church, viewed as a community of faith, as “community” or “communion” in each case. The state of being or becoming united or being at one (Gemeinschaft) with each other comprises not a strict identity but a conjoint oneness between two distinct kinds of being. 6. (1) John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.2: “Then the Son of God, bearing the wisdom and power truly of God, overshadowed her … and made for himself … an implanted body, … its form not being put together bit by bit but being completed all at once.” (2) Athanasius (ca. 300–373), Letters, no. 59 (to Epictetus): “Or whence again have certain men vomited an impiety as great as those already mentioned, saying, namely, that the body is not newer than the godhead of the Word but was coeternal with it always, since it was compounded of the essence of wisdom.” Ed. note: (1) ET Tice; cf. Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 270; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:985–86. (2) ET Nicene and PostNicene Fathers, Ser. 2, vol. 4 (1892), 571; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 26:1053–54. 7. See Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 3, 421. 8. Ed. note: Here, as just above, “true reality” translates Wahrheit, in accordance with one main meaning in ordinary usage. 9. Mittel. Ed. note: That is, in God’s own will and acts suitably entering into the lives of Jesus, other human persons, and the human community of faith, but not therewith becoming what God thus communes with, not even with time-bound means and measures. 10. Ratschluß. Ed. note: “Decree” versus an ordinary human decision (Beschluß). 11. Of the two expressions that were used for this act of union by leaders of the Greek church, ἐνσάρκωσις (incarnation) is by far to be preferred to ἐνσωμάτωσις (embodiment). This is so, for the latter expression, in part, permits the notion that the λόγος was planted in a body already prepared to receive it, and, in part, it permits the notion that the λόγος was simply attached to a body but took the place of the soul itself. When ἐνσάρκωσις came into use, both of these expressions dropped out of use. Hence, wherever the subject was authentically handled, this expression too and the corresponding Latin word incarnatio came into more customary use than corporatio and ἐνσωμάτωσις. 12. Wesen. 13. Dasein. 14. Tat. Ed. note: Previously in this discussion the term used was Akt. 15. Ed. note: That is, by procreation first, then by the new human being’s “vital force.” 16. Menschwerden. Ed. note: This is the word typically used for and instead of “incarnation” in German usage. 17. Matt. 1:18–25 and Luke 1:31–34. Ed. note: Sermon on Luke 1:31–32, Dec. 25, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), then SW II.2 (1834), 55–68. ET Wilson (1890), 279–94. 18. John 6:42. 19. Matt. 13:55; Luke 4:22. 20. Roman Symbol (= the so-called Apostles’ Creed, early 8th cent.): “… conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary.” Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol (325, 381): “… incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary, and became a human being.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 21, 23; Latin and German in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 21, 26. In the first instance, Schleiermacher actually quotes from the Greek of Marcellus (340). See note at §36. 21. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 3: “born of the virgin Mary.” (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 11: “… not from the coitus of a man … but … most chastely conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of the ever virgin Mary.” (3) First Helvetic Confession (1536) 11: “… took on flesh from the immaculate virgin Mary through the cooperation of God by the Holy Spirit.” (4) Gallican Confession (1559) 14: “And as to his humanity, he was the true seed of Abraham and of David, although he was conceived by the secret and incomprehensible power of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the blessed virgin.” (5) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) 2: “… took man’s nature into the womb of the blessed virgin, of her substance.” (6) Belgic Confession (1561) 18: “… being conceived in the womb of the blessed virgin Mary, by the power of the Holy Spirit, without the means of man.” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 38; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 54. The two versions given have “pure” and “blessed” before “virgin.” (2) ET Cochrane (1972), 243; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 255. Cf. §37n3. (3) ET Tice, here drawn from the original German and Latin version in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 215f.; cf. Cochrane (1972), 103. (4) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, also Cochrane (1972), 149; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 333. The Latin text Schleiermacher used adds “and incomprehensible” and “in the womb of the blessed virgin.” (5) Schleiermacher quoted from the earlier 1562 Latin edition. See 1571 English in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 488. See §37n5. (6) ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 409f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 371. 22. Even where the subject does not come up at all, as in the Symbolum Quicunque vult [the so-called Athanasian Creed after the late 4th cent.] and the Hungarian Confession (1562), no intentionality is to be sought in this regard. 23. See §69. 24. Jung frau. Ed. note: This young woman, sometimes called a virgin, was the mother of Jesus.

25. Zutun. Ed. note: Earlier this role was also called a cooperative sharing in the process. 26. Just consider, for example, the expressions that are emphasized in passages from the confessions cited above. 27. Christenheit. 28. Rightly understood, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749) agrees with this position in 1.10, and 3.11: “The Father and the Holy Spirit in no way participate in the incarnation of the word save by good pleasure,” although elsewhere he also speaks differently and even more inexactly. Ed. note: The Orthodox Faith (743–); ET Tice, cf. Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 191 and 292; Greek and Latin: Migne Gr. 94:841–42 and 1027–28. 29. Cf. Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764), 3, 416. His definitions are chiefly based on Hilary of Poitiers’ The Trinity (356–360) 2. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 35–63; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:49–75. 30. Many passages on this subject are to be found in Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622). 31. Gemeinschaft. Ed. note: This instance makes clear that Schleiermacher’s usual meaning of “communion” and “community” can include as few as two members, hence the translation “mutual participation” for the presumed two “natures.” 32. Gemeinschaftlichkeit. 33. Sein Gottes. Ed. note: Here, as always regarding Christ, Schleiermacher’s real meaning is twofold: Sein as God’s presence and, at the same time, Sein or seiend as active existence. 34. Mitgefühl mit dem Zustand der Menschen. Ed. note: “Compassion for” would also be implied here. 35. Ed. note: Here the Impuls is an “impetus” from God and with God, thereupon an impulse within Jesus with and for and on behalf of other human beings: am bestimmtesten den Impuls des versöhnenden Seins Gottes in Christo erkennen. Thus, it testifies to how Christ’s mediatorial role occurred. On Christ’s reconciling activity, as such, see §101, esp. 101.3–4, then §§104.2–4 and 108.2. 36. Der geistigen Zustände. Ed. note: Indistinguishably, as it were, in German usage geistig means spiritual or mental, hence all the internal functions of a human being. 37. In subsection §97.2 here. 38. Ed. note: In the German third edition (1835–1836) is to be found the conjecture that Schleiermacher meant to say “timeless” (zeitlose). This could be the case, since for him the eternal God was being active in Christ. However, also for him, God was then acting in time: in Christ what is supernatural (but in this case not arbitrarily, i.e., not “absolutely” so) had become natural (finite, temporal, and personal), not bursting through these conditions created by God to be known as God in se. 39. Among others, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749) said the same thing, if one but grasps him aright, in The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.7: “One must know, moreover, that although we say that the natures of the Lord are mutually immanent, we know that this immanence comes from the divine nature. For this last pervades all things and indwells as it wishes, but nothing pervades it. And it communicates its own splendors to the body [more about this below] while remaining impassible and having no part in the affections of the body [to which everything temporal also belongs].” Ed. note: The comments in brackets are Schleiermacher’s. ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 284; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1011–12. 40. Ed. note: That is, belief in the divine and human natures of Christ that was stated in the Evangelical confessional symbols, as indicated earlier under this proposition. 41. Zusammensein. Ed. note: See §§126 and 148 for parallel uses of this specific term. 42. For example, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–), 3.3ff. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 271ff.; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:987ff. 43. Without division (ἀχωρίστως), without difference (ἀδιαιρέτως), and without separation (ἀδιαστάτως). Ed. note: In characterizing these standards as a “threesome” (Dreiheit), Schleiermacher is repeating the same term as what he used to name the divine threeness from that time on. 44. Not subject to change (ἀναλλοιώτως), unchangeable (ἀτρέπτως), without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως). 45. Vollständigkeit. 46. Ed. note: The phrase is das einwohnende Sein Gottes. In case it be overlooked, this phrase is a practically onetime brief characterization of Schleiermacher’s account regarding God’s being “in Christ.” 47. Negation des göttlichen Wesens. 48. Solid Declaration (1577) 8: “‘the whole fullness of deity’ [Col. 2:9] dwells in Christ … ‘bodily’ as in its own body … in the assumed human nature … exercises the same divine power, glory, and efficacy as the soul does in the body and fire in a glowing iron.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 628; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1038. 49. See Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818), §97.2. Redeker note: Page 369 reads: “Thus, one cannot say that his miracles were performed by his divine nature, i.e., by using his omnipotence. For this use he first

obtained only in the state of being exalted (Erhöhung, glorification). … Rather, he performed his miracles as the other prophets did, through extraordinary spiritual gifts.” [ET Tice] 50. Wesen. 51. Ed. note: Be aufgehoben (suspended)—that is, as now grasped in one’s God-consciousness. 52. Solid Declaration (1577) 8: “For if I believe that only the human himself suffered for me, then Christ would be a poor savior for me; in fact, he himself would need a savior.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 623; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1029. 53. John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 744), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.7: “[The divine nature] communicates its own splendors to the body while remaining impassible and having no part in the affections of the body.” Ed. note: The addition in brackets is Schleiermacher’s, in Greek. See the expanded quotation to which this one belongs in §97.3. ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 284; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1011–12. In this quotation, “impassible” implies what Schleiermacher has called an “incapacity for suffering” on the part of the divine nature earlier in this subsection. 54. Ed. note: See §§100–105. 55. Gallican Confession (1559) 15: “In one person … the two natures are actually and inseparably joined and united, and yet each remains in its proper character.” Likewise in the Belgic Confession (1561) 19. Ed. note: ET and original French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, 404; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 333, 372.

§98. Third Doctrinal Proposition: Christ was distinguished from all other human beings by his essential sinlessness and his absolute perfection. 1. Essential sinlessness is to be understood as a sinlessness that has its sufficient ground in the interior of Christ’s personal existence itself, with the result that, under whatever external relations there may be—in connection with which we also admit what is physical to be something external—Christ’s personal existence would have been the same throughout. At the very least, moreover, the point in dispute is set forth by means of this expression with sufficient definiteness, in that as a consequence of what was said earlier1 this inner ground can be nothing other than the union of what is divine and what is human in his person. We must also imagine something to be possible in general that we immediately experience in individual instances, namely, that actualization of sin, even its inner actualization, can be prevented by a favorable chain of circumstances. However, this process must occur in such a way that thereby we not only remain conscious of ourselves as sinful human beings but are also further strengthened in this consciousness by sense perception itself, because this sense perception includes consciousness that the inner ground for averting sin has been lacking.2 Thus, such a sinlessness, in comparison with that sinlessness which is only accidental, would not only not express the distinctive superiority of the Redeemer; rather, it would also express the following: that where the inner possibility of sinning would be posited, at least an infinitesimal bit of reality would also be coposited to be a tendency toward sinning. As a result, someone who can be content with such an accidental sinlessness for the Redeemer would also be able to let actual sin pass. However, this would be the case only inasmuch as such actual sin could not be registered in sense perception3 with the result that someone or other could be positioned higher than the Redeemer in some given instant. In contrast, the typical formulations of the scholastics do not regard the difference with suitable rigor, and the dispute conducted among them appears to be entirely empty. To be sure, the formulation “It is possible not to sin”4 does express the essential superiority of Christ, if one takes it to express a contrast to the state of all other human beings. This is the

case, for viewed collectively at no time could human beings not sin; on the contrary, sin creeps into everything, which, strictly speaking, would then have to have been the case also with Christ, if a real possibility of sin were located in him, by virtue of that infinitesimal bit premised just above. However, the formulation does not express that superiority as soon as it intends to say something other than the first formulation did, namely: “It is not possible to sin.”5 This is so, for in contrast to that first formulation, this one in itself forecloses the possibility of sin. The same situation holds, however, with the latter formulation, for one can also use it only if one assumes a general divine preservation that governs the Redeemer as well, with the result that this formulation would also correspond with the contents of our formulation only if one were to equate the second formulation with the first one in the sense indicated. It would always remain difficult to determine, even based on the viewpoint of our formulation, what is then precluded regarding Christ as a result of the second formulation, with the result that everything that would have to befit him by virtue of his identity with us would remain intact. Moreover, this point is indisputably one based on which much that is essential for Christian ethics would have to be explicated, in that in order to define the beginning of sin everything would refer to this point.6 A particular difficulty originates here from this point on, that already in the first testimonies of faith Christ was imputed to be tempted in every respect, which in light of our determination above7 already implies sin if we imagine struggle therewith, even if it were only an infinitesimally tiny one. On the other hand, receptivity for the contrast between having a pleasant state and having a lack of any pleasant state8 belongs to the reality of human nature with the result that pleasure and the lack of pleasure must be able to exist in a sinless manner. At that point, moreover, the beginning of sin would have to lie between this element of behavior, when pleasure or the lack of pleasure are existing in a sinless manner, and the element that emerges when the struggle begins. At the same time, if we now imagine that in Christ every element of his behavior had to have been determined by God-consciousness, then it follows that pleasure and lack of pleasure could also exist in him, but not as something determining a given element, consequently only as the result of an element determined in a manner that is in keeping with him. This would be so, insofar as such results would entirely remain as sensation or feeling9 within the limited bounds of consciousness that is at rest. In contrast, such results could not exist in him inasmuch as they were to cross over into desire or repulsion. Now, temptation consists precisely in an approximation to either of these two options. Christ, moreover, could have been tempted without detriment to his essential sinlessness, but only in such a way that pleasure and lack of pleasure had been conveyed to him, viewed as intensified sensation. However, essential sinlessness contains the basis for neither pleasure nor lack of pleasure ever forming the ability to become anything other than indicators of a state, yet without their bearing any determining or contributing force, though not in such a way that their transition from being an indicator into the state of desire or repulsion would actually have come to pass at any time.10 To the extent that this standard must be valid for all

Christ’s life moments without distinction, there is only to be observed that this standard is only expressed for a developed consciousness, and that the childhood of Christ can also have had the character of complete innocence only if this standard also held validity at that time, this in accordance with the respective state of his development. Thus, with respect to sin, Christ would at all times have been at once very differentiated from all other human beings and, in the same way, always essentially free from sin. It also belongs to this sinlessness that Christ could neither have produced actual error himself nor could have taken up into himself even foreign error with real conviction and as duly established truth. It is indeed not necessary, moreover, to limit this statement to the domain of his actual vocation, except that the difference must be firmly maintained between, on the one hand, receiving and spreading notions that are definitely advocated by others— hence, in relation to Christ’s use of these notions, one would neither engage in scrutiny of them nor acknowledge any kind of accountability for them—and, on the other hand, a settled judgment that in any relation would always determine a mode of conduct as well. In every case, to err in the latter judgment would either presuppose a hastiness that could have been produced only by extraneous motives, or would presuppose a clouded sensibility for reality that would, on the one hand, be grounded in general susceptibility to sin, but, on the other hand, would be connected in each individual case with the particular sinfulness of the individual involved. Now, the opinion regarding the natural immortality of Christ is connected with this doctrine regarding the essential sinlessness of Christ, namely, that Christ would not have been subjected to death by virtue of his human nature. This opinion—which has indeed not come to be established through statements that became creedal, nor is even really grounded in biblical passages11—has, nevertheless, been very generally adopted. The connection, however, rests only on its being thought that death is the wages of sin and that one who is released from all connection with sin also could not have stood under the sway of death. Moreover, having taken into account what was already said earlier12 regarding the natural immortality of Adam and regarding the interconnection of all natural evil with sin, nothing more can follow from the sinlessness of Christ than that death could not have been evil for Christ. In addition, we must stick with this point, and instead of that opinion hold on to those which maintain that immortality was first given to Christ’s human nature with the resurrection.13 We must do that all the more, since mortality and the capacity to suffer physically belong together to such an extent that if Christ had such a natural immortality, the capacity for the human nature in his person to suffer would be only an empty word, and only by contradicting oneself could one place any great value on his physical suffering. Instead, this opinion is not merely to be considered as an inference drawn from the sinlessness of Christ; rather, only first in this opinion does one expect to find the correct explanation for all the declarations that present his death as voluntary and so only then to exhaust the higher meaning of his suffering and death. Yet, it is precisely regarding this aspect of the matter that the notion of Christ’s immortality is most highly questionable, for a person who could not die by natural means also could not be killed violently. Accordingly, by

some miracle Christ would first have had to make himself mortal, in order to be able to be killed, and he would have fairly directly killed himself. 2. Now, as regards the absolute perfection14 of human nature at the time of Christ’s masculine maturity: very frequently, spiritual and physical excellence are found to be especially set forth, particularly in ancient discussions on this subject. Yet, it is well to ponder —since no accounts come to assist here that would transform every such statement into a simply historical one,15 whereby it would then be deleted from the domain of doctrine— whether or not we could, based on the impression that we receive from Christ, give an accounting for the disposition of attributes that we cannot trace back to the uniting of what is divine with human nature. Only one thing can be said if we trace the temporal appearance of this creative activity, viewed as a particular fact, back to the general divine ordering. That is, just as the Redeemer could first emerge only at a certain time and only from among this people, so also the divine activity would not have taken up human nature in the process of a person-forming act that would somehow have been able to be caught up in a malforming one earlier. Hence, it is then natural enough to ascribe to the Redeemer a physical, prototypical character as well. However, since the physical aspect of his appearance was bound to be and to effect nothing at all of itself, except as an organ for that uniting, this physical, prototypical character is also to be restricted solely to that function. What follows from this presupposition and from the uninterrupted continuing effective influence of a pure will is simply a healthiness that is equally far removed from a one-sided strength or a mastery of particular physical functions as it is from sickly frailty. This is the case, since through them both the proportionate soundness of Christ’s overall organization16 for the sake of all demands from his will would be diminished thereby. Accordingly, we must limit ourselves to this latter function and so much the more set aside all impertinent questions,17 since our notions of the connection between body and soul are still open to significant corrections. Hence, if discourse among the ancients not seldom also concerns the beauty of the Redeemer,18 then this notion already lies very near the boundary that we may not touch, and we may disregard this notion as an unconscious, secondary effect of heathen views.

1. Ed. note: Concerning §§93–97. 2. Ed. note: That is, the inner ground for averting sin in reversed circumstances is virtually absent (fehlte). 3. John 8:46. Ed. note: Sermon on John 8:46–59, June 19, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 123–37. Note that in this context, sense perception (Wahrnehmung) is the base level of inner mental functioning being addressed. 4. potuit non peccare. 5. non potuit peccare. 6. Sittenlehre. Ed. note: See Hermann Peiter’s edition of Schleiermacher’s Christliche Sittenlehre (1826–27), Bd. I (2011). After establishing an exact correspondence of this ethical treatment of Christian life in and through the church with his Glaubenslehre (Christian Faith), over the main text Schleiermacher established how the essential reference to sin operates as a basis for treatment of Christian life as well. For example, see in Peiter’s edition of Christliche Sittenlehre, pp. 28–37, 97–107, and 128–37. See also BO §§223 and 305, wherein sin is only indirectly even alluded to (cf. 2011, p. xvii). 7. Compare §93.4. 8. Ed. note: Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, immediately thereafter supplanted by Lust und Unlust, the first pair presumably implying the second pair. 9. Empfindung oder Gefühl.

10. In this discussion I could not make a specific reference to the temptation story, because for me it is not possible to treat it as a historical account. Taken literally, however, the story’s content is such that very often in the midst of his active life, Christ would have to have been much more strongly tempted. On this account, the teller of this story is not at all to be blamed for not exactly taking this to be the end of all temptation (Luke 4:13). Ed. note: The narrative in Luke ends with this statement: “And when the devil had ended every temptation, he departed from him until an opportune time” (RSV). See Schleiermacher’s sermon on Matt. 4:1–11, Mar. 11, 1810, published that year and in SW II.4 (1835), 378–89, and in 1844, 428–40. 11. This is so, for what Christ himself says in John 10:17–18 directly expresses no physical relation but only a social and ethical one. Ed. note: Sermon on John 10:17–18, Mar. 31, 1809, separately published in 1811, also in SW II.4 (1835), 778– 81. 12. Cf. §59.P.S. 13. Belgic Confession (1561) 19: “And though he hath by his resurrection given immortality to the same [his body], nevertheless he hath not changed the reality of his human nature, etc.” Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 404; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 372. 14. Ed. note: schlechthinige Vollkommenheit. 15. Ed. note: einen historischen Satz, thus quite secondhand or worse, and auxiliary as evidence, at most. “Historical” using this term (historisch) for it, has two uses in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary: (1) as a general title for what has the deeper, more integrative, and more highly significant matters of Geschichte (“history” proper) for its core subject matter, and (2) the narrower sense of auxiliary material. See BO §§28–37, 70, 86, 145–59, and 249–51 with notes. 16. Organization. Ed. note: This term refers to the arrangement of one’s physical organs or organism for accomplishing given functions. 17. It is a matter of divine leading, one surely of very great importance though insufficiently known, that neither a reliable tradition regarding the external aspect of Christ’s person nor an authentic picture of it has reached us. Indeed, that even an exact depiction of how he lived and a coherent narrative regarding how occurrences in his life proceeded are lacking to us—all this also belongs precisely to this [recital of what we do not have]. 18. For example, John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407), Homilies on Colossians (n.d.), Homily 8 (on Col. 3:5–7): “For Christ … was so beautiful as it is not even possible to tell.” Ed. note: ET in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 1, vol. 8 (1889), 295; Migne Gr. 62:353.

§99. [Addendum to This Point of Doctrine:] The facts regarding Christ’s resurrection and ascension and the prediction of his return to judge cannot be set forth as genuine components of the doctrine of his person. 1. If we compare, on the one hand, the doctrinal propositions concerning the person of Christ set forth up to this point, and the propositions1 already embodied in the oldest creedal symbol2 that express these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension, on the other hand, with the canon for dogmatic propositions set forth above,3 then those doctrinal propositions set forth here are consistent with both criteria in that canon, but the creedal statements are consistent with neither criterion. This is the case, for if Christ’s redemptive efficaciousness rests on God’s being in him, and precisely the impression from that efficaciousness that such an existence dwells in him and grounds faith in him, then an immediate connection between these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension and the doctrine of the person of Christ cannot be proven. The disciples recognized the Son of God in him without suspecting anything about his resurrection and ascension, and we can say the same for ourselves as well. In the same way, the spiritual presence promised by him and everything that he says about his perpetual influence on those surviving him is mediated by nothing originating from these two factual claims. Now, suppose that this mediating work were indeed actually to depend on his sitting at the right hand of God—by which expression,

notwithstanding, since the impression cannot possibly be authentic, nothing may be understood other than Christ’s distinctive and incomparable dignity, itself elevated above all conflict—but this dignity would not depend on a resurrection or ascension having been made perceptible, since Christ could indeed have been elevated immediately to glory even without these connecting links. Even this case does not allow one to disregard in what connection the two events would stand with Christ’s redeeming efficaciousness. Although Paul does appear, on the one hand, to ascribe to the resurrection a role of its own in redemption, as well as to Christ’s death,4 on the other hand, the manner in which he advances the resurrection as a guaranty for our own resurrection5 shows that in no way does he think of it as in an exclusive connection with the distinctive being of God in Christ. In addition, the resurrection is never advanced as a testimony of the divine dwelling in Christ, since everywhere it is attributed not to Christ himself, but to God.6 Just as little did John advance the perceptible ascension as a proof of Christ’s higher dignity. Accordingly, we can certainly expect the discernment of those who ply dogmatic propositions, that the correct impression of Christ can exist completely, and also did so, without taking any notice of these factual claims. As regards the return to judge, we cannot treat the doctrinal meaning of this notion until later.7 Only the following is to be observed here. Suppose that judgment, to the extent that we would view it as a communicable divine action, would stand in such close union with the work of redemption that it would not be easy to conceive that God could hand over that work to anyone other than the Redeemer. In this case, the work of the Redeemer would not involve anything greater in the person of Christ than we would already attribute to him without this. Moreover, just as little would judgment belong to the works of redemption itself, since, indeed, those who have faith do not come under judgment. Viewed as the return of Christ, however, the return would be connected with the ascension as its counterpart. Just as ascension would be only an incidental form in order to bring about being situated at the right hand of God, so too that promise of Christ’s return would be only an incidental form for satisfaction of the desire to be united with Christ. Furthermore, what is incomprehensible and miraculous in the ascent cannot be traced back to what is divine in Christ, which is indicated as the impetus for all his free actions. Inasmuch as the ascension is also nowhere presented as his action, what is miraculous in that return of Christ also cannot be traced back to what is divine in him. The result is that the disparity between our doctrinal propositions up to this point, namely, those that we have accepted as such, and these statements must be obvious to everyone. Something else is the case with Christ’s so-called descent into hell,8 for this would certainly belong to the redeeming activities, in accordance with the prevailing notion of it, if we could regard it simply as a fact. It would then be regarded as an expression of his prophetic and high-priestly office toward those who had died before his appearance. Nevertheless, in part, the sole passage that appears to treat of this event9 does not even cover it, not by far, and, in part, even expanded in this way the matter itself does not correspond to the event’s purpose as it would have to be conceived. The reason is that all those who would also have died after his appearance, but without proclamation of the gospel having come to

them, would have the same claim as those others who died before his appearance. What is more, however, the expressions that comprise that passage in no way compel the supposition of such an otherwise entirely unattested fact, just as they also fix no point in time whatsoever. On this account, it also has not been taken up in our proposition in the first place. 2. Belief in these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension is, accordingly, not a freestanding belief belonging to the original features of faith in Christ in such a way that we could not accept Christ as Redeemer or recognize God’s being in him if we were not to know that he had risen and gone to heaven, or if he had not promised a return for judgment. This belief is also not to be derived from those original features, not with the result that we could conclude that because God was in Christ, thus he could have risen and gone to heaven, or that because an essential sinlessness befitted him, he would have to return in order to sit in judgment. On the contrary, these factual claims are taken up only because they stand written. Moreover, it can only be required of each Evangelical Christian that one believe in these factual claims only to the extent one considers these claims to be sufficiently attested. This is so, in that in this regard the sacred authors are to be regarded simply as reporters. As a result, immediately and originally, belief in these factual claims belongs more to the doctrine of Scripture than to the doctrine of Christ’s person. Nevertheless, however, the belief ‘s indirect connection with the doctrine of Christ’s person is not to be denied, namely, insofar as judgment concerning the disciples, viewed as original reporters, would, in return, affect one’s judgment concerning the Redeemer. For example, take someone who, so as not to accept Christ’s resurrection as a literal event, would prefer, with regard to miraculous events, to presuppose that the disciples had been deceived and took something internal to be something external. That person would then attribute to the disciples a mental weakness, such that not only would their entire testimony to Christ be considered untrustworthy, but Christ would have to be adjudged not to have known “what is in human beings,”10 since he himself chose such witnesses. Or, if Christ himself were to have intended or arranged that they would have to take an internal phenomenon to consist of externally oriented sensory perceptions, then he himself would be an originator of error. Further, all moral concepts would be thrown into confusion if such a higher dignity were supposed to be compatible with all that. It is a little different case with the ascension, insofar as we do not have sufficient cause to claim that an immediate report of any eyewitness, and least of all an apostolic eyewitness, lies before us regarding a course of events in the ascension, viewed as external fact. If it were asserted, nevertheless, that Christ was indeed resurrected but not raised up into heaven, that instead he had lived thereafter an indeterminate period in secret, and on that account he must have had to stage something that could have been considered to be observed as an ascension, then the case is entirely the same as that with the resurrection. The promise of his return stands in combination with the actual doctrine of Christ’s person least of all. This is so, especially since the return is promised for the sake of a certain work and to that extent would pertain to the point of doctrine that would follow only if the work were one that would directly pertain to his calling as Redeemer. Only if an interpretation were to ascertain that a time for this return was specified, one that had long

since expired by now, or, if this return would have been described in such a way that we could demonstrate its impossibility, would this have to have led to some repercussion, if not on the doctrine regarding Scripture then surely on the doctrine regarding Christ’s person. Postscript to this point of doctrine: The foregoing presentation of the person of Christ that was given first in our own entirely independent mode of expression and then in closer connection with ecclesial forms is, as regards what is essential, so widespread in the Christian church and so old in it that one must view it all the more as the general belief of Christians. This is the case, because even many of those who are satisfied with a less encompassing notion of the Redeemer simply reject the latter prevailing notion. They reject it, moreover, for two reasons. In part, they do so because they shun anything miraculous altogether—whether they overlook the distinction we set forth11 or they reject it—in part, because they believe that they must assume the doctrine of the Trinity at the same time, a doctrine that is offensive to them on account of its polytheistic appearance. As a result, it is to be hoped that in a freer presentation many will more easily tolerate the same thing that repels them when it appears wrapped up in austere scholastic forms. However, it is true, first, in part, that the same doctrinal contents cannot be definitely evidenced everywhere in Christendom where the same faith has underlain relationship to the Redeemer, because understanding and expression have not been far enough developed for this purpose. Second, in part, it is also undeniable that already very early in Christendom dissenting and less developed views were also in circulation alongside this view of the Redeemer. Thus, to be sure, one cannot evade the question as to whether the ecclesial view can even really be justified as the original view by means of expressions of Christ himself and those of the apostles, or whether those who maintain that this view of the Redeemer arose later are in the right. To preface our response, one need only say, first, supposing also that the originality of our doctrine had not been demonstrated, nevertheless, it would not follow therefrom that the doctrine had been falsely or arbitrarily thought out. Rather, our doctrine could stand only inasmuch as those original testimonies would not stand in demonstrable contradiction to it. However, the question itself is, admittedly, so complicated that it is impossible to resolve it in a way that could win general acknowledgment for itself so long as, on the one hand, the most varied opinions concerning the mode of origin and concerning the authors of the New Testament Scriptures still continue side by side, and, on the other hand, so many various, arbitrary options still prevail among hermeneutical methods. Now, if quarrels can arise without end concerning the contents of particular passages, then it is futile to appeal to singular odd sayings on behalf of his essential sinlessness12 or on behalf of God’s being in him.13 Yet, suppose that someone, after hearing the interpretation of particular statements, is not satisfied with the possibility of a sense in accord with one’s own theory. Suppose, instead, that someone sincerely holds oneself open to a total impression, unalloyed, just as Christ’s discourses on his relationship to human beings and on his relationship to his Father14 actually complement and permeate each other. Such a person would doubtless find it difficult to attribute more modest contents to those discourses than

our propositions above express, even if these propositions do not exactly convey the sense of the ecclesial formulations associated with the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time, moreover, the expressions we offer are still not constructed in such a way that they negate the true reality of Christ’s human existence,15 as if Christ could, as it were, have had a memory in his temporal consciousness regarding an isolated being of what is divine in him before he had become human.16 The twofold appellation “Son of Man”17 and “Son of God” that Christ attributes to himself fully agrees with this view. Such is the case, for he could not have attributed the first name to himself if he had not known himself to participate completely in the same nature as other human beings do. Nevertheless, it would have been meaningless to adopt the name specially for himself if he had not had grounds for doing so, grounds that others could not adduce. Consequently, the meaning would also have to have been a precise one that was supposed to indicate a distinction between him and all other human beings.18 Likewise, moreover, the connection of the designation “God’s son” with what Christ says regarding his relationship to his Father shows that he does not attribute it to himself in the same sense in which the usage of it had already been made.19 This understanding is already implied plainly enough in the expression “only begotten”20 that derives from Christ himself. If one simply ruptures this natural connection between the two appellations, which obviously refer to each other, it becomes easier to grant room for more modest interpretations and easier to posit them in connection with ebionitic theories. In contrast, there are, on the other hand, passages in which a high level of distress is imputed21 to Christ or something is narrated regarding him that carries in itself the semblance of impassioned agitation.22 Actually, these are only details that would not even remotely testify against his sinlessness or be incompatible with God’s being in him. Obviously, no one would have made a mistake about him in this regard, because everyone was already accustomed to conceiving such particular elements only in accordance with the total impression that one would already have held firm. Moreover, the elements also remind us simply that faith in Jesus as Redeemer did not arise based on details, but developed based on a total impression, whereupon it can only follow that no details present themselves that would have hindered that total impression. However, already in the first generation of his disciples, faith had the same content as that expounded here. This observation is based not only on the manifold testimonies that attribute a perfect purity23 and a fullness of force24 to Christ, but is based also on the way in which Paul describes him as the author of a new human standard of worth in contrast to Adam,25 just as it is based on the Johannine presentation of the λόγος, and on the theory set forth in the Letter to the Hebrews. Now, indeed, even these testimonies could also be weakened by forced interpretations if one wrenches them out of their interconnection and combines them with what is extraneous. Yet, it is not sufficient, nevertheless, simply to show that this or that expression can also signify less. On the contrary, one must also make clear how it can have come to pass that one would have designated an ordinary relationship using extraordinary and exceptional

expressions and how the original sense went astray so early in the tradition. As long as this straying can be accomplished no better than through extremely arbitrary hypotheses, it would be well to let the matter rest in recognition that the faith of the church is also the original faith and in itself is grounded in the sayings of Christ. Now, if this results clearly enough from reflection on Scripture taken as a whole, then, not only can our faith-doctrine easily dispense with the entire arsenal of individual sayings that are set forth under various titles26 that give evidence of God’s being in Christ, but our faith doctrine can also the more readily set aside these sayings if the most exact mode of presentation is not promoted thereby. Instead, often what is important and sure disappears in a context of what is unreliable. What does it help, moreover, if divine names are attributed to Christ since he himself appeals to a figurative linguistic usage of God’s word? In contrast, appellations that would express the oneness of what is divine and what is human in such a definite and unambiguous way as the later designation “God-human” are not found in Scripture; on the contrary, all predicates to be drawn from it into this context are more or less unsteady.27 Thus, as regards divine attributes, it is also natural that only attributes that express an enhanced humanness are assigned to him, since discourse about Christ is always discourse about a human being, with the result that it is an easy task to explain these divine attributes simply as quite permissible hyperbolic expressions. Now, since it is also difficult to distinguish the utterances of a deep reverence that is not in the proper sense divine from strict devotion, the solution, in using the mode of procedure recommended here, would be to refer everything to the divine activities affirmed regarding Christ. However, creation and preservation are ascribed to Christ28 only in such a way that it must remain doubtful whether he is not to be effective cause only insofar as he is final cause. At the raising of the dead and the final judgment, Christ is finally distinguished from God throughout, in that he appears only as authorized representative,29 and thus not only is the authority for that purpose presented as resting in the Father, but also the determination originally comes from the Father. Precisely this distinction applies to the sending of the Spirit, which Christ sometimes ascribes to himself, sometimes also to the Father at his request.30 In consequence, little would be accomplished with all these details if it were not for those eminent, continuous testimonies.

1. Sätze. 2. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “On the third day he rose again in accordance with the Scriptures; he ascended into the heavens and is seated at the right hand of the Father. He is coming again in glory to judge the living and the dead.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 23, from the Greek; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26. 3. See §29.3. Ed. note: Criteria in this subsection include these two: “Nothing touching upon the Redeemer can be set forth as genuine doctrine that is not tied to his redemptive causality and that does not permit of being traced back to the original and distinctive impression that his actual existence made.” 4. Rom. 4:25. 5. 1 Cor. 15:13, 16. 6. Acts 2:24; 4:10; 10:40; Rom. 4:24; 1 Cor. 6:14; 15:15; 2 Cor. 4:14. 7. Ed. note: §160.

8. Roman Symbol (the so-called Apostles’ Creed, after later 4th cent.): “Descended into hell.” [Schleiermacher’s comment:] This phrase appears in only one Greek version but in several ancient Latin versions. Symbolum Quicunque vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed): “descended into hell.” Ed. note: ET Leith (1982), 24. Predecessors to the Roman Symbol included the Greek Interrogatory Creed of Hippolytus (ca. 215), which read only: “died (and was buried).” Among the various Latin examples, the Creed of Rufinus (ca. 404) read: “crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried. He descended to hell.” The Apostles’ Creed (ca. 700) has “suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried. He descended to hell.” The Symbolum Quicunque vult, called after its initial words, is the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius (probably ca. late 4th–early 5th cent.). See Leith (1973, 1982) for a fuller discussion; see Bek. Luth. (1963), 21–23, for the Apostles’ Creed; and cf. §36n1. 9. The only one is 1 Pet. 3:19, for in no way is Eph. 4:9 to be drawn into this position. 10. John 2:25. Ed. note: Sermon on John 2:18–25, Nov. 16, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 142–54. 11. Cf. §13. 12. John 8:46. Ed. note: Sermon on John 8:46–59, June 19, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 108–22. 13. John 10:30–38. Ed. note: See sermons on John 10:22–33 and 34–42, Oct. 9 and 23, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 213–37. 14. John 5:17, 24, 26; 8:24, 36; 14:11, 20; 17:10, 21–25. Ed. note: Sermons on John 5:16–23 and 24–30, June 13 and 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 331–64; John 8:20–26, May 8, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 82–94; John 10:12–21 and 22–33, Sept. 11 and Oct. 9, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 198–225; John 14:7–17 and 18–24, May 21 and June 4, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–56. 15. Dasein. Ed. note: That is, not strictly Sein, as in simply possessing a human nature, but really “being there,” in true human existence and thus having a wholly “existential relationship” with God and with other human beings. See OG (1981) 40. 16. If one wants to make out an intimation of this sort in John 17:5, then John 5:19–20 makes this particular explanation almost impossible. Yet, it would have to be questionable even without that reference, because Jesus’ petition [to the Father to glorify him “with the glory which I had with thee before the world was made” (John 17:5)] remained unrealized at that time, in that, despite all the pains taken to understand, no one has reached a clear consciousness of what he meant or ever will. Ed. note: Menschenwerdung is the usual German term for “incarnation,” which itself (as the actual Latin term) bears the meaning “becoming embodied.” In John 5:19–20 (RSV), Jesus says, “The Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing.” Sermon on John 5:16–23, June 13, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 331–46. 17. Ed. note: Menschensohn, or “human son,” sometimes reinterpreted to mean simply “son of Mary,” thus not procreated by or the child of Joseph as well. 18. The thought is just as peculiar that this title [“son of man”] was supposed to run counter to the popular view of it, namely, that no one would know wherefrom the Messiah would come, as is that other thought that it was supposed to refer to a vision in Daniel (7:13) where someone like a son of man—clearly in contrast to the beasts mentioned earlier—comes before the Ancient of Days in the clouds of heaven. Ed. note: The word translated “precise” (prägnante) also appears in ordinary German and English, to connote “pregnant with meaning,” an allusion not to be missed in this context. 19. Compare esp. John 10:35ff. Ed. note: Sermon, see §99P.S.n13 just above. 20. John 3:16 KJV. Ed. note: Sermon on John 3:16–18, Dec. 25, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 185–96. 21. Matt. 26:31; Luke 19:44. Ed. note: Sermon on Luke 19:41–48, Aug. 11, 1822, first separately published in 1825, later SW II.4 (1835), 416–31. 22. John 11:33, 38. Ed. note: Sermon on John 11:28–40, Dec. 4, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 264–67. 23. See 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 2:22; Heb. 1:3; 7:26–27; and 9:14. 24. Phil. 4:13. Ed. note: Sermon on Phil. 4:10–13, Mar. 28, 1823, SW II.10 (1856), 781–93. 25. Ed. note: This points to a summation of Pauline doctrine containing allusions especially to 1 Cor. 15:45 on Jesus as the second Adam of the new creation and to Phil. 3:8 on “the surpassing worth of following Christ Jesus,” as well as to new life in “the Spirit of Christ” versus life merely in “the flesh,” as in Rom. 8 and Gal. 3. See sermons, within his Philippians series, on Phil. 3:4–11, Oct. 27 and Nov. 10, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 625–50. Similar themes, somewhat differently stated, appear, as Schleiermacher notes, in Johannine talk of Christ as λόγος (word) and in Hebrews. 26. For example, God is called one who is ὀνομαστικῶς (named), ἰδιωματικῶς (uniquely), ἐνεργητικῶς (efficaciously), and λατρευτικῶς (worshiped) in Christ. 27. It is self-evident that Old Testament signs, voices from heaven, and phenomena in which some want to recognize the Son of God cannot be the subject here, for in no instance can they say anything of the person of Christ; rather, at most they could be considered in the doctrine of the triune God. 28. As in 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:15–17; Heb. 1:4. Ed. note: Sermon only on Col. 1:13–18, July 25, 1830, SW II.6 (1835), 232–43. 29. Bevollmächtigter. Ed. note: In legal parlance this term sometimes translates “plenipotentiary,” which means endowed with unrestricted power to represent.

30. Luke 24:49 and John 15:2, 6; cf. John 14:16, 30. Ed. note: Sermons only on the John passages: John 15:1–7, July 2, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 469–83; John 14:1–7 and 18–24, June 4 and 18, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–56. See also John 14:26 there, on the coming of the Holy Spirit.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Work of Christ

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §100. The Redeemer takes up persons of faith into the strength1 of his Godconsciousness,2 and this is his redeeming activity. 1. By virtue of the teleological character of Christian piety, not only the arrested state of the higher life but also the furtherance3 of it—albeit the latter in a different way—appears in our self-consciousness as the very act of our own individual lives. However, the same furtherance is conceived as the act of the Redeemer by virtue of the distinctive character of Christianity in that selfsame self-consciousness.4 In this case, these two are able to combine in no way other than that this furtherance would be the act of the Redeemer become one’s own act, and, accordingly, this is the clearest expression for the common element in Christian consciousness of divine grace. Consequently, if we proceed from this point, the distinctive work of the Redeemer would be, above all else, this generating of an act in us. However, since, when viewed more closely, what is described has always been a common act of the Redeemer and the redeemed, the Redeemer’s original activity would be one that is clearly separated and belongs to him and that occurs before any furthering activity of our own. It is that activity by virtue of which he takes us up into this community of his activity and life, and the endurance of that activity subsequently constitutes the very nature of the state of grace. This is so, in that the new collective life is the locus of this generating of an act by Christ, in which the continuing efficacious action of his sinless perfection is revealed. However, his act in us can never be anything but the act of his sinlessness and perfection, conditioned upon God’s being in him. Thus, this sinlessness and perfection, including that being of God in him, must also become ours, because otherwise it would not be his act that would become ours. Now, since the individual life of each person runs its course in the consciousness of sin and imperfection, we can find ourselves in community with the Redeemer only to the extent that we are not conscious of our own individual life; rather, as he gives us the impetus, we find that from which everything proceeds in him also to be the source of our activity—as a joint possession, so to speak. This is also the sense wherever in the Scriptures the discourse concerns the being and life of Christ in us,5 having died to sin,6 or taking off the old and putting on the new person.7 However, Christ can then direct his God-consciousness against sin only insofar as he, in his joining in collective human life, had consciousness of sin as a shared feeling,8 yet as something that is to be overcome by him.9 Thus, in his generating of an act in us, precisely this consciousness of sin also becomes the principle of our own activity.

This fact notwithstanding, what immediately befalls us in this being taken up into community with Christ will be discussed in the first point of doctrine in the second division, regarding being made blessed,10 likewise, the further development of this community in time through a succession of common actions is the subject for the second point of doctrine of the same division, regarding sanctification.11 Only what the Redeemer does and how he effects it is to be discussed in greater detail here. 2. Now, if all activity in Christ proceeds from the being of God in him, and if we know of no divine activity other than the creating activity in which the preserving activity is encompassed, or, vice versa, we know of no divine activity other than the preserving activity in which the creating activity is then encompassed, then we will also have to view the efficacious action of Christ in the same way. However, just as we do not exclude the human soul from the creation—despite the fact that we can no more be required to grasp the creation of free agents and of those who remain free creatures who are interconnected with a greater whole than simply to conceive this in our self-consciousness—so it is also with the creating activity of Christ, which has wholly to do with the domain of freedom. That is to say, Christ’s activity of taking us up is an activity of creating; but what it brings forth is something altogether free. Further, just as the being of God in Christ is timeless and eternal even as an active principle, but all expressions of it are conditioned by the form human life has, so Christ can also influence what is free only in accordance with the way in which what is free enters the sphere of Christ’s life and only in accordance with the nature of what is free. Christ’s activity of taking us up into community with him is thus a creative engendering of the desire-to-take-him-up-into-oneself. Or it is, rather, a creative engendering simply of an acquiescence to the working of his communicating activity, for this desire is simply a receptivity to his activity in the process of his communication.12 The Redeemer’s activity of taking us up into community with him, however, is conditioned by the fact that individuals enter into his historical sphere of influence, where they become aware of him in his selfdisclosure. Now, if this acquiescence can indeed also be thought of only as conditioned by the consciousness of sin, then it is indeed not necessary that consciousness of sin precede entry into the sphere of the Redeemer. On the contrary, consciousness of sin can just as well first arise in the sphere of the Redeemer as an effect of the self-disclosure13 of the Redeemer, as, in any case, it first attains full clarity through perception14 of his sinless perfection. The original activity of the Redeemer will thus be best thought of in the form of a permeating15 activity. That permeating activity, however, is taken up as an attracting activity by its object, due to the free motion with which the object turns toward the activity, in the same way in which we ascribe an attracting power to every object that has cultivating spiritual influences to which we gladly submit. However, if all activity of the Redeemer proceeds from the being of God in him, and if the creative divine activity that established itself as the being of God in him was also the sole active agency in the emergence of the Redeemer’s person, then all activity of the Redeemer may also be considered to be a continuation of that person-forming divine influence on human nature. This is the case, for the permeating activity of Christ

cannot establish itself in an individual without also becoming person-forming in that individual, in that all the individual’s activities are then determined differently through the effect of Christ in the individual; indeed, all impressions are taken up differently as well. Consequently, personal self-consciousness also becomes something different. Moreover, the creation did not have an orientation toward individuals, such that each creation of an individual would have been a particular deed; on the contrary, the world was created, and everything particular as such was created, only in and with the whole, just as much for others, moreover, as for itself. Likewise, the activity of the Redeemer is also worldforming, and its object is human nature, in the entirety of which a powerful Godconsciousness is to be planted as a new principle of life. Individuals, however, he appropriates in relation to this totality, just as he impacts those in whom his activity not only can continue but can even take effect on others through the manifestation16 of his life proceeding from them. Accordingly, the entire efficacious action of Christ is simply the continuation of God’s creative activity, from which the person of Christ also came into being. That is to say, even that creative divine activity had its orientation toward the totality of human nature, in which that being of God was to exist. This has been occurring in such a way, however, that the effects of that activity are mediated through Christ’s life, viewed as the most original organ of that being of God in human nature, and these effects are mediated for all human nature, which, in the natural sense, had already become personal. These effects are mediated in the measure that human beings permit of being brought, with that life and its ever-developing organism, into spiritual contact, so as, with the deadening of former personal existence, to be shaped in community of life with Christ into persons within the totality of that higher life. Now, however, whether we might be looking at that collective life or at the community of individuals with the Redeemer, we will best designate the beginning of it with the expression a call, since this beginning is conditioned by a free acceptance, just as then the entire official activity of that communal life began with such a call. In contrast, the participation of the Redeemer in the common life as it continues we will with full right call ensouling,17 in relation to the collective life above all, as the church is indeed called his “body.” Likewise, however, Christ is also to be the soul in the particular community, yet each individual is to be the organism through which the soul has an effect. The two things relate to each other in the same way as the divine activity does in the act of uniting and in the condition of being united in Christ, and as the creating activity and the sustaining activity do in God. Yet, here it is even clearer both how every element of a common activity can, in turn, be viewed as calling and how the actual calling can already be viewed as ensouling. This formulation will find its application, however, in another place as well.18 3. Just as this analysis is entirely traced back to inner experience and simply describes and clarifies this experience, so this analysis can make no claim, of course, to intend to be a proof that it must have been this way. Such a proof is possible in the domain of experience only as long as mathematics can be applied to it, which does not occur here at all. On the contrary, the only thing to be set forth is this: that the complete contentment for which we

strive can be truly contained in the consciousness that a Christian has regarding one’s relationship to Christ only to the extent that this consciousness expresses a relationship such as has been described here. If Christian consciousness were not to have this content, however, then either complete contentment must have arisen from elsewhere or it would not be attainable at all. Moreover, we would have to be satisfied with an indeterminate consolation that could also be found without a Redeemer, with the result that there would be no distinctive possession of divine grace in Christianity at all. These repudiations cannot be confuted, however, but can be removed only by deed, in our seeking to get those doing the repudiating to experience what we do. Now, however, precisely those doing the repudiating ordinarily designate as “mystical” a presentation of the redeeming activity of Christ viewed as the establishment of a new life, one common to him and to us, one original in him but new in us and originating from him—a presentation such as we have given here. In that light, it does indeed seem better to avoid this expression on account of its considerable vagueness. However, if one wants to adhere to the original usage so closely that by this concept one understands that which belongs to the sphere of teachings common only to a few but which is a mystery for others, we are willing to consent to that. Yet, a person cannot be taken up into this sphere arbitrarily, precisely because such teachings are simply an expression of inner experiences, the result being that one who has these experiences automatically belongs to that sphere, but one who does not have these experiences does not even enter into that sphere at all. For all that, an analogy for this relationship from a generally well-known domain can still be demonstrated. That is to say, a civil association is also related to a distinct domain as bearing a higher potential for life, in comparison with the condition that existed previously without any laws. Now, let us suppose a case in which a people belonging together by nature first entered into civil association through an individual, as legend has indeed sufficiently enumerated. In this way, then, the idea of the state first came to consciousness in this civil association, and the idea of the state appropriated the personal character of this civil association as its immediate dwelling place. At that point, the founding individual took up everyone else into the community of life that corresponded to this idea, in that in them too the unsatisfactory aspects of their former condition also came into clear consciousness through the founder’s effective proclamation. Further, in this case the power to form in them the idea that is the founder’s innermost principle of life and to take them up into the community of this life is vouchsafed in the founder. Thereby not only is a new collective life established among them in complete contrast to the preceding collective life, but also each individual becomes a new person in and of oneself—that is, a citizen. Moreover, the collective life is all that arises from that point on, which life develops variously through time but is one in essence, belonging as it does to this idea, which idea has appeared temporally at that point but has already been predetermined by the nature of the given tribe. The analogy could also be still further expanded to points that will be discussed only later,19 yet even this presentation will seem mystical to those who grant only a paltry, inferior view regarding the situation of a citizen. If we consent to people’s naming our conception “mystical” in this

sense, then naturally that will also be valid for everything that is to be derived from this main point. However, just as this mystical conception can well be legitimized as the original one, it also lays claim to be the true mean between two other conceptions. Regarding them, I would like to term the one the “magical” conception and the other the “empirical” conception. The magical conception certainly does want to hold that the activity of Christ is redemptive, but without the communication of his perfection being dependent on the establishment of a communal body.20 Instead, the magical conception holds that the activity of Christ is redemptive through the immediate influence of Christ on individuals, in which influence some still count on the written word as a necessary means, but others do not. The latter group appears to be the more consistent, but, in them the magical conception becomes all the more plain the more they completely renounce everything that has its origin in a communal body. What is magical is located in an influence that is mediated by nothing that is natural, an influence that is attributed to one person. This position is totally in contrast to the maxim21 that underlies our presentation throughout—that the beginning of the reign of God is supernatural but becomes natural as soon as it appears—for in the magical conception every substantive element is posited to be supernatural. Furthermore, this view is completely separatist in nature, because in it the collective life appears as something purely incidental, and it borders very closely on the docetic position. This is the case, for if Christ were indeed effective in such a way today, indeed as a person but only as a heavenly person without any earthly presence, yet effective in a truly personal fashion, then he could always have been working in the same way all along, and his actual personal appearance would have been only a superfluous addition. However, those who likewise assume an immediate personal influence, yet mediate it through the word and the community, are only a little less magical when they attribute to word and community the power to call forth a mood in which an individual becomes receptive to that personal influence. Yet, they are even more magical when these natural features are supposed to have the power to dispose Christ to bear his influence, for their efficacious action is then completely the same as that attributed to magical charms. The contrasting empirical conception does indeed also want to claim a redemptive activity of Christ. This activity, however, is one that would consist in bringing about our growing perfection, which cannot reasonably occur otherwise than in the form of teaching and example. These forms are general in nature and contain no distinguishing features. Moreover, suppose that the following admission is also posited: that by means of the sheer perfection of his teaching and of his example, Christ would distinguish himself from those who contribute to our improvement in the same way through teaching and example. Then, if something that is only imperfect would be effected in us, no other option is left than that we should disclaim redemption in the most proper sense—that is, disclaim the taking away of sin —and should console ourselves, on account of the consciousness of sin still remaining even in our growing perfection, with the general practice of calling upon divine mercy. Now, since, on this position, only such a growing perfection would be brought about through teaching and example and since that consolation would also occur without Christ, one would

have to concede that his appearance would be in vain insofar as it was intended to be something special. Or, at the most one could say that through his teaching he has brought human beings to the point of having desisted from the former general striving to offer God substitutes for their greatly flawed imperfection. Nevertheless, since the futility of this striving can be demonstrated, we already have divine surety regarding it in our natural reason, hence we do not need to receive this surety from elsewhere. Moreover, this conception, most of all, is probably the cause of philosophy’s placing itself above faith and viewing this faith only as a transitional condition. We cannot be satisfied, however, with a self-consciousness regarding our growing perfection, because, in belonging to the consciousness of sin as much as to the consciousness of grace, this self-consciousness cannot contain distinctively Christian consciousness within itself. Yet, for a Christian, selfconsciousness regarding our growing perfection generally belongs to the consciousness of grace only if that self-consciousness is traced back to the Redeemer as its ground. Moreover, that self-consciousness thus has to be a different one for a Christian than for others— naturally so, because that self-consciousness is interconnected with something different, namely, with the actual redemptive activity of Christ.

1. Kräftigkeit. Ed. note: That is, as will be seen, this strength within himself is an activated strength, not only a stored-up potency or potential; when transmitted to others, it is likewise an active enablement versus a sheer, unmitigated infusion of his own pure power (Kraft). 2. Cf. §88. 3. Förderung. Ed. note: Or “carrying forward” or “advancement.” That is, Christ’s continuing activity takes us up into a community of life and work with him in which his original life and work are then furthered. On advancement of “the higher life,” especially through “the higher feelings,” see OR (1821) IV. References to the use of music to stir these feelings, with or without words, were made in the first edition (1821) of Christian Faith (§§35.3, 64.2, 72.1, and 153.1). These were removed in this 1830–1831 edition but are plentiful in his practical theology lectures and displayed throughout Christmas Eve Celebration (ET 2010). In these other works, Schleiermacher emphasizes that music, poetry, hymns, and use of stories and rhetorical expressions can be powerful resources for stirring higher feelings. He gave testimony to this long-abiding interest by editing a new, revised edition of the Berliner Gesangbuch (1830) (hymnal) and in his Aesthetics lectures. In the religious life of Christians he refers to such higher feelings that are experiences of communicating Christ’s Godconsciousness and of entering community with Christ as “mystical.” See also §101.1. In §124.1–2 he states that in these processes of higher life, “Holy Spirit,” “Spirit of Christ,” and “divine Spirit” are the same Spirit in both individual and communal aspects of the life of “the children of God.” Accordingly, “divine self-communication” occurs among them in “the work of redemption,” thereby as love (cf. §§164–67). 4. Cf. §63.1–2. 5. Gal. 2:20; Rom. 8:10; John 17:23; and 2 Cor. 13:5. Ed. note: Sermon only on Gal. 2:19–21, July 18, 1830, first published in 1831, also in SW II.2 (1834), 653–65. 6. Rom. 6:2, 6, 11; and 1 Pet. 2:24. Ed. note: Sermon only on Rom. 6:4–8, April 22, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), also in SW II.2 (1834), 176–86. ET Wilson (1890), 266–78. 7. Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:22, 24. Ed. note: Sermon only on Col. 3:5–11, May 8, 1831, SW II.6 (1835), 325–36. ET Philips, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Interpretation (2009), 217–28. 8. Mitgefühl. 9. John 16:33. Ed. note: Sermon on John 16:23–33, Sept. 24, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 537–48. 10. Begnadigung. Ed. note: §§107–9. The point of doctrine in that location is titled “Regarding Regeneration” (Wiedergeburt). Generally, Begnadigung means “pardon,” but in Schleiermacher’s usage it means being graced, or blessed, by God. This state certainly does imply being forgiven by God, but, taken as a whole, it is always to be acknowledged, never enacted by any intermediary agent. 11. Heiligung. Ed. note: §§110–12.

12. John 16:19. Ed. note: Sermon on John 16:16–23, Aug. 27, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 524–36. 13. Selbstoffenbarung. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, every religion is based on “revelation” (Offenbarung) in some form. This he defines as a divine communication that appears within the constraints of some social context and is active, as the supernatural’s becoming natural, altogether within natural conditions. Thus, in its reception it is always subject to error in some degree. Given these limitations, no religion, even Christianity, can meaningfully claim absolute truth, pure and entire, for this would be tantamount to making the impossible claim that God has made Godself known only and exactly as God is in God-self. (See §§10.P.S. and 13, also related discussions in §§47.1, 54.4, 83.1, 89.4, and 92.4.) Christ’s “selfdisclosure” was the distinctive “natural fact” by which God’s unique revelation in his being, communication, and influence as the Redeemer could be manifested. This process Schleiermacher also refers to as, in part, the Redeemer’s “selfproclamation” (Selbstverkündigung). 14. Anschauung. 15. Ed. note: eindringenden. That is, this activity both penetrates or enters into and increasingly suffuses the life of the community it affects, thus of each person who takes part in it. 16. Offenbarung. Ed. note: Cf. §99n13. 17. Ed. note: “A call” translates Berufung, and “ensouling” literally translates Beseelung (also meaning both “animating” and “inspiring”—by word or deed). 18. Ed. note: See §§116–17 for the other application, esp. §116.1 and §117.1, already set up by the description in §§108– 9 of a process within a community of faith extending from nurturance and conversion into sanctification. 19. Ed. note: There are numerous such points. However, see esp. §§124–25, also §§113–14, 120.P.S., 121, 129–130, 164.2–3, and 166.1. 20. Gemeinwesen. Ed. note: Or the church as “commonwealth,” on the analogy with a civil society. 21. Maxime. Ed. note: This is a rare appearance of “maxim” in the entire work. A maxim, then, would seem to refer to a very basic, underlying statement, as compared with a highly important but subordinate “canon” or any other implied, still more subordinate “rule.”

§101. The Redeemer takes up persons of faith into the community of his unclouded blessedness,1 and this is his reconciling activity. 1. If this being taken up into the community of blessedness were something independent from being taken up into the strength of God-consciousness, or if the first activity were indeed to follow entirely from the second, then the teleological nature of Christianity would be altered. However, just as in God blessedness and omnipotence are equally posited, mutually conditioned by each other, and consequently also independent one from the other, so too in the person of Christ must blessedness and strength of God-consciousness be equally posited in the same manner, each one conditioning the other and each independent from the other. Hereupon, one should doubtless be able to say, the same would have to be the case with the efficacious action of Christ as well. Moreover, either this implication would have to be simply recognized or there would have to have been two contrasting conceptions of Christianity, both of which had supplemented each other, the one conception setting it forth as a striving after blessedness for the sake of attaining strength of God-consciousness, the other conception setting it forth in reverse order. Nevertheless, in that the efficacious action of Christ arises only to the extent that a receptivity or a longing in its object precedes it, Christ’s reconciling activity can also express itself only in the wake of his redeeming activity. This is so, because the consciousness of sin in itself, and not viewed as a source of evil, has to establish that longing, in that evil does not exist in relationship with sin for the individual. Thus, if we were to think of the Redeemer’s activity as that of bearing influence on individuals, then we could only have the reconciling

element of life follow upon the redeeming element and based on it. We equate the two activities, however, to the degree that communication of Christ’s blessedness, no less than communication of Christ’s perfection, is given immediately in people’s being taken up into community of life with Christ. 2. Now, this equation of the two activities appears in the exact parallel drawn between this proposition and the previous one, so that viewed properly in and of themselves the two propositions could have been dissolved into one. This scarcely requires an explanation, for the following reasons. On the one hand, in Christ all activity did originate from the being of God2 in him, and this activity was never restrained by any resistance from his human nature. Likewise, however, restraints to his efficacious activity did not condition any element of his life before his sensory perception of them was taken up into his innermost selfconsciousness; moreover, this self-consciousness was so at one with his strong Godconsciousness that restraints within that God-consciousness could appear only as belonging to the merely temporal form that was attached to the complete efficacious activity of his own nature.3 Yet, on the other hand, in Christ still fewer restraints from his own natural or social life could be taken up into this innermost consciousness as restraints, appearing, instead, simply as indicators of whatever direction his activity would take. If all this is the case, then one who is redeemed also finds—insofar as one is taken up into Christ’s community of life— that one is never filled with a consciousness of any evil, because evil is not able obstructively to affect one’s common life with Christ. On the contrary, all restraints in life, natural and social, enter also into this domain simply as indicators. Restraints in life will not be removed, as if one who is redeemed ought to be or could be without pain and free of suffering. For the same reason, even Christ had pain and suffered pain. Rather, lack of blessedness simply has no part in pain and suffering, because as such they do not suffuse one’s innermost life. Moreover, this is also the case regarding consciousness of sin that is still presenting itself to one who is redeemed, for since sin cannot be derived from one’s new life, one thus refers sin exclusively to the collective life of general susceptibility to sin, which still has some locus in oneself. Thus, it is not as if there would be no pain and suffering, inasmuch as one who is redeemed still has one’s own personal existence. On the contrary, suffering enters into Christ’s life within one who is redeemed only as an indicator of what is to be done, and consequently suffering is not a lack of blessedness in Christ’s life within that person. Hence, being taken up into community of life with Christ removes the interconnection between evil and sin, in that morally4 the two are not related to each other any longer—not even if, as observed in their natural course, the one is a result of the other. Morally, however, each of them, regarded in and of itself, is related solely to the task of the new life. Accordingly, just as Christ’s redeeming activity establishes a collective activity for all persons of faith corresponding to God’s being in Christ, so too the reconciling feature, that is to say, the blessedness of God’s being in Christ, establishes a blessed collective feeling5 for all persons of faith and for each one in particular. At the same time, in this collective feeling their personal existence then expires, inasmuch as it was once a self-containment of feeling in a unity of sensory life, to which unity of sensory life all feeling that would resonate with

others and with the whole of that life remained subordinate. However, in the new life of persons of faith, what remains as the selfsameness of the person is the distinctive way of comprehending and sensing, a way that is formed as an individualized intelligence6 within that new common life. As a result, in relation to this first element too, the activity of Christ is person-forming, in that an “old” human being is removed and a “new” one is put on.7 Suppose, however, that here too we wanted to look at whatever similarity exists between Christ’s activity in formation of the new collective life and divine activity in formation of Christ’s personal existence. Then we would be able to distinguish two elements here as well. The first element, which would correspond to the actual act8 of uniting, viewed as its first beginning, and, as such, would only be able to look back to what preceded it. The second element would depict the situation of being united and, viewed as corresponding to a continuing process, would also look toward the future. Now, here the beginning consists in the disappearance of the “old” human being, consequently also of the old way of relating everything evil to sin. Thus, this beginning consists in the disappearance of any consciousness of meriting punishment; consequently, forgiveness of sin is the first feature of the reconciling element.9 This is the case, for all relation to the law ceases in unity of life with Christ, in that the general orientation over against sin that proceeds from him begins then.10 In contrast, the situation of being united with Christ is the actual possession of blessedness in consciousness that Christ is the focus of our life; consequently, Christ is so in such a way that this possession of blessedness always exists only as his gift. This gift is his blessing and his peace, because we would already have received blessedness in that he wills that we are to have it. Yet, here it is also true, in turn, that each of these two elements is, at the same time, also to be viewed in accordance with the formulation belonging to the other element. That is to say, the entire development being considered here is already implicitly coposited in the first element, but in each later instant the first element is also coposited, because the ubiquity of sin—all the less to be disregarded in this very possession of blessedness whenever we are tracing the source of our new life back to Christ—also constantly discloses forgiveness of sin to us. 3. Now, obviously our proposition is also mystical in the same sense as the preceding proposition was, and its truth is also disclosed only through experience. In the same sense, however, this truth also stands in the middle between a magical conception that dissolves all conformity to nature in the continuing efficacious action11 of Christ and an empirical conception that posits the same efficacious action entirely on a level with that found in ordinary sense perception, thus does not lay a foundation for any super-natural origin and for any distinctiveness that would differentiate it. Likewise, the latter, empirical conception proceeds from the interconnection established between sin and evil, and it correctly infers a decrease of evil given a decrease of sin. Yet, that interconnection applies only to social evil in particular, and it is exact even for such evil only if one is considering a sizeable collective life in its self-containment. However, in each individual part of that collective life, inner improvement can easily be accompanied by increasing evil because of that part’s interconnection with other parts. So too, the increasing

improvement of an individual can vouch for that individual’s release from evil and can thus supply a basis for that individual’s blessedness, but it does so least of all. Instead, even given one’s increase toward perfection, for an individual too not only do hindrances to life12 remain, hindrances viewed in general terms, but hindrances also arise of the sort that have a connection with one’s still-existing sins and what one consequently views as punishment. Now, accordingly, this latter form of reconciliation will occur as an enjoyment and possession only quite incidentally, so that essentially it can never be set forth other than as a hope. In both forms, however, reconciliation would not be something distinctively Christian as regards its content; nor could it have a greater strength as enjoyment or a higher degree of certitude as hope within Christianity than it does outside Christianity. Indeed, how meager such reconciliation would be overall is made evident in history. This is the case, for apart from Christianity the dispute has been renewed time and time again as to whether evil in the world is actually declining or is only changing its form, whereas at best everything, taken as a whole, remains as it was. Even in Christianity itself, the same doubt has returned ever and again. The less the shared enjoyment of Christ’s unclouded blessedness is a matter of experience, but has receded simply to that general hope, all the more strongly does that same doubt return. Thereby, moreover, blessedness has been referred only to the next life. Furthermore, thereby blessedness will have been defined, nevertheless, as independent of gradual improvement, a definition that is entirely contrary to Christ’s own assurance.13 At that point, however, Christ would have a part in our blessedness only as he would bring about this growing improvement—that is, in such a way that little depends on any specific difference between him and other human beings. Only those conceptions of the reconciling activity appear magical which make the communication of Christ’s blessedness independent of being taken up into a common life with him. In other words, forgiveness of sins would be derived from the punishment that Christ suffered, and the blessedness of human beings would itself be presented as a recompense that God has extended to Christ for suffering that punishment. It is not as though the thought that our blessedness is a reward gained through Christ were to be entirely rejected, concerning which there is still much more to be said. Just as little is it as though all connections between Christ’s suffering and forgiveness of sins are to be denied. Each of these views, however, becomes magical as soon as it is not transmitted14 through community of life with Christ. That is to say, in this community the communication of blessedness, as has been discussed above,15 is a natural one, but without this community the reward gained through Christ would be merely an arbitrary divine act. Moreover, already these views would always be something magical, but they would be so above all if something so utterly internal as blessedness is were to be engendered externally, established apart from anything internal. That is to say, since human beings do not have the source of blessedness in themselves, then if blessedness were independent of one’s life in Christ, it could be instilled in every individual, in themselves alone, but this would still occur, in some fashion or other, from without.

Forgiveness of sins would be effected just as magically if consciousness of deserving punishment were supposed to cease simply because another has borne the punishment. That is, this view would lead one to imagine that thereby one’s expectation of punishment would be removed. This thought, however, merely points to the sensory feature in forgiveness of sins. The ethical16 feature proper, namely, consciousness of deserving punishment, would still remain. Consciousness of deserving punishment would thus have to disappear without any cause, as if conjured away. Now, the extent to which something of these views has also been handed down in ecclesial doctrine remains yet to be treated below.17 4. If we now compare the interconnected process presented here with the two opposing views just set forth, to be sure they do lead to the observation that in our account Christ’s suffering is not mentioned at all.18 As a result, there is not even a single occasion to raise the question of whether and to what extent Christ’s suffering belongs to redemption or to reconciliation. From this delay in our account, however, the only conclusion to be drawn is that no basis existed to specify Christ’s suffering as a primary feature, either in the one locus of doctrine or in the other. This conclusion is also correctly drawn, moreover, because otherwise it would not have been possible to be completely taken up into community of life with Christ—in which community redemption and reconciliation could be completely comprehended—before the suffering and death of Christ. Yet, as a second-order feature Christ’s suffering and death belong to both, though they belong more directly to reconciliation and only indirectly to redemption. Christ’s activity in founding the new collective life could really appear in its completion—although belief in this completion could also exist without this event—only if that activity did not yield to any resistance, not even to that which was able to effect annihilation of his person. Thus, here completion of the new collective life lies not actually and immediately in the suffering itself; rather, it lies only in Christ’s giving himself up19 to that suffering. Moreover, one also gets a magical, distorted picture of this suffering, as it were, if one considers precisely this giving himself up to suffering, and for suffering’s sake, to be the actual sum total of Christ’s redeeming activity, thus isolating this climax of his life and setting aside his founding the new collective life. As regards reconciliation, however, for our presentation it has been self-evident that in order to bring about being taken up into the community of Christ’s blessedness, the longing of those who have been conscious of their lack of blessedness would first have had to be inclined toward Christ by means of the impression of his blessedness that they had received.20 Here too, the situation would likewise be the following: Faith in this blessedness could be present even without this longing, but blessedness could still have appeared in its fullness only in that it would not be overcome by the intensity of Christ’s suffering. Furthermore, this would indeed be all the more the case if even the Redeemer’s compassion for people’s lack of blessedness were to have had to begin its most momentous phase at the point of his own suffering. The reason is that this suffering had arisen from sin’s resistance ever since the Redeemer made his appearance within the collective life of sin, though in all respects without any disturbance of the compassion accompanying his blessedness.

Moreover, at this point it would not be Christ’s giving himself up to suffering, viewed as that to which his redeeming activity would belong. Rather, it would be the suffering itself that would come to be the complete corroboration of faith in the Redeemer’s blessedness. Yet, the magical, distorted picture of that suffering would, in turn, be the very conception that, entirely misconstruing the necessity of an unclouded blessedness in Christ, places the reconciling force of his suffering precisely in this claim: that he would also have freely given up his blessedness and would actually have been accursed, even if only in certain instances of his life. The extent to which ecclesial doctrine is not entirely free of even this mistake we intend to return to below.21 That we posit sympathy with the lack of blessedness to be the pinnacle22 of suffering, however, already includes in itself the claim that no suffering that is not interconnected with the redeeming activity of Christ can be seen as belonging to reconciliation. This is so, because such suffering would also have no connection with the orientation of the Redeemer against any lack of blessedness; consequently such suffering could also be included in the process of reconciliation only in a magical fashion. Now, in contrast, all of Christ’s suffering, altogether and viewed as one, can be thought of in this interconnection with his redeeming activity. In contrast, picking out an individual affliction in particular and attributing a distinctive reconciling value to it appears not to be simply playful allegory in didactic discourse and not to be simply trifling sentimentality in poetic discourse, but is rather quite rarely without a contaminating admixture of superstition. Least of all is it fitting to attribute such a highly marked reconciling value to physical suffering, since this kind of suffering, when viewed in and of itself, does not stand in the faintest connection with that reconciling reaction to sin. Rather, also in accordance with our own feeling, suffering itself already contains a reward for reaching a moral23 formation of a moderate nature24 and a strong piety. This moderate moral formation and strong piety are such that in their being joined with a joyful spiritual self-consciousness, whether it is then a personal or a communal feeling, physical suffering is almost entirely transcended. At the very least, therefore, that spiritual consciousness could never be diminished, nor could the contents of any element of it be diminished. In order for the foregoing presentation to be able to serve in every way as a criterion for judging ecclesial formulas, however, we must apply it to our general formula that in Christ the creation of human nature is completed,25 so as to gain the conviction that this creation also obtains its completion in Christ’s twofold activity of redemption and reconciliation. That is to say, whatever of human nature is taken up in this way into community of life with Christ is taken up into the community of a distinct activity that is appropriate for bringing each occasion to completion, an activity that is determined by the strength of God-consciousness alone. At the same time, however, that human nature is taken up into the community of goodwill that rests in this activity and is to be shaken by no further motion from any other quarter. Now, it must be evident that every such reception into that community of goodwill is nothing but a continuation of that same creative act,26 the appearance of which in time began with the forming of Christ’s person. It must also be evident that every intensive enhancement

of this new life in its relation to the disappearing collective life of susceptibility to sin is likewise such a continuation of creation. Moreover, that the original destiny of the human being is attained in this new life, and also that for such a nature as ours nothing beyond that nature is to be imagined or sought, requires no further comment. Thus, however much even this presentation speaks to the immediate consciousness of the Christian, so that this consciousness is itself recognized therein, then nevertheless, inasmuch as this presentation stands in the middle between empirical and magical conceptions, it is unavoidable that this presentation will be considered by each of these two views to be one that opposes it. This is the case, for, on the one hand, because something spiritual like the founding of a collective life requires its being brought about only spiritually, and there is no spiritual influence other than self-presentation in word and work, even the Redeemer could draw human beings to himself and unite with them only by means of making an appearance within our collective life. Now, if those who incline to the magical side are to be cautioned, then the following test must be placed before them: the test of whether their conception is also congruous with the fact that from its origin onward the efficacious action of Christ is to be thought of as taking place within this historical form of nature. Moreover, nothing is easier than for them to misunderstand this fact in such a way that, given an elimination of divine nature in him, Christ would have to work only in customary human fashion, as a teacher and example. On the other hand, however, the distinction of Christ, as he is set forth here, from such a so-called Christ is made clear only in the concept “Christ in us,” which was discussed earlier.27 In contrast, teacher and students, like providing an exemplar and providing an imitation, always remain distinct from each other.28 Now, suppose that those who are inclined, however, to hold the empirical view were asked hereupon whether they would also actually have had experience of a community of life with Christ. They would then all too easily misunderstand that question as if one intended to promote the reprehensibly magical view. Yet, precisely on this account we hold open some considerable room for both sides, not only within the Christian church in general but also within the Evangelical church, where all these differences are found to be present. In doing so, as long as this extreme view has not yet got much weight, the community can always hold steady, so that through this communal life we may bring everything closer to the middle. This is possible wherever at least some recognition of Christ is still present. Letting go of this recognition entirely, however, would lie just as much on the side of the magical extreme as on that of the empirical extreme.

1. Ed. note: Here, as there, Versöhnung is the term for “reconciliation.” 2. Sein Gottes. Ed. note: That is, God’s being in him, the way God was present to him in his self-consciousness— viewed, as just below, as at one with his strong (kräftigen or powerful) God-consciousness, not viewed as a second, separable divine nature. See §§93–97 above. 3. Wesen. Ed. note: That is, the full “nature” of his “person.” 4. Sittlich. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, sittlich covers the entire sweep of human action (a domain that he also calls Ethik) versus the physical aspects (Physik); hence, it does not usually mean simply “moral” or “morally” in any narrower sense. It can refer to mere “custom” (Sitte), however.

5. Gesamtgefühl. 6. Individualisierte Intelligenz. Ed. note: That is, an intellect of an individualized nature. 7. Ed. note: Cf. Col. 3:9–17; also 2 Cor. 5:17 and Eph. 4:24. See esp. the two sermons from May 8 and 15, 1831, on Col. 3:5–11 and 12–17, in SW II.6 (1835), 325–47; ET Philips (2009), 217–40. 8. Akt. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term (Akt) is to be distinguished from an “action” of human moral or customary behavior (Handlung), from any human or divine “activity” (Tätigkeit), and from what comes of any of these three, namely a “deed” (Tat). 9. Rom. 8:1; also 1 John 1:8–9 and 2:1–2. 10. Gal. 2:19–21 and 5:22–24. Ed. note: Sermon only on Gal. 2:19–21, “On Righteousness Based on Faith,” July 18, 1830, SW II.2 (1834), 653–65. ET Nicol (1997), 65–77. 11. Wirksamkeit. Ed. note: In the present contexts, where this term referred to Christ’s work, this activity is called “efficacious action,” sometimes “efficacious activity,” because of its redeeming and reconciling effect. 12. Lebenshemmungen. Ed. note: Throughout, either “hindrance” or “restraint” is used for Hemmung, for these words best convey factors placed by oneself, others, or both on Schleiermacher’s meaning: obstacles to growth, hampering or repression of freedom, barriers that hem the flow of impetus to perception, feeling, or action. 13. John 5:24. Ed. note: Sermon on John 5:24–30, June 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 347–64. 14. Ed. note: Here, as traditionally in theology, blessedness is “transmitted” (vermittelt, or “mediated”) by Christ, described in this case as through community of life with Christ. This process, then, is what and how Christ provides in his role as the Mittler or Vermittler (both meaning “mediator”), for which role Schleiermacher prefers the more general title of Erlöser (“Redeemer,” or more literally, “Releaser”). For the action in his own theological account, he ordinarily uses the verb mittheilen, “to communicate.” 15. Ed. note: Cf. §100, also in presenting the doctrine of Christ’s person (§§93–99). 16. Ethische. Ed. note: cf. §101n4. 17. Ed. note: See §§102–5. 18. Ed. note: Here begins a refutation of “atonement” (Versöhnung) theories in general, insofar as they tend to focus on Christ’s suffering and death as the primary means—through sacrifice (Sühnopfer) or substitution (Ersatz leisten) for the sin of human beings—of either redemption or reconciliation. Instead, Schleiermacher claims that essentially Christ “saves” (selig macht), i.e., brings “blessedness” (Seligkeit), through his life, thus through people’s being enabled by him to enter into “living community” or “community of life” (Lebensgemeinschaft) with him. Since Christ’s death, which he deems to be an important but relatively secondary feature, this community exists by and in the Holy Spirit, which he identifies as constituting the “common spirit” of the church and as the same thing as “Christ in us.” 19. Hingebung. Ed. note: See Eph. 5:2 and 5:25. In contrast, the phrase “lay down his life” (John 10:15–18 and 13:37; 1 John 3:16) suggests sacrifice. Sermons only (1) from Sept. 11, 1825, on John 10:12–21, in SW II.9 (1847), 198–212, and (2) from April 23, 1826, on John 13:21–38, in SW II.9 (1847), 399–416. 20. Ed. note: This statement repeats the claim that Schleiermacher made in §65, at the close of his introduction to Part Two of this work, namely, one’s consciousness of grace prior to one’s distinctly Christian, corresponding consciousness of sin. 21. Ed. note: This account occurs especially in his treatment of regeneration and sanctification (§§106–12). 22. Gipfel. Ed. note: This multivocal word always included the more literal connotations of being at the peak or apex. Thus, the “climax” of Christ’s life at death, referred to just above, also translates Gipfel. 23. Sittlichen Ausbildung. Ed. note: Cf. §101n4. 24. Ed. note: Here the word mäßigen denotes a moderating, restrained, temperate calm, deeply felt sympathy—an openhearted spirit in face of both moral and physical challenges. Therein even a tugging sadness and longing (Wehmut) is accompanied by joy (Freude). See the index to Tice trans. of On Religion for discussions regarding this combination of features within religious and corresponding moral temperament, especially in discourse V. 25. Ed. note: See §89. 26. Ed. note: The phrase schöpferischen Akt implies divine creation. 27. Ed. note: See §§100.1 and 101n5. 28. Ed. note: See §§93–94.

§102. Ecclesial doctrine divides the total activity of Christ into its three offices: prophetic, high-priestly, and kingly.

1. At first glance, this classification has against it the appearance of great arbitrariness. That is, it is as though just one of a number of figurative1 expressions that Christ himself employed were selected, setting aside the others, and to this one was added two other expressions that were employed not by Christ himself but only by his disciples.2 Hence, if figurative expressions are supposed to have value, then unquestionably the figure of shepherd, which Christ himself employed and which Peter repeated, doubtless has a greater claim than the expressions high priest and prophet. Now, if it really happened that these expressions had been chosen almost randomly, as it were, from several equally entitled expressions, all of them figurative, then it would be a small wonder how such a presentation could have survived so long without another having superseded it, even one no less arbitrary, since figurative expressions are always difficult to circumscribe and thus almost necessarily lead to considerable inconveniences in any dialectical explication. Rightly, one would also have to bear strong reservations about reproducing this form still further in a strictly didactic treatment. These expressions, however, are not to be placed on the same footing with other figurative expressions. Rather, obviously their aim is to search out how the accomplishments of Christ in the collective life founded by him are to be compared with those by which God’s sovereignty was depicted and held together among the Jewish people. Moreover, within a system of doctrine this comparison is not to be neglected even now. That is to say, if it is equally true that this sort of presentation belongs more to the time in which faith originally emerged—when it surely was necessary to gain clarity about the anti-judaizing features of Christianity subsumed under the actual Jewish form of it—as it is true that this very presentation is suited to be an enduring typus of doctrine, then it simply follows therefrom that these forms alone cannot be sufficient for us. However, if, in our fashion, we have explicated the matter out of our own Christian consciousness, as has occurred above, then it is still incumbent on us to maintain for ourselves a certain continuity with those original presentations, since the first conceptual formation of Christianity was based on the juxtaposition of the new reign of God with the old. Thus, we have to show that our presentation is in harmony with the presentation that the early Christians formed, in that they depicted Christ’s works as transformations to a higher power3 of those works by which the divine government was revealed in the old covenant. 2. Naturally, here we have to do more with the underlying idea of those authorities who held sway4 in Judaism than with the development of these positions in history. The kings were the actual representatives5 of Israel’s God. Governance was given over to them in order to keep the nation6 together, and, where need arose, to renew and to reform the community. The priests were the keepers of the temple and the holy places, and they had to superintend the immediate relationship to God, in that they brought petitions and offerings before God and they brought back forgiveness and blessing from God. In an extraordinary way, the prophets were persons summoned by God and emissaries of God, belonging to both sides, God and the people, and mediating between the two. However, they were not continuous as the kings and priests were, for even if there were prophetic schools, there was, nevertheless,

no unbroken succession of prophets, viewed in the narrower sense. Rather, the prophet arose in a moment of need, sometimes from the circle of one of those holding authority, sometimes from the midst of the people, in order to issue warnings when some established authority had strayed from the right path, or in order to revive its original spirit, in turn, when something had threatened to sink into the status of a dead letter. Now, in order to clarify the relation of the reign of heaven to that sovereign rule of God on earth, Christ, on whom alone that relation rests, is presented as one in whom all three offices are united. It should then be said, in this regard, that in this reign of God—concerning which it is always understood that it is not of this world7—the founding and preserving of the communion each person has with God and the preserving and leading of the community of all members with one another are not separate functions but are the same. Moreover, it should also be said that these activities and the free sway of the human mind8 in knowledge and doctrine, in turn, arise not from different sources but from the same source. 3. Now, only the explication that follows can show how the collective redeeming and reconciling activity of Christ, as it has just been described,9 is completely recapitulated in these three offices. In the meantime, we can already demonstrate this much here: that if one either attributes only one of these three functions to the Redeemer while ignoring the rest, or even entirely excludes one particular function, then the harmony among them that we have noted would be destroyed and the distinctiveness of Christianity would be endangered. This is so for the following reasons. First, if someone were to claim the prophetic office alone for Christ, this would be to say that his efficacious action in teaching and admonition would be restricted in regard to some formation of life already given before him or apart from him and in regard to a relationship with God already founded otherwise and apart from him, and thereby the distinctiveness of Christianity would recede considerably. Likewise, if someone were to attribute the two formative activities to him but were to disqualify him from prophetic activity that is directly stimulating spiritually, then if the power of the living word is not to be contributive, it would be impossible to see how the reign of God could occur other than in a magical fashion. Second, if someone wanted to disqualify the kingly office, then the other two functions taken together, however precisely those two functions might also bind each individual redeemed person to the Redeemer, would simply produce an unwelcome separatism and, viewed more closely, even an un-Christian separatism, because reference to an existence in common would be missing. Third, if the high-priestly office were to be omitted but the other two were retained, then the prophetic activity also could have reference only to the kingly activity. Consequently, in this case there would then be a complete absence of religious content if we would want to remain true to the original typus of a high-priestly office. On the other hand, if Christ were to be presented as high priest alone, then it would be almost impossible to avoid a magical conception of his efficacious action. In the same way, if the kingly dignity were to be alone valid, and as a consequence, Christ were thought of only as forming and leading the church, thereupon the immediate

relationship of an individual to the Redeemer would be endangered and, at the very least, we would fall into the realm of the Roman church, which, at the same time, would make this relationship dependent on the church and those who govern it. Now, where such a close, dependent connection appears, as is present among these three offices, a presumption also arises there that what is connected in this way would also become a complete set.

1. Bildlichen. Ed. note: In German usage, a bildlicher Ausdruck (figurative expression) is also called a Metapher (metaphor), whereas a Bild, as below, is a “figure.” 2. Apart from the Letter to the Hebrews, the title “high priest” is found, albeit only indirectly, in Paul (Rom. 5:11), and in Peter (1 Pet. 2:21), also in John (1 John 2:1). Christ calls himself “prophet” in Luke 13:35 and less directly in similar passages. Ed. note: See §104. 3. Ed. note: als potenzierte Umbildungen. This concept, drawn from mathematics, might well indicate Schleiermacher’s strong, long-term interest in mathematics, displayed more often and more directly in his early writings. 4. Ed. note: “Those authorities who held sway” translates Gewalten. 5. Stellvertreter. Ed. note: That is, deputized by God. In Christian doctrine this same term has been applied to Christ, as one who is God’s representative or even who stands in, or substitutes, for human beings before God. Those acts were attributed to Israel’s God; very often they were done or spoken of by representatives such as prophets, priests, and kings. 6. Volk. Ed. note: Literally, “the people,” as usually below. Here “governance” translates Regiment, whereas just above “government” translates Regierung. 7. Ed. note: John 18:36; cf. John 8:23; 16:33; and 17:14. 8. Geist. Ed. note: Not der heiligen Geist. Wherever Geist, which also means “spirit,” is not the divine Spirit or the Holy Spirit, it virtually always takes a modifier in Schleiermacher’s usage. 9. In §§100 and 101.

§103. First Doctrinal Proposition: Christ’s prophetic office consists in teaching, prophesying, and working miracles.1 1. These three activities also constitute the Old Testament prophetic dignity. To be sure, the essential thing was always stimulation through teaching and admonition. However, in every important case wherein the teaching proceeded from a particular occasion, it would become prophecy at the same time, because of the prevailing idea of divine retribution— sometimes threatening, sometimes promising, in accordance with the original typus of legislation.2 Yet, since the prophets always appeared only in relation to some shortcoming or calamity in public life, for which there would doubtless always be some underlying fault on the part of those to whom they had to speak, in the absence of an external calling on which they would have been able to rely, they would need some special, authenticating proof. On account of that need, then, some amazing outcome came to be expected or presupposed as a consequence of their mission. Only on account of this third mark of prophecy could John the Baptist say that he was no prophet,3 despite his having such a distinct divine calling, for he also taught and prophesied,4 but working miracles was not granted to him,5 and he could not subject himself to any needless question about that activity. With Christ, no one of these marks simply derives from any of the others. Rather, all three marks were already one from the very outset. The reason is that his proclamation of the reign of God was both teaching and prophecy. Moreover, just as the reign of God is itself the

distinctive miracle accomplished by Christ, but its fulfillment also began right along with that proclamation, so too, all three marks resided in one and the same seed, and we can separate them out only in the further development of this seed.6 2. As Jesus appeared, one fact was that the prophetic voice had died away, a fact already generally conceded for a long time. In contrast, at that time a tradition of teaching existed in the schools of the scribes, which also intended, however, to be nothing but tradition gradually being augmented by the subtle combinations of outstanding figures and, in connection with this activity, also an official practice of teaching in the synagogues. Christ, however, could have belonged to none of the various sects into which the scribes were divided. Just as little, moreover, could he have undertaken any official activity that would have entangled him in other occupations and restricted him in a way incompatible with what he was meant to do. Yet, since a complete freedom to teach did exist apart from that activity, he could appear publicly in an acceptable fashion as soon as he had reached the age that custom7 required. Hence, no objection against his right to teach could have been issued by any public authority. Accordingly, Christ’s teaching office is also simply tantamount to his self-determination to make use of this freedom to the greatest extent possible. In consequence, for him the only occasion needed to engage in some distinct act of teaching was simply the presence of individuals or crowds eager to be taught. Moreover, all of his conversational activity also served to teach, to the extent that it could, in accordance with the existing mode in each case and with the given circumstances. Furthermore, to this extent it must be granted, in any case, that Christ would have taught, in this broader sense, already before he entered into teaching publicly. However, to say that he already taught publicly as a boy ever continues to be a false view, one that is not grounded in the cited narrative8 at all and that already borders on apocryphal presentations. Likewise, only one evangelist’s testimony9 actually connects his initial public appearance with his receiving the baptism of John; but the way in which Jesus himself explains this relationship does not permit of understanding this account in such a way that as a result of this baptism he would have become something that he was not before or that he would have obtained a right or a consecration that he did not yet possess. The first view is not compatible with faith in the original presence of the divine in his person, and for the latter view all external authority is lacking in John’s own institution of baptism. Thus, we can attribute no value to this baptismal action other than that it belonged to the historical intelligibility of his public appearance, in that he directly indicated his more noticeable transition from seclusion into public life by means of a specific confession, which would have had to awaken a more distinct opinion concerning him to which he could tie his teachings. Christ then concluded his teaching activity for the people with his arrest and imprisonment. For his disciples, however, he did not do so until his ascension, in that in the days of resurrection it appears to have been his main occupation, in part, to interpret Scripture to his disciples, no doubt establishing the way in which they would use Scripture among their people thereafter, and also, in part, to complete his directions regarding the collective life proceeding from him and thereby to establish this life itself all the more firmly.

Accordingly, it is self-evident how essentially this teaching activity of Christ belonged to his redeeming activity, as was just described. Now, however, as regards the source of his teaching, the law had always been the sole source for the prophets, even though their participation in teaching did come to them in the form of a special divine calling. Likewise, their call referred entirely to the relation between God and the people, and their intended focus was entirely national.10 Now, it did belong to Christ’s respect for the law for him not to destroy the law; hence he acknowledged and confirmed the national obligation to it. Despite this fact, his inner production of thoughts could not have been dependent on the law any more than his inspiration could have been a transitory one and dependent on particular instances that the state of the people offered. Moreover, he is also not in the slightest to be viewed as a mere result of human nature determined by a particular people. Moreover, even viewing his teaching as a purification of thinking that proceeded from general human reason and a generation of the moral teachings11 that then had currency among the people—that belongs to an empirical conception, which we have renounced. Instead, the source of his teaching would have been the purely original revelation12 of God in him. The contrast between learning and teaching would, in him, have been only the contrast between the operation of the divine principle in him on the receptivity of his spiritual organ, on the one hand, so that he could clearly conceive the state of persons present to him in regard to their relationship with God, and, on the other hand, the operation of that same divine principle on the self-initiated activity13 of his spiritual organ. Now, however, just as self-initiated activity would always be coposited in receptivity already, likewise his teaching would already be imperceptibly formed in his learning. Moreover, this initial unfolding of his own generation of thoughts would already be the source of his admirable questions.14 However, after his self-initiated activity would have become dominant and teaching would have emerged as his constant aim, the law no less than messianic hopes would naturally be the starting point wherefrom he developed his proclamation of the new collective life, or reign of God, to be founded by him. Hence, supposing that the content of Christ’s teaching were to be separately laid out here, irrespective of the fact that our entire work consists only in the presentation of that teaching, then in the process this would require returning to what was prophetic about it above all. That is, we know that it was incumbent on the prophet wholly to comply, by his discourse, with that impetus which had become a divine impetus for him, also to reproduce its entire content, which was always a distinct and limited task. Likewise, Christ’s self-determination to teach was comprised of the task of completely fulfilling his powerful God-consciousness—which also meant, at the same time, his creative God-consciousness—as it was impressed on his spiritual organ, also of the task of reproducing it in his teaching in such a way that human beings’ coming to be taken up into his community would also be effected thereby. This is how it was, for any other measure of the result, and thus also any other measure of the perfect adequacy of his teaching, cannot apply here.

Now, his discourses were, of course, sometimes more general and sometimes more detailed, sometimes more a pure outpouring of his inner being and sometimes more in reference to some external given. In consequence, persons have for a long time sought to separate what is more essential from what is more subsidiary and incidental, though in very dissimilar ways indeed. In this regard, we can only say that everything is essential in the measure that it coheres with his self-presentation, for only the manifestation15 of his distinctive dignity could have invited persons to enter into the community that he offered to them with some efficacy. For that reason, moreover, these three points of doctrine that constitute the essence of his teaching are not to be divided from each other: the teaching regarding his person, which, when viewed from an external perspective, is at the same time the teaching regarding his calling or regarding the communication of eternal life in the reign of God, and which, when viewed from an internal perspective, is the teaching regarding his relationship to the one who sent him or regarding God as his Father that was being revealed to him and through him. As a result, everything that belongs to his high-priestly and kingly offices must likewise be found in his teaching, in that he proclaimed his purpose to be both to lift human beings into communion with God and to reign spiritually. Further, only that is incidental which contained these features to the least extent; this adheres to the greatest extent to a historically bound standpoint and relates to what was peculiar to the people of that time. Demanding that the latter, incidental aspects be emphasized over the former, essential aspects leads then most effortlessly to a questionable discrimination between a teaching of Christ and a teaching regarding Christ, viewed as merely accessory. Moreover, it undeniably endangers what is distinctively Christian, as if it could have emerged thereupon only from a few improvements in the natural doctrine of morals16 and the natural doctrine of God, which, in addition, are presented in such a way that human reason would also have to have discovered them on its own. However, stipulating this point still allows enough free room for Christians of various frames of mind17 so as to hold mainly on to one or the other feature for their own use. Furthermore, this original revelation of God in Christ is so sufficient and, at the same time, so inexhaustible, that as concerns this first element, teaching, Christ appears, at the same time, as the apex and as the end of all prophecy. The reason is twofold: first, that outside the domain in which Christ is already acknowledged, a presentation of our relationship with God cannot arise that would not fall short of that revelation, nor, second, can even all advances made within the Christian church ever lead to that point of discerning something incomplete in Christ’s actual teaching, at which one would have something better to put in its place or even lead to the point of conceiving something in a human understanding of our relationship with God that is more spiritual, more profound and more complete than what Christ did. This is so, for with an acceptance of a perfectibility of Christian doctrine such that we would be able to see beyond Christ himself, acceptance of the distinctive dignity of Christ would be entirely lost. Instead, even the most splendid future in this domain can never be anything other than the proper unfolding of what, in part, lies

undeveloped in those of his sayings which have been preserved for us, and of what, in part, must already have been his insight in connection with those sayings. Now, if Christ is the apex of all prophecy on account of the completeness of his proclamation, which arose from a divine impetus, he is also that apex, at the same time, because as a teacher he is not simply one among many like himself. Moreover, if Christ is the end of all prophecy, because no new teaching can emerge that would not be a false teaching once his is fully established,18 then, from now on, all true teaching in this domain no longer traces back to Moses and the law but traces back to the Son. Thus, at the same time, he is the apex also because now there is no more independent personal inspiration in this respect; rather, there is only a process of being inspired by him. Only the following is yet to be observed: First, like the teaching of the prophets, his teaching too was always a direct expression, thus it was also not to be separated from the total impression of his entire being.19 Yet, second, because his inspiration was not transitory but was constant, it also follows for his teaching that any expression of the stirring of his mind and heart20 by means of speech and by means of any accompanying nonverbal expression, because it would give testimony to God’s being in him, would also contain didactic features and serve as confirmation for the teaching proper. 3. The prophecy of the Old Testament prophets, insofar as we are able to infer things about the whole based on what remains to us from it, was, in part, a special prophecy aimed at something particular and it admixed cautionary, rousing, or comforting teaching in conformity to the spirit of the law, because it was resting, for the most part hypothetically, on the two principal Jewish concepts regarding divine election of the people and regarding divine retribution. In part, prophecy elevated itself beyond particular instances to presentation of a general nature and proceeded altogether in this way, and this was what was messianic in it. In the first, special prophecy was comprised of an actual prediction, which in its more or less distinct declarations approached a sometimes higher, sometimes lower degree of accuracy. In the second, messianic prophecy, the particular declarations are simply more or less dressed up in such a way that frequently it is to be regarded as undecided whether this thing or that belongs in the prophecy itself or not. The essence of the matter, however, is based on the claim that the prophecy declared the future of one essentially sent by God, whose idea could only be limitedly conceived by individuals in a manner unique to each one. Yet, rightly understood, it always contained in itself an end belonging to those two Jewish concepts of retribution and election. Now, Christ, viewed as the messiah already then appearing in person, could prophesy as the messiah only regarding what had not yet appeared, which would also be fulfilled, however, by that same activity from which the prophecy emerged—namely, from the further development of his reign or the completion of it. In consequence, this prophecy was wholly at one with his teaching, and in this sense he prophesied without predicting.21 He could not even incidentally predict, however, in that everything that falls under this designation is without value in his reign and thus could not even be a matter of either an investigative or a foreboding participation in it. Rather, he could predict only the end of institutions based on

those limited concepts of election and retribution; and he did this, not hypothetically but with that complete accuracy which befits his perfection, which was itself incapable of generating error. In the same way, his confidence in this prediction then had to be one and the same with his surety regarding his own destiny. Thus, in relation to both, Christ is the apex of prophecy. However, just as he is the apex, he is also the end of it. That is to say, his essential prophecy has been entirely fulfilled ever since the Spirit was also poured out, and it is not to be imagined what else that is essential could be missing in the reign of God. Rather, whoever would want to point out something brand-new that is impending would have to be proclaiming a different gospel. The case is no different, however, also with respect to prediction. The apostolic prediction that perchance exists22 we can only view as an interpretation and echo of Christ’s own prediction, to the extent that there was an occasion then that did not yet exist in Christ’s time to predict something similar regarding the antagonistic Gentile world, just as he had regarding the Jewish world. Otherwise, however, given these limited concepts, a reason and standpoint for all predicting then fell away, and this predicting is to be bound exclusively to a heightened religious stirring.23 As a result, only those predictions still remain that can arise out of understandable synoptic views offered regarding human circumstances and out of genuine and deep common feeling. No prediction, however, can have a holy character attributed to it, whatever its content and however great its exactness might be or however wondrously confirmed any pictures issuing from an aroused capacity for presentiment might occasionally be. If this proposition was formerly not so distinctly expressed as doctrine in the Evangelical church as occurs in a logical manner here, it is also perhaps more indispensable today than it was earlier, and it might well experience little opposition in the church itself. Moreover, this is the case not only because it essentially belongs to the reign of God’s having become natural24 but also because it results from the entire early mode of procedure in our church, in that everywhere the church has presupposed that a fanatical spirit25 is operating wherever a gift of prophesying comes to be accepted. Accordingly, for our domain nothing remains besides interpretation of Christ’s and the apostles’ prophesying, but this is a task that can be resolved only according to the rules of art,26 not with an arbitrariness that could only gain currency insofar as it would itself have been prophecy. All predictions, however, both those based on historical sensibility and those based on an unaccountable capacity for presentiment,27 are left up to scientific inquiry regarding the human psyche.28 4. Although even wonders and signs were not to protect the prophets, if they spoke against Jehovah and his law,29 it also follows of itself that signs and wonders were always borne in mind too whenever one of the prophets was brought to mind.30 In relation to the Redeemer we could already31 have surmised it as something natural, but of a higher order, that he would also have to have miraculous powers at his command. However, this comparison with the Jewish prophets shows in what sense Christ himself and his disciples could actually appeal to his miracles but why Christ did not perform signs and wonders when

they were demanded of him. That is to say, even the wonders of the prophets were not meant to call forth belief in their messianic prophecies, and could not do so, but could only call forth belief in their conditional predictions, in order to determine thereby what was to be done. In contrast, Christ did not give such conditional predictions about himself, and belief in his relation to the messianic idea was supposed to arise only from the immediate impression of his person.32 Therefore, Christ also never used his miraculous powers in any distinct relation to the various summons he issued or in relation to what he said about himself;33 rather, he used his miraculous powers, just as each person uses one’s natural powers, to effect good whenever the opportunity presented itself. Now, already at that time, in particular instances a true recognition of Christ could be occasioned by miracles, or could, on the other hand, find some confirmation in them; but at no time could that recognition actually be grounded on miracles. Thus, miracles must be entirely superfluous for us with regard to our own faith. That is to say, by virtue of their being directly perceivable, miracles can only deflect spiritual need toward a particular object, or, if spiritual need has already been turned in that direction, can only justify this inner relationship in some external way.34 A direct vivid quality, however, fades in the measure that one who is to have faith is distant in space or time from the miracle itself. In contrast, what appears in the place of miracles in our time is historical information regarding the quality as well as the scope and constancy of Christ’s spiritual workings. Because of these spiritual workings, we have an advantage over the Redeemer’s contemporaries; and in them a testimony to his power increases in the same measure as that by which miracles lose their vivid quality. What does that signify other than that we are pointed away from particular, more physical miracles toward the general, spiritual miracle that begins with the person of the Redeemer and is completed with the consummation of his reign? So too belief in external miracles performed by Christ belongs less to our immediately held faith in Christ and more to our belief in Scripture, as is true of any belief we might have in actions that were not performed by him, in accordance with principles that could be learned anywhere and the results of which cannot be traced back to laws of nature that would be known to us as valid for all time.35 The reason is that we cannot pull down these events from above into the realm of nature, which is quite familiar to us, without having recourse to presuppositions whereby the trustworthiness of the whole interconnection of our accounts regarding Christ would be endangered.36 Moreover, this conviction will no doubt arise out of the dispute hovering over all these presuppositions, all the more sincerely and sensibly the more vigorously and generally it is conducted. If we stick with affirming these particular more physical miracles, this would be to make less clear than could occur by simply teaching and prophesying that Christ is also the apex of working miracles. This is so, for in Christ’s miracles nothing is given to us that, in and of itself, distinctly elevates them above other similar miracles that are recounted from various ancient times and places. However, if we look at that spiritual collective miracle he did bring about, we must declare him to be this apex, all the more distinctly as we recognize that apart from him this could not have been accomplished by all the powers of our known spiritual

nature. Yet, just as surely, Christ is then the end of miracles as well. This is so, for the more firm and sure it is that redemption is completed through Christ—in such a way that everything still lying in store for humankind, insofar as it relates to any communion humankind has with God, is to be viewed only as a further development of the work of Christ and not as a new revelation—the more reason we have to reject what wants to claim recognition as miracle so as to indicate something newly generated in the domain of spiritual life. Instead, only new epochs in nature or even in history—but not, indeed, in the domain of piety—could still be made known by way of miracles. Concerning such events, at that point any remaining judgment is to be left solely to the science of nature.37 Without doubt, a fixed doctrine regarding this point too does not exist in the Evangelical church. Nevertheless, Luther’s words regarding the matter38 do indeed also show plainly enough that he did not at all take that great transformation in the church to which he contributed to be a point of development such that it would stand in need of having miraculous power to assist it—even though this transformation was the beginning of a new collective life, at least in a subordinate sense. Accordingly, this doctrine also depends on a maxim that we can well consider to have become predominant in the Evangelical church by tacit agreement, namely, that we generally presuppose the presence of superstition whenever new miracles are presented and are believed to be occurring as confirmations of Christianity. Against this view, someone could object that in no instance is our proposition to be conceded strictly and literally, since the miracles of Christ’s disciples were just as attested to as were his own, and he had also evidently bequeathed his miraculous power to them.39 Moreover, since it also could in no way be proven that those miraculous gifts had suddenly died out with the death of the apostles, this much would indeed be certain, that Christ himself would not have wanted to be the end of miraculous power. However, one must leave undecided whether these gifts have actually been gradually extinguished, or whether they perhaps do not still persist in the church or are at least periodically renewed once more. To all this it is to be rejoined that the same holds for the apostles’ miracles as for their prophesying, also that Christ transmitted miraculous power to them only as signs accompanying their initial proclamation. Now, a strict proof cannot be adduced to the effect that the church’s miraculous power has died out, a position denied by the Roman church. Yet, in general terms it is undeniable that current proclaimers do not stand in need of such signs, given the great advantage in power and culture40 that Christian peoples, almost without exception, have over nonChristian peoples. In every individual instance, however, it can always be demonstrated that the alleged miracle, whatever spiritual aim one might also want to attribute to it, would always be a sign insufficient for grounding faith, consequently superfluous as well. Likewise, even the Roman church itself betrays no great confidence in the position that it sets forth, in that the way in which it limits miracle in one case is used in another case to open miracle to scrutiny.

1. Ed. note: In ecclesiology the more direct counterpart to this proposition is presented in §§128–35, on Holy Scripture and ministry of the divine word. 2. Gesetzgebung. Ed. note: That is, the giving of the law, thus any reference to living by or fulfillment of the law on the part of prophets. 3. John 1:21. 4. Matt. 3:10, 16–17. 5. John 10:41. 6. Ed. note: See sermons on seeds of proclamation, Luke 8:12–13 and Matt. 13:22–23, May 28–July 9, 1826, SW II.4 (1835), 656–716, and (1844), 707–68. See also two 1821 sermons, on Matt. 4:7 and 10:11–13, SW II.10 (1836), 195–208, 227–62; ET Tice, “Schleiermacher’s Concept of Ministry” (2006), 222–37. 7. Sitte. Ed. note: Cf. §101n4. 8. Luke 2:46–47. Ed. note: See his sermon on Luke 2:41–54, Jan. 11, 1824, published separately in 1825, also in SW II.4 (1844 only) 206–18. 9. Luke 4:14. However, in addition consider Acts 1:21–22. 10. Volkstümlich. Ed. note: That is, directed solely to peoples as a whole or to their leaders and representatives. 11. Sittenlehre. Ed. note: Among the Jewish peoples the law came to cover all conduct, literally all customs (Sitte), not only those that might be regarded as “moral” in a narrower sense. 12. Offenbarung. Ed. note: Or “manifestation.” 13. Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: Used here is a standard distinction in Schleiermacher’s psychology between Empfänglichkeit (or Receptivität) and Selbsttätigkeit (or Spontaneität). He takes the two actions to be two interdependent phases of a single capacity for openness in the mind, which is one’s “spiritual [geistige] organ.” 14. Luke 2:47. Ed. note: See his sermon on Luke 2:41–49, Mar. 4, 1821, first published in 1821, also in SW II.4 (1835), 265–81, and (1844), 313–30. ET DeVries (1987), 117–35. On “Christ as Teacher” see the sermon on John 7:18, Jan. 2, 1825, first published in 1825, also in SW II.4 (1835), 546–56, and (1844), 597–607. The three other sermons in this Jan.–Feb. series are on Christ as miracle-maker, in social life and among his disciples. 15. Kundmachung. Ed. note: Literally, “making known,” which could occur either by word or by deed. 16. Sittenlehre. Ed. note: See §103n11. The contrasting term used in this sentence is Gotteslehre, in Christian theology a synonym for Glaubenslehre (faith-doctrine) in distinction from Christliche Sittenlehre (Christian ethics), both of which in Schleiermacher’s usage are parts of dogmatics, technically but not theoretically separable (§§26 and 29.2; cf. §§111.4 and 126.2 for examples of the overlap). Here, in contrast, the specific reference is to “natural theology,” which Schleiermacher abjures (§29.2). Arguments for exclusion of natural theology are developed throughout the Introduction (esp. in §§10.P.S., 11.4, 14.2, 15.1–2, 16.2–3, 16.P.S., 17.2–3, 18.2–3, 18.P.S., 19.4, and §28) but are fully accomplished only in the system as a whole (§30.1–2). 17. Gemütsfassung. Ed. note: Actually, the entire human spirit (Gemüt), mind and heart. 18. Ed. note: The verb is dasteht, i.e., stands “there,” stands pat, comes fully into existence. 19. Des ganzen Wesens. 20. Gemüt. Ed. note: Cf. §103n17 just above. 21. Acts 1:7. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 1:6–11, Ascension Day, May 7, 1812, published in Festpredigten (1833), also in SW II.2 (1834), 518–30. For further discussion on prophecy, see §14.3. 22. I also do not count the Apocalypse [Revelation] as belonging here, for I cannot acknowledge an apostolic origination for it. Ed. note: Nevertheless, four extant sermons were on the book of Revelation. See, notably, (1) sermon on Rev. 3:11, Memorial Day (Todenfest), Nov. 23, 1828, on a saying attributed to Jesus, first published separately in 1829, also in SW II.4 (1835), 182–94, and (1844), 257–69; and (2) sermon on Rev. 22:12 from New Year’s Day 1827, Festpredigten (1833), also in SW II.2 (1834), 371–85. Also see (3) on Rev. 22:10–13, from the First Sunday in Advent (1810), in SW II.7 (1836), 548– 56, and (4) Rev. 21:1–5, from New Year’s Day (1826), in a separate publication (1866). ET of the New Year’s sermons in Schleiermacher, Fifteen Sermons, trans. Lawler (2003). 23. Eine erhöhte Gemütserregung. Ed. note: The word for “emotion” typically used is Gemütsbewegung, a “moving of one’s mind and heart”; here it is a “stirring” or arousal. 24. Naturgewordensein. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher has noted at each stage in his explication of this system of doctrine, all of the redemptive process has to do with “the supernatural becoming natural.” 25. Schwarmgeist. Ed. note: Among Evangelicals this word has been used for a follower of a trend (Schwärmerei) that deviates from the official movements for reformation. Such movements were strongly opposed from early on in the Evangelical church. It could also refer to the craze of a throng or to heightened hysteria. 26. Ed. note: That is, by the hermeneutical and critical rules followed in exegesis. 27. Ahndungsvermögen.

28. Der psychischen Naturforschung. Ed. note: Apart from what is called “philosophy of mind” today, only rudiments of an organized field of psychology existed before the late nineteenth century. 29. Deut. 13:1–5. Ed. note: Here “signs and wonders [Wunder]” are spoken of. “Miracle” translates Wunder just below. 30. See §103.1. 31. Cf. §14.P.S. 32. Matt. 16:16; John 1:14, 16; 4:42; 6:68–69; and 7:25–26. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Matt. 16:13–19, Nov. 28, 1819, first separately published in 1820, also in SW II.4 (1835), 87–99, and (1844), 120–32; (2) John 1:14–18, May 11, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 43–54; (3) John 1:12–17, Dec. 5, 1830, first separately published in 1831, also in SW II.4 (1835), 195–208, and (1844), 271–83; (4) John 4:35–42, April 11, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 291–302; (5) John 6:61–71, Jan. 9, 1825, SW II.8 (1837), 468–75; (6–7) John 7:14–24, and 25–36, Feb. 20 and Mar. 6, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 16–45. 33. Even John 11:42 offers no exception to this rule, though this cannot be dealt with in detail here. Ed. note: Sermon on John 11:41–54, Dec. 18, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 277–91. 34. This sense of the matter cannot but be that of John 20:30–31 as well. Ed. note: The KGA sermon volumes III/9 and III/10 may include transcripts from sermons after John 16:33. Publication of the series in the SW ended at that point due to lack of adequate transcripts at the time. 35. Ed. note: Here, as elsewhere in this work, Glaube has to be translated by both “faith,” here referring to one’s relationship with God or Christ, and “belief,” referring to such things as propositions, Scripture or scriptural statements, and other claims or actions. 36. Cf. §99. 37. Naturwissenschaft. Ed. note: For further explanations, see §14.3. 38. Luther, Noch eine andere Predigt am Tage der Himmelfahrt Christi: Mark 16: “If it were needed, the same sign that the apostles performed could reasonably occur even today.” Ed. note: This is not an exact quotation. See two Luther sermons by this title and on this biblical text in Sämtliche Schriften, ed. Walch, vol. 11 (1742), at 1294 and 1339. 39. Ed. note: See Mark 16:14–20 (a passage now disputed). Sermon on this passage from Ascension Day, May 11, 1820, first published in Festpredigten (1826), then in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 204–15. 40. Bildung. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s conception, peoples that enjoy developments in culture strongly rely on education, which in turn supports growth in both personal and communal formation or growth. Thus, the “power” (Kraft) to which he refers here is that associated with mutually supported growth, not the power wielded by certain persons or groups over others (Gewalt).

§104. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Christ’s high-priestly office includes his complete fulfillment of the law, or his active obedience, his atoning death,1 or his passive obedience, and his advocacy with the Father on behalf of the faithful. 1. This part of our account is chiefly concerned with the difficulty of making a presentation of Christ’s efficacious action overall under these three forms derived from the old covenant. This difficulty arises, on the one hand, because the analogy between what within Christ’s efficacious action would have to be taken into account here, if any room for it is to be found at all, and high-priestly functions are just not greatly apparent. The difficulty arises, on the other hand, because much among high-priestly functions that are thereby supposed to be depicted in Christ as well actually show up only in activities of the Redeemer that one might rather be inclined to assign to one of his other two offices. To start with, the uncommon but supremely significant function of the high priest, that of receiving instructions from Jehovah in the holy of holies, finds no direct analogy in Christ’s functioning. Instead, inasmuch as Christ had received from his Father all the instructions that he imparted to his own followers,2 we would find this function to be echoed chiefly in his prophetic activity. Then the blessings-wishes3 that the high priest expressed concerning the people brings to mind what we have earlier reckoned to Christ’s reconciling activity,4 though ecclesial doctrine has not expressly included it in that activity. Even so, Christ’s blessing can be no mere wish but is rather a true gift. Thus, he can also extend blessing only through what belongs to his activity of guiding and governing, just as the Epistle to the Hebrews has also5 definitely conceived of a kingly dignity beside that of a high priest. Consequently, all that remains are Christ’s symbolic actions, whereby the main expression rests on what is done on the Day of Atonement.6 Yet, no relation of particular functions performed on that day to the special functions of Christ just noted here is to be thought of. Rather, if one views the high priest as head of the priesthood at the same time, so that its ordinances can also be traced back to him, then he would be the head functionary of the people before Jehovah, and thus this role would be fully expressed by the concept “substitution.” Yet, nothing is directly said regarding the legal requirement of perfection on the part of the high priest, and nothing is found that corresponds to an atoning death viewed as a “sacrifice.” As regards the first notion, on the one hand, some allowance is to be made for the personal perfection imputed to the high priest as an essential quality, though above all the sinless perfection treated in the doctrine of Christ’s person7 directly corresponds to this perfection. Suppose, however, that we still have to take special notice of the fact that the official function of the Day of Atonement is nevertheless its most distinctive feature. Then, what we find is that before the high priest entered into this observance, the high priest had to purify himself in various ways and had to bring a sin-offering for himself and his household. By virtue of these preparations, he was then considered to be perfect, as was legally required. As regards the second notion, concerning a sacrificial atoning death, in this context little value is to be placed in the fact that Christ offered himself up. That is to say, insofar as he

was the one who was offering himself up, he is to be compared with a sacrifice, and this language usage is indeed not only also found in certain passages of Scripture,8 but this twofold reference to Christ as sacrificer and sacrifice is also carried over into some confessional writings as well.9 Thereby it is all the more necessary that we divorce the two descriptors from each other, and yet in those sources Christ is especially to be regarded as one who offers sacrifice. In that role, however, he is engaged in action; suffering, moreover, can be only an attendant feature and can be grounded only in his sympathy for sin, which, to be sure, is to be presupposed in the high priest, above all in his acts of atonement. Still, a new difficulty enters in at this point: namely, that both Christ’s active obedience and his passive obedience entirely belong to his self-presentation, and consequently to his prophetic office, just as his intercession or advocacy, since it indeed cannot be thought of without its successful outcome, seems entirely to coincide with his governance. Thus, here too a distinction has to be made in both respects. That is, here Christ’s advocacy is to be depicted only to the extent that it is something different from his governance, and his twofold obedience is to be depicted only to the extent that it10 is something different from his selfpresentation or his proclamation of the divine will by word and deed. 2. If we initially divide Christ’s obedience into active and passive obedience, the two are still not to be imagined as divided, as if they would have taken up different seasons of his life, which is commonly assumed, so that the passive obedience would have begun only with his arrest whereas the active obedience would have been expressed from the onset of his public life up until that point. The reason is as follows. First, in general no passivity11 occurs without some countering effect, which always has the character of activity. Accordingly, we have particularly established regarding Christ12 that no instant of his life could have been concluded without its also containing his powerful God-consciousness within it. Moreover, this God-consciousness could never exist except as activity, and even where this activity appears only as counteraction—as it surely does in his actual suffering—it could always be only the most complete fulfillment of the divine will. Likewise, his complete submission always exists simply as the crown in his life of active obedience—without complacency, on the one hand, and without bitterness or rancor on the other. In the same way, no activity exists without some occasion for it, which always presupposes a passive13 state, no less the case than that there is any activity without a limited result, and the attendant limitations are sensed, in any case, as something one has suffered. Now, both those occasions for activity and those limitations of activity came to Christ out of the collective life of general sinfulness. As a result, for him every resistance he experienced in the course of his active life, every snare set by his opponents, but no less also the indifference with which many passed him by, would lead to suffering, because in these instances he felt sympathy for and thus bore the sin of the world. This suffering accompanied him throughout his entire life. Thus, when observed more closely, both active and passive obedience were bound together in every instant. The expression “passive obedience,” therefore, simply designates the state, pleasing to God and completely sufficient for God, of Christ’s receptivity to all that came to him from the collective life of sin. That is, he had this

receptivity in that he took up all these things only in relation to the task he was to pursue by the strength of his God-consciousness and in that he did so in the fullest and purest fashion. The expression “active obedience” designates the coincident state of his self-initiated activity in relation to all that it was incumbent on him to do for that collective life which he had come to call into being, pursuing this task in such a way that as he faced all that lay before him, he never formed within himself any other aim than this one. Both states, however—receptivity and self-initiated activity, and consequently passive and active obedience—were present in every single element of Christ’s life. Hence, it also follows that what Christ was doing could not have been redemptive without his suffering, nor could his suffering have had a reconciling effect without what he was doing. Likewise, redemption cannot be ascribed to his active obedience alone, nor can reconciliation be ascribed to his passive obedience alone. Rather, both redemption and reconciliation are to be ascribed to both these two states. 3. Suppose that with reference to his active obedience, thus defined, we now compare Christ with the high priest—having to focus, of course, only on the original institution of the latter’s practice, not on its eventual degeneration. Then the high priest would have been situated, by his being set apart and by the containment of his life within the precincts of the sanctuary,14 in such a favorable manner that it was not easy for him to neglect anything that belonged to his calling, nor did he find himself required to do anything that was not in accord with his dignity and that could thus have done damage to it. Accordingly, it was also far easier for him than for anyone else to guard against proscribed defilements. These privileges in which the high priest engaged would have had to be attributed to human weakness if, in relationship to his people, he were supposed to have presented, even but symbolically, what Christ actually was in relationship to human beings. That is, in those days the people lived in constant danger of defilement, indeed in an almost constant awareness of that possibility. In contrast, in his segregation from all worldly affairs, the high priest also lived in detachment, indeed even from the most natural of duties as long as they could not be performed without even a slight defilement. He was supposed to present himself as one undefiled, who was as such also alone able to preside over the annual sacrifice of atonement, viewed as the completion15 of all the sacrifices that the people were ceaselessly offering through the priesthood as a whole. Likewise, in their dwelling more or less at a distance from the holy of holies, the people also seemed to be at a greater distance from God, which was but temporarily diminished in the fluctuation between times of worship and of ordinary occupations. In contrast, the high priest was supposed to bear within himself the counterweight to these wavering movements, in that he continually remained within the immediate precincts of the sanctuary, though he actually entered it only at prescribed times and for prescribed purposes. Now, this very thing is also what is essential in the high-priestly value of Christ’s active obedience. That is to say, the very basis of our relationship to Christ lies in the fact that what he did not only completely corresponds to the divine will but also both purely and entirely expresses the domain of God-consciousness in human nature. Moreover, all that is

distinctively Christian rests on this recognition. Precisely the following is implied therein: that apart from a connection16 with Christ, neither any individual human being nor any distinct part of the collective life of human beings, viewed in and of oneself or itself, would be righteous before God at any time whatsoever or would be an object of God’s good pleasure. Furthermore, just as the high priest alone, among the entire Jewish people, directly appeared before God, and just as God, as it were, saw the whole people only in him, so Christ is also our high priest because God sees us not as each individual in and of oneself but only in him. When in living community with Christ, no one intends to be something in and of oneself nor even to be viewed by God in this way; rather, each individual intends to appear only as one animated17 by him and as a part of his work that is still involved in ongoing development. As a result, that which is not yet fully united18 with him is nonetheless referred to the same animating principle, itself viewed as that which is yet to be animated by him in the future. Therefore, just as was the case with the high priest, so here Christ is the one who purely presents us before God by virtue of his own perfect fulfillment of the divine will, for which the impulse is also effective in us by means of his life in us. The result is that in this interconnectedness19 with him, we are also objects of the divine good pleasure. For us, this is the distinct, and on Christian grounds indisputable, meaning of an oft-misunderstood expression, namely, the expression that Christ’s obedience is our righteousness or the expression that his righteousness is imputed to us.20 These expressions are very easily misunderstood, but they are certainly not to be reasonably defended without the presupposition of a life held in common, which is in any case also most definitely presupposed in the concept of high priest. In this respect, moreover, we will also be in a position to distinguish the prophetic value of Christ’s obedience from the value of the high priest’s obedience. That is, belonging to Christ’s prophetic office is all that consists in proclamation, consequently also self-presentation, not only in words but in deed as well. This proclamation, however, is directed to human beings in relation to their difference from Christ, so as to make them receptive to union with him. In this way, moreover, Christ’s obedience in this active aspect is also held up as an example21 to all those who are in the church, in relation to their still persistent distinction from him. The highpriestly value of this active obedience, however, is related to his union with us—that is, to the extent that his pure intent to fulfill the divine will is effective in us too, by dint of the continuing community of life that exists between him and us. Further, we thus participate in his perfection, even if not in its execution then still by our own volition and being stimulated to action.22 In consequence, even though our union with Christ never develops in this way in its actual appearance, it is nonetheless recognized as absolute and eternal by God and is posited as such in our faith.23 We have yet to enter protest against two things contained in the customary presentation of this matter. First, we must protest against people’s presenting Christ’s active obedience as a complete fulfillment of the divine law. The reason is as follows. In every instance, “law” designates a distinction and discord between a higher will that bids certain actions and an

imperfect, subordinate will, and in this sense one must, to be sure, set forth the claim regarding Christ that he was not subject to the law.24 This is so even if one ascribes a twofold will to him by virtue of his having “two natures,” since then the two wills would indeed have to be in full agreement. Yet, at that point one also cannot say with any greater warrant that he, by his own free will, would have subjected himself to the law, for he could also not willingly have entered into conflict with the divine will, with the result that doing this could have become law for him. Instead, Christ’s active obedience lay in his perfect fulfillment of the divine will.25 Suppose, however, that what is in question is the Mosaic law, insofar as it chiefly prescribed external actions and omissions. Then, in accordance with his personal existence he was, to be sure, subject to this law;26 accordingly, it cannot be said that he would have undertaken to fulfill this Mosaic law by his own free will. Yet, the high-priestly value of his active obedience would not have laid in this fulfillment alone but would have done so only to the extent that this fulfillment was a part of his fulfillment of the divine will. The second misconstrual that we must protest against is this: that, if one intends to express oneself with any accuracy, one also cannot say that Christ would have fulfilled the divine will in our place or for our benefit. The first conception, regarding Christ’s fulfilling the divine will in our place, is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is mistaken in a sense in which no Christian disposition can wish for and no sound doctrine has ever expressed, namely, as if we would thereby have been relieved of fulfilling God’s will ourselves, since Christ’s supreme accomplishment does indeed consist in his animating us in such a way that an ever-increasing satisfaction of the divine will would also proceed from us.27 This conception is also mistaken for a second reason, namely, as if the lack in God’s good pleasure that we come across in and of ourselves would have to be, or could be, covered, as it were, by a superfluity in Christ’s own gaining of God’s good pleasure. That is to say, since only what is perfect can stand before God, even Christ himself would have had nothing left over, as it were, that could be distributed among us. This would be true whether one were looking at the total satisfaction of fulfillment in terms of external actions—which conception, moreover, would be quite un-Protestant, for reasons that will more specifically arise later on—or even whether one is simply looking at purity of disposition within. Thus, the second conception, that of Christ’s somehow in general fulfilling the divine will for our benefit, is also mistaken, as if Christ’s obedience, viewed in and of itself, would actually achieve anything for us or anything would be altered in relation to us. Rather, Christ’s overall obedience—δικαίωμα28—redounds to our benefit only inasmuch as our being taken up into community of life with him is effected by it and we are affected by him in this community; consequently, the principle that has motivated him becomes ours as well, just as we are also condemned by Adam’s sin only inasmuch as we all do sin ourselves, in a natural community of life with Adam and activated in the same fashion.29 4. As further concerns Christ’s passive obedience, it has already been noted above that here any similarity with the high priest would be only an entirely general one. In

consequence, by this reference we can no more explain an interconnection of Christ’s passive obedience with his redemptive and reconciling activity than there was any mention of the high priest’s enduring any evil done to him, whereas this experience is what Christ’s passive obedience is expressly understood to mean. Thus, what Christ was sensible of as one who was offering sacrifice and what he underwent as one who was sacrificed or as one offered in sacrifice are oddly blended together. Now, if we examine this blending in a preliminary way, we will be led back to the fact that in every human community, to the extent that it can be viewed as a self-contained whole, there is as much evil as there is sin. As a result, evil is indeed punishment for sin. Not every individual, however, fully and exclusively suffers an evil that stands directly in connection with one’s personal sin.30 Therefore, it can then be said that in every instance wherein another person endures evil that has no connection with that person’s own sin, that same person then suffers punishment for others. Moreover, since the causality of the person’s sin will have come to an end, these others will no longer encounter this evil by virtue of their sin. In comparison, in order to take us up into community with his life, Christ would first have to have entered into our community. This he did, without any sin, and hence from his existence no evil could emerge within the community of sinful life, even though there evil is being engendered over and over again with sin and from it. Hence, it must be said of him that what he has suffered in this community, of a sort that it had its basis in sin and given that he was not suffering from natural evil, he would have suffered for those with whom he was standing in community—that is, for the entire human race. He belongs to the whole human race, moreover, not only because no particular community within it can be completely divorced from that whole but also by his own determinate will. This is the case for two reasons. First, both in actual deed, already by his appearance as prototype, and particularly in his consciousness, the distinction between Jew and Gentile was abolished. Second, on the one hand, not only had his activity already had a bearing on the Gentiles, at least indirectly; but, on the other hand, particularly in the last days of his life as his suffering was being occasioned—both Jewish and Gentile society encircling him in the form of spiritual and worldly authority—both were representing31 the sin of the entire world. Suppose, however, that we disregard these evils borne through suffering, evils which do not actually bear a high-priestly character in themselves, and consider the suffering that Christ received in his high-priestly role. Then it is patent that his compassion32 regarding sin, as in a human sense that compassion existed within him and as that compassion was conditioned by what lay before him, had to have arisen to its greatest peak when the two chief classes of sinners were together arrayed against the sinless existence of his person. Just as this compassion in the face of human guilt and culpability was the initial occasion that motivated redemption, inasmuch as a distinct impression precedes every distinct human selfinitiated activity, so too the greatest heightening of precisely this compassion was the direct inspiration that lay behind the greatest element in the work of redemption. Moreover, just as victory over sin then arose from this element33 but its connection with evil was also overcome, so too one can also say, in comparing like with like, that by Christ’s suffering,

punishment was also removed. This happened because in community with his blessed life, that evil which was only then in the process of disappearing was being, at the very least, no longer received as punishment.34 Now, what has just been expounded here comprises the meaning of the expressions—in the distinctive domain of Christianity, in general terms easily understood and easily defended though often contested from outside it—that by his free surrender in suffering and death to divine justice, viewed as that which has ordained the connection that exists between sin and evil, Christ gave satisfaction and has thereby freed us from punishment for sin.35 Moreover, it must be possible to infer from this presentation everything viewed as an appropriation of his suffering that has ever proven fruitful for Christian piety—that is, everything apart from that prototypical value of Christ’s suffering which belongs to his prophetic office. Indeed, even that form of this piety which occasionally appears to be one-sided, and which, as it were, focuses the entire power of redemption exclusively in Christ’s suffering and thus finds its satisfaction in this suffering alone, can be very well understood on this basis. That is to say, his absolutely self-denying love is indeed manifested to us in his suffering unto death—itself evoked by his unfailing perseverance. Moreover, in this love we come to realize in utmost clarity how it was that God was in him reconciling the world to Godself, just as we most fully come to share a feeling of how unshakable his blessedness was in his suffering. This is why one can say that the conviction of his holiness as well as of his blessedness always becomes clear to us above all from our being engulfed in his suffering. Furthermore, just as Christ’s active obedience has its actual high-priestly value chiefly in the fact that, in Christ, God sees us as partners in his obedience,36 so the high-priestly value of his passive obedience consists chiefly in the fact that we see God in Christ and see Christ as the most immediate partaker of that eternal love which has sent and equipped him. It might now be scarcely necessary to make a comparative review of this simple presentation with those spuriously constructed presentations37 which cannot assemble reasons enough, of whatever varied sort they may be, to declare the necessity of Jesus’ suffering and death. Yet, there are some misunderstandings left which we have to renounce. The first misunderstanding is the following. If we directly gain a true understanding of Christ in a particularly striking fashion from his suffering, this offers no justification for what is at play in the so-called wounds theology, which was once very widespread but is already almost obsolete today. This theology has thought to find the profound meaning of Christ’s suffering in its sensory details, hence has broken the whole of Christ’s suffering into pieces to play around with allegorically. Underlying this theological process is a displacement that transfers to his high-priestly dignity what can be attributed to Christ only as sacrifice. That is, the sacrifice is itself far from being any sort of self-initiated activity, and in that sacrifice everything is confronted only in a completely passive way. Accordingly, in Christ too there would have been no decision to be a sacrifice whatsoever with respect to these details, thus for him they would not at all have been regarded as elements of that sacrifice. The second misunderstanding lies in people’s claiming the formula—quite right in the sense indicated above—that punishment’s being removed by Christ’s suffering is to be

understood in such a way that he would have borne the punishment himself. That is, the mistaken view is that Christ’s suffering was equal to the sum total of evils proportionate to the punishment due for the sins of humankind and that without it God’s justice would have remained unsatisfied. Naturally, since on this basis the total sin of the human race can only be posited to be infinite, an infinite amount of suffering follows. Now, suppose the following. First, suppose that Christ’s suffering and death indeed occurred in a restricted, distinct stretch of time and suppose that it was related to a capacity actually to suffer that is infinitely lowered by the higher spiritual power in Christ. Then suppose that this suffering and death is nevertheless to be equalized with the pictured infinite totality of human suffering due. On this basis, it is scarcely to be denied that one would also infer, in a supplementary fashion, that even the “divine nature” in him would have suffered.38 This latter account of the matter, which contradicts the incapacity of Christ’s “divine nature” to suffer that has also been recognized in this doctrine from ancient times onward, certainly cannot withstand any strong attack from opponents. This misunderstanding first reaches its full extent, however, in the assumption that Christ’s suffering would, in the still narrower sense, lie in the transference of punishment to him. Therein God—who, in accordance with the ecclesial doctrine itself, is nevertheless generally not viewed as the author of punishment—would have ordained for the Redeemer suffering as punishment for sin. In consequence, Christ would also have had to have a sense of the primary and most immediate aspect of his suffering, namely, the divine wrath over sin, as something encountering him and resting upon him. Such is the case, on the one hand, for this theory abrogates all human verity in Christ’s human consciousness if he were supposed to have had what, by the nature of the case, could only be compassion in him as his own personal self-consciousness.39 On the other hand, undeniably underlying this theory is the presupposition of an absolute necessity of divine punishment, even without its having any natural connection with wickedness.40 Moreover, this presupposition, in turn, is hardly to be divorced from a notion of divine justice that is transferred to God from the most brutal of human conditions. Suppose that we then take these two features together, as they are combined in the notion “vicarious satisfaction.”41 Then we might well have to concede that it would not be suitable to mark out this notion as the one in which these aspects of Christ’s high-priestly work42 would be summed up. Yet, perhaps the protestation against this expression—indeed, already multiply disputed but repeatedly retaining currency in the church—cannot be presented more effectively than by showing how it would have to be reinterpreted if we were to make any valid use of it. That is, instead of referring it homogenously to both active and passive obedience as one, as it gives itself out to be, we would rather have to divide it. Thus, the “vicarious” part would be referring only to Christ’s passive obedience and, in contrast, the “satisfaction” part would be referring only to his active obedience. That is to say, Christ has indeed done enough for us,43 in that by the totality of what he did he has become not only the onset of redemption at one point in time but also the eternally inexhaustible source of a spiritual and blessed life, sufficient for every further unfolding of redemption. This

satisfaction, however, is in no sense vicarious, either in such a way that we ourselves could have been expected to have the capacity to start off this spiritual life on our own devices or even in such a way that by Christ’s feat we would be relieved of the necessity to advance this spiritual life in community with him by our own self-initiated activity. In contrast, Christ’s suffering44 is vicarious, to be sure, and it is so with respect to both of the components of his life just mentioned. This is so, for he fully bore compassion regarding sin, even toward those who had not themselves yet felt a lack of blessedness through their consciousness of sin. However, the evil that he suffered was vicarious in that general sense in which one in whom human evil is not present is also not supposed to suffer, but if that person does nonetheless receive evil, that same person is thus struck by it in the place of those in whom human evil is present. Yet, in no way does this vicarious suffering make satisfaction. It does not do this in the first case, because those who have not yet felt a lack of blessedness still have to get to that point before they can be taken up into community by him. It does not do this in the second case, because it does not exclude further suffering of the same sort. Rather, all those who are taken up into community of life with Christ share in his suffering45 until such time as sin has been totally vanquished in the human race, satisfactorily accomplished through suffering. Until that time, however, every bit of suffering will always bear a vicarious character, even suffering by one who is relatively innocent. Suppose, however, that we would want to view these two aspects of Christ’s high-priestly office indivisibly, consequently in such a way that Christ’s suffering can also be embedded in his actual doing. Then, in reversing the expression, we will be able to call Christ our vicar, who makes satisfaction in our place.46 We can do so in the following sense. On the one hand, by virtue of his prototypical dignity, in his redemptive activity he represents the consummation of human nature in such a way that by virtue of our having become one with him, God sees and values the totality of the faithful only in him. On the other hand, his compassion with respect to sin was strong enough to produce redemptive activity sufficient to bring all humanity into his community of life. Moreover, the absolute power of this compassion, most fully presented in his freely giving himself over unto death, serves over and over again to make up for and improve upon47 our own incomplete consciousness of sin. Precisely as the high priest’s restorative sacrifice also referred above all to those trespasses which had not been taken into people’s consciousness—so that his compassion, regarded as the source of that observance, took the place of that consciousness, and the people felt themselves to be free of all concern regarding divine punishment for past sins—it was as if each person had accomplished what should have issued from this consciousness of sin, in accordance with the law. At this juncture only one misunderstanding is yet to be averted, the belief that Christ’s giving himself over unto death has to be set forth as a free decision in any sense other than that which underlies our discussion here, namely, that Christ’s surrender has been one and the same thing with his perseverance in redemptive activity. The reason is that if we stray from this underlying meaning, Christ’s suffering, inasmuch as it has to be viewed as his action, will seem to be arbitrary, because at that point he would have to have decided straightaway to

undergo the suffering as such. Moreover, what is viewed as a divine institution would be that senseless necessity for retribution which we have dismissed earlier, and what is viewed as an exercise of Christ’s free choice would amount to arbitrary self-torture and would be a model for those arbitrary mortifications of the Roman church by the assuming of which one person could also release another from punishment. At that point, the next step would be to look out lest death by one’s own free will, even of the sort that is simply unchristian, should appear to be justifiable by Christ’s example—and it would not be possible to disregard how such an implication were to be drawn. All this would follow, for if we wish to uphold the truth of customary human nature48 in Christ, then in this relation too we are obliged to ascribe to him no maxims other than those we must recognize to be applicable to us all. Otherwise, the prototypical character of his life would be endangered; and, along with it, the original character of his life would be endangered at the same time. Thus, insofar as self-preservation is generally a duty, it must also be true for Christ that inasmuch as he saw his death coming in advance, and there was some means to avoid it without violation of duty, he would also have had to use that means in this situation, as he had done earlier.49 It was only the act of bidding angels to serve him50 or the act of drawing upon anything miraculous to aid him in this battle that he could not feel bound to do. He must, then, have to have taken it up as his vocational duty51 to appear at this festival in the holy city, despite his prescience.52 Moreover, it unquestionably belongs to the complexity of this great turning point that Christ likewise met his death in zeal for his calling also with respect to his Father’s law, just as his opponents—the best among them, at least—sentenced him to death in their vocational zeal for the law. For all that, suppose that we also still want to consider precisely this matter from the standpoint of the divine decree. Then we would surely concede that it behooved the “perfecter of our faith”53 to die a death such that it would not be a sheer event but, at the same time, would be a feat in the most elevated sense of the word, so that herein as well he could make known the full dominion of the spirit over the flesh. In a death from natural causes, whether it be by an accidental illness or from the weakness of advanced age, this feat could always seem only incidental and could never come into view so graphically. This danger too, however, namely, lest what was voluntary in Jesus’ death would be sorted out in a dubious manner, will best be obviated if we stick with the method of handling such matters that we have used up to now but make really good use of it. Thereby we notice that the atoning sacrifice54 of the high priest was also an observance freely entered into but in accordance with his calling. Further, on the one hand, it too was conditioned by the sins of the people and, on the other hand, it too was following an established divine ordinance, without any arbitrariness of the high priest’s own. 5. In the end, it scarcely seems possible for Christ’s advocacy55 to be separated in any way from Christ’s kingly office. This is the case if one takes the word in its usual meaning— less definitely in its standing for “carrying out the business of another,” more definitely and closer to the biblical expression in its standing for “bringing someone’s wishes before a third party and urging that they be granted.” That is to say: How is one to distinguish what Christ

is thought to be obtaining from his Father from what he himself brought forth and determined as king by means of laws and administrative arrangements? Thus, if the expression is to have any truth in it and, at the same time, is not, as an undefined middle term, to muddle the presentation of it, then we must do the following. On the one hand, we must limit it to subjects that do not belong to Christ’s reign, or at least not entirely so. On the other hand, however, this part of his efficacious action would also have to have been going on already during his life here, just as the other parts did, else he would also not have been a high priest in full standing. The New Testament passages on which this expression is chiefly grounded56 offer little definite guidance, in that it is not clear that all of them have the high priest in mind; rather, they seem more likely to proceed from various points of view. It would be better, therefore, that we hold on to the concept of high-priestly functioning and to draw primarily from Christ’s appearing before God on our behalf.57 Moreover, if the distinction we have seen is to be observed in the process, his advocacy will chiefly have a twofold content. In the first place, Christ appears for us before the Father so as to start off our community with the Father. In the second place, however, he does this so as to support our own prayer before the Father. The explanation is as follows. Christ’s reign does indeed stretch only over those who have already been taken up into community of life with him, and the gradual attachment of individuals to this government depends on divine leading in relation to them in this community of life. However, this community of life with Christ is then everywhere solicited by Christ on our behalf and is granted by God for his sake. Accordingly, we have an indication of the memorable fact of this advocacy not only in his high-priestly prayer but also in all that he said about his prayer,58 not excluding what seems to be mutually contradictory, and so also in what was said about it otherwise.59 As regards other testimony, even if we were to proceed entirely from the claim that what does not belong to God’s reign also ought not to be an object of our prayer,60 nevertheless, on the one hand, even particulars within the spiritual domain do not belong so entirely to that reign of God that they would not also interconnect with God’s general governance of the world, and, on the other hand, these particulars would not be entirely determined by the general prescriptions and arrangements that we actually derive from Christ’s kingly office. Moreover, in that Christ bids us to pray to the Father ourselves, so the surety of that same sanctifying collaboration of Christ as purification and replenishment of our God-consciousness is already implied in the fact that it is to be prayer in Christ’s name.61 Now, this collaboration is his advocacy for us in the sense that only through him does our prayer come before God in a well-pleasing and effective manner. Thus, by virtue of his relationship to us, grounded as it is in his distinctive dignity, he remains an advocate on behalf of the entire human race. He does so in that, like the high priest, he brings our prayer before God and delivers divine blessings62 to us. Still, faith in that aspect of his work which extends beyond the course of Christ’s life on earth in no way depends on any supposed information, in any case denied us, concerning the actual nature of his condition afterward.

Rather, it depends only on the content and value—as was established above—of his personal existence63 in relation to God and to us. 6. Now, just as, according to all the above considerations, Christ is at the apex of priesthood and even beyond all comparison with the high priest, so too he is, at the same time, the end of all priesthood. This is so, for what is essential in that concept, of which every earlier priesthood is, however, only an incomplete indication, is posited in Christ in an eternal fashion and absolutely so. That is to say, for all times he is the most complete mediator between God and every single part of the human race. In general terms, no member of that race could, in and of oneself, be an object for God nor enter into any kind of alliance with God. The eternal priesthood is known, and is the true one; therefore, now no arbitrarily contrived, merely imitative priesthood can exist any longer, nor any sacrifice either. Instead, all human institutions of this sort are done away with. At the same time, however, the highpriestly activity of Christ has passed over into the communal body64 of the faithful, in such a way that Christians as a whole are called a priestly people.65 Two things are obviously implied in this designation, however. First, among those very people all distinction between priests and laity is dissolved. Even the apostles never attributed anything priestly to themselves in any proper sense. In this perspective, then, the return of the priesthood in the church has to be regarded as one of the most enormous of all misunderstandings. Yet, second, the totality of Christendom, viewed as that part of humanity which is already connected with the Redeemer, relates to the rest of humanity as the priests were related to laity. That is to say, only to the extent that a real community of life with Christ is occurring in at least one part of the human race is Christ’s relation to the rest of the species also found to be in place. Thus, in this sense the communal body of the faithful, viewed as inseparable from Christ, also makes its appearance before God on behalf of the entire human race and advocates for it. In contrast, there can be no talk whatsoever of any sort of special intercession and advocacy of some individual from the communal body of those who have passed away.66 Likewise, all the activity of this totality of Christendom on behalf of the gospel67 belongs to Christ’s active obedience. On the other hand, nothing of a meritorious character deriving from good works of the faithful follows from this activity for the gospel. The same thing goes, moreover, for all suffering for the gospel’s sake in the broadest sense in which it belongs to Christ’s reconciling suffering.68 However, nothing follows from this activity for the gospel that would support willful mortifications, any more than there was anything willful in Christ’s suffering.69 Thus, Christ remains the end of all priesthood, because all of this collective activity is simply high-priestly inasmuch as it is really, at the same time, Christ’s feat and Christ’s suffering. These final considerations so obviously follow that they alone should suffice for this mode of presenting the matter of the high-priestly office, disputed among all the recent dogmaticians since Ernesti,70 to keep its place in our doctrinal corpus.

1. Versöhnenden Tod. Ed. note: Cf. §104n4 below; see also §101n1 and n18 there. Except in this proposition, Versöhnung is always translated “reconciliation.” The German language has no other word for the general concept “atonement,” only words that reflect specific theories of it (e.g., Sühnopfer). In ecclesiology the more direct counterpart to this proposition is presented in §§136–42, on baptism and the Lord’s Supper. 2. John 7:16; 8:26; and 17:8. Ed. note: Sermons only on (1) John 7:14–24, Feb. 20, 1825, SW II.8 (1837), 16–31; and (2) John 8:20–29, May 8, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 83–94. 3. Segenswünsche. Ed. note: Not only or strictly Segensspruche (benedictions), rather including all wishes or prayers for what Jehovah might send among the chosen people—godsends, blessings. 4. Versöhnenden Tätigkeit. Ed. note: Cf. §101, also §104n1 just above. 5. Ed. note: Clemen has auch here, not nicht (not). Hebrews 9–11 depicts Christ as abolishing the day-by-day sacrifices by the high priest, this through God’s forgiveness of sins in Christ’s final sacrifice, whence he became judge over all and will come again in this kingly role. 6. Versöhnungstage. 7. Ed. note: See §98. 8. Eph. 5:2; Heb. 9:26. 9. (1) Apology Augsburg (1531) 24: “Therefore let this remain the case, that the death of Christ alone is truly an atoning sacrifice [propitionem sacrificium].” (2) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) 31: “The offering [oblatio] of Christ, once made, is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world.” (3) Similarly in the Tetrapolitan Confession (1530) 19 and (4) Declaratio Toruniensus (Acta synodua generalis Toruniensus, 1645), 425. Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 262; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 356. (2) The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition; ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 507. (3) ET Cochrane (1972), 76–78; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 761f. (4) Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 681. 10. Er. Ed. note: This reading follows the use of er in the first and third editions, as does Schäfer in KGA I/13, so that the word er is taken to refer, more appropriately, to “obedience,” not sie, present in other editions and referring to “governance.” 11. Leiden. Ed. note: This is the German word for both “passivity” and “suffering.” 12. In §94.2. 13. Ed. note: Both Redeker and Schäfer note that the first edition of 1822 (KGA I/7.2, 87) has the word “passive” (leidentlich), as here, but Redeker keeps the apparently mistaken word “passionate” (leidenschaftlichen). If Schleiermacher had intended to change the word, it would have been to emphasize that Christ’s passion (Leidenschaft, Passion) occurred not simply at his death but throughout his public life. 14. Heiligtum. Ed. note: In this discussion, this term is consistently used for the innermost sanctuary, or holy of holies (Allerheiligste), within the temple’s sanctuary. 15. Ergänzung. Ed. note: That is, this ceremony was the one annual event that gave uttermost expression to the meaning of all other sacrifices offered throughout the year. 16. Verbindung. Ed. note: Or “union,” as in the bond or union between two persons in marriage. In this same context, a similar connection is denoted in the terms Vereinigung (union, alliance), Gemeinschaft (community, communion), and Zusammenhang (interconnectedness). In no case is a total merging or identity implied. Here God’s “will,” or “good pleasure,” refers exclusively to the single eternal divine decree of redemption, of which the ultimate human mediator or conveyor is Christ. How God will have brought this decree to fulfillment within the creation or preservation of human nature through the ages is not discussed at this juncture; thus, no direct implication regarding the relation of Christianity to other modes of faith or to other religions is to be drawn from this statement. 17. Beseelt. Ed. note: Or “ensouled.” The Latinate form seems more directly to express an activity that itself activates, not simply implants. 18. Vereinigte. 19. Zusammenhang. 20. (1) Solid Declaration (1577) 3: “Therefore, his obedience consists not only in his suffering and death but also in the fact that he freely put himself in our place under the law and fulfilled the law with this obedience and reckoned it to us as righteousness.” (2) Belgic Confession (1561) 22: “Jesus Christ, imputing to us all his merits and so many holy works, which he hath done for us and in our stead, is our righteousness.” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 564; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 918f. (2) ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 408; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 374. 21. Phil. 2:5–8; 1 Pet. 2:21. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Phil. 2:5–11, May 17 and June 9, 1822, SW II.10 (1856), 492–526, and (2) 1 Pet. 2:20–22, May 3, 1829, SW II.4 (1835), 765–77, and (1844), 233–45. 22. Cf. §88.3. 23. Ed. note: Cf. §14.1.

24. To be sure, this is not, however, what is meant in Solid Declaration (1577) 3: “He was thus as little under the law, since he was Lord of the law, as he was obligated to suffer and die for himself.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 364; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 918. 25. John 4:34; 5:19, 30; and 6:38. Ed. note: Sermons on John 4:25–34, Mar. 28, 1824, on 5:16–23, June 13, 1824, and on 6:36–44, Nov. 14, 1824, all in SW II.8 (1837), 279–90, 331–46, and 430–32. 26. Gal. 4:4. Ed. note: See §12n5 and n7. 27. John 15:2, 5, 8, and 11. Ed. note: Sermons on John 15:1–17, July 2 and 16, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 469–94. 28. Ed. note: “act of righteousness” (cf. Rom. 5:18, also cited just below). 29. Rom. 5:12, 18. Ed. note: Cf. sermon on Rom. 5:7–8, on the theme “Christ’s Death as the Most Sublime Glorification of God’s Love for Us,” Good Friday, April 20, 1832, first published in 1832, then in SW II.3 (1835), 242–52, and (1843), 252–63; ET Wilson (1890), 372–84. 30. Cf. §77. Ed. note: Just above and continually here, “evil” translates Übel, not Böse (human evil). 31. Repräsentierend. 32. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: Or attitude of “sympathy,” as in some other contexts here. 33. John 12:24. Ed. note: Sermon on John 12:20–26, Feb. 5, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 320–42. Here, as usual, “element” translates Moment. If Schleiermacher had meant exclusively the “moment” of crucifixion, he would probably have used Zeitpunkt or Augenblick. Here, in contrast, the emphasis is placed on Christ’s compassion overall, which he indeed took to have reached its “peak” in Christ’s last days, as he indicated just above. 34. Rom. 8:28. Ed. note: Sermon, Nov. 23, 1806, SW II.1 (1834), 251–65. 35. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 15: “Therefore, solely on account of Christ’s sufferings and resurrection God is propitious with respect to our sins,” etc. (2) The First Basel Confession (1534) 4: “We believe … That Christ made satisfaction to God for our sins … and by his death has conquered and overcome the world,” etc. (3) Scots Confession (1560) 9: “We avow that … he suffered in body and soul to make the full satisfaction for the sins of the people,” etc. (4) Luther’s Larger Catechism (1529) on the Second Article of the Creed: “He suffered, died, and was buried so that he might make satisfaction for me and pay what I owed.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 256; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 266. Cf. §37n3. (2) ET Cochrane (1972), 92; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 90. Schleiermacher refers to this as the Mylhus Confession. After its initial drafting by Basel pastor John Oecolampadius (1482–1531) in 1531, shortly before he died, it was revised by his successor Oswald Myconius (1488–1552) and then officially issued in 1534 at Basel. (3) ET drawn from original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 447, also Cochrane (1972), 170; cf. an inferior Latin version in Niemeyer (1840), 344, and a closely related ET by Bulloch (1960). (4) ET Book of Concord (2000), 434; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 652. 36. Ed. note: In this and the previous sentence, the three successive allusions are to 2 Cor. 5:19 (“reconciling …”), and then, apparently, to 1 Pet. 4:13 (“engulfed [Versinken] …,” actually “sharing in” Christ’s suffering) and to Rom. 8:17. 37. Among others Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818) §§107–8, 401ff. Redeker note: “Reinhard indicates nine reasons for Jesus’ death, among them (2) he served as an example of how one is to behave in time of need, (5) thereby Jesus was formed into the compassionate ruler of the world, and (9) Jesus underwent death in a substitutionary manner. The ninth reason Reinhard then fully explicates.” Ed. note: Schäfer (KGA I/13.2, 142f.) briefly quotes (also in German) all nine reasons, the ninth of which was that Jesus’ death “especially should serve to free human beings from guilt and punishment for sin; hence, he was supposed to be acting vicariously, mors vicaria.” 38. This is not unclearly articulated in the overall context of Solid Declaration 3, cited above [cf. §104.3], though in general the proposition that the divine nature does not suffer is to remain literally valid. That is to say, at the same time the claim is made that Christ’s human nature became capable of suffering only through its union with the divine nature, which actually means by the divine nature. Also in agreement with this position is the fact that this confession, which is admittedly open to marked critique, also teaches the opposite of what has been set forth here in saying: “We reject the view … that faith looks not to Christ’s obedience alone but to his divine nature, as it dwells in us, and that through this indwelling our sins are covered in God’s sight.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 573; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 935. 39. I was delighted to read that even the dearly departed Johann Jacob Hess (1741–1828) could not bring himself to view the passage Matt. 27:46 [“Why hast thou forsaken me?”] as Christ’s description of his own wretched condition but only as the beginning of the Psalm [22:1] that is cited in relation to what follows there. Ed. note: See Schleiermacher’s sermon on Matt. 27:46, April 1, 1821, SW II.2 (1834), 399–416. 40. Böse. Ed. note: As usual here, this term is translated “wickedness,” an evil attributable to humanity. However, in this context, as usually, what can be literally “bad” extends to all human action, not to moral action alone. 41. Ed. note: The quoted notion is stellvertretende Genugtuung. Here Redeker quotes from Hess’s Lebensgeschichte Jesu, Bd. 2 (1794), 458f. Hess was a pastor in Zurich, having grown up in a Herrnhuter household. The first edition of his famous Geschichte der drei letzten Lebensjahre Jesus appeared in 1768–1773.

42. Ed. note: Redeker aptly notes that Geschäftes (“work”), used in the first edition (1822) in §125.4, is possibly preferable to Geschlechts (“lineage”), used in the second edition (1831). Both Peiter (KGA I/7.2, 94f.) and Schäfer (KGA I/13.2, 145) use Geschäftes. 43. Genug für uns getan. 44. Ed. note: Here we are to recall that “suffering” (Leiden) has a predominately “passive” (leidend) character in Christ’s obedience. Both meanings have in common a quality of undergoing something. 45. Matt. 10:24–28; John 15:18–21. Ed. note: In this sharing of Christ’s suffering, they are similarly “reproved” (verweisen in these texts within the German Bible). There are four sermons on these two texts: (1–2) Matt. 10:21–26 and 26–27, Sept. 9 and 23, 1821, SW II.10 (1856), 253–90; (3) Matt. 10:28, New Year’s Day, 1807, SW II.1 (1834), 281–97, ET Lawler, Fifteen Sermons (2003), 86–107; and (4) John 15:18–16:4, July 30, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 495–509. 46. Unsern genugtuenden Stellvertreter. Ed. note: That is, the one who represents us, who advocates for us in the process of satisfying God’s justice (Gerichtigkeit, also the word for “righteousness,” the term used in the confessions cited here). 47. Zur Ergänzung und Vervollständigung. Ed. note: That is, respectively, “restorative” or “complementary” action in the face of our deficiency and “transformative” or “completing” activity in view of our destiny as human beings. 48. Der menschlich sittlichen Natur. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, normally what is sittlich (a matter of custom) covers the entire domain of human nature, thus of human action in contrast to physical nature as such. Thus, it is not restricted to the moral domain. 49. Luke 4:30; John 8:59. Ed. note: Sermon on John 8:46–59, June 19, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 123–37. 50. Matt. 26:53. 51. Berufspflicht. Ed. note: In the cited passage, Christ’s teaching about his calling “to communicate eternal life in the reign of God” is listed as one of three essential pieces of his teaching, none of which is to be divorced from the others. This calling (Beruf) distinctly relates to Christ’s activity. The other two pieces have to do with his person and his relationship to God. 52. Matt. 16:21 and in other locations; cf. John 11:7–9 and 56. Ed. note: Until the critical edition in KGA I/13.2 (2003) the second passage was wrongly cited as John 4:7–9, 56. Sermons on (1) John 11:1–14, Nov. 6, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 238– 50, and (2) John 11:53–12:8, Jan. 8, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 292–304. 53. Ed. note: Heb. 12:1–3 reads: “Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us also set aside every weight, and sin which clings so closely, and let us run with perseverance the race that is set before us, looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame, and is seated at the right hand of the throne of God. Consider him who endured from sinners such hostility against himself, so that you may not grow weary or fainthearted” (RSV, ital. added). In addition to a sermon outline on this passage, April 11, 1800, on “Grounds Christ’s Death Gives Us for Being Moved to Let Go of Our Sins,” see sermon excerpt on Heb. 12:1–2, “The Sanctifying [heiligende] Influence of Our Redeemer’s Suffering,” published by Johannes Bauer, “Aus einer bisher ungekannten Predigt Schleiermachers von Sonntag Invocavit, 8 Feb. 1818,” Christliche Welt 24, no. 6 (February 1910): 121–23. 54. Versöhnungsopfer. Ed. note: Cf. §104n1 above. 55. Vertretung. 56. Rom. 8:34; Heb. 7:25; 1 John 2:1, wherein it is to be noted, nonetheless, that the two expressions “intercessor” (ὑπερεντ#gyχάνειν) and “comforter” (παράκλητος) are also used regarding the Holy Spirit elsewhere. Ed. note: See Rom. 8:26 and John 14:26 regarding the Holy Spirit’s advocacy. 57. Heb. 9:24. 58. John 14:16; 16:26; 17:9; and Luke 22:32. Ed. note: Clemen rightly corrected the original incorrect citations to John 16:46 and Luke 22:31. Sermons on John 14:7–17 and 16:23–33, May 21 and Sept. 24, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–42 and 537–48. The cited passages refer, respectively, (1) to “another Counselor,” whom Christ promises to send from the Father “to be with you” and “in you”; (2) to prayer in Christ’s name; (3) to Christ’s praying especially for those the Father has given him, not directly “for the world”; and (4) to his saying to Simon Peter, “I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren” (RSV). 59. Luke 6:12, etc., and Heb. 5:7. 60. Matt. 6:33. 61. Ed. note: See §147 below. 62. Segnungen. Ed. note: That is, God’s own delivery of what would be well for us, well-being, not literally the same as blessedness (Seligkeit). 63. Persönlichkeit. Ed. note: Virtually always, in Schleiermacher’s usage this word also refers to the general mode of one’s existence as a person, not to details of one’s “personality.” The reference is to Christ’s actual existence there and then,

not to information such as that in Heb. 12:2 about his being “seated at the right hand of the throne of God” (cited in §104n53 above), especially if taken literally. 64. Gemeine. See §148n7. 65. As in 1 Pet. 2:9. Ed. note: Literally, “a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people” (RSV). 66. Gallican Confession (1559) 24: “We believe that as Jesus Christ is our only advocate, … all imaginations of men concerning the intercession of dead saints are an abuse and a device of Satan to lead men from the right way of worship.” Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 373, also Cochrane (1972), 156; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 335. Here Schleiermacher uses the concept “communal body” instead of “dead saints.” Likewise, in the Roman Symbol (alias Apostles’ Creed) widely used today, the last phrase in the main text is Gemeine der Vollendeten, called “the communion of saints” (communio sanctorum). This phrase was not present in earlier versions and was sometimes omitted since the Reformation. 67. Ed. note: The last part of 1 Pet. 2:9 (quoted in §104n65 just above, RSV) continues: “that you may declare the wonderful deeds of him who called you out of the darkness into his marvelous light.” 68. Versöhnenden Leiden. Ed. note: Cf. §104n1 above. 69. See 2 Cor. 1:5; 4:10. Ed. note: Both passages have to do with sharing in Christ’s suffering unto death and thus in his life as a whole. 70. See his essay on the threefold office of Christ. Ed. note: Johann August Ernesti (1707–1781), De officio Christi triplici (1792), 371ff., quoted in KGA I/7.3, 415–29. Schäfer notes (KGA I/13.2, 151) that Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider (1771–1849), Institutiones theologia (1815; the 4th and 6th eds., 1824 and 1829, were both in Schleiermacher’s library), mentions various theologians for and against. In the 1829 edition, 429, Ernesti refers to Schleiermacher’s formulation in the first edition of CG1 1822 (KGA I/7.2, 97f.), which is repeated in the account just given.

§105. Third Doctrinal Proposition: Christ’s kingly office consists in the fact that everything that the community of the faithful requires for its well-being proceeds ever and always from him. 1. The more ambiguous the word “king” is—as is true today and was in the time of Christ as well—and the greater the distinction between the strict official usage and its polite, generous usage is, the less are we able to base our doctrinal presentation on the exegetical decision regarding the sense in which Christ was asked whether he was a king1 and whether he answered in the sense intended or in some other sense. Instead, we have to keep to the not yet faded memory of how the concept “king” stood, on the one hand, in contrast to that of the “tyrant,” whose sovereign rule was just as unlimited but not natural, and, on the other hand, in contrast to that of the “governing authority in a communal body”2 whose possession of power was held only within certain boundaries, delegated by those who were themselves governed. In contrast to the practice of governing authorities, tyranny always included within itself the possibility, indeed presupposed that power,3 arbitrarily seized, would also be selfserving and could hold to purposes other than the free development and natural welfare of the governed. The sovereign rule4 of Christ fully contrasts with both of these types, in that it everywhere corresponds to the animating principle if the animating power of this principle is neither externally hampered nor internally weakened. Thus, this sovereign rule is also selfevidently exercised in the interest of the governed, since it is comprised only of dominion over that feature within themselves the weakness of which human beings regret and on the basis that each person would give oneself over to that dominion only voluntarily. The kingly way in which Christ holds sway, however, has in common with the other two offices that its

object cannot be an individual as such but is a communal body and includes individuals only insofar as they belong to this body. Accordingly, in voluntarily submitting to Christ’s dominion, individuals enter, at the same time, into a communal body to which they did not previously belong. As a result, in that we attribute a kingly dignity to Christ, we already distinctly declare ourselves against the twofold claim that Christ would not have had any organic community in mind, but this association of the faithful would have emerged or been formed later on instead, without his having ordained it. At the same time, however, no one enters into this communal body except in that one submits to Christ’s dominion; thus, it also follows that Christ himself inaugurates this reign, consequently Christ is the successor to no one in this kingly office.5 Christ himself, however, sets forth yet another contrast in that he designates his reign as not to be “of this world,”6 whereby he contrasts it in yet another way from those other two offices. This negation implies the following two things above all. First, it implies that his kingly might does not rule over and order the things of this world, whereupon all that could be the immediate domain within which his might would apply would be what is inside people —in each person, of oneself, and in people’s relation to one another. Second, it implies that in the exercise of his sovereignty he exercises no means other than what depends on the things of this world—that is, no coercion, which would require an excess of material forces, nor enticements or threats of any kind, which would also require such undergirding and would operate only on people’s sensate capacities, which capacities also belong to this world. In no way, however, is it said thereby that Christ’s kingly might would have started only after he had risen from this earth or had perhaps moved beyond this life.7 Rather, as he himself says, it was not that he would become a king but that he was one. Thus, he has not only shown himself to be king during his life on earth, in that he issued laws to his communal body,8 sent out his servants for the purpose of broadening it, set forth rules for its administration and imparted instructions as to how the will of his command was to be carried out, but also his regal might is and remains everywhere the same, for all times. This is so, for those laws and instructions do not become obsolete but retain currency in undiminished force9 in Christ’s church. Moreover, when he refers his disciples to his spiritual presence for the future’s sake, there is no distinction of various times in this promise, for his original works were purely spiritual too. Furthermore, just as they were then mediated by his physical appearance, so too his spiritual presence is still mediated today through the written word and by the picture of his nature and work laid down within it. Even today, however, his governing influence is not, as it were, a merely mediated and derivative one on that account. As a result, we are able to say, with respect to what has been mentioned earlier, that just as his advocacy relates to our prayer in his name, so too does his government relate to any action we may undertake in his name. Indeed, in that he relates to the totality of the faithful, it is also obvious precisely how his dominion is also singular. That is, just as the divine nature10 in him is related to his human nature as animating power,11 so too is being taken up into the community of his original life so related, in that no one else is in a position to share in this dominion.

Hence, just as Christ is a successor to no one in the communal body governed by him, but he is the sole founder of it, he too has no successor and no surrogate within that communal body. That is to say, just as he exercises his dominion by means of ordinances that originate in him,12 and he himself has declared them to be sufficient,13 so it all comes down to their correct application. Moreover, this is the common calling of those who are governed by Christ, as such. Even if those governed by Christ were ever able to transfer this calling to some individual or to more than one, they still could not do this without giving up their own living relationship to Christ. So, such a person, thus chosen, would still be their surrogate and not Christ’s surrogate.14 In conclusion, then, among the faithful nowhere can there be any dominion but Christ’s alone. 2. What is difficult in relation to this aspect of Christ’s work chiefly consists in the need to define Christ’s kingly might correctly with respect to divine government in general, and one cannot overlook this difficulty once one considers this subject theoretically, even if one considers it only somewhat more exactly. Then there is also a need to define Christ’s kingly might correctly in relation to worldly government, and this difficulty directly arises as one treats the subject practically. The customary division of Christ’s reign into the reign of might, the reign of grace, and the reign of glory15 contributes little to this subject. We must, first of all, dissolve this classification so that the last two categories are combined to point to the actual object of Christ’s kingly efficacious action, namely, the world as it has come to take part in redemption. In contrast, the reign of might is understood to point to the world in general, in and of itself. What very easily follows from claiming the latter reign is the overreaching opinion that Christ would have attained to a “reign of might,” as it were, before the reign of grace and in a way independent of it. Now, at the very least such a reign could not possibly belong to Christ’s redemptive activity. Moreover, if the apostles had been aware of such a reign of the Word,16 then, at the very least, this would be a knowing that could not belong to Christian piety, because it has no tie to redemption. Suppose, however, that one believes it is necessary to exegete expressions that the apostles use for Christ,17 such as “the Word become flesh” and as “the God-man” and “Redeemer,” as well as those Christ used for himself,18 as if the entire government of the world would be attributed to him thereby. In that case, one would fall into contradiction not only with all those passages where he himself makes petitions to the Father and refers to something that the Father has reserved to himself but also with all those passages which announce the aim of establishing a direct relationship of petition and granting, respectively, between the faithful and the Father. To be sure, in isolated cases even within the Evangelical church a mode of doctrine is to be found—indeed even a mode of worship held in common, in that all prayers there are indeed directed only to Christ—that leaves room only for a relationship of the faithful with Christ, excluding the Father altogether. However, with Scripture and also by far preponderantly with the church, we must declare these modes of doctrine and worship to be a dubious aberration. Yet, if this shoal is to be avoided, we can understand “the might of

Christ” to be only that which begins with the reign of grace and which is essentially included within it. This might, moreover, is one exercised over the world only to the extent that the following two conditions are met. First, the faithful are indeed taken away from living in the midst of the world. Second, the community of the faithful, or the reign of Christ, can increase, in that the world, viewed in its contrast over against the church, decreases and its components are gradually changed into components of the church, with the result that human evil19 is overcome and the domain of redemption is extended. Yet, even this process is an exercise of might by Christ over the world only from the reign of grace outward. That is, it occurs only by virtue of the efficacious action of Christ’s command to proclaim the gospel, an efficacious action constantly holding currency in the church. In contrast, which part of the world before another and which individual before another will be ready for the fruits produced through proclamation20—all this belongs to the reign of might, which the Father has reserved to himself.21 Accordingly, what remains is always simply the powers22 of redemption implanted in the church, over which Christ governs. It would be a rather unfruitful distinction, moreover, and one not at all properly specified, if one wanted to term his reign a reign of grace to the extent that these powers proved to be effective purely internally, for the purpose of sanctification and edification, but to term it a reign of might to the extent that these powers are utilized for the purpose of overcoming the world, for these two functions are in no way to be divorced from each other. The distinction between the reign of grace and the reign of glory, however, is customarily understood in such a way that the second reign follows the first once Christ’s subjects are put in full possession of all the benefits he has obtained for them and are no longer in touch with the world, a presupposition that will be more closely considered below.23 At this juncture it is only to be noted with respect to Christ’s kingly dignity that if one strictly held to this presupposition, there could no longer be any activity in this reign other than that of presentation, wherewith exercise of any general governance would be reduced to a minimum. Accordingly, one can indeed regard this reign as a glory of Christ if he, with the totality of the faithful because it is consummated and self-contained, would also have nothing more to suffer in compassion, but precisely this state permits of being depicted as a reign least of all. Hence, the only thing that remains as a true reign of Christ is the one reign of grace. This reign is then also the sole reign the consciousness of which is really present in our religious frames of mind and heart.24 Moreover, a knowledge of the governing presence of this reign alone is required, because our effective faith has to be directed to it. We can make use of the other two members of the customary classification only in order to designate precisely what the compass of this reign is. In our calling it a “reign of might,” we express that not only does the broadening of Christ’s efficacious action over the human race know no bounds and that no people can permanently pursue an evasive action against it, but also that no stage of purity and perfection exists that does not belong within Christ’s reign. In contrast, in calling it a “reign of glory” we confess—naturally in connection with that supreme purity and perfection which is present to us only by approximation—an unlimited process of drawing more nearly

toward absolute blessedness, which blessedness is to be found in connection with Christ alone. Now, a concern exists as to the way Christ holds sway25 as king in distinction from civil government. In accordance with what has been presented up to now, it would appear that nothing would be easier than to make an exact conceptual distinction between the two. This could be the case for two reasons. On the one hand, civil government is indisputably both an institution that belongs to the general divine government of the world26 and accordingly, an institution that is as such alien to the reign of Christ, as he himself has also said.27 On the other hand, civil government is legal in nature and is generally to be found even where Christian piety does not exist. Consequently, as something stemming from the collective life of sinfulness and everywhere presupposing this life—namely, because in exercising sanction under its laws it counts on the power of sensory motives—as such it also cannot order even a scintilla of anything in Christ’s reign. On these grounds, these two modes of government seem to be totally distinct from each other, to such an extent that within his reign Christ’s sole dominion remains unendangered if his own do not avail themselves of worldly things other than in accordance with the ordinances of worldly government and regard all that presents itself from this government as derivative of the divine government of the world.28 Yet, it is historically very clear how much the matter changes once we picture to ourselves a worldly government of Christians over Christians. On the one hand, we can see that the church has endeavored to take possession of worldly government in the name of Christ. On the other hand, we can see that ruling bodies made up of Christians have ascribed to themselves the right to order affairs of the communal bodies of the faithful. Now, so that we do not bring into this discussion anything that belongs to Christian ethics, from which the theological principles for church law29 must also flow, here we have only to raise the question of whether Christ’s reign would be altered in its compass by means of this newly introduced state of affairs. In this case, the following is, to be sure, correct: that Christ is to have total dominion over the communal body of the faithful; consequently, every member of that body should also prove oneself to be governed wholly by Christ and in every aspect of one’s life. Yet, this life also rests only on each individual’s internal interconnection of life with Christ, and there can be no substitute who would exercise Christ’s kingly office in Christ’s name. Thus, this fact simply means that no person, no matter whether one is a ruling authority or a subject, has to seek additionally in Christ’s instructions either the proper instructions for one’s mode of conduct in civil government, in that this mode of conduct indeed remains a technical matter,30 or even one’s proper disposition in this regard. On the other hand, the following also remains true: that each member of the communal body of the faithful is able to exercise an influence on it only in the measure that one is an especially suitable organ of Christ’s kingly might,31 in that otherwise the sole dominion of Christ would be endangered, and only in the measure that this influence does not interconnect with any external calling.32 Rather, just as each person who was a slave when called is, on that account, not a slave in the communal body as well but is a person let free in the Lord, so too

whoever was a master when called does not, on that account, become a master in the communal body but simply becomes a “slave of Christ,” like everyone else.33 In consequence, the civil contrast between ruling authority and subject34 is a matter of complete indifference within the communal body with respect to any varied relationship to Christ’s kingly might. 3. In this manner, we have separated Christ’s kingly might, on the one hand, from the might that the Father has reserved to himself, and we have placed it, on the other hand, outside all the means and occasions by which civil government holds sway. Moreover, the latter distinction is indisputably the way in which “the two swords” are to be kept apart, to use Luther’s term. Thus, we will be able to say of this aspect of Christ’s work, as of the two others, that he is the apex and end of all spiritual kingship, and this claim will hold true of this separation of powers as much as it does in and of itself. We have to compare his dominion, considered in and of itself, with every other might exercised strictly on the human spirit.35 Moreover, we must also by far subordinate to this relationship all relationships between master and student, model and imitator, lawgiver and adopter, viewing these relationships as standing at an incomparably lower level and laying claim only to particular aspects of that life of the human spirit. The same thing is also the case with other founders of religion, who have neither similarly called forth a disposition in contrast with previous modes of conduct, to which they rather accommodated in manifold ways, nor called the entire human race to live under their dominion, as Christ did. Likewise, however, he is also the end of such a kingship, in that there is just as little likelihood of a reign similar to his that would be forthcoming after his own36 as there is that a similar one exists alongside it or has ever existed. Yet, he is both apex and end only inasmuch as that separation persists, for it belongs to the purity of his spiritual might, thus also to its perfection, that in no way should sensory motives cooperate therein. This is why Christianity is neither a political religion nor a religious state nor a theocracy. The first two things consist of religious communities that are regarded to be institutions of a distinct civil union and that are based on the presupposition that religion would proceed from civil legislation or would be conducted as a subordinate stimulus that belongs to the same higher impulse that would initially have engendered the civil condition. On this view, the result would be that, for the sake of the civil union, those associated with it would also be bound to the religious community as well, and thus this community would be animated by the common spirit of the civil union and by love of the fatherland, which, according to the sense given them by Scripture, are motives of the flesh. In contrast, theocracies are religious communities that have as such brought the civil union under their control. Hence, in theocracies the drive to obtain civil honor works to attain something that stands out within the broadly religious37 community, and in them the underlying presupposition is that the pious community or divine revelation on which this institutionally religious community rests could also have called forth the civil union, which is possible in this sense only in pious communities that are restricted to a certain nation. Christ, therefore, makes an end to both political religions and theocracies, this by the spiritual dominion of his God-consciousness.

The more firmly established and extended his reign is, moreover, the more definitely are church and state sundered from each other. As a result, in the proper external separation of the two, which can indeed subsist in very different forms, harmony between the two will develop ever more completely. Postscript to This First Division38 Only now that we have completed treatment of the entire doctrine of Christ is it possible to survey what sort of affinity it would have with two contrasting positions attributed to him, his humbling and his exaltation.39 It was not possible to do this before, in that the two expressions, when taken as exactly as having a place in a system of doctrine requires, do not permit their being applied either to the circumstances of Christ’s person as such or to those of his work as such or to the relation of his work to his person. Now, in the first place, the expression “humbling,” exactly taken, presupposes a higher being that existed beforehand, but what this was cannot be found out if we stick with the unity of Christ’s person. The reason is as follows. One might indeed term it an “exaltation” when Christ has become the firstfruit of resurrection and sits at the right hand of God, and in comparison with that status one can term his earthly condition a “lower” one; but since Christ’s person nevertheless began to exist only with his becoming a human being,40 this lower condition cannot be referred to as a “humbling.”41 Thus, some proceed to divide Christ’s person, and in that one views the divine in him as a particular being that has come here from eternity, the descent of this being to earth appears to be a humbling. However, that which is the absolutely supreme and eternal being, consequently a being that is necessarily self-identical, cannot possibly permit of having any humbling ascribed to it. This point would also imply that, based on the same viewpoint, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit42 in the community of the faithful would also have to be all the more of a humbling, since the human nature that exists in us is not pure and sinless as it is in Christ’s person. Indeed, even the process of creation would have to be a humbling on account of the omnipresent being of God in all that is finite, since the claim is made, albeit to the contrary, that glorification43 of God is the purpose of creation. Suppose, however, that we consent to using the expression “humbling” instead of referring to the more precise condition of “lowliness,”44 but still stick with the unity of Christ’s person. Then in this way too the contrast involved proves to be a sheer illusion, or, at the very least, to be merely a pretense for others but not a truth for Christ himself. That is to say, how can that person, who spoke of his relationship to God the Father in such a way45 that even his sitting at the Father’s right hand could not be regarded as an exaltation, have been conscious of a lowliness of his condition? Suppose that one further considers the customary notion of the “two natures” and a reciprocal communication between attributes of the two natures.46 Then one can relate Christ’s humbling not to the unification of the two natures, for that unification would indeed remain even if Christ’s human nature were elevated to the right hand of God, but only to the divine nature—either insofar as it would refrain from

using its attributes or insofar as it would have to assume the human attributes along with its own. Now, with the second option the relationship remains unchanged in any case. This is so, for since the gap between God and every finite being is infinite, this gap would also not change whether one imagined humanity in its present state or in its advanced development. However, the first option—that of the divine nature’s restraint in using its own attributes— has only slightly more in its favor. This is so, for if—as fits together with this same account —exceptions to the use of his divine attributes would have occurred even in the status of lowliness by virtue of Christ’s free will,47 then his renunciation would also have had to be voluntary. Moreover, we would still also have to assert precisely this, irrespective of the divine exceptions, since no coercion can be imposed on Christ’s divine nature. As a result, a being coerced to make use of those divine exceptions contrary to free will would instead have been a lowering to a more humble state. Yet, we also cannot at all imagine a more nearly complete use of those divine attributes in the elevated state either. This is so, for if all the attributes of Christ’s divine nature would have to be uninterruptedly active in his human nature, then all the activities of his human nature would have to be uninterruptedly stilled. This, in turn, would unexceptionably mean that his human nature would be absorbed by his divine nature as far as its own activities are concerned. Moreover, all that would remain would be his passive side, which would be totally against the original presupposition regarding human nature. Yet, how is an uninterrupted use of the divine attributes to be imaginable if we are nonetheless to think of Christ as advocating for us with the Father and interceding for us on account of our sin, thus are also to think of him as a compassionate participant in the struggles of the church militant?48 So, here too only more or less of Christ’s use of the divine attributes would remain, which cannot justify use of expressions such as these. Given this situation, moreover, it can also scarcely be said that this contrast can be referred even to Christ’s functions. This is the case, for even if one would want to say that Christ’s kingly function would be by far the highest of the three, the prophetic and high-priestly functions would still accompany this one but not be contrasted with it, as if they were lowly. Indeed, even the way in which Christ exercised his prophetic activity does not indicate a lowly position. If, given the complete untenability of this formula, we may then inquire as to what its origin was, we find that it is based solely on one passage of Scripture.49 The ascetic50 character of this passage and, considered in its entire context, its rhetorical character as well do not give evidence of an aim that the expressions presented there were to be exactly fixed in a didactic manner.51 It would also follow from this passage that Christ’s exaltation would be a definite award given him by God simply for his being humbled but without any direct connection either with his distinctive dignity or with the consummation52 of his work. Yet, the way in which Paul here depicts Christ as prototype53 comports very well with the sense that Christ has proceeded in his life as well as in his death only from the semblance of being

humbled. On this basis, then, this formula can with every right be reasonably set aside in the process of handing down doctrine and consigned to history for custodial care.

1. John 18:33; Matt. 27:11. 2. Obrigkeit im Gemeinwesen. Ed. note: E.g., magistrates or officials in a society. Here the term for “power” is Macht (might). In subsequent sections, where the “church” is the explicit object, “communal body” regularly translates Gemeine, which can more specifically refer to congregations. 3. Gewalt. Ed. note: Literally, “holding sway.” Cf. use of the same distinctions between kinds of power and control in §§144–47, on power of the keys and prayer in Jesus’ name. In ecclesiology the more direct counterpart to the present proposition lies in those four propositions. 4. Herrschaft. Ed. note: This is the same term as that used just above for “possession of power.” Customarily, however, it refers to Christ’s “lordship” or “dominion,” the latter of which is ordinarily used in this translation, though occasionally “sovereignty” seems more appropriate in context. In any case, Schleiermacher holds of all three offices that the “dignity” to be accorded them is unprecedented and unparalleled. 5. Ed. note: Here as a few times elsewhere, “office” translates Würde (“dignity” or “office”)—that is, an Amt (“office”) to which a certain dignity or special honor is attached. 6. Ed. note: John 18:36. 7. Ed. note: Here in the first edition Peiter (97f.) refers to Bretschneider’s book on concepts in the Protestant confessions (1805), 363. 8. Matt. 10:5–14; 18:15–20; and 28:19–20. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Matt. 10:11–13, Aug. 12, 1821, SW II.10 (1856), 222–37; (2) Matt. 18:16–20, Exaudi, June 3, 1810, SW II.7 (1836), 411–18; and (3) Sermon outline on Matt. 18:18–20, Ascension, May 5, 1796, in Bauer (1909), 32–33. 9. Ungeschwächter Kraft. 10. Natur. Ed. note: Cf. critical treatment of the classical “two natures” doctrine in §96. 11. Als beseelend. Ed. note: Also translated elsewhere here as “ensouling.” 12. Eph. 4:11–16. Ed. note: Sermon on Eph. 4:11–12, Aug. 29, 1830 (re: Augsburg), SW II.2 (1834), 692–709. ET Nicol (1997), 107–25. 13. Matt. 28:20–22; John 15:9–10 and 17:4. Ed. note: Sermons only on (1) John 15:8–17, July 16, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 484–94; and (2) John 15:9, 14–15, Aug. 17, 1806, SW II.1 (1834), 208–22. 14. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 17: “Therefore, the church cannot have any other head besides Christ, for as the church is a spiritual body, so it must also have a spiritual head in harmony with itself.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 263; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 273. Cf. §37n. 15. Macht, … Gnade, … Herrlichkeit. 16. John 1:2–3. Ed. note: Sermon on John 1:1–5, April 13, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 3–14. The assumption regarding such a Word preexisting Jesus would be that it is to be identified with Christ in a “logos Christology.” 17. Heb. 1:2–3. 18. Matt. 11:27; 28:18; cf. John 17:5, 22, 24. 19. Böse. 20. Fruchtbarkeit. Ed. note: As always here, these fruits of proclamation are produced by word and deed, not by preaching alone, and they are likewise deemed to be “fruits of the Spirit.” Thus, this passage is a marked foretaste of the doctrines of election, of the Holy Spirit, and of the triune God. 21. Acts 1:7 and John 6:44. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Acts 1:6–11, May 7, 1812, Festpredigten (1833), SW II.2 (1834), 518–30, and (2) John 6:36–44, Nov. 14, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 430–42. 22. Kräfte. 23. Ed. note: See §§157–63, on “the consummation of the church.” 24. Gemütszuständen. 25. Gewalt. 26. Rom. 13:1–2. Ed. note: Sermon on Rom. 13:1–5, Jan. 5, 1809, SW II.4 (1835), 1–13. On the general government of the world, see esp. §§168–69. 27. Ed. note: John 18:36 RSV: “My kingship is not of this world.” Schleiermacher’s diary indicates that he preached on this verse in his series on John in 1826. However, the last sermon from the series published in the nineteenth century is from Sept. 24 of that year, on John 16:23–33. KGA III/9 might contain additional sermon transcripts found in the late twentieth century.

28. Augsburg Confession (1530) 16: “Because the gospel transmits an eternal righteousness of the heart, … in the meantime the gospel does not overthrow secular government, public order, and marriage [German: stosset nicht weltlich Regimen, Polizie, und Ehestand; Latin: non dissipat politiam aut oeconomiam] but instead intends that a person keep all this as a true order of God and demonstrate Christian love in these walks of life.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 49f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 71. 29. Kirchenrechtes. 30. Sache der Kunst. Ed. note: That is, a “matter of art,” of how an action is done rather than of the reality, the what, involved. 31. This condition also underlies the rule [for replacement of Judas] set forth by Peter (Acts 1:21) and the communal policy declared in Gal. 2:7–9. Ed. note: Sermon only on Acts 1:21–22, June 3, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 276–88. 32. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 30: “If he (the magistrate) is a friend and even a member of the church, he is a most useful and excellent member of it, who is able to benefit it greatly and to assist it best of all.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 299; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 305. Cf. note at §37n3. 33. As in 1 Cor. 7:22. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 Cor. 7:20–23, Aug. 9, 1818, first published in The Christian Household (1820), then in SW II.1 (1834), 640–51, followed by a second sermon on servants, 652–65. ET Seidel and Tice (1991), 91– 105 and 106–22. Cf. a sermon on self-induced servitude (re: Augsburg) on 1 Cor. 1:23, June 20, 1830, SW II.2 (1834), 613– 25. ET Nicol (1997), 21–33. 34. Obrigkeit und Untertan. Ed. note: That is, literally, those who are positioned “over” vs. “under.” 35. Rein geistigen Macht. 36. Heb. 12:27f.; even 1 Cor. 15:28 does not speak contrary to this point. 37. Ed. note: At this point the term for “broadly religious” is religiösen. Elsewhere in this context frommen is the adjective modifying “community,” an adjective usually translated “religious,” but it is distinguished by being translated “pious” later in this sentence. 38. Ed. note: The present postscript is to §§92–105 as a whole. Part Two (§§62–169) of Christian Faith examines two aspects of Christian consciousness: the First Aspect is consciousness of sin (§§65–85), and the Second Aspect is consciousness of grace (§§86–169). The first section of the Second Aspect (§§91–112) attends to the Christian’s consciousness of grace (in contrast to the second section on the ordering of the world and the third section on divine attributes) and begins with this first division (§§92–105) regarding Christ’s person and work. Careful reading of the table of contents will clarify the shape of the presentation. 39. Erniedrigung und Erhöhung. Ed. note: The first condition is sometimes, rather misleadingly, called his “humiliation” and the second condition his “being lifted up.” 40. Menschwerdung. Ed. note: This is also the only word available in German for “incarnation,” which itself already normally presupposes the higher status of being just rejected. This is why Schleiermacher rarely uses it for dogmatic purposes. 41. Ed. note: Literally, “a being reduced to a lower status,” just as “elevated” means “a being raised to a higher status.” 42. Ed. note: Cf. §116n1. 43. Verherrlichung. Ed. note: To “glorify” is to acknowledge, honor, and celebrate God’s having “dominion [Herrlichkeit, Herrschaft] over all things,” or God’s truly being “the Lord” (Herr). 44. Niedrigkeit. 45. John 1:51; 4:34; 5:17, 20f.; 6:57; 8:29; 10:30, 36; and so on. Ed. note: This theme is well represented in sermons already cited. 46. Ed. note: See §96 and index. 47. Solid Declaration (1577) 8: “He revealed his divine nature as he pleased, when and how he wanted to, and not only after his resurrection and ascension but [also] in the state of his humiliation.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 630; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1029. 48. Ed. note: Cf. §§157.1 and 159.1. This notion implies that until the church reaches the projected state of being “the church consummate” (vollendete), it will always be struggling, striving, in conflict, or embattled to some extent, hence “the church militant” (streitend). 49. Phil. 2:6–9. No other passage that is adduced to this subject contributes anything to it. Ed. note: Sermons on Phil. 2:5–11, May 27 and June 9, 1822, SW II.10 (1856), 492–526, from an early morning series on Philippians. 50. Ed. note: On “ascetic” practice, see §87.2. There Schleiermacher regards individual ascetic practice under the broader umbrella of “devotional” (andächtig) practice. Those practices that are entirely divorced from the collective life of grace shared with Christ are deemed to be delusive. In the context of Philippians, “entirely” would likely be too strong a claim for him, but he seems not to be thinking of the passage as presenting a wholly suitable devotion either. The passage Phil. 2:5–11 (RSV) reads: “Have this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the

form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. Therefore God has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.” 51. Ed. note: Cf. §16. 52. Vollendung. Ed. note: Use of this term also directly alludes to the theme “consummation of the church,” treated in §§157–63, to which one can refer only in an imagined, “prophetic” manner. 53. Vorbild. Ed. note: Or model for devout followers.

Division Two

Regarding the Way in which Communion with the Perfection and Blessedness of the Redeemer Is Expressed in the Individual Soul [Introduction to Division Two] §106. The distinctive self-consciousness of one who is taken up into community with Christ in one’s life is presented under two concepts: regeneration and sanctification. 1. The nature of redemption consists in the fact that the previously weak and suppressed God-consciousness in human nature is raised and brought to the point of dominance1 through Christ’s entrance into it and vital influence upon it. Thus, the individual in whom this influence is expressed must attain a religious personal existence2 that the individual did not yet have beforehand. That is, up to that point the individual’s God-consciousness had expressed itself only in occasional sparks, as it were, sparks that kindled no flame because the individual’s God-consciousness was not positioned to determine particular elements of the individual’s life in a steady fashion. As a result, very quickly even particular elements that really were determined by the individual’s God-consciousness were, in turn, constantly being quelled by elements of a contrary sort. A pious personal existence,3 however, is understood to be one in which every predominantly passive element is impacted only through relation to the God-consciousness contained in the Redeemer’s influence, and every active element proceeds from an impulse emitted by this very God-consciousness. Thus, one’s life stands under a different formulation and is consequently a new life; hence come the expressions “new human being” and “new creation,”4 which mean the same as our expression “new personal existence” here. Naturally, however, since a human being, viewed as having a unity of psychical life, remains the same, and since this new life is thus simply engrafted, as it were, onto the old life, in its appearance this new life is also only a life in the process of becoming. Yet, the state in which the new life is in a process of becoming, when related in memory to a state in which it was not yet involved in such a process, could be attached to the previous state and could be joined into the temporal continuity of the selfsame person only by presupposing a turning point. At this turning point the continuity of the “old life” would have stopped and the “new life” would have begun the process of becoming. This turning point, moreover, is what is essential in the concept of “regeneration.”5 Likewise, on the other hand, there is the growing continuity of the new life—wherein the elements appropriate to its formulation fit together more and more and elements representing the old life recur, though more and more weakly and rarely—and this process would be designated by the term “sanctification.”6 Suppose that, given this account, we go back to what we noticed earlier: that Christ’s relationship to the rest of human nature is exactly the same as the relationship in his person of what is divine in it to what is human.7 So too, then, the two concepts correspond exactly to

the analogy between the act of uniting and the state of being united.8 The only difference is that, in Christ’s case, a person originated pure at the outset, and after that, the state of being united was also comprised of one uninterrupted continuity and of just as uninterrupted a spreading within human nature. Hence, the same characteristics would have to be the case here as well, were it not for the fact that, by virtue of the identity of the subject with its previous existence as a person, features from the life of sinfulness would repeatedly be present as obstructive factors. Moreover, just as in Christ’s person the act of uniting and the state of being united could not exist without each other, it is no less true here as well that regeneration and sanctification cannot be isolated from each other. 2. Now, if the construction of this division is hereby justified in general terms, only a few remarks are still to be added, having to do with the relation of its positioning to what has already been said.9 This relation can be displayed as follows. To start with, what we have just considered regarding Christ’s kingly office could, in and of itself, have led us in the most natural way to a presentation regarding the new collective life over which he governs. Furthermore, to be sure, just as today stimuli come to each individual only out of this collective life, stimuli from which one’s being taken up into community of life with Christ emerges, and just as an individual’s sanctification also depends on the influences of the whole body on the individual, these two points of doctrine could very well have been treated under the following Section too.10 The reverse arrangement, however, could just as well occur. The reason is that just as Christ’s entrance into humanity is its second creation and humanity thus becomes a new creature11 thereby, one can also view this entrance as the regeneration of the human race, a rebirth that really comes to pass, however, only under the form of the regeneration of individuals. Moreover, just as the community of the faithful, in accordance with its true nature, nevertheless has its existence only out of the totality of those elements of sanctification that are shared by all individuals who are taken up into community of life with Christ, so, in turn, the sanctification of individuals includes within itself all that by which the community is entered into, held together, and extended.12 Now, given this total reciprocity, the present positioning of the doctrines is justified in the following way. At the outset, individuals were seized by Christ; and today, as well, it is still always a working of Christ himself, mediated by his spiritual presence in the Word,13 whereby individuals are taken up into the community of the new life. Above all, however, this positioning of the two doctrines is justified by the fact that their earlier placement is suited more for that content which, on the one hand, refers back to the old collective life of general sinfulness but, on the other hand, underlies the new collective life under grace. Furthermore, this rationale holds true for both of the concepts to be discussed in the present Division. If, for the individual, regeneration is the turning point at which one’s earlier life breaks off, as it were, and the new life begins, for us it thus sets forth the disappearance of the old life, as it is then to be understood only through Christ’s redemptive activity, but only in such a way that the power of the new life must have been implanted in the soul at the same time. Moreover, just as, in this fashion, the treatment of these doctrines looks back to the previous Division, the present Division also contains the foundation for the next Section, in

that this power of the new life is, at the same time, also the common spirit,14 which animates15 the whole. Sanctification, however, likewise has two aspects to it. Viewed in the one aspect, its extent is general sinfulness, as it is overcome more swiftly or more slowly in the individual soul. Viewed in the other aspect, its extent is the relationship of the individual soul to the new life in common, as it advances more swiftly or more slowly in the service16 of the collective new life.

1. Herrschaft. 2. Ed. note: religiöse Persönlichkeit. That is, one “religious” in the broadest sense, wherein true piety is not yet sustained. Cf. §104n63 and §105n37. 3. Ed. note: frommen Persönlichkeit. 4. As in 2 Cor. 5:17 and Eph. 4:24. Ed. note: Sermon only on 2 Cor. 5:17–18 (re: Augsburg), Oct. 24, 1830, SW II.2 (1834), 725–38; ET Nicol (1997), 141–54. 5. Wiedergeburt. Ed. note: More literally, “rebirth,” “being born again.” 6. Heiligung. Ed. note: More literally, “being made holy,” made more of a “saint.” 7. Ed. note: See §97. 8. Vereinigung … des Vereintseins. Ed. note: At §97, Schleiermacher notes that the two terms correspond to unitio … unio. 9. Above, §§90.1 and 91.2. 10. Ed. note: That is, under §§115–63, on the constitution of the world in relation to redemption (ecclesiology). Thus, the “reverse” would be to treat doctrines regarding the church within the doctrines of regeneration and sanctification. 11. Ed. note: See also the progression in Part One from §63 to §§80–84 and to §87, then to §89 in Part Two on the founding of the “new collective life” as “the completed creation of human nature.” 12. Ed. note: geknüpft, zusammengehalten, und verbreitet. Three phases are thus represented in the church’s or individual’s relation to the world: getting started, sharing in a process, and broadening the new creation that it experiences into the rest of humanity. 13. Ed. note: geistige Gegenwart im Wort. Christ’s mediated presence thus occurs as geistig, “heart, mind, and soul” in the biblical sense, or through all the conscious powers of “spirit” (Geist) among individuals in the community of the faithful —otherwise stated, through the activity of the Holy Spirit among them (see §§121–25). This process occurs by the continual influence of the Word that witnesses to Christ’s own proclamation by word and deed in Scripture and therefrom in the shared ministries of the people congruent with that Word (see esp. §§128–35). So, for Schleiermacher this is not an esoteric “spiritual presence” independent of all these very concrete gifts and graces. 14. Gemeingeist. Ed. note: As is presaged in §106n13 here, the Holy Spirit is later presented as the “common spirit” of the new common life. Cf. Schleiermacher’s deep concern regarding society’s need for “a fresher common spirit” arising “to renew it” in OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 26. The original strictly civil use of “common spirit” (Gemeingeist) is subsequently used to present the spiritual working of Christ whereby God’s Holy Spirit is present to create and develop “new life” for individuals within Christian community. See §105.1 and §106.2 respectively. Already employed several times in Part Two of the first edition (1822), Gemeingeist had greatly expanded usage in Part Two of the second edition (1831). This term is equivalent to the activity of God’s Spirit and through the internal fully Spirit-respondent invisible church, namely, “Holy Spirit.” See §§116.3, 120.P.S. and 121–126, 127.2, 129.2, 133.1, and 144.1, also in the concluding doctrine of the divine Threeness (§170.1, where he also cites §§94 and 123). 15. Ed. note: In this context, beseelt (in the Latinate form, “animates”) could just as well be translated “ensouls,” for in Schleiermacher’s account the Gemeingeist indwells and activates, provides “soul” to the community viewed as a whole. 16. Ed. note: Here Dienst could also be translated “ministry,” for in the common life each and all are in ministry.

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Regeneration

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §107. Being taken up into community of life with Christ, viewed as a human being’s changed relationship to God, is that person’s justification; viewed as a changed form of life, it is the person’s conversion. 1. Here we have to do only with the state of the individual in transition from the collective life of sinfulness to community of life with Christ. Thus, we also have only to explain, on this basis, the necessary congruity between the two elements that are to be designated here. In this context “form of life” is understood to be nothing other than the way in which the two temporal segments of life come into being and line up, and selfconsciousness is thus observed in its transition into activity—that is, as the basis of one’s will. Now, in the state that is left behind, the stirrings of self-consciousness, in which stirrings God-consciousness has been coposited, were not determinative of one’s will but were only intermittent, and only sensory self-consciousness was determinative of one’s will. Interconnection with Christ in one’s life, however, engenders a transformation of this relation between the two features, and this process is designated by the term “conversion.”1 We really have a relationship with God only when our self-consciousness is steady, as it holds constant in its being reflected in thought,2 and only insofar as God-consciousness is coposited within it. Now, we are acquainted with only one relationship of human beings to God’s holiness and justice, as inherent in the condition of sinfulness in our lives, and this is nothing other than the self-consciousness of fault and culpability.3 Now, it is self-evident that this selfconsciousness must cease with the onset of community of life with Christ and not, as one might expect, as if only with some degree of completion or another within it, since the two conditions can in no way persist together. Moreover, no true consciousness of being in community with Christ can exist as long as that other consciousness is still operative. It is also obvious, however, that these two elements of our lives cannot be divorced from each other in such a way that a conversion could be imagined without a process of justification or a process of justification could be imagined without conversion. On the one hand, conversion without justification would then be simply a decision to forgive oneself in view of the fact that sin is unavoidable, so as to bring the old relationship with God to a halt. This would mean that no new relationship would have emerged. Thus, instead of justification there would be a total cessation of God-consciousness within one’s self-consciousness—that is, a hardening.4 This is so, for a new relationship with God can arise only through becoming at one with Christ, which is how conversion also arises. Just as little, on the other hand, is it possible to imagine a new direction of one’s will, proceeding from having become at one with Christ, wherein one’s consciousness of fault and culpability would continue to function. The reason is that the new human being would then have to be one devoid of any consciousness or, to put the point another way, there would have to be a being taken up into the community that shares in Christ’s perfection without being taken up into the community

that shares in his blessedness. Instead, wherever this result might seem to have occurred, either the consciousness of fault is simply visualizing something drawn from the past that is illusory or one’s “conversion” is merely a resolve to improve based on one’s own devices, without sharing in any true community of life with Christ. Now, if these two things, conversion and justification, cannot be divorced from each other, then the two must also be thought of as occurring contemporaneously, and each is a reliable identifying mark of the other. 2. As concerns the terminology for these subjects, a great variety of terms is to be found among teachers of faith-doctrine,5 in that the same expressions are taken by others to have a different meaning, and so the ones chosen here can also seem to be arbitrary. That is to say, first, if one compares the terms “regeneration” and “conversion” used here, no proper indication is present in them to show that conversion should be simply an aspect of regeneration, but one could just as easily suppose the reverse to be true. Second, still less does anything lie in the term “justification” that points to the beginning of a new form of life; moreover, if one considers that the condition coming to an end is that lived under the law, this expression can more easily suggest that such a condition is to continue on rather than to expire. Likewise, third, the term “conversion” permits of pushing to the forefront other expressions that are no less meaningful and just as biblical.6 Given the great richness of mainly biblical7 expressions that the writers of sacred writ make use of for this locus of doctrine, such fluctuation of usage is unavoidable. Recognizing this phenomenon, moreover, then leads more to the task of explaining exactly what is to be thought of in using these expressions than to the task of explaining the choice of the words themselves. Still, the choice of words made here is justified, on the one hand, by the fact that “regeneration” does most distinctly express the onset of a coherent life and, on the other hand, by the fact that the relation to what has gone before, which is a very recessive element in the general term “regeneration,” is dominant in the two concepts into which exposition of it is divided, namely, “conversion” and “justification.” Regarding the term “conversion,” standing for a turning about, a changing of one’s ways for the better,8 this term immediately makes clear that it refers to the beginning of a new course in contrast to an old one. Yet, “justification”9 also presupposes something in relation to which a given individual is justified; and since no mistake is possible in the Supreme Being, it is assumed that something would have happened to a human being between a previous time and now, by which the earlier divine displeasure would have been overcome and without which that individual could not have become an object of the divine good pleasure. It would not seem advisable, however, to carry still further figurative expressions found in Scripture into the sphere of regeneration. The reason is that without getting overly subtle and bringing useless intricacies into that sphere, it would be possible not to distinguish still further relations within this element, even as a sheer point of departure—quite apart from the fact that the metaphors of “enlightenment” and “renewal” could also just as well be used for the continuing element and thus for the sphere of “sanctification.”

In view of the reciprocity of the relation between the concepts “conversion” and “justification,” the order in which they are presented seems to be of no consequence. However, in several respects it would seem more convenient to start with conversion.

1. Bekehrung. Ed. note: That is, a turning about. See §107n8 below. 2. Ed. note: in unserm ruhenden Selbstbewußtsein, wie es sich im Gedanken reflektiert festhält. See the extended account of this relationship with God in self-consciousness in §§3–6, then cf. §§97 and 102.2. Four explanatory comments are of special importance here. First, this self-consciousness is anything but quiescent or at rest, two other meanings that can be attached to the verb ruhen. Rather, ruhend normally means “continuous,” hence “steady” right along, unintermittent. Second, at its highest stage what self-consciousness reflects, in thought, is its basic, immediate existential relationship with God in feeling, notably represented in the concept “feeling of absolute dependence.” Third, at this stage it is not so much a reflection upon oneself, as such, as an actual reflection of this relationship with God, both in community and within oneself. Fourth, also in this highest, religious stage, self-consciousness is not only carried “in thought” but is also ready for, and expressing itself in, acting. These are both essential ingredients in the experience Schleiermacher calls “piety” or “faith,” though piety cannot validly be reduced to either thought or action. In particular, this is how Christians are obediently to live out their “liberty” as “the children of God” (Rom 8:21; cf. §112.1), versus slavish dependency of any kind. 3. Cf. §§83–84. Ed. note: These propositions concern the affirmations that God is holy and just. Cf. also the larger context of §§79–85. 4. Verstockung. Ed. note: The allusion is to the biblical notion, already prevalent in the Old Testament, of a “hardening of the heart.” Cf. Mark 6:52; John 12:40; Rom. 11:7; and 2 Cor. 3:14. On helping people to avoid such a condition, see esp. the three 1818 sermons on “Christian Child-Rearing,” first published in 1820, then in SW II.1 (1834), 598–639, and (1843), 547–620; ET in Seidel and Tice, The Christian Household, 36–90. See also the sermons on (1) Mark 6:45–56, Nov. 4, 1832, SW II.5 (1835), 340–50; and (2) John 12:36–43, Mar. 5, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 348–61. 5. Ed. note: Schäfer (2003) 2.169 found Glaubenslehrern (teachers of faith-doctrine) occurring in the original manuscript, rather than Glaubenslehren (as in our published text), which would mean “bodies of faith-doctrine,” or dogmatics. The manuscript reading seems to be correct. 6. For example, “enlightenment” [or “seeing the light”] in Eph. 3:9 and 5:14, also Heb. 6:4–6; “renewal” in Eph. 4:23; Titus 3:5; and Heb. 6:6. Ed. note: Sermon only on Eph. 4:23, Sept. 21, 1828, first separately published in 1829, also in SW II.4 (1835), 171–81. 7. Ed. note: biblischer. Without indicating why, Schäfer (2003) 2.170 replaces this word with bildlicher (figurative), possibly because the later word is used below in a phrase that is otherwise the same. However, the first usage seems to have a more general reference than only to figurative expressions in Scripture. 8. Bekehrung … Umwendung, Umkehr zum Besseren. 9. Rechtfertigung. Ed. note: Recht means “right” or “justice,” and being morally “straight,” hence it might well refer to a life under the law. Thus, this derivative term may mean a process of being justified or one of being made “righteous” (gerecht) or a state of being “right with God” because one is considered so in the eyes of God, even if, strictly speaking, one is not altogether so or is only becoming so. For Schleiermacher, being “righteous” (or having “righteousness,” Gerechtigkeit), however, does not nearly approach either being perfect or being morally straight. Rather, it refers to a process of being made all of these things by God and in a particular way, i.e., in community of life with Christ— because one then participates in Christ’s own perfection and blessedness—that involves total and final acceptance by God. See the third and fourth 1830 sermons re Augsburg, “The Relationship of Evangelical Faith to the Law” and “On Righteousness Based on Faith,” in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 637–65; ET Nicol (1997), 47–78.

§108. First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Conversion. In each individual, conversion, viewed as the beginning of the new life in communion with Christ, is manifested through repentance, which consists of the combining of contrition and change of heart, and through faith,1 which consists of a person’s taking the perfection and blessedness of Christ into oneself.

(1) Augsburg Confession (1530) XII: “Now, properly speaking, true repentance (poenitentia) is nothing else than to have contrition and sorrow or terror (contritio seu terrores) about sin, and yet at the same time to believe (fides [have faith]) in the gospel and absolution.”2 (2) Apology Augsburg (1531) XII: “In order that we might lead pious conscience out of the labyrinths of the sophists, we have established two parts in repentance, namely, contrition and faith. We will not object if someone wants to add a third part, namely the fruits worthy of repentance. … But, … we here understand repentance as the entire conversion (mutationem totius), in which there are two sides: a putting to death and a raising to life … contrition and faith.”3 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XIV: “By repentance we understand the recovery of a right mind in sinful man awakened by the Word of the Gospel and the Holy Spirit, and received by true faith, by which the sinner immediately acknowledges his innate corruption and all his sins … and grieves for them from his heart and … before God with a feeling of shame, with indignation abominates them and now zealously considers the amendment of his ways. … And this is true repentance, namely, a sincere turning (conversio) to God and all good, and earnest turning away (aversio) from the devil and all evil. Now we expressly say that this repentance is a sheer gift of God and not a work of our strength.” XV: “Wherefore, in this matter we are speaking … of a living, quickening faith … because it apprehends Christ who is life.”4 (4) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551) (On the calling of faith): “We have demonstrated above that by faith is meant trust (fiducia) finding repose in the Son of God, on account of whom we are received and are acceptable. Faith is reliance on (fiduciam) applying Christ’s benefits to ourselves. Reliance, or trust, is a movement in the will by which the will finds repose in Christ.”5 (5) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) “We desire to retain the matter itself, whatever words the others may wish to use for it.”6 1. Admittedly, the description of the matter given in the confessional writings cited here do not seem to be the same as that given in our proposition. This is so, in that the word poenitentia corresponds only to “repentance,”7 thus only to one aspect, and in the Swiss confession the word conversio, which corresponds to our word “conversion,”8 is supposed to

express only one aspect of poenitentia. Moreover, if in a prefatory way we also note that the other aspect, not explicitly present in our proposition, namely, turning away9 from evil, is meant to be implied in it, these two aspects conjoined—turning away from evil and turning to God and to what is good—would still encompass only the aspect that we designate by the term “change of heart.”10 However, although in the Swiss confession these two aspects, conversio and aversio, are together equated with poenitentia, thus with the whole of the matter, also reckoned to this whole beforehand are both the grievous recognition of sin, which has to precede that turning away, and also faith, which has to precede that turning toward, with the result that of themselves the two turnings still do not constitute the whole. In the Augsburg Confession, besides “faith” we find only “remorse,”11 which is simply equivalent to our term “contrition,”12 but in the Apology we find an added concept of changing for the better, which when viewed as a continuing process indeed amounts to sanctification, but viewed as a beginning nonetheless belongs here and then corresponds to our term “change of heart.” Thus, if one looks at the whole set of features, the confessional writings have entirely the same content as our proposition. However, our general description is sufficiently justified as such by prevailing ascetic13 usage. Moreover, for the purpose “change of heart” is by far to be preferred to the term poenitentia, in German Buße, since this term bears no indication of the actual beginning of a new form of life, and it also sounds very alien to hear of “faith”—a term we obviously use exactly in the way the confessional writings do—specified as an aspect of “repentance.” Accordingly, even elsewhere in the Apology14 the terms “repentance” and “conversion” are used interchangeably. Another difference is best revealed in other passages in the Apology, where the two main aspects, contrition and faith, are also described as “putting to death” and “making alive.”15 That is to say, if “putting to death” is patently “remorse” or “contrition,” and “making alive” is just as patently “faith,” then what we have called a “change of heart” is left out. Yet, really being affected by Christ in faith is unimaginable without such a change in one’s innermost striving, and without this change even contrition would be simply a transitory stirring; consequently, change of heart is also tacitly coposited in both. Finally, it is yet to be noted that in ecclesial usage our general term “conversion” and the particular terms “repentance,” “contrition” and “change of heart” as well are all used not alone as descriptors for the onset of the new life but also as descriptors for what occurs in relation to the sin that remains as that new life continues. Yet, based on an earlier discussion here,16 it follows that a considerable distinction must be made between what belongs to a turning away from sin for those who are not yet living in community with the Redeemer and for those who are already doing so. For some among the latter group, their connection with the Redeemer and their correspondingly changed disposition can indeed have become obscure and have become hampered in their efficacy, but neither of these two characteristics will ever have been entirely lost. Hence, for that group no sin will indeed come into consciousness without giving rise to contrition, but they will not ever need to begin the new life over again, nor will they ever have to have a change of heart, viewed in the strictest

sense. On the other hand, as concerns faith, it is no doubt quite apparent that faith is a permanently enduring state of mind and heart and that here in the doctrine regarding conversion, strictly taken, what is to be addressed can only be the emergence of faith. This is so, for appropriation or taking possession of Christ17 is a onetime act; in contrast, faith, thought of in its enduring character, is the persistent consciousness of having possession of Christ that begins with that act. Accordingly, if the onset of faith that is divinely effected already essentially exists in conversion but the enduring character of faith is the abiding state on which the new life is grounded, then, at the same time—given the only relative separation of regeneration and sanctification, their necessarily belonging together, and the constancy of the divine working over the entire course of the new creation—focusing on that faith will serve to present a preliminary account of the new life. In contrast, the Roman church does not reckon faith to be an aspect of conversion but puts in its place confession and satisfaction. Rightly understood, “confession” is already implied in “contrition.” “Satisfaction,” however, is an impossible term. The reason lies partly in the Roman church’s doctrine of the church, partly in the fact that the Roman church uses the word “faith” differently, in that it understands “faith” to mean only information18 regarding human destiny that is divinely communicated and received by us. For this reason the Roman church then also asserts that this faith precedes repentance and conversion.19 Now, this diversity of language usage is indeed disagreeable, because it makes discussion of the points of differentiation more difficult. Likewise, it is also disagreeable that in ordinary life the same word, “faith,” is so often used for a conviction20 that likewise not only includes no movement of will in any case but is also unsatisfactorily grounded. Nevertheless, we should not let the word “faith” go. Rather, given its well-earned right, we must protect it. We must protect it all the more so since, on the one hand, the linguistic appropriateness of our way of using it is easy to demonstrate and since the term has become fully indigenous among us as a translation of the word whereby the original language of Scripture designates that human state of mind and heart which feels itself to be satisfactorily positioned and strong within Christ’s community. We must also protect the word “faith” as, on the other hand, the word has accrued a new historical value for us in our struggle against the orientation to “works” activity within the Roman church. 2. If we consider repentance and faith in their significance to encompass the whole of conversion, then, just as every turning point is, at the same time, the end of one direction taken and the beginning of the direction taken over against it, so too in the two features joined together a person’s being in the collective life of sin must cease and the person’s being in Christ’s community must begin. Accordingly, we can be in a state of both repentance and faith only as persons whose activity is self-initiated, but activities taken in a new direction can only be something we do in a successive manner. In contrast, therefore, the turning point between the two directions itself comprises a twofold lack of activity in the form of a nomore-being-active regarding the first direction taken and a not-yet-being-active regarding the new direction taken. Hence, in lieu of the vanishing activity nothing remains to the subject for supplying one’s spiritually21 animated being except a passive echo of that former activity

which is now carried in feeling and which, with respect to the activity not yet begun, is but a longing, viewed as a passive presentiment. Now, the first feature is contrition,22 which is indeed expressive of the collective life of sin. This contrition, however, does not exist as a self-initiated activity, for contrition always takes place only where the condition repented of is rejected. Rather, it exists as the firm retention in one’s self-consciousness of what has passed. In every element that is also to be regarded as simply an approximation to the actual transition yet to occur, this consciousness, in turn, is only expressive of a disturbance of one’s own life and a hindrance to it, thus is experienced as a lack of pleasure. In fact, the contrition which inheres in conversion and which refers to a condition not of the individual as such but to a collective condition that is, moreover, permanently rejected by the individual, is consequently, when considered of itself alone, the purest, most overwhelming lack of pleasure. To be sure, if imagined to mount up without restraint, this state could serve to destroy life itself.23 At this point, moreover, it is to be noted that the contrition which is connected with the knowledge of sin derived from the law cannot be the same thing as the contrition which directly inheres in the process of conversion. That is to say, on the one hand, by its very nature the law separates off the individual, and in this way contrition too can refer only to individual tendencies, not to the collective state of human beings and its innermost ground. On the other hand, in the context of the law there is nothing on the basis of which a countervailing tendency could unfold, and in its continuing development this kind of contrition would thus have to effectuate death or despair. Therefore, however much this brand of contrition may precede it, the true contrition of conversion must always eventually arise from the perception24 of Christ’s perfection, and in this way this onset of rebirth25 too must rest in his redeeming activity. Only on the basis of this presupposition, moreover, is the coinherence of contrition and faith also made understandable, in that both of these features flow from the same source. Christ can awaken only the most complete kind of contrition, in that his self-communicating perfection encounters us in its very truth, a process that happens precisely in the emergence of faith. Further, he can really grasp hold of us with his activity of taking us up only if, as a result of his self-presentation having moved us, our previous condition is entirely rejected. Now, if contrition and faith appear immediately to interconnect in this manner, then being in a community of life with Christ does indeed also begin in this very same manner. This is so, because in this process we cannot operate differently than the human nature of Christ did in the act of uniting—that is, with the peaceful26 consciousness of one’s being taken up. This peaceful consciousness is not only originally joyful and, in contrast to contrition, uplifting in its effect.27 Rather, through a constant movement forward it also expands to the point of an act of will, in that it already includes a fresh impulse of one’s will on account of which conversion is also completed by the emergence of faith. However, longing28 nevertheless steps in between that peaceful consciousness and one’s real activity. Indeed, this longing is manifested in two concomitant forms: as a continuing rejection of the community of sinful life, itself a lingering trace of contrition, and as a desire to take up whatever impetus proceeds from Christ. Moreover, this twofold radiation of one’s longing comprises the “change of

heart”29 effected by Christ, which in combining contrition and the emergence of faith depicts the true unity of conversion. Hence, with equal warrant one can assign this change of heart more to the first, rejecting aspect of this radiation in placing contrition under the concept “repentance,”30 or one can hold more to the positive, receptive aspect of this radiation in associating it with “gaining new life,”31 just as one can set forth this change of heart itself as an intermediate part of the process. Suppose, however, that we move somewhat farther back into the collective life of sinfulness. Then we will find many sorts of contrition within the domain of Christian religious life itself—for there can be no place for speaking of other sorts outside Christianity or without reference to God-consciousness, for that matter. Accordingly, within this domain these forms of contrition too more or less closely refer back to people’s perception of Christ, and they are not always restricted to some particularity but, instead, they truly demonstrate a displeasure regarding general human sinfulness as this sinfulness is manifested in one’s own person. Yet, they still do not develop into a constancy of inner movements to the point that a living faith emerges. Despite this fact, such stirrings, which proceed from people’s being influenced by the collective life of Christians, are definitely to be regarded as divinely caused. This is true even if they comprise only a disconnected, apparently incidental multiplicity of elements. Moreover, they are actually in connection with that divine ordinance according to which all human beings are to be placed in relationship with the Redeemer, and in this sense such situations are ascribed to prevenient divine grace.32 In the same manner, a change of heart that occurs before any constant connection with conversion is also to be considered a work of preparatory grace.33 This is all the more the case whenever the insight that entails rejection of what a person previously strived after looks back to the figure of Christ and to the teaching of Christ. Further, we do not always find change of heart and contrition in isolation from each other. Rather, instances of contrition and change of heart are also found to relate to each other in such a way that they do not lose their preparatory character on that account. Hence, every more advanced character of these two features can be recognized only in terms of the simultaneous emergence of faith; moreover, the completely efficacious grace of God is made manifest only in the unity of all three features: contrition, change of heart, and faith. To be sure, such preliminary approximations to faith do also occur, however. That is to say, it would be wrong to regard someone as being permeated by the Redeemer’s perfection —even if that perfection is taken to be purely human. No other wise or divinely gifted human being is any longer positively placed on a par with the Redeemer; and such a delight is taken in his reign that this reign is placed above other human pursuits, such as a summary condemnation of him by human reason. That condemnation of him is wrong in that some presentiment of his higher dignity can already lie hidden therein, and a deeper devotion can be formed there-from. Rather, even this condemnation of Christ is an act of preparatory grace. As a consequence, moreover, it is also true of faith that as it emerges its still higher character is to be recognized only in its union with the other two features distinguished here.

Indeed, since quite easily only an incomplete sense of contrition and change of heart can be combined even with a more elevated notion of the Redeemer that has been engendered in one’s psyche, it obviously follows that in and of itself conversion cannot be distinguished from the effects of preparatory grace or from any particular distinct signs of its effects. Rather, only gradually can one’s own consciousness of that grace gain surety, and only gradually can peace be firmly established in one’s heart. This is the case, for even approximations to faith must already have borne an influence on one’s mode of behavior. This influence is all the less surely to be distinguished from the very first beginnings of sanctification when the true life of Christ within us is initially made known, in accordance with the laws of organic nature, only in weak, intermittent stirrings, and only gradually does a coherent activity form out of those beginnings. Thus, this same gradual process is that by which we are made aware of steady advances in sanctification, except that we have to take these advances in their entire compass. This very process, moreover, is that by which we are made aware of our participation in the broadening of Christ’s reign. That is to say: on the one hand, by its very nature what is incomplete here mostly wavers in its progress; on the other hand, it is inconceivable that a person would be taken up into unity of life with Christ and in one’s strivings not quickly also prove oneself to be an instrument of his redemptive activity. Hence, when the Redeemer terms the decisive effect of divine grace a “new birth,”34 we also have to understand by this image that, just as when we are born into earthly life, this new birth is not something that springs up all at once. Rather, a hidden, inchoate life already precedes this birth, but then too, precisely like birth into earthly life for the newborn baby, this newborn is not conscious of the life that is to emerge, and only gradually does the child learn to find oneself to be a real person in the new world. Sticking with this image that the Redeemer himself advanced, thereby we can rest assured of the following. First, neither others nor we ourselves may be able to pinpoint the precise beginning of our new life. In fact, generally the time of it can no more be determined than can the place where the wind begins. Second, despite this fact, distinction between the new life and the old holds true, and we also become ever more sure of our participation in that new life. 3. Now, for this reason the conjecture that every Christian has to be able to point out the date and hour of one’s conversion is really a whimsical and presumptuous restriction of divine grace, and it also cannot but bring confusion to our minds and hearts. This thought has reached its most definite form in the claim made by an otherwise estimable party in our church35 that every true Christian must be able to demonstrate the beginning of one’s state of blessedness in a penitential struggle—that is, an upswelling of contrition bordering on hopeless self-loathing followed by a feeling of divine grace that borders on inexpressible bliss—arguing that otherwise all strength of heart would be but delusion and all show of holiness would be but deceitful human work. This view has never gained entry into official doctrine, however, and must also continue to be regarded as a dubious deviation.36 Moreover, two further points can clearly be made in this connection. In the first place, in no way does true change of heart always have to complete the process from contrition to faith

by springing from an extravagance of contrition, such that it is filled with a feeling so distressful as to well-nigh break one’s very existence apart. Why not? On the one hand, the spectrum of excitability among people is so varied that what is in fact extreme excitement to one less able to be moved seems minor to one more readily stirred. Even in the same person, moreover, a similar variation is to be found at different times. As a result, it is already impossible on these grounds to forge a summary and definitive statement on the subject. On the other hand, based on innumerable accounts from the lives of religious persons, experience teaches that even if deep convulsions of mind and heart had occurred in them beforehand, which they confidently took to be the instant of conversion, nevertheless afterward not infrequently they could sink, in turn, into such a state of emptiness and uncertainty that the supposed value of those instances would appear totally pointless. As a result, even in such cases strength of heart arises only gradually. In the end, even in that sort of contrition one must also distinguish pain, viewed as the sensory aspect of contrition, from self-disapproval, which indeed is not itself a sheer judgment but is also a feeling, viewed as the more spiritual aspect of contrition. This is so, in that the two aspects could be combined together in a quite variable relationship, so that the most strict and profound self-disapproval can exist in a mind and heart already practiced in amassing all its sensory impressions and without pain’s arising in equal measure in relationship to it. Indeed, on the one hand, one must take care lest intensity of pain should give an overwhelmingly sensory stamp to this whole situation, whereupon contrition itself would not yet be pure and undefiled and, even in its deepest motives, would not yet be free of all admixture with sensory elements, thus not be suited to have life-giving faith as its immediate result. Furthermore, on the other hand, the more frequently and strongly such a defective state of contrition has set in prior to conversion, the more readily can the relationship of selfdisapproval to pain also take a different shape in one’s actual act of repentance. As a result, what evokes that entire process of self-disapproval, to which faith and the positive pole of one’s change of heart are attached, has to be simply like a recalling of earlier suffering and to be a mere shadow of the pain that one has already experienced. On this basis, we see anew how inadmissible is the claim that everyone should be able to distinguish among the phenomena of consciousness the working of divine grace that initiates the new life from the workings of preparatory grace. In general, therefore, we can admit that some reality is contained in the concept of penitential struggle only to the extent that one understands by it the whole set of changing relationships that extends from the very first summoning and preparatory workings of grace on to the inalterable strengthening of one’s heart in faith. Yet, however longer or shorter the interval within which these workings may be compressed or spread out, and however greatly the particular swing cycles may differ from each other during this period, as well as whether the last turn must be precisely the strongest, will be left wholly undetermined. The second point that can be established is as follows. If participation in Christ’s blessedness also belongs to community of life with him, then from the very onset on, thus

also in the emergence of faith, this participation in Christ’s blessedness would have to be coposited, all the more so because the lack of blessedness that is inherent in contrition can be overturned only by its opposite, namely blessedness. Now, the two chief elements of conversion can also draw quite close to each other, so that even in one’s full experience of contrition, pain would not always be starkly prominent. Thus, a wide range of relationships are also possible between the pain that is present in repentance and the joy that appears in one’s consciousness of community of life with Christ. One of these relationships could be one in which a more glorious outburst of joy occurs quite adjacent to a faint state of sorrow, in which relationship the latter state can thereby become almost indiscernible. Actually, forms of conversion of this sort do undeniably exist, forms that are to be conceived simply as a blissful rescue from despondency. Likewise, forms also exist in which nothing whatsoever of a penitential struggle comes up. Instead, the person senses an almost pure blessing from on high, as it were, almost as if what is painful in one’s contrition can be rolled back, yet without its entirely disappearing.37 4. Although several teachers both in the English and in the German church have recently proposed that generally no conversion is needed for those born in the bosom of the Christian church who as children were already received into its community, in that these persons would already have been members in the body of Christ and would already have attained rebirth38 in baptism, we must refuse agreement with that proposal by virtue of almost everything discussed thus far. This is so, for in and of itself everything that had been indicated earlier as causes for the emergence of sin in human beings is found just as much among those born within the Christian church as among others. As a result, in children born within the Christian church, there also dwells a tendency to pull down what is divine—which certainly does bear influence on them from the Christian community—into the sensory domain. Indeed, one can reasonably say that even in any Christian child, lending a sensory-laden cast39 to what is divine develops of itself—sometimes of the more pagan, recklessly sacrilegious sort and sometimes of the more Jewish, dejectedly anxious sort. Thus, if the might of sin appears in them despite their baptism as infants, they too have need of conversion just as much as those born outside the church do. The only real difference, therefore, that exists between the two groups of children is that among the latter group it is incidental whether and how the summons of the gospel reaches them, whereas the former are already summoned by their already standing in a natural and ordered connection with the workings of divine grace. However, the natural order that is presented here—that is, the sequence of preparatory to life-giving40 grace—is by no means obviated thereby. Wherever this order obtains, however, there a process of conversion is also taking place. Moreover, the proposal to which we are responding also finds at most a semblance of support in our confessions, whereas they are completely in accord with the position we have presented here. This agreement is recognizable, in part, by the fact that in treatment of the doctrine of conversion, no mention whatsoever is made of a distinction between those born within the church and those born outside it41 and, in part, by the fact that the confessions expressly ascribe to baptism only the beginning of the workings of divine grace.42 However,

that this beginning within the church is ever the same, even apart from any previous baptism, is demonstrated by those who are later disposed to be baptized by their own fiat. Other confessional passages, to be sure, do seem to come closer to the proposal that we have examined.43 Yet, when one considers what they say about regeneration in other passages— namely, that in it the Holy Spirit illumines us for the purpose of our understanding the divine mysteries44 and that sanctification begins with regeneration—one can well see that in this way these confessions actually link only the baptism that occurs for adults and their longing for it with regeneration and extend it to infant baptism only by way of consent, as it were. Moreover, nowhere in the confessional writings of these churches is anything intended other than what Calvin45 also said on this subject, which also accords precisely enough with the above-cited confessions, in that what these statements say about the working of baptism can be understood only as “the seeds of repentance and faith.” Yet, one can all too easily lapse, in turn, into something magical when one associates regeneration with the way we administer the sacrament of baptism. This point will become clear of itself when we then seek to answer the question: How, in accordance with the typus of baptism that is generally set forth among us, does Christ’s activity of taking up persons in that rite and the passive state of the person being taken up relate to each other? 5. Now, as concerns the first of these two features, here again there appears to be a troublesome quirk in our arrangements concerning baptism, in that in our official teaching frequently regeneration is ascribed to the divine Spirit, concerning which we have not as yet treated at all, just as—to call to mind the next topic to be taken up, already announced—the divine activity in justification is customarily attributed to the Father. Yet, here too we must bring to mind the principle that just as the whole process of redemption is the same for all peoples, whether they be Jews or Gentiles, this is true for all times as well, also that the selfsameness of redemption and of Christian community would be endangered if our faith had a different content or were to arise in a way different from the way it did for the first disciples—the second condition and its consequence necessarily dragging the first along with it. If, moreover, faith is to arise in the same way, conversion must also occur in the same way. Now, in the first disciples both of these things were effected by the “Word,” taken in the broader sense—that is, by the total prophetic activity of Christ.46 Further, we must therefore be able to understand this communal feature, as such, in a preliminary fashion—that is, without the doctrine of the Holy Spirit—just as well as the disciples also understood it within their own situation, without that doctrine. Thus, what is continuous is, first of all, that same divine power of “the Word,”47 a term understood as having the same scope as that by which conversion is still effected and faith arises even today. The only difference is that today Christ’s self-presentation is conveyed by those who proclaim him, though since they are appropriated by him as his instruments and consequently the activity of proclamation proceeds from him, this activity is always essentially his own. Quite definitely and without qualification, most of our confessions also make this claim, though also with reference to the Holy Spirit—a matter that will first become clear to us below.48 Moreover, if other passages seem to be explicable only in a more qualified way,49

they do take note of exceptions that, on closer inspection, turn out to be only seeming ones. This is so, for one need only distinguish the Word itself from what belongs to the official ministry of the Word50 and consider that all Christians are directed to a service to the Word held in common in order boldly to assert that no example can be advanced of a conversion occurring without mediation of the Word. Moreover, there is a justifiable concern as to whether divine omnipotence would be restricted by a strict, unexceptionable claim regarding this content. This is so, for precisely in this way the act of second creation will be recognized as a work of divine omnipotence, such that only through the power manifested in that divine omnipotence would the task of conversion be fulfilled in any and all persons of faith. Moreover, the miracle of Christ’s appearance,51 which could itself become effectual only under the form of the Word, would be insufficient if some would have to be converted differently than through the workings that issue from him, since in that case these persons would not be included in Christ’s high-priestly prayer.52 Suppose, to the contrary, that it were possible for Christ to be revealed directly within some persons apart from the Word. If that were true, then this could also have happened to anyone, which would amount to a redemption by means of the sheer idea of the Redeemer. On that basis, Christ’s appearance would then be superfluous. For the present day, moreover, this observation is the especially pertinent ground for our claim—in any case resting on the entire practice of the apostles and on the express witness of Scripture53—that our aim is not perchance simply to secure ourselves against certain enthusiasts on the fringe.54 Instead, it is probably only by means of this proposition that we can first get full insight into the perilous nature of such enthusiasm on this point. This is so, for if in the process of conversion, workings of divine grace were received that are not tied to any historical connection with the personal efficacious action of Christ—even positing that they would have come as workings of Christ within one’s consciousness— there would still be no way of being sure that this inner Christ is the same as the historical Christ. Hence, every presentation on this subject that wrests from the Word its unexceptionable right to be included in the conversion process not only oversteps all boundaries, in that in this way anyone can proffer anything, with unlimited arbitrariness, to be Christian and to have proceeded from Christ. It also negates all necessity for community, in that anyone who is illumined55 in a purely internal and original way would also have to be completely selfcontained, having no occasion or need for community. All truly separatist tendencies likewise proceed on the basis of similar notions.56 Thus, here Christ’s efficacious action exists only in human communication of the Word, but it also exists only in the indwelling divine power of Christ himself within this communication to the extent that it moves forth by the Word of Christ. In this process, however, that Word is fully commensurate with the truth, on two conditions: if every distinct human intervention disappears from the consciousness of a person going through conversion57 and if Christ is made immediately present to that person strictly in Christ’s

redeeming and reconciling activity, extending from his prophetic activity to his kingly activity,58 all of which has taken possession of that person. Now, in this sense the whole process is Christ’s efficacious action—from the first impression of Christ’s proclamation on one’s mind and heart to one’s strengthening in faith, each aspect simply making a contribution toward conversion. Thus, all these workings of divine grace are supernatural insofar as they rest on God’s being in the person of Christ and also actually proceed from this source. At the same time, however, all these workings of divine grace are also historical and history-forming, thus natural, insofar as they are, in general, naturally bound to the historical life of Christ and also insofar as every particular working of divine grace that grounds a new personal existence also attaches its work to the historical interconnection of all the workings of Christ. 6. Let us now consider the state of the subject itself during conversion, this inasmuch as we regard conversion to be the element in which entrance into community of life with Christ is completed. Suppose, then, that this element is the beginning of a higher form of life and that this higher form of life can be communicated only by Christ because it originally existed in him alone. First of all, it is self-evident that no causality can be attached to the person who is taken up into this higher form of life, just as that higher form of life can in no way arise from the lower level of life on the part of one or more persons who are to be converted. On the other hand, we recognize that in community of life with Christ hereafter, as in the past, the convert does exercise self-initiated activity as an individual possessing one’s intellect and senses, though also persisting in the collective life of sin, also that everywhere, in the entirety of any moment, no living being can exist bereft of all self-initiated activity. Thus, two questions unavoidably arise. The first question is: How do certain naturally existing doings of the subject that are certainly present in the element called conversion relate to Christ’s influence in calling forth one’s change of heart and one’s faith? In contrast, the other question is How does the presupposed passive state during conversion relate to one’s subsequent selfinitiated activity, in community with Christ? With respect to the first question, in this instant of conversion we cannot consider the natural self-initiated activity of human beings as cooperative without diverging from our basic presupposition. To be sure, that which is already placed in a person by preparatory grace is cooperative in the process of conversion, but this activity is itself a part of the divine working of grace and does not belong to the person as one’s own doing.59 What proceeds from one’s own inner being could be cooperative only to the extent that the efficacious action of divine grace were really conditioned by these activities of one’s own. Now, to be sure, some such contingency is not to be denied. That is to say, the Word by which Christ’s influence is mediated can effect this mediation only inasmuch as it makes an impression on a person, for which impression activity both from one’s sense organs and from the internal functions of one’s consciousness are requisite. Hence, precisely inasmuch as the activity of all those functions would depend on a person’s free will, one’s capability for apprehending the Word must also rightly be attributed to a person in one’s natural condition.60 We cannot admit any natural cooperation of a person, however, to what occurs after the Word has made

its impression on one’s psyche—that is, to the Word’s attaining its purpose in a person. Even the consent that accompanies one’s reception of the divine Word can be ascribed only to the workings of grace that preceded it, inasmuch as that consent is directed to what is essential and distinctive in that Word. Suppose, on the other hand, that someone should regard a person’s natural activity during Christ’s exercise of influence on one’s conversion to be that of resistance. Then that natural resistant activity would have to be, if not exactly one of disparagement, then at least one of indifference. That is, a person’s activity would continue to be directed elsewhere and would have a null effect on Christ’s influence. If, however, conversion should take place when a person is in a state of resistance, it would at least not occur by virtue of the Word’s being received in this way. Consequently, an assumption that there is no relation whatsoever between one’s own activity and Christ’s higher influence also leads to no satisfactory result. The remaining task, then, is to find a state of activity that stands in some relation to Christ’s influence and that would nonetheless be neither one of resistance nor one of cooperation. Now, suppose that we start with the cooperation that we have already granted to be an activity that precedes one’s apprehension of the Word, namely, one of organic functioning, and from a minimum of resistance, namely, a directing of one’s will elsewhere, which we have already discounted. It is evident, then, that the latter activity cannot coexist with the former. Thus, that cooperation of the psyche’s organs to the end of apprehending the Word also already entails concurrence of the will. This concurrence, however, is nothing more than an acquiescence to Christ’s influence or the release of a vital receptivity to it.61 Accordingly, it wholly corresponds to our task to note this intermediate factor—to which we repair in all similar cases and which is a passive state, yet nonetheless includes in itself that minimum of self-initiated activity which belongs to every complete element of experience. Even so, one entirely ruins the resolution of this task if one, in turn, splits receptivity into an active factor and a passive one and would validate only the passive factor.62 This is so, in that one must then still account for yet another simultaneous self-initiated activity, since the same old difficulty then returns. Now, let us go back to the other question. It is clear, at the outset, that generally the life of the Redeemer, as such, is one only of activity and not passivity at all, because his life is exclusively determined by the being of God in him. Thus, in community of life with him too, no element can be strictly one of passivity, because therein everything that proceeds from him and becomes an impetus is activity, of necessity. Self-initiated activity occurring in community of life with Christ therefore begins, at the same time and without any intervening interval, with one’s being taken up into that life in common. As a result, one can say that conversion is nothing but the evocation of this self-initiated activity in union with Christ. That is, a person’s vital receptivity immediately passes over into enlivened self-activity. Every heightening of that vital receptivity is a work of preparatory divine grace; however, by that grace which effects conversion that receptivity is immediately transformed into enlivened self-initiated activity. Suppose, however, that we trace the first feature further back from the point where it makes its appearance as already heightened by the effects of

preparatory grace and ask: In its very first beginnings, then, wherein would the vitality whereby it is distinguished from a state of passivity consist? Then there is surely no alternative but to point out one’s longing for communion with God, which, even if it may press back so close to the boundary of unconsciousness, is nevertheless never entirely snuffed out, a longing that also belongs to the original perfection of human nature. Thus, in that we deem this longing to be the first point of contact for all the workings of divine grace, we exclude only that passivity which is entirely, thoroughly incompatible with human nature, a passivity by virtue of which a human being is said to be like inanimate objects in the process of conversion.63 Thereby, however, we do not take exception to anything that we have already ascribed to the grace of God in Christ within our Christian self-consciousness. This is the case, for sheer longing is no deed; rather, it is simply the anticipatory feeling64 of a possible deed under the presupposition of a stimulus that would come from elsewhere. Indeed, it is simply the same as what is manifested in a person as the felt need for redemption, without which felt need there also could not logically be any lack of pleasure regarding sinfulness in general. Rather, generally at this point there would have to be only self-consolation in the face of sin’s inevitability. Thus, this longing is simply the ineradicable residual presence65 in the human race of that original divine communication which constitutes human nature. Consequently, this divine communication does not, in and of itself, provide for the contrast between nature and grace; rather, it provides for that contrast only inasmuch as it is raised to the point of being the determinative power. Indeed, the parallel between the emergence of the divine life within us and the Redeemer’s becoming a human being66 is demonstrated here as well. That is to say, the passivity of human nature in that element of our lives would have been just as vital a receptivity for an absolutely powerful God-consciousness—indeed, a longing, as it were, to be grasped and determined by such a consciousness of God as would have changed into a person-forming, self-initiated activity by means of that creative act in Christ. Likewise, then, this longing is raised to the point of self-initiated activity that constitutes a coherent new life by means of Christ’s self-communication in conversion.

1. Ed. note: On the essential Christian view of “faith” and being in community with Christ as communication of his perfection and blessedness, see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 14. See also CF §§89.2, 105.2, 107.1, and index. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 44; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 67. For clearer understanding more text is given here and in the next quotation on this subject, and what Schleiermacher selected is placed in italics. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 191; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 257. 4. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 251f., 257; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 262f., 267. This is the Swiss confession mentioned just below. Cf. note at §37n3. This quotation exactly follows Schleiermacher’s own extensive selection. The final two quotations here also exactly follow his own text. 5. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 28:391; Schleiermacher here refers to the edition in Symbole (1816), 147. 6. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:749. See §32n16. 7. Buße. 8. Bekehrung. 9. Aversio. 10. Sinnesänderung. Ed. note: That is, change of one’s inner sensibility (Sinn) or disposition (Gesinnung). 11. Zerknirschung.

12. Reue. 13. Ed. note: On ascetic language and practice, see §105n50. For the present context, the “ascetic” part of “devotional” usage seems to be more acceptable compared with that which has strayed from genuine community of life with Christ, which would be more suspect for Schleiermacher. 14. Apology Augsburg (1531) 12: “We must show that Scripture makes them the chief parts in repentance or conversion.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 193; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 259. 15. Apology Augsburg (1531) 12: “Wherever Paul describes conversion, … he almost always distinguishes these two parts, putting to death [mortificationem] and making alive [vivificationem]. … Therefore, these are the two parts, contrition and faith.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 194; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 260. 16. §74. 17. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 15: “Faith receives Christ.” Ed. note: The statement continues: “Our righteousness … attributes everything to the grace of God in Christ …, for it is the gift of God.” ET Cochrane (1972), 256; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 267. Cf. note at §37n3. 18. Kenntnis. 19. Roman Catechism (Catechismus Romanus, 1566), praefatio q. 27, 8f.: “For since the end that was intended for the blessedness of humankind is higher than can be perceived with the sharpness of the human mind, it was necessary for the human being to receive knowledge of it from God. This knowledge is, in turn, nothing other than faith.” Pars 2, de poenitentia q. 8, 223: “But in whom it causes to repent, faith goes before penitence. It is necessary … and happens from it so that in no way can faith be called a part of penitence.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. Schleiermacher used a reprint of the first edition: … jussu primum editus, editio iterata (Loewen, 1678), 8f., 223; many revised versions have since appeared. Cf. The Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.), 9, 259. The title is a popular shorthand for an exposition titled Catechismus Romanus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini. The council itself met sporadically from 1543 to 1563. Versions of the initial catechism are numbered differently. 20. Überzeugung. Ed. note: As it is formed, this word certainly suggests some movement or response or other exercise of will, but in the particular usage referred to at this point, it sticks with mere information, or belief, based on instruction. 21. Ed. note: Meanings of the word geistig run through a range from purely “spiritual”—in this instance also joining thinking and acting to one’s basic feeling in repentance and faith—all the way to strongly “intellectual.” 22. Reue. Ed. note: This state can also be variously referred to as regret or remorse, which, as the next note indicates, can rise to a terrifying degree, though it does not have to do so. 23. Apology Augsburg (1531) 12: “Putting to death involves genuine terrors … which nature could not endure unless it were raised up by faith. Thus, what we usually call contrition, Paul (Col. 2:11) calls putting off the body of sins, because in these troubles our natural lust is purged away.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 194; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 260. 24. Anschauung. Ed. note: Or “beholding” or “vision.” 25. Wiedergeburt. Ed. note: In this book otherwise referred to as “regeneration.” 26. Ed. note: Such a consciousness is ruhend: to be regarded as profoundly at rest, restful, almost static in one’s quietly moving only to receive, hence “peaceful.” 27. Apology Augsburg (1531) 12: “Making alive [vivificatio intelligi] should … be understood … as consolation [consolatio] that truly sustains a life that flees [sin] in contrition.” Ed. note: ET: Book of Concord (2000), 194; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 260. Schleiermacher’s own word here is aufrichtendes, which literally means picking one straight up, uplifting; hence, it also figuratively means heartening or putting fresh heart into a person, or, as in the quoted text, it is revivifying or consoling, so that one no longer feels the need to flee from one’s state. All this language, and that which directly follows, reflects an inner state often reported as a recurring characteristic of contemplative experience. 28. Verlangen. Ed. note: As immediately described in two forms, this stretching out of the self seems to be further compounded by a corresponding inner twofold sense of demand and calling, another two meanings of this word. 29. Sinnesänderung. Ed. note: Or the “turning about” of one’s sensibility, a phrase reflected in the term “conversion.” 30. Buße. Ed. note: This word too can mean “penitence,” which would fit well, for example, when the church year includes a special day, Bußund Bettage, as in the German Evangelical churches. 31. Belebung. Ed. note: Or “resurrection,” as at Easter. 32. The expression “prevenient grace” is ever inexact, since in consequence of our general category all divine grace is always prevenient, and so it would be more accurate to say “preparatory” here. 33. Ed. note: “Prevenient” translates zukommende. In §108n32 Schleiermacher has introduced the contrasting concept of “preparatory” (vorbereitende) grace, which he prefers, especially in this context. See the index for uses of this latter concept elsewhere. 34. Ed. note: See John 3:3–8.

35. Ed. note: This unassigned allusion to a requirement of an earlier Halle pietism, taught by August Hermann Franke (1663–1727), is quoted at this spot in the first edition, KGA I/7.2, 123f. Peiter then refers to its source in Walch, vol. 5 (1739), 476–82, 491–503, 553–95, and 910–35. 36. Ed. note: On other qualifications for being dubbed “a Christian,” see OR (1821) V, supplementary note 8. The closest Schleiermacher gets to such a qualification in CF appears here, where the concept “the true Christian” appears, requiring a struggle to reach authentic inner repentance and the emergence as the beginnings of development in inner faith through conversion, and in an account on baptism (§137). 37. Ed. note: This discussion has culminated in an allusion to what Schleiermacher does with the term Wehmut, not directly used here. Translated “tugging sadness and longing” in other contexts, in his view Wehmut tends to be admixed with joy (Freude) in varying degrees throughout the Christian life. The term is used by his character Karoline in Christmas Eve Celebration (1806, 1827) and in several passages of On Religion (1821) II, supplemental note 14, and IV, supplemental note 14. 38. Ed. note: “Rebirth” translates Wiedergeburt, as does “regeneration” in all that follows. These two words for Wiedergeburt are intended to mean the same thing, the first word perhaps in a more obvious, literal fashion. 39. Versinnlichung. 40. Ed. note: Here, for the first time, a term is directly assigned to the grace that succeeds “preparatory” (vorbereitende) grace, namely, that which brings the “new life” of the gospel: belebenden Gnade. 41. In the Apology Augsburg (1531) one may compare its entire treatment of the concepts “penitence” (Buße), “confession,” and “satisfaction” (Genugtuung). Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 12 (Repentance), 183–218; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 152–91. 42. Apology Augsburg (1531) 2: “He (Luther) even added about the material element that when the Holy Spirit is given through baptism, he begins to put concupiscence to death and to create [Schleiermacher adds “(obviously meaning ‘begins to create’)”] new impulses in the human creatures.” 9: “Therefore it is necessary to baptize little children in order that the promise of salvation might be applied to them.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 117, 184; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 154, 247. See also §138. 43. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 20: “All these things are assured by baptism, for inwardly we are regenerated, purified and renewed by God through his Holy Spirit and outwardly we receive the assurance of the greatest gifts,” etc. (2) Gallican Confession (1559) 35: “Although it is a sacrament of faith and penitence, … the children of believing parents should be baptized.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 282; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 290. Cf. note at §37n3. (2) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 379f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 338 On these connections between baptism, Holy Spirit, and regeneration, see also §§107.2, 109.2, 121.1–2, 123.2–3, 124, and 136–37. 44. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 9: “In regeneration the understanding is illumined by the Holy Spirit in order that it may understand both the mysteries and the will of God.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 238; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 250. Cf. note at §37n3. 45. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 4.16.20: “Infants are baptized into future repentance and faith, and even though these have not yet been formed in them, the seed of both lies hidden within them by the secret working of the Spirit.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 1343; Latin: Opera selecta 5 (1926), 324, and CR 30:990. 46. Ed. note: Cf. §§102–3 regarding Christ’s “prophetic office.” 47. Ed. note: Later, in treating of “the essential and inalterable basic characteristics of the church” in its relationship to the world (§§127–47), after considering the authority of Scripture he inserts “ministry of” (Dienst, literally, “service to”) “the divine Word” (§§133–35) before discussing the other characteristics: baptism, the Lord’s Supper, the office of the keys, and prayer in Jesus’ name. These are all characteristics of the community of faith, not of the clergy alone. 48. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 5: “To obtain such faith God instituted the office of preaching, … thereby … as through means, … the Holy Spirit … produces faith … in those who hear the gospel.” (2) Schmalkaldic Articles (Luther, 1537), Part 3.8: “It must be firmly maintained that God gives no one his Spirit or grace apart from the external Word that goes before. [Schleiermacher adds: “And it is to be noted that here communication of the Spirit is described as a result.”] … We say this to protect ourselves from the enthusiasts, … who boast that they have the Spirit apart from and before contact with the Word.” (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 14: “By repentance we understand the recovery of a right mind in sinful man, awakened by the Word of the Gospel and the Holy Spirit.” 16: “And this faith is a pure gift of God which God alone of his grace gives to his elect. And this he does by the Holy Spirit by the means of the preaching of the gospel.” (4) Gallican Confession (1559) 25: “Now as we enjoy Christ only through the gospel … ” (5) Belgic Confession (1561) 24: “We believe that this true faith, being wrought in man by the hearing of the Word of God and the operation of the Holy Ghost, doth regenerate and make him a new man.” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 40; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 57. Schleiermacher’s quotation has “the Holy Spirit awakes, comforts hearts and gives faith.” (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 322; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 453f. (3) Here Schleiermacher deletes the word “elect.” ET

Cochrane (1972), 251, 257f.; Latin alone: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 268. Cf. note at §37n. (4–5) ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 374, 410; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 338, 375. Regarding the Holy Spirit, see also §116n1. 49. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 1: “For although ‘no one can come to Christ unless he be drawn by the Father’ (John 6:44) and unless the Holy Spirit inwardly illuminates him, yet we know that it is surely the will of God that his Word should be preached outwardly also. God could indeed, by his Holy Spirit or by the ministry of an angel, without the ministry of St. Peter, have taught Cornelius,” etc. … “At the same time, we recognize that God can illumine whom and when he will, even without the external ministry,” etc. (2) First Helvetic Confession (1536) 14: “This church … is constituted by external signs, customs and ordinances which Christ himself has instituted and ordered by the Word of God as a general, public and orderly discipline … so that no one is numbered to it without these things.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 225; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 238. Cf. note at §37n3. (2) ET Tice, drawn from the original German and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 215, cf. Cochrane(1972), 105. 50. Ed. note: Here, as elsewhere, öffentlichen can mean either “official” or “public,” and Dienst can mean either “ministry” or “service” (here “of” or “to the Word”). 51. Ed. note: See also §§41.1 and 103.4 on Christ’s appearance as itself the one great miracle. 52. John 17:20. Ed. note: John 17:20–21 RSV reads: “I do not pray for these only, but also for those who are to believe in me through their word, that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.” See also §104 on Christ’s high-priestly office. 53. Rom. 10:17; Titus 1:3. 54. Schwärmer. Ed. note: As in some confessional statements from the Reformation period, the specific reference is to certain so-called Anabaptist fanatics who were said to hold a kind of Jesus religion in which Christ was said to communicate directly and personally to people’s inner selves independent of any mediation of the Word. This was called Schwämerei—at best a fringe fanaticism, a dubious and even dangerous brand of “enthusiasm” (as just below). Schleiermacher always expressed respect for churches that were harboring such views, nonetheless. By 1830 he was proposing that they be welcomed into the united Evangelical church. 55. Ed. note: The general allusion here is likely to enthusiast sects making such special claims, to which the name Illuminati (here Erleuchtern, not Erleuchteter) was then and still is applied, particularly to a Masonic brotherhood called Illuminati, modeled by its Jesuit founder Adam Weishaupt (1748–1830) after largely Jesuit principles. 56. Ed. note: See Brief Outline §57, where separatism is defined as “a weakening of the impetus to community” and a “disease” of the Christian church. See also its context, within the “polemics” aspect of philosophical theology in §§54–62, and §234 there. In CF see esp. §§87.3, 121.1, and 126.1. 57. Ed. note: On “converting” people, see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 7, and V, supplementary note 10. See also CF §113.3. 58. Ed. note: See §105. Thus, in the paragraph just below, “the workings of Christ” refers to the “three offices” (munus triplex) of Christ, which are used to explicate his work (§§100–105), and his “personal existence” refers to the exposition of Christ’s person in §§93–99. To preserve the entire reference, the phrase “to his high-priestly activity and finally” could have been added above, for its traditional part in the threesome could be taken for granted. However, the two offices that Schleiermacher cites here are more readily understood, whereas the high-priestly office would require much reinterpretation to be acceptable, in his view. 59. Solid Declaration (1577) 2: “It follows from this … that as soon as the Holy Spirit has begun his work of rebirth and renewal in and through the word and the holy sacraments, it is certain that on the basis of his power we can and should be cooperating with him, though still in great weakness. This occurs not on the basis of our fleshly natural powers but on the basis of the new powers and gifts which the Holy Spirit initiated in us in conversion.” Actually, this claim must apply more to the period after conversion than to the period before it. Ibid.: “By oneself or by one’s natural capacity no human being can confer anything to one’s conversion or affix anything additional to it.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 556, 561; Latin and German Bek. Luth. (1963), 897f., 910. In the final citation the Book of Concord editors insert the following claim instead of Schleiermacher’s quotation found above: “ [Luther says that] human beings conduct themselves in their conversion ‘pure passive’ (that is, they do absolutely nothing at all) but only endure what God effects in them.” 60. Solid Declaration (1577) 2: “People have a free will to a certain extent even after the fall, so that they may … listen or not listen to the Word of God.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 552; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 892. 61. Ed. note: The choice of terms is important here. “Concurrence” translates Zustimmung; “acquiescence” translates Sich-Hingeben (or giving over of oneself, or surrender); “release” translates Freilassen. All of these terms, like “receptivity” (Empfänglichkeit), suggest an altogether passive, yet in the sense indicated somewhat active, state. That is, even in a passive state the psyche’s organs do not shut down. 62. Among others, cf. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 5, 113, and Solid Declaration (1577) 2: Luther is said “to call this a capacity, not active but passive,” though the latter phrase is not in Luther’s words. Ed. note: ET

cf. Book of Concord (2000), 548, where the phrase is omitted, as Schleiermacher notes here, and where an explanatory note indicates that in the final German draft of 1577 the phrase was omitted, but it was present parenthetically in earlier drafts and in the Latin translation of 1584. In parentheses it remains in Bek. Luth. (1963), 882. 63. Solid Declaration (1577) 2: “But before people are … renewed [regeneratur] by the Holy Spirit … they cannot in and of themselves … begin, effect or accomplish [inchoare, operati aut cooperari] anything in spiritual matters, any more than a stone, a block of wood or piece of clay.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 548f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 882. See also §63.2 on this point. 64. Vorgefühl. Ed. note: Or presentiment. 65. Rest. Ed. note: See §59. 66. Menschwerdung. Ed. note: In English this word can also mean “incarnation,” though somewhat misleadingly. That is, that Christ “became a human being” does not necessarily imply that he was a preexistent spirit that assumed a human body.

§109. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Justification. God’s justifying the person who is converting includes God’s forgiveness of the person’s sins and God’s recognizing the person as a child of God. However, this turning about in the person’s relationship to God truly occurs only insofar as the person has genuine faith in the Redeemer. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) IV: “Likewise, they teach that human beings cannot be justified before God by their own powers, merit or works, but they are justified as a gift on account of Christ’s sake through faith.”1 (2) Tetrapolitan Confession (1530) III: “Our preachers have taught that this whole justification is to be ascribed to the good pleasure of God and the merit of Christ and to be received by faith alone.”2 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XV: “To justify means to remit sins, to absolve from guilt and punishment, to receive into favor, and to pronounce a man just. … Now it is most certain that all of us are by nature sinners … and that, solely by the grace of Christ and not from any merit of ours …, we are justified. … We receive this justification not through any works but through faith …, we therefore teach … that sinful man is justified by faith alone in Christ.”3 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) XVIII: “We believe that all our justification rests upon the remission of our sins, in which also is our only blessedness. … we rest simply in the obedience of Jesus Christ, which is imputed to us as much to blot out all our sins as to make us find grace and favor in the sight of God.” XX: “We believe that we are made partakers of this justification by faith alone. … Thus, our justification through faith depends upon the free promises by which God declares and testifies his love to us.”4 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XXII: “However, to speak more clearly, we do not mean that faith itself justifies us, for it is only an instrument with which we embrace

Christ our righteousness.” XXIII: “We believe that our salvation consists in the remission of our sins for Jesus Christ’s sake, and that therein our righteousness before God is implied.”5 (6) John 1:12; Gal. 3:26 and 4:5.6 1. Even in their treatment of this particular subject, the language usage of the confessional symbols cited here does not agree exactly, and thus that of our proposition also does not uniformly agree with them all. Some of these writings use “justification” as the broader concept, as we do, while others use “forgiveness of sin” instead, positing therein our entire state of blessedness, and if justification is then still supposed to be a particular doctrine, it has to be subsumed under forgiveness of sin. For all that, it is evident that in and of itself forgiveness of sin is simply the overcoming of something negative in nature and thus cannot be the designation used for the entire state of blessedness. Based even on our standpoint, strictly speaking only a former relationship to God would be overcome by forgiveness of sin, but no new relationship would be set in its place unless it had already existed earlier. This is so, for otherwise, given that the one had forgiven the other, the two would remain just as separated as they were before. Now, the expression “justification” does have a more positive ring to it when applied to the same procedure in an investigation into someone’s conduct. Yet, here a special reference to one’s having-been-in-the-right is inconceivable. Thus, the expression is already more suitable if a corresponding positive feature is juxtaposed with that negative one, as appears in the Augsburg Confession. Alternatively, it is also more suitable if it designates the whole proceeding and also permits of our expecting a positive feature alongside forgiveness of sin, as is preferred here. The latter designation was preferable, because where sin has to be presupposed, an act of justification, however it might arise, has to include forgiveness of sin in it. However, in that something else is then contained in the act of justification, the remaining task is to show what that other feature is in particular. Several confessions do express this positive feature. The rest express this more positive feature in a rather indefinite and troublesome fashion, at the same time, by saying that people find favor with God by receiving grace.7 The language used is indefinite, because what “being received” contains is not defined. It is troublesome because the same expression, “grace,” which is everywhere used in this region of faith-doctrine for divine activity, is used here only for its result. Indisputably, our way of designating this positive feature is more definite. Yet, even though the relation of “filiation,” or “adoption,”8 is frequently set forth among teachers of faith-doctrine, it appears so little in this locus within the confessional symbols that we have had to refer to scriptural passages in which such an expression is most definitely grounded and indeed in the same context. Our designation does indeed have one drawback, namely, that linguistically it interconnects neither with the general term “justification” nor with the

other, particular term “forgiveness of sin.” This drawback, however, will have disappeared once the facts of the matter are properly discussed. Talk about “justification” in the Roman church completely diverges from that in the Evangelical church. This is the case, in that the Roman church does not deal with justification as a correlate of conversion and thus does not subsume it with conversion under regeneration; instead, it customarily places justification rather more generally than regeneration, embracing both justification and sanctification at the same time. If we then recall, on the other hand, that in the Roman church faith is placed before conversion, one can see how the two might be thought to belong together, so as to be able to bring faith and justification as far apart from each other as possible. Moreover, that being done, one could all the more readily present the justification of a human being as dependent on one’s sanctification. Yet, even apart from this consideration, it cannot be advisable completely to blot out the distinction between what the divine working9 on a human being is and what the divine working within a human being is. Above all, what is given in experience here is a person’s earlier life without divine influence,10 and thereby we are directed to the task of aptly distinguishing what follows, viewed as grounded in the turning point, from the turningpoint itself, viewed as something that is what does the grounding. 2. For a self-consciousness that is resting in contemplation, justification is, nevertheless, the same thing as conversion is for self-consciousness that is passing over into voluntary movement. Thus, an analogy is to be expected between two aspects of the two modes of selfconsciousness. Moreover, repentance, viewed as self-consciousness that is moved by one’s consciousness of sin, comes to rest in forgiveness of sin, just as faith, made active by love from its very emergence onward, is in thought one’s consciousness of being a child in relation to God, viewed as the same consciousness as that of being in community of life with Christ. For all that, as our proposition states, this analogy is not to be understood as if forgiveness of sin could also precede faith. Rather, it is to be understood only in such a way that forgiveness of sin marks the ending of one’s former condition, likewise in such a way that repentance and being a child in relation to God corresponds to the character of one’s new condition, just as faith does. Now, to be sure, both forgiveness of sin and being a child in relation to God, like the two elements of conversion, namely, repentance and faith, depend on the activity of Christ taken as a whole. However, immediately and in themselves forgiveness of sin and being a child in relation to God do, nevertheless, express only the relationship of a person to God. In the collective life of susceptibility to sin, the individual simply as a human being has no relationship to God by virtue of God’s holiness and justice,11 other than one’s consciousness of being indebted to God and deserving punishment.12 It is obvious that this consciousness must then cease once community of life with Christ has arisen through and with faith.13 However, if one were to ask how this happens, the easiest way to answer, to be sure, would be to say that the longer and more uninterruptedly we are prompted by Christ, the sooner do we forget sin. This process would obtain, because sin would no longer appear, and it would

not come into consciousness; then, our fault and our deserving punishment would not do so either. Yet, this answer would mean, first, placing the change in our relationship to God at the very end of the process of sanctification, with the result that consciousness of one’s deserving punishment, consequently of one’s lack of blessedness as well, would have to continue to accompany sanctification. Then, however, to forget one’s fault would not also include consciousness that our sin is forgiven, for even if this forgiveness were simply the overcoming of an earlier consciousness of sin, that consciousness would still be a real one, in which recollection of sin would be an essential component. Thus, if justification and conversion were taken to be simultaneous, then forgiveness of sin would have to be posited as existing in us while sin and consciousness of sin are still there. Yet, to be sure, if the relation of sin to God’s holiness and justice is to cease, sin and the consciousness of sin would have to have become something different. Now, the new human being is one who has then got taken up into community of life with Christ to the extent that one then is taken possession of by this consciousness of sin; for this person, consciousness of sin and of reception into this community of life comprise one and the same consciousness. Thus, in this new human being sin is no longer functional.14 Rather, it exists simply as an aftereffect or repercussion of the old human being. Thus, the new human being no longer makes sin one’s own and also operates against it as against something alien. Thereby one’s consciousness of fault is thus dissolved. Herewith, however, it is the case that one’s consciousness of deserving punishment must, in part, already be disappearing. Further, in part, it is the case that within one’s community of life with Christ lies the willingness and right to share in Christ’s suffering, something that might yet arise in uncertain future circumstances immediately. It would be simply irreconcilable with these cases for the new human being to deem social evils, even less to deem natural evils, to be punishments for sin15 or even to fear any punishment yet to come. This is so, since the new human being is indeed also taken up into community with Christ’s kingly office.16 In this way, moreover, on account of one’s faith, consciousness of sin comes to be consciousness regarding forgiveness of one’s sin.17 As concerns this second feature, it is not possible for Christ to live in us unless the relationship he has to his Father is being formed within us as well. Consequently, we participate in Christ’s relationship of Son to the Father, which by the impression Christ makes on us empowers us to be children of God. This empowerment, moreover, includes the guarantee of sanctification. Such is the case, for the right inherent in being children is directed to being reared to free cooperative activity within a household, and the natural law of being a child so reared lies in a likeness to the father also developing in children through that context of life.18 Thus, it is not possible to sever these two features from each other—that is, community with Christ and forgiveness of sin. This is the case, for divine adoption of human beings without forgiveness of sin would be futile, since penal desert would beget fear and fear would beget enslavement.19 Furthermore, no constancy of one’s relationship to God would be obtained by forgiveness of sin without an attendant adoption. However, in this

inseparability both features comprise the entire swing of human beings’ relationship to God, which in combination with putting off the old human being is called “forgiveness of sin” and in combination with putting on the new human being is called “adoption.” In addition, the two features are also mutually conditioned by each other, in such a way that one can regard each of the two features, forgiveness of sins and adoption, as occurring before or after the other. That is to say, on the one hand, the feeling one has regarding one’s old life seems to have to be eradicated20 before feeling regarding the offering of the new life can be formed. On the other hand, only in the new life does one have the right and necessary force to cast off the old life.21 Thus, one can quite correctly say that once one’s sins are forgiven one has been taken into being a child of God, and that once one has been taken into being a child of God one obtains forgiveness of one’s sins. 3. This presentation of the matter will not easily be subject to the misunderstanding which holds that each individual would justify oneself. It cannot be misunderstood in this way in that the presentation does indeed refer everything back to Christ. Yet, in that it also draws justification entirely from the process of conversion, it would also seem that this presentation would wholly and fully ascribe justification as well as conversion to Christ, and thus it would entirely correspond to the fact that the two aspects of regeneration relate to each other just as do the communication of Christ’s perfection and the communication of his blessedness thus entirely refer back to Christ himself. This position could also be justified by a confessional symbol.22 At the same time, however, it would, nevertheless, seem to diverge entirely from the now prevailing manner, in which justification goes back to a singular divine activity and in which forgiveness of sins and adoption are ascribed in a special way to God.23 Moreover, these current procedures are also present in what we are predisposed to say, inasmuch as justification is described as an alteration in human beings’ relationship to God. Therewith, of course, the activity involved must belong to God, whereas a human being can be thought to be only in a passive state.24 Now, as regards the latter point, concerning our drawing of the doctrine of justification from the process of conversion, we have already placed our presentation as closely tied to the now-prevailing presentation of doctrine by showing that nothing that has come to belong to it would, as it were, already be ascribed in advance to the self-initiated activity of the one converted, although it might seem that what has been conditioned by Christ and drawn out by his stimulus would apply, as if the process of justification were a part of sanctification or had issued from it. Rather, what we have done is to draw justification based entirely on Christ’s influence, which brings about faith through living receptivity. As regards the first point, namely, deriving everything from Christ’s influence, we must see how the formulation regarding a divine act of justification relates to formulations set forth earlier. At this point, the following is clear, first of all, that we cannot think this divine act to be at all independent of Christ’s efficacious action in conversion as if the one could exist without the other. This likewise follows from what has been said, in that we have considered justification of itself and conversion to be conditioned by each other. Ecclesial formulations

that present faith as the receptive organ for this divine act also hold to this mutual conditioning. The reason is, if this act were not received, faith would indeed come to nothing.25 Frequently, in ascetic prose and poetry this interconnection is presented in relation to Christ’s advocacy to God,26 as if Christ had indicated to God the one in whom Christ wrought faith and recommended that God now bestow forgiveness of sins and the status of being children of God on that person. In such an account poetic expression would be very conspicuous. That is to say, it would be a strongly sensory matter if we were to imagine Christ’s pointing out something for God to do. Neither in the positive formulation nor in the previous negative one, however, does there lie any sort of dependence of a divine act on Christ’s efficacy or on its outcome, not even in the mediating form of God’s activity having been motivated by Christ. This is so, for we have indeed already reckoned God’s being moved to act, regarding exactly when each individual is to be converted and at what time, not to the reign of grace, thus placing it in dependence on Christ, but to the reign of might27 and in dependence on God, just as precisely this activity indeed does involve the Father’s drawing toward the Son. Second, suppose that we would want to speak as much as possible without any reliance on sensory material and with keen dogmatic rigor. In that case, we could, as little here as elsewhere, assume a temporal act from God ensuing in a single definitely identified element of life, and we could just as little assume that such an act would be directed at one individual. Rather, what could occur in this case is simply one particular and temporal effect of a divine act or decree, not the act or decree itself. That is, only insofar as that dogmatic treatment were to proceed based on the self-consciousness of an individual human being, and only insofar as this treatment were also to proceed based on self-consciousness regarding an alteration in one’s relationship to God, could we think of justifying divine activity in its relation to just one individual. Furthermore, because everyone would attach this alteration to others who are involved in it, that relation of justifying divine activity to a given individual would appear to be occurring at the very same time as it is occurring in others. Only to this extent and for this purpose would it be granted that such an individualized and temporalized divine activity is taking place. Yet, such a divine activity of justification should not be taken to be something that exists in and of itself, as if justification of each individual were rooted in some isolated divine decree. It should not be so taken even if one were to grasp it as coming from eternity and wanted to present it as entering into reality only at a definitely identified point in time.28 Instead, there is only one eternal and general divine decree regarding justification of human beings for Christ’s sake. This decree, in turn, is the same thing as Christ’s mission;29 otherwise this mission would have to have been thought up and decided by God but without its intended effect. In addition, this decree, in turn, is also simply at one with that decree regarding creation of the human race, inasmuch as the human race first reaches its perfect end30 in Christ. Moreover, since in God thinking and willing, willing and doing are functions not to be divided, all of this ensuing process is simply comprised of one divine act for the purpose of altering our relationship with God, the temporal manifestation of which is begun in Christ’s existence as a human being31 and from which the collective new

creation of humanity proceeds. From there on, moreover, the temporal proclamation of this divine act is also truly constant, though in its effect it appears to us as though it were dispersed into many points, all separated from each other. These points are as numerous as may be posited to be the uniting of individual human beings with Christ. If we now reflect on justification, observed in its two features, we must say, in like fashion, that to assume a particular decree regarding forgiveness of sin and adoption would mean placing God under the contrast between what is abstract and concrete or between what is general and what is particular, in that God’s decree of redemption would indeed be nothing other than a general one in relation to both features. Beyond that identification, however, for a human being, consciousness of fault and of deserving punishment is arranged by God only in relation to redemption. Thus, consciousness of fault and deserving punishment is arranged as a consciousness that is disappearing overall and for each one with the entrance of redemption into one’s life. Thus, no special divine decree or act is needed for cessation of fault and deserving punishment; rather, what is needed is only that consciousness of this cessation arise for the individual, and how this occurs in interconnection with conversion has been presented above. Likewise, with respect to adoption, that the human race is pleasing to God in God’s Son is already contained in the divine decree of redemption or of the new creation of the human race. Accordingly, no individual act that would make the individual a subject of divine love is needed; rather, only the consciousness of this relation has to arise in the individual, and this happens as described above. Hence, what we have to assume is simply one general divine act of justification in relation to redemption, one that is gradually realized in temporal fashion. Third, our final point is not to be passed over in silence, namely, that this discussion might seem to conceal yet another divergence from the presentation of doctrine prevailing in our church. That is, this doctrine regards the divine act of justification to be declaratory in nature, namely, the one converted is declared by God to be just, and at the same time, there might seem to be no place whatsoever in the present explication of the matter for a contrast between our church’s pronouncement and what is expressed in the Roman church. However, this is how the matter actually stands: First, that expression, to be sure, reverts back to a plurality of acts or decrees of justification, which has been renounced here. The reason is that given the one general decree, one would not easily consider what is declaratory to be separated from it. Second, God would have ordained the Redeemer, because through him sin was to be taken away and human beings were to become children of God; and since in God thought and deed are at one, and God expresses thought by deed and deed propagates thought by means of proclamation, thus, any special act—as we would have to put it, despite all else —by which God would thus express to Godself what God does in yet another act would be something completely empty of meaning. This very form of self-address, frequently present in the Old Testament writings, is simply one of the indigenous anthropomorphisms that are applied to God. More closely observed, however, the form is not different from that applied in other particular declaratory acts. By itself, such a declaratory act could not prevent recurrence of peoples’ consciousness of being involved in breeding sin. By itself, moreover,

it would be futile, as a declaration regarding one’s being a child of God would be at that point. The latter declaration, in and of itself, would not be in a position to hinder one’s becoming conscious of being a participant in enmity against God. Thus, it would be something realized only in an interconnection with an influence of Christ evoking conversion. However, if we were also to refer this process of conversion back to what God generally ordains, then the declaration would disappear again within all the arrangements of creation. Yet, one could rightly say that insofar as one’s consciousness of God’s forgiveness of sin and of one’s being a child of God emerges along with one’s faith, every act of conversion within a human being would itself be a declaration of God’s general decree to provide justification for Christ’s sake. As regards our relationship to the Roman church, it might even seem to be the case that our contrast to it would lie in the declaratory constitution of God’s act of justification and only seem to be the case that the Roman church would scarcely agree to make its declaration in the way we have renounced this constitution of it here. This is so, for here it still continues to be our view that a human being is justified once faith has been wrought in that person.32 The Roman church’s contrary interest lies in its holding fast to the view that one first obtains justification by one’s works. 4. Finally, our being justified by faith is what marks this mode of doctrine as decisively Protestant. That is, the application of that aforementioned general act of divine justification to an individual human being is tied to and is conditioned by the emergence of faith. Viewed in this way, this mode of doctrine is indeed all the more necessary when justification is depicted as a merely declaratory act. This is so, because otherwise redemption of a given human being would easily be construed as an arbitrary act—that is, one directed toward that individual in a groundless manner.33 In any case, even if we were not to separate God’s efficacious act from God’s declaratory act, it would still be necessary to determine the point at which and the way in which justifying divine activity would reach completion in any individual. Now, our proposition has three things to say on this matter. First, since with forgiveness of sin and becoming a child of God a person is an object of divine good pleasure and of divine love, one does not obtain this status except in one’s taking hold of Christ in faith.34 In no way does this process imply that previously one was an object of divine displeasure or wrath, for there is no such thing. Rather, the expression “overlook,” used in another passage,35 has its distinctive usage here, in that for God, an individual is previously not at all regarded as a person in this specific relation, but is treated only as a part of the whole mass of human beings. Out of this mass an individual first becomes a person36 through the ongoing work of God’s creative act from which the Redeemer himself has come. Since faith arises only through the efficacious action of Christ, the statement is well placed in our proposition that nothing in the natural makeup of a human being, nothing within oneself apart from the entire series of effects formed by means of grace mediated through Christ, alters one’s relation to God and brings about one’s justification. Consequently, it also states that no merit of any kind serves toward this end. It follows therefrom that prior to justification all human beings are equal before God, despite the unevenness of sins and of good works, and,

correspondingly, this is surely also consistent with the self-consciousness of anyone who finds oneself in community with Christ when one looks back at one’s prior state within the collective life of sin. Second, in accordance with what has been set forth above,37 if communication of Christ’s blessedness takes place in the process of justification, just as communication of Christ’s perfection takes place in the process of conversion, and just as nothing more has to be added to faith, then faith makes for blessedness, and indeed in such a way that this blessedness can be increased by nothing added to faith. This is the meaning of the statement that blessedness comes “by faith alone.”38 This is the case, for by any means whereby blessedness could be increased it would also have had to be able to arise. Indeed, this blessedness everywhere belongs to that which least admits of being more or less but remains as nearly uniform as possible. That is to say, union of what is divine with what is human in Christ has remained the same, nevertheless, during all exercise and further development. Thus, our union with Christ in faith always remains the same as well. On the other hand, third, our presentation of how this matter stands does not, to be sure, lead to the customary formulations that faith would be the causa instrumentalis (instrumental cause) or the organon leptikon (receptive organ) for justification. Moreover, these formulations launch a great many misunderstandings, to be sure, and shed not much light on the subject. This is the case, for an “instrumental cause” does not belong at all, if viewed as something to be employed as an essential component in the course of the entire series of activities being considered here. Rather, having served as it could, it would be laid aside. In contrast, faith ever abides. On the other hand, a “receptive organ” belongs to the natural constitution of human beings. In this formulation it might seem as if faith were something that each individual must already contribute to make divine grace efficacious, whereas the only thing we have to bring along is our living receptivity,39 which is indeed the organ that truly receives grace. Moreover, it is perhaps this very formulation that has led many theologians to set forth the proposition that faith would have to be our own work and that only when it would be brought to completion could the workings of divine grace begin.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 39f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 56. 2. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 57; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 746. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 257f.; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 266f.; cf. note at §37n3. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 369–70 and 370–71; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 334, 337. 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 408 and 409; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 374 and 424. 6. Ed. note: Sermons only on John 1:6–13, May 4, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 15–28, and John 1:12–17, Dec. 5, 1830, separately published in 1831, later in SW II.4 (1835), 195–208. 7. Durch Gnade-Erlangen zu Gnaden angenommen werden. 8. Kindschaft oder Adoption. Ed. note: The first term can refer to being in a relation of “child” to God or to being adopted as such by God. 9. Wirkung auf … Wirkung in. Ed. note: That is, what God does or effects toward versus in human beings. 10. Einwirkung. 11. Ed. note: Cf. §§83–84, where these divine attributes are discussed as the two attributes in relation to human sin. 12. Verschuldung gegen ihn und der Strafwürdigkeit. Ed. note: The first concept includes a judgment of being at fault or guilty (Schuld) for wrongdoing.

13. Cf. §107.1. 14. Ed. note: nicht mehr tätig—that is, sin has lost the energy it could once bear, its effectiveness as a cause of behavior, its “sting” (cf. 1 Cor. 15:56 RSV: “The sting of death is sin”; also §59.P.S.n34). As will be seen, it would be inappropriate to translate this word to mean no longer “active” at all, because sin is still part of one’s life as one develops in sanctification. 15. Rom. 8:28, 35–39. Ed. note: Sermon on John 15:9, 14–15, regarding the contrast between master and slave, which especially cites Rom. 8:28, Nov. 23, 1806, SW II.1 (1834), 251–65. See other references to this verse in §§84n15 and 104n34. 16. Ed. note: §§105 and 144 are devoted to Christ’s kingly office and participation in its activity by persons of faith. See also §§102, 104.5, and 106.2. 17. Ed. note: Here Christ’s high-priestly office and participation in its activity by persons of faith are also touched upon. See its explanation in §104 (see also §§102 and 141.2). The third office (Amt) of three (see §102) is Christ’s prophetic office, treated especially in §103 (see also §§102 and 133.2). 18. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, this view of human development includes various models and influences from others as well as the child’s own distinctive individuality. Even in his still generally patriarchal era, this description intends children’s engagement in the household to rise constantly toward fulfilling the principles of equality and of love—most notably love that is benevolent, thus including love that is caring, parentally enabling of growth, respectful of persons, appreciative, and filially grateful. “Child rearing” and “education” chiefly translate the same German term (erziehen, Erziehung). Schleiermacher’s acclaimed, revolutionary views on both activities are expressed in a considerable number of extant teachings on lower and higher levels of education, and in the church his views and attitudes toward people at all levels of development, as in his oft-republished 1818 sermons The Christian Household (first published in 1820, ET 1991). 19. Knechtschaft. Ed. note: Think, literally, of a reduction of a person to a servile, “menial laborer” status, hence the status of mere servitude or slavery, of one who is in bondage to an owner or master. See the 1806 sermon on slave vs. masters, cited in §109n15 above. In this context, one is first enslaved to sin, beyond proper self-control, and is then released into what Paul calls “the glorious liberty of the children of God” (Rom. 8:21). 20. Ed. note: Not surprisingly, this word (getilgt, tilgen) for eradicating also means to be redeemed—that is, released from its old status and replaced as a token of value or worth. 21. Ed. note: Here “cast off “ (entschlagen) can be used, as in Scripture, to refer to one who has died or to one who has renounced one’s old life—that is, “died to sin” and been “freed from sin” (Rom. 6:5, 7). Constantly, in the present doctrinal setting, Schleiermacher is drawing chiefly from a tradition that is generally to be traced back mostly to Paul, yoked here and there with roots that he traces back to what the Gospels (Evangels) record regarding “the Redeemer” (Christ, the Erlöser). Thus, within a generally Evangelical tradition, he is carrying out his announced plan for using the New Testament Scriptures in testimony to God’s work in Christ, though generally not proving text by text as an alternatively “biblical” theology might do. 22. Belgic Confession (1561) 22: “For it must needs follow either that all things which are requisite to our salvation are not in Jesus Christ or if all things are in him that then those who possess Jesus Christ through faith have complete salvation.” Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 408; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 374. 23. And this is also biblical insofar as we may presuppose that the term “to justify” as it is defined here corresponds to the Pauline term dikaiw=sai, which is made most strikingly clear in Rom. 8:33. Ed. note: This passage reads: “It is God who justifies.” 24. Ed. note: As always, in Schleiermacher’s discourse this claim of human “passivity” in relation to God’s gracious activity does not entail a complete inability to act as this divine activity proceeds. For him, the healthy human capacity for receptivity is always accompanied by a corresponding capacity for self-initiated activity. Nevertheless, divine grace is therefore to be received as a gift to which we cannot contribute except in our own free and active response. The meeting of the two forces in conversion and all the rest of the Christian life is seen to be reciprocal in this way. God is seen to will, act, thus to initiate by God’s own gift of grace, and then, by that same grace, even to cooperate with us in our own activity—in a relationship of community and communication with us in that subsequent activity. In this respect, Schleiermacher has attempted to keep the boundaries clear, as it were, between God and human beings, notably in his treatment of divine attributes throughout but also in his account of how Christ’s life would have been constituted. Accordingly, and without reservation, in his view we are born to be free—especially to respond to God’s activity of creation and preservation, as of reconciliation and redemption, in a feeling of absolute dependence on God for all that God has initiated and done. However, we can never fully exercise our freedom while in a state of hard-bound dependency such as we can have in regard to sin. He thus seeks, throughout this presentation of doctrine, to keep the general perspective already evidenced in the Introduction clear as a general frame for explication of all distinctively Christian doctrine. 25. Presentations in the confessional symbols also present this character of inseparable connection, though not infrequently in vacillating expressions, from which the facts of the matter clearly emerge only when one assigns oneself the

task of balancing them out. Take this passage from the Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 15, for example: “Itaque iustificationis beneficium non partimur partim gratiae Dei vel Christo partim nobis … sed in solidum gratiae Dei in Christo per fidem tribuimus.” Ed. note: This statement was only partially quoted in Schleiermacher’s original note. The Cochrane translation smooths over the difference between vel (or) and in (in), and it is not immediately clear what the object of “faith alone” is supposed to include. Here is the full statement: “But because we receive this justification not through any works but through faith in the mercy of God and in [vel, “or”] Christ, we therefore teach and believe with the apostle that sinful man is justified by faith alone in [in] Christ, not by the law or any works.” ET Cochrane (1972), 256; Latin above: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 267. Cf. §37n3. 26. Vertretung Christi. 27. Reich der Macht. Ed. note: Referring to Almighty God’s omnipotence. See index on divine omnipotence and §§117– 20 on election, which does depend on God’s drawing toward and rearing of Christ (Ziehen des Vaters zum Sohne). 28. Cf. Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 4, p. 147. 29. Sendung. Ed. note: More nearly literal: God’s “sending” Christ into this world, which is a major traditional understanding. Schleiermacher’s own understanding of Christ’s mission and work does not require that an actually preexistent human being was sent by God but only that the event itself was to occur at the appropriate time (“when the time had fully come,” as it were, Gal. 4:4). For some, like Schleiermacher, this Christ event only metaphorically, not actually, divided the temporal order with respect to human beings, thus has occurred, as it were, “between the times.” That is, it is at the interpretive center of all time for human beings. As such, the Christ event is a critically important aspect of God’s own mission on behalf of humankind, the missio Dei. 30. Ed. note: vollendet, reflecting Schleiermacher’s meaning for the same term in other parts of speech, translated either “perfect, perfection, perfected, made perfect” or “completed,” etc., in this work. The root meaning is, literally, “fully reaching its intended end or goal,” thus his description of Christianity as a “teleological religion” in §11. For him, Judaism is the other most widely recognized religion of this type and is historically yoked with Christianity in this respect, yet quite separate by virtue of Christianity’s focus on “the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth,” himself a Jew but bringing a new covenant. 31. Menschwerdung Christi. 32. (1) Belgic Confession (1561) 24: “For it is by faith in Christ that we are justified, even before we do good works.” (2) Apology Augsburg (1531) 4: “Faith is the very righteousness by which we are reckoned righteousness before God … because it receives the promise … and because it knows that ‘Christ … God made for us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption.’” Ed. note: (1) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 411; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 375. (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 135; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 178. The quotation from 1 Cor. 1:30 is slightly altered to match Schleiermacher’s use of the Latin. 33. Ed. note: That is, however the individual might take it, such a groundless act would serve no discernibly general purpose on God’s part. This purpose has already been established in earlier subsections. 34. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 3.2.32: “But it is indisputable that no one is loved by God apart from Christ.” Ed. note: Battles (1960), 579; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1967), 43, and CR 30:424f. 35. Ed. note: See §99.P.S. and Acts 17:30. 36. Augustine (354–430), Enchiridion (423–424) 99: “For it is grace alone that separates the redeemed from the lost, all having been mingled together in one mass of perdition from a common cause leading back to their origin.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 452; Latin Migne Lat. 40:278 and Corpus Christianorum Lat. 46 (1969), 102. 37. Ed. note: See §§106–8. 38. Ed. note: Throughout the Reformation period and beyond, this statement is distinguished from any that added “good works” to the process of justification either before or after it. One is “made blessed” or “saved” (both translating seligmachend) only once the phase of reception by faith has been completed in conversion and once God has bestowed, at the same time, the gifts just mentioned through Christ’s agency. 39. Empfänglichkeit. Ed. note: This term means to receive an impression or what is impressed upon oneself. Here the term for “receives” is aufnehmende, which literally means “taking up” into oneself. In the present context, both terms bear the same, relatively passive, yet vital living connotation, something far short of being the single human product called a “work.” In Schleiermacher’s view, faith is still God’s work, but for human beings it is first a reception of that divine work in perception and feeling, which then leads to various active responses to God’s work expressed in thought and action. This schema is fully worked out for faith or religion conceived as the built-up nature of all “piety” in the successive three editions of On Religion (1799 to 1821), as well as in Christian Faith §§3–5, then throughout the work, in both editions (1821–22, then 1830–31).

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding Sanctification

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §110. In community of life with Christ the natural forces of the regenerate are appropriated for Christ’s use, wherefrom a life is built that is conformed to Christ’s perfection and blessedness, and this process is called the state of sanctification. 1.1 Retention of the term “sanctification” is sufficiently justified by its scriptural status. However, since it depends on the rather indefinite concept regarding what is holy—“holy” being a concept that by divergent explanations and modes of usage has come to be still more complicated—it needs some further clarification for usage in dogmatic discourse. The nearest history-of-language element that comes into account is the Old Testament usage of the word “holy” regarding all that which, based on people’s being set apart from the generally shared course of life, amounts to a usage simply dedicated to people’s being related to God. This being related to God, however, allows for no distinction from this relation to God in any activity that would issue from an impetus proceeding from Christ. This relation is significant because Christ’s absolutely strong God-consciousness brings forth the relation and of itself includes separation from cooperative activity within the collective life of susceptibility to sin. We grant, moreover, that community is something essential to human nature. Thus, this Christian account already implies presupposing an effective tendency to form a new collective life, just as, also by means of the noted Old Testament usage, the term “holy” connects with the priestly standing of all Christians and presents the new collective life as a spiritual counterpart of the temple.2 As a result, the status of sanctification can also be viewed as service in this spiritual temple. Given this interconnection with distinctively Christian ideas, retention of the term “sanctification” for dogmatic use as well would seem to be all the more desirable. This is the case, since instead of this term someone could only too easily grab onto terms that would sooner place in shadows what is distinctively Christian in the spirit of the new life, thus making it more difficult to distinguish development of a Christian life from a gradual process of improvement along a strictly natural pathway. The second linguistic element is the interconnection of the term “sanctification” with “holiness,” viewed as a divine attribute.3 We do, of course, stick by our explanation of this attribute, given above.4 It is evident, however, that through the mode of life to be more closely explicated here, the regenerate person also develops conscience in others, to the degree that all of this person’s activities diverge from what happens in the collective life of susceptibility to sin.5 Yet, in neither of these two cases can we call the condition one of holiness, which would be the same thing as being holy. Instead, we would call it sanctification, like becoming holy or getting to be holy, which we would define as striving to attain holiness and designate it by

that same term, sanctification.6 If “being holy” were the meaning, a complete turnabout would have taken place already at a single point, at one’s rebirth. The result would be that every connection with the collective life of sin would be completely erased, and in that instant one’s entire nature would have to be wholly suffused by Christ and held under his dominion. At that point, however, this transformation would be entirely a part of regeneration, and there would be no doctrine whatsoever to set forth regarding what would have developed thereafter. Sanctification, then, is thus to be understood as something in progress. As a result, from the turning point of regeneration onward7 the contents of what is accomplished in time are ever farther removed from what preceded that turning point and grows ever closer to pure suitability for the impetus that proceeds from Christ, thus also to one’s being indistinguishable from Christ. In consequence, these two features will also be the two points of view from which the standing of sanctification is to be considered.8 2. Thus, suppose that we first compare the state of someone who is in the process of sanctification with what preceded regeneration. Then, this comparison would, above all, not be about the distinction of elements in which dominion of susceptibility to sin had been manifested, but, on the contrary, would be about elements that had already hearkened to preparatory grace.9 We should not perchance limit these preparatory workings of grace only to people’s being brought near to repentance and to belief in certain thoughts or certain stirrings of feeling. Rather, these phenomena also show up in actions, since it would be against nature if lively thoughts and strong emotions were not to bear some influence on actions; to be sure, both sources of influence on actions would be stronger or weaker, depending on affinities with those actions, and both would be occurring at about the same time. Indeed, it is possible, given a more frequent return of similar influences, that the active results of these influences would even prove to be facilitative through repetition and would be formed into habits. Yet, in every particular case the impetus to such alteration of one’s actions comes simply from outside oneself. Moreover, this impetus remains effective only as long as the momentary stimulus still continues to sway, this without one’s being in a position to reproduce itself from within. In other situations, it is like one’s finding, even frequently, that one has pursued some compelling directive in action, but afterward it seems to be something foreign to one’s own self. Thus, such actions do not belong to the agent’s own life. Rather, they belong to an unfamiliar outer life, one that proves to have been strongly present in oneself. Thus, actions that are similar to those that belong to the situation of sanctification but are not grounded in the regeneration of their agents are actually actions of the Christian collective life, which exercises some sway over individuals. This is also the case with habits that are formed in the same fashion. This practice is best observed in the example offered in Scripture regarding the relationship of strangers to native inhabitants of a people.10 That is, among themselves the latter of the two groups form law and custom based on the inner force afforded them by the indwelling, distinctive spirit they hold in common. Moreover, in that they behave in this way, all this process is within their very nature. On the other hand,

strangers have had no part in the cultivation of law and custom, because they do not carry the formative force within themselves, but they accommodate themselves to custom and frequently act in accordance with custom, even where no demand is placed on them. In contrast, when they go back home, where these influxes from a community whose nature is foreign to them are no longer present, they habituate themselves with greatest ease, even to laws and customs adopted there in the meantime. Accordingly, it is not so much the contents, much less the number11 of particular actions or of an entire series of them, that distinguishes the status of sanctification from the condition of human beings before their regeneration. Rather, in regeneration a repelling force has come into being, namely, a no-longer-willing-to-be in a collective life that is reproducing12 sin. This force does continue to have its steady effect within the form of an essential achievement of life,13 but it is, in turn, simply an outflow of one’s having-given-oneself-up to receiving Christ’s influence, which, within the entire system of self-initiated activity, has then grown in strength to a steadfast willing-to-be-determined-by-Christ. This growing in strength, moreover, also remains the only tenable distinction if, simply reversing the direction, we look back from the new life to the old life. That is, the selfsame strength of God-consciousness does not come first, but this spiritual communication is bestowed on us only when sin has already developed as a power; and what has developed over time can also be removed only by something countering it in a timely manner. Since this is so, then approaching toward that aim of attaining a strong God-consciousness would also be delayed by what has already reached the point of being a habit. Thus, sin that is readily and often rearoused has to be worked against by that countering force of repulsion. Not only is this the case, but the susceptibility to sin of each individual is also grounded both before and outside of each one. Thus, sin itself cannot be completely extirpated in anyone but ever remains in the process of disappearing. To the extent that sin has not yet vanished, it can also still appear. Hence, actions can exist within the situation of sanctification that are even similar to such as were habitual prior to regeneration, actions in which the power of the collective life of sinfulness prominently holds sway and traces of preparatory grace are internally hidden. Indeed, suppose still further that in this manner growth in sanctification were not to occur without such struggle between the new and the old human being. Even then, over the entire course of this struggle, not once would it present a smoothly progressive increase in might on the one side and a smoothly regressive decrease in might on the other side. This is so, for in each case one’s own susceptibility to sin is always stirred anew by influences from sinful collective life all around us. As a result, even if the susceptibility to sin, regarded in and of itself, might be constantly reduced by growth of the new human being, this, nevertheless, cannot be claimed in the same fashion regarding reinforcements that susceptibility to sin obtains from without. At least given the variegated change occurring in this domain—in that individual life is laid hold of by sinful collective life in the most irregular and unforeseen ways, now more strongly and now more weakly—growth in sanctification could be explained only by a special kind of miracle,14 one not based on the natural course taken by divine grace within a human being. It could be so explained if it were

not that, within the struggle one must go through, particular elements have also entered the fray, elements in which the might of sin rises to the fore more strongly than it did in earlier elements. Thus, even after regeneration, a manifold change of conditions is manifested, and with it repentance—and indeed not only a little repentance over trivial matters. However, this repentance, nevertheless, is distinguished from every earlier instance of repentance by a steadfast inner no-longer-willing-to-be under the sway of sin. Moreover, it is posited as disappearing in the same way as the repentance that, as long as some resistance to the impetus of Christ still occurs even in obedience, also accompanies all those actions that appear to be fruits of this obedience but also show traces of resistance. Furthermore, even though those intermittent evidences of a lingering presence of sin can make particular instances appear to be retrogressive, as compared with other instances, nevertheless, a firm consciousness remains, such that the more numerous the series of such faltering instances one views en masse is, the greater the inroads of their amassed total is seen to be. Further, the surety of faith—viewed as an appreciation of interconnectedness with Christ and as good pleasure in that interconnectedness—is likewise constantly on the rise, with the result that, given the forces invested in Christ, sin can never obtain new purchase while it is being dislodged from its former hold. Viewed from this side of the struggle, the state of sanctification is chiefly distinguished from all prior states by this recognition: that sin can win no new ground. 3. Now, let us observe, from the other side of the struggle, how this state of sanctification approaches toward likeness to Christ. Above, we have already drawn a boundary line that we are not permitted to overstep. That is, from the very onset of his incarnation15 on, Christ developed naturally in every way, yet constantly and without interruption in organic union with the principle16 animating him for service to that principle. Such a service, however, is not bestowed on any other human being, all bringing with them, as they do, a personal existence based on a collective life of susceptibility to sin. Closely observed, this difference from Christ must indeed be posited in every element and also come into real consciousness in proportion to the clarity of self-consciousness in relation to what is divine, or one’s illumination. This is so, for wherever imperfection still exists, such that it does not solely give expression to the pattern of temporal development but also deserves to be named imperfection with respect to the relationship of deed to impetus, there some recollection of one’s old life would also be grounded, thus, some realization of that old life. Consequently, even elements that already, in and of themselves, contain advance in similarity to Christ would contain some consciousness of sin. This consciousness of sin, however, does not hinder interconnectedness with Christ being efficacious in every element belonging to the state of sanctification, and thus in every element of that state does not hinder that new life from deserving the designation of “being conformed to Christ’s perfection and blessedness” as given in our proposition. This very life with Christ is already implied in the analogy exactly set forth that regeneration is to be seen as the divine act of union with human nature and sanctification as

the situation of that union. This is the case, for that act of union would have been nothing but a fruitless illusion had it not brought forth an enduring situation of living union, in which the divine and human were to be divided no more. Rather, in all its accomplishments human nature would prove to be an instrument of that divine force. Thus, even the activity of regeneration proceeding from the divine force in Christ uniting individuals with him would have come to naught and would be no different from the most fleeting, transitory stirrings, yet surely anything but the end of an old life and beginning of a new life, unless that act had proved to be temporally effective within every element. As a result, every element is to be regarded as a repetition of that same initial act, viewed as a new act that involves people’s coming to be stirred by Christ’s receptive activity, and thus every element includes within it a not-willing-for-oneself but rather a willing-to-be-in-community-with-Christ. In these two desires, taken together, however, the sinless perfection of Christ, thus also, the selfconsciousness that is diminishing in reference to self, the blessedness of Christ are coposited. Now, suppose that here too we want to make clear what the boundaries of likeness and unlikeness consist of. To do this we must distinguish a constant feature and a varying feature in that which belongs to this growing suitability of elements in our life for impulses proceeding from Christ. Inasmuch as each element can be viewed as a renewal of one’s regeneration, each element is like every other element and each one participates in the perfection and blessedness of Christ, for there is no being taken up into community with Christ other than this. Now, on the one hand, this ever-constant likeness consists in one’s continually renewed will for the reign of God, just as in Christ this will grounded all particular actions and acts of will.17 Likewise, on the other hand, it is one’s consciousness of a union of divine being with human nature through Christ, just as also existed in Christ, in all the determinative factors18 of Christ’s self-consciousness. Now, this self-consciousness is likewise participation in Christ’s blessedness, since our being linked with Supreme Being brings absolute satisfaction,19 viewed as that participation in his sinless perfection, since sin resides outside the reign of God, but within itself the reign of God contains the strength of all that is good. In contrast, all else that sticks out as some particular feature within the life of the regenerate, and insofar as it does, lies within the boundaries already drawn. As a result, not only do particular actions render more or less sin in their being carried out, but the same also goes for particular aims and goals. Correspondingly, suppose that in many of its elements an actual individual self-consciousness is in sorrow, yet is, at the same time, assuaged by the ever-remaining-constant feature, whereas in other elements it is joy that thereby transitions into being brought low,20 because only thereby can joy be justified, and in that instance only thereby can any sorrow lying nearby be assuaged. Hence, any doctrine yet to be set forth as a particular doctrine concerning the state of sanctification can be related only to this contrast between a feature that belongs to its starting point and a feature that belongs to its goal.21

1. Ed. note: For glimpses into conceptual contents in this proposition, see esp. Rom. 8:29 and 12:2; Col. 2:6–7 and 3:12– 17; also Eph. 2:8–22. 2. Ed. note: As indicators of usage, not proof texts, cf. 2 Cor. 6:16 and Eph. 2:21. Through Christ’s role as counterpart to high-priestly functions recorded in the Old Testament, Schleiermacher also reflects the widespread belief that Christians are called to be and comprise a priestly people among themselves. Cf. index. 3. Ed. note: In the present work, the terms for holy, what is holy, holiness, and sanctification all have the same root— Heil, Heilig, Heiligkeit, Heiligung—but they do not keep the same meaning. 4. Cf. §83. 5. Ed. note: At this point in the first edition §131.1, this influence of regenerate persons on others’ conscience is called an “awakening,” which is “obviously an approximation to divine holiness.” 6. Ed. note: Successively, not Heiligkeit or Heiligsein but Heiligung or Heiligwerden, sich heiligen, and Trachten nach Heiligkeit. 7. Ed. note: The turning point has been identified in §§108–9 in the process of conversion, specifically God’s justification coming to be received in faith, thus rebirth (Wiedergeburt), or the onset of the new human being, which in regeneration (Wiedergeburt) moves forward. 8. Ed. note: This is the place where the phrase Stand (locus, standing, status, state, situation) der Heiligung begins to be used most strategically. At this juncture “locus” represents a place in doctrine where the process of sanctification itself, not just the term, is to be observed, considered, and/or reflected on (betrachten). 9. Ed. note: See index on Grace, preparatory. 10. Eph. 2:19. Ed. note: In the first edition (1822), KGA I.7/2 (1980), 191, Schleiermacher’s note refers to Eph. 2:17–22, placed after the following sentence: “All the didactic portrayals of Christian community [in Scripture] also agree in their ascribing all that is stirring and lively within the whole to one Spirit, and all individuals are described as organs who are animated [beseelt] by that Spirit and as participants in that whole who are integrated into it by that Spirit.” The initial outline for a sermon on Eph. 2:19, preached at Rügenwald on Dec. 16, 1802, is in Bauer (1908), 330–33. Despite his very well-constructed delivery, down to the last detail, he rarely appeared in a pulpit with more than an outline. Schleiermacher’s first extant sermon text on this Scripture is from Aug. 24, 1806; first printed in his second sermon collection (1808), then in SW II.1 (1834), 222–38, and (1843), 218–33; also in KGA III/1 (2012), 248–64. It has also been published in several special collections (1835–1969). The same Scripture text was also used in “Remarks at a Wedding,” ET in Seidel/Tice (1991), 195–98, also reproduced a few times after its appearance in a periodical in 1827 and in SW II.4 (1835), 818–20, and (1844), 855–57. The Eph. 2:19 text reads: “So then you are no longer strangers and sojourners, but you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God” (RSV). The sermons all refer to Christ’s working toward union of individuals by Christ’s Spirit in and through the church. Overall, they compare unions between couples in matrimony, those who gather in the civic union, and those who obtain union within the church. 11. Der numerische Wert. 12. Ed. note: In this passage the procreative term is kept, not only in the usual use of a term meaning “rebirth” (Wiedergeburt), in theology usually meaning “regeneration,” but also meaning “procreating” or “begetting,” from being in one generation to producing another (wiedererzeugenden Gesamtleben), in this case “reproducing,” or, with little change, “passing on,” some collective life. 13. Ed. note: Clemen’s conjecture of replacing Lebensverrichtung with Lebensrichtung would seem to miss the main point, merely repeating the obvious change in the course, direction, or alignment of one’s life but not keeping the characterization of a radical, essential turn in one’s life, a transformation to be viewed as an “achievement.” This point emphasizes that essential turn: even though sin remains in abundance, no-longer-willing-to-be in a collective life that is reproducing sin is now an outflow of justification. Further, one’s growing sanctification takes the form of countering any resistance to Christ’s influence. 14. Ed. note: On Christ as the apex of miracle, cf. §103.4. See also preliminary considerations on miracle in §§5, 13.l and 13.P.S., 14.P.S., 34.2–3, 47, and 76.3, and index. For him, recognition of miracle (Wunder) requires in the viewer an internal capacity to marvel (e.g., a relationship of faith with Christ). Thus, a miracle is not simply an objective fact supposedly associated with the object or event viewed. The source of miracle could be supernatural, but not absolutely so, as if poured directly through a pipeline into the natural order and breaking its laws, and it could be suprarational, but not absolutely so, not beyond all reason. 15. Menschwerdung. Ed. note: See index on this German term and the usual Latinate term “incarnation,” both holding a meaning different from Schleiermacher’s. 16. Prinzip. Ed. note: Since ancient times, this term had the meaning of a moving, originative source. Schleiermacher chiefly uses it in this sense.

17. Willensakten. Ed. note: This choice of “act” here underscores Schleiermacher’s consistent distinction of one’s “acts” of will and of actual activity from one’s “deeds” (Taten). Here Willensakten covers a wide gamut of volition, not simply acts of will—that is, acts of deciding or resolve. Volition of any kind, that is, acts of will and other expressions of will, provides impetus for “deeds,” whether these deeds turn out to be more or less good or more or less bad. 18. Bestimmtheiten. 19. Ed. note: The phrase “absolute satisfaction” (schlechthinige Befriedigung) contains an array of significant biblical meanings and associations, including being at peace or rest and suggesting a quiet mood of being utterly content, pleased, or gratified. 20. Demuth. Ed. note: Ordinarily this word means “humility.” Here it refers to joy’s being somewhat subdued but not replaced, thus to a mood of feeling rather low, so that sorrow is, in turn, admixed with and qualified by joy. In Schleiermacher’s catalog of moods and feelings, sometimes there turns out to be no definite word for such admixed affective states, arrayed as they are on sliding scales. One word he distinctively uses for a similar state, for example, is Wehmut, to be translated “tugging sadness and longing.” Especially when admixed with joy, he has found this term to be a distinctively Christian feeling, by virtue of its placement within the context of regenerate life, where sheer sadness over sin and its effects is always accompanied by an upbeat God-consciousness. See §120.P.S. See also esp. OR (1821) V, under the headings “Religious Character” and “Longing for Purification and Fulfillment.” See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 14, on an association of Wehmut with both Demut (humility) and Stoltz (pride) and OR (1821) II immediately under the main heading “The Inner Locus” and supplemental note 14. 21. Ed. note: In an account that identifies what conditions accompany sanctification from its starting point onward, sin is always still present. When one is at the constant, ideal goal outside and beyond the old life, to the degree that it is realized within any element of one’s life, one lives in the reign of God. One participates in the new life while struggling over remnants of sinfulness from the old life left behind. Thus, the process of sanctification is outside the boundary of the ordinary and varying state that defines the ongoing process moving gradually toward that final goal, the end point that one seeks to reach in all the elements of one’s life. Hence, this arrangement also helps further to define the announced teleological nature of Christianity (cf. §§11–14). The same process describing what occurs for individuals here also applies to the entire doctrine of the church, viewed as a community of faith, yet to follow (cf. §§62–63 and 126), and to doctrines presented in between. In short, the operations of grace are transformative indeed, but they are also developmental throughout until the point of consummation is finally reached (cf. §§157–59 and 163).

§111. First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Sins of the Regenerate. Because the sins of those who are in the state of sanctification are always being combated in advance, they always bring their forgiveness with them in advance and have no capacity to annul the divine grace that comes in regeneration. 1. If we take together the two propositions just set forth—that in the condition of sanctification no new sins develop and that in all elements, thus also in all works and actions, even the best and most similar to Christ’s, something belonging to the earlier condition, consequently something sinful, still exists.1 On this basis, then, it is evident that in the state of sanctification no sin can exist that could put an end to regeneration. The reason is that some resistance to sin by the new human being is necessarily also contained in all of one’s sinful actions, even if not of a thoroughly penetrating and sufficient sort. Thus, in these sinful actions it is equally the case, as it is for those of the old human being in whom resistance to sin also proves to be insufficient, that the new human being is active and, in that such a one is active, also cannot have died out. Now, surely no one has believed that the state of grace could wither away through elements in which the new kind of human being is active; rather, this would happen only by elements of the old kind of human being. What would occur instead is not a determinate contrast between old and new human beings but only a distinction of more or less, hence a

distinction in which a point at which a particular destructive effect would have begun could not be definitely established. Suppose that, instead, we were to set forth such a contrast and call the one action a sin and the other a good work. Accordingly, this contrast would always be a designation of which of these actions is the predominant part. In particular cases, designating the actual comparative difference between the two actions could indeed seem to be an almost endless task. Yet, if sin were to be the deed of a regenerate person, then the deed would, nevertheless, have to be something other than what would be sin in another individual, however similar it might seem to be. However, it would seem similar only by dint of that feature which would be the same in it and in the good works of the regenerate person. Hence, transitions and approximations are also tendered to each one who observes oneself and others, and there are cases of the sort where we have to say this: by an intervening introduction of circumstances, a preponderance of an action lies on one or the other of two sides, such that at a given time the action has become a good work that is in transition, since it was on the way to becoming a sin, and at another time, in reverse, the action has become a sin instead of a good work. At that point, moreover, one could indeed not possibly say either that in the first case the state of grace would be forfeited but that in the second case it would not be so. Admittedly, the border that we have marked here— namely, that in the state of grace no new sin can be generated—might seem to be indefinite. No action is entirely identical with a previous one. However, the degree to which not every sin is a new one, whether a given action is declared to be sin or not, nevertheless depends on the rather arbitrary definition by which one would hold it to be akin to, or of the same kind as, an earlier one; and, admittedly, strictly speaking only each person’s own consciousness can judge concerning it. Only so much can be said about sins in general terms. Suppose that we take regeneration in the sense in which we have explained it here and imagine that only subsequently would a function of sinfulness develop that until then had been completely dormant or that such a totally new circumstance would form that could find no concord whatsoever within the domain where sin had had its locus up to then. It would be impossible then for anyone not to grant that that function, in the one case, or this set of circumstances, in the other case, should have developed in a sinful manner. Moreover, suppose that we likewise imagine that already before one’s regeneration someone in a particular function or relationship, whether it then be by one’s personal distinctiveness or by the influence of good breeding or custom, that person had always been kept so pure that no sin had proceeded from that state. Then it would also not be possible to think that after one’s regeneration from there on out sin would creep in. What results clearly enough from this conclusion, moreover, is that in every case that tenders such an illusion, we would also always have to say, despite all else, that either the sin in question is not new but is based already on earlier times and is simply aroused once again, or regeneration was not proper and genuine, because susceptibility to sin could still generate something new. Viewed from another side, we would also have to reject the converse of our proposition, because the claim that a regenerate person—who is indeed a new human being—could lose

the grace of regeneration by a single action stands in most exact connection with the claim that we already rejected earlier, namely, that the first human beings could have lost certain attributes through a single action, attributes that they still had while they were engaged in that action. That is to say, one could want to assert that the opinion is not that loss of grace occurs by an action of the new human being, but rather, only by a nonaction of the new human being. Thus, for that reason, the presupposition that regeneration is the onset of life with Christ in us, which is indeed necessarily an action, would have to be retracted. Moreover, in this case as in the other one it becomes evident that, in whatever way one might conceive even such a destructive action, already the grace of regeneration would, nevertheless, have to have been lost in advance in every instance. This consideration does indeed yield another analogy, to be used if one is to remain true to the concept of regeneration. This is so, for at this point an individual would also have had to renounce community of life with Christ by being cooperative with an impetus proceeding from Christ. In the same way, since in the case of the wicked spirit, this spirit would have to have broken away from this status of kinship by the very forces that would have most closely affiliated this spirit with God. Consequently, what we concluded there also follows here.2 Finally, suppose that we return to the task of definitely separating the condition of sanctification from the condition of being in a collective life that is susceptible to sin but under influences from preparatory grace, whether that task of separating is fulfilled or not. Then, in every instance embedded in this task would be the demand to distinguish a working of divine grace on human beings from a working that is produced from within and through human beings themselves. Now, suppose that the latter working were not a purely momentary one, retreating to itself in turn—that is, suppose it were a sheer moment of inspiration3—thus continuity would automatically follow therefrom. Then, one would imagine even this working of grace to be ceasing, in turn. Thus, its warranty would lie simply in the inspiration itself, whether it might have been long or short. Hence, for the contrary of our proposition, what remains to consider is simply the choice between an alteration of one’s nature wrought by one’s own deed or a voluntary withdrawing of divine grace prior to the decisive action. This would be taken to occur precisely as in another place, this time before the storied fall of human beings, a withdrawing of an extraordinary, discrete divine supporting grace. Hence, it also seems impossible that this contrary mode of doctrine can have come to the fore out of the self-consciousness of one who is conscious of divine grace and be conceived in this way. That is to say, given that we too have granted that in sensorily perceptible self-consciousness an element of regeneration definitely cannot be removed, consequently also granted that the surety regarding a form of life contrary to the earlier state does not ensue at once. Thus, we must assume, nevertheless, that even as a matter of experience expressions of the new life become ever more steadfast, and thereby confidence in the endurance of this union of life with Christ also has to enter into sensorily perceptible self-consciousness more and more. This is so, for, quite apart from all vacillations, a growing dominion of life with Christ over flesh does distinguish the state of sanctification. This natural confident expectation that is

appropriate to regeneration can be expressed only in this part of our proposition, and not in what is contrary to it. 2. Thus, even though the contrary formulations are favored by reputed teachers and have got into some confessions, those formulations to the effect that faith could be lost, in turn,4 that justification could be lost, and that grace could be lost5—we concur with them much less than passages in other confessional symbols that maintain positions favorable to our proposition do, in part straightaway and in part indirectly, and that clearly express the same confidence.6 If we compare these contrasting expressions with each other, then the following results seem to come to the fore. First, the concept of a fall and that of those fallen and the intervening of baptism into the midst of them show that the formulation that contrasts with ours conforms to old ecclesial decisions. These decisions were made in opposition to a stringent desire happily to exclude others from their company, and with good reason. Yet, in no way had those who had fallen away, externally disowned Christian belief, and given up on the church7 lost their faith internally on that account. Rather, to give a few examples, they would have disowned certain beliefs only externally out of fear—that is, they might have been rather lacking as yet in bravery. In addition, at that time not all of those who had been baptized were reborn, any more than is the case now. Those, moreover, who had given up on Christianity, in order perchance to enjoy greater sensory freedom again, were not yet fully stirred within and had not yet attained proper faith and justification.8 Second, suppose that the concept of falling and of being fallen is applied to our circumstances today and, in that same sense of being devoid of faith and justification, the concept is tied to those circumstances. Then, even the question as to what kind of sin would occasion this being devoid of faith would be answered in many various ways. This would be the case, for to sin knowingly and willingly, to sin premeditatively, and to persist in sinning premeditatively are three very different kinds of definition.9 Suppose that we now constrain ourselves to the two extremes. Then, the first category belongs within the succession of different situations between more and less—that is, present in each person in the state of sanctification, since, often enough, even lack of perfection in doing good works takes place knowingly and willingly. In contrast, if we understand the third category indicated just above, namely, premeditative persistence, to mean an entire knowing resistance, then it belongs just as plainly to cases where regeneration was only an apparent one. Third, it is surely not to be doubted that doctrine regarding the indestructible security of a justifying divine grace—or, more correctly stated, of the complete reliability of it—has not become the prevailing ecclesial doctrine. This result is simply grounded in controversy with the Roman church and in polemics against fanatical sects, just as every dogmatic statement that cannot gain currency as an analysis10 of Christian self-consciousness is either speculative or is grounded in a similarly external manner.11 This explanation is also made clear enough on the basis that the case of premeditative persistence-in-sin is itself implicated in it. The fanatic caricature of this doctrine is obvious: it authoritatively cites an inner surety

of feeling alone, and then it enlarges what it has to say by switching items around in the proposition to the effect that what a regenerate person does is deemed right or at least permissible. These rubrics, however, find no support in our formulation as it is set forth here. Conclusions that the Roman church wants to draw from the doctrine of justification by faith are likewise sufficiently guarded against, in that we presuppose that a regenerate person is continually struggling against sin. However, as concerns thoughtless misuse of the doctrine, this misuse finds no more support for it as it does in the view that someone can always be reconverted when that person has fallen from grace, or as it does in the view that sins are possible for a regenerate person that do not make the person correspondingly lacking in the state of grace. Yet, it lies much closer to our presentation to counter the objection with the view that whoever seeks such an excuse does not want to struggle against sin, thus is surely no regenerate. Thus, the entire doctrine of justification has nothing to do with that person at all. Hence, there is no further ground for desiring to construct some better access to the doctrine, by adding untenable, obfuscating postscripts to the plain and simple testimony of evangelical Christian self-consciousness. 3. However, the assertion that sins committed in the state of sanctification always carry forgiveness of sins with them is not also intended to mean that it is as if the regenerate person were conscious of forgiveness in one’s actual sinning or were sinful in and with this consciousness. Rather, first sin has to come into consciousness in this person as one’s own deed, consequently as fully carried out and with repentance, in that forgiveness and repentance are mutually conditioned. Only this is a sure thing: that resistance to sin, even when it does not have a happy and victorious outcome, viewed as a harbinger of repentance, is also a harbinger of the consciousness of forgiveness. The actual meaning, however, is simply this: that what applies to the entire concept of justification, likewise applies to this particular part of that process, namely, that the gracious forgiveness of sin is not a particular decree or act intended for each person, and just as little is it a sheer declaratory act; rather, it is a general act that leads people out of the domain of fault, guilt, and deserving punishment, one that is indeed temporally fulfilled in each individual, but at that point really fulfilled and needing no repetition. This is so, for even in the act of forgiveness, divine omniscience is indeed not able to place sin as absolutely extinguished in the element of regeneration itself but only as in a gradual process of disappearing. Now, conversion is the turning point into this process, but it is so in such a way that sin is still appearing even afterward. Accordingly, even afterward a relation to this act of conversion would have to exist in consciousness, but in a natural manner this relation would have to be a different one. Suppose, then, that in the life under dominion of a general susceptibility to sin, sin itself is taken to be a collective fault, with the result that sin regarded as occurring one by one were not accounted to the individual as such but to everyone who has had a part in this collective fault and in such a way that, precisely for that reason, nothing of an individual nature would be forgiven. In that light, what would happen in the state of sanctification would be the exact opposite. That is to say, if redemption were also possible only under the form of a collective

life, then, taken strictly in and of itself, sin would still not have its ground in this collective life but would have it only in individuals, inasmuch as they would still have something from the previous collective life in them. So, sin would also not be the fault of collective life but rather that of the individual and thus is accounted to some individual. However, it is only an apparent contradiction that sins would be accounted to some individual and that the individual would always be forgiven already, not only because in every instance forgiveness is such an accounting but because here too no other accounting than a forgiving one takes place. This is so, in turn, because, for the natural person who is passing over from the sinful collective life into the new life, sins are accounted on a personal track and indeed to this person more in a truly personal way than to an individual who still belongs to the old collective life. However, they are not accounted to the new human being, as such, who, identifying oneself with the whole by virtue of shared feeling, does not bear fault in one’s own person. Sins are thus forgiven this person because they can be accounted only to some individual who no longer exists. This person, therefore, also bears the consciousness of forgiveness as soon as this person is conscious of oneself as existing within the new collective life. This connection occurs because the continuity of the new life, by virtue of one’s desire for the reign of God and one’s not desiring sin,12 has not been interrupted and, at the very same time, some sort of resistance to sin has been brought to the fore. Yet, it is selfevident that this consciousness of forgiveness cannot exist at the very same time as a sin is committed, at whatever level this consciousness might be. Instead, one’s not desiring sin must necessarily become manifest as repentance only after the deed is done, and consciousness of forgiveness presupposes repentance. 4. All the less would there be something to say about the very struggle against sin, as in doing so one could hardly avoid swerving over into the domain of Christian ethics. This effort could be passed on to that domain if misunderstandings had not emerged regarding that struggle as well. It follows from concerns addressed thus far that in the state of sanctification, in each person the danger of falling into sin issues from those branches of meaning-giving sensory functions,13 which mostly held sway before one’s regeneration and which had been located within circumstances in which habits could most easily be shaped in ways favorable to one’s liking. Thus, this domain, within which one’s enticements lie, enticements against which it is always the hardest fully to mount a resistance against, is the domain of temptation for each person. Now, however, in each person the efficacious activity of Christ’s life, which proceeds from his willing the reign of God, is defined on the basis of the demands that are issued to a person by virtue of one’s position in that collective life. Thereby Christ’s willing the reign of God is formed into distinct purposes. These purposes, moreover, are thus surely a constant thing, since Christian ethics embraces the whole of life. Accordingly, the domain of temptation can also lie only within the domain of one’s calling, in the broadest sense of that word. That is, there can be no struggle against one’s own sin other than after sin is effectually stirred up through our activity in the reign of God, consequently in such a way that, at the same time, whatever is waged against that sin has to be an activity within the reign of God.

Thus, the struggle consists solely in this: that we seek to fend off or to overcome temptations that emerge within our activity in the reign of God. This formulation of the matter, moreover, must be able to include procedures against all that can still possibly be understood as sins in the changing course of our state of sanctification. This is so, for otherwise, two different but adjacent tasks would be set for us, tasks neither one of which could be sufficiently accomplished in any one instance without impairing the other effort. Further light can be shed on both tasks in the following way. In every case, proper utilization of divine forgiveness of sin is conditioned by struggle against sin. In contrast, proper utilization of divine adoption, by virtue of which the person who is engaged in the state of sanctification can say that in sanctification one is still a child of God, conditioned by the liveliness and efficacy of faith. In the latter case, those engaged in sanctification are so even after sin is present, namely, in every instant, since sin is still present everywhere. Now, however, since the two sides are one and the same, likewise those things by which each is conditioned would also have to be only the same. Consequently, there is no haphazard struggle against possible future sins, which could always be simply a suppression or a debilitation of naturally developing sensory forces, a process whereby, at the same time, these sensory forces would get more ineffectual as organs of spirit. Further, there are also no exercises of repentance which are special, namely, that are formed in actions not arising from our work in the reign of God. Of still less significance is an arbitrary abandonment of the domain of temptation, which would be viewed, at the same time, as an abandonment of the domain of one’s calling—this since any such abandonment could in no way be derived from being taken into community of life with Christ, for this community would indeed also have to be community with his being sent into the world. That withdrawal would stand in contradiction to any such mission. Hence, the only proper course that remains is simply resistance against temptations that actually arise.

1. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 16: “Moreover, in the works even of the saints there is much that is unworthy of God and very much that is imperfect.” (2) Belgic Confession (1561) 24: “For we can do no work but what is polluted by our flesh.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane (1972), 260; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 271; cf. §37n3. (2) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 412; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 376. 2. Ed. note: See §§72, 80, and 81 for discussions of various conceptions that make ineffective use of the idea of a wicked spirit named the “devil.” 3. Ed. note: On “inspiration,” see §14.2. 4. Epitome of the Articles (Formula of Concord, 1577) 4: “Accordingly, we also believe … that when it is said that ‘the reborn do good works from a free and spontaneous spirit,’ that is not to be understood as if … they would nevertheless retain faith even if they deliberately persist in sin. … We condemn the teaching that faith in Christ … is not lost in one who knowingly and willingly sins.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 499f., with some changes in comparing the Latin and German in Bek. Luth. (1963), 788–90. 5. (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “It is necessary to differentiate sins that in this life remain in the reborn from those sins on account of which grace … and faith are lost. Therefore, actual mortal sin in one’s falling after reconciliation is an inner or an outer action conflicting with God’s law and done against conscience.”—“It is not possible to counter the conscience of faith with an evil design.” (2) Augsburg Confession (1530) 12: “Those who have sinned after their baptism may obtain forgiveness of sins whenever they come to repentance. … Rejected here are those who teach that whoever has once … become righteous [fromm] cannot fall again.” (3) Declaratio Toruniensus (= Acta synodua generalis Toruniensus, 1645), in the section “On Grace”: “Let us decree, as it were, that God’s grace or his

certitude … cannot abandon those once justified, even if they wallow in sins for the sake of pleasure. Yet, on the other hand, we do teach instead that those who are reborn, as often as they fall back into sins against their conscience, persist in them for a little while, and neither the living faith nor the justifying grace of God nor God’s certitude … do they retain for that time,” and so forth. (4) In his Dogmatik (1818), Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1755–1818) tries to reconcile the main proposition “ipsum tamen iustificationis descretum in Deo mutabile non est” (that very decree of justification is not mutable in God) with the proposition that a person could be justified more than once in one’s life, for as often as one receives true faith again after a preceding moral deterioration, the justifying decree that is in God related to this faith must also be restored. Cf. §128: “… iustificatio … neglecta fide iterum potest amitti” (justification can be lost when faith has again been neglected). Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:681, 780. (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 44; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 66f. (3) ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 676. (4) ET Kienzles. 6. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 16: “The same (faith) keeps us in the service we owe to God.” (2) Gallican Confession (1559) 21: “We believe also that faith is not given to the elect only to introduce them into the right way but also to make them continue in it to the end.” (3) Solid Declaration (1577) 11: “He (God) wills to protect them in their great weakness, … to guide and lead them in his ways, to lift them up when they fall, and to comfort and preserve them.” (4) Augustine’s definition also belongs here: “I say that sin consists in forsaking faith, which works through love (dilecionem) even unto death.” Ed. note: (1) ET Cochrane(1972), 258; Latin alone: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 269. Cf. note at §37n3. (2) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 371, also Cochrane (1972), 151; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 334. (3) ET Book of Concord (2000), 644; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1069. In this particularly instructive example, as in many other places, the ET follows a German text far different from the corresponding Latin one that Schleiermacher used. Here the Latin reads: “In this eternal counsel God proposes to make them righteous in their many and varied infirmities, … to defend them, … and if they lapse to give them support … and to comfort and restore them to life.” As here, Tappert (1959), 619, tends to stay somewhat more faithful to the German meaning in translating this document. (4) Also quoted in §74.2 above, from “Admonition and Grace” (427) 12.35; ET Tice, cf. Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 288; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:938. 7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s tendency with respect to those once forcibly or harshly isolated from communities of faith was warmly to welcome all; only rarely and temporarily, if ever, did he exclude anyone from the Communion table, and he used only general terms to depict those who might fit these three categories even in strictly academic company. Thus, these general terms are used here as well. In German they are die Abfallenden, den christlichen Glauben äußerlich verleugnenden und die Kirche verlassenden. All three categories have been known to have highly dismissive meanings or epithets attached to them in ecclesial discourse. These general terms themselves barely hide a multitude of what he would call sins. 8. Ed. note: See §§136–38 on baptism, including the issue of whether and how infant baptism should be confirmed. As is typical in Schleiermacher’s discourse, all of these examples presuppose different stages and levels of development in one’s faith and capacity for expression in belief and action. 9. Cf. §74 above. Ed. note: Bestimmungen can mean either definitions (of a concept) or determinations (on the part of a sinner). Either meaning can easily apply here. 10. Analyse. Ed. note: Schleiermacher rarely employs technical terms indicating what he is doing in the main text. He must have thought it to be worthwhile to do so at this point. See §19, which opened the Introduction in the first edition (1821) and in the present second edition (1830) climaxes the section on “the relation of dogmatics to Christian piety” (§§15– 19). This section places emphasis on rules that most directly bear on his task of analysis. 11. Ed. note: This principle, in focusing on merely external sources, announces Schleiermacher’s consistently held basis for discarding or properly replacing any specific content of doctrine that is not grounded in authentic internal Christian faith. See index on “speculation.” It would be more difficult to identify the full array of “external,” nontheological, or theologically well-grounded factors within his discourses on theology. No sizeable attempt to do so has been apparent thus far. 12. Ed. note: In this rare case, a word, Wollen, for both “will/willing” and “desire/desiring,” has such a twofold character that each English word can be applied equally to it. The first choice is etymologically the more accurate, but it can be mistaken to mean that one wills the reign of God into existence, for example. Yet, it is also more appropriate as a more inclusive function, whereas “desire,” though quite familiar as a key term in Augustine’s writings and, subsequently, has actually been one of many words that can be applied within that larger function of willing. It would seem to be best, then, simply to bear this anomaly in mind when using either word. 13. Zweigen der Sinnlichkeit. Ed. note: Already in the first editions of On Religion (1799) and Soliloquies (1800), Schleiermacher had forged an analysis of how meaning-giving mental functions operate, from a largely sensory level on up. Often readers have attributed a down and dirty quality of “sensuousness” to the lowest level, as can easily be encountered in ordinary German usage as well. However, this is not how he uses the term, and he does not apply derogatory meanings to it. For him, even the “sensory” level provides some meaningfulness, as in sense perception (Wahrnehmung), if admittedly limited, and that function never goes away. It always accompanies the higher levels of meaning-making, whether it is

contributing to sin or not. For him, the word Sinn therefore conveys both “sense” as in sense, sensation, sensory, and “sense” as in sense, meaning, sensible; in his technical usage, as here, Sinnlichkeit denotes both. Yet, generally the word also means “sensual” and “sensuous,” almost irreplaceably. So, if—in some rare case, if any—he chose to use it in a derogatory manner, he would have to qualify it in context.

§112. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding the Good Works of the Regenerate. The good works of the regenerate are natural effects of faith and as such are objects of divine good pleasure.1 (1) Apology Augsburg (1531) IV: “Furthermore, we not only teach how the law can be kept but also in what way it pleases God when we keep any of it, that is, not because we live up to (satisfacimus) the law but because we are in Christ.”2 (2) Smalcald Articles (Luther, 1537) Part III.13: “Good works follow such faith … and whatever in these works is still sinful or imperfect should not even be counted as sin or imperfection, precisely for the sake of this same Christ. Instead, the human creature should be … completely righteous and just according to both the person and his or her works. … We also say that if good works do not follow, then faith is false.”3 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XVI: “For we teach that truly good works grow out of a living faith … and are done by the faithful according to the will or rule of God’s Word. … and indeed works and worship which we choose arbitrarily are not pleasing to God. … Now the works which we do by faith are pleasing to God and are approved by him. Because of faith in Christ those who do good works … are pleasing to God. … We teach that God gives a rich reward to those who do good works. … However, we do not ascribe this reward … to the merit of the man who receives it.”4 (4) The First Confession at Basel (1534) IX: “This faith is continually exercised, signalized and confirmed by works of love, yet we do not ascribe to works, which are the fruit of faith, the righteousness and satisfaction for our sins.”5 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XXIV: “which works, as they proceed from the good root of faith, are good and acceptable in the sight of God. … Therefore we do good works but not to merit by them. … In the meantime we do not deny that God rewards good works.”6 (6) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) XIV: “Voluntary works besides, over and above God’s commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogance and impiety.”7

1.8 Discussions so frequently present in our confessions, as in all older expositions of faith-doctrine, on the claim that good works are not necessary for justification we can take up only as something extraneous here. We say this, because—even though the first point of doctrine within the doctrine of regeneration set forth here accedes to the claim—it cannot occur to anyone to entertain thought of it by now. This is the case, for justification and conversion mutually condition each other, and so, because conversion cannot be conditioned by good works, justification is not conditioned by good works either. It would be a strange thing, moreover, if someone should want to attach yet another question to the matter, namely, whether eternal life or blessedness would be conditioned by good works. The reason is that, in any case, both of these outcomes begin with faith, in that what remains constant in the soul from rebirth9 on is included in both of them. We could not quarrel at all with anyone who wants to deny this assertion, because we would first have to contend over other points. That is to say, someone may hold that good works are necessary for obtaining blessedness, because by “faith” that individual simply means some knowledge, which we call belief.10 With that individual either we do not have usage of the term in common or, in fact, he or she shares nothing at all with us in doctrine regarding redemption. The oddest disagreement in this conflict, however, would arise if an overstatement were to be made that good works are injurious to blessedness and that one has repudiated blessedness only by halves, as if one could find something in it if the statement were only more suitably and closely defined11 and as if one could avoid all possibility of people’s taking offense at the alternative found thereby. Nevertheless, works that could be injurious as a result of putting one’s trust in them would not be good works in our sense. They would not be good works, for anyone who did them would have blessedness in faith already and could not find oneself desiring to rely on works first. Contrary to these critiqued positions, the positive assertion that good works are natural effects of faith is so exactly connected to what we started with above that it needs no further elucidation. The reason is that once we allow ourselves to be taken up into community with Christ, we are deeply stirred, with him, by the union of what is divine with the human nature in Christ’s person, and our consent12 to this situation becomes a steadfast, active will to hold firm to this union and to spread its impact further.13 What this active will brings forth, moreover, is a good work, even if it were also only a first start at resistance against sin. Surely, then, it is therefore simply out of anxiety that one would deny that faith is confirmed or held firm by good works.14 That is: Let us suppose that one were to think of holding faith firm as if the actual implanting of it had been something merely transitory, which would be no more the case for faith than for acknowledgment of any kind of act. Accordingly, then, one could only imagine the life of faith to be a series of elements in which faith is inalterably the same. It would then be impossible, however, to think of two elements of faith being separated from each other unless the first element already had brought forth some good work before the second element began. As a result, one’s holding firmly to faith—to bring up this term again—is always brought about by one’s doing good works. It is then always correct to say that our union with Christ in faith, even if it is not likewise completely achieved, does

likewise essentially consist of a continual, active obedience, just as Christ’s life consisted of the active obedience of his human nature to an indwelling being of God in him. Moreover, our being taken up into community of life with him is already likewise the seed-made-fertile of all good works, just as the act of union was already the seed of all redemptive activity. Now, this matter can also be expressed in such a way that the regenerate person cannot be otherwise equipped for good works other than by virtue of faith. This being so, then it would, nevertheless, simply be a pointless misunderstanding if on this account one were to raise the question of whether good works were also free. This is the case, for the underlying presupposition of this question could only be that the very weakest will, one that can be overturned most easily, is the most free will, and that a champion of faith who would know no better way than to describe his situation by saying that he “can do no other” would not have been free.15 Now, fully lively receptivity, which is already the situation of the human being who is in the process of conversion, is clearly a freer one. Thus, one’s desire for the reign of God that was emerging from it is also a freer situation, because there is no will without freedom.16 Moreover, being-continually-and-receptively-open-to-the-influence-Christ-makes-on-one17 and being-continually-active-with that-desire-for-the-reign-of-God together comprise the new human being’s life-process. 2. Now, let us tie to this assertion the question of the extent to which the good works of the regenerate person are also that person’s own and in such a way that they are accounted to that person. Then we will want, preliminarily, to disregard that part of the question that happens to do with reward for good works and answer first the part that has to do with authorship of them. Let us then think, at the same time, on something given: that no redemption would exist without the founding of a new collective life, to which essentially everyone who appropriates redemption belongs. Then two questions arise, namely: To what extent do the good works belong to the individual, as such, or belong to Christ? And to what extent do they belong to the communal entity or belong to the individual? In regard to the first question, it is self-evident that by virtue of the community of life existing between the individual and Christ, that which belongs to Christ in good works cannot be separated from what belongs to each individual. This is the case, for in a process of separating the two the community between them would be broken up. On the other hand, a formulation that can make participation of the two parties known then can be attempted. Now, if conversion is the onset of sanctification, Christ is alone active in conversion and the individual is simply in the condition of living receptivity. Yet, in conversion the new life does come into being. Thus, even there we will also have to ascribe to Christ every element of active faith inasmuch as it is present, given the analogy of that start-up—that is, inasmuch as in that element of active faith new life comes into being or increases, in brief, inasmuch as it contains some progress. Suppose, in contrast, that we ourselves could make the new life grow. Then we would also have to be able to make it start. Yet, that would be tantamount to that turning point into the new human being occurring and the desire for the reign of God that emerges therein being

our will; thus every element of faith-activity, inasmuch as it an expression of this will set within us, would also be ascribed to us and is our work. Hence, if divine grace in sanctification is called “cooperative grace,” then this new life of human beings would be cooperative too. Apart from the inappropriateness of the term, it would, strictly taken, simply designate a second spot in authorship of the new life, always also still a misnomer. This is so, for divine grace does not work “with” us toward attainment of what is ours in our good works. Rather, grace has already worked to that end. On the other hand, what is the work of divine grace is also efficacious of itself alone. Using the expression “cooperative” would assign a third category to preparatory and efficacious grace.18 Chiefly, it would designate that a regenerate person will have become a self-initiating actor, and this tendency of the regenerate person is indisputably correct. However, since this third category would be no less effective than the second one, finding a replacement for the term “cooperative” would be desirable. Now, it is obvious that this formulation regarding good works chiefly applies to a determination made by will. In the execution of such a determination, imperfection and sin are always present and hence cannot be ascribed to Christ. Accordingly, in our earlier discussion of how good works are formed, it has already been granted that something impure is even mixed into particular set purposes, and yet in our account we have stuck only with what makes for progress in each good work. If, however, we reflect on the relationship of the individual to the collective life of Christians, everything would seem to be absolutely held in common, and if each individual wanted to assess what one’s own part in collective activity would consist of, the effort would only be in service of a misconstrued interest. 3. Now, based on what the discussion has yielded thus far, it could very easily be understood that good works are an object of divine good pleasure, for it could be impossible for actual actions as they come to be present to be an object of divine good pleasure. This impossibility could be the case, because these actual actions, like good works, are also sins at the same time. Rather, in good works only what is an activity of faith, consequently an expression of community of life with Christ, can be an object of divine good pleasure. Consequently, it follows, then: if only that within our good works which is love is what is pleasing to God, then it is pleasing in our desiring the reign of God at the same time as it is love for human beings and love for Christ and love for God and also at the same time as it is the love of Christ that is in us and enduringly spreading through us. Now, just as what is present at one time and not present at another generally cannot be an object of divine good pleasure, thus in all its elements in the state of sanctification the object for this divine good pleasure must, above all else, be self-identical, just as it also draws to itself and assimilates what is changing. Hence, it is entirely correct to say that it is actually only the person who is an object of divine good pleasure, and only as God sees that person in Christ, but works are objects of divine good pleasure only for the person’s sake. This consciousness, moreover, in its necessarily being bound together with one’s desiring the reign of God, is blessedness, which itself is accompanying that desiring.

Arising in this way, the question as to whether God rewards good works might seem well-nigh superfluous. It might seem so, for in examining ourselves19 we find that if being a child of God is posited in being regenerated and blessedness is posited in being a child of God, then, indeed, the regenerate person cannot crave some reward, nor can a reward be guaranteed to that person, for the person already has the guarantee of continuing advancement in sanctification. The regenerate person could not crave some reward, however, because therein disposition and reward cannot be brought into any kind of relation to each other whatsoever, this, in turn, because works are still sins as well and such a disposition deserves no reward. This is the ground, moreover, on account of which one can rightly say that in the state of grace there is no place for reward.20 Widening one’s circle of influence, which is itself simply the same thing, in turn, as any enhancement of strengths, can only very inappropriately be called a reward, since all it does is to guarantee the opportunity for a reward to that for which a reward is supposed to be given. One could feel content that among the confessional symbols cited here, those which admit some reward for good works do so only halfway convinced. Whereupon, there is all the less ground, however, for having even a notion of reward, much less of one viewed as an inducement to sanctification. 4. Previously we have distinguished what in the activities of faith is an expression, in each case, of the status of what we have and of what is an increase in what we have. Thus, this distinction cannot be stretched as if there were two kinds of good works, namely, such as would move outward with whatever forces are in place and such as would increase the force in its value, for this is not what takes place. If it were, we would then have to be caught up in an endless and irresolvable struggle, in that within every instant something would have to be possible to do on both sides and thus one side would have to be neglected to some extent in favor of the other. Instead, it can be shown that in this domain there can be no special actions aimed at elevating the forces we have. If desire for the reign of God emerges with faith, then every person of faith emerges out of the person’s position in the world and in accordance with the measure of challenges to one’s forces that stand at one’s command and one’s acquaintance with the situation of one’s circle of influence, challenges pointing to activity within the reign of God. The sum of all these circumstances would then form the domain of that person’s calling, the notion of which is intimately bound together with desire for the reign of God. Moreover, all of the good works of each individual must then lie within this domain, with the result that what does not belong to the individual’s calling is also not a good work for that individual.21 Now, actions belong within certain periods of life and circumstances, actions that move toward the point of exercising and enhancing one’s forces along with them directed toward calling and at that point of calling are justified in and of themselves as actions of one’s calling. Otherwise, however, every activity of one’s calling contributes of itself to what lies in the nature of all finite forces bent toward exercise and enhancement of forces. The more we examine our inner resources, however, the less can any other way be thought of. This is so, for the force of faith itself cannot be strengthened by special actions to which Christ has not provided impetus. In contrast, the actions to which he gives impetus are essentially

actions of one’s calling by which something is suitably constituted for the reign of God. Furthermore, all that can happen for the purpose of strengthening other spiritual22 and sensory forces must all the more be able to be justified as actions of calling. This is so, because these other spiritual and sensory forces, strengthened as well as sinful, can function as well-pleasing to God. Now, if by “means of grace” we mean activities through which sanctification is further stimulated, whereas by “good works” we mean simply productions of sanctification, it follows, then, that we can recognize nothing as means of grace other than what are good works, at the same time, and can recognize that, at the same time, all good works must be means of grace. Thus, in this domain there are no purely ascetic actions, nor are there arbitrary ones—that is, there are no good works that lie beyond one’s calling, still less are there good works that someone, after one has satisfactorily performed one’s calling, could accomplish as though it were a bonus. 5. Now, what has been described thus far is supposed to be the very nature of sanctification, with the result that all that is of an efficacious character in the reign of God and all inner development of a human being proceeds from the vitalizing force of faith and from its action through love.23 If this is so, then a certain question could scarcely arise here in any way other than by an incidental remembrance, a question as to the necessity and use of law24—this also in any sense of the word that might be taken. That is to say, something similar to legislation will always be present in Christian life, for the purpose of ordering the actions of less prudent people to distinct domains. To that ordering, then, also belong civil legislation and every set of rules related to any sort of art. Such legislation, moreover, would also be a good work inasmuch as it would be grounded in love. Further, in that way it, viewed as an all-encompassing action and as one very much laying claim to spiritual strengths, would also be a means of grace. Yet, in the domain of sanctification we would still not be able to attribute any value to the law itself, because love always consists in much more and does much more than law can be or supply. Even for producing knowledge of sin, law does not suffice for those who are engaged in the state of sanctification, in that, in and of itself, it does not trace the production of external action back to the internal recesses of mind and heart.25 As a result, in Christ we have a much more complete knowledge of sin, just as Paul too,26 once faith had been revealed to him, no longer ascribed such necessity to law thereafter. Still less, however, is law able to hold before us the goal of sanctification. That is to say, the goal is nothing but a changing mode of life, in its entire compass presenting the force and purity of disposition,27 which law, viewed as a collection of particular prescriptions,28 can never clearly exhibit. Accordingly, Paul then also brings up works of the Spirit such as cannot be determined and measured by any law, for if one calls statements that express some disposition “commands,” this happens only in a figurative manner. Thus, even the two commandments that Christ brings up29 as the content of the whole law are only figuratively so. Moreover, they do not once depict the goal of sanctification unalloyed, in that they place love for God and love for neighbor separately, side by side. In contrast, what Christ sets forth as his single “command”30 he simply, by this designation, places over

against that previously held law that is conveyed in a set of commands. He does so, for Christ’s “command” is actually no command at all, since it points solely to the comparison he makes with his own redemptive love.31 Therefore, today one would well need to say that in the Christian church it would be neither necessary nor advisable to begin instruction concerning sin with the Decalogue, still less instruction concerning sanctification, since both practices can lead only to flawed and superficial notions. Moreover, even if one busied oneself with dragging into the Decalogue all sorts of things that do not lie in it, this effort, on the one hand, is a bad example of arbitrary exposition of Scripture that has been long available. On the other hand, the same effort could result more easily and more coherently from the moral law of reason, itself formed under the influence of Christianity. The moral law of reason would, nevertheless, no longer arrange actions into formulations but would bring modes of action into formulations.32 If it let go of the imperative form and simply described, in all respects, the way life is lived in the reign of God, Christian ethics, however, would be far more adequate in its relationship to Christian faith-doctrine,33 consequently to its immediate determination.

1. Ed. note: This proposition serves, alongside §11, as a bridge to the presentation of Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics and as a major part of a prolegomenon to it. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 142; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 187. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 325; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 460f. 4. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 258, 266f.; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 269–71; cf. note at §37n3. 5. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 94f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 98f. See §104n35. 6. Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 411f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 375f. 7. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 495. See §37n5. 8. Ed. note: As the above confessional statements show, this proposition, line for line, is not a summary of Christian ethics but a set of considerations regarding a key topic of Reformation doctrine, which discards the notion that “good works” can either win one salvation or contribute to it. Continually it sticks to this topic, still important also for understanding the role of good works in the ongoing process of sanctification. As such, it does have a bearing on how one might conceive that role in relation to the tasks of Christian ethics. See the excerpts from the 1822/23 lectures ed. and trans. Brandt (ET 2011), the first edition of the 1826/27 lectures by Peiter (2011), their introduction (ET ed. and trans. Shelley, 1989), and a German/English collection of Peiter’s lifelong essays on this other half of dogmatics, ed. Tice. 9. Wiedergeburt. Ed. note: Although they both translate this word, “rebirth” can mean either the initial and decisive turn into the extended process of “regeneration,” as here, or the continuing effects in oneself of the entire process. 10. Ed. note: In German there is only one word for both faith and belief, Glaube. Some would claim that in Christian usage it simply means belief, viewed as assenting to some sort of knowledge, perhaps reserving the attitude of trust (Vertrauen) for inner faith, if such a one attaches importance to any such inner element at all. 11. Epitome of the Articles (Formula of Concord, 1577) 4: “We also repudiate … the bold expression that ‘good works are harmful to salvation.”’ One may fruitfully compare that statement with what immediately follows it. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 499, with some changes in comparing the Latin and German in Bek. Luth. (1963), 789. 12. Zustimmung zu. Ed. note: Underlying such a state, to which consent is then applied and sustained by will, could well be a state described by the root meaning of this term, Stimmung/stimmen, which requires inclusion of states even deeper, where the roots of faith and allied feeling also lie, than acts of will. Language that is not directly or necessarily based on knowledge would include strictly perceptual language, either quite general (like “harmonize,” “in keeping with”) or arising from what our senses already suggest to us (like “resonate,” “see,” “behold,” “be deeply in touch with,” “be in good humor regarding,” “receiving and extending love,” “stirred by and forming a disposition from”). 13. Ed. note: The word is fortzupflanzen. The corresponding term in Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics is verbreitendes Handeln (“broadening action,” both “intensive” and “extensive”), whereas the image in the term used here suggests a process like that of plants, only in Christian life inwardly growing and outwardly propagating what is given and received in

the union. This process, then, occurs in oneself, in participation within the community of faith, and in the outreach of all life there into other aspects of life in coexistence with the world and in its own systems. The other two commingling major categories in Schleiermacher’s “Christian Ethics” in 1826/27 are “effective action” (wirksame Handlung), including both struggle against sin (in earlier versions of the lectures called “purifying action”) and “restorative action” but much else as well, and “presentational” (darstellende ) types of action. Both of these major categories are especially applied to the community but—like the third factor here, namely, broadening (erweitende) action—both also include how one is effective or presents oneself and how the community is effective or presents its life within and to the rest of the world. In all these general, organizing respects, his expositions on Christian ethics readily correlate with the understanding of faith-doctrine offered in the present work, though their organization looks very different. 14. Epitome of the Articles (Formula of Concord, 1577) 4: “We believe … that faith is not conserved or retained in us by works but only by the Spirit of God.” The last phrase does not yet belong in this context; however, it too can indeed be said. Yet the Holy Spirit also cannot bring faith to maturity except through what is done in good works. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s translation from the Latin is more likely “confirmed or held firm” (bewährt oder festgehalten) here, from conservari aut retineri; but the point holds either way. ET Tice, drawn from the Latin and German in Bek. Luth. (1963), 789; cf. Book of Concord (2000), 499. 15. Ed. note: This is a not very hidden but ironic reference to Martin Luther, who at the very beginning of the Reformation in Germany stated: “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Obviously, Luther had felt unfree and oppressed at that moment, like a terribly constrained serf, in bondage not to sin but to actions of the Roman church, justified and freed through Christ in faith; and at that moment he also felt forced, yet was courageous enough to be a powerful champion of reform, a hero of faith, in that respect standing tall and free. Here Schleiermacher is setting forth in 1830 this reminder of Luther’s great first act, of nailing his theses to a church door in 1517 and of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation’s first great act of common confession at Augsburg, Oct. 17, 1830. See Schleiermacher’s Latin Oratio (Address) of Nov. 3, 1830, as keynote speaker in a celebration at the University of Berlin, which he had cofounded (1808– 1810), in Nicol (2004), 29–44. Therein he attributes the rising of the Reformation to the relative freedom of many academic institutions in Germany. His ten 1830 sermons on the handing over of the Augsburg Confession to the king (published 1831) open with one of June 20 on the text 1 Cor. 7:23: “You were bought with a price; do not become slaves of men.” See also his early, mostly philosophical essay on ethics, “On Freedom” (from 1790–1792), ed. and trans. Albert Blackwell (1992). 16. Ed. note: Cf. §4. 17. Einwirkungen. Ed. note: In this complex construction, “influence” translates Einwirkungen. Actually, in this work Christ’s influence, or the impression he makes, is always seen to be registered in or within oneself. 18. Ed. note: In this work, as in Schleiermacher’s “Christian Ethics,” in different contexts wirksam can mean either effective/effectual, reflecting a broader category, or efficacious, with respect to redemptive work. He seems to make no explicit, strict, and unqualified distinction between first, final, and efficient causes, as have Aristotle and others after him, including theologians. Instead, he slides over those distinctions in saying, simply: What God wills, God does. What we experience of what God does can be “preparatory” to what God does in and through Christ. This is the only way he can find to make a real distinction between causes in Evangelical faith-doctrine apart from attempts, by analogy, provisionally to map out divine attributes in a Christian version of monotheism, and these attributes too relate only to God’s work in creation and redemption. See index. 19. Ed. note: This entreaty in 2 John 1:8 starts a verse that ends a longer string in verses 1–8 that focuses on the true reward entailed in remaining faithful in one’s Christian life and ministry. 20. Ed. note: This conclusion is consistent with Jesus’ sayings in Matt. 5:46; 6:1–6, 16–18; and 10:40–42, concerning one’s continuing reward in regeneration and that reward’s not mounting up as if God used an accounting system to bestow grace. Schleiermacher especially draws on Paul’s offering an example from his own case in 1 Cor. 15–16. See also Col. 3:23f. and 2 John 1:1–8. Typically, Schleiermacher does not reveal key sources like this, as if they were direct proof texts for his own language, for he claims immediate self-consciousness in feeling-experience just as is indicated by these sources. He does not claim the literal words even if they actually came directly from Jesus, because their function, like everything done by Jesus, was to evoke a justified and regenerate life of faith, itself viewed as rooted in the internal experience of persons. See §§128–31 on which aspects of the New Testament may serve as norm and authority for Christian faith and doctrine; see also his lectures on the life of Jesus—ET ed. Verheyden (1975); SW I.6 (1864)—and his sermon series on Acts and select sermons from the Gospels in Trinity season, 1821, in SW II.10 (1856) and KGA III/6 (2015). 21. Ed. note: This paragraph makes especially clear that while a human being is still transitioning through the stages of conversion and is not yet through it, he or she is called an individual, but for purposes of dogmatic presentation one is called a person, modeled after the ideal personhood of the Redeemer. And yet, insofar as a person still has in oneself participation in the collective life of sin, by Schleiermacher’s lights, one is still also to be respected by all humans as a beloved, precious person, equal in standing and rights, just as, in the eyes of God, all individual human beings, including only once-born

babies and all baptized and authentically confirmed and not yet confirmed children are. Each is here referred to simply as one individual within the human species, taken as a whole. Whether Schleiermacher always stuck to this distinction, even in his dogmatic writings, or by what date he did, cannot be certified at this point. In the present work, Person is always translated “person,” and Gläubiger is always translated “person of faith,” not “believer.” Otherwise, normally the context itself can already display which would be the correct term. 22. Ed. note: Here geist (spiritual) might well include “intellectual.” 23. Ed. note: In OG 84f., Schleiermacher notes that among the earliest critics of CG1 (1822), no one had mentioned his doctrine of sanctification or his eschatology. Both sections contained marked departures from those of these critics, however. 24. Ed. note: Here, Schleiermacher is, in effect, dismissing—as he always tended to do—all distinctions between natural versus revealed law, by Roman Catholics or Protestants, and any special contribution of a “third use of the law” regarding stimulus or encouragement of faith, just as he negated tendencies to use “natural theology” within Evangelical theology. He regarded such distinctions to be philosophical, not theological. See his Christian ethics lectures for treatment of these “questions.” 25. Ed. note: The phrase is das Innere des Gemütes. 26. Gal. 3:25 and 5:18, despite his speaking of the lusts of the flesh against the spirit. 27. Eph. 4:13, where we are expressly directed to a parallel with Christ. 28. “The law of commandments and ordinances,” Eph. 2:15—Solid Declaration 6: “It must be diligently noted that when we speak of good works that are in accord with the law of God … the word ‘law’ has one single meaning, namely the unchanging will of God, according to which human beings are to conduct themselves in this life.”—In general, however, in this article on “the third use of the law,” which, contrary to our view, protects the law in Christianity, one sees best the inexactness of the notion that underlies it and the kind of confusions that cannot be avoided in the process. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 589; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 965. 29. Matt. 22:37ff. 30. John 15:12. Ed. note: Sermon on John 15:8–17, July 16, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 484–94. 31. Gallican Confession (1559) 23: “We believe that the ordinances of the law came to an end at the advent of Jesus Christ; but, although the ceremonies are no more in use, yet their substance and truth remain in the person of him in whom they are fulfilled.” Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 372, also Cochrane (1972), 152; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 335. 32. Where the reference is clearly to the Mosaic law, one cannot truly say of any law that “it teaches that it is God’s will and command that we walk in new life.” Ed. note: Solid Declaration 6 (1577). ET Book of Concord (2000), 589; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 965. 33. Ed. note: The relationship is between Christian Sittenlehre and Glaubenslehre.

SECTION TWO

Regarding the Constitution of the World in Relation to Redemption [Introduction to Section Two] §113. All that is planted1 in the world through redemption is embraced within the community of faithful persons, in which all the regenerate are ever to be found already. Accordingly, this section contains the doctrine of the Christian church. 1. Our proposition makes the two expressions “community of faithful persons” and “Christian church” equivalent without further explanation. Thus, it might seem to have the Roman Symbol2 against it. Yet, neither do the older exemplars of that creed know anything of this differentiation between the two, nor does the Nicene Creed. Already at this point it must indeed be obvious that this community can be understood both in a narrower and in a broader sense. That is to say, if the regenerate are to have been found in it earlier, they would thus have belonged to it already—that is, before they were regenerated—but, patently, in a sense different from that of people who are actually faithful already. Without this distinction no transition into the church at all, and consequently no expansion of it, could possibly be imagined other than by an absolute leap, which would mean in an unhistorical fashion. In contrast, the situation is such that today the new life of every individual does indeed arise from the collective life, but that collective life arises from no other individual life than that of the Redeemer. Thus, we will have to say that the totality3 of those who live in the state of sanctification is the inner community. In contrast, the totality of those to whom those preparatory workings of grace from among the first group4 have been directed form the outer community to that extent, until they will have become members of the inner community through rebirth and can then help to cultivate the outer community. Yet, it would be an entirely new and simply confusing use of language if we chose to apportion the two parallel expressions to the two communities respectively. In any case, no one form of community is either distinctly posited or distinctly excluded in this account. Rather, all forms that have existed or will yet exist, both complete and incomplete, are embraced here. This much alone is distinctly presupposed, that wherever regenerate persons are able to be in touch with one another, some sort of community also has to emerge among them. This is the case, for when they are able to be in touch with one another, their witness to faith also partially fills the same space, and a recognition and common agreement concerning what their efficacious action would be within that communal space is unmistakably bound therewith. What we said at the very outset of our treatment of the consciousness of grace5 was also intended to be understood as not at any remove from this present account, namely, that this consciousness would always derive from some collective life. Nevertheless, this claim finds its full explanation only at this point. This is so, for if we were not already to have found ourselves to be regenerate within this particular

collective life, but would have had to seek out grace as such or to cultivate it in advance, then indeed precisely the most decisive workings of grace would not have been grounded in that collective life. 2. However, the more exactly our proposition coheres with what was just adduced, the more difficult it might seem to be to reconcile this proposition with the assertion that our dogmatic propositions are to express only what was the same even in the earliest modes of Christian piety as among us.6 That is to say, how should those who have received Christ in faith through his personal influences have been found to exist already within the community of faithful persons? In response, it is to be noted that a collective whole7 of those who were in need of and were awaiting redemption was already constantly in place at that time, a collective whole that was prepared to recognize itself as being in contrast to one that would offer remedy.8 As a consequence, this outer community did emerge precisely at the point of Christ’s appearance in public, in the course of which the power to create the inner community lay in Christ alone. Then, gradually, the inner community began to be shaped out of this outer one, the inner one initially arising among the disciples, who were constantly in Christ’s company. Hence, when the question has been raised as to whether it was, in fact, Christ’s aim to found such a community, it is clear enough to respond that he also could not have exercised any activity whatsoever of an attracting or of a redeeming kind if such a community were not coming into being. Therefore, exactly when and how he actually founded it does not need to be demonstrated at all. Rather, just as we are also acquainted with self-organizing activity in all spiritual relations, so self-organizing already belonged to the becoming natural9 of the supernatural in him. Moreover, it must be possible wholly to grasp the very nature10 of this organism,11 in part, based on Christ’s activity as it was also directed to individuals, who at that point became his organs, and, in part, based on his distinctive dignity, which was then to present itself in this organism as something that exists in contrast to the world. That question, however, is clearly answered, on the one hand, based on inner experiences that bear the appearance of being direct influences of Christ that are not conditioned by the community and, on the opposite hand, based on concerns about collisions between different communities that existed within the same circle, on account of which collisions some people would rather accord validity to civil community alone. What needs to be said on the second point has already been said above,12 as has been done concerning relationship of individuals who are bound with Christ into this community.13 Moreover, just as no redemptive efficacious action could take place toward individuals unless a community were arising, so this community, too, can consist of nothing other than all those elements that belong to the state of sanctification in all who are blessed by grace. 3. Now, the Christian self-consciousness that is articulated in our proposition is the general form of the shared feeling we have regarding things human and regarding human conditions, a feeling that is determined by our faith in Christ and that becomes all the more clear when we combine with it the negative expression that belongs to it. To be exact, suppose that, for us, apart from redemption, the world with respect to human beings has indeed become the locus of the original perfection of both human beings and things but also

the locus of sin and evil. Suppose, further, that something new enters into precisely this world with Christ’s appearance, thus something that stands in contrast with the old situation. It follows that, for us, only that part of the world that is at one with the Christian church then becomes the locus of what perfection has come into being thereby or of what is good, and, for us, with respect to latent self-consciousness, only that part has become the locus of blessedness. All this does not occur by virtue of the original perfection of human nature and of the nature of things. Rather, instead, although all this is, to be sure, conditioned by these two things, it all occurs only by virtue of Christ’s sinless perfection and blessedness, which is constantly being extended in Christ and is being communicated through him. It is then coherent with all this action that to the extent that the world lies outside this community with Christ, for us it is continually the locus of sin and evil14 regardless of that original perfection of humans and of nature in general. As a result, no one can be surprised that already at this point our proposition states both that blessedness is present in the church alone and that the church alone generates blessedness,15 the latter because this blessedness cannot come from outside but can exist within the church only inasmuch as it is accomplished therein. As for the rest, it is self-evident that this contrast of what is placed in the world through redemption with the rest of the world comes to be more strongly or weakly subject to tension depending, in each case, on how the distinctive dignity of Christ and what redemption contains16 are grasped. It is also self-evident that this contrast completely disappears and is lost in an indeterminate distinction between better and worse only where the very contrast between Christ and sinful human beings is likewise loosened and transformed. 4. In addition, this is how the claim that our proposition is nothing other than an expression of our Christian self-consciousness is best confirmed. That is to say, if by its very nature the Christian church were to be an object of external sense perception, then it would be possible for this perception to be communicated without its being bound to Christian selfconsciousness. Now, it is the case, however, that those who do not share faith in Christ with us also do not acknowledge Christian community in its existence over against the world. Wherever the feeling of the need for redemption is entirely suppressed, certainly the Christian church will be misunderstood in every way, and from that point onward the two views would be explicated in the same fashion. With the first workings of preparatory grace that stir up this consciousness, there also arises a presentiment of the divine origin of the Christian church. Moreover, simultaneously with vital faith in Christ, faith in the actual presence of the reign of God in the community of faithful persons also invariably arises. Conversely, an incorrigible opposition to the Christian church can also open up the highest degree of resistance to redemption, wherewith even an external respect for the person of Christ can scarcely take place. On the other hand, faith in the Christian church as the reign of God not only contains within it the view that this reign of God will ever continue to exist over against the world. Rather, just as the reign of God has grown into such a community out of a few initiates, so too it cannot be imagined to be effective in any other way. Therein lies the hope that the church will increase and the world that is placed over against it will decrease. This is the case, in that for human nature Christ’s incarnation17 corresponds to what

regeneration is for individual persons, and just as sanctification is the progressive appropriation of particular functions and, as time goes on, increasingly ceases to consist of fragmentary details but more and more every part harmoniously interplays with and mutually supports the other parts, so, here too, this cooperative and mutually reinforcing community is organized out of particular redemptive activities more and more. Furthermore, this organism must increasingly overwhelm what is but an inorganic mass over against it.

1. Ed. note: Here “planted” translates gesetzt, thus using a partly organic metaphor to express the setting down or positioning of the church in relation to the world. 2. Ed. note: The earlier (two third-century) versions of the eighth-century version, which is familiarly called the Apostles’ Creed (see §36n1), preceded the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of the fourth century (see §96n7). 3. Gesamtheit. Ed. note: or “collectivity.” Just above, “collective life” translates Gesamtleben, then refers to the specific collectivity (or totality, collective whole) of faithful persons. 4. Ed. note: For example, see §110.2. See index. 5. §87. 6. Ed. note: See also §§101.1 and 128.1. 7. Gesamtheit. Ed. note: See §113n2 just above. 8. Hülfe. 9. Naturwerden. 10. Wesen. 11. Organismus. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, human interconnected relationships could be characterized using biological metaphors, as here, as well as with personal metaphors, such as using “person” to characterize a moral community. 12. In §§100 and 105. 13. In §106.2. 14. Gal. 1:4 and 1 John 5:19. 15. Ed. note: The term is selig macht. In another usage familiar in ecclesial tradition, it can also mean “brings salvation.” 16. Gehalt der Erlösung. Ed. note: Usage of this word itself suggests proportionate substance, strength, and extent. 17. Menschwerdung.

§114. If we want to present all declarations that belong to our Christian selfconsciousness concerning the community of faithful persons comprehensively, we must first consider the emergence of the church, or the way in which it is formed out of what exists in the world, next consider the way in which the church continues to exist over against the world, and, finally, consider the overcoming of this contrast, or of prospects for the church’s consummation. 1. Now, to be sure, these three points of doctrine do not at all seem to relate to our Christian self-consciousness in the same way. The second point has to do with the sphere of our day-to-day experience. There our spiritual life takes its course within the contrast between church and world. To the extent that we know how to distinguish within ourselves between what belongs to the community of faithful persons and what still belongs to the world, the Christian feeling that we share will also correctly separate, within whatever is going on around us, what belongs to the church and what belongs to the world. All this, moreover, comprises features in our propositions concerning the continuance of the church in its coexistence with the world. However, propositions that come from other sources would

not be included, even if they have this content. That is to say, just as in the case of individuals, what belongs to sinfulness and what belongs to grace can be decided not on the basis of some external aspect of a deed that is registered by sense perception but only on the basis of motions within oneself,1 so too, only those who are acquainted with the Christian church’s inner life on the basis of their own participation in it can speak of it aright. In contrast, if we can indeed set forth any declarations at all concerning the consummation of the church on the basis of our self-consciousness, they would, nonetheless, surely be only very unreliable. Moreover, we would be able to appropriate only historical indications concerning the emergence of the church, the direct communication of which indications cannot possibly belong here. Now, to begin with this last-mentioned point of doctrine, the Christian church is increased in the process of individuals and whole masses of people gradually coming to be incorporated into the interconnectedness with Christ that exists there. Moreover, just as it is generally established that the new life of individuals proceeds from that collective life in the outer circle of which they have already been present, this process also obtains in the new life of those initial followers,2 since the power of the inner circle still lay wholly contained in Christ alone. Thus, the emergence of the Christian church is the same as what we witness in our own daily lives. In this respect, however, if we proceed from the claim that gradually redemptive activity is to embrace everything, the task is not at all that of finding a rule for the way by which the church’s ordering would appear and on account of which this broadening of the church would occur in precisely such and such a fashion. Rather, since at the very same time the redemptive activity that occurs in the communal body3 of the church stretches out to far more persons than are assisted at any given time toward conversion through it, we have to see to it that we rightly conceive the difference between those persons in the communal body of the church and those other persons. Such a distinction is required, for it involves understanding the beginnings of the church. Moreover, for this purpose, to be sure, we would possess a selfconsciousness that we would then have to grasp in thought. That is, herein we would possess a contrast that would have formed within our shared feeling, a contrast between a prior equal valuation of all persons in their common state of sinfulness and a subsequent distinction between persons blessed by grace and other persons. As concerns the consummation of the church, if we apprehend our self-consciousness as something of a personal nature, then only growth in sanctification is given to us in that selfconsciousness, without any anticipatory feeling4 to the effect that the total harmony of all our powers and the consummation of individual life, viewed as an organism for Christ’s life in us, would appear once our former life had been totally wiped out. Likewise, moreover, if we conceive our self-consciousness as a shared feeling, then the church would exist only as it is growing out of the world and is gradually distancing the world from itself. However, any anticipatory feeling to the effect that consummation of the church would occur would constantly be restrained by this imperishable feature of the shared feeling, namely, that with every individual existence the old way of life5 is repeatedly reborn. Thus, to the extent that

the consummation of the church would be conditioned, even if viewed only as an anticipatory feeling, by cessation of all generating of the human race, this anticipatory feeling would founder on our species-consciousness and it would appear as if whatever Christian doctrine is to be presented on this subject would have to have a source other than Christian self-consciousness. Furthermore, then, such doctrine could not logically occupy a distinctive place in our presentation. Rather, in that it would have to rest on some sort of objective consciousness, it could be included within our presentation only in a subordinate manner6 in relation to the source of that objective consciousness. Still, in this respect two things can already be noticed, even at this point. For one thing, we are not at all in a position to realize more fully as an anticipatory feeling the opposite notion: one of progress over endless time, a progress that, because it is repeatedly blocked by new generations, would approach consummation only asymptotically.7 Besides, this anticipatory feeling of progress over endless time would provide no ready supplement to the anticipatory feeling regarding the incomplete sanctification of one’s “I” at the close of one’s life. At that point, for another thing, although this anticipatory feeling cannot, of itself alone, form any doctrine in the same sense, because it is not an isolable element of selfconsciousness, the conception of it can still offer a test, for which the alternative form of endless approximation could not serve, a test as to whether in what underlies this doctrine, namely, the doctrine regarding the continuation of the church, we have also conceived aright the nature of the reign of God. That is, the continuation of the church would also retain its truth in the effort to bring the reign of God, in and of itself, apart from its contrast with the world, into the doctrinal presentation. Moreover, insofar as this effort would achieve this end, the effort would be both natural and necessary. 2. Not to be overlooked is an analogous dissimilarity among the three main divisions. This dissimilarity consists in the fact that in treating of the second division we find ourselves entirely and, as far as possible, exclusively in the domain of Christ’s redemptive activity, for this activity constitutes the actual compass of Christ’s reign.8 On the other hand, if we think of absolute consummation in an extensive as well as in an intensive sense, at that point the dissimilarity between him and us would be entirely lifted,9 and consequently even his lordship would then cease. Moreover, this consideration offers new support for the claim that this subject cannot obtain for Christian doctrine in the strictest sense of the word. It does so especially since in the very consummation of the church no further need could be posited in self-consciousness, and consequently this consummation could be conceived as distinctively Christian only insofar as it would remain, despite all else, only as the consummation of a collective life that is dependent on Christ. Meanwhile, in this way certain changes in nature would also be constantly presupposed in relation to this consummation. These changes would lie outside the domain of Christ’s kingly lordship and would belong to the divine government of the world. The point in question, however, would concern the physical aspect of the divine government of the world, about which we have nothing to say in the present context.10 Hence, we would find ourselves, in any case, to be at the boundaries of Christian doctrine, in such a way that we could not say anything definite without overstepping them.

The same situation also obtains regarding the emergence of the Christian church, both at the beginning and as it proceeded.11 This is the case, for if in the great act of proclamation within the church, the power of the divine word and the power of that love which seeks the salvation12 of human beings are the same thing, then the difference in their effect on persons is based on differing states of receptivity. Moreover, these states are, at the same time, dependent on differing circumstances into which divine government of the world places different persons. Yet, here all this must appear to be quite natural, because divine government of the world also plays a role in any transition from the world into the church, whether it is that of an individual or that of whole masses of people, and, indeed, the divine government of the world can play that role only in the form of activity. Hence, our shared feeling would not be very complete if it were not to conceive the emerging difference between church and world as a result of divine government of the world. Here as well, however, something different is going on than an expansion on the earlier treatment of a necessary element. That is, above we have considered the Redeemer’s activity and its effect within the soul of an individual apart from the collective life. As a result, in the doctrine of sanctification, which follows, we could also consider the individual to be a self-standing particular being who acts on one’s own13 within one’s community of life with Christ. Now, the act through which the individual comes to be regenerate and the act through which the individual comes to be a member of the Christian church acting on one’s own are, indeed, entirely the same act. However, in those earlier passages14 we have not included this communal aspect of the act. Thus, here as well, inasmuch as this act grounds the individual’s relationship to the whole, we must describe the same act yet again in a way that is independent of that earlier presentation. At the same time, moreover, in this process we are most definitely referred to our self-consciousness, in which we always both distinguish and unite these two aspects: our personal existence acting on its own in community of life with Christ, and our life as integral members of the whole. Now, although it is considered based on the two aspects just pointed out, the doctrine of the church in its coexistence with the world is the proper kernel giving rise to this entire section. Accordingly, it would also be entirely appropriate to the subject to establish this coexistence first of all and to handle the other two features in a more supplementary fashion. Nevertheless, we will gain greater clarity15 regarding our subject, and do so with better facility, by adopting an ordering that is natural to a course of history.

1. Ed. note: Here “motions within oneself” translates innern Bewegungen. Often Schleiermacher uses Regungen or Erregungen (“stirrings”) instead, referring to those same internal feeling states versus what comes into oneself from external sources through sense perception (Wahrnehmung) and is registered as sensations. 2. Erstlinge. Ed. note: Literally, “first children”—here the first among the newborn. 3. Gemeinwesen. Ed. note: That is, in the publicly visible life of the church, in parallel with other bodies of a society. 4. Vorgefühl. Ed. note: For such an anticipatory feeling for which there is, however, some foretaste in experience, Schleiermacher typically uses the terms Ahnung or Ahndung (cf. §159n3). In the fuller account of this third division, introduced in §§157–59, still other related terms are also used. The division extends through §163.P.S. In this work the term Vorgefühl tends to be used especially to convey one’s having a distinct feeling regarding the constitution of human life in the

future, in particular in “the future life” beyond death (cf. §118.2, the sentence just before §118.3). See §146n1. In §146.2 Schleiermacher describes it as a special gift that Christ had, as do some persons of faith, one analogous to a prophetic gift but not simply a wish (cf. §147.1–2). Schleiermacher’s usage also bears a contrast with several other future-looking concepts, notably these: (1) Ahnung (“presentiment,” cf. §159n8, also §146 where only Vorgefühl is in the proposition, and §146n1 and n5); (2) Vorstellung (“intimation,” though usually simply “notion,” both meanings pointing imaginatively to something putatively cognitive that is less reliable than is a concept, being rather remote from being solidly based in what is perceptibly real, thus ordinarily more properly rendered metaphorically, cf. §158n3 and §163n6); (3) Phantasie (“fantasy,” a general use of the imagination to form pictures, memories, and sometimes projections into the future, cf. §159n11). Two other cognate concepts, each of which helps toward an understanding of Vorgefühl, are (4) Mitgefühl (“shared or common feeling,” rarely “compassion” in his usage, cf. §163n3—vs. Vorstellung—and compare §162n7); and (5) Prinzip, “principle,” cf. §163n20. 5. Ed. note: Here “the old way of life” translates der alte Mensch, literally the biblical phrase “the old man.” 6. [In a subordinate manner] similar to the way the facts of Christ’s resurrection and ascension were seen above. 7. Ed. note: This term, derived from mathematics, refers to a gradual approach to an end, an approach that is infinite and thus does not reach that end. 8. Cf. §105. Ed. note: The second division, introduced in §126, consists of §§126–156. 9. See 1 John 3:2. 10. Ed. note: Even in §§164–69, where the divine government of the world is a major theme, the spiritual aspect is featured, not the physical (leiblich, or bodily) aspect. 11. Ed. note: This first division of the doctrine of the church (§§115–25) opens with the doctrine of election and closes with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, viewed as the common spirit (Gemeingeist) of the church. 12. Heil. Ed. note: This same root appears in Heiligung (sanctification). It essentially means “salvation” only in the sense of coming and continuing to be “blessed,” or spiritually whole or well—that is, gaining sanctity. 13. Ed. note: Here the phrase “who acts on one’s own” translates selbständig. Implied is the recognition that one can act in this way while still being interdependent within such a community and not totally self-reliant. 14. Ed. note: See esp. §106, which introduces the points of doctrine regarding “how community with the perfection and blessedness of the Redeemer is expressed in the individual soul” (§§106–12), in regeneration and sanctification. 15. Ed. note: Here Anschaulichkeit could also quite fittingly be translated “finer perception,” for the questions addressed all have to do with how the church, viewed as community of faith and life with Christ and in the Holy Spirit, is to be perceived as a shared subject of members’ own immediate self-consciousness. Here, then, as an organ of the Holy Spirit, the church ceases to be merely a sociological category and is thereby treated chiefly as an “invisible,” if also “visible,” entity (cf. esp. §§148–56).

Division One

Regarding the Emergence of the Church [Introduction to Division One] §115. The Christian church is formed by the joining together of individual regenerate persons to affect one another and to cooperate, both in an orderly fashion. 1. If we look at the procedure of the Evangelical church in its efforts to augment community, both by its reception of instructed young people of the congregation and in its missionary work or in its transferal of individual members from other Christian communities, then our proposition is certainly the right expression of the shared feeling that is prevalent in the Evangelical church and of the way of doing things that has come into use therein. Throughout, such action is always arranged with a view to regeneration, naturally in accordance with the way in which the concept is understood there. The consequence is that even if a person cannot yet be sure of regeneration in most instances, the ruling presupposition is, nonetheless, that it has taken place. At the very least, the freer a congregation is to operate within its own sphere, the more strictly it will hold to the view that those against whose purported regeneration well-founded doubts arise would also not be received into membership. This practice, however, would not be necessary, indeed would be even counterproductive, if those being received were only to be introduced into a community in which the workings of preparatory grace were present.1 Now, a strong desire for the reign of God is also given with regeneration. Thus, those who receive and those who are received must share the conviction that both the receivers and the recipients should exercise the same efficacious action. Moreover, since both of them also share the same sphere of influence for this efficacious action by virtue of their occupying the same space, with every act2 of this kind the task of ordering this working together must, in turn, be created. Now, in this proposition a mutual affecting of one another is also stipulated, at the same time. This activity is based not simply in the fact that in each person much is still found that belongs to the world, against which the collective working of the others must be directed. Rather, it is also based in the fact that just as no one is conscious of a conception of Christ that is complete and covers every aspect, so each person sees conceptions held by others as complements to one’s own. Out of the ensuing exchange arises a presentation that is reciprocally communicating in nature. Everything that can be presented as a feature in the life of the church must also then permit of being explicated based on this process. 2. To be sure, it would seem more difficult likewise to apply this account to the original emergence of the community that was proceeding from Christ himself. Yet, if we go back to the fact that as the efficacious action of Christ began, there was already a community of people who were awaiting fulfillment of their messianic hopes, it should, indeed, not be

claimed that this was already the Christian church before Christ. However, it was a religious community, nonetheless, one containing an exchange of similar stirrings of mind and heart and a process of transaction regarding all things that related to it. When a number of persons in that community then came to honor Christ, for them there was no basis for dissolving their community. However, their community was sustaining a relation to Christ that could not exist, in the sense already set forth above, without some affecting of one another. Thus, at the same time, the relation to Christ had to become a way of working together—for the time being, in relation to those previous companions who were not yet imbued with an honoring of Christ. These companions then became the outer circle, in which they were receiving workings of preparatory grace through those with a closer relation to Christ. These workings of preparatory grace were proceeding from the inner circle of those who had already come to honor Christ, the more powerfully the more pertinently these workings were ordered. Yet, this way of working together actually remained subordinate and fragmentary as long as their shared receptivity for Christ’s immediate influences still remained paramount in their union. Furthermore, in this respect one can say that despite the presence of a sizeable number of regenerate persons within it, the church actually still remained incompletely formed, and, as a consequence, it lagged in importance behind the union of these individuals with Christ as long as the efficacious action of Christ in person continued.

1. Ed. note: That is, in keeping with what was just said above about regeneration, every authentically Christian church would include preparatory grace, but no such church would have only preparatory grace at work in it. 2. Akt. Ed. note: That is, every specific practice of receiving and being received, taken as a whole.

§116. The emergence of the church is made clear through the two doctrines regarding election and regarding the communication of the Holy Spirit.1 1. Outside the context already set forth, it might, perhaps, seem odd to find these two concepts conjoined in such a manner. They might not sound as if they would have any affinity with each other. Even with respect to their meaning, moreover, the concept of election might not seem to cohere with that of the communication of the Spirit any more exactly than it would, as it were, with the concepts of conversion and justification. In the present context, however, this coherence can no longer seem strange. Instead, in accordance with what was said above, the concept of election through the emergence of the church is a matter of the divine government of the world. That is, it has to do with the fact that those who are to fashion the church must be separated from the world. Hence, this is the reflection on the emergence of the church that one has while looking backward to the place out of which its members come. In contrast, the concept of communication of the Spirit has to do with what it is in individuals that is the ground of constancy in their working together and affecting one another. Now, since the very nature of the church continues to exist in this ground, the church’s emergence is observed in this concept, in that one looks forward to the collective life that emerges in this way. Only through the sameness of what moves and stirs in

each and every individual can this collective life become and remain a true unity of life—that is, after the manner of an integrated or so-called “moral person.”2 As a result, the whole life and working of the church must be explained on the basis of this principle, which is communicated to each individual as one of the elect. The two concepts, however, do have in common with each other that originally they are not directly applicable to the circumstance in which the effective power of the new life existed in Christ alone, as yet uncommunicated, barring the sense in which it could also be said of Christ that he would himself be elected and have the Holy Spirit. In actuality, however, therein the contrast between that outer circle which is the locus for the preparatory workings of grace and the inner circle from which these preparatory workings proceed would have to be presupposed. This is the case, for ordinarily those who have been drawn into the outer circle by the preaching of the gospel’s having reached them are not referred to as “the elect” in biblical and ecclesial speech, despite their also being distinguished from others as a result of their connection with the divine government of the world. Rather, they are simply referred to as “those who are called.” In contrast, the designation “of the elect” is reserved for those who by regeneration have been introduced into the inner circle. Likewise, moreover, the Holy Spirit is the bond of this inner circle. By virtue of the Spirit, the effects that individuals have on the outer circle become a unity, and their reciprocal working upon one another likewise forms, as it were, an organic cycle. In contrast, we do not yet ascribe the Holy Spirit to those who are called, as if the Holy Spirit were communicated to them or were dwelling in and moving them. 2. Now, first, as concerns the term “election” in its details, the actual task fulfilled by use of the term is as follows. For us, all human beings also have wholly the same status—being in a state of common sinfulness, wherein everything involved amounts to a shared fault—and no advantage in relation to the new life that is to be communicated by Christ is to be ascribed to any of them. Indeed, initially all are then drawn into the circle of preparatory grace— except that, on the one hand, certain distinctions that also emerge there are not to be ascribed to these persons themselves and, on the other hand, a distinct partiality also already exists therein, in that, at the very same time, some persons are called and other persons are not called. As a result, for purposes of this clarification, we are able to treat the two things in concert: election and the calling that precedes it and refers to it. Thus, at this point, generally when we observe the relative success and miscarriage of proclamation, there exists an advantage of some persons over other persons that is introduced within the divine government of the world—but without there being any preceding basis for this state of affairs in the persons involved. Moreover, it is possible to trace this special advantage from the oldest to the youngest of persons, not only in this particular domain but in other domains as well; but we do not have to treat of these other domains here. If we think of Christ’s becoming human as the beginning of the regeneration of the entire human race, the establishment of a permanent home for proclamation of the gospel among a people, owing to firstborn persons within its midst, will be the beginning of the regeneration of that people. Furthermore, such a people will have an advantage over contemporaries

among whom it was not possible to hear the voice of proclamation with any success. We cannot attribute this advantage to any difference in worthiness, however—just as little for a people as for individuals in the same circumstance and no less for foreign immigrants than for those born into a given community’s outer circle. Now, just as surely as we push this situation back to a divine ordering, as the Redeemer himself has done,3 so the task is also set before us to assent to this same ordering, because otherwise we would be in contradiction to our God-consciousness—and indeed, we would be in contradiction with our moral consciousness. In this matter, however, we have no ground other than to rest satisfied in the divine will, of which we can only say that it would not have been determined by the worthiness of a given person, with the result that one situation could not be viewed as reward and another situation as punishment. In our shared feeling all else remains indeterminate, in and of itself, as is the case in the concept of election. 3. Consistent with what was indicated above, the term “Holy Spirit” is understood to mean the unity of life that is inherent in Christian community, viewed as a moral person. Moreover, since everything that is actually law-bound is already excluded from it, we would be able to designate this presence in terms of the “common spirit” of that community.4 Thus, it should not actually be necessary expressly to assert that by this latter term we wish to designate the same as what is also called “Holy Spirit” and “the divine Spirit”5 and “Christ’s Spirit” in Scripture and is also adduced as the third person of the Godhead in our ecclesial teaching. That at this point we, as yet, have nothing to do with the latter ascription is selfunderstood, based on how the entire presentation of doctrine is arranged here. However, based on what has been considered earlier, though subject to more exact explication below, what follows is, likewise, to be understood in a preliminary way. We have seen that once particular influences were no longer proceeding directly from Christ, a divine presence had to be in the Christian church, which we can just as well call the being of God within it,6 provided that communication of Christ’s perfection and blessedness is continually to persist in it. To look at this activity in a preliminary way means the following. First, the communication of Christ’s sinless perfection and blessedness, viewed as the absolute constant intent of God’s reign, is the innermost impulse of the individual. Thus, second, this innermost impulse must be the common spirit of the whole as well; otherwise there would have to be no such common spirit in it. That is to say, if this common spirit were something else, that innermost impulse of individuals would have to be subordinated to it, thus subordinate to something less than perfect, just as in every instance of collective life all that is of a personal nature must be subordinate to its common spirit. If there were no common spirit at all, however, the Christian church, too, would not be a true collective life, as has been the case, nonetheless, from the outset onward, in relation to this divine Spirit that indwells it and as this Spirit has been taken up into the self-consciousness of every invigorated member in this way. Thus, this desire for the reign of God comprises the unity of life that exists in the whole, and in every individual it comprises the common spirit that is one’s own. In the whole, in accordance with its inner nature, however, this desire for the

reign of God is an absolutely powerful God-consciousness; consequently it is the being of God within that God-consciousness, yet it is conditioned by the being of God in Christ.

1. Der Mitteilung des heiligen Geistes. Ed. note: In Redeker’s edition the h (for heiligen) is mistakenly made H. This mistake was not in the original manuscript, thus was corrected by Schäfer (KGA I/13.1–2, 2003). In German usage, ordinarily the H is restricted to liturgical contexts and is not used in theology. By itself, this distinction does not represent any difference in doctrine, however, nor does the ordinary placement of the definite article (der, des, dem, den) before heilige Geist, a convention Schleiermacher always follows, as does the present translation (using “the”). Capitalizing nouns was a late convention in German in contrast to the practice in Greek, Latin, and many other languages, but it was also followed by Schleiermacher. Doing so, however, does not imply attributing personhood to the Holy Spirit in any way. It emphatically does not bear this implication for Schleiermacher. For him, moreover, writing “Holy” simply indicated that he was referring to this specific, divine spirit. §116.2–3 refers to the Holy Spirit as the “common spirit” that indwells the community of the faithful. Thus, throughout this work, as elsewhere, Schleiermacher conceives the “Holy Spirit” not as a third person (prosōpon) in a divine “Trinity” (cf. previous references here in §§55, 65.1, 74.2, 97.2, 105.P.S., and 108.5) but as the “common spirit” (Gemeingeist; e.g., cf. §§133.1 and 170.1) that God has “sent” for the continuation of Christ’s work (cf. §99.P.S.). This common spirit is the divine Spirit that, through its gifts, is constitutive of the church over its entire existence, development, and consummation. It, like Christ, represents “the supernatural becoming natural” (e.g., cf. §§99 and 123) and, for that reason, is called “holy.” So, the actual nomenclature “Holy Spirit” is not a name or title but the designation of a continuing redemptive, sanctifying process, which, in turn, stems from God’s “one eternal divine decree” (cf. §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2). Temporally, it succeeds Christ. As such, the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the church is the same process as “Christ in us” (e.g., cf. §122.3), namely, in the regenerate, wholly active and efficacious as the spirit of “the invisible church” (cf. §149). God’s presence in history is always “of a spiritual nature” (cf. §55), and this same “holy” God is manifest only in and through the world, notably through the human nature of Christ and the human nature of the “visible” church (§§148–56). Accordingly, Schleiermacher’s version of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is more specifically set forth, in detail, from §121 on out. However, the doctrine is actually laid out as a whole from §113 to §172 and is, in effect, presupposed within the system of doctrine as a whole. 2. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s ethics a community can be referred to as if it were a person, a moralischen Person. 3. John 6:44. Ed. note: Sermon on John 6:36–44, Nov. 14, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 430–32. 4. Gemeingeist. Ed. note: With quite different meanings, this term was also occasionally used by Schleiermacher for other social entities, as he does near the end of this paragraph. 5. Geist Gottes. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage this expression ordinarily reads der göttlichen Geist. 6. Ed. note: The phrase “the being of God within it,” or God’s being within it, translates das Sein Gottes in ihr. Elsewhere here Schleiermacher uses the same expression for God’s being in, or the being of God in, Jesus (e.g., in §93, noting there the same connection with the church).

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Election

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §117. In consequence of the laws inherent in the divine government of the world, as long as the human race continues to exist on the earth it can never be the case that all persons living at any given time can be uniformly taken up into the reign of God founded by Christ.1

1. Here “uniformly” is not perchance to be understood as an equality in strength of faith or an equality in the degree to which all natural powers are assimilated to the common willing2 to which we have just referred, for in this case the proposition would be quite clear, in that it could not occur to anyone to desire3 such an equality. Rather, the reference is supposed to be to the distinct difference between the inner circle and the outer circle of Christian community. The reason is that if all other communities of faith are destined to pass over into Christianity, and if it is assumed that all who are born into this community would eventually come under the influence of preparatory grace, then a time can be imagined when everyone whose consciousness is but scantily developed to this end would also belong to that outer circle. However, since partaking of Christ’s perfection and blessedness is not yet tied into this condition, these people are decidedly different from self-initiating, active members of the Christian community, a fact that also fully harmonizes with the distinction between calling and election indicated above. For the rest, two different points are indicated here, of which one point is indeed more a law of the divine ordering of the world, while the other point is also such a law but only to a certain degree.4 That is, patently this second law is such that what proceeds from the one point is only gradually spread out over the entirety of space. This second law is already less obvious, in that accordingly the state of grace could never be inborn; rather, at birth even Christian children would be essentially like all others that stem from Adam. Instead, any actual deviation from that heritage would, in part, be an exception that is inconceivable based on the fundamental fact of Christianity; consequently, it would be a new miracle independent of Christianity. Moreover, it would also demolish the concept of species. 2.5 Let us suppose that even as Christ began to proclaim the reign of God with reference to himself, he would have detected the same feeling of need for redemption everywhere. In that case, in part, in relation to his person, some would have been prepared by John and others not, whereas, in part, in relation to his forming the reign of God, some would have been bound in a particular fashion to what already existed, thus rejecting the very idea of Christ, while others would not have done so. Consequently, wherever he went he could show himself to be efficacious only in the most varied gradations imaginable. This was so, just as he could also establish the range of his proclamation, spatially speaking, only within distinct limits,6 but at one spot broadening it by changing location and at another spot staying longer where he was. Indeed, even where he might have been enjoined to leave,7 for many who would have come to the point of following him, this act would, of course, have served their undeserved disadvantage. Yet, all of this activity has its basis in the divine government of the world. Moreover, we also find this same inequality in proclamation pursued from apostolic times right up to the present day. This continuing situation is to be explained as follows. The inclination to expand the church outward—an inclination that indwells the whole community of faith but that is particularly prominent in certain individuals—is indeed completely homogeneous in itself. It is so, in that it proceeds from the equality of all in their sinful status. In practice, however, this inclination to expand the church is, in part, subject to societal circumstances that have to

provide points of connection with the church’s proclamation, and is, in part, subject to the mysterious activity of being attracted or repelled.8 The latter activity stands under the divine government of the world no less than the former activity does. Moreover, it also could not have been otherwise—not if what was supernatural in Christ was to become natural and the church was to be formed as a natural, historical phenomenon. 3. Suppose that we likewise observe the continuing growth of the church over the succession of generations. Here too, there arises a similar inequality in that the regeneration of individuals is bound to this natural form of living together by every two generations that follow one after the other, which is likewise rooted in the divine ordering of the world. This inequality occurs in that, sooner or later, every individual would arrive in this inner circle among social surroundings and influences that are more or less fitting for that individual. Two things always arise in this way. First, among persons who are living within the compass of the church at any given time, many will not belong to it. Second, it will be possible to say about those persons that they could already have been members of the church if their life path had been guided differently. Then, suppose too that a long succession of generations of a people, viewed in its entirety, had been living in a state of sanctification and that each of them would have borne an influence on later generations, while impulsive natural tendencies9 would have been tempered more and more. However, this process would still always be simply a better form of general sinfulness. Moreover, at some point, self-knowledge and repentance would still have to enter in. Suppose, though, that recognition of the Redeemer would also have resulted early in this same relationship, enabling one to imagine a time—though physical birth and spiritual birth never could fall within the same moment in time—in which nature and grace would also not be distinguishable at all, but, nevertheless, a time in which the development of living faith would occur as closely as possible to the initial development of moral10 notions and sensations. This whole development would be the nearest possible approximation of the human development of Christ. Moreover, by that moment of recognition every individual would surely have attained much earlier to the possession of and gratification in one’s partaking of the higher life in a way that befits each one.11 Even given those suppositions, however, differences would persist, nevertheless, differences such that some persons would not yet have attained to this gratification whereas others of their age group would have been enjoying it long since.12 4. Now, if we designate this ordering by the term “divine election” because thereby we would stick with an act of divine good pleasure as the ultimate ground for all this ordering, then our not being allowed to seek that whereby this divine good pleasure is itself to be determined does not obviate against our choosing the term “divine election.” In particular, we also cannot say that with God everything would be the same toward everyone but that the will of some persons places obstacles in the way. In that case, that very will would, in fact, develop only gradually, to a greater or lesser degree of one’s readiness to be stirred,13 and likewise not without influence from external circumstances. Paul has led the way in this investigation.14 He did so, moreover, by trying to articulate the law under which the apostolic

church filled itself at first with Gentiles of that time, given that the larger portion of the Jewish people still remained outside it. Moreover, the call to do this became all the more pressing once whole peoples were adopting Christianity, among whom many did also at least attain regeneration, while many members of peoples long designated as Christian still remained, for the time being, outside the interconnected life of the church’s inner circle.15 Suppose that one adds to this observation how differently the end of life is set among human beings. For many who are born into the Christian church and who have already experienced many workings of preparatory grace, the end nevertheless comes before these impressions could be combined and intensified for the purpose of beginning a spiritual process of life in a state of regeneration. Furthermore, many who live in places where the voice of the gospel has only just begun to penetrate are called away, in accordance with the divine ordinance concerning duration of life. Thus, it is clearly grounded in the divine ordering of the world that many die unregenerate because the time to reach their life’s goal has elapsed. Whether this happens to many or few is actually a matter of indifference here, as is the fact that one person responds no differently than others do to the offerings of divine grace. Hence, we cannot say that God would definitely not have willed all this, since it all has its ground in the relationship between the natural order, which is dependent on God, and God’s decree of redemption through Christ, which decree bears just as profound a surety for us. As a result, we are not able to resist the conclusion that if God had not definitely and unconditionally willed this, God would have arranged either a different natural order16 for human life or a different order of salvation for the human spirit. If God has somehow ordered matters in this way, the task naturally arises for us also to consent to this divine will in the most conscious manner possible and without internal contradiction.17

1. Ed. note: Here §§117–118 are taken to be introductory to the two doctrinal propositions that follow (§§119–120). 2. Gemeinwillen. Ed. note: This shared process of willing the reign of God is identical with what in §116 was termed “desire” (wollen) for it. 3. Ed. note: Here the verb “desire” translates begehren. 4. Ed. note: Continuing the two-part analysis begun in §§113–116, here the two “points” (Punkte) refer again, first, to that point from which “the divine government of the world” begins and “the one eternal divine decree” is made “law” by God, and second, to the point at which Christ comes into the world and the “reign of God” is made manifest through the church—this representing a law only gradually to be fulfilled from that point on. This first law is emphasized in the doctrine of election, the second in the doctrine of the communication of the Holy Spirit. Each of these doctrines is literally a “piece” of the doctrinal system, in English usage called a “point of doctrine” (Lehrstück). 5. Ed. note: See also §108.6 on the collective whole of the church being united with Christ in his high-priestly role, otherwise referred to as a “ministry” that variously belongs to the whole people ([g]γαóς[/g]) of God in the the church, not to clergy alone. See his writings on practical theology, also index on “laity” in BO and pp. 137f. there. 6. Matt. 15:24. 7. Matt. 8:34. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 8:28–34, Feb. 2, 1812, SW II.1 (1834), 414–24. 8. Acts 16:6–10. Ed. note: These verses describe Paul and companions being repelled in their attempts to preach to some cities and attracted through a dream to preach in other regions. 9. Ed. note: Here “impulsive natural tendencies” translates leidenschaftlichen Naturanlagen. Carried within this usage by Schleiermacher is the connotation of being passive, and not in a state of active receptivity, in relation to those influences,

on the one hand, and, on the other hand, being impelled by one’s own natural tendencies, not necessarily by passionate ones only. This adjective can also mean “passionate.” 10. Ed. note: Here “moral” translates sittlicher, which in Schleiermacher’s usage always covers the entire range of human conduct, not simply what is often meant by “moral,” as if it could refer only to one portion of human action. 11. Ed. note: What “befits” each person thus points not simply to a certain age level, for any given person’s readiness for or sustained experience of “the higher life” could occur at any time within one’s life after one has reached a sufficient level of discretion with regard to “moral notions and sensations”—usually not attained, according to Schleiermacher’s psychology and educational thought, until late in one’s childhood, or one’s early teens. 12. Ed. note: This language suggests an analogy to the subsequent experience of partaking of, being gratified by, and enjoying the Lord’s Supper and to the experience of not being ready for it. See §§139–42. 13. Erregbarkeit. Ed. note: Here “readiness to be stirred” is in parallel to the translation of Erregung as “stirring.” 14. Rom. 10 and 11. Ed. note: Only one sermon on Rom 11:32–33, May 29, 1831, Festpredigten (1833), also SW II.2 (1834), 562–73. 15. Ed. note: By “inner connection” (innern Zusammenhang). 16. Naturordnung … Heilsordnung. Ed. note: All along, Schleiermacher has been referring to God’s Weltordnung, translated “ordering of the world.” 17. Ed. note: Widerspruch has connotations both of inconsistency and of dissent. Both are to be avoided in consent to the divine will.

§118. The shared feeling of Christians is at ease with one or another person’s being taken up into the community of redemption earlier or later; however, an irresolvable dissonance does remain if, on the presupposition that there is a continuing existence after death, we were to think of a portion of the human race as entirely excluded from this community.1 1. If we consider ourselves, with both features of our self-consciousness, that of sin and that of grace, to be members of the church over against the world, by virtue of the latter feature, wherein the complete surety of the divine decree of our blessedness is given to us, we find ourselves to be in contrast to all those in whom this consciousness has not yet developed. On the other hand, by virtue of the consciousness of sin we find ourselves completely equal2 to them, for the consciousness of forgiveness belongs to the other feature, grace, but ever makes us mindful of that original feature, sin, which inheres in the consciousness of that nature which all human beings have in common. Thus, the equally natural incapacity from which consciousness of the need for redemption can develop in each person is supported in one place and is left to its own devices in another place. Further, consciousness of the need for redemption is received in revelation of the divine decree, which makes for blessedness3 in one place but not in another place. As a consequence, then, this inequality within this selfsame human race is one in which no portion of the rest would be definitely excluded in relation to the divine efficacious action of Christ. This inequality, moreover, would be such that in order to accept it we would either have to reduce our Godconsciousness to a particularistic attitude or have to estimate the difference between those who are blessed and the rest to be lower and to be a matter of an almost accidental more or less. Otherwise, the blessedness that is posited in the consciousness of grace would, of necessity, be nullified by the shared feeling of having a lack of blessedness, which would be bound up with a sense of abasement.

Yet, all this gains a whole other perspective, as soon as we hold ourselves to be justified in assuming that this contrast is simply in process of vanishing at every particular point, with the result that everyone who is now still outside this blessed community would at some time or other be within it, deeply touched by the workings of divine grace. This would be the case, for at that point there would be no bifurcation in our species-consciousness anymore, and for that consciousness the merely gradual transition of individuals into the full enjoyment of redemption would be entirely the same as the gradual progress of sanctification is for our personally oriented self-consciousness. That is, it would simply be the natural form that divine activity would of necessity take on in its historical appearance, and, as was stated above,4 it would be the indispensable condition of all temporal efficacious action of the Word-become-flesh. What could be objected to this view is cleared up in the following two reflections. The first reflection is about an application we make of the proposition already set forth earlier,5 that Christ’s becoming human occurs in the same way as does the regeneration of the whole human race, viewed as a unity. If this is the case, then no one can say that it would have been better for the whole human race if Christ had been born earlier and, consequently, if the new spiritual collective life had begun earlier. That is to say, this earlier birth would indeed have been better, but this would have been the case only if this new life could have been taken up with the same purity and power. In contrast, when it is said that Christ was born in the fullness of time,6 this means that the divine anticipatory provision7 concerning the whole human race and the particular determination concerning the point in time when the Redeemer would appear are one undivided revelation of divine omnipotence. They are to such an extent that the spiritual life, which is conditioned by this determination as to time, is surely also the absolutely largest one, and it articulates the whole idea of the nature of humanity. Now, the same thing can also be said of the individual, that when one’s fullness of time is reached, each one will be regenerated. As a result, one’s new life too, in its being conditioned by this determination of time, is an absolutely largest event, however late it may come, and completely articulates the whole idea of one’s person, as this person is likewise bound to the collectivity that exists in a given place. Hence, in agreement with that belief, we cannot think, even regarding the individual, that it would have been better for him or her to have been regenerated earlier. Moreover, there is no basis for fearing that thereby some sluggishness of witness to Christ would be founded or that a decline in discipline and teaching would occur. There is no basis for this fear, simply because it would not help to bring the gospel to people’s hearts before their time is fulfilled. Augustine already clearly expounded this point,8 and this objection would also not easily be seriously made by anyone who is truly affected by the process of sanctification, that is, by anyone who is ready to bear witness or to apply teaching and discipline. This is so, for such a person, on the one hand, is driven from within,9 without a view to any definite result and, on the other hand, also knows that the workings of grace by the Spirit, which workings proceed from every regenerate person, fit with the fact that each person would also actually be regenerated whenever the fullness of time would have been reached for that person.

The second reflection is about the application we make of the proposition that in regeneration each person becomes a new creature. That is to say, in accordance with this proposition, a shared feeling concerning the lateness of such a rebirth would be empty in any case, because there would be no origin for this feeling in the given subject. It would be just as empty as if one had assumed a temporal creation of the world and felt distressed that the world had not been created earlier. Furthermore, if someone would also want to say that the previous period of one’s life was not altogether pointless to oneself but was a disagreeable one, this disagreeable quality would indeed disappear in the surety that one’s sin is forgiven just as fully whether that period had been longer or shorter. Indeed, if such a regret were intimated from time to time, because the new life would not have lasted so long as it would have lasted had it developed earlier, even this regret would be but an illusion that still gives evidence of a lack of familiarity with the new life. This would be so, for this new life is eternal and requires no increase over some length of time. In like manner, then, no one who has come to be mature in sanctification has any such awareness, unless it were to happen in a diseased state of mind. Rather, such after-pains could befall only those who are starting out, but in a state of composure10 these afterpains would disappear of themselves. Hence, in no way are these afterpains suitable for consideration within the sphere of a doctrinal concept. Instead, from the earliest to the latest comer among the regenerate, each must be of equal worth11 to oneself and for others. Moreover, this is true even if the earliest comer is a very young child and the latest is of an age reached only after a long series of developments in life. This is so, for the first is better placed to be a likeness of the original unity of the divine with the personal existence of a human being, whereas the latter is better placed to be a likeness of the eventual suffusion of human nature in its entirety by Christ’s redemptive power, wherewith the collective efficacious action of all previously regenerated persons is presupposed. Yet, even the semblance of a differentiation must disappear, all the more so the more the shared feeling and common spirit win the upper hand in them, whereby each person takes to oneself all that is present in the others. So, there is no basis for fearing12 that indifference to the workings of preparatory divine grace or deferral of repentance and conversion to an undetermined future would be occasioned thereby. This would be the case, for anyone who would offer this outlook would defer conversion, not because Christian teaching forbids one to have it but because, at present, one would still prefer to take part in the collective life of sin than to take part in God’s reign. Such a person also cannot be helped by someone withholding this teaching but can be helped only by someone who knows how to stimulate longing for the reign of God in that person. Taken together, then, what all this yields is that once anyone who lags behind us is received into a living community with Christ, our shared feeling can be fully at peace, without any contradiction arising between that shared feeling and our God-consciousness. 2. It is plain to see, however, that all that has been adduced thus far is useless the moment we feel obliged to think that a portion of our human race is to be entirely excluded from this community with Christ and from the higher state that is dependent on it. Indeed, this point is so self-evident that one would be disinclined to make a distinction, whether one assumes a

continuing existence after death or not, and certainly would be disinclined to make a distinction if one agrees with what has been stated here. That is to say, if this life is in itself eternal, then the possession and deprival of eternal life can also not diverge more widely, as long as only one person has come into possession of blessedness, which alone confers value to life, and another person has not. This would be the case whether eternal life refers to an unending duration or to an insignificant duration. Now, let us assume this dichotomy for the moment. Accordingly, the discordance is then to be resolved in only one of the following two ways. Either we would justify the coexistence of such equality and inequality between ourselves and others and would try to trace it back to a law, in which case the proposed contradiction would be recognized to be a mere illusion; or we would declare one of the two itself to be an illusion, whether it is the original equality that would have come about by divine apportionment, or it is the inequality that would have come about in this way. The first option can be attempted in two ways. That is to say, just as equality among human beings would be the original arrangement of human nature, so too the stipulated inequality would also be grounded in that very same nature. Thus, a contradiction between the two could take place only by finding fault with the arrangement of human nature, which would then no longer make any sense because we would not exist if we were not human beings. However, the inequality, which would have arisen only through the intervention of Christ, could not be located in human nature as it underlies the collective life of sinfulness. Against our assumption, and reverting to Pelagian principles,13 we would then have to assume receptive powers in the one person or repelling powers in the other. Moreover, despite all this, one would revert to an inequality in the dispensation of individual impulses, which was supposed to be grounded only in the divine good pleasure. The other way around, if equality were to be grounded in the same source as inequality, namely, in the divine order of salvation, this grounding would have to mean that with respect to redemption, God would have placed all human beings under sin, even though only some were to enjoy the benefit of redemption. Then, however, the reception of one person and exclusion of another would be grounded in such an arbitrariness on God’s part that we would rightly have to call this order an absolute, willful decision. Yet, even if the coexistence of equality and inequality could be thought of in this manner, those who would be left behind for our sakes would, nonetheless, be and irretrievably remain an object of our shared feeling,14 which, the more species-consciousness is put on the same footing as personal consciousness, would thus cancel out the blessedness attached to personal consciousness, because it would be a shared feeling of not being blessed. Some have sought to remedy this impasse and have believed that they had done so by hypothesizing that the order of salvation, in which they take the equality of incapacity and the inequality of assistance to be grounded, would have its motivation in the fact that the divine mercy would have to be made manifest in the one and the divine justice in the other.15 Therewith, they think, there would be a full divine manifestation of the two aspects in human nature: of justice in those who are lost and of mercy in those who are saved.16 It could be objected

against this position, however, that, as a special case, divine justice would also be fully revealed if all that is made possible overall through redemption would also come to be realized, for it would then be rendered as reward in Christ and as punishment in all those who continue to belong to the collective life of sin. In general, however, it is not to be conceded that there is such a thing as a divided revelation of divine attributes, in that they would then be restricted17 and God would be an unrestricted being with restricted attributes. Instead, justice and mercy must not be exclusive of each other, the result being that mercy would have to be shown to the same subjects as is justice, which would itself be unthinkable if conceived as a permanent exclusion of some persons from the blessedness communicated by Christ. Thus, only the second way remains, namely, that of declaring one of the two, the equality or the inequality of the two portions of humankind, to be an illusion. Inequality between those who are taken up into a living community with Christ and those who are excluded from it cannot possibly be held to be an illusion without giving up an essential component of our Christian consciousness. The case is different with equality, which we find in the consciousness of sin. This equality would be an illusion if there had actually been an original inequality among human beings, thus a split in human nature from the very outset. The reason is that as we would become aware of this split, the contradiction would disappear, because those whom we had taken to be originally not equal to us also could not be an object of our shared feeling. Rather, the oneness of human nature, as previously apprehended by us, would be a deception. However, if one may then imagine that there would be an arousable receptivity for divine grace in one person but none in another, or that there would be an insurmountable resistance to divine grace in one person but none in another, one would in every instance arrive at Manichean presuppositions18 that inveigh against our conception, just as we saw the Pelagian presuppositions do above. Indeed, even redemption would obtain an entirely different form, for in that perspective Christ would then actually have come only to unfold the inequality that was already present and to bring it into the light, and his actual function would be that of judgment, and what could then be called redemption would simply be the form taken by one aspect of this function. Thus, there is no way to overcome this discordance if, proceeding from our Christian consciousness, we are supposed to consent to assume that a portion of our human race would remain entirely excluded. However, why our proposition admits of being understood in such a way that the discordance would be greater, given the generally predominant presupposition within the Christian church of a personal existence after death, than if we could adopt the opposite view is to be explained only as follows. In our present life, even if we do acknowledge the state of grace as a communication of the perfection and blessedness of Christ, this communication would occur, nevertheless, only within the innermost ground of our consciousness. In contrast, if we reflect on the collective self-consciousness of the blessed, the consciousness of sin would always be contained within it as well. Thus, for the others the sense of inequality would not be present, because in the only consciousness that would be present in them, namely, temporal consciousness, they would recognize only the difference of a more and a less, and they would find this difference to be all the more meager

the less they would be touched by preparatory grace. On the other hand, when we consider present life, eventually we have also to imagine a final development of both blessedness and lack of blessedness: that is, a contrast between the two that would have stretched to its greatest extent. Moreover, the more we would already be suffused with the anticipatory feeling19 regarding a future life even now, the stronger would the shared feeling of a future lack of blessedness also have to be and thus the sterner the discordance. 3. A couple of other attempts to resolve this problem have a certain affinity with this last reflection. The one attempt would concede a continuing existence after death to those who have reached the point of receiving communication of Christ’s blessedness, but it would have those who are excluded perish in death, with the result that they are simply to be viewed, in a physical fashion, as like children who die before they have grown to enjoy the light of day. In this view, the inequality would indeed be diminished on both sides, because a brief lack of blessedness would present a lesser contrast than one that would extend indefinitely. However —quite apart from the fact that only in this way would redemption become the cause of immortality, and it would thus exercise a physical effect that would exist not at all in its nature and destiny, but in this case too a splitting of human nature into two entirely different parts would otherwise underlie its functioning—a particularistic element would still remain in redemption, which could assure blessedness and immortality only to some, not all. The other attempt would want to reduce the inequality from a different direction: namely, in holding that after this life the unregenerate too could attain to a certain fulfillment and happiness by faithfully utilizing the natural light given to them, even if this fulfillment and happiness were only of a subordinate status, and they would remain excluded only from a higher stage of life.20 At that point, however, it would not be possible to see why they should not also remain within the sphere of preparatory grace or be transported into it and why preparatory grace should not have reached its end sooner or later. Otherwise, redemption would remain particularistic here as well, and we would also arrive again at a divine arbitrariness that would cancel out any full harmony, in this case simply in a different form. The following doctrinal propositions are now to be more exactly defined and evaluated in accordance with these considerations.

1. Once and for all, for this point of doctrine I make reference to my essay on the doctrine of election. Ed. note: On the Doctrine of Election, 1819, SW I.2, 393–484; KGA I/10 (1990), 145–222; ET Nicol and Jorgenson (2012). 2. Ed. note: Throughout this section gleich, Gleichheit, ungleich, and Ungleichheit are used to compare groups of persons. The German simultaneously indicates both “equality” and “similarity.” In these propositions this translation consistently renders versions of gleich with versions of “equal.” 3. Offenbarung des begnadigenden göttlichen Ratschlusses. Ed. note: Elsewhere in the work Schleiermacher refers to this as the one eternal divine decree of redemption (e.g., cf. §§90.3 and 109.3). In German, begnadigen (from Gnade, grace) means to bless. In much theology of his day and since, begnadigen means to pardon; but it does not mean this in his usage, hence the translation “that makes for blessedness” here. Further, the term “blessedness” just below, and frequent in his discourse, translates Seligkeit. The Luther Bible translates the Greek word swthri/a with Seligkeit (e.g., Eph. 1:13; Phil. 1:28; Heb. 2:3; 1 Pet. 1:1). Intermittently Luther translates swthri/a with Heil (e.g., Rom. 11:11 and 12:10; Titus 2:11; and Rev. 17:1). Whereas in English “salvation” translates the Greek in such passages, “blessing” also translates other Hebrew and Greek words in the English Bible. For the most part, Schleiermacher chose the words begnadigten (blessed by grace) and Seligkeit to refer to the state of blessedness (vs. “salvation”) or righteousness (vs. “justification,” cf. Rom. 4:6, 9—“blessing

is reckoned as righteousness”) or sanctification (Heiligung). All of these states stand for what is given and achieved by grace. (He reserved Heil for “salvation.”) Such divine action always includes God’s forgiveness of sin, but Schleiermacher tends to find serious lacks in strictly transactional, judicial, or penitential interpretations of what God is said to do or to require, either with respect to Christ or with respect to the Christian life. 4. Ed. note: For example, see §96.3 and §108.5. 5. Ed. note: See §100. 6. Gal. 4:4. Ed. note: See §12n5. 7. Vorherversehung. Ed. note: This rare usage seems intended to avoid the simpler term “providence” (Vorsehung), which Schleiermacher took to be too easily misunderstood to be useful (§164.3). 8. In Augustine’s book Admonition and Grace (427), throughout. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 245–304; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:915–59. 9. As in 2 Cor. 5:14 and 20. 10. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, to be in a beruhigten Zustand is to be at peace or calmed down, hence “in a state of composure.” 11. Ed. note: The theme of equality (gleichwert here) often appears in Schleiermacher’s sermons. For example, see that on Gal. 3:27–28, Dec. 26, 1832, first published in 1832, then in his Festpredigten (1833), also in SW II.2 (1835, 1843), 343– 56. 12. Ed. note: See §8.P.S.2 and the citation there of his sermon on the theme “Perfect love casts out fear” from 1 John 4:16–18. 13. Ed. note: Cf. §61.5. 14. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: This is one instance where perhaps the word returns, in part, to the ordinary nontechnical meaning of “sympathy.” Yet, here too, it is a feeling in which the observer is not disjoined from the other, thus is rendered as a “shared feeling.” 15. (1) Gallican Confession (1559) 12: “We believe that from this corruption … God, according to his eternal and immutable counsel, calleth those whom he hath chosen by his goodness and mercy alone in our lord Jesus Christ … to display in them the riches of his mercy, leaving the rest in the same corruption and condemnation to show in them his justice.” (2) Belgic Confession (1561) 16: “We believe that God did then manifest himself … merciful and just, merciful since he delivers and preserves from this perdition all whom he … hath elected in Christ Jesus … just in leaving others in the fall and perdition where they have involved themselves.” Ed. note: For these two items, ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 366 and 401; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 332 and 370. 16. Ed. note: See §§84–85 on these two proposed attributes of God. 17. Begrenzt. Ed. note: That is, they would be limited to certain boundaries in themselves. 18. Ed. note: See §22 for Schleiermacher’s description of the presuppositions he calls “Manichean” among the four heresies “natural” to Christianity. 19. Vorgefühl. Ed. note: Cf. §108n64 and §146n1. 20. Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818), §116.3. Redeker note: Cf. page 440: “It is illuminating … that when people speak of the blessedness of the next life, they have to make an important distinction between the blessedness [Seligkeit] that God would offer through Christ and happiness [Glückseligkeit] in general. To a certain extent, in his general love God has intended the latter for all and has also made the necessary arrangements for that. On the other hand, by virtue of the nature of things, only some could take part in blessedness.” [ET Tice]

§119. First Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding Predestination: The election of those who have been justified1 is a divine predestination to blessedness in Christ. (1) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “and whether it is very certain that a person doing penance on account of God’s Son freely, because of faith, receives forgiveness for sins and justification and that this person is an inheritor of eternal life.”—“God wants it understood that the human species was created by God … not for eternal destruction but that he might gather a church for himself in humankind with which he might share for all eternity his wisdom, goodness and joy (laetitia).”2

(2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) X: “From eternity God has freely … predestinated or elected the saints whom he wills to save in Christ. … God has elected us, not directly but in Christ … in order that those who are now ingrafted into Christ by faith might also be elected. But those who were outside Christ were rejected.”3 (3) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) XVII: “Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, who … hath constantly decreed … those whom he hath chosen in Christ to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation.”4 (4) Solid Declaration (1577) XI: “Predestination (predestinatio) … applies (pertinet) only to the children of God, who are chosen and predestined (electi et ordinate) to eternal life.”5 (5) Confessiones Marchicae (= Confessio Fidei Ioannis Sigismundi Electoris Brandenburgici, 1613): “That Almighty God has ordained and elected to eternal life all who have steadfast faith in Christ. … thus, in accordance with his firm justice, from eternity God has also overlooked all those who do not have faith in Christ and has prepared the everlasting fire of hell for them.”6 1. Let us now reflect on our self-consciousness as regenerate persons. Let us observe how it operates during our advances in sanctification, from the very onset on. Further, let us do so under two conditions: first, not only inasmuch as we are aware of our activity within the reign of God as something divinely effected by means of Christ’s being sent to us but also, second, inasmuch as the unfolding of these advances in each person is at one with the place given to each person within the general interconnected process of human circumstances. Accordingly, this would be the natural way to speak concerning the matter: that the ordering within which redemption is realized in each person is the same thing as the carrying out of the divine ordering of the world in relation to that person. Moreover, this assertion would apply not only to the period since regeneration would have emerged. Rather, because it also applies to that earlier period, which also belongs to the realization of redemption within that person at a time when that same person would have stood under the influences of preparatory grace, it applies, as well, to the element of rebirth, which unites these two periods with each other. Yet, the self-consciousness that is expressed in this way is not the merely personal one of an individual. Rather, this self-consciousness is comprised of the shared feeling of all who find themselves within the circle of Christ’s working, and therefore it is rightly transmitted to all for whom being drawn into that circle might yet be near at hand. Thus, if this very process counts for them as the instant of their rebirth, this very process of the individual’s being drawn, each in one’s own time, into community with Christ is simply the result of the fact that the divine activity of justification is made distinct in its manifestation7 through the

general ordering of the world and is a part of that. This view of the matter would then be contrary to that held by someone wishing to claim that one’s own conversion and sanctification would have started at the same time and in the same fashion even if the course of one’s own life were disposed within an entirely different set of circumstances. Now, how our proposition is in conformity with the consciousness of freedom has already been discussed above.8 Moreover, in this respect we could also express our proposition in such a way that the manner in which any given individual would obtain rebirth, and the time when this would occur, would, in every instance, be determined by the distinctiveness of one’s inner life, or one’s freedom, and by one’s relationships to the natural, historical unfolding of the justifying divine activity, or by one’s place in the world. Accordingly, the reign of grace, or of the Son, would arise, first of all, only in absolute unity with the reign of the omniscient Almighty One, or of the Father,9 and there the overall world order, together with the world, would exist eternally in God. Therefore, within the reign of grace nothing would happen without divine predestination. Thus, all this would be present, first of all, in the self-consciousness of those blessed by grace and would be posited by means of it. Moreover, whether they might then say that their condition is a work of divine grace in Christ or that it is a result of divine predestination, in each of the two expressions the other would be implied. 2. However, as concerns those whom we find to be outside Christ’s community, they cannot stir us in such a manner that this outside status would give us a well-grounded occasion to declare something about them in this context. The reason is that we are conscious of proclamation regarding Christ that is ever proceeding from the church, as a vital efficacious action, consequently as one that is not without its results. Moreover, we experience how the workings of preparatory grace first arise for individuals from this proclamation and how these very individuals later on become church members, in whose progress in sanctification the surety of their being right with God10 is made manifest; consequently, we also experience how this very same divine predestination comes to be revealed in them as well. In contrast, of those who do not evidence these workings we have no basis for declaring anything else but precisely this negation, and indeed only in their relation to the reign of God at a given time and the workings of grace that proceed from it.11 Thus, with respect to divine predestination, there lies herein only what has been explained above,12 that there are always some people in whom divine predestination has not yet reached its goal, namely, the beginning of blessedness in Christ. However, by taking this route we can never arrive at the notion that there would be a counterposed predestination for these people or for certain ones among them. That many are called but few are chosen13 is true at every particular point wherein the reign of God is proclaimed and for every time—that is, for the present time—and it is always proper for one to say that most people are not yet to be thought of as among the elect—that is, at the present time. This is the case, for it is natural that in every moment most people are held in trust for some later moment, for this provision is commensurate with the ordering of the divine decree, in that in every temporal development there is necessarily a succession, even among things that were originally

contemporaneous. Thus, only in this limited sense—that is, at every time when we are able to compare with each other those who are in the process of sanctification and those who are not yet there—are we permitted to say that God passes over or overlooks some and that God also rejects those whom God overlooks, consequently that election always manifests itself in opposition to this rejection.14 From our standpoint, the term “passing over”15 is the most suitable one, because it says “no” to only a distinct action. It is not as if no divine activity, or no divine decree for that matter, would have been implicated in relation to them. Rather, only as a consequence of the overall divine ordering of things is this divine activity so completely bound up in remote internal and external preparations that they merely seem to us to be passed over. That is to say, for us, those who are not yet taken up are simply this indeterminate element. Lacking in personal existence of a spiritual kind, they are still sunk within the mass of sinful collective life, and as long as divine predestination has not yet come to light in them, they are, purely and simply, where the whole church also was at one time. On account of this fact, we too can never cease to view them as objects of that divine activity by which the church is gathered and as included with us all under the same divine predestination. Now, since we have also denied and declared as mere appearance every return from community with Christ into the collective life of sin,16 such that this community with Christ would have been entirely surrendered, so too no divine predestination can be assumed whereby that community with Christ would be lost to an individual. Thus, we also reasonably stick with this one divine predestination to blessedness, in accordance with which the emergence of the church is ordered. 3. Hence we also can deal with the other kind of notion, which holds to a bifurcated predestination of some to blessedness and of others to damnation, only, as it were, by way of an appendage yet, strictly speaking, not as something belonging here at all.17 For that purpose, however, we have no point of connection with the reflection carried out above other than in our thinking of death’s intervening before predestination is fulfilled in a given individual. Now, suppose that there were an individual in whom significant influences of preparatory grace could be detected but also that it could just as surely be assumed that this individual is not yet in a state of sanctification. At that point, the thought would easily arise that this individual’s having come into community with Christ and having attained to enjoyment of blessedness is not to be, and must not be, by virtue of some divine arrangement. Suppose that instead we proceed based on the presupposition that all who belong to the human race would, sometime or other, be taken up into community of life with Christ. Thus, this one divine predestination would remain. In no way would we conclude from the claim that this predestination would not yet have been accomplished during a given individual’s lifetime that some other destination would be accomplished through that individual’s death. Rather, even the condition one would have at death would at that point be simply an intermediate one. This is faith in Christ: one that ascribes to him a jurisdiction and power over the entire human race and, at the same time, does not have to assume any blind18 preference among

persons on God’s part. In that faith, moreover, no contradiction would arise for us between the prospect implicit in the divine order of salvation that we have embraced and any outcome encountered through the divine order of the world. In contrast, as soon as one were to proceed from the opposite assumption, as is clearly the case in our confessions19—that is, that death would bring the workings of divine grace to an end– the above proposition would cease to be a suitable expression. Moreover, if everything is to remain logical and straightforward, one would then have to assume a predestination whereby some would be ordained to damnation just as others are ordained to blessedness. Suppose, however, that someone would want also to say that predestination would apply only to those who have become blessed and that the rest would simply be overlooked or left where they are. This position would not do any longer, at least not without artificial distortion, if by predestination one can understand only a divine decree that would lead a human being to one’s end.20 Similarly, this position would not hold for someone who would identify predestination with election and would then claim that with respect to persons who are evil there would be no predestination but only foreknowledge,21 for an overlooking that is foreknowledge is, in any case, a predestining. The reason is that if one claims that individual persons who are elected are predestined,22 it follows that if there is to be only a mere foreknowledge for the others, then there would also be no divine will with respect to them. Moreover, if one were then to state, however emphatically and prefatory to that claim, that predestination to election would have to be viewed in Christ and not as something absolutely in and of itself, it would also follow that if in Christ some could not be elected but could only be overlooked, the general nature of redemption would also have to be restricted accordingly. Taken together, these considerations can only yield the following result. Proceeding from the presupposition that for those who die outside Christ’s community there is no further access to it at all, if someone would still want to claim that these excluded persons would be overlooked, then it would follow that they must likewise be regarded as nonexistent. Now, this conclusion would also be entirely correct if one were simply to shift our proposition in its entirety to the domain of new creation, for those who would be excluded would not be found in that domain, but, viewed in this way, neither would the elect be there in advance. Instead, each could be in that domain only in one’s own time, in accordance with predestination, and thereupon the term “predestination” would also not be applicable to individuals in their present actuality. Rather, the proposition would then have to read in this way: “There is a divine predestination according to which the totality of the new creation is called forth out of the total mass of the human race.”23 In and of itself, this formulation equally fits all three presuppositions: that which has those not elected perish at death, that which is contained in our own proposition, and that which we are now considering. Our proposition would then simply add to it that the totality of the new creation is simply equivalent to the total mass of humanity; the first presupposition would add that the total mass of humanity simply becomes the totality of the new creation; in contrast, the last presupposition would have the total mass of humanity remain the larger category.

This is all true, except that, accordingly, one must also say of the redemptive power of Christ that it is sufficient to save the totality of the new creation contained within the human race from shared perdition. Furthermore, the composite formulation that would assign a larger compass to providence than to predestination would always continue to be false, because such a disparity cannot occur. The reason is as follows. First, suppose that, as a general matter, God predestines whatever it is that conditions just as effectively as God foresees whatever is conditioned. It follows that if God foresees being lost after death as something conditioned and does not alter what conditions it, namely—to speak in the most human way possible—the distinctive makeup of an individual as it relates to where one is located in the course of proclamation, God will also have predestined what is conditioned in this case. Instead, if one refers either of these concepts to individuals of either party, then one has to use the other concept too. Thus, the one party is comprised of those who are foreseen and predestined to be features of the total mass of humanity from which the children of God’s reign are to be formed; those who comprise the other party are both foreseen and predestined to be these same new creatures, who are in the process of being formed out of the total mass of humanity. Hence, this formulation, which was crafted as an expedient, would then always be a deviation from the confessions of both Evangelical parties, for both agree in their exclusion of a part of the human race as definitely as they agree in their referring the term predestination to the individual viewed in one’s entire actuality. Moreover, if the term is to be used in this way, Calvin’s formulation indisputably carries the advantage of consistency. The extent to which this presupposition, which has come to be more generally held in the church, would be necessary or admissible, however, can first be considered only where the consummation of the church is treated,24 not here, where we have to do with the church’s emergence.

1. Gerechtfertigt. Ed. note: Or “made righteous.” See §§107–9. Note too that in the present context “rebirth” and “regeneration” translate the same word (Wiedergeburt). 2. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin CR 28:403, 407; Schleiermacher here refers to the edition in Symbole (1816), 157, 162. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 240; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 252; cf. §37n3. 4. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 497. See §37n5. 5. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 641; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1065. 6. Ed. note: ET Tice, from the German text in Niemeyer (1840), 650. 7. Manifestation. 8. In §§4, 46, and 49. 9. Solid Declaration (1577) 11: “According to his normal arrangement (gemeinen Ordnung, ordinem a se decretum et institutem), the Father draws people by the power of his Holy Spirit.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 652; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1085. 10. Rechtfertigung. 11. Likewise, certainly Acts 2:41 and 13:48 should not go on to say [after mass conversions] that at some later time no one among those who did not yet become persons of faith would have been able to become so. Ed. note: Confirmation discourse on Acts 2:41, Thursday, Mar. 31, 1831, its sole separate publication first in 1895. The 16-year-old Count Otto von Bismarck was among the confirmands. Cf. Tice, Schleiermacher’s Sermons (1997), 101. 12. Cf. §117. 13. Matt. 22:14.

14. John Calvin (1509–1564), Institutes (1559) 3.23.1: “Election itself could not stand except as set over against reprobation.” However, Calvin does not use the word in our limited sense. Rather, he goes on to say that this limitation, the ground for which is supposed to be indicated in the above quotation, is brought forth “very ignorantly and childishly.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 947; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1959), 394, and CR 30:698. 15. Übergehen. 16. Ed. note: Cf. §111. There Schleiermacher contends that once sanctification is underway, no backsliding into sin can overcome the effects of regenerating grace or cancel the state of blessedness. 17. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 3.21.5: “No one who wishes to be thought religious dares simply deny predestination by which God adopts some to hope of life and sentences others to eternal death. … For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 926; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1959), 375f., and CR 30:682f. 18. Ed. note: Here the word “blind” (blinde) suggests the images of “blind fate” and “blind justice.” In contrast, what God has in view, as it were, for human beings is taken to be neither unintentional nor simply impartial. Thus, just below, with Redeker the term Ansicht (prospect) present in the first printing is accepted here, in contrast to Clemen’s conjecture, Absicht (aim), present in the original draft and chosen by Schäfer. 19. In the section on predestination, Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) in Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) also says this: “God, wanting the whole human race not to perish, always on account of his Son … calls … and receives those who assent … before the last day.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; cf. the different translations by Manschreck (1995) from the 1555 German edition; Latin: CR 21:920. See §32n16. 20. Calvin, Institutes (1559) 3.21.5: “We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 926; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1959), 374, and CR 30:683. 21. Solid Declaration (1577) 11: “The eternal election of God, however, or predestination (that is, God’s preordination to salvation) does not apply to both the godly [Frommen, bonos] and the evil [Bösen, malos],” and all that follows. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 641; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1065. Cf. §119n5. 22. Solid Declaration 11: “In his counsel, intention and preordination God did not only prepare salvation in general, but he also graciously considered each and every one of the elect … and chose them for salvation.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 644; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1070. 23. Quite properly, the following formulation in Augustine’s Enchiridion (421), 99, cited earlier, belongs here as well: “Grace alone … separates the redeemed from the lost, all having been mingled together in one mass of perdition from a common cause.” To suit our purpose, we need only change it slightly in this way: “Predestination separates the redeemed from the common mass of perdition.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 2 (1947), 452; Latin: Migne Lat. 40:278. 24. Ed. note: See the “prophetic doctrines” treated under the heading “The Consummation of the Church” in §§157–63.

§120. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Regarding the Grounds for Defining Election. Considered from the aspect of how it influences the divine government of the world, election is grounded in the faith of the elect, foreseen by God; considered from the aspect of how it is founded on the divine government of the world, election is determined solely by the divine good pleasure. (1) Canons of Dort (1618–1619) IX: “This same election is not accomplished based on faith that God forsees.”—X: “The true cause of this election by grace is solely the divine good pleasure.”1 (2) Confessiones Marchicae (= Confessio Fidei Ioannis Sigismundi Electoris Brandenburgici, 1613) III: “Namely, that God … out of pure, unalloyed grace … has ordained and elected to eternal life all who have steadfast faith in Christ, his own also know and recognize right well.”—Note (thanks to Prince Sigismund): “It is

Pelagian to think that God … has selected out some on account of their faith, which God has foreseen.”2 (3) Leipzig Colloquium (1631) (theologians from Brandenburg and Hesse): “That in Jesus Christ God … has chosen certain human beings whom God … inspires and restores to faith in Christ, also sustaining them in this faith until the end.”— (theologians from Saxony): “That from eternity God has chosen those of whom he has seen that they … would have faith in Christ and would then persevere in this faith to the end of their lives. … that God has found no cause or occasion … for such a choice in the chosen themselves.”3 1. Quite generally, the contrast set forth here in relation to election is applicable to all free actions. That is, each such action contributes something toward the further development of the divine government of the world, because whatever belongs to that sphere would have become more or less different if the action had been different, but in its specifically determined spatial and temporal characteristics, every action is also a product of the unfolding of the divine government of the world up to then. However, reflection on election from this point of view also rests on the fact that someone represents the reign of God, consequently also the divine way of proceeding in gathering and preparing4 it, as a particular divine activity in and of itself, apart from the divine government of the world conceived in general. Moreover, it also rests on the fact that since, on account of sin, all human beings are originally equal in relation to redemption, the question then arises as to why one would be elected and another not. The question arises, for entirely the same warrant and ground would be present for raising this question if one were to assume that all people are either elected or not, except that in the first case the more exact way to put the question would be Why would one person already be regenerate but another not? Now, with reference to what was already said here about the supernatural’s becoming natural,5 we would then have to answer that this matter could be judged only after the manner of nature. Thereby it would be possible to say only that if someone has become regenerate, the conclusion to be drawn from this fact would be that in this person proclamation would have encountered the greatest receptivity at the same instant with its greatest force. This answer is not satisfactory, however, because this very instant would, in turn, be dependent on conditions that are under divine control. Moreover, if, at this point, one were to phrase the question once more, asking why circumstances would have been ordered in such a way that one person would be regenerated and another not, one would have to seek the basis for determination either absolutely at the beginning, before anything existed, and that would mean sticking with divine good pleasure, or one would have to seek it at the end, in the final result, and that would mean sticking with a divine foreknowledge. Patently, however, these two proposals cannot be separated from each other, because there is no foreknowledge in God that would not stand in union with a divine good pleasure,6

and just as little is there a divine good pleasure in anything other than in its entire interconnectedness, which, as this encompasses everything temporal, thus necessarily includes a divine foreknowledge within it. In the passages cited above, however, and in other similar passages, a notable vacillation predominates in this matter. Therein a divine good pleasure and a divine foreknowledge are set over against each other; yet, in almost every instance, what is to be excluded in these passages is also taken into them, nevertheless, using carefully crafted formulations. Now, the wording of our proposition has the aim of overcoming this unstable entanglement. 2. If the elements of rebirth are chiefly to be viewed as the expansion of the uniting of the divine with human nature, and if the justifying divine activity is to be viewed as the temporal and particular advance of the general act of uniting begun with Christ’s becoming human, then one must also grant that the divine mode of proceeding with respect to these elements of rebirth would follow the same pattern7 as occurred in that act begun in Christ. Thus, suppose that someone wants to venture the question as to why, then, precisely Jesus of Nazareth was chosen for this uniting with human nature, or rather—since he would have become who he was only by this uniting—why precisely this person-forming action of human nature and no other was chosen and why precisely at this particular time. It would then have to be possible to answer the question in a wholly analogous fashion. Now, if we consider how this act would have been a becoming natural of the supernatural from the outset and consider what effects were to proceed from that act, the only possible answer would be that the time and place for this event would have been chosen absolutely for the best—that is, the time and place that could yield the greatest efficacy. Now, this answer to that question clearly postulates faith that is foreseen, viewed as the ground for determining the election of individuals. That is to say, in accordance with the same pattern, those persons must be elected as their participation in the ongoing work of redemption is able to reach to greatest peak, and the time of their conversion must be determined to occur at that point. Likewise, if we consider election on a large scale, not only as the determination8 of a succession of reborn individuals but also as the election of people so that a firmer foundation for the gospel would be established in them, this election would be determined in such a way that in the entire context of their historical existence the extensive and intensive maximum can be reached. Now, in contrast, it is possible to combine under the term “proclamation” or “preaching” everything that an individual or even a community can do by word and deed toward spreading the reign of God, belonging as it does to Christ’s prophetic activity, viewed as its continuation.9 Moreover, preaching, in this sense and scope, comes from faith,10 and it is faith’s natural expression. Thus, it is entirely the same thing to say that divine election would be determined by the foreseen efficacious action of preaching or by the foreseen, most vigorous power of faith. Still, in the ordinary use of this formulation this latter element, to be sure, comes least to the fore. Rather, the constancy and soundness of faith is presented more than is the vigorous power of faith. The unsatisfactory nature of this formulation, if one sticks with it, must be

evident to anyone, however, and for two reasons. For one thing, when the formulation is stated in this way, it fails to refer to the idea of the reign of God at all, or to the emergence of the church, even though God’s reign is the natural locus of the question under consideration, on the strength of the very scriptural passage11 that most underlies all discussions on this subject. Instead, at that point a completely atomistic view of the work of redemption always underlies any attempt to focus on the individual as such, and a proper view of the matter cannot possibly arise from such a restriction. This consequence also becomes very clear if one adds to this formulation two others that are meant to illuminate and support it. That is to say, first of all, it follows from the formulation that if some individuals are not chosen at all, they would be the ones in whom grace in its effects would not as yet have had a firm hold. Regarding these latter individuals, however, it is also said that God would then have decided to harden and reject12 those who had become hardened in their resistance to the word. Now, if the combination in this formulation is to lead to anything, it would have to be possible to demonstrate a distinction between a person’s aversion,13 which is the basis for not being elected, and an aversion effected by God, which is supposed to be the result of it. The impossibility of forming this distinction then makes the formulation useless, either for being a canon to be utilized in research on Christian history or even for giving a fruitful direction to self-observation. Suppose, on the other hand, it is then said that God would elect those whom God sees to be persons who are steadfast in faith, and it is also said, in turn, that God would also have decided to strengthen and establish14 those whom God had elected. Then it would likewise be impossible to ascertain a distinction and boundary between their prior establishment in faith, which would simply be foreseen, and their later establishment in faith, which would be directly communicated by God. Suppose, however, that the formulation intends entirely to avoid the reproach of being Pelagian and thus also intends to regard the prior, foreseen establishment of the elect, viewed as something brought about by God, since there would indeed be no foreknowledge in God other than one that bears effect. Then the final event would still be that God would have elected only those whom God would also have decided to strengthen in faith. Moreover, this formulation would be completely empty if one were not to bring faith into consideration at the same time as one thinks of the efficacious action that belongs to faith. The same is also true of the simpler formulation that taking faith into account cannot be excluded from the decree of election.15 Surely no one would want to extend use of the first formulation so far that we must undertake to demonstrate that the maximum fruits of redemption could have been reached, just as the church would actually be built up precisely and solely in this process of election. That is to say, such proof would not be possible since the alternative formulation could not be assigned even for comparison’s sake. Therefore, in this alternative formulation faith too speaks to provision of a foundation for the historical conception and for self-observation regarding election. 3. In any case, the answer that is given in relation to what can be viewed as divine election in Christ’s becoming human likewise permits of being referred to the second

formulation stated in our proposition. This is the case, for the following reasons. Suppose that we say that the point from which the greatest measure of efficacious action could be developed would be chosen. Then someone could say, in turn, that the given point would have had this attribute only because and insofar as the overall situation had also become just as it was. However, that situation too could have been different, depending on how God had directed it, and in that case a different point could have had this attribute. Thus, Christ had come to be determined16 in the way he was only because and insofar as the whole given interconnection of things was also determined in a certain fashion, and, in reverse, the whole given interconnection of things would have been determined in the way it was only because and insofar as Christ too would have been determined in a certain fashion. Furthermore, if we stick with the concept “the divine good pleasure,” clearly this is to say that, taken together, Christ and the interconnectedness of things would have been determined as they were solely by the divine good pleasure. Indeed, wherever we conceive an aggregate17 of natural causality as complete in itself and refer to its foundation in divine causality18 we would be able to assign no basis of determination for the latter other than the divine good pleasure. Now, just as the entire world is ordered by God in such a way that God could say “it is all good,” that is, in accordance with God’s good pleasure, but in this respect no particular is to be divorced from its interconnection19 with all the rest, so too if we consider the reign of God as a whole that is complete in itself, we can say only that it is determined as it is solely by the divine good pleasure. That being the case, everything that belongs to Christ’s being as he is, on the one hand, and the entire internal multiplicity of the human race in time and space, from which multiplicity the reign of God is formed through Christ, being as it is, on the other hand, are both determined by the divine good pleasure. To be sure, there is no obstacle to one’s also being able to say that the ordering by which the relation to Christ is realized in an individual would result from that multiplicity and would be determined by it, except that, in reverse, one would also have to be able to say that the multiplicity of the human race would result from that ordering and would be determined in relation to it, so that redemption through Christ would be developed therein precisely in this measure and ordering. Now, if the two statements are equally correct, and if, in consequence, they are also equally false because they are opposite to each other, in summary one can rightly say only that what the two statements indicate is, in the above sense, ordered in accordance with the divine good pleasure—both in relation to each other and, in consequence, each in and of itself as well. Thus, suppose that it would be God’s good pleasure that human nature would manifest itself within this determinate multitude of individual beings so determined. No other basis for this claim should then be assigned, moreover, for any other explanation would require contingent presuppositions that would themselves, in turn, still always be conditioned by this original all-encompassing divine good pleasure. Likewise, it would have been God’s good pleasure to bring the arrangement of things human to fulfillment through Christ. This would be the case, for God could otherwise have laid down the entire course of the human race differently from the very outset, but from

that point onward the human race would also have been differently disposed, since as soon as one thing were posited everything else would also be coposited in only that one way. Any attempt to deduce the necessity of redemption in this form always presupposes something the necessity of which would require a like deduction. For pious folk, moreover, there is no way out of this cycle of a conditioned necessity, wherein each part is being strictly referred to other parts, other than this one divine good pleasure, which encompasses everything within itself. Accordingly, only one task remains to us: in every instance both to unite this good pleasure of God, necessarily coposited within our consciousness, with what we perceive with our senses regarding the course of redemptive work and, in the process of our also being stimulated by what happens, to rest in this good pleasure. Yes, faith in Christ is itself nothing other than the shared sentiment20 regarding this divine good pleasure in Christ and the holiness21 grounded in him. Moreover, the consciousness of divine grace, or the peace of God, in the redeemed person is also nothing other than precisely this resting in the divine good pleasure, with respect to the ordering by which the redeemed person has actually been taken up into the domain of redemption. Now, in the world in general we encounter the most manifold gradation of life, from the lowest and most incomplete forms to the most advanced and accomplished forms. Moreover, there can be no doubt that precisely this multiplicity, viewed as the most abundant possible fulfillment in time and space, is the object of divine good pleasure. Furthermore, such gradations do also arise within the domain of human nature. Accordingly, we would likewise reasonably expect within the spiritual domain of life that would have emerged through redemption to find everything that lies between the most meager level and the most advanced level, and we would also view this whole profusion of all that is bound to vital community as the object of the divine good pleasure and would desire to rest in it.22 4. Now, considerations up to this point have shown us how one would have arrived at these grounds for a definition of election and how they appear to be opposed in relation to each other, since they refer back to contrasting starting points. Yet, here the follow-up treatment of this apparent opposition thus far is supposed to have resolved it, as our proposition demands, in presenting them as formulations, bearing the same content, formulations that are simply construed from different starting points, with the result that no one who confesses either formulation is at all obliged to reject the other one. However, the two formulations could be presented in this agreement with each other only in that they were freed, at the same time, from untenable positions that they have, in large part, attracted as a result of this contrast. That is to say, the first formulation is then freed from the divine decree’s appearing to be dependent on a foreknowledge in God that is patently altogether human, the object of which foreknowledge would be posited to be independent of the divine decree, which would itself have to be guided only by that foreknowledge. The reason is that if faith that is foreseen were to determine the divine decree, in contrast to its being determined by the divine good pleasure, the conclusion would be almost unavoidable that faith too would be grounded in a way that is independent of any divine influence on the free

will of human beings. Moreover, this semblance of a Pelagian position has not become so remote by means of artful stipulations that the formulation still has retained any definite contents. To the contrary, we say that foreseen faith would determine the divine decree inasmuch as it would have been God’s good pleasure to permit such efficacious action for the sake of God’s reign to proceed from this point, as this very efficacious action is being conditioned by this strength and ripening of faith. The other formulation claims that a divine good pleasure would attract some and leave others behind. When this formulation is set forth in opposition to the other one, it appears all too easily as an outright encouragement of some persons and a slighting of others, and indeed as if the end of this process would have to follow from its beginning, whatever might happen in between. Moreover, this appearance of a divine arbitrariness in an unconditioned divine decree concerning individuals—viewed, so to speak, as an urgent support of some persons with irresistible succor and as a foreclosed abandonment of others—does little to prevent the formulation’s being the slickest stratagem for winning straightforward assent but without resolving its difficulties. To the contrary, our presentation knows of no unconditioned decree concerning any individual as such, in that all that is of an individual nature is mutually conditioned. Instead, it recognizes only one unconditioned decree—that is, one by which the whole, viewed in its undivided interconnectedness, exists in the way it does by virtue of the divine good pleasure. Thus, in no way is it as if the individual already existed somehow or other and would be something irrespective of this divine decree, and in no way is it as if the individual would be simply blessed or not by this divine decree. Rather, each individual would first come to be in any such state only because and inasmuch as this sort of feature, and thus an effective feature within the whole, is put in place in accordance with the divine good pleasure. In this light, each individual would be prepared to be a member of the Christian community because each one is foreseen to be a person of faith. Now, if we consider our two formulations in their combination, they are seen to contain two rules under which those detrimental conclusions which we have reviewed cannot arise at all. The first rule is that no one person, of oneself and apart from one’s place within the whole, can become anything as a consequence of a single, special divine decree with reference to that person. The second rule, however, is that, considered in its general interconnectedness, everything, even the way in which redemption is realized, is, at the same time, no less the complete presentation of the divine good pleasure than the complete presentation of the divine omnipotence.23 Postscript to This Point of Doctrine24 Based on what is indicated here, let us now return once more to the presupposition that a portion of the human race would ever remain excluded from the domain of redemption. Alternatively—to express the presupposition in a manner that comes closest to the immediate content of our point of doctrine—the presupposition is that the Christian church would emerge out of the human race only in such a way that another portion of humanity would always be lost to it. Accordingly, on the one hand, it is not to be denied that, in this light, it

would be difficult to arrive at a complete state of rest in the divine good pleasure. This is so, in that species-consciousness would be adversely affected by the situation, as personal consciousness would be, and that tugging sadness and longing,25 which would unavoidably be renewed repeatedly therefrom, would itself permit no pure communication of Christ’s blessedness. Therein emerges the task of thinking about the matter itself in such a way that the selfsameness of human nature therewith persists in everyone, for, to be sure, if someone should want to divine human nature in a Manichean fashion, that tugging sadness and longing would drop away, since the others would no longer be like us in the same way. On the other hand, if our Christian self-consciousness is not supposed to be modified so as to be essentially different, the task emerges—almost as little to be fulfilled as the previous task—of thinking about all this in such a way that Christ would, nevertheless, still be sent not only to the entire human race but also for it. That is to say, this would be the case only if it is assumed that a trace of his efficacious action would also at some point be truly perceived in everyone. One readily sees, however, that the difficulty faced is very different if the treatment concerns those who have already experienced the workings of the Christian church as compared with its concerning those who have remained outside any association with the Christian church. Consistent with this account, it can be advisable to divide the presupposition itself. As concerns the first part, in no way should an unreadiness for redemption be ascribed to these people. Rather, whenever an operation of preparatory grace would have prospered in them to the point of actual communication, they would have to have become organs for spreading the reign of God. This is so, for a witness to the grace of God in Christ would have come to be rendered through every such communication. However, the less we would be in a position to perceive a transition into the state of sanctification right away but, instead, would have to recognize it likewise as a sudden, albeit unappreciable entry of regeneration, the more we would have to acknowledge, with respect to all those persons who already belong externally to Christian community, the correctness of a certain reservation, namely, that one must not flippantly count someone as among the lost.26 As a result, here any case in which we could apply the presupposition with confidence is unthinkable. As regards others, it is an essential ingredient of our faith to recognize that sooner or later every people27 will become Christian, just as Paul hoped regarding those even among his own people who had repeatedly resisted divine grace in their hardness of hearts.28 Thus, to the extent that we consider a given person in one’s existence within a people and admit that one’s sharing in a common spirit is an essential component of one’s personal existence, to that extent we would also be able to say that every person would bear in oneself precisely this predestination to blessedness. We would be able to say this all the more, the more the individual would oneself possess those attributes of that common spirit to which adoption of faith is attached among one’s people. We would also be able to say this less, the more an individual would possess attributes on which protracted resistance of the whole is grounded. To be sure, for us this more and less—obviously analogous to faith that is foreseen—has only the sense that these same human beings, if they were living at a time when the gospel was

appearing among their people, would have been seized by it, some already at the very beginning of the process and others only at later stages. However, it does not follow from our being able to construct, based on this circumstance, only a formulation that indicates nothing actual, that it cannot have a different meaning with respect to divine predestination without our being obliged, on this account, to resort to scientia media,29 for these attributes are indeed actual in the individuals mentioned. Rather, if, in this fashion, everyone is taken to be included in the divine predestination to blessedness, the high-priestly dignity of Christ30 also first gives evidence of the overall efficaciousness of this predestination, and, indeed it belongs to this efficaciousness that God sees all human beings only in Christ. Precisely this connection can also be applied to the case previously considered. In consequence, at least the following is clearly shown: in the first place, that if the general scope of redemption, which cannot really be imagined at all without this high-priestly dignity of Christ and its success, is taken in its entire compass, then predestination to blessedness must also be posited in an entirely general way, also, in the second place, that neither one can be restricted without the other being diminished as well.31

1. Ed. note: ET from the Latin, in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 553f., and Niemeyer (1840), 695; cf. Ecumenical Creeds and Reformed Confessions (1988), 124f. 2. Ed. note: ET Tice, from the German text in Niemeyer (1840), 650f. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice from the German, Niemeyer (1840), 664f., 666. 4. Ed. note: Here Schäfer chooses Verbreitung (expanding) from the original manuscript, whereas Redeker retains Vorbereitung (preparing) from the first edition (1822), as here. Although either option could easily be correct, an allusion to preparatory grace in forming the reign of God would seem to be more fitting in this context. 5. Ed. note: E.g., see §113.2, §120.2, and the index. 6. Cf. §55.1. 7. Regel. Ed. note: That is, literally this divine mode of proceeding follows the same “rule.” In Schleiermacher’s usage, every technical action or procedure follows a set of rules, here interpreted in their production of regular, established “patterns.” The same term is repeated just below. 8. Bestimmung. Ed. note: Here “determination” means a “destining,” but the prefix necessary to make the act one that is a “predestination” (Vorherbestimmung) is not applied. 9. Ed. note: Cf. §103. 10. Rom. 10:17 and 2 Cor. 4:13. 11. Rom. 10 and 11. Ed. note: See §117.4, on the early spreading of the gospel, and §117n14, on a sermon regarding Rom. 11:32–33. 12. Solid Declaration (1577) 11: “He (God) concluded in his counsel that he would harden, reject and condemn all those whom he called through the word when they spurn the word and resist and persist in resisting.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 647; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1075. 13. Abneigung. 14. Ed. note: The words “strengthen” and “establish” translate zu stärken und zu befestigen. See 1 Pet. 5:10, where both concepts appear. These concepts frequently appear separately in the Hebrew Bible, often in contexts of election, as here, and they are combined in liturgical discourse there. 15. “We say that an understanding [intuitum] concerning faith must be included in the decree [decreto] of election.” Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 4, 207. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice. 16. Ed. note: The noun Bestimmung and the verb bestimmen always bear the root meaning of “determination” and “to determine.” However, we have already noted that in cases of divine “pre-destination” they can also denote, respectively, a specific “destinating” or “destining” and “destiny” that God has determined. Here this fuller meaning is applied to Christ. 17. Ed. note: Inbegriff (“aggregate”). In Schleiermacher’s usage this term usually refers to some organized whole, where the parts can be at least roughly sorted out, as in a “body of doctrine.” Wherever “body” cannot be confused with a human

body or a social entity such as “the body politic,” this word is chosen. Here, however well they are thought to be interconnected, Christ himself is a body, a somebody in fact, surrounded by such else to form an “aggregate.” 18. Ed. note: Regarding “divine causality,” see esp. §§50.3–55.1, 81–84, and 164–65. For further explanation, see also closely related concepts in §§5, 63, and 91. 19. Zusammenhang (“interconnection,” or “interconnectedness”). Ed. note: Elsewhere, this same word is occasionally translated “context.” In Schleiermacher’s usage, it always refers either to specific context or some complex set of relations, or to the whole interconnectedness of nature (Naturzusammenhang). 20. Mitempfindung. Ed. note: Just above, wahrnehmen is the word translated “perceive with our senses.” Both terms refer especially to the sensory aspect of religious experience. 21. Heil. Ed. note: As in Heiligung (sanctification); the allied meanings are “salvation” and “well-being.” 22. Ed. note: The verb for “rest” is beruhen. In accordance with images already mentioned in this immediate context, it would also mean “be at peace” or even “rest ourselves.” The full range of meanings apply in each instance of the “multiplicity” of phenomena, that is, in the difference and diversity inevitably to be found within the spiritual domain, individually and socially expressed. The verb can also mean “to be rooted in” as in “being rooted in faith.” 23. Ed. note: As an attribute of God that is presupposed in Christian religious immediate self-consciousness, “omnipotence” (Allmacht) can be fruitfully laid out, in connection with the present discussion, by tracing its use esp. in §§47, 50–52, 53.P.S., 54–55, 56.P.S., 57, 61.5, 62.3, 63.2, 64.2, 65.1, 79, 80.4, 81.3, and 83.3, then thought out further in connection with §§164–65, 167.2, and 168–69. 24. Ed. note: This postscript anticipates the further considerations contained in Schleiermacher’s treatment of prophetic doctrine in §§157–63. 25. Wehmut. Ed. note: The entire phrase translates this key term in Schleiermacher’s Christian discourse, a term that he always takes to be compounded with joy. See the beginning of Karoline’s speech in Christmas Eve (1806, 1827), also OR (1821) II, supplementary note 14, and V, supplemental note 14. See as well his sermon on the subject: Jan. 21, 1821, on Luke 2:28–35, published separately, also in SW II.4 (1835), 432–41, and (1844), 484–93. 26. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 10: “Yet we must hope well of all and not rashly judge any man to be a reprobate.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 241; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 252; cf. §37n3. 27. Volk. 28. Ed. note: The reference is probably to Phil. 2:1–16; cf. also Eph. 4:18, Peter’s declaration in Acts 2:40, and Stephen’s defense in Acts 7:51. Being stiff-necked and having hardness of heart are the same concept. Among related later sermons see (1) regarding “Condemnation,” Oct. 10, 1830, on John 6:37, SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 710–24; (2) “Against Judging,” July 24, 1821, Matt. 7:1, SW II.3 (1835), 32–43 and (1843), 34–45; (3) “Restoration of True Equality,” Dec. 26, 1832, Gal. 3:27–28, SW II.2 (1835, 1843), 343–56; (4) “Humility and Self-Exaltation,” Oct. 13, 1833, Matt. 23:12, SW II.3 (1835), 665–76, and (1843), 687–99; (5) “Love of God and Neighbor,” Jan. 12, 1834, Mark 12:28–34, SW II.3 (1835) 765– 78, and (1843), 790–804. In other writings, including his Christian Ethics, he indicates that such attitudes do not inveigh against strong witness and even gentle admonishment, but they do betoken “speaking the truth in love” and in hopeful “openness” to a future that God is bringing forth for all. 29. Ed. note: “Mediating knowledge.” 30. Ed. note: Among the three offices of Christ, borrowed in part from Calvin so as to present the work of Christ, the high-priestly office is treated in §104. 31. Ed. note: Accordingly, what Schleiermacher claims here regarding Christ’s dignity in his being a rough counterpart to the high priest and actually superseding that role—by an intentional implication also assuming that same dignity with respect to Christ’s prophetic and kingly offices (§§100–105)—he has also extended to communication and reception of Christ’s blessedness in regeneration and sanctification (§§106–12). For him, the above-mentioned alternative practice introduces inherently questionable “knowledge” (scientia) into an argument with the aim of trying to make the argument more convincing. Elsewhere Schleiermacher especially identifies this alternative procedure with scholastic method.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding Communication of the Holy spirit

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §121. All who are living in the state of sanctification are conscious of an inner drive to become increasingly at one in a common cooperative and mutually interactive existence, this driving force being viewed as the common spirit of the new collective life founded by Christ. 1. This fact is itself most distinctly expressed in all the biblical narratives regarding the initial planting of the Christian church. Moreover, even the encouraging impression made on non-Christians is always definitely presented there as occurring by means of this becoming one,1 just as this commonality is brought into the closest connection with the new life of every individual. Indeed, all the instructive depictions of Christian community also agree in their describing all individuals within it as integral components of one whole and in ascribing everything to the one Spirit active within that whole and enlivening it.2 Suppose, moreover, that adherents of the twofold, already frequently failed, separatist tendency of the naturalistic and enthusiastic kinds have chosen to offer the rejoinder that this commonality rightly had currency only in the early stages of the Christian church, but that it was in no way essential to the church and that it would increasingly have had to fade away, in that every basis for relating to one another in that manner would have fallen by the wayside as the new life came to be more securely established and could be perfected in every individual out of the common source. Then the countering reply to them would be as follows. First of all, what can peter out or recede through the gradual strengthening of individuals is only one aspect of one half of what our proposition expresses—that is, only that part of the process of mutual interaction which falls under the analogy of teaching and learning3 or of communicating and receiving—for no one who is truly taught of God is in need of another teacher. In a certain respect, this part of the community is also always in the process of being out of a job.4 They are so, that is, if they are continuously looking at the same persons. However, in that new persons are constantly entering, that part keeps winding on too, in that those who were once receptive eventually communicate as givers to later comers. Still, this same process of mutual interaction has yet another aspect, namely, a reciprocity of communication and comprehension among equals. This reciprocity is grounded in the fact that the new life also comes to be different on account of different personally distinctive qualities in each individual. Moreover, in the same way in which each individual might receive Christ himself wholly into oneself, one strives also to receive as much as possible of everything that has been wrought by him. In this way, each individual is, in turn, moved by

Christ to present the power of Christ that is efficacious within oneself just as Christ has presented himself, which process does indeed happen through all the good works of the regenerate. Still less, however, is the other aspect, the cooperative one, ever in process of fading away. Rather, this aspect can be made easier and progress only in the same measure as the new life gains strength in each individual. Moreover, manifestly, each one must also lay claim to related powers and must do so to the degree that one’s will for the reign of God, which is simultaneously grounded in a vital faith in Christ, is more definitely formed in oneself and develops within an interconnected body of functions. Accordingly, by virtue of the selfsame nature of the new life in all, there arises within this intertwining of these mutually interactive and cooperative efforts the tendency toward a work shared in common, a work that is to be advanced in a convergent manner, only through an interlocking of all powers and activities. Even at a point when the entire human race would have been taken up into the community of redemption, in no way would this work be finished, because already in itself it would still persist as the endless, reciprocal presentation of what is communal in what is distinctive and of what is distinctive in what is communal. The reason is that this is an essential feature in the life of a people, and Christians have always wanted to be viewed as such, or as a household of God.5 In the second place, in this respect there are, to be sure, two sorts of human association that are contrasted to each other. There are associations that of themselves intend to peter out, thus in which no increasing unity is sought, and there are those that intend to remain, thus in which a diminution of differences has to be sought and unity has to be secured. The first sort, however, are always merely fortuitous, being, in part, associations that by nature can no more be put into distinct forms than they can be placed within distinct boundaries. This is true of all associations of free sociality,6 though even here something similar to a common spirit is formed under certain circumstances, and being, in part, associations in which some definite cooperation is all that matters, without internal agreement, but the work is done in such a way that each participant can have one’s own purposes, in and of oneself. Moreover, if there can be religious communities that come close to having this character, this is not true of Christian community. The reason is as follows: that which each participant recognizes in any other participant is their shared love for Christ; thus, an uninterruptible, efficacious, unifying principle is present in that community. 2. Now, when we designate this endeavor by the term “common spirit,” we essentially understand by it what is meant in worldly governance.7 That is, in all who together form a moral person8 there exists a shared tendency to advance the whole, a tendency that in each individual is, at the same time, a distinctive love for every individual. Hence, up to this point, no objection to our proposition can easily be raised, though if one compares the content of this proposition with the heading and rightly infers that this common spirit is supposed to be the Holy Spirit and that the communication of it is supposed to be that of the Holy Spirit, the suspicion will quite easily arise that the latter expression has been taken in an entirely different sense from what Holy Scripture gives it. However, we must not confuse all those notions that have emerged through the place given to the Holy Spirit in the doctrine of the

Trinity, this placement being, in part, so as to elucidate this doctrine and, in part, so as to refute it—when, for example, the Holy Spirit has been presented as an exalted individual being, albeit only as one that is created—with sayings of the New Testament Scriptures, which always present the Holy Spirit as present only in the faithful. The Holy Spirit is always promised to that entire company,9 and wherever an original communication of the Holy Spirit is spoken of, it issues in one act, an act which is directed to a number of persons,10 who form a totality precisely by means of that act, a totality that is moved to engage in the same activity and that is generated in and of one another. The Holy Spirit is also presented, however, as one and the same in all, and the different things that the Holy Spirit forms in different persons are distinguished from this very Holy Spirit as the Holy Spirit’s gifts.11 Moreover, this idea of gifts is not conceived as if some advantage were to be indicated by it, an advantage that some individuals possess and then, of course, in such a way that in each individual the Holy Spirit would be a distinct property of one’s personal existence—even if similarly held and in its kind the same as that of another person, just as we imagine special talents and perfections to be. Rather, on the one hand, the Holy Spirit is depicted as a true unity, by which precisely the entire gathering of Christians also becomes a unity, and the many particular personal modes of existence become a true collective life or moral person. On the other hand, the Holy Spirit is not seen to be added in a scattered and disconnected fashion, as it were, to a few individuals thus viewed as a phenomenon that now appears and then, in turn, disappears, but, instead, the presence of the Holy Spirit in each individual is seen to be the condition of one’s participation in that collective life.12 This is so, for only when this common spirit of the whole is beginning to manifest itself as efficacious in a person does one know that the person is a member of the whole,13 and likewise when an individual attaches oneself to the whole, people are then sure of the communication of the Holy Spirit for that individual.14 Now, from time immemorial conflict has persisted over similar matters in the domain of thinking, over the extent to which what exists in a number of people is, nonetheless, also one and the same thing, and over which is correct, or to what extent it is correct, that a given thought or state of volition in a number of people is one and the same thing or a particular thing in each one. In this place, we do not, in addition, have to make a decision on differences of this sort, either in themselves or even in that we might preemptorially present one or the other position as incompatible with this point of Christian faith. To the contrary, we do not want to enter into this territory at all but simply want to set forth two views as expressions of our Christian self-consciousness. The first view, then, is that the unity of the Spirit of which we have spoken is to be understood in the same sense as anyone would regard even the distinctive formation of humanity in a people to be one, and also in the same sense as those who attribute being only to individuals, who can say, nonetheless, that the personal existence of each individual consists of the distinctive character of a people modified by one’s original disposition. This is the case, for we, likewise, say that the new life of each individual consists of the efficacious action, itself conditioned by the situation in which rebirth finds that individual, of this common spirit’s being manifested in the same way as in all the others; and the Christian

church is likewise one that exists by this one Spirit, just as a given people is one by that selfsame distinctive character of a people which is common in all. This observation leads to the second view as well, that this common spirit is also one because it exists in all from one and the same source, namely Christ, in that each individual is conscious of the communication of that Spirit as most closely interconnected with the origination of faith in Christ and in that each individual also knows Christ to be in the same interconnection with the others. Indeed, in like manner, faith too comes only through preaching, which always goes back to Christ’s commission and thus stems from him. However, just as in Christ himself everything proceeds from the divine in him, this is also the case with this communication of the Holy Spirit, which now becomes the power of new life in each individual, a power that is not different in each, but is the same in all. 3. Another objection that could still be raised is as follows. If we are proceeding from the view that all religious communities are destined to be submerged into Christianity, thus all peoples are also destined to pass over into Christian community, the common spirit of the Christian church would then also be that of the human race. Then, however, in analogy with the common spirit of a people, there must also exist one common spirit that we would not know how to designate otherwise than by the expressions “species-consciousness” and “love for humanity as a species.” That being so, however, it follows that the species is also just as much one as the church is one, and since there cannot be two unities of life for the same whole, that which we wanted to denote by the expression “Holy Spirit” would be completely at one with species-consciousness. So, runs the argument, either species-consciousness would be something supernatural, which no one would want to assert, or the Holy Spirit would have to be something natural, and if the Holy Spirit proceeds from Christ, it would then, nevertheless, have to come from what is human in him. As a result, communication of the Holy Spirit would be no different from the awakening of pure species-consciousness wrought through Christ. For the subject to be treated just now, this argument would be the most logical presentation of the outlook that views the awakening and spreading of the general love of human beings as the distinctive and essential fruit of Christ’s appearance. For us, however, it is certain not only that our participation in the Holy Spirit also actually belongs to that of which we are aware as communicated through Christ, but it is also certain that in Christ everything proceeds from the absolute15 and exclusive strength of his God-consciousness. On the other hand, when, in addition, we take into consideration our self-consciousness, as it still presents our participating in the collective life of sinfulness, we find therein so many kinds of interest of a solely individual personal existence, but so many kinds of interest of a broadened personal existence as well, that pure species-consciousness, viewed as something that would provide impetus, can no more gain currency than can a moral law that would be drawn up under some other form. Rather, such self-consciousness as this serves only as a check against selfishness16 of both a personal and a broadened kind. Thus, it is, to be sure, only through Christ, viewed as founder of a union that can encompass all human beings, and also in that this union has absolutely appropriated

individual human beings solely to it, that species-consciousness has, at the same time, come to be a powerful impetus along with God-consciousness and in relation to Godconsciousness. Precisely on this account, however, no natural principle that would have developed of itself from human nature as it would have continued to be without Christ is operative in this powerful impetus of species-consciousness. Rather, we know this powerful impetus only as the utmost originative expression of the Holy Spirit, as consciousness of the need for redemption within all alike and also consciousness of the capacity in all to be taken up into Christ’s community of life. Moreover, we know the general love of human beings only as one and the same thing as willing the reign of God in its full extension. For us, furthermore, only in this sense are the common spirit of the Christian church and the general love of human beings the same one Holy Spirit. The general love of human beings is itself experienced in every Christian as love both toward those who have already settled into the reign of God17 and toward those who are yet to take part in this reign.

1. Acts 1:13ff.; 2:42ff.; 4:32ff.; 5:12–14; and 9:31. Ed. note: Sermon only on Acts 2:41–42, June 10, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 216–30. Regarding the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the church, see §116n1. On the distinction between societal and religious common spirit (Gemeingeist), see also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 2. 2. Rom. 12:3–6; 1 Cor. 12:4ff.; Eph. 2:17–22 and 4:16; 1 Pet. 4:5–10. Ed. note: Sermon only on 1 Cor 12:3–6, June 17, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 249–66. The focus of §§121–25 is on how grace works by God’s Spirit. See further explanations of the Holy Spirit that follow from here to §169, also OR (1821) III, supplemental note 2. There he speaks of inspiration as being “an instrument of the divine Spirit” in serving “to awaken new life” in others. However, “no other should suppose that the fashioning of that new life lies within one’s own power.” That is, the energic source of grace working within oneself is God alone, even when it is gradually transmitted through communities of faith and whatever influences and stirrings from divine and Holy Spirit have been formed within those communities. 3. John 6:45. Ed. note: Sermon on John 6:45–61, Nov. 28, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 443–54. See also Brief Outline §3 and other references there to relations between clergy and laity, or church leaders and ordinary members. 4. Eph. 4:11–13. Ed. note: Sermon on Eph. 4:11–12 (re: Augsburg), Aug. 29, 1830, SW II.2 (1834), 692–709. 5. Eph. 2:19; Titus 2:14; 1 Pet. 2:9. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Eph. 2:19–21, Aug. 5, 1797, sermon outline for a Saturday preparatory service, Bauer (1908), 328–30; (2) Titus 2:11–15, April 6, 1794, his ordination sermon, SW II.7 (1836), 193– 202. 6. Ed. note: The words “free sociality” translate freien Geselligkeit, as in the salons that Schleiermacher frequented. This kind of social life is represented in his philosophical ethics as affording more open and mutually attentive dialogue, creativity, and play. 7. Regiment. Ed. note: Usually “church government” is used to translate Kirchenregiment. For Schleiermacher, this is, at best, essentially a shared democratic process, not top-down. 8. Ed. note: At that time, “person” could designate a human organization, such as a church or a state, that bears characteristics of individual agency. 9. John 16:7ff.; Acts 1:4–5. Ed. note: Gesamtheit, ordinarily translated “totality,” as just below. Sermon only on Acts 1:4, May 30, 1824, SW II.4 (1834), 602–19. 10. John 20:22–23; Acts 2:4. Ed. note: eine Mehrheit. Sermon only on Acts 2:1–42, June 10, 1810 (Pentecost), SW II.7 (1836), 419–26. 11. See 1 Cor. 12:4. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) 1 Cor. 12:4–6, Aug. 10, 1806, SW II.1 (1834), 191–207, and (2) 1 Cor. 12:3–6, June 17, 1821 (see §121n2). 12. As in 1 Cor. 12:3, Rom. 8:9. Ed. note: See §121n2 for sermon on 1 Cor 12:3–6. 13. Acts 10:47; 19:2. 14. Acts 2:38. 15. Ed. note: Here “absolute” translates absoluten, which denotes incomparably to the nth degree. Here the noun Kräftigkeit could also be translated “powerfulness,” viewed as an exact synonym of “strength.” 16. Selbstsucht.

17. Einbürgert. Ed. note: Or naturalized, become citizens of.

§122. Only after Christ had departed from the earth was it possible for the Holy Spirit to be fully communicated and received as this common spirit. 1. Let us first compare this proposition with what is most often heard on the subject, not only in the treatment of it before a congregation but also prominently laid down in public teaching. That is, there the procession of the Spirit in the doctrine of the Trinity is indeed posited as timeless and eternal, but the outpouring of the Spirit is first tied to the event of Pentecost as the beginning of the Spirit’s efficacious action in the Christian church. Thus, what is to be defended, first of all, is the claim that earlier—as is being at least intimated here —that same Holy Spirit was to have been effectual already, at least in an incomplete way. Now, it is true, to be sure, that Christ himself made his death a condition of the Spirit’s sending,1 but it is likewise true that he had himself communicated the Spirit to his followers already before his total departure from the earth,2 indeed, that even earlier he had presupposed the Spirit’s presence among them, for whatever exists, in relation to Christ himself, as a divine revelation in the soul3 is also seen to be a work of the Spirit. Furthermore, these various sayings certainly do not easily harmonize, unless what Christ enjoined them to expect on the occasion of his ascension in Jerusalem4 was simply their being fully saturated5 with the Spirit. If we now proceed from the explanation that the Holy Spirit is the innermost life force of the Christian church as a whole, then we must also refer back to the two most primary stirrings of life, namely, vital receptivity and free self-initiated activity,6 the relation of which to each other first constitutes life, with the result that the more complete and developed life is, the greater is the domain of each of these primary stirrings and the more exactly they correspond to each other. The receptivity of the disciples developed with their being in Christ’s company, and the basis for their future efficacious action for the reign of God was laid down in their persistent apprehension of what Christ offered them. Hence, in that they also related their apprehension entirely to the reign of God proclaimed by Christ, they likewise recognized this receptivity, each disciple in the others, as that same reign of God, established and maintained in them all in the same manner. Moreover, in that a community of apprehending was occurring among them and each was also able to be a representative of the others in asking questions and answering in front of Christ,7 this receptivity was shown to be the single essential factor of the common spirit, in which sense the proper apprehension of Christ too was already ascribed to the Holy Spirit.8 In contrast, at that time an actual self-initiated activity had not yet come within their province. Rather, what Christ expected of them in this interchange was only a self-initiated activity in training, not in outright practice. Precisely on that account, it was also not free self-initiated activity but merely a self-initiated activity that still needed some particular impetus for each expression of it. The first-cited communication of the Spirit in the days of Christ’s resurrection shows us a transition toward full maturity of this same self-initiated

activity. That is to say, in accordance with the main matter here, the proper retainment9 and forgiveness of sin is simply an expression of properly formed receptivity for what relates to the reign of God, but in that this expression is unthinkable without some reaction to the person whose sin is forgiven or retained, it already contains a transition to free self-initiated activity. Clearly, moreover, receptivity most distinctly reveals itself as the common spirit in these expressions, regarding which it is presupposed that they will be of one voice therein. 2. Yet, if the common spirit was still incomplete, then at the time of the personal existence of Christ the collective life wherein the reign of God presented itself cannot have been complete either, and this was also in fact the case. That is to say, a collective life is all the less a life in common, the more it depends on the life of an individual. The reason is that, in part, it is not equipped to remain ever the same in the cycle of death and procreation; also, in part, a collective life is indeed supposed to be a singular life but not that of one individual. In contrast, the more everyone depends on an individual and each person receives one’s motivation from this individual, the more are all of them mere instruments or limbs of this individual, and the whole is but an extension of this one personal existence. Or, if someone should want also to look at the variability of individual lives, the whole is more like a household or a school than like a commonwealth. This is how the ancients regarded any state in which everyone is unconditionally subjected to the will of a single individual, namely, as an extended household wherein many enlivened instruments move at the command of one individual. Moreover, school, for us, is any collective life, focused on intellect, that hangs entirely on one individual’s power of thought and way of organizing people, which one impressed on a number of them in common. Accordingly, Christ’s being together with his disciples was, to be sure, a household of companions, on the one hand, and a school, on the other hand. A household, however, is scattered upon the death of its head, and if a new bond is not formed for all its members, certain ones will disperse of themselves. Further, in a school too if some other common impetus does not enter in to spur adherence and the desire to learn, as the initial impetus did, no further advance takes place after the master’s death. Rather, the earlier union gradually disappears. Just so, after Christ’s death we find the disciples about to disperse, and up to his ascension the continuity of their being together was interrupted and was diminished to the point of losing its shape. In contrast, while Christ was alive, it could not be otherwise than that each disciple wanted chiefly to adhere to him and receive from him, without any one of them having gained the maturity for free self-initiated activity in the reign of God that was to be forming. 3. Now, someone certainly could say that if we were not willing to hold fast to the view that the Holy Spirit is an entirely distinctive divine communication—even though the Holy Spirit were taken to be conditioned by Christ, yet would not be linked with Christ’s earlier influences in the way described—thus, the distinction that is supposed to be given currency here would not even be tenable. This would ostensibly be the case, for in accordance with our own assertions, in the vital community of the regenerate with Christ, everything would always proceed from Christ; consequently, even today, strictly speaking, in each person there would ostensibly be only receptivity and not self-initiated activity. Hence, even collective life

today would no more be an existence in common10 than it was then. The reason is that selfinitiated activity already then too, as now, would have been completely in Christ, and today too the life of faithful persons together with Christ would consist only in a mutual communication of what each person would have received from Christ. Yet, to this conclusion the claim is to be countered that whenever we have perceived11 the way redemption unfolds only in individual human beings, in and of themselves, this has been an incomplete observation. In addition, from the very outset we have referred to the present situation by saying that preparatory grace12 would already have come to each person from this existence in common. Now, that in the regenerate everything proceeds from Christ was true of the communication of his sinless perfection,13 which consists simply in a pure will that is oriented to the reign of God. We have said that in individual aims such a perfection would no longer exist.14 Thus, if we ask how individual aims arise for us from that pure will, the answer is that this happens only in the collective life. This is so, for the individual regenerate does not have anything directly from Christ any longer, and to no one as an individual is anything commanded by Christ as happened to the disciples in their time. Rather, just as no individual can arrange something by oneself in the reign of God, so too no aim can attain actual shape in anyone except a person for whom one foresees that one would be supported in it by others—thus as an aim the seed for which already lies in others. Moreover, in reverse, by every such shared impulse only so much will be advanced as a proper communal consciousness underlies it. In this context, therefore, receptivity in individuals is not present by itself, and one’s truly active and effectual self-initiated activity is not simply the activity of Christ channeled through oneself; but the common spirit expressing itself in this selfinitiated activity is the Holy Spirit, only inasmuch as the preliminary activity for it lies in the continuation of Christ’s activities. Likewise, the receptivity of individuals is no longer simply receptivity for what directly proceeds from Christ as it was in the days Christ was alive. Rather, it is also receptivity for the self-initiated activity of others. Now, suppose that we want to apply to this situation the general rule15 that everything that essentially coheres with our partaking of redemption must exist in us just as it did in the first disciples. Then we will affirm that as long as all self-initiated activity was in Christ alone, but in the disciples there was only receptivity, in that respect the reign of God, in the narrower sense, would have existed in Christ alone, but the disciples would have represented only the external circle of preparatory grace, in which circle receptivity is also alone present. Likewise, moreover, just as occurred at that time in the disciples, so in each person today, the remembered apprehension of Christ has to be formed into the self-initiated activity of imitation. Furthermore, in its unity and selfsameness this shared self-initiated activity— which indwells everyone, rectifies itself in each person through all and continues in activity of a personal nature—we quite rightly term the common spirit of the Christian church. This communal activity corresponds to all that Christ promised concerning the Holy Spirit and to what was presented as the working of the Holy Spirit.

Hence, in putting all this together, we will now be able to state the following. First, in the group of disciples after Christ’s departure, their shared apprehension of Christ’s communityforming activity was transferred into a self-initiatively active continuation of it. Moreover, only in that this self-initiated activity—related as it was to the established apprehension of Christ—came to be the imperishable common spirit did the Christian church emerge. Thus, just as the sway of God’s reign is likewise grounded in oneself through faith, anyone who possesses this Christian common spirit only as receptivity—within the circle of preparatory grace, by the workings of Christian life upon oneself and in the streaming of others’ activity through oneself—has to transfer one’s relation to the apprehension of Christ that is established within the collective life into such a self-initiated activity. This, moreover, is what is called the communication of the divine Spirit. Now, if the divine activity that justifies16 could be conceived under the form of particular divine actions, then we would have to say that today this communication would be, as it were, the final element of this act for each person; during Christ’s lifetime, however, this final act would have been postponed, as it were, until after his departure from the earth. However, we do not have to accept such a paradoxical formulation by assuming any particular and temporal divine act. Instead, we will be able to express the homogeneity between the first disciples and ourselves just as well when we affirm the following. Precisely because the disciples had been taken up into Christ’s community, even at the time of Christ they would already have had the principle17 of the new life as well, not only as receptivity but also as self-initiated activity, except that as long as these disciples had Christ among them, this self-initiated activity came to be merged entirely into the constant desire18 to receive from him. Consequently, only thereafter could there be a true community among them, manifesting itself as the Holy Spirit. These circumstances are to be more fully explicated in the doctrinal propositions that follow.

1. John 16:7. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 16:5–7, May 14, 1795 (Thursday, Ascension Day), Bauer (1909), 31–33; and (2) John 16:4–15, (1826), SW II.9 (1847), 510–23. 2. John 20:22. 3. Matt. 16:17. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 16:13–19, Nov. 28, 1819, separately published (1820), also SW II.4 (1835), 87–99, and (1844), 120–32. 4. Acts 1:4, 5, 8. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Acts 1:4, May 30, 1824, separately published (1826), also SW II.4 (1834), 602–19, and (1844), 653–70; and (2) Acts 1:6–11, May 7, 1812 (Ascension), Festpredigten (1833), SW II.2 (1834), 318–30. 5. Sättigung. Ed. note: The reference in Acts is to being baptized in the Spirit—thus completely saturated or suffused by it—as Christ had been. 6. Ed. note: These two “primary stirrings” (ursprünglichsten Lebenseregungen) were featured in Schleiermacher’s psychological and ethical writings from early on, though ordinarily without the qualifying adjectives: lebendige Empfänglichkeit and freie Selbsttätigkeit. The latter is a transcription of a Latinate term he sometimes used: Spontaneität. Cf. §4.1. 7. Matt. 16:16; John 14:8–9, 11ff. Ed. note: Peter answers and Philip asks on behalf of all the disciples in these two biblical examples. Sermons on (1) Matt. 16:13–19, Nov. 28, 1819 (see §122n3); (2) John 14:7–17, May 21, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–42; and (3) John 14:5, May 27, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 265–75. 8. As in 1 Cor. 12:3. Ed. note: See §121.2. 9. Behalten. Ed. note: The allusion is to John 20:23, in which the resurrected Christ breathes the Spirit on those gathered and bestows the responsibility to forgive or to retain sin.

10. Gemeinwesen. Ed. note: Or, “a communal being/entity.” 11. Ed. note: Here, as usual, “perceived” translates anschauten. In this same sentence, “observation” translates Betrachtung. 12. Ed. note: E.g., cf. §§117.1 and 118.1. 13. Ed. note: E.g., cf. §100. 14. Ed. note: E.g., cf. §§58–61, 68.2, and 68.3. 15. Kanon. Ed. note: That is, this rule has already been established within the overall account. 16. Ed. note: Cf. §107. 17. Prinzip. Ed. note: In this usage, a “principle” as an underlying, driving force behind a process, action, or state of affairs, not a guiding statement. 18. Willen.

§123. First Doctrinal Proposition: The Holy Spirit is the uniting of the divine being with human nature in the form of the common spirit that animates the collective life of faithful persons. 1. In the doctrine of Christ, as we dealt with the union of the divine with the human in his person, we completely set aside the question of whether this divine aspect, apart from its union with human nature, would have been, and would still be, something special like a second person of the Godhead and relatively separate in the divine being, or not. Here too, in that we do set forth a similar formulation for the Holy Spirit, we can likewise suspend this consideration, despite the threeness1 having full status among us today. We can do so, in that the only thing that belongs to this locus of doctrine is dealing with the relation between Supreme Being and human nature insofar as this relation is present, with its workings, in our Christian self-consciousness. Now, since these workings will first be completely demonstrated only in the next division2 and since the content of the section that just follows3 has also been assigned for us already, a summary of these relations can find its place only in the doctrine of the Trinity4 at the conclusion of our entire presentation. However, at this point we do have to make some prefatory remarks about something else. That is, our definition is not at all meant to encompass all passages in our Holy Scriptures in which this expression appears, any more than it is meant to include all the ways this expression is dealt with in dogmatic treatments. Rather, here we have to do only with the Holy Spirit in the Christian church, and we leave it wholly undecided whether or not the expression means the same thing when used outside this relation. Yet, the choice does signify this much, that for us the “Holy Spirit” to be treated here is not the same thing as the Spirit to which some participation in creation of the world is ascribed5 or from the indwelling of which outstanding talents of all sorts issue.6 Indeed, it is also not the Spirit mentioned with respect to Christ’s becoming human, at least not insofar as a physical effect therewith is ascribed to it,7 however exactly even this effect may, in itself, be connected with the Christian church. Yes, we even divorce ourselves from the usage according to which the Holy Spirit is presented as already active in the prophets before Christ’s appearance.8 Moreover, we will not be obliged, thereupon, to identify the common spirit of the Jewish theocracy with that of the Christian church. Furthermore, in this regard we have the spirit of the Holy Scripture of the New Testament to back us up, however the letter of it might appear to be

contrary to that spirit, for in Christ’s promises9 of the Spirit of truth there is also not even the slightest suggestion that this Spirit was something that existed earlier and simply disappeared for awhile, or that it was something other than what it was for the disciples of Christ. Otherwise, the disciples would also clearly have been prophets at that time, and Christ could hardly have said that prophecy had come to a close with John.10 2. Now, having provisionally set aside what we have set forth in both of the last two propositions, let us go back to the fact that in the church, from time immemorial, and so also in the New Testament Scriptures, all powers that are efficacious in the Christian church—not, perchance, simply the gifts of miracles, for these are quite incidental in this respect—have been traced back to the Holy Spirit,11 and let us ask what has been meant by this claim all that time. The following, then, will certainly have to be conceded. First, there has been the claim that these powers are not, perchance, to be found outside the Christian church as well and, consequently, do not also develop elsewhere, either through the general arrangement of human nature—for otherwise Christ would indeed also be superfluous—or even based on any other sort of divinely instituted organization.12 Second, the claim has been made that this Spirit is indeed not, perchance, something supernatural and mysterious but is also not immediately divine. Rather, the claim further asserts, it is a higher being, to be sure, but one that is created, nonetheless, and one that places itself in relation to human beings in hidden fashion. Rightly, the Christian church has rejected this last assertion in the same way and in the same sense in which it has rejected all Arian notions regarding Christ. It has done this, for just as in Christ what is human would also no longer be human if we had to imagine it as conjoined with a higher nature in one person, so too our own life and that of all persons of faith would no longer appear to be humanly connected if our consciousness and conduct were thought to be determined by influences of a superhuman nature.13 Third, the claim has been made that the Holy Spirit too is indeed not, perchance, something divine, yet it is not united with human nature either but in some fashion simply works upon it from without. The reason given is that something enters into us from without only through the senses, but thereby it always becomes simply an occasion for our actions. However, the way such occasionings are then handled, this process is a determination that proceeds from within, and this latter domain is that of the Holy Spirit, whereas the domain of the senses is not that of the Holy Spirit at all. That these occasionings are given to us from outside does not block the unity of our self-consciousness or our self-determination; however, this unity of our self-consciousness would be dissolved straightaway if determinations of it were themselves to be given from outside. Moreover, if there are scriptural passages, mostly determined by prophetic linguistic usage, that seem literally to claim such an external working,14 these passages would likewise definitely have the letter of other passages countering them.15 It is also totally unimaginable how the gifts of the Spirit could exist in us16 while the Spirit itself is taken to be and remain outside us. It is no less unimaginable how it should be supposed that the Spirit could work on us from outside in any way other than by way of

human discourse and presentation, which indeed means that the Spirit would exist within and work within someone else. In this case, however, the person on whom the Spirit would be working would not yet be partaking of the Spirit thereby, but only a person in and through whom the Spirit is already working17 would have received the Spirit. Moreover, this would be how the Spirit would bring about the gifts in each person and, indeed, we would not be conscious of the gifts as internal gifts but be conscious of the power that brings them about as an external power. Rather, we would distinguish those on whom the Spirit is working, viewed as those in whom no gifts have as yet been brought about, from those who are already in the process of sanctification, in whom the Holy Spirit is bringing about the gifts.18 As a result of these considerations, we are conscious, as Scripture also says, of both the Spirit and the gifts as something internal—of the gifts, however, as different in different persons and, on the contrary, of the Spirit as one in various people, despite the diversity of gifts. Now, from these considerations it follows, consistent with the witness of those who first possessed the Holy Spirit, that they presented this same Spirit as a distinctive divine efficacious action in persons of faith, yet one not to be separated from recognition of the being of God in Christ. The two things, however, also exactly cohere. This is the case, for if the divine had not come into human nature in the person of Christ yet something divine would be present in the gifts of the Holy Spirit, then this divine factor could not have proceeded from Christ but would have to have been communicated in particular and in an absolutely miraculous fashion. Yet, at that point it would also have to have been possible for this divine factor to be communicated over and over again in the same way and, on account of the absolute arbitrariness involved, without any such supposed possessor of the Spirit being able to lay claim to it, or even to be recognized by others as such a person. As a result, precisely the characteristic of working upon and with one another would be wiped out, and anyone who would have the Holy Spirit would also have it only for oneself alone, an idea that the church has rejected from the very outset, viewing the idea as contradictory to its own consciousness. On the other hand, if it is supposed that the divine has indeed come into human nature through Christ but that after the disappearance of his person it would not have remained on earth, not even in human nature, then nothing of what in Christ depended on the being of God in him could have remained in human nature. Consequently, there would be no communication of Christ’s sinless perfection or of his unclouded blessedness. 3. Thus, it is plain to see that the testimony of Christ’s first disciples harmonizes with what was set forth in the previous two propositions as statements concerning our consciousness, and it remains only to justify the expression in our present proposition, based on those two. However, if the Holy Spirit is an efficacious spiritual power in the souls of persons of faith, we must represent it as united in them with their human nature, or we must abrogate the unity of their existence. This latter view would be true if, on the one hand, they were persons in whom human nature turns out to be efficacious and, on the other hand, if they were persons in whom the Holy Spirit, separated from human nature, were proved to be

efficacious. The second assumption so greatly emphasizes a total split in human life that it could never be upheld. To be sure, the theory concerning a single distinct and direct efficacious action of the Holy Spirit has been taken to such an extreme as this, not, however, when this efficacious action was still taking place but only long after the action had ceased to occur.19 Thus, what is yet to be settled is simply that this union persists in the form of the common spirit. Yet, consider human nature even independently of redemption. There, we do not regard whatever is completely the same and incapable of individualizing modifications, that is in all individuals of the species as spiritual power, to be something multiple according to the measure of individual beings. This is so of reason above all else. Rather, we view it as the same in all and in each. Now, if we were to separate the Spirit from the gifts, which are, to be sure, modified individually and personal in nature, then the Spirit would simply be one and the same in all who partake of the Spirit’s gifts, without being multiplied when the partakers come to be more multiple or diminished when they come to be fewer, and without being something in one person that it would not be in another, except that it would show itself to be the same more strongly in one person and more weakly in another. However, the Spirit is not one in all solely to the extent that its life and work in one person cannot be distinguished from that in some other person. Rather, just as we have already said above that overall each person attains to the new life only in and through the community, so each person partakes in the Holy Spirit and does so not in one’s personal self-consciousness, considered in and of itself, but only inasmuch as one is conscious of one’s being in this whole—that is, as consciousness held in common.20 Hence, the union of the divine with human nature in persons of faith is not a person-forming union, for otherwise it would not be distinguishable from the union that is in Christ, and the distinction between Redeemer and redeemed would be abrogated. When we observe an individual in the individual’s inborn and inherited collective life, we do not find such a distinction there, as the formulation already set forth above21 also states. Yet, if the question is of a collective life into which an individual enters only after one’s personal existence has developed up to a certain point, it cannot be said that this personal existence is nothing other than the common spirit that is being distinctively formed. Rather, only increasingly does this personal existence come to be exactly this common spirit. If we could isolate the new life of an individual, begun with rebirth, and put it together in and of itself, we would doubtless be able to say: first, that this life is wholly determined by the Holy Spirit and, second, that the new creature is nothing other than the Holy Spirit itself in conscious possession of this distinctive ratio of components within a mixture,22 made up of natural human powers. However, the new life is no homogenous whole, and it does not evenly permeate the entire organism of the person. Rather, the person, viewed as a steady unity of self-consciousness, is a mixture23 of the divine and the human, being separate and being one. Moreover, even though an individual might actually attain to a state wherein the new life would be spread over one’s entire being, the part of one’s life from before rebirth24 would still belong to one’s person, nevertheless. In the end, the divine efficacious action that constitutes the new life in the individual is also the common spirit, and for two reasons. It is

so, in part—without any consideration of special personal attributes—because this efficacious action exists in each individual inasmuch as one belongs to the community through whose efficacious action one’s rebirth was also conditioned, and from which community, by means of preaching, in the broadest sense of the word,25 this new life has passed over into that individual just as it took shape in the disciples through the power of Christ’s self-communicating life. It is also so, in part, because this divine efficacious action takes hold of the individual only for the sake of the community and forms the individual only for one end, namely, so that, and in such a way that, it can best work through the individual for the sake of the whole.

1. Dreiheit. Ed. note: “Threeness,” here not Dreieinigkeit, which would refer to the triune God, the doctrine of which latter “threeness-in-one” is often designated in Schleiermacher’s discourse by the term Trinitätslehre (see §123n4 below). 2. Ed. note: §§126–56, on the continuance of the church in its coexistence with the world. 3. Ed. note: §§164–69, on the divine attributes of love and wisdom. 4. Trinitätslehre. Ed. note: The “oneness” or “unity” of God, relatively speaking, is scarcely in dispute among Christians, compared with God’s purported “threeness.” Hence, normally any doctrine that considers how the concept “triune God” is to be understood is simply called “the doctrine of the Trinity.” In contrast, the church that Schleiermacher served in Berlin was named—not by him—the Dreifältigkeitskirche, literally, “the church of the Threefolded God” (or triune God). 5. Gen. 1:2; Ps. 33:6. Cf. Augustine (354–430), On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book (393) 4.16. Ed. note: “The Spirit of God was borne over matter … by a productive and creative power. Thus, that over which the Spirit is borne is produced and created.” ET cf. Fathers of the Church 84 (1991), 155; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:226. 6. Exod. 31:2–3. 7. Matt. 1:18 and Luke 1:35. 8. Isa. 34:16; 61:1; and Mic. 3:8. 9. John 14:16–17; 16:7ff. Ed. note: Sermon on (1) John 14:7–17, May 21, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–42; and (2) John 16:4–15, Aug. 13, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 510–23. 10. Matt. 11:13 and Luke 16:16. 11. See 1 Cor. 12; Eph. 1:17; and 2 Tim. 1:7. Ed. note: Especially sermons on gifts of the Spirit and unity in the Spirit: (1) 1 Cor. 12:3–6 (see §121n2); (2) 1 Cor 12:13–14, April 15, 1824, Bauer (1909), 111–25; (3) on the end of miraculous expressions at Pentecost, 1 Cor. 12:31, May 15, 1826, Festpredigten (1833), then SW II.2 (1834), 532–48; also (4) 2 Tim. 1:7, May 1, 1833, SW II.3 (1835), 550–62. 12. Gal. 3:2–5. 13. Ed. note: These points have already been worked out in earlier sections, especially at the christological core in §§91– 101. 14. Acts 1:5; 2:3; 8:29, 39; 10:19, 44. 15. Mark 13:11; Rom. 8:9, 11; 1 Cor. 6:19; Gal. 4:6; and Jas. 4:5. 16. 1 Cor. 12:7. 17. Acts 10:44–47. 18. Gal. 5:22 and Eph. 5:9. 19. Ed. note: This point was carried in the phrase “in particular and in an absolutely miraculous fashion” in subsection 2 just above. 20. Gemeinbewußtsein. Ed. note: That is, this consciousness is “held in common,” or “shared,” as individuals’ consciousness of the community, which is to that extent “communal,” just as species consciousness comes out of and is directed to one’s being a member of the species called “humanity.” 21. In §121.2. 22. Mischungsverhältnisses. Ed. note: This is a technical term from chemistry. 23. Mischung. 24. Ed. note: In this, as in other contexts, Wiedergeburt means both “rebirth” and “regeneration,” without distinction. 25. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s broadest sense of preaching (Predigt) includes all forms of proclamation in words and actions. See §§127.3 and 133–35, where he made this broader meaning explicit.

§124. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Every regenerate person partakes of the Holy Spirit, so that there is no vital community with Christ without an indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and vice versa. 1. We have asked ourselves the question of how redemption is realized in human souls and thence have answered that it happens by being taken up into vital community with Christ, and here the claim is set forth that each person has to partake of the Holy Spirit. This process is in no way to be understood as if, by the nature of the case, it involves two different things and as if something special happens to a regenerate person in one’s partaking of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, temporally, as well as by the nature of the case, the two phenomena are not to be distinguished. Rather, strictly speaking, this process would have to entail that in one’s coming to be regenerate, one also comes to be partaking of the Holy Spirit. The reason is that being taken up into vital community with Christ includes in itself, at the same time, that we are conscious both of being children of God and of being under the dominion of Christ, both of which Scripture has already ascribed to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.1 Thus, we also cannot conceive of how either one could exist if the other were missing. Suppose we were fictively to assume, instead, that we could find ourselves to be in a collective life such that it would present the reign of God and be driven by the Holy Spirit as its common spirit, except that we would be unaware of any founder such as Christ. Suppose, too, that we were then to view this situation over against the collective life of sin. In that case, we would certainly not be able to derive that condition from the collective life of sin. Consequently, because sin would indeed not be intended in this case but would, nonetheless, constantly exist in all members of that collective life, we would not be able to consider that condition to be grounded in and of itself—that is, also to have emerged originally in the way it now exists. This, in turn, would be so precisely because sin would likewise have to have been able to emerge in some other fashion and from some other points of origin as well.2 Speaking incidentally, this is also the reason why persons who generally proceed based on such an incomplete and sundered divine revelation still easily recognize one another, even if they are in conflict with one another. Thus, as long as we do not assume, at the same time, that other such divine reigns could emerge independently of the Christian church, also in other times and places, we would be forced to recognize an origin outside the collective life of sin, an origin from which this divine communication within that life would be a mere derivative. Then, however, even membership in this collective life of sin would, at the same time, be viewed as a being placed within the circle wherein this sole founder does his work. In this way, moreover, we would also find ourselves articulating the belief that such an outpouring of the Spirit would have been possible only after the Son of God had appeared and on the basis of his personal efficacious action. Now, already implied therein is the fact that our partaking in that Spirit and our own connection with the vital efficacious action of Christ are simply one and the same thing. Likewise in beginning with Christ, in reverse order, we do not give up the proposition that union of the divine with his human personal existence was, at the same time, an endowment of human nature in its entirety. From this it follows, first, that in general, a

continuation of this union must also exist after Christ’s departure and, second, that since this continuation is also supposed to proceed from that original union, wherever it exists a connection with Christ must also exist, and vice versa. Moreover, since after Christ’s departure the broadening of the connection with him can proceed only from the community of persons of faith, these three things must have one and the same meaning: to-be-drawninto-the-community-of-persons-of-faith-through-the-community-itself, to-partake-in-theHoly-Spirit, and to-have-been-drawn-into-vital community-with-Christ. 2. Herewith it is quite natural to ask how the two expressions that the same apostle employs relate to each other: that “Christ lives in us” and “led by the Spirit of God.”3 Now, when the same apostle says that those whom the Spirit of God leads are “children of God,” he would have to be contradicting another of his statements, which says that those who have taken up Christ are children of God,4 and no one would believe that, or here too these two statements—“the life of Christ in us” and “the leading of the Spirit in us”—are one and the same thing within that third category, being children of God. Further, either there are two different ways of being children of God—which none of us would concede any more than Paul or John5—or the two expressions are the same. Suppose that we were to answer the question based on how interconnected ecclesial expressions are. Then, first of all, the latter of the two expressions, “led by the Spirit of God,” has its proper application at a higher level than the first one, and, on that account, it has also won wider scope in scholastic language and in that formation of ascetic language, which places special value on what is easily understood. The first expression, “Christ in us,” on the other hand, is quite recessive in scholastic language, and it has gained its place, above all, in that ascetic language which is customarily termed “mystical.” If we go on to consider that the Holy Spirit is also called “the Spirit of Christ,”6 it is likewise true that elsewhere we also say, more distinctly, that “the spirit of another lives in us” than that “the other lives in us,” without our intending to denote something else by the one expression than by the other. Consequently, already on that account, nothing else could be understood by the one expression than by the other. Now, if we add the union of the divine with the human in Christ to these considerations, then obviously the human in him can be in us only as the properly conceived image of him. In contrast, the divine is, to be sure, also in us as a powerful impetus, though not so exclusively determining the whole person as it did in him. Rather, it is in us only in and with his properly conceived image, which can also more properly and fully take shape in us only in the degree to which that divine impetus illumines7 it in us. Yet, the work of the Holy Spirit is also precisely the same: to bring and to illumine Christ in memory. So, in every way, both expressions show themselves to be one and the same. We also reach the same result when we compare the contents of the two expressions in accordance with their effects. This is so, for if we imagine ourselves to be completely in vital community with Christ, all our actions can then be viewed as his as well. However, if, on the one hand, the Holy Spirit leads us into all truth in the knowledge of Christ,8 it cannot, on the other hand, also lead us to actions other than to those from which Christ can be made known.

Moreover, the fruits of the Spirit9 are nothing other than the virtues of Christ. This is the case, for to avow a leading of the divine Spirit in our souls that would not be linked with what we have received from Christ’s words and from his life, viewed as Christ’s mode of conduct, would mean to open the door to all sorts of enthusiastic behavior that the Evangelical church has vigorously opposed from the very outset. Accordingly, the leading of the Holy Spirit in us is never anything other than the divine impetus to conformity with what Christ has been and done humanly by virtue of the existence of God in him. Moreover, the life of Christ in us is nothing other than efficacious action for the reign of God through the embrace of human beings in the love that proceeds from Christ—that is, the strength of the Christian common spirit. Further, if to have faith in Christ and to have Christ living in ourselves is the same thing, this account also explains how it can be said, on the one hand, that the Holy Spirit brings forth faith and, on the other hand, that the Holy Spirit actually comes through faith.10 That is, through the activity of those who already partake in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit effects faith in others insofar as these others attain to recognition of what is divine and salutary11 in Christ, and thereby precisely in these persons the Holy Spirit becomes their motivating principle.12 So, precisely the fact that just as the divine being was united with the human person of Christ, so too, after Christ’s personal influences had ceased and hence efficacy of a strictly personal nature no longer existed in any individual, the divine being shows itself to be efficacious in the community of persons of faith as its common spirit—that is, the manner and means by which the work of redemption is advanced and extended in the church. 3. Now if, in accordance with their content, the two expressions mean the same thing, those Christians who like best to designate their experiences in the domain of grace as the immediate existence and life of Christ in them are not to be blamed, nor are those any the more blameworthy who prefer to describe, and almost exclusively do so, the exposition of their new life in terms of the indwelling of God’s Spirit in us. Dogmatic language, however, is obliged not only to preserve both tendencies but also to allocate proper usage to each of them, so as to point out the dangers inherent in one-sided usage. Accordingly, the one tendency could lead to detachment from the community, in that its adherents might claim to enjoy more direct influences from Christ; the other tendency could lead its adherents to imagine that the Spirit that is at work within the community could help them advance even when they are detached from Christ or could lead them beyond Christ. We could hardly leave this subject, however, without posing the question as to whether the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is to be conceived as a new divine revelation—although conditioned by Christ’s becoming human, yet original in its distinctive character—or rather as a fact that is not only dependent on Christ’s appearance but that also naturally follows from it. In the latter case, Christ’s appearance would be the sole supernatural foundation of Christianity—in the sense already indicated. Moreover, in this latter case Christianity and the entire development of spiritual life would advance naturally from this source. In the first instance, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit would be a second miracle13 like unto the first one and of equal necessity.

In any case, the question is not a dogmatic one in the narrowest sense, for we cannot decide it on the basis of our Christian self-consciousness. The reason is that today the communication of the Spirit to individuals presents itself to each one as a natural working of the presence and efficacious action of the same Spirit within the whole of the Christian community. It follows, however, that the basis for accepting the first miracle would have to be given in unmistakable witnesses. Now, the phenomena at Pentecost14 do clearly enough bear signs of what is miraculous in itself. Still, on the one hand, so do later communications of the Spirit through preaching, which communications thus lie fully in an analogy with our own current situation, yet likewise—and indeed described with attention to the sameness these phenomena have15—in such a way that here what is miraculous does not adhere to the essence of the matter, based on which the first miracle can also then be considered complete in itself. On the other hand, it is nevertheless difficult to claim that this outpouring of the Spirit was also the first communication of the Spirit to the disciples, since it is reported that Christ had already communicated the Spirit to them earlier,16 at a time when neither the words he used nor the accompanying symbolic action could possibly be construed as a mere promise. So, we would certainly not in any way consider this miraculous event as essentially attaching to the matter itself but would consider it as belonging to that particular time and leave the question entirely up to exegesis to deal with. Yet, leaving aside those accompanying phenomena, communication of the Spirit cannot be more or less of a miracle in one case than in another. Moreover, in this connection one could say that this communication is not a miracle in any instance if one considers the gradual spread of the Spirit to be wrought by the life force of the church, any more than it could be a miracle if it were wrought by the life force of Christ. In contrast, this communication of the Spirit would always be a miracle if one considered it to be a sudden leap from fragmentarily aroused receptivity into an interconnected, shared self-initiated activity. In such a leap the communication of the Spirit would have burst forth on the day of Pentecost and, through proclamation of this original event, would have engendered something miraculous in its train. Likewise, today too the more conversion appears to be something sudden in similar circumstances, the more we are inclined to consider anomalous appearances accompanying it to be miraculous.

1. 1 Cor 12:3 and Gal. 4:6. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 Cor 12:3–6, June 17, 1821. See §121n2. 2. Ed. note: For further clarifications, see §§66–73. 3. Gal. 2:20 and Rom. 8:14. Ed. note: Sermon on Gal. 2:19–21, July 18, 1830 (re: Augsburg), SW II.2 (1834), 653–65. 4. Ed. note: Gal. 3:26; cf. Rom. 8:14, 17, 21. 5. Ed. note: John 1:12; 11:52; and 1 John 3:1. 6. Ed. note: Rom 8:9; see also Gal 4:6; Phil 1:19; and 1 Pet 1:11. Sermon on Phil. 1:19–20, Mar. 10, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 408–25. 7. Verklärt. Ed. note: Perhaps both “illumines” and “transfigures.” The same verb leads to both, but it leads to “illumines” only figuratively. In some biblical and ecclesial language, those who are “blessed” (“the blest”) are imagined to be made effulgent, radiant with light. 8. Ed. note: Cf. 1 John 5 and Eph. 1:17, also John 16:14–15 and 1 Cor. 4:6. Sermon on 1 John 5:5, Dec. 26, 1833, in SW II.3 (1835), 738–51, and (1843), 763–76.

9. Ed. note: Gal. 5:22; cf. Rom. 8:23. 10. See 1 Cor. 14:3 and Gal. 3:5, 14. Sermon on Gal. 3:14, Trinity Sunday, May 25, 1823, first published in Bauer (1909), 34–44. 11. Heilbringend. Ed. note: Or, bringing what is holy, beneficial, of saving grace. 12. Ed. note: Here “motivating principle” translates bewegende Prinzip. That is, the Holy Spirit is the principle that is moving them, that is thus their “impetus” (Antrieb). 13. Ed. note: Elsewhere in this book, Schleiermacher depicts Christ’s appearance as itself the one great miracle (§93.3) and the reign of God in humankind as itself “the miracle” accomplished by Christ (§103.1). The latter was, is, and is to be effected, however, only through him as its source. Apart from Christ, the whole idea should be completely abandoned (§47.1–3). For other comparisons of Christ and the Holy Spirit in this respect, see also §§108.5, 117.2, 123.2, and 130.4. 14. Acts 2:2ff. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 2:1–42 on Pentecost, June 10, 1810, in SW II.7 (1836), 419–26. 15. Acts 10:47; 11:15. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 11:15–17, Sept. 3, 1810, in SW II.7 (1836), 470–78. 16. John 20:22. Ed. note: This conferral of the Holy Spirit to the disciples is appended to verse 21, regarding his commissioning of them. See the sermon on John 20:21, May 12, 1833, in SW II.3 (1835), 550–62, and (1843), 581–91. 17. Reinheit und Vollständigkeit.

§125. Third Doctrinal Proposition: In its purity and fullness17 the Christian church, being animated by the Holy Spirit, is formed as the perfect image of the Redeemer; every regenerate person is a complementary, constituent part of this community.1 1. If we reflect on the Redeemer in the maturity of his human life, we see that the totality of his powers was a sufficient organism for the multiple impetus that proceeded from the existence of God placed within him. In this respect, no individual regenerate person can be regarded as an image of Christ even once, because the state of differentiated sinfulness2 in which divine grace finds that person does not permit a likeness in the relation of the person’s psychological capacities to the multiple impetus of the Spirit. We suppose, however, that the Christian church is a true collective life, a unified, moral person, to use customary terminology. Yet, on the other hand, the church is not a hereditary or natural person. Thus, on this latter account, the church is indeed not like a personal existence that has been produced by the person-forming activity of nature, in that entering and exiting are related in very different ways within each of the two cases, though the church can and must be an image of personal existence. It can and must be so, for since the divine being is but one being, everywhere self-identical, even though the way God exists in the individual being of Christ and in the collective life of the church is not the same, nevertheless, in the two cases the impetus that proceeds from the divine being can only be that which we have named. Hence, both the church’s modes of apprehension and its modes of conduct are also like those of the Redeemer, in that precisely in each individual member, and thus also in the whole, the same human powers exist that in the Redeemer were also taken up into unity with the divine principle.3 Now, in a certain sense such a whole comprised of human powers exists in every mass of human beings that belong to one another, within which the most significant contrasts that human life offers are customarily present at the same time. This situation is also true of the early church, wherein, despite its limited compass, it was already presaged that it would very soon be spread among both Jews and Gentiles and consequently embraced the most significant contrast in this relation within one community. In this way, every further

development by the assumption of subordinate contrasts was prepared for and introduced. However, if we seek the true perfection of its likeness,4 we must also consider the church in its absolute purity and fullness. Obviously, its purity is seen only if we do not observe the entire life of individual regenerate persons, even after their rebirth, as a feature of the church but, instead, count only that within it which constitutes their good works but does not belong to their sins. Moreover, from this consideration it follows that the absolute fullness of the church is to be seen only in the totality of the human race. The reason is as follows. Just as we are able to imagine the first human beings—presupposing that they were the first parents in general—as having no differences of temperament or constitution, precisely because everything is supposed to have developed from them, whether of a more individualized or of a more climatic5 nature—in such a way that the image of the first human beings is completely given only in the basic types of all the human races and tribes into which each of these types falls. Furthermore, these types, in turn, would be completely presented only in terms of the entirety of all those individual beings who belong to them. The same must be the case in relation to Christ. That is to say, also in relation to Christ as the actually given spiritual prototype—with reference to discussion of his sinless perfection, on the one hand, and of the basis for sinfulness in all others, on the other hand—after the same fashion, it must follow that not only is each individual imperfect in every particular attribute but also that, considered in one’s entirety, each one is a one-sided, fragmentary likeness, in all aspects needing to be supplemented. Further, based on this consideration, it is self-evident that only in the collectivity composed of all formations of spiritual life that are grounded in the variety of people’s natural dispositions6 is the perfect likeness of Christ to be found. That is, only in this way would the one-sided tendencies of people be supplemented among themselves, and only in this way would the imperfections that can persist in one person be offset by others. The same thing would result if we look more at the work of Christ instead of his person and, in that respect, consider the church as an organic body equipped to be a collectivity of activities, a body in which the perfection7 of each expression of life is conditioned by the fullness brought by the various members.8 This is so, for diverse works can be appropriately distributed only if a variety of gifts underlies the distribution, and in reverse, if a variety of gifts is to arise naturally, a variety of personal unity of life must be presupposed along with that variety of gifts. In this fashion, the following two statements harmonize with each other very well: that the church is called “the body of Christ,” governed by its head,9 and that the more the church spreads externally and improves internally, the more will the church also come to be the likeness of Christ.10 2. The second half of our proposition then also follows from this consideration. This is so, for suppose that one can already say, directly with respect to the last statement, that everything that anyone contributes to the continuance and growth of the whole by one’s activity must ever be supplemented by the joint action of numerous others, because otherwise Christ would have been wrong in saying that when all is said and done, each one of us is still an unworthy servant.11 Then, with respect to what was stated earlier, each individual, despite all imperfection and one-sidedness, is, viewed as a subordinate unity within the whole, a part

of it not needing to be supplemented by anyone else. This contrast is explained in that there are numerous basic formations, even within the domain of the new human being. Here these formations are the same thing as a people’s characteristics are on the side of the natural human being. Thus, here too each of these basic types would also include a mass of subordinate varieties that we can indeed neither measure nor count. Yet, our shared feeling as Christians compels us to hold each of these varieties complete and to regard each one as a self-contained whole, no less than our species-consciousness compels us to do in that domain. Moreover, we find our justification12 for this fact not only in the biblical images already cited but also in the recognition we are admonished to give to all such distinctive parts, without limitation or exception.13 Correspondingly, we must also say of the temporal development of the Christian community that nothing would happen in the church as it does happen without each individual member being as that member is. Also immediately connected therewith is the fact that everything in the church is a common deed and a common work, consequently a common merit and a common fault as well, but this commonality simply presents itself unevenly in different individuals. Now, if, accordingly, the church grows toward being the perfect likeness of Christ only gradually, we will also be able to express what the divine order is in the gradual addition of individuals and in the further extension of the whole in the following formulation. Such an advancement ensues in such a way that in every instant, viewed in and of itself, not only is the whole as fully developed as possible, but also every instant also bears within it the basis for the greatest possible fulfillment for instants that follow. This formulation can always be affirmed, though only in faith, and it can never be demonstrated in direct experience.14 Postscript to the First Division (§§115–125) The last reflection15 sums up the many relations that have already issued from the foregoing doctrinal proposition, in part directly and in part indirectly. This is the case, in that a relationship to the doctrine of regeneration was shown that is similar to that of election, with the result that combining the two doctrines within one point of doctrine on the emergence of the church can no longer seem strange. Rather, it must appear quite natural that the elect are chosen precisely for communication of the Spirit. At the same time, however, the same reflection forms a transition to the next point of doctrine, regarding the continuance of the church in its coexistence with the world.16 The reason is that if the discourse here could be focused only on communication of the Holy Spirit, it would happen, then, that since the church is preserved only by the same principle by which it has emerged and is renewed, the ongoing efficacious action of the Holy Spirit is to be described in teaching regarding the basic features17 of the church’s life. Moreover, what will come up in this next point of doctrine is, in the same sense, the same as the doctrinal proposition regarding sanctification, just as what has just been treated is the same in content as that regarding regeneration.18

1. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s depiction of the “ideal church,” see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 4. Having discussed largely written modes of communication in supplemental notes 1–3, here he emphasizes “equality for all,” the essential place of order (“disorder destroys community”), and total independence from the state’s “civic” order. Supplementary note 5 then holds up the “royal priesthood” of all (1 Pet. 2:5, 9) and aspects of common concord for service ranging from Christian nurture to care for those more poor, and he again treats of relations between clergy and laity, also between more cultured and less cultured members, and mentions visits to, and understandings of, congregations different from their own. See also his wrap-up on “the true church” in OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 11. There he also addresses the issue as to whether Christianity is destined to absorb all forms of religion into itself. He doubts that even Christianity will have within it an external unity that transcends its external diversity, a state wholly defined by “a pure form of mutual sharing,” wherein its communication is such that “there is no inequality and no need of prayers.” Inside or outside the Christian church, then, “new forms” are bound to arise under temporal and finite conditions. He therefore describes even what Christian unity can be attained as inclusive and tolerant of diversity, as both “cosmopolitan” and “triumphant” in that sense alone. See also OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 15. See further CF §§134–35 and 127–32; also OG 63. 2. Ed. note: In the phrase “differentiated sinfulness” (differentierter Sündhaftigkeit), the adjective refers to sin’s being both actual and original, i.e., both originating in each person and originating collectively within the human race. In both respects, Schleiermacher takes Christ to be sinless, thus in that way unlike any other human being. 3. Prinzip. Ed. note: That is, the divine impetus (Impulse), or driving, initiating principle within, which God conferred upon him as the special human being that he was. 4. Abbild. Ed. note: As in a sketch or portrait, the comparison being with Christ’s perfection. 5. Klimatischen. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s time, this term referred to geographical conditions, which can serve to divide human groupings from each other. The lives of peoples were thought to be greatly affected by the different climes, or surroundings, in which each was rooted. 6. Naturanlage. Ed. note: This term also suggests talents or gifts. 7. Vollkommenheit. Ed. note: Throughout the discussion of §125, this term directly refers to a state of being completed, the usual translation. Thus, here a “perfect likeness” is one completed through all its parts, which supplement (ergänzen) each other. 8. As in 1 Cor. 12. Ed. note: See §123.2. 9. Eph. 1:23 and Col. 1:18. Ed. note: Sermon on Col. 1:18–23, Aug. 8, 1830, in SW II.6 (1835), 244–55. 10. Eph. 4:13 and 1 John 3:2. 11. Luke 17:10. 12. Rechtfertigung. Ed. note: This “justification,” when viewed as a defense, is not greatly different from that in typical ecclesial parlances, in saying that we are justified by Jesus’ death on the cross. The meaning that Schleiermacher adopts, however, is that of being made righteous in blessed community with Christ. 13. See 1 Cor. 12:19–26. 14. Ed. note: Here “direct experience” translates erfahrungsmäßig, to convey the meaning that shared experience would always carry an element of indirect experience as well, for each person of faith, based on observation of others. 15. Betrachtung. 16. Ed. note: §§126–56, which are divided into eight points of doctrine: regarding Scripture, ministry, baptism, the Lord’s Supper, the office of the keys, and prayer in Jesus’ name in the first half, and in the second half regarding the plurality and capacity for error in the visible church versus the unity and unfailing reliability of the invisible church. 17. Grundzügen. 18. Ed. note: Especially §§110–12 on sanctification and §§107–9 on regeneration. Following the point of doctrine on Christ’s person and work above (§§92–105), the doctrinal propositions regarding regeneration and sanctification were presented under a single point of doctrine (§§106–12) regarding “the way in which community with the perfection and blessedness of the Redeemer is expressed in the individual soul.”

Division Two

Regarding the Continuance of the Church in Its Coexistence with the World

[Introduction to Division Two] §126. Animated by the Holy Spirit, the community of persons of faith remains ever selfidentical in the way it is situated in relation to Christ and to this Spirit, but in its relationship to the world it is subject to variation and change.1 1. If the community of persons of faith is to exist and to continue in constantly efficacious action as a historical body within the human race, it must unite two things within itself: both a self-identical feature, by virtue of which it remains the same in the midst of change, and a variable feature, in which that selfsameness is made manifest. If we consider it solely in its coexistence with the rest of contemporary human existence, as is condensed in Scripture in the expression “world,” then, it would seem that it can indeed be said that the church could just as easily be recognized in its difference from the world as the world could be recognized in its difference from the church. In any case, moreover, among persons of faith themselves there is no lack of people who believe that they recognize themselves and those who are like them, especially in their not being what the world is. Still, this view leans just as much toward separatism as toward legalistic righteousness. The reason is that sinful collective life —with the exception of the residual feeling of dire need2 within that collectivity, which feeling underlies the church’s original claim upon the world and which already actually belongs to the church itself—is an actual emptiness and a sheer negative factor, as was sufficiently elucidated by all that was brought out concerning sin.3 Thus, the world can indeed be recognized by persons of faith as amorphous and disordered, in that the world is excluded from participation in what the church essentially is, but not the reverse. The scriptural language that uses “world” for that part of the human race that is not yet church is quite natural, because the entire human race, designated as world, would have become what the whole of that world would have been continuously, as this part that is not yet church would then remain. However, that usage bears the dubious quality of seeming very much to foster the impression that the world could, in this sense, be a whole just as well as the church, since the church would be described as, in fact, only an aggregate of individual elements striving in manifold ways against each other and combining only arbitrarily and in a transitory fashion. This impression simply increases when the church, over against the world, is continually described as a little band,4 thus, even on its own part, described only as an aggregate, indeed a negligible one. Hence, this use of the expression “world,” taken from the ascetic domain, would do better gradually to disappear, being reserved only for the dogmatic domain, in that here its true value is easier to determine and to secure. What is self-identical in the Christian church, however, can refer only to the fact that the divine’s existing within what is human remains ever the same and to the fact that what the church seeks to approximate in all that it does also remains the same. In Christ too, the union of the divine with the human was always the same. Moreover, because there could be no talk of approximation in his case, the exact fit of what came to be human in him to the divine impetus in him was also the same, but all else was determined by his locus in the world and

in accordance with temporal laws. Likewise, the relation of the Holy Spirit to the church as its common spirit also remains the same, and, viewed as the locus of the Holy Spirit within the human race, the church remains ever self-identical, as it also is in its being the selfsame image of Christ, to which it ever strives to be conformed. As concerns what is variable, however, the situation is as follows. This feature also existed in Christ, as such, though without struggle or strife; yet, it was determined not by the divine in him, for the divine is not subject to any temporal determination, but by the human nature that is united with the divine. Likewise, here too what is variable, as such, is determined not by the Holy Spirit but by the human nature on which and through which the Holy Spirit works. Now, if we designate “world” to be the entire compass of human nature within which human nature is not determined by the Holy Spirit, then we will also be able to say that everything variable in the church is, as such, determined by the world, only not everything in the same manner. That is, what has happened and has gradually come to exist in human beings by the Holy Spirit is as it is because the world on which the Holy Spirit works was as it was. Recognizable in all the gifts of the Spirit is a determinate basis in human nature by virtue of which it has had to be shaped in such and such a way. Moreover, in the entire development of the new human being, the manner and degree of progress depends on the development of nature in any given subject and on the state of the subject’s environs. Likewise, however, the manner in which Christian community takes shape within a people depends on that people’s distinctive mode of being. This is the case, in that apart from this distinctive mode of being there would be no basis for the Holy Spirit’s shaping Christian community in such and such a way in one place and differently in another place. Consequently, the determining basis for all the Holy Spirit’s community-forming activity is in the world, by virtue of the principle5 that Christianity is to develop as a historical force, and the world shows up in contexts provided by that force as that force is moved and suffused by the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, everything that is indeed within the church— because it is in and on those through whom the Holy Spirit works—but that is within the church, though not by virtue of the Holy Spirit’s activity, is determined by the world. It is all so determined inasmuch as it inveighs against the Holy Spirit and presents an intrusion of the world into the domain of the church. Included therein is not only what is, in the strict sense, to be called sins of regenerate persons, but also all obstructive and distortive influence that their sinfulness exercises alongside the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit and, likewise, all falsity and perversity that insinuates itself into religious consciousness. Now, although all this interference is constantly in process of disappearing, it is also renewed over and over again as often as the Holy Spirit takes possession in some new area, just as both the signs of being grasped and the signs of resistance are already no less to be found in the domain of preparatory grace. The same thing also applies to those variations in Christian community which depend on the multiplicity that is posited in human nature. Not only is what develops out of this multiplicity by virtue of adherent sinfulness in the church supposed to be in process of disappearing, but also the more close-knit that community

becomes, the more is each person, as one seeks what others possess, also supposed to take that up into oneself, and in this way the differences between them will, of course, also then naturally diminish proportionately. Yet, if that process also occurs in some fashion in every generation, the task is, nonetheless, renewed undiminished in the next one. 2. Now, if what is self-identical in the Christian church is to be considered in and of itself, inasmuch as it can be viewed, to a certain degree, as a manifold, then this self-identity is laid down within the disciplines both of Christian faith-doctrine and of Christian ethics.6 This is so, for the following reasons. First, if we want to depict7 the likeness of Christ, which we would increasingly strive to approximate, then this depiction consists in the basic characteristics of Christian life most recently laid down in Christian ethics. Therein, however, the explication8 of Christian consciousness is already coposited as an integrating component. Second, if we want to depict the self-identity of the Christian church as the locus of the Holy Spirit, then the church has to be presented as bearing within itself the truth into which the Holy Spirit can lead. Yet, third, those two disciplines cannot be presented in any way other than in terms of temporal and spatial differences. Thus, we can only say that in those two disciplines, and in all that are attached to them, what we actually aspire to present is that which is self-identical, but for this purpose there is not any means of presentation other than that variable one. However, fourth, the same is likewise the case in all Christian elements of life, inasmuch as the truth to which the Spirit leads underlies them and inasmuch as they contain within them characteristics of the likeness of Christ. Now, the totality of these Christian elements of life is none other than the historical reality of the Christian church over its entire course. Accordingly, we would also have to turn to this historical reality if we would want to depict what is variable and changing, and thus we would also not be able to do this without having coposited what is unvarying and selfidentical in this reality at the same time. This is all the more obvious as all such efforts, from which those changing formations of faith-doctrine and Christian ethics emerge, are seen to comprise a small portion of the church’s overall course. Consequently, neither discipline is to be presented without the other. Suppose that someone should want to set forth what is self-identical and unvarying in Christianity in complete separation from what is historical in it. Then one’s undertaking would scarcely be distinguishable from that of people who believe they have presented Christianity by communicating pure speculation. Suppose, furthermore, that someone should want to bring to light9 only what is entirely variable in Christian history, entirely apart from what is self-identical. Then this person would seem to have intended to do nothing other than what those do who, by sticking with the outermost shell, show us only the ruinous contributory play of blind delusion and passion in the history of the Christian church. Now, it is clear that the two elements cannot be presented in isolation from each other without making the distinctive nature of the church unrecognizable. Yet, here we cannot handle the two elements bound together exactly in the way that was pointed out just above, either. Thus, in the doctrine of the church in its coexistence with the world, it will be possible to proceed only as follows. First, we must set forth those main activities by the constancy of

which the explication regarding this whole over time actually becomes the explication belonging to the Christian church. Moreover, these main activities will consequently form the church’s own essential and invariable basic characteristics. Next, we must set forth those properties of community by which it distinguishes itself during its coexistence with the world from what it can also be in its appearance only once this obstructive contrast between church and world will have come to an end; yet, that is what the church, viewed internally, also is all along, inasmuch as it is the same entity under both forms. Now, that invariable element is essentially grounded in the fact that the church can endure and attain to its perfection10 only through that whereby it has also emerged. As determined by the world, the second, changeable element, however, is also especially traceable to what the world offers to that efficacious action of the church’s moving principle, which, in turn, ever presses upon the world. Accordingly, this second section falls into two halves. The first half contains the essential —and irrespective of its coexistence with the world—invariable basic characteristics of the church. The second half presents what is changeable, what the church bears within itself by virtue of its coexistence with the world.

1. Ed. note: Schleirmacher often speaks of expecting considerable diversity in and among churches as to expressions and practices of piety, beliefs, and other distinctive characteristics—many by virtue of their visible relation to the external world. Their strengths in relation to the divine (Holy) Spirit’s work in the Christian church (viewed as its “common spirit”) comprise the “united,” “invisible” church (cf. §§21–22, 121–25). On his carefully nuanced position concerning smaller separatist communities such as the Herrnhüter Brethren, see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 8. 2. Hilfsbedürftigkeit. Ed. note: Literally, needing help (redemption). 3. In §65ff. 4. Häuflein. Ed. note: Cf. Luke 12:32 (“little flock,” kleine Herde). 5. Gesetz. 6. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: As indicated earlier, the first German term translates doctrina fidei, doctrine concerning Christian faith. Likewise, the second German term means doctrine concerning Christian life, thus all that is customary (Sitte) there, not only what some narrower conception points to as morals. This is one of the many locations in which Schleiermacher describes a close coordination between faith doctrine and Christian living. For a full explanation of the latter term, see Hermann Peiter’s Christliche Ethik bei Schleiermacher / Christian Ethics according to Schleiermacher (2010). 7. Ed. note: Here “depict” translates vorstellig machen, which means to give the best, most approximate depiction (Abbild, “likeness”) or notion (Vorstellung) of Christ that we possibly can. The same locution is used in relation both to Christ and to the Holy Spirit. 8. Entwicklung. Ed. note: Although Christian consciousness can indeed be thought of as “unfolding” or “developing” over time—two other meanings of the word—these meanings do not appear to be appropriate in this context. 9. Ed. note: The expression “bring to light” translates zur Anschauung bringen. 10. Vollkommenheit. Ed. note: In §§157–63, what Schleiermacher calls “prophetic doctrine” regarding such a “perfection” of the church is referred to as its “consummation” (Vollendung).

THE FIRST HALF [OF THE SECOND DIVISION]

The Essential and Invariable Basic Characteristics1 of the Church [Introduction to the First Half] §127. Irrespective of the changeable characteristics2 that are inseparable from its coexistence with the world, the Christian community is still always and everywhere selfidentical: first, inasmuch as witness to Christ is ever the same within the community— and this selfsame witness is found in Holy Scripture and in ministry with respect to the Word of God; second, inasmuch as joining into and maintaining vital community with Christ rests on the same ordinances of Christ—and these are baptism and the Lord’s Supper;3 third, inasmuch as the mutual influence of the whole on the individual and of the individual on the whole is always ordered in the same way—and this is displayed in the office of the keys and in prayer in Jesus’ name.4 1. To begin with, it is certainly necessary to dispel the objection as to how the unity and self-sameness of the church is to rest on these points of doctrine, among which none would have escaped being an object of controversy. Indeed, among these points of doctrine, several have been so differently formulated in different regions of Christendom that, precisely on that account, they have constituted particular mutually exclusive communities and, in reverse, others who also want to be regarded as Christians have been rejected by particular communities. First of all, this objection is the most direct confirmation of what was said above,5 that it is not possible to present either one of the two features6—changeableness and selfsameness—in isolation from the other. Indeed, in accordance with what was indicated in the Introduction7 concerning the relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism, it will appear quite natural that Evangelical doctrine on almost all these subjects must be found to be in contradiction to Roman doctrine. The same is true, however, with respect to a number of small church communities that are, to be sure, essentially Protestant and that leave us far behind in their opposition to the Roman church. Yet, in any case, a distinction between internal and external factors is to be drawn here. This is needed, for no Christian community will concede that such a community could persist without witness regarding Christ and, indeed, in such a way that what is essential in that witness would be the same overall. Just as little could such a community persist without a continuity of vital community with Christ, to which also belongs a linking of that community with the newly arisen life at the turnover of generations. Further, wherever there is talk of a perfect community that rests in a common spirit, there a mutual influence of the whole and individuals on each other has to be presupposed as well. Thus, the variations only in part affect how some external factor is to be fitted to the internal factor and only in part affect notions of the necessity and exactness of the connection between this internal factor and some external factor, however the connection may be formed. So, the most important thing, with respect to these variations, is that one

judge correctly whether they are based on spatial and temporal variations in the spiritual nature of human beings, and are thus unavoidable, or whether they are to be regarded as fallible8 because they are based on encroachments of the world upon the church. The latter variations are then all the more resolutely to be resisted, the more those encroachments reach into the innermost sanctum of the church, while the former variations are counterbalanced of themselves through mutual recognition. 2. The next task is to comment a bit more on the relation in which these ecclesial institutions are set here and on how they fit together. If we proceed from the principle that our Christianity is to be the same as that of the apostles, then ours too must arise through the personal influences of Christ, since spiritual states are not independent of the way in which they emerge. Today, however, these influences of Christ cannot proceed from him directly, because they could never be recognized as having proceeded from him in a supernatural manner, with a surety such that they should not also have to have a confirmatory proof of their identity with those original influences. In consequence, we would always have to trace influences of Christ back to those that are given to us in presentations regarding Christ’s personal existence. Moreover, just as a self-initiated activity for the sake of the reign of God through the communication of the Spirit could never have come to pass, even in the disciples, without those influences, so the efficacious action of those presentations regarding Christ would always be an indispensable condition if the Holy Spirit is to be communicated. Now, this position certainly does not seem to embrace the entirety of what is written in the New Testament. Nor would it necessarily allow everything that is taught about the church to be explicated using that source alone. However, as regards the latter process, we do assign that to the further progress of the church. As regards the first process, we observe that, in general, the existing letter of Scripture does not even seem to be an essential factor for the given purpose; rather, the possibility also of an oral transmission must be granted, inasmuch as an intact identity of tradition could be guaranteed only by it. Moreover, to that extent we can consent to the view that this form in which the personal existence of Christ is presented to us does not belong indispensably to the very being of the church but belongs more to its well-being. Yet, as pertains to the greater portion of the New Testament writings, which do not actually have to do with the gospel: on the one hand, these writings contain proof that the church-forming self-initiated activity that Christ promised actually derived from the influences of Christ himself and from the witness of his disciples that Christ called for, and to that extent these writings are the charter for what we possess; on the other hand, they are a supplement to those direct expressions of Christ, in that we are able to derive from the disciples’ arrangements and actions Christ’s own instructions and expressed intentions, conceived as their source. However, as it is, Scripture—both each individual book in and of itself as well as the collection, a treasure laid up for all subsequent generations of the church—is always the work of the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the church. However, Scripture is only a particular instance of the witness to Christ expressed, in a general way, in our proposition. This is explained by the fact that originally oral and written teachings and stories about

Christ were the same and were only incidentally varied. Today Scripture is something special, because its unaltered preservation guarantees, in a distinctive way, the identity of our witness to Christ with the original one. Still, Scripture would be only a lifeless holding if this preservation were not an ever-renewing self-initiated activity of the church that, at the same time, becomes manifest in that living witness to Christ which refers back to Scripture or harmonizes with it in meaning and spirit. Moreover, here the expression “ministry of the divine Word” is to be understood only under this perspective in its general character as a duty and calling of all members of the church—provisionally apart from its every specific formation. Considered in this general sense, however, and related to each other in this way, these two first points of doctrine9 are necessary, because otherwise faith could arise only through direct influences, wherewith the selfsameness of faith could not be expected nor could the truth of it be authenticated. Yet, this ministry of the Word proves to be efficacious, as it were, not only outwardly; rather, it is an organic constitutive feature when viewed within the church as well, stemming as it does from Christ himself for the sake of more enlivening and strengthening communication. For the same reason, namely, that we have nothing more to expect from the direct personal influences of Christ, today entering into vital community with Christ and renewal of it must also proceed from the church, and these activities must be traced back to the church’s actions, but traced back only to such actions as are to be viewed as activities of Christ, at the same time, so that in no way would Christ retain a passive stance therewith and stay in the shadows over against the church. This communality, moreover, comprises the distinctive nature of the two sacraments.10 This is the case, for although, in accordance with its original institution, baptism did not initiate the relationship between the church and individuals, everything that preceded it first attained confirmation through baptism, in such a way that continuity of conscious vital community with Christ did first begin with baptism. Further, the Lord’s Supper is also not the sole medium for sustaining vital community with Christ, and, even in a preliminary way at this point, this observance is not to be conceived as something that can be isolated so as to produce a distinct effect. Nevertheless, we hold it to be the supreme action of this kind and engage in all other enjoyment in Christ as subsidiary approximations to it or as continuations of it. Hence, here we keep ourselves more to this idea of the Lord’s Supper underlying its observance than to the external form under which it is realized. In the same manner, all influence of the whole on individuals is concentrated in the forgiveness of sin. This is the case, for to the degree that the sins and good works of the regenerate persist over against each other, good works can be recognized only to the degree that any sin adhering to them is taken away. At the same time, however, good works are the seed and fruit of the gifts of the Spirit, which develop in such a way within each person that forgiveness of sin also first assigns to these good works their locus in the community of the faithful.11

Finally, as concerns prayer in Jesus’ name, the influence of individuals on the whole is to be represented by this prayer. Without prayer in Jesus’ name there can be no progress in a whole that is animated by a common spirit and that is, to this extent, a self-contained whole. Accordingly, there can be no prayer in Jesus’ name except with respect to the affairs of his reign. Thus, the efficacious action of this reign, which Christ has promised even to the smallest association of individuals, underlies an influence of individuals on the whole. However, if we view this prayer as the representative of all such individual influences on the whole, then this characteristic rests on a presupposition that is immediately evident to any Christian, namely, that prayer necessarily includes and assumes one’s own activity for the purpose of obtaining what is asked for. Consequently, without these last two institutions there would be no order, nor progress or success, in the church’s collective life.12 3. Still, it will best be shown that everything on which the unity and selfsameness of the Christian church rests in all times and places is also fully assembled here if we return to the church’s relationship to Christ. That is, in that, on the one hand, the church as Christ’s organism—which is meant when it is called “the body of Christ” in Scripture13—relates to Christ as outer factor relates to inner factor; accordingly in its essential activities it must also be the likeness of Christ’s activities. Moreover, in that what is effected through the church is nothing other than the progressive realization of redemption in the world, accordingly its activities must, at the same time, consist of further progressions of Christ’s activities. Thus, in the same way in which we have referred these activities of Christ to the scheme of his three offices,14 it must be possible also to demonstrate the likeness and further progression of these offices in the essential activities of the church to be set forth here. Accordingly, prayer in Jesus’ name, inasmuch as it includes the whole activity to which each individual is called, is the likeness of Christ’s kingly activity, both in and of itself and as regards the relationship of Christ’s rule to that of the Father. It is the latter to the extent that it ends up in any given person’s expression of thoughts concerning the spread of God’s reign, which is left in God’s hands, and to the extent that it concerns encroachment of the world. It is the former in that all purposes that proceed from the strength of God-consciousness are contained therein. In addition, the office of the keys comprises everything that belongs to order in the church and to that valuing of persons15 in the church which derives from a consciousness belonging to the whole. Thus, here we have the further progression of Christ’s kingly activity, which began with Christ’s selection of the disciples and selection of ordinances for the community to follow. Further, Christ’s prophetic activity consists of his self-presentation and his summons to enter the reign of God. Thus, Holy Scripture—inasmuch as its composition and preservation, viewed as a work of the church, most directly brings Christ to mind—is also the most steady likeness of his prophetic activity. In contrast, we can view ministry of the Word only as the further progression of that activity, since applying a presentation in common with Christ and a summoning of people in his name are the essential features of that ministry. Finally, if one separates the activity of Christ’s high-priestly office as far as possible from his prophetic and kingly offices, what is essential in this office is chiefly to be found in the

fact that he mediates communion of human beings with God; then we will not hesitate to acknowledge a reference to this office in the two sacraments. Indeed, we will do so in such a way that baptism will be viewed more as a likeness,16 on account of its more symbolic character, while the Lord’s Supper will be viewed more as a further progression, on account of its more real contents. At the same time, a result of this systematic combination of doctrines is that everything that belongs to Christ’s activity finds its likeness and its further progression here, in that the first three points of doctrine also likewise belong to Christ’s redeeming activity, just as the three succeeding ones belong to Christ’s reconciling activity.17 Also, in our Evangelical conception of Christianity we will have nothing to exhibit in the Christian church that we would want to put at equal rank with these six institutions. Instead, we desire neither to place tradition alongside Scripture nor to subordinate ministry of the Word to any symbolic observances. We desire neither to let the sacraments multiply nor to destroy their analogy with the other points of doctrine by assuming magical effects in them. We desire neither to limit prayer in the name of Christ by seeking intercession of the saints nor to grant validity for the office of the keys to a special representative of Christ, whether it be individual or collegial in nature.

1. Das wesentlichen und unveränderlichen Grundzüge. 2. Das Wandelbaren. Ed. note: See the title for the second half, just before §148, for the account of what is set aside here. 3. Ed. note: See also OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 12, on the regulation that all who are allowed to partake of the Lord’s Supper are to engage first in “previous meditation and preparation.” In place of this regulation, Schleiermacher proposes welcoming all who desire to be there. The event itself, in his view, offers the core experience of mystery and grace within worshiping Christian communities of faith. His own practice as a presiding pastor was closer to Huldrych Zwingli’s internal emphasis than to Luther’s sense of the “outward” manifestation of grace. See esp. §§139–42. 4. Ed. note: See OR (1821) I, supplemental notes 1 and 2, on values for faith and ministry, also contrary to use of anthropomorphisms, of “a more deeply speculative sensibility,” in which “faith is already essentially posited.” See also OR II, subsections “Rationalism and Superstition” and “Religion as System (like Music).” 5. Ed. note: In §126. 6. Elementen. Ed. note: As elsewhere here “features” translates this word, to save the English “element” to translate Moment. 7. See §24. 8. Ed. note: für fehlerhaft zu achten. 9. Ed. note: §§128–32 and 133–35, on Scripture and ministry, respectively. 10. Ed. note: §§136–38 and 139–42, on baptism and the Lord’s Supper, respectively. 11. Ed. note: See §§144–45 on the power of the keys, and finally §§146–47 on prayer in Jesus’ name. On both, see Matt. 18:19–20. On prayer in Jesus’ name, see John 14:13–14; 15:16; and 16:23–26. 12. Gesamtleben. Ed. note: Here, as elsewhere in this work, the “collective life” of the church, itself quite differently constituted, is always to be contrasted with the “collective life” of sin. 13. Ed. note: 1 Cor. 10:16; 12:27; and Eph. 4:12. In this respect, as a “body” the collectivity of the church becomes distinctively corporate. 14. Ed. note: §§102–5: prophet, high priest, and king. 15. Personen. 16. Abbild. Ed. note: Throughout this consideration of the three offices of Christ, this term “likeness” is used to relate the church’s essential activities or basic, invariable characteristics directly to the activities, or work, of Christ. 17. Ed. note: Thus, §100 is further explicated in §§128–38, and §101 is further explicated in §§139–47.

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Holy scripture

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §128. The authority of Holy Scripture cannot be the basis of faith in Christ; rather, in order to accord special authority to Holy Scripture, this fact already must be presupposed. 1. The polemical introduction of this proposition simply rests on the fact that what we deny here is actually claimed, and in practice it might well be assumed far more frequently than it is decidedly asserted, in that all books on doctrine and all confessional writings that preface the doctrine of Scripture as the source of Christian faith seem definitely to encourage precisely this view. Now, on this account, the need arises herewith to place the misunderstanding that underlies this practice in its proper light. That is, when faith in Jesus as the Christ or as the Son of God and the Redeemer of human beings is supposed to be based on the authority of Scripture, the question arises as to how one intends to establish a ground for this authority, since this must, nevertheless, obviously be done in such a way that one would impress a conviction upon the minds and hearts of those who are not faithful such that they would also come to faith in the Redeemer along this pathway. Now, if one has no starting point other than common reason, then it would have to be possible, first and foremost, to demonstrate the divine authority of Scripture purely on the grounds of reason, and two considerations are to be recalled in opposition to that move. The first consideration is that, in any case, this effort presupposes a critical and scientific use of intellect, of which not all persons are capable. Thus, only persons who are competent in these skills could have faith handed down to them1 in an original and authentic fashion; all others would simply have faith only secondhand and on the authority of those experts. Now, if the matter were that of providing insight into the doctrine and evaluating various conceptions of it, we could indeed assume such a gradation2 in our arena, too. However, to assume such a gradation for possession of genuinely salvific faith does not at all comport with the sense of equality among Christians that the Evangelical church declares. Rather, after the manner of the Roman church, it would demand of the laity an unconditional, obedient faith in those who alone have authority over the grounds of faith. This is so, for the right of access to the divine word that we afford to all Christians and the zeal with which we seek to keep it in vital circulation in no way relate to a supposition that everyone is supposed to be able to offer proof that these books contain a divine revelation. Second, suppose that such a proof could be offered and that faith could be grounded in this way, and consequently, given a certain degree of intellectual culture,3 that one could come close to demonstrating this faith. Then, by this route faith could exist even in persons

who have no consciousness of a need for redemption at all, thus could also exist independently of repentance and change of mind, and thus, by virtue of this mode of emergence, this faith would not actually be the true and vital faith. Consequently, in and of itself, this conviction, attained by proof, would not be of any use. That is to say, this conviction would not, of itself, sprout true and vital community with Christ. However, wherever the need for redemption would ring true, quickening faith4 would also arise from tidings5 of Christ that are not tied at all to conviction regarding a special quality of these books. Instead, this faith could rest on that other witness, which is itself tied to a perception6 of Christ’s spiritual effects; consequently, it could also rest on oral tradition. 2. Now, where the issue concerns the ground for faith, we would scarcely be able to allow a distinction between different classes of people,7 any more than we would be able to allow a distinction between different times. Rather, the ground of faith must be the same among us as among the first Christians. Suppose one then wanted to say that among those early Christians from the apostles onward, the ground of faith would have emerged, in any case, from their faith in Scripture, namely, the Old Testament and especially the prophetic sayings regarding Christ contained therein. Then here the only thing to be added to what was said above8 is this: Although already at the outset of their relationship with Jesus, the apostles designated him as the one predicted by the prophets,9 this can in no way be understood as if they would have been brought to faith by studying these prophecies and comparing their content with what they saw in Jesus and heard from him. Instead, the immediate impression in their minds and hearts, prepared by the witness of John the Baptist, had awakened faith, and that early faith was simply an affirmation regarding this faith aroused by John the Baptist, itself tied to their faith in the prophets. In their proclamation10 the apostles also struck the same path themselves, in that, referring first of all to Jesus’ deeds and discourses, they expressly shared their own faith and only then cited the prophetic witnesses as confirmation. Accordingly, just as their faith arose from Christ’s own preaching regarding himself, so did faith arise in others from their preaching regarding him and from the preaching of many others. Now, to the extent that the New Testament writings are such a preaching that has come to us, our faith also arises from them. In no way, however, is this the case under the condition that a special doctrine concerning these writings, namely, that they would have arisen from a special divine revelation or inspiration, would have to have been set forth and assumed in advance.11 Instead, this faith would have been able to arise in the same manner even if there would have remained to us only those testimonies, of which one could not deny that, alongside Christ’s essential testimonies regarding himself and alongside the original preaching of his disciples, in the particulars they contained much that would be misunderstood or would be improperly conceived or in the confusions of memory would be set forth in an improper light. Thus, if we do not need such a doctrine in order to attain faith, and if the attempt to require people not of faith to come to faith by means of such a doctrine could never succeed, the consequences are as follows. First, we notice that the apostles already had faith before they entered into a position rather different from faith itself, a position in which they were

able to contribute their part to these books. Likewise, among us faith already has to precede, before we are led by reading these writings to assume both a position like that in which they had been written down and a makeup of these books grounded in this position. Second, it will always be possible to make such a doctrine acceptable only to those who have already become persons of faith. 3. Hence, in the entire explication of faith up to now, we have presupposed only this faith itself as it is contained in a mind and heart that is in need of redemption, by means of whatever tidings it may have arisen. We have cited Scripture, however, only as it affirms that same faith in detail. Moreover, only at this point is Scripture first dealt with, especially in its natural relation to the Christian church, and only at this point is the question of its distinction from other books brought into consideration. Even so, that method which places the doctrine of Scripture in front—whether it appears in confessional writings or in books of doctrine—is not to be absolutely reproved if by proof of doctrinal propositions from Scripture one simply understands nothing other than a demonstration that a proposition documented in such a way expresses an authentic and original feature of Christian piety. Further, this process works only if caution is exercised so that it does not appear that a doctrine is supposed to belong to Christianity because it is contained in Scripture—since, on the contrary, it is contained in Scripture only because it belongs to Christianity. If we were to be satisfied with the first of these two options, then dogmatic theology would also remain only an aggregate of individual propositions, the internal interconnectedness of which is not elucidated. Their relationship to the common faith of the church would then be one or the other of two things. First, true and complete surety of faith would exist only where readiness to prove the divinity of Scripture exists. All who are not so greatly educated scientifically, however, would simply “believe” on authority, and thus piety would proceed from and depend on such science. Second, to the extent that the laity would be cut loose from this process and would ground their faith in their experience and rejoice in the vitality of that faith, for the community of the church scientific presentation would become something useless and vapid. Therefore, it has been of importance for this present mode of presentation to grasp its true aim independent of Scripture and to assign to the doctrine of Scripture its locus only at this spot, where by this time its distinctive authority12 can come to clear consciousness in the relation of what is selfidentical to what is changeable in the church and in proper interconnection with the other essential features of the church.

1. Ed. note: The phrase “have faith handed down to them” translates den Glauben … überkommen. 2. Abstüfung. Ed. note: That is, a “gradation” that reflects a passing down from experts to others who are presumed to be at a lower level. 3. Geistesbildung. Ed. note: Or “cultivation of the mind”; in significant contrast, “spiritual formation” would be geistige Gestaltung. 4. Ed. note: der lebendig machende Glaube. 5. Kunde. Ed. note: In this context, it is fitting to recall that the word for “proclamation”—as in preaching good tidings, the good news—is Verkündigung. 6. Anschauung.

7. Ed. note: On the affirmation that in its view of the roles of clergy and monks versus laity, Protestantism tends to be closer to the true church than Roman Catholicism, see OR IV, supplemental note 13. See also CF §§24, 127.1, 143.3, and references to each church in the index. 8. In §14.P.S. 9. John 1:45. Ed. note: Sermon on John 1:43–51, July 21, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 100–111. 10. Verkündigung. 11. Ed. note: On “inspiration,” see §14.2. 12. Ansehn. Ed. note: Not Autorität, which was used just above in the phrase “on authority.” Ansehn is the term that is translated throughout this work as “authority,” to refer to what is a properly authoritative source, also bearing within it normative dignity and importance.

§129. On the one hand, the Holy Scriptures of the New Testament are the first member in the whole series of presentations of Christian faith, continued ever since. On the other hand, they comprise the norm for all succeeding presentations.1 1. That the Holy Scriptures are the first member in an incipient series presupposes that the succeeding members are of the same kind, and this goes for their form as well as their content. If one divides the New Testament writings, as usual, into books of history and of teaching, this arrangement is actually correct only to the extent that one divides them not according to their predominant content but according to their external form. The reason is that in the historical books the didactic discourses of Christ and the apostles form a highly significant part, and, with few exceptions, the letters of the apostles are intelligible only to the extent that they either contain historical elements straightaway or as we are able to construct their historical circumstances out of them. Whether we then keep to this division or set it aside and attend more to the form of particular features in these books, we will always have to say that everything that has attained currency as presentation of Christian piety through language in later periods of the Christian church has moved within the same original forms or has been attached to them as an explanatory accompaniment. We find this to be so, for even religious poetic art in the lyrical form, which is the only true poetic form used in the church, already has its seed in the New Testament, and, on the other hand, all the explanatory and systematic works that have less originality and autonomy as presentations of Christian piety serve only as aids for interpreting those original products and those compilations that are derived from them. As regards contents, the general rule is to be applied first and foremost, here too, that in every community any particular attains currency only to the degree that it expresses the community’s common spirit. In this respect too, we will also have to view everything of this sort that still bears influence alongside the Holy Scriptures as bearing similarity to them, but concerning what does not still bear influence we also cannot demonstrate that it has a place in the series. 2. Suppose, however, that redemption is increasingly to be realized over time in the historical development of the Christian church and that, consequently, the Holy Spirit is also to penetrate the whole of it ever more completely. Then, on the contrary, it does not seem that the first member of this series, or of any other series, can, at the same time, be the norm for all the members that follow, not if every later stage in this development is to be more

complete than its predecessors. This point also bears some truth, but only if one combines two elements, each in its entirety, for if we observe the Christian church during the apostolic age as a unity, then the totality of the thoughts engendered in it cannot also serve as the norm for the thoughts engendered in subsequent ages. The reason lies in the naturally very unequal apportionment of the divine Spirit among those thoughts. Moreover, since not everyone produced religious notions only in accordance with the degree of one’s participation in this common spirit, in those days religious presentations could very easily have arisen that, strictly taken, came more from Jewish or Gentile thought that was affected by Christianity than from Christianity itself, because Jewish and Gentile views and maxims were still rooted in their thought, and the contradictions they bore over against the Christian spirit could come to be recognized only gradually. Consequently, viewed as Christian presentations, these presentations were imperfect to the highest degree. Contemporaneous with these most imperfect presentations, however, were the proclamatory presentations of Christ’s immediate disciples. Among them, the danger of an unconscious, contaminating influence from their previous Jewish forms of thought and life on their presentation of what is Christian in word and deed would have been averted, depending on how near to Christ they had stood, through the purifying influence of their living memory of the whole and undivided Christ. That is to say, thereby in all that developed to such clarity of consciousness, since such clarity of consciousness must precede any presentation in discourse, anything contradictory to the Spirit that brings life and to the teaching of Christ would have to have been immediately disclosed to them. Consequently, this process would apply, above all, to their accounts of Christ’s very discourses and deeds, by means of which what was to exert the most general, purifying influence was being established. Then, however, this process would apply, first and foremost, to all that the apostles taught and arranged for Christian congregations, because there they were acting in the name of Christ, though even when they proceeded more as individuals on their own, each one would also find not only his complement but also his correction in some other apostle.2 Thus, in these two ways, within the apostolic age itself the most complete and the most incomplete material stood side by side, viewed as “canonical” and “apocryphal,” respectively. Both terms are taken in the sense that resulted from earlier discussion here— that is, as two extremes that could not return in any later age in the same manner. This was the case, for presentations in the church increasingly had to distance themselves from what was apocryphal, because influence on the church of alien religious features—though in particular instances new portions were still constantly accruing to the church from the domain of Judaism—nevertheless subsided proportionately as the greatest portion of Christians had already come to be born and raised in the bosom of the church. In comparison, however, after that time the church could also no longer attain to what was canonized, because the living perception3 of Christ could no longer ward off contaminating influences in the same immediate way but only in a way that was derived from those writings and thus was dependent on them.

Hence, if we take the two together, canonical and apocryphal writings, even the apostolic age is seen to have stood under the general rule indicated, for the efficacy of the canonical writings seems to have been more secure and their influence more widespread as influence from the apocryphal writings faded, even at the very edges of the church. So, viewed as a whole, the later presentation would also seem to be the more nearly perfect one. In contrast, if we consider the canonical writings in and of themselves, these do bear in themselves a normative value for all times. We do not ascribe this value to every aspect of our Holy Scriptures equally but only to the degree that the authors are found to be in the situation just described. Accordingly, occasional utterances and purely incidental thoughts do not accrue the same degree of normative value as what belongs to the main subject in each instance. Further, we do not understand the Holy Scriptures in such a way that all later presentation would have to be uniformly derived from the canon and be inchoately contained in it already. That is to say, since that time when the Spirit was poured out upon all flesh,4 no era was also to be without a distinctive originality with respect to Christian thought. Yet, on the one hand, nothing is to be regarded as a pure product of the Christian spirit unless it is possible to demonstrate that it is in accord with those original products; and, on the other hand, no later product accrues an authority equal to those original writings if the aim is to ensure the Christian character of a given presentation or to point out the non-Christian character of one.

1. Ed. note: See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 17, for further explication of “the normative biblical power” of the New Testament canon, even though it has to be open to new discoveries. 2. Cf. Gal. 2:11ff. Ed. note: See also Acts 11:19–26 for closely related examples. 3. Anschauung. 4. Ed. note: Acts 2:17.

§130. First Doctrinal Proposition. The individual books of the New Testament are inspired by the Holy Spirit, and their collection has arisen under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. (1) First Helvetic Confession (1536) I: “The canonical scriptures, the Word of God inspired by the Holy Spirit, delivered to the world by the prophets and apostles,” etc.1 (2) Gallican Confession (1559) V: “We believe that the Word contained in these books has proceeded from God and receives its authority from him alone and not from men.”2 (3) Scots Confession (1560) XVIII: “The interpretation of Scripture … appertains to the Spirit of God by whom the Scriptures were also written.”3

(4) Belgic Confession (1561) III: “We confess that … holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost … and that afterwards God … commanded his servants, the prophets and apostles, to commit his revealed Word to writing.”4 (5) Declaratio Toruniensus (= Acta synodua generalis Toruniensus, 1645), in the general confession: “We confess … that we embrace the holy canonical … scriptures … written originally by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit,” and so forth.5 1. It is not easy to assign an exact boundary to the ecclesial expression “inspiration.”6 Before special treatment of the matter, moreover, we intend at this point to offer only the following preliminary remarks regarding the word. The expression “inspired by God”7 refers to writings in the Old Testament, which historical reference, in turn, most decidedly underlies this terminology. The expression does, to be sure, lead very easily to the thought of a relationship of the Holy Spirit to a given writer, a relationship that refers especially to this act of writing and does not exist otherwise. Less subject to this collateral notion is the expression “moved by the Holy Spirit,”8 for here the interpretation that these men were already constantly moved by the Holy Spirit and in this state then also spoke and wrote is, in and of itself, just as obvious as the interpretation that they were first moved to spoken discourse and writing. Now, since the ecclesial expression is not exactly in accordance with Scripture and is figurative besides, it will be necessary to define it in relation to cognate expressions that also designate how a person comes to form one’s notions. In this regard, then, on the one hand, what is inspired along with what is learned from it is in contrast to what is thought out, just as what has emerged under the influence of another’s self-activity is in contrast with what is devised based entirely on one’s own activity. In turn, what is inspired contrasts, on the other hand, with what is learned, in that what is learned is derived from something communicated from without, whereas what is inspired emerges for others as something original that is entirely dependent on communication from within. Hence, what is presented by a person who has learned may approximate something mechanistic as nearly as you please, whereas what comes to the fore in what is inspired can be seen as due to the complete freedom of a person’s own productivity. The general practice of also calling Sacred Scripture “revelation,” however, gives rise to the not infrequent practice of mixing up the two concepts, which cannot but lead to some confusion. This occurs in that if one should understand the matter in such a way that by writing down Sacred Scripture in a state of inspiration these authors would declare9 its content in a special divine fashion, this would be an entirely groundless claim. This is the case whether one looks more at the act of composing a sacred book itself or more at the arousal of thoughts that precede and underlie that act. That is to say, because all that they teach is traceable to Christ, the original divine declaration of whatever is contained in the Sacred Scriptures also has to be present in Christ himself. This material should in no way be

isolated after the manner of inspiration, however, but should be one indivisible declaration from which all the particulars develop organically. Thus, the speaking and writing of the apostles, moved as they were by the Spirit, was also a communicating of the divine revelation that existed in Christ. Now, our proposition ascribes to the Holy Spirit not only the composing of the individual books, however, but also their compilation so as to form the New Testament canon, and another expression does service for the latter process. Thus, this distinction rests, first and foremost, on the fact that we regard the composition of a book as the intentional act of an individual, but compilation of the canon is the result of a complex process of collaboration and counteraction in the church, so that not everything that has contributed to that compilation can be equally attributed to the Holy Spirit. Yet, generally the same value is not assigned to each of the two concepts as it is here; rather, some would be satisfied with only a guiding activity of the Spirit even in the process of composing the books, while others also raise this activity to the point of inspiration in the process of compilation as well. 2. If we return to the concept of the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the Christian church, hence also as the source of all spiritual gifts and good works, then all production of thoughts is also to be traced back to, and is thus inspired by, this common spirit insofar as that production belongs to the reign of God. Thought production in the apostolic age, however, fits this description in such a way that the two contrasting features, apocryphal and canonical, are included. Accordingly, in the apocryphal writings only particular traces of a connection with the collective life of Christians are seen to stem from the Spirit, and in the canonical writings the efficacious action of the Spirit is more closely detected only in terms of an individual entity10 in each case, almost without being weakened or altered thereby, yet in such a way that in no individual person is the distinction from Christ entirely removed. Now, suppose that the contrast between these two features were filled out through gradual transitions. Then the efficacious action of the Spirit would be most complete and most concentrated in the particularly notable circle of those who had walked with Christ from the very beginning of his public life, in the circle of Peter and with agreement of the entire community at that time.11 This is explained in that within this apostolic class, as one might call it, the individual members would have been so equally balanced among themselves that without violation of conscience the number of original apostles could be increased simply by lot from among the wider circle. This would have been possible in that this continuity guaranteed both purity of their zeal and integrity of their conception. However, even in this original circle no one could fail to appreciate the significant difference between elements that belonged only to the private life of individuals and those that were devoted to leadership regarding Christian concerns. This difference becomes evident, for even among the apostles the human factor would more readily have come to the fore in private life, whereas in the practice of leadership the will to let the spirit of the whole hold exclusive sway would have had to be far more determinative. Hence, what would be said and done in this role could be called inspired in a far more rigorous and definite sense.

On the other hand, a person would destroy the unity of life among these apostolic men in the most hazardous fashion if that person wanted to claim, in order really to emphasize the inspiration of Sacred Scripture above all else, that they were less animated and moved by the Holy Spirit in other aspects of their apostolic office than in the acts of writing, and, in turn, less so in formulating such material also from writings pertaining to ministry to congregations, writings that were not previously destined to be taken up into the canon and likewise stood out more in those public discourses or parts of discourses which were later preserved in the History of the Apostles,12 than in all other materials. Moreover, with or without their knowing it, this distinction was based on the fact that these discourses and writings were determined to be relevant to all future times as well, though detached from their original aims. Consequently, distinctively apostolic inspiration is not something that befits the New Testament books exclusively. Rather, these books participate in apostolic inspiration, and inspiration in this narrower sense—as it is determined by the purity and integrity of the apostles’ conception of Christianity—also extends only as far as that officially apostolic efficacious action which proceeded from this conception. Now, suppose that in this connection someone does consider inspiration of Scripture as a special part of the apostles’ official life, which was generally guided by inspiration. Then one would hardly go so far as to bring up all the difficult questions about the prolongation of inspiration that have been answered for so long in such a way that the subject is shoved entirely outside the arena wherein it could be adjudged in terms of experience. Only an entirely dead scholasticizing outlook could either somehow want to draw a distinct boundary along the way from the initial impulse to write thence to the word actually put down or even want to present the latter in its external form, in and of itself, as a special product of inspiration. Here the natural canon is analogous to the doctrine of Christ’s person, on condition that in the apostles’ vocational life, viewed in its totality, the efficacious action of the common spirit that holds sway within the church actually came as close as can be imagined to that personforming union of the divine being with human nature that has constituted Christ’s person, without canceling out the specific distinction between the two modes of union. The analogy would also fit, in accordance with this criterion, only if in any apostolic act its external aspect could, in part, exist only due to a source different from that internal aspect which is decisive for its presentation. The negative answer to the question as to whether, on account of divine inspiration, the sacred books would require hermeneutical and critical treatment divergent from generally valid rules is readily understandable based on these presuppositions. Moreover, on that ground all other difficulties would automatically be disposed of. 3. In this fashion, inspiration of Scripture is traced back to the Holy Spirit’s influence in the official activity of the apostles. Thus, it could easily seem as though this determination would apply only to the books that present teaching and not likewise to the historical books as well. Regarding the latter kind, it might be thought that they would not at all be about communicating someone’s thoughts but that instead everything would simply have to do with compiling and sorting out authentic remembrances and doing so in a proper way. On the one

hand, however, the apostles’ thoughts were supposed to be simply extrapolations upon Christ’s own expressions, but these expressions could be fully understood only in their context on each occasion, as they were induced by circumstances, since Christ’s discourses were indeed also occasional ones in large part. This being so, an integrated and unadulterated conception of the elements of Christ’s life would seem to be a necessary condition for the entire official activity of the apostles. We affirm, moreover, that no element of Christ’s public life can be thought of as completely divorced from his instructive and life-giving discourse but that, at the same time, all of his actions were also selfpresentations and as such were fruitful for proclamation of God’s reign by him. Yet, these elements of Christ’s public life could be conceived in the most varied way. Moreover, they could be conceived so truly for some that the natural impression that these elements made on them would also have had to grow into being a factor in their recognition of Christ’s divine dignity. That natural impression would have had to be just the reverse for others, so that the impression could be transformed into an apocalyptic caricature or could even serve toward disproving Christ’s messianic dignity. Accordingly, we naturally find the most genuine conception of the elements of Christ’s life—a conception also in a certain sense already to be ascribed to the divine Spirit—in the same circle as those who from the very beginning followed Christ’s public life with increasing trust, having discovered the messianic promises in him. As a consequence, we find that in this same circle the genuine conception of Christ and the genuine advancement of his teaching and prescriptions belong inseparably together. On the same basis, however, before long it became a supremely important task for the entire church to secure proper remembrances from Christ’s life according to the criterion of how each element cohered with the vision of God’s reign through Christ. Hence, we too, in service of this general apostolic purpose, must think of this recollection as subject to the influence of the Holy Spirit. We too, moreover, cannot assume any distinction in this respect between the apostolic teaching and those Gospel narratives, just as we also then find the apostles themselves telling the tale, both orally and in writing. This is the case even though this teaching issues from distinct official circumstances, consequently from vocational activity in the narrower sense. Still, the narrating too was grounded in a cooperative effort encompassing and benefiting the entirety of the church, thus in its vocational activity in the broader sense. So, the matter does not at all come down to deciding the question of whether or not the Gospel narrations were a special office of the church, one either adjacent or subordinate to apostolic proclamation. Rather, in no instance is the rendering of remembrance to be entirely sundered from historical composition, no less in oral than in written transmission, not even if we are considering only narration of a particular fact. Furthermore, the effort to make the Redeemer appear therein exactly as he was in reality is, in any case, the work of the Spirit of truth, and only to the extent that this was so can such a narration assume a place in Sacred Scripture. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the communication of such individual narratives is the original communication, also that the subsequent collection of these narratives actually

ended up in the compilations that comprise three of our Gospels. Then the possibility must also be granted that in the process a person who would report only in a certain interconnected form what that person had experienced oneself could just as well blend into what one has experienced oneself something credible that one has heard from another person. Indeed, it is just as possible that a person who had not experienced something at all could, motivated by the same effort and by the same Spirit, compile what was derived from some purer and more original conception just as fruitfully as an actual eyewitness would have been able to do. So, if the proper choice and interconnection of historical elements already available is of primary importance in this process, then the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit in this particular enterprise would be completely contained in the analogy drawn with efficacious action in the selection of individual books for the canon. 4. Finally, as concerns the role of the Holy Spirit in the collecting of these books, the first differentiation that anyone has to take notice of is the following. Even if all the individual books in this collection do belong within the apostolic age, the collection itself certainly does not belong to it. Moreover, no tidy apostolic limit regarding what is canonical and normative can have been transmitted to us. For this matter, therefore, scarcely any other analogy remains than this, that we manage to think of the Holy Spirit ruling in the thought world of the overall Christian collectivity then in the same way as every individual does in one’s own thought world. This analogy holds, for anyone knows how to sort out one’s outstanding thoughts and to preserve them in such a way that their being brought to mind can be secured. In contrast, one lays other thoughts aside, in part to process them further, or one even disregards them entirely, leaving to chance whether they will present themselves to oneself again or not, just as one can certainly also come to the point of rejecting some thoughts entirely, sometimes precisely when they have arisen and sometimes later on. In the same way, the faithful preservation of apostolic writings would be the work of the divine Spirit in giving recognition to its own products, the work of that Spirit by which what is to remain unchanged would be distinguished from what, in the further development of Christian teaching, would be multiply transformed and over against what is apocryphal. In part, the latter products would be thrown out as soon as they would have emerged, and, in part, they would be treated in such a way that in the church both the given mode of production of such products and any taste for such products would gradually disappear. In this connection, the only thing that can appear difficult is this, that in relation to individual books, opposing elements would succeed each other in history, in that they would first be accepted as canonical and later on would be rejected as uncanonical, and vice versa. However, on the one hand, it would not have been the judgment of the whole church that changed in this way; rather, what was earlier accepted in one region and later rejected in another region would still later be generally accepted or rejected. Moreover, for the church organized as a sizeable unity, some books could be considered disposable, in comparison with other books that were acceptable among isolated congregations and that were effective for them alone, or the reverse could be the case. On the other hand, this situation makes it clear that the collection of Sacred Scripture came into being as such only gradually and by

approximation. Likewise, this same activity then continually persisted in the careful adjusting of the various degrees of normative worth that people would be able to assign to particular components of Scripture and in making decisions about lacunae and interpolations of all sorts. The result was that the church’s judgment only gradually approached complete rejection of all apocryphal writings and thus gained the position of holding all canonical writings sacred. Now, what supported this gradual process and also guided the whole course of its procedures is simply the Holy Spirit holding sway in the church. In contrast, all wavering and all that held back this gradual approach can be somehow grounded only in the world’s influence on the church. Hence, if in this relation someone wants to draw a sharp line between certain things that are forever settled and other things with which the church could still be occupied, one cannot recommend too much caution. The reason is that even the sense for what is truly apostolic is, as history teaches us, a gift of the Spirit that gradually ascends within the church. Accordingly, at times much can have slipped into the sacred books through people’s oversight or blunders, things which, in turn, can be recognized and definitely proved to be uncanonical only at a later time. Yet, staying on this tack also with respect to the entire collection obscures the fact that this collection has always remained self-identical ever since it first existed as such in the church, though it is not as if this determination were irrevocable. On the contrary, we are not able to provide the particulars of this determination—which we would have had so little warrant to regard as an absolute miracle or as a completely isolated work of the Holy Spirit, since that work, in accordance with its origin, is wholly unknown to us. Nor are we able even to view this determination simply as an element that could be fully accounted for only if the church were to have remained continually occupied with this enterprise and were to have been able to establish the truth ever more completely through its ever-renewed confirmatory activity but also were to have remained subject to the possibility of being corrected. Therefore, even though many a symbolic writing of our church defines the canon,13 further free investigation concerning the canon ought not to be hindered thereby. Instead, critical research must repeatedly investigate the individual writings anew, in order to probe whether these writings are rightly included in the sacred collection. This task must be done, for only an increasingly greater surety can emerge from calling what is “genuine” into question. Even a particular situation cannot bear a negative influence on this task, a situation wherein writings exist that are otherwise undeniably apostolic or wherein writings that are closely linked with them have disappeared. This is so, for we are justified in our belief that nothing essential to the preservation and well-being of the church will have been withdrawn from us by such losses, and we are also at least equally justified in the belief that the wellbeing of the church can only be advanced if what does not truly belong in Sacred Scripture is differentiated from it.

1. Ed. note: ET Tice, here drawn from the original German and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 211; cf. Cochrane (1972), 100. 2. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 362; also Cochrane (1972), 145; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330. The Latin text quoted by Schleiermacher ends with ab uno Deo esse profectum. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice, drawn from the original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 463, cf. also Cochrane (1972), 172; an inferior Latin version is given in Niemeyer (1840), 350, and a closely related ET was made by Bulloch (1960). 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 385, also Cochrane (1972), 190; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 361. 5. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 669. 6. Ed. note: On “inspiration,” see §14.2 and §132. 7. 2 Tim. 3:16. Ed. note: Θεόπνευστος. 8. 2 Pet. 1:21. Ed. note: ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίον ϕερόμενοι. Regarding the Holy Spirit conceived as “common spirit,” see §116n1. 9. Ed. note: kundgemacht (“declare,” or “pronounce,” “make generally known,” or “publish”). At its root, this verb and the nominative Kundmachung mean “to give notice of” and “what is announced or made known.” The allied words ordinarily seen in Schleiermacher’s discourse are verkundigen, Verkundigung (“proclaim” and “proclamation”), and offenbaren, Offenbarung (“reveal” and “revelation”). In the present context, however, Schleiermacher’s choice is the most fitting. In none of the three words, however, is the corresponding event normally epistemic—that is, solely or even primarily conveying knowledge. 10. Individuum. Ed. note: That is, the collective appropriation and realization of the Spirit is indeed defined, thus detected (bestimmt) as occurring, almost without diminution, through some individual entity (Individuum, e.g., called “Luke” or “Peter” or “John” or “Paul”), yet no such individual person (Einzeln) is thereby totally identified with Christ, without any distinctive characteristics of one’s own. 11. Acts 1:21f.; cf. John 15:27.—Paul did not belong to this circle, and yet the church never placed him behind the other apostles even with respect to inspiration. Thus, the church recognizes in him the same merits even though in a way he acquired them by another path. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Acts 1:21–22, June 3, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 276–88, and (2) John 15:18–16:4, July 30, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 495–509. 12. Apostlegeschichte. Ed. note: This is the German title of the Acts of the Apostles, or “Acts” for short. 13. (1) Gallican Confession (1559) 3; (2) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) 6; (3) Belgic Confession (1561) 4. Ed. note: (1) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 360; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 329. (2) ET from the 1571 edition in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 489. See §37n5. (3) ET in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 386; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 361.

§131. Second Doctrinal Proposition. The Scriptures of the New Testament are authentic in their origination and sufficient as norm for Christian doctrine. (1) Smalcald Articles (Luther 1537) Part II: “This means that the Word of God— and no one else, not even an angel—should establish articles of faith.”1 (2) Gallican Confession (1559) IV: “We know these books to be canonical, and the sure rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the church as by the testimony and inward illumination of the Holy Spirit.”2 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) I: “We believe … the canonical scriptures … to be the true Word of God and to have sufficient authority of themselves, not of men. … And in this Holy Scripture the universal church of Christ has the most complete exposition of all that pertains to a saving faith and also to the framing of a life acceptable to God.”3

(4) Anglican Articles of Religion (1562) VI: “Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith.”4 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) VII: “We believe that these holy scriptures fully contain the will of God, and whatsoever man ought to believe unto salvation is sufficiently taught therein. … Therefore, we reject with all our hearts whatsoever doth not agree with this infallible rule.”5 (6) Confessiones Marchicae (= Confessio Fidei Ioannis Sigismundi Electoris Brandenburgici, 1613) II: “From the outset … we give witness to … the true, infallible and alone salvific Word of God, as that Word … is written down in the holy Bible, which Word is and shall be the sole standard (Richtschnur, plumb line) for all the faithful … complete and sufficient for all blessedness, even to decide all conflict in religion, and will ever remain so.”6 1. From the above discussion it is already evident that the authenticity of Scripture does not at all require that every book should actually derive from the person attributed to it. Rather, in all the extant manuscripts, a given piece of writing could have been falsely ascribed to a particular author by some later judgment. Consequently, it would not be authentic in this sense, and yet it would belong to the only circle in which we are to seek canonical writings. Hence, it would nonetheless remain an integral component of Sacred Scripture. Indeed, even at its first appearance a piece of writing could have borne at the top the name of someone other than its actual author. In that case, if that name were simply based on a fiction regarded to be innocent and on a moral feeling regarding the author in keeping with the shared moral feeling of the author’s contemporaries, even a book conveyed in this fashion could always be authentically a part of the Bible. Only if such a designation were to have been an intentional deception would this piece of writing not be qualified to complement the normative presentation of Christianity. Hence, even if a number of doubts raised as to the correctness of statements given by the authors of individual sacred books were to be more nearly substantiated, there would still be no justification, much less a duty, to exclude such books from the collection. In no way, however, would it be permissible to draw up a list of authors to whom individual writings would have to belong in order to be canonical, or to specify a class the productions of which would all have a definite right to be called canonical. On the contrary, even if writings were discovered today that, with the greatest certainty humanly possible, would be ascribed to a direct disciple of Christ or to an actual apostle, we would not incorporate them into the New Testament without further ado but would at most attach them as an appendix.

Now, even the early church, especially given that it was not able to demonstrate an apostolic sanction for individual writings,7 cannot bind us to what it established, not even if its manner of determining the canon had been harmonious. Thus, probably the first half of our proposition can hardly intend to indicate anything more exact than what the above-cited symbolic writings also intend, namely, that we trust the general experience of Christians, viewed as a product of the Holy Spirit, that certain components of the canon handed down to us by the church failed to be accepted not out of deceit, on the one hand, or out of ignorance, on the other. Instead, such components would actually have belonged to an apocryphal or heretical region of Christianity and could not be assigned such an outstanding worth without danger. In this light, we do nevertheless admit that in content and form not all of these books are equally suited to having their canonical status truly validated. Now, since determination of the canon has also occurred only in a gradual process, and what is more, since we know that in the church all errors and imperfections can be uncovered and removed only gradually by the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit, that trust to which we referred must be protected just as much by according the greatest freedom to treatment of the canon as by the most rigorous conscientiousness. What is implied by this consideration? First, all activity that is directed to correct exposure of authorship or to the genuine or spurious character of individual passages must be able to progress undisturbed, and no doubt that arises should be met with untoward prejudice or be cast off unexamined. Such practice not only affects the completeness of our information about Scripture; it is also not without influence on the interpretation and use of individual passages. Second, we must not admit anything misleading into exercise of the purest hermeneutical procedures possible or, as it were, knowingly prefer artfully to elaborate in our interpretation rather than to set forth a result that could disclose a conception of Christian faith less pure. Only under these conditions can we be proud of our work. Likewise only thus—though limited to a smaller compass of controversial issues and equipped both with more numerous technical aids and with a more trained sensibility—can we be actively engaged in appreciation of Scripture as were those Christians who first sorted out and established Sacred Scripture from the total mass of written Christian works. 2. Now, if this second doctrinal proposition is to be understood in its entire compass, we must, first of all, refer back to the original efficacious action of these writings. If the books of teachings are then to be grasped in terms of the life circumstances of Christians at that time, and in such a way that the apostles’ expressions bore influence upon the formation of the guiding thoughts as well as of the practical purposes of Christians, and if the historical books are also supposed to have replicated the similarly effectual discourses and deeds of Christ and the apostles, they should then also become the regulative typus8 for our own generating of thoughts, a typus from which that process too does not distance itself, in turn. Moreover, if Sacred Scripture is described as sufficient in this respect, this means that the Holy Spirit can guide us into all truth through its use, just as the Holy Spirit did the apostles themselves and all others who were gladdened by the direct instructions of Christ. In consequence, if in future the complete model for Christ’s vital knowledge of God will be present in the church,

we can quite rightly regard this as a fruit of Scripture, without anything originally alien to it needing to have been added to it—except that, of course, the effect of whatever was already formed by Scripture on what came later will also be attributed to it. In this manner, correct expressions of Christian piety emerge, in proportion to the distinctive domain of each person’s thinking and speaking, as one’s own individualized understanding of Scripture. Moreover, whatever gains currency in each period as a conception of Christian faith occasioned by Scripture is also the unfolding of the genuine and original conception of Christ and his work that is most appropriate for this moment, and it constitutes, for this time and place, true Christian faithfulness held in common.9 To this constitutive efficacious action of Scripture is then related the second critical efficacious action, which people often solely have in mind when they speak of the normative worth of Scripture, yet it is simply a subordinate action, almost a shadow of the first. To be sure, it is possible to imagine a generating of thoughts that is independent of the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit through Scripture but that is still religious in content and Christian in its original grounding, the products of which are rather meager and fruitless or erroneous and bordering on heresy. Any such generation of thoughts, which originates in a state that is cloudy or as yet undeveloped on the part of those who receive or process them, must then be put to the test in Scripture. Moreover, if it at least intends to be Christian, it can secure this only if it seeks to be founded on Scripture and thus admits of such testing. Obviously, however, this critical aspect of the normative use of Scripture must decrease to the degree that the productive aspect gains ground and, at the same time, as interpretation of Scripture progresses toward completion, ameliorating misunderstanding of it. As concerns scientific10 expression of Christian faith in proper faith-doctrine,11 this expression, to be sure, is realized only in scientific individuals and also exclusively in those who want to be organs moved by the Spirit as it is operative in Scripture. This process involves bringing what is fragmentary in these expressions together. In addition, it both refers the various presentations to each other—those that were originative and those that turned against Judaism and paganism—and, through each other, it brings the whole matter to completion. Accordingly, the productive, normative power of Scripture is evident here as well, though in itself the distinction between a more popular and a more scientific universe of discourse is scarcely indicated. On the other hand, many misgivings must arise, at the same time, toward a system of faith-doctrine that, after it has gone its own way completely, intends to allow a critical use of Scripture only in order to prove that some particulars are likewise to be found in Scripture as are set forth in the system of doctrine12 and that nothing in this system contradicts the sayings of Scripture, rightly understood. In that case as well, it cannot be expected that every single dogmatic locus should also be represented by a scriptural passage especially devoted to it. 3. If one takes the statement that Scripture is to be sufficient as norm for Christian doctrine exactly, then nothing in it would have to be superfluous. This would be so, for anything superfluous would be something confusing,13 thus is always but a negative factor, and would take a comparatively great effort to meet its fruitless demand. However, Scripture

contains much that is virtually repetitious and that indeed more frequently comes from elsewhere, and this appearance of superfluity is all the more striking in comparison with a given system of doctrine the less complete that system is. Yet, since Scripture itself has not emerged as a complete whole, this is in accordance with the nature of the matter itself. Furthermore, in this respect our proposition expresses the conviction, which already lies in all proper use of Scripture and is also repeatedly confirmed by any proper hermeneutical treatment of it, that the presence of repetitions in the historical books offers all the better warrant for what is authentic in tradition, though without excluding the possibility of their complementing each other. The same thing goes for the more frequent treatments of the same subjects in the books of teaching. This holds true in that thereby the identity of the Spirit’s working in different elements and individuals is all the better testified to, even though an influence on different conditions and circumstances would not be held in view more in one instance than in another.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 304; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 421. 2. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 361, also Cochrane (1972), 145; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 224; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 237; cf. note at §37n3. 4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s actual quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET from the 1571 edition in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 489f. See §37n5. 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 387f, also Cochrane (1972), 192; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 362f. 6. Ed. note: ET Tice, from the German text in Niemeyer (1840), 643f. 7. What Irenaeus and Eusebius reported no one is likely to view as authentic accounts, all the less so the further they were from the events. See Irenaeus (ca. 130–ca. 200), Against Heresies (ca. 190) 3.1, and Eusebius (ca. 260–ca. 340), The Church History (303–323) 2.15, 3.24, 39, and 5.8, etc. Ed. note: Subsequent introductions handle the subject still differently, tending to give scant credibility to these early reports. For Irenaeus, ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, 414–15; Greek: Migne Gr. 7:844f. For Eusebius, ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, vol. 1, 196, 234–37, 250–52, and 304–7. 8. Ed. note: Cf. §145n29. 9. Ed. note: The phrase is gemeinsame christliche Rechtgläubigkeit. 10. Ed. note: wissenschaftlichen (“scientific”) refers not to the physical sciences but to any study pursued in an orderly, properly interconnected fashion and in accordance with rules pertinent to that study. Cf. §28. 11. Ed. note: eigentlichen Glaubenslehre, or that which is genuine and actual at any given time and place. 12. Lehrgebäude. 13. Ed. note: Verwirrt (“confusing”) literally connotes an “entanglement,” either in something inappropriately sensory (or “organic”) or in something else that does not clearly belong, thus leading to “confusion” and to the corresponding need to disentangle and clarify what is to be said.

§132. Addendum to This Point of Doctrine. The Old Testament writings owe their place in our Bible in part to New Testament references to them, in part to the historical connection of Christian worship with the Jewish synagogue, without their sharing the normative worth or the inspiration of the New Testament writings on that account. 1. The presentation of this point of doctrine already diverges from the customary one in its treatment only of the New Testament writings in its two doctrinal propositions. This addendum is designed to ground this divergence and to lay it out distinctly. Intentionally, however, it is declared to be only an addendum, because it is simply polemical1 in nature, hence will become superfluous once the differentiation between the two sorts of writing

would be generally recognized. Yet, the further away this point in time seems to be, the more risky it would also be to set forth such an entirely divergent proposition as a doctrinal one within an ecclesial system of doctrine. This same view predominates especially outside the schools, in that very often, indeed not uncommonly with special preference, Old Testament passages are used as a foundation in Christian formation, with the result that the New Testament seems to make its claims almost only in proportion to its size. Moreover, for contrasting reasons this happens quite often both among those who place less value on what is distinctive about Christianity and among those who recognize this distinctiveness solely and exclusively to constitute the salvation of human beings. Here we seek to accord currency to our claim only for the second group, in that the first one lies outside our domain. 2. Now first of all, as concerns inspiration of the Old Testament writings, we still have to distinguish, above all, between the law and the prophets. So, suppose that the apostle is right to present the law, though taken to be a divine ordinance, as something placed between the promise to Abraham’s seed and its fulfillment by an “intermediary”2 and to claim besides that it lacks the power of the Spirit, from which the Christian life must spring.3 Accordingly, it certainly cannot be claimed that the law is inspired by this same Spirit, of which this apostle says that he would no longer hear of the law and its works.4 Rather, God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue of our joining with Christ. Likewise, even Christ never or in any way presents the sending of this Spirit, the witness of which he conjoins with the witness of the disciples,5 as the return of something that was already present before and then afterward disappeared for a time. At the same time, however, all the Old Testament’s historical books, from the giving of the law onward, are attached to the law. This is so, for if we contrast messianic prophecy, viewed as that which has the greatest affinity with Christianity, with the law, viewed as that which is the most alien to it, surely no one will venture to claim that the Jewish historical books contained more of the history of messianic prophecy than that of the law. Indeed, most of what the prophetic books contain refers to the legal system and to the actual circumstances of this people. Moreover, the spirit from which they proceed is the common spirit of the people, nothing else, thus not the Christian common spirit, which as one Spirit was to break down the dividing wall between this people and all others.6 So, all that would be left is the messianic prophecy itself, which could have its part in inspiration as we think of it. If we bear in mind, however, that only in particular moments did the prophets rise to the pitch of inspiration and that only in relation to these moments is the spirit driving and animating them called “holy,”7 we must surely conclude that even this ascription is made only in an inappropriate manner. This is so inasmuch as this common spirit, which is tied to consciousness of the need for redemption and expresses itself as a presentiment of a more internal and spiritual dominion of God, carried within itself an utmost receptivity to the Holy Spirit and could rouse and sustain this receptivity even beyond itself. Now, if we inquire, in the second place, about normative worth and indeed especially productive worth, on the whole it is undeniable that by and large the religious sense of Evangelical Christians recognizes a great difference between the two kinds of Sacred Scripture. That is to say, even the noblest psalms always contain something that Christian

piety cannot appropriate as its purest expression. In consequence, only after deluding oneself by performing unconscious additions and subtractions could one possibly bring oneself to hold that a Christian doctrine of God could be assembled from the prophets and the psalms. On the other hand, there is an overweening penchant for using Old Testament sayings as expressions for religious self-consciousness, almost always accompanied by a ruleoriented way of thinking or by a slavish deference to the letter.8 Finally, as concerns the critical aspect of a normative use of Scripture, admittedly there are indeed few Christian doctrines that people, within certain time periods, would not have wanted to overlay with Old Testament passages. However, how could it be possible for anything belonging to the doctrine of redemption through Christ to have been so clearly presented, in the period of mere presentiment, that it should be used with equal profit alongside what Christ himself said or what his disciples said once the work of redemption was completed! Alternatively, if one wants to think this is possible precisely by means of inspiration, how was it that an entirely different recognition would not then have been prepared thereby among the biblically literate portion of his people, a recognition for the Redeemer and the way he announced the reign of God, so that the effect would in no way be proportionate to the cause they want to ascribe to it? The history of Christian theology also shows plainly enough how much these efforts to find our Christian faith in the Old Testament has, in part, redounded to the detriment of our application of interpretive art and also, in part, swamped the further formation of doctrine and controversy over its more precise definitions with useless entanglements. As a result, well-grounded improvement of doctrine has had to await people’s entirely relinquishing Old Testament proofs for distinctively Christian doctrines and preferring wholly to set aside whatever chiefly relies on such proofs for support. 3. Yet, when something that has had currency in the church for such a long time is to be reformed, it becomes necessary to show how this practice has arisen. Now, this external placement of the two collections on the same level rests on two platforms. The first platform is the belief that not only did Christ himself and the apostles teach about Old Testament passages that were read but that this practice also continued in public gatherings of Christians, both before and after the New Testament canon was formed. It cannot possibly follow from this fact, however, that identical homiletic use of the Old Testament as well as of the New Testament should persist even to this day, or that we have to consider it a corruption of the church if our own generation of Christians is not just as conversant with the Old Testament as with the New Testament. On the contrary, the gradual, everbroadening subsidence of the Old Testament lies in the nature of the matter. It does so to the degree that its currency in the church has flowed from the historical connection just mentioned. Least of all, moreover, is this connection able to guarantee the normative worth and inspiration of these Old Testament books. The Pauline passages that attest to the usefulness of the Old Testament writings9 refer most of all to the usage indicated above, and the free manner in which the apostle himself makes use of those writings is completely in accord with that

statement, so that he would surely give us witness for the claim that we no longer have any need for such proofs. The second platform on which external placement of the two collections on the same level rests is the fact that Christ and the apostles themselves refer to the Old Testament writings as if to divine authorities advantageous for Christianity. However, it does not at all follow from this fact that we still have need of these preliminary intimations, since we have the experience, and the New Testament Scripture gives countenance to it, that one ceases to have faith on account of such testimonies10 if one has gained immediate certitude based on one’s own perception.11 To be sure, on this account it does indeed simply belong to historical accuracy and integrity that what Christ and his first heralds appealed to is also to be preserved. However, this appeal touches almost exclusively on the prophetic writings and the Psalms, and the practice of attaching these to the New Testament as an appendix is justified on this basis. Yet, since at the time of Christ these writings were not available separately but only as parts of the sacred collection and since they are often quoted only in this way and, moreover, particular quotations are also drawn from other books, one can raise no objection to the Old Testament’s accompanying the New Testament whole and entire, even though for us it cannot possibly be an indivisible whole in the same sense as it is for the Jewish people. The proper sense of the matter, however, would be better expressed if the Old Testament followed the New Testament as an appendix, since where it is placed at present does unclearly set forth the presumption that one would have to work through the entire Old Testament in order to get onto the right path to the New Testament.

1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher largely directs polemical activity inside the church, not outside. See Brief Outline §§40–41. 2. Gal. 3:19. 3. Rom. 7:6ff. and 8:3–4. 4. Gal. 3:2. 5. John 14:26 and 15:26–27. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 14:25–31, June 18, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 457–68; and (2) John 15:18–16:4 (see §130n11). 6. Ed. note: Cf. Eph. 2:14. 7. As in 2 Pet. 1:21. 8. Ed. note: Cf. 2 Cor. 3:6. In the RSV “letter” becomes “written code,” whereas other passages (e.g., Rom. 7:6) have rather suggested adherence to a supposed literal meaning versus the spirit of what is said. 9. Rom. 15:4; 1 Cor. 10:11; and 2 Tim. 3:16. 10. John 4:42. Ed. note: Sermon on John 4:35–42, April 11, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 291–302. 11. Anschauung. Ed. note: John 4:42 RSV states, in part: “We have heard for ourselves.”

Second Point of Doctrine

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine]

Regarding the Ministry of the Divine Word

§133. Those members of the Christian community who conduct themselves predominately by their own self-initiative carry out their ministry of the divine Word through self-communication directed to members who are conducting themselves in a predominately receptive fashion; this ministry is in part undefined and fortuitous, in part formal and orderly.1 1. The presupposition of an unequal distribution of the common spirit that holds true for every sort of community has already been claimed for the Christian community as well in an earlier discussion.2 Now, even this distinction between relative strength and weakness as well as of purity and impurity of presentation and conception—each of these contrasts being viewed of itself as in conjunction with the other one—existed in the early church, as in every province of the church, most strongly from its beginning onward, and was destined gradually to decrease. Yet, for a long time, and in all parts of the church, this distinction has also remained significant enough as a lack of parity among persons. Suppose, moreover, that this lack of parity had also entirely ceased to exist. Even then there would remain such a lack of parity within each individual as to one’s mood that sometimes one would find oneself to be active on one’s own initiative and sometimes simply receptive to prompting. Thus, the contrast indicated here is always present, and the task based on it is always to be fulfilled. This is the case, for those who have weakness and impurity in them, even if only for an instant, belong to the community only inasmuch as they are receptive to being cleansed and strengthened;3 also, the community really retains them only inasmuch as persons are present within it who by their own initiative offer cleansing and strengthening to them. Further, here this process must be considered to be present among the regenerate themselves, irrespective of the distinction between an inner and an outer circle in the church.4 Now, that the conduct of self-initiating members toward receptive ones is a communication and that every such communication of the former to the latter is an offering and tendering of the divine Word may well be shown to hold true in the following way. That is, self-communication5 exists in no way other than by a self-presentation that works stimulatively, in that the motion stirred up by a reproductive process in the one presenting becomes in those who are receptively bestirred a force that calls forth the same motion. If this motion effects some cleansing or strengthening or both, this event can only be a powerful working of the Holy Spirit in an individual, as is the case in all similar instances of the common spirit’s working in an individual. Moreover, this Holy Spirit, in assuming everything from Christ, is always that same Holy Spirit that has also inspired Scripture. So, every expression an individual utters will be able to generate a similar effect only insofar as it is analogous to Scripture and consequently can also be justified as scriptural. Thus, it can be said with equal justice that each self-communication that serves to effect godliness is certainly scriptural as well, and everything scriptural is also edifying. This is to be explained as follows. First, no true Christian, as such, can want to adhere to something in one’s inner depths and let it be a force in one’s life except to the extent that one in turn recognizes Christ in it. Second, neither, therefore, can anyone in one’s self-communication—in relation to the

Christian community, that is—want to commend and propagate oneself and what is one’s own, but one can commend and propagate Christ alone and that which lives within oneself from Christ. Finally, likewise no one can want to take up something into oneself in order to further one’s growth except as it is received from Christ. Accordingly, every communicative and bestirring activity in the Christian community is bound up with self-knowledge—for “self-denial” would be an unsuitable term for it—such that the effective content of that activity can be ascribed neither to the person oneself nor to a divine revelation distinctively one’s own. Rather, everything must be referred to the conception of Christ that comes from Scripture, with the result that everyone may work only as a remembering and developing organ of Scripture. Otherwise, non-Christian claims and separatist operations would just disintegrate the community. So too, a truly Christian receptivity would spurn adopting the word and deed of some individual as a model and accepting it as truth. Moreover, this same effort of refusal will gladly make a distinction within what is scriptural itself so as not to be deceived when something is presumed to be justified by a particular biblical passage but does not reflect the spirit of the whole. 2. If we then reflect on this influence of the stronger upon the weaker members, we observe that it encompasses the entire Christian life. This is so, for insofar as even the actions of individuals express the same Spirit, they are just such a proffering of the Word as follows from what was said earlier6 concerning Christ’s prophetic office, to which this ministry is correlated. This is why the distinction made at the end of our proposition is of importance. All of the influences just indicated variously occur in an individual’s life, often in part not intended and in part not sought. These influences comprise the undefined and relatively fortuitous ministry referred to in the proposition. We cannot deal with these here, in that the proper arrangement for these belongs in Christian ethics. However, some mention of them must be made here too, where we have to do only with ministry that is formal and orderly, because the Evangelical notion of ordained ministry has its most reliable grounding in the fact that in all essentials it is homogenous with that other more general and undefined ministry. Moreover, this combining of all ministries into one, which does not permit any sharp distinction to be made between those who perform the functions of ordained ministry and other Christians, we already find in Scripture as well. That is, where Paul lists the various gifts and offices,7 he unambiguously mixes the two together. Likewise, Christ too summoned many to be his followers in a way not specially designated, apart from the distinct relationship in which the Twelve stood with him or similarly the SeventyTwo who were sent out on a particular mission. So too, in the early church the apostles’ ministry was an especially ordained one, since they kept to a definite number8 and acted on decisions made in common. The same thing applies to the office of deacons, first in Jerusalem9 then also in other congregations after that model. However, already the effort of the deacon Stephen to defend Christianity at trial belonged not to the special ministry assigned him, in that he spoke out solely as an individual; and this is how it was with all who were suited for the general and undesignated ministry within the congregations: they were commended and challenged to it.10

The distinction also lies in the nature of the matter, but not to the degree that higher and special attributes necessarily belong to ordained ministry. Rather, even though in civil society the common life cannot be completely broken down into distinct leadership functions allocated by the society as a whole, such a strict division of leadership functions is much less feasible with regard to religious communication and influence in ecclesial community. This is so, for, on the one hand, the Holy Spirit can never be inactive and, on that account, also cannot be bound to particular times in all its activities since it rather moves each person to do all that comes ready to hand. On the other hand, it is not possible to imagine such a spiritual community to be well-ordered without any distribution of work, in that otherwise none of the various gifts could reach its maximum effectiveness. Above all else, the distribution can be all the more readily and securely effected the more the one Spirit also guides decisions harmoniously.

1. Ed. note: Cf. OR (1821) discourses III and IV, supplemental note 5. 2. §129.2. Ed. note: See also Brief Outline §§3, 236, 267–70, 307–8. Regarding the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the church, see CF §116n1. 3. Geläutert und gestärkt. Ed. note: Cleansed in the sense of being helped to clear out and clean up, to enter a process of further refining. In contrast, gereinigt refers to being made pure, unrein to being “impure,” a distinction Schleiermacher has just used. 4. Cf. §§115.2 and 116.1. 5. Selbstmitteilung. Ed. note: This kind of communication comes directly from within oneself; Selbstdarstellung is a presentation given in the same way. 6. In §103. 7. See 1 Cor. 12:8–10 and 28–30. 8. Acts 1:17. 9. Acts 6:2. Ed. note: The story of Stephen and his defense at trial is related in Acts 6:8–7:60. Before that the Twelve chose seven good men to serve tables, among them Stephen. Sermon on Acts 6:1–5, July 8, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 303–14. 10. Eph. 4:29; 5:19. Ed. note: The latter verse was prefaced, in 5:18, with the charge “and be filled with the Holy Spirit.” Generally the citations made here refer to the Spirit’s working.

§134. First Doctrinal Proposition: A public ministry with respect to the Word exists in the church as a leadership function entrusted under specific forms, and from this ministry also proceed all the organizations of the church. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) V: “To obtain such faith God instituted the office of preaching, … thereby the Holy Spirit works as through means and comforts people’s hearts … when and where God wills.” XIV: “Concerning church government it is taught that in the church no one should publicly teach, preach or administer the sacraments without a proper call.”1 (2) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “We give thanks to God … that … he has preserved public ministry and upright gatherings, who himself also distinguished certain times for these.”2

(3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XVIII: “God has always used ministers for the gathering or establishing of a church for himself . … no man ought to usurp the honor of the ecclesiastical community. … But let the ministers of the church be called and chosen by lawful and ecclesiastical election. … Not any one may be elected, but capable men,” etc.3 (4) First Helvetic Confession (1536) XVI: “The church’s ministers are co-workers with God … through whom God imparts and offers to his faithful people knowledge of him and remission of sins, converts men to him, sets them aright and consoles them … so that power and efficacy in all this is ascribed to the Lord, service to his ministers.”4 (5) Gallican Confession (1559) XXIX: “As to the true church, we believe that it should be governed according to the order established by our Lord Jesus Christ; that there should be pastors, overseers and deacons, so that true doctrine may have its course, that errors may be corrected and suppressed, and the poor and all who are in affliction may be helped in their necessities, and that assemblies may be held in the name of God, so that great and small may be edified.”5 (6) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) XXIII: “It is not lawful for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching … before he be lawfully called and sent to execute the same”6 1. If, in inquiring as to the origination of this public ministry, we go back to the commission7 Christ gave to the apostles, we see that this commission was directed predominately outward from the community. This is shown in that as regards a commission directed to the community’s internal life,8 this commission can also be understood to apply to its general, undefined ministry. Of necessity, however, the internal ministry emerged from the external one, since the newly converted had need of a continual process of instruction and correction and were consequently also contained in Christ’s commission as a natural implication of that call to go out into the world. However, the apostles themselves also proposed a division of this general ministry, and they left it to the whole communal body9 to charge others with the ministry of serving.10 This is also how the ministry of teaching became a charge to them from the communal body, just as the communal body had earlier entrusted the two ministries combined to a new member of the group of twelve. Accordingly, the two ministries have continued to exist in the church as the main branches of that public ministry, for it is self-evident that the diaconate too can be an ecclesial office only inasmuch as it is a proffering of the Word. That is to say, it is an expression and announcement of love by Christian brethren through one’s own deed. In contrast, a triple ministry, however it may be construed, is an arbitrary division. In

essence it has to refer back to that original distinction between teaching and serving, which has its true basis in the fact that the gifts requisite for either one of these sets of tasks are least conditioned by those requisite for the other one. This is why the female gender has always, from the very beginning on, attended its serving in public11 but has always been excluded from the public stewardship of teaching.12 2. Now, no one individual or any small band of them can act in Christ’s place.13 All the more do we have to regard only the totality of the Christian community as the source of this commissioning. Furthermore, the formation of the clergy as a self-contained and selfreplenishing official body is lacking any scriptural foundation whatsoever. Rather, Scripture distinguishes only two elements regarding this replenishment of clergy: determination of the attributes requisite for the functioning of a given set of tasks and selection from among those known to be so equipped. Accordingly, a large space remains here for allotting a different part in ministry to different people without abandoning the principle that the entire community arranges for its leadership and apportions this leadership among its members. Such a transmittal of responsibility is not possible without a distinct separation of affairs and an exact delineation of the sphere within which each leader is to carry out one’s set of tasks. Now, in this respect too, what can be vested in a person and what cannot be vested must be established. Thus, in an indirect fashion even undefined ministry is assumed within organizing activity, and the contrast between the defined and undefined ministry is blurred. For example, from time to time it happens in this way: that in order to enable a ministry that is not assigned, temporary associations arise made up of individuals who share closely related interests. However, even the ministry of the Word, defined in the narrower sense, can never be commissioned in such an exclusive manner that just such self-communications cannot take place between individuals apart from public ministry. The reason is that following this practice would be both to lord it over conscience14 and to quench the Spirit.15 From this commissioning, however, there does arise a twofold relation: the relation of every person in need to a number of communicators, in accordance with the variety of the person’s needs and of the communicators’ functions, and likewise the relation of every communicator to many recipients with respect to some specific need and within the circle to which the communicator is assigned. As a result, wherever we imagine a sizeable stable quantity of Christian life to exist, separate congregations form within certain boundaries through a combination of these two relations. Each becomes a sphere in which all the gifts necessary for the advancement of Christian life are present and all assignable sets of tasks are distributed accordingly. Delineation of ecclesial offices, as well as delineation of the form under which they will be transmitted, can be very different, and the theory of all this has its proper place in practical theology.16 Here it is necessary only to point out, in general terms, that these offices will be good only to the extent that, on the one hand, their allotment is realized and occurs as an act of the total community, either directly or indirectly, but, on the other hand, that the most spiritual17 ministry—namely, the ordained proffering of the divine

Word—preserves currency as the center from which everything proceeds and to which everything relates. 3. Without this ordained public ministry and the constitution of Christian congregations that depend on its existence, all Christian communication would simply be isolated and sporadic and would be fortuitous to all appearances. In truth, however, Christian communication could not even start off without a confusing stagger, in which much energy would have to be expended in vain, if no receptive person, with that person’s need, were directed to designated communicators and, vice versa, if no communicator, with attendant gifts, were directed to a particular circle of recipients. Suppose, however, that someone wanted to assert that in the power of the Spirit every gifted person would do everything in order to apply one’s gifts for the common good, and likewise that every person in need would have enough proper sensibility for testing the spirits,18 consequently that everything that is ordinarily achieved only imperfectly even in the best apportionment of energies would be done by individuals. Then everything would still rest on the arousal of personal religious self-consciousness and of sporadic shared feeling. In contrast, a true communal consciousness, a vital conviction of the identity of spirit in all, cannot be realized in this way. Without this conviction, however, generally a selfrecognition of the Holy Spirit could not exist in us, no more than could a proper consciousness of our mode of vital communion with Christ exist, if we have not become conscious of ourselves as members of his body.19 Hence, it is possible only for a completely superficial view of Christianity to trace Christian community back to domestic life and to tranquil, private circumstances devoid of any public character. Rather, public gatherings for shared confession of faith and for shared edification20 are of primary importance, and the transfer of executive and leadership activities within those gatherings exclusively to certain persons remains only a secondary matter. In this regard, it is also true that an ecclesial community that grants no significance to such a transfer of authority, but accords the right and responsibility21 of leadership within those gatherings to every Christian, can exist wholly in the Evangelical spirit.

1. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Book of Concord (2000), 40, 46; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 58, 69. 2. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 28:442. Schleiermacher here refers to the edition by Twesten, Die drey ökumenischen Symbole (1816), 196. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 271; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 278, 280. See §37n3. 4. Ed. note: ET Tice, drawn from the original German and Latin in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 219f.; cf. chap. 15 in Cochrane (1972), 105. 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 376f., also Cochrane (1972), 154; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 336f. 6. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition; ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 501. See §37n5. 7. Matt. 10:6ff. 8. E.g., Matt. 18:15–20. 9. Gemeine. Ed. note: Hereafter, “congregation” is used to translate this word only where the reference is clearly to a local communal body. 10. Acts 6:2. Ed. note: See §133.2. 11. See 1 Tim. 5:9; Luke 8:3. 12. Ed. note: It may be noted, first, how uncharacteristically slim is the evidence evinced in §134n11 and, second, how carefully, indistinctly phrased are the distinctions between gender roles. These were indeed the roles generally assigned to

women in German culture at that time and within the Evangelical church. Moreover, women were not admitted to German universities until 1906, hence could not be “equipped” with “gifts” attendant upon a theology degree, necessary for ordination to ministry of the Word. It is clear in other writings, however, that Schleiermacher’s principles did not go in the direction of exclusion of women, or of any other qualified person among the regenerate, for that matter. Here too, the necessary grounding of the distinction between ministries is not articulated as gender related. Although he did not choose openly to call present custom into question, he did slyly refer to the traditional female-oriented diaconal ministry as “public” too, not domestic. Compare his sermons in The Christian Household (1820, ET 1991). Obviously, as he words it, serving (Handreichung, extending a helping hand) could just as well be a man’s role too, and stewardship of the Word (Verwaltung des Wortes) could just as well be that of a woman. The two ministries are one (vereinigt, united). 13. Ed. note: On limitations of religious communities wherein the techniques for leading lie among one or a few experts, and the rest are relatively passive, see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 9. In the following supplemental note 10, Schleiermacher admits that “the external church” has “gradations” in its development too, as does the internal church and all institutions in human affairs. Moreover, “the individual who divorces oneself from the common life gives up the greatest portion of one’s religious consciousness.” See also §§137–38, all under the heading of “baptism” (justification and further nurture in faith) for all who come to be regenerate and, as such, are members of the church (§125). 14. See 2 Cor. 1:24. Ed. note: Cf. 1 Pet. 5:3. 15. See 1 Thess. 5:19. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 Thess. 5:19–21, June 11, 1810, SW II.7 (1836), 427–36. 16. Ed. note: See Brief Outline §§257–338. This set of disciplines is especially directed to the functions of leaders in congregational ministry and to their functions with respect to church polity and governance. See also CF §§144–45. 17. Geistigste. Ed. note: In ordinary German usage there exists an ambiguity in the word geistig, which can mean “spiritual,” “mental,” or “intellectual.” Ordained ministers are supposed to be both highly educated and highly spiritual in regard to religious matters. 18. Ed. note: See 1 John 4:1. 19. Ed. note: This metaphorical phrase, referring to the body of Christ’s community of faith, is to be found in Rom. 12:5 (“one body in Christ,”), thence in the shortened version (the church as “the body of Christ”) in 1 Cor. 10:16–17 and 12:27, and in Eph. 4:4, 12, 16, and 5:30. 20. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, Christian education in the broader sense (Erziehung) belongs to the domain of practical theology, hence he scarcely alludes to such practices in CF, except to say here that, like edification, all aspects of educative activity, in church and at home, must be done “in the Evangelical spirit.” See also his 1818 Christian Household sermons (1820) and his numerous lectures and writings on education, which spearheaded movements into progressive education in Germany. See also OR Epilogue, supplemental note 2, which discusses child rearing and other upbuilding educational practices in the family. Here in CF “edification” (Erbauung) also means, more nearly literally, “upbuilding” and in a developmentally appropriate way. 21. Die Befugnis … zugesteht. Ed. note: The verb seems to imply that one who is accorded such a right or warrant is also to be zuständig, i.e., held to be responsible in it. Thus, the entitlement is not necessarily accorded where one has no qualifications. Presumably the more mature among the regenerate are basically qualified. The essential primacy of community is a major theme in this work; cf. On Religion III–IV.

§135. Second Doctrinal Proposition: The church’s public ministry is, at all points, bound to the Word of God. 1. Even the isolated and informal communications of Christians, to the extent that they communicate something effected by the Holy Spirit, can likewise simply be elucidations of the divine Word or ways of putting it into action. Now, suppose that the same thing is to apply to public ministry of the Word not only in the two ways just indicated but also in a special way inherent in its own distinctive character. If so, this can happen only by the fact that this being bound to the divine Word is taken up into the form of public communication. In relation to doctrine, the process occurs in one of two ways. In part, it occurs directly in that particular acts of expounding religious thoughts appear, in their entire arrangement, as interpretation of individual passages of Scripture. In part, it occurs indirectly, through some confession of faith, which is a brief embodiment of

doctrine that refers back to Scripture, and which, given the presupposition of its scriptural character and as something ever present, is supposed to hold the course of everyone’s consciousness in check and against which all doctrine is supposed to be measurable.1 Both modes of communication, however, must degenerate into empty form, one easily bypassed, if in the same circle free and informal communication is not also of itself scriptural. Thereupon, ordinarily a confession of faith intends to assert itself as an authentic explication of Scripture, so as to prevent an even greater variance with respect to Scripture. However, there does arise an unevangelical deference to the letter thereby, and, at the same time, deeper penetration into Scripture is made impossible. The same scriptural character is also to be required of Christian poetic art insofar as its products, though originally intended only for individual life, are to cross over into the public use of a congregation. This scriptural character is displayed in one way in the psalmodic type of Christian poetry. This type treats individual passages and situations from Scripture in attaching itself, whether more closely or more distantly, to the periphrastic translations of the psalms after the mode of the oldest Christian hymns. The scriptural character is displayed somewhat differently in those symbolic types of Christian poetry which, in referring to generally held confessions of faith, bring the embodiment of common doctrine into poetic harmonies. The more Christian poetry distances itself from these two basic forms and presents elements of religious life of a purely individual sort, the more it limits its efficacy to smaller circles of society.2 Yet, if we have also assimilated everything that constitutes an act of the congregation, as such, into the concept of public ministry, then the requirement of scriptural character must extend to all these acts as well. Accordingly, these active public communications also show themselves to be bound to the Word. In part, this occurs directly, insofar as particular demonstrations of this tie to the Word are grounded in exhortations distinctly expressed in Scripture and make these exhortations real or insofar as they adhere to some example given in Scripture. In part, this occurs indirectly, in setting forth ecclesial rules that, being derived from Scripture after the manner of confessions of faith, intend to establish an order for Christian life, one that is linked to public ministry. Not only is all active public communication to take shape in accordance with this order; it is also possible to recognize in this order which sorts of individual actions the congregation acknowledges as its own and which it does not. 2. Now, from all this follows how confessions or creedal symbols and church rules or canons3 arise in the church—that is, not as a standard for various presentations of faith by word and deed, but in order all the more surely to mediate an individual’s measuring up to the original expressions of the Spirit. In no way does it follow, however, that these phenomena can at all times correspond to this idea as much as they did in the period when they were originally formed. That this is not the case already flows from the fact that in each instance they are a work of the church as a whole. Thus—if we embrace the church within the contrast just set forth—these phenomena are the work both of those who are self-active and communicative and, at least indirectly, of those who are receptive and in need. This is

true, not only insofar as these phenomena can derive their efficacy simply from the free acknowledgment of those in need, even if they also proceed from those who are communicating something, but also because the shared knowing in regard to the need of these persons, consequently the special character of this element of their common life, contributes as a defining feature. Hence, from the very outset every such product remains short of the original idea, because within the oscillating advance of the church sequences of retrogressive movements are also coposited in every element. These movements then have currency for us only under the reservation that their scriptural character must always remain an object of probing. Thus, an organism that is as fully formed as possible must also be associated with public ministry within the church so as to preserve a technically adept understanding of Scripture and so as to realize improvement in this understanding through constant pursuit of that understanding. It does not follow from this that, in general and at all times, those who perform public ministry must obtain a special standing within the Christian community. Rather, our two propositions establish that even if in particular instances the ecclesial contrast between those who discharge public ministry and those for whom they discharge it comes quite strongly to the fore, this contrast still remains subordinate. On the one hand, the contrast is subordinate to the unity and selfsameness of the Spirit in both parties and, on the other hand, to their common, direct dependence on Scripture. This implies, in turn, that the contrast between the two parties must become more and more blurred, as also follows from the generally demonstrable affinity between sporadic, informal efficacious action and officially allotted, ordained efficacious action. If we then add to this observation that the critical aspect of people’s normative use of Scripture must also come to an end one day, at that point this contrast will also disappear, viewed as a personal contrast in an immediate surety shared by both parties concerning the scriptural character of both doctrines of faith and rules for life.

1. Ed. note: Behind this discussion is the classic contrast between “the Spirit and the letter.” See OR (1821) II, supplemental note 9, where “notions and concepts” are taken to be “the original, constitutive factors” in the domain of dogmatics, but “to avoid delivering the spirit unto death along with the letter, it secures the vital mobility of the letter” and does so also to build “a variety of distinctive positions” into its structure. See also OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 8, against separation based on a narrowly restrictive, dead letter. Cf. also in CF §§96.2–3, 123.1–2, also 15.2, 25.1. 2. Ed. note: For further elaboration, see the corresponding section in the practical theology lectures. During the years Schleiermacher was completing this second edition, he was also preparing the Berliner Gesangbuch (1830). There he was contributing his own principles for what may appropriately be included in Evangelical hymnbooks, as much as he could within this officially joint enterprise. 3. Ed. note: Such orders, or sets of rules or canons, include polity (Verfassung) for governance. Here the concept is broader, referring to Christian life as a whole and as that life can be acknowledged as belonging to the community of faith.

Third Point of Doctrine

Regarding Baptism

[Introduction to Third Point of Doctrine] §136. As the church’s observance, baptism simply designates the intentional act by means of which the church takes up individuals into its community. In contrast, insofar as Christ’s effectual promise reposes in it, baptism is, at the same time, the conduit for the divine activity of justification, or regeneration, whereby individuals are taken up into community with Christ in their lives. 1. What is essential in our proposition was already anticipated above,1 namely, that an individual’s being taken up into Christian community and the individual’s being justified or regenerated could be regarded as simply one and the same act. Suppose otherwise, that being taken up into the church were an action of the church alone. Since this reception is not thinkable without participation of the Holy Spirit, Supreme Being in preparing for union with human nature in the form of the church’s common spirit would have to have behaved passively. Yet, of course, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is dependent on Christ2 and is based on Christ’s promise. Thus, the same thing must also be true of the Spirit’s bestowal on each individual if the Spirit, being necessary for the unity of the church, is also to come from Christ to all in the same fashion. Thus, the Christian church is relieved of a great lack of surety by Christ himself having ordered baptism as the act of being taken up into the church, for, on this basis, every reception is an act of Christ himself if it is performed in the way he ordered it to be and in conformity with his command. Hence, the Christian church can then as little deviate from this form of being received through baptism, on the one hand, as it can doubt, on the other hand, that in any instance wherein Christ’s command is properly carried out, his promise that with this reception the blessedness of a person begins and should also come to fruition. This is so, for just as the latter action would amount to doubting the redeeming power of Christ himself, so the former action would be a rash venture that could not proceed from that divine Spirit which derives everything from Christ. Now, suppose that it is established hereby that baptism must continue to be preserved in the church just as the church has adopted it. Even then, no information concerning baptism could be required or imparted as to whether or how the external mode of this observance connects with its internal contents and purpose. Rather, the only thing we could say about that connection is that if Christ would have ordered an entirely different external functioning, we would hold this to be just as holy and would expect the same results from it. Only this much is certain, that if Christ would have especially instituted something entirely new in this observance for the same purpose, it would be incumbent on us to search for relations between its external mode and its internal contents and purpose—indeed, the most exhaustive

relations possible. This would be the case in that only under the most extreme necessity would we bring ourselves to assume anything purely arbitrary in any institution of Christ. The actual situation was different, since Christ attached his institution of baptism to something that already existed and baptism was already historically conditioned by its connection with the proclamation of John. That is to say, that historical grounding can then satisfy us completely, without our having to be tempted to elaborate on the symbolism already generally recognized in the area where they lived, beyond what already appears in Scripture.3 Nor would we even be tempted to take this symbolism to be so essential that one could claim that the observance itself would be complete and could attain its purpose only if it is also externally arranged in such a way that the significance of the observance can fully stand out. 2. Quite apart from this undeniable connection between the baptism Christ instituted and that of John, however, one can hardly assert that they are wholly the same without removing something from the baptism that Christ instituted.4 This is so, for even though the idea of God’s reign through redemption does underlie John’s baptism, nonetheless the person of the Redeemer was not a definite person for John, nor was it so for those he baptized before John himself had recognized Jesus in the act of baptizing him. Hence, one would have to distinguish, at the very least, between John’s baptism before and after that event, so that, in any case, the first kind, in order to be like Christian baptism, would still have needed some augmentation. However, this distinction would still be meaningful only if John had baptized in Jesus’ name after the event. Yet, all circumstances taken into account,5 this is rather to be denied than affirmed. Accordingly, one could hardly admit that John’s baptism could already have meant being taken up into the Christian church or even being reborn in the waters. Consequently, it could also be declared identical with the baptism that Christ instituted only if one either declared both to be ineffectual6 or if one wanted to claim that John would have been able to offer exactly what Christ offered without any definite reference to Christ, which would be as good as abolishing the distinction between the old and the new covenant. Against this position, on the other hand, one cannot possibly claim that, for persons baptized by John, recognition of Jesus as the Christ was not a sufficient addendum but that a new baptism was indispensable. Overall it is also not clear that baptism was altogether necessary for entering into community with him as long as the Redeemer still lived. Rather, it appears that on occasions when he had granted forgiveness to a person by his word and had summoned that person to follow him, being taken up into community was already accomplished by this act. After that, baptism would have been added simply as an observance wholly lacking in meaningful content. Likewise, one also cannot possibly claim that just the apostles would have received baptism from John, not to speak of all Christ’s disciples, those from Galilee above all. Still less can one possibly claim that Christ himself baptized even one person7 on whom the task of baptizing others would then have devolved. Hence, especially useful here is the distinction between the church yet to be established and the church already existent. Moreover, it would not be at all surprising if among Christians who had not been reached by the church many were not baptized. The reason

would be that Christ’s own personal choosing8 of them, as an act of his will, has to have been wholly sufficient for beginning both processes that our proposition ascribes to baptism, that is, applying the divine decree of redemption to a given individual and placing that individual into community with all who were already faithful. This twofold process then best makes clear how baptism, viewed as a general ordinance instituted by Christ, took the place of Christ’s own personal choosing. 3. Now, suppose that we stick to this viewpoint and imagine every act of baptism wherewith this process could have the stated effect to be something ordered by the church as a whole. Suppose too that, as a consequence, the highest canonical authority would reside in this ordered act, on account of the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit in all its abundance. As a result, the church could not baptize anyone who would not be just as ripe and ready truly to begin the new spiritual life in community with Christ since this readiness would have had to hold good of anyone whom Christ himself chose. Accordingly, there would then be no occasion to raise questions as to whether baptism and regeneration could be divorced from each other; rather, we could assert, without any further consideration, that everyone would be regenerated in baptism and only through baptism. That is to say, in that the Holy Spirit was granted to the entire body of disciples, the divine activity directed to regeneration and sanctification would have been tied so exclusively to the administration of baptism that not only would anyone whom the church would present to God in baptism be, on this account, recognized by God—afterward as it were—but also both partaking in the Holy Spirit and being among the children of God would have been sustained with baptism itself. Now, in reality this is not what has happened, however. Rather, baptism has always come to be recognized and administered only by a relatively self-contained part of the church— and, indeed, during a transitional point in its development wherein no such canonical completeness in its particular observances could be reached. Hence, all the particular observances of baptism too will simply have approached complete correctness to a greater or lesser degree. Moreover, let us add to this observation the fact that, humanly speaking, a moment in which an individual’s regeneration occurs is not precisely determinable, even less foreseeable. Accordingly, that merely incomplete correctness in the proffering of baptism, which is to be presupposed, is always referred back to the fact that the church does not approach baptism of a catechumen in the same way as the catechumen’s soul progresses toward regeneration, even though this too is always mediated by activities of the church. As a result, what would have been something absolutely simple under that presupposition of an eventual completeness9 in the church instead falls into two series of activities, which correspondingly end up in two different elements.10 Now, suppose that it were to be proven that the series of the church’s activities that occasions approaches toward regeneration would also—because it is less personal and proceeds more directly from the power of the divine Word—present the influence of the church as a whole more exactly than the other series of activities and that hence the most complete aspect of this incomplete situation would exist if, each time, the administration of baptism would be attached to the element of regeneration, rightly understood. In that case, it

would still unmistakably lie in the nature of the matter that the church’s inclination to baptize would sometimes run ahead of the inner workings of the Spirit aimed at regeneration and would sometimes lag behind those workings of the Spirit. In each instance, those in charge of baptism would, in their appraising of the inner condition of the person to be baptized, swing over to the one side or the other. This is why we find—in the effort to set our minds at ease, as it were, concerning this incompleteness—that already in the apostolic period both forms of deviation appear, that is,11 the communication of the Spirit before baptism and baptism before communication of the Spirit. Moreover, it is plain to see that today the divergence between these two alternatives can be even greater than it was then. In any case, however, when the decisive workings of grace by the Spirit precede baptism, this constitutes an imperative requirement to have baptism, viewed as an act of being taken up into the community, follow directly afterward. The other way around, having baptism precede that act is to be justified only by the strong faith, grounded in the vital activity of the church, that regeneration of the one received into the church will then also ensue from the influences of the community as a whole. Thus, all things considered, the number of those baptized and of those regenerated would always be the same, except that by virtue of that teetering between the two sides which we have seen, the more nearly perfect the church is, the fewer regenerate persons there will be in proportion to the church as a whole, persons who have not yet been baptized but who would have a well-grounded right to have been taken up into the church. The same will be true of baptized persons who are not yet regenerated but who are quite effectually commended to divine grace to the point of regeneration by the prayer of the church. Hence, the same process would then always underlie the relation of the two alternatives to each other, and the two would have to be thought of as absolutely belonging together, however greatly they may also diverge from each other from time to time. 4. Based on these reflections, it can easily be seen how widely opinions concerning the value and efficacy of baptism can diverge without our being entitled to declare either one to be unchristian. This conclusion is manifest in that if one starts from the fact that, in a given situation of the church, baptism and regeneration do not always coincide, one then indicates this fact most strikingly if one says that even in an instance wherein the two forms would coincide, this occurrence would be simply fortuitous, and in no way would a person become regenerate simply by someone’s delivering baptism to that person. Even this act, however— against which, if rightly understood, nothing is to be objected—can also be conceived in such a way that in and of itself baptism would not effect anything inwardly but would rather be an outward sign of entrance into the Christian church.12 Now this is also true, but only if one thinks of the particular external observance as independent of the Spirit’s activity in the church—to the extent that the time when it occurs is largely determined externally, either by general ordinances regulating worship or by special circumstances. That is to say, the statement is true, but it is so only as a description of the church’s incompleteness at the point of baptism. However, if it is meant to be a total and general description of baptism, it is false, for without activity of the Spirit, baptism by water is indeed but an external performance, which Christ himself declared to be unsatisfactory.13

Suppose, however, that baptism is said to be called forth by the activity of the Spirit—just as what happened at Pentecost, viewed as the first event of the actual church, has been continually repeated in this way ever since and is said to be intimately connected with that same activity. Yet, suppose, too, that this claim—precisely because baptism in and of itself would still not bring forth regeneration, but everything would come down to regeneration—is extended to the point that one says this: either baptism would be superfluous and would better be discontinued, or at least there would be no other basis for retaining it than simply a praiseworthy reverence for ancient institutions. Then, however, the second view would twist the relationship reported earlier, that between John’s baptism and Christian baptism, so far that the latter baptism would appear to be a mere appendage to the former one. Given this view, moreover, the longer Christian baptism would survive, the more meaningless it would be. In contrast, the first view here would actually abolish the church itself, or at least its outer existence. This is so, in that it would abolish the interconnection between the influences of the community, which are crowned by baptism, and the inner development of individuals to the point of regeneration, or at least it would not allow this interconnection to be prominent. In this case, moreover, the Christian community could appear just as shadowlike and almost accidental in its externals as it does in the Society of Quakers. Yet, in general terms even this view cannot be called unchristian, because it simply depreciates baptism, regarded as something external, so as to elevate the value of what is internal, namely, regeneration alone.14 Suppose that one proceeds from the other side, which holds that regeneration and entrance into the community of the faithful are essentially bound to each other and are mutually conditioned by each other, all the more so since all workings of the Spirit also proceed from this community, workings that lead to regeneration. Then the closest and earliest expression for this process would be this: that one and the same series of the church’s activities would have this twofold end, baptism and regeneration. Now, to be sure, this position too is true. Yet, it is so, in accordance with what we saw above, simply as a description of a completeness of the church, something that actually does not exist at any particular point and that cannot actually appear in any particular observance. Now, suppose, however, that a further implication flows from this view, because one of the two ends would still have to be conditioned by the other, but baptism could not be conditioned by regeneration—that is, because regeneration could be recognized only in the reality of one’s new life, baptism would presuppose an efficacious action in the church that existed before one’s being taken up into the church, and this would be nonsensical—so, on the contrary, regeneration would have to be conditioned by baptism. Furthermore, just as the earlier states of the individual preparatory to regeneration would have been brought forth through earlier activities of the church, even regeneration itself would be brought forth only through the final activity of the church in this series of activities, namely, through baptism. Therefore, this view is also true and correct if it is taken in a purely spiritual sense and if even baptism, as the final end of that series, is regarded only in its inner aspect, not considered to be something bound to any particular feature—for example, bound to the

church’s tendency to expand itself, which can reach its goal only by the regeneration of its new members. Now, suppose that we add to this conclusion the observation that even to one’s own consciousness the inner fact of regeneration cannot, in a temporal fashion, arrive at full surety except through the progress of sanctification.15 Suppose, too, that for a long time it can be endangered repeatedly by all that interrupts and impedes the sanctifying process. Then, in this connection too it must be conceded that regeneration, viewed as an inner possession, is definitely conditioned by baptism. This is so, for then a person’s selfconsciousness can, at moments when it insecurely wavers to and fro, be strengthened and fortified16 in the communal consciousness expressed in baptism and sanctified by prayer in Christ’s name.17 This same claim becomes false, however, when it is supposed to be taken in a temporal sense and is supposed to be referred to the external observance. It is all the more false when one imagines all this to be divorced from the motives that should underlie baptism and from whatever causation preceded these motives. It is false then, for it leads to the atrocious assertion that God must necessarily justify those on whom the church confers baptism, no matter how little this act may exist in the person’s inner state. Such deformities border on magic and are thus dangerous and reprehensible. The one-sided claims previously cited from the opposing side are directed against these deformities above all. Nevertheless, we cannot declare them to be absolutely non-Christian either. This is so, to the extent that this power ascribed to the church is still referred back to Christ and, viewed as a fruit of baptism, is also presented not simply as a remission of sin but also as a living union with Christ.18 Now, what can be established as church doctrine between these two points, with the free latitude required, will be developed in the propositions to follow.19

1. In §124.2. 2. See §124.3. 3. Ed. note: E.g., see Matt. 3:11 and 28:19; Luke 3:16; Mark 10:39; John 4:12; and Acts 10:48, 19:5. 4. See Johann Gerhard (1582–1687), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 9, 101ff. 5. Cf. John 3:22ff. and Acts 9:3–5. Ed. note: Sermon on John 3:22–30, Jan. 4, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 207–18. 6. As Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) did in his Commentary on True and False Religion (1525), 17 (Baptism): “How the baptism of John and that of Christ differ is a question much mooted both in the past and today, but it is an unprofitable question. … John’s dipping effected nothing. … Christ’s dipping effected nothing.” Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 189; Latin: CR 90:765f. See also his Fidei Ratio: “An Account of the Faith of Huldreich Zwingli, Submitted to the German Emperor Charles V at the Diet of Augsburg, July 3, 1530,” in Zwingli, On Providence (1983), 33–61. 7. John 4:2. Ed. note: Sermon on John 4:1–10, Feb. 1, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 232–48. 8. Erwählung. Ed. note: This is the same word used for “election” in §§117–20 above. 9. Ed. note: In KGA I/13.2, 357, Schäfer found der Vollkommenheit before der Kirche in the original manuscript, but this addition was not present in the first printing or in subsequent editions. Schleiermacher might well have had it deleted, thus stating: “that presupposition … by (or of) the church.” In any case, the presupposition referred to is clear. Here the discussion simply considers a possible “completeness” of the baptismal observance, not yet the “consummation” (Vollendung) of the church. 10. Ed. note: The two series of activities named in the proposition itself are these: the “church takes up individuals into its community” and “individuals are taken up into community with Christ in their lives” (“regeneration”). 11. Acts 10:44–47; compare with Acts 2:38, 41, and 19:6.

12. Huldrych Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion (1525) 15 (Baptism): “But it is a mere outward thing, this dipping, … a sign and ceremony signifying the real thing. … So are ceremonies outward signs which prove to others that the participant has bound oneself to a new life.” Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 197; Latin: CR 90:773. 13. Indeed, moreover, this is so even when baptism is a confession of readiness to repent, as the context of John 3:5 indicates. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 3:1–8, May 24, 1812, SW II.1 (1834), 492–509, and (2) John 3:1–6, Nov. 30, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 155–67. 14. This is how the relationship of this view to the church is presented in the Quaker Robert Barclay’s (1648–1690) classic passage in An Apology for the True Christian Divinity (1676) 12: “This is where the controversy between us and our opponents is so frequently drawn. They often prefer the form and the shadow to the power and the substance. They consider people to have inherited and possessed the truth if they have the form and shadow, even though in reality they lack the power and the substance.” Ed. note: ET Barclay’s Apology (1967), 308; Latin: 1st ed. (1676), 269; also in Barclay’s Latin and English editions from 1678 on. 15. Cf. §108.3. 16. Ed. note: Stärken und befestigen. See §§146–47 below. See also John 14:13. Sermon on John 14:7–17, May 21, 1826 (Trinity Sunday), SW II.9 (1847), 428–42. 17. Luther’s Larger Catechism (1529) on Baptism: “Thus, we must regard baptism and put it to use in such a way that we may draw strength and comfort [corroboremur et confirmemur] from it when our sins or conscience oppress us.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 462; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 700. 18. Ed. note: Compare §§144–45. 19. Ed. note: The “two points” are those stated in the proposition; see note 10 above. The direct reference is to what follows in §§137–38, to which this proposition has served as an introduction. However, the statement could readily apply to all the remaining propositions, all of which must depend on what Schleiermacher has established by now concerning Christ’s ongoing work of redemption (recall §11), thus regeneration and sanctification by the Spirit.

§137. First Doctrinal Proposition: Along with citizenship in the Christian church, baptism, when delivered in accordance with Christ’s institution of it, at the same time confers blessedness as that relates to the divine grace present in regeneration. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) IX: “Concerning baptism they teach that it is necessary for salvation that the grace of God is offered through baptism.”1 (2) Smalcald Articles (Luther. 1537), Pt. III. 5: “Baptism is nothing other than God’s Word in the water, commanded by God’s institution. … Therefore we do not agree with Thomas, who … says that God has placed a spiritual power in the water which, through the water washes away sin. … We also disagree with Scotus … who teaches that baptism washes away sin, … that this washing takes place only through God’s will and not at all through the Word and the water.”2 (3) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “I baptize you, that is, I give witness by this water (mersione) that you are absolved from sins and are now received by the true God … whom you recognize …, and certainly you determine that benefits are bestowed on you that he promised in the Gospel, so that you are a member of God’s church.”3 (4) Luther’s Larger Catechism (1529) on Baptism: “‘The one who believes and is baptized will be saved’, that is, faith alone makes the person worthy to receive the

saving divine water profitably. … Just by allowing the water to be poured over you, you do not receive or retain baptism in such a manner that it does you any good. … Further, we say, we do not put the main emphasis on whether the person baptized believes or not, for in the latter case baptism does not become invalid.”4 (5) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XIX: “For in baptism the sign is the element of water and that visible washing which is done by the minister, but the thing signified is regeneration and the cleansing from sins. …” XX: “Now to be baptized in the name of Christ is to be enrolled, entered (initiari) and received … into the inheritance of the sons of God … and to be granted the manifold grace of God, in order to lead a new … life.”5 (6) Gallican Confession (1559) XXXV: “Baptism is given as a pledge of our adoption, for by it we are grafted into the body of Christ so as to be washed and cleansed by his blood and then renewed …”6 (7) Belgic Confession (1561) XXXIV: “He has commanded all those who are his to be baptized … thereby signifying to us that as water washeth away the filth of the body … so doth the blood of Christ, by the power of the Holy Ghost, internally sprinkle the soul, cleanse it from its sins, and regenerate us from children of wrath unto children of God.”7 (8) Leipzig Colloquium (1631): “Although the grace of God does not obtain automatically (ex opere operato) through baptism … just as blessedness is not effected by more external cleansing, it does nevertheless occur by the power of Christ’s words of institution and promise issued through baptism.”8 1. A certain wavering in pronouncements of the two Protestant communities of the church is undeniable. Thus, if one compares the different passages, it is not easy to decide whether in baptism something is given and communicated from the one side and obtained from the other side or whether something is simply indicated and attested or tendered. Now, our proposition has no part in this wavering, placing itself on the side that attributes the most to baptism. In consequence, the greater the effect attached to baptism is, the more important it becomes to determine what belongs to Christ’s institution of it, to which institution this effect would be tied. Now, in this connection if it is possible initially to distinguish between the observance itself and the meaning involved in its being performed, then the observance, viewed only in and of itself, is simply the outer aspect of baptism and, in contrast, the meaning is the inner aspect. Moreover, since even the declared effect is something purely spiritual and deeply inward, it is already implied therein that this effect cannot be brought about by the external

observance viewed in and of itself alone. Rather, the interconnection between the two aspects can be mediated only by the underlying meaning. Now, this meaning is in accordance with the words of Christ himself9 and in accordance with the original interpretation of these words that his disciples made in action,10 and it lies in peoples’ being taken up into the community of the disciples. That is to say, “teaching to observe”11 all that Christ had commanded, itself distinct from the bestirring of faith or from “making disciples,” is found only in this community. The efficacy of this observance of baptism, however, does not depend on its being performed with pure and unalloyed intention or on its always being done every time with a specified consciousness on the part of those who offer it.12 This is so, for this observance is not that of any given individual; rather, an individual performs it only by virtue of the church’s authorization of that individual to do it, thus as a performance of the church. The intention of the church in this authorization, however, is that that observance be done genuinely and correctly. Based on this presupposition, therefore, the following is also generally established for all periods in which the church is mostly divided into relatively opposing communities. That is, for any community among them that permits baptism to be performed, baptism holds validity not simply for that community but also for all of them together, because they all have the aim of taking people up into the Christian church through baptism. Indeed, suppose that one community or another would attach to this observance something that would have a special reference to that party of the church. In that case, the other communities would probably either correct this always unsuitable addition or declare it to be null and void; they would not, however, impugn the validity of the observance as a whole if the institution of baptism simply remained undisputed. This fact, moreover, rightly extends to heretical parties as well, for they too hold themselves to be true Christians, and their aim ever remains that of receiving people into Christianity. Indeed, suppose that their intention is also, at the same time, to foster the propagation of their own heresy. Even then, the “orthodox” church needs simply to work strongly against this heresy among those baptized within heretical parties, without on that account having to tear down the original, communal Christian foundation of baptism. Now, as concerns the observance itself, what is to be noticed, above all, in descriptions of baptism in the scriptural passages cited is emphatically not simply the use of water in and of itself and irrespective of the observance. Rather, the external observance as well, no matter whether by total or partial immersion—and an immersion of the latter sort includes all acts of sprinkling a person with water or pouring it over a person—is disconnected from its purpose unless it is attached to the divine Word. Moreover, without this Word it would therefore be incomplete. Yet, however obvious this observation is, we are also far from wanting to claim therewith that by Christ’s institution of baptism a pronouncement of predefined words would, at the same time, be required in its external observance, thus that a baptism would be invalid that lacked a constant and uniform utterance of these words. Instead, all that is to be attached to

this observance is the bringing to mind13 of the divine Word, on which discipleship rests, namely, the evocation of the word that is the Word regarding “the Father, Son, and Spirit.” Further, by reference to this Word as of equal sacred significance for the one baptizing and the one baptized, baptism is to preserve its more elevated significance in that it expresses both the aim of the church and the concurring wish of the person to be baptized. One can speak of an utterance of the usual formulation only as one does of a quite ancient church tradition. As a general rule, however, only the following is to be said: that since each person who performs baptism does so only by virtue of one’s ecclesial authorization, that person is also to perform it only in a way that is in conformity with that authorization. Thus, it also cannot be correct to regard the legitimacy of baptism among various religious parties as dependent on their altering nothing in this formulation, as if it would constitute the substantive truth of baptism.14 That is to say, such a requirement would bring us into conflict with the practice of baptism by Christ’s disciples during his lifetime, since in that period they could not have baptized in the name of the Holy Spirit.15 Indeed, it could probably never be decided whether the apostles used this formulation from Pentecost onward or found in Christ’s instruction the command to do this. Thus, just as in supposed emergencies, not likely ever to happen, occasion might arise to ask whether in such a situation something could be substituted for water, so one could also ask in a case where a person to be baptized would have to have signs substituted for words, whether signs that could not reproduce the words themselves but only their sense should be valid whereas other spoken words having that same sense would not be valid. What is by far the more essential thing, however, in this co-constitutive relation to the divine Word in baptism is that precisely this Word must be confessed and acknowledged by the person being baptized. This is so, for it is plainly implied therein that being made a disciple, which can occur only by the power of the Word, preceded baptism, for we find this relationship to be observed everywhere even in the practices of the apostles, as far as the reports we have go. Likewise, the completeness of this observance is then also not conceivable without this component, for just as the church expresses its intention only by attaching the Word to its external performance of baptism, so too, the person being baptized expresses agreement with this intention only by appropriating this Word. 2. Based on what has been said here concerning the nature of this observance, especially regarding the confessed adherence of the person being baptized to the Word that accompanies baptism, it most clearly follows that the faith of the person being baptized is also required in advance if the observance is really going to be what it is intended to be. This requirement is already implied in both of Christ’s sayings about baptism.16 Let us suppose that we want to think of “making disciples” and “baptizing” as most closely combined in the one saying. Then the first saying contains a subsequent revision that is to be completed only through the other saying, and that, from the very outset, can be only an approximation to faith. Moreover, even in baptism faith would not yet attain its completion if the individual being baptized is not already prepared to profess the Word of baptism. Likewise, even that faith which Christ says is to precede baptism in the other passage can only be the same faith as that of which we

have spoken right along. Peter does indeed appear17 to insist on repentance, and not yet faith, before baptism. Still, it was a repentance in relation to their having taken part, as members of the people, in the rejection of Christ. It was also a repentance that was simply presupposing a recognition of Christ and a moving over to his side made possible by Peter’s discourse, and faith must already be implied therein. Moreover, since Peter placed this summons at the close of his sermon, he was thus proceeding on the same presupposition as Paul did18 and was convinced that, to the extent possible, his sermon would already have produced faith. By the same token, it is also to be imagined of the church, given its constant engagement in preaching, that it would not interrupt a sermon with baptism but would conclude with that observance. Now, in the passages just cited it is also stated that baptism is also complete and proper without faith, and the fact that other writers depict faith as a fruit and consequence of baptism is in agreement with this view. However, we must insert opposition to both notions, for if baptism is illreceived when received without faith, it is also inappropriately given. To be sure, the ordinance itself does not lose a scintilla of its value thereby, for the simple reason that the church can never have determined that it would be a matter of indifference to baptize people who have faith or who do not have faith. Nor does it lose value thereby, viewed either in its origination as Christ’s institution or even in its narrower determinations as an ordinance of the church. On the same grounds, however, baptism viewed as an observance performed by an individual alone has not been something of which the church can approve or recognize as entirely its own, and, in any case, such baptismal observances belong to a defective administration of the church. Suppose, however, that this awareness is simply prefatory to the fact that even in such cases no repetition of baptism is necessary. If so, then this matter has to be expressed more precisely, so that people will not disregard such patent deficiencies. That is to say, baptism remains ineffectual only so long as it is performed too early, which means before the work of preaching has been accomplished and faith has been awakened by that preaching. It is a very different thing to claim that faith proceeds from baptism as a fruit thereof.19 Clearly, that claim inveighs against the entire practice of the apostles and against the entire experience of the church as it has grown in size through baptism. Indeed, even in particular instances when someone is prematurely baptized who is not yet a person of faith, the church does not rely on that baptism but pursues preaching in the full sense of the word. Moreover, if later on faith emerges in this way, any ordinary Christian will ascribe this fact not to a wrongly administered baptism but to what the church has done in consequence of baptism. Now, what do we say of such a complete baptism, one that already includes the faith of the baptized person within it? We say that it produces blessedness, but it does so only as it is accompanied by citizenship in the Christian church—that is, only to the extent that being taken up into that community is accomplished by it. Against this position, someone could say that if baptism presupposes faith, then blessedness already precedes baptism, in that we ourselves have defined faith20 to be appropriation of Christ’s perfection and blessedness. Moreover, to pay heed to this objection is most suited to shedding light on this entire

complex of relations. That is to say, it refers to the relationship of our present section to the second division of the previous section. Faith regarded as the state of an individual is the appropriation just mentioned. In contrast, just as an efficacious action of Christ’s appropriated perfection exists only in the community of the faithful, the same thing is true of an enjoyment of Christ’s appropriated blessedness. Hence, the person in whom faith unfolds will also want to enter into this community. In this sense, then, baptism, regarded as an immediate reception into the community of the faithful, is also termed “the sign and seal” of divine grace.21 This is the case because the actual enjoyment of divine grace is secured through that community. Every person who enjoys such grace, therefore, can also be regarded as requiring baptism, which the church then furnishes, as conversely the church also proffers it in other instances and the person who has become faithful accepts it. In the same sense, we have also termed baptism the “conduit” for the divine activity of justification,22 because only in community can the individual come to receive forgiveness of sins, which is essentially conditioned by the efficacious action of the new collective life, and adoption as a child of God, which is essentially conditioned by citizenship shared with those who are sanctified.23 Now, in this connection suppose that someone wants to divide in words something that is substantively indivisible. Then, on the one hand, we will be able to say that where faith is present, there conversion must also have occurred, and where regeneration is present as a whole, there justification is present as well. Thus, if faith already preceded baptism, then everything that people customarily depict as a fruit of baptism has also preceded it, so actually baptism would not effect anything but would simply indicate and attest what was effected already. Accordingly, one class of passages in the confessional symbols can be expressed in this way, yet without actually extracting anything from the true force of baptism. On the other hand, even if faith has not yet arisen by the time of baptism, one can still say the following. That is, faith will arise not only after baptism but also through baptism, since this act is the beginning of a whole series of activities that the church directs toward baptized persons, and thus the entire coherence of the person’s spiritual life with Christ’s perfection and blessedness proceeds in this manner. If one should imagine a case in which a regenerate person would remain unbaptized and consequently would also not be taken up into Christian community, this process would be seen to arise from baptism all the more as one would have to admit that such a person could have no true part in Christ’s perfection and blessedness. This would be so because the person would have no part in Christ’s activity of founding community, also no part in that blessedness of Christ which is grounded in the community’s shared consciousness. To be sure, this result would be all the more the case as well if it were the person’s own desire to remain outside the community. The result would be all the less the case if the person were not yet baptized simply based on some inadvertent mistake of the church, despite the person’s being regenerate. In this way, the other class of passages in our confessional symbols can ascribe faith and all that proceeds from faith to baptism without having its efficacious action spill over into anything magical. This is so, for the opinion is not that the external performance would simply work ex opere operato,24 not even to the least

extent. Rather, baptism bears its effect neither alone nor in combination with the uttering of certain words, which would then also comprise only an external performance, nothing more. Instead, external performance bears its effect only in combination with that Word which ordains baptism for and with the church and which is uninterruptedly effectual within the church in accordance with its entire interconnectedness. Now, in that our proposition claims efficacious action for baptism only in relation to the divine grace present in regeneration and thus combines the church’s observance of it with what occurs in the soul of the individual, anything magical is most definitely remote from it. However, in that our proposition distinctly attributes a sanctifying efficacious action to baptism, regarded as a conferral of Christian citizenship, the view that it is a strictly external observance is entirely eliminated. Accordingly, our proposition serves as an adjustment between the two competing sorts of expression in the confessional symbols, expressions that otherwise mutually incriminate each other for causing one or the other of the misconceptions pointed out here. 3. Hence, one can also say that everything that is taught regarding the efficacious action of baptism is made completely clear as soon as a correct administration of baptism is presupposed. Then, moreover, there exists no occasion whatsoever either for attributing magical effects to it or for degrading it to the status of a strictly external practice. Rather, only if one presupposes a faulty administration of baptism do difficult questions arise—that is, if one wants to set forth propositions that are supposed to be equally valid for both sides. Then the one side is setting forth a rule that plainly isolates the external aspect, namely, the rule that the effects of divine grace are not supposed to be made dependent on any external observance.25 The other side is setting forth the rule, plainly favorable to magical action, that no human state has the capacity to make those divine promises which are attached to a given external observance ineffectual.26 Neither side suitably recalls that in congregational life God does not intend to be “a God of disorder.”27 Thus, everything comes down to a correct rule for administration. Accordingly, if it is rightly taught, against the Donatists,28 that the validity of baptism is independent of the frame of mind and heart of the one who carries it out, this cannot be claimed in the same fashion regarding the salutary character of baptism. The reason is that if the person who does the baptism is not a pure organ of the church for the purpose of discerning the inner state of the person to be baptized, then the salutary character of baptism has to be diminished in every instance. Furthermore, such baptism is sinfully executed, and the more frequently it occurs, the more defective is the church. Now, the first consequence of this understanding is the ordinance that not only does the decision as to when baptism is to be performed rest with “the ministers of the Word” in the narrower sense, but the administration of baptism is also incumbent on them.29 Indeed, this ordinance is grounded in the obvious fact that the minister, as the person in whom the most lively conviction has to have arisen that faith has affected the candidate for baptism, will be the most stalwart organ of the church for carrying out this observance. Precisely on this account, baptism is also not entrusted to any moment of elevated mood but is administered only in the form of a premeditated observance performed at a predetermined time. Only very

special circumstances could warrant an exception to this practice. The rule to which all ministers must unfailingly adhere will always be the following. The performance of baptism must be conditioned by means of the shared feeling30 of the church—for an actual knowledge of the divine Spirit’s influences on the soul, which influences can be trusted to engender faith, is hardly to be found here. Moreover, where this shared feeling is not yet present, it is preferable to wait and watch for the signs of faith to arise.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 43; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 63. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 319f.; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 449f. 3. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 28:414; Schleiermacher offers no source here. Apparently he used Twesten’s Symbole (1816), 168f. 4. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 460, 461, 463; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 997, 998, 701. 5. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 279, 282; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 287, 290; cf. note at §37n3. 6. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 379, also Cochrane (1972), 156; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 338. 7. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 425, also Cochrane (1972), 214; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 384. 8. Ed. note: ET Tice; for the German context: Niemeyer (1840), 662. 9. Matt. 28:19–20. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 28:16–20, June 3, 1810, SW II.7 (1836), 411–18. See also §137n16 below. 10. Acts 2:41, 47. 11. Haltenlehren. Ed. note: The German text of Matt. 28:20 reads: “und lehret zu halten.” 12. That is to say, this rule is to be applied as follows: “A person may use the sacraments even when they are administered by evil people.” Augsburg Confession (1530) 8 and elsewhere. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 43; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 62. 13. Vergegenwärtigung. Ed. note: Thus, this reference to Matt. 28:19 (which many critical scholars now regard to have been added late) demands not a literal recital of these words but (at most) some corresponding language. Sermon on Matt. 28:16–20: see §137n9 above. 14. Cf. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 9, 90. Ed. note: Essentially, Gerhard claims that the fruit of baptism is to know regeneration, as faith arises by the Spirit in one’s heart. 15. John 4:2; cf. John 7:39. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 4:1–10, Feb. 1, 1824 (see §136n7); (2) John 7:14–24, Feb. 20, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 16–31. 16. Matt. 28:19–20 and Mark 16:16. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Matt. 28:16–20 (see n. 9) and (2) Mark 16:14–20, May 11, 1820, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1835), 204–15. This passage appears in Mark 16:9–20, one of two endings to Mark added in some ancient texts. 17. Acts 2:38. 18. Rom. 10:17. 19. See Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, 1764) 9, 152, where the statement that faith is ignited by baptism in the heart of the person being baptized is indeed made, but the connection between the two is also not shown, not in the least. 20. See §108. Ed. note: §108 concerns the conversion aspect of regeneration. The reference that follows the present second section (§§113–63) treats of “the constitution of the world in relation to redemption,” whereas the second division (§§106–12) in the first section regards “the way in which communion with the perfection and blessedness of the Redeemer is expressed in the individual soul.” 21. Heidelberg Catechism (1563), Questions 69–72. Ed. note: ET and German: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 329f.; ET only, Torrance (1959), 81f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 445. Here “sign and seal” translates Versiegelung. 22. Ed. note: See §109, in the justifying aspect of regeneration. 23. Ed. note: The doctrine of sanctification follows in §§110–12. 24. Ed. note: That is, be effective on the basis of the observance alone. 25. Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1530), Commentary on True and False Religion (1525) 15 (The Sacraments): “For in this way the liberty of the divine Spirit, which distributes itself to individuals as it will … would be bound.” Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 182; Latin: CR 90:761. 26. Catechismus romanus (Loewen, 1678), pars 2, cap. 2, de baptismis sacramento q. 58. Ed. note: In the first edition (1822), in KGA I/7.2 (1980), 259, Schleiermacher states concerning this creed: “For it asserts that all differences in people’s frame of mind and heart are able to be engendered only by a more or less of the workings of grace.” The Latin text of the

creed: KGA I/13.2 (2003), 372. Redeker (1960) quotes the following from the creed itself: “Nevertheless, these are indeed the fruits of baptism; if indeed we should contemplate the power of this sacrament, there could be no doubt that these fruits pertain equally to all.” ET: Kienzles/Tice. Schleiermacher himself used a reprint from the first edition (1566); many revised editions have since appeared. Cf. The Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.). See also §108n19. 27. Unordnung. Ed. note: The quotation is from 1 Cor. 14:33, which continues “but of peace.” 28. Ed. note: In the African church from the early fourth century to the Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries which destroyed it, the Donatists (named after an early bishop, Donatus) were a schismatic group that held the sacraments to be invalid if performed by a minister whose attitude was deemed to be unworthy or undesirable, which led to the practice of rebaptizing converts. First Optatus and then Augustine were notable opponents of this view. 29. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 20: “Baptism has to do with ecclesiastical duties.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 283; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 291; cf. §37n3. 30. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: The usual word “sympathy” does not quite fit. The reference is to a bond uniting the regenerate and the one to be baptized, a bond carried in feeling.

§138. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Baptism of children is a complete baptism only if the profession of faith that is to follow, once requisite instruction has been accomplished, is regarded to be the final act belonging to it. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) IX: “They teach … that children should be baptized. They are received into the grace of God when they are offered to God through baptism. They condemn the Anabaptists who disapprove of the baptism of children and assert that children are saved without baptism.”1 (2) Smalcald Articles (Luther, 1551) Part III.5: “We maintain that we should baptize children because they also belong to the promised redemption that was brought about by Christ. The church ought to extend it to them.”2 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XX: “Why should those who belong to God and are in his church not be initiated by holy baptism?”3 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) XXXV: “Although it is a sacrament of faith and penitence, yet as God receives little children into the church with their fathers, we say, upon the authority of Christ, that children of believing parents should be baptized.”4 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XXXI: “We believe that (the infants of believers) ought to be baptized and sealed with the sign of the covenant. … And, indeed, Christ shed his blood no less for the washing of the children of the faithful than for adult persons and therefore they ought to receive the sign and sacrament of that which Christ hath done for them.”5 (6) Declaratio Toruniensus (= Acta synodus generalis Toruniensus, 1645), in the section “On Baptism”: “However, we do not decree that this necessity is therefore

absolute, so that whoever departs from this life without baptism … either infant or adult … must necessarily be damned on that account.”6 1. Up to this point we have considered baptism in an entirely general way, without even beginning to ponder the distinction between its original institution and the way it is currently practiced almost universally in the Christian church. To be sure, however, we have done this with the intention that the propositions set forth are not, as it were, to be restricted to the baptism of adults but are to apply to any baptism that would claim to be a genuinely Christian baptism. Suppose, then, that we would require in advance of baptism at least a beginning of faith and—in relation to our earlier propositions7—thus, necessarily, repentance as well. The apostolic practice known to us does thoroughly agree with this position, since every trace of the baptism of children8 that people have thought to find in the New Testament first has to have been inserted there. So, given the lack of definite reports, it is difficult to explain how this deviation from the original institution of baptism could have arisen and could have been so widely established. It might well be difficult to find a single satisfactory reason. Instead, probably many reasons taken together could have won over Christian feeling for this practice. First of all, there could have been the desire to be able to include children of Christian families who die before the age of instruction among those who “die in the Lord.”9 Next, there could also have been the desire to strengthen the duty of Christian congregations to the children of Christian parents, all the more in case these parents themselves would not be in a position to fulfill that duty. Finally, there could also have been the desire to distinguish Christian children from Jewish and Gentile young people. These motives might have been the most effective ones right along. However, once the custom had already been established of regarding children to be true members of the Christian church on account of the baptism they had received, it became advisable, viewed as comforting in and of itself, to express in this observance the firm assurance that children born of Christian parents could not fail to be cultivated by the divine Spirit. The pertinent passages in our confessional symbols, however, reflect on the baptism of children apart from all historical considerations, and they undertake to justify it in and of itself, yet in an unsatisfactory manner and on grounds that are mutually abrogative. That is to say, if these children already belong to God, they do not need baptism for the purpose of being offered to God and to be taken up by God into a state of grace; and, conversely, if they do need baptism for this purpose, the justification for its being offered to them cannot lie in the fact that they already belong to God. Likewise, this position would require a special grounding, which it did not receive, to the effect that God already reckons offspring to be part of the church along with their parents, and a special restriction, which it also did not attain to, to the effect that children are to be baptized because Christ has shed his blood for them as well. These moves would not work, for on the same basis all human beings would have to be baptized whom the church could get ahold of.

Now, if the restrictions applied to baptism of children, indicated in the present proposition as missing in that baptism, have to be referred to the special circumstances of the children of Christian parents, and the particular grounding of the first proposition10 as well, then this second proposition would appear to make up for these missing factors and, at the same time, to resolve the contradictions mentioned at the outset. That is to say, in that it declares baptism of children, in and of itself, to be incomplete in strictest comparison with the first proposition, because it is administered without any possibility of repentance and faith on the part of those who are baptized, it also tacitly allows that baptism of children cannot possibly engender in these baptized children the effects that are necessarily conditioned by repentance and faith. Moreover, we can no more ascribe a state of blessedness to these children after baptism, based on the premise that their being children of God has come into their consciousness, than we can ascribe a lack of blessedness to them before baptism, based on the premise that their consciousness of sin has been developed to the point of penitence. Hence, there need be no question of any proof to the effect that faith can be bestirred through baptism even in such children. Now, our proposition does, however, show why there is a reason to administer such a baptism nonetheless: namely, because with regard to those children a motive does exist for counting on their future faith and their profession of that faith. Moreover, also tied to this expectation is the extent to which we are able to view these children in terms of God’s reckoning them to be part of the church. That is to say, it is inherent in the very order of the church that we bring them, viewed as the closest outer circle of persons assigned to us, into connection with the divine Word and to shelter them in it to the end that faith will emerge. This, moreover, is the gentlest way of resolving the contradictions that we noted in the two propositions. This is the case, for we do not want to say simply that we baptize children because they are already in the church and for the purpose of commending them to divine grace; rather, we do so because they are already commended to divine grace by their natural connection with the Christian order of things in which God has placed them and for the purpose of bringing them into the church. Moreover, both relations are expressed in accordance with their full truth in that we set forth the objective of the baptism of children to be their own eventual profession of faith, which they will attain and for which they must give a good account of themselves.11 On the other hand, it is certainly true that if its objective is not properly attended to, this ecclesial practice contributes a great deal to the fact that some attribute a magical power to baptism and others degrade it to the status of a solely external custom. 2. Thus, of itself alone, such a baptism is indeed patently an attachment to the reign of God for the individual concerned. However, it does not directly accomplish the possession and enjoyment of blessedness. Rather, it simply leads to the orderly preparatory workings of the Holy Spirit; and thus no such observance, viewed of itself alone, is in any way to be accorded the same value as a baptism that is in accordance with Christ’s original institution, so that the person’s own profession of faith is also immediately included in the observance itself. However, this observance of child baptism is no more invalid on account of its

incompleteness than is any other baptism, as if child baptism were something corrupt. So, the Anabaptist claim that baptism must be repeated for anyone baptized as a child has rightly met with opposition, for on the same basis no single baptism would have a sure effect other than that administered—albeit certainly not in a praiseworthy fashion—in the ancient church shortly before life’s end. That is to say, that practice gave no sure sign that regeneration actually followed from it, as would happen in a person’s steady progress in Christian sanctification. Thus, the baptism of children is like every other baptism that has erroneously preceded mature faith in the baptized person but that is still valid, with the exception that the efficacious action distinctive of baptism remains suspended until that person will also really have become faithful. Our proposition must simply be justified in the face of our having accounted such defective baptisms to be a reproach to the church in particular respects, whereas here we are wanting to make provision for all child baptisms taken as a whole. This, however, is one of those cases in which scientific deviations from the present account12 must be judged more leniently than nonscientific ones. The reason is that the nonscientific deviations are in any case overhasty, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, give an individual out to be a faithful Christian who is not one as yet, while the scientific deviations, in contrast, are rather a matter of statute and by their reference to a person’s own profession of faith distinctly separate out persons who are baptized incompletely, without meeting that criterion, from already faithful Christians. Hence, we do the baptism of children an injustice when we regard confirmation—which for us is simply the rendering and accepting of a person’s own profession of faith, filling in the gap left at baptism—to be an inessential observance, since only as this observance is added does baptism of children correspond to Christ’s institution of baptism. Hence, in that our proposition counts confirmation as an aspect of the administration of baptism, it rightly makes paying the closest possible attention to this observance a duty of the church, so that, insofar as may lie within its power, in its life the church may prove itself to be the true and honorable consummation of child baptism. The same injustice also arises, however, when confirmation is lifted out of this connection with baptism and is presented as a sacrament in its own right. This is so, for whatever we might otherwise hold to be significant and beneficial in this observance, to make it into a sacrament leaves the baptism of children incomplete and ineffectual. Yet, we cannot claim necessity for a baptism thus divided into two phases, something that, to be sure, does occur when the Anabaptists or Baptistminded are condemned because they accept that unbaptized children who have died can still gain blessedness. Moreover, in this respect we unhesitatingly side with the passage of the confessional symbol cited last. To be sure, a situation did arise as soon as a considerable mass of children born of Christian parents were to be reared and educated in the Christian church, a situation that had not obtained earlier. Moreover, it seems quite natural to mark this situation with a symbolic observance—all the more so as observances like this were taking place almost throughout the church—for the purpose of indicating that newborns do not belong exclusively to their

parents but belong communally to the entire company of Christians. At that point, nothing could be more natural than immediately to choose baptism for that purpose. All things considered, at the time of the Reformation it could have been quite convenient to let go of child baptism so as to draw nearer to Christ’s institution of baptism once more. Furthermore, we could do this even now, without having broken communion thereby with that period in which only child baptism existed, provided that we do not declare child baptism to be invalid. Moreover, we could just as well abandon this custom without detriment to our children. We could do so, for only if some magical power is attributed to baptism can it be assumed that it would establish entitlements in relation to life after death, without regard to what it has already effected in this life. Thus, no one who does not assume such a magical power can assume any distinction between children who are indeed baptized but die before the renewal of their baptismal covenant and children who leave this temporal life without being baptized at all. Therefore, it would be a natural thing to leave it up to each Evangelical household whether it would like to offer its children to be baptized in the customary fashion or only when its children can tender their own profession of faith. As regards this point, we should declare, moreover, that we abrogate our previous condemnation of rebaptism and on our part are ready to establish ecclesial communion with present-day Baptist-minded folk, provided that they do not wish to declare our baptism of children, which is also supplemented, to be absolutely invalid. Surely it ought to be possible to reach agreement easily on this matter.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 43; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 63. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 320; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 450. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 283; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 291; cf. §37n3. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 379f., also Cochrane (1972), 156; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 338. 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 427, also Cochrane (1972), 212; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 384. 6. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 681. 7. Propositions on regeneration, §§107–9. 8. Kindertaufe. Ed. note: The classic English term “infant baptism” also translates this word, reflecting the once-frequent inclusion of babies and young children in the word “infant.” Here, “baptism of children” and “child baptism” are used throughout. 9. Citing 1 Thess. 4:16. Ed. note: In both German and English versions the phrase is “the dead in Christ who are to rise first and be with him, the Lord.” 10. Ed. note: The “first proposition” is §137; the “second,” i.e., the “present” proposition, is §138. 11. Ed. note: In somewhat different language the phrase seems to allude to Rom. 14:12 and even Gal. 6:5, but only in the sense of standing the test, meeting the criteria for baptism to be complete. 12. Ed. note: The reference is to theological statements, which may also underlie some to be found in confessional symbols. “Scientific” refers specifically to careful, thoroughgoing scholarly work on baptism in theology (see CF §17 and Brief Outline §§9–13).

Fourth Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Lord’s supper

[Introduction to Fourth Point of Doctrine] §139. In partaking of the Lord’s Supper, Christians experience a distinctive strengthening of their spiritual life1 in that, in accordance with Christ’s institution of it, his body and blood are offered to them therein. 1. All of our propositions are supposed to contain only expressions of our Christian selfconsciousness. So, in this context we must proceed from the experience that we ourselves have of this observance and—by way of proof that we do not view this experience to be something strictly personal—that we also expect all persons of faith to have. Not until we have ascertained that can we refer further back to the question concerning the initial emergence of this experience. This initial experience coheres with our own only to the extent that if a need were not present that is found to be satisfied therein, this experience would not be repeated anew over and over again, or at least the view of this subject and the mode of treating it would be formulated quite differently. Now, if we connect this subject with that of the just-previous point of doctrine, we see that the subject of the present one would be something completely devoid of content if the blessedness that commenced with properly administered baptism were to exist in such a way that it would, of itself, be preserved unimpaired and would sufficiently develop further. However, just as its analogy with all of life already speaks for the opposite outcome, likewise it is implied, especially in the inseparable connection between entrance into vital community with Christ and entrance into the community of the faithful, that each of the two has to be sustained by the other. Precisely for this reason, however, the way in which the church coexists with the world and the obstructive influence of the world upon the church require that the church be periodically undergirded and strengthened, and satisfaction of this need is what the faithful also seek in the sacrament of the altar. Suppose that we then imagine, in a preliminary way, both the community of the faithful with one another and the community that each person has with Christ, and suppose that we do so in such a way that each of the two is something particular in and of itself. Then community of any given person with Christ would be strengthened against obstructive influences of the world by each religious turn inward of a faithful person. In these moments, one would, on the one hand, resist the world’s influences, and one would, on the other hand, open oneself to Christ through Scripture, for this always happens through Scripture, be it directly or indirectly. In comparison, the community of the faithful with one another would already be strengthened by every vigorous and stimulating disclosure of Christian love in every area of their common life. Then, however, each of these two communities is also supposed to work upon the other, and therefore the area that we designate with the general name “public worship” occupies the area between solitary contemplation2 and active life in common. Viewed from the one aspect, this public area is nothing other than the common life itself, as it withdraws from ordinary external activity into communicative presentation of inner life. Viewed from the other aspect,

it is nothing other than contemplation itself, as it moves out of solitude and extends into community. Thus, the two communities unite herein, that of the faithful with one another and that of each person with Christ, and therefore everything that happens here seems to have to exert an effect in both. However, any effect that either community can have on the other also seems to have to proceed from and pass through this area. Now, the Lord’s Supper also belongs to this public area. Accordingly, Christ has instituted it as a communal observance and, at the same time, not only as a way of making himself present but certainly also as a way of strengthening both communities. Thus, in the church too it has always been celebrated in gatherings or a congregation, in that every other kind of celebration is an exception, but, at the same time, the exception also represents the gathered congregation. Now, however, it is only through faith in what others commend as their experience that any individual can come to the point of making that experience one’s own. Thus, in an unbroken tradition this process leads us back to the very beginning of the church and to the Supper itself, recalled as Christ held it with his disciples. Ever since that occasion, the proffering of his body and blood has been adhered to as the essential thing about this meal, but elsewhere Christ also sets forth the partaking3 of his flesh and blood as something necessary in order to have life in Christian community. So, these two are the main points to be considered first of all: first, how the Lord’s Supper, viewed as the proffering of his body and blood, relates to that purely spiritual act of partaking and, second, how it is distinguished, as a component of public worship, from the other parts of worship. 2. Now, to begin with the second main point, it is quite obvious that in its public teaching and practice the entirety of Christianity has, at all times, viewed the Lord’s Supper as the very apex4 of public worship.5 For us, the sphere in which we gather for worship would seem incomplete if, at certain points, the Lord’s Supper did not have its place within it as the most intimate means for our bonding together—and indeed at the highest and holiest points most of all. Moreover, we would likewise declare it to be a diseased condition, whether it might be in individuals or in entire congregations, if they wanted to attribute a greater power for preserving or enhancing blessedness to any element of worship other than to the Lord’s Supper. We cannot be satisfied with this account, however. Rather, we must inquire as to a specific distinction between what has come into practice in the church, even though it is based on a most proper judgment of common benefit, and what Christ has ordained in the manner reported; and this distinction seems to apply in the following way. In all other practices of conducting worship, the aforementioned effect on the community of Christians with one another and on the community of each person with Christ is dissimilar, hence they appear to be out of balance. The more markedly one individual stands out and draws others to oneself or the more strongly a mood held in common is expressed and is enhanced by communication, the greater is the effect on the common life. In contrast, the effect of each person’s community with Christ depends on the personal self-initiative with which each one relates what is publicly presented and expressed to one’s relationship with Christ and processes it within oneself. Accordingly, in both cases the effect depends on some other factor. Thus, in each case the one factor can also be strong whereas the other is weak. In the

Lord’s Supper, however, the two factors are to be neither separated nor distinguished. Nothing individual and particular underlies it whereby the effect could be directed more to the one side or to the other. Likewise, the one who dispenses it does not exercise personal sway over the ones who receive it, nor does any recipient exercise any particular inner selfinitiated activity. Rather, therein we are directed only to the whole redeeming love of Christ. Moreover, just as the one who dispenses the Lord’s Supper is simply the organ of Christ’s institution of it, in a uniform fashion the recipients find themselves to be simply in a state of most open receptivity to the influences of Christ. Thus, its total effect proceeds, without any special addition from anyone, directly and undividedly from the words of institution. Therein not only is Christ’s redeeming and community-founding love depicted; this love also stimulates the participants ever anew. The observance itself, moreover, is carried out over and over again in obedience to those words of institution. Thus, it is by means of this individual, self-contained immediacy and by means of its effects in independence from changing personal states and circumstances, both cohering with this immediacy, that the Lord’s Supper is distinguished from all other elements of worship. Now, as regards the first point indicated above, it is obvious that in the discourse6 where Christ commended the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood, he had in mind neither the Lord’s Supper nor any other particular observance. Rather, in this discourse he wanted to indicate, in general terms, how he himself would have to continue and thrive for our sake. Moreover, if we compare this expression with another one, that we are to relate to him as branches to the vine,7 we see that there is no distinction between the two sayings except that the second one designates more the steadiness of this relationship whereas the first saying designates more the periodic renewal of it. Likewise, no one will have any great doubt that the periodically repeated effect of the Lord’s Supper could be designated by that same expression—indeed, not only the effect that it is to have on each person’s community with Christ, viewed as a repeated nourishment of one’s own spiritual life out of the abundance of his life, but also the effect it must have on our community with one another. The reason is that since it is an observance simultaneously shared by a number of people and has the same sort of effect in all, in the consciousness of one’s own benefit8 from it, at the same time each person holds the shared feeling that this has been happening to the others as well; and just as each person knows that the others are more closely united with Christ, precisely by means of that honoring one also feels oneself to be more closely united with them. Moreover, this is not, as it were, an exclusive relationship among those present at the Lord’s Supper on each occasion. Rather, each participant is already a representative of the entire congregation to the others by virtue of what was noted just above. Indisputably, however, viewed as something more general in nature, that spiritual partaking of the flesh can take place in a number of ways. At the same time, the Lord’s Supper is distinguished from all other occasions in that whenever it occurs, the same outcome is bound to this distinct observance’s being blessed and hallowed by the words related to it that Christ gave. Now, for the faithful this distinction is, in and of itself, nothing inconceivable, nor does it require any special explanation—all the less so as it is placed in analogy with all the other

important commemorative celebrations in the church. Moreover, to the extent that the external aspect of this observance appeals to us just as it is, on account of its manifold significance, we will also just as easily concede the following, namely, that if Christ had been pleased to give what he instituted a different form, we would still expect the same outcome from it, also that even the significance of the external aspect that is indicative of this outcome would be easy to discover. Thus, what is unclear and what is more or less inconceivable, depending on how each might be explained, lie simply in the expressions that Christ used to relate the external observance to that outcome. 3. Now, so that we can proceed to discuss this matter more closely, under the presupposition that our proposition expresses, namely, that the observance’s outcome depends on its also being consonant with its institution, first we have to come to a mutual understanding about what this consonance would consist of. The variety of practices regarding the Lord’s Supper in the Christian church—quite apart from the fact that the various parties have claimed that each other’s Lord’s Supper is actually nothing of the kind— already gives sufficient evidence that no complete settlement of the matter has been reached as yet. It can readily be shown, however, that no such settlement is possible. That is to say, with respect both to the observance and to the elements, there is both a material and a formal quality of sameness in the parties’ views that can be ascertained—not altogether alike, on account of the altered mode of life in each party, but neither quality can be achieved except at the expense of the other quality. Furthermore, that being the case, it is virtually impossible for everyone to decide the matter in accordance with one and the same maxim. The reason is as follows. First, in general terms it can very well be said that insistent devotion to material identity gives evidence of an incomplete state. Second, it is also patent that a truly spiritual Christianity would already be satisfied, without any concern whatsoever, if this celebration were simply administered in a way that realizes the original observance in its essential features. Third, in part, the historical unity and continuity of the institution would, however, be endangered, and incidental differences would be produced endlessly, if we chose to be completely indifferent to that material identity, and, in part, the very realization of this unity and identity can also be made dependent, in turn, on entirely different points. As a result, the task can scarcely be stated otherwise than in such a way that one seeks, regarding every sort of sameness, to reach only as much as can be reached with the least possible sacrifice on the other side. Accordingly, with respect to the elements that are used in the Lord’s Supper, we require that the one element can rightly be called “bread” but not be prepared from the same dough and in the same way as ordinary bread; likewise we require that the “wine” that is drunk be from the branches of the vine but in each locale not, as it were, the same drink as is ordinarily consumed there, even if it is something other than wine. Further, with respect to the observance, we regard it to be essential that the eating and drinking be done by all participants in the same manner, also the distributing and receiving of them, and, finally, that as a common meal the observance should be preceded by some sort of religious dialogue and common prayer. However, it seems that it cannot be required that it would also be celebrated

in an evening hour or scheduled at the close of some other, more complete meal—especially if it is of a worshipful nature—and in such a way that what is partaken is only what is left over from that meal, because even in our present situation neither is attainable. Indeed, suppose that someone wanted to say, sticking with the latter form, that the Lord’s Supper would have such an exact relation to the Jewish Feast of Passover that no present realization of the original impression would be possible if the Passover were not also realized in this observance in accordance with its own original significance. In that case, one could easily infer that, nonetheless, it could no longer be the same today as what Christ would have founded and thus could also well not have been ordained by him as an independent and everenduring institution for the church. This objection is so obvious that it can easily come to be better known in the Evangelical church than has been the case up to now, and it naturally gives rise to the question as to what our faith actually rests on in this matter. It can hardly be claimed that this view quite definitely stems from the words of Christ preserved for us. Rather, some of the narratives we have contain no such command at all9 and in others it is only vaguely expressed.10 Moreover, since the apostles have not drawn any such command from Christ’s words at the footwashing,11 they would also have had no more right to make a lasting and general institution out of this Supper with Jesus.12 Now, it is clear that the apostles have done this in the one case and not in the other. Thus, we can adhere to what they have ordained without needing to decide whether Christ gave them other express instructions concerning the Lord’s Supper,13 or whether they inferred these from his words or simply took something different from the direct impression of the matter and from attendant circumstances with respect to the Lord’s Supper than they did with respect to the footwashing. In the latter case, we would then be able to view the Lord’s Supper as directly instituted by Christ, only not entirely in the same sense. Yet, we would always have to believe that the apostles observed it in his sense nonetheless, if we do not want to give up their canonical authority even in their most intimate vocational circle.

1. Ed. note: See index for “spiritual life” and “human being, new.” Cf. OG 64. 2. Betrachtung. Ed. note: Here the “contemplation” is relatively solitary. When it is shared, “reflection” would be the meaning. Schleiermacher frequently invites listeners to reflect with him in his sermons. In his sense of Betrachtung, one could also reflect or contemplate when alone, but one could do so as if one were in an implicit dialogue. 3. Genuß. Ed. note: In ordinary usage, Genuß is employed for the partaking of food, also of the Lord’s Supper. Lingering underneath are the other common meanings of pleasure, delight, enjoyment, and gratification. 4. Höchste Gipfel. 5. Cf. Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “At the same time, the Lord also wanted the Lord’s Supper to be the sinew [nervum] for congregating in public.” Ed. note: Schleiermacher here refers to the edition in Symbole (1816), 170f. ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 28:416. At that time nervus could also mean fiber, string, or tendon, or even energy or force. 6. John 6:52–56. Ed. note: Sermon on John 6:52–60, Dec. 12, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 455–67. 7. John 15:4–6. Ed. note: Sermon on John 15:1–7, July 2, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 469–83. 8. Förderung. Ed. note: In KGA I/13.2, 381, Schäfer indicates that this is the word used in the original manuscript, while the initial edition (and all others since) had the less likely Forderung, which would mean “claim on it” rather than “benefit from it.”

9. Matt. 26:26–28, and Mark 14:21–24. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s final sermon on Mark 14:1–26, Feb. 2, 1834, was separately published (Berlin, 1834). 10. Luke 22:19–20 and 1 Cor. 11:24–25. 11. John 13:14–15. Ed. note: This ceremony is also called the Agape or Love Feast. Sermon on John 13:12–20, April 16, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 399–416. 12. Cf. Robert Barclay (1648–1690), Apology (1676) 13. Ed. note: In the midst of a lengthy account of contending views on Communion, wherein Barclay (Barklay) sets forth a purely spiritual account that in no way affords a special privilege to the ceremony itself, he states the following, quoted in a note by Redeker: “Communion or partaking of the body and blood of Christ has no necessary relationship to breaking of bread and drinking of wine. … First, it is not of an inherent nature. … Second, it has nothing by way of divine precept; if it had, it would be possible to give an account of its institution or to tell of its practice by the people of God as recorded in Scripture, but this is not so.” ET Tice, cf. Barclay’s Apology (1967), 339 (see the entire proposition 13, 327–61); Latin in Barclay’s 1st ed. (1676); also in Barclay’s Latin and English from 1678 on. 13. Cf. 1 Cor. 11:23.

§140. With a view to the interconnection between bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ in the Lord’s Supper, the Evangelical church takes a definite stand in two respects. On the one hand, it simply stands against those who consider this connection to be independent of the action of partaking. On the other hand, it stands against those who, in spite of this interconnection, do not want to concede that there is any association between partaking of the bread and wine and partaking spiritually of the flesh and blood of Christ. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) X: “Thus, it is taught of the Lord’s Supper that the true body and blood of Christ are truly present under the form of bread and wine in the Supper and are distributed and taken there.”1 (2) Apology Augsburg (1531) X: “That in the Lord’s Supper, the body and blood of Christ are truly and substantially present and are truly distributed with those things that are seen, the bread and wine, to those who receive the sacrament. … [Quarto edition:] Since Paul says (I. Cor. 10:16) that the bread is a ‘sharing in the body of Christ,’ it would follow that if the true body of the Lord were not truly present, the bread would not be a participation of the body but only of his spirit.”2 (3) Smalcald Articles (Luther, 1537), Part III.6: “We maintain that the bread and wine in the Supper are the true body and blood of Christ and that they are not only offered to and received by upright Christians but also by evil ones.”3 (4) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XIX: “In the Lord’s Supper the outward sign is bread and water, taken from things commonly used for meat and drink, but the thing signified is the body of Christ which was given and his blood which was shed for us, or the communion of the body and blood of the Lord. …” XXI: “Bread is outwardly offered by the minister, and the words of the Lord are heard,” etc. “Therefore the faithful receive what is given,” etc. “At the same time, by the work of

Christ through the Holy Spirit they also inwardly receive the flesh and blood of the Lord and are thereby nourished unto life eternal.”4 (5) Gallican Confession (1559) XXXVIII: “Thus we hold that the bread and wine given to us in the sacrament serve to our spiritual nourishment, inasmuch as they show, as to our sight, that the body of Christ is our meat and his blood our drink. … And so we reject the enthusiasts and sacramentarians who will not receive such signs and marks.”5 (6) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) XXVIII: “Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of the bread and wine) in the Supper of the Lord (Eucharistia) cannot be proved by holy writ but is repugnant to the plain words of scripture. … The body of Christ is given, taken and eaten in the Supper only after an heavenly and spiritual manner. And the means whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith.”6 1. Suppose that the question to be dealt with here were solely an exegetical one. Then presentation of this particular doctrine of faith could wait until the hermeneutical deliberations were finished and at that point could simply record the result—just as do other propositions that are not dogmatic in the full sense, precisely because their content is comprised not of assertions concerning our immediate self-consciousness but only of facts that we assume based on testimony. This would be the case, for only as such a fact could we assume what would have been yielded exegetically concerning the meaning of the words “This is my body,” and so forth. This question is not at all purely exegetical, however. That is to say, since the words given in the various narratives do not come out the same, we must begin instead to determine something that already belongs to historical criticism, namely, what kind of expressions Christ might have used, from which these reports could have arisen. Only then, moreover, would it be possible to inquire as to what Christ originally meant by such words. Now, it is possible to proceed here from very different points of view, and a generally satisfactory outcome is not likely. Thus, our special responsibility is to set forth, concerning the various views that have achieved currency in the Evangelical church, the conviction underlying church union that their differences cannot be an obstacle to their partaking of the Lord’s Supper conjointly.7 Thus, we must first try, as much as may be possible, to establish what the points in dispute actually are. Then we must lay down the principles by virtue of which we can, as it were, transcend the differences that exist within our church while retaining currency for whatever differences with the Roman Catholic church we may express both in our doctrinal propositions and in passages within our confessional symbols, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with those ecclesial communities and the views of individuals that would remove all real action8 from the sacrament.

Now, as regards establishing the points of dispute, these differences all proceed from the words of Christ already noted, and for this purpose we can only refer back to what was already established in the previous proposition. Accordingly, two questions arise. The first question concerns how the meaning of these words would relate to partaking of the bread and wine, on the one hand, and to the expected strengthening of spiritual life, on the other hand. In contrast, the second question concerns the extent to which insight into the meaning of these words would belong to the completeness of this observance and consequently also the extent to which agreement in its explanation would belong to its communal character. We will not be able to answer this second question otherwise than to the effect that understanding what these words mean is necessary only to the extent that the expected result, namely, the strengthening of spiritual life, would be conditioned by them. Here, furthermore, agreement is required only insofar as differences would be composed that could be an obstacle to its being administered conjointly. Moreover, in following this path we would also be able to say concerning the first question that every explanation that is in other respects able to attain validity hermeneutically can be correct for us, insofar as for the faithful it simply does not jeopardize the interconnection between the observance and its result, regardless of whether the Redeemer’s difficult words are related more to the physical observance or more to the spiritual result. 2. The first contrast set forth in our proposition is that with the Roman Catholic Church. It may well not be correct to seek this contrast especially in the doctrine of transubstantiation. On the contrary, for this matter it is an insignificant distinction whether Christ’s body and blood are physically partaken of at the same time as the bread and wine or whether Christ’s body and blood have been made into a physical partaking in place of the bread and wine. That is to say, the only distinction between the two positions is that in the one case the bread and wine are also partaken of, whereas in the other case they are not partaken of along with Christ’s body and blood, which is a matter of complete indifference in terms of their intended effect. Suppose, further, that the only thing renounced had been the extended position that in this transformation of the two elements they would then remain, irrespective of the act of partaking, or that what would not have been partaken of in the Lord’s Supper would nonetheless also have been transformed along with it. Then, if one were simply to look at the third passage cited at the beginning here, the Saxon reformers would have had little objection at that time. On the other hand, if anyone had wanted to treat consubstantiation as physical in such a way that Christ’s body and blood would still remain in the bread and wine after Christ’s words had been spoken over them, even if these elements would not have been partaken of in the Lord’s Supper, then Luther would have protested against this position just as severely. For example, even where he discusses his view in strictest opposition to the Reformed view, he never asserts a co-presence of the body and blood with the bread and wine outside the actual observance of the Lord’s Supper. In contrast, ever since the doctrine regarding transubstantiation of the bread was adopted in the Catholic church, that presupposition of a physical and permanent transformation has constantly underlaid all casuistic treatments of the doctrine. Hence, in this respect, firm opposition to all display and

reverence for the consecrated elements is essential, as is opposition to any presumption of wanting to accomplish anything through these elements apart from the actual partaking thereof. Accordingly, for a general rule there has certainly also been a definite denial within the Evangelical church that any partaking of the consecrated elements could have been conducive to any salvific or juridical effect outside celebration of the sacrament. Thus, quite apart from the fact that this practice cannot be justified hermeneutically, the main reason why we reject the theory of the Roman Catholic Church is that its intention in binding the elements with Christ’s body and blood in this way, outside the communal partaking of them, is to serve entirely different purposes and to tie spiritual effects of a magical sort to physical ones. 3. By the second contrast indicated in our proposition, the Evangelical church separates itself from the “sacramentarians.”9 Of course, the term is not taken in the same sense as Luther, and then other theologians as well, used it, in the heat of battle, against adherents of the Helvetic and Gallican confessions. The views of these theologians, however, fall entirely within the limits set by our proposition. Rather, it designates opponents of the sacrament itself. These opponents claim that partaking of the bread and wine by identifying them with “body and blood” is but a phantom as compared with the spiritual partaking of Christ’s body and blood, which is not tied to this observance at all. They also claim that once this spiritual nourishment is secured, the merely figurative observance is better abandoned than continued.10 Now, we do indeed concede that the spiritual partaking—to which Christ invited people long before his institution of the Lord’s Supper and, to be sure, not as something that lay ahead—has in no way been bound exclusively to or restricted to the sacrament through Christ’s institution. Instead, we trust in the words of Christ that in the subsequent institution called the Lord’s Supper, Christ’s earlier invitation was realized by his power in such a way that every person of faith can then depend on finding spiritual nourishment in observance of this sacrament and in such a way that today this observance affords sure and unfailing access for the faithful to that spiritual nourishment if it is but rightly administered in its every aspect. Hence, in its role as the most complete communal spiritual partaking of Christ’s body and blood, the Lord’s Supper relates to solitary instances apart from it, just as what is organized relates to what is incidental. Organized edification occurring in public worship relates to individual, sporadic edification in the same way. However, although that opposed view does not deny that spiritual partaking can also occur in the sacramental observance, it nonetheless does declare that this tie is precarious and purely incidental, in that otherwise it indeed could not counsel against taking part in the Lord’s Supper and consequently misconstrue the value of Christ’s institution of it. Yet, almost the same thing is true of those who do indeed want to have an unwavering retention of the Lord’s Supper in the church, viewed as a command of Christ, but cancel out any connection of it with the spiritual partaking of Christ’s body and blood because they declare it to be simply a practice by which we bear witness or profess our faith.11 We oppose this view for two reasons. In part, we oppose it because it does not at all view the Lord’s Supper as the apex of public worship, since they do not believe that they receive anything in

it whatsoever.12 Thus, to this gathering together, which is so eminently done in the name of Christ, they do not even apply that general promise which Christ gave to all who gather in this way.13 In part, we also oppose this view because then the Lord’s Supper would not be the same for all time. That is to say, without this sacrament Christians in their various common associations lacked no opportunity among themselves mutually to acknowledge one another to be members of the church, moreover, no one else was present at its original institution to whom the disciples could bear witness, and the early church also permitted no non-Christians to be onlookers. 4. Now, suppose that we leave open to the Evangelical church the entire space between these two views, of which the one view ascribes a magical value to the Lord’s Supper and the other view reduces it to a mere sign. Then, the historical reason for doing so lies, above all, in the fact that, right from the very beginning, two other views were developing in the church within these bounds, of which the one view came nearest to the Roman Catholic position and the other view came nearest to the Socinian position, while both views nevertheless held fast to a consciousness of their shared opposition to those other two positions. Furthermore, in part, there were repeatedly renewed attempts to reconcile these two views, and, in part, a third view arose between the two views out of that same endeavor. Thus, over time wherever the two views bordered on each other, there prevailingly arose the shared conviction that collectively, under the same condition—namely, that they expected the same result from genuine living faith—each party would also have to believe that the other parties would have the same claim to this result as it did. The reason given was that no party could be sure that it would construe the interconnection between the observance and its result exactly as the Redeemer intended it, inasmuch as it lies outside our province to make this happen, and yet each party would have the sincerest desire to conform with the Redeemer’s meaning in the strictest way possible. Now, this conviction is based precisely on the recognition of the exegetical difficulty that lies in the way Christ chose to mention his body and blood in proffering the bread and wine. One group, in facing a discourse of this importance, will then permit only a literal reading, yet on account of differences in the reports it cannot consistently apply that reading—“this” corresponding to “blood” and “cup” corresponding to “covenant.”14 The result is that our Lord’s Supper and the original one cannot be the same if the body being proffered is literally supposed to be exactly the same as that of the one who originally proffered it. Suppose that the other group can infer from this comparison that this equating of the bread with the body is to be understood only figuratively, in that the bread is only a sign of the body. Then all that they have to do is explain, first, how it is that a particular sign of the blood would have to be proffered, apart from that of the body itself, then, second, if the disciples were supposed to understand Christ’s discourse, whether they were directed more to explain it on the basis of Christ’s earlier analogous discourses or more on the basis of the Old Testament observance to which Christ’s institution was attached. Now, if none of these problems has been resolved by either side up to now, it is also possible that new attempts will be made, which we must likewise count among the

progressive endeavors of the Evangelical church, until a satisfactory explanation makes all the incomplete explanations superfluous. However, the three views that have gained the greatest currency out of such incomplete attempts can best be arranged in the following way. The first view, the Lutheran, declares that Christ would have conjoined for our nourishment the real presence of his body and blood with the bread and wine, but only for the observance of the physical partaking of the two elements. The second view, the Zwinglian, declares that Christ would have conjoined nothing with the bread and wine themselves, but by his command he simply conjoined the spiritual partaking of his flesh and blood with the observance of eating that bread and wine. The third view, the Calvinist, declares that, to be sure, Christ would have conjoined the eating and drinking with the observance alone, yet not simply that spiritual partaking which is also to be had apart from the sacrament, but that real presence of his body and blood which cannot be had anywhere else.15 The second view recognizes only two things: the physical partaking and the spiritual effect, both of which are bound together by the Word. Indisputably, this is the clearest and most intelligible view, because it sets forth an exact analogy between the Lord’s Supper and baptism and leaves entirely out of consideration “the real presence of the body and blood,” something admittedly very difficult to describe. In consequence, this view cannot understand sacramental partaking to be anything other than the conjoining of spiritual nourishment with that distinctly physical partaking.16 Yet, even if the above-cited words of Zwingli are strongly accentuated, and numerous other expressions whereby he could seem to intend to diminish or even erase the sacrament’s power17 are to be judged only from the viewpoint of his fight against Roman doctrine, the view nonetheless leaves unexplained why Christ used the particular words he spoke if nothing more was to be said on the matter than this. Besides these two points, the other two views recognize yet a third one, namely, a real presence of Christ’s body and blood. That is to say: according to Luther, by a particular mysterious power of the Word, the real presence of Christ’s body and blood is conjoined with the elements, the bread and wine, to form a resemblance to what is consumed in the physical partaking; according to Calvin, it is conjoined only with the spiritual partaking of the faithful, to form an actual sacramental elevation of that partaking, which requires no other power to be effective than the spiritual power of the divine promise known to us all. Prefaced in both of these two views is precisely an assumed third feature, namely, the question as to why Christ could have laid down his purpose only in such totally distinctive expressions. However, apart from the fact that Luther’s presentation borders too closely on the Roman version not to have fostered appropriation of numerous superstitious notions, the way in which the body of Christ is eaten at the same time as the bread and the way in which this sacramental partaking is different, on the one hand, from the physical partaking of symbolic elements and, on the other hand, from the spiritual partaking of flesh and blood, can also be made so little comprehensible that formulations on the matter can indeed be set forth composed of unscripturally fabricated words, but the fact itself can never be made evident. The Calvinist view obviates may of these difficulties by distancing itself not only from the overly prudent meagerness of the Zwinglian view but also, at the same time, from the

mysterious senseoriented quality of the Lutheran view. However, the Calvinist view no more settles what it means to have a share in Christ’s body and blood than the Lutheran view does; and the Calvinist view also no more serves to explain the manner and means of relations between the body and blood, or the reason for separating them, than the Zwinglian view does. Hence, despite the fact that this Calvinist view has exercised a strong power of attraction, it still contains fresh grounds for vacillating between the appeal, inherent in something symbolic, of seeking even more in the sacrament than has developed in the explanation of it, and falling back on something more external since the distinctiveness of this observance is not readily detectable. In sum, it is not to be imagined that the Calvinist view will generally gain the upper hand in the Evangelical church; rather, it is to be expected that, based on continued unfettered labor by exegetes, some other view would be developed that will not flounder on these rocks. Until then, shared church doctrine can be set forth only in relation to the effects of the Lord’s Supper itself and, as such, can set forth only the following two propositions.

1. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Book of Concord (2000), 44; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 62f. Here Schleiermacher gives the text in German. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 184; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 247f. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 320; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 450f. 4. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 279, 281; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 287, 292; cf. §37n3. 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 381, also Cochrane (1972), 157; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 338f. 6. Ed. note: The quote is actually from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 506. See §37n5. 7. Die Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Genusses. Ed. note: Literally, the communality or communal character of partaking. See the next paragraph below. 8. Realität. Ed. note: That is, something real, not purely symbolic, does occur in a complete observance of the Lord’s Supper, as in a complete baptism. It has reality. 9. Ed. note: This term was originally used by Luther to describe those, following the lead of Huldrych Zwingli (1484– 1531) and John Oecolampadius (1482–1531), who regarded the elements only in a metaphorical (or “sacramental”) sense, then slightly later applied to all those who denied any “real presence” of Christ’s body and blood in the Lord’s Supper. 10. Ed. note: In the first edition of 1822, reference is given to the seventeenth-century Quaker leader Robert Barclay, already quoted in CF §139.3. 11. In the Rakov Catechism (1605–1609), Questions 334–345. Huldrych Zwingli is not to be mistaken for these people, for even though he terms the partaking of bread and wine in the Lord’s Supper simply a thankful remembrance, he nonetheless everywhere presupposes spiritual partaking in that act. In his Exposition of the Christian Faith (1530), Zwingli states: “When you come to the Lord’s Supper with this spiritual eating … or at the same time you share bread and wine with the brethren, which are now the symbolic body of Christ, you eat in an appropriately sacramental way when, in fact, you do the same thing inwardly that you perform outwardly.” Ed. note: Zwingli ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 48. 12. Rakov Catechism (1605–1609), Question 338: “It is evident that the Lord’s Supper was not instituted so that we would consume something there.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. This was the first confessional writing of the Socinians, initially published in Polish in 1605, in German in 1608, and in Latin and English in 1609. A later English version was edited by Thomas Rees, with historical introduction (London, 1818); Latin: Catechesis Ecclesiarum (Rakov, 1609), reissued as Catechesis Rakoviensis (1739). 13. Ed. note: See Matt. 18:20. 14. Ed. note: See esp. 1 Cor. 11:25; compare Matt. 26:27–28 and Mark 14:23–24, also Luke 22:17–20. 15. John Calvin (1509–1564), Institutes (1559) 4.17.10: “Therefore, if the Lord truly represents the participation in his body through the breaking of bread, there ought not to be the least doubt that he truly presents and shows his body.” 11. “ I say, therefore; that in the sacred mystery of the Supper, Christ is truly shown to us through the symbols of bread and wine, his very body and blood. … First, that we may grow into one body with him, secondly, having been made partakers of his

substance, that we may also feel his power in partaking of all his benefits.” Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 1371f.; Latin: Opera selecta 5 (1926), 352–54, and CR 30:1009f. 16. Ed. note: Throughout these discussions of the Lord’s Supper, and the quotations given, “partaking” and “nourishment” translate the same word, Genuss, while Geniessen means “the eating.” 17. Huldrych Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion (1525) 15 (The Sacraments): “A sacrament … cannot have any power to free the conscience. That can be freed by God alone.” 12: “They are wrong, therefore, by the whole width of heaven, who think that sacraments have any cleansing power. … The sacraments are, then, signs or ceremonials … by which a person proves to the church that one either aims to be or is a soldier of Christ and which inform the whole church rather than yourself of your faith.” Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 181, 182, 184; Latin: CR 90:759, 760, 761.

§141. First Doctrinal Proposition: For all the faithful, partaking of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord’s Supper serves to strengthen their community with Christ. (1) Luther’s Larger Catechism (1529) on the Sacrament of the Altar: “We go to the sacrament because there we receive a great treasure, through and in which we obtain the forgiveness of sins. … Therefore, it is appropriately called food of the soul, for it nourishes and strengthens the new creature.”1 (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XXI: “There is also a spiritual eating of Christ’s body … whereby the body and blood of our Lord, while remaining in their own essence and property, are spiritually communicated to us … by the Holy Spirit, who applies and bestows upon us these things which have been prepared for us by the sacrifice of the Lord’s body and blood for us … so that Christ lives in us.”2 (3) Scots Confession (1560) XXI: “… but this union and conjunction which we have with the body and blood of Christ Jesus in the right use of the sacraments, wrought by operation of the Holy Ghost, who by true faith carries us above all things that are visible, carnal and earthly and makes us to feed upon the body and blood of Christ Jesus.”3 (4) Belgic Confession (1561) XXXV: “This feast is a spiritual table, at which Christ communicates himself with all his benefits to us and gives us there to enjoy both himself and the merits of his sufferings and death.”4 (5) Melanchthon, Loci theologici (1545–1559): “For this purpose, therefore, it is profitable to do penance by eating—that is, to be confirmed by faith.”5 (6) Calvin, Institutes (1559) IV.17.5: “By this means the Lord intended … that, by true partaking of him, his life passes into us and is made ours. … ” 11. “By effect I understand redemption, righteousness, sanctification, and eternal life …”6

1. The one benefit claimed for this partaking here is the strengthening of our community with Christ. Thus, the strengthening of Christians in their association among themselves is included therein,7 in that this association rests in their union with Christ so completely that the union of an individual with Christ is not imaginable without one’s union with the faithful. That this point is more recessive than is reasonable in the confessional passages cited above is based on the fact that customarily the question concerning the sacrament’s benefit comes up in such discussions only in connection with questions treated previously, wherein each individual who partakes is considered only as such. Hence, customarily information about the sacrament’s benefit is to be sought only under the enumeration of goods gained through Christ or under the all-embracing concept of sanctification. Accordingly, general expressions for the effects of this partaking that are usually most prominent are these: strengthening in faith and nourishment of “the new human being” or the passage of Christ’s life into our own. The two processes thus named are essentially the same, insofar as living faith in Christ is indeed nothing but the self-consciousness of our being in union with Christ. Customarily, however, two concepts are emphasized in particular: (1) that for us in the sacrament forgiveness of sins is indeed renewed and strengthened, but (2) that we then experience an enhancement of powers given for the purpose of sanctification. In reality these two things are not to be separated from each other. Both, moreover, rest on the fact that, on account of sin’s still not being entirely erased, even the new spiritual life is interrupted in its advancements by partially retrogressive movements. This is so, for just as regeneration is truly made firm and sure only as one reaches the status of sanctification, so too if one’s union with Christ has been disturbed by sin, the surety that sin is forgiven also can become truly secured only in the feeling of restored and fortified life. Moreover, the picturing to oneself of the entire congregation of the faithful that naturally occurs in observance of the Lord’s Supper is an important factor in this whole process. That is to say, realizing the presence of this community8 has to awaken in each person a powerful stirring of the common spirit,9 as it also arouses a heightened consciousness of one’s general and specific calling within this community, and a fresh sense of direction regarding the gifts to be further developed in oneself is not to be separated from each of these experiences. Now, as concerns the relation of the Lord’s Supper to forgiveness of sins in particular, the first thing to be noted is that in this respect no separation ought to be made between original sin and actual sin,10 as if perchance baptism would relate only to original sin and the Lord’s Supper only to actual sin. The reason is as follows. Apart from the fact that baptism can be completed only at a time when actual sin has already issued from original sin11 and apart from the fact that baptism could not designate the beginning of the new life if by it actual sin also did not cease to hinder one’s being in community with Christ’s blessedness,12 baptism, viewed as the sign and seal of regeneration, already also bears a relation to all actual sins, in that the sins of the regenerate are always forgiven in advance.13 The same account also applies to the Lord’s Supper, for since it is original sin that is continually made manifest in those actual sins by which vital community with Christ is hindered, it is also, at the same time, original sin the forgiveness of which must be secured for us anew.

The second thing to be noted, however, is that the forgiveness of sins also should not be divided up, and the power of forgiving sins in the sacrament of the altar should not be regarded as a power set apart, as if sins would first be forgiven in one way by justifying divine activity in regeneration and then in another way by the particular presence and communicative activity of Christ in the sacrament.14 Rather, there exists but one and the same power of forgiving sins. Moreover, regeneration is nothing but Christ’s general and internally effective relationship to the totality of the human race as it first touches an individual life. Likewise, forgiveness of sins in the Lord’s Supper is simply and precisely this living relationship as it is revealed in a single moment of Christ’s becoming present shared by a number of Christians. In this respect, it can appear puzzling as to why the church declares forgiveness of sins to communicants on each occasion upon their making confession of sins but already before they partake of the sacrament, for this practice does not rest on Christ’s institution of the sacrament. In answer, we consider that as an anticipation this act belongs to the Lord’s Supper just as confirmation, in reverse order, belongs to baptism as its eventual supplement. Hence, in the Evangelical church absolution, when viewed as a separate sacrament in and of itself, as initially had occurred here and there,15 was also soon discontinued. This was done, for confession of sins bears no ecclesial character of a public nature except in relation to the Lord’s Supper.16 Moreover, the wish to participate in this sacrament is not to be expressed otherwise than by a confession of sins, because if there were no sin, there would be no need to renew one’s union with Christ.17 In that the church already pronounces forgiveness of sin in relation to this confession of sins, however, it simply declares, first of all, that it places anyone who now feels precisely the need for renewal of one’s community with Christ on a par with those who have already satisfied that need, and then the church affords that needy individual the surety that one will find the satisfaction one needs in the sacrament. Hence, every Evangelical Christian will also likely have the experience that consciousness of the forgiveness of sins on the occasion of absolution administered by the church is still only a shadow of what one enjoys in partaking of the Lord’s Supper itself. That is to say, here this consciousness is conjoined with consciousness of a new influx of the power of spiritual life from the fullness18 of Christ, which truly serves to overcome obstacles to new life and remnants of general sinfulness. 2. Based on what has been noticed thus far, how the church would proceed in this observance is self-evident in the following ways. First of all, the Lord’s Supper bears a relation to baptism. Hence, as long as child baptism is still adhered to, no participation in the Lord’s Supper can take place before “confirmation,” in the Protestant sense of the word. Therefore, serving communion to children,19 in whom neither the consciousness of sin nor the consciousness of grace can have developed suitably for the purpose, is a serious impropriety that clings to superstitious notions. Second, since according to none of the various views of the matter can a partaking of the Lord’s Supper take place without Christ’s becoming present in one’s spirit, there can be no observance of the Lord’s Supper where one is wanting in one’s awareness of what is going on or where one’s consciousness is either

distracted or is already in process of disappearing. Third, since the Lord’s Supper was appointed by Christ to be a shared observance, in this sense it is also always to be undertaken within the church. Precisely for this reason, however, it also should never happen that in this observance companions are lacking for Christians who are unable to participate in the public feast because of illness or for some other reason, so that they would have to celebrate it alone. Fourth, and finally, on our part no link whatsoever is found with the doctrine of the Greek and Roman churches that the union of Christ’s body with the bread apart from partaking of it in the sacrament would also retain the nature of a “perpetual sacrifice” “offered to God,”20 and that doctrine remains forever wholly out of the question. This is so, even if the qualifying explanation—that this repetition, as it were, of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is simply supposed to be a “commemoration” of it—were not wholly detached from it.21 This is so, for we know nothing of the “merits” and “satisfactions” that are aimed at in those views.22 The makeshift notion that this sacrifice is not supposed to be any different from that accomplished on the cross but is the very same sacrifice23 is for us a completely empty claim, for in the end we would have totally to divorce the sacrifice in Christ’s death from obedience in his life,24 and at that point the original sacrifice would be regarded as something just as incidentally established and just as magical as sacrifice in the mass. In any case, this latter sacrifice would have to be regarded as a supplement to the original one, and then two things would follow. In the first place, without that supplementary sacrifice the faithful would not always be in God’s sight in Christ and their justification would be removed, in turn, irrespective of the fact that whatever could alone serve to bring about this result would also have to have been coposited as God’s foreknowledge in God’s justifying activity. A second consequence, however, is interconnected with this one, namely, that redemption would be brought to fruition only by this supplementary observance of the church. That is to say, in part, human beings would redeem themselves in that Christ’s highpriestly office would be insufficient apart from the sacrifice of the mass. This would be true of redemption not only as concerns its realization in human beings, thus as it is viewed in its temporal aspect, for there the result is plain to see, but also in its being the ground of the divine good pleasure, thus viewed in its eternal aspect. Hence, although there is no longer any need to designate the mass as an idolatrous practice, we nonetheless do continue, withal and without qualification, to reject this entire notion of a sacrifice occurring after the end of all sacrifice, because having proceeded from a demonstrable misconception, it necessarily provokes superstition in that it distorts faith and egregiously adulterates the concept of Christian priesthood. We also particularly reject this notion in and of itself, independent of the doctrine of transubstantiation, with which it obviously interconnects.25

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 469; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 711f. 2. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 285; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 292f.; cf. 37n3. 3. Ed. note: ET drawn from the original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 468, also Cochrane (1972), 179; an inferior Latin version in Niemeyer (1840), 352f., and a closely related ET by Bulloch (1960).

4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 431, also Cochrane (1972), 216; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 386. 5. Ed. note: ET Templin/Tice; Latin: CR 21:865. See §32n16. 6. Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 1365, 1372; Latin: Opera selecta 5 (1926), 347, 355; CR 30:1006, 1010. 7. Cf. 1 Cor. 10:17; 12:27. 8. Vergegenwärtigung. Ed. note: To make this notion clear, the translation has also just rendered it as one’s “picturing to oneself.” The two meanings both resound in ordinary usage. Just above, specific allusions are made to the doctrine of sanctification (§§111–12). 9. Gemeingeist. Ed. note: This first appearance of Schleiermacher’s term for the Holy Spirit in the present doctrine continues his unbroken practice of treating ecclesial matters in terms of the divine Spirit’s being essentially present therein. Cf. §125. This opening paragraph indicates errors and issues to be addressed more fully in arguments to follow, especially in pointing out the priority of communal, shared experience over any distinctively individual experience of the Lord’s Supper and its benefits. 10. Ed. note: Cf. §74.4. 11. Ed. note: Cf. §73. 12. Ed. note: Cf. §101. 13. Cf. §§111–12. Ed. note: On baptism, in this respect, see also §137.2 and §138.2; on forgiveness of sin, esp. §111.3. 14. Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “We also admonish them not to think that it is on account of this work … that sins are remitted; rather, we are in trust to behold the death and merit of God’s Son … and to determine that our sins are forgiven on account of him.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin: CR 28:418; Schleiermacher here refers to the edition in Symbole (1816), 173. 15. (1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559): “Let these be counted as sacraments: baptism, the Lord’s Supper, and absolution.” (2) The same view is also featured in articles 8–13 in the Augsburg Confession (1530), hence likewise in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession 13: “Therefore, the sacraments are actually baptism, the Lord’s Supper and absolution (the sacrament of repentance).” Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:849. See §32n16. (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 219; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 292. 16. Ed. note: On regulations regarding requiring specific preparations before taking part in Communion, see OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 12. For discussion of further principles that inform these regulations as they necessarily change, see also §§127, 140–42, and 145.1, also BO §47. In his congregation a service in preparation for Communion was available but voluntary. 17. Ed. note: Generally in Schleiermacher’s day, a service preparatory for Communion was held on Saturdays, available to any who chose to attend in anticipation of that observance the next day. In the years when an associate pastor joined Dreifaltigkeitskirche, the associate pastor tended to take the Saturday service. The two senior pastors—Schleiermacher, the Reformed copastor, and Prof. Dr. Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780–1846), the Lutheran copastor—tended to alternate between the earlier and later Sunday morning services every other week. Schleiermacher also tended to administer the Lord’s Supper twice each month. 18. Ed. note: See esp. John 1:16: “And from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace” (RSV). This “fullness” can be seen as one that flows out from God to Christ to the church and thence to the individual, as in a succession suggested in moving from Col. 1:19 and 2:9 to John 1:6 and finally to Eph. 1:23. 19. Kommunion der Kinder. Ed. note: This is the first use of the word Kommunion in the presentation of this doctrine here, instead of Gemeinschaft for “Communion.” It is also the first mention of any special practice for children. As in Schleiermacher’s school years among the Herrnhuter Brethren, this community still celebrates a Kindergottesdienst in which adults serve rolls and tea to children, but not the bread and wine. In other traditions, baptized children, in contrast, may be invited to partake of the Lord’s Supper itself. 20. (1) [John of Damascus,] Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Exthesis orthodoxou pisteos (1695), q. 107: “a sacrifice performed by God”; (2) Roman Catechism (1566) Part 2, chap. 4, De eucharistiae sacramento q. 77: “So that the church would have a perpetual sacrifice, by which our sins would be expiated.” Ed. note: (1) Schleiermacher himself quotes but does not identify his Greek source; ET Tice. Schäfer (2003) locates the source as the Exposition and refers to Johannes Karmiris, Dogmatica et symbolica (1968), vol. 2, 638–40. (2) Roman Catechism: the initial Latin edition Schleiermacher used is the jussu primum editus, editio Loewen (1678), 216; ET Kienzles, cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.) and §108n19. 21. Roman Catechism (1566), Part 2, chap. 4, q. 85: “The very holy sacrifice of the mass is not only the simple commemoration of the sacrifice that was made on the cross but is also truly a propitiatory sacrifice, by which God is appeased and rendered propitious to us.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.) and §108n19; Latin: Catechismus Romanus (1678), 219.

22. Roman Catechism (1566), Part 2, chap. 4, q. 85: “Those who offer this sacrifice, by which they commune with us, merit and make satisfaction for the fruits of the Lord’s passion.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.) and §108n19; Latin: Catechismus Romanus (1678), 219. 23. Roman Catechism (1566), Part 2, chap. 4, q. 83: “Thus we confess that it is and ought to be considered as one and the same sacrifice, that which is performed in the mass and was offered on the cross.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 ed.) and §108n19; Latin: Catechismus Romanus (1678), 218. 24. Heb. 2:10, 17; and 5:2, 8. Ed. note: Sermon only on Heb. 5:8–9, Dec. 23, 1832, Festpredigten (1833), also SW II.2 (1835), 299–313. 25. (1) Heidelberg Catechism (1563), q. 80; (2) Schmalkaldic Articles (1537) 2: The Mass; (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 21. Ed. note: (1) ET and German: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 335f., cf. Torrance (1959), 84f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 448. (2) ET Book of Concord (2000), 301ff.; German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 416ff. (3) ET Cochrane (1972), 283–88; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 291–95; cf. §37n3.

§142. Second Doctrinal Proposition: Partaking of the Lord’s Supper unworthily serves to bring down judgment upon the partaker. (1) Apology Augsburg (1531) XI: “Christ says (1 Cor. 11:29) that ‘all who eat and drink unworthily eat and drink judgment against themselves.’ Our pastors, accordingly, do not force those who are not ready to use the sacraments.”1 (2) Belgian Confession (1561) XXXV: “Therefore, no one ought to come to this table without having previously rightly examined himself, lest by eating of this bread and drinking of this cup he eat and drink judgment to himself.”2 (3) Heidelberg Catechism (1563) q. 81: “Hypocrites and those who are unrepentant, however, eat and drink judgment on themselves.”3 1. It is not easy to give a clear account concerning the practicability of this proposition. The reasons are, in the first place, that it is hard to form a definite notion of where the unworthiness is to come from, since one who is not a member of the Christian church also has no access to the sacrament. In contrast, each time any true member of the church will be all the more a worthy partaker, since this meal possesses a distinctive and independent power, by Christ’s institution of it, through which power it stands out, above all else, that otherwise occurs as an expression of piety and as a means of effecting piety. Moreover, the meal does so in such a way that each partaker has to feel summoned to the most auspicious of moods in it. In the second place, what presents itself, apart from all this, is the following situation. Since the Lord’s Supper was instituted as an observance held in common and is proffered publicly by ministers of the Word, certain times for it also have to be set in accordance with an ecclesial order. Thus, this order indeed has the appearance of a summons, and one can imagine that individuals hearken to this summons—be it out of habit or in view of someone else’s judgment—without any longing after this nourishment having been stirred in them by a consciousness of deficiency in their spiritual state. In its origin such a partaking of this

nourishment is then an unworthy one, because it bears no connection with the aim of its institution. This is so, in that without a vital consciousness of one’s personal relationship with Christ, no effective remembrance of him, as he is depicted in this event, is even possible. Moreover, that effective remembrance will always be lacking, whether we might then picture that spiritual state as one of dull-minded inattentiveness, which cannot be conquered by the observance itself, or whether we regard it as a persistent consciousness of alien motives, which can scarcely occur otherwise than as accompanied by a lack of faith in the sacrament’s power and high value, even if that lack of faith were temporary. 2. Now, however, suppose that the judgment which is designated as the consequence of unworthiness is understood as an induction into eternal damnation. If this were the claim, then it would seem impossible to set forth a connection between these two things. Indeed, if unworthy partaking is actually possible and if such a danger is thought to arise from this partaking, yet, on the other hand, if the salutary spiritual partaking of Christ’s flesh and blood is also thought to take place apart from this sacrament, it would appear that one would have to harbor the wish that it might be better had the sacrament not been instituted and we had been directed instead to that extra-sacramental, spiritual partaking alone. Suppose, however, that we provisionally set aside the notion of eternal damnation and stay with the notion of unworthiness. In that case, it is still true that both the inattentiveness by which such an abundantly promising moment is turned into a meaningless external function and the false pretense that hides alien inner promptings behind this sacred observance are indeed a degradation quite suited to induce a state of unreceptivity and hardness of heart. We would all have cause to regard such a state as a feature of damnation. It is this consideration, moreover, by which the expression in our proposition is completely justified. That is, the Lord’s Supper seems to be a means of sorting, in that worthy and proper partaking of it promotes communal life with Christ, whereas an unworthy partaking makes this most powerful means of strengthening communal life with Christ less and less effectual, thus constantly increasing the sway of all sorts of obstructions to this process. Now, let us ponder how insuperable inattentiveness must already have become and, still further, how impudent false pretense must already have become, when the two have overpowered what is sacred, and how little faith in the Redeemer can keep its bearing when what he has instituted is torn from the interconnectedness that defines it. If we do this, we will find understandable the shivering dread with which the ascetic language of the ancient church expresses itself concerning this subject. Yet, it is all the more necessary that the church’s public teaching on this subject refrain from all disheartening determinations that do not readily flow from the matter itself. 3. It would be worth our while, however, to revisit the distinction between the Lutheran and the Calvinist notion of the Lord’s Supper from this perspective, so as to convince ourselves of how little suited the distinction is to ground any severance of community among these Evangelical churches. That is to say, in that neither of the two parties has succeeded in bringing the third, intermediate feature we have discussed to some sort of graphic clarity4— the feature that they both accept and that we designate by the expression “sacramental

partaking”—reference to our proposition establishes what value actually lies in the distinction between the two, after all. That shared value is explained as follows. This distinction is long-established in the Lutheran account to the effect that because sacramental partaking of Christ’s body and blood is bound to partaking of the bread and wine, it is also enjoyed by worthy and unworthy partakers in common, except that for the unworthy it redounds to judgment, whereas for the worthy it redounds to spiritual nourishment and, by means of this nourishment, to blessedness. In contrast, the Calvinian theory, which binds sacramental partaking to spiritual partaking, can claim only that those who are unworthy cannot share in that sacramental partaking at all. If these are the only things that can be clearly expressed concerning this distinction, then it would have to retreat wholly into obscurity as unworthy partaking ceases to be practiced. In any case, this doctrinal difference would automatically fade away as the two ecclesial communities approach a finished condition;5 thus it cannot be a sufficient ground for their remaining separate. The reason is that unworthy partaking of the Lord’s Supper is always a manifestation of an imperfection attendant upon the church itself. Suppose, then, that the conduct of those who come to the sacrament is in harmony with the shared feeling of the whole. Suppose, too, that the church offering the sacrament has developed to the point that a fully shared feeling of the whole exists within the state of every individual. In that situation no one would desire to partake of the sacrament in an unworthy manner, and the congregation would not offer it to anyone to partake of unworthily. Suppose, too, that the church has really been progressing to a better position. Then those instances which alone can call into consciousness the distinction between the two theories would have to arise ever more infrequently, and gradually the distinction would have to disappear.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 186; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 250. Schleiermacher refers to section 4 (de ecclesia) from the different numbering of Lücke’s edition. 2. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 431; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 386. 3. Ed. note: ET and German: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 336; ET Torrance (1959), 85; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 449. 4. Anschaulichkeit. Ed. note: This term is rarely used by Schleiermacher, though it contains the root meaning of Anschauung, which connotes several layers of “perception” (literally, a “looking upon”) that he always pairs with Gefühl (an affective state also containing several layers, called “feeling” for short, as in “the feeling of absolute dependence”) in his analysis of genuinely religious states. His use here indicates something of what he himself is shooting for in the present critical investigation: not so much a concept as a clarity of inner experience that can perhaps eventually be given a generally agreed-upon theological account, one in any case centered on what God is doing in Christ through the “common spirit” of the church (the Holy Spirit). For example, see references to the Spirit’s work successively in the remaining propositions in this section, notably in §§145.1–2, 146.2, 147.1, 148.1, 149.2, and, finally, in 151.1 (which articulates the drive to attain church union) and 157 (which looks to the whole of humanity). 5. Vollkommenheit. Ed. note: This condition would amount to a consummation (Vollendung) of the church as a whole, as can be described only “prophetically” (see the introduction to division 3 here, §§157–59). Until that ideal point, the church is always to some extent imperfect, unfinished.

[Addendum to the Last Two Points of Doctrine



Regarding the Term “Sacrament”]

§143. The Evangelical church uses the term sacrament only for these two institutions, baptism and the Lord’s supper, which were instituted by Christ himself and represent his high-priestly activity. 1. It is quite natural for a term taken over from an entirely foreign domain to have no defined boundary in our own domain. Hence, only very gradually did the Roman church arrive at its seven sacraments, and only gradually did we settle on these two. Now, the basic elements of meaning for this word cannot be adopted without considerable disquiet, because although the New Testament image of a “soldier of Christ” may underlie its use, nonetheless in this term precisely an element of very shaky application has been extracted from that image.1 Thus, one might well raise the wish, even more unconditionally than Zwingli did,2 that it would be better if this term had never been taken into ecclesial language, consequently, also the wish that it might be possible to drop its use entirely. This could be done by way of approximation to the Eastern church, which has remained at a distance from this term and has the expression “mysteries” for such observances, but this approximation must certainly be postponed to a later time. However, even a wish is reasonable only insofar as it carries with it something that serves toward its fulfillment. Accordingly, a way into a change has been provided here in that we have treated baptism and the Lord’s Supper in their own right and without any definite reference to the term “sacrament,” though it has been used now and then as a familiar word for the sake of convenience. This choice was made, for the usual procedure of starting out with this so-called general concept and defining it strengthens more and more the false opinion that this could be a genuinely dogmatic concept and could express something essential to Christianity, also that baptism and the Lord’s Supper could obtain their distinctive value primarily in this concept’s being realized in them. At the very least, this bias finds no support along the course of treatment struck here. This is the case, since even the closer relation to each other in which we have placed baptism and the Lord’s Supper here is kept in total independence from this traditional term. Moreover, like the previous two points of doctrine in this Division,3 what the relation of these two points of doctrine have in common is grounded solely in activities associated with one of Christ’s three essential offices,4 in such a way that it does seem purely incidental that this middle pair of our six points of doctrine bears a common name, whereas the others do not. 2. In any case, it would be a fruitless procedure to examine the term etymologically and on that basis to seek to determine what can be subsumed under it and what cannot be. In this respect, even dispute with the Roman church would be entirely empty if it merely dealt with the explanation of this word for the two observances and with whether our explanation or theirs is the correct one, for according to them five more institutions could still carry the

name. No, the dispute has some sense only if the opposing parties want, thereby, to place these two observances on a par with the other five observances in some essential respect. Now, on the contrary, the dissimilarity among those observances and circumstances that the Roman church comprises under this term is plain to see, and the close connection between the two observances that our church assigns exclusively to this term is demonstrated elsewhere. This being the case, nothing else remains for us to do, if the term is to be used any longer, than to stamp it, in a purely arbitrary way and without any further reference to its original sense, as a communal designation of these two institutions. From the very outset, the use of this term was also not a fixed one in the Evangelical church. Not only was absolution set forth as a third sacrament, but Melanchthon also proposed that ordination be numbered among the sacraments.5 However, absolution did not get a foothold, and the ordination proposal found no support. Generally, we find it to be more proper—and our celebration of the Lord’s Supper has been shaped wholly in accordance with this idea—to regard absolution as a component of this observance, in exchange for which it has lost its sacramental autonomy. Likewise, it was just as proper to attach confirmation to baptism once a distinct significance had been referred to it. In turn, baptism was, at the same time, initiation6 into the true priesthood of all Christians, held in common, whereas ministry of the Word, viewed in that narrower official sense, is not held in common with all Christians; thus, being consecrated for that function also cannot be placed on a par with that broader priesthood. Marriage was added in only because Scripture uses the word “mystery” for it, later replaced by the word “sacrament.” Yet, as a permanent state not only does it bear no similarity to our two observances, so that by analogy only the wedding ceremony could be called a sacrament, not the marriage itself. Rather, it also does not belong here, because as a divine moral institution it had an established status already from the beginning on, without any reference to Christ’s mission. Finally, extreme unction, viewed as a practice dating from the apostolic era—to which some wanted also to assign a special power—would always be grounded only in the efficacious action of the church’s prayer in Jesus’ name, just as the consecration of marriage could have validity only as grounded in such a prayer. It is sufficiently definite, therefore, that these five remaining practices are simply by-products of our two sacraments. What these two sacraments have in common, however, by whatever name they may be called communally, will always consist in the fact that they are continued workings of Christ wrapped in and most closely bound to observances of the church. Through these observances of the church, Christ extends his high-priestly activity toward individuals and both preserves and spreads the community of life that exists between him and ourselves. For the sake of that community alone does God look upon individuals in Christ. 3. Also not to be entirely ignored at this point is the interconnection between our two sacraments and two Old Testament institutions, namely, circumcision and the Passover Feast. This interconnection is one that is emphasized, more at one time and less at another, but is also frequently quite badly misconceived. Thus misconceived, for example, is the notion that circumcision and the Passover Feast had stood in some sort of special relation to each other, as baptism and the Lord’s Supper did. Actually, in no way did circumcision, viewed as an

Abrahamic institution, have a different relationship to the Passover Feast than it had to other Mosaic institutions. Quite apart from this fact, moreover, one says much too much when one claims that baptism has replaced circumcision or that the Lord’s Supper has replaced the Passover Feast. Such interconnections do not fit, for baptism was instituted quite independently from circumcision, and the practice of circumcision was also stopped not by baptism but by the ascendancy of Gentile Christians over Jewish Christians and by their crossbreeding. Moreover, the Lord’s Supper was indeed initially attached to the Passover Feast, but it was let loose from it forthwith, so that Passover was still celebrated in addition by Jewish Christians but without any relation to the Lord’s Supper. It is not impossible, nevertheless, that some closer attention to the circumstances of this observance’s original founding could lead, for the first time, to a more exact understanding of difficult expressions used as the Lord’s Supper was instituted. Likewise, a comparison of the two New Testament institutions with these Old Testament ones does also quite definitely lead to placing the difference between the old covenant and the new covenant in a clear light.

1. Ed. note: The reference is to the original meaning of sacramentum, an oath, especially a soldier’s oath of allegiance, on one’s sacred honor, as it were. In the Latin New Testament it was used to render the Greek word μυστήριον, but there it has numerous connotations apart from any ceremony such as occurred in the Greek mystery cults. Thus 2 Tim. 2:3 introduces the phrase “soldier of Christ Jesus.” 2. Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531), Commentary on True and False Religion (1525), 15 (The Sacraments). Ed. note: There Zwingli stated: “I heartily wish that this word ‘sacrament’ had never been adopted by the Germans without being translated into German, for when they hear the word ‘sacrament’ they think of something great and holy which by its own power can free the conscience from sin.” ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 180; Latin: CR 90:757. 3. Ed. note: That is, the doctrines “Regarding Holy Scripture” (§§128–32) and “Regarding the Ministry of the Divine Word” (§§133–35), in this first half of division 2 in part 2. 4. Wesentlichen Berufstätigkeiten Christi. Ed. note: The first pair reflects Christ’s prophetic office and the second pair reflects his high-priestly office (cf. §§102–5). The last pair, regarding the office of the keys and prayer in Jesus’ name (cf. §147.1), reflects Christ’s kingly office. 5. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) in the section on the sacraments. Redeker note: See Melanchthon’s statement that “By all means, I agree ordination, as they call it, should be added, that is, the calling to ministry of the gospel and the public approbation of that calling, because all these things are ordered by the command of the gospel.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 21:850. See §32n16. 6. Weihe. Ed. note: This term is also used for consecration to holy orders or ordination to the priesthood, as is Einsegnung, translated by “consecration” just below.

Fifth Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Office of the Keys

[Introduction to Fifth Point of Doctrine] §144. On account of its coexistence with the world, there exists in the church a legislative and administrative power1 that flows as an essential element from the kingly office of Christ. 1. Suppose that the church had reached its culmination, so that no remnant of the world had remained in all those who belong to it. Suppose, too, that, instead, the soul of every single Christian, as regards the whole system of the church’s powers,2 were wholly an organ of the Holy Spirit. Then, in the church everything would proceed—everywhere and always, indeed of itself—only in conformity with this Spirit. Moreover, at that point, on account of the uniform presence of the Spirit, everything that would happen would of itself also be in harmony with all the rest. Because of all this, no difference would arise between the general will and that of individuals, and nothing would provide any occasion for a law; rather, those who held the capacity to conceive general ideas applied to the domain of the church would always be able to express simply what human beings would do on their own initiative. However, this state of affairs has never been the case, except in Christ himself. Thus, the expressions and impulses of the Spirit are expressed and received as law wherever resistance is stirred up against them. Yet, the analogous activity of those who are animated by the Spirit then also assumes a relation to the law and to the resistance and thus takes the form of executive power.3 This response arises not in any sort of external manner after the pattern of civil power,4 for an external feature lacking in an internal counterpart from which it sprang has not even the slightest value for the church. Rather, it happens by virtue of the natural ascendancy of the common spirit over merely personal existence, just as those who belong to a community have a sense of such a common spirit, viewing it as something which everyone has freely acknowledged. Yet, suppose that someone does not sense this common spirit, or in one’s personal capacity knowingly strives against what it requires. Then this attitude signifies an element in one’s life that moves outside the church. Then, moreover, the ascendancy of the common spirit has first to be reinstated internally before the person in whom it has been violated can be viewed as a true member of the church once again. Now, precisely this ascendancy of the Spirit, apart from any external means whatsoever yet effecting a free, steadfast acquiescence, has also been the very power5 that Christ has exerted. Moreover, that union with him of which we have spoken has been expressed precisely in such a way that the impulses that proceed from him would be recognized as law, and in such a way that his judgments concerning human beings would be viewed as sterling

witnesses to what exists in human beings by which precisely this new community would become his reign. Then, in this relation, the Spirit also calls forth within the church what is to be derived from the fullness of Christ. Or, in other words, in that Christ breathed his Spirit into the community of his own, thereby this power was at the same time communicated to that community, a power that is inconceivable independently of that original governing activity of Christ. In fact, without this activity the continuing union of the divine being with human nature that continues in the church would either have to be far greater than what is contained in the ordinary concept of a ruling common spirit, or it could only be far less than what is contained in that concept. 2. At first glance, however, this activity might not appear to lead at all to what is usually understood by “the power of the keys.” This is true in that usually one relates this spiritual power to the broadening and solidarity of the church. Accordingly, it would be up to the church to determine who is to be received into the Christian community or not and, likewise, who may remain in it or must be expelled—a matter mentioned not at all up to now and one that would have to be implied only as an addendum to what has been said earlier. However, it is also easy to join these two interests together, and doing so is simply more suitable to the path taken here, for the purpose of combining church government in its entirety under this concept, as ought to be done in any case. That is, if we proceed from a recognition of that resistance already mentioned, every steadfast acquiescence, brought about after such resistance through the legislative respect6 in which the church is held, comprises a new way of being owned by the common spirit. This common spirit adopts a place in an individual who was previously at least questionably possessed of it, wavering on the border between world and church. Moreover, the territory of the church is thus expanded by every such overcoming of a person’s wavering by means of legislative7 activity. Yet, even the initial entrance of an individual results from this same activity. The reason is that regeneration is also an effect of this activity, which first brings to individuals the strength8 of Godconsciousness, viewed as the rule of spiritual life. The same thing applies, however, to the power being employed with respect to this rule in particular judgments and declarations. This is so, in that these declarations determine the place each individual will occupy as a result of the individual’s situation within the community and whether much or little can be entrusted to this individual in that community. Another divergence may seem to lie in our having described the power of the keys above9 as a continuation of the efficacious kingly action of Christ, whereas here we describe it more as an outflowing of this action mediated by the Spirit. In this respect, however, only a slight difference obtains among the institutions brought together in this second division.10 That is to say, the mediation of the Spirit enters into every one of these institutions, because otherwise they could not be observances of the church; and, on this account, they are all also an outflow from Christ, because the Spirit always derives its creative activity only from Christ.11 In this context, however, we are less able to call this process a continuation of Christ’s activity, because this differentiation between legislative and administrative activity essentially refers to an organized community, but Christ’s own activity preceded this formation. Hence, if this

difference does not emerge in him, then, in the strictest sense, whenever the office of the keys is bifurcated in this way, it cannot be called the continuation of his activity, though it does simply develop further the basic features of life shared in common that Christ sketched out, without importing anything alien from elsewhere.

1. Macht. Ed. note: Here “power” is more closely aligned with a capacity that has some authority behind it, whereas Kraft, the word ordinarily translated by “power” or “force” in this book, refers more closely to an originative or inherent force. 2. Kräfte. Ed. note: Regarding the Holy Spirit, see §116n1. 3. Macht. 4. Gewalt. Ed. note: See §145n8 for a definition. 5. Macht. Ed. note: Unless otherwise indicated, this is the term used in the remainder of this discussion. 6. Ansehen. Ed. note: Although this term is sometimes translated “authority,” that meaning might well be misleading in Schleiermacher’s case, because he could have used the usual Authorität or gesetzmässige Macht and because Ansehen for him is a communal respect in which the church’s decision-making leaders are held by virtue of their responsibility for Seelsorge, care of souls. This kind of authority is won, not simply imposed. See CF §164 and Brief Outline §§263 and 290– 308 (on practical theology). 7. Ed. note: gesetzgebenden. In all of this discussion, “legislative” activity is only roughly distinguished from administrative activity, because it refers not only to making laws, which are in any case simply to be recognized as appropriate, but also to giving out the law appropriately in decision making, treating people properly under the law. 8. Kräftigkeit. Ed. note: Or “powerfulness.” 9. In §127. 10. Ed. note: §§126–56. 11. Ed. note: See also §§122.3 and 124.1, where Christ’s continuing presence and the work of the Holy Spirit are treated as one and the same thing.

§145. Doctrinal Proposition. The office of the keys is that power by virtue of which the church determines what belongs to the Christian life and makes provisions concerning each and every individual according to the degree of an individual’s appropriateness in relation to these determinations. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) XXVIII (On Abuses of the Church’s Power VII): “The power of the keys … is a power and command of God to preach the gospel, to forgive or retain sin, and to administer and distribute the sacraments. … Ibid.: “Our people reply that bishops or pastors may make regulations for the sake of good order in the church.”1 (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XIV: “Concerning the keys of the kingdom of heaven … we say that all properly called ministers … exercise the keys or the use of them when they … keep in discipline the people committed to their trust.” … XVIII: “There ought to be discipline among ministers. In synods the doctrine and life of ministers is to be carefully examined.”2 (3) Basel Confession (1536) XVII: “The authority to preach the Word of God and to tend the flock of the Lord, which properly speaking is the office of the keys … is a

high and sacred trust not to be violated. … and ought to be conferred … only by those appointed and elected as a committee of the church.”3 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) XXXII: “We believe, also, that it is desirable and useful that those elected to be superintendents devise among themselves what means should be adopted for the government of the whole body.” … XXXIII: “… and we receive only that which conduces to concord and holds all in obedience, from the greatest to the least. In this we must follow that which the Lord Jesus Christ declared as to excommunication, which we approve and confess to be necessary with all its antecedents and consequences. Rom. 16:17.”4 Cf. Belgic Confession (1561) XXXII.5 (5) Tetrapolitan Confession (1530) XIII: “These (ministers) have the keys of heaven, the power to bind and to loose, to remit and to retain sins, yet in such a manner that they be nothing else than the ministers of Christ, whose right and prerogative alone this is.”6 (6) Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551): “And these things pertain to ministry … to exercise the judgments of the church in a legitimate fashion over those who are guilty of evident crimes in behavior or doctrine, and to bring a sentence of excommunication against the insolent, and to absolve and take back the converted. So that these things may be done properly, consistories have been established in our churches.”7 1. The expression “office,” or “power,”8 of the keys is connected with the expressions “bind” and “loose” to be found in one of Christ’s discourses,9 expressions that relate to the first part of our proposition. Those expressions “bind” and “loose” likewise turn up in another related discourse,10 where, to judge by the context, they at least also relate to the second part of our proposition, and this second part, in turn, is very similar to a third discourse,11 which probably has to do exclusively with the latter part. That something is that to be “bound” means that it is to be determined by command and prohibition,12 and for something to be “loosed” means to leave whatever is not so determined to the selfdetermination of each individual.13 As long as a good conscience can be presupposed in each one, the self-determination occurs in such a way that the shared feeling of the community relates equally to someone who determines a matter for oneself in one way as to someone who determines it in a contrasting way. Moreover, here we have, at the same time, the legislative activity of the church described in the previous proposition along with its limitation. That is to say, the shared feeling of the community has no more occasion to express itself in a determinative fashion except (1) in instances where certain individuals who, on account of their being insufficiently animated by the Holy Spirit, do not want what

that shared feeling actually deems to be an essential expression of faith to come about, or (2) in instances where something is continually going on in some individuals that, if not reproved, would bring some harm to the efficacious action of the Spirit in others. Equally essential, however, is another factor that also belongs to that same legislative activity, namely, that something be let loose that could, as it were, serve to bind arrogance and spiritual pride. That is to say, the unity of the church cannot endure when certain individuals desire to give currency to their merely personal way of thinking or of doing things, as if it expressed the common spirit. Now, suppose that this passage,14 because it is the one on which this doctrine can chiefly rely, were taken so literally that Christ would have transferred this power15 to Peter alone. Then one would also have to take this event in the strict sense, so that at Peter’s death legislative activity in the church would have come to an end—that is, it would do so insofar as it rested on this charge putatively made by Christ. No one would doubt, however, that this legislative activity would still have had to emerge anew. Otherwise, if everything had already been established for all time in the first generation, this could only have happened in a supernatural manner that would have destroyed its truly historical character. In that case, however, no further living and free development could have taken place. By implication, then, if this were the literal meaning of what Christ said, the church’s legislative activity could not rest on him alone. However, it would not have ceased to be a continuation of his activity on that account. That is to say, it would always flow from the intention of Christ, namely, that a communal body16 should endure that could not possibly exist without an activity conceived in this way. However, Peter himself must not have understood Christ’s words in this way, because wherever statements of this kind were at issue, he did not arrogate the right to decide to himself alone but brought the matter to the communal body. The activity of applying law by judgment and of taking responsibility for carrying out that judgment was already finally assigned, in the second passage cited here,17 to the communal body itself. Moreover, it is therefore self-evident that, even earlier, individuals were to work in the name of the communal body and as an organ of it, all the more so since the Redeemer certainly had not wished to accord to anyone who might be personally annoyed the right to call one’s brother to account. However, if on some occasion we consider an individual to be an organ of the communal body with respect to one’s brother, everything that sins against the whole also sins against the individual. In every instance, moreover, that individual is a natural organ of the whole to whom sure notice of a given fact comes first. If, however, we also draw upon the third-cited passage for this purpose—one that has already been repeatedly brought into accounts of the matter—this passage can, to be sure, be understood above all from the fact that forgiveness was first imparted at baptism, consequently even for those whose baptism would be postponed to a later date, the sins in question would still be “retained.”18 This consequence too we would in no way want to exclude.19 Furthermore, the proper management20 of baptism, or of confirmation among us today, which management is to be expected to occur by the efficacious action of the Spirit, patently belongs to the office of the keys, essentially so. Yet, certainly the content of this passage is not exhausted by these

connections. Rather, the apostles themselves, and the most ancient church after them, also applied that passage to persons already received into the church,21 and, at the time, this practice also then included Christ’s promise regarding each judgment by them that would declare whether an individual would find oneself within community with Christ, in which community with Christ sin would disappear. Now, all regenerate persons are found in this community, hence their actual sins, which alone can call for some judgment of the church, are also forgiven all along. Yet, let us add to this observation the fact that no one exists in the church who is, as yet, entirely an organ of the Spirit, also the fact that in the church an efficacious action can take place only with powers22 that have already become organs of the Spirit—that is, its gifts—since wherever there is still some resistance against quickening by the Spirit, sin must also necessarily be present. Then, the following becomes evident. First, it becomes evident what an essential component of this promise of the Redeemer it is that a proper judgment should also be made by the church as to what, and how much or little, can be entrusted to any one individual in the church. Second, it becomes evident to what degree an individual’s influences on the church, or on any cooperative efforts within it, would have to be restrained, in such a way that an individual’s condition would produce the least possible disturbances to the church. By this means, moreover, we also discover that everything that belongs to the second part of our proposition is grounded in what Christ has spoken. 2. Now, if we put together the passages from confessional symbols noted above, we will find therein the same main aspects that constitute the office of the keys, though not everywhere expressed with total distinctiveness or divided with even clarity. Thus, it might suffice simply to add the following comments. First: Frequently we find the ministry of the Word to be calculated in connection with the office of the keys. This reckoning stands to reason with respect to a minister’s proffering of the sacraments, an activity that is so closely connected with forgiveness of sin. Moreover, what we have already claimed of baptism must be true of the Lord’s Supper, that the proper administration23 of it belongs to the office of the keys. However, with respect to preaching, regarded in and of itself, this claim would be a mistake. Indeed, a correct determination of who is to be admitted to this ministry of the divine Word does indeed belong to the office of the keys as a particular application of the general account of that office given above, and this determination is indisputably one of the most important aspects of the office of the keys. Further, given this presupposition, one can find it to be only natural that almost everywhere the church has also tied the practice of dispensing both sacraments to this ministry. Second: Taken by themselves, many of these passages in the confessions seem to infer that the entire office of the keys would be exercised by the totality of ministers of the Word. Suppose that this were the case. Consequently, since examination and authorization24 of ministers of the Word is an important function of this entire body, the totality of teachers in the church would be constantly self-propagating, and in this way the power25 of the keys would be exclusively entrusted to them. Then there would be such a sharp division between

the clergy in this narrower sense and the laity that the distinction from the Roman church would entirely disappear. This disjunction, however, cannot be what is intended, since Christ himself assigned a portion of this function to the communal body, and from the very outset onward the communal body was involved in the most important functions of administrative activity.26 Moreover, in this way even the passage that assigns the function of carrying out the judgment of the communal body to spiritual leaders27 still presupposes that the communal body pronounces this judgment. As concerns legislative activity, however, that could not arise, to be sure, until a significant contrast had developed in the church, only this contrast is different. That is to say, those to whom preaching is entrusted have the responsibility, above all else, to form themselves into increasingly better interpreters of the divine Word in Scripture. It is one thing, however, to understand the sayings of Christ and the apostles aright and something entirely different to employ them appropriately to more or less general determinations in a comparatively very diverse formation of life. Moreover, the way in which Scripture is utilized in the pulpit is quite different from the way in which rules are developed for life in the communal body under distinct circumstances and based on a spirit of being faithful to Scripture, often without being able to rely on a word from Scripture for the purpose. Hence, at that juncture, the contrast between the person who conceives the religious significance of various circumstances and tasks in life quickly and surely enough to express the corresponding law and the person who takes something to be law because one recognizes one’s own true inner voice28 within it is quite different from the contrast between a spiritual leader and anyone who is listening. Hence, too, in public teaching it is most advisable to avoid even the appearance of ecclesial legislation and management being assigned chiefly to spiritual leaders. Therefore, certain passages ought not to be overlooked: those which bestow the task of deliberation concerning governance of the whole upon the collective overseers of communal bodies and those which29 reckon among these not only elders but also deacons, even though they have taken no part in the teaching office. Moreover, in the last analysis both of these activities, legislative and administrative, proceed from the communal body itself. Third: Although this take on the matter can also be drawn from our confessional symbols, they do not make clear what the scope of this office is with respect to a communal body or how that body is to exercise it. That is, a given communal body exercises it not only indirectly, in that the body arranges for and distributes the officeholders to whom legislation and judgment are formally transferred but also, in an originative and informal way, in which each individual member does actually practice the office of passing judgment through one’s forming judgments concerning what happens in the communal body and through forming one’s corresponding praise or blame. This is so, for how are these officeholders to arrive at the point of having the readiness and proficiency for such activity unless they will already have had some practice? Moreover, each individual not only practices in this way but also practices legislative activity through everything that can contribute to forming public opinion,30 which must always be the living spring from which express acts of legislation flow. Exactly taken, the latter, in turn, are nothing but the distinct manner in which such

public opinion is brought to recognition in matters of the church. Suppose, for example, that in this domain something is attempted that is not a pure expression of the way in which human nature in union with the divine Spirit actually endeavors to shape itself and what belongs to it in a given time and place. Then the attempt will also smack of failure, and the resultant law, which will not be able to obtain such a recognition of public opinion, will simply reveal a defective situation in the church. The church will then be unavoidably disturbed, and only through conflict can agreement return—which agreement, however, will at that point be more fully conscious—and thus, with that agreement, a clearer state of the whole. Fourth: Yet, what directly follows from this account is not anywhere found to be so clearly expressed that we could spare ourselves the trouble of laying it out, though to a certain extent it does refer back to our initial statements concerning our undertaking. The point is that all acts of legislation in a communal body always remain subject to being repaired. Imagine a time when all the particular acts of legislation that now have currency could not yet be promulgated as law because they would not have been acknowledged as such. Likewise, there can come a time when law that has currency now will no longer be acknowledged. Moreover, if at that point there is still a desire to retain it as something having currency, a faulty semblance of law would emerge that would not survive without carrying some disadvantage with it. In no way does this observation mean to assert that everything set forth publicly as a rule of faith or of life is immediately alterable. Rather, what is to be asserted is simply that nothing ought to be presented as if it were inalterable, in that we may trust that some matters go through a process of gaining currency over and over again. If, finally, the right to decree excommunication is also attached to the aspect of administrative activity, this must be understood with considerable restriction. If we refer this branch of the office of the keys back to the undivided governing activity of Christ, then what we indeed find, contrary to this practice, is that not only did Christ choose the apostles and call disciples and assign functions to both, but he also called out “woe” concerning the scribes and Pharisees and concerning those places where he had not been received. However, those were all people who had not yet been taken up into his community. All he would have needed was to draw away from them. He would not have had to expel them. On the other hand, he would not himself have cast out the prodigal child.31 So, among us too there can be no total excommunication, one by which all relationship of community would be withdrawn. Rather, any situation that could rightly call for a judgment excluding a person from all participation in life within the church should, nevertheless, be viewed as only a temporary one, and no judgment should bear the intention of barring from its influences any individual who has once been received into the church.32

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 92, 98; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 121, 129. Ed. note: Schleiermacher referred to this document as the Confessio Augustana, citing the Twesten edition (1816), 110, and following the custom after the 1560s of referring to Melanchthon’s original 1530 Latin version of the Augsburg Confession as the

Confessio Augustana Invariata: the last word tended to be omitted once the initial controversy that led to this title had ended. Throughout CF, Schleiermacher has used the Latin edition. 2. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 253, 376; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 264, 285; cf. §37n3. 3. Ed. note: See §71n3. The German text on the “keys” is in article 16; in contrast the Latin text, quoted here, is in article 17. ET here drawn from the original German and Latin in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 220; cf. “chapter” 16 in Cochrane (1972), 105. Latin and German also in Niemeyer (1840), 119. Chapters 14 to the end are differently numbered in the German and Latin editions. Here, as in §71n3, Schleiermacher uses this title for the First Helvetic Confession, which was the second Swiss confession that was written in Basel. 4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 378, also Cochrane (1972), 155; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 337. Both confessions reject “inventions” and “laws” that would “bind conscience,” to which Rom. 16:17–18 is noted in the French version. 5. Ed. note: Not quoted. ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 423f., also Cochrane (1972), 212; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 382f. 6. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 69; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 756. 7. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: CR 28:413; Schleiermacher here refers to the edition in Symbole (1816), 167. 8. Gewalt. Ed. note: Macht is used in the proposition, while Gewalt indicates some capacity for definitive choice, enablement, or enforcement—and without stretching beyond Schleiermacher’s own practice, one may add such activities as capacities for planning, negotiation, and evaluative readjustment regarding the special gifts of every person for ministry and sharing; cf. §144n1. 9. Matt. 16:19. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 16:13–19, Nov. 28, 1819, first separately published (1820), also in SW II.4 (1835), 87–99, and (1844), 120–32. 10. Matt. 18:18. 11. John 20:23. Ed. note: This passage concerns Christ’s appearance to the disciples and telling them that the consequences of their forgiving and retaining sins will hold. Later this was taken to be a charge and entitlement given to Peter and presumably to those holding his power in succession. 12. Gebot und Verbot. 13. Augsburg Confession (1530) 28 (On Abuses of the Church’s Power 7): “It is necessary to retain the teaching concerning Christian freedom.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 99; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 128. 14. Ed. note: See §145n11 above. 15. Macht. 16. Gemeine. Ed. note: Here reference is being made to a time in which there was as yet no larger community (Gemeinschaft) but only other communal bodies (or “congregations,” to which Gemeine usually refers) where decisions had to be made. 17. Ed. note: Matt. 16:18. There Christ says that he will build his church on the “rock” that is Peter. 18. Cf. Matt. 10:14–15, for no community arose in a place from which the disciples distanced themselves in this way, and sins were “retained” for all in that place. Ed. note: See §145n11 above. That is, the sins, though forgiven, would remain intact. 19. Ed. note: Cf. §§109–11 on forgiveness and sins of the regenerate. 20. Verwaltung. Ed. note: This term can also have the closely allied connotations of “administration” or “stewardship.” Instead of this term Schleiermacher has typically used Einrichtung regarding baptism, as in other earlier contexts within this book. 21. Acts 8:20–23; 1 Cor. 5:4–5. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 8:18–23, July 30, 1820, SW II.10 (1850), 67–82. The first passage contains the story of Peter’s admonishment of Simon for offering to pay John and Peter money if they would give him the Spirit. In the second passage Paul joins the congregation at Corinth in the prospect of its condemning a man “with the power of our Lord Jesus” that the man might eventually be saved. 22. Kräften. 23. Verwaltung. Ed. note: Cf. §145n20 above. 24. Bevollmächtigen. Ed. note: That is, they alone would be able to “empower” ordination to this ministry or to hold them to their calling. 25. Gewalt. 26. Acts 1:15–23 and 6:2–6. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 6:1–6, July 9, 1820, SW II.10 (1850), 37–51. The first passage, referred to in the next sentence, has Peter and an assembly of about 120 choose between two men to succeed Judas among the twelve apostles. A similar procedure was followed in choosing seven men to serve tables (the first deacons). 27. Geistlichen. Ed. note: Even today, this term is often used for ministers (Diener) of the Word.

28. Stimme. Ed. note: A built-in ambiguity reveals the full meaning of this term, which means at once that the person has found a proper “voicing” on a matter, a way to be “in tune” with the situation, and a suitable way to “vote” based on conscience. 29. See at §134. 30. Ed. note: “Public opinion” here refers to opinion formed within the church, not outside it, just as “public worship” does. 31. Das verlorene Kind. Ed. note: Although the reference is clearly to Jesus’ story of the prodigal son, use of the word “child” is no doubt to suggest a favorite image of Schleiermacher, that everyone taken up into community with Christ is a “child of God.” Sometimes in sermons he called his hearers “children,” pointedly meaning God’s, not his. 32. Ed. note: The word Kirchenbann, the term used for “excommunication” above, does carry connotations that Schleiermacher is openly rejecting here.

Sixth Point of Doctrine

Regarding Prayer in Jesus’ Name

[Introduction to Sixth Point of Doctrine] §146. Naturally, the correct anticipatory feeling1 that is fitting for the Christian church to have regarding what is salutary2 for it in its coexistence with the world becomes prayer. 1. It is inseparable from the way in which the church takes form historically and grows that various obstacles and vacillations arise in it, stronger at one time, weaker at another. This happens through influences of all that is worldly, both in an internal sense, because every member carries something belonging to the world within oneself, and in an external sense. The same thing is also true of the church’s outward task of taking the world into itself, in that it does not achieve a smooth or easily noticed progress in this respect either. Accordingly, the collective consciousness of all this is that of the church’s incompleteness. Now, in contrast, the desire to achieve the purpose of Christ’s mission to perfection continually lives on in the church. For this reason, that consciousness of incompleteness, in being bound to this impetus, bears the stamp of a certain needy state, namely, that since that consciousness is nothing but the proper self-knowledge of the church with respect to its love for the Redeemer, it must necessarily be regarded as itself a working of the divine Spirit. That is, it is so to the extent that such consciousness is itself pure. Further, in this way the church’s consciousness then hovers between the present and the future, and for this reason it is combined with God-consciousness in a twofold manner. That is, in relation to the fact that its every success is not exclusively the result of its own self-initiated activity but is, at the same time, the result of the divine government of the world, the church’s consciousness becomes either calm acceptance or gratitude for whatever in the present is an outcome of earlier endeavors—this depending on whether the ordinary human elements have been surpassed on balance or have remained ineffectual, respectively. In contrast, for whatever still wavers

undecided, the church’s consciousness becomes prayer—that is, the intimate combination with God-consciousness of a wish directed to the best success possible.3 Suppose that we were indeed always reflecting on and carrying into clear consciousness the fact that we do, in any case, come to the point either of calm acceptance or gratitude, and both of these are states in which participation in the undisturbed blessedness of the Redeemer is expressed, with the result that we are completely confident in this aspect of our subject. Accordingly, the church, when oriented entirely to its own self-initiated activity, really should wholly refrain from wishing. Even things that would appear to be settled, moreover, are simply points of transition, such that what was taken up with an attitude of calm acceptance later comes to be marked as an object of gratitude, and vice versa. Consequently, calm acceptance and gratitude should eventually disappear, in that the church would have left all points of transition behind and attained to complete rest. The church would then, in its joy in God, hold fast simply to an untroubled surety as to the final outcome. However, in its running ahead of the development of temporal matters, the thinking subject cannot refrain from picturing what is possible in numerous forms and, comparing their value for efforts of one’s own, cannot refrain from attaching oneself, with some predilection, to those efforts for which one mostly anticipates having support. Further, as long as this activity continues, it must also combine with one’s God-consciousness and thus must become prayer. Then, since this activity does, in fact, continue in us constantly, we also have no reason to treat the injunction that we should “pray without ceasing”4 as a hyperbolic expression. This is so, for if we did not keep on praying, then either our interest in the reign of God, which produces those notions of what is salutary but uncertain, or our God-consciousness, which holds before us the absolute powerfulness of the divine governance of the world, would have to have disappeared. 2. Now, suppose that the apostle’s very prescription, just cited, were apparently given more to individuals, so that the play of thoughts with as yet indefinite results that we just recalled were also occurring only in individuals as such. If so, then the correctness of one’s anticipatory feelings5 would not by itself be conducive to one’s anticipatory feelings becoming prayer. Instead, if all this does not happen in equal measure, the difference between anticipatory feeling and prayer would chiefly rest on the importance of the given object; thus, it would appear that our proposition is not significantly explained by our discussion thus far. This will happen, however, if we attend to the relationship of the church to individuals in this respect. That is, the individual has one’s own sanctification in view in this relationship first and foremost, and then one has in view the efficacious action incumbent on oneself within the whole body, using the gifts already bestowed upon oneself. The individual and the whole body form a single manifold, however, the parts of which are not all advanced in equal measure by each act. Moreover, the experience must very soon be borne in each individual that as one is dashing along, with one’s plans and hopes, on one path, by the divine government of the world challenges do come that steer one off onto another path. Hence, at any given moment, one cannot even have confidence in one’s anticipatory feelings regarding

what will be most salutary for oneself personally. Just as little, in fact, can the individual gain a sure judgment, proceeding from one’s own standpoint, concerning what will be salutary for the whole body, given the posture of its overall task on each occasion. To be sure, individuals within that whole body will be dissimilar, and only those will be rightly suited to exercise a greater and distinct influence on the whole who will already have developed within themselves precisely this anticipatory feeling into a special gift analogous to the prophetic gift. Furthermore, this anticipatory feeling belonging to the body’s shared consciousness could be more sure at times when a particular individual still constituted a larger part of the whole6 and this anticipatory feeling came to that individual in its full truth.7 Now, in Christ we have to think of such anticipatory feeling, considered to be something human in him also, as developed to the highest degree. From Christ onward, it must be received by approximation, but, in addition, the degree of surety involved must be the more diminished the more what is merely personal is mixed into that prototypical prefiguring8 in relation to the future. The same thing, however, that is true of the individual also applies to every association of a plurality of individuals, whether it exists more freely or more bound by nature, this according to the extent to which individuals play smaller or larger roles within the whole and attend to the others with more or less unselfish love or do not. So, after considering this sort of progress made within this one aspect, we will have to say of the whole that just as personal consciousness and collective consciousness are not different but are rather totally at one, this whole also depicts the most exact image9 of Christ possible. Thus, where the whole is manifested as a unity in this fashion, the surest anticipatory feeling possible will also be found. As to the other aspect of the matter, however, the church is, at the same time, the collective locale for all those foreshortened anticipatory feelings which, given their varied defects, are also very often directed against each other and involved in controversy. Therewith it is then incumbent on the church, first of all in comparing itself with the complete portrayal10 of Christ, since the church does not yet carry this complete portrayal in its temporal consciousness, to make this its prayer: that those of its members who are the most cultivated organs of the divine Spirit might increasingly gain the greatest influence toward the proper discovery and introduction of that which is necessary for the increase and betterment of God’s reign. This, moreover, is an absolutely proper anticipatory feeling of the church, one which becomes prayer and in which all individuals are, accordingly, also in harmony with the whole. Next, however, to the extent that individuals could oppose each other, the church also has the duty first to adjust the unsteady anticipatory feeling that proceeds from the incomplete collective consciousness held by individuals. Then the church has the further duty to bring the consciousness of being unsteady about the future to a state of resolution by turning to prayer. These two things already occur as people unite in common prayer, in that through the very shape of this act of collective religious life, each individual is already redirected from what is grounded more in one’s personal existence to what can be the same in all and,

through the content of this act on each occasion, each individual is already redirected to whatever in this act has taken hold of all alike. At that juncture, however, through prayer both actions also reach a further point. That is, presupposing the difference between personal anticipatory feeling and wishes among them, each participant unites in the prayer for others that, facing the facts of the divine government of the world, they might be brought ever closer to pure joy in God—be it then under the form of calm acceptance or under the form of gratitude. Moreover, all the church’s prayers can be brought under these two forms.

1. Ed. note: “The correct anticipatory feeling” (Das richtige Vorgefühl) is a feeling, or sentiment, that looks ahead, not necessarily an Ahnung, which is a presentiment that contains a hint or hunch or foretaste of what is to come. 2. Heilsam. Ed. note: The word could mean “salvific,” since in other theological contexts Heil means (final, eternal) “salvation.” In this book, however, “redemption” is the key term instead, and “sanctification” (Heiligung) is the corresponding process of life in Christ. The question is What is proper and salutary for that life in Christ? 3. Ed. note: The three successive responses introduced here are these: (1) Ergebung (a giving over or surrender of oneself, or submission to God’s will and thus to the way things are, under the divine government of the world, or a letting go of anger, sadness, or anxiety with respect to past or anticipated future events, or in extreme instances even an attitude of resignation in the face of such events—withal an attitude of calm acceptance, relatively free of disquietude); (2) Dankbarkeit (thanksgiving or gratitude); and (3) Gebet (an asking for, petition, or prayer). 4. See 1 Thess. 5:17. 5. Vorgefühle. Ed. note: See §146n1 above. 6. Cf. Acts 16:6, 10. Ed. note: In v. 6 Paul and companions are prevented by the Holy Spirit from preaching in Phrygia and Galatia, but after Paul receives a vision in the night (v. 9), they successfully go to Macedonia and preach there (v. 10). 7. Vollständig zur Wahrnehmung. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage Wahrnehmung always refers to whatever “truth” (Wahrheit) can be more or less accurately brought to the use of one’s senses, including what one imagines or envisages here in one’s anticipatory feeling (Vorgefühl). He is about to make a claim about Christ’s “prophetic” gifts. Cf. §§102–3 above. 8. Vorbildung. Ed. note: Earlier (§93) Christ is depicted as Vorbild, here also with respect to his capacity for Vorgefühl. See also the account of “prefigurative prophetic doctrine” in §157 and the barely imagined “final answer” to prayer (§157.2) at the consummation of the church. 9. Ebenbild. 10. Abbild.

§147. Doctrinal Proposition: Every prayer in Jesus’ name, but only such prayer, bears Christ’s promise that it is heard. (1) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XXIII: “Let all the prayers of the faithful be poured forth to God alone through the mediation of Christ only, out of faith and love.”1 (2) Belgic Confession (1561) XXVI: “Therefore, according to the command of Christ, we call upon the heavenly Father through Jesus Christ, our only Mediator, … being assured that whatever we ask of the Father in his name will be granted us.”2 (3) Heidelberg Catechism (1563), q. 117: “Third, we must rest on this unshakable foundation: even though we do not deserve it, God will surely listen to our prayer because of Christ our Lord.”3

1. In using the expression “pray in Jesus’ name,”4 whether one might then be thinking more of praying in terms of his greatest concerns or be thinking more of praying based on his sensibility and spirit, the two possibilities are really not to be separated from each other. This is the case, for if we could want to advance the spiritual welfare of human beings differently than in his sense, we would also have to have thought about it differently than he did, and at that point what we took to be his greatest concern would not be addressed to God in such prayer. Thus, to the extent that each prayer is indeed already a prayer in Jesus’ name, whatever its content might also be, it is one in which prayer is made in relation to the reign of God. However, the more distinctly focused the prayer is, the more necessary it also is that its object be thought to be in agreement with the order according to which Christ governs his church, so that the one who is praying could, as such, be regarded as one who is truly and acceptably empowered by Christ. On that basis, it quite clearly follows that the only prayer that can be a genuine prayer in Jesus’ name is one in which the whole self-consciousness of the church underlies it—that is, one the content of which reflects the church’s collective condition. Certainly, this prayer is then a portion of the common prayer of the church at any given time, and it is not to be doubted that such prayer will be heard. That is to say, if the need of the church is rightly apprehended and if the guiding anticipatory feeling5 regarding the church is the outcome of the church’s full consciousness of its internal states and external circumstances, then the prayer will bear the full truth within it, as that truth also consists in Christ’s knowledge of his spiritual body and his governing activity. Consequently, by virtue of the power6 that the Son has taken over from the Father, the prayer’s content must also attain fulfillment. Every other prayer, in arising from a defective consciousness, even though it may deal no less with Christ’s greatest concerns and proceed from a sincere effort to act in his Spirit, expects its fulfillment only in the degree to which it accords with that normative prayer. Indeed, it ought to lay claim to this fulfillment only by this measure. Hence, such a prayer can gain assurance only by submitting itself to that normative prayer and desiring to be heard only on that condition. Even regarding this conditional prayer, as it is best called, more than one passage in the Sacred Scriptures contains an example of Christ’s praying that way,7 which, because it has to do with only one event and hour, does not inveigh against what we have claimed earlier as to the complete accuracy of his anticipatory feeling. Thus, we can see by this example that a conditional prayer can occur without sin, namely, in that it already bears within it submission to God’s will as a corrective to one’s lack of surety, so it will be heard only inasmuch as what is prayed could also be a component of a normative prayer. In this manner, the usual explanations are also easily conjoined with our own, namely, either that one who would simply want to be heard for Christ’s sake would be praying in Christ’s name, especially with a view to conditional prayer, or to the extent that what is prayed for would be that God’s will be done in relation to what God has decreed in Christ. 2. Against this explanation, however, the objection is repeatedly raised that if it really exhausted the subject, the entire teaching about prayer being heard would actually be a mere delusion. This objection presupposes that one would actually believe that through prayer one

could exercise an influence on God, in that God’s will and decree would be diverted by this means. This presupposition inveighs against our own initial basic presupposition that there exists no relationship of reciprocity between the creature and the Creator.8 Accordingly, any theory of prayer that proceeds from such an assumption we can only declare to be a passing over into magic. This we declare, even though some Christians who are just as submissive to God as they are faithful do continually espouse such a theory of prayer. In that connection, people do, to be sure, refer back to Christ’s promises.9 However, in part, these promises are themselves not correctly understood and, in part, the conditions to which Christ’s promise is indeed tied are not taken into account in their full scope. That is to say: How is one to avoid coming to the point of doubting what can only be called “an incidental future event,”10 to use the customary expression, if one cannot take it to be a necessary event in some other respect? Moreover, what can a Christian, as such, take to be a necessary event, except one without which a regenerate person could not be kept in the state of sanctification or one without which Christ’s reign could not endure and progress? However, it is only unconditional prayer to which we are referred in this manner. When Christ made faith a condition of prayer’s being heard, by this he did not at all mean an isolated faith in the hearing itself. Rather, he meant faith in Christ in the full and complete sense of the word, and, consequently, he meant faith in the imperishable nature and superordinate value of the reign of God founded by him. Moreover, all that has already been discussed here is embraced in this faith. If, therefore, we also dismiss every magical notion regarding prayer’s being heard, we do not thereby detract from Christ’s promises. This is so, for we do not in the least admit that if something for which a prayer is given is then heard, it would then occur because it had been prayed for, even if it were contrary to the original will of God, any more than we assert that it would have occurred even if prayer for it had not been uttered. Rather, there exists an interconnection between prayer and its fulfillment that rests on the fact that both are grounded in one and the same thing, namely, in the way God’s reign operates. That is to say, in this process both are simply at one: prayer, viewed as Christian anticipatory feeling that has unfolded from the collective activity of the divine Spirit, and the fulfillment of prayer, viewed as the expression of Christ’s governing activity with respect to that same object. Regarded in this way, the fulfillment of prayer would not arise if there had been no prayer. That is, at that juncture even in the unfolding of God’s reign, the point would not yet have arrived at which the given object of prayer would have had to follow. The fulfillment of prayer would not occur, however, simply because it had been prayed for, as if the prayer given could be considered in isolation here as a cause in and of itself, but because proper prayer can have no object other than what lies within the order that derives from the divine good pleasure. The fulfillment of prayer would also not occur on account of a specific divine decision11 even if it had not been prayed for, as if there were some divine decision concerning any particular viewed as isolated from the interconnectedness of nature. Rather, in this case, fulfillment would result only because the state from which a given prayer arises belongs among the conditions that would enable the result to ensue in an effective way.

Now, this presentation of the matter also obviates another objection against the teaching that prayer is heard, namely, that it serves to cripple the activity of faithful persons—which, fully stated, amounts to saying that if one believes that prayer is heard, one is splitting “pray and work”12 apart, and it must then be possible entirely to replace work with prayer. The corresponding formulation, “Pray, then you need not work,” stands in opposition to another one uttered in denial that prayer is heard: “Work and leave yourself no time to pray.” We must reject both formulations, however, in that, in accordance with the discussion just above, proper prayer arises only while we are engaged in activity directed to the fulfillment of our Christian calling. If every true moment of prayer is formed in such a way that it depends on some moment of activity, then prayer cannot do away with activity without doing away with itself. On the other hand, the anticipatory feeling that is expressed in a prayer that has not arisen in this way can always be a merely arbitrary prayer; consequently it cannot bear within itself any surety whatsoever that it is in tune with Christ’s governing activity. Yet, just as little can activity do away with prayer, for such activity could not be oriented to God’s reign. This is so, because the doer wants to be satisfied with what the doer can attain of oneself, and such activity would then not vouchsafe any surety that it is under the influence of Christ’s governing activity. 3. Now, in that we have constantly understood prayer solely in its orientation to the concerns of God’s reign, we have proceeded from the presupposition that only this prayer in Jesus’ name would be natural to Christians. Meanwhile, our proposition itself reminds us of another sort of prayer, with which we are all familiar based on general experience. If, on the one hand, we cannot then concede to this sort of prayer any share in Christ’s promise, yet, to the extent that conditional prayer in Jesus’ name does form a transition to this other sort, we should not simply toss it out. That is to say, it is always possible to point to a combination of human sensations and stirrings13 with God-consciousness, a combination in which these sensations and stirrings become ever more dispassionate and spiritually fertile than without the combination. Now, suppose that actually this other sort of prayer—whether it then be called a prayer of personal piety14 or of self-love, and whether these be of the more noble or of the less disciplined form—is not distinctively Christian but that the hearing of it is a special promise of Christ to his own. Then this prayer too would have a share in that promise, but only to the extent that it is akin to the object of that promise. That is, it has a share to the extent that we are able to set forth the wishes brought before God as what is, at the same time, needful for the church. Now, prayers arising out of piety fall somewhat short of that normative condition, for the higher status we give to an individual, the more easily we can be misled into believing that it is a distinct loss for the reign of God if that individual would be torn from one’s sphere of influence or hampered within it. Yet, on closer consideration, we will always have to say that, except for Christ, no individual is indispensable in the reign of God. Still further from the norm, to be sure, are situated all those wishes that refer to our own or even others’ faring well15 externally. We are also less likely to deceive ourselves on that score. Even so, as long as we have not yet arrived at a state of unalloyed calm acceptance, exclusive of all wishes,

even as Christians it is both natural and salutary for us to combine these wishes with Godconsciousness.16 It will be salutary for us, however, only to the extent that we are advanced toward the point of unalloyed calm acceptance, this precisely by the consciousness that we cannot bring these wishes before God in the name of Jesus. Indeed, if we do not reach this point beforehand, then while it is being uttered, as it were, the prayer would have to be turned into a prayer for calm acceptance, and this latter prayer would then be a prayer in Jesus’ name. Yet, since every such prayer is simply a part of caring for individual souls,17 it also belongs most properly within the sphere of individual and domestic life, wherein it has its natural locus. On the other hand, suppose that the public, common prayer of Christians is always to present the pure typus of prayer in Jesus’ name, without the admixture of objects that have no evident connection with the progressive unfolding of the reign of God. Then it would have to be the case that public care of souls18 would require that through public prayer those collective wishes which proceed from a worldly interest should be turned into prayer for calm acceptance. All public Christian intercessions19 are to be arranged accordingly, just as instructions in Scripture20 for this purpose are also to be explained only in connection with the promise of Christ that underlies our discussion here.

1. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 290; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3, (1919), 297. 2. Ed. note: ET and French: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 416; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 375. 3. Ed. note: ET and German: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 350; ET Torrance (1959), 93; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 458. 4. John 16:25–26. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 16:23–33, Sept. 24, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 537–48; (2) John 16:24–30, May 7, 1820, SW II.4 (1835), 307–20, and (1844), 357–70; also (3) John 16:23, May 29, 1791, SW II.7 (1836), 27–41. See also §104n58. 5. Vorgefühl. Ed. note: Cf. §146, the proposition and both §146n1 and n5. 6. Gewalt. Ed. note: Cf. §145n8 for a definition. 7. Matt. 26:42ff. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 26:36–46, Mar. 23, 1800, SW II.1 (1834), 28–40. ET Wilson (1890), 38–51. Here Jesus’ prayer is “Father, if this cannot pass unless I drink it, thy will be done” (RSV); cf. a like passage in Luke 22:42. A conditional attitude (if it is thy will, etc.) is indeed to be found throughout the New Testament, though rarely directly in the form of prayer. 8. Ed. note: This presupposition of Christian religious self-consciousness was laid out in Part One, esp. §§40–41 and 51– 54. In particular, the argument is that if we are absolutely dependent on God in time and space, we cannot influence God to bend God’s eternal perfect will and decree. Part Two seems to make clear that in Christ what God wills will, in any case, be ultimately fulfilled in the all-wise and all-loving divine government of the world. See the culmination of Part Two in §§164– 69. 9. Matt. 17:20 and 21:21–22. Ed. note: Sermon on Matt. 17:20, Aug. 4, 1833, SW II.3 (1835), 654–66. In Matt. 21:22 Jesus says: “Whatever you ask in prayer, you will receive if you have faith” (RSV). See the similar prayer in Luke 22:42; cf. John 14:13–14; John 16:23; and sermons on (1) John 16:23, May 29, 1791, SW II.7 (1836), 27–41; ET DeVries (1987), 169–80; (2) John 16:16–23, Aug. 27, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 524–36, followed by one on John 16:23–33, Sept. 24, 1826, op. cit., 537–48; (3) on the same topic, on John 16:24–30, May 7, 1820, first published in a periodical in 1823, then in SW II.4 (1835), 307–20, and (1844), 357–70; (4) on Matt. 7:9–11, Aug. 21, 1831, SW II.3 (1835), 56–67, and (1843), 59–70; and (5) Luke 11:8–9, Oct. 27, 1833, SW II.3 (1835), 677–88, and (1843), 700–11. 10. Ed. note: The expression is ein künftiges Zufälliges. 11. Beschluß. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s term for the eternal divine decree is Ratschluß. 12. Ed. note: These words refer to the traditional phrase Labore et orare. 13. Ed. note: Cf. §5 on relations of sensory consciousness and other lower levels of mentation to religious selfconsciousness.

14. Pietät. Ed. note: Here the discussion focuses not on Frömmigkeit, Schleiermacher’s usual word for “piety,” which in the Christian context always has its place within the collective life of grace and faith, but on purely personal or household piety (pietas). Essentially, the latter arises from self-love (Selbstliebe) or that for a narrower social circle surrounding oneself and contributing an especially personal identity to oneself, as in a household. These kinds of love he does not abjure in general terms, but in Christian terms their scope is rather narrow, and they are less attuned to a broader God-consciousness or to the reign of God, of which one can become more fully aware in community with Christ. See Schleiermacher’s sermonic treatise The Christian Household (1820). 15. Wohlergehen. Ed. note: Or prospering, versus Wohl, which could mean internal and/or external well-being or welfare. 16. See 1 Pet. 5:7; cf. Matt. 6:31–32. Ed. note: (1) Two sermon outlines on 1 Pet. 5:7, Jan. 1, 1800, Zimmer (1887), 1–2 —“Cast all your anxieties on God, for God cares about you”; (2) Sermon on Matt. 6:31, Sept. 30, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 376–88, and (1843), 389–401—“Therefore do not be anxious … for … your heavenly Father knows that you need [all these things].” 17. Einzelnen Seelenpflege. Ed. note: In contrast, the responsibility of church leaders for Seelsorge, care of souls within the congregation or other communal body as a whole, is the overarching concern of the various tasks of practical theology for Schleiermacher. See Brief Outline §§290–308. These tasks, of course, include Seelenpflege as described here, care of individual souls, as such. 18. Öffentliche Seelsorge. 19. Öffentliche Fürbitten. 20. See 1 Tim. 2:1–4; Phil. 4:6. Ed. note: The first passage refers to “supplications, prayer, intercessions, and thanksgivings … made for all.” Sermons on (1) Phil. 4:6, undated but published in 1827 as “Remarks at a Wedding,” also in SW II.4 (1835), 815–17, and (1844), 852–54, and (2) on Phil. 4: 6–7, Mar. 2, 1823, SW II.10 (1856), 754–69. The second passage reads: “Have no anxiety about anything, but in everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known to God. And the peace of God, which passes all understanding, will keep your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus.”

THE SECOND HALF OF THE SECOND DIVISION

The Variable Characteristic of the Church by Virtue of Its Coexistence with the World [Introduction to the Second Half] §148. For the church itself, the contrast between the visible and the invisible church is grounded in the fact that the church cannot be formed out of the world without the world’s also exercising some influence on the church. 1. Suppose that it were instantly true of everyone in the world who had been deeply moved by the spirit of Christianity1 that, in this way, within each one no moment in life would be determined otherwise than by one’s receptivity for the influences of this Spirit and that nothing contrary that was fully established earlier in one’s life would be present anymore. In that case, the world could indeed continue to exist alongside the church, in that the world would resist further pressure of the church upon it, and thereby it could also modify the church’s prior activities within it and throw them back to where they came from. In contrast, the church would nevertheless continue to exist at each moment entirely without any mingling with the world. Thus, the two would be totally separate communities, situated wholly apart from each other. Now, regeneration is no sudden transformation, however. Rather, even though delight in God’s will has become the actual “I” of a human being,2 there still remains in every individual an activity of the “flesh” resisting the Spirit. Consequently, even in those who constitute the church, taken as a whole, there repeatedly exists something of what belongs to the world.3 Thus, church and world are not spatially and externally divorced. Rather, at every point in which human life appears, wherever the church is already in existence because faith and the community of faith exists there, the world is precisely there too, because sin and community with what is generally sinful still exists in that place. Thus, when observed more closely, every visible aspect of the church is seen to be an admixture of church and world. Moreover, only if we could isolate what is effected in human beings by the divine Spirit and so piece just those effects together would we have the church in its purity. Now, not only are these effects so surely present only as the Holy Spirit is given in this efficacious union with human nature, but these effects also constitute an intimately connected and cooperative whole. Yet, these effects are not to be presented as if they were isolated. Rather, these effects are contained within the mixture of church and world only invisibly, as what is efficacious within that mixture over against the world and as what severs it from the world. Thus, the invisible church is the totality of all the workings of the Spirit in their interconnectedness.4 In contrast, what constitutes the visible church is those same workings of the Spirit in their connection with lingering effects from the collective life of general

sinfulness, which effects are not lacking in any individual life that has been deeply moved by the divine Spirit. 2. Ordinarily, by the invisible church, people understand the totality of those who are regenerate and are truly engaged5 in the process of sanctification. By the visible church they understand both these persons and all those others who have heard the gospel and are thus called and outwardly profess to be of the church. As we would prefer to put it, those others are those who make up the outer circle of the church, in that by means of an externally grounded relationship they receive preparatory workings of grace from the totality of the regenerate.6 Now, if this externally grounded relationship is to lie in the fact that they have received baptism and call themselves Christians, then, in accordance with Christ’s original aim, such a visible church should not exist at all, in that only those who had repented and at the very moment of baptism were ready to receive forgiveness of sins and the communication of the Spirit were to be baptized. Thus, even those who were called were to remain outside the church until the communal body7 and they themselves agreed in the conviction that a community of life existed between Christ and themselves. Moreover, that outer circle was to be comprised not of church members but only of those aspiring to be of the church. One might then want to say that this original arrangement could not be withdrawn thereafter—not only in the period since child baptism was introduced but far more in the period since whole peoples were Christianized and in the period since preferential rights of citizenship were accorded to Christianity, and thus that this arrangement should be considered, as it were, as if it were altered by Christ himself. Even so, in this light it would still not be more fitting to call the community of the regenerate invisible. That is to say, even if the moment of rebirth cannot be determined, indeed even if many people cannot be sure of whether they are in the process of sanctification, then this very lack of surety concerning some individuals could not make the whole body invisible. Rather, precisely the community of those who would in this sense have to be the most visible of all also take the most vigorous steps in opposition to the world, because they are most firmly established in the process of sanctification.8 Accordingly, what is called “the invisible church” in ordinary usage is, for the most part, not invisible, and what is called “the visible church” is, for the most part, not church. On the other hand, the way we have conceived the contrast signifies something true and necessary. This is so, for even if it were possible to keep all unregenerate persons outside the church, the totality of the regenerate would still be simply the visible church in our sense; but because it would be visible, it would also not be clear of alien admixture there. Indeed, the pure church cannot be made visible everywhere, but it is necessary also to consider it separately as that which is distinctively efficacious within that church which is mixed with alien elements. Now, the institutions of the church treated in the doctrinal propositions of the First Half9 are the preeminent organs of the invisible church, and they most represent the strengths exercised by the invisible church within the visible church. Here, in turn,10 those general conditions of the visible church are to be considered which, viewed as the ever-renewed

consequences of the world’s coexistence in the visible church, most bring to consciousness the contrast between the visible and the invisible church.

1. Ed. note: von dem Geist des Christentums ergriffen wird. Here we may recall that Geist means, at the same time, both “common spirit” and “Holy Spirit.” Ergriffen means genuinely affected, at some deep level—that is, truly grasped, not just vaguely brushed by. 2. Rom. 7:17, 20; 1 John 1:8–10. Ed. note: In context both passages affirm that insofar as sin remains in oneself, in conflict with the will (or law or word) of God, it is felt to be sin, pure and simple, not the “I” that “delights” in what God wants. Paul depicts this sin as an activity of the “flesh” within oneself. 3. Cf. §126.1. Ed. note: In §126.1 the scriptural use of “world” to denote that part of the world not yet consonant with what the church is supposed to be, and in that way not a part of the church, is appropriated for use in dogmatics alone. Because of the unsalutary separatist tendencies to which the word “world,” left unexplained, can readily lead, in §126.1 Schleiermacher counsels against its use in any activity of Christian devotion. 4. Ed. note: The “invisible” church, for Schleiermacher, is one in community with Christ’s perfection and blessedness, true and infallible, without error. It is united, unchanging in its community with Christ’s perfection and blessings (ultimately consummate and triumphant over the sway of sin), and infallible (without error), true to its internal relationship with God in Christ, thus the “true church.” To some extent, it may well be manifested in the visible church, but it is not yet identical with it. See §§149–52 for a fuller definition, also §§114.1, 120, 157–63. In relation to philosophical theology treated as “the idea” of Christianity, see BO §130. On the “true church” versus the purely or largely “external church,” see OR (1821) IV, supplemental notes 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15. 5. Begriffen. 6. Cf. §115.2. Ed. note: There the latent church, while it was still directly related to Christ himself, was depicted as comprised chiefly of an “outer circle” under the influence of preparatory grace and an “inner circle” of those who were cooperatively helping to lead this incipient church, not yet formed, into a religious community, as has constantly been the arrangement ever since. Cf. “Grace, preparatory,” in the index. 7. Gemeine. Ed. note: “Communal body” includes gatherings not specifically designated as established congregations. Gemeinde is a parish or congregation. 8. Matt. 5:14. Ed. note: This verse reads: “You are the light of the world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid” (RSV). The similar lamp parable on being in the light versus hidden in the darkness follows in Matt. 5:15–16, paralleled by Mark 4:21 and Luke 11:33; cf. John 8:12. See the sermon on Mark 4:10–21, Jubilate Sunday, May 13, 1832, SW II.5 (1835), 196–208. Compare that on John 8:12–20, Misericordias Domini Sunday, April 17, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 64–81; this passage begins: “I am the light of the world.” 9. Ed. note: Part Two, second aspect, section 2, division 2, first half of this work is comprised of §§126–47. See table of contents to get oriented. 10. Ed. note: In §§148–56, the second half of division 2 of section 2. This will be followed by the third section, on the divine attributes of love and wisdom (§§157–69) and the conclusion to the entire work, on the Trinity (§§170–72).

§149. The contrast between the visible and the invisible church admits of being comprised of the following two propositions. First, the visible church is a divided church, but the invisible church is one and undivided. Second, the visible church is always subject to error, but the invisible church is unfailingly reliable.1 1. We need only to return to what we have said concerning the locus and mode of the communication of Christ’s sinless perfection2 to be able to assert that what is innermost in every truly regenerate person is nothing other than the entire truth of redemption. However, it is also wholly to this domain alone that the unfailing reliability3 that we ascribe to the invisible church is also limited. Thus, the first thing to be noticed is the very consciousness of being children of God in community of life with Christ, a consciousness that each has for all

and all for each. Moreover, essentially belonging to this consciousness is then a consciousness of a being-led-into-all-truth that is present in them and for them.4 However, the scattered individualizing of that innermost consciousness into distinct notions already ceases to possess this same full truth, for the notions held by an individual are the product of one’s earlier life and are developed based on one’s earlier sensibility and interest. On account of this process, rebirth cannot, then, be a sudden transformation of one’s whole manner of concept-formation. Hence, the external expression of this internal truth is falsified to a greater or lesser extent, and the Spirit takes possession of a given individual organism5 only gradually. The same thing is true of the direction that Christ’s living in us gives to each person’s will. This direction is the pure direction that Christ himself takes against sin and toward the spreading of Christ’s life. However, just as this direction derived from Christ puts its stamp on particular actions, so not only does the conception of a distinct circumstance intervene but the prefiguring aim6 of the action does too. Yet, since one’s will was situated in the service of one’s sensory consciousness, both of these elements are conditioned by notions formed over time and, consequently, will no longer be the immediately pure presentation of that inner impulse which is derived from Christ. Accordingly, in this fashion, what is pure or impure becomes distinguished very quickly once we move from the point at which the new life begins—and indeed precisely as what is visible or invisible becomes distinguished—for from the very outset whatever passes into an arising consciousness already ceases to be pure. Yet, both pure and impure elements inhere within the community, for the fact that redemption is realized in a given individual and the fact that this individual begins to belong to the community of the faithful are simply one and the same thing. To understand why, suppose, first, that someone wanted to say that one could indeed concede the distinction between what is pure and what is cloudy,7 just as one could concede the distinction between what is visible and what is invisible. Then, suppose that this person would also claim that what is invisible does not comprise any community, but what is absolutely internal would, as such, be isolated as well, because a community is possible only by means of expression, but this very expression would already no longer be something pure and true. To be sure, this claim is to be admitted, inasmuch as the invisible church is a community that is not completely divorced from the visible community and does not exist in and of itself alone. However, this is also not the case with the ordinary use of these terms. Rather, here, as in that usage, the visible community mediates the invisible church, viewed as a community—the latter concept simply standing out more prominently in our understanding of these subjects. In one’s everyday experience, however, anyone will surely distinguish between the two, as we do. That is, in the one instance we bypass and disregard the manifold cloudiness of individual expressions and, in the same manner, we are also each made transparent to the other person, each one placing oneself in a mutually strengthening and supporting association with the innermost impulses of the other. In this way, we constitute an element of the invisible church. In the obverse instance we enter into an actual community comprised of individual actions and expressions, so as to occupy a common space

homogeneously with those who are most closely akin to us and so as to keep what is extraneous out of that space. In this way, we constitute an element of the visible church.8 It is not necessary to deal with the fact that the unfailing reliability of the invisible church also includes its purity, or the fact that the capacity for error of the visible church also includes sin. This is the case, since these facts are established, in part, by individual actions’ being grounded in aims9 that determine the bounds of those actions and that underlie the actual defects present in notions, also, in part, by the development of religious notions likewise resting on activities of will that are subject to a lack of purity in individual selfdeterminations. 2. Now, directly cohering with these observations is the fact that the invisible church overall is essentially one, while, in contrast, the visible church is constantly engaged in acts of deviation and division.10 That is to say, since the innermost consciousness and the innermost impulses referred to are nothing other than the presence and living stirrings of the Spirit itself, so too, the community of that same presence and living stirrings of the Spirit is nothing other than the Spirit’s own cognition of itself,11 and thus this community must extend as widely as the Spirit remains the same—that is, over the entire domain of Christendom.12 However, since it is only an invisible community, it is lacking in everything that could give it any definite form, and it is always and everywhere simply the immediate relationship of all among whom the Spirit dwells,13 who, as they encounter one another simultaneously include in their innermost sensibility all who are the likes of them in the same community. That is, it is the shared endeavor of all those people to recognize and draw to themselves the same Spirit everywhere, throughout the external community. However, just as individual expressions—both notions and actions—in their role as guides are what mediates that one community, they are, in and of themselves, the agents of what is divergent in the visible community.14 This is certainly the case insofar as the force of attraction between people, moving from overwhelmingly determinative points, somewhere or other finds its limits in accordance with physical laws,15 and their interconnection is broken off. It is also especially the case insofar as the consciousness of binding affinity, as it interconnects with differences among human beings registered in our own sensibility by sensory means, forms into something self-preferential,16 consequently also something divisive and restrictive. At this point, moreover, what we have demonstrated from a different angle in another place17 arises anew, namely, that Christian community, viewed as one, cannot possibly restrict itself—that is, it cannot possibly have an operative desire to have other religious communities alongside itself. This is so, for otherwise either (1) Christ’s power of attraction would have to be cut short, and in this way Christ’s community of life would have to be limited by a distinct periphery, and then he would not have been inspired and endowed on behalf of the entire human race, or (2) the endeavors that proceed from Christ would have to be restricted in a narrowly self-loving18 manner within the community of the faithful, a manner such that other religious communities alongside itself would not have a share in the same privileges, and then this love would not be the same as Christ’s love.

3. It can easily be shown, however, that a total difference between the visible and the invisible church is expressed in these statements. That is to say, whether we begin with Christ’s living in us or with the efficacious action of the Spirit in us,19 the two processes issue forth in a twofold manner to appropriate everything human in the individual to this divine presence and then, with what has been thus appropriated, to make those human features effective in the communality of spiritual life. Thus, whatever still works as world in the individual works as a disturbing element within this efficacious action, so that one or another of these spiritual activities must be stemmed and averted thereby. Furthermore, generally we will indeed be able to refer even what bears the semblance of a negation, or of an omission, to something that really happens, to a deed. Now, if every work within the community is generative of that community, because the community can continue to exist only through actions pertaining to it, then, as a consequence, what disturbs this spiritual activity must likewise include something divisive of the community within it. By the same token, if the Spirit present in every individual is a guide into all truth, whatever bears a disturbing influence within an individual in this respect must likewise be a deviation into untruth.20 Moreover, that our proposition includes deviation of the will in sin under the category of untruth is justified by the fact that, since we are speaking of the church, we consider the actions of individuals only as they bear upon the community, and there they have a disturbing influence only as they are at the same time actually availed of21 and become operative, and that occurs only insofar as they are taken up as maxims that nevertheless contradict the basic expression of the new life or are given currency as false subsumptions under proper maxims—thus, in both instances, insofar as they admit of being traced back to error. In contrast, individualized sin that does not arise from any such aim fades into the community without a trace. There exists no influence of what is still world within us, disturbing our relationship with one another in the church, other than that which “grieves the Spirit,”22 viewed as error grieving the Spirit that leads to truth and as separation grieving the Spirit that binds and unites. Not only does this happen, but these two aspects also hang together so closely that either one can be recognized only in the other. Many things can appear as a disturbance of community, but nothing is actually so unless it is also a deviation from the truth. Likewise, nothing that appears to be an error or a sin is actually so unless it also disturbs community at the same time.

1. Ed. note: untrüglich. Under trügen Cassell’s dictionary (1972) cites the German saying Gottes Wort kann nicht trügen and translates it as “The word of God cannot fail.” This scriptural statement is not found in the Luther Bible; however, it is consonant with the sixteenth-century Evangelical confessions. Moreover, Unfehlbarkeit is the term long contrastingly used for “infallibility” with regard to Roman Catholic discourses. In the explanations that follow, the allied term Getrübten (cloudy, unclear; cf. §149n7) is contrasted with Rein (pure), and at the end den Geist betrüben (grieve or distress the Spirit; cf. §149n22) appears. Also, what is unerring, or lacking in error, in the church is presented as anything that overcomes what brings distress to the Spirit, inseparably with respect to both notions and actions (cf. §149n8 and n9). Hence, the phrase “unfailingly reliable” is chosen here.

2. Cf. §88.3. Ed. note: There Schleiermacher states: “In fact, since Christ’s companions in his lifetime are no longer alive, we also do not wish to vest any assembly of individuals, however well chosen so as to complement one another, not even with the right simply to set forth doctrines, thus rules of faith or of life, with any kind of claim to unfailing reliability [Untrüglichkeit] or persistent validity [Geharrliche Gültigkeit].” 3. Untrüglichkeit. 4. John 16:13. Ed. note: This verse reads: “When the Spirit of truth comes [it] will guide you into all the truth; for [the Spirit] will not speak on [its] own authority, but whatever [the Spirit] hears [it] will speak, and [it] will declare to you the things that are to come.” Here masculine usage in the RSV is replaced in brackets. Sermon on John 16:13–14, June 11, 1832, Festpredigten (1833), also SW II.3 (1835), 549–61, and (1843), 548–60. 5. Organismus. Ed. note: That is, the way one’s overall life is organized, not one’s physical makeup alone. Schleiermacher’s psychology always presupposes a more or less integrated body-mind/mind-body. 6. Ed. note: vorbildende Zweckbegriff. That is, an anticipatory concept of a purpose yet to be fulfilled. In this sense too, the image of Christ’s presence in our common life is also to be conceived as a gradually developing Vorbild (prototype) of our own future. 7. Getrübte. Ed. note: Or unclear, disturbed, distorted; cf. §149n1 above. 8. Ed. note: The first instance is perhaps harder to envisage than is the second instance, for the first instance requires one’s having moved past the peculiarities or excrescences of another person’s words and actions to an “innermost impulse” (innersten Antrieben, or self-initiated motive or impetus) within that person, which impulse is made transparent (durchgesehen) to one’s own and unites with one’s own. This aspect of a person-to-person process becomes reciprocal in community and is even broadly shared there, and in large part it is invisibly felt (carried in a “shared feeling,” or Mitgefühl). In this passage each reader is invited to try to imagine and recall something like such an instance, if one can. 9. Zweckbegriffe. Ed. note: Viewed as determinations of will, the indication of “aims” at this point retains the conjoint activity of notions and voluntary actions in each of the two “parts” noted in this context. 10. Ed. note: immer in Auseinandergehen und Sich-Trennen begriffen. See Brief Outline §§50–62, 155, 233–34, and 338. There Schleiermacher makes broad distinctions between “radical division” (e.g., Protestant vs. Roman Catholic), “separatism,” “schism,” “deviation,” “heresy,” and “indifferentism” (itself a result of such weaknesses, diseases, and factions in the church). Schleiermacher regularly holds that a certain cultural divergence, as it were, in the church can be sustained even when union is achieved. See also Brief Outline §§203–12 regarding the somewhat slippery distinction between “orthodox” and “heterodox” and related issues of verification. 11. Ed. note: das Sichselbsterkennen des Geistes. In Schleiermacher’s usage, “self-knowledge” would render the stricter word Selbsterkenntnis. 12. Christenheit. Ed. note: The word for “Christianity” is Christentum. 13. Begeisteten. Ed. note: In contrast, “those inspired” would render Begeisterten. The reference is consistently to a communal reality, hence to “the common spirit,” humanly speaking. 14. Cf. §6.3. Ed. note: There Schleiermacher gives a more extended account of how religious self-consciousness, like every other “essential element of human nature,” develops, in distinctly circumscribed forms and numerous uneven and fluid stages. Both in the individual and as socially defined, this element moves by such stages into an experience of community to be termed “church.” 15. Ed. note: That is, on the analogy of magnetic forces but applied to social interactions of “affinity,” or attraction to “the likes of them.” In physics, electromagnetic forces were not very well understood at the time, but what had recently come to light was understandably impressive. 16. Ed. note: selbstliebig. That is, the bond reached is one of like-attraction, mutual fondness, or attraction, something exclusive because it has come to be preferred by those who have entered into association with one another. In contrast, “selflove” would render Eigenliebe. See §149n18. 17. Ed. note: Beginning with the account in §§126 and 127, §§128–47 then lay out in detail the six “essential and invariable characteristics of the church.” 18. Ed. note: Here the phrase is eigenliebig begrenzen; cf. §149n16. 19. Ed. note: In §§121.2 and 122.3 these two processes are already set forth both as communal phenomena and as one and the same. 20. Unwahrheit. Ed. note: The proposition refers to being subject to error (Irrtum). 21. Wahrgenommen. Ed. note: In ordinary usage this particular meaning, that of being taken to be authentic, or “true,” entails being “availed of,” as is made clear in the context. The other chief meaning, that of being perceived by the senses, can likewise entail what is perceived by the senses, or a sense perception, being “availed of.” 22. Ed. note: Eph. 4:30–31: “Do not grieve the Spirit” with such things (specifically mentioned) as wrath, anger, clamor, slander, malice, lack of kindness, and failure to forgive one another.

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Plurality of the Visible Church in Relation to the Unity of the Invisible Church

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §150. Whenever separations actually arise in the Christian church, it is also the case that the effort to unite what is separate is never lacking. 1. Now, if in individuals all that is world is, in and of itself, an element that disturbs community, then always and everywhere seeds of separations1 are scattered throughout the visible church, but each seed is, of itself, only a miniscule element. Moreover, depending on whether these elements are more individualized or combine to form a sizeable quantity, in the latter case more or less of a separation will arise in the church, whereas in the first case only a transitory disturbance will result, this within narrower circles. It is clearly evident from the very beginning onward, that those elements which were based in earlier religious conditions among the first Christians, who were Jews and Gentiles, came together most strongly but also worked most severely against each other. Hence, already in the era of early Christianity, which one must otherwise be inclined to regard as an exception to that general will to fall apart which persists in the visible church, those elements so widely formed into a predisposition toward a divorce between Jewish and Gentile Christians that only the countervailing force2 of the church’s community-forming principle,3 then operative in its originative vigor, could thwart a real outbreak of such a division. However, based on this early situation, it is also clear that the more the Spirit that binds suffuses the whole company of Christians and, in consequence, sunders the worldly elements within that company from it, the more these elements must lose in their power4 to separate. Thereafter, this power to separate has never again resided so strongly in individual differences within the unfolding of doctrine as in the period when heresies were identified and when the general5 councils of the church were convened. On the other hand, however, the bent toward separations has always shown itself to be effective in the measure that deviations are fixed by some sort of self-seeking effort, deviations that would otherwise dissolve of themselves in turn, almost unnoticed. 2. Yet, even in the state of separation, every part of the visible church nonetheless still exists as a part of the invisible church, in that affirmation of Christ, and thus the efficacious action of the Spirit, also exists in it. To that extent, then, even the impulse from which the given division has arisen will gradually be weakened. Moreover, wherever these different parts of the church are in contact with each other, the same community-building principle

within them will direct its activity against this division. Thereby an effort to achieve reunion will emerge, one that is naturally subject to the same changes and oscillations in the churchthat-actually-appears-to-sight as is true in the church that is not visible. Indeed, even if this principle does not become noticeable on the historical plain, it certainly is dispersed among individuals. Further, this presupposition is as necessary as it is proper to believe that the Holy Spirit cannot at any time either have entirely disappeared or have been absent from any part of the church whatsoever, or to believe that none of the Holy Spirit’s essential occupations can ever be entirely neglected. However, it is an undeniable experience that apart from these occupations of the Holy Spirit, attempts at union do frequently appear, attempts that cannot spring from the Spirit of the church and the success of which thus cannot be regarded as yielding any profit. This experience reminds us that there can also be separations that are not based on what is world in the church and consequently are ultimately to be reckoned to workings of the Holy Spirit, so that the truth of our assessment seems to be merely a subordinate matter and to require finer definition. Yet, just as those unions can be merely apparent and can certainly strive to divide what is united from the whole in some other fashion, so too what strives only to found a narrower association within community as a whole and without doing it any harm, or what is simply a return to some abandoned community that consists of earlier formations of the church, may appear to be a separation but, in fact, is none. Accordingly, the general truth is that the Spirit binds and that what loosens must always consist of a disposition according to the flesh.6 Application of this truth, however, can be difficult; and if several communities that are divided from each other continue to exist side by side in Christianity, the task devolves upon critical activity to determine on which side the principle behind loosing has its seat and thus where the division comes from. This is an issue that is often no easier to decide than the issue of which of two sides in a war has actually been the aggressor.

1. Ed. note: Whereas such seeds of discord (the biblical seeds that fall among thorns or on uncultivated soil) move to disturb, disrupt, or destroy community, for Schleiermacher seeds of proclamation, in both word and deed, serve to build community. See two sermons on Matt. 13:22–23, June 22 and July 9, 1826, separately published in 1827, then in SW II.4 (1835), 687–716, and (1844), 739–68. 2. Kraft. Ed. note: Cf. §144n1 and n2. 3. Prinzip. Ed. note: That is, an active, formative power, not a statement. 4. Gewalt. Ed. note: Cf. §145n8. Here, by contrast, the “power”—whether strictly authoritative or not—is one that tends to hold sway, hence bears the power to separate. 5. Ed. note: allgemeinen. These councils have also been called “ecumenical,” an inexact term that Schleiermacher tends to avoid in referring to these councils. 6. Ed. note: This is an allusion to and a further expansion on an earlier discussion of the contrast given in Matt. 16:19; cf. §145n9 and context.

§151. First Doctrinal Proposition: The total suspension of community among the various parts of the visible church is non-Christian.1

1. What was stated in the Introduction to this work2 regarding communities of piety in general can also be said of Christianity on account of its broad extension over such an abundance of peoples and of language areas: namely, that a homogeneous interconnection among people belonging to it is not possible. This is true for two reasons: not only on account of uneven internal affinity and external contact, but also on account of uneven distribution of its common spirit. Now, it is natural that the first lack of homogeneity is established by the leading role of language as well as by the totality of social circumstances, and that Christians whose discourse is tied to one sort of language and belong to the same people would form a special ecclesial community. Such churches of peoples and territories, however, simply comprise a form in which a more sizeable community is alone possible, in accordance with the divine way of ordering things. Moreover, they do not in any way involve a suspension of community with other Christians, which rather takes place now as ever, only once the natural conditions for such community have been given. The same thing is true of associations that arise among Christians—always quite marked in their external form—that have some affinity in several respects and that link up especially with those who present these Christians’ own peculiar way of thinking in a most markedly productive fashion, for this too is possible without suspension of any sort of preexisting community with other parts of the church. Instead, such a suspension of community first begins when closer associations that have arisen in the manner last mentioned move into opposition against each other and cannot enjoy their respectively distinctive modes of being without distancing themselves from others’ modes of being and excluding these others from their company. To be sure, such a polemical relationship does constitute a suspension of community, yet it does so only partially. The reason for this situation is that when conflict really breaks out concerning the incompatibility of their distinctive natures in relation to each other, this conflict nonetheless has its basis solely in the interest each takes in the other, and hence the conflict itself as is simply about the manner in which some community can persist between them under the given circumstances. Indeed, this qualification already lies in the presupposition that the last point of communal existence to which they refer back in their conflict is still Christian. Thus, in order to understand each other or even themselves, they will also have to distinguish the undisputed area from that which is in dispute, thereby entertaining a different mode of community in the first area than in the second. Hence, a total suspension of community is introduced only when two given ecclesial social groups3 regard no element in the other, simply because it is regarded to be Christian, as a reason for their identifying with each other. As a consequence, all religious communication of each one to the other ceases and no ecclesial hospitality is practiced between them of any sort that each would not exercise toward non-Christians. That is to say, at that point the only thing they would have in common is simply the empty title of “Christianity.” 2. In this sense, a total suspension of community is then non-Christian as long as the social group that has been cut off still retains its historical interconnection with proclamation of the gospel, by which it has been founded, and if with suspension of this interconnection it

does not trace its current shape to some other source of revelation. This is the case, for as long as acknowledgment of Christ still exists within a community, some efficacious action of Christ must still exist within it, even if Christ’s efficacious action were very much repelled. Moreover, since all who are taken up into community of life with Christ are also to share community with one another, if we disengage from Christ’s efficacious action in this way, we exclude and divorce ourselves from the unity of the invisible church.4 In accordance with this basic principle, even heretics, in the more literal sense, are still in the church. No matter how many more still-later degenerations there may be in which other ecclesial communities claim to find something heretical, community with them is not to be entirely suspended. Indeed, suppose that, in order to establish some boundary, we imagine, first, that in the most heretical of heresies—for example, the Manichean—elements originating outside Christianity are admixed with Christian elements. In contrast, suppose, second, that the Indians, for example, wanted to recognize Jesus to be one of their many other incarnations of a god. As a result, this second case would be simply a mixing of what is Christian with what is not Christian, and we would not adjudge the mixture to be Christian,5 but then these individuals would not be designated as heretics either. Thus, we will probably be able to define for the external community no boundary other than this: that we must not break completely with any community that continues to attach itself to Christian tradition and that, on its own part, holds fast to the desire to belong to the Christian church. It is also patent that ecclesial community is not entirely suspended between any religious communities that meet this condition, and in this way the unity of the invisible church is presented across this entire spectrum. Such a widespread community, however, persists not only in that each grants validity to the scripturally proper baptism of the others, but persists also in that all have in common a stretch of history that for the most part extends further back than Scripture and the apostolic age. It persists, moreover, in that each is supportive of the others’ expanding themselves at the expense6 of the world beyond where Christians now live, and thus, even though they do not join together in other Christian works, they do, nonetheless, take up this work of broadening Christianity in community with each other.

1. Ed. note: In CF, Schleiermacher does not use the term “church union” but constantly endeavors to present theological grounds for unity in diversity. The true, genuinely distinctive “invisible,” Spirit-filled church is “one” (§§148–50 and 157– 58). In OR (1821), Schleiermacher indicates his change from preferring smaller ecclesial communities, stimulated by early successes in America, to gathering them, with acceptance of diversity, into larger unions. See OR (1821) IV, supplemental notes 18 and 24. 2. In §6. 3. Gesellschaften. Ed. note: That is, at that point one or both of them regards the other only as a social group (literally, as “societies”), not as Christian. 4. Augustine (354–430), On Faith and Works (ca. 413): “Such persons only make trouble for the church; they try to separate the cockle from the wheat before the appointed time. But because of their blindness they themselves rather are separated from union with Christ.” Ed. note: ET Lombardo (1988), 11–12; Migne Lat. 40:201. 5. Thus 1 John 4:5 may be understood as referring only to individuals of this sort. 6. Ed. note: Here “at the expense of “ translates auf Kosten der. Thus, presumably they do this mission work at no real loss or cost, or at no derogation from each other, though some non-Christians might experience such things. This would be the case, for example, when mission fields are pioneered by a single ecclesial community or when denominations divide

these fields among them. Cf. Brief Outline §298, also Schleiermacher’s accounts of Christian activities around the globe in his lectures on church geography and statistics (KGA II/16, 2005).

§152. Second Doctrinal Proposition: All divisions in the Christian church continue to exist only as temporary ones.1 1. If community is not completely suspended between parts of the church that are divided from each other, consequently if every division is only relative, one must also assume a twofold movement in each part, thinking of each one as a distinctive life. That is, sometimes a stronger emergence of a motivation toward unity is present, sometimes a receding of this motivation and an emergence of a motivation toward division. Now, already implied therein, in and of itself, is the possibility that an element of the unitive kind would coincide with the formation of a new contrasting position within the whole that could suppress the motivation toward division within this whole, a motivation very much at work up to then, with the result that a party within the church2 that had previously existed on its own might do one of two things. On the one hand, it might pitch itself entirely to one aspect of the new contrasting position, so that it becomes a part of that contrasting position, and along with it its previous character passes over as a merely subordinate feature. On the other hand, it might also split apart entirely, in that some of its members turn to one aspect of the new contrasting position and others to a different aspect. In the latter case, however, the original contrasting position will gradually be blunted, having been subsumed under the new one. Likewise, even when this process does not occur, if any other circumstance changes interest in this contrasting position, that contrasting position might become so blunted that it would no longer hold the power3 to keep a separated community together. On the other hand, we might presuppose the best that can be said of such a party in the church, that it rests on a spiritually distinctive character that is suited to its being a special organ of the Holy Spirit. Even in that case, such a community, spatially limited as it is, would have only a passing currency. By this token, it is still possible to take notice only of those social groups in which Christian piety assumes a particularized form in all respects. Moreover, its transitory nature must be all the more evident the more meager and unsatisfying the unity is that forms the kernel of a community. Therefore, no special social group within the church should ever be grounded in the distinctive nature of an especially prominent individual.4 Further, no special social group can count on lasting very long that has desired to rest only on divergent morals without a corresponding variance in doctrine or, in reverse, on particularly distinctive doctrines without any variance in its way of life. Divisions that have a physical basis and are limited by language and by affinity among a people are also among the more stable ones. However, in part, these natural forms are themselves transitory, and in part, Christianity has done things to promote community among different peoples and languages, more than is true elsewhere. Hence, the inner principles spurring division often overflow these boundaries; also, sometimes churches of different peoples and languages nevertheless unite into a like-minded and similarly shaped whole, and sometimes those that naturally belong together split up into opposing sides.5

2. From these observations it already follows, of itself, that even the zeal with which an individual adheres to one’s particular ecclesial community can be genuine only if that zeal remains enclosed within certain limits, in such a way that one is not deprived of full participation in the unity of the invisible church, which unity binds everything together. What is essential is that each individual has love for the particular form of Christianity, to which form one belongs only as a passing formation of the one imperishable church, which church includes within it one’s own temporal existence. This limitation is very remote from indifference, in that it positively proceeds from the fact that each individual stands in association with the entire church only through one’s own community. It is indeed distinguished from the partisan presupposition that is frequently present when some ecclesial opposition reaches a certain point, namely, where the opposition cannot be resolved unless the other side moves over to one’s own. The two extremes, which need not be dealt with here, we usually designate by the terms “indifferentism” and “proselytizing.” However, it is in no way indifferentism to remain unperturbed in face of the fact that a given form of Christianity, one that is already recognized in general terms to be transitory, will also perish one day. Rather, one can be charged with this fault of indifferentism only if one can conceive of one’s own relationship to the ecclesial community to which one adheres only as something arbitrary, not being conscious of any inner reason for deciding to be there. Likewise, just as little is the endeavor to commend one’s own ecclesial community to the members of another one in the most effective way possible what we would call a proselytizing attitude in the bad sense. This is the case, because otherwise both Christianity, in general, and even Evangelical Christianity, in particular, would have been subject to outright repudiation at their very origins. Instead, whenever we perceive a weakness or perversion of Christian piety in some other ecclesial community, that endeavor to commend one’s own community is grounded in the nature of the case. Indeed, the above-mentioned partisan presupposition assumes the very same thing in general terms; thus the same endeavor is organized by it as a general task with good reason, and we should not count such an endeavor to be non-Christian even in members of an opposing ecclesial community. Rather, the actually objectionable proselytizing attitude is that which both makes the expansion of a given ecclesial community into an unqualified purpose and which places demands on individuals as if they were mere means to that end.6

1. Ed. note: On separations, schism, and Schleiermacher’s rare use of the term “sects,” see also §2. 2. Partialkirche. Ed. note: That is, being party to certain notions or actions that themselves reflect partiality, separate and incomplete parties arise in the church possessing a partial nature (partial = partielle) as church in relation to the church as a whole. Correspondingly, as Schleiermacher observes, such parties tend either to retain a markedly limited perspective for a time or to eventually fade back into the whole. 3. Kraft. 4. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:12. Ed. note: In effect, this is the definition of a sect. 5. Ed. note: The sources of such observations are Schleiermacher’s own historical studies, which he recommended in Brief Outline as part of a well-rounded theological education. He lectured on a large part of these studies. For the contemporary period, these lectures included church geography and statistics. Cf. the corresponding KGA volumes and also related discussions in Brief Outline.

6. Ed. note: This general point is directly reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s by-then famous absolute, “categorical imperative” that human beings should be treated with respect, as belonging to “a kingdom of ends,” never merely as “means.” In the present context, however, the kingdom is specifically the reign of God, in which both recognition and formation of Christian community in the Spirit, on the one hand, and a corresponding loving respect even for individuals who may oppose us, on the other hand, together comprise the chief moral end. This perspective is immediately reflected in the way sinful error in the church is treated in the next proposition.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding the Capacity for Error in the Visible Church in Relation to the Unfailing Reliability of the Invisible Church

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §153. Just as error is possible in every part of the visible church and consequently is somehow really present there as well, so the corrective force1 of truth likewise does not fail to be present in any part. 1. To be sure, all error is an ingredient of sin to the extent that error is knowingly and willingly decided but is an act of thinking that does not correspond to what the thought is actually about. Thus, in general terms, its presence must be remedied or obviated by the progressive efficacious action of the Holy Spirit—not directly, but insofar as the Holy Spirit works against the sinful rudiments of error. Still, here the principal concern is with truth and error only in the religious domain. Now, if what was said about the absolute purity of Christ’s impulse above2 must also be applied to this subject, then error will also be possible everywhere, and indeed at every point, as much in the forming of religious notions as in the religious forming of our aims. This is so, for if a sensory stimulus falsifies a given aim unconsciously, at that point the willing that is directed to the process of forming a religious notion can also be falsified, and then the error must also be present in every aspect of the aim’s being carried out. Moreover, as long as the conception of our circumstances in the Christian church can be contaminated in this same manner, no aim can be formed free of error. As a result, no full, real element of life will exist in pure truth. Rather, a greater or lesser amount of error exists in what is true within every act of pious3 consciousness. Now, the entire course of error’s being mixed into the efficacious action of the Spirit of truth is reflected in the formulations just set forth. Moreover, at every point every individual will also find the source of falsification in oneself and, by virtue of one’s own consciousness, will have no doubt that error also becomes really present everywhere, even though in particular instances it can recede to something scarcely noticeable. However, it is just as certain that even though error has massively penetrated into particular regions of the Christian church, it is still unimaginable that any part of it that is organized as a separate whole could exist without some efficacious action of the Spirit of truth. That is to say, wherever recognition of Christ persists as the basis for a collective life, precisely in that way the basis is also already laid down for all worship of God in spirit and in

truth,4 even if the very disfigurement of worship is the most significant feature of such an organization. This situation already proceeds from the fact that in no branch of the visible church is recognition of Scripture and of the ministry of the divine Word missing, even where the sacraments are lacking to it or might be regarded as amiss on account of the abnormal way they are administered. Hence, in every ecclesial community there are, at the very least, some individuals who rise above the prevailing errors and bear in themselves the seeds of a more definite development of the truth. 2. Yet, since our proposition assumes that error is present everywhere, even if only infinitesimally so, in that way it might seem to contradict what we have earlier asserted regarding Scripture.5 That is to say, even if Scripture is subject to the possibility of error in such a manner that it would also contain error in some way or another, then it cannot be the norm for the production of all religious thoughts, for its normative dignity, if it were imparted to error, would have to spread and consolidate this error. Even worse, at that point truth would have to have a different firm locus within the church for the purpose of being able to turn the corrective power of truth against errors contained in Scripture itself. However, in our present reflection we have to do not with Scripture as it lies before us today but with its origination. Moreover, in the first place, we will be able readily to grant, connecting well with what was said there, that even in the apostles’ production of religious thoughts the general possibility of error would have been realized in isolated instances without its penetrating into Scripture as a whole on that account, given that Scripture was assembled under the guidance of the Holy Spirit precisely as a collection of writings that were most error-free. Indeed, Scripture itself gives us testimony6 of how human error existed even in the apostles’ thinking as a transient phenomenon and, accordingly, enables us to have a sense of how the initial stimuli of error might also have been distorted, perhaps often, before the influence of those stimuli could come to light. Accordingly, in the second place, we might well need to admit also of Scripture itself, so as not wholly to suspend the natural connection of it with all other writings, that in the many sorts of continuous subordinate thoughts which were not taken up but, nevertheless, which belonged to the production of thoughts by the writers of holy writ, slight traces of human erring would have been discoverable. Moreover, this presence of error would not at all inveigh against either their normative dignity or against the activity of the Holy Spirit in their conception.

1. Ed. note: berichtigenden Kraft. See also §149. On reformation to and within Christianity, see OR (1821) V, supplementary note 12. 2. §110.3. Ed. note: In the final subsection to that proposition, which introduces the doctrine of sanctification, Schleiermacher summarizes this “impulse,” or “impetus,” as follows. It is one that comes from “the divine power in Christ” and the accompanying “willingness to be in community with Christ.” This impulse, he indicates, contains both “an element that remains the same [gleichbleibendes] and a varying [wechselndes] element.” The first element, which remains the same, is comprised of “an ever-renewing will for the reign of God, as it underlay all particular actions and acts of will in Christ, likewise … the consciousness of the union of the divine being with human nature through Christ as it was also the same within Christ viewed as the determinations of his self-consciousness.” This means “participation in his blessedness, … absolute contentment [Befriedigung], … participation in his absolute perfection,” “in the strength [Kräftigkeit] of all that is

good” over against sin. Moreover, this pure impulse from Christ leads to joy over against the sorrow, regret, and humility that exist on account of sin. 3. Ed. note: Here, for the first time in this proposition, the adjective is frommen, normally translated “religious” here. Just above, “religious” translates religösen, referring, respectively, to the religious domain (Gebiet), religious notions (Vorstellungen), religious forming (Bildung) of aims, and the process of forming a religious notion (Vorstellen). 4. Anbetung. Ed. note: The reference is to John 4:24. 5. In §§129 and 131. 6. Acts 10:14; 16:7; and Gal. 2:11.

§154. First Doctrinal Proposition. No presentation of Christian piety that issues from the visible church bears in itself pure and perfect truth. 1. If Scripture itself is not actually a presentation proceeding from the visible church but, rather, has first served to constitute the visible church, to that extent it does not belong within the sphere our proposition covers. Yet, someone could well object that, precisely as a consequence of the principles set forth there, error would be transmitted to the lowest degree in all orderly actions, thus also in the appointment of those who are officially charged with purification of existing notions so as to communicate Christian truth. To be sure, if these persons also remain subject to error, each regarded in and of oneself alone, the ruling force1 of the common spirit would thereby have to be vouchsafed in this occupation so that the false tendencies of individuals would reciprocally cancel each other out in the community. However, it would belong to this situation that every such tendency would also find its exact counterweight in some other tendency. Now, if all possible tendencies do indeed exist within the whole as well, but the whole is already partitioned by internal differences, the one-sidedness of any one such part cannot be overcome within the part itself; rather, each portion of the church can err even in its official presentations. However, it does not yet follow from this observation that if the church were undivided at some time or other, pure and complete truth would automatically be offered in those official presentations. The reason is that not all tendencies that might cancel each other out exist in the church at the same time; rather, at any given time one-sided views also exist in the church that can be overcome only in a succeeding period. Indeed, suppose that we would have to assert that the justification for the arising of the Evangelical church rests in the fact that there could be an original, unofficial reforming influence of specially inspired individuals upon the whole. Then it already follows from this admission that it was not the capacity for reformation2 that was seated in the official organization of the whole but the need for reformation. This is a situation that can arise anywhere and that can recur periodically, wherever and as long as the relationship between the whole and certain individuals to each other vacillates between a predominate self-initiating activity of either one and a predominate receptivity of the other. 2. Now, generally, no definition of a doctrine that is conceived, even in the most complete state of community, can thus be viewed as unreformable3 and valid for all times on that account. So, that is true, above all, of doctrines that have arisen due to controversy, as the presentation of a greater or lesser majority, in that in a controversy everything that induces

error is stirred up most of all. Hence, on the one hand, no one can be bound to acknowledge the content of such presentations as Christian truth, except insofar as they are also the expression of one’s own religious consciousness or are commended to oneself by their scriptural character. On the other hand, according to the measure of one’s strengths and resources, the reformation of public doctrine remains an occupation the exercise of which every individual has the duty, and thus also the right, to join through examination of whatever concepts and statements have been set forth. One must not be impeded in carrying out this occupation. However, of itself there nonetheless extends throughout the entire course of this occupation an agreement as to the basic principles, according to which principles and in the meaning of which principles error is to be opposed—except that even this agreement can gradually form within each church only once the church has learned how to gain a clear knowledge of itself. Accordingly, we will ever prize the fact that as it came into being, the Evangelical church did not choose to submit itself to the decision of a general council of the church in regard to doctrines that were in dispute. However, we can no longer prize its having, nevertheless, immediately resumed adherence to the collected ecumenical confessions, which are still nothing but products of similar councils that were, moreover, occasioned by disunity and consequently were not especially suited to meting out truth. It is likewise to be prized that the onetime status of convictions was laid down in brief confessional writings for Christendom as a whole, whereby reforming influence upon the whole first took a firm hold; but it is not to be prized that by means of these very writings people subsequently wanted to impede the very undertaking from which these writings had emerged, as if these writings were themselves unreformable.

1. Ed. note: waltende Kraft. 2. Verbesserung. Ed. note: Literally, this word means simply “improvement.” 3. Ed. note: unverbesserlich. This subsection seems to be as close as Schleiermacher gets to the classic saying reformata sed semper reformanda (“reformed but ever reforming”), though the attitude suffuses his historically oriented theological work. His major writings on confessional and church union issues (1817–1831) have been translated and introduced by Iain G. Nicol (2004).

§155. Second Doctrinal Proposition. All errors that are generated in the visible church are eventually overcome by the truth that is continually at work in it. 1. This proposition hangs so closely together with the just previous one that in general terms an objection cannot very well be made to it. If error, no matter how severe it may be, relates to truth only in the way described, then in every organic part of the whole church, error must be diminished the more the Holy Spirit appropriates the organism of thought.1 Error is restrained, moreover, by two sorts of influence, each of which may prevail differently at different times. First, error is restrained within an individual who is erring in a particular fashion through the influence of a public mode of thinking that then takes hold of the individual from all sides. Second, error is also restrained within a mass of people, this time

through the influence of spiritually accomplished individuals, an influence that is constantly spreading a clear consciousness on the matter. However, if anyone thinks that in addition to this error in the truth2 there also exists in Christendom an error exclusive of all truth and that, on that account, some other path must be struck with regard to that additional kind of error, then the matter is as follows. Notions can exist that issue from an incomplete faith in Christ. Notions can also exist that are directed against those who give witness to a more complete faith in Christ. The truth that ever remains the same within the church nevertheless underlies both kinds of notion. On the other hand, thoughts and rules of life exist that do not at all issue from Christian consciousness. Of these particular thoughts and rules of life, moreover, one thus cannot say that they are simply errors in the truth. Furthermore, one also cannot say that these thoughts and rules of life belong to the domain of Christendom simply to the extent that they are in those persons who have fostered them and in whom a dominion of the Christian spirit has already been introduced from elsewhere. This would be so, in that a distinct consciousness of that influence would not yet be present. That is to say, where no relation whatsoever to this spirit exists, there also exists at that time and place no part of the visible church. In that situation, moreover, the church has to do with particular incorrect notions only to the extent that these notions can yield a point of connection for its broadening activity. In the first of these two cases, however, even if the error in question as yet appears to have no rudiment of Christian truth in it whatsoever, it still rates as a precursor of that Christian spirit, for there is already present in it a point at which Christian consciousness can begin to develop.3 2. Obviously, however, our proposition cannot intend to designate any particular time. Rather, in the history of Christendom one can certainly point out significant periods in which error has developed and has taken the upper hand while, in contrast, truth was repulsed. However, such phenomena are fitted more to motivating a different judgment concerning previous conditions that were apparently more favorable than to justifying the belief that truth had vanished from the church or had only been partially lost, a belief that would not comport with faith in4 the reign of Christ. Moreover, in the visible church everything can be traced back to the fact that the advancement of truth and the overcoming of error by truth assumes a twofold shape. The one shape emerges when truth gradually destroys error that stands over against it. The other shape emerges when error that is attached, unconsciously,5 to the very expression of truth is, with all its effects, detached from the truth and, although the truth might seem to have lost something of its power and efficacy, truth is indeed clarified6 to the end of its exercising greater efficacy. Independently of this process, history frequently depicts an apparent diminishment of the sphere of truth by revolt,7 in which overwhelming external force is ordinarily at work.8 If revolt is not apparent, however, then Christianity was also merely apparent earlier, in that it is not possible to imagine any interconnection at all between some power of this sort and the state of community of life with Christ. Along this path, therefore, no repression9 of Christian consciousness whatsoever can be brought about, much less a total disappearance of it.

1. Organismus des Denkens. 2. Ed. note: Here the same German preposition governs a relation of error to truth with the Christian domain and the relation of faith with respect to Christ: an (which mainly connotes a direction or approach toward), not in (which mainly connotes a specific location in, into, or within). However, generally only the English word “in” is available for translating an, though in some instances, as here, one could say “moving toward.” 3. Ed. note: The set of problems to which Schleiermacher is addressing himself at this point prominently includes relations to other religions, already partly addressed within his fifth discourse in On Religion. See also his references to preparatory grace elsewhere in the present work, most immediately in §156.3. 4. Ed. note: Here again, the preposition is an, and thus the meaning of the word Glaube must shift from mere “belief “ to an inner condition of relationship called “faith,” which indeed includes and necessarily presupposes certain beliefs but is not confined to or exclusively defined by them. 5. Ed. note: unbewußt. This is one of those occasional important junctures at which Schleiermacher affirms activities, and corresponding impulses and motives, that do not immediately rise to consciousness but are nonetheless held in the mind unconsciously. This affirmation, then, is of critical significance for his ability to expect confidence in the ongoing presence of the invisible church, for what has been held unconsciously may, or does somehow, eventually rise to consciousness. In this confident awareness, selectively applied, Schleiermacher is a clear-cut precursor of Sigmund Freud (1856–1940). In part, his point concerning how error can be unconsciously attached to truth is illustrated by the very fact that he could not possibly be aware of such a relationship. Formally, with respect to truth and error, the same process occurs in philosophy and science as well as in religious faith. What Freud and his successors have done is to define further basic dynamics of unconscious processes and, while no doubt both committing and correcting some errors of their own, also to clarify and refine what is true about those dynamics and processes. 6. Ed. note: More literally, sich läutert means cleansed, purified, or refined. 7. Abfall. Ed. note: Literally, a falling off—in the areas of belief or faith: decline. 8. Ed. note: aüssere Gewalt wirksam ist. 9. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher employs a term that has distinct military overtones, Zurückgedrängt werden, “to be forced back.” Later psychological research came to employ verdrängen and Verdrängung for “repressing” and “repression.”

Postscript to These Two Points of Doctrine §156. The claim that the true church began at the outset of the human race and remains one and the same to the very end of the human race must not be taken to mean that the Christian church, properly so called, is itself only part of a larger whole. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) VII: “It is also taught that at all times there must be and remain one holy Christian church. It is the assembly of all believers among whom the gospel is purely preached and the holy sacraments are administered according to the gospel.”1 (2) Apology Augsburg (1531) VII: “Paul distinguishes the people of the law in this way: the church is a spiritual people. … Among the people of the law, in addition to the promise about Christ, those born according to the flesh had promises regarding physical well-being, political affairs, etc. … the people according to the gospel are only those who receive this promise of the Spirit.”2 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XVII: “Because God, from the beginning, would have men to be saved … it is altogether necessary that there always should have been, and should be now, and to the end of the world, a Church. … This Church militant was set up differently before the law among the patriarchs, otherwise under

Moses by the Law, and differently by Christ through the Gospel. … here we acknowledge a diversity of times and a diversity in the signs of the promised and delivered Christ.”3 (4) Scots Confession (1560) V: “We … believe that God … called to life his Kirk in all ages from Adam till the coming of Christ Jesus in the flesh.”4 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XXVII: “We believe … one catholic church. … This church hath been from the beginning of the world and will be to the end thereof.”5 1. Not only do the last three confessional writings cited from the Reformed side express the unity of the Old Testament and New Testament church, but the same is the case on the Lutheran side as well. This is so, for even if one wanted to draw from the Augsburg Confession to the contrary, the same sense of the matter is undeniably present in its authentic explanation, the Apology. Only in the Saxon Confession does Melanchthon appear to be more cautious, in that he does not extend beyond the time of Christ’s birth with his examples. However, if this move appears to be actually intentional, it also appears to be rather less consistent, in that, nevertheless, Christ could not as yet have exercised any redemptive efficacious action on Simeon, Hannah, and the others mentioned there.6 Rather, after the pattern of Simeon’s belief, Melanchthon too was indisputably thinking of the messianic belief of earlier times. Now, if one were actually supposed to understand the unity of the church from the very beginning of humanity onward, as one of these cited passages seems to do—that is, in such a way that Christ was for the third period of humanity what Moses was for the second period, then our divergence from these passages in the confessional symbols would widen still further. If we then recall what we said earlier,7 the matter comes down to defining more exactly the difference between our proposition and that of the passages cited from the confessional symbols. We proceed from both sets of passages by asserting that the church would exist only where faith in Christ is present. Yet, the latter set of confessional symbols holds that this church would exist already from the beginning of the world, whereas we hold that the church would begin only with the personal efficacious action of Christ. Thus, the second set of confessional symbols would have to assume that faith in Christ would have existed before his personal efficacious action, whereas we condition that faith in Christ upon this personal efficacious action of Christ and thus derive that faith from it. So, this is the first point to be settled. Doing so, however, is interconnected with the fact that both sets of passages proceed, at the same time, from the assertion that faith generates blessedness.8 Yet, whereas the second set of confessional symbols claims that the personal efficacious action of Christ would not be necessary to bring about the blessedness of human beings, we, on the other hand, claim that the love of God that generates blessedness would not have become effective until the appearance of Christ. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether a choice would really have to be made between these two assumptions and, in the pertinent case, on what basis the

choice would have to be decided. Since these statements, viewed in and of themselves, are not predicated on our immediate self-consciousness, we can only indicate even of our own statement here, by virtue of its negative form, that it has arisen only with reference to claims that are foreign to us, whereas, for the comparison that is to be made, no other criterion can be acknowledged than an agreement with what has already been established as an expression of our immediate self-consciousness. 2. Now, as concerns the first point, we have already established9 that for us the Old Testament prophecies cannot be grounds for faith on account of their being fulfilled—not in the sense that we would have had faith in Christ because he had been foretold in the way in which he had later been found to be. This is the case, in that in our Evangelical sense this foretelling of the messiah cannot be a ground for faith at all. To be sure, this difference does not obviate against the promises’ having been able to serve as a ground of blessedness for human beings before Christ’s appearance. That is, presupposing a sharpened consciousness of sinfulness and of the need for redemption, if a redeemer would then be promised, people could fix their longing upon that promise, and an anticipatory feeling10 of a future blessedness in his company could arise, which as a shared joy could, in a certain sense, overcome an individual’s own lack of blessedness. However, this concession is but to a life in the shadows, a presentiment11 of the Christian church but not the Christian church itself. This is so, for we are simply saying that this church would never exist except where faith exists, inasmuch as this faith is one’s whole appropriation of Christ and inasmuch as Christ’s existence is, at the same time, essentially of a community-forming nature. Indeed, here one can, in a certain sense, admit to an appropriation of Christ’s blessedness but not to an appropriation of his perfection. Moreover, that faith in the messianic promises never, at any time, became community-forming under the old covenant; rather, it is historically quite clear that community there rested entirely on the law. For that reason, the distinction is not exhausted if one simply admits that different symbols were used at the time of the promised messiah and at the time when the messiah actually appeared. Rather, even faith itself became different between the two times, and at the time when law prevailed, the true faith of the New Testament was only something that lay in the future.12 Moreover, even what has been conceded thus far cannot be proven, namely, that the messianic promises in the old covenant really contained the concept of a redeemer in the sense we have assumed it to have, in keeping with the books of confessional symbols, or that they applied that concept to the consciousness of sin in the sense we have also conceived it to have. Suppose, however, that one not only wants to make this assertion but also wants to equate faith before Christ’s appearance with our own, this also in relation to the perfection of Christ that is effective in us and our bond of love as brethren. Then one would also have to concede that those who heard the promise were in a position not only to form the concept of sinless perfection itself from very incomplete indications but also to put that concept into effect. Moreover, this concession obviously leads to the conclusion that Christ’s real

appearance would not have been necessary for our attaining blessedness but that merely the promise of it would have had to be kept alive. 3. Now, in that we are able to obtain so little agreement on this matter, no less unsatisfactory a yield might seem to follow from our claim that human beings did not attain to blessedness prior to Christ’s appearance. However, in face of the inference that the love of God generating blessedness would have begun only with Christ’s appearance, we must restrict ourselves, precisely in accordance with our own basic principles, to saying that only the temporal appearance of this love that generates blessedness would not have begun earlier. We have no objection, however, to acknowledging the point in this form, for we simply find ourselves to be in the same situation as the whole human race, a situation in which every individual still finds oneself even today: only in regeneration does one attain to a partaking of love that generates blessedness.13 That is, up to Christ’s appearance the whole human race was in the condition of living under preparatory grace—the whole of it, not exclusively the entire series that the Jewish historical books take us through from Adam through the patriarchs to the founding of Mosaism.14 This is the case, for this preparatory grace has everywhere been in evidence, where and in the measure that the effects of divine sanctification and righteousness were present, and from this point outward we too preserve the same equal status of Jew and Gentile from which Paul also proceeded. The way in which Paul relates Christ’s appearance to the promise and faith of Abraham is also in accord with this view, more than might appear at first glance, namely, in that preparatory divine grace has not been revealed in a special or exclusive way in any statutory law. Rather, it has been revealed preeminently in the fact that a lasting abode had to be preserved for monotheism and in the fact that action on this basis is faith—faith that can also just as well be viewed as obedience. For this reason, moreover, faith was accounted to Abraham as righteousness when he then became an instrument of preparatory divine grace and when, in this relation to what was to come, he could, by that same grace, become an object of the divine good pleasure. Hence, in this manner it is also possible to assume a justification for Christ’s sake15 before Christ’s appearance, one that is analogous to a blessedness contained in shared feeling regarding the future: consequently, it is possible to assume scattered features of the church before Christ’s appearance but not the church itself. Suppose, on the other hand, that someone holds, instead of this claim, that there would have been a true church from the beginning of the human race onward, simply the view that from the beginning onward there would have been no other originator of blessedness for human beings and no other basis for the divine good pleasure toward human beings than Christ. In that case, no objection is to be raised against this latter position.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 42; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 61. 2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 176; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 236f. 3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 261f.; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 271–25; cf. §37n3. 4. Ed. note: ET drawn from the original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 442, also Cochrane (1972), 167; cf. an inferior Latin version in Niemeyer (1840), 342, and a closely related ET by Bulloch (1960). 5. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 416f., also Cochrane (1972), 208; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 379.

6. Saxon Confession (= Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551) in Symbole (1816), 164, CR 28:409: “Nevertheless, in that assembly there are many who are not holy but who agree about true teaching, just as in the time of Mary these were the church: Zachariah, Simeon, Elizabeth, Mary, Anna, the shepherds and many others who were agreeing about pure teaching and were listening not to the Sadducees or Pharisees but to Zachariah, Simeon, Anna, Mary and the like.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. 7. In §12.2. Ed. note: Under §12 Schleiermacher presents an argument supporting the position that Christianity is not “a transformation or a renewing continuation of Judaism” any more than would be true of its relation to Gentile religion, with the sole exception that ordinarily Gentile converts would first have to adopt a form of monotheism directly from Christianity, while Jews would not. Abraham’s faith, for example, was in acceptance of a “promise” from God to him and his people of what was to come, whereas Christianity represents God’s “fulfillment” of a different and larger promise in Christ on behalf of all humanity. More specifically, in §12.2 Schleiermacher elaborates on this position as follows. In Christ, and then by the Holy Spirit, what God reveals is certainly “suprarational” in that it does not depend on reason alone, but it is not “absolutely suprarational” in that this divine Spirit is “the supreme enhancement of human reason” and is ultimately to be “completely at one” with reason. Thus, in §13 he argues for the position that there is simply no gradual transition to Christianity from Jewish or Gentile religion, nor is there any homogeneity between them and Christianity. All other socalled revelation tends to be restricted in some fashion, whereas that which is brought through Christianity, though perfectly natural, is alone able to lift the entire human race into a higher life. 8. Ed. note: The theme of what makes for blessedness runs through the entirety of Part Two. To trace the thread, see, for example, §§87, 90.1, 91.2, 101, 106.1–2, 109.3–4, 110.3, 121.3, 137.2, 159.3, 162.3, and 163. 9. In §14.P.S. 10. Vorgefühl. 11. Ed. note: Here “presentiment” translates Ahnung while, as indicated in the previous note, “anticipatory feeling” translates Vorgefühl. For the distinction, see §146n1. 12. Cf. Gal. 3:22–23. Ed. note: Sermon on Gal. 3:21–23, Dec. 10, 1820, SW II.2 (1834), 21–35. 13. Seligmachende Liebe. Ed. note: That is, God’s grace effected in and through Christ. 14. Mosaismus. 15. Ed. note: eine Rechtfertigung um Christi willen. That is, a being made righteous in God’s sight, in accordance with the redemption to come through Christ.

Division Three

Regarding the Consummation of the Church [Introduction to Division Three] §157. Since the church cannot attain its consummation within the course of human life on the earth, the depiction of its consummated state is immediately useful only as a pattern that we are to approximate. 1. In and of itself, the sufficient ground for this consummation of the church lies in the Holy Spirit, viewed as the vital principle of the church’s common life.1 However, since the Holy Spirit’s efficacious action is subject to the law of temporal life, that consummation can occur only when all resistance is vanquished, in such a way that within the sphere of the Holy Spirit’s efficacious action nothing that counteracts it temporally remains, and thus all influences of the world upon the church are at an end. For this to happen, it would first have to be presupposed that Christianity will have spread over the entire earth2 and indeed in such a way that no other mode of faith would exist

as an organized community any longer. That is to say, as long as these outdated and incomplete forms of religion still exist alongside Christianity and want to persist alongside the church, their adherents will also be so deeply stamped with their character that when Christianity takes hold of them, individually or collectively, they will bring with them much that is corrupt, even if unconsciously, from which separations and errors will emerge. Now, our self-consciousness attests to the fact that, in general terms, the emergence of faith in the Redeemer is conditioned not by any influence in particular but by the shared consciousness of sin that can be awakened in all and, on account of the selfsameness of human nature, by the general capacity to receive a specific impression from the Redeemer as well. Thus, we hope that this spread of Christianity over the mass of humanity will accelerate as the majestic presence of Christ is reflected ever more clearly in the church itself.3 Hence, the possibility is undeniable that this end might yet occur in the course of human affairs, but human procreation does not cease as this course proceeds and sin unfolds anew in each generation.4 Consequently, even if it is posited that the more the power of sin loses its sway, the more it is pushed back and the more easily it is broken, then the church still repeatedly takes the world into itself in this manner. Hence, the church also constantly stands in conflict, as was described earlier, and therefore never reaches consummation. Now, it is customary to call the church wrapped in conflict the church militant, in part, because it must defend itself against the world and, in part, because it must seek to overcome the world. On the other hand, precisely for the reason that it is imagined as in a state of consummation, it is termed the church triumphant, because at that point what was the world is in this sense engulfed by the church and no longer exists as the church’s antagonist. 2. Thus, from our standpoint, strictly taken, no doctrine of the church’s consummation can arise for us, since our Christian self-consciousness flatly cannot say anything about this situation, which for us is entirely unfamiliar. This is so, for since we have also recognized Christ to be the end of prophecy,5 this already implies that the church too recognizes no gift of the Spirit for prefiguring a future on which—because it lies beyond all things human—our activity can have no influence whatsoever. Indeed, we could hardly conceive such a picture, or hold it clearly in mind, for lack of any analogy. Given that these prefigurings do, nonetheless, take up a lot of room in the church, we are still obliged to inquire as to their source before drumming them out of our presentation. Now, the first task here is to refer to prophecies regarding the church’s consummation in the New Testament, all of which prophecies we must, in any case, trace back to Christ’s utterances that are prophetic in nature. Now, suppose that these utterances were to be handled in accordance with the rules,6 and would, nonetheless, never be viewed as genuine faith propositions. Suppose, too, that these utterances would be handled only as statements that we take on testimony but that do not stand in such a close connection with our faith as do similar ones that concern the person of the Redeemer. Then we would also hardly be able to find a place for such statements within our account of faith-doctrines, and, without exception, we would do this only as they concern the Redeemer and our relationship to him. These statements are also not faith-doctrines inasmuch as their content, overstepping our mental

capacity as it does, is no description of our actual self-consciousness. Yet, the matter looks different when, apart from their leading us beyond our own real conditions, we stick by our proviso that they should contain nothing of what is derived from influences of the world in our present circumstances. That the world should be curtailed, even beyond what the cooperation of any one individual could achieve, is ever the object of our prayers, and accordingly the church consummate is the locus of the final answer to these prayers. Consequently, this notion is rooted in our Christian self-consciousness as the community that human nature shares with Christ, a community that persists under entirely unfamiliar and only waveringly imaginable conditions, but also persists as the community that can alone be thought to be fully free of all that has its basis in the resistance of the flesh against the spirit.

1. Ed. note: als dem gemeinsamen Lebensprinzip. As before, “principle” here means originative driving force. Regarding the Holy Spirit, see §116n1. 2. Rom. 11:25–26. 3. Eph. 1:22–23 and 2:21–22. Ed. note: Sermon outline only on Eph. 2:19–21, preparatory service, Saturday, Aug. 5, 1797, Bauer (1908), 328–30. The images in these passages indicate an exalted leading presence of Christ throughout the whole, thus here Herrlichkeit is rendered not in its usual sense of awesome “glory” or “splendor” but in the sense of majesty, of Christ as Lord. 4. Ed. note: See the accounts of “original” and “actual” sin in §§66–74. There it is made clear that original sin is due to and transmitted by acts of free will, not by the process of procreation as such. Every newborn enters into the collective life of sin, variously carried from generation to generation as “original” sin, and every child contributes “actual” sin to the mix by one’s own self-initiated activity. 5. See §103.3. 6. Regeln der Kunst. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, every form of art, craft, or discourse requires rules proper to its aims and contents—as, for example, rules for proper communication in the church, notably in practical theology.

§158. Just as faith in the continuing existence of the human person is already contained in faith in the immutability of the union of the divine being with human nature in the person of Christ, so for the Christian there emerges out of that faith the inclination to form a notion of a state after death. 1. The opinion expressed in our proposition cannot be read as if belief in the continuation of personal existence1 after death—or, as we are generally used to expressing it, in “the immortality of the soul”—would have to have arisen precisely in this way, since traces of this belief are to be met with everywhere and, in particular, this belief was predominate among the Jewish people at the times of Christ and the apostles. Rather, our statement simply means that without the connection identified here, the belief could not find any place within our account of Christian faith-doctrine.2 Likewise, all of our preceding deliberations have been presented and demonstrated wholly without any connection with this belief, and only a single doctrinal proposition, that regarding the ascension of Christ, which was also indirect in nature, even alludes to it. As a result, anyone who has found one’s Christian selfconsciousness portrayed in our presentation thus far must also grant the following. Presupposing the facts of Christianity and what we have told of it, out of the consciousness of sin that acknowledges the need for redemption, there can develop faith in the Redeemer in

the way described here, and out of that faith, communication of Christ’s blessedness can also develop in each moment of life, even at the last instant, even if we would have had no intimation3 of a state after death. Accordingly, the question very naturally arises as to whether and along what path this belief in an afterlife would have come to be associated with our religious self-consciousness if the Redeemer had not adopted and sanctioned that belief. In this connection, moreover, only one twofold possibility becomes apparent. Either the continuation of personal existence would have been conveyed as truth by cognitive activity, thus by way of objective consciousness, or it would originally have been imparted to us in our immediate self-consciousness, whether essentially bound to Godconsciousness, which underlies everything here, or of itself and independent of God-consciousness. Now, as concerns the first option, at that point this doctrine would belong to a higher level of natural science, and surety regarding it could exist only among those who had mastered procedure belonging to this science, with the result that others could have possessed the doctrine only at second hand. This, however, is patently not how the matter stands. Rather, it is undeniable that in the scientific domain this belief has been just as vigorously impugned by some, in fact repeatedly afresh, as it has been defended by others. Indeed, anyone who has more closely examined the so-called rational proofs for immortality would hardly be able to believe that the notion itself is a product of this domain. Rather, it has come from some other source in some way or another, and science has then sought to combine it with its other findings. Moreover, by the nature of the matter, such a procedure also would have to remain ever open to criticism. Hence, a presentation of faith-doctrine could never be justified in adopting these proofs if it wants to make any broader use of the notion of immortality. Even less, however, could it be obligated to examine the notion and make up for the notion’s deficiencies. Instead, a presentation of faith-doctrine would have to wait until the notion is established scientifically, leaving the matter undecided until then, since otherwise presentation of faith-doctrine would be made dependent on a philosophical position still in dispute. Now, as concerns the other option, if belief in immortality were, in general terms, coherent with God-consciousness, it would have been a great mistake not to have explicated it then and there. However, this mistake would already have been remarked on and avenged, which has certainly not been the case. Precisely this fact, moreover, cannot predispose us to assume such a coherence between the two. To be sure, there does indeed exist a nonreligious denial of immortality, one that coheres with a denial of God’s existence, since both denials are inherent in the materialistic or atomistic way of thinking. However, there likewise exists an entirely different renunciation of any continuation of personal existence after death, a position far remote from that which regards spiritual activities4 simply as material phenomena and subordinates spirit to matter. This position asserts instead that, in strictly real terms, spirit is the power that engenders living matter and conforms that matter to itself. That is to say, from this point of view it is possible to claim two things at once: on the one hand, that God-consciousness would constitute the essence of every life that is, in the higher sense, self-conscious or rational, but, on the other hand, also that if the spirit is essentially immortal

in this productive activity, the individual soul is but a passing action of this productive activity, consequently is likewise essentially ephemeral. Accordingly, any supposed action of this sort that would reach beyond the distinct point of development and the distinct region of human existence to which it belongs would lose its meaning. Any dominion of Godconsciousness that would also require the purest morality and the most elevated spirituality in life would be completely compatible with such a renunciation of any continuation of personal existence after death. Now, we must also recognize that, to be sure, some people do hold to a belief in the continuation of personal existence that corresponds to the spirit of piety in general terms, a belief that views the presence of Godconsciousness in the human soul as the reason why it cannot share in the general destiny of transient existence. This belief, however, is likewise not a religious one, for how is this belief to be at all akin to God-consciousness if it proceeds solely from an interest in the sensory contents of life, even if this interest is refined to a certain degree? That is always the case, moreover, when immortality is postulated for the purpose of recompense, in that it is presupposed that no pure and immediate tendency toward piety and morality would exist, but each of these would be sought only as a means to attain to complete happiness5 on the other side. Hence, if it must be conceded that there is a way to reject any continuation of personal existence beyond death and that with such rejection one can be more suffused with God-consciousness than by way of accepting that continuation, then no claim to an interconnection between this belief and God-consciousness, regarded in itself, can be sustained any longer. 2. It may well be claimed, however, that belief in the continuation of personal existence after death coheres with our faith in the Redeemer. That is to say, if he ascribes such a continuation to himself in all that he says regarding his return or reunion with his own, and given that he can say this of himself only as a human person, since only as such could he also share in community with his followers, so, by implication, the same must be true of us as well. This is the case, by virtue of the selfsameness of human nature in him and in us. However obvious this point may seem, we must still investigate whether and what sort of objections can be raised against it as well, be they then against the correctness of the presupposition or against the legitimacy of the inference. Objections of the first sort could refer only to a deviant explanation of Christ’s discourses, and to that extent they would also not be adjudged here at all but would devolve to the art of interpretation. Meanwhile, this much would be proper to say here: Suppose that someone should want to claim, in good faith, that all the discourses of Christ that are pertinent here were to be understood as figurative and as inauthentic in some fashion, and that Christ would not therein ascribe to himself any personal continuation at all after death. Therewith, a faith in Christ as it has been presented here would certainly remain possible— for even though the disclaiming of personal continuation after death just described would then be something common to both Christ and ourselves, nonetheless the distinctive difference between Christ and ourselves would not necessarily be suspended on that account. However, if such a mode of interpretation should ever gain currency in the church and

underlie Christian faith, then a thoroughgoing transformation of Christianity would, nonetheless, have to emerge from this fact. Moreover, it is already implied in this kind of inference that we do not presuppose that such an interpretation could be made in good faith. The matter would not be greatly different if someone wanted to place in doubt the legitimacy of the inference drawn,6 on the ground that even if Christ ascribed to himself personal continuation beyond death, he would simply have adopted this ascription from the belief that then prevailed, without any distinct conviction of his own, and also would simply have made use of this opinion as he did in similar cases. In consequence, his expressions on this matter would not belong to those that cohered with Christ’s certainty concerning his dignity and destiny—they would not belong in such a way that faith in either his dignity or his destiny would not be possible without accepting these expressions as well. That is to say, hardly anyone would be able honestly to claim that Christ would likewise also simply have dismissed the Sadducees’ position, without his having conviction of his own on the matter, and that his belief in the irresistible advancement of his word7 would have been independent of his belief in the continuation of his personal existence after his death. Now, if a firm conviction regarding this matter on Christ’s part is not denied, then the only objection anyone could still want to raise is that from the continuation of Christ’s personal existence after death, in which we would then have to believe with him, nothing follows for our own death. That is, nothing would follow for us inasmuch as his continuation would rest only on what is distinctive about him, on the union of the divine being with human nature, itself exclusively formative of his human person. Moreover, one would therefore have to say that precisely because and insofar as the Redeemer is immortal, this would not be true of all other human beings. This explanation, however, would be docetic— granted in a particular way but still unqualifiedly docetic. This is the case, for the distinction between an immortal soul and a mortal soul cannot alone consist in or alone be made intelligible by the consideration that at some point or other the one soul really does die; rather from the outset, always and in every respect, the activities and conditions of the one soul would have to be different from those of the other souls. Hence, if the Redeemer’s soul were imperishable but ours were perishable, then it could not rightly be said that as a human being he was like us in all things except sin. That is, if one wanted to say that originally it was certainly of the nature of the human soul to be immortal, but the passing on of sin to each soul would have made it mortal, then it follows that the entire original work of God would have been destroyed by sin and that something else would have had to take the place of that work. Hence, we would also have to dismiss out of hand the bifurcation that some want to assume, namely, that all souls will indeed die from sin and in death will be lost with the body, but through community of life with Christ, the faithful would obtain a share in immortality and with him would press through death into life. This position is untenable, for it bears one or the other of two unacceptable implications. Either the position refers back to a presupposition that is Manichean in spirit and holds that those who do not attain to community of life with Christ could also, already on that account, never become immortal.

Or if the others are by nature the same as they are, then through regeneration even nature itself would have to have become entirely different, in every way. Thus, nothing else remains except to hold that if we reckon the Redeemer’s expressions concerning the eternal continuation of his personal existence beyond death to be an aspect of the complete truth he represents, as his disciples undeniably did, then all members of the human race have that continuation to look forward to. In this way, however, the Redeemer certainly also remains the mediator of immortality, only not alone for those who have already had faith in him here but for everyone without exception. This conclusion is understandable, first, in the sense that if personal continuation beyond death did not belong to human nature, then a union of the divine being with human nature to form a personal existence such as that of the Redeemer also would not have been possible. Second, the other way around, because God had chosen to complete and to redeem human nature through such a union, on that account from the outset individual human beings also would always have had to bear within themselves the same immortality of which the Redeemer was conscious. This bearing the same immortality within themselves comprises the true Christian surety regarding this belief. Every other guarantee for this belief, even if it were more graphically clear than previous attempts would lead us to expect, would nonetheless remain alien to the Christian as such, until such time as this belief would belong, as it were, to those notions that would constitute the full-orbed general conviction of humankind. 3. Now, in a natural fashion this faith is indeed accompanied by an effort to form and establish a graphic intimation of the state of personal existence after death. However, we cannot make even the least claim that up to a certain point we would succeed in such a venture. That is to say, the question concerning the condition of that existence after death, acquaintance with which would nonetheless have to underlie any graphic intimation8 of it, is a cosmological question. Moreover, “space” and “spatiality” are so closely akin to “time” and “hour” that they also, like them, lie outside the sphere of communications that the Redeemer had available to make to us. Hence, even his allusions9 are all, in part, purely figurative and, in part, so indistinctly held in relation to everything else that nothing further is to be derived from them than what is so greatly essential for every Christian in every intimation regarding a state beyond death—that is, for a Christian, apart from continuation beyond death of union of persons of faith with the Redeemer, this intimation could only point to damnation. Likewise, what the apostles say on this subject is expressed only as presentiment10 and with the understanding that there is a lack of any more definite knowledge. Thus, however true it may also be that every element of our present life is, as such, the more complete and imbued with wisdom the more fully and clearly both past and future are brought to mind in it, we should not ever turn to wanting to determine our present aims by somehow visualizing that future form of life. Instead, we must indeed guard against admitting, in addition, any influence of attempts to form notions that derive from the interest of sensory self-consciousness with respect to the continuation of personal existence beyond death, as if these attempts had sprung from our Christian faith. Consequently, moreover, even

if such attempts might be nobler than Jewish or Muhammadan ones,11 they are still unexceptionally sensory in nature. Such influence can all too easily become detrimental to Christian faith and life and can thus ruin the present for us. Hence, as concerns the notion12 of a future life, our task now is chiefly that of carefully examining propositions advanced by others and whatever opinion has come to prevail.

1. Persönlichkeit. Ed. note: Here, as throughout Schleiermacher’s discourse, except when specifically defined otherwise (as rarely occurs), this term invariably means not “personality” but existence in a personal manner, albeit having a set of distinctive characteristics, versus being merely an individual quantity and versus having, say, a charming or harsh personality in the eyes of others. For example, he describes Jesus as having a personal existence, but he never refers to him as the Redeemer in these two contrasting ways. In general usage even today, persönlich likewise means “personally” or “in person,” while Persönlichkeit has accrued other meanings in German, just as it has in English. 2. Ed. note: In this rare instance, Glaube appears in both of its meanings—that is, “religious faith” and any “belief,” whether religious or not. 3. Vorstellung. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s discourse, “notion” ordinarily translates this word most accurately. In this proposition, wherever one’s attention is directed imaginatively to some anticipated future state of affairs, “intimation” seems more suited, as in the familiar title Intimations of Immortality (1807) by William Wordsworth (1770–1850). Otherwise “notion” is used. 4. Ed. note: geistigen Tätigkeiten. 5. Glückseligkeit. 6. Ed. note: This second sort of objective is referred to in the sentence just previous to the preceding paragraph. 7. Wortes. Ed. note: In KGA I/13.2 (2003), Schäfer adopts Werkes (work) from the unrevised manuscript instead of Wortes. While this choice may seem more immediately plausible, the presence of “word” in the original edited text of 1831 is certainly consistent with accounts in Scripture. In Matt. 22:23–33/Luke 20:27–38 Jesus countered some Sadducees—a group who, unlike the Pharisees, refused to believe in bodily resurrection—emphasizing, however, that God is “the God of the living, not of the dead.” This group continued to attack the apostles similarly (cf. Acts 4:1–3; 5:17) and Paul (Acts 23:6– 10) on the same issue. Then in John 5:24 (RSV) Jesus is reported to say: “[Anyone] who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life; [that person] does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life” (cf. also John 4:12 and 8:53). His work involves his proclamation of himself, that is, his word. See §103. 8. Anschauliches Vorstellung. Ed. note: As just above, “graphic intimation” seems to capture what he is referring to here. Ordinarily these are terms that would mean “clearly perceptible” and “notion.” The latter of these terms is ordinarily taken to be less clear than a scientifically supported concept. In this context “intimation” of immortality seems to fit ordinary usage well. See also §158n3 above. 9. The things people say that I think of here are known to all and are too numerous to adduce them in detail. Ed. note: Andeutungen is the word used here; “intimations” and “suggestions” are near synonyms. 10. Ahnung. Ed. note: See §146n1. 11. Ed. note: Cf. the contrast between more “teleological” and more “aesthetic” modes of faith in §11. Here “sensory” refers to more “aesthetic” attempts at visualizing, imagining, or bringing to mind details of an afterlife, but not necessarily artistic ones. 12. Ed. note: Cf. §158n3 and n8 above.

§159. The fulfillment of these two tasks, to present the church in its consummation and to present the state of souls in an afterlife, is attempted in official church doctrines of the last things. However, the same value cannot be attached to these doctrines as to the doctrines treated thus far. 1. The German expression “last things,” even though rather generally adopted, has something strange about it that is more concealed in the word eschatology. That is, the expression “things” threatens to lead us entirely outside the domain of inner life, with which

we are alone concerned nevertheless; and, to be sure, it also contains a sign that, at the same time, something is being endeavored here that could not be achieved by real faith-doctrines in our sense of the term. The two expressions have this in common, that if the beginning of an entirely new and eternally enduring spiritual form of life is presented, from our standpoint, as the “last,” thereupon that everlasting duration seems to be simply the end of temporal existence, which is almost insignificant in comparison with that everlasting duration. This position permits of being justified only by applying the concept of retribution,1 which is therefore also a dominant feature. In strong contrast, if one considers the same everlasting duration to be the further development of the new life that has begun here, thereupon the shortness of that temporal existence seems to be only the preparatory and introductory beginning of it. The first way of looking at the matter, which bears the concept of retribution before it, appeals chiefly to passages in which Christ depicts himself as the one to whom the power of judgment is entrusted. On the other hand, the second way of looking at the matter, which rests on the concept of development, appeals chiefly to passages in which Christ says that he has come “to save.”2 Undeniably, this second way of looking at the matter coheres more closely with the foreboding presentiment3 of personal continuation beyond death as that is demonstrable in the self-consciousness of a Christian. In contrast, the first one corresponds more to the notion of the church’s consummation, which, in order to attach itself to some point in our present collective life, requires cutting off all that is “world,” even from its external connection with the church. Accordingly, the doctrinal propositions regarding the last things all belong in common with these two tasks, named in this proposition, for each doctrinal proposition relates to both tasks. If we should want to form for ourselves a Christian notion of a state of existence after this life, it would not, at the same time, correspond, however, to the notion of the church’s consummate state of existence. Thus, we would not be able to believe that we had spoken of a “last thing” by the latter notion but would have to assume that some development would still lie ahead that would bring the church to its consummation. Conversely, if we should imagine the church’s consummation to be ushered in during the present course of things human, we would have to attach something else to the state of existence after death so as to give it some distinctive content. Yet, no ingredient for this purpose could be drawn from our Christian self-consciousness, for it has nothing different from this in it. Therefore, it has laid in the nature of the matter to draw the two elements together in such a way that the consummation of the church, which we nevertheless cannot imagine to be possible in this life, shifts into that afterlife which we still have to imagine to ourselves; and the notion of that afterlife, the foundation of which would still be community with Christ, would wholly consist in the consummate state of the church, so that the new form of life would rise above the present one in a decisive manner. Nevertheless, we are not, however, in a position to depict the concurrence of the two elements or to offer warranty for that concurrence. That is to say, if the church consummate is not to be imagined after the analogy of the church militant, then we also do not know

whether we are to project into that afterlife a harmonious chorus of common life and work for which no actual purpose is assigned. If, on the other hand, we want to imagine future life as a progressive development, after the analogy of the present one, then we would still have to doubt whether such a life would be possible in the church consummate. So, in this way the resolutions of the two tasks never seem to concur in any exact way. The same quandary arises when we hold to the allusions given in Scripture. Here much is to be found that expresses depiction of the church consummate, yet not in such a way that we could claim with any surety that it is to occur only after the close of all things earthly.4 For this reason, from ancient times onward many Christians have expectantly awaited a consummation of the church here on earth. On the other hand, other passages tend more to depict a life after death,5 but one could well doubt whether they are also depictions of the church consummate. 2. Now, for these reasons we can in no way assign the same value to the propositions that follow, treating as they do of “the last things,” as we have assigned to the propositions we have advanced up to now. To be sure, the following is not to be denied: In that we are conscious of our spiritual life as the communicated perfection and blessedness of Christ, this already implies that in general terms what is consummate is alone originally true, whereas what is incomplete is true only by means of what is consummate. This affirmation, moreover, comprises our belief in the reality6 of the church consummate, but it is so only as an effectual driving force within us, which is what is genuinely active7 in all those elements of life that advance the church. Yet, given this lifting of the distinction between inner principle and outer appearance, which is also ineradicably present in our self-consciousness, to think of this effectual principle as somehow present, at the same time, as something always appearing spatially and temporally, is not a thinking process that can be so well grounded. In like fashion, it is already implied in the identification of all individual human beings with Christ that for the Christian the general presentiment8 of the spirit’s imperishability, even in the form of an individual human being, rises to the point of surety, but an exact way to envisage this continuation beyond death is also not contained in this attitude. Rather, we are no more capable of carrying out this process of envisaging continuation in the form of a progressive development into infinity than in the form of a consummation that remains invariably the same, in that our power of sensory imagination is inadequate for the purpose. Suppose, on the other hand, that, quite apart from their origin in our self-consciousness, we try to treat these propositions as matters that we accept on scriptural authority. In that case, here too we cannot compare them with the doctrine regarding Christ’s resurrection, which treats of the disciples’ reports concerning a fact that stands in the closest possible relation to their calling. This is so, for if we indeed had evidence of a sort that enabled us to gather how Christ had formed the two intimations in himself, so that we could reproduce the process in ourselves, then we would seek to adopt his self-consciousness for ourselves with complete confidence. That is, we would do this if in this sphere too we simply wanted to ascribe to him a completely developed human capacity for foreboding presentiment9 devoid

of all wavering based in sin. However, such a derivation of these propositions is not available to us in any case, for we never do find a cohesive, irrefutable treatment of these subjects anywhere, one that undeniably underlies an aim of imparting firm information concerning them. In all the particular utterances related to this matter, in part, the object itself is contestable, in part, the sketch is indistinctly drawn, and the interpretation is shaky in numerous respects. Hence, nothing is left to us but to deal with those various modes of intimations which have long been given currency in the church and have been carried over into our confessional documents, without any fresh examination, simply as attempts that employ an insufficiently supported capacity for presentiment.10 We do this under the title of prophetic points of doctrine, giving both the reasons for and the serious doubts lodged against them. Further, we enter upon this effort with the proviso that in any new formations of these doctrines that may eventuate, in order to remain a distinct product of Christian imagination,11 the effort has to be placed under the protection of the art of interpretation.12 Everything that seems strange to our given sphere of experience and that is proposed as an object of some future experience devolve, in any case, to imagination. Moreover, our task would be to process only that material which is offered to us, not giving way to arbitrariness or to the presumption of serving out new revelations. 3. Under these conditions, an actual construction of these propositions within a compact, coherent whole is also not to be imagined. Rather, since the content of these propositions is generally presupposed as familiar, we must be satisfied to vouchsafe through the matter itself that no different content has demonstrably the same cast, in that everywhere the intent will be to present the two notions—personal continuation beyond death and the consummation of the church—in a single picture conceived through the senses. Accordingly, first of all, the continuation of personal existence beyond death will be presented as a transcending of death under the image of the resurrection of the flesh. The consummation of the church, however, will be presented in a twofold manner. First to be considered is the extent to which this consummation, conditioned by the supposition that no further influences on the church by those who do not belong to the church are possible, is introduced as a separation of the faithful from the unfaithful by the last judgment. Second, to the extent that the church consummate is in contrast to the church militant, completely severed from all operations of sin and all defect within persons of faith, it will be presented as eternal blessedness. However, the continuation of personal existence beyond death, and in this way the resurrection of the flesh as well, was to be conceived as extending over the entire human race; consequently, a mode of existence would also have to be of a sort that can be applied to those who are separated out from persons of faith. Thus, eternal blessedness would be thought to stand over against eternal damnation of those lacking in faith, something also introduced by the last judgment. However, it is quite clear that since no image of our future experience can indeed be prefigured by that notion, we cannot mark out a special point of doctrine regarding it but can only treat it as the shadow of blessedness or as the dark side of judgment.

These particular images, however, can be fused together into one sensory whole in view of the new form of existence’s being conditioned by Christ’s coming again, to which all that belongs to the consummation of his work must be referred. Hence, it appears to be most natural to begin with this return of Christ, viewed as introducing all the other points of doctrine, therewith to unfold all the rest on this basis and in relation to it in their natural sequence.

1. Vergeltungsbegriffe. Ed. note: Here “retribution” seems to allude to Heb. 2:2, which itself points to a day of retribution (Vergeltungstag). 2. Ed. note: selig zu machen. This is the wording, for example, in Matt. 18:11: “to save the lost.” 3. Ahndung. Ed. note: During Schleiermacher’s lifetime, this term, “foreboding presentiment,” was gradually being distinguished from Ahnung, which continued to mean “presentiment” chiefly with a positive or neutral meaning. Schleiermacher uses both terms in this proposition. 4. John 6:53–56; Acts 1:6–7; and Eph. 4. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 6:52–60, Dec. 12, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 455– 67; (2) Acts 1:6–11, May 7, 1812, Festpredigten (1833), SW II.2 (1835), 518–30, ET Wilson (1890), 423–38; (3) Eph. 4:1– 3, undated (by 1827), SW II.4 (1835), 636–56, and (1844), 688–706; and (4) Eph. 4:23, originally in London, Sept. 21, 1828, SW II.4 (1835), 171–81, and (1844), 246–56. 5. See 1 Cor. 15:23ff. and Phil. 3:21. Ed. note: Sermon only on Phil. 3:17–21, Jan. 19, 1823, SW II.10 (1856), 697–706. 6. Realität. Ed. note: This term, rarely used in Schleiermacher’s theological discourse, serves to emphasize his point: what is originally and ultimately perfect, or complete, is itself absolutely, consummately real. Our ordinary, organic so-called reality (Wirklichkeit) is always admixed with what we can “see,” with imperfect, mutually isolated, and defective appearances (phenomena); hence, Realität is to that extent “invisible.” 7. Ed. note: das eigentlich Handelnde. 8. Ahnung. Ed. note: See §159n3 above. 9. Ahndungsvermögen. 10. Ahnungsvermögen. 11. Phantasie. Ed. note: From early on, Schleiermacher used this term to represent a valued but often unsteady capacity of imagination to form images and notions. It need not be a mere, undisciplined play of fancy, in English often relayed by the word “fantasy,” which is very different from Schleiermacher’s use of Phantasie. 12. Auslegungskunst. Ed. note: That is, under the general, inseparable rules of both hermeneutics and criticism. See his lectures and Academy essays regarding this twofold art of what he also calls “exegesis” when applied to texts. The general results of applying this art, or technical discipline, to the problems just introduced are laid out in §160.

First Point of Prophetic Doctrine

Regarding Christ’s Coming Again

§160. Since Christ’s disciples could not hold that the comforting promises of his coming again1 were fulfilled in the days after his resurrection, they expected this fulfillment at the end of all things human on earth.2 Now, since the separation of the good from the bad is joined to this notion of the end time, we teach a return of Christ for judgment. (1) Roman Symbol (ca. 8th century): “Thence he will come to judge the living and the dead.”3

(2) Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “He is coming again in glory to judge the living and the dead. There will be no end to his kingdom.”4 (3) The Augsburg Confession (1530) article 3 simply refers to the Roman Symbol of ca. 700 A.D. (the Apostles’ Creed5) then enlarged upon much further. (4) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XI: “And from heaven the same Christ will return in judgment,” etc.6 (5) Belgic Confession (1561) XXXVII: “We believe … that our Lord Jesus Christ will come from heaven, corporally and visibly, as he ascended with great glory and majesty, to declare himself judge of the quick and the dead.”7 1. We have no report that Christ had repeated similar promises in the days of his resurrection appearances.8 Rather, he spoke only of his entering into his glory and apprised his disciples of his spiritual presence.9 Yet, this circumstance could have aroused no hesitation in the disciples’ minds that would have occasioned their explaining those promises as if they had already been fulfilled, for in their context they were pointing out, too explicitly for this interpretation, a return of Christ in which he would make himself known to all human beings. For this reason, the disciples were thus susceptibly confident of a literal meaning in these discourses of Christ,10 even though the meaning was not given to them in Christ’s own name, that afterward as the destruction of Jerusalem occurred, in the distinct prophecy of which Christ had also spoken of his future appearance, not once could the question be raised among Christians as to whether all of these discourses could perchance designate that future return of Christ in a way not to be understood in a literal fashion. Hence, after all chiliastic11 elements had been extirpated, the opinion was very quickly established and given currency almost everywhere that Christ’s return would coincide with the end of the earth in its present state. 2. However, if one more closely examines the most generally cited and strongest passages of this sort used to support this opinion, one finds, in part, that suspicion is aroused as to whether they are to be taken literally—some on account of dates given, others on account of their overweening moralistic application. One also finds, in part, that even if one wants to take Christ’s personal return literally, in the same context much else is nonetheless present that is not at all to be taken literally, with the result that in adopting such an interpretation, the entire unity of the discourse gets lost. However, if we bracket out such literal interpretation, then we have no more biblical warrant for the view that reunion of the faithful with Christ— which is the essential content of our belief in personal continuation beyond death—depends on such a personal return of Christ, just as elsewhere he himself speaks of that reunion without mentioning this return.12 Much less do we have biblical warrant, first, for the view

that such an eventual general separation between good and bad people would be tied to these two things, just as Paul then also entirely passes over any such separation,13 and, second, for the view that this event, effected by a distinct reappearance of Christ, would at the same time bring with it the termination of our present form of life. According to this examination, everything that might be formed into a definite picture falls asunder. What then remains is to assert the following, viewed as the essential component of our proposition, in that we substitute Christ’s strong efficacious action for his physical presence. Since the church’s consummation, viewed as the cessation of its unsteady coming into being and growth, is possible only by a leap and only under the condition that propagation would cease and the coexistence of good and bad people would cease, this leap would have to be regarded, through and through, as an act of the kingly power14 of Christ. This perspective, moreover, certainly lies deep in Christian faith, in such a way that even if it does not develop of itself into a distinct thought in each individual, each one does find it appealing once it is given. That is to say, if in Christ the divine being is everlastingly united with human nature, this nature also cannot be so firmly bound to the soil of one world body in all the heavens that it would have to be embroiled in its eventually being destroyed in accordance with cosmic laws. Rather, everything that relates to this human nature must be imagined in its connection with this union with the divine being and, at the same time, as capable of being regarded as a deed proceeding from this union. In this way, in this point of doctrine everything that is figurative and, as such, must remain unsettled then proceeds from the interest in personal continuation beyond death; but, on the other hand, what can be set forth securely relates to the consummation of the church.

1. After bracketing out all passages that manifestly are entirely parabolic in nature, we find this kind of statement in Matt. 16:27–28; 24:20 etc.; 25:31 etc.; Mark 13:26 etc.; Luke 21:27–28; and John 14:5, 18; and 16:16. 2. See 2 Cor. 5:1–10; 2 Thess. 1:7–10; 2:8; 2 Tim. 4:1; 1 Pet. 4:5–7, 13; 2 Pet. 3:10. 3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher actually quotes the Greek of the Interrogatory Creed of Hippolytus (ca. 215), an early form of the Roman Symbol = Apostles’ Creed (early 700s). See §36n1. 4. Ed. note: Quoted in Greek. ET Book of Concord (2000), 23, from the Greek; Latin and German: Bek. Luth (1963), 26. 5. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 22, 39; Latin and German in Bek. Luth. (1963), 55. 6. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 245; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 256; cf. §37n3. 7. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 433f., also Cochrane (1972), 218; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 387f. 8. John 21:22 is probably not definite enough to be used here. 9. Matt. 28:20; Luke 24:26; and John 20:17. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Matt. 28:20, May 8, 1823, Bauer (1909), 20–29; (2) Luke 24:25–26, Mar. 11, 1832, SW II.2 (1835), 207–19; and (3) John 20:17, May 25, 1797, sermon outline in Zimmer (1882), 374–75. 10. Acts 1:11. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 1:10–11, May 31, 1810, SW II.7 (1836), 402–10. 11. Ed. note: Chiliasm (from the Greek word for “a thousand”), presumably based on Rev. 20:1–7, is the view that Christ’s return would lead to his reign on earth for a millennium (hence the synonym “millenarianism”) before the end or consummation of all things earthly. 12. John 17:24. Ed. note: Sermon outline on John 17:24, May 22, 1800, Zimmer (1887), 69. 13. In 1 Cor. 15:20ff. and 1 Thess. 4:14ff. Ed. note: Sermon only on 1 Thess. 4:13–14, 18, Nov. 26, 1820, Bauer (1909), 9–16. 14. Gewalt. Ed. note: See §105.

Second Point of Prophetic Doctrine

Regarding Resurrection of the Flesh

§161. Partly in figurative1 and partly in didactic2 discourse as well, Christ not only sanctioned the notion of the resurrection of the dead that was prevalent among his people, but in his discourses he also ascribed this awakening to his own agency. Moreover, it is simply a further extension of this teaching of Christ, though entirely natural and drawn from discourses akin to it, to claim that all of a sudden the general awakening of the dead will cause the usual course of human life on earth to cease.3 1. We are so generally conscious of the interconnection of all the activities of our spirit, even the deepest and innermost ones, with our physical activities that we cannot really manage to get a notion of an individual’s finite spiritual life without having a notion of its organic, bodily existence. Indeed, we only imagine the spirit as soul if it is in a body, so that there can be no talk whatsoever of an immortality of the soul in its distinctive4 meaning without a bodily life. Thus, just as the effectual activity of the spirit, viewed as a distinct soul, ceases at the same time as bodily life in death, likewise it can only begin again with bodily life. Indisputably, however, something more does lie in the notion of the resurrection of the flesh, namely, a selfsameness of life such that life after resurrection and life before death constitutes one and the same personal existence. Moreover, nominally this characterization also belongs to the Jewish notion of the matter.5 Obviously, the soul, viewed in and of itself as individual existence, also endures only in its constancy of consciousness,6 which constancy, in turn, appears to us to be conditioned by memory. We view memory, on its part, as just as much tied to what is bodily as is any other activity of spirit. As a result, we can get no intimation of how such a unifying memory could operate under completely different bodily circumstances, for without such a memory the soul, viewed in and of itself, would certainly not be the same. However, this requirement seems, in turn, to refer to something that we have already denied above, namely, the human spirit’s being bound to the soil of earth.7 That is to say, in one respect, every organized entity is, at the same time, a product of the world body that bears it and dependent on the mode and nature of that world body; hence, the similarity of the individual’s future body with the individual’s present one would also presuppose a similarity of two worlds. In another respect, memory too is dependent, by virtue of its organic aspect, on affinity of impressions, just as in present life too, memory of a distinct stretch in time turns very pale when the whole scene has changed. Suppose that one adds to this observation that the more superior that future life is to the present one, the less even a decisive will could come to the aid of that memory. In such a case, it must surely be conceded that the more the soul, viewed in and of itself, should remain the same, all the more would the future life have

to be a pure, readily linked continuation of the present one. Given that condition, however, the other point of departure for all these intimations, namely, the consummation of the church, comes off badly as something that would not be possible in such a life. Hence, the interest in the church’s consummation necessitates our again restricting the similarity between our future and present corporality, all the more so if we are to avoid that extreme. Moreover, two defining qualifications, that the resurrection body would be immortal8 and without distinct gendered functions,9 have their basis in that restriction. The first defining qualification, which already presupposes an entirely different constitution of the future world, would push the interest in bodily self-preservation out of the way, an interest that we experience as a rampant seed of strife between flesh and spirit. In addition, the other defining qualification would guard against a mixture of the church consummate with new souls emerging as they are being restored, in that we cannot imagine the latter process without some natural force preceding the development of spirit, consequently without sinfulness. Patently, however, both defining qualifications, in turn, do injury to the selfsameness of the soul and to the constancy of consciousness. That is to say, the immortal body would also have to show itself to be different from the mortal body in every element and function. Moreover, at that point the soul could take into itself, all the less, the share that the mortal body had in the forming of our present consciousness and retain it in memory. Furthermore, as concerns the other defining qualification, on the one hand, we can get no intimation that if gendered functions would cease, the organic system on which they rest would continue to be maintained. On the other hand, we can get no intimation that a male soul and a female soul should not be different, as such. Hence, if every soul were to cease being one of the two souls, because of an altered organization of life, no soul would then be the same any longer. Thus, it is clearly evident here that although both points of departure would, to be sure, be allowed for in our doctrine, the two do not converge in what they require. That is, the resurrection of the flesh must be imagined in one way if the individual10 is to remain completely the same and in a different way if it is to occur collectively in the church consummate. Hence, these particular features do not merge into a single clearly manageable notion. Rather, this notion suffers from an indefinite quality that informs the distinctive character of these points of doctrine, one suitable to the general title, “prophetic doctrine,” that we have assigned to them. 2. The simultaneous resurrection of all in common presupposes that those who are being resurrected would have been found since their death in some state11 different from that which they enter through this simultaneous resurrection itself. Now, the reality to which the notion of a last judgment points also rests on this presupposition. Naturally, the sensory interest in the continuation of individual existence beyond death is directed, first of all, to this intermediate state as the state that takes place just before it. The question arises, moreover, as to whether we have a rule, given our standpoint, for guiding such attempts to imagine what happens, or for any necessity to keep a watch on those attempts. The first option would be

the case only if we were to find something about this intermediate state set forth in the New Testament writings. However, when we look at all that could be counted for this purpose,12 in part, its instructive character is indecisive and, in part, the interpretation is in dispute. The second option would be compelling if something that is contrary to our Christian self-consciousness could be included in our attempts to imagine this intermediate state. Now, this intermediate state can be imagined in a purely negative way as a state of having ceased the old activities of life and as a state of having not yet begun the new ones, and this comprises the notion of souls being asleep.13 Our Christian self-consciousness can lodge no distinct complaint against this notion. Suppose, however, that, on the one hand, all Christians thereby come to be of equal status, in that for those who are first asleep as for those who are asleep last, the intermediate period is simply a blank. Then, on the other hand, if the soul’s awakening is to be imagined as simultaneous with creation of the new body, it becomes hard to envisage how recollection of the earlier state could, at the same time, be either supposed or established. Suppose, in contrast, that the intermediate state is imagined to be a conscious state. Then the requirement of our Christian faith is, to be sure, that it must not be a state devoid of community with Christ. This is so, for in that case the intermediate state would be a fall from grace, which could be regarded only as a punishment, and this perspective would bring us to a notion [purgatory] that the Evangelical church rejected at its very beginning.14 Suppose that one wanted, instead, to imagine that a community with Christ already existed in this intermediate state as well. In that case, one must also completely abandon any likeness of ancient, including Jewish, notions of a diminished life in the underworld. This is so, for since all obstacles to blessed community with Christ that emerge within this life from the sensory world would have fallen away, at its onset that intermediate state would have to be a state raised to completion. In that case, however, it would be hard not to regard the notion of a general resurrection of the dead to be something superfluous and hard not to regard a reuniting of the soul with a body to be a retrograde occurrence. Indeed, it appears that to be consistent only one way out remains, namely, to conjecture that within that intermediate state every individual soul would, in and of itself, be in community with the Redeemer; however, the community of the blessed among themselves, consequently the efficacious action of each individual as well, would be conditioned by the resurrection of the flesh, therefore this resurrection would also be necessary for that raised state of completion. Under this presupposition, however, the actual existence of the church would remain constant and unbroken right up to the point of resurrection, just as the actual existence of the individual was taken to be in accordance with the first-mentioned presupposition. Consequently, one of these two features will always be the more endangered the better thought of the other feature is. For this reason, some have understood the simultaneous general resurrection only figuratively and have chosen to draw from other scriptural passages15 to the effect that the future life begins for each individual alike immediately after one’s death.16 Inherent in this notion, however, are two claims, the first claim is that the soul would already have the new body, in that it would be separated from the old one—a notion that is frequently found to be assumed. The second claim is that both the simultaneous last

judgment and, consequently, the personal return of Christ would have to be understood no less figuratively than the general resurrection is understood, because the assigned purpose of Christ’s return would have dropped away entirely. Based on these observations, we have to waver between this latter more biblical notion— in accordance with which the future life and the church triumphant suddenly but surely, though at the cost of an otherwise uninterrupted continuity, end up being one immense whole through the efficacious action of Christ in connection with huge cosmic changes—and the first less biblical notion. That first notion—though indeed viewed in such a way that one would have to wish for it a natural scientific warranty, since it relies on a close affinity with earthly conditions—would maintain the continuity17 of personal existence in the purest way possible, in accordance with which the church consummate would, however, be only gradually growing away from the earthly life that would continue to exist alongside it in the same period. 3. Now, if we still stick with general resurrection and, at the same time, also with the prevailing mode of envisaging the topics of the following points of doctrine, one more difficulty is yet to be disposed of. That is, if totally opposite states enter into the picture for the blessed and the damned, then the requirement that the new bodies they receive must not be the same is self-evident, because the way these respective states are organized must be suited to the life circumstances that are to unfold. Furthermore, a new difficulty arises from this observation if one wants to combine the notion of general resurrection with that of the last judgment. That is to say, if the two classes become instantly different in this resurrection, then all these people will already have been tried and their sentence will have been laid down before the last judgment, so that this last judgment would become superfluous. All the more would this be the case as such a difference between bodies arising simultaneously could not be realized by the effective activity of the same cosmic forces in this context using a purely ethical18 contrast, but it could be realized only by an immediately creative divine dictum. Suppose, on the other hand, that at the resurrection those persons who were to be blessed and those persons who were to be damned still had the same status. Then, obversely, judgment would not be carried out through the resurrection itself. Moreover, since, postresurrection, those internal changes that transform the way individual lives are organized would have to enter into one class of persons or the other or into both classes of persons, then the reality to which the notion of final judgment points would simply depend on these changes being introduced simultaneously, whereas, in contrast, the simultaneity of the resurrection of the dead and the metamorphosis of the living both become superfluous. In consequence, if we put all these examinations of the matter together, what we also find is that the various notions regarding the connection of future life to present life cannot attain to any completely definite result. However, what is left, to be viewed as the essential contents of this point of doctrine, is simply the following. First, it is essential that an ascension19 of the resurrected Redeemer is possible only to the extent that a renewal of organic life is also in store for all individual human beings, one that is connected to their present condition. Second, it is also essential, however, that the unfolding of a future state would have to be

posited, on the one hand, as conditioned by the divine power invested in Christ and, on the other hand, at the same time as a cosmic occurrence20 that is attributed to the general divine ordering of the world. The first, the divine power invested in Christ, stands firm as the presupposition of faith, which presupposition grounds the effort to form notions regarding this content. The second, a cosmic occurrence attributed to the divine ordering of the world, remains a wavering, unsettled task, which is never to be completely resolved by us.

1. Matt. 25:31ff.; John 5:28–29 and 6:40, 54. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) John 5:24–30, June 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 347–64; (2–3) John 6:36–44 and 6:52–60, Nov. 14 and Dec. 12, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 430–42 and 455–67. 2. Matt. 22:30–32. 3. See 1 Cor. 15:51–52 and 1 Thess. 4:15–18. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 Thess. 4:13–14, 18 (see §160n13). 4. Eigentümlichen. Ed. note: Instead of this word in the original printing, Schäfer (KGA I/13.2) chooses eigentlichen (actual) from the original uncorrected manuscript. This would indeed be the word usually found in the phrase, but either meaning could be proper. 5. Luke 20:28–33. 6. Stetigkeit des Bewußtseins. 7. Ed. note: Cf. §160.2. 8. See 1 Cor. 15:22. 9. Matt. 22:30. Ed. note: Here the reference is to not marrying, like the angels. 10. Individuum. Ed. note: That is, the individual human being is selfsame; the word Schleiermacher has been using for a distinctive individual here is einzelne. 11. Zustand. Ed. note: This word suggests not only a “state” but also a condition or even a specific place (e.g., purgatory) in which the dead would have to wait until all the rest would have died. 12. Luke 16:22ff. and 23:43; 1 Pet. 3:19–20. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Luke 16:19–31, June 21, 1795, SW II.1 (1834), 97–112; (2) Luke 16:19–31, June 4, 1820, SW II.4 (1835), 321–37, and (1844), 371–87; and (3) Luke 23:43, Mar. 18, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 123–37, ET DeVries (1987), 58–72. 13. Ed. note: At this point in the 1821–1822 edition (KGA I/7.2, 326), Peiter aptly refers to a passage on this notion in Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider (1776–1848), Handbuch der Dogmatik, Bd 2 (1818), 376f. In his essay on election (1819) Schleiermacher had constantly referred to views of this major theologian on the subject. 14. (1) Smalcald Articles (Luther, 1537) Part 2: “Purgatory … is to be regarded as an apparition of the devil. For it too is against the chief article that Christ alone (and not human works) is to help souls. Besides, concerning the dead we have received neither command nor institution.” (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 26: “What some teach concerning the fire of purgatory is opposed to the Christian faith, namely, ‘I believe in the forgiveness of sins and the life everlasting,’ and to the perfect purgation through Christ and to the words of Christ our Lord (John 5:24; 13:10).” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 303; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 420. (2) ET Cochrane (1972), 295; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 301; cf. §37n3. 15. Directly, though unsurely, in Luke 23:43, indirectly in Phil. 1:21–24. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Luke 23:43, Mar. 18, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 123–37, ET DeVries, (1987), 58–72; (2) Phil. 1:21–24, Mar. 24, 1822, SW II.10 (1856), 426–43. 16. Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 26: “We believe that the faithful, after bodily death, go directly to Christ. … Likewise, we believe that unbelievers are immediately cast into hell.” Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 295; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 301; cf. §37n3. 17. Kontinuität. Ed. note: This is the first use of this Latinate word; just above the word was Stetigkeit, which can also mean steadiness or constancy (§161n6 above). 18. Ed. note: ethischen. The meaning here might have a strictly moral reference but not necessarily, for Schleiermacher normally uses the word to refer to the entire domain of human life, as in the contrast between the physical and the human (ethical) sciences. 19. Ed. note: See §99. 20. Ed. note: kosmisches Ereignis. As before, “cosmic” refers to God’s ordering of the entire cosmos, or universe, not to some supposedly special event outside or contrary to the general ordering God has established and preserves in nature.

Third Point of Prophetic Doctrine

Regarding the Last Judgment

§162. The intent of the notion of the last judgment, features of which are also met with in Christ’s discourses, is to present the total separation of the church from the world insofar as the consummation of the church excludes all influences of the world upon it. 1. The main feature in the notion of the last judgment—namely, that Christ will completely separate persons of faith and persons not of faith from each other, and in such a way that they are placed in entirely different locales and can no longer have any effect on each other whatsoever—does not in any way already include the consummation of the church within it. This is the case, for, as was already shown above,1 the church’s defects stem far less from influences of persons not of faith mixing with persons of faith in this world than from the “flesh,” which is still to be found within regenerate persons themselves. Hence, if in their souls persons of faith would be the same in their resurrected state as they were at their departure from this present life, then, despite this separation, they would also unexceptionably enter into the new life as people in whom sin is still coposited, even if it is in a process of disappearing. Thus, in this respect, the value that one attributes to that separation simply rests on the improperly conceived distinction between the visible and the invisible church.2 If, on the other hand, this distinction, as we have conceived it, is to cease with the onset of the new life, then with that new life whatever of sin and the flesh still attaches to people would have to disappear from the regenerate themselves. This result, however, would not be caused by that external separation in and of itself. Hence, Origen in his day had already tried to point out an internal separation of this sort, in his mode of interpreting one of the passages that belong to this concern.3 However, quite apart from the fact that this having been suddenly wrenched from all worldly and fleshly notions and stimulations would, in its own way, endanger the constant selfsameness of personal existence4 in turn, this internal separation would still be, unexceptionably, nothing other than the end point of sanctification. Moreover, since the entire process of sanctification is to proceed from community of life with the Redeemer, Christian consciousness cannot recognize itself in any depiction that does not include this community within it. Rather, we would have to find something magical in any such sudden conclusion of sanctification, bereft of any self-initiating activity. In every individual, had this magic but been applied earlier, it would have resulted in making superfluous the entirety of redemption, attached to community of life with Christ as redemption is. In consequence, in every case it appears as though either one of these two features would exclude the other. John5 does, in fact, seem to offer a middle way for resolving this conflict, for if this internal separation is to be brought about by a full recognition of Christ that is bound to his return, this recognition, then, would itself be a work of redemption. However, observed more

closely, this knot—this middle way—does not hold either. The reason is that if Christ’s return is to bring about such a change only in accordance with each individual’s receptivity, such would not be of equal measure in all regenerate persons when they are severed from this life. Hence, the entire purification of the soul through Christ’s appearance would also not be instantly effected for all alike; rather, for some it would go faster, for others slower. Thus, even this separation would not be simultaneous but would arise in each new life only gradually from its very outset onward. If, on the other hand, it does not matter for knowledge of Christ what the degree of higher or lower receptivity may be, then, to be sure, that internal separation would be brought about all of a sudden. However, this very same effect would also have to be generated within the nonfaithful, to whom Christ would indeed also appear in his return and in whom this receptivity would also indeed be present, even in the worst case, as an infinitesimal factor at the very least. Thus, at that point this event would begin to grow into being a sudden restoration of all souls into the reign of grace, in accordance with which a separation of persons would no longer have any object but which would not itself be entirely free of some admixture of that sudden magical characteristic mentioned just above. 2. Now, let us refer back to the image of a separation of persons depending on whether they have finished their lives in a faithful or nonfaithful state. This notion has come to prevail because Christ’s own discourse appears to be favorable to it. Thus, we can hardly deny that this notion is more suited to the commencement of blessedness belonging to persons of faith in the new life than to their perfection. The reason is as follows. Suppose that influences from persons not of faith who are admixed with persons of faith are received by regenerate persons only as those influences are to be viewed as organs of the Holy Spirit and as they give rise simply to an activity that proceeds from and is determined by the Holy Spirit. Then a number of perfections would thereby appear, perfections of the sort that we also find in the prototypical life of Christ but that could not develop without such influences. The situation seems to be quite different with respect to blessedness, however. This is the case, for since evil6 that arises from sin always spreads over the entire collective life, even in that future life if persons of faith were combined with persons not of faith in one and the same collective life, they would still have to be subject to evils that these nonfaithful individuals would have brought into it. For all that, however, a proper reference to community of life with Christ is missing here as well. That is to say, we do not also assume of Christ, who while he dwelt here did likewise mingle with sinners in the collective life he shared, that he was subject to sin, except that he did experience compassion and bodily pain in face of that life. Thus, nothing would contribute to the hindrance of the spiritual life of those who were engaged in community of life with him there, nor would they be able to experience any such hindrance as an evil, just as Christ too was not sensible of bodily pain and compassion7 as evils. As for the rest, even if bodily pain were still quite possible after resurrection, it too would have to be regarded as possible by some means different from its simply being aroused by sin. As a result, the separation would not carry with it any guarantee against bodily pain.

Compassion too, moreover, would continue to be tied to the selfsameness of human nature, with the result that blessed persons would have compassion with respect to others even if they were completely divided from these others. Thus, considered from this standpoint as well, the separation that is supposed to occur at the last judgment remains, in part, unsatisfactory, in part, superfluous. Therefore, the only thing left to say would be this: that the separation would happen for the sake not of blessed persons but for the sake of the others. Now, it would be for their sake whether, first, because they would have missed out even on whatever advantage had accrued from what good people had done to diminish the spread of evil within the communal new world or whether, second, because they had not yet found the means within that community itself to attain to community with Christ for themselves as well. However, taking this position would mean either, in part, ascribing a “jealousy”8 to the Supreme Being, against which ascription a sound Gentile world had already protested, or using it simply to underlie the already familiar and widespread view of divine “righteousness.” This latter notion, given its one-sidedness, has an appearance of arbitrariness to such an extent that, in fact, its origin would have to be much more unambiguous, what is said about it much more decisive, and the usage the apostles make of it much more far-reaching if we were simply to be warranted, to say nothing of being obliged, to take the notion to be one Christ himself envisaged.9 3. Now, if we cannot therefore bring even this notion of the last judgment to a clear conclusion that satisfies both requirements, we do still have to see if we can find some essential content in this notion, on account of its almost universal diffusion throughout Christendom. Before we do that, however, it is important to take note of the following two things. First, the more the notion of a last judgment is traceable to an effort bordering on vindictiveness10—an effort directed to enlarging the lack of blessedness11 among persons not of faith and excluding them from all the salutary influences of good people—all the less refined is the Christian disposition that underlies that notion. Thus, second, the more such an effort is accompanied by a fear that, even in the case of a community of life with Christ that has mounted to its highest peak, a lack of blessedness could nonetheless still arise for us out of being in the company of bad people, all the less can even the essential content of this notion be made evident. It then follows from this analysis that only what remains when we totally abandon this fear and vindictiveness can serve the task, and that seems to consist of the following two points. First, suppose that a consummation of our community with Christ is posited, then we would also be so completely separated from wickedness that even where wicked people and human wickedness might be present, either one, as such, would be nonexistent for us. Moreover, if what is humanly or otherwise evil is, in this way, totally excluded from the collective consciousness belonging to persons of faith, then nothing other than the undisturbed fullness of divine grace could exist unhampered therein. Furthermore, at that point the church would, in truth, be completely self-contained. In consequence, even the outlook that everywhere throws the contrast into relief, a contrast with which we unavoidably remain constantly burdened in this present life, would, in the afterlife, entirely give way to an

outlook by virtue of which human evil is nonexistent, because God could not be the originator12 of it. Second, suppose that we imagine the church to be consummate but, at the same time, assume that a portion of the human race would still exist that would not be affected and permeated by the Spirit of the church. This assumption can be made only on the condition that this portion would be completely secured against all influences of the church, consequently would also be and remain excluded from all contact with it. Indeed, there is also one teaching discourse of Christ13 that is very closely akin to this subject and that quite clearly implies the view that every emanation, however faint it may be, from the seat of those particularly graced by God14 that reaches those who have not turned to God in this earthly life, has already planted good stirrings within them.

1. Cf. §126.1. 2. Cf. §148.2. 3. Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), Commentary on Matthew (246–248) 10.2, on Matt. 13:36–40. Ed. note: ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 9 (1906), 414f.; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 13:837–40. Here Origen interprets Jesus’ parable on separation of the “good seed” from the “weeds” at “the close of the age,” to the effect that false teachings that have taken root in human souls are then thrown into the fire. 4. Ed. note: persönlichen Daseins. This phrase is rarely, if ever, used elsewhere in the present work. Literally, it means personal being-there—that is, existence within a specific context and circumstance and with one’s own capacities for interaction. In contrast, Persönlichkeit, also regularly translated “personal existence,” simply means one’s being as a person, one’s person-ness, as it were. 5. See 1 John 3:2. Ed. note: This passage reads: “Beloved, we are God’s children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is” (RSV). 6. Übel. Ed. note: This term would presumably cover any evil that results from sinful activity, whether human (Böse) or nonhuman. Cf. §§75–76, 82, and 111. 7. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: In the strictest sense, within Schleiermacher’s usage this term is not restricted to feeling others’ pain or discomfort, as might appear here. It is, literally, a shared feeling or a feeling held in common, whether the feeling is oriented to some negative or to some positive experience. In neither respect would Christ have been sensible of such a feeling as itself an evil. 8. Mißgunst. Ed. note: Or grudging partiality and misfavor. The reference is to the notion of a jealous God in the Old Testament writings. The few allusions to this particular notion in the New Testament appear to be quite unclear. Cf. 1 Cor. 10:22 (“Shall we provoke the Lord to jealousy?”); 2 Cor. 11:2 (“I feel a divine jealousy for you”); Jas. 4:5 (an ambiguous citation of Prov. 3:34); and Rom. 11:11 (on Israel’s becoming jealous because “salvation has come to the Gentiles”). There, humanly speaking, jealousy is generally taken to be a vice, not a virtue. 9. Ed. note: eine Anschauung Christi. In any case, the question of “origin” arises in that almost all the numerous New Testament uses of the word “righteousness” refer to a human state required or effected by God, not to a distinct attribute of God. The only possible reference to God’s righteousness directly placed in Jesus’ mouth, in John 16:8–10, may seem quite obscure. See the sermon on John 16:4–15, Aug. 13, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 510–23. See also the discussions of God’s holiness and justice in §§79–85, and sermons in §162n13 below. 10. Rachsucht. Ed. note: In such a context, “vengefulness” is often the meaning, even if it is projected on God (“Vengeance is mine”). 11. Unseligkeit. Ed. note: Again, in such a context “misery” (cf. §86) is often the meaning of this word, projecting a desire for punishment even on a God conceived to be “merciful” (cf. §85). 12. Urheber. Ed. note: Cf. §79, where in the sense that God creates the possibility and basic condition for human evil (notably free will) in this life, in that restricted sense God is deemed to be the originator of sin. 13. Luke 16:19–31. Ed. note: This is the story Jesus tells of the rich man and the poor man Lazarus, who end up in different places after death than might have been expected for either man. See sermons on this passage (1) “The Righteousness of God,” from June 21, 1795, first published in 1801, then in SW II.1 (1834), 97–112, and (1843), 93–108; and (2) “On Yearning for Information about the Other World and for Communion with It,” June 4, 1820, first published separately in 1824, then in SW II.4 (1835), 321–37, and (1844), 357–70. See also §§161.2 and 162n8 above.

14. Ed. note: aus dem Sitz der Begnadigten. Conventionally this term would mean those reprieved, pardoned, or forgiven.

Fourth Point of Prophetic Doctrine

Regarding Eternal Blessedness

§163. Through their vision of God, from the resurrection of the dead onward, those who have died in community with Christ will find themselves in a state of blessedness inalterable and undisturbed. 1. The state of persons of faith after their total restoration into life can be imagined under two different modes: first, as a sudden indwelling of the Highest that remains ever the same or, second, as a gradual progression toward the Highest. Like the development of Christ, the latter mode of this state, however, would have to be imagined as without any relapse or struggle. Yet, each of the two modes presents its own special difficulties as soon as one tries to draw a clearer outline in general and to shape the formulation for a graphic image. As concerns the first mode of this state, we can hardly give an account of how consummation could be obtained by us directly upon our resurrection, or could be planted in us at that time, if all connection with our present life were abolished. This disconnection would not occur if perfection were reached through a gradual process of growth and our present life would then gradually be forgotten, just as our childhood state is forgotten in our present life. Yet, still further, let us imagine a perfect state not capable of any further progression but still occurring in a finite being and, indeed, in a finite being completely separated from all that could somehow still be both capable and needful of some reworking. Then we would be in the predicament of trying to envisage how this being, deprived of any action in any circumstance, is to express one’s perfection. It is not only that we cannot sever life shared in common from the nature of a human being, much less that a Christian can ever imagine existing without such a communal life, since the community of the faithful with one another and that of each Christian with Christ are indeed simply one and the same thing. It is also that we can hardly imagine, as an absolutely perfect state, a life shared in common but lacking in any object of shared activity, which life would thus have to remain restricted simply to a mutual depiction of people’s internal life course. That is to say, certainly we do indeed have a kindred feature within our present life in our conjoint reverence for God1 and in all of our artistic depictions of God-consciousness; however, just as we would not only find it to be reprehensible if pious Christians were thereby to neglect any efficacious activity for which they are responsible but would instead consider such a life to be a paltry substitute, so too we cannot accept that the peak of perfection in our human existence would be reduced to such an exchange of giving and receiving of such a slack and barren depiction as this one. Instead, it

strains our imagination to find anything for us to do in that life. Under the given presuppositions, then, nothing remains but some external nature to be worked on or some defective spiritual world to be ruled over, both of such a kind that being occupied with them could not disturb one’s blessed state. Yet, we do not find in Scripture any actual inducement2 to occupy ourselves with such a formulation, nor do we find any capacity for doing so in ourselves. It goes no more easily, however, when we try to envisage that an endless rise toward perfection would begin at our resurrection. That is to say, we can scarcely imagine this rise toward perfection without irregularities and vacillations, and, even then, still not without such a dissatisfaction with the present as is naturally bound to the anticipatory feeling3 regarding something better yet to come. Moreover, this state would, nevertheless, always include a consciousness of imperfection and thus, in free beings, a consciousness of guilt in some way or another. Indeed, such a rise can hardly be imagined without external relations and external conditions for development. Once this floodgate is opened, however, the dissimilarity belonging to what is of the same kind and the contrast between what is agreeable and disagreeable would then come pouring out too—and as a result of this, so would all that is characteristic of human life on this side. Indeed, based on this presupposition, all that remains, which is perhaps not to be avoided without contradiction, is to include the alternation between life and death as well. Doing this makes it evident that under this form we still have not imagined any consummation of the church at all but only a gradually improving and refining repetition of this present life. Thus, the task is not resolved. 2. Now, suppose that, under whichever of the two forms it may be, we inquire about how life is actually lived in this future state, and suppose that we have already granted that as concerns our own self-initiated activity,4 its content is limited simply to that of presentation.5 Then, in order to obtain a graphic intimation,6 it would be necessary for us to know what we would then have in mind to present—that is, what will influence us and what we will receive within ourselves. The general answer to the question posed lies in the expression that eternal life would consist in beholding God.7 If by this, however, we can but understand the most complete fullness of the most vital consciousness of God, then the next question concerns the means by which this God-consciousness would then be distinguished from our present Godconsciousness. Now, the very next thing to say would very likely be that this God-consciousness we have at present is always mediated, in that we have it only in and with some other consciousness; consequently, in that other state it would be unmediated. However, this concept can hardly be reconciled with the retention of personal existence. That is to say, as self-conscious individual beings we can never have God-consciousness, if it is truly to be our own, except with our self-consciousness. Moreover, if we would then still have to distinguish this selfconsciousness from that God-consciousness, this distinction could be envisaged only in one of two ways. One alternative would be simply to distinguish ourselves from our Godconsciousness as the subject it indwells and to imagine that our self-consciousness would have no other content than that, and hardly anyone would be able to entertain this notion. The

other alternative would have to be that of distinguishing self-consciousness as a variable consciousness, consequently as one constantly subject to being affected, from Godconsciousness that is imagined to be constantly self-identical. Hence, if individual life is to continue in human nature—indeed, within finite nature overall—our God-consciousness will always continue to be simply a mediated one, and we will have to search out the distinction between present and future God-consciousness within this domain alone. Then, however, there remains only what we already strive for in this life, though with the consciousness that we cannot attain it. That is, not only can we not have cognizance of God in all and with all without hindrance, but also, to the extent that finite nature permits this, we cannot unwaveringly have cognizance of all that wherein and wherewith God lets Godself be known without there ever arising within us some conflict—a conflict, that is, between this effort in us to have cognizance of God and some other effort of some kind or one between a steady consciousness of God and some other kind of consciousness. Now, to be sure, this would be a clear and sure beholding,8 and in this way we would be completely at home with God. All this would be so, except that it is no more possible to grasp how we should already stand at this point right at the resurrection, without the continuity and selfsameness of our existence being endangered, than it is possible that we could even come to see, by latching onto the passages we have cited thus far, how we should ever attain to this consummation. Consequently, we could indeed proceed from either of these two starting points—both from the task of prefiguring a state of blessedness that is inalterably the same and from the task of prefiguring an endless progression—but we cannot really resolve either task. Thus, we will remain forever uncertain as to how that state which comprises the supreme consummation of the church would ever be gained by the personal existence of individuals, viewed as rising into immortal9 life, or would ever be possessed in this form. [P.S. 1] Addendum [to the Fourth Point of Doctrine]: Regarding Eternal Damnation Certain figurative discourses of Christ10 have occasioned people’s assuming, in contrast to eternal blessedness, a state of nonblessedness,11 one not to be ameliorated for those who died while living outside community with Christ. Upon closer examination, these discourses will hardly be found to be sufficient for the purpose. Short of using a very arbitrary procedure, in part, these passages are themselves not to be divorced from others that would have to refer to something that is to occur beforehand12 or to something that happened earlier; in part, they are countered by other passages that do not allow any thought of a definitive victory of wickedness over some portion of the human race, from which passages one must rather conclude that wickedness will be entirely wiped out even before the general resurrection.13 Still less, by far, can the notion of eternal damnation itself withstand close examination, whether considered in and of itself or in relation to eternal blessedness. Regarding eternal damnation considered in and of itself, the following observations apply. First, suppose that it is understood that eternal damnation cannot mean being condemned to physical pain and suffering, because if human nature is not to have been

entirely wiped out, then we indeed cannot imagine it without the mitigating effect of being used to pain and suffering, so that even the consciousness of being able to bear affliction would always carry some satisfaction with it. Consequently, a pure lack of blessedness, capable of no amelioration, would not emerge from this process. On this basis, therefore, we would scarcely find any firm spot left to stand on. This being said, suppose that the lack of blessedness is to be of a spiritual sort and, further, is to consist above all in torments of conscience. In that case, the damned would be ever so much better off in the state of damnation than they were in this life, and yet they should be more miserable by virtue of their already being better off. We cannot imagine this outcome, for even if it should issue from divine justice, there would still be nothing to keep the self-appraisal of an awakened and sharpened conscience from containing a counterweight to one’s lack of blessedness. Indeed, we cannot imagine that an awakened conscience, viewed as a vital inner movement, should not also yield something good. Suppose, on the other hand, that someone wanted to say that a sharpened feeling for the contrast of good and wickedness is not to be viewed as the basis for eternal torments but only the consciousness of throwing away one’s chance at blessedness. In that case, even this consciousness could have been vitally aroused only inasmuch as at least a facsimile of blessedness were present in one’s consciousness, and it could be tormenting in its effect only inasmuch as some capacity to participate in that blessed state were there. However, this capacity would already presuppose some improvement, and that facsimile would already be a partaking14 that serves to ameliorate the lack of blessedness. If we now consider eternal damnation in its relation to eternal blessedness, it is easy to see that if eternal damnation exists, eternal blessedness cannot continue to exist. That is to say, even if the two domains were totally separate externally, such an elevated state of the blessed, already regarded in itself, could not be conjoined with complete ignorance of others’ lack of blessedness, even less so if that very separation were to be simply the result of a general judgment at which the two sides were present—that is, in which each side would also be aware of the other. If we accordingly apply to the blessed some knowledge regarding the condition of the damned, this knowledge cannot be imagined to be devoid of any feeling for them.15 This is so, for if the perfecting of our nature is not to have retrogressed, this feeling must embrace the entire human race, and feeling for the damned must needs disturb the state of blessedness, all the more so in that, unlike every similar feeling in this life, it would not be tempered by hope. In this connection, however much we might bear in mind that if eternal damnation really exists, it must also be just and that God’s justice must be included in people’s beholding God, feeling for the plight of others also cannot be removed from that experience. Likewise, then, in this life as well we would rightly require a deeper compassion16 for suffering that is deserved than for that which is not deserved. Further, suppose that remembrance of an earlier state, in which some of us were always united with some of those others in the same collective life, would somehow continue in us beyond death. In that case, our feeling for them would have to be all the stronger if in this earlier period there was a time when we were no more regenerate than they. Then, since in the

divine government of the world everything is integrally conditioned by everything else, we also cannot hide from the fact that things worked out well for us that were conditioned by the very same arrangement of the world, by virtue of which such fortune did not fall to them. As a result, a piercing quality must be added to our feeling for them that cannot fail to strike us whenever we sense a definite connection between our advantage and the disadvantage of anyone else. Thus, viewed from both sides, there are great difficulties in trying to envisage that the eventual outcome of redemption would be such that thereby some would have a share in supreme blessedness but others—and indeed according to the conventional notion the largest portion of the human race—would be irretrievably lost in a state lacking blessedness. In consequence, we should not cling to such a notion without decisive evidence that Christ himself foresaw this outcome in that fashion, and in no way do we have such evidence. Hence, we surely ought, at the very least, to grant equal right to that more moderate outlook of which there are also still some traces in Scripture,17 namely that by the power of redemption a general restoration of all human souls would eventually occur. [P.S. 2.] Postscript to the Prophetic Points of Doctrine. What seems to result from these discussions is the following. We have seen that the two features—the consummation of the church and personal continuation beyond death—are of themselves each taken up into Christian consciousness with complete truth. We have also established that the church’s consummation never comes about in this life and that the state of individuals in the afterlife cannot relate to the church’s consummation in the same way as it does in the present life. Nevertheless, the combination of these two features and their relation to each other does not yield a firmly demarcated, genuinely graphic intimation,18 nor can such a graphic intimation of either feature be developed out of allusions found in Scripture. That is to say, if we should want to use the idea19 of the church’s consummation to define the relationship of individual life there to that which exists here and to do so based on the relationship of the church consummate to the church not yet consummate, we would simply not be able to accomplish this task. Further, if we should want to assign a place for the church consummate by means of the notion of a future life wherein the church would no longer be simply productive but would itself be a product, we would not be able to accomplish this task either. The first mode of presentation will always end up dallying with what is mythical—that is, with a historical presentation of something suprahistorical. The second mode of presentation will always come close to being visionary—that is, to an earthly presentation of something supra-earthly. Everywhere these modes of presentation, moreover, have constituted the forms of prophetic utterance, which in its higher meaning has never made any claim to producing knowledge in the proper sense but is meant to give shape in a stimulating fashion only to principles20 already acknowledged.

1. Gottesverehrung. Ed. note: The term for a service of worship is Gottesdienst; here emphasis is placed on peoples’ sheer reverence for or adoration of or looking up to God, side by side. 2. For surely Matt. 19:28 and 2 Tim. 2:12 cannot be viewed in this way. 3. Vorgefühl. Ed. note: Cf. §§114n3, 114.2, and 146, including 146n1 and n5 therein. See also most of the notes that follow just below. 4. Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s discourse this term is always paired with Empfänglichkeit (receptivity), so that there are always two general elements in every human experience, each in varying degrees relative to each other: a more spontaneous self-initiated activity and an activity of undergoing, taking in, or more or less passively receiving. See §4.1–2. 5. Darstellung. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher proceeds to demonstrate here, one prominent aspect of self-initiated activity is that of presenting what one has experienced and learned, usually to others, by word or deed—this after having processed for oneself whatever one may have received. Hence, a presentation (in some instances a depiction) is ordinarily an outward expression of what is within oneself, not a mere re-presentation (for which activity he uses repräsentieren, but only rarely). Of course, one can also make a presentation quietly to oneself in thought or imagination, as he has done here before writing this presentation down. Cf. §§15–19. 6. Ed. note: anschauliche Vorstellung. This is an apt place to be reminded that in contrast to a Darstellung, which pins down the meaning of an experience, ideally with the greatest care and clarity one can muster, in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary a Vorstellung is a looser image, intimation, or (usually) notion, necessarily more provisional and therefore quite temporary and approximate. Here “graphic” means such as to be perceptible, at least to the mind’s eye. See §158n3. 7. Taken above all from Matt. 5:8 and 2 Cor. 5:7, with what right is debatable. Ed. note: anschauen Gottes. Sermon outline on Matt. 5:8 (from the Beatitudes: “shall see God”), July 24, 1802, Zimmer (1882), 377. And 2 Cor. 5:7 RSV reads: “We walk by faith, not by sight [Schauen].” See sermon on 2 Cor. 5:17–18, regarding “the new creation,” Oct. 24, 1830, “That We Have Nothing to Teach concerning the Wrath of God,” the ninth of ten Augsburg sermons, first published in 1831 then in SW II.2 (1835, 1843), 725–38; ET DeVries (1987), 152–65, and Nicol (1997), 141–54. 8. Schauen. Ed. note: That is, able to see or look upon God. Then the reference is to being “at home with the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:8 RSV). 9. Ed. note: unsterblich. Ultimately meaning to transcend death, this has been Schleiermacher’s usual term here; it is a literal transcription of the Latinate term “immortality.” Otherwise this state is called “eternal” (vs. temporal) or “everlasting,” unending, infinite (vs. finite), or “resurrected” into an afterlife but involving a life beyond death in any case. The two unresolved tasks just summarized have been to “prefigure” (vorzubilden) personal immortality and thereby the consummation of the church. 10. Matt. 25:46; Mark 9:44; and John 5:29. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Mark 9:41–50, June 16, 1833, SW II.6 (1835), 41– 50; and (2) John 5:24–30, June 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 347–64. 11. Unseligkeit. Ed. note: Or “lack of blessedness.” By some conventions called “misery” (Elend, Trübsal) or “damnation” (Verdammnis) or “gone to hell” (zur Hölle gefahrt), but Schleiermacher privileges only the term used here, which some convention also uses to mean “not saved,” though he does not. In the sermon cited in note 7 above, he also abjures damning or anathematizing the views and practices of opponents. 12. Cf. Matt. 24:30–34 and John 5:24–25. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Matt. 24:32–42, undated, Festpredigten (1833), SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 478–89; and (2) John 5:24–25, June 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 347–64. 13. See 1 Cor. 15:25–26. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 Cor. 15:26, April 24, 1791, SW II.7 (1836), 77–90. 14. Genuß. Ed. note: This is the same term used for partaking of the Lord’s Supper, meaning a nurturance and enjoyment. 15. Mitgefühl. Ed. note: Or “compassion.” 16. Mitleid. Ed. note: That is, a Mitgefühl that is specifically directed to another’s suffering (Leiden), a “suffering with.” The reference to “the divine government of the world” that follows presages his use of the concept in §§164–69, which, in turn, directly leads into the “capstone” conclusion of the entire system of doctrine, his consideration of the doctrine of the triune God in §§170–72. 17. See 1 Cor. 15:26, 53, 55. Ed. note: (RSV) “[26] The last enemy to be destroyed is death. … [53] For this perishable nature must put on the imperishable, and this mortal nature must put on immortality. … [55] ‘O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting?’” [cf. Hos. 13:14]. See §163n7 just above. 18. Ed. note: See §163n6 above. 19. Idee. 20. Prinzipien. Ed. note: Principles are more or less well-defined statements or convictions. Some principles provide the basis for or serve to motivate activity of some sort. Prophecy in the “higher” sense would not mean giving these principles “shape” by heavily relying on either “mythical” or “visionary” imagination (graphic images or intimations) to project into

the future the consequences of what such acknowledged principles imply. Ordinarily, as Schleiermacher has indicated here, these projections include some evaluative judgment regarding future events or actions, hence the tasks that have been defined and pursued in these six prophetic doctrines.

SECTION THREE

Regarding the Divine Attributes That Relate to Redemption [Introduction to Section Three] §164. In tracing to divine causality our consciousness of communion with God as it is restored through the efficaciousness of redemption, we posit the planting and spreading of the Christian church as an object of the divine government of the world. 1. Just as we are able to set forth only the concept of government of the world in this place, no other content is to be attributed to it than is stated here. The reason is that for our Christian self-consciousness, everything else is present only in relation to the efficaciousness of redemption, viewed either as belonging to the organism in which reawakened Godconsciousness is expressed or as material at hand that is first to be processed by it. However, above all, governing means setting in motion forces that otherwise are already at hand and controlling them. Thus, even here the expression very easily tempts one to think of a divine control of earthly forces as occurring previously. It also tempts one to separate government of the world from the creation in such a way that it appears to be something that comes afterward or betwixt and between and as if everything could even have happened differently than it did from the creation onward. To the contrary, the Christian belief that everything is created with a view to the Redeemer1 implies that everything is already ordered by means of creation, in both a preparatory and a retrospective way, in relation to the revelation of God in the flesh and for the fullest possible transmission of that revelation to the whole of human nature for the purpose of forming the reign of God. Likewise, we are also not to view the natural world in such a way that it goes its own way by virtue of divine preservation and that the divine government of the world exercises influence on it only through special particular acts designed to bring it into conformity with the reign of grace. Rather, for us the two things are wholly one, and we are certain that even the entire ordering of nature would have been different from the beginning onward if redemption through Christ had not been destined for the human race after sin had occurred. 2. Granted, it does seem that the concept of world government set forth in our proposition belongs to a time when there was no occasion to think of other spiritual life besides that of human beings, except for that of the angels. The early Christians, though, however grandly the life of angels was described, placed that life beneath the life of human nature, lacking as the angels were thought to do, in any sense of union between the divine being and the angels’ nature. The early Christians also related angels’ life to human beings only as in service to them. Still, even if we gladly presuppose in advance that the world is the most abundant revelation of God that we can possibly imagine, and accordingly if we were to have been fully convinced that organic life would be developing in every heavenly body and indeed is rising to the level of possession of reason, this position would nonetheless be an empty one

for our self-consciousness. This is so, for suppose that we were able absolutely to broaden our species-consciousness concerning the human domain to consciousness of intelligent life; even then, this nonhuman intelligence would not affect us in such a way that we would have to broaden our notion of divine government of the world to the point that something regarding the temporal course of these nonhuman intelligent beings would be made evident. Since nothing is now available for this purpose, we also know no compass for government of the world other than our world, thus than the domain in which redemption shows its power. Now, if that element in our self-consciousness which becomes for us the consciousness of sin does not immediately lead us to the divine causality, the concept of preservation gains its full content only in relation to that element which becomes for us consciousness of grace, leading thereby to the concept of divine causality. Hence, we may say that both processes set forth earlier,2 the nature of things in their relation to each other and the ordering of their reciprocal influences on each other, subsist by God, just as they subsist in relation to the redemptive revelation of God in Christ or in relation to that revelation of God in Christ which the Spirit is developing toward its consummation.3 That is to say, everything in our world— human nature above all and then all else the more surely the more closely it interconnects with human nature—would have been differently arranged, and so too the entire course of human occurrences and of natural events would have been different if the union of divine being4 with human nature in the person of Christ, and as a consequence of this union also the community of the faithful through the Holy Spirit, had not been decreed by God. Moreover, with regard to our judgment concerning the notion of the unity and selfsameness of the church for all time,5 we will divide this divine government of the world into two periods. The first period occurs before that union in time and space actually emerges, in which everything is simply preparatory and introductory. The second period is one of development and fulfillment once that union has actually come to pass. 3. Now, there is no division or contrast in the divine causality anywhere, and we can view the divine government of the world only as one causality, directed toward but one aim. Accordingly, the church, or the reign of God, is in its entire extension and in the entire course of its development the one object of the divine government of the world, but every particular is such an object only in and for this reign of God. Indeed, for our part we cannot help but posit each particular as of itself part of this whole. In contrast, we sharply diverge from the right path when we take a given particular to be a special case of divine causality that is somehow simply divorced from its connection with the whole, consequently viewing that particular as of itself a special goal and outcome of the divine government of the world, to which something else is thus subordinate as its means. Rather, as a necessary correction we must then immediately subordinate this very particular to the rest, with the result that every particular appears as a point of transition, one that is equally very much conditioning in its effect and conditioned. Indeed, this was also true of the Redeemer when he presented his disciples individually, in the particular circumstances of their lives, as objects of divine care, therewith ever holding in view their calling, thus their effective action in the reign of God, as that to which that divine care was actually directed.

In this perspective the customary classification of a general, special, and very special divine providence becomes rather useless for us. If the first category is supposed to refer to everything in general, the second to the whole human race, and the third to religious folk or to the reign of God, for us everything nonetheless comes together only in this third category, because everything else relates to the object of this third category. In general, the term “providence” is of an alien origin, initially transferred from heathen writers into later Jewish writings and subsequently into those of teachers in the Christian church. This crossover was not without numerous impediments to a clear presentation of distinctively Christian faith, impediments that would have been avoided by using the scriptural terms “predetermination” and “foreknowledge.” That is to say, these terms more clearly express the relating of every particular part to the interconnectedness of the whole and present the divine government of the world as an internally harmonious ordering. Moreover, the terms do this in such a way that the term “fate,” which is not Christian in any case, is in no way to be mistaken for the divine government of the world. What is always kept in mind in this connection is a determining of any given particular by the combined action of all the rest, without consideration of what might be thought to derive from any self-positing of an object.6 Quite similarly, however, the term “providence” is thought especially to contain a determination of a particular without consideration of what would naturally ensue from its coexistence with everything else, and this one-sidedness is alien to the concept of predetermination as well. In contrast, Scripture itself is not averse to confessing that sin is also included in the divine foreknowledge, even though it actually contradicts the idea of the reign of God. Instead, Scripture counts sin among the preparatory and preliminary elements of the divine government of the world. Moreover, we can recognize it to be in itself completely in agreement with the divine decree that all human beings should have a part in this earlier condition before the new creation, so as to participate in the powers afforded by the new creation solely under the form of the contrast that determines the entire actual existence of human beings. Out of this recognition, however, the difficulty, already stirred up above,7 of accomplishing the notion of an eternal damnation is made evident once again, for here the trouble has to do with trying to reconcile that notion with the notion of a divine government of the world that is one in itself and that is directed to one aim.

1. Col. 1:16. Ed. note: Sermon on Col. 1:13–18, July 25, 1830, SW II.6 (1835), 232–43. 999 2. Cf. §46.P.S. 3. Ed. note: The phrase is den Geist zur Vollendung entwickelende Offenbarung Gottes in Christo. In this context, Geist would appear to mean only that aspect of the divine Spirit in which the “common spirit” that is shared in the broadening reign of God is developing, notably in the Christian church. 4. Wesen. 5. Cf. §156. 6. Fürsichgesetztsein des Gegenstandes. 7. Ed. note: §163.P.S.2. See also §§142.2 and 159.3.

§165. Within the divine government of the world the divine causality presents itself as love and as wisdom.1 1. Generally speaking, the one and undivided divine causality cannot be presented within a sphere of divine attributes without anthropomorphizing. Thus, here too, in order to bring the mode and orientation of these attributes to clear consciousness, we must look for distinctions that, since they are human in nature, rest on some contrast.2 Now, in all human causality, we distinguish the underlying disposition therein from the more or less corresponding manner of carrying it out. The first feature mostly presents the inner depths of a self-actively3 causal being viewed in its unity, as a will that is bestirred in some distinct fashion. The second feature originates more in one’s understanding and shows us one’s selfinitiated activity, viewed as something manifold in relation to a given object. The aforementioned divine attributes are represented in accordance with this distinction in human beings, and in this way they correspond to the contents of the divine government of the world specified above. That is to say, first, love is the orientation of wanting to unite with others and wanting to be in the other. Hence, if the pivotal point of the divine government of the world is redemption and the establishment of God’s reign, whereby union of divine being with human nature is what is occurring, the underlying disposition in that process can be represented only as love. Second, wisdom is understood to be the proper outlining of designs, these designs being conceived in their manifold determinability and in the totality of their relationships to each other. Hence, if the divine government of the world manifests itself in the harmonious ordering of the entire domain of redemption, alongside divine love, we rightly term wisdom as the art, so to speak, of bringing the divine love to its complete realization. 2. Naturally, the two attributes are the more readily separated in human life in that, on account of the distinction between understanding and will that is essential in human beings, disposition and the formation of design do sometimes merge with each other, but only among a few, and even among those few never completely. Instead, proficiency of understanding more or less lags behind purity of will, or vice versa. Now, such a split in divine being is unthinkable; hence, even these two attributes are not divorced, not in any way whatsoever, but are so totally one that one can also view each attribute as already contained in the other one. The consequence is that, without positing any limitation in God in terms of them, we are able to assert that divine wisdom is not suited to determine any arrangement of things and any other ordering of their course than that wherein divine love is realized most fully; no more is divine love suited to self-communications in which it would not satisfy itself completely and thus would not appear as wisdom absolutely. This harmony must be illuminated still more clearly in the following two points of doctrine.

1. This fundamental, if complex, contrast between love and wisdom is highlighted in three 1831 sermons: (1) “How We Must Marvel at Divine Wisdom in the Ordering of Salvation,” on Rom. 11:32–33, Trinity Sunday, May 29, 1831, first published in 1831, then revised in Festpredigten (1833), also in SW II.2 (1834), 562–73, and (1843), 561–72; (2) “How Every Individual Soul Recognizes in the Peace of the Redeemer an Infinite Fullness of Divine Wisdom,” on John 14:27,

Third Sunday in Trinity, June 12, 1831, first published in 1831, then in SW II.3 (1835), 1–10, and (1843), 1–11; ET Wilson (1890), 314–25; (3) “How the Redeemer Is the One for Whose Sake We Too Are Loved by God,” on John 16:27, Third Sunday in Advent, Dec. 11, 1831, first published in 1832, also in SW II.2 (1835), 121–31, and (1843), 126–36; ET Wilson (1890), 343–54. In these sermons, “grace” and “mercy” are close affiliates of divine love; “knowledge,” “measure,” and “order” relate similarly to divine wisdom. The two correlated activities by God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in human life, in accordance with the one eternal divine decree of creation and redemption, lead to Christian faith and action and to community, freedom, peace, love, justice, and truth. In the May 29 sermon, Schleiermacher summarizes (571): “God’s love and wisdom, God’s might and glory, can be revealed to us in its full radiance only when we move out of the night of sin into the light of the Redeemer.” These themes were already presaged in the 1824 New Year’s sermon, using Job 38:11 as its metaphorical text but also featuring John 1:14; 14:23; and 15:15, as well as related New Testament allusions, so as to flesh out its Christian contents: “God, Who Determines the Measure of All Things,” Thursday, Jan. 1, 1824, published first in Festpredigten (1826), then in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 85–103; ET Wilson (1890), 212–34, and Lawler (2003), 142–68. There God fosters out of sorrow “a more intimate love” in human beings through God’s own “kindly and tender measure” (147), and “a salvific order” is produced by “the Spirit of love” (162f.). Also, based on God’s decree and out of God’s corresponding love and wisdom, this Spirit of love is found especially in community with God in Christ and among one another, through the various gifts noted above. Signs of the love-wisdom awareness systematically represented in these four later sermons were already in evidence as early as 1797, in an outline for a sermon on 1 Cor. 14:33 titled “Implications of God’s Being a God of Order and of Peace,” preached at Charité Hospital, Aug. 27, 1797, and first published in Bauer (1908), 334–35. Significant links in this process of concept formation appear in the correlated pair “love and sensibility” in his Soliloquies (1800, 1810, 1822) and in his Brouillon, notes on ethics and the theory of virtue (1804–1806), ET Wallhausser and Tice (2003); see also Schleiermacher’s ethics notes from 1814–1816. In the 1804–1806 notes he distinguishes within the work of reason between the correlate pair “formative (or creative) love” and “knowing love.” This distinction is summarized there as follows. In the moral life: “wisdom and love now form a unity. There is no genuine creating without love; there is no contemplation without love” (Brouillon, 237; see also 152f., 156–58, 162, 207, and 212). 2. Gegensatz. Ed. note: As in the example just given, this concept almost never refers to sheer opposites in Schleiermacher’s usage. Rather, it points to two or more differentiated items in nature, and some of these are correlated to such an extent that they cannot be conceived without each other. The entire process of nature, in turn, is viewed as one organic, interconnected whole, absolutely dependent on God. 3. Selbsttätig. Ed. note: “Self-active” in its contrast with receptivity. In Schleiermacher’s usage this term refers to an individual’s spontaneous, self-initiated activity (Selbsttätigkeit).

First Point of Doctrine

Regarding Divine Love

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine] §166. As the attribute by virtue of which the divine being1 communicates2 itself, divine love is recognized in the work of redemption. Basel Confession (1536) V: “The concern of the entire canon of scripture is to show God’s goodness to humanity and to proclaim God’s goodwill through Christ the Lord. … This message … is received by faith alone.”3 1. Even in our own sphere the two attributes are not infrequently contested. Many reject the claim that Supreme Being communicates itself and that the essence of divine love

consists therein, considering it to be mystical. The other statement, that insofar as a divine communication exists overall, this takes place only by means of redemption, is rejected for being exclusive and for limiting demonstrations of divine perfection over too narrow a range. Some people also diverge from us in this respect, especially those who generally place what is distinctive about Christianity into the shadows rather than emphasize it. As concerns the first statement, these people do recognize the divine love in all the arrangements of nature and orderings of things human, protecting and advancing life, but apart from redemption and taken only in this sense, divine love remains something ever dubious. If we want to view the life of individuals as the object of divine love, nevertheless, we cannot infer the divine love from advancements of life that are made at the expense of others, not if we do not want to sink back into the most grievous particularism, because then every time love would have appeared, its opposite would have done so as well.4 Indeed, this goes not only for the advancements of and restraints against sensory well-being; rather, it is the same for the spiritual development of individual life, where in a great many respects promotion of one life is conditioned by negligence of others’ lives. In contrast, suppose that we want to put individual life to the side and pay more attention to humanity, thus to our species-consciousness. In that case, since here the advancements and restraints of individuals reciprocally cancel each other out whenever they reciprocally condition each other, we will all the sooner come back to the fact that the divine goodwill cannot be observed in an unambiguous fashion if it does not prove to be protective and caring of what is most distinctive and supreme in human beings viewed generally, namely, Godconsciousness. Overall, however, our Christian eyes see God-consciousness to be in a suppressed condition outside the domain of redemption, and in that respect as Christians we find ourselves, once again, within the domain of divine self-communication. The consequence is that, as Christians, even if we want to present divine love only as a benevolent and protective love, we are able to stop short of nothing less than the communication of God in Christ and in the Holy Spirit, a communication that renews and perfects our God-consciousness. This is so, for even though every formation of Godconsciousness—however incomplete it may be, indeed even the latent possession of it as something merely sought after—counts even for us Christians as a communication God makes to human nature; it is not something in which we can stand still. Rather, Godconsciousness is something that from every side shows itself to exist only as a point of transition, one through which preliminary and unsatisfactory human conditions pass. 2. On the other hand, objections are raised against our proposition, first, that it has not been necessary to await redemption in order to recognize divine love, even as God’s selfcommunication, and, second, that it is ungenerous to the highest degree and unthinkable to find that love solely and exclusively in redemption. As regards the first objection, some claim that the communication of God exists in everything that can be at all reckoned to be the image of God in human beings, thus in all the functions of reason, indeed in everything on which the original perfection of human nature rests and in every seed of spiritual development that is inherent within our nature. To be sure, the God-consciousness that

underlies piety would then also belong to all this except that if, on that account, we should want to afix knowledge of divine love only to redemption, we would be assigning the greatest value to what is less significant. This is so, for the difference between God’s relating to creatures who have no capacity for God-consciousness whatsoever and to those who are developing it, even if only in the most incomplete and unpowerful way, is far greater than that between God’s relating to the latter and to the regenerate in our midst. This is so, because obviously the difference between what the God-consciousness of the last two groups contains is far lesser than what obtains between the first two groups. Still, to this point it is to be replied that surely all human beings, regarded as having the capacity for God-consciousness, are also objects of divine love. However, divine love is not automatically realized in them. Rather, those who have lived under the law have been hardpressed by fear before God, which was then the prevailing religious frame of mind and heart, rising at best to the negative consciousness that Supreme Being is not jealous,5 which is far remote from being an acknowledgment of divine love. This acknowledgment first arises with the efficaciousness of redemption and from Christ. Now, however, God is not able in any direct way to love those who still move precariously between idolatry and godlessness— which, rightly understood, one can say of the entire territory outside Christianity—inasmuch as they do not themselves love God.6 Hence, even here we come back to the fact that God loves them only insofar as God sees them in Christ, just as they too do not come to a knowledge of divine love before they are themselves in Christ. As regards the second objection, it is said that even if it is true that in the domain of Godconsciousness, which is coposited in self-consciousness, the love of God first comes to the fore only with redemption, it nonetheless does show up in many domains, both outside Christianity as within it, especially in all successful pursuit of human knowledge and in human dominion over the earth. Yet, since all that is human is to be permeated by the power of redemption and is to attain its perfection only in this connection, so too no human good, no matter of what kind it may be, actually conforms to the corresponding divine will if it is not brought into this interconnection with the dominion of God-consciousness in our souls through Christ. However, the divine love also cannot be recognized on the basis of anything that does not present the divine will. Thus, to be completely justified, our proposition can be understood only within the compass already vouchsafed to it above.7

1. Wesen. 2. Mitteilt. Ed. note: “Imparts” only in the sense of “communicates,” not in the sense of “giving some part of what one possesses over to” another. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Cochrane (1972), 101; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 116. This statement is from the second Basel Confession (= the First Helvetic Confession). The Niemeyer text reads “God’s Son,” instead of “the Lord.” 4. Cf. §85.1. 5. Ed. note: This conception of God as “jealous” appears only in the Old Testament (e.g., Exod. 20:5; Deut. 5:9). In the only two passages where this conception is referred to in the New Testament (1 Cor. 10:22 and 13:4), it is abjured. 6. Ed. note: That is, in community with Christ, they come to love God, thus in this relationship they come to experience this exchange of love as not only a relational phenomenon but as one that is reciprocal as well. 7. In §164.

§167. Doctrinal Proposition. God is love.1 1 John 4:16. “So we know and believe the love God has for us. God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them.”2 1. Repeatedly it has been asserted that in God no distinction can exist between essence3 and attributes, and precisely on this account the concept “attribute” is not really suitable for presentation of the divine being.4 Thus, at the same time, it is implied in that assertion that insofar as something true is said of God in what we posit as a divine attribute, the same must also be an expression for the divine nature5 itself. Indeed, for the same reason, it would have to be possible then to form similar statements regarding all other divine attributes, if they too are not to be posited as such erroneously. Yet, such statements do not appear in Scripture, nor has it ever been set forth in ecclesial doctrine that God would be “eternity” or “omnipotence” or the like. Moreover, if we could at least venture to say that God is loving omnipotence or omnipotent love, we would still grant that in the one form no less than in the other, only love is being equated with the being or nature of God.6 Therefore, our proposition must be established and justified in this exclusive form, meaning that only love and no other divine attribute can be equated with God in this fashion. Given this understanding, however, here too we do not intend to refer to any concept of God that is in any way established along a speculative path. Rather, we have only to show how it is that this attribute, “love,” is distinguished in such a manner from the others that we have set forth on the path we have taken. 2. Now, first of all, as regards the attributes ascertained in Part One of our presentation, already in that place these attributes laid no claim to be7 expressions regarding the divine being that could be substituted for the name “God” itself. That is to say, even if we declare “omnipotent”8 to be the attribute by virtue of which all that is finite exists by God’s agency, precisely as it does exist, we have posited this entire divine act, to be sure, but without assigning a motive. Thus, we have posited it as an action that is absolutely undetermined. Further, this formulation can lead to people’s calling God “omnipotent” only mistakenly, with reference to what has occurred viewed in a quantitative fashion. That is to say, since what is finite not only is, as such, a manifold but is also something changing and always exists for us only in transient conditions, thus at points of transition; so, that declaration contains nothing at all other than what the finite actually is by God’s agency and what God wills and puts in place. Moreover, unless we move beyond that domain, we will always remain unsure as to what the will of God coposited in the concept “omnipotent” is, as such. Obviously, the same is also true of the remaining divine attributes treated there. Indeed, as a whole set they have been derived in abstraction from the distinct feeling content of our God-consciousness. Thus, if we do not think of them in connection with the attributes of God that do derive from our reflection on this feeling content—as is the case in the formulations “God is almighty love”

and “God is eternal love”—but hold to them by themselves, faith in God as “almighty” and “eternal” is but a shadow of faith, such as the devils too can have.9 The two attributes treated in the first Aspect of our Part Two10 are also not such that they could originally be expressions of the divine being. That is, we cannot say that in Godself God is justice and holiness, because neither concept can be thought of without reference to human evil11 and to the contrast between good and human evil.12 Justice and holiness, however, both in their contrast and in their resolution, altogether fail to apply to God, if God is viewed in and of Godself alone. Hence, separated from the other attributes, the workableness of these attributes too is limited to a certain area. They come properly to be recognized as divine attributes, moreover, only once we have brought their separation to an end and have resolved them into those attributes which are treated here as a result of this second Aspect of our presentation in Part Two.13 As a consequence, what we have taken to be the work of divine holiness and justice is actually reckoned to the work of redemption, though in a way that is more preparatory than fulfilling. For us, those two attributes then come to be divine love, in turn, but viewed only in its preparatory expressions; and divine love is holy and just love only inasmuch as it essentially begins with these preparations, just as it is also omnipotent and eternal love. Now, if only love and wisdom thus retain the claim of being, at the same time, expressions for the very being of God, we are not able to say that God is wisdom in the same way as we say that God is love. Even so, the following particulars do admit of being adduced even before the concept of wisdom is likewise elaborated. If we look at the way in which we have consciousness of the two attributes, we find that we have that of divine love directly in the consciousness of redemption. Moreover, in that this consciousness is the fundament on which we lay all other God-consciousness, for us it naturally represents14 the very nature of God. In contrast, for us divine wisdom does not come into consciousness in such a direct fashion but does so only when we extend our self-consciousness, definitely our personal consciousness but even more our species-consciousness, to the point of relating every element of experience to each other.15 Indeed, the two attributes cannot be thought to be divorced from each other. Then, however, just as love is not the completion of wisdom, but wisdom is the completion of love, so too, if we think of God as wisdom, love would not also be so completely contained in it as wisdom would be if we think of God as love, for where omnipotent love is present, there absolute wisdom must be as well.

1. Ed. note: Cf. Thönes note (1873) under §48. 2. Ed. note: Sermon on 1 John 4:16–18, Trinity Sunday, June 16, 1822, first published in 1825, also in SW II.4 (1835), 289–302, and (1844), 535–46; ET in The Triune God (trans. Tice, forthcoming). Also on this theme see sermons on (1) John 16:21, Dec. 11, 1831, SW II.2 (1833), 121–31, and (1843), 126–36, ET Wilson (1890), 343–54; and (2) Rom. 5:7–8, April 20, 1832, SW II.3 (1835), 242–52, and (1843), 252–63, ET Wilson (1890), 372–84. 3. Wesen. Ed. note: As applied to God this word is almost always translated either “being” (as in “Supreme Being”) or “nature” (as in “nature of God”). The statement itself explains why “essence” is almost never used in this translation. 4. Wesen. Ed. note: See §167n3. 5. Wesen. Ed. note: See §167n3.

6. Sein oder Wesen Gottes. 7. Cf. §56.P.S. 8. Ed. note: The corresponding conventional title would be “the Almighty” (das Allmächtige) or “Almighty God.” The other attributes in Part One, there described as being “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness, were all in the same category as that being discussed here. They present God as “eternity,” “omnipresent,” and “omniscient” (Ewigheit, Allgegenwart, Allwissenheit, as well as Allmacht). 9. Jas. 2:19. 10. Ed. note: Those two are “holiness” (Heiligkeit) and “justice” (Gerechtigkeit), both especially related to Christian self-consciousness regarding sin in its relation to redemption. 11. Auf das Böse. 12. Guten und Bösen. 13. Ed. note: That is, they are to be conjoined and resolved in relation to God’s love and corresponding wisdom in the light of divine grace. 14. Ed. note: repräsentiert. 15. Zur Beziehung aller Momente aufeinander erweitern. Ed. note: That is, reference is then to the entire interconnectedness of nature, beginning with and thereby including human nature.

Second Point of Doctrine

Regarding Divine Wisdom

[Introduction to Second Point of Doctrine] §168. Divine wisdom is the principle that orders and determines the world for the divine self-communication that is carried out in redemption. 1. The particular relationship1 to be used for positing divine wisdom as an attribute distinguished from divine omniscience, a relationship lacking to us above,2 is found in this connection between divine wisdom and divine love. It remains true, however, that divine omniscience, defined in the way we did there, simply posits the same character in God that divine wisdom does, except that for us the nontemporal relationship, of course, becomes a twofold one: wisdom serving as the foregoing term and omniscience serving as the succeeding one. Consequently, the second attribute is in the same relationship to divine love as is the first one, and all being in God is simply posited as that which is mediated by God’s love. Moreover, what I have said elsewhere3 in another context concerning the relationship between love and wisdom is hereby augmented, namely, by the claim that the foregoing term is also the term that directly generates the second. Yet, what results, first of all, from our positing divine love to be wisdom as well is that we cannot possibly regard the totality of finite being in its relation to our God-consciousness other than as comprising the absolutely harmonious divine work of art—something that we also always imply in the expression “world.” This is explained as follows. The proper and complete design belonging to the idea of a work of art is thought to be the originative work of wisdom in the human domain as well. As a consequence, actual human actions are also taken to have their origin in wisdom only to the extent that they can be viewed at the same time to be works of art and parts of a

life, both in connection with the whole of that life and in and of themselves. The most complete human being, however, would be one in whom the totality of one’s plans for works and deeds would have formed an integrated whole of communicative self-presentation. In the same way, divine wisdom too is thought to be nothing other than Supreme Being in its absolute, not compound but simple, and originally complete self-presentation and communication.4 On our part, however, we must not imagine any division here. Just as there is no distinction between divine works and divine deeds, so too—unlike our situation— divine communication is not more predominant in divine deeds and presentation more predominant in divine works. Rather, it is only in our perspective that one thing could originally have been divine communication and then have come to be divine presentation, or the other way around. The reason why this expression is prominently used lies precisely in the fact that God’s sending Christ to us is originally divine communication. The unfolding of our consciousness of God’s wisdom consists in the fact that, for us, in its temporal progressions God’s communication moves more and more toward a complete presentation of God’s omnipotent love. Our next task is to be watchful that we do no damage to our concept “wisdom” by bringing our contrast between end and means into it. The reason for this caution has already been given above. That is, it is already clear that every human work of art is the more complete the more it accords with this concept in such a way that nothing within it falls into the contrast between end and means, but everything relates only as part to whole, and means lie only outside it. Moreover, this principle concerning a work of art is also manifested as it applies to an entire human life, viewed as a still higher completion. Thus, how should divine wisdom not exclude this contrast even more? Further, how should it not do so in such a way that since nothing that could be used as a means exists outside the world, everything within the world would be arranged in such a way that it relates only as part to whole, when viewed in its connection with all else? However, in and of itself every particular would be both means and end, so much so that in every instance each of the two modes of looking at things always ceases, in turn, and transfers into the other mode. Now, this is indeed generally acknowledged, in that wisdom would be placed exclusively in the correctness of the purpose God had in mind, to such an extent that no one assumes a cleverness in God, conceived as perfection that is separate from wisdom in the choice and use of means. In contrast, frequently enough and no less confusedly, people do sometimes take cleverness to be a component in the concept of divine wisdom itself and explain divine wisdom as divine perfection in terms both of establishment of ends and determination of means. The reason this happens is that means are always employed only where the producer has to rely on what has not been engendered by oneself. Further, one can hardly think of a determination of means otherwise than under the form of a choice, that is, in one’s reverting, in turn, to intermediate knowledge that had earlier been set aside by us. So, this consideration too agrees with the point that both divine wisdom and omniscience are the same in relation to each other and are the same as divine generativity, also that one cannot remove this equivalence without despoiling the concepts themselves, and vice versa.

2. Now that we recognize redemption to be the actual key to understanding divine wisdom, this comprises the distinctively Christian conception of the subject. The reason is that even in its greatest extension our Christian self-consciousness cannot rise beyond what stands in relation to us, and we are also able to make the entire divine ordering of the world within this domain intelligible only in reference to God’s revelation in Christ and in the Holy Spirit if we want truly to appropriate that divine ordering of the world for ourselves. However, in no way will this appropriation degenerate into a search, contrary to investigation of the things of nature, to find in particular happenings particular purposes that pertain only to the reign of God. Indeed, if this were attempted, we would constantly be operating with reference to points of transition5 the value of which for the whole is completely unknown to us. Surely, in contrast we will guard against ascribing the divine ordering of external and physical nature, or institutions for development of the human spirit in any quarter, to divine wisdom in such a way that we are at the same time divorcing them from the domain of redemption. That is to say, anything that would have no connection whatsoever with this domain and would not, at the same time, be totally divorced from human life as well—as we cannot rightly say of any part of external nature—could likewise also do injury just as well to the progress of redemption and so would not have been prefigured in divine wisdom. Alternatively, how could we believe that we have fathomed divine wisdom if we have conceived its expressions only in such a way that they could even occasionally be in contradiction with the supreme interest of humanity? Therefore, everything in the world, precisely insofar as it is ascribed to divine wisdom, must also be referred to God’s redemptive or newly creating revelation. Hence, without reservation the proper work of divine wisdom is the spreading of redemption. Differently put, on the one hand, it is the manner and arrangement in which election is accomplished, and the rebirth both of individuals and of the human race, taken in its entirety, is effected; on the other hand, it is the ever-changing transformation of Christian community in each instance when Christian piety that has been called into life has entered into or is to enter into union with other communities and other human circumstances. Hence, it is also in this light that any effort in which we strive to penetrate into depths of divine wisdom that are still hidden to us is always to be apprised, in and of itself. Furthermore, this effort can cease to be praiseworthy, not in its wanting to venture too far into the details—for whatever can be viewed as a detail in the domain of divine grace is also not too tiny to be contemplated as an object of divine wisdom —but only in our doing damage to the absolute unity of divine wisdom by using the contrast between end and means.

1. Verhältnis. Ed. note: This term is used to denote relationships of proportionality or comparison, not an interpersonal relationship. 2. Cf. §55.1. 3. In my essay “Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes,” Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1819. Ed. note: March 4, 1819, SW III.2 (1838). Cf. SW III.2, 377, and KGA I/11 (2002), 335: “Generally, wisdom and love are set forth as the most essential attributes of God, indeed love as the expression of God’s entire being, which is also totally correct

to the extent that it is inconceivable to make a distinction between wisdom and love in God in that there the very thought of love directly brings it forth.” 4. Acts 17:24–28. Ed. note: Sermons on (1) Acts 17:24–27, Nov. 2, 1800, SW II.1 (1834), 154–69, and (2) Acts 17:22– 31, Nov. 18, 1810, SW II.7 (1836), 528–37. 5. Durchgangspunkte. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher borrows from geometry in conceiving every point along a line, just as every point in time, to be in transition from one point to another.

§169. Doctrinal Proposition. Divine wisdom is the ground by virtue of which the world, viewed as the theater of redemption, is also the absolute revelation of Supreme Being, and, consequently, the world is good.1 1. We have already initiated this proposition earlier2 but can fully elaborate it only at this point. Moreover, it combines more precisely what was already stated there rather than containing anything new. It essentially demands that we are not to look for any divine communication greater than that effected in the human race by means of redemption through Christ. Further, in this sense the proposition must, above all, stand the test of two kinds of statements that we find in the two Aspects3 in this Second Part of our presentation. That is, in the first statement sin generally brings with it a diminishment of God-consciousness and thus of divine communication. So, if one assumes that before sin arose there was an actual state of purity or even of moral and spiritual perfection that either could or could not be interrupted by sin, then to be consistent with our proposition, one would also have to assume that if no fall into sin had resulted, and consequently if there had been no need for redemption, thereupon communication of divine being4 would have been less plentiful than is now the case given the presence of sin, but also given the presence of redemption. The second statement is that as long as unregenerate folk live here in community with religious folk, undertones of blessedness will come to the unregenerate too. This phenomenon will occur through the God-consciousness that ever dwells within them, and these undertones are also powerfully manifest in them as workings of preparatory grace. Now, suppose that one were to assume for all who walk on this path with regenerate people, but who would not eventually have attained to rebirth, an eternity of punishment in hell, viewed as an undiminished lack of blessedness. Then, in accepting our proposition one would have to grant that, under the arrangement wherein some go to hell, the sum total of divine communication would still have been greater in its effect up to the point of death than if one were to suppose, instead, that the rebirth of those who had not advanced so far as that of the regenerate would also have remained possible after death.5 2. We must reflect on the same demand of our proposition from another side. Suppose that we put Christ at the top, as we do, viewing him as the one individual who is totally permeated6 with God-consciousness and who, on that account, is received into full unity with the Highest. This being the case, all else is but incompletely and unequally permeated. If this permeation takes place within intelligent nature, then in increasing degrees it falls away from the top by means of various communal and preparatory circles until it might wholly disappear into unintelligent and inanimate nature, if one simply takes these aspects of nature

as such.7 Moreover, suppose that in accordance with our proposition this limited and diffuse communication of Supreme Being were indeed to be the total outcome. In that case, divine wisdom would be wholly devoted to this outcome just as divine love would find its total satisfaction therein. We would then have to become entirely doubtful as to whether those who were without reason and consciousness8 are also to be objects of divine love, because we do find them to be included within what is ordered by divine wisdom. Alternatively, we would then have to be entirely doubtful as to whether they are to be shut out even from that love, because they are unable to have any part in what is ordered by divine wisdom. That is to say, information that reason in effect requires regarding this entire range of gradations in subordinate existence as a footing for its own operation always remains unsatisfactory, because therein lies the presupposition that divine wisdom would be conditioned. Hence, we must add to this consideration the observation that everything that is not in and of itself9 capable of receiving divine communication would have to be brought into vital connection with that wherein such communication has its seat. It would then follow that as long as this connection were not operative in every possible way, and as long as spirit does not yet express and present itself in some fashion in everything that has no reason, divine wisdom too could not appear to us in every respect. However, it would also follow that if one supposes that it is through us that the world would come to be completely ready for us,10 it would also become manifestly clear that everything would exist only insofar as it could be an object of divine love. 3. Now, only here, with reference to divine love, do the divine attributes presented in Part One obtain their full meaning. Thus, here our understanding of divine wisdom, viewed as the unfolding of divine love, leads us to the domain of Christian ethics, in that for us the task arises of increasingly bringing into recognition the world conceived as good.11 The task also arises of attaching everything conformable to the divine idea that originally underlies the world order to the divine Spirit as its organ12 and in this way to bring it all into connection with the system of redemption.13 In this way, in both respects we will attain to complete community of life with Christ, both insofar as the Father has given him power “over all things” and insofar as the Father shows him works “ever greater” than those he has already known.14 In this perspective, then, the world can be conceived as a complete revelation of divine wisdom only insofar as the Holy Spirit gains recognition as the ultimate worldforming power from the Christian church outward.

1. Ed. note: See sermon, “How We Must Marvel at Divine Wisdom in the Ordering of Salvation,” on Rom. 11:32–33, Sunday, May 29, 1831, in SW II.2 (1834), 562–73, and (1843), 561–72, also published in Festpredigten (1833), 489–509; ET Wilson (1890), 314–25. This sermon is particularly helpful in that the explanation of this proposition is unusually brief, adding little more than clarifications in relation to views that Schleiermacher regarded to be untenable. Imagine that Schleiermacher is a shopkeeper. In this proposition he is doing three things as he nears the end of long, hard years of work on this project. (1) He is sweeping up and clearing out the last ideas that have proved to be useless. (2) He is about to close up shop, knowing that there is no room left to offer straggling last thoughts, for what he has produced is a systematic presentation, one that is to be understood not in bits and pieces but only as a whole. (3) Finally, having done what he set out to do and thus undistracted by lingering possibilities, he is moving readers toward a real conclusion in §§170–72.

This conclusion is itself to be largely a summary of the system, presenting a grand vision of the whole, albeit in a rather open-ended fashion. As in §169, moreover, this vision is to be offered in a rather condensed form. He conceives it in terms of one of the most abstract, difficult, highly contested doctrines of all: the doctrine that conceives God as a trinity-in-one (triune). Schleiermacher has been very careful throughout to provide only doctrinal conceptions that can reflect the immediate Christian religious consciousness of individuals experiencing genuine community of faith with Christ. Herein the God he presents is seen both to create and to redeem by eventually enacting one eternal decree to perfection. Thus, in speaking of divine wisdom and of the triune God, he does not wish suddenly to lapse into philosophical speculation, even at a juncture where the range of reference encompasses everything. Since theologians often do, perhaps unwittingly, speculate, readers are left with the task of carefully attending to what Schleiermacher does and does not say here. 2. See §59.P.S. Ed. note: Proposition §59 concerns “the original perfection of the world.” Since it is in Part One, it deals with a matter that is “presupposed” in the religious consciousness of a Christian. It focuses on the manifold ways and levels in which the world presents both conditions and means for the realization and presentation of God-consciousness. The postscript of §59 distinguishes this account from two types of position: (1) talk about “the best possible world,” which is composed of both good and evil, talk that arose in response to the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646– 1716) conception of a perfect God who has created “the best possible world” but not a “perfect” world, and (2) talk about a world that was once “perfect” and was then changed into an “imperfect” one, namely, the one in which we now live. As Schleiermacher indicates, the first language which had entered into the supposedly “natural” or “rational” doctrine of some German theologians, in particular, is purely “speculative” and is lacking in historical sensibility. The second language, likewise continuing those two characteristics, also attempts to transcend immediate religious consciousness, arguing, in effect, that this present world is “the best” one possible. Instead of either position, in §59.P.S. Schleiermacher proposes stopping at the ascertainable position, sufficient for religious consciousness, that the world is “good.” The second position, also taken up by some theologians, goes back to ancient fables regarding a “golden age” and to the Old Testament notion of an original “paradise,” which human beings could have enjoyed without contributing any effort of their own, purely passively. The rest of the world would then have had to conform to this condition, contrary to the very history of nature itself (of humanity and possibly of the entire universe). This history, in turn, contributes to the very conditions that have turned out to be necessary for the need for redemption to occur among human beings, including their own development as they strove to deal with the rest of the world and faced their own mortality. Finally, he argues, nothing in the Old or New Testament narratives obviates against the account of the world’s “original perfection” presupposed in §59 and throughout this book. It does not claim a natural “immortality” for human beings, nor does it regard any alteration of the world to be necessary, or even desirable, to achieve God’s redemptive purpose. 3. Enden. Ed. note: This word refers to the two aspects, ends, or results of Part Two, on sin and grace. For the first kind of statement, indicated just below, see esp. the discussion under §§66–67. For the second kind of statement, see esp. §110.2. 4. Mitteilung des göttlichen Wesens. Ed. note: To think of such communication as being less or more in quantity, the German word Mitteilung is of greater help than our English word, for it suggests that communication comes in “parts” (Teilen). Thus, sin can limit how many parts of what God communicates one can register and truly receive. 5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher refers here to one of the prophetic doctrines, namely §§157–63, “Regarding the Consummation of the Church.” 6. Ed. note: The word durchdrungene (“permeated,” or more or less saturated or imbued) suggests degrees of being filled with God-consciousness—that is, with the effects of divine communication, just referred to. The unstated assumption that makes this line of thought work seems to be either that divine communication would resume in some different form after death or that rebirth would be granted without divine communication, because the earlier form and amount of it would not count at all. In either case, those who assume damnation for some at the point of death are left with a quandary in trying to account for effects divine communication would have had on the unregenerate before death. 7. Ed. note: During part of his six years as chaplain at Charité Hospital in Berlin (1796–1802), the mental hospital burned down and its patients were transferred to Charité Hospital. He therefore had ample opportunity to observe persons who could seem to be in such dire conditions. 8. Ed. note: das Vernunftlose und Bewußtlose an und für sich would seem to include at least human beings, and yet if it meant only human beings, the grammatical construction could easily have been different. 9. Ed. note: The same is to be said of this phrase, alles, was an und für sich selbst, as was stated of that in §169n8 just above. 10. Ed. note: The phrase is wenn die Welt durch uns wird für uns fertig sein. So brief as to be cryptic and thus aphoristic, it continues a supposition shared by many devotees of reason, that the world does exist for the use of humans and that we can also master it by reason. It is clear here, in §59, and elsewhere that Schleiermacher does not wish entirely to deny these suppositions but, in a theological context at least, would certainly qualify the claim in some fashion and has repeatedly done

so. As he has explained, the world’s existence surely does include the redemption of humanity and is entirely consistent with that purpose and process. Thus, at least in that one major respect, God does love the world (cf. John 3:16), unreservedly, even if it might as yet be unclear to some as to whether, how, or why God does this beyond that specific purpose. In his philosophical writings (especially those on dialectic) he even holds that there could come to be a point when the overall products of reason and those of theology might cohere, though that possibility too is a matter of speculation, thus one of no consequence for theology at this point in history. Since love, by definition, both intends and reveals that the world’s creation and preservation is “good,” as it is taken to be in this proposition, even devotees of reason might come to accept the claim that this sentence ends with, namely, “that everything would exist only insofar as it could be an object of divine love.” 11. Ed. note: Christian ethics is fully the second half of the theological task of dogmatics (cf. §61.3 and Brief Outline §223). It considers not just moral behavior but also the entire range of behavior to which human sciences would point. See also Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), 43–47, for a detailed formal characterization and summary of its basic content, all with references to points made about Christian ethics in Christian Faith. The two halves of dogmatics are not deductively related, and they are meant consistently to hold to the same path (cf. esp. §§111.4, 112, 126.2, and 133.2; in relation to the present proposition see §§84.3 and 163.P.S.). 12. Organ. Ed. note: Here God as the wise divine “idea” and the divine Spirit as active “organ” represents the repeated theme that God’s will and act are always inseparably one. 13. Ed. note: Cf. §169n1 to this proposition. 14. Ed. note: Cf. Matt. 11:27//Luke 10:21–22 and John 14:12 on these two points, respectively. Sermon on John 14:7– 17, Trinity Sunday, May 21, 1826, in SW II.9 (1847), 443–56.

CONCLUSION Regarding Divine Threeness §170. All that is essential in this Second Aspect of the Second Part of our presentation is also posited in the essential features of the doctrine of the Trinity;1 however, in its ecclesial formulation2 this doctrine is not itself an expression that immediately conveys Christian self-consciousness but is only a combination of several such expressions. (1) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (the so-called, “Athanasian Creed” after late 4th century) 1.3: “This is the catholic faith: that we worship one God in trinity and the trinity in unity.”3 (2) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “First, we teach … according to the decree of the Council of Nicaea that there is one divine nature … and that there are nonetheless three persons in one and the same divine nature, equally powerful, equally eternal, etc.”4 (3) Second Helvetic Confession (1562) III: “Nevertheless, we believe in [and teach] that this only God [boundless, one and undivided] exists inseparably and unconfused in the distinct persons Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”5 (4) Gallican Confession (1559) VI: “Scripture teaches us that in this sole and simple divine nature subsists three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit”6 (5) Hungarian Confession (1562) (“On the Triunity of Jehovah”): “We believe this one and only God to be three, attested in heaven as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who, even though they are three as they subsist in their distinctiveness and in the management of their functions, are also one in this being three.”7 1. In this Part the doctrine of the uniting of the divine nature with human nature, both through the individual person of Christ and through the common spirit of the church,8 is essential to our presentation, and the whole conception of Christianity in our ecclesial doctrines stands or falls with this Part. The reason is that unless a being of God in Christ were assumed, the idea of redemption could not be concentrated in this manner in his person. Moreover, if there were no such uniting in the common spirit of the church as well, the church too could not in such a manner be the bearer and perpetuator of the redemption brought about through Christ.

Now, precisely these features are also the essential features in the doctrine of God’s triunity. Clearly this doctrine was established only in defense of the view, first, that nothing less than the divine nature was in Christ and indwells the Christian church as its common spirit. Second, in these expressions we intend neither a diminished nor a totally figurative meaning, not wanting to have anything to do with exceptional higher beings—conceived, as it were, as subordinate deities—in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the Trinity had no other origin than this, at first having wanted simply to equate,9 in the most definite way possible, the divine nature considered in this union with the divine nature in itself. This origin is all the less to be doubted since religious parties within Christianity that conceive the doctrine of redemption in a different fashion also necessarily dispense with the doctrine of the Trinity. They do this because they have no point of doctrine to which it could be attached, which could not be the case, even in Catholic doctrine, if the doctrine of the Trinity were also at least attached to points of doctrine other than these at the same time. Moreover, that this is the origin of the doctrine of the Trinity is also obvious from the fact that those divergent parties,10 distinguished chiefly by their negation of God’s tri-unity, are not thereby obliged to adopt still other divergences in the doctrine of God and the divine attributes, as would have to occur if the doctrine of the Trinity were based on a particular conception of the nature of Supreme Being as such; in all probability they are directly obliged, however, to advance a different theory of the person of Christ and thus also of the human need for redemption and of the significance11 of redemption. By virtue of this interconnection we now justifiably regard the doctrine of the Trinity, insofar as these features are lodged within it, as the copestone12 of Christian doctrine. Accordingly, we also regard this equal status13 of the divine in each of these two unions with the divine in the other, and then also of the two with the divine nature as such, to be what is essential in the doctrine of the Trinity. 2. We would also like to stop with this affirmation, however, not being able to assign the same importance14 to the additional formation of this dogma, which also first justifies the customary use of the term. This point is to be explained as follows. The term “triune” is first founded on each of the two unitings being traced back to a separateness posited both as independent of the two unitings and as existing eternally in Supreme Being as such. Then, once the distinct member of this separate existence that was destined15 to be united with Jesus had been designated by the term “Son,” it was also deemed necessary in a corresponding way to posit the term “Father” as designating such a separate existence. The result was the duality present in that term: the unity of the divine nature and the threeness, or trinity,16 of the persons. Now, however, surely that presupposition of an eternal separation in Supreme Being is not the expression of any religious self-consciousness, in which it could indeed never emerge. Or, who would venture to assert that the thought of such an eternal separateness would be implied in the impression made by the divine in Christ as the basis of that impression? No one, surely, for suppose that one wanted somehow to find this task set forth in John’s teaching about the Logos, as though this one feature of Trinitarian doctrine were

definitely contained there and thus, as though establishing the rest of it, were naturally implied. Then, one would be confronted by so many objections that one would hardly find ground to stand on. For one thing, the Arian position sought to substantiate itself in this very passage. In addition, the exegesis of both sides in that controversy succumbs to equally telling, though contrasting, difficulties. As a result, it must be said that whichever of the two notions is taken to underlie the passage and is viewed as in John’s mind as well, it must be admitted that he would have had to have gone about his work in a most unsatisfactory, unfitting manner. For another thing, if the Trinity had been in the apostle’s mind, this presentation would easily have lent itself also to a similar introduction of the Holy Spirit, which is indeed mentioned quite frequently in the discourses of Christ recorded for us by John, nor would he have lacked occasion to bring in this second member elsewhere as well, speaking of the relationship of the Spirit as one that was from the beginning with God and is God.17 Suppose, however, that one had simply to grant the assumption that here John asserted of the divine united with human nature in Christ that it was to be posited as a particular in God from all eternity. It would not remotely follow that this assertion would be meant in the way the doctrine of the Trinity takes it or that this doctrine would therefore be the true natural completion of the Johannine statements and be the only one. This is so, for what underlies the development of the doctrine would be not simply the endeavor quite exactly to reproduce our Christian self-consciousness that the divine nature is of equal status in the two forms of union and is also equal to the being of God as such. Rather, once this distinction regarding the onset of the divine and the human being united were transplanted into eternity, only then would the need arise both to guard against the emergence of something polytheistic in appearance and to see to it that this being of God, which is in a certain sense set apart, nevertheless coheres in the unity of the divine nature. In contrast, there is not even a trace of such a need in John’s discourse; nor, therefore, was he on the way to the doctrine of the Trinity as we have it. 3. Hence, the second part of our proposition is not to be understood as if the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity were to be viewed as an immediate, or even one at all necessary, combination of expressions regarding self-consciousness. Rather, the intermediate step is first to view the eternalized18 being of God in itself as something separate from the eternalized being of God for the activity of uniting. Now, suppose that this distinction arose with such definiteness, based on statements that Christ and the apostles made regarding him and the Holy Spirit, that we would have to accept it on their testimony. The doctrine of the Trinity would then be a fully developed doctrine of this kind, and we would accept it as a collection of testimonies concerning a supersensible fact.19 However, it would no more be a doctrine of faith20 in the most fundamental, proper sense of the term than are the doctrines of the resurrection and ascension of Christ.21 Moreover, it would also resemble these doctrines in that our faith in Christ and our living communion with him would be the same even if we had no knowledge of this transcendent fact or if this fact were different. Now, however, exegesis that has intended to establish the doctrine in this manner has never been able to gain such currency as to have avoided attacks constantly being lodged against it. For that reason, it is

important to establish the independence of those main two cardinal points of ecclesial doctrine—the being of God in Christ and in the Christian church—from the doctrine of the Trinity. Now suppose that information regarding this supersensible fact were further built on and taught in such a way that the proposed separation in Supreme Being had no point to it until the uniting began. Suppose, even still, that the second and third persons of the Trinity were involved in the creation of the world and continued to be involved afterward, and that the second person was the subject of all the Old Testament theophanies, and the entire activity of prophecy under the old covenant received its impetus from the third person. These propositions would be still farther removed from containing expressions concerning our Christian self-consciousness, and we can wait all the more calmly to see whether the exegeses on which these expansions rest are more securely validated by the latest efforts on this subject than has been true up to now. Postscript. Suppose that at some point it had proved possible, or ever could be proved possible, to bring the notion of a threeness in God to light or to demonstrate it either on the basis of general conceptions or a priori, yet without reference to the circumstances of redemption and without appeal to Scripture; such a doctrine of the Triune God would still be incapable of finding any place in a Christian doctrina fidei.22 This would be the result even if it were far more fully executed than ecclesial doctrine—insofar as that is bound to the basic facts of Christianity—has had or can ever have success in doing. This would be the case even if the task were occasioned by our ecclesial doctrine, for without this condition hardly anyone would have thought to do it. Indeed, even if the proposed revision strictly held to the same terms for designating both the threeness and the oneness as the ecclesial doctrine uses, we would still firmly maintain that it is a different kind of doctrine. Not only do such deductive products, which are not closely connected with those basic facts of Christianity, manifest a totally different origin for that doctrine; precisely on this account, they also can be of no use whatsoever in Christian doctrine. As a consequence, we can simply leave them alone in this context, since they are mere dicta of philosophy;23 and we are in no way called upon to subject them to any critique, whether they might stem from ancient24 or modern25 teachers of the church.

1. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s contrast between “triune” and “Trinity,” see OR (1821) II, supplemental note 1. He preferred to use “triune” when referring to who God is in relation to human beings. According to OR (1821) V, supplemental note 9, at the highest stage among the forms of religion, high enough to have formed a theology, one task of dogmatics is to map out its domain. Moreover, it is to do this so completely that all that has occurred of any significance, not simply moments of sudden awareness, is to be located and understood in its relation to the whole domain. See the BO index and table of contents on the key theme of God’s triune domain in theology, and see biographical sources that show how this interest arose for him already as a teenage lad at the Herrnhüter Brethren’s secondary school in Barby. For a summary on “The True Nature of Piety,” see OR II, its concluding subsection. See also OR index on “piety” and “religion,” especially that of Christianity. On the “perfectibility” of Christianity, see CF §93.2 and OR V. 2. Ed. note: Here, as in other contemporaneous contexts, “ecclesial” (kirchliche) refers to decisions made by the church as a corporate entity, notably through the creeds and other doctrinal symbols. See an earlier explanation of where this

doctrine is placed in §123.1; see also §§96.1, 97.2, and 99.P.S. 3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28. 4. Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Schaff’s translation from the Latin, Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 7, also Book of Concord (2000), 17; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 50. 5. Ed. note: Here, material omitted by Schleiermacher is supplied in brackets. ET Tice; cf. Cochrane (1972), 228; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 470. Cf. §37n3. 6. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 362f., also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330. 7. Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 542. The Latin title is Confessio Czengerina. 8. Cf. §§94 and 123. Ed. note: Gemeingeist der Kirche. 9. Gleichstellung. Ed. note: The term selected is open and ambiguous, suggesting at least features of similarity or commonality but not necessarily identity in the strictest sense, though this too is possible, depending on what “the most definite way possible” would be. In all his writing on the doctrine of the Trinity, Schleiermacher himself insists on equal divine status among the three, but he does so under nonphilosophical presuppositions, thus in ways quite different from those to be found in the classic ecclesial doctrine. 10. Ed. note: For an account of those “divergent parties,” see Schleiermacher’s own essay On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and the Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity (1822, trans. 1835). 11. Wert. Ed. note: As used here, this term especially denotes importance—worth, dignity, value—as to what meaning is to be attached to redemption, hence “significance.” 12. Schlußstein. Ed. note: This is a stone placed all along the peak of a sloping roofline. Schluß is also the word used for “conclusion”; hence, this concluding discussion is intended to “cap,” or draw together synthetically, the entire system in summative fashion, not to produce a merely inconclusive addendum. The words for “coping stone,” as in an archway, are Deckstein and Kappenstein (coping stone of an archway, not the concluding copestone of a structure’s roofline). 13. Gleichstellung. Ed. note: See note 8 above. 14. Wert. Ed. note: See §170n11 above. 15. Ed. note: “Intended” translates bestimmte. That is, “determined” or “destined” by theologians and church leaders. 16. Ed. note: Einheit (unity) versus Dreiheit (threeness). 17. Ed. note: See John 1:1. 18. Verewigung. 19. Ed. note: übersinnlichen Tatsache. Schleiermacher means a supposed fact that refers beyond sense experience and is thus abstract, transcendent. 20. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: Below, this term is usually translated by its direct historical referent, doctrina fidei (faithdoctrine). 21. See §99. 22. Ed. note: See §170n16 and main text. 23. Philosopheme. 24. For example, in Anselm (1033–1109), Monologian (1076), chaps. 29–61. Ed. note: ET and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 132–81; ET only: Williams (1996), 48–74. 25. For example, in Karl Daub (1763–1836) of Heidelberg, Theologumena (1806), §§126–27. Ed. note: Quoted in KGA I/7.3, 393–96. Daub came to hold that dogmatics is the science of the Trinity.

§171. The ecclesial doctrine of the Triune God requires that we consider each of the three persons to be equal to the divine being and the reverse, also that we consider each of the three persons to be equal to the other; yet, we do not have the capacity to do either the one or the other, but we can represent the persons only in some kind of gradation and likewise either represent the unity of the divine nature as something less than the three persons or the reverse. (1) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (= the so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th century): “This is the catholic faith: that we worship one God in trinity and trinity in unity neither confusing the persons nor dividing the substance. For the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit still another, but the

deity (divinitas) of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is one—equal in glory, coequal in majesty. … and in this trinity none is before or after, greater or less than another, but all three persons are in themselves coeternal and coequal.”1 (2) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “That there is one divine nature, which is called and truly is God, and that there are nonetheless three persons in one and the same divine nature … and by the word person is meant not a part, not an attribute within some other, but that which subsists of itself, just as the fathers have used this word in this matter.”2 (3) Belgic Confession (1561) VIII: “Who is one single being, in which there are three persons that are from eternity really and truly distinct in their inexchangeable characteristics.”3 1. The acceptance of eternal separations in the divine nature necessarily implies to us this further presupposition regarding this twofold equality of the divine in all three persons among themselves and in each person, with Supreme Being conceived as a unity. Of this result there can be no doubt.4 The explanation is as follows. If divinity or power and glory were something less in all three persons together than in Supreme Being conceived as a unity, the three persons would also be not in Supreme Being but under Supreme Being. Therefore, the divine in them would be called divine only figuratively, and our community of life with Christ as well as our participation in the Holy Spirit would not be any sort of community with God. The outcome would also be exactly the same if the divine in the three persons themselves were not the same, and perchance only the divine in the Father would be the true, proper divine, while that in Christ and the Holy Spirit would be something figurative and subordinate. Then, however, even our indwelling consciousness of the need for redemption would have to express something different, since we would be satisfied differently by redemption that would not bring us into community with God, viewing it as a hindrance to our community with God. In short, everything that is most important in Christianity would have a different cast. Hence, in proceeding from the presupposition stated above, nothing further could be determined than is posited in the ecclesial doctrine, and the constantly renewed zeal for it would be perfectly understandable to us. 2. Now, the passages from the creedal and confessional symbols cited here undeniably assert, first and foremost, that might and divinity are not less in any of the three persons than in the other two.5 Patently, this would be sufficient to avert all inequalities were it not for a contradiction that shows up with the view that presenting the way in which the persons are distinguished is required to continue alongside presenting this equality. The contradiction lies in the fact that asserting this equality would have to serve, at the same time, as the canon to be followed in presenting the distinctions among the persons—that is, the canon that no feature that includes within itself an inequality of the designated sort is to be taken into

presentation of the doctrine. Now suppose, however, that Father and Son are distinguished from each other in that the Father is eternally begetting but is himself unbegotten, but in contrast the Son is begotten from eternity but does not himself beget. Then—however remote the eternal generation may also be from all temporal and organic generation—the word itself, if it is to mean anything at all, must at least denote a relationship of dependency. Thus, suppose that might has indwelt the Father from eternity to beget the Son as second divine person, but no such might indwelt the Son and yet no relationship of dependence in which the Father would stand to the Son could be adduced as a counterweight. It is then undeniable that the might of the Father would be greater than that of the Son and that the glory that the begetter has in relation to the begotten would have to be greater than the glory the begotten has in relation to the begetter. Moreover, the same holds true of the Spirit, whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, as in the Greek dogma, or from the Father and the Son, as the Latin dogma will have it. In the Greek case, the Son has a twofold incapacity as compared with the Father, since he does not beget, nor does a person proceed from him. In the Latin case, only the Spirit has this twofold dependency—for this procession is also a relationship of dependence, except that it is supposed to be something different from being begotten, even though no one has ever been able to make clear what the distinction between the two is—but here the Son has one capacity in common with the Father that puts him in a position above the Spirit, whereas in the Greek case the Spirit is equal to the Son. Thus, in either case the Father stands above the other two, and all that remains in dispute is whether these two are equal to each other or even whether one of them is subordinate to the other; but the equality of all three persons does not emerge from either side of this distinction. 3. Likewise, this proposition that the divinity in the three persons, taken together, is the same as that of the one divine nature would have to be the canon by which the relationship of the three persons to the unity of the divine nature is to be represented. Yet, suppose that, at the same time, we are to add into our consideration what has just been treated, namely, the view that the persons are distinguished from one another by distinctive properties that cannot be predicated of the divine nature in and of itself,6 but that the divine nature itself is present only in these three persons, not perchance also outside of them either as a fourth person or as an impersonal entity,7 and even in them not somehow dispersed such that some attributes would reside in one person and different attributes in another;8 rather, the divine nature is in each one wholly and undivided. The required equality, therefore, cannot be extracted from this account. The reason is that we have no closer typus by which to represent a relationship such as is advanced here than that of the concept of a species and of the individual entities included under it, for the concept of a species is likewise present wholly and undivided in the individual entities that belong to it but is not present anywhere outside them. Admittedly, this suggestion has been in dispute all along, since some grant the analogy validity9 while others reject it.10 Still, if the relationship is not to be considered in terms of this typus, then, as its opponents also grant,11 we could not be in a position to conceive anything definite on the subject and thus could not attribute any importance to it. In contrast,

if we are to follow the analogy, no equality between the unity and the threeness is possible. Instead, we must do one of two things. Either, more realistically, we would grant the superior position to the unity, conceived as the nature common to all three, and then the separateness of the persons would appear to be a subordinate matter and would recede accordingly while the divine monarchy would step to the fore. Or, more nominalistically, we would grant the superior position to the threeness, and then the unity, conceived as something abstract, would recede; but then that which has immediate existence for our religious self-consciousness— the divinity of the Holy Spirit and the divinity of Christ, along with the relation of Christ as Son to his Father—would step to the fore, yet at the same time there would be the danger of bordering on the tritheistic12 view. Between these two approaches—for we must, in any case, always begin either with the unity or with the threeness—no strictly middle course would be possible, not one that would fail to be an approximation to one or the other of the two. Yet, neither a subordination of the unity under the threeness nor the reverse lies in the presupposition stated in the above proposition. Accordingly, with reference to the separation that subsists in Supreme Being from eternity, there are no other options than to take only one or the other course, which conflicts with the requirements of the propositions contained in the confessional symbols; or, should we be wary of these requirements, we could settle on neither of the two positions— either that emphasizing the unity or that emphasizing the threeness, but be left wavering unsteadily between them.13 In these circumstances, then, this doctrine can offer little toward securing those two main positions, which are, nevertheless, its sole points of reference, or to place them in clearer light. 4. The task remains of showing how the unity and threeness are related to the divine causality—which is apprehended in our self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence—both in redemption and sanctification as well as already in a general way in creation and preservation.14 The divine causality should not be parceled out among the persons, however proximate it may be to say that the Father alone is creator and preserver and likewise that the Son alone is redeemer and the Spirit alone is sanctifier. Thus, if the divine causality is to remain undivided, here too we reach the same conclusion as before: that either these causalities as a set belong to the one divine nature as such, but to the persons only inasmuch as they are in this nature and not inasmuch as they are distinct from one another, or they belong to the three persons as such but to the unity of the divine nature only inasmuch as it is composed of them. The first view has not been able to gain currency, patently because the threeness would recede further than is permitted by the dominant tendency,15 for it is almost the case in this view that the persons would retain some reality16 only for the kinds of particular acts mentioned above. That is to say: The Father would retain reality only insofar as he has begotten the Son from eternity, but creation and preservation would have reality only in the unity of the divine nature. To be sure, the Son would not merely have been begotten and the Spirit merely have been breathed into being; rather, the Son would also have become human and the Spirit would also have been poured forth. However, the activity of justification would

nonetheless not be that of the Son and the activity of sanctification not that of the Spirit; rather, both activities would belong to the unity of the divine nature. Now, the second view has, therefore, been the one generally accepted, the view that the entire divine causality belongs to the three persons. However, the way it has taken shape in ecclesial doctrine does not appear to be free of a hidden contradiction. This is shown as follows. If the divine causality belongs to the persons as such, it belongs to each of them inasmuch as each is distinguished from the others and, thus, the same causality would in the one person be the causality of the unbegotten, in another person the causality of the begotten. The consequence is that a threefold causality would belong to each person, though only to one in effect because in each the divine causality would issue from what is distinctive of the person. The situation is roughly like that of Christ’s being supposed to accomplish the same thing with two wills: the three persons also accomplish the same thing, each time in the person’s own way, thus also with the person’s own act.17 This consistent arrangement, however, has not gained currency, patently because the divine unity then recedes in a wholly nominalistic fashion and scarcely anything is left to that unity than to serve as the equality of the three persons in accordance with their nature and will. Contrariwise, for people to assume that those causalities would indeed belong to the three persons as such but that each causality would be one and the same in all three, not a distinct causality in each, would actually mean that the divine causalities would not refer to the persons after all but would refer to the divine nature in its unity. As a consequence of using this approach, once it were presupposed that the eternal threeness exists in the divine unity, we would again arrive only at the same result as before: a wavering between one feature rising to the fore and the other receding, or vice versa. 5. Now, if we observe the way in which this doctrine is handled almost everywhere in dogmatic presentations, it becomes still clearer how little of what is required in the general formulations survives in exposition.18 That is, first, the doctrine of the nature and attributes of God is treated without reference to the threeness, thus God is considered only in terms of the divine unity. Among these attributes, however, no single attribute is presented as threefold and in some distinct way separated or distributed. Rather, the doctrine of the three persons follows, treated separately without any such interconnection and, in any case, without having been prepared for by the consciousness of a being of God in Christ and in the Christian church. Yet, even then it is handled in such a way that if this or that divine attribute is designated as belonging also to the three persons, the demonstration is always carried out only for the Son and the Spirit in particular, while ordinarily the demonstration for the Father is held to be self-evident already. Now, if the equality of the persons were not only asserted as a formulation but also operative as a canon, such self-evident claims would have to be true either of all three persons or of none. The superior position accorded the Father in this respect proves that he is still conceived as having a different relationship to the unity of the divine nature. Thus, those who deem it to be superfluous to demonstrate that divine attributes and activities belong to the Father, while they demand this demonstration for the Son and the Spirit, are as a group not strict Trinitarians, since they identify the Father with the unity of the

divine nature but not the Son or the Spirit. This approach can be traced back directly to Origen’s notion19 that the Father is unqualifiedly God but the Son and Spirit are God only through their participation in the divine nature. This notion is indeed rejected straightaway by orthodox teachers of the church, but it secretly underlies their overall procedure, nonetheless.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28. 2. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 7; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 50. 3. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Cochrane (1972), 192f., and French version in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 389; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 363f. 4. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.1 in CG1 (1822). An exact comparison of the two texts in both editions of the conclusion is given in Schleiermacher, The Triune God, trans. and ed. Tice (forthcoming). 5. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.2 and §190.1 in CG1 (1822). 6. Ed. note: From here on, the subsection draws from discussion in §189.2 in CG1 (1822). On this point the Belgic Confession and a statement by Gregory Nazianzus were cited in CG1 (1822). 7. Ed. note: At this point the phrase unitas in trinitate was cited in CG1 (1822). 8. Passages like the following in the Gallican Confession (1559) 6, “the Son, his (the Father’s) word and eternal wisdom … the Holy Spirit, his virtue, power and efficacy,” are to be viewed as too inexact, though they have functions belonging to a confessional symbol. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 363, also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330. 9. (l) Gregory Nazianzus (ca. 329–390), Oratio 21 (“In Praise of Athanasius,” 380), sec. 35: “… the nature of essence [οὐσία φύσιν] … signifies hypostasis of a particular nature [ἰδιότητας].” Ed. note: These concepts are drawn from a passage differently formed, which reads: “We use in an orthodox sense the terms one essence and three hypostases, the one to denote the nature of the godhead, the other the properties of the three.” ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, 7:279; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 35:1123–24. (2) Basil of Caesarea (“the Great,” ca. 330–379), Epistolarum Classis 2, letter 214: “Substance [οὐσία] has the same relation to person [ὑπόστασιν] as the general has to the particular.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 28 (1955), 102; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 32:789–90. (3) Theodoret of Cyrus (ca. 393–ca. 466), Dialogue 1 (with Eranistes): “But, according to the teaching of the fathers, substance differs from subsistent entity as the common differs from the proper, or as the genus differs from the species or the individual.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 106 (2003), 31; Greek: Migne Gr. 83:33. 10. Augustine (354–430), The Trinity (400–416), 7.11: “We do not use these terms according to genus and species. … Nor do we therefore call the Trinity three persons or substances one essence … as though three somethings subsist from one matter.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 45 (1963), 238; Latin: Migne Lat. 42:944. 11. Augustine (354–430), The Trinity (400–416), 7.8. “These three together are one God on account of their ineffable union.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 45 (1963), 232; Latin: Migne Lat. 42:941. 12. Tritheistische. 13. Gregory Nazianzus (ca. 329–390), Oratio 40 (In sanctum baptisma) sec. 41 (381–). “No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the splendor of the three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the one.” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Church, Ser. 2, vol. 7 (1894), 375; Greek: Migne Gr. 36:417. 14. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.3 in CG1 (1822). 15. This is so, for ecclesial doctrine, which is actually inclined to give greater validity to the persons than to the unity of being (Wesen), arises unobscurely from these words: “We are compelled by the Christian truth to confess that each distinct person is God and Lord, so we are forbidden by the catholic religion to say there are three gods or three lords.” Symbolum Quicunque vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.) 19. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28. 16. Realität. 17. Ed. note: Thus, presumably the Father would act on his own but also in two other respects: in his distinct relation to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. The same would be true of the other two persons. 18. Ed. note: This subsection corresponds to §190.2 in CG1 (1822). 19. Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), Commentary on John (230–231): “At one time the God is very God [αὐτόθες]. … On the other hand, everything besides the very God which is made God by participaton in his divinity would more properly not be said to be ‘the God,’” where the context unquestionably posits that αὐτόθες is the Father. Cf. Origen’s Peri Archon (“On

Principles”) 1.62. Ed. note: In the above elision, Origen quotes Jesus’ praying “that they may know you to be the only true God” (John 17:3). ET Fathers of the Church 80 (1989), 98–99; Greek: Migne Gr. 14:109. Peri Archon ET On First Principles (1966); Greek: Migne Gr. 11:115ff.

§172. Since we have all the less reason to regard this doctrine as settled in that it did not receive any fresh treatment when the Evangelical1 church was established, it must still await a reorganization of it that goes back to its very beginnings. 1. We may now recall, on the one hand, that the formulations that still have currency in the doctrine of the Trinity today derive from a time when Christianity was still spreading extensively across heathendom.2 We may also recall how easily, as a consequence, unconscious echoes of things heathen could slip in when it was necessary to speak of a plurality or differentiation in God. It is no wonder, then, that from the outset designations of this plurality were unsteady and subject to misconceptions and that at later times, when no admixing of things heathen was a matter for concern anymore, they could no longer be suitable. Reservations did have to be attached to the use of these designations, however, so as to guard against deviations in various directions. Moreover, in part, even such reservations rarely avoid bordering on one extreme in trying to guard against the other; and, in part, they must likewise lose their value when the danger of misunderstanding to which they originally referred has disappeared, and then the deceptive appearance that they afford in some other respects will come to the fore all the more.3 Now let us move to the original tendency of the doctrine, which was to make clear that it is no hyperbolic expression of our consciousness of Christ and of the common Spirit of the Christian church when we assert that God is in them both. At this point, what shows up as the first problem this doctrine must tackle is that this distinctive being of God in another must be defined in terms of its relationship both to the being of God in and of itself and to the being of God in relation to the world in general. Moreover, it is patent that there is no prospect of ever so completely resolving this problem that a formulation could be drawn up that is adequate for all time and every deviation from this formulation could be rejected as nonChristian. This is the case, because since we are concerned only with the God-consciousness given to us in our self-consciousness along with our world-consciousness, we have no formulation for the being of God as such, distinct from the being of God in the world. Rather, any such formulation would have to be borrowed from the speculative domain and, as a consequence, would not be faithful to the nature of our discipline.4 In addition, if we know that in itself every one of our dogmatic expressions for God’s relationship to the world bears the inevitable error of anthropomorphizing God,5 how are we supposed to believe that we would do better at the more complicated problem of differentiating the distinctive being of God in Christ, viewed as one who has an individual nature, and in the Christian church, viewed as a single historical whole from the omnipotent presence of God in the world in general,6 of which world Christ and the church are parts? Instead, we will have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the problem can be resolved only by approximation and that on this account formulations that have contrasting points of departure must remain in motion over

against each other.7 This will continually occur, since interest in the problem is bound to be renewed again and again. 2. Given this state of the subject, one could be most surprised concerning the subject that whereas so many other problems first posed only later on have been resolved to a rather satisfactory extent, precisely this one, which encompasses so much, has remained stationary for such a long time at a point that vouchsafes little satisfaction, a point to which it was advanced at the very onset, so to speak.8 Still, precisely those later questions—particularly those concerning the person of Christ and the gracious actions9 of the Spirit—did treat the same subject, in the aspect of it that is directed to the immediate interest of faith. Moreover, the actual Trinitarian formulations had to remain as they had already come to be, all the more so to the degree that they were regarded as basic to these discussions. They remained so, in spite of the undeniable fact that an impassioned zeal for polemics,10 by which mistakes are so easily committed, had had all too great a part in their formulation. Now as it happens, however, the doctrine of the Trinity persists in not being free of the above-indicated vacillations between equality and subordination on the one side and, on the other side, between tritheism and a unitarianism such that it, in turn, completely obscures the eternal separateness of the persons, which was regarded as of chief importance. Thus, it should not be particularly surprising to us that anti-Trinitarian opinions should constantly reemerge and occasionally gain more ground, nor should we rise too quickly to judgment.11 The reason is that the situation here is like that with the doctrine of God in general, where many not only allege but also think that they are opposed to every belief in God, when actually they are simply rebelling against the customary presentations of the doctrine but have by no means removed from themselves all conditions of the mind and heart12 that are based on God-consciousness. Likewise, it is natural, given the difficulties and imperfections with which the formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity still current are burdened, that those who cannot reconcile themselves to it should assert that they repudiate everything connected with it, whereas their piety by no means lacks the impress of what is distinctively Christian. Even today this is often enough the case not only in the unitarian societies in England and America but also among the scattered opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity here. This situation can only lead us to resolve, in part, to secure free room for a thoroughgoing critique of this doctrine in the form it has had up to now and, in part, to prepare the way for and introduce a reconstruction of it appropriate to the condition of allied faith-doctrine at the time. 3. Now, perhaps the position that the doctrine of the Trinity has obtained here is at least an initial, preliminary step toward that end. Here are the reasons.13 First, one who is a “believer” in the ecclesial sense cannot be equipped with the equanimity required either for an impartial critique of the procedure used up to now or for a reworking of the doctrine, if one has not oneself become convinced that our faith in the divine that exists in Christ and in the Christian community can find dogmatic expression suitable to it before discussion is also focused on these further definitions that form the doctrine of the Trinity. This independence, however, can never attain clear status if that doctrine is handled before the two main points of

faith just mentioned, for doing that all too easily gives rise to the impression that accepting the doctrine of the Trinity is the necessary precondition of faith in redemption and in the founding of the reign of God through the divine in Christ and the Holy Spirit. The church’s history, however, completely contradicts this impression. These reasons do not yet take into account that the character of the entire presentation is clouded with respect to dogmatic interests, hence neither the critique nor the points of contact needed for a reworking of the doctrine can be put on a proper footing if that doctrine, despite its saying nothing directly about our Christian self-consciousness, is advanced as a fundamental doctrine and accordingly, of course, in a speculative fashion. Furthermore, this approach is then extended into the doctrines of the Redeemer and the divine Spirit, made out as being dependent on that doctrine, with the result that gate and door are opened to the intrusion of speculative elements. We would not be satisfied, however, to take this preliminary step but would have to give at least some indications of what remains to be done in the matter. Thus, based on the present situation it appears that the following two sets of observations are pertinent. The first unresolved difficulty lies already in the relationship of the unity of the divine nature to the threeness of the persons, and here everything focuses on the proposed original, eternal separation within the divine nature. Thus, it would be of primary importance to investigate whether this notion is given in some clear yet indefinite way in New Testament passages so that one must view it as an assertion made by Christ about himself or by the divine Spirit that determined the thinking of the apostles. For this purpose there can scarcely be a better test, to go the other way around, than to ask whether the same passages adduced in support of the notion officially held in the church could not also be explained by the Sabellian notion set up against it. Suppose that the answer is that they could not. Then nothing remains but to put to the test whether the ecclesial doctrine could not, without damaging the two essential presuppositions noted earlier, be reduced to formulations that could avoid the rocks on which the ecclesial presentation founders, without contradicting the biblical passages. Suppose, in contrast, that the answer is that they could. Then it cannot be asserted that our ecclesial doctrine, even if it does not have a purely exegetical origin, can still at least be grounded on a purely exegetical basis. As a result, the Athanasian hypothesis would then be on a par with the Sabellian hypothesis. At that point, it may be asked whether the Sabellian view cannot render the same service without entanglement in such irresolvable difficulties. In other words, the question would be whether formulations could not be found that did not predicate eternal distinctions in Supreme Being but were still capable of presenting in their true light both unitings of Supreme Being with human nature and in an equal manner. The precondition would be that thereby no mutability would be ascribed to Supreme Being. A second precondition would be that although the uniting activities of Supreme Being are presented as temporal, this would not occur in any manner different from what we always see to be the case, because we are able to conceive the divine causality in its eternity only as decree but to represent its realization only as temporal.

The second difficulty that the ecclesial doctrine offered us is that the designation of the first person as Father and the Father’s relationship to the other two persons would seem rather to present the relationship of the persons to the unity of the divine nature than to be compatible with equality among the three persons. Now, at this juncture the question comes down to this: whether it was correct at the outset to apply the designation “Son of God” only to the divine in Christ and to refer the expression “Father” to one of the distinctions in the divine nature and not rather to the unity of the divine nature itself. Now, suppose that it turns out that by “Son of God” Scripture always means only the whole Christ himself. Suppose, too, that Scripture does not recognize a difference between “God” and “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” as designators of Supreme Being but uses the second name in precisely the same way as the first. Then the task would be to ask whether a similar question could not be asked about Holy Spirit and with a similar answer, whereby propositions would then result that would resolve the second difficulty. Now, if the results of the two inquiries would fit together,14 a reworking of the doctrine could easily be devised. In contrast, if this would not happen, then new adjustments would have to be sought, depending on what the remaining differences are. Moreover, these considerations already justify in themselves an inability to move beyond these indications here; thus, the matter at hand is hereby brought to a close.

1. Der evangelischen Kirche. Ed. note: This refers to the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Germany, without separating the two. This dogmatic work is geared strictly to that “evangelical” church in Germany at that time. The proposition corresponds to §188 in CG1 (1822). 2. Ed. note: The first part of this subsection corresponds to §188.2 in CG1 (1822). 3. Ed. note: The remainder of this subsection corresponds to §188.1 in CG1 (1822). 4. Ed. note: On the discipline of dogmatics, for its primary restrictions see esp. the notes in §§2–4 and 11, on the discipline as a whole see BO (2011) index. 5. Ed. note: Although Schleiermacher reports having to form human analogies to describe God’s activity in Christ, in self, and in church and world, throughout this work he attempts strictly to avoid anthropomorphizing God. Already in the Introduction he has announced this organic principle in §30.2. There he announces that one can afford no security for the “truly dogmatic character” of any statement in which anthropomorphic expressions are used for God’s nature (Supreme Being in se). Such use, he admits, would seem to be unavoidable in the poetic practices of piety, including rhetorical expressions in hymns and sermons, but not in dogmatics (§53). Thus, the only other times he was forced to use the root concept “anthropo-” in either volume was to warn against anthropopathische ascriptions for God’s activities with human beings in space and time (§§13.2, 33.2, 68.1, 85.1). Such ascriptions would describe God as feeling in the way humans do, thus as receiving what affects them in affective ways. Yet, by analogy, he does depict the all-benevolent God in the best way he can, as Christ and his closest companions on earth did, namely, “God is love” (§§166–67). Regarding use of analogical language, see in the Introduction how he already sets up the conditions for and considerable limits regarding use of analogy itself. See also §172n7. 6. Ed. note: Everywhere in this work Schleiermacher has advised trying to view Christ, above all else, as a whole, and the church, first of all, as a whole. As here, he also advises viewing them as “parts” of the world, taken as a whole. The sense of God’s eternal omnipotent omnipresence in the world is presupposed in immediate Christian religious selfconsciousness. The “feeling of absolute dependence” he uses as a basic rubric for experience among Evangelical Christians to serve as a perception of these wholes. The ultimate object of this experience is God—that is, God’s creative presence in their world-consciousness, registered in their self-consciousness. This process happens alongside and under dominion of their God-consciousness, hence the constant threefold structural feature of presenting doctrine throughout this work. 7. Ed. note: Essentially the “problem” addressed in speaking of analogy at all is that of comparing and contrasting concepts by seeking proper “approximations,” if any. In dogmatic/systematic/constructive theology it is not possible to

approximate very far toward God in se, transcendent over and beyond this world. This is so, because there are no prospects for anything approaching toward identity between humans and God. However, there is some room for using analogy in relation to God’s activities in Christ, among regenerate persons in the church and in its coexistence with the world. This is so, because there God is known by what God brings about, among and in them, namely, grace. There is no clear identity with God in those quarters either, but one has grounds for seeing approximations. There the central struggle is between action under sway of sinfulness and under sway of God-consciousness. Within that setting there is then room for testing language concerning what God does in relation to human beings who are there. Actually, after introducing the concept “analogy” in §2.1 of the Introduction, in the rest of it Schleiermacher continually focuses on its limitations with respect to variability and distinctiveness among characteristics adherent in history, nature and reason. He particularly takes into account limitations tied to the distinctiveness of Christ, redemption and those affected by him, also regarding faith experience and religious stirrings, relations between East and West, Roman Catholic and Evangelical. Finally, the lack of “a point of culmination.” This lack already places limits on any spots where analogies might be applied (cf. §§23.1, 24.2, 27.4). Choice of how various terms are used to describe relations between God and humans— e.g., by reason of “force” (Kraft, a soft sense of energic power; cf. §§53.1 and 53.P.S.) and “infinite causality” in relation to God’s omnipresence. Nowhere in this work is a full account on use of analogy given. In Part Two the most widely influential analogy is closely based in Scripture: “that the creation of humanity is first brought to completion in Christ,” who in his person also creates “the new human being” (§97.5). Whereas this analogy offers nothing toward an analogy between human beings and any attribute of God presupposed in Part One, because human attributes are a pure “Negation” of those (§97.5). See index for other uses of the concept “analogy.” His lectures on dialectic come closest to a general account in KGA II/10.1–2 (2002). There the two largest sets of accounts (ca. 300 pages each) are from 1818/19 and 1822. Indications given in the 1811 notes (ET Tice, 1996) concern analogies applied to individual ways of knowing. 8. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §188.3 in CG1 (1822). 9. Gnadenwirkungen. Ed. note: This term refers to key points in the communities of faith where lives of regenerate persons are most notably touched by God, as does the closely related term göttliche Selbstmitteilung (divine selfcommunication). Cf. CG1 first edition (1822) §181.3 and the present edition §133 and its first subsection, also in §168 as a whole. In §133 here the discussion is about divine self-communication through service to the word of God through the church’s “common spirit,” then in §168 here God’s attribute of “wisdom” is defined as the moving principle of God’s selfcommunication in redemption for ordering and determining the world, as was done in the first edition (1822) in §181.3. In the first edition (1822), Schleiermacher also referred to three special points at which God’s “workings of grace” appear in the lives of persons, successively (§§130.3, 130.P.S2, 138.3): in baptism (described as “the beginning”), conversion (as another step taken in faith, expressed further in “cooperation” with God), and election (as what registers for each person through proclamation, in its broadest sense). In both editions, other concepts tend to be used for other points of doctrine regarding divine grace. In the first edition (1822) §180.3, however, Schleiermacher also distinguishes among two modes in which workings of grace appear: as preparatory (vorbereitende) and as fulfilled or realized (erfüllende). 10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s 1829 open letters to his friend Lücke, On the “Glaubenslehre,” displays examples of his kindly, sometimes ironic approach to controversy. Apparently few of his many earlier reviewers knew quite what to do with this tightly interwoven whole that he called his Glaubenslehre. Few even grasped the main points of the Introduction, or seem to have read much beyond it. Yet, he took their alarming retorts seriously, wherever he could. He faced them with puzzled humor when he could only conclude that they had used poor critical skills for reading. As is all too often practiced in the academy, then and now, polemics is an undisciplined free-for-all, lacking in real respect and quick to be haughtily dismissive, drawing upon habitual presuppositions, some largely hidden even to their purveyors. For him, polemics were to be struggles for understanding, not out-and-out fights. They were also to be directed inwardly within the church, not outwardly to enemies or strangers. The activities of polemics were to be entirely directed to diseased conditions within Christianity, within and among the churches, and in the spirit that is proper to the reign of God. Their leadership function, even among academics, is to foster and engage in healing, in Seelsorge, care of souls. See BO §§40–42 and index there. 11. Ed. note: The term is verurteilen, ordinarily meaning to condemn; however, it also means to deliver a sentence, which in a court, as in this saying, means most generally to decide “guilty” (as charged) or “not guilty” (acquitted). Here, Schleiermacher has summarized an argument against keeping the long-lasting early set formulations and for rehabilitation of the doctrine by reformulation, knowing that the trouble it has caused cannot properly be restored on scriptural ground nor gain currency in the direction he has taken it any time soon. As an aid to further inquiry, translations of his 1822 essay, his CG1 (1822) Conclusion, and this (1831) Conclusion showing changes from the CG1 text, are all included in Schleiermacher, The Triune God (ed. Tice, forthcoming). 12. Gemütszustände. 13. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §188.P.S. and §190.P.S. in CG1 (1822). 14. Ed. note: The German has “einem” in italics to emphasize fitting “together” as one.

APPENDIX

Preface to the First Edition (1821) The practice among the public teachers of our institutions of higher education1 of issuing supplementary textbooks and handbooks for the sciences in which they are lecturing is something so customary that a new example of this sort needs no justification, even though it would always be an inflating of the literature we have, itself already too abundant. Thus, the appearance of this book also needs no justification, particularly since this custom is so very common among teachers of dogmatic theology that not to do this would almost be an exception. In large part, the fact that aids of this kind are published is also simply for convenience’s sake in the teacher’s relationship to students. Only rarely, moreover, does a new general textbook on Christian faith turn out to be a scientifically significant event. This is the case, in that deeply reflective, historically thoroughgoing treatments of particular points of doctrine add far more to the advancement of science. For that purpose, a comprehensive, unfettered critical inventory2 concerning recent dogmatics overall would be very soon desired instead of a constant stream of new textbooks that, taken as a whole, tend to go back to basic forms that bear scarcely any true difference. Now, as relates to the present book, it does indeed appear to be less able than most other such books to make any claim to be excused from obeying the general rule followed by German institutions of higher education, in that the book is too detailed for it to serve only as a guide to accompany lectures. It ought rather to be considered as the legacy of one who intends to relinquish taking that route. Having this characteristic, however, has entailed the book’s taking shape as follows. To be sure, I have worked first and foremost for my past and future hearers. Yet, I could not cast aside the thought that a number of others might take this book in hand, viewing it as an account for the general public of the mode of teaching that I had finally rendered to the theological public. Now, I did not believe that my presentation could be understood by general readers in the brief form that students hearing my lectures could have found satisfactory for purposes of preparation or perhaps also of recollection. As a result, a fullness of detail emerged that, wholly contrary to my original intention, eventually necessitated my dividing the book into two volumes so that it would not be far too unwieldy. The book’s original purpose, however, should not fail because of this enlargement. Rather, it would be very convenient for me, if I am then able to offer my lectures in dogmatics more often, to be able to assume that those who hear them are already acquainted with the book’s contents and thereby to gain time for discussions that would otherwise have to be omitted. Now, after I had decided to divide the book into two volumes, I did not want to hold back an earlier publication of this first volume, all the less so since I have already referred to this textbook in a number of passages in the third edition of my discourses On Religion, which is already being printed (1821). Yet, I cannot hide my wish that knowledgeable readers might foreswear issuing an appraisal of my work in public until the second volume, which is to be

delayed as little as possible, appears. The reason is that, in my view—further discussed in the Introduction—what can offer a distinctive value to a work of doctrine regarding Christian faith is the way in which the whole work is arranged and the interconnected order in which its individual propositions are placed. This is so, since people are accustomed to be more forbearing toward such writings in view of their style, and I too must lay a strong claim to such forbearance. In general terms, moreover, this interconnectedness of the whole is indeed already laid down in this first volume, but it is not yet made nearly so obvious as to enable movement to a well-grounded appraisal. If one has only this half in view, even the content of a number of its propositions can readily make an inappropriate impression, which can be corrected, in turn, only once these propositions can be conceived in their natural relationship to the whole. No one will overlook a particular defect that already appears even in this first volume, and unfortunately I cannot promise to do any better in this respect in the volume to follow. I refer to the overall deficiency in references to the literature, which elsewhere makes up a large and valuable part of the whole in writings of this sort. Yet, I am far from wishing that anyone who wants to make a more exact study of Christian faith-doctrine3 would take my book alone in hand. Precisely for this reason, even at this point I have wanted all the less to fill space with references that are found better and more fully made in every other similar book than I could vouch for on my own. Instead, I have used the space gained in this fashion to write out only a relatively small selection of pertinent citations. If needed, I would have devoted still more space to them. For me, the ones I chose were necessary, in part, so as to display statements being assessed at the most suitable spot. In part, I did this so as to furnish statements, which I myself have approved of, by the most prominent authorities and in the most original form possible. All too often, in such works citations not written out are overlooked by readers or are even made ineffectual by errors, which in the case of numbers and abbreviations are extremely difficult to avoid. In contrast, the less I have set forth such points for comparison, the more important it has been to me that the comparisons I have intended are also really made. Nevertheless, in order not to do too much even here, in the passages cited I have had no scruples about passing over intermediate statements and elaborations that do not belong to the matter under discussion. Moreover, only where words that were actually pertinent could be removed from their larger context at all have I refrained entirely from writing out a statement referred to. Given this process of selecting passages for citation, I have simply to refer to principles of demonstration for dogmatics that are already set forth in my Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study (1811) and are also further discussed in the Introduction to the present work. Based on these principles, anyone will also readily grasp why more recent dogmaticians are cited almost not at all. Now, I am the first to set forth a work of faith-doctrine in accordance with the principles of the Evangelical church as if it were one united church,4 and thereby I declare that for me no dogmatic wall of partition seems to exist between our two Evangelical communities of the church.5 Thus, I hope that this declaration will be justified by my efforts here. That is to say, I have sought to present the nature of the Evangelical outlook on faith and life within its

distinctive boundaries as the same in both confessions and to indicate the locus for the various opinions of the two confessions within this domain. Thus, this process must shed light on the following facts. First, it is supposed that, on the same basis, we do not want our shared ecclesial community to continue to be divided any longer, so that ultimately each part would have to go on subsisting for itself alone. Second, these differences in doctrine within our two confessions can, and perhaps must, just as well exist side by side in the unity of the Evangelical church, even though externally this has not yet been fully accomplished, just as within the greater unity of Christendom6 there exists, side by side, a mass of deviations that do indeed appear to come close to being nonChristian notions but that have happily avoided getting that far. As a consequence, I hope that since this outcome flows naturally from the whole design, I will not be saddled with blame as if the outcome would be something artificially induced by my predilection for the union that is to be achieved. Finally, I should like to plead indulgence from those among whom the term “Protestant” has begun to be objectionable,7 given that in treating of this subject I have frequently, indeed predominately, made use of this term and meanings allied with it.8 In many respects they are in the right. This is so, for, in the first place, this term is not suitable for designating a body of doctrine, because it does not in any way convey the character of Evangelical doctrine and instead can only occasion faulty understandings among persons not conversant with it. Not only that, but also those who are opposed to this expression are in the right inasmuch as, in going back to its origin, it also can designate only the German, not the entire Evangelical church. However, even apart from the fact that it hardly works either to eliminate or to establish any usage within the domain of language simply by stipulation, I believe nonetheless that we ought to go on using the term “Protestant,” provided that from time to time we take precautions against misconstruing it. That is to say, the historic protestations of the German estates comprised no stolid opposition against a legitimate power but were simply directed against an illegitimate use of such power, and thus there is nothing in that protestation of which we would have to be ashamed. So, why should we ban from our language an expression that has always been used in our most important proceedings related to church polity, by which precisely the distinctive way in which the German Evangelical church arose is preserved in memory? The church of our fatherland all the more requires its own designation as it takes on a still more distinct character through dissolution of the contrast between Reformed and Lutheran. Moreover, is “Protestant” not also the expression used, at the same time, by every knowledgeable person to memorialize that point of historical development with which the church’s Reformation is so closely connected?9 Indeed, even in our dogmatic language we cannot well dispense with this expression, because we have to be able to indicate the contrast to “Catholicism” with a ready and satisfactory word and thus say “Protestantism” up to the point at which it has been found and commended for ordinary usage as being an inclusive word of like meaning with “Evangelical,” a word that likewise cannot be contrived and given currency in an arbitrary way. May these considerations suffice for this preface, except simply to express, out of a full heart, the devout wish that this book may truly serve that end for which it is honestly

intended—at best by itself but wherever this goal is not reached then at least by disagreement because of its defects, which disagreement will not at that point cease to be under God’s direction. That end is to assist in our attaining a clearer shared understanding concerning the content of our holy faith. Written in Berlin, on the day before Trinity Sunday in the year 1821 [June 16, 1821].10

1. Hochschulen. Ed. note: This term then included both universities and technical or professional schools, all part of what would be called “academia” or postsecondary education today. 2. Repertorium. 3. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: This term for a work in dogmatics translates doctrina fidei, “faith-doctrine” or doctrine regarding Christian faith. 4. Ed. note: See Schleiermacher’s preface to the second edition (1830) for his recanting of this claim. 5. Ed. note: See note 4 under the 1830 preface. 6. Christenheit. Ed. note: In contrast, the term for “Christianity” is Christentum, odd as it may seem to English ears. 7. Ed. note: Peiter gives examples here, KGA I/7.1, 6–7. 8. Ed. note: Actually, Schleiermacher does not make much use of this term in either edition, except in a few limited contexts to express the contrast of Protestant versus Roman Catholic institutional identity and practice; thus uses in the second edition are almost exclusively in §§19.2, 23–24, and 27.2–3; cf. also §127. The same usage appears in several passages of Brief Outline. 9. Ed. note: Verbesserung is the word for “Reformation” used here. In this connection, see Schleiermacher’s 1817 official Oratio: “Address Celebrating the Third Centennial of the Reformation of the Church by Luther at the University of Berlin Held on 3 November 1817,” in Nicol (2004), 45–64. There he attributes the Protestant Reformation especially to the relative freedom enjoyed by academic professionals in certain German universities. 10. Ed. note: The first edition’s second volume was finished on June 29, 1822, and published later that year. After writing this preface on Saturday, the next day Schleiermacher preached from 1 Cor. 12:3–6, on the theme “Who and What Belongs in the Reign of God?” This sermon was initially published in his first collection of Festpredigten (1826), also in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 249–66.

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xii, 198 pp. ———. Saint Augustine: The Trinity. Translated by Stephen McKenna. Fathers of the Church 45. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1963. ———. The Spirit and the Letter (412). In Library of Christian Classics 8, Augustine: Later Works, translated by John Burnaby, 195–250. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Barclay, Robert (1648–1690). Theologiae vera Christianae apologia. Amsterdam, 1676. Likewise in editions of Barklay’s Latin and English from 1678 onward. See also Barclay’s Apology in Modern English. Edited by Dean Freiday. Alburtis, PA: Hemlock Press, 1967. xli, 465 pp. Basil. Exegetic Homilies. Translated by Agnes Clare Way. Fathers of the Church 46. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1963. xvi, 378 pp. ———. Letters. Translated by Agnes Clare Way. Fathers of the Church 28. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1955. Bauer, Johannes. Schleiermacher als patriotischer Prediger: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nationalen Erhebung vor hundert Jahern mit einen Anhang von bisher ungedruckten Predigtentwürfen Schleiermachers. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1908. xii, 364 pp. ———, ed. Ungedruckte Predigten Schleiermachers aus den Jahren 1820–1828. Leipzig: N. Heinsuis Nachfolgery, 1909. vii, 128 pp. Baumgarten, Siegmund Jacob (1706–1757). Untersuchung theologischer Streitigkeiten. Edited by J. S. Semler. 3 Bde. Halle, 1762–1764. Baumgarten-Crusius, Ludwig Friedrich Otto (1788–1843). Einleitung in das Studium der Dogmatik. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1820. viii, 194 pp. Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930; 5. durch.ges. A., 1963. xlvi, 1228 pp. Bellarmino, Roberto Francesco Romolo (1542–1621). Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei, adversus huius temporis haereticos. Paris: Tri-Adelphorum Bibliopolarum, 1608. vol.4. Boekels, Joachim. Schleiermacher als Kirchengeschichtler, mit Edition der Nachschrift Karl Rudolf Hagenbachs von 1821/22. Schleiermacher-Archiv 13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994. xi, 488 pp. Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (ca. 480–524). The Theological Tractates; The Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester. Loeb Classical Library 74. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. xv, 441 pp. The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Edited by Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000. xii, 774 pp. The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert. Fortress Press: Philadelphia, 1959. vii, 717 pp.Contains the three ecumenical creeds—the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian; Augsburg Confession (1530); Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1531); Schmalkaldic Articles (1537); Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope (1537); Luther’s Small Catechism (1529) and Large Catechism (1529); and Formula of Concord (1577). Tappert’s translation of the Augsburg Confession from the German is included in Leith (1982). Braniss, Christlieb Julius (1792–1873). Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre: Ein kritischer Versuch. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1824. v, 197 pp. Bretschneider, Karl Gottlieb (1776–1848). Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche; mit einer besonderen Abhandlung: Über die Grundansichten der theologischen Systeme in den dogmatischen Lehrbücher der Herren Prof. Dr. Schleiermacher und Marheineke, sowie über die des Herrn Dr. Hase. 2. A. Leipzig, 1822; 3. A. 1828. ET in part: “Bretschneider’s View of the Theology of Schleiermacher,” translated from Handbuch der Dogmatik, 4. A., in Bibliotheca Sacra 10 (1853): 598–616. ———. Versuch einer systematischen Entwicklung allen in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe noch dem symbolischer Büchern der protestantischen Kirche. Leipzig, 1805. 3. A. Leipzig, 1825. Buddeus, Johann Franz (1667–1729). Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae. Leipzig, 1724. ———. Theses theologicae de Atheismo et superstitio. Leipzig, 1717. 291 pp. Calvin, John (1509–1564). Institutes of the Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics 20–21. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. lxxi, 1734 pp. ———. Opera selecta. Edited by Peter Barth. 5 vols. Munich: C. Kaiser, 1967. Cassell’s German and English Dictionary. 12th ed. Based on the editions by K. Breul. Revised and edited by H. T. Betteridge. London: Cassell & Co., 1972. xix, 632 pp. Catechesis Rakoviensis, sen liber Socianorum primarius (1609). Edited by Georg Ludwig Oeder (1694–1760). Frankfurt/Leipzig, 1739. 1046 pp. Originally published as Catechesis Ecclesiarum. … Apud Joannem Adamum

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Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Appellation an das Publikum (1799). In Ausgewählte Werke, Bd. 3, edited by Fritz Medicus. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962, 1910. Fries, Jakob Friedrich (1773–1843). Bemerkungen über das Aristoteles Religionsphilosophie. 1828. In Sämtliche Schriften, Bd. 20. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1969. Gerhard, Johann (1582–1637). Loci communes theologici (Jena, 1610–1625). Edited by J. F. Cotta. 20 vols. Tübingen, 1762–1781. Edition by E. Preiss, 8 vols. Berlin, 1863–1870. A 9-volume edition was published in Leipzig, 1875. Gesangbuch zum gottesdienstlichen Gebrauch für evangelische Gemeinden. Besorgt von Brescius, Küster, Marot, Neander, Ritschl, Schleiermacher, Spilleke, Theremin, und Wilmsen. Berlin, 1830, 1831. Gregory Nazianzen. “Oratio 21” and “Oration 40.” Translated by Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow. In S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Gregory Nazianzen, 269–84 and 360–77. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Church, Series 2, vol. 7. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1894. Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm. Kinder und Hausmärchen. Grosse Ausgabe, 7. Auflage. 3 Bde. Göttingen: Dieterich, 1857. Hahn, August (1792–1863). An die evangelische Kirche zunächst Sachsen und Preußen: Eine offene Erklärung. Leipzig: Bey Fr. Chr. Wilhem Vogel, 1827. xi, 140 pp. ———. De rationalismi qui dicitur vera indole et que cum naturalismo contineatur ratione: Commentationis historicotheologicae particula prior. Leipzig: Ex officina Frid. Christ. Guil. Vogelii, 1827. 75 pp. Henderson, G. D., ed. The Scots Confession of 1560. With an ET of the Scots Confession by James Bulloch, 58–80. Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1960. Confession reprinted in The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Part I, Book of Confessions, 3.01–25. Louisville, KY: Office of the General Assembly, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1999. Henke, Heinrich Philipp Conrad (1752–1809). Lineamenta institutionum fidei Christianae historio-criticarum. 2. verbesserte und vermehrte Aufl. Helmstedt: Redemtore Car. Godofr. Fleckeisen, 1795. 256 pp. Hess, Johann Jakob (1741–1828). Lebensgeschichte Jesu. 3 Bde. Zurich: Orell, Füssli und Co., 1794; 8th ed., 1822–1823. Hilary of Poitiers. The Trinity. Translated by Stephen McKenna. Fathers of the Church 25. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1954. xix, 555 pp. Hopkins, Jasper. A New Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion. Minneapolis: Arthus J. Banning Press, 1986. xii, 343 pp. Hugh of Saint Victor (1096–1141). Dogmatica. Patrologia Latina 176. Edited by J.-P. Migne. Paris, 1854. ———. On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De sacramentis). Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951. xx, 486 pp. Hunnius, Nikolaus (1563–1643). Diaskepsis theologica de fundamentali dissendu doctrinae evangelicae-Lutheranae & Calvinianae. Wittenberg: Helwig, 1626. 632 pp. ———. Epitome credendorum, oder kurtzer Inhalt christlicher Lehre, so viel einem Christen darvon, zu seiner Seelen Seligkeit, zu wissen und zu glauben hoch nötig und nützlich ist. Wittenberg, 1657. 567 pp. Irenaeus (ca. 130–ca. 200). Against Heresies. (ca. 190). In The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Vol. 1, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 309–578. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905. Jerome (Hieronymus, 342–420). Commentariorum Osee 2. Patrologia Latina 25, edited by J.-P. Migne, 810–946. Paris, 1845. John of Damascus. An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. In Writings, translated by Frederic H. Chase Jr., 165–406. Fathers of the Church 37. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1958. Karmiris, Johannes, ed. Dogmatica et symbolica monumenta orthodoxae catholicae ecclesiae. 2nd ed. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1968. Keller, Adelbert von. Fastnachtspiele aus dem fünfzehnten Jahrhundert. 3 Bde. Stuttgart: Literarischer Verein, 1853. Kelly, J. N. D. Early Christian Creeds. 3rd ed. New York: R. McKay, 1972. xi, 446 pp. Lactantius. The Divine Institutes Books I–VII. Translated by Mary Francis McDonald, OP. Fathers of the Church 49. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1964. 561 pp. Leith, John H., ed. Creeds of the Churches: A Reader in Christian Doctrine from the Bible to the Present. 3rd ed. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1982. x, 748 pp. Luther, Martin (1483–1546). Luther’s Works. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Press, 1958–. ———. Sämtliche Schriften: Sowol in Deutscher als Lateinischer Sprache Verfertigte. Edited by Johann Georg Walch. 24 vols. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1740–1753. ———. Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 58 Bde. Weimar: 1883–. Melanchthon, Philipp (1497–1560). “Confessio Saxonica.” In Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl 6:80–167. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1955.

———. Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559). Corpus reformatorum 21 (1854) contains the 1st ed. of 1521, Loci communes rerum theologicarum (later shortened to Loci communes theologici), and the greatly revised editions of 1535 (Loci theologici) and 1543–1559 (Loci praecipui theologici). Schleiermacher used only the third edition in Latin. In 1555 Melanchthon translated a version of that edition into German: ET Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine. Translated and edited by Clyde L. Manschreck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965. lvii, 356 pp. The present translation of Schleiermacher’s excerpts from the third edition has been compared with Manschreck’s, though the texts he and Schleiermacher used are not the same. No other ET of the third edition was found. The first edition can be found in Loci communes theologici, in Melanchthon and Bucer, 1521, translated by Lowell G. Satre, edited by Wilhelm Pauck, 3–152. Library of Christian Classics 19. Philadelphia: Westminster Press; London: SCM Press, 1969. ———. Opera quae supersunt omnia. Halle Saxonum: C.A. Swetzschke, 1834–1860. Mendelssohn, Moses (1729–1786). Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum. Berlin: F. Maurer, 1783. 141 pp. Michaelis, Johann David (1717–1791). Compendium theologiae dogmaticae. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1760. 2nd ed., 1784. Migne, Jacques-Paul, ed. (1800–1875). Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca. 162 vols. Paris: 1841–1866. ———. Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina. 221 vols. Paris: 1841–1866. Morus, Samuel Friedrich Nathanael (1736–1792). Commentarius exegetico-historicus in suam theologiae christianae epitomen. 2 vols. Halae Saxonum, 1797–1798. Mosheim, Johann Lorens (1694–1755). Elementa theologiae dogmaticae in academicis quondam praelectionibus propositia et demonstrata. 2 vols. ed. altera revisa, emendata et insignitur aucta a Christian Ernst von Windheim. Norinbergae, 1764. Müller, E. F. Karl. Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche. Leipzig, 1903; Zurich: Theologische Buchhandlung, 1987. lxxi, 976 pp. Nemesius of Emesa (4th cent.). “On the Nature of Man” (ca. 390). In Library of Christian Classics 4, Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, edited by William Telfer, 224–453. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Nicolaus de Lyra. Postilla fratris Nicolai de lyra de ordine minorum super Genesim Exodum Leuiticum Numeri Deutronomium Josue Judici Regum & Paralyppomenom. Cum additionibus pauli episcopi Burgensis. Nuremberg: Koberger, 1493. 424 pp. Niemeyer, Hermann (1802–1851). Collectio confessionum in ecclesiis reformatis publicatarum. Edited by Agathon. 2 vols. Leipzig: J. Klinkhardti, 1840. Nitzsch, Karl Immanuel (1787–1868). System der christliche Lehre für academische Vorlesungen. Bonn, 1829. 2nd ed., 1831. Origen (184–253). Commentary on the Gospel of John. Translated by Ronald E. Heine. 2 vols. Fathers of the Church 80. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1989–1993. ———. Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Translated by John Patrick. In The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 9, edited by Allan Menzies, 411–512. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906. ———. On First Principles. Translated by G. W. Butterworth. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. lxiv, 342 pp. Pegis, Anton C., ed. Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas. New York: Modern Library, 1948. xxx, 690 pp. Peiter, Hermann. Christliche Ethik bei Schleiermacher: Gesammelte Aufsätze und Besprechungen / Christian Ethics according to Schleiermacher; Collected Essays and Reviews. Bilingual edition edited by Terrence N. Tice. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2010. xxvii, 772 pp. ———, ed. Schleiermacher’s “Der christliche Glaube” 1821/22. 3 Bde. KGA I.7/1–3. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980. lxv, 357 pp.; vii, 309 pp. Includes Marginalien und Anhang. Edited by Ulrich Barth using preparatory work by Hayo Gerdes and Hermann Peiter. KGA I.7/3. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. xxv, 672 pp. Pelikan, Jaroslav. Luther the Expositor: Introduction to the Reformer’s Exegetical Writings. St. Louis: Concordia, 1959. xiii, 286 pp. Philips, Buran F. Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Interpretation of the Epistle to the Colossians: A Series of Sermons (1830–31). Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009. xi, 304 pp. Photius (ca. 820–ca. 891). Bibliotheque. Tome 5. Texte établi et traduit par René Henry. Paris: Societé d’édition Les Belles lettres, 1967. 230 pp. ———. Photii bibliotheca. Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Berlin: G. Reimeri, 1824–1825. Pisecius, Thomas (ca. 1580–ca. 1650). T. Pisecii responsio ad decem rationes Edmundi Campiani Jesuitae notae ad appendices Vilkovianas. Racoviae: Sternacus, 1610. 138 pp. Prosper of Aquitaine. The Call of All Nations. Translated and annotated by P. DeLetter, SJ. Ancient Christian Writers 14. Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1952. 234 pp. Pseudo-Dionysius (5th cent.). The Complete Works. New York: Paulist Press, 1987. ix, 312 pp.

Quenstedt, Johann Andreas (1617–1688). The Nature and Character of Theology: An Introduction to the Theology of J. A. Quenstedt from Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologicum. Abridged, edited, and translated by Luther Poellot. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1986. This translation from a 1696 printing is of chaps. 1–3, of fortyeight chapters published in two volumes, four parts, 2,073 large pages. To date, it is the only sustained translation of any portion of this work; only detailed references to sources are omitted. Unfortunately, Schleiermacher’s seven quotations are from later chapters in vol. 1. ———. Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologicum in duas sectiones didacticum et polemicam divisum. 2 vols. Wittenberg, 1685–1690. Reissued, Leipzig: Fritsch, 1691, 1698, 1701, 1702, 1715, 1717. Rees, Thomas. The Racovian Catechism, with Notes and Illustrations, Translated from the Latin. Lexington, KY: American Theological Library Association, 1962. cviii, 404 pp. Reinhard, Franz Volkmar (1753–1812). Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik. 4. A. Sulzbach: J. E. Seidel, 1818. xxiv, 710 pp. Roberts, Alexander, and James Donaldson, eds. Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325. 10 vols. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1903. Reprint of 1885–1887 Edinburgh edition. Sack, Karl Heinrich (1789–1875). Christliche Apologetik: Versuch eines Handbuches. Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1829. xviii, 456 pp. ———. Von Worte Gottes, eine christliche Verständigung. Berlin, 1825. Schaff, Philip, ed. (1819–1893). The Creeds of Christendom. 6th ed., revised and enlarged. 3 vols. New York: Harper & Bros., 1919. 1st ed., 1877. Schaff, Philip, and Henry Wace, eds. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Translated with prolegomena and explanatory notes. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1890–1900. Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768–1834). Aesthetik. Sämmtliche Werke III.7. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1842. ———. Akademievorträge. Herausgegeben von Martin Rössler unter Mitwirkung von Lars Emersleben. KGA I/11. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. lxxxi, 833 pp. ———. Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study. 3rd ed. Revised translation of the 1811 and 1830 editions, with essays and notes, by Terrence N. Tice. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011. xiii, 230 pp. Critical German editions include Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum behuf Einleitender Vorlesungen. Kritische Ausgabe. Edited by Heinrich Scholz. 1910, 1993. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993. xlv, 134 pp. Also, Universitätsschriften, Herakleitos, Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums. Edited by Dirk Schmid, 317–446. KGA I/6. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. ———. Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806). Translated by John Wallhausser in collaboration with Edwina Lawler, 33–172. Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 22. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. German edition of these personal notes: Werke: Auswahl in vier Bänden. Vol. 2. Edited by Otto Braun. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1913. Reissued as Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06). Introduction by Hans-Joachim Birkner. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981. xxxiv, 163 pp. ———. The Christian Faith. ET of the 2nd German ed. Edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1928. We have only made reference to this translation in “Concerning This Translation.” Original publications: Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt 1821/22. 3 vols. KGA I.7/1–3. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980. (This is the first edition in a critical edition. See Peiter for details on the 3rd volume.) Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. Zweite umgearbeitete Ausgabe. 2 vols. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1830–1831. This is the edition translated in this volume. Later editions referred to in notes include 7th critical ed., edited by Martin Redeker (2 vols., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960), and what is effectively the 8th ed., also a critical edition, edited by Rolf Schäfer (2 vols., KGA I/13.1–2, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003). ———. The Christian Household: A Sermonic Treatise. Translation of the 1820 and 1826 editions, with essays and notes, by Dietrich Seidel and Terrence N. Tice. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991. xii, 236 pp. ———. Christliche Festpredigten. 1 Bd. Berlin, 1826. vi, 448 pp. Also in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 3–266, and KGA III/2 (2015). ———. Christliche Festpredigten. 2 Bd. Berlin, 1833. vii, 569 pp. Also in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 269–608, and KGA III/2 (2015). ———. Christliche Sittenlehre: Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1826/27. Nach größenteils unveröffentlichten Hörernachschriften und nach teilweise unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Schleiermachers. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Hermann Peiter. Bd. 1 (Hörernachschriften). Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2011. lxviii, 635 pp. A second volume of historical apparatus is in preparation. ———. Christmas Eve Celebration: A Dialogue. Translated by Terrence N. Tice. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010. xxxi, 114 pp. Originally published as Die Weihnachtsfeier: Ein Gespräch. Erste Aufgabe. Berlin, 1806. Zweite Aufgabe.

Berlin, 1826. In KGA I/5, Schriften aus der Hallenser Zeit: 1804–1807, edited by Hermann Patsch, 39–100. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995. ———. Dialectic, or, The Art of Doing Philosophy: A Study Edition of the 1811 Notes. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Terrence N. Tice. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996. xxv, 92 pp. German edition, Dialektik (1811). Hrsg. v. Andreas Arndt. Hamburg: Meiner, 1986. lxxxiv, 115 pp. Critical edition of all years of Dialektik lectures is in Vorlesungen über die Dialektik. 2 Teilbande. Edited by Andreas Arndt. In KGA II/10.1–2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. lxxxviii, 426 pp., 815 pp. ———. Fifteen Sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher Delivered to Celebrate the Beginning of a New Year. Translated with introduction and notes by Edwina G. Lawler. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. lxxxiii, 282 pp. ———. Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions, and Church Union: “That They May Be One.” Translated with an introduction and notes by Iain G. Nicol. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. 265 pp. ———. Geschichte der alten Philosophie. Geschichte der neuen Philosophie. Edited by H. Ritter. In Sämmtliche Werke III.4.1, 15–282. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839. ———. Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings. Translated and edited by Andrew Bowie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xl, 283 pp. This translation largely omits the material on biblical hermeneutics. Critical edition, Vorlesungen zur Hermeneutik und Kritik. Edited by Wolfgang Virmond in cooperation with Hermann Patsch. KGA II/4. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012. li, 1162 pp. ———. Introduction to Christian Ethics. Translated by John C. Shelley. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989. 108 pp. ———. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. (Abbreviated KGA.) Edited by Hans-Joachim Birkner, Gerhard Ebeling, Hermann Fischer, Heinz Kimmerle, Kurt-Victor Selge, Ulrich Barth, Konrad Cramer, Günter Meckenstock, Andreas Arndt, Jörg Dierken, Lutz Käppel, Notger Slenczka in various years. Multiple volumes in 4 series: Abteilung I: Schriften und Entwürfe; Abteilung II: Vorlesungen; Abteilung III: Predigten; Abteilung IV: Briefwechsel und biographische Dokumente. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980–. ———. The Life of Jesus. Edited with an introduction by Jack C. Verheyden. Translated by S. Maclean Gilmore. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975. lxii, 481 pp. Originally published as Das Leben Jesu: Vorlesungen an der Universität zu Berlin im Jahr 1832. Edited by K.A. Rütenik. Sämmtliche Werke I.6. Berlin: Reimer, 1864. ———. On Freedom. Translated, annotated, and introduced by Albert L. Blackwell. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992. 155 pp. ———. On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Terrence N. Tice. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969. 383 pp. A revised edition including notes to all changes made from 1799 and 1806 to 1821 is forthcoming. Critical German edition by Georg Christian Bernhard Pünjer. Friedrich Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion. Kritische Ausgabe. Braunschweig: E. U. Schwetschke, 1879. xv, 306 pp. Pünjer makes the 1799 text his main text and provides all changes in 1806 and 1821 in notes. Tice makes the 1821 text his main text and provides all changes from earlier editions in notes. KGA published the texts separately. In Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit 1796–1799. Edited by Günter Meckenstock, 185–326. KGA I/2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. Über die Religion (2.–) 4. Auflage. Monologen (2.–) 4. Auflage. Edited by Günter Meckenstock. KGA I/12. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995. lxxiii, 411 pp. ———. “On the Condemnation in Our Confession of Those Who Believe Differently.” In Reformed but Ever Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the Augsburg Confession (1830), translated by Iain G. Nicol, 127–40. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997. Critical German edition, Predigten 1830–1831. Herausgegeben von Dirk Schmid, 346–57. KGA III/12. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013. ———. On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and the Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity. Translated by Moses Stuart. Andover, MA: Gould & Newman, 1835. Original publication, “Über den Gegensatz zwischen der Sabellianischen und der Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität” (1822). Critical edition in Theologisch-dogmatische Abhandlungen und Gelegenheitsschriften, edited by Hans-Friedrich Traulsen and Martin Ohst, 223–306. KGA I/10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990. ———. On the Doctrine of Election: With Special Reference to the “Aphorisms” of Dr. Bretschneider. Translated by Iain G. Nicol and Allen G. Jorgenson. Columbia Series in Reformed Theology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012. xii, 108 pp. Original publication, “Über die Lehre von der Erwählung, besonders in Beziehung auf Herrn Dr. Bretschneiders Aphorismen,” Theologische Zeitschrift 1 (1819). Critical edition in Theologisch-dogmatische Abhandlungen und Gelegenheitsschriften, edited by Hans-Friedrich Traulsen and Martin Ohst, 145–222. KGA I/10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990. ———. On the “Glaubenslehre”: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke. Translated by James Duke and Francis Fiorenza. Texts and Translations Series 3. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981. Originally published as “Über die Glaubenslehre: Zwei Sendschreiben an Lücke.” Theologische Studien und Kritiken 2 (1829): 255–84, and 3 (1829): 481–532. Critical edition

in Theologisch-dogmatische Abhandlungen und Gelegenheitsschriften, edited by Hans-Friedrich Traulsen and Martin Ohst, 307–94. KGA I/10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990. ———. Oratio (Address) of Nov. 3, 1830. Translated by Terrence N. Tice. In Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions and Church Union: That They May Be One, edited by Iain G. Nicol, 29–44. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. Original in SW I.5 (1846), 309–15, and KGA I/10 (1990), 1–16. ———. Die praktische Theologie nach den Grundsäzen der evangelischen Kirche in Zusammenhange dargestellt. Edited by Jacob Frerichs. Sämmtliche Werke I.13. Berlin: Reimer, 1850. ———. Predigten. Sämmtliche Werke Abteilung II contains 10 volumes of sermons. All volumes published in Berlin by G. Reimer: Bd. II.1 (1835, 1843); Bd. II.2 (1834, 1843); Bd. II.3 (1835, 1843); Bd. II.4 (1844); Bd. II.5 (1835); Bd. II.6 (1835); Bd. II.7 (1836); Bd. II.8 (1837, 1847); Bd. II.9 (1837, 1847); Bd. II.10 (1856). Where there are two publication dates, there may be additional sermons in the later volume. ———. Predigten Erste bis Viert Sammlung (1801–1820) mit den Varianten der Neuauflagen (1806–1826). Edited by Günter Meckenstock. KGA III/1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012. cxvii, 1069 pp. ———. Predigten Fünfte bis Siebente Sammlung (1826–1833). Edited by Günter Meckenstock. KGA III/2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015. 1000 pp. ———. Predigten 1790–1808. Edited by Günter Meckenstock. KGA III/3. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013. 1200 pp. ———. Predigten 1809–1815. Edited by Patrick Weiland in cooperation with Simon Paschen. KGA III/4. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011. xliii, 793 pp. ———. Predigten 1816–1819. Edited by Katja Kretschmar in cooperation with Michael Pietsch. KGA III/5. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014. 800 pp. ———. Predigten 1820–1821. Edited by Elisabeth Blumrich. KGA III/6. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015. 1200 pp. ———. Predigten 1822–1823. Edited by Kirsten Maria Christine Kunz. KGA III/7. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012. lxx, 1181 pp. ———. Predigten 1824. Edited by Kirsten Maria Christine Kunz. KGA III/8. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013. lv, 787 pp. ———. Predigten 1825–1827 presumably will be published in KGA III/9 and III/10. ———. Predigten 1828–1829. Edited by Patrick Weiland. KGA III/11. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014. xlii, 650 pp. ———. Predigten 1830–1831. Edited by Dirk Schmid. KGA III/12. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013. xx, 860 pp. ———. Predigten 1832. Edited by Dirk Schmid. KGA III/13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014. lxi, 648 pp. ———. Predigten 1833–1834 presumably will be published in the last volumes of Kritische Gesamtausgabe Abteilung III. ———. Psychologie. Aus Schleiermacher’s handschriftlichem Nachlasse und nachgeschriebenen Vorlesungen. Herausgegeben von L. George. Sämmtlich Werke III.6. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1862. xvi, 557 pp. ———. “The Redeemer’s Last Meetings with His Disciples, 2 Feb. 1834.” Published as Letzte Predigt, gehalten in der Dreifaltigkeits-Kirche in der Frühstunde am Sonntage Sexagesimä, den 2ten Februar 1834. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1834. 16 pp. ———. Reformed but Ever Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the Augsburg Confession (1830). Translated with introduction and notes by Iain G. Nicol. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997. xxviii, 185 pp. ———. Sämmtliche Werke: Dritte Abtheilung zur Philosophie. Bd. 1 Philosophische und vermischte Schriften. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1846. ———. Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies, an English Translation of the Monologen, with a Critical Introduction and Appendix. Translated by Horace Leland Friess. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1926. ix, 176 pp. Critical German edition, “Monologen: Eine Neujahrsgabe (1800).” In Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit 1800–1802, herausgegeben von Günter Meckenstock, 1–61. KGA I/3. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988. ———. Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher. Translated by Mary F. Wilson. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1890. viii, 451 pp. ———. Selections from Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “Christian Ethics”. Edited and translated by James M. Brandt. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011. xiv, 198 pp. ———. Servant of the Word: Selected Sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher. Translated by Dawn DeVries. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. x, 230 pp. ———. Theologisch-dogmatische Abhandlungen und Gelegenheitsschriften. Edited by Han-Friedrich Traulsen and Martin Ohst. KGA I/10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990. ———. “Toward a Theory of Sociable Conduct” (1799). Translated by Jeffrey Hoover. In Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “Toward a Theory of Sociable Conduct” and Essays on Its Intellectual-Cultural Context, edited by Ruth Drucilla Richardson, 20–39. New Athenaeum / Neues Athenaeum 4. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995. Critical edition of

the German “Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens” in Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit 1796–1799, edited by Günter Meckenstock, 163–84. KGA I/2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. ———. “Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes, 4. März 1819.” Critical edition in Akademievorträge, herausgegeben von Martin Rössler unter Mitwirkung von Lars Emersleben, 313–35. KGA I/11. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. ———. “Versuch über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Pflichtbegriffs, 12. August 1824.” Originally in Denkschrift der Koniglichen Academie der Wissenschaften, philosophische Klasse, 4–6. Reprinted in SW III.2 (1838), 379–96. Critical edition in Akademiervorträge, herausgegeben von Martin Rössler unter Mitwirkung von Lars Emersleben, 415– 28. KGA I/11. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. ———. Vorlesungen über die Dialektik. 2 Bde. Herausgegeben von Andreas Arndt. KGA II/10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. lxxxviii, 426 pp., 815 pp. ———. Vorlesungen über die kirchliche Geographie und Statisik. Herausgegeben von Simon Gerber. KGA II/16. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005. xlix, 584 pp. ———. Vorlesungen über die Lehre vom Staat. Herausgegeben von Walter Jaeschke. KGA II/8. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. lxiii, 968 pp. Schott, Heinrich August (1780–1835). Epitome theologiae christianae dogmaticae: In usum maxime scholarum academicarum adornata. Editio altera. Leipzig: Io. A. Barthiii, 1822. xxiv, 352 pp. Schwartz, Eduard, ed. Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum: Ivssv atqve mandato Societatis scientiarvm Argentoratensis. II.I. Berlin, 1922. Schwarz, Friedrich Heinrich Christoph (1766–1837). Recension. Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur Bd. 15 (1822), 854–64, 945–80; Bd. 16 (1823), 209–26, 321–52. Reprinted in full in KGA I/7.3 (1984), 539–623. Smalcius, Valentinus (1572–1622). Refutatio thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii, theologiae doctoris et professoris publici in academia Witebergensi, quas ibidem de praecipuis Christianae Religionis capitibus anno 1609 et 1610 disputandas proposuit. Racoviae: Sternacius, 1614. viii, 462 pp. Socinus, Faustus (1539–1604). Praelectiones theologicae. Biblioteca fratrum polonorum quos unitarios vocant 1. Amsterdam, 1656. Stange, Carl. Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, kritische Ausgabe. 1. Abteilung: Einleitung. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1910. viii, 226 pp. The two editions are compared in detail. Steffens, Henrich (1773–1845). Von der falschen Theologie und den wahren Glauben: Eine Stimme aus der Gemeinde. Breslau: J. Max & Komp., 1823. ix, 252 pp. Steudel, Johann Christian Friedrich (1779–1837). “Die Frage über die Ausführbarkeit einer Annäherung zwischen der rationalistischen und supranaturalistischen Ausicht der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre.” Tübinger Zeitschrift 1828, 1.H. 74–199; 2.H. 74–120. Storr, Gottlob Christian (1746–1805). Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik. Übersetzt und bearbeitet von Carl Christian Flatt. Stuttgart: J. B. Melzer, 1803; 2. Aufl. 1813. xx, 408 pp. Telfer, William. Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa. Library of Christian Classics 4. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. 466 pp. Theodoret of Cyrus (ca. 393–ca. 458). The Ecclesiastical History, Dialogues and Letters Theodoret. Translated by Blomfield Jackson. In A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series 2, vol. 3. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1906. xii, 348 pp. Theophilus of Antioch (2nd cent.). Ad Autolycum. Translated by Robert M. Grant. Oxford: Clarendon, 1970. xxix, 153 pp. Thomas, Aquinas. (1225–1274). Summa theologiae. Vol. 15, The World Order (1a.110–19). Edited and translated by Maxwell John Charlesworth. London: Blackfriars: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970. xvi, 192 pp. ———. The Summa Theologica. In Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis. New York: Modern Library, 1948. xxx, 690 pp. Thönes, Carl, ed. Schleiermachers handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum ersten Teil der Glaubenslehre. Berlin, 1873. vi, 60 pp. Only the more significant of these notes are translated here. All are included in Redeker (1960). Tice, Terrence N. Schleiermacher. Nashville: Abingdon, 2006. xv, 95 pp. ———. Schleiermacher Bibliography: With Brief Introductions, Annotations, and Index. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1966. 168 pp. Updates are provided in New Athenaeum / Neues Athenaeum through 1994. A compilation of all years to about 2012 is in preparation. ———. “Schleiermacher’s Concept of Ministry: Proclamation in the Christian Life.” In The State of Schleiermacher Scholarship Today, edited by Edwina Lawler, Jeffery Kinlaw, and Ruth Drucilla Richardson, 227–62. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006. Includes two sermons by Schleiermacher: on Matt. 4:17, July 1, 1821, from SW II.10 (1836), 195–208; and on Matt. 10:11–13, Aug. 12, 1821, from SW II.10, 222–37.

———. “Schleiermacher’s Conception of Religion: 1799–1831.” In Schleiermacher, a cura di Mario M. Olivetti, 332–56. Padova: CEDAM, 1984. ———. Schleiermacher’s Sermons: A Chronological Listing and Account. Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 15. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997. 181 pp. Torrance, Thomas F. The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church. New York: Harper, 1959. cxxvi, 298 pp. Contains translation of Calvin’s Geneva catechism, 1541. Twesten, August Detler Christian (1789–1876). Die drey ökumenischen Symbole, die Augsburgische Confession und die Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae. Kiel, 1816. x, 212 pp. ———. Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche nach dem Compendium des Herrn Dr. W. M. L. deWette. 2 vols. Hamburg, 1829. Vorstius, Conradus (1569–1622). Parasceve ad amicam collationem cum claris. theologo D. Iohanne Piscatore … : Super notis hujus ad loca quædam, ex illius tractatu de Deo, & exegesi apologetica, pridem excerpta, & notis istis breviter examinata. Gouda: Caspari Tournaei, 1612. 71 pp. Walch, Johann Georg (1693–1775). Historische und Theologische Einleitung in die Religions-Streitigkeiten der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche. 10 Bde. Jena, 1733–1739. Wegscheider, Julius August Ludwig (1771–1849). Institutiones theologiae Christianae dogmaticae. Halle, 1815. 4. Aufl. Halle, 1824. 6. Aufl. Halle, 1829. The 4th and 6th editions were both in Schleiermacher’s library. Wordsworth, William (1770–1850). “Intimations of Immortality” (1807). In The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, vol. 4, edited by E. de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire, 460. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Zimmer, Friedrich. “Predigtentwürfe aus Friedrich Schleiermachers erste Amtsthätigkeit.” Zeitschrift für praktische Theologie 4 (1882): 281–90, 369–78. ———, ed. Predigtentwürfe von Friedrich Schleiermacher aus dem Jahre 1800. Gotha: Perthes, 1887. iv, 75 pp. Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531). Commentary on True and False Religion (1525). Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson and Clarence Nevin Heller. Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1981. vi, 415 pp. ———. On Providence and Other Essays. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson and William John Hinke. Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1983. 307 pp.

INDEXES Guide to the Indexes 1. Index entries are drawn from Schleiermacher’s actual wording. Infrequent exceptions to this practice occur only where long phrases had to be shortened. 2. In Schleiermacher’s diction, indicators to a topic were usually not found captured by nouns alone. Selections of what to feature in subheadings under more complex conceptual headings include major factors that point out a position he held. 3. So as not to confuse the huge number of alternative doctrinal proposals with Schleiermacher’s position, the analytical index focuses primarily on his proposals and arguments. The indexes to Creeds and Confessions and to Persons and Places will help readers locate the ideas of those with whom Schleiermacher was in dialogue. 4. References to a large number of Schleiermacher’s other works can be found under his name in the Persons and Places Index, with one exception. The manifold references to specific propositions in his 1830 Brief Outline required a separate index. To locate sermons referred to in the notes, one may find them listed by year preached in the Index to Persons and Places under Schleiermacher: sermons. One may also find them listed by their subject Scripture text in the Index to Scripture. 5. In these indexes “re:” means “in regard to” or “in relation to,” “&” means “and” and “def.” means “definition.” 6. With the exception of front and back matter, index references are to proposition [§1], proposition section [§1.1], footnote [§1n2], or quotations printed in the main text between the proposition and the first section [§119(3)] not to pages. This might make the indexes useful with other editions as well as this one. Index of References to Brief Outline Index of Creeds and Confessions Index of Scripture Index of Persons and Places Analytical Index of Topics: Subjects, Concepts, Themes, Definitions, Word Usage, and Contrasts

INDEX OF REFERENCES TO BRIEF OUTLINE Schleiermacher referred to the 1811 edition of his Brief Outline in the 1830–1831 edition of Christian Faith, even though he had revised and published a second edition of Brief Outline in 1830. Here, references to the 1811 Brief Outline and any Tice translations of it appear under the corresponding renumbered 1830 edition of that work in a recent English translation (2011). Hence, the Brief Outline proposition numbers in this index all refer to the 1830 edition. BO §1 §§1–8 §§1–10 §§1–20 §§1–31 §2 §3 §§3–5 §3–20 §4 §5n §6 §9 §§9–13 §14 §§14–20 §§15–17 §17 §§18–19 §19 §20 §21 §22 §23 §§23–24 §26 §§28–37 §29 §32 §§32–39 §§32–40 §35 §§35–37

CF §2n2, §4n25 §61n44 §61n44 §20n3 §1n4, §28n17 §2n2, §2n5 §1n4, §19n3, §45n24, §121n4, §133n2 §19n2 §45n24 §20n12 §21n1 §72n36 §23n5 §17n9, §58n1, §138n12 §19n2 §61n44 §19n3 §19n11 §19n2 §19n11, §28n17 §20n2 §2n2, §2n7, §39n7 §2n2, §2n7 §2n2 §2n2 §20n12 §98n15 §2n2, §28n11 §2n1, §2n2, §2n7, §2n8, §11n5 §10n8 §11n1 §2n2, §2n7, §28n11 §2n2

§39 §§39–41 §§40–41 §§40–42 §§41–42 §43 §§43–53 §45 §§45–46 §47 §48 §52 §§52–53 §§54–62 §§54–64 §55 §§55–57 §57 §§57–62 §58 §§58–62 §59 §60 §§60–61 §62 §§63–64 §§63–68 §67 §69 §§69–85 §70 §82 §§84–85 §86 §89 §§94–97 §97 §§97–101 §§103–108 §§103–124 §115 §122 §126 §134 §136

§2n14, §28n19 §23n1 §132n1 §18n7, §172n10 §11n1 §2n2, §2n7 §11n5, §28n19 §14n41, §20n12 §14n41 §141n16 §2n2, §2n7 §20n12, §24n1 §61n44 §8n18, §108n56 §18n7 §2n1 §39n7 §108n56 §2n1 §80n16 §21n2 §2n2 §24n1 §23n1 §19n11 §11n1 §11n1 §28n17 §72n36 §8n18 §98n15 §19n2, §19n4 §19n5 §98n15 §19n11, §28n17 §19n2 §19n11, §82n5 §20n2 §81n16 §29n5 §29n5 §23n1, §24n1 §27n12 §14n41, §23n1 §81n16

§§138–139 §§145–159 §§146–148 §148 §149 §§150–155 §169n §178 §179 §180 §§181–182 §183 §193 §195 §§195–202 §196 §§196–216 §199 §§201–202 §§202–203 §§203–208 §§203–210 §§203–212 §§205–206 §207 §209n §§209–210 §§209–213 §§209–217 §210 §§210–211 §212 §213 §§213–214 §§213–222 §§213–231 §215 §§216–219 §§216–222 §217–219 §219 §222 §223 §§223–230 §§223–231

§19n11 §98n15 §58n1 §81n16 §20n12 §8n27 §2n2 §85n1 §19n11 §2n1 §81n16 §72n36 §17n9, §58n1 §1n4, §19n2, §61n1 §25n1 §82n5 §26n2 §19n11 §19n11 §28n17 §22n11, §25n8, §61n44 §80n16 §25n8 §58n1 §20n12 §2n1, §7n13 §27n4 §85n1 §17n9 §19n1, §19n11, §19n12, §25n8 §22n11 §24n1, §87n5 §28n17, §85n1 §16n8, §19n2, §19n6, §63n2 §28n17 §60n27 §87n5 §23n1 §24n1 §87n5 §16n8, §63n2, §81n16, §85n1 §11n1, §18n7 §10n13, §26n4, §98n6, §169n11 §26n2 §16n8, §63n2, §72n36

§226 §228 §236 §236n §247 §§247–248 §§249–251 §251 §§251–256 §253 §§255–256 §§257–262 §§257–338 §258 §260 §262 §263 §§267–269 §§267–270 §270 §271 §§271–276 §§277–338 §§280–285 §§280–289 §282 §284 §286 §290 §§290–308 §§291–297 §298 §305 §§307–308 §310 §313 §§315–328 §323 §§329–331 §§329–334 §332 §§332–334 §338 Editor’s postscript Index

§2n1 §23n1, §24n1, §87n5 §45n24, §133n2 §16n8 §18n7 §17n9, §58n1 §98n15 §19n11, §28n17 §2n1 §11n1, §18n7 §2n2 §17n9 §134n16 §58n1 §61n44 §58n1 §74n32, §144n6 §28n21 §19n3, §45n24, §133n2 §58n1 §20n12 §61n44 §85n2 §28n21 §85n1 §85n1 §85n1 §63n2, §85n1 §72n69, §74n32 §144n6, §147n17 §85n2 §151n6 §72n36, §98n6 §133n2 §60n28 §58n1 §61n44 §19n11 §17n9, §58n1 §61n44 §28n17 §19n11 §23n1, §24n1, §87n5 §60n28, §82n5, §117n5 §12n3, §14n1, §78n3, §170n1, §172n4

INDEX OF CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS Anglican Articles of Religion (1571), §37(4), §70(5), §80n6, §96(2), §97n21, §104n9, §112(6), §119(3), §130n13, §131(4), §134(6), §140(6) Apology Augsburg (1531), §42n10, §61n40, §70(2), §71(2), §71n27, §72n4, §72n43, §74n10, §104n9, §108(2), §108n14, §108n15, §108n23, §108n27, §108n41, §108n42, §108n48, §109n32, §112(1), §140(2), §142(1), §156(2) Apostles Creed (= Roman Symbol), §37n8, §99n8, §113n2 Augsburg Confession (1530), §37(1), §37n15, §44n7, §44n9, §63n7, §63n9, §66n11, §70(1), §71(1), §72n4, §72n43, §81(1), §81n44, §96(1), §96.2, §97n21, §105n28, §108(1), §109(1), §111n5, §134(1), §137(1), §137n12, §138(1), §140(1), §141n15, §145(1), §145n13, §156(1), §160(3), §170(2), §171(2) Basel Confession. See First Helvetic Confession Belgic Confession (1561), §41(1), §41n11, §41n14, §41.2, §44n8, §61n41, §70n15, §71(5), §72n4, §72n8, §72n22, §72n43, §96n12, §97n21, §97n55, §98n13, §104n20, §108n48, §109(5), §109n22, §109n32, §111n1, §112(5), §118n15, §130(4), §130n13, §131(5), §137(7), §138(5), §141(4), §142(2), §147(2), §156(5), §160(5), §171(3), §171n6 Book of Concord (2000), §27n7, §36n1 Canons of Dort (1618–1619), §120(1) Catechism of the Council of Trent (1852 edition), §108n19, §137n26 Confessio et exposition simplex orthodoxae fidei (1566), §37n3 Confessiones Marchicae (=Confessio Fidei Ioannis Sigismundi Electoris Brandenburgici, (1613), §119(5), §120(2), §130(6) Confession of the Bohemian Brethren (1535), §36(2), §37n14, §37n15, §71(7), §82(2) Creed of Athanasius (ca 5th cent.), §37n12 Creed of Rufinus (ca 404), §99n8 Declaratio Toruniensus (Acta synodua generalis Toruniensus, 1645), §104n9, §111n5, §138(6) Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Exthesis orthodoxou pisteos, 1695), §141n20 First Basel Confession (=Mylhus Confession, 1534), §104n35, §112(4) First Helvetic Confession (= Second Basel Confession, 1536), §71(3), §71n3, §96(5), §97n21, §108n49, §130(1), §134(4), §145(3), §166(1) Formula of Concord (Epitome, 1577), §44n8, §61n40, §61n41, §69n13, §71(8), §111n4, §112n11, §112n14 Gallican Confession (1559), §37(3), §37n15, §70(3), §71(4), §72n5, §72n47, §96(4), §97n21, §97n55, §104n66, §108n43, §108n48, §109(4), §111n6, §112n31, §118n15, §130(2), §130n13, §131(2), §134(5), §137(6), §138(4), §140(5), §140.3, §145(4), §170(4), §171n8 Geneva Catechism (1541), §36(3) Heidelberg Catechism (1563), §137n21, §141n25, §142(3), §147(3) Hippolytus (ca 215), source for a Roman creed, §37n15 Hungarian Confession (1562), §37(6), §81(5), §97n22, §170(5) Interrogatory Creed of Hippolytus, §99n8, §160n3 Leipzig Colloquium (1631), §120(3), §137(8) Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559, Melanchthon), §108(5), §111n5, §119n19, §141(5), §141n15 Luther’s Larger Catechism (1529), §104n35, §136n17, §137(4), §141(1) Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381), §37n8, §96(7), §97n20, §99n2, §113n2, §160(2) Quicunque vult (so-called Athanasian creed, after late 4th century), §37n8, §96(8), §96n34, §97n22, §99n8, §170(1), §171(1) Racov Catechism, §61n36, §140n11, §140n12

Roman Catechism (Catechismus Romanus, 1566), §108n19, §137n26, §141n20, §141n21, §141n22, §141n23 Roman Symbol, §36(1), §37.1, §37n8, §37n12, §37n15, §97n20, §99n8, §104n66, §113.1, §160(1) Saxon Confession (=Melanchthon, Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, 1551), §70(6), §108(4), §119(1), §134(2), §137(3), §139n5, §141n14, §145(6) Scots Confession (1560), §37(5), §37n15, §104n35, §130(3), §141(3), §156(4) Second Helvetic Confession (Expositio simplex, 1566), §37(2), §37n15, §44n8, §61n41, §70(4), §72n4, §72n22, §72n43, §74n8, §81(4), §96(3), §96.1, §97n21, §104n35, §105n14, §105n32, §108(3), §108n17, §108n43, §108n44, §108n48, §108n49, §109(3), §109n25, §111n1, §111n6, §119(2), §120n20, §131(3), §134(3), §137(5), §137n29, §138(3), §140(4), §140.3, §141(2), §141n25, §145(2), §147(1), §156n(3), §160(4), §161n14, §161n16, §170(3) Smalcald Articles (1537), §42n10, §71(6), §72n4, §72n43, §108n48, §112(2), §131(1), §137(2), §138(2), §140(3), §141n25, §161n14 Solid Declaration (1577), §44n8, §61n40, §61n41, §70n16, §70n18, §71(9), §72n28, §72n29, §81(2), §82(1), §96(6), §97n48, §97n52, §104n20, §104n24, §104n38, §105n47, §108n59, §108n60, §108n62, §108n63, §111n6, §112(3), §112n28, §112n32, §119(4), §119n9, §119n21, §119n22, §120n12 Tetrapolitan Confession (1530), §104n9, §109(2), §145(5)

INDEX OF SCRIPTURE

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 1 1:2 1:6 1:11 1:14–19 1:21 1: 24 1:26 1:28 1:31 2 2:1 2:7–3:24 2:8 2:16–17 2:17 2:19 3 3:1 3:12–13 3:14 3:16–18 Exodus 17:7 20:5 31:2–3 32:14 Leviticus 11:44–45 Deuteronomy 5:9 6:16 13:1–5 Job 26:36

§89n9 §123n5 §44n1 §61n29 §13n13 §61n29 §61n29 §59n19, §61n6, §61n31, §61n43 §59n17 §57n16, §59n1 §43n5, §89n9 §59n28 §61n6 §59n26 §44n4, §59n29 §59n33 §61n11 §72n17 §44n2 §81n27 §75n2, §82n8 §75n2, §82n8

§74n38 §77n2, §166n5 §123n6 §52n24

§83n4

§166n5 §43n5 §103n29 §45.1, §45n20 §52n14

38:4ff Psalms 22:1 33:6 33:6–9 46:1 90:2 102:27 104 121:2 139 144

§40n10

§104n39 §123n5 §40n10 §11n10 §52n5, §52n15 §52n14 §40n10 §11n10 §53n1 §83n17

Proverbs 18:4

§13n8

Isaiah 34:16 42:3–4 45:18 61:1

§123n8 §14n29 §40n9 §123n8

Jeremiah 10:12 16:13 31:31–34 42:10

§40n9 §52n24 §12n14 §52n24

Daniel 7:13

§99n18

Hosea 6:7 13:14

§72n53 §163n17

Micah 3:8

§123n8

Zechariah 1:12

§43n4

NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 1:18 1:18–25

§85n11 §123n7 §97n17

3:10 3:11 3:16–17 4:1–11 4:7 5:8 5:14 5:15–16 5:45 5:46 6:1–6 6:16–18 6:31 6:31–32 6:33 7:1 7:9–11 8:28–34 8:34 10:5–14 10:6ff 10:11–13 10:14–15 10:21–27 10:24–28 10:28 10:40–42 11:13 11:27 12:19–20 12:31 12:43 13:19 13:22–23 13:36–40 13:38 13:55 15:19 15:24 16:13–19 16:15–18 16:16 16:17 16:18 16:19

§103n4 §136n3 §103n4 §98n10 §103n6 §163n7 §148n8 §148n8 §77n3 §112n20 §112n20 §112n20 §147n16 §147n16 §104n60 §120n28 §147n9 §117n7 §117n7 §105n8 §134n7 §103n6, §105n8 §145n18 §104n45 §104n45 §104n45 §112n20 §123n10 §105n18, §169n14 §14n29 §74n30 §45n13 §45n2 §103n6, §150n1 §162n3 §45n4 §97n19 §45n17 §117n6 §103n32, §122n3, §122n7, §145n9 §14n11 §103n32, §122n7 §122n3 §145n17 §145n9, §150n6

16:21 16:26 16:27 16:27–28 17:20 18:10 18:11 18:15–20 18:16–20 18:18 18:18–20 18:19–20 19:26 19:28 20:14–15 21:21–22 22:14 22:23–33 22:30 22:30–32 22:37–39 23:12 24:20 24:30–34 24:32–42 25:14–30 25:21 25:31 25:46 26:25 26:26–28 26:27–28 26:31 26:36–46 26:42ff 26:53 27:11 27:46 28:16–20 28:18 28:19 28:19–20 28:20 28:20–22

§104n52 §61n49 §42n6 §160n1 §147n9 §42n6 §159n2 §105n8, §134n8 §105n8 §145n10 §105n8 §127n11 §82n7 §163n2 §84n8 §147n9 §119n13 §158n7 §161n9 §161n2 §70n24, §112n29 §120n28 §160n1 §163n12 §163n12 §77n10 §84n11 §42n6, §160n1, §161n1 §163n10 §104n50 §139n9 §140n14 §99n21 §147n7 §147n7 §42n6 §105n1 §104n39 §137n9, §137n13, §137n16 §105n18 §136n3, §137n13 §105n8, §137n9, §137n16 §137n11, §160n9 §105n13

Mark 4:10–21 4:21 6:45–56 6:52 8:31–39 8:36 9:41–50 9:44 10:27 10:39 12:28–34 13:11 13:26 14:1–26 14:21–24 14:23–24 16:9–20 16:14–20 16:16 Luke 1:31–34 1:35 1:78 2:28–35 2:41–49 2:41–54 2:46–47 2:47 3:16 4:13 4:14 4:22 4:30 6:12 6:27–38 6:32–35 6:35–36 6:36 6:37 6:38 8:3 8:12–13 10:18

§85n11 §148n8 §148n8 §107n4 §107n4 §61n49 §61n49 §163n10 §163n10 §82n7 §136n3 §85n11, §120n28 §123n15 §160n1 §139n9 §139n9 §140n14 §137n16 §103n39, §137n16 §137n16

§97n17 §123n7 §13n8 §120n25 §103n14 §103n8 §103n8 §103n14 §136n3 §98n10 §103n9 §97n19 §104n49 §104n59 §82n15 §85n11 §85n11 §85n11 §82n15, §85n11 §82n15 §134n11 §103n6 §45n13

10:21–22 11:8–9 11:14–26

§169n14 §147n9 §45n13

11:33 12:10 13:1–3 13:5 13:34 13:35 16:16 16:19–21 16:19–31 16:22ff 17:10 19:21 19:41–48 19:44 20:27–38 20:28–33 21:27–28 22:17–20 22:19–20 22:31 22:32 22:42 22:43 23:43 24:25–26 24:26 24:49

§148n8 §74n30 §77n6 §77n5 §85n11 §102n2 §123n10 §161n12 §161n12, §162n13 §161n12 §125n12 §77n10 §99n21 §99n21 §158n7 §161n5 §160n1 §140n14 §139n10 §45n7, §104n58 §104n58 §147n7, §147n9 §42n4 §161n12, §161n15 §160n9 §160n9 §99n30

John 1:1 1:1–5 1:2–3 1:6 1:6–13 1:12 1:12–17 1:14 1:14–18 1:16 1:18 1:21 1:41

§14.1, §99.1, §123.1 §170n17 §105n16 §105n16 §141n18 §109n6 §109(6) §87n2, §103n32, §109n6 §13n22, §14n37, §81n35, §103n32, §165n1 §87n2, §103n32 §87n2, §103n32, §141n18 §96n13 §103n3 §14n30

1:43–51 1:45 1:45–46 1:46

§128n9 §128n9 §14n11 §14n30

1:51 2:18–25 2:25 3:1–6 3:1–8 3:3–8 3:5 3:16 3:16–18 3:17 3:22–30 3:22ff 4:1–10 4:2 4:12 4:24 4:25–34 4:34 4:35–42 4:42 5:16–23 5:17 5:19 5:19–20 5:20f 5:24 5:24–25 5:24–30 5:26 5:28–29 5:29 5:30 6:36–44 6:37 6:38 6:40 6:42 6:44 6:45 6:45–61 6:52–60

§42n7, §105n45 §99n10 §99n10 §136n13 §136n13 §108n34 §136n13 §99n20, §169n10 §99n20 §18n2 §136n5 §136n5 §136n7, §137n15 §136n7, §137n15 §136n3, §158n7 §153n4 §104n25 §104n25, §105n45 §103n32, §132n10 §103n32, §132n10, §132n11 §99n16, §104n25 §99n14, §105n45 §104 n25 §99n16 §105n45 §99n14, §101n13, §158n7 §163n12 §101n13, §161n1, §163n10 §99n14 §161n1 §163n10 §104n25 §104n25, §105n21, §116n3, §161n1 §120n28 §104n25 §161n1 §97n18 §105n21, §116n3 §121n3 §121n3 §159n4, §161n1

6:53–56 6:54 6:57 6:61–71 6:68–69 7:14–24 7:16 7:18 7:25–26 7:25–36 7:39 8:12 8:12–20 8:20–29 8:23 8:24 8:26 8:29 8:36 8:44 8:46 8:46–59 8:47 8:48–59 8:59 9:3 10:12–21 10:15–18 10:17–18 10:22–33 10:30 10:30–38 10:35ff 10:36 10:41 11:1–14 11:7–9 11:28–40 11:33 11:38 11:41–54 11:42 11:53–12:8 11:56 12:20–26

§159n4 §161n1 §105n45 §103n32 §14n11, §103n32 §103n32, §104n2 §104n2 §103n14 §103n32 §103n32 §137n15 §18n2, §148n8 §148n8 §104n2 §102n7 §99n14 §104n2 §105n45 §99n14 §45n5 §98n3, §99n12 §98n3, §104n49 §45n6 §99n12 §104n49 §76n9, §77n4 §101n19 §101n19 §98n11 §99n13 §18n2, §105n45 §99n13 §99n19 §105n45 §103n5 §104n52 §104n52 §99n22 §99n22 §99n22 §103n33 §103n33 §104n52 §104n52 §104n33

12:24 12:31 12:36–43 12:40 12:43 13:12–20 13:14–15 13:21–38 13:34 13:37 14:1–7 14:5 14:7–9 14:7–17 14:8–9 14:11ff 14:12 14:13 14:13–14 14:16 14:16–17 14:18 14:18–24 14:20 14:23 14:25–31 14:26 14:27 14:30 15:1–17 15:2 15:4–6 15:5 15:6 15:8 15:8–17 15:9 15:9–10 15:11 15:12 15:14–15 15:15 15:16 15:18–21 15:18–16:4

§104n33 §45n10 §107n4 §107n4 §18n2 §139n11 §139n20 §101n19 §70n24 §101n19 §99n30 §122n7, §160n1 §32n18 §104n58, §122n7, §123n9, §136n16, §169n14 §122n7 §99n14, §122n7 §169n14 §136n16 §127n11, §147n9 §99n30, §104n58 §123n9 §160n1 §99n30 §99n14 §165n1 §132n5 §99n30, §104n56, §132n5 §164n1 §45n10, §99n30 §99n30, §104n27, §139n7 §99n30, §104n27 §139n7 §104n27 §99n30 §104n27 §105n13, §112n30 §105n13, §109n15 §105n13 §104n27 §112n30 §105n13, §109n15 §165n1 §88n6, §127n11 §104n45 §104n45, §130n11, §132n5

15:25 15:26–27 15:27 16:4–15 16:5–7

§88n6 §132n5 §130n11 §122n1, §123n9, §162n9 §122n1

16:7ff 16:8–10 16:11 16:13 16:13–14 16:14–15 16:16 16:16–23 16:19 16:21 16:23 16:23–26 16:23–33 16:24–30 16:25–26 16:26 16:27 16:33 16:46 17:4 17:5 17:8 17:9 17:10 17:14 17:20 17:21–25 17: 22 17:23 17:24 18:33 18:36 20:17 20:21 20:22 20:23 20:30–31 21:22

§121n9, §122n1, §122n9 §162n9 §45n10 §149n4 §149n4 §124n8 §160n1 §100n12, §147n9 §100n12 §8n21, §167n2 §147n4, §147n9 §127n11 §100n9, §104n58, §105n27, §147n4, §147n9 §147n4, §147n9 §147n4 §105n58 §165n1 §61n49, §100n9, §102n7, §103n34 §104n58 §105n13 §96n13, §99n16, §105n18 §104n2 §104n58 §99n14 §102n7 §108n52 §99n14 §105n18 §100n5 §105n18, §160n12 §105n1 §102n7, §105n6, §105n27 §160n9 §124n16 §122n2, §124n16 §122n9, §145n11 §103n34 §160n8

Acts

§42.1

1:4 1:4–5 1:5 1:6–11 1:7 1: 8

§121n9, §122n4 §121n9 §122n4, §123n14 §103n21, §105n21, §122n4, §159n4 §103n21, §105n21 §122n4

1:10–11 1:11 1:13ff 1:15–23 1:21 1:21–22 2:1–42 2:2ff 2:3 2:4 2:17 2:24 2:37 2:38 2:40 2:41 2:41–42 2:42ff 2:47 4:1–3 4:10 4:32ff 5:12–14 5:17 6:1–6 6:2–6 6:9–10 6:15 7:51 8:18–23 8:20–23 8:29 8:39 9:3–5 9:20–22 9:31 10:19 10:40 10:44

§160n10 §160n10 §121n1 §145n26 §105n31, §130n11 §103n9, §105n31, §130n11 §121n10, §124n14 §124n14 §123n14 §121n10 §129n4 §99n6 §14n14 §121n14, §136n11, §137n17 §120n28 §14n14, §119n11, §136n11, §137n10 §121n1 §121n1 §137n10 §158n7 §99n6 §121n1 §121n1 §158n7 §145n26 §145n26 §14n20 §93n30 §120n28 §145n21 §145n21 §123n14 §123n14 §136n5 §14n20 §121n1 §123n14 §99n6 §123n14

10:44–47 10:47 10:48 11:15 11:15–17 11:19–26

§123n17, §136n11 §121n13, §124n14 §136n3 §124n15 §124n15 §129n2

13:48 16:6 16:6–10 16:10 17:22–31 17:24 17:24–27 17:24–28 17:27–30 17:30 18:27–28 19:2 19:5 19:6 23:6–10

§119n11 §146n6 §117n8 §146n6 §40n2, §168n4 §40(1) §168n4 §168n4 §7n16, §11n14 §109n35 §14n20 §121n13 §136n3 §136n11 §158n7

Romans 1:16–25 1:18 1:25 1:19 1:19–20 1:21 1:21–26 1:25 2:11–12 2:15 3 3:21–24 3:23 4:4 4:6 4:9 4:16 4:24 4:25 5:7–8 5:11 5:12

§40n2 §11n14, §68n13 §68n13 §10n35, §11n14 §40, §52n4 §7n16, §11n14 §74n12 §11n14 §12n6 §68n12 §73n13 §12n6 §63n7 §84n8 §118n3 §118n3 §84n8 §99n6 §99n4 §8n21, §85n11, §104n29, §167n2 §102n2 §59n33, §76n15, §104n29

5:12–19 5:12–21 5:18 5:19 6:1 6:2 6:4–8

§45n17 §72n48 §104n28, §104n29 §72n48 §89n10 §100n6 §100n6

6:5 6:6 6:7 6:11 6:18–22 6:52–56 6:52–60 7:5–25 7:6ff 7:7 7:7ff 7:8–9 7:16–18 7:17 7:18 7:18–23 7:20 7:22–23 7:23 7:24–8:2 8 8:1 8:2 8:3–4 8:5 8:6 8:9 8:10 8:11 8:14 8:17 8:21 8:23 8:26 8:28 8:29 8:33 8:34

§109n21 §100n6 §109n21 §100n6 §74n33 §139n6 §139n6 §84n29 §132n3, §132n8 §68n24 §45n17 §81n15 §81n15 §148n2 §67n7 §66n7 §148n2 §67n8 §68n9 §66n9, §68n23 §99n25 §101n9 §74n33 §132n3 §84n29 §89n11 §121n12, §123n15, §124n6 §100n5 §123n15 §124n3 §104n36 §81n25, §107n2, §109n19 §124n9 §104n56 §84n15, §104n34, §109n15 §110n1 §109n23 §104n56

8:35–39 10–11 10:17 11:7 11:25–26 11:32–33 12:2 12:3–6 12:5 13:1–2 13:1–5 14:12 15:4 16:17 1 Corinthians 1:12 1:30 2:4 4:6 5:4–5 5:5 6:14 6:19 7:20–23 7:22 7:23 8:6 10:11 10:16 10:16–17 10:17 10:22 11:23 11:24–25 11:25 12 12:3 12:3–6 12:4–6 12:4ff 12:7 12:13–14 12:19–26 12:27

§109n15 §117n14, §120n11 §108n53, §120n10, §137n18 §107n4 §157n2 §107n14, §120n11, §165n1, §169n1 §110n1 §121n2 §134n19 §105n26 §105n26 §138n11 §132n9 §145(4)

§152n4 §109n32 §14n32 §124n8 §145n21 §45n21 §99n6 §123n15 §105n33 §105n33 §112n15 §99n28 §132n9 §127n13 §134n19 §141n7 §166n5 §139n13 §139n10 §140n14 §123n11, §125n9 §121n12, §122n8, §124n1 §121n2, §121n11, §121n12, §123n11, §124n1 §121n11 §121n2, §121n11 §123n16 §123n11 §125n14 §127n13, §134n19

12:31 13:4 14:3 14:33 15–16 15:13 15:15 15:16 15:20ff 15:21–22 15:22 15:23ff 15:25–26 15:26 15:28 15:45 15:51–52 15:53 15:55 15:56 15:57 2 Corinthians 1:5 1:24 2:1 3:6 3:14 4:4 4:10 4:13 4:14 5:1–10 5:7 5:8 5:14 5:16–17 5:17 5:17–18 5:19 5:20 5:21 5:22 6:16 7:10

§123n11 §166n5 §124n10 §137n27, §165n1 §112n20 §99n5 §99n6 §99n5 §160n13 §72n50 §161n8 §159n5 §163n13 §163n13, §163n17 §105n36 §99n25 §161n3 §163n17 §163n17 §59n33, §109n14 §61n49

§104n69 §134n14 §45n8 §132n8 §74n38, §107n4 §45n15 §104n69 §120n10 §99n6 §160n2 §163n7 §163n8 §118n9 §12n6 §12n7, §89n4, §106n4 §84n26, §106n4, §163n7 §104n36 §118n9 §99n23 §123n18 §110n2 §118n3

11:3 11:14 12:7 13:5

§72n51 §45n15 §45n12 §100n5

Galatians 1:4 2:7–9 2:11ff 2:19–21 2:20 3 3:2 3:2–5 3:5 3:9 3:14 3:19 3:21–23 3:22 3:22–23 3:23–25 3:25 3:26 3:27–28 4:4 4:5 4:6 5:13–26 5:17 5:18 5:22 5:22–24 6:5 6:15

§113n14 §105n31 §129n2 §100n5, §101n10, §124n3 §100n5, §124n3 §99n25 §132n4 §123n12 §124n10 §12n5 §12n5, §124n10 §132n2 §81n41, §156n12 §81n41 §156n12 §12n5 §112n26 §109(6) §118n11, §120n28 §13n19, §80n10, §104n26, §109n29, §118n6 §109(6) §123n15, §124n1, §124n6 §5n31 §66n7 §112n26 §125n9 §101n10 §138n11 §12n7

Ephesians 1:10 1:13 1:16–23 1:17 1:22–23 1:23 2:8–22 2:13–18 2:14

§86n14 §118n3 §5n31 §123n11, §124n8 §157n3 §125n10, §141n18 §110n1 §12n6 §132n6

2:15 2:17–22 2:19 2:19–21 2:21 2:21–22 3:9 4 4:1–3

§12n7, §112n28 §110n10, §121n2 §110n10, §121n5 §121n5, §157n3 §110n2 §157n3 §107n6 §159n4 §5n31, §159n4

4:4 4:11–12 4:11–13 4:11–16 4:12 4:13 4:16 4:18 4:22 4:23 4:24 4:30–31 5:2 5:9 5:14 5:18–20 5:25 5:30 6:11–12 6:11ff 6:23–24

§93n16, §134n19 §105n12, §121n4 §121n4 §105n12 §127n13, §134n19 §112n27, §125n11 §121n2, §134n19 §120n28 §100n7 §107n6, §159n4 §100n7, §106n4 §149n22 §101n19, §104n8 §123n18 §107n6 §5n31 §101n19 §134n19 §45n12 §43n2 §5n31

Philippians 1:19 1:19–20 1:21 1:21–24 2:1–16 2:5–8 2:5–11 2:6–9 2:9–10 2:12–13 2:12–16 2:13 2:15

§124n6 §124n6 §61n49 §61n49, §161n15 §120n28 §104n21 §104n21, §105n49, §105n50 §105n49 §84n9 §70n14, §81n16 §70n14 §70n14 §81n16

3:4–9 3:4–11 3:7–8 3:8 3:17–21 3:21 4:4 4:4–9 4:6 4:6–7

§61n49 §99n25 §61n49 §99n25 §159n5 §159n5 §87n2 §5n31 §147n20 §147n20

4:8 4:10–13 4:13

§99n9 §89n12, §99n24 §70n14, §89n12, §99n24

Colossians 1:13–18 1:15–17 1:16 1:18 1:18–23 1:19 2:6–7 2:9 3:5–11 3:10 3:12–17 3:23 5:19 5:19–21

§99n28, §164n1 §99n28 §42n8, §164n1 §125n10 §125n10 §141n18 §110n1 §141n18 §100n7 §12n7, §100n7 §5n31, §110n1 §70n24, §112n20 §134n15 §134n15

1 Thessalonians 4:13–14 4:14ff 4:15–18 4:16 5:17

§160n13, §161n3 §160n13 §161n3 §138n9 §146n4

2 Thessalonians 1:7–10 2:8 2:9

§160n2 §160n2 §45n15

1 Timothy 1:17 2:1–4 3:7

§52n6 §147n20 §45n3

5:9 2 Timothy 1:7 2:3 2:12 3:16 4:1 4:8

§134n11

§123n11 §143n1 §163n2 §130n7, §132n9 §160n2 §84n8

Titus 1:3 2:11–15 2:14 3:5 Hebrews 1:2–3 1:3 1:4ff 1:12 2:2 2:9–10 2:10 2:14–15 2:15 2:17 2:27f 3:8 5:2 5:7 5:8 5:8–9 6:4–6 6:6 7:25 7:26–27 9–11 9:14 9:24 9:26 10:1–3 10:8–12 11:3 12:1–3

§108n53 §121n5 §121n5 §107n6 §42.2, §102n2 §105n17 §99n23 §42n8, §99n28 §52n14 §159n1 §84n9 §141n24 §45n16 §75n6 §141n24 §105n36 §74n38 §41n24 §104n59 §41n24 §141n20 §107n6 §107n6 §104n56 §99n23 §104n5 §99n23 §104n57 §104n8 §86n4 §86n4 §40(1), §40n2 §104n53

12:3 12:22

§104n63 §43n11

James 1:12 2:19 4:5

§45n17 §167n9 §123n15

1 Peter 1:11 1:14–16 1:20–22 2:5

§124n6 §83n4 §104n21 §125n2

2:9 2:21 2:22 2:24 3:19 4:5–7 4:5–10 4:13 5:3 5:7 5:8 5:8–9 5:10

§104n65, §104n67, §121n5, §125n2 §102n2, §104n21 §99n23 §100n6 §99n9 §160n2 §121n2 §104n36, §160n2 §134n14 §147n16 §45n9 §43n2 §120n14

2 Peter 1:4 1:21 2:4 3:8 3:10

§96n17 §130n8, §132n7 §45n11 §52n8, §52n15 §160n2

1 John 1:8 1:8–9 1:8–10 1:9 2:1 2:1–2 3:2 3:8 3:14 3:16 3:21

§80n6 §101n9 §148n2 §84n14 §102n2, §104n56 §101n9 §114n9, §125n11, §162n5 §45n14 §87n2 §101n19 §87n2

4:1 4:5 4:16 4:16–18 5 5:4 5:5 5:19 2 John 1:1–8 1:8 Jude 6 Revelation 3:11 20:1–7 21:25 22:6 22:10–13 22:12

§134n18 §151n5 §167(1) §8n21, §85n11, §118n12, §167n2 §124n8 §61n49 §124n8 §113n14

§112n20 §112n19

§45n11

§103n22 §160n11 §103n22 §14n37 §103n22 §103n22

INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES Abelard, Peter (1079–1142), §54n10 Abraham, §12.2, §156.3 Academy of Sciences, Berlin, §59n22 Ambrose (ca 339–397), §60n26, §66n12, §72n12, §72n53 Ambrosiaster (dates unknown), §72n53 Ammon, Christoph Friedrich (1766–1849), §83n12 Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), vi, §41(5), §41.1, §41n12, §50n3, §55n14, §55n15, §60n18, §77n1, §170n24 Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274), §27n1, §47n17, §55n33 Aristotle (384–322 BCE), §14n17, §28n7, §50n4, §96n19, §112n18 Athanasius (ca. 300–373), §97n6, §99n8, §171n9 Augusti, Johann Christian Wilhelm (1771–1841), §96n2 Augustine (354–430), §52.2, §54n33, §61.5, §61n45, §66n12, §70.2, §74n39, §76n6, §81n14, §111n12, §118.1, §137n28 “Admonition and Grace,” §72n19, §74n23, §111n6, §118n8 Against Julian, §73(2), §73n2 The City of God, §41(8), §41n8, §41.2, §55n46 Confessions, §41n13, §52n7, Eighty-three Different Questions (388–396), §53n5, §53n12 The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (421), §54n10, §54n37, §70n19, §72n9, §109n36, §119n23 Epistolae classis (411–430), §53n5, §53n13 “Homilies on the Gospel of John,” §56n21 The Literal Meaning of Genesis (404–417), §52n8, §53n15, §123n5 Of True Religion (ca 388–395), §33n23, §66n14 On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus (ca 395–397), §55n17, §55n27, §55n29 On Faith and Works, §151n4 On Genesis against the Manichees, §41(9), §41n9, §41.2, §52n6, §52n11, §72n13, §72n62 On Music (387–391), §52n11 The Spirit and the Letter (412), §74n24, §74n37 The Trinity, §50n3, §171n10, §171n11 To Simplicianus. See On Diverse Questions Barclay, Robert (1648–1690), §136n14, §139n12, §140n10 Basil of Caesarea (ca 330–379), §54n8, §171n9 Bauer, Johannes, §70n22, §104n53, §105n8, §110n10, §121n5, §122n1, §123n11, §124n10, §157n3, §160n9, §160n13, §165n1 Baumgarten, Siegmund Jacob (1706–1757), §74n20, §74n25 Baumgarten-Crusius, Ludwig Friedrich Otto (1788–1843), §3n5 Bellarmin, Roberto Francesco Romolo (1542–1621), §61n47 Berlin, Schleiermacher’s pastorates in, §19n9 Blair, Hugh, xxii Boekels, Joachim, §16n15 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (ca 480–524), §14n17, §52n7 Böhm, §25n5 Brandt, James, §80n14, §112n8 Braniss, Christlieb Julius (1792–1873), §14n37 Bretschneider, Karl Gottlieb (1776–1848), §19n13, §105n7, §161n13 Britain, §61n36 Buddeus, Johann Franz (1667–1729), §47n17, §83n17 Bullinger, Henry (1504–1575), §37n3 Calvin, John (1509–1564), §36(3), §36n3, §38(1), §38n7, §40.2, §40n8, §43n3, §44n5, §45.2, §45n20, §55n11, §61n36, §72n47, §73n13, §81n14, §108.4, §108n45, §109n34, §119.3, §119n14, §119n17, §119n20, §120n30, §140.4,

§140n15, §141(6) Caygill, Howard, §67n5 Chrysostom, John (ca 347–407), §43n8, §98n18 Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 BCE.), §71n25 Clemen, Carl, xxvii, §25n1, §52n4, §55n1, §72n56, §74n13, §74n36, §75n9, §104n5, §104n58, §110n13, §119n18 Clement of Alexandria (ca 150–ca 215), §3n10, §12n11, §33(3), §33n5, §41n22 Cochrane, Arthur C., xxvii, §109n25 Cross, George, xix Cudworth, Ralph (1617–1688), §52n12 Daub, Carl (1763–1836), §170n25 Delbrück, Ferdinand (1772–1848), §4 DeVries, Dawn, xxvii, §84n26, §85n11, §103n14, §147n9, §161n12, §161n15, §163n7 DeWette, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht (1780–1849), §61n19 Dewey, John, §5n37 Dionysius the Areopagite (= Pseudo-Dionysius), §50n3 Dreifaltigkeitskirche (Berlin), §28n5 Duke, James and Francis Fiorenza, §22n11 Eberhard, J. A. (1739–1809), §9n14 Eckermann, Rudolph (1754–1837), §52n13 Eisler, Rudolf, §64n8, §67n5 Endemann, Samuel (1727–1789), §50n7 England, §10n17, §91n1 Erigena, John Scotus (ca 810–ca 877), §55n11, §55n12 Ernesti, Johann August (1707–1781), §104.6, §104n70 Eusebius (ca. 260– ca. 340), §131n7 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1764–1814), §5n12, §28n7, §61n20 Flacius, Matthias (1520–1575), §72n26 France, §10n17, §91n1 Franke, August Hermann (1663–1727), §108n35 Freud, Sigmund (1856–1940), §69n7, §155n5 Fries, Jakob Friedrich (1773–1843), §28n7 Geiseler, Johann Carl Ludwig (1792–1854), §22n11 Gerhard, Johann (1582–1637), §47n21, §53n16, §53n17, §53n20, §54n16, §54n27, §54n33, §54n34, §55n32, §55n33, §66n12, §72n20, §97n7, §97n29, §97n30, §108n62, §109n28, §120n15, §136n4, §137n14, §137n19 Germany, §91n1 Gethsemane, §42.1 Gregory Nazianzus (ca. 329 – 390), §171n6, §171n9, §171n13 Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm, §55n9, §77n10 Hahn, August (1792–1863), §22n11, §25n1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831), §28n5, §28n15 Henke, Heinrich Philipp Conrad (1752–1809), §83n10 Herrnhuter Brethren, §28n7, §96n10, §104n41, §126n1, §141n19, §170n1 Herz, Henrietta, §77n8 Hess, Johann Jakob (1741–1828), §104n39, §104n41 Hilary of Poitiers (ca 315–367), §41(4), §41(7), §41.1., §41n12, §50n3, §53n11, §53n15, §55n15, §83n17, §97n29 Hippolytus (ca 170 – ca 236), §36n1, §37n15, §41n17, §99n8, §160n3 Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1674), §8n16 Hopkins, Jasper. See Anselm Hugh of Saint Victor (1096–1141), §72n58, §74n10 Hunnius, Nikolaus (1563–1643), §22n11

Irenaeus (ca. 130– ca. 200), §131n7 James, William, §5n37 Jerome (Hieronymus, 342–420), §72n53 John of Damascus (ca 675 – 749), §41(2), §41n11, §41n18, §52n10, §53n4, §53n10, §54n14, §54n39, §55n36, §66n12, §96n21, §97n6, §97n28, §97n39, §97n42, §97n53 Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), §15n2, §28n5, §28n7, §61n16, §64n8, §67n5, §72n59, §152n6 Karmiris, Johannes, §141n20 Keller, Adelbert von, §77n10 Kienzle, Kathleen and Beverly Mayne Kienzle, xiii, §32n16, §33n3, §36n2, §41n24, §46n8, §46n12, §46n13, §46n14, §47n15, §47n16, §50n7, §52n12, §53n17, §53n22, §54n10, §54n16, §54n27, §54n28, §54n29, §54n34, §55n11, §55n12, §55n15, §55n46, §56n1, §56n10, §56n12, §59n23, §61n34, §61n35, §61n48, §70n7, §70n25, §71n7, §71n10, §71n12, §72n38, §72n53, §72n58, §74n8, §74n20, §74n21, §74n23, §74n35, §74n40, §80n6, §81n4, §81n6, §81n38, §82n3, §83n10, §83n12, §83n16, §97n2, §108n5, §108n6, §108n19, §111n5, §119n2, §119n19, §120n15, §130n5, §134n2, §137n3, §137n26, §138n6, §139n5, §140n11, §140n12, §141n14, §141n15, §141n20, §141n21, §141n22, §141n23, §143n5, §145n7, §156n6 Kierkegaard, Sören (1813–1855), §81n26 Lactantius (ca 240 – ca 320), §56n8 Landsberg an der Warthe, §74n5 Lawler, Edwina, §15n9, §74n17, §103n22, §104n45, §165n1 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646–1716), §28n5, §59P.S., §59n22 Leith, John H., §36n1, §99n8 Lübeck, §22n11 Lücke, Friedrich (1791–1855), §22n11 Luther, Martin (1483–1546), §40.2, §40n4, §40n8, §41(3), §41.1, §41n12, §41n14, §41n25, §42n10, §43.1, §43n1, §43n5, §44n1, §44n2, §44n4, §61n43, §71(6), §71n6, §72n11, §77n10, §103.4, §103n38, §104n35, §105.3, §108n42, §108n48, §108n59, §108n62, §112(2), §112n15, §127n3, §131(1), §131n1, §136n17, §137(2), §137n2, §137(4), §137n4, §138(2), §138n2, §140(3), §140.2, §140.3, §140.4, §140n3, §140n9, §141(1), §161n14 Manes (ca 216–270), §76n6 Marheineke, Philipp Konrad (1780–1846), §28n5, §141n17 Melanchthon, Philipp (1497–1560), §27n1, §32n16, §33(1), §61n48, §63n9, §66n12, §70n7, §70n25, §71(10), §71n10, §71n12, §72n26, §73(1), §73n1, §73n8, §74n8, §74n15, §74n20, §74n21, §74n26, §80n6, §81(3), §81n4, §81n38, §108(4), §108(5), §111n5, §119(1), §119n2, §119n19, §134(2), §134n2, §137(3), §137n3, §139n5, §141(5), §141n14, §141n15, §143.2, §143n5, §145(6), §145n1, §156.1, §156n6 Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae (1551), §70(6), §108(4) Mendelssohn, Moses (1729–1786), §10n21 Michaelis, Johann David (1717–1791), §59n23 Migne, Jacques-Paul (1800–1875), xxvii Mohammed, §11.4, §32.3 Morus, Samuel Friedrich Nathanael (1736–1792), §41n24, §46n12, §46n14, §47n16, §46n18 Moses, §11.4, §12.1, §12.2, §32n17, §40n8 Mosheim, Johannes Laurentius (1694–1755), §44n5, §47n12, §50n7, §50n18, §52n12, §53n22, §54n29, §55n44, §56n1, §56n10, §56n12, §56n18, §83n12 Müller, E.F. Karl, xxvii Myconius, Oswald (1488–1552), §104n35 Nemesius of Emesa (4th cent.), §38(2), §38n5, §38n7 Newton, Isaac, §59n22 Nicol, Iain, xxviii, §12n6, §14n31, §23n6, §82n15, §84n26, §101n10, §105n12, §105n33, §106n4, §107n9, §112n15, §118n1, §154n3, §163n7, p. 1042 Nicolaus de Lyra, §72n11 Niemeyer, Hermann (1802–1851), xxviii Nitzsch, Carl Immanuel (1787–1868), §13n2, §14n22, §22n11, §26n2, §26n4

North American, §61n36 Oecolampadius, John (1482–1531), §104n35, §140n9 Origen (ca. 185 – ca. 254), §41(6), §41.2, §41n22, §72n15, §162.1, §162n3, §171.5, §171n19 Pascal, Blaise (1623–1662), §61n44 Pegis, Anton C. See Aquinas Peiter, Hermann, xxiv, xxviii, §24n6, §33n5, §48n7, §74n17, §85n1, §98n6, §104n42, §105n7, §108n35, §112n8, §126n6, §161n13, p. 1042 Pelikan, Jaroslav, §72n11 Philips, Buran F., §100n7, §101n7 Philo (ca 25 BCE – ca 50), §40.2 Photius (ca 820–ca 891), §41(6) Pisecius, Thomas (ca 1580–ca 1650), §53n18 Plato (ca 424–ca 348 BCE), §8n30 Polish Reformed clerics, §61n36 Porphery (ca 232 – 304), §14n17 Prosper of Aquitaine (ca 390–ca 463), §60n26. See also Ambrose Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., §37n5 Prussian royal family, §28n7 Pseudo-Dionysius (5th cent.), §50n3, Quenstedt, Johann Andreas (1617–1688), §46n8, §46n13, §47n15, §61n34, §61n35, §72.3, §72n38, §83n16 Rakov, §53n17 Redeker, Martin, xxviii, §2n2, §10n21, §33n25, §41n25, §42n3, §47n4, §50n18, §52n12, §53n20, §55n26, §55n38, §56n18, §57n12, §59n23, §66n12, §72n30, §74n39, §74n40, §81n31, §81n48, §85n1, §96n28, §97n49, §104n13, §104n37, §104n41, §104n42, §116n1, §118n20, §119n18, §120n4, §137n26, §139n12, §143n5 Rees, Thomas, §140n12 Reformers, §37.2, §40.2, §42.2 Reinhard, Franz Volkmar (1753–1812), §33n25, §42n3, §43n9, §47n12, §47n18, §50n18, §52n12, §52n22, §53n20, §54n39, §55n26, §55n38, §56n12, §56n18, §61n22, §72n30, §73n10, §74n35, §74n40, §81n48, §96n28, §97n2, §97n49, §104n37, §111n5, §118n20 Reinhold, Karl Leonhard (1743–1819), §28n7 Rufinus, §56n7 Sack, Karl Heinrich (1789–1875), §2, §2n2, §14n37 Schäfer, Rolf, xxviii, §2n2, §19n17, §41n12, §42n9, §72n20, §80n8, §81n31, §104n10, §104n13, §104n37, §104n42, §104n70, §107n5, §107n7, §116n1, §119n18, §120n4, §136n9, §139n8, §141n20, §158n7, §161n4 Schaff, Philip (1819–1893), xxviii Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1775–1854), §28n7 Schlegel, Friedrich, §5n12, §61n20 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768–1834). Aesthetik, §9n14, §100n3 Akademievorträge, §5n13, §25n9, §27n12, §168n3 Berliner Gesangbuch (1830), §45n30, §100n3, §135n2 Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study (1830), xvii, xx, xxv, xxvii, §1n4, §2, §2P.S.2, §2n2, §2n3, §2n5, §2n7, §2n8, §2n14, §7n13, §8n18, §8n27, §10n8, §10n41, §11n1, §11n5, §14n41, §19n2, §19n3, §19n4, §19n5, §19n6, §19n11, §19n12, §22n11, §23n5, §25n1, §25n8, §26, §26n2, §26n4, §27n4, §27n12, §28n17, §28n19, §28n21, §39n7, §45n24, §54n40, §55n10, §58n1, §60n27, §60n28, §61n1, §61n44, §72n69, §74n32, §78n3, §80n16, §82n5, §83n6, §85n1, §87n5, §108n56, §117n5, §121n3, §132n1, §133n2, §134n16, §138n12, §144n6, §147n17, §149n10, §151n6, §152n5, §169n11, p. 1041, 1042n8. See also Index of References to Brief Outline Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806), §9n7, §165n1 Christian Ethics, Christliche Sittenlehre: Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1826/27, §48n7, §56n6, §61n4, §63n2, §74n17, §78n3, §80n14, §83n6, §98n6, §103n16, §112n8, §120n28

Christian Faith, 1st ed., KGA I/7, xx–xxi, xxiv, xxvii, §8n1, §9n22, §13n11, §23n4, §24n1, §33n5, §41n24, §44n5, §47n4, §47n12, §50n7, §52n12, §53n17, §53n18, §53n20, §53n22, §54n10, §54n28, §54n29, §55n46, §56n1, §56n10, §56n12, §56n18, §57n12, §59n1, §59n23, §61n19, §74n36, §74n39, §75n9, §83n12, §85n1, §94n14, §100n3, §104n13, §104n42, §104n70, §105n7, §110n5, §112n23, §170n25, §171n4, §171n5, §171n6, §171n7, §171n14, §171n18, §172n1, §172n2, §172n3, §172n8, §172n9, §172n11 The Christian Household: A Sermonic Treatise, §61n17, §84n27, §105n33, §107n4, §109n18, §134n12, §134n20, §147n14 Christliche Festpredigten Bd. 1 & 2, §14n14, §97n17, §100n6, §103n21, §103n22, §103n39, §105n21, §117n14, §118n11, §121n1, §121n2, §122n4, §123n11, §137n16, §141n24, §149n4, §159n4, §161n12, §161n15, §163n12, §165n1, §169n1, p.1043 Christmas Eve Celebration, §19n12, §77n8, §100n3, §108n37, §120n25, Church Geography and Statistics, §1n4, §8n18, §74n44, §151n6, §152n5 Dialectic, §3n11, §5n3, §7n13, §8n27, §13n33, §14n39, §16n12, §28n15, §28n18, §33n20, §39n4, §39n5, §41n27, §50n2, §55n10, §67n5, §68n19, §85n1, §169n10, §172n8 on duty. See “Versuch über…Pflichtbegriffs” educational writings, §84n27, §109n18 essay on shamefulness (1800), §61n12 essays on administrative work, §84n6 Fifteen sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher delivered to celebrate the beginning of a new year, §103n22, §103n45, 1 Timothy (1807), §45n3 Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions and Church Union, xxvii, §23n6, §112n15, §154n3, §165n1 on hermeneutics & criticism (1829–1830), §60n22 Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings. §25n9, §27n12, §60n22, §159n12 Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGA). See individual volumes in the series The Life of Jesus (1832, 1864), §112n20 On Freedom, §112n15 On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics (1799, 1806, 1821) (OR, On Religion), xvii, xx, xxviii, §2n2, §2n13, §3n13, §4n23, §5n4, §5n37, §6n3, §8n1, §10n1, §11n5, §15n11, §19n12, §20n3, §20n11, §34n10, §55n41, §57n13, §58n1, §60n6, §60n25, §61n16, §62n5, §70n20, §72n39, §72n68, §73n6, §74n28, §81n35, §84n22, §109n39, §111n13, §151n1, p.1040 Discourse I, §16n1 Supplemental note 1, §2n1, §127n4 Supplemental note 2, §9n22, §127n4 Supplemental note 4, §53n27, §62n5 Supplemental note 5, §8n12 Supplemental note 6, §20n3 Discourse II, §3, §3n2, §3n8, §4n9, §6n3, §8n12, §8n32, §10n25, §14n6, §28n15, §48n7, §50n5, §61n3, §110n20, §127n4, §170n1 Supplemental note 1, §7n13, §85n1, §170n1 Supplemental note 2, §62n5, §85n1 Supplemental note 3, §28n15, §62n5 Supplemental note 4, §15n11 Supplemental note 5, §85n1 Supplemental note 6, §85n1, §85n11 Supplemental note 7, §20n5 Supplemental note 8, §7n12 Supplemental note 9, §135n1 Supplemental note 10, §21n2, §23n2, §25n8 Supplemental note 11, §8n22 Supplemental note 12, §8n20, §9n22 Supplemental note 13, §2n12, §9n22 Supplemental note 14, §6n5, §60n1, §108n37, §110n20, §120n25 Supplemental note 16, §5n35, §14n22 Supplemental note 17, §63n2 Supplemental note 18, §4n23, §5n35

Supplemental note 19, §8n29, §62n5 Supplemental note 20, §76n14 Supplemental note 21, §8n29, §82n19 Discourse III, §4n9, §6n3, §8n27, §10n25, §14n6, §133n1, §134n21 Supplemental note 1, §9n20 Supplemental note 2, §8n27, §9n20, §9n22, §121n2 Supplemental note 3, §9n20 Supplemental note 4, §9n20, §14n5 Supplemental note 5, §62n5 Discourse IV, §10n25, §14n6, §100n3, §134n21 Supplemental note 1, §16n4, §125n2 Supplemental note 2, §8n27, §125n2 Supplemental note 3, §16n8, §125n2 Supplemental note 4, §16n8, §125n2 Supplemental note 5, §133n1 Supplemental note 6, §10n17, §87n5 Supplemental note 7, §10n7, §108n57 Supplemental note 8, §126n1, §135n1, §148n4 Supplemental note 9, §20n7, §134n13, §148n4 Supplemental note 10, §9n15, §134n13, §148n4 Supplemental note 11, §125n2, §148n4 Supplemental note 12, §27n2, §127n3, §141n16 Supplemental note 13, §128n7 Supplemental note 14, §2n2, §20n3, §20n12, §87n5, §108n37 Supplemental note 15, §27n2, §125n2, §148n4 Supplemental note 16, §87n5 Supplemental note 18, §2n10, §151n1 Supplemental note 20, §76n14, §87n5 Supplemental note 24, §151n1 Supplemental note 26, §106n14 Discourse V, §2n2, §4n9, §7n12, §7n13, §8n18, §10, §10n1, §10n12, §10n25, §12n4, §14n6, §101n24, §110n20, §134n21, §155n3, §170n1 Supplemental note 2, §71n28, §121n1 Supplemental note 3, §2n1 Supplemental note 4, §8n10, §8n20 Supplemental note 5, §10n7, §13n5, §13n21, §108n1 Supplemental note 6, §10n7 Supplemental note 7, §21n2, §25n8 Supplemental note 8, §14n5, §108n36 Supplemental note 9, §20n12, §170n1 Supplemental note 10, §108n57 Supplemental note 11, §6n2, §13n1 Supplemental note 12, §153n1 Supplemental note 13, §3n3 Supplemental note 14, §8n22, §96n13, §108n1, §110n20, §120n25 Supplemental note 15, §89n2 Supplemental note 16, §89n2 Supplemental note 17, §129n1 Supplemental note 18, §91n1 Epilogue Supplemental note 1 Supplemental note 2, §134n20 Supplemental note 3, §24n1, §87n5 Supplemental note 4, §24n1, §87n5 “On the Condemnation in Our Confession of Those Who Believe Differently,” §82n15

On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and the Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity (1822), §170n10 On the Doctrine of Election (1819), §8n32, §14n31, §118n1 On the Glaubenslehre (1829) (OG), xvii, xxviii, xxxi, §3n12, §5n15, §8n29, §11n4, §12n3, §12n10, §13n5, §13n21, §13n34, §14n2, §14n22, §14n34, §15n1, §16n1, §19n9, §19n12, §20n2, §20n5, §22n4, §22n11, §25n8, §28n7, §29n5, §30n10, §32n1, §50n2, §57n12, §61n32, §84n22, §84n31, §93n3, §99n15, §112n23, §125n2, §139n1, §172n10 Traulsen and Ohst edition of, §22n11 Oratio (Address) of Nov. 3, l830, §23n6, §112n15, p.1042 philosophical writings, §60n25 Die praktische Theologie, §28n21, §83n6, §84n6, §100n3, §117n5, §135n2 Psychologie. Aus Schleiermacher’s handschriftlichem Nachlasse und nachgeschriebenen Vorlesungen, §3n15, §7n5, §9n1, §72n59, §76n2, §55n41, §59n12, §72n59, §76n2 psychology of, §34n1 Reformed but Ever Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the Augsburg Confession (1830), xxviii, §12n6, §25n8, §27n10, §82n15, §84n26, §101n10, §105n12, §105n33, §106n4, §107n9, §163n7 Sämmtliche Werke: Dritte Abtheilung zur Philosophie. Bd. 4.1 (history of philosophy lectures), §16n15 Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies, an English translation of the Monologen, with a critical introduction and appendix, §111n13, §165n1 Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher. See Wilson, Mary Selections from Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics. See Brandt, James Sermons, §60n25, §103n34 1790: §13n19, §93n16 1791: §147n4, §147n9, §163n13 1794: §121n5 1795: §93n16, §122n1, §161n12, §162n13 1796: §105n8 1797: §121n5, §157n3, §160n9, §165n1 1800: §104n53, §147n7, §147n16, §160n12, §168n4 1802: §93n16, §110n10, §163n7 1806: §84n15, §104n33, §105n13, §109n15, §110n10, §121n11 1807: §104n45 1809: §98n11, §105n26 1810: §7n16, §40n2, §93n30, §98n10, §103n22, §105n8, §121n10, §124n14, §124n15, §134n15, §137n9, §160n10 1812: §103n21, §105n21, §117n7, §122n4, §136n13, §159n4, §168n4 1818: §104n53, §107n4 1819: §103n32, §122n3, §122n7, §145n8 1820: §81n41, §103n39, §137n16, §145n26, §147n4, §147n9, §156n12, §160n13, §161n12, §162n13 1821: §14n14, §15n9, §87n2, §97n17, §100n6, §103n6, §103n14, §104n39, §104n35, §105n8, §112n30, §120n25, §120n28, §121n1, §121n2, §121n11, §124n1, §161n12, §161n15 1822: §8n21, §61n49, §70n14, §81n16, §87n2, §99n21, §99n25, §104n21, §105n49, §124n6, §161n15, §167n2 1823: §87n2, §89n12, §99n10, §99n20, §99n24, §103n32, §105n16, §109n6, §124n10, §128n9, §136n13, §147n20, §159n5, §160n9 1824: §86n4, §99n14, §99n16, §101n13, §103n8, §103n32, §104n25, §105n21, §116n3, §121n3, §121n9, §122n4, §123n11, §132n10, §136n5, §136n7, §137n15, §139n6, §159n4, §161n1, §163n10, §163n12, §165n1 1825: §76n9, §88n6, §98n3, §99n12, §99n13, §99n14, §99n22, §101n19, §103n14, §103n32, §103n33, §104n2, §104n49, §104n52, §137n15, §148n8 1826: §32n18, §99n14, §99n30, §100n9, §100n12, §101n19, §103n6, §103n22, §104n27, §104n33, §104n45, §104n52, §104n58, §105n13, §105n27, §107n4, §112n30, §122n1, §122n7, §123n9, §123n11, §130n11, §132n5, §136n16, §139n7, §139n11, §147n4, §147n9, §150n1, §162n9, §169n14 1827: §103n22, §110n10, §147n20, §159n4 1828: §103n22, §107n6, §159n4 1829: §104n21

1830: §12n6, §27n10, §82n15, §84n26, §87n2, §99n28, §100n5, §101n10, §103n32, §105n12, §105n33, §106n4, §107n9, §109n6, §112n15, §120n28, §121n4, §124n3, §125n10, §163n7 1831: §8n21, §100n7, §117n14, §119n11, §147n9, §164n1, §165n1, §167n2, §169n1 1832: §104n29, §105n31, §107n4, §118n11, §120n28, §122n7, §130n11, §141n24, §147n16, §148n8, §149n4, §160n9, §167n2 1833: §61n49, §70n24, §72n48, §120n28, §123n11, §124n8, §124n16, §147n9, §163n10, §163n12 1834: §120n28, §139n9 Servant of the Word: selected sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher. See DeVries, Dawn Soliloquies (1800), §111n13, §165n1 Toward a Theory of Sociable Conduct (1799), §77n8 on translation (1813), §60n22 translations of Plato’s works, §82n17 “Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes, 4. März 1819,” §168n3 “Versuch über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Pflichtbegriffs, 12. August 1824.” §5n13 Vorlesungen über die Dialektik. See Schleiermacher, Dialectic Vorlesungen über die Lehre vom Staat, §24n1, §84n6 Schott, Heinrich August (1780–1835), §50n18 Schwartz, Eduard, §96n7 Schwarz, Friedrich Heinrich Christoph (1766–1837), xxxii Smalcius, Valentinus (1572–1622), §53n17 Socinians, §53.2, §53n17, §55.3, §56n20, §61.4, §61n35 Socinus, Faustus (1539–1604), §52.2, §52n12, §55n46, §61n36 Socrates, §46n10 Sozini, Lelio Francesco Marina (1525–1562), §61n36 Steffens, Henrich (1773–1845), §3n5 Steudel, Johann Christian Friedrich (1779–1837), §42n1, §43n6 Storr, Gottlob Christian (1746–1805), §47n4, §47n13, §49n6 Switzerland, §61n36 Tappert, Theodore G., §111n6 Telfer, William. See Nemesius of Emesa Templin, Alton, xiii, §53n18, §141n5 Theodoret of Cyrus (ca. 393–ca. 458), §171n9 Theologische Studien und Kritiken, §22n11 Theophilus of Antioch (2nd cent.), §53n12 Thönes, Carl, xxiv, xxviii, §3n9, §4n2, §4n6, §4n11, §4n11, §4n12, §4n13, §4n14, §4n15, §4n16, §4n17, §4n22, §5n2, §5n7, §5n10, §5n11, §5n14, §5n16, §5n23, §5n25, §5n36, §6n13, §6n14, §7n1, §7n2, §7n3, §7n12, §8n10, §8n18, §8n26, §8n30, §8n31, §9n2, §9n4, §9n5, §9n18, §9n19, §10n4, §10n5, §10n8, §10n12, §10n16, §10n17, §11n2, §11n25, §12n2, §13n2, §13n4, §13n6, §13n12, §13n13, §14n6, §14n22, §15n1, §15n8, §16n3, §16n7, §17n1, §17n6, §17n7, §20n9, §21n1, §23n7, §25n5, §25n10, §26n4, §27n3, §27n7, §27n9, §27n13, §27n15, §28n5, §28n6, §28n7, §28n8, §28n11, §28n12, §28n15, §28n17, §28n20, §32n2, §32n3, §32n4, §32n6, §32n9, §32n15, §33n2, §33n4, §33n5, §33n6, §33n15, §34n6, §34n11, §35n2, §35n4, §35n5, §36n7, §36n8, §37n9, §37n19, §42n1, §43n6, §45n7, §45n21, §45n23, §45n26, §48n1, §48n8, §50n1, §50n3, §50n6, §50n8, §51n6, §51n7, §52n1, §52n4, §52n10, §52n14, §53n6, §53n7, §53n9, §53n10, §53n11,§53n12, §53n13, §53n21, §54n2, §54n11, §54n15, §54n17, §54n31, §54n33, §54n38, §54n39, §55n1, §55n2, §55n3, §55n8, §55n9, §55n11, §55n12, §55n15, §55n16, §55n18, §55n24, §55n25, §55n29, §55n41, §56n3, §56n5, §56n9, §56n17, §56n22, §57n2, §57n10, §57n14, §59n1, §60n26, §61n1, §61n5, §61n7, §61n9, §61n13, §61n14, §61n19, §61n21, §61n25, §61n39, §61n46, §63n2, §63n6, §63n7, §63n10, §63n11, §64n1, §64n10, §64n11, §66n1, §66n3, §66n5, §66n6, §67n1, §67n2, §67n4, §67n5, §68n4, §68n5, §68n6, §68n7, §68n10, §68n11, §68n14, §68n15, §68n17, §68n18, §68n20, §68n23, §70n1, §70n8, §70n13, §72n21, §72n24, §72n26, §72n30, §72n33, §72n34, §72n55, §72n61, §72n64, §72n65, §72n66, §72n70, §73n4, §73n6, §73n11, §74n1, §74n4, §74n7, §74n9, §74n22, §75n1, §77n7, §78n1, §78n2, §78n4, §79n1, §79n3, §79n4, §80n1, §80n2, §80n13, §80n15, §81n1, §81n7, §81n14, §81n17, §81n19, §81n21, §81n22, §81n24, §81n32, §81n34, §81n37, §81n40, §81n42, §81n45, §81n47, §82n1, §82n9, §82n10, §82n11, §82n12, §82n13, §82n16, §83n5, §83n8, §83n9, §84n1, §84n2, §84n6, §84n12, §84n18, §84n20, §84n24, §84n28, §167n1 Tice, Terrence N., xiii, xxi, xxiv, §85n1, §85n12, §86n1, §101n24, §103n6, §112n8, §119n11

Greek or Latin translations by, §32n16, §33n3, §36n3, §37n7, §41n3, §41n6, §41n17, §41n24, §44n4, §44n7, §46n8, §47n4, §50n18, §52n10, §52n12, §53n18, §54n §54n10, §54n16, §54n27, §54n34, §54n39, §55n17, §55n26, §55n27, §55n29, §55n38, §55n46, §56n1, §56n18, §57n12, §59n23, §61n48, §68n14, §70n25, §71n3, §71n10, §71n12, §72n38, §73n8, §73n10, §74n15, §74n20, §74n23, §74n26, §74n35, §80n6, §96n5, §97n6, §97n21, §97n28, §108n5, §108n49, §111n6, §112n14, §120n15, §130n1, §130n3, §134n1, §134n2, §134n4, §137n26, §139n12, §140n1, §141n5, §141n14, §141n20, §141n21, §141n22, §166n3, §170n4, §170n5, §170n7, §171n2, §171n3 interpretations by, §5n4, §5n37, §60n28, §61n44, §165n11 Schleiermacher (2006), §5n38, §85n1, §86n1 trans. Schl’s works, xxvii–xxviii, §3n2, §8n21, §15n9, §61n16, §61n44, §68n19, §74n17, §84n27, §105n33, §107n4, §110n10, §165n1, §167n2, §171n4, §172n7, §172n11 Torrance, Thomas F., §36n3, §137n21, §141n25, §142n3, §147n3 Twesten, August Detler Christian (1789–1876), xxviii, §13n2, §14n6, §14n22, §108n5, §119n2, §134n2, §137n3, §139n5, §141n14, §145n1, §145n7, §156n6 Ullmann, Carl Christian (1796–1865), §22n11 Umbreit, Friedrich Wilhelm (1795–1860), §22n11 Unitarians, §10n17 University of Berlin, §19n9 University of Halle, §9n14 Valantasis, Richard, xiii, §41n17, §52n10 Varnhagen, Rachel von, §77n8 Vorstius, Conradus (1569–1622), §56n20 Walch, Johann Georg (1693–1775), xxviii, §41n25, §103n38, §108n35 Wegscheider, Julius August Ludwig (1771–1849), §54n28, §55n44, §104n70 Weishaupt, Adam (1748–1830), §108n55 Wilson, Mary F., xxviii, §8n21, §85n11, §86n4, §97n17, §100n6, §104n29, §147n7, §159n4, §165n1, §167n2, §169n1 Wittenberg, §22n11 Wolff, Christian (1679–1754), §28n5 Wordsworth, William (1770–1850), §158n3 Zimmer, Friedrich, §147n16, §160n9, §160n12, §163n7 Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531), §33(2), §127n3, §136n6, §136n12, §137n25, §140.4, §140n9, §140n11, §140n17, §143.1, §143n2

ANALYTICAL INDEX OF TOPICS Subjects, Concepts, Themes, Definitions, Word Usage, and Contrasts absolute dependence, §33.2, §34.3 consciousness of, §4, §8.2 freedom & necessity within, §49.1 or relationship with God, §4.4 on what not present as objects, §56.2 See also feeling of absolute dependence absolute dependence on God, §83n1 all influences located within, §46 all mediated & unmediated in, §46P.S. absolutely (schlechthin), def., §91n2 absolute wisdom, where omnipotent love is present there it must be as well, §167.2 absolution in Lord’s Supper, §143.2 acquaintance with (Kenntnis), a form of knowing, §55.1 act (Akt), §44n3, §63n2, §88n8, §117.2 vs. action or activity, §101n8 via creative divine act, §93.3 evil or wicked, §44n3 external to humans (fremden Tat), §63.2, §63n8 on one’s own while interdependent (selbständig), §114n13 action (Handlung), §2.2, §5n11, §81n28 account re: forming of, §9.1, §110.2 of the Christian collective life, §110.2 critical, corrective, restorative & reforming, §80n14 efficacious, §54.1, §61.4, §80n14, §89.2 how it is done vs. what is done, §105n30 symbolic, §15.2 See also broadening action; presentational action; purifying action activity (Tätigkeit), §4n8, §61n3, §81n28 that people are called to do, §87.2 pleasing to God, increase in, §86.3 solely directed against suffering must be sensory, §78.2 See also Christ, activity of; God, activity of; self-initiated activity Adam, §59n33, §13n13, §72.5, §72n19, §72n64, §94.3, §99.P.S., §117.1 Christ &, §61.5, §61n49, §72.4 original act of, §69n11 Adam, second, §89.2 Jesus as, §99n25 aesthetic (αỉσθητικóς), §63.1 as chiefly empirical, §9n14 outlook, §9.2 aesthetic (αỉσθητικóς), mode of faith, §63.1, §63n3, §76.1 Islam identified as, §63n3 affect (Affekt), §5n34, §6n10, §15n7 aroused in a given element, §55.3 as a being-affected (effect), §4.1 def. of, §3n15, §7n4 range of meanings, §14n37 affected by (affiziert), §13n29, §14n37 affection (Affektion), def. of, §7n5

affective component, §11n6, §15n2 pathic states, notions of God, §85n2 state, def. of, §3n15 affinity, §151.1 afterlife development in without any relapse or struggle, §163.1 intimation of, §158.1 more moderate outlook re:, traces remain in Scripture, §163P.S. options if Redeemer had not adopted & sanctioned belief in it, §158.1 personal, does not converge with consummation of church, §161.1 prefiguring of, sources, §157.2 there God could not be originator of evil, §162.3 almighty (allmächtig), §54n1, §167n8. See also God, divine omnipotence of Anabaptist, §138.2, §108n54 angels, revelations regarding, §43 anschaulich, clear-seeing, §55n30 Anschaulichkeit, clarity of perception, §72n37 Anschauung, §126n9. See also perception Anschauung & Gefühl, §5n37, §61n16, §64n8, §72n39, §72n59, §81n35 Anschauung des Universums, §62n5 Apocalypse (book of Revelation), not apostolic in origin, §103n22 apologetics, §11n2, §11.5, §14n41, §19n8 business of, §28.3 apostles, §45n23, §105.2, §128.2, §139.3, §145.1, §153.2 already had faith before their books, §128.2, canonical authority of, §139.3 communicated divine revelation that existed in Christ, §130.1 expressed their own faith, §128.2 faith arose from Christ’s own preaching re: himself, §128.2 never attributed anything priestly to themselves, §104.6 See also disciples of Jesus Arian notions rejected by church re: Christ also re: Holy Spirit, §123.2 ascension, §99, §99.1, §122.1, §158.1, §161.3 ascetic, §105P.S., §108.1, §108n13 actions, in God’s reign there are no purely, nor any arbitrary, §112.4 discourse, def. §85n12 language, §96.2, §96n32, §124.2, §142.2 practices vs. devotion, §87.2, §105n50 assurance (Versicherung), §45.2, §86.3, §86n10 atonement day of, high priest’s role, §104.1, §104.4 in German language, §104n1 theories: refuting, §101.4, §101n18 Versöhnung, or reconciliation, §82n12 atoning death (Versöhnenden Tod), §11n8, §104n1 attribute, vs. nature or essence, §4n1. See also divine attributes baptism, §108.4, §127, §127.2, §151.2 all traces of child baptism have been inserted in New Testament, §138.1 in any community of faith holds validity for all, §137.1 blessedness accompanies, only with citizenship in church, §137.2 child, can’t engender effects from repentance & faith, §138.1 Christ’s effectual promise reposes in it, §136 complete only if a well-prepared profession of faith follows it, §138 conditions for being the sign & seal of grace, §137.2

connections to Holy Spirit & regeneration clarified, §108.4, §108n43 distinctive efficacious action of, remains suspended until later, §138.2 that effects nothing inwardly is an outward sign of entrance into church, §136.4 external observance of, is not independent of Spirit’s activity in the church, §136.4 faulty rules for keeping internal & external aspects apart, §137.3 greater the effect attached to, the more important to find where Christ’s institution lies in it, §137.1 how Christ actually instituted it, §136.1 by an individual alone is defective administration of church, §137.2 infant, §108.4 initiation into true priesthood of all Christians, held in common, §143.2 leads to preparatory work of Holy Spirit in reign of God, §138.2 observance as act for church taking up individuals into itself, §136 observance (outer) vs. meanings (inner aspect), §137.1 one performed as ordered act of Christ himself, §136.1 performed only by church’s authorization, §137.1 provides only beginning of grace, §108.4 relation to shared feeling of the church, §137.3 value & efficacy of, can diverge without being unchristian, §136.4 baptism & Lord’s Supper, §104n1 being (Sein), §5n18 a process which can be assigned attributes, §74n29 self-identity-of-being-no-matter-where, §53.2 See also Existenz; totality of being being (Wesen) God’s, gleaned from divine activity, §74n29 unity of (Einheit des), contrast to being/Sein, §96n24 See also nature (Wesen) being, totality of (Gesamtsein), given determining factor within the, §30.1 being-one-with-the-whole, feeling of freedom in self-initiated activity in, §32.2 belief freestanding, def. of, §99.2 as outcropping from the root of inner experience, §14n1 term for some knowledge, §112.1, §112n10 Betrachtung, meanings & uses of, §34.3, §34n13, §50n24. See also contemplation; observation Bible. See Scripture blessed Begnadigten, persons forgiven & in state of grace, §74n27 being made, by being taken up into community with Christ, §100.1 no degrees of being, all or none, §86n3 selig machen, to make one blessed vs. to save from eternal damnation, §86n3 blessedness (Seligkeit), §5n28, §43n2, §109.1 alone confers value to life, §118.2 can mean salvation, §86n3 eternal, inalterable & undisturbed, §96n3, §163 falsely deferred to next life, §101.3 grounding of, in new collective life, §87, §87.1, §87n1 how it begins & should also come to fruition, §136.1 possession of, as Christ’s gift, §101.2 subject to fluctuation, §5.4, §5n25 unfolding (werdende Seligkeit), §87n1, §87.2, §89.1 why present in church alone, §113.3 See also Christ, blessedness of blessedness, lack of, §86, §86.1 how Jesus overcomes, §89.2 blessing, §100n10

bondage from fear of death, §75.1 or servitude, §81.2, §81n31 wherein sin predominates, §74.3 Böse, def., §44n6 broadening action, §80.3, §112n13, §124.1, §155.1 call, calling, def. of, §100.2, §103.1, §112.4, §141.1 what defines a person’s, §112.4 canon, §52.2, §52n23, §54n40, §55.1, §99.1 that there is no change in God, §55.2, §55n27 re: uniting of two natures in Christ, §97.1, §97.2, §97.3 See also rule(s) (Regel) care for preservation of life, §59P.S. care of souls (Seelsorge), §45.2, §45n24, §72n69, §74.2, §74n32, §83n6 as core of practical theology, §84n27 with instructional purposes, §85n2 caring, for ourselves and others, §43.1, §43n6, §147.3 neglect of, §45.2 catechesis, §19.4, §28P.S., §35.1 no proofs in, §33.3 traditional, §85n2 causation (or causality), §51, §52.2, §81.2 in conversion, §108.6 criteria for using the idea of, §50.3 divine & finite, §51.2 feeling of absolute dependence &, §50.3, §51, §53P.S., §53n27 finite, measured via time & space, §47.2, §53P.S. free causality, §84n17 natural, §46.2 partial, vs. partial passivity, §51.1 receptivity &, for free agents, §84n21 See also divine causality causality, natural, complete in itself & founded in divine causality, §120.3 causes free & natural cooperate, §49.2 free vs. natural, §49P.S. general vs. particular, §46.2 hindering life—evil at work, §75 intermediate, §47n13 natural, §49.1, §49.2 See also free causes center (Mittelpunkt), §81n28 certain, just as, §40.3. See also surety (Gewißheit) change of heart (Sinnesanderung), §108n10 child of God, §109.2, §124.2, §137.2 children, §43.1, §68n8, §93n13, §108.4 consciousness & pre-language mastery, §5.1 individual, growth of spirit in, §68.1 inherent rights, §109.2, §109n18 relationship to parents, §4.2, §107n4 Christ, §§92–105, §110.3, §117.3 action of, is simply continuation of God’s creative activity, §89, §100.2 active & passive states in, §97.3 advocacy of, §104.5, §105.5, §109.3

alone raises all to higher state, §13.1 annunciation of, §42.1 apex & end of all priesthood, §104.6 apex/end of spiritual kingship, §105.3 ascension of, §99 author, new view of worth, §99.P.S. become human (Menschwerden), §13n11 becoming human of, in same way as regeneration of the human race, §118.1 beginning of life of, §94.3, §97.1 being of God in, §94.3, §100.1, §101.1 being with his disciples, like a household or a school, §122.2 being with requires community, §24.4, §87.3 blessedness of, unshakable in suffering, §104.4 born in fullness of time, §118.1 calling of, §98.1, §104n51 church is organism of, the body of Christ, §127.3 communicated the Spirit, present before his death, §122.1 communication of influence of, §13.2 communication re: self, §59n7, §123.2 as completion of human nature, §47n5 couldn’t err in judging conduct, §98.1 death of, negative results of divorcing sacrifice in, from obedience, §141.2 different from other humans, §11.4, §22.2, §110.3 discourse of, not readily dogmatic, §16.2, §16n7 distinctive miraculous force of, §76.2 divine in, §97.3, §97.4, §99.1, §121.2, §161.3 divine love in, aligns sense perception to spiritual states once & forever, §97.3 does not retain a passive stance or stay in shadows over against the church, §127.2 dominion of, §89.3, §105.1, §105.3 elements of life of, §130.3 existence, self-presentation, §18.1, §18n2 existence of God in him, §124.2 fullest mediator for all times, §104.6 high priestly prayer of, §45n23, §104.5, §104n58, §108.5 historicity of his God-consciousness, §93.3 Holy Spirit &, equal status of divine in each, §170.1 how he can be called our vicar, who makes satisfaction in our place, §104.4, §104n46 human nature of, being-taken-up, §97.2, §97.3, §97.4, §97n4 immediate influences of, in the earliest circle of followers, §115.2 impact of what is divine in, §14n37 impetus of reconciling being of God in, §97.3 impression of, total, §99.1, §99.P.S., §103.2 inner Christ of an individual, must be same as historical Christ, §108.5 inspiration from his being is constant, §103.2 kingly office of, §105, §109.2 life of, not isolated from dying, §101.4 life of, original organ of the being of God in human nature, §100.2 life of, passage of into our own, §141.1 living community with, §118.1 makes an end to political religions & theocracies, §105.3 miraculous appearance of, §93.3 mission of, §109.3 the model of his vital knowledge of God is a fruit of Scripture, §131.2 new collective life &, §93.3 no one or small band can act in his place, §134.2

no pre-existing entity before Jesus, §13.2 no relation to, not also to God, §32.1 original, final completion of human nature, §13n15, §92.1 originally the effective power of new life existed in him alone, §116.1 passion of, throughout public life, §104n13 personal existence of, §127.2 prediction of return not aspect of doctrine re: his person, §99 promises of, §147.2, §147n9 promises of the Spirit of truth, no suggestion of preexistence, §123.1 prototypical is only fitting expression for personal dignity of, §93.2 as prototypical vs. an exemplar, §93.5 public life, all his varied actions were also self-presentations, §130.3 purity & fullness of force of, §99.P.S. purpose of, to lift humans into communion with God & to reign spiritually, §103.2 resurrection of, §99, §170.3 resurrection appearances, §160.1 return, §99.1, §160, §162.1 as revelation, §13n12 as second Adam, §47n5, §89.1 self-consciousness of, constantly steady, ever identical, §16.2 self-denying love of, is manifested to us in his suffering unto death, §104.4 self-depicted as the one entrusted with judgment, §159.1 self-presentation of, §59n7, §100n13, §104.1, §108.2 similarity: activity of Christ in forming new collective life & divine activity in forming Christ’s personal existence, §101.2 some passive states in, proceed from inter-connected process of human organization, §97.3 Son of God, §13.1, §45.1, §172.3 sovereign rule of (Herrschaft), Christ himself inaugurates, §105.1 spiritual life of, articulates the whole idea of human nature, §118.1 subject of divine revelation, §16.2 substitute for two-natures language: in him was an absolutely clear God-consciousness, a steady living presence, a true being of God, that was exclusively determining every element of his life, §96.2 supernatural became natural in him, §97n38 as supernatural become natural, §93n3 teaching about confirms & applies his teaching re: himself, §89n2 teachings of, §103.2 temptation of, §98.1 those governed by, are ever able to transfer their common calling to others, §105.1 union with, not imaginable without being united with the faithful, §141.1 in us, §100.1, §101.4 why he alone mediates all being of God in world & all revelation of God through the world, §94.2 why he is the end of miracles, §103.4 why his efficacious action must correspond to his dignity, §92.1 will of, §98.2, §104.4 Christ, activity of attracting or redeeming kind of, requires an inner-out community to arise, §113.2 effects of, intended for all human nature, §100.2 never restrained by resistance from his human nature, §101.2 person-forming, §101.2 summary characteristics, §100.3 Christ, blessedness of, §101, §109.4 communication of, & perfection, §118.2 Christ, coming again of, §160 why treated first as basis for other prophetic doctrines, §159.3 Christ, efficacious action of, §100.2, §101.1, §104.1, §104.5, §108.5, §118.1 proceeds from willing the reign of God, §111.4

we substitute his, for his physical presence, §160.2 Christ, essential sinlessness, §100.1 sufficient ground for in his interior personal existence, §98.1 Christ, God-consciousness of, §43n6, §45n23, §93.2, §103.2, §121.3 an actual being of God in, §94, §94.2 blessedness of &, both condition & are independent of each other, §101.1 determines every element of his life, §94.2, §94n14 development of, as human, §87.2, §93.3, §93.4, §104.4, §121.3 the one totally permeated with God-consciousness, §169.2 why it must be equally posited with his blessedness, §101.1 Christ, high priestly office of, §99.1, §104, §109n17, §120P.S. active obedience in: fulfillment of the law, §104, §104.1, §104.2 value of active obedience of: God sees us as partners in his obedience, §104.4 value of passive obedience of: we see God in Christ & as partaker of eternal love, §104.4 ways he extends his activity, §143.2 Christ, might of kingly, separate from Father’s might & from civil government, §105.3 over world, increases by efficacious action of Christ’s command to proclaim the Gospel, §105.2 Christ, perfection (Vollendung) of absolute, §98 & blessedness of, entire personal spiritual life proceeds with, §137.2 communication of, occurs in process of conversion, §109.4 human nature, §89n2, §98.2 incapable of generating error, §103.3 Christ, person of, §14n12, §16n4, §22.3, §88.2, §§93–99 state of being united was uninterrupted, §106.1 Christ, power of different from mere teaching, §11.4 natural powers to effect good, §103.4 Christ, prophecy of end of prophecy re: afterlife, §157.2 essential prophecy fulfilled since Spirit was poured out, §103.3 at one with his teaching thus without predicting, §103.3 surety re: his own destiny, §103.3 Christ, prophetic office, §99.1, §109n17 as apex & end of all prophecy, §103.2 consists in teaching, prophesying & working miracles, §103 receiving from the Father instructions given to followers, §104.1 Christ, reconciling work of, §82n12, §101.1, §104.1 last three points of doctrine on church belong to, §127.3 reconciling world to Godself, §104.4 Christ, redeeming activity, §101.2, §127.3 Christ, reign of, §104.5, §155.2 more firmly established more church & state are sundered, §105.3 what is inside people & their relationships, §105.1 Christ, relation to, §17.1, §32.3, §62.2, §87.1, §106.1 Christ, self-proclamation of, §16.2, §16P.S., §16n3, §16n6 limited range of, §117.2 only source for all doctrine, §19P.S. Christ, sinless perfection of, §73n5, §76n10, §98, §125.1 communication of, §149.1 Christ, suffering of & his activity both necessary for redemptive reconciling effect, §104.2 no great value can be placed on, §98.1 Christ, three offices of, §14n41, §102, §104n70, §108n58, §120n31

case against using here, §102.1 harmony among them, §102.3, §103.2 none is lowly, §105P.S. united in him alone, §102.2 Christ, two natures of, §24.2, §24.4, §88.2, §97.2, §97.3, §99.1, §109.4, §124.2, §126.1 act of uniting & state of being united of, corresponds to regeneration & sanctification in the redeemed, §106.1 Christ, work of, §14n12, §16n4, §18.1, §18n2, §§100–105, §102.1 consistent with creation: world-forming, §100.2 further developments of, possible but new revelation impossible, §103.4 Christendom (Christenheit), §64.1, §64n6, §97n27, §99.P.S., §104.6, §155.2 diseased & to be rejected, §21.2 error in vs. excluding all truth in, §155.1 Christian allowing free room for various frames of mind among, §103.2 becoming non-Christian, §24.3, §24.4 distinctively, §7n16, §32n2, §87.1 mixing what is with what is not, §151.2 qualifications for being called, §108n36 Christian character, §11.3 result incompatible with, §80.4 Christian consciousness fully holding all shared loci of, §20.1 of grace, common element in, §100.1 redemption never at null point in an actual, §63.3 Christian domain, §9.2, §11.1. See also domain of piety Christian immediate religious self-consciousness, §8n1 what speaks to the, §101.4 See also religious self-consciousness Christianity, §2n2, §7n11, §8.4, §9.1, §11.3, §11.4, §11n1, §11n2, §11n4, §11n7, §12, §13.1, §13.2, §13P.S., §13n26, §14n37, §14P.S., §18n7, §19n5, §21.1, §24.3§93.2, §102.1, §129.2 articulating actual nature of, §21.2 Christentum, shared faith & life, §64n6 conditions for being permanent, §13.1 decisive features of, §11.5 fundamental fact of, §117.1 historical elements of, §129.1 how inner-outer unity grounds, §10.1 idea of, §18n3 Judaism &, §11n2, §11n4, §12, §12.2 nature vs. essence of, §72n25 posits redemption as God’s work, §62.2 presupposed it alone will spread to entire globe, §157.1 spirit of, §77P.S. spread by proclamation alone, §15.2 supreme revelation, §14P.S. teleological view of, §56P.S., §101.1 when whole peoples adopted it, §117.4 why it is not a political religion nor religious state nor theocracy, §105.3 Christianity, distinctive nature of (eigenthümliche Wesen), §2.2, §2n2, §2n8, §2n14, §9.2, §11n1, §24.2 not detectable purely empirically, §24.3 Christian life, §26n2, §62.2, §77n1, §106.2 Christian piety, §11.3, §28.3, §29.2, §31.1, §32.3, §45.1, §129.1, §131.2 basic form of all, §4.4, §4n23 basis in feeling of freedom, §32n15 what is inapplicable within, §52.1

Christian religious consciousness, §11.3, §26.1, §29.1, §29.2, §45P.S., §62.2 all relates to the Redeemer, §62.3 dogmatics not lacking any essential element of, §18.3 Christian religious (religiöses) life, §32n5 presupposed in all elements of, §56P.S. Christian religious self-consciousness, unfolding of, outward, §26.2, §26n2 Christians all refer their community to Christ, §11.2, §11n2 remaining outside the interconnected inner circle, §117.4 as “us,” “we,” “ourselves,” §36n5 Christian self-consciousness, §13P.S., §39.1, §111.2, §121.2, §159.1 analysis of, §111.2 correct & immediate expressions of, §89.2 def. of contemplation of, §17.2, §17n8 as form of the shared feeling re: things human, §113.3 re: growing in perfection traces back to Redeemer as its ground, §100.3 Christian teaching, distinctive, §45.1 Christology, not a logos theology, §13n22, §105n16 church(es), §2.2, §26.2 all within it but not via Holy Spirit’s activity is determined by world, §126.1 begins only with personal efficacious action of Christ, §156.1 belonging to & not, led by life path, §117.3 changeable element traces to what world offers to efficacious action by church’s moving principle, §126.2 Christ’s mission, desire to achieve its purpose lives on in church, §146.1 Christ’s three offices are the essential churchly activities, §127.3 collective consciousness of, §146 continuance of, in co-existence with the world, §114, §114.1, §117.3, §§126–156, §139.1 defects in, stem more from flesh than being with persons not of faith, §162.1 def. of, §6, §6n13, §126.1 doctrine of the one, §12.3, §12n13 each person in, is representative of entire, to the others, §139.2 on earth constantly in conflict, thus never reaches consummation, §157.1 emergence of, §§114–116 essential & invariable characteristics of, §126.2, §127 everything in it is a common deed & work unevenly in individuals, §125.2 external, gradations in development, §134n13 formed out of the world, which exercises influence on it, §148 further progress of, §127.2 God-consciousness in, §127.3 Holy Spirit in the, determined via human nature, §126.1 household of God, §121.1 invisible, §148.1, §148n4, §148.2, §149.1, §150, §153 invisible vs. visible, §8n18, §148, §149, §162.1 law, §145.2 legislative & administrative power via Christ’s kingly office, §144 militant, §105P.S., §105n48 militant vs. triumphant, §157.1, §159.1 mission of, §146.1 as an organic body equipped to be a collectivity of activities, §125.1 organizations of the, issue from leadership ministry, §134 purification of, where it prevails, §27.3 results of, reach more than just those experiencing conversion, §114.1 relates to Christ as outer factor to inner factor, §127.3 role of dogmatic theology in, §19 separations, def., §150.1

as a so-called moral person, §116.1 and state, §2n10, §3.1, §105.3 statistics, §1n4, §19n2 strives to conform to the self-same image of Christ, §126.1 success of, is result not only of its activity but also of divine government of the world, §146.1 true, vs. existing church, §16n8 union, §23.2, §23n9, §83n1, §140.1 what the divine order is in the gradual growth of the, §125.2 why leans as much toward separatism as legalistic righteousness, §126.1 and world, an admixture, §148.1 See also Evangelical church church, Christian, §2.2, §21.1, §113.4, §115, §116.3, §126.1, §127.3, §164, §172.1 all divisions in, continue only as temporary, §152 desire for the reign of God comprises the unity of life of the, §116.3 in its purity & fullness, is perfect image of the Redeemer, §125 planting & spreading of, §164 unified moral person, not a hereditary or natural person, §21.1, §125.1 as a unity with diversity during apostolic age, §129.2 what occurs in, does so by Christ’s sinless perfection & blessedness, §113.3 church, consummation of, §61n27, §84n23, §105n52, §114, §119, §119.3, §§157–163, §159, §159.1, §159.2 attained only beyond human life on earth, §157 excludes all influences of world upon it, §162 is final answer to our prayers, §157.2 unreliable sense of, on basis of Christian self-consciousness, §114.1 church doctrinal proposals, §81n36, analogous dissimilarity among three divisions of, §114.2 See also doctrine, ecclesial church government, §2n14, §144.2, §145.2 church service &, covers the domain of love & care in Christian ethics & practical theology, §85n2 church, inner & outer circles of, distinct difference between, §117.1 have reciprocal working upon the other forming an organic cycle, §116.1 church, inner community/circle of Holy Spirit is the bond of, §116.1 life of the, §117.4 totality of those who live in state of sanctification, §113.1 See also community, inner church leadership, §2n14, §19n11, §46n15, §134 def., §45n24 egalitarian & communal, §19n3 church, outer community/circle of, §148.2 a larger group affected by the Redeemer & to whom preparatory workings of grace are directed, §113.1 not referred to as “the elect” but simply as “those who are called,” §116.1 See also community, outer church, visible, §149, §149.1, §153, §154 total suspension of community among parts of, is non-Christian, §151 circumscriptively vs. repletively, §53.2, §53n9 citizen, def. of, §100.3 citizenship shared with those sanctified, §137.2 clergy, formation of, lacks any scriptural foundation at all, §134.2 clergy & laity, §19n3, §74n32, §104.6, §145.2 contrast between is subordinate to unity & self-sameness of the Spirit & direct dependence on Scripture, §135.2 lay leaders, §61n44 co-existence, state of, §53.2, §53n7 cognition (Erkennen), §46n7 cognitive frame, §64n8 for recognizing what is perceived or felt, §72n39

cognizing process, §3.3 collective deed & fault of human race, distributed unequally, §73.2 collective deed & possession, that contains an impression of the sinless perfection of Jesus, §88.3 collective element of spiritual life, §74.4 collective evil, can be related only to collective sin, §78.3 collective fault, §84n17 collective life, §110.2 is less a life in common the more it depends on one individual, §122.2 spirit strengthened via, §67.2 uneven characteristics of self-contained, §94.1 collective life, new (church), §90.1, §93, §101.4, §102.1, §123.3, §149.3 Christ has no successor or surrogate in, §105.1 without institutions re: keys & prayers no order, progress or success in, §127.2 through which soul has effect, §100.2 collective life founded by proceeding from Christ as creation of human nature first completed, §89, §89n2 in community with him, §88.4 directions regarding, §103.2 individual aims arise only in, §122.3 no redemption outside the, §87.3 collective life of sin, §88.1, §104.2, §106.2, §124.1, §148.1 undermines notion of a pure species consciousness, §121.3 where being in it must cease, §108.2 without restraint, could destroy life itself, §108.2 collective life of susceptibility to sin, §109.2. See also sin, susceptibility to collective relationship, starts with awakening God-consciousness, §67.2 collective whole or collectivity (Gesamtheit), §113n3, §125.1 common feeling, §64.1, §72n2, §80.1, §103.3 in the church accompanies its common spirit, §80n4 common life, moving from external activity into communicative presentation of inner life, §139.1 common spirit, §14.1, §59n7, §106n14, §106n15, §116.3, §122, §124.2, §129.1, §141.1 as church is more like a commonwealth than like a household or school, §122.2 contrast civil use of the term, §106n14 essential component of one’s personal existence, §120P.S. Gemeingeist, expanded use in 2nd edition, §106n14 is being distinctly formed into each community of faith, §123.3 in it today each goes through the same process the disciples did, §122.3 meanings of, §121.2 ruling force of, must be vouchsafed from false tendencies, §154.1 term designates Holy Spirit, divine Spirit & Christ’s Spirit & third person of Godhead, §116.3 communal body of the faithful appears before God on behalf of humanity as its advocate, §104.6 Christ has no successor or surrogate in, §105.1 Gemeine, §105n2 stimulates sanctification of individuals, §106.2 communal existence, §151.1 communal feeling, §84.4 communal piety, unity in, §10 communicated (Mitgeteiltes), def., §92n2 communicated capacity, from the Redeemer, §29.1 communication, §61n28, §74n42 of Christ’s sinless perfection attributed only to Christ, §88.3 fragmented, appraised, rectified, §28.2 Mitteilung, §74n42, §94n21 popular, poetic & religious, §30.3, §51.2, §55.3

See also religious communication communication of blessedness, §89.2, §116.3 communication of divine being, §169.1, §169n4 communication of grace comes to one only in new collective life, §90.1 communication(s) of Christians can be elucidations of divine Word or putting it into action, §135.1 even isolated & informal are what the Holy Spirit effects, §135.1 communication of sinless perfection, §88, §116.3 communion of saints, critique of phrase for those passed away, §104n66 communion with God, §62.2, §62n5, §91, §91n1 consciousness of, being restored via redemption, §164 rests on a communication from Redeemer: grace, §63 communities, religious, §10n25, §16.2, §16n9 all will pass into the new collective life, §93.1 highest stage, each distinctive, §10.2, §10n4 revelation at onset presupposed, §10P.S. stages of development & kinds, §7 strictly only one universal, §10n7 communities of faith with Christ & together work upon each other, §139.1 God-consciousness shared in, §60.2 outsiders have incidental part in, §6.4 personally distinctive, §24.3, §24n3 religious, unity & differences, §2n2 required for living piety, §60.2 as sanctuaries, §8n27 community (Gemeinschaft), §77P.S., §104n16 always emerges via communication, §10.2 broadly religious, §105n37 collisions between different ones within the same circle, §113.2 essential elements of religious, §6.2 essential primacy of, §134n21 community, Christian, §115.1 indifference re: civil contrast of ruling authority vs. subject, §105.2 no one form of, is distinctly posited or excluded, §113.1 not animated by love of the fatherland, §105.3 organic, contra claim that Christ had none in mind & it arose later, §105.1 piety in co-posits relation to Christ, §14, §32.1, §32n6 therein all is ascribed to the one Spirit, §121.1 when lack of a godly state is attributable to, §33.2, §33n13 community, inner, §113.2 community, outer, emerged at point of Christ’s appearance in public, §113.2 community of faith & life, §2.1, §11n5, §68.1, §91 Lebensgemeinschaft, §91n6 community of faithful persons, §136.4 Christian self-consciousness re:, §114 efficacious action of Christ’s perfection exists only in, §137.2 community of life with Christ, §91.1, §91n6, §93.5, §104.3, §104.5, §109.2, 111.4 forgiveness of sin &, §109.2 in, no repression or total absence of Christian consciousness possible, §155.2 no return from, into collective life of sin, §119.2 ordinances for, §127 restraints in, natural & social, §101.1 where being in it must begin, §108.2 community of persons of faith remains ever self-identical in its situation in Christ & Holy Spirit, §126

subject to variation & change in relation to world, §126 community of redemption, §118, §121.1 community of the faithful, §113, §139.1 exists in shared elements of sanctification, §106.2 community with Christ, §136 if in it fully, §124.2, §139.1 no vital one without indwelling of Holy Spirit, §124 compassion (Mitgefühl), §104n32 Christ’s in face of guilt & culpability, §104.4 shared (Mitleid), §4n13, §85n2 completeness, §31.1 completeness, but lacking, §19.4 Vollkommenheit, §58n4 Vollstandigkeit, connotations of, §58n4 completion, §46P.S., §46n17 not logical or dialectical, §16.1 exists via receptivity to Christ, §93.1 See also perfection conceptions (Auffassungen), §15n2 two re: developments in new Christian life, §88.1, §88n3 concepts (Begriffe), §15n2 doctrinal, §19n6 formation & combination of, §13P.S. mediatorial, §59n7 vs. notions, §60n15 positive, def., §61n25 psychological & ethical factors, §19n6 confession (ὁμoλoγία) of belief, nominal, §13n29 private, §19.3 vs. proclamation, §16.1 confessions, confessional symbols, §108.1, §109.1, §109.3, §111.2, §112n8, §112.3, §145.2, §156.1 appeal to Evangelical, §27 Bekenntnisschriften, def., §27n5 as brief embodiment of doctrine referring back to Scripture, §135.1 Evangelical church can no longer prize adherence to the ecumenical, §154.2 Scripture interpretation in, §25P.S. See also Creeds and Confessions Index confidence, §111.1 confirmation, §138.2, §141.2, §143.2 conflict, §83.1, §145.2 inner, §84n29 need to settle, §16.2, §16n8, §121.2 resolving apparent, §18.2 connection (Verbindung) or union with Christ, without it no righteousness before God, §104.3, §104n16 vs. other related terms, §104n16 conscience (Gewissen), §6.2 awakened, sharpened, §83.2, §163P.S. bad conscience, §68.2 collective life proper locus for, §83.2 def. of, §83.1 not the same as appearance of God-consciousness, §83.1 only through, does a state become sin for us, §83.1 Redeemer had only a silent, §83.2

conscious interconnectedness with God in & through world, §62n5 conscious life, nature of lies in free will, §81.2 consciousness (Besinnung), full, in every instance of, absolutely dependent, §36.1 consciousness (Bewußtsein), §5.1, §14n39, §24.2, §59.1, §69.2, §80.3 of being children of God, §124.1, §149.1 of being in need of redemption, §14.1 collective, §73n4 conditioned by memory, §161.1 defective, §147.1 of divine grace & peace is resting in divine good pleasure, §120.3 dreamy elements of, §5.1 each has for all & all for each, §149.1 entangled state of, §60.1 facts of, §28.2, §28n10 of fault & deserving punishment, §109.3 of forgiveness, one bears it as soon as one is conscious of existing within the new collective life, §111.3 general interconnectedness always postulated in, §30.1 of God, imperfect except Christ’s, §86n1 gradations of, §14n39 held in common, §88.3, §123.3 higher, §5n23, §86n1 highest form of life, §51.2 human’s early state akin to lower animals, §5.1 immediate Christian religious, §28.2 re: indwelling God-consciousness, §50.1 that the inner ground for averting, has been lacking, §98.1 of need for redemption, does not develop under dominion of flesh, §84.4 objective, §13P.S. of ourselves, as locus for notions, concepts, truth, §34.1 peaceful, joyful, §108.2, §108n26, §108n28 reality-based, vs. fanciful §60n16 of redemption, the fundament of all other God-consciousness, §167.2 at rest, §98.1 subject-object entanglement of, §5.5, §6.1 unsullied human, §53.1 what occurs in the innermost ground of our, §118.2 See also religious consciousness; self-consciousness; sensory consciousness consciousness of grace, §91, §113.1 contrast: consciousness of sin, §87.1 consciousness of penal desert, §84.4, §84n18 is to divine justice as conscience is to divine holiness, §84.2 consciousness of sin, §87.3, §100.1, §101.1, §109.2, §138.1 Christian religious, two elements in, §86.2 first attains full clarity through perception of Redeemer’s sinless perfection, §100.2 known only through consciousness of grace, §86.2 consciousness, personal, collective &, when at one, §146.2 two features of experience, belonging to, & to shared consciousness, §88.3 consent, as work of grace, §108.6 to being in community with Christ becomes an active will, §112.1 contemplation, §56.6 levels of, §14n24 particular mode of, §50n24 of self & world in relation to God, §62n5 contrast, §5.1, §140.2

between preaching & legislative administration, §145.2 between sin & grace, §80 both members of, intermingle, §59.1 divine, is placed above all, §55.2 fades away at highest level of functioning, §5.1 faulty, §54.4, §54n18 features of, §23n7 of freedom & bondage, §74.3 free vs. necessary re: causality, §76.1 humans limited by, not free of, §32.2 natural evil & social evil, §75.2 none absolute in organic world vs. math, §41n27 opposites as form of, §51.1 re: what is humanly good & evil, §28.1 of sin & good work, §28.1, §111.1 spontaneity vs. receptivity, §55n2 tension in a, §23.3 contrition or remorse, §108.1, §108.2, §108.3 conversion, §11n9, §108, §109.4 can’t be conditioned by good works, §112.1 def., §107.1 misery not required to accomplish, §86n3 none occurs without mediation of the Word, §108.5 turning, beginning new course, §107.2 unimaginable without justification, §107.1 convert, self-initiated activity through intellect & senses, §108.6 converted, or turned, §70n20 conviction, §2n14, §3.4, §19.1, §27P.S., §42.2, §46.2, §108n20 via defined perception, §13.1, §13n17 objective, §14n38 a quite firm one that one’s own impression is right is no ground of proof, §88.1 ways it can be bolstered, §68n19 cooperation between divine causality & human sensory drive, §81.3 God’s, meanings of, §46P.S. cooperative deed (Mittat), §63n6 copestone (Schlußtein), §170n12 coposited (mitgesezt), §34n7 correlate factors that are, §11.3 tacitly, §108.1 copula (i.e. “is”), is a modality, §82P.S. created world is good, §41n20, §76n1 creating & sustaining activity in Christ & God, §100.2 creation (Schöpfung), §40, §41, §41n26 all is already ordered vis-à-vis redemption, §164.1 Erschaffung, §61n30 vs. generation, §41.1, §41n15 Mosaic story of, §36.2, §39.1, §40.2, §59P.S. no instrument or means for, §40.1 not given immediately in self-consciousness, §36.1 refers chiefly to particular things, §38.1 Reformers saw OT account as historical, §40.2, §40n8 reliable because God preserves it as a whole, §57n1 Schaffen, §41n26 Schöpfung, §41n26, §61n30

supplement to concept of preservation, §36.1, §36n7 why doctrine of, precedes preservation, §39.2 creation, new. See new creation creation of humanity divided in two moments, §89.2 first completed in Christ, §97.4, §104.4 creation-preservation, doctrine of distinction without real difference, §79n11, §36.2, §39.3 norm for, §37.3 reasons to treat separately, §49P.S. creedal symbols or documents, §82.1, §82.3, §84n22 authority invested in, §45P.S. derived from biblical witness to redemption, §27n2 See also confessions, confessional symbols; Index of Creeds and Confessions critical attention to what has currency, §19, §19n1 critical fruitfulness, of a dogmatic proposition, §17.2 critical realist mode, §60n18 critical work, §2n2 skeptical &, needed the more speculative, §50.1 criticism, higher, §14n36 art of interpretation &, principles of, §97.2 culture (Bildung), §103n40 currency (geltend, Gültigkeit), §1n4, §9.2, §11n24, §16.2, §19, §60n12, §61.4, §129.1, §158.2 array of views gaining greatest, §140.4 of Christ’s commands, §105.1 in the church, §27.1, §39.3, §39n7, §65.2, §80.1, §93.5 from church’s public proceedings, §19.3, §19n10 criteria for, §25.1 def. of, §14n36, §19n1 of differences in disputes, §23.3 vs. doctrines not public yet Christian, §19.3 in dogmatic treatment of shared piety, §19.3 in the Evangelical church, §37.2, §64.1, §88.1, §91.1, §140.1 general type of, §19.4 given as false subsumptions under proper maxims, §149.3 granting restrictively, §95.1 how one view gains greater, §88.1 within a larger compass, §17.1 limitation of doctrine not a criterion for, §19.2 of movements must always remain object of probing, §135.2 never declarable by a particular act, §25P.S. not giving rise to schism or division, §19.3 in one’s experience, §94n13 proclamation constantly has, in the church, §105.2 proper, §78.2 public, considered a given, §19.4 within a shared domain, §69.2 used as providing only, not total validity, §84n6 what has it now may not be acknowledged later, §145.2 custom (Sitte), §24n6 comprises all modes of action & all religious action, §88n17, §101n4 ethical theory &, §24n9 Dankbarkeit, thanksgiving or gratitude, §146n3 Dasein. See existence death

Christ’s relation to, §98.1 condition at, simply an intermediate point, §119.3 does not bring grace to an end, §119.3 dying & afterlife, §81n50, §158, §118 is not the wages of sin, §98.1 decree, divine, §82n11, §104.4 actualized through Redeemer in one point of space & period of time, §97.2, §104n16 always in process of fulfillment, §89.3 best denoted by “new creation” less by redemption, §89.1 contra an aggregate of many, §90.2, §90n2 not dependent on a human foreknowledge in God, §120.4 proposition that expresses a, does not express immediate self-consciousness, §90.2 surety re: natural & redemptive order, §117.4 unity of, §89.3 decree, divine, one single eternal, §12.2, §12n8, §14n31, §41n19, §55.3, §80n9, §84n17, §84n22, §88n18, §94.3, §104n16, §109.3, §120.4 decree of election, includes faith, §120.2 deed (Tat), §10P.S., §13.1, §61n3, §83.1, §110n17 something that really happens, §149.3 vs. Akt, §81n28 definiteness (Bestimmtheit), §16.2, §17n6, §18.1 def. of, §16n1 definition (Erklärung), §44n3 by aggregate of differences, §24.2 contents of particular, §50.1 of dogmatics, §15n2 of God & world independent of faith-doctrine, §40.1, §40n6 most dogmatic, §16P.S. negatively, §24.2 role of, §16.2 deity (Gottheit) “being” better than “nature” for, §96.1 in communion with, §8n32 found in selves & world alike, §8n22 dependence condition of partial, §54.1 of evil on sin must be demonstrated experientially, §77 of finitude on one supreme being, §8 on God, §38.2, §47, §48.2 highest meaning of, §4n9 occurs as one has confidence in another, §4n13 vs. passivity, §51.1 on Supreme Being vs. highest collectivity, §8.1 spread between partial & total, §8n10 stages of, §4n9 See also feeling of absolute dependence dependent, finding oneself-to-be absolutely, §32 depiction (Veranschaulichung), def., §96.2, §96n31 descriptions popular & poetic, carry into dogmatic, §53.2 reasons for separating, §90.1 desire Augustine’s use of, §61.5, §61n45 readiness to succumb to sensory, §72.2 that wills not to miss any opportunity, §73.2

development, §28n5, §33.1, §74.2, §81.2, §110.1, §159.1, §159.2 all inner Christian, proceeds from faith & its action through love, §112.5 child, §61.3, §61n17 Christ’s saving activity suggests concept of, §159.1 in force of God-consciousness, §83.2 interconnection of old & new stages of, lies in unity of divine thought, §88.4 node of, §38.1 peoples stuck at lowest stage of, §33.2 of religious self-consciousness, §59n3 deviations (Abweichungen), §80n16 dubious, §108.3, §108n36 devil, §41n27, §43.1, §43n2, §45, §45n26, §72.3, §80n17, §81n10, §81n11 devotion, contains blessedness only when becomes thought or deed, §87.2 devotional life, inner religious, §15n11 devoutness (Andacht), vs. mere sensory mirth or sadness, §15.1 devout reflection, §38.1 dialectic, §72n21, §85n1 aim of knowing in, §28n16 on the art of philosophy, §5n3 def., §28n16, §28n18 includes epistemology, metaphysics, logic, §60n18 required for theologically scientific work, §85n1 dialectical comparing alternative notions, §27.4 definition, in the ancient sense, §28.1 explication, §102.1 dialectical language features of, §28.2 too defined for any but dogmatic discourse, §28.2 dialogue, implicit, §59n22 didactic def. of, §15n11, §16n8 descriptively, vs. directly stimulative, §19.4 discourse, §52.1, §85n1 expression, features of, §18.3 is released from vagueness & ambiguity, §18.2 religious type language a special domain, §28.1 shaped into well-formed series, §18.3 difference Differenz, a marked difference without qualifications, §56n15 essential vs. incidental, §9.1 external, determined by time & space, §11.1 inborn, help constitute a distinctive personal existence, §69.1 posit in finite being, not in God, §53.1 relatively vanishing, §10.3 Verschiedenheit, presupposes significant qualifications, §56n15 dignity (Würde) that attaches to an office, §105n5 discernment or insight (Einsicht), §46n3, §68.1, §68n1, §68n2 becomes a governing command, §68n4 discipleship rests on evocation of the word that is that Word re: Father, Son & Spirit, §137.1 disciples of Jesus, §14P.S., §14n40 in Christ’s lifetime could not baptize in the name of the Holy Spirit, §137.1 community among, manifested as Holy Spirit, only after Christ gone, §122.3 didn’t see Christ’s promises were fulfilled in days after resurrection, §160 during Christ’s life they had new life merged with desire to receive from him, §122.3

entered a process of continuing Christ’s community-forming activity, §122.3 expected fulfillment at end of things human on earth, §160 proclamatory presentations of, §129.2 recognized Christ as son of God before resurrection or ascension, §99.1 recognized their receptivity to Spirit in Christ’s company, §122.1 reports re: Christ not available to us on some subjects, §159.2 represented only the external circle of preparatory grace, §122.3 they each moved from receptivity re: Christ into self-initiated activity of imitation & beyond, §122.3 when mere reporters, may be mistaken, §99.2 discourse practical & popular, §55n1 presentational-didactic, §16 rhetorical, §16.1 relations among three modes of, §15.2 well-defined, §15.1 what poetic & rhetorical offer, §17n6 diseased conditions, §21.1, §139.2 spiritual functions under sway of, §81.2, §81n25 disposition, (Gesinnung), def., §72n59 dispute, conduct of, §103.4 distinctive nature (eigentümlichen Wesen), of Christianity, §11n1, §19n8 distinctiveness (Eigentümlichkeit), of religious stirrings, §10n22 divine, the a powerful impetus of, in Christ the only determinate, in us less, §124.2 implanting, an eternal act of, §13.1, §13n14 divine activity creative, §94.3 initiating, is supernatural but human receptivity can make it historically natural, §88.4 divine attribute(s), §8n33, §§50–56, §92.2 always inaccurate, §51.1 articulate only some relations to world, §50.2, §82P.S., §82n18 as composite presenting knowledge of divine being, §50.2 correspond to elements of religious self-consciousness, §50.3 deny similarity between divine & finite causality, §56.1 designate how feeling of absolute dependence refers to God, §50, §50.3, §64.2 experienced via divine-human encounter, §13n30 identity/unity of four, §51.2, §51n8 inadequate to convey God in se, §64n9 as modalities assigned to divine causality, §82P.S., §82n17 must permit being thought of without limits, §56n9 oneness, infinity & simplicity, §56 in Part One, not a description of God’s nature, §56P.S., §56n24 place of holiness & justice in re: wisdom & love, §84n31 re: God’s internal life, formal or negative, §50.3, §50n21 re: sin can’t diverge as sin & grace do in Christian self-consciousness, §79.2 revelation of, cannot divide, §118.2 speculative elements excluded from explication of, §50.2, §90.2 statements about, proceed from relationship with divine, §64.2 three methodological paths for, §50.3, §50n10 usual ordering of hides their relationship to basic facts of piety, §31.2 whole doctrine of God not done until whole set completed, §31.2 divine being is one being, everywhere self-identical, §125.1 divine causality, §49.1, §53.1, §80.4 absolutely living, §55.1, §76.1 apprehended in self-consciousness as feeling of absolute dependence, §171.4

contrasts with finite & natural causality, §49.2, §51.1, §51n4, §81.2 defined in relation to sin’s persistent presence, §79.1, §79n7 force ordering a connection of evil with actual sin in the state of common susceptibility to sin, §84 hypostatizing co-existence &, §53.2 interconnected process of nature &, §51.1, §54 no division or contrast in it, §164.3 One in the all, §8n1 presents itself as love & wisdom, §165 same compass as totality of natural causality, §51.1 should not be parceled out among the persons but only proximately, §171.4 timeless & nonspatial, §52.1, §52n6, §52n7, §53P.S. in what is originative, §10P.S. divine communication a particular, to which grace is ascribed but sin lacks, §80.1 status of, §10P.S. divine cooperation, §47.2, §48.3, §48n12, §79.1 evil &, §48.3 preservation, absolute dependence &, §48.3 divine decree. See decree, divine divine economy, vs. in se, §41n27 divine force, communicated by means of our God-consciousness, §80.2 divine generativity, always as part to whole not means to end, §168.1 divine good pleasure election determined solely by, §120 object of, §112.3, §120.3 as ultimate ground for ordering, §117.4, §120.1, §120.3 divine government of the world, §13n16, §14n41, §46P.S., §46n18, §48n5, §84n5, §88n18, §117, §117.2, §146.1, §146.2 in it everything is integrally conditioned by everything else, §163P.S. is manifested in harmonious ordering of redemptive domain, §165.1 one causality, directed to one aim: development of church or reign of God, §164.3 two periods in: before & after divine-human union in Christ, §164.2 divine holiness, §83, §83n4, §84.4 divine justice &, §107.1, §167.2 divine impetus for Christ as prophet, §103.2 to conformity with what Christ has been & done & how, §124.2 divine indwelling, acknowledging, §13.2 divine influence, §47.2, §109.1 divine interventions, supernatural doctrine of occasional, §81n49 divine justice, §84.2, §86.2 def., §84 dispenses only rewards, §84.1 locus of, §84.4 ordained the connection that exists between sin & evil, §104.4 relation to church doctrines, §84n23 relation to divine holiness, §84.4, §84n28 satisfied by Christ’s free surrender in suffering & death, §104.4 why readiness to remit sins is assigned to, §85.2 divine knowing, is knowing what is willed & generated by God, §55.1, §55n10 divine legislation & distribution, designated as divine wisdom, §84.1 their perfection can’t be described as justice, §84.1 divine love, §64n9, §§166–167 in Christ aligns sense perception to spiritual states once & forever, §97.3 everything exists only insofar as it could be an object of the, §169.2

not inferable from advancements of life made at the expense of others, §166.1 only benevolent & protective, §166.1 we have it directly in consciousness of redemption, §167.2 wherein divine being communicates itself in redemptive activity, §166 why it alone among attributes can be equated with God’s being or nature, §167.1, §167.2 why it is the term that directly generates wisdom, §168.1 See also “God, is love”; God, love of divinely wrought, same as divinely derived from Christ, §87.3 divine mercy, §71n31, §86.2, §100.3 more suited to homiletics & poetry than to dogmatics, §85 why it is mythological, §85n11 divine nature, §97.2, §97n3 in Christ & Holy Spirit, equated in most definite way possible with divine nature in se, §170.1 uniting of, with human nature in Christ & via church’s common spirit, §170.1 divine ordering of the world, §117.3, §119.1. See also divine government of the world divine presence, referred to causal activity of finite being, §53.1, §53n4 divine principle, §125.1 operation of the, on Christ’s spiritual organ, §103.2 divine recompense, §84.1, §84n10 limited use of concept, §82n19 divine revelation in the soul, a work of the Spirit, §122.1 divine self-communication, occurs among persons of faith in the work of redemption, §100n3 divine sending, of a founder, §10P.S. divine Spirit. See Holy Spirit divine summonses, §61.4 divine thought, unity of, §88.4, §88n18 divine Threeness, §§170–172 divine will never determined by worthiness of a person, yielding reward or punishment, §116.2 object of, is world in totality of its development, §54.4, §96.1 producing collectivity of finite God-consciousness, §81.1 divine wisdom, §46n15, §64n9 active principle in God’s ordering & determining world for redemption, §84n5 is ground of the world being theater of redemption, absolute revelation of Supreme Being, & thereby good, §169 no division in, including none re: presentations, works of communication & divine deeds, §168.1 omniscience &, both attributes bear the same relationship to divine love, §168.1 divine working within a human, §109.1 divine wrath, contra notions of, §84.3, §84n26 Docetic heresy, §22, §93.3, §97.2, §100.3, §158.2 def. of, §22.2, §96.2 denies reality of Christ’s body, §22.2 doctrinal features, brought from other modes of faith, §21.1 doctrinal formulations, appear as a complete whole, §28.2 doctrinal propositions (Lehrsätzen), §10n18, §15n1 description of the three forms of, §35 human life, God’s activity, world’s make-up, §26.1, §30, §30n1 interconnected structure of, §27n3 what gives warranty to, §27n4 doctrine actually presented in Part Two, §10n28 authority or valid standing of, in church, §93.5 held in common, purpose for, §25.2 incoherent re: Christ, def. of, §92.2 presuppositions slip into unconsciously, §95.1 See also faith-doctrine

doctrine, body of (Lehrbegriff), §20.1, §20n4 brought to an integral whole, §18.3 church’s, development of, §27.1 church’s, systematic arrangement required, §28.2 dialectical tie to philosophy, §18.3, §19n6 Inbegriff, def., §27n1 Lehrgebäude, §27n6 points of, more exactly defined, §25.2 points of demarcation structured in all, §22.3 realizing a structure of, §21 doctrine, Christian Christ’s self-proclamation the source, §19P.S. def. of, §18.3 faith-doctrine, constitution of, §26.2 doctrine, ecclesial, §36, §101.3, §104.4 critical assessment of, §61.5, §81 is product of conflicts, §95.1 tends to ban equality of all sins, §74.1, §74n8 vacillation between heretical tendencies, §65.2 doctrine, prophetic. See prophetic doctrine doctrine, system of, §8n33, §27.1. See also doctrinal propositions (Lehrsätzen) doctrine of last things includes church’s consummation & souls in afterlife, §159 not of same value as genuine faith-doctrines, §159 dogma, generally acknowledged teachings, §27n1 kernel of all: “we have seen his glory,” §14n37 dogmatic domain, subject is self-consciousness, §58.1, §58n1 explications, §28P.S. features, fragmentary or chaotic before conjoined, §20.1 form, basic, is description of human states, §30.2 purely, meaning of, §36.2, §36n8 dogmatic language, §49.2 alleviates dangers inherent in one-sided usage, §124.3 correctness of, §17.2 vs. other kinds, §95n1 dogmatic presentations accessible & perspicuous, §20.2 contra individualistic content, §19n11 freer vs. austere scholastic forms, §99.P.S. must show doctrines in their relation to be scientifically complete, §96.1 no external domain of its own, §28.2 not a science with self-derived principles, §28.2 religious states of mind & heart essential, §19.4 scientific interconnectedness alone inadequate, §19.4 dogmatic procedures, §50.3 remaining within bounds of, §50.1 dogmatic propositions, §16P.S. are to contain only expressions of our Christian self-consciousness, §139.1 basic form easily draws deviations from the others, §35.1, §35.3 def. of, §16 other two forms explicated via the first, §30.2 ours express only what is same now as from earliest Christian piety, §113.2 overall procedure for, §18P.S. principle to combine & arrange, §20

rule for adopting or excluding, §20 three forms of, §64, §65.2, §84n23, §90.1 twofold: ecclesial & scientific, §17 viewed directly, §1.2 dogmaticians Evangelical: sure, comprehensive, §24.2 what most seem not to notice, §23n7 dogmatics actual truth vs. ecclesial opinions, §19P.S. arrangement (Anordnung) in, §27.4, §28.2, §28n11 can form own terminology, §19P.S. compared with On Religion, §58n1 def. of, §1, §1n4, §§2–19, §15n2, §19 dialectical nature of its language, §28 ethical half of, §14n1, §48n1 excise everything heretical from, §21 justifiably in two parts, not necessarily, §26n2 method of, §§20–31 must presuppose faith, §19.4 needs theory of biblical interpretation, §27.3 no selecting various proofs, §33.3 not concern only of clergy/scholars, §20n12 not simultaneously apologetic, §19.1, §19n8 philosophy &, mistaken for each other, §33.3, §33n23 purifying, improving doctrine, §19P.S. re: Christian faith & ethics, §1.1, §16n8, §26, §27n1, §78n3 relationship to Christian piety, §15 relies on rules of dialectic, §39n4 retain what has ecclesial merit, §21 scientific status essential to it, §28 scriptural, §27.4 dogmatics, Protestant, creedal commentary nears Roman dogmatics, §27.4 criteria for being ecclesial, §27.4 domain of piety, §10.1, §42.2, §76.1 doctrines in, can surpass Christ’s words, §93.5 dominion Botmäßigkeit, def., §84n29 as holding sway, §68n22 Donatists, §137.3, §137n28

ebionitic, def. of, §96.2, §99.P.S. ecclesial doctrine. See doctrine, ecclesial ecclesial interest, §17.3 ecclesiology direct counterpart to Christ’s high priestly, prophetic & kingly offices in, §103n1, §104n1, §105n3 economic, re: God’s activity in God’s world, §50n14 edification, §18P.S. edifying (erhebender), or uplifting, vs. reduced, lowly, §9n11, §9n12 effective cause, leaving room for divine causality, §61n26 efficacious action or activity of the common spirit, §130.2, §148.1, §149.3 def. of, §101n11 is conditioned by strength & ripening of faith, §120.4 origin of its greatest measure, §120.3 efficacious in varied gradations, §117.2 efficacy of God-consciousness, hindrances to, §65.1 of redemption, servitude only gradually set aside, §81.2 elect are chosen precisely for communication of the Spirit, §125P.S. God holds in trust all those not yet among the, §119.2 election, §§117–120 Calvin’s formula of, consistent, §119.3 comprises reflection on emergence of church, §116.1 predestination to blessedness in Christ, §119 element(s) (Moment), §9n3, §19n5, §19.4, §53n2, analog to chemical elements, §53n2 vs. Charakter (characteristic or character) §63n13 Christian, contain God-consciousness, §32.1 co-constitutive, §5.4 constituent of the world, §30.3 of human life, §5, §57.1, §57n6, §57n11, §75.1 vs. moment in time, §63n13, §104n33 partial, of freedom & dependence, §5.4 particularistic, in redemption, §118.3 of Redeemer’s life, §93.1 of sin, §74.1 element(s), of life, §3n2, §5.3, §5.4, §6.1, §6.3, §11.2, §17n3, §22.2, §50.2, §72.4 Christian, in their totality is the historical reality of the church, §126.2 as a constituent part of every larger part, §57n11 reconciling, §101.1 what fills or is only a component of, §29.1, §29n5 within a process, not instants, §11n15 embodiment, why incarnation is preferred concept, §97n11 emergence of the world, due entirely to divine activity, §41 emotions (Gemütsbewegungen), §15n7 def. as moving one’s mind & heart, §103n23 not strictly stirrings, §11n6 religious, broader treatment in OR, §2n12 See also affect; feeling empathy (Mitgefühl), def., §83n7 empirical conception, §100.3 infers decrease in social evil with sizeable decrease in sin, §101.3 no foundation for supernatural origin or distinctiveness of Christ, §101.3 entangled, vs. rooted in Christian piety, §38.2

entanglement(s) (Verwirrung), §88n15 def. rarely “confusion” in Schl’s use, §56n16, §59n3, §131n13 sensory (Verworrenheit), def., §61n8 verwirrend, entangled, §81n46 environment, human damage to is a social evil, §76n1 epitome, §27n1 Ergebung, calm acceptance, §146n3 Erkennen, refers to cognition, §55n10 Erkenntnis, refers to knowledge, as a product, §55n10 error, §103.3, §153.1 attached unconsciously, §155.2 capacity for, of visible church includes sin, §149.1 completely faultless, vs. sin, §76.2 forming religious notions such as religious forming of aims, §153.1 fundamental, §47n13 of judgment presupposes susceptibility to sin, §98.1, §153.1 why all, is an ingredient of sin, §153.1 eschatology, §2.1, §159.1 essence vs. distinct attributes, §72n25 essential, def. of, §2.2 eternal, opposite of temporal, §51.1 eternal blessedness, §159.3, §163P.S. eternal damnation, §159.3, §163P.S. eternal life communion with God in, §8n29 open to all, whether unending or insignificantly short, §118.2 eternal power of omnipotence, §52n4 eternity, contrast to interconnected process of nature, §51.2 ethical (sittliche), includes activities not strictly moral, §26n5 ethics (Ethik), §28n11 def. of, §2P.S.2 domain of, §101n4 as human sciences, §8n27, §88n17 philosophical, description of, §93n24 provides the principles of history, §2n2, §39n5 ethics (Sittenlehre), §1n3, §6n4 ethics, Christian, §15n11, §24n3, §72n36, §72n69, §93n24, §98.1, §98n6, §103n16, §136.2 bridge to & prolegomenon for, §112n1 can’t be grounded in Part One on divine attributes, §56P.S. correlates with faith-doctrine, §112n13 covers whole of Christian life, §9n1 domain of, §29.2, §56n22 effective action in, §112n13 embraces whole of life, §111.4 faith-doctrine &, §126.2 features of, §26 four questions at boundary of, §78.1 handles theological principles for church law, §105.2 lets go of imperative form & describes life in the reign of God, §112.5 same standards as faith-doctrine, §26n2 three major categories for, §112n13 Evangelical Christianity, §3.1 Evangelical church, §1n4, §16P.S., §71.3, §88.1, §124.2, §139.3 accords with spirit of confessions vs. letter, §25P.S. can no longer prize its adherence to the ecumenical confessions, §154.2

confessional documents of, §37 currency of rationalism & supernaturalism in, §25n1 declares equality among Christians, §128.1 vs. Roman church, §28.2, §128.1 two sacraments only, Christ-instituted & representing his high-priestly activity, §143 when established, no fresh treatment of Trinity doctrine occurred, §172 Evangelical dogmatics, distinctiveness varies in degree, §25 what every doctrine must show, §19n1, §23.3, §23n9 Evangelical household, up to each whether children be baptized, §138.2 Evangelical spirit, development of, §37.2 Evangelical tradition, §109n21 evil, §§75–78, §75n1 all, is punishment for sin, §76 can’t exist at all if it can’t be grounded in God, §84.4 connection of, with sin restricted to actual sin, §84.2 connection of, with sin viewed as punishment, §84.1 consists of two features, §75.2 def., non-human evil, §86n2 dependence of, on sin, consequent requirements, §77, §78 as derived & secondary, sin as first & original, §76.1 human, rough translation of Böse, §76n1, §86n2 natural, def., §48.1, §75.2, §76.2 natural, indirectly punishment for sin, §76 none present isolated from good, §48.2 not arranged by God, §48.3, §49P.S. parity of, with sin extends beyond social evils, §77.1 relation to human control, §75.3 retributive, how differentiated, §84.3 social, §48.1, §48.3, §75.2, §82.2 social, alone immediately grounded in sin, §76.2 social, directly punishment for sin, §76 social, issues in hardship & adversity, §75.2 suffered by an individual not always equal to their sin, §77.2 what Christ says about, §77.2 why suffered collectively, §77.2, §82.3 world, humankind &, relation of, §75.3 evil ones, §44.2, §44n7 evolution, human with interconnected process of nature, §61n25 excommunication, §145.2 exegesis, §19n11, §74.2, §72n31, §172.3 exegetical-hermeneutical work needed to decide an issue, §140.1 exemplar (Vorbild), §93n2, §105n53 exhibit (zur Anschauung bringen), §72n63 exhibited, fully, def. of, §64n8 existence (Dasein), §10n10, §12n9, §14n25, §14n33, §75n7, §99n15 always in process, §36.1 brute, §8n16 entire human, §4.3, §26.1, §81.2, §81n26 finite, def., §75n7 of God, as really being there [immanent], §33n2 interconnectedness of, §5.3, §5n17 as something distinctive, §10n30 existence, personal. See personal existence (Persönlichkeit) existential relationship, effects all that is good, §48n7

Existenz (being, entire existence), §13n4, §14n33 vs. Dasein, §81n26 def. of, §12n1 Existenzen, existing beings, §82n14 experience(s) (Erfahrung), §5n34, §5n37, §88n8 complete elements of, bear passive & active components, §108.6 domain of, §57.2 in faith, §3n13, §24.4 of faith, §2n6, §139.1 general facts of, §94.3 human, developmental account of, §61n16 inner, analysis of Christ’s activity traces back to, §100.3 in Lord’s Supper, §139 supernatural features of, re: Redeemer, §94.3 tie between distinctly Christian, & Scripture, §29n5 two features of, belonging to personal & to shared consciousness, §88.3 See also religious experience, immediate experiential (Erfahrungsmäßig), §77, §77n1 explicate (erklären), meanings of, §50n17 explication, explicated (Entwicklung), §28n11, §39, §81.3 expression (Ausserung), §16.1, §16.2, §18.2 context changes meaning of, §25.1 via facial features, voice, motion, §15.1 of religious self-consciousness, §80.3 steps of, §6n10 expression, original, re: God & world, creation-preservation, §36n1, §36.2, §37, §37n1, §37.3, §38 fact(s) (Tatsache), §6.2, §27.4, §28.2, §29, §29.3, §92.2, §100.1, §103.2, §109.1 alleged, a matter of indifference, §97.2 already presupposed by contrast of sin & grace, §40n6 assumed based on testimony vs. immediate self-consciousness, §140.1 basic, of faith-doctrine, §28.3 character of, §22.1 of Christian consciousness, §17.2 conditioned by nature, §47 historical, vs. second-order, §11n2, §61n3 internalized, §14n12 kindred, §17.2 none conflict with nature, §47.1 originative, §10P.S. factor, §11n17, §30.1, §31.2, §33.1, §55.2, §127.1 def., when not used occasionally implied, thus stated, §63n13 distinctively Christian, §13P.S. Faktor, §63n13 inner & outer, personal & community, §33.2, §60.2, §72n45 faith (Glaube), §3n2, §19n11, §43n2, §72.4, §72n46, §87.3 alone, means that blessedness can’t be increased by anything added to faith, §109.4, §109n25 basis, same as first Christians’, §14n41 as belief, §3.3, §103n35 of church is original & grounded in sayings of Christ, §99.P.S. def. as immediate surety, §15.2, §33.3, §110.2 def. of, §14n13, §58.2 def. taking perfection & blessedness of Christ into oneself, §108 development of, as a Christian, §86n1 emergence of, as enduring state of mind & heart, §108.1

experience, conditions for making claims re:, §61n3 how professed from roots on, §35n3 inner, coheres with faith in living God, §57.1, §57n6 made active in love, §109.2 means of, directed toward Jesus, §14n1 without ministry could not arise or be expected, §127.2 not a kind of belief, §14n6 obedience as, §156.3 onset of an abiding state on which new life is grounded, §108.1 person of (Gläubiger), §70n20, §120.4 pious, vs. intellectual belief, §8n10 in redemption communicated by spiritual force, §68.3, §70n2 swing-cycles in working toward, §108.3 where it is present conversion has occurred, §137.2 faith (pistis), from, to knowledge (gnosis), §33n5 faith, modes of, §11, §11n3, §12n4 commandment & doctrine not originative in, §10P.S. distinctive nature of, §9.2 features from many areas of experience, §10.2 faith & piety, elemental, is receptivity to God’s love, §8n1 faith-doctrine (Glaubenslehre), §1n3, §57.2, §57n17, §59P.S., §103n16 a brief title of this work, §64n11 derived from Christian self-consciousness & faith experiences, §64.1, §64n1 a designation not fully adequate, §26n2 doctrina fidei, §15n1, §25n2, §27n1 positive def., §10P.S., §10n19 scientific expression of Christian faith in proper, §131.2 serves Christian ethics & vice versa, §48n8 twofold task of, §39.3 faith-doctrine, presentation of, §56.1, §81n36, §82n5 aim of, to provide vision of Christian life, §64.2 content of complete Christian, §90 has presuppositions that bear on both conduct & doctrine, §78n3 rejects direct propositions from Scripture, §74.3 faith in Christ, §120.3, §121.1 faith that the reign of God has come &, are the same thing, §87.3 based only on immediate impression, §13n22, §99.P.S. conditions for, originally must be same as conditions for, today, §88.2 def., §119.3 Holy Spirit brings forth, §124.2 influence on God-consciousness, §10.2 living, is self-consciousness re: our union with Christ, §141.1 faith in God, surety re: feeling of absolute dependence, §14.1 faith in Jesus as the Christ or Son of God & Redeemer of human beings, §128.1 faith propositions (Glaubenssätze), §15n1, §15.2, §62.3. See also doctrinal propositions Fall concept of a, §111.2 no single moment of, §86n1 period before the, explained by original perfection of human being, §61.2 Father, the Christ’s relation to & ours, §109.2 creator & preserver, §171.4 Son not wholly equal to, §171.2 fault, (Schuld), §72n69, §86n6, §109.2 collective, §77.2

feature (Einteilung), structural, def., §31, §31n1 feature(s) (Element), §10n4, §17n6, §24.4, §45.2, §45n20, §63n13, §72n46, §108.1, §127n6 vs. characteristic (Charakter), §5n22 of Christ, must entirely merge, §92.2 of Christians’ faith & life, §14n23 of Christian religious self-consciousness are one, §81.3, §84.4 criteria for two suffusing each other, §25.2, §25n6 defs. of, §3.5, §5n22 distinctive, in individuals, §72n25 divine & human in Christ, §96.1 external, belonging to organism of our life, §61n32 inner & outer closely interconnected, §6P.S. when natural sciences were latent in theology, §40.1 feeling (Gefühl), §72n59 affected by God in one’s, §15n2 attended by internal perception, §15n2 basic, §37.3, §39n7, §46P.S., §47.1, §47n13 community of, §6.3 content, §5.4 elements of, §4.2 for life, §60.1 of need for redemption detected, §113.4, §117.2 perception &, §3n13, §45n27, §60n6, §66n2 personal, one vs. held in common, §48.2 religious (see religious feeling) as self-consciousness, §3.2, §8n1 See also shared feeling (Mitgefühl) feeling, anticipatory, §156.2 as felt need for redemption, §108.6 re: a future life, 118.2 as a prophetic gift, §146.2 feeling of absolute dependence, §4n9, §5.1, §6n16, §50.3, §54n26, §80.4, §91n2, §107n2 above subject-object contrast, entanglements, §5.2, §5.3 absolute surety of in its general reference, §32n2 of all that is finite, §47.2 awakened through power of utterance, §6.2 basic contrast included in complete descriptions of, §62.3 can fill an element of life, §51.1 coexistence with world-consciousness, §32n2 complete expression of the, §38.2 contained in every Christian stirring, §34 def. re: how it fills an element in time, §30.1, §30n3, §30n4 endures with feeling of relative freedom, §49.1 engrained or less so in every element of one’s life, §29.1 exact definition of, §57.1 faith in God as surety re:, §14.1 on God, fully given only in monotheism, §33n9 God as the “whence” of, §4.4, §4n9 how to know each modification of, §30.1 imperfect love foreshortens, §8P.S.1 implies faith in original perfection of world, §57 in & of itself a co-positing of God, §30.1 at most potential, inchoate at lower stages, §36n5 no basis for any differentiation in, §9.1 no counterpart in absolute feeling of freedom, §32.2

not decreased by self-consciousness of world, §57.1 object of, indivisible, §49.1 refers to absolute causality, §51 relationship to interconnectedness of nature, §34.2 relation to sense-stirred self-consciousness, §56.1 re: necessity of redemption, §71.4 same in all who hold it, §5.4, §33.1, §36n5, §49.1, §50.2 re: self, §6.2 sensory stimulus, material condition of, §9.1, §9n4, §46.2 status of def., §57.1 stirrings of, full content described in Part Two, §90.2 See also absolute dependence feeling of dependence, §4.2, §5.4, §46.1, §51.1 feeling of dire need, residual, belongs to the new collectivity, 126.1 feeling of freedom, §4.2, §5.4, §51.1 feeling of relative freedom, §49.1 feelings, def., 59n14 fetishism, §4n9, §33.2 figurative expressions, §45n29, §80.4 getting most exact def. of, §17.2 figurative manner, in a, §56.1, §76.1, §85n2 finite being, §81.3 hard to imagine how it could progress, disconnected from former life, §163.1 as a self-identical “I,” §52.2 within totality of, §46.2, §54.1 whole of, absolutely dependent, §36.1 finite free beings, actions of, §83.3 finite nature, every instance of, a blending of being & not-being, §81.1 finitude being conscious of universal, §8.2 natural state of human, §15n2 first human beings, §82.3, §94.1, §94.3, §125.1 absolutely first state of, cannot be imagined, §61.3 conditions for acceptability of concept of, §61.4, §61n25 first expression of the species, §61.4 in image of God, use concept with caution, §61.4 flesh, §74.1, §80.4 aim of holding dominion over the, §80.4, §86.1 conscious of as manifold, §67.2 def., §13n22, §162.1 def., soul’s lower forces, §66.2 everything developing spiritually is dragged into dominion of, §72.5 how inroads of conscience occur in a soul subject to, §84.4 motives of, §105.3 physical aspects of interconnection of mind & body, §72n59 resisting Spirit, §148.1 self-focused activity of, seed of sin not yet resistance to spirit, §67.1, §67n3 against spirit, §66n2, §66.2, §71.2, §71.3 standing activity of, draws one into sinning, §74.1 force (Kraft), §3n2, §53.2, §53n19, §59n5, §73n6, §74n41, §144n1 as any mode of energy, §81n39 body-forming, of human nature, §97.2 countervailing, of the church’s community-forming principle, §150.1 elemental, §46.1 energic not rigid or coercive, §68n4

every outstanding, draws mass to itself & holds it fast, §88.4 formative, §38.1, §110.2 of God-consciousness, §74.1, §84.3 of habit, strengthens tendency to commit sin, §72.3 inherent, §41.2, §41n19 inner & outer, §60, §67n5, §121 interaction among, §54.4 invested in Christ, §110.2 living vs. dead, §51.2, §53.1 vs. Macht, Gewalt, Potenz & Stärke, §81n39 mechanical, §49.1 natural, §48.1, §48.3, §75n17 necessary to cast off old life, §109.2, §109n21 over oneself, §45P.S. ordering a connecting evil with actual sin, §84 present in redemptive process, §66.2 probative, §43.1 spiritual, §14.2 spiritual & sensory, §112.4 vital, variously embodied, §74.4 forgiveness of sin, §118.1 adoption &, mutually condition, §109.2 all influence of the whole on individuals focuses on, §127.2 annulment of sin via, §84.2 can’t precede faith, §109.2 consciousness of, §118.1 vs. consciousness of meriting punishment, §101.2 divine, vs. self-forgiveness, §86.2 end of former condition, §109.2 gracious, a general act temporally fulfilled, needing no repetition, §111.3 in the Lord’s Supper, §141.1 magical view of, §101.3 prayer for, §74.2 received only in community, §137.2 repentance &, mutually conditioned, §111.3 repentance comes to rest in, §109.2 free agents, §49.1, §120.1 free causes, §49 divine preservation &, §47.1 domain of, §49.1 See also causation (or causality); causes freedom, §49.1 can blend with traces of bondage, §74.3 condition of sin, §81.2, §81n22 determinacy &, §56n11, §84n22 determined by self-initiated activity, §4.2 implies dependence on God, §32n9 of inquiry in theology, §28n17 no will without, §112.1 personal & political, §9n20 See also feeling of freedom free sociality, §16n8, §121.1, §121n6 free spiritual power, §61n44 free will, §44.1, §44n6, §49.1, §70n25, §72.3, §80n17, §86n1 inner & outer facts re: §61n3

at the innermost center of life, §81.2 not excluded by God’s action, 59n6 function(s), §81n25 basic, none subordinate, §20n3 of feeling, presentiment & faith, §28n7 higher spiritual, §72.1, §72n7 interconnection of body & mental, §72n59 lower, development of, §67.1 of sanctification & overcoming the world are not to be divorced, §105.2 undifferentiated as to self-consciousness & objective consciousness, §33.1, §33n11, §33n12 furtherance (Förderung), advancement of life, §85.1, §100n3 Gefühl, §4n23, §7n5, §14n37. See also Anschauung & Gefühl; feeling (Gefühl) Geist, def., §59n14, §102n8. See also spirit Gentile & Jew distinction abolished, §104.4 global environment, evil done by humans to, §73n12 God absolutely living, §51.2, §51n9 agent of sin’s being overcome, §79n7 Almighty, §41n22, §51n5 anthropomorphic notions of, §51.1, §172.1 arranges life’s restraints & advances, §48.2, §48n5 arranges things so can be good or evil, §48.2 attributes of (see divine attributes) beholding of, clear & sure, §163.2 for Christians not co-posited in the way the world is, §32.2 cognizance of, in all & with all, not possible for us without mediation, variability, hindrance or conflict, §163.2 command vs. will of, §54.4, §54n38 conception of, personal in certain conditions, §8n29 cooperation of in activity, §49.2 does what God wills, & vice versa without exception, §81n49 exists in the individual being of Christ not the same as in church’s collective life, §125.1 foresees, def., §119.3 good pleasure of, being an object of, §104.3 grace of, invites & equips communally, §9n21 as grounding all interconnected being, §30.1 how, determines human receptivity, §59.1, §59n6 immediate presence of, in world through immediate religious self-consciousness, §81n49 inalterability implied eternity, §52P.S., §53n21 incommensurability of, §14n19 independence of, contained in eternity & omnipotence, §54P.S. infinite, not caught up in finitude, §41n27, §50n5 inspires affects in humans, §85n2 as Jehovah, §103.4, §104.1 love of, §13n22, §13n30, §50n14, §50n21 Natur never used as term for, §74n29 nature (Wesen) of, §50n23 no arbitrary decision by, §118.2 no attribute of, designates something in God, §50 no distinction of possible from actual or of ability & willing re:, §54.3, §54n14 no equal to, §56.2, §56n1 no interaction in, is grounded in some particular, §54.2 no sensations, feelings or emotive moods in, §85n2 not a specific being, analogous to finite being, §50n5 as One in All, non-pantheistic view, §62n5

ordered vs. ordained by, 48n5 preserves the world, §36.1 productive activity of, as unlimited, §50.3, §54n2 sees all humans only in Christ, §120P.S. self-proclamation of, §10P.S., §10n38 sends the Spirit by virtue of our joining with Christ, §132.2 sovereignty over all, §37.1, §37n10 supernatural character of, §97.2 as Supreme Being & be-ing in world, §32n12 (see also Supreme Being) thinking, willing & doing of are undivided functions, §109.3 unconditioned & absolutely simple, §96.1 unity & fullness of, §53n27 “whence” of human existence, §4.4 will & permission of, §44.1 within world vs. extra or superworldly, §8P.S.2, §8n33 in re: world, §50.2 See also absolute dependence on God God, activity of, §47n5 general cooperative, §83.1 in living, only the real can be an object of, §55.2, §55n39 ordains sin with & alongside grace, §80 God, being of both Sein and Seiendes, being & actively be-ing, §94n10 can be conceived only as pure activity, §94.2, §94n9 Christ alone has actual being of God in him, §94.2 in God’s self (in se), §50n14, §55.2, §55n34, §72n25, §74n28, §97n38 no formulation for it distinct from being of God in the world, §172.1 vital receptivity & having being of God present to oneself, §94.2, §94n10 God, command of, is not identical with the producing will of God, §81.1 God, communication of, in its temporal progressions increases toward full presentation of omnipotent love, §168.1 God, consciousness possessed by (Bewußtseins Gottes), rare formulation, §84n30 God, divine omnipotence of, §8n1, §8P.S.2, §47.1, §51.1, §51.2, §51n7, §80.4, §81.3, §167.2 absolute exercise of, also of preservation, §54.4 act of second creation is a work of, §79.1, §108.5 def. of, §54 relation to interconnected process of nature, §54.1 God, divine omnipresence of, §8n1, §51.2 as absolutely space-less causality, §53 as locus for everything, §53.2, §53n12 as preservation of things, §53.2 God, divine omniscience of, §8n1, §8P.S.2, §8n33, §51.2 def., is absolute spirituality of divine omnipotence, §55 does not permeate Christ’s adopted human nature, §97.5, §97n48 is the living character of God’s omnipotence, §55.1 posits the same character in God as divine wisdom does, defined in reverse order, §168.1 God, eternal, eternity of, §8n1, §8n33, §40n2, §51.1, §51.2, §52.2, §52n12 def., §52, §52n1 God, existence of (Dasein), def., §33n2 no proofs for, §4n22, §40n12 God, holiness of, §83 def. of in marked difference from def. by other teachers, §84.1 “God, is love,” §8n33, §41n27, §167 identitative or predicative senses, §4n30 “God, is wisdom,” differently said than “God is love,” §167.2

God, living, §8n29, §43n11, §61n32 God, love of, §85n11 all being in God is simply posited as that which is mediated by it, §168.1 benevolent, §8n1 God, mercy of, redeemed persons can’t be the object of, §85.1 God, redemptive activity of, §13P.S. enters into human beings as a force, §74n41 re: world, §8n33 God, reign through Christ of, how each element of Christ’s life cohered with vision of, §130.3 God, triune, §37.1, §47n5, §50n3, §50n14, §53n9 God, uniting with Christ of, general act of, same pattern in rebirth, §120.2 God-consciousness an actual being of God in the Redeemer, §94 a spiritual function co-posited in self-consciousness, §94.2, §94n7 awakening of, §72.5 calling forth active states, §9.1 calling forth mediated by Redeemer, §22.2 Christ’s entrance into & influence upon, §106.1 communicated only in association with others, §60.2 conditions for uniting, with sensory self-consciousness, §57.1 conditions of mind & heart based on, §172.2 as a consciousness of sin’s status being overcome by redemption, §84.4 develops more freely from less to more, §11.4, §62.1, §62.2, §110.2 effect of a shared supremacy in all, §75.1 efficacious action of, within us, §61.4 entails internal feeling of faith rising to conscious operations, §70n23 exists only as a point of transition, §166.1 feeling of absolute dependence &, explained via each other, §62.2 fills element of self-consciousness that contrasts pleasure & lack of it, §62 first manifests in childhood, §33.2 force in, §66.1, §73.1, §84.3 how furthered & transmitted, §60n22 as impetus to religious stirrings, §9.1 incompleteness of, belongs to stage of existence, §81.4 infinite scale of degrees of, §60n25 inner power of, §54.3 inseparable from self-consciousness, §4.4, §10.3 intellectual nature conditions, §60.1 internally acknowledged appropriation of, §74.3, §74n34 Jesus’s pure & perfect strength of, §88.2 never the content of religious elements of life, §32.3 no absence of anywhere, §62.1 no sheer, content-less striving after, §29.1 not pure in polytheism or Jewish monotheism, §94.2 occasional spark in kindles no flame, §106.1 at one with world-consciousness, §57.1 ours, how it has to comprise the fully harmonious divine work of art, implying “world,” §168.1 planted in one personally & spontaneously, §74.4 presence of, in Jesus, §81n49 presence of, in preparatory grace, §81n49 presence of, within communities of faith, by Holy Spirit, §81n49 present only with other determinants, §32.1 provides impetus toward outward actions, §78.2 realized from stimulation within life elements, §50.1 after the Redeemer, purportedly new formations would be regression, §93.1

Redeemer takes persons of faith up into the strength of his, §100 referred to Jesus to be Christian, §62.2, §91.1 retrograde movement of, §62.2, §62n5, §68.3 as a seed developing in Christ, §93.3 sensory self-consciousness unites with, §48.2 shaped in stirred self-consciousness, §63 sin overcome in & blessedness present in same measure, §87.1 steadiness vs. hindrances to, §60.1, §60.3, §60n14, §60n25, §74.1 stimulus of & modes of action from, §83.1 stirred by both lack of pleasure & pleasure, §59.3 strength of, as rule of spiritual life, §144.2 strength of, referred back to communication in community of redemption, §80.3 teleological character of Christianity altered if community of blessedness were independent of being taken up into Christ’s, §101.1 underlying condition for, in human life, §60.1 vitality of, makes elements of blessedness possible, §87.2 vitalized only in connection with our bodies, §61.4, §61n32 weak & suppressed, is raised by Christ & brought to dominance, §106.1 See also Christ, God-consciousness of godly state does not mean being God or a part of God, §33n13 life in conscious relationship of communion with God, §33n13 good all that is, is so, §81.3 Christ effected, §103.4 evil &, as states both dependent on God, §75n14 occurs by stepping out with one’s inner being, §48.2, §48n7 true &, concepts of what is so, originate as an external impetus & happen deep inside, §88.3 what is, §61.5, §74.4, §110.3 good work def., §112.4 natural effects of faith, §112.1 nothing meritorious from, §104.6 persist with sin to some degree, §127.2 seemingly indefinite distinction between, §111.1 Gospel, §120.2, §148.2 appearing among a people, §120P.S. proclamation of, §45.2, §45n25 governance (Regierung), divine, §59n5 governing, def. setting in motion force already at hand & controlling it, §164.1 government of Christ is not mediated & derivative, but related to any action taken in his name, §105.1 government of the world, no compass for, other than our world in which redemption shows its power, §164.2 grace (Gnade), §9n21, §47n5, §87.1 all respond the same to offerings of, §117.4 that brings new life (belebenden Gnade), §108n40 communion with God that comes from Redeemer, §63, §63n2 def., mighty power of God-consciousness in our souls, §80.1 efficaciousness of, only requires our receptivity, §109.4 justifying divine grace, complete reliability of, §111.2 no third category to preparatory & efficacious (wirksam) grace, §112.2 in the state of, there is no place for reward, §112.3 grace, collective life of, §71n17 grace, consciousness of, §§86–169, §90 grace, efficacious, §108.2 grace, means of, def., §112.4

all, are also good works & vice versa, §112.4 grace, preparatory, §13n16, §47n5, §63n2, §70n6, §108.2, §108.3, §108n40, §110.2, §115.1, §117.4, §118.1, §118.2, §119.2, §120P.S., §156.3, §169.1 actions in which traces of it are internally hidden, §110.2 before Christ all humans were living under, §156.3 consciousness of, gains surety gradually, §108.2 first workings of, stir up consciousness of church against world, §113.4 received from totality of the regenerate, §148.2 receptivity is a work of, §108.6 signs of resistance already found in the domain of, §126.1 grace, state of, §74.1, §74.2, §74n27, §90.1 gratitude, §4n23, §146.1 habit or customary behavior, §74n44, §110.2 sin grows through unchecked, §84.3 happiness (Glücklichkeit), def., §76n5 expected complete, false assumption for belief, §158.1 hardness of heart, §80.2, §81.1, §81.3, §107n4, §120.2, §120P.S., §142.2 harmony, §9.1, §10n1, §21.1 among dogmatic expressions, §17.2 heart, def. stirring up of senses & feelings, §59n14, §72n59 Heil, Heilig, Heiligkeit, Heiligung, same root but not same meaning, §110n3 Hellenism, §12.3, §12n12 assumptions, in early Christianity, §9.2 heresy, §2n1, §22, §22.1, §22.2, §22.3, §22P.S., §65n4 compromises redemption or Redeemer, §22.2 def., §21n2 how pairs of, relate historically, §22.3, §22n10 natural, §22, §22.1, §22n11, §80n16 what is helpful in times of an epidemic of charges of, §97.4 See also Docetic heresy; Manichean; Nazarean or Ebionites’ heresy; Pelagian heretical def., §21.1, §21n1, §22.2 identify with great caution, §21.2, §22.3, §22n8 people seeming so without being so, §23n2 vs. simply non-Christian, §22.2, §54n2 heretics, still belong in the church, §151.2 hermeneutics agreement on methods needed, §27.3, §99.P.S. includes philological criticism, §25n9, §74n31 principles of, §10P.S., §10n29 Herrnhuter Brethren, §96n10, §104n41 heterodox, §72n34, §76n6, §80n16 heterodoxy vs. heresy, §2n1 higher life, §5.4, furtherance & form of, as act of the Redeemer, §89.1, §100.1, §108.6 hindrance to, §5.5 partaking of, §117.3 Highest, moving toward, gradual, §163.1 power of the, §53.1, §53n3 high priest, re: Christ, §102n2, §104.1 hindered states of life, §85.1 historical, §7n3, §22.1, §30.3, §49P.S., §113.1, §126.2 geschichtlich, §64n2

historisch, def., §28n9, §98n15 presentations alone can’t spread faith, §61.1, §61n4 historical phenomenon church formed as a, §117.2 what God wrought can only be taken up & have an effect as an, §87.3 history (Geschichte), §61.1, §61n3, §98n15 holiness, def. of, compared with customary def., §82P.S., §83.3, §83n9 holy, Old Testament usage of term, §110.1 Holy Spirit, §121.2, §123.1, §123.3 capital letter for “holy” does not imply attributing personhood to the, §116n1 def., uniting of divine being with human nature in form of common spirit that animates the collective life of faithful persons, §123 def., unity inherent in Christian community, designated in terms of its common spirit, §116.3 distinguished from its gifts, §121.2 effectual, at least incompletely, before Christ died, §122.1 every regenerate person partakes of, §124 has divine aim too: to bring & illumine Christ in memory, §124.2 notion of sin against, §74.2 not preexistent, §123.1 original communication of, one act directed to multiple persons, §121.2 outpouring & bestowal of, §136.1 spirit of Scripture indicates it is not pre-existent, §123.1 stirrings & consciousness of, §149.2 summary account of, §116n1 as supernatural become natural in the church, §93n3 ultimate world-forming power from church outward, §169.3 as world-shaping power, §56n22 Holy Spirit, activity of, §108.4, §112.4, §123.2, §124.2, §131.1, §133.2, §157.1 Holy Spirit, communication of, §§121–125 as the common spirit only after Christ’s departure from earth, §122 each conscious of it as interconnected with Christ & with others, §121.2 everything proceeds from the divine in it, §121.2 Holy Spirit, in relation to church, §14n41, §59n9, §105P.S., §112n14, 123.2, §124.1, §129.2, §150.1, §152.1, §157.1 church as locus of, §126.1 as its common spirit, §126.1, §130.2 Spirit gradually removes all errors & imperfections by church, §131 hope, §101.3, §113.4, §115.2 human being def. of the most complete, §168.1 each a unity within all the world’s contrasts, §32.2, §32n9 human being, new, §109.2, §112.1 humanity, humans, humankind divine adoption of, §109.2 imperfection of, & feeling of absolute dependence, §60.1, §60n9 initially all are drawn into circle of preparatory grace, §116.2 limitation re: God, §10P.S. natural condition of, in collective life of sin, §4n13, §86.2 role of natural inclinations in, §158.2 “some portion of would be lost” is unacceptable presupposition, §120P.S. human life, development of, §59.1, §61 human nature, §13n4 Christ’s distinctive, §93.3, §94.1 community as essential feature of, §6, §6.1, §6.2, §110.1 inseparably mind-body, §7n9 no alteration in, §13n16, §72.3, §88.4

seed of God-consciousness in, §97.2 self-differentiating capacity of, §94.1 united with divine Spirit, §145.2

“I” & “me” def. of, §5n3 Christ positing self as an, §93.3 entrance of, not our own deed, §69.3, §69n7 incomplete sanctification of one’s at close of life, §114.1 same in all elements over time, §96.1 idolatry, §7.1, §8.2, §10n5, §68.1 immortality, §118.3, §158.1, §158.2, §158.3 first given to Christ’s human nature with the resurrection, §98.1 NT doesn’t require a theory of, §59P.S. if Redeemer is mediator of, then he is so for everyone, §158.2 uncertainty re:, §163.2 impetus (Antrieb), §3n18, §14n38, §78.1, §97.1, §108.6 impetus, impulse (Impuls), §14n38, §59n5, §110.3, §146.1 from God-consciousness, §64.2 living, §60.1, §60.4 as Redeemer gives the, activity is a joint possession with him, §100.1 those Christ received from divine love comprise an interrelation, §97.3 to action, §80.4 impression, from Christ, §14.1, §14n40, §88n13, §93n28, §97.2, §99.P.S. incarnation, §13n11, §97n11 Christ’s, §113.4 God becoming human (Mensch-werden), §97n16, §99n16, §105n40 individual(s) adding to Christian community, §6n5 agency of, spiritual, intellectual, §13n6 aims of in Christ’s perfection would no longer exist, §122.3 arriving in inner circle, are socially unequal, §117.3 in Christian community all are integral parts of one whole, §6n5, §93.3, §121.1, §125.1 each, is a representative of the entire human race, §71.2, §74n5 each a partial likeness of Christ, §125.1 at one’s fullness of time each, will be regenerated, §118.1 temporal continuity as the selfsame person, §106.1 individual being (Einzelwesen), §4n30, §72n25, §75n4 individual entity (Individuum), §10.3, §10n9, §13n23, §72n68, §73n7, §84.3, §84n25, §88n4, §130n10, §161n10 def., 33n14 individuality (Individualität), §10.2, §10n8 individual, states, in collective life of sinfulness vs. in community of life with Christ, §90.1, §107.1 infinity, free of limitation, §50.3 problematic divine attribute, §56.2 influence Einfluß, Einwirkung, §59n5, §112n17 humans & world on each other, §64.2 of preparatory grace, §108.2 requires active receptivity, §91.1 inner-outer dialectic, §48n7, §60n6, §73n6, §159.2 of sins, classification rejected, §74.2 insight, §44.1, §58.2, §64n8 inspiration, §10P.S., §13.1, §14n19, §14P.S., §132.2 explication of its meanings, §130.1 rigorous & definite sense of, §130.2 intellect (Intelligenz), def. of, §72n59 def. of, vs. Intellekt, §84n16 exercise of, §48.2

intelligence or rational soul, §96n34 relationship of, to organism, §34n6 will &, no reason to assume unequal progress of, §72.2 interconnectedness of divine good pleasure, encloses temporality, §120.1 interconnectedness of everything, §49.1, §164.3 interconnectedness of human nature, developed from Adam on, §89.1 interconnectedness of individuals across time & place, §71.2 interconnectedness of nature, §14P.S., §34.3, §39.2, §46.1, §94n10, §94.3 consciousness of, must be united with God-consciousness, §34.3 everything in it has a share in benefits of Redeemer, §89.3 evil can be present anywhere within, §48.2 no divine decision re: any particular in isolation from the, §147.2 interconnectedness with Christ, §91.1, §104.3, §110.3, §114.1 interconnected process of nature, §8n1, §47, §51, §51.1, §52.1, §53.1, §55.3, §65.1 conditions dependence on God, §46 finite causes &, §47.2, §54.1 including human nature, §34n4 Naturzusammenhang, §79n9 no support for divine causality outside of, §54.2 scope of, §46.1 stands in for Universum, §51n3 totally dependent on God, §47.1 unity of, §51.1 what it is comprised of, §51.1 interconnected shared self-initiated activity, §124.3 interconnection (Zusammenhang), §19, §27n3, §91n6, §120n19, §136.4, §140, §147.2 interpretation, art of, §25P.S., §25n9, §27.2, §27.3, §27n12, §74n31, §159.3 intuition (Intuition), §72n59 intuition, Kant’s usage of term, §15n2, §61n16, §64n8 Islam, Islamic (Mohammedian), §8.3, §9.2, §158.3 Jesus Christ misused as proper name, §96.1 two natures in one person, §96 Jesus (of Nazareth), §85n8 baptism of, did not confer anything he did not already possess, §103.2 completed humanity’s creation, §89.2 condition for decreasing faith in, §88.2 deeds & discourses of, §128.2 distinctive dignity attributed to, §89.2 efficacious action of, developed historically, §89.2 extraordinary distinctiveness of, §88.2 founder of new religious community, §11.3 God-consciousness of possible only apart from collective life of sin, §88.4 life of, nothing depicting body or mind of, §98.2, §98n18 people have faith in him as in one who became supernatural, §88.4 petition to Father re: “glory,” clarity re: his meaning impossible, §99.P.S. piety referred to him, §11.3 redemption accomplished via him, §11 regarded as the Redeemer, §22.2 as the second Adam, §89.2 self-proclamation of by word & deed, §45n24 as Son of the Father, §170.2 unique relation to, in Christianity, §11.4

why chosen, §120.2 Jesus’s life, §12.1, §93.3, §94.3 Jesus’s sinless perfection, §88.2, §89.2 Jews, §12.1, §12.2, §45.1 John (writer of Gospel), §124.2, §170.2 John the Baptist, §42.1, §103.1, §117.2, §128.2, §136.2 joy, §3.2, §3.4, §5.4, §85.1, §108.3, §146.1, §146.2 Judaism, Jewish people, §9.2, §12.1, §50.1, §158.3 Christianity &, §11n2, §12n2, §27.3, §86n4, §93.2 Jesus’ relation to, distinction from, §93.2, §93.4 Judas, §45.1, §45n23, §105n31 judgment, §27.2, §27n3, §99.1, §142.2 judgment, last, §159.3, §161.3, §162 just (Recht) & justice (Gerechtigkeit), other meanings of, §84n3 justice, §81n45, §84n2, §104.4, §104n47 justification (Rechtfertigung), §84n3, §109.4 based entirely on Christ’s influence but mutually conditioned with receptivity in faith, §109.3 being right with God via proclamation, §119.2 can’t be conditioned by good works, §112.1 def. of: changed relationship with God, taken up into community of life with Christ, §107 divine activity in, customarily attributed to the Father, §108.5 divine activity of, is a part of general ordering of the world, §119.1 of each individual not rooted in an isolated divine decree, §109.3 includes: forgiveness of sins & God recognizing one as a child of God, §109 must occur such that it is unimaginable without a process of conversion, §107.1 truly occurs only insofar as one has faith in the Redeemer, §109 Kenntnis & Kennen & Erkennen, defs., §14n39 kindness (die Güte), §85n2 or goodness, §85.1, §85.2, §85n7 knowing (Wissen), §3.4, §3n11, §16.2, §16n12 comparison of Wissen & Erkennen, §55n10 as confident surety, §3.5 (See surety) def. of, §14n39 excise alien matter from domain of, §39.2 objective, §55.3 only a co-mingling of self-initiated activity & receptivity, §55.1, §55n8 a scale in differing degrees, §55.1 knowing, perfect in re: things, §55.2 knowing process, ecclesial disintegration re: classical, §16P.S. knowledge (Erkenntnis), §28.1, §72.5 def. of, §3n2, §5n3, §10n32, §14n39, §46.1, §61n44, §74n28 scientia media mediating, no need for, §120P.S. three kinds of, §55.2 which we call belief, §112.1 Kraft, power or strength, §53n3, §54n19, §81n39, §93n20, §100n1 of redemption, §105.2 Kräfte, geistige, spiritual strength, def. of, §7n6 lack of blessedness (Unseligkeit), §86n3. See also blessedness (Seligkeit) language, §15.2, §16.2, §28.1, §45P.S. See also dialectical language law, §2.2, §10.2, §13.1, §83.2, §89.3, §107.2, §108.2, §112.5, §112n28, §145.1 does not trace production of external action back to internal mind & heart, §112.5

of God, consciousness of requires God-consciousness, §74.3 relation to ceases in unity with Christ, §101.2 tends to separate the individual from one’s collective bearings, §108.2 law-giving & distributive action, human, must & should be just, §84.1 leadership, in the church, elders & lay deacons, §145.2 entire community arranges for & apportions it, §134.2 executive, in one person or all are both in Evangelical spirit, §134.3 lay & clergy, §85n2 spiritual, §145.2 legislation, §112.5, §145.2 legislative activity,§144.2, §145.1, §145.2 life animalistic vs. spiritual, §5.1 with Christ, growing dominion over flesh, §111.1 force, Christ as of the church, §124.3 functions of, §6.1 functions of mental, §3.4, §7n7 held in common, entirety kept in view, §77 transition in, explanation of congruity between two elements of, §107.1 two conditions of can’t persist together but can’t be divorced as long as sinfulness is operative: sinfulness & community with Christ, §107.1 as a whole, more active & more passive, §9.1 See also element(s) of life; higher life; new life; scientific (wissenschaftlich): life, via perception; sensory: life life, hindrances to, §61n1, §75n13, §76.2, §78.2, §82.2, §83.1, §84.2, §101.3, §101n12 locus, def., §110n8 of propositions, §18.1 logos (λoγoς), §13n22, §99.P.S., §105n16, §170.2 critique of notions of relation of, to Christ, §97n11 longing for communion with God, §108.6 for a redeemer hastens its contentment, §86.1, §88.2 in two forms: rejection of community of sin & positive desire, §108.2 Lord’s Supper, §117n12, §127, §127n3, §134, §142.3 apex of public worship, §127.2, §139.2 common meal preceded by religious dialogue & common prayer, §139.3 does not produce an effect by itself, §127.2 early history of views & oppositions, §140.3, §140.4 idea of, vs. form of observance, §127.2 contra notions of §140.3, §141.2 not the sole medium for vital community with Christ, §127.2 obedience to Jesus’ words of institution, §139.2 partaking of unworthily, always involves imperfection in the church itself, §141.1, §141.2, §142.3 real presence, §140.4 relation to Passover, §139.3, §143.3 relation to Scripture, §139.1 rule: no partaking of consecrated elements outside communal partaking, §140.2 serving to children a serious superstitious impropriety, §141.2 shared church doctrine can be set forth only re: effects of, §140.4 welcoming all who desire to be there, §127n3

love, §4n23, §86n1, §114.2 for Christ & for God, §112.3, §121.3, §124.2 for Christ a unifying principle, §121.1 when church’s love would not be the same as Christ’s love, §149.2 consists in more than law, §112.5 def. of, §4n30 disclosure of Christian in every area of common life, §139.1 grounds legislation that is a good work, §112.5 for human beings, §72.2 only full love casts out fear, §8P.S.1 same as willing the reign of God in its full extension, §121.3 self-denying, §104.4 sermons on, §85n11, §86n1 love & wisdom divine causality presents itself as, §165; cf. §56n22 each is contained in the other, §165.2 Lutheran, §140.4, §156.1 Lutheran & Reformed communities, grown together vs. separation, §24P.S. magical, §45.2, §47.2, §76n3, §77.2, §101.3, §102.3 applied to redemption makes it superfluous, §162.1 conception, def. of, influence mediated by nothing natural, §100.3 infant baptism, §108.4, §137.2 picture of Christ’s suffering, §101.4 as sacrifice in the mass, §141.2 Manichean, §22, §22.2, §72n26, §72.3, §76n6, §80.4, §81n11, §81.3, §120P.S., §151.2, §158.2 bordering on, §65.2 critique re: results of inequality in, presuppositions, §118.2 view of devil, §45.1, §72.3 manifestation (Offenbarung), §93n5, §100n16 vs. revelation, §6n7 materialist or atomistic thought, §158.1 maxim, §104.4, §139.3, §149.3 status of, §7n13, §100.3, §100n21 meaning, ways of conveying, §6n10 mediation, of Christ’s presence, §105.1 mediator (Vermittler), Christ as, §101n14, §104.6 memory, §161.1 mental (geistigen), mentation, §59n14 mental disposition (Gesinnung), §15n5 mental functioning (Besinnung), §15.1, §15n5, §5n16, §49n2, §81n25 when conditioning God-consciousness, §60.1, §60n8 mental life, powers & states, §3.2, §7.1, §60.1 mercy (Barmherzigkeit), §85 message, news (Botschaft), def., §84n29 Messianic, §12.1, §12.3 metaphysics, §30.3, §35n4 method (Methode), §15n2, §19n9, §31.2, §50.1, §50.4, §66.1, §84.1 re: attributes, §20.2, §50.3, §64.2 dialectical, §16n8 (see also dialectic) might (Macht), §54n2, §59n5, §72n6, §72.3, §93.4, §144n1 vs. Kraft & Gewalt, §72n31 or power, §105n2 mind, def. cognitive functioning, §59n14

frames of, §72n60 mind & heart (Gemüth), §6.2, §59n14, §72n39, §72n59 changes in, §45.2 def. of, §7n5, §7n6 mind & heart, state(s) of (Gemütszustand), §6.3, §6n11, §6P.S., §8.4, §9n7, §15, §30.2, §66n2, §72n59 basis for dogmatic structure always lies in direct description of, §31 calm & reflective, §16n5 Christian, §13P.S. def. of as a cognate term for Zustand, §76n13 facilitates unfolding of one’s God-consciousness, §34.3 when in greater community with Christ, §34.3 inner, originative, §15n1, §15n2 internal, evident in all elements of one’s life, §35.1 reason indispensably belongs to, §13.2 reverberates in thought & action, §26.2 See also religious states of mind & heart; stirrings of mind & heart ministers of the Word, §137.3, §145.2 ministries of teaching & serving, §134.1 ministry (Dienst), or service, §45n24, §108n50 ministry/service of the Word, §34.3, §127.3, §133 all Christians are directed to, §108.5, §127.2, §133, §134, §135, §143.2 miracle(s), §14n19, §14P.S., §44n6, §46n18, §47.1, §47.2, §81n49, §84n22, §88.2, §103.4, §103n14, §108.5 absolute, §47.2, §93.3 account of, §14n22, §47n2, §86n1 Christ’s community not a, §88.4 by Christ’s disciples, §103.4 in Christ’s life & work, §47n2 forming canon of Scripture not an absolute miracle, §130.4 Holy Spirit as a second great, §124.3 miraculous in every natural event, §14n22, §14n41 not absolutely supernatural, §14n41, §47n2, §110n14 only true: Christ’s appearance, §47.1, §47n5, §108n51; cf. §103 reign of God is the distinctive, accomplished by Christ, §103.1 miraculous, §49P.S. analogy to revelation, §93n11 something assumed to be, in accounts of Jesus’ birth, §97.2 what is actually, presupposes interconnectedness of nature, §34.2 monolatry (Monolatrie), §8.1, §8n6 monotheism, §8, §9n13, §70n11, §72n40 aesthetic type, §2n12 Christian, §6n3, §29.2 teleological type, §2n12, §11 monotheistic faith, §8.3, §8.4, §8n18, §58n5, §62.2 mood(s), §17n4 more complex than feelings, §72n60 Stimmungen, includes tempers, §72n60 moral (sittlich), §9n17, §74n17, §88n17 ideal endpoint (telos) of, §9.1 moral custom (Sitte), §9n1 morality (Sittlichkeit), §9n1 moral notions & sensations, §117.3 morals (Moral), §3n13, only part of domain of morality, §9n1 Mosaic legislation or law, §84.3, §84n29, §103.2, §104.3

Mosaic narrative, §72n17, §72.3, §72.4, §72.5, §75.1, §76.3, §82.1 mysterious, mystery, mystical, mysticism, §30n4, §56n6, §100.3, §100n3, §101.3, §117.2, §124.2 mythical, as a historical presentation of something supra-historical, §163P.S.2 myths, mythology, §10P.S., §22.3, §36.2 natural order, §76n3 God is engaged in, §47n1 is rational, §13n28, §13P.S. redemption & ordering of nature are wholly one, §164.1 natural process, characterized, §46.1, §84n21 nature (Natur), §96.1 two incommensurate meanings re: Christ, §96.1, §96n14 nature (Wesen) of a thing or concept, def., §4n1, §101n3 vs. existence (Dasein), §56n3 vs. nature (Natur), §94n3 nature, physical, §7.2, §7n9, §43.1, §43.2, §41.2, §47.2, §48.2, §74n29, §77P.S. Christians placed in general process of, §34 created & preserved by God, §86n1 dynamic view of not yet arisen, §41.2, §41n19 open to influences of spirit, §14P.S. See also interconnected process of nature; nature (Natur) Nazarean or Ebionites’ heresy, §22, §22.2, §22n4. See also ebionitic, def. of necessity in re: to contingency, §120.3 need for redemption consciousness a condition for, §13.2 for a particular redeemer, §22.2 species, §64.1 new birth, gradual, §108.2 new collective life. See collective life new creation, §11n13, §89n2, §93n28, §119.3, §164.3 assuming a, through the Redeemer, postulates a supernatural procreation of some kind, §97.2 Christ bears its entirety, in himself, §94.2 new human being, §112.1, §126.1, §141.1 new life, §99n25, §106.1, §108.2, §108n31, §116n2, §121.1, §123.3 continuity of it, §111.3 does not evenly permeate the entire organism of the person, §123.3 is eternal, requiring no increase over time, §118.1 in it a person is unity of self-consciousness & a mixture of divine & human, §123.3 re: precise beginning of, §108.2 in process of becoming, §106.1 seeming to be only preparatory & introductory, §159.1 new spiritual life, advancements & interruptions, §141.1 New Testament, §14P.S., §40.2, §45, §99P.S., §127.2, §129.1 authentic in origination, §131 canon, §14n34, §116n2, direct warranty not found in, §27.3 first in a series of presentations of Christian faith, is norm for all succeeding presentations, §128.2, §129, §131 God there is always “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,” §32.3 only portion of Bible used, §27.3 norm, dogmatic, §19.3 obedience, §104, §104.1, §104.2, §104.3, §104.4

union with Christ consists of, §112.1 See also Christ, high priestly office of objective consciousness, §30.2, §46.1 observation (Betrachtung), §14P.S., §14n24, §15n8, §24.3, §43.1, §46.1, §46P.S., §47.2, §90.1 capacity for, to be advanced, §45.2 closer, of faith-doctrine, §40.3, §40n13 self-conscious, §2n12 office of the keys, §127.3, §§144–145 displays ordering of mutual influence of whole & individual, §127 power of, arises by internal ascendancy of common spirit over personal existence, §144.1, §144.2 Old Testament, §11n4, §12n3, §14P.S., §27.3, §132.2 account of creation, §59P.S. excluded from Christian canon but in our Bible via NT references to it & no share in normative worth of the New Testament, §132 prophecy re: election & retribution, §103.3 prophetic sayings re: Christ, §99n27, §128.2 worship use, §29n5, §132 omissions in CF are not arbitrary, §91.2 omnipotence, §47.2, §51.2, §54.2, §54n19. See also God, divine omnipotence of one, what is outside us & other posited as, §4.2 one All, vs. all things, §38.1 One & the all, the, §8P.S.2, §8n32 no identity between, §8n27 oneness (Einheit), vs. singularity (Einzigkeit), §56n2 one source, everything persists indivisibly by the, §54.1 opinion, §24.3, §46P.S., §96.2 ordering of life, civil legislation & rules of any sort of art belong to it, §112.5 order of salvation, §12.3 organ, organism, §100.2 def. §59n16 no one is yet entirely an, of the Spirit, §145.1 vs. medium of presentation, §59.2 of the whole, §145.1 organic whole, being within an, §6n5 organization, of human influence on world, §59.1, §59n16 original (ursprünglich), expression re: creation-preservation, §34n6, §37, §37n1 original goodness of humanity, residue of, remains in human nature, §70.2 original perfection of humanity, §49n2, §57.1, §58.1, §60, §65.1, §66.1, §75.1, §75n9, §108.6 inborn, §72.5, §72n55 mental functions belong to, §60.1 not invalidated through presence of sin, §68, §68.2, §68n15 tendency to God-consciousness inherent in, §70.2 original perfection of the world, §59, §65.1, §75.1, §76.3, §82n10 humankind &, §58.2, §59.1, §59n5 includes spirit coming to fore enabling flesh’s resistance to it, §67.2 original righteousness, vexed idea, §61.4 original sin actual sin &, §69P.S. as collective, §71.1, §71.2, §71.3 def., §86n1 occasioning vs. occasioned, §72.6, §72n70 orthodox, vs. heterodox, §22n11, §25P.S., §25n8

orthodoxy, §84n22 pain (Leid) of contrition vs. self-disapproval, §108.3 as an indicator of what is to be done, §101.1 vs. physical pain (Pein), §5n26 pantheism, §4n9, §8n10, §8n20, §8n26, §8P.S.2, §8n27 contra, §4n22, §8P.S.2, §8n31, §46.2, §49.2, §53.2, §53n8, §53.2 paradise, §57.2, §61.2, §61n10, §86n1 pardoned status (Gnadenstande), §91.1, §91n4 passive states, §46P.S., §59.1, §76.2, §78.1, §108.6, §109n24 Paul, §11n14, §12.2, §40n2, §52n4, §72.4, §74.2, §76n6, §81n15, §81n16, §84n29, §89.2, §99.1, §105P.S., §109n19, §109n21, §109n23, §112n20, §112.5, §117n8, §117.4, §120P.S., §124.2 Pauline presentation of Christ re: sin & death, §76.3, §99.P.S. peace, §4n23, §5n34, §43n2, §101.2 Pelagian, §22, §61.5, §63n2, §65.2, §72.3, §74.4, §80.4, §81.3, §118.2, §120.2, §120.4 def., §22.2 penal desert, §84n18, §109.2, §109n19 penal evil (Strafübel), §84.3, §84n20 penitence, §108.3, §108n30 Pentecost, first event of the actual church, §124.3, §136.4 perceivers (Anschauenden), §16n13, §92n4 perceptible, §73.2, §99.1 perception (Anschauung), §3n2, §15n2, §24.3, §54n7, §55.2, §55n25, §58.1, §58n1, §72n59, §81.3, §81n35, §89.3, §162n9 def. of, §7n5, §85n3, §96n30 simple (bloße Anschauen), §92n3 of the universe, §10n1, §58n1 See also sense-perception (Wahrnehmung) perception & feeling, §4n23, §5.1, §5n4, §61n16 entangled between subject & object, §5.1, §5.2 perceptual experience, def. of, §64n8 perfect (vollendet), meanings of, §109n30 perfectibility, notion of, §93.2 perfection, §33n21, §57.2, §83.1 def., or completion, §58n4 of human being as such, §58, §58.2 not referring to primeval or ideal world, §58n4 perfection of the world, §58, §58.2, §58n4, §59P.S. def., §57.1 See also original perfection of the world person of developed sensibility, §8n27 as a distinct Existenz, §13.1, §13n13, §74.4 each individual becomes a new, in & of oneself, §12.2, §100.3, §108.3 one nature of a, in ordinary usage, §96.1 one’s, is bound to some local collectivity, §118.1 problematic, if two natures in, §96.1 personal existence (Persönlichkeit), §4n27, §28n17, §73.2, §91.2, §121.2, §144.1, §158.1 before new collective feeling, §101.2 in Christ, §6n6, §13n15, §33.1, §89n2, §104n63 Christ’s, §104.3, §158 def. of, §73n7, §104n63, §162.1 personal life emerges via deeds, §97.2 person-forming action of human nature, §120.2

union of divine with human nature in persons of faith is not, §123.3 persons, moral, §7n10, §14n13, §14n27 Christian church as a, §21.1, §121.2 persons of faith, distinguished among themselves, more or less so, §36n5, §86.1, §126.1 strengthened by each religious turn inward, §139.1 philosophy (Weltweisheit), §12n12, §28.3, §28n1, §28n18, §46.2, §46n9, §60n18, §81n26, §158.1 philosophy of religion, §11.5, §11n26, §28n7. See also theology, philosophical piety (Frömmigkeit), §3.3, §3.4, §3n2, §3n9, §5n10, §8n32, §9.1,§15n2, §32.3, §46.1, §46P.S., §47, §69.2, §72.3, §78.2 aesthetic, def. of, §9.1, §9n14 basic feeling of, §3, §3n8, §54.1 church necessary to facilitate a life of, §9n2, §9n21, §16.2, §150.1, §154 def. of, §3n13, §60.1 entangled in sensory self-consciousness, §3.5, §3n8, §5n19, §11.5, §6.3, §72.5 essence of, §3.4, §74n28 essential feature of life, §46.1, §62.2 may grow while other functions lag, §7.1, §10.2 no automatic rise from objective consciousness, §3.4, §33.3 rooted in feeling as self-consciousness rises, §8n10, §32n5 should always rest on revelation, §10P.S., §10n40 teleological, §9.1, §59.1, §76.1 traces everything re: God-consciousness to sin or grace, §70.1 See also Christian piety; communal piety, unity in piety, Christian, §11.5, §28.2, §64.2, §66.1, §70n20, §71.4, §72.2 pious (fromm) trans. “religious,” §2n13 personal existence, def., §106.1 pleasure (Lust), §3n14, §4n13 contrast: lack of pleasure, §5, §50.4, contrast: pleasurable (angenehm), §5n22, §9.1, §48n1 indicator of a state, not activity, §98.1 lack of pleasure (Unlust), §3n14, §4n13, §59.3, §108.2 must exist in sinless manner in Christ, §98.1 poetic, §45P.S., §52.1, §52n9 polemics, §3.4, §8n18, §11n1, §18n5 polity, §2n1, §24.4, §24P.S. polyolatry (Vielgötterei), §8.1, §8n6, §8.3, §9.2 polytheism (Polytheismus), §4n9, §7.3,§7n14, §8.2, §8n6, §10.1, §96.1 posit (setzen), def., §46.1 positive vs. natural, §2n2, §10P.S. postscript in theology, role of, §26.2 powers & activities, interlocking, §121.1 power or holding sway (Gewalt), §105n3 practical theology, §12n3, §19n5, §28P.S., §28n21 prayer, §43n2, §47.1, §47n8, §147.1, §147.2 at, church is in full consciousness of its internal states & external circumstances, §147.1 for calm acceptance, §146.1, §147.3 correct anticipatory feeling re: church in relation to world becomes, §146 critique of directing them only to Christ, §83.2, §105.2 def.: intimate combination with God-consciousness of a wish for best success possible, §146.1 to the Father, §104.5, §105.2 full faith in Christ is a condition of its being heard, §147.2 prayer in Jesus’ name, §§146–147 in Christ’s name, §104.5, §136.4 desire not to limit it by seeking saints’ intercession, §127.3 is based on his sensibility & spirit & greatest concern, §147.1 is the likeness of Christ’s kingly activity, §127.3

without it no progress in a self-contained whole animated by a common spirit, §127.2 preaching (Predigten), §14n15, §15n9, §35.2, §85n1, §93.5, §120.2, §123.3, §123n25, §128.2 faith comes only through, §121.2 no proofs in, §33.3 See also proclamation (κήρυγμα); proclamation (Verkündigung) predestination, §119, §119.1, §119.2, §119.3, §120P.S. critique of bifurcated (“double”) notions of, §119.3 preparatory grace. See grace, preparatory presentation (Darstellung), §14.1, §17n5, §59n7, §97.4, §104.4, §104n37 presentational action, §3.5, §3n17, §15n11, §112n13 presentational-didactic discourse, §15n11, §15n16, §16, §16.1, §16n7 presentiment (Ahnung), §10n32, §14n9, §14P.S., §66.1, §71n28, §72.4, §72n59, §74.3, §84.4 aroused capacity for, §103.3 contrast to knowing, §6.4 of divine origin of church, §113.4 insufficiently supported capacity for, §159.2 re: redemptive process, §80.2 of release from need for redemption, §14.1 of something better, §94.3 of state without internal contradiction, §74.4 presentiment, dim, foreboding (Ahndung), §14n9, §159.1, §159.3 of the true God, §7.3, §7n14 preservation, §36n6, §37n1, §38.1, §46, §46.1, §47.1 as absolute dependence on God, §46.2 appearance of Christ is viewed as, §89.3 concept of, gains full content only re: consciousness of grace, hence refers to “divine causality,” §164.2 concept of creation must refer to, §89.3 division of categories in, §46P.S. by far less problematic doctrine, §37n1 general, governs Redeemer too, §98.1 hidden in treatment of divine government of the world, §37.1 of power of Christ to redeem & make blessed, §89.3 same as natural causation, §46.2 uses of the doctrine, §37n1 of world by God is good, §76n1 prevenient divine grace, §108n32 better termed preparatory, §108.2, priesthood, §102.2, §104.6 Christian, §141.2 hereditary, §6.4 priestly people, implications of Christians as, §104.6 principle (Prinzip), §20n1, §24.3, §27n2, §39.2, §48n8, §93n27 basic, re: every religious feeling, §36.1 that Christianity is to develop as a historical force, §126.1 Christ’s animating, §100.3, §104.3 def., a moving originative source, §110n16 motivating, §124.2 moving, §47.1, §47n10 that our Christianity is the same as that of the apostles, §127.2 repressed, §75.1 unifying, §121.1 procedure (Verfahrung), §15.1, §15n8, §28.2, §54.2, §55.2, §80n15, §81n36, §84n22, §90.1, §91.2, §95.1, §96.2, §158.1 of always citing Scripture disadvantageous, §27.3

critical, §9n5, §17.2 in dogmatics re: proclamation, §19.1, §19n7 for ecclesial doctrine, §95.2, §95n5 procedures (Verhalten), §13P.S., §20.2 process, §10n1, §11.1, §34n6, §38.1, §47n1, §51.1 complex, §4n8, §84n21 pragmatic, §19n9 proclaim (kundgeben or verkündigen), §10P.S., §14.1, §14n15, §14n41, §15.2, §105.2, §105n20, §109.3 by word & deed, §10n34, §11n21, §14n15, §45n24, §105n20, §120.2 proclaim (verkündigen) vs. know & declare (kundgemacht), §130n9 proclamation (κήρυγμα), §15.2, §90.1 proclamation (Verkündigung), §15n8, §15n9, §19n7 vs. the act of making known (Kundmachung), §10P.S., §10n33 by the apostles, §128.2 calling of, §16.1 designates immediately stirring, §18.3 of the Gospel, §151.2 inequality in, apostles to the present, §117.2 not restricted to preaching, §14n15 power of, & of love which seeks the salvation of humans are same, §114.2 receptivity to, with great force, §120.1 of the reign of God both teaching & prophecy, §103.1 rhetorical & poetic, §18.2 by utterance & presentation, §18.3 progress, approaches consummation only asymptotically, §114.1 proof(s), §14n19, §81n49, §83.1, §100.3 apagogic, §3.3, §3n6 bring forth only an objective consciousness, §33.3 vs. contentment in relation to Christ, §100.3 def., §33n2 for existence of God, what supplants, §33, §33n2 and not viewing our experience as strictly personal, §139.1 possible only in mathematics, §100.3 vs. a quite firm conviction, §88.1 from Scripture, §27.4 in Scripture, used only with Jews, §14.3 strict, cannot be adduced re: miracles, §103.4 why no scriptural, §88.2 proof-texts, §27n4, §27.3 prophecy, §13.1, §14n19, §14P.S., §88.2 Christ as apex & end of all, §103.2 three marks of, §103.1 prophet(s), §102.2, §102n2, §103.1 prophetic doctrine, §84n23, §89n2, §159.2, §159.3 def., §58n4, §81n50 why statements of, are not faith-doctrine, §157.2 prophetic utterance, §163P.S.2 propositions, §13P.S., §16P.S., §18.1, §27n3, §28.2 borrowed are only lemmas, §2.3 re: human bear an anthropological content, §30.2, §30n7 second order, def. of, §27.1 See also doctrinal propositions (Lehrsätzen); dogmatic propositions Protestant, §23n6, §24.3, §25.2, §27.4, §28.2 limits on def. re: distinctive nature of, §2n14, §24.3

Protestant Scholasticism, §81n36 Protestant vs. Roman Catholic, §19, §23, §23n3, §23n6, §23.2, §24, §24n1, §24n7, §24.2, §24.3, §24.4, §27n1, §27P.S., §27n16 prototype (Urbild), §93.1, §93n2, §104.4, §146.2 Christ as the actually given spiritual, §93.2, §93.3, §93.4, §104.4, §125.1 vs. general exemplar, def. of both, §93.5 providence, divine, §38.1, §46n1, §53.3, §58.3, §76n3, §118n7, §164.3 always expressed as divine government of world, §46n18 def., Christ’s power to save (bless) all humans, §119.3 impediments in this alien term adopted by Christians, §164.3 psyche, §7n5, §10P.S., §20n10, §45.2, §103.3, §103n28 as body-mind, §3n8, §3n15, §7n5, §9n1, §46.1, §49n2, §68n13, §72n59, §88n17 cooperation of, entails concurrence of will, §108.6 forms in, §3.3, §3.4 Seele, §20n10 psychology, §3.3, §14n38, §20n10, §49n2, §71n13, §72n21 descriptive empirical, §28n7 philosophy of mind, §3n7, §5n3 studies Psyche, §68n13 psychology of religion, §11n26 public gatherings, importance for shared confession of faith & edification, §134.3 public opinion, role of, §145.2 punishment, §76.1, §84.1, §84.2, §84.3, §84n18 in the afterlife, can’t be discussed on basis of our self-consciousness, §84.3 consciousness of deserving, §71.4, §71n30, §84n18, §109.2 consciousness of deserving, doesn’t end when another bears the punishment, §101.3 for sin, §44.2, §74.2, §104.4 purifying action, §8n18 purifying effort, §24.3 vs. forced into reforming, §24.1

Quakers, Society of, §136.4 rationalism, §26n2, §81n36 vs. absolute supernaturalism, §13n34, §22P.S. rationalist academics, §25n1 vs. heterodox, §25n8 rationality, then & still in dispute, §61n15 reality, §30n4, §72.3, §72n45, §82n25 approaching, §29.2 of Christ’s body, §22.2 clouded sensibility for, §98.1 examines claims re: what is, §48.3 historical, of the church, §126.2 includes a tendency toward sinning, §98.1 Realität, §32n14, §159n6 of this world wherein we meet God, §41.2 Wirklichkeit, §159n6 reason, §8P.S.2, §19.4, §32n20, §47n1, §60n15, §75.1 is the same in all & each, §123.3 vs. rational self-consciousness, §94.2 vs. revealed & inspired, §10P.S. reassurance (Beruhigungsmittel), def., §86n5 rebirth, §119.1, §120.2 meanings of, §112n9 not a sudden transformation of one’s concept formations, §149.1 onset of in contrition, §108.2 Wiedergeburt, regeneration, §108n38 receptivity (Empfänglichkeit), §3n2, §4n5, §6n10, §59.2, §70n13, §89.3, §94.2, §109n39, §124.3 in household-religious communities, §6.4 implanted at onset & developing, §89.3 for impulses from God-consciousness, §66.2 occurs & remains in self, §3.3 passivity &, none in God, §55.1 precedes self-initiated activity, §4.1 of redemptive activity can’t operate independently in oneself, §92.1 in response to Redeemer, §91 vs. self-initiated activity, §9n7 self-initiated activity coexists with, to Christ immediately passes into self-activity, §108.6 Recht, meanings of, §2n9 reciprocity, §4.2, §5.1, §5n8 God with world, not human-like, §8n20 none between creature & creator, §147.2 recompense, §84.1, §84n7 proceeding from divine justice not recognized by Christian self-consciousness, §84.1 punishment vs. positive reward, §82n19 redeemed, §45.2, §85n4, §92.1 distinctive constitution of the, §90.1 living, short of perfection, §33n21 moved by the Holy Spirit, §13.2 or released from sin, §70n20 Redeemer, §6n5, §11.4, §13.2, §22.2, §29.3, §59P.S., §68n23, §80.2, §80.3, §80.4, §89.2, §89.3, §94.1, §96.1, §100.1, §101.4, §108.6 activity & dignity of, refer to each other & are inseparable, §92 activity of, is world-forming & object is human nature, §100.2

act of, becomes one’s own act, §100.1 actuality of, precedes full consciousness of sin, §68n23 appearance of the, is emergence of a new stage of development, §88.4 being in community with, def. of, §100.1, §108.6 being of God in him, §96.1 community of life with, no element can be strictly passive, §29.1, §32.1, §108.6 continuing efficacious action of, §11n2 criteria re: Christ’s calling as the, §99.2 death of, end of all sacrifice, §86n4 dignity of, §92.2, §93.1, §97.2, §97.4 divine activity is sole active agent in, §100.2 dominion & strength of God-consciousness in, §81.2, §94 ecclesial view of, can it be justified as the original view? §99.P.S. efficacious action of, §15.2, §93.1 expression of divine decree re: redemption, §13n22 how faith could recognize Jesus to be, §88.2 faith in the Redeemer, §101.4, §158.2 formulation re: neither docetic nor ebionitic, §96.2 had a conscience only empathically, §83.2, §83n7 has no need for redemption, §22.2, §93.3 if he is mediator of immortality, then for everyone, §158.2 humanness of, forms organism for his primary strength, §68.3, §96.2 human powers in, same as in each member & in the whole, §125.1 influence from the distinctive self-initiated activity of the, §80.1 is it futile to draw an account of him from singular odd sayings? §99.P.S. no inner struggle in, §93, §93.4 passes on his sinlessness to regenerate persons, §70n9 person of the, §93.3, §136.2 as prototypical: God-consciousness, §68.3, §93.2, §94.4, §100 reconciling activity of, §101 redemptive power of, from birth on, §11.4, §22.2, §29, §74.2, §83n6, §86, §86.3 sinlessness of, doesn’t alter his identity with human nature, §68.3, §94.1 sinless perfection & blessedness of, §72n42, §75n10, §88, §91 strength & purity of will we see in, §83.2 suffering of, arose from sin’s resistance ever since he appeared, §101.4 supreme spiritual liveliness of, §81.2 redemption (Erlösung) ability to receive, can’t disappear, §22.2 accomplished via Jesus, §11.3 accounts of require Christ’s whole life & work, §82n12 apart from, no one is secure against some sin, §10n16, §11.2, §11.4, §11.5, §11n21, §11n23, §22n2, §45.1, §63n10, §73.2, §86.3, §108.5, §113.4, §120.3, §122.3 appropriating, is a deed embracing Christ, §63.2, §63n9, §120.3 completely comprehensible before Christ’s suffering & death, §101.4 conditions for full expression of, in piety, §74n28 def. of, §11n8, §11n23, §68n21, §71n29 does not arise from an individual’s spiritual force, §63.2 efficaciousness of, gradually, §81.2 faith in, §70.2 gifts, fruits, benefits of, §11n21 heresy re: compromises, §22.2 innermost in all regenerate persons is entire truth of, §149.1

interconnected process of, §74.2 longing for, §14P.S. must be communicated, vs. simply aroused or released, by Christ, §92.1 need of, §11.3, §14.2, §64n3, §68.1, §83, §86.2, §89.2 §91 not grounded in divine holiness, §83.3 ordained for entire human species via Christ, §83.2 outside of, good develops alongside wicked, §72.5 process of, human & divine aspects, §8n1, §83.2, §83n6 purely sensory views of God re:, §33.2, §33n15 Redemption, §11n23 relation of freedom & bondage to, §11n18, §74.3 why the term might not be consistent with communication of God-consciousness, §89 what is conditioned by, bears stamp of, §64.2 reflecting, §3.4, §39.2, §48.1 reflection(s), §3.5, §16P.S., §31, §45.2, §64n3, §81.3, §99.P.S., §118.1 Betrachtung, Contemplation, §4.1, §4n24, §72n45, §120.2 vs. mirror-reflection, §33.2, §55.1 Reflexion, §4n24, §15n8, §37.1 Reformation, §24, §25.2, §81n36, §103.4, §112n8, §138.2 Reformed & Lutherans, §24P.S., §27.2 Reformed school of doctrine, §97.5, §156.1 regenerate persons, §89.3, §111, §111.1, §113.1, §117.4, §118.1, §123.3, §125, §125.1 good works of, §112 sins of, §111 regeneration, §47.1, §47n9, §61n28, §84n3, §106, §106.1, §107.2, §108.1, §100n10, §115.1, §116.2, §117.4, §118.1, §120P.S., §122.3, §125P.S., §126, §137.2, §136.4, §144.2, §156.3 preparatory to, §136.4 reign of God (Reich Gottes), §9.1, §9.2, §9n18, §9n20, §9n13, §30.3, §43n6, §45.2, §46P.S., §71n17, §80.3, §90.2, §91.1, §100.3, §102.2, §102.3, §103.1, §103.2, §103.3, §103n24, §110.3, §112.4, §113.4, §115.1, §117, §117.2, §118.1, §119.1, §120.1, §120.2, §120.3, §120P.S., §121.1, §121.3, §122.1, §124.2, §127.2, §127.3, §130.2, §136.2, §146.2, §147.1, §164.1 general def. of, §9.2 reign of grace, §81n19, §105.2, §109.3,§119.1, §162.1 reign of the Father, §119.1 relationship (Verhältnis), §6.4, §28.3, §57n14, §72.4, §74n42, §91.1, §105.2, §107.1, §149.2 relationship with God, §70n20, §107.1, §107n2, §109.3 religion, §2n13, §3n2, §3n13, §6P.S., §6n14, §10n1, §11n5, §13n24, §19.4, §61n3, §62.2, §72n25, §100n13 religion, natural, §6P.S., §10P.S., §10n17, §91n1 narrow def. of the notion, §10P.S. religion, philosophy of, §2.2, §2n2, §§7–10 def. of, §2P.S.2 religious (fromm) or pious, §3n13, §5n19, §16n9, §6n17 def. of, vs. religiös, §10n25, §18n4 religious (religiös), §3n13, §6n12, §16.2, §16n9, §39n2, §106n2 def. of, §30n9, §39n7 religious communication, §19.3, §37.3, §39.3, §39n7, §45P.S., §45n27 religious consciousness, §11.5, §17.2, §28.2, §45.1, §49n2, §53.1, §82P.S., §86.2, §126.1 religious development, §59n3 religious elements of life, §10n25, §11.3, §56P.S. religious experience, immediate, §8n29 religious feeling (fromme Gefühl), §6.3, §14n6, §28.1, §32.3, §46.1, §46.2 def. of, §4n23 religious formation, def. of, §20n11 religious interest, §23n5, §36.2 practical vs. theoretical, §80.4

vs. scientific spirit, §58n1 religious life, §5.4, §8n32, §11.2 religious self-consciousness, §5.4, §6, §14P.S., §16.1, §18.3, §34n5, §46.1, §50n24, §59n3, §59P.S., §62.1, §70n11, §88n13 analysis of stages of, §61n16 basic facts of, §27.4 Christian, §13P.S. Christian vs. Jewish or heathen, §76.1 coincides with relation to nature, §46 contemplate it via what belongs to it, §50.4 immediate, where God & humans are internally in touch, §81n49 new modifications of, §29.2 not instigated with all sensory self-consciousness, §46.1 participates in disparities belonging to temporal life, §62.1 popular expression of, §16P.S., §16n15 presupposed & contained in Christian stirrings, §28.1, §32, §46n2 relation to objective consciousness, §46.2 relation to sensory self-consciousness, §57.1 religious states, sensory factor in, §5.3 religious states of mind & heart, §6n11, §7.1, §11.1, §15.1, §19.4, §26.1, §29.1, §29.3 where distinctions of are insignificant, §23.3 in Reformed/Lutheran not different, §24P.S. religious stirrings (frommen Erregungen), §6.3, §10P.S., §11n5 all refer to lack of redemption, §11.3 distinctiveness of, §10n22 each modifies existence, §26.1 equal strength among, §11n6 essentially proceeds into activity, §26.1, §26.2 expressed in interconnectedness, §34.3 heightened, §103.3 inner affective states re: piety, §20n11 miracle not required by, §47.1 overpower pleasure/not pleasure contrast, §9.1 producing always implies community, §6P.S. in re: self-consciousness, §15.1 social circumstance & resonance, §9.1, §9n6 sources of, §9.1 when such underlies dogmatic expression, §27.3 when such underlies Scripture passage, §27.3 transmitted by signs & symbolic actions, §15.1 religious stirrings of mind & heart (fromme Gemütserzeugnungen), §5.4, §21.1, §21n3, §30.2, §53P.S. described in sequence, §18.3 given in natural interconnection, §18.3 propagation of, §6.4 summons to uninterrupted, §5.5 repentance, §74.2, §109.2, §111.4 & being a child of God, §109.2 def.: combining of contrition & change of heart, §108 distinguished by inner no-longer-willing-to-be-under the sway of sin, §110.2 & self-knowledge, §117.3 represent (repräsentieren), §19n6 def. of, §17n5, §51n2, §60n15 vs. imagine or have notion, §57n5 the very nature of God, §167.2 resistance, §91.1, §108.6, §120.2 to sin is a harbinger of repentance & consciousness of forgiveness, §111.3

rest, def., untroubled surety re: final outcome, §146.1 complete state of, adversely affected by the loss of others, §120P.S. resurrection, §99, §99.1, §159.3, §161, §161.1, §163 Christ’s is guaranty of ours, §99.1 why never used to testify to divine in Christ, §99.1 retribution, §84n6, §84n10, §159.1 revelation, §16n1, §92n5, §122.1 Christ as, §13n12, §47n2 confusion results from calling sacred Scripture this, §130.1 conscience as revelatory, §13n20 def. of, §10P.S. divine, §14n41, §45.2 of the divine decree makes for blessedness, §118.1, §118n3 of God, meaning of phrase, §4.4 of God in Christ is sufficient & inexhaustible, §103.2 in God vs. in science, §3n2 mediated vs. immediate, §10P.S. no pretext for opposing nature, §13n21 not absolutely supernatural or natural, §13, §13n1, §13n2, §47n2 Offenbarung, def. of, §100n13 reception of, always subject to error, §100n13 Scriptures contain a, §128.1 what can become a, §94.2 what is not, §10P.S. reverence, §4n23, §8n20, §99.P.S. for God, §163.1 reward, §84n6, §84n14, §112.3 rhetorical, §20n3, §47n14 vs. didactic, §105P.S. righteousness, §43n2, §61n37, §104.3 divine, one-sided notion of, §162.2 Gerechtigkeit, §61n39, §70n20 inborn fitness for receiving divine summonses, §61.4, §61n38 possible, §72.6, §72n66 righteous reaction (Gerechtigkeit), in God, acting in love, §33.2 Roman Catholic, §23n2, §76n6, §140.4 disputes with Evangelicals re: Lord’s Supper, §140.1 way of thinking, §87.3, §87n5 Roman church, §24.1, §25.1, §25n5, §34.2, §43.1,§103.4, §104.4 critique of re: faith, §108.1 explanation of sinlessness preferred by, §61.5, §61n47 five of its sacraments are byproducts of our two, §143.1, §143.2 on justification, §109.1 relationship emphasizing it rather than Christ, §102.3 re: works & conversion, §109.3 rule(s) (Regel), §13n33, §16n8, §20.2, §20n1, §26.1, §39.3, §41.1, §61n14, §73.1, §81n16, §92.2, §93n6, §120.4, §122.3, §129.1, §161.2 applicable to what is “good” & “faith,” §26.1, §26n2 distinctions among, §54n40 governing religious expression, §49P.S. of (hermeneutical) art, def., §103.3 See also canon Sabellians, §97.2, §172.3 sacraments, §127.3, §143, §143.1

sacrifice, §80.4, §86.1, §104.4, §104n1, §141.2 salvation via action not cognition, §10P.S. divine order of, §118.2 God arranges conditions for, §14n31 new order of, §14P.S., §14n31 not contrary to natural order of, §117.4 universal (apokatastasis), §47n6 sanctification, §26.2, §70n20, §106, §108.1, §108.2, §121 analogy with the living union of human & divine in Christ, §110.3 approaches likeness to Christ, §110.3 begins with regeneration, §108.4 community of faith with Christ via a series of common actions, §100.1 constant vs. varying features in, §110.3 contrast between feature belonging to its starting point & one belonging to its goal, §110.3 countering resistance to Christ’s influence in, §110.2, §110n13 danger from sins in, that held sway before regeneration, §111.4 def., a life conformed to Christ’s perfection & blessedness in community of life with him, §110 def., elements belonging to the new life increasingly fit together while those of old life recede, §106.1 distinguish from regeneration, §110.2 every element of, includes a not-willing-for-oneself & a willing-to-be-in-community-with-Christ, §110.3 gradual process of, §118.1 growing toward being exact same as Christ, §110.1 growth in: progressive appropriation of functions, §84n3, §110.2, §113.4 Heiligung, §84n3 in re: holiness, §110.1, §110.2 human nature during, is an instrument of divine force, §110.3 of individuals includes all that holds & extends community of faithful, §106.2 law has no value in domain of, §112.5 long succession of generations living in, §117.3 natural forces of the regenerate are appropriated for Christ’s use in, §110 no new sins develop in, §111.1 original sin &, §71n17 proceeds from community of life with Redeemer, §162.1 process of, §136.4, §148.2 how regenerate consciousness operates during advances in, §119.1 role of good works in, §112n8 sin can win no new ground in, §110.2 something sinful still exists in, §111.1 surety of, §45.1 varying features in, §110.3 Satan, §44.2, §44n8, §45.1, §45.2, §72.2, §72n18, §72.3, §76n6 satisfaction, §44.1, §66.1, §80.4, §104.4 scholastic, §27n1, §28.3, §44n6, §50.1, §55.3, §81.1, §96.2, §98.1, §124.2 scholasticism, §28n5, §46n10, §55.3 science (Wissenschaft), §1.2, §1n2, §3n11, §16.2, §19n9, §37.2, §37n18, §74n28 appeal to religious self-consciousness in, §33P.S. components definitive of, §19n9 dogmatic theology as, §19 more nearly exact, & final knowledge, §14n39 positive, §1n2 theological, §1.1 sciences life, metaphors drawn from, §8n25 natural, §94.3, §158.1

re: non-human & physical, §9n1 physical & ethical, §1n2 Physik, physical sciences, §88n17 scientific (wissenschaftlich), §6n4, §17.3, §19.4, §19n6, §23n5, §25P.S., §26n2, §28.3, §30.3, §49P.S., §53.1, §96.1 construction, copositing of God underlies, §18P.S., §33P.S. institutions vs. religion, §3.1 life, via perception, §3n2 terminology, psychological, ethical, metaphysical, §28.1 value, §17.2, §17n6 Scripture, §13.1, §14P.S., §127.2, §139.1, §160.2, §161, §161.2, §162.1, §163.1, §163P.S. allusions given in, §159.1 alone, principle of, §33.3 appeal to New Testament, §27 attributes of Christ found in, §99.P.S. authority of, §27.4, §33.3, §128.1, §128.3, §159.2 belief in, what belongs to, §103.4 biblical expressions & dogmatic language, §61.4 confessional statements re: §27.1 deciding what use to make of, §27.3 demonstrative argument in, §14.3 efficacious action of, §131.2 Evangelical conception of, does not place tradition alongside it, §127.3 ever work of Holy Spirit, §127.2 exegesis of, no special rules, §27n12 inspiration of, §14n41 interpretation of, §19P.S., §27.4, §131.2 investigation of, §59P.S. language of, where not required, §27.3 literal vs. figurative reading, §140.4 most ready likeness of Christ’s prophetic activity, §127.3 most value belongs to the main subject of, §129.2 narratives re: initial planting of Christian church, §121.1 nonauthoritative assertions in, §82n5 normative worth of, §131.2 options re: preserve & refer to as is, or harmonize with its spirit, §127.2 passages torn out of context, §27.3 production of, belongs to reign of God, §130.2 proper ground of faith within, §14n2 reflection on as a whole, §99.P.S. sacred authors of, are simply reporters, §99.2 spirit of being faithful to, §145.2 spirit vs. letter of, §123.1 typus of, def., §45P.S., §45n29 uses of, §27.3, §103.2, §145.2 witness of, §108.5 witness to Christ is found in & in ministry re: Word of God, §127 Scripture, canon of collection of, does not belong to apostolic age, §130.4 composing vs. compiling the books, §130.1 Holy Spirit’s role in forming, §130.4 trust in founders of, implies allowing critical research questions, §131.1 Scripture, doctrine of incarnation belongs to, §97.2 why necessary, §127.2 no special, assumed, §128.2

not the source of Christian faith, §128.1 propositions of, must express authentic original features of Christian piety, §128.3 specially inspired, easily acceptable to those who already have faith, §128.2 unattested claims in Scripture, belong to doctrine of, §99.2 Scripture, Holy not the basis of faith in Christ, §128 special authority is presupposed, §128 as a work of the church, most directly brings Christ to mind, §127.3 sei (is, be, would be), §3n8 self, §38.1 incapacity of, is a deficiency in community with Christ, §32.1 as an object, §15.1 self-absorption, §46.1 self-approval, self-reproach &, §3.2 self-conscious, state of being, §34.1, §34n1 self-consciousness, §11n7 analogy between willed & contemplative modes of, §109.2 apex of, §5.3 when apprehended as just personal, no anticipatory feeling accompanies, §114.1 when apprehended as shared feeling, §114.1 articulation of is a moral activity, §26.2 as the basis of one’s will, observed in its transition into activity, §107.1 community of, first humans not included in, §72.1 in community with Christ, §109.4 conjoining of sensory & higher, §57n12 content of, §82.1, §82n9, §82.2, §86.2 determination of a state of, lacking in pleasure, §66 determinations of, §3.4, §3.5, §30.1, §49.1 where differently determined, §10.2 distinctive, of one taken up into community with Christ, §106 effected by other beings, §34.1 emerges by God, §38.1 if extended to totality of finite being, §54.1 as finite being, §5.1 formations of, §5.1 general, not varied & accidental, §33 God-consciousness realized in, §60 God’s being & Christians’ meet in, §32 incidental form of, §6.1 inner determination vs. outer expression, §6P.S. interconnectedness in, corresponds to that of concepts in objective consciousness, §34.1 limitations of, §4.2, §26.2 moved by consciousness of sin is repentance, §109.2 none re: beginning of being, §39.1 objects of, §53.1 one that is diminishing in reference to self, §110.3 how operates in regenerate, §119.1 personally oriented, §118.1 preeminent & primary reference of, §10.3, §10n11 in relationship with God is not quiescent or at rest, §107n2 represents finite being, §36.1, §51.1 requires a finite causality, §49.1 sensory determination of, §30.1 of sin & grace, §118.1 species-consciousness &, §121.3

stirred or moved, §15.1, §49 subordinate reference of, §10.3, §10n11 of those who have faith, §92 three levels of, §5.1, §5n9, §5.3, §5.4 two features of, §4.1 unity of, §3n2 See also Christian self-consciousness self-consciousness, higher, §13n27 depends on sensory being stimulated, §33.1 determinative feature of, §17.1 free vs. bound, §28.1 lack of pleasure in sinning, due to diminished God-consciousness, §66.1 pre-established harmony between flesh &, §75.1 sensory separated from, yet mutually relatable, §33.1 temporal element in is referred to lower, §5.4 weaker emergence of, §5.5 will to be at one with lower self-consciousness, §57.2 self-consciousness, highest, conjoined with lowest, §5 identifies with all finite being, §8.2 not only carried in thought but in acting as well, §107n2 perseverance of, §5.3 posits sensory kind, §5.3 reflects in thought its immediate relation with God in feeing, §107n2 self-consciousness, immediate, §5.4, §5.5, §16P.S., §156.1 as a distinct formation of feeling, §3, §3.2 higher, §39.3 highest level of, §6.1, §7n5 immediate religious, §37.3 self-consciousness, personal, attained only by being conscious of communal, not considered in & of itself, §123.3 self-consciousness, religious. See religious self-consciousness self-consciousness, sensory, §5.3, §5.4, §8.2, §11.2, §89.3, §94n12, §111.1 coposited in all Christian religious stirring, §34.1 def. of, §7n5 feeling of absolute dependence &, §46.2 higher, separated yet mutually relatable, §33.1, §34n5 immediate, §5.5 provides boundedness & clarity, §5.3 relation to religious self-consciousness, §57.1 unites with God-consciousness, §48.2 self-contradictory, what is, is neither a thing nor knowable, §55.2 self-initiated activity (Selbsttätigkeit), §9n7, §61n3, §122.1 bearing an influence on, §33.2 capacity for, with receptive self-consciousness, §57.1 combines self-consciousness of dependence & freedom, §49.1 cooperating, §91.1 a distinct impression precedes every, §104.4 elements of, §9.1 emitted from within, §60n4 gained with memory, association & repetition, §61.3, §61n20 vs. mere reaction against life-hindering influences, §78.2 most unhampered, §32.2 of new collective life original in Redeemer, §93 no living being bereft of all, in any moment in life, §108.6 object of activity is given to us, §4.3 receptivity &, §4.1, §46P.S., §71n13

restriction of, points to inoperative mastery, §78.2 root of all species-consciousness, §59.2 during sanctification is willing-to-be-determined-by-Christ, §110.2 transition to free self-initiated activity, §122.1 selfishness (Selbstsucht), personal & broadened kinds of, §121.3 self-organizing activity, found in all spiritual relations, §113.2 self-preservation, generally a duty, how also for Christ, §104.4 self-reproach, in judgment & shame, §3n9 self-righteous “pious,” narrower sense of, §6n15 sending (Sendung), §109n29 sensation (Empfindung), §72n59 or feeling, what remains in resting consciousness, §98.1 state of, vs. state of mind & heart, §85n3 stirred by a stranger’s suffering, §85n3 sense impression plus a notion passes into consciousness of an object, §55.2 sense-perception (Wahrnehmung), §2n8, §5.1, §5n5, §7n5, §33P.S., §46P.S., §50.1, §53.1, §66n2, §72n39, §72n59, §85n2, §92n3, §95n2 base level of inner mental functioning, §98n3 re: creation & God’s consciousness, §46.1 def. of, §3n5 error when internal phenomenon are viewed as externally oriented sensory, §99.2 vs. higher perception, §18n3 included in all Christ’s redeeming activity, §97.3 strengthens consciousness of ourselves as sinful human beings, §98.1 subject-object contrast passes into, §5.4 well-marked domains of experience, §28n9 See also perception (Anschauung) senses, not in themselves humanly evil, §86n1 sensibility (Sinn, Sinnlichkeit), §4n26, §15n5, §72n59, §84.3, §93n21, §149.2 sensory, §5.4, §5n1, §43.2, §43n10, §72n59, §84.3, §94.3 drive wherein divine causality occurs cooperatively, §81.3 features vs. capacity of God-consciousness, §66.1 influences from, presupposed at higher levels of mentation, §72n59 life, §5.1, §69.3, §69n6 sensory consciousness, three general levels of, §7n5, §86n1 sensory drive, an expression of it in every self-contained sinful element, §81.3 separatist tendencies, §108.5, §108n56, §121.1 servitude, escape from, §84.4 sexual urge is not thoroughly bad, §97.2 shamefulness (Schamhaftigkeit), §61.2 shared feeling (Mitgefühl), §24.3, §85.1, §85n2, §85n6, §139.2 of the church, §137.3 consciousness of sin as a, §100.1 how enacted, with exceptions, §145.1 of a future lack of blessedness, §118.2 no contradiction between, & our God-consciousness, §118.1 right expression of, prevalent in Evangelical church, §115.1 at sensory level in re: is joy, §85.1 as sympathy or compassion, §4n13 re: things Christian, self-consciousness is the general form of, §113.3 with those left behind mars blessedness, §118.2 of the whole exists within the state of each, §142.3 yields being at peace over new converts, §118.1 shared joy (Mitfreude), §4n13, §156.2 shared religious feeling (fromme Mitgefühl), def. of, §9n15

shared sorrow or compassion (Mitleid), §4n13 simplicity, §56.2§56n17, §56n19 sin, §63, §64, §64.1, §64n10, §66n1, §69.2 advantage of, for the sake of redemption, §79.1, §80.2, §80.3, §81.1, §81n1, §81.4, §108.1 attribution of first, §70.1, §72.6 beginning of, where it can occur, §98.1 being without, in any moment does not depend on us, §86.2 blame for, §81.2 blunts & deranges spiritual, §75.2 can be revealed within some good & by virtue of that good, §68.2 can’t exist at all if it can’t be grounded in God, §84.4 collective act of humankind, §72.4, §72.6, §76.1, §82.3, §87.3, §93.3 conditions for actualization of, §98.1 consciousness of, dominates outside of domain redemption, §66.2 consciousness of, two features bound together, §71.3 consciousness of dominion of & disappearing of, §86.2 consciousness of sin & sin, when simultaneous, §66.1, §66.2 conscious of, both grounded in us & beyond us, §69 correctly conceived as collective act of the species, §77.1 critique of concept of, as violating divine law, §66.2 critique of formulas differentiating types of, §60P.S., §74n9, §111.2 critique of “it is not possible to sin”, §98.1 critique of strictly material concept of, §79.1 darkening of God-consciousness by, §70n8 def. of, a distortion of nature, §68 def. of, a hindering caused by autonomous sensory functioning, §66.2 def. of, all that hinders free development of God-consciousness, §66.1 def. of, a moment’s being filled without determining activity of our consciousness of grace, §80.1 def. of, brief, §64n5 def. of, force & work before God-consciousness comes to fore, §67 depends on passivity of will against sinfulness, §67n4 deterioration of world by one’s, §76.3 development of God-consciousness, §66.1 diminishment of (Entsündigung), §84.2, §84n19 does not alter human nature, §72n67 does not contradict original perfection of humanity, §68.2 entire interconnected process of, §77.1 emergence of, §59P.S., §124.1 equality in proper value of all, §74.1 exists in relation to what is good, §81.3 exists insofar as consciousness of sin exists, §68.2 exists when we desire what Christ holds in disregard, §66.2, §66n14 expresses what is isolated from unified whole in our development, §68.2 God as “author” of, §61n1 God-consciousness present in condition of, §66n3 greater & lesser exist only in re: efficaciousness of redemption, §74.1 as ground for evil, consequent requirements, §78 grounded in, §69.2, §79.1 growth in, grounded in susceptibility moving to committing sin, §72n61 against Holy Spirit, notion of, §74.2, §74n30 how it comes to consciousness, §68.2 ignorance of (Unkenntnis) vs. incomprehension (Unwissenheit), §74n16 of incomprehension, def., §74.2, §74n17 increase in, brings an increase of evil as well, §78.3

individual, fault of others in also lies hidden, §78.3 individual human value same in re:, §74, §74n1 inertia a physical component of, §77n7 intentional vs. unintentional, §74.3, §74n18 is sinner’s own free deed, §81.2 its being with & alongside grace is ordained by God, §80 in itself can’t be ordained by God, in re: to redemption it can be, §81.3 vs. lack of formation, §68.2 mortal & venial, relation, §74.2, §74n20 never just a lack of some capacity, §81.3 no instant can be completely filled up with sin, §81.1 none can exist in sanctification that could end regeneration, §111.1 none is entirely one’s own, §82.3 not conceived as first free deed after awakened God-consciousness, §72.5 not ordained & willed for its own sake alone, §80.2 not ordained by God & does not exist for God, §89 no warrant for bringing forth evil in response to sin, §78.3 of one can bring punishing evil to those not at fault, a glaring injustice, §84.2 persistence of, & divine omnipotence, §65.1 presence of, before God-consciousness emerges, §66n1 presupposes a commanding will of God, §81.1, §81n17 presupposes original perfection of humankind, §68.2 presupposes some degree of God-consciousness, §81.1 of regenerate vs. unregenerate persons, §74.4 reject grading of human states in, §74.3 relationship to redemption not same in all, §74 requires self-consciousness in order to arise, §66.1, §66n5 resistance to, in new human being even in sinful actions, §111.1 rooted in divine causality, §81.2 seed of, §66.1 seen as conflict of flesh & spirit, §66, §67.2 state preparatory to, §94.1 three kinds: knowingly & willingly, premeditated, persisting premeditatively, §111.2 transmission of, passive vs. active, §72.6, §72n72 turning away from God is sin, §63 turning away from sin, §108.1 unintentional, are incomprehension or hastiness, §74.2, §74n15, §74n16 venial, in the regenerate, §74.4 victory over, how & when, §104.4 See also original sin sin, actual, §§73–74, §73.2, §86n1 all equal re: emergence, nature & character, §74.1 in each generation brings original sin for the next, §72.6 expression of desire vs. defilement of God-consciousness, §74.2 held in common, §84 is appearance of susceptibility to sin, §74.1 is continually issuing from original sin, §73 vs. original, §71.2, §72n21, §74.4 types of, inseparable, §74.2 sin, state of within interconnected process of nature, §65.1 never simply passive & determined from elsewhere, §81.2 sin, susceptibility to (Sündhaftigkeit), §70n1, §73n4, §81.2, §84, §97.2, §98.1, §110.1 actual sin in relation to an initial, §72.4, §72n7, §72n40 already imparted to every individual, §7.1, §70.1, §70n8, §70n9

before any deed, incapacity for good, §70 can spread to all functions of psyche, §72n59 collective, def. of, §71.2 def., §72n59, §74n3 defiles tendency to have God-consciousness, §70.1, §72.5 disappearing collective life of, §101.4 dominion of, §110.2 fault &, §70n1, §71.1, §71.2, §71n22 feeling of having, held in common, §71.2, §71n21 grounded before & outside each one, can’t be extirpated completely, §110.2 grows through exercise from birth, §71.1 has some locus in oneself, §101.2 influenced by past, influences future, §71.2 inherent in interconnected process of nature, §73.1 innate, §72.5 is self-effected originating original sin, §71.1 natural imperfection &, have same source, §77.2 not based on change of human nature by a first sin, §72 original, §72.5, §72n61, §84.2 punishment &, §71.1 reinforced from outside the self, §110.2, §110.3 removed only through influence of redemption, §70 vs. sinfulness, §72n23 some lack of consciousness re:, §71.3 victim’s susceptibility not cause of evil they experience, §77 sin & evil, §54n36, §76.1, §78n1 sin & grace, §29n6, §64n1, §64.1, §64n2, §64n3, §64n7 sin & redemption, persisting relation to God, §79.2 sinful, §70n9, §74.1, §74.2 non-Christian views of what is, §72.3 status, equality of all in their, §117.2 Sündigkeit, §72n42 sinful humanity (sündigen Menschenheit), §73.1, §73n5 sinfulness, §70n9, §86n1, §87.3, §89.2, §91.2, §117.2, §125.1 characteristics in consciousness of, §66.1 collective life in, §88.1 exercises falsity & perversity insinuating itself into religious consciousness, §126.1 implies some natural force preceding development of spirit, §161.1 knowledge re:, §74.2 when no longer productive, consciousness of sin not same, §89.2 possible primordial, §72.6, §72n66 due to relation of intellect & volition, §93.3 in relation to regeneration, §126.1 thoroughly collective in nature, §71.2 sinlessness (Sündlosigkeit), §73n4 assuming, in the Redeemer postulates a supernatural procreation of some kind, §97.2 sinless perfection, def., moral excellence not enough for attributing, to a being who could rescue us from sin, §88.2 sinning, §73.1, §81.1, §98.1 Sitte, def., §6n4, §60n27 not restricted to morals, §3n13 Sitten, customs in social domain, §61n12 sittlich, domain larger than morals, §9n1 social entities as “persons,” §6n6 sociality (Geselligkeit), free, def., §77n8

societies, §6.1, §10P.S. society (Gesellschaft), §77P.S. being determined in a, §10P.S. readiness for more reflection & contemplation in, §15.2, §15n3 Socinian, §140.4 Son begetting of, if eternal, §41.1 Christ as, has taken over some power from the Father, §147.1 of God, §13n19, §13n22, §96.1, §96n13, §99.P.S., §103.2 of man, §99.P.S., §99n18 & Word, confusion between, §41.1 soul endures only in its constancy of consciousness, §161.1 immortality of, §158.1 lower powers of, obedient to higher, §61.5 restoration of all souls, if sudden, §162.1 slight dominion of, §61.5, §61n42 species, §7.2, §10.1, §13.1, §46P.S., §54.2, §61n20, §72n24 completion of, §93.2 concept of, contra demolishing, §117.1 genus &, §7n8, §10.3 human, §82n11, §89.3, §93.2, §109.3, §120.3 impermanence of, §46P.S. nature of the, (Wesen der Gattung), §72n25 species-character, not lost as a community develops, §7.2 species-consciousness, §6n5, §8n27, §34.1, §38.1, §71.3, §93.2, §121.3, §125.2 anticipatory feeling &, §114.1 bifurcation in vs. gradual transition of ours, §118.1 can be a powerful impetus along with God-consciousness, §121.3 expressed externally only in contrast between reign of God & world, §80.3 expressions of God-consciousness must not refer to, §60.2 feeling of, passes into thinking, doing, §6.2 indicates that divine good will is protective & caring of humanity’s best: God-consciousness, §166.1 interconnection with self-consciousness, §60, §60n1, §73.1 no natural principle developed without Christ being operative in it, §121.3 self-initiated activity at root of, §59.2 turns notions into imitations, §6.2 speculation, §8P.S.2, §13n26, §37n18, §50.3, §50n3, §59P.S., §111.2 vs. actual religious domain, §37.3, §50.1, §50n1 domain of, vs. dogmatic, §20.1 excluded from explication of divine attributes, §90.2 is what is presented if what is historical is separated from it, §126.2 not properly dogmatic, §16P.S. structured presentation of doctrine in, §27.4 speculative discourse, about God, §56.1 speech, §16.1, §16n8 spirit, §59.1, §56.2, §70.3 actions of, §60.1 activity of, bears intensive & extensive quantity, §67.2 always embodied, §59n7 Christian, could be recognized only gradually, §129.2 conscious of as one, §67.2 development of, fitful, §67.2 distinctive of Protestantism, §24.3 divine vs. human, §96.1

dominion of, over flesh, §104.4 Evangelical, §24.4 vs. flesh, §68.1, §68n11, §104.4, §157.2, §161.1 freedom of, §84.3 Geist, def., mental or spiritual aspects of Psyche, §72n59 Geist, refers to all mind’s functions, never just to intellect, §69n2, §93n21, §94n19 gifts of, have a determinate basis in human, §7n6, §15.1, §34n2, §126.1, §161.1 by which Gospel is proclaimed, §43n2 includes intellect & objective or subjective consciousness, §60n17 interconnected process of nature &, §60.1 vs. letter, §27.2 as soul, §60.1, §60n12 of truth, §7n13, §130.3 Spirit, activity of, §112.5 efficacious action of, §145.1, §161.1 how identified in different elements & individuals, §131.3 inner workings of it, aimed at presentiment re: imperishability of, rises to surety, §159.2 regeneration, §136.3 spirit, common. See common spirit Spirit, divine, §12n3, §14n41, §83n2, §108.5 activity of, in collective, §147.2 already present within reason, §13.2, §13n25 from the beginning with God & is God, §170.2 coming of the, §99n30 communication of the, §10.2, §10n6, §116.1, §122.1, §136.3 error that grieves the, §149.3 fruits of, are Christ’s virtues, §124.2 inner ascendancy of, effects discernment & acquiescence like Christ exerted, §68.1, §144.1 what it gave to the apostles, §14P.S. living by, §84n29 in processes of higher life, Spirit, Holy Spirit, & Spirit of Christ, are the same, §100n3 as organ of the world order, §169.3 possesses organism gradually, §149.1 sending of, Christ sometimes ascribes to self & sometimes to Father, §99.P.S. ultimate effects of, also reason’s, §13.2 See also Holy Spirit Spirit, the one, is active within the whole & enlivening it, §121.1 is the same in all who partake of its individualized gifts, §123.3 spirit of truth, §7n13, §130.3 spirits, evil, §43.1, §43n1 spiritual, §48n4, §72n7 vs. from sense-oriented, §28.1 spiritual character of Christ’s works mediated by physical appearance, §105.1 spiritual domain of life via redemption, from meager to advanced levels, §120.3 spiritual life, §14n5, §74.1, §74.4, §75.1 §149.3, §162.2 as communicated perfection & blessedness of Christ, §159.2 innermost mysteries of, §13.1 new, in the Redeemer, §94.3, §94n18 stronger as God-consciousness is greater, §74.1 spiritual manifestation, is temporal & entwined in contrast, §56.2 spiritual nourishment for every person of faith in Lord’s Supper, §140.3 spiritual organ, receptivity & self-initiated activity a single capacity, §55n2, §103n13

spiritual power, §13.1, §14P.S. spiritual presence of Christ via written word & picture of his nature & work therein, §105.1 spiritual states, §9.1 are not independent of the way they emerge, §127.2 spiritual welfare of human beings, §147.1 state (such as nations), §2.2, §7n2, §17.1 lack of a godly, three kinds of, §33.2 vs. religion, §3.1 varied developments of, §7n1 states (of things), §10P.S., §14.1, §26.2, §26n3, §38.2, §53.2, §60n6, §70.3, §80.4, §81.3 of absolute dependence, §49.1 active, §46P.S. descriptions of human, are basic dogmatic form, §30.2 faithful vs. nonfaithful, image of separation between, §162.2 of peace & blessedness, made by Christ, §89.3 See also passive states stirred, readiness to be, §117.4, §117n13 stirrings, §45.2, §54n32, §55n41, §59n8, §69.1, §108.1 accompanying knowing & doing, §60.1 affective, popularly attributed to God, §55.3, §55n42 contain their own inner determinacy, §81.2 expressing restraint or promotion of life, §48 fully within absolute dependence on God, §48 from influence of collective life of Christians, divinely caused, §108.2 of religious consciousness, 56.2 of self-consciousness, §46.1, §48 stirrings of mind & heart (Gemütserregungen), §15.1, §15n7, §32.1, §48.1, §115.2 Christian religious, §37.1 def. of, §7n5 religious, §17.1 religious, as formed dialectically, §16P.S. struggle, against sin, §93.4, §111.4 subject (Subjekt), §14n27 capable of consciously registering stimuli, §33n7 def. re: having agency, §4n4, §9n13 when object not distinctly separated, §5n2 place within totality of being, §30.1 reciprocity with a coposited other, §4.2 subjective, purely vs. purely objective, §74n28 subjectivity, in religion, §61n32 subject-object contrast, §5.4 suffering of Christ not mentioned at all, §101.4, §101n18 contra positing a divine capacity for, §97.5 Leiden, also means passivity, §104n11 not a lack of blessedness, §101.2 not desirable with domain of redemption, §78.2 for others, by one person, §77.2 supernatural, §26n2 assumptions regarding events, §49P.S. event cancels concept of nature, §47.2 re: God, §13n5 includes ideas disconnected from Christ, §13P.S. intervention, §43.1

naturally conditioned, §13n12 perspective, §76n3 used to refer to what is not understood, §46.1 supernatural become moral nature, §88.4 supernatural become natural, §8n32, §13n21, §117.2, §120.1 in Christ, as historical fact, §61n3 does not annul laws of nature, §47n2, §47n5 supernaturalism, vs. rationalism, §22P.S. superrational, §13.2, §13P.S., §13n5 superstitions, §86.1, §101.4 Supreme Being (das höchste Wesen), §5P.S., §8n12, §8n29, §10n1, §12n1, §16P.S., §42.1, §46.1, §47.1, §49.2, §50.1, §50n5, §50n23, §50.3, §52n9, §55n34, §55.3, §76.1, §81n10, §83n2, §96n24, §97n3 how all three persons might relate to, §171.1 ascribing jealousy to, §162.2 being linked with, brings absolute satisfaction, §110.3, §110n19 complete indwelling of, in Christ, §94.2, §94n13 def. of, §168.1 eternal separation in, not expression of any religious self-consciousness, §170.2 Holy Spirit in re: to, §172.3 influences ordained by, §9.1 no mistake possible in, §107.2 not a nature, §97.5 not a thing, object or being, §56n6 not bound by anything, §56.2, §56n11 perhaps both “God” & “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” designate it in the same way, §172.3 preparing for union with humans in church’s common spirit, §136.1 provides the theater for redemption, §56n22 as referent of feeling of absolute dependence, §8.2 in relation to persons, §4n30, §9n13 responsibility when life is difficult, §48.1 as such, §170.1 unity of vs. plurality of higher beings, §8.1 surety (Gewißheit), §15.2, §29.2, §30.2, §33n2, §46.2, §68n19, §147.2 re: advancing dominion over sin by God-consciousness, §68.3 of Christ’s collaboration, §104.5 connected to God-consciousness, §57.1 def. of, §14n4, §68n19 of faith, §110.2 of feeling, §5P.S. gaining or obtaining, §18.2, §77.1 in higher self-consciousness, §14.1 knowing as confident, §3.5 purely factual, §14.1 of religious stirrings, §56.2, §61.1 re: Scripture, §27.3 system, §16n1, §19.4, §28.2, §51n3, §82n5 of all being, §8.1 teleological character of Christianity, §56P.S., §58n4, §59.1, §100.1 teleological modes of faith, §85.1, §85n8 defined by ideal aims, §63n3 emphasis on human self-initiated activity in, §63.1 Judaism & Christianity identified as, §63n3 teleological tendency, §9n17, §57n14 telos (final end, consummation), §58n4, §60n18, §85n8

temptation, §98.1 domain of, lies in the domain of one’s calling in the reign of God, §111.4 external, §73.2 story, §45.1, §98n10 susceptibility to, §72.2, §72.4 tension between church & world, why more or less, §113.3 testimony, refers to codeterminates of religious stirrings, §58.1 theology based on receptivity to grace via faith, §8n27 biblical, proof texts in, §109n21 consummation of, §19P.S. depends on philosophy for form only, §19P.S. encyclopedias of, §1.1 as faith seeking understanding, §77n1 historical, divisions of, §19n4, §19n5, §19n6 historical embeddedness of all, §8n18 interdependence of its branches, §19P.S. may cohere with philosophy & scientific knowledge, §8n27 mediating, §22n11 nondogmatic disciplines of, §24n7 not of itself religion, §3n2 responsibility of church leaders, §19n3 speculative, purely, §56.2 supernaturalist, §81n36 systems of, §84n22 theoretical disciplines of, §19P.S. wrongly severed from Christian religion, §33.3, §33n24 theology, Greek, §53.2 theology, natural, §50.1 contra, §11n14, §13P.S., §29.2, §103n16 so-called, or speculative, §83.3 theology, philosophical, §11n1, §19n5, §19n8, §108n56 theology, practical, §84n6 re: wherever God-consciousness operates, §60.3 theology, rational/rationalist §2n6 conditions for its being Christian, §11.4, §11n25 theoretical vs. practical, §26n2 theories, artificially constructed, §72.4 theory vs. allegory, §40.2 thetic, def. of, §18n5, §19n2 three divine persons, §97.2, §171.1 threeness (Dreiheit), §96n23, §97n43, §170n16 presupposition of, in God, §170.2 unity &, how relates to divine causality, §171.4 why we must always begin with the unity, §171.3 time efficacy of original perfection of the world, §59P.S. endless duration of, §52.1, §52.2, §52n13 totality of being, §9.1 tradition, §95.1, §127.3, §128.1 transaction, process of, §115.2 transubstantiation, §140.2, §141.2 Trinity, §96n23, §97.2, §99.P.S. def. of, §37.1 ecclesial formulation of, does not immediately convey Christian self-consciousness, §170

nomenclature for, §37n11, §37n13 problem can be resolved only by approximation, §172.1 unity of the divine nature & threeness, §170.2 Trinity doctrine, §§170–172 all that is essential re: grace is posited Greek vs. Latin case re:, §171.2 described here, it is perhaps an initial, preliminary step, §172.2 distinctive properties & equality of persons in, difficulties identified, §171.3 with given features, as the copestone of Christian doctrine, §170.1 indications of what remains to be done, §172.3 inessential features of, §170 little required in the general formulas survives in exposition, §171.5 little toward securing or clarifying the two main positions, §171.3 not closely tied with basic facts of Christianity, §170P.S. not rising too quickly to judgment re: what it provided, §17.2 origin of, §170.1 still awaits reorganization of it from its very beginnings, §172 subject from §93–§172, §93n3 triune concept first founded on each uniting being traced back to a separate & independent Supreme Being in se, §170.2 Triune God, §82n12, §96n23 triunity, doctrine of, criteria for inquiry in, §64n9 use of “person” in Western, §96.1 truth, §43n2 acquisition of complete, re: God, §10P.S., §10n36 re: any collective life, §94.1 ascribed to what is thought to be possible, §54.2 of Christian consciousness, §87.1 church’s, into which Holy Spirit can lead, §126.2 clarified to gain greater efficacy, §155.2 conditions for being commensurate with the, §108.5 corrective force of, §153 of customary human nature, §104.4, §104n48 disclosed only through experience, §101.3 exact & irremediable, §44.1 external expression of internal, is falsified to a greater or lesser extent, §149.1 of faith, without ministry it could not be authenticated or efficacious, §127.2 between magical & empirical, §101.3 will prayer bear full, §147.1 tugging sadness & longing (Wehmuth), §108n37, §120P.S. distinctively Christian feeling, §110n20 turning point, active & passive features, §108.2 typus, §9.1, §93n28 unconscious, §5.1 admixture of receptivity & passivity, §55.1 contaminating influence from, §129.2 error attached unconsciously, §155.2 sensory stimulus falsifying an aim unconsciously, §153.1 unconsciousness, like that of inanimate objects, §108.6 understanding, capacity for, §44.1 uniformly, what the word does & does not mean, §117.1 unite vs. combine, §96.1, §96n23 unity or identity (Einheit), §170n16 in arrangement of world, §59P.S.

def. of, §10n2 depends on more than doctrine alone, §28.2 external, §24P.S. inner & outer, grounded historically, §10.1 universe (Universum), §3n2, §8n27, §10n1, §34n10, §50n5, §73n7 Unlust, def. of, lack of pleasure vs. pleasure, §66n2 vicarious satisfaction, §104.4 virgin birth, critiqued based on evidence & dogmatic value, §97.2 virtue, def. §61.4 always result of a struggle, §93.4 warranty, §92.2 Wesen, §8n13, §8n15 whole, §3n2, §51n2 how the core of being a human relates to the human organism taken as a, §97.4 parts always interconnected, §30.1 wickedness, §45.2, §48n4, §48.3, §73.2 Böse, or human evil, §73n12, §104n40 both condition & activity, §48.1 can benefit individuals, §48.2 counteraction to good, §45.2 in re: evil, §48.1, §73n12, §75.2, §75n13 among evils, §48.1 increase of, not properly a punishment for sin, §84.1 injustice or, §84.3 interplay & cooperation of, §45.2 not deduced from natural imperfections, §76.1 protection against, §45P.S. restraints on life, §48.1 strength in re: to good, §48.3 unnecessary distinctions in, §48n10 what can’t provide the nature or idea of, §83.3 wicked people, §48n4, §162.3 will act of, §44.1, §110n17 active, to unite with Christ is a good work, §112.1 concurrence of, def. of, §108.6 defects of, §149.1 distinctiveness of one’s, §81.2 fails to stop all intentional sins, §74.2 feeling underlies all expressions of, §3.5 force of (Willenskraft), inherent vs. willpower, §68n1 understanding &, re: ethics & doctrine, §83.1, §83n2 understanding &, usually placed together, §96.1 See also free will willful mortifications, no support for, §104.6 wisdom. See divine wisdom; “God, is wisdom” wisdom, absolute, where omnipotent love is present there it must be as well, §167.2 wishes brought before God & combined with God-consciousness, §147.3 wissen, indicates an active process of knowing, §55n10 Wissen, Gewissen, Ungewissenheit, def., §74n28 Wissenschaft. See science (Wissenschaft) witness of Scripture & in the church, §86n1

statements of, re: grace, §65.2 word as activity of God in & as consciousness, §13n22 God’s, figurative linguistic use of, §99.P.S. & Son, confusion between, §41.1 that is the Word: Father, Son & Spirit, §137.1 Word, i.e. prophetic activity of Christ, §108.5, §108.6 mediation of, in conversion, §108.5 Word-become-flesh, indispensable condition of his efficacious action, §118.1 world, §17.1, §30.2, §32.2, §34.1, §36, §38.2, §41.1, §41n27, §42.1, §46.2, §55.2, §58.2, §59P.S., §59n1, §59n25, §75, §75.1, §84n17, §84n21, §113.3, §120.3, §126.1, §164.1 being at one with, a living part, §32.2 best, notion of critiqued, §59P.S. body, §160.2 Christ’s appearance brings something new into the whole, §113.3 constituted with natural evil, §86n1 constitution of, in relation to redemption, §§113–163 def. of, §40.1 end of, §46P.S. everything particular in, was created only in & with the whole, §100.2 in re: to God, §35.1, §36, §40.1, §55.1 re: human dominion over, §59.2, §59n18 ill that is done to, can return as harm to humans, §76n1 impressions of, harmonize with God-consciousness, §57.1 manifold gradations of life in, §120.3 no consummate knowledge of, §46.1 no consciousness of absolute dependence on, §32.2 not evil in itself, §75n17 original harmony between humans &, §75.1 as original revelation of God (Paul), §10P.S., §10n35 in relation to particulars, §4.2 See also original perfection of the world; perfection of the world, world-consciousness, §32n15, §46.2, §57.1 has all as its referent, §57.1 world order, §76.1, §84.2 constitutes & surrounds the human species, §84n17, §84n22 World Spirit, §8.4 worship, public, §19.3, §19n10, §139.1 worship of God, §153.1 wounds theology, sensory details of, §104.4 wrath, §85.2 supposed divine, §104.4 wretched state, §11.2 Zustand, meanings of, §74n40, §76n13 Zwinglian, §140.4