Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation [1st ed.] 9789811545375, 9789811545382

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxiii
Introduction: Constructing and Negotiating Chineseness in the Age of Globalisation (Lu Zhouxiang)....Pages 1-20
Yellow Peril or Yellow Revival? Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Late Qing Chinese Utopianism (1902–1911) (Guangyi Li)....Pages 21-59
Shaolin, Wuxia Novels, Kung Fu Movies and National Identity (Lu Zhouxiang)....Pages 61-84
Social Network Service Platforms and China’s Cyber Nationalism in the Web 2.0 Age (Nini Pan)....Pages 85-111
Fostered Idols and Chinese Identity (Ning Jiang)....Pages 113-135
Chinese National Identity and National Image in the Age of Globalisation (Peter Herrmann)....Pages 137-160
A New Chinese National Identity: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy (Niall Duggan)....Pages 161-182
Identity Narratives in China and the EU’s Economic Diplomacy: Comparing the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia (Constantin Holzer)....Pages 183-202
Nationhood and Ethnicity at the Frontiers: A Study of Hmong Identity in Western Hunan (Lijing Peng)....Pages 203-225
‘The People Are God’ Third World Internationalism and Chinese Muslims in the Making of the National Identity in the 1950s (Zhiguang Yin)....Pages 227-260
From ‘Small’ to ‘Big’ Nationalism: National Identity Among China’s Hui Minority in the Twenty-First Century (Dean Phelan)....Pages 261-284
The Complexity of Nationalism and National Identity in Twenty-First Century Xinjiang (David O’Brien)....Pages 285-308
Leveraging Mega-Events to Embrace Chinese National Identity: The Politics of Hong Kong’s Participation in the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo (Marcus P. Chu)....Pages 309-332
The Evolution and Recognition of Self-identity in Food and Foodways of the Overseas Chinese (Yu Cao)....Pages 333-359
Temples and Huiguan: Negotiating Chineseness in Ho Chi Minh City (Zhifang Song)....Pages 361-386
National Identity, Religious Identity and Their Impacts on Subjective Well-Being—A Case Study on Chinese Catholics in Ireland (Yinya Liu)....Pages 387-414
Identity Reconstruction of Chinese Migrant Women in Ireland (Jun Ni)....Pages 415-433
Back Matter ....Pages 435-439

Citation preview

Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation Edited by Lu Zhouxiang

Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation

Lu Zhouxiang Editor

Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation

Editor Lu Zhouxiang Maynooth University Maynooth, Ireland

ISBN 978-981-15-4537-5 ISBN 978-981-15-4538-2  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Contributor: dim_dok/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

First of all I wish to thank Sara Crowley-Vigneau, Senior Commissioning Editor at Palgrave Macmillan, for her enthusiasm and support for this project, and I want to thank Connie Li, Senior Editorial Assistant at Palgrave Macmillan for her diligent work in preparing the manuscript for publication. I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and feedback for this project. I am appreciative and grateful to all the contributors to this volume for their time and effort in preparing excellent chapters and sharing their knowledge. My sincere thanks also go to Martin Shiels and Aelred Doyle who helped in proofreading and providing editorial feedback on the manuscript.

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About This Book

Written by a team of international scholars from China, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, this book provides interdisciplinary studies on the construction and transformation of Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation. It addresses a wide range of issues central to national identity in the context of Chinese culture, politics, economy and society, and explores a diverse set of topics including the formation of an embryonic form of national identity in the late Qing era, the influence of popular culture on national identity, globalisation and national identity, the interaction and discourse between ethnic identity and national identity, and identity construction among overseas Chinese. It highlights the latest developments in the field and offers a distinctive contribution to our knowledge and understanding of national identity.

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Contents

1

Introduction: Constructing and Negotiating Chineseness in the Age of Globalisation 1 Lu Zhouxiang

2

Yellow Peril or Yellow Revival? Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Late Qing Chinese Utopianism (1902–1911) 21 Guangyi Li

3

Shaolin, Wuxia Novels, Kung Fu Movies and National Identity 61 Lu Zhouxiang

4

Social Network Service Platforms and China’s Cyber Nationalism in the Web 2.0 Age 85 Nini Pan

5

Fostered Idols and Chinese Identity 113 Ning Jiang

6

Chinese National Identity and National Image in the Age of Globalisation 137 Peter Herrmann

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CONTENTS

7

A New Chinese National Identity: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy 161 Niall Duggan

8

Identity Narratives in China and the EU’s Economic Diplomacy: Comparing the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia 183 Constantin Holzer

9

Nationhood and Ethnicity at the Frontiers: A Study of Hmong Identity in Western Hunan 203 Lijing Peng

10 ‘The People Are God’ Third World Internationalism and Chinese Muslims in the Making of the National Identity in the 1950s 227 Zhiguang Yin 11 From ‘Small’ to ‘Big’ Nationalism: National Identity Among China’s Hui Minority in the Twenty-First Century 261 Dean Phelan 12 The Complexity of Nationalism and National Identity in Twenty-First Century Xinjiang 285 David O’Brien 13 Leveraging Mega-Events to Embrace Chinese National Identity: The Politics of Hong Kong’s Participation in the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo 309 Marcus P. Chu 14 The Evolution and Recognition of Self-identity in Food and Foodways of the Overseas Chinese 333 Yu Cao

CONTENTS  

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15 Temples and Huiguan: Negotiating Chineseness in Ho Chi Minh City 361 Zhifang Song 16 National Identity, Religious Identity and Their Impacts on Subjective Well-Being—A Case Study on Chinese Catholics in Ireland 387 Yinya Liu 17 Identity Reconstruction of Chinese Migrant Women in Ireland 415 Jun Ni Index 435

Notes

on

Contributors

Yu Cao is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Migration and Ethnic Studies of Sun Yat-sen University, China. He received his Ph.D. in History from Jinan University in 2015, and finished his postdoctoral research at the Anthropology Department of Sun Yat-sen University in 2018. His research interest is the food and foodways of Chinese domestic and international migrants. He has conducted studies on chilli peppers all around China in recent years, and wrote a book A History of the Chilli Pepper in China (Beijing United Publishing Co. Ltd., 2019). Marcus P. Chu obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Auckland. He is currently an Assistant Professor and the Associate Program Director of the M.A. in International Affairs in the Department of Political Science at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He has published extensively on the history and politics of sporting mega-events in the Greater China region. His most recent book is Politics of Mega-Events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). He also serves as a member of the editorial boards of the International Journal of the History of Sport and the Asian Journal of Sports History and Culture. Niall Duggan is a Lecturer in the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland, where he teaches international relations, international political economy and Asian politics. He received his Ph.D. from the School of Asian Studies and the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork. He also holds a B.Sc. in Government and Public Policy from University College Cork xiii

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

and an M.A. in East and Southeast Asian Studies from Lund University. From 2013 to 2015 he was the Acting Chair of Modern Chinese Society and Economy at Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. He has also been a lecturer at the Institute of East Asian Politics, Ruhr Universität Bochum and the Department of Chinese Studies at Maynooth University. His main research focuses is emerging economies in global governance, international relations (IR) of the Global South, and China’s foreign and security policies, with a special focus on Sino-African and Sino-EU relations. Peter Herrmann is a social philosopher with an academic background in sociology, political science, economics and jurisprudence. Affiliated with the world of teaching and research, he is chasing the answer to the Faustian question ‘what holds the world together at its core’ (concrete links between economics and jurisprudence). His recent positions range from the Max-Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy to the Faculty of Economics and Sociology at the University of Łódź. Currently he is Research Fellow at the Law School of Central South University, Changsha, China. His recent publications include, Right to Stay—Right to Move (Vienna: Vienna Academic Press, 2019) and Is There Still Any Value in It? Revisiting Value and Valuation in a Globalising Digital World (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2019). Constantin Holzer  graduated with a Ph.D. in Economics from Renmin University of China before starting his career in University College Cork, Ireland as a Lecturer in Chinese Business. His research focuses on Chinese entrepreneurship and innovation cooperation between China and the EU, as well as the dynamics of state–society relations in China under its economic reform process. Before his appointment at Central South University he worked as a trainee in the ‘Science, Technology and Environment’ section of the European Union Delegation to Beijing, and was awarded a Marietta-Blau Research Fellowship from the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy for his research on business ethics in China. Constantin has coordinated Horizon 2020 proposal submissions under the EU-China Flagship Cooperation in the areas of Sustainable Urbanisation and Food Safety, and has been funded with coordinator grants by Enterprise Ireland and UCC. Ning Jiang is an applied linguist who specialises in Chinese linguistics, psycholinguistics and teaching Chinese as a foreign language. A graduate

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS  

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of Shanghai University (TCFL) and East China Normal University (Applied Psychology), she has completed a Ph.D. in Psycholinguistics and a Master’s in Education at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. She now works as an assistant professor in Chinese Studies and Linguistics at Trinity College Dublin. Her recent research work at Trinity College explored acquisition strategies in learning Chinese characters. Her research interest to date is interdisciplinary, with a focus on Chinese studies in culture (e.g. Chinese diaspora, and cultural issues in media), translation studies (between English and Chinese) and linguistics (e.g. psycholinguistics, second language acquisition and semantics). Guangyi Li  is Associate Professor of Chinese Literature and Culture at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at Chongqing University, China. His main research interests are modern Chinese literature, Chinese intellectual history, science fiction literature and culture and utopian fiction and thought. His recent publications include the edited volumes, Zhongguo kehuan wenxue zai chufa (Chinese Science Fiction: A New Start, 2016) and, with Chen Qi, Santi de X zhong dufa (Diverse Ways of Reading Three-Body, 2017). Yinya Liu is Lecturer in Chinese Studies at Maynooth University, Ireland. She received both her Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Philosophy from Sun Yat-Sen University, and obtained her Ph.D. in Philosophy at Maynooth University in 2011. She worked in the Department of Philosophy at Maynooth University, the Department of Chinese Studies at Dublin City University and the International Strategic Collaboration Programme (ISCP-China) before joining the School of Modern Languages, Literatures and Cultures at Maynooth University in 2015. She has published research articles and book chapters on philosophy, religion, culture and media. Her research interests are Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy in literature and Chinese Buddhism. Jun Ni completed her Ph.D. at the University of Lyon 3, France. The title of her Ph.D. dissertation is Chinese language acquisition and cross-cultural adaptation of Irish university students studying-abroad in China. Her main research interests are Chinese language pedagogy, intercultural studies and migration studies. Jun Ni has been lecturing in Chinese language and culture in Ireland since 2003, first at Trinity

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College Dublin, then at Dublin City University; and, since 2008, at Technological University Dublin. She designed the online Smart Learning Chinese Programme funded by Enterprise Ireland. Jun Ni is also a committee member of the Irish Society for Chinese Language Teaching and Learning and a member of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS). David O’Brien is a Lecturer at Ruhr University Bochum (RUB), Germany. Based in the Faculty of East Asian Studies, he researches the relationship between politics and identity in China with a particular focus on ethnic identity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. His ethnographic approach is based on many years of fieldwork in the region. He is the co-author of The Politics of Everyday China (with Neil Collins) recently published by Manchester University Press. His most recent journal articles have appeared in China Quarterly and Asian Ethnicity. Before joining RUB, he worked for six years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Nottingham where he was based at their China campus. He received his Ph.D. in 2013 from University College Cork. Nini Pan is an Associate Professor in the School of Communication at East China Normal University, China. She obtained her B.A. in International Politics and Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from Peking University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Waseda University, Japan. Before joining East China Normal University in 2019, she was an Associate Professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at Chongqing University, China. Her main research interests are Chinese politics, Japanese politics, history of political theory, environmental politics, and media politics. Lijing Peng received her Ph.D. in Anthropology from Maynooth University in 2014. She is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Trinity Centre for Literary and Cultural Translation. Lijing has published prolifically in top-ranking anthropology journals and other literary/history journals, including Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, Social Anthropology and Oxford Comparative Criticism and Translation Review. She has also published translation works in literature and anthropology, including a translation of selected poems by Paul Muldoon and Michael Longley (Northern Literature and Art Press Co. Ltd, 2016). Dean Phelan obtained his Ph.D. in Geography from Maynooth University Social Science Institute (MUSSI). His research interests lie at

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the intersection of critical geopolitics, cultural geography and Chinese studies. Specifically, he is interested in identity politics, emotional geographies, processes of minoritisation, gender and ethnic studies and conceptualisations of place. Set within the context of the Global War on Terror, his current research explores the myriad ways in which the lives, everyday geographies and ethno-religious identities of Beijing’s Hui population are shaped by both national and international politics, and how these identities are performed through the group’s distinctive food cultures. Zhifang Song is Lecturer in Anthropology in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He holds a B.A. from Hebei Normal University, an M.A. from Beijing Foreign Studies University and a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. Before joining the University of Canterbury, Zhifang held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Southern California. He also taught anthropology at the University of Southern California and California State University. Zhifang’s research interests include kinship and family (especially changes under the conditions of modernity and postmodernity), visual anthropology, societies in China and East Asia, economic development and rural ecology, religion and modernity and globalisation and the transnational flow of people and ideas. Zhiguang Yin is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Exeter, UK. His research interest lies mainly in the area of Chinese modern intellectual and legal history, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century history of international relations, and contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations, with a strong interest in understanding the formation of our modern ­‘world-view’. His current research project investigates Chinese foreign relations with Third World countries, especially the Middle Eastern, countries during the 1950s and 1960s. It intends to understand how a Chinese internationalist vision was articulated through its interactions with Third World states and how it was responded to by them. It also aims to show that the Chinese interpretation of the ‘three worlds thesis’ (sange shijie lilun) is associated with China’s own revolutionary experience and the Chinese Communist Party’s understanding of the ‘national question’, which differs significantly from both the Soviet reading of the same term and the American narrative of ‘national self-determination’ coined by Woodrow Wilson.

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Lu Zhouxiang is Lecturer in Chinese Studies within the School of Modern Languages, Literatures and Cultures at Maynooth University, Ireland. His research interests are nationalism, national identity, modern Chinese history, Chinese martial arts and China’s sport policy and practice, and he has published extensively in these areas. His recent publications include A History of Shaolin: Buddhism, Kung Fu and Identity (Routledge, 2019) and Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts (Routledge, 2018).

Abbreviations

AFC Asian Football Confederation AIIB Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank AUM Anxiety/Uncertainty Management BIE Bureau International des Expositions BRI Belt and Road Initiative CAI Comprehensive Agreement on Investment CCCYL Central Committee of the Communist Youth League CCP Chinese Communist Party CCYL Chinese Communist Youth League CEPA Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement CIAPC Chinese Islamic Association Preparation Committee CPV Communist Party of Vietnam EEA European Economic Area EU The European Union EU NAVFOR European Union Naval Force FGI First Generation Immigrants FIFA International Federation of Association Football IAC Islamic Association of China IBC Irish-Born Chinese IOC International Olympic Committee MENA Middle Eastern and North African NMW National Minimum Wage NPC National People’s Congress PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China SAR Special Administrative Region xix

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ABBREVIATIONS

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SCT Self-Categorisation Theory SIT Social Identity Theory SWB Subjective Well-Being UAR United Arab Republic XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Number of reports on TFBoys in Chinese mainstream media Fig. 5.2 Number of micro-blogs with the theme of TFBoys and China, August 2013 to June 2017 Fig. 5.3 Number of micro-blogs with the theme of TFBoys and China, August 2017 to June 2018 Fig. 5.4 Findings of this study Fig. 9.1 Location of West Hunan (yellow) within Hunan Province of China (Drawn by Wikipedia User Croquant in December 2007 using various sources, mainly: Hunan Province administrative regions GIS data: 1:1M, County level, 1990 Hunan Counties map from www.hua2.com. Please refer to: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiangxi_Tujia_and_Miao_ Autonomous_Prefecture#/media/File:Location_of_Xiangxi_ Prefecture_within_Hunan_(China).png; under Creative Commons License, CC BY 3.0, accessed October 8, 2019.)

121 123 124 127

205

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 17.1 Table 17.2

Daily routine of Jackson Yee Support during the TFBoys’ sixth anniversary concert Comparing national identity narratives in China and the EU Comparison of the official representations of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy for Asia Profiles of research participants Facilitators and barriers to cross-cultural adaptation identified in this study

120 126 188 190 420 422

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Constructing and Negotiating Chineseness in the Age of Globalisation Lu Zhouxiang

China’s rise has become an increasingly discussed and debated topic over the past three decades. The country’s fast-growing economic, cultural and political influence has made it an important player in this new era of globalisation. Since the twentieth century, Western scholars from a range of disciplines have studied the history, culture, politics and economy of China from diverse perspectives. In recent years, Chinese national identity has become a popular topic in Western academia, and an increasing number of English publications have emerged. Most published works discuss the issue from historical and political perspectives. Some focus on the formation and construction of a national identity among the Chinese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when China was transforming from a culturally bound empire into a modern nation state.1 Some study the development of the transformation of Chinese national identity in the twentieth century in the context of the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War, the communist revolution, the Cold War and China’s reform and opening up.2 Others analyse the relationships between ethnicity, religion and national identity, and highlight L. Zhouxiang (*)  Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_1

1

2  L. ZHOUXIANG

ethno-nationalist conflict among various ethnic groups in China.3 In addition, an increasing number of scholars have started to explore the issue from a cultural perspective by examining the role of literature, opera, films, sport, television shows, the Internet and so on in the construction of Chinese national identity.4 Due to the increase in Chinese migration to foreign countries in the past decades, researchers have also begun to investigate the identity construction of Chinese migrants and diaspora.5 In response to the growing interest from academia, this book intends to provide a comprehensive overview of the construction and transformation of Chinese national identity in the age of globalisation. Written by a team of international scholars from China, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, it explores a diverse set of topics and addresses a wide range of issues central to Chinese national identity in the context of culture, economy, politics and society.

The Construction and Transformation of Chinese National Identity The concepts of nation state, national identity and nationalism emerged in Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and since then have become a mighty political force that has had great global influence over the last two centuries.6 For the Chinese, national identity and nationalism are new ideas imported from the West. The renowned Chinese philosopher Lin Yutang (1895–1976) has argued that ancient China developed into a ‘Tianxia’7 (meaning the world, literally ‘under heaven’) instead of a country or nation state. The prominent Chinese social scientist Li Shenzhi (1923–2003) has pointed out that in ancient China, the term ‘Guojia’ (country) meant the government and that ‘Tianxia’ meant the culture so that ‘Tianxiaism’ equals ‘Culturalism’.8 The core of this cultural entity is Confucianism and the major concept of Tianxiaism was the idea that China was the only true civilisation in the world and its cultural superiority remained unchallenged. There was no concept of or need for nation state and nationalism in a world that lacked cultural or interstate competition.9 As Liang Qichao (1873–1929), a leading reformist and philosopher who inspired Chinese scholars with his enlightened essays, observed in 1899:

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We do love our country. It is the absence of the concept of ‘country’ that caused a lack of patriotism. China gained unification and sovereignty in ancient times; other small nations and countries near China were not strong enough to challenge China’s dominance, and were regarded as Manyi [barbarians] rather than neighbouring countries. That’s why the Chinese use ‘Tianxia’ instead of ‘country’ to describe their territory. As the notion of ‘country’ was ambiguous, patriotism and nationalism failed to come into being.10

Tianxiaism is based on the concept of unification which is attributed to China’s unique climate, geography and ideology. First, appropriate amounts of rainfall and fertile farmlands made the Zhongyuan (middle China) into East Asia’s most populated, affluent and developed region, one that was based on an agricultural economy. Second, surrounded by high plateaus, deserts, mountains and the Pacific Ocean, China was physically separated from the West and developed into an ‘isolated world’ that lived off its own resources. There were only two pathways to the outside world: the desert in the northwest and the sea in the east, both were blocked unless a potential major trade partner existed at their terminal.11 This isolation lasted for thousands of years until the industrial revolution made it possible for European countries’ merchant fleets and battleships to reach China’s east coast in the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Third, Confucianism contributed to the prevalence of ‘Tianxiaism’ and eroded awareness of ethnic differences. As China’s leading historian and philosopher Qian Mu (1895–1990) has argued, ‘in China, the notion of country or nation was absorbed into the notion of Tianxia. People considered the country or nation a cultural entity’.12 At the core of this cultural entity is Confucianism. From the rise of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty (202 BC–220 AD), China was governed according to Confucian principles. ‘Politicians and social elites showed their loyalty to principles that defined a manner of rule and the social hierarchy based on Confucianism instead of a particular king, regime or nation’.13 In short, the world was Confucianism’s Tianxia, a world based on Confucian ideology, social norms and manner of rule. Townsend argues, ‘The history of modern China is one in which nationalism replaces Culturalism/Tianxiaism as the dominant Chinese view of their identity and place in the world’.14 It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the Celestial Empire began to realise that

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it was no longer a dominant power in the world. China’s defeat in the two Opium Wars (1840–1842 and 1856–1860) forced the Qing court to re-evaluate the foreign powers and redefine the meaning of Tianxia. Zhao Suisheng asserts that the rise of Chinese nationalism was intertwined with the intellectual search for answers as to why China had suffered defeat in the Opium Wars.15 Imperialist aggression and colonial expansion from Western powers made late Qing enlightenment thinkers believe that national salvation could only be achieved when people showed their loyalty to a modern nation state instead of submitting to an emperor or a culture-bound regime. Liang Qichao argued that it was nationalism that had made Europe strong.16 He believed that a lack of collectivism was one of the most significant reasons for China’s failure and that the ideas of nation state and nationalism that had come from the West could be applied to enhance social cohesion and make China powerful. Liang stated in 1901, ‘Facing the danger of being invaded and occupied by foreign powers, we must cultivate and promote nationalism to defend [China]. This is the most urgent issue for China’.17 According to Liang, the traditional idea of ‘Tianxia’ should be replaced by ‘country’ and the only way to save China was to establish a modern nation state.18 In order to achieve this goal, the concepts of nation state and nationalism were introduced to the broader public by the country’s intellectuals and revolutionists. Guangyi Li’s opening chapter on ‘Yellow Peril or Yellow Revival: Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Late Qing Chinese Utopianism (1902– 1911)’ delves into late Qing enlightenment thinkers’ utopian thought from the perspective of race and nation, and offers some insights on the formation of an embryonic form of modern Chinese national identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The chapter begins with an analysis of the origin and development of modern racism, especially the concept of the ‘yellow’ race and racial discrimination and discourse against the people thus categorised. It then points out that for China, a country where yellow has been a symbol of greatness, nobility and royalty for thousands of years, Western racial discourse such as ‘yellow peril’, surprisingly, became a catalyst for racism and nationalism. A considerable number of Chinese intellectuals regarded the xenophobic fear of the ‘yellow’ race in the West as recognition of their own potential from which they derived a utopian prospect for China and the Chinese. The author highlights that there are interesting divergences between these utopias, reflecting very dissimilar aims and hopes relevant to the world order.

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By the late nineteenth century, with its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), China had been brought to its knees by imperialist and colonial powers, triggering a strong anti-foreign sentiment. With the accumulation of the resentment caused by the Qing government’s inability to defend against foreign aggressions, the growing ethnic nationalism among the Han Chinese sparked uprisings. From the late 1890s, an anti-Manchu movement organised by Han nationalists and led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) plotted to overthrow the Manchu’s Qing dynasty, and nationalism was utilised to propagandise revolutionary ideas. The Qing government was overthrown in the 1911 Revolution. A modern nation state, which the country’s enlightenment thinkers, politicians, nationalists and revolutionaries believed was the only way forward for the Chinese nation, eventually took shape.19 The nationalists moved to the second stage of the revolution: building up a multi-ethnic nation state capable of withstanding imperialist aggression. During the early years of the Republic of China (ROC), against the background of the two World Wars and in response to imperialist aggression, anti-imperialism, militarism and Social Darwinism prevailed in China, giving rise to a nationalism that focused on national unity and national survival. Fuelled by nationalism, the first half of the twentieth century saw the transformation of the modern Chinese nation state, bringing it from its infancy to maturity. Anderson developed the concept of an ‘imagined political community’ to define a nation. He believed that a nation is a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group, and print media facilitates the construction of national identity.20 Lu Zhouxiang’s chapter on ‘Shaolin, Wuxia Novels, Kung Fu Movies and National Identity’ investigates how print media plays its part in nation building and identity construction in China in the twentieth century. It points out that wuxia novels and kung fu movies functioned as important vehicles for the maintenance and reinvention of nationhood. They served two purposes: retrieving traditional Chinese culture and constructing a modern Chinese national identity. As the cradle of Chan Buddhism and a centre of Chinese martial arts, Shaolin was regarded as a symbol of indigenous virtue and strength and therefore became a popular theme in novels and movies. Chinese novelists and movie producers consciously or unconsciously used legendary Shaolin heroes and Shaolin kung fu to invent a cultural identity, and thus aided the construction of a collective modern national identity among

6  L. ZHOUXIANG

the Chinese. These wuxia novels and movies in turn helped Shaolin lay a ­rhetorical claim to Chinese identity. While Zhouxiang’s chapter focuses on the role of traditional media in fostering and expressing Chinese national identity and nationalism in the twentieth century, Nini Pan’s chapter on ‘Social Network Service Platforms and China’s Cyber Nationalism in the Web 2.0 Age’, on the other hand, explores how new media serves the building of nationalism in the twenty-first century. The author examines how China’s ideological institutions have created a new cyber style that entails actively participating in daily interaction with netizens, and argues that this approach has changed the ecology of cyber nationalism. As one example, the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CCCYL) has been rather prominent for its strategy of using and strengthening cyber nationalism. The League’s online operators adapt their nationalist mobilisation to cyber trends through popularising publicity, participating in discussion on topical news, making and sharing animation videos and so on. Meanwhile, a new type of nationalist emotion among netizens has provided ready-made resources. In practice, young staff in the CCCYL who are also skilled cyber surfers have risen in the ranks through learning from the political communication experiences of developed democracies and integrating nationalist networks among young professionals and activists. Ning Jiang’s chapter on ‘Fostered Idols and Chinese Identity’ entails a case study based on the newly emerging Chinese representative fostered idols, offering a unique approach to understanding the influence of media and popular culture on identity construction in contemporary China. By using statistical methods and cultural theories of nationalism, Jiang identifies how the TFBoys, a pop group composed of these idols, serve as a bridge to remind their fans and the public of traditional Chinese heritage and modern mainstream Chinese culture, and, finally, have strengthened their fans’ Chinese identity. Alter asserts that national consciousness and national identity emerge when people feel ‘that they belong primarily to the nation, and whenever affective attachment and loyalty to that nation override all other attachments and loyalties’.21 In the age of globalisation, loyalty to the nation has been increasingly influenced by consumerism, individualism, internationalism, globalism and presentism. Peter Herrmann’s chapter on ‘Chinese National Identity and National Image’ presents some theoretical and methodological considerations on this ‘loyalty’ matter against

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the background of the rise of China in the increasingly globalising world. Herrmann observes that while globalisation is a recurrent topic in academic and political debates, and also one prevailing in many people’s minds (either as threat or mitigation), many facets are still underexplored. The present interest focuses on the most fundamental question: do we need—and can we find—a new reference point for eliciting nationality and identity? The underlying reasoning has to be seen in the far-reaching shortcomings of those methodological foundations of social science that emerged in the wake of the Western Enlightenment— namely, individualism, nationalism, solutionism and presentism, or, less academically, in the idea that it is I, who wants everything, and who wants it now, instantaneously—and what is also good for society. Recognising that such methodological paradigms are also guiding politics, we have to acknowledge that those methodological foundations are bound to a historically specific context. This can be expressed in a reversed way, proposing that time (we may call it historical progress) and geographical reference (referring to shifts of globalisation) suggest the necessity of changing the methodological reference—proposed as prospects for today’s world are methodological globalism, collectivism, noospherism and sustainabilitism. What does that mean for national identity? This chapter examines if and in which way the new position, which China is likely going to occupy in this globalising world, may be one that can only persist by overcoming a national focus. That would translate into a paradoxical notion of national identity where to be ‘truly Chinese’ would translate into striving for a global understanding of citizenship. The relationships between national identity, globalisation and international integration are further discussed by Niall Duggan in his chapter on ‘A New Chinese National Identity: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy’. Duggan analyses two case studies of the effects of China’s new nationalism on Chinese foreign policy: Sino-Japanese relations during the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands disputes of 2013–2019 (reactive case) and Sino-Malian relations during Chinese peacekeeping missions in 2013 (proactive case). He observes that under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the PRC has moved to a more proactive foreign policy. While the Chinese economy’s increased importance within global production has given China a greater influence on the world stage, a more proactive Chinese foreign policy has its roots in the rise of a new Chinese nationalism, which emerged from the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen

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Square protests. In policy formation, Chinese nationalism is a factor that warrants greater consideration for Chinese foreign policymakers than it had elicited prior to Xi Jinping’s administration. Duggan’s research is complemented by Constantin Holzer’s chapter on ‘Identity Narratives in China and the EU’s Economic Diplomacy: Comparing the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia’. Holzer argues that the basic understanding of external economic engagement in China and the EU is heavily marked by the respective actors’ identity narratives—that is, ‘national rejuvenation’ and national interest in the case of China, and ‘reconciliation’ and the support for rules-based multilateralism in the case of the EU. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the EU Connectivity Strategy represent China and the EU’s respective flagship initiatives of economic diplomacy in the twenty-first century and offer two separate blueprints for shaping the future of shared economic prosperity on the Eurasian continent. While China and the EU pursue similar objectives, it is more the political question of how to guarantee a ‘level playing field’ and ‘shared benefits’ that cause uncertainty and tension between them. Examining China and the EU’s identity narratives is a useful method to learn more about the ideas and purposes behind the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy, and can be essential for avoiding misunderstandings, as well as for opening up ways of cooperation between them.

The Paradox of ‘Big Nationalism’ and ‘Small Nationalism’ Weber believes that political community and political action are ‘the primary inspiration and basis for the “belief in common ethnicity”, which in turn always rests on a sense of common origins. This belief in common descent, along with shared customs, underlies the notions of both ethnicity and “nation”’.22 He stated: ‘a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own’.23 When the ideas of ‘nation’, ‘nation state’ and ‘nationalism’ were introduced to China in the late nineteenth century, Chinese scholars and revolutionists noticed that nationalism could unite the Han majority under the banner of patriotism to overthrow the Manchu regime and resist foreign aggression, but it could also bond individual ethnic

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minority groups together and might lead to ethnic conflict within China, thus posing a major threat to political stability and national unity.24 The leading enlightenment thinker Liang Qichao therefore developed the theory of ‘Big Nationalism’ and ‘Small Nationalism’ to cope with this complex issue. According to this theory, every ethnic group in China, such as the Han, the Zhuang, the Miao, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Uyghur and the Hui, had its own ‘Small Nationalism’, while ‘Big Nationalism’ united all ethnic groups together to stand against foreign powers, namely the Western colonial powers and imperial Japan.25 Soon after the establishment of the ROC in 1912, state leaders, nationalists and intellectuals promoted the idea of ‘Big Nationalism’, hoping to create and reinforce a sense of national unity among all ethnic groups in China. At the inauguration of the president of the ROC held in Nanjing on 1 January 1912, Sun Yat-sen, Provisional President of the ROC, stated, ‘The foundation of the country is people; the territories of the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans should be integrated into one country. The Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans should be integrated into one people. This is called the unification of the Chinese nation’.26 He also emphasised equality among all the ethnic groups in China; ‘The people in the Republic of China are equal and should not be distinguished by race, class or religion’.27 In the following years, the idea of ‘Five Races under One Union’, which meant that the five major ethnic groups in China (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans) would unite under the Republic, was advocated by the government.28 Stalin defined a nation as ‘a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture’.29 While the ROC government actively promoted ‘Big Nationalism’, China’s ethnic minorities’ unique cultures, languages and religions helped them build their own national identity. ‘Small Nationalism’ was growing among major ethnic groups, notably the Uyghur, the Tibetans and the Mongols, and eventually gave birth to the Uyghur independence movement in 1933 and led to the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1945.30 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Communists adopted the ROC’s ethnic policy, which was based on the idea of ‘Five Races under One Union’. At the same time, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders intended to develop a new relationship among all ethnic

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groups in China. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) was established under the State Council to develop and implement the country’s ethnic policies, supervise the regional ethnic autonomy systems and protect the rights and interests of all the ethnic minority groups.31 By 1965, five autonomous regions—Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet—had been established, and by 1979 the State officially recognised 56 ethnicities/nationalities in China. Over the past decades, continuous efforts have been made by the State and the SEAC to cultivate ‘Big Nationalism’ among all ethnic groups. The goals are to promote interethnic friendship, eliminate possible ethnic conflict and consolidate national unity. The second section of this book focuses on the interaction and discourse between ethnic identity and national identity in China in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and explores the paradox of ‘Big Nationalism’ and ‘Small Nationalism’ from various perspectives. Lijing Peng’s chapter on ‘Nationhood and Ethnicity at the Frontiers: A Study of Hmong Identity in Western Hunan’ investigates the characteristics of multi-polar nationhood and pre-modern ethnicity in the local history of western Hunan in late imperial China. It also studies their impact on the development of nationalism in western Hunan in the Republican period (1912–1949). The nature of and the changes in Chinese nationhood are examined through analysing the relationship between indigenous communities (mainly the Hmong ethnic group) and the central imperial government. The author observes that local intellectual and military elites entered central governmental institutions through civil and military service examinations, or through serving in the national army. Successive imperial regimes advanced the integration of local communities by incorporating local deities into the national pantheon and sponsoring local gazetteer publication projects. Through state rituals and official documentation at an empire-wide level, a national identity was gradually formed and shaped. Multi-polar ethnic identities emerged as a result of negotiating with the central government over issues concerning land use, taxation and the quotas of civil service examination degrees. These pre-modern forms of nationhood and ethnicity served as an important foundation and a source of continuous influence in the construction of national identity in western Hunan in the final years of the Chinese empire and the following Republican period. Zhiguang Yin’s chapter on ‘“The People are God” Third World Internationalism and Chinese Muslims in the Making of the National

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Identity in the 1950s’ studies the role of Islam, particularly the participation of Chinese Muslim scholars, in the nation building of the PRC. It also looks at the political narrative of the CCP on Islam in the context of the Chinese revolution. Yin argues that anti-imperialism and socialist construction were the two primary political goals allowing people to be politically engaged and consequently creating a common ground for recognition. Hence, religion was considered as merely another form of ideology which needed to be incorporated into the political mission leading towards human liberation. The internationalist support of the anti-colonial struggles in the Arab World also played a crucial role in the formation of the national recognition in the 1950s. The reports on the Chinese political support of the Arab world presented the Arab people as a unitary people with their revolutionary spirit rooted in Islamic religious tradition and inspired by their recent history of being oppressed by colonialism. Dean Phelan’s chapter on ‘National Identity Among China’s Hui Minority in the Twenty-First Century’ explores the theoretical development of Chinese nationalism, focusing on the contributions of Liang Qichao’s ‘Big’ and ‘Small’ nationalism to current conceptualisations. The author examines current ethnic policies affecting minorities in China, and demonstrates the lived realities of China’s twofold nationality policy, looking at how national identity is performed by ethnically Hui people in Beijing through their food cultures. Phelan points out that the PRC has been relatively successful in promoting ethnic unity among its diverse population, despite facing the challenges presented by globalisation. Discourses of the PRC as being composed of 56 distinct yet equal ethnicities are vital to Chinese national identities and policies and have been a cornerstone of Chinese nationalism since its inception. Liang Qichao’s ‘Big’ and ‘Small’ nationalisms have been particularly important to the development of current policies; whereby ‘Small’ nationalism exists among individual ethnic groups, while ‘Big’ nationalism unites all ethnicities together within the nation state. This twofold approach to nationalism has had an impact on the ethno-nationalist identities of minority peoples in China, including the Hui. Anderson stated, ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings’.32 Although major ethnic minority groups such as the Hui, Manchu, Zhuang, Yi and Miao

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have maintained a harmonious relationship with the Han majority under the umbrella of ‘Big Nationalism’, entering the twenty-first century, the rising ‘Small Nationalism’ among the Tibetans and the Uyghur has led to the growth of anti-Han sentiment and resulted in tension, conflicts and violence in Xinjiang and Tibet. Major riots broke out in Lhasa (2008) and Urumqi (2009) resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. Fuelled by nationalism and Pan-Turkism, and influenced by the Islamic State movement, Uygur separatists and extremists launched violent attacks in Xinjiang’s Kashgar (2011), Yecheng (2012), Urumuqi (2014) and other parts of China, including Beijing (2013), Kunming (2014) and Guangzhou (2015), killing innocent people on the streets and causing terror among the civilian population. In response, the Chinese government tightened its control over Xinjiang and took intense security measures in the region to prevent further conflicts. However, ethnic tension in the region is far from resolved. David O’Brien’s chapter on ‘The Complexity of Nationalism and National Identity in Twenty-First Century Xinjiang’ explores questions of nationalism and national identity in Xinjiang and offers some insights on recent conflicts and the escalating tension in the region. O’Brien points out that the Chinese government grossly simplifies the intricacies of history and exacerbates the tension in the region by failing to engage with the experiences and perceptions of its citizens. He then examines the effects recent conflicts between the Uyghur and the Han population in Xinjiang have had on ideas of the nation and senses of belonging among people from both ethnic groups. O’Brien also analyses the multiplicity of nationalist discourses in Xinjiang, both in terms of state constructed narratives of Chinese national identity, which emphasises ethnic unity and material progress, and with the lived experiences of people in a region struggling with deep divisions. Hong Kong, the former British colony, is another region that saw increasing tension and conflicts brought about by the growing ‘Small Nationalism’. Marcus P. Chu’s chapter on ‘Leveraging Mega-Events to Embrace Chinese National Identity: The Politics of Hong Kong’s Participation in the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo’ explains how the Chinese authorities, after the sovereignty transfer in 1997, successively assigned Hong Kong to host the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian competitions and invited Hong Kong professionals to take part in the organisation of the 2010 World Expo. All efforts were made to facilitate communication and integration, and

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to cultivate ‘Big Nationalism’ among the Hong Kong people. The chapter also investigates the reasons for the decline of the Hong Kong public’s allegiance to Beijing and the rise of the local youngsters’ unwillingness to identify themselves as Chinese after the celebrations of the two ­mega-events were over.

The Negotiation of Chineseness Among Overseas Chinese Globalisation is ‘the moment of mass migration, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism’.33 It stretches social, political, cultural and economic activities across regions and continents, and ‘intensifies our dependence on each other, as flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, and culture increase’.34 The interchange of views, ideas, cultures, religions and beliefs is one of the most important aspects of globalisation.35 This process is aided by international migration that generates transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity and interaction. The last section of this book looks at the impact of globalisation on national identity through case studies on identity construction among overseas Chinese. Deutsch asserts that national identity is based on a ‘state of mind which gives “national” messages, memories and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making of decisions’.36 People may devote greater attention to messages which ‘carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or culture’.37 Food and foodways are unique codes of Chinese culture. Overseas Chinese are the carriers of these national codes outside China. Yu Cao’s chapter on ‘The Evolution and Recognition of Self-identity in Food and Foodways of the Overseas Chinese’ takes the evolution of Nyonya food and American–Chinese food as examples to analyse the stages of self-identity of overseas Chinese food culture according to the concepts of assimilation, isolation and integration of cultural inclusion theory. The author points out that the generation of self-identity depends on the confirmation of boundaries. Overseas Chinese are surrounded by the environment of different cultures and have a clear sense of self-identity. The establishment of self-identity through food and foodways is a result of the overseas Chinese historical experience, living situation, cross-cultural experience and self-identity. Within the different developments of the overseas Chinese foods and mainland Chinese food,

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there is a common ground for Chinese food culture—it is a cultural matrix that covers all the food varieties of Chinese communities living all over the globe. It is not defined by specific food or ingredients, but a set of variables complying with the Chinese philosophy of food. This self-identity gave Chinese food an inclusive feature. Temples and huiguan (guild halls) are two other important codes of Chinese culture and identity. Based on data from fieldwork in Vietnam, Zhifang Song’s chapter on ‘Chinese Temples and Huiguan: Negotiating Chineseness in Ho Chi Minh City’ studies how the Vietnamese Chinese and the Vietnamese government interact and negotiate in subtle ways concerning the functions and roles of Chinese temples and huiguan, as well as how Chineseness is to be framed within Vietnameseness. The research shows that after the fall of Saigon in 1975, tensions between Vietnam and China, former allies against the United States, gradually built up and eventually escalated to open military confrontations. The Chinese in Vietnam became victims of this international tension. Seeing the Chinese in Vietnam as potential agents of China, the Vietnamese government took measures to erase the Chineseness of the Chinese, if not the Chinese themselves. This did not change until the late 1980s when the need to improve its relationship with China made it necessary for the Vietnamese government to ease its antagonistic and repressive policies towards the Chinese. But at the same time, the government did not want to see among the Chinese a resurgent allegiance towards China. Thus, a redefinition of Chineseness has become an important issue. Chinese temples and huiguan, which used to be the core of Chinese culture, have become important battlegrounds for this redefinition of Chineseness. While Chinese migrants in Vietnam tried hard to keep their tradition by promoting temples and huiguan, some overseas Chinese in other parts of the world have embraced foreign religion and negotiated their Chinese identity in different ways. Yinya Liu’s chapter on ‘National identity, Religious Identity and Their Impacts on Subjective Well-Being: A Case Study on Chinese Catholics in Ireland’ explores the nature of and relationships between national identity, religious identity and subjective well-being for Chinese Catholics in contemporary Ireland. By analysing a survey of the impacts of religious beliefs and practice, lifestyle and social networks and the sense of belonging among Chinese Catholics in Ireland, the research reveals that there is a special tension between traditional Chinese values and Catholic beliefs, which presents a unique

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opportunity for Chinese migrants to establish their identity in Irish society. National identity, religious identity and subjective well-being have significant positive correlations with Chinese migrants’ perception of their sense of belonging and their understanding of happiness. Renan has argued, ‘a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form’.38 Jun Ni’s chapter on ‘Identity Reconstruction of Chinese Migrant Women in Ireland’ demonstrates overseas Chinese’s strong will to value and preserve their culture and identity. Using a thematic analysis approach, the author conducted twelve in-depth qualitative interviews and carried out a qualitative study on the cross-cultural adaptation process and identity reconstruction of Chinese migrant women in Ireland. The research identifies facilitators of and barriers to the cross-cultural adaptation and reveals that, on the one hand, the interviewees want to maintain their Chinese cultural identity and heritage; at the same time, they are committed to developing relationships with Irish mainstream society. Ni highlights that most Chinese women take pride in their culture and values and this pride results in higher levels of self-esteem. They aim to bring their own culture to the attention of Irish people and enjoy playing the role of an intercultural ambassador. To conclude, this book offers interdisciplinary studies on the topic and highlights the latest developments in the field. It provides a distinctive contribution to our knowledge and understanding of national identity. We hope that the topics and views in this book will further stimulate research and debate on the development and transformation of Chinese national identity in the age of globalisation.

Notes



1.  Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 2. Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995); Christopher Hughes,

16  L. ZHOUXIANG Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997); Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Guoqi Xu, China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past; Dittmer, and Kim, China’s Quest for National Identity; Baogang He, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 3. Arabinda Acharya, Rohan Gunaratna, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Enze Han, Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 4. Wenshan Jia, The Remaking of the Chinese Character and Identity in the 21st Century: The Chinese Face Practices (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2001); Francoise Mengin, ed., Cyber China: Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Information (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jing Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895–1937 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Daphne P. Lei, Operatic China: Staging Chinese Identity Across the Pacific (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Klaus Muhlhahn and Clemens von Haselberg, eds., Chinese Identities on Screen (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012); Yue Wang, Who You Want We Are? When Chinese Media Facing Western Audience—China Daily’s Construction of the National Identity (Saarbrücken: AV Akademikerverlag, 2012); Lauren Gorfinke, Chinese Television and National Identity Construction: The Cultural Politics of Music-Entertainment Programmes (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Liu Li and Fan Hong, The National Games and National Identity in China: A History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 5.  Yuanfang Shen and Penny Edwards, eds., Beyond China: Migrating Identities (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002); Shuang Liu, Identity, Hybridity and Cultural Home: Chinese Migrants and Diaspora in Multicultural Societies (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 6. Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 1. 7. Tianxia 天下. 8. Shenzhi Li, “Quanqiu hua yu Zhongguo wenhua” [Globalization and Chinese Culture], Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies] 8, no. 4 (1994): 127–135. 9. James Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism (New York: Hunter College of the City of New York, Research Institute on Modern Asia, 1969), 2. 10.  Qichao Liang, “Aiguo lun” [On Patriotism], in Liang Qichao quanji [Liang Qichao’s Collection], vol. 1. (Beijing: Beijing chuban she, 1997), 270.

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11. Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, trans. Richard Mayne (London: Penguin, 1995). 12. Cited in Qiang Wang and Xiaoguang Bao, Zhongguo chuantong wenhua jingshen [The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Culture] (Beijing: Kunlun chuban she, 2004), 16. 13. Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism, 2. 14.  James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 27, no. 1 (1992): 97–130, 97. 15. Suisheng Zhao, A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004). 16. Qichao Liang, Xinmin shuo [New Citizens] (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Press, 1998). 17. Qichao Liang, Liang Qichao quanji [Liang Qichao’s Collection], vols. 1–10 (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999), 324. 18. Xueling Zhang, Wan Qing zhishi fenzi minzu zhuyi sixiang yanjiu [Nationalism and Chinese Scholars in the Late Qing Era] (Hefei: Hefei University of Technology, 2013). 19. The term ‘enlightenment’ is used here to refer to an ideology that seeks to cultivate a sense of scientific and civic duty, to encourage people to form the habit of being hard-working and industrious, and to promote national unity and the national spirit. 20. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 44. 21. Alter, Nationalism, 9. 22. Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism and Classical Social Theory,” The British Journal of Sociology 34, no. 1 (1983): 19–38, 32. 23. Cited in: Smith, “Nationalism and Classical Social Theory,” 32. 24. Lu Zhouxiang and Fan Hong, “From Celestial Empire to Nation State: Sport and the Origins of Chinese Nationalism (1840–1927),” The International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 3 (2010): 479–504. 25. Liang, Liang Qichao’s Collection, 1069. 26. Yat-sen Sun, Sun Zhongshan quanji [Sun Yat-sen’s Collection], vol. 2 (Beijing: China Book Press, 1981), 2; Zhiyong Zhai, “Sun ­ Yat-sen’s ‘Declaration of the Provisional President of China’ and the Qing Emperor’s ‘Xunwei Zhaoshu’,” Global Law Review 33, no. 5 (2011): 64–66. 27. Zhao, A Nation State by Construction, 68. 28. Guodong Li, Minguo shiqi de minzu wenti yu minguo zhengfu de minzu zhengce yanjiu [Ethnic Issues and the Government’s Ethnic Policy in the Republic of China Era] (Beijing: Minzu Press, 2009). 29. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), 15.



18  L. ZHOUXIANG 30. Yuzheng Zhao, Xinjiang tunken [Land Reclamation in Xinjiang] (Urumchi: Xinjiang People’s Press, 1991); Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 31. Binghao Jin, Xin Zhongguo minzu zhengce 60 nian [New China’s Ethnic Policy in the Past 60 Years] (Beijing: Minzu University of China Press, 2009). 32. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. 33. Imre Szeman, “Culture and Globalization, or, The Humanities in Ruins,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 2 (2003): 91–115, 94. 34.  David Held, Anthony G. McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999), 484. 35.  Nayef R. F. Al-Rodhan and Gérard Stoudmann, “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006). 36. Alter, Nationalism, 7. 37. Alter, Nationalism, 8. 38. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (Abingdon: Routledge, 1990), 19.

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Han, Enze. Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Harrison, James. Modern Chinese Nationalism. New York: Hunter College of the City of New York, Research Institute on Modern Asia, 1969. He, Baogang. Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. Held, David, Anthony G. McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999. Hughes, Christopher. Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society. Abingdon: Routledge, 1997. Jia, Wenshan. The Remaking of the Chinese Character and Identity in the 21st Century: The Chinese Face Practices. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2001. Jin, Binghao. Xin Zhongguo minzu zhengce 60 nian [New China’s Ethnic Policy in the Past 60 Years]. Beijing: Minzu University of China Press, 2009. Lei, Daphne P. Operatic China: Staging Chinese Identity Across the Pacific. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Li, Guodong. Minguo shiqi de minzu wenti yu minguo zhengfu de minzu zhengce yanjiu [Ethnic Issues and the Government’s Ethnic Policy in the Republic of China Era]. Beijing: Minzu Press, 2009. Li, Shenzhi. “Quanqiu hua yu Zhongguo wenhua” [Globalization and Chinese Culture]. Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies] 8, no. 4 (1994): 127–135. Li, Liu, and Fan Hong. The National Games and National Identity in China: A History. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. Liang, Qichao. “Aiguo lun” [On Patriotism]. In Liang Qichao quanji [Liang Qichao’s Collection], vol. 1, 270–276. Beijing: Beijing chuban she, 1997. Liang, Qichao. Liang Qichao quanji [Liang Qichao’s Collection]. Vols. 1–10. Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999. Liang, Qichao. Xinmin shuo [New Citizens]. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Press, 1998. Liu, Shuang. Identity, Hybridity and Cultural Home: Chinese Migrants and Diaspora in Multicultural Societies. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Liu, Xiaoyuan. Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Mengin, Francoise, ed. Cyber China: Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Information. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Muhlhahn, Klaus, and Clemens von Haselberg, eds. Chinese Identities on Screen. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012. Renan, Ernest. “What Is a Nation?” In Nation and Narration, edited by Homi K. Bhabha, 8–22. Abingdon: Routledge, 1990.

20  L. ZHOUXIANG Schoppa, R. Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. Shen, Yuanfang, and Penny Edwards, eds. Beyond China: Migrating Identities. Canberra: Australian National University, 2002. Smith, Anthony D. “Nationalism and Classical Social Theory.” The British Journal of Sociology 34, no. 1 (1983): 19–38. Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and the National Question. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947. Sun, Yat-sen. Sun Zhongshan quanji [Sun Yat-sen’s Collection]. Vol. 2. Beijing: China Book Press, 1981. Szeman, Imre. “Culture and Globalization, or, The Humanities in Ruins.” CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 2 (2003): 91–115. Townsend, James. “Chinese Nationalism.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 27, no. 1 (1992): 97–130. Tsu, Jing. Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895–1937. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005. Wang, Yue. Who You Want We Are? When Chinese Media Facing Western Audience—China Daily’s Construction of the National Identity. Saarbrücken: AV Akademikerverlag, 2012. Wang, Qiang, and Xiaoguang Bao. Zhongguo chuantong wenhua jingshen [The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Culture]. Beijing: Kunlun chuban she, 2004. Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Zhai, Zhiyong. “Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Declaration of the Provisional President of China’ and the Qing Emperor’s ‘Xunwei Zhaoshu’.” Global Law Review 33, no. 5 (2011): 64–66. Zhang, Xueling. Wan Qing zhishi fenzi minzu zhuyi sixiang yanjiu [Nationalism and Chinese Scholars in the Late Qing Era]. Hefei: Hefei University of Technology, 2013. Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004. Zhao, Yuzheng. Xinjiang tunken [Land Reclamation in Xinjiang]. Urumchi: Xinjiang People’s Press, 1991. Zheng, Yongnian. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Zhouxiang, Lu, and Fan Hong. “From Celestial Empire to Nation State: Sport and the Origins of Chinese Nationalism (1840–1927).” The International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 3 (2010): 479–504.

CHAPTER 2

Yellow Peril or Yellow Revival? Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Late Qing Chinese Utopianism (1902–1911) Guangyi Li

Introduction Narrative utopias, the ‘imaginary communities’, have been known to play a vital role in the formation of nation-states, the ‘imagined communities’, since the former ‘provided one of the first spaces for working out the particular shapes and boundaries of the latter’.1 This was indeed the case in late Qing China, where utopian writing, notably in the form of novels, created a conceptual space in which the ‘cycle of historical reciprocity of nationalism and racism’ can be seen in full view.2 However, the ‘imaginary communities’ were not necessarily confined to nation-states. Rather, there was an increasing trend at the turn of the twentieth century—an era of nation-state formation, and also of world integration—to reflect upon the world order and envision a global utopia.3 Cherishing the ideal of tianxia and echoing the zeitgeist, Chinese

G. Li (*)  Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_2

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utopians embarked on exploring how to ensure humankind’s universal welfare. It is therefore inviting to view the conflicting and competing views of ethnicity, race and nation—human categories that constitute the world— in late Qing thought through a specific lens: utopianism. Similar discussions are available in Phillip E. Wegner’s Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernities and De Witt Douglas Kilgore’s Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space. The former explored the entanglement of utopia and nation haunting modernity from Thomas More’s time to the present day. The latter describes how American technological utopianism responded to the rising civil rights movement, imagining the new frontier of space as a colony to preserve or challenge current racial and gender hierarchies. Both books are mostly based upon British-American utopianism, in which the vision of world order is not the major concern. In contrast, portraying a new world was no less important than envisioning China’s own future for late Qing utopians. In their mushrooming utopian visions, people discussed passionately how to construct an ideal world order and what role China should play in this process. Their discussions helped in the formation of modern China and foreshadowed China’s international participation, which has been unfolding from that time to the present day. In this chapter, I will first trace the developmental trajectory of the ‘yellow race’ concept, as it initiated the thinking and debates about race in late Qing China and figured prominently in utopianism. This section will be followed by an analysis of the ‘yellow peril’, an intriguing topic in utopian writing for it aroused fervent discussions and gave rise to diverse imaginations of a world order. In the third part, Kang Youwei’s scheme of racial assimilation, because of its impressive singularities, illustrative of utopian universalism, will be carefully examined.

The Yellow Race: Western Origin and East Asian Reception Although racialised thinking can be dated back to the very early stages of human civilisation, the concept of the yellow race is a European invention that only became well-known in China in the nineteenth century. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, early missionaries and travellers often regarded the Chinese and Japanese as whites.4 However,

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such a white tag for East Asians was less descriptive than evaluative. For Europeans in the early modern age, white, in combination with Christianity and civilised, constituted European identity. East Asians were white because, according to some legends, they were Christians, or their minds were open to Christianity. Therefore, when close encounters frustrated missionary enthusiasm, the illusion of white Asians dissipated. Despite the diversity of skin colour observed and recorded in many documents, Asians in European accounts became invariably yellow.5 The reason why Carl Linnaeus, the father of modern taxonomy, chose luridus (pale yellow, deathly, ghastly, etc.) as his derogatory label for Asians remain unclear, but his denomination influenced a variety of scientific researches in the field of taxonomy, anatomy and anthropology that eventually established the yellow race as an ‘objective’ category.6 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the yellow race became increasingly unwelcome in the West. Disdain for them developed into hostility and fear that brought forth the spectre of the yellow peril and other delusions of threat.7 At this time, colonial conquest—military, economic and to a lesser extent cultural—of China and its vassal states were, in general, successful, in spite of their continuing resistance. For the Westerners at home, the persistence and diligence under miserable conditions of overseas Chinese labourers (especially in Australia and North America) caused great anxieties among local communities of escalating competition. Moreover, cultural differences, low education and family concerns prevented Chinese migrants from becoming integrated into local society. Resentment and grievances against the Chinese evolved into explicit racial discrimination, persecution and exclusion, as exemplified by the Chinese Exclusion Act enacted in 1882 by the United States.8 Japanese emigrants in the United States were confronted with similar problems. At the turn of century, for Westerners who worried about the threat of the yellow race, a number of historical events sounded new alarms: the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 aroused attention to Japan’s ambition and elicited Kaiser Wilhelm II’s notorious drawing, The Yellow Peril; The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 demonstrated the populous China’s staggering potential for resistance and revolution; and Japan’s pyrrhic victory over Russia in 1905 was even celebrated by some people in China, as well as other colonies and semi-colonies, as the yellows’ monumental triumph over the whites.9 Interestingly, the two major alleged origins of the yellow peril, China and Japan, had readily accepted Western racial classifications,

24  G. LI

even though they differed considerably in how they responded to their respective position in such a scheme.10 In Meiji Japan, especially after the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War, opposition to being classified as the yellow race was remarkable, the major reason being the unwillingness to be lumped together with the Chinese, whom many Japanese intellectuals strove to distance themselves from. Aside from the victor’s contempt for the defeated, the expectation to ‘depart from Asia’ and become identified as the same as the powerful and civilised Westerners also accounted for the Japanese dismissal of being yellow. Noteworthy arguments in this regard included: Takekoshi Yosaburo’s denigration of Chinese history and race; Oyabe Zen’ichiro and Kimura Takataro’s theories about the Japanese race’s occidental origin; and Taguchi Ukichi’s contention that Japanese, specifically the upper class, because of their fair skin, fine appearance and linguistic affinities with ancient Europeans, were in fact Aryans.11 The reluctance to be yellow pertained as well to Japan’s increasing awareness of the discourse of the yellow peril in the West. During the Russo-Japanese War, Japan made a well-concerted effort to diminish the fear of the yellow race’s rise by maintaining a domestic ‘golden silence’ on irritating ideas about the yellow threat, on the one hand, and by launching a diplomatic campaign to clarify Japan’s intentions and pacify uneasy Westerners, on the other hand.12 This refutation of the yellow peril and any hint of pan-yellow coalition lasted into the Taisho period. However, the years after Japan’s historic victory also witnessed the rise of Japan’s identity as part of the yellow race. In fact, ever since the early Meiji years, many Japanese, notably those well-versed in Confucianism, viewed China as a country of the same language and same race with which Japan could ally in resisting Western invasion. Despite the decline of China’s reputation, a significant number of intellectuals and politicians, including Takayama Chogyū and Ōkuma Shigenobu, still proposed a Sino-Japanese alliance.13 They chose not to challenge Western racial theories, but rather to internalise such a Western gaze and develop a yellow and Asian identity accordingly, often expressed in the form of pan-Asianism. Nevertheless, their central concern was still nationalistic, for almost every Japanese pan-Asianist proudly identified Japanese as the most superior among the Asian peoples. Straddling the Western coloniser and the Chinese colonised, Japan adopted a distinct strategy, distancing itself from other Asian peoples in a hierarchical racial order within its emerging colonial empire, while claiming to take on the

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‘civilising mission’ of educating, enlightening and embracing the yellow race so as to lead them in the fight against the whites for an ‘Asia for the Asiatics’.14 For Japan, how to establish itself and achieve recognition in the shadow of an overwhelming Other (first China, then the West) remained its predominant concern. In contrast, the Chinese basked in their yellow identity from when they were first exposed to Western racial taxonomy. In China, the Yellow River was considered the cradle of Chinese civilisation, yellow earth was the mythical material Goddess Nüwa used to create the human race and the colour yellow had been a monopoly of the royal house since the Tang dynasty. For late Qing Chinese, yellow as an ethnonym was nothing but appropriate.15 Without any difficulty, they adopted the four- or five-part racial scheme to classify people on earth, albeit arguing that the yellow race was as civilised and noble as, if not better than, the whites. Meanwhile, many Chinese intellectuals of the day displayed blatant bias against the black, brown and red races. For them, these dark races looked terribly ugly and stupid, and their enslavement and eventual extinction only attested to their racial inferiority. The yellow race, they warned, would suffer the same fate if necessary efforts were not made to ward off the white invaders.16 Such discrimination against other races was clearly inspired by Western racism17; however, it can also be traced back to Chinese traditions—regional stereotypes, Sino-centric worldviews characterised by superiority over exotic barbarians, and notions of social hierarchy that linked white complexions with nobility and blackness with the lower classes, if not with slaves.18 Racism was substantially challenged only when Chinese intellectuals began to appreciate other oppressed people’s unrelenting struggle, and to seek alliance in anti-imperialism.19 For the rise of racial consciousness in China, social Darwinism was a critical impetus. Through Yan Fu’s translation of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, Chinese intellectuals were exposed to Darwinism. Remarkable in their understanding of the principles of evolution was their strong belief in these rules’ universal efficiency. ‘Living things compete, nature selects and the fittest survives’ was commonly believed to be the fundamental rule that governs nature and human society alike. As an intellectual vogue, social Darwinism provided a systematic interpretative framework for worldwide colonial conquests, portraying interracial competition, however inhuman it was, as inevitable and to a large extent justifiable.20 The spread of social Darwinism fuelled the aforementioned bias against the vanquished races, which was a mixture of contempt and

26  G. LI

compassion, and to a far greater degree a panic about the yellow race and China’s imminent doom. Chinese intellectuals therefore devoted themselves to saving their wretched race, as manifested in the 1898 tenet of Baoguo Hui (Society for Protecting the Country), ‘save our country, save our race, save our religion’.21 The looming menace to ‘our race’ provided a rationale for social reform, and the concept of the yellow race, more importantly, offered an opportunity to work China into a nation-state. As the label for a simplified and distorted oriental Other, the yellow race, to its creators’ surprise, endowed this Other with a certain homogeneity necessary for the formation of a nation. What the Chinese had to do was to r­ e-conceptualise themselves by discovering, imagining and recounting their own racial origin and development, in a manner conducive to raising their consciousness and exciting their will to unite and fight. But what on earth was ‘our race’? Crucial divergences emerged. The revolutionaries, represented by Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Taiyan and their Tongmenghui (United League) comrades, called for a revolution featuring an anti-Manchu racism that would restore the Han race’s exclusive governance and even occupation of China proper; while the moderate reformers, including Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Yang Du and their followers, along with Manchu sympathisers, strove to maintain a multi-ethnic China and revive the country through practising constitutional monarchy. For the former, it was rather easy to clearly define the Han race as a nation by revealing their origin, memorialising their ancestor Huang Di (the Yellow Emperor), celebrating their glorious history, extolling the Han heroes and condemning the hanjian (traitors to the Han race).22 It is worth noting that Terrien de Lacouperie’s theory about the Chinese race’s Western origin lent allegedly scientific, and thus powerful, support to their assertions about the racial distinctiveness and superiority of the Han.23 The moderate reformers found an exclusively Han republic unacceptable. To oppose Han racism and nationalism, some reformers contended that the Han and the Manchu shared the same origin and ancestors, and were therefore racially homogenous; and that the two ethnic groups should unite against Western invasion.24 But in such arguments, the common racial identity of the Han and the Manchu, if defined as the yellow race, was either ambiguous or insufficient for building a nation. As was well known, the people pigeonholed as yellow included ethnic groups that spread across so many geographical and political boundaries that making them a single nation was impossible.25

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‘Yellow nationalism’ also failed because the revolutionaries employed the yellow race and the Han race indistinguishably in their speeches and writings, or resorted to an intraracial hierarchy, claiming that the Han race, as the most superior among yellow people, deserved their own nation. In fact, most reformers turned to different strategies. They made a painstaking attempt to downplay the racial and ethnic (and sometimes cultural) differences within the Qing imperial territory and, based on the emergent Zhongguo26 identity, sought to construct a Zhongguo nation through constitutional politics.27 Though of lesser importance in nation building, the concept of the yellow race still haunted the mind of late Qing intellectuals. Recurrent uproars over the yellow peril in the West provoked various reactions. While direct responses to the warnings of the yellow threat were little more than defences of the peaceful nature of the yellow race and countercharges to the ‘white peril’, some thinkers saw in such Western anxieties the possibility of a new world.28 Liang Qichao, for example, took pride in the Western powers’ fear of the Chinese. He believed that the advanced racial character of the Chinese would ensure their brilliant future: [Thanks to the influence of western thought arguing for freedom and equality, as well as Chinese people’s own adventurous spirit, excellent scholarship, and commercial competitiveness,] that we Chinese will be the most powerful race in the world in the upcoming century is by no means my exaggeration.29 We, the Chinese race, are certainly the most expansive and powerful race in the world. The people in Britain and France are surprised either by our invincibleness or expansion, to the extent that some worry that one day the East will overwhelm the West and invade Europe.30

Would the revived Chinese and yellow race, as Robert Hart foretold in 1903, inflict revenges on the past invaders?31 Such a prospect appealed to many late Qing Chinese, including Huang Zunxian, and was echoed in Japan.32 In contrast, Lu Xun, in a most thoughtful and balanced way, proposed a different fulfilment of the yellow peril: Poland and India are countries suffering the same lot as China…But our ‘men of aspiration’ today overlook this and simply assert that all such countries have fallen into their present state because of their own

28  G. LI inferiority, and toss in various other defamations to boot. That so blind and absurd an attitude can exist in China is probably due to the fact that we have repeatedly been made to taste fire and the blade, and have cowered beneath the heel of power and despotism for so long. As a result, we have lost our original character and our ability to feel sympathy for others has been worn away; all that remains in our hearts is the urge to fawn on the powerful and show contempt for the weak! Thus, generally speaking, those who sing the praises of militarism have, through their prolonged submission to power and despotism, gradually nurtured a sense of servility in themselves. They have forgotten their origins, joined the cult of aggression, and are truly the lowest of the low. Those who merely echo others and have no ideas of their own may be considered somewhat better. There are also people who fall into neither of these categories, who occasionally exhibit the characteristics of our pre-human ancestors. I have seen a few instances of this sort of thinking reflected in the poetry of this group, where they take especial pride in Kaiser Wilhelm II’s warning of the ‘Yellow Peril’. They growl hideous clamourings for the destruction of London and the levelling of Rome. Paris alone, they announce, may stand to serve as a setting for their libertine indulgence. Although the original proponents of the ‘Yellow Peril’ notion compared the yellow race to beasts, not even they could have endowed the notion with such fierceness. Through the present writing, I beg to submit to the able-bodied men of China that though bravery, strength and resolve in struggle are certainly attributes most appropriate to human life, they are best applied to s­elf-improvement and should not be employed to attack and swallow up innocent countries. If our own foundation is stable and we have surplus strength, let us then act as the Polish general Bem did in supporting Hungary, or as the English poet Byron in aiding Greece, that is, to promote the vital cause of freedom and to topple oppression, so that the world will finally be rid of tyranny. We should offer aid and support to all countries in peril or distress, starting with those which have been our friends and extending our aid throughout the world. By spreading freedom everywhere, we can deprive the ever-vigilant white race of its vassals and servants; this will make the beginning of a real ‘Yellow Peril’.33

It is worth quoting this long passage for it provides a critical assessment of the ideas of race that prevailed in the late Qing intellectual milieu, and reflects Lu Xun’s effort to promote the struggles of China from mere conflicts among different kinds of racism to the ‘cause of freedom’. Throughout his life, Lu Xun was critical of the Manchu maltreatment

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of the Han. What he lamented most, however, was people’s servility—a central part of the national character he criticised for decades—cultivated and reinforced by the Manchu rulers.34 Likewise, more hateful than the injustices Western powers committed against the colonised people, was the servility of those Chinese snobs who ‘fawn on the powerful and show contempt for the weak’. However, to get rid of servility is only the first step to freedom. Those who cheered at the idea of the yellow peril and desired to be ‘the master of Europe’ were still trapped in the master– slave dialectic, of which Lu Xun called for abolition.35 Expecting China’s revival, he creatively transformed the aggressive tone of the yellow peril into a resolution to free China as well as the whole world, displaying an outstanding world consciousness and ulterior utopian passion. Yang Jui-sung has carefully analysed late Qing intellectuals’ strategy of ‘self-orientalisation’ in the process of forging a new collective identity for the Chinese. Chen Tianhua and Zou Rong, focusing on the Western conspiracy to partition China by deploying the discourse of the yellow peril, were mainly defensive in their discussion. In the meantime, however, they implicitly took the concern with the yellow peril as a Western recognition of China’s potential, and hence found confidence in their own narrative of crisis. For Liang Qichao and Huang Zunxian, who shared such confidence while themselves concerned more with Sino-Western rather than Manchu-Han antagonism, the yellow peril transformed into a more offensive form of self-imagination.36 Lu Xun’s reflection implies a third dimension in this conception, that is, the constructive role China plays in the remaking of the world order. This dimension derived more from a distinct Chinese self-expectation than the illusion of the yellow peril, and, arguably, it was this s­elf-expectation— as a practitioner of universal justice and liberation—that rescued China from mere nationalism, even if it was unable to free the country from the yokes of power.

Yellow Peril Utopianism In comparison with political essays, literature provides more room for envisioning and depicting future scenarios in terms of race and nation. On the eve of the First World War, fictions of future war became a worldwide phenomenon. In Western and Japanese works, the fictional future was often nightmarish because of the yellow peril and the

30  G. LI

white peril, respectively.37 These dystopian fantasies contrasted remarkably with the utopian revival of the yellow race some Chinese writers exulted. Interestingly, most late Qing utopians were reformers who adhered to the ideal of constitutional monarchy while opposed to revolution. Although commonly labelled conservative, these gailiangpai (lit. the school that espouses gradual improvement) created the most daring and striking blueprints for a world populated by different races. ­Anti-revolutionary as they were in terms of how to modernise China, their utopian writing revealed their passion for a different kind of revolution, a world revolution intended to overthrow the ruling hierarchy, a revolution that most nationalistic revolutionaries, committed to a domestic racial revolution they viewed as the primary task, had addressed far less. Sometimes, conservative and revolutionary are but the two sides of a same coin.38 Late Qing utopian novels contained interesting considerations by the intellectuals for the prospect of China and the whole yellow race beyond the Han–Manchu vendetta. The yellow peril, unsurprisingly, became a favourite play on the rebuilt world stage. In this section, I will first discuss questions of utopian taxonomy in order to shed light on the peculiar nature of late Qing Chinese utopias. Following this part will be my analysis of a few key texts showcasing the complexities of the race-based world order late Qing Chinese desired. In his seminal article, The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited, Lyman Tower Sargent has proposed definitions of utopia, eutopia (or positive utopia), dystopia (or negative utopia), utopian satire, anti-utopia and critical utopia for our study of the utopian genre. His essential criterion is how the author of a certain utopia intends his contemporaneous readers to view the utopian society.39 Knowing that a utopia at a certain time may well seem dystopian in another time, Sargent employed the term ‘contemporaneous’ to confine the intended readers to a specific group. However, to ensure the reader’s homogeneity necessary for arriving at a minimum consensus on whether a work is utopian or not, it is no less crucial to take the ethnic, political and spatial boundaries into consideration. For instance, Thomas More’s work was not intended to appeal to a sixteenth-century Chinese mandarin, who would probably find More’s society interesting but bizarre. Judging from the interrelations between an intended utopia and co-existent communities, states and other social and political entities, we may re-arrange the utopias (or, to be exact, the eutopias) as follows:

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Isolated utopia. A non-existent society having little or no contact with other people in the world and living basically on its own, intended by the author to seem to its readers to be considerably better than their real society, and described in considerable detail. As is so often the case, such utopias are located in geographically secluded, barely visited places, as in Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun, as well as Tao Yuanming’s Peach Blossom Spring. Reciprocal utopia. A non-existent society living peacefully with and, in most cases, benefitting considerably from all kinds of reciprocal communications with other utopian or non-utopian societies, intended by the author to seem to its readers to be considerably better than their real society, and described in considerable detail. For instance, the residents of B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two obtain important supplies from outside and keep sending out its members to establish similar communities that are expected to form a larger, mutually beneficial, and hence more persistent utopian community together with Walden Two. Dominant utopia. A non-existent society subjugating and/or ruling one or more societies, intended by the author to seem to its readers to be considerably better than their real society, and described in considerable detail. Given the slaves acquired through war and their downplayed, while pivotal, role, the ideal polis Plato desired in Republic is an early example of a dominant utopia. The ideal of empire, especially in the era of national imperialism, may also fall into this category, for it often envisions a splendid imperial centre and subservient peripheries in the name of vassal states, colonies and barbarian tribes.

In the transitional stage of China, divergent utopias displayed the confluence and conflicts between old and new.40 The local utopian tradition of Peach Blossom Spring, dreaming of an escape from sorry realities, found its renewed expression in late Qing utopias. An unknown, faraway and pleasing island or land became the site for utopia in Chiren shuo meng ji (A Tale of a Fool’s Dream, 1904), Shizi xue (The Lion Blood, 1905) and Wutuobang zhi haojie (The Heroes of Utopia, 1909). Such isolated utopias were also favoured by anarchists in the 1910s. In contrast, Xin Zhongguo weilai ji (A Story of Future New China, 1902) and Xin shitou ji (A New Story of Stone, 1905) suggested peaceful and reciprocal co-existence among states. A great many more authors composed dominant utopias with remarkable focus on the life-or-death battle between the Chinese/yellow race and their Western/white foe. Despite their dissimilar imaginations, late Qing utopian authors shared an obsession

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with China that permeates and bridges all three types of utopia.41 For instance, isolated utopias were not necessarily a mere evasion of despotism or turmoil. Rather, in a few cases, the discovered islands were intended as overseas colonies that not only manifest the adventurous spirit of the Chinese, but also serve as exemplars of modernisation that inspire the colonisers’ compatriots in China. More interesting still, in the case of author Bihe guan zhuren (The Master of Green Lotus House, hereafter abbreviated as Bihe), the author constructed two different but interrelated utopias that call for a comparative reading.42 In Huangjin shijie (Golden World, 1907), a group of Ming loyalists flee Manchu-ruled China and arrive at a beautiful and tranquil island in the South Pacific. Their descendants’ reclusive life on luodao (Snail Island) undergoes fundamental changes when they accidentally obtain an opportunity to travel to the modern world. Their leaders receive a modern education in Britain and rescue thousands of Chinese workers from ‘Golden World’ slavery in the Americas. Later, with the help of other progressive Chinese, the Snail Island residents establish modern industry and agriculture, as well as political institutions that secure social order and gender equality. ‘A corner of the world as it is, (this island) is really like Paradise (jile shijie)’.43 Furthermore, it is foretold at the end of the story that a magnificent utopia, hopefully the paradise for all the Chinese, is to be founded in a newly discovered land: Yinhong, also present at the time, said to Mrs. Zhang, ‘My sister, I’m about to tell you that, in the recent days, (I have) discovered a land mass [where] no human has ever lived.’ Her words lead to a splendid and glorious world as the colony of our compatriots, fathers and sons, brothers, husbands and wives, friends, and offspring. Its flawless politics and morality are ten times better than today’s civilised countries. Isn’t this our compatriots’ sheer bliss?44

This ‘sheer bliss’ is Heaven’s distinctive gift to the Chinese, and not to be shared with other races. For Bihe, datong or human unification, given the brute racism plaguing the world, is impossible: Tunan said, ‘…Other people have drawn very clear racial boundaries, while some among our compatriots remain adherents of the old idea of datong, hoping to integrate all the countries on earth into a large society and thus accomplish a great community. Isn’t it flapdoodle?’ Jianwei replied, ‘The idea of datong is no more than nonsense. While their blindness invites derision, their intention behind this argument is pitiable.’45

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Such was Bihe’s own contempt for datong, the Confucian ideal cherished for so long in China. Yet, in a modern world, an entire nation’s migration to a promised land, as he proposed in Golden World, seemed little more viable. Probably for this reason, one year after Golden World’s publication, he presented an entirely different utopian imagination in Xin jiyuan (New Era, 1908). In this novel, by the year 1999, China has obtained wealth and power through its successful practice of constitutional monarchism. The country is proud of its annual income of more than 2000 trillion taels of silver, spider-web like railway network and highly advanced technological inventions. China’s military might, built upon its defence budget of one-third of its national expenditure, is also awe-inspiring. All the foreign concessions have been reclaimed, and all the treaties prescribing extra-territorial jurisdiction abolished. This powerful China sends its troops to protect Hungary (Xiongyelü), a country purportedly controlled by the yellow race, determined to adopt the Yellow Emperor’s calendrical notation—a reform China dictates to ‘the countries of the same race on earth, as well as the tributary countries subordinate to China’—and thus besieged by the whites in Europe.46 The conflict between China and the white nations, who make a joint effort to prevent the former from becoming a full-fledged yellow peril, soon develops into a racial world war. The yellow race all over the world, encompassing Japan and the republics founded by the descendents of overseas Chinese labourers in Australia and America (perhaps the colonies of Snail Islanders?), comes to China’s aid. Eventually, the yellow race, led by China, overpowers the united white nations and forces their defeated enemies to sign a treaty reminiscent of the humiliating Unequal Treaties with which New Era’s late Qing readers were familiar. Peculiarly remarkable among the twelve clauses are those pertinent to racial order, stipulating that (1) all countries are to recognise Hungary as China’s protectorate; (2) all countries of the yellow race are to use the Yellow Emperor’s calendrical system, and the countries of other races who voluntarily adopt this system are not to be interfered with by other parties; and (3) the overseas places where Chinese immigrants reside are to become Chinese ­extra-territories for commercial purposes, and are under China’s full legal jurisdiction. In this fashion, China has actually recovered its traditional tributary system while expanding its sphere of influence to the entire world. The story concludes with an ambiguous ending; the unequal treaty arouses objections and protests among the whites who worry about becoming

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the slaves of the yellows. ‘Perpetual peace’, as the yellow heroes have expected, is yet to come. Having been reprinted at least seven times by 1936, New Era manifests the mentality of a great portion of late Qing intellectuals who had in mind a scenario of ‘oppressed–resistance–independence–oppressor’.47 Indeed, the intense concern with racial order of the Chinese intelligentsia encouraged the emergence of dominant utopias.48 However, is racial conflict necessarily a zero-sum game? For the oppressed race, is its only choice to seek tit-for-tat retaliation? Is it inevitable to reproduce as one’s own a Western Manichean worldview characterised by a variety of dichotomies such as white and non-white, good and evil, or the Occident and the Orient? The open ending of New Era betrays the author’s quandary; if another bloody racial war is needed for making the old masters into submissive slaves, is it desirable? If he were to write a sequel to New Era, would he try to transcend the master-slave cycle in pursuing racial reconciliation? A year later, a more complex novel, Dian shijie (Electrical World, 1909), authored by Gaoyangshi bucaizi (The Untalented from Gaoyang, hereafter abbreviated as Gaoyang), came out in Xiaoshuo shibao (Fiction Times) and explored how a ‘Pax Sinican’ racial harmony was not possible.49 There is also a racial war between yellows and whites in Electrical World, no less brutal than that in New Era. At war, though, are not the entire yellow race and their white counterparts, but China and its most formidable white enemy, the country tellingly called Xiwei (lit. Western Might). Western Might, on the European central plain, invented a kind of flying fleet in 1999, and in no more than five years ruined all the strong countries in Europe. Two years ago, this country came into conflict with the country North Harmony and successfully wiped it out. Henceforth Western Might has developed greater ambition, taking East Asia as its first target in unifying the world.50

That Western Might singles out East Asia for its first strike and presses forward its invasion with no mercy has much to do with its obsession with the menace of the yellow race: ‘The country Western Might, dwelling upon the rumour of the “Yellow Peril”, can only relieve itself by

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destroying the whole Asia with its flying fleet’.51 The country Eastern Shadow, having tried desperately to ingratiate itself with the invader, ends up being devastated with nothing left. Then in no time is Western Might’s fleet ready to launch a fatal attack on China, the supposed origin of the yellow peril, which, just as in New Era, has become an independent and strong country implementing constitutional monarchy. The legendary scientist and entrepreneur with the dramatic name Huang Zhenqiu (lit. Yellow shocks the globe), relying upon his exceedingly advanced electrical devices, single-handedly annihilates the approaching enemy fleet over the Pacific. To Huang’s surprise, the king of Western Might, Napoleon X, orders a massacre of Chinese residents in his country for revenge. Such an atrocity provokes pain and fury in the mind of Huang, who then unleashes the utmost power of his electrical gun on the capital of Western Might. In an explosion shaking heaven and earth, the king, the troops and hundreds of thousands of people seeing off their invasion force vanish into the void. Upon first sight, the racial wars in New Era and Electrical World are essentially similar; the persecutory delusion of the yellow peril is fulfilled. Close reading, however, reveals crucial difference between the two novels. China’s opponent in Electrical World is not only the representative of white racism, but also the beastly winner of the internecine struggles among white nations—in some sense, a demon to which radical social Darwinism has given birth.52 Defending against this demon’s expansion thus deserves approval. In contrast to Western Might’s ruthlessness, Huang, the war hero of China, has been compassionate throughout his battle: Unexpectedly, the fleet’s tentative attack killed a thousand people. Unable to repress his own outrage, Huang said to himself, ‘They are so brutal! I cannot help but treat them brutally. In the hope to wait and see, I was unwilling to inflict the disaster on them in haste – but now, how can I speak in this way?’ [Witnessing the fleet’s spectacular destruction]…at first, Factory Owner Huang is very satisfied, but later he feels much compassion for his enemy, shouting ‘Too brutal! Too brutal!’, but to no avail. [The Western Might’s capital is burnt to the ground]…Mr Huang, who cannot bear to see this, hurriedly flies back to his own country and mourns for a few days.53

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All these descriptions serve to show the leniency indispensable for an ideal ruler, whom Huang had expected China to become at the beginning of Electrical World: Our past competition with European countries resulted from so-called childish thoughts. How can my compatriots be so deficient in progressive ideas!…My humble self is determined to wipe out this disgrace…and accomplish an entirely new electrical world…[by virtue of electricity] one person or two are enough to subjugate the whole Earth. The world will enjoy great unity and great equality when neither victory nor failure are attainable [due to the disappearance of warfare].54

Hence, China, already a utopia in 2010, is supposed to create a global utopia premised on China’s overwhelming force, which Huang manages to demonstrate in the war that ends the war. Entitled the King of Electricity and enjoying great power and prestige, Huang starts his new adventure at the moment where New Era concludes. Applying his scientific wonders to social reform, the King of Electricity has raised people’s standard of living and education considerably. To satisfy China’s financial need, he recruits one hundred and twenty thousand European workers to mine gold in Antarctica. These labourers enjoy superb working conditions under his management: The European workers are so happy, because the King of Electricity is a generous person, who treats them extremely well. They work for only four hours every day, earning extraordinarily high salaries. They are also allowed to bring their family members with them. Now, because of stocktaking, everyone receives a largesse of fifty pounds. How can European workers not be grateful? The King of Electricity often says, ‘In the nineteenth century, Westerners treated Chinese labourers extremely badly, while in our time, why should I follow their bad example?’ Thus he is always considerate, winning everyone’s admiration.55

For Bihe, the abuses Chinese labourers suffered overseas demanded merciless revenge. In contrast, in Gaoyang’s imaginary future, the King of Electricity tries to forgive Westerners’ wrongdoings and, to turn over a new page of human society, return good for evil. His effort pays off. Before long, a ‘world of great unity’ (datong shijie) has materialised. Nevertheless, in this novel, the brave new world is variably called datong shijie, datong guo (state of great unity), or datong diguo (empire

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of great unity). The ambiguity in designation calls our attention to the relationship of domination/dominance, as indicated by the gold coins in circulation; on the one side, they feature the images of the Chinese Emperor and the King of Electricity, and on the other side, four characters spelling datong jinbi (gold coin of great unity) encircle the earth. The dominator’s benevolence and generosity notwithstanding, the dominated’s resentment erupts once again. After a failed assassination attempt on the King of Electricity, a criminal confesses: Our race always claimed supremacy on earth. Nowadays, however, we surrender our territory to others. How can we not seek revenge for such shame! Besides, due to the order of building the Arctic Park, we again suffered from fatigue among the workers, only to provide entertainment for you yellow people. How can we not be angry!56

The rebellion of the white race casts a shadow upon the so-called datong. A dominant utopia, however good it intends to be, still entails the master–slave framework Lu Xun endeavoured to avoid. Aside from this fatal flaw, the imperfect morality of ordinary people, as the author described, also opens the datong shijie to question. Gaoyang’s novel ends up being a critical utopia that encourages us to reflect upon the viability of a dominant utopia.57

Towards a Great Racial Assimilation As a late Qing intellectual leader and the earliest utopian, Kang Youwei had a distinctive interpretation of historical progress and social reform in his magnum opus, Datong shu (The Book of Great Unity). Long before utopian ardour permeated late Qing intelligentsia through A Story of Future New China and other enchanting works of Liang Qichao, whose enthusiasm for a brilliant future had been first ignited in Kang’s classroom, his teacher Kang had already engaged himself in futuristic imaginings.58 His initial drive, never fully eclipsed by his concern with China’s salvation, was the human race’s universal redemption after a mystical meditation gave rise to his messianic belief. This idiosyncratic point of departure led ultimately to political visions very unlike those discussed previously. Hence, a fourth utopian type is necessary to appropriately define The Book of Great Unity:

38  G. LI Universal utopia. A non-existent society featuring human integration and universal equality, intended by the author to seem to its readers to be considerably better than their real society, and described in considerable detail.

The road to a racially universal world is the most controversial part of The Book of Great Unity, and therefore worthy of scrutiny. Under the subtitle ‘To abolish the racial boundaries and unify the humankind’, Kang proposed to make the different races into a single one. All humans are equal in the datong world; however, equality is not unconditional. ‘It is the natural situation that things are unequal. Equality can only be practiced when things have comparable aptitude, knowledge, appearance, and physique’.59 For Kang, the whites and yellows were almost the same in terms of talent and appearance, while the blacks ‘with their iron faces, silver teeth, pig-like slanting chin, front view like a bull, long hair all over the breast, dark black hands and feet, are stupid like sheep or swine and look terrifying’.60 It was thus impossible to treat the blacks and ­ lighter-skinned races equally. The solution, Kang argued, was to assimilate all other races into the whites. The expected unity of the original white race and those transformed into whites manifests Kang’s recognition of the white race’s superiority. The yellow race, he insisted, is the second best because the yellows are clever and easily transformable into whites. As long as they can emulate the whites—who eat beef underdone, and walk outdoors to enjoy sunshine, fresh air and get exercise—after a hundred years they will be as healthy and ruddy as the white people.61 The browns, living close to the tropical areas, are dull and sluggish, while still redeemable. Extremely difficult is the transformation of the black race, since vis-à-vis the whites and yellows, the blacks are like ‘the demons from Hell’.62 There would be no room for them in the datong world. Within China, Kang argued, there was a parallel hierarchy. ‘We, the sacred descendents of the Yellow Emperor’ had conquered south China, the land of the Miao, who fled to remote mountains with other aboriginals and almost died out. The triumph of the Han race in China was but another illustration of ‘the theory of natural evolution that the fittest survives’.63 For Kang, existent racial inequality, albeit the origin of miseries, demonstrated the essentially unequal nature of the human races. In his long years of exile, Kang travelled to many countries and realised that human appearance and physique had been overdetermined by ‘race, location, weather, food, daily life, living condition and exercises’.64 Accordingly, the dark races were to be transformed by various means:

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1.  Migration. All the blacks were to be moved to Canada, South America and Europe, while their homes—India, Central Africa, Southeast Asia and other equatorial areas—were to satisfy the needs of agriculture, industry, stockbreeding and trade. 2. Intermarriage. Interracial marriages were to be encouraged. Whites and yellows who married browns and blacks were to be honoured and awarded a medal with the inscription ‘Race Improver’. 3.  Dietary change. The ‘barbarians’ usually eat uncooked and unhealthy food, which caused their feebleness and foul odours. If they lived on the same fragrant and delicious food as the yellows and whites eat, their body odour would disappear. 4. Sterilisation. ‘For the browns and blacks whose nature is too bad, whose appearance is too hideous or who carry diseases, doctors are to have them drink a sterilising medicine and extinguish their race. By so doing, the trivial remnant of bad black race will not pollute our good race and give rise to degeneration’.65 Through a three-stage evolution, Kang said, the human race would ultimately become equal. In the first stage, the races of various colours differ greatly in their talent, appearance, physique, strength and stature. It is therefore inappropriate for these unequal races to intermarry. The second stage is marked by the transformation of browns and blacks into yellows, who are slightly different from the whites. Eventually, the yellows and whites will merge into a single race that have similar physical and mental characteristics and live in a society of universal equality. Kang’s amazing imagination was no doubt unprecedented and has had, so far as I know, no comparable analogue thereafter. While today’s people may find his proposals problematic for their undisguised racial discrimination, Kang, completely unaware of his own prejudice, drew up the plan of racial fusion with full sincerity. Why did a utopia aimed at universal humanity, equality, progress and solidarity yield such a biased plan? In what sense is racial sterilisation humane? Is it just to realise a humane utopia through inhumane means? Why should equality be based on humans being equally white instead of, say, diverse races, who are equally healthy, wise, good-looking and pleasant-smelling from ­well-planned cultivation and medical treatment, living together in harmony? A discussion around environmental determinism’s influence on the The Book of Great Unity may help answer these questions. In his journey,

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Kang had carefully observed the connection between geographical location and skin colour: If the Cantonese come to live in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, they will become ruddier and chubbier. Back in Canton, they are sallow and skinny again. [In contrast,] arriving in Singapore, even the rosy and chubby Cantonese become sallow and skinny. Moreover, the British who had resided long in the South Sea region turned black, and who had lived in India for one or two generations became sallow and indigotic, while the Chinese children born in Europe and America are all rosy and white. We therefore know that it was the tropical climate’s influence upon several generations that made the races of India, Malaysia and Africa black. In the beginning, it was not the case.66

He also took the situation of Turks, Mongols, Siberians, American Indians, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese into his consideration, arriving at a nuanced understanding of the geographical distribution of complexions: Among the humans whose living place has both land and sea, those in the frigid zone are whites, those in the temperate zone are yellows, and those in the torrid zone are blacks. The closer to the equator, the darker. In the frigid zone, those living inland look yellow, while those in the desert look also black. In the temperate zone, those living in the area of more sea are pale yellows, while those in the area of more land are dark yellows. In the torrid zone, those living close to sea are brownish yellows, while those living in the inland deserts are pure blacks. This is the general situation.67

Kang was not the only late Qing writer who had in mind a variegated world where skin colour hinges on geographical location. Early compilers of books introducing world geography provided a location-based ethnographical account, which provided a (pseudo-) knowledge background for Kang’s thinking.68 The idea that environment decides racial characteristics certainly has its Chinese origins.69 Late Qing intellectuals, however, learned this idea more from western geography, especially that propagating environmental determinism. Since Montesquieu’s famous argument in The Spirit of Law (1748) that natural environment has a decisive influence upon human physiology and mentality, as well as social organisation, environmental determinism had been widespread in geography, sociology and philosophy. In the last decade of the Qing dynasty—a period significant to the completion of The Book of Great

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Unity—environmental determinism was translated into Chinese and, before long, embraced by Chinese intellectuals.70 The rise and fall of races were commonly believed to have been determined by geographical environment. Liang Qichao, as the most prominent introducer and advocate of environmental determinism, might well have reinforced his teacher Kang Youwei’s understanding of the role geography performed in shaping racial hierarchy.71 Neither Liang nor Kang was a mere recipient of environmental determinism, though. Implying eurocentrism or white racism, environmental determinism looked problematic in their eyes. In Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi (the relationship between geography and civilisation), Liang wrote: Is it that our Asia cannot catch up with Europe? Not the case. If humans make the best effort (renli), they can subjugate nature (tianran). Considering that civilisation developed in Europe, a place unfavourable to civilisation, how can progress in Asia, a place unfavourable to the progress of civilisation, be impossible? Nowadays academic studies become more and more prosperous, human knowledge more and more advanced. Hence railways have spread all over Asia, and electrical wires are woven into a mass network. Even the lofty mountains of the Himalayas cannot hinder transportation between China and India; even the Deccan Plateau cannot thwart the communication between inland India and the eastern and western oceans. Asia will also become a stage for competition amid civilisations.72

This passage, albeit in fact a complete, unattributed quotation from Japanese historian Ukita Kazutami, manifests Liang’s wish for Asia’s rejuvenation.73 It is easy to sense in his words a utopian passion for a future that echoed Kang’s splendid imaginations in The Book of Great Unity. More important is his strong will to challenge the rule of nature that he expounded in this article. In other words, for Liang, the environmentally determined fact is not irreversible, as long as people are determined to change it. His teacher, Kang, was also determined to challenge the outcome of geography-based evolution. Kang’s inspiration for racial assimilation was perhaps relevant to Yinghuan zhilue (A short account of the maritime circuit, 1849), in which the author Xu Jiyu said that foreigners would look like Chinese after having spent a long time in China.74 And, as Confucians, both Xu and Kang were familiar with the idea that Yi (foreigner/barbarian), through cultivation, is able to become Xia (Chinese/

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civilised). In the context of late Qing, Kang, by suggesting to transform backward races and unite all humans through worldwide migration and social remaking, defied the European environmental determinists who sought to justify and perpetuate the superiority of Europeans and the white race in a scientific or philosophical way.75 But Kang failed to remain critical of white racism throughout The Book of Great Unity. As Jing Tsu has pointed out, Kang’s plan is characterised by a remarkable ambivalence relating to his yellow racial identity. His imaginary racial union slips from exclusively ‘white’ to ambiguous ‘white and yellow’. He seems to have attempted to argue for a certain equality between the white and yellow races: ‘Even though the white race commands strength and occupies a position of superiority, the yellow race is large in numbers and possesses wisdom. Thus, it is only reasonable for the two to combine and integrate’. Then why should the yellow race, as he suggested, take a hundred years to turn into whites, instead of shaping a new race that looks yellowish white? Another embarrassing question Kang would find difficult to answer is why white women, unlike in the case of dark races, would like to marry yellow men.76 Reluctant to admit that the yellow race, also threatened with racial enslavement or demise, was little better than other coloured races, Kang contended that the yellow race’s distinctive merits and their affiliation with the white race would raise the yellows to the same level as the whites through interbreeding. Interestingly, at an earlier time, Japanese scholars, such as Takahashi Yoshio and Kato Hiroyuki, also sought to improve the Japanese race through intermarriage with Westerners. This proposal, when presented to Herbert Spencer for advice, was turned down for fear that interbreeding between different races ‘would, as in Latin America, produce disastrous consequences for both’.77 Had Kang asked Spencer a similar question, the latter’s answer would have been no different. Ironically, the past ‘heavenly dynasty’, with which the ‘barbarians’ strove to associate through intermarriage, sought in the modern time to elevate its status by the same strategy, while Spencer, a leading European elite, sounded like a white Shi Jie.78 Kang’s ambivalence towards the white race in some sense decided his unambivalent scorn of other oppressed races. His attitude reflects a mentality rather common in late Qing Chinese intellectuals—that the Chinese, though probably less advanced than the Europeans (at the material level), were indisputably far more civilised than other races in the world.79 To defend themselves, Kang and his compatriots tried

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their best to dispel the myths and fallacies about the yellow race, while as regards the red, brown and black races, they accepted all kinds of rumours, stereotypes and defamations without hesitation. This mindset had to do with a knowledge deficiency, as Kang was unable to learn the theory of Mitochondrial Eve that reveals humankind’s African origin, or make a nuanced assessment of the relationship between geographical circumstances and human capability as Jared Diamond has done in Guns, Germs, and Steel.80 It had more to do with the framework within which late Qing Chinese intellectuals perceived and considered the world. From their point of view, the West, featuring economic prosperity, military strength and scientific advantage, was another centre of civilisation as respectable as China. Yet, only the Western ‘barbarians’ succeeded in convincing the proud Chinese literati that they were actually as civilised as, if not better than, the Chinese.81 Other ‘barbarians’, in the Chinese mind, remained barbarous. For these people, this fact, determined by the rules of nature, is unquestionably irreversible. Kang claimed to challenge the racial hierarchy, but mainly on behalf of the yellow race. What the inferior races deserve is no more than assimilation. Even so, some are deemed too inferior to be assimilated. Given their hopeless future, sterilisation of these unremediable creatures, for Kang, is no more than a racial euthanasia, and therefore humane. It seems we can now conclude that Kang derived his racism from a variety of flawed sources—geography, biology, eugenics—for which (flawed) science and his own bias are both to blame. Yet, Kang’s racialised thinking, as an integral part of The Book of Great Unity, has also to be understood within his larger cause of refashioning universalism. As Wang Hui has revealed, Kang designed a grand transformation for China as well as the world; the Chinese Empire, through ­re-interpreting, re-constructing and re-practising Confucian universalism, would transform into a modern sovereign state, and in the remote future melt into the great unity—the ultimate global political and social structure. In traditional Confucianism, the foundation of political order is Heaven’s Mandate. Kang, in the name of Heaven, negotiated Western views of the cosmos and nature and their Confucian counterparts, thus providing a set of ‘authentic principles’ (shili) upon which he developed ‘public law’ (gongfa) for universal social organisation. On the historical level, through his ‘Three Ages’ theory, Kang located human society within a universal linear progress. Regarding China as being in the age of chaos and the West in lesser peace, he recognised the necessity for China to learn from

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the advanced West. However, the advantage of the West was relativised in his universal compassion for human sufferings and pursuit of universal transcendence towards great unity and peace.82 In such an intellectual effort, according to Wang, Kang ‘attempted to create a universal ethics based on global relations. In light of this ethics, the Euro-centric universalism is reduced to European particularism’.83 But the question remains whether Kang’s was a complete reduction. Kang’s elaboration of miseries in Western society disenchanted his readers with the nation-state form and industrial capitalism and cast a shadow upon their alleged universal value. However, Kang did little to reduce scientific racism, the justification for racial hierarchy in the name of universally valid science. Rather, as I have analysed, he only sought to amend it by a levelling of the whites and the yellows, thus securing a niche for the Chinese/yellow/Asian race. In addition to the complicity between European scientists’ and Kang’s discriminatory attitudes against the dark races, Kang’s utmost confidence in science, as well as the crucial role science or ‘Western learning’ (xixue) played in shaping Kang’s new Confucian universalism, also prevented him from being critical of the scientific classification and assessment of the human race.84 More importantly, what science provided for Kang’s equality theory, which is central to his universalism, is an ontological basis and technical means rather than socio-political analysis of its practice. Therefore, equality, as Kang understood, was first and foremost an all-encompassing sameness instead of a set of common basic rights and/or welfare. His daring universal utopia thus coincided with the fundamental logic of modernity— in Alexandre Kojève’s words, the ‘politics of recognition’—to struggle for universal equality and freedom and realise the ‘universal and homogeneous state’.85 A strong sense of morality, justice, and liberation theories and practices for the sake of universal utopia may consolidate the oppressed people and their sympathisers by coordinating and integrating their struggles into a common cause. However, due to relations of dominance that utopians are either unaware of, unable to address or even unwilling to recognise, as exemplified by Kang’s thought, those who sow the dragon’s teeth of universal utopia are likely to harvest the fleas of domination and oppression. Kang’s scheme foreshadowed what was to unfold in the twentieth-century history of China, as well as of the whole world.

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Notes







1.  Phillip E. Wegner, Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), xvi. 2. “From this accumulation of entirely individual but historically linked cases there results what might be called the cycle of historical reciprocity of nationalism and racism.…Racism is constantly emerging out of nationalism, not only towards the exterior but towards the interior.…And nationalism emerges out of racism, in the sense that it would not constitute itself as the ideology of a ‘new’ nation if the official nationalism against which it were reacting were not profoundly racist.” Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (New York: Verso, 1991), 53. 3. Jens Bartleson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–19. 4. Michael Keevak, Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 23–42. 5. David E. Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500– 1800 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 130–134; Keevak, Becoming Yellow, 23–42. 6. Keevak, Becoming Yellow, 43–123. 7. For a helpful literature review of the studies of the yellow peril, see Fuhui Luo, Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua (Hsin-tien: Lihsu wenhua, 2007), 47–53. Apart from Luo’s book and the works he has introduced, other important references include: Gregory Blue, “Gobineau on China: Race Theory, the ‘Yellow Peril,’ and the Critique of Modernity,” Journal of World History 10, no. 1 (1999): 93–139; Akira Iikura, Yellow Peril no shinwa: teikoku nihon to “kōka” no gyakusetsu (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2004); Yang Jui-sung, Bingfu, huanghuo yu shuishi: “xifang” shiye de Zhongguo xingxiang yu jindai Zhongguo guozu lunshu xiangxiang (Taipei: Zhengda chubanshe, 2010). 8. For an overview of the Chinese migration from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, see Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 107–238. Donna Gabaccia has made a careful and inspiring comparison of the Chinese and Italian overseas workers and analysed how racial animosities were developed against them. See Donna Gabaccia, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the ‘Chinese of Europe’: Global Perspectives on Race and Labor, 1815–1930,” in Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, eds. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (Berne: Peter Lang, 1997), 177–196.



46  G. LI 9. Keevak, Becoming Yellow, 122–128. For an overview of the non-Western world’s reaction to the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, see Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 71–92. 10. For Japan’s adoption of western social Darwinism and racial theory, see Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan,” in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, ed. Frank Dikötter (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 96–117. 11. Luo Fuhui, Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua, 348–351, 360–364, 377–379. See also Keevak, Becoming Yellow, 134–135. Oyabe and Kimura’s theories were inspired by western scholars who introduced anthropology and archaeology into Japan. See David Askew, “Debating the ‘Japanese’ Race in Meiji Japan: Towards a History of Early Japanese Anthropology,” in The Making of Anthropology in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Shinji Yamashita, Joseph Bosco, and J. S. Eades (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 66–67, 72–74. 12. See Akira Iikura, “The Japanese Response to the Cry of the Yellow Peril During the Russo-Japanese War,” Josai International Review 11 (2006): 29–47. 13. Fuhui Luo, Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua, 352–354, 368–370. In an article published in Nippon, Japan was expected to ally with China to lead the Asian yellows in stemming the white race’s ambition: ‘Our Japan is equal to the European powers. The Japanese national spirit and its thriving imperial nationalism have fully embodied our characteristics as the superior yellow race of Asia. If we one day assume the leadership of the yellow race, we will command the 800,000,000 Asian people together with China and sharpen our common will to fight, then the competition for the Pacific (because of our active participation) is yet to be determined. How can this world be exclusively owned by the whites? I know that the world is created for the humans, and the beasts in the wild, the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky are for human’s consumption, while I never knew that the yellow race, as descendents of sacred nobles, are to suffice the white race’s need of d ­ og-and-horse-like slaves. China, China, I hope to hold sway over the Pacific with you!’ “Lun Taipingyang zhi jingzheng,” Youxue yibian 1 (October 1902): 88. 14. Kazuki Sato, “‘Same Language, Same Race’: The Dilemma of Kanbun in Modern Japan,” in Dikötter, The Construction of Racial Identities, ed. Frank Dikötter (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 130–135. For a meaningful comparison between Okakura Tenshin and Taguchi Ukichi, see Leo Ching, “Yellow Skin, White Masks: Race, Class, and Identification in Japanese Colonial Discourse,” in Trajectories: Inter-Asia

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Cultural Studies, ed. Kuan-hsing Chen (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 65–86. 15. Huang Xingtao and Chen Peng, “Jindai Zhongguo ‘Huangse’ ciyi bianyi kaoxi,” Lishi yanjiu, no. 5 (2010.): 83–85. 16. Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), 68–69, 75–76. 17. The Chinese translation of Okamoto Kensuke’s Mankoku shiki had evidently spread Western racial bias. See Sakamoto Hiroko, Chugoku minzoku shugi no shinwa: jinshu, shintai, gender (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2004); James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1983), 131–132. In addition, Gregory Blue has criticised Dikötter for failing to ‘consider whether Liang might have somehow have got hold of Gobineau’s distinctive racialist reading of Genesis.’ See Blue, “Gobineau on China,” 130. 18. Dikötter, The Discourse of Race, 10–12, 79–80, 82; Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, 132. Dikötter’s overemphasis of late Qing Chinese racism’s indigenous origin incurred Sun Lung-kee’s pointed critique. See Sung Lung-kee’s review of “The Discourse of Race in Modern China,” The Journal of Asian Studies 52, no. 3 (1993): 707–708; “Lun Zhongguo shi zhi fuke hua: ping Frank Dikötter,” Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiusuo jikan 44 (2004): 160–162. While making sense, Sun’s critique sometimes also simplified the case. For example, Sun argued that Kang Youwei’s suggestion to sterilise the blacks was just a reflection of the ‘white race’s worldview’ because there were no blacks in China at that time. In fact, The Book of Great Unity, where Kang raised his striking suggestion, contains Kang’s close observation of the blacks when travelling abroad. White people’s racist bias may probably have influenced him, but his own impression about the blacks was also fairly negative. In Japan, diplomats also played a role in introducing western racial bias and social Darwinism, see Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity,” 105–108. 19. See Rebecca E. Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 83–116. 20. Yuntao Bai, “Shehui daerwen zhuyi de shuru ji qi dui jindai Zhongguo shehui de yingxiang,” Beijing shifan xueyuan xuebao, no. 4 (1990): 93–101. For a critique of social Darwinism in late Qing and early Republican China, see Jilin Xu, “Xiandaixing de qilu: qingmo minchu de shehui daerwen zhuyi sichao,” in Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de hexin guannian, ed. Xu Jilin and Song Hong (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010), 175–194. 21. Youwei Kang, “Baoguo hui zhangcheng,” in Kang Youwei zhenglun ji, Vol. 1, ed. Tang Zhijun (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 233.

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22. Chunxia Wang, ‘Paiman’ yu minzuzhuyi (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 52–100; Sung-chiao Shen, “Zhen da han zhi tiansheng: minzu yingxiong xipu yu wanqing de guozu xiangxiang,” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 33 (2000): 77–158. 23. See Li Fan, “Xifang jindai minzu guannian he ‘hua yi zhi bian’ de jiaohui: zai lun Liu Shipei dui Lakeboli ‘Zhongguo renzhong wenming xilai shuo’ de jieshou he chanfa,” Beijing shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), no. 2 (2008): 66–72; Tze-ki Hon, “From a Hierarchy in Time to a Hierarchy in Space: The Meanings of Sino-Babylonianism in Early Twentieth-Century China,” Modern China 36, no. 2 (2010): 139–169. For the debate about the Chinese people’s origin during the Republican years, see James Leibold, “Searching for Han: Early Twentieth-Century Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development,” in Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, ed. Thomas S. Mullaney et al. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 220–225. 24. Sung-chiao Shen, “Wo yi wo xue jian xuanyuan: Huangdi shenhua yu wanqing de guozu jiangou,” Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan 28 (1997): 50–60. 25. Shen, “Wo yi wo xue jian xuanyuan,” 61; Lung-kee Sun, “Qingji minzuzhuyi yu Huangdi chongbai zhi faming,” Lishi yanjiu, no. 3 (2000): 75–76; Dikötter, The Discourse of Race, 84–85. 26.  Zhongguo 中国 (China/Middle Kingdom). 27. Shen, “Wo yi wo xue jian xuanyuan,” 61–72; Xingtao Huang, “Minzu zijue yu fuhao rentong: ‘zhonghua minzu’ guannian mengsheng yu queli de lishi kaocha,” in Zhongguo jindaishi duben, Vol. 2, ed. Shuanglin Guo and Xutian Wang (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006), 671–730. For the Zhongguo identity that has been taking shape since the early Qing dynasty, see Gang Zhao, “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century,” Modern China 32, no. 3 (2006): 3–30; Chengkang Guo, “Qingdai huangdi de Zhongguo guan,” Qingshi yanjiu, no. 4 (2005): 1–18; Xingtao Huang, “Qingdai manren de Zhongguo rentong,” Qingshi yanjiu, no. 1 (2011): 1–12. 28. For an overview of the Chinese discussions about ‘Yellow Peril’ theories in the late Qing and early Republican period, see Fuhui Luo, Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua, 292–346. 29. Qichao Liang, “Lun Zhongguo renzhong zhi jianglai” (1899), in Liang Qichao quanji, Vol. 1, ed. Zhang Pinxing et al. (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 260–262. Through her research, Jing Tsu has clarified Liang’s thoughts about the Chinese and the yellow race. Jing Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese

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Identity, 1895–1937 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 51–55. 30.  Liang, “Lun Zhongguo guomin zhi pinge” (1903), in Liang Qichao quanji, Vol. 2, 1079. 31. “This episode of today is not meaningless – it is the prelude to a century of change and the keynote of the future history of the Far East.…But what is this ‘Yellow Peril’?…It has slept long, as we count sleep, but it is awake at last, and its every member is tingling with Chinese feeling – ‘China for the Chinese and down with the foreigners!’…Twenty millions or more of Boxers armed, drilled, disciplined, and animated by patriotic – if mistaken – motives, will make residence in China impossible for foreigners, will take back from foreigners everything foreigners have taken from China, will pay off old grudges with interest, and will carry the Chinese flag and Chinese arms into many a place that even fancy will not suggest today, thus preparing for the future upheavals and disasters never dreamt of.” Robert Hart, “These from the Land of Sinim”: Essays on the Chinese Question, 2nd ed. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1903), 49, 51–52, 54–55. 32. Dikötter, The Discourse of Race, 112. In his memoirs, Timothy Richard recalled what he had seen during his 1903 visit to Japan: ‘The most interesting man I met was Prince Konoye, then President of the House of Peers. He might be described as the Bismarck of Japan. Educated at Bonn, where Kaiser Wilhelm II as a student must have left a forecast of his future policy carefully preserved by the traditions of the University, Konoye conceived the idea of the domination of Asia over the world by the Japanese leading the yellow race. When the Japanese government sent him to China, he suggested that an alliance be formed between the two nations, whose aim should be to dictate the policy of Asia and check Western aggression’. Timothy Richard, Forty-Five Years in China (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1916), 319. ‘Prince Konoye’ is Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), father of Konoe Fumiraro (1891–1945), who became Japanese prime minister during the Second World War. 33. Xun Lu, “Toward a Refutation of the Voices of Evil,” trans. J. E. Kowallis, Renditions 26 (Autumn 1986): 108–119. I have made a few revisions. 34. Abe Kenya and Jun Wu, “Luelun Lu Xun de ‘paiman’ sixiang,” Wenyi lilun yanjiu, no. 1 (1996): 27, 29–30. 35. ‘Yellow Peril, at that time, was interpreted to be the trend that the yellow race would sweep Europe. Some heroes took this as some whites’ compliment that China was a sleeping lion and felt complacent for a few years, preparing to be the master of Europe’. Xun Lu, “Huang huo,” in Lu Xun quanji, Vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2005), 354. See also Wang Hui, “The Voices of Good and Evil: What Is Enlightenment?

50  G. LI Rereading Lu Xun’s ‘Toward a Refutation of Malevolent Voices’,” trans. Ted Huters and Yangyang Zong, Boundary 2 (2011): 118–122. 36.  Jui-sung Yang, “Er you huanghuo zhi xianzhao, er you zhongzu zhi shili: ‘huanghuo’ yu jindai Zhongguo guozu gongtongti xiangxiang,” in Bingfu, huanghuo yu shuishi: “xifang” shiye zhong de Zhongguo xingxiang yu jindai Zhongguo guozu lunshu xiangxiang, 93–99. 37. Fuhui Luo, Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua, 213–219, 372; Lung-kee Sun, “1908: Huanghuo lun de yinian,” Nanfang renwu zhoukan, no. 18 (2008): 92. 38.  Among late Qing revolutionaries, anarchists were a major exception, who, because of their radical critique of all kinds of oppression, usually expected and called for a world revolution. That said, the anarchist utopias in the 1900s and 1910s, except for Cai Yuanpei’s Xinnian meng (1904), are all depictions of isolated communities. 39.  L yman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,” Utopian Studies 5, no. 1 (1994): 9. He defines utopia as ‘a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space’. 40. In a 1902 advertisement of Xin xiaoshuo, Liang Qichao listed the following summaries of two utopias and a dystopia under the title zhengzhi xiaoshuo (political fiction): Xin Zhongguo weilai ji (A Story of Future New China) This book begins with the Boxer Incident and narrates the happenings of the next fifty years. The whole story is a flashback from a visionary future, while it narrates like a historical account, as if there were indeed such people and such events, making the readers feel like they are personally on the scene and no longer realise that it is only a fable. As regards the structure, a southern province first achieves independence, and with assistance of heroes all over the country establishes a government practicing complete republicanism and constitutionalism, which signs equal treaties, builds up trade and develops friendly relations with other countries on Earth. A few years later, other provinces echo the pioneer province and become independent one after another and form four or five republican governments. Again through the strenuous efforts of the heroes, [all the provinces] are integrated into a great federal republic. The three northeastern provinces also transform into a state practicing constitutional monarchy that before long joins the federation. Citizens of the entire country make concerted efforts to engage in commerce and industry. [This new country’s] cultural prosperity and national affluence thus leads the whole world. Soon, a war breaks out between China and Russia because of disputes over the sovereignty of Tibet and Mongolia. Allying with Britain, the United States and Japan, China routs Russia. There are folk heroes who offer personal help to Russian nihilists to overthrow their

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autocratic government. At last, due to the abuses the yellows suffer in the colonies of Britain, the United States and the Netherlands, a racial war almost breaks out. The European and American countries ally against us, while the yellow countries form a corresponding alliance, in which China plays the role of leader and coordinates the military preparation of other countries, including Japan and the Philippines. Right before the war breaks out, Hungarians volunteer to mediate, and they succeed. Finally, a world peace conference, presided over by the Chinese prime minister, is held in the capital of China. Reached in this conference are clauses prescribing yellows and whites’ equal rights and friendly coexistence. So is this book concluded. Jiu Zhongguo weilai ji (A Story of Future Old China) This book’s format is the same as the former one. It just narrates an unchanged China, describing its miserable future. The powers at first make use of the Beijing government and the provincial governors as their puppets and deprive the people all over the country of their rights by every means. Chinese people all become slaves of foreign countries, servile to foreigners while unable to make a living. Finally, riots frequently arise. Employing insurgency suppression as a pretext, the foreigners carry out China’s partition. Then these foreign countries, driving Chinese people to serve in their respective armies, fight among themselves and cause great damage to China. Eventually, but only after fifty years, there is the rise of a great revolutionary army, who secure one or two provinces for the foundation of a recovery. Such is the content of this book. Xin taoyuan (New Peach Blossom Spring), also entitled Haiwai xin zhongguo (Overseas New China) This book is just to elaborate on the institutions of regional autonomy so as to supplement what Xin Zhongguo weilai ji does not address. Its structure is that, two hundred years earlier, people of a large Chinese ethnic group, unable to endure tyranny, sailed over the ocean and retired to a wild island. Having developed into a large community, only today are these people in communication with the mainland again. Their political system is similar to that of the first-class civilised countries in Europe and America, sharing their merits while being without their flaws. Having never forgotten their motherland, these people eventually help the mainland heroes to fulfill the great task of reform, and transplant all their laws and institutions to their ancestral land. Such is this book’s content. While Liang himself, as we know, later only wrote the beginning part of A Story of Future New China, his call for a revolution of fiction, and his utopian models successfully excited many writers’ utopian passion and prefigured the diverse forms of late Qing utopianism. Noteworthy as well

52  G. LI















is that Bihe guan zhuren took up Liang’s utopian designs, infused them with his own ideas, and developed these utopian sketches into Huangjin shijie (1907) and Xin jiyuan (1908). See “Zhongguo weiyi zhi wenxuebao Xin xiaoshuo,” in Ershi shiji zhongguo xiaoshuo lilun ziliao, Vol. 1, ed. Chen Pingyuan and Xia Xiaohong (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1989), 43–45. 41. Chih-tsing Hsia has an influential analysis of modern Chinese literature’s ‘obsession with China’, that is, ‘its obsessive concern with China as a nation afflicted with a spiritual disease and therefore unable to strengthen itself or change its set ways of inhumanity’. See Chih-tsing Hsia, A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 533–534. While Hsia is addressing the ‘new literature’ from the literary revolution in 1917 to the founding of the PRC in 1949, his analysis evidently applies to late Qing writers. 42. “Bi heguan zhuren” is the pen name of the late Qing educator and writer Yang Ziyuan (1871–1919). 43. Bihe guan zhuren, Huangjin shijie (Nanchang: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1993), 644. 44. Bihe guan zhuren, Huangjin shijie, 652–653. 45. Bihe guan zhuren, Huangjin shijie, 629. For an elaborate late Qing critique of datong and pacifism, see Baishui (Lin Xie), “Shijie heping shuo,” in Xinhai geming qian shinian jian shilun xuanji, Vol. 3, ed. Zhang Zhan and Wang Renzhi (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1977), 707–711. 46. Bihe guan zhuren, Xin jiyuan (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), 439. 47. Delong Liu, “Wanqing zhishi fenzi xintai de xiezhao: Xin jiyuan pingyi,” Ming-Qing xiaoshuo yanjiu, no. 2 (1994): 96. 48. ‘Race not only is a claim about one’s cultural or ethnic legitimacy but also promises the investment of power in the conception of who one is in relation to others. As a structurally hierarchical category, its discursive invention is premised on the question of domination and hegemony’. Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature, 86. 49. Gaoyangshi bucaizi is the pen name of the late Qing writer and journalist Xu Zhiyan (1875–1923). For a comprehensive study of Xu’s life and career, see Le Kang, “Xu Zhiyan jiqi zuopin yanjiu” (MA diss., East China Normal University, 2009). In his analysis, however, Dian shijie is barely mentioned. 50. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, Xiaoshuo shibao, no. 1 (1909): 9. 51. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, 16. 52. In Chiren shuomeng ji, the author also made a critique of social Darwinism by pushing its logic to the extreme. ‘Menghe said, “It is absolutely true that the superior win and the inferior lose. I’m afraid that,

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in the future world, only the intelligent people can survive and avoid extinction. The foolish races are probably to die out.” Xixian said: “Isn’t it the case? I’m afraid that not only the foolish will die out due to their incapability to compete with the intelligent but the intelligent will also compete among themselves to decide the winning superior and the losing inferior. Today’s whites who order about blacks and self-claim mightiness may not necessarily evade being ordered about in the future”’. Sheng Lü, Chiren shuomeng ji (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), 186. 53. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, 17–19. 54. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, 2. 55. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, 20. 56. Gaoyangshi bucaizi, Dian shijie, 46. 57. According to Sargent, a critical utopia is ‘a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporary reader to view as better than contemporary society but with difficult problems that the described society may or may not be able to solve and which takes a critical view of the utopian genre’. Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,” 9. 58. Liang was first exposed to Kang’s datong theory when studying at Wanmu School. See Wenjiang Ding and Fengtian Zhao, eds., Liang Qichao nianpu changbian (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983), 23. 59. Youwei Kang, Datong shu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2005), 114. 60. Kang, Datong shu, 114. 61. Kang, Datong shu, 110–111, 115–116. 62. Kang, Datong shu, 111. 63. Kang, Datong shu, 111. 64. Kang, Datong shu, 115. 65. Kang, Datong shu, 117–119. 66. Kang, Datong shu, 116. 67. Kang, Datong shu, 116–117. 68. Dikötter, The Discourse of Race, 49–50. 69.  The Book of Rites contains such a statement, ‘The people of those five regions – Zhongguo, rong, yi, (and other wild tribes) – all have their distinctive natures, which are unchangeable’. In his authoritative annotation to this sentence, Zheng Xuan explained the fixity of human nature, ‘This is made so by regional climate’. Li Xueqin et al., eds., Liji zhengyi, vol. 2 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 398. In addition, as I have discussed, Shi Jie regarded Zhongguo as the exclusive living space for Chinese civilisation. Zheng Sixiao (1241–1318), a Southern Song scholar, echoed Shi Jie and went even further to argue that the barbarians are an outgrowth of a vile environment.

54  G. LI 70.  The Book of Great Unity, although first published in 1902, contains many later revisions. The part arguing for racial assimilation is a case in point, because Kang included many personal observations from his travels to Europe and North America after 1902. 71. For a thoughtful discussion of the influence of environmental determinism and its critique in late Qing China, see Shuanglin Guo, Xichao jidang xia de wanqing dilixue (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000), 49–70. 72. Liang Qichao, “Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi” (1902), in Liang Qichao quanji, Vol. 2, 948. Italics added. 73. Guo, Xichao jidang xia de wanqing dilixue, 52–54, 69–70. 74. In 1874, at the age of seventeen, Kang Youwei was for the first time exposed to A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit and the map of Earth, and hence ‘learned the past of different countries and the rules of Earth’. Kang Youwei, Kang Nanhai zibian nianpu, ed. Lou Yulie (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), 1992, 6. 75. For instance, Henry Thomas Buckle stated in his renowned work History of Civilization in England that, other than Europeans, who are able to harness nature to a certain extent, humans are completely subordinate to nature. Guo, Xichao jidang xia de wanqing dilixue, 69. 76. Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature, 43–45. 77. Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity,” 108. 78. Shi Jie (1005–1045) is a Chinese scholar-official living in the Northern Song dynasty. In his famous essay “On Zhongguo”, he argued for a pure zhongguo-ness or Chinese-ness and asked for isolating zhongguo from barbarian influences. 79. An illustrative event was recorded in Youxue yibian. In 1903, the Fifth National Industrial Exhibition in Osaka planned to exhibit Chinese in its Human Pavilion. Because of Chinese students’ protest, the sponsor then claimed to exhibit Taiwanese instead. However, rumours said that they actually exhibited a woman from the province of Hunan. Irritated, the Hunan Students Society sent Zhou Hongye to investigate this matter. Zhou said to the staff of the Expo, ‘I have no idea of what you actually mean by “Human Pavilion”. That said, the word “human” should disregard the differences between the civilised and the barbarous and include Koreans, Chinese, Aryans and other foreigners, as well as you Japanese, the so-called Yamato race. According to what we have seen in the newspaper, the people your pavilion intends to exhibit, besides Chinese, are no more than Indians, Koreans, Ainus and other aborigines. From our point of view, although the national power of China is in such a [poor] situation, in terms of race, our level of living and civilisation are still closely comparable to that of Japanese and Aryans. Now, exhibiting some inferior races, you want to rank us among them as their equals – this is what

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makes us disappointed.’ “Hunan tongxianghui diaocha Daban bolanhui renlei guan Taiwan nüzi shijian,” Youxue yibian, no. 6 (1903): 532–533. 80. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. (New York: Norton, 2005). 81. James Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in ­Nineteenth-Century China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 82. Hui Wang, Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi, Vol. 2. (Beijing: Sandian shudian, 2004), 737–829. 83. Wang, Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi, 746. 84. For an analysis of the relationship between modern science and the concept of equality in Kang Youwei’s thought, see Yixia Wei, “Pingdeng yu ziran kexue: yi Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong de sixiang wei zhongxin,” Zhexue yanjiu, no. 7 (2010): 55–60. 85. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols Jr., ed. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 69 et passim.

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“Hunan tongxianghui diaocha Daban bolanhui renlei guan Taiwan nüzi shijian.” Youxue yibian, no. 6 (1903): 532–533. Iikura, Akira. “The Japanese Response to the Cry of the Yellow Peril During the Russo-Japanese War.” Josai International Review 11, (2006): 29–47. Iikura, Akira. Yellow Peril no shinwa: teikoku nihon to “kōka” no gyakusetsu. Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2004. Kang, Le. “Xu Zhiyan jiqi zuopin yanjiu.” MA diss., East China Normal University, 2009. Kang, Youwei. “Baoguo hui zhangcheng.” In Kang Youwei zhenglun ji, edited by Tang Zhijun, 233. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981. Kang, Youwei. Datong shu. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2005. Karl, Rebecca E. Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. Keevak, Michael. Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Kenya, Abe, and Jun Wu. “Luelun Lu Xun de ‘paiman’ sixiang.” Wenyi lilun yanjiu, no. 1 (1996): 27–30. Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. Edited by Allan Bloom. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980. Kuhn, Philip A. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008. Leibold, James. “Searching for Han: Early Twentieth-Century Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development.” In Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, edited by Tom Mullaney, James Leibold, Stephane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, 220–225. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. Liang, Qichao. “Lun Zhongguo renzhong zhi jianglai” (1899). In Liang Qichao quanji, Vol. 1, edited by Pinxing Zhang et al., 260–262. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999. Liang, Qichao. “Lun Zhongguo guomin zhi pinge” (1903). In Liang Qichao quanji, Vol. 2, edited by Pinxing Zhang et al., 1079. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999. Liu, Delong. “Wanqing zhishi fenzi xintai de xiezhao: Xin jiyuan pingyi.” ­Ming-Qing xiaoshuo yanjiu, no. 2 (1994): 96. Lü, Sheng. Chiren shuomeng ji. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989. Lu, Xun. “Huang huo.” In Lu Xun quanji, Vol. 5. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2005. Lu, Xun. “Toward a Refutation of the Voices of Evil.” Translated by J. E. Kowallis. Renditions 26 (Autumn 1986): 108–119. “Lun Taipingyang zhi jingzheng.” Youxue yibian, no. 1 (1902): 88.

58  G. LI “Lun Zhongguo shi zhi fuke hua: ping Frank Dikötter.” Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiusuo jikan, no. 44 (2004): 160–162. Luo, Fuhui. Huanghuo lun: dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua. Hsin-tien: Lihsu wenhua, 2007. Mungello, David E. The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. Pusey, James Reeve. China and Charles Darwin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1983. Richard, Timothy. Forty-Five Years in China. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1916. Sargent, Lyman Tower. “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited.” Utopian Studies 5, no. 1 (1994): 9. Sato, Kazuki. “‘Same Language, Same Race’: The Dilemma of Kanbun in Modern Japan.” In The Construction of Racial Identities, edited by Frank Dikötter, 130–135. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997. Shen, Sung-chiao. “Wo yi wo xue jian xuanyuan: Huangdi shenhua yu wanqing de guozu jiangou.” Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan 28 (1997): 50–60. Shen, Sung-chiao. “Zhen da han zhi tiansheng: minzu yingxiong xipu yu wanqing de guozu xiangxiang.” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 33 (2000): 77–158. Sun, Lung-kee. “1908: Huanghuo lun de yinian.” Nanfang renwu zhoukan, no. 18 (2008): 92. Sun, Lung-kee. “The Discourse of Race in Modern China.” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 3 (1993): 707–708. Tsu, Jing. Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895–1937. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. Wang, Chunxia. “Paiman” yu minzuzhuyi. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005. Wang, Hui. “The Voices of Good and Evil: What Is Enlightenment? Rereading Lu Xun’s ‘Toward a Refutation of Malevolent Voices’.” Translated by Ted Huters and Yangyang Zong. Boundary 2 (2011): 118–122. Wang, Hui. Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi. Vol. 2. Beijing: Sandian shudian, 2004. Wegner, Phillip E. Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spacial Histories of Modernity. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Wei, Yixia. “Pingdeng yu ziran kexue: yi Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong de sixiang wei zhongxin.” Zhexue yanjiu, no. 7 (2010): 55–60. Weiner, Michael. “The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan.” In The Construction of Racial Identities, edited by Frank Dikötter, 96–117. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.

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Xu, Jilin. “Xiandaixing de qilu: qingmo minchu de shehui daerwen zhuyi sichao.” In Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de hexin guannian, edited by Jilin Xu and Hong Song, 175–194. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010. Yang, Jui-sung. Bingfu, huanghuo yu shuishi: “xifang” shiye de Zhongguo xingxiang yu jindai Zhongguo guozu lunshu xiangxiang. Taipei: Zhengda chubanshe, 2010. Zhao, Gang. “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century.” Modern China 32, no. 3 (2006): 3–30. “Zhongguo weiyi zhi wenxuebao Xin xiaoshuo.” In Ershi shiji zhongguo xiaoshuo lilun ziliao, Vol. 1, edited by Pingyuan Chen and Xiaohong Xia, 43–45. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1989.

CHAPTER 3

Shaolin, Wuxia Novels, Kung Fu Movies and National Identity Lu Zhouxiang

Introduction Shaolin Monastery in Dengfeng, Henan Province (also known as Shaolin Temple) was built around 496 by Emperor Xiaowen (467–499) of the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534) for the Indian monk Batuo, who had travelled to China to spread Buddhist teachings. Based on the legends of Bodhidharma (?–mid-530s), the first patriarch of the Chinese Chan lineage, and thanks to royal patronage, Shaolin earned great fame as the cradle of Chan. The perfect combination of Chan Buddhism, martial arts and traditional Chinese culture has made Shaolin unique and noteworthy. Today, Shaolin is widely recognised as a leading religious institution in China and Shaolin kung fu has become a supporting pillar of Chinese martial arts1 and a well-recognised brand of Chinese culture.2 Karl W. Deutsch has argued that national identity is based on a ‘state of mind which gives “national” messages, memories and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making

L. Zhouxiang (*)  Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_3

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of decisions’.3 A nationalist devotes greater attention to those messages which ‘carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or culture’.4 Shaolin carries at least two symbols of nationality for the Chinese: Buddhism and kung fu, both regarded as national codes of traditional Chinese culture. Although Buddhism was a foreign import from India, the official promotion of Buddhism in China between the fifth and tenth centuries, and the unity of the Three Teachings5 since the Song dynasty (960–1279), gradually transformed it into a mainstream indigenous religious tradition. By the Tang dynasty (618–907), Shaolin had grown into a centre of Buddhist studies. In the following centuries, the monastery established its position as one of the leading religious institutions in China. During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Shaolin monks served the government as a loyal military force. Battles against rebels and pirates in the first half of the sixteenth century helped Shaolin to extend its fame and identity outside the religious world and capture the attention of diverse segments of Ming society. Assisted by religious mysticism, this fame transformed Shaolin into a major player in the martial arts community. The Shaolin monks had created a wide range of martial arts forms and combat techniques, with martial arts training becoming an integral part of monastic life. By the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Shaolin kung fu has developed into a supporting pillar of Chinese martial arts and a source of strength and pride for the nation.

Nationalism, Martial Arts, Wuxia Novels and Shaolin Chinese martial arts have long been regarded as an important element of Chinese culture. They helped the Chinese to create a collective cultural identity over the course of time. After the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, fuelled by a modern Chinese nationalism that focused on anti-imperialism, national unity and national revival, practising martial arts became widely recognised as a basic approach to build up people’s physiques, strengthen the nation and achieve national salvation. A nationwide campaign was launched by the government to promote Chinese martial arts in the education sector and in society.6 Supported by politicians, educationalists and the general public, martial arts served

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the goals of promoting individual fitness and aiding national defence, and contributed to the construction of national identity and national spirit among the Chinese people.7 In this context, Shaolin kung fu developed alongside other schools of martial arts and continued to strengthen its influence in society. The rapid development of Chinese martial arts was accompanied by the rise of wuxia (martial arts hero/heroine)8 novels. Following the flourishing of martial arts stories in the Qing dynasty, a new generation of wuxia novels began to appear in magazines and newspapers from the early 1910s onward, immediately becoming one of the most popular genres of Chinese literature.9 These wuxia stories can be divided into two main categories. The first category of stories is set in ancient China. The heroes and heroines use kung fu to fight evil forces and promote traditional virtues and norms.10 The second category is those stories based on the legends and myths of kung fu masters in the late Qing and early ROC eras. Plots are usually set against the background of major historical events, such as the anti-Manchu revolts, the Boxer Rebellion and the 1911 Nationalist Revolution, reflecting the strong nationalist sentiment of the time.11 As an important segment of Chinese martial arts, Shaolin and Shaolin kung fu frequently appear in wuxia novels. The history of Shaolin and the legends of Bodhidharma and Kinnara King12 are incorporated into stories. For example, chapter seven of Xiang Kairan’s Legends of Modern Chivalric Heroes (Jindai Xiayi Yingxiong Zhuan, 1923) tells the story of Shaolin abbot Haikong challenging martial arts master Wang Donglin, Instructor of the Imperial Guards in Beijing. The author interprets the origins of Shaolin kung fu as follows: Shaolin is a vast Buddhist monastery with a long history. It sits underneath Mount Song in the centre of the country. It normally accommodates between three hundred and five hundred monks. After the First Patriarch, Bodhidharma, achieved enlightenment, he left the formulas for internal martial arts training. In the Daye period of the Sui dynasty, a monk who worked in the kitchen fought off hundreds of rebels with a staff. After that, Shaolin staff methods became a school of Chinese martial arts.13

Li Shoumin’s Legend of Shushan Swordsmen (Shushan Jianxia Zhuan, 1932) describes Shaolin as a leading centre of martial arts:

64  L. ZHOUXIANG Shaolin enjoyed its golden age during the Yuan and Qing dynasties and accommodated many masters… The mountain paths were steep and difficult. Only those who were eager to learn kung fu would travel to the monastery. On their way to Mount Song, the two girls heard many incredible stories about Shaolin and were told that Shaolin monks were very decent and hard-working. They already felt that Shaolin was worthy of admiration and respect.14

Nationalism was one of the driving forces behind the success of wuxia novels in early twentieth-century China. These novels served the inheritance and preservation of the core values of Chinese tradition and stressed a sense of pride. They also provided readers with psychological compensation for foreign aggressions, imperialist expansion, warlordism, ineffectual government and economic hardship, and functioned as an effective ideological instrument that contributed to the construction of national and cultural identities. After the establishment of the Republic in 1912, Han nationalists moved away from anti-Manchuism and promoted the new idea of ‘Five Races under One Union’, hoping to quell potential ethnic conflicts in China and reinforce a sense of national unity among all the ethnic groups.15 However, anti-Manchu sentiment still ran high, dominating the mindsets of many Chinese people. This is reflected in wuxia stories, especially those based on the Xilu legend of the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui, or Hongmen), an influential secret society which advocated pro-Ming and anti-Qing ideologies.16 The legend has it that Shaolin monks answered the call of the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722) to battle against the Xilu barbarians. After defeating the barbarians, the Emperor rewarded the monks with official posts, but they declined and returned to Shaolin. The emperor was convinced by a scheming official that the monks might use their military power to launch rebellions, so he dispatched troops to eliminate Shaolin. The Qing army burned down the monastery and killed almost all the monks. Only five monks managed to escape; they founded the Heaven and Earth Society to support the Ming prince in overthrowing the Qing government and restoring the Ming dynasty, and are called the Five Shaolin Ancestors.17 The Heaven and Earth Society employed Shaolin to build credibility and influence. The Xilu legend developed into different versions and was incorporated into the rituals of the Society, turning Shaolin and Shaolin kung fu into a symbol of rebellion and a source

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of ethno-national identity. Members of the Society practised martial arts to improve their physiques and fighting skills. Hongquan (Hong Fist) and Shaolin Wuzuquan (Five Ancestors Fist) were the prime martial arts they developed and practised. Popular novels based on the Xilu legend and the Heaven and Earth Society included: Shaolin Warriors’ Heroic Battles (Shaolin Yingxiong Xuezhan Ji, 1931) and Zhishan’s Three Travels to Nanyue (Zhishan San You Nanyue Ji, 1931) by Deng Yugong; Teenage Shaolin Heroes (Shaolin Xiao Yingxiong, 1931) by Jiang Dielu; The Burning of Shaolin Monastery (Huo Fen Shaolin Si, 1930s–1940s) by Zheng Zhengyin; and Monk Sande’s Three Visits to Xichan Monastery (Sande Heshang San Tan Xichan Si, 1948)18 by Chen Jing. The names of the main characters of these novels, such as Chan Master Zhishan, Monk Sande, Fang Shiyu, Hu Huiqian, Hong Xiguan and Miao Cuihua,19 are mostly taken from a late Qing novel, The Prosperous and Great Qing Dynasty (Sheng Chao Dingsheng Wan Nian Qing), in which they are described as villains from the Shaolin school. Due to the change in popular social and political ideology after the fall of the Qing dynasty, these fictional kung fu masters with a Shaolin background were portrayed by a new generation of novelists as folk heroes using superior combat skills to fight the evil forces backed by the Manchu government. For example, the plot of Monk Sande’s Three Visits to Xichan Monastery is based on the conflict between the Shaolin school and the Wudang school. It clearly spells out anti-Manchu sentiment: Chan Master Zhishan assembled his disciples in the abbot’s room and announced, ‘Today’s Shaolin and Wudang are like ice and coal that cannot co-exist. Wudang assists the Qing government to suppress our revolution. If we want to restore the Ming dynasty, we must defeat the Wudang school first.’20

The Wong Fei-hung/Huang Feihong series is another popular genre of wuxia novels published in the 1930s and 1940s. The plots are based on the legendary stories of Huang Feihong (1847–1924), a famous Shaolin kung fu master, physician and folk hero from Foshan, Guangdong Province,21 described by disciple Lin Shirong (1861–1943) as an anti-Manchu rebel and the inheritor of Hongquan passed down from Chan Master Zhishan who survived the destruction of Shaolin.22 After

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Huang Feihong died in 1924, his stories became the subject of many popular wuxia novels composed by Cantonese writers. He was shaped into an idealised image that represented traditional Chinese virtue and strength. Popular titles included: The Supplementary Stories of Wong Feihung (Huang Feihong Bie Zhuan, 1933) by Zhu Yuzhai; Wong Fei-hung (Huang Feihong, 1938) by Dai Shaoyu; The Legend of Wong ­Fei-hung (Huang Feihong Zhuan, 1942) by Xu Kairu; The Story of Wong Fei-hung (Huang Feihong Zheng Zhuan, 1946) by Kuang Qitian; and Further Tales of Wong Fei-hung (Huang Feihong Zai Zhuan, 1947) by Zhongyi Xiangren. These novels greatly contributed to the spread of Shaolin kung fu culture in the Pearl River Delta region–the birthplace of the Heaven and Earth Society.

The Rise of Kung Fu Movies and the Further Development of Wuxia Novels Owing to their overwhelming popularity, wuxia stories became among the most important sources for filmmakers. From the 1920s onward, both classic and modern wuxia novels and stories were turned into films and soon gained popularity. Between 1928 and 1931, more than 250 wuxia movies were produced in Shanghai, accounting for 60 percent of the films produced in this period.23 These early wuxia movies belong to the category of ‘period costume martial arts’ or ‘swordplay’ films. They are adapted from folktales, myths and legends dominated by Chinese cultural traditions and values. The foci are the exploration of traditional Chinese values and social norms, and the reflection of philosophy and religion, including Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism.24 The heroes and heroines have advanced fighting skills and battle evil forces, endeavouring to promote traditional virtues and norms such as honesty, righteousness, forbearance and altruism.25 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, facing imperialist aggression and influenced by nationalism and militarisms, leading Chinese filmmakers and directors called for the promotion of a ‘national spirit’ through period costume movies. They urged their colleagues to use cinema to cultivate this among the general public.26 As film director Zhen Junli (1911–1969) argued in 1936, ‘We want to counter the European influence on Chinese cinema and build up a national character of Chinese cinema… and make foreigners aware that the Chinese also have a great

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and heroic national spirit’.27 The importance of kung fu movies in the construction of China’s national spirit is explained by a film critic in his review of wuxia movie Red Butterfly the Heroine (Nuxia Hong Hudie, 1939): Our country is in a critical state. People are ‘sleeping on firewood and tasting gall’ to build up the strength of the nation. Romantic movies won’t help to inspire the people and will undermine the spirit of the nation. Only wuxia movies can cultivate a sense of courage and build up confidence.28

After the outbreak of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, many novelists and film producers fled to the British colony of Hong Kong29 as refugees, turning the city into a hub of modern Chinese literature and film.30 From the very beginning, Chinese martial arts established a dominant position in novels and films produced in Hong Kong. The Adventures of Fong Sai-yuk (Fang Shiyu Da Leitai, 1938) was one of the first kung fu movies produced in Hong Kong.31 The main character, Fang Shiyu, is from the Shaolin school. One year later, Burning of the Shaolin Temple (Huoshao Shaolin Si, 1939) was aired in Hong Kong. The plot was based on The Prosperous and Great Qing Dynasty, telling the stories of kung fu masters Hu Huiqian, Fang Shiyu and three of the Five Elders of Shaolin—Chan Masters Zhishan, Baimei and Wumei.32 By the late 1940s, the film industry had taken root and was flourishing in Hong Kong. Many of the wuxia novels published in the 1920s and 1930s were adapted into films.33 Their plots are based on heroic stories of legendary kung fu masters, advocating traditional Chinese virtues and ethics including etiquette, filial piety, integrity, loyalty, sacrifice and tolerance. The Story of Wong Fei-hung, Part One: Whip That Smacks the Candle (Huang Feihong Zheng Zhuan Shangji: Bian Feng Mie Zhu, 1949) was one of the most influential kung fu movies of the time.34 It integrates authentic martial arts forms and had huge success.35 With increasing demand from the market, a total of 60 Huang Feihong sequels were produced in the 1950s, making Huang Feihong an emblem of the Hong Kong film industry and, more importantly, integral to Cantonese and southern Chinese popular culture and identity.36 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, due to the nationalisation of all sectors of the economy and the introduction of strict political censorship, films and books were mainly produced for the purpose of ideological construction. Wuxia novels and

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kung fu movies fell into the category of feudal superstition and were therefore banned by the government.37 By the mid-1950s, Hong Kong and Taiwan had become the places with the appropriate resources, talent and freedom to produce wuxia novels and kung fu movies.38 Headed by Liang Yusheng (1924–2009), Jin Yong (1924–2018) and Gu Long (1938–1985), a new generation of wuxia novelists began to emerge.39 As in the ‘old school’ of wuxia novels produced in the 1920s and 1930s, Shaolin Monastery and Shaolin kung fu frequently appear in the ‘new school’ of wuxia novels by writers from Hong Kong and Taiwan. For example, in Dragon and Tiger Fight in the Capital, Liang Yusheng reviews the history of Shaolin and Chan Buddhism, describing Shaolin Monastery at Mount Song as the centre of Chinese martial arts: Chan was founded by the Indian Master Bodhidharma who arrived in China during the Southern and Northern Dynasties.…Bodhidharma settled down in Shaolin Monastery at Mount Song, Henan. He faced the wall for ten years and created the ‘Chan without words’. He was honoured as the first patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism. Bodhidharma was not only an expert in Buddhist studies, he was also a kung fu master. Legend has it that he composed two qi gong manuals entitled The Muscle Development Classic and The Tendon Washing Classic to teach people how to build up strength and qi energy.…Shaolin Monastery at Mount Song was called the Centre of Martial Arts. There were 72 kung fu techniques. One can survive in the Jianghu after mastering any one of these techniques…40

In Jin Yong’s works, Shaolin is usually portrayed as a major school that represents the righteous group in the martial arts world. Monks and kung fu masters with a Shaolin background are involved in conflicts between various schools and families, including Wudang, Qingcheng, Emei, Kunlun and Kongtong. Some of the main characters, such as Qiao Feng and Xu Zhu in Demi-Gods and Semi-Devils (Tian Long Ba Bu), study kung fu in Shaolin Monastery. In The Smiling, Proud Wanderer (Xiao Ao Jianghu), Jin Yong describes the superior status of Shaolin in the beginning of Chapter one of The Heaven Sword and Dragon Sabre (Yitian Tulong Ji, 1961): Shaolin is widely regarded as the cradle of martial arts…the stele monuments in the monastery tells the story of Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty rewarding the thirteen Shaolin monks who assisted the Tang army in battles against rebels headed by Wang Shichong. Monk Tanzong was

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offered the position of Great General. The other twelve monks who did not want to join the Tang army received kasayas. She [Guo Xiang] was wondering, ‘Shaolin monastery has been famous for its martial arts since the Sui and Tang dynasties. Shaolin monks have continued to improve their kung fu for centuries. The monastery is a place for crouching tiger and hidden dragon. There must be many kung fu masters.’41

In Gu Long’s works, Shaolin is portrayed as a superior school of martial arts. Legendary Shaolin kung fu included: Shaolin Fist, Hundred-step Fist and Taming the Dragon and the Tiger Arhat Fist. In The Celebrity (Da Renwu, 1971), Gu Long describes the Shaolin Arhat Fist as follows: There is hardly anyone in the Jianghu42 who could defeat a Shaolin dharma guardian…Shaolin Taming the Dragon and the Tiger Arhat Fist has been improved by more than ten generations of Shaolin senior monks and is now almost impeccable…it is said that a senior Shaolin monk who has mastered the Arhat Fist could complete the set while only leaving seven footprints in the snow.43

In addition to the new-school wuxia novels, stories of legendary folk heroes from the Shaolin school, notably Huang Feihong, Hong Xiguan and Fang Shiyu, remained popular among wuxia fans in the Pearl River Delta region. Headed by Chen Jing (?–1974), writers in Hong Kong continued to produce this unique sub-genre. Popular titles included: Story of Fang Shiyu (Fang Shiyu Zheng Zhuan, 1950), Hong Xiguan’s Three Attempts to Build Shaolin Monastery (Hong Xiguan San Jian Shaolin Si, 1950) and True Story of Huang Feihong (Huang Feihong Zheng Zhuan, 1953) by Chen Jing; Further Stories of Huang Feihong (Huang Feihong Zai Zhuan, 1965) by Shi Xianshanren; and The Battle of Dingjia Village (Da Nao Dingjia Zhuang, 1970) by Ma Yun. From 1957 on, many of the ‘new school’ of wuxia novels began to be adapted into kung fu movies. At the same time, with increasing market demand, a massive number of Huang Feihong and Fang Shiyu movies were produced by movie studios in Hong Kong, further boosting the development of the popular wuxia culture. By the mid-1960s, fanned by the Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962, the Sino-Soviet Split and the Vietnam War (1955–1975), an anti-imperialist and defensive nationalism, rooted in the feeling of national humiliation brought about by a series of defeats at the hands of

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imperialist and colonial powers in the late Qing and Republic of China era, prevailed in mainland China.44 This defensive nationalism was consolidated by the Cultural Revolution and resulted in a surge of hostility towards major Western powers, especially the United Kingdom and the United States. A strongly xenophobic nativism spread to Hong Kong and triggered large-scale demonstrations against British colonial rule in 1967.45 Influenced by anti-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiments, from the late 1960s onward, kung fu movies produced in Hong Kong began to form a new cultural imagination, one constituted by and constituting of popular nationalism.46 This cultural imagination focused on reviving China and relied on the image of a muscular and masculine body ‘accoutred’ in the regalia of traditional Chinese martial arts.47 Many of these films were adapted from popular wuxia novels. The plots were usually set in the socio-historical context of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Kung fu masters were portrayed as national heroes who had helped the Chinese to restore their confidence and dignity by defeating foreign fighters. Scenes of Chinese fighters thrashing Japanese karate practitioners and Western kick-boxers became stereotypical. The triumph of Chinese kung fu over foreign forms of fighting integrated martial arts into a cultural and national identity.48 The Chinese Boxer (Long Hu Dou, 1970) was one of the first major works of this kind. Set in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the story is about a Chinese kung fu master defeating evil Japanese karate fighters and swordsmen. The movie was a huge success and topped the Hong Kong box office in 1970. Two years later, Bruce Lee (Li Xiaolong, 1940–1973) hit the market with Fist of Fury (Jing Wu Men, 1972) and Way of the Dragon (Meng Long Guo Jiang, 1972), marking the beginning of a new era in kung fu movies. Fist of Fury is set in early twentieth-century Shanghai. Bruce Lee plays Chen Zhen, a member of the Pure Martial Athletic Association. The film is full of anti-imperialist sentiment and advocates a Chinese nationalism mixed with Confucian-based morality, filial piety, individual dignity, brotherhood and national honour.49 Chen Zhen is portrayed as a national hero who helps his countrymen restore their confidence and dignity by defeating Japanese and Russian fighters, who represent the imperialist powers. In Way of the Dragon, the main character Tang Long (played by Bruce Lee) travels to Rome to help a relative whose restaurant is being

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targeted by the local mafia. He uses his kung fu skills to defeat all the Italian gangs. The implication is that Chinese kung fu is superior to foreign martial arts, and that China is no longer the ‘Sick Man of East Asia’.

The Golden Age of Shaolin Kung Fu Movies New-school kung fu movies produced in Hong Kong created a powerful form of nationalist discourse which spelled out ‘the discontent of Hong Kong’s inhabitants towards the British rule and associated that feeling with the racial and cultural memory of a distant China’.50 This unique form of nationalist discourse was adopted by kung fu movies produced in subsequent years. Shaolin and Shaolin kung fu were among the most popular themes of these movies. From 1974, an increasing number of Shaolin kung fu movies came out in Hong Kong, most based on fictional rebellions by Shaolin monks against Manchu rule.51 Popular titles included: • Five Shaolin Masters (Shaolin Wu Zu, 1974) • Men from the Shaolin Monastery (Shaolin Zidi, 1974) • Shaolin Shajie (1975) • The 18 Bronzemen (Shaolin Si Shi Ba Tong Ren, 1976) • Shaolin Wooden Men (Shaolin Muren Xiang, 1976) • Shaolin Temple (Shaolin Si, 1976) • The Blazing Temple (Huo Shao Shaolin Si, 1976) • Return of the Eighteen Bronzemen (Yongzheng Dapo Shiba Tongren, 1976) • Executioners from Shaolin (Hong Xiguan, 1977) • Shaolin Traitor (Shaolin Pantu, 1977) • The 36th Chamber of Shaolin (Shaolin 36 Fang, 1978) • Young Hero of Shaolin (Shaolin Xiaozi, 1978) • Avenging Warriors of Shaolin (Jie Shi Yingxiong, 1979) • Revenge of the Shaolin Master (Lengdao Ran Hong Yingxiong Xue, 1979) • Fury in the Shaolin Temple (Shaolin Zhen Yingxiong, 1979) • Return to the 36th Chamber (Shaolin Dapeng Dashi, 1980) • Shaolin Temple Against Lama (Hongyi Lama, 1980) • Shaolin Hellgate (Di San Lei Dadou, 1980) • War of the Shaolin Temple (Shisan Dian Heshang, 1980)

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Five Shaolin Masters (Shaolin Wu Zu, 1974) was an influential title from this period. Directed by the famous kung fu movie director Chang Cheh (1923–2002), it tells the story of the five Shaolin ancestors in the Xilu legend, who ally with Ming loyalists to battle against the Qing forces after the monastery is torched by Qing soldiers. The movie was in the Hong Kong box office top five in 1974, and won Best Sound Design at the 12th Taipei Golden Horse Film Festival in 1975.52 Encouraged by the success of Five Shaolin Masters, Chang Cheh produced Shaolin Temple in 1976. In the movie, a group of Ming loyalists join Shaolin to hide from the Qing soldiers. They undergo intensive training in the monastery and master Shaolin kung fu. A traitor reports them to the Qing government, which leads to a massacre in Shaolin by the Qing army. Only a few Shaolin disciples escape.53 Tiger of Northland (Bei Shaolin, 1976) is an interesting Shaolin kung fu movie produced in this period. It tells the story of a Chinese anti-Japanese activist who travels to Japanese-occupied Korea in the ­ 1930s and uses Shaolin kung fu to assist Chinese refugees and Korean people in their fight against the Japanese colonists. It expresses a strong nationalist sentiment and perfectly reflects the political reality of Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s. The film’s opening scene states: After the fall of the Ming dynasty, Shaolin disciples took on the mission of overthrowing the Qing and reviving the Ming. In the next 260 years, these great Han fighters inspired us with numerous heroic and moving stories. After the establishment of the Republic [of China], the Japanese invaded. Shaolin disciples carried on their patriotic tradition and joined the ­ anti-Japanese resistance. In Northern China, the Northern Shaolin branch led the resistance, but they were outnumbered by the Japanese. They retreated to North Korea and continued to carry out guerrilla warfare there. They never forgot the Shaolin spirit and the anti-Japanese cause. Today’s famous Korean martial art Tang Shou Dao was founded by these Shaolin disciples. This film tells an inspiring story of Northern Shaolin.54

Together with the wuxia novels published in Hong Kong between the 1950s and 1970s, the above-mentioned movies contributed to the construction of a Shaolin kung fu culture. Empowered by martial arts, Shaolin was endowed with political and cultural significance and evolved as a unique representation of Chinese nationalism and national identity.55 These movies were also released just when the world was starting to get a grasp on

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Chinese martial arts. They unleashed the Shaolin fever that later stormed China and the world, and made Shaolin kung fu one of the best-known Chinese martial arts styles among both domestic and foreign audiences.

Shaolin Kung Fu Movies in the Era of Reform and Opening Up Since the launch of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, China has experienced rapid development and profound changes. The Chinese government recognised the importance of religion in society and sought to more openly ensure the prosperity of mainstream religions to serve the purposes of social stability and inter-ethnic harmony. Benefiting from the new religious policy, Shaolin Monastery entered a period of revival. The revival of Shaolin was assisted by kung fu movies, notably The Shaolin Temple (Shaolin Si), which came out in mainland China in 1982. Unlike previous Shaolin kung fu movies, which were produced in Hong Kong, The Shaolin Temple was filmed in the real Shaolin Monastery at Mount Song.56 Starring Li Lianjie (Jet Li), who won gold at the National Wushu Championships in 1975, 1977 and 1978 and was the all-round champion of the Fourth National Games in 1979, the film is based on the legendary story of the 13 Shaolin monks who assisted Tang emperor Li Shimin (598–649) in the battle of the Cypress Valley Estate in 621.57 The movie had record-breaking success in China and theatres showed it for several months. It generated staggering box office receipts of over RMB 100 million, a new record for the Chinese film industry.58 The Shaolin Temple was later shown in Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States, to enormous success.59 Soon after The Shaolin Temple came out, people around China started travelling to Mount Song to see the real Shaolin Monastery, with many young people hoping to stay there and learn kung fu.60 Encouraged by the unexpected success of The Shaolin Temple, filmmakers in mainland China and Hong Kong pumped out Shaolin kung fu movies and TV dramas ‘as fast as they could’.61 Major titles included: • Shaolin Prince (Shaolin Chuanren, 1982) • Shaolin Intruders (San Chuang Shaolin, 1983) • Shaolin and Wu Tang (Shaolin Yu Wudang, 1983)

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• Shaolin Brothers (Shaolin Si Dizi, 1983) • Shaolin vs. Ninja (Shaolin Yu Renzhe, 1983) • Kids of Shaolin (Shaolin Xiaozi, 1984) • Lightning Fists of Shaolin (Hongquan Dashi, 1984) • The Shaolin Cleric Haideng (Shaolin Haideng Fashi, 1985) • Disciples of the 36th Chamber (Pili Shi Xia, 1985) • Martial Arts of Shaolin (Nanbei Shaolin, 1986) • Once Upon a Time in China I–III (Huang Feihong 1–3, 1991–1992) • The Heroes from Shaolin (Wuzun Shaolin, 1993) • Burning Paradise (Huoshao Honglian Si, 1994) • Treasure Hunt (Huaqi Shaolin, 1994) • The New Legend of Shaolin (Hong Xiguan Zhi Shaolin Wuzu, 1994) • Dragon from Shaolin (Long Zai Shaolin, 1996) • Days in Shaolin (Xin Shaolin Wu Zu, 1998) • Shaolin Soccer (Shaolin Zuqiu, 2001) • Kung Fu in Japan (Riben Shaolin, 2002) • Southern Shaolin (Nan Shaolin, 2003) • Shaolin Monk Soldiers (Shaolin Sengbing, 2008) • Shaolin Legend I–III (Shaolin Si Chuanqi 1–3, 2008–2011) • Shaolin (Xin Shaolin Si, 2011) • Shaolin Nirvana (Shaolin Wen Dao, 2016) Like the Shaolin kung fu movies produced in Hong Kong in the second half of the 1970s, many of the above movies are based on the Xilu legend of the Heaven and Earth Society. The New Legend of Shaolin (1994) is a good example. It tells the story of anti-Qing Shaolin disciple Hong Xiguan (Jet Li) who protects the five ancestors of Shaolin from assassins sent by the Qing government. In Burning Paradise (1994), the Qing army burn down Shaolin and the monks are imprisoned in the Red Lotus Temple, an underground fortress run by the evil Qing General Shen Gong. Shaolin disciples Fang Shiyu and Hong Xiguan break into the fortress and rescue their fellow monks.62 Some of the movies are set in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, and the plots are based around the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion and the 1911 Nationalist Revolution. Legendary Shaolin kung fu masters are portrayed as patriotic revolutionaries. Their enemies are no longer local gangs but rather foreign invaders and the corrupt Qing government, which was incapable of defending China against foreign invasions. For example, in Lightning Fists of Shaolin/Opium and

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the Kung Fu Master (Hongquan Dashi, 1984), Hongquan master and militia coach Tie Qiaosan (1813–1886) becomes addicted to opium, fights his addiction and protects his town from evil opium dealers. In Once Upon a Time in China I (1991), the famed Shaolin school master Huang Feihong (Jet Li) tries to stop the British opium trade in Foshan. In Once Upon a Time in China II (1992), Huang joins the A ­ nti-Manchu Rebellion and fights for the future of China by assisting Han nationalists and revolutionaries. In The Legend I (Gongfu Huangdi Fang Shiyu, 1993) and The Legend II (Fang Shiyu II Wan Fu Mo Di, 1993), young hero Fang Shiyu (Jet Li) helps nationalist organisation the Red Flower Society overthrow the Qing government.63 In Bodyguards and Assassins (Shiyue Weicheng, 2009), a group of kung fu fighters, including Shaolin disciple Wang Fuming, assemble to protect the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen, who has been targeted by assassins sent by the Qing government. Shaolin (Xin Shaolin Si, 2011) tells the story of the destruction of Shaolin monastery at the hands of the Christian General Feng Yuxiang’s (1882–1948) subordinate officer Shi Yousan (1891–1940) in 1928, highlighting a ‘Shaolin Spirit’ that focuses on benevolence and compassion. A number of the Shaolin kung fu movies are set in contemporary times. Take Jet Li’s The Master (Huang Feihong 92 Zhi Long Xing Tianxi, 1992) for example, the movie is modelled on Bruce Lee’s Way of the Dragon (1972) and borrowed elements from Huang Feihong’s stories. Uncle Tak, a Shaolin kung fu master who has emigrated to the United States, opens a herbal medicine store named Bao Zhi Lin and a kung fu school in Los Angeles. Local gangster Johnny attempts to take over Tak’s school and even tries to kill him. Jet Li, in the role of Uncle Tak’s best student Jet, travels to Los Angeles to visit his teacher, and in the end defeats Johnny and his gang.64 Due to the influence of popular nationalism, which focuses on self-strengthening and Chinese-Western confrontation/competition, the movie was highly successful in China. By pitting a Shaolin kung fu hero against American fighters, it provided the Chinese with a medium for the expression of national pride. While the country had fallen far behind Western countries in terms of economy and modernisation, the movie allowed them to feel a sense of confidence restored through the defeat of foreign competitors.65 Treasure Hunt (Huaqi Shaolin, 1994) is another interesting title that involves Shaolin, kung fu and national identity. Starring iconic Hong Kong action star Yun-Fat Chow and acclaimed actress and singer Jacklyn

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Wu, the movie tells the story of Chinese-American CIA agent Zhang Zheng (Yun-Fat Chow) who is sent to China to steal a hidden national treasure. In the beginning, Zhang is reluctant to take the mission due to his Chinese identity, but his boss insists and reminds him that he has already taken the oath to be loyal to the United States. After arriving in China, Zhang is allocated to Shaolin Monastery by his Chinese contact Tang Ling. The movie highlights Zhang’s Chinese identity and the cultural shock he encounters in Shaolin. He eventually became friends with the Shaolin abbot and the fellow monks, and falls in love with a girl named Xiaoqing (Jacklyn Wu) who has supernatural powers. He discovers that Xiaoqing is the treasure he is supposed to bring back to the United States and then he destroys Tang Ling’s conspiracy to sell Xiaoqing to foreign countries. Two years later, Zhang returns to China from the United States and reunites with Xiaoqing—a happy ending for everyone. To conclude, Shaolin kung fu movies produced in Hong Kong and mainland China in the past decades successfully transformed Shaolin kung fu into an art form characterised by a cultural framework. They created a kung fu fever and facilitated the revival of Shaolin. Since the early 1980s, the monastery began growing into one of China’s most popular tourist attractions. Shaolin monks also took the initiative to promote Shaolin kung fu and Chan Buddhism. Martial arts performances, religious rituals, services and public events are frequently held at the monastery to build up the influence of Shaolin kung fu and Chan Buddhism both nationally and internationally. After thirty years of rapid development, Shaolin has now become a well-recognised brand of Chinese culture and a symbol of Chinese national identity.66

Conclusion The twentieth century saw the rise of Chinese wuxia fiction novels and kung fu movies which functioned as an important vehicle for the ‘maintenance and reinvention of nationhood’.67 As the cradle of Chan Buddhism and a centre of Chinese martial arts, Shaolin was regarded as a symbol of indigenous virtue and strength and therefore became a popular theme in wuxia novels and kung fu movies. A ‘national idea’ was nourished and consolidated by wuxia stories based on the history of Shaolin, the foundation myths of the Heaven and Earth Society and the anti-Manchu folk heroes from the Shaolin school. Living in an era of rapid social transformation and influenced by the prevailing nationalism,

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Chinese novelists and movie producers used legendary Shaolin heroes and Shaolin kung fu to invent a cultural identity, and aided the construction of a modern national identity among the Chinese. These wuxia novels and movies in turn helped Shaolin lay a rhetorical claim to Chinese identity and created a legacy of remembrance. The dominant position of Shaolin in wuxia novels and the popular Shaolin kung fu movies all demonstrate the Chinese people’s strong will to continue to value and preserve such heritage in the age of globalisation. Acknowledgements   I wish to thank Routledge for allowing me to use some parts of my monograph—A History of Shaolin: Buddhism, Kung Fu and Identity (2019)—in this chapter.

Notes

1. Chinese martial arts, also known as kung fu (功夫), wuyi (武艺), guoshu ( 国术) or wushu (武术). 2.  Kam Hung et al., “Contesting the Commercialization and Sanctity of Religious Tourism in Shaolin Monastery, China,” International Journal of Tourism Research 19, no. 2 (2016): 145. 3. Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 7. 4. Alter, Nationalism, 8. 5. The three teachings: Confucianism 儒, Buddhism 释, Daoism 道. 6. Lu Zhouxiang, Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts (Abingdon: Routledge), 105. 7. Zhouxiang, Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts, 105–111. 8. Wuxia 武侠. 9. Yibing Cao, “Lun Zhongguo wuxia xiaoshuo cong gu zhi jin de yanbian” [The Historical Development of Chinese Wuxia Novels], Research into Ming and Qing Dynasties Novels 67, no. 1 (2003): 78. 10.  Qingdong Kong, “Minguo jiupai wuxia xiaoshuo jian lun” [A Brief Introduction to Old-Style Kung Fu Novels During the Republic of China], Journal of Suzhou College of Education 30, no. 2 (2013): 6–10. 11. Yu Yang, “Minguo wuxia xiaoshuo niaokan” [A Study of Wuxia Novels of the Republic of China Era], Min guo chun qiu, no. 3 (1994): 35–36. 12. Shaolin Monastery was attacked by the Red Turbans rebels in the late Yuan dynasty era. This was later developed into a legend to cultivate a sense of wonder and fantasy around Shaolin. According to the legend, when the rebels attacked the monastery, the monks resisted and held the rebels off. A monk who worked in the kitchen came to assist, miraculously transforming himself into a giant and using a staff to scare away the

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rebels. He was honoured by the Shaolin monks as Kinnara King and was worshiped as the dharma guardian—Narayana—of the monastery. 13. Kairan Xiang, Jindai xiayi yingxiong zhuan [Legends of Modern Chivalric Heroes], vol. 2 (Taiyuan: Beiyue wenyi chuban she, 2016), 33. Translated by the author. 14. Shoumin Li, Shushan jianxia zhuan [Legends of Shushan Swordsmen], vol. 3 (Shijiazhuang: Huashan wenyi chubanshe, 2015), 249, 250–251. Translated by the author. 15. The idea of ‘Five Races under One Union’ meant that the five major ethnic groups in China (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan) would unite together under the Republic. 16. The origin of the Heaven and Earth Society is still debated, but it is clear that from the 1760s, with the efforts of the monk Tixi from Gaoxi Monastery in Yunxiao County, Fujian Province, the society began to build its influence and spread across coastal regions in south-eastern China. In its early years, the society developed as a mutual aid brotherhood. Many of the regional societies engaged in predatory crime and violence, and there was little evidence of rebellious intent or national political concerns. The Society caught the Qing government’s attention when its members launched the Lin Shuangwen rebellion of 1787–1788 in Taiwan. Thereafter, the authorities began to suppress the movement and hunt down its members. Despite the government crackdown, the Society continued to grow and became a dominant underground organisation in the Pearl River Delta. Members engaged in illegal activities such as banditry, piracy, feuding, smuggling, gambling, prostitution and racketeering, and they occasionally rebelled against local authorities in order to secure political and economic interests. From the early nineteenth century, the Society began to advocate pro-Ming and anti-Qing ideologies. A story called the Xilu legend was created to link the foundation myth of the society to Shaolin. 17.  The Five Shaolin Ancestors 少林五祖: Cai Dezhong 蔡德忠, Fang Dahong 方大洪, Ma Chaoxing 马超兴, Hu Dedi 胡德帝 and Li Shikai 李 式开. 18. Wo shi shan ren, Sande heshang san tan Xichan si [Monk Sande’s Three Visits to Xichan Monastery] (Guangzhou: Guangdong shang bao, 1948). 19. Chan Master Zhishan 至善禅师, Monk Sande 三德和尚, Fang Shiyu 方世 玉, Hu Huiqian 胡惠乾, Hong Xiguan 洪熙官 and Miao Cuihua 苗翠花, 20. Wo shi shan ren, Sande heshang san tan Xichan si, 15–16. 21.  Weifang Zhao, “Xianggang dianying zhong de wuxia lishi renwu Huang Feihong” [Huang Feihong in Hong Kong Wuxia Movies], Arts Criticism, no.4 (2009): 40.

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22. Shirong Lin, Gong zi fu hu quan lue li (Gong zi Crouching Tiger Fist) (self-published by Shirong Lin, 1930), I. Translated by the author. 23. Leilei Jia, “Zhongguo wuxia dianying: yuan liu lun” [On the Origins of Chinese Wuxia Movies], Film Art, no. 3 (1993): 25–30; Suyuan Li and Jubin Hu, Zhongguo wusheng dianying shi [A History of Chinese Silent Films] (Beijing: China Film Press, 1996), 239. 24.  Wei-Ching Wang, “A Critical Interrogation of Cultural Globalization and Hybridity,” The Journal of International Communication 14, no. 1 (2008): 53. 25. Wang, “A Critical Interrogation of Cultural Globalization and Hybridity,” 53–54. 26. Yinjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 57. 27. Mo Chen, “Zhongguo zaoqi wuxia dianying zai rengshi” [A Study of China’s Early Wuxia Films], Contemporary Cinema, no. 1 (1997): 32. Translated by the author. 28. Chen, “Zhongguo zaoqi wuxia dianying zai rengshi,” 33. 29. Hong Kong lies at the south-eastern tip of China. It became a British colony in 1841 after the Qing government lost both Opium Wars. 30. Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 92. 31. Peng Fu, “Xianggang gongfu dianying zhong de minzu zhuyi shuxie” [Nationalism Expressed in Hong Kong Kung Fu Movies], Arts Criticism, no. 7 (2010): 9. 32. Mo Chen, Zhongguo wuxia dianying shi [A History of Chinese Wuxia Movies] (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chuban she, 2006). 33.  Christina Klein, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: A Diasporic Reading,” Cinema Journal 43, no. 4 (2004): 24. 34. Weifang Zhao, “Xianggang dianying zhong de wuxia lishi renwu Huang Feihong” [Huang Feihong in Hong Kong Wuxia Movies], Arts Criticism, no. 4 (2009): 40; Feng Pu, “Huang Feihong na fu ji ­ dongxi-Huang Feihong dianying de zhuanbian lichen” [The Transformation of Huang Feihong Movies], in Pop Hong Kong: Reading Hong Kong Popular Culture, 2000–2010, vol. 1, ed. Junxiong Wu, Zhiwei Zhang, and Zhongjian Zeng (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Company, 2012), 157. 35. Ken-fang Lee, “Far Away, So Close: Cultural Translation in Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 4, no. 2 (2003): 285. 36.  Chaowen Yao, “Xiangtu Zhongguo chuangzao wenhua xiangxiang de shijie qiguan – bai bu Huang Feihong dianying jinisi jilu de qishi” [The Worldwide Marvellous Spectacle of Chinese Country Culture as an Enlightenment from More than 100 Films of Kung Fu Master Huang Feihong], Academic Research, no. 3 (2013): 135.

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37. Zhouxiang, Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts, 152. 38. Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 92. 39.  Zhesheng Tang, “Bianyuan yao yan: Zhongguo tongsu xiaoshuo 60 nian” [The Shining Edge: Chinese Novels in the Past 60 Years], Wenyi zheng ming, no. 9 (2011): 68–69; Yibing Cao, “Lun Zhongguo wuxia xiaoshuo cong gu zhi jin de yanbian” [The Historical Development of Chinese Wuxia Novels], Research on Ming and Qing Dynasties Novels 67, no. 1 (2003): 89; Yong Fei and Xiaoyi Zhong, Jin Yong Chuanqi [The Legend of Jin Yong] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chuban she, 1996), 32; Bin Li, Liang Yusheng zhuan [Biography of Liang Yusheng] (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chuban she, 2001), 217. 40. Yusheng Liang, Longhu dou jinghua [Dragon and Tiger Fight in the Capital] (Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press, 2012), 56. Translated by the author. 41. Yong Jin, Heaven Sword and Dragon Sabre [Yitian tulong ji] (Guangzhou chuban she, 2013), 1. Translated by the author. 42. Jianghu 江湖: Martial arts world/community. 43. Long Gu, Da renwu [The Celebrity] (Zhuhai: Zhuhai chuban she, 2013), 318, 322. Translated by the author. 44.  Andrew Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 34. 45.  Ray Yep, “Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong: Emergency Powers, Administration of Justice and the Turbulent Year of 1967,” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 4 (2012): 1007–1032; Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Watershed—The 1967 Riots,” Journal of Comparative Asian Development 9, no. 1 (2010): 175–177. 46.  Siu Leung Li, “Kung Fu: Negotiating Nationalism and Modernity,” Cultural Studies 15, no. 3/4 (2001): 518. 47. Li, “Kung Fu: Negotiating Nationalism and Modernity,” 518. 48. David Dresser, “Fists of Legend: Constructing Chinese Identity in the Hong Kong Cinema,” in Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics, ed. Sheldon Lu and Emile Yueh Yeh (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 281–282. 49. Fist of Fury, directed by Wei Lo (Hong Kong: Orange Sky Golden Harvest, 1972). 50. Yuan Shu, “Reading the Kung Fu Film in an American Context: From Bruce Lee to Jackie Chan,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 31, no. 2 (2003): 53. 51. Huang Feihong, Wan pian gui zong yi Shaolin [Shaolin Movies] (Beijing: Beijing lianhe chuban gongsi, 2011). 52. Five Shaolin Masters [Shaolin wu zu], directed by Che Zhang (Hong Kong: Shaw Brothers Studio, 1974).

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53.  Shaolin Temple [Shaolin si], directed by Che Zhang (Hong Kong: Shaw Brothers Studio, 1976). 54.  Bei Shaolin [The Northern Shaolin], directed by Changgui Peng (Hong Kong: Orange Sky Golden Harvest, 1976). Translated by the author. 55. Dallas Hudgens, “The Way of the Shaolin,” Washington Post, November 17, 2000, accessed October 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/lifestyle/2000/11/17/the-way-of-the-shaolin/0e02efd7-e95042ff-86c7-222398da9654/. 56. Yongxin Shi, Shaolin Temple in My Heart (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2013), 57–58. 57. In 621, Shaolin intended to free the Cypress Valley Estate, which had been awarded to the monastery by Emperor Wen of Sui (541–604), from the hands of warlord Wang Shichong (591–621). Shaolin monks provided military support to the future Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty, Li Shimin (598–649), and took part in a battle against Wang Shichong’s nephew Wang Renze and reclaimed the Cypress Valley Estate. In gratitude for Shaolin’s support, Li Shimin rewarded the monks. This was recorded in the Shaolin Monastery Stele of 696: “Emperor Taizhong of Tang’s Letter”. 58.  Zhanfeng Wang, “Shaolin si 30 nian zai huishou” [Looking back at The Shaolin Temple 30 Years Later], Qiye Guancha Jia, no. 1 (2012): 107–109. 59. Huang, Wan pian gui zong yi Shaolin, 118–120. 60. Martha Burr, “The Jet Li Story,” Kungfu Tai Chi, May 1998, accessed September 3, 2018, http://www.kungfumagazine.com/magazine/article.php?article=82. 61.  Lewis Beale, “Popular Shaolin Films Blend Martial Arts, Buddhist Spirituality,” Washington Post, September 9, 2011, accessed January 2, 2017,       https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/popular-shaolin-films-blend-martial-arts-buddhist-spirituality/2011/08/14/gIQA0KsGFK_story.html. 62. Burning Paradise [Xin Huoshao Honglian Si], directed by Ringo Lam (Shanghai: Shanghai Film Studio, 1994). 63. Jing-Lan Lee, Wuxia Film: A Qualitative Perspective of Chinese Legal Consciousness (Washington: University of Washington Libraries, 2008), 29. 64.  The Master (1992), Hong Kong Movie Database, accessed December 10, 2017, http://hkmdb.com/db/movies/view.mhtml?id=7575&display_ set=big5. 65. Li, “Kung Fu: Negotiating Nationalism and Modernity,” 519. 66. Beale, “Popular Shaolin Films Blend Martial Arts, Buddhist Spirituality.”

82  L. ZHOUXIANG 67.  Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, “Introduction: Mapping the Field of Chinese-Language Cinema,” in Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics, ed. Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 2.

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Lee, Jing-Lan. Wuxia Film: A Qualitative Perspective of Chinese Legal Consciousness. Washington: University of Washington Libraries, 2008. Lee, Ken-fang. “Far Away, So Close: Cultural Translation in Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 4, no. 2 (2003). Li, Bin. Liang Yusheng zhuan [Biography of Liang Yusheng]. Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chuban she, 2001. Li, Shoumin. Shushan jianxia zhuan [Legends of Shushan Swordsmen]. Vol. 3. Shijiazhuang: Huashan wenyi chubanshe, 2015. Li, Siu Leung. “Kung Fu: Negotiating Nationalism and Modernity.” Cultural Studies 15, no. 3/4 (2001): 515–542. Li, Suyuan, and Jubin Hu. Zhongguo wusheng dianying shi [A History of Chinese Silent Films]. Beijing: China Film Press, 1996. Liang, Yusheng. Longhu dou jinghua [Dragon and Tiger Fight in the Capital]. Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press, 2012. Lin, Shirong. Gong zi fu hu quan lue li [Gong zi Crouching Tiger Fist]. ­Self-published by Shirong Lin, 1930. Lu, Sheldon H., and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh. “Introduction: Mapping the Field of Chinese-Language Cinema.” In Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics, edited by Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005. Nathan, Andrew, and Robert S. Ross. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998. Pu, Feng. “Huang Feihong na fu ji dongxi-Huang Feihong dianying de zhuanbian lichen” [The Transformation of Huang Feihong Movies]. In Pop Hong Kong: Reading Hong Kong Popular Culture, 2000–2010, vol. 1, edited by Junxiong Wu, Zhiwei Zhang, and Zhongjian Zeng. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Company, 2012. Shi, Yongxin. Shaolin Temple in My Heart. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2013. Shu, Yuan. “Reading the Kung Fu Film in an American Context: From Bruce Lee to Jackie Chan.” Journal of Popular Film and Television 31, no. 2 (2003): 50–59. Tang, Zhesheng. “Bianyuan yao yan: Zhongguo tongsu xiaoshuo 60 nian” [The Shining Edge: Chinese Novels in the Past 60 Years]. Wenyi zheng ming, no. 9 (2011): 68–69. Wang, Wei-Ching. “A Critical Interrogation of Cultural Globalization and Hybridity.” The Journal of International Communication 14, no. 1 (2008): 46–64. Wang, Zhanfeng. “Shaolin si 30 nian zai huishou” [Looking Back at The Shaolin Temple 30 Years Later]. Qiye Guancha Jia, no. 1 (2012): 107–109. Xiang, Kairan. Jindai xiayi yingxiong zhuan [Legends of Modern Chivalric Heroes]. Vol. 2. Taiyuan: Beiyue wenyi chuban she, 2016.

84  L. ZHOUXIANG Yang, Yu. “Minguo wuxia xiaoshuo niaokan” [A Study of Wuxia Novels of the Republic of China Era]. Min guo chun qiu, no. 3 (1994): 35–36. Yao, Chaowen. “Xiangtu Zhongguo chuangzao wenhua xiangxiang de shijie qiguan – bai bu Huang Feihong dianying jinisi jilu de qishi” [The Worldwide Marvellous Spectacle of Chinese Country Culture as an Enlightenment from More Than 100 Films of Kung Fu Master Huang Feihong]. Academic Research, no. 3 (2013). Yep, Ray. “Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong: Emergency Powers, Administration of Justice and the Turbulent Year of 1967.” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 4 (2012): 1007–1032. Zhang, Yinjin. Chinese National Cinema. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. Zhao, Weifang. “Xianggang dianying zhong de wuxia lishi renwu Huang Feihong” [Huang Feihong in Hong Kong Wuxia Movies]. Arts Criticism, no. 4 (2009). Zhouxiang, Lu. Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts. Abingdon: Routledge.

CHAPTER 4

Social Network Service Platforms and China’s Cyber Nationalism in the Web 2.0 Age Nini Pan

Introduction This chapter tries to analyse the performance of a government institution as an active participant—not a supervisor—in creating the ‘new normal’ of Chinese cyber nationalism. Regarding the research on Chinese cyber nationalism, we mainly emphasise special netizens who demonstrate nationalist attitudes in their forms of expression and the causes they espouse. The political authority of the government institutions of the ­Party-state is commonly seen as an external factor, providing ideological resources for civil nationalism or practising top-down supervision of and orientation to the existing flames of cyber nationalist expression. However, here we pay more attention to a new phenomenon: in adapting to Web 2.0, some government institutions have tried for several years to behave as if on an ‘equal’ level with netizens. They first learn the existing agendas, discourse and cultural style of cyber nationalism; they N. Pan (*)  School of Communication, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_4

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then promote the ‘evolution’ of cyber nationalist expression in favour of, basically, the general official ideological agenda. We may say that those official institutions participating in the daily life of social networking have a double identity, intermediating authoritarianism and cyber nationalism, and bringing change to the cyber ecology of Chinese contemporary nationalism. That is why such institutions— more specifically, their official accounts on SNS platforms—also need to be researched as a subjective body of cyber nationalism, not only as an external factor. During the earlier stages of Chinese cyber society, government intervention is considered to have mainly operated through direct bureaucratic administration, through using secret individual agents as Internet commentators (wang pingyuan) to orient cyber opinion on specific public issues. However, in recent years there is a new normal: official institutions formally join social networking platforms and try to build new relations with netizens, through opening SNS accounts and interacting with them. Generally, this new normal follows the guidance of Chinese high-level leadership with the expectation of learning from international experience. In consideration of the change in the nature of public opinion in the online age and the political guidelines for building a ‘service-type government’ (fuwu xing zhengfu), all Party and government institutions at the central, local and basic level have been attempting to improve their public relations. This move has two separate purposes for governance and politics. For governance, the government uses PR to alleviate potential trouble caused by information control and the poor communication techniques of untrained bureaucrats. Institutions and bureaucrats can learn well-developed methods from their counterparts in developed democracies. However, this also has the implication of repoliticising Chinese society in a ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics (zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi)’ context, according to the willingness of the current leadership. The expanding and changing cyber society thus becomes both a challenge to and an opportunity for Chinese politics. The Party-state is trying to search for new approaches to embed political leadership (zhengzhi lingdao), as the highest leadership has always emphasised, in this Internet jungle. Most of the official accounts are simply more channels used to release information, rather than practising real networking with netizens.

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However, some of them are trying to adapt their opinion orientation to the information age and have achieved a certain amount of success not only in the orientation of specific issues, but also in bringing change—good or bad—to the Chinese cyber ecology. Among these ‘successful’—from the point of view of government institutions—cases, the performance of the official accounts of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CCCYL) has prominently demonstrated its strategy to ­utilise and strengthen cyber nationalism, especially through the platforms of China’s most popular online social networks and ­video-sharing sites, which mainly attract young people—this article will take Sina Weibo and Bilibili Video as examples. The CCYL online operators have adapted to cyber trends through popularising publicity information, participating in discussions on topical news, making and sharing animation videos and so on. From 2013, when the CCCYL first opened its accounts on Weibo and began developing its methods, it has drawn more and more attention and has even built integrated emotional ties among its increasing audience. Why has the CCCYL been so active in Chinese cyberspace? This may be attributed to two ‘ity’s—necessity and possibility—in other words, pressure and opportunity. In terms of necessity and pressure, the CCCYL, originally created in the revolutionary era as the youth wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to mobilise and integrate the youthful energy of resistance, lost its irreplaceable position during the reform era, when technology bureaucracy and political prudence were emphasised. Its political function came to exist in name only, despite the maintenance of its function of promoting elite cadres. Since the current authority with Xi Jinping at the core highly values the historical organisational ability of the Party, strong political willingness has put heavy pressure on the CCCYL to demonstrate its practical function as an organisation. Under political pressure and new demands from the highest authorities, however, a relatively new type of cyber nationalism arising from 2008 on—mainly among young people—has provided the CCCYL with an opportunity. The CCCYL propaganda section, in particular, has taken this critical chance to rebuild its mobilisation function by utilising and orienting this trend. Moreover, despite its relative decline, CCCYL has always maintained a tight-knit organisational structure from the central to the basic level, with 80–90 million members aged 14–28. Such institutional resources, despite not having played an important role for a long

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period, are a reserve of potential intelligence for the CCCYL to create a new style in order to guide youthful nationalism and patriotism in an imperceptible way.

Pressure and Opportunity for the CCCYL Decline in Organisational Function The establishment of a youth wing has been a common practice of various communist parties. In China, the Youth League was founded in 1920, a year earlier than the CCP itself. As a parallel youth organisation affiliated with the CCP, the CCCYL is organised on the Party pattern at various levels, and generally acts as the Party’s assistant and back-up. During the revolutionary era, its crucial functions were clear. It served as an intermediary between the CCP and young revolutionaries or those with potential, communicating party policies, assisting in organisational construction and directing activities. It also recruited, trained and investigated young people for CCP membership and reserved cadres for leadership. Accordingly, the CCCYL strongly affected the sustainability of the revolution. However, in the reform era the CCCYL began to share a similar crucial problem with the CCP, that of how to embed the political function of leadership in the daily governance of so-called socialism with Chinese characteristics (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi). The dilemma for the youth wing was even more severe. In contrast with the revolutionary or Mao era, when young people had been endowed with political values of clearing out decaying traditions and inspiring the future,1 during the reform era, one highly dependent on professional skills and prudent administration, young people have been appropriately excluded from the political sphere. Youth political participation has made no sense on a constitutional or practical level.2 The CCYL thus had one realistic function left, as an incubator and elevator for young cadres, and the Youth League faction (tuan pai) concept has become familiar to researchers of Chinese informal factional politics. The awareness of this Youth League faction can be traced back to the early 1980s, with observers inclined to focus on a group of cadres with a Youth League background who supported Hu Yaobang, who had been the General Secretary of the Youth League and retained

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tremendous influence. The implicit tie between them was that they self-identified as reformists (gaige pai) on the Chinese political spectrum. As we know, at the time when ‘reform’ became a kind of magic word, young people were expected to embody new ways of thinking, and thus younger cadres received more promotions because they were seen as possibly being more capable and knowledgeable when it came to modern economic development, and less affected by past convictions. In particular, the appointment of a position in the Youth League system was important leverage for a political patron to promote promising young people. One case is the rise of Hu Jintao, among the so-called f­ourth-generation leadership core (di si dai lingdao hexin). After long-term technical postings, his first political (for Party affairs) position was as Secretary of the Gansu Provincial Committee of the CCCYL, and his subsequent involvement in youth and personnel affairs made it a straight road for the well-educated engineer to reach the highest political level at the 12th Party Congress, when he was appointed Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee and became President of the ­All-China Youth Federation the following year.3 When Hu Jintao was elected as General Secretary in 2002, observers again paid attention to the proportion of cadres with a Youth League background in Hu’s two administrative terms. The research of Bo Zhiyue on the background of elites in the 17th Party Congress of 2007 shows the prominence of the CCCYL group, expanding from 57 in the 16th Central Committee to 82, with 41 full members and 41 alternate members. And further, at the core decision-making level, former CCCYL cadres had two positions in the Politburo Standing Committee and six in the Politburo.4 However, it’s hard to say that the second Youth League faction had a direct political lineage with the former, or whether they had the same political beliefs.5 In contrast with increasing CCCYL prominence in high-level and central politics, its organisational function had hollowed out, especially at the basic level, with the number of Youth League units in public institutions decreasing from the 1990s on.6 In addition, basic-level Youth League organisations were more involved in entertainment events and other daily services. The mixture of factional competition at high levels and political inability finally led to strict criticism and pressure for rectification.

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Political Pressure and Opportunity With the advent of Xi Jinping’s administration, power has been centralised and the Youth League is once again being employed for mass mobilisation. The leadership’s sharp criticism and related policymaking and implementation have put heavy pressure on the Youth League to innovate working methods to demonstrate its political loyalty and unique role in the reform era. Since early 2013, Xi, the CCP Secretary General, has continually mentioned his attention to youth work in various speeches and publications. On December 29, 2014, this willingness was deliberately emphasised in a document titled ‘Suggestions on the strengthening and improvement of CCP mass and league work’ (Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang he gaijindang de qutuan gongzuo de yijian), proposed at a meeting of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee. After six months of study inside the Party system, this document was re-discussed on July 7, 2015, at a special meeting for mass and league work with all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee participating, unprecedented in Party history. Two days later, the document was formally published. According to this document, the weak points of the Youth League system—and also of other Party bodies responsible for mass work—can be summarised in three points: (a) basic-level units are generally weak in foundation ability and lack mass appeal, especially on the burgeoning social networks; (b) some units operate in a bureaucratic way, divorced from the masses, without improving consciousness and innovative spirit; (c) the ability, quality and work of league cadres needs to be improved.7 These contents were further distilled on February 2, 2016, when the Central Inspection Team8 sent to the CCCYL office consolidated Xi’s consideration of the reform into four types of ‘becoming’ (hua): becoming bureaucratised (jiguan hua), becoming administrative (xingzheng hua), becoming high-end (guizu hua) and becoming entertainment (yule hua). Accordingly, the document made four proposals: (a) improve the constitution, structural organisation and operating mechanism of the CCCYL leadership, especially by significantly increasing the ratio of members in basic level and front-line posts; (b) reform the selection, assignment and management of CCCYL cadres, with less strict age limits and the enhancement of cadres’ direct communication with normal young people; (c) reform and innovate strategies and methods of routines, events and organisational development at the basic level, highly

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emphasising creative online work; (d) improve Party and government support and assurance for Youth Leagues.9 Based on these guidelines, we may find some encouraging factors, other than the pressure from above, that led the CCCYL propaganda department to operate online. First, the document clearly emphasises a ‘cyber Youth League’ construction plan that allows younger staff at lower levels more freedom of action. In addition, these guidelines call for Youth League work to depend more on young, ‘common’ Youth League members. Finally, the emphasis on innovation and de-bureaucratisation provides young PR staff the practical legitimacy to use cyber cultural resources for a different mobilisation. This is not only a theoretical conjecture but actually has developed into a focus point of the CCCYL in building its unique ability. The most intuitive piece of evidence is that in February 2016, when CCCYL’s top staff responded to the comments from the central inspection team, they announced that they would put more effort into incorporating more ‘leaders of young associations, cyber commentators, new media journalists and returned students’,10 seen as effective in terms of cyber opinion and its cultural style. A New Type of Cyber Nationalism While the willingness of Party leadership to strengthen organisational construction and resume its mobilisation ability continues to apply pressure and offer opportunity, especially for lower-rank young staff in marginalised sectors, a particular new trend in the cyber sphere offered young CCCYL online practitioners another chance. As will be explained in detail at the end of this chapter, a new trend of young urban nationalists jokingly describing themselves as ‘voluntary 50-cent’ (ziganwu) spread widely around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Observers outlined a different image of this new type of young nationalist in defence of the Beijing Olympics and protesting against Tibetan liberation. ‘In March and April of 2008, cheerful, mini-skirted and spiky-haired Chinese student demonstrators filled city streets and university campuses from San Francisco to Sydney, waving red flags and chanting patriotic songs while snapping photos of each other. The students, and graduates, were protesting at Western media coverage of recent rioting in Tibet, and “protecting” the Olympic torch relay from hecklers.

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When they returned home from the demonstrations, they posted their accounts on blogs, online bulletin boards and discussion forums and uploaded video clips and photos. Millions of Chinese Internet users read their stories, circulated their pictures and cheered them on to “fight” for the nation. The overseas rallies became a national affair. Demonstrators were applauded with admiration and encouraged to persevere when facing confrontations, while their opponents, if Chinese, were condemned as traitors’.11 The appearance and behaviour of nationalist demonstrators described above in 2008 may be the first and most observable point, and it could be also applied to the domestic youth. Generally, analyses of post-Mao nationalism frame conflicts as between ‘reform’ and ‘anti-reform’. The two topics have been connected with two lines. In one line, the symbiosis of reform and opening (to developed Western countries) in discourse and practice has naturally made nationalism a synonym for seclusion. In the other line, nationalism has been judged as an effective alternative to hollowing out communist/socialist ideology, in order for the post-Mao administrations to maintain political legitimacy while preventing thorough political reform.12 Thus, the typical post-Mao nationalist has been seen as naturally connected with some simple factors: older, or young without social experience, uneducated, ill-tempered, of a lower social class, living in underdeveloped areas, especially rural places or small internal cities. In other words, people who were not able to adapt to (or benefit from) the reforms, who could be easily incited, especially by official propaganda, and so depended more on political authority. In contrast, people who had opposing qualities, those that might be collectively called the (rising) middle class by scholars and observers of civil societal growth, would be expected to promote contentious politics challenging the authorities. However, these young nationalist demonstrators embodied a paradox, with their position on the front line of China’s opening up based on their stable and comfortable middle-class families. The majority of them came from coastal metropolises and had a relatively good education, an innate sense of modernity and living experience, and were Internet-savvy. Another aspect of this new type was that the target as they performed their nationalism was not particularly ‘imperialist states’—in p ­ articular Japan and the US, with the former playing the most negative role

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among the big powers considered to have damaged the sovereignty and independence of China, and the latter always described by the government as hindering China’s ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan). Instead, they turned to overseas media figures who were judged to be distorting truth, and domestic intellectuals considered to be traitors to the motherland. In this nationalist wave, there were a number of online posts criticising ‘Western media hegemony’ and videos claiming to reveal the ‘truth’ that attained popularity and enthusiastic responses; a website named Anti-CNN was even established, to specifically collect and discuss information on what its founders considered to be distortion or treason, becoming an important platform for impressionable young people to find comrades and promote further action on- and offline. It should be noted that this article will not examine whether these accusations were true or false; it merely takes it as an existing feature for analysis. Finally, these new-type nationalists stylised themselves with pop culture and subcultures, cultivated through an experience of cultural consumption similar to that of young people in developed countries. This style made them seem cosmopolitan rather than ‘filial nationalists’13 mainly drawing from Chinese ancient tradition. For example, they drew Japanese-style manga, using a handsome character or cute bunnies to personify the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and adapting stories from textbooks and propaganda, or they appropriated revolutionary and patriotic songs with a popular aesthetic sense. Also, in contrast to the ‘angry youth’14 stereotype, this new type seemed to be happily enjoying the romantic emotions evoked by the history of China and the Party, breaking though the intellectual monopoly in the network age. The ‘voluntary 50-cent’ nickname could be seen as vividly reflecting this sense of cultural play. It was used to respond to the widespread accusation of being ‘50-cent’ online posters with self-mockery. As researchers may already be aware, ‘50-cent’ online posters—the official term was cyber commentator—were believed to be people hired or administratively ordered by the Chinese government to disrupt or mislead public discussion online.15 This new concept of ‘voluntary 50-cent’16 was written as ‘50-cent bringing their own provisions’ (zidai ganliang de wumao, abbr. ziganwu), to claim that their comments in favour of political authority or specific public policies was self-motivated.

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CCCYL Strategies on Weibo and Bilibili This chapter will demonstrate the prominent performance of the CCCYL’s official channels on two influential SNS platforms: Sina Weibo (https:// weibo.com) and Bilibili Video (www.bilibili.com), analysing the strategies and effects of approaching and mobilising the cyber nationalism of these ‘voluntary 50-cent’ posters. The Chinese government’s limitation of access to the global Internet has not only blocked ‘undesirable’ information, but also protected domestic Internet firms from their well-developed foreign counterparts. Thus, some imitative services have taken advantage of proven technology and taken a majority of the Chinese market share, changing societal lifestyle. Among them, Sina Weibo and Bilibili Video are typical, with the former imitating Twitter in the US, and the latter copying a Japanese website named Niconico Douga. They have both drawn great attention as platforms for youth popular culture. The official CCCYL channels they carry indicate the League’s awareness of the need to fit in with the unique features of each individual base separately, in contrast with traditional propaganda. Based on different features, the CCCYL and its cyber operators demonstrate their flexibility: for Weibo, where text messages are still important, they actively participate in countering ‘fake news’, indirectly mobilising nationalist identity by indicating a ‘rational’ view; for the video-sharing site, they use subcultural visual elements to directly indicate highly emotional nationalist affection.

CCCYL Strategy on Sina Weibo: ‘Anti-fake News’ to Indicate ‘Rationality’ Features of Sina Weibo As introduced above, Sina Weibo (weibo literally means microblog) is an imitator of Twitter, an online news and social networking service where users post and interact with messages. After starting on August 14, 2009, it took two years to reach a similar market penetration to Twitter, with 30% of China’s Internet users.17 By the first quarter of 2017, according to the quarterly financial report of the Sina Weibo Corporation, the number of active users per month had reached 340 million, exceeding Twitter’s 328 million.18

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As an imitative service, the Sina Weibo has similar functions, features and political/social implications as Twitter. The ‘forward’, ‘like’ and ‘comment’ functions create a new style of social interaction, in which the promulgator and his/her followers exchange information and opinions directly. This style is seen as making up for the deficiency of traditional mass media in terms of timeliness and feedback. Moreover, such equal and liberal interaction breaks the dominant power of giant media organisations to issue and interpret information throughout the offline/real world, in order to develop a ‘cyber democracy’ innovation. For example, while remaining a highly debated subject, observers of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s were impressed by the fact that social media—represented by Twitter and Facebook—had facilitated the revolutionary process, by promoting communication among participants organising demonstrations, framing political debate, disseminating information on their activities and raising local and global awareness of ongoing events.19 It is not hard to understand why such features were also attractive to civil activists in China, who had already gathered some experience of online civil movements through early forms of web pages and bulletin boards in the mid-1990s. In comparison to these, the social networking features of Weibo allow particular agendas to spread beyond limited and specialised spaces and to reach regular young people previously uninterested in public topics. In comparison to traditional forms mainly covering participants in developed coastal cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xiamen, the rapid market expansion of Weibo extended public discussion into more remote second- and third-tier cities. In addition, Twitter’s facilitation of civil movements in the Middle East, as discussed above, affected views of Weibo as well and led to some positive evaluation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the CCP and government institutions did not take long to notice the potential political risk of this big taxpayer, and to therefore strengthen censorship.20 The CCCYL would prove to be no exception. Performance of the CCCYL Weibo Account As well as imposing censorship, various Party and government bodies were ordered to open official channels on Sina Weibo, as part of the explicit policy of ‘transparent government affairs’ (touming zhengwu),

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and the implicit policy of orienting public opinion. Accordingly, the official CCCYL Sina Weibo channel opened on December 27, 2013. In September 2019 it had over 10 million followers, with more than 30,000 posts. It is noteworthy that even though the number of followers may not be particularly high—the top three government channels are those of the Security Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (about 25 million), the Supreme People’s Court (about 15 million) and the General Office of the State Council (about 14 million)21— the average number of ‘forwards’ and ‘comments’ for each post on the CCCYL channel is similar to that of the top channels. This contrast with the tremendous difference in followers implies that it has a larger ratio of active users who participate and interact, with other government channel users preferring to merely receive official information. With further investigation, it can be seen that the CCCYL channel has been designed accordingly—rather than just issue information so as to be ‘transparent’, it is meant to be an active participant getting deeply involved and trying to support and integrate the existing ‘voluntary 50-cent’ resources on Weibo. For this purpose, the channel must identify itself with them and embed ideological messages in human stories with socially ‘positive energy’ (zheng nengliang)—an established concept in the Chinese propaganda context—in an entertaining style. Posts can be classified into three main types, building a logical framework which connects the private, social and political spheres. The first type are those aiming to get close to young people’s daily life, such as tips for daily life, funny videos, and warm stories of common people— especially those engaging in public services—or tagged as ‘sharing childhood memories’ with young followers. The second type are news, videos and comments about hot public issues and current events, especially those that are controversial with regard to domestic crisis handling or overseas events important for China as a stakeholder. The last type entails authoritative information on CCP and CCCYL affairs—sometimes young pop stars are invited to participate in CCCYL events, making their fans enthusiastic followers of the CCCYL channel. As part of this construction of an identification with ‘voluntary 50-cent’ nationalists, the most successful and typical public opinion orientation of the channel was undoubtedly a post on July 7, 2016 titled ‘The Three Gorges Dam can hold up floods, but cannot hold up flooding in some people’s brains’ (Sanxia daba dang de liao shui, que dang buzhu mouxie ren naozi li de shui). (‘Flooding in one’s brain’ is a way

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to insult someone’s intelligence.)22 By July 2017, this post had been read nearly four million times, with 24,276 forwards, 10,474 comments and 25,242 likes. It was written by an online commentator from the Global Times, a very well-known nationalist newspaper, and posted as a long Weibo, a particular function of Sina Weibo that allows the posting of long pieces unrestricted by the 140-character limitation copied from Twitter. In the lead of this widely spread article, the operators of the channel framed the issue in a typical ‘voluntary 50-cent’ manner: During recent weeks, there has been continuous torrential rain along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River … Soldiers, police and municipal administration staff (chengguan) have got into the hard work of flood control, and even the flood-fighting front. (However, for some news media, it’s just their ‘natural’ duty, and thus they never bother to report their efforts.) In contrast with such common people dedicating their hard work silently to crisis management are those ‘keyboard heroes’ [jianpan xia, an ironic concept deriving from the Chinese translation of American superheroes like Superman and Batman, meaning people who criticise a lot online without getting involved in real life] hiding safely behind computer screens. While soldiers, police and municipal administration staff spare no effort to protecting people’s life and property, they are setting off an annoying ‘reverse current’ online. This article will expose some typical performances of those keyboard heroes to you.

This demonstrates three obvious features of ‘voluntary 50-cent’ expression. Firstly, it specifies its target of criticism as ‘big VIPs’—­ identityverified users with a large number of followers who are usually seen as opinion leaders—and commercial mass media. As discussed above, this is a typical feature of ‘voluntary 50-cent’ consciousness: attacking so-called ‘lying intellectuals’. In addition, this article appeared in the context of an existing controversy around a ‘big VIP’ (a well-known TV presenter) who had said the mayor of Nanjing ‘deserved death’ while complaining about floods outside the presenter’s housing estate. In other words, the channel didn’t start a public opinion event, but rather intervened to portray the controversy as a simple black-and-white issue and support and encourage one side, attempting, with the aid of its political authority, to be a decisive force for the final conclusion. However, in order not to alienate young nationalists, this channel could not crudely use an authoritative attitude

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to simply suppress opponents; this would make it seem no different from a traditional government propaganda outlet. Instead, it chose to argue its side in a ‘reasonable’ manner in order to shape its neutral and depoliticised image. This article criticises the TV presenter in this way: Yesterday morning, he took a controversial action. While complaining about the flood on the street outside his housing estate, he actually wrote four characters: ‘the mayor deserves death’. … Ironically, soon afterward the mayor really visited the neighbourhood to investigate flood solutions, and this led to another controversy, with some netizens describing him as ‘getting down to business only after being scolded’. … However, … according to local media reports, the mayor supervised front-line flood prevention at 3pm, attended a relevant meeting at 4pm, visited the area where the TV presenter lives – for the drainage work of this area had not been effective – at 5pm, according to his established schedule, and went to check dams that afternoon. … In addition, according to the introduction of local netizens to the author, it’s not the first time that street has been flooded … for various objective reasons [in the following paragraph, the author also admits that the municipal government is responsible for the delayed construction of drainage facilities]. For example, 1. the housing estate is located in a depression; 2. the mistakes of the housing developer in lifting the foundations; 3. under the rapid development of recent years, the main drainage channel, Friendship River, has reached maximum capacity.

Secondly, despite its focus on a current event, this article still reminded its audience of the Three Gorges Dam Project, a long-sustained and symbolic Chinese political controversy that serves as a good reflection of the conflict between the authoritative and development ethics of the Party-state, and the criticism from domestic dissenters and developed democracies. In Chinese government discourse, this project is a reflection of its great industrial achievements, which back its legitimacy. In contrast, according to civil societal expression, this great project is nothing but a representation of political suppression in decision-making, disregard for the human rights of environmental migrants, and damage to the natural environment. For ‘voluntary 50-cent’ members who prefer economic development—in contrast to their cyber nationalist predecessors who aggressively emphasised political, diplomatic and martial ‘dignity’—overseas critics of the Three Gorges Project remain important,

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as they are seen as reflecting a ‘Western distortion’ that wishes to deny Chinese development. This is why the first section of this article targets what the author calls ‘unjustified criticism’ by ‘journalists’ and ‘big VIPs’ lacking ‘professional knowledge’. The political implications of the Three Gorges Project are replaced, based on a list of simple statistical data, by a seemingly neutral and ‘scientific’ meaning. Finally, the article tries to reshape the image of government officials and staff, from ‘violence organs’ like the army, the police and the municipal administration to ‘ordinary working people’—in a romantic manner, in order to inspire youthful empathy. As we know, these officials and the institutions they belong to are generally perceived negatively in civil society issue framing, seen as embodying authoritarian suppression and bureaucratic defects, and furthermore as a contrast to the efficiency and moral potential of civil society activists. This article exactly reverses this position, arguing that Party workers, soldiers and governmental officials are ‘working’ hard to gain the respect and empathy of ‘common people’, while ‘big VIPs’, ‘mass media’ and ‘keyboard heroes’ only ‘talk big’. This reversal of issue framing follows that created by grass-root ‘voluntary 50-cent’ netizens after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, claiming that civil activists had ‘exaggerated’ their contributions to relief work.

Bilibili Video: Manipulating Subcultural Style to Mobilise Emotions Features of Bilibili Video Founded in 2010, Bilibili Video is a video-sharing website which allows individual users to watch, upload and share personal, business or ­royalty-free videos. YouTube is probably the best equivalent. In China, websites like Youku and Tudou had earlier copied this pattern with considerable success. However, Bilibili turned out to have its own particular characteristics, related to its direct object of imitation, Japan’s Niconico Douga, set up in 2007. As with Niconico, on Bilibili user comments are overlaid directly onto the relevant video, synced to a specific playback time. This creates a sense of shared watching experience, with comments directly responding to the content of the video, in sync with viewers. This shared watching experience was originally aimed at the Japanese otaku subculture (roughly, young people who prefer virtual society

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to real social life) interested in ACG (Anime, Comic [manga], Game). However, because of limited access to foreign websites and loose copyright management, mainland Chinese otaku finally committed to founding a Chinese version of Niconico. Bilibili was not the first, but it has had the most commercial success. For this reason, Bilibili has been from the very beginning tinged with this otaku subculture. This implies that, in comparison with Sina Weibo, users of Bilibili are more likely to be urban youth looking for or creating this subculture, and also to be people interested in Japanese culture. Nationalism and patriotism are more sensitive on this platform because, in the Cold War era, popular culture was seen as an ideological weapon helping the United States to defeat the Soviet bloc. It is thus unsurprising that both the Chinese government and nationalist intellectuals remain wary of the soft power of Japanese ACG culture, which the Japanese government indeed considers a precious resource in public diplomacy. Another feature is the potential political inclination of otaku tastes. The emphasis on a common identity makes it possible for the depoliticised entertainment-based life to be repoliticised. From the early 1970s, represented by Stuart Hall and his Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, cultural theorists, especially in Western Europe, began to pay attention to the political potential of youth subcultures as a possible ‘resistance’ to mainstream bourgeois consumerism and capitalist cultural hegemony, and further to the capitalist social and political system. According to the Birmingham School, culture is a ‘critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled’.23 Different from the traditional concept of resistance through violence and radical factors, subcultural resistance is embodied by unique style, fashion and value which constitute an abstract and symbolic ‘ritual’, creating a common identity among participants in a particular circle. The potential function of such identity and ritual is to express—though only symbolically—and lead to a ‘collective solution’ to the structural dilemma hidden under consumerism and hedonism.24 Even though this analytical framework of subculture, especially the practical effectiveness of the expected symbolic ‘collective solution’, has long been doubted, it still encourages young subcultural figures to establish a unique identity. In this sense, the initial form of Niconico Donga consciously expressed its cultural challenge and constructed an identity beyond pure

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entertainment. On June 1, 2007, one of its founders issued the ‘Niconico Declaration’, announcing the ‘Constitution Day of Niconico’. This Constitution outlines an idealised social life of information exchange, media commentary, intelligence and even emotions, human identity and rational outlook on this online platform.25 In addition, the website also directly participated in political events. In 2009, it held an opinion poll on Japan’s general election. In contrast with the actual success of the Democratic Party, Niconico users overwhelmingly supported the Liberal Democratic Party,26 drawing observers’ attention to the ‘rightward deviation’ of Niconico otakus. This does not prove that Niconico users are right-wing, but it may indicate that the challenge of ‘reality’ remains a potential motivator for the otaku taste group to stay in touch with politics. If the potential political choice of Niconico users derives from the ‘challenge’ to real society, Chinese otaku users of Bilibili are confronted with an additional conflict—between the taste for Japanese ACG and national identity. As with the ‘Cool Japan’ theory,27 the soft power of ACG has the capability to reconstruct youth identity. However, is it possible that this conflict may also create a consciousness of ‘keeping’ a national identity? The performance of the Bilibili CCCYL channel may show us the government utilisation of this potential. CCCYL Performance Similarly to Sina Weibo, the CCCYL on Bilibili also takes advantage of existing cyber nationalist resources, styling its propaganda into a ‘cute/ kawaii’ play rich in the current fashion of subcultural style, and adapting itself to the otaku identity. The Bilibili CCCYL channel opened on December 24, 2015, after the CCYL already had abundant experience of online opinion orientation on Sina Weibo, and had issued 433 videos by August 1, 2017. The most popular of these—played more than 776,000 times, with a ‘barrage’ (comments in sync)28 of about 3000 comments up to July 2017—is an obviously nationalist 48-second episode spliced from a press conference of the Chinese Ministry of Defence regarding a Sino-Japanese military controversy. This video is titled ‘makes me a mad fan’, and most of the comments praise the ‘handsome’ and ‘cool’ spokesman, and are full of fashionable online phrases. Another recent contribution, played 156,000 times and gaining 3781 barrage comments in two days, also demonstrates otaku-style nationalist

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propaganda on Bilibili. The video is a display of the military development of China, with the title ‘How is it possible for our PLA to be that fiery’, borrowing from the title of a Japanese otaku light novel, How is it Possible for my Younger Sister to be that Lovely. The style of these popular contributions demonstrates that visitors to the CCCYL’s Bilibili channel share a dual identity as both Japanese-style fans and nationalists. The efforts of the CCCYL to utilise and promote a grassroot work titled That Year, that Rabbit and those Stories (abbr. That Rabbit) offer an important example of its Bilibili strategy to adapt nationalist publicity to otaku tastes. Created in 2011, this manga doujinshi created by an ACG journal editor in the southwestern city of Kunming has now become generally known as a representative of the ‘voluntary 50-cent’, and was quite commercially successful. Despite the simplicity of its stories and the basic drawing techniques, it took the twenty-something author less than three years, with no sponsorship, to get 100,000 fans on Sina Weibo. Paradoxically, his work is a typical reflection of ‘cool Japan’ soft power—many believe that it imitates a Japanese work titled Hetalia, in that various nation states are personified as cute characters, with the PRC being the titular rabbit. In addition, it is full of allusions to various Japanese ACG works, in order to add humour or support the storyline. It’s no exaggeration to say that only a veteran otaku can completely follow the story and have a full grasp of the core style. On the other hand, the main theme of this work is nonetheless the military achievements of the Party-state. Government framing of imperialist oppression, the historical dilemma of China, the leading role of the CCP, the People’s Army, socialist achievements and ‘peaceful rise’ are prominently indicated—and in particular, Japan is given a negative role. The work’s popularity bears out the paradoxical symbiosis of nationalist identity and a depoliticised subcultural identity sourced to a foreign country’s soft power,29 making it appealing to the CCCYL. With its resources widely rooted in universities and other youth organisations, and its long-time active participation in the Weibo public sphere, the CCCYL noticed the influence of That rabbit and seriously thought about its potential function, far earlier than other publicity institutions that had also been ordered to pay more attention to the Internet and youth culture. Its strategy for this work can be judged as having three stages: hitchhiking, incorporation and further utilisation.

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Firstly, when the CCCYL opened its Weibo channel, as we know, government channels were still alien to this sphere. The mere act of searching for (or just pretending to search for) a ready-made youth cultural symbol would help to shape an ‘equal’ and friendly image. From April 13, 2015, when the CCCYL channel in Sina Weibo first promoted an episode of the animated series That Rabbit, it continually posted videos or texts to promote the series, forwarding relevant microblogs or using this IP to create patriotic publicity videos. In this series of posts, the CCCYL was personified as a sentimental and feminine fan. In that first post, it specifically deliberately chose one of the most popular episodes of this anime—one based on the Battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War—in order to rapidly attract existing fans and further draw them into the CCCYL’s patriotic agenda. This proved to be a success. Below are several selected comments with the most likes, as examples of the general good response. • Even the Central Party institution is pressing the author to speed up his creation. The author should take care of ‘political scrutiny’ (with smile emojis) • Mashe (the nickname of the author), now you should work harder or you will make political mistakes! (with smile emojis) • It’s the best video for Qingming Festival. Thanks CCCYL for spurring on the lazy author for us! Great style! • Could the Central Party institutions try to actively make more works like this? • I suddenly find the CCCYL so lovely. These comments convey a sense that these fans have begun to see the CCCYL as one of them, relaxing and easily making jokes. At the same time, the CCCYL’s encouragement—seen as being that of the Party— has also strengthened both fans’ love for the work and their nationalism. In addition, another less important but still interesting point is that the avatars the commenters use are Japanese ACG characters and pop singers. As well as improving its image in this way, beneficial in helping the Party institution to gain more access to this youth subculture, CCCYL propaganda further directly played a role as a sponsor of the

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production of That Rabbit. In other words, grassroots work was ­formally incorporated as a semi-government resource for patriotic education. However, in contrast to traditional experiences, the incorporation is not via administrative order but through financial ties. Along with the current growth of financial budget, government institutions have gained more support for so-called investigation and research programmes and innovation programmes, aimed at reforming and developing bureaucratic ability and operative techniques of intelligence and governance. This policy offers the CCCYL both beneficial conditions and pressure—special funds are hard to be used personally, while failure to spend them could influence future allocation. In this situation, the sponsorship for the animated series of That Rabbit came via an innovation programme. In fact, despite strict supervision of expenditure, the approval procedure was uncomplicated, since this form of innovation of online opinion orientation remained opaque to veteran staff accustomed to traditional methods. This meant that young staff who were skilled cyber surfers and ACG fans gained enough space to operate more informally. According to private interviews with some of them, the decision-making behind materially promoting That Rabbit came from a very limited circle of CCCYL staff, animators and cyber activists. Fortunately for them, the results have been positive. One of these positive results has been that this work, especially the characters and their specific style, has been incorporated as a core resource for the CCCYL to use for propaganda and strengthen the emotional association with ‘otaku nationalists’. The use of That Rabbit has made the CCCYL’s standing in Bilibili natural and acceptable. In addition, its sponsorship allows the CCCYL to use its characters and style to create its own videos. For example, the CCCYL has produced a series of videos titled I and the Engine of my Country in order to introduce core concepts of national policy or events to young people. These are mainly sponsored by the CCCYL publicity section, created by a media team with a clear self-identity as ‘voluntary 50-cent’ with narratives provided by well-educated young researchers in the social sciences. An episode on the topic of military parades made extensive use of That Rabbit animal characters to represent the martial forces of various countries.30 The results were impressive: the video has been played more than 150,000 times with about 2000 barrage comments, compared to an average of 20,000–30,000 plays and less than a thousand comments for other episodes.

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Conclusion As a crucial organisation for CCP work directed at the masses, there is no doubt that the Chinese Youth League continues to have various regular approaches to its work; the online mobilisation of nationalism, or rather the performance of nationalism, is an irregular operation deviating slightly from the traditional administrative process. However, this irregular manipulation has made a deep impression on public opinion in recent years. Based on the analysis of the previous chapters, we find three dynamics behind the ‘positive’ effects of CCCYL efforts to mobilise online nationalism. These dynamics function practically through young CCCYL staff at lower levels of the propaganda department. Firstly, pressure has created a grey zone where young staff who are also skilled cyber surfers can operate (to a certain extent) flexibly, with the assistance of both institutional resources and their personal experience. Lacking the autonomy of innovation under regular administrative procedures, these younger members of staff are allowed to promote their action agendas under unprecedented pressure—in the reform era—put on the Youth League by the highest-level leadership, forcing it to play an effective role in the network age. Institutional resources have also backed up their operation, especially the potential identity produced by Youth League membership or ex-membership—even though it may not have any practical use in everyday life—among an overwhelming majority of middle-school and university students, with systematised YL committees and branches which can get in touch with members as needed. CCCYL PR staff therefore have legitimate and effective networks to search for and sponsor intelligence resources identified with students and young tutors, a most active group of cyber surfers. Secondly, the new type of nationalism has provided CCYL operators with ready-made objects and a style of mobilisation. This article, in common with a number of other observers, uses the ‘voluntary 50-cent’ concept to refer to both this new wave and the young nationalists behind it. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is mainly promoted by urban middle-class youth, targeting what they see as ‘lying media and intellectuals dominating the discourse’, and acting in global pop-cultural and subcultural style. Particularly in accordance with the extensive online debate and real-world demonstrations around the Beijing Olympics, this form

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of nationalism had great appeal to young people and others, including individuals serving the Party-state system. CCCYL staff with a clear sense of being members of the ‘voluntary 50-cent’ movement have been more inclined to dominate the mobilisation process, and more capable of doing so. They depend on this identity to find and contact active ‘comrades’—university students, tutors, journalists working for nationalist media, field experts and so on—and sponsor them through institutional networks. And finally, CCCYL strategies reflect a bias for learning from the experiences of developed democracies in political communication and public relations. The utilisation of existing resources has not relied on traditional administrative orders but has mainly made effective use of financial leverage and social networking. In addition, this form of nationalist mobilisation has tried to get rid of a sense of ‘education’ or ‘instilling’, instead aiming to create an emotional association with young people born during the rapid economic growth and opening of China. They have few memories of undisguised political suppression, and are instead more sensitive to concepts like financial capitalism, media monopoly and postcolonisation, ideas mostly developed by Western academia and media. Alongside the examples (Sina Weibo and Bilibili Video) examined in this article, the traditional ‘grey’ strategies continue to expand. In 2017, the CCCYL propaganda department opened channels on two other very popular platforms, Zhihu and Netease Cloud Music, a question-and-answer website and a website for music sharing respec­ tively. Notably, Zhihu is generally seen as a liberal website. Further study of CCCYL online operations is needed.

Notes



1.  The political implications of youth may be most clearly manifested in a speech by Mao Zedong to Chinese students and young interns in Moscow on November 17, 1957. It started: ‘The world is both yours and ours, but nevertheless it’s yours in the end. Being full of vigour and vitality, you youth are in your blossom, like the rising sun between eight and nine in the morning. Hopes rest on you’. 2. Not only do the Constitution and related laws on political events stipulate the age limit, but in public affairs ‘heroic action’ by young people, which used to be highly praised in traditional propaganda, has also gradually faded away since the start of the 1990s.

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3. See more detail in: Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” The China Quarterly, no. 173 (2003): 17–34. 4.  For more details, see: Zhiyue Bo, China’s Elite Politics Governance and Democratization (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 147–166. 5.  There’s also analysis of their shared bias. For example, Li Cheng of Brookings Institution argues that the Youth League faction belongs to the ‘populist’ faction, which is different from the ‘elitist’ coalition, consisting of officials with relatively humble backgrounds who rose from the grassroots and therefore focus more on societal harmony and equality. See: Cheng Li, “One Party, Two Coalitions in China’s Politics,” Brookings Institution, August 16, 2009, http://www.eastasiaforum. org/2009/08/16/one-party-two-coalitions-in-chinas-politics. 6.  Shaoguang Wang and Jianyu He, “Zhongguo de shetuan geming” [Community Revolution in China: Outlining Associational Map of Chinese], Zhejiang Xuekan (Zhejiang Academic Journal) 6, no. 149 (2004): 71–77. 7. “Suggestions on the Strengthening and Improvement of CCP Mass and League Work,” Xinhua Agency, July 9, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2015-07/09/c_1115875561.htm. 8. 中央巡视组. 9. “Suggestions on the Strengthening and Improvement of CCP Mass and League Work.” 10. “The CCCYL Began to Tackle the ‘Four -ations’ Problem as Response to the Severe Criticism from the Central Inspection Team,” Lianhe Zaobao [Union Morning Post], April 27, 2016, http://www.zaobao.com/ special/report/politic/cnpol/story20160427-610015/. 11. Nyíri, Zhang, and Varrall, “China’s Cosmopolitan Nationalists,” 25. 12. See research on Post-Mao populist nationalism, for example: Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996); Peter Hayes Gries, “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” The China Journal, no. 46 (2001): 25–43; Yingjie Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under Reform (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003); Peter Hayes Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Vanessa Fong, “Filial Nationalism Among Chinese Teenagers with Global Identities,” American Ethnologist 31, no. 4 (2004): 631–648; Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007). 13. Fong, “Filial Nationalism Among Chinese Teenagers with Global Identities.” 14. Fenqing (愤青).

108  N. PAN 15. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 1–18; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 484–501. 16. It is also possible that this concept was created as a taunt by online opponents of cyber nationalists, and then reclaimed by them. 17.  Kenneth Rapoza, “China’s Weibos vs US’s Twitter: And the Winner Is?” Forbes, May 17, 2011, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/ 2011/05/17/chinas-weibos-vs-uss-twitter-and-the-winner-is/#147 182a529b5. 18. “Weibo Reports First Quarter 2017 Financial Results,” Weibo, May 16, 2017,  http://ir.weibo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253076&p=irol-news Article&ID=2273153. 19.  See for example: Ekaterina Stepanova, “The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the ‘Arab Spring’,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 159, May, 2011, http://pircenter.org/kosdata/page_ doc/p2594_2.pdf; R. Mourtada and F. Salem, “Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter,” Arab Social Media Report, May 2011, http://www.dsg.fohmics.net/En/Publication/Pdf_En/DSG_Arab_ Social_Media_Report_No_2.pdf; Daniel Trottier and Christian Fuchs, eds., Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in an Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 20.  On detailed theoretical analysis and case studies of civil movements through social networking media, especially Sina Weibo, and the response of the Party-state, see for example: Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Graham Meikle and Guy Redden, eds., News Online: Transformations and Continuities (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Biao Teng, “Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and Popular Surveillance (weiguan): The Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline,” Chinese Perspective 3 (2012): 29–39; Johan Lagerkvist, “Principal-Agent Dilemma in China’s Social Media Sector? The ­Party-State and Industry Real-Name Registration Waltz,” International Journal of Communication 6 (2012): 2628–2646; Maria Bondes and Günter Schucher, “Derailed Emotions: The Transformation of Claims and Targets During the Wenzhou Online Incident,” Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 1 (2014): 45–65; Chongyi Feng, “Preserving Stability and Rights Protection: Conflict or Coherence?”

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Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 2 (2013): 21–55; Lijun Tang, Desai Shan, and Peidong Yang, “Workers’ Right Defence on China’s Internet: An Analysis of Actors,” Information, Communication & Society 19, no. 8 (2016): 1171–1186. 21. All data up to date as of July 2017, according to the public statistical list of Sina Weibo: http://data.weibo.com/top/hot. 22. See: “Sanxia daba dang de liao shui, que dang buzhu mouxie ren naozi li de shui” [The Three Gorges Dam Can Hold up Floods, but Cannot Hold up Flooding in Some People’s Brains], Weibo, July 7, 2016, http://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309403994545674167450. 23. James Procter, Stuart Hall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 2. 24. See for example: Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds., Resistance Through Ritual: Youth Subculture in Post-war Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1976); Dich Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979); Stuart Hall, ed., Culture, Media and Language (London: Hutchinson, 1980). 25. “『ニコニコ宣言(9)』,” http://info.nicovideo.jp/base/declaration.html. However, along with its increasing access to market, this Constitution was inclined to focus on dealing with the contradiction between copyright and users’ free choice; see its instruction on the amendment to the Constitution in: http://blog.nicovideo.jp/niconews/2008/06/001264. html; http://blog.nicovideo.jp/niconews/2009/06/003148.html. 26. “ネット出口調査 ニコニコ大百科」” [A General Report of the Internet Exit Poll by NICONICO Encyclopedia], dic.nicovideo.jp/a/ネット世論 調査. 27. Douglas McGray, “Japan’s Gross National Cool,” Foreign Policy, May 2002, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool. 28. 弹幕 (Danmu). 29.  Of course, there is also very severe controversy on this work among ChinReese ACG fans. 30. “Yuebinbing shi ge shenma bing” [What Is a Military Parade], Bilibili, January 18, 2017, https://www.bilibili.com/video/av8072602?from= search&seid=17860746712117561263.

Bibliography Barmé, Geremie R. “China’s Flat Earth: History and 8 August 2008.” The China Quarterly 197 (2009): 64–86. Bo, Zhiyue. China’s Elite Politics Governance and Democratization. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010.

110  N. PAN Bondes, Maria, and Günter Schucher. “Derailed Emotions: The Transformation of Claims and Targets During the Wenzhou Online Incident.” Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 1 (2014): 45–65. Ewing, Richard Daniel. “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary.” The China Quarterly, no. 173 (2003): 17–34. Feng, Chongyi. “Preserving Stability and Rights Protection: Conflict or Coherence?” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 2 (2013): 21–55. Fong, Vanessa. “Filial Nationalism Among Chinese Teenagers with Global Identities.” American Ethnologist 31, no. 4 (2004): 631–648. Gries, Peter Hayes. “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing.” The China Journal, no. 46 (2001): 25–43. Gries, Peter Hayes. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Guo, Yingjie. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under Reform. Abingdon: Routledge, 2003. Hall, Stuart, ed. Culture, Media and Language. London: Hutchinson, 1980. Hall, Stuart, and Tony Jefferson, eds. Resistance Through Ritual: Youth Subculture in Post-war Britain. London: Hutchinson, 1976. Hebdige, Dich. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London: Methuen, 1979. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 1–18. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 484–501. Lagerkvist, Johan. “Principal-Agent Dilemma in China’s Social Media Sector? The Party-State and Industry Real-Name Registration Waltz.” International Journal of Communication 6 (2012): 2628–2646. Latham, Kevin. “Media, the Olympics and the Search for the ‘Real China’.” The China Quarterly 197 (2009): 25–43. Leibold, James. “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Conflicted National Form.” The China Journal, no. 63 (2010): 1–24. Meikle, Graham, and Guy Redden, eds. News Online: Transformations and Continuities.London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Nyíri, Pál, Juan Zhang, and Merriden Varrall. “China’s Cosmopolitan Nationalists: ‘Heroes’ and ‘Traitors’ of the 2008 Olympics.” The China Journal, no. 63 (2010): 25–55. Pan, Nini. “‘Wumao’? ‘Gongmin” – Hulianwang chuanbo zhong ‘Ziganwu’ de yuanqi yu huayu fenxi” [‘50 cent’ or ‘Citizen’: Analysis on Cause and Discourse of ‘Voluntary 50-cent’ in Network Communication]. Journalism Bimonthly (Xinwen daxue) 3 (2015): 91–100.

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Procter, James. Stuart Hall. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. Tang, Lijun, Desai Shan, and Peidong Yang. “Workers’ Right Defence on China’s Internet: An Analysis of Actors.” Information, Communication & Society 19, no. 8 (2016): 1171–1186. Teng, Biao. “Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and Popular Surveillance (weiguan): The Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline.” Chinese Perspective 3 (2012): 29–39. Trottier, Daniel, and Christian Fuchs, eds. Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in an Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014. Unger, Jonathan, ed. Chinese Nationalism. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Wang, Shaoguang, and Jianyu He. “Zhongguo de shetuan geming” [Community Revolution in China: Outlining Associational Map of Chinese]. Zhejiang Xuekan (Zhejiang Academic Journal) 6, no. 149 (2004): 71–77. Wu, Xu. Chinese Cyber Nationalism. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. Yang, Guobin. The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

CHAPTER 5

Fostered Idols and Chinese Identity Ning Jiang

Introduction It is argued that ‘the roots of identity are in the culture’.1 To be more specific, culture provides individuals with various elements to choose from for their self-categories during their identity construction. Moreover, individuals rely on various cultural terms to understand social experiences and corresponding communication. With the rise of cultural studies in academia, some related research has attempted to explore cultural studies within the context of national identity. However, popular culture, as a vital and active part of cultural practice, has rarely been paid attention to in conventional discussions2 where national cultural elements are often referred to as high culture, historical tradition, versions of folk culture or mainstream culture. In contrast, popular culture has conveyed its huge influence on ordinary people, caused by the increasing extensive global cultural flows in this era of globalisation and new media. This is playing an important role in detraditionalising and supplementing those traditional cultures, eventually reshaping individual identity. Based on previous studies, this process might result in diminution,3 or reinforcement, of the sense of national identity.4 However, popular N. Jiang (*)  Trinity Centre for Asian Studies, School of Linguistic, Speech and Communication Sciences, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_5

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cultural practice will ‘facilitate the expansion of national identities and also provide cultural resources which can be domesticated, enfolded within popular and everyday national cultures’.5 As a result, it is worthwhile to gain an understanding of the construction and reformation of national identity in mundane settings, which could not only explain how culture influences national identity in this new era, but also increase the understanding of it. Based on this theoretical consideration, this chapter focuses on a new pop culture phenomenon, namely fostered idols, and a case study of a Chinese fostered idol group, prior to discussing some of the major issues regarding Chinese national culture and identity surrounding the rise of this particular cultural phenomenon.

Fostered Idol: A New Subculture and Its Spread to China The emergence of a girl idol group called Onyanko Club in 1985 turned out to represent a new trend in the entertainment industry: the fostered idol. Compared with traditional pop stars, who gain celebrity status through their contribution of certain works of pop culture, fostered idols normally enter the consumer market with very little celebrity training or experience. However, within less than two months of Onyanko Club making their debut on an entertainment TV show, they had rapidly gained popularity in Japan and started to produce music. In 1986, their songs remained at the top of the Oricon Albums Chart for 38 weeks. This huge success encouraged the producer of Onyanko Club to promote another girl idol group, AKB48, in 2005. With this group of over ‘130’6 young singers, a key marketing strategy of this new trend in pop culture was developed: the deep involvement of the fan community. Okajima and Okada7 conclude that AKB48 was created and promoted with the idea of producing idols that ordinary people could meet. Correspondingly, fans could feel that their contribution was closely related to the career development of ordinary girls becoming real idols. To achieve this target, the producers of AKB48 conducted a serious of practices that are still uncommon to this day. These young singers were first selected and then promoted in the market, without having ­well-trained skills. They then received training and gave a live performance for their fans in an AKB48 theatre in Akihabara.

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The members of this group are annually ranked by their fans through popularity voting, also known as a general election. Members with a higher rank earn a number of benefits, such as a greater exposure rate, a better position in performances, training opportunities to release solo songs, etc. This voting is open for registered fans only, who must buy albums of the group to get voting tickets. A certain collection of these tickets sometimes also offers entry to special invitation-only events, where fans can meet their idols in person and shake hands with them, in order to ‘gives fans a sense of privilege but also remind the AKB48 members that their career is directly connected to these core fans’.8 In this way, certain members of AKB48 have become a vital part of their fans’ lives, and these fans have great empathy during this process. The AKB48 girls first become their friends, then they keep them company in their career development, and finally they become symbols of ­self-achievement. As a result, ‘the fans of AKB48 typically describe themselves as supporters rather than fans’.9 This model continues to have unprecedented and steady success in the music industry. In addition, ‘the longstanding practice of selling the same product multiple times has become closely associated with AKB48’.10 Despite many members being replaced, AKB48 remains one of the highest-earning musical performing groups in Japan. In 2018, their album sales brought in over 70 million US dollars.11 While the global music industry suffered a decline in album sales in the late twentieth century, AKB48 helped ‘reverse this trend and enabled Japan to surpass the United States as the largest music market in the world’.12 Observing its huge success, this business model has been successfully adopted in other East Asian countries, such as South Korea and China. Fostered idols, together with their hard-core fans, have become a relatively new but popular cultural phenomenon in China.

An Introduction to the TFBoys: Chinese Native Fostered Idols In witnessing the success of fostered idols in Japan, a number of entertainment companies began to attempt to create native fostered idols in China, including one called Time Fengjun Entertainment. In contrast to the other 48 groups (SNH48, BEJ48, ENG48, SHY48 and CKG48) in China, which fully copied the AKB48 model, Time Fengjun changed part of the model in their practice in China.

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The company first promoted real ordinary people, rather than a r­eady-made group, to the market, then generated a group based on the feedback from the fan community. The earliest preparation began in 2010 with the selection of boys aged eight to twelve. These boys then started to upload singing videos online after receiving some part-time training during the summer and winter school holidays, in order to assess the boys’ popularity and fans’ attraction. In 2013, Kerry Wang and Roy Wang’s singing video was promoted as the original song of the band and this, initially, gained a large amount of attention on the Internet. Based on this, Time Fengjun Entertainment decided to promote a boys’ idol group composed of Kerry and Roy. In considering that Kerry and Roy were good at singing and hosting programmes respectively, they then invited Jackson Yee, who had a talent for dancing, to join the group, calling this group the TFBoys, meaning the fighting boys. In the year of the TFBoys launching, both Roy and Jackson were only 14 years old, while Kerry was 15 years old. The second development was that modern digital information technology changed the communication methods between these boys and their potential fans from that of AKB48. Video websites and social media replaced the traditional theatre to maintain the boys’ exposure to their fans. All aspects of the members’ daily lives and working updates are recorded and uploaded online by the company. During the early years, these videos were produced as rough-cut elements without any beautification, like continuous family recordings. Kerry, Roy and Jackson also maintain regular contact with their fans by using their social media accounts to post their life trivia and reflect their mood. All of these approaches aim to dispel a disconnection whereby fans cannot see their idols in person. Thirdly, instead of fan voting, the TFBoys first tried to convince their fans that their contribution was vital as a whole group, rather than as individual members. This implied the Confucian idea that harmony is prized, in order for fans to provide their full support to these three boys without any internal consumption at the early stage. For example, the TFBoys promoted a short video, Ten Years, on the theme of achieving dreams and ten-year appointments. In the summer of each subsequent year, following this idea Time Fengjun would arrange an anniversary concert to reinforce the concept of the ‘ten years’. By doing so, fans are encouraged to pursue self-development together with these three young boys over a long period.

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Within one year, the TFBoys shot to fame as earliest Chinese native fostered boys’ idol group. They amassed over five million fans, won the Most Popular Award in the qualified music chart, became endorsers of various brands, and finally performed at the Mid-Autumn Festival Gala held by China Central Television. Over six years, the three boys kept changing the public’s understanding of how successful Chinese native fostered idols could be, compared to those from South Korea, Japan, etc. Now, in 2020, these three members have over seventy million followers, respectively, on Weibo, China’s biggest micro-blogging platform. Each member can easily achieve over 10 thousand replies to each post, with some reaching one million. Based on this huge popularity, the TFBoys have demonstrated corresponding business values. For example, over 80,000 fans applied for tickets for the 2019 TFBoys concert, with only 30,000 seats available. Each member of the TFBoys endorses over 20 brands, from luxury brands to fast-moving consumer goods, putting them in the top 10 in the Pop Star Business Value index in May 2019.13 Few academic studies have discussed Chinese fostered idols, due to this being a relatively new field, let alone focused on the TFBoys, with the majority of the publications in Chinese. Furthermore, most have explored the business models and marketing strategies behind their success. For example, Lin14 explores how Time Fengjun localised Japanese approaches in the creation and operation of such idols, as well as the corresponding marketing strategies in China, and Zheng confirms the importance of full use of new media.15 Gong further discusses how self-media platforms play a significant role in the promotion of the TFBoys, fulfilling the needs of their potential audience and making possible mass dissemination to the public.16 However, the topics of the integration of Chinese culture and identity and the link with the success of the TFBoys have been neglected. In terms of the fans group, Gu finds that the TFBoys’ fan community was formed via two processes, which are the ‘increasing depth from appearance to character recognition’ and ‘the spread of network media to television media spread, and to network space’.17 Based on this, the fans would generate a basic identity when facing external threats. Liu considers the TFBoys fan community as a group and explores their admission, their internal interactions and how they confront other groups.18 Liu finds that the construction of the fans’ identity increased their intergroup attraction, resulting in more support from their fans.

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By using the approaches of ‘ethnography’, Sun explores the group identity of TFBoys fans by analysing the realisation of self-identity in self-reflection within the group, group members’ interactions with others, and group identification.19 Liu furthers this discussion of fostered idols’ identity by arguing that the emotional contribution from fans creates an imitation of a close relationship to alleviate fans’ loneliness in their real lives; however, this could potentially have a number of negative consequences for these fans.20 Most studies have focused on the TFBoys fan community itself, with only one discussing the interaction between Chinese mainstream ideology and TFBoys fans. Yu borrows the concept of domestication from educational theories in describing the Chinese mainstream ideology to ‘cultivate compliant fans and to achieve the goal of a solid guideline’21 of monoculture.

TFBoys’ Public Image: The Integration of Chinese Cultural Heritage Although the fostered idol model was generated in Japan, it has gained popularity throughout East Asia. Development of this model varies in different countries, resulting in different portrayals of specific fostered idol groups. One of the most apparent elements is the attitude towards their own countries’ traditional culture and values. In Japan, another ‘fundamental idol characteristic’ is ‘cuteness’,22 other than intimacy with their audience discussed above, which normally encompasses sweet smiles with bared teeth, signatures with small animal paintings, flimsy handwriting, etc. This concept of ‘cuteness’ can be traced back to ‘its classical form, kawayushi or kawayurashi, which appears in poetry and stories from the pre-modern era’.23 Although there is no specific research on South Korean fostered idols, Lie once concluded there is ‘the radical displacement of traditional values’ in K-pop culture as a whole. Lie claims that South Korean cultural-national identity is rarely to be found there, due to the ‘almost complete repudiation of traditional cultures, both Confucian and folk’,24 during the cultural transformation to K-pop. In contrast with Japanese and South Korean idol groups, with the former trying to carry forward one key traditional concept and the latter almost completely abandoning traditional identity, the TFBoys, a Chinese representative fostered idol group, present a comprehensive integration with Chinese traditional values, in aiming to identify these three idols identified as Chinese outstanding youth.

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The TFBoys’ music works can be seen as a representative example. For instance, the music video for Youth Say stresses their Chinese national identity, as well as traditional Chinese patriotism, by showing the boys treasuring the Chinese national flag in many different ways, such as it being held and protected by the TFBoys and being the background of their performance. In addition, the TFBoys team carefully filter their jobs and endorsement activities based on this marketing strategy. For example, they kept attending charity fundraising activities to show they enjoy helping others, which is another key value of Chinese traditional moralities. Furthermore, the TFBoys continually promote Chinese traditional culture in many different approaches, such as being promotional ambassadors, performing songs based on traditional Chinese culture, wearing classical Chinese clothes, and so on. The following example shows the business strategies and how three concepts— Chinese culture and identity, outstanding youth, and the TFBoys—are combined to create a public image of the TFBoys. In contrast to the Japanese and South Korean fostered idol models that treat idols as a full-time profession, the three members of the TFBoys are maintaining their student status and try to create a public image based on this identity by showing that they can maintain a balance between their academic achievement and their professional success, which is in line with traditional Chinese culture and identity. ‘Education has always been an extremely important means of personal advancement in China’,25 and Chinese philosophy traditionally emphasises the importance of education to the human being. For example, Confucius believed that ‘in teaching there should be no distinction of classes’,26 indicating the necessity and value of education for the masses, rather than for a particular group. Practically, from the seventh century until 1905, being a scholar and passing the imperial examination to become a government official is one of the main opportunities to change ordinary people’s social class and their whole family’s life. ‘Examinations remain the primary path of upward mobility in contemporary China’ due to the ‘huge urban-rural economic differences’.27 As a result, continuing to receive education in order to become well educated is encouraged by the whole society. In addition, students with good academic performance would be preferred based on this tradition. In the TFBoys’ marketing strategy, their public image regarding being outstanding students is continuously enhanced by the release of these three members’ examination results, while not making it known that they may benefit from some preferential treatment during

120  N. JIANG Table 5.1 Daily routine of Jackson Yee

8:00–8:30 8:30–9:00 9:00–10:00 10:00–18:00 18:00–19:00 19:30–22:00 23:00–8:00

Get up Have breakfast Do sports Work Have dinner Study Sleep

their examinations as arts students. Moreover, the Time Fengjun keep stressing their huge contribution to, and enthusiasm for, their academic studies, despite them having a busy working schedule as idols during market promotions. For example, Jackson once presented his daily schedule, as detailed in Table 5.1,28 showing that Jackson studies very hard by maintaining a daily routine and staying up late for long-time study.

Confirmation from Mainstream Culture and Ideology Figure 5.1 graphs Chinese mainstream media reporting on the TFBoys during a period of six years, reflecting the focus of mainstream culture. Data is retrieved from Wisers, which is featured as the biggest database of Chinese newspapers. This can be seen as evidence of how the image of the TFBoys is recognised and constructed by mainstream ideology. The reports first peak around July 2014, which is about the same time the TFBoys received a performance invitation to the CCTV ­Mid-Autumn Festival gala. From the first peak until the second peak, which occurred around October 2015, the reports demonstrate that the TFBoys had begun to be noticed by mainstream culture, with the public trying to understand this group and their unexpected popularity.29 The TFBoys were initially recognized as young talents of Generation Z30 who had gained rapid popularity due to their similarities to K-pop.31 Furthermore, these three idols were simply grouped as ‘small fresh meat’, a term that refers to young men with an attractive, cute and young appearance in China. The focus on the TFBoys’ age and appearance in these reports indicates that the TFBoys were not identified as traditional pop stars with significant endowments or a perfect stage performance. Consequently, the mainstream media began to realise the difference between the TFBoys and previous celebrities. By quoting fans’ words, the mainstream culture found that this huge popularity was not

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Fig. 5.1  Number of reports on TFBoys in Chinese mainstream media

due to their outstanding talent or abilities.32 It was during this period that the image of students with excellent academic performance was discovered by the Chinese mainstream media. The third and highest peak was in June 2015, after the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), which is officially defined as a group organisation of advanced youth under the leadership of the Communist Party of China,33 released a video featuring the TFBoys singing We Are the Heirs of Communism, the Young Pioneers song.34 During the following eight months, the TFBoys gradually came to achieve mainstream recognition and support. In August 2015, the TFBoys became image ambassadors for Sunshine Posting, a campaign initiated by the CCYL calling for rational online comments. In November 2015, they were invited to be official ambassadors of the Chongqing Fire Corps. In February 2016, the TFBoys cooperated with the CCYL again by taking part in another campaign to raise young people’s interest in Chinese traditional poems. During the same month the TFBoys attended the opening of the National Chinese Spring Festival Gala, bringing the TFBoys unprecedented focus from mainstream reporters. The carefully built image of the TFBoys provided these reporters with plenty of material to publish. As a result, most reports focused on them prioritising their academic studies and their good behaviour with Chinese characteristics, such as politeness, filial piety, modesty, etc.35 He and Ya even described the TFBoys as ‘excellent in both artistic skills and moral integrity’,36 although they mainly refer to the artistic skills as the TFBoys’ professional dedication. The small peak afterwards demonstrates the increasing popularity of the TFBoys among mainstream reports, and the expansion of

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mainstream understanding. This group was identified as representative fostered idols in China.37 Another peak in the year 2016 shows further approval from mainstream ideology. As well as partaking in regular promotional work for the CCYL, the TFBoys group was selected to be the promotional ambassador for the China Mars exploration project. Moreover, Roy Wang started to work with the UN China Youth group to promote the Imagine 2030 campaign. As one of the delegates representing China, Roy spoke at the 6th United Nations Economic and Social Council youth forum in January 2017. Since then, the TFBoys have been represented as ‘Chinese youth’38 by the mainstream media. The image of the TFBoys was now closely connected with Chinese culture and identity in mainstream reports. They were seen as representative stars of native Chinese popular culture39 by the mainstream media. Until the year 2019 they performed at the National Spring Festival Gala for four consecutive years. In addition, the TFBoys was portrayed as outstanding Chinese youth, both nationally and internationally. Nationally, they continued to expand their cooperation with different government departments. Apart from their being Chinese pop stars, the public image of the TFBoys was endowed with more political and symbolic meaning by the mainstream media. For example, in the 2018 National Spring Festival Gala, the TFBoys performed a specially designed programme called ‘I Have a Date with 2035’, consistent with the report of Xi Jinping, President of China and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Xi’s report presented the latest Chinese development strategy, which aimed to basically realise socialist modernisation by 2035. In the reports on the 2018 Gala, these three idols of the TFBoys were seen as representing the country’s backbone during that time. They not only reflected ‘the young generation with ideals, competence and responsibilities’, but also showed China’s ‘cultural confidence’.40 The concept cultural confidence was proposed at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and promoted afterwards. Internationally, all three idols addressed the UN and endorsed different UN campaigns. Commercially, the TFBoys were seen as a vital part to of promoting Chinese cultural products and bringing ‘China’s dreams of soft power to life’.41 Correspondingly, the image of TFBoys in the mainstream media is gradually escalating to Chinese ‘youth model’42 with ‘outstanding professional competence’.43 As representative pop culture idols with a Chinese identity, the TFBoys is also undertaking the role of demonstrating cultural confidence and China’s soft power.

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The Influence on Fans: From Passive Response to Active Construction In order to gain a broader picture, this study explores micro-blogs on Sina Weibo to fully understand fans’ opinions. Sina Weibo is a Chinese micro-blogging platform widely believed to be one of the biggest and most representative open social media platforms in China, which makes it the proper tool for accessing and understanding public attitudes. Figure 5.2 presents the change in the number of micro-blogs linking the TFBoys to China, from the foundation of the group until June 2017. When compared with Fig. 5.1, the public discussion connecting the TFBoys and China after June 2014 shows a similar but a little bit lagging fluctuation to that of mainstream media reports. If the fans’ cognition regarding the TFBoys was influenced by the TFBoys’ marketing strategy and mainstream reports before June 2017, Fig. 5.3 indicates that from 2017 to 2018 the public’s link with both the TFBoys and China kept increasing sharply, despite the decline in mainstream reports. After June 2018, the number of micro blogicro-blogs with the theme of the TFBoys and China exceeded 100,000 in most months. The content analysis of these micro-blogs further proves the increasing Chinese awareness among fans of the TFBoys. Prior to June 2014, the TFBoys were recognised only as a Chinese-version idol group. Similarly, initially there was no huge difference between the contribution ϰϬϬϬ ϯϱϬϬ ϯϬϬϬ ϮϱϬϬ ϮϬϬϬ ϭϱϬϬ ϭϬϬϬ ϱϬϬ Ϭϴϭϯ ϭϬϭϯ ϭϮϭϯ ϬϮϭϰ Ϭϰϭϰ Ϭϲϭϰ Ϭϴϭϰ ϭϬϭϰ ϭϮϭϰ ϬϮϭϱ Ϭϰϭϱ Ϭϲϭϱ Ϭϴϭϱ ϭϬϭϱ ϭϮϭϱ ϬϮϭϲ Ϭϰϭϲ Ϭϲϭϲ Ϭϴϭϲ ϭϬϭϲ ϭϮϭϲ ϬϮϭϳ Ϭϰϭϳ Ϭϲϭϳ

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Fig. 5.2  Number of micro-blogs with the theme of TFBoys and China, August 2013 to June 2017

124  N. JIANG ϵϬϬϬϬ ϴϬϬϬϬ ϳϬϬϬϬ ϲϬϬϬϬ ϱϬϬϬϬ ϰϬϬϬϬ ϯϬϬϬϬ ϮϬϬϬϬ ϭϬϬϬϬ Ϭ Ϭϴϭϳ

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Fig. 5.3  Number of micro-blogs with the theme of TFBoys and China, August 2017 to June 2018

of TFBoys’ fans to promote this idol group and other South Korean or Japanese fostered idol groups, which entail all-round support to help their idols’ development. For example, they spontaneously monitored public opinions of the TFBoys and maintained their reputation by flooding online forums with positive, unified comments, following the marketing strategy and the influence of mainstream reports. As a result, the TFBoys and the three members became closely linked to Chinese representative youth with traditional Chinese virtues among their fans. Gradually, the support from TFBoys fans is featured with a combination of Chinese cultural values guided by themselves. For example, many teenage fans valued the boys’ insistence on education, so that they started to present good examination results online. In addition, TFBoys’ fans were keen to donate to and support charity work, which is consistent with the TFBoys’ frequent attendance at charity fundraising events. The focus of these events has normally been the elderly and children, presenting the Chinese traditional virtues of revering elders and caring for the young. The content analysis shows that eventually the TFBoys came to be perceived as symbols of Chinese pop culture and identity, which serves as a bridge to remind fans and the public of traditional Chinese heritage

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and modern mainstream Chinese culture. Among their fans, TFBoys are described as ‘Gen Zheng Miao Hong’44 (lit. root is straight and the seedling is red, politically correct) and ‘You Hong You Zhuan’45 (lit. red and professional, people with the proletariat world outlook and professional skills). This is highly consistent with the public image of the TFBoys generated by their marketing strategy and the mainstream ideology. Correspondingly, the fans’ focus on the TFBoys and their programmes that promote Chinese culture and ideology provides them with more opportunities to strengthen their Chinese consciousness and finally reinforce their Chinese national identity, as seen in the first micro-blog posts excerpted below. Fans of the TFBoys started to present a very strong Chinese national awareness, rather than only focusing on the cultural perspective. This can be seen in the second micro-blog post below, in which a fan records two birthday wishes. Compared with her 14th birthday wish, which was to meet the TFBoys, her 15th birthday wish was connected with the Chinese nation and her contribution to China: We are sons and daughters of the mother country. We are proud of the great Chinese nation. We are proud to be the dragon’s offspring. We will fight for the youth of the mother country. Happy birthday to the mother country with @TFBOYSgroup! ❤Wish the mother country richer, stronger and more prosperous. Wish the mother country more brilliant step by step.❤46 This year is 15 years old. When 14, the dream was to meet the TFBoys. And let Roy tell Kerry that I like Jackson! Ha, no. I have to be more ambitious. My dream is to realise the Chinese national rejuvenation and to build China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful [fist] [fist] [fist].47

Practically, the supporting events organised by these fans reflected their increasing Chinese awareness. For example, Table 5.2 partly shows how fans supported the sixth anniversary concert of the TFBoys. Apart from donations, fans started to organise several events with Chinese national awareness, such as visiting Chinese veterans and visiting the Shanghai Expo exhibition.

126  N. JIANG Table 5.2  Support during the TFBoys’ sixth anniversary concert Number

Location

Item

1 2 3 4

Longxian, China Tianjing, China Hunan, China International

5

Shenzhen, China

6 7 8

Kenya Media Online

9

China

10

Shanghai, China

11

Beijing, China

12 13 14

Concert stadium Online and offline Chongqing, China

15

Anhui, China

Donation to a primary school library Donation to child patients in hospital Donation to free lunches for children Donation to protect a bottlenose dolphin, a fennec and an emerald hummingbird Visiting Chinese veterans of two world wars Hiring a LED screen in a subway station to play TFBoys advertisements Donation to the Davie Sheldrick Wildlife Trust Gift package to the mass media Videos with TFBoys themes Opening advertisements in mobile apps Special online pages on the theme of the sixth anniversary, with cooperation of famous media organisations Charity events, including visiting Chinese veterans of two world wars, spending time with parents of war victims, taking care of lonely senior citizens Visiting Shanghai Expo Hiring city-centre LED screen to play TFBoys advertisements Distributing 86,000 TFBoys-themed boarding passes Hiring city-centre LED screen to play TFBoys advertisements Special LED lamp brand with the theme of TFBoys Prize draw among loyal fans Hiring city-centre LED screen to play TFBoys advertisements Donation to primary schools

Discussion Based on a case study of one Chinese fostered idol group, the TFBoys, four dimensions regarding the Chineseness of the TFBoys are explored: the founding of the TFBoys; the marketing strategies; the mainstream reports; and the reactions of their fans and the public. To sum up, the findings of this chapter are shown in Fig. 5.4. First, in contrast with other fostered idol groups, the founders of the TFBoys did not attempt a full copy of the Japanese or South Korean model, instead developing a new approach: to establish and manage the

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Fig. 5.4  Findings of this study

TFBoys as a Chinese pop fostered idol group based on Chinese consumers’ preferences and habits. Correspondingly, these three boys’ public image was established as that of excellent but fashionable Chinese youth who inherited the Chinese traditional legacy, such as patriotism, filial piety, unity, etc. The management company, Time Fengjun, secured effective marketing strategies to promote this public image. Second, the TFBoys were noticed and recognised by mainstream culture as being different from the traditional ideological incorporation form of subculture.48 The TFBoys were not seen as threats or as responsible for deviant behaviour by the dominant group. The mainstream ideology relabelled them by strengthening one aspect of the group, one that already existed and had been shaped by their marketing strategy, then redefined the TFBoys as representative stars of native Chinese popular culture and promoters of Chinese culture and identity. Third, compared with other subculture fans, those of the TFBoys seldom displayed any conflict or resistance when the TFBoys were incorporated into the mainstream culture, both actively (through marketing strategy) and passively (through mainstream reporting). In contrast, they were very happy and proud to witness all of this, and tried to contribute more. This may be embedded in the characteristics of fostered idols and their relationship with their fans. As discussed in a number of studies,49 fans of fostered idols are defined as supporters and companions rather than fans, with their contribution a vital part of their idols’ success. Therefore, in contrast with traditional supporting behaviour seen from previous fandom, such as sending gifts or purchasing related products, the fans of fostered idols generate all-round support to help their idols’ development, and contribute more emotional involvement during this process. As a result, they are more easily convinced to accept the incorporation of mainstream ideology, as this can help increase the reputation and popularity of the group, particularly in China. Finally, this

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continuous contribution speeds up fan contact with Chinese awareness, reinforces individual self-categorisation in terms of Chinese culture, and strengthens fans’ Chinese identity. Considering the great number of TFBoys fans and their age distribution, with over 44% born after 1995 and over 33% born after 2000,50 this reinforcement of Chinese culture and Chinese national identity becomes more significant, especially when in 2017 it was found that Chinese teenagers’ ‘strength of national identification decreased with age’.51 This disregard of the unique culture and identity of a nation is common in the era of globalisation and consequently may endanger that nation’s future creativity and production. It has been suggested that social contexts play an important role in the development of children’s national consciousness,52 including education, home location, mass media, etc. The practice of the TFBoys further shows the huge influence of pop culture on strengthening youth national identity, and its special path in China. In a broader picture, it presents a new example of interpreting and recreating an imported sub-cultural concept in a new environment, in order to augment the dynamism of the national identity.

Conclusion Taking a fostered idol group, namely the TFBoys, as a case study, this study explores how this pop group links with, and carries, traditional Chinese culture and identity, with the group members eventually becoming Chinese representative youth and finally perceived as a symbol of Chinese popular culture, which serves as a bridge to remind their fans and the public of traditional Chinese heritage and modern mainstream Chinese culture. The cultural representations and interpretations of national consciousness within this symbolism have been widely accepted by the public, strengthening fans’ Chinese cultural identity. So far, the TFBoys can be seen as a typical and successful example in China of highlighting Chinese identity and increasing cultural confidence, especially among young people. This study not only explores the influence of pop culture on national identity, but also reflects how Chinese mainstream ideology uses Chinese native popular culture to build up cultural confidence and national consciousness.53 However, for reasons of space and the scarcity of previous literature on this topic, a number of related aspects are not discussed

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here, such as intergroup bias, the founding of social norms within the fan community, and the influence of outsiders on fan groups. Considering that this field is relatively new in both cultural research and Chinese research, this study further convinces the unique value of investigating popular culture in studies regarding national identities. The use of more research approaches is encouraged in further explorations.

Notes







1. Amir Ben Porat, “Football Fandom: A Bounded Identification,” Soccer & Society 11, no. 3 (2010): 278. 2. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998); John Hutchinson, “Nations and Culture,” in Understanding Nationalism, ed. M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 3.  Phan Le Ha, “Issues Surrounding English, the Internationalisation of Higher Education and National Cultural Identity in Asia: A Focus on Japan,” Critical Studies in Education 54, no. 2 (2013): 160–175. 4. Tim Edensor, National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002). 5. Edensor, National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life, 29. 6. Yuya Kiuchi, “Idols You Can Meet: AKB48 and a New Trend in Japan’s Music Industry,” The Journal of Popular Culture 50, no. 1 (2017): 30. 7. Okajima Shinshi and Okada Yasuhiro, Gurupu Aidoru Shinka Ron: ‘Aidoru Sengoku Jidai’ ga Yatte-kita (Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunikeshonzu, 2011), 5. 8. Kiuchi, “Idols You Can Meet: AKB48 and a New Trend in Japan’s Music Industry,” 30. 9. Patrick W. Galbraith and Jason G. Karlin, eds., Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 21. 10. Galbraith and Karlin, Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture, 20. 11.  Tokyohive, “2018 Oricon Yearly ‘Artist Total Sales Ranking Top 5’,” December 21, 2018, retrieved from https://www.tokyohive.com/ article/2018/12/2018-oricon-yearly-artist-total-sales-ranking-top-5 (accessed 2 December 2019). 12. Kiuchi, “Idols You Can Meet: AKB48 and a New Trend in Japan’s Music Industry,” 31.

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13. Alman, “Zhongguo Yule Zhishu” [Chinese Entertainment Index], retrieved from http://m.chinaindex.net/home/1/2/commercialValue/2019-05 (accessed 2 December 2019). 14.  Jiaying Lin, “Cong TFBoys zouhong kan bentu guize yu riben yule yuying tizhi de jiehe” [The Integration of Native Rules of Japanese Entertainment Operation], Journalism & Communication, no. 9 (2015): 92–93. 15. Guoqing Zheng, “TFBoys: Xin meiti, fensi wenhua yu chuangyi chanye zai dingyi” [TFBoys: New Media, Fandom and Redefinition of Creative Industry], Fujian Tribune (The Humanities & Social Sciences Monthly), no. 2 (2017). 16. Tao Gong, “Hulianwang Shidai de ‘xinshengdai ouxiang’ chuanbo moshi – cong ‘xiaohudui’ dao TFBoys” [The Communication Model in the Internet Era—From ‘the Little Tigers’ to TFBoys], Academic Journal of Jingchu, no. 19 (2018). 17. Nan Gu, “Duozhuti ouxiang fensi de qunti rentong janli – Yi TFBoys fensi weili de zhixing yanjiu” [The Establishment of Group Identification of the Fans of Multi-Agent Idols: A Qualitative Research on TFBoys Fans], Master’s thesis, China Youth University of Political Studies, 2017: II. 18. Jin Liu, “Xinmeiti shidaixia miqun de shenfen renting he jiangou” [The Construction of Identity of Fandom in New Media Times—A Case Study of Online Fandom], Master’s thesis, Central China Normal University, 2017. 19. Yutian Sun, “‘Yangcheng’xi ouxiang de fensi wenhua yanjiu [Fan Culture Research of the Fan-Based Idol, in the Case of TFBoys Fans], Master’s thesis, Jinan University, 2016. 20.  Shuang Liu, “‘Yangcheng’xi ouxiang miqun de rentong jiangou yanjiu” [Research on the Identity Construction of the ‘Fostered Idol’ Fans—Taking the TFBoys Fan Group as an Example], Master’s thesis, Zhengzhou University, 2019. 21. Jianqiao Yu, “Suzao yu xunhua: zhuliu yishi xingtai qianghua TFBoys fensi rentong de celve yanjiu” [Constructing and Domesticating: Study on the Strategies of Strengthening Mainstream Ideology of TFBoys Fans], Master’s thesis, Jinan University, 2017. 22. Aoyagi Hiroshi, “Pop Idols and the Asian Identity,” Japan Pop! Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture (2000): 309–326, 312. 23. Hiroshi, “Pop Idols and the Asian Identity.” 24. Hiroshi, “Pop Idols and the Asian Identity,” 361. 25. Chuansheng Chen and David H. Uttal, “Cultural Values, Parents’ Beliefs, and Children’s Achievement in the United States and China,” Human Development 31, no. 6 (1988): 351–358, 352.



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26. James Legge, The Four Books: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), 235 27. Legge, The Four Books, 236. 28. Han Wang et al., Day Day Up. China HunanTV Official Channel, 2017. 29. “Kuanian wanhui zhibo shangyan ‘sanguosha’, ping nanshen ping xianrou ping huaijiu” [‘Legends of the Three Kingdoms’ Can Be Seen During New Year’s Eve Party Live, There Are Competitions on Prince Charming, Small Fresh Meat, and Reminiscence], Yangtze Evening Post, January 1, 2015, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:036g%5E201501015317521(S:343896936)?from=search&index=63&style=all&total=125 (accessed 2 December 2019); “Mengxiang xing dadang>II liyao ‘xiaoxianrou’ ‘de nianqing zhe de tianxia’ zhengzai chengwei dianshijie gongshi” [II Invites ‘Small Fresh Meat’ ‘to Win by Gaining Youngsters’ Became the Common Ideas Among TV Industry], Beijing Morning Post, January 28, 2015, Retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:15 dh%5E201501285306288(S:343896936)?from=search&index=8&style=all&total=125 (accessed 2 December 2019). 30. Nannan Zhao and Qinghong Zu, “Wang shiling canyan   zhenrenxiu daihuo mengwa 00hou shezu yulequan zhuanzu renqi qiangdipan” [Wang Shiling Participation in From Vegas to Macau 2 Reality Show Makes Cute Kids Popular, Post-00s Gain Popularity in Entertainment Industry], Beijing Times, July 14, 2017, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:248c%5E20 1407145309441(S:343896722)?from=search&index=13&style=all&total=53 (accessed 2 December 2019). 31. “‘00hou’ chengwei zongyi xin shili ‘xiaoxianrou’ dangdao” [‘Post-00s’ Become New Force in TV Variety Shows, ‘Small Fresh Meat’ Hold Sway], Qilu Evening News (Digital Edition), July 21, 2014, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:05 99%5E201407215394103(S:343896722)?from=search&index=4&style=all&total=53 (accessed 2 December 2019). 32. “Zhiyao zouxin bupa zouyin” [Only Take Heart, Not Afraid of Off Key], Guangzhou Daily, January 24, 2015, retrieved from https://search. wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:133i%5E20150124531 7155(S:343896936)?from=search&index=23&style=all&total=125 (accessed 2 December 2019). 33. The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) is defined as a group organisation of advanced youth under the leadership of the Communist

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Party of China. It also leads the work of the Young Pioneers of China and guides the work of the All-China Students’ Federation. 34. The Young Pioneers of China is defined as a group organisation of teenagers and children under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the school in which socialism with Chinese characteristics and communism are taught, and the reserves to establish socialism and communism. 35. Lei Liu, “Naxie guangxian beihou de shenghuo you ni xiangxiang budao de beicui” [Behind the Glamorous Life, There Are Sad Reminders That You Cannot Imagine], Modern Express, January 7, 2016, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:23jk% 5E201601073091055(S:343966551)?from=search&index=165&style=all&total=706 (accessed 2 December 2019); Yue Feng and Shan Xu, “TFBoys zuotian luzhi  tamen hongdao jihu meige xiaohaizi shoushang douyou shoucang zhaopian” [TFBoys Recorded ‘Kangxi Lai le’ Yesterday, They Are so Popular That Nearly Every Young Kid Collects Their Photos], City Express, July 23, 2015, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:04ff%5E20 1507233171589(S:343964596)?from=search&index=4&style=all&total=5 (accessed 2 December 2019). 36. Yajia He and Xueyuan Ya, “TFBoys caishi deyi shuangxin” [TFBoys Are Excellent in Artistic Skills and Moral Integrity], News Express, December 1, 2015, retrieved from https://search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:0651%5E201512013123124(S:343957862)?from=search&index=172&style=all&total=606 (accessed 2 December 2019). 37.  Yi Qiu, “Fensi jingji cuisheng ‘ouxiang yangcheng’ qishi shi yizhong fangchangxian diaodayu” [Fans’ Business-Generated ‘Fostered Idol’ Is Actually Throwing a Long Line to Catch a Big Fish], Qilu Evening News (Digital Edition), June 19, 2016, retrieved from https://search. wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:14ka%5E2016061943 07283(S:343968278)?from=search&index=48&style=all&total=56 (accessed 2 December 2019); “SNH48 li yangchengxi ouxiang haiyou henchang lu yaozou” [SNH48 Is Very Far Away from Fostered Idols], Xin Jingbao, August 1, 2016, retrieved from https://search. wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:23el%5E20160801311 8106(S:343968264)?from=search&index=49&style=all&total=156 (accessed 2 December 2019). 38.  “Jujiao jiaoyu xin Liliang” [Focusing on New Power of Education], Shanghai Morning Post, February 27, 2017, retrieved from https:// search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:02f8%5E20170227 3073836(S:343964781)?from=search&index=1&style=all&total=262 (accessed 2 December 2019).

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39. Dan Ye, “Meitian tingge liang xiaoshi, re’ai bentu wenhua ye ai guochao” [Listening to Songs for 2 Hours Every Day, Love Native Culture as Well as Chinese Pop], Nanfang Daily, May 17, 2019, retrieved from https:// search.wisersone.com/wevo/documentDetail/news:1641%5E20190517 0443013(S:343994581)?from=search&index=15&style=all&total=75 (accessed 2 December 2019). 40. Xue Fan, “Chunwan wutai zouxiang qiangguo yidai” [The Generation of a Great Country Shown in Spring Festival Gala], Chinese Youth Daily, February 26, 2018, retrieved from https://zqb.cyol.com/html/201802/26/nw.D110000zgqnb_20180226_3-11.htm (accessed 2 December 2019). 41. “TFBoys: The Boyband Bringing China’s Dreams of Soft Power to Life,” Nanhua China Morning Post, retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/ week-asia/society/article/2079161/tfboys-boyband-bringing-chinas-dreams-soft-power-life?utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=SCMPSocialNewsfeed (accessed 2 December 2019). 42.  Wei Qiu, “Hunan weishi kuanian yanchanghui zhengrong gongbu” [Hunan TV Releases Cast of the New Year’s Eve Concert], Beijing Evening, December 17, 2019, retrieved from https://bjwd.bjd.com. cn/html/2019-12/17/content_12436119.htm (accessed 2 December 2019). 43. “90 hou weihe huozan tamen taiqianmuhou yong shili shuohua” [Why Post-90s Generation Were Praised for Their Competence in Front of and Behind the Scenes], Guangzhou Daily, April 21, 2018, retrieved from https://gzdaily.dayoo.com/pc/html/2018-04/21/content_16_1. htm?v=23 (accessed 2 December 2019). 44.  根正苗红. 45. 又红又专. 46.  “Qianshengya809”, micro blog, October 1, 2019, retrieved from https://m.weibo.cn/detail/4422681887701047 (accessed 2 December 2019). 47.  LYongbaoyixiatiandefengR, micro blog, May 4, 2019, retrieved from https://weibo.com/u/3547163605?is_all= (accessed 2 December 2019). 48. Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 49. Galbraith and Karlin, eds., Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture; Sun, “‘Yangcheng’xi ouxiag de fensi wenhua yanjiu”; Liu, “‘Yangcheng’xi ouxiang miqun de rentong jiangou yanjiu.” 50. Shuang Liu, “Yangcheng’xi ouxiang miqun de rentong jiangou yanjiu.” 51. Xian Dai and Rongxuan Chu, “National Identification and Intergroup Attitudes of Chinese Youth Towards Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans,” National Identities 29, no. 1 (2019): 21–38, 14.



134  N. JIANG 52. Martyn Barrett, Children’s Knowledge, Beliefs and Feelings About Nations and National Groups (Hove: Psychology Press, 2007). 53. Xi Jinping, “Jianding wenhua zixin, jianshe shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo” [Strengthening Cultural Confidence and Developing a Great Socialist Culture in China], Qiushi 12 (2019).

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983. Barrett, Martyn. Children’s Knowledge, Beliefs and Feelings About Nations and National Groups. Hove: Psychology Press, 2007. Chen, Chuansheng, and David H. Uttal. “Cultural Values, Parents’ Beliefs, and Children’s Achievement in the United States and China.” Human Development 31, no. 6 (1988): 351–358. Dai, Xian, and Rongxuan Chu. “National Identification and Intergroup Attitudes of Chinese Youth Towards Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans.” National Identities 29, no. 1 (2019): 21–38. Edensor, Tim. National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002. Galbraith, Patrick W., and Jason G. Karlin, eds. Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture. Berlin: Springer, 2012. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Gong, Tao. “Hulianwang Shidai de ‘xinshengdai ouxiang’ chuanbo moshi – cong ‘xiaohudui’ dao TFBoys” [The Communication Model in the Internet Era—From ‘the Little Tigers’ to TFBoys]. Academic Journal of Jingchu, no. 19 (2018). Gu, Nan. “Duozhuti ouxiang fensi de qunti rentong janli – Yi TFBoys fensi weili de zhixing yanjiu” [The Establishment of Group Identification of the Fans of Multi-Agent Idols: A Qualitative Research on TFBoys Fans]. Master’s thesis, China Youth University of Political Studies, 2017. Hebdige, Dick. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. Hiroshi, Aoyagi. “Pop Idols and the Asian Identity.” Japan Pop! Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture (2000): 309–326. Hutchinson, John. “Nations and Culture.” In Understanding Nationalism, edited by M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, 74–96. Cambridge: Polity, 2001. Kiuchi, Yuya. “Idols You Can Meet: AKB48 and a New Trend in Japan’s Music Industry.” The Journal of Popular Culture 50, no. 1 (2017): 30–49. Legge, James. The Four Books: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966.

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Lin, Jiaying. “Cong TFBoys zouhong kan bentu guize yu riben yule yuying tizhi de jiehe” [The Integration of Native Rules of Japanese Entertainment Operation]. Journalism & Communication, no. 9 (2015): 92–93. Liu, Jin. “Xinmeiti shidaixia miqun de shenfen renting he jiangou” [The Construction of Identity of Fandom in New Media Times—A Case Study of the Online Fandom]. Master’s thesis, Central China Normal University, 2017. Liu, Shuang. “‘Yangcheng’ xi ouxiang miqun de rentong jiangou yanjiu” [Research on the Identity Construction of the ‘Fostered Idol’ Fans— Taking the TFBoys Fans Group as an Example]. Master’s thesis, Zhengzhou University, 2019. Porat, Amir Ben. “Football Fandom: A Bounded Identification.” Soccer & Society 11, no. 3 (2010): 277–290. Shinshi, Okajima, and Okada Yasuhiro. Gurupu Aidoru Shinka Ron: ‘Aidoru Sengoku Jidai’ ga Yatte-kita. Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunikeshonzu, 2011. Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991. Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism and Modernism. London: Routledge, 1998. Sun, Yutian. “Yangcheng’xi ouxiang de fensi wenhua yanjiu” [Fan Culture Research of the Fan-Based Idol, in the Case of TFBoys Fans]. Master’s thesis, Jinan University, 2016. Wang, Han, et al. Day Day Up. China HunanTV Official Channel, 2017. Xi, Jinping. “Jianding wenhua zixin, jianshe shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo” [Strengthening Cultural Confidence and Developing a Great Socialist Culture in China]. Qiushi, no. 12 (2019). Yu, Jianqiao. “Suzao yu xunhua: zhuliu yishi xingtai qianghua TFBoys fensi rentong de celve yanjiu” [Constructing and Domesticating: Study on the Strategies of Strengthening Mainstream Ideology of TFBoys Fans]. Master’s thesis, Jinan University, 2017. Zheng, Guoqing. “TFBoys: Xin meiti, fensi wenhua yu chuangyi chanye zai dingyi” [TFBoys: New Media, Fandom and Redefinition of Creative Industry]. Fujian Tribune (The Humanities & Social Sciences Monthly), no. 2 (2017).

CHAPTER 6

Chinese National Identity and National Image in the Age of Globalisation Peter Herrmann

Introduction In a way it seems to be an ever-present topic and issue: China and the Chinese, occasionally presented as the dominant if not sole part of Asia. In some respects, there are two entrances to this playing field. We may start from globalisation—another topical issue, concerned with migration, competition, labour and the labour market, investment in and development of economic structures, and the like. By looking at China from one or other of these perspectives, questions may be raised concerning the assessment of the country. As correct as it is to use ­well-known terms such as threshold-country, developing market economy, empire of the middle, they all fail to provide a clear picture that reflects the double structure of catching-up with traditional patterns of development and setting up/germinating something that is structurally new. All of these concepts are heavily biased; and, while explicit reference is made to development, and thus to past, present and future, the structural habitus is non- or even anti-relational. P. Herrmann (*)  Human Rights Center, Law School at the Central South University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_6

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Instead of taking globalisation as point of departure, we may also commence our journey of reflection with China; for instance, the fascination of a language that is for Westerners often incomprehensible— incomprehensible because it is a written language without letters as we know them—is similar to the fascination with the lightening business start-up performed by Huawei as a global player in the market for electronics. All this suggests that the framework for developing a ‘Chinese identity’ and also an ‘identity as Chinese’ has changed in a ­far-reaching way. We may ask if the Huawei1-formula is the Eastern version of Obama’s ‘Yes, we can!’? The answer, first and foremost, presupposes a divide between the We and the Them. And talking about the identity of the other always implies that you know who you are yourself2— it implies, at least, the notion of self-understanding. However, there is another perspective, by and large overlooked. Economics and jurisprudence, as well as political science and socio-cultural studies, are stuck in a methodological trap. While aiming at grasping and explaining social facts and society, reference is made to individuals. This has to be understood literally, but also by way of considering nation states as actors—not to say as the sole point of relevance. So we find, as a second trap, methodological nationalism. This can immediately be seen on the level of the two main disciplines of social science and political practice: we are speaking of national economies and constitutions as the legal foundation for the action of independent agencies. Even if considered with the pompous concept of TRUDI (i.e. ‘Territorial State, the state that secures the Rule of Law, the Democratic State, and the Intervention State, …’),3 reference is made to the Weberian understanding of the state as ultimate bearer of sovereignty, monopolising the legitimate use of physical violence. While it is frequently bemoaned that states have lost control, there is little readiness to allow for an affirmative perspective on such development. In other words, while we are habitually referring to globalisation, such development remains caught in traditions; we seem to face the paradox that increasing international and global interconnection goes hand in hand with an emphasis on the nation state not as centre of power but as point of orientation of identity and interest. This is complemented by a mounting reference to ‘meaningful’ entities, pronouncedly offering themselves and being accepted as such—meaningfulness is expressed in the number of membership cards one has, a life can be redrawn in plastic, and part of it is withdrawn by their loss.

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While there are various other methodological guidance and principles, a third seems to be of special relevance: the establishment of binarisation as faith system—actually this itself is a principle which we may call religiosity, a kind of sanctification of individual, nation and state as Statism. The acceptance of the invariability is then the fourth methodological principle—clearly to be seen if we consider that even change is only alteration. Moreover, revolutionary change is always a confirmation of the status quo; disruption is predominantly thought of as an impossibility, a questioning of the old order, leading to and into nothing, lacking a clearly positive outlook, but also not derived as a clearly defined negation of the existing order. The reason for highlighting these four pillars of contemporary Western social science is fourfold: 1. Reading in law and constitutionalism as a way of establishing the We and the Them, one definition gives a valuable approach to the relationship of inclusion and exclusion: Citizenship is a form of ‘legalized discrimination,’ in the sense that polities make categorical distinctions in their laws on the basis of defined membership criteria with regard to allocation of benefits and rights. These distinctions are justified because citizenship is viewed as a constitutive element of political community.4

On the other hand, looking for instance at Rawls’ understanding, there is a clear difference between the morals of state and communities, the latter requiring full identification as matter of compliance with the inner-constitutive aspects, whereas the state accepts and even depends on different morals of the members, referring to pluralism as a condition sine qua non.5 2. Recent experience shows that borders are increasingly closed even where they had been seemingly sidelined by the establishment of a larger European entity aimed at going beyond nation states—for instance, the violent regional riots in Spain/Catalonia, BREXIT and also the considerations of a GREXIT as possible solutions have to be mentioned as variations on a theme.

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3. A recent photomontage in ‘The Economist’, dealing with the trade war between the US and China, showing a strong echo of the crusades in seemingly religious buildings standing against sober modern utility buildings. 4.  ‘Populism’ paradoxically being a matter of personalisation of politics, the focus on somewhat charismatic leaders while claiming to be a matter of the people, has to be mentioned in the same vein. It is true that the issue of identity—and with this the topic of drawing borders—is to some extent an issue of defence; a more important factor, however, is the increasingly far-reaching process of socialisation. We may go so far as saying that globalisation is a process capturing the contradictory character of socialisation by providing at the very same time a channel of inclusion and a channel of exclusion. The first occurs by enhancing the availability of resources and sources of support, the second by taking the form of externalisation and an increasing social divide. The concrete relation between inclusion and exclusion, in this present thesis, presents the foundation on which identity is based. It emerges from a threefold reference to historical time, which is captured by the confrontation with ‘general challenges’ that humankind faces as a first grand narrative: the productive forces as they are developed at the very moment in conjunction with the solidification of the various anecdotes and their conglomeration in a second grand narrative; and together these are establishing themselves as a national mindset (tradition). Looking at national identity, China is in three respects facing a somewhat exceptional challenge. The country is characterised by its strength—we may speak of identity based on elevation and self-esteem. As such the question of responsibility and/versus misusing a position of supremacy is prevalent. This turns increasingly into an ­outward-directed orientation which is itself, however, the result of a fundamental, far-reaching change of the general metabolism, that is, the relationship between humankind and nature where humans are themselves always a part of nature. The productive forces that are developing with digitisation and artificial intelligence towards fundamental changes in respect of the organisation and mode of production are conjoined by changes in the production/consumption nexus.

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Opening the World We may start discussing the new dimensions with a very short excursion into physics, and with this opening up our understanding of realities: Modern physics now comes to the surprising conclusion: matter is not made up of matter! If we take matter further and further apart, hoping to find the smallest, shapeless, pure matter, there will be nothing left in the end that reminds us of matter. In the end there is no more matter, only form, shape, symmetry, relationship. This realisation was and still is very confusing. If matter is not composed of matter, this means the primacy of matter and form turns around: The primary is relation, the matter the secondary. According to the new physics, matter is a phenomenon that appears only after a certain coarsening. Matter/substance is a coagulated form. Perhaps we could also say: at the end of all the fragmentation of matter, something remains that resembles more the spiritual – holistic, open and vivid; Potentiality, the possibility of realisation. Matter is the slag of this spiritual – decomposable, delimitable, determined; Reality.6

Applying such understanding of physical nature to social realities is as necessary as it is difficult. While history could never really be understood in a linear way, there was, at least, an understanding of the contradictions that allowed a clear reflection on further development, for which we needed the elements. While an understanding of some elements of society can be presupposed as well today, the clarity is vanishing, not least because with socialisation the scope and range of combinations is widening and at the same time becoming increasingly relevant. A quick view of the concept of the nation state shows immediately its relevance as we are becoming aware of the meaning of the various ‘smallest entities’, defined by very specific customs and rules; the fact that the nation state is a unity but one that is composite in its character, a kind of patchwork7; and, furthermore, that the unity can only be understood in a meaningful way when considered as part and parcel of a larger entity (as regional cooperations, e.g. ASEAN, or those rooted in common interest, e.g. BRICS), itself embedded in various dimensions of globality and universality. More difficult to understand when it comes to economic processes is this process of overcoming borders, blurring borders, and also tightening existing borders and drawing new borders. Various concepts that had been taken for granted cannot be so taken anymore. This actually begins with Marx’s opening of his magnum opus; the first sentence of the first volume of Capital reads as follows:

142  P. HERRMANN The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ‘an immense accumulation of commodities’, its unit being a single commodity.8

While still being a capitalist world system—consisting of capitalist societies and the prevalence of commodities as a given standard of wealth—we already have to be more specific here, stating that while we are dealing with a capitalist world system, we need to underline the fact of multiple centres. Despite such variety, this world system consists of societies that occur as varieties of capitalisms, including pre-capitalist forms of production and distribution wrapped in a capitalist costume, where wealth is given in the form of commodities but also given and vehemently claimed in different forms—frequently taking immediate social forms, for instance, a clean environment as part of the value that has to be included in determining wealth. Of special meaning here is the increasingly relevant consideration of ‘free time’ as an essential element for defining individual and societal wealth. An analytical problem in economics is that we have to maintain that [t]he circulation of capital realises value, as living labour produces value.9

However, we have to deal at the same time with the fact that both, product and process of production are increasingly frazzled. Instead of moving from here towards marginalist approaches, we have to make the step towards understanding the process of production as truly socialised. With this, consumption, distribution and exchange are emerging as genuine parts of the overall process of production. The issue of economics cannot be explored further. The point that is of particular interest in the present context is that the meaning of social production and, more generally, the human being as social being is more and more explicitly and consciously becoming immediately integrated into the process of production of commodities—side by side with the standardised mass-production other areas emerge where the concrete product and ­ process of production is intrinsically linked to the personality of the producer and vice versa, the producer ‘owns’ the product. This issue, that is seemingly disjoined at least from ‘big identity’,10 finds its expression, however, in a shift that is often very visible and which we encounter when reading the label of many products; it is the shift from ‘made in …’ to ‘made by …’.11 This is a corporate strategy, but equally it is a strategy by which individuals gain identity—writing

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‘gain identity’ reflects the fact of such a point of reference being actively searched for by and systemically attributed to individuals. It will be obvious that this follows the pattern that was presented at the beginning of this section: ‘[p]otentiality, the possibility of realisation. Matter is the slag of this spiritual – decomposable, delimitable, determined: Reality’.

The Cat Has to Decide…—Identity as Ordering Principle Taking openness in the said understanding as a point of departure, the first step allowing the development of an understanding of order in the realm of contingency is to make reference to relationality12 and processuality.13 This suggests understanding identity as a multiple constitutional movement where the anticipated result actually influences the current action. Traditionally the nation state—and thus national identity—played a major role. The function—summarised in very simple terms—being: • The demarcation of an area—space and/or subject field for economic (re)production. • The defining of the external borders. • The quality of the relationship between the We and the Other. • Finally, the determining of the positioning of the individual within the entire context, whereby positioning is also about a permanent process of relating. Identity and identity building today have to consider two aspects, however, they are not entirely new. With the increasing complexity of societies, and with the more prevalent global interconnectedness, embedding the relevance seems to have gained momentum. Even if it helps in developing an understanding of social processes and structures, it is highly problematic to speak of one national identity. Even if we take the nation as a point of reference—and there are many good reasons for doing so—the meaning is different for different groups of people, depending on their belonging to a specific social stratum, a ‘functional group’ (e.g. artists, car-makers, students) or any other reference group, which may be real or exist entirely as social constructs. While we should consider nation and class in their interlinkage as dominant, another element in question is the fact that identities are multifaceted facts, depending

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on the various roles the people have in life. Another reference to quantum theory may be helpful: there we are confronted with the problem that the correctness of any calculation depends on the stability of circumstances—changes of air-pressure, temperature, etc.—and, therefore, any change in the real world alters the result by integrating it into the ­real-world-context. This hypothetical openness is obviously sacrificed to the determination of the reality, depending on the various push and pull effects of daily life. The same can be said for identities; while they may be stabilised in specific contexts or under certain conditions, they are fugitive states in the end. One of the difficulties—of theory building and of real life—is the double character of the constitutive process; while identity is a social construct, emerging from the concrete conditions of a time, the constitution has an active side as well, which we must accept, reshape, concretise or reject as a given condition.

Riding the Tiger—A Rough Taxonomy Leaving all qualifications aside, we can take from general debates about Chinese identity some suggestions as characteristic: 1. A pronounced consciousness about the meaning of the ‘we’, while referring to the family understanding this as a matter of familiarity, thus going far beyond kinship. 2. Ethical and spiritual dimensions of harmony. 3. Extending this fundamental orientation on the environment and proposing a related subordination at least as ideal. 4. Which can then be interpreted as ‘reasoning’ behind a ­generally valid ‘principle of subordination’, still maintaining the r­ole-/ function-relationship of ‘love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends’.14 An interesting facet of some forms of field research is the importance of a seemingly small difference. Following the basic principle that you never know before you go, an important point has to be raised when going: What characterises the actual experience of facing the Other correctly? Are we dealing with the fact that ‘they really behave as we expected’?15 Or is it more correct to say: ‘Our tacit knowledge (Mihály Polányi)—prejudices and theories—had been well capturing the reality or part thereof.’

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This reflects the two different views on the meaning of identity; the one is about self-assurance, the other a matter of clarification of the relationship. In both cases, the core is a reified and perpetuated understanding of whom and what the relationship is about. While both perspectives are a matter of politics and while both are closely interrelated, we can say that the one issues integration directed to internal issues (consolidation), while the other is, at least factually, about disintegration. One may in some cases compare this with Bourdieu’s analysis of ‘distinctions’— objectively perhaps small, however subjectively and societally decisively meaningful.

Measuring the Cage I: Identity Made up from Difference Approaching this question requires bringing a reasonably deep analysis of two dimensions together—‘slow reading’ of the following is required to understand the subtlety of the matter: • The real-life perspective of people in terms of perceived appropriateness of appropriation. Are people in general content with, (i) the social quality that is characterising their living circumstances, and in particular, (ii) the relation between productive work16 on the one hand and available free time on the other—be it as individual leisure time, social, cultural and political activity and the like. • The global integrity—as matter of appropriateness of the real-life perspective in terms of value/poverty/distribution or put as a simple question: Is the real-life perspective of people in a global perspective reflecting a ‘real standard’ as we can define it with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principle of self-determination? In the present author’s view, China’s policies can be characterised by the emergence of a strong nationalism; however one that is characterised by a fundamental tension between different poles. One pole is the vast size of the country that actually undermines any real identity if understood as ‘being identical’—leaving the most general level aside (like ‘being human’, being ‘legally citizens of one nation state’), there is little scope for identity in this respect. Nevertheless and because of these

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adverse conditions for nation building, we find some counteracting, i.e. integrative key features. Belonging to one nation state means fostering identity in the sense of people identifying with each other. So establishing what can be called ‘Chinese identity’17 through a common history, derived from (i) external pressures, and (ii) successful bordering, results in the self-image of ‘we are the other’ or ‘we are different’. The commonality is given not least by the fact of having a common adversary, even if this occurred only at a historically late stage, and is used after the fact as justification of difference and, possibly, hostility. Furthermore, such experience can enforce commonality, as it does in otherwise very different settings— we can think of the experience of poverty, especially after the enforced nation-building occurring from the Opium War in China or, equally, the experience of extreme poverty resulting from the great famine in Ireland. Perhaps there is a link from here to the fact that the empire-building under the various dynasties was more inward-oriented, less characterised by an aggressive strategy of conquest.18 Though we cannot speak of any empire-building in Ireland, we find there also an inward-looking character of mode of regulation and mode of living. While peripherialisation, also characterising the position of both countries within the consolidation of the world system, meant exclusion, it meant at the same time integration and internal consolidation—the sense of all being in the same boat dominated the collective consciousness. However, the Huawei-effect turned this perception of common weakness around, ­ encouraging a consciousness of common strength and even superiority.19 On another level, we can make out some specificities that are more recent. While the country as a whole is gaining in terms of material wealth, it is also becoming increasingly unequal—this applies to social strata and also with respect to regional imbalances, both of which are gaining momentum. This is a quite common feature of ‘development’; we can even speak of a globalisation paradox: to the extent to which the Ricardian comparative advantage is losing relevance,20 principles of competitive advantage are gaining significance. However, at the same time, a far-reaching general shift in the global and national economic formations, which I tentatively call ‘life world economy’, spreads out some roots, opening potential pathways for a production-based system of distribution (a distribution that is not about equalising the dispersal of resources after first producing their unequal distribution). For China this opens the opportunity for gaining world leadership by fostering a

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new world order, namely one that has no leader. This paradox can be explained by the fact that a multipolar world is more than and different from a constellation without definite order, where—for better or worse—governance processes lead21 to the replacement of governmental by governance leadership and ‘regimes’ replace, or at least complement, the traditional state.22 The complexity of this constellation, without overcoming or negating the meaning of traditional lines of definition and conflict, establishes a new framework. Decisive is that the state is complemented by somewhat communitarian superstructures that conjoin identity elements, establishing this way a constitutional dimension of identity. Referring to National Image in the title of this contribution aims to underline the fact that nation building, identity, and even (or especially) belonging are constructs, climaxing in the coming together of individual, social and societal levels—in short the reality of the principle Ubi societas ibi jus est (Wherever there is society, there is law). As much as this comes to a point of reification, it is the result of what Rudolph von Jhering calls the ‘struggle of law’, and there is little scope in law alone for the simple reason that such struggle takes place in a real world—here the quantum-theoretical openness, initially needed to allow free space for definition, is exposed to unstable conditions and returns into a binary system, requiring a concrete solution. Nevertheless, it is therefore important to determine exactly the pathway of the two realities, namely asking if so-called first principles are taken from above (an idealistic and voluntaristic approach) or if they are taken from below (being developed as matter of praxis which is always bound to structural relations). The image can then function as a kind of border and bridge at the same time, bringing ideals and realities together. In this light, law has a specific function which can be understood in the light of hegemony building, defining the dimensions of possibilities as they are outlined by Ernst Bloch.23 He suggests four dimensions, which are (i) the formally possible—what is possible according to its logical structure; (ii) the objectively possible—possible being based on assumptions on the ground of epistemologically based knowledge; (iii) the objectively possible—possible as it follows from the options inherently given by the object; and (iv) the objectively real possible—possible by following the latency and tendency which is inherent in its elementary form. Approaching identity as part of a wider constitutive process—understood as relational and processual matter—has to aim at developing an

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understanding of identity in its relevance for praxis, governmental and non-governmental, public and private. In this light, the understanding of identity will not least be a string of anecdotes, forming a net of seemingly diffuse lines, but presenting itself as grand narrative if properly unfolded—and it will not be anything more. What may appear as seemingly simple, amusing, saddening, frightening, energising anecdote becomes a paragraph and even a chapter. But, taken as part of a sober analysis, it may also become an element of a formula or equation—even worse, an answer without a question or, to use another formulation, a prejudice or stereotype.

Measuring the Cage II: Some Considerations on Sino-EU Relations and Processes of Globalisation Sino-European relations have existed for a long time; Marco Polo suggested that Hangzhou is ‘beyond dispute the finest and the noblest in the world’ and ‘[t]he number and wealth of the merchants, and the amount of goods that passed through their hands, was so enormous that no man could form a just estimate thereof’.24 In this context the wrongly attributed Chinese saying ‘what the heavens are above, Su-cheu and Hang-cheu are upon earth’ is mentioned again and again.25 Similarly, looking at the interior of some of the palaces owned by the Medici in Italy, the exchange between the worlds cannot be overlooked. The devotion, inner appreciation and humbleness of both relations and exchange were fundamentally different from the obsession of today’s literates with the alphabet of url and abc@xyz, which is, not least, the legal head and heart of Google. In trying to figure out what is happening behind the visible scene of discussing the relationship today, especially from the Western perspective, we arrive at the following main positions: • Looking at the relationship between the EU and PRC, we arrive easily at the idea of a trade war; however, we may also speak of a trade war within the EU; utilising the PRC as a kind of game point. • Another playing field deals with the uni-, bi-, and multipolarity of the world order. China in particular shows that the simple centre– periphery relationship is essentially problematic—such a ­ critique includes, not least, the limitation given by looking at relations instead of relationality and development instead of processuality.

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• Another and more fundamental aspect concerns the question of whether it is really about countries and states or if it is about formations and accumulation regimes. In particular, the latter point highlights the need for exploring questions of identity as a matter of the overall process of a socio-technological metabolism. The discussion of some ‘single issues’, more or less isolated facts and perceptions, can illuminate the meaning of identity in this understanding. A prevailing topic can be discussed as supposed hostile acquisitions—for example the purchase of a four per cent share in Mercedes by a Chinese individual, which was widely commented on as a ‘hostile Chinese attempt to dominate Germany’s economy’. An additional aspect of this case was that the acquisition actually meant a major addition to know-how in the area of e-cars, an area underdeveloped so far. Leaving aside that the deal in a relational perspective had been a process of various winners, the German car manufacturer had been immediate winner due to the gain of technical know-how, without having to bear any loss, also including without any control. Looking realistically at the trade balance, and also considering the per capita ratio, there is little reason at this moment, not least because the flows go into both directions, to even justify speaking of a kind Ricardian relationship of comparative advantage. Speaking of comparative advantage, we find an example that concerns identity at its very heart, the matter of standards-setting. We may take Huawei’s success story as a metaphorical example—such an accomplishment would not have been possible if the original name in its original written form (华为) had been maintained. One may say in generalised terms that a major step towards adapting Western culture was the price that had to be paid for being ‘allowed to enter the game’, and the game was one in which the rules were set by the West. A major and fundamental issue behind this is, of course, the definition of the industrial policy and the role each side will play in the future as they aim to gain and maintain power and utilise the new ­socio-technological opportunities. Mentioning some delicacies and inconsistencies is helpful in order to develop a deeper insight into the development of what has been called the socio-technological metabolism. One of these inconsistencies has already been mentioned, namely the ‘West’, tremendously

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fearing ‘the East’. This fear is so strong that even obvious statistics are not recognised, even though statistical figures are a kind of holy grail of social science and comparative research. Another, very topical, issue is that protestors in Hong Kong have called on the current US president for support on human rights issues. Without discussing the events, claims and counter-claims in Hong Kong, asking the anti-humanitarian Trump for support is surely a remarkable step. Again, another sensitive issue is links to Taiwan. This is not the place to discuss issues of the Taiwan-question itself, but the dualism of two ‘laws’ is interesting in this case, or one might even say two laws and consequently four dimensions (again not to be discussed here in any actual respect)26: • In the understanding of the PRC: – National Independence – Cultural Belonging • In the understanding of Taiwanese nationalists: – National Independence – Cultural Belonging. A further point to note under the heading of inconsistencies and contradictions is that interests and benefits follow their own rules and are not necessarily (at first glance) identical with national interest. An example can be seen in the naval exercises ‘since January 2009, [when] both EU NAVFOR and the PLAN have continuously deployed ships to counter piracy and protect vulnerable shipping off the coast of Somalia’.27 From such extremely focused actions, relations arrived in 2018 at common exercises, suggesting that ‘general national interests’ had been in some respects overwritten and altered by ‘professional military interests’.28 The individual items show their own complexity, each also referring to a very specific understanding of the different agents. In particular, speaking of China, one has to take the ambiguities into account, summarised by the characterisation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, and finding its expression in international relations in notable constellations, summarised, for instance, in the words, ‘It is truly ironic, we had been forced to privatise according to the rules of the market, and sold finally to enterprises of state capitalism.’29 As we learn, the confusion goes deeper; the harbour of Piraeus being extraterritorial—seemingly an

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extraordinary situation as extraterritoriality means in this case becoming in effect part of another territory. However, such extraterritoriality is not so unusual if we consider, for instance, the number of Export Processing Zones in general30; while they are not contributing directly to the production of national wealth, they surely contribute to employment, being part of the overall metabolism of the nation in question. Thus, interpreting what we see from a perspective of science, we witness a truly miraculous constellation—part of the metabolism of a body being carried out by another, explicitly detached body. In contrast, nationally, the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017 discussed as a main contradiction today the tension ‘between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing need for a better life’.31 This main contradiction can be broken down into some dimensions of identity politics. We can also say that we are dealing with the dialectical challenge of overcoming and maintaining. Four areas will be looked at, guided by the work of Frigga Haug and her proposal for a four-in-one perspective, though presented in a slightly altered version—the alteration is due to reference to the Social Quality Approach. In any case, at the core stands the presumption of ongoing socialisation.32 There are four ‘building blocks’ that provide the framework in and by which this socialisation occurs33: • Socio-economic security gained from socialised production of goods. • Reproductive Work/Family Work. • Cohesion-Activities/Community Work. • Empowerment through politics from below and community development.

What to Do? Identity, finally, has to be revisited against this background, considering it as a consolidation of three strands of reality and thought: • The solidification of the various anecdotes and their conglomeration in narrative, establishing themselves as national mindset (tradition). • The confrontation with ‘general challenges’ humankind faces—for a basic outline see below (secular future).

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• The productive forces as they are developed at the very moment in conjunction with the national state of the art (presence). Thus, the present increased interest in questions around identity—its continuity and change—is part of a civilisation crisis and the challenges the anthroponomic system faces.34 Earlier, four features were mentioned as characteristic of China and the Chinese. They are here summarised as a We-Society, based on and maintaining social harmony, and emphasising not least harmony with nature—all specifically ordered by a differentiated system of subordination. The following is to some extent speculative, a picture painted with a very broad brush—as such, subject to common criticisms of generalisations, and in this case in addition the sheer size of the country has to be considered. Still, there is some justification for talking about a specific Chinese identity. The presupposition is that the general principle of harmony goes hand in hand with and depends on the principle of self-denial. While any interpretation of ancient thought is problematic, it may still be sufficiently acceptable to say that the underlying authoritarian, subordinating expectation, something that can also be found in the Western world, had been more differentiated in China. Whereas the ancient Greek perspective suggests intellectual, the ancient Roman physical superiority standing behind sub-/super-ordination, the Chinese version suggests a more differentiated perspective, looking at different roles and distinct functions. In addition, the ‘Mencius-order’ can be read from two sides, that is, by beginning with looking at the agents or by commencing with considering the ‘attitudes’. Further deployment of this thought leads us to studies of the outstanding works on religion by Max Weber, going in their meaning far beyond the question of religion in the narrow sense, to in fact dealing with issues of identity. Against this background I propose four perspectives on identity prevailing in China: 1. A simple hierarchical law and order imperative. 2. A complex hierarchical regime of sublime disciplining. 3. An open identity of individualist anxiety. 4. An open identity of socio-individualist integrity.

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We may—tentatively—define some features where Chinese identity finds distinct repercussions while such classification only makes sense if it is used for some kind of social comparison. 1. Hierarchical law and imperative order can be seen in the validity of strict bureaucratic rules, going hand in hand with the requirement of subordination and obedience as part of the Confucian tradition. It was in this connection that a strictly meritocratic system of accessing and advancing in the bureaucratic apparatus had been established in very early years during the Qin dynasty—thus at a time when we barely can speak of a Chinese nation and may refer instead to a ‘unified space without national statehood’. 2.  As this is not anything more than an anecdotal reflection, it is interesting to look at differences in the sharing economy, in particular in respect of the material—although not having validated statistical data. One may be wondering if these obviously privately owned bikes, employed for making profit, are nevertheless seen by a majority in a different light, namely as social property, at least in terms of the utility character and thus the use-value; in other words, there is something that makes social (use) value gaining more momentum than it has in (the) traditional capitalist countries/economies. The identification with the country, the identity of being Chinese, presumes that it is necessary ‘to do something for the country’—this has something of the ubuntu-principle suggesting that ‘I am because we are’ and there is in this line of reasoning no sacrifice. However, it is at the same time starting from the individual and the individuals’ right and duty ‘to perform’, in this perspective suggesting some quasi-protestant notion.35 Furthermore, we may also assume that on the side of the customer the expectation prevails that the social obligation of private property is valid. Taking this as momentum that finds its roots in the history of a ‘country without nation’, there are today other dimensions, not least the state and its partly national(ised) games and sport events as well as computer games (see Lu in this volume)— entities that are ideationally unifying as much as they play an institutional, so to say pragmatic and logistic, role in establishing fixed points needed for building up and maintaining identity. It is important—as shown by many if not all of the contributions in this

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volume—that we can find historically and regionally shifting hierarchies; depending on ideational ‘needs’, national, religious and ethnical aspects are prioritised, that vary over time and/or in spatial terms, establishing what we may call distinct identity formations. 3. It deserves remarking on that we find in this context ‘giving identity away’ as a specific pattern; the statement (and the acceptance of the statement always carries the implication of supremacy within it) establishing a hierarchical regime of sublime disciplining. 4.  We may speak of open identity of individualist anxiety when it comes to what is known in Western countries as the system of social credits. Of course, there is a simple surveillance side to this. However, we find also another dimension, namely a means of helping to maintain or gain orientation in an era and ambience of increasing desolation, and the difficulty in establishing meaning that is emerging from being embedded in a ‘natural’ social context. In the end, we witness an interplay of disciplining measures, offers of guidance and actively taking up of such guidance and ‘living it’.36 It requires a long debate to find the balance of the different aspects. Interesting, in any case, is the occurrence of similar topics and modes of social control across the globe, together with the Italian attempt to pass a law on volunteering.37 5. Also, with the frequent German celebrations and awards for ‘active citizenship’, and the particularly American dealings around philantrocapitalism,38 we witness the prevalence of politics of ‘states without demos’. 6. Consumerism as a perfected design of oneself is the main feature of an identity of socio-individualist integrity—we finally arrive at a ‘demos without nation state’. All four fields or patterns of reference are relevant, though it is likely that we witness a secular shift towards the third and fourth. While this is a general trend, it still is specifically interpenetrated by national traditions, for China, as briefly outlined above, the ‘we-society’—hailing harmony und subordinating under nature, though doing so in a somewhat alienated way by sanctifying it.

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Conclusive Consideration—Securing National Stability Through Flexible Identity Indeed, ventilating identity as a social phenomenon and fact with multiple facets, and making reference to ‘image’ as a matter of duplicate on the one hand and inspiration on the other hand is a useful exercise, highlighting the tension that is inherent to national identity. Here, Rawls’ understanding of society as a (fair) system of cooperation is taken as a central reference, not least in its connection to social contractualism. This opens the way to link national identity by way of introducing its different aspects to a common understanding; while such commonality is surely a matter of power and struggle,39 it is in the end still an agreement that is reached and accepted by all parties. This is especially concerned with the second essential feature mentioned by Rawls, the statement that ‘[t]he idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity, or mutuality: all who do their part as the recognised rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard’.40 Paradoxically this includes that even a rejecting attitude towards certain aspects of the ‘national character’ (i.e. those accepted general principles) takes these positively into account (i.e. as valid and accepted). Partly it is founded in the contradictory character of any imaginable version of such principles: they emerge from productive tensions between individuals in their links to various social entities—from nearby associations to the global village, and from the professional and political grouping, strictly following defined rules, to the informal and occasional gathering of peers.

Notes

1. Huawei means something like ‘China is promising’. 2. See, in this context, Cao in this volume. 3. Michael Zuern and Stephan Leibfried, “A New Perspective on the State: Reconfiguring the National Constellation,” European Review 13, no. 1 (2005): 2. 4. Maarten Vink, “Comparing Citizenship Regimes,” in Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, ed. Ayelet Shachar, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 221–244.

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5. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971). 6. Hans-Peter Dürr, Warum es ums Ganze geht. Neues Denken für eine Welt im Umbruch, Herausgegeben von Dietlind Klemm und Frauke Liesenborghs (München: oecom Verlag, 2010). Translation Peter Herrmann. 7. See on these issues Phelan in this volume. 8. Karl Marx, “Capital; Volume I,” in Marx & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 35 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996), 45. 9. Karl Marx, “Economic Manuscripts 1857–58,” [First Draft of Capital], in Marx & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 28: Marx 1857–61 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986), 467. 10. Alluding to Dean Phelan’s contribution in this volume, where we find the concepts of big and small nationalism; we find similarly relevant the distinction between a democratic society/political society and communities/associations in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2001), 3–4, 20ff. 11. The German car-manufacturer Mercedes advertised in this manner for some time with the statement ‘Made by Mercedes Benz’ replacing the slogan ‘Made in Germany’. 12. Instead of relations, which would suggest some kind of linearity. 13. Instead of development, which is also conceptually linked to linearity. 14. Mencius, Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau (London: Penguin 2003), 60. 15. That is, as prejudices and theories suggest. 16. Employment and necessary housework, which when taken together are time, the use of which is, by and large, out of the control of the respective individual. 17. That is, attributing ‘belonging together’ and ‘being one with a defined group of others’ to oneself. 18. See Phelan in this volume. 19. While not necessarily overwriting the proverbial Chinese modesty. 20. Here is not the place to discuss the actual relevance of Ricardo’s theory. 21. Today it still has to be added: in tendency and potentially. 22.  See Jens Steffek, “Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from International Relations,” in Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, eds. Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004), 81–101; Thomas Vesting, “Constitutionalism or Legal Theory: Comments on Gunther Teubner,” in Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, eds. Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004), 29–39; Bob Jessop, “From the KMNS to the SWPR,” in Rethinking Social Policy, eds. Gail Lewis, Sharon Gewirtz, and John Clarke (London: Sage, 2000). Though in Jessop’s case the argument is limited to suggesting a mere alteration of the existing system.

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23. Ernst Bloch, Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959): 258–288. 24. “Marco Polo,” Visit Hangzhou (website), accessed October 5, 2019, http://www.visithangzhou.com/cmarter4b3a.html?doc=998&node= 1031. 25. Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian, ed. John Masefield (London: J. M. Dent, 1928), 89. 26. Being well aware of the ambiguities, the following remark is for clarification: I refer to the fundamental and even constitutive characteristic of jurisprudence; any legal issue is one of conflicting interests, finding their formulation in different and incompatible interpretation of the ‘facts’ while the facts themselves are ‘given’ (a) by pre-legal conditions and (b) the understanding of the legal interpretation (‘if a has b as possible consequence [causes a future event], one might say a = b; Z as b [the future event] = a, one can predict the future as = to a, in other words: the future cannot be anything else than the presence, allowing at most minor alterations and in any case caught on the initial rail which does not have any deflector. Already featuring in antiquity, particularly known from Cicero suggesting the question ‘cui bono’ as guiding principle, we find this as a general principle reformulated by Rudolph von Jhering, suggesting a ‘Struggle for Law’ and writing ‘The end of the law is peace. The means to that end is war. So long as the law is compelled to hold itself in readiness to resist the attacks of wrong – and this it will be compelled to do until the end of time – it cannot dispense with war. The life of the law is a struggle – a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of individuals’. See Rudolph von Jhering, The Struggle for Law, with an Introduction by Albert Kocourek, trans. John J. Lalor (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1915). 27.  Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “A First: China, EU Launch New Combined Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, October 18, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/10/a-first-china-eu-launch-new-combined-military-exercise/. 28. European External Action Service, “EU NAVFOR Conducts First Exercise with Chinese PLA(N) in Djibouti,” October 16, 2018, https://eunavfor. eu/eu-navfor-conducts-first-exercise-with-chinese-plan-in-djibouti. 29. Investigate Europe, “China: Der Gefürchtete Partner,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 28, 2019, https://interaktiv.tagesspiegel.de/lab/china-dergefuerchtete-partner/. 30. See for instance: Susan Tiefenbrun, “Introduction,” in Tax Free Trade Zones of the World and in the United States (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 31. China Daily, “‘New Contradiction’ Keeps Pace with Times,” updated October 22, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnational congress/2017-10/22/content_33556562.htm.

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32. Referring to Marx, ‘[m]an is a Zoon politikon [political animal] in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal, but an animal that can be individualised only within society’ (Marx: 1857–1858). Here, this means that the much-bemoaned individualisation has to be seen as well in the light of secular processes of increasing socialisation. 33. Frigga Haug, Die Vier-in-einem-Perspektive. Politik von Frauen für eine neue Linke (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 2008/2009); Frigga Haug, “Die Vier-in-Einem-Perspektive – Eine Utopie von Frauen, die eine Utopie für alle ist,” Blog Postwachstum, August 28, 2011, https://www. postwachstum.de/die-vier-in-einem-perspektive-eine-utopie-von-frauendie-eine-utopie-fur-alle-ist-20110828; Laurent J. G. Van der Maesen and Alan Walker, eds., Social Quality: From Theory to Indicators (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 34. See in this context, not least for methodological aspects, Paul Boccara, Neuf Leçons Sur l’Anthroponomie Systémique (Paris: Delga, 2017). 35. This is not meant as a borrowing but as an attempt to make understanding easier for Western readers. 36.  See in this context Peter Herrmann, “Apps-generation,” Peter’s Log (Blog), November 8, 2019. https://williamthompsonucc.wordpress. com/2019/11/08/apps-generation/. 37. Peter Herrmann, Partizipationskulturen in der Europäischen Union. Nichtregierungsorganisationen in EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Rheinfelden and Berlin: Schäuble Verlag, 1998). 38. Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, “Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value,” Harvard Business Review, November/December 1999, https://hbr.org/1999/11/philanthropys-new-agenda-creating-value; Kerstin Plank, “Philanthrocapitalism and the Hidden Power of Big U.S. Foundations,” Momentum Quarterly 6, no. 3 (2017): 203–209. 39. Cf. Jhering, The Struggle for Law. 40. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 6.

Bibliography Bloch, Ernst. Prinzip Hoffnung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959 [written in 1938–1947; revised 1953 and 1959]. Boccara, Paul. Neuf Leçons Sur l’Anthroponomie Systémique. Paris: Delga, 2017. China Daily. “‘New Contradiction’ Keeps Pace with Times.” Updated October 22, 2017.  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/201710/22/content_33556562.htm. Dürr, Hans-Peter. Warum es ums Ganze geht. Neues Denken für eine Welt im Umbruch, Herausgegeben von Dietlind Klemm und Frauke Liesenborghs. München: oecom Verlag, 2010. Translation Peter Herrmann.

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European External Action Service. “EU NAVFOR Conducts First Exercise with Chinese PLA (N) in Djibouti.” October 16, 2018. https://eunavfor.eu/ eu-navfor-conducts-first-exercise-with-chinese-plan-in-djibouti. Haug, Frigga. “Die Vier-in-Einem-Perspektive – Eine Utopie von Frauen, die eine Utopie für alle ist.” Blog Postwachstum, August 28, 2011. https://www. postwachstum.de/die-vier-in-einem-perspektive-eine-utopie-von-frauen-dieeine-utopie-fur-alle-ist-20110828. Haug, Frigga. Die Vier-in-einem-Perspektive. Politik von Frauen für eine neue Linke. Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 2008/2009. Herrmann, Peter. Partizipationskulturen in der Europäischen Union. Nichtregierungsorganisationen in EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Rheinfelden and Berlin: Schäuble Verlag, 1998. Herrmann, Peter. “Apps-generation.” Peter’s Log (Blog), November 8, 2019. https://williamthompsonucc.wordpress.com/2019/11/08/apps-generation/. Investigate Europe. “China: Der Gefürchtete Partner.” Der Tagesspiegel, September 28, 2019. https://interaktiv.tagesspiegel.de/lab/china-der-gefuerchtete-partner/. Jessop, Bob. “From the KMNS to the SWPR.” In Rethinking Social Policy, edited by Gail Lewis, Sharon Gewirtz, and John Clarke. London: Sage, 2000. Jhering, Rudolph von. The Struggle for Law, with an Introduction by Albert Kocourek. Translated from the Fifth German Edition by John J. Lalor. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1915. Marx, Karl. “Economic Manuscripts 1857–58” [First Draft of Capital]. In Marx & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 28: Marx 1857–61. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986. Marx, Karl. “Capital; Volume I.” In Marx & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 35. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996. Mencius. Mencius. Translated by D. C. Lau. London: Penguin, 2003. Plank, Kerstin. “Philanthrocapitalism and the Hidden Power of Big U.S. Foundations.” Momentum Quarterly 6, no. 3 (2017): 203–209. https:// www.momentum-quarterly.org/ojs2/index.php/momentum/article/ view/2041/1607. Polo, Marco. The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian. Edited by John Masefield. London: J. M. Dent, 1928. Porter, Michael E., and Mark R. Kramer. “Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value.” Harvard Business Review, November/December 1999. https://hbr. org/1999/11/philanthropys-new-agenda-creating-value. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971. Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2001. Stanley-Lockman, Zoe. “A First: China, EU Launch New Combined Military Exercise.” The Diplomat, October 18, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/ 10/a-first-china-eu-launch-new-combined-military-exercise/.

160  P. HERRMANN Steffek, Jens. “Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from International Relations.” In Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, edited by Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner, 81–101. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004. Tiefenbrun, Susan. “Introduction.” In Tax Free Trade Zones of the World and in the United States. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012. Van der Maesen, Laurent J. G., and Alan Walker, eds. Social Quality: From Theory to Indicators. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Vesting, Thomas. “Constitutionalism or Legal Theory: Comments on Gunther Teubner.” In Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, edited by Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner, 29–39. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004. Vink, Maarten. “Comparing Citizenship Regimes.” In Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, edited by Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink, 221–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Zuern, Michael, and Stephan Leibfried. “A New Perspective on the State. Reconfiguring the National Constellation.” European Review 13, no. 1 (2005): 1–36.

CHAPTER 7

A New Chinese National Identity: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy Niall Duggan

Introduction Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘hide capabilities and lie low’ (taoguang yanghui), which resulted in a policy of avoiding confrontation in foreign affairs, taking action only in key areas and focusing on domestic matters. While domestic matters and China’s lack of experience in international affairs have limited China’s foreign policy action, China is more proactive on the world stage under Xi than under any leader since the beginning of the reform period in the early 1980s.1 While the Chinese economy’s increased importance within global production has given China a greater influence on the world stage, a more proactive Chinese foreign policy has its roots in the rise of new Chinese nationalism, which emerged from the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.2 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reacted to the crisis N. Duggan (*)  Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_7

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that resulted from the 1989 protests by launching a patriotic education campaign aimed at renewing domestic pride. The campaign focused on China’s long history as a great power in the world and on the CCP’s role in overcoming the ‘Century of National Humiliation’ (bǎinián guóchǐ).3 The patriotic education campaign, China’s successful hosting of ­mega-events, such as the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and the rise of social media in China have all contributed to an increased national belief that China is entering a period of new nationalism that is more nationalist and more hawkish in its public opinion on foreign policy matters. Nationalism has long been seen as a key factor within Chinese foreign policy. One hundred years on from 1919s May Fourth Movement, this chapter reviews the effect of the rise of new Chinese nationalism on Chinese foreign policy. The chapter employs role theory, an international relations constructivist theoretical framework that focuses on social structures. It is argued that nationalism is a social role that becomes active when a state seeks to defend its national identity in order to achieve ontological security. It is also argued that China’s new nationalism has both a reactive and a proactive effect on Chinese foreign policy. This chapter will examine both the effects of China’s new nationalism on Chinese foreign policy by analysing two case studies: Sino-Japanese relations during the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands disputes of 2013–2019 (reactive case) and ­Sino-Malian relations during Chinese peacekeeping missions in 2013 (proactive case).

The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy Modern Chinese nationalism has its roots at the end of Manchu rule in 1911 and the rise of China as a nation state.4 However, after the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, Chinese nationalism became interconnected with China’s socialist, anti-imperialist nationalism in the form of socialist patriotism. As highlighted by Chen Zhimin, from 1949 to 1971, ‘The new Chinese version of socialist internationalism assigned “world revolution” as its task “at the present stage”, making imperialism, capitalism and reactionaries its primary targets. It committed Chinese support for revolutionary forces around the world’.5 This form of nationalism linked China’s historical experiences of Western imperialism to that of other nations attempting to overcome colonial rule. While China moved into a period of positive nationalism during the 1980s, which saw the state attempt to reduce the anti-Western,

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a­ nti-imperialist nature of nationalism,6 this socialist patriotism returned after the introduction of patriotic education campaigns following the 1989 protests. In 1994, the Chinese government issued a document entitled The Outline on the Implementation of Education in Patriotism. This document became the foundation of the teaching of Chinese history and current affairs within the Chinese public education system. The document focused on three different periods of Chinese history: first, ‘five thousand years of splendid Chinese history’; second, ‘the humiliation of more than a century of invasion and the struggle to save the country from destruction’ and third, ‘the People’s Republic opens up for progress: gigantic change in the Holy Fatherland for more than four decades’. This campaign set out a narrative of an ancient civilisation that resisted Western imperialism to return to its status of a great power. In turn, this narrative defined Chinese nationalist identity, which is where new Chinese nationalism found its roots. Patriotic education campaigns also resulted in a number of publications, most famously China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-cold War Era. These publications, rooted in the narrative outlined in the 1994 document, were anti-Western in nature and called for China to take a more Chinese, more proactive role in foreign affairs. This could be viewed as state-led nationalism. Scholars such as Zhao7 argue that the CCP has sought to use nationalism to increase its legitimacy. However, as questions began to arise regarding how best to manage nationalism in China,8 it became clear that Chinese nationalism was not purely a top-down political instrument of the Chinese elites. The start of the twenty-first century saw the first generation of Chinese who had undergone the patriotic education campaign come of age. This new wave of nationalism, which resulted from the campaign, came to the fore as the world saw the rise of online platforms that facilitated the development of cyber nationalism. This generation also witnessed the rise of the Chinese economy and the increased importance of China in international affairs. The internet gave Chinese netizens an outlet to express their pride in the nation.9 During this period, China hosted several international mega-events, including the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Expo 2010 in Shanghai. These events were often met by protests in the West related to Tibetan independence and human rights issues in China. For this new generation, these protests were an attack on Chinese national pride. The resulting response online spilled into public protests calling for hawkish foreign policy responses. This suggests that

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China has also developed more proactive bottom-up nationalism. This has had profound effects on Chinese foreign policy, as outlined by Chen Weiss: If domestic audiences in China – including netizens, elites, and the mass public – want the government to take a tougher foreign policy stance, then claims about domestic pressure are harder to dismiss. The existence of this pressure does not mean the Chinese government’s hands are irreversibly tied, but it may make compromise costlier.10

This limits the scope to which China can cooperate in international relations as the new wave of nationalism has led to a more assertive Chinese foreign policy. However, a growing body of research questions the hawkish nature of Chinese nationalism, as well as the influence of the new Chinese nationalism.11 In her 2019 article How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy, Jessica Chen Weiss reviewed a number of public surveys taken in China that focused on Chinese nationalism.12 She found that younger Chinese citizens on average over the surveys were indeed more nationalist and more hawkish in their foreign policy views. However, some scholars have concluded that even with a clear increase in hawkish foreign policy sentiments among younger Chinese citizens, who contributed to the new wave of nationalism, public opinion was not a significant factor in the Chinese government’s response to maritime and territorial disputes in South China and South East China Seas.13 As highlighted by Chen Weiss, ‘the government has shown its ability and willingness to bear or minimise public opinion costs’.14 It is clear from the literature on nationalism in China and its effects on Chinese foreign policy that nationalism is not the key factor in driving Chinese foreign policy actions in China. Therefore, rather than understanding nationalism as a key driver for foreign policy action, a more useful analytical approach would be to understand the effect of nationalist identity as a role undertaken by China in its foreign policy actions. According to Michael Alan Brittingham, While it is easy to conceive of a state using force to pursue tangible benefits like territory or wealth, or even intangible benefits like prestige, would a state go to war over something as abstract as its identity or its role in the world? This seems rather unlikely. It might make more sense to treat the conflict potential of nationalism as indirect.15

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Some scholars, such as Brittingham16 and Krolikowski,17 have used nationalism as a kind of role to understand how nations undertake foreign policy actions to protect self-identity and how this can lead to foreign policy actions. Thus, this chapter will apply a role theory framework.

Role Theory and China’s Foreign Policy This chapter argues that China, in its foreign policy action, is attempting to achieve ontological security by maintaining its two historical identities—that of a great power and that of a developing state that has been a victim of Western imperialism. To support this argument, this chapter employs a constructivist role theory framework.18 Role theory is committed to the study of behaviour using the notion of role. International roles are understood to be social positions constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organised group.19 Roles are created by the combination of an actor’s subjective understanding of what its behaviour should be— that is, its role conceptions—and international and domestic society’s demands—its role expectations—combined with the particular context in which the role is being acted out.20 Therefore, roles are understood to be the categories of behaviour that states adopt. While these roles are continually reshaped by domestic and external developments, they are anchored in a historical discourse. As such, roles provide individual states with a stable sense of identity.21 With the exception of Duggan22 and Harnisch,23 little focus has been given to the effect of history in the development of both domestic and external role expectations. This chapter concentrates on the nexus between the domestic, historical and external role expectations, which determines policy behaviour. To fully understand a state’s role in a given context, it is necessary to understand a state’s historical self. The historical self is conceptually related to ontological security. Zarakol defines this as the situation in which ‘an actor has a consistent sense of “self” by performing actions in order to underwrite his/her notion of “who they are”’.24 Therefore, a state seeks ontological security because it wants to maintain consistent self-identity.25 That ‘self’ is constituted and maintained through a historical narrative that gives life to routinised foreign policy actions.26

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Maintaining those foreign policy action routines, which maintain a state’s historical narrative, allows the state to protect its historical self. Mitzen argues that states value these routines as they underwrite the state’s sense of self—that is, that a state might privilege routine over other values, even when the physical cost is involved.27 Historical roles that China has undertaken in the past also affect the creation of both domestic and international role expectations. China’s role as a developing nation that has been a victim of Western imperialism has had an effect on how China shapes its foreign policy during key events in international affairs.28 Here, China creates policies that are consistent with its sense of historical self. A qualitative analysis of the Chinese state’s self-identity is expressed through role conceptions. A study of China’s national role conceptions at any point in time can help to understand how China conceives of itself in its foreign policy. Such role conceptions provide an internal guide for foreign policy action and furnish the rest of the world with expectations about China’s international behaviour. China does this by creating a consistent sense of self as a collective actor, performing actions in order to underwrite the notion of its role. For those who have applied a role theory approach to Chinese nationalism and its part in Chinese foreign policymaking, a reactive model of nationalism is applied. A reactive model of nationalism occurs only during points of national crisis, be they tangible or existential. As outlined by Brittingham, ‘It is only in moments of crisis when the public is called forth to rally around that flag that nationalism manifests itself more openly. In other words, while national identity is always present, it is mobilised as “visible” nationalism as a reaction to outside threats’.29 Within the reactive model, a foreign policy action affected by nationalism is by its nature confrontational and aggressive. In the case of China, this reaction is driven by the domestic expectations of China to ‘stand up for itself’. However, as Brittingham outlines, a role is dependent on the specific relationship between two or more states.30 This chapter will examine two cases studies of Chinese nationalism. These case studies will give a greater understanding of how a change in the specific relationship between two or more states can change the role of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. The first case will be a most-likely case study: Sino-Japanese relations during the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands disputes, 2013–2019, and the second case study will be Sino-Malian relations during Chinese peacekeeping missions in 2013.

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Sino-Japanese Relations: Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands Disputes The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are a small Japanese-administered chain of islands covering an area of 7 km2 located 200 km southwest of Japan and a similar distance northwest of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Although the island chain was annexed by Japan following the first ­Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895), unlike other territories taken by Japan from the Qing Empire, the archipelago was not returned to China under the terms of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. China has long claimed that these islands have formed part of China since ancient times.31 In 1969, a UN report highlighted potential oil resources off the coast of the archipelago. The presence of oil, the archipelago’s abundant fish stocks and the strategic location of the islands to the shipping industry encouraged China to reassert its claim to the island chain. Until 1971, the archipelago was controlled by the United States before being returned to Japanese administration. The islands have provided an intermittent source of conflict between the two states ever since. In 1978, 108 Chinese fishing boats entered the sea around the islands, with 16 of them entering Japanese territorial waters, causing Japan to increase its naval presence in the archipelago.32 There were also anti-Japanese protests resulting from smaller scale conflicts between Japan and other parts of greater China, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. For example, in 1970, Japanese authorities evicted Taiwanese reporters who raised the Republic of China’s flag on one of the islands, and in 1996, Japanese authorities prevented a Hong Kongese group from landing. Both incidents resulted in anti-Japanese protests.33 In 2003, a group of mainland Chinese nationalists landed on the islands, gaining support from across Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China.34 However, except for a few intermittent protests and a few fishing boats entering the area around the islands, the dispute between Japan and China over control of the archipelago remained relatively quiet for several decades. However, in 2012, Shintarō Ishihara, the then governor of Tokyo, said he would use public funds to buy the islands from a private Japanese owner.35 In the same year, the Japanese government completed the purchase of three of the islands,36 which resulted in large-scale public and diplomatic protests in China, prompting the Chinese government to send ships regularly in and out of what Japan claimed to be its territorial waters around the

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disputed archipelago. Tensions reached new heights in 2013 when China announced the creation of a new air-defence identification zone that included the disputed archipelago. Aircraft in this zone had to meet with Chinese rules and standards. In response, Japan increased its presence on the island chain, and Prime Minister Shinzō Abe believed the country should move to amend Japan’s ‘pacifist’ constitution to allow for an increase in military action.37 In terms of nationalism, the island dispute between China and Japan was particularly complex as China frames Japan as its old foe in Chinese nationalism. Fuelling mistrust and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, anti-Japanese popular nationalism in China has deep roots in China’s state propaganda, which has implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory.38 The symbolism protestors employed during the anti-Japanese rallies during the territorial dispute is deeply rooted in the Chinese narrative of the Century of Humiliation. Within this narrative, China was a victim of imperialism, including Japanese imperialism. The framing of Japan as the old foe in the Chinese narrative of the Century of Humiliation throughout the island dispute led to a number of large-scale anti-Japanese protests in China. However, the effect of anti-Japanese popular nationalism on Chinese foreign policy has been limited. During the 1985, 1996, 2005 and 2012 anti-Japan protests, external events sparked a swell of public anger and activism in China. However, Chinese leaders, who initially tolerated these protests, were able to bring them under control.39 According to Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, The Chinese leadership’s delicate balancing act depends on the ability to manage the contradictions between its domestic legitimation strategies while maintaining access to the international economy. China’s economic partners tolerate the CCP’s efforts to stir up nationalism and antiforeign sentiment because they benefit economically and therefore have been willing to make allowances for the Chinese leadership’s domestic need to cloak capitalist economic reforms in socialist and nationalist rhetoric.40

However, the 2013 anti-Japanese popular nationalist protests differed from earlier protests due to the rise of online Chinese nationalism among Chinese netizens, who publicly claimed that China’s response was weak and called for China to stand up to Japan.41 The Chinese netizens called for China to take military action to confirm China’s claim over the disputed archipelago, pushing the Chinese government to take a harder line

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on the conflict. Some 819 Chinese ships entered the territorial waters immediately around the disputed islands in 2013, adding fuel to the online debate. The number of Chinese government vessels dropped to 615 as the tension between the states dissipated, but rose to a record 998 in 2019 as distrust between Tokyo and Beijing continued to rear its ugly head.42 Chinese netizens have again pushed for greater action. The rise in this public expression of the new wave of Chinese nationalism has acted as a domestic expectation that the state must fulfil. The result is that if the CCP were to develop a foreign policy that would match this domestic role expectation, it would come into conflict with its role as a responsible great power. The tough foreign policy position that new wave of Chinese nationalism increasingly demands prompts a response from the ‘other’, which in this case is Japan. Driven by fear that this new Chinese nationalism will lead to conflict, Japan adapted its role behaviour and increased its military presence, causing China to do likewise. This is, by its nature, a reactive foreign policy response by the Chinese state towards Chinese nationalism. This undermines the Chinese leadership’s foreign policy initiatives, such as the peaceful development policy, the China Dream policy and the move towards regional leadership through a responsible great power role. This suggests that the new Chinese nationalism is no longer fully under the control of the Chinese state. As China is limited by its two historical narratives—that of China as a great power and that of a developing state that has been a victim of Western imperialism, particularly Japanese imperialism—its foreign policy actions are limited. The historical frame created by the new Chinese nationalism constrains the ability of China’s leadership to pursue China’s national interests since those interests do not match ontological security. According to Gries, Steiger and Wang: Chinese nationalism can no longer be described as a purely ‘state’ or ‘official’ top-down affair. Bottom-up popular pressures are increasingly threatening the party’s nationalist legitimacy. As the party loses its hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse, the hyphen that holds the Chinese party-nation together weakens, and Chinese foreign policy becomes ­ increasingly hostage to the accidents of history that can arouse the ire of domestic nationalists. Let us hope that our luck holds, and that no Chinese dies soon at the hands of a Japanese—whether over the Diaoyu issue or otherwise. The peace and prosperity of twenty-first century East Asia depend upon it.43

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Scholars such as Andrew Chubb have downplayed the effect of new Chinese nationalism rhetoric and the power of Chinese public opinion on Chinese foreign policy in the case of maritime disputes, highlighting that it has not yet compelled the Chinese government to use force in the territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands.44 It is also unclear whether Chinese netizens are free from state control and to what extent the state directs public opinion in terms of the new Chinese nationalism. However, what is clear is that China’s role behaviour in the context of the conflict over the disputed islands in the ’70s, ’90s and early 2000s took a less hawkish, more diplomatic approach. Yet after 2013, with the rise of the new Chinese nationalism and its online presence in the form of Chinese netizens, there has been a sea change in China’s role behaviour in the context of the conflict over the disputed island. This has led to a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy, with military actions becoming part of a wider, more hostile approach by China towards Japan. By its nature, this role behaviour fits the reactive model of nationalism.

Sino-Malian Relations: 2013 Chinese Peacekeeping Missions During the period of socialist patriotism, China played a strong interventionist role on the African continent, supporting wars of national liberation against Western colonial rule.45 However, as China opened up its economy, its focus moved towards economic engagement with other states, including African nations. Underpinning this economic foreign policy focus was the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.46 Yet despite this guiding principle, China has supported the position of the African Union on intervention in internal conflicts in several African states. This position in itself was a change in China’s role behaviour since the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, a conflict to which China allowed peacekeeping troops to be sent under UN Security Council mandate.47 The position of the African Union was a central component of China’s support for the mission. In part, this was due to an internal expectation, which stated that China would support the position of developing states. During the 2011 Libya crisis, China advanced this shift in its role behaviour when it backed a UN resolution that referred Libya to the International Criminal Court and imposed sanctions.

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In keeping with China’s nationalist narrative of granting support to developing states, China looked to African and Arab regional bodies during the Libyan crisis to direct its decisions in the UN Security Council. Li Baodong explained that ‘taking into consideration the special situation in Libya at this time and the concerns and views of the Arab and African countries, the Chinese delegation voted in favour of resolution 1970’.48 As the situation in Libya escalated, the UN moved to allow members to take any measure needed to protect civilians, including imposing a no-fly zone, which became the ground for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Both the Arab League and the African Union backed the increased intervention, so China did not veto the resolution, stating that it ‘attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya…[and] to the position of African countries and the African Union’.49 The Libyan case illustrates that China is attempting to achieve ontological security by maintaining its consistent sense of self by defending the views of the African Union. China’s behaviour during the Libyan crisis reflects its role as a supporter of African nations in line with the historical narrative outlined in Chinese new nationalism. However, the military intervention in Libya left the North African nation in a state of semi-crisis. The conflict in Libya has spilled over to other nations in the region. Mali was one such nation. Both Malian soldiers and hard-line jihadist groups, such as Ansar al-Dine, returned from Libya, triggering a large-scale conflict in the north of the country. When regional groups’ attempts to deal with the issue failed, the French government intervened.50 As highlighted by Yun Sun, the Chinese response to the French intervention in Mali was one of concern about a potential abuse of the UN mandate, as had been the case in Libya.51 Although the French obtained the support of the UN Security Council members for the intervention, the Chinese believed that the French mission, like the NATO mission in Libya, went beyond its remit. Despite China’s concerns, it dispatched troops to Mali.52 The authorised strength of MINUSMA was 12,680, comprising of up to 11,240 military personnel and 1440 police, and as of 31 March 2015, 11,510 peacekeepers had been committed.53 China first dispatched a 170-member peacekeeping guard detachment to the Mali mission area in West Africa at the request of the United Nations to guard the UN headquarters in Gao.54 In total, China dispatched 395 officers and soldiers, including 170 members in a guard detachment, 155 in an engineering detachment and 70 in a medical detachment.55

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This peacekeeping mission in part meets an external expression that China would become a responsible actor in global affairs and contribute to global peace. From the perception of Chinese nationalism, this mission meets the internal expression that China would become a great power with a strong military capacity. According to Vice Captain Zhao Guangyu, the mission was ‘showing China’s role as a protector of international peace and a responsible great power’.56 The mission was also a clear statement that China was not a Western power and that a Chinese approach would differ from that of the West; it would be comprehensive, and it would prevent the crisis from continuing after the intervention. In other words, this would not be another Libya. During the 180-day mission, Chinese troops organised 145 armed patrols; the Chinese engineering detachment successively completed multiple tasks, including road construction, bridge erection, ground levelling and building of makeshift housing; and the Chinese medical detachment treated 1281 persons, including 84 who were hospitalised.57 The Chinese comprehensive security approach also targeted Malian food and water security issues, which had been among the main triggers of this and previous conflicts in Northern Mali. Under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2013–2017 Country Programming Framework, a South–South cooperation project was set up to enhance Mali’s agricultural production through the provision of Chinese technical assistance. It is clear that in Mali, China is taking a wider approach to tackling many of the non-traditional security threats that are the underlying causes of much of the conflict in Mali. China’s actions are also a reflection of China’s desire to play a responsible great power role in international relations. The Chinese mission in Mali received daily coverage in the Chinese media. The traditional military aspects of the mission were highlighted, and images of Chinese troops, carrying Chinese-made military equipment and undertaking patrols were common. These images of a strong Chinese military fulfil the expectation of the new wave of Chinese nationalism for a greater role for the Chinese military. Yet China’s comprehensive approach to the mission also fed into the old nationalism of socialist patriotism. Framing the comprehensive approach as a response to the failed Western model of intervention—for example, the response to the 2011 Libya crisis—also fulfilled the expectations of the new wave of Chinese nationalism. However, by its nature, this policy response to Chinese nationalism was proactive rather than reactive. Here China is framed as a great power, but a responsible great power that differs from

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the Western powers in its engagement with other states, because it does so as an equal of the other states. In the case of Sino-Malian relations in the context of the Chinese peacekeeping missions of 2013, nationalism’s impact on China’s role pushed China into adopting a responsible great power role. This was due in response to China’s position during the Libyan crisis and the need for China to take a different approach from the West. There was also pressure to take action coming both from China’s traditional partners in the developing world and from the West. The result was a role behaviour that allowed China to fulfil the narrative of China’s new nationalism— that of socialist patriotism—by helping a developing state using a comprehensive approach and by demonstrating that China is a strong power by sending military troops as part of the mission. This role behaviour, which is a proactive response to Chinese nationalism, allowed China to achieve ontological security.

Conclusion The year 2019 marked the centenary of the May Fourth Movement, one of the most powerful examples of the effects of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy. In 2019, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has become more proactive on the world stage. As part of the new Chinese nationalism, which emerged from the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, this more proactive Chinese foreign policy is understood in the wider historical narrative of China’s long history of being a great power in the world and on the CCP’s role in overcoming the ‘Century of National Humiliation’. This chapter applied a role theory approach to argue that nationalism is a social role that becomes active when a state seeks to defend its national identity in order to achieve ontological security. The chapter argued that China’s new nationalism has both a reactive and a proactive effect on Chinese foreign policy. In the case of Sino-Japanese relations during the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands disputes (2013–2019), we observed reactive Chinese role behaviour. In this case, China changed its role behaviour in the context of the conflict over these disputed islands, shifting from a less hawkish, more diplomatic approach pre-2013 to a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy with military actions that became part of a wider, more hostile approach towards Japan post-2013. The change in China’s role behaviour in this context can be understood as an attempt by the Xi leadership to achieve

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ontological security by maintaining its two historical identities—that of a great power and that of a developing state that has been a victim of Western imperialism. This reaction, to meet the domestic expectation of China’s new nationalism, limits China’s foreign policy actions and comes at the cost of trade with Japan, one of China’s key economic partners, but allows China to achieve ontological security. In the proactive case study, Sino-Malian relations during Chinese peacekeeping missions in 2013, nationalism’s impact on China’s role pushed China into assuming the role of a responsible great power. China also faced immense pressure to take action and to take a greater role in global affairs coming both from China’s traditional partners in the developing world and from the West. However, China’s foreign policy actions were limited by its historical narrative of China’s long history as a great power in the world and the CCP’s role in overcoming the Century of National Humiliation. China needed to take a greater role in international affairs in order to fulfil its great power role but could not adopt Western patterns of intervention, as seen in the case of Libya, as this would go against socialist patriotism, which sees China as a brother-in-arms of the developing world. The result was a role behaviour that allowed China to fulfil the narrative of China’s new nationalism—that of socialist patriotism—by helping a developing state, Mali, using a comprehensive approach and by sending military troops as part of the mission, which presented China as a strong power. This role behaviour allowed China to achieve ontological security but was proactive rather than responding to a direct threat. The action was taken by China without a direct challenge to its security. Using role theory to understand the effect of the new wave of Chinese nationalism on Chinese foreign policy can explain how China can adopt a policy that promotes China as a responsible great power but at the same time matches the China threat narrative. While this chapter does not claim that the new wave of Chinese nationalism is the key factor by which all Chinese foreign policy is designed and implemented, it does argue that in policy formation, domestic Chinese nationalism is a factor that warrants greater consideration for Chinese foreign policymakers than it had elicited prior to Xi Jinping’s administration. Nationalism is now a factor that must be balanced against that of external expectations by significant others. However, it is not necessarily the case that Chinese foreign policy actions, due to the rise of Chinese nationalism, will be more aggressive or hostile, as was the case in Sino-Japanese relations during the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands disputes. What is clear is that

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the context to which nationalism is applied will be the determining factor in how China enacts its role. The case of Chinese peacekeeping in Mali showed that Chinese nationalism can have a proactive effect, prompting China to undertake actions that underwrite its role as a responsible great power.

Notes

1.  Angela Poh and Mingjiang Li, “A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping,” Asian Security 13, no. 2 (2017): 84–97; Nien-chung Chang-Liao, “China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping,” Asian Security 12, no. 2 (2016): 82–91; Jian Zhang, “China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping: Towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?,” Global Change, Peace & Security 27, no. 1 (2015): 5–19. 2.  Shameer Modongal, “Development of Nationalism in China,” Cogent Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2016); Jessica Chen Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at ‘Rising Nationalism’ and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 119 (2019): 679–695. 3.  Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and P ­ ost-communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302; Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 783–806. 4.  Julia C. Schneider, “Early Chinese Nationalism: The Origins Under Manchu Rule,” in Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power: Nationalism and Historical Consciousness in World Politics, ed. Bart Dessein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 5.  Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (2005): 43. 6.  Shuisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 9; Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 14. 7. Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism.” 8. Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 131–144; Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security

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Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, ed. David Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 151–190. 9. Jiang Ying, Cyber-Nationalism in China: Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet Censorship in China (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2012); Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007); Duan Xiaolin, “Unanswered Questions: Why We May Be Wrong About Chinese Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 108 (2017): 886–900. 10. Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?,” 680. 11. Allen Carlson, “A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent Within the Study of Chinese Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 1 (2009): 20–35; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,” International Security 41, no. 3 (2017): 7–43. 12. Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?” 13.  Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?”; Andrew Chubb, “Assessing Public Opinion’s Influence on Foreign Policy: The Case of China’s Assertive Maritime Behaviour,” Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2019): 159–179. 14. Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?,” 692. 15. Michael Alan Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism & Conflict,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007): 147–166, 156. 16. Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy.” 17. Krolikowski Alanna, “State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008): 109–133. 18.  Sheldon Stryker and Anne Statham, “Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, eds. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (New York: Random House, 1985), 311–378. 19. Cameron Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” in The International Studies Encyclopaedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark (West Sussex: ­Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 6335–6356. 20. Cameron Thies, The United States, Israel and the Search for International Order (London: Routledge, 2013). 21. William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 22.  Niall Duggan, “China’s Changing Role in Its All-Weather Friendship with Africa,” in China’s International Roles Challenging or Supporting International Order?, eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 207–225.

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23. Sebastian Harnisch, “China’s Historical Self and Its International Role,” in China’s International Roles Challenging or Supporting International order?, eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 38–58. 24.  Ayse Zarakol, “Ontological Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan,” International Relations 24, no. 3 (2010): 3. 25.  Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–767; Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 26. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 2–3. 27.  Jennifer Mitzen, “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 270–285. 28.  Chris Connolly and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, “The Long Quest for an International Order with Chinese Characteristics: A Cultural Perspective on Modern China’s Foreign Policies,” Pacific Focus XXVIII, no. 2 (2013): 269–293. 29. Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 153. 30. Brittingham, “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 155. 31. Koichi Sato, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive—A Japanese View,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 8, no. 1 (2019): 50–82. 32. Sato, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute.” 33. Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger, and Tao Wang, “Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy: The Diaoyu Islands Protests, 2012–2013,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 98 (2016): 264–276. 34.  Gries, Steiger, and Wang, “Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy.” 35. “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” BBC, November 10, 2014, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-pacific-11341139. 36. “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties.” 37.  McCurry Justin, “Japan PM To Overturn Pacifist Defence Policy,” June 13, 2014, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/japan-pm-overturn-pacifist-defencepolicy-hinzo-abe. 38.  Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging ­Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (2007): 1–24.

178  N. DUGGAN 39. James Reilly, “A Wave to Worry About? Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and China’s Anti-Japan Protests,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 197–215. 40. Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 123. 41. Gries, Steiger, and Tao, “Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy,” 269. 42.  Julian Ryall, “Japan and US Drills Simulate Response to a Seaborne Invasion, Reflecting Anxieties About China,” South China Morning Post, September 19, 2019, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www.scmp. com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3028109/japan-and-us-drills-simulateresponse-seaborne-invasion. 43. Gries, Steiger, and Tao, “Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy,” 292. 44.  Chubb, “Assessing Public Opinion’s Influence on Foreign Policy,” 159–179. 45. Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 46. Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess, “Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African Policy,” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 356–383. 47.  Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan, “Hesitant Adaptation: China’s New Role in Global Policies,” in Role Theory in International Relations, eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (Abingdon: Routledge 2011): 234–251. 48.  United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2022 (2011), United Nations, December 2, 2011, accessed December 13, 2019, https:// undocs.org/S/RES/20222011. 49. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the Security Council S/ PV.6736, March 21, 2012, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www. un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 50.  Susanna D. Wing, “French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-Term Regional Presence?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 1 (2016): 59–80. 51. Yun Sun, “How China Views France’s Intervention in Mali: An Analysis,” Brooking Institution, January 23, 2013, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-china-views-francesintervention-in-mali-an-analysis/. 52. Kathrin Hille, “China Commits Combat Troops to Mali,” June 27, 2014, accessed December 13, 2019, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e46f3e42defe-11e2-881f-00144feab7de.html.

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53.  United Nations, “MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MINUSMA Facts and Figures 2015,” United Nations, accessed December 13, 2019, http:// www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml. 54.  Yao Jianing, “First Chinese Peacekeeping Force in Mali Returns with Great Honor,” Ministry of National Defence (PRC), September 28, 2014, accessed July 17, 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/ 2014-09/28/content_4540697.htm. 55.  Dong Zhaohui, “China Supports African Rapid Response Forces,” Ministry of National Defence (PRC), December 12, 2014, accessed July 17, 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2014-12/12/content_4557257.htm. 56. Guangqu Hu, “Zhōngguó fù mǎlǐ wéihé bùduì kāishǐ shǒucì lúnhuàn” [Chinese Troops Began First Rotation in Mali], September 19, 2014, accessed December 13, 2019, http://www.huaxia.com/thjq/jsxw/ dl/2014/09/4074761.html. 57.  Dong Zhaohui, “Chinese Peacekeeping Troops to Mali Receive UN Peace Medals,” Ministry of National Defence (PRC), March 26, 2015, accessed December 13, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Peacekeeping/ 2015-03/26/content_4577156.htm.

Bibliography Aidoo, Richard, and Steve Hess. “Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African Policy.” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 356–383. Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Brittingham, Michael Alan. “The ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism & Conflict.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007): 147–166. Carlson, Allen. “A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent Within the Study of Chinese Nationalism.” Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 1 (2009): 20–35. Chubb, Andrew. “Assessing Public Opinion’s Influence on Foreign Policy: The Case of China’s Assertive Maritime Behaviour.” Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2019): 159–179. Connolly, Chris, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald. “The Long Quest for an International Order with Chinese Characteristics: A Cultural Perspective on Modern China’s Foreign Policies.” Pacific Focus XXVIII, no. 2 (2013): 269–293.

180  N. DUGGAN Downs, Erica Strecker, and Phillip C. Saunders. “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands.” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 114–146. Duggan, Niall. “China’s Changing Role in Its All-Weather Friendship with Africa.” In China’s International Roles Challenging or Supporting International Order?, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, 207–225. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. Fewsmith, Joseph, and Stanley Rosen. “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, edited by David Lampton, 151–190. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Gottwald, Jörn-Carsten, and Niall Duggan. “Hesitant Adaptation: China’s New Role in Global Policies.” In Role Theory in International Relations, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, 234–251. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. Gries, Peter Hays, Derek Steiger, and Tao Wang. “Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy: The Diaoyu Islands Protests, 2012–2013.” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 98 (2016): 264–276. Harnisch, Sebastian. “China’s Historical Self and Its International Role.” In China’s International Roles Challenging or Supporting International Order?, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, 38–58. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. He, Yinan. “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict.” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (2007): 1–24. Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing.” International Security 41, no. 3 (2017): 7–43. Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–767. Krolikowski, Alanna. “State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View.” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008): 109–133. Liao, Nien-chung Chang. “China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping.” Asian Security 12, no. 2 (2016): 82–91. Mitzen, Jennifer. “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security.” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 270–85. Modongal, Shameer. “Development of Nationalism in China.” Cogent Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2016). Poh, Angela, and Mingjiang Li. “A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping.” Asian Security 13, no. 2 (2017): 84–97.

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Reilly, James. “A Wave to Worry About? Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and China’s Anti-Japan Protests.” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 197–215. Sato, Koichi. “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive—A Japanese View.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 8, no. 1 (2019): 50–82. Schneider, Julia C. “Early Chinese Nationalism: The Origins Under Manchu Rule.” In Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power: Nationalism and Historical Consciousness in World Politics, edited by Bart Dessein, 7–29. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Steele, Brent J. Ontological Security in International Relations. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. Stryker, Sheldon, and Anne Statham. “Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory.” In Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, 311–378. New York: Random House, 1985. Taylor, Ian. China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006. Thies, Cameron. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” In The International Studies Encyclopaedia, edited by Robert A. Denemark, 6335–6356. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Thies, Cameron. The United States, Israel and the Search for International Order. London: Routledge, 2013. Wang, Zheng. “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China.” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 783–806. Weiss, Jessica Chen. “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at ‘Rising Nationalism’ and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 119 (2019): 679–695. Wing, Susanna D. “French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-Term Regional Presence?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 1 (2016): 59–80. Wu, Xu. Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007. Xiaolin, Duan. “Unanswered Questions: Why We May Be Wrong About Chinese Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications.” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 108 (2017): 886–900. Ying, Jiang. Cyber-Nationalism in China: Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet Censorship in China. Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2012. Zarakol, Ayse. “Ontological Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan.” International Relations 24, no. 3 (2010): 3–23. Zhang, Jian. “China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping: Towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?” Global Change, Peace & Security 27, no. 1 (2015): 5–19.

182  N. DUGGAN Zhao, Shuisheng. “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations.” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 1–33. Zhao, Suisheng. “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China.” Communist and Post-communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302. Zhao, Suisheng. “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 131–144. Zhimin, Chen. “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (2005): 35–53.

CHAPTER 8

Identity Narratives in China and the EU’s Economic Diplomacy: Comparing the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia Constantin Holzer

Introduction The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia represent China and the EU’s respective flagship initiatives of economic diplomacy in the twenty-first century and offer two separate blueprints for shaping the future of shared economic prosperity on the Eurasian continent and beyond. This chapter will look into the different identity narratives that undergird these initiatives and will compare the BRI with the EU Connectivity Strategy by linking their formal representation, as found in official discourse, to their respective narratives of self and otherness. As can be seen from China’s Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative from March 2015,1 and as was also reiterated in President Xi’s opening address to the Second International BRI Forum in April 2019,2 C. Holzer (*)  University College Cork, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_8

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the BRI is much more than an economic flagship project. It is an overall umbrella term for China’s engagement with the outside world according to its strategic interests. While the official bedrock is infrastructure development, the initiative encompasses the flow of goods, financial capital and people-to-people exchanges, but also includes geopolitical, cultural and even security aspects, like the fight against terrorism. The EU’s Connectivity Strategy instead grew out of the ASEM Connectivity process. First published in September 2018 with a focus on its key principles, ‘rules-based, sustainable and comprehensive’,3 it represents the EU’s vision of Eurasian connectivity and is a reply directed at China’s BRI. Examining China and the EU’s identity narratives will be a useful way to provide a better understanding of ideas and purpose associated with both initiatives. It may also be essential for avoiding misunderstandings and opening up ways of cooperation between them.

The Rationale Behind the BRI and the EU’s Connectivity Strategy As two of the world’s largest economies, China and the EU both understand that they depend on deeper international economic integration and connectivity to sustain economic growth into the future. The stalled Doha trade negotiations and doubts about the future of the WTO system, together with recent rounds of global protectionism and hitherto unprecedented levels of global public and private debt, have made the need for finding new strategies to secure growth more acute than ever. The financial upheaval in connection with the aftermath of the US subprime crisis of 2008 and the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis not only dismantled the aura of economic superiority enjoyed by the advanced economies of the US and the EU, it also increased China’s confidence in their own political and economic system, especially after the leadership change in 2012. In the first half of the 2010s, Beijing saw itself confronted with sluggish international demand, alarming overcapacity in, among other sectors, the Chinese construction industry and insufficient domestic consumption. The need to help a more and more economically vulnerable China secure sources of economic growth into the future, together with increased re-centralisation of power under President Xi Jinping,

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presented the government with an opportunity to launch a new master narrative in support of its economic strategy abroad. China’s leadership had pronounced its ‘Going-out’ strategy4 already in 1997 under President Jiang Zemin, but it was only after 2012, compounded by falling growth rates under what has been referred to as the ‘new normal’, that the time felt right to look overseas in a coordinated attempt at restoring profit rates of Chinese companies. With the confidence of being united under a resolute leader, President Xi Jinping, China announced its BRI in 2013, offering a powerful new narrative to reshape the economic balance of the Eurasian continent. In the years after 2013, China’s Overseas Direct Investments in Europe surged significantly.5 Chinese companies were encouraged to invest abroad to seize strategic assets, acquire foreign technology through mergers and acquisitions, and take part in tenders overseas. On the diplomatic front, China consistently pushed for the inclusion of references to the BRI in bilateral contracts, as well as in directives of multilateral institutions like the UN. By enshrining the BRI in China’s own Party constitution in 2017, its long-term significance as a major pillar of external engagement cannot be overstated.6 In a bid to support funding for its initiative, aside from Chinese ­state-owned policy banks and the US$40 billion Silk Road Fund, China also created a new multilateral development institution in the form of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Comparisons have already been made by Beijing between the BRI and the US Marshall Plan, raising awareness of the high ambitions China has put behind the initiative. The EU, on the other hand, did not feel any urgency to openly react to the BRI until more recently, but China’s rhetoric and active engagement forced the EU to draft a strategy to engage with the BRI in a more coordinated fashion. The news of targeted tech-takeovers of European companies by Chinese companies in 2015 and 2016, together with ‘promise fatigue’ about China’s economic reform process and restricted access to the Chinese market, also led to changes in the EU’s perception of China as a reliable partner in building a multilateral system based on reciprocal market access and competitive neutrality. Against this backdrop the EU launched the Connectivity Strategy for Asia in September 2018, which tries to engage Eurasian connectivity in accordance with the EU’s values and operating principles and is seeking closer coordination on Eurasian infrastructure investment with Japan.7

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Other consequences of the above-mentioned change of perception are ongoing adjustments in the EU’s policies towards China, especially the establishment of a foreign direct investment screening mechanism and the heightened tenor of ‘reciprocity’ in EU–China relationships. In the EU’s Strategic Outlook on China from March 2019, the EU for the first time referred to China as a ‘systemic rival’, marking a new level of sobering realism in EU–China relations.8

Closing in on Evolving Chinese and European Identities Identity can be seen as a foundational moment of collective distinctiveness and purpose.9 It is also relational, which incorporates the dichotomy of the ‘self’ vis-à-vis the ‘other’ and affects actors’ speech and actions.10 This is also true for the European Union and China. Identity is in a sense a form of essentialisation of certain characteristics or events that form part of the history of a person, group, party, nation, etc.—an ephemeral and constantly evolving configuration. What it lacks in accuracy and objective truth, it makes up through emotive charge and its potential to coordinate and arouse individual or collective action. Identity or narrative construction is an essential part of nation building. States build identity around categories such as shared values or history, thereby creating expectations regarding the behaviour of individuals and groups. For this chapter, it is therefore useful to explore the most prominent official narratives that to this day shape perceptions of self and otherness in China and the EU, and analyse in what sense these narratives also form a part of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy. In the case of China, it is recognised that its transformation from the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 to a modern nation state has been a painstaking and difficult process fraught by foreign incursions, war and rivalling ideologies. The official key narrative shaping Chinese identity and national consciousness is that China is heir to an ancient and rich civilisation, which perceived itself as the centre of the world, not as a nation among many. The contact with militarily superior foreign imperialist powers of the nineteenth century humiliated and degraded China, forcing it to agree to unequal treaties and granting extraterritorial privileges to foreigners on their own terms. China’s quest for modernity starts with the desire to remove this stain of national humiliation inflicted at the hands of foreign powers. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged

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victorious from the Civil War and founded the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong in 1949, it set as its task to restore China’s pre-eminent position among nations. China’s rise however does not stop there. In the years after the death of Chairman Mao and with the beginning of economic reform and opening-up in 1979, supreme leader Deng Xiaoping brought China’s economy back on track, growth was restored and China gradually created a more open and international image through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, China’s core narrative of the need to avoid current and future humiliation by foreign powers by achieving national rejuvenation has not changed but is continually evolving. In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping coined the newest version of that narrative by proclaiming the ‘Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation’.11 What is at the core of national rejuvenation and avoiding humiliation is to increase China’s national wealth and power.12 The term fuqiang (wealth and power) is akin to ‘national interest’ in a Westphalian sense, and has become the single most coherent pursuit of Chinese political modernity. Also today, whenever its national interest is under perceived or real threat, China reflexively invokes the nefarious influence of ‘foreign forces’13 and the need to keep working on increasing its national strength as the only way to avoid future bullying by foreign powers. While in China the defining awakening of national identity was linked to national humiliation, in Europe it is the experience of having been ravaged by two world wars, the exalting feeling of national independence, as well as the bitter realisation of guilt associated with the Holocaust and its colonial past. If we further compare Chinese and European national identity, we see that both share a certain feeling of entitlement or e­xceptionalism. They see themselves as heirs to ancient civilisations and stress the exceptional contributions these cultures have left to humankind. For Europe, as a normative power, these contributions hail from the age of Enlightenment and the intellectual achievements attributed to it, as well as Europe’s recent focus on ‘universal values’ such as societal justice, equality, etc. Identity narratives do thus have a strong impact on how China and the EU see themselves today. Whereas the EU likes to present itself as a global role model in terms of responsive and responsible governance, China thinks of itself as reemerging power, which needs to develop further in order to avoid future humiliation. The EU’s narrative of a

188  C. HOLZER Table 8.1  Comparing national identity narratives in China and the EU

Historical legitimacy Foundational moment Self-image

Political and economic system

Geopolitical assessment Means

Ends

China

EU

Ancient civilisation (文明古 国), Chinese cultural heritage, Confucianism, Tianxia 天下, etc. One hundred years of humiliation (百年国耻) Heir to an ancient civilisation on the road towards national rejuvenation Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era Democratic centralism, mass line, socialist market economy Positive (realist) understanding of international order Wealth and power (富强), pragmatism, focus on national interest in a Westphalian sense National rejuvenation (民族复兴), reaching a moderately prosperous society (小康社会), building a community of shared future for mankind (人类命运共同体)

Ancient civilisation, Greco-Roman culture, Christianity, Enlightenment, Renaissance, rationality War, guilt, colonialism and decolonisation, struggle for nationhood Responsible power, paragon of peace, democracy, free trade, cradle of the enlightenment (Eco)social market economy

Separation of powers, parliamentary democracy, rule of law Normative (idealistic) understanding of international order Post-Westphalian moral idealism, promotion of universal values and human rights, free-market competition Peace and reconciliation, individual freedom, equality, justice sustainable growth and prosperity

responsible power that stands for universal norms and values does also pose an implicit threat to China’s political system, at least in the eyes of part of the Chinese leadership. ‘Universal values’, in Chinese known as pushi jiazhi,14 have been identified by the CCP as one of the most dangerous foreign ideological threats (Table 8.1). When China announced the BRI in 2013, this event marked a decisive change in China’s economic and geostrategic interactions with the world. It has been accompanied by a new assertiveness since President Xi came to power in 2012. This assertiveness is compounded by China’s international achievements over the past decade, such as overtaking Germany and Japan as the world’s export champion and becoming the second-largest economy in terms of GDP after the US. China’s slowing but still competitive economic growth rate of over 6 per cent in early 2020 before Covid-19 hit the world, its success in poverty alleviation over the last decades, impressive infrastructure development and rapid

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industrialisation have all contributed to the awareness of being a rising economic power. Under President Xi, China felt prepared to eschew Deng Xiaoping’s well-proven doctrine of ‘avoiding the limelight and honing one’s abilities’ (taoguang yanghui) in favour of a more confident display of its new ‘four confidences’—confidence in the way of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,15 its theories,16 political system17 and culture.18 This new confidence has also meant China becoming more vocal about defending its national interests abroad and not shying away from using its economic and rhetorical muscle to pressure foreign companies or countries into submission in cases where they dare criticise official Chinese policy or otherwise ‘hurt the feelings of the Chinese people’.19 At the core, we see that national humiliation and rejuvenation in the case of China, and national reconciliation and a rules-based global order in the case of the EU, are still the defining hallmarks of their respective identities to this day. What will be the bearing of these narratives on China and the EU’s economic diplomacy in the twenty-first century?

Shared Objectives and Separate Narratives of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy The BRI and the Connectivity Strategy for Asia represent China and the EU’s flagship initiatives for foreign economic engagement in the twenty-first century. Despite the many similarities they share in terms of boosting trade and investments, their respective objectives are also expressions of different identities, perspectives and national interests. According to Zou Lei’s ‘The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, the BRI is a ‘top level design of China’s economic diplomacy in the new era, (and) reflects China’s efforts to promote economic transformation and upgrade through strengthening international cooperation’.20 It has further ‘opened up new space for global economic growth, produced new platforms for international trade and investment and offered new ways for improving global economic governance’.21 The EU’s Connectivity Strategy, which was launched in September 2018, is much less ambitious and low profile compared to the d ­ iplomatic efforts connected to the BRI. The Connectivity Strategy has its sources in joint economic cooperation under the ASEM process, without the large political fanfare associated with the BRI. It instead aims at transforming

190  C. HOLZER Table 8.2  Comparison of the official representations of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy for Asia BRI Main partners

China and Eurasian neighbours, open to all countries including overseas Core principles Win-win and shared benefits, extensive consultation Geographic No restrictions but focus is on scope China’s neighbourhood policy Geostrategic Multipolarity, centralisation of consideration power (democratic centralism) Guided by National interest, national rejuvenation, fuqiang Priorities Infrastructure, energy, transport, people-to-people

Connectivity strategy EU, Japan, countries of Europe and Asia Comprehensive, rules-based, competitive neutrality and equality 30 European and 21 Asian countries of the ASEM process Multilateralism, rules-based, separation of powers, rule of law Universal values, norms and rules Transport, energy, digital, human dimension

Asian and European societies by delivering quality projects through comprehensive, sustainable and rules-based economic cooperation (Table 8.2).22 In order to better illustrate these differences, this chapter will present here a comparison of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy according to several parameters. First, in terms of geographic scope, the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy differ decisively. For the EU, with its strong multilateral tradition, the Connectivity Strategy includes the 30 European and 21 Asian partner countries of the ASEM process, and among others the ASEAN Plus Three, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, etc. The BRI incorporates 6 main economic corridors and stresses the priority of its immediate neighbourhood policy.23 But in addition to that, the BRI is inherently open by design. It does not have any geographical or institutional limitations and was also mentioned in connection with the participation of African and Latin American countries. As stated by President Xi, every project that serves China’s interest and helps to ‘make friends’ and improve people’s life can be a part of the BRI. It is thus open to cooperation from all countries or multilateral institutions and is intended to provide a friendly narrative to mollify critics of China’s economic rise and help promote its strategic interests. While its main focus is on connectivity as a means to sustain growth and improve livelihoods, it also includes

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coordination among states in the area of security, the fight against terrorism, dispute settlement, etc. This purported ‘open design’ or lack of precision regarding geographic reach and purpose of the BRI is to some extent deliberate. Ambiguity is not only an important part of the initiative itself, it is one of its key advantages. Vagueness or openness fit with China’s doctrine of ‘experimentalism’, where the central government first pronounces a policy framework and then lets others try to look for ways towards its realisation. Successful examples are then scaled up and can become national policy.24 In addition to being open in terms of participation, China also remains vague about the financial scale of the BRI and the timescale of its implementation, with estimates ranging from several hundred million to several trillion dollars in connectivity finance over the next few years. At the second BRI summit in April 2019, President Xi signalled both China’s determination and openness about the financing of the BRI, while also confirming that China had signed new BRI-related deals worth US$64 billion: …we will continue to make good use of the Belt and Road Special Lending Scheme, the Silk Road Fund, and various special investment funds, develop Silk Road theme bonds, and support the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance in its operation. We welcome the participation of multilateral and national financial institutions in BRI investment and financing and encourage third-market cooperation.25

Also, the EU is working hard on building financial leverage of the Connectivity Strategy and has increased its external action budget for 2021–2027 to €123 billion, of which €10 billion would go to Asia and the Pacific as part of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. An additional €60 billion euro is being included as investment framework for external action, such as connectivity projects in the EU neighbourhood, the Western Balkans, Africa, etc.26 Second, regarding core principles, we see that there are a lot of synergies and co-dependencies between the initiatives. According to Zou Lei from the Shanghai Party Institute, the central principles of the BRI are openness for cooperation, market principle and shared benefits ­(win-win).27 To these three, the often-cited principle of ‘extensive consultation’ would definitely have to be added. What Beijing means by this

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term is a reference to pragmatism and national interest, as well as to the importance of diplomacy in international relations to strike a balance of interests. Whereas the EU tries to uphold the perception that it acts according to prescribed rules and universal principles, China, with its Westphalian understanding of statehood, acts more visibly on national interests. For the BRI this means that decision outcomes can be subject to diplomatic negotiations and power games among member states, which can define and redefine the rules under which the BRI as a multilateral institution is going to operate. In official representations of the BRI, China is careful to curate a benevolent and multilateral image of the initiative. At a meeting of the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly, which is responsible for economic and financial affairs, President Xi reiterated: The Belt and Road Initiative focuses on development, emphasises the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, pursuits open, green and clean cooperation, and commits to ­high-standard cooperation to improve people’s lives and promote sustainable development.28

Strategically speaking, for China, multilateralism is a tool to work towards a multipolar world order, with China as one of the poles of power and a counterbalance to American hegemony. The EU on the other hand has been a reluctant political power that is still showing strong economic and political dependence on a US-led international alliance. The core principle of the EU’s Connectivity Strategy, instead, is to promote rule-based, comprehensive and sustainable cooperation under a system of competitive neutrality. The EU’s main concern is to work towards a multilateral and open trade system as a guarantee for future prosperity. The key question for the EU is to what extent can China become an ally? Third, also in terms of priorities the two initiatives show significant synergies with their focus on infrastructure, transport, energy, digitalisation and people-to-people exchanges as central pillars for sustaining trade and prosperity throughout the twenty-first century. China’s BRI has also flagged policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure and facilities, unimpeded trade and financial integration as additional priorities.29 In terms of the influence of the two initiatives, it seems clear that the BRI, having been announced first, in 2013, has had more time to hone

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its narrative than the EU Connectivity Strategy. Additionally, in terms of the number of people reached, the Connectivity Strategy is currently no match for the BRI, in part because of the coherent diplomatic effort that the Chinese government has put into promoting their flagship initiative. For the EU, the launch of the Connectivity Strategy is still a reason to rejoice as the bloc has demonstrated its seriousness to engage with Transeurasian connectivity on its own terms, and not left the game to Beijing alone.

Identity Narratives and Discourse Power in Economic Diplomacy China has been infatuated with Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power for a long time.30 Beijing came to agree that there exist other sources of national strength than crude military or financial power, and that they might have a bearing on helping it reach the ultimate goal of national rejuvenation. The ability to co-opt other groups and states by one’s mere behaviour and have them identify with one’s own narrative or cause is a key element of diplomacy, and an indispensable step towards becoming a global power. China can lay claim to its ancient sources of soft power in form of the ‘lai hua narrative’ (come to China and become sinified), the attraction of Confucian civilisation and the pre-eminent status of the Chinese emperor, which influenced other states or people through the attractiveness of China’s superior culture and civilisation rather than brute force. Having understood the need to have China’s official story heard across the globe, Chinese leaders have launched large-scale initiatives to increase China’s international discourse power. A decade before the BRI, China launched its Confucius Institutes under then President Hu Jintao to spread the Chinese language and culture overseas. In 2013, with the BRI under President Xi Jinping, the focus shifted from cultural to economic diplomacy, but under the same principles. The BRI represents in its essence a grand strategy to increase China’s ‘discourse power’ (huayu quan)31 abroad, and to have its official voice heard. Its reference to the historic Silk Roads is of great benefit in this regard as it evokes positive associations and creates a sense of historic legitimacy in support of China’s narrative. But the question is, what does Beijing really stand for in the end? The EU and the US sometimes accuse China of not standing for any

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particular values, thereby calling into question its reliability as a partner. If we look at China’s official utterances and actions, however, we see that this is not the case. Starting from China’s reform and opening-up period under Deng Xiaoping, it has consistently projected its identity through its values and policies. These can be summed up in three points: (1) the right of sovereign states to a pragmatist and flexible foreign policy, (2) being a role model in terms of national rejuvenation and economic development for the Global South or other developing countries, and (3) straddling the twin objectives of preserving one’s traditional culture and values together with rapid modernisation of the country. The BRI and its narrative fit very well into this roster. Together with the AIIB, it presents one of the first multilateral global initiatives that originated in the ‘Global South’ or a ‘developing country’. They thereby support China’s stated aims of multipolarity and multilateralism in international relations and stand for a possible alternative to the hegemony of European and American financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF. Another source of legitimacy of the BRI certainly lies in China’s impressive record in fighting poverty and driving rapid industrialisation over the past 40 years. This narrative is vital for selling the BRI to third countries that are eager to learn from China’s experience and follow its path. If we go back to what the EU and China stand for in terms of principles and values, the focus on non-interference and national sovereignty in a Westphalian sense is one of China’s key characteristics. This point distinguishes it from the politics of universality of norms that are promoted by the European Union. In its understanding of international relations, China did not move very far from the five principles of peaceful coexistence dating from the 1950s, which are still relevant for it today.32 Being aware that China has to show more than that to the international community if it wants to present itself as a positive actor in building a multilateral system of global governance, it skilfully created another narrative—President Xi Jinping’s ‘Community of shared future for mankind’.33 This phrase has also been enshrined into the Party Constitution, and was adopted in a UN Security Resolution for the first time in 2017, marking a major diplomatic victory for China. The phrase sends a strong signal that China is seeking to be a responsible global power and is open to pursue common objectives that benefit the international community. It provides direction for China’s participation in multilateral initiatives combating climate change, terrorism, disarmament, etc.

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China’s new confidence also marks its identity shift from a ­developing country to a developed nation, from imitation to innovation, from rule-taker to rule-maker, from reactive to proactive. The BRI is pre­ sented as a friendly win-win scheme of economic cooperation, but it can also be used as a transmission belt for China’s state power.

Changing European Perceptions of China and the EU’s Responses to BRI-Related Concerns Are China and the EU’s identity narratives compatible with one another or do they present an obstacle to closer cooperation? As mentioned above, for the EU, the biggest question is whether China can be a reliable ally in building a rules-based multilateral global order based on equitable participation and competitive neutrality, or whether China’s different political system and Westphalian understanding of national interest will present a threat to a multilateral system? China’s references to market principles and shared benefits (win-win) in relation to the BRI do warrant closer scrutiny, as they have been at the centre of allegations accusing the BRI of promoting debt-trap diplomacy and favouritism for Chinese companies. Reports of China seizing strategic assets abroad dealt a blow to the win-win narrative of the BRI in 2018 and 2019.34 China is aware of these criticisms, and has tried to adjust its policy accordingly, as evidenced by the 2nd BRI forum in April 2019 where it promised increased openness, environmental sustainability and a zero tolerance for corruption. In the forum’s keynote address, President Xi said that China needs to be guided by a: people-centered approach, give priority to poverty alleviation and job creation to see that the joint pursuit of Belt and Road cooperation will deliver true benefits to the people of participating countries and contribute to their social and economic development.…We have also formulated the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road and published the Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative to provide guidance for BRI financing cooperation.35

There is also concern among the EU that with the increased influence of the BRI and stronger economic dependency, China may be in a position

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to push its interests through economic coercion, which offers more subtle approaches to imposing one’s will and extracting concessions from other countries. China’s vocal responses and boycotts against foreign companies whose employees dared to criticise China’s domestic policies are an eerie example of this. Due to the sheer size and attractiveness of the Chinese market, it seems that China’s tactics of naming, publicly shaming and boycotting are very effective, and might lead to more companies prohibiting their employees commenting on sensitive topics. For this reason, the question of China’s participation in critical infrastructure projects like telecommunication networks has become a sensitive one for the EU. As a result, a final decision on the degree of involvement of Huawei in building the next generation of telecommunication infrastructure in the EU is still awaited at the time of writing. Despite some backlash and criticisms, the BRI continues to make steady advances also in Europe. As of now, 14 out of 28 EU member states have already signed bilateral endorsements of the BRI, with Italy in 2019 being the first G7 nation to join the initiative.36 China also started its own economic dialogue with the Central and Eastern European States (known as the 16+1),37 promising much needed infrastructure investments. Recently, after harsh criticism from the EU, China seems to have toned down the initiative, despite many Central and Eastern European countries feeling positive about the dialogue forum itself. The EU’s main concerns about the BRI are related to economic vulnerability and dependence, but also to the question of how to ensure shared benefits and reciprocal relations. As put in a report by Bart Gaens for the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: China is investing strongly in integration towards the West, but a comparable flow from West to East is generally absent. Furthermore, China funded projects most often are tied with Chinese companies, and are much more to the benefit of China than of the local countries. Frequently lacking a transparent bidding process, they are generally less open to local or international companies. Importantly, China typically provides loans to countries rather than investments, which can have a profound impact on national debt, as in the case of Montenegro.38

The EU has come to terms with the fact that China’s new status in the world and economic overtures of win-win cooperation across the globe require some level of policy coordination on the part of the EU. In that

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regard, 2019 was an important year. In the new EU Strategic Outlook on China from April 2019, China was referred to for the first time as a systemic rival. The report further elaborated that The European Commission now regards China simultaneously as a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.39

The launch of the Europa Connectivity Forum in Brussels in September 2019, jointly opened by EU President Jean-Claude Juncker and Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe, marks a decisive step towards advancing the EU’s flagship connectivity strategy with Japan as its key partner in Asia. While China’s BRI is still perceived as a major chance for reviving investment and growth, the EU seems to be more and more ‘receptive to business complaints that China is buying up EU firms and their technologies while denying reciprocal access to Chinese markets’.40 To further protect its economic interests, the EU also adopted a regulation on screening foreign direct investment from non-EU countries in March 2019, with the aim of protecting security and public order.41 While the EU mandate for action is still small in that regard when compared to similar mechanisms in the US, Japan or China, it still marks an important step towards economic realism.

Conclusion We have seen that both China and the EU present themselves as responsive and, to a varying degree, responsible international powers and proponents of a multilateral trading order, international trade and environmental sustainability. The BRI can make a contribution to both, to a multipolar and sinocentric world order, and to an alternative multilateral system next to the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO. One key thing the BRI achieved from the moment it was announced by the Chinese government was to spell the death sentence for traditional development finance as it has been practised by the advanced economies since the post-war era. The fact that a developing country like China launched a new multilateral investment initiative that was outside the established financial institutions simply obliterated the ‘aid narrative’ in economic

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development. What took its place was the ‘business narrative’, with ‘connectivity’ and ‘infrastructure development’ as the ways to achieve economic growth. A healthy level of competition between the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy will also mean that the solemnly stated aims of ‘green, open and transparent’ will be taken more seriously by both sides, which should be viewed as positive. China and the EU have also shown that they take each other more and more seriously as partners, as evidenced by the appointment of a special envoy to Europe on the Chinese side. Pressure from the US–China trade war means that China is increasingly looking towards strengthening its ties with Europe: In Madrid and in Brussels this month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi characterised EU-China relations as standing at a new historical starting point. He added that for China, supporting European unity and prosperity was a strategic choice given the absence of geopolitical contradictions and conflicts of interest.42

The question China has yet to answer, and which will be essential for gauging its reliability to other nations, is whether it would submit under international norms and rules that it itself has helped co-create? Will it allow rules to limit its radius of action or will its famous ‘win-win’ mean that China always wins twice? At the second international BRI forum, China showed that it can be responsive to international criticism and tried to perform adjustments to the BRI in 2019 in reaction to accusations of debt traps and seizures of strategic assets. In addition, the Joint Statement of the 21st EU-China summit in April 2019 gives cause for cautious optimism about future cooperation on Eurasian connectivity. With a bilateral trade volume of more than €500 billion a year and a joint belief in multilateral engagement, the EU and China know their partnership is too important to the world to not get it right. While the official objectives of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy show many synergies and there is a healthy level of competition between them, it is rather the political question of how to guarantee ‘reciprocity’ and ‘shared benefits’ in a closer relationship with China that causes uncertainty and tension. In a pre covid-19 world, the year 2020 was seen as a critical juncture for the future of China–EU relations with two high-level meetings and a possible breakthrough in negotiations on the much-anticipated EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on

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Investment (CAI). While covid-19 and its wider impact have somewhat dampened these hopes, China and the EU should eventually realise that their respective connectivity agendas are best served by further strengthening mutual economic cooperation and assisting each other to make a speedy recovery from the crisis. Worsening geopolitical rivalry and lingering mutual mistrust will however not make this an easy task.

Notes









1.  NDRC, “Action Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative,” National Development and Reform Commission, March 30, 2015, http://english. www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080 249035.htm. 2. Jinping Xi, “Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation—Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 26, 2019, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1658424.shtml. 3. European Commission, “Connecting Europe and Asia—Building Blocks for an EU Strategy,” European Union, September 19, 2081, https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_connecting_ europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf. 4. Zouchuqu zhanlue 走出去战略. 5. Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies,” MERICS Papers on China (Berlin: MERICS and Rhodium Group, 2019). 6. Ying, “Belt and Road Incorporated into CCP Constitution,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/ c_136702025.htm. 7. The EU and Japan joined forces on connectivity and infrastructure finance in Europe and Asia in a step to brace themselves for strong competition from China’s BRI. Their unique selling position is the focus on delivering quality infrastructure and upholding international standards on environmental protection, societal equity and transparency. For more information, see Michael Peel, “Japan and EU Sign Deal in Riposte to China’s Belt and Road,” Financial Times, September 27, 2019, https://www.ft.com/ content/dd14ce1e-e11d-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc. 8.  European Commission, “EU-China—A Strategic Outlook,” European Union, March 12, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.

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9. Reuben Wong, “The Issue of Identity in the EU-China Relationship,” Politique Européenne 1, no. 39 (2013): 160; Mary F. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 24. 10. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 161. 11. Shixian zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de zhongguo meng 实现中华民族 伟大复兴的中国梦. 12. For a detailed historical exposition of this thought, see Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 2014); Yaqing Qin, “Guojia shenfen, zhanlue wenhua he anquan liyi – guanyu Zhongguo yu guoji shehui guanxi de sange jiashe” [National Identity, Culture Stratagem and National Security—Three Assumptions About China’s Relationship with the International Community] Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics], no. 1 (2003): 10–15. 13. Waiguo shili 外国势力. 14. Pushi jiazhi 普世价值. 15. Zhonguo tese shehui zhuyi daolu zixin 中国特色社会主义道路自信. 16. Lilun zixin 理论自信. 17. Zhidu zixin 制度自信. 18. Wenhua zixin 文化自信. 19. Recent examples are China’s boycotts of the Houston Rockets and FC Arsenal over critical comments made by members of their clubs’ management or players. 20. Lei Zou, The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Vol. 1 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2018), 141. 21. Jinping Xi, “Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation.” 22. China and the EU jointly set up the EU-China Connectivity Platform in 2015 between the EU Commission’s DG Move and China’s NDRC, in an effort to coordinate actions in the area of transport and explore synergies between the BRI and the EU’s approach to connectivity. For more information, see European Commission (DG Move), “The EU-China Connectivity Platform,” March 12, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/ transport/themes/international/eu-china-connectivity-platform_en. 23. The 6 BRI corridors are: (1) the New Eurasian Land Bridge, (2) the ChinaCentral Asia-West Asia Corridor, (3) the China-Pakistan Corridor, (4) the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Corridor, (5) the ­ China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, and (6) the China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor; Zou, The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 164–168. 24. For more information on experimentalism as a strategy in Chinese politics, see Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic

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Rise,” Studies in Comparative International Development, no. 43 (2008): 1–26. 25. Jinping Xi, “Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation.” 26. Bart Gaens, “Europe’s Connectivity Strategy and the Challenge of China: Rivalry, Reciprocity, or Both?” FIIA Comment 22, May 12, 2018, https:// www.fiia.fi/en/publication/europes-connectivity-strategy-and-the-challenge-of-china; European Commission, “Explaining the European Union’s Approach of Connecting Europe and Asia,” Press Corner, September 19, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_ 18_5804. 27. Zou, The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 160–161. 28. Xinhua Agency, “Chinese Enjoy Calls for Advancement of Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhuanet, October 8, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2019-10/08/c_138454448.htm. 29. Zou, The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 168. 30.  For additional information on soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–171. 31. Huayu Quan 话语权. 32. These principles are (1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (互相尊重主权和领土完整), (2) mutual n ­on-aggression (互不侵犯), (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (互不干涉内政), (4) equality and mutual benefit (平等互利), and (5) peaceful coexistence (和平共处). 33. Renleil mingyun gongtong ti 人类命运共同体. 34.  Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said Than Done,” Journal of Contemporary China (2019): 10. 35. Jinping Xi, “Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation.” 36.  Bart Gaens, “Europe’s Connectivity Strategy and the Challenge of China,” 22. 37. The name was changed from 16+1 to 17+1 after Greece’s decision to join the initiative in April 2019. 38.  Bart Gaens, “Europe’s Connectivity Strategy and the Impact on ­Asia-Europe Relations,” in Trade and Economic Connectivity in the Age of Uncertainty, eds. Christian Echle and Megha Sarmah (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2019), 22. 39. European Commission, “EU-China—A Strategic Outlook,” 1. 40. Philippe Legrain, “The EU’s China Conundrum,” Asia Times, April 7, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/the-eus-china-conundrum/ (first appeared in Project Syndicate, April 5, 2019, https://

202  C. HOLZER www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-divide-and-rule-europeby-philippe-legrain-2019-04?barrier=accesspaylog). 41. European Commission, “Screening of Foreign Direct Investment,” News Archive, April 10, 2019, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index. cfm?id=2006. 42. Mathieu Duchatel, “Why China Senses Strategic Advantage in Its ‘New Historical Starting Point’ with Europe,” South China Morning Post, December 28, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ article/3043584/why-china-senses-strategic-advantage-its-new-historical.

Bibliography Gaens, Bart. “Europe’s Connectivity Strategy and the Impact on Asia-Europe Relations.” In Trade and Economic Connectivity in the Age of Uncertainty, edited by Christian Echle and Megha Sarmah. Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2019. Hanemann, Thilo, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz. “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies.” In MERICS Papers on China. Berlin: MERICS and Rhodium Group, 2019. Heilmann, Sebastian. “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise.” Studies in Comparative International Development, no. 43 (2008): 1–26. Katzenstein, Mary F. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–171. Qin, Yaqing. “Guojia shenfen, zhanlue wenhua he anquan liyi – guanyu Zhongguo yu guoji shehui guanxi de sange jiashe” [National Identity, Culture Stratagem and National Security—Three Assumptions About China’s Relationship with the International Community] Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics], no. 1 (2003): 10–15. Schell, Orville, and John Delury. Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House, 2014. Wong, Reuben. “The Issue of Identity in the EU-China Relationship.” Politique Européenne 1, no. 39 (2013): 160. Zhao, Suisheng. “China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done.” Journal of Contemporary China (2019): 10. Zou, Lei. The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Vol. 1. Singapore: World Scientific, 2018.

CHAPTER 9

Nationhood and Ethnicity at the Frontiers: A Study of Hmong Identity in Western Hunan Lijing Peng Introduction A decade after Benedict Anderson’s scholarship on nationalism became fundamentally influential in humanities studies, Prasenjit Duara brought forward a new perspective on Anderson’s theory using China as a case study.1 Duara considers that ‘Chinese culturalism’, a hybrid of universalistic beliefs in the civilising effects of culture found in Confucianism, and a sense of ethnically defined community of the Han Chinese, enabled the peoples of China to imagine their community as a totalising one.2 What then for the non-Han communities in China? What political or cultural criteria do they use to recognise their identities? Drawing on accounts of military activities, educational institutions and trans-regional commercial networks, the nature and changes of Hmong identity recognition is examined in this chapter by analysing the relationship between indigenous communities (mainly the Hmong ethnic group) and the central Imperial and Republic governments.

L. Peng (*)  Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_9

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Multipolar ethnic identities have emerged as a result of negotiating with the central government over issues concerning land use, taxation and the quotas of civil service examination degrees. These various forms of nationhood and ethnicity served as an important foundation and a source of continuous influence in the construction of nationalism in Western Hunan in the final years of the Chinese empire and the subsequent Republican period. At the end of the chapter, new approaches adopted by current generation of scholars are also discussed. The discussions in this chapter do not aim to direct attention to the nature of Hmong identity; they rather emphasise a semiotic approach of understanding the process of constructing Hmong identity as continuous changes in perceived social positions and social relations. Yet, more importantly, they emphasise the fluidity of identity in the construction of ‘Hmong-ness’ in the late Qing and early Republic of China periods. Caspar Hirschi defines ‘nation’ in terms of the multipolarity of nationality in contrast to the bipolarity of the empire.3 In their introduction to the edited volume Empire at the Margins, Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu and Donald S. Sutton look at ‘how state categories confront and compromise with indigenous ones, and how differences were attested in different historical contexts’.4 This inquiry is particularly relevant when one thinks of the identity formation of China’s minority ethnic groups. As Paul R. Katz points out, ‘the study of such mechanisms can also shed light on the nature of so-called “cultural frontiers” in modern Chinese history. This relates to the question of whether we choose to consider frontiers as barriers (zones of resistance that slow cultural movements or divert them into different channels) or contact zones (meeting places where hybrid cultures form, with ritual advancing such processes)’.5 Looking into the idea of ‘cultural frontiers as contact zones’ gives us insights into the complexity of identity recognition. The construction of the ethnic identity of the Hmong, or in modern Mandarin ‘Miao’, is a good example. Working on this topic is by no means easy, given that the community in question has few historical archives written in the indigenous language(s), and is not under the influence of one specific institutional religion. It is a demonstration of how diversified and mixed social and cultural resources function in the construction of ethnic identity. The research area is West Hunan (see Fig. 9.1), where the particular historical and geographical environment has witnessed long-term conflicts between minority ethnic groups and dominant imperial forces. The characteristics of multipolar nationhood and ethnicity in the local history of Western Hunan in late Imperial (fourteenth to early twentieth

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Fig. 9.1  Location of West Hunan (yellow) within Hunan Province of China (Drawn by Wikipedia User Croquant in December 2007 using various sources, mainly: Hunan Province administrative regions GIS data: 1:1M, County level, 1990 Hunan Counties map from www.hua2.com. Please refer to: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiangxi_Tujia_and_Miao_Autonomous_Prefecture#/ media/File:Location_of_Xiangxi_Prefecture_within_Hunan_(China).png; under Creative Commons License, CC BY 3.0, accessed October 8, 2019.)

century) China are investigated, with particular interest in the impact of nationalism on Western Hunan in the Republican period (1912–1949), which took the form of shaping Republican citizenship and minority ethnic identity. It is worth clarifying that the formation and recognition of Hmong ethnic identity in other (mostly neighbouring) areas of China is different. In this chapter, the term ‘Hmong’ is used instead of the modern Mandarin ‘Miao’, because ‘Hmong people’ is a more internationally recognised term for this ethnic group. It is also worth pointing out that when the term ‘the Han’ is referred to, it does not denote the current

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Han ethnic group in the modern Chinese nation. It refers to a vaguely defined criterion in differentiating ancient Chinese people. Before the twentieth century, in the very long imperial history, ‘the Han’ roughly referred to those who conformed to Confucian morality and at the same time traced their sovereignty to the ancient Huaxia Chinese. In some dynasties the sovereignty went to non-Han rulers. For example, in the Qing dynasty, the rulers were Manchu. However, the expansion of central government’s power to the Southern area was still justified by Confucian politico-moral cultures. Therefore, southern ethnic groups such as Hmong were still treated as cultural others.6

West Hunan Hmong land in Ancient and Imperial China (Eleventh Century B.C. to Nineteenth Century A.D.) Recent scholarship recognises a distinct culture of ancient China (eleventh to second century B.C.) indigenous to large areas of the current Central and Southern China, namely the Chu culture (culture of the ancient Chu State). This culture is considered to include apparently different geographical, religious, literary (literature and legal) and ritual burial traditions according to the recent archaeological findings and manuscript research.7 An earlier researcher, Edwin Pulleyblank (1922– 2013), studied the Chu culture and proposed that Chu civilisation was formed by non-Han ethnic groups residing along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River under the influence of the Han civilisation (see Map 2). As a result, the civilising process can be seen as a process of adopting Han culture and discriminating against ‘barbarism’. The most important index of this process, according to Pulleyblank, was language.8 Luo Xin insightfully indicates that the conversion of the Southern Polity to Han culture does not mean the conversion of the whole population, or even of the majority population; he further points out that this conversion was a very slow process in which Han culture gradually permeated socially from one place to another. In ancient Chu areas, the Han-influenced regions and populations were like small islands surrounded by a sea of Chu culture; yet it is observed that when the two cultures confronted each other, the Chu residents who would not acknowledge Han political administration moved away to the remote mountainous areas.9

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As early as the Han and Jin Dynasties (202 B.C.–420 A.D.), the peoples living along the vales and glens of Hubei, Hunan and South-eastern Sichuan Provinces were already designated by the Zhongyuan (lit. Central Plain, mainstream Huaxia Chinese) people as Ba or Man. The Huaxia Chinese may have thought that of these alien tribes, those who inhabited the northern half were descendants of Lin Jun (a heroic ancestor figure of the Ba people), while those in the southern half descended from Pan Hu. Pan Hu was a mythological figure with canine features, imagined as being a divine hound himself. Ancient Chinese myths tell that he was given the hand of the daughter of Emperor Gao Xin, another mythological figure, and from the couple derived all the barbarian tribes in the mountains. During the Nanbei Dynasties period (420–589 A.D.), many Huaxia Chinese fled southward from their homeland in Northern China, and the ‘descendants of Pan Hu’ at this time referred more clearly to the mountain tribes in Western Hunan.10 The most well known were the ‘Five-Stream Barbarians’ (third to sixth century A.D.) residing in current Hunan Province. The ancient myths describe how these ‘barbarians’, or progeny of Pan Hu, favoured colourful and highly decorated clothes. They had split up into many regional communities, distinguished mainly by different clothing, as early as their first large-scale contacts with the Huaxia Chinese during the Han Dynasty. Western Hunan locals living amid Huaxia Chinese during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.) had already been assimilated to Huaxia in all aspects of life. Yet those inhabiting the valleys and mountains kept their own languages, distinct customs and communities.11 After the Tang Dynasty, the range of ‘descendants of Pan Hu’ in the mind of mainstream Huaxia gradually expanded to include more southern and south-eastern regions. Approximately around the time of the Southern Song Dynasty, all the non-Han populations began to be designated either individually as the Hmong, etc., or collectively as ‘descendants of Pan Hu’. The people known as the Hmong at that time probably also recognised themselves as progeny of Pan Hu.12 In many areas of China where a minority people were a considerable local force, a certain degree of autonomy was granted, while local government being still responsible for reporting administrative issues to the royal court. This is called the Tusi Institution (native chieftain institution). The local chieftainship was similar to the feudal lordship in medieval Western Europe. The office of local chieftain was hereditary, and the chieftains had military duties when the sovereignty of

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central government was violated. Paying annual tributes, military duties and land-farming were mandatory. It was also mandatory that some of their male offspring were educated in the civil service examination system and passed the first or second round of the civil service recruiting exams.13 In an extreme example, the last generations of one local chieftain family in Kham Tibet never spoke Tibetan during their lifetime.14 Due to the uniqueness of the Hmong, none of the Tusi was ever from the Hmong communities; the local chieftain families in Western Hunan were from another ethnic group: the Tu-jia. It was also widely believed, even by local people, that the Tusi families in central China were actually descendants of Han migrants from Jiangxi Province from before the fourteenth century.15 Since the Tusi institution was established in Western Hunan, people under Tusi administration were thus indirectly governed by the central government, but the majority of the Hmong remained ‘raw barbarians’ outside the dynasty’s jurisdiction. Since the fourteenth century, in the periods when the Han or the other ruling ethnic groups had evident economic developments and population booms, or had to migrate and to expand their settlements as dictated by the development policies of the central government, their confrontation with Hmong people usually led to fierce warfare. The military frontline, which was intended for the whole Hmong territory, gradually advanced into the Hmong heartland during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and finally formed a military defence line against the Hmong in the Wanli period (1573–1620). It was then named the Twelve Fortresses of Wanxi by the government. Later, it was named Hmong Frontier Wall (currently known as The Southern Great Wall) was built along this defensive line.16 The construction of the Southern Great Wall took over four centuries, and its construction by the central imperial government officially marked the Raw Hmong, the Hmong beyond the wall, as an population that were not protected or regualted by local administrative forces. However, the Tusi also had subtle but solid relationships with the Raw Hmong, especially in economic and military collaborations. Some local chieftains developed military skills and improved their weapons manufacture by learning from the Raw Hmong. It is worth noting that the communications between the Raw Hmong and Tusi were mostly in the Hmong language.17 It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that Hmong people started learning the South-western dialect of Mandarin. Western Hunan area

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had the longest surviving local chieftainship in Chinese history. Tusi was allowed by the central government to have their own armies, which were not part of the imperial army and had no military obligation towards the government except on occasions of foreign invasion, when they had to follow the central government’s command. The Tusi army was half civilian, half military: civilian in times of peace but enlisted when wars broke out. Some Hmong people joined the Tusi army and fought under central leadership against invasions, such as in the battles against the Japanese pirates who plundered the coastline of South-eastern China from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.18

Western Hunan and the Hmong in Late Qing Dynasty Owing to increasing military confrontations, the central government’s attention to West Hunan substantially increased. During the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), the first formal governing institution was set up as the Shoubei (guardianship) in 1513. The Tusi institution was abolished in 1707, and the first local government was established two years later in Fenghuang. Finally, in 1735, the Dao of Chenyuanyong Jingbingbei (a military-political administrative division) was set up, with its administrative centre in Fenghuang, which rendered Fenghuang the then military and administrative centre of Western Hunan. Two early gazetteers of Fenghuang were compiled. Xie Xiaohui states that in the early eighteenth century, local rulers who reported to Qing imperial court used two different policies and strategies in Western Hunan. To the communities which were under the control of Tusi, of whom the majority were Han, Tu-jia and Hmong communities in Northern Western Hunan and within the Southern Great Wall, the state political and juridical institutions of Qing applied and replaced the native chieftainship. To the communities living outside the control of Tusi, who were mainly Hmong communities in south-western Hunan and beyond the Southern Great Wall, certain specific census registers, conventional regulations, land policies and tax policies applied alongside the state institutions.19 These specific policies implied that the Qing Empire recognised the region as the frontier rather than part of the empire. At this stage, the Hmong representatives and lower ranking officials played an important role in forming the perception of the culture of these communities as accepted by central government, and in mediating the relationship between the Qing central government and

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local communities. The Qing administration of south-western Hunan in this period, especially its land policies, led to the tragic confrontations between some Hmong communities and the Qing State.20 A gazetteer of Fenghuang was first compiled in 1758, then revised and enlarged in 1824, and emended again in 1890—all over the time span of 132 years. These gazetteers documented more detailed information on the Western Hunan Hmong people and reflected the attitudes of the government officials towards them. A Gazetteer of Fenghuang Ting compiled in Qianlong period (1736–1795) stated: Before their submission, the Red Hmong21 were aggressive and wild, raiding and assaulting the residents, so that peaceful living had not been possible for centuries. Now, however, sage emperors rule and succeed one another, so that the Hmong are touched by the teaching of the sages and come to submission, like the beasts and birds which dance when hearing the Confucian teaching; and we are exempt from marauders for decades… so that all the future generations know that the sage is in the supreme position, and his morality and authority command the farthest parts…customs should be observed, in order to establish the standard of abundance and scarcity; let them learn about loyalty, filial duty, integrity and righteousness, so that they will follow the rights and avoid the wrongs. The heavier the laws, the less effective it sustains people’s hearts and customs; ruling this land in such a way, is it not as easy as looking into one’s own palm!22

From this account, Hmong people were still considered as barbarians beyond the imperial administration; and the relationship between the Hmong and the emperor’s government was analogised to the relationship between beasts and Confucian saints. The royal families and aristocratic houses of the Qing Dynasty came from the Manchu ethnic group and fully adopted Confucian morality as a basic ruling principle. Accordingly, the local officers, mostly the Han, would not strengthen the non-Han features of Southern ethnic groups but would only point out their status as not being involved in the central governmental administration system using the metaphor of not being Confucianised. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the ­Qianlong-Jiaqing Hmong Rebellion (1795–1806)23 was suppressed, the local government opened regular markets in the Hmong–Han borderland (along the Southern Great Wall), and made the third day of each month a market day for the Hmong and the Han to trade. The market commerce brought great convenience to the daily life of this borderland,

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and the regulations and restrictions published by the local government thereby helped preserve peace to some extent.24 He Lin (1753–1796, a political and military minister) promulgated the Six Aftermaths for Hunan Miaojiang (Hunan Miaojiang Shanhou Liutiao, 1796)25 after the rebellion, which states, among other things, that ‘for Han-Hmong trades, a site should be chosen by the people at the border, and a market is thus set up to trade on certain days regularly, but no bartering of goods for land is allowed’. The markets were located near the sentry posts on the border wall, so that Han–Hmong communication was directly put under the supervision of the central government. Since the nineteenth century, market commerce had greatly developed in Western Hunan, and the commercial production in all parts of Western Hunan had increased significantly, especially after the Opium Wars, when the production and commerce of China wood oil (Tung oil) became a large contributor to the local economy. During the Daoguang period (1821– 1850), the number of markets doubled from seven, in the Qianglong period, to fourteen. This century also witnessed: first, the enlargement of Fenghuang Town to twice its original size; second, the building of more than thirty new temples and altars, and dozens of bureau houses and third, the renovating of 180 li (90 km) of the border wall and sentry posts, which was a costly project.26 A Gazetteer of Fenghuang Ting compiled in Daoguang period (1821–1850) wrote: Though the Hmong are alien people, they also have human temperaments; though their land is barbarian and remote, they also understand the teachings. Today’s Hmong people respect the superiors and elders as well, turning their faces inland (towards the central dynasty), there are some who would not abandon themselves… And the Hmong of today are not the same as the Hmong of yonder.27

At the peak of the Western Hunan Hmong rebellion (1796), representatives of the Hmong held a negotiation with representatives from the central government in Fenghuang Ting, demanding ‘Hmong land for the Hmong, and Han land for the Han’.28 Ethnic identity was realised through fighting for space for the Hmong. After the 1796 Rebellion, the rotating government officials mainly appointed Hmong officials and accepted subject Hmong people into their governance. The subsequent official documents of regulations on Hmong–Han trading put

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business activities directly under supervision of central government, which also reflects that the Hmong, except those living in deep mountainous area, were finally viewed as citizens of the empire. Soon after the Qianlong-Jiaqing Hmong Rebellion, the local government carried out a registration census in Western Hunan, but only the households inside the Southern Great Wall were registered and made to abide local taxing. The registered households were also officially under the protection of the empire. In contrast, the ones who were not registered were neither under the protection of the local army against raids by bandit gangs, nor protected by the empire’s law in commercial activities. The Hmong households which were registered were termed the Cooked Hmong (shumiao) while the ones beyond the wall were called the Raw Hmong (shengmiao).29 After the Qianlong-Jiaqing Hmong Rebellion, Baojia system, a ­community-based system of law enforcement and civil control aiming at reducing the central government’s reliance on mercenaries, was established in Western Hunan. Baojia system was applied in different forms in different areas of imperial China since the eleventh century. Regional rulers were authorised to collect taxes and to maintain military and civil projects.30 Under this system, several Hmong officials were selected to participate in political administration in Hmong areas, which allowed the Hmong a certain degree of autonomy.31 These local officials were very important in regulating local commerce and the military land-farming system. The most famous local army of Fenghuang, the Gan Army (gan jun), played an important role in the late Qing/early Republican period in Western Hunan. The local soldiers of the Gan Army (mostly from the Hmong) had only temporary military status32; they undertook military training from autumn to winter and ploughed from spring to autumn. From 1840 to 1874, the Gan Army had trained an impressive number of military elites, seven of whom became important military ministers in charge of frontier guardianship. During the Republic period, this system continued to function and contributed at least seven lieutenant generals and many more lower ranking military officials to the Republic army.33 Besides the military land-farming system, there were also a civil land-farming system34 and a Hmong land-farming system.35 A Gazetteer of Fenghuang Ting compiled in Guangxu period (1824– 1890) deleted the Defence against the Hmong (Miao Fang) volumes of the Daoguang compilation. It still has two volumes on geography and

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military farming, with its emphasis shifting from discussing subsistence to describing the people’s customs and morality. There are 16 volumes in total of this compilation, of which 12 are devoted to customs and morality, including ceremonies, schooling, temples and altars, celebrities, elections, countryside gentry, notable characters, newly settled persons, retired officials, virtuous women and miscellaneous details. May-bo Ching suggests that the native-place gazetteers compiled by local literati in the late Qing Dynasty generally reflected the local government’s will to cultivate patriotic sentiments.36 The Daoguang compilation of the Fenghuang Ting gazetteer includes many descriptions of the Hmong area, which further indicates that Hmong people were considered to be subjects of the empire in Western Hunan by this time. In the nineteenth century, the local government significantly increased the education input in Western Hunan, which was substantially funded through taxation from the land-farming systems. The number of public schools exempt from tuition fees (yixue) increased. Students from registered Hmong schools were enrolled, while local officials advocating an increase in the quota of Hmong students participating in the civil service exams. In the mean time, a large number of private schools funded by local elites were set up to ensure that even more students from various ethnic backgrounds were involved in the civil service examination system. In the meantime, modernised schools featuring Western education, as well as military schools, burgeoned.37

Western Hunan and the Hmong in Late Qing and Early Republic of China Period Henry Davies (1865–1950, a British military officer) led expeditions into the Yunnan Province to explore possible routes for a railway connecting British-occupied Burma with the upper Yangtze River and on through to Sichuan between 1894 and 1900. Samuel Clarke stayed in South-western China for more than thirty years from 1889, mostly with the Black Hmong community in Guizhou as a missionary. Davies’ and Clarke’s publications were welcomed by Western scholars for exploring the Han and non-Han cultures in imperial China and indicating their ‘immiscibility’. From this exploration the conclusion was drawn that the expansion of Han culture in imperial China did not effectively bring

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civilisation to non-Han races, but rather turned them to ‘practical slavery’.38 In 1924, French missionary François Marie Savina (1876–1941, Missions Etrangéres de Paris) published his landmark documentation of Hmong people in Asia. This historical work includes a profound exploration of language, social institution, contemporary ethnography and the mythical past of Hmong people living in South-western China.39 Inspired by the Asian-European historical linguistics of the nineteenth century and the Annales school developed by French historians in the twentieth century, as well as the burgeoning anthropological studies of his time, Savina’s academic approach was set up with a clear framework: to look for exotic, ancient nations that encapsulated all forms of purity and goodness. He believed that the Hmong language had remained a stable form which could be dated back to ancient times (2000 B.C.). Following the earliest ethnographic surveys of the Hmong in China written by the European missionaries and army officials, systematic researches were carried out and published by Chinese scholars once the political regime of the Republic of China was stabilised. Academia Sinica was established by the government of the Republic of China in 1928; and the Institute of History and Philology belonging to its Humanity and Social Sciences Division was established in the same year. Many European and American-trained scholars were hired and worked for Academia Sinica or other research institutions in order to study the South-western ethnic groups and to illustrate a cultural ground of the unitary ‘national ethnic group’. In October 1934, the ­Mongolian-Tibetan Committee of Republic Government promulgated the No. 112 Address: The South-western provinces of our nation are resided by various ethnic communities; the Hmong and other barbarians scattered distributed, and their customs vary. In order to unite all ethnic groups in our nation and to prevent the imperialists to take advantage of them, it is necessary to thoroughly survey the circumstances and state of affairs of these ethnic groups. The inquiry schedule is hereby formulated which is for the consultation of different governments in South-western provinces; and effective surveys were demanded.40

Since then ethnographic surveys and identifications have been carried out by different governments and academic institutions in the ­South-western provinces of the Republic of China. Ethnographers from

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the Institute of History and Philology, Ling Chunsheng (1902–1981, trained in France and influenced by the Annales school) and Rui Yifu (1898–1991, educated in Yale University), did three-months of anthropological research in Fenghuang in 1933 and documented a large number of non-Han rituals and customs. They also observed that, because of the late Qing ethnic policies reviewed above, the Hmong land was deeply influenced by the imperial administration, mostly the ideology of regional identity and Confucian morality adopted by local gentry. In their research report there is a paragraph stating: In recent years the local government constantly announces their prohibition of the uncivilised sacrifice rituals, therefore the drum dances are not usually seen; and the educated Hmong gentries consider it a big insult to talk about the drum dances which they think exposes the remaining barbarism of the Hmong.41

After their field surveys, some local intellectuals from Fenghuang wrote to the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission of the Republic Government and accused them of ‘focussing on the uncivilised and primitive customs of the Hmong, collecting them to make films, and using the films for making fun and profit’. They also accused the scholars of three major crimes: ‘forcing the Hmong to kill their oxen as sacrifice to deity’, ‘enjoining the good womenfolk to play the drums and excessive immoral music, if anyone refused, they flogged her and imposed fines on her’ and ‘extorting Man labor to work in their service’. The letter of accusation was signed by ‘Peng Tianfang, the Hmong Representative from Western Hunan’, and included the signatures of one representative from each ethnic group: ‘the Liao from Zhejiang, the Li from Guangdong, the Hmong from Yunnan, the Yao from Guangxi, the Man from Sichuan, the Hmong from Guizhou’.42 This letter shows how the non-Han intellectual elites in the Republic period appealed for their communities to be recognised as progressive and enlightened by nationalist ideology instead of being ‘primitives’ that must be watched and studied by Han scholars. Most of the Southern ethnic groups were mentioned in ancient Chinese historical materials with names indicating their barbarism. And the signatories of this letter continued to use these contemptuous designations. The Chinese characters Liao43 and Yao44 relate these communities to fierce animals, and Man45 literally means ‘barbarian’. This either means

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that the learned class of these communities accepted them as designations for their own communities—but this is very unlikely given that they were already able to formulate such a letter and were so self-conscious of their ethic identities—or that they had become proud of being distinct from other ethnic groups and hoped to be recognised as independent ethnic components in the new Republican nation. The ideology of a unitary Hmong identity within a ‘nation-state’ was actually vaguely formed much earlier than Ling and Rui’s survey; and it was influenced by the local education and economic policies in the late Qing period which brought Western Hunan into early modernisation.46 Many local elites joined the Chinese United League (Tongmeng Hui) initiated by Sun Y ­ at-Sen at an early stage, and welcomed the 1911 Revolution and its claim to establish a new nation state. Some of them led the revolutionary force that attacked the Qing imperial army on 7 December 1911, which was the first battle of the 1911 Revolution fought in Hunan Province.47 Ling and Rui’s researches were also funded and helped by the local warlord Chen Quzhen (1882–1952), who had set up new schools for importing science and sociology subjects and founded all sorts of capitalist industries in Western Hunan. It is worth noting that Chen Quzhen was actively devoted to formulating new education policies in Western Hunan, which banned the using of non-Han languages and the practice of local religious rituals in schools.48 Ling and Rui also received a lot of help from a representative of the local intellectual elite, Shi Qigui (1896–1959). Shi also did three years of independent research into Hmong cultures after Ling and Rui left. He, on the one hand, kept sending complementary data to Ling and Rui, who had promised him a post in the Institute of History and Philology, and, on the other hand, strived to prove the existence of a distinct ‘Hmong culture’.49 In late Qing and Republic of China period, most areas in South-western China were governed by warlords who were cooperating with the Republic Government and cultivating their own military and political forces at the same time. The influence of the central government in local administrations was flimsy and complicated. Therefore, in the early nationalist ideologies, South-western China was seen as part of the ‘inland’, which did not share the sensitivity with the frontier areas. Later when the Second ­Sino-Japanese War was approaching and the South-western area became more important from the military strategic perspective, ethnographic surveys and the effort of constructing local identities suddenly became more important.

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The Full Records of the Autonomy of Ten Counties in Western Hunan in Republic of China Issued in 192350 drafted by Chen Quzhen’s cabinet details his policies and the supply of ‘self-sufficient industries’ (without mentioning that part of those were from opium farming and transporting weapons).51 There are some new policies which are very relevant to the changes in status of non-Han ethnic groups. Qing governments had set the regulation whereby Hmong representatives were selected by subject Hmong people to communicate between the central government and the subject Hmong households. According to the new policies, however, representatives of a certain number of households were selected who met specific standards, the most important of which were literacy and considerable personal property, which caused the number of Hmong representatives to drop sharply. Inspired by nationalist thought, Chen Quzhen’s educational policy was a combination of Confucian education and new type of schooling imported from Europe. The education system was economically supported by Chen Quzhen’s re-distributing the fortune made by local businessmen in newly constructed capitalist industries, and by the harvests of the confiscated Hmong lands following the old land-farming system. Though Chen Quzhen’s power was taken over by the Republic of China regime in 1925, he continued to play a role as a local military official. His political and economic policies were put into practice until the beginning of Second World War.52

New Space and New Approaches A younger generation of West Hunan Hmong scholars have taken advantage of the internet space and started new approaches to interpreting Hmong identity. Among them Wu Xiaodong has already won a reputation by publishing influential academic essays online. Wu Xiaodong currently works for the Institute of Ethnic Literature, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and he publishes most of his academic essays on the official website of the institute. He argues that the popularly received image of ‘mother butterfly’ as ancestor goddess of the Hmong comes from a misinterpretation of Mais Bangx Mais Liuf (lit. Hmong woman/girl who is called flower) which sounds similar to the pronunciation of ‘butterfly’ (Gangb Bax Liuf) in Hmong language. This article was originally published in a journal in 2010. However, it only became well known after being widely read online after 2011.53

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This is not the first time that Wu Xiaodong’s articles have drawn extensive attention from scholars who have interests in minority ethnic literature and myths. The articles he wrote in 2005 and 2006 generated much debate surrounding his challenges to the mainstream opinion that Chi-you was the ancestor hero of the Hmong.54 In a 2005 article he argued that the figure of the ancestor god in the Western Hmong migration epics, Gid Chib yeul Laol (lit. a heroic grandfather), was misread as Chi-you because the similarity in pronunciations confused Han scholars. And the current popular reading of ­Chi-you as the ancestor of Hmong people was mainly a result of the influence of those Han scholars who had done their researches in the 1980s and 1990s. According to my interviews with the staff of Fenghuang County Library and the keepers of Baojing Archives, this article was widely circulated and remains very controversial; Wu Xiaodong sticks to an ambiguous statement saying that this heroic figure may or may not be Chi-you. In a 2006 article, he proposed considering both Chi-you and Pan Hu to have been tribal leaders who took on animal imagery because of totemism. He further proposed that the narratives in historical archives indicated the opposition between the tribe of Chi-you and the tribe of the Yellow Emperor, while they conferred the subordinate position of the tribe of Pan Hu to the tribe of Emperor Gaoxin, who is also a mythological figure in the Yellow Emperor’s pedigree. In so doing Wu Xiaodong returned to the popular reading of Chiyou and the Yellow Emperor legends which signify the Hmong identity through demonstrating the Hmong–Han relationship. However, he draws upon the theories of totemism in his attempt to explain why the tribal leaders relating to the Hmong were seen as animal-like barbarians by the ancient Han scholars. This approach appears to be fundamentally different from the popularly received Hmong belief in the mythical power of Hmong ancestor gods and goddesses. Therefore, though the dominant historical narratives are still being supported, a younger generation of Hmong scholars is now suggesting alternative constructions of ‘Hmong-ness’. Wu Xiaodong’s use of the internet to publish his articles appeals to a larger group of readers; and his angle of consideration of the dominant reading of Hmong origin/ancestor myths suggests a historical positivist attitude. Both of these approaches have demonstrated the new features in the construction of the Hmong identity by the younger generation of Hmong scholars. In his attempts one can observe the influences of

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systematic modern ethnographic training and a more open mind to prevalent academic thinking. One can also observe a deeply rooted nationalist ideology which is best seen in his insistence on the unitary Hmong identity and its recognition, while his materials—especially the parts he has cited to prove unitary identity—probably suggest otherwise. Wu Xiaodong’s impressive historical studies and linguistic analyses generate an effect of ‘resonance’, which generally arouses readers’ respect of ‘historical facts’ and ‘linguistic evidences’ and makes it easier for them to accept the very problematic premise.

Conclusion Concluding this chapter, the Chinese nation state had rich and multilayered sources originating from both wider cultural imports and a stratified worldview constructed in ancient and imperial Chinese history. A close examination of the historical documents does not support the view that the Hmong ethnic group was a unity distinct from other ancient Southern ethnic groups from the beginning, but suggests that the people known as the Hmong today started to distinguish their ethnicity from the others only since around the late Qing period. Furthermore, the crystallisation of the Hmong ethnic identity and the conception of nation were catalysed by a series of wars during the Ming and Qing dynasties (from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century) between central government and local communities. The Chinese state construction in the Republican period brought about concerns for relationships between the Han and Southern ethnic groups, and the concerns for recognising minority ethnic identities. New generations of Hmong scholars have started their own construction of Hmong identity using the new internet space. In the age of globalisation, the fluidity of ethnic and national identities is felt by people with new perspectives and purposes.

Notes

1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 2006), 6–7. 2. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 58. 3. Caspar Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 39.

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4. Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 3. 5.  Paul R. Katz, ‘Repaying a Nuo Vow in Western Hunan: A Rite of ­Trans-Hybridity?’ Taiwan Journal of Anthropology 11, no. 2 (2013): 5. 6. Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 55–60. 7. Constance A. Cook and John S. Major, eds., Defining Chu: Image and Reality in Ancient China (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 1–5. 8. Edwin G. Pulleyblank, “The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times,” in The Origins of Chinese Civilization, ed. David N. Keightley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 411–466. 9. Xin Luo, “Wanghua yu shanxian – zhonggu zaoqi nanfang zhuman lishi mingyun zhi gaiguan” [Imperial Transformation and Mountain Retreat: A General Study on the History and Fate of Southern Barbarians in Early Medieval China], Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research] 2 (2009): 7, 13. 10. Hou Han Shu - Nan Man Zhuan [Book of the Latter Han: Treatise on the Southern Barbarians]. Hou Han Shu [Book of the Latter Han]. Written by Fan Ye (398–445 A.D.). Vols. I–XII (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007). 11.  Sui Shu - Di Li Zhi Xia [Book of Sui: Geography II]. Sui Shu [Book of Sui]. Compiled in 621–636 A.D. Vols. I–VI (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1973). 12. Luo, “Wanghua yu shanxian,” 7–14. 13. Chai Huanbo, Yongshun Laosicheng: Babai nian Xizhou Tusi de Zongji [Yongshun Old Chieftain City: Traces of 800 Years’ Local Chieftain System] (Changsha: China South Publishing and Media Group, 2013, Preface). 14. Personal communication with Zheng Shaoxiong, associate professor of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 15. According to interviews with keepers of Baojing Archive, Western Hunan, June, 2012. 16.  Jing yi Jishi - Bian Lue Si [Records of Barbarians in Jiaqing Period, 1552–1578: Frontier Strategies IV]. Jing Yi Jishi [Records of Barbarians in Jiaqing Period, 1552–1578]. Written by Gao Gong (1512–1578) (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1936). 17.  Magnus Fiskesjö, “The Southern Great Wall and the Question of the Miao Barbarians,” paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Sinology, Taipei, June 20–22, 2012. 18. Aimin Ji and Yueyao Zhao, “Guojia Quanli de ‘difang’ yunzuo – yi qingdai Xiangxi Miaojiang ‘bianqiang – xuchang’ jiegou weili” [State Power

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Operated in Local Areas: A Case Study of the Bianqiang- Xuchang Structure in Miao Areas, Xiangxi, in Qing Dynasty]. Jishou University Journal 30, no. 1 (2009): 54–59. 19.  Xiaohui Xie, “Diguo zhi zai Miaojiang” [The Empire on the Miao Margins: Social Structure, Rituals and Ethnic Groups in Western Hunan in Qing Dynasty], Journal of History and Anthropology 11, no. 1 (2013): 51–88. 20.  Wu Guo, “Accommodation and Conflict: The Incorporation of Miao Territory and Construction of Cultural Difference During the High Qing Era,” Frontier of History in China 7, no. 2 (2012): 240–260. 21.  The Hmong communities distributed in Western Hunan and Eastern Guizhou called themselves dut Xongb (lit. red Hmong). The Eastern Dialect of Hmong language in China is also named dut Xongb. 22.  Qianlong Fenghuang Ting Zhi - Xu [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting Compiled in Qianlong Period, 1736–1795: Preface]. Qianlong Fenghuang Ting Zhi [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting Compiled in Qianlong Period, 1736–1795] Compiled by Pan Shu and Shengfang Yang. 1977 Microfilm Copy, Peking University Library. 23.  A large-scale anti-Qing rebellion; its principle was ‘Zhu kemin, fu gudi’ [Casting Out Guest People (Han and Manchu Landlords and Government Officials) and Recovering Ancestral Lands]. The rebel army punished landlords (including the Cooked Hmongs) and took over their lands. The Qing government summoned armies from seven Southern provinces to extinguish the rebellion and ended it twelve years after it started. 24. Rongzhen Wu, Qianjia Miaomin qiyi shigao [Historical Record of Revolutions of the Hmong in Qianlong and Jiaqing Period, 1795–1796] (Guiyang: Guizhou People Publishing House, 1985), 1–20. 25.  Daoguang Fenghuang Ting Zhi - Zhengfu Xia [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting Compiled in Daoguang Period, 1821–1850: Conquest II]. Daoguang Fenghuang Ting Zhi [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting, Compiled in Daoguang Period, 1821–1850]. Compiled by Huang Yingpei et al. (Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 2011). He Lin’s proposition in this decree includes returning lands to the Hmong, restricting rights of landlords and advocating Hmong–Han commerce; his aim was to strengthen the ruling of Qing government through effective political administration. 26. Ji and Zhao, “Guojia Quanli de ‘difang’ yunzuo,” 57. 27.  Daoguang Fenghuang Ting Zhi - Miao Fang [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting, Compiled in Daoguang Period, 1821–1850: Defense Against the Hmong]. 28. Wu, Qianjia Miaomin qiyi shigao, 21.

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29. Biyou Tan, Qingdai Xiangxi Miaojiang duominzu shequ de jindai chonggou [Modern Reconstruction of Xiangxi Miaojiang Multi-National Community in Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2007), 1–20; Magnus Fiskesjö, “On the Raw and the Cooked Barbarians of Imperial China,” Inner Asia 1, no. 2 (1999): 139–168. 30. T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, Zhongguo Fengjian Shehui [Feudal Society in Traditional China] (Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2005), 173–177. 31. Qianlong Fenghuang Ting Zhi - Baojia [Gazetteers of Fenghuang Ting Compiled in Qianlong Period, 1736–1795: Baojia]. 32. The word of describing these basic level soldiers is Yong, who differed from Bing with military status of the central government army. The former were only exempt of taxes of their own land when they or their descendants were in military services; The latter were registered in the census and were exempt from taxes on their own land no matter whether they were in military service or not. And the taxation policy could be inherited by their descendants no matter whether the descendants were in military service or not. See Hunan Miaofang Tunzheng Kao [Researches on Defense against the Hmong and Land-Hoarding System in Hunan Province]. Compiled by Dan Xiangliang. 1883 block-printed edition, Vols. I–V, Jishou University Archives. 33. According to interviews with keepers of Baojing Archive. 34. Min tun, an agriculture system which allocated lands belonging to central government to normal people and extracted taxes from harvests. Sometimes local government recruited businessmen from other provinces to plough the lands and contributed to taxation, which termed ‘commercial land-farming system’ [shang tun]. 35. Miao tun, an agriculture system which allocated lands belonging to central government to registered Hmong households and extracted taxes from the harvest. The whole administration was undertaken by local Hmong officials. See: Tan, Qingdai Xiangxi Miaojiang duominzu shequ de jindai chonggou. 36.  May-bo Ching, “Classifying People: Ethnic Politics in Late Qing Native-Place Textbooks and Gazetteers,” in The Politics of Historical ­ Production in Late Qing and Republican China, ed. Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 55–77. 37. Pengyuan Zhang, Hunan xiandaihua de zaoqi jinzhan [Early Modernisation in Hunan Province, 1860–1916] (Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 2002), 170–190. 38. William Churchill, “Review of Among the Tribes in Southwest China by Samuel R. Clarke,” Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 44, no. 2 (1912): 135–136.

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39. François Marie Savina. Histoire des Miao [1924], trans. Li Ren (Guiyang: Guizhou University Publishing House, 2009). 40. Meng zang weiyuanhui, established in 1929 according to Government Organization Act of the Republic of China [Zhonghua Minguo Zhengfu Zuzhi Fa, issued in 1924] and was in charge of the political and religious administrations in Mongolia (already declared independent) and Tibet, as well as the administrations of Mongolian and Tibetan residents in other provinces. 41. Chunsheng Ling and Yifu Rui, Xiangxi Miaozu Diaocha Baogao [Surveys of Hmong Ethnic Group in Xiangxi] (Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2003). 42. Ming-ke Wang, “Lishiyuyan Yanjiusuo yu zaoqi Xiangxi Miaozu diaocha” [Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica and Early Surveys of Xiangxi Hmong], Chinese Review of Anthropology 22 (2010). Here please also refer to the debates around ethnic identities and national identities happening in Republic of China period, see Huang Xingtao, “Chongsu Zhonghua: jindai Zhongguo ‘Zhonghua Minzu’ guannian de yanjiu” [Reshaping Zhonghua: The Idea of ‘the Chinese Nation’ in Modern times] (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2017), 173–183. 43. Liao, related to current Gelao ethnic group. 44. Yao, related to current Yao ethnic group. 45. Man, related to current Qiang ethnic group. 46. Magnus Fiskesjö, “Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth Century,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 1 (2006): 15–44. 47. Wang, “Lishiyuyan Yanjiusuo.” 48. Lu Lan. Chen Quzhen (Chen Chü-zhen) (Changsha: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1989). 49. Qigui Shi, Minguo shiqi Xiangxi Miaozu diaocha shilu [A Memoir of Sureys of Xiangxi Hmong in Republic China] (Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2009). 50.  Minguo Xiangxi Shi Xian Lianhexiang Zizhi Quan An [Full Records of the Autonomy of Ten Counties in Xiangxi in Republic of China]. 1923 original draft, Baojing Archives. The original copy was put in an archive box which labels the file under ‘false government’ (wei zhengfu) because the file was drafted during the time of the warlord’s government. 51. According to the interviews with two local high school teachers and two old people who have memories of their family firms in the Republic period. 52. Zhang, Hunan xiandaihua de zaoqi jinzhan, 70–90, 180–210. 53. “Hudie Yu Chiyou Miaozu Shenhua Xin Jiangou Ji Fansi” [Butterfly and Chiyou: New Constructions and Introspections on Myths of Miao], http://iel. zhongyan.org/news_show.asp?newsid=9439, accessed December 18, 2019.

224  L. PENG 54.  “Lun Xibu Miaozu Qianxi Shishi Fei Chiyou Shidai Miaozu Zhanzheng Qianxi Koubei” [A Demonstration of Western Miao Migration Epics to Prove They Are Not the Oral Tradition of Miao Wars in the Time of ­Chi-you], http://iel.zhongyan.org/news_show.asp?newsid=2205&detail=1, accessed December 18, 2019; “Miaozu Chiyou Shenhua Yu Zhulu Zhi Zhan” [The Miao Chi-you Myth and the War of Zhulu], http://iel.zhongyan.org/news_show.asp?newsid=2044, accessed December 18, 2019.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Books, 2006. Ch’ü, T’ung-tsu. Zhongguo Fengjian Shehui [Feudal Society in Traditional China]. Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2005. Chai, Huanbo. Yongshun Laosicheng: Babai nian Xizhou Tusi de Zongji [Yongshun Old Chieftain City: Traces of 800 Years’ Local Chieftain System]. Changsha: China South Publishing and Media Group, 2013. Churchill, William. “Review of Among the Tribes in Southwest China by Samuel R. Clarke.” Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 44, no. 2 (1912): 135–136. Cook, Constance A., and John S. Major, eds. Defining Chu: Image and Reality in Ancient China. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Crossley, Pamela K., Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, eds. Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Fiskesjö, Magnus. “On the Raw and the Cooked Barbarians of Imperial China.” Inner Asia 1, no. 2 (1999): 139–168. Fiskesjö, Magnus. “Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth Century.” European Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 1 (2006): 15–44. Fiskesjö, Magnus. “The Southern Great Wall and the Question of the Miao Barbarians.” Paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Sinology, Taipei, June 20–22, 2012. Hirschi, Caspar. The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Huang, Xingtao. “Chongsu Zhonghua: jindai Zhongguo ‘Zhonghua Minzu’ guannian de yanjiu” [Reshaping Zhonghua: The Idea of ‘the Chinese Nation’ in Modern Times]. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2017. Ji, Aimin, and Zhao Yueyao. “Guojia Quanli de ‘difang’ yunzuo – yi qingdai Xiangxi Miaojiang ‘bianqiang – xuchang’ jiegou weili” [State Power Operated

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in Local Areas: A Case Study of the Bianqiang-Xuchang Structure in Miao Areas, Xiangxi, in Qing Dynasty]. Jishou Daxue Xuebao [Jishou University Journal] 30, no. 1 (2009): 54–59. Katz, Paul R. “Repaying a Nuo Vow in Western Hunan: A Rite of ­Trans-Hybridity?” Taiwan Renleixue Kan [Taiwan Journal of Anthropology] 11, no. 2 (2013): 1–88. Ling, Chunsheng, and Rui Yifu. Xiangxi Miaozu Diaocha Baogao [Surveys of Hmong Ethnic Group in Xiangxi]. Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2003. Lu, Lan. Chen Quzhen (Chen Chü-zhen). Changsha: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1989. Luo, Xin. “Wanghua yu shanxian – zhonggu zaoqi nanfang zhuman lishi mingyun zhi gaiguan” [Imperial Transformation and Mountain Retreat: A General Study on the History and Fate of Southern Barbarians in Early Medieval China]. Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research] 2 (2009): 4–20. Pulleyblank, Edwin G. “The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times.” In The Origins of Chinese Civilization, edited by David N. Keightley, 411–466. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Savina, François Marie. Histoire des Miao [1924]. Translated by Li Ren. Guiyang: Guizhou University Publishing House, 2009. Shi, Qigui. Minguo shiqi Xiangxi Miaozu diaocha shilu [A Memoir of Surveys of Xiangxi Hmong in Republic of China]. Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2009. Tan, Biyou. Qingdai Xiangxi Miaojiang duominzu shequ de jindai chonggou [Modern Reconstruction of Xiangxi Miaojiang Multi-National Community in Qing Dynasty]. Beijing: The Publishing House of Minority Nationalities, 2007. Wang, Ming-ke. “Lishiyuyan Yanjiusuo yu zaoqi Xiangxi Miaozu diaocha” [Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica and Early Surveys of Xiangxi Hmong]. Zhongguo Renleixue Pinglun [Chinese Review of Anthropology] 22 (2010). Wu, Guo. “Accommodation and Conflict: The Incorporation of Miao Territory and Construction of Cultural Difference During the High Qing Era.” Frontier of History in China 7, no. 2 (2012): 240–260. Wu, Rongzhen. Qianjia Miaomin qiyi shigao [Historical Record of Revolutions of the Hmong in Qianlong and Jiaqing Period, 1795–1796]. Guiyang: Guizhou People Publishing House, 1985. Xie, Xiaohui. “Diguo zhi zai Miaojiang” [The Empire on the Miao Margins: Social Structure, Rituals and Ethnic Groups in Western Hunan in Qing Dynasty] Lishi Renleixue Xuekan [Journal of History and Anthropology] 11, no. 1 (2013): 51–88. Zhang, Pengyuan. Hunan xiandaihua de zaoqi jinzhan [Early Modernisation in Hunan Province, 1860–1916]. Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 2002.

CHAPTER 10

‘The People Are God’ Third World Internationalism and Chinese Muslims in the Making of the National Identity in the 1950s Zhiguang Yin

Introduction On 24 October 1952, readers of the People’s Daily across China saw the news that a ‘Chinese Muslim Hajj delegation returned to Beijing from Pakistan on October 5th’. During their stay in Pakistan, the delegates received ‘a warm welcome’ and ‘attended banquets hosted by the Egyptian ambassador and the Saudi Envoy to Pakistan’. Their arrival was ‘extensively covered by the Karachi local newspapers’. The delegates also introduced the ‘reality about the significant improvements in ethnic equality, religious freedom, and the living conditions of all ethnic groups believing in Islam’.1 Buried underneath the news of the Korean War, this brief report might have seemed insignificant. After all, this was merely about a failed first attempt by the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) to send a formal Hajj delegation to Mecca. Z. Yin (*)  University of Exeter, Exeter, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_10

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As the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the People’s Daily is widely regarded by Western critics as a ‘political instrument’ for ‘mass education’ under the firm grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).2 Considering the significance of the People’s Daily, it seems rather odd to today’s observers that a story about a failed religious outreach to the Arab World could appear as its front-page news. Researchers have long noticed the PRC’s political use of the Hajj mission as a form of ‘people’s diplomacy’ to extend connections with the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) nations.3 However, attention is almost exclusively devoted to the successful ones organised after the PRC’s diplomatic triumph at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Nevertheless, the story presented the cooperation between ­ethnic-religious groups and the Communist central government. Failed or not, this trip marked one of the very first diplomatic ice-breaking attempts by the PRC to establish formal relations with the Arab nations. It also demonstrated an intricate cooperative relation between religion and state in the early PRC period. The 1952 Hajj mission was organised by the newly formed Chinese Islamic Association Preparation Committee (CIAPC)4 headed by Burhan Shahidi, a Chinese Uygur revolutionary leader and then the chairman of the PRC’s Xinjiang Provincial People’s Government. One of the vice directors of the committee was Da Pusheng, a Muslim scholar and Hui Chinese born in Jiangsu, a coastal province at the estuary of Yangtze River. The delegation was dispatched only a month after the initial ­meeting of the CIAPC. Led by Imam Da Pusheng and Imam Imin Mesum, an ethnic Uyghur and veteran of the Uyghur independence movement, the group consisted of 16 members. All delegates were highly influential Imams (Akhoond or religious leaders), Islamic scholars and Muslim community leaders from the Hui and Uygur ethnic groups. Some members of this team of 16 people were Chinese Azharites, such as Pang Shiqian (Muhammad Tawadu Pang, 1902–1958) and Zhang Bingduo (Sulaiman Zhang, 1915–2004), and many had already been to Mecca during the Republican period.5 However, as citizens of the PRC, which at the time had no diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the delegates had to rely on Pakistan’s facilitation to apply for visas to Mecca. After waiting in Pakistan for over a month, none of their visa applications were successful. However, during their stay in Karachi, apart from meeting political and religious elites in Pakistan, the delegates also attended receptions hosted by the chargé d’affaires of Saudi Arabia and the Ambassador of Egypt.

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Their primary focus was to showcase the ‘significant improvement in the living condition of different ethnic groups in the PRC’ and introduce ‘the PRC’s policy on ethnic equality and religious freedom’.6 The year 1952 was a volatile one for the PRC. Apart from the intensification of the Korean War, the internal riots by ethnic groups also posed threats to the new state. On 2 and 4 April, two uprisings led by Ma Zhenwu’s Jahriyya order took place in Guyuan, Ningxia and Zhangjiachuan, Gansu, respectively.7 The incidents happened less than two months after the PRC’s central government announced the implementation of the regional ethnic autonomy system. The spiritual authority of the religious leader in ethnic minority groups could still be competitors to the state, similar to the situation in late Imperial and Republican China. Traditionally, the ‘protests and clashes’ between the state and different ethnic and religious groups receive most of the scholarly attention. Under the dominant discourse of identity politics, such a perspective assumes the primordial qualities of ethnic and religious identities, projecting a naturally confrontational interethnic relationship in the PRC.8 The state, in this context, as a hegemonic presence, functions as a ‘manager’ and extends its top-down tight ‘control’ over different domestic social groups to maintain the status quo.9 Religious groups under such a political structure are believed to suffer the most in the atheistic Communist party-state.10 Apart from the apparent Cold War stigma of assuming the common behaviour of a ‘communist regime’, such a reading of the situation fails to recognise the complexity of the PRC’s ethnic relations in the Chinese socio-political context. However, it is always dangerous to assume the universality of what the term ‘religion’ signifies and its relationship with the ‘state’. It is insufficient to presume that the same socio-political pattern encompasses all the stories of the end of empire and the rise of the nation-state across the globe. In the case of China, while the Chinese Empire as a political institution of governance broke down, its territorial extent remained more or less intact. The new republic also inherited the ethnic diversity of the old empire. This reality calls for a more sincere querying of modern Chinese history, and a reviewing of the terminologies in our theoretical arsenal to see if there are any ahistorical ­Western-centric presumptions of universality. Throughout the history of Chinese state-making and nation-­building, there are also countless cases in which the spiritual authority of religious groups was offered or gained by forming a partnership with the

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central political power. In the Chinese context, Islam is the only religion associated with ethnic groups regarded as an integral element in Chinese cultural heritage. Two major ethnic groups are the Hui and Uygur. Many recent studies have revealed the active participation by Chinese Muslims in the national salvation movements against the Japanese invasion.11 The characteristic of Islam as a world religion also played a crucial part in determining the way in which Chinese Muslims were involved and treated in the modern Chinese nation-building process. In the early years of the PRC, Chinese Muslim groups were a conduit to champion the state’s diplomatic outreach to the Arab/Islamic nations in the search for an international united front against imperialism. The role of Chinese Muslim groups, particularly the Islamic Association of China (IAC), in extending and facilitating diplomatic links with Arab countries has received extensive scholarly attention.12 Nevertheless, the common practice in the existing historical investigations is to look at 1949 as a watershed moment which abruptly separates the object of study into two. Such a narrative is only applicable if we believe that the top-down regime change creates two isolated universes, each with its own unique habitat and with no prior history, behaving distinctively from each other. Otherwise, we must break away from the conviction that the regime change severed the lineage of human history. Instead, we can look at the cooperation between ethnic-religious groups and the Communist central government in the modern history of Chinese nation-building and the search for national salvation. This remained the case until 1958 when the Anti-Rightist Movement began to severely influence ethnic and religious affairs.13 This chapter addresses the construction of affinities, an aspect in the complex dynamic between the central authority and minority groups in a society, which has only recently begun to receive some scholarly attention from historians of empire such as David Cannadine.14 It also echoes Robert Bellah’s application of the Rousseauian concept ‘civil religion’ when discussing the cohesive forces in the US that drive cultural and social integration among its different groups.15 This chapter focuses on Muslim intellectuals and prominent religious figures who were ethnically Huizu (Hui ethnic group). It examines the representation of and presentation by these Hui individuals in the public domain, with a specific interest in understanding the way that Islamic religious discourse was entangled in consensus building in the early PRC period before

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1958. It hopes to elaborate on how the ethnic identity of the Hui and the religious identity of Muslims reconciled and even resonated with the Chinese national identity of ‘Zhonghua Minzu’ (literally Chinese nation). This chapter is particularly interested in understanding the role of the discourse and politics of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial internationalism and human liberation in facilitating the making of the common political subjectivity known as ‘Zhongguo Renmin’ (literally Chinese people).

Hui as a ‘National Question’ The ‘National Question’ is universal in nature. It unfolds across the world but takes different shapes in different socio-political contexts. On a practical level, the CCP began to systematically examine the issue of the relationship between Huizu and Huijiao (Islam) in the late 1930s, soon after the formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front in 1937. In his Report to the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Politburo of the CPC in October 1938, Mao Zedong elaborated on the importance of this unity in ensuring the success of the Anti-Japanese War and establishing the republic. He stated that the anti-Japanese struggles marked a ‘great unity and progress across the country’. The ‘only way’ to ‘triumph in this protracted war’ is to ‘unite all ethnic groups, strive for progress and rely on the masses’. He particularly emphasised that such a unity ‘is not across all the political parties and social classes, but also across all the ethnic groups in China’. This was to ‘counter the enemy’s plot to dissociate all the ethnic minorities from our nation’. Hence, one of the most urgent missions ‘at this point is to unite all the ethnic groups into one’. In order to achieve this purpose, ‘all the ethnic groups such as Mongol, Hui, Tibet, Miao, Yao, Yi and Fan should have equal rights as Han’. Under the principle of unity against Japanese invasion, all the ethnic groups ‘should have the right to self-governance’, while at the same time, ‘unite with the Han people to establish a unified nation’. Under this principle, we should ‘rectify the mistake of Han Chauvinism; respect the cultures, religions, and customs of ethnic minority groups’. The Han people should also avoid ‘using insulting languages and committing abusive actions against them’. Only through the ‘self-propelled striving for rights by the ethnic minority groups’ and the ‘implementation from the government’ can we achieve the ‘true improvements of ethnic relations in China’.16

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Mao’s elaboration on the ethnic issue concerning the ­nation-building process set out the guidelines and principles for ethnic autonomy in both the CCP-controlled base areas17 and, later, the PRC. Under these guidelines, the Association of Research on the National Question in the North West Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP edited a comprehensive document based on the investigation of the Hui minority in the CCP-controlled area. This edited volume was officially published in 1941 in Yan’an. It strongly criticised the Japanese narrative which promoted the ‘self-determination of Hui’ to establish a Hui nation-state through secession.18 To simplify the ‘Hui’s problem’ (Huihui Wenti) as a religious issue was a ‘representation of Han Chauvinist attitude’. Another ‘fallacy’ it challenged was the ‘pan-Islamic attempt’ to ‘fabricate a so-called Islamic ethnicity’, which the editors stated was associated with the imperialist colonial expansion.19 It particularly criticised the ‘Japanese imperialist advocacy’ of the ‘Islamic nationalist movement’ in China as a way to single out the ‘ethnic groups that believed in Islam’ and ‘put them on the opposite side of the Chinese unity against Japanese invasion’.20 The recognition of the Hui problem as a ‘national question’ raises an important theoretical and legal concern. How is the concept of ‘self-determination’ defined? More importantly, should the CCP have ­ recognised the right to secession as Lenin did? These concerns echo the classic debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg over the issue of the ‘national question’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When faced with the issue of ‘self-determination’, the CCP inevitably had to address the reality of ethnic diversity inherited from the fallen empire without breaking that unity apart. Apart from referring to the strategic utility of forming a solidarity against the Japanese invasion, the CCP developed a theoretical understanding of the national problem through the discourse of class liberation. The CCP recognised that the Hui people were oppressed by two forces, namely the international imperialism represented by the Japanese invasion, and the domestic ‘national oppression’ (Minzu Yapo) inflicted mainly by Han chauvinism. Hence, instead of focusing on the self-determination aspect, the CCP’s attitude towards the ‘national/ethnic question’ emphasised equality. Theoretically, the CCP’s take on the ‘national question’ was closer to Rosa Luxemburg’s criticism of Lenin. Luxemburg’s analysis was rooted in the socio-political context of Poland. The rise of Polish nationalism in the early nineteenth century, as Luxemburg argued, was

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fundamentally different from the nationalist recognition formed in the Central European nations. The root of Polish national aspirations, according to Luxemburg, was the ‘natural-feudal economy’ rather than the ‘modern capitalist development’ that gave birth to nationalisms in Central European nations in the nineteenth century. Henceforth, Luxemburg rejected the assumption that the nation-state unequivocally suggests national ‘independence’. Instead, she recognised the ‘nationstate’ as the ‘class dominance of the bourgeoisie’ with a strong tendency towards adopting ‘protectionist policy, indirect taxation, militarism’ and consequently leading towards ‘war, and conquest’.21 In the case of Poland the true ‘national movements’ for liberation ‘vanished’ when the feudal economy died out due to the hegemonic expansion of colonialism. This process also ‘transplanted’ the class of bourgeoisie ‘into the Polish soil’. From the outset, the Polish bourgeoisie, who advocated for ­self-determination and establishment of a nation-state, was ‘clearly an anti-national factor’.22 The ‘“national” movements’ and ‘struggles for “national interests”’ in all the ‘modern societies’ were ‘usually class movements of the ruling strata of the bourgeoisie’.23 Based on the Polish historical context, Luxemburg rejected the assumption that there is a universal ‘formula’ of ‘the right of all nations to self-determination’. She particularly pointed out that such a formula would do more harm than good in ‘smaller and petty nations’. Without positioning the smaller nations in the context of nineteenth-century capitalism that exercised its hegemonic power globally, the pursuit of their ‘independent existence’ would just be ‘an illusion’. She stated that ‘hopes of solving all nationality questions within the capitalist framework by ensuring all nations, races, and ethnic groups the possibility of “self-determination” is a complete utopia’.24 Luxemburg argued that the rights of nations should not be the standard for socialist parties when discussing the national problem. She considered concepts such as nation, right and the will of the people to be ‘remnants from the times of immature and unconscious antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie’. In this sense, the ‘national question’ was fundamentally a ‘question of class interests’. For the ‘class-conscious and independently organized proletariat’ to use these concepts would be a ‘historical contradiction’. 25 Lenin’s defence of the right to self-determination, on the other hand, should also be read in the unique political context of the Russian Empire. Similar to Luxemburg, Lenin was acutely aware of the

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socio-political context when discussing the national question.26 Different from Poland, Russia was predominantly an imperialist power in the nineteenth century, with the feudal landlords as the ruling class. He stated that the ‘Great Russians in Russia are an oppressor nation’; and the ‘creation of an independent national state’, in the early twentieth century, ‘remains the privilege of the Great-Russian nation alone’. Hence, by rejecting the ‘right to secession’ for small nations in Russia, argued for by Lenin, Luxemburg was ‘in fact assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds’. To Lenin, advocating the right to secession for the weak and small nations was to fight against the Great-Russian oppression of the other nations in the Russian Empire. It helped Russia to ‘clear the road to its freedom’, and consequently formed a crucial component of the Russian revolution for liberation and equality.27 According to Lenin, the global expansion of capitalist Produktionsver­ hältnisse (the relations of production) in the late nineteenth century also involved the oppressive relationship between the powerful and weak nations of the world. Most of the countries in the East were colonies or semi-colonies of the Great Powers. Hence, the ‘awakening’ of national movements for self-determination among these nations was, undoubtedly, challenging the unequal world order dominated by the strong nations.28 However, we should also note that while accepting the ‘right to secession’, it is important to acknowledge the idea of greater unity based on the proletarian class recognition. Lenin used the case of Swedish socialists’ support of Norwegian independence in 1905, and argued that the support for national secession forms ‘fraternal class solidarity’ among the working-class peoples. By recognising the ‘right of the Norwegians to secede’, the Swedish workers challenged the ‘privileges of the Swedish bourgeoisie and aristocracy’ and consequently demonstrated the ‘progressive nature’ of supporting weak nations’ self-determination.29 By the year 1916, in the middle of the First World War, Lenin had developed the thesis further and elaborated on the intricate entanglement between national self-determination and internationalism. He stated that those who ‘repudiated’ the national problem ‘in the name of the social revolution’ were Proudhonists. The true Marxists had ‘mainly the interests of the proletarian class struggle in the advanced countries’ in mind.30 In this sense, the Great Russians could only achieve liberation by supporting the self-determination of the oppressed nations out of the spirit of internationalism.

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In China’s case, the national question bears a two-fold characteristic. On the one hand, the Chinese Empire, similar to the old empires in the East, was put under pressure by global colonial expansion in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, its ethnic diversity brought forward an internal power dynamic within the ruling class and ethnic groups, mainly the Han nation, as the oppressor of the ethnic minorities. The Chinese communist revolution, therefore, had to combat imperialism and Han chauvinism to achieve the liberation of the Chinese people.31 To the CCP, the broadly accepted theoretical norm was Marx’s take on religion as an ideological reflection of a fundamental socio-economic oppression. Similarly, the identification of ethnic differences was not driven by the physical anthropological interest in understanding the biological characteristics scientifically but to address the political problem of global inequality manifested as ‘national questions’ due to the highly diverse levels of socio-economic development and modes of production among regions. With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the institutional arrangement of the PRC’s central government reflected the CCP’s take on religious and ethnic issues as components in the national mission of socialist transformation. This take was based on two moral ideals—namely, the pursuit of equality and the promise of human liberation. Since liberation is the ultimate salvation yet to come, the pursuit of equality became the moral guideline in daily political practices. In this sense, ethnic affairs were prioritised by having a cabinet-level institute underneath the State Council known as the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the PRC.32 Religious affairs were regulated under the authority of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, a sub-ministerial level under the State Council. Under the party organisational structure, ethnic and religious affairs were still part of the United Front works (tongzhan gongzuo) and overseen by the Second Bureau of the United Front Work Department under the command of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Apart from the apparent Soviet influence, the PRC’s take on religious affairs in association with ethnic issues reflected the unique socio-political conditions in China. To the CCP, a modern Chinese revolution entailed a two-stage transformation. Firstly, it was a political revolution that overthrew the ancien régime. Secondly, the success of the political revolution marked the beginning of a persistent pursuit of social revolution,

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which ultimately would not only transform the nation according to the socialist vision of modernisation but, more importantly, ensure the rise of the political consciousness of the Chinese people. The national revolutionary agenda was also firmly fused with a Marxist internationalist vision of human liberation, which, in the PRC’s discourse, could be achieved through the Third World national independence movements, or generally speaking, the global resistance against imperialism.

The Chinese Understanding of the National Question The fall of the Qing Empire also presented a thorny problem to the inheritors of its territory. Both the Republic of China and the PRC had to face the challenge of nation-building among the ethnically diverse peoples inhabiting its vast territorial span. The challenge was how to bring the dispersed peoples, who had long experienced ignorance, distrust and even aversion to each other, closer and form a coherent national identity? How to avoid going down the same route of devolution or disintegration as most of the empires in the twentieth century? These problems were more practical than theoretical compared to the discussions on the ‘national question’ within the international Communist movement. To the CCP, the identity building revolved around the making of the ‘Zhongguo Renmin’. Renmin (people) connotes a collective subjectivity formed by liberated and aware individuals. It transcends class and national boundaries. The attributive word Zhongguo (Chinese) gives the universal concept a national and historical footing. Zhongguo Renmin thus becomes the national identity, which inclusivity derives from the transcendence of the political ideal of Renmin. During the war, the Japanese imperialist was the common enemy of the Han, Hui, Manchurian and Mongolian people in China. This shared experience accelerated the formation of a trans-regional, cross-racial and ­class-inclusive political recognition of a collective identity known as the Zhongguo Renmin.33 Mao once gave an intriguing analogy that highlighted the essence of Renmin as a transcendental concept. In his concluding remarks to the Seventh National Congress of the CCP in 1945, Mao stated that ‘[o]ur God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people’.34 This speech was later given the title of ‘The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains’35 and was regarded as one of his must-read writings for

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the Chinese general public. We can see Mao using a similar analogy after 1949. During his meeting with Iraqi Culture and Workers Delegations in 1960, he praised the Iraqi Revolution in 1958 and condemned US imperialism. ‘God will not forgive them’, Mao said. He further explained that ‘the people are God’, and history ‘belongs to the people’.36 Mao was also ready to apply the same principle to understand the role of religion in the context of a communist revolution. Mao once gave a practical lead towards the need of working with religious groups in forming the unity of the people. When meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in 1959, Mao was asked about whether or not a Communist member should go to church. Mao suggested that ‘as long as the masses are still going (to churches), a Communist member could also go’. Mao said that Khalid Bakdash, the founder of the Syrian Communist Party, expressed the same concern about Communist members going to mosques when he visited China. Mao’s opinion was rather practical. Communists going to churches and mosques ‘were to get closer to and unite with the masses’. Although being atheists themselves, Communists should not deny the reality that ‘the masses still believe in God’.37 Hence, to ‘get close to the mass and unite with the mass’, Communist members could even go to mosques and churches.38 To Mao, China and the Arab world were linked by the same struggles of anti-imperialism and national construction. This unity therefore made China a ‘friend’ and ‘brother’ of the Arab world. Likewise, Mao stated that the Arab world was also ‘our friend and brother’.39 Mao’s comments on religious issues presented a two-fold approach for the CCP in the making of Zhongguo Renmin. The political subjectivity of Renmin would form spontaneously with the presence of imperialism as a common enemy. It would also require the active social engagement of Communist members, who, in Lenin’s sense, were the vanguard of the masses. In China’s case, the end of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945 and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 marked the termination of an immediate common enemy who threatened the survival of the nation. However, to the general public in the PRC, the termination of the Japanese invasion was only a temporary and very much regional success in the global resistance against imperialism. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 reinforced such a conviction among the Chinese people. Apart from the imperialist aggression in East Asia, Chinese media also kept a close eye on the situation in the MENA region where the people’s call for national independence was growing. It was through

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the support of the Arab people’s struggles against imperialism that the transnationalism of the anti-imperialist struggle became more obvious to the Chinese people. China was portrayed as the home front in this global struggle for liberation, which manifested in the other parts of the ­Afro-Asian world as direct military confrontations. The support of the global military struggle against imperialism involved more than supplying goods and materials to the front lines. The Chinese people were also immersed in the sentiment that supporting the brothers and sisters who were still entangled in the anti-imperialist struggles was morally just. The sense of fulfilment that came with building a ‘new China’ through revolution was carried further by a more universal conviction that the oppressed people of the world had the possibility and capability of overthrowing the old hegemonic world order and building a better one across the world. Hence, participating in the Korean War could not only be perceived as an initiative to ‘defend home and nation’ but as also supporting national independence movements in areas much further away from China, which could be taken as a ‘national responsibility’ of the new people’s republic. While supporting the anti-imperialist military struggles in the Middle East provided the ‘new element of sociality’ on a global scale after the Second World War, allowing the ethnic groups to participate in the grand struggle against imperialism as parts of the large collective, the domestic development of ethnic policy helped to consolidate the CCP’s promise of building a better and more equal society. Articles 50–53 in the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (later referred to as the Common Programme), the provisional constitution of the PRC adopted in 1949, laid out the fundamental principle of Chinese ethnic policy. The PRC was regarded as ‘a big fraternal and co-operative family composed of all its nationalities’, which were ‘equal’ to each other. The formation of such a fraternal family fell on the shoulders of ‘all nationalities within the boundaries of the PRC’. They were to ‘oppose imperialism’ and ‘establish unity and mutual aid among themselves’.40 Apart from stating the legal and political equal rights, the Common Programme also criticised Han chauvinism and supported the ‘freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs’.41 In this context, Islam received more attention as a transnational cultural identity in the discussion of the ‘national question’ in the PRC. It was then treated as a cultural heritage that enhanced the common

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connection between the Chinese people and the Muslim population in the Afro-Asian nations. Deng Yingchao, the vice president of the AllChina Women’s Federation and wife of Premier Zhou Enlai, presented an image of pan-Asian solidarity across all Asian nationalities (minzu) in her report to the All-Asian Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1949. Islamic culture, ‘centred in the Middle East’, together with other ‘highly developed and sophisticated cultures across Asian nations’ were ‘momentous contributions to world civilisation’. Deng acknowledged that in the modern period42 the development of Asian ‘ethnic people’ (gezu renmin) was lagging behind. This, however, according to Deng, was due to the ‘brutal oppression, excessive exploitation, and obscurantist policy implemented by foreign imperialists and national reactionaries’.43 This Congress had official representatives from 15 nations, among which were Lebanon, Syria and Iran. Israel also participated in this Congress. Narrating the cultural subjectivity of Asia challenged the colonial discourse of Asiatic backwardness. The ‘struggle’ against imperialism constituted the foundation of the political subjectivity of the Asian people.44 Deng’s speech presented a Communist political take on Islam on an international stage. Islam was seen as a cultural heritage formed with material development. Hence, the repression of an individual culture was, in fact, suppressing or exploiting the physical advancement of a group of people who shared a similar cultural heritage. This statement is responding to the nineteenth-century Western theory of civilisation, which was associated with the idea of ethnonationalism and used to justify colonial expansion in the non-Western world as a mission civilisatrice (civilising mission). To the early CCP members, the national independence movements from the non-Western world were the main components in the global resistance against imperialism and colonialism. Such movements were not only political but, more importantly, cultural. In the Chinese revolutionary context, independence could only be achieved through people’s emancipation45 in three aspects—political, economic and cultural.46 The same principle was used to understand the Third World national independence movements. Since national independence was merely a gateway leading towards the ultimate human liberation, it was important to articulate the political mission of national independence in the context of the internationalist ideal of equality. The CCP used the term ‘new patriotism’ to enunciate the departure from the ‘old’ self-centred nationalism rooted in European history. In the 1950s, such a new patriotism contained devotion to both the socialist construction on

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a domestic level and safeguarding peace through anti-imperialism on an international level. Within the newly established republic, some Chinese Muslim scholars began to articulate an extra layer of devotion. Wen Xingsan, a prominent Muslim scholar and pro-national activist during the anti-Japanese period, proposed ‘four missions’ for Muslims in the PRC. He stated that the self-cultivation of a good Muslim draws inspirations from two main sources. ‘The Qur’an teaches us the importance of Tawḥīd’. From the ‘viewpoint of the people’, Chinese Muslims should also ‘love the motherland, be determined, constantly raise our political awareness, learn the policies and laws of our nation, obey the law, and strengthen the devotion to the nation and the people to increase the power of ­national-construction’.47 Wen’s discussion responded to the PRC’s general principle on the religious issue, which required the religious groups to ‘love the country and religious organisations’48 at the same time. Muslim scholars in the early PRC period were eager to communicate their devotion to the nation-building agenda by actively participating in major state organised events. They also actively published commentaries and essays in the Chinese-language national media, backing the state’s positions on various issues with religious teachings. In the 1950s, one of the most important topics which attracted the Chinese Muslim scholars’ attention was the call for anti-imperialism. The discourse of a global struggle against imperialism enabled the CCP to encompass the transnationality of Islam and to address the Arab world directly through such a bond. Chinese Muslim scholars played a key role in the process. In 1950, soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, Ma Jian, a prominent Chinese Islamic scholar, trained at Al-Azhar University and a vital member in the CIAPC, published a short article in the People’s Daily stating that the imperialists, particularly the US imperialists, were the ‘arch nemesis of Islam’. Ma Jian described Islam as a religion of resistance by quoting from the Qur’an verses 2:256, 18:29, 39:14 and 15. He harshly criticised the missionary work of Samuel Marinus Zwemer among the Chinese and south-east Asian Muslims as an instrument of American imperialism. Hence, competing for religious freedom among the Hui and other Muslim minorities in China became a part of the transnational struggle against imperialism. The article ends with a call to arms to all the Muslim ‘brothers and sisters’ across different ethnic groups to ‘contribute your powers’ to resist against ‘American invasion’, defend ‘your religion’ and ‘your motherland’, and to ‘safeguard global peace’.49

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With the establishment of the CIAPC in 1952 and the IAC in 1953, Chinese Muslims quickly became champions in advocating the ‘new patriotism’ at both national and international levels. Chinese Muslims, as the letter sent to Mao Zedong on the launch day of the CIAPC suggested, enjoyed the rights of ‘ethnic equally and religious freedom’ in the ‘big fraternal family’. The IAC that ‘we are preparing for’ will ‘assist the people’s government to implement the religious policy coined in the Common Programme’. Together with ‘other fraternal ethnic groups in China’, the Chinese Muslims had ‘turned from slaves to masters’ of the country. To cherish this hard-earned happiness, the Chinese Muslims would strive for ‘ethnic solidarity’, the ‘defence of the motherland’ and ‘world peace’.50 The CIAPC was quick in fulfilling its mandate. In 1952, in preparation for the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, the CIAPC made its first appearance to the Chinese general public. The conference was scheduled to be held in Beijing from 2 to 12 October 1952, with the purpose of supporting the post-war ‘economic and cultural reconstruction’ across the world through broad discussion on ‘safeguarding the perpetual peace of the world’. According to Ma Jian, the mandate of this Peace Conference was in line with the mission of ‘national independence in the Islamic countries as well as the rest of the world’.51 At the same time, the PRC was involved in the Korean War. As a case of direct military intervention, the Korean War was associated with struggles for national independence in the Islamic world. Speeches from Iranian and Iraqi delegates pointed out that ‘the glorious and brave struggles for peace and independence by the Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Malaysian people’ were not only a ‘power that inspires us’ but also ‘our role model’. ‘Strategic arteries’ such as the ‘Suez Canal’ and ‘Çanakkale Boğazı (the Dardanelles)’ were ‘more important than Korea’ to the imperialists.52 The CIAPC was essential in showcasing the religious freedom and ethnic equality in the PRC to the outside world. Its presence at major international events was usually received very positively. In the case of the Asian Peace Conference, ‘seventeen delegates from India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Syria, and other Mohammedan countries met the Chinese Islamic Society to praise religious liberty in China and the fitness of Mohammedanism in a Communist order of things’.53 From then on, the presence of Chinese Muslims on the international stage became a common practice, helping to demonstrate the PRC’s ­non-hegemonic image to the broader Third World nations. A famous example of using

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domestic political practices to communicate a devotion to i­nternational equality was Zhou Enlai’s speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955. When faced with the accusation by former Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhel al-Jamali that Communism was a ‘new form of colonialism’, Zhou responded with the example of the PRC’s ethnic policy on the treatment of Chinese Muslim. He suggested that the principles of ethnic autonomy and religious freedom showed the PRC was aware of the danger of imposing Han hegemony on the ethnic minorities in China, and that the PRC as a unified nation was never going to adopt a hegemonic attitude when interacting with other nations in the world.54

China as the Home Front of the Arab People’s Struggle Against Imperialism With hot wars for national independence in the MENA region, the PRC was self-portrayed as the home front in this long global resistance against injustice. In this sense, this belief was able to bring the idea of being part of a noble collective struggle for a better future for humankind much closer to the Chinese people living in peacetime, particularly after the end of the Korean War. Nation-building, in this context, was almost like a wartime social mobilisation that brought together people from different ethnic groups, social classes and religious backgrounds. The People’s Daily began to cover the events in Palestine as early as 1946, almost immediately after the post-Second World War tensions and military confrontations with the Western nations began in Algeria, Egypt and Palestine.55 After 1949, the continuous armed struggle of the ‘Arab people’ against imperialism was communicated to the Chinese people through news reports, political movements, literary works, folk music, cartoons and posters. The connection with the ‘Arab brothers’ was also reflected in people’s daily life through the mainly agricultural produce which came from international trade with the Arab nations.56 Such a transnational temporality formed an experience of working towards the political ideal of ‘liberation of mankind’. Additionally, it also provided the Chinese people with a political purpose which went beyond the limited concern of national interests during the process of socialist construction. The support given to the Arab people enabled the Chinese Muslims to further incorporate their religious conviction in line with the state’s political discourse of anti-imperialism in peacetime. It also allowed the

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rest of the Chinese, mainly the Han ethnic majority, to get acquainted with the domestic Muslim population. Through the readers’ letters in the People’s Daily, people were asking for ‘more introductions to Arab Islamic art, literature, history, and other general knowledge’.57 The People’s Daily quickly reacted by publishing translations of Arab poems, short stories, travel logs, informative pieces on Arab affairs and, sometimes, even excerpts from the Qur’ran on its eight page. Books of translated Arabic literature were published and made available to the general public. Chinese Muslim scholars also began to write essays for the People’s Daily, introducing the Arab people’s long history of resistance against oppression by using the Qur’an as a crucial reference point. In this internationalist moment, Islam was integrated into the Chinese political discourse of human liberation through anti-imperialism and became a revolutionary narrative. Ma Jian argued that people in modern times ‘enjoyed a much richer historical experience than the ancients’. Hence, we need to ‘provide new interpretations of the Qur’an’. In his opinion, ‘do not quarrel with one another, or you may lose heart and your spirit may desert you’ was the Qur’an’s expression of the same idea of ‘power comes from unity’, which derived from a CCP slogan originating in the Anti-Japanese War mobilisation. He argued that the historical development of the Arab world required solidarity (Ummah). The Baghdad Pact nations broke this bond by serving as tools for imperialist invasions in the Middle and Near East. Hence, these countries betrayed the Qur’an’s teaching of ‘help one another to do what is right and good; do not help one another towards sin and hostility (5:2)’. Condemning the Baghdad Pact (1955) as both immoral and unlawful in the context of Shari’ah (Islamic law), Ma Jian argued that the anti-imperialist war against these aggressors waged by the oppressed people was a jihad. Such a righteous war connected the ‘370 million Muslims across the world’ with ‘millions of peace-loving people globally’. Chinese Muslims, as part of the Chinese people, formed a solid foundation for unity and to ‘provide the Arab brothers with moral and material supports to extinguish the war flame of invasion and safeguard world peace’.58 Reportedly, similar discussions occurred across the nation in many Muslim communities. Messages like ‘the warmth of the Arab people towards Chinese people’ were also communicated to the general public by Chinese Muslims who had returned from a Hajj through the People’s Daily, forming a sense of international solidarity against imperialism among the oppressed people.

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From 1955 to 1958, the Sino-Egyptian interactions were almost the only tangible international relations that substantiated the rhetoric of the fraternal bond between the Chinese and Arab peoples in the Chinese national media. The disputes during the Bandung Conference reminded the CCP that the majority of the MENA nations perceived ‘colonialism’ quite differently. The grudge against the old colonisers such as France and Britain, as well as the fear of the expansion of the Soviet-style communism, was more important to the MENA nations. Whereas the PRC’s main concern was the threat from the growing global influence of the US, especially its presence in China’s surrounding regions, such as the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula and Japan. Moreover, the 1956 Suez Canal even helped the US to gain a rather positive image among the MENA nations as the criticiser of the British and French colonisers.59 The outbreak of the Iraqi revolution in 1958 presented China with an unmissable opportunity. First, unlike the Suez Crisis which had happened two years earlier, the US had responded in 1958 by sending a military force to Lebanon, fearing the nationalist movement in Iraq might threaten US influence in the region. This sparked waves of anti-American protests in Egypt and some other MENA nations, which were described by President Dwight Eisenhower as a ‘campaign of hatred’.60 Second, with the Arab world voicing their criticisms of Western intervention, the call for safeguarding peace could potentially gain wider international public support. The seemingly arbitrary bridge between China and the Arab world based on the link of a shared cultural-religious background, which, in reality, only the Chinese Muslims could claim, began to gain its political substance through a de facto common-struggle against imperialist aggression. On 14 July 1958, at around four a.m. local time, the Free Officers led by Brigadier General Abdel Karim Qasim began to march on Baghdad. At five a.m., people heard the voice of Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif on the radio informing the public that the monarchy and the old regime had been overthrown.61 The US and the UK responded to the event by sending troops to Lebanon and Jordan, respectively.62 The PRC quickly reacted. From July 15 to 20, Mao and high-ranking officials were holding overnight discussions about the situations in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan. In a meeting on 20 July, attended by 44 members of the Politburo and military generals, a consensus was reached that the Chinese military must be prepared to respond to the current international situation.63

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In the meantime, the general public was mobilised to voice the people’s support for the Arab brothers and to excoriate the Anglo-US aggressors. On 17 July 1958, people from across Beijing gathered in Tiananmen Square. At four p.m. Beijing time, Liu Ren, the then chairman of the Beijing municipal Party committee, announced the opening of the ‘Conference on Protesting against the US Armed Invasion of Lebanon, Supporting the Republic of Iraq, and Lebanese National Independence Movement’. According to the People’s Daily on 18 July, 500,000 people participated in this conference. During the rally, Peng Zhen gave a short speech in support of the Lebanese people’s national independence movement and demanding the US imperialist army’s retreat from Lebanon. Peng condemned the US military move as an act of intervention. There was an Arabic translator on the spot, providing simultaneous translation of Peng’s speech to the United Arab Republic (UAR) delegates attending the meeting. A group of foreign journalists were also attending the meeting, among whom was French director Claude Lanzmann. He was there as a correspondent for the famous left-wing weekly L’Express. On 24 July, readers of L’Express read about the ‘astonishing scene’ in Beijing. Lanzmann told his readers that there were street shows played by workers and students, re-enacting the events happening in Lebanon. People on Tiananmen ­ Square saw the Arab people in shackles, the Arab dictators with whips and arrogant US soldiers wearing black sunglasses, an image which many Chinese people were familiar with from the Korean War, which had finished less than three years previously. On 29 July, Lanzmann’s article was translated into Chinese and appeared in the People’s Daily.64 The story of the Chinese people supporting the Arab people on 17 July reoccurred in many formats and was read by Chinese across the nation. It became the foundation of an internationalist moment of ‘liberation of mankind’ experienced by many ordinary Chinese people. Peng emphasised in his speech that the Iraqi revolution was a ‘joint achievement’ of the ‘Iraqi people’, the ‘Arab people’ and the ‘people across the world who cherish peace’. It was considered a heavy blow against the ‘colonial rule of imperialism in the Middle East’ and would bring a ‘new wave’ of national independence movements in the AfroAsian world. The US military intervention in Lebanon was considered as part of a continuous imperialist threat against regional peace after the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 and the Syrian Crisis in 1957. Peng argued that the same oppression was inflicted on the Chinese people through

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the military presence of the US in Taiwan. Hence, linking the Chinese people’s resistance to imperialism with the struggle in the Arab world was not merely historical rhetoric but, more importantly, an urgent contemporary matter. The resistance against Anglo-US imperialism in both China and the MENA region formed a global ‘struggle on the frontline of anti-imperialism and anti-invasion’.65 The national mobilisation against imperialism created a political occasion which enabled incorporation of religious identity into the national identity. The mobilisation of the Chinese ethnic minorities, particularly the Muslim population, was another essential element in this internationalist moment of supporting the Arab people. Islam as a shared cultural background between the Arab people and Chinese Muslims was strongly emphasised. By accentuating this collective identity of Muslim, Chinese Muslim groups became a channel bringing the suffering of a distant land much closer to home for the newly independent Chinese people. In turn, by standing solidly in support of the Arab cause against foreign intervention, the PRC gained a moral high ground integrating the Islamic view of the just war with the Chinese mission of fighting against imperialism through socialist construction. This message was delivered on the 18 July rally in Tiananmen Square. In addition to Peng Zhen’s speech, Imam Da Pusheng, the vice president of the IAC also gave a short sermon, stating the ‘support from Chinese Muslims to their Arab brothers’. He said that ‘Chinese Muslims stands together with the Chinese people to celebrate the great triumph of the Iraqis’. The US aggression was an ‘act of imperialism and the Devil’. It was an ‘unscrupulous provocation to the Arab world and a threat to the peace in Asia and Africa’. The Imam emphasised that ‘loving your nation is part of the Islamic belief’. He quoted a famous phrase from the Qur’an and argued that a patriotic war against the US invasion was a ‘fight in God’s cause (2:190)’.66 On 21 July 1958, at a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China, Pavel Fyodorovich Yudin, Mao Zedong mentioned that ‘it was difficult for us to conduct safeguarding peace movements, as people will say they were agitated by the communists’. Hence, these movements had ‘very little influence’. However, the ‘American and British invasions of Lebanon and Jordan became our advertiser’. ‘Isn’t it clear now’, Mao asked rhetorically, ‘who stands for peace and who promotes war?’ To Mao, the change of affairs in the MENA region suggested that ‘now the revolutionary force stored around the world will unite together under the slogan of safeguarding peace’. Mao then drew a picture of a hopeful

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future that ‘anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutions are fermenting across Asia, Africa, and Latin America’.67 Mao had been praising the Egyptian nationalist movement highly since 1956 when the Suez Crisis occurred. In his opening speech to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP, he stated that the nationalist movement in Egypt should be understood in the global trend of ‘struggling for national independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America’.68 These ‘national independence movements’ were not ‘socialist revolutions’. But they were considered as the essential international force which could ‘support all the socialist nations’.69 To the Chinese people, the political experience of supporting the Arab people was an internationalist moment that brought the Chinese and the Arabs together. It was also like a wartime social mobilisation that drew the Chinese people closer to each other. The support of the Iraqi and Lebanese people happened at a vital point in the PRC’s history. In early 1958, the CCP government had launched the Great Leap Forward, a radical political attempt to increase Chinese productivity through a mass movement. The campaign was focusing on helping China to achieve economic independence. It was also a project aiming to assist the Chinese people to gain political awareness through socialist construction. During the month-long support of the Iraqi and Lebanese people, the People’s Daily published numerous letters from workers, farmers, intellectuals and students, stating that they wanted to help the Iraqi and Lebanese people by producing more steel and grain, and making technological breakthroughs. During the campaign supporting the Arab brothers, the political idealism of forming a unity with the Arab world was often given a humanitarian touch. On 18 July 1958, the eighth page of the People’s Daily, which was usually devoted to literary works and the introduction of socio-political knowledge, published a poem by Yuan Ying together with a blurry picture of an allegedly Lebanese child.70 The poem depicted how, when the US soldiers landed in Lebanon, this child’s ‘eyes narrow and lips tighten’. The child was affirming that ‘we, the Arabs, will drive those US invaders out’. It was ‘the world’s people standing behind this little kid’. This image of an indignant Lebanese child quickly caught the hearts of the Chinese people. In the following months, stage plays, poems and folk songs were written about this child, transforming him into the embodiment of Third World heroism and resistance to imperialist brutality.71

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At the time, the narrative in the public domain was that by supporting the Arab brothers who were fighting on the front line of ­anti-imperialism, China would became the home front in this long-lasting international warfare. People from all regions, social classes and ethnic groups were mobilised to support the righteous cause of the Arab people. The mobilisation under the spirit of internationalism was also associated with the General Line of Socialist Construction. Hence, workers and farmers were encouraged to participate in rallies and study groups about MENA affairs after working hours or during work breaks. Students’ attendance at rallies should also be after class time. More importantly, it encouraged workers to speed up production and construction to support the people in the Middle East. Activities from across the nation were meticulously recorded, some of which were also published in the People’s Daily. Readers in China encountered stories like how the Ma’an’shan Steel Factory workers ‘proposed to hit the invasive wolf by producing more steel and iron’, or how workers from Quan’jiao County Machinery Factory posted big-character posters after ‘attending group meetings protesting against the crime of the US and UK invasion of the Middle East’, stating that they ‘decided to work overnight in order to support the righteous struggle of the Arab people’. Miners and oil workers from Tongchuan in Shan’xi province stated that Chinese workers ‘swore to be the backup for the Arab workers’. Farmers were also enthusiastically involved in these demonstrations of solidarity. In Yinxiang village in Shan’xi province, farmers ‘were working overnight ploughing over 100 mu of land, after finishing the group meeting condemning the crimes of US imperialists’. About ‘3,000 farmers from Xinmin county in Liaoning province’ worked overnight to ‘fight the drought’ to ‘strengthen the motherland’s ability to safeguard world peace and support the righteous struggle of the Arab people’.72 Similar reports from workers, farmers, shop clerks and even business owners appeared in the People’s Daily nearly on a daily basis from July to mid-August in 1958.

Conclusion In Chinese political discourse, Islam is officially recognised as a world religion and a socio-economic system. In the context of the socialist revolution, the socio-political role of Islam does not always have to be in a contest with the state. To the broader Third World nations, it is not strange to witness religion, religious groups and religious thinking

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actively participating in the modernising mission of nation-building. This historical reality requires us to further question the Eurocentric reading of modernity bearing a key characteristic of ‘secularisation’—the process of separating ‘state’ and ‘church’. Instead, we should investigate the role of religion, particularly the cohesion between religious and political forces in the universal mission of human liberation and socialist modernisation. The CCP, being a vanguard party, bears the idealistic mission of striving for human liberation. As the ultimate stage of people’s self-awareness, human liberation can only be achieved through people’s active involvement in gradual social transformations. In the case of the early PRC, anti-imperialism and socialist construction were the two primary political goals allowing people to be politically engaged and, consequently, creating a common ground for recognition. Hence, religion was considered as merely another form of ideology which needed to be incorporated into the political mission leading towards human liberation. The CCP also recognised religion as a socio-economic institution. During the process of socialist construction, the implementation of land reform policy in different regions regularly challenged the interests of the local religious establishment and consequently caused retaliations. This tension constituted another vital component in understanding the meaning of ‘secularisation’ in the Communist revolutionary context. However, despite the political and historical complexity in pushing through the land reform policy across China, the guiding principle and the utmost concern for the then CCP was to win the hearts and minds of the people. Beyond this practical concern, there also lies an idealistic vision of liberation. By mobilising individuals from across the nation to engage in a discussion about international affairs and the world’s future, the people as a political entity could then start to acquire its connotation and subjectivity as the ‘drive behind the making of the world’s history’.73 The vision depicted in Third World internationalism might be idealistic in the eyes of today’s people, particularly through the lenses of political realism and pragmatism. However, in the context of the 1950s, when the ­war-torn world was eagerly redeeming itself from its brutal hegemonic past, the discourse of internationalism did indeed provide new hope for people who believed in the new world order depicted in the UN Charter. It was in this moment of international solidarity that the needs for redemption, transcendence and, ultimately, salvation, which were usually delivered through religion, were presented to the people through political practices.

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Notes







1.  “Woguo Yisilanjiao Chaojintuan yi Fanjing zai Bajisitan Shoudao Dangdirenmin Relie Huanying [The Islamic Haji Delegation of Our Country Returned to Beijing, They Received a Warm Welcome from the Local People],” People’s Daily, 24 October, 1952, 1. 2. Regarding the Western perspective on the People’s Daily, see one of the earliest systematic narratives on this topic in the English-speaking world: Franklin W. Houn, “Chinese Communist Control of the Press,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Winter 1958–1959): 425–448. 3. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, 1949–1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41–45. Some researchers even go a step further and called the Hajj delegations organised by the PRC ‘Hajj diplomacy’. See Naser M. Al-Tamimi, China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990–2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance? (London: Routledge, 2013), 60–62. 4. 中国伊斯兰教协会筹备委员会, CIAPC, later became the Islamic Association of China, 中国伊斯兰教协会, IAC in 1953. 5.  For a historical account of the Chinese Muslim students studying in al-Azhar, see Yufeng Mao, “Selective Learning from the Middle East: The Case of Sino-Muslim Students at Al-Azhar University,” in Islamic Thought in China: Sino-Muslim Intellectual Evolution from the 17th to the 21st Century, ed. Jonathan Lipman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 147–170. John T. Chen has an excellent discussion about this transnational exchange of Chinese Hui students studying in al-Azhar prior to 1949 in relation to the formation of their political and historical subjectivity. Chen’s study primarily focuses on Pang Shiqian. See John T. Chen, “Re-orientation: The Chinese Azharites Between Umma and Third World, 1938–55,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 1 (2014): 24–51. Also see Yueyang Chen, Alabo Wenhua Zai Zhongguo: Yi Ershishiji Weili [Arabic Culture in China: The Case of 20th Century] (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 2016), 97–127. Regarding the Hajj trips in the Republic period, see Chen, Alabo Wenhua Zai Zhongguo, 75–78. For personal memoirs and a collection of historical documents regarding the dispatch of Hui students in the 1930s, see Ma Bozhong and Na Jiarui, eds., Licheng: Minguo Liuai Huizu Xuesheng Paiqianshi Yanjiu [Journey: The History of Hui Students Studying in Egypt During the Republic of China Period] (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 2011). For a historical account of the intellectual exchanges between China and Egypt before 1949, see Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “Taking Abduh to China: Chinese-Egyptian Intellectual Contact in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Global Muslims

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in the Age of Steel and Print, ed. James L. Gelvin and Nile Green (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 249–267. 6. “Woguo Yisilan Chaojintuan yi Fanjing” [The Hajj Delegation Returned to Beijing], People’s Daily, October 24, 1952, 1. 7.  Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, 2 ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 136; Alexander Stewart, Chinese Muslims and the Global Ummah (London: Routledge, 2018), 31–32. 8. For example, see Gui Rong, Hacer Zekiye Gönül, and Zhang Xiaoyan, eds., Hui Muslims in China (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016); Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities, Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1991); Raphael Israeli, Muslims in China, a Study in Cultural Confrontation (London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1980). 9. Beatrice Leung, “China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity,” The China Quarterly, no. 184 (December 2005): 894–913. 10.  Michael Dillon, “Muslim Communities in Contemporary China: The Resurgence of Islam After the Cultural Revolution,” Journal of Islamic Studies 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 70–101; Jérôme Doyon and Will Thornely, “The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State: Consanguinity and Opportunities,” China Perspectives 4, no. 100 (2014): 45–52. 11.  Yufeng Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation: Chinese Pilgrimage Missions to Mecca During World War Ii,” The Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (May 2011): 373–395; Chen, “Re-orientation: The Chinese Azharites Between Umma and Third World, 1938–55,” 24–51. 12.  For example, see T. Y. Wang, “Competing for Friendship: The Two Chinas and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 63–82; Dru C. Gladney, “Sino-Middle Eastern Perspectives and Relations Since the Gulf War: Views from Below,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 4 (November 1994): 677–691; Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 75–105. 13. Husheng He, Zhongguo Gongchandang De Zongjiao Zhengce Yanjiu [Study of the Religious Policies of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Religion Culture Publishing House, 2004), 110–111. In 1958, Li Weihan (李维汉, 1896–1984), the then Minister of the United Front Work Department, gave a talk about Islam and the social development of the Hui people. He particularly pointed out that religious obligations

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such as Zakat and Ramadan held back the social development of Hui communities. See Weihan Li, “Zai Huizu Yisilanjiao Wenti Zuotanhui Shangde Jianghua [Talk at the Forum of Islam Religious Issues of Hui People],” in Li Weihan Xuanji [Selected Works of Li Weihan] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 340–361. 14. David Cannadine, Ornamentalism, How the British Saw Their Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2002). 15. Robert N. Bellah, Varieties of Civil Religion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 17. 16. Zedong Mao, “Lun Xinjieduan [On the New Phase],” in Mōtakutō Shū [Collected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung], ed. Minoru Takeuchi (Tokyo: Sososha, 1983), 163–263. 17.  根据地. 18. Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, Huihui Minzu Wenti [The National Question of Hui] (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1980), 83–95. 19. Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, Huihui Minzu Wenti, 105–106. 20. Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, Huihui Minzu Wenti, 107. Regarding the Japanese activities to advocate pan-Islamism in China, see Masashi Haneda, Isurāmu Sekainosōzō [The Creation of the Islamic World] (Tokyo: Tōkyōdaigaku Shuppankai, 2005). 21.  Rosa Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” in The National Question, Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, ed. Horace B. Davis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 175–182. 22. Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” 176. 23. Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” 137. 24. Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” 129–131. 25. Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” 137–138. 26. V. I. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in V. I. Lenin Collected Works, ed. Julius Katzer (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 410–414. 27. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” 409–413. 28. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” 400. 29. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” 429–435. 30.  V. I. Lenin, “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to ­Self-Determination (Theses),” in V. I. Lenin Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 150–151. 31. Mao, “Lun Xinjieduan [On the New Phase],” 242–243. 32. Before the 1954 reform, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission was under the direct management of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government (中央人民政府政务院). The 1954 Constitution reformed the governmental structure and introduced the State Council of the PRC (中华人民共和国国务院), a much bigger administrative

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authority chaired by the premier. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission was temporary suspended between 1970 and 1978. Since 1978, it has been a department in the State Council. The 2018 central government institutional reform put the State Ethnic Affairs Commission under the leadership of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中共中央统一战线工作部), a party organisation under the Central Committee of the CPC (中国共产党中央委员 会). The State Ethnic Affairs Department continues to be part of the State Council. But the 2018 reform reintroduces a stronger presence of the party’s leadership in ethnic affairs and reinforces the importance of ethnic affairs as a United Front issue. Similar reform also applies to the leadership of religious work. It was put back under the United Front Work Department. See Zhonggongzhongyang, “Shenhua Dang He Guojia Jigou Gaige Fangan (Plan for Deepening the Institutional Reform of Party and State Administrations),” Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Zhongyangrenminzhengfu [The Central People’s Government of the PRC], http://www.gov.cn/ zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1, accessed April 15, 2018. 33. Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2004), 157–189; Tai Yin and Ming Zhang, “Zhongguo Hongse Gemingzhong De Rentong He “Zhengzhi Xingdong Zhuti” [The Political Subjectivity and Recogition in the Chinese Red Revolution],” Ershiyi shiji [Twenty-First Century], no. 125 (June 2011): 44–62. 34. Mao tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 321–324. 35.  愚公移山. 36. Xianzhi Pang et al., eds., Mao Zedong Nianpu 1949–1976 [Mao Zedong Chronicle, 1949–1976], 6 vols., vol. 4 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013), 391. 37. Pang, Mao Zedong Nianpu 1949–1976, 188–189. 38. Mao stated this opinion when he met with the General Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party Khalid Bakdash in 1959. He expressed the same idea to Nikita Khrushchev later. Pang et al., Mao Zedong Nianpu, vol. 4, 188–189. 39. This was mentioned in Mao’s meeting with the then president of the Yemen Arab Republic Abdullah al-Sallal in 1964. Pang et al. Mao Zedong Nianpu, vol. 5, 360. 40.  “Zhongguorenmin Zhengzhixieshang Huiyi Gongtonggangling [The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference],” in Minzu Zhengce Wenxian Huibian [Collection of Documents on Ethnic Policy] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 1953), 1.

254  Z. YIN 41. “Zhongguorenmin Zhengzhixieshang Huiyi Gongtonggangling.” 42. In Chinese official historiography, modern (jindai) refers to the period between 1840, when the First Opium War broke out, and 1949, when the PRC was established. 43.  “Yazhou Funv wei Minzu Duli Renmin Minzhu yu Shijieheping er Douzheng [Asiatic Women Fighting for National Independence, People’s Democracy and World Peace],” People’s Daily, December 12, 1949, 1. See also, ‘Yazhou Fudaihui Ding Jinri Kaimu’ [The Asiatic Women’s Congress Will Open Today], People’s Daily, December 10, 1949, 1. 44. Xinhuashe, “Yazhoufunv Wei Minzuduli Renminminzhu Yu Shijieheping Er Douzheng Deng Yingchao Zai Yazhou Fudai Huiyi Shangde Baogao [Asian Women Fighting for National Independence, People’s Democracy and World Peace, Deng Yingchao’s Report to the All-Asian Women’s Conference],” People’s Daily, December 12 1949, 1. 45. The CCP uses a colloquial term ‘fanshen’ when communicating this idea to the general public. Fanshen literally means ‘roll-over the body’. 46. It is under this principle that the CCP rationalised their objection against the Tibetan secession movement. In the case of Tibet, the CCP’s argument is very similar to Rosa Luxemburg’s concern about the Polish national independence movement’s incapability of achieving true freedom when the global imperial influences remained powerful in Poland. In 1951, the CCP stated that Tibetan independence would destroy the hard-earned national independence and freedom, and render the Tibetan people as slaves of imperialists. See “Yonghu Guanyu Heping Jiefang Xizang Banfa De Xieyi [Supporting the Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet],” in Minzu Zhengce Wenjian Huibian [Collection of Documents on Ethnic Policy] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 34. 47. Xingsan Wen, “Musilin De Sidarenwu [The Four Main Missions of the Muslim],” Zhongguo Musilin [Chinese Muslim], no. 1 (1957): 13. 48.  爱国爱教. 49.  Jian Ma, “Meidiguozhuyi Shi Yisilanjiao De Sidi [The American Imperialist Is the Arch Nemesis of Islam],” People’s Daily, November 26, 1950, 3. 50.  “Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Choubeihuiyi Xiang Mao Zedong Zhuxi Zhijingdian [Telegraph to Chairman Mao Zedong by the Preparation Conference of the Islamic Association of China],” People’s Daily, August 5, 1952, 1. 51. Ma Jian, “Huanying Yazhou ji Taipingyang Quyu Hepinghuiyi [Welcome the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific regions],” Shijie Zhishi [World Knowledge], no. 34 (1952), 6–7. 52.  Gholam Hossein Rahimian, “Guanyu Minzuduli Wenti De Buchong Baogao [The Supplementary Report on Issues of National Independence],”

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in Yazhou Ji Taipingyang Quyu Hepinghuiyi Zhongyao Wenjian Ji [Collection of Important Documents of the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions], ed. The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions Secretariat (Beijing: The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions Secretariat, 1952), 88–90. 53.  “Importance of the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference,” CIA Information Report, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP82-00457R015400020005-8.pdf, accessed April 15, 2018. 54. A. Doak Barnett, “Chou En-Lai at Bandung, Chinese Communist Diplomacy at the Asian-African Conference,” May 4, 1955. ADB-4-’55, https://www. icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ADB-77.pdf, accessed April 15, 2018. See also Zhou Enlai, “Zai Yafeihuiyi Quantihuiyi shang de fayan [Speech for the Plenary Session of the Afro-Asian Conference],” in Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan [Collection of Zhou Enlai’s Works on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1990), 112–125. 55. For example, on 29 May 1946, just two weeks after its official launch, People’s Daily published three pieces of news about the struggles in the MENA region on its front page. They covered the clash between British forces and Egyptian people at Port Alexandria, the Arab nations’ protests against the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry’s recommendation of moving 100,000 Jewish people to the Palestine region, and the reorganisation of the Lebanese government. 56. Regarding Chinese trade relations with Arab nations, see Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–1975: Three Case Studies (London, Boston, Melbourne, and Henley: KPI, 1981). 57. “Duzhe Laixin [Letters from Readers],” People’s Daily, July 19, 1958, 8. 58.  Ma Jian, “Chongdu Gulanjing [Reinterpret Qur’an],” People’s Daily, August 3, 1958, 8. 59. Odd Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124–125. 60. Mounira Soliman, “The Reception of U.S. Discourse on the Egyptian Revolution, Between the Popular and the Official,” in American Studies Encounters the Middle East, ed. Alex Lubin and Marwan M. Kraidy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 137. 61. Majid Khadduri, Republican ‘Iraq, a Study in ‘Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 38–46. 62. The US was primarily concerned about losing influence in the MENA region in general, and that the credibility of the US for ‘assistance in the event of need would be brought into question throughout the world’. The US was also worried about the spread of Nasserism in the region. Hence, an initially denied request from Lebanese President Camille

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Chamoun for military assistance in June 1958 was accepted in July 1958. Regarding the initial decision on President Chamoun’s request, see Louis J. Smith, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 109–110. The military intervention in Lebanon was initially implemented as a first step. The US ‘would have to be prepared to go into the whole area’. See Smith, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 211–212. Britain’s main driver for collaborating with the US on military intervention was to protect oil interests. On July 17, the Cabinet voted to send two battalions of paratroopers to Jordan. See Peter Catterall, ed. The Macmillan Diaries, Prime Minister and After, 1957–66 (London: MacMillan, 2011), 133–135. 63. Pang et al., Mao Zedong Nianpu, vol. 3, 387–388. 64.  “Yige Waiguo Jizhe Yanli de Beijingrenmin Fanqinlue Shiwei [The ­Anti-Invasion Rally Through the Eyes of a Foreign Reporter],” People’s Daily, July 29, 1958, 8. 65. “Zhongguo Quanli Zhichi Yi Li Liangguo Renmin de Zhengyi Douzheng [China Fully Supports the Righteous Struggles of the People of Iraq and Lebanon],” People’s Daily, July 18, 1958, 2. 66. “Zhongguo Musilin Zhichi Alabo Dixiong [Chinese Muslims Support Arab Brothers],” People’s Daily, July 18, 1958, 2. 67. Pang et al., Mao Zedong Nianpu, vol. 3, 618–619. 68. Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo Gongchandang Dibaci Quanguo Daibiaodahui Kaimuci [Opening Remarks to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP], in Mao Zedong Wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Works], vol. 7, ed. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993–1999), 114–118. 69.  Mao mentioned this opinion in his meeting with delegates from the Union des Populations du Cameroun in 1959. Mao Zedong, “Feizhou Dangqian de Renwu shi Fandui Diguozhuyi, Bushi Fandui Zibenzhuyi [The Current Mission of Africa Is to Resist Against Imperialism NOT Capitalism],” in Mao Zedong Wenji, vol. 8, 7–8. 70. Yuan Ying, “Libanen yi Xiaohai [A Small Child from Lebanon],” People’s Daily, July 18, 1958, 8. 71. For example, “Libanen Xiaohai [A Lebanese Child],” People’s Daily, July 27, 1958, 8. 72. “Duochan Liangshi Duochugang Henhen Daji Yexinlang Anhui Shanxi Liaoning Renmin yi Shijixingdong Zhiyuan Zhongdong Renmin [Produce More Crops and More Steel in Order to Clamp Down the Wild Ambition of the Wolf, People from Anhui Shanxi and Liaoning Supporting the Arab People with Actions],” People’s Daily, July 24, 1958, 2.

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73.  Mao Zedong, “Lun Lianhe Zhengfu [On United Government],” Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1991), 1031.

Bibliography Al-Tamimi, Naser M. China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990–2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance? London: Routledge, 2013. Behbehani, Hashim S. H. China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–1975: Three Case Studies. London, Boston, Melbourne, and Henley: KPI, 1981. Bellah, Robert N. Varieties of Civil Religion. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980. Benite, Zvi Ben-Dor. “Taking Abduh to China: Chinese-Egyptian Intellectual Contact in the Early Twentieth Century.” In Global Muslims in the Age of Steel and Print, edited by James L. Gelvin and Nile Green, 249–267. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Bozhong, Ma, and Na Jiarui, eds. Licheng: Minguo Liuai Huizu Xuesheng Paiqianshi Yanjiu [Journey: The History of Hui Students Studying in Egypt During the Republic of China Period]. Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 2011. Brazinsky, Gregg A. Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. Cannadine, David. Ornamentalism, How the British Saw Their Empire. London: Penguin Books, 2002. Catterall, Peter, ed. The Macmillan Diaries, Prime Minister and After, 1957–66. London: MacMillan, 2011. Chen, John T. “Re-orientation: The Chinese Azharites Between Umma and Third World, 1938–55.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 1 (2014): 24–51. Chen, Yueyang. Alabo Wenhua Zai Zhongguo: Yi Ershishiji Weili [Arabic Culture in China: The Case of 20th Century]. Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 2016. Dillon, Michael. “Muslim Communities in Contemporary China: The Resurgence of Islam After the Cultural Revolution.” Journal of Islamic Studies 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 70–101. Gladney, Dru C. Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1991. Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic. 2 ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. “Sino-Middle Eastern Perspectives and Relations Since the Gulf War: Views from Below.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 4 (November 1994): 677–691.

258  Z. YIN Haneda, Masashi. Isurāmu Sekainosōzō [The Creation of the Islamic World]. Tokyo: Tōkyōdaigaku Shuppankai, 2005. He, Husheng. Zhongguo Gongchandang De Zongjiao Zhengce Yanjiu [Study of the Religious Policies of the Chinese Communist Party]. Beijing: Religion Culture Publishing House, 2004. Houn, Franklin W. “Chinese Communist Control of the Press.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Winter 1958–1959): 425–448. Israeli, Raphael. Muslims in China, a Study in Cultural Confrontation. London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1980. Khadduri, Majid. Republican ‘Iraq, a Study in ‘Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. Lenin, V. I. “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.” Translated by Bernard Isaacs and Joe Fineberg. In V. I. Lenin Collected Works, edited by Julius Katzer. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. Leung, Beatrice. “China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity.” The China Quarterly, no. 184 (December 2005): 894–913. Li, Weihan. “Zai Huizu Yisilanjiao Wenti Zuotanhui Shangde Jianghua [Talk at the Forum of Islam Religious Issues of Hui People].” In Li Weihan Xuanji [Selected Works of Li Weihan]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987. Luxemburg, Rosa. “The National Question and Autonomy.” In The National Question, Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, edited by Horace B. Davis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. Mao, Yufeng. “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation: Chinese Pilgrimage Missions to Mecca During World War Ii.” The Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (May 2011): 373–395. Mao, Zedong. “Lun Xinjieduan [On the New Phase].” In Mōtakutō Shū [Collected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung], edited by Minoru Takeuchi. Tokyo: Sososha, 1983. Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, ed. Huihui Minzu Wenti [The National Question of Hui]. Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1980. Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2004. Pang, Xianzhi, Feng Hui, Chen Jin, Li Jie, Xiong Huayuan, Wu Zhengyu, and Zhang Suhua, eds. Mao Zedong Nianpu 1949–1976 [Mao Zedong Chronicle, 1949–1976]. 6 vols., Vol. 4. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013. Perry, Elizabeth J. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. Rahimian, Gholam Hossein. “Guanyu Minzuduli Wenti De Buchong Baogao [The Supplementary Report on Issues of National Independence].” In Yazhou Ji Taipingyang Quyu Hepinghuiyi Zhongyao Wenjian Ji [Collection of Important Documents of the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions], edited by The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions

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Secretariat. Beijing: The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions Secretariat, 1952. Rong, Gui, Hacer Zekiye Gönül, and Zhang Xiaoyan, eds. Hui Muslims in China. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016. Rudelson, Justin Jon. Oasis Identities, Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Shichor, Yitzhak. The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, 1949–1977. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Smith, Louis J., ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan. Edited by John P. Glennon. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992. Soliman, Mounira. “The Reception of U.S. Discourse on the Egyptian Revolution, Between the Popular and the Official.” In American Studies Encounters the Middle East, edited by Alex Lubin and Marwan M. Kraidy, 136–158. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. Stewart, Alexander. Chinese Muslims and the Global Ummah. London: Routledge, 2018. “Selective Learning from the Middle East: The Case of Sino-Muslim Students at Al-Azhar University.” In Islamic Thought in China: Sino-Muslim Intellectual Evolution from the 17th to the 21st Century, edited by Jonathan Lipman, 147– 170. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Thornely, Jérôme Doyon and Will. “The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State: Consanguinity and Opportunities.” China Perspectives 4, no. 100 (2014): 45–52. Tse-tung, Mao. Selected Works. Vol. 3. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965. “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses).” In V. I. Lenin Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. Wang, T. Y. “Competing for Friendship: The Two Chinas and Saudi Arabia.” Arab Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 63–82. Wen, Xingsan. “Musilin De Sidarenwu [The Four Main Missions of the Muslim].” Zhongguo Musilin [Chinese Muslim], no. 1 (1957): 13. Westad, Odd. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Yin, Tai and Ming Zhang. “Zhongguo Hongse Gemingzhong De Rentong He “Zhengzhi Xingdong Zhuti” [The Political Subjectivity and Recogition in the Chinese Red Revolution].” Ershiyi shiji [Twenty-First Century], no. 125 (June 2011 ): 44–62. “Yonghu Guanyu Heping Jiefang Xizang Banfa De Xieyi [Supporting the Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet].” In Minzu Zhengce Wenjian Huibian [Collection of Documents on Ethnic Policy]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981.

260  Z. YIN Zhonggongzhongyang. “Shenhua Dang He Guojia Jigou Gaige Fangan [Plan for Deepening the Institutional Reform of Party and State Administrations].” Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Zhongyangrenminzhengfu [The Central People’s Government of the PRC], http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1. “Zhongguorenmin Zhengzhixieshang Huiyi Gongtonggangling [The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference].” In Minzu Zhengce Wenxian Huibian [Collection of Documents on Ethnic Policy]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1953.

CHAPTER 11

From ‘Small’ to ‘Big’ Nationalism: National Identity Among China’s Hui Minority in the Twenty-First Century Dean Phelan

Introduction ‘We sing in praise of our beloved motherland, toward a prosperous and strong nation’.1 These words filled the Bird’s Nest Stadium as 56 ethnically costumed Han children carried the Chinese national flag at the opening of the Beijing Olympics on 8 August 2008. This moment was one of great national pride for many Chinese people across the globe, an opportunity for modern China to show the world its national strength, prosperity and unity. The decision to have the national flag brought out by 56 children from seemingly different ethnic minority groups was not insignificant, nor was the song being sung. The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was sending a clear message to the world, and indeed to its citizens—China is a prosperous nation-state of 56 united nationalities. Such demonstrations and representations of the PRC as being a ­multi-ethnic yet united nation are neither superficial nor politically neutral. D. Phelan (*)  Department of Geography, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_11

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Rather, discourses and imaginaries of the PRC as being composed of 56 distinct yet equal ethnicities are central to Chinese national identities and policies. The centrality of ethnicity to the Chinese national imaginary is not a new occurrence; it has been a cornerstone of Chinese nationalism since its inception. Liang Qichao’s ‘small’ and ‘big’ nationalisms have been particularly important in the development of current policies. This two-fold approach to nationalism has had an impact on the e­ thno-nationalist identities of minority peoples in China, including the Hui. In today’s era of globalisation, these discourses of nationalism, both ‘big’ and ‘small’, are challenged by increased international interconnectedness and transnational networks,2 as communities and individuals are less confined by national boundaries. This global interconnectedness and its heightened movement of people and ideas presents obstacles for the sovereignty of governments,3 particularly those with diverse multicultural minority populations, with some authors claiming that globalisation signifies the end of the nation-state.4 Political events do not happen in isolation, with events and activities in one place impacting on communities elsewhere. These global political networks pose distinct challenges for nation-states and often result in international cooperation between governments in order to address issues stemming from globalisation, such as the allying of states in the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’. Although seen as an international response to the political obstacles of global terrorism, the ‘Global War on Terror’ is enacted in localised ways as n ­ ation-states attempt to use it as a discourse to further their specific national agendas. In the Chinese context, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used it to justify their crackdown on their Muslim minority groups, especially those in north-western China, while promoting an increasingly authoritarian discourse and image of nationalism. The CCP’s nationalistic actions and policies target the globalised networks of China’s Muslim minorities. In Xinjiang Province, this has resulted in more than a million Muslims being detained in ‘education camps’ for numerous ‘offences’, including having ties to individuals and communities abroad.5 In Ningxia Province, the labelling of Qingzhen (pure and true) foods has become increasingly politicised as authorities have now ordered that Arabic writing be removed from labels in an effort to counter Arabisation among Chinese Muslims.6 Actions such as these not only show the counter-globalisation efforts of the CCP and its nationalistic agendas but also demonstrate

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the usefulness of examining food as a political mechanism. Food is more than a mundane consumption practice; it is filled with political, social and cultural meanings. For many people, food is closely tied to their identities and connections to place,7 with dietary practices acting as performances of individual and group identities. As such, this chapter will examine the performances of national identities by Hui individuals in Beijing through their engagements with their food cultures. Specifically, this will be achieved through structuring the chapter in three parts. Firstly, the theoretical development of nationalism within China will be explored, focusing on the contributions of Liang Qichao’s ‘big’ and ‘small’ nationalism to current conceptualisations. The chapter will then examine current policies affecting minorities in China. Before concluding, the lived realities of China’s two-fold nationality policy will be demonstrated, looking at how national identity is performed by ethnically Hui people in Beijing through their food cultures. This discussion draws heavily from twelve months of ethnographic research in Beijing City with Hui individuals involved in the production of Hui food cultures, specifically those people working in Hui restaurants and eateries. In line with the theoretical belief that food cultures allow for important insights to be gleaned into lived experiences of political practices, the opinions, experiences and identity performances of Hui individuals working in the Qingzhen food industry were garnered so as to explore Hui national identity.

Theoretical Development of Nationalism: Making the Chinese Nation The concepts of nation, nation-state and nationalism were first introduced into the realm of Chinese politics in the late nineteenth century as instruments of defence and regeneration in the face of Western imperialism and the weakening of the Qing Dynasty. Despite there being similarities between nationalism and pre-modern Chinese sentiments, nationalism and the nation appeared with the establishment of the nation-state system, or the Westphalian system, in Europe.8 According to Smith the concept of a nation may be defined as ‘a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members’.9 As Hsü has noted, ‘imperial China was not a

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nation-state’ and, as such, nationalism did not exist in ancient China.10 Rather than being bound by national consciousness, the people of traditional China were linked by culturalism and universalism, whereby China was perceived as being the only civilisation in the universal world and all those who adopted its teachings and principles could be incorporated within its culturalist bounds.11 The defeat of the Chinese by the British in the 1840–1842 Opium War and by the Japanese in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War, would prove to be major catalysts in fuelling Chinese nationalism and nationalistic movements. According to Liang Qichao, one of China’s most important and influential early twentieth century nationalists, the 1895 loss to Japan was a particularly poignant moment in Chinese history as he claims that it awoke the Chinese people ‘from the dream of 4000 years’,12 with many other scholars agreeing that it proved to be a watershed moment in the development of Chinese nationalism.13 Although prominent Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong argues that China had existed as an ‘unconscious nation’ for thousands of years, he conceded that the Chinese nation only came into being as a ‘conscious national entity’ as a result of contact and conflicts with Western imperial forces in recent times.14 Following the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese nationalism was specifically centred on ethnic nationalism, whereby the nation is viewed as consisting of a single politicised ethnic group. At the turn of the twentieth century, this form of ‘racist and ­anti-imperialist’15 nationalism would be the defining quality of the Han nationalists’ attempts to not only fight off the Western powers but also to topple the minority Manchu rule. Following the fall of the Qing Empire in 1912, Sun Yat-sen and other nationalist revolutionaries realised that their Han-centric version of ethnic nationalism risked the dissolution of Qing territories by excluding other self-identifying ethnic groups. Thus, Sun began to promote a vision of the newly established Chinese nation as being multi-ethnic while rejecting the ethnic nationalism that he had once argued so passionately in favour of; instead claiming that China was one country with five united ethnic groups. Once again, the work of Liang Qichao is useful in understanding this development in Chinese nationalism as it spearheaded the change in Chinese nationalist views of the nationstate by making a conceptual distinction between the nation and the state. Importantly, he claimed that a nation could be defined as the result of humans’ natural tendency to gather in larger groups. Further,

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he believed that these nations may be spread across many states and a state may in fact contain multiple nations.16 In relation to these distinctions, Liang developed and introduced two new Chinese terms; da minzuzhuyi (‘big’ nationalism) and xiao minzuzhuyi (‘small’ nationalism).17 ‘Small’ nationalism may be understood as the nationalism existing among individual ethnic groups, similar to ethnic nationalism among the Han. However, ‘big’ nationalism unites all ethnic groups within the state together, particularly in opposition to foreign powers and is thus comparable to state nationalism.18 Liang’s definition of Chinese nationalism prioritised territory as the most important criterion for Chinese nationalism, as opposed to the ethnic nationalism and expulsion of minorities pursued by Sun Yat-sen and other nationalists at the time. Initially, Sun objected to Liang’s definitions and views, however, following the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent separatist movements in China’s frontier regions, Sun attempted to transcend his previously ethnic nationalist approach by establishing a ‘national people’ that was inclusive of certain non-Han groups.19 The Republican era was marked by a struggle between nationalists who advocated for a centralised state system and those nationalists who sought to establish a federalist system, similar to that of the United States of America. Those in support of a federalist system believed that provincial identity and autonomy should be preserved, as provincial traditions were the foundations for the nation-state. The contest between the centralists and federalists was particularly heated in the 1920s.20 During this time, warlordism was rampant throughout China, with the years between 1916 and 1928 being referred to as the Warlord Era. Each of these warlords held tremendous political, military and economic power over substantial territories, and some were controlled by members of ethnic minority groups who consolidated power by uniting populations against the exclusionary Han ethnic nationalists. The north-western provinces of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai were controlled during this time by a group of Hui warlords known as the Ma family warlords.21 Many federalists believed that a centralised state was too weak to challenge China’s numerous warlords and as such, provincial forces would be better equipped to tackle the problem. Although the federalist movement was focused on provincial self-governance, it nevertheless became a tool used by these warlords in their struggle with each other, resulting in political crises for the fledgling state’s government. In 1922, Sun Yatsen began the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to unify China’s

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feuding provinces and territories by establishing a centralised national government. The Northern Expedition was continued by Sun’s successor, Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1927 a central government was established in Nanjing, and territorial integrity and power were largely regained.22 Interestingly, despite the successful establishment of the Guomindang Government (Chinese Nationalist Party), warlordism continued to play a role. In 1934, the Guomindang Government allied with the Hui warlord Ma Zhongying to overthrow the separatist state of the First East Turkestan Republic, which was established by the Uyghur nationality in western Xinjiang province. The willingness of the Hui warlords and armies to assist Chiang Kai-shek’s government in overthrowing their fellow Muslim minority group held huge significance, especially in relation to the construction of a Chinese national concept. Their cooperation with the Han government in defending the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation shows that although the Hui were actively pursuing a type of ‘small’ nationalism during the Warlord Era, by 1934 they were working with the Han nationality to practice ‘big’ nationalism. Thus, the Hui consolidated their ‘small’ national identity while also working with the Han in defence of their common identity, their Chinese national identity.

Classifying a Nation Despite there being enormous cultural, geographical, linguistic and religious differences among China’s Muslims, they continued to be grouped together under the term Hui until the 1950s. This notion of a homogenous Islamic population in China was further developed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his idea of the ‘Five Peoples of China’, which would prove vitally important in his efforts to topple the Qing Empire. In order to unite the broader Chinese populace against the ruling Manchurian elite, Dr. Sun devised the ‘Five Peoples of China’, identifying five nationalities or minzu (ethnicity) and establishing the Han as the majority nationality. In addition to the newly united Han and Manchu nationalities, Dr. Sun also identified the Mongolian, Tibetan and Hui.23 During Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist era, his government argued vehemently that there was in fact only one nationality in China, the Chinese people, asserting that groups such as the Hui were merely a subvariety of the same minzu. Early communists in China began to dispute this mono-ethnic claim, promoting the belief that China was composed of a variety of distinct, yet politically equal, ethnic groups.24 This multi-minzu stance was forged

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during the 1930s in an attempt to gain the support of those people that were discontented by Chiang Kai-shek’s nationality policy. Crucially, it was during the Long March that communist leaders, faced with possible extermination, were forced to make promises of special treatment to the ‘barbarians’ that they encountered on their 371-day trek. Specifically, promises were made to the Miao, Yi, Tibetan and Hui.25 The commitment of the Chinese Communists to grant recognition to non-Han minzu was further emphasised in a series of treatises written during the 1930s. Most famously, the minzu policies of Republican and Imperial era China were criticised in The Question of the Huihui Nationality. In this text, it was argued that the Hui constituted a distinct nationality, rather than being a mere religious sub-division of the Han people. It was argued that Nationalist policies were designed to impede the ‘national awakening’ of the Hui people and that by failing to recognise the Hui as a separate minzu, the Nationalist Government was avoiding the issue of political equality and representation for the Hui.26 Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese state set about documenting and categorising China’s many nationalities, challenging both Dr. Sun’s notion of a ‘Five Peoples’ nation and Chiang Kai-shek’s mono-minzu version. Over the ensuing three decades, a series of extensive ethnographic and linguistic classification projects under the collective title of minzushibie (Ethnic Classification Project) would result in the identification of 56 nationalities using a criterion that Mullaney27 has termed ‘ethnic potential’. Beginning in the early years of the CCP’s rule, a team of ethnographers and linguists were instructed to categorise and classify China’s diverse population using Stalin’s ­four-point criteria for ethnic evolution.28 This set of criteria requires groups to possess four shared traits in order to be considered a nationality; ‘a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture’.29 However, the classification team quickly realised that many of the self-identifying groups they met across China did not in fact meet all four requirements. Despite this, some of these groups were considered to hold sufficient cultural difference from the Han and other newly identified minority groups to warrant classification as nationalities. As such, the classification team leader, Lin Yaohua, devised a new approach for assessing the eligibility of applicant groups based on an enlarged definition of minzu.30 Rather than requiring groups to already possess all four criteria, they would be assessed on their potential

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to possess these traits, i.e. their potential to achieve nationality status. Further, this new approach aimed to allow for the self-identification of groups.31 This liberal approach to self-identification would result in more than 400 applicant groups seeking recognition across China. However, by 1982, just 56 ethnic groups had been officially recognised, including the majority Han population and 55 minority ethnic groups.32 As such, people in China were then provided with a predetermined list of ethnicities to choose from, resulting in the official amalgamation and exclusion of certain groups for political expediency.33 In line with this Stalinistic approach, the 55 non-Han groups are considered by much official and popular discourse to be fossilised remnants of earlier stages of the evolution towards socialism. Yet, it is apparent that these groups are by no means fossilised. Rather, they are in a constant state of flux and change, a continuum of reinvention and contention.34 As Connor and Mullaney have pointed out, Marxist writings claim that ‘nationalities are parts of the superstructure, ideational manifestations of underlying economic relationships and processes that are destined to wither away once the inherent contradictions within the economic structure resolve themselves dialectically’.35 So why then would the newly formed government of the PRC want to classify and categorise that which is seemingly destined to disappear in time? Once again, Mullaney’s insightful work is helpful in addressing this question as he points towards three reasons. First, leading up to the establishment of the PRC, the Communists had been engaged in a bitter battle for power with the Nationalists. From the 1930s on, the Communists devised an ethno-political platform that put them in opposition to the Nationalists in an attempt to garner support from the increasingly disgruntled peoples of China. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Nationalists became evermore committed to their ­mono-minzu stance, claiming that China was comprised of only one people, the Chinese people. The Communists set about placing themselves in opposition to this stance, proposing a vision of China as a composite of different, yet politically equal, groups. The second point is that the classification of China’s nationalities needs to be situated within the broader history of the post-imperial transition in China and the historical issue of maintaining territorial integrity of a diverse and vast empire. Throughout history, the communist party’s predecessors had long struggled to incorporate China’s western tribes and people into a unified polity. In order to overcome this problem, many regimes attempted to create policies that

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manipulated the various practices of the people whom they attempted to govern. From this standpoint, it is clear to see why the Communists wished to categorise the diverse people of Western China and document their cultural, economic and societal practices. Finally, the categorisation may be seen as an attempt to address the government’s initial failures to live up to earlier commitments. Initially, the government adopted a non-interventionist approach of self-categorisation when dealing with the question of ethnicity. However, the astonishing proliferation of nationality categories that appeared on the first national census of 1953– 1954 showed that a non-interventionist policy with regards to minzu categorisation would mean that the government’s earlier commitments to proportional representation for non-Han people would be impossible. As such, they needed to establish a definable list of minzu in order to guarantee proportional representation. As the initial, extremely liberal, self-categorisation aspirations of the Chinese state proved to be unfeasible, the Chinese people were then provided with a preset list of 56 options from which to choose their ethno-national identity. These options were in line with the earlier policy proposal of Fang Guoyu, whereby each group was to be given ‘one name, one spelling, one pronunciation, not to be changed at will’.36

Nationalism and Politics: Ethnicity and Ronghe in China Although Mullaney’s work certainly sheds light onto some of the possible political reasoning behind the CCP’s decision to identify and document China’s minority populations, it arguably overlooks a key point—minorities and their assimilation were not new issues in China. By the 1940s, the term minzu was not one that had a particularly long history in China; having only been introduced into the realm of Chinese politics by the Japanese in the early nineteenth century.37 However, that is not to say that the idea of culturally distinct groups did not exist before that time. Heberer points out that the Han Chinese identified distinct non-Han groups of ‘barbarians’ as far back as the Han Dynasty (260BC–220AD).38 Although these groups, including the Han, were not specifically self-identified ethnicities, as the concept had not yet been coined, they can nonetheless be considered as distinct cultural groups. According to Confucian philosophy, these culturally distinct barbarians

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could become part of the Han cultural community if they adopted the Han culture. Confucianism promoted the idea of political, cultural and economic intermingling to encourage ethnic and cultural assimilation of ‘barbarians’ into the Han community.39 In essence, the Confucian concept of cultural communities promoted the assimilation and acculturation of minority people into Han society.40 Central to this assimilation process were military conquests, after which the minority group would eventually merge with the Han, adopting their cultural practices and language.41 Key to this interface is the notion of ronghe, whereby non-Han minorities became assimilated to the Han majority.42 Dr. Sun Yat-sen turned to this concept of ronghe when attempting to promote Chinese nationalism based on the unity of Han culture by arguing that the Han had a long-standing society that the Manchu ‘barbarians’ had conquered. Despite playing a valuable role in the overthrow of the Qing Empire, Dr. Sun’s ronghe-inspired ideology would prove divisive and problematic in its aftermath, alienating minority groups and threatening China’s territorial integrity. It was in response to this issue that Dr. Sun began promoting the notion of zhonghua, or Chinese nation, and the unification of China’s five minzu groups and their territories. He claimed that these five groups were all subdivisions of the same people, the Chinese people, and that they would ultimately be assimilated into a ‘single cultural and political whole’ led by the Han.43 Following the fall of the Republic of China (ROC) and the emergence of the PRC, the CCP continued Dr. Sun’s ronghe approach, promoting a unified Chinese nation and encouraging assimilation and acculturation of minorities. In the 1950s and 1960s, the ronghe policy was promoted through socialist transformation, with the CCP arguing that the Han had already achieved a coherent society, and that the minorities were feudal and backward by comparison. By implementing this rhetoric of socialist development, the Han were legitimising their control of the minorities, leading them to a better stage of socio-economic development which ‘pre-determined the uniformity of interests of Han Chinese and nonHan peoples in the socialist transformation of ethnic minority groups and minority areas’.44 It was argued that these minorities could only achieve socialist transformation and modernity through establishing a socialist system under the CCP by engaging in class struggle. Throughout this era, the CCP implemented a relatively soft approach to the assimilation of minority groups. In 1957 Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s Premier, stated that ‘assimilation would not be welcome if it were achieved by force.

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Assimilation should be promoted if it were the outcome of mutual efforts of the majority and minority peoples. Successful examples of assimilation include the Hui people and the Manchu people’.45 This mild approach to assimilation was quickly replaced by the political extremism and forced assimilation imposed during the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution. During this turbulent era, efforts were made to forcefully assimilate minorities, with the CCP officially denying that China was a multinational country, thus resolving the minority issue.46 Despite a further shift in political governance after 1978, the ronghe ideology still lives on in the CCP’s nationalities policy. Officially, China is viewed as consisting of many united nationalities, which are linked economically, culturally and historically.47 Yet, the belief remains that minzu extinction is an inevitable consequence of China’s modernisation as it is the final stage of minzu development. As China modernises, it is hoped that a national community will continue to be formed, whereby ethnic minority distinctions will become irrelevant as people assimilate and adopt a ‘higher level of identification – Zhonghua Minzu’,48 a concept that is still fraught with political meaning and notes of assimilation as the Han are considered to be most central to the Zhonghua Minzu.49

Current Policy Despite their underlying ideology of ronghe, the CCP have, in ­theory, taken the protection of minority cultures, languages and religions seriously. Following the end of the Cultural Revolution and its associated forced assimilation policies, the CCP partly restored the moderate approach to ethnic policies that it had taken pre-1957. The government in Beijing has created a series of policies and laws to serve this purpose with Article 4 of the PRC Constitution of 1982 declaring that all nationalities have the right to preserve or change their own ways and customs, to develop their own languages, and that the state will assist them with their cultural and economic development. Religious freedom of minorities is also, in theory, protected by the Chinese State under Article 36 of the PRC Constitution. Religious institutions and places of worship or religious practices must be registered with the religious bureaus of local governments, who ensure that they are run by patriotic individuals and groups, thus safeguarding the government’s ethnic policies.50 Some scholars claim that the Hui are among the minority groups to enjoy relatively better freedom of religion compared to other groups, and that

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their religious practices are neither encouraged nor discouraged as long as they do not affect government ideology or policy.51 However, despite legal reassurances of religious freedom, Muslim minority groups are facing an extreme crackdown on their religious practices under the guise of the ‘Global War on Terror’, whereby their international connections and links to Global Islam are seen as a threat to Chinese nationalism, as is evident in the CCP’s actions in Xinjiang.

Representing Minzu During the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese State organised one of the largest ethnological expeditions in human history, the Social History Research Investigation. From this investigation of the country’s newly designated minzu groups, a series of documents were written, detailing the concise histories (jianshi) of each group. These jianshi were to act as the basis of the state’s official narratives of each newly recognised minzu, detailing the groups’ histories as far back as possible in an attempt to make their classifications seem natural. Through publishing the jianshi series, two parallel processes were taking place. Firstly, new knowledge was being produced to legitimise the state’s classification of minzu. Secondly, a process of ‘silencing the past’ was being carried out, a deliberate attempt to remove the classification from public memory.52 In contemporary times, the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China has shown that the CCP Government in Beijing has continued to tighten control over how minority groups and cultures are represented, while undertaking propaganda campaigns on the role of minority groups in the multi-ethnic and united nation.53 These representations do more than simply provide a stereotypical version of minority groups. Rather, the practice of reducing minority groups to a set list of definable qualities—such as passive, exotic, backward, erotic and, often, feminine in the Chinese context—is vital in constructing Han identity, and by extension, national identity. The minority subjects are placed in a binary with the majority Han population, and their represented traits not only highlight their difference to the Han but in so doing they establish a sense of identity and unity among the Han.54 In the case of the Hui, they are rarely portrayed as a ‘model minority’, exemplars of the eroticised, passive ideal and feminine docility.55 Rather, their exoticism to non-Muslim Chinese presents them as the ‘familiar strangers’,56 a conceptualisation that was evident throughout this project’s fieldwork and

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which is arguably becoming increasingly relevant as the CCP continues to arouse suspicion of Muslim minorities by linking them with separatist and terrorist movements.57

Lived Realities: The Hui Although the term Hui was previously used to demarcate all Muslim subjects in China, it is used here to refer to the specific ethnic minority group as identified and registered by the Chinese State, rather than all Chinese Muslims. Despite being the second-largest ethnic minority group in China today, the Hui have largely been ignored by Western academic research. Considered by many as too Islamic for Sinological studies, the Hui have also been overlooked by Islamic studies. The Hui were among the first nationalities to be recognised by the Chinese state, receiving their first autonomous county in 1936, no doubt a political gesture of repentance for their earlier allegiances. Today, the Hui possess more autonomous administrative areas than any other minority group in China. They constitute the second most populous ethnic minority group and the largest Islamic nationality in China, accounting for almost half of the country’s approximately 20 million documented Muslims.58 According to the 2011 Census, the number of Hui people in China exceeded 10.5 million people. Unlike the other nine Islamic groups, the Hui are not geographically confined to China’s northwestern territories and can be found throughout China. In fact, they’re the most widespread minority group in China inhabiting every region and province. In Han-dominated areas they are often the vast majority of the minority population. This is particularly true for urban contexts as the Hui are China’s most urbanised minority group. The Hui are also the only minority group not to possess their own shared language. As a result, they generally speak the dominant local Han dialects in the areas that they live. Their lack of shared language, territory and uniformity of customs has led many to consider the Hui as a ‘none-of-the-above’ category, comprising of the Chinese Muslims that the Government considered too distinct from the other nine Muslim groups, yet not distinct enough to warrant their own nationality. Despite the geographical, linguistic and even religious differences of the Hui, state-sponsored histories and propaganda have played a huge role in establishing the diverse group as a unified nationality, with particular emphasis on their shared culture.

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Given the diversity of the Hui, cultural practices vary significantly with individuals and groups often refuting traditional cultural traits and stereotypes. For urban Hui living in Han-dominated Beijing, it is their shared food culture that acts as the leading unifying feature for the group. Specifically, the word Qingzhen is of importance here. Despite often being translated as meaning halal, Qingzhen can be directly translated as ‘pure and true’, incorporating the dietary restrictions and associated practices of halal while also exceeding such simplistic definitions. The concept of Qingzhen plays a central role in shaping how many of Beijing’s Hui understand their identities, their culture and their place within Chinese society affecting their everyday geographies and their interethnic interactions. The significance of the concept to the Hui is so great that Gladney has argued that it has become a ‘sacred symbol’ marking Hui identity, while acting as a cornerstone of their shared cultural and ethno-national practices and identifications.59 Specifically, it is the ways that Qingzhen is adhered to through the Hui’s food culture that holds greatest significance for Beijing’s Hui population. As such, these food cultures allow an analytically useful and methodologically appropriate way to explore contemporary Hui national identity.

‘Small’ Nationalism and Hui Food Culture When conducting field research with Hui communities in Beijing between 2015 and 2019, the concept of ‘small’ nationalism appeared repeatedly during conversations about the group’s food culture. Many participants would directly refer to their ethnic status or ‘small’ nationality during conversations, while others would imply it through their discussions of a shared culture and history among the Hui—two features that are considered important in their qualifying as an ethnic group. This shared culture, specifically their shared food culture, was mentioned by every participant throughout the research. ‘We are Qingzhen Ren’ (Qingzhen People), ‘I eat Hui food, so I am Hui’ and ‘Hui people have to eat Qingzhen food’ were three statements and notions that would often appear. ‘Of course I only eat Qingzhen food, I’m Hui’, was the response of one male chef from Gansu Province working in Central Beijing in early August 2017. He went on to explain that eating Qingzhen food is what makes him a Hui. When asked if failure to adhere to a Qingzhen diet meant that one could not be considered a Hui, he said that in his opinion, failure to adhere to a Qingzhen diet was

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equivalent to not eating Hui food and as such one could not be considered a Hui. This opinion was echoed by some others, including a young male Beijinger, working in Changying but educated in the West, who explained that ‘if you stop eating Qingzhen, then you quit being a Hui. Then you’re just like everybody else, like the Han’. This man’s view that Hui identity and status could be lost or given up if Qingzhen food is not consumed was not unique, nor was his emphasis on the Hui’s food culture as being their distinctive ethnic trait. Similarly, many other participants explained that the group’s shared food culture was the defining and distinguishing characteristic of the Hui and an essential requirement in qualifying and identifying as a member of the minzu. For some Hui, particularly those whose understandings of Hui and Qingzhen depended also on religious devotion to Islam, anyone who followed a Qingzhen diet could be called a Hui. One young Shandong waitress working in Dongcheng District perhaps best put into words the importance of Qingzhen and food cultures to the group’s ethnicity when she said that Qingzhen food ‘symbolises us as Hui people’. Often, people would refer to China’s other officially classified nationalities when attempting to explain their understandings of the Hui as an ethnic group rather than a religious one; ‘We [have] 56 nationalities, [and] there is a Hui nationality’ and ‘[We are] divided into many nationalities. The Hui are a single nationality’. By comparing the Hui to other officially recognised nationalities, these individuals were legitimising the group’s official state-imposed classification, and strengthening official narratives and discourses that have defined the Hui as a distinct ethnic group and subjected them to the government’s nationalities policies. It was striking to see how pressing it was for some people to explain that the Hui held the status of an official ethnic group akin to any other in China, until one Hui woman elaborated on this point by suggesting that their ethnicity is often mistaken for religion or disregarded by many ­non-Hui. This association with religion is unsurprising given the close association between the Hui and Islam, and the term’s history of being an umbrella term for all Muslims and Islam in China until the modern era. When conversing with non-Hui in Beijing, particularly the Han or other Islamic minorities, this uncertainty around the Hui’s status as a nationality occasionally appeared. While recruiting interviewees in August 2017, a Qingzhen restaurant run by an ethnically Salar family was visited. The male manager of the restaurant, and the patriarch of the family, claimed that the research project should be conducted with

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the Salar, Uyghur or another minority group as the Hui are not a real nationality, exemplifying the disregard experienced by some Hui for their ethnic status. When discussing their ethno-nationalist understandings of Hui identity, lineage and genealogy were prominent factors, with the status of Hui being something that one inherits from one’s parents at birth; ‘You are born a Hui, you are a Hui’, ‘[His] Parents are, so he is … because of your parents, it passes over to you … you have Muslim bloodline’ and ‘His parents are Hui, so he is also Hui’. For many Beijing Hui, the categories of religion and ethnicity are overlapping and co-constitutive; religion is an ethnic ‘characteristic’ of the Hui, and Hui ethnicity and ethnic difference is dependent on this religious practice and cultural trait. Therefore, Hui identity, Qingzhen and Hui food cultures can be understood through an appreciation of the inter-linked relationship between religion and ethnicity; ‘The Hui nationality has their own belief. Moreover, Hui people only eat beef and mutton, chicken, and don’t eat other meats’, and ‘We have been Hui people for generations, and then some of our beliefs, and what we usually worship, they are already customs’. Adding to these points, a young male from Lanzhou working as a supervisor in a large restaurant in Chaoyang District perhaps summarised it best by saying, ‘The Hui nationality is Islam’.

‘Big’ Nationalism and Hui Food Culture When discussing the topics of Hui identity, food culture and Qingzhen during interviews, it was explained by three interviewees that the most important facet of Hui identity was, according to these three individuals, that the Hui are Chinese people before all else. These individuals, two males and one female, insisted that Hui shared identity was similar to those of other ethnic groups in China in that individuals first identified as Chinese, and that ethnic and religious labels held less significance than the national one. The male interviewee, a manager of a small restaurant in Haidian District, answered that ‘First of all, we are Chinese people’ when asked to explain what the term Hui means. The precedence of their citizenship was mirrored by the responses of the other two, with the female interviewee referring to her status as Chinese several times. Admittedly, this repeated vocalising of her citizenship was most likely in response to a miscommunication between the interpreter and researcher, and the interpreter’s biases regarding Han festivals. As the excerpt below

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shows, this miscommunication resulted in unintentional insult being caused; Researcher: ‘Will you ask her if she also celebrates other festivals, like Chinese New Year?’ Interpreter: ‘Do you celebrate Chinese traditional festivals?’ Interviewee: ‘Chinese?’ Interpreter: ‘Yes, like Spring Festival, Dragon Boat Festival, Lantern Festival [Interrupt].’ Interviewee: ‘Like us Hui generally don’t celebrate those holidays, because sometimes like … we are also Chinese. Hui people are Chinese.’

Understandably, the interviewee appeared displeased by the wording of the question and its insinuation that she was non-Chinese. After apologising to her for unintentionally causing upset, she accepted the apology and luckily confirmed that she was willing to continue with the interview. A good rapport was re-established quite quickly and she appeared to relax once again. However, she continued to reference her Chinese citizenship several times later in the interview. Although likely a response to the earlier line of questioning, her insistence on the importance of ‘big’ nationality to Hui identity, food cultures and Qingzhen fits with her initial explanation of the Hui as being Chinese before all other categories. Although only three individuals argued specifically for the importance of Chinese nationalism when asked to explain who the Hui are, many others did allude to the topic of state-level nationalism and Chinese citizenship. Most often, this was done by describing the Hui as either Chinese Muslims, or a Chinese ethnic minority group. Although both of these responses also define the Hui as either a religious or ethnic collective, they nonetheless demonstrate the importance of ‘big’ nationalism in people’s understandings of Hui identity. This implied national unity also appeared when discussing the Hui’s food cultures and Qingzhen. Although the majority of participants focused on their food culture’s differentiating characteristics as a way of exemplifying the Hui’s ­ethno-religious individualism and uniqueness, some participants argued that Hui food was no different to that of the Han with the exception of their food taboos; ‘The difference, now [it is] a harmonious society, there is no difference. Except for our additional taboo, oh, things. I feel nothing [is different], now it’s almost the same’. This culinary and cultural similarity to the Han and other minority groups was even more

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pronounced for others who did not mention any differences between the groups. As the male manager of a Lanzhou Beef Noodle restaurant explained in relation to inter-ethnic differences, ‘Almost no difference, because all [are] the same. All are Chinese’.

Conclusion Officially, the PRC is a multi-ethnic state, consisting of 56 distinct yet politically equal and unified nationalities. This multi-minzu approach to nationalism is dependent on a conceptualisation and interpretation of nationalism as occurring at two levels. Influenced by Liang Qichao’s notions of ‘small’ and ‘big’ nationalism, China’s 55 officially recognised minority groups occupy a peculiar position within nationalist discourses and policies. At the level of ‘small’ nationalism, they are awarded a limited amount of freedom to identify as ethnically distinct from the Han majority. Yet, they are also expected to fall in line with the policies and imaginaries of ‘big’ nationalism; whereby their positioning as Chinese citizens takes precedence over their ethnic identities. Such dualistic understandings of nationality are internalised in diffuse ways by minority subjects. In the case of Beijing’s Hui population, these two-fold nationalist identifications are continually performed and manifested through various cultural practices. The ways in which these nationalist ideologies impact on the Hui’s food culture show that, for Hui in Beijing, the CCP’s two-tiered understanding of nationalism is more than merely theoretical. Rather, it is lived and performed everyday by those deemed ethnically different from the Han. For these minority subjects, the CCP’s approach to nationality has meant that they not only identify as belonging to the Hui nationality, but they also identify with a larger national calling, that of the Chinese nation.

Notes



1. ‘A Hymn to the Motherland,’ English translation by author. 2. Robert Holton, Globalization and the Nation State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 3. John Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 4. Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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5.  Raza, Zainab, “China’s ‘Political Re-Education’ Camps of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (2019): 488–501. 6. Xin Liu. “Ningxia changes halal label amid pan-Islam backlash,” Global Times, March 26, 2018. 7. David Bell and Gill Valentine, Consuming Geographies: We Are Where We Eat (London: Routledge, 1997). 8. Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 9. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 13. 10.  Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 13. 11. Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 12. Qichao Liang, Yingbingshi Wenji [Collected essays from the ice-drinker’s studio] (Shanghai: Shanghai Wenhua Jinbushe, 1935). 13.  Michael Yahuda, “The Changing Face of Chinese Nationalism: The Dimension of Statehood,” in Asian Nationalism, ed. Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), 21–37; Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 14. Xiaotong Fei, Zhonghuaminzuduoyuanyitigeju [The pattern of diversity in unity of the Chinese nation] (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Chubanshe, 1989), 1–36. 15. Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995). 16. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 17. Qichao Liang, Yingbingshi Wenji; Qichao Liang, Liang Qichao’s Collection, 10 vols. (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999). 18. Qichao Liang, Liang Qichao’s Collection. 19. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 20. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 21. Jonathan Lipman, Familiar Strangers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 22. Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction. 23. Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 15. 24. Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 25.  Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 26.  Minzu Wenti Yanjiu Shi, Huihui Minzu Wenti [The question of the Huihui nationality] (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1980).



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27. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation. 28. Barry Sautman, “Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints,” Law and Policy 21, no. 3 (1999): 283–314; Xiaowei Zang, Ethnicity in China (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015). 29. Joseph Stalin, Works, vol. 11, 1907–1913 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953); Zang, Ethnicity in China. 30. Stéphane Gros, “The Politics of Names: The Identification of the Dulong (Drung) of Northwest Yunnan,” China Information 18, no. 2 (2004): 278; Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation. 31. Nicholas Tapp, “In Defence of the Archaic,” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 1 (2002): 67; Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation, 230. 32. Xiaotong Fei, Towards a People’s Anthropology (Beijing: New World Press, 1981); Gladney, Dislocating China. 33. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation. 34.  Kevin Caffrey, “Who ‘Who’ is, and Other Local Poetics of National Policy,” China Information 18, no. 1 (2004): 243–274. 35. Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation, 20. 36. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation, 121. 37. Zang, Ethnicity in China. 38. Thomas Heberer, China and its National Minorities (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), 18. 39.  June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Baogong He, “Confucianism versus Liberalism over Minority Rights,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2004): 114–115; Colin Mackerras, “Folksongs and Dances of China’s Minority Nationalities,” Modern China 10, no. 2 (1984): 188. 40. Zang, Ethnicity in China, 19. 41. Mette Halskov Hansen, Frontier People (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005); Guobin Zhu and Lingyun Yu, “Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7, no. 1 (2000): 39–57; Zang, Ethnicity in China. 42. He, “Confucianism,” 112; Zang, Ethnicity in China, 20. 43.  Leo Kwok-yueh Shin, The Making of the Chinese State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Elena Barabantseva, “From the Language of Class to the Rhetoric of Development,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (2008): 570–572; Eric Hyer, “Sinocentrism and the National Question in China,” in Nations and Their Histories, ed. Susana Carvalho and François Gemenne (London:

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Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 255–273; Gladney, Muslim Chinese; Zang, Ethnicity in China. 44. Zang, Ethnicity in China, 22. 45.  Baogang He, “Minority Rights: A Confucian Critique of Kymlicka’s Theory of Nonassimilation,” in The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches, ed. Kim Chong Chong, Sor-Hoon Tan, and Chin Liew Ten (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2003), 226. 46. James Leibold, “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Conflicted National Form,” The China Journal 63 (2010): 1–24. 47.  Colin Mackerras, “Ethnic Minorities,” in Understanding Chinese Society, ed. Xiaowei Zang (London: Routledge, 2011), 111–126; Colin Mackerras, Ethnic Minorities in Modern China, 4 vols. (London: Routledge, 2011); Eric Hyer, “China’s Policy towards Uighur Nationalism,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 75–86. 48.  China’s Ethnic Unity Textbook Compiling Team, ed., A General Introduction to Theory on Nationality (Beijing: China Central Radio and TV University Press, 2009); Zang, Ethnicity in China. 49. Xiaotong Fei, Zhonghuaminzuduoyuanyitigeju; Shin, The Making of the Chinese State. 50.  US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984). 51. Zang, Ethnicity in China. 52. Trouillot, Silencing the Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 53. US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2005 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), 15. 54. Gladney, Dislocating China, 52–53. 55. Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2009), 130. 56. Lipman, Familiar Strangers. 57.  Matthew Erie, “Shari’a as Taboo of Modern Law: Halal Food, Islamophobia, and China,” Journal of Law and Religion 33, no. 3 (2018): 390–420. 58. Huizu Jianshi Editorial Committee, Huizu Jianshi [Brief history of the Hui] (Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Publishing Society, 1978); Gladney, Dislocating China. 59. Gladney, Muslim Chinese.

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Bibliography Agnew, John. Globalization and Sovereignty. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. Barabantseva, Elena. “From the Language of Class to the Rhetoric of Development: Discourses of ‘Nationality’ and ‘Ethnicity’ in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (2008): 565–589. Bell, David, and Gill Valentine. Consuming Geographies: We Are What We Eat. London: Routledge, 1997. Chen, Chwen Chwen, Colapinto, Cinzia, and Lou, Qing. “The 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony: Visual Insights Into China’s Soft Power.” Visual Studies 27, no. 2 (2012): 188–195. Caffrey, Kevin. “Who ‘Who’ is, and Other Local Poetics of National Policy.” China Information 18, no. 2 (2004): 243–274. China’s Ethnic Unity Textbook Compiling Team, ed. A General Introduction to Theory on Nationality. Beijing: China Central Radio and TV University Press, 2009. Connor, Walker. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Dreyer, June Teufel. China’s Forty Millions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976. Erie, Matthew. “Shari’a as Taboo of Modern Law: Halal Food, Islamophobia, and China.” Journal of Law and Religion 33, no. 3 (2018): 390–420. Fei, Xiaotong. Towards a People’s Anthropology. Beijing: New World Press, 1981. Fei, Xiaotong. Zhonghuaminzuduoyuanyitigeju [The pattern of diversity in unity of the Chinese nation]. Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Chubanshe, 1989. Friedman, Edward. National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. Gladney, Dru C. Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Gladney, Dru C. Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Gros, Stéphane. “The Politics of Names: The Identification of the Dulong (Drung) of Northwest Yunnan.” China Information 18, no. 2 (2004): 275–302. Hansen, Mette Halskov. Frontier People. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005. He, Baogang. “Minority Rights: A Confucian Critique of Kymlicka’s Theory of Nonassimilation.” In The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches, edited by Kim ChongChong, Sor-Hoon Tan, and Chin Liew Ten, 219–245. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2003.

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He, Baogang. “Confucianism versus Liberalism over Minority Rights.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2004): 103–123. Heberer, Thomas. China and its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989. Holton, Robert. Globalization and the Nation State. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1958–1980. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. Huizu Jianshi Editorial Committee, ed. Huizu Jianshi [Brief History of the Hui]. Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Publishing Society, 1978. Hyer, Eric. “China’s Policy Towards Uighur Nationalism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 75–86. Hyer, Eric. “Sinocentrism and the National Question in China.” In Nations and Their Histories, edited by Susana Carvalho and François Gemenne, 255–273. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Leibold, James. “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Conflicted National Form.” The China Journal 63, (2010): 1–24. Levenson, Joseph. R. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959. Liang, Qichao. Yingbingshi Wenji [Collected essays from the ice-drinker’s studio]. Shanghai: Shanghai Wenhua Jinbushe, 1935. Liang, Qichao. Liang Qichao’s Collection 10 vols. Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999. Lipman, Jonathan. Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997. Liu, Xin. “Ningxia Changes Halal Label Amid Pan-Islam Backlash.” Global Times, March 26, 2018. Mackerras, Colin. “Folksongs and Dances of China’s Minority Nationalities: Policy, Tradition and Professionalization.” Modern China 10, no. 2 (1984): 187–226. Mackerras, Colin. “Ethnic Minorities.” In Understanding Chinese Society, edited by Xiaowei Zang, 111–126. London: Routledge, 2011. Mackerras, Colin. Ethnic Minorities in Modern China, 4 vols. London: Routledge, 2011. McCarthy, Susan. Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009. Minzu Wenti Yanjiu Shi. Huihui Minzu Wenti [The question of the Huihui nationality]. Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1980. Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. Ohmae, Kenichi. The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Free Press, 1995.

284  D. PHELAN Raza, Zainab. “China’s ‘Political Re-Education’ Camps of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims.” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (2019): 488–501. Sautman, Barry. “Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints.” Law and Policy 21, no. 3 (1999): 283–314. Shin, Leo Kwok-yueh. The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Smith, Anthony, D. Nationalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010. Stalin, Joseph. Works, vol. 11, 1907–1913. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953. Tapp, Nicholas. “In Defence of the Archaic: A Reconsideration of the 1950s Ethnic Classification Project in China.” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 1 (2002): 63–84. Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. Yahuda, Michael. “The Changing Face of Chinese Nationalism: The Dimension of Statehood.” In Asian Nationalism, edited by Michael Leifer, 21–37. London: Routledge, 2000. Zang, Xiaowei. Ethnicity in China. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015. Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004. Zhu, Guobin, and Lingyun Yu. “Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7, no. 1 (2000): 39–57.

CHAPTER 12

The Complexity of Nationalism and National Identity in Twenty-First Century Xinjiang David O’Brien

Introduction This chapter explores questions of nationalism and national identity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The aim is to explore the Chinese government narrative on Xinjiang through an exploration of a variety of secondary sources and to respond to these narratives with observations and insights from ethnographic research in the region.1 It responds to official sources, such as recent Government White Papers, by drawing on passive and participant observation and interviews carried out in Xinjiang over the past ten years. In doing so, it seeks to construct a dialogue between official government documents and the views of people living in the region, in order to explore more deeply the roots of identity in Xinjiang. This study is guided in its theoretical understanding of nation and nationalism by Benedict Anderson’s ideas of the ‘imagined community’ and Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal nationalism’. Anderson situates his D. O’Brien (*)  Ruhr University Bochum, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_12

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definition of ‘nation’ as anthropological (i.e., based upon the lived ­experiences of people), defining the nation as ‘an imagined political community’.2 The nation is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. For Anderson the ‘remembering and forgetting’ of history is a key part of nation-building. Official ‘histories’, which trace the history of a nation long before it existed as a nation, are ‘the process of reading nationalism genealogically – as the expression of an historical tradition of serial continuity’,3 and are used to ‘give historical depth to nationality’.4 For Anderson, this is an act of ‘creation’—not based on whether the historical facts are true or false—but because history is here turned into evidence for the present. Indebted to Anderson’s conceptualisation of nations as ‘imagined communities’, Michael Billig highlights the ways in which in established nations national identity is continually marked ‘banally’ through the various details of everyday lives. ‘Daily, the nation is indicated, or “flagged” in the lives of its citizenry’.5 Banal nationalism is the way in which nationality is continually ‘flagged’, reiterated and made habitual, through ‘daily’ ‘symbols and assumptions’.6 For Billig history is one such means of flagging nationalism: ‘The creation [of a nation must be represented] as a revival, as if something ancient were being continued.…Through the invention of traditions, national identities were being created as if they were “natural”, even eternal, features of human existence’.7 The Chinese government is attempting to mobilise history to legitimise the nation, as all nations do, but in so doing it fails to engage with the ways in which the real complexity of the past feeds into the complexity of the present. This chapter thus seeks to explore the tension between the official constructed narrative of Xinjiang and the everyday lived experience of the people of the region and how these tensions have escalated into violent conflict and harsh government crackdown.

Situating Xinjiang On the night of 5 July 2009, Urumqi the provincial capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) witnessed the worst outbreak of ethnic rioting in the history of the People’s Republic of China.8 According to official figures, 197 people were killed and over 2000 injured.9 The majority of those who died were from the Han ethnicity.

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The Han make up over 92% of the Chinese population; however, they are in a minority in Xinjiang. Their attackers were mostly of the Uyghur ethnicity, a Turkic Muslim ethnic group which is in the majority in Xinjiang. The 2009 riot was not an isolated event, but the worst of a series of sporadic outbreaks of violence in recent years. Serious violence in 2014 also spread to ‘Inner China’ with attacks in Beijing and Kunming causing serious concern and anxiety.10 The attack on Kunming train station, in which 33 people were killed and over 100 injured by knife-wielding Uyghur attackers, caused particular shock across the nation as it was the first major terrorist attack to take place in ‘Inner China’. Xinjiang has seen a major increase in security monitoring and restrictions on movement since new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo11 moved there from his previous role as Party Secretary of Tibet in August 2016.12 Significant restrictions on movement, hugely invasive surveillance and a campaign to prevent (according to the Chinese government) the radicalisation of Uyghurs that has seen upwards of a million people interned in prison camps, have all become the reality of life for the citizens of Xinjiang.13 To walk down the streets of any of Xinjiang’s towns or cities today is to encounter the power of the Chinese state at its most aggressive and defensive. Police checkpoints, CCTV cameras, routine searches and examinations of mobile phones are ubiquitous. The hugely repressive security regime is clearly directed at the Uyghurs, a predominately Turkic language-speaking ethnic group who number just over half of the approximately 20 million people who live in Xinjiang. They are the titular majority in the XUAR but, in the narrative that justifies such repressive security, they are increasingly viewed as a threat to the State. David Tobin writes that the Chinese party-state’s ethnocentric narratives exacerbate ethnic tension between Han and Uyghurs. ‘These narratives’, Tobin argues, ‘frame China as being under threat from Turkic enemies within, supported from outside by Islamic and Western enemies’.14 Ethnic separatism in Xinjiang is today considered to be one of the gravest threats the nation faces. Separatists, according to the government narrative, have rejected the enormous economic and social benefits the state has brought to Xinjiang and, in collusion with hostile forces, wish to undermine the progress the Chinese people have made since the establishment of the PRC. They do so because poverty and ignorance have led them to be ‘infected’ with an ideology that, if allowed to develop, fundamentally undermines the harmony and unity of the Chinese nation.

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‘Ethnicity’ is an official classification within China, with the CCP adopting Stalin’s definition of ethnic groups as ‘an historically constituted, stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’.15 In the early years of the PRC the emphasis was on nation-building and bringing those from the border regions, where the majority of the minority people live, into the nation both physically and psychology. In minority regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet the discourse was one of liberation, the people there being liberated from their feudal past by Chinese communism.16 The CCP established ethnic minority autonomous regions to ensure ‘diversity and genuine equality’ and to protect the ‘essence of China’.17 Measuring approximately 1.6 million square kilometres, Xinjiang is larger than Western Europe and makes up one-sixth of the total land area of China. It is also sparsely populated with just 13 people per square kilometre, a total of just under 22 million.18 It is a region of varied landscapes, from the grasslands of the north to the soaring Tian Shan mountains that divide Xinjiang across the middle, to the enormous sea of sand that is the Taklamakan desert in the south, beyond which stand the towering Kunlun range and Tibet. Northern and Southern Xinjiang are divided by the Tian Shan, on either side of which are two deep basins, Zhunghar in the north and Tarim in the south. The northern basin is an area of scrub, steppe, marshland and grassland bordered on the west by the Altai mountains and Mongolia, and to the north-west by Kazakhstan and a short border with Russia. The Taklamakan makes up a large part of the southern basin around which are a string of oases. To the north are the oasis towns of Aksu, Kucha, Korla and Turpan, and to the south Niya, Keriya, Yarkand, Kashgar and Hotan. These two regions are distinct, not only in landscape but also because, for most of the region’s history, they have been home to distinct peoples. To the north, nomadic herders, and to the south, oasis dwelling agriculturalists. It was not until the late eighteenth century that these two regions began to be known by the one name—Xinjiang, which translates as ‘New Dominion’ or ‘New Frontier’. Previous to this, the region had been officially known as Xibu,19 meaning ‘Western Regions’, an archaism that had once taken in everything west of the Han period Jade Gate in present-day Gansu, including central and south Asia, and even the Mediterranean and Europe.20

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In 2003 the Chinese government published a White Paper entitled History and Development of Xinjiang prepared by the Information Office of the State Council, which states that ‘since the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–4 A.D.) [Xinjiang] has been an inseparable part of the ­multi-ethnic Chinese nation’.21 It traces Chinese rule over the region to the present and declares it unbroken. This is the central aspect of government policy on all of the PRC’s frontier regions. Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia are now, and have always been, an inalienable part of the motherland. There is and has always been, ‘one China’. To imply otherwise would be to give credence to a view that China had in fact ‘colonised’ these vast areas. This chapter will examine the CCP’s nationalist narrative towards Xinjiang and contrast it with other historical overviews, showing how the fit between nationalistic claims and historical reality is, as James Millward and Peter Perdue put it, ‘often imperfect at best, ­far-fetched at worst’.22

‘Facts Are Indisputable’ A more recent government White Paper entitled Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang released by the State Council Information Office in July in the wake of mounting international criticisms of the policy of internment, reinforces this position, stating in the preamble that: China is a unified multi-ethnic country, and the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang have long been part of the Chinese nation. Throughout its long history, Xinjiang’s development has been closely related to that of China. However, in more recent times, hostile forces in and outside China, especially separatists, religious extremists and terrorists, have tried to split China and break it apart by distorting history and facts.23

The White Paper is an interesting and significant document on many levels. From the beginning it states that its claims are ‘indisputable fact’, and that ‘history cannot be tampered with’. It states that to imply that Uyghurs have been historically close to other Central Asian Turkic groups is not just inaccurate but a programme for ‘separatists and anti-China forces to split China’. This is forceful and highly defensive rejection of the strong historical, linguistic, religious and cultural links between China’s Uyghur population and the Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz whom they have lived alongside, traded with and intermarried

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with for thousands of years. The White Paper does not explain where the hundreds of thousands of its own citizens who it categorises as Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Uzbek, each one of the PRCs 56 officially recognised ethnic groups, fit within this historical understanding. Even the name of the province is not open for discussion, ‘Xinjiang’ is stated now not to mean ‘New Territory’, which is how 新疆 has always been translated; instead it is asserted that it means ‘land newly returned’ according to this official government document.24 The White Paper also argues that the Uyghur people did not convert to Islam voluntarily but rather were forced to do so as a result of religious wars. The paper states: Religion can exert an influence on culture in two ways: willing acceptance, and forced acceptance through cultural conflict or even religious wars. In the case of Xinjiang, Islam entered through the latter. This caused serious damage to the cultures and arts of the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang created in earlier periods when Buddhism was popular in the region. As to the incoming Islamic culture, the ethnic cultures in Xinjiang both resisted and assimilated it in a selective manner, and adapted it to China’s realities. This did not alter the fact that ethnic cultures in Xinjiang were ingrained with Chinese features, nor did it halt the flow of local cultures into Chinese civilization, or change the fact that they were part of Chinese culture.25

The White Paper goes on to argue that Islam is neither an indigenous nor the sole belief system of the Uyghurs. It offers as proof of this that ‘orthodox Islam does not allow the worship of anyone or anything other than Allah. However, the Uyghurs and some other ethnic groups still venerate mazars, which are mausoleums or shrines of notable religious leaders. Mazar worship is a prominent example of the localisation of Islam in Xinjiang’, the paper argues, adding that ‘[t]oday in Xinjiang a significant number of people do not follow religion, and many Uyghurs follow religions other than Islam’.26 This ‘worshipping of Mazars’ is the only evidence the paper offers for its argument; there are no references, no mention of any literature—they are not needed, facts being irrefutable. It is an extraordinarily simplistic historical narrative and a narrative that could be considered highly offensive to Islam. Had the United States or France or Germany, for example, released an official government document which stated that the entry of Islam to their country

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had caused ‘serious damage’ to their culture, as the Chinese White Paper does, strong condemnation would surely have resulted in the Islamic world. However, not one Islamic country has objected or voiced any public concern in response to China’s assertions. Indeed, the same month as the White Paper was released, 37 nations signed a letter expressing support for China’s policies in Xinjiang.27 Among the signatories were Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. When questioned on this, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the UN Abdallah Al-Mouallimi told reporters, ‘Nobody can be more concerned about the status of Muslims anywhere in the world than Saudi Arabia’. The Ambassador went on to say, ‘What we have said in that letter is that we support the developmental policies of China that have lifted people out of poverty’.28 The White Paper seeks to justify China’s widely condemned policies in Xinjiang by dismissing any alternative narrative other than its own on the history of the people who live there, and by claiming that only the CCP can bring development and prosperity to the region. It goes beyond just dismissing alternative narratives; it strongly argues that these narratives have been created with the sole purpose of splitting China. It also states clearly that the Uyghur people must have a stronger sense of Chinese identity; that without this, they will be unable to develop. Having a stronger sense of identity with Chinese culture is essential to the prosperity and development of ethnic cultures in Xinjiang.…Whenever ethnic cultures in Xinjiang assimilated, integrated and accommodated the diverse culture of the Central Plains, including the concepts of benevolence, people-orientation, integrity, sound reasoning, harmony and unity, diversity and integration of Xinjiang ethnic cultures were more apparent, and these cultures could make more progress.29

The paper states clearly that values such as benevolence, integrity and sound reasoning are values and cultures which the Han people of the Central Plains possess and which the Uyghurs must learn from them. In order to be able to learn these values, the paper says it is incumbent that the Uyghur people speak Mandarin, that without this they will not be able to learn and practice these values. ‘Long years of experience shows that learning and using standard Chinese as a spoken and written language has helped Xinjiang’s ethnic cultures to flourish’, the paper says.30

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The complete absence of any mention of Marxism, is also notable. In the entire document the term ‘Socialist’ appears only three times, and then only referring to ‘socialist society’ or ‘socialist values’, terms which are not defined. The only mention of anything even remotely Marxist occurs in the conclusion: It is a matter of principle to correctly treat historical issues. The historical and dialectical materialist [my italics] stance, viewpoint and methodology help us gain a clear understanding of our country and its history, ethnic groups, culture and religious affairs. They help us to properly understand and treat historical forces concerning Xinjiang.…Hostile forces and separatist, religious extremist and terrorist forces that have colluded to distort history and tamper with facts run counter to the trend of our times and will be cast aside by history and the people.31

The White Paper ends with the following rallying call to national pride: Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China with Xi Jinping as the core, and with the support of the whole country and its people, all ethnic groups in Xinjiang are striving to achieve the two century goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Xinjiang will embrace an even better future.32

A More Complex Narrative of Identity Many scholars disagree with the view that Xinjiang has been an inalienable part of a united Chinese nation for 2000 years. China today traces much of its modern civilisation to the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.). However, Victor Mair has pointed out that there were no state names or names for human groups that outlasted a single dynasty in the Central Plains.33 Scholars have argued that the ‘Chinese nation’, as with all other nation states, is a modern invention dating to no earlier than the late nineteenth century, although just as their counterparts around the world have done, Chinese nationalists concocted an ancient origin story and linear history of their ‘self-same, national subject’ moving through time.34,35 Yet in China today, and especially in Xinjiang, to even express an alternative view to the narrative of a 2000-year-old unified state is dangerous. Many of Xinjiang’s mostly highly respected Uyghur scholars have been

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detained and imprisoned for deviating even slightly from the official line. Scholars such as Iman Tohti, an economist working at Beijing’s prestigious Minzu University, and Tashpolat Tiyip, former President of Xinjiang University, have been imprisoned for life and given a suspended death sentence, respectively, while numerous other scholars and writers have been removed from their positions and have disappeared into the system of re-education/concentration camps.36 According to Beijing, these scholars are guilty of separatism not because they advocate an independent East Turkestan but because they may at some time in their careers have written something or said something that is not verbatim in line with the current position. One Uyghur scholar living outside of Xinjiang rejected the idea that Uyghur scholars could advocate political goals or attempt to undermine the government; ‘For a Uighur intellectual, a Uighur writer living in Xinjiang, writing about politics is suicide’, he said.37 Even writing about Uyghur folklore is dangerous; Rahile Dawut, perhaps the most revered of all Uyghur scholars, writing extensively and lecturing across China and the world to explain and celebrate Uyghur traditions, has not been heard from since she disappeared in December 2017.38 While the PRC may have been founded with claims to the principles of science and reason, guided by the philosophy of dialectical materialism, there is no place in Xi Jinping’s China for any deviation from the nationalist orthodoxy. From what is known of recorded history, a variety of peoples and empires have claimed the territory now known as Xinjiang. Powers pass by in quick succession—Qarluq, Qarakhanid, Qara Khitay, Mongol, Chaghatayid, Moghulistan and Yarkand are just some of the rulers of the region, who ebbed and flowed like the desert sands. Broadly speaking southern Xinjiang became more Turko-Mongolian during the ninth century.39 In 840, the Uyghur capital in ­north-western Mongolia was destroyed by another tribal confederation, the Kirghiz. Some Uyghur survivors fled south and settled on the Gansu/Qinghai border, the descendants of these would become today’s Yugur minzu. Another group migrated to north-eastern Xinjiang, establishing a state centred on the cities of Beshbaliq and Qocho (Gaochang) near modern-day Turpan. It is perhaps one of the most striking aspects of the modern ethnonym ‘Uyghur’ that it referred from the ninth to the fifteenth century to a people who were expressly non-Muslim, the Uyghurs of that time were Buddhist. The Uyghurs of Qocho viewed themselves as quite different from the various southern oasis agriculturalists who

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had embraced Islam from the tenth century onwards. Indeed once they themselves began to convert to Islam, they rejected the ethnonym Uyghur, which to them meant heathen.40,41 While scholars consistently trace the origin of the Uyghurs to the Uyghur Kingdom (744–840),42 it was not until the 1930s, following the lead of Soviet ethnographers, that the oasis dwelling Muslims of Xinjiang’s Tarim basin were defined by this name. As Justin Rudelson,43 who carried out the first prolonged anthropological fieldwork among the Uyghurs in the late 1980s, points out, Uyghur has had vastly different meanings throughout its history. It was first used (744–840) to refer to a Turkic steppe, nomadic, shamanistic and Manichaean society in north-western Mongolia. Following attacks by Kirghiz tribes, it became the name for a sedentary, Buddhist, Manichean and Nestorian Christian society centred in what is today called Turpan (844–932). It then (932–1450) came to refer to an elite, primarily Buddhist, Turkic society centred in the Turpan oasis. Used in this way, Uyghur distinguished the society from the Islamic Turks living to the west. As the Buddhist Uyghurs converted to Islam, the term fell out of use and did not appear again until the 1930s, when the Chinese government used it to exploit ethnic differences in its attempt to secure control over the western regions. However, the Uyghurs did not cease to exist during this period, it was, as Rudelson eloquently describes, ‘an identity that became an historical undercurrent, part of a symbolic repertoire that could be tapped into or refined when the occasion demanded’.44 However, this complexity of identity cannot be discussed in Xinjiang today. To even express a view that history may be complicated is to risk being labelled a separatist—if it is a Uyghur expressing this view. The only narrative allowed today is one that portrays the Han, and by extension the CCP, as a benevolent ‘Big Brother’ who have brought harmony, stability and prosperity to the region. The region may always have been part of China but it was in ‘New China’, the PRC, that the people who lived on the periphery could fully experience the benefits of belonging. In this narrative it is the Han who ‘civilised’ the west, who brought Xinjiang into modernity. In the words of the 2019 White Paper, it was only ‘after the founding of the PRC in 1949 (that) ethnic cultures in Xinjiang entered a period of unprecedented prosperity and development’. It is a narrative which constructs a dichotomy between the welfare and development of Xinjiang, and by contrast implicit conflict, poverty and ‘backwardness’. This constructs a binary choice in

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which the welfare of Xinjiang and its population is only assured through the CCP. Any narratives of the possibility of development, modernity or stability that is not mediated by the Chinese state are completely circumnavigated.45

The Ubiquity of Division: Whose Time Is It Anyway? To walk down the streets of Urumqi or any of Xinjiang’s cities or towns is to experience a streetscape almost exactly the same as in any city in Inner China. The same architecture, the same stores, the homogeneity visible throughout China is present here too. This is particularly striking in the southern city of Kashgar where a massive citywide rebuilding programme has seen much of this ancient oasis city torn down in the name of modernisation and development. Beijing has poured billions of dollars into the city, which it designated as a special economic zone in 2010—one of only six such zones in China. The authorities want to transform Kashgar into the transport hub it was in the days of the Silk Road—opening up markets in Central Asia and beyond.46 However for some, the demolition of Kashgar’s old town—an atmospheric, mud-brick maze of courtyard homes and winding cobblestone streets—is an attack on the Uyghur culture and way of life. The plan is to transfer residents to a new city on the edge of town. This development will eventually house 100,000 people and will contain a large shopping complex, along with recreational facilities.47 As well as physical demolition and rebuilding of towns and cities, Beijing has pursued a goal of cultural integration in the region. The authorities at first denied the existence of so-called ­ re-education camps in Xinjiang but after their existence was proven by a number of foreign academics and journalists, the government changed tack and argued that the camps had been established to help Uyghurs learn Mandarin and ‘vocational skills’ that would help them modernise.48 In late 2018, the governor of Xinjiang, Shohrat Zakir, described the facilities as ‘professional vocational training institutions’ that focus on ‘the country’s common language, legal knowledge, vocational skills, along with de-extremisation education’. The governor said the camps are part of the Chinese government’s way of fighting extremism to protect the country.49 The government’s heavy-handed approach (which also situates only the ethnic minority groups as those in need of ‘learning’ to live in

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‘harmony’) treats stability as something that can simply be inculcated into people. It does not, however, do anything to address the boundaries that exist in the everyday lives of the various groups within Xinjiang, boundaries which may seem banal but which signify much deeper tensions and resentments, which are not unique to one ethnic group. There are spatial, social and symbolic boundaries between Uyghur and Han which are created in many ways. This is particularly apparent in Xinjiang’s dual time zone. While Kashgar may be over 4000 kms from Beijing, the government insists that all of China share one-time zone. So, when it’s 8 a.m. in Beijing and 6 a.m. in Xinjiang, it is officially 8 a.m. in Xinjiang, despite what the sun might suggest. To avoid regularly beginning the day in darkness, a compromise is made by pushing some opening times back by two hours, so schools, for example, begin at 10 a.m. rather than 8 a.m. However, in private life, the choice of time zone is clearly correlated with group identity; Uyghurs tend to use the local time, while Han stick to Beijing time. When organising meetings, especially when it involves people of different ethnicities, it is necessary to clarify if ‘Beijing time’ or ‘Xinjiang time’ is being used. Joanne Smith argues that this symbolic boundary is a vehicle through which Uyghurs underline their belongingness to the land vis-à-vis the Han Chinese and the Hui Muslims, whom they perceive as newcomers. While on the one hand the use of local time reflects a desire to stick to old habits and practices, it also represents a symbolic rejection of Han Chinese hegemony and administration, all the more remarkable because of the inconvenience to all concerned. For Smith, this represents ‘a symbolic boundary between the “original” Central Asian’ inhabitants and the Han Chinese and Hui “newcomers”. For Smith, this represents ‘a symbolic boundary between the “original” Central Asian’ inhabitants and the Han Chinese and Hui “newcomers”’. While Hui and Han use Beijing time, all other ethnic groups use local time.50 John A. Armstrong argues that because ethnicity is defined by boundaries, ‘both the cultural and the biological content of the group can alter as long as the boundary mechanisms are maintained and that groups tend to define themselves and others…by exclusion, that is, by comparison to others’.51 Joanne Smith has written how the Islamic avoidance of pork is also employed to enforce social segregation in Xinjiang.52 Cristina Cesaro has also analysed the ways in which Uyghurs draw on Muslim dietary prescriptions in order to strengthen boundaries between themselves and the Han. While pork is forbidden for Muslims, it is the meat of choice for most Han, and this dietary difference is often given as the reason why Han and Uyghur rarely socialise together. As Cesaro writes,

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‘while it might be the case in North America or Europe that Muslims and non-Muslims are able to socialise together while retaining their halal food restrictions, in Xinjiang, the polemics around food consumption reinforce the strict interethnic boundary between Uyghurs and Han Chinese’.53 Here is a boundary legitimised by the suggestion that it is a respectful understanding of the others dietary requirements. While it may not be socially acceptable to refuse to socialise with a member of the other ethnicity in Xinjiang, at least in terms of the official narrative of ethnic harmony, it is acceptable to refuse to socialise because of these dietary differences. As one young professional Uyghur lady living in Urumqi but originally from a smaller city told me in 2011: It’s not that I refuse to spend them with Han people. I do have Han friends, at my office I have Han friends, but we do not meet in the evening to have dinner or have lunch together because we Uyghurs do not eat pork and I would prefer not to eat where pork is served. My Han friends know this and they do not invite me. It is a pity but it is the reality here.54

While Han and Uyghur rarely socialise together, when they do it is often work related. While such ‘work dinners’ are a point of contact between the ethnic groups, this also imports all work hierarchies and formality into the socialisation. If the dinner is held in a Han restaurant, Uyghurs may still feel compelled to attend. I have attended a number of dinners in Han restaurants attended by Uyghurs. At one such dinner the host, a local government official, took great pride in explaining to me that the Uyghur lady present was very modern and happy to eat at a Han restaurant, to which she smiled awkwardly. The boss went on to say that he believed Han food was the best in the world and when Uyghur people became used to it, they would eat it more often. He stressed that he had not ordered pork out of respect for his colleague but that pork was his favourite meat and that he would prefer to have it.55 Such scenes are held up as evidence of integration but circumnavigate key points of tension: the tokenism of ‘a modern Uyghur woman’ who can be presented to others as evidence of integration; the framing of integration as o ­ ne-way, that it is the Uyghurs who must ‘integrate’ into Han ‘culture’; the generalising of ‘Han’ food (which elsewhere in China implies numerous regional cuisines) as well as the assertion of its superiority; the implicit linking of ‘eating like the Han’ to ‘modernity’; and, indeed, the presumed ‘naturalness’ of liking a particular type of food (of course, once

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they try it, they will like it and eat it more often). Though merely a passing comment and a banal scene, it holds some of the kernels of the wider problems within the region—in particular, the lack of real dialogue or clear evidence of mutual understanding.

The Paradox of Zhonghua Minzu The paradox of PRC minority policy is that it seeks to bring the minorities into a sense of a unified China by re-enforcing a sense of Chinese nationality that transcends ethnic divisions with a central identity for China as a whole, while at the same time emphasising the differences between central and peripheral peoples.56 There is, however, a paradox here that is a fundamental flaw of state minority policy and has actually widened the social cleavages between both groups. CCP leaders have long sought to persuade the heterogeneous peoples of China into a unified nation state, yet despite decades of trying, China’s government, one of the strongest and most penetrative states in the world, has not been able to transform all its citizens into conscious and willing members of the ‘Chinese nation’.57 The 56 ethnic groups which make up the Zhonghua Minzu or greater Chinese nation are defined by their differences more than by what unites them. Any discussion of ethnic minority groups in China invariably mentions minority customs and traditions in the sense of being different from Han majority customs. Chih-yu Shih argues that the study of ethnic consciousness in China is ‘a study of the relationship between the small numbers of ethnic minority people and the vast majority of Han Chinese’.58 Other scholars have also argued that the representation of the Han as ‘normal’ and ‘un-exotic’ is critical for understanding the construction of present-day Chinese identity.59 This sense of the ‘normal’ and ‘exotic’ is directly related to the official portrayal of Han and minority groups in the PRC, widespread both in official propaganda posters and government statements, as well as in museums, films and a variety of other media.60 In Xinjiang, the discourse of difference is reinforced by discourses of danger and threat posed by Uyghur terrorists. Tobin writes that in Xinjiang ‘everyday thinking about identity’ is made ‘a security issue by framing acceptance of official binarizing narratives as an existential matter for Chinese survival’.61 This has undoubtedly become worse since the 2009 Urumqi riots. While it may be only anecdotal in terms of evidence, it is clear to me that there is now almost no interaction between ethnic

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groups outside of that orchestrated by the State. When I first began visiting Xinjiang in 2002 it was not uncommon to encounter genuine friendship and warm relations between Han and Uyghur, although tensions certainly existed. I would argue that in the past ten years such relationships have ceased. This is one of the greatest tragedies of PRC control in Xinjiang. Not alone is the narrative of ethnic harmony that is often celebrated in official propaganda not true but, because of the Chinese government’s misrule, fear, mistrust, grievance and, indeed, hatred are what define relations between the groups. The Chinese government however strongly argues that their hugely repressive policies and imprisonment of an estimated one in ten Uyghurs and other minorities has been successful in preventing attacks. ‘There has not been a single case of violent terrorism in the past three years’, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the UN in September 2019. ‘The education and training centers are schools that help the people free themselves from terrorism and extremism and acquire useful skills’.62 The PRC government which initially denied the existence of the camps now celebrates them, and for the most part the international community has expressed little concern about over one million people being detained in prison camps without trial or any indication of when they will be released. It has become almost impossible for researchers working on Xinjiang to record the Uyghur voice, it is simply too dangerous for a Uyghur to speak with a foreigner about what is happening and it is unethical to put anyone in that position. Ten years ago, when the situation was somewhat less restrictive, although extremely tense following the Urumqi riots, a 31-year-old Uyghur businessman who identified as Chinese, and who strongly rejected independence for the region and any form of violence against the state or the Han told me: What happened on 7/5 was hundreds of years in the making. It was building up all this time, all this anger had been growing and growing and growing and in recent years it has gotten much worse and then on that night it just exploded. Of course I am not condoning what happened, it was terrible and shocking but what I am saying is that if you make a people suffer so much for as long as they have made us suffer, than eventually something will happen. A cornered animal will eventually fight back.63

It is the argument of this chapter that views such as this (here expressed by a businessman with little interest in politics who expressed loyalty to

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the PRC) have increased significantly, not decreased. And it is the failure of the government to apprehend that even those with little interest in politics feel this way that is part of the problem, to not even acknowledge various factors beyond ‘radicalised religion’ to be at play in the violence in this region. History shows us that extreme repression, while often effective in the short term, can provoke violent resistance for generations to come.

‘The Partnership of Stability’ Recent scholarship and journalism has understandably focused on the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The views of the Han are less clearly understood. Tom Cliff64 has recently published important anthropological work on the Han identity and experience which helps fill an obvious gap in the literature. Cliff argues that the social contract between the Han mainstream in Xinjiang and the Party and government, which he calls ‘partnership in stability’, has been greatly undermined since the violence of 2009. Perhaps the most striking example of this was in September 2009 when a large crowd of mostly Han protestors gathered in Urumqi’s People’s Square demanding the government to improve the security situation. Wang Lequan appeared on the roof of the square’s government building appealing for calm but was shouted down by the crowd. The significance of such a senior official being shouted down by an angry crowd cannot be overstated. For Wang, a member of the Politburo, who led the XUAR for 15 years—far longer than the usual 10-year limit designed to prevent regional leaders from becoming too powerful—to be shouted down by a clearly furious Han crowd was a disaster as far as Beijing was concerned. The heavily repressive control and surveillance in Xinjiang may have improved the security situation in the eyes of some Han, but for many the increasingly Orwellian nature of their home distresses them and leads them to question government policy in the region. One young Han student who was born and raised in Urumqi and who is now studying at university in Inner China told me: Things are quite bad in my hometown now. The atmosphere is very tense and people are worried all of the time. The leaders say they are protecting the people but when I see all of the police and even the army, the heavy security everywhere, it makes me feel nervous. When I was growing up it was not like this.65

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The assertion that ethnic groups have only ever existed in harmony with each other implicitly renders any tensions or violence in the present exceptional or unnatural, rather than part of larger, far more complicated, histories and social relations.66 It is indeed taboo to discuss ethnic tension in China, any problems are blamed on terrorists and extremists rather than policy or inequality, in effect othering anyone trying to open a discussion or intervention into the causes of such violence or resentment. Though situating itself as a champion of the people—bringing a Marxist revolution to all corners of China, and claiming to lift all of its people, from diverse ethnic groups, out of poverty—the CCP is also nevertheless refusing to enter into any meaningful dialogue with those it claims to be liberating. At the crux of this tragic situation is that by refusing to acknowledge any complexity—to history, to culture, to people’s experiences or to people’s sense of identity—the CCP is complicit in generating the tension they state they are trying to combat.

Conclusion In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate some of the complexity at play in Xinjiang, in part as a counter to the grossly simplified narratives put forward by the CCP’s official position in the region. Such simple narratives are problematic, not only because they absent ‘the truth’ but because they claim to be the fact of the matter, accusing any other position of being not only a distortion of facts but a distortion done with the sole aim of causing civil unrest and division within China. This is a paranoid position, rendering any critique of a conspiracy theory. Its failure to enter into meaningful dialogue also means that despite the creation of the camps and use of highly repressivesecurity measures, it does not actually acknowledge the deep divisions in the region, divisions that both sides are complicit in creating or reinforcing. These divisions are played out in what at times appear to be banal details of everyday life, but they are heated into significance as markers of identity and social meaning. At the crux of many of these is the question of China’s imagination of itself in homogenous terms, despite the heterogeneity of its people (including the Han). The ways in which China is fashioning what it means to be Chinese (through the campaigns to ‘Sinicise’ religion for example) is beyond the scope of this chapter, but at stake in Xinjiang is the question of what it will ultimately mean for those who will be required to enact such Chineseness, or those who might fail to do so. It creates—ironically

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enough in its assertion of a harmonious and homogenous past—a narrative which is in fact divisive for the present; Islam is rendered not as something meaningful but as something ‘forced’ upon them, and ‘detrimental’ to their culture, for example. This is where it segues into banal nationalism—or perhaps here banal ethnicity. Constantly asserting that Xinjiang has always been part of China is, basically, irrelevant in a contemporary context where different ethnic groups continually mark the boundaries between themselves—through what they eat, what time it is and how they think of one another—and the government response largely fails to engage with the everyday experiences of ‘difference’, including the banality of prejudice: that some cultures are better than others, that some people are more or less developed, or backward, or childlike. Acknowledgements   I am hugely grateful to Melissa Shani Brown for all her help and suggestions for this chapter and to the participants in the ‘Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalization’ conference at Maynooth University for their comments and lively discussion. I am also grateful to the reviewers of this chapter for their helpful and constructive feedback.

Notes





1. Some of the ethnographic research in this chapter was originally carried out for my PhD thesis (2013). Subsequent fieldwork carried out in 2013, 2014 and 2016 continued to explore questions of identity formation in Xinjiang. I am currently working on a book project based on this which explores how Han and Uyghur identities in the region are deeply intertwined, and how they continue to influence one another. 2. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2016). 3. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193. 4. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 197. 5. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 2002), 5. 6. Billig, Banal Nationalism, 8. 7. Billig, Banal Nationalism, 25–26. 8.  Edward Wong, “China Locks Down Restive Region After Deadly Clashes,” New York Times, July 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes. com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07china.html?_r=1&hp. 9.  “Xinjiang Officials Pledge Crackdown on Violent Crime, Call for Safeguarding Ethnic Unity,” Xinhua Wang, July 24, 2009, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/24/content_11768237.htm.

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10. Xiaoling Zhang, Melissa Shani Brown, and David O’Brien “‘No CCP, No New China’: discourses of pastoral power in the Xinjiang region of China,” China Quarterly, no. 235, (September 2018): 784–803. 11.  陈全国. 12. David O’Brien and Christopher P. Primiano, “Opportunities and Risks along the New Silk Road: Perspectives and Perceptions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” in International Flow in the Belt and Road Initiative Context: Business, People, Ideas and History, ed. Chen Faith, David O’Brien, and Hing Kai Chan (Forthcoming, 2020). 13.  Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Xinjiang Re-Education Campaign,” Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-educationcampaign-in-xinjiang/. 14.  David Tobin. “‘A Struggle for Life and Death’: Han and Uyghur Insecurities on China’s North-West Frontier,” China Quarterly (July 2019): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101900078X. 15. Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question,” in Collected Works of J. V. Stalin Vol. II. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 307. 16. David O’Brien and Melissa Shani Brown, “Harmony and Dancing on the New Frontier: The Idealisation and Commodification of Ethnic ‘Otherness’ in Xinjiang,” in Reclaiming Identity And (ReMaterialising Pasts: Approaches To Heritage Conservation In China, ed. Carol Ludwig and Yiwen Wong (Forthcoming, 2020). 17.  David Tobin, “Between Minkaohan and Minkaomin: Discourses on ‘Assimilation’ Amongst Urban, Bilingual Uyghurs,” in Language, Education, and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang, ed. Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 18.  Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous, Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2011 [Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2011] (Beijing: Zhonguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2011). 19.  西部. 20. James Millward, “‘Coming onto the Map’: ‘Western Regions’ Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang,” Late Imperial China 20, no. 2 (1999): 61–98. 21.  State Council Information Office, White Paper on History and Development of Xinjiang (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council, 2003). 22. James Millward and Peter Perdue, “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003): 27–62.

304  D. O’BRIEN 23.  State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council, 2019). 24. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 25. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 26. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 27. Tom Miles, “Saudi Arabia and Russia Among 37 States Backing China’s Policy in Xinjiang,” Reuters, July 12, 2019, accessed October 15, 2019,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rightsidUSKCN1U721X. 28.  Michelle Nicholas, “Saudi Arabia Defends Letter Backing China’s Xinjiang Policy,” Reuters, July 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-china-rights-saudi-idUSKCN1UD36J. 29. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 30. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 31. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 32. State Council Information Office, White Paper on Historical Matters. 33. Victor Mair, “The North-Western Peoples and the Recurrent Origins of the Chinese State,” in The Theology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 46–84. 34. Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 35. James Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007). 36.  Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Scholar Arrested Over Politically Sensitive Book,” Radio Free Asia, October 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-12102018170131.html. 37. Christian Shepard, “Fear and Oppression in Xinjiang: China’s War on Uighur Culture,” Financial Times, September 12, 2019, https://www. ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77. 38. Chris Buckely and Ramzy Austin, “Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China,” New York Times, August 10, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rahile-dawut.html. 39. James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 40. Dru Gladney, Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Nationality (Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1998). 41. Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

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42. Rudelson, Oasis Identities; Colin Mackerras, “The Uighurs,” in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 317–365. 43. Ruddelson, Oasis Identities. 44. Ruddelson, Oasis Identities, 7. 45. Zhang, Brown, and O’Brien, “No CCP, No New China.” 46.  Martin Patience, “Will Development Bring Stability to Restive City of Kashgar?” BBC, August 12, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-china-19264601. 47. Patience, “Will Development Bring Stability to Restive City of Kashgar?” 48.  Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Xinjiang Re-Education Campaign.”; Darren Byler, “China Distances Children from Families to Subdue Muslim West,” New York Times, September 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/20/world/asia/ ap-as-china-orphans-of-the-state-abridged.html?utm_source = UW%20 News%20Subscribers&utm_campaign = ­82ea5b6dac-UW_Today&utm_ medium = email&utm_term = ­0_0707cbc3f9-82ea5b6dac-308907373&login  =  email&auth = login-email. 49. Chieu Luu, Claudia Hinterseer, and Angela Cheung, “Xinjiang Camps: Top Official Speaks of ‘Vocational Training Institutions’ as Part of Chinese Government’s PR Campaign,” South China Morning Post, October 17, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/video/china/2168991/xinjiang-camps-top-official-speaks-vocational-training-institutions-part-chinese. 50.  Joanne Finlay Smith, “Making Culture Matter: Symbolic Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese,” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2 (2002): 161. 51. John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 5 52. Smith, “Making Culture Matter.” 53. Cristina Cesaro, “Consuming Identities: Food and Resistance among the Uyghur in Contemporary Xinjiang,” Inner Asia 2, no. 2 (2002): 225. 54. Personal Interview. 55. I explored this in detail in my PhD thesis People and Place in the New Frontier: An Examination of the Construction of Han and Uyghur Ethnic Identities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. I am currently developing this into a monograph. 56. Stephen Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontier (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995). 57. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs. 58. Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to the State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), 4.

306  D. O’BRIEN 59.  Dru Gladney, “Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of Asiatic Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123; Gladney, Ethnic Identity in China. 60. Zhang, Brown, and O’Brien, “No CCP, No New China.” 61. Tobin, “Between Minkaohan and Minkaomin,” 2. 62. Jane Perlez, “China Wants the World to Stay Silent on Muslim Camps. It’s Succeeding,” New York Times, September 25, 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/09/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-camps. html. 63. Personal Interview, 2009. 64. Tom Cliff, Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 65. Personal Interview. 66. Zhang, Brown, and O’Brien, “No CCP, No New China.”

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 2016. Armstrong, John A. Nations Before Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 2002. Bovingdon, Gardner. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Cesaro, Cristina. “Consuming Identities: Food and Resistance among the Uyghur in Contemporary Xinjiang.” Inner Asia 2, no. 2 (2002): 225–238. Cliff, Tom. Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. Gladney, Dru. “Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities.” The Journal of Asiatic Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123. Gladney, Dru. Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Nationality. Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1998. Harrell, Stephen. Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontier. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995. Leibold, James. Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes Became Chinese. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Mackerras, Colin. “The Uighurs.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Mair, Victor. “The North-Western Peoples and the Recurrent Origins of the Chinese State.” In The Theology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China, edited by Joshua A. Fogel, 46–84. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

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Millward, James. “‘Coming onto the Map’: ‘Western Regions’ Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang.” Late Imperial China 20, no. 2 (1999): 61–98. Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Millward, James, and Peter Perdue. “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century.” In Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr, 27–62. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. O’Brien, David, and Christopher P. Primiano “Opportunities and Risks along the New Silk Road: Perspectives and Perceptions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” In International Flow in the Belt and Road Initiative Context: Business, People, Ideas and History, edited by Faith Chen, David O’Brien and Hing Kai Chan. Forthcoming, 2020. O’Brien, David, and Melissa Shani Brown. “Harmony and Dancing on the New Frontier: The Idealisation and Commodification of Ethnic ‘Otherness’ in Xinjiang.” In Reclaiming Identity and (Re)Materialising Pasts: Approaches to Heritage Conservation in China, edited by Carol Ludwig and Yiwen Wong. Forthcoming, 2020. Perlez, Jane. “China Wants the World to Stay Silent on Muslim Camps. It’s Succeeding.” New York Times, September 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/09/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-camps.html. Rudelson, Justin. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. Shih, Chih-yu. Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to the State. Abingdon: Routledge, 2002. Smith, Joanne Finlay. “Making Culture Matter: Symbolic Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2 (2002): 153–174. Stalin, Joseph. “Marxism and the National Question.” In Collected Works of J. V. Stalin Vol. 2, 307. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953. State Council Information Office. White Paper on Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang. Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council, July 2019. Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2011 [Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2011]. Beijing: Zhonguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2011. Tobin, David. “Between Minkaohan and Minkaomin: Discourses on ‘Assimilation’ Amongst Urban, Bilingual Uyghurs.” In Language, Education, and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang, edited by Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang. Abingdon: Routledge 2015.

308  D. O’BRIEN Tobin, David. “‘A Struggle for Life and Death’: Han and Uyghur Insecurities on China’s North-West Frontier.” China Quarterly (July 2019): 1–23. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S030574101900078X. Zhang, Xiaoling, Melissa Shani Brown, and David O’Brien “‘No CCP, No New China’: Discourses of Pastoral Power in the Xinjiang Region of China,” China Quarterly, no. 235 (September 2018): 784–803.

CHAPTER 13

Leveraging Mega-Events to Embrace Chinese National Identity: The Politics of Hong Kong’s Participation in the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Marcus P. Chu Introduction Mega-events in this article refer to sporting galas and cultural fairs governed by international organisations with the aim of promoting world peace and pushing forward global cooperation. China, since the 1990s, has been a keen mega-event host. By 2018, its cities had successively staged a Summer Olympics, a World Expo, a Youth Summer Olympics, two Asian Games, two Asian Winter Games, two East Asian Games, three Summer and Winter World University Games, and five International Horticultural Exhibitions. In the next few years, they will celebrate a Winter Olympics, an Asian Games, a Summer World University Games, a Military World Games, a Police and Fire Games, a World Games, a FIFA (International Federation of Association Football)

M. P. Chu (*)  Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_13

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Club World Cup, an AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Asian Cup, and an International Horticultural Exhibition. The reason for insisting upon this decades-long enthusiasm was multifaceted. Domestically, organising and celebrating these mega-events helped create job opportunities, stimulate economic growth, and enhance patriotic sentiments among the local residents. Internationally, aside from facilitating China to polish image, raise profile and project soft power, they may powerfully attract the ethnic Chinese living outside the mainland to embrace national identity, intensify their allegiance to the communist regime, and consolidate their support for national unification. After winning the hosting rights of the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo, the ethnic Chinese living outside the mainland—including those in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other countries—delivered sincere congratulations to the Chinese cities. They also paid great attention to the updates on the preparation tasks for these mega-events. The people of Hong Kong, with the support of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government, even proposed to the Chinese authorities to hire their compatriots to work for these mega-events and to assign their hometown to hold some of these mega-event programmes. The Chinese authorities accepted the requests, as arranging for the city to take up hosting duties and its professionals to take part in the event organisation were deemed to be likely to further pull the local public to accept the Chinese national identity. Through reviewing Hong Kong’s holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian events and its participation in the operation of the 2010 World Expo, the following sections aim to provide an in-depth account of this political exercise in which the Chinese central and local governments, the SAR government, and the professional groups and business community of Hong Kong took part together. They also investigate the reasons why Hong Kong’s centrifugal pull towards China soared significantly after these two ­mega-events were over. This chapter brings the following academic contributions: First, it shows that the holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo, in the eyes of the Chinese central and local governments, was more than to seek economic gain, push forward social development, and/or display cultural attractiveness, but to serve their broader political goals. Thus, the findings further confirm the inseparable nature of ­mega-events and politics. Second, it sheds light on how the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Expo were leveraged to intensify Hong

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Kong’s centripetal force, and its people’s allegiance, towards China. This facilitates readers to comprehend the interactions between the Chinese and SAR governments for reaching their common political objectives under the framework of ‘One Country, Two Systems’.

Chinese National Identity in Colonial Hong Kong According to Sydney Verba, any national identity is a collective idea of people within the boundaries constructed by the state. So the government is a key actor leading the public to understand why they are different from others.1 Since the formation of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese living in the mainland have been continuously indoctrinated by the regime regarding the Communist Party’s contribution to obstructing the invasion of foreign powers, strengthening domestic economic might and military muscle, improving their living conditions, and raising the international status of the country. Ultimately, most of these people, unlike the Chinese living outside the mainland, have accepted the legitimacy of the Party to direct the unification of the nation. They have also believed that the unification and the subsequent national revival would be in vain without the leadership of the Party. Furthermore, the propaganda of the communist regime frequently crossed borders, aiming to make the public in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other overseas Chinese communities uphold the political values of Beijing and share the same national identity as the people in the mainland. Despite living under the colonial rule of Britain for over 150 years, the ethnic Chinese of Hong Kong were also eager to see, and even engage in, a prosperous Chinese nation. Nevertheless, some of them refuse to accept national unification under the charge of the communist regime. The reasons behind this position are related to the local public’s decades-long fear of the Party and the socio-economic contrast between Hong Kong and the mainland. In fact, after the communist regime was established, millions of business tycoons, wealthy landlords, and professional elites were labelled by the authorities as enemies, so that they and their family members were persecuted and their assets confiscated. In this situation, some of them fled to Hong Kong to elude the fatal purges. Besides, as a result of policy failures by Beijing, a years-long famine occurred in the mainland during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Hong Kong thus became

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one of the shelters for the Chinese people who experienced shortages of food in their hometowns. In 1966, President Mao Zedong raised the curtain on the Cultural Revolution. To escape from the endless struggles in this ruthless nationwide political movement, the influx of mainlanders to Hong Kong continued. Meanwhile, under the manipulation of local pro-Beijing groups, thousands of Hong Kong leftists mobbed the streets, aiming to echo the Red Guards’ radical acts in China. The riots eventually caused the deaths and injuries of hundreds of innocent civilians.2 In short, the sufferings of mainland immigrants and the outrages of local leftists served as the root causes of the Hong Kong public’s dread of the Communist Party and its regime. Since its GDP soared dramatically in the 1970s, Hong Kong became a symbol of prosperity and opportunity in the world. This astonishing boom was not only supported by the arrival of mainlanders that ensured the sufficiency of the local labour force, but also supported by the institutions and policy measures brought in by the colonial government, including an independent judiciary, a corruption-free civil sphere, the free flow of information, prudent fiscal policy, non-intrusive government, and low tax rates. Meanwhile, the British executives introduced nine-year mandatory education and allowed the professional elites’ participation in lawmaking, so as to enhance the competitiveness of the local young population and lay the foundation for the city’s democratisation. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution ended after the death of Mao in late 1976. Since this notorious ten-year political movement ruined the national economy, Deng Xiaoping, the second-generation leader of the communist regime, welcomed overseas people to invest in China for the sake of supporting his grand economic reform plan. Hong Kong businessmen subsequently brought capital, technology and professional skills to Guangdong and other coastal provinces. However, in view of the economic conservativeness and social backwardness, the Hong Kong public was reluctant to accept the political values upheld by Beijing despite the fact that some of them made a fortune from their investments in the mainland.3 The Chinese authorities fully understood the stance of the Hong Kong people. Thus, while negotiating with the British government about the handover issue in the early 1980s, they designed the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, promising that in the first 50 years after the retreat of the coloniser, the city would be entitled to enjoy a high degree of

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autonomy. The confidence of the Hong Kong public in the sovereignty transfer was still low, particularly while witnessing the communist troops’ brutal suppression of unarmed civilians in the 1989 Tiananmen incident. To turn the table, the Chinese authorities’ pledges were all included in the Basic Law, the mini constitution of the city.4 On July 1, 1997, the city became an SAR under the sovereignty of China. In addition, since Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour, the Chinese government accelerated the pace of market liberalisation. Consequently, a nationwide economic resurgence took place. However, the rapid GDP growth, along with the increasing military capability and rising nationalism, caused the Western countries to believe that China would be a potential challenger to the status quo of the international order.5 President Jiang Zemin and his fellows believed that this view would surely damage the image of China on the world stage, hamper overseas corporations’ investment in the mainland, and affect the country’s development, so the Chinese government should speed up international engagement. Accordingly, in the late 1990s, it signed and/or rectified a number of international treaties regarding weapons n ­ on-proliferation and human rights.6 Its efforts to make progress in the negotiations with the US and the EU over China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation were intensified. Beijing and Shanghai, respectively, activated the bids to host the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo. Meanwhile, to strictly obey the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, the Chinese authorities insisted upon not intervening in the internal affairs of Hong Kong. Thus, the city continued the capitalist practice and order left by its British colonisers and allowed the existence of the political opinions and activities that were prohibited in the mainland. The people of Hong Kong indeed appreciated it. Yet this did not enable them to recognise the communist regime as the legitimate leader for national unification.

Hong Kong’s Participation in the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics Seven months after celebrating the 1990 Asian Games, Beijing, on the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s orders, launched the bid for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games. Since Sydney, Berlin, Manchester, and

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Istanbul later successively put forwards the same hosting intention, the Chinese officials proactively lobbied the International Olympic Committee (IOC) over the next two years. Nevertheless, most IOC members still favoured Sydney due to its superior environmental conditions, advanced communication technology, and generous financial offerings. Meanwhile, to further punish China for its government’s brutal crackdown in the Tiananmen protests and its constant disrespect of human rights, the Western states collectively opposed Beijing hosting the event. Eventually, the Chinese candidate was defeated by its Australian rival in September 1993.7 Six years later, Beijing, with the collective endorsement of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and the other Party Politburo Standing Committee members, launched its application for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Over the twenty-four months of the bidding journey, no political obstacle to the Chinese applicant was placed by Western politicians. This was partly because the US and its allies, to intensify economic ties with China, had gradually forsaken their human rights principles, and partly because the political leaders who were involved in directing the Tiananmen crackdown were out of the executive affairs of China. Even so, the Chinese central and local governments did not take the project lightly. Rather, they seriously adopted measures to improve the capital city’s air quality and traffic congestion, and proactively promoted its ambitious hosting mission—portraying the Beijing Games as a green, hi-tech, and humanitarian sporting mega-event in the year 2008. The majority of the IOC members were greatly impressed by these efforts. Not surprisingly, Beijing won the hosting rights in July 2001.8 Hong Kong witnessed the two bidding projects above with different attitudes. Given the participation of Manchester, and the tense relations between Governor Chris Patten and the Chinese authorities regarding his political reform plan, the colonial authorities of the city decided to keep silent on Beijing’s first bid. Except for a few pro-China businessmen, like Henry Fok,9 the local business tycoons, professional elites, and social celebrities remained quiet. In contrast, the Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, on behalf of the Hong Kong SAR government, frequently delivered speeches to support Beijing when the second bid was undertaken. Meanwhile, the business tycoons, professional elites, and social celebrities also keenly provided assistance to the Bid Committee of the capital city.10 Timothy Fok, the chairperson of the Sports Federation and

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Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF&OC) and Henry Fok’s son, even zealously lobbied the IOC members to vote for the Chinese candidate.11 Timothy Fok’s objective in offering enthusiastic support was more than just to continue his father’s patriotism, but to realise an ambitious plan— letting Hong Kong host the 2008 Games sailing events.12 In fact, before Beijing submitted its documents of application for the 2008 Olympics to the IOC, President Juan Samaranch, in a meeting with Tung and Fok in Hong Kong, suggested Hong Kong should host some competitions of the event if the Chinese capital city obtained the hosting rights. They did not, however, pay attention to the visitor’s words, instead intending to bring the 2006 Asian Games to their hometown.13 Nevertheless, given the SAR executives’ sloppiness in handling the application tasks, and the other candidate cities’ lavish hosting plans, Hong Kong failed in the 2006 Asian Games bidding contest. This disappointing result later encouraged Fok to make Samaranch’s suggestion a reality. A few weeks after Beijing won the Olympics bid, Mayor Liu Qi and his fellows were informed of Hong Kong’s intention to host the sailing competitions of the 2008 Olympics. The municipal government of Beijing understood that Fok’s plan could not be accomplished because the IOC had already approved Qingdao, a seaside city in Shandong province, to host the sailing events of the 2008 Olympics. Yet none of them wanted to disappoint Fok given his and his father’s tremendous contribution to Beijing’s two Olympic bids. Thus, given that it had over 100 years experience in managing horses, Hong Kong was proposed by the mayor to stage the equestrian competitions of the Games.14 However, the Chinese central government deemed that assigning Hong Kong to host the equestrian events would be a violation of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’, as the Beijing side, in theory, needed to oversee the organising tasks. Therefore, they did not support Liu, instead suggesting that Fok should ask the IOC whether this proposal was feasible.15 Since the IOC had once assigned Stockholm to host the equestrian events of the 1956 Melbourne Summer Olympics,16 Fok thought that the newly incumbent President Jacques Rogge would accept Hong Kong hosting the 2008 Olympics equestrian competitions. Rogge and his colleagues, however, refused to discuss this issue, because China did not have such strict legal stipulation for the entry of overseas horses as Australia had, nor had Beijing and other Chinese cities been confirmed as being unable to stage the equestrian events. Fok, in the circumstances,

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dropped the hosting plan.17 The 2008 Olympics Organising Committee subsequently commenced the building of the equestrian competition venue in Beijing.18 While Fok had put forward the proposal to the IOC for approval, the Falun Gong—which had become an illegal organisation in China in 1999—intensified its anti-Beijing activities in the SAR.19 In view of this, State Councillor Qian Qichen, in a meeting with Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, emphasised the importance of enacting the national security law,20 so as to ban the relevant activities of this religious group in Hong Kong and arrest its members.21 Tung and his administration subsequently launched a public consultation about the legislation. Although the local pro-Beijing groups strongly supported the government’s lawmaking intention, lawyers, intellectuals, journalists, religious figures, university students, and pro-democracy politicians all expressed their strong opposition as the enactment would inevitably suppress opinions and activities in the SAR not favoured by Beijing, kill the local political freedom and destroy the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle. Meanwhile, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) hit the city, resulting in the death of residents, and further worsening the local economy. While the government was blamed for being incompetent to contain this fatal epidemic, Tung and his colleagues decided to send the national security law bill to the Legislative Council (LegCo) for the second reading in July 2003.22 Given this, the popularity of the Chief Executive reached a new low.23 In a rally on 1 July—the sixth anniversary of the handover—over 500 million Hong Kong people collectively demanded that (1) the government should withdraw the bill; (2) Tung and his colleagues who took charge of the legislation and the SARS crisis should resign from office; and (3) universal suffrage should be implemented in the 2007 Chief Executive and the 2008 LegCo elections. Since they attached great importance to the voice of the protestors, some of the lawmakers who had previously supported the law changed their mind. In this situation, Tung had no choice but to shelve the bill indefinitely. Two other senior executives also left the government.24 In the next few months, demonstrations urging the government to implement universal suffrage in the 2007 Chief Executive and the 2008 LegCo elections were held one after another. The government later activated a consultation regarding the procedures of the elections.

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Meanwhile, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the lawmaking body of China, took the initiative of interpreting the Basic Law, so it had the power to guide amendments to the procedures for selecting the Chief Executive and forming the LegCo.25 Tung followed this new stipulation, requesting the NPC Standing Committee to give instructions on whether the local people’s political appeal could be accepted. The Chinese authorities, having witnessed the 1 July massive rally and the participants’ opposition to the enactment of the national security law, realised that, despite the fact that Hong Kong had been a part of China for six years, its people’s reluctance to accept the political values of the mainland remained. Thus, they decided to use the newly signed Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with the SAR government for strengthening the city’s dependence upon and integration into the mainland. Accordingly, Chinese enterprises and citizens were mobilised to raise funds in and tour Hong Kong. They also decided that to proactively promote China’s cultural attractiveness, technological advancement, scientific excellence, and athletic superiority in Hong Kong was another imperative, so as to push local residents, particularly young students, to enthusiastically embrace the country and its advocated national identity. Meanwhile, the NPC Standing Committee proclaimed that no universal suffrage would be implemented in the elections of the Chief Executive and the LegCo in 2007 and 2008. This decision caused the SAR government to ignore the appeals of the Hong Kong public in the subsequent design of the election procedures. Not surprisingly, Tung and his cabinet remained unpopular. Besides, the Chinese authorities thought that to boost the morale of Tung and his administration, and to restore the confidence of the local public and overseas investors in the post-SARS era, it was necessary for them to keenly support the SAR government in handling international pursuits, like the applications to hold mega-events. The support eventually became the key to the city’s eventual success in the contests vis-a-vis the other metropolises for the hosting rights to the 2006 International Telecommunication Union Telecom World and the 2009 East Asian Games. It also motivated Tung Chee-hwa and Timothy Fok to reactivate the application for the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian competitions.26

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At that time, the failure of Beijing and other mainland cities to build epidemic prevention zones for horses and that of China to meet the standards for horse inspection and quarantine were confirmed. The municipal government of Beijing thus fully supported Hong Kong, where none of the above issues existed. The central government also approved this request because holding the Summer Olympics together with Beijing and other mainland cities facilitated the people of Hong Kong to further experience the cultural attractiveness and sports superiority of China, accept its official values and forgo their decades-long dread of the communist regime. Jacques Rogge and his colleagues later investigated the two cities, realising their contrast in terms of caring for horses. The IOC, in July 2005, approved this China-endorsed hosting arrangement.27 It should be noted that while the SAR’s ability to stage the Olympic equestrian competitions was being assessed, Tung Chee-hwa declared his resignation from office. His deputy, Secretary of Administration Donald Tsang, subsequently became the Chief Executive of the city. To ensure that the political purpose of the central government would be successfully achieved, the Beijing 2008 Olympics Organising Committee proclaimed that given the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, except for funding the operation of equestrian events, it would not intervene in the relevant work of the SAR. Donald Tsang and his colleagues, meanwhile, wisely secured the promise of the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a non-governmental organisation in charge of the local lottery and horseracing, to fully cover the cost of building the equestrian competition stadium, and settled the requests of the parties whose interests were affected by this hosting duty. The SAR government and the local sports community later enthusiastically mobilised the local people to take part in the activities with the aim of promoting the 2008 Olympics and China’s economic and social achievements. These measures indeed boosted the sense of belonging to the mainland for some of Hong Kong’s people.28 In view of this, the Chinese authorities suggested the SAR launch a national education programme, pushing forward young people’s allegiance to their motherland and its political values.29 Subsequently, the government activated the design of the national education curriculum, and intensified efforts to promote the Olympics and its equestrian competitions in primary and secondary schools.

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While the promotion activities were ongoing, the SAR government requested the NPC Standing Committee to stipulate the timeline and roadmap for implementing universal suffrage to elect the Chief Executive and the LegCo members.30 The Standing Committee later promised that Hong Kong could do so for the Chief Executive elections in 2017 and for the LegCo elections in its aftermath. Despite feeling disappointed that they could not cast vote in the 2012 elections for the Chief Executive and the LegCo,31 the local public did not feel great antipathy towards Beijing’s decision. Instead they paid more attention to the happenings in the mainland. In May 2008, an earthquake with the magnitude force of 8.0 caused the death of over 69,000 residents in Wenchuan County of Sichuan province. While the people of Hong Kong generously donated money and goods to the disaster area, they were concerned about the upcoming 16-day Olympics. After watching the extravagant opening ceremony and the Chinese athletes’ outstanding performance in the subsequent competitions, the local public’s sense of pride towards the mainland grew. A survey even confirmed that their willingness to identify themselves as Chinese had reached an historic high. The public were also delighted, while receiving praises from the Chinese authorities and the international sports community, over their hometown’s holding of the 13-day equestrian competitions.32

Hong Kong’s Participation in the Shanghai 2010 World Expo To forge Shanghai as the engine of China’s economic development, the central government, in the 1990s, approved the formation of the Pudong New Area (Pudong Xinqu) and cancelled the decades-long stipulation that the city must submit over 80% of its annual income to the state.33 Since these measures resulted in a swelling of its wallet, the municipal government accelerated the pace of renovating urban infrastructure, advancing communication technology, and building new venues for conferences and fairs. Consequently, Shanghai staged over 270 international exhibitions from 1996 to 1998 and was assigned to host the 1999 FORTUNE Global Forum, the 2000 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit Meeting and the 2001 APEC Informal Leaders’ Meeting.34 In view of these achievements, Mayor Xu Kuangdi, in 1999,

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was confident that holding a World Expo in his jurisdiction could be accomplished in the year 2010.35 The World Expo is a three to six month global cultural event held every three to five years. Given that its governing body—the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE)—is an international intergovernmental organisation, any application for the holding of a World Expo must be made under the name of, and handled by, the central government rather than the local authorities. Therefore, after the Shanghai municipal government decided to undertake this ambitious hosting plan, Xu requested the central government of China to follow it up. Through a rigorous analysis, Premier Zhu Rongji and his colleagues deemed that the celebration of the 2010 Expo could be leveraged for more than just boosting the economy of Shanghai and its international profile, but, most importantly, for facilitating the comprehensive development of China in the twenty-first century.36 Thus, the central government approved Xu’s request and put forward the bidding documents to the BIE in May 2000. Meanwhile, the governments of Russia, Mexico, Poland, and South Korea also announced their intention of applying to stage the event on behalf of the cities of Moscow, Queretaro, Wroclaw, and Yeosu, respectively. To ensure that Shanghai would triumph in this fierce competition, the Chinese government, over the next 30 months, not only formed a dedicated group of officials to manage the bidding tasks37 but also gave a number of unprecedented promises, including offering USD 100 million to subsidise participant developing countries, spending USD 3 billion to construct a 400-hectare exposition site in Shanghai, and attracting over 70 million people to visit the event.38 Eventually, the Chinese candidate city obtained the hosting rights in December 2002. Unlike their enthusiasm to support Beijing for its 2008 Summer Olympics bid, the people of Hong Kong were quiet when Shanghai was applying for the 2010 World Expo. This was because the local tycoons did not plan to let their hometown co-host the event with the Chinese municipality, nor did the central government invite any local celebrities to take part in the bidding tasks. Despite the silence in the civil sphere, the SAR government still attached great importance to the application, as the World Expo was viewed as being able to benefit Hong Kong’s event-management, hotel, tourism, catering, and fundraising industries.39 Thus, after the bid was over, they keenly lobbied the Chinese authorities to hire Hong Kong professionals from those fields to assist Shanghai.

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In fact, given the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the failure of a series of government policies, Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth evaporated during the first six years after the handover. The outbreak of SARS in 2003 accelerated the slowdown. Inevitably, the income of the local hotel, catering, tourism, and other service-related industries was severely affected, and the job security of their employees threatened. Some of them even joined the 1 July demonstration in 2003. In view of this happening, the Chinese authorities, who were seeking measures to help the SAR government boost the local economy, thought that it was necessary to take initiative of offering employment opportunities for Hong Kong professionals in China, so as to prevent their further participation in anti-establishment activities. They also believed that absorbing the Hong Kong labour force—whose experience in dealing with international expositions was richer than that of the mainlanders—to serve in Shanghai, would not only advance the hosting standards of the World Expo, but also strengthen the Hong Kong business circle’s connection with, and reliance upon, China and help to build their members’ allegiance to the Communist regime and its political values. Given this, from 2004 on, thousands of SAR citizens were recruited to work for the organisation of the Shanghai World Expo. While Hong Kong citizens were offering their professional services to Shanghai, the Organising Committee of the World Expo decided to invite Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to build their pavilions beside that of China. In fact, the people of these three Chinese-speaking regions had always been arranged to take part in China’s official ceremonies since Deng Xiaoping’s formal accession to power in the late 1970s. This inclusive measure aimed not only at symbolising that these regions were a part of China but also at projecting Beijing’s ambition to peacefully unify the Chinese nation. The SAR government perfectly understood the political motive behind the invitation. While Chief Executive Donald Tsang and his colleagues planned to faithfully complete their duty, the Chinese authorities emphasised the importance of enhancing the SAR local students’ sense of patriotism. Accordingly, HKD 145 million was appropriated from the public reserve to construct the Hong Kong Pavilion and the Hong Kong’s Urban Best Practices Area Exhibition in the Expo. Meanwhile, another HKD 234 million were allocated to cover the costs of staging a total of 69 promotion events and over 100 performances in Shanghai, holding 28 exhibitions in Hong Kong, and arranging over 6000 local students and their teachers to visit this mega-event.40

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In the second half of 2008, the economy of Hong Kong suffered a severe setback due to the unexpected global financial crisis. The SAR authorities and professionals, in this tough situation, deemed that to further tighten the city’s dependence on China, which had surprisingly sustained little harm from the worldwide financial meltdown,41 was a key prescription for economic recovery. Accordingly, they intensified efforts to work for the World Expo so as to display Hong Kong’s urban attraction, technological advancement, and professional excellence in front of the people of the mainland. In November 2010, a total of 73 million people were recorded as having taken part in the 22.9 thousand activities at the Shanghai World Expo, which cost RMB 45 billion (USD 6.65 billion) and aimed to promote the role of cities in improving the quality of life for human beings.42 The Chinese authorities, accordingly, remarked that this six month party was a successful display of China’s passion for embracing the world and its commitment to global cooperation and peace.43 Additionally, as one of 246 participant units, Hong Kong’s extraordinary enthusiasm highly impressed the visitors. Thus, aside from receiving the Chinese authorities’ appreciation, its significant contributions also facilitated the mainlanders to embrace the SAR. In view of these achievements, the morale of the participant Hong Kong professionals was boosted and their centripetal sentiment towards China was strengthened.

Chinese National Identity in Hong Kong Since 2011 To ease the slump in the local economy from the global financial crisis and further tighten Hong Kong’s dependence to China, the restrictions on Chinese citizens’ entry into the SAR were relaxed. Their arrival yet was not simply for leisure and shopping but for giving birth, hoarding properties, and snapping up daily necessities. Thus, the visitors’ behaviour resulted in the local public’s disfavour towards the mainland. This sentiment worsened when the media confirmed that money and goods donated by Hong Kong for the rebuilding of Wenchuan County were seriously mismanaged by the Sichuan local executives, and that the SAR government deliberately avoided discussions on the Tiananmen incident and other controversial events in China in the newly designed national education curriculum. As a result, the local young people, in 2012, organised a series of protests against the launch of the national

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education in schools. The SAR government subsequently made concessions.44 Meanwhile, Xi Jinping became the most powerful person in China. He and his administrative team, in view of the attitude of the Hong Kong public towards the mainlanders and their opposition to the national education curriculum, thought that it was necessary to exercise tighter control over the SAR. Accordingly, the State Council, in 2014, issued a white paper, stating that the Chinese authorities had comprehensive jurisdiction over the city.45 The NPC Standing Committee also designed the 2017 Chief Executive Election framework under which the participation of pro-democracy figures was excluded.46 Hundreds of thousands of the local residents, most of whom were secondary school and university students, then occupied the main streets in the downtown area for 79 days, demanding the implementation of genuine universal suffrage in the 2007 Chief Executive election. Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities’ hard-line position towards Hong Kong remained unchanged. The failure of the occupation movement caused local youngsters to despair for the political future of their hometown under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, so some of them appealed to make the city an independent political entity. To eradicate the separatist voices and further demonstrate its comprehensive jurisdiction, the Chinese authorities took initiative of interpreting the Basic Law, laying the legal foundation for the Hong Kong authorities to exclude pro-independence figures from the political stage. Furthermore, it declared that the practical significance of the Sino–British Joint Declaration over Hong Kong was over.47 Accordingly, the SAR government disqualified elected lawmakers who were involved in the notion of separating Hong Kong from China, and denied Western politicians and journalists whose words and deeds challenged the political principles of China to enter the city.48 Meanwhile, reports regarding local citizens being secretly taken by Chinese state security agents from Hong Kong to the mainland for investigation were unveiled.49 Inevitably, the professional elites and business tycoons of Hong Kong, despite still identifying themselves as Chinese, were greatly apprehensive about the autonomy of the SAR and its future political development. The young people’s reluctance to embrace China continued. The government thus formulated policies to benefit the interests of the professional and business communities. With the backing of the

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Chinese authorities, it also intensively invested money and resources to restore the centripetal force of the local young generation towards Beijing. In March 2019, the SAR government unexpectedly proposed to enact an extradition law to allow the transfer of anyone who violated Chinese law in Hong Kong to the mainland. Given their distrust of the jurisdiction of China, people of Hong Kong from different occupations and social classes, over the next three months, constantly raised concerns over this matter. Over one million residents even took part in the ­anti-enactment protest on 9 June. Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her colleagues, however, refused to back off.50 Not surprisingly, tens of thousands of people, most of whom were secondary school and university students, surrounded the LegCo two days later, aiming to obstruct the second reading of the government’s extradition bill. The government’s proclamation characterising the protest as a riot, the police’s excessive use of force to disperse young protestors and Carrie Lam’s subsequent arrogant pro-police stance caused over two million residents to take part in a rally on 16 July, despite the fact that the government had suspended the legislation of the extradition bill one day earlier. Over the next two months, a series of massive-scale protests shattered the city one after another.51 The national symbols of China were defaced by a few radical participants. In response to that, the police continued to use excessive violence against the protestors. Local triad gang members, under the influence of Chinese officials and pro-establishment lawmakers, also brutally attacked innocent civilians in public spaces.52 The Chinese authorities even described the protests as having the characteristics of a colour revolution and showing signs of terrorism, and intended to send troops to restore social order.53 In this situation, the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle tottered, and the legitimacy and ability to govern of Lam and her administration crumbled. Their working programmes, including those with the aim of intensifying the Hong Kong people’s allegiance to China, were suspended.

Conclusion Given their fear of the communist regime, the people of Hong Kong were reluctant to accept the Chinese regime to lead national unification and became apprehensive about the handover of their hometown. The

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Chinese authorities, to turn the table, promised that Hong Kong, after the political transfer, would be entitled to enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle. Nevertheless, the SAR government’s intention to enact the national security law in 2003 worsened the anxiety of the public. The spread of SARS meanwhile also caused a slump in the local economy. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities decided to let Hong Kong host the 2008 Olympics equestrian competitions and allow its professionals to work for the preparation of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. These measures were confirmed as having been a useful boost to the city’s centripetal pull towards China, as the Hong Kong public, through taking part in the two mega-events, witnessed the economic success, cultural attractiveness, and athletic superiority of the mainland under the leadership of the communist regime. Nevertheless, the slowdown after the global financial crisis forced Hong Kong to tighten its economic dependence upon China. The arrival of mainland visitors and tourists, despite supporting the growth of the local GDP, gave rise to Hong Kong people’s disaffection with China. The mismanagement of money donated by the city to Wenchuan County in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake also intensified their distrust of the Chinese executives. In response to these misgivings, the local people even successfully forced the SAR government to put aside the launch of the national education curriculum. In view of this situation, from 2012 onwards, President Xi Jinping and his administration adopted hard-line measures to restrain the political autonomy of the city. Inevitably, the youngsters’ reluctance to identify themselves as Chinese mounted, although local residents in other age groups were still willing to embrace the nation. In 2019, the legislation for the extradition law not only brought the worst political crisis in Hong Kong since the handover but also further escalated the centrifugal sentiment of the local public against the mainland. So, can the Chinese authorities once again use mega-events to turn around this tough situation? The answer is awaited. Acknowledgements   My gratitude is extended to (1) Prof. Lu Zhouxiang for initiating and editing this volume as well as organising the conference entitled ‘Chinese National Identity in the Era of Globalisation’ at Maynooth University in October 2019, and (2) the two anonymous reviewers’ comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also thank Lingnan University for offering the direct grant (No. DR19B6) which supports the research of this article.

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Notes







1. Sidney Verba, “Sequence and Development,” in Crisis and Sequence of Political Development, ed. Leonard Blinder and Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 283–316. 2. Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 161–208. 3. Tsang, A Modern History, 161–208. 4. Hong Kong SAR Government, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government, 2017). 5.  Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, “Introduction,” in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, 1–19(Abingdon: Routledge, 2002). 6. Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006). 7. Hong Fan and Zhouxiang Lu, “Beijing’s Two Bids for the Olympics: The Political Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 1 (2012): 145–156. 8. Fan and Lu, “Beijing’s Two Bids,” 145–156. 9. He Zhenliang, Jianxin De Huihuang: Wode Shenao Riji [Tough Glory: My Diary of Olympic Bids] (Hong Kong: Motherland Press, 2008), 170–171; Edmund Kwok Siu-tang, Ever Onward—60 Years of Sporting Excellence: The Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong: Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China, 2011), 215. 10. Yuan Qiushi, Xianggang Huigui Yilai Dashiji 1997–2002 [Big Events after Hong Kong’s Handover 1997–2002] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2003), 479. 11. Kwok, Ever Onward, 215. 12.  “Aoyun Mashu Youxianggang Xieban?” [Would Hong Kong Hold Olympic Equestrian Competitions?] Hong Kong Economic Times, October 25, 2001, A20. 13. Fok and his colleagues in the SF&OC aimed to use this event to push forward local sports development. Tung deemed that the Asian Games could facilitate the SAR to become Asia’s World City and integrate with China—both of which were the goals that he intended to accomplish during his tenure. See Marcus P. Chu, “Post-handover Hong Kong’s International Sporting Bids: A Win-Less-Lose-More Journey,” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2016): 1194– 1197; Marcus P. Chu, Politics of Mega-Events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), 62–67.

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14. “Huo Zhenting Tichu Beijing Shizhang Liuqi Heying” [Beijing Mayor Liu Qi Echoed Fok’s Suggestion], Sing Tao Daily, October 25, 2001, A04. 15. “Aoyun Yusai Xiangmu Youwang Zai Xianggang Juxing” [Hong Kong Has Chance to Hold Some Olympics Competitions], Wen Wei Po, October 26, 2001, A10. 16. Because of the Australian authorities’ reluctance to adjust its strict horse quarantine laws, Melbourne, the host of the 1956 Summer Olympics, could not hold the equestrian competitions. The IOC had no choice but to assign the Swedish capital city to take up the hosting duty. For details see Troy Lennon, “Strict Aussie Quarantine Laws Forced Equestrian Events for the 1956 Melbourne Olympics to Be Held in Stockholm,” The Daily Telegraph, June 9, 2016, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/equestrian-events-forthe-1956-melbourne-olympics-were-held-in-stockholm/news-story/ f03b536615410413b98b9b74fac6a3dc. 17. “Huo: Aoyun Mashu Nanzaigang Juxing” [Timothy Fok: It Is Difficult to Stage Olympic Equestrian Competitions in Hong Kong], Wen Wei Po, August 14, 2002, A27. 18. “Gangban Aoyun Mashu Wuwang” [Hong Kong Has No Chance to Hold Olympic Equestrian Competitions], Ming Pao, October 30, 2002, A18. 19. One of them was undertaken during the ceremony celebrating the 5th anniversary of the formation of the SAR, which President Jiang Zemin attended. 20. The law, in accordance to the Basic Law Article 23, aimed to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organisations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or bodies. For details see Hong Kong SAR Government, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong. 21. “Qian Qichen Dianchu 23 Tiao Lifa Duifu Falungong” [Qian Qichen Pointed out Using Article 23 Legislation to Handle Falun Gong], Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 26, 2002, P05. 22.  The bill aimed to amend the Crimes Ordinance, the Official Secrets Ordinance, and the Societies Ordinance pursuant to the obligation imposed by the Basic Law Article 23. For details see “National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill to Be Introduced into LegCo,” Hong Kong SAR Government, February 24, 2003, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/200302/24/0224159.htm. 23. “Teshou Minwang Xindi” [Chief Executive’s Popularity Reached New Low], Ming Pao, June 29, 2003, A10.

328  M. P. CHU 24. For a detailed analysis about SARS, the Article 23 legislation and their impact on the July 1 demonstration and the crisis of Tung’s administration and governance, see Michael E. DeGolyer, “How the Stunning Outbreak of Disease Led to a Stunning Outbreak of Dissent,” in At the Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak, ed. Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 117–138; Wong Yiu-chung, “Super-Paradox or Leninist Integration: The Politics of Legislating Article 23 of the Basic Law in the Post-handover Hong Kong SAR,” Asian Perspective 30, no. 2 (2006): 65–95. 25. “The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” Hong Kong SAR Government, https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc18.pdf. 26. Chu, Politics of Mega-Events, 70–71. 27. Chu, 71–72. 28. Chu, 74. 29. Hu Jintao, “Zai Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Huanying Wanyanshang De Jianghua” [Speech delivered at Hong Kong SAR Banquet], Central People’s Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong SAR, June 30, 2007, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.locpg.gov.cn/gjldrnxg/ hujingtao/200707/t20070709_2604.asp. 30.  Hong Kong SAR Government, Green Paper on Constitutional Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government, 2007); “Statement by CS on Report on HK’s Constitutional Development by CE to NPCSC at LegCo,” Hong Kong SAR Government, December 12, 2007, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200712/12/P200712120171.htm. 31. Nevertheless, under the guideline of the NPC Standing Committee, the SAR government could modify the existing method to select the Chief Executive and form the LegCo in 2012. Accordingly, Donald Tsang and his colleagues proposed to expand the size of the Chief Executive Electoral Committee from 800 members to 1200 members, and that of the LegCo from 60 seats to 70 seats. This proposal, with the assistance of the Central People Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong SAR, was approved by the LegCo in 2010. 32. Chu, Politics of Mega-Events, 74–75. 33. From 1949 to 1990, Shanghai was required to submit 84% of its total revenue to the central government. The central government, however, rarely reallocated resources to the city. It eventually caused Shanghai, in this period, to be supported only by its remaining 16% revenue. For details see Shanghai Caizheng Shuiwu Zhi [Shanghai Records of Finance and Tax] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1995), 56–58.

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34.  “Shanghai Guoji Huizhuan: Nianzeng 20%” [The Number of International Exhibitions in Shanghai Rises 20% Annually], Wen Hui Daily, August 9, 2000, 10; Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed., Shanghai Almanac 2000 (Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2000), 32; Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed., Shanghai Almanac 2001 (Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2001), 37; Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed., Shanghai Almanac 2002 (Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2002), 23–24. 35. Xu Kuangdi, Wang Wenqing and Liu Yiding, “‘Xu Kuangdi: Wosuo Jingli De Shanghai Shibohui Shenban Gongzuo” [Xu Kuangdi: The Works that I Experienced in Shanghai’s Bid for the World Expo], Renmin, May 4, 2010, accessed August 21, 2019, http://scitech.people.com.cn/ BIG5/11513451.html. 36. “Shanghai Quanli Shenban Shibanhui” [Shanghai is Trying its Best to Bid for World Expo], Tai Kung Po, October 17, 2001, A14. 37.  State Councilor Wu Yi was assigned to chair the Bid Committee. President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji also frequently took part in the activities to lobby the BIE executives and member representatives in China and abroad. 38. “Shanghai Nengbanyijie Chenggong Nanwang De Shibohui” [Shanghai Can Hold a Successful and Unforgettable World Expo], Tai Kung Pao, September 28, 2002, A13; “Guojia Shenbowei Zaibeijing Juxing Shenbo Qingkuang Jieshaohui” [World Expo Bidding Committee Introduced its Working Tasks in Beijing], Tai Kung Pao, September 28, 2002, A13. 39.  “Hushibohui Weigang Dailai Shangji” [Shanghai World Expo Bring Business Opportunities to Hong Kong], Tai Kung Pao, December 6, 2002, A04. 40. “Hong Kong Wraps up Successful, Event-Packed Expo Experience,” Hong Kong SAR Government, October 31, 2010, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/201010/31/P201010310130.htm. 41. Shalendra D. Sharma, Global Financial Contagion: Building a Resilient World Economy After the Subprime Crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 204–233. 42.  “184 Tian Kongqian Shenghui Chuangxia Yigege Shibo Xinjilu” [A Number of World Records in World Expo History Have Been Broken at 184-day Festival], Expo 2010, November 1, 2010, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.expo2010.cn/a/20101101/000033.htm; Shi Jianguo, “Chengshi Rang Shenhuo Gengmeihao” [Better City Better Life], History of the Chinese Communist Party, September 28, 2011, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.zgdsw.org.cn/GB/218994/219 017/222982/231106/15778786.html. 43. “Yongbu Luomu De Shanghai Shibo” [World Expo Will Never End], People’s Daily, November 1, 2010, 1.

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44. It should be noted that the SAR government suspended the launch of the national education in schools rather than shelved it indefinitely. 45. “The Practice of the One Country Two Systems Policy in Hong Kong SAR,” PRC State Council Information Office, June 10, 2014, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/Document/1373 163/1373163.htm. 46. “Full text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for Hong Kong Chief Executive selection,” Xinhua, August 31, 2014, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/china/2014-08/31/c_133 609238.htm. 47. “China Says Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong No Longer Has Meaning,” Reuters, June 30, 2017, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-anniversary-china/china-says-sino-british-joint-declaration-on-hong-kong-no-longer-has-meaning-idUSKBN19L1J1. 48.  Tom Phillips and Benjamin Haas, “British Conservative Party Activist Barred from Entering Hong Kong,” Guardian, October 11, 2017, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ oct/11/british-conservative-party-activist-benedict-rogers-hong-kong; Alvin Lum, Su Xinqi, Sum Lok-kei and Naomi Ng, “British journalist Victor Mallet Denied Entry to Hong Kong as Tourist,” South China Morning Post, November 9, 2018, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2172383/ british-journalist-victor-mallet-denied-entry-hong-kong. 49. Alex Palmer, “The Case of Hong Kong’s Missing Booksellers,” New York Times, April 3, 2018, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/04/03/magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers. html; Michael Forsythe and Paul Mozur, “A Video, A Wheelchair, A Suitcase: Mystery of Vanished Tycoon Deepens,” New York Times, February 12, 2017, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/ world/asia/xiao-jianhua-hong-kong-disappearance.html. 50. The prime reason for the SAR government to hold the uncompromising position was that the legislation had been endorsed by the state leaders, like Wang Yang and Han Zheng, at official occasions. See Kathy Zhang and Yang Zekun, “CPPCC Leader Voices Support for Extradition Bill,” China Daily, May 23, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2019-05/23/content_37472806.htm; Chen Zimo, “Han: New Rendition Bill Will Strengthen HK’s Rule of Law,” China Daily, May 22, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www. chinadailyhk.com/articles/212/130/14/1558456775250.html. 51. These protests aimed to demand that: (1) Lam should step down, (2) the government should withdraw the legislation rather than suspend it,

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and cancel the proclamation characterising the protest on 12 June as a riot, (3) an independent commission of inquiry should investigate police behaviour, and (4) genuine universal suffrage should be implemented in the Chief Executive and LegCo elections. However, none of these demands were accepted. 52. James Pomfret, Greg Torode and David Lague, “Chinese Official Urged Hong Kong Villagers to Drive off Protestors before Violence at Train Station,” Reuters, July 26, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-extradition-gang-insight/ chinese-official-urged-hong-kong-villagers-to-drive-off-protesters-before-violence-at-train-station-idUSKCN1UL0LK; Sum Lok-kei and Su Xinqi, “Pro-Beijing Lawmaker Junius Ho Defends White-clad Mob that Attacked Civilians in Hong Kong MTR Station, Says They Can be ‘Pardoned for Defending Their Home’,” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/politics/ar ticle/3019621/pro-beijinglawmaker-junius-ho-defends-white-clad-mob. 53. Kimmy Chung and Tony Cheung, “Hong Kong Protests Have Obvious Characteristics of Colour Revolution, Top Beijing Official Warns Amid Worst Crisis Since 1997 Handover,” South China Morning Post, August 8, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/politics/article/3021877/protests-colour-revolution-threatening-hong-kong-abyss-top; Zhang Yi, Kathy Zhang and Dai Kaiyi, “Signs of ‘Terrorism’ seem in HK unrest,” China Daily, August 13, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/250/250/246/1565630378909.html.

Bibliography Chan, Gerald. China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights. Singapore: World Scientific, 2006. Chu, Marcus P. “Post-handover Hong Kong’s International Sporting Bids: A Win-Less-Lose-More Journey.” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2016): 1194–1197. Chu, Marcus P. Politics of Mega-Events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. DeGolyer, Michael E. “How the Stunning Outbreak of Disease Led to a Stunning Outbreak of Dissent.” In At the Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak, edited by Christine Loh and Civic Exchange, 117–138. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004. He, Zhenliang. Jianxin De Huihuang: Wode Shenao Riji [Tough Glory: My Diary of Olympic Bids]. Hong Kong: Motherland Press, 2008.

332  M. P. CHU Hong Kong SAR Government. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government, 2017. Hong Kong SAR Government. Green Paper on Constitutional Development. Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government, 2007. Hong, Fan, and Zhouxiang Lu. “Beijing’s Two Bids for the Olympics: The Political Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 1 (2012): 145–156. Kwok, Edmund Siu-tang. Ever Onward—60 Years of Sporting Excellence: The Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China. Hong Kong: Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China, 2011. Qiushi, Yuan. Xianggang Huigui Yilai Dashiji 1997–2002 [Big Events after Hong Kong’s Handover 1997–2002]. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2003. Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed. Shanghai Almanac 2000. Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2000. Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed. Shanghai Almanac 2001. Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2001. Shanghai Almanac Editorial Board, ed. Shanghai Almanac 2002. Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2002. Shanghai Caizheng Shuiwu Zhi [Shanghai Records of Finance and Tax]. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1995. Sharma, Shalendra D. Global Financial Contagion: Building a Resilient World Economy After the Subprime Crisis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Tsang, Steve. A Modern History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007. Verba, Sidney. “Sequence and Development.” In Crisis and Sequence of Political Development, edited by Leonard Blinder and Joseph LaPalombara, 283–316. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971. Wong, Yiu-chung. “Super-Paradox or Leninist Integration: The Politics of Legislating Article 23 of the Basic Law in the Post-handover Hong Kong SAR.” Asian Perspective 30, no. 2 (2006): 65–95. Yee, Herbert and Ian Storey. “Introduction.” In The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, edited by Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, 1–19. Abingdon: Routledge, 2002.

CHAPTER 14

The Evolution and Recognition of ­Self-identity in Food and Foodways of the Overseas Chinese Yu Cao

Introduction ‘Wherever there are shores, there are Chinese; wherever there are Chinese, there are Chinese restaurants’. This expression is well-known to the overseas Chinese and their researchers. Although the statement is dogmatic, there are two facts implied. First, that Chinese people are distributed globally. Second, that wherever the Chinese have settled, they have brought their food with them and opened up Chinese restaurants. Therefore, food and foodways are important cultural forms of Chinese identity. Food and foodways are not only the daily practice of overseas Chinese lifestyle, but also an important industry for the overseas Chinese. Chinese restaurants are the starting point for many Chinese emigrants, they feed the overseas Chinese (physically and financially), and also provide a cultural asylum for those who seek a shelter from an alien atmosphere. Thus, some scholars proclaim Chinese restaurant as

Y. Cao (*)  Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_14

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a ‘Noah’s Ark’1 for the overseas Chinese, a metaphor that is vivid and appropriate. In Chinese Overseas: Migration, Food and Identity, Tan Chee-beng states that the overseas Chinese construct a self-identity for local Chinese community members though localised Chinese food. Through the examples of religious (ritual) food and Chinese restaurants, he points out that the food localisation of Chinese immigrants in their interaction with local society demonstrates the changes of culture inherent in cultural continuity. Each Chinese community around the world has its own unique food taste(s) that represent its unique life situation, cross-cultural experience and self-identity.2 In contrast, Eugene Anderson reached conclusions opposed to Tan’s; in Anderson’s Chinese Food, after he conducted a survey of Chinese immigrants in South California, he summarised that Chinese people have been able to maintain their food and foodways longer and more faithfully than other immigrant groups.3 While Tan focuses on the differences and uniqueness of overseas Chinese food and foodways, Anderson emphasises the common origins of the overseas Chinese consciousness and culture of food. This chapter attempts to explore the historical track of the formation of self-identity of overseas Chinese food and foodways through the use of a historical anthropology approach, along with a dialogue with many previous researchers, and tries to answer the following questions: 1. How is the self-identity of overseas Chinese food and foodways established? 2. What are the stages in the establishment? 3. What are the milestones in these stages? 4. What is the difference between overseas Chinese food and foodways and those of mainland China? 5. How do these differences arise?

The Boundaries and Identification of Chinese Food and Foodways Norwegian anthropologist Frederick Barth said, in his famous Ethic Groups and Boundaries, that the boundary of ‘us’ cannot be determined without contact with ‘others’. The most important cause of ethnic recognition is its ‘boundary’; that is, the boundary repeatedly confirmed

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through contact with other ethnic groups, rather than the ‘connotation’, such as language, culture and blood relationship.4 Food and foodways are two of the symbols that indicate ethnic boundaries. Food and foodways include not only the types of food consumed, but also the forms of food preparation, serving order, condiment preferences and food combinations. Taboos and the absence of taboos, as well as the consumption of a particular food at a particular festival or time of year, are characteristics of food and foodways as symbols of ethnic boundaries.5 The American historian, Frederick Turner puts forward, in his The Significance of the Frontier in American History, that the advance of the American western frontier promoted the formation of a mixed nationality in the American people.6 In a similar way, the principles of the Chinese food and foodways identity were shaped. As early as the Chunqiu and Warring States period (BCE 770–BCE 221), people living in Zhongyuan (the area on the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River which formed the cradle of Chinese civilisation) had already wrote primitive ethnographies on their four frontiers. They recognised Beidi (barbarians to the north), Xirong (barbarians to the west), Dongyi (barbarians to the east), and Nanman (barbarians to the south), and their related food traits, while in contrast, they summarised the characteristics of ‘our’ food and foodways, that is, Li Shi (grain food) and Huo Shi (cooked food).7 As late as in the Qing Dynasty (the last imperial dynasty in China’s history), Yuan Mei wrote in Sui Yuan Shi Dan (Cookbook of Sui Chateau) that Manchurian food emphasises stews and roasts, and Han food emphasises broths and soups.8 Throughout China’s history, these kinds of contrasts and self-awareness of ‘our’ food and foodways can be easily found in the vast multitude of Chinese archives. Gu Jie-gang said, in his controversial essay Zhong Hua Min Zu Shi Yi Ge (The Chinese Nation Is One), that the existing Han culture was shared with non-Han people, so that it could no longer be called the Han culture but could only be called ‘the Chinese national culture’. It has long been a mixed culture due to the combination of various ethnic groups under the unitary imperial governance, and cultures of different ethnic groups gradually overcame their differences and were mutually reinforced.9 Gu’s idea was opposed by many scholars in the 1930s, especially Fei Xiao-tong, who was trained in Britain in anthropology and ethnology. They believed that China’s ethnic groups were diverse and equal, and that ‘one’ should not be used to erase the objective differences between ethnic groups. However, after the 1980s, Fei’s thoughts

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also changed. He integrated Gu’s idea with his own and put forward his theory of ‘diversity and unity’. This theory was later adopted by the ruling CCP and became the doctrine binding China’s ethnic disputes. On the aspect of food and foodways, the ‘diversity and unity’ theory can be explained as the idea that the various specific elements of Chinese food and foodways can be traced back to different ethnic groups, but, seen from a holistic viewpoint, there is a general set of rules for Chinese food and foodways. This set of rules, as the Chinese-American archaeologist and anthropologist Chang Kwang-chih summed up, is that ‘Chinese food is a tradition consisting of sets of unique ingredients and food preparation that follow the eating principle of staple–subsidiary balance, with a number of adaptive traits for the typical features, and is associated with a series of characteristics of all kinds food-health beliefs’.10 Eugene Anderson also said that the most unique thing about Chinese cooking is the mixture of condiments, and that the whole cooking process matches the principles of harmony and balance in Chinese philosophy.11 Whether the ‘rice and fish’ food tradition on the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, or the ‘meat and cheese’ food tradition of the northern Gobi, they have been mixed into the whole that is Chinese food and foodways. Therefore, the author believes that Chinese food and foodways are a combination of traditions, including the food traditions of various regions and ethnicities in China, and, moreover, those of overseas Chinese communities, are not an assemble of independent segments but a systematic sociology of food with clear historical origins and relatively consistent evaluation criteria. Boundary, as explained by Barth, consists of inclusive and exclusive boundaries; exclusive boundaries means there are symbols to indicate others, while inclusive boundaries means there are symbols to indicate ours, and once these symbols occur, they can be ours or can be a dialogue with us.12 For example, cheese and raw meat are exclusive symbols for modern Chinese food (despite the facts that, historically, cheese and dairy products were popular among northern aristocrats before the Mongolian invasion, and while the Chinese never developed a fondness for raw meat, raw fish is a delicacy in Cantonese food to this day), thus, one must be aware of the continual change of boundaries. In contrast, tofu and soy bean products are an inclusive example; tofu indicates an awareness of East Asian food—Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese or Korean—and was shared among these neighbouring cultures with a clear

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Chinese origin. Moreover, the similarities make dialogue among these cultures possible. In the last four years, the author has been conducting fieldwork across China. I have noticed most people living in inland China do not usually have a clear idea on what is Chinese food, due to a lack of contact with the food of ‘others’ even in this era of globalisation. Although they do have a very clear sense of regional food features in comparison to neighbouring regions—regional food identities are far more identifiable for an inland resident in China than the holistic Chinese food identity. Therefore, it is only through contact with ‘others’, the process of engagement with alien symbols, that the boundary of ‘ours’ can be affirmed. There are two groups of Chinese who engage with ‘others’ directly: one is the overseas Chinese, the other is the inhabitants of border areas. Below are two examples that explain how inland Chinese food identities differ from those of border inhabitants. Fei Xiao-tong (literately cold skin, a dish made from rice noodles mixed with gluten, bean sprouts, sliced cucumber, chilli oil, soy sauce, vinegar, etc.) is a famous food from Shannxi Province. Liangpi in the Guanzhong region is quite different from that in the Hanzhong region. Separated from each other by the Qinling Mountains, the Hanzhong region to the south is an important spice producing area, while the Guanzhong region to the north is a fertile plain. The main ingredients of liangpi in both regions are roughly similar. In Guanzhong, liangpi are usually served warm, which makes the rice noodles waxy and soft, and with a heavy vinegar. In Hanzhong, liangpi are usually served cold, which makes the rice noodles crisp and smooth, with a heavy spice of Sichuan pepper and chilli pepper. People from both regions are aware of the differences, which contribute to their regional identity, flavour preferences and regional character. Despite the differences, the philosophy of preparing food, the theory of food–health relationship and the tradition of food preparation techniques are the same in both regions. Furthermore, the written language used to describe the food and all the metaphors built on the food, is the same. Therefore, for people in inland China, identities of region, village or family are far more explicit than a holistic Chinese identity. For people living in border regions, due to their long and close contact with ‘others’, their food identity can be elevated from a regional sense to the national sense. This elevation is promoted by the

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confirmation of the national border, and, through narratives of language and symbols, becomes an exclusive boundary. People living in Pinxiang county of Guangxi province, who share a border with Vietnam, know Vietnamese food consists of large amounts of tropical fruit, such as pineapple, mango and lime. Instead of stir fry cooking methods, boiling is the primary cooking method of Vietnamese cuisine, and Vietnamese eat less meat and oil than Chinese but more fruits and vegetables. Furthermore, people on both side of the border have elevated the differences to the national level; during my field study, my informants always used words such as ‘our Chinese food’, ‘their Vietnamese food’ and so on. In fact, the ingredients of both are more or less similar. It is hard to see a difference that is so significant across a river or a hill on the border. As I observed, the differences on the Chinese-Vietnamese border are no greater than between the aforementioned Guanzhong and Hanzhong in Shannxi. The content of the food and foodways is not segregated by the border but by people’s minds, the exclusive national narrative and the border confirmation. The existence of the national border promotes the comparison of food and foodways on each side, the differences are reinforced by mindsets and repeated announcements by each culture’s semiotics, such as language narrative and metaphors, thus giving shape to the recognition of the border in national identities. China’s cultural consistency is enhanced by its isolated geographical environment. The combination of the Gobi desert to the north, the Tibetan plateau to the west and the Indochinese rainforest to the south, left only two possible routes for China to communicate with other major civilisations: the Silk Road to the northwest and the marine route to the southeast. Once China completed the conquest and unification of the agricultural hinterland of the East Asian mainland, and formed a relatively consistent national identity, there were very few opportunities for Chinese to have contact with other different civilisations. In ancient times, the Huaxia civilisation had frequent contact with bordering tribes, as ancient Chinese archives recorded: the Yi tribes to the east, the Rong tribes to the west, Di tribes to the north and the Man tribes to the south. These ancient tribes collided with Huaxia and eventually merged into the Chinese culture narrated in Hanzi (Chinese written language). Since the middle ages, China has completed its territorial expansion and all the lands suitable for farming were annexed to the Celestial Empire. The motivation for outward expansion was converted to an inward

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concentration and integration. As narrated in Hanzi, the reorganised Chinese culture became a very stable and restraining civilisation. It was not until the age of great maritime discoveries, from the sixteenth century on, that China re-established frequent contact with other major civilisations through its southeastern ports. Through contact with different cultures, the coastal, frontier and overseas Chinese have found that the ‘world’ they once thought of is only the common cultural entity of their own group. In the wider world, there are many people who are totally different from them. Chinese people, even many overseas Chinese, have an extreme sense of the superiority of Chinese food culture. There are many reasons for this sense of superiority, including a lack of knowledge of foreign food cultures, the national sentiment stimulated by the perceived national disgrace since the opium wars in the nineteenth century, etc. The most important reason among these is that Chinese food carries many cultural metaphors—eating and drinking in Chinese culture goes far beyond physical needs and endows rich cultural symbols. Many Chinese intellectuals hold a consensus on this subject. Yi Zhongtian, a best-selling author, wrote in his Xian Hua Zhong Guo Ren (Gossips on Chinese People), that Chinese culture has a tendency to ‘pan-foodism’. To seize power is called Wen Ding (ask the weight of a cooking vessel), while useless people are called Fan Tong (rice barrel), and so on.13 Christoph Harbsmeier, Professor of Chinese Studies in the University of Oslo, also agrees that the Chinese word for ‘eat’ goes well beyond food and drink.14 Nataliia Kolesnykova, a Ukrainian student in China, summarised in an essay that there is a huge misunderstanding in China—most Chinese people think Westerners do not know how to cook and eat properly (that is, according to Chinese standards), and even lack a food culture. In Chinese culture, daily events are closely related to eating and drinking, and food, as an important means to maintain human relationships, has long gone beyond nutrition. Therefore, food in the mindset of the Chinese and the western people has great differences.15 Civilisations greatly influenced by Abrahamic monotheism, have a very different view on food from Chinese culture. In Christian philosophy, the third of the seven deadly sins—the sin of gluttony—is the ‘satisfaction of taste buds’ and the ‘satisfaction of fullness’. Civilisations that accept Abrahamic monotheism tend to have a feature of a ‘fasting doctrine’, which is exactly the opposite of the ‘pan-foodism’ of Chinese civilisation, thus

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leading to completely different understandings of food and foodways between Chinese and Westerners. Since the residents of the Chinese interior have few opportunities to experience authentic foreign food, let alone be surrounded by a different cultural environment, their recognition of distinct Chinese food and foodways is not as clear as that of the overseas Chinese, who are submerged in a foreign culture. Inland Chinese understand foreign food mostly from media propaganda and as relayed by other Chinese. Even on the rare occasions when they taste foreign food and beverages, the ‘foreign catering’ is heavily localised and merely resembles an ambiguous generalised western food. Therefore, most Chinese do not have a valid point of reference, making it impossible for them to establish an ‘us’ identity without any comparison with ‘others’. Coastal Chinese communities fare slightly better than their inland compatriots, they do have more access to foreign food, yet it is still common for them to see ­take-out pizza and fast food burgers as the whole picture of western food. This situation is because there is a ‘filtering’ mechanism for foreign food entering China. Only food and beverage products that can complement the increasingly rich lifestyles in developed regions of China will be introduced to this country, and only after fierce market competition can they survive in China. Therefore, the foreign food that Chinese people in the coastal areas have engaged with is twisted like the reflection in a distorting mirror—it serves as a reference object for the identity of ‘our’ food but the understanding they get is distorted and unreliable. Therefore, taking the self-identity of the overseas Chinese food and foodways as a research subject is the inevitable choice for the study of the identity of Chinese food and foodways, and also the only choice that is likely to produce a deep and extensive understanding. The overseas Chinese are the physical carriers of Chinese culture outside China. They are truly surrounded by an environment of different cultures and thus have a very clear sense of self-identity in contrast to surrounding identities. Of course, this sense of self-identity awareness is not only in the ways of life, such as food, clothing and other superficial things, but also in deep cultural introspection and conscious ­self-reorganisation. In addition to a surrounding environment made up of different cultures, the overseas Chinese constantly communicate with the local culture of China, inspiring the homeland culture to undergo significant introspection and reorganisation, and bring contemporary Chinese culture to the outside world. Figuratively speaking, if Chinese

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culture itself is a huge octopus, then the overseas Chinese are the tentacles of this huge organism, connected with the body and the flesh, but comprehensively spread across different cultures.

The Evolution and Stages of Overseas Chinese Identity Recognition in Food I divide the self-identity of the overseas Chinese in food and foodways into three stages, which are closely related to the development of overseas Chinese society in the corresponding historical periods and their own development. The first stage is from the middle Ming dynasty in the sixteenth century to the Opium Wars in mid-nineteenth century, during which the overseas Chinese engaged in trade activities mostly in Southeast Asia. The second stage is from 1842, after the First Opium War, to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. This stage is symbolised by massive Chinese indentured labour during global colonialism; Chinese labour, indentured, contracted or self-supported, spread to Southeast Asia, South Africa, North America, South America, Australia, the Pacific islands and the Indian Ocean islands. During the First World War, some labour was also exported to Western Europe. Chinese migration activity during this stage laid the basic geographical distribution of the modern overseas Chinese global population.16 The third stage is from the second half of the twentieth century up until today. This stage also can be divided into two periods, divided by the opening-up policy from 1978 onwards. Before 1978, migrants from mainland China were basically isolated, and the overseas Chinese communities were cut off from communist-controlled mainland China. This isolation made them rethink their relationship with China and seek their own path for cultural development. In this period, overseas Chinese communities gradually perfected their mechanisms of community culture, and developed a key sense of self-identity. Since 1978, China has reconnected with Chinese communities around the world, restarted a new and diversified migration process and reconnected the culture maintained by the overseas Chinese with the culture of mainland China, which has undergone drastic changes since the revolutionary period. Some cultural symbols that had disappeared or been diluted in the Chinese mainland after several revolutions have been brought back from the overseas Chinese community, where they had been kept intact or developed in different social circumstances. In addition, some

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new cultural symbols produced in China under the drastic social changes there have also been exported, transferring new Chinese cultural content to the overseas Chinese communities. In the following sections, I will discuss the three stages of self-identity of overseas Chinese food and foodways through three iconic features. The main character of the first stage is the food prepared by the overseas Chinese for themselves using local ingredients. The main character of the second stage is that the overseas Chinese treated catering as an industry, preparing local food for other ethnic groups and independently establishing the self-identity of a food culture of each overseas Chinese community. The main characteristic of the third stage is that after establishing their own identity through food culture, overseas Chinese independently innovated or introduced Chinese food culture fragments fitting their own situation. Especially after 1978, the overseas Chinese community re-established the connection with mainland China, and in the process there was a collision between the different food from different regions of mainland China, brought by a steady stream of new migrants, and the established overseas Chinese food. Although the sequence of the three stages occurs in roughly the same order, the local geographical areas are different; in some cases, or in some areas, the boundaries of these three stages are not clear, sometimes they are intertwined, and in some places one or more stages are missing. For example, Chinese in Europe and North America have not experienced the first stage, while Chinese in South America are still at the second stage. But as the title of this chapter suggests, my subject is the large and widespread global community of overseas Chinese, rather than being confined to any one particular region.

Nyonya Food in Southeast Asia Early Chinese migrants to Southeast Asia were mainly merchants and their retinues, and, on some rare occasions, diplomats and officials. These people were as arrogant as the Celestial Empire they represented, they only regarded the food prepared in the Chinese way as cooked food, or ‘Le Cuit’ (the cooked) as Levi Strauss called it. The food prepared by indigenous people, even though it was physically cooked, was still seen as ‘raw food’ or ‘Le Cru’, barbaric food in the eyes of the proud subjects of the Celestial Empire.17 This antagonistic symbolic mindset based on cultural consciousness dominated Chinese merchants’

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behaviour in Southeast Asia. They made huge efforts to teach their local concubines and servants the Chinese way of cooking, thus forming the hybrid Nyonya food tradition that is still flourishing today. In this stage, from the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese food and foodways outside China were served to Chinese only, foreigners were not supposed to partake of them. The overseas Chinese, already aware that ‘our’ food was different from ‘others’ food, considered Chinese food and foodways as the only civilised food, and that the food of others was not its equivalent. The history of Chinese influence on the South China Sea region started between the eighth and twelfth centuries, during the Tang and Song dynasties, the summit of classical Chinese civilisation. There is archaeological and archival evidence showing the Shi Bo Si (Bureau for Commercial Shipping) located in Canton, administered commerce with Southeast Asia, mostly importing spices and fragrances from Southeast Asia and exporting handcrafts.18 However, during the Tang and Song dynasties, Chinese activities in Southeast Asia were mainly for exploration, less often for trade, and to declare the greatness and might of the Chinese empire (sometimes one voyage fulfilled all three purposes at the same time), but they did not found large-scale settlements or regular trading routes. It was at the time of the Ming dynasty, around the sixteenth century, that the Chinese began to settle in Southeast Asia. Settlements and maritime trading posts with more than a thousand Chinese residents were scattered around the South China Sea; Malacca is one of the important Chinese settlements from this period. Its famous Bukit Cina is home to more than 12,000 thousand Chinese tombs, dozens of which date back to the Ming dynasty, evidence of the early Chinese migration activities. During the sixteenth century, important Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia included Malacca, which sat on the Malaysian Peninsula and overlooked the Malacca Strait; Palembang, on Sumatra; Surabaya, on Java19; Luzon and Borneo, which also hosted more than one thousand Chinese.20 Since the twentieth century, the descendants of early Chinese migrants have been called Peranakan, which means ‘descendants of immigrants born locally’ in Bahasa, the language of Malaysia and Indonesia. In the local mixed common language of Hokkien and Malaysia, Peranakan were also called Baba Nyonya, and this term is more familiar to the local and Chinese populations. Baba means male peranakan—scholars argue about the origins which may be from Arabic, Malaysian or Bangladeshi. Nyonya

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mean female peranakan—again there are arguments over its origin, one is that it is from the Malaysian ‘Nona’ (missus), the other is that it is from the Hokkien ‘Nya’ (mother). An interesting argument suggested by Chen Henghan says the Chinese writing of Baba (峇), is a Hanzi character made up by Chinese migrants with the symbol, composed by ‘山’ (mountain) and ‘合’ (combine), a metaphor implying they are the descendants of intermarriage between Chinese and local mountainous people.21 Nyonya cuisine is a crucial part of Southeast Asian Chinese food, and it is a specialty that local Chinese are happy to advocate as it represents local experience. Nyonya, as the name suggests, is a peranakan ‘mom’s’ food, which is characterised by strong local Southeast Asian ingredients presented in the form of Chinese food. Before the twentieth century, most of the Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia were men, some of them were married, but the majority were bachelors.22 The Haijin (sea ban) decree was an important background to Chinese migration; it was a series of related isolationist Chinese policies restricting private maritime trading and coastal settlement during most of the Ming dynasty and some of the Qing. Despite the brutal enforcement of the decree, extremely high profits still attracted people to engage in maritime trading, and people tended to setup overseas settlements and trading posts to avoid the risk of frequently entering Chinese government-controlled territory. As they had to spend most of their ­ time abroad, taking local concubines was common among the overseas Chinese. As an archive of the Ming period recorded, the custom of Chinese in Southeast Asia was: ‘exchange was mostly done by women, when a Chinese came to this land, he first took a local concubine, as the concubine helped the business as well as with the chores’.23 These types of records are numerous throughout the time of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Peranakan were called Baba Nyonya in the local language, but the food of Peranakan is called Nyonya food, not Baba food. The naming of Nyonya food reveals the gendered nature of food and foodways: men’s food and foodways indicate banquets, feasts and ceremonies, it is a public declaration of a patriarchal culture; while women’s food and foodways indicate household, private and daily nurturing, it is an unvarnished reality of life. Even for the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, men’s food still maintains the arrogance of the Celestial Empire by showing its complete Chineseness and not surrendering a bit to the local culture.

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Therefore, Baba food is de facto Chinese food. Women’s daily cooking, the Nyonya food, is quite different. Chinese husbands surely taught their local wives the ‘authentic’ Chinese foodways, yet the local wives brought in their own ingredients and cooking methods as the expensive food ingredients shipped from China were obviously not a practical choice for daily consumption. Therefore, Nyonya food consists of lots of local food materials and cooking methods, masked with a general form of Chinese food and foodways. In Chinese archives, ethnographic writings on the food and foodways of neighbouring ethnos were common, Xing Cha Sheng Lan (Star and Raft Sight Seeing) recorded that in the Sulu Islands, ‘people harvest fish and shrimp from the sea and eat them raw, conch and clam boiled’. In Dragon Teeth Cape (today Patani, the southern end of Thailand), ‘people boil sea water for salt, and brew millet for liquor’.24 Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu (Overseas Customs Advisory Book) recorded that ‘Java indigenous [people] have dark skin, sit without chairs and lay without beds, they eat without chopsticks and spoon, take ant, snake, worm and insect as food, eat with their dog and [do] not regard [this] as filthy’.25 These archives are indeed a valuable asset for those Southeast Asian ethnos with no written language, and some of these archives show detailed observations on ethnography, yet the Chinese often took a superior condescending perspective in them. They regarded themselves as the civilised people of the Celestial Empire, and observed the barbarian people who were ‘not aware of civilisation’. Local diet was a strange and unusual style, whereas Chinese food and foodways were outstanding. For the Chinese people living in these extraterritorial lands, such local diets were never acceptable. Although they would accept some local fruits, vegetables, meat and other food materials, they still needed to use spoons and chopsticks to eat these food materials, eat them from bowls and plates, keep the order of serving, and adjust the food to the proper proportions of meat, vegetable and staple food. Nyonya food is a prominent example of the localisation of Chinese foodways in Southeast Asia. Tan Chee-beng points out that the overseas Chinese, located in different parts of the world, have accepted local tastes and become accustomed to local food. He cites examples of the chilli dips that are essential for Hainan chicken rice in Singapore, as well as Chinese curries and spiced shrimp paste (Belachan), suggesting that the Min and Yue (Hokkien and Cantonese) Chinese, who do not normally eat spicy food, are embracing the region’s pungent tastes in Southeast

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Asia and are also creating new ones.26 However, no matter how tastes change, seasoning increases or decreases, or the number of local special ingredients included, Nyonya food always meet Chang Kwang-chih’s rule of balance: the collocation of staple food and subsidiary are in the proper proportion, yin and yang, cold and hot food, from raw material to edible delicacies, the whole process of food making meets a set of interrelated variables.27 As a result, most Nyonya dishes are not far removed from Chinese foodways, despite their unique ingredients and tastes. Take Itik Tim (sour duck soup) as an example. This dish is usually considered to be a representative of the Nyonya cuisine, but sour duck soup is also very popular in the Chaoshan area of Guangdong, raw materials and practices are similar, both using Chaoshan style pickled mustard leaf and duck as the main ingredients, complemented with pickled olive, coriander and tomatoes. The only difference is in Malaysia and Singapore, asam gelugur (garcinia atroviridis—the fruit is sour and fragrant) is added as one of the spices. Soy sauce braised chicken (Ayam Pongteh), black fruit stewed chicken (Ayam Buah Keluak), pork bun (Roti Babi), hot and sour fish maw (Perut Ikan), braised pork (Sek Bak), sealed pork (Hong Bak), shrimp paste fried egg (Cincalok Omelette) and pork liver balls (Hati Babi Bungkus) are all representative dishes of Nyonya cuisine,28 and just like the sour duck soup, these foods are also found in the south of Fujian province, while Chaoshan and Cantonese cuisine echo them. But the Nyonya versions of these dishes use many of the spices that are native to Southeast Asia, creating a rather different taste. However, another category of Nyonya dishes cannot find their corresponding origins in south China, take otak-otak as an example, it is a mixture of fish puree and various spices (in Malaysia the spices are usually chillies, belachan, ground ginger and coconut milk, while in Indonesia, ground ginger and chilli are not used) that is wrapped and roasted in banana or nipa leaves. Chinese Malaysians claim otak-otak is a food created by Chinese fisherman, mostly Teochew, as a method for preserving redundant fishing catches. However, Malaysians consider otak-otak to be a native dish, as all the condiments used in otak-otak are native to Malaysia, and the cooking method of the dish—roasting in leaves—is common in Southeast Asian cuisine but rarely found in Chinese cuisine. Chinese food cooked in leaf wrappings—Zongzi—is boiled or steamed in vessels, not roasted directly. All aspects of otak-otak are consistent with

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other Malaysian foods, although Nyonya cuisine often claims this dish. The Chinese also changed the manner of eating otak-otak, they serve it as a side dish, whereas Malaysians usually eat it as a standalone snack. Laksa represents another variant of Nyonya food, it is the creation of multiple ethnic groups living in Malaysia. The word laksa came from the Tamils of the South Asian subcontinent, originally meaning ‘a hundred thousand’, it now means a great many, but there is no such food as laksa in South Asian cuisine, not even a close variation. Laksa is a joint creation of Tamils, Malaysians and Chinese, possibly as a result of intermarriage.29 It is composed of spices, fish, rice vermicelli and noodles, ingredients from different food traditions gathered in one bowl, thus its name laksa is appropriate. There are two main variations of laksa, one is the asam laksa popular in northern Malaysia, using fish soup and the sour taste of asam as the base, with the addition of many fruits and vegetables; the other is the curry laksa popular in southern Malaysia, using curry and thick noodle soup as the base, usually with meats and tofu. The manner of eating laksa is similar to that of noodle soup in Chinese cuisine—it is a street food, usually not appearing on a formal table. Nyonya food is associated with the early experiences of Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. As the word Nyonya suggests, it is a feminine, domestic and private style of food, it is not a formal feast or ceremonial food. Even in the Peranakan tradition, formality requires a full Chinese traditional display; in such occasions, Peranakans will carefully remove all the local elements in their food and increase the Chinese elements30 to represent formality and their Chinese origin. These behaviours show their awareness of self-identity, their clear understanding of which food is of Chinese origin, and which is not. An example is the display of Chinese tea on altars, on the occasion of ancestor worship, when Peranakans offer Chinese tea instead of their daily drink, coffee. Even though their worshipped ancestors did not drink Chinese tea, they are still offered the tea which represents their Chinese identity.31 Nyonya food is a great example of Peranakan awareness of Chinese identity in food. In the early days of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia, before the mid-nineteenth century, communications and transportation were very inconvenient, and they created Nyonya food, which follows Chinese foodways but uses a great number of local ingredients. Nyonya food was cooked by Chinese, or by local people who were closely associated with the Chinese, and it was served to Chinese, matching the standards and values of Chinese foodways. Nowadays, Nyonya

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food is becoming a brand that the Chinese of Singapore and Malaysia take pride in, and are happy to advocate. It is a narrative of Chinese foodways adapting local elements and showing integration in some senses. In recent decades, with the development of tourism, Nyonya food has been introduced from domestic kitchens into public restaurants, becoming a local specialty to attract tourist. Following the collapse of the Chinese Celestial Empire in the late-nineteenth century, Chinese migration started its second stage. In the British Strait Colonies and the Dutch East Indies, the ‘new comers’—indentured labourers—became the mainstream of Chinese migration and soon overwhelmed the old Peranakans in numbers. The contradictions between these two groups of Chinese gradually came to the surface. The newcomers could not understand the integrated culture of the Peranakans, or the Peranakans holding of power over the upper strata of the colonies.32 The newcomers brought in ‘authentic’ Chinese food and foodways, or at least what in their narrative they saw as authentic, colliding with the localised Chinese food and foodways, and starting a new stage of overseas Chinese identity in food—the cosmopolitan Chinese cook—that will be discussed in the next section.

Chinese Cooking in the American Gold Rush After the Opium Wars, the traditional Chinese economic system gradually collapsed, Chinese arrogance vanished, along with the dignity of the Celestial Empire, under the guns of the Western powers. Massive numbers of Chinese labourers were deported overseas, many of whom took to cooking to make a living. At the very beginning of this process, most Chinese catering businesses served Chinese labours predominantly, yet after a short while, they turned to serving other workers as well. The news that being a cook could make one a fortune overseas soon spread across China’s southern coast, so more Chinese chose to go abroad to cook, and along with the changing of their customers, they changed the taste of Chinese food to meet the non-Chinese customers’ needs, inventing a great number of ‘Chinese’ foods only known outside of China. In this section, Chinese-American food is examined; representing the second stage of overseas Chinese identity in food and foodways, Chinese-American food is symbolic for it was and is a major trade of Chinese businesses serving non-Chinese customers. Similar occurrences can be found elsewhere from the mid-nineteenth century when Chinese

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indentured labour became the mainstream of Chinese migration, yet the situation in the United States is the most representative. The acculturation of Chinese food happened in the United States, with local food materials widely adopted and also changes to traditional foodways, such as the order of serving, the proportion of staple to non-staple food and the manner of table setting. Integration is a suitable word for the first stage of development of overseas Chinese food, that is the Nyonya food discussed above, and acculturation is the best word to describe the second stage of development of overseas Chinese food. American-Chinese food started in San Francisco, dating back to the time of the Gold Rush (1849–1855) when the Chinese arrived in great numbers, initially looking for gold, but then finding many business opportunities other than the dangerous business of gold-digging. Before the transcontinental railway was opened, the shipping route from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast by way of Cape Horn usually took three months. In contrast, the shipping route from Hong Kong to San Francisco only took 45 days. Even after the railway opened, shipping goods from China was far cheaper than transporting them across the country via the railway.33 This advantage was well used by the early Chinese merchants who flooded San Francisco with their goods, including building materials, daily supplies and food, and worked to the advantage of low salaried Chinese workers. Chinese owned restaurants were soon the best choice for impoverished bachelors in the Golden State. Dollar meals supplied by these restaurants often consisted of a meat course with boiled potatoes or steamed rice, eggs and a cup of tea or coffee,34 there was not much ‘style’ involved, just simple food. Neither the Chinese restaurant owners nor their customers wanted to mention the exotic styles of Chinese food at that time; price was the primary concern, exotic styles only drove customers away. From 1870 to 1890, rampant anti-Chinese propaganda often described Chinese food as disgusting and foul. Most of these claims were sensational false accusations, yet the uncommonly low price of the food did raise suspicions. Cantonese speaking Chinese had long-established trade with Westerners in Canton and Hong Kong, and they were the majority of Chinese in America, so they were well aware of what kinds of food were acceptable to Western diners, and they made sure their food would not scare people away. After the Gold Rush, California gradually merged with the other parts of the United States. In the 1880s, the price of commodities in

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California was aligning with the rest of the country, which meant that Chinese restaurants no longer had a price advantage. Moreover, the transcontinental railway brought in thousands of immigrants from the east, anti-Chinese feeling was higher than before, and many Chinese fled California to less hostile states in the east. Chinese restaurants spread across America with the movement of Chinese people. Apparently, selling conventional western food was no longer an effective strategy for the Chinese, but selling authentic Chinese food was even more impractical. The Chinese who left California knew where Americans drew the line between exotic and quirky, and a new style of Americanised Chinese food was born to satisfy their needs. Chop suey, the most iconic Chinese-American food, developed in the late 1880s. According to Chinese rights activist Wong Chin Foo’s account, chop suey ‘may justly be called the national dish of China’,35 yet such a dish is not common among Chinese; chop means miscellaneous, and suey means food sliced into bite-size pieces in Chinese, but putting these two words together does not make any sense to a Chinese speaker. However, the cooking method of this dish, stir-frying and seasoning with soy sauce and sugar, is very Chinese. Chop suey is an example of balancing the proper sum of exotic and acceptable foods for universal customers. I have lived in California and visited many Chinese restaurants where I was always presented with two menus, a Chinese and an English version, and these two menus never matched each other. On the English menu, there would be chop suey, egg foo young and suchlike, while on the Chinese menu, there would be a daily soup, roasted ribs and suchlike; waiters in the restaurants, once they had confirmed that I spoke Chinese, always recommended that I order from the Chinese menu. It is interesting to see the two faces of the same restaurant. This phenomenon can be seen as manifesting the self-identity awareness in the food of the overseas Chinese—one face for acculturation and the other face for segregation. In this way, the overseas Chinese are acknowledging what the others may not accept, and what can only happen in the Chinese enclaves—physically and mentally. The ebbs and flows of Chinese-American food are closely related to the publicity around China, the first wave of Chinese fever was during Count Li Hong Zhang’s visit to the United States in 1896, then the Boxer Uprising in 1900 and the Chinese revolution of 1911; whether good or bad news, media coverage has always driven customers to

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Chinese restaurants. Good times fly past. After 1914, the First World War turned the public focus to Europe, and Chinese-American food was seen as lacking innovation, the long-lasting chop suey fever had exhausted people’s curiosity and palate. From the 1920s on, ­Chinese-American restaurants went through a dim and dispirited era, until some new blood was brought to America in the 1960s.

Rediscovering Chinese Food In 1965, the U.S. Congress modified the Immigration Act, which opened the road for Chinese immigration to the United States in relatively reasonable numbers. In the 83 years since the Chinese Exclusion Act, from 1882 to 1965, Chinese immigration had de facto halted, and the isolation of Communist China cut off the majority of Chinese in America from their relatives in China. The societies of China and Chinese-America had both undergone great changes during these years of separation. When immigration resumed, the collision of the two styles of Chinese food was a great shock to Chinese-American society. Arising from the old Chinese-American experience, the question was asked, can Westerners accept Chinese food other than chop suey and chow mein? Times change and, with the dissolution of the Western discourse of power and the development of multicultural theory since the 1960s, the acceptance by Westerners of exotic food has also changed. Non-western cultures are no longer seen as backward and ignorant. As international travel became more common, many Westerners came to Asia and found that the ‘Asian food’ they were used to eating at home was very different from the local food. They began to hope that overseas Chinese restaurants would return to ‘authentic’ food, and overseas Chinese restaurants also found that their customers’ tolerance for different tastes was becoming higher and higher, while the homogenised competition also made profit margins thinner and thinner. Many overseas Chinese restaurants tried to introduce real Chinese tastes abroad. The first success was achieved by Cecilia Chiang and her Mandarin restaurant in San Francisco. Chiang was born to an aristocratic family in Wuxi. She came to the United States in 1958, where she started her business by accident. By then, the majority of Chinese-Americans were Cantonese or Hokkien, and they were not familiar with the upper class Chinese food traditions. Chiang decided to introduce aristocratic Chinese food to the United States, rather than rely on the usual boring

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chop suey. It was difficult at the beginning; she could not find supplies for her restaurant in the local China town and had to import them from Taiwan and Japan, which made her food more expensive but different from others. Since 1962, her restaurant’s uniqueness attracted attention from high society; famous food critic Herb Caen started to recommend the Mandarin restaurant and it eventually became very successful and created a new genre of Chinese food. Later, Chiang’s son Philip, inspired by his mother’s success, opened his famous food chain, the P. F. Chang’s China Bistro.36 Chiang introduced more than 300 dishes through her restaurant and many of which, such as moo shu pork, walnut shrimp, sizzling rice soup and smoked duck, became well-known and influential.37 These new dishes were new blood for Chinese-American food, which was revived after the 1970s. Peng Chang-kuei is another contributor. Peng was a chef to Chiang Kai-shek, and migrated to New York City in 1973 where he created the General Tso’s chicken dish. 1973 was an important year for Chinese-American Food; the historic event of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States contributed to the revival of Chinese food in the United States. As Count Li Hongzhang’s visit to the United States 80 years previously had boosted the popularity of chop suey, Nixon’s visit to China was covered by the media in great detail, including the menus at state dinners and the various foods and gifts offered by China. The average American was curious about all things happening in China because these two countries had long been separated; they were hungry for news from China, through newspapers, radio and television, while also trying to find Chinese restaurants near them to get a taste of China. If the nearby chop suey restaurant only had some resemblance to Chinese food, luckily for diners in New York and San Francisco, there was no shortage of more authentic Chinese restaurants. During this period, Shun Lee Palace, Peng’s Garden in New York, and the Mandarin and Golden Dragon in California ushered in a new era. Encouraged by this new popularity, more diverse Chinese restaurants were opened, featuring improved Sichuan and Hunan cuisine, northern cuisine, and more authentic Cantonese dim sum. However, attention brought by the media always fades, and the original styles of Chinese food were hard for Americans to accept for a long time. Northern food is too complicated to eat, Sichuan food is too hot and dim sum ingredients are too strange. Soon, these too began the process of acculturation, as their predecessors had. Sichuan spices in the United States eventually evolved into the somewhat Chinese

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‘hot and sweet flavour’, a kind of thick red sauce served in all kinds of battered fried food. Unlike in the previous two stages, in this third stage there were more upper class food styles involved, which gave the overseas Chinese food more diversity. After the communists took over China’s mainland, traditional Chinese aristocrats were exiled or vanished from China, and food in China changed greatly after the revolution. From 1978 onwards, China resumed its migration process. The southeast coast of China is still the starting place for many Chinese emigrants, but there are more migrants from inland regions joining the emigration, which gives overseas Chinese food more diversity. Today’s overseas Chinese food includes not only the highly localised versions, such as Nyonya food, but also the likes of Chinese-American food, which is highly commercial and served mainly to non-Chinese. There are also many Chinese restaurants dedicated to restoring the flavours of regional Chinese cuisine. In addition, the overseas Chinese also cooked various kinds of Chinese food in their own homes through their own understanding of Chinese food and foodways.

Conclusion This chapter raised five questions at the beginning. After examining the examples of overseas Chinese food and foodways, now we return to these questions. How is the self-identity of overseas Chinese food and foodways established? Overseas Chinese food identity is the sum of living conditions, cross-cultural experience and history. As such, overseas Chinese food as an agent of nostalgia, and different experience, carries self-identities. As Nyonya food carries narratives and folklores of Chinese-Malaysia, ChineseAmerica also tells stories through General Tso’s chicken and chop suey. What are the stages in the establishment? The three stages of self-identification in overseas Chinese food and foodways are reflections of the historical experience and living situation of the overseas Chinese in different periods. In the first stage, the overseas Chinese started by using local ingredients to cook Chinese food, which was a reflection of the typical overseas Chinese lifestyle before the collapse of China’s trading system. At this stage, the overseas Chinese were

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mainly engaged in business, and their economic and social status were relatively advantageous, therefore, the local food materials they cooked through Chinese foodways were mainly for Chinese people, and had to conform to Chinese tastes and the general principles of Chinese food. In the second stage, the overseas Chinese took up catering as a means of making a livelihood by preparing Chinese food for people of other ethnic groups. This reflects China’s historical experience as a great exporter of labour from the second half of the nineteenth century through the first half of the twentieth century. A large number of overseas Chinese entered the restaurant industry but they had to change their food to suit the taste preferences of local residents, resulting in many unique foods with foreign styles. During this period, due to the forced interruption of contact with mainland China, the colonial independence movement and the awakening of national consciousness, many overseas Chinese communities independently established their own food culture self-identity. In the third stage, the overseas Chinese re-established their connection with China, re-examined overseas Chinese foods and introduced the diversity of regional Chinese foods. The historical background to this stage is the increasingly close connection between China and other countries, the emigration of Chinese of different classes with different purposes, the process of globalisation and the re-examination of the positioning of western and other cultures in the western world. This stage presents the diversification of food culture and identity. What are the milestones in these stages? The milestones of these three stages are marked by integration, acculturation and segregation, with the added dimensions of initiative and passivity. Nyonya food is an example of passive integration and initiative segregation; Chinese-American food before the 1960s was an example of initiative acculturation and passive segregation; and modern ­Chinese-American food is a combination of both initiative and passive acculturation, segregation and integration. What is the difference between the overseas Chinese food and foodways and those of mainland China? Due to their different historical experiences, living situations and cross-cultural experiences, the food culture of the overseas Chinese produced foods different from those of China. Since the end of the Qing dynasty, China has experienced the impact of the colonial period, the

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baptism of the revolution and great cultural challenges. Therefore, China also has a different historical experience and living situation from the overseas Chinese, resulting in varieties of foods rooted in the same origin. How do these differences arise? The differences between overseas Chinese foods are mainly caused by two specific factors. The first is the factor of materials, local Chinese people using local products as the raw material for Chinese foodways, which is particularly prominent in Nyonya food. Trade is also important, food materials convenient for storage and transportation are more common in overseas Chinese foods, so regions that have long-established trade with China tend to have more authentic Chinese foods. The second factor is the human factor, that is, when non-Chinese ethnic groups are the main customers, Chinese restaurants compromise to suit the local palate. Taking Chinese-American food as an example, to facilitate a universal taste, such as the sweet and salty tastes, taste preferences that are unique to China and need to be cultivated from childhood, such as the flavour of fermented soy, are discarded. Some cooking steps are also added, such as removing bones from fish and chicken, and discarding some Chinese food materials that Westerners do not accept, such as pig intestines, preserved eggs, black fungus, fermented bean curd and so on. However, these ingredients are still common in Southeast Asian Chinese cuisine, where the majority of customers are Chinese. As Chang Kwang-chih and Eugene Anderson demonstrated, Chinese food has a set of common principles of harmony and balance from Chinese philosophy, and a unique tradition of ingredients. The preparation and consumption of food follows the staple/non-staple principle. This set of variables is the common feature of Chinese foodways. Because of the identity of this set of common characteristics, it is possible for Chinese people to identify Chinese food wherever they go. Even if one had never been to the United States but walked into a Chinese-American restaurant, no matter how lacking in Chinese elements the restaurant decor, the dish collocation, tableware, food seasoning and cooking methods, it will awaken one immediately to the heart of the Chinese food culture identity—one can clearly still identify it as a Chinese restaurant. The common recognition of Chinese food culture by all Chinese people is a concrete manifestation of a metaphysical Chinese philosophy of food. Its principle of harmony and balance points not to a specific dish, but to an abstract set of variables—a way of thinking about food and a system of discourse of food.

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Notes





1. Hongmei Hao and Weinong Gao, “Guanyu Dangqian Meiguo Huaren Canguanye Chujing de Sikao” [Thoughts on Situations of Chinese American Restaurants], Zhongguo Fazhan, no. 1 (2005): 60–63. 2. Chee-beng Tan, “Haiwai Huaren: Yimin Shiwu yu Rentong” [Chinese Overseas: Migration, Food and Identity], Beifang Minzu Daxue Xuebao, no. 4 (2008): 5–12. 3. Eugene N. Anderson, The Food of China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 258. 4. Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, the Social Organization of Culture Difference (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969). 5. Daming Zhou, Duoyuan yu Gongrong Zuqun Yanjiu de Lilun yu Shijian [Diversity and Congregation: Theories and Practices on Ethnic Study] (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2011), 17. 6. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (London: Penguin, 2008). 7. “Confucianism -> Liji -> Wang Zhi -> 36”, Chinese Text Project, accessed September 16, 2019, https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl?if=en&id=59345. 8. Mei Yuan, Sui Yuan Shi Dan [Cookbook of Sui Chateau] (Beijing: Wanjuan Chuban Gongsi, 2016), 21. 9. Mengxi Liu et al., eds., Zhongguo Xiandai Xueshu Jingdian: Gu Jie-gang Juan [Chinese Academic Classics: Volume of Gu Jie-gang] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), 773. 10. Kwang-chih Chang and Guo Yu-hua, trans., “Zhongguo Wenhua Zhong De Yinshi: Renleixue Yu Lishixue De Toushi” [Food and Foodways in Chinese Culture: An Anthropology and History Perspective], in Zhongguo Shiwu [The Food of China], ed. Eugene N. Anderson (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), 257. 11. Anderson, The Food of China, 171 12.  Richard Alba, “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 20–49. 13. Zhongtian Yi, Xian Hua Zhonguo Ren [Gossips on Chinese People] (Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe, 2000), 3. 14.  Christoph Harbsmeier, “Hanyu Shijie Zhong ‘Chi’ De Zhexue” [Philosophy of ‘Eat’ in Chinese Context] (presentation at International Conference on Chinese Food and Culture in Local and Global Perspectives, Sun Yat-sen Univerisity, Guangzhou, October 28, 2016). 15. Nataliia Kolesnykova, The Definition and Concept of Chinese and Western Food Culture (Hangzhou: Zhejiang University, 2012), 8.

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16. Rukang Tian, “Jindai Huaqiao Shi De Jieduan Wenti” [The Discussion on Stages in the History of Overseas Chinese], Xiamen Daxue Xuebao, no. 1 (1958): 89–92. 17. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Zhou Changzhong trans. Shen Hua Xue: Shengshi He Shushi [Le Cru et le Cuit] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2007). 18. Qufei Zhou, Ling Wai Dai Da Jiao Zhu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1999), 170. 19. “Mao Kun map” [Set of navigation charts published in the Ming dynasty military treatise Wubei Zhi] Wikimedia Commons, accessed September 16, 2019, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Mao_Kun_map. 20. Weiming Chen, “Ming Qing Yue Min Haishang De Haishang Yingyun Jiagou” [Maritime Operation Structure of Guangdong and Fujian Merchants in Ming and Qing Dynasties], Hai Jiao Shi Yan Jiu, no. 1 (2000): 55–64. 21.  Henghai Chen, “Cong Baba Niangre Kan Nanyang De Wenhua Pengzhuang Yu Ronghe” [Baba and Nyonya: The Cultural Collision and Fusion in Nanyang], Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao 35, no. 3 (2011): 104–108. 22.  Ke Fan, “Yimin Yu Lisan: Qianxi De Zhengzhi” [Immigrant and Diaspora: The Politics of Migration], Si Xiang Zhan Xian 38, no. 1 (2012): 14–20. 23. ‘Wiki - > 殊域周咨錄 -> 第八卷真臘 -> 17’, Chinese Text Project, accessed September 16, 2019, https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=202042. 24. ‘Wiki -> 星槎勝覽 -> 星槎勝覽’, Chinese Text Project, accessed September 16, 2019, https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=436710. 25. ‘Wiki -> 殊域周咨錄 -> 第八卷真臘 -> 85’ Chinese Text Project, accessed September 16, 2019, https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=202042. 26. Tan, “Haiwai Huaren,” 5–12. 27. Chang and Yu-hua, “Zhongguo Wenhua Zhong De Yinshi: Renleixue Yu Lishixue De Toushi,” 252. 28. Hanafi Hussin, “Baba-Nyonya Ancestor Worship and Food Offerings: A Case Study of the Peranakan Chinese of the Straits of Malacca,” Journal of Chuxiong Normal University Social Science Edition 10, no. 31 (2016): 13–17. 29. Urvija Banerji, “How Intermarriage Created One of the World’s Most Delicious Foods,” Atlas Obscura, accessed September 16, 2019, https:// www.atlasobscura.com/articles/how-intermarriage-created-one-of-theworlds-most-delicious-foods. 30. Yanying Chen, “Yong Yingxiang Jilu Dangdai Jilandan Tusheng Huaren Wenhua Tezheng: Yi Laiyadao Daomin Weili’m,” in Hudong Yu Wangluo:

358  Y. CAO Duowei Shiye Xia De Haiwai Huaren Yu Zhongguo Qiaoxiang Guanxi Yanjiu, eds. Xiaoling Wu and Zheng Yixing (Guangzhou: Shijie Tushu Chuban Guangdong Youxian Gongsi, 2016), 352. 31. Tan, “Haiwai Huaren,” 5–12. 32. Suryadinata Leo, “Malaixiya De Tusheng Huaren: Huigu Yu Qianzan, Malaixiya Huaren Shehui Bainian” [A Century of Chinese Society in Malaysia], November 22–23, 2003, Singapore: Nantah Education And Research Foundation. Also see, http://nantah.org.my/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133. 33. Albert S. Evans, Á La California (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1873). 34. Bayard Taylor, Eldorado (New York: Putnam, 1850), 116–117. 35. Wing Chin Foo, “Chinese Cooking,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 6 July 6, 1884, 4, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/22988297/the_brooklyn_daily_ eagle_6_july_1884/. 36. Belinda Leong, “Cecilia Chiang, in Her Own Words,” Eater.com, accessed September 16, 2019, https://www.eater.com/2018/7/20/17419118/ cecilia-chiang-interview-profile-belinda-leong. 37.  Bauer, Michael. “At the Mandarin, Cecilia Chiang changed Chinese food,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 2, 2011, https://insidescoopsf. sfgate.com/blog/2011/05/25/at-the-mandarin-cecilia-chiang-changedchinese-food/.

Bibliography Alba, Richard. “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 20–49. Anderson, Eugene N. The Food of China. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, the Social Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969. Chang, Kwang-chih, and Guo Yu-hua, trans. “Zhongguo Wenhua Zhong De Yinshi: Renleixue Yu Lishixue De Toushi” [Food and Foodways in Chinese Culture: An Anthropology and History Perspective]. In Zhongguo Shiwu [The Food of China], edited by Eugene N. Anderson. Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2003. Chen, Henghai. “Cong Baba Niangre Kan Nanyang De Wenhua Pengzhuang Yu Ronghe” [Baba and Nyonya: The Cultural Collision and Fusion in Nanyang]. Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao 35, no. 3 (2011): 104–108. Chen, Weiming. “Ming Qing Yue Min Haishang De Haishang Yingyun Jiagou” [Maritime Operation Structure of Guangdong and Fujian Merchants in Ming and Qing Dynasties]. Hai Jiao Shi Yan Jiu, no. 1 (2000): 55–64.

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Chen, Yanying. “Yong Yingxiang Jilu Dangdai Jilandan Tusheng Huaren Wenhua Tezheng: Yi Laiyadao Daomin Weili’m.” In Hudong Yu Wangluo: Duowei Shiye Xia De Haiwai Huaren Yu Zhongguo Qiaoxiang Guanxi Yanjiu, edited by Xiaoling Wu and Zheng Yixing. Guangzhou: Shijie Tushu Chuban Guangdong Youxian Gongsi, 2016. Evans, Albert S. Á La California. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1873. Fan, Ke. “Yimin Yu Lisan: Qianxi De Zhengzhi” [Immigrant and Diaspora: The Politics of Migration]. Si Xiang Zhan Xian 38, no. 1 (2012): 14–20. Hao, Hongmei, and Weinong Gao, “Guanyu Dangqian Meiguo Huaren Canguanye Chujing de Sikao” [Thoughts on Situations of Chinese American Restaurants]. Zhongguo Fazhan, no. 1 (2005): 60–63. Harbsmeier, Christoph. “Hanyu Shijie Zhong ‘Chi’ De Zhexue” [Philosophy of ‘Eat’ in Chinese Context] presentation at International Conference on Chinese Food and Culture in Local and Global Perspectives, Sun Yat-sen Univerisity, Guangzhou, October 28, 2016. Hussin, Hanafi. “Baba-Nyonya Ancestor Worship and Food Offerings: A Case Study of the Peranakan Chinese of the Straits of Malacca.” Journal of Chuxiong Normal University Social Science Edition 10, no. 31 (2016): 13–17. Kolesnykova, Nataliia. The Definition and Concept of Chinese and Western Food Culture. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University, 2012. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Zhou Changzhong trans. Shen Hua Xue: Shengshi He Shushi [Le Cru et le Cuit]. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2007. Liu, Mengxi et al., eds. Zhongguo Xiandai Xueshu Jingdian: Gu Jie-gang Juan [Chinese Academic Classics: Volume of Gu Jie-gang]. Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996. Tan, Chee-beng. “Haiwai Huaren: Yimin Shiwu yu Rentong” [Chinese Overseas: Migration, Food and Identity]. Beifang Minzu Daxue Xuebao, no. 4 (2008): 5–12. Taylor, Bayard. Eldorado. New York: Putnam, 1850. Tian, Rukang. “Jindai Huaqiao Shi De Jieduan Wenti” [The Discussion on Stages in the History of Overseas Chinese]. Xiamen Daxue Xuebao, no. 1 (1958): 89–92. Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Significance of the Frontier in American History. London: Penguin, 2008. Yi, Zhongtian. Xian Hua Zhonguo Ren [Gossips on Chinese People]. Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe, 2000. Yuan, Mei. Sui Yuan Shi Dan [Cookbook of Sui Chateau]. Beijing: Wanjuan Chuban Gongsi, 2016. Zhou, Daming. Duoyuan yu Gongrong Zuqun Yanjiu de Lilun yu Shijian [Diversity and Congregation: Theories and Practices on Ethnic Study]. Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2011. Zhou, Qufei. Ling Wai Dai Da Jiao Zhu. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1999.

CHAPTER 15

Temples and Huiguan: Negotiating Chineseness in Ho Chi Minh City Zhifang Song

Introduction Visiting District Five of Ho Chi Minh City during the period of Tet (the lunar New Year), one would easily recognise the pronounced features of the Chinese culture conspicuously displayed. Days before Tet, various goods for the holiday are already stacked outside numerous stores along the streets. Some learned gentlemen set up stalls on the street, writing and selling Chinese couplets, which are indispensable to every Chinese family during the holiday. Temples begin to be crowded with people, who come to worship the deities. On the eve of Tet, almost everybody comes to the temples. They burn incense and paper offerings, repaying the deities for helping them to meet their wishes in the past year. New wishes and promises are made again before the deities. Early on the morning of Tet, the sounds of gongs and drums prevent people from staying in bed. Outside, lion dance groups are already parading the street, visiting one temple after another to accept blessings from

Z. Song (*)  Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_15

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the deities and to entertain both deities and worshippers with their best performances. Sometimes they stop in front of stores, performing there and receiving donations from store owners. This continues for days. At night, the plazas of some temples are lit up as bright as day, with Chinese opera performances staged there to entertain both deities and people. All these activities culminate on the fifteenth day after Tet, when almost all lion dance clubs and other cultural groups come out on street to join a grand parade, ending with a gala night at the Cultural Centre of District Five. District Five is the core of Cholon, which used to be the ­biggest Chinatown in the world, boasting of more than half a million Chinese residents before 1975.1 Cholon, which is called Di An by the Chinese, was a town established by Chinese immigrants a couple of hundred years ago. Under French colonial rule, it grew in size and economic importance together with the neighbouring Saigon. These two cities merged into one bigger Saigon under the Republic of Vietnam, but Cholon had remained a predominantly Chinese town before 1975. Today, Cholon is no longer an administrative unit, but just a geographical area covering Districts Five, Six and Eleven of Ho Chi Minh City. As a scholar researching the Chinese diaspora, I was excited to see such conspicuous Chineseness when I first did my fieldwork in Ho Chi Minh City. But when I interviewed the Chinese there, I found that many of them lamented the fact that Cholon was no longer what it had been before 1975, when it was a real Chinese town. In other words, what is seen today is no longer seen as real Chinese to these people. This implies that the Chinese culture in Vietnam has experienced many changes in the past decades, like the Chinese culture in other countries. As scholars have pointed out, the experience of the Chinese in different countries varies through history and across different social and political contexts, giving rise to different configurations of Chineseness.2 This chapter aims to examine how Chineseness has been transformed and reconfigured in today’s Cholon. The focus will be placed on the dynamic interactions of different parties around Chinese temples in District Five, which used to be, and still are, the centre of Cholon. Particular attention is given to a unique ethnic policy adopted by the Vietnamese government, as well as its impact on the shaping of Chineseness in contemporary Vietnam.

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Chineseness, Chinese Diaspora and the Chinese in Vietnam The Chinese in Vietnam are but part of the tens of millions of people of Chinese descent living outside China. As one of the largest diasporic populations in the world,3 the Chinese diaspora is a product of a long history of Chinese emigration. After China was forced to open her door to international trade in the nineteenth century, wave after wave of Chinese people emigrated from China and spread to almost every corner of the world. The Chinese diaspora, formed by Chinese immigrants who left China during different historical periods and for different reasons, and scattered around in countries of great geographical and sociopolitical diversity, challenges any effort for generalisation and essentialisation.4 Despite its heterogeneity, scholars have proposed various theoretical frameworks to understand this diverse diasporic experience. While an assimilationist perspective by early scholars emphasised the sojourning nature of early Chinese immigrants, and thus saw the experience of Chinese immigrants as unique and exceptional compared with immigrants from other countries,5 a later historical perspective highlighted the diverse experience of Chinese immigrants in different historical periods and thus de-essentialised the otherness of Chinese immigrants.6 As part of a growing interest among post-structuralist scholars of identity in the postcolonial world, the identity of the overseas Chinese has attracted great scholarly attention since the 1990s.7 Re-examining the history of Chinese emigration and the resultant overseas Chinese communities, historians were the first ones to challenge the assumption of a homogeneous Chinese identity among the overseas Chinese.8 Their researches have shown that early Chinese emigrants did not necessarily have a sense of a unitary Chinese identity.9 The assumed universal identity of huaqiao (overseas Chinese) was a product of politics inside and outside China from the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.10 This identity of huaqiao implied a Chineseness based on cultural and political allegiance to China, who recognised all overseas Chinese as Chinese citizens.11 This unitary identity based on cultural and political allegiance to China no longer held after the 1950s, when the People’s Republic of China stopped recognising most Chinese living outside China as Chinese citizens.12 Political allegiance to China was no longer an option for the overseas Chinese. No longer able to claim their full Chineseness, they

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had to redefine their identity in the postcolonial world.13 Conditioned by the geopolitical forces of the postcolonial world, different ramifications of Chineseness have been produced in different sociopolitical contexts.14 A unitary Chineseness is no longer something to be taken for granted.15 The Chinese experience in Southeast Asian countries and North America has dominated research on the identity of the overseas Chinese. While multiculturalism eased some institutional discrimination against the Chinese in the United States and other Western countries, the othering of Chineseness by the mainstream society is still experienced by the overseas Chinese in one form or another.16 In Southeast Asia, the Chinese had to renegotiate their positions in the new independent nation-states that refused to give the Chinese equal rights.17 For the Chinese living in postcolonial Southeast Asian countries, claiming Chineseness needed to overcome many institutional or non-institutional barriers.18 In spite of the differences in laws and policies, Chineseness has meant otherness and has been the basis for discriminatory laws and policies made to restrict the rights and interests of the Chinese in most Southeast Asian countries since the Second World War.19 As Allen Chun has rightly pointed out, Chineseness should not be understood just as a matter of cultural representation, but should be seen as a ‘superficial reflection of culture’s embeddedness or ongoing entanglement with more complex social institutional processes, such as modernity, colonialism, nation-formation and globalisation’.20 Thus, we should look beyond the superficial cultural expressions and probe into the social institutions behind them. Past research on the Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries did examine the role of the nation states and the nation-formation process in the configuration of Chineseness in Southeast Asian countries, but most of them took a simplistic view of the role of the nation state. According to such research, in countries where the Chinese form only a small portion of the population, the ultimate goal of the nation states is to completely eliminate their Chineseness and thus to completely assimilate the Chinese, while in countries where the Chinese form a big proportion of the population, their Chineseness is tolerated but often suppressed.21 The Vietnamese case, however, challenges this simplistic model. While the Chinese form only a very small portion of the Vietnamese population, the government takes a unique ethnic policy. Instead of attempting to eliminate the Chineseness of the Chinese, the government tries to redefine Chineseness as a distinct subculture embedded in the overarching Vietnamese national culture.

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Although there has been some recent research on the identity of the Chinese in Vietnam, most of it ignores the impact of such a policy on the dynamics of identity construction for the Chinese in Vietnam.22 With Vietnam as a major arena of postcolonial geopolitical transformation, ignoring this unique process of the construction of Chineseness will prevent us from a thorough understanding of the complexity of identity construction in the postcolonial world. The lack of attention to this aspect of diasporic Chinese experience is partially due to the relatively insufficient scholarly attention to the Chinese in Vietnam. Compared with numerous researches on the contemporary situations of the Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries, there has been limited research on the Chinese in contemporary Vietnamese society in both Western and Chinese literature. Among the little that is available, although much of it examines changes in government policy towards the Chinese,23 none of it pays much attention to the role of ethnic policy in the identity construction of the Chinese. While a chapter by Tong on the Chinese in Vietnam discusses identity construction by the Chinese in contemporary Vietnam, he does not pay attention to the role of the government and its ethnic policy in reshaping Chineseness.24 Chinese huiguan (congregation house) and their temples in Vietnam have been studied by some scholars, but no one has discussed their role in the construction and representation of Chineseness in contemporary Vietnam.25 This chapter will focus on the interactions between the government and the Chinese community around the revival of Chinese huiguan in Cholon, the eastern part of Ho Chi Minh City. As huiguan used to be the cultural and political centres in the local Chinese community, they are seen as important symbols of Chineseness by both the local Chinese and the Vietnamese government. Thus, these huiguan and their temples have become an important arena where the government and the local Chinese interact and negotiate the redefinition of Chineseness. In examining these interactions, the unique ethnic policy of Vietnam is highlighted as an important factor motivating the practices of all parties involved.

Huiguan, Temples and the Chinese in Vietnam The presence of Chinese immigrants in the area around Saigon has a long history. Like those in other parts of Southeast Asia, the Chinese grouped themselves into bang, which were associations based

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on language and regional differences. Under the French colonial administration, five bang were legally recognised as the self-governing organisations for the Chinese.26 Each bang was headed by a chief selected from its wealthiest and most powerful members.27 Every Chinese living in Vietnam was required to register with one of the bang organisations and be subject to its governance. The bang organisations provided basic social welfare for their members. They and their chiefs were held responsible for any liability that its members might incur, including taxes to be paid.28 Every bang had its office housed in a huiguan, literally meaning ‘the congregation house’. Each huiguan often had a temple attached to it, housing deities familiar to bang members and thus serving as a major venue for religious activities among the Chinese. Huiguan and the temples attached to them were often the political, cultural and religious centre for each bang.29 Under French colonial rule, the Chinese were effectively segregated from the local Vietnamese population socially, culturally and politically. This segregation was further strengthened by the economic success of the Chinese in Vietnam in the first half of the twentieth century and the rising Chinese nationalism of the time. Every bang established its own schools and hospitals. Chinese newspapers became an important part of social life in the local Chinese community.30 With such a social and cultural segregation, the Chinese highly valued their ties to China and had no intention of assimilating into the local population. After the end of French colonial rule in the 1950s, the government of the Republic of Vietnam that ruled South Vietnam intended to assimilate the Chinese.31 It forced most Chinese to adopt Vietnam citizenship, cutting off their legitimate political ties to China.32 The bang system was abolished and Chinese self-governance was put to an end. But the assimilation of the Chinese did not achieve much success.33 Huiguan temples were still important social and cultural centres of Cholon, exerting significant political influence on the community.34 More Chinese schools were opened, with Mandarin used as the language of teaching and learning.35 Many more Chinese newspapers were published.36 Cholon still remained a Chinese city segregated from the mainstream society of Vietnam. The year 1975 was a watershed for the Chinese in Cholon. Saigon fell to the Communist troops on 30 April that year. The Chinese, who dominated the economy of South Vietnam, became the target of revolution.37 The properties of wealthy Chinese businessmen were confiscated.38 Many had already fled the country, but those who stayed

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behind were arrested and sent to reform camps in remote places.39 In subsequent years, the Chinese community was hit even harder by the socialist policies designed to eliminate the private economy.40 The conflicts between China and Vietnam made it even worse for the Chinese, as they were treated almost as enemy aliens, although the Communist government of Vietnam would never allow the Chinese to claim their Chinese citizenship.41 The new government would not tolerate the existence of a Chinese cultural enclave either. Chinese schools were converted into state public schools and forced to adopt the Vietnamese curriculum and teach in Vietnamese.42 Chinese mandarin was no longer allowed to be used in teaching and learning.43 Newspapers published by the Chinese were all closed.44 Chinese cultural activities were forbidden. Chinese huiguan and their temples, symbols of the Chinese cultural enclave, became major targets of this political cleansing. Immediately after the communist occupation of Saigon, managers of Chinese huiguan were forced to hand over all assets of their huiguan and temples to the new government.45 By the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese economy had come to a dead end. With private businesses eliminated, the once prosperous economy of South Vietnam was replaced by a malfunctioning socialist economy characterised by low income and commodity scarcity.46 To solve the problem, the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to learn from China, its enemy and neighbour. A reform policy was adopted in 1986, giving private businesses a space to develop.47 The Chinese talent for business, and their extensive overseas connections, began to be seen as assets rather than threats by the government.48 A special meeting was held by the central committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1986 to reassess its policies towards the Chinese in Vietnam. A new decree was published, removing tangible restrictions on the Chinese in education and occupations, and recognising their equal rights as Vietnamese citizens;49 the Chinese would no longer be seen as second-class citizens. Unlike other Southeast Asian countries, communist Vietnam has a model of ethnic policy, borrowed from the Soviet Union, to i­ncorporate different cultural and ethnic groups within its boundaries. Key to this model is an official claim of recognising the right of each ethnic and cultural group to keep their own culture and language, although all these cultural differences are to be brought in line with the overarching communist ideology.50

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The Chinese in Vietnam are recognised as Hoa, one of the 54 ­ethnic groups, with the right to retain their own culture and language. This status symbolises the Chinese integration into Vietnamese society and also implies the denial of any political allegiance to China. Thus, the government takes the distinction between Hoa and Chinese very seriously. When we visited a Vietnamese professor studying Vietnamese-Chinese, she always corrected us when we used the word ‘Chinese’, insisting that ‘Hoa’ was the proper expression. As Chinese temples in Cholon used to be the icons of the Chinese community, constructing a Hoa culture would not work without these temples. It was in such a context that the temples were allowed to open again. Although a general guidance for this ethnic policy existed, there was no detailed plan on how to build a Hoa culture that would inherit, but differ from, the previous Chinese culture. To what extent the Hoa would be allowed to restore what they used to have has been under constant negotiation between the Hoa community and the government. The interaction between the Hoa elites and the government regarding Hoa huiguan and temples provides a good opportunity to examine the negotiation of Chineseness in the reform era under the communist rule.

Negotiating the Expression of Chineseness at Temples Although the government has made great efforts to turn the Chinese into Hoa and their culture into Hoa culture, it is not always clear where the boundary lies in terms of cultural expression and representation. As the government officially acknowledges the rights of ethnic minorities to keep their own culture, it has to allow the local Chinese (Hoa) to keep most cultural elements that were originally from China. On the other hand, it has to make sure that no cultural practices will cultivate among the Hoa a loyalty to China and thus jeopardise the integrity of the Vietnamese nation and its national culture. From the Hoa’s perspective, they want to restore their own culture as much as possible, but at the same time they are aware that they cannot go too far, as they are not willing to be seen as disloyal to Vietnam again. Government policies change through time and vary with changes in leadership. No one really knows exactly where the line should be put. Thus, what we see today in Cholon is a product of continuous negotiation, explicitly or inexplicitly, between the Hoa and the Vietnamese government. As symbols of the Hoa community, temples are venues where such negotiations happen the most.

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Turning Chinese Temples into Hoa Temples Chinese temples were allowed to reopen for religious and cultural activities from the late 1980s.51 Tianhou Temple of Suicheng huiguan was the first one to open. Instead of forming a board to manage the temple, which had been the practice before 1975, the temple continued to be managed by Tang Ming, a communist revolutionary veteran of Chinese ancestry who was appointed by the government to take care of the temple after 1975. Tang Ming played a key role in reviving the cultural and religious activities at the temple in subsequent years. According to the website of Suicheng huiguan, which manages the temple, one of the most important contributions he made was to make the temple financially healthy. When he first took the job, he had nothing, as all the assets of the temple had been taken away by the government, who did not have any intention of giving them back. Under Tang Ming’s management, the temple followed the government’s directions closely in meeting the religious and cultural needs of the Chinese community. Other temples were managed in a similar manner in the first few years after their reopening. Trusting the temple to one manager selected by the government was just a temporary solution, the legitimacy of which was not without its problem. Based on the official ethnic policy, Hoa temples, as symbols of Hoa culture, needed to be managed by a board elected by the Hoa. But a decade of hostility between the government and the Chinese community made it difficult for the government to find people who could be trusted and had influence among the Chinese. An election organised in a hurry would risk putting on the board people the government could not trust. One of Tang Ming’s tasks was to help the government to make connections with the Chinese community and find suitable candidates. After several years of work, the government thought everything was ready. An election was held in 1994 to form a managing board for Tianhou Temple. Candidates were pre-screened by government officials, with the help of Tang Ming. A revolutionary veteran, Li Wenjing, was elected Chair of the board. With Li as Chair, the temple was in safe hands, at least from the government’s perspective. In the following years, most of the Chinese temples also formed their own boards through elections under close government supervision. As in the past, the managing boards and their offices were called huiguan and they again became active organisations in the Chinese community, just

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as it was before 1975. But this time the communist government had a much tighter control over huiguan than the former South Vietnam government, which had allowed Chinese huiguan to enjoy almost complete freedom in managing their own affairs. Since then, several terms of boards have been elected for these huiguan. All the elections were closely supervised by the government, with candidates pre-screened. In this way, the government has ensured that the temples and huiguan are controlled and Chinese temples have successfully been turned into Hoa temples, at least politically. Recognising Chinese temples as cultural heritage sites was a strategy to culturally turn Chinese temples into Hoa temples. Tianhou Temple of Suicheng huiguan and Guangong Temple of Yian huiguan were recognised as sites of national cultural heritage in 1993. In subsequent years, most important Chinese temples received this title. In 2016, I came across a ceremony of acceptance of the certificate of cultural heritage site by Sanshan huiguan for its temple. Important local government officials were present at the ceremony. The Chair of the managing board, representing all board members present, received the certificate from a government official with great respect. From then on, the temple of Sanshan huiguan would be a cultural heritage site and thus subject to rules and regulations the government has made concerning cultural heritage conservation. It was the last of the major Hoa temples to be recognised as a cultural heritage site. Every temple with that status displays its certificate in a conspicuous place. Pictures of the receipt of the certificate from government officials are often included in the chronicles published by these temples. It appears as if the people of the temples see this as a very important honour. But interviews with people gave us another side of the story. Most of these temples had conducted major maintenance projects during the two decades after they were recognised as cultural heritage sites. I assumed that these projects had been funded by the government, but when I asked managers how much the government contributed, one manager said the amount of government funding was so small that his temple did not even take the trouble to claim it, since accepting funds from the government would give the government more control over how the project was conducted. This explains why one huiguan once resisted the government’s attempt to designate its temple as a cultural heritage site. But eventually, the government succeeded in having it accept such a designation.

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Recognising Chinese temples as cultural heritage sites gives the government more legitimacy in controlling these temples. When the government decided to let the temples reopen, the status of the temples was in question. Did they belong to the Chinese community or to the government? If the former, then the government would not have much legitimacy in interfering in the affairs of the temples, so long as they did not break the law. If the latter was true, then it would violate its own ethnic policy of allowing the Hoa to retain their own culture. Designating them as cultural heritage sites solved this dilemma. As cultural heritage conservation is a practice promoted by UNESCO that has become an accepted value worldwide, it has legitimised government involvement in supervising the management and operation of the Chinese temples. As cultural heritage sites, these properties could be owned by the Chinese community, but the government had the legal right to oversee their operation to make sure that they were used in a way that did not jeopardise their cultural value. In this way, no one could challenge the government’s right to supervise the management of these communities. In other words, these properties are no longer properties belonging solely to the Chinese community, but also properties belonging to the whole Vietnamese nation, of which the Hoa form a part. Recognising these temples as national cultural heritage sites has also been a strategic move towards integrating the Chinese and their culture into the mainstream Vietnamese society and preventing the Chinese community from returning to its previous cultural self-segregation. As national cultural heritage sites, these Chinese temples are no longer seen as symbols of a foreign culture in the land of Vietnam. They are instead seen as cultural symbols of the Hoa, one of the 54 ethnic groups composing the Vietnamese nation. They are no longer properties important only to the local Chinese, but have also become properties of cultural and historical significance to the whole Vietnamese nation. In this way, Chinese temples have been culturally redefined as Hoa temples and have become part of the national culture of Vietnam. The local Chinese culture, which used to be seen as part of the colonial legacy and a symbol of continued foreign influence, has been redefined as part of the Vietnamese national culture. A Chineseness redefined as part of Vietnameseness is exactly what the government desired with its ethnic policy. Thus, temples as cultural heritage sites set a common ground for the Hoa and the government to negotiate how Hoa culture should be expressed and represented at these temples.

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Huiguan as Nexuses of Economic Wealth, Culture and Political Power With growing economic prosperity, a new generation of successful businessmen has arisen in the Hoa community in the last three decades. These people are neither politically close to the CPV, nor are they descendants of previous Chinese elites. Many of them have arisen from very humble backgrounds. These people are willing to use their newly acquired wealth to build their social influence. But using their wealth for political achievement is not easy, as Vietnam is still ruled by the CVP, which, in spite of its deviation from the communist orthodoxy in its economic policy, is still reluctant to give political power to the wealthy, especially the wealthy among the Hoa. None of the newly rich tycoons have been admitted to the CVP or put in a position of political power. At the same time, it is not easy for the Hoa elites to form their own social organisations. As in any Communist state, power is firmly controlled by the Communist Party in Vietnam. No civil society exists outside its totalitarian political system. Forming any new social organisation without consent from the government would be seen as suspicious. The Chinese were in an even worse position in this respect. Although they were treated much better than before, many Chinese interviewed still felt the lack of trust from the government. Joining huiguan presents no such problems, as huiguan are organisations officially recognised by the government, and contributions to huiguan are welcome by the government. Practical needs of the temples also make these newly rich Chinese elites very welcome by huiguan. After more than a decade of neglect, none of their temples were in very good shape when reopened. As cultural heritage sites, these temples needed to be repaired to meet the standards required for cultural heritage conservation purposes. As the government was neither able nor willing to undertake the financial burden, every huiguan needed to find the money themselves to repair their temples. The newly rich elites became indispensable resources, and putting these wealthy elites on the boards of these temples became a common practice. The more elites a temple could attract, the better the chances they would have of receiving big donations. Thus, huiguan provided a rare niche where these Hoa elites could exchange their wealth for social recognition. From the perspective of the government, these new Chinese elites were not absolutely loyal to the CVP, but they would not challenge its

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authority either. There was no reason to keep them from joining huiguan under its control when huiguan needed money to repair their temples, money which the government did not want to contribute. Allowing them to join huiguan would actually help the government to bring these new elites under control. Today, most important wealthy elites sit on the boards of huiguan. Some even sit on the boards of more than one huiguan. Joining huiguan also provides the Chinese elites with access to ­people in power. Kept out of political power, the new Chinese elites have very few pre-existing connections with people in power. In a country like Vietnam where resources are controlled by the government, access to people with political power is important for their continued economic success. Huiguan as government-sanctioned organisations provide a platform for the Chinese elites to build networks with government officials. This is also one of the reasons why these Chinese elites are willing to donate to temples and join huiguan. Take Yian huiguan as an example. This is a huiguan of Teochiu (people whose ancestral hometown is Chaozhou in Guangdong Province of China). Teochiu people are known for their recent economic success in Vietnam. This huiguan boasts of some of the wealthiest people in Vietnam. Shen Pi, who arose from a very humble background and became the chair and CEO of one of the top banks in Vietnam, served as chair of the huigan’s managing board before he was convicted of corruption in his banking business by the government. Zhang Meilan, who has become one of the richest women in Vietnam, has served as the honourable chair of its managing board for many years. Every Lantern Day on the fifteenth day of the Lunar New Year, a lantern auction event is held at the temple. In 2016, I observed one such event. The biggest payment for a lantern was USD 20,000. This single event helped the temple to raise a large sum. Although not every huiguan boasts of such tycoons, donations from wealthy board members are important sources of revenues for most huiguan. Erfu huiguan, for example, also had a lantern auction event every year until a couple of years ago, when the suspicious ways money was handled by the leaders alienated big donors. Hainan huiguan, whose temple does not have a lot of visitors, also lists many big donors, many of whom are members of its managing board or advisory board. In this way, huiguan and their temples became a platform where cultural tradition, economic wealth and political power meet. As is shown

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below, it is the interactions of these three forces that generates an expression of Chineseness that inherits most of the traditions but also tailors them to the contemporary social and political conditions in Vietnam. Reshaping Cultural Practices With the government keeping a close watch, temple management is supposed to follow government guidelines and help the government to build a Hoa culture. Huiguan are no longer free to decide which cultural practices should be restored and which should be dropped. They need to take into consideration government rules and regulations as well as the opinions of officials in charge. A fine line needs to be maintained between restoring traditional practices and following government guidelines. This fine line is shaped by day-to-day bargaining and negotiation and thus is continuously changing and moving, producing a cohort of cultural features that are accepted or at least tolerated by the parties involved. The Chinese New Year Parade has been a good example of such interactions. The parade used to be one of the most important events in Cholon. Incorporating many cultural elements from China, this event used to symbolically confirm cultural ties between the local Chinese and China. It was forbidden after 1975 by the Communist regime, which discouraged any tie to China when tensions between the two countries were high. In the early 1990s, the government decided to allow the Chinese to revive this ceremony as a gesture to reaffirm its new policy towards the Chinese. As in the past, Chinese temples played an important role in organising this event. But different from the past, they did not have a free hand this time. The Cultural Centre of District Five, a government institution, also undertook the organising work. Although the Chinese may have wanted to bring back everything they used to have, restrictions by the government prevented them from doing so. Some important elements of the ceremony had to be left out, no matter how important they were seen to be by the Chinese. Before 1975, the focus of the parade was the deities. Major deities were brought out from these temples and carried in sedan chairs, receiving worship from people along the way. There was always a Tongji, a man in a trance, following each important deity, showing the power of the deities by doing all sorts of terrifying but impressive tricks, including burning himself with fire, swallowing swords and cutting his face.

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All activities, including the lion dance, Chinese music and Chinese operas, were performed to entertain the deities. In other words, the New Year Parade had been both cultural and spiritual in the past. But the government did not like the spiritual aspect of the parade, so the event had to be reoriented to highlight its cultural aspect. Parading deities were dropped out of the programme, and cultural performances, such as music and dance, were foregrounded. But there was also something new. A gala night at the Cultural Centre of District Five was added. Held at the government-owned venue, this gala night symbolised the ultimate control of the parade by the government. Everyday practices in the temples are no longer the same as before either. The government has rules and regulations over the practices at religious venues, which apply to every temple in Vietnam. Hoa temples, under close watch by the government, are also supposed to honour these rules and regulations. Notices reaffirming government rules and regulations are conspicuously posted on the gates of the temples during holidays, when religious activities are intensive, telling temple-goers which practices are allowed and which are not. This does not mean that every temple follows government rules to the letter. For example, divination and spiritual medium services used to be important practices in Chinese temples, but they have been deemed superstitious practices and thus forbidden. Based on my observation, only Tianhou Temple of Suicheng huiguan has really followed these rules and regulations very closely, not allowing any of these forbidden activities in the temple. This is also what Suicheng huiguan proudly claims on their website. But most other temples deviated from the official requirements to a certain extent. For example, Yian huiguan allows divination in its Guangong Temple, and Wenling huiguan allows spirit mediums to serve in its Guanyin Temple during the New Year. Sanshan huiguan allows spirit mediums to provide their services there all year round. All these happen while government instructions forbidding these activities are conspicuously posted on their gates. It is hard to believe that government officials are not aware of what is happening in these temples. The more convincing explanation is that they intentionally turn a blind eye to these breaches of rules. Not every temple has super-rich people sitting on their boards and small donations from temple-goers are still important sources of revenues for these temples. Funding is needed for everyday operation, holiday ceremonies, sponsoring cultural activities, donations to government-sponsored charity

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programmes and temple repair and maintenance. These ‘superstitious’ practices are very good for attracting temple-goers and thus can help the temples to increase their revenues. As the government does not provide funding, it would not be practical to cut off the sources of revenues of these temples. Thus, although the government is against these practices ideologically, it has to give in to practical needs. The result is an unspoken compromise between the government and huiguan that manage these temples. Such aspects of Chinese culture can still be retained, even though the government is officially against them. These examples show that the cultural activities we see today are the consequence of the negotiations and compromises between the Hoa and the government. The level of Chineseness conveyed by these activities might not completely meet the desires and expectations of either the Hoa or the government, but it is something that both sides can accept or tolerate. What the Temples Should Look Like In traditional times, when a major repair was needed, the management often invited craftsmen from China, as they thought local Vietnamese craftsmen did not really know how to construct such temples. When major repairs were conducted in the 1990s, none of these temples invited craftsmen from China. They just used Vietnamese craftsmen. For example, Suicheng huiguan found craftsmen from the northern part of Vietnam where there were more old temples, and thus the craftsmen there were more experienced. But when the Guangong temple of Yian huiguan was completely rebuilt a couple of years ago, the project was contracted to a Chinese company. Most new materials were also imported from China. It cost three million US dollars in total, with Zhang Meilan alone contributing half of that sum. What was interesting was not the large amount of money spent, but the fact that they deliberately emphasised their cultural ties to China. When we interviewed managers as to why they purchased almost all materials from China and contracted it to a Chinese corporation, we were told that this was the best way to restore the temple to its original state, since Vietnam did not produce the same kind of materials needed, and no corporation knew how to do the job properly. This would have been impossible without the financial resources they had. It would also not have happened if the government had not given its

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consent. Considering the unspoken hostility of the government and the general public of Vietnam towards China, this was a very unusual practice. Without some compromise and consensus between the government officials and the huiguan, such an emphasis on the ties to China would have surely brought trouble to the management of the temple. Of course, there has been no way for us to find the details of the negotiation process. The status of the temple as a cultural heritage site may have played an important role in enabling the huiguan to do that without much fear of incurring negative reactions from the government and the general public towards this conspicuous highlight of Chineseness. As this temple was originally a copy of temples in Chaozhou, China, conserving cultural heritage may have been a reason that government officials found it difficult to object to. The economic power of the huiguan and its members must also have been a consideration when government officials made their decisions. As long as it did not explicitly pose a challenge to government policies, government officials in charge may have been reluctant to reject such requests. From this case it would appear that when the situation allows, the Hoa always try their best to enhance their Chineseness, at least in its cultural sense. But how far they would be willing to go varies from huiguan to huiguan, and how far they could go varies from context to context and from time to time. Language and Education Chinese schools in Cholon had formed one of the three important pillars of the local Chinese culture before 1975. Many schools were established and sponsored by huiguan. These schools, financially independent of the South Vietnam government, were able to adopt textbooks from Taiwan and teach their students in Mandarin, providing generations of children with a Chinese education, and cultivating among them a strong identification with Chinese culture. When the temples were allowed to reopen, the schools that had been taken away from the temples were not returned to the Chinese community. These schools are still located adjacent to the Hoa temples, but they have been turned into state schools, adopting the same curriculum as all other schools in Vietnam. Mandarin is no longer the language used in teaching and learning.

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According to official policy, the government respects the rights of the Hoa to retain their own culture and language. But this only means allowing after-school Chinese programmes to operate at these schools. Such programmes are not a formal part of the school curriculum and thus receive no funding from the government. As these programmes symbolise the official ethnic policy of allowing ethnic minorities to retain their language, the government allows huiguan to financially support these programmes, but will never allow them to open new schools adopting a full Chinese curriculum. Thus, what the government means by allowing the Hoa to retain their own language and culture is dramatically different from the previous practice in Chinese education in Cholon. Chinese language education has been reduced to an unimportant status in all these schools. Consequently, few children have received enough education in Chinese and Chinese culture. Those attending after-school Chinese programmes stop learning Chinese at high school, when they are fully occupied by their school coursework. Few of them can speak fluent Mandarin, and still fewer can read and write in Chinese. The Chineseness represented by proficiency in Mandarin and attachment to Chinese culture that was cultivated before 1975 by Chinese schools is lost in younger generations. They will become Hoa, whose Chineseness is only reflected in their ability to speak Cantonese, the lingua franca among the Chinese in Cholon. Charity Beyond the Chinese Community One of the most important social functions of huiguan was to provide charity services to the community associated with them. In their prime, before 1975, they often provided temporary accommodation for newcomers, financial relief for the poor and scholarships for outstanding students of Chinese descent. Their hospitals provided free medical treatment for the poor, with the costs covered by contributions from the huiguan. Huiguan also had their own cemeteries that provided a final resting place for the poor. With the wealth gradually accumulated after the temples were reopened, huiguan began to resume some of their charity services. Providing financial relief for the poor, giving financial aid to students from low-income families and awarding scholarships to outstanding students have become regular charity programmes for most of the huiguan. Pictures of such charity activities are often included in the chronicles that

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huiguan publish. In 2015, I attended a scholarship awarding ceremony jointly held by four huiguan of Fujian people. They gave handsome scholarships to outstanding students of Fujian ancestry at all levels of schooling. Other huiguan also have their own annual scholarship awarding ceremonies. Hospitals no longer belong to huiguan. Like schools, most of them were taken over by the government in 1975 and became public hospitals. But some huiguan still cherish the traditional relationship with these hospitals and make regular donations. They also donate to Chinese medicine clinics to enable them to serve the local people with alternative medicine that is not funded by the government. What makes contemporary charity activities different from those in the past is that these charity activities are no longer confined within the Chinese community. Most huiguan actively participate in ­government-sponsored charity programmes. Disaster relief programmes, funding bridge construction in rural areas, building houses for rural poor people and providing financial aid to families of revolutionary veterans are the most common charity programmes to which huiguan contribute. The government greatly appreciates their contributions. Many huiguan have received medals for their contributions to these charity programmes. Certificates for the medals, as well as big pictures of the receipt of these medals from government officials, are often conspicuously displayed in the offices of huiguan. These examples show that managers of huiguan are making efforts to show the government and the general public that they are part of the broader Vietnamese society and are willing to fulfil their obligations towards society. In this way, a certain degree of trust has been built with government officials, who may allow them to sponsor Chinese cultural activities and retain a certain level of Chineseness. In this sense, these huiguan and temples are no longer Chinese huiguan and temples. They are huiguan and temples of the Hoa, who identify with Vietnam instead of China, at least in appearance. This is exactly what the government endorses with its ethnic policy.

Conclusion The Chinese in contemporary Vietnam provide a unique case to examine the diverse experience of reshaping Chineseness in the postcolonial world. In all postcolonial Southeast Asian countries, the ­nation-building

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process has been an important factor in how Chineseness is shaped and represented among the Chinese living within their boundaries. The nationalism of the mainstream society, as the ideological foundation of this postcolonial nation-building process, often constrains how Chineseness can be expressed by the Chinese community. The tension between local nationalism and Chinese identity is the background against which Chineseness is reconstructed and reshaped. What has made contemporary Vietnam unique is its ethnic policy based on a Marxist ideology, which recognises the rights of ethnic groups to their own culture and language. Under this policy, the boundaries of ethnic groups are not to be eliminated, but are legally recognised and thus consolidated through a bureaucratic process of classification, with each citizen assigned an exclusive ethnic label. Thus, Chineseness is not something that only the Chinese cherish, but is also something that the government needs to foster in order to incorporate the Chinese as Hoa, one of the 54 officially recognised ethnic groups. However, the Chineseness that each party wants to produce might not be the same. Neither party may have a clear idea of what is the ideal version of Chineseness that they want. The Chineseness we see today is the product of constant negotiation between the Chinese community and the Vietnamese government. It is never static, but is constantly shaped and reshaped through time and across contexts. Huiguan and temples, as traditional social, cultural and political centres within the Chinese community, are still important platforms whereby the expression of Chineseness is shaped and reshaped through negotiation between the Chinese and the government. While the Chinese have tried their best to restore what was there before 1975, they have had to accept the limits of what they can do. By the same token, the government has also had to tolerate some practices, which they do not necessarily like, in order to uphold their official policy of recognising the Hoa as a distinct ethnic group.

Notes

1. This number is a conservative estimation based on the numbers provided in Stern “The Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, 1920–75: Demography, Social Structure, and Economic Power,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 12, no. 2 (1985): 1–30; Ramses Amer, Ethnic Minorities, Government Policies, and Foreign Relations: The Ethnic Chinese in

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Vietnam and Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, Asia Paper Series (Singapore: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2014). Most Chinese were forced to adopt Vietnamese citizenship in the 1960s and only those who refused were classified as Chinese in the subsequent census conducted by the Republic of Vietnam. Thus, there are no official statistics for the population of Chinese descent between the 1960s and 1975. 2. Allen Chun, Forget Chineseness: On the Geopolitics of Cultural Identification (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017); Prasenjit Duara, “Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911,” in Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, eds. Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), 39–60; Gungwu Wang, “The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia,” in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, eds. Jennifer W. Cushman and Gungwu Wang (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), 1–21; Gungwu Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic, 1991). 3. Dudley L. Poston and Juyin Helen Wong, “The Chinese Diaspora: The Current Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population,” Chinese Journal of Sociology 2, no. 3 (1 July 2016): 362. 4. Mette Thunø, ed., Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007); Zhifang Song, “Global Chinese Diaspora,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, ed. Steven Ratuva (Singapore: Springer, 2019), 1167–1183. 5. Philip Q. Yang, “Sojourners or Settlers: Post-1965 Chinese Immigrants,” Journal of Asian American Studies 2, no. 1 (February 1999): 61–91. 6. Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas. 7. Wang, “The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia”; Chun, Forget Chineseness. 8. Chun, Forget Chineseness; Duara, “Nationalists Among Transnationals”; Wang, “The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia”; Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas. 9. Duara, “Nationalists Among Transnationals,” 41. 10.  Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 239–282; Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas, 6–8; Ching-Hwang Yen, The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2008), 344–353. 11. Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas. 12. Leo Suryadinata, Understanding the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 95–98.

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13. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others; Wei Li, Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009); Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” in Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, ed. Leo Suryadinata (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 1–24; Chee Kiong Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011); Yen, The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond; Min Zhou, Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009); Manying Ip and David Pang, “New Zealand Chinese Identity: Sojourners, Model Minority and Multiple Identities,” in New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations, eds. James H. Liu et al. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 174–90; Rosalin S. Chow and Joe R. Feagin, Myth of the Model Minority: Asian Americans Facing Racism, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016); Song, “Global Chinese Diaspora.” 14. Chun, Forget Chineseness. 15. Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas; Chun, Forget Chineseness. 16. Chow and Feagin, Myth of the Model Minority; Xiaojian Zhao, The New Chinese America: Class, Economy, and Social Hierarchy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010); Zhou, Contemporary Chinese America. 17. Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia”; Suryadinata, Understanding the Ethnic Chinese. 18. Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia,” 11–13. 19.  Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia”; Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations Asia. 20. Chun, Forget Chineseness. 21. Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.” 22.  Yuk Wah Chan, “‘Vietnam Is My Country Land, China Is My Hometown’: Chinese Communities in Transition in the South of Vietnam,” Asian Ethnicity 19, no. 2 (3 April 2018): 163–179. 23. Amer, Ethnic Minorities, Government Policies, 32–34; Yande Chen, “Cong paichi dao jiena: yuenan huaren zhengce de zhuanbian” [From Exclusion to Integration: Changes in Vietnamese Policies Towards the Chinese in Vietnam], World Nationalities, no. 6 (2008): 41–53; Chung-ting Huang, “Zhan hou yuenan de huaren zhengce” [Policies Towards the Ethnic Chinese in Post-War Vietnam] (Masters thesis, National Chengchi University, 2006); Weihua Zhao, “Gexin kaifang yilai yuenan huaren zhengce de tiaozheng yu shijian” [Adjustment and Implementation of Policies Towards Ethnic Chinese Since the Renovation and Opening-Up], Journal of Wuhan University of Science & Technology 13, no. 4 (2011): 429–433.

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24. Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations. 25. Tracy C. Barrett, The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia: The Overseas Chinese in Indo-China (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012); Satohiro Serizawa, “Chinese Charity Organizations in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam: The Past and Present,” in Voluntary Organizations in the Chinese Diaspora, eds. Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Evelyn Hu-DeHart (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 99–119. 26. Barrett, Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia, 11–27. 27. Barrett. 28. Barrett. 29. Barrett. 30.  Barrett, 125–131; Baiyin Li, Yuenan huaqiao yu huaren [The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam] (Nanning: Guangxi Normal University Press, 1990), 36; Yiling Chen, ed., Yuenan huaqiao zhi [Chronicle of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam] (Taipei: Huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1958), 95–101. 31.  Chung-ting Huang, “Yuenan gonghe guo zhi huaren zhengce 1955– 1964” [The Policies Toward Ethnic Chinese of Republic of Vietnam Between 1955 and 1964], Bulletin of Academia Historica 11 (2007): 189–249. 32. Huang, “Yuenan gonghe guo zhi huaren zhengce 1955–1964”; Wenhe Zhang, Yuenan huaqiao shihua [History of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam] (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1975), 78–80. 33.  LiAnne Sandra Yu, “The Reemergence of Vietnam’s Ethnic Chinese Community Through Local, National, and Transnational Structures” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2006) 77–78; Chen, “Cong paichi dao jiena: yuenan huaren zhengce de zhuanbian,” 44. 34. Huang, “Yuenan gonghe guo zhi huaren zhengce 1955–1964,” 223–240. 35. Huang, 207–223. 36. Shanfu Xu and Minghua Lin, Yuenan huaqiao shi (History of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam) (Guangzhouo: Guangdong Higher Education Press, 2011), 310; Yu, “The Reemergence,” 127. 37. Ramses Amer, “Vietnam’s Policies and the Ethnic Chinese Since 1975,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 11, no. 1 (1996): 76–104; Baiyin Li and Fangming Luo, “Yuenan ge ge shiqi de huaqiao zhengce (Policies towards the Ethnic Chinese in Different Historical Periods in Vietnam),” Dong Nan Ya Zong Heng, no. 4 (1989): 14–16; Lewis M. Stern, “Vietnamese Communist Policy toward the Overseas Chinese, 1920–82” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburg, 1984). 38. Li, Yuenan huaqiao yu huaren, 199–204.

384  Z. SONG 39.  Lewis M. Stern, “The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979–82,” Asian Survey 25, no. 5 (1985): 521–536. 40. Amer, “Vietnam’s Policies.” 41. Amer, 81–82. 42. Li, Yuenan huaqiao yu huaren, 209–210. 43. Li, 43–47. 44. Li, 209. 45. Huang, “Zhan hou yuenan de huaren zhengce,” 141. 46. Stern, “The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” 523– 24; Amer, “Vietnam’s Policies,” 88–89. 47. Chen, “Cong paichi dao jiena: yuenan huaren zhengce de zhuanbian,” 47–49. 48. Chen, 51. 49. Chen, 49; Amer, Ethnic Minorities, Government Policies, 32. 50.  See Article 5, Chapter 1 of the Constitution of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2013. Its English translation can be found at http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/tranlation_of_vietnams_new_constitution_enuk_2.pdf. 51. Chan, “Vietnam Is My Country Land.”

Bibliography Amer, Ramses. Ethnic Minorities, Government Policies, and Foreign Relations: The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Asia Paper Series. Singapore: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2014. Amer, Ramses. “Vietnam’s Policies and the Ethnic Chinese Since 1975.” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 11, no. 1 (1996): 76–104. Barrett, Tracy C. The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia: The Overseas Chinese in Indo-China. London: I. B. Tauris, 2012. Chan, Yuk Wah. “‘Vietnam Is My Country Land, China Is My Hometown’: Chinese Communities in Transition in the South of Vietnam.” Asian Ethnicity 19, no. 2 (April 2018): 163–179. Chen, Yande. “Cong paichi dao jiena: yuenan huaren zhengce de zhuanbian” [From Exclusion to Integration: Changes in Vietnamese Policies Towards the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam]. World Nationalities, no. 6 (2008): 41–53. Chen, Yiling, ed. Yuenan huaqiao zhi [Chronicle of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam]. Taipei: Huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1958. Chow, Rosalin S., and Joe R. Feagin. Myth of the Model Minority: Asian Americans Facing Racism. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2016. Chun, Allen. Forget Chineseness: On the Geopolitics of Cultural Identification. Albany: SUNY Press, 2017.

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Duara, Prasenjit. “Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911.” In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini, 39–60. New York: Routledge, 1997. Huang, Chung-ting, “Yuenan gonghe guo zhi huaren zhengce 1955–1964” [The Policies Toward Ethnic Chinese of Republic of Vietnam Between 1955 and 1964]. Bulletin of Academia Historica 11 (2007): 189–249. Huang, Chung-ting. “Zhan hou yuenan de huaren zhengce” [Policies Towards the Ethnic Chinese in Post-War Vietnam]. Master’s thesis, National Chengchi University, 2006. Ip, Manying, and David Pang. “New Zealand Chinese Identity: Sojourners, Model Minority and Multiple Identities”. In New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations, edited by James H. Liu, Tim McCreanor, Tracey McIntosh, and Teresia Teaiwa, 174–90. Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005. Kuhn, Philip A. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Li, Baiyin, and Fangming Luo. “Yuenan ge ge shiqi de huaqiao zhengce” [Policies towards the Ethnic Chinese in Different Historical Periods in Vietnam]. Dong Nan Ya Zong Heng, no. 4 (1989): 12–17. Li, Baiyin. Yuenan huaqiao yu huaren [The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam]. Nanning: Guangxi Normal University Press, 1990. Li, Wei. Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. Poston, Dudley L., and Juyin Helen Wong. “The Chinese Diaspora: The Current Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population.” Chinese Journal of Sociology 2, no. 3 (July 2016): 348–373. Serizawa, Satohiro. “Chinese Charity Organizations in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam: The Past and Present.” In Voluntary Organizations in the Chinese Diaspora, edited by Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Evelyn Hu-DeHart, 99–119. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006. Song, Zhifang. “Global Chinese Diaspora.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, edited by Steven Ratuva, 1167–1183. Singapore: Springer, 2019. Stern, Lewis M. “The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979–82.” Asian Survey 25, no. 5 (1985): 521–536. Stern, Lewis M. “The Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, 1920–75: Demography, Social Structure, and Economic Power.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 12, no. 2 (1985): 1–30. Stern, Lewis M. “Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward the Overseas Chinese, 1920–82.” PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1984.

386  Z. SONG Suryadinata, Leo. “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” In Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, edited by Leo Suryadinata, 1–24. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997. Suryadinata, Leo. Understanding the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007. Thunø, Mette, ed. Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007. Tong, Chee Kiong. Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. Wang, Gungwu. “The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia.” In Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War II, edited by Jennifer W. Cushman and Wang Gungwu, 1–21. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988. Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic, 1991. Xu, Shanfu, and Minghua Lin. Yuenan huaqiao shi [History of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam]. Guangzhouo: Guangdong Higher Education Press, 2011. Yang, Philip Q. “Sojourners or Settlers: Post-1965 Chinese Immigrants.” Journal of Asian American Studies 2, no. 1 (February 1999): 61–91. Yen, Ching-Hwang. The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2008. Yu, LiAnne Sandra. “The Re-emergence of Vietnam’s Ethnic Chinese Community Through Local, National, and Transnational Structures.” PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2006. Zhang, Wenhe. Yuenan huaqiao shihua [History of the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam]. Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1975. Zhao, Weihua. “Gexin kaifang yilai yuenan huaren zhengce de tiaozheng yu shijian” [Adjustment and Implementation of Policies Towards Ethnic Chinese Since the Renovation and Opening-Up]. Journal of Wuhan University of Science & Technology 13, no. 4 (2011): 429–433. Zhao, Xiaojian. The New Chinese America: Class, Economy, and Social Hierarchy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Zhou, Min. Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009.

CHAPTER 16

National Identity, Religious Identity and Their Impacts on Subjective ­Well-Being—A Case Study on Chinese Catholics in Ireland Yinya Liu Review of National Identity and Religious Identity When we try to explore the question of national identity, we encounter multiple characteristics of that identity and different roles of identity—for example, in relation to gender, territory, class and religion. All of these aspects reveal how individuals live in a specific nation with their unique identities. This chapter chooses national identity and religious identity as observation objects in order to analyse the living situation and its corresponding perception of subjective well-being among overseas Chinese, specifically Chinese Catholics, who live in Ireland. The reason for this choice is because it both invites and requires an intriguing and intricate reflection on the relationships between overseas Chinese’s Chinese identity, Irish identity and their religious identity, and how these entangled identities affect people’s feeling of happiness.

Y. Liu (*)  Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_16

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National identity, in its simplest form, can be defined as the state of belonging to a specific nation, which has its own distinctive history, tradition, value, culture and language.1 This term indicates the positions of both individual self and collective selves against an economic, social and political background. It is thus concerned with not only how we identify the differences between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’, or the ‘we’ and the ‘they’, but also with how these differences include the awareness of commonalities and the sense of belonging to a specific nation.2 National identity, then, should be distinguished from the concept of ‘social identity’ elaborated by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner. Social identity emphasises one’s sense of whom is in a specific social group or in different groups at the same time. The development of national identity, however, is closely and directly related to the formation of one’s social identity.3 It is important to know their relationships and distinctions, especially when trying to evaluate how the psychological impacts of these identities function on the subjects, who may have multiple-identities. Before children gain a clear sense and understanding of their own national identities, they have already developed their social identities in various social groups.4 In their middle childhood, children may show strong interests and feelings around the knowledge of their own national groups, which will remain throughout the later adolescent period.5 Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) can precisely clarify the psychological consequences of individuals’ feeling and understanding by means of the stereotyping of in-groups and out-groups: that is to say, how people psychologically identify themselves as members of a group or groups.6 Nevertheless, the formulation of self-concept, and its internalisation to a specific social group, will entail very different and variable factors in the case of the overseas Chinese, who will have to experience multiple-identities in different social groups emerging from the background of the within-category and the between-category.7 These social categorisations also provide some auxiliary indicators on how people explain their physical and mental living situation. Based on these social categories, which are related to race, nationality, religion, career, and so on, people will identify themselves with specific social groups by relevant confirmation and action. After the second stage, that of social identification, people will compare themselves as an in-group with the others as out-groups. In the final stage of social comparison, people not only compete to gain self-esteem but to make their identity prominent.8 Therefore, social identity provides an

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important and solid foundation for developing national identity, both at the individual level and the collective level. Compared to social identity, which reveals individual’s, as well as collectives’, psychological position within one or many groups in a society, national identity focuses more on the social and political perspective on both the individual’s private life and public life. Even though national identity can be taken as ‘natural’, it also can be ‘constructed’ by the situation of mobility and immigration. In this chapter, overseas Chinese will be defined in a wider sense. For this chapter, the term includes the first-generation immigrants, as well as the later generations who live in Ireland. For overseas Chinese who live and work in Ireland, they may not have ‘dual’ nationality but they must be aware that there are at least two national identities which exist in their daily life: as Irish or as Chinese. Or, it can be more complicated, such as Irish-born Chinese, or mixed race brought about by mixed marriages. In this context, attention to the multi-dimensional features of national identity has been raised in both daily life experience and in research, and is of importance not only for government policymaking but also essential for establishing individual positive subjective well-being when living in this inter-group context. Religious identity plays an important role in the history of Ireland as well as in Irish people’s daily lives. It is commonly believed that Christianity was introduced to Ireland in the fifth-century AD as Gaelic Christianity by Saint Patrick. As it developed in the twelfth century, the diocesan structure was proposed for Ireland and a series of reforms were made during that time, at the same time as the Norman invasion of Ireland.9 The Catholic Church in Ireland was outlawed after the Tudor conquest of Ireland, which took place between 1529 and 1603. As a consequence of this, the English crown sought to impose laws, language and culture, as well as religion on Ireland. This, in effect, was an extension of the English Protestant Reformation, a movement that had broken with the authority of the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church.10 Since the sixteenth century, Irish national identity has been divided into Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant. Until the twentieth century, the Irish Catholic majority were repressed, although some efforts had been made to restore their traditions and identity. However, following the Easter Rising of 1916, the Irish Free State was established in 1922. It declared itself as a republic in 1949, and the Catholic Church achieved significant domination during this period. However, over recent decades, with the process of modernisation as well as the mobility of immigration, the

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influence of the Church has gradually declined. According to the 2016 Census of Population, ‘Roman Catholics accounted for 78.3 per cent of the de facto population, compared with 84.2 per cent in 2011’.11 It is the lowest level recorded in history; from 1881 to 1911, the average percentage of Roman Catholics in Ireland was around 89.5%, but it has slowly declined since 1961, when it reached its peak at 94.9%. Today, the three fastest growing religious groups are Christian Orthodox, Apostolic or Pentecostal, and Atheist. In 2016, nearly 10% of the population in Ireland identified themselves as having ‘No Religion’, making them the second-largest religious group in the country.12

History of Chinese Immigration to Ireland and the Current Situation of Chinese Catholic Believers in Ireland Research on the history of Chinese immigration to Ireland is relatively limited. The first group of Chinese immigrants arrived from the 1950s to the 1970s were from Hong Kong; they initially aimed to immigrate on to the UK but ended up remaining in Ireland for various reasons.13 Most of them settled down in Ireland running their own business— mainly restaurants or take-away food businesses. The second group of Chinese immigrants were, mainly, Mandarin-speaking students and young professionals from mainland China and Malaysia in the 1980s.14 For this group, there were more career opportunities on offer because the Irish government had attempted to attract students to study in Ireland by offering them part-time employment prospects, although with some restrictions. After these students graduated, some of them found jobs and stayed in Ireland, while others returned to China. The Chinese community is a relatively small immigrant group in Ireland in comparison to other non-Irish nationalities living in Ireland, such as the Polish, British, Lithuanian or Romanian.15 Additionally, Chinese people tend not to attract public attention; so much so that sometimes they are viewed as ‘almost invisible’ compared to other nationalities.16 However, nowadays, more and more organisations have been established that provide support to Chinese immigrants in various ways. Thus the visibility of the Chinese community has been promoted in Ireland and the public image of Chinese immigrants has changed. In the

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most recent Census of Population, in 2016, the population of Chinese usually resident in Ireland had reached 19,447. The majority with Chinese ethnicity (55.7%) come from mainland China, with only 6.4% from Hong Kong.17 The number of Chinese with Irish nationality has also increased—from 4469 in 2011 to 7760 in 2016.18 This shows the changes in the composition of Chinese immigration to Ireland over the past 50 years. According to a survey conducted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland in 2008, nearly a quarter of Chinese respondents reported that they ‘did not belong to a faith group’.19 Compared to other immigrant groups, such as Indians, Lithuanians or Nigerians, Chinese immigrants have a lower level of religious practice. The other three groups mentioned had more than 60% of respondents declaring that they were Christian, and more than 60% of them maintaining that they were Roman Catholics. However, this situation has also changed, and the data will need to be updated, after ten years of increased promotion and growth by religious groups. One of the popular Chinese Catholic congregations in Ireland is the Chinese Catholic Community Ireland at St Andrew’s Church, located in Westland Row, central Dublin.20 Believers are mainly from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, as well as Southeast Asian Chinese. They regularly meet up every week or twice a month, to cultivate their faith and support each other in daily life. From this brief review of the national identity and religious identity of overseas Chinese, especially Chinese Catholics who live in Ireland, we can see that the history of Chinese immigration to Ireland is not very long, the number of Chinese immigrants in Ireland is relatively small, and the religious tradition of Chinese immigrants seems not to be that strong. However, the number of both Chinese immigrants and Chinese Catholics in Ireland has been growing. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct further research on how they settle down in Ireland with a proper understanding of their own identity; whether religion, such as Catholicism, will provide some positive impacts on their life in Ireland; and, most importantly, whether they feel happy to live in Ireland. Therefore, in the next section, we will review theories of Subjective Well-Being, use them to examine the answers to questions from a survey of Chinese Catholics in Ireland, and further explore the relationships among the elements of identity.

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Subjective Well-Being and National Identity In a psychological sense, Subjective Well-Being (SWB) refers to how people affectively and cognitively evaluate their own lives. In other words, SWB examines what good living is and what happiness is, from a subjective perspective. Therefore, the indices of SWB focus not just on basic material needs but on the values of an individual’s life. These indices include many resources; for example, income, the number of friends, religious faith, intelligence and education.21 Nevertheless, this list could be endless because these indices change when people move to different environments, experience different life stages and live in different relationships. The concept of SWB has been developing for over fifty years, since Warner Wilson advanced it in his work Correlates of Avowed Happiness in 1967.22 When we look into the subjective evaluation of an individual’s level of happiness, the influence of genetic predisposition on personality is unavoidable. In other words, some people are innately happier or unhappier than others, a fact which is related to the study of heritability. This is an indispensable element of SWB, even though it is not essential in this chapter where we are mainly examining how national identity and religious identity, as two established but also dynamic concepts, affect overseas Chinese’s SWB at a macrosocial level. Nonetheless, we still need to emphasise the interaction between the personality as an internal element and the environment as an external element. Recent developments in gene research have provided certain physiological evidence on how personality has developed from a neuroscientific perspective.23 Research also reports that traits and cognitive dispositions connect with SWB.24 Nevertheless, how these internal and external factors influence or interact with each other is still being investigated, even though there are several models of interactionism on the personality and environment.25 When we look further into the indices for SWB of nations, we can see that they can be further clarified with respect to six ‘macrosocial variables’ where ‘happiness depends on one’s position relative to variable standards’.26 This macrosocial angle suits our analyses on the relationship between the multiple-identities and SWB of the overseas Chinese. The first index is material well-being, that is to say, physical well-being, and is still the most basic and fundamental well-being of all the other variables. In a practical sense, to achieve a better material well-being is always at the top of the list for overseas Chinese. The second index, considers

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political and civil rights as key elements in determining whether the overseas Chinese can achieve both self-efficacy and the feeling of security in a nation or nations. The third index is social comparison. For overseas Chinese, there are several social comparisons that may be taken when they live in countries other than their homeland. For example, the comparison of the living situations between the current country in which they are living and the previous country in which they lived, the comparison between different groups within various categories in the same nations, and so forth. The fourth index refers to equality. This index makes the differences among individuals more prominent, but it is also concerned with whether social awareness of equality has been applied to people who have different nationalities. The fifth index stresses the model of Independence-Interdependence (I-I) or the model of Individualism-Collectivism (I-C).27 This index links to both cultural and political indicators but it still needs further definition or clarification to explain their effects on SWB, although they are useful paradigms to analyse some of the relevant social phenomena.28 The sixth index is about cultural homogeneity, which is best understood as a comprehensive concept that looks at how overseas Chinese evaluate their own nationality or nationalities, values, religions and traditions, when compared with citizens of the host country. In this section, the definition and development of SWB has been reviewed and further research on the SWB of a nation has been examined. This will be applied to analyse the relationship between multiple-identities and SWB. However, research on the relationship ­ between national identity and SWB is still relatively limited.29 The phenomenon of immigration is becoming more and more common nowadays with the unavoidable international tendency towards globalisation. Nevertheless, how immigrant people adapt to a foreign country, and how local people adjust to the changes that are caused by immigration and the ­ re-composition of the population, are of importance and an urgent issue for serious consideration.

Subjective Well-Being and Religious Identity Research on the relationship between SWB and religious identity is more extensive, compared to the research on the relationship between SWB and national identity. Robert A. Witter has confirmed the positive relationship between religion and SWB, an impact that is especially strong

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for older people.30 Religious activity can provide not only a sense of social integration for individuals by means of collective congregation but also a sense of meaning that is external to themselves.31 Nevertheless, when religious identity is examined, its definition and the scope of discussion on this theme need to be further clarified. This chapter explores religious identity from two perspectives: from the point of view of individual religiosity and from that of institutional religion.32 Individual religiosity emphasises the relationship between the self and the divine other, or spiritual enlightenment. This private religiosity directs the individual to deepen their understanding of the existential meaning, difficulties and happiness encountered in their daily lives. When individuals attend institutional religious activities, they can proceed through social communication to informally share their similar mentalities and values. Compared to those social communications which take place in the workplace or family, the social intercourse that happens in religious activities is relatively personal. This also helps the believer to achieve a deeper level of mental relief or satisfaction, which is also an important aspect of SWB. As we have mentioned in the previous section, SWB examines subjective feelings, however, this subjective perception is synthetically received from the interactions of several paradigms separately or simultaneously: internal vs. external, dependent vs. interdependent, individual vs. collective, and so forth. Therefore, all these dual aspects of religious identity are significant elements for understanding one’s position mentally and socially. Furthermore, Catholicism has a unique position in Irish society and history, as we mentioned in a previous section. Religious identity, therefore, is an important factor when we explore its impact on overseas Chinese, especially for Chinese Catholics, in Ireland. Much research has been conducted on various aspects of the relationship between religion and SWB, especially at a national level.33 According to previous research, religion plays a positive role in both psychological and social aspects of people’s daily experience.34 According to Durkheim, religion has ‘a collective identity’ and ‘social network’ when it serves different purposes in a society.35 This can be considered as a non-religious benefit brought by religion. Even so, the question of whether religious or non-religious people have a higher or lower level of SWB is not an easy one to answer. It needs more rigorous research and analysis of specific groups of people by defining all the variables. Thus, in this chapter, when we examine the level of SWB for our respondents,

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we have specified several variables in order to achieve accurate results and analyses. In order to obtain first hand information on how Chinese Catholics perceive the interactions of national identity, religious identity and SWB, a survey and interviews were conducted on a ‘self-reported happiness scale’.

Survey and Results—An Evaluation of Self-reporting on Multiple-Identities and Their Impact on SWB The rationale behind this survey can be argued in three ways. First, people in the selected group, Chinese Catholics believers from the Chinese Catholic Community in Ireland, have all the above-mentioned ­multiple-identities. Their responses to the survey that was conducted for this chapter demonstrated various aspects of SWB when evaluating how these identities impact on SWB from both the individual and collective perspectives. Second, taking the Catholic background of Irish society and identity into account, religious identity plays a special role for this selected group in the self-evaluation of both their Chinese identity and Irish identity. This is an exclusive perspective for relevant research on multiple identities. Third, based on this unique characteristic, it suggests that this selected group may achieve higher levels of understanding of their identities as well as happiness. The survey was conducted in September 2018 with a total of 29 respondents providing complete and valid answers. Several interviews were also conducted. The first section of the survey was about their personal background information and was anonymised. Nineteen females and ten males participated in the survey. Age ranges were mainly in the thirties to forties. More than twenty respondents had received third-level education; two of them had received only primary school education. More than 70% of the respondents were married. Their occupations were quite diverse. The types of occupation included financial services, technology, catering industry, self-employment and student. However, more than 30% of the respondents were carrying out the duties of full-time care for their family. The second section was about their beliefs. Nearly 60% of the respondents had already been Catholic believers before coming to Ireland, and 40% of them started believing in Catholicism only after they had lived in Ireland. When they were asked the reasons why they were interested in Catholicism, more than 15% of the respondents, the

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greatest number compared to other reasons, said it was because of their family tradition. The other types of answers were not completely the same but quite similar. For example, Catholic belief changed the way they viewed the world; it also provided meaning and direction for their life; it was led by the calling of the God; it had the fullness of the truth; and they received peaceful feelings by means of learning the doctrines of faith, hope and love. Regarding the frequency of participation in a Chinese church event, nearly 43% of respondents attended activities once a week. Another 40% of respondents attended relevant events from time to time. The respondents also provided multiple reasons for why they participated in events organised by the church. More than 80% of them chose the option ‘getting closer to the Lord’, and more than 70% said it was because they could ‘learn more about the history and knowledge of the Catholic Church’. More than 80% also chose the option of ‘social gatherings with other believers’. The next five questions, as the last section, were designed to find out how the respondents viewed their multiple-identities and their level of SWB. When they were asked to rank the importance of identity, nearly 38% of respondents chose to rank Catholic as their first identity, Chinese as their second, and Irish as their last. Six respondents only chose Chinese and Catholic as their identities and four respondents chose Chinese as their only identity. One of the interviewees emphasised that it is difficult, or maybe not appropriate, to compare the importance of Catholic identity and national identity because they are not the same type of identity; Catholic identity belongs to the religious identity while Chinese and Irish identities belong to national identity. This interviewee also commented that overseas Chinese usually have a very strong national identity with their home country. They do not integrate easily into the social environment of a foreign country; as a result, it is relatively more difficult for them to develop a sense of belonging in an overseas country. This is even more complicated when it is applied to the case of ­Irish-born Chinese. The interviewee also mentioned that, in recent times, more than 90% of Chinese Catholics are from mainland China. One of the main purposes of taking part in the church is to obtain certificates of baptism in order to be qualified to enrol in local church schools, which usually provide better quality of teaching. In addition, more than half of the Catholics from mainland China, especially those who are new to the church, intend to get this certificate by becoming Catholic.

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When they were asked to explain ‘the significance of believing in Catholicism for you who is living in Ireland’, their rankings were quite different. Nearly all of them confirmed the option that ‘Faith makes me feel safe and dependent’ and the option that ‘I have a positive feeling’. 80% of respondents chose the options that they ‘Know more people with common beliefs’ and ‘members in the same church provide mutual help in life’. When they were asked to compare traditional Chinese ideas and Catholic beliefs, fifteen respondents chose the option that Catholic beliefs play a more important role in their life. Eight respondents, however, considered that both are important and emphasised that they are mutually interrelated and can be identified from various aspects. An interviewee highlighted the commonalities between these two aspects and emphasised that it is important to have a deeper understanding on the nature of these ideas and beliefs because it is essential for overseas Chinese to identify their social and religious position. With better understanding of these ideas and beliefs, overseas Chinese can further recognise, on the one hand, how they have been cultivated through their own traditions and values, and, on the other hand, how they have been integrated into a society with different values and religions, especially when this society has a strong religious background. When they were asked whether being a Catholic made it easier to make friends with Irish people, 60% of the respondents provided positive answer, while 32% of the respondents did not think so. Two respondents thought that sometimes it would be beneficial. The last question was about their satisfaction with their current status, which is an essential question for self-reporting on the level of SWB. Thirteen respondents said they were quite satisfied and twelve respondents were very satisfied. Only two mentioned that they were not very satisfied with their situation. One of those two respondents tried to improve themselves by learning more about Catholic beliefs. Another respondent thought their satisfaction would be improved if they could own a house, which shows the need for material well-being. As we mentioned at the end of last section, Chinese Catholics are a special group of overseas Chinese in Ireland, who can show how multiple-identities—national and religious identities—have been inter­ woven and how these identities affect their perception of SWB. The discussion on these two processes could provide some meaningful interpretation for further observation and discussion on social integration.

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National Identity, Religious Identity and Their Impacts on SWB As our research object is on how the multiple identities of the overseas Chinese, specifically Chinese Catholics who live in Ireland, affect their SWB, we also need to have further information on the substantial changes that have occurred in Irish society in the last twenty to thirty years. These changes have had a deep influence on how Irish people view themselves and their own country, and on how they perceive immigrants who work and live in their country. Additionally, these changes may also show why Chinese people choose Ireland as their destination for residence, how they may suit the needs of Chinese immigrants, and their significances for the further integration, not only on a material level but also on a cultural and mental level. In other words, how overseas Chinese may achieve a sense of belonging, which is an essential concept for the discussion of both national identity and SWB. We will provide a brief summary of the development of Irish society as background information. Ireland’s agriculture beginnings can be traced back to the Neolithic period, i.e. between 4000 and 2500 BC.36 This agrarian tradition was kept until the modern period in Ireland, with the economy still highly dependent on agriculture today. Modernisation of agriculture has occurred in Ireland, and the country achieved an economic boom during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era of the 1990s by developing an industrial economy. In this recent period, Ireland saw a political shift from protectionism to a neo-liberal and international agenda. It is argued that Irish society has transformed from a mono-cultural society directly into a postmodern society, without experiencing the modern society phase.37 In this period of rapid social change, questions regarding whether Irishness has been kept or has been changed dramatically provide inspiring clues for determining whether the values and structures of Irish society have changed to a more open society with a high degree of acceptance towards immigrants. We can summarise the characteristics of Irishness or Irish identity, from traditional perspectives to modern perspectives, in the following aspects.38 First, as we already mentioned, Ireland has a strong religious tradition of Catholicism, which has influenced every aspect of ordinary people’s daily life. However, its influence has been weakened nowadays. This has led to a phenomenon that has been termed the ‘moralisation of religion’ or ‘moralising religion’, which has been discussed

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comprehensively and scientifically.39 Second, the economy of Irish society, which had been mainly based on agriculture, has now developed into one based on new technology industries. Third, family orientation is still a basic value of Irish society. Fourth, the Irish government emphasises the importance of high education, not only for local students but also for international students. The income from this process of industrialisation of education is an important source of revenue for Irish society. Finally, the self-positioning of the Irish market (as an English-speaking country) has favoured the tendency of globalisation, neo-liberal capitalism and multi-culturalism. All of these features are completely different from those in the traditional Irish society. Since Irish identity comprises, directly or indirectly, these characteristics, we may examine how they fit into the re-construction of Chinese identity in Ireland. ‘Chinese’ is a word which denotes comprehensive attributes; for example, races, culture, and ethnicity. It can be further specified as Zhongguoren,40 Zhonghua minzu,41 Huaren,42 Huaqiao,43 Tangren,44 Hanren,45 and so on.46 Huaren and Huaqiao are the words that best fit into the discussion of overseas Chinese identity. The term overseas Chinese includes those Chinese people who have already changed their citizenship to that of their country of residence, and those Chinese people who only obtain residency but do not change their citizenship. The decision to change citizenships can be viewed as a personal decision, but it also depends on whether people meet the relevant requirements of their country of residence. However, no matter which situation occurs, overseas Chinese who stay in Ireland will have started to seek for, or have already found, the sense of belonging because, otherwise, they would not have made or sustained the decision to live in Ireland. Therefore, we have attempted to examine how the overseas Chinese identity in Ireland would have, possibly or actually, been re-constructed when Chinese immigrants met the Irish identity and made the decision to live in Ireland with a proper sense of belonging. According to previous research, the role of moralising gods in social complexity was ‘to sustain and expand complex multi-ethnic empires after they have become established’.47 Moralising religions plays a similar role to moralising gods but they also displays a wider range of manifestations. In the context of modern societies, religions may have social, political and psychological functions in people’s daily life in a weakened form, as can be seen from the data that we presented at the beginning of this chapter.

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In Irish society nowadays, Irish people still acknowledge the Catholic tradition, but fewer and fewer people strictly follow the traditional beliefs and norms. Nevertheless, Catholic doctrines have been converted into moral values and are used to make decisions and judgements when social and personal issues need resolution. This moralising Catholic faith within Irish identity matches the traditional Confucian values of moral cultivation of the self and society, which provides a space to develop commonalities between the two identities. Thus, from our survey, some answered that being a Catholic can be useful for overseas Chinese to make friends with Irish people, but it is more important to find a breakthrough point to proceed with proper communications based on common values. Some Chinese Catholics, from our survey, are aware of the commonalities between Catholic doctrines and Confucian values, which is a positive phenomenon for seeking mutual understanding. There is a tendency for moralising religion to play an increasingly frequent and beneficial role in these communications, no matter whether the overseas Chinese have religious beliefs or not. The second aspect, developing new technology industries, is the main market tendency in Ireland. This also provides more job opportunities for Chinese graduates and even attracts more Chinese students to pursue their studies and research in Ireland. A consequence is that the composition of occupations for the Chinese community in Ireland has been re-constructed from non-professional to professional occupations. This will lead to changes of social cognition and recognition for the image of the Chinese community from the perspective of Irish people and society. Furthermore, this will affect how Chinese people re-identify their social position in Irish society. Regarding the third element, family orientation, this is both a traditional and moral common denominator shared by both Irish and Chinese people. This is similar to the fourth element of the reformed Irish identity that lays an emphasis on education. Traditionally, Chinese people pay enormous attention to education, with a view to seeking better employment prospects and better social status. The policy of promoting education followed by the Irish government offers a healthy and sustainable win-win platform for both the Irish education system and potential Chinese immigrants to achieve what they need. Concerning the final elements of globalisation—neo-liberal capitalism and m ­ ulticulturalism—they are present in the openness of Irish government and

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society to the global changes that welcome more and more people with diverse backgrounds to work and live in Ireland. The elements we discuss in this section do not play equal roles in the composition of religious identity or national identity. However, the interaction and combination of these elements have shaped both the reformation of Irish identity and the re-construction of overseas Chinese Identity in a dynamic and developing way. The phenomenon of moralising religion is not only a secularisation process, but it also remodels the way that people reflect on their own religious identity, direct their daily behaviours and seek mutual understanding in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. This tendency follows, rather than precedes, the changes and developments of both Irish society and the society of overseas Chinese in Ireland, and its corresponding reformation of respective national identities. The openness and complex composition of Irish society requires tolerance and recognition of different states of beliefs, which should bring about reflection on individuals’ religious identity. However, the changes in religious identity should also cause new understandings of their own national identity, with a deepened recognition of their own original values in contrast to foreign values. Social integration, in a positive sense, will be achieved by this interactive process.

Multiple-Identities and Their Impacts on SWB As we have already mentioned above, there are six indices that may be applied to analyse the level of SWB from the perspective of a nation. In this section, we will adapt those six indices to analyse and evaluate the impact of multiple-identities on SWB, particularly in the case of the overseas Chinese in Irish society. The case study of the Chinese Catholics in Ireland will be discussed too. Ireland, as a developed capitalist country, has achieved an advanced level of material well-being. This attracts people from all over the world to consider Ireland as an immigrant destination. China, as a developing communist country, has also seen stupendous economic development after its recent economic reforms. However, if we compare the National Minimum Wage (NMW) of these two countries, we will see a gap. China’s NMW in 2018 was US$325.6 while Ireland’s NMW in 2019 was US$1896.4.48 High salary is definitely an attractive element for immigrants. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned above, compared

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to other immigrant communities, the Chinese immigrant community is a relatively small immigrant group in Ireland. One of the reasons why the Chinese immigrant numbers are low is that non-EEA (European Economic Area) nationals must have an employment permit to work in Ireland.49 In order to obtain a permit for general employment, applicants must have a minimum annual remuneration of €30,000. This requirement sets a boundary for applicants who want to work and live in Ireland. Nonetheless, it secures a proper standard of living for qualified immigrants. Therefore, for Chinese immigrants or graduates who would like to work and live in Ireland, finding qualifying jobs is the first step in pursuing a better salary and ideal living standard in Ireland. In this sense, the majority of the Chinese immigrants who have held employment permits were guaranteed material well-being by living in Ireland. For the other overseas Chinese, who lived in Ireland before this requirement was introduced, they may have a relatively lower income but they would have richer resources of local networks. From our survey, the majority of the Chinese Catholics work in various companies, and most of them stated they have achieved a high level of satisfaction from their current status. Accordingly, even though Chinese as non-EEA nationals may face some restrictions under certain circumstances, this restriction still allows for a relatively high level of SWB for those who are qualified to work and stay in Ireland. With regard to political and civil rights, this index can be measured in the right to vote. Only those who have obtained Irish citizenship have the right to vote in all referenda and national elections in Ireland. Those who are living in Ireland but are not Irish citizens have only the right to vote in some elections.50 Even though Chinese people would not usually be very active in voting, voting is an important way for them to integrate into the Irish community, and also to improve the policies that may be relevant to both local people and immigrants who have not obtained Irish citizenship. All of these would be beneficial to increase the level of SWB. Social comparison is a complicated index because it can include many aspects of comparison. Nevertheless, the first aspect related to SWB is income. It is not about the absolute standards of income but more about the relative standards, which means that the individuals are happier if they think their income is higher than the reference standard for other people around them. It is interesting to find that, thanks to the requirement of an employment permit, the Chinese graduates who have

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held qualifying jobs achieved a standard income for Irish society. Their income even tends to be relatively higher than the overall average salary when compared to that of local graduates, because the subjects that Chinese students usually choose are Irish market-oriented subjects—for example, computer science and accounting. This would suggest that they may achieve a higher level of SWB when they start to work in Ireland. The next index, equality, is relevant to the social comparison because only after they have compared can they find out whether they differ from one another. Normally, this index includes the quality of life expectancy, income, access to education, gender equality, and so forth. The sixth index includes two relevant paradigms or models: one is independence-interdependence (I-I), the other is ­ individualismcollectivism (I-C). This index examines the values of individuals, communities and societies, but, more importantly, it intends to find out how these values will be perceived and evaluated in different contexts and how these differences will affect the level of SWB. Irish society values independence and individualism, although family orientation is also an important value for them. Overseas Chinese retain the Confucianist values: the self, the family, the state and the world linked together. However, Chinese people give priority to the state and family, rather than to the individual self. The reason for this is that the existence of the state and family is the precondition of the self, which belongs to the side of collectivism or interdependence. From the perspective of independence or individualism, personal freedom and individual goals are more relevant to the achievement of high levels of SWB. From the perspective of interdependence or collectivism, individuals rely more on the mutual support from friends, family and community. As Diener stated, ‘When deciding how satisfied they are, people in individualistic nations find it natural to consult their affect, and feeling pleasant motions frequently is a reasonable predictor of life satisfaction in these societies. In contrast, people in collectivist cultures tend to more often consult norms for whether they should be satisfied and to consider the social appraisals of family and friends in evaluating their lives’.51 People in the individualistic nations will give priority to their own life satisfaction while those in the collective nations will prefer to give up life satisfaction in order to fulfil duties and then achieve harmony in the family or community. With regard to the situation of overseas Chinese in Ireland, no matter whether for the first generation immigrants (FGI) or for the Irish-born

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Chinese (IBC), they have to experience and, sometimes, struggle with these two values. This struggle is not necessarily going to undermine the level of SWB, as it brings in cultural richness. However, a successful cultural richness should be developed from a clear and solid awareness of how these multiple-identities affect their living situation; otherwise, it will cause confusion, or even have negative impacts on individuals’ daily life experiences and to the communication between different parts of society. Even though, both FGI and IBC may experience the tension between these two paradigms, the perception and the evaluation of their own identities will not be the same. With regard to the FGI, they have had the initiative to choose to move from one county to another. Nevertheless, the knowledge, affection and values of their homeland have been shaped and they now must try to adapt to another country. In this process, Chinese identity plays a leading role in their value judgements and mental reactions when compared to their new identity as immigrants who live in Ireland. The Irish identity will gradually become an acquired identity, mainly in and through the process of adaption. In other words, the values of the individualistic nation will account for a growing proportion of their values over the existing values of collectivism. Regarding the IBC, born in Ireland into Chinese or mixed families, they innately possess two identities and the tensions between these two identities will gradually strengthen as they grow up in and enter the society. In this situation, the IBC has to identify their own priorities between individualism and collectivism from their daily experience. Compared to the FGI, the IBC do not have the initial choices in their identity, therefore, they have to learn to cope with multiple-identities from the start. Diener further distinguished between adaption and coping: ‘Adaptation should be distinguished from coping, where the emphasis is on the active role of the participant rather than on an automatic passive biological process, as in habituation’.52 According to Diener, adaptation is essential for the modern theories of SWB because it is directly related to the regulation of emotion when people deal with ‘the temporal context of events’, which includes the reactions to both single events and events that would cause long-term transitions. That is, both FGI and IBC, as people who have multiple-identities, will adopt the approaches of both adaption and coping when they try to integrate themselves into Irish society. Nonetheless, the balance between adaption and coping will determine the level of their SWB.

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The last index is cultural homogeneity. As we mentioned above, this is a concept that looks into various elements to see how they differ between immigrants, or foreigners, and their fellow citizens who are citizens of the host country. We will choose religion as the main aspect to demonstrate how it will benefit both overseas Chinese and local Irish to achieve positive improvements in their mutual understanding, as well as to obtain a higher level of SWB. As we have already mentioned, religion has a collective identity, which provides opportunities for achieving social integration by means of collective congregations for Chinese Catholics who live in Ireland. However, the tendency of moralising religion in Ireland, by sharing a common foundation in the emphasis on morality, has also become a favourable element for non-religious overseas Chinese to integrate into Irish society. As we found from the survey results, nearly one-third of Chinese Catholics, after they had attended more religious activities organised by their church, agreed that Catholic doctrines and Confucian teachings share some common points. They started to reflect more on the traditional Chinese values, which they were equipped with from their previous education and cultivation, after they had encountered and practised another belief system. Additionally, the congregation provided by the church offers opportunities for overseas Chinese to gain the sense of belonging; on the one hand, by means of sharing the same faith, and, on the other hand, by virtue of balancing and relieving the tension caused by the struggle between Chinese identity and Irish identity.

Conclusion Both national identity and religious identity are significant factors for assessing the extent to which immigrants feel happy or not when they live in countries other than their own homeland. Both internal elements, such as personality, and external elements, such as, life circumstances, are essential for evaluating the level of SWB. Therefore, this chapter has attempted to disclose these relationships and sought to point out some potentially beneficial perspectives in order to provide useful information for individuals, communities and governments. The relationships between national identity and religious identity are in part genetic. Reflecting on their interaction, therefore, could generate a comprehensive self-evaluation on being an individual as well as

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being a part of a collective in society. The comprehensive self-identity is reflected in the form of being both individual and part of the collective at the same time. Therefore, in order to achieve a high level of SWB, it is crucial to find the balance between these multiple-identities. From the psychological perspective, the self-identity starts from research on self-image, self-esteem and individuality.53 In other words, how the self can understand and evaluate itself. Erik Erikson proposed the concept of ‘ego identity’ in order to examine the relation between the individual’s pre-adult experience and adolescence in the process of life-cycle development.54 Cote and Levine explained the development of the self-identity relationship as well as the interaction between individual and society.55 Social structure and personality are linked as a dynamic relationship, which can be considered through three terms.56 The first is social identity which identifies the individual’s position under the influence of cultural factors and social roles. The second is personal identity which indicates how the individuals’ personal experiences interact with others as well as with society. The third is ego identity which denotes ‘the more fundamental subjective sense of continuity that is characteristic of the personality’.57 It was this concept of ‘ego identity’ that is closely related to our observation on the integrative and multi-dimensional evaluation on national identity, religious identity and their relationship to subjective well-being. From a sociological perspective, such research focuses on the interaction between the self and the society on a wider scale. According to Stets and Burke, the development of society is relatively stable and the lives of individuals are embedded in the structure of a society, which is called the structural approach. This approach clarifies three terms in order to analyse the relationship between self and identity. The first is the self. When people start to ‘think’ about themselves and their interaction with the society, self becomes a reflective object.58 When this object has been formulated into content and structure by means of abstraction, self-concept has been defined. This self-concept usually refers to self-esteem, but also to more than that, including thoughts, feelings, and imaginings on who we are.59 It is the self-image that indicates how the self interacts with the given society. In other words, the self-image already entails a social attribute. The third term is self-evaluation. It evaluates different aspects of the self or self-esteem. According to Gecas & Schwalbe, there are two types of self-esteem: one is ‘efficacy-based self-esteem (seeing oneself as

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competent and capable) and [another one is] worth-based self-esteem (feeling that one is accepted and valued)’.60 This evaluation approach is formulated and rooted in the different bases of identities because it looks into the content of the self. In other words, when the mental and psychological self of a person has started to interact with the society, it is developed into various identities according to various aspects of the social structure. National identity is one of these identities. Yet, when the individual keeps evaluating their multiple identities during their lifelong development, the ranking or the hierarchy of these identities will keep changing. Moreover, ‘this idea of multiple identities highlights the fact that individuals are always acting in the context of a complex social structure out of which these multiple identities emerge’.61 According to Stets and Burke’s research, these multiple identities have positive impacts on people’s mental health. Accordingly, we have demonstrated how religious identity can have positive impacts on dual, or even multiple, national identities, especially on the sense of belonging, by examining them through the perspectives of subjective well-being.

Notes

1. Richard D. Ashmore, Lee J. Jussim, and David Wilder, Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Reduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 74–75. 2. János László, Historical Tales and National Identity: An Introduction to Narrative Social Psychology (New York: Routledge, 2013), 191; Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997), 171–172; Stephen Reicher, Russell Spears, and Alexander Haslam, “The Social Identity Approach in Social Psychology,” in The SAGE Handbook of Identities, eds. Margaret Wetherell and Chandra Talpade Mohanty (London: Sage, 2010), 45–62. 3.  Martyn Barrett, Evanthia Lyons, and Arantza Del Valle, “The Development of National Identity and Social Identity Processes: Do Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory Provide Useful Heuristic Frameworks for Developmental Research?” in The Development of the Social Self, eds. M. Bennett and F. Sani (New York: Psychology Press, 2004). 4. Jean Piaget and Ann-Marie Weil, “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and Relations to other Countries,” International Social Science Journal 3, no. 3 (1951): 561–578.

408  Y. LIU









5.  Martyn Barrett and Janis Short, “Images of European people in a group of 5–10-year-old English schoolchildren,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 10, no. 4 (1992): 339–363. 6. Barret et al., “The Development of National Identity and Social Identity Processes,” 159–188. 7. Barret et al., 159–188. 8.  Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in Organizational Identity, eds. Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 56–65. 9. Marie Therese Flanagan, The Transformation of the Irish Church in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2010), 243. 10. James Murray, Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland, Clerical Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534–1590 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43–56. 11. “Census of Population 2016—Profile 8: Irish Travellers, Ethnicity and Religion,” Central Statistics Office (Ireland), accessed October 21, 2019, https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp8iter/p8iter/ p8rrc/. 12. “Census of Population 2016—Profile 8.” 13.  Colleen McFadyen, ed., “Getting on: From Migration to Integration. Chinese, Indian, Lithuanian, and Nigerian Migrants’ Experiences in Ireland,” Immigration Council of Ireland Independent Law Centre, accessed October 21, 2019, https://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/5115_gettingon.pdf, 59. 14. Nicola Yau, “Celtic Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Exploring Identity Among Second Generation Chinese in Ireland,” Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review 2, no. 1 (2007): 48–69, accessed October 21, 2019, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.594.1568&rep=rep1&type=pdf; McFadyen, “Getting on: From Migration to Integration”; Zhouxiang Lu and Weiyi Wu, “Rethinking Integration and Identity: Chinese Migrants in the Republic of Ireland,” International Review of Sociology 27, no. 3 (2017): 475–490. 15.  Chinese are not even one of the ten largest non-Irish nationalities. “Census 2016—Non-Irish Nationalities Living in Ireland, Central Statistics Office,” accessed October 21 October, 2019, https://www.cso. ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cpnin/cpnin/. 16. Yau, “Celtic Tiger, Hidden Dragon,” 48–69. 17. “Census of Population 2016—Profile 8.” 18. “Census of Population 2016—Profile 8.” 19. McFadyen, “Getting on: From Migration to Integration.” 20. Chinese Catholic Community Ireland website, 天主教华人团体, accessed October 21, 2019, https://irelandccc.wordpress.com/.

16  NATIONAL IDENTITY, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY … 

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21. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976). 22.  Ed Diener, “Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress,” Psychological Bulletin 125, no. 2 (1999): 276–302, 278. 23.  Colin Deyoung and Jeremy Gray, “Personality Neuroscience: Explaining Individual Differences in Affect, Behaviour and Cognition,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology, eds. Philip Corr and Gerald Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 323–346; Lawrence Pervin, Oliver John and Richard Robins, eds., Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research (2nd ed.) (New York: Guilford Press, 1999). 24. Diener, “Subjective Well-Being, Three Decades of Progress,” 280. 25. Diener, “Subjective Well-Being, Three Decades of Progress,” 286. 26. Ed Diener, Marissa Diener and Carol Diener, “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations,” Journal of Personality Social Psychology 69, no. 5 (1995): 851. 27. Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind (London: McGraw-Hill, 1991); Geert Hofstede, “Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context,” Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2, no. 1, accessed October 21, 2019, https:// scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol2/iss1/8/; Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,” Psychological Review 98, no. 2 (1991): 224– 253; Harry Triandis, “The Self and Social Behaviour in Differing Culture Contexts,” Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 506–520. 28.  Diener, Diener and Diener, “Factors Predicting the Subjective ­Well-Being,” 853. 29.  There are several papers that have been published on this theme by means of specific case studies. For example, Eli Grozdanovska, “The Relationship Between National Identity, Subjective Well-Being and Meaning in life,” Suvremena psihologija 19, no. 1 (2016): 91–99; Agustín Espinosa, Mathias Schmitz and Jan Marc Rottenbacher, “Ideological Bases of National Identity and Their Influence on Subjective, Psychological and Social Well-Being in Peru,” Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 11, no. 35 (2016): 18–32; Liza G. Steele and Scott M. Lynch, “The Pursuit of Happiness in China: Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being during China’s Economic and Social Transformation,” Social Indicator Research 114, no. 2 (2013): 441–451. 30. Robert A. Witter, “Religion and Subjective Well-Being in Adulthood: A Quantitative Synthesis,” Review of Religious Research 26, no. 4 (1985): 332–342.

410  Y. LIU 31.  The relation between religious activities and social integration was first discussed by Durkheim in his work Suicide: A Study in Sociology (1951/1987). 32.  Christopher G. Ellison, “Religious Involvement and Subjective ­Well-Being,” Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 32, no. 1 (1991): 80. 33. Ed Diener, “Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress.” 34.  Melvin Pollner, “Divine Relations, Social Relations and Well-Being,” Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 30, no. 1 (1989): 92–104; Daniel McIntosh, Roxane Cohen Silver and Camille Wortman, “Religion’s Role in Adjustment to a Negative Life Event: Coping with the Loss of a Child,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, no. 4 (1993): 812–821. 35. Phillip A. Mellor, “In Defence of Durkheim: Sociology, the Sacred and ‘Society’,” Durkheimian Studies /Études Durkheimiennes 8 (2002): 15–34. 36. Gabriel Cooney, Landscapes of Neolithic Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1. 37. Kieran Keohane and Carmen Kuhling, Collision Culture: Transformations in Everyday Life in Ireland (Dublin: Liffey Press, 2004), 58. 38.  Fiona O’Donovan, “Irish Identity Is Far From ‘Ideal’,” Socheolas, Limerick Student Journal of Sociology 2, no. 1 (2009): 95–115. 39.  Nicolas Baumard et al., “Increased Affluence Explains the Emergence of Ascetic Wisdoms and Moralizing Religions,” Current Biology 25, no. 1 (2015): R37–R38; Scott Atran, “Moralizing Religions: Prosocial or a Privilege of Wealth?” Behavioural and Brain Science 39 (2016): E2; Harvey Whitehouse et al., “Complex Societies Precede Moralizing Gods Throughout World History,” Nature 568, no. 7751 (2019): 226–229. 40. 中国人, Chinese people: A most general word to describe the nationality of Chinese people both in China as well as in other foreign countries. 41.  中华民族, Chinese nation: A political term to emphasise the connections among Han Chinese and the other 55 Chinese ethnic groups from the perspective of nation building. 42. 华人, Ethnic Chinese: A conventional but not strictly academic word usually used to distinguish Chinese people from people with other nationalities. Sometimes it shares the same connotation with 华侨. However, most of the time, it only refers to the Chinese who have already obtained the nationality of the country of residence. 43.  华侨, Overseas Chinese: It is also a conventional word but has different usages indifferent context. It mainly refers to Chinese emigrants who reside outside of the territories of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 44. 唐人, Tang People: A word used to describe Han Chinese who shared the same connotation of 华人, while it specifically refers to those who

16  NATIONAL IDENTITY, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY … 







411

are Cantonese/Guangdongren, Hakka/Kejiaren, Hoochew/Fuzhouren, Kokkien/Fujianren/Minnanren, Teochew/Chaozhouren. 45.  汉人, Han People: It is a term that can refer to Han ethnicity and can also be used to refer to people of Chinese descent around the world. 46.  David Yen-ho Wu, “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities,” Daedalus 120, no. 2, The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today (1991): 159–179. 47. Whitehouse et al., “Complex Societies Precede Moralizing Gods,” 226. 48. “Country comparison China vs Ireland,” countryeconomy.com, accessed October 21, 2019, https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/ china/ireland. 49.  “General Employment Permit,” Citizens Information, accessed October 21, 2019, https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/migrant_ workers/employment_permits/work_permits.html. 50. “Right to Vote in Ireland,” Citizens Information, accessed October 21, 2019, https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/moving_country/moving_to_ireland/introduction_to_the_irish_system/right_to_vote.html. 51.  Ed Diener, “Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index,” American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000): 39. 52. Ed Diener, “Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress,” 286. 53. Peter Weinreich, “The Operationalisation of Identity Theory in Racial and Ethnic Relations,” in Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations—Comparative Ethnic and Race Relations, eds John Rex and David Mason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 299–320. 54. Erik Homburger Erikson, “The Problem of Ego Identity,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 4, no. 1 (1956): 56–121; James E. Marcia, “Development and Validation of Ego-Identity Status,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, no. 5 (1966): 551–558. 55. James E. Cote and Charles G. Levine, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis (New York: Psychology Press, 2002), 7–8. 56. Cote and Levine, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture, 8. 57. Cote and Levine, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture, 8. 58. Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity,” in Handbook of Self and Identity, eds. Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford Press, 2003), 128–152. 59.  Stets and Burke, “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity,” 128–152. 60. Viktor Gecas and Michael Schwalbe, “Beyond the Looking-Glass Self: Social Structure and Efficacy-Based Self-Esteem,” Social Psychology Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1983): 77–88. 61.  Stets and Burke, “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity,” 128–152.

412  Y. LIU

Bibliography Ashmore, Richard, Lee J. Jussim, and David Wilder. Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Reduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Atran, Scott. “Moralizing Religions: Prosocial or a Privilege of Wealth?” Behavioural and Brain Science 39 (2016): E2. Barrett, Martyn, and Janis Short. “Images of European People in a Group of 5–10-year-old English Schoolchildren.” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 10, no. 4 (1992): 339–363. Barrett, Martyn, Evanthia Lyons, and Arantza Del Valle. “The Development of National Identity and Social Identity Processes: Do Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory Provide Useful Heuristic Frameworks for Developmental Research?” In The Development of the Social Self, edited by M. Bennett and F. Sani, 159–188. New York: Psychology Press, 2004. Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Ervin Staub. Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997. Baumard, Nicolas, Alexandre Hyafil, Ian Morris, and Pascal Boyer. “Increased Affluence Explains the Emergence of Ascetic Wisdoms and Moralizing Religions.” Current Biology 25, no. 1 (2015): R37–R38. Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers. The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. Cooney, Gabriel. Landscapes of Neolithic Ireland. New York: Routledge, 2012. Cote, James E., and Charles G. Levine, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis. New York: Psychology Press, 2002. Deyoung, Colin, and Jeremy Gray. “Personality Neuroscience: Explaining Individual Differences in Affect, Behaviour and Cognition.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology, edited by Philip Corr and Gerald Matthews, 323–346. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Diener, Ed. “Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index.” American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000): 34–43. Diener, Ed. “Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress.” Psychological Bulletin 125, no. 2 (1999): 276–302. Diener, Ed, Marissa Diener, and Carol Diener. “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations.” Journal of Personality Social Psychology 69, no. 5 (1995): 851–864. Ellison, Christopher G. “Religious Involvement and Subjective Well-Being.” Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 32, no. 1 (1991): 80–99. Erikson, Erick Homburger. “The Problem of Ego Identity.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 4, no. 1 (1956): 56–121. Espinosa, Agustín, Mathias Schmitz, and Jan Marc Rottenbacher. “Ideological Bases of National Identity and Their Influence on Subjective, Psychological

16  NATIONAL IDENTITY, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY … 

413

and Social Well-Being in Peru.” Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 11, no. 35 (2016): 18–32. Flanagan, Marie Therese. The Transformation of the Irish Church in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2010. Gecas, Viktor, and Michael Schwalbe. “Beyond the Looking-Glass Self: Social Structure and Efficacy-Based Self-Esteem.” Social Psychology Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1983): 77–88. Grozdanovska, Eli. “The Relationship Between National Identity, Subjective Well-being and Meaning in Life.” Suvremena psihologija 19, no. 1 (2016): 91–99. Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London: McGraw-Hill, 1991. Keohane, Kieran, and Carmen Kuhling. Collision Culture: Transformations in Everyday Life in Ireland. Dublin: Liffey Press, 2004. László, János. Historical Tales and National Identity: An Introduction to Narrative Social Psychology. New York: Routledge, 2013. Lu, Zhouxiang, and Weiyi Wu. “Rethinking Integration and Identity: Chinese Migrants in the Republic of Ireland.” International Review of Sociology 27, no. 3 (2017): 475–490. Marcia, James E. “Development and Validation of Ego-Identity Status.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, no. 5 (1966): 551–558. Markus, Hazel Rose, and Shinobu Kitayama. “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation.” Psychological Review 98, no. 2 (1991): 224–253. McIntosh, Daniel, Roxane Cohen Silver, and Camille Wortman. “Religion’s Role in Adjustment to a Negative Life Event: Coping with the Loss of a Child.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, no. 4 (1993): 812–821. Mellor, Philip A. “In Defence of Durkheim: Sociology, the Sacred and ‘Society’.” Durkheimian Studies / Études Durkheimiennes 8 (2002): 15–34. Murray, James. Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland, Clerical Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534–1590. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. O’Donovan, Fiona. “Irish Identity Is Far From ‘Ideal’.” Socheolas, Limerick Student Journal of Sociology 2, no. 1 (2009): 95–115. Pervin, Lawrence, Oliver John, and Richard Robins, eds. Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. New York: Guilford Press, 1999. Piaget, Jean, and Ann-Marie Weil. “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and Relations to other Countries.” International Social Science Journal 3, no. 3 (1951): 561–578. Pollner, Melvin. “Divine Relations, Social Relations and Well-being.” Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 30, no. 1 (1989): 92–104.

414  Y. LIU Reicher, Stephen, Russell Spears, and Alexander Haslam. “The Social Identity Approach in Social Psychology.” In The SAGE Handbook of Identities, edited by Margaret Wetherell and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 45–62. London: Sage, 2010. Steele, Liza G., and Scott M. Lynch. “The Pursuit of Happiness in China: Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being during China’s Economic and Social Transformation.” Social Indicator Research 114, no. 2 (2013): 441–451. Stets, Jan E., and Peter J. Burke. “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity.” In Handbook of Self and Identity, edited by Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney, 128–152. New York: Guilford Press, 2003. Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In Organizational Identity, edited by Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, 56–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Triandis, Harry. “The Self and Social Behaviour in Differing Culture Contexts.” Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 506–520. Weinreich, Peter. “The Operationalisation of Identity Theory in Racial and Ethnic Relations.” In Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations—Comparative Ethnic and Race Relations, edited by John Rex and David Mason, 299–320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Whitehouse, Harvey, Pieter François, Patrick E. Savage,Thomas E. Currie, Kevin C. Feeney, Enrico Cioni, Rosalind Purcell, Robert M. Ross, Jennifer Larson, John Baines, Barend ter Haar, Alan Covey, and Peter Turchin. “Complex Societies Precede Moralizing Gods Throughout World History.” Nature 568, no. 7751 (2019): 226–229. Witter, Robert A. “Religion and Subjective Well-Being in Adulthood: A Quantitative Synthesis.” Review of Religious Research 26, no. 4 (1985): 332–342. Wu, David Yen-ho. “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities.” Daedalus 120, no. 2, The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today (1991): 159–179.

CHAPTER 17

Identity Reconstruction of Chinese Migrant Women in Ireland Jun Ni

Introduction When migrants move from their country of origin to a different country, they meet unfamiliar behaviour, symbols, rules, roles, beliefs and values. It is a challenge for migrants to deal with two cultures simultaneously, because the home culture and the host culture are both exerting pressure to conform. Thus, this often leads to changes in a person’s sense of self and identity. Migrants face the dilemma of cross-cultural adaptation and identity maintenance. Scholars in the field of intercultural studies have discussed the changing identities that include both the home and host culture and that result from cross-cultural contact. Kim points out that hybridisation of identity emerges from the simultaneous engagement in both the home culture and the host culture, which resembles the development of a larger intercultural identity as a result of ­engaging in the process of cross-cultural adaptation.1 The current study, therefore, is a response to this call and an attempt to examine the relationship between cross-cultural adaptation and identity reconstruction in J. Ni (*)  School of Languages, Law, Social Sciences, Technological University, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2_17

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416  J. NI

an empirical study of the cross-cultural adjustment process of Chinese migrant women in Ireland. Using a thematic analysis approach, in-depth ­face-to-face interviews were conducted with twelve Chinese women. It is necessary to introduce the background of migration in Ireland and the migration history of Chinese in Ireland. Ireland has traditionally been a country of emigration, particularly to Great Britain, the United States and Australia.2 Following the economic boom of the Celtic Tiger in the mid-1990s, Ireland came to be considered a country of immigration, with a culturally diverse society as a result.3 The 2006 Census showed that around 10% of residents in Ireland were of foreign nationality.4 Net migration to Ireland increased from 8000 in 1996 to over 420,000 in 2006. Non-EU migrants dominated the migration flows between 2001 and 2004. Among the various categories of non-EU nationals coming to Ireland in the last decade, the great majority have been workers (about 280,000 work permits were issued between 1998 and 2008), followed by asylum seekers (74,000 applications made from 1998 to 2008), students and dependents.5 Chinese migrants make up one of the largest minority ethnic groups in Ireland. There have been two main waves of Chinese migration into Ireland. The first came mostly from Hong Kong. Long before the Celtic Tiger days, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, earlier Chinese migrants, mostly originating from Hong Kong, moved to the Republic of Ireland from Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Members of the first wave tend to run their own businesses, mostly in the food and catering sector, and most have settled permanently in Ireland.6 The second wave began in the late 1990s and mostly were students who came from the People’s Republic of China.7 The population of Chinese migrants increased significantly between 2002 and 2006. Statistically, 11,161 Chinese people were living in Ireland in April 2006—an increase of 91% on the 2002 figure of 5842.8 However, there is widespread agreement that in fact there are more Chinese immigrants than this figure reveals in Ireland. Other estimates, based on PPS numbers, work permit and visa data, residency figures and other indicators, show the top three foreign national groupings in 2006 residing in Ireland as: Poland, 150,000; China, 60,000 and Lithuania, 45,000.9 Given the large number of Chinese immigrants living in Ireland and the increasing benefits of trade with China, there is a great opportunity for exploratory research on the cultural identity of Chinese migrants. My strong personal interest in the field of intercultural and migration studies motivated me to undertake this study. Based on my own experiences

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as a Chinese migrant woman living in Ireland for nearly eighteen years, I was inspired to explore other Chinese migrant women’s ­cross-cultural experiences in Ireland to see whether they had the same kind of journey as mine. It was fascinating to discover the concerns of Chinese migrant women, and to analyse their intercultural experiences and cultural identity in relation to my personal experience. It could be argued, of course, that my own bias has influenced the research—I feel, however, that it gave me some empathy for the participants, and allowed them to be more open during the interviews. It is hoped this research will provide an original insight into the identity-development of Chinese migrant women living in Ireland.

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Migration The situations and conditions that influence migration are generally tested in terms of push and pull factors.10 Push and pull factors are those factors which either forcefully ‘push’ people into migration or attract them. Push factors are negative factors tending to force migrants to leave origin countries, while pull factors are positive factors attracting migrants to go to destination countries in the expectation of improving their standard of living. According to Kofman, women migrate due to a diversity of motivations, including better economic opportunities, to achieve a greater degree of independence, to escape patriarchal oppression, or increasing participation in higher education.11 Breton is generally credited with introducing the concept of institutional completeness to explore how migrants integrate in host societies.12 According to Breton’s research conducted in the United States: ‘Many [ethnic communities] have developed a … formal structure and contain organisations of various sorts: religious, educational, political, recreational, national, and professional. Some have organised welfare and mutual aid societies. Some operate their own radio station or publish their own newspapers and periodicals. The community may also sustain a number of commercial and services organisations. Finally, it may have its own churches and sometimes its own schools’.13 Researchers have investigated the relationships between institutional completeness and acculturation strategies. Ward and Kennedy suggest that migrants may be discouraged from participating in the host society due to a high level of institutional completeness.14 Immigration communities with high levels of institutional completeness are more likely to allow the separation strategy to prevail and have the potential to cause

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acculturative stress. Portes and Rumbaut argue that migrants can soften ‘their landing’ in the host country by using existing social networks and organisations.15

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Ethnic Identity According to Phinney, ethnic identity revolves around the knowledge an individual obtains from participation in a social group regarding his or her membership of that group, manifested as a component of ­self-concept.16 This membership offers the individual both emotional support and values. Phinney highlights that ethnic identity consists of the following components: ethnic self-identification in terms of membership of a group, participation in and commitment to the group, possessing both positive and negative attitudes towards the group, a feeling of common attitudes and values, and the practising of ethnic and cultural traditions.17 Selfidentification refers to the self-assignment of an ethnic label. Phinney states that the attitude concerning an individual’s group membership can affect their ethnic identity.18 It is commonly accepted that ethnic identity is reinforced by positive attitudes and contentment with a person’s own ethnic group. Negative attitudes towards a person’s own ethnic group can lead to a denial of one’s ethnic identity. The components frequently used to evaluate ethnic involvements are language, friendship, social organisations, religion, cultural traditions and politics. Fishman points out that language is one of the most significant markers of ethnic identification,19 and Chow echoes that language can be considered a core aspect of identity and culture. Social Identity Theory states that membership of a group offers individuals a sense of belonging that enhances a positive self-concept.20 It was Lewin who first emphasised how critical the ability to identify with a group is to maintaining a sense of well-being, thus establishing the importance of social identity.21 Tajfel and Turner argue that the mental health and stability of ethnic group members is reliant on a sense of group identity.22 As ethnic group members value their ethnic group and extract self-esteem from their sense of belonging, ethnic identification may therefore play an important role in self-concept. Yamada and Singelis declare that ethnic identity can be affected by contact with another ethnic group.23 Scholars in the field of intercultural studies have discussed the changing identities that include both the home and host culture and that result from cross-cultural contact. Kim points out that hybridisation of identity emerges from the simultaneous engagement

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in both the home culture and the host culture, which resembles the development of a larger intercultural identity as a result of engaging in the process of cross-cultural adaptation.24 Petkova declares that most sojourners have developed a hybrid identity in the process of cross-cultural adaptation, though they struggle to confirm their identity.25

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Cross-Cultural Adaptation It was Oberg who defined the distress that the sojourner experiences as a result of losing all familiar indications, signs and symbols from their physical and social environment as ‘culture shock’.26 Furham and Bochner find that symptoms known to arise from culture shock are feelings of a loss of importance, confusion, anxiety, depression and stress.27 Berry lists four strategies of acculturation: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation.28 Gudykunst introduces the Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) model, which states that cross-cultural adaptation is a method of uncertainty reduction. Culture shock is a product of uncertainty; in order to reduce uncertainty and adapt effectively, migrants must have a solid sense of self-awareness, adaptive attitudes and behaviour, and high tolerance for ambiguity.29 According to Kim, the concept of cross-cultural adaptation has a broader definition than most similar concepts, such as acculturation, adjustment, coping/adjustment and integration. Kim describes the adaptive personality as: openness, strength, positivity. The adaptive personality immensely aids the process of cross-cultural adaptation for migrants.30 Kim’s integrative theory of cross-cultural adaptation appears to be dominant among the theories related to cross-cultural adaptation. Utilising a wide range of factors such as communication and psychological and sociological research, the aim of the theory is to enhance understanding of the processes of c­ ross-cultural adaptation.31

Research Methodology The empirical work for the current research was informed by a qualitative approach based on thematic analysis. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a view to capturing narratives of Chinese migrant women’s identity. A total of twelve women from different provinces and cities in China were chosen to participate in the interviews, all having lived in Ireland for more than five years. Their ages range from

420  J. NI Table 17.1  Profiles of research participants Interviewees

Age, marital status and children

Reasons for coming to Ireland

Prior crosscultural experiences

Visa

Interviewee 1

29, single, no children 41, married with one child

Study

None

Stamp 2 Basic

Study

Stamp 2 Intermediate

27, single, no children

Study

Travelled to Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia for short periods Studied in Finland for one year None None

Stamp 3 No English

Family unification Study

None

Stamp 3 No English

None

Stamp 4 Intermediate

Study

None

Stamp 2 Intermediate

To visit her sister Study

Studied in Stamp 4 Intermediate Moscow for one year None Stamp 2 Advanced

Study

None

Stamp 2 Intermediate

Family unification

None

Stamp 3 No English

Interviewee 2

Interviewee 3

Interviewee 4

20, single, no children Interviewee 5 39, married with one Irishborn child Interviewee 6 55, married with one child Interviewee 7 30, married with two Irishborn children Interviewee 8 26, married, no children Interviewee 9 42, married with one Irishborn child Interviewee 10 27, married, no children Interviewee 11 35, single, no children Interviewee 12 47, married with two children

Family unification Family unification

Level of English

Stamp 2 Advanced

Stamp 3 Basic

twenty to mid-fifties. The participants were selected partly because of availability and partly because of their visa status (see Table 17.1). • The first group is those who hold a student visa (Stamp 2). There are six women in this group.

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• The second group is those who hold a dependent visa (Stamp 3). There are four women in this group; they are the spouses of migrants who hold work permits or long-term residency. • The third group is those who hold a Stamp 4 visa. There are two women in this group. They have obtained long-term residence in Ireland because they have Irish-born children. The interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese because it was felt that the participants would feel more comfortable interviewed in their mother tongue by a co-ethnic interviewer, and therefore the validity of the research would increase. Braun and Clarke state that it is essential for verbal data such as interviews to be transcribed to written form in order to conduct a thematic analysis.32 The interview data of the current research was transcribed in Chinese and then translated into English. I present data from three themes derived from the interviews, identified as facilitators of or hindrances to the cross-cultural adaptation of Chinese women. In presenting these themes, I have provided detailed descriptions of their narratives to give voices to these Chinese women immigrants. I believe that the use of thick descriptions can be more trustworthy and credible than statistics, because thick description facilitates a deeper understanding of the significance of Chinese women’s cross-cultural experiences.

Findings and Discussion Based on an analysis of Chinese women’s cross-cultural adaptation experience in Ireland, this study identifies seven facilitators of the ­cross-cultural adaptation of the Chinese migrant women: motivation; prior cross-cultural experiences; preparation; perceived social support; integrative attitude; gender; and intercultural personality characteristics. Through exploring the concept of acculturative stress of Chinese migrant women in Ireland, this study identifies barriers to the cross-cultural adaptation of Chinese migrant women—cultural distance, visa status and perceived discrimination. This study also suggests that host language (English) proficiency, institutional completeness, age of immigration, length of stay in the host country, and the use of modern technology can be both facilitators of and barriers to cross-cultural adaptation (see Table 17.2). These facilitating/hindering factors are deemed significant based on the frequency of reference to them and on the importance which the women attributed to them during the interviews.

422  J. NI Table 17.2  Facilitators and barriers to cross-cultural adaptation identified in this study Facilitators

Hindrances

• Motivation • Cultural distance • Prior cross-cultural experience • Visa status • Preparation • Perceived discrimination • Perceived social support from two sources: Chinese networks and the host society • Integrative attitude • Gender • Personality characteristics: openness, self-esteem and self-efficacy Facilitators/Hindrances Host language proficiency, institutional completeness, length of stay in the host country, age, and the use of modern technology can be both facilitators of and barriers to cross-cultural adaptation

Factors Which Facilitate Cross-Cultural Adaptation The Chinese women in the current study were highly motivated to come to Ireland for a better life, such as for family reunification or further education. Education is valued and prioritised in Confucian beliefs. Chinese parents highly value it and want to give their children the best education they can. Some women in this study mentioned that they were the only child in the family. The One-Child Policy in China, with families allowed only one child, has resulted in parents devoting themselves to their only child, with little regard to cost or effort. Their parents decide to send them abroad to study and pay the tuition fees, because they believe that studying abroad offers them better opportunities. With the growth of China and its emergence as a major world player, English has become very important for it. As an international language, it is the language of business, technology, sport and aviation in China. Chinese migrants believe they can find a better job in China with better English language skills, and they chose to come to Ireland specifically to improve their English, either through courses or through communication with native speakers in an English-speaking environment. Although dependent on personal circumstances, the majority of women in this study see coming to Ireland as an opportunity to escape family strictness and enjoy independence, adventure and self-fulfilment.

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These women’s motivations are largely ‘pull’ factors rather than ‘push’ factors. As a result, they had a more open and positive attitude towards Irish culture on arrival, which in turn facilitated their cross-cultural adaptation. Most women in this study had no prior cross-cultural experience; however, those who did highlighted that their prior cross-cultural experience assisted them in managing their life in Ireland, particularly in the early stages of migration. The Chinese women in this study put a lot of effort into preparing themselves before they started their journey of migration to Ireland, in order to adjust to an unfamiliar environment in the host country. The preparation included gathering information about life in Ireland from friends or family members there, and from education agents in China, as well as improving English language skills in order to be able to survive in the new country. Pre-arrival information gathering facilitates an individual’s adaptation to the host culture on arrival, because it creates reasonable expectations which can help reduce uncertainty and anxiety, which in turn facilitates adaptation. The Chinese women in this study received social support from two sources: existing Chinese networks in both China and Ireland, and host-culture networks. They stated that they made friends with Irish people such as neighbours, landlords and work colleagues. They set up new social networks in Ireland and gained support from within the host community. Overcoming the language barrier is crucial to creating these social networks. This illustrates the importance of a high level of English, which allowed them to deepen their friendship with Irish people. The Chinese women in this study acknowledge that they have received practical support from Irish society and that social support has facilitated cross-cultural adaptation. There are governmental and n ­ on-governmental organisations that provide help for Chinese migrants, such as free consultations and Chinese interpreting services. The Chinese women in the current research indicated their use of these services in Ireland. The women agree that having an open personality makes it easier to adjust to life in Ireland. This study finds that women with high levels of efficacy have adapted to life in Ireland better and are more satisfied with life, because they tended to regard setbacks encountered during the process of adaptation as challenges rather than difficulties. The Chinese women in this study believe it is not difficult for women to adapt to life in Ireland, because women enjoy a relatively equal status to men and are respected.

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Factors Which Hinder Cross-Cultural Adaptation Through reviewing the concept of acculturative stress of Chinese women immigrants in Ireland, this study identifies three factors which hinder the cross-cultural adaptation of Chinese migrant women: cultural distance, visa status and perceived discrimination. In the current study, cultural distance is an important factor which made the Chinese migrant women’s process of cross-cultural adaptation more difficult. Irish culture is very different from Chinese culture. For example, throughout the data English-language acquisition is seen as one of the biggest challenges that Chinese women migrants encounter. The Chinese women in this study drew comparisons between Chinese and Irish drinking cultures. They complained about extensive alcohol drinking in Irish culture. This perception caused them to develop negative attitudes towards Irish culture, which in turn affected their adaptation. The Chinese women in this study feel structurally discriminated against within the migration system in Ireland, because they do not have the same freedom to apply for full-time jobs as people from European Union countries. The majority of women in this study work in the unskilled sector, for example in restaurants, pubs or cleaning companies, because they have less opportunity to enter the labour market. Their adaptation is thus hindered because they have less opportunity to achieve their personal goals and objectives. They feel they are losing out in the competition with other European migrants because they are structurally disadvantaged. This structural disadvantage in turn hinders their adaptation to the host culture, as they struggle to access the opportunities available to European migrants who are not bound by visa restrictions. This is very difficult for individual migrants to change, no matter how motivated they are, as the power to change such restrictions resides with government authorities. The Chinese women in this study mentioned being subjected to discrimination both in work and on the streets. They reported that they experienced racial harassment and abuse from youths and teenagers on the street because they are a visible minority in Ireland. This perception of discrimination caused them to develop negative attitudes towards Irish culture, which in turn hindered their adaptation by reducing the amount of contact with the host community and culture. Chinese students coming to Ireland had limited support in dealing with immigration and other services, despite paying high tuition fees. Experiences of renewing

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visas in immigration offices were unpleasant and often created stress and anxiety, thus making their process of adaptation more difficult. The Chinese women in this study stated that they feel discriminated against in the work place. Some feel they have less opportunity for promotion than EU staff; some are paid less and have to work longer, more unsociable hours. As well as this, they feel their career paths are impeded by prejudiced management who favour staff from within the EU. The negative feelings that Chinese migrant women associate with these events individually affect their individual cross-cultural adaptation, as these negative experiences cause feelings of rejection and prevent them from participating in the host culture. Factors that Can Be Both Facilitators of and Barriers to Cross-Cultural Adaptation This study suggests that host language (English) proficiency, i­nstitutional completeness, age, length of stay in the host country, use of media and modern technology can be both facilitators of and barriers to ­cross-cultural adaptation. Good English skills can facilitate communication with the host nationals and use of mass host media; a poor level of English is perceived as a barrier for Chinese women migrants attempting to integrate into the host society. Institutional completeness offers a way to make a transition from the migrant women’s own culture into the new culture; high levels of institutional completeness hinder communication with the host society. Women who migrated at a younger age found it easier to adapt to the host society, while women who migrated at an older age found it more difficult to adjust. Migrants experience different levels of stress at different times of their residency in the host country. The period of arrival is a critical phase in which migrants experience physical, social and cultural changes or losses. Uncertainty is at its highest level at the initial stage and reduces gradually with time. Using modern technology can be helpful to diminish homesickness, but it can potentially keep migrants away from people of the host culture. Development of Intercultural Identity The current study suggests that migration creates a space for personal maturity, which leads to the development of a larger intercultural

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identity, in addition to the material benefits gained from migrating to Ireland. Successful adaptation results in an intercultural identity. The Chinese women in this study openly appreciate both their own home culture and the new host culture. An intercultural identity has been developed, integrating aspects of both Chinese and Irish culture: Interviewee 1: I feel that I am becoming international. I benefit from my traditional Chinese culture so I hope that I can keep it. Meanwhile, I have absorbed Western culture and I will keep learning it. I feel that I have enhanced my abilities in Ireland. First, my English has improved. Second, I have learned to think independently and make decisions on my own. I was childish and impulsive when I was in China, but now I handle matters with discretion. I was pampered and indulged since childhood, but now I do things conscientiously and reliably. I also make more money than in China. I am very content with my life. Interviewee 2: I like reading the Buddhism book Xinyu. It is about the enlightenment of life and guidance of people’s behaviour. I practise Buddhism. I like Chinese traditional culture. I decorated my room in a Chinese style using Chinese knots and Chinese paper-cutting. My friends were fascinated when they came to visit my house. I cook Chinese food for them. I like reading Chinese classical poems. I participated in a Chinese poem competition on the internet. I also like reading English novels and English magazines. I often listen to BBC news, especially reports about China and financial news. I would love to get to know more about Western culture and introduce Chinese culture to Irish people.

Most Chinese women have an English name, and they use it at the early stage of migration as a sign of assimilation. However, they feel their Chinese name is part of the cultural identity they were given by their parents. This is a strong signal of their pride in their culture and their ancestry. Interviewee 3: I have an English name. I used my English name when I first came to Ireland until I met a friend in Ireland. He told me that my Chinese name is pleasant to the ears and he asked me why I gave it up. He advised me to keep my own cultural identity. His words woke me up. My name was given to me by my parents and I should respect my parents. Actually, my Chinese name is easy to remember. So I started to use my Chinese name. Now my colleagues still use my English name, because they are used to it. But the friends I met later call me by my Chinese name.

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Interviewee 8: An English name is more easily accepted by Irish people because my English name is easier for my classmates to pronounce. But I feel that my English name does not belong to me. Sometimes I don’t even know it is me when other people call my English name. So I think it is better to tell other people my Chinese name. At least it is my real name.

Chinese women express pride in their Chinese culture and traditions, including Chinese food culture. They are proud of being Chinese because the reputation and importance of China in the West has been growing steadily. They refer to the increased status of China on the international scene and deprive pride from it. Interviewee 4: I am very proud of being Chinese, because China is becoming stronger. One of my Chinese friends has an Irish boyfriend. His mother looked down upon my friend because she thought Chinese people were very poor. Some short-sighted Irish didn’t know that China has developed fast over the last few years. I am proud that China is becoming one of the strongest countries in the world. Now more and more Irish people go to China on holiday and they get to know China better than before.

Self-esteem helped these Chinese women feel accepted by the people in the host society; thus they could easily adapt to life in Ireland. Chinese women who gain an understanding of the social norms, attitudes and behaviours in the host country feel closer to the host culture. This in turn gives them self-confidence to bring their own culture to the attention of Irish people, and they feel proud of playing the role of an intercultural ambassador. They want to maintain their Chinese cultural identity and heritage, and at the same time are committed to developing relationships with Irish mainstream society. Interviewee 10: I shared Chinese culture with my Irish friends. I showed Chinese knots and ornaments of the Chinese zodiac to my friends. I also explained the meaning of the Chinese zodiac to my friends, and they were amazed. … I like eating Chinese food and cooking Chinese food. My Irish friends and neighbours like eating the food I cook for them. I introduce Chinese food to them and recommend Chinese supermarkets to them so they can buy Chinese food. They get recipes from me and learn to cook Chinese food. I am very happy that I can have a big influence on them.

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Conclusion This research presents an original qualitative study on the c­ ross-cultural adaptation process and identity reconstruction of Chinese migrant women in Ireland. The research findings emphasise the difficult nature of cross-cultural adaptation. Chinese women come to Ireland with deeply engrained traditions, such as a strong work ethic and desire for education. Their experiences tell us that no matter how prepared or motivated they are, there are setbacks, such as language barriers and perceived discrimination, which hinder their cross-cultural adaptation and therefore complicate their sense of belonging in Irish society. Overall, most women in this study are positive about their experiences of living in Ireland. They believe these experiences have broadened their mind and they have become more independent and mature. The research findings suggest that migration creates a space for personal maturity, which leads to development of a larger intercultural identity. Successful adaptation results in an intercultural identity. This study aims to make a worthwhile contribution to the field of research of identity-development and cross-cultural adaptation of female migrants. Firstly, the experiences of Chinese female migrants in an Irish host society have not been specifically studied before. It is therefore useful for this research to do so. As Irish culture and society are becoming increasingly diverse, it is legitimate and useful for this study to analyse one element of Irish diversity—Chinese female migrants—as one component of contemporary Ireland. Secondly, the individual experiences and perceptions of Chinese migrant women need to be explored, as they are constantly changing along with Irish society, and research is rapidly rendered obsolete. A limitation of this study is the sample size. Using a q ­ualitative research framework, this study reports on the Chinese women’s ­self-reported opinions and perspectives, which may not be entirely reflective of the experiences of other migrant groups. The sample size is small and not generalisable. It does not address the social context; it is one small snapshot in time. Future studies would necessitate further investigations of similar topics with different population groups and with larger and more random samples, including Chinese male migrants and undocumented migrants.

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Notes





1. Young Yun Kim, Becoming Intercultural (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001). 2. Torben Krings, “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Migrants and Migration Policy: Ireland,” in Migration and the Economic Crisis: Implications for Policy in the European Union (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010). 3. Martin Ruhs, “Managing the Immigration and Employment of Non-EU Nationals in Ireland,” Studies in Social Policy, no. 19 (2005): 1–152. 4. Central Statistics Office, Census: Non-Irish Nationals Living in Ireland (Cork: Central Statistics Office, 2007). 5.  Ruhs, “Managing the Immigration and Employment of Non-EU Nationals in Ireland”. 6. Nicola Yau, “Celtic Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Exploring Identity Among Second Generation Chinese in Ireland,” Translocation 2, no. 1 (2007): 48–69, 49. 7.  Yin Yun Wang, The Chinese Earthquake Appeal Network in Ireland, Migrant Networks Project, Trinity Immigration Initiative, 2008. 8. Central Statistics Office, Census: Principal Demographic Results (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2008). 9. “Who We Are. A Supplement to the Irish Times,” Irish Times, Dublin, May 23, 2006. 10. Eleonore Kofman, “Female ‘Birds of Passage’ a Decade Later: Gender and Immigration in the European Union,” International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999): 269–299; Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). 11. Kofman, “Female ‘Birds of Passage’.” 12. Raymond Breton, “Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants,” The American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (1964): 193–205. 13.  Breton, “Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants,” 194. 14. Colleen Ward and Antony Kennedy, “Strategies, Psychological Adjustment, and Sociocultural Competence During Cross-cultural Transitions,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 18, no. 3 (1994): 329–343. 15.  Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006). 16. Jean S. Phinney, “The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure: A New Scale for Use with Diverse Groups,” Journal of Early Adolescence 7, no. 2 (1992): 156–176.

430  J. NI 17.  Jean S. Phinney, “Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults,” Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990): 499–514. 18. Phinney, “Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults.” 19. Joshua A. Fishman, “Language and Ethnicity,” in Language and Ethnicity, and Intergroup Relations, ed. Howard Giles (London: Academic Press, 1977). 20. Henry Chow, The Challenge of Diversity: Ethnic Identity Maintenance and Heritage Language Retention in the Canadian Mosaic, Commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage for the Ethnocultural, Racial, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity and Identity Seminar, Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 1–2, 2001, 4. 21. Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflict (New York: Harper, 1948). 22.  Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986), 7–24. 23.  Ann-Marie Yamada and Theodore M. Singelis, “Biculturalism and ­Self-construal,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23, no. 5 (1999): 697–709. 24. Kim, Becoming Intercultural. 25. Diana Petkova, Culture Shock and Adaptation in a Multiethnic City. Paper presented at the third “Diversity in Cities: Visible and Invisible Walls” Conference, December 2007. The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series Index: http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/ EURODIVPapers/default.htm. 26. Kalervo Oberg, Culture Shock and the Problems of Adjustment to New Cultural Environment (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1958). 27.  Adrian Furham and Stephen Bochner, Culture Shock: Psychological Reactions to Unfamiliar Environments (New York: Methuen, 1986). 28. John W. Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” Applied Psychology: An International Review 46, no. 1 (1997): 5–68. 29. William B. Gudykunst, An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment. Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005). 30. Kim, Becoming Intercultural. 31. Kim, Becoming Intercultural. 32.  Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, no. 2 (2006): 77–101.

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Bibliography Berry, John W. “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation.” Applied Psychology: An International Review 46, no. 1 (1997): 5–68. Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, no. 2 (2006): 77–101. Breton, Raymond. “Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants.” The American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (1964): 193–205. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003. Central Statistics Office. Census: Non-Irish Nationals Living in Ireland. Cork: Central Statistics Office, 2007. Central Statistics Office. Census: Principal Demographic Results. Dublin: Stationery Office, 2008. Chow, Henry. The Challenge of Diversity: Ethnic Identity Maintenance and Heritage Language Retention in the Canadian Mosaic. Commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage for the Ethnocultural, Racial, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity and Identity Seminar, Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 1–2, 2001. Fishman, Joshua A. “Language and Ethnicity.” In Language and Ethnicity, and Intergroup Relations, edited by Howard Giles. London: Academic Press, 1977. Furham, Adrian, and Stephen Bochner. Culture Shock: Psychological Reactions to Unfamiliar Environments. New York: Methuen, 1986. Gudykunst, William B. An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment: Theorizing About Intercultural Communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005. Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” In Theorizing Diaspora, edited by Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Heine, Steven J., Darrin R. Lehman, Hazel Rose Markus, and Shinobu Kitayama. “Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard?” Psychological Review, no. 106 (1999): 766–794. Kim, Young Yun. Communication and Cross-Cultural Adaptation. London: Multilingual Matters, 1988. Kim, Young Yun. Becoming Intercultural. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001. Kim, Young Yun. “Inquiry in Intercultural and Development Communication.” Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 55, no. 3 (2005): 554–577.

432  J. NI Kofman, Eleonore. “Female ‘Birds of Passage’ a Decade Later: Gender and Immigration in the European Union.” International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999): 269–299. Krings, Torben. “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Migrants and Migration Policy: Ireland.” In Migration and the Economic Crisis: Implications for Policy in the European Union. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010. Markus, Hazel Rose, and Shinobu Kitayama. “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation.” Psychological Review 98, no. 2 (1991): 224–253. Oberg, Kalervo. Culture Shock and the Problems of Adjustment to New Cultural Environment. Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1958. Petkova, Diana. Culture Shock and Adaptation in a Multiethnic City. Paper presented at the third “Diversity in Cities: Visible and Invisible Walls” Conference, December 2007. The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series Index: http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/EURODIVPapers/ default.htm. Phinney, Jean S. “Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults.” Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990): 499–514. Phinney, Jean S. “The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure: A New Scale for Use with Diverse Groups.” Journal of Early Adolescence 7, no. 2 (1992): 156–176. Phinney, Jean S., Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, and Paul Vedder. “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective.” Journal of Social Issues 57, no. 3 (2001): 493–510. Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait, 3rd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006. Ruhs, Martin. “Managing the Immigration and Employment of Non-EU Nationals in Ireland.” Studies in Social Policy, no. 19 (2005): 1–152. Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, 276–293. Chicago: Psychology Press, 1986. Ting-Toomey, Stella. “Ethnic Identity and Close Friendship in ­Chinese-American College Students.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 5, no. 4 (1981): 383–406. Tsai, Jeanne L., Yu-Wen Ying, and Peter Allen Lee. “Cultural Predictors of Self-esteem: A Study of Chinese American Female and Male Young Adults.” Journal of Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 7, no. 3 (2001): 284–297. Wang, Yin Yun. The Chinese Earthquake Appeal Network in Ireland. Migrant Networks Project, Trinity Immigration Initiative, 2008.

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Ward, Colleen, and Antony Kennedy. “Acculturation Strategies, Psychological Adjustment, and Sociocultural Competence During Cross-cultural Transitions.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 18, no. 3 (1994): 329–343. Yamada, Ann-Marie, and Theodore M. Singelis. “Biculturalism and S ­ elf-construal.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23, no. 5 (1999): 697–709. Yau, Nicola. “Celtic Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Exploring Identity Among Second Generation Chinese in Ireland.” Translocation 2, no. 1 (2007): 48–69.

Index

A Acculturation, 417, 419 Anthropology, 214, 215 Anti-Chinese sentiment, 350 Anti-colonialism, 231 Anti-imperialism, 231, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 246–249 Anti-Japanese sentiment, 167, 168 Anti-westernism, 162, 163 Archaeology, 206 Assimilation, 269–271 ronghe policy, 270 B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 183–185, 189, 192, 193, 195 ‘Big’ and ‘small’ nationalism, 263 Bihe guan zhuren, 32 Boundaries, 334–336, 342 Buddhism, 61, 62, 66, 68, 76 C Censorship, 95

Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CCCYL), 87–91, 94–96, 101–106 Chinese-America, 351, 353 Chinese ethnicity, 262, 266, 269, 276 Chinese identity, 122, 128, 138, 144, 146, 152, 153, 363, 380 Chinese nationalism, 262, 264, 265, 270, 272, 277 Chinese traditions, 374, 379, 380 culture, 114, 118, 119, 122, 128 heritage, 118, 124, 128 values, 118, 124 Chinese-Western relations colonialism, 70 competition, 75 imperialism, 64, 66, 69, 70 Cinema, 66 Civil society, 99, 372 Communism, 242, 244, 366–370, 372, 374 Community, 390, 391, 395, 400, 402, 403, 408, 417, 423, 424 Confucianism, 2, 3, 203

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 L. Zhouxiang (ed.), Chinese National Identity in the Age of Globalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4538-2

435

436  Index Cross-cultural adaptation, 415, 419, 421–425, 428 Cultural distance, 421, 422, 424 Cultural studies, 113 Culture, traditional, 61, 62, 64, 72 Cyber nationalism, 85–87, 91, 94 Cyber society, 86 D Development/Aid, 163, 165, 169 Diplomacy, 183, 189, 192, 193, 195 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) nations, 228 Muslim, 228, 230 Third World, 236, 239, 241, 247–249 with Arab, 228, 230 Discrimination, 421, 422, 424, 428 E Economic(s), 310–314, 318, 319, 321, 322, 325 crisis, 184 development, 194, 195, 198 reform, 185, 187 Education, 162, 163 Enlightenment thinker, 4, 5, 9 Entertainment industry, 114 Ethnic identity, 10, 204, 205, 211, 219, 269, 278, 418 minorities, 261, 265, 270, 271, 273, 277; Hoa, 368; policies, 378 policies, 271 violence, 287, 301 Ethnicity, 1, 4, 8, 10, 22, 204, 219, 227–233, 235, 238, 240–243, 246, 248

EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia, 183 European Union, 186, 194 F Fandom, 127 Food and foodways, 263, 274–278, 333–336, 338, 340–345, 348, 353, 354 chow mein, 351 Laksa, 347 Foreign direct investment, 186, 197 Foreign policy, 161–166, 168–170, 173, 174 non-interventionism, 170 Foreign relations, 295, 299 Fostered idols, 114, 115, 117–119, 122, 124, 126–128 G Gaoyangshi bucaizi, 34 Globalisation/Counter-globalisation, 137, 138, 140, 146, 148, 262 Government, 85–87, 91, 93–96, 98–104 H History, 24, 26, 44, 286, 288, 289, 291–294, 300, 301 Chinese, 63, 68, 76 Chinese empire, 204 Republic, 203, 204, 212, 214–217 Hmong, 203–219 Miao, 204, 205 Ho Chi Minh City, 361, 362, 365 Hong Kong, 310–325 Hui, 262, 263, 265–267, 271–278 Huiguan, 365–370, 372–380

Index

I Identity, 23–27, 29, 42, 162–166, 173 Chinese, 61–63, 65, 67, 70, 72, 75–77, 122, 128, 138, 144, 146, 152, 153 construction, 204, 218 individual, 142, 147, 154 national, 140, 143, 155 politics, 151 Identity narratives, 183, 184, 187, 193, 195 China Dream, 187 national humiliation, 186, 187, 189 rejuvenation, 187, 189, 193, 194 Image body image, 70 cultural, 70 national, 61 Indigenous peoples, 203, 204, 206 Infrastructure, 184, 185, 188, 192, 196, 198 Integration/Segregation, 291, 295, 297, 394, 397, 398, 401, 405 Intercultural identity, 415, 419, 425, 428 International relations Sino-Japanese relations, 162, 166, 173, 174 Sino-Malian relations, 162, 166, 170, 173, 174 Ireland, 387, 389–391, 394, 395, 397–405, 416, 417, 419–424, 426–428 Irish identity, 387, 395, 398–401, 404, 405 Islam, 272, 273, 275, 276, 290, 291, 294, 296, 302 in China, 232 Chinese Muslim groups, 230, 246 Chinese Muslims, 230, 240–244, 246 in Communism, 242

  437

J Japan/Japanese, 22–25, 27, 29, 33, 41, 42 culture, 100, 117–119, 124, 126 K Kang Youwei, 22, 26, 37, 41 L Law, 139, 147, 150, 152–154 Liang Qichao, 26, 27, 29, 37, 41 Literature, 29, 63, 67 M Marketing, 114, 117, 119, 123–127 Martial arts, 61–63, 65–73, 76 Mega-events, 309, 310, 317, 325 Migration, 2, 13, 33, 39, 42, 137, 218, 341, 343, 344, 347–349, 353, 416, 417, 423–426, 428 Minorities, 229–232, 235, 240, 242, 246, 262–273, 275–278 Minority (ethnic) policies, 298 Modernism/Futurism, 30, 32, 37 Multi-culturalism, 399, 400 Multilateralism/Multipolarism, 192, 194, 197 Multiple-identities, 388, 392, 393, 395–397, 401, 404, 406 Mythology, 207, 214, 218 Chinese, 63, 66, 76 N Nation/National/Nationalism, 2–8, 10–12, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29, 33, 162–166, 168, 169, 172–175, 285, 286, 302 Chinese, 62, 64, 66, 70, 72, 75

438  Index National identity, 140, 143, 155, 310, 311, 317, 322, 325, 338, 387–389, 391–393, 395, 396, 398, 401, 405–407 National image, 147 National interest, 187, 189, 192, 195 National question, 231–236, 238 Nation-building, 229, 230, 232, 236, 240, 242, 249 Nation state, 138, 139, 141, 143, 145, 146 New nationalism, 85, 87, 88, 91–93, 105, 161–163, 169–171, 173, 174 Nyonya food tradition, 343

242, 263, 269, 293, 299, 310, 363, 418 Popular culture, 94, 100, 113, 122, 127–129 Propaganda, 87, 91–94, 96, 98, 101–106, 168, 272, 273, 298, 299, 311, 340, 349 Q Quantum theory, 144

O Olympics, 309, 310, 313–315, 317–320, 325 ‘One Country, Two Systems’, 311– 313, 315, 316, 318, 323–325 Ontological security, 162, 165, 169, 171, 173, 174 Opium War, 4 Orientalism, 26, 29 Overseas Chinese, 13–15, 23, 33, 311, 333, 334, 336, 337, 339–345, 348–351, 353–355, 363, 387– 389, 391–394, 396–403, 405 huaqiao, 363

R Race colour, 25, 39, 42 eugenics, 43 racism, 21, 25, 26, 28, 32, 35, 41–44, 214 social Darwinism, 25, 35 views on, 22 Religion, 387–389, 391, 393, 394, 397–401, 405 church-state relations, 249 religiosity, 139, 394 religious freedom, 227, 229, 240–242 religious identity, 387, 389, 391– 396, 398, 401, 405–407 Role theory, 162, 165, 166, 173, 174 Roman Catholicism, 390, 391

P Philosophy/Confucianism (datong), 24, 40, 43 Political protests, 229 Politics/political movements, 1, 2, 7, 12, 27, 32, 86, 88, 89, 92, 101, 140, 145, 154, 194, 229, 231,

S Secularism, 249 Self-determination, 232–234 Self identity, 334, 340–342, 347, 350, 353, 354 Shanghai World Expo, 310, 321, 322 Shaolin

Index

kung fu, 61–66, 68, 69, 71–77 monks, 62, 64, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76 myths, 76 Temple, 61, 71–73 tourism, 76 Silk Road(s), 185, 191, 193 Sino-European relations, 148 Social media, 116, 123 Social networks, 86, 87, 90, 94, 95, 106 Society(ies), 138, 141, 147, 155, 389, 394, 395, 397–401, 403–407, 416, 417, 422, 423, 425, 427, 428 hierarchies, 44, 407 military, 62, 64, 270 organisation of, 75, 372 structure of, 398, 406 trade, 341 Sociology, 40, 216, 336 South-east Asia, 341–347 State repression, 287, 299–301 State security, 287, 298, 300, 301 Subjective well-being (SWB), 387, 389, 391–393, 406 Surveillance, 154, 287, 300 T Temples, 361, 362, 365–380 Territorial disputes, 164, 168, 170 Tet (New Year), 361 Third World, 236, 239, 241, 247–249 Tianxiaism, 2, 3

  439

U United Nations African Union, 170, 171 MINUSMA, 171 peacekeeping, 162, 166, 170–175 Utopia utopianism, 22, 29 utopias, 21, 30–32, 34 Uyghurs, 287, 289–291, 293–297, 299, 300 V Vietnam, 362, 363, 365–368, 370–377, 379, 380 W Web 2.0, 85 Women, 416, 417, 419–428 World War, 1, 5 Wuxia, 63–70, 72, 76, 77 X Xi Jinping, 161, 173, 174, 184, 185, 187, 193, 194 Xinjiang, 285–302 Y Yellow peril, 22–24, 27–30, 33–35 Young people, 87–90, 93, 95, 96, 99, 104, 106 Youth culture, 102, 119, 128