Chinese Émigré Intellectuals and Their Quest for Liberal Values in the Cold War, 1949–1969 9789004466043, 9789004466036

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction China Rescue, Democratization, and the Émigré Schools of Thought in the Cold War Era
1 The Three Émigré Schools of Thought and Their Adherents
2 Relevance of the Cold War Émigrés to Contemporary China
3 Major Questions to Be Addressed
4 Description of Chapters and Major Findings of the Book
Chapter 1 Saving China from Communism and Fighting for Democracy: Prioritizing the Two Tasks
1 The Loyal Critic to Chiang Kai-shek: The Case of Xu Fuguan
2 Yin Haiguang and His Pursuit of Democratization
3 Zhang Junmai and His Prioritization of Recovering the Mainland
4 Conclusion
Chapter 2 The Influence of Cold War Currents on Chinese Émigré Intellectuals
1 Liberals Who Departed from Socialist Tendencies
2 Moderate Socialists Who Remained Consistent in Their Beliefs
3 Cold War Currents as a Stimulus for the Revitalization of Confucianism
4 Conclusion
Chapter 3 In Search of a Liberal-Scientific Modern China: The Case of Yin Haiguang
1 Yin Haiguang’s Quest for a Revival of the “May Fourth Spirit”
2 Yin Haiguang’s Views on Democracy and Freedom, 1947–1956
3 Conflicts with the New Confucians and the Guomindang Officials
4 Yin Haiguang’s Views on Science in the Late 1950s
5 Yin Haiguang in the 1960s: His Reappraisal of Chinese Culture
6 Conclusion
Chapter 4 Balancing Tradition and Modernity: The Case of Zhang Junmai
1 The Confucian Dimension of National Reconstruction, 1949–1969
2 Revival of Confucianism as an Aid to Modernization
3 Confucianism and Zhang Junmai’s Political Ideals
4 Conclusion
Chapter 5 Confucian Ideals for the Chinese Nation with a Liberal Tendency: The Case of Xu Fuguan
1 Xu Fuguan’s Confucian Political Ideals in the 1950s
2 Xu Fuguan’s Cultural Ideals in the Late 1950s and 1960s
3 The 1958 Joint Manifesto on Chinese Culture
4 Conclusion
General Conclusion
Selected Bibliography
Index

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Chinese Émigré Intellectuals and Their Quest for Liberal Values in the Cold War, 1949–1969

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Ideas, History, and Modern China Edited by Ban Wang (Stanford University) Wang Hui (Tsinghua University)

volume 25

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ihmc

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Chinese Émigré Intellectuals and Their Quest for Liberal Values in the Cold War, 1949–1969 By

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Cover image: Cover pages of Free China, Democratic Review and National Renaissance. Sources: Ziyou Zhongguo v. 17, no. 12 (December 1957); Minzhu pinglun v. 1, no. 2 (July 1949); and Zaisheng, no. 253 (October 1949). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Yung, Kenneth Kai-chung, author. Title: Chinese émigré intellectuals and their quest for liberal values in the Cold War, 1949–1969 / by Kenneth Kai-chung Yung. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2021] | Series: Ideas, history, and modern China, 1875–9394 ; volume 25 | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2021026012 (print) | LCCN 2021026013 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004466036 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004466043 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Immigrants—China. | China—Emigration and immigration. | Intellectuals—China. | Cold War. Classification: LCC JV8702 .Y86 2021 (print) | LCC JV8702 (ebook) | DDC 320.51089/951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021026012 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021026013

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1875-9394 ISBN 978-90-04-46603-6 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-46604-3 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

To my parents Yue-leung Yung and Anita Kim-sung Wong and to my wife, Carrie Ka-lai Fung, for their endless support

∵

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction: China Rescue, Democratization, and the Émigré Schools of Thought in the Cold War Era 1 1 The Three Émigré Schools of Thought and Their Adherents 2 2 Relevance of the Cold War Émigrés to Contemporary China 11 3 Major Questions to Be Addressed 13 4 Description of Chapters and Major Findings of the Book 26 1 Saving China from Communism and Fighting for Democracy: Prioritizing the Two Tasks 29 1 The Loyal Critic to Chiang Kai-shek: The Case of Xu Fuguan 30 2 Yin Haiguang and His Pursuit of Democratization 35 3 Zhang Junmai and His Prioritization of Recovering the Mainland 42 4 Conclusion 48 2 The Influence of Cold War Currents on Chinese Émigré Intellectuals 51 1 Liberals Who Departed from Socialist Tendencies 52 2 Moderate Socialists Who Remained Consistent in Their Beliefs 63 3 Cold War Currents as a Stimulus for the Revitalization of Confucianism 76 4 Conclusion 81 3 In Search of a Liberal-Scientific Modern China: The Case of Yin Haiguang 83 1 Yin Haiguang’s Quest for a Revival of the “May Fourth Spirit” 84 2 Yin Haiguang’s Views on Democracy and Freedom, 1947–1956 89 3 Conflicts with the New Confucians and the Guomindang Officials 99 4 Yin Haiguang’s Views on Science in the Late 1950s 112 5 Yin Haiguang in the 1960s: His Reappraisal of Chinese Culture 117 6 Conclusion 125 4 Balancing Tradition and Modernity: The Case of Zhang Junmai 127 1 The Confucian Dimension of National Reconstruction, 1949–1969 128 2 Revival of Confucianism as an Aid to Modernization 137 3 Confucianism and Zhang Junmai’s Political Ideals 141 4 Conclusion 147

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5 Confucian Ideals for the Chinese Nation with a Liberal Tendency: The Case of Xu Fuguan 149 1 Xu Fuguan’s Confucian Political Ideals in the 1950s 150 2 Xu Fuguan’s Cultural Ideals in the Late 1950s and 1960s 162 3 The 1958 Joint Manifesto on Chinese Culture 168 4 Conclusion 181 General Conclusion 183 Selected Bibliography 191 Index 227

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Acknowledgements It has been thirteen years since I began to write my doctoral dissertation on which this book is based. I am heavily indebted to different people who helped me in various stages of the production of this book, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them all here. First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my two supervisors in Sydney, Australia. I am extremely grateful to Prof. Helen Dunstan, who provided me the most important encouragement when I was at the trough of my research. Her guidance and support were essential to my scholarly career and the completion of this study. Without her mentorship, I might well have withdrawn from my studies and quit academia. I am also thankful to Prof. Edmund S.K. Fung, who shared with me his insight in modern Chinese intellectual history and provided the necessary advice on the theoretical framework of this study. His vision has also broadened my horizons in the Chinese liberal tradition. This work would not have been possible without the help of Profs. Dunstan and Fung. At the University of Sydney, I would like to thank a number of colleagues and friends in the Department of History. Prof. John Y. Wong’s demonstration of his seriousness in research was always admirable. Prof. James Curran introduced the department to me when I was a newcomer to the university. Dr. Julie Ann Smith gave me the necessary advice on grant applications. Other staff members in the department, such as Prof. Robert Aldrich, Prof. Warwick Anderson, Prof. Chris Hilliard, Dr. Cindy McCreery, Dr. Michael McDonnell and Prof. Glenda Sluga all provided advice and encouragement at different stages of my doctoral years. I am especially thankful to two of my colleagues, Dr. Chen Changwei and Dr. Sophie Loy-Wilson, for sharing their insights on Sino-foreign relations and the history of Australian Chinese. Back in Hong Kong, where I grew up, I would like to thank a number of mentors who have shaped my scholarly interests and career path. At the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where I received my undergraduate degree, I would like to thank Prof. Hon-ming Yip for introducing me to the history of modern Chinese intellectuals. It has been almost seventeen years, but I still remember how I was fascinated with her article on the postwar activities of the Chinese middle forces. Prof. Stanley Vittoz introduced me to the field of Western liberal tradition and the history of the Cold War. Prof. Cathy Potter provided me with the necessary knowledge of the history of the Soviet Union. All three of them contributed to the formation of the topic addressed in this book—selfexiled Chinese intellectuals and their liberal thought in the Cold War era.

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At the University of Hong Kong, where I obtained my M.Phil. degree, I would like to thank Dr. Priscilla Roberts who introduced me to the field of American diplomatic relations and deepened my interest in Cold War studies. Prof. John Carroll’s insight in Hong Kong history has encouraged my shift in focus to Hong Kong history in recent years. I am thankful to his inspiring advice and support when I encountered difficulties in the first few years of my doctoral studies. I am also grateful to Dr. Peter Cunich who encouraged me to further my doctoral studies in Australia. Moreover, I also appreciate Dr. Michael Share’s encouragement and Prof. Xu Guoqi’s advice on my research. Outside my universities, a number of senior scholars have provided precious suggestions on my research. Profs. John Makeham and Timothy B. Weston provided valuable suggestions as examiners on my doctoral dissertation. Prof. Chi-shing Chak has given his comments on an earlier version of my chapter on Xu Fuguan. Prof. David Elstein has given an insightful commentary on my paper on Zhang Junmai during a conference held in Taipei in 2016. Profs. Hung-lam Chu, King-fai Tam, Chi-kong Lai, and Hon-wai Ho have all shared their thought on my research and concerned about its progress. Prof. Kam-keung Lee particularly shared with me his experience in the New Asia Research Institute, in which a number of émigré intellectuals taught Chinese culture. Mr. Hu Zhiwei (Zheng Yi), the translator of General Zhang Fakui’s reminiscences, particularly shared with me his insightful thoughts on the Chinese Third Force in the 1950s. I would also like to thank various friends in Hong Kong. Carol Tsang, a longtime friend since my early postgraduate years, has always been helpful and encouraging. I am grateful to her support throughout my doctoral studies. Tony Chui shares with me his views on Chinese politics and modern Chinese history. Jack Cheung always shares with me his insights on Chinese intellectual history and is supportive of my publication plan. Chi-man Kwong is always ready to listen to my worries about my research progress. Kate Wong provided the necessary encouragement when I was uncertain about my career prospects. Brian Tsui often shares with me his perspective of Chinese intellectual history. Special thanks must go to Mr. Charles Ng in Sydney, an old friend of my father, whom I met regularly during my studies in Australia. I always enjoyed listening to his past experiences as an editor of the Australian Chinese Daily. I am also thankful to Chun-leung Wong and Novia Wong for their support throughout my doctoral studies. Gathering with them has always been the best way to alleviate my anxiety. Other friends such as Micheal Kam, Gary Luk, Wilhelmina Ko, Phoebe Tang, Zardas Lee, Joey Li and Michelle Tong have all been helpful on one occasion or another. Earlier versions of chapters or parts of chapters in this book were first published as either a journal article or a book chapter:

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Chapter 2: Copyright © 2015 Twentieth Century China Journal, Inc. This article first appeared in Twentieth-Century China, Volume 40, Issue 2, May 2015, pages 146–164. Published with permission by Johns Hopkins University Press. Chapter 4: “Zhang Junmai: The Political and Cultural Thought of a New Confucian,” in Dao Companion to the Contemporary New Confucian Philosophy, ed. David Elstein (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2021), 105–24. At Brill, I am grateful to Dr. Qin Higley, Senior Acquisitions Editor in Asian Studies, and Lauren Bissonette, Assistant Editor, for facilitating the publication of this book. Lastly, I thank my parents, Yue-Leung Yung and Anita Wong, for their everlasting support throughout my postgraduate years. I am also grateful to Uncle Ken and Aunt Robyn for their excellent care during my stay in Sydney. Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Carrie Fung, for her love. She has always been my source of consolation whenever I encounter difficulties in my research.

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

Introduction

China Rescue, Democratization, and the Émigré Schools of Thought in the Cold War Era “Wherever I go, that is China. Why should I have to go to a certain tract of land before I can say I am in China? To the contrary, there is no China on that tract of land,” said Yu Yingshi 余英時 (b. 1930), Emeritus Professor of East Asian Studies at Princeton University, in a newspaper interview in 2008.1 Fifty-eight years earlier, the young Yu, in his early twenties, had fled from the Chinese mainland to the British colony of Hong Kong. In the next twelve years, he completed his undergraduate studies in Hong Kong and his doctoral studies at Harvard University. Then he held a series of academic posts at universities in the United States until his retirement in 2001.2 The case of Yu Yingshi reminds us of the fate of Chinese intellectuals after 1949, a year that not only signifies the establishment of a new Communist regime in China but also marks the beginning of Chinese émigré intellectuals’ self-exile. In that year, thousands of anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals fled the mainland and went to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. I call them émigrés, not exiles, because they were not forced to leave China. They left China because they had made the decision to do so. Upon their departure from China, these émigré intellectuals all shared the same pursuit—the reconstruction of the Chinese nation with freedom and democracy—which can be traced back to the late Qing reformers. Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) and Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), for example, were seeking human rights for national salvation.3 During the Republican era, this quest was continued by adherents of several political schools of thought. To liberals such as Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 1 Chen Wanqian 陳宛茜, “Bushuo shenhua, bushuo guihua, dashi zhishuo renhua 不說神話 不說鬼話 大師只說人話 [The master speaks neither divine nor ghostly language, but only human language],” Lianhe bao 聯合報 [United daily news], 28 June 2008, A12. 2 Yu Yingshi 余英時, “Wo zou guo de lu 我走過的路 [The road that I have walked],” in Yu Yingshi 余英時, Xiandai xueren yu xueshu 現代學人與學術 [Modern scholars and scholarship], ed. Shen Zhijia 沈志佳 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2006), 474–76; Judy Peet, “The Humble Scholar: He Rose from War and Poverty in China to Place in History,” The Star-Ledger, 31 December 2006. 3 Marina Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 114.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_002 Kenneth Kai-chung

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(1887–1936), Fu Sinian 傅斯年 (1896–1950) and Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1907– 1994), the foundation of a modern China should be laid upon the safeguard of individual freedom. Hu Shi once told his readers that “to fight for your individual freedom is to fight for the freedom of your state.”4 The geologist Ding Wenjiang urged the Nationalist government to respect the freedom of thought, which he saw as “the most important condition for peaceful political reforms.”5 Fu Sinian, director of the Institute of History and Philology of Academia Sinica, defended academic freedom as a crucial prerequisite for scientific innovation.6 Zhang Foquan, a professor of politics at Peking University, suggested that individual freedom was beneficial to the advancement of society.7 1

The Three Émigré Schools of Thought and Their Adherents

Moderate socialists such as Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973), Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (Carsun Chang, 1887–1969), and Luo Longji 羅隆基 (1898–1965), who were all founders of the Chinese State Socialist Party (Zhongguo guojia shehuidang 中國國家社會黨), promoted constitutionalism under which freedom, democracy, and human rights should be guaranteed. In the party’s manifesto, they asserted that a free society would increase the efficiency of the government. They also expressed the fear that “the state would lose its soul if there is no freedom of thought.”8 Zhang Junmai, drafter of the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China, put an emphasis on the rule of law and believed that human rights, as the “basis of constitutionalism,” could not be removed by the state.9 Such an elevation of the importance of human rights 4 Hu Shi 胡適, “Jieshao wo ziji de sixiang 介紹我自己的思想 [Introducing my own thought],” in Hu Shi quanji 胡適全集 [The complete works of Hu Shi], vol. 4, ed. Ji Xianlin 季羨林 (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), 663. 5 Ding Wenjiang 丁文江, “Zhongguo zhengzhi de chulu 中國政治的出路 [The prospects of Chinese politics],” Duli pinglun 獨立評論 [Independent critics], no. 11 (July 1932): 4. 6 Ouyang Zhesheng 歐陽哲生, Fu Sinian yi sheng zhi ye yan jiu 傅斯年一生志業研究 [A study of Fu Sinian’s career] (Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2014), 239. 7 Edmund S.K. Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 156. 8 “Women suo yao shuo de hua 我們所要說的話 [The words we want to say],” in Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 中國民主社會黨 [The Chinese democratic socialist party], ed. Fang Qingqiu 方慶秋 (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), 69, originally published in Zaisheng 再生 [National renaissance] (Beijing edition), no. 1 (May 1932). 9 Edmund S.K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 1929– 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 141; Zhang Junmai 張君勱, Zhonghua Minguo minzhu xianfa shijiang 中華民國民主憲法十講 [Ten lectures on the democratic constitution of the Republic of China] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947), 24. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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was shared by Luo Longji, who held a utilitarian view on the concept. The protection of human rights, he wrote, would help “attain the goal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the group.”10 He regarded the freedom of speech in particular as essential for one’s participation in the public domain.11 Confucian scholars attempted to reconcile Chinese tradition and modern democratic values. Acknowledging various material and spiritual differences from Western civilization, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) argued that China should undergo democratization in its own way in the tide of modernization.12 Since the Chinese economy was based on agriculture, reforms should begin at the rural level. He called for a rural reconstruction program guided by democratic principles. Refurbishing the traditional village compact (xiangyue 鄉約), a rural mutual-aid institution in late imperial China, Liang’s program was a joint effort between the intellectuals and the peasants so that they could complement each other in achieving rural self-autonomy.13 Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), saw democratic tendencies in the Confucian ideal of “the rule of rites” (lizhi 禮治). When everyone shares the quality of an “exemplary person” (shi junzi 士君子), ordinary people would then be capable of governing themselves and realizing the “rule of the great unity” (datong zhi zhi 大同之治).14 The above-mentioned intellectuals were all striving for a free, democratic, and modern Chinese nation. Although some of them stayed behind after the Communist takeover in 1949, many of them and their fellows left China and spent the rest of their lives self-exiled outside their motherland. Among all these émigrés, three men—Zhang Junmai, Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969), and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982)—are particularly worthy of scholarly attention. Zhang Junmai has been selected for inclusion in this study because he was not only one of the most famous Chinese moderate socialists 10 Luo Longji 羅隆基, Zhengzhi lunwen 政治論文 [Essays on politics] (Shanghai: Xinyue shudian, 1932), 7. English translation quoted from Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 129. 11 Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China, 165; Fredric J. Spar, “Human Rights and Political Engagement: Luo Longji in the 1930s,” in Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-century China, ed. Roger B. Jeans (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 70–71. 12 He Xinquan 何信全, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu: dangdai xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue yanjiu 儒學與現代民主：當代新儒家政治哲學硏究 [Confucian Studies and Modern Democracy: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Present-day New Confucians] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 16–19. 13 He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 29–30; Guy Alitto, “The Conservative as Sage: Liang Shu-ming,” in The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, ed. Charlotte Furth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 234. 14 He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 45. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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in the Cold War period, but also a politician who participated actively in the Chinese Third Force Movement (Zhongguo disan shili yundong 中國第三勢力 運動) in the 1940s and the early 1950s. Born in the late nineteenth century, Zhang belonged to a senior generation of Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s. Compared with most émigré intellectuals in the decade, he had a deeper understanding of moderate socialism and, as this book will explain, advocated a more balanced integration between different schools of thought and assigned a clear role to each school in modernizing China. Unlike most émigré intellectuals in Taiwan or Hong Kong, Zhang did not rely on the Nationalist government for the task of recovering the Chinese mainland. Consistent with his stance in the 1940s, he preferred organizing an independent military force to expel Communism from China. His reputation as a long-time liberal and a Third Force leader also won him attention from American intelligence agents, who once considered sponsoring his Third Force Movement in the early 1950s. The case of Zhang Junmai is worth studying because his experience in the political and intellectual arenas was indeed unique among his contemporaries. Existing scholarly studies on Zhang Junmai focus on his pre-1949 activities and thought. Roger Jeans and Zheng Dahua 鄭大華 have published two excellent biographies. Jeans explores various aspects of Zhang’s political life in the Republican era.15 Zheng Dahua provides a comprehensive study of Zhang’s life and his major writings. However, he takes an official Communist standpoint and criticizes Zhang for being anti-Marxist.16 Xue Huayuan 薛化元 puts Zhang’s thought in a nationalist framework. He suggests that, from the early 1930s until the later phases of the Sino-Japanese War, Zhang gave priority to the interests of the state over the pursuit of democracy whenever China was in crisis or instability.17 In contrast to Xue, Edmund S.K. Fung saw Zhang’s idea of “revisionist democracy” (xiuzheng de minzhu zhengzhi 修正的民主政治) in the 1930s as an attempt to strike a balance “between personal freedoms and state powers” and

15 Roger B. Jeans, Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: The Politics of Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1906–1941 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). 16 Zheng Dahua 鄭大華, Zhang Junmai zhuan 張君勱傳 [Biography of Zhang Junmai] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999); Zheng Dahua 鄭大華, Zhang Junmai xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 張君勱學術思想評傳 [A critical biography of Zhang Junmai’s scholarship and thought] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), 322–29. 17 Xue Huayuan 薛化元, Minzhu xianzheng yu minzu zhuyi de bianzheng fazhan: Zhang Junmai sixiang yanjiu 民主憲政與民族主義的辯證發展：張君勱思想硏究 [The dialectical development of constitutional democracy and nationalism: a study of Zhang Junmai’s thought] (Taipei: Daohe chubanshe, 1993), 277–78.

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to reconcile the quest for national independence with the one for democracy.18 Zhang did pay attention to the safeguarding of liberal values even when a strong state was needed against Japan. He regarded liberal values as essential for China’s national strength.19 Fung also assesses the intellectual implications of Zhang’s socialist ideals. In his view, Zhang did not see socialism and capitalism as two contradictory ideologies. To Zhang, state socialism with a planned and mixed economy would not be successful without the aid of capitalism, which should be regulated to avoid the social and economic inequalities that it would generate.20 Moreover, Fung analyzes Zhang’s “cultural conservatism” and suggests that Zhang advocated a “national renaissance” (minzu fuxing 民 族復興) as a means of boosting the Chinese people’s morale against Japanese invasion.21 Fung argues compellingly against the perception, widespread in the 1990s and upheld by researchers such as Xue Huayuan, that in the 1930s Zhang Junmai subordinated democratic values to the urgent need of saving the nation. Fung has also played a pioneering role in elucidating the cultural dimension of Zhang’s political thought. After 1949, Zhang Junmai chose to spend the rest of his life overseas, where he continued his faith in moderate socialism and his studies in Confucianism. Weng Hekai 翁賀凱 observes that the intellectual resources on which Zhang drew were “to a large extent Western” because Zhang was heavily influenced by German idealism. At the same time, Zhang believed that extreme materialism in the West was having adverse consequences and regarded the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong sixiang 中庸思想) as the solution to extreme materialism. This explains why he wanted to strike a balance between Western and Chinese culture by advocating the revival of Confucianism.22 Weng, however, does not satisfactorily clarify how far Zhang incorporated Confucianism into his post-1949 ideals of national reconstruction. Edmund S.K. Fung, on the other hand, examines Zhang’s attempt to integrate Confucianism with democracy. He argues that Zhang’s New Confucian political thought was a synthesis of 18 Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 141; Edmund S.K. Fung, “Chinese Nationalism and Democracy during the War Period, 1937–1945: A Critique of the Jiuwang–Qimeng Dichotomy,” in Power and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu, ed. Billy K.L. So et al. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 214. 19 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 168–69. 20 Ibid., 226. 21 Ibid., 108. 22 Weng Hekai 翁賀凱, “Zhang Junmai wannian rujia sixiang fuxinglun zai tanxi 張君勱 晚年儒家思想復興論再探析 [A reappraisal of Zhang Junmai’s revival of Confucian thought in his later years],” Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu 中國文化研究 [Studies of Chinese culture], no. 2 (Summer 2009): 36–37.

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various Chinese and Western schools of thought, but that Zhang was in a “predicament” because he never solved the problem of showing exactly what Confucianism had to offer China.23 Weng and Fung have provided a glimpse of Zhang’s post-1949 Confucian thought, thereby laying a good foundation for my study of the last twenty years of his life, which would help us understand how a middle-of-the-road émigré positioned himself politically and intellectually in China’s ideological conflict in the early Cold War years. Yin Haiguang has been chosen because he was one of the most politically active Taiwan-based liberals in the 1950s. Until his death in 1969, Yin had been critiquing liberalism, socialism, and Chinese tradition in order to search for the best political model for China’s modernization. He was a typical example of a Chinese intellectual who was under the influence of “Cold War liberalism,” a concept that I shall explain later in this chapter, and departed from socialist tendencies after 1949. Having been an anti-traditionalist for years, Yin began to reappraise Chinese culture in the late 1960s. He appreciated selected Confucian values that he thought could rescue intellectuals from anxiety about an uncertain future, which he was also suffering after being diagnosed with gastric cancer in the late 1960s. As a former supporter of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang 中國國民黨, hereafter the Guomindang), Yin quickly became an outspoken critic of Chiang Kai-shek’s autocratic rule in Taiwan after 1949. Such a sharp change was indeed representative. Comparatively young among his émigré fellows, Yin was particularly zealous and dedicated to the quest for Chinese democracy. He was determined to struggle for an end of Chiang’s dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic Republic of China government. Therefore, a study of Yin would shed light on how a young émigré responded to the loss of the Chinese mainland to Communism. For a long time, as He Zhuo’en 何卓恩 demonstrates, Yin was merely a follower of the May Fourth liberal tradition. It was only in the early 1960s that he was able to formulate his own liberal thought.24 Still, he was hardly an original thinker. Zhang Qing 章清 contends that Yin’s major contribution lay in the introduction of logical empiricism in Taiwan. Yet, Yin’s adherence to logical empiricism prevented him from addressing the ethical aspects of liberalism effectively. This hindered him from developing his own liberal theories. Thus, Zhang argues, Yin’s liberal thought was largely based on that of Western 23 24

Edmund S.K. Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization: The Thought and Predicament of Zhang Junmai,” Twentieth-century China 28, no. 2 (April 2003): 54–63. He Zhuo’en 何卓恩, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi 殷海光與近代中國 自由主義 [Yin Haiguang and modern Chinese liberalism] (Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2004).

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philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Friedrich A. Hayek (1899– 1992), and Karl R. Popper (1902–1994).25 Yin’s understanding of democracy and freedom is also challenged by scholars. He Guangwei 賀廣巍 observes that Yin did not clearly distinguish the two ideas in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. It was only after the mid-1950s that he was able to identify democracy and freedom as two different concepts.26 Nevertheless, like Zhang Junmai, Yin did not see a dichotomy between the pursuit of freedom and democracy and the quest for national salvation. Jian Minghai 簡明海 notes that Yin regarded the former as the only viable cultural foundation for a modern China and the necessary means to save China as long as the mainland was under Communist rule.27 Jian, however, does not examine how changing political circumstances shaped Yin’s political thought. Yin Haiguang is also remembered for his anti-traditionalism. Li Hanji 黎 漢基 puts Yin’s anti-traditionalist thought into Lin Yusheng’s 林毓生 (b. 1934) framework of “totalistic anti-traditionalism,” a phrase that refers to “total rejection of Chinse tradition” by the May Fourth iconoclasts.28 He argues that Lin’s framework is not totally applicable to the case of Yin Haiguang. True, Yin was an anti-traditionalist in the 1950s. However, he found himself uncomfortable with the highly modernized lifestyle of the United States during his visit there in 1955. He preferred the quieter and less urbanized environment of Chinese society.29 Yin’s appreciation of the ethical values of Chinese tradition in the 1960s also suggests that he eventually rejected “totalistic anti-traditionalism.”30 Zhang Chunlin 張春林 comments that Yin had indeed transcended May Fourth iconoclasm in his final years by reappraising Chinese culture.31 However, the 25 Zhang Qing 章清, Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1996), 252–54. 26 He Guangwei 賀廣巍, “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu 殷海光自由思想研究 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s liberal thought]” (m.a. thesis, National Chengchi University, 1996), 118–19. 27 Jian Minghai 簡明海, “Jiuwang yu qimeng de kunjing: Yin Haiguang sixiang zhuanbian zhi yanjiu 救亡與啟蒙的困境：殷海光思想轉變之研究 [Dilemma between salvation or enlightenment: a study of the transformation of Yin Haiguang’s thought]” (m.a. thesis, Tunghai University, 1997), 190–92. 28 Yü-sheng Lin, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 6. 29 Li Hanji 黎漢基, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu: you wusi dao zhanhou Taiwan, 1919–1969 殷海光思想硏究 : 由五四到戰後臺灣, 1919–1969 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s thought: from May Fourth to postwar Taiwan, 1919–1969] (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 2000), 194–200. 30 Ibid., 288–90. 31 Zhang Chunlin 張春林, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu 殷海光政治哲 學思想研究 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s political philosophy] (Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2008), 186–92.

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above-mentioned studies focus mainly on the evolution of Yin’s culturalpolitical thought. They are unable to answer satisfactorily how liberalism interacted with the two other émigré school of thought—moderate socialism and Confucianism—in the early Cold War years. A comparative study of Yin Haiguang, Zhang Junmai, and a representative Confucian intellectual is then needed. Xu Fuguan has been selected because he had the deepest connection with Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887–1975) and was the most politically engaged figure among his fellow New Confucians. Other New Confucian scholars such as Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) may have made a more substantial contribution to the development of Confucian philosophy, but they were not involved in political affairs as much as Xu did. A subordinate of Chiang in the 1940s, Xu withdrew from the Guomindang in 1951. He then devoted himself to Confucian studies and came to be regarded as a prominent New Confucian scholar in Taiwan. He also remained an active political commentator until his death in 1982. Unlike Zhang Junmai, who sought a more balanced integration between tradition and modernity, as Chapter 5 will explain, Xu Fuguan advocated a concept from the Confucian tradition as an alternative option for modern democratic governance. While Zhang Junmai and Yin Haiguang agreed that the rule of law was the foundation of modern democracy, Xu Fuguan emphasized the essentiality of the “rule of virtue” (dezhi 德治) in building Chinese democracy. Xu also held an elitist view on the role of intellectuals in social advancement and provided a comprehensive explanation of his view in his writings. He had high hopes for China’s cultural elite and assigned to them a key role in rejuvenating Chinese culture and tradition and in building a modern Chinese state. Like his Confucian colleagues, Xu Fuguan was dedicated to the revival of Confucianism in the modern world. He reviewed the Confucian political tradition and noted that two traditional concepts, renxinglun 人性論 (theory of human nature) and youhuan yishi 憂患意識 (concerned consciousness), were particularly important. In Xu’s view, as Jiang Lianhua 蔣連華 suggests, renxinglun was the spirit of morality that was grounded in good human nature and that guided China’s historical development.32 Rendered by Honghe Liu as “concerned consciousness” and Thomas Metzger as “sense of anxious concern over the troubles of the world,” youhuan yishi, as Xu defined it, refers to the consciousness that everyone has personal responsibility for overcoming future 32

Jiang Lianhua 蔣連華, Xueshu yu zhengzhi: Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu 學術與政治：徐 復觀思想研究 [Scholarship and politics: a study of Xu Fuguan’s thought] (Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2006), 168.

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difficulties of all kinds.33 Every Chinese person should have this concept in mind so as to prepare for different challenges that he or she may encounter in the tide of modernization. On account of Xu Fuguan’s efforts to rejuvenate Confucianism for China’s nation-building, Huang Junjie 黃俊傑 regards him as a transformer of Chinese culture and Confucianism and a “cultural nationalist” (wenhua de minzu zhuyi zhe 文化的民族主義者) who comforted the Chinese people through discovery of the democratic spirit in the Confucian classics.34 Xu Fuguan was also famous for his advocacy of Confucian democracy. Portraying Xu as a “liberal Confucian,” Xiao Bin 蕭濱 argues that he put much effort into the integration of freedom, democracy, and Chinese tradition. Xu also helped mediate the conflict that had arisen in the May Fourth era between Confucianism and China’s infant liberalism.35 Li Minghui 李明輝 explores Xu’s conception of liberty and concludes that Xu’s thought lay somewhere between liberalism and communitarianism. On the one hand, Xu recognized the importance of the basic human rights guaranteed by “negative liberty,” under which one is free to do what one wants without interference by others. On the other hand, he emphasized the role of the community in safeguarding democracy. Thus, Li argues, Xu also valued “positive liberty,” under which the community would facilitate the welfare of the people.36 In Taiwan, Xu Fuguan engaged in a number of debates with the liberals, especially Yin Haiguang.37 Although Su-san Lee argues that Xu “had failed to convince his compatriots [of] the plausibility of a ‘Confucian 33 Honghe Liu, Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal: Hsu Fu-kuan’s Critical Examination of the Confucian Political Tradition (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 51; Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 250; Xu Fuguan, Zhongguo renxinglun shi: xian Qin pian 中國人性論史：先秦篇 [A history of theory of human nature in China: the pre-Qin era] (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 2009), 32. 34 Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, Ruxue yu xiandai Taiwan 儒學與現代台灣 [Confucian studies and modern Taiwan] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 133. 35 Xiao Bin 蕭濱, Chuantong Zhongguo yu ziyou linian: Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu 傳統中國 與自由理念：徐復觀思想硏究 [Traditional China and the concept of liberty: a study of Xu Fuguan’s thought] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), 308–12. 36 Li Minghui 李明輝, Rujia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang 儒家視野下的政治思想 [Political thought from a Confucian perspective] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005), 169–70. 37 Li Weiwu 李維武 covers Xu’s scholarship, his political, cultural and philosophical thought, and his relationships with his friends and mentors in his book. Although Li’s book is excellent in reconstructing various aspects of Xu’s life and thought, it lacks a central argument to bind its chapters together. See Li Weiwu 李維武, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 徐復觀學術思想評傳 [A critical account of Xu Fuguan’s scholarly thought] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2001).

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democracy’,” these debates did reflect the intellectual development in Taiwan.38 Through these debates, Li Hanji observes, both Xu and Yin were actively competing for scholarly authority in the 1950s and 1960s. Both were eager to vanquish the other in academic debates.39 They were also keen to challenge established authorities such as Hu Shi and elevate their own reputations.40 The two men’s perceptions of freedom and democracy differed from each other as well. According to Li Minghui, they held different positions regarding the need for a moral foundation for democracy and freedom. As a logical empiricist, Yin denied the necessity for such a foundation. Xu, however, insisted from a holistic viewpoint that morality was a prerequisite for democracy and freedom.41 Li’s study is complemented by Ren Jiantao’s 任劍濤 book on liberalism in modern China. Ren compares and contrasts Xu’s “Confucian liberalism” (rujia ziyou zhuyi 儒家自 由主義) with Yin’s “Westernized liberalism” (xihua ziyou zhuyi 西化自由 主義). “Confucian liberals” argued that proto-liberal values were found in Chinese tradition. These values could be turned into modern liberty through the transformation of Chinese tradition. Thus, Xu saw vitality in Chinese culture. “Westernized liberals,” however, contended that liberal values must be imported from the West. Only the construction of a new Chinese culture could enable liberal values to take root in China. Yin saw crisis and challenges in China’s future.42 These great differences, however, did not refrain Xu and Yin from reconciling with each other before the latter’s death in 1969. While the traditionalist Xu was leaning increasingly towards liberalism, Xie

38 Su-san Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation” (PhD diss., Brown University, 1998), 489. 39 Li Hanji 黎漢基, “Jingzhu quanwei: liuwang zhishi fenzi zhengzhi sixiang de bijiao yanjiu 競逐權威：流亡知識分子政治思想的比較硏究 [Competing for authority: a comparative study of émigré intellectuals’ political thought]” (m.a. thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995). 40 Li Hanji, “Lun Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang: xiandai Taiwan zhishi fenzi yu yishi xingtai yanjiu (1949–1969) 論徐復觀與殷海光：現代台灣知識分子與意識形態硏究 (1949–1969) [On Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang: a study of intellectuals and ideology in modern Taiwan (1949–1969)]” (PhD diss., Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998), 297. 41 Li Minghui 李明輝, Dangdai ruxue de ziwo zhuanhua 當代儒學的自我轉化 [Self-transformation of contemporary Confucian studies] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 94–95. 42 Ren Jiantao 任劍濤, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang mailuo zhong de ziyou zhuyi 中國現代 思想脈絡中的自由主義 [Liberalism in modern Chinese intellectual trends] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004), 22–39.

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Xiaodong 謝曉東 points out that the liberal Yin was selectively absorbing some traditionalist viewpoints.43 2

Relevance of the Cold War Émigrés to Contemporary China

Despite the many strengths of the above literature in establishing the place of Zhang Junmai, Yin Haiguan, and Xu Fuguan in Chinese intellectual history, one or two lacunae remain. First, it sometimes seems to be assumed that there were only two Chinese schools of thought—Confucianism and liberalism—in the 1950s and 1960s. The existence of a third school of thought—democratic socialism—tends to be ignored. Only Edmund S.K. Fung has written about Zhang Junmai’s democratic socialist thought in the post-1949 era.44 In fact, a number of democratic socialists led by Zhang Junmai survived in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and some overseas communities in the 1950s. Like the New Confucians and the liberals, these émigré democratic socialists struggled to promote their democratic ideals among Chinese people outside China. A general understanding of Chinese émigré intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s can be attained only through a comparative study of figures representing all three groups. Attention should also be paid to the interaction of different intellectual tendencies within the thought of each representative figure. Another gap in the existing literature is a comparative analysis of the responses of Zhang Junmai, Yin Haiguang, and Xu Fuguan to the onset of the Cold War and related phenomena, particularly the Communist takeover of the mainland and the persistence of dictatorship on Taiwan. How, in fact, did Yin, Zhang, and Xu’s backgrounds and past experiences shape their activities and thought in the Cold War era? What exactly was the significance of their activities and thought to the broader émigré intellectual community? What were the connections between their activities and their thought? What do their activities and thought suggest about the characteristics of the liberal thought of Chinese émigré intellectuals in this period? This book is significant not only in providing a comprehensive picture on the émigré intellectual community in the 1950s and 1960s, but also in shedding light on intellectual development in contemporary China. Since the 43

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Xie Xiaodong 謝曉東, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi: Xu Fuguan Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue bijiao yanjiu 現代新儒學與自由主義：徐復觀殷海光政治哲學比較研究 [Modern New Confucianism and liberalism: a comparative study of the political philosophy of Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 2008), 278. Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 51–54.

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reopening of China to the West in the early 1980s, intellectuals in mainland China have come under the influence of Western political thought again. In recent decades, there are revived debates and discussions among the New Left, the neoliberals, and specialists on Confucianism about how China should be reformed. New Leftists such as Wang Shaoguang 王紹光 (b. 1954), Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元 (b. 1963), Gan Yang 甘陽 (b. 1952) and Wang Hui 汪暉 (b. 1959) perceive that the widening economic inequality between coastal and inland regions and between city centers and suburban areas is caused by excessive capitalism. Thus, they recognize the role of the state in regulating market economy. Neoliberals such as Zhu Xueqin 朱學勤 (b. 1952), Xu Youyu 徐友漁 (b. 1947) and Qin Hui 秦暉 (b. 1953) argue that problems in contemporary China are more political than economic. It is the corrupt political system that has hindered China’s advancement. To solve China’s problems, democratic reforms and further development of the market economy are necessary.45 Since the mid-1980s, specialists in Confucianism have been exploring the contribution of Confucianism to China’s modernization. Serving ideological purposes, senior researchers such as Fang Keli 方克立 (1938–2020) and Li Jinquan 李 錦全 (b. 1926) tend to study Confucianism from a Marxist point of view.46 In contrast to Fang and Li, Jiang Qing 蔣慶 (b. 1953) considers Marxism as a “destructive doctrine” that cannot “represent the national spirit of the Chinese nation.”47 He suggests that Confucianism has a social function to “make moral criticisms of actual government.”48 Meanwhile, overseas-based scholars such 45 Chen Lichuan, “The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century,” China Perspectives, no. 55 (September–October 2004): 30–39; Yu Bing 語冰, “Zhishijie de fenlie yu zhenghe (dai qianyan) 知識界的分裂與整合(代前言) [Split and unity in the intellectual circle (for preface)],” in Sichao: Zhongguo “xinzuopai” ji qi yingxiang, ed. Gong Yang 公羊 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), i–vii; Zhu Xueqin 朱學勤, “‘Xinzuopai’ yu ziyou zhuyi zhi zheng 新左派與自由主義之爭 [Conflict between the New Left and liberalism],” Sichao, ed. Gong Yang, 261–263. 46 John Makeham, Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2008), 250–252. 47 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, “Zhongguo dalu fuxing ruxue de xianshi yiyi ji qi mianlin de wenti (shang) 中國大陸復興儒學的現實意義及其面臨的問題(上) [The practical significance of the revival of Confucian studies in mainland China and the problems it faces (part 1)],” Ehu yuekan 鵝湖月刊 [Goose lake monthly] 15, no. 2 (August 1989): 35. English translation quoted from Makeham, Lost Soul, 262–263. 48 Jiang Qing, “Zhongguo dal fuxing ruxue de xianshi yiyi ji qi mianlin de wenti (xia) 中 國大陸復興儒學的現實意義及其面臨的問題(下) [The practical significance of the revival of Confucian studies in mainland China and the problems it faces (part 2)],” Ehu yuekan 鵝湖月刊 [Goose lake monthly] 15, no. 3 (September 1989): 23. English translation quoted from Makeham, Lost Soul, 264.

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as Du Weiming 杜維明 (b. 1940), Liu Shuxian 劉述先 (1934–2016) and Cheng Zhongying 成中英 (b. 1935), all of whom disciples of the New Confucian masters, have been discussing for decades the meaning of Confucianism in the modern world.49 The triangular relationship among the New Left, the neoliberals, and specialists in Confucianism in contemporary China resembles the one among the moderate socialists, the liberals, and the New Confucians in the émigré circle of the Cold War period. A study of the latter may offer insight for present-day Chinese intellectuals to narrow down their differences and achieve consensus if possible. After the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, a number of intellectuals were forced to flee China, forming a new generation of émigrés. Like their counterparts in the Cold War era, many of them continue to call for Chinese democracy on the cultural front. Wang Dan 王丹 (b. 1969) is a historian and productive writer on the prospect of Chinese democracy. Wang Juntao 王軍濤 (b. 1958), a political scientist specialized in the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, is still paying close attention to Chinese politics. Feng Congde 封從德 (b. 1966), a scholar in religious studies, is in charge of the online “Tiananmen University of Democracy.” The experiences of their Cold War predecessors may also provide them suggestions on how they can further contribute to the quest for Chinese democracy while sojourning overseas. Through a study of the life and thought of the Cold War émigré intellectuals, this book will benefit contemporary intellectuals both inside and outside the Chinese mainland by further inspiring them to transform China into a better society. 3

Major Questions to Be Addressed

The three émigrés on which this book focuses, Zhang Junmai, Yin Haiguang, and Xu Fuguan, were all inheritors of a multifaceted intellectual tradition that in the broadest sense can be called “liberal.” During the Republican era, according to Edmund S.K. Fung, this broad-sense “liberal” tradition consisted of three strands—liberalism, moderate socialism, and cultural conservatism.50 All three strands would meet a broad definition of liberalism—for example, that of Jerome B. Grieder, who describes it as “a belief in popularly based institutions of government, in the rule of law, in political processes that are made legitimate by the manner in which they function rather than by the 49 Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, 2001), 396–416. 50 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 20–21.

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ends ascribed to them; and uniting all these elements, a belief in the creative and benign power of free intelligence.”51 As I will discuss later in this book, some adherents of moderate socialism and cultural conservatism also advocated liberal democracy. Proponents of the three constituent strands of the liberal tradition also lived liberal values by tolerating each other in open and free scholarly debates, such as the “science versus metaphysics” controversy in the early 1920s and the debate over democracy and dictatorship in the 1930s. The multifaceted broad-sense “liberal” tradition continued well into the Cold War era. In the 1950s and 1960s, many émigré adherents of the three ideological strands, such as Zhang Junmai, Yin Haiguang, and Xu Fuguan, pursued freedom and democracy for a future China. This book scrutinizes how the Chinese émigré intellectuals’ political activities and liberal thought were influenced by the coming of the Cold War era. Covering representative figures from different schools of thought, it focuses on the responses of émigré intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s to the challenge of “rescuing” China, a theme that has rarely been covered by China specialists who work on the Cold War era. It is also the first attempt to investigate the development of the Republican-era multifaceted liberal tradition after 1949. While existing scholarship tends to establish the significance of the three selected figures in Chinese intellectual history, this study places them in the context of the Cold War and examines how they responded to Cold War currents from the West. Through an exploration of these major issues, this book elucidates what the life and thought of Chinese émigré intellectuals meant in the Cold War era. First of all, what did émigré intellectuals think “rescuing China” consisted of? Since the late nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals had been exploring ways of accomplishing two main tasks: rescuing China from internal disturbances and foreign imperialism, and pursuing freedom and democracy. Scholars today, looking back on the period, have debated the relationship between these two tasks. Vera Schwarcz thinks that, in twentieth-century China, the two tasks conflicted with each other.52 Li Zehou 李澤厚 further argues that, from the early 1920s onwards, the task of rescuing China gradually prevailed over that of pursuing freedom and democracy.53 Edmund S.K. Fung, 51 Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917–1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 344. 52 Vera Schwarcz, “A Curse on the Great Wall: The Problem of Enlightenment in Modern China,” Theory and Society 13, no. 3 (May 1984): 455. 53 Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou 啟蒙與救亡的雙重變 奏 [The dual variations of enlightenment and national salvation],” in Li Zehou, Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shilun 中國現代思想史論 [Discourse on modern Chinese intellectual history] (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1996), 11–39.

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however, disagrees with Schwarcz and Li, arguing that many Chinese intellectuals saw liberal-democratic pursuits as an answer to the challenge of rescuing China during the Japanese occupation. These intellectuals, Fung writes, preferred to work towards the Nationalist government’s strengthening through democratic institutional reforms rather than resorting to the violent revolution led by the Chinese Communists.54 Fung supports his argument with the thought of a number of Chinese intellectuals such as Shi Fuliang 施復亮 (1899–1970), Luo Longji, Liang Shuming, Shen Junru 沈鈞儒 (1875–1963) and Zhang Junmai, all of whom saw the task of rescuing China and that of pursuing freedom and democracy as two sides of the same coin.55 The Communist takeover in 1949, however, brought about a change in émigré intellectuals’ conceptions of the task of rescuing China and that of pursuing freedom and democracy on Chinese soil. Considering that the two tasks could not be achieved simultaneously, many Chinese émigré intellectuals in the Cold War era began to prioritize one over the other. Each émigré intellectual had his own considerations when he decided how to prioritize the two tasks and how these tasks should be approached. Scholars who work on the Taiwan-based intellectuals seem to assume that émigré intellectuals in this era were all focusing on the prospects for democracy on that island.56 However, these scholars have not studied the life of the non-Taiwan-based émigré intellectuals. Did the Taiwan- and non-Taiwan-based émigré intellectuals prioritize the two tasks differently? In what ways did the changing political and international circumstances affect the émigrés’ prioritization of the two tasks? How—and how far—did each émigré’s relationship with the Guomindang authorities shape his conception of the tasks? How diverse were the émigrés’ ways of participating in the tasks? Drawing on the case studies of Xu Fuguan, Yin Haiguang, and Zhang Junmai, this book attempts to provide an answer to these questions. Second, what happened when Chinese liberal thought encountered Cold War currents from the West? To what extent did “Cold War liberalism” from the West influence Chinese émigré intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s? In what ways were Cold War currents shaped by specific political circumstances in China? “Cold War liberalism” is a term coined by the British political scientist 54 55 56

Fung, “Chinese Nationalism and Democracy during the War Period, 1937–1945,” 207–10. Ibid., 211–14. See, for example, Xue Huayuan 薛化元, Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng: 1950 niandai Taiwan sixiang shi de yige kaocha 自由中國與民主憲政：1950 年代臺灣思想史 的一個考察 [Free China and constitutional democracy: a study of Taiwanese intellectual history in the 1950s] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe 1996); Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969)”; Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu.

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Anthony Arblaster to refer to a specific brand of liberalism that developed in the Cold War era. This brand of liberalism was not only anti-Communist and anti-totalitarian, but also anti-utopian.57 Many Western liberals in the 1950s opposed and feared Communism because they regarded it as a combination of totalitarianism and utopianism, both of which they detested. The Austrian economist Friedrich A. Hayek regarded totalitarianism as the opposite of liberalism.58 The American sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr. (1913–2005) gave a concise definition of totalitarianism in Political Power and Social Theory. “As the root ‘total’ suggests,” he wrote, “writers who use this term usually have in mind a society all of whose activities, from the rearing of children to the production and distribution of economic goods, are controlled and directed from a single centre.”59 After the defeat of Fascism in the Second World War, Western liberals generally perceived Communism as the greatest totalitarian threat. For instance, there was a revival of the “Red Scare” in the United States in the early postwar era.60 Arblaster notes that the fear of totalitarianism went far beyond Communism in the 1950s. Among American liberal intellectuals, there was in fact a fear of all leftist ideas, radical or moderate, that projected a utopian future.61 Many Western liberals in the late 1940s and 1950s saw “all forms of utopianism as sinister and potentially tyrannical.”62 For example, the Austro-British philosopher Karl R. Popper explained in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1947) that “the Utopian attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint of society as a whole, is one which demands a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is likely to lead to a dictatorship.”63 Popper also made the criticism that utopianism was unscientific. According to him, adherents of utopianism were wrong to assume that human beings possessed enough “factual knowledge” to undertake fundamental reconstruction of the whole society. “Holistic” reconstruction of society also went against “the principle of trial and error,” which 57 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 309–32. 58 Ibid., 319; Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 166. 59 Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory: Six Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 31, quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 317. 60 Mary Sperling McAuliffe, Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947– 1954 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 48–62. 61 Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 319. 62 Ibid., 320. 63 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd, 1947), 140, quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 320.

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was only possible “in piecemeal” projects. As Popper thought that “the whole secret of scientific method is a readiness to learn from mistakes,” utopianism was “impossible” in his view.64 Arblaster called this group of thinkers “Cold War liberals.” These people, he argues, “wanted to uncover the pedigree of Left totalitarianism; to expose the fundamental philosophical errors which, they believed, had set the Left on the path which led in the end to Lenin and Bolshevism; Stalin, the labor camps and mass purges; the world of Koestler’s Darkness at Noon and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.”65 In this book, I will adopt a broader definition of Cold War currents. While Arblaster’s “Cold War liberalism” refers to an intellectual trend that arose in the late 1940s, I am expanding the context of Cold War currents to cover not only “Cold War liberalism,” but also the political and confrontational atmosphere that spread from the Western world to the Asia-Pacific region in the same period. Such an atmosphere coincided and intertwined with the longtime rivalry between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party in China. To a certain extent, Cold War currents were sinicized when it arrived in China. When émigré intellectuals responded to the currents, they inevitably put domestic politics into consideration. The Guomindang-Communist rivalry then became an important element in these sinicized Cold War currents, along with the “Cold War liberalism” from the West. What impact did Cold War currents have on China’s liberal community? In what ways did the émigré intellectuals respond to Cold War currents as manifested in a particular Chinese context? Most of the existing studies of Chinese émigré intellectuals tend to reconstruct their thought and assess its significance in Chinese intellectual history or the history of specific schools of thought—Confucianism, liberalism, socialism—in China. This book attempts to examine their thought with reference to the broader Cold War context and to investigate how the coming of the Cold War era shaped their ideas for rescuing the Chinese nation and realizing freedom and democracy for Chinese people. Third, what happened to the Republican-era intellectual tradition in the 1950s and 1960s? How was the intellectual tradition of Republican China inherited by the Chinese émigrés in the Cold War era? This tradition, according to Edmund S.K. Fung, was an “interactive triad” comprising the “liberal, conservative, and socialist” strands that featured prominently in modern Chinese 64 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 144, quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 321; Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 68–69, quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 321. 65 Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 316.

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thought during the period before 1949.66 In Fung’s view, liberalism, cultural conservatism, and moderate socialism were so closely related that the three schools of thought were intermingled.67 Before we examine the interaction between these ideological strands, let us review their development in modern China. Liberalism emerged as a school of political thought in Europe in the seventeenth century and became popular among European intellectuals in the eighteenth century. John Gray notes that there are a number of variants of liberalism. A common feature of them all “is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society.”68 The crucial elements of this conception are “individualist,” “egalitarian,” “universalist,” and “meliorist.” Liberalism is “individualist” because it focuses on the individual and rejects any form of collectivism, “egalitarian” in that it recognizes the equal status of every individual, “universal” because it affirms “the moral unity of the human species,” and “meliorist” because it affirms that politics and society are improvable.69 It first appeared in the form of classical liberalism, or laissezfaire liberalism. A major feature of classical liberalism is the belief that, apart from maintaining the rule of law and safeguarding the social order and private ownership, the government should exercise only a minimal role in administering the state.70 The climax of the Industrial Revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by the exploitation of workers through poor working environments, low wages, and long working hours. In response to this situation, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a new form of liberalism became increasingly popular in Europe. This phase of liberalism, or “new liberalism” as Andrew Vincent calls it, was based on the belief that the welfare of the individual and that of society are tied together.71 Problems of the individual such as “poverty, unemployment, and illness” were seen by adherents of new liberalism as “communal or social issues.”72 New liberals, such as T.H. Green, Leonard T. Hobhouse, and John A. Hobson, thus advocated a greater role for the state in solving these social problems and providing welfare to the people.

66 67 68 69 70

Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 2. Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 15. John Gray, Liberalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995), xii. Ibid. Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 30. 71 Ibid., 31. 72 Ibid.

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Liberalism was first introduced to Chinese intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century by Yan Fu and Liang Qichao.73 When Chinese intellectuals adopted liberalism, Edmund S.K. Fung argues, they skipped the “laissez-faire phase” of liberalism and were directly influenced by new liberalism.74 Fung attributes the direct adoption of new liberalism by Chinese intellectuals to China’s distinctive historical circumstances. Western-style individualism did not take root in premodern China because of various unfavorable factors in traditional Chinese society such as the absence of “a powerful middle class” and the existence of familial constraints.75 This, however, does not mean that modern Chinese liberals ignored the claims of the individual. Yan Fu, for example, emphasized both the individual and the common good of society, as Max Ko-wu Huang has shown.76 Douglas Howland also notes that, from Yan’s point of view, one had obligations both to oneself and to society at large.77 Moving on to the 1920s, Marina Svensson notes, in her study of human rights debates in modern China, that the thought of some Republican-era liberalminded intellectuals was heavily influenced by the British political scientist Harold J. Laski. Luo Longji, for example, shared the liberal belief in human rights and individual freedom. He saw the “enjoyment of rights” as an essential criterion for one to be qualified as a human being. He took the view that rights and duties went together and was opposed to the Guomindang’s view that people had “unconditional obligations” to the state.78 He further claimed that the state’s legitimacy to rule should be subject to its ability to protect individual freedom.79 As Fung has shown, Chinese liberals’ emphasis on individual liberty continued well into the mid-1930s.80 After the Communist takeover in 1949, a number of Chinese liberals settled in Taiwan. Yin Haiguang, for example, co-founded the periodical Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國 (Free China) with Lei Zhen 雷震 (1897–1979) and Zhang Foquan in order to promote liberal values on the island. In the late 1940s, as I 73 Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1964), 62, 130–48.; Hao Chang, Liang Ch‘i-ch‘ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 189– 206; Nathan, Chinese Democracy, 45–66. 74 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 133–34. 75 Ibid., 133. 76 Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), 167–71. 77 Douglas Howland, Personal Liberty and Public Good: The Introduction of John Stuart Mill to Japan and China (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 83. 78 Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China, 163–64. 79 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 166. 80 Ibid., 156–57.

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will discuss later in details, Yin regarded liberalism as a power for world progress that would facilitate the growth of a new Chinese society. He also saw individual freedom as the core value of liberalism.81 How did Yin’s liberalism develop in the Cold War period? Xu Fuguan, a Confucian scholar, began to explore the compatibility between Confucian and liberal values. Under liberalism, Xu wrote, a person could freely decide his or her own fate (zizuo zhuzai 自作主宰) and liberate himself or herself from traditional restrictions. This did not mean to turn against tradition completely, but to reevaluate and rejuvenate it and to create a more reasonable and richer tradition and society. A liberal should be active in improving tradition and society and turning them into a “product of conscience and rationality” (liangxin yu lixing de shengcanpin 良心與理性的生產品).82 How far did his understanding of liberalism shape his Confucian political ideals? Zhang Junmai, who chose to go overseas after 1949, was a long-time socialist with liberal tendencies. He had been an advocate for liberalism since the 1910s. He was particularly concerned with the safeguarding of human rights and different individual freedoms such as the freedom of thought and freedom of speech. He once suggested that “freedom of thought is essential for the people.”83 He closely linked the protection of human rights to the maintenance of social justice (shehui gongdao 社會公道) and the bright future of the Chinese state. The greatest value of liberalism, he asserted, was to nurture independent personalities (duli renge 獨立人格) and upright citizens ( jianquan gongmin 健全公民).84 Zhang’s view on liberalism after 1949, however, is rarely explored in existing scholarship. How did he promote liberal values in the Cold War era? How did the Communist domination of the Chinese mainland and the global anti-Communist ambience influence Chinese liberalism? Moderate socialism was another intellectual tendency that contributed to the Republican-era broad-sense liberal tradition. In general, moderate socialism attempts to strike a balance between state intervention and the free market. It also aims at creating an egalitarian society through non-violent and 81 Yin Haiguang, “Lun ziyou zhuyi zhe ji qi renwu 論自由主義者及其任務 [On liberals and their mission],” Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 [Central daily news] (Nanjing), 25 January 1948, 2. 82 Xu Fuguan, “Weisheme yao fandui ziyou zhuyi” 為什麼要反對自由主義 [Why does the government oppose liberalism?] (1 November 1956), in Xu Fuguan, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan 儒家政治思想與民主自由人權 [Confucian political philosophy, democracy, liberty, and human rights], ed. Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義 (Taipei: Bashi niandai chubanshe, 1979), 285, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 7, no. 21 (November 1956). 83 “Women suo yao shuo de hua,” 69. 84 Xue, Minzhu xianzheng yu minzu zhuyi de bianzheng fazhan, 99–105.

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democratic constitutional means.85 Andrew Vincent is correct to contend that “There are, rather, socialisms, which often overlap with other ideologies.”86 A number of scholars have been exploring the connections between moderate socialism and new liberalism. Noel Thompson, for example, has noted that new liberalism had a certain degree of influence upon Labor politics in twentiethcentury Britain.87 Indeed, Vincent argues, moderate socialists and new liberals shared a common concern for the welfare of society and the goals of creating equal opportunities for social mobility and of nurturing “human potential.”88 The distinction between moderate socialism and new liberalism became blurred when the two schools of thought were introduced to the Chinese intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. Many Chinese intellectuals showed signs of adherence to both moderate socialism and new liberal values. Luo Longji, as mentioned earlier, was an advocate of human rights and individual liberty. In the 1930s, he was also a leader of the Chinese State Socialist Party and participated actively in the promotion of moderate socialism.89 Zhang Junmai, co-founder of the State Socialist Party, was committed to the promotion of liberal values and constitutionalism during the Sino-Japanese War.90 Luo and Zhang’s liberal tendency suggest that moderate socialism can be regarded as one strand of the broad-sense Republican-era liberal tradition. After 1949, many adherents of moderate socialism fled the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. Zhang Junmai, for instance, chose to settle in the United States. In the following decades, the Communist bloc countries seemed to provide a negative example of what socialism meant in practice. When living in Cold War America, did Zhang Junmai maintain faith in a non-Communist, alternative socialism? Or did he repudiate his earlier vision? How did he articulate his moderate socialist ideals in order to attract 85 Andrew Vincent has identified five major features of reformist state socialism. See Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, 91. 86 Ibid., 89. 87 Noel Thompson, Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism, 1884–2005 (London: Routledge, 2006), 41–51. 88 Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, 102–03. 89 Zheng, Zhang Junmai zhuan, 222; Xu Jilin 許紀霖, “Xiandai Zhongguo de ziyou zhuyi chuantong 現代中國的自由主義傳統 [Liberal tradition in modern China],” Ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀 [Twenty-first century], no. 42 (August 1997): 29; Jiang Yihua 姜義華, “Lun Hu Shi yu renquan wenti de lunzhan 論胡適與人權問題的論戰 [On Hu Shi and the debate on human rights issues],” in Hu Shi yu xiandai Zhongguo wenhua zhuanxing 胡 適與現代中國文化轉型 [Hu Shi and cultural transformation in modern China], ed. Liu Qingfeng 劉靑峰 (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1994), 75–77. 90 Zhang Junmai, Liguo zhi dao 立國之道 [The way to found the nation] (Guilin: s.n., 1939), 101.

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the support of the Chinese people living on the mainland and outside China? What were the differences between his socialist ideals in the Cold War era and those in the Republican period? What did these differences signify? Now let us turn to conservatism. The word “conservatism” normally refers to defense of the existing socio-political order and suspicion of change, especially radical and revolutionary change.91 However, conservatism in modern China was different. It was opposed to radical changes, but it did not, in most cases, defend China’s imperial political order.92 Benjamin I. Schwartz once observed that few intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century were keen to defend the imperial political order.93 In his view, modern Chinese intellectuals’ conservatism was largely cultural. It was concerned with the defense of China’s “sociocultural heritage” and based on the belief that such a heritage was the key to China’s modernization.94 Charlotte Furth notes that modern Chinese intellectuals began to identify “national political order” and “the web of social custom and moral-spiritual belief” as two independent spheres. To them, repudiating China’s traditional political order did not mean that they had to reject the nation’s traditional social and moral values.95 In a recent study, Edmund S.K. Fung argues that Chinese conservatism was cultural as well as economic and political. Many Chinese conservatives were anxious to revitalize Chinese tradition and synthesize it with Western values so as to meet the challenges from China’s rapid modernization. They regarded agrarian self-sufficiency as equally important as industrialization and capitalism in China’s state-building and were alert to the domination of foreign goods in China’s market. They also rejected Communism and violent revolts. Some of them were even reserved about liberal democracy and agreed to a certain degree of authoritarian rule.96 While Aymeric Xu tries to distinguish four different types of Chinese conservatism and explores them in detail in his recent study, Charlotte Furth has identified two major types of cultural conservatives

91 Anthony Quinton and Anne Norton, “Conservatism,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Goodin, Pettit, and Pogge, vol. 1 (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 285–86. 92 Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular,” in The Limits of Change, ed. Furth, 20. 93 Ibid., 17. 94 Ibid., 16. 95 Charlotte Furth, “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism,” in The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, ed. Furth, 24–25. 96 Edmund S.K. Fung, “Nationalism and Modernity: The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Republican China,” Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2009): 782–83.

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during the Republican era.97 The first type was “the followers of the nativist or national essence variety” as Furth calls them.98 They attempted to search for elements from Chinese tradition that were “compatible with modern science” and develop them on the basis of modern science in China.99 The second type was the New Confucians (xinrujia 新儒家), or the “Neotraditional Confucianists” as Furth calls them.100 They regarded Confucianism as the most important school of traditional Chinese thought and tended to search for “spiritual truth” in it. They believed that such Confucian “spiritual truth” was not confined by any “national or cultural boundaries” and that such truth belongs to a dimension “separable from” and even “superior to” science.101 New Confucianism is an ongoing scholarly movement whose participants try to revive Confucianism in the modern era and to rejuvenate its values to suit modern needs. John Makeham suggests that, as early as 1941, He Lin 賀 麟 (1902–93) was already using the term xinrujia “to refer to a new form of Confucianism” that was different from “the daoxue Confucianism of the Song and Ming periods.”102 However, Makeham notes that there is little evidence that New Confucianism was promoted as a “distinct philosophical movement” before the 1970s. It was only recognized as a distinct movement from that decade onwards.103 In an essay published in 1976, Zhang Hao 張灝 (b. 1937) used the English term “New Confucianism” to “distinguish the twentiethcentury Confucian thinkers from the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian scholars.”104 In recent decades, in the context of China’s economic reforms and Taiwan’s democratization, a younger generation of New Confucian scholars has been

97 Aymeric Xu, “Mapping Conservatism of the Republican Era: Genesis and Typologies,” Journal of Chinese History 4, no. 1 (January 2020): 135–59. 98 Furth, “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism,” 38–39. For a broader understanding of the ‘national essence’ movement, or rather movements, in early twentieth-century China, see Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900–1937 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), chapter 9. 99 Furth, “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism,” 39. 100 Ibid. 101 Furth, “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism,” 39. 102 John Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism,” in New Confucianism: A Critical Examination, ed. John Makeham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 26. 103 Makeham, Lost Soul, 2, n.2. 104 Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism,” 26. For Zhang Hao’s discussion of twentieth-century Confucianism, see Hao Chang, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China,” in The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, ed. Furth, 276–302.

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emerging on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. They have extensively discussed various aspects of the Confucian tradition.105 Like moderate socialism, cultural conservatism can also be seen as a strand of the Republican-era broad-sense liberal tradition. Some scholars have argued that Confucianism and liberalism are, in fact, compatible. Wm. Theodore de Bary, in the early 1980s, claimed that a kind of “Confucian liberalism” could indeed be found in the Song-Ming intellectual tradition.106 To de Bary, four elements constitute “the essence of the liberal attitude.” These elements include a “positive commitment to humane values,” a “sceptical or critical habit of mind,” willingness to “entertain opposing views and engage them in open discourse,” and the existence of “institutional frameworks, legal enactments, and countervailing power structures” to protect the “open exchange of information and opinion.”107 “The essence of the liberal attitude,” de Bary argues, was manifested in the legal and educational thought of the Ming Confucian Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695), who emphasized that “putting the laws in order” (zhifa 治法) was the first step to “governing people” (zhiren 治人).108 De Bary also claims that Huang proposed a new role for local schools as parliament-like places for discussing the local community’s affairs.109 While de Bary focuses on the liberal tradition in premodern China, Ren Jiantao argues that “Confucian liberalism” also existed in the thought of twentieth-century advocates of New Confucianism. Adherents of “Confucian liberalism” such as Xu Fuguan, Ren wrote, believed in the liberal values intrinsic to the Chinese tradition and the possibility of building a modern liberal democratic political system upon traditional political ideals.110 Although some cultural conservatives, as Edmund S.K. Fung has suggested, “had reservations about liberal democracy,” Xu Fuguan and some of his fellow cultural 105 For a study of the recent development of the scholarly discourse on Confucianism in the Chinese academia, see Makeham, Lost Soul. 106 Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983), 6–7. 107 Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Confucian Liberalism and Western Parochialism: A Response to Paul A. Cohen,” Philosophy East and West 35, no. 4 (October 1985): 408–09. 108 de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China, 21–27, 84; Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 17–29. 109 Huang Zongxi, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, trans. Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 56. For a critique of de Bary’s discussion of the thought of Huang Zongxi, see Helen Dunstan, “Premodern Chinese Political Thought,” in Handbook of Political Theory, ed. Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage, 2004), 326–27. 110 Ren, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang mailuo zhong de ziyou zhuyi, 22–39.

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conservatives, such as Zhang Junmai, were positively interested in it, albeit in different ways.111 As this book will show, the thought of Xu and Zhang would meet not only the very broad definition of what Wm. Theodore de Bary called “the essence of liberal attitude,” but also the more focused definition of liberalism by Jerome B. Grieder, as quoted previously in this introduction. A number of New Confucian scholars left the Chinese mainland after 1949. Zhang Junmai migrated to the United States, while Xu Fuguan decided to move to Taiwan. Living in the very different worlds of the United States and post-colonial Taiwan, did Zhang and Xu cling to their belief in Chinese values or abandon it? As early as the 1930s, Zhang was advocating the promotion of Chinese tradition and culture as a way to establish a distinctive national character, although it was only in his later years, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, that he wrote extensively about Confucianism.112 Did he ever attempt to synthesize Confucianism and moderate socialism? If he did, how convincing was his synthesis of the two schools of thought? Was Zhang able to build a new, and fully integrated, philosophical system? Xu Fuguan, by contrast, was a latecomer in the field, beginning his study of Confucianism only in the mid-1940s. To what extent did Confucianism shape his political and cultural thought? What were the similarities and differences between his and Zhang’s vision of China’s cultural construction? This book examines the development of the multifaceted Chinese liberal tradition in the 1950s and 1960s. After the Communist takeover in 1949, Marxism became the dominant political doctrine on the Chinese mainland. Although there was little scope for adherents of other schools to express their ideas publicly in Communist China, those who emigrated to Taiwan and Hong Kong or took up residence in overseas Chinese communities enjoyed varying degrees of freedom of expression. Among these émigré intellectuals, Yin Haiguang and Xu Fuguan became university lecturers in Taiwan. Living in the United States, Zhang Junmai still kept contact with his Taiwan-based disciples, some of whom continued to promote moderate socialism after his death in 1969. The three men were all inheritors of the modern Chinese liberal tradition, as each of them was an adherent of at least one strand of that tradition.

111 Fung, “Nationalism and Modernity,” 782. 112 For Zhang Junmai’s discussion of Chinese culture in the 1930s, see Zhang Junmai. Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu jichu 民族復興之學術基礎 [The academic foundation of national revival] (Beiping: Zaisheng she, 1935); Zhang Junmai. Mingri zhi Zhongguo wenhua 明 日之中國文化 [Tomorrow’s Chinese culture] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936). For his writings on Confucianism in the 1960s, see Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962).

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To what extent did they reshape that tradition? In which ways did they further develop that tradition? 4

Description of Chapters and Major Findings of the Book

The above issues and questions will be dealt with in the following chapters. Chapter 1 explores how the émigré intellectuals perceived the tasks of national salvation and democratization. Many of the intellectuals who fled the Chinese mainland on the eve of Communist takeover followed the Nationalist government to Taiwan, but others decided to go to the British colony of Hong Kong or overseas. This decision directly shaped their responses to the question of how to prioritize the two tasks, so that they each took different approaches. Taiwan-based intellectuals tended to regard the island as a starting point for any worthwhile anti-Communist activities. Those who lived in Hong Kong or overseas preferred straightforward counteroffensives launched by new military forces independent from Taiwan. However, their plans remained almost impossible. Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of global Cold War currents on the Chinese émigrés, as the adherents of different schools of thought could hardly avoid encountering this global phenomenon in the 1950s. Their responses were, however, diverse. Many of the liberals yielded to the currents, but others, especially the hardcore moderate socialists, did not. The next three chapters look at the cultural-political thought of three émigrés respectively. Chapter 3 investigates Yin Haiguang’s liberal-scientific model of a democratic China. He was keen to promote democracy and science—two major ideas of the May Fourth Movement—in the 1950s and saw Chinese tradition as an impediment to China’s modernization. It was only in the 1960s, after the collapse of the democratic movement in Taiwan, that he began to seek spiritual contentment from Confucian values and reevaluate them. Chapter 4 presents the thought of Zhang Junmai in the last twenty years of his life. Compared to Yin and Xu, Zhang’s model of Chinese democracy seems to have been more balanced. While Yin leaned towards Western liberal-democratic values, and Xu insisted on the Confucian foundation of Chinese democracy, Zhang was advocating “the unity of virtue and law” (de yu fa zhi heyi 德與法之合一), hoping to strike a balance between traditional Chinese and modern Western values in his political design. Chapter 5 focuses on Xu Fuguan’s Confucian model of a democratic China. His model was primarily based upon Confucian values. He particularly put an emphasis on dezhi 德治 (rule of virtue), as opposed to fazhi 法治 (rule

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of law), in his political design. To him, modern democratic values could be adopted on the basis of the Chinese Confucian tradition. What Xu was promoting was indeed an opposite of the ideals of Yin Haiguang. The general conclusion summarizes the entire book and assesses the significance of the three émigrés examined in the book. Several findings are drawn from this study. First and foremost, the activities and thought of the Chinese émigré intellectuals need to be understood in the context of their commitment to rescuing the Chinese nation from dictatorship. Coming from different political backgrounds, the émigrés attempted to engage in such a commitment in various ways, such as publishing political commentaries and participating in different political and even paramilitary activities. They had different strategic priorities in the task of rescuing China. The Taiwan-based Xu and Yin thought it important to secure democracy on the island before trying to recover the mainland from Communism and realize democracy there, while the overseas-based Zhang initially saw the recovery of the mainland as the prerequisite for worthwhile liberal-democratic pursuits. These émigré intellectuals’ pursuit of national salvation provided a strong rationale for their exploration of different cultural-political ideals within the multifaceted Chinese liberal tradition. Second, the broad-sense liberal tradition inherited by the Chinese émigré intellectuals was not immune to Cold War currents from the West. There were signs of influence from Cold War liberalism in the Chinese émigré liberal intelligentsia. The influence was obvious among Yin Haiguang and his colleagues in the editorial board of Ziyou Zhongguo. However, the direct influence of Cold War currents was limited. Zhang Junmai and his fellow moderate socialists were still committed to promoting their socialist beliefs. Cold War currents also acted as a stimulus for the revitalization of Confucianism. Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and their New Confucian associates were keen to rejuvenate Confucianism as a resource for China’s democratization and modernization. To many of them, the promotion of Confucian values in Chinese communities overseas was crucial to the continuation of the Confucian school, to the search for Confucian democracy in modern China, and to the ability of Chinese people living outside the Chinese mainland to resist Communist influence. Despite the arrival of Cold War currents in Chinese émigré intellectual communities, Confucianism and moderate socialism remained as major strands within the broader fabric of the liberal thought of Chinese émigré intellectuals. Third, the diversity and “interactive” quality of the multifaceted Chinese liberal tradition were largely maintained in the Cold War era. As inheritors of the Republican-era liberal tradition, émigré intellectuals were, in the 1950s and

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1960s, able to continue their discussions on liberalism, moderate socialism, and cultural conservatism. The interaction among these three strands can be seen in the form of debates between individuals as well as in the thought of the same individual. In pursuing Sino-Western cultural integration as a means of envisaging a new Chinese nation, each of the three selected thinkers proposed a distinctive model of integration into which he incorporated key tenets of the different strands.

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Chapter 1

Saving China from Communism and Fighting for Democracy: Prioritizing the Two Tasks When anti-Communist activists departed from the Chinese mainland on the eve of the Communist takeover, each of them had their own ideas on how to continue their anti-Communist quest. Many of them followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, working for the consolidation of the island as a stronghold against Communism. Others stayed in Hong Kong, a British colony where they could be free from Chiang’s control and enjoyed a certain degree of freedom to spread anti-Communist propaganda. Some of them travelled to the United States, trying to lobby the American government to support their self-organized anti-Communist activities. These options were not simply the various means by which Chinese émigrés responded to Communist expansion. They also reflected how the Cold War émigrés prioritized “national salvation” and “democratic state-building”—the two tasks that had been preoccupying Chinese intellectuals for decades. “National salvation,” in the context of the Cold War, referred to the rescuing of the Chinese nation from the hands of the Communists. “Democratic state-building” had long been a goal of the Chinese liberals since the early twentieth century. In the 1950s, the Cold War émigrés were looking forward to the restoration of constitutional democracy as promised in the 1947 Chinese constitution, either on Guomindang-controlled Taiwan or on the Chinese mainland after a future Communist collapse. The different views on where democratization should first be realized determined the émigrés’ ways of tackling Communism. Many of those who settled in Taiwan tended to give first priority to democratization on the island, regarding this as a prerequisite for possible recovery of the mainland. A number of émigrés who stayed in Hong Kong and overseas did not see the Nationalist government as a necessary leader in the counteroffensive campaign against the Chinese Communists. They tended to organize paramilitary organizations under the auspices of the United States and planned to launch their own campaign with self-trained guerillas. This chapter attempts to illustrate and explain why the Chinese émigrés took different routes to achieve these two major quests with the cases of Xu Fuguan, Yin Haiguang, and Zhang Junmai. It suggests that past experiences and especially attitudes towards the Nationalist government were the most decisive factors affecting their political choices after 1949.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_003 Kenneth Kai-chung

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The Loyal Critic to Chiang Kai-shek: The Case of Xu Fuguan

Born in 1904 to a poor peasant family in Xishui 浠水, Hubei, Xu Fuguan joined the Nationalist army in the early 1930s.1 He had no specific philosophical position until he met the Confucian Xiong Shili and began their teacher-student relationship in the spring of 1944.2 After that, he read extensively on the Confucian classics and came to be regarded as one of the most important scholars in the school of New Confucianism. During the Sino-Japanese War, Xu was deputy head ( fuguan 副官) of a regiment of the Nationalist army. In 1945, he was promoted to the Generalissimo’s Secretariat, where he was responsible for verifying and analyzing intelligence reports.3 During his service there from 1945 to 1949, Xu made numerous suggestions to Chiang about reforming the party and believed that his suggestions impressed Chiang deeply.4 As a staff member of the Secretariat, Xu followed Chiang to Taiwan. However, his activities were not limited to that island. In June 1949, one month after he fled the mainland, he obtained a grant of hk$90,000 from Chiang to found a periodical named Minzhu pinglun 民主評 論 (Democratic review) in Hong Kong.5 The goals of the periodical were to open a new ideological battlefront against Communism, to inspire the thought of the liberals in the Guomindang and the upper class in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and to search for a proper direction for cultural nation building.6 While Xu was concentrating on his new periodical, he also thought of withdrawing from the Guomindang because he felt powerless to save the party from corruption. He settled in Taichung and quit the Guomindang in early 1951.7 From 1955 onwards, he taught at Tunghai University, Taichung, until his retirement in 1969.8 1 Cao Yongyang 曹永洋, “Xu Fuguan xiansheng nianpu 徐復觀先生年譜 [Chronology of Mr Xu Fuguan],” in Xu Fuguan jiaoshou jinian wenji 徐復觀敎授紀念文集 [Essays in memory of Professor Xu Fuguan], ed. Cao Yongyang (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1984), 561; Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 25–39. 2 Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 71–95. 3 Ibid., 55–57. 4 Xu Fuguan, “Lasexiang wai 垃圾箱外 [Outside the rubbish bin]” (2 December 1975), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zawen: yi wangshi 徐復觀雜文：憶往事 [Miscellaneous articles of Xu Fuguan: remembering the past] (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1982), 36, originally published in Xinwen tiandi 新聞天地 [Newsdom], no. 1455 (January 1976). 5 Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 153–54. 6 Xu Fuguan, “Benkan jieshu de hua 本刊結束的話 [Last words of the Democratic Review],” Minzhu pinglun 民主評論 [Democratic review] 17, no. 9 (August 1966): 22. 7 Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 122. 8 Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 29.

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Despite Xu’s disappointment with the Guomindang’s persistent corruption and his resignation from the party, he still placed his final hope on it and looked forward to its initiation of democratic reforms on Taiwan. He suggested that the Guomindang could learn from the practice of Western democracies, where political parties were independent of the state, several parties competed for power, and the ruling party followed democratic norms and did not demand eternal state power. Instead, the ruling party would be changed by peaceful democratic means. Citizens could demonstrate their patriotism either individually or through participation in a political party.9 The only way for the Nationalist government to achieve a normal party-state relationship would be to turn the Guomindang into a democratic party.10 The Guomindang should serve the state and its people, not vice versa. Xu suggested that Chiang rectify his position by retaining his role as head of state but resign from the chairmanship of the Guomindang. Then he could stand aloof from the internal disputes in the party and serve as a widely recognized symbol of anti-Communism in China and more widely in East Asia.11 Moreover, Xu Fuguan was quite dissatisfied with the 1948 “Temporary Provisions” that had overridden the 1947 constitution and granted Chiang Kai-shek “virtually unlimited powers.”12 He warned that political dissidents would use this as an excuse to challenge the legitimacy of the government.13 The government should therefore restudy the spirit of the constitution and apply that spirit to its governance.14 He urged the Nationalist government to allow the formation of an anti-Communist opposition party that would not only criticize the government’s wrongdoings but also monitor the government. He further lamented that many Chinese people had been attracted to the Communist cause during the Sino-Japanese War because there were no other 9 Xu Fuguan, “Ruhe jiejue fangong zhenying zhong de zhengzhi weiji 如何解決反共陣 營中的政治危機 [How can we solve the political crisis within the anti-Communist coalition?]” (1 January 1952), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian 徐復觀雜文補 編 [Supplementary miscellaneous articles of Xu Fuguan], ed. Li Hanji 黎漢基 and Li Minghui 李明輝, vol. 6 (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2001), 77–78, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 2 (January 1952). 10 Xu Fuguan, “Dang yu ‘danghua’ 黨與「黨化」 [Party and ‘partification’]” (16 August 1950), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 6, 58, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 4 (August 1950). 11 Xu Fuguan, “Disan shili wenti de pouxi 第三勢力問題的剖析 [A deep analysis of the problem of the Third Force]” (1 March 1950), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 6, 37, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 1, no. 18 (March 1950). 12 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1999), 70. 13 Xu, “Ruhe jiejue fangong zhenying zhong de zhengzhi weiji,” 79. 14 Ibid., 79.

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strong opposition parties for them to choose from.15 Having a strong opposition party on Taiwan would provide another political option, so that people there would not be attracted by the Communists. Throughout the 1950s, Xu Fuguan published a number of articles in which he used cautionary tales to warn Chiang Kai-shek of the adverse consequences of being a dictator. For example, he talked about the rule of Emperor Dezong (779–805) of the Tang Dynasty, who became isolated because he was overconfident and suspicious of his ministers. Xu pointedly commented that “treating others with sincerity, correcting one’s own mistakes, and accepting criticism were the greatest virtues of a ruler.”16 In his discussion of Emperor Wu of Liang (502–49), Xu straightly pointed out that “an imperial court that was hostile to public opinion (remonstrance) was actually hostile to society.”17 Such a state would never be in harmony with society, and the emperor would truly become the “solitary one” (guaren 寡人) or “lone fellow” (dufu 獨夫), as described in customary epithets for rulers. Xu Fuguan seldom mentioned Chiang or criticized him directly in his critical essays on political topics. Given the political circumstances in Taiwan at the time, however, most of these essays implicitly pointed at Chiang. Xu further elaborated his view on state-society relationship in the following passage: No matter how pure its motive, how hard it works, or how correct its goal, any leadership that closes its doors to society is doomed to failure. Whether we suppose the leadership closes its doors to society intentionally or unintentionally, society will respond by gradually closing its door to the leadership as well. It will be a tragedy to be lamented by our descendants when society completely closes its doors to the leader or the whole ruling stratum.18 15 16

Ibid., 81. Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo de zhidao 中國的治道 [The way of ruling in China]” (1 May 1953), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 222–32, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 9 (May 1953). 17 Xu Fuguan, “Qian Daxin lun Liang Wudi: bao tianxia bi zi najian shi 錢大昕論梁武 帝—保天下必自訥諫始 [Qian Daxin’s discussion of Emperor Wu of Liang: accepting criticism is the first step of maintaining one’s rule]” (15 June 1955), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 6, 183, originally published in Ziyouren 自由人 [The free man], no. 447 (June 1955). 18 Xu Fuguan, “Lun zhengzhi lingdao de yishu 論政治領導的藝術 [On the art of political leadership]” (31 March 1954), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zawen: ji suosi 徐復觀雜文—記 所思 [Miscellaneous articles by Xu Fuguan: a record of what I have thought], ed. Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義 (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxiangongsi, 1980), 209, originally published in Huaqiao ribao 華僑日報 [Overseas Chinese daily], 31 March 1954.

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He was also critical of the personality of Chinese political leaders: The worst kinds of temperament in politics are eagerness to win, obstinacy, and severity. As soon as a person with these kinds of temperament faces dissident voices, especially those inevitable political criticisms that have existed in both ancient and modern times, and in both China and foreign countries, he immediately feels discontented and engages in malicious speculation. This results in unnecessary disputes.19 It is possible that the real target here was Chiang Kai-shek, who was the supreme leader in the Nationalist government and had already disappointed Xu. In May 1956, Xu accurately hinted in an article that Chiang trusted only his favorites and was suspicious of many who were loyal to him. He argued that: a man who is shallow in understanding and magnanimity is unable to grasp a principle that is recognized by most of the people, but makes decisions according to the force of his likes and dislikes. Thus, he inevitably shows partiality when handling personal relationships and other affairs. If you are partial to your relatives, those who are not your relatives will not cooperate with you. If you are partial to your former schoolfellows and people who come from the same place as you, not to mention your own students, those who do not belong to these categories will not cooperate with you, either. As a result, if those to whom you should be close are looked upon as strangers, you will in the end become a “lone king” (guwang 孤王) or “solitary one” (guaren 寡人).20 This passage seems to be a response to Chiang Kai-shek’s elevation of his son Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 (1910–1988) and his dismissal of several competent officials. Chiang Ching-kuo was promoted to Deputy Secretary of the National Defence Council in September 1954.21 Xu warned that Chiang Kai-shek would 19

20 21

Xu Fuguan, “Zhengzhi shang de shi yu liang 政治上的識與量 [Understanding and magnanimity in politics]” (2 September 1955), in Xu Fuguan, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian 學術 與政治之間 [Between scholarship and politics]. (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980), 329, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 2 September 1955. Xu Fuguan, “Guren zai weinan zhong de zhihui 古人在危難中的智慧 [The wisdom of our ancestors at times of crisis]” (16 May 1956), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 6, 187, originally published in Rensheng 人生 [Human life] 12, no. 1 (May 1956). Xue Huayuan 薛化元 ed., Taiwan lishi nianbiao: zhongzhan pian 台灣歷史年表：終戰 篇 [A chronology of Taiwanese history: the postwar era] (Taipei: Zhang Rongfa jijinhui: Guojia zhengce yanjiu ziliao zhongxin, 1990), 216.

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eventually find himself isolated if too many of his able supporters were marginalized and expelled from his circle of trusted subordinates. In warning against partiality to old associates, Xu was referring to Chiang’s fellow Zhejiangese and graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy and the Central Political Academy, many of whom had been staff members in the Generalissimo’s Secretariat since the 1930s.22 Xu also pointed out in the same article that Chiang’s partiality was harmful to the unity of the anti-Communist movement: If he thinks that only those who have a personal relationship with him are qualified for membership in the coalition against Communism, while others are not qualified for an equal status in the anti-Communist coalition, he is definitely not seeking a way to unity.23 Xu Fuguan’s criticisms thus became increasingly explicit. In his earlier articles, Xu admonished Chiang Kai-shek indirectly about his overconfidence and unwillingness to accept criticism through several cautionary tales. From 1955 onwards, Xu began to publish articles criticizing Chiang’s leadership ability and personality in a tougher tone. However, the Nationalist government did not appreciate Xu Fuguan’s advice. In celebration of his seventieth birthday in October 1956, Chiang Kai-shek publicly called for suggestions from the people on Taiwan on various political issues.24 In response, Xu published an article in which he criticized Chiang for being intolerant of criticism and his subordinates for filtering out all the bad news before reporting to Chiang.25 Xu was then branded a “showy publicist” in a confidential pamphlet issued by the Department of Defense and accused of delivering “noxious ideas” to the public. The Guomindang’s Zhongyang ribao 22 Li Ao and Wang Rongzu 李敖、汪榮祖, Jiang Jieshi pingzhuan 蔣介石評傳 [A critical biography of Jiang Jieshi], vol. 1 (Taipei: Shangzhou wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1995), 285–86. 23 Xu Fuguan, “Guren zai weinan zhong de zhihui,” 188. 24 Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 269. 25 Xu Fuguan, “Wosuo liaojie de Jiang zongtong de yimian 我所了解的蔣總統的一面 [One aspect of President Chiang as I understand him]” (31 October 1956), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 304–09, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo, 15, no. 9 (October 1956); For an alternative study of Xu’s view on Chiang Kai-shek, see Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, “Weida shijia yanzhong de weida lishirenwu: Xu Fuguan ping Jiang Jieshi 偉大史家眼中的偉大歷史人物：徐復觀評蔣介石 [A great historical figure from the eyes of a great historian: Xu Fuguan’s commentaries on Chiang Kai-shek],” Dongwu lishi xuebao 東吳歷史學報 [Soochow journal of history], no. 30 (December 2013): 115–71.

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中央日報 (Central daily news) also condemned a number of dissident writers,

including Xu, for allegedly attempting to implant Communism in Taiwan.26 Xu reacted by accusing Zhongyang ribao of confusing right and wrong.27 By this time, Xu Fuguan was already frustrated with the Nationalist government. After making a last, fruitless attempt in 1957 to call for democratic reforms in two articles, he gradually shifted his attention from politics to the envisioning of an ideal Chinese nation in which Chinese tradition and democratic ideas were well integrated.28 2

Yin Haiguang and His Pursuit of Democratization

The idea of prioritizing democratization on Taiwan over recovering the mainland was not limited to Chiang Kai-shek’s former subordinates, but also shared by some Taiwan-based democrats such as Yin Haiguang. Born in 1919 to a missionary family in Huanggang 黃岡, Hubei, Yin Haiguang attended primary school in his hometown and high school in Wuchang 武昌.29 In 1937, he was admitted to National Qinghua University in Beiping 北平, where he studied philosophy. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Yin fled to the southwest of China and continued his tertiary studies at the wartime National Southwestern Associated University in Kunming 昆明. He completed the undergraduate program in 1942 and then pursued master’s studies in philosophy at the same university. In 1944, Yin suspended his studies and enlisted in the Nationalist Youth Army in response to a government appeal.30 However, Yin did not resume his studies after the war was over. He took up a position as an editor in a publishing company in Chongqing 重慶. At a friend’s home, Yin met Xu Fuguan. They soon became good friends.31 Through Xu’s recommendation to Tao Xisheng 陶希聖 (1899–1988), deputy head of the 26 Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 272. 27 Xu Fuguan, “Beifen de kangyi 悲憤的抗議 [Furious protest]” (12 February 1957), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 491–92, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 12 February 1957. 28 Xu, “Beifen de kangyi,” 491–96; Xu Fuguan, “Fanduidang zuida de zeren shi zai fandui de yanlun 反對黨最大的責任是在反對的言論 [The most important duty of an opposition party is to maintain its voice of opposition]” (1 August 1957), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 6, 218–22, originally published in Minzhu chao 民主潮 [Democratic tide], 7, no. 15 (August 1957). 29 Wang Zhongjian 王中江, Lianyu: Yin Haiguang pingzhuan 煉獄：殷海光評傳 [Purgatory: a critical biography of Yin Haiguang] (Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe, 2003), 16. 30 Ibid., 20–42. 31 For a comparison of Yin Haiguang and Xu Fuguan’s background, and their friendship and later enmity, see Li, “Lun Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang,” 17–35.

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Guomindang’s Department of Central Propaganda, Yin was appointed as the chief writer (zhubi 主筆) of Zhongyang ribao, the Guomindang party organ in Nanjing 南京.32 He was also offered a post teaching philosophy at the University of Nanking (Jinling daxue 金陵大學). During his service at Zhongyang ribao, Yin Haiguang gradually became dissatisfied with the Guomindang. In response to the introduction of the “Temporary Provisions” in 1948, Yin argued—but not in Zhongyang ribao— that the Guomindang had departed from the ideals of the Three Principles of the People and the blueprint for nation-building written by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925).33 The party was not sincerely committed to implementing constitutional democracy even though the promulgation of the 1947 constitution should theoretically have ushered in Sun’s blueprint. From Yin’s point of view, the Guomindang abided by the Three Principles only on the surface and only for the purpose of upholding one-party dictatorship and the interests of a privileged group of people. Nevertheless, Yin Haiguang did not lose all hope in the Nationalist government, and followed the party organ to Taiwan in March 1949.34 Believing that only with good governance could the government survive, he argued that a return to Sun Yat-sen’s political platform was the only way for the Guomindang to regain popular support against the Communists. He appealed for the Guomindang to “correct [its] errors and return to the original route,” and was once delighted to see the commencement of the party’s reorganization campaign in mid-1949.35 This campaign, however, finally dispelled Yin Haiguang’s illusion of any possible reform of the Guomindang. According to the campaign’s outline, the Guomindang would become a “revolutionary-democratic party” (geming minzhu zhengdang 革命民主政黨), and introduce a “system of democratic centralism” (minzhu jiquan zhi 民主集權制).36 The term “revolutionarydemocratic” was intended to characterize the Guomindang as a party that 32 Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 16. 33 Yin Fusheng 殷福生 (Yin Haiguang), “Women zou na tiao lu? 我們走那條路？ [Which route should we take?]” (September 1948), in Yin Haiguang, Zhengzhi yu shehui 政治與 社會 [Politics and society], vol. 1 (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 20, originally published in Qingnian zazhi 青年雜誌 [Youth magazine] 1, no. 2. 34 Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 59–60. 35 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Niuzhuan cuowu, huidao yuanlu 扭轉錯 誤，回到原路 [Correct the errors, return to the original route],” Minzu bao (Taipei), 1 June 1949, 1; Yin Haiguang, “Lun Guomindang de gaizao yundong 論國民黨底改造運 動 [On the Guomindang reform movement],” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 23 July 1949, 2. 36 Chen Xiaohui 陳曉慧, “You shang er xia de geming: Zhongguo Guomindang gaizao yundong zhi yanjiu (1950–1952) 由上而下的革命：中國國民黨改造運動之研 究 (1950–1952) [A top-down revolution: a study of the Guomindang Reorganization Movement (1950–1952)]” (PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2000), 174. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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would use revolutionary means to safeguard democracy.37 Democracy was mentioned simply because the party wanted to contrast itself with the Communist Party, which was widely considered to be anti-democratic.38 In fact, decision-making power remained in the hands of the top leadership of the Guomindang, which was paying lip-service to democracy. Having concluded that the Guomindang leaders were insincere in reforming the party, Yin resigned from his position at Zhongyang ribao in August 1949.39 Yin Haiguang soon secured a lectureship in philosophy at the National Taiwan University, whose president, Fu Sinian, supported him for the appointment. Having left Zhongyang ribao, he assisted Hu Shi and Lei Zhen in the founding of Ziyou Zhongguo, which published criticism of Communism and articles promoting freedom and democracy, and became a member of its editorial board.40 Although Yin Haiguang was disappointed with Chiang Kai-shek’s insincerity in democratic reforms, he did not make any explicit criticism of the Guomindang’s dictatorial rule in the early 1950s, because anti-Communism had brought Ziyou Zhongguo and the Nationalist government together. In its initial years, the periodical enjoyed a very friendly relationship with the Guomindang. For Lei Zhen at this early stage, there was no conflict between his role as founding director of Ziyou Zhongguo and his position as a national policy advisor in the President’s Residence. On the contrary, he worked very closely with Chiang Kai-shek to gather the support of anti-Communist intellectuals. For example, Chiang dispatched Lei twice, in 1950 and 1951, to investigate the attitudes of émigré intellectuals in Hong Kong towards the Nationalist government.41 37 38

Ibid., 93. Bruce Dickson, “The Lesson of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 133 (March 1993): 68. 39 Chen Pingjing 陳平景, “Yin Haiguang zhuanji 殷海光傳記 [Biography of Yin Haiguang],” in Yin Haiguang, Chuncan tusi: Yin Haiguang zuihou de huayu 春蠶吐絲：殷海光最後 的話語 [The spring silkworm spits silk: the last words of Yin Haiguang], ed. Chen Guying 陳鼓應 (Taipei: Yuanjing chubanshe, 1978), 236; Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 19. 40 Chen, “Yin Haiguang zhuanji,” 237; Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 19–20. 41 Ma Zhisu 馬之驌, Lei Zhen yu Jiang Jieshi 雷震與蔣介石 [Lei Zhen and Jiang Jieshi] (Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe wenhua chubanbu, 1993), 34–57; Qiao Baotai 喬寶泰, “Zhongyang zhengfu qian Tai chuqi zhi Zhongguo Guomindang Gang Ao zhengce: yi Lei Zhen, Hong Lanyou zhi fu Gang jianyi weili (1950–1951) 中央政府遷台初期之中國國民黨港澳 政策：以雷震、洪蘭友之赴港建議為例 (一九五○–一九五一) [The Guomindang’s Hong Kong–Macau policy soon after the moving of the central government to Taiwan: a case study of Lei Zhen and Hong Lanyou’s suggestions after their trips to Hong Kong, 1950–1951],” in Gang Ao yu jindai Zhongguo xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 港澳與近代中國 學術研討會論文集 [Proceedings of the Conference on Hong Kong, Macau and Modern China], ed. Gang Ao yu jindai Zhongguo xueshu yantaohui lunwenji bianji weiyuanhui 港澳與近代中國學術研討會編輯委員會 [Editorial committee for the proceedings of Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Ziyou Zhongguo did not publish any critiques of Chiang’s policies during its first year and a half of publication. Yin did write an article in June 1950 criticizing a recent speech by Chiang, but Lei Zhen declined to publish it because he wanted to protect Chiang’s reputation.42 Without any explicit and direct criticism of the Nationalist regime, Yin Haiguang concentrated on the discussion of freedom and democracy in the early 1950s. He particularly argued that democratization and the safeguarding of freedom on Taiwan were prerequisites for rescuing China from Communism: In democratic countries such as Britain and the United States, the people have all along enjoyed full democracy and liberty, which is ten thousand times more than can be said of the Russians. Therefore, the false propaganda of the Communist Party is naturally not at all effective in such countries. Thus, the only way to resist Communist totalitarianism is to let the people enjoy full democracy and liberty. And the basic precondition for letting the people enjoy full democracy and liberty is to have the capacity for tolerance. If one cannot show tolerance towards the people, “democracy” and “liberty” will become empty words. Thus, if we want to save China, we must offer the people democracy and liberty in the face of Communist dictatorship. If we are truly to put democracy and liberty into practice, we must have the greatest tolerance.43 In response to the introduction of the “Temporary Provisions,” Yin questioned whether freedom should be sacrificed for anti-Communism’s sake. He affirmed that the popular demand for freedom and democracy had become irresistible in recent years, and pointed out that the Guomindang leaders was not adapting to what he saw as the recent trend of democratization in the West. Again, he reminded the Guomindang leadership of Sun Yat-sen’s dictum that “the people are the masters of the state; the officials are the people’s public servants.” He now urged the Guomindang leadership to “restore the people to their rightful position of ‘master.’”44 In other words, the Nationalist government the Conference on Hong Kong, Macau and Modern China] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 2000), 627–28. 42 Lei Zhen 雷震, Lei Zhen riji (1950) 雷震日記 (1950) [The diary of Lei Zhen (1950)] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989), 130; Xue, Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng, 77. 43 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Minzhu yu kuanrong 民主與寬容 [Democracy and tolerance],” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 28 May 1949, 2. 44 Yin Haiguang, “Zhanzheng yu ziyou 戰爭與自由 [War and freedom]” (1 February 1950), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 153–57, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 3 (February 1950). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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should introduce democratic reforms so that the government could rest on a popular basis. The harmonious relationship between Ziyou Zhongguo and the Guomindang came to an end when cross-strait relations became more stable. Although the American Seventh Fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War to prevent a Communist takeover of Taiwan, the United States had not yet formulated a clear policy towards the island. In mid-1951, the Korean War came to a stalemate, with the United States judging that the coalition between the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans could gain no further advantage. Adopting a tougher stance towards the Chinese Communists, the American government decided on the permanent stationing of the Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan, thus guaranteeing Taiwan’s security.45 Without any immediate threat from the Chinese Communists, from mid-1951 onwards, Ziyou Zhongguo paid more attention than before to abuses of civil liberties on Taiwan. It was no longer prepared to remain silent about that government’s wrongdoings for the sake of unity against Communism. They wanted the government to be more transparent and to commit itself to the building of a free and democratic Taiwan. In response to Ziyou Zhongguo’s criticism, the Guomindang’s Central Reorganization Commission disciplined Lei Zhen for creating trouble for the government.46 Lei was finally expelled from the Guomindang in December 1954.47 From then on, the editors of Ziyou Zhongguo adopted an increasingly tougher and direct tone in its criticism of the government. They also shared Yin Haiguang’s view that democratization in Taiwan should be the first step of China’s salvation. This, however, does not mean that the idea of recovering the Chinese mainland was no longer important in their minds. Rather, these editors were now working on the assumption that China’s salvation would be best pursued by first realizing democracy and liberty in Taiwan. Lei Zhen, for example, was now advocating democracy as part of a larger strategy of “national salvation.” He once asserted that: 45 Zhang Shuya 張淑雅, “Meiguo dui Tai zhengce zhuanbian de kaocha, 1950 nian 12 yue–1951 nian 5 yue 美國對臺政策轉變的考察，1950 年12 月–1951 年5 月 [A study of the changes in the United States’ policy towards Taiwan, December 1950–May 1951],” Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan 中央硏究院近代史硏究所集刊 [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica] 19 (June 1990): 471–85. 46 Xue, Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng, 93–97; Ma, Lei Zhen yu Jiang Jieshi, 179–83; Lei Zhen 雷震, Lei Zhen huiyilu: “Wo de muqin” xubian 雷震回憶錄：「我的母親」續 編 [The memoirs of Lei Zhen: my mother (part 2)] (Hong Kong: Qishi niandai zazhishe. 1978), 96–97. 47 Lei, Lei Zhen riji (1953–1954), 384–85; Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰, Taiwan minzhu yundong sishi nian 台灣民主運動四十年 [Forty years of democratic movement in Taiwan] (Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe, 1988), 60. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Only if we thoroughly realize democratic politics can we resist Communism, smash the Communist bandits’ violence, and achieve the goal of restoring the nation by counterattack.48 Lei’s assumption that democratization should be implemented before recovering the mainland was supported by Yin Haiguang. He commented on the Nationalist government’s claim that it would one day launch counteroffensives on the Chinese mainland. He noted that this claim had long remained mere rhetoric, for no substantial action had been taken.49 Such rhetoric, however, had a serious adverse impact on the mainlanders residing in Taiwan. After listening to such rhetoric, many mainlanders might believe that they were going home soon and that their refuge in Taiwan was temporary. So they tended to tolerate unreasonable and problematic government policies, assuming that these too were temporary. The government, Yin argued, exploited the misperception, and did whatever it wanted. As a result, “human rights and liberty are seriously obstructed,” and “politics progresses along the road of anti-democracy.”50 Yin Haiguang now regarded the struggle against the Communists as “a contest of culture, politics and economy.”51 He further asserted that “liberty and democracy are the road of life in the struggle against Communism.”52 He asked why the Nationalist government had postponed the introduction of democracy until after the recovery of the mainland.53 He then called for a “political advance towards the mainland” (xiang dalu zuo zhengzhi jinjun 向大陸作政治 進軍) in order to “launch a real fight against Communism” (shizhi fan Gong 實 質反共): 48 Lei Zhen, “Women de taidu 我們的態度 [Our attitude],” in Lei Zhen, Lei Zhen yu ziyou Zhongguo 雷震與自由中國 [Lei Zhen and Free China] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989), 90, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 10 (November 1956). 49 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Jinri de wenti (2): Fangong dalu wenti 「今日 的問題」(二)：反攻大陸問題 [Today’s problems (2): the problem of launching a counteroffensive on the mainland]” (1 August 1957), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 509–11, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 17, no. 3 (August 1957). 50 Ibid., 519. 51 Yin Haiguang, “Guanyu ‘fangong dalu wenti’ de wenti 關於「反攻大陸問題」的問 題 [With regard to ‘the problem of launching a counteroffensive on the mainland’]” (1 September 1957), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 533, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 17, no. 5 (September 1957). 52 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Ziyou minzhu shi fan Gong de huolu 自由民 主是反共的活路 [Liberty and democracy are the road of life in the struggle against Communism]” (20 July 1958), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 635, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 19, no. 2 (July 1958). 53 Ibid., 640.

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Politically we should beam rays of light at the mainland, breaking through the iron curtain so that the people of the mainland can have news about liberty and democracy and maintain their resistance to the Communist totalitarian dictatorship within their heart, turning it into action when the opportunity arrives. This is called “advancing politically towards the mainland.”54 However, Ziyou Zhongguo soon faced a fatal blow when Yin’s promotion of freedom and democracy was at its climax in the late 1950s. In early 1960, the Ziyou Zhongguo editors were preparing the formation of an opposition party that could end the Guomindang’s monopoly in the next local elections.55 Yin suggested that the proposed party could aim at realizing liberty and democracy in concrete terms, such as achieving various kinds of human rights, including “freedom of speech, thought and religion and the right to vote, to receive education, to earn a living, to assemble and to form organizations,” which were all supposedly “guaranteed” in the existing constitution that had been ratified in 1947.56 This attempt of founding a new party was not tolerated by Chiang Kai-shek. Lei Zhen and several senior editors were arrested in September 1960. They were charged with “being aware of bandit activity but failing to report it.”57 Lei was sentenced to ten years in prison by a military court.58 Although Yin Haiguang was spared because Ziyou Zhongguo did not identify the authors

54 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Renqing dangshi xingshi, zhankai zixin yundong 認清當時形勢，展開自新運動 [Understanding the present situation clearly and launching the campaign of self-renewal]” (20 October 1958), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 732, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 19, no. 8 (October 1958). 55 Lei Zhen, “Women weisheme poqie xuyao yige qiang you li de fanduidang 我們為什 麼迫切需要一個強有力的反對黨 [Why do we urgently need a strong and powerful opposition party?],” in Lei Zhen, Lei Zhen yu zhengdang zhengzhi 雷震與政黨政治 [Lei Zhen and party politics] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989), 107–08, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 22, no. 10 (16 May 1960). 56 Yin Haiguang, “Wo duiyu zaiyedang de jiben jianyi 我對於在野黨的基本建議 [My basic suggestions for an opposition party]” (16 July 1960), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 949, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 23, no. 2 (July 1960). 57 Xue, Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng, 172. 58 Su Ruiqiang 蘇瑞鏘, Zhanhou Taiwan zudang yundong de lanshang: Zhongguo minzhudang zudang yundong 戰後臺灣組黨運動的濫觴：中國民主黨組黨運動 [The origins of party formation movements in postwar Taiwan: The movement for the formation of the Chinese Democratic Party] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2005), 161–62; Fu Zheng 傅正 ed., Lei an shimo: Lei an fengbo 雷案始末：雷案風波 [An account of the case of Lei Zhen: The turbulent case of Lei Zhen], vol. 2 (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989), 441–45.

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of its editorials, he had no more room to publish political critiques.59 Before he died of gastric cancer in 1969, Yin spent the rest of his life pondering how Chinese culture and democracy could be integrated in an ideal China. 3

Zhang Junmai and His Prioritization of Recovering the Mainland

While Taiwan-based émigrés tended to focus on democratization on Taiwan before recovering the mainland, a number of non-Taiwan-based émigrés did have different prioritization. Sojourning outside Taiwan, they were not necessarily looking forward to Chiang Kai-shek’s initiation of political reforms or a change to the political status quo on Taiwan through local elections. Since they engaged in the quests of national salvation and democratization without putting Taiwan into consideration, many of them prioritized the rescue of China before democratic state-building. Zhang Junmai and his fellows, for example, reorganized the so-called “Third Force” in Hong Kong in the early 1950s and prepared to recover the mainland with their own effort. Born in 1887 in Jiading 嘉定, Jiangsu, Zhang Junmai began his studies in Chinese classics at the age of six under the guidance of a family tutor. At the age of ten, he entered the School for the Study of Many Languages (Guangfangyan guan 廣方言館) in Shanghai, where the curriculum emphasized English, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and Western history. At the same time, he kept studying Chinese classics in his leisure hours. After graduating from the School for the Study of Many Languages, Zhang studied political economy at Waseda University in Japan from 1906 to 1910, where he joined the Political Information Society (Zhengwenshe 政聞社) of Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and entered Chinese politics.60 Zhang played a major role in assisting Liang in his campaign against the monarchical movement of Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859– 1916), and facilitating the cooperation between Liang’s Research Clique and 59

Xia Daoping 夏道平, “Jinian Yin Haiguang xiansheng 紀念殷海光先生 [Commemorating Mr. Yin Haiguang],” in Yin Xia Junlu 殷夏君璐 et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji 殷海光紀念 集 [Essays in memory of Yin Haiguang] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989), 241. 60 Xue, Minzhu xianzheng yu minzu zhuyi de bianzheng fazhan, 19–22; Zheng, Zhang Junmai zhuan, 4–26; Cheng Wenxi 程文熙, “Zhang Junmai xiansheng nianbiao jianbian chugao (I) 張君勱先生年表簡編初稿(上) [Draft of the abridged chronology of Mr. Zhang Junmai (I)],” in Zhang Junmai zhuanji ziliao 張君勱傳記資料 [Biographical materials of Zhang Junmai], ed. Fang Shiduo 方師鐸, vol. 2 (Taipei: Tianyi chubanshe, 1979), 253–54, originally published in Zaisheng 再生 [National renaissance] (Taipei edition) 2, no. 2 (February 1972).

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Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865–1936) in 1917.61 He was a keen follower of Liang until the latter’s death in 1929. In 1932, he co-founded the Chinese State Socialist Party with Zhang Dongsun and Luo Longji.62 Zhang and his party responded positively to Chiang Kai-shek’s call for a united front after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.63 He and six other party members became delegates to the People’s Political Council (Guomin canzhenghui 國民參政會), an advisory body consisting of representatives from various minor political parties and groups and independent politicians.64 As a participant in the United Front, Zhang tried to establish cooperation between all China’s minor parties by joining other minor-party leaders to form the Chinese Democratic League (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng 中國民主同盟) in 1941. These minor parties and the Democratic League represented what their members called the “Third Force” because they were independent of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party.65 After the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Zhang participated actively in the discussion of constitutionalism. He was even invited by the Political Consultative Conference (Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 政治協商會議) in 1946 to draft a new constitution because of his neutrality between the Guomindang and the Communists.66 However, the new constitution, adopted by the National Assembly (Guomin dahui 國民大會) in January 1947, was soon overridden by the “Temporary Provisions” in April 1948.67 The introduction of the “Temporary Provisions” ran counter to Zhang Junmai’s emphasis on the need for the President to be committed to the constitution and for there to be an alternation of parties in government.68 This was a factor contributing to Zhang’s decision not to follow the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Zhang 61 Xue, Minzhu xianzheng yu minzu zhuyi de bianzheng fazhan, 27–28. 62 Fung, “Nationalism and Modernity,” 795; Jeans, Democracy and Socialism in Republican China, 202–03. 63 Zheng, Zhang Junmai zhuan, 282. 64 Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 162. 65 Ibid., 231–35; Zheng, Zhang Junmai zhuan, 377. 66 Jiang Yuntian 蔣勻田, Zhongguo jindaishi zhuanlidian 中國近代史轉捩點 [Turning points in modern Chinese history] (Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1976), 37. 67 Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 290–91; Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 138; Jing Zhiren 荊知仁, Zhongguo lixianshi 中國立憲史 [A history of constitution-making in China] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1984), 461. 68 Zhang Junmai, “Zhongguo zhanshi xianzheng shishi ji qi buzou 中國戰時憲政實施 及其步驟 [The implementation of Chinese wartime constitutionalism and the steps thereto],” Zaisheng (Chongqing edition), no. 32 (1939): 4; Zhang Junmai, “Lun duodang yidang wenti 論多黨一黨問題 [On the multiparty / one-party problem],” Zaisheng (Chongqing edition), no. 43 (1940): 4.

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advocated fair competition for power between different political parties under constitutional democracy. He regarded the Guomindang as one political party among others, and thought that only victory in elections would grant it the legitimacy to rule. Thus, rather than relying on the Taiwan-based Nationalist government, Zhang began, in the early 1950s, to search for his own way to fight for “the independence and autonomy of the Republic of China” from Communism.69 Zhang Junmai left the Chinese mainland in December 1949, never to return. He then conducted a two-year-long lecture tour in India under the auspices of the Indian government.70 In late March 1952, Zhang Junmai spent a month in Hong Kong, where he had frequent meetings with political émigrés such as Zhang Fakui 張發奎 (1896–1980), Gu Mengyu 顧孟餘 (1888–1972), and Tong Guanxian 童冠賢 (1894–1981), with whom he had been keeping in touch since his sojourn in India. They agreed to found the Hong Kong-based Chinese Fighting League for Freedom and Democracy (Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng 中國自由民主戰鬥同盟), which aimed at counterattacking the mainland by force. Zhang Junmai drafted the Fighting League’s manifesto. He was also included in the new league’s eleven-man executive committee.71 However, Zhang did not settle down in Hong Kong because he was under close surveillance by the Hong Kong colonial government who, according to Chi-kwan Mark, regarded Third Force leaders like Zhang as a threat to the stability of the colony.72 During Zhang Junmai’s stay in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong police sent him “three summonses to report for questioning,” but Zhang Fakui advised him “to ignore the summons.” Shortly after Zhang Junmai left Hong Kong, the place where he had stayed was searched by the Hong Kong

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Zhang Junmai, Zhonghua Minguo duli zizhu yu Yazhou qiantu 中華民國獨立自主與亞 洲前途 [The independence and autonomy of the Republic of China and the prospects for Asia] (Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1955), 22. 70 Yang Yunyuan 楊允元, “Zai Yindu jiangxue shi de Zhang Junmai 在印度講學時的 張君勱 [Zhang Junmai during his lecture tour in India],” Zhuanji wenxue 傳記文學 [Biographical literature] 19: 1 (July 1971): 35. 71 Fa-k’uei Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 942–47. This is an oral history manuscript dictated by Zhang Fakui and transcribed by Julie Lien-ying How in the 1970s. The manuscript is deposited in the Chinese Oral History Collection, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York; Wan Lijuan 萬麗鵑, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong 一九五零年代的中國第三勢力運動 [The Chinese Third Force Movement in the 1950s]” (PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2000), 43. 72 Chi-kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 1949–1957 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 192–93.

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police.73 Such close surveillance by the Hong Kong government probably deterred Zhang Junmai from settling in Hong Kong, even though that would have made his participation in the new organization more efficient. Zhang Junmai’s contribution to the Fighting League mainly lay in his effort in rallying support for the organization in the United States, although it brought little success. He settled in the United States after his visit to Hong Kong. He spent three years in Washington D.C., during which he published The Third Force in China (1952) to promote the Third Force Movement to an international readership.74 In this book, he traced the history of the Republican-era Third Force and discussed the prospects of the movement. He also put a great deal of effort into lobbying the American government, émigré Chinese intellectuals, and Chinese community leaders in the United States.75 Zhang met George C. Marshall (1880–1959), former U.S. Secretary of State, and John Leighton Stuart (1876–1962), former U.S. Ambassador to China. However, by early 1952, the U.S. State Department had already formed the view that the Third Force in Hong Kong was a movement without any program or money. To the American officials, supporting the Nationalist government seemed to be a more realistic option.76 This explains why Marshall refused to talk about Chinese political problems when he met Zhang. Stuart, for his part, told Zhang that the underground anti-Communist activists on the Chinese mainland should get in touch with the Chinese government on Taiwan, and that the United States would not support any political force that was hostile to both the Communist and the Taiwan-based Nationalist governments.77 Indeed, the U.S. State Department now decided to make use of the Third Force intellectuals for anti-Communist propaganda.78 The Ford Foundation, which had close links with the American government and played an important role in the cultural aspects of American foreign policy, agreed to sponsor Zhang Junmai’s plan to establish tertiary colleges for overseas Chinese in various Southeast Asian countries so as to spread the League’s influence in Chinese communities in these countries and to nurture talents for the League.79 73 Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 951–52. 74 Carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952). 75 Yang Yongqian 楊永乾, Zhonghua Minguo xianfa zhifu: Zhang Junmai zhuan 中華民國 憲法之父：張君勱傳 [Father of the Republic of China’s constitution: A biography of Zhang Junmai] (Taipei: Yang Yongqian, 1993), 177–78. 76 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, 190. 77 Wan, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong,” 45. 78 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, 191. 79 Letter from Zhang Junmai to Zhang Fakui, Tong Guanxian and Li Weichen, 22 March 1953, in “General Chang Fa-k’uei Papers,” Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York, USA.

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Nevertheless, there were some discrepancies between the China policy of the U.S. State Department and that of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency continued to sponsor the Third Force secretly even after the U.S. State Department stopped doing so.80 According to an intelligence report presented to the Guomindang Central Standing Committee on December 4, 1952, the “American side” (Mei fang 美方) agreed to grant US$10,000 to the Fighting League as a result of Zhang Junmai’s lobbying activities in the United States.81 In his reminiscences, Zhang Fakui also mentioned that some Americans of unknown affiliation also provided the Fighting League with a military training camp in Okinawa, Japan.82 Besides securing some financial assistance from the American government and philanthropic sources, Zhang Junmai approached some émigré intellectuals and Chinese community leaders in the United States. On May 7, 1952, he met Hu Shi, who had taken up the position of curator of the East Asian Library at Princeton University, and invited him to join the Fighting League. Hu, however, refused to participate in it and replied bluntly that the Third Force in Hong Kong could do nothing but beg “chicken feed” from the U.S. State Department.83 Hu even attempted to persuade Zhang to go to Taiwan, but Zhang refused. Hu then condemned Zhang as a zhengke 政客, a negative Chinese rendering of the English word “politician,” and the two men quarreled about whether the Nationalist government was worthy of support.84 Nevertheless, Zhang succeeded in persuading Li Daming 李大明 (1904–61), leader of the Chinese Democratic Constitutionalist Party (Zhongguo minzhu xianzheng dang 中國民主憲政黨), and Tan Hu 譚護 (date unknown), leader of the Hongmen 洪門 in San Francisco, to join the Fighting League.85 With the military training provided by the United States, the Fighting League did make one unsuccessful attempt at a counterattack on the Chinese Communists. They dispatched a self-trained guerrilla unit from Putai 蒲台 Island, an outlying island in Hong Kong, with the hope that it would land on the shore of 80 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, 191. 81 “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng zuzhi zhi diaocha baogao 中國自由民主 戰鬥同盟組織之調查報告 [Investigation report on the organization of the Chinese Fighting League for Freedom and Democracy],” attached to the minutes of the 6th meeting of the Seventh Guomindang Central Standing Committee, December 4, 1952, Party Archives of the Guomindang, Taipei, Taiwan. 82 Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 958–60. 83 Hu Shi 胡適, Hu Shi riji quanji 胡適日記全集 [The complete diaries of Hu Shi], vol. 8 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2004), 759. 84 Yang, Zhonghua Minguo xianfa zhifu, 178. 85 Wan, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong,” 46.

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Guangdong province. But the unit was caught by the Hong Kong Marine Police before it was even able to reach international waters.86 However, the Fighting League was soon paralyzed by internal disputes between Zhang Junmai and Gu Mengyu. As Zhang lived in the United States and Gu sojourned in Japan, the Hong Kong-based Fighting League was actually headed by Li Weichen 李微塵 (1903–77), the League’s Secretary-General and a follower of Zhang Junmai. Li usually sought to remove from the Fighting League any potential threat to his position. He even proposed a cut to the budget of Zhongguo zhi sheng 中國之聲 (The Voice of China), the Fighting League’s organ in Hong Kong directed by Zhang Guotao 張國燾 (1897–1979), a close friend of Gu Mengyu. Zhang Guotao protested by withdrawing from the Fighting League. His withdrawal can be seen as a victory of Zhang Junmai’s faction over Gu Mengyu’s in the power struggle within the League.87 Zhang Junmai and Gu Mengyu were also very different in personality. Gu was very cautious and suspicious. He wanted to consolidate the Fighting League before launching other plans. Zhang was very ambitious. He was eager to expand the influence of the organization as soon as possible.88 For example, he wanted to found a university for young Chinese in Indonesia—presumably to prepare a pool of well-educated youths for the reconstruction of Chinese society after the recovery of the mainland.89 Such ambitions irritated Gu Mengyu, who would have preferred the Fighting League to develop at a steady pace. By late 1954, Zhang Junmai and Gu Mengyu were already frustrated as a result of their mutual distrust. Gu withdrew from the Fighting League in September, and Zhang Junmai followed later in the year.90 Since the two most important leaders had quit, Zhang Fakui decided to dissolve the organization.91 As the Fighting League was the foremost paramilitary organization in the Third Force Movement of the 1950s, its dissolution signified the end of the phase of active hopes of retaking the mainland. Indeed, such hopes were probably unrealistic in the first place. The fact that the Chinese Communist Party had consolidated 86 Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 962–64. 87 Wan, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong,” 49. 88 Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 943; Minutes of the 337th meeting of the Guomindang Central Reform Committee, 7 May 1952, Party Archives of the Guomindang, Taipei, Taiwan. 89 “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng zuzhi zhi diaocha baogao.” 90 Yang Tianshi, “The Third Force in Hong Kong and North America during the 1950s,” in Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-century China, ed. Jeans, 273; Wan, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong,” 50. 91 Chang, Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang, 983.

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its rule by the early 1950s effectively deterred any attempt to recover the mainland. The Fighting League failed partly because the financial and military assistance it received from the United States was so limited, and partly because of the Hong Kong government’s surveillance of its activists.92 But one should not ignore Zhang Junmai’s overambitious attitude, which put him at odds with some of his fellows and was an obstacle to unity among the Fighting League’s members. How do Zhang Junmai’s post-1949 political activities broaden our understanding of the different ways émigré intellectuals prioritized the tasks of national salvation and democratization in the 1950s? While Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang hoped to see democracy realized on Taiwan before the Nationalist government launched counteroffensives on the mainland, Zhang concentrated on trying personally to save China from Communism. He regarded the recovery of the mainland as the most urgent task. Democratic reforms would be implemented afterwards. In Zhang’s view, these reforms were worthwhile only after successful elimination of the Communists. However, Zhang Junmai and his fellows who prioritized recovery of China over democratization underestimated the unfavorable circumstances ahead of them. For instance, they miscalculated the United States’ China policy. The American government tended to sponsor their cultural activities for antiCommunist propaganda rather than supporting their political activities, which were independent from the Nationalist government. Zhang Junmai could not secure any money from the American government apart from some shortterm funding from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Ford Foundation. Despite his efforts in drafting the League’s manifesto and lobbying Chinese community leaders in the United States, Zhang realized no solid political achievement. Indeed, in relying on the Fighting League, Zhang Junmai and his fellows had a problematic point of departure, not to mention their unrealistic hopes of counterattacking the mainland—a task already difficult enough for the Taiwan-based Nationalist government. 4

Conclusion

Throughout the 1950s, Chinese émigré intellectuals differently prioritized the tasks of national salvation and democratization. Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang, 92 Wan, “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong,” 172–75; Chen Zhengmao 陳正茂, Zhongguo qingniandang yanjiu lunji 中國青年黨研究論集 [Essays on the Chinese Youth Party] (Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2008), 36–39.

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for example, focused on democratic nation-building in Taiwan and regarded this as a foundation for counteroffensives on the mainland. Zhang Junmai and his fellows, however, believed that worthwhile democratic pursuit was only possible after successful recovery of the mainland from the Communists. This explains the diversity of their strategies for achieving their goals in the 1950s. Although unfavorable circumstances in the 1950s prevented these émigré intellectuals from realizing the two tasks, this did not mean that they made no achievements. Their writings on freedom and democracy were indeed important resources for a younger generation of Taiwan- or overseas-based Chinese intellectuals as they further developed their thinking on an ideal Chinese nation. The émigré generation of the 1950s also nurtured or inspired a number of prominent scholars who are still active in academia today. For example, Du Weiming and Liu Shuxian, contemporary experts on Confucianism, have been exploring the possibilities of integration between Western democratic ideas and Confucianism. Lin Yusheng and Zhang Hao, both students of Yin Haiguang, have been studying how liberty and democracy can be best realized in modern China. The extent to which contemporary scholars have inherited the thought of the generation of the 1950s remains unclear. It is hoped that more research on the continuity between the two generations will be done in the future. The émigré generation of the 1950s also had its legacy in the political arena. Although the voice for democracy on Taiwan was suppressed along with the arrest of Lei Zhen in 1960, it revived a decade later during the “Outside the Party” Movement (Dangwai yundong 黨外運動) since the mid-1970s. Selections of articles from Ziyou Zhongguo were reprinted by the Dangwai activists in the late 1970s, and discussions on freedom and democracy were revitalized among them (Xue, 1996: 391–92). They had inherited the democratic pursuit of Yin Haiguang, Lei Zhen and their fellows. To a certain extent, the ideals of the émigré generation of the 1950s were partly the foundation of Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s. What about the case of Hong Kong? The failure of Zhang Junmai’s Fighting League and the so-called “Third Force” convinced émigré intellectuals in the British colony that recovery of the mainland was impossible in the near future. Many of them became teachers in local high schools and colleges such as New Asia, Zhuhai, and United Colleges. Like their Taiwan-based counterparts, these émigrés in Hong Kong also nurtured a new generation of locally-grown intellectuals who have been envisaging a future democratic China. Knowing that Chinese democracy was a distant goal, they began their quest for democracy in local politics and connected it with China. In the 1980s, they formed different political groups and began to demand universal suffrage in the local

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Legislative Council and District Boards. After the June Fourth Massacre in 1989, these intellectuals founded the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, whose ultimate aim is to realize democracy in the Chinese mainland. They believe that the democratic prospects of Hong Kong and China were interconnected, and that a democratized Hong Kong will definitely be beneficial to the quest for democracy in China. Here, we can indeed see a similarity between contemporary democratic intellectuals in Hong Kong and the Taiwan-based émigrés in the 1950s. Both of them tended to view that democratization in both places could serve as a role model for possible political changes on the mainland. Of course, more in-depth comparison needs to be done on this topic.

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Chapter 2

The Influence of Cold War Currents on Chinese Émigré Intellectuals The Chinese émigrés’ activities and thought were not only a response to the quests for “national salvation” and “democratic state-building,” but also a reaction to the global Cold War-era currents of thought that were influencing intellectuals worldwide.1 The coming of the Cold War in the late 1940s provoked widespread anti-leftist sentiment among liberals in the West. This anti-leftist sentiment was not limited to fear of Communism, but was also an awareness of the harms of utopian ideas, whether radical or moderate. This is shown in the thought of prominent Western liberals of the 1940s and 1950s. Karl R. Popper, for instance, argued that utopianism would ultimately lead to dictatorship.2 Friedrich A. Hayek asserted that utopianism was both anti-democratic and anti-liberal.3 Since the late 1940s, the works of these Western liberals had been introduced to the Chinese intellectual circle. Many Chinese liberals were fascinated with their arguments and translated their works into Chinese. For example, Hayek’s thought was extensively introduced by his student Zhou Dewei 周德偉 (1902–1986).4 Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) was also translated by Yin Haiguang.5 However, the émigrés’ responses to Cold 1 This chapter is reprinted by permission from Johns Hopkins University Press. An earlier version of this chapter was published as Kenneth Kai-chung Yung, “Cold War Currents and Chinese Émigré Intellectuals, 1949–1960,” Twentieth-Century China 40, no. 2 (May 2015): 146–65. 2 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 140. 3 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 25–28. 4 Zhou Dewei 周德偉, “Jieshao Haiyeke gei Zhongguo zhishi qunzhong 介紹海耶克給中 國知識群眾 [Introducing Hayek to intellectuals in China],” in Zhou Dewei, Zhou Dewei shehui zhengzhi zhexue lunzhu 周德偉社會政治哲學論著 [Zhou Dewei’s works on society, politics, and philosophy] (Taipei: Zundexing zhai, 1968), 313–27; Zhou Dewei, “Haiyeke xuepai de shehui sixiang de yanjiu 海耶克學派的社會思想的研究 [Introduction to the social thought of the school of Hayek],” in Zhou, Zhou Dewei shehui zhengzhi zhexue lunzhu, 328–47. 5 Yin’s translation of The Road to Serfdom was first published in twelve instalments in Ziyou Zhongguo in 1953 and 1954, see Xue Huayuan 薛化元 ed., “Zi you Zhongguo” quan 23 juan zong mulu ji suoyin 自由中國全23 卷總目錄暨索引 [Table of contents and index for all twenty-three volumes of Free China] (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 2000), 42–52. The translation was published as a book in 1965 and reprinted in 1979, 1990 and 2009. See Haiyeke 海耶克 [Hayek], Dao nuyi zhi lu 到奴役之路 [The road to serfdom], trans. Yin Haiguang

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_004 Kenneth Kai-chung

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War trends of thinking were much more diversified, since their arrival in Hong Kong and Taiwan intertwined with the pursuit of national salvation in the 1950s. Hardcore liberals such as the Ziyou Zhongguo editors in Taiwan embraced the anti-utopianism from the West and began to reject all kinds of leftist schools of thought. Veteran democratic socialists, most of whom were residing in Hong Kong, were still confident in their beliefs and even developed a moderate socialist blueprint for a future China. Traditionalists such as the New Confucian scholars were being stimulated by Cold War currents in a different way. In response to the Communist domination of the Chinese mainland, the New Confucian scholars resisted the spread of Communist influence by advocating the adoption of traditional Confucian values, though reinterpreted to envisage a democratic system of government. Through a study of several representative figures, this chapter discusses the impact of the Cold War-era trends of thought on Chinese émigrés as well as their diversified responses to them. It argues that Chinese émigrés were not immune to the anti-Communist thinking of the 1950s. The degree of influence, however, varies among adherents of different schools of thought. 1

Liberals Who Departed from Socialist Tendencies

Upon their arrival in Taiwan, liberal-minded intellectuals had more opportunities to read contemporary literature on political science published in the West. Influenced by the works of various scholars such as Friedrich A. Hayek and Karl R. Popper, these intellectuals departed from their moderate socialist tendencies. Yin Haiguang, for instance, was once an advocate of moderate socialism before 1949. Although he had been opposed to Communism since his student years, Yin was able to make a distinction between Communism and moderate socialism. Indeed, he advocated “democratic socialism” (minzhu shehui zhuyi 民主社會主義) in a number of articles published in the late 1940s. In one of these articles, he claimed that there was a general consensus among Chinese intellectuals that China should take the road of “democratic socialism,” which was “the baby of the marriage between democracy and socialism.”6 “This baby is endowed with the blood of both democracy and socialism. It combines the advantages of both to create an ideal society,” he asserted.7 In (Hong Kong: Zongheng chubanshe, 1979), (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009). 6 Yin, “Women zou na tiao lu?,” 6. 7 Ibid.

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such a society, various kinds of freedom would be guaranteed, while the gap between the rich and the poor would be narrowed. Communism would, therefore, no longer be attractive to the Chinese people.8 Yin stated the meaning of democratic socialism as “political democratization” (zhengzhi minzhuhua 政 治民主化) plus “economic socialization” ( jingji shehuihua 經濟社會化). These were to lead to “political freedom” and “economic equality” respectively.9 He placed high hopes on democratic socialism in the late 1940s, claiming that it should be the founding principle of a new Chinese nation.10 Yin Haiguang’s democratic socialist tendencies probably came from his admiration of Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood (minsheng zhuyi 民生主義).11 The concept had first been reflected in the slogan “equalizing land ownership” in the “Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance” (Tongmenghui xuanyan 同盟會宣言) published in 1906.12 It was further elaborated in a series of lectures by Sun in 1924. “Socialism arose as an effort to solve the problem of the people’s livelihood. In this particular sense, the social problem is also the problem of the people’s livelihood. Therefore, the Principle of the People’s Livelihood can be said to be the main theme of socialism,” said Sun.13 By adopting this principle, in 1924, Sun aimed at realizing “the equalization of 8 Ibid. 9 Yin, “Women zou na tiao lu?,” 6; see also Yin Haiguang, “Wo dui Guo Gong de kanfa 我對 國共的看法 [My views on the Guomindang and the Communist Party]” (2 October 1948), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 29. Originally published in Chuangjin zhoukan 創進週 刊 [Creation and progress weekly] 1, no. 12 (October 1948). 10 Yin, “Women zou na tiao lu?,” 6, 22–23. 11 He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 79–81. 12 “Tongmenghui xuanyan” was included in the Revolutionary Alliance’s “Geming fanglüe 革命方略 [Guidelines for revolution].” See “Zhongguo Tongmenghui geming fanglüe 中 國同盟會革命方略 [Guidelines for revolution of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance],” in Sun Zhongsan quanji 孫中山全集 [Complete works of Sun Yat-sen], ed. Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo 中國社會科學院近代史硏究所 [Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 297. Sun Yat-sen also published Minbao 民報 [People’s journal] in 1905 as a forum to facilitate discussion of the Three Principles of the People. For the influence of the American reformer Henry George on Sun Yat-sen’s formulation of his Principle of the People’s Livelihood, see Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 167–72. For a detailed account of how Sun’s experience in Britain in 1896 and 1897 shaped his Principle of the People’s Livelihood, see Huang Yuhe 黃宇和, Sun Yixian zai Lundun, 1896–1897: sanmin zhuyi sixiang tanyuan 孫逸仙 在倫敦, 1896–1897：三民主義思想探源 [Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896–1897: the intellectual origins of the Three Principles of the People] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2007), 415–52. 13 Translation slightly modified from Sun Yat-sen, The Three Principles of the People, trans. Frank W. Price (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1929), 373. For the original passage in

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land ownership,” the regulation of private capital and the nationalization of all important industries so as to develop state capital.14 Sun admired Marxism, but he distinguished the principle from Marxism because he disagreed with the Marxist idea of class struggle. He believed that the interests of different social classes could be harmonized through the realization of the principle.15 As Marie-Claire Bergère notes, the principle was “both an idealistic goal and a strategy for development.”16 However, Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood was not really followed strictly by his political successor, Chiang Kai-shek. Although the Guomindang did propose some socialist measures in its party platform, it did not put them into practice extensively. For example, in 1926, the party introduced a program of rent reduction that would cap the land rent at 37.5 percent of main crop production. However, despite the fact that the program was “written into the national Land Law of 1930,” Suzanne Pepper notes, “these provisions were never widely implemented.”17 In 1937, the Nationalist government revised the Land Law to limit rents to within eight percent of the land value. Still, because of the Japanese invasion, “little effort was made to enforce this provision,” Pepper observes.18 By contrast, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Communists modelled their rent reduction program upon that of the Guomindang and took concrete steps to implement it. Pepper summarizes the Communists’ program as follows: The Communists had carried out a 25 percent reduction of farm rentals, levied a single progressive tax, made available agricultural loans at low interest rates, encouraged productive activities on the part of rich peasants, increased production through the opening up of waste lands, increased cotton acreage, started to coordinate the use of labor by organizing labor exchange or labor service teams, and promoted cultural and educational activities in the villages.19 After the end of the war, Pepper continues, the Communists replaced this program with “the more advanced one of abolishing tenancy altogether and

14 15 16 17 18 19

Chinese, see Sun Zhongsan 孫中山 (Sun Yat-sen), Sanmin zhuyi 三民主義 [The three principles of the people] (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1983), 190. Sun, The Three Principles of the People, 429–44. Ibid., 373–407. Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 386. Pepper, Civil War in China, 230. Ibid. Ibid., 231.

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transferring the ownership of land to the peasant who tilled it.”20 In response to such radical socialist reforms, Yin Haiguang urged the Guomindang not to lag behind its enemy. It was under such circumstances that Yin promoted the Principle of the People’s Livelihood in his writings. For him, the principle was like democracy and liberty—a means to combat Communism. He was keen to tell his readers that the Guomindang could do better at tackling socioeconomic problems than the Communists. In Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha 中 國共產黨之觀察 (Observations on the Chinese Communist Party), published in 1948, Yin wrote: China does not need the Communist Party in the future, either. Once China’s society and economy depart from the feudal stage, they may also gradually progress along the road of state capitalism. State capitalism has state-run large-scale enterprises as its backbone. If China progresses along this road, the outcome will be a gradual reduction of private capital through a restriction of private capital. On this, Mr. Sun’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood will have been implemented. If Mr. Sun’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood is implemented, the Chinese Communist Party’s political thesis will eventually disappear. Once the Chinese Communist Party’s political thesis disappears, will there still be any prospects for [that party]?21 In the above passage, Yin Haiguang apparently accepted what he called “state capitalism” (guojia ziben zhuyi 國家資本主義), which, according to Frederick Pollock, is the non-Communist assumption of important functions of private capitalists by the state and under which “profit interests still play a significant role.”22 In fact, William C. Kirby suggests that, facing the military threat from Japan, the Nationalist government had been prioritizing industrialization since the early 1930s. In addition to defence-related industries, heavy industries such as the steel industry and the electric power industry and some light industries such as the silk industry were considered strategically important. These industries were put under state control. Such a policy aimed at strengthening national defence and economic self-sufficience in a foreseeable war 20 21

Ibid., 231. Yin Haiguang, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha 中國共產黨之觀察 [Observations on the Chinese Communist Party] (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009), 166–67. 22 Frederick Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations,” in Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2005), 286.

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against Japan.23 This may be regarded as a kind of state capitalism. But would implementation of state capitalism indeed be tantamount to implementation of Sun’s “Principle of the People’s Livelihood”? Ought not the principle, as one of the Three Principles of the People, to be democratic as well? In a speech on the principle given on 10 August 1924, Sun Yat-sen had suggested the “mutual integration of the Three Principles of the People” (Sanmin zhuyi huxiang jiehe 三民主義互相結合).24 In other words, Principle of the People’s Livelihood should be upheld together with democracy (minquan zhuyi 民 權主義) and nationalism (minzu zhuyi 民族主義). The Principle of the People’s Livelihood, understood as state capitalism, would fit well enough as the “socialism” of “democratic socialism” to the extent that the latter, as Donald F. Busky suggests, “combines the ideas of liberal-democratic government with that of social ownership and control of the economy.”25 However, state capitalism is not necessarily democratic. As Frederich Pollock suggests, there are both democratic and totalitarian forms of state capitalism.26 Yin’s equation of state capitalism with minsheng zhuyi may simply reflect careless assumptions in line with the apparent common sense of his day. Nevertheless, Yin Haiguang shared socialist thought not only with Sun Yat-sen but also with several of his contemporaries. His preference for democratic socialism was echoed by a number of contributors to Ziyou Zhongguo in the first two years of the 1950s. As He Zhuo’en has suggested, there was indeed a socialist tendency among the periodical’s contributors.27 One writer using the pen name Zi Youren 資友仁 (a homonym of ziyouren 自由人, “free man”) suggested that both a democratic mode of government and equal economic opportunities were necessary for an ideal democratic country. The pursuit of economic equality should be moderate and gradual, and should be based upon political democracy.28 Zeng Xubai 曾虛白 (dates unknown) asserted that 23 William C. Kirby, “Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928–1937,” in Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 148–52. 24 Sun, Sanmin zhuyi, 216. 25 Donald F. Busky, Democratic Socialism: A Global Survey (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), 7. 26 Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations,” 286. 27 He Zhuo’en, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao : weiquan tizhi xia de minzhu kaoyan 《自由中國》與臺灣自由主義思潮：威權體制下的民主考驗 [Free China and liberal thought currents in Taiwan: a challenge for democracy under authoritarianism] (Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 2008), 260–73. 28 Zi Youren 資友仁, “You zhengzhi minzhu dao jingji pingdeng 由政治民主到經 濟平等 [From political democracy to economic equality],” Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 4 (February 1950): 15; See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 262.

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“liberalism is the ultimate goal of human evolution.”29 “Democracy and socialism are  … the two most correct routes to this goal,” he wrote.30 Unlike Zi Youren, Zeng gave economic equality priority over political freedom, on the grounds that the former was the root of democracy and socialism. “There is no political freedom without economic equality.”31 “Equality is the mother; freedom is the son,” he claimed.32 Gao Changshou 高昌壽 (dates unknown) reminded his readers that, in the last fifty years, most capitalist countries in the world had adopted a controlled economy to address the adverse impact of laissez-faire liberalism.33 He believed that “socialism is one step towards the ideal lifestyle for humankind.”34 He saw no contradiction between socialism and liberalism. “Socialism,” from his point of view, “should be the extension of liberalism. Liberalism should be the backbone of socialism.”35 The socialist tendency of the Ziyou Zhongguo liberal contributors in the early 1950s comes as no surprise in view of Edmund S.K. Fung’s argument that “liberty and equality were a dominant theme in the quest for modernity” in the Republican Era.36 Given the tradition of Sun Yat-sen’s democratic socialism, it was not problematic for someone like Yin to fit elements of socialism into his predominantly liberal approach. He Zhuo’en may be correct that the above contributors in Ziyou Zhongguo were in an embarrassing position because they were under pressure from antiCommunism in Taiwan.37 I would like to further argue that Yin Haiguang and his fellow liberals soon began to depart from moderate socialism and lean towards Cold War liberalism. One of the characteristics of Cold War liberalism, according to Anthony Arblaster, was hostility to “utopianism,” which the Cold War liberals saw as “the intellectual source of communist totalitarianism.”38 Arblaster suggests that a tendency towards anti-utopianism was reflected

29 Zeng Xubai 曾虛白, “Ziyou, minzhu, shehui san zhuyi helun 自由、民主、社會三 主義合論 [An integrated discussion of liberalism, democracy, and socialism],” Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 6 (March 1950): 14. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 15. 32 Ibid.; See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 266–67. 33 Gao Changshou 高昌壽, “Jingji de ziyou zhuyi 經濟的自由主義 [Economic liberalism],” Ziyou Zhongguo 4, no. 3 (February 1951): 13. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.; See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 263–64. 36 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 262. 37 He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 260. 38 Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 320.

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in the works of J.L. Talmon and Karl R. Popper.39 It was under such influences that Yin and his colleagues moved away from socialism.40 In the early 1950s, Yin Haiguang began to appreciate economic freedom and oppose the planned economy.41 He advocated that all human beings should have the freedom to develop their “economic ability” ( jingji nengli 經濟能力) so as to make a living, and that no restrictions should be imposed on them.42 “In theory,” he claimed, “it is hard to make sense of approving political democracy but opposing economic freedom.”43 “Once economic freedom is lost, this will be followed by the loss of many other kinds of freedom,” he continued.44 He now regarded the planned economy as an ineffective way to improve people’s standard of living. “In countries that talk about a planned or controlled economy, people’s standard of living is not as good as that those in countries where the degree of economic freedom is considerably high,” he wrote.45 Yin also started to equate all kinds of socialist thought with totalitarianism. He expressed concern, in a number of book reviews, about the adverse sociopolitical impact of a controlled economy and excessive government intervention. He warned that a controlled economy would only serve to make “the rulers” (zhizhe 治者) more arbitrary.46 Quoting the passage, “… the proles were natural inferiors who must be kept in subjection, like animals, by the application of a few simple rules,” from George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-four, Yin further asserted that “the philosophy of socialism is the philosophy of pig-feeding.”47 He claimed that the problems of socialism were 39 Ibid., 320–22. 40 For the influence of Karl R. Popper on Yin Haiguang, see Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 135–44. For the influence of J.L. Talmon on Yin, see Weng Songran 翁松燃, “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan 殷海光先生的民主觀 [Mr. Yin Haiguang’s view on democracy],” in Wei Zhengtong 韋政通 et al., Ziyou minzhu de sixiang yu wenhua 自由民主的思想與文化 [The thought and culture of freedom and democracy] (Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe wenhua chubanbu, 1990), 237–40. 41 He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 106–08. 42 Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou zhuyi de yunhan 自由主義底蘊涵 [The implications of liberalism]” (1 August 1950 and 16 August 1950), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 206. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 3, no. 3 (August 1950). 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 207. 46 Yin Haiguang, “Minzhu Zhengzhi 民主政治 [Democratic politics]” (1 January 1951), in Yin Haiguang, Shuping yu shuxu 書評與書序 [Book reviews and prefaces], vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2010), 57, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 4, no. 1 (January 1951). 47 Yin Haiguang, “Yijiu basi nian 一九八四年 [Year 1984]” (16 July 1951), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 103, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 2 (July 1951). For the

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serious not only in Communist countries but also in countries with long democratic traditions, such as Britain, where “freedom has been threatened by the implementation of socialism.”48 He alleged that “Britain has reached the brink of this kind of danger.”49 Government intervention, from his point of view, was a “necessary evil to be implemented only when there is no other option.”50 “In a truly democratic state, the free development of the individual economy reigns supreme,” stated Yin.51 Karl R. Popper’s open society theory had considerable influence on Yin Haiguang’s political thought.52 According to Popper, an open society “sets free the critical powers of man.”53 He was opposed to utopianism, or “utopian social engineering” as he called it, on the grounds that it would lead to authoritarianism and suppress criticism.54 Yin agreed with Popper’s advocacy of “piecemeal social engineering,” which refers to “the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society” one by one.55 Yin explained that “piecemeal social engineering” would guarantee “social flexibility,” which was essential to the development and progress of society.56 He elaborated this with a quotation from Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty (1960): “If we are to advance, we must leave room for a continuous revision of our present conceptions and ideals which will be necessitated by further experience.”57 Thus, he was opposed to any “construction on a national

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57

quoted passage, see George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four (Fairfield, Iowa: Literary Society, 2004), 91. Yin Haiguang, “Ziyou ren 自由人 [Free man]” (1 December 1951), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 144–45, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 11 (December 1951). Ibid., 145. Yin Haiguang, “Jingji zhengce yu jingji xueli 經濟政策與經濟學理 [Economic policy and scholarly principles of economics]” (16 August 1952), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 217, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 4 (August 1952). Yin Haiguang, “Meiguo qulai 美國去來 [Back from the United States]” (16 March 1953), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 253, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 8, no. 6 (March 1953). Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 142–44. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd, 1947), 1. Ibid., 140–41. Yin Haiguang, “Haiyeke lun ziyou chuangzaoli (dai xu): cong ‘wuzhilun’ chufa 海耶克論 自由創造力(代序)：從「無知論」出發 [Hayek on free creativity (for preface): to start off with the ‘theory of ignorance’]” (18 October 1965), in Yin Haiguang, Xueshu yu sixiang 學術與思想 [Scholarship and thought], vol. 3 (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 1209, originally published in Shi yu chao 時與潮 [Time and tide], no. 198 (October 1965); Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 139–40. Yin Haiguang, “Haiyeke lun ziyou chuangzaoli,” 1209. Ibid. For the quotation, see Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 74.

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scale” ( juguo guimo de jianshe 舉國規模的建設) that required coordination by the state.58 Yin Haiguang completely abandoned his socialist tendencies after reading Friedrich A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom in 1952.59 Yin was fascinated with Hayek’s book and translated it into Chinese. In the preface to his Chinese version, Yin admitted that he had been puzzled by the apparent compatibility between political democracy and economic equality for some time. After reading Hayek’s book, Yin wrote, “my confusion is dispelled and my worries disappeared immediately.”60 In one of the translator’s footnotes, Yin wrote that “it is indeed very easy to realize equality in a ‘socialist system.’ Unfortunately, such equality is false equality.”61 His Cold War liberal tendencies are clearly reflected in the following passage in “Wo weishenme fangong?” 我為什麼反共？ (Why do I oppose Communism?), published in Ziyou Zhongguo on 16 June 1952: Since I moved to Taiwan, I have had more opportunity to come into contact with Western political philosophy and to ponder the political disturbances in China over the last fifty years. Given also the various stimuli that I now personally experience, I have arrived at last at a firm answer: in China as it is now, political democracy is more important than economic equality. Without political democracy, there is simply no basis for discussing anything. Those who lose political freedom will first sink to the level of peasant-slaves, worker-slaves, commercial slaves and literary slaves. Once they have lost their status as human beings, they will not be able to move an inch, and if their words do not fit with the proprieties, their lives will be in danger. How can they still win economic equality? Obviously, talking about socialism in China’s present circumstances will be a fatal threat to democracy. The result will definitely be a new system of slavery. Because of this, I have abandoned the unrealistic idea of putting equal emphasis on both [goals] and set off on the road towards political democracy.62 58 Yin Haiguang, “Haiyeke lun ziyou chuangzaoli,” 1209. 59 Zhang Zhongdong 張忠棟, Ziyou zhuyi renwu 自由主義人物 [Figures of liberalism] (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1998), 30–31; Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. 60 Yin Haiguang, “Xu 序 [Preface],” in Haiyeke, Dao nuyi zhi lu, trans. Yin, 2. See also Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 140. 61 Haiyeke, Dao nuyi zhi lu, trans. Yin, 31. Other scholars may have mentioned Friedrich A. Hayek’s and Karl R. Popper’s influence on Yin Haiguang, but they did not see it as a part of the Cold War liberalism in East Asia. For example, see Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 94–95; Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 135–48. 62 Yin Haiguang. “Wo weishenme fan Gong? 我為什麼反共？ [Why do I oppose Communism?]” (16 June 1952), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 257. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 6, no. 12 (June 1952). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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The above passage underscores Yin Haiguang’s departure from democratic socialism. He now prioritized political democracy on the grounds that the call for economic equality was meaningless without the realization of democracy. He even went so far as to represent socialism as a threat to democracy when the latter had not taken root in China. The result would be disastrous: “a new system of slavery”—a phrase echoing the title of Hayek’s book—would emerge. Yin Haiguang was not the only one to be influenced by Cold War liberalism. In addition to the pressure from anti-Communism on Taiwan, the fear of Communism seems to have brought some of Yin’s fellows at Ziyou Zhongguo under the influence of Cold War liberalism and made them begin to ignore the distinction between moderate socialism and Communism. As He Zhuo’en suggests, many of Yin’s fellow liberal editors at Ziyou Zhongguo began to oppose socialism in the 1950s.63 Hu Shi stated that “all kinds of planned economy are incompatible with liberty. They are all anti-liberal.”64 He argued that socialism was no longer in fashion in the West. “Socialist states of the old school, such as Australia and New Zealand,” he wrote, “have abandoned socialism one by one.” He claimed that even the British Labor Party had dropped socialism after its defeat in the 1951 parliamentary elections.65 Hu declared himself convinced that “nowadays it is a very common trend to abandon socialism and return to capitalism.”66 Dai Duheng 戴杜衡 (1907–1964), an editor at Ziyou Zhongguo, considered all kinds of socialist thought equally evil. He asserted that “anti-liberal theories include Communism, socialism, planned economy, controlled economy, and all kinds of interventionism. Although their main points are not the same, they always join together to attack liberalism.”67 It seemed to him that economic equality was impractical. The saying “all men are born equal,” he said, “only contained political meaning” as opposed to economic meaning.68 This was because economic inequality was caused by “the innate inequality in the physical strength, intelligence, and personality of human beings, which cannot be solved by eugenics, training, or education.”69 He believed that it was hard to 63 He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 281–97. However, He Zhuo’en did not place the thought of these Ziyou Zhongguo editors in the context of Cold War liberalism. 64 Hu Shi, “Cong Dao nuyi zhi lu shuoqi 從《到奴役之路》說起 [Discussion commencing from The Road to Serfdom],” Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 6 (March 1954): 4. See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 284–85. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Dai Duheng 戴杜衡, “Cong jingji pingdeng shuoqi 從經濟平等說起 [Discussion commencing from economic equality],” Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 8 (October 1952): 12. See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 291–92. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., 13. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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tackle economic inequality in a fair way. As it was impossible to ameliorate the innate qualities of the weaker, policy-makers would have no choice but to suppress those of the stronger or eliminate those of the weaker if they wanted to level everyone’s inborn qualities.70 Thus, methods that were said to be solving economic inequality were all “methods of suppression” that undermined the interests of a certain proportion of the population.71 “Because of the equality motive, socialists are all more or less hostile to wealth. This is the beginning of their error,” Dai concluded.72 Wang Yuxiu 王聿修 (dates unknown) and Zhou Dewei were concerned about the arbitrariness of power holders in a socialist state. Wang claimed that these power holders possessed both economic power and political power. “They can control every aspect of the everyday life of the people.”73 “The result is that the people consume whatever a small number of power holders produce under their plan. The people work to manufacture whatever a small number of power holders have decided to manufacture. There is absolutely no room left for choice,” wrote Wang.74 Zhou argued that a planned economy was dangerous not only because it “destroyed freedom,” but also because it provided a chance for “deceitful people” to “seek personal gain.”75 “Numerous people have been used by them [deceitful people] without being aware of it,” Zhou alleged.76 Under the influence of several Western intellectuals such as Karl R. Popper and Friedrich A. Hayek, the Ziyou Zhongguo editors departed from moderate socialism and even turned against all schools of socialism in the early 1950s. As democracy had not taken root in China, they believed, striving for economic equality would only lead to the enslavement of the people. From then on, they insisted that political democracy and economic equality could not be upheld at the same time.

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Ibid. Ibid., 16. Ibid., 16. Wang Yuxiu 王聿修, “Ziyou jingji biran pingdeng 自由經濟必然平等 [A free economy is bound to be equal],” Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 11 (June 1954): 7. See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 297. Wang, “Ziyou jingji biran pingdeng,” 7. Zhou Dewei 周德偉, “Duiyu Haiguang xiansheng pingjie Jingji zhengce yu jingji xueli zhi shangque 對於海光先生評介《經濟政策與經濟學理》之商榷 [Feedback on Mr. Yin Haiguang’s critical introduction of Economic policy and scholarly principles of economics],” Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 5 (September 1952): 29. See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 296. Zhou, “Duiyu Haiguang xiansheng pingjie Jingji zhengce yu jingji xueli zhi shangque,” 29.

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Moderate Socialists Who Remained Consistent in Their Beliefs

While Yin Haiguang and his fellow liberals turned against socialism in the 1950s, a number of émigré intellectuals were unshaken in their political beliefs. Zhang Junmai, for example, had been promoting democratic socialism for modern China since his early years. In the 1930s and early 1940s, he emphasized the need for a strong state for the sake of resisting Japanese invasion and further occupation. He gradually retreated from such an emphasis after the victory over Japan in 1945. His major concern in the second half of the 1940s was how China and its people should respond to the bipolarization of the world in the Cold War era. He talked about “the crisis of world culture” (shijie wenhua zhi weiji 世界文化之危機) in a series of lectures in the late 1940s. The postwar globe, as Zhang saw it, had succumbed to the confrontation between the dictatorial Communist camp and the democratic capitalist camp. Communist leaders from Western Europe were promoting violent revolution and echoing their Russian counterparts. The French Communist Maurice Thorez (1900– 64), for instance, explicitly pledged allegiance to the Soviet Union and broke up with the French democratic institution in the late 1940s.77 From Zhang’s perspective, three factors contributed to the world’s bipolarization. First, the capitalist and the Communist camps gave different definitions to political terms such as “democracy” and “free election.” The Anglo-Americans defined democracy as different kinds of freedom such as freedoms of speech and assembly. The Communists defined the term as the struggle for the well-being of the working class and the elimination of capitalism. While the capitalist world held true free elections for parliamentary seats, the Soviet Union manipulated “free elections” under one-party dictatorship.78 Second, the two camps upheld two different value standards ( jiazhi biaozhun 價值標準). Capitalist societies were built upon nationalism, individualism, morality, rule of law, and political institutions. The Communists, however, condemned these values as tools used by rulers to oppress the masses. Instead, they prioritized relations of production in a society and formulated a new set of values for the proletariat.79 Third, the Western world emphasized rationality (lixing 理性), while the Soviet world denied it. Marxism reigned supreme in the Soviet world. Rational theories 77 Zhang Junmai, “Shijie wenhua zhi weiji 世界文化之危機 [The crisis of world culture]” (23 October 1948), in Zhang Junmai, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji 中西印哲學文集 [Collected essays on Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophy], ed. Cheng Wenxi 程文熙 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1981), vol. 1, 213. 78 Ibid., 209–10. 79 Ibid., 210–11.

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and concepts that did not fit in Marxism would be rejected. Zhang found it difficult to reconciliate the differences between the two camps.80 In response to this turbulent world, he suggested, the Chinese people should first revitalize Chinese culture with modern concepts such as democracy, individualism, and empiricism.81 Hence, Zhang Junmai put particular emphasis on the safeguarding of human rights through the realization of democracy.82 He upheld the concept of inalienable rights as discussed by the English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) in his Two Treatises of Government (1690).83 According to Zhang, basic human rights, such as the rights to life, freedom of thought, and ownership of property, were the inalienable rights of every individual. These rights must not be undermined by the state.84 The threat that Communism posed to democracy provoked him to defend human rights more explicitly. In an article published in 1946, Zhang summarized the characteristics of democratic governance in nine points: first and foremost, respect for individual human dignity; second, respect for inalienable human rights; third, the safeguarding of these rights by the constitution; fourth, recognition of popular sovereignty; fifth, that laws and national budgets should be subject to the approval of a representative parliament; sixth, that government policies should be subject to the consent of the governed; seventh, that the parliament should be constituted through general elections; eighth, the adoption of multiparty competition; ninth, respect for majority rule and the protection of minority rights.85 Zhang was aware of the Communists’ criticism of such democratic principles and portrayed Communism as a school of thought contradictory to democracy. In the eyes of Soviet leaders such as Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) and Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1938), Zhang wrote, the Western democratic system was controlled by the capitalists, who oppressed the working class and 80 Zhang Junmai, “Xiandai wenhua zhi weiji 現代文化之危機 [The crisis of modern culture]” (23 October 1948), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 216–17. 81 Zhang Junmai, “Ouzhou wenhua zhi weiji ji Zhongguo xinwenhua zhi quxiang 歐洲文 化之危機及中國新文化之趨向 [The crisis of European culture and the prospects for China’s new culture],” in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 225–27. 82 Weng Hekai 翁賀凱, “Xiandai Zhongguo de ziyou minzu zhuyi: Zhang Junmai minzu jianguo sixiang yan jiu 現代中國的自由民族主義：張君勱民族建國思想研究 [Liberal nationalism in modern China: a study of Zhang Junmai’s nation-building thought]” (PhD diss., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2006), 226–29. 83 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), 341–42. 84 Zhang Junmai, “Renquan wei xianzheng jiben 人權為憲政基本 [Human rights are the basis of constitutionalism]” (9 August 1946), in Zhang, Zhonghua minguo minzhu xianfa shijiang, 24, originally published in Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 125 (August 1946): 3. 85 Zhang Junmai, “Minzhu fangfa 民主方法 [Methods of democracy]” (12 October 1946), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 134 (October 1946): 4. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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restricted the political participation of the poor. The only way for the working class to end such oppression was to seize power from the capitalists and eliminate them by force.86 Zhang was opposed to Communist advocacy of violent revolution because human rights had been severely curtailed in the case of the Soviet Union. Proletarian dictatorship, he claimed, limited the right to vote to peasants and workers while eliminating the bourgeoisie.87 “There is no democracy without the safeguarding of human rights,” Zhang asserted.88 To him, the Soviet Union was anti-democratic. For fear that ordinary Chinese people would confuse socialism with communism, Zhang attempted to distinguish between the two. First, he emphasized that it was not necessary for socialists to believe in historical materialism (weiwu shiguan 唯物史觀). There is no absolute relationship between the mode of production and historical development. In the case of Russia, Zhang argued, Lenin rose to power simply because he succeeded in the power struggle against Alexander Kerensky (1881–1970), which had no relationship with the mode of production.89 Second, class struggle was not essential to the realization of socialism. Zhang admitted that there were differences between the interests of the working class and those of the bourgeoisie, but this did not mean that class struggle was necessary to solve the problem.90 Different classes could in fact live harmoniously with each other through cooperation.91 Karl Marx (1818–1883) advocated class struggle simply because a political movement based on hatred would be more appealing than one based on love, Zhang alleged. This explained why the Communists vented their anger on the capitalists and landlords. However, Zhang argued that the principle of class struggle violated the goal of socialism, which was to realize the happiness of all people. There should not be any hatred between different social classes.92 “How far can [violent revolution] increase human happiness?” Zhang asked.93 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Zhang Junmai, “Minzhu shehui dang de renwu (3) 民主社會黨的任務(三) [The mission of the Democratic Socialist Party (3)]” (17 May 1947), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 164 (May 1947): 3. 89 Zhang, “Minzhu shehui dang de renwu (3)” (14 June 1947), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 168 (June 1947): 2. 90 Ibid. 91 Zhang Junmai, “Cong ziyou zhuyi dao shehui zhuyi 從自由主義到社會主義 [From liberalism to socialism]” (17 January 1949), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 247 (January 1949): 5. 92 Zhang, “Minzhu shehui dang de renwu (3),” 3. 93 Zhang Junmai, “Minzhu shehui zhuyi zhi zhexue Beijing (5) 民主社會主義之哲學 背景(五) [The philosophical background of democratic socialism (5)]” (August 1948), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 225 (August 1948): 5. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Third, socialism did not mean the total abolition of private property. Zhang noted that there were different forms of property ownership, many of which did not contribute to monopoly and gross economic inequality.94 Such forms should not be abolished. Also, private ownership could stimulate people’s initiative to work and start new businesses, which was beneficial to society at large. Therefore, while Zhang advocated the nationalization of key industries, he argued that small-scale private business should be encouraged. The existence of private property, from his point of view, was not a hindrance to the realization of socialism.95 However, Zhang was still emphasizing the importance of state planning and control over private business in the early postwar years, noting that “the realization of socialism is impossible without a planned economy.”96 In short, he was at pains to tell his readers that, although both democratic socialism and communism adopted the planned economy, the former was neither radical nor violent. Zhang Junmai also provided a blueprint for democratic state-building with socialist characteristics in the Fighting League’s Manifesto that he drafted in 1952. In response to Communist control of the Chinese mainland, the Fighting League’s manifesto listed a number of goals, such as the overthrow of the Communist regime, the safeguarding of basic human rights, the de-politicization of China’s military forces, and the “pursuit of national independence” against Beijing’s leaning towards the Soviet Union.97 It also outlined a moderate-socialist blueprint for national reconstruction after the recovery of the mainland. The manifesto announced that the Fighting League would introduce a social welfare system that would provide pensions for the sick, the unemployed, the injured, and the aged.98 It would adopt the following economic policy: The economic policy of the state, which is based on the central idea of blending freedom and management, will adopt the following guiding principles: to increase production and distribute the profit reasonably, to guarantee citizens’ minimum standard of living, and to adjust the income of people from every social class. With regard to agriculture, the state will protect land-owning farmers, introduce a system of cooperation, improve 94 95 96 97 98

Weng, “Xiandai Zhongguo de ziyou minzu zhuyi,” 234. Zhang, “Minzhu shehui dang de renwu (3),” 3. Ibid., 4. “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng xuanyan 中國自由民主戰鬥同盟宣言 [The Manifesto of the Chinese Fighting League for Freedom and Democracy],” Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 327 (November 1952): 15. Ibid., 16.

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agricultural techniques, and increase production, so as to achieve household self-sufficiency in grain production. With regard to industry, mining and transportation, in all cases—except for heavy industry and those transportation enterprises that are defence-related or of a monopolistic nature—the people [will be] encouraged to raise capital wherever they can and run their own business with the help of the state. Also, the state will introduce a system of democratic enterprises (minzhu qiye zhi 民 主企業制) on the basis of the principle of cooperation between labor and capital. After the recovery of the mainland, [the state] will safeguard peasants’ cultivation rights on the land that they have acquired and confiscate the land that the Communist regime publicly owns or has seized through its power and influence. Such land will be distributed by law to former fighters against Communism and other people who are able to cultivate the land by their own efforts. The state will assist former landlords to take up new occupations.99 Some of the planned actions listed in the above passage may have been a response to the land reform program that the Chinese Communists had inaugurated in North China during the Civil War years and extended to the whole of China in the early 1950s.100 The 1950 Agrarian Reform Law treated landlords and rich peasants quite differently. Landlords were to be deprived of all their land, agricultural draught animals, and ordinary agricultural tools. Extra crops that they were unable to consume at the normal rate and housing space in which they were not living were also expropriated. Rich peasants were to be allowed to continue to own their land, but the government reserved the right subject to certain safeguards to confiscate the land that was cultivated by tenants if there was not enough land for redistribution to the poorest peasants.101 C.K. Yang, a sociologist who conducted fieldwork in Guangdong province in the early 1950s, observed that the land reform made rich peasants particularly anxious because “they knew their fate was undecided.”102 It is likely that, in order to gather the support of these affected peasants, the Fighting League’s leaders promised to safeguard smallholders’ cultivation rights. 99 Ibid., 15. 100 For an in-depth study of the land reform inaugurated by the Chinese Communists during the Civil War years, see Pepper, Civil War in China, 229–330. 101 Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949–1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 48–53. 102 C.K. Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition (Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959), 143–44.

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The ideas of safeguarding cultivation rights and establishing a nonCommunist system of peasant cooperatives were in fact not new in China. Zhang Junmai had already stated clearly in Liguo zhi dao 立國之道 [The way to found the nation] (1939) that he was opposed to the confiscation of land from landlords. He also envisaged that every peasant household should have its own land. State-owned agricultural land would be sold to landless peasants, who would pay the price in several instalments.103 Liang Shuming had advocated a non-coercive form of agricultural cooperation from the late 1920s until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. He showed high respect for the will of the peasants and rejected any forceful implementation of rural reforms. The government, Liang wrote, should encourage peasants to form cooperatives through stimulation, not compulsion.104 It is likely that the Fighting League’s leaders had similar views on land reform to those earlier expressed by Zhang and Liang. While in 1938 Zhang Junmai had devoted an entire chapter of Liguo zhi dao to his economic thought, in the 1950s he did not publish anything beyond the above outline in the Fighting League’s manifesto about his latest economic ideals.105 Although, from Zhang’s perspective, there was an urgent need for “national salvation” in both the late 1930s and the early 1950s, the political circumstances were quite different. Liguo zhi dao was written in May, June, and July 1938, when the Japanese troops were attacking Henan province and the Nationalist government was physically in transit from Nanjing to Wuhan.106 At that time, Zhang thought that a well-developed national defense and a strong national economy were the keys to the struggle against the Japanese.107 He elaborated his state-building ideals in detail probably because he believed that China would be capable of resisting the Japanese invasion, and that economic construction was still possible as long as China was able to defend its remaining territory. In the 1950s, however, even recovery of the mainland would be an extremely difficult task for the Hong Kong-based Fighting League, let alone future economic construction. It is possible, then, that state-building became a distant dream to Zhang. This may explain why he did not publish much about

103 Zhang, Liguo zhi dao, 261–62. 104 Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 214–15. 105 For Zhang’s economic thought in the 1930s, see chapter 3 of Zhang, Liguo zhi dao, 165–272. 106 Zhang Junmai, “Liguo zhi dao xin ban xu 《立國之道》新版序 [Preface to the new edition of The Way to Found the Nation]” (7 December 1947), Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 193 (December 1947): 17; Zhang, Liguo zhi dao, iii. 107 Zhang, Liguo zhi dao, 2, 9.

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state-building in the 1950s apart from outlining a plan in the Fighting League’s manifesto, which was written to attract popular support for the organization. Unlike Yin Haiguang, who turned against all kinds of socialism in the 1950s, Zhang Junmai continued to show his socialist concerns amidst the tide of Cold War liberalism in the 1950s. According to the Fighting League’s manifesto, social welfare was to be provided for the sick, the unemployed, the disabled, and the elderly.108 Like the State Socialist Party’s manifesto published in 1932, the Fighting League’s manifesto pledged to harmonize the relationship between labor and management for socialist as well as pragmatic reasons. The proposed introduction of agricultural cooperatives and “democratic enterprises” implied the protection of poor peasants and the working class through better livelihood and a harmonious relationship “between labor and capital.” The idea of “democratic enterprises” had originated in the United States in the 1920s, when certain American intellectuals began to advocate democratic responsiveness in the management of enterprises in order to resolve the “conflict between labor and management.”109 Moreover, the manifesto expressed a desire to “blend freedom and management.”110 With the exception of heavy industry and defence-related or monopolistic transportation enterprises, people would be encouraged to “run their own business.” The state would provide assistance to them instead of asserting control.111 The above economic blueprint outlined in the Fighting League’s manifesto was largely similar to that in Zhang’s Liguo zhi dao. Nevertheless, there are a few differences between the economic blueprint in Liguo zhi dao and that in the Fighting League’s manifesto. Zhang no longer advocated protectionism in the 1950s. In Liguo zhi dao, he had argued that the Chinese people should achieve “national self-sufficiency” (minzu zihuo 民 族自活). China should stop importing foreign goods and consume domestic products instead, so that it could strengthen its economy for a prolonged war against Japan.112 In the Fighting League’s manifesto, however, protectionism was implicitly abandoned. The manifesto states: Under the support of the state’s plan, the free development of foreign trade will be encouraged. At the same time, international investment 108 “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng xuanyan,” 16. 109 Peter Miller and Ted O’Leary, “Hierarchies and American Ideals, 1900–1940,” The Academy of Management Review 14, no. 2 (April 1989), 256. 110 “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng xuanyan,” 15. 111 Ibid. 112 Zhang, Liguo zhi dao, 238–41.

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will be welcomed in order to promote rapid industrial development at full speed.113 Since the Fighting League had just been founded, it had to seek foreign support. Zhang Junmai tried hard to lobby the American government for funding in the early 1950s, as discussed in the previous chapter. The proposed encouragement of foreign investment may have been, at least in part, a tactic to attract foreign sponsorship for the Fighting League. Zhang Junmai did not elaborate on his socialist ideals elsewhere in his writings of the 1950s, but other moderate socialists did write about their own thoughts in detail, either for propaganda purposes or as academic exercises. Although they may not have been explicitly echoing the Fighting League’s manifesto, many of them did provide their own socialist blueprints. These Hong Kong-based moderate socialists seldom had face-to-face contact with the U.S.-based Zhang and did not represent him. Nevertheless, a study of the thought of these people tells us more about what moderate socialism meant to the émigré intellectuals of the 1950s, who fled the mainland at the time of the Communist victory, than can be gleaned from Zhang’s brief references. Sun Baoyi 孫寶毅 (dates unknown), a Hong Kong-based member of the Democratic Socialist Party, suggested that the planned economy of a democratic socialist system did not necessarily require full concentration of decision-making power in state hands: As long as it fits with the plan’s goals, economic power should be as dispersed as possible. Workers’ unions and consumers’ and producers’ organizations should participate in decision-making on ordinary economic policies, subject to the principle that [they must] not infringe on the constitutional authority of the national parliament. Of course, these groups and organizations should themselves first undergo democratization.114 Luo Mengce 羅夢冊 (1906–1991), a lecturer at New Asia College in Hong Kong, explained why the state should help the people set up their own private businesses. To encapsulate his economic ideals, he used the notion of a 113 “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng xuanyan,” 16. 114 Sun Baoyi 孫寶毅, Minzhu shehui zhuyi de lilun tixi 民主社會主義的理論體系 [Theoretical framework of democratic socialism] (Hong Kong: Xin shehui chubanshe, 1954), 118.

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“human-rights economy” (renquan jingji 人權經濟), which refers to the construction of an economic buffer for the people against any government that asserted complete control over the economy.115 According to Luo, The human-rights economy would assist all the hardworking, goodhearted, and self-helping people in a country to establish miniature economic stepping stones or economic strongholds one by one, so that they can stand up on their own stepping stones. When necessary, they can go on to hide in their own strongholds and defend their own basic human rights, which also means defending their own political independence and freedom.116 Luo thought that, in order to establish a human-rights economy, the state should first try its best to protect small property owners from becoming propertyless. Then it should prevent large property owners from infringing on the property rights of others and from loafing around. It should also guarantee property owners that they would be able to defend their dignity, independence, and individual freedom when necessary.117 Luo also elaborated on how the system of democratic enterprises would work in a “human-rights economy”: The management of enterprises and the performance of work should as far as possible abide by democratic forms and the spirit of selfmotivation, and accord with the requirements of human rights. [Management] should vigorously avoid [resorting to] forms of compulsion such as centralized orders, or treating the workers as part of the machinery. Not only should one vigorously demand that the working environment be clean and hygienic in accordance with health requirements, but one should also strive to prevent the [actual] work from becoming too monotonous and dull. Not only should workers be free to choose their occupation, but they should also have the right to participate in management and decision-making on important matters in the factories or farms where they are working.118

115 Luo Mengce 羅夢冊, Fuli xuanyan 福利宣言 [A manifesto about welfare] (Hong Kong: Zhuliushe, 1950), 72–73. 116 Ibid., 73. 117 Ibid., 78. 118 Ibid., 79.

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Weng Qingping 翁青萍 (1902–1951), another moderate socialist in Hong Kong, attempted to elaborate on the “idea of blending freedom and management” mentioned in the Fighting League’s manifesto. He suggested that contracts could be signed between the government and experienced contractors in order to run all productive industries efficiently and avoid the problems generated by bureaucratized state-owned corporations, such as those that had been established by the Nationalist government from the late 1930s onwards and continued to exist on both Taiwan and the mainland after 1949.119 Under Weng’s proposed contracts, the government would provide the basic facilities, machinery, and raw materials, while contractors would provide the working capital and be responsible for workers’ wages and other operating expenses. With the exception that wages would be regulated by the government, contractors would retain a certain degree of freedom in administering their businesses. Weng argued that such a contract system would both facilitate economic growth and benefit the working class.120 He also proposed the formation of a “National Economic Committee” (Quanguo jingji weiyuanhui 全國經 濟委員會), which would be responsible for the administration of the planned economy and long-term projects. The committee would draft economic plans and implement them once they had been approved by the state’s legislative body, which would also monitor their implementation. The composition of the committee would not be affected by changes in the leadership of the state. In this way, Weng claimed, economic plans would be formulated through democratic procedures, and their continuity would also be guaranteed.121 However, he did not explain whether the proposed “National Economic Committee” would be multiparty and whether it would cooperate with the leadership of whichever party was in government. He may have overlooked the possible disruption of economic plans by leadership changes after general elections. Nevertheless, Weng did provide a preliminary proposal for “blending freedom and management.” 119 Weng Qingping 翁青萍, Minzhu zhengzhi de shehui jingji sixiang 民主政治的社會經濟 思想 [Socio-economic ideals in a democratic political system] (Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1952), 92. See also William C. Kirby, “Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943–1958,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990): 127–28; Kirby, “Engineering China,” 151. On nationalization policy on the mainland in the first half of the 1950s, see Nicholas R. Lardy, “Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan,” in The People’s Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, vol. 14 of The Cambridge History of China, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 160–74. 120 Weng, Minzhu zhengzhi de shehui jingji sixiang, 92–93. 121 Ibid., 97–98.

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While the above associates of Zhang Junmai had different plans and ideas for realizing moderate socialism in a future democratic China, Zhang himself seems to have had complicated feelings about the prospects for socialism. In 1959, he published an article in Ziyou Zhongguo to mark the tenth anniversary of the founding of the magazine. On the one hand, he noted that after 1949 he had become less passionate about socialism for three reasons. First, he did not believe that an ideal society could be achieved through “class struggle” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Second, he was disappointed with what he perceived as the Soviet Union’s enslavement of its people in the name of socialism. Third, Zhang was further frustrated with the foreign socialist parties that, he claimed, tended to cultivate friendship with the Soviet Union.122 As these three points suggest, Zhang was concerned that the Soviet Union would damage the reputation of the whole socialist tradition of practice. He seems to have been worried that this whole tradition would be swallowed up by its Communist wing sooner or later. On the other hand, he was impressed and delighted with the West German socialists’ recent political platform, which, he wrote, had abandoned the illusion of a classless society and the goal of eliminating the bourgeoisie.123 They had, he noted, also ceased to advocate atheism, recognized parliamentary democracy as the foundation of socialism and called on socialist regimes to abide by international law.124 He also agreed with the West German socialists’ advocacy of restricting state control to essential industries and encouraging fair competition between private enterprises in non-essential industries. Zhang did not write in detail about his latest thinking about socialism in this article. From his admiration of the West German socialists’ political platform, it seems that, to him, the most important role of the state should be safeguarding individual freedom and social justice through the protection of human rights and the provision of social welfare.125 On the whole, although Zhang Junmai was concerned that moderate socialism 122 Zhang Junmai, “Shehui zhuyi fangxiang de zhuanbian: wei Ziyou Zhongguo shi zhounian jinian zuo 社會主義方向的轉變：為《自由中國》十周年紀念作 [Changes in the direction of socialism: in celebration of the tenth anniversary of Free China]” (16 November 1959), in Zhang Junmai , 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji 一九四九 年以後張君勱言論集 [Collected works of Zhang Junmai after 1949], ed. Xue Huayuan 薛化元, vol. 5 (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1989), 401, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 21, no. 10 (November 1959). 123 For the political platform of the West German socialists, see “Basic Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany,” in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. John W. Boyer and Jan Goldstein, vol. 9 of University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, ed. John W. Boyer and Julius Kirshner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 528–39. 124 Zhang, “Shehui zhuyi fangxiang de zhuanbian,” 404–09. 125 Ibid., 403–07.

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would be marginalized by Communism one day in the future, his support for the new platform of the West German socialists reflects his consistent support for the kind of moderate socialism and mixed economy that would be compatible with liberal principles. Besides expressing his continual support for moderate socialism, Zhang also went on the offensive, attacking the theoretical foundations of Marxism. In 1958, he published a book entitled Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物 主義駁論 (Refutation of dialectical materialism), in which he provided a comprehensive critique of dialectical materialism.126 First of all, he criticized Karl Marx’s claim that the “base” determined the “superstructure,” using religion as an example. Zhang agreed with Edward Gibbon that there were five causes of the rise of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire: “exclusive zeal, the immediate expectation of another world, the claim of miracles, the practice of rigid virtue, and the constitution of the primitive church.”127 Similarly, the spread of Buddhism in premodern China had been a result of Zhang Qian’s 張騫 (164 bc–114 bc) journey to Central Asia (138 bc–126 bc), the efforts of Indian Buddhist monks, and Chinese scholars’ discontent with the lack of supernatural belief in Confucian teachings.128 Zhang Junmai argued that the rise of both religions was not a result of changes in the relations of production, or of class struggle, and that there had been no cause-and-effect relationship between the base, or “economic relations” ( jingji guanxi 經濟關係) in society and the superstructure, by which he meant “politics, the law, religion and philosophy.”129 Second, Vladimir Lenin’s materialist epistemological position claiming that matter was above mind was unfounded, Zhang argued. In Material and Empirio-Criticism (1909), Lenin had prioritized “nature over spirit, matter over mind, body over consciousness, brain over thought, and nervous system over sensation.”130 However, Zhang reminded his readers that Lenin’s claim that matter was above mind had actually been overthrown by his successors twenty-seven years later. In 1936, Zhang wrote, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had announced that the selfconsciousness of human beings had its own regularity which could not be explained by any physical law. As the Russian Communists had thus 126 Zhang Junmai, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物主義駁論 [Refutation of dialectical materialism] (Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1958). 127 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 2 (Dublin: printed for William Hallhead, 1781), 291; Zhang, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, 123. 128 Zhang, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, 123. 129 Ibid., 123. 130 Z.A. Jordan, “The Dialectical Materialism of Lenin,” Slavic Review 25, no. 2 (June 1966): 261.

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contradicted their former leader, Zhang questioned why they still advocated the materialist epistemology.131 From Zhang’s point of view, the Communists should not have disregarded the importance of the mind. Third, Zhang critiqued Friedrich Engels’ dialecticism. He extensively cited the American philosopher Sidney Hook’s Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy (1940), drawing on Hook’s argument that some of the “seven meanings of dialectic” were mutually incompatible.132 On the basis of Hook’s discussion, Zhang argued that Engels’ dialecticism was untenable because it violated the three essential principles for both philosophical and scientific studies: precise meaning, careful analysis, and clear demarcation of the boundary between natural science and social science. As to the first principle, there were various, mutually contradictory meanings of “dialectics.” As to the second, like his definitions of “dialectics,” Engels’ analysis of dialecticism was full of contradictions. As to the third, he had also failed to demarcate the boundary between natural science and social science. Dialecticism, Zhang concluded, was neither philosophical nor scientific.133 Fourth, Zhang criticized Marxist historical determinism. He suggested that the study of history could train one’s ability to think critically and strengthen one’s intellect and conscience. It could also benefit society by ameliorating people’s integrity and the cultural foundation of the nation.134 Zhang criticized the Marxists for claiming that the historical development of society was decided by scientific laws.135 He dismissed such a claim as “determinism” (dingming zhuyi 定命主義).136 He argued that, on the contrary, human beings had the ability to shape the development of society. Socrates (470 bc–399 bc), Jesus Christ (4 bc–c. ad 33), Confucius 孔子 (551 bc–479 bc) and Mencius 孟子 (372 bc–289 bc) had all contributed to the ethical development of their people. The resistance of Wen Tianxiang 文天祥 (1236–1283) against the Mongols and Johann G. Fichte’s anti-Napoleonic Addresses to the German Nation (1808) had aroused nationalist feeling in premodern China and the German states respectively. These examples showed that historical development could not simply be seen as the result of changes in the mode of production. For Zhang, the

131 Zhang, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, 135. 132 Ibid., 156–64. It was chapter 9 of Hook’s work that Zhang cited. Cf. Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myths and Democracy (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2009), 183–226. 133 Zhang, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, 164–65. 134 Ibid., 180. 135 Ibid., 175. 136 Ibid., 177.

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Marxist interpretation of history not only ignored the will of human beings but also denied its existence.137 Zhang concluded his critique by reminding his readers how dialectical materialists misled their adherents. First, they “recognize only the existence of matter, not that of mind and spirit.” Second, they “recognize only changes in things, not the constancy or changelessness in them.” Third, they “recognize only struggle and opposition, not compromise and tolerance.” Fourth, they “recognize only class, not the individual.” Fifth, they “recognize only revolution, not how important it is to maintain order.”138 Through these characterizations of dialectical materialists, Zhang attempted to portray dialectical materialism as a school of thought that was contradictory to stability, harmony, and individuality. Since anti-Communist sentiment remained at its peak until the 1970s, Zhang’s book was well received by scholars long after its publication. The historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990), who wrote a preface for the book, commented that it “strikes directly at the loopholes in Karl Marx’s thought.”139 In his review of Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, published in the 1970s, Zhang Jiansheng 張健生 commented that Zhang Junmai’s harsh criticism and incisive analysis of Marxism were unmatched by any other contemporary political commentator.140 Yu Zhi 雨止 regarded the book as “one of the important documents for the anti-Communist ideological struggle.”141 Under the global Cold War currents, while Zhang Junmai was able to maintain his moderate socialist belief, he seems to have written a more comprehensive critique of the Marxist ideology than he did in the pre-1949 years. 3

Cold War Currents as a Stimulus for the Revitalization of Confucianism

The arrival of anti-Communist Cold War currents in China also influenced the New Confucian scholars, who saw the spread of global Communism as a 137 Ibid., 180. 138 Ibid., 187–89. 139 Qian Mu 錢穆, “Qian Mu xiansheng xu 錢穆先生序 [Preface by Mr. Qian Mu],” in Zhang, Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun, iii. 140 Zhang Jiansheng 張健生, “Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun duhouzhi 「辯證唯物主義駁 論」讀後誌 [Book review of Refutation of dialectical materialism],” Zaisheng (Taipei edition) 6, no. 1 (January 1976): 18. 141 Yu Zhi 雨止, “Du Zhang Junmai Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 讀張君勵「辯證唯物主義 駁論」 [Reading Zhang Junmai’s Refutation of dialectical materialism],” Su E wenti yanjiu 蘇俄問題研究 [Studies of the problems of Soviet Russia] 13, no. 6 (June 1972): 42. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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threat to China’s Confucian tradition. Xu Fuguan, for example, was particularly alert to the Soviet Union’s “ideological offensive” (sixiang gongshi 思想 攻勢). “Ideological offensive,” as Xu interpreted it, was the Soviet Union’s strategy to deceive its enemies. Soviet leaders, from Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) to Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), had been colluding with Russia’s secondary enemies so as to defeat the primary ones. In 1943, Stalin dissolved the Communist International in exchange for the United States and Britain’s support in the Second World War. Khrushchev applied a similar strategy in the 1950s.142 In the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party convened in 1956, he affirmed “the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.”143 Xu regarded this policy as an “ideological offensive” because it would give leaders of emerging capitalist states, such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) of India, a wrong impression that the Soviet Union was their ally. Subsequently, the United States would be isolated, and Communism would supersede capitalism in its global expansion. From Xu’s perspective, the Soviet Union’s “Ideological offensive” was indeed an application of the united front policy at the international level.144 To Xu Fuguan, however, Communist encroachment not only existed in the diplomatic arena, but also in the cultural one. He argued in the late 1940s that the Chinese Communists were destroying the foundation of Chinese culture, which was founded on human nature (renxing 人性).145 In his view, the forcible confiscation of land from rich peasants and the introduction of class struggle on the mainland by the Communists was a serious challenge to human nature.146 Class struggle and purges made peasants lose their human nature and go mad, Xu claimed.147 Mou Zongsan criticized Marxism for denying the 142 Xu Fuguan, “Zai Su’e ‘sixiang gongshi’ xia ziyou zhuyizhe de fanxing 在蘇俄「思想攻勢 」下自由主義者的反省 [Reflections of a liberal in response to the Soviet Union’s ‘ideological offensive’]” (19 March 1956), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 3 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wen zhe yanjiusuo choubeichu, 2001), 142, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 祖國周刊 [China weekly] 13, no. 12 (March 1956). 143 N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956), 38. 144 Xu Fuguan, “Zai Su’e ‘sixiang gongshi’ xia ziyou zhuyizhe de fanxing,” 142–46. 145 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo renmin de jueze 中國人民的決擇 [The decision of the Chinese people]” (6 August 1947), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 5 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wen zhe yanjiusuo choubeichu, 2001), 68, originally published in Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 6 August 1947. 146 Xu Fuguan, “Gongchandang de renxing 共產黨的人性 [The human nature of the Communist Party]” (1 June 1951), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zuihou zawenji 徐復觀最後 雜文集 (The last miscellaneous articles by Xu Fuguan) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxiangongsi, 1984), 346–48. 147 Xu Fuguan, “Chulun Zhonggong xian jieduan zhi tuge yundong 初論中共現階段之土革 運動 [Preliminary commentary on the current land reform of the Chinese Communists]” Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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existence of human nature as well.148 He alleged that the Chinese Communists had overthrown Confucian values.149 To these émigré New Confucian scholars, there was an urgent need to promote Confucianism in non-Communist Chinese communities in order to preserve the Confucian tradition. Under the influence of the strong anti-Communist atmosphere in the 1950s, the New Confucian scholars regarded the revitalization of Confucianism as a means to counteract the expanding Communist influence on the Chinese population in Taiwan and Hong Kong. This is shown in Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言 (A manifesto to the people in the world on Chinese culture), jointly published by four prominent Confucian scholars—Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi and Zhang Junmai—on January 1, 1958.150 In the document’s introduction, the authors expressed their concerns about the domination of Communism on the mainland after 1949 and the need to continue Confucian studies outside the mainland. They were anxious to reflect on China’s problems and think about how they could help solve these problems as émigrés. As the manifesto stated: Although we have paid close attention, as have numerous others scholars or statesmen both at home and abroad, to the aforesaid topics [basic understanding of Chinese culture in the past and present, together with its outlook for the future] in the past years, we might not have attained such a lucid discernment of them, were it not for the fact that about eight years ago China suffered from an unprecedented cataclysm, which forced us to take shelter abroad. The feelings of sadness and loneliness in turn

(19 November 1947), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 5, 73–76, originally published in Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 19 November 1947. 148 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, “Lun wu renxing yu ren wu dingyi 論無人性與人無定義 [On the loss of human nature and the loss of man’s definition],” in Mou Zongsan, Daode de lixiang zhuyi 道德的理想主義 [Moral idealism] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1978), 134; Mou Zongsan, “Daode de lixang zhuyi yu renxinglun 道德的理想主義與人性論 [On moral idealism and the theory of human nature],” in Mou, Daode de lixiang zhuyi, 29–31. 149 Mou Zongsan, “Ziyou yu lixiang 自由與理想 [Freedom and ideal],” in Mou, Daode de lixiang zhuyi, 139. 150 Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan 徐復觀、張君勱、唐君毅、 牟宗三, “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan—women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中 國文化敬告世界人士宣言—我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途 之共同認識 [A manifesto to the people in the world on Chinese culture: our common understanding of Chinese scholarly research, Chinese culture and the prospects for world culture]” (1 January 1958), Minzhu pinglun 9, no. 1 (January 1958): 2–21.

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prompted us to contemplate reflectively many fundamental problems. We believe that genuine wisdom is born of suffering.151 To establish the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy and to counteract the spread of Communism in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the manifesto’s signatories argued for the existence of proto-democratic elements in the Confucian tradition. They identified several premodern institutional practices that restricted rulers’ behavior and suggested that these practices should be transformed into a modern constitutional democratic system in which the ordinary people could monitor popularly elected governments. The authors also pinpointed some traditional Confucian concepts that they considered to have been “seeds of democratic thought” (minzhu sixiang zhi zhongzi 民主思 想之種子) in premodern China.152 However, they did not explain in detail how premodern China’s proto-democratic elements could be realized in a modern democratic framework. In the ninth section of the manifesto, the signatories noted that, in imperial China, the behavior of monarchs had been restricted in various ways. In traditional Chinese political thought, they argued, “the will of the people represented the mandate of heaven.” Chinese monarchs who “received the mandate of heaven” ( fengtian chengming 奉天承命) had to respect the will of the people.153 Although the New Confucian scholars did not explain in the manifesto why the will of the people had represented the mandate of heaven in premodern China, and it is questionable whether it really did, they seem to

151 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 2. As there are discrepancies between published translations and the Chinese original, I present my own translations in most cases in the discussion that follows. In cases in which any discrepancies are not significant, I adopt, with due acknowledgement, the version of the complete translation. See Hsu Foo-kwan, Carson Chang, Tang Chun-i, Mou Chung-san, and Hsieh Yu-wei, “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook,” in Tang Chun-i, Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Taipei: Taiwan Student Book, 1991), 492–562, originally published in Chinese Culture 3, no. 1 (October 1960): 1–71. While Tang Junyi was travelling in the United States in 1957, he sent the draft of the manifesto to Xie Youwei 謝幼 偉 (Hsieh Yu-wei). Xie subsequently agreed to co-sign the manifesto. See Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism,” 46, n. 11. Another abridged English translation of the manifesto was published in 1962. See Hsu Fo-kwan, Carsun Chang, Tang Chun-I, and Mou Tsung-san, “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture,” in Chang (Zhang), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, vol. 2, 455–83. 152 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 13. 153 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 13.

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have thought that such representation was one of the proto-democratic elements in Confucian thought. The signatories also discussed the important role of premodern Chinese literati in restricting the monarch’s behavior. “Official historiographers” (shiguan 史官) recorded the monarch’s everyday life, and court ministers decided the monarch’s “posthumous title” (shihao 諡號) after his death. These imperial practices became “spiritual shackles put upon the ruler’s actions” because monarchs cared about how they would be appraised after their death. The New Confucians further argued that various institutions in the broader political system had restricted the monarch’s actions. “The system of ‘state chancellorship’” (zaixiang zhidu 宰相制度) “represented social intellectuals’ strength in the government.”154 The “censorial system” (yushi zhidu 御史制度) allowed court officials to remind the monarch of his faults and wrongdoings. The system of civil service examinations “recruited Chinese intellectuals into the government.” These institutions imposed some sort of “moral restriction” on the monarch’s power and facilitated communication between the central government and society.155 Through the above discussion, the New Confucians implied that a theoretically effective premodern system of checks and balances existed in Chinese political tradition, but they again did not explain in detail how the three traditional institutions had functioned. However, the traditional Chinese literati had no real power to keep this system of checks and balances constantly in effect. Too much depended on “the monarch’s personal morality”; there was no regulation to force him to respect these institutions, the signatories wrote. When the monarch abused his power and persecuted the traditional Chinese literati, they could do nothing but die for their integrity. To give ordinary people the intellectuals’ traditional role of monitoring the government, a democratic political system must be established in modern China, the signatories argued. Restrictions imposed on the monarch by the three traditional governmental institutions should be transformed into restrictions imposed on the government by the people’s power guaranteed under the constitution.156 The New Confucian scholars thought that only in such circumstances could intellectuals criticize the government freely. Again, the manifesto did not explain in depth how a modern Chinese democratic government could be built upon Chinese political tradition. 154 Translation of zaixiang zhidu is from Michael Loewe, “The Structure and Practice of Government,” in The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of China, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 468. 155 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 13. 156 Ibid.

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The signatories also claimed that “the seeds of democratic thought” had existed in Confucian thought. In their view, adherents of Confucianism had been opposed to abuse of power on the part of monarchs and hoped that they would “rule by non-action” (wuwei er zhi 無為而治). This was, in fact, an idea of limiting monarchical power, the signatories claimed. However, they did not explain their claim in detail in the manifesto. Also, the Confucian advocacy of the mythological “institution of ceding the throne to the wise young” (shanrang zhi 禪讓制) and the belief that “everyone can become Yao and Shun,” according to the signatories, suggested that the state should not be owned by one single person but belonged to the whole people.157 The New Confucians asserted that the ideal of “the whole world becom[ing] a commonwealth” (tianxia weigong 天下為公) was the “root of democratic political thought” and contradictory to monarchical rule, in which one single family owned the state.158 Therefore, to guarantee the equal status of every individual, the Confucian ideal of tianxia weigong must be turned into practice in a democratic form of government.159 4

Conclusion

Having fled the Chinese mainland, émigré intellectuals in Taiwan and Hong Kong did not escape being challenged by Cold War currents of thought. Their varied responses to these currents demonstrate that the threat of Com­ munism was received quite differently by each circle of intellectuals. Long-time liberals with some sympathy towards socialism, such as Yin Haiguang and his Ziyou Zhongguo fellows, seemed to be convinced by the latest anti-utopian literature in the West and turned against all kinds of socialism completely. Veteran moderate socialists such as Zhang Junmai and his companions did not lose confidence in moderate socialism, which, from their point of view, would still play an important role in state-building after successful recovery of the mainland in the future. The effect of Cold War currents on them was limited. The New Confucian scholars viewed Communism as a threat to the Confucian tradition. Communist dominance on the mainland strengthened

157 The translation of shanrang zhi is from Chun-Chieh Huang (Huang Junjie), Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 112. 158 The translation of tianxia weigong is from Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 219. 159 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 13–14.

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their aspiration to rejuvenate Confucianism with liberal and democratic elements in the second half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Cold War currents did not undermine the interactive quality of the triadic Chinese liberal tradition inherited from the Republican era. As the next few chapters will show, there was indeed continuity in the thought of Republican-era intellectuals and that of the émigré intellectuals of the 1950s. Although Yin, Zhang, and Xu made some adjustments in the interpretation of their affiliated schools of thought, the interactive triad of Republican China clearly remained in Taiwan and Hong Kong during the Cold War era. Adherents of liberalism, moderate socialism, and cultural conservatism maintained frequent communication with each other through different kinds of well-documented discussions and debates, which have been further explored in the works of various Chinese scholars.

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In Search of a Liberal-Scientific Modern China: The Case of Yin Haiguang In their quest for national salvation, Chinese émigré intellectuals in the early 1950s remained dedicated to political engagement. Many of them, such as Yin Haiguang and Xu Fuguan, believed that Taiwan and the Nationalist regime was the only stronghold and starting point for any possible counteroffensive on the Chinese mainland in the future. For this reason, they were looking forward to the democratization of Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule, hoping that a democratized Taiwan could serve as a role model for Chinese democracy and stimulate the population in coastal China to revolt against the Communist government. A number of the émigrés, exemplified by Zhang Junmai and his Third Force fellows, completely rejected Chiang’s dictatorship and worked for an independent anti-Communist movement in the British colony of Hong Kong. Instead of pursuing democratic reforms in Taiwan, they believed that launching a military offensive, with the aid from the United States, was more worthwhile. Regardless of their different approaches, these émigré intellectuals’ political endeavors proved to have failed by the end of the 1950s. This, however, did not mean the end of their nation-saving pursuits, and many of them turned to the intellectual arena. Drawing from the intellectual legacy of the Republican era, these émigrés explored different possible models of future Chinese democracy. Here I do not intend to imply that the Republican intellectual triad was wholly transplanted to Taiwan and Hong Kong after 1949. But if we examine the thought of the Cold War émigrés in detail, it is not difficult to discover that most of them drew resources from the three major liberal schools of thought—liberalism, moderate socialism, and cultural conservatism—in the Republican intellectual triad. Among the Chinese émigrés, the thought of Yin Haiguang, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai were the most representative, demonstrating the interactive quality of the abovementioned three political schools of thought. While the thought of Zhang Junmai and Xu Fuguan will be analyzed in the next two chapters, this chapter mainly deals with the thought of Yin Haiguang. It first traces his pursuit of reviving the “May Fourth Spirit” in the 1950s and identifies the impediments that, in his view, were hindering such a revival. It then examines how Yin’s responses to these impediments shaped his discussion of

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_005 Kenneth Kai-chung

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democracy, freedom, and science. Last but not least, this chapter explores the sharp change in Yin’s cultural ideals towards the end of his life in the late 1960s. Through a study of Yin’s cultural-political thought, I argue that his model of cultural integration was primarily based upon modern liberal and scientific values, with the highly selective adoption of Confucian values added in the later years of his life. 1

Yin Haiguang’s Quest for a Revival of the “May Fourth Spirit”

Born in 1919, Yin Haiguang called himself a “post-May-Fourthian” (wusi houqi renwu 五四後期人物) and “a son of May Fourth” (wusi de erzi 五四的兒子), one who had “absorbed many concepts from the May Fourth Movement.”1 Yin claimed in a letter to one of his students in 1967 that “the blood of the May Fourth Movement is still running in [my] veins.”2 Throughout his life, Yin considered himself an heir to the May Fourth Movement.3 His commitment to the “revival of the May Fourth Spirit” lasted long into the era of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule on Taiwan. The May Fourth Movement, Vera Schwarcz suggests, was a quest for Chinese enlightenment that sought self-emancipation from the Confucian lijiao 禮教 (“the cult of ritualized subordination”).4 The key to such enlightenment, its advocates believed, was democracy and science. “Mr. Democracy” (De xiansheng 德先生) and “Mr. Science” (Sai xiansheng 賽先生) were the “only two gentlemen” who “can save China,” claimed Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879– 1942), founder of the periodical Xin qingnian 新青年 (New youth).5 Thus, the phrase “May Fourth spirit” (wusi jingsheng 五四精神) represented the pursuit 1 Yin Haiguang, “Haiguang wenxuan zixu 《海光文選》自敘 [Preface to Selected Works of Haiguang]” (21 August 1968), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, 567; Letter from Yin Haiguang to Zhang Hao (8 March 1967), in Yin Haiguang, Yin Haiguang shuxin ji 殷海光書信集 [The correspondence of Yin Haiguang] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 164–65. 2 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Zhang Hao (8 March 1967), 164–65. 3 The May Fourth Movement was named after a large-scale student demonstration on 4 May 1919 against the proposed transfer of German rights in Shandong province to Japan in the Paris Peace Settlement. For a detailed account of the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 84–116. 4 Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 3. 5 Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, “Benzhi zuian zhi dabianshu 本誌罪案之答辯書 [Our response to the charges against the periodical],” Xin qingnian 新青年 [New youth] 6, no. 1 (January 1919): 10–11.

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of democracy and science for the building of a modern Chinese nation. These were the ideals to which Yin Haiguang devoted himself. Yin became interested in logic during his high school years in the mid1930s. He read extensively the works of two of his favorite logicians, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Jin Yuelin 金嶽霖 (1895–1984).6 He published his first scholarly article, which was on the freedom of the will (yizhi ziyou 意 志自由), in Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 (Eastern miscellany) in 1935.7 He also translated Frank Chapman and Paul Henle’s The Fundamentals of Logic (1933) into Chinese before his high school graduation in 1936.8 Thus he had already acquired a good foundation in logical studies and scientific methodology before he entered university. Yin’s “blood of the May Fourth Movement” was probably inherited from Jin Yuelin and transfused at the wartime National Southwestern Associated University. He first met Jin in Beijing in late 1936 and started studying philosophy under Jin’s supervision at National Southwestern Associated University in 1938. Jin had been an active participant in the May Fourth Movement. With Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) and Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (1893–1986), he had “pioneered a scientific approach to philosophy at Qinghua University” at that time.9 Yin was particularly impressed that Jin was open-minded enough to welcome criticism from students.10 Yin later recalled that he had received a “liberal education” (ziyou jiaoyu 自由教育) at Southwestern Associated University, where he studied from 1938 to 1944.11 In fact, the university became an important center for promoting the May Fourth ideals during the Japanese occupation.12 Yin appears to have been influenced by the “May Fourth spirit” 6 7

Chen, “Yin Haiguang zhuanji,” 176–77. See Yin Fusheng 殷福生 (Yin Haiguang), “Yizhi ziyou wenti de jiantao 意志自由問題 底檢討 [A review of the question of the freedom of the will]” (1 January 1935), Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 [Eastern miscellany] 32, no. 1 (January 1935): 57–67. 8 Chen, “Yin Haiguang zhuanji,” 178–79; cf. Frank Miller Chapman and Paul Henle, The Fundamentals of Logic (New York: Charles Scribner’s sons, 1933). 9 Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment, 99. 10 Chen, “Yin Haiguang zhuanji,” 188–89. 11 Yin. “Wo weishenme fan Gong?,” 251. 12 Wen Liming 聞黎明 has conducted an in-depth study of the promotion of the “May Fourth spirit” at National Southwestern Associated University. See Wen Liming, “Xinan lianda ‘wusi’ jinian shulun 西南聯大“五四”紀念述論 [Discussion of the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement at the National Southwestern Associated University],” in Wusi de lishi yu lishi zhong de wusi: Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong 90 zhounian guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 五四的歷史與歷史中的五四：北京大學紀念五四 運動90 周年國際學術研討會論文集 [History of the May Fourth Movement and the May Fourth Movement in history: proceedings of the International Conference at Peking University to Commemorate the Ninetieth Anniversary of May Fourth], ed. Niu Dayong

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during his studies there. After that, he committed himself to reviving the “May Fourth spirit” in the interests of building an ideal Chinese nation. By 1948, he had formulated his views on the significance of the May Fourth Movement. This movement, Yin commented in an editorial published in Zhongyang ribao on 22 June 1948, “had repudiated the corrupt old China” and “outlined a beautiful prospect for the political and cultural construction of a new China.”13 Before exploring Yin Haiguang’s attempts to revive the “May Fourth spirit,” we shall investigate why he thought there was a need to revive it. Civil war between the Nationalist government and the Communist Party resumed in mid-1946. Having been a supporter of the Guomindang during the war against Japan, Yin published Guangming qian zhi hei’an 光明前之黑暗 (The darkness that precedes the light) in December 1945 so as to defend the Nationalist government. In this work, he portrayed the Communists as rebels.14 But his attack on Communism was more than political. In the early postwar years, he began to identify Communism as an obstacle to the revival of the “May Fourth spirit.” In the next fifteen years, Yin identified two more obstacles—Chinese tradition and the Nationalist government—but his criticism of the latter appeared only after the mid-1950s. The first obstacle was Communism itself, as he explained in several articles published in Zhongyang ribao in the late 1940s. Given that—if the historian Wu Haiyong 吳海勇 is correct—the Guomindang saw the promotion of the nationalistic “May Fourth spirit” as a tool against Communism’s “undemocratic” nature and its Soviet connections, it comes as no surprise that Yin was allowed to talk about democracy and freedom when he was working at Zhongyang ribao.15 He accused the Communists of eliminating the “May Fourth and Ouyang Zhesheng 牛大勇、歐陽哲生 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009), 565–86. 13 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Wusi yu jinri 五四與今日 [May Fourth and today],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 22 June 1948, 2. For Yin Haiguang’s conception of the May Fourth Movement, see He Zhuo’en, “‘Wusi zhi zi’ Yin Haiguang de ‘wusi’ qingjie yu ‘wusi’ guannian 「五四之子」殷海光的「五四」情結與「五四」觀念 [The ‘May Fourth’ complex and ‘May Fourth’ conception of the ‘son of May Fourth’ Yin Haiguang],” Renwen zazhi 人文雜誌 [Humanities magazine] Year 2010, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 120–28. For an alternative discussion of Yin Haiguang’s view on the “May Fourth Spirit,” see Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 55–61. 14 Yin Haiguang. “Guangming qian zhi hei’an 光明前之黑暗 [The darkness that precedes the light]” (December 1945), in Yin, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha, 3–65, originally published as Yin Haiguang, Guangming qian zhi hei’an (Chongqing: Guangming chubanshe, 1945). 15 Wu Haiyong 吳海勇, “1928 nian zhi 1948 nian Zhongyang ribao dui wusi yundong de pinglun 1928 年至1948 年《中央日報》對五四運動的評論 [Central Daily News’ commentaries on the May Fourth Movement, 1928–1948],” Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian 上 海黨史與黨建 [Shanghai party history and party construction] (May 2009): 16–17. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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spirit” by infiltrating the universities, which had been its birthplace.16 For him, Communism was harmful in that it “goes all out to provoke the instinct for hostility, the narrow-mindedness, the consciousness of arbitrariness, and the misguided belief in religion that are found in human nature.”17 Thus, Communism was highly exclusive (chongman paitaxing 充滿排他性), meaning that it did not tolerate other ideas.18 Yin also claimed that a small number of “professional student spies” (zhiye jiandie xuesheng 職業間諜學生) had been ordered by the Chinese Communist Party to instigate disturbances in several universities and to pervert normal student movements. He alleged that the “rational activities of students” often degenerated into a “smokescreen for the Communists” because of the influence of the “spies.”19 The “spies” also dominated the academic atmosphere in universities and persecuted teachers and students who advocated democracy and freedom.20 Yin branded the Chinese Communists as the “cultural vanguard destroying China” (miewang Zhongguo de wenhua xianfeng 滅亡中國的 文化先鋒).21 He argued that it was difficult for a modern Chinese culture based on the “May Fourth spirit” to flourish under the threat of Communism.22 Another obstacle was Chinese tradition. Yin Haiguang did not publish any critiques of Chinese tradition before 1949, and there is no clue whether he showed any anti-traditionalist tendencies before his migration to Taiwan. Instead, in the late 1940s, Yin established a friendship with Xu Fuguan, a Confucian scholar who helped him get his job at Zhongyang ribao. Although both men were anti-Communist and committed to the liberal-democratic cause, their different attitudes towards Chinese tradition soon split them apart. In 1952, Yin first launched an attack on Chinese tradition by claiming that “only an empty form is left” in it.23 This claim resulted in the deterioration of Yin’s relationship with Xu and other New Confucian scholars. From then on, Yin began to view Chinese tradition as an impediment to the modernization 16 Shelun (Yin), “Wusi yu jinri,” 2. 17 Yin Haiguang, “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu 中國文化建設之路 [The road of Chinese cultural construction],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 10 August 1947, 2. 18 Ibid. 19 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Zhiye xuesheng zhi zhiye 職業學生之職業 [The profession of professional students],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 18 June 1948, 2. 20 Ibid. For the activities of the “student spies,” see the following section. 21 Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu,” 2. 22 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Wusi yundong yu kexue minzhu 五四運動與 科學民主 [The May Fourth Movement and science and democracy],” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 4 May 1949, 2. 23 Mei Yunli 梅蘊理 (Yin Haiguang), “Wo suo renshi zhi ‘zhenzheng de ziyou ren’ 我所 認識之「真正的自由人」 [‘The true free man’ as I know him]” (16 January 1952), Ziyou Zhongguo 6, no. 2 (January 1952): 13. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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of China. For example, in an article published in 1957, Yin criticized those whom he called the “restorationists” ( fugu zhuyizhe 復古主義者), meaning the New Confucian scholars, for admiring antiquity. He alleged that the following beliefs were deeply embedded in their minds: They believe that things associated with antiquity are all good … Their ideal society is a quiescent one like those of antiquity. They dream that antiquity was a golden age. The golden age conserved all the good “essentials.” The more society changes, the further it departs from these “essentials.” As it departs further from these “essentials,” it declines even further than before. The stabilizing factor that maintains this kind of static society is authority [quanwei 權威].24 In Yin Haiguang’s view, authority was the enemy of science and democracy, the two components of the “May Fourth spirit.” He believed that a sci­entific attitude, one that emphasized scepticism and pragmatism, would shatter authority and bring China a vibrant society. “The new way of thinking and the new social order brought by science and democracy”—that is, modern thought and society—were something to which “the restorationists” could not adapt, however. That explained why they were opposed to the May Fourth Movement, Yin alleged.25 As this book will later show, Yin’s critique, more emotional than rational, was hardly a fair assessment of the New Confucian scholars’ thought. Viewing Chinese tradition as an impediment to China’s modernization, Yin committed himself to trying to save Taiwan from an outdated Confucian authoritarianism, which, from his point of view, Chiang Kai-shek was utilizing to maintain his dictatorial rule. The third obstacle was the post-1949 Nationalist government on Taiwan. However, overt and positively harsh criticism did not emerge until 1956, when Ziyou Zhongguo began to attack Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. Yin denounced the “power holders in reality” (xianshi quanli 現實權力), which probably referred to the Nationalist government, for maintaining their rule on their own authority and not implementing democratic reforms. He alleged that the “power holders in reality” were intolerant of the “May Fourth spirit” because China’s rebirth and progress brought about by May Fourth anti-authoritarianism

24 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Chongzheng wusi jingshen 重整五四精神 [Revitalize the May Fourth spirit]” (5 May 1957), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, 458–59, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 16, no. 9 (May 1957). 25 Ibid., 459.

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would challenge their rule. Thus, the “power holders in reality” would try their best to prevent society from progressing in order to safeguard their rule.26 In 1958, he criticized the government for keeping Taiwan culturally backward. He argued that the Communists’ rise in China since the 1920s and their utopian ideals had threatened the authority of the Nationalist government, whose Three Principles of the People appeared less attractive than Communism to the ordinary people. In response to the challenge from Communism, the Nationalist government had been forced, in both the Republican era and the Cold War era, to look for new ideological support for its authority. It had resorted either to Chinese tradition or to Fascism. Thus, Yin suggested, Taiwan had become a battlefield between conservatism and totalitarianism, which had hindered the development of science and democracy on the island.27 His views were shared by many of his colleagues at Ziyou Zhongguo.28 2

Yin Haiguang’s Views on Democracy and Freedom, 1947–1956

Yin Haiguang had begun talking about democracy and freedom while he was employed at the Guomindang’s Zhongyang ribao in the second half of the 1940s. For Yin and the Guomindang, the struggle against Communism was the first priority. Thus, Yin’s views on democracy and freedom in this period were largely a reflection of his anti-Communist attitude.29 In late 1947, during the Chinese Civil War, an important task for Yin was to counteract the propaganda campaigns 26 Shelun (Yin), “Chongzheng wusi jingshen,” 459–60. Zhang Chunlin has provided a detailed discussion of Yin’s anti-traditionalism and opposition to the Nationalist government. See Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 61–66. 27 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Genzhe wusi de jiaobu qianjin 跟著五四的 腳步前進 [Advancing in the footsteps of the May Fourth Movement]” (1 May 1958), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 572–73, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 18, no. 9 (May 1958). 28 This explains why Yin Haiguang was asked to write the editorials for Ziyou Zhongguo celebrating the anniversaries of the May Fourth Movement in the late 1950s. Jian Minghai 簡明海 suggests that Ziyou Zhongguo actually used the discourse on the May Fourth Movement as a tool against Communism and the Guomindang authorities. See Jian Minghai, “Ziyou zhongguo wusi guan de xingsu yu yunyong 《自由中國》五四觀的型塑 與運用 [The formation and usage of Free China’s view on the May Fourth Movement],” Si yu yan 思與言 [Thought and word] 47, no. 2 (June 2009): 110–22. 29 Yin Haiguang read extensively about Western political philosophy after 1951. Scholars generally agree that Yin’s democratic and liberal thought became more concrete after 1952. See Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 128–91; He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 117–250; Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 44–141; He, “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu,” 30–75.

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of the Chinese Communists. In 1940, Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976) had created the notion of “New Democracy” (xin minzhu zhuyi 新民主主義), which became the guiding principle of Communist policies. “New Democracy,” according to Mao, was a strategy for the Chinese proletariat to lead and unite the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the “petty bourgeoisie” (xiao zichan jieji 小資 產階級), and the “national bourgeoisie” (minzu zichan jieji 民族資產階級) in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, a term that represented warlord politics. Mao claimed that all the above classes shared the same enemies because they were all under the oppression of foreign imperialism and domestic warlords.30 According to Thomas D. Lutze, “New Democracy” was a strategy designed well to make it possible for the Communists to cooperate with the middle parties (zhongjian dangpai 中間黨派): It systematized the application of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese Revolution, and in an unexpected way: by appealing to the “democratic” and even the “bourgeois” demands which the Communist Party found to be commonly shared by workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. It upheld a final goal of socialism and communism while at the same time advocating the immediate establishment of an economy “benefiting both labor and capital.”31 In July 1947, the middle parties launched the Movement to Oppose U.S. Support of Japan ( fan Mei fu Ri yundong 反美扶日運動) against the United States’ assistance with the reconstruction of Japan after the Second World War.32 The Chinese Communist Party participated actively in the movement and organized a series of protests and demonstrations in major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing.33 It also established party branches and initiated student protests in various universities in Shanghai, such as Jiaotong University, Tongji University, Fudan University, and St. John’s University. It was in this context that Yin Haiguang branded the student leaders at these universities 30

For the original passage in Chinese, see Mao Zedong, “Xin minzhu zhuyi lun 新民主主 義論 [On new democracy],” in Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xuanji 毛澤東選集 [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 672–77. Translation of xiao zichan jieji and minzu zichan jieji is from the official English translation of Mao’s article, see Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 15–16. 31 Thomas D. Lutze, “New Democracy: Chinese Communist Relations with the Urban Middle Forces, 1931–1952” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996), 54–55. 32 Ibid., 341–42. 33 Ibid., 406.

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as “student spies,” as discussed earlier.34 The Chinese Communist Party also “coordinated student activism in Beijing and Tianjin.”35 All these activities, Lutze suggests, were “undertaken in the name of New Democracy,” which “provided not only the practical, programmatic basis for uniting a wide army of urban social and political groups under Communist leadership,” but also “a vision of a new society—the ‘New China’ dreamt of by many Chinese who for so long had endured such a bitter existence in war and poverty.”36 In response to the Communists’ advocacy of “New Democracy” and their protests and demonstrations, Yin Haiguang published a number of articles in Zhongyang ribao on democracy and freedom. He suggested that the most important task for the present was to “realize political freedom,” which would “put the nation on the road to progress.”37 He represented the “armed insurrections” of the Chinese Communists as a “huge hindrance” on this road. To make political freedom possible in China, “we should first eliminate the armed insurrections,” Yin argued.38 He also warned that the Chinese Communists would follow the example of their Russian counterparts if they seized power in China. They would probably impose state control of all means of transport and telecommunication, prohibit the importation of unauthorized foreign publications, and use all available cultural resources to indoctrinate the population with Marxist ideology. These measures would severely undermine freedom in China.39 In a series of articles published in the late 1940s, Yin argued that the ideas of freedom and democracy had not only been undermined but also hijacked by the Communists.40 The Communists, Yin wrote, often claimed to safeguard the freedom to assemble, demonstrate, protest, and strike. Yet they did not respect the 1947 constitution, which guaranteed freedom, and they would gradually turn these activities into social unrest through disturbances and insurrections.41 By doing so, they would tempt liberals down the path of anarchism.42 He also accused the Chinese Communists of distorting the 34 35 36 37

Ibid., 416–30; Shelun (Yin), “Zhiye xuesheng zhi zhiye,” 2. Lutze, “New Democracy,” 429–30. Ibid., 405. Yin Haiguang, “Zhengzhi ziyou yu wuzhuang baodong 政治自由與武裝暴動 [Political freedom and armed insurrections],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 21 April 1947, 2. 38 Ibid., 2. 39 Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu,” 2. 40 Yin, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha, 127. 41 Yin Haiguang, “Zhongguo minzhu yundong de zhengque fangxiang 中國民主運動底正 確方向 [The correct direction of the Chinese democratic movement],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 29 June 1947, 2. 42 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Ziyou zhuyi de zuiren 自由主義的罪人 [The sinners against liberalism],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 22 April 1948, 2.

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meaning of democracy from “liberty, equality, and fraternity” to “autocracy, hatred, and social class bias.”43 “Liberty, equality, and fraternity,” however, is the French national motto that originated from the French Revolution and can hardly serve as a definition of democracy. Such an obvious mistake suggests that, in the late 1940s, Yin might not have had a sophisticated understanding of important political concepts. In response to the Communist “distortion” of the meaning of democracy, Yin called for the realization of democracy by “concrete and positive constructive actions” ( juti de jiji de jianshe xingdong 具體的積極的建設行動).44 The people of the entire country, he suggested, should “abide by the constitution,” “employ democratic means effectively,” “exert their strength together,” and “engage in various kinds of construction.”45 However, Yin did not explain what he meant by “democratic means.” In another article, he described the democratic spirit as “anti-narrow-minded, anti-arbitrary, coordination-oriented, and harmonyoriented.”46 His characterization of the democratic spirit suggests that he advocated democracy more as a matter of opposing Communism than to promote the idea among his readers. Yin Haiguang also discussed liberalism and related concepts in a number of articles. He considered liberalism to be the “conceptual motive power for world progress” (shijie jinbu de guannian dongli 世界進步的觀念動力).47 It was anti-conservative and brought about freedom and liberation; it entailed the pursuit of democracy. It had introduced Western civilization, modern material culture, and science and technology to China, accelerated the collapse of the old Chinese society, and facilitated the growth of a new Chinese society.48 Since liberalism was founded upon rationalism with individualism as its core value, Yin argued, it emphasized individual freedom. Enjoying individual freedom does not mean being selfish. It means respect for oneself, the perfection of one’s personality, and the realization of one’s ideals. He admonished his readers that one should live according to one’s own mind and not be opportunistic.49 Moreover, Yin linked liberalism with the safeguarding 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Yin, “Zhongguo minzhu yundong de zhengque fangxiang,” 2; Yin, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha, 135. Yin, “Zhongguo minzhu yundong de zhengque fangxiang,” 2. Ibid., 2. Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu,” 2. Yin, “Lun ziyou zhuyi zhe ji qi renwu,” 2. Ibid.; Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu,” 2; Yin Haiguang, “Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhi sichao 中國現代政治思潮 [Political thought currents in modern China],” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 10 October 1947, 10. Yin, “Lun ziyou zhuyi zhe ji qi renwu,” 2.

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of national independence. He warned against the “spread of totalitarianism to the Orient” and that the independence of the Chinese race was seriously under threat.50 His warning referred explicitly to the spread of Communism to China, a process that, he suspected, was under the guidance of the Soviet Union. Thus, Yin thought that an important mission for Chinese liberals was to save the Chinese nation from succumbing to Soviet control.51 The above paragraphs demonstrate the dual character of Yin’s liberalism. On the one hand, his liberalism was a commitment to what he depicted as “democratic spirit” and the free development of individuality as the foundations of a healthy new China. On the other hand, it was an insistence on resisting Communist dictatorship and the spread of Soviet influence. Regarding collectivism as “the greatest enemy of freedom and democracy,” he raised the slogan, “Oppose totalitarianism and struggle for freedom” ( fan jiquan zheng ziyou 反極權爭自由), and continued to call on liberals to fight against Communism for the sake of China’s future.52 He argued that “one of the essential factors for liberty and democracy is tolerance,” and that the most effective way to resist Communist dictatorship was to introduce liberty and democracy, because Communism would no longer be attractive to people who “enjoyed full democracy and liberty.”53 In the early 1950s, Yin Haiguang joined Ziyou Zhongguo. It was also at about this time that he began to suspect that the Nationalist government was a threat to democracy and freedom. Yin argued that the Guomindang had turned the Three Principles of the People into a dogma ( jiaotiao 教條). Its leaders had been advocating a kind of “revolutionism” (geming zhuyi 革命主 義), elevating revolution as the most important task. These two developments were not at all conducive to the growth of freedom and democracy.54 He seems 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Yin Haiguang, “Lun quanti zhuyi ji qi tongzhi xingtai: ziyou minzhu de zuida dihai 論全 體主義及其統治形態：自由民主的最大敵害 [On collectivism and its form of ruling: the greatest enemy of freedom and democracy]” (1 April 1950), Ziyou shiji 自由世紀 [Free century], no. 15 (April 1950): 3–7; Yin Haiguang, “Zheng sixiang ziyou de lishi juliu 爭思想自由的歷史巨流 [The giant historical currents of the struggle for freedom of thought]” (16 September 1949), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 90, originally published in Ziyou shiji, no. 2 (September 1949); Yin Haiguang, “Ziyou zhuyi zhe yu Zhongguo de weilai 自由主義者與中國底未來 [Liberals and the future of China],” Minzu bao (Taipei), 26 June 1949, 1–2. 53 Shelun (Yin), “Minzhu yu kuanrong,” 2. See also chapter 1. 54 Yin Haiguang, “Jiaotiao zhuyi yu sixiang ziyou 教條主義與思想自由 [Dogmatism and freedom of thought],” Minzu bao (Taipei), 10 July 1949, 1; Yin Haiguang, “Minzhu Zhengzhi 民主政治 [Democratic politics]” (1 January 1951), in Yin Haiguang, Shuping yu shuxu,

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to have thought that ordinary people should test the Guomindang’s tolerance of dissident voices, as he encouraged his readers to criticize the party and to have their own views about the Three Principles of the People.55 In Yin’s view, freedom of thought was an effective weapon against totalitarianism, which, for him, primarily referred to Communism.56 Given that he was now no longer a supporter of the Guomindang, by totalitarianism, he may have referred to the Guomindang dictatorship as well. Yin wrote about his understanding of totalitarianism in his review of Li Xingwu’s 李省吾 (date unknown) translation of a chapter in Harry E. Barnes’ (1899–1968) Cultural Lag and the Institutional Crisis of the Twentieth Century. Using Li’s translation, Yin approvingly quoted Barnes as having written that under totalitarianism, a minority of people maintained their dictatorial rule with supreme power. But their exertion of such supreme power was not authorized by the majority of citizens. A totalitarian government did not tolerate dissident voices. It imposed comprehensive control on the thought and activities of the people.57 Agreeing with Barnes, Yin added that “the conflict between democracy and totalitarian control is the conflict between freedom and slavery, between human equality and insult to human dignity, between development of the individual and suppression of the individual.”58 The above passage contains some typical negative descriptors of totalitarianism that were used by Cold War liberals. If, for Yin, democracy and totalitarianism were thus polar opposites, it is not surprising that he regarded the former as a weapon against the latter. “Only if we are more democratic and liberal [than totalitarianism] are we qualified to fight against it,” wrote Yin in another article.59 However, vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2010), 54, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 4, no. 1 (January 1951). 55 Yin Haiguang, “Zhuyi bingfei guojiao 主義並非國教 [A doctrine is not a state religion],” Minzu bao (Taipei), 16 July 1949, 1. 56 Yin Haiguang, “Sixiang ziyou yu ziyou sixiang 思想自由與自由思想 [Freedom of thought and free thought]” (20 November 1949), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 86, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 1, no. 1 (November 1949). 57 Li Xingwu published the translated book chapter as a booklet. Banzi 班兹 (Barnes), Jiquan duiyu minzhu ziyou de weixie 極權對於民主自由的威脅 [The threat to democracy and freedom from totalitarianism], trans. Li Xingwu 李省吾 (Hong Kong: Huaguo chubanshe, 1951), quoted in Yin Haiguang, “Jiquan duiyu minzhu ziyou de weixie 極權 對於民主自由的威脅 [The threat to democracy and freedom from totalitarianism]” (1 September 1951), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 110–11, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 5 (September 1951). 58 Yin, “Jiquan duiyu minzhu ziyou de weixie,” 109. 59 Yin Haiguang, “Zhengjiao heyi yu sixiang ziyou 政教合一與思想自由 [Unification of politics and religion and the freedom of thought]” (16 February 1950), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 684, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 1, no. 17 (February 1950).

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since Lei Zhen, the editor-in-chief of Ziyou Zhongguo, wanted to maintain a friendly relationship with the Nationalist government, Yin did not explicitly relate his discussion of totalitarianism to Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian rule in the early 1950s. Yin Haiguang’s idea of freedom went through a marked change after 1953. Scholars have suggested that a book written by Zhang Foquan, an editor at Ziyou Zhongguo, inspired Yin Haiguang’s new understanding of freedom.60 In his book Ziyou yu renquan 自由與人權 (Freedom and human rights), published in 1953, Zhang Foquan suggested that there were two kinds of freedom—“external freedom” (waibu ziyou 外部自由) and “internal freedom of the mind” (neixin ziyou 內心自由). The meaning of “external freedom” was simple and direct. It referred to the safeguarding of one’s rights.61 “Rights are freedoms” (zhu quanli ji zhu ziyou 諸權利即諸自由), Zhang claimed.62 What Zhang meant by “internal freedom of the mind” was more complex. It represented not only “free will” (ziyou yizhi 自由意志) but also self-initiated thought or mental activities.63 Yin Haiguang found Zhang’s book inspiring. Although Yin criticized Zhang’s notion of internal, mental freedom as metaphysical and meaningless, he had high praise for Zhang’s notion of external, political freedom.64 Yin’s discussions of freedom did become broader and more concrete afterwards.65 60 Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 154; He, “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu,” 31–34; Weng Zhizong 翁志宗, “Ziyou zhuyi zhe yu dangdai xinrujia zhengzhi lunshu zhi bijiao: yi Yin Haiguang, Zhang Foquan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan de lunshu wei hexin 自由主義者 與當代新儒家政治論述之比較：以殷海光、張佛泉、牟宗三、唐君毅、徐復觀的 論述為核心 [The Political Discourse of the Liberals and Present-day New Confucians: A Comparative Study of Yin Haiguang, Zhang Foquan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan]” (PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2002), 56. 61 Zhang Foquan 張佛泉, Ziyou yu renquan 自由與人權 [Freedom and human rights] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1993), 12. 62 Ibid., 14. 63 Ibid., 12. 64 Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 74–75. 65 Scholars have written extensively about Yin’s democratic and liberal thought after 1953. See Zhang, Yin Haiguang, 128–91; He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 117–250; Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 44–141; He, “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu,” 30–75. Yin provided an in-depth discussion of democracy and freedom in two of his articles. See Yin Haiguang, “Minzhu de shijinshi 民主的 試金石 [The touchstone for democracy]” (3 January 1955), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 355–73, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 祖國周刊 [China weekly] 8, no. 13 (January 1955); Yin Haiguang, “Ziyou de zhenyi 自由的真義 [The true meaning of freedom]” (24 January 1955), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 375–95, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 4 (January 1955).

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Nevertheless, Yin’s emphasis on the function of freedom and democracy as weapons against totalitarianism may have delayed his enunciation of a clear analytical distinction between freedom and democracy until the mid-1960s. Weng Songran 翁松燃 suggests that Yin Haiguang first identified democracy and freedom as two different concepts in Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang 中 國文化的展望 (The prospects for Chinese culture), published in 1966, after he had read about “totalitarian democracy,” a term coined by the Israeli historian J.L. Talmon (1916–80).66 Yin was shocked by Talmon’s apparently contradictory combination of the terms “totalitarian” and “democracy.”67 In The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1952), Talmon identified two types of democracy: liberal and totalitarian. Liberal democracy “assumes politics to be a matter of trial and error and regards political systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity.”68 Totalitarian democracy, by contrast, was “based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics.”69 Having read Talmon’s book, Yin came gradually to the conclusion that democracy was not the opposite of totalitarianism because the two concepts belonged to different categories.70 In the mid-1960s, he reclassified democracy and autocracy as political systems, and liberalism and totalitarianism as “value systems” ( jiazhi xitong 價值系統).71 “The opposite of a democratic political system is an autocratic political system. The opposite of liberalism is totalitarianism. That is to say, there is definitely no democratic political system under an autocratic political system, but this does not mean that there can be no liberalism. There is definitely no liberalism under totalitarianism, but this does not mean that there can be no democratic political system,” asserted Yin.72 Having been opposed to state control since the early 1950s, Yin Haiguang also dismissed the notion of “freedom of the state” and adopted individuality

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Weng, “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan,” 237–38; Yin Haiguang, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang 中國文化的展望 [The prospects for Chinese culture], vol. 2 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009), 470. 67 Yin Haiguang, “Youguan Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang de jige wenti 有關《中國文 化的展望》的幾個問題 [On the several issues in The prospects for Chinese culture]” (15 July 1966), in Yin Haiguang, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 665, originally published in Si yu yan 4, no. 2 (July 1966). See also Weng, “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan,” 237–38. 68 J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952), 1. 69 Ibid. 70 Yin Haiguang, “Youguan Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang de jige wenti,” 665–66. See also Weng, “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan,” 237–38. 71 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 471. 72 Ibid., 472. See also Weng, “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan,” 236–37.

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as the basis of his conception of the individual-state relationship. In an article published in 1956, he argued: The state is not a natural product. It is a man-made construction. The existence of such a construction is completely founded on a kind of “interpersonal activity.” If one day this kind of interpersonal activity were to disappear, no one can prove that a “state” would still exist independently. A probe into the substance of so-called “actions of the state” shows that every single one of them is the result of individual actions or interaction between individual actions. From ancient times to the present, is there even one thing that has been done in the name of “the state” that was not done by people? So-called cultural activities are also a kind of interpersonal activity. What culture will there be to speak of if it is separated from the individual in all his individuality? It is the individuals, in all their individuality, not some abstract construction, who go on from age to age. It is living individuals, not some abstract concept, who feel the need for economic satisfaction. It is thinking individuals, not some construction formed out of these individuals, who feel the need for freedom. A dissection of the freedom of any organization shows that it is nothing but the freedoms of the members aligned in the same direction. Therefore, “freedom of the state” is a meaningless expression. Only believers in totalitarianism need such an expression.73 To judge by the above passage, Yin Haiguang seems to have put heavy emphasis on “thinking individuals” in his conception of freedom. In his view, the state was a construction based on “interpersonal activities,” or interactions between people. It was human beings and their activities that composed the state. All kinds of freedom would ultimately be individual freedom. Thus, freedom could be acquired only by intelligent human beings, not man-made or abstract constructions such as the state or other organizations. In Yin’s view, there was no such thing as “freedom of the state.” For this reason, the individual should “exist for the sake of individual interests” rather than “the sake of the state’s interests.” Yin claimed that this was “actually the case in Western democratic countries.”74

73 Shelun 社論 (Yin Haiguang), “Geren wei guojia zhi ben 個人為國家之本 [Individuals are the basis of the state]” (5 March 1956), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 402, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 14, no. 5 (March 1956). 74 Ibid., 403. See also He, “Ziyou Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao, 203.

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Yin Haiguang’s dismissal of the notion of “freedom of the state” was as well reflected in his remarks on the nature of totalitarian systems. At a time of political turbulence, it was easy for a “non-democratic political organization” ( fei minzhu de zhengzhi zuzhi 非民主的政治組織), which Yin referred to as the ruling party of a totalitarian state, to attain a dominant position in the state and to promote a certain political doctrine. With an appealing political ideal, the organization would usually attract a portion of the population to join it. Once people joined it, however, they would be completely dominated by it. Speech would have to fit with regulations, achievement would have to be done as planned, and collective action would be promoted. There would be no free will, and individual freedom will be taken away.75 Yin Haiguang also questioned the idea of “freedom of the state” with reference to the behavior of states in the international arena. If “freedom of the state” meant that “a state can go on the rampage without the constraint of international obligations,” Yin asked, “were Stalin’s Soviet Russia, Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy not ‘free’ enough? But what were the consequences? How many ‘states’ can afford to advocate this kind of ‘freedom of the state’?”76 In this question, Yin implied that the misconception about “freedom of the state” had encouraged the expansionist policy of the three totalitarian regimes, which was disastrous for their neighboring countries. Thus, “freedom of the state” was not at all favorable to the international community. Yin’s portrayal of “freedom of the state” as a concept contradictory to individual freedom and international stability was indeed a response to recent developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, the Nationalist government was consolidating its authoritarian rule and advocating the sacrifice of individual freedom for the sake of “freedom of the state.”77 In the Chinese mainland, the Communist regime had been launching a series of political and social campaigns that infringed people’s rights and freedom since the early 1950s. It also participated in the Korean War, which was a huge disaster for the Korean people. Yin’s discourse on individual freedom was timely enough to expose the oppressive nature of both regimes.

75 Yin Haiguang, “Zhengzhi zuzhi yu geren ziyou 政治組織與個人自由 [Political organization and individual freedom]” (16 January 1954), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 306–08, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 2 (January 1954). 76 Yin Haiguang, “Zhengzhi zuzhi yu geren ziyou,” 311. 77 Xue, Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng, 207.

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Conflicts with the New Confucians and the Guomindang Officials

At first, Yin Haiguang and his fellow Ziyou Zhongguo editors enjoyed a friendly relationship with the New Confucians. The two groups shared the pursuit of democracy, and many of the liberals contributed articles to the New Confucian periodical Minzhu pinglun. After the immediate threat from the Communists abated in early 1950s, however, differences in attitude towards Chinese tradition rapidly drove the two groups apart. The New Confucians were eager to rejuvenate Chinese tradition, while the liberals were hostile towards it. Hu Shi, the leading liberal figure, had long been a focus of the New Confucians’ criticism. He was already under attack for his disdain towards Chinese tradition before the intellectuals left the Chinese mainland. Tang Junyi even dismissed all of Hu’s contributions to scholarship. “It is a fact that he has achieved nothing in the past thirty years,” wrote Tang in a letter to Xu Fuguan.78 The conflict between the two groups intensified soon after Minzhu pinglun adopted a culturally conservative stance in the mid-1950s. Hu Shi’s assumption of his appointment as the president of the Academia Sinica in 1958 further deepened the mistrust between the two groups. There was even a rumor in 1960 that Hu Shi barred Qian Mu from being elected an academician (yuanshi 院士). Thus, the increasingly discontented New Confucians concluded that Hu Shi and his clique were dominating Academia Sinica.79 Meanwhile, Yin had begun to criticize the Nationalist government after his arrival on Taiwan in April 1949. Earlier I have discussed the changes in Yin’s attitude towards the government in the 1950s, but here I shall address Yin’s debates with Guomindang officials and with the New Confucian scholars within the framework of a single section.80 I do this because it was almost as if 78

Zhai Zhicheng 翟志成 (Chak Chi Shing), “Wenhua jijin zhuyi vs. wenhua baoshou zhuyi: Hu Shi yu Gang Tai xinrujia” 文化激進主義 vs. 文化保守主義: 胡適與港臺新儒家 [Cultural radicalism versus cultural conservatism: Hu Shi and the New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan], Xinya xuebao 新亞學報 [New Asia journal] 26 (January 2008): 13–16; Letter from Tang Junyi to Xu Fuguan, 14 November 1958, in Tang Junyi, Tang Junyi quanji 唐君毅全集 [Complete work of Tang Junyi], vol. 26, Shujian 書簡 [Correspondence] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), 123. 79 The rumor was first heard by Qian Mu. He then told Zhang Junmai about it. Zhang then spread the rumor to Tang Junyi in a letter. Chak Chi Shing has pointed out that the matter was not true. Instead of barring Qian Mu from the election, Hu Shi was in fact willing to be his referee. The rumor’s origin, however, is still unknown. See Zhai, “Wenhua jijin zhuyi VS wenhua baoshou zhuyi,” 67–68. 80 Zhang Chunlin has also mentioned Yin’s view on the relationship between the Guomindang authorities and Chinese tradition, but she does not discuss the matter in detail. See Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 61–64.

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Yin perceived a conspiracy between the Guomindang authorities and Chinese tradition—whom he considered to be the two major enemies of the May Fourth spirit. Throughout the 1950s, Yin had been calling for the remolding of Chinese tradition through the “metabolic” replacement of old Chinese culture with modern democracy and science. This paved the way for his more in-depth reappraisal of Chinese culture in the 1960s and his resulting interest in a model of integration between Chinese and Western cultures. The debate between Yin Haiguang and the New Confucians began in January 1952. Mou Zongsan published an article in the Hong Kong-based Ziyouren 自由人 (Free man) criticizing Jin Yuelin, Yin’s mentor, and other Chinese liberals who had chosen to stay in the mainland after 1949 for making self-criticisms under pressure from the Chinese Communist government. Some liberal intellectuals, Mou pointed out, were “reluctant to reflect critically on their own scholarship and research interests and to seek improvement.” Although these liberal intellectuals appeared to have “strong characters,” their lack of steadfastness in their belief in liberalism showed that this was not the case. They had shown themselves capable of backing down easily under the threat from the Communists and turning gradually towards materialism.81 Mou claimed that liberals should “stick to their personal [research] interests and liberal stand to fight unswervingly against the devil” and “turn to the right way to be champions of justice.”82 In addition, Mou suggested that the character of “a true liberal” would be as follows: He will definitely not be willing to bow his head in the event of violation of his personal [research] interests and free[ly chosen] studies, or if in the course of his life he encounters some jolt to his belief in human nature, humanity, personality, and values.83 In response to Mou’s criticism of his mentor, Yin Haiguang published an article in Ziyou Zhongguo under the pseudonym Mei Yunli 梅蘊理.84 “With reference to Mr. Mou’s lengthy discourse,” he wrote, 81 Mou Zongsan, “Yige zhenzheng de ziyouren 一個真正的自由人 [A true free man],” in Mou Zongsan, Shidai yu ganshou xubian 時代與感受續編 [My feelings and the era (part 2)] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2003), 50–51, originally published in Ziyouren 自由人 [Free man], no. 87 (January 1952). 82 Ibid. Translation by Su-san Lee, slightly modified by the present author. See Lee, “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969),” 237–38. 83 Mou, “Yige zhenzheng de ziyouren,” 52. Translation made by the present author. 84 It is confirmed that Mei Yunli was one of Yin’s pseudonyms because this article has been reprinted in the latest edition of Yin Haiguang quanji 殷海光全集 [Complete works of Yin Haiguang]. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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the basic nature of his thought is an attitude of resistance and rejection towards Western culture. In terms of the basic nature of his thought, I do not see any big difference between his thought and the doctrine “Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for practical application.” Very obviously, this route is a dead end. How can Eastern agricultural culture and civilization resist the impact of Western culture and civilization? Things indigenous to China have long lost their life and content. Only an empty form is left.85 Yin Haiguang’s criticism of Chinese culture as “empty” and “having long lost [its] life and content” triggered a protracted debate between the New Confucians and the liberals. Participants in the debate included, on the New Confucian side, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan, and on the liberal side, Luo Hongzhao 羅鴻詔 (1897–1956), Yin Haiguang, Hu Shi, Zhang Foquan, and Lei Zhen.86 Since other scholars have already covered the debate in detail, I am focusing mainly on Yin’s understanding of tradition as an addiction of 85 Mei, “Wo suo renshi zhi ‘zhenzheng de ziyou ren’,” 13. For details of the debate between Mou Zongsan and Yin Haiguang, see Zheng Huijuan 鄭慧娟, “Chuantong de duanlie yu yanxu: yi Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang guanyu Zhongguo chuantong wenhua de bianlun weili 傳統的斷裂與延續：以徐復觀與殷海光關於中國傳統文化的辯論 為例 [The fracturing and continuity of tradition: a case study of the debate between Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang on traditional Chinese culture],” (m.a. thesis, National Taiwan University, 1992), 80–83; Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 129–35. The slogan “Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for practical application” (Zhongxue weiti, Xixue weiyong 中學為體, 西學為用) is a famous motto of the Late Qing statesman Zhang Zhidong 張之洞. Zhang’s original wording reads “old learning for the essence, new learning for practical application.” 舊學為體，新學為用 See Zhang Zhidong, Quanxue pian 勸學篇 [Exhortation to learn] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), 41. 86 For relevant articles from both sides, see Tang Junyi 唐君毅, “Lun jieshou xifang wenhua sixiang zhi taidu 論接受西方文化思想之態度 [Attitudes towards receiving Western culture and thought],” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 15–16 (July 1952): 2–8, 5–11; Yin Haiguang, “Ziyou ren de fanxing yu zaijian 自由人的反省與再建 [The self-reflection and re-establishment of a free man],” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 17 (August 1952): 3–13; Xu Fuguan, “Wenhua de Zhong yu Xi: da youren shu (2) 文化的中與西：答友人書 (二) [Culture in Chinese and Western context: a reply to a friend (2)],” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 19 (September 1952): 24–25; Lao Siguang 勞思光, “Zhongguo wenhua zhi weilai yu ruxue jingshen zhi chongjian 中國文化之未來與儒學精神之重建 [The future of Chinese culture and the re-establishment of the Confucian spirit],” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 22 (November 1952): 10–17; Hu Shi, “Sanbai nian lai shijie wenhua de qushi yu Zhongguo ying caiqu de fangxiang 三百年來世界文化的趨勢與中國應採取的方向 [The trend of world culture in the last three hundred years and the direction that China should take],” Ziyou Zhongguo 8, no. 3 (February 1953): 4–6; Luo Hongzhao 羅鴻詔, “Piping yu dadao: dui Zhongguo wenhua de taidu 批評與打倒：對中國文化的態度 [Criticism and overthrow: attitudes towards Chinese culture],” Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 9 (May 1953): 10–11. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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the Chinese people and his criticism of tradition as unscientific.87 I also suggest that, since the addictive and unscientific nature of Chinese tradition had not been tackled in the mid-1950s, Yin still regarded Chinese tradition as an impediment to the revival of the May Fourth spirit and proposed to appraise it from a pragmatic point of view. In February 1955, Yin proposed the adoption of a new attitude towards tradition. He first identified three kinds of attitude towards tradition among Chinese people. The first kind was that of the New Confucians, whom he referred to as the “traditionalists” (chuantong zhuyi zhe 傳統主義者) on the grounds that they treated “tradition as paramount” (chuantong zhishang 傳統至上).88 Traditionalism, Yin suggested, had eight characteristics: it was sage-worshipping (nisheng de 擬聖的), omniscient (tongtian de 通天 的), authoritarian (quanwei de 權威的), monist (yiyuan de 一元的), absolute ( juedui de 絕對的), exclusive (paita de 排他的), and anti-sceptical ( fan huaiyi de 反懷疑的), and it emphasized one’s social standing (mingfen de 名份的).89 The second kind was that of the Communists who went to the 87

See Zhang Zhongdong 張忠棟, “Minzhu pinglun yu Ziyou Zhongguo 《民主評論》與《自 由中國》 [Democratic review and Free China],” Lishi yuekan 歷史月刊 [Historical monthly], no. 23 (December 1979): 126–30; Zheng, “Chuantong de duanlie yu yanxu,” 79–94; Li, “Lun Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang,” 128–35; Wei Zhengtong 韋政通, “Yin Haiguang yu Xinrujia 殷海光與新儒家 [Yin Haiguang and the New Confucians],” in Yin Haiguang xueshu sixiang yanjiu: haixia liang’an Yin Haiguang xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 殷海光 學術思想硏究：海峽兩岸殷海光學術硏討會論文集 [Studies of Yin Haiguang’s scholarship and thought: proceedings of the cross-strait conference on Yin Haiguang], ed. Zhang Binfeng and Zhang Xiaoguang 張斌峰、張曉光 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 2000), 9–14; Li, Dangdai ruxue de ziwo zhuanhua, 81–117. Wei Zhengtong has also published an article comparing New Confucianism and liberalism; see Wei Zhengtong, “Liangzhong xintai, yige mubiao: Xinrujia yu ziyou zhuyi guannian chongtu de jiantao 兩種心態，一個目標：新儒家與自由主義觀念衝突的檢討 [Two mentalities and one goal: a review of the conceptual conflict between New Confucianism and liberalism],” in Sanshi nianlai woguo renwen ji shehui kexue zhi huigu yu zhanwang 三十年來我 國人文及社會科學之回顧與展望 [Reviewing and envisioning the development of the humanities and social sciences in our country in the past thirty years], ed. Lai Zehan 賴澤 涵 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1987), 35–66; Su Ruiqiang 蘇瑞鏘, “Minzhu pinglun de xinrujia yu Ziyou Zhongguo de ziyou zhuyi zhe guanxi bianhua chutan: yi Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang wei zhongxin de taolun 《民主評論》的新儒家與《自由中國》的自由主 義者關係變化初探：以徐復觀與殷海光為中心的討論 [A preliminary study of the changing relations between the New Confucians of Democratic review and the liberals of Free China: A discussion focused on Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang],” Si yu yan 思與言 [Thought and word] 49, no. 1 (March 2011): 7–44. 88 Yin Haiguang, “Chuantong de jiazhi 傳統底價值 [The value of tradition]” (21 February 1955), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 270, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 8 (February 1955). 89 Ibid., 271–72.

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opposite extreme. They believed that “tradition was man-eating” (chuantong chiren 傳統吃人) and saw tradition as their own enemy.90 Yin noted that the Communists despised traditional ethics as “a tool that served the interests of the bourgeoisie” and were eager to establish a new Marxist social order.91 If they succeeded, “the whole world will be deluged.”92 Yin Haiguang laid claim to a third position, that “tradition is malleable” (chuantong kesu 傳統可塑).93 He accepted that communities with a strong tradition would be more stable than those without it. But he criticized those who believed in the sanctity of tradition for having a “fatherly image” ( fuqin yixiang 父親意像) in mind. He was probably referring to the authoritative nature of tradition in a patriarchal society.94 Suggesting that the value of a nation’s tradition should be judged on the basis of its adaptability, Yin argued that Chinese tradition was incompatible with science and democracy.95 However, he stressed that he did not oppose the entirety of Chinese tradition. What he wanted to see was the elimination of Chinese people’s addiction to “traditional history and culture.” He looked forward to the “metabolic” replacement (xinchen daixie 新 陳代謝) of the “politics, economy, education, culture, and customs of Chinese society” with democracy and science.96 Practices in old tradition that were no longer suitable for modern life should be abandoned.97 From Yin’s point of view, China should have a new tradition that would be based on science and democracy and introduced through a quasi-organic process. Yin Haiguang also regarded traditional Chinese thought as metaphysical and unscientific. While the New Confucian scholar Tang Junyi argued that traditional Chinese had already acquired science, Yin distinguished the possession of pre-scientific invention from the acquisition of scientific principles.98 To him, it was undeniable that pre-scientific inventions, such as the compass and printing, were products of cleverness, and some of them might fit with scientific principles by chance. However, cleverness was not equivalent to science, 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Ibid., 273. Ibid., 274. Ibid. For a brief account of Yin’s view on tradition, see also Zheng, “Chuantong de duanlie yu yanxu,” 115–16; He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 164–65; Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 62–63. Yin Haiguang, “Chuantong de jiazhi,” 276. Ibid., 278–79. Ibid., 284–85. Ibid., 289, 291. Ibid., 291. Tang Junyi, “Kexue dui Zhongguo wenhua zhi jiazhi 科學對中國文化之價值 [The value of science for Chinese culture],” Minzhu pinglun 6, no. 14 (July 1955): 2. For Yin’s views on science, see the following section.

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and traditional Chinese were not consciously using scientific principles in their inventions. Thus, science could not be derived from Chinese canonical texts, and premodern China had not entered a scientific stage.99 Echoing his predecessors such as Hu Shi and Ding Wenjiang, who had participated in the “science versus metaphysics” debates of the early 1920s, he also criticized the Chinese classics for being “metaphysical” (xing er shang 形而上), which had hindered the development of science and logical studies in modern China. This was reflected in the popular books on logic written in Chinese. Authors of these books, Yin claimed, tended to put logic, grammar, epistemology, and metaphysics together. They were looking for the “metaphysical foundation of logic” (luoji zhi xingshangxue de jichu 邏輯之形上學的基礎), which, of course, was non-existent from Yin’s point of view. Yin attributed such misunderstanding of logic to the impact of Chinese tradition on modern Chinese logicians.100 In the footnotes to his translation of the Austrian philosopher Herbert Feigl’s “Naturalism and Humanism,” Yin criticized the New Confucians for upholding backward metaphysics. “Many of those who advocate ‘ancient studies’ (guxue 古學) and rigidly adhere to the classics” were not aware that such ancient knowledge, developed in an age when “human reasoning was still at a primitive stage,” was metaphysical in nature.101 From Yin’s point of view, tradition was the accumulation of experience in a community. It was not as sacred as people believed. Thus, he called for an appraisal of traditional values with an “empiricist’s attitude” ( jingyanlun zhe de taidu 經驗論者的態度). What Yin called an “empiricist’s attitude” was probably pragmatism. According to him, an important way to appraise tradition was to examine whether a given traditional value could adapt effectively to a new stimulus, such as modernization. A flexible value would be able to accommodate the new stimulus. Such a traditional value would be beneficial to the community. However, a traditional value would become a burden to the community if it had lost the flexibility to adapt to stimuli.102 Advocacy of such an

99 Yin, “Chuantong de jiazhi,” 286–287. 100 Yin Haiguang, “Zenyang yanjiu luoji? 怎樣研究邏輯？[How to study logic]” (1 January 1960), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 890–92, originally published in Daxue shenghuo 3, no. 7 (January 1960). 101 Feige 菲格 [Feigl], “Ziran sixiang yu renwen sixiang 自然思想與人文思想 [Naturalism and Humanism],” trans. Yin Haiguang, in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 330, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 12, no. 6–7 (March–April 1955). For Herbert Feigl’s original article, see Herbert Feigl, “Naturalism and Humanism,” American Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer 1949): 135–48. 102 Yin Haiguang, “Chuantong de jiazhi,” 276–80.

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“empiricist’s attitude” paved the way for Yin’s reappraisal of Chinese culture in the 1960s, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Yin Haiguang’s opposition to Chinese people’s alleged addiction to “traditional history and culture” also shaped his analysis of the Guomindang. In the mid-1950s, Yin was involved in a separate debate with the Guomindang authorities.103 In September 1956, Zhang Qiyun 張其昀 (1901–1985), the Minister of Education, wrote an article arguing that the three great principles of democratic politics were “loving the people, educating the people, and nurturing the people” (aimin, jiaomin, yangmin 愛民，教民，養民).104 “Loving the people” meant ensuring that people were able to “live comfortably and work contentedly” (anju leye 安居樂業); this in turn necessitated the maintenance of a social security system and resistance to foreign invasion. “If one loves the people, one must love the state. Only when one loves the state does one love the people,” wrote Zhang.105 He argued that democratic governance could not be realized without the existence of the state.106 “Educating the people” referred to the implementation of civic education (gongmin jiaoyu 公民教 育) so as to “arouse the political consciousness of the people” and to “facilitate the grand unity of all Chinese in Taiwan and overseas” for the revival of the Republic of China.107 “Nurturing the people” referred to the amelioration of the social welfare system. Zhang criticized the liberals for advocating laissezfaire, which had led to serious inequality of wealth in society and triggered the radical response of Communism. Thus, he supported Sun Yat-sen’s minsheng zhuyi, emphasized the leading role of the state, and advocated a planned economy and cooperation between state-owned and private enterprises.108 In response to Zhang Qiyun’s article, Yin Haiguang wrote an editorial in Ziyou Zhongguo in early October 1956. He attacked each of Zhang’s three “principles” in turn.109 First, he argued that “loving the people” was an Oriental concept. “Only in the Orient’s eras of despotism was there talk of ‘loving the 103 For a brief account of the debate, see He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 134–35. The following discussion is based on He’s account, supplemented by my own reading of Yin’s writings. 104 Zhang Qiyun 張其昀, “Minzhu zhengzhi sanda zhendi 民主政治三大真締 [The three great true principles of democratic politics],” Zhenglun zhoukan 政論周刊 [Political commentary weekly], no. 88 (September 1956): 1. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 2. 108 Ibid. 109 Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang), “Jiaoyu buzhang Zhang Qiyun de minzhu guan: junwang de minzhu 教育部長張其昀的民主觀：君王的民主 [Minister of Education Zhang Qiyun’s view on democracy: the democracy of a monarch]” (1 October 1956),

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people as if they were one’s own children’.”110 As local magistrates in imperial China had commonly been known as “parent-officials” ( fumuguan 父母官), Yin claimed that this was where Zhang’s idea of “loving the people” came from. In Taiwan under Guomindang rule, “Who is to ‘love the people’? Who is qualified to ‘love the people’? Is ‘loving the people’ the privilege of a certain group?” Yin asked.111 Second, Yin claimed that only totalitarian states indoctrinated the people. The Soviet Union, for instance, had adopted “planned education” and “revolutionary education.” Western democratic governments never imposed an official viewpoint on the people, as this was not the proper function of education, Yin claimed.112 Third, those who advocated the principle of “nurturing the people,” Yin wrote, insisted that the key to solving China’s economic problems was to increase the economic strength of the people and the country through interventionism. However, Yin thought that state intervention would restrict the people rather than benefiting them. “Under such circumstances, how can ‘the economic strength of the people’ be ‘nurtured’?” he asked.113 In Yin’s view, Zhang’s three “true principles” had nothing to do with democracy. One week later, the Taiwan-based Zhongguo yizhou 中國一周 (China weekly) published an editorial claiming to correct the arguments in Yin’s editorial and to take issue with his “disrespect” for the state. “Unless you are an anarchist, you cannot deny the existence of the state and the government,” intoned the editorial.114 In its rejoinder to Yin’s attack on Zhang’s three principles, however, the editorial failed to go beyond appealing to the authority of historical figures. To support the argument that “If one loves the people, one must love the state,” the editorial quoted the famous words of Lin Juemin 林覺 民 (1887–1911), a revolutionary martyr who had died in April 1911. “Our concern shall be with all the people under Heaven. And we shall gladly sacrifice your and my welfare for the welfare of all the people under heaven,” wrote Lin in his last letter to his wife.115 The editorial claimed that such an idea had been widely supported by thousands of patriots over the last seventy years. The editorial sought to enhance the authority of the principles of “educating” and in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 406, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 7 (October 1956). 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid., 407. 112 Ibid., 409. 113 Ibid., 412. 114 Sheping 社評 [Editorial], “Jiuzheng Ziyou Zhongguo de miulun 糾正「自由中國」的謬 論 [Rectifying Free China’s fallacies],” Zhongguo yizhou 中國一周 [China weekly], no. 337 (October 1956): 3. 115 Lin Juemin 林覺民, “Yu qi juebie shu 與妻訣別書 [Letter of farewell to my wife],” quoted in Sheping, “Jiuzheng Ziyou Zhongguo de miulun,” 3.

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“nurturing” the people by claiming that they came from Sun Yat-sen, whom it quoted as follows:116 During the glorious eras of the Han and Tang dynasties, the responsibility for protecting and governing the people was never abandoned. Thus, externally, [the government] was able to ward off marauders; domestically, it was able to correct injustice. When education and nurturing were abandoned at the end of the Song and Ming dynasties, the result was the downfall of the state and the collapse of governance.117 In response to Zhongguo yizhou’s editorial, Yin argued that there was no “inseparable special connection” (bukefen de teshu guanlian 不可分的特殊關 聯) between “democracy” and “love of the state” because autocratic governments also emphasized love of the state.”118 The revolutionary martyr’s quoted words were also irrelevant to the relationship between “democracy” and “love of the state.” Martyrs like Lin were engaging in “revolutionary activities,” not “democratic politics.” The former was violent, but the latter was “a product of reason, negotiation, and peace.” It was nonsense to try to prove the “true principles of democracy” with a “revolutionary statement,” Yin commented.119 He also criticized the Zhongguo yizhou editorial’s use of the passage by Sun Yat-sen. Since China was still in the age of despotism during “the glorious eras of the Han and Tang dynasties,” Yin wrote sarcastically, “does the author of the editorial want to realize the ‘monarchical democracy’ of ‘the glorious eras of the Han and Tang’ in the present Republic of China?”120 Yin’s suspicion that the Guomindang authorities and Chinese tradition were conspiring to tighten the party’s control over the state was not only reflected in the above debate, but also in his discussion of the Guomindang-created

116 Sheping, “Jiuzheng Ziyou Zhongguo de miulun,” 3. 117 Ibid. The author of the editorial modified the quotation slightly. For Sun’s original wording, see Sun Zhongshan 孫中山 (Sun Yat-sen), “Difang zizhi shixing fa 地方自治實行法 [Guidelines for the implementation of local autonomy],” in Sun Zhongshan quanji 孫中 山全集 [Collected works of Sun Yat-sen], ed. Guangdong sheng shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiushi 廣東省社會科學院歷史硏究室 [Unit of historical studies, Guangdong academy of social science] et al., vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), 224. 118 Yin Haiguang, “Zailun junwang de minzhu 再論「君王的民主」[Further discussion of the ‘democracy of a monarch’]” (20 October 1956), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 416, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 8 (October 1956). 119 Ibid., 416–17. See also He, Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi, 135. 120 Ibid., 417.

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“culture of partification” (danghua wenhua 黨化文化).121 He interpreted “partification” as “the adoption of a party’s power and interests as the ultimate standard for judging all activities in society.”122 “Culture of partification,” Yin wrote, referred to “the adoption of the party doctrines as the precondition, regulation and conclusion of cultural activities.”123 Under such a “culture of partification,” what ordinary people could learn from the government was not the “truth of the world” (shijie de zhenxiang 世界的真相) but stories made up by the government. In other words, “the dictator not only possesses your body but also deprives you of the right to know about the world,” Yin alleged.124 A review of the Guomindang’s history suggests that the beginning of the party’s partification policy can be traced back to the late 1920s. In August 1927, four months after it had established its capital in Nanjing, the Nationalist government issued a document entitled “Methods for the Implementation of Partification of Education in Schools (Draft)” (Xuexiao shishi danghua jiaoyu banfa cao’an 學校實施黨化教育辦法草案), announcing its intention to “revolutionize and popularize education under the guidance of the Guomindang.”125 At the level of tertiary education, Wen-hsin Yeh suggests, the government put an emphasis on developing science and professional subjects that were considered to be beneficial to China’s modernization. Humanities and social sciences were given fewer resources because the government feared that these subjects would generate more dissident voices that would challenge the Guomindang’s dictatorial rule.126 This did not mean, however, that the government paid little attention to the social sciences. Instead, in order to create, in 121 Li Hanji thought that Yin saw Chinese tradition as an “accomplice of totalitarianism” ( jiquan zhuyi de bangxiong 極權主義的幫兇). For Li’s discussion, see Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 186–89. 122 Yin Haiguang, “Zhongguo wenhua fazhan de xin quxiang 中國文化發展的新取向 [New trends of the development of Chinese culture]” (20 July 1959), in Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 853, originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 21, no. 2 (July 1959). 123 Ibid., 854. 124 Ibid. 125 Fan Hong 范泓, Zai lishi de touying zhong 在歷史的投影中 [In the projection of history] (Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2008), 280; Guomin zhangfu jiaoyu xingzheng weiyuanhui 國民政府教育行政委員會 [Educational Administration Committee, the Nationalist government], “Xuexiao shishi danghua jiaoyu banfa cao’an 學校實施黨化教育辦法草案 [Methods for the implementation of partification of education in schools (draft)],” printed in “Jiaoyujie xiaoxi” 教育界消息 [News from the education sector], Jiaoyu zazhi 教育雜誌 [Education magazine] 19, no. 8 (August 1927): 1, quoted in Gao Qi 高奇, Zhongguo xiandai jiaoyu shi 中國現代敎育史 [A history of modern Chinese education] (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1985), 113. 126 Wen-Hsin Yeh, The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919–1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990), 172–73.

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Yeh’s words, “a culture of the Three Principles of the People” at tertiary institutions, the government used social science courses for political indoctrination. Students were taught that the Three Principles of the People were the infallible guiding doctrines for China’s development. A number of measures were also adopted on campus so as to strengthen students’ sense of belonging to the Guomindang. These included the hoisting of the national flag and the Guomindang flag, the singing of the national anthem and songs glorifying the party, and the circulation of party publications at school libraries.127 Party organizations were also set up in colleges and universities so as to recruit students into the Guomindang’s youth organizations.128 Through the above measures, the Guomindang was able to assert tight control over the higher education sector. In addition to education, the Guomindang also attempted to “partify the judiciary” (danghua sifa 黨化司法) after 1927. Xiaoqun Xu notes that, at first, the Guomindang tried to do so by appointing Guomindang officials as judges throughout the country, so that they could adjudicate legal cases according to the party’s interests. In July 1928, the Training Institute for Judges was also established in Nanjing so as to produce judges who were familiar with the Guomindang’s doctrines.129 However, the impact of the institute was limited. It only produced about 400 new judges with Guomindang membership in the first half of the 1930s, while there were over 2300 judges in the whole country in that period.130 The Guomindang also failed to reach its goal of filling all high judicial positions with its members, not to mention the judicial posts in local governments. In 1934, “out of 248 employees in all positions in the mj [Ministry of Justice], only 104 were party members.”131 Therefore, the Guomindang changed its policy in 1934. Ju Zheng 居正 (1875–1951), the Minister of Justice, suggested that partification did not mean creating “a judiciary of party members” (sifa dangrenhua 司法黨人化) by filling all high judicial positions with party members. It only required the making of “a judiciary of party doctrines” (sifa dangyihua 司法黨義化) by filling these positions with people who adhered to and were familiar with party doctrines.132 127 Ibid., 177. 128 Ibid., 178. 129 Xiaoqun Xu, Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-century China, 1901–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 87–88. 130 Ibid., 89. 131 Ibid., 89. 132 Translation of sifa dangrenhua and sifa dangyihua is from Ibid., 92. For Ju Zheng’s article, see Ju Zheng 居正, “Sifa danghua wenti 司法黨化問題 [The question of partifying the judiciary],” in Ju Zheng 居正, Ju Zheng xiansheng quanji 居正先生全集 [Complete works

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Yin Haiguang probably thought that the Guomindang’s partification practices had their origin in Chinese tradition. In his view, cultural tradition provided the resources for the Guomindang authorities to justify partification. According to him, the promotion of the “fatherly image” ( fuqin yixiang 父親意 像) of the party, or patriarchal worship of it, was an important means for the Guomindang to maintain its supreme power.133 He claimed that the “culture of partification” in Taiwan had inherited its content from Chinese culture in three ways. First, there was formalism (xingshi zhuyi 形式主義) in both imperial China and the Nationalist government. Like officials in imperial China, the Guomindang authorities tended to exaggerate their achievements so as to make a good impression on the ordinary people. Second, both the dynastic governments of imperial China and the Nationalist government emphasized “factional relationship” (paixi guanxi 派系關係) in the appointment of officials. While the Qing government, Yin alleged, made appointments on the basis of ethnicity, and only Manchus were appointed as top officials before the Taiping Rebellion, the Nationalist government adopted party affiliation as the selection criterion for official appointments, and only Guomindang members were appointed as top officials.134 Third, the Nationalist government was reluctant to adapt to “imported innovations,” by which Yin probably meant science and liberal democracy.135 Having alleged that there were similarities between the dynastic governments of imperial China and the Nationalist government, Yin wrote that “the culture of partification is the exterior while the old existing culture is the interior.”136 In other words, traditional culture survived in the guise of partification. Yin Haiguang’s criticism of the Guomindang and his anti-traditionalist attitude finally resulted in the termination of his lectureship at National Taiwan University. The countdown of Yin’s final days at the university began when the “Literary Battle between Chinese and Western Cultures” (Zhong Xi wenhua lunzhan 中西文化論戰) broke out in 1962. Yin was accused by his traditionalist

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135 136

of Mr. Ju Zheng], ed. Chen Sanjing 陳三井 and Ju Mi 居蜜, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1998), 241–58, originally published in Zhonghua faxue zazhi 中華法學雜誌 [Chinese journal of legal studies] 5, no. 11/12 (December 1934): 1–27. Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua fazhan de xin quxiang,” 854–56. Yin Haiguang was mistaken that only Manchus were appointed as top officials before the Taiping Rebellion. Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672–1755), for example, held several important positions simultaneously in the Qianlong period. See R. Kent Guy, “Zhang Tingyu and Reconciliation: The Scholar and the State in the Early Qianlong Reign,” Late Imperial China 7, no. 1 (June 1986): 53. Yin, “Zhongguo wenhua fazhan de xin quxiang,” 856–58. Ibid., 856. See also Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 188.

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enemies of manipulating the debate behind the scene.137 Hu Qiuyuan 胡秋 原 (1910–2004), a college lecturer, alleged that Yin had arranged for people to interrupt his talk at the university, even though nothing really happened. Xu Gaoruan 徐高阮 (1911–1969), a researcher at Academia Sinica, charged Yin with lacking academic integrity (xueshu zhencheng 學術真誠) and being a political agitator (zhengzhi shandongzhe 政治煽動者).138 Yin’s predicament became even worse after John Israel, an American history professor, listed him as a representative liberal on Taiwan in an article criticizing the Guomindang dictatorship.139 In 1966, citing Israel’s article as evidence, Yin’s enemies, including Hu Qiuyuan and Xu Gaoruan, tried to fabricate his connection with John K. Fairbank (1907–91), a historian who had been labelled by the Guomindang authorities as a conspirator against the Nationalist regime.140 Zhang Qiyun took this opportunity to urge Wang Shijie 王世杰 (1891–1981), President of Academia Sinica, to cut the yearly stipend given to Yin Haiguang. Yin was then advised by a friend to withdraw his application for renewal of the stipend in June 1966. Two months later, Yin was offered a position in the Department of Education. He rejected the offer, because he knew that it was an excuse to expel him from the university. He disdained to work for the dictatorship as well. Nevertheless, he was already frustrated with his work environment and agreed to the termination of his lectureship.141

137 The literary battle was fought between the liberals who supported Westernization and the traditionalists who defended Chinese culture. For a detailed discussion of this battle, see Tao Hengsheng 陶恒生, “Liushi niandai de Taiwan Zhong Xi wenhua lunzhan 六十年代 的臺灣中西文化論戰 [The Taiwan-based literary battle between Chinese and Western culture in the 1960s],” Zhuanji wenxue 83, no. 3 (September 2003): 15–31. 138 Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 33–34; Yin Haiguang, “Wo beipo likai Taiwan daxue de jingguo 我被迫離開臺灣大學的經過 [How I was forced to leave Taiwan University],” in Yin Haiguang, Zayi yu suibi 雜憶與隨筆 [Random memories and casual writings] (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 156–57. 139 Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 35; John Israel, “Politics on Formosa,” The China Quarterly, no. 15 (September 1963): 5. 140 Yin, “Wo beipo likai Taiwan daxue de jingguo,” 157–58. In the 1960s, John K. Fairbank began to advocate that the Western world should recognize the influence of the People’s Republic of China in global politics. This provoked radical criticisms from the proGuomindang intellectuals in Taiwan. Many of these intellectuals alleged that Fairbank had “sold out” Taiwan and was promoting the recognition of “two Chinas.” For an analysis of these criticisms, see Leonard H.D. Gordon and Sidney Chang, “John K. Fairbank and His Critics in the Republic of China,” Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (November 1970): 137–49. 141 Yin, “Wo beipo likai Taiwan daxue de jingguo,” 159–65.

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Yin Haiguang’s Views on Science in the Late 1950s

As Fu Dawei 傅大為 has noted, there was no prominent Chinese scientist in Taiwan in the 1950s. Scientific approaches were not popular among the intellectuals in Taiwan, either. Yin Haiguang was one of the very few advocates of scientific research.142 He felt that science had not taken root in China because the Chinese people still had not acquired a comprehensive understanding of science.143 Thus, he set himself the task of introducing an in-depth understanding of science to the people in Taiwan. At the same time, he attempted to criticize Marxism from a scientific perspective and portray it as an unscientific school of thought. Yin Haiguang professed allegiance to logical positivism, or logical empiricism, which became the foundation of his philosophy of science.144 Logical positivism is the “logical analysis of scientific knowledge” and the dismissal of metaphysical thought on the grounds that it lacks cognitive meaning (renzhi yiyi 認知意義, that is, meaning that “conveys information” about “the physical conditions of the world”).145 It rejects the claim that “philosophy has a distinctive, extra-scientific domain of enquiry.”146 Yin Haiguang had been publishing articles on logical positivism since the early 1950s, but most of his discussions of his conception of science are found in works dating from the later years of that decade.147 He wrote a few articles summarizing the characteristics of 142 Fu Dawei 傅大為, “Kexue shizheng lunshu lishi de bianzheng: cong jindai xifang qimeng dao Taiwan de Yin Haiguang 科學實證論述歷史的辯證：從近代西方啟蒙到臺灣 的殷海光 [The historical dialectics of the discourse on scientific empiricism: from the Enlightenment in the modern West to Yin Haiguang in Taiwan],” Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan 台灣社會硏究季刋 [Taiwan quarterly in social studies] 1, no. 4 (December 1988): 23. 143 Yin Haiguang, “Kexue ji qi jiben 科學及其基本 [Science and its basics]” (1 February 1959), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 10, originally published in Wenxing 文星 [Literary star], no. 16 (February 1959). 144 Chen Ruilin 陳瑞麟, “Taiwan kexue zhexue de shouhang: Yin Haiguang de kexue zhexue 台灣科學哲學的首航：殷海光的科學哲學 [Pioneer in philosophy of science in Taiwan: Yin Haiguang’s philosophy of science],” Guoli zhengzhi daxue zhexue xuebao 國立政治大學哲學學報 [National Chengchi University journal of philosophy], no. 10 (July 2003): 4–5. 145 Tom Flynn ed., The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2007), s.v. “Logical Positivism,” 509; Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2008), 74. 146 Alan Richardson, “The Scientific World Conception: Logical Positivism,” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870–1945, ed. Thomas Baldwin, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 394. 147 For a brief discussion of Yin’s logical positivism, see Chen, “Taiwan kexue zhexue de shouhang,” 5–12. For Yin’s articles on logical positivism in the 1950s, see, for example, Yin Haiguang, “Kexue jingyan lun de zhengxing ji qi piping 科學經驗論底徵性及其批

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science in a number of keywords with explanations. According to Yin, science “corresponded with facts” (yu shishi xiangfu 與事實相符) and possessed “generality” (pubianxing 普遍性), because scientific principles should be justifiable with facts and be applicable to any general conditions.148 It was “value-free” (wuguan yu jiazhi 無關於價值) because facts and experience were not subject to influence by any value judgement.149 It was “quantitative” (dingliang 定量), “sceptical” (huaiyi de 懷疑的) and “experimental” (shixing de 試行的), because people who engaged in scientific research should adopt a sceptical attitude and prove scientific principles with endless experiments and a quantitative methodology.150 It was “non-absolute” ( fei jueduixing de 非絕對性的), because recognized scientific principles could be revised with new findings via experiments.151 Yin Haiguang was opposed to metaphysics (xing er shang xue 形而上學 or xuanxue 玄學), because he considered metaphysics an obstacle to the development of logical studies. He observed that most Chinese books on logic published in Taiwan tried to link logic with metaphysics, such as the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.152 In another article, Yin argued that many of the terms used in metaphysics, such as “the self” (benti 本體), “universal” (gongxiang 共相), “transcendental existence” (chaoyue de cunzai 超越的存在) and “the

148

149 150 151 152

評 [The characteristics and criticisms of scientific empiricism]” (February 1951), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 93–120, originally published in Guoli Taiwan daxue wenshizhe xuebao 國立臺灣大學文史哲學報 [National Taiwan University journal of literature, history, and philosophy], no. 2 (February 1951); Yin Haiguang, “ Shizhenglun daoyin 實 徵論導引 [Introduction to empiricism]” (15 September 1953 and 1 October 1953), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 221–46, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 18–19 (September–October 1953); Yin Haiguang, “Luoji jingyan lun daoshi 邏輯經驗論導 釋 [A guide to logical positivism]” (November 1956), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 391–457, originally published in Xiandai xueshu 現代學術 [Modern scholarship] 1, no. 1 (November 1956). Yin Haiguang, “Jingyan kexue de jiben ciwei 經驗科學的基本詞謂 [Basic terminology of empirical science]” (April–May 1960), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 920–24, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 30, no. 3–5 (April–May 1960); Yin Haiguang, Zenyang panbie shifei 怎樣判別是非 [How to distinguish between truth and falsehood] (Taipei: Wenxing shudian, 1962), 35–41. Yin Haiguang, “Kexue he weiwulun 科學和唯物論 [Science and dialectical materialism]” (May 1959), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 863–65, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 26, no. 7–8 (May 1959). Yin, “Jingyan kexue de jiben ciwei,” 904–05; Yin Haiguang, “Lun minzhu yu kexue 論民 主與科學 [On democracy and science]” (March 1955), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 297–99, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 10–11 (March 1955). Yin, “Kexue he weiwulun,” 865–68. A list of these characteristics can also be seen in Chen, “Taiwan kexue zhexue de shouhang,” 15–16. Yin, “Zenyang yanjiu luoji?,” 890–92.

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destiny of man” (ren de mingyun 人底命運) had no cognitive meaning at all. These terms had been used by religious leaders to interpret their scriptures and by “ism”-makers to formulate the philosophical basis of their “isms.” The metaphysical terms were also widespread among students who were interested in such mysteries simply because professors of metaphysics had talked about them seriously. Yin suspected that such professors might not really understand what they had been teaching for years.153 Yin argued that metaphysics was not at all tenable. He alleged that metaphysicians were arrogant, because they believed that they understood the universe more deeply than scientists did, when they actually lacked the necessary methodology to explore that universe. “When metaphysicians ponder a question,” Yin alleged, “most of them do not ponder it with a mathematical and logical mind. And they always ignore scientific knowledge.”154 Yin declared himself optimistic about the future of logic studies in Taiwan, since he was confident that the advancement of science would gradually weed metaphysics out. “At least,” Yin claimed, “logic studies published in the West since 1950 no longer talk about Kant’s philosophy.”155 Yin also discussed Hu Shi’s famous slogan about scientific methodology: “Hypothesize boldly and verify carefully” (Dadan de jiashe, xiaoxin de qiuzheng 大膽的假設，小心的求證).156 In an article published in August 1958, he wrote about the fundamental difference between metaphysics and scientific hypothesis in their response to uncertainty. Scientific hypothesis, he claimed, is “open to criticism and challenge” and “can be verified, revised, or disproved.” “Scientists have never said that any particular hypothesis is ‘the absolute truth’ ( juedui de zhenli 絕對的真理),” he continued.157 Metaphysics, however, “relies on value judgments or coherence theory to reject verification.”158 One of the metaphysical schools of thought that Yin challenged in the late 153 Yin Haiguang, “Luoji jingyanlun de zai renshi 邏輯經驗論底再認識 [Revisiting logical positivism]” (16 May 1960), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 945, originally published in Daxue shenghuo 大學生活 [University life] 6, no. 1 (May 1960). 154 Ibid., 946. 155 Yin, “Zenyang yanjiu luoji?,” 890–92. 156 The phrase comes from Hu Shi, “Zhixue de fangfa yu cailiao 治學的方法與材料 [The methods and materials of scholarship]” (1928), in Hu Shi, Hu Shi quanji 胡適全集 [Complete works of Hu Shi], ed. Ji Xianlin 季羡林, vol. 3 (Hefei: Anhui jiao yu chu ban she, 2003), 132. 157 Yin Haiguang, “Lun ‘dadan jiashe, xiaoxin qiuzheng’ 論「大膽假設，小心求證」[On ‘hypothesize boldly hypothesize and verify carefully’]” (18 August 1958 and 25 August 1958), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 710, originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 23, no. 8–9 (August 1958). 158 Ibid., 710–11.

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1950s was indeed Marxism. He made a point of mentioning that “certain isms are usually regarded as ‘the absolute truth’ in modern times, and they reject scepticism,” implying that these isms were metaphysical rather than scientific.159 Marxism may have been one of the isms to which Yin referred, as he criticized the Marxists, in the same article, for misleading the masses into believing that “Marxism is the absolute truth.”160 On another occasion, Yin explicitly argued that dialectical materialism was not scientific. He criticized Chen Duxiu for having taken dialectical materialism to be a kind of science in the “science versus metaphysics” debates of the early 1920s.161 Dialectical materialism, as Yin understood it, divided society into two parts, the “base” (xiaceng jiangou 下層建構) and the “superstructure” (shangceng jiangou 上層建構). The base was the “technological forces of production” ( jishu de shengchan liliang 技術的生產力量) and the “relations of production in society” (shehui de shengchan guanxi 社會的生產關係), while the “superstructure” referred to ethics, religion, philosophy, political structures, value systems, and lifestyle. According to dialectical materialism, the base determines the superstructure. The adherents of this doctrine, Yin claimed, regarded “the state as a tool of those who had economic advantages” to maintain their vested interests. Thus, they were hostile to the existing socio-political system.162 But the dialectical materialists were rather naïve, Yin argued. They thought that human society as it currently existed was full of selfishness, fear, exploitation, and repression, and they believed that a change in the mode and relations of production would bring about a “socialist heaven” (shehui zhuyi de tianguo 社會主義的天國), which would eliminate all these problems on earth. However, things had not turned out in accordance with the wishes of the dialectical materialists. “Under the rule of the Bolsheviks,” Yin noted, “selfishness, exploitation, and especially fear have not been reduced. Instead, they have greatly increased. People in the Soviet Union all want to escape from such a ‘socialist heaven’ if they have a chance.”163

159 Ibid., 711. 160 Ibid., 712. 161 Yin Haiguang, “Kexue yu weiwulun 科學與唯物論 [Science and materialism]” (18 May 1959 and 25 May 1959), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 837–39, originally published in Zuguo zhuokan 26, no. 7–8 (May 1959). For Chen Duxiu’s claim, see Chen Duxiu, “Kexue yu rensheng guan xu 《科學與人生觀》序 [Preface of Science and views of life],” in Kexue yu rensheng guan 科學與人生觀 [Science and views of life], ed. Yadong tushuguan 亞東圖書館 [East Asian library] (Shanghai: Yadong tushuguan, 1925), 11. 162 Yin, “Kexue yu weiwulun,” 852–53. 163 Ibid., 853.

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Yin went on to challenge the Communist claim that dialectical materialism was scientific. He agreed that some examples raised by some dialectical materialists were drawn from science. However, “they place those scientific examples in an unscientific framework.”164 From Yin’s point of view, the “thesis,” “antithesis,” and “synthesis” of dialecticism constituted a metaphysical framework, not a scientific one, and the dialectical materialists adopted such a metaphysical framework as their guiding principle.165 He then criticized dialectical materialism for being vague and empty. He asked the dialectical materialists a number of questions: In terms of their nature, are ‘thesis,’ ‘antithesis’ and ‘synthesis’ a priori (xianyan de 先驗的) or a posteriori (empirical, jingyan de 經驗的)? If they are a priori, how can we know that? On what basis are they so? How can [the dialectical materialists] verify that the development of society and history in the empirical world follows them [thesis/antithesis/synthesis]? If they are empirical, what does such a broadly-defined formula say about the empirical world with all its shapes and colors? If they say nothing about the empirical world, how can we know that they are true? And how can we know that they are false? If they cannot be proved to be true or false, do they possess any cognitive meaning?166 Yin Haiguang tried to explain why such an empty, unscientific doctrine had become popular among the adherents of Marxism. Karl Marx and his followers, Yin argued, were good at manipulating the psychology of the masses. They knew that what the people craved was “monumental simplicity” (Yin’s English) and “simple certainty” ( jiandan de queding xing 簡單的確定性), or something that was simple to understand and “absolutely unshakeable” ( juedui queding buyi 絕對確定不移). With their insistence that “Marxism is the absolute truth” and “tomorrow’s victory certainly belongs to us,” Yin alleged, the Marxists were able to mislead millions of people.167 However, he did not clarify in detail how they were able to do so. The above allegation suggests that Yin tended to portray the Marxists as cheaters who fooled people into believing in their doctrine. The allegation can also be seen as Yin’s rhetoric in which he attempted to dismiss Marxism as a scientific school of thought.

164 Ibid., 874. 165 Ibid., 875. 166 Ibid. 167 Yin, “Lun ‘dadan jiashe, xiaoxin qiuzheng’,” 711–12.

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Why was it specifically in the late 1950s that Yin Haiguang criticized Marxism on these particular grounds? According to an entry in Lei Zhen’s diary on 27 October 1959, Yin mentioned to Lei that he was pessimistic about Taiwan’s future after reading a mainland-based magazine where photographs showing recent accomplishments by the Communists were printed.168 Li Hanji suggests that Yin may have doubted the apparent “achievements” of the Great Leap Forward (1958–61).169 Although Yin did not mention the Great Leap Forward in his discussion of science and Marxism, it is possible that he chose to publish the above critiques in the late 1950s so as to dismiss the Communist “achievements” as a hoax and prevent his readers from being attracted to Communism. 5

Yin Haiguang in the 1960s: His Reappraisal of Chinese Culture

In 1959, Yin Haiguang mentioned in a letter to Hu Shi that he had become “very interested in the evolution of modern Chinese thought.”170 In the 1960s, Yin turned away from his focus on modern science and began to concentrate on the study of Chinese culture and intellectual history. In this decade, he became appreciative of some of the values reflected in traditional Chinese thought and eventually published a book predicting the future development of Chinese culture. His appreciation of some traditional values prompted him to advocate a pattern of integration between Chinese and Western values that was based upon modern liberal-democratic and scientific principles, together with selected Confucian virtues. He also proposed solutions to the problem of anomie (tuoxu 脫序) from which he thought modern Chinese intellectuals had been suffering. Since the late 1950s and especially after the crackdown on Ziyou Zhongguo in 1960, Yin’s intellectual activities had been greatly hindered by the restrictions imposed on him at National Taiwan University. This may be one of the reasons why letters that Yin wrote in the 1960s express a sense of loneliness. It may have been in search of consolation that, in 1964, he resumed correspondence with his friend-turned-rival Xu Fuguan. Yin made many constructive

168 Lei, Lei Zhen riji (1959–1960), 182. 169 Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 28. 170 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Hu Shi, 22 May 1959 [Reference no. hs-NK01-214-001], in “Hu Shi Papers” [Hu Shi dang’an 胡適檔案], Nangang Files [Nangang dang 南港檔], Hu Shi Memorial Hall [Hu Shi jinianguan 胡適紀念館], Academia Sinica [Zhongyang yanjiuyuan 中央研究院], Taipei, Taiwan.

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comments on Xu’s book, published one year earlier, about human nature in the pre-Qin era.171 In a letter to Xu on 19 December 1964, Yin wrote: In your previous letter, you talked about the desolate years [suffered by] the people of the “lonely world,” especially intellectuals. This is a big problem for humankind. The feeling is particularly deep for perceptive intellectuals. Nowadays, however, all positive mutual trust is lost while basic values disintegrate. People only play Tai-chi with each other [that is, interact superficially] and, when they see each other, they only talk about the weather. How to revitalize the self deep in their heart? This is the fundamental question that has been perplexing me for five years.172 Xu Fuguan suggested in an essay written in memory of Yin shortly after his death in September 1969 that Yin had begun to appreciate Chinese culture because he was living in a state of “anxiety over future uncertainties” (youhuan 憂患).173 “Chinese culture takes shape in youhuan. And only in youhuan can Chinese culture really be understood,” wrote Xu.174 Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇 suggests that Yin’s experience in adversity contributed to a change in his attitude towards spiritual life.175 In March 1962, one of Yin’s students, Wu Minxiong 伍民雄 (date unknown), commented to Yin about his loneliness while studying abroad. In his reply to Wu, Yin wrote that “a man is not a ‘logical machine’ and nothing more,” and that “you [Wu] know clearly about my spiritual loneliness.”176 To comfort Wu, Yin wrote that he “fully understood” the “lonely and helpless feeling of living in a strange environment” without the support of parents, siblings, or relatives.177 In these remarks, we 171 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Xu Fuguan, 2 October 1964, in “The Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan” [Xu Fuguan shuxin shougao 徐復觀書信手稿], Tunghai University Library, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan. For Xu Fuguan’s book, see Xu, Zhongguo renxinglun shi. 172 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Xu Fuguan, 19 December 1964, in “The Letters and Manu­ scripts of Xu Fuguan.” 173 Xu Fuguan, “Tong dao wu di, tong dao wu you 痛悼吾敵‧痛悼吾友 [Sorrowfully mourn for my enemy, sorrowfully mourn for my friend],” in Yin Xia et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji, 79, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 22 September 1969. 174 Xu, “Tong dao wu di, tong dao wu you,” 79, also quoted in Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, Ruxue yu ruxue shi xinlun 儒學與儒學史新論 [New discussion of Confucian studies and the history of Confucian studies] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002), 286. 175 Guo, Ruxue yu ruxue shi xinlun, 291. 176 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Wu Minxiong 伍民雄, 28 March 1962, in Yin Haiguang, Yin Haiguang shuxin ji 殷海光書信集 [The correspondence of Yin Haiguang] (Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 258. 177 Letter from Yin Haiguang to Wu Minxiong, 258.

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find an admission that adherence to logic is, after all, inadequate to solve all the problems of humankind. In the next few years, Yin seems to have sought spiritual contentment. In a letter to another student in November 1965, Yin mentioned that he had undergone “some changes in the past four or five years.” He also said that he felt that his “spiritual state is moving upwards (xiangshang tisheng 向上提昇) on the one hand” and bringing him “inward composure” (xiangnei shoulian 向內收 斂) on the other. “Of course, I vent my anger when I encounter something that goes against my wishes or is unreasonable. However, [my anger] will dissipate after a while,” he continued.178 Shoulian is translated by Thomas A. Metzger as “collect[ing] one’s spirit and draw[ing] it inward,” or more simply “drawing one’s spirit inward.”179 Although Yin did not use this term often in his extant writings, it looks from the above passage as though he recognized shoulian as a process that would keep him calm and peaceful. He may have known that he needed more than logic to overcome his loneliness and helplessness. In January 1966, Yin Haiguang published Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, in which he attempted to reappraise Chinese tradition.180 Whereas in the 1950s he had not paid much attention to ethics, he now recognized its necessity in China’s cultural reconstruction. In his view, “truth, charity, and beauty” were the ultimate ethical values of humankind.181 In other words, Yin seems to have come to appreciate what he had despised in the previous decade. Yin Haiguang also reassessed Confucian ethics in this book. Although he still criticized Confucianism for shortcomings such as “valuing men and belittling women” (zhongnan qingnu 重男輕女), being intolerant of dissident voices, and hindering the development of science, he did appreciate some Confucian values—those which he thought were meaningful in his own days.182 He agreed with the Confucian saying, “When there is no trust, the common people will not be able to stand on their feet” (min wuxin buli 民無信不立), from Lunyu 論語 (The analects).183 He thought that the saying was important because, he 178 Letter from Yin Haiguang to He Xiuhuang 何秀煌, 29 November 1965, in Yin, Yin Haiguang shuxin ji, 178. 179 Metzger, Escape from Predicament, 102, 293. 180 Zhang Chunlin and He Guangwei have provided an alternative discussion of Yin’s reappraisal of Chinese tradition, see Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 117–41; He, “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu,” 76–117. 181 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 589. 182 For the details of Yin’s criticism of Confucianism, see Ibid., 568–80. 183 Ibid., 581. For the quoted Confucian saying, see Lunyu 論語 [The analects], 12/7. Translation is adopted from D.C. Lau, The Analects (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1992), 111.

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noted, “nowadays there is a serious lack of trust among people in society.”184 “If there is no trust between people, the whole society cannot ‘get onto its feet’,” he continued.185 He also agreed with Confucius that people should not obtain wealth and honor in violation of moral principles.186 He discerned a path to the “spirit of objectivity” (keguan jingshen 客觀精神) in the phrase “no arbitrariness of opinion, no dogmatism, no obstinacy, and no egoism” (wu yi, wu bi, wu gu, wu wo 毋意、毋必、毋固、毋我) in Lunyu.187 The “spirit of objectivity” is essential for the “empiricist’s attitude,” which can be a way to appraise traditional values with scientific methodology. Yin advocated the Confucian spirit of “giving up self-interest and choosing righteousness” (sheli er quyi 舍利而取義), and even, as the Mencius puts it, “giving up life and choosing righteousness” (shesheng er quyi 舍生而取義).188 People with such a spirit would not be tempted by fame and gain. They would not fear death either, claimed Yin.189 In his view, such people were a “role model for intellectuals” (zhishi fenzi de fanshi 知識份子的 範式).190 Having been oppressed by the Guomindang authorities since the late 1950s, Yin probably admired such a role model and wished to be one for his fellow intellectuals. Besides having come to appreciate some Confucian values, Yin Haiguang suggested an “integration of Eastern and Western ethics” (dongxi daode de jinghe 東西道德的整合), presumably for both the Chinese people and the whole of humankind.191 This was his proposal for integrating selected Confucian virtues such as ren 仁 (benevolence) and yi 義 (righteousness) with the modern values of liberty, democracy, and science.192 In his view, these Confucian moral terms were broad enough to be open to different interpretations. This was essential for integration with Western values.193 He placed the above three modern values at the core of his model of integration and suggested that these modern values be shaped with Eastern and Western traditional religions such as Confucianism, 184 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 581. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., 582. 187 Ibid. For the quoted phrase, see Lunyu, 9/4. Translation is adopted from Wing-tsit Chan trans. and ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35. 188 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 582. For the quoted phrase, see Mencius, 6A10. Translation is adopted from Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 57. 189 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 583. 190 Ibid., 582. 191 Ibid., 590. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid., 594–95.

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Buddhism, and Christianity.194 The outcome of such integration would be the formation of a “scientific humanism” (kexue de renben zhuyi 科學的人本主義), a term that, according to Yin, referred to an integration of values such as liberty, equality, kindness, and justice for the sake of enhancing the happiness of humankind.195 He noted that “scientific humanism” would be realized in Bertrand Russell’s dictum: “The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.”196 The first step towards achieving “scientific humanism” was to “regard ‘love’ as the most fundamental point of departure for human life,” Yin wrote.197 By putting “love” at the center of “scientific humanism,” Yin was perhaps signalling that human affection was more important than logical empiricism in his model of cultural integration. The discussion above demonstrates that Yin Haiguang attempted to incorporate selected Confucian values into the liberal-democratic and scientific foundation of a modern culture for both China and the world. He proposed the examination of traditional Chinese values on the basis of liberty, democracy and science. Values that were beneficial to the formation of “scientific humanism” would be absorbed, but Yin did not state clearly what to do with those values that were not deemed beneficial. Also, his attempt to “integrate Eastern and Western ethics” seems to have been a further development of his 1950s theory that “tradition is malleable,” which envisaged the “metabolism” of Chinese society with the three core modern values—liberty, democracy, and science. Yet, there was an obvious difference from his previous theory. In the 1950s, he focused on the removal of traditional values that could not adapt to stimuli. Now he stressed the importance of moral values selected from the great religious traditions in such “metabolism.”198 Yin Haiguang’s admiration of the spirit of “giving up self-interest and choosing righteousness” also reflects his concern about the prospects of modern Chinese intellectuals. He devoted a chapter in his Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang to discussing “the responsibilities of intellectuals.” In this chapter, he claimed that many modern Chinese intellectuals had been suffering from a sense of loss. To help them regain their confidence, he encouraged them to devote themselves to the quest for cultural construction. Only when these 194 Ibid., 590–96. 195 Ibid., 599. See also Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 284–85. 196 Ibid. For Bertrand Russell’s dictum, see Bertrand Russell, What I Believe (London: Routledge, 2004), 10. The book was first published in 1925. 197 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 599. See also Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 130–31. 198 For a further discussion of Yin’s attempt to integrate liberal-democratic and Confucian values, see Zhang, Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu, 137–41.

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intellectuals felt secure about the future would they be able to come out of the shadow of frustration. Yin identified two kinds of people in the leadership of a mass movement, namely “people of action” (xingdong renwu 行動人物) and “people of ideas” (guannian renwu 觀念人物). The “people of action” are the decision-makers in charge of the movement, while the “people of ideas” are those who talk about ideas and theories and provide the blueprint for an ideal society.199 These two kinds of people will get along quite well at the initial stage of the movement. However, the relationship between them deteriorates once the mass movement succeeds and a new ruling stratum is formed. Referring implicitly to the Guomindang leaders, Yin wrote that the “people of action” became the new rulers. Some “people of ideas” who had supported the party guiding the mass movement also joined the new ruling stratum because they thought the party had reached the goals of the mass movement. Other “people of ideas,” by which Yin meant liberal intellectuals such as himself, were “persistent in their original ideals and also naïve.” They then felt “betrayed.”200 Yin attributed the conflict between “people of action” and “true people of ideas” to their motivational differences. “People of action are interested primarily in success,” Yin argued. They do not care if the means to success are morally objectionable, because they think such a consideration is “empty” (kongdong de 空洞的). They make frequent use of personality cults in order to attract more supporters. They draw support from ideals when those ideals are favorable to personality cults, and they get rid of those ideals when the opposite circumstances prevail.201 “People of action” and “true people of ideas” then turn into rivals. “People of action” are authoritarian and seek to secure their power by regulating other people’s behavior. By contrast, Yin claimed, the “true people of ideas regard the pursuit of the truth as an important matter.” In their opinion, the practices of “people of action” are unacceptable. “True people of ideas” will then continuously criticize the existing authorities and advocate their own beliefs.202 When Yin described “people of action” who favor the use of personality cults, he was really describing totalitarian leaders. By “true people of ideas,” he meant the unyielding intellectuals, among whom he presumably numbered himself, who feared nothing when facing oppression from the Guomindang authorities.

199 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 607. 200 Ibid., 609. 201 Ibid., 610. 202 Ibid., 610–11.

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Yin Haiguang also observed that, in modern China, there was “a sense of loss among intellectuals” (zhishi fenzi de shiluo 知識份子的失落), including some “true people of ideas” who felt “betrayed” by the “people of action.”203 Citing Robert M. MacIver’s The Ramparts We Guard (1950), a book about the defence of democracy in the Cold War era, Yin noted that modern Chinese intellectuals had been suffering from anomie, which he regarded as “a kind of social condition resulting from conflicts between [different] ethical restrictions.” Anomie emerged particularly easily when there were radical changes in society and culture, a persistently chaotic environment and conflicts between “foreign cultural values” (wailai wenhua jiazhi 外來文化價值) and “primary cultural values” (zhuwei wenhua jiazhi 主位文化價值), wrote Yin.204 MacIver saw anomie as a “malady of democratic man that becomes most virulent in times of crisis and turbulent change, the breakdown of the individual’s sense of attachment to society, to all society.”205 According to MacIver, Yin wrote, some people had a “tragic sense of insecurity” (beijushi de bu’anquan gan 悲劇式的不安全 感), which made them lose their sense of direction, their confidence in their social values, and their social connections, social status, and economic support. They were always afraid of being persecuted. They were both angry and uneasy because they felt alienated and treated with disrespect.206 Yin claimed that this was the case for many modern Chinese intellectuals in the Cold War era—a time that was full of political unrest: The general [sense of] loss among Chinese intellectuals … mainly results from the severe unrest of the era. Many, many people have lost their direction in the severe unrest, and they do not know where their way actually lies. Many people have settled down physically, but [they] have not got [their] spirit settled … [They] simply prefer not to think about it [their way]. This is to abandon more than half their ego.207 Thus, Yin Haiguang argued, Chinese intellectuals had to rescue themselves from their sense of loss.208 He suggested four keys to achieving this: morality, freedom, democracy, and science.209 He called for the formation of new 203 Ibid., 606, 611–12. 204 Ibid., 613. 205 Robert M. MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 84. 206 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 612–13; For relevant discussion in MacIver’s book, see MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard, 85–87. 207 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 616–17. 208 Ibid., 637. 209 Ibid., 632.

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“cultural ideals” (wenhua lixiang 文化理想) within Chinese society. Such ideals would aim at realizing “the universal values of humankind” (ren de pubian jiazhi 人的普遍價值) by utilizing existing scientific knowledge and technology.210 He insisted that reconstruction of society and culture on the basis of such ideals was the solution to China’s problems.211 The goal of such a reconstruction would be to transform Chinese society into an “open society” as outlined by Karl Popper, who, Yin noted, had suggested that an “open society” with piecemeal social engineering would safeguard individual freedom and allow flexibility in social construction.212 Chinese intellectuals should be prepared to “bring peace for ten thousand generations to come” (wei wanshi kai taiping 為萬世開太平). They should dedicate themselves to the promotion of a liberal culture, which would permeate into the Chinese mainland. Yin hoped that this would clear the violent and hateful sentiments that were spreading there and facilitate the emergence of an environment that emphasized morality, guaranteed freedom, and implemented democracy. “From the prospective of an intellectual, what else can be more worth doing than this?” he wondered. “If we put our intelligence and effort into this prospect,” he asserted, “we will feel that human life has meaning, value, and a realistic goal.”213 The fact that Yin invoked Karl Popper suggests that, by the mid-1960s, he had transcended the fear of possible totalitarian tendencies in utopian social engineering and was turning to Popper for a positive vision. While Yin Haiguang was still somewhat critical of Chinese culture in Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, he seems to have become much more positive in his views about Chinese culture shortly before his death in 1969. In the preface to Haiguang wenxuan 海光文選 (Selected works of Yin Haiguang), written in August 1968, Yin admitted that freedom and democracy could not be realized without morality as the motivating force.214 He had frequent 210 Ibid., 639. 211 Yin Haiguang, “Rang women xishou congshi wenhua chuangjian 讓我們攜手從事文化 創建 [Let’s participate in cultural construction together]” (1965), in Yin, Chuncan tusi, 167–68. 212 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 639–40; Yin Haiguang, “Sixiang yu fangfa zaiban xuyan 《思想與方法》再版序言 [Preface to the second edition of Thought and method]” (1 May 1965), in Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 2, 559–60, originally published in Wenxing, no. 91 (May 1965); Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 183; Yin Haiguang, “Haiyeke lun ziyou de chuangzaoli 海耶克論自由的創造力 [Hayek on the creativity of freedom]” (18 October 1965), in Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 3, 1209–10, originally published in Shi yu chao 時與潮 [Time and tide], no. 198 (October 1965). 213 Yin, Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang, vol. 2, 640. 214 Yin Haiguang, “Haiguang wenxuan zixu,” 568. Haiguang wenxuan was renamed and published two years after Yin’s death. See Yin Haiguang, Yin Haiguang xuanji: zhenglun pian

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conversations with his students and friends during a serious illness in August 1969. His words in the last few months of his life were collected and published posthumously by Chen Guying 陳鼓應 (b. 1935), one of Yin’s students, in Chuncan tusi 春蠶吐絲 (Spring silkworm spitting silk) (1969).215 According to Chuncan tusi, Yin admitted that logical empiricism was inadequate for solving spiritual problems.216 He had begun to appreciate the role of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in supporting, respectively, the social, spiritual, and religious life of the Chinese people.217 With a wish that he could live longer to contribute to the integration of Chinese tradition and Western liberalism, Yin died of gastric cancer on 16 September 1969.218 6

Conclusion

What is the significance of Yin Haiguang’s hostility to the three “impediments”—Communism, the Guomindang’s dictatorship, and Chinese tradition—to the “May Fourth Spirit”? In the last twenty years of his life, Yin Haiguang provided a diverse discussion of possible “impediments” to the development of a modern Chinese nation. He attempted to critique Marxism from a largely scientific perspective. This was something that Xu Fuguan and Zhang Junmai did not attempt. Yin’s rise as a major critic of the Nationalist government brought him the title “the helmsman of Chinese liberalism” (Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi de linggangren 中國自由主義的領港人) among his fellow Taiwan-based intellectuals.219 His scepticism about what he perceived as the conspiracy between Chinese tradition and the Guomindang authorities also provoked vigorous debates between the anti-traditionalist liberals and the New Confucian scholars in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, Yin’s longstanding commitment to the revival of the “May Fourth Spirit” played a crucial role in shaping his thought. While he and his associates shared similar opinions about the undemocratic nature of Communism 殷海光選集：政論篇 [The selected works of Yin Haiguang: political commentaries] (Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1971). 215 Yin, Chuncan tusi, ed. Chen, 39–87. 216 Ibid., 49–50. 217 Ibid., 54. 218 Ibid., 70. 219 Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, “Wo bu fenxiang zhege shidai de jiazhi: jinian Yin Haiguang xiansheng shishi ershi zhounian 我不分享這個時代的價值：紀念殷海光先生逝世二 十周年 [I don’t share the values of this era: in memory of the twentieth anniversary of Mr. Yin Haiguang’s death],” in Yin Xia et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji, 499.

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and Chinese tradition, his application of logic in critiquing both was distinctive within his circle of friends, in which few people had received training in logical positivism. Moreover, he was one of the first people to introduce logical empiricism in Taiwan. For this reason, Fu Dawei called him “Taiwan’s pioneer of ‘positivist discourse’” (Taiwan “shizheng lunshu” de xianquzhe 台灣「實證論 述」的先驅者), while Chen Ruilin 陳瑞麟 praised him for “planting the roots for the later flourishing of the development of mathematical logic, analytical philosophy, linguistic philosophy, and philosophy of science in Taiwan.”220 We have seen that, in the mid-1960s, Yin became interested in the possibility of integrating modern and traditional values. Although in attempting to do this he showed appreciation of a few Confucian values, his affection for Chinese tradition was still limited. He did not place tradition in a significant position in his model of cultural integration, unlike Xu Fuguan and Zhang Junmai, as we shall see. Yin’s model was largely based on modern liberal and scientific values. To him, Confucian virtues were, in the end, merely supplemental to his ideals for a modern China. 220 Fu, “Kexue shizheng lunshu lishi de bianzheng,” 55; Chen, “Taiwan kexue zhexue de shouhang,” 27–28.

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Balancing Tradition and Modernity: The Case of Zhang Junmai Zhang Junmai resided in the United States from the early 1950s.1 In 1955, he became a visiting research fellow in Chinese studies at Stanford University, where he stayed for one year. He then moved to San Francisco, writing editorials for Shijie ribao 世界日報 (World daily), a local Chinese newspaper. From the late 1950s onwards, he devoted himself to the study of Confucianism and explored the potential contribution of tradition to China’s democratization and modernization. His confidence in the possibility of reconciliation between Chinese tradition and liberal democracy qualifies him for recognition as what the contemporary Chinese scholar Tao Dongfeng 陶東風 calls a “conservative liberal”—one who attempts to derive liberal resources from the Confucian tradition.2 Zhang was also a “cultural nationalist” who, in keeping with John Hutchinson’s characterization of this type, proposed “alternative indigenous models of progress” when confronting the challenges of modernization.3 This was particularly reflected in his national reconstruction ideals. He created the notion of “the unity of virtue and law” which attempted to integrate the Confucian concept of virtue and the Western concept of the rule of law. This chapter first examines the Confucian dimension of Zhang’s national reconstruction ideals. It then discusses his proposal that Confucianism be used as an aid to modernization. Finally, it analyzes how Zhang attempted to strike a balance between traditional and modern values in his conception of democratic state-building. I argue that Zhang Junmai, compared to other émigrés, was more capable of placing Confucianism on an equal footing with modern 1 Portions of this chapter are reprinted by permission from Springer International Publishing ag. Part of the chapter is published in Edmund S.K. Fung and Kenneth Kai-chung Yung, “Zhang Junmai: The Political and Cultural Thought of a New Confucian,” in Dao Companion to the Contemporary New Confucian Philosophy, ed. David Elstein (Cham: Springer International Publishing ag, 2021), 105–24. 2 Tao Dongfeng 陶東風, “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi : Zhongguo wenhua jiangou de disan tiao daolu 保守自由主義：中國文化建構的第三條道路 [Conservative liberalism: the third road of China’s cultural construction],” in Zhishi fenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang 知識分子立場：激進與保守之間的動盪 [The stance of intellectuals: the turbulence between radicalism and conservatism], ed. Li Shitao 李世濤 (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000), 482. 3 John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (London: Fontana Press, 1994), 41.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_006 Kenneth Kai-chung

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democratic principles. Having studied Chinese classics since his childhood, Zhang had more deeply internalized their traditional values, which Yin Haiguang did not begin exploring in depth until late in life. 1

The Confucian Dimension of National Reconstruction, 1949–1969

Zhang Junmai is remembered not only as a politician, but also as a Confucian scholar. Since his early years, Zhang had been advocating the building of a modern China on the basis of Chinese culture. After the demise of the Third Force Movement in the mid-1950s, he retreated to the intellectual sphere, where he concentrated on the study of Confucianism. He authored two major publications, one on the history of Confucianism from the Song dynasty to the twentieth century, and the other on Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), a noted Confucian philosopher of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).4 In addition, he published a considerable number of articles on the revival of Confucian values in modern China.5 He saw Confucianism as an aid to the social and cultural spheres of China’s modernization, while he put equal emphasis on Confucian and Western political concepts in his vision of China’s prospects for democracy. In other words, Confucianism and Western political thought had complementary functions in Zhang’s model of state-building and Sino-Western cultural integration. For three decades prior to the Communists’ rise to power, Zhang Junmai had been concerned with the importance of traditional Chinese culture in the modernization of China.6 He had written about “the academic foundation of national revival” (1935) and about the future of Chinese culture (1936).7 He argued that the strengthening of minzu yili 民族意力 (national will [Zhang’s translation]) among the Chinese people was essential because it would provide them with spiritual strength and a sense of unity against Japanese

4 See Chang (Zhang), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought; Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai), Wang Yang-ming: Idealist Philosopher of Sixteenth-century China (Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John’s University Press, 1962). 5 Zhang Junmai’s articles on the revival of Confucian values were collected and reprinted in Zhang Junmai, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji 中西印哲學文集 [Collected essays on Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophy], ed. Cheng Wenxi 程文熙 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1981). 6 For Zhang’s thought on this matter during the Republican era, see Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 108–13. 7 See Zhang, Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu jichu; Zhang, Mingri zhi Zhongguo wenhua.

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invasion.8 The way to strengthen minzu yili was to establish a distinctive national character through the promotion of Chinese history, tradition, and culture.9 He also suggested that “spiritual freedom” ( jingshen ziyou 精神自由) should be the foundation of Chinese culture because it was the key to the revitalization of China’s politics, scholarship, religion, and fine arts.10 As discussed previously, he also spent most of his life pursuing freedom and democracy. However, many modern Chinese liberals were anti-traditionalists. Yin Haiguang regarded Chinese tradition as one of the three impediments to the revival of the May Fourth spirit. Did Zhang’s sympathy for Chinese tradition run counter to his advocacy of liberty? Tao Dongfeng’s concept of “conservative liberalism” may help us to clarify Zhang’s position: Conservative liberalism does not totally reject change, and it only opposes radical revolution that utterly smashes historical tradition and the existing order. From a conservative liberal point of view, the relationship between order and freedom is not hostile but complementary. There is no freedom when there is no order or authority, and it is inconceivable that this kind of authority would depart from the tradition in which people live. Of course, unlike ordinary conservatism, the “conservatism” of conservative liberalism takes the pursuit of individual freedom as its ultimate goal. Therefore, it does not defend the tradition of autocracy. However, unlike radical liberalism, it does not stand for radical revolution and thorough anti-traditionalism.11 From Tao’s point of view, tradition and freedom are “complementary” to each other. The existence of freedom relied greatly on the existence of tradition. In his book on Chinese liberalism, the Chinese political scientist Ren Jiantao discusses similar ideas, albeit in different terminology and with differences in interpretation. While Tao uses the term “conservative liberalism” to refer to Chinese tradition in general, Ren uses the term “Confucian liberalism” (rujia ziyou zhuyi 儒家自由主義), which refers specifically to China’s Confucian tradition but not the country’s other traditions. Ren identifies two kinds of 8 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 110. For Zhang’s discussion of minzu yili, see Zhang, Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu jichu, vol. 2, 73–74. 9 Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 111. See also Zhang, Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu jichu, vol. 1, 148–49. 10 Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 50. For Zhang’s discussion of jingshen ziyou, see Zhang, Mingri zhi Zhongguo wenhua, 120–33. 11 Tao, “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi,” 482.

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liberalism in China, namely “Westernized liberalism” (xihua ziyou zhuyi 西化 自由主義) and “Confucian liberalism.” According to Ren, the two kinds of liberalism are different in three ways. First, “Westernized liberals” think that the “intellectual resources of liberty” (ziyou de sixiang ziyuan 自由的思想資源) can only be imported from the West, while “Confucian liberals” think that they are inherent in Chinese tradition. Second, “Westernized liberals” think that a liberal democratic political system in modern China should be constructed (gouzao 構造) on the foundation of Western knowledge and experience, while their Confucian counterparts think that it can be realized through a process of transformation (zhuanjin 轉進) that starts out with traditional political ideals. Third, “Westernized liberals” think that Chinese intellectuals are so influenced by traditional values that they face a “crisis” (weiji 危機) about their “societal identity” (shehui rentong 社會認同) when adopting liberal values. For “Confucian liberals,” however, the “vitality” (shengji 生機) in traditional beliefs augurs well for the adoption of liberal values by Chinese intellectuals.12 While Ren sees Yin Haiguang as a typical example of a “Westernized liberal,” Zhang Junmai seems to have been one of the “Confucian liberals” of modern China.13 Other scholars have noted Zhang’s overall positivity regarding the respective strengths of traditional Chinese culture and Western traditions of freedom and democracy. According to Edmund S.K. Fung, Zhang first traced the source of “the strengths of the West” to “spiritual freedom,” which “manifested itself in democracy and individual liberty” in the field of politics.14 Suggesting that “spiritual freedom” also existed in Chinese tradition, Zhang was already trying to “reconcile Confucian philosophy with modern liberal and democratic thought” in the 1930s.15 Second, Zhang and his fellow New Confucians suggested in the late 1950s that there were “seeds of democratic thought” (minzhu sixiang zhi zhongzi 民主思想之種子) in traditional Chinese culture.16 In their view, Fung notes, these “seeds of democracy could grow and flourish, marked by the development of political institutions.”17 Fung also suggests that Zhang and his associates revived the premodern “liberal Confucian tradition” of which the late Ming Neo-Confucian Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) was a representative figure.18 Theodore de Bary notes that the New Confucians 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Ren, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang mailuo zhong de ziyou zhuyi, 22. Ibid., 22–45. Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 50. Ibid., 50–51; Zhang, Mingri zhi Zhongguo wenhua, 122–23. Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 13. Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 55. Ibid., 56.

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have “welcomed Western constitutional democracy as a support for the more liberal Confucian tradition as they espouse it.”19 Thus Zhang Junmai and his fellow New Confucian scholars did not see any crisis in Chinese tradition when it encountered modern liberal democratic values, but only adaptability and vitality. However, to return to Ren Jiantao, the case of Zhang Junmai does not completely fit with Ren’s characterization of “Confucian liberals.” Later in this chapter we shall discuss how Zhang, unlike his Confucian associates such as Xu Fuguan, did not place the traditional political ideal of dezhi or the “rule of virtue” at the center of his political discourse. It remains unclear whether he thought dezhi to be applicable to a modern democratic polity. Instead, he advocated “the unity of virtue and law” in governing China.20 Also, his perception of individual-society-state relationships was based on modern ideas of rights and duties, not Confucianism. Although Zhang agreed that Chinese tradition provided the resources for modern liberal democracy, it is questionable whether he thought that traditional political ideals could be completely realized in a modern liberal democratic political system. Nevertheless, Zhang’s recognition of China’s inherent “intellectual resources of liberty” and of the vitality in Confucianism qualifies him for recognition as a “Confucian liberal” in Ren’s terms. His notion of “the unity of virtue and law,” which implies an emphasis on order and authority, also qualifies him for recognition as a “conservative liberal” in Tao Dongfeng’s terms. Zhang Junmai can be regarded as having been a “cultural nationalist” as well as a conservative liberal. According to John Hutchinson, cultural nationalism “puts forward a mobile view of history that evokes a golden age of achievement as a critique of the present, with the hope of propelling the community to ever higher stages of development.”21 Hutchinson also observes that “at times of crisis generated by the modernization process, cultural nationalists play the role of moral innovators proposing alternative indigenous models of progress.”22 He distinguishes cultural nationalists from political nationalists, whose main aim is to “secure a representative state for their community” although they “may be 19 Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Introduction,” in Confucianism and Human Rights, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 22. 20 Zhang Junmai, “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue 新儒家政治哲學 [Political philosophy of New Confucianism]” (2 March 1965), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 384, originally published in Ziyou zhong 自由鐘 [Liberty bell] 1, no. 3 (May 1965). 21 Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism, 41. 22 Ibid. See also Michael Hon-chung Chun, “The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong 1949–1997: A History” (PhD diss., The Australian National University, 2010), 93.

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driven to adopt ethnic-historical identities” in the process of state-building.23 He argues that the two types of nationalism “must not be conflated” and are different from each other in terms of “conceptions of the nation” and “political strategies.”24 However, Zhang was a man who showed tendency towards both kinds of nationalism. As discussed previously, from the 1920s onwards, Zhang had been working hard for the realization of a constitutional state in China. Edmund S.K. Fung suggests that Zhang was at the same time a cultural nationalist who utilized Chinese history to posit a distinctive cultural identity of the Chinese people.25 Thus, cultural nationalism and political nationalism intertwined in the thought of Zhang Junmai. As I will show later, Zhang Junmai continued to be a cultural nationalist after 1949. How far he was a “moral innovator,” however, remains a question. Cultural nationalism in the modern Chinese context was also closely related to the idea of national salvation. N. Serina Chan suggests that Mou Zongsan, one of Zhang’s fellow New Confucians, saw the Chinese people’s esteem for their culture as a crucial factor in the formation of Chinese nationalism. To Mou, the revival of Confucian studies (ruxue 儒學) was central to the Chinese quest for national salvation from both foreign colonialism and Communism.26 In the 1950s and 1960s, Zhang Junmai shared Mou’s view that the revival of Confucianism was a means to save the Chinese nation from Communism. Moreover, he was concerned about how such a revival could help the Chinese people meet the challenges of modernization. Before investigating Zhang Junmai’s “cultural nationalism” and “conservative liberalism,” which were reflected in his writings mainly after the mid-1950s, I shall first discuss one of his major concerns in the early 1950s. Soon after he began his émigré life in 1949, Zhang Junmai became aware that some Chinese intellectuals, including the famous philosopher Feng Youlan, had chosen to stay on the mainland and given their allegiance to the new regime.27 In response 23 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 13. 24 Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism, 12. 25 For Edmund S.K. Fung’s views on Zhang Junmai’s cultural nationalism in the Republican era, see Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 110–13. 26 N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 71–82. 27 In addition to Feng Youlan, other intellectuals who gave their allegiance to the new regime include Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973), Luo Longji 羅隆基 (1896–1965), Chu Anping 儲安平 (1909–66), Shen Junru 沈鈞儒 (1875–1963), Zhang Bojun 章伯鈞 (1895–1969), Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978) and Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (1910–2005). See Gerry Groot, Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67–84.

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to this situation, Zhang published an article in 1951 in Zaisheng 再生 (National renaissance) discussing the traditional concept of qijie 氣節 (integrity). Qijie is a Confucian term that has been translated by Wing-tsit Chan as “moral courage.”28 It refers to personal integrity. In an article published in Zaisheng in October 1951, Zhang expressed the view that qijie was closely related to Mencius’ notion of “vast flowing energy” (haoran zhi qi 浩然之 氣) and Wen Tianxiang’s “Song of the Upright Spirit” (zhengqi ge 正氣歌).29 He argued that it was particularly important for Chinese intellectuals to maintain qijie in the 1950s because the world had become chaotic in three ways. Politically, the rise of Communism had brought democracy and liberty under threat. Philosophically, dialectical materialism and the theory of class struggle had distorted the relationship between mind and matter. Internationally, the Third World War was brewing because of the rivalry between the Communist bloc and Western democracies. The atomic bomb had the potential to destroy human civilization completely.30 Living in such a chaotic world, Zhang argued, an intellectual should maintain qijie and be a “person of unyielding character” (you guqi zhi ren 有骨氣之人).31 Zhang suggested that qijie has three components: “reason” (lixing 理性), “confidence” (xinxin 信心), and “the spirit of martyrdom” (xundao jingshen 殉 道精神). According to Zhang, qijie required that one be able to maintain the “dignity of personality” (renge zhi zunyan 人格之尊嚴) and the “distinction [between right and wrong] through reason” (lixing zhi bianbie 理性之辨別). This meant, Zhang continued, that one should have a firm will ( jianding de yizhi 堅定的意志) against any temptation of fame and wealth. People with qijie should pursue the Mencian ideal of the man who “cannot be led astray 28 This translation is adopted from Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch’ien, Chin-ssu lu: Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology, trans. and compiled Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 258. 29 Zhang Junmai, “Zhonghua minzu zhi jingshen: qijie 中華民族之精神—氣節 [The spirit of the Chinese: integrity]” (16 October 1951), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 599, originally published in Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 301 (October 1951). The phrase “vast flowing energy” (haoran zhi qi 浩然之氣) is from Mencius, 2A2; translation (slightly modified) from Irene Bloom trans., Mencius (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 30. The “Song of the Upright Spirit” was written by the Southern Song official Wen Tianxiang after he was captured and imprisoned by the Yuan regime. In this song, Wen expressed admiration for twelve historical figures who were “all willing to suffer and even die for their moral principles.” After Wen was executed by the Yuan government, he and his “Song of the Upright Spirit” became an evocative symbol of qijie for Chinese people. See Xu Gang, “Symbolism in Chinese Poetry on History,” Monumenta Serica 48 (2000): 14–16. 30 Zhang, “Zhonghua minzu zhi jingshen,” 622–26. 31 Ibid., 626.

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by riches and honor, moved by poverty and privation, or deflected by power or force.”32 When people face dilemmas, they should choose the path of righteousness and have confidence in it. They would then be comfortable with their decisions. Such had been the attitude of Wen Tianxiang in choosing to die for his country rather than surrender to the Mongols.33 Zhang thus emphasized “the spirit of martyrdom” as particularly important in face of the Communist threat. In the “days of life or death” when China was being devastated by “class struggle” and “party dictatorship” and the globe threatened by “world revolution,” Zhang suggested, one should seek peace of mind and face the challenge with a positive attitude. The martyrdom of some of Jesus Christ’s apostles was an example.34 Zhang must have been aware, however, that he would have been persecuted if he had stayed on the mainland. Rather than choosing to be a martyr, he had decided to flee China and was soon to settle in the United States, where he would enjoy a level of political and personal safety not available to intellectuals who had remained in mainland China. Qijie could be realized through “intelligence” (zhi 智), “will” (yi 意) and “authentic feeling” (qing 情). Intelligence was the “effort to study extensively, think carefully, inquire accurately, and identify clearly.”35 The “heart of selfconfidence” (zixin zhi xin 自信之心) could be acquired only through the correct identification of right and wrong. When one’s will was firm, one could be indomitable and “as immovable as a mountain” (budong rushan 不動如 山).36 Having intelligence and a firm will was, however, not enough to realize qijie. One must also be sincere towards ordinary people so that they would respond positively to one’s call. With charisma, one could “light the fire of the inner hearts of others with one’s own individual fire,” wrote Zhang.37 Zhang also suggested eight principles for the realization of qijie. First, one must not serve foreigners and forget about the “grand duty of loving the nation” (aiguo zhi dayi 愛國之大義). Second, one must not instigate rebellions or stir up disturbances. Third, one must be loyal only to one’s own state. Fourth, one must not be seduced by wealth and power. Fifth, one must not succumb to the authority of the rulers, by which Zhang meant the Communist Party on the 32 Ibid., 599–600. The quotation is from Mencius, 3B2. Translation is adopted from Bloom trans., Mencius, 62. 33 Zhang, “Zhonghua minzu zhi jingshen,” 600. 34 Ibid., 600–01. 35 Ibid., 611–12. Zhang derived this wording from passage 20 of the “Zhongyong 中庸 [Doctrine of the mean]” chapter of the Liji 禮記 [Book of rites]. Translation is slightly modified from Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 107. 36 Zhang, “Zhonghua minzu zhi jingshen,” 612. 37 Ibid.

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mainland. Sixth, one must not abandon one’s dignity and the right to think freely when one is under threat. Seventh, one must not obey a government that does not love the people and the nation. Eighth, one should have confidence in one’s beliefs and cling to them instead of going with the crowd.38 Chinese intellectuals should abide by these principles so as to be “people of unyielding character.” These eight principles also reflect, by implication, Zhang’s perception of the Chinese Communists. In Zhang’s view, the Chinese Communists were not patriots because they served the Soviet Union. They also instigated rebellions (civil war) and threatened people’s freedom of thought. Besides discussing what qijie was about, Zhang Junmai criticized those who he thought had abandoned their qijie. Indeed, one year before the publication of his article on qijie, he launched an attack on Feng Youlan, denouncing his reported allegiance to the Communist Party. Feng, a renowned New Confucian scholar, had published widely in Chinese philosophy and its history. He stayed on the mainland after the Communist takeover in 1949. Soon afterwards, he published a number of articles in which he conducted self-criticism, communicated what he said he had learned from the land reform campaign and glorified the role of the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群眾路線) in the campaign and the campaign’s “educational function” ( jiaoyu gongyong 教育功用).39 Zhang saw what Feng had written in these articles as a departure from qijie. He wrote an “unsent letter” (buji xin 不寄信) to reproach Feng in June 1950 and published it in September of the same year. In this letter, Zhang criticized Feng from a highly moralistic angle without any substantial proof of Feng’s lack of qijie. Zhang expressed shock at Feng’s self-criticism regarding his own previous beliefs. He questioned Feng’s sincerity in his past Confucian studies. While other scholars studied hard and wrote books about their beliefs, 38 39

Ibid., 619–20. Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, “Yinian xuexi de zongjie 一年學習的總結 [A summary of learning in the past year],” in Feng Youlan, Sansongtang quanji 三松堂全集 [Complete works of the hall of three pines], vol. 14 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 2001), 396–400, originally published in Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s daily] (Beijing), 22 January 1950; Feng Youlan, “Canjia tugai de shouhuo 參加土改的收穫 [The fruits of participating in the land reform],” in Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 401–10, originally published in Xuexi 學習 [Learning] 2, no. 2 (April 1950); Feng Youlan, “Tugai gongzuo zhong de qunzhong luxian 土改工作中的群眾路線 [The mass line in land reform work],” in Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 411–14, originally published in Guangming ribao 光明日報 [Brightness daily] (Beijing), 23 March 1950; Feng Youlan, “Tugai de jiaoyu gongyong 土 改的教育功用 [The educational function of the land reform],” in Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 415–18, originally published in Jinbu ribao 進步日報 [Progressive daily] (Tianjin), 27 March 1950.

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Zhang wrote, Feng simply treated Chinese philosophy as a “skill” and made a living out of it. He did not really abide by the moral principles taught in the Confucian canon.40 In other words, Zhang implied that Feng had been keen to study Confucianism only because it had given him fame before 1949. Once 1949 had come and Confucian studies were no longer profitable but actively despised, Feng was willing to abandon them and study something more profitable, Marxism. This showed that Feng had only been paying lip service to Confucianism for the past several decades.41 Zhang also reproached Feng Youlan for lacking confidence in what he had advocated before 1949 but abandoned afterwards. Given that Feng had no confidence in what he had been advocating for decades, how could he claim in his articles that he had now suddenly converted to Marxism?42 Feng also lacked insight into the true nature of the Communists, Zhang claimed, because he was not aware of the Communists’ practice of forcing their beliefs on people. He wondered why a well-educated intellectual like Feng was unable to comprehend that.43 It seemed to Zhang that Feng possessed neither willpower nor the ability to “think carefully” and “identify clearly,” which were both necessary for the realization of qijie. Feng Youlan was shameless as well, wrote Zhang. As a prominent intellectual, Feng was supposed to be a “great man” (da zhangfu 大丈夫) who “cannot be led astray by riches and honor, moved by poverty and privation, or deflected by power or force.”44 “Even if you [Feng] were persecuted to death, you would still qualify as a hero among ghosts,” Zhang wrote in the letter.45 Feng, however, chose to live under Communist rule and conduct self-criticism on the Communist model.46 Zhang even accused Feng Youlan of being as shameless as Feng Dao 馮道 (882–954), an imperial official who had served five shortlived dynasties.47 “Do you actually not know there are things to be ashamed of 40 Zhang Junmai, “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng 一封不寄信—責馮芝生 [An unsent letter: reproaching Feng Zhisheng]” (23 June 1950), Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 274 (September 1950): 12; Zhou Zhiping 周質平, “Qijie yu xueshu: lun Feng Youlan de daoshu bianqian 氣節與學術：論馮友蘭的道術變遷 [Integrity and scholarship: the evolution of Feng Youlan’s scholarship],” Ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀 [Twenty-first century], no. 66 (August 2001): 98. 41 Zhang, “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng,” 13. 42 Ibid.; Feng, “Yinian xuexi de zongjie,” 399–400. 43 Zhang, “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng,” 13. 44 Zhang, “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng,” 13. The quotation is from Mencius, 3B2. Translation is adopted from Bloom trans., Mencius, 62. 45 Zhang, “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng,” 13. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid.

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in this world?” Zhang asked.48 Feng, it seems, was totally lacking in the “spirit of martyrdom” and guilty of violating the eight principles of qijie. 2

Revival of Confucianism as an Aid to Modernization

In January 1958, Zhang Junmai and his fellow New Confucians, namely Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan, jointly published a manifesto entitled “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 為中國文化敬告世界 人士宣言 (A manifesto to the people of the world on Chinese culture). In the late 1950s and the 1960s, Zhang Junmai also published a number of articles exploring the possibility of reviving Confucianism. A study of these articles confirms that Zhang was what Hutchinson calls a “cultural nationalist.” Zhang took the view that, for a few reasons, there was an urgent need for a revival of Confucianism. First, by the mid-1960s, the Communist government had ruled China for over fifteen years, during which, in Zhang’s view, Confucianism had been “spurned” (tuoqi 唾棄) and “devastated” (cuican 摧 殘) by the Communists. He expected, however, that Confucianism would be revived at some time in the future.49 Second, the Chinese should make use of their ancestors’ wisdom in modernizing their own nation, just as the Europeans had done. “Modern European thought is the continuation of Greek thought” and “Greek philosophy is the foundation of modern thought,” said Zhang in a lecture.50 It followed, for Zhang, that the Chinese people should modernize their nation on the basis of their own intellectual foundation—Confucianism. Third, Chinese tradition required people to incorporate morality into their daily life, whereas Western tradition did not, Zhang alleged. Instead, Westerners attached “supreme importance to knowledge,”51 which they “studied for its own sake.”52 They “recognized only the importance of knowledge, not 48 Ibid. 49 Zhang Junmai, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing 中國現代化與儒家思想 復興 [China’s modernization and the revival of Confucian thought]” (1965), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 583–86; Zhang Junmai, Xin rujia sixiang shi 新儒家思想史 [The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought] (Taipei: Hongwenguan chubanshe, 1986), 5–6; Zhang Junmai, “Xin rujia sixiang shi xie wan yihou 新儒家思想 史寫完以後 [After the completion of The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought],” in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 2, 801, originally published in Rensheng, no. 297 (March 1963). 50 Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing” 586. 51 Chang (Zhang), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, 453. 52 Ibid.

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that of action.”53 By contrast, Chinese people treated “knowledge and morality as equally important” and emphasized “the unity of knowledge and action” (zhixing heyi 知行合一) or, to use Zhang’s translation, “the unity of knowing and doing.”54 “Unity of knowledge and action” was a concept propounded by the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming, who thought that knowledge and action were inseparable from each other. According to Wang Yangming, knowing is the intent of acting and  … acting is the work of knowing … knowing is the beginning of acting, and acting is the completion of knowing. Once one understands this, then if one only talks about knowing, [the idea of] acting is already present, or if one only talks about acting, [the idea of] knowing is already present.55 In Zhang’s view, an emphasis on “the unity of knowledge and action” would encourage modern Chinese to live a moral way of life, one that had probably been forgotten by people on the mainland after fifteen years of Communist rule. The above discussion offers a preliminary glimpse of Zhang’s cultural nationalism. He was fully aware of the challenges of modernization and Communism that China had been facing. He also noticed that Chinese tradition offered valuable cultural resources from which the Chinese people could draw support so as to meet these challenges. Zhang Junmai’s cultural nationalism was also reflected in his discussion of specific Confucian concepts that could help modern China to tackle its challenges. Such a discussion also formed the basis of his model of Sino-Western cultural integration, which put equal emphasis on Chinese and Western values. In a speech given in July 1965, he suggested that “five basic concepts” in Confucian thought were the keys to China’s modernization. They were “the autonomy of rationality” (lizhi de zizhu 理智的自主), “thinking and the function of mind” (xin de zuoyong yu sikao 心的作用與思考), “the 53 Zhang Junmai, “Ruxue zhi fuxing 儒學之復興 [The revival of Confucian studies]” (16 June 1964), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 573, originally published in Rensheng, no. 327 (June 1964). 54 Chang (Zhang), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, 453; Chang (Zhang), Wang Yang-ming, 39; Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai), “Wang Yang-ming’s Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West 5, no. 1 (April 1955): 11. The translation “unity of knowledge and action” comes from the title of A.S. Cua, The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming’s Moral Psychology (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982). 55 Wang Yangming 王陽明, Chuanxilu 傳習錄 [A record for practice] (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 2001), 9. The translation of the quoted sentences is by Philip J. Ivanhoe, slightly modified by the present author. See Philip J. Ivanhoe trans., Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2009), 142.

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existence of the universe” (yuzhou de cunzai 宇宙的存在), “phenomenon and substance” (xianxiang yu shiti 現象與實體) and “the theory of the virtuous nature” (dexing xueshuo 德性學說).56 First, “the autonomy of rationality” referred to people’s inherent possession of four types of moral potential [literally, “four sprouts” (siduan 四端)] as universal characteristics of human nature. These were “benevolence” (ren 仁), “righteousness” (yi 義), “propriety” (li 禮), and “wisdom” (zhi 智).57 Second, “the function of mind” helped one acquire the ability to think and to judge. Such an ability was essential for the classification of things and for value judgement.58 Third, the universe was made up of different kinds of animate and inanimate beings. With the ability to think, one was able to classify different objects in the world and, more importantly, become aware of one’s “ability [to carry out] moral self-reflection” (daode fanxing nengli 道德反省能力).59 Fourth, Zhang claimed that Confucius had recognized the existence of an “abstract world” (chouxiang shijie 抽象世界) of spirit ( jingshen 精神) and a “phenomenal world” (xianxiang shijie 現象世界) of substance (wuzhi 物質), while the Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) had argued that principle (li 理) and vital force (qi 氣) were inseparable from each other.60 Fifth, since li and qi were inseparable, an important Confucian concept was the realization of virtue in the “phenomenal world” through the socio-political teachings of the daxue 大學 (Great learning)— “cultivation of persons” (xiushen 修身), “regulation of families” (qijia 齊家), “keeping states in order” (zhiguo 治國) and “keeping the world at peace” (pingtianxia 平天下).61 Zhang’s advocacy of his “five basic concepts” suggests that, in his view, Confucian ethics ought to be restored in Chinese society after fifteen years of Communism’s devastation of Chinese tradition on the mainland. It seems that Zhang’s proposal for restoring Confucian ethics was not innovative, as he did not elaborate on how the above five Confucian concepts could be modified for modern needs. Nevertheless, the restoration of Confucian ethics was the first step of Zhang’s model of state-building and Sino-Western cultural integration.

56 57 58 59 60 61

Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 586. Ibid., 586–87. For Mencius’ original conception of the “four types of moral potential,” see Mencius, 2A6. Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 587–89. Ibid., 589. See also Mencius, 2A2. Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 590–91. Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 591–92. Translation of the phrases from the Daxue is slightly modified from A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 132.

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Perhaps because post-Communist social reconstruction on the mainland was still a distant dream in the 1960s, Zhang did not discuss in detail how the “five basic concepts” could benefit the modernization of China. Nevertheless, he did provide an outline for the revival of Confucian philosophical thought in modern China. First, the Chinese people should make use of their ancestors’ wisdom. But Zhang did not mean that Chinese should ignore ancient Greek and modern Western philosophy.62 Rather, Zhang hoped that, through an indepth comparison between Chinese and Western thought, Chinese people would be able to identify the advantages and disadvantages of their own philosophy and reappraise their premodern philosophers in modern terms. For instance, Xunzi 荀子 (c. 310 bc–c. 235 bc), who argued that human nature was evil, had been seen in opposition to Mencius, who argued that human nature was good. “Nowadays, we can call Xunzi an empiricist,” Zhang said in a lecture.63 Second, Chinese philosophy should in future be based on a broad foundation. No school of thought should be advocated to the exclusion of all others. Zhang endorsed the wisdom of the “Zhongyong” 中庸 (Doctrine of the mean) chapter of Liji 禮記 (Book of rites) where it observes that “All things are produced and developed together without injuring one another. The courses [of the seasons, and of the sun and moon] are pursued together without any collision among them.”64 He saw no harm in philosophy accommodating different schools of thought and suggested that people should not be constrained by any particular school.65 Therefore, Zhang advocated that Chinese philosophy in the future should incorporate the good points of various schools of thought, both Eastern and Western. This should be a highly selective process—one that would be different from simply mixing (zarou 雜揉) different schools, or seeking compromise (zhezhong 折衷) or reconciliation (tiaoting 調停) between their doctrines.66 Unlike Yin Haiguang who founded his model of cultural integration upon a liberal-scientific basis and Xu Fuguan whose model, as I will discuss in the next chapter, was based upon Confucianism, Zhang did not set any preconditions for his own model.

62 Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 595. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. The translation of the quoted sentences is by Wing-tsit Chan, slightly modified by the present author. See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 112. 65 Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 595. 66 Zhang Junmai, “Xinrujia zhexue zhi jiben fanchou 新儒家哲學之基本範疇 [Basic categories of New Confucian philosophy]” (25 June 1960), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 1, 539–40, originally published in Rensheng, no. 232 (July 1960).

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Third, and most importantly, morality and knowledge should be equally emphasized. Zhang argued that knowledge is inadequate to bring human beings happiness. Only when knowledge is used in a moral way can happiness be achieved.67 He thus endorsed Wang Yangming’s notion of “the unity of knowledge and action” which, he believed, did not exist in Western culture. In Zhang’s view, the position reflected in Daxue, Lunyu, and Mencius was that knowledge (zhi 知) and morality (de 德) were inseparable. However, he noticed that scientific development in the twentieth century, especially the invention of the atomic bomb, posed a threat to humanity. He advised that scientists should have a “sense of responsibility” (zeren gan 責任感) and a “sense of duty” (yiwu gan 義務感). They should take morality into consideration when exploring new kinds of technology so as to avoid the total destruction of humankind. “The unity of knowledge and morality” (zhide heyi 知德合一), a similar notion to Wang Yangming’s, was thus important for Chinese and foreign scientists alike.68 On the whole, “the revival of Confucian thought does not run against the meaning of modernization. Instead, it is the method that will help modernization to develop roots and establish [itself] on a more stable and more solid foundation,” Zhang claimed.69 To him, the revival of Confucianism was an aid or a “method” to solidify the foundation for modernization. However, he did not specify how Confucian such a foundation should be. 3

Confucianism and Zhang Junmai’s Political Ideals

While Zhang Junmai sought to promote Confucianism as an aid to modernization, one may question how far he incorporated Confucianism into his political ideals and exactly how he proposed to integrate Chinese and Western political thought. Edmund S.K. Fung argues that Zhang in the 1950s was caught in a predicament in which he finally found it difficult to demonstrate the contribution of Confucianism to China’s democratization.70 I shall now attempt to assess the place of Confucianism in Zhang’s democratic ideals. Zhang thought that Confucian teachings emphasized virtue (de 德) and that the rule of law ( fazhi 法治) might not have existed in premodern China. 67 68

69 70

Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 595–96. Zhang Junmai, “Xiandai shijie fenluan yu rujia zhexue de jiazhi 現代世界紛亂與儒家 哲學的價值 [The turbulence of the modern world and the value of Confucian philosophy]” (1 March 1959), in Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, ed. Cheng, vol. 2, 819, originally published in Minzhu Zhongguo 民主中國 [Democratic China] 2, no. 5 (March 1959). Zhang, “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing,” 596. Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 54–63.

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However, unlike Xu Fuguan, Zhang did not construct his political discourse around the concept of dezhi 德治 (rule of virtue). Instead, he advocated “the unity of virtue and law” in the governance of a democratic China.71 In this formulation, the Chinese concept of “virtue” and the Western concept of “law” were on an equal footing. Indeed, Zhang was able to treat traditional Chinese political thought and modern Western political thought equally because he thought that the two had close connections. According to the latest studies in the West, he claimed, the concept of natural rights (tianfu renquan shuo 天賦人權說) originated from Confucianism. When the early Catholic missionaries studied the Confucian classics, they discovered Tianlishuo 天理說 (theory of heavenly principles).72 This concept was introduced to the Europeans and inspired the spread of rationalism (lixingshuo 理性說) in Europe. Enlightenment thinkers such as Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) then began to critique religion with rationalism.73 Zhang saw the concept of natural rights as a manifestation of rationalism in the political sphere. He even found the following corresponding passages from Mencius: The ode says, “Heaven, in giving birth to humankind, / Created for each thing its own rule./ The people’s common disposition/ Is to love this admirable Virtue.” Confucius said, “How well the one who made this ode knew the Way!” Therefore, for each thing, there must be a rule, and people’s common disposition is therefore to love this admirable Virtue.74 When Western thinkers read these passages, Zhang claimed, they learned that there was a rule (dingze 定則) governing everything in the world. The rule came from the common disposition of all humankind. This was virtue, or rationality as the Western thinkers interpreted it. The concept of natural rights was indeed a product of the political application of rationality. Zhang even claimed that Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) was deeply inspired by the above-quoted passages and asserted certain natural rights in the United States Declaration of Independence. From this perspective, “the concept of natural rights was originally an old possession of ours that we left overseas for two or three hundred

71 72

Zhang, “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue,” 384. Translation of tianli as “heavenly principles” is from Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1982), 90. 73 Zhang, “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue,” 386. 74 Zhang, “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue,” 386. Zhang quoted the passage from Mencius 6A6. Translation is adopted from Bloom trans., Mencius, 124.

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years,” Zhang wrote.75 Zhang hoped that, in order to save China from lagging behind the West, the content of Confucianism could be enriched with these long-lost ideas that had been well developed in the West. He wanted to see Western democracy “returned” to Confucianism through “the unity of virtue and law.”76 However, Zhang’s claim was exaggerated. True, Catholic missionaries and the Enlightenment thinkers may have learned about tianlishuo or read the above-quoted passage from Mencius. They may also have been fascinated with these ideas.77 Yet, we shall not ignore the influence of ancient Greek rationalism on the Enlightenment thinkers. For example, Kant read extensively the works of Plato and Aristotle and critiqued their views on reason.78 It was unlikely that Confucianism had such a great impact as Zhang claimed. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that Jefferson had ever read Mencius. Zhang fabricated the story probably because he would like to make his claim more convincing. Having interpreted the relationship between Chinese and Western values as discussed above, Zhang Junmai did not prioritize either set of values in his model of cultural integration. Although he saw the revival of Confucianism as an aid to modernization, he did not advocate the adoption of traditional dezhi. Indeed, Zhang insisted that modern individual-state relationships should be based on rights and duties. Although Zhang did not write much about the relationship between the individual, society, and the state in the 1950s and 1960s, he did talk about it in 1967 when he was invited to give a series of lectures in Singapore on the history of socialism in the West. These lectures seem to be Zhang’s last recorded discussion of socialism before his death in 1969. The transcripts of these lectures were published by his students in 1988.79 In one of these lectures, he discussed the ideal individual-society-state relationship as he envisaged it. He argued that the individual was the “fundamental constituent” ( jiben fenzi 基本分子) of a state. The individual grew up as a member of a family and developed physical strength, intellect, and morality during his or her school years so as to become a citizen. Thus, “every citizen

75 Zhang, “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue,” 386. 76 Ibid; Fung, “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization,” 54–59. 77 For a study of the influence of Confucianism on the European Enlightenment thinkers, see Walter W. Davis, “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (October 1983): 523–48. 78 Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch, The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 54, 210. 79 Zhang Junmai, Shehui zhuyi sixiang yundong gaiguan 社會主義思想運動槪觀 [An overview of socialist thought and movements] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1988).

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is an individual.”80 Then the individual might devote himself or herself to a career. The individual might also participate in elections, become a member of parliament, or even become a government official. Zhang Junmai viewed the above course of personal development, from the nurture of intellect and morality to devotion to a career or politics, as “a duty and right that every individual should have.”81 Society, according to Zhang, was “the place where the individual earns a living” and “the place for every individual to be engaged in commercial activities.” “In fact, nobody can separate himself or herself from the state or from society,” said Zhang.82 The state was “the supreme body that controls all powers.”83 It was linked inseparably with the law. “Only when there is law can the social order in a state be maintained,” Zhang said.84 Although the law “should be observed by all citizens,” it had to “accord with the interests and needs of the people.”85 New laws would be legal only after serious discussion and approval by a representative parliament. In this way, the law would “contain rationality” and “fit with human sentiment.” “The law ( falü 法律) and morality (daode 道德) will then be integrated,” Zhang claimed.86 However, he did not explain in detail how such an integration would be achieved and whether it was the same as “the unity of virtue and law.” He did not confront the problem of diversity of interests among different groups within society, either. While Yin Haiguang put an emphasis on the theoretical supremacy of the individual, Zhang Junmai treated the individual, society, and the state as equally important because he was aware of the dangers of elevating any one of them above the others. In totalitarian regimes where the interests of the state were given the highest priority, the individual was exploited by the state.87 Karl Marx had emphasized the role of society in historical development and agitated for proletarian dictatorship, which was conducive to social tyranny.88 As for the theoretical supremacy of the individual, Zhang linked this with laissez-faire, which had contributed to the exploitation of the working class, he claimed.89 He then reminded his audience of the three keys to maintaining the balance between the individual, society, and the state—human 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Ibid., 17. Ibid., 17–18. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 19–20. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 21. Ibid., 18–19. Ibid., 19.

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rights, constitutional democracy, and social justice—keys that he had been advocating since his youth and that constituted what he called “socialism that is based on democracy and freedom.”90 Zhang Junmai also disputed the historian Qian Mu’s 錢穆 (1895–1990) claim that the premodern Chinese political tradition was not as autocratic as other scholars had believed. Qian mentioned that many recent Chinese scholars had concluded that political systems in imperial China were autocratic on the grounds that these past systems were not at all democratic.91 He claimed that such scholars had reached this conclusion largely because, being under the influence of Western analytical methodologies, they had fitted the Chinese case into an autocratic-constitutional dichotomy. He argued that political systems in premodern China were not at all autocratic if they were analyzed according to China’s particularities.92 For example, Qian wrote, the composition of government in imperial China had realized the “direct rights of citizens” (zhijie minquan 直接民權) because ordinary people could become government officials and participate in the government via the civil service examination system. Hence, there was no need for a separate “body representative of public opinion” (daibiao minyi jiguan 代表民意機關), by which Qian probably meant the parliament, to monitor the government.93 Also, Qian argued that premodern Chinese people had placed too much emphasis on fazhi 法治, by which he meant the “rule by the legal system,” which was used to impose constraints on people in the imperial period. He took modern Chinese people to task for thirsting for fazhi while failing to realize that their ancestors had already put too much emphasis on it in the past. Instead, Qian suggested, it was living people rather than the lifeless legal system that needed to be emphasized.94 Zhang Junmai published a series of articles in the late 1960s critiquing Qian Mu’s arguments and methodology.95 He emphatically rejected the idea that Western analytical frameworks were inapplicable to China’s historical 90 Ibid., 21–22. For a detailed discussion of Zhang’s interpretation of social justice, see He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 162–72. 91 Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhongguo chuantong zhengzhi 中國傳統政治 [China’s traditional politics] (Hong Kong: Zhongguo wenti yanjiusuo, 1950), reprinted in Qian Mu 錢穆, Guoshi xinlun 國史新論 [New perspective on the nation’s history] (Hong Kong: Xinhua yinshua gufen gongsi, 1975), 33. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 46. 94 Ibid., 55–58. 95 These articles were first published in Ziyou zhong and then published as a book in 1986. See Zhang Junmai, Zhongguo zhuanzhi junzhu zhengzhi zhi pingyi 中國專制君主政制 之評議 [A critique of autocratic monarchy in China] (Taipei: Hongwenguan chubanshe, 1986).

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development. As the twentieth century was “an era of communication between China and the West,” he noted, Chinese scholars should adopt the same “method of defining and classification” (dingyi fenlei fa 定義分類法) as their Western counterparts for the study of Chinese politics and society. Research might suggest similarities or differences between China and the West. In the case of similarities, the same theories or explanations could presumably be applied to both China and the West. If there were differences, scholars should attempt to explain why particularities existed in China.96 Zhang claimed that it was a major problem if scholarly studies in China were not brought into line with international practice. If Qian really loved Chinese culture, Zhang argued, he should help bring the study of China up to modern standards so that the world would know more about Chinese politics and society.97 In response to Qian Mu’s claims that the selection of government officials via the civil service examination system in imperial China had realized the “direct rights of citizens” and that there was no need for a separate “body representative of public opinion,” Zhang Junmai drew a distinction between a “body representative of public opinion” and the civil service examination system. The former should be composed of elected representatives and responsible for legislation and the approval of the government budget. The latter was established for the recruitment of government officials and was “ten thousand miles away from the spirit of representing public opinion.”98 Zhang said that he had no idea why Qian had linked them together.99 He also criticized Qian for mistakenly understanding the modern notion of “the rule of law” as “rule by the legal system,” for Qian had used the same term, fazhi, for both concepts. According to Zhang, fazhi, or the rule of law, referred to both the rulers and the ruled observing a constitution. This had not happened in premodern China. What Qian meant by fazhi in traditional China, Zhang wrote, was the rules and regulations formulated by the government to facilitate its governance. Zhang wondered why some Chinese scholars still did not use the same scholarly terminology as their Western counterparts after over a hundred years of crosscultural communication.100 The account of Qian Mu’s relationship with New Confucianism by Yu Yingshi, one of Qian’s students, may offer an explanation for the dispute between Qian and Zhang. According to Yu, Qian “deeply believed that there 96 Ibid., 8. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., 566. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., 208.

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was a rational inner core in Confucian political theories, one that could connect with modern democracy.”101 His refutation of the claim that the premodern Chinese political system was an absolute monarchy, Yu wrote, “inevitably led to misunderstanding.”102 Indeed, Yu reminds his readers that Qian’s refutation triggered a similar response from the U.S.-based Chinese political scientist Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權 (K.C. Hsiao, 1897–1981), who dismissed Qian’s argument that premodern Chinese political systems were not autocratic as “farfetched and forced” (qianqiang fuhui 牽強附會).103 Thus, Zhang was not the only one to criticize Qian’s claims. Compared with Xiao’s comment, however, Zhang Junmai’s allegation that Qian Mu’s research was not up to modern standards was more personal. It was not well-founded, either. The above discussion has shown that Zhang’s perception of individualsociety-state relationships and his critique of Qian Mu’s arguments are con­ sistent with the view that both Confucianism and modern democratic principles were equally emphasized in his vision of China’s political reconstruction. Indeed, he presented a different model of state-building and Sino-Western cultural integration from that of Yin Haiguang and Xu Fuguan. While Yin incorporated selected Confucian virtues into his liberalscientific model of cultural integration and Xu founded his model upon a Confucian foundation, Zhang advocated a more balanced model. He saw Confucianism as an aid to the social and cultural spheres of China’s modernization. In the political sphere, he adopted “the unity of virtue and law” as his philosophy of governance while envisioning a rights-and-duties-based relationship between the individual, society, and the state. On the whole, Zhang seems to have envisaged different but complementary functions for Confucianism and modern political thought in his model of state-building. 4

Conclusion

Zhang Junmai was one of the few émigré intellectuals who regarded moderate socialism and Confucianism as two pillars of national reconstruction. 101 Yu Yingshi 余英時, “Qian Mu yu Xinrujia 錢穆與新儒家 [Qian Mu and New Confucianism],” in Yu Yingshi 余英時, Xiandai ruxue lun 現代儒學論 [On modern Confucianism] (River Edge, N.J.: Bafang wenhua qiye gongsi, 1996), 119. 102 Ibid. 103 Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權, “Zhongguo junzhu zhengti de shizhi 中國君主政體的實質 [The substance of China’s monarchical political system],” in Xiao Gongquan, Xianzheng yu minzhu 憲政與民主 [Constitutionalism and democracy] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2006), 66.

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However, he seldom discussed the relationship between the two ideological strands apart from occasionally mentioning that the Confucian “great commonwealth” (datong 大同) ideal was indeed a socialist utopia.104 He did not write about how this datong ideal could be revitalized and realized in a modern democratic socialist state, either. This lack of explanation of the relationship between Confucianism and socialism illustrates that Zhang’s discussion of Confucianism’s role in China’s modernization was more theoretical than practical. He did not go into detail on many relevant issues. Zhang Junmai’s lack of in-depth elaboration of how Confucianism could be renovated to meet modern needs also raises the question how far he can be regarded as a “moral innovator.” He was a cultural nationalist in the sense that he resorted to traditional resources in order to meet the challenges of modernization and, as Hutchinson puts it, proposed an “alternative indigenous model of progress.”105 However, to what extent he contributed innovative ideas about the content of Chinese morality is still unknown. We cannot exclude the possibility that he had some innovative ideas in his mind, but he did not write about them. Further studies need to be done on this question. Zhang Junmai’s promotion of Confucianism in the last two decades of his life, before his death in 1969, not only tells us about his hope of rejuvenating Confucianism in modern China, but may also be seen as a means by which he expressed his Chinese identity while living overseas. While many overseas Chinese tend to show their abiding Chineseness by following traditional customs and celebrating Chinese festivals, Zhang did this in an intellectual way. It is likely that writing articles about Confucianism was a way for Zhang to maintain his sense of connection with his home country. It may also have seemed to him that continuing the discussion of Confucianism overseas would be a way of showing that Confucianism was able to continue outside China. Preserving Confucianism outside China would be of strategic importance to its sustainability in an era when schools of thought other than Marxism were marginalized on the Chinese mainland. 104 Zhang Junmai, “Guoxianyi 國憲議 [Suggestions for the national constitution],” in Zhang Junmai, Xianzheng zhi dao 憲政之道 [The way of constitutional politics] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2006), 86–87; Zhang, Shehui zhuyi sixiang yundong gaiguan, 6–7. 105 Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism, 41.

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Chapter 5

Confucian Ideals for the Chinese Nation with a Liberal Tendency: The Case of Xu Fuguan After his arrival in Taiwan in 1949, Xu Fuguan promoted Confucian political ideals with his writings. In response to the Communist domination of the Chinese mainland, Xu Fuguan decided to resist the spread of Communist influence by advocating the adoption of traditional Confucian values, reinterpreted to envisage a democratic system of government for a future China. Xu’s conception of democracy was, however, quite different from that of Yin Haiguang and Zhang Junmai. Having served in the Nationalist army until the mid-1940s, Xu was a latecomer in the field of philosophy. As discussed in Chapter 1, he began his scholarly studies with Xiong Shili, a prominent Confucian philosopher. As I will discuss in this chapter, Xu tended to interpret Western democratic and liberal concepts with extensive reference to Confucian values and ideas. This resulted in an alternative model of a democratic China unlike those of Yin Haiguang and Zhang Junmai. Xu’s model was largely based on Confucian tradition. This chapter first explores Xu’s understanding of the political foundation of an ideal modern Chinese nation through a study of his 1950s writings on Confucian political ideals. Then it examines his conception of Chinese culture and tradition in the 1960s. It also looks at his elitism in the quest for cultural advancement. Finally, it discusses Xu’s efforts to promote Confucian values in the wider world through an analysis of the 1958 manifesto on Chinese culture published by Xu and other Confucian scholars. I argue that, although both Xu Fuguan and Zhang Junmai were Confucian scholars, their models of cultural integration differed significantly from each other. While Zhang advocated “the unity of virtue and law” and envisaged a function for Western ideas of rights and duties in maintaining individual-society-state relationships, Xu thought that democracy based on dezhi was more important than the rights-and-duties-based democracy of the West. This chapter also demonstrates that, like Yin Haiguang and Zhang Junmai, Xu showed concern about the role of Chinese intellectuals. In Xu’s view, the cultural elite possessed the insight and self-consciousness for ameliorating society. Thus, he emphasized the role of the Chinese cultural elite, of which he was a member, in the rejuvenation of Chinese tradition.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_007 Kenneth Kai-chung

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In January 1958, Xu and his associates published a manifesto on Chinese cul­ture in which they attempted to establish the meaning of Chinese cul­ ture and tradition in modern China and the modern world. Through an examination of this document, I argue that Confucianism, as an ideological strand of the Chinese liberal tradition, could be and was shaped so as both to serve a cultural-nationalist agenda and to express an equally nationalist and internationalist concern for world unity. The New Confucian scholars not only saw Confucian values as essential to the building of a modern China, but also regarded them as beneficial to the cultural development of the rest of the world. 1

Xu Fuguan’s Confucian Political Ideals in the 1950s

Following his resignation from the Guomindang in 1951, Xu Fuguan seems to have come to believe that he could help China through his scholarship on Confucian studies. Alleging that the Chinese Communists on the mainland were destroying the foundation of Chinese culture—that is, renxing—through their implementation of class struggle, Xu sought to resist the spread of Communism by arguing for the compatibility of traditional Confucian values with modern liberal-democratic values. As a Confucian scholar, he attempted to interpret modern concepts such as democracy and liberty in the light of the Confucian canon. He further argued that Confucianism should still be the foundation of a modern democratic Chinese nation. Before investigating Xu Fuguan’s attempt to integrate Chinese and Western political ideals, we shall first examine his conception of liberty and democracy. Ren Jiantao argues that three beliefs are characteristic of a “Confucian liberalism” in modern China: that “the intellectual resources of liberty” (ziyou de sixiang ziyuan 自由的思想資源) are inherent in Chinese tradition, that a liberal democratic political system can be built upon Chinese tradition, and that there is vitality in Chinese tradition for adapting to liberal values.1 Ren has illustrated this “Confucian liberalism” with a case study of Xu’s thought. He argues that Xu’s thought met all the three criteria that he proposes, and that this qualifies Xu as a Confucian liberal.2 In his discussion of Xu’s belief that a liberal democratic political system can be built upon Chinese tradition, Ren particularly cites the following example. In an article published in November 1956, Xu Fuguan admitted that, 1 Ren, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang mailuo zhong de ziyou zhuyi, 22. 2 For Ren’s discussion of Xu’s thought, see Ibid., 23–39.

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in premodern China, there was no clear conception of freedom and human rights in the political sense. However, Xu continued, this did not mean that there had been no “spirit of liberalism” (ziyou zhuyi de jingshen 自由主義的精 神) in Chinese culture. He made the following comment on “the spirit of freedom” (ziyou jingshen 自由精神): In the West, the spirit of freedom first leapt in the intellectual [human] nature (zhixing 知性). In China, it first leapt in the moral [human] nature (dexing 德性). But the spirit of freedom must extend into politics and have concrete achievements in politics. Only after that can [the spirit of freedom] itself become a clear system and provide an exact and unshakable guarantee for the freedom of both the intellectual and the moral [human] nature. Of course, political freedom is not the whole of freedom. Political freedom needs the freedom of both the intellectual and, more especially, the moral [human] nature to be its roots. It must absorb the nutrition it needs from the freedom of the moral [human] nature.3 However, Ren does not elaborate on this passage in detail. Indeed, the passage suggests that, in Xu Fuguan’s view, political freedom in the Chinese case had its origins in “the spirit of freedom” embedded in dexing. Xu saw potential in “the freedom of dexing” (dexing ziyou 德性自由) for nurturing political freedom in modern China. In turn, only when political freedom developed “concretely” could “freedom of dexing and zhixing” (dexing zhixing de ziyou 德性知性的自 由) be guaranteed. In other words, Xu saw the two kinds of freedom as interdependent and mutually beneficial to each other. Xu’s discussion of “the spirit of freedom” not only vindicates Ren’s argument that Xu was a Confucian liberal, but is also crucial to portraying Xu as an adherent of democracy. Xu seems to have seen democracy as a necessary aid to tackling the threat to human nature from politics. He noted that “the greatest disasters of humankind and the greatest constraints on human nature always come from politics.”4 He thought that “the spirit of freedom” would inevitably encounter politics, and that democracy would be an effective way to put politics under humankind’s control: The spirit of freedom’s activity in dexing and zhixing inevitably bumps against politics; it inevitably requires the subordination of politics to 3 Xu, “Weisheme yao fandui ziyou zhuyi,” 287. See also Ren, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang mailuo zhong de ziyou zhuyi, 34. 4 Xu, “Weisheme yao fandui ziyou zhuyi,” 287.

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each individual. And accordingly, [politics] is also under the control of every individual’s conscience and reason. This turns politics into every individual’s tool, and does not let any individual become a tool of politics. The result of this effort, as everyone knows, is a democratic political system that takes human rights as its soul and the parliament as its framework.5 To Xu Fuguan, democracy was the key to tackling the conflict between the political reality of monarchical autocracy and the Confucian political theory of minben zhuyi 民本主義 (literally, the principle of [being] people-based). In “Zhongguo de zhidao” 中國的治道 (The way of ruling in China), published in Minzhu pinglun on 1 May 1953, he noted that Confucian political ideals constituted a kind of minben zhuyi, which recognized the ordinary people as the “protagonist of politics” (zhengzhi de zhuti 政治的主體).6 In imperial China, however, the state was ruled by autocratic monarchs, and the “source of political power” (quanyuan 權原) was in their hands, not those of the people. In reality, Xu wrote, the monarch became the “protagonist of politics.” He called this phenomenon “nature of dual protagonists” (erchong de zhutixing 二重的 主體性) because the “protagonist of politics” in reality was different from that of the prevailing political ideal.7 Below, I shall further discuss Xu’s argument that representative democracy was the key to dealing with such a phenomenon, reinstating ordinary people as the “protagonist of politics” and restoring the “source of political power” to the people. Before discussing how the adoption of democracy would solve the problem of the “nature of dual protagonists,” however, I should examine Xu Fuguan’s definition of democracy, which he gave in a number of articles published in the 1950s. As David Elstein has suggested, when Xu was elaborating his views on morality and politics, he tended to avoid any transcendent or metaphysical interpretation that Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan had used.8 If we examine Xu’s discussion of democracy and relevant concepts, it is not difficult to notice that he was targeting a general readership rather than a scholarly one. Modern democracy, he wrote, was “the subordination of the minority to the majority” (shaoshu fucong duoshu 少數服從多數) and, at the same time, “the protection 5 Ibid., 287–88. 6 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo de zhidao 中國的治道 [The way of ruling in China]” (1 May 1953), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 218, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 9 (May 1953). 7 Ibid. 8 David Elstein, Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2015), 68.

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of the minority by the majority” (duoshu baozhang shaoshu 多數保障少數).9 In other words, losers should yield to winners in democratic elections, and winners should protect the losers. Only when both conditions existed together was democracy meaningful.10 Democracy was also a political form (zhengzhi fangshi/xingshi 政治方式/形式) that could be filled with different political content (zhengzhi neirong 政治內容).11 For example, the democratic form (minzhu fangshi 民主方式) in Britain could be filled with differing political content, such as the platform of the Labor Party or that of the Conservative Party, as long as this content fell within the democratic form.12 The Communists, by contrast, did not place their own particular brand of political content within a democratic form. Naming their political platform “New Democracy” or “Democracy of the Proletariat” (wuchan jieji de minzhu 無產階級的民主), Xu claimed, the Communists had modified the political form for the sake of their own platform and marginalized other kinds of political content.13 Thus, Xu argued that Communism must be eliminated so as to guarantee fair competition between kinds of different political content.14 What kind of political content did Xu Fuguan advocate? He once wrote about democratic socialism. However, his view on this political school of thought was quite different from those of Zhang Junmai and Yin Haiguang. While Zhang continued to advocate economic equality and Yin Haiguang rejected it after 1949, Xu Fuguan adopted a pragmatic approach towards the concept. 9

10 11 12

13 14

Xu Fuguan, “Rujia zai xiuji yu zhiren shang de qubie ji qi yiyi 儒家在修己與治人上的 區別及其意義 [The difference between the Confucian concepts of self-cultivation and the governance of others and its meaning]” (16 June 1955), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 212, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 6, no. 12 (June 1955). Ibid. Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo zhengzhi wenti de liangge cengci 中國政治問題的兩個層次 [The two dimensions of China’s political problems]” (16 March 1951), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 31–33, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 18 (March 1951). Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Xu Fuguan), “Women xinlai minzhu zhuyi 我們信賴民主主 義 [We trust democracy]” (15 September 1950), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 27–28, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 6 (September 1950). For a more detailed discussion of Xu Fuguan’s thought on democracy, political form, and political content, see also Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 233–41; Lai, “Rujia chuantong yu minzhu zhengzhi,” 69–73; Lai Lisheng 賴理生, “Xu Fuguan sixiang zhi yanjiu 徐復觀思想之研 究 [A study of Xu Fuguan’s thought]” (m.a. thesis, National Chengchi University, 1988), 117–23. Shelun (Xu), “Women xinlai minzhu zhuyi,” 29. The term wuchan jieji de minzhu 無產 階級的民主 may have been an error for renmin minzhu zhuanzheng 人民民主專政 (People’s Democratic Dictatorship). Ibid.

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As Su-san Lee has suggested, Xu was supportive of economic equality and government’s intervention of the economy in the 1950s.15 It was because Taiwan was under the threat of Communism, and the Nationalist government needed to reserve certain power to regulate the island’s economy and stabilize the society. To Xu, realizing economic equality was a means to “safeguard humankind’s democracy and freedom.” He was looking forward to the reconciliation between freedom and equality, and to “safeguard equality with freedom and freedom with equality” on Taiwan.16 However, Xu Fuguan believed that free economy (ziyou jingji 自由經濟) should be promoted after the successful recovery of the Chinese mainland in the future. People should be free from all kinds of restrictions imposed by the Communists. Private enterprises should play a major role in reviving the country’s economy in a future democratic China. Government intervention will become a hindrance to democratic national reconstruction.17 In other words, Xu Fuguan did not have a keen belief in democratic socialism like Zhang Junmai did. To him, democratic socialism was simply a political doctrine that was best suitable for the Nationalist regime in crisis. Although he claimed that economic equality remained important after the elimination of the Communists, he did not explain it in detail.18 He did not elaborate the concept of free economy in depth either. He probably thought that it was too early to explore the substance of his favorite political content before the realization of Chinese democracy. Xu Fuguan’s discussion of his democratic ideals also reflects his conception of the relationship between democracy and Confucianism. As for political form, Xu Fuguan particularly appreciated “representative democracy” (weituoxing de minzhu zhengzhi 委託性的民主政治, literally, “democracy of entrusting”) because ordinary people could entrust political power to their 15

16

17 18

Li Shuzhen 李淑珍 (Su-san Lee), “Ziyou zhuyi, Xinrujia yu yijiu wuling niandai Taiwan ziyou minzhu yundong: cong Xu Fuguan de shijiao chufa 自由主義、新儒家與一九五 零年代臺灣自由民主運動：從徐復觀的視角出發 [Liberalism, New Confucianism and the liberal democratic movement in Taiwan in the 1950s: an analysis from Xu Fuguan’s perspective],” Si yu yan 思與言 [Thought and words] 49, no. 2 (June 2011): 59. Li (Lee), “Ziyou zhuyi, Xinrujia yu yijiu wuling niandai Taiwan ziyou minzhu yundong,” 58–59; Xu Fuguan, “Cong xianshi Zhong shouzhu renlei pingdeng ziyou de lixiang 從現 實中守住人類平等自由的理想 [Defending the humankind’s ideals of equality and freedom in the reality]” (1 January 1953), Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 2, 30–31, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 1 (January 1953). Li (Lee), “Ziyou zhuyi, Xinrujia yu yijiu wuling niandai Taiwan ziyou minzhu yundong,” 58–59; Xu, “Cong xianshi Zhong shouzhu renlei pingdeng ziyou de lixiang,” 28–29. Li (Lee), “Ziyou zhuyi, Xinrujia yu yijiu wuling niandai Taiwan ziyou minzhu yundong,” 58–59; Xu, “Cong xianshi Zhong shouzhu renlei pingdeng ziyou de lixiang,” 28–29.

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elected representatives so that they would be free to focus on other pursuits in life.19 Although both Xu and Zhang Junmai supported representative democracy, the former had his own distinctive understanding of the value of democracy and differed from the latter in the way in which he related democracy to the Confucian tradition. While Zhang claimed that modern liberal democratic values were the long-lost “old possession” of the Chinese people, Xu attempted to interpret features of modern democracy by drawing analogies with Confucian political concepts in traditional China, and he argued that democracy was the key to tackling the political “nature of dual protagonists” and realizing Confucian political ideals. For example, he portrayed “representative democracy” as an inversion of the premodern monarchical system. Under a representative parliamentary democratic system, Xu wrote, the “source of political power” would be transferred from the hands of premodern monarchs to the hands of ordinary people.20 “Political figures” (zhengzhi renwu 政治人 物), by whom Xu presumably meant members of parliament, would have a role equivalent to “the way of an official” (chendao 臣道) in premodern China. They could be regarded as ordinary people’s employees who would be responsible for policy-making. Ordinary people would have a role equivalent to “the way of a ruler” ( jundao 君道) in premodern China. They would give consent to proposed policies and authorize “political figures” to implement the policies on their behalf. Under this system, ordinary people would be reinstated as the “protagonist of politics.” Political leaders would not be able to abuse their power because they would be responsible to ordinary people and subject to criticism from members of parliament. In Xu’s view, the traditional “virtues of a ruler” ( junde 君德), such as “correcting one’s own mistakes” and “accepting criticism,” would be “objectivized” (keguanhua 客觀化) as parliamentary politics and the freedoms of speech and assembly.21 Even so, he did not explain in detail how this could be achieved, nor did he mention whether there would be competition between political parties. While drawing analogies between features of modern representative democracy and traditional Confucian political concepts, Xu Fuguan also noted that modern democracy had a very different theoretical foundation from that 19 20 21

Xu Fuguan, “Zhengzhi yu rensheng 政治與人生 [Politics and life]” (16 January 1953), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 99, originally published in Rensheng 人生 [Human life] 4, no. 6 (January 1953). Xu, “Zhongguo de zhidao,” 241. See also Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 251. Ibid., 241–42. For more detailed discussion of Xu’s solution to the political “nature of dual protagonists,” see Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 247–57; He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 139–40; Xiao, Chuantong Zhongguo yu ziyou linian, 134–38; Lai, “Rujia chuantong yu minzhu zhengzhi,” 50–53; Lai, “Xu Fuguan sixiang zhi yanjiu,” 114–117.

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of Confucian political philosophy. The Chinese democracy of the future, as he imagined it, should be founded upon a different theoretical basis from that of its Western counterpart. He claimed that the emergence of modern liberal democracy in the West had begun with “consciousness of the self” (wo de zijue 我的自覺), which he described as “the spiritual condition of liberal life” (ziyou zhuyi de shenghuo di jingshen zhuangtai 自由主義的生活底精神狀態).22 Xu defined “consciousness of the self” as realization, on the part of subjects and in opposition to their ruler, of “their own independent and autonomous right to survival.”23 Such a right was implicit in “the natural law that all men are born free and equal” and “the social contract rooted in mutual agreement.”24 Accompanying the right was the individual’s duty to serve and respect others.25 Xu Fuguan argued that Western liberal democracy had originated from the struggle for individual freedom and rights, and that the distinction between different kinds of rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, was clear-cut.26 Edmund S.K. Fung has noted that some modern Chinese intellectuals tended to “identify freedom with democracy, human rights, constitutionalism, and the rule of law.”27 Xu may well have been one of these intellectuals. While acknowledging that democracy and the rule of law were inseparable, Xu noted that Chinese democracy of the future should also be based upon respect for humankind and trust in renxing, on both of which traditional Chinese society was founded.28 Renxing is usually translated as “human nature.” In Xu’s view, “ren 仁 (benevolence) and renxing are one.” Hence, both concepts were two sides of the same coin. Only when ren took root in renxing could it have a solid foundation.29 According to Xu, respect for humankind and trust in renxing could be realized in dezhi zhuyi 德治主義, or simply dezhi, the doctrine 22 Xu Fuguan, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin 儒家政治思想的構 造及其轉進 [The structure and transformation of Confucian political thought]” (16 December 1951), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 53, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 1 (December 1951); Xu, “Weisheme yao fandui ziyou zhuyi,” 285. 23 Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 53. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Edmund S.K. Fung, “The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural Conceptions and Dual Responsibilities,” Modern China 32, no. 4 (October 2006): 466. 28 Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 49, 53. 29 Xu Fuguan, “Fuxing yu fugu 復性與復古 [Restoring nature and restoring antiquity]” (1 September 1950), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan wencun 徐復觀文存 [Essays of Xu Fuguan] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), 130–31, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 5 (September 1950).

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of the rule of virtue. He called dezhi “the highest principle of Confucian political thought.”30 Under dezhi, the ruler should first try his best to be virtuous so as to encourage everyone else to be virtuous.31 The relationship between the ruler (zhizhe 治者) and the ruled (beizhizhe 被治者) should be based on virtue rather than a struggle for power.32 In Xu’s view, under dezhi, interpersonal relationships were maintained by the virtue embedded in everyone’s heart.33 While David Elstein suggests that Xu considered the sole reliance on law as inadequate for good government, I further argue that Xu took the position that dezhi was more crucial than the rights-and-duties based democracy of the West for realizing the Chinese democracy of the future.34 He argued that: Relationships maintained by power and the law are basically external. External relationships have to be grounded in internal relationships; otherwise they cannot be firmly established, and renxing cannot develop freely. Dezhi is the establishment of internal interpersonal relationships via everyone’s de. From the Confucian perspective, internal relationships are the only natural and reasonable form of [interpersonal] relationships.35 Xu Fuguan’s perception of the difference between the Confucian political and Western democratic theories was shared by fellow New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi. Mou Zongsan proposed a similar analysis of Western political culture. He thought that consciousness of individuality (gexing de zijue 個性的自覺) had been aroused as a by-product of class conflict in the West.36 The Western political form that safeguarded individuality along with liberty, equality, and human rights was just the “outward extension of reason” (lixing zhi waiyan 理性之外延). Such an “outward extension of reason” had contributed to the formation of democracy, the law, and the social contract. But the law and the social contract in turn imposed restrictions, passivity, 30

Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 49. See also Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 169. 31 Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 173. 32 Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 49. 33 Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 50. For a more detailed analysis of Xu Fuguan’s thought on dezhi, see Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 170–77; He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 137–48; Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 242–46. 34 Elstein, Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, 73; Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 53–54. 35 Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 50. 36 Weng, “Ziyou zhuyi zhe yu dangdai xinrujia zhengzhi lunshu zhi bijiao,” 109–110.

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and inflexibility on the people.37 Dezhi, by contrast, was realized through the “inner content of reason” (lixing zhi neirong 理性的內容), under the influence of which the ruler respected life, safeguarded individuality, governed according to the people’s will, and imposed no restrictions on the people.38 Tang Junyi pointed out that Westerners had struggled for their freedom because of various restrictions imposed by the Church and the feudal system. In China, however, instances of repression such as “burning of books and burying of scholars” ( fenshu kengru 焚書坑儒) and “literary inquisition” (wenziyu 文字獄) had occurred in only a few dynasties.39 According to Tang, traditional Chinese society was supported by the belief in ren and the presence of renxin 仁心 (benevolent heart) within individuals. Ren and renxin contributed to individuals’ affection and respect for others.40 Such a belief in ren, Tang asserted, was “the last and only basis of all [kinds of] democratic spirit” (yiqie minzhu jingshen zhi zuihou weiyi genju 一切民主精神之最後唯一根據), including both the future Chinese democracy which would be based on trust in renxing and Western democracy which had originated from the struggle for individual rights.41 It appears that New Confucians such as Xu, Mou, and Tang generally agreed that Western concepts of rights and duty were basically external and could hardly hold human relations together. Therefore, the Confucian conception of interpersonal relationship based on de and renxing had the potential to make good the shortcomings of rights-and-duties based democracy. Although Xu Fuguan and his fellow New Confucians agreed that Confucianstyle dezhi could overcome the weaknesses of reliance on law and social contract, they did not claim that Western liberal democracy had no meaning for China or that it should not be adopted. Xu argued that there was something in the Western democratic tradition from which China could learn. Whereas democracy in the West had begun with “the self-consciousness of the individual” 37

Yan Binggang 颜炳罡, Zhenghe yu chongzhu: Dangdai daru Mou Zongsan xiansheng sixiang yanjiu 整合與重鑄：當代大儒牟宗三先生思想研究 [Integration and remolding: a study of the thought of Mr. Mou Zongsan, the present-day Confucian] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1995), 218. 38 Ibid., 216. 39 He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 88–89; see also Tang Junyi, “Yu qingnian tan Zhongguo wenhua 與青年談中國文化 [Discussing Chinese culture with youth],” in Tang Junyi, Qingnian yu xuewen 青年與學問 [Youth and knowledge] (Taipei, Sanmin, 1973), 83, originally published in Rensheng 4 no. 3 (December 1952). 40 Tang Junyi, “Zhong Xi shehui renwen yu minzhu jingshen 中西社會人文與民主 精神 [The humanities and the democratic spirit in Chinese and Western societies]” (February 1953), in Tang Junyi, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建 [The reconstruction of the spirit of the humanities] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1978), 412. 41 Ibid.

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(geti zijue 個體自覺), a notion similar to Mou’s gexing de zijue, Xu thought (as did Tang) that the Chinese had not discovered this geti zijue during the past 2500 years. Xu even asserted that it was because of the lack of geti zijue that postimperial China had continued to be ruled by despots such as Yuan Shikai and Mao Zedong.42 Xu Fuguan argued that Chinese citizens should have their own geti zijue. But the Chinese geti zijue should be different from the Western geti zijue. While geti zijue in the West was consciousness of one’s rights to liberty and equality, the Chinese geti zijue should be moral self-consciousness (daode de zijue 道 德的自覺).43 Through such moral zijue, individuals would be integrated into the community (qunti 群體).44 With the discovery of moral zijue in China, people would devote themselves to society and realize the mutual respect and trust connoted by dezhi. Future Chinese democracy, laying its foundation on dezhi, would have a moral emphasis. Xu also argued that dezhi was compatible with modern liberal democracy in three ways. First, since dezhi emphasized “respect for renxing” (zunzhong renxing 尊重人性), it also emphasized wuwei 無為 (non-action), he claimed.45 From the fact that he linked “respect for renxing” with wuwei, one may interpret “respect for renxing” as the recognition of the inherent, good nature of humankind and wuwei as the absence of intervention in the free development of this good nature. Thus, Xu drew an analogy between this kind of wuwei and the restriction of government power under modern democracy.46 Second, dezhi required political leaders to be indifferent to political power. Xu claimed George Washington as an exemplar from the democratic West of such indifference: he had refused to serve a third term as the American president because he wanted democracy to take root in the United States.47 From Xu’s example of George Washington, it seems that Xu probably perceived the spread of democratic ideas as an effective way to encourage political leaders to be indifferent to power, a virtue that was long-lost in China after the legendary Yao and Shun. Third, there was supposed to be no suppression of dissident voices under dezhi because the latter emphasized “respect for renxing.” The same was true of modern democratic states that guaranteed citizens’ basic human 42 43 44 45 46 47

Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 57–58. Ibid., 58. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. He Xinquan and Li Weiwu have provided an in-depth discussion of Xu Fuguan’s view on the relationship between dezhi and government power, see He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, 137–43; Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 242–45. Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” 58–59.

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rights and safeguarded their freedom of speech.48 The goal of realizing dezhi in modern democracy seems to have become a matter of consensus among New Confucians. As Tang Junyi put it, “there was a political ideal of the rule of virtue, rites, and humanity in ancient China, and we should now realize it with democracy founded on the rule of law.”49 Is there any relationship between Xu Fuguan’s emphasis on dezhi and moral zijue and his attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s? Since he claimed that interpersonal relationships had to be maintained by the virtue embedded in one’s heart and that one should acquire moral self-consciousness, it is likely that he hoped to help Chiang rediscover his virtue and to encourage his aspiration for democracy by stimulating his moral self-consciousness. He may have wanted to “rinse the dregs” out of Chiang’s heart, as shown in his discussion of what Lu Zhi 陸贄 (754–805) had done for Emperor Dezong of Tang.50 The way to do so was probably to advise Chiang about the essential qualities of a good leader in a mild and indirect tone. Xu may have considered that severe and direct criticism was too antagonistic for the purpose. From Xu Fuguan’s perspective, China had its advantages over the West in terms of political theory, but it was far from perfect. There was still much to learn from Western democratic systems. It seems that Xu was proposing an integration of Confucian and Western political theories. Xu’s model of integration, however, was different from that of Zhang Junmai. Unlike Zhang, Xu did not attribute the origins of modern democratic values to the Confucian tradition. Instead, he drew extensive analogies between modern democratic concepts and traditional Confucian concepts and argued that a democratic system of government could actually be built upon Confucian political ideals. In his model, future Chinese democracy would be founded upon Confucian concepts such as renxing and dezhi, which were to be realized in a modern framework—representative government. Both Xu and Zhang aimed at realizing their political ideals through parliamentary democracy, but their theoretical foundations were very different. Hence, Xu Fuguan’s model can be seen as a third model of Sino-Western cultural integration within the context of the liberal tradition of Chinese émigré intellectuals. Moreover, Xu noted that such an integration would be applicable to both Chinese and Western society and contribute to the formation of a “world culture” (shijie wenhua 世界文化), 48 Ibid., 59. 49 Tang Junyi, “Zhengzhi ji guojia yu daode lixing 政治及國家與道德理性 [Politics, nation, and moral reason],” in Tang Junyi, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing (shang) 文化意 識與道德理性 (上) [Cultural consciousness and moral reason (part I)] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1978), 263. 50 Xu, “Zhongguo de zhidao,” 217.

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which would be shared by most of the nations of the world.51 Xu seems to have believed that China had its own contribution to make to the world’s continuing democratic and cultural development.52 The advantages of the Chinese political tradition had been emphasized by some Chinese intellectuals from the last decades of the Qing period onwards. Authors such as Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927), Liang Qichao, Zhang Jian 張謇 (1853–1926) and Liang Shuming had suggested the existence of democratic elements in the Confucian scriptures and pointed out the shortcomings of Western civilization.53 Xu Fuguan and his fellow New Confucians largely continued their predecessors’ efforts to establish the value of Confucianism in modern China. Why, then, was Xu’s thought significant? The Chinese mainland was now under Communist rule. Confucian scholars who remained in the mainland, such as Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili, were severely persecuted during the 1950s and 1960s.54 In such circumstances, the idea of integrating the strong points of Confucian and Western political philosophy found expression only in the writings of New Confucian émigrés such as Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan. These three New Confucian scholars nurtured dozens of students who revived Confucian studies and continued to search for ways of ameliorating Chinese society in the late twentieth century. Xu Fuguan was, therefore, a key figure in the articulation of Confucian democracy in the Cold War era.

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Xu Fuguan, “Wenhua de Zhong yu Xi: da youren shu (2) 文化的中與西：答友人書(二) [Culture in Chinese and Western context: a reply to a friend (2)]” (16 September 1952), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 90, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 19 (September 1952). 52 Xu Fuguan, “Rujia zhi jiben xingge ji qi xianding yu xinsheng 儒家之基本性格及其限 定與新生 [Confucianism’s basic character, delimitation and rebirth]” (1 May 1952), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 92, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 10 (May 1952). 53 Wang Juntao 王軍濤, “Confucian Democrats in Chinese History,” in Confucianism for the Modern World, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 72–80; Yan Binggang 顏炳罡, Dangdai xinruxue yinlun 當代新 儒學引論 [Introduction to contemporary New Confucianism] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1998), 8; K.C. Hsiao (Xiao Gongqian 蕭公權), A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 86; Alitto, The Last Confucian, 90–96. 54 Alitto, The Last Confucian, 324–30; Chi-shing Chak, “The Contemporary Neo-Confucian Rehabilitation: Xiong Shili and His Moral Metaphysics” (PhD diss.: University of California, Berkeley, 1990), 392.

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Xu Fuguan’s Cultural Ideals in the Late 1950s and 1960s

While Xu Fuguan focused on the political aspects of an ideal Chinese nation in the first half of the 1950s, he began to concentrate on the intellectual sphere after he became disillusioned and frustrated with Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership in the late 1950s. He seems to have thought that what he could now do for China’s future was to preserve Chinese tradition and culture in nonCommunist Chinese territories and overseas Chinese communities. Thus, from the late 1950s on, he was mainly concerned about the prospects for Chinese culture and tradition and the leading role of intellectuals in rejuvenating Chinese civilization. Adopting a hierarchical view on culture and tradition, Xu thought that intellectuals belonged to a more progressive culture than that of the grassroots people and that some of them were capable of creating a more sophisticated tradition than that of the ordinary people. In Xu’s view, the cultural elite should play an important role in the rejuvenation of a nation’s culture and tradition. Like Yin Haiguang, he had high hopes of Chinese intellectuals leading China’s state-building process. Such concern about the role of Chinese intellectuals was common among Chinese émigré liberals in the 1950s and 1960s. While Xu Fuguan and his fellow New Confucians were free to promote their school of thought in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1950s, they were also involved in a series of debates with the Taiwan-based anti-traditionalist liberals led by Yin Haiguang over Chinese culture. This not only turned the friendship between Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang into rivalry but also led to hostility between the New Confucians and the liberals. Although there had been ongoing debates since the early 1950s, Xu Fuguan recalled that it was an editorial published in Ziyou Zhongguo in 1957 that signified the “formal breakup” (zhengshi de juelie 正式的決裂) between the two groups of intellectuals.55 On 5  May 1957, Yin Haiguang published an editorial in Ziyou Zhongguo, in which he branded the New Confucian scholars as “restorationists” ( fugu zhuyizhe 復古主義者).56 He criticized them for indulging in fantasies about antiquity and asserted that the promotion of tradition in modern China was “a road to death” (silu yitiao 死路一條).57 Xu Fuguan responded by condemning the Ziyou Zhongguo editors as “cultural ruffians” (wenhua baotu 文化暴徒).58 55

Xu Fuguan, “Dui Yin Haiguang xiansheng de yinian 對殷海光先生的憶念 [My recollection of Mr. Yin Haiguang]” (15 February 1970), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen: Yi wangshi, 175. 56 Shelun (Yin), “Chongzheng wusi jingshen,” 456. 57 Ibid., 458–61. 58 Li Shi 李實 (Xu Fuguan), “Lishi wenhua yu minzhu ziyou: duiyu ruma women zhe de dafu 歷史文化與自由民主：對於辱罵我們者的答覆 [History, culture, and liberal

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In the next few years, this “formal break-up” and the intensification of the debate impelled Xu to write about the concepts of culture and tradition and their relevance to the development of a nation. In the early 1960s, Xu Fuguan published a number of articles about the relationship between culture, tradition, and the Chinese nation.59 He argued that both the culture and the tradition of every civilization were stratified because hierarchy (cengjixing 層級性) existed in every culture and tradition. According to Xu, Hierarchy refers to the various different cross-sections in social life within the same culture. Distances between these cross-sections are great. Within these great distances, some cross-sections are contradictory to each other, while some cross-sections are in many ways subtly threaded with each other.60 According to Xu, “culture is a kind of self-consciousness on the part of human nature towards life, a kind of attitude (value judgment) towards life that is generated from self-consciousness.”61 Xu roughly divided Chinese culture, regardless of period, into two cross-sections, namely upper-class culture (gaoceng wenhua 高層文化) and grassroots culture ( jiceng wenhua 基層文化). Upper-class culture was the culture pursued by a small number of intellectuals. These intellectuals, he claimed, met the challenges of a new era by pursuing the latest knowledge and freeing themselves from traditional restrictions. They took the lead in embracing the new era and formed the upper-class culture of the nation. Thus, the upper-class culture was progressive (qianjin 前進) and put democracy: a reply to those who have condemned us]” (16 May 1957), in Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 525, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 8, no. 10 (May 1957). See also Li, Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu, 135. 59 The following overview of Xu Fuguan’s cultural ideals is provided to illustrate the cultural conservative strand of his thought. For a more philosophical discussion on Xu’s view on tradition and culture, see Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 123–44; Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 43–45; Lai Weiliang 賴威良, “Rujia chuantong yu minzhu zhengzhi: yi Xu Fuguan sixiang de quanshi weili 儒家傳統與民主政治：以徐復觀思想的 詮釋為例 [Confucian tradition and democracy: an interpretative study of Xu Fuguan’s thought]” (m.a. thesis, National Central University, 1995), 6–25. This overview is based on my own reading of Xu’s writings and Li, Xie and Lai’s publication. 60 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo wenhua de cengjixing 中國文化的層級性 [The hierarchical nature of Chinese culture]” (22 September 1962), in Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui 徐復觀文錄選粹 [Selected essays of Xu Fuguan], ed. Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980), 118, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 22 September 1962. 61 Xu, “Rujia zhi jiben xingge ji qi xianding yu xinsheng,” 45.

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an emphasis on freedom. Grassroots culture was the culture of the common people. It was conservative (baoshou 保守) and put an emphasis on regularity (guilu 規律). Xu argued that the two cultures were obviously in conflict with each other. For the sake of a stable and progressive nation, the upper-class and grassroots cultures must be harmonized.62 The key to harmonizing the two conflicting cultures was tradition (chuantong 傳統), Xu noted. In the following passage, he explained why “tradition” could be rendered as chuantong: The term chuantong was probably translated from the English word “tradition.” The English word “tradition” comes from the Latin word “traditio.” “Traditio” comes from “tradere,” which means “to transfer,” or to pass an object from one person to another. Thus, what we mean by chuantong is the lifestyle and concepts of a group or a race transmitted from generation to generation. In terms of time, because the lifestyle and concepts are transmitted from generation to generation, they have their tongxuxing 統緒性 (continuity). In terms of space, because they pertain to a particular group, they have their tongyixing 統一性 (unity). I think it is very appropriate to render “tradition” as chuantong.63 After clarifying that tradition was characterized by both continuity and unity, Xu Fuguan argued that, as with culture, there were two levels of tradition. Low-level tradition (diciyuan chuantong 低次元傳統) comprised “all kinds of folkways and customs.” This level of tradition was “less spiritual and mostly found expression in concrete facts and phenomena.” It was “passive,” “dormant,” “conservative,” and “lacking in self-consciousness.” It was also something to which “the ordinary people had recourse every day without knowing it.” Therefore, low-level tradition was incapable of recognizing its own backwardness and lacked the ability to improve itself. Xu suggested that low-level

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Xu Fuguan, “Chuantong yu wenhua 傳統與文化 [Tradition and culture]” (8 April 1962), in Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, 98–99, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 8 April 1962. See also Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 136–44; Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 43–45. Xu Fuguan, “Lun chuantong 論傳統 [On tradition]” (March 1962), in Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, 107, originally published in Dongfeng 東風 [Easterly wind] 2, no. 6 (March 1962). The same definition also appears in Xu Fuguan, “Sheme shi chuantong? 什麼是傳統？ [What is tradition?]” (1 April 1962), in Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, ed. Li and Li, vol. 1, 168, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 1 April 1962.

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tradition corresponded to grassroots culture.64 According to Xu, high-level tradition (gaociyuan chuantong 高次元傳統), through the concrete facts and phenomena of low-level tradition, discovers the original spirit and purpose hiding behind them. It has usually been created by the religion-founders, sages, great artists, and great thinkers of a people. It exists spiritually. Invisible and inaudible, it can be rediscovered only through self-examination and self-consciousness. Following such a rediscovery, high-level tradition will be critical of lowlevel tradition. In its criticism, high-level tradition will naturally connect the past, the present, and the future and reflect on them at the same time. All the criticism will definitely be targeted at and based on the age, and never depart from criticism of the times.65 While low-level tradition corresponded to grassroots culture, high-level tradition did not correspond to upper-class culture. Citing a study by the Japanese philosopher Mutai Risaku 務台理作 (1890–1974), Xu Fuguan suggested that high-level tradition belonged neither to grassroots nor to upper-class culture.66 It synthesized the two cultures from within, so as to maintain the harmony and unity of a national culture. He explained that the “self-consciousness of highlevel tradition” (gaociyuan chuantong de zijue 高次元傳統的自覺) referred to awareness of the self’s relationship with the exterior world so that the individual could be connected with society, the nation, with the world, and the present with the past and the future.67 Through such connection and the spirit of “the past and the present existing together” (gujin tongzai 古今同在), people would think carefully about what they really needed in the wider world, and even what the direction of humankind’s development should be.68 They would also be critical of both grassroots and upper-class culture. As a result, 64 Xu, “Lun chuantong,” 110. 65 Ibid. 66 For Mutai Risaku’s article, see Mutai Lizuo 務台理作 [Mutai Risaku], “Lishi zhexue zhong de chuantong wenti 歷史哲學中的傳統問題 [The question of tradition in historical philosophy],” trans. Xu Fuguan, in Xu Fuguan, Lunzhan yu yishu 論戰與譯述 [Scholarly battles and translated pieces] (Taipei: Zhiwen chubanshe, 1982), 190–200, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 7 (April 1953). 67 Xu, “Chuantong yu wenhua,” 98–99. 68 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo wenhua fuxing de ruogan guannian wenti 中國文化復興的若干 觀念問題 [Some conceptual problems on Chinese cultural revival]” (1 January 1967), in Xu, Xu Fuguan wencun, 180, originally published in Chuban yuekan 出版月刊 [Publication monthly] 2, no. 8 (January 1967).

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backward elements in grassroots culture and extreme elements in upper-class culture would be weeded out, and a new tradition would be formed.69 “Self-consciousness of high-level tradition” was also relevant to the “sense of anxiety over future uncertainties” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識), a concept suggested by Xu Fuguan in the 1960s.70 In Zhongguo renxinglun shi 中國人性論 史 (History of the discourse on human nature in China), published in 1963, Xu argued that youhuan yishi originated from the ancient Zhou dynasty (11th century bc–256 bc). After their conquest of the Shang people, the Zhou leaders, instead of indulging themselves in celebration of their victory, are said to have reflected upon the downfall of the Xia (21st century bc–17th century bc) and Shang (17th century bc–11th century bc) dynasties and hoped to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. Xu claimed that this was the formation of youhuan yishi in China because, having learned a lesson from the downfall of the two dynasties, the Chinese began to be aware that one’s behavior and attitude played a crucial role in one’s success. They also began to have a sense of responsibility for their own acts.71 In other words, youhuan yishi was a matter of anxiety about the uncertainties of the future and taking responsibility to work for a better future. It seems that, in Xu Fuguan’s philosophical framework, youhuan yishi was one of the factors contributing to the emergence of the “self-consciousness of highlevel tradition,” although he did not write about this explicitly. The connection between the two concepts, as I interpret it, may have been as follows. When the cultural elite were anxious about their nation’s future, some of them would think about how to prepare for possible future adversities and try their best to improve their nation so as to minimize the impact of any potential crises. This would help them attain “the self-consciousness of high-level tradition.” 69

Xu, “Chuantong yu wenhua,” 99–100. For an alternative discussion of Xu’s view on highlevel and low-level traditions, see Li, Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan, 126–28; Xie, Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi, 43–45; Lai, “Rujia chuantong yu minzhu zhengzhi,” 6–25; Zheng, “Chuantong de duanlie yu yanxu,” 97–98. 70 An alternative translation is Metzger’s “sense of anxious concern over the troubles of the world.” See Metzger, Escape from Predicament, 296. 71 Xu, Zhongguo renxinglun shi, 32. For detailed analyzes of Xu Fuguan’s concept of youhuan yishi, see Huang Junjie, Dong Ya ruxue shiyu zhong de Xu Fuguan ji qi sixiang 東亞儒學 視域中的徐復觀及其思想 [Xu Fuguan and his thought within East Asia’s Confucian horizons] (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2009), 186–94; Liu, Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal, 51–55; Xiao, Chuantong Zhongguo yu ziyou linian, 115–17; Ruoshui 若水, “Dangdai xinrujia Xu Fuguan ‘youhuan yishi’ tanwei 當代新儒家徐復觀 「憂患意識」探微 [A study of the contemporary New Confucian Xu Fuguan’s ‘sense of anxiety’],” Shehui kexue jikan 社會科學輯刊 [Journal of social science], no. 122 (1999): 18–23.

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The Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland after 1949 was definitely a national crisis in the eyes of Xu Fuguan. It is likely that he wanted to bring his fellow émigré intellectuals’ attention to the quest for rescuing China by arousing their youhuan yishi so that they would think about how to contribute to this quest. Indeed, Xu had high hopes for Chinese intellectuals and attributed to them a leading role in historical development and the advancement of Chinese culture and tradition. An intellectual, according to Xu, should defend his own rights when he faced oppression. He should also fulfill his duty to society, which, as the Northern Song (960–1127) politician Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052) said in his famous motto, was to “be the first to worry about the worries of the world, the last to take pleasure in its pleasures.”72 Xu further argued that intellectuals should influence politics with their own knowledge and integrity, and struggle for the realization of democracy in China.73 He also asserted that the cultural elite were capable of promoting the welfare of their fellow countrymen and even humankind: Cultural workers regard what they have said and created as an ideal for humankind, the state, or the race, and hope that everyone will pursue this ideal together. The starting point of these cultural workers is of course their malaise and dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs; however, they have broken through the malaise and dissatisfaction conceptually and found their own through road towards ease and satisfaction.74 This passage appears in an article entitled “Yishu yu zhengzhi” 藝術與政治 (Fine arts and politics), published in September 1961. “Cultural workers,” in the context of the article, may have meant artists. But Xu’s use of “cultural workers” instead of “artists” may imply that he was referring to a wider spectrum of intellectuals, including those who engaged in cultural activities, as he was 72 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de zeren 中國知識份子的責任 [Responsibilities of Chinese intellectuals]” (December 1968), in Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, ed. Xiao, 214, originally published in Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [University magazine], no. 12 (December 1968). The translation of Fan’s motto is from Gloria Davies, Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 17. 73 Xu Fuguan, “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de lishi xingge ji qi lishi de mingyun 中國知識份子 的歷史性格及其歷史的命運 [The historical personality of Chinese intellectuals and their historical destiny]” (16 April 1954), in Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 194, originally published in Minzhu pinglun 5, no. 8 (April 1954). 74 Xu Fuguan, “Yishu yu zhengzhi 藝術與政治 [Fine arts and politics]” (8 September 1961), in Xu, Xu Fuguan wencun, 218–19, originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 8 September 1961.

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illustrating the influence of culture on politics.75 It seems that, for Xu, “cultural workers” were creators of high-level tradition and had the potential to play a leading role in rejuvenating Chinese culture and tradition. The above discussion demonstrates Xu Fuguan’s elitist view on the advancement of society. He took the view that grassroots culture and low-level tradition of the ordinary people lacked dynamics and were incapable of bringing about changes to society. The key to realizing societal changes lay in the cultural elite. Only the cultural elite possessed the necessary knowledge and foresight to envisage what adversities might lie ahead in the future and what their nation should do in response to these possible adversities. Xu’s perception of the role of “cultural workers” was particularly significant at a time when the political dominance of authoritarian regimes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait prevented any possible democratization in Chinese territory. He may have drawn inspiration and a sense of mission for himself and his fellow émigrés from his vision of the “cultural worker’s” role. To him, the rejuvenation of Chinese culture and tradition seemed to be a more achievable goal. To this end, he jointly issued a manifesto on Chinese culture with several New Confucian scholars in 1958. 3

The 1958 Joint Manifesto on Chinese Culture

Xu Fuguan very likely regarded himself as a member of the cultural elite that would transform the Chinese nation and even contribute to the world. He participated in the preparation of a Confucian joint manifesto on Chinese culture published in early 1958. To a certain extent, this manifesto reflects the New Confucians’ cultural nationalism and shows that there was a consensus among Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and some of their New Confucian fellows about the value of Chinese culture in the modern world. The content of the manifesto suggests that the New Confucians were concerned about more than their own nation. While their attempt to establish the contribution of Chinese traditional values to the development of democracy in modern China reflects their cultural nationalism, their appeal to the West to learn from Chinese wisdom and their quest for world unity can be regarded as the internationalist dimension of New Confucianism. The tone of certain sections in the manifesto also suggests that the four signatories, namely Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and Mou Zongsan, were critical of some Western Sinologists and may have negatively generalized about Western 75 Ibid.

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scholarly approaches to studying China. These characteristics of the manifesto all broaden our understanding of the Confucian facet of the Chinese liberal tradition after 1949. Models of Sino-Western integration that did not one-sidedly privilege the West were not new in the late 1950s. In fact, several Republican-era Chinese intellectuals, such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1881–1973), and New Confucian scholars, such as Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and He Lin 賀 麟 (1902–1992), had already discussed the possibilities of cultural integration between China and the West and proposed different theories for the purpose.76 The discussion was continued by the émigré New Confucian scholars of the 1950s, such as Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan. In 1957, these scholars had the idea of publishing a manifesto on Chinese culture so as to clarify their perspective on the issue. This idea was initiated by Tang Junyi and Zhang Junmai. In February 1957, Tang met Zhang while travelling in the United States. They decided to publish a manifesto in order to correct Westerners’ misconceptions about Chinese culture and tradition. Subsequently, in a letter to Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan on 7 March 1957, Tang wrote about his meeting with Zhang and mentioned that “Westerners who study China all talk nonsense.”77 Xu and Mou soon agreed to assist in the preparation of the manifesto.78 The manifesto was then drafted by Tang and reviewed by Xu, Mou, and Zhang.79 Concerning the language of publication, according to the correspondence between Zhang and Tang in May 1957, Zhang insisted at first that the manifesto should be published in English in an American newspaper.80 This was because he wanted to remind Western readers 76 For relevant discussion and theories of Sino-Western cultural integration in the Republican era, see Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity, 63–93. 77 Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, “‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan zhi caoni ji kanxing jingguo biannian yanjiu 〈中國文化與世界〉宣言之草擬及刊行經過編年研究 [A chronological study of the drafting and publication of the manifesto on “Chinese culture and the world”],” in Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie: Zhongguo wenhua xuanyan wushi zhounian jinian lunwenji 中國文化與世界：中國文化宣言五十週年紀念論文集 [Chinese culture and the world: collected essays in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the manifesto on Chinese culture], ed. Li Ruiquan 李瑞全 and Yang Zuhan 楊祖漢 (Zhongli, Taiwan: Zhongyang daxue wenxueyuan ruxue yanjiu zhongxin, 2009), 71–73. 78 Ibid., 74–76. 79 Ibid., 80–90. 80 Letter from Zhang Junmai to Tang Junyi, 7 May 1957, in “The Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan.” For Zhang Junmai’s role in preparing the manifesto, see Jiang Rixin 江 日新, “Zhang Junmai yu ‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan: qi xiangfa ji suqiu 張君 勱與「中國文化與世界」宣言：其想法及訴求 [Zhang Junmai and the manifesto on

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that they had long ignored the Chinese perspective on Chinese culture.81 He was also of the opinion that many Chinese scholars who were based in the United States treated the study of Chinese culture as a kind of “antiquarianism” (gudong yanjiu 古董研究).82 He wanted to correct what he saw as the misconceptions of both Westerners and expatriate Chinese scholars about the value of Chinese culture.83 When Xu Fuguan reviewed Tang Junyi’s draft of the manifesto, the two scholars had some disagreements about its final version on two points. First, Xu wanted the manifesto to be more explicit in conveying the message that democratic principles were rooted in the spirit of Chinese culture and that democracy must be encouraged with these principles. Second, Xu did not agree with Tang’s attachment of religion to Chinese culture and regarded them as two separate spheres. This was indeed contradictory to Tang’s belief that Confucianism had a religious dimension. Tang accepted the first suggestion but insisted to emphasize the religious aspects of Chinese culture. As we can see, Tang was the main drafter of the manifesto, and Xu’s suggestions were not always respected.84 Nevertheless, the four signatories soon found that they had no time to translate the drafted Chinese manifesto into English. They decided to publish the Chinese version first.85 On 1 January 1958, a manifesto entitled “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan” 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言 (A manifesto to the people of the world on Chinese culture) was published in both Minzhu pinglun and Zaisheng.86 In May 1958, the manifesto was first abridged and translated into English by the Sinologist Robert P. Kramers (1920–2002) and published in Ching Feng, a Hong Kong-based Christian periodical on

‘Chinese culture and the world’: his ideas and demands],” in Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, ed. Li and Yang, 43–63. 81 Letter from Zhang Junmai to Tang Junyi, 7 May 1957, in “The Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan.” 82 Letter from Zhang Junmai to Tang Junyi, 13 May 1957, in “The Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan.” 83 Letter from Zhang Junmai to Tang Junyi, 7 May 1957, in “The Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan.” 84 Jesús Solé-Farràs, New Confucianism in Twenty-first Century China: The Construction of a Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2014), 177. 85 Huang, “‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan zhi caoni ji kanxing jingguo biannian yanjiu,” 93–96. 86 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 2–21; Zaisheng, no. 366 (January 1958): 2–39.

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Chinese religion and culture.87 A complete translation of the manifesto was published in Chinese Culture, a Taiwan-based periodical, in October 1960.88 In this 40,000-character declaration, Xu Fuguan and his fellow New Con­ fucians clarified their common understanding of various aspects of Chinese culture and philosophy. The manifesto is divided into twelve sections, each of which examines a specific aspect of Chinese culture: 1 explains why the authors published it. 2 examines the shortcomings of Westerners’ methodologies in conducting research in Sinology. 3 affirms the “spiritual life” ( jingshen shengming 精神生命) of Chinese history and culture. 4 discusses the place of Chinese philosophical thought in Chinese culture and the differences between Chinese and Western cultures. 5 looks at morality and ethics (daode lunli 道德倫理) and religious spirit (zongjiao jingshen 宗教精神) in Chinese culture. 6 discusses the meaning of the Confucian “learning of the mind and the nature” (xin xing zhi xue 心性之學).89 7 examines why Chinese history and culture were so durable. 8 looks at the relationship between science and the development of Chinese culture. 9 discusses the prospects of Chinese culture and the building of a democratic nation. 10 outlines the authors’ understanding of modern Chinese political history. 11 discusses what the West should learn from Chinese wisdom. 12 concludes the manifesto by restating the authors’ appeal for the future unity of humankind. On the whole, the first half of the manifesto is a general introduction to Chinese culture from the perspective of the New Confucian scholars, while the second half is the signatories’ response to the tide of modernization. The structure of the manifesto suggests that it was written to serve three purposes. First, the 87 Huang, “‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan zhi caoni ji kanxing jingguo biannian yanjiu,” 101–02. For the abridged English translation of the manifesto, see Hsu Foo-kwan, Carson Chang, Tang Chun-I, and Mou Chung-san, “A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture,” trans. Robert P. Kramers, Ching Feng 2, no. 2 (May 1958): 1–21. 88 Huang, “‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan zhi caoni ji kanxing jingguo biannian yanjiu,” 106–109. For the complete English translation of the manifesto, see Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook,” 492–562. 89 The rendering of xin xing zhi xue as “learning of the mind and the nature” is from Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism,” 29.

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signatories intended to clarify their understanding of Chinese culture. Second, they attempted to convince their readers that Chinese culture was compatible with modernization. Third, they called for the learning of Chinese culture by the rest of the world. Xu Fuguan and his associates were dissatisfied from an academic viewpoint with Western scholars’ interpretation of Chinese culture and responded to them in a cultural nationalist tone. In the second section of the manifesto, the New Confucians criticized three motives of Western scholars in pursuing Chinese studies. First, the Chinese classics had first been introduced to the West about three hundred years earlier by Jesuit missionaries. According to the manifesto, these missionaries were interested in Chinese religious beliefs such as the identity of the shangdi 上帝 (literally “supreme god”) described in the Chinese classics and “the reverence toward Heaven and respect for the gods of ancient Chinese scholars.”90 They “were strongly opposed to the Sung-Ming Confucian thought that emphasized both principle (li 理) and the mind (xin 心).”91 They “saw Song-Ming Confucian thought merely as [corresponding to] the ordinary rationalism, naturalism, or indeed materialism of the West at that time.”92 Song-Ming Confucianism was often misinterpreted by European atheists and materialists, too.93 Second, since the mid-nineteenth century, Western sinologists had been studying Chinese fine arts, archaeology, geography, history, and languages. The New Confucians agreed that Western sinologists had “made ‘imperishable contributions’.”94 They argued, however, that Westerners did not directly focus on the origins and developmental pathways of the cultural life and spirit of China—a living nation. There is no intrinsic difference between this kind of interest and the interest of Western scholars who travel everywhere to discover, purchase, and transport cultural relics in their desire to study the extinct civilizations of Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia.95 Xu and his associates wanted to show the world that Chinese culture was not a dead culture, as Western sinologists seemed to believe. They wanted to convey the message that Chinese culture was still alive and was in fact an important motivational force for the ongoing development of the Chinese nation. By emphasizing China’s status 90 91 92 93 94 95

Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 3. I have borrowed “reverence toward Heaven” (zuntian 尊天) from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 496. Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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as a “living nation,” the signatories wanted to persuade Westerners that they should not simply treat the study of China as a scholarly discipline and that Chinese culture was competent to meet the challenges of modernization. Third, since the Sino-Japanese War, some Western advisers to the Chinese government had emerged as leading figures in the study of modern Chinese history. The New Confucians admitted that such people were interested in China because of the changing international situation rather than mere academic curiosity and that they “pay attention to the problems of the living Chinese race.”96 But the New Confucians also discovered a new problem in the studies conducted by these recent experts: In cases where the motive of a research worker is aroused by a certain political phenomenon, what he formulates as the main issue of study, what he treats as the relevant facts for testimony, what he uses as his hypothesis to explain the facts[,] finally the conclusions he draws—all these may be inevitably influenced by his individual emotions when confronting certain political actualities. He may even be swayed by his subjective attitude toward the issue though in name he is pursuing an objective or scientific study. Therefore, in this regard, he is liable to be swayed by individual prejudice.97 The signatories seem to have thought that the influence of “individual emotions” on some Western scholars had resulted in a distorted representation of Chinese culture. Similar criticism of Western researchers can also be found in the New Confucians’ private correspondence. According to a letter by Tang Junyi to Xu Fuguan on 29 September 1957, Zhang Junmai had initiated the drafting of the manifesto because he was worried that Westerners’ misunderstanding of Chinese scholarship and culture was “enough to harm [Chinese] politics intentionally,” which probably meant that their attitudes towards Chinese culture would undermine Western support for the Nationalist government on Taiwan.98 Tang may have worried that some Western scholars’ misperception of Chinese tradition was influential enough to affect the United States’ China policy. When he talked about his experience in the United States at the Publishers’ Association in Hong Kong, Tang expressed the view 96 97 98

Ibid., 4. Ibid. Translation is adopted from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 498. Letter from Tang Junyi to Xu Fuguan, 29 September 1957, in Tang Junyi, Tang Junyi quanji 唐君毅全集, vol. 26, Shujian 書簡 [Collected works of Tang Junyi, vol. 26: private correspondence] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), 113.

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that most Westerners were incorrect to analyze China’s historical development from their own perspective. “Even if they had understood [China’s historical development] correctly, this did not necessarily lead them to a sympathetic appreciation,” Tang wrote in his diary on 2 November 1957.99 Although the manifesto did not name any Western researchers, it is likely that one of those its authors had in mind was John K. Fairbank, a prominent scholar of Chinese history who had served in the United States Office of Strategic Services in Chongqing during the Sino-Japanese War.100 In his The United States and China, published in 1948, Fairbank portrayed Chinese tradition as an authoritarian tradition.101 To him, Confucianism had not only obstructed the development of scientific method in China but also discouraged political participation by ordinary people.102 Associating the Guomindang dictatorship with Confucianism, Fairbank claimed that Chiang had tried to maintain “a power-state in Confucian dress” in the Republican era.103 He also alleged that Chiang’s rule was a kind of “Confucian totalitarianism.”104 In the second edition of the book, published in 1958, he further argued that the Communists had reconstructed China “with emphasis upon the authoritarian elements in the great tradition.”105 The New Confucians did not criticize John K. Fairbank explicitly in their manifesto, but the suggestion that he was one of the manifesto’s targets gains added plausibility from an article that Xu Fuguan published in 1966. In a U.S. Congressional hearing convened on 10 March 1966, Fairbank had claimed that Mao Zedong was governing China by a “great Confucian political fiction, the myth of rule by virtue (dezhi de shenhua 德治的神話).”106 Fairbank’s testimony soon provoked the response of over 1500 Chinese scholars. On 99 Entry for 2 November 1957 in Tang Junyi, Tang Junyi quanji 唐君毅全集, vol. 27, Riji (shang) 日記 (上) [Collected works of Tang Junyi, vol. 27: diaries (Part I)] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), 301. 100 Paul M. Evans, “Fairbank: Intellect and Enterprise in American China Scholarship, 1936– 1961” (PhD diss.: Dalhousie University, 1982), 92. 101 For Fairbank’s discussion of the “authoritarian nature” of Chinese tradition, see John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, 1st edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 98–119. 102 Evans, “Fairbank,” 141. For Fairbank’s remarks on the negative influence of Confucianism on China’s political and scientific development, see Fairbank, The United States and China, 1st edition, 73–76. 103 Fairbank, The United States and China, 1st edition, 254. 104 Ibid., 252. 105 Fairbank, The United States and China, 2st edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 105, quoted from Evans, “Fairbank,” 239. 106 E.W. Kenworthy, “China Expert Says U.S. Is Overreacting to Peking: Advises Senators to Give Regime an Open Door While Standing Firm,” New York Times, 11 March 1966, 14.

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16 May 1966, these scholars jointly published an open letter to the American people, refuting the claim that Mao had inherited Chinese tradition. Instead, they argued, Mao had conspired to destroy Chinese culture completely.107 Although Xu Fuguan did not sign this open letter, he responded to the issue in an article on Confucius and the rule of virtue published in September 1966. In this article, Xu criticized Fairbank heavily for arguing that Mao had inherited the tradition of Confucius and for branding Confucius’ political ideals as “the myth of rule by virtue.”108 Having disputed Fairbank’s arguments comprehensively, Xu made the following comment about him at the end of the article: “If he does not scruple to make insincere arguments intentionally because of his predetermined political stance, it means that he lacks scholarly conscience.”109 Why did Xu allege that Fairbank had a “predetermined political stance”? In the same article, Xu informed—or misinformed—his readers that in 1943, when Fairbank was serving in the United States Office of Strategic Services, he had already suggested opposing Confucianism on the grounds that Confucian ideas were “aggressive” ( juyou qinluexing 具有侵略性).110 Xu probably suspected that Fairbank had been discrediting Chinese tradition from that time on. If we examine Fairbank’s career, it is not hard to understand why Xu was suspicious of him. Towards the end of the Chinese Civil War, Fairbank was one of the American China specialists who suggested reducing American military aid to the Nationalist government.111 Xu may have borne Fairbank a grudge for this. Since the mid-1950s, Fairbank had been advocating a “middle of the road” 107 “Zhonghua Minguo Yiqian wubai yu wei xueren ji jiaoshou gei Meiguo renmin de yifeng gongkaixin 中華民國一千五百餘位學人及教授給美國人民的一封公開信 [An open letter to the American people from over 1500 scholars and professors from the Republic of China],” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 16 May 1966, 2, 5. 108 Xu Fuguan, “Kongzi dezhi sixiang fawei 孔子德治思想發微 [An examination of Confucius’ philosophy of the rule of virtue]” (28 August 1966), in Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, ed. Xiao, 94–95. 109 Ibid., 114. 110 Ibid., 94. Xu quoted Fairbank’s words from Liang Hejun 梁和鈞, “Fei Zhengqing gaizao le Mao Zedong? Mao Zedong gaizao le Huashengdun 費正清改造了毛澤東? 毛澤東改 造了華盛頓? [Has Fairbank reconstructed Mao Zedong? Has Mao Zedong reconstructed Washington?],” Zhengxin xinwenbao 徵信新聞報 [Credit Newspaper], 28 June 1966, 2. Liang was quoting from a telegram from the Ambassador in China (C.E. Gauss) to the Secretary of State, 24 November 1943, in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1943 China, ed. United States Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), 385. Both Xu and Liang may have misquoted and mistranslated Gauss’ telegram, which reads “Dr. Fairbank observes that these ideas and evaluations [of reviving Confucianism] are both a source of and a vehicle for atavism, chauvinism and xenophobia.” 111 Evans, “Fairbank,” 165.

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policy that sought “negotiation with the Communists but recognition only under terms favorable to the United States.”112 Xu Fuguan seems to have been over-sensitive to Fairbank’s critical remarks on Chinese tradition. After all, the United States did not establish a formal diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China until 1979. Xu may have overestimated Fairbank’s influence over the United States’ China policy in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, Fairbank had been promoting Chinese studies in the United States since 1946.113 He encountered severe criticism after being accused of sympathy towards the Chinese Communists and was even summoned to testify at Congressional hearings during the McCarthy era in the early 1950s.114 Xu may have overreacted to Fairbank’s assessment of Confucianism and ignored his contribution to the establishment of Chinese studies as a scholarly discipline in the United States. His criticism of Fairbank’s remarks was largely nationalistic and not without exaggeration. To the extent that the 1958 manifesto was an expression of its authors’ aspiration to correct Westerners’ misinterpretations of Chinese culture, it can be regarded as a product of their cultural nationalism. Scholars have generally agreed that the manifesto “had a strong nationalist feeling.”115 Yu Jiyuan writes that the New Confucians “were eager to establish the special importance of traditional Chinese thought. Their goal was to prove that Chinese moral culture was far superior to the West, although the West was higher than China in scientific and technological development.”116 Liu Shuxian has also commented that “the scholars who signed the manifesto are deeply convinced that the Confucian tradition is the most open, inclusive, and creative among the various traditions of the world and may therefore serve as the best vehicle for looking toward the future of humankind.”117 While Yu and Liu focus on the positive aspect of the four authors’ cultural nationalism—that is, their confidence in Chinese tradition—N. Serina Chan explores its negative dimension. Like Yu, she observes that the authors of the manifesto regarded Western culture as more advanced than Chinese culture in science, technology, and democratic 112 113 114 115

Ibid., 263. Ibid., 281. Ibid., 184–204. Yu Jiyuan, “The ‘Manifesto’ of New-Confucianism and the Revival of Virtue Ethics,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3, no. 3 (2008): 329. 116 Ibid. 117 Liu Shu-hsien, “Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical Review of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought,” in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-dragons, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 103.

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governance. They were proud that, in their view, Chinese culture had a more solid moral foundation and was spiritually superior to Western culture. But Chan suggests that, in adopting this view, the authors were stereotyping Chinese and Western cultures and simplifying their differences.118 She argues that the authors were “culturally chauvinistic” in the sense that they placed Confucian thought in a position higher than any Western spiritual system of thought such as Christianity.119 This was indeed contradictory to the authors’ aim of achieving mutual understanding between China and the West “on equal terms.”120 The New Confucian scholars’ “cultural chauvinism” was reflected not only in the above stereotyping, but also in their overreaction to Western scholarly approaches on China—an overreaction that culminated in Xu Fuguan’s later attack on John K. Fairbank. In addition to the New Confucians’ cultural nationalism, the 1958 manifesto at the same time reflects their internationalism—their belief in the global importance of Chinese culture and their concern for world unity. In the eleventh section of the manifesto, Xu Fuguan and his associates discussed how traditional Chinese thought could contribute to the world. They first recognized the contribution of Western liberal and democratic thought to the emergence of the modern world. Like Chinese intellectuals in the early Republican era such as Liang Qichao and Liang Shuming, they noted a number of problems in recent Western history. These included endless warfare between European nation-states, conflicts between factory owners and workers resulting from the Industrial Revolution, colonialism, and the recent confrontation between totalitarianism and democracy.121 In the global confrontation between democracy and Communism, they wrote, Chinese culture and Western democratic culture should join together because both cultures were “not inherently dialectical-materialistic.”122 In order to help the West to recover from its problems, the New Confucians advocated that Westerners learned from “Oriental thought,” a phrase that they used as a synonym for Chinese thought, in five ways. First, the West needed “the spirit of ‘appreciating what is at the present moment’” (“dangxia jishi” zhi jingshen「當下即是」之精神) and “the capacity to ‘let go of everything’” (“yiqie fangxia” zhi jinbao「一切放下」之襟抱).123 The New Confucians argued that “the advantage of the spirit of Western 118 Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, 270. 119 Ibid., 276. 120 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 21. 121 Ibid., 16. 122 Ibid., 17. 123 Ibid.

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culture is that it is able to [push] forward in unlimited pursuit and endless exploration.”124 But this “unlimited pursuit” and “endless exploration” only brought Westerners a sense of “emptiness” (kongxu 空虛).125 Chinese people, however, “think that knowing only advance and not retreat is a crisis in life.”126 Thus, they were satisfied with what they had acquired and were able to “appreciate what is at the present moment.”127 Therefore, the signatories of the manifesto hoped that Chinese wisdom would bring Westerners spiritual contentment and increase the “sense of security” (anquan gan 安全感) and “perseverance” ( jianren xing 堅韌性) of Western culture.128 Second, the West would be well advised to acquire the “wisdom of being curvilinear and spiritual” (yuan er shen de zhihui 圓而神的智慧) from Oriental thought.129 The New Confucians argued that in Western science and philosophy, all common concepts and principles grasped by intellectual reason are straight lines. When they [the straight lines] connect with each other, a square is formed. Since these common concepts and principles are abstract, their application to concrete objects will definitely neglect or eliminate some aspects of those objects. Then [these common concepts and principles] will be unable to explain in detail the particularity and individuality of objects.130 Thus, the problem with Western principles was that they were too rigid and inflexible. The signatories suggested that the West should learn from the Chinese “wisdom of being curvilinear and spiritual.” The New Confucians considered that such wisdom could turn the straight lines of intellectual reason into circles which “orbit around the center of concrete objects” so that “the particularity and individuality of objects” can be understood.131 After the acquisition of this wisdom, “the spirit of the mind” (xin zhi jingshen 心之精神) could be developed without hindrance.132 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 18. 126 Ibid. I have borrowed the translation “crisis in life” from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 549. 127 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 18. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. I have borrowed the translation “grasped by intellectual reason” from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 551. 131 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 18. 132 Ibid.

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Third, the West should acquire “a feeling of mildness and commiseration or compassion” (wenrun er dace huo beimin zhiqing 溫潤而怛惻或悲憫之 情).133 The New Confucians admitted that “Westerners’ loyalty to ideals and spirit of social service and their enthusiasm and love towards others are often unmatched by Orientals.”134 But “will to power and thoughts of possession can permeate enthusiasm for and love of others.”135 People might then approach Christianity, which teaches forgiveness. However, extreme forgiveness would lead to “the abandonment of everything in the world.” One would then only seek an “individual path of blessing.”136 The manifesto noted that “a cycle is formed, while the will to power and the thoughts of possession can still exist within love and enthusiasm.”137 Thus, the New Confucians asserted that Westerners’ reliance on God could not solve their problem. They suggested that the solution to the problem of the West was to achieve a fusion of love and respect.138 Fourth, Westerners should obtain the “wisdom of how to make culture longstanding” (ruhe shi wenhua youjiu de zhihui 如何使文化悠久的智慧) from China, which had the longest history in the world.139 The New Confucians agreed that although “modern Western culture is very brilliant and magnificent, many people are already worried about how to avoid a decline like that of the Greek and Roman cultures.”140 Thus, they suggested that Westerners should “possess a mindset that is formed by historical consciousness and that connects the past thousands of years and the future myriads of generations” so as to prolong their culture by preserving the spiritual life that is expressed in it.141 The New Confucians claimed that Chinese culture was the best model for the West to study.142

133 Ibid., 19. This translation is adopted from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 553. 134 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 19. I have borrowed the translations “loyalty to ideals” and “spirit of social service” from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 553. 135 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 19. I have borrowed the translation “will to power” from Hsu and Chang et al., “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture,” 553. 136 Xu and Zhang et al., “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” 19. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid., 19–20.

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Fifth, the West should share “the feeling that the whole world is a single family” (tianxia yijia zhi qinghuai 天下一家之情懷). The New Confucians argued that: We admit that at present humankind has founded many countries. And countries that have not yet undergone democratic state-building must first put themselves on the road of democratic state-building one after another. But in the end humankind will inevitably unite as a single family. Therefore, modern people, in addition to being citizens of any one country, should also have the feeling that they are members of a single world. And then the world will truly reach the day when the whole world unites as a single family.143 While Oriental ways of thought such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism emphasized the importance of consideration, kindness, and love for others, Christianity was intolerant of heresy, the New Confucians claimed. Therefore, the West should share the universal kindness embedded in Oriental ways of thought for the sake of a world family.144 In the last section of the manifesto, Xu Fuguan and his associates stated that both Chinese and Westerners should fulfil their own role in realizing a world family. Chinese people should work hard for their nation’s modernization and democratization upon their own cultural foundation. Westerners should reflect on their own cultural weaknesses and learn from the East. As the Western democracies were in the position of world leadership in the 1950s, the New Confucians claimed, they should also safeguard the cultural development of all races in the world and facilitate their democratic state-building process.145 In other words, the signatories implied that the West should be committed to assisting the Chinese people in the struggle against Communism and in the quest for building a democratic China. The New Confucians concluded the document with an appeal to the world for mutual respect between the East and the West. “It is now time for the East and the West to study each other on equal terms,” they wrote.146 It seemed to the authors that only the unity of humankind could bring about a bright future for the world. At the very end of the manifesto, its authors expressed the view that only when people from

143 Ibid., 20. 144 Ibid., 20. 145 Ibid., 21. 146 Ibid.

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all around the world “jointly bear the difficulties, sufferings, weaknesses, and mistakes of humankind will they be able to find a new road for humankind.”147 The publication of the 1958 manifesto on Chinese culture reflected not only the New Confucian scholars’ cultural nationalism—the instinct to establish the value of Chinese culture in modern China—but also their internationalism— the emphasis on the global importance of Chinese culture and the concern about the prospects of humankind. Moreover, as seen from the authors’ analysis of Westerners’ motives for studying China, the Confucian scholars were quite critical of Sinology in the West. Given that Chinese studies in the West in the 1950s were still quite immature by today’s standards, it is not difficult to understand why the authors of the manifesto had a negative impression of the discipline. It took several decades for the discipline to grow and earn a reputation among a younger generation of Chinese Confucian scholars. 4

Conclusion

Did Xu Fuguan’s eagerness to advocate dezhi remain keen throughout the rest of his life? Most of the articles in which Xu discussed dezhi were published in the 1950s. At that time, Xu was not yet completely disillusioned with Chiang Kai-shek and was still hoping that he would initiate democratic reforms. As discussed previously, Xu wanted to help Chiang achieve moral zijue so that he could be a good head of state. After 1960, however, Xu no longer had any hope for Chiang. Therefore, he seldom published articles on dezhi from 1960 onwards. It appeared to him that the promotion of dezhi was no longer a pressing issue, so he gradually switched his focus to envisaging cultural ideals for a future China. This does not mean that he no longer believed in the dezhi ideal, but he had lost his enthusiasm for promoting it. How does Xu Fuguan’s attitude towards Chinese intellectuals compare with those of Yin Haiguang and Zhang Junmai? Both Xu and Yin thought that Chinese intellectuals should play a crucial role in China’s national construction, but they articulated that role quite differently. While Yin emphasized the role of intellectuals in building a cultural ideal for China and making Chinese society more open, Xu claimed that the Chinese cultural elite should respond to the challenges of modernization by utilizing China’s inherent cultural resources. The two men also envisioned different bases on which Chinese intellectuals should be encouraged to reconstruct the nation. While Yin regarded modern liberal and scientific principles as the guidelines that 147 Ibid.

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intellectuals should use to formulate a cultural ideal, Xu considered that the cultural elite should rejuvenate Chinese culture and tradition in modern China. Moreover, while Yin wrote about what he considered to be the spiritual loss of Chinese intellectuals, and Zhang was concerned about possible loss of qijie by some mainland-based intellectuals after 1949, Xu seldom expressed worry about Chinese intellectuals. He seems to have been confident in Chinese intellectuals’ youhuan yishi and its role in inspiring them to tackle the changing socio-political circumstances of the Cold War era. To what extent was the 1958 Confucian manifesto on Chinese culture a product of the four authors’ critical response to Western scholarly studies of China? Tang Junyi and Zhang Junmai’s reservations about Western approaches to studying China provoked them to draft the manifesto. The New Confucians wrote about their dissatisfaction clearly in the manifesto, and there is no doubt that it was published partly because the authors wanted to correct what they perceived as Westerners’ misunderstanding of Chinese culture. However, one should not neglect the fact that the New Confucians drafted the manifesto partly as a result of their reflections on the future of Chinese culture—a reason that was briefly explained in the introduction to the document. In this sense, the manifesto can also be seen as an attempt of the New Confucians to reiterate the value of Chinese culture to the world in an era when Confucianism was marginalized on the Chinese mainland. Xu Fuguan had no political achievement to his name by the end of the 1960s. However, he perceived an urgent need to rescue Chinese tradition and culture at a time when they were under attack on the Chinese mainland and misunderstood by Westerners. Thus, he contributed to the quest for cultural salvation with his discussion of Confucian political ideals and his promotion of Chinese culture in the 1958 New Confucian manifesto. His concern about the prospects for Chinese culture and tradition lasted well beyond the 1960s until his death in 1982.

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General Conclusion The year 1949 was a watershed in the life of many Chinese intellectuals who were committed to their political beliefs. Whereas in the Republican era most intellectuals enjoyed varying degrees of freedom of expression and could advocate any school of thought, after the Communist takeover it was almost impossible on the Chinese mainland for non-Marxist intellectuals to discuss their political ideals publicly. In order to look for a safer place to continue their discussion, many of them decided to flee the newly established Communist regime. From then on, they never returned to the Chinese mainland. Among these émigré intellectuals, Yin Haiguang, Zhang Junmai, Xu Fuguan, and many others either remained active in the Chinese political arena or continued to pay close attention to Chinese political developments while in self-exile. This book has demonstrated how Yin Haiguang, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan responded to the Communist takeover and the coming of the Cold War era. It has attempted to understand the life and thought of Chinese émigré intellectuals of the Cold War era and has argued that these émigré intellectuals had the following characteristics. First, they were committed to rescuing the Chinese nation from dictatorship and engaged in this commitment, but in very different ways. Second, these émigré intellectuals can be regarded as liberals in the broadest sense. They were inheritors of the Republican-era multifaceted liberal tradition, whose diversity and “interactive” quality was largely maintained in the Cold War era. Third, émigré liberal intellectuals were not immune to Cold War currents from the West. They were all affected by the currents to a varying degree. Yin Haiguang, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai all shared the same commitment to rescuing China from Communism and the Guomindang’s dictatorial rule but developed different ideas on how to do this. Each of the three men’s prior relationship with the Guomindang was an underlying factor that affected his political stance and strategic priorities as a would-be savior of the Chinese nation after 1949. At the beginning of the 1950s, immediately after the Communist victory, each of the three men held a very different attitude towards the Guomindang. As a supporter of the Guomindang, Yin Haiguang came gradually to the conclusion in the late 1940s that the party under Chiang’s leadership had deviated from the liberal-democratic tradition laid down by Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. He left the editorial board of Zhongyang ribao soon after his emigration to Taiwan in 1949. In the 1950s, he co-founded Ziyou Zhongguo, turned against Chiang, and struggled for the realization of freedom

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004466043_008 Kenneth Kai-chung

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and democracy in Taiwan. He saw this as a prerequisite for rescuing the whole Chinese mainland from Communism. Having been a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek in the 1940s, Xu Fuguan seems to have had the illusion that he had a close relationship with Chiang. Following Chiang to Taiwan in 1949, he was sympathetic to Chiang and looking forward to Chiang’s initiation of democratic reforms. He portrayed Chiang positively in his political commentaries published in the journal Minzhu pinglun and did what he could to shield Chiang from blame for the defeat of the Nationalist government on the Chinese mainland. Although he differed from Yin Haiguang in placing high hopes on Chiang, he shared with Yin the belief that freedom and democracy should first be realized in Taiwan before launching counterattacks on the mainland. Having devoted himself to the realization of constitutionalism during the Republican era, Zhang Junmai finally became frustrated and disappointed with Chiang Kai-shek’s lack of real commitment to introducing constitutional democracy. He did not go to Taiwan after 1949 and decided to continue his anti-Communist quest through his own efforts. Thus, he reorganized the Third Force Movement, co-founded the Fighting League in Hong Kong and prepared for possible counterattacks on the mainland. The goals that he envisaged were the recovery of the mainland followed by the building of a Chinese democratic state. Political developments in the 1950s also played a role in shaping the three men’s involvement in the task of rescuing China. Yin Haiguang’s expression of his opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s rule was subject to the attitude of his colleagues at Ziyou Zhongguo. In the early 1950s, he was unable to express his views freely in Ziyou Zhongguo. At that time, he was in a junior position on the periodical’s editorial board and was marginalized by the mainstream opinion that cooperation with the Nationalist government was the top priority in the struggle against Communism. Thus, his criticism of Chiang in the first half of the 1950s had to be mild, indirect, and in the form of innuendo. It was not until the senior editors turned against Chiang in the mid-1950s that Yin gained a more important position on Ziyou Zhongguo’s editorial board. Yin and his colleagues now shared the view that democracy should be realized in Taiwan before counterattacks were launched on the mainland. Not only was Yin offered the opportunity to draft some of the paper’s editorials, but he was now also free to criticize the Nationalist government. Xu Fuguan soon awoke from his illusions about Chiang Kai-shek. After 1953, he gradually realized Chiang’s reluctance to tolerate criticism and implement democratic reforms. Probably because of his former affiliation with Chiang, Xu chose to be a loyal critic of the Chinese leader. He preferred to offer Chiang

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sincere advice and admonish him about how to be a good leader rather than criticize him severely and directly. For instance, he used cautionary tales to warn Chiang of the consequences of being intolerant of dissident voices. After the mid-1950s, his criticism became increasingly harsh because he noticed that Chiang still had no intention of introducing democracy. Chiang’s crackdown on Ziyou Zhongguo and the Taiwan-based democratic movement in September 1960 shattered both men’s hopes for democratization on the island. Zhang Junmai soon realized that his dream of reorganizing the Third Force was impractical. Suffering from financial difficulties, internal power struggles, and unrealistic hopes of recovering the mainland, Zhang’s Fighting League only lasted for approximately three years and collapsed at the end of 1954. The failure of the organization prompted Zhang to rethink the importance of the Taiwan-based Nationalist government in the quest for saving China. Zhang may have now admitted that Taiwan was an indispensable stronghold in the struggle against Communism. From then on, like Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang, he concentrated on the prospects for democracy on Taiwan, and his major concern was Chiang’s violation of the 1947 constitution and abuse of power.1 Zhang’s case shows that not all Chinese émigrés focused on Taiwan in the first instance, and it also demonstrates the diversity of émigrés’ responses to the task of rescuing China. The three selected figures pursued their commitment to rescuing China in the intellectual sphere as well. Since the early 1950s, they had been seeking the best cultural-political ideals for a future free and democratic Chinese nation. Such an exploration became more important to them after the failure of their political endeavors in 1960, because discussion of freedom and 1 See, for example, Zhang Junmai, “Qiaotuan dui Yin kangyi yiwai de jiji banfa 僑團對印抗 議以外的積極辦法 [Positive measures apart from protest that Overseas Chinese organizations can adopt against India]” (25 December 1956), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, vol. 1, 16, originally published in Shijie ribao 世界日報 [World daily], 25 December 1956; Zhang Junmai, “Junyuan gonggu Taiwan zhuanzhi 軍援鞏固台灣專制 [Military assistance has consolidated the autocracy in Taiwan]” (28 May 1957), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, vol. 1, 25, originally published in Shijie ribao, 28 May 1957; Zhang Junmai, “Taiwan zai zaocheng wenziyu 台灣在造成文字獄 [Taiwan is having a literary inquisition]” (12 January 1957), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, vol. 1, 9–10, originally published in Shijie ribao, 12 January 1957; Zhang Junmai, “Taiwan yu dalu fanduidang wenti 台灣與大陸反對黨問題 [The problem of organizing an opposition party on Taiwan and the mainland]” (21 September 1957), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, vol. 1, 55–56, originally published in Shijie ribao, 21 September 1957; Zhang Junmai, “Fanduidang yu zhengfu zhi guanxi 反對黨與政府之關係 [The relationship between the opposition party and the government]” (14 November 1957), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, vol. 1, 75–76, originally published in Shijie ribao, 14 November 1957.

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democracy was now the only way open to them of expressing their concern for China’s future. Their intellectual endeavors to save the nation were reflected in the diversity and “interactive” quality of the multifaceted Chinese intellectual tradition in the Cold War era. Yin Haiguang, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan were inheritors of the Republican-era broad-sense liberal tradition that consisted of three major strands—liberalism, moderate socialism, and cultural conservatism. Each of the three men was a representative figure of one or two constituent strands and determined to defend liberal values. Yin Haiguang was a prominent liberal intellectual who wanted to revive the “May Fourth spirit”—science and democracy—against Communism, the Taiwan-based autocratic Nationalist government, and Chinese tradition. He denounced the Communists for distorting the meanings of freedom and democracy and Marxism for being unscientific. He also perceived a pernicious partnership between Chinese tradition and the Nationalist government. While traditionalism rejected modern values such as freedom and democracy, Yin claimed, the Nationalist government was maintaining its dictatorial rule by drawing support from traditionalism. For the sake of China’s liberal and democratic future, he was determined to fight against the above three major impediments to the “May Fourth spirit.” Beside being a dedicated constitutionalist and advocate of individual freedom, Zhang Junmai remained a moderate socialist and a Confucian scholar. He provided a socialist blueprint in the Fighting League’s manifesto that he codrafted in 1952. The manifesto envisaged the provision of welfare to the elderly and the sick and measures to foster a harmonious relationship between employers and the working class after successful recovery of the mainland. It also recognized private ownership of light industries and envisaged that the state would provide support for private enterprises. Zhang was also a “Confucian liberal” who claimed that proto-liberal values were inherent in Chinese tradition. He argued that Confucian and modern liberal-democratic values were mutually compatible. Zhang was joined in his efforts by Xu Fuguan and two other Confucian scholars, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. In early 1958, the four men copublished a manifesto to establish the value of Chinese culture in the modern world. This document can be seen as a product of the signatories’ cultural nationalism. In the manifesto, they attempted to rectify Westerners’ misconceptions about Chinese culture and tradition, extract proto-democratic elements from the Confucian political tradition, and affirm the importance of Confucianism in China’s future liberal-democratic state-building. The four authors also claimed that Chinese tradition provided the necessary wisdom for Westerners to resolve their cultural crisis and for the world to attain unity.

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The New Confucians’ concern for the well-being of other peoples in the world gave their liberal thought some internationalist tinges. In addition to its diversity, the émigré liberal tradition retained its “interactive” quality, i.e., the interaction between adherents of different strands within the liberal tradition. For instance, there was a series of debates between the Ziyou Zhongguo editors and the New Confucians about the value of Chinese culture in modern China. Interaction between the different strands also took place in the thought of the same intellectual. Each of the three selected figures proposed a distinctive model of cultural integration and state-building into which he incorporated key elements of different strands. In the mid-1960s, Yin Haiguang began to appreciate some Confucian values and to advocate the selective incorporation of Confucian values into the liberal-scientific foundation that he proposed for a modern China. In Yin’s model, Confucian values tended to be supplements to modern liberal-democratic political ideals. Zhang Junmai acknowledged the potential contribution of Confucian values to China’s modernization and democratization. He also recognized the function of rights and duties, as envisaged in the West, in constituting a positive individual-society-state relationship. In Zhang’s model, equal emphasis would be put on Chinese and Western values. This could be achieved through realizing the unity of the Confucian concept of virtue (de 德) and the Western concept of law ( fa 法). Xu Fuguan based his ideals of modern China on Confucianism. He attempted to derive democratic values from China’s Confucian tradition and promote a tradition-oriented model of cultural integration. In Xu’s model, traditional Confucian political concepts that he considered proto-liberal and proto-democratic would be revised, adapted, and fitted within a modern liberal-democratic system of government. In other words, Xu was exploring the possibility of making modernized Confucian political ideals the backbone of a liberal-democratic framework. Although the émigré Chinese liberal tradition was able to retain its diversity and “interactive” quality, it did not escape challenges from the prevailing intellectual currents of the Cold War. Cold War currents reached the émigré Chinese intellectual communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas in the early postwar era, it influenced a number of intellectuals. Yin Haiguang, for example, had been an adherent of moderate socialism in the 1940s. Having read the works of a number of Western Cold War liberals, he became convinced in the early 1950s that socialism of all sorts would ultimately lead to people’s enslavement. From then on, under the influence of Cold War currents, he opposed what Karl Popper called “utopian social engineering.” He now advocated the supremacy of individual freedom in economic affairs. To the New Confucians, the Cold War currents actually strengthened their determination to revitalize

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Confucianism to meet modern needs and to promote Confucianism in Chinese communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. Such efforts were indeed a kind of non-violent resistance against the spread of Communism. Nevertheless, these Cold War currents’ influence was limited. Zhang Junmai and his compatriots were not overwhelmed by the anti-socialist wave. Living in a polarized world split between antagonistic capitalist and communist camps, their belief in moderate socialism remained unchanged. They kept advocating what they had previously considered the proper role of the state in regulating economic development, even though, in Zhang’s view, the Soviet Union had brought socialism into disrepute. Like many other Chinese intellectuals since the late nineteenth century, Xu Fuguan, Yin Haiguang, and Zhang Junmai can also be regarded as intellectual agents who refined Western political thought to fit China’s special features. Their contribution to the search for Sino-Western intellectual integration may not have transcended their pioneering predecessors like Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao, but we shall not underestimate their significance. Through the efforts of the émigré intellectuals, the Republican-era multifaceted liberal tradition was able to continue in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese communities. This was particularly important in an era in which Marxism was the dominant school of thought on the mainland, and adherents of other schools of thought were unable to express their ideas openly. More research still needs to be done on the legacy of the Cold War-era émigré intellectuals’ liberal thought. For example, it is not clear how far Xu Fuguan’s teachings have influenced the Confucian thought of his disciples. Comparative studies of Yin Haiguang’s model of cultural integration and those of Lin Yusheng and Zhang Hao remain to be conducted.2 There were also a number of younger émigrés such as Yu Yingshi and Xu Guansan 許冠三 (1924– 2011) who fled to Hong Kong after 1949. Even though Yu and Xu later became historians, they did publish several booklets on the concepts of freedom and

2 Lin Yusheng and Zhang Hao have been exploring the relationship between Chinese tradition and modernity. See Lin, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness; Lin Yusheng 林毓生, Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua 中國傳統的創造性轉化 [Creative transformation of Chinese tradition] (Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2011); 林毓生 Lin Yusheng, Zhengzhi zhixu yu duoyuan shehui: shehui sixiang luncong 政治秩序與多元 社會：社會思想論叢 [Political order and pluralist society: discussion on social thought] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1989); Zhang Hao 張灝, You’an yishi yu minzhu chuantong 幽暗意識與民主傳統 [Dark consciousness and democratic tradition] (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1989).

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democracy in the 1950s.3 Nevertheless, this book has explored the Chinese liberal tradition in the 1950s and 1960s by studying three major schools of thought in these decades and placed this intellectual tradition in the context of the Cold War. We can now have a more detailed picture of the transitional generation between China’s Republican-era intellectuals and younger Chinese intellectuals who were based outside the mainland in the second half of the twentieth century. 3 Yu Yingshi 余英時, Minzhu zhidu de fazhan 民主制度的發展 [Development of democratic political system] (Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954); Yu Yingshi 余英時, Ziyou yu pingdeng zhi jian 自由與平等之間 [Between freedom and equality] (Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1955); Yu Pingfan 于平凡 (Xu Guansan 許冠三), Zhongguo minzhu ziyou yundong shihua 中國民主自由運動史話 [A history of the movement for democracy and liberty in China] (Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1950).

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Selected Bibliography

Archival Materials

Hu Shi Memorial Hall, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Hu Shi Papers [Hu Shi dang’an 胡適檔案] Party Archives of the Guomindang, Taipei, Taiwan Minutes of the Guomindang Central Reform Committee Meetings [Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang gaizao weiyuanhui huiyi jilu] [中國國民黨中央改造委員會會議紀錄] Minutes of the Seventh Guomindang Central Standing Committee Meetings [Zhongguo Guomindang diqijie zhongyang changwu weiyuanhui huiyi jilu] [中國國民黨第七屆中央常務委員會會議紀錄] Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University General Chang Fa-k’uei Papers Reminiscences of Fa-k’uei Chang Tunghai University Library, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan Letters and Manuscripts of Xu Fuguan [Xu Fuguan shuxin shougao 徐復觀書信手稿]



Newspapers and Periodicals

Daxue shenghuo 大學生活 [University life] (Hong Kong, 1955–1969) Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [University magazine] (Taipei, 1968–1971) Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 [Eastern miscellany] (Shanghai, 1920–1940) Dongfeng 東風 [Easterly wind] (Taichung, 1962) Huaqiao ribao 華僑日報 [Overseas Chinese daily] (Hong Kong, 1949–1969) Minzu bao 民族報 [Nation daily] (Taipei, 1949) Minzhu pinglun 民主評論 [Democratic review] (Hong Kong, 1949–1966) Minzhu Zhongguo 民主中國 [Democratic China] (Taipei, 1950–1963) Rensheng 人生 [Human life] (Hong Kong, 1951–1971) Shi yu chao 時與潮 [Time and tide] (Taiwan, 1949–1961) Shijie ribao 世界日報 [World daily] (San Francisco, 1956–1958) Wenxing 文星 [Literary star] (Taipei, 1957–1969) Xueshu jikan 學術季刊 [Academic review quarterly] (Taipei, 1953) Zaisheng 再生 [National renaissance] (Beiping, 1932–1935; Chongqing, 1938–1939; Shanghai, 1946–1948; Hong Kong, 1949–1960)

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Ziyou shiji 自由世紀 [Liberal century] (Taiwan, 1949–1950) Ziyou zhong 自由鐘 [Liberty bell] (San Francisco, 1965–1971) Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國 [Free China] (Taipei, 1949–1960) Ziyouren 自由人 [Free man] (1952–1955) Zhenglun zhoukan 政論周刊 [Political commentary weekly] (Taiwan, 1956) Zhengxin xinwenbao 徵信新聞報 [Credit Newspaper] (Taipei, 1966) Zhongguo yizhou 中國一周 [China weekly] (Taiwan, 1956) Zhongguo zhi sheng 中國之聲 [The voice of China] (Hong Kong, 1952) Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 [Central daily] (Nanjing, 1946–1949; Taipei, 1949) Zuguo zhoukan 祖國周刊 [China weekly] (Hong Kong, 1953–1964)



Works by Xu Fuguan (in Chronological Order)

Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo renmin de jueze 中國人民的決擇 [The decision of the Chinese people]” (6 August 1947). Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian 徐復觀雜文補 編 [Supplementary miscellaneous articles of Xu Fuguan], edited by Li Hanji 黎 漢基 and Li Minghui 李明輝, vol. 5, 65–70. Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2001. Originally published in Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 6 August 1947. Xu Fuguan. “Chulun Zhonggong xian jieduan zhi tuge yundong 初論中共現階段之 土革運動 [Preliminary commentary on the current land reform of the Chinese Communists]” (19 November 1947). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 5, 71–76. Originally published in Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 19 November 1947. Xu Fuguan. “Disan shili wenti de pouxi 第三勢力問題的剖析 [A deep analysis of the problem of the Third Force]” (1 March 1950). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 28–47. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 1, no. 18 (March 1950). Xu Fuguan. “Dang yu ‘danghua’ 黨與「黨化」[Party and ‘partification’]” (16 August 1950). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 51–59. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 4 (August 1950). Xu Fuguan. “Fuxing yu fugu 復性與復古 [Restoring nature and restoring antiquity]” (1 September 1950). In Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan wencun 徐復觀文存 [Essays of Xu Fuguan], 126–33. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 5 (September 1950). Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Xu Fuguan). “Women xinlai minzhu zhuyi 我們信賴民主主 義 [We trust democracy]” (15 September 1950). In Xu Fuguan, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian 學術與政治之間 [Between scholarship and politics], 27–30. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 6 (September 1950). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo zhengzhi wenti de liangge cengci 中國政治問題的兩個層 次 [The two dimensions of China’s political problems]” (16 March 1951). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 31–45. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 18 (March 1951). Xu Fuguan. “Gongchandang de renxing 共產黨的人性 [The human nature of the Communist Party]” (1 June 1951). In Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zuihou zawenji 徐復觀 最後雜文集 [The last miscellaneous articles by Xu Fuguan], 346–51. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxiangongsi, 1984. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 2, no. 23 (June 1951). Xu Fuguan. “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin 儒家政治思想的構造 及其轉進 [The structure and transformation of the Confucian political thought]” (16 December 1951). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 47–60. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 1 (December 1951). Xu Fuguan. “Ruhe jiejue fangong zhenying zhong de zhengzhi weiji 如何解決反共陣 營中的政治危機 [How can we solve the political crisis within the anti-Communist coalition?]” (1 January 1952). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 68–82. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 2 (January 1952). Xu Fuguan. “Rujia zhi jiben xingge ji qi xianding yu xinsheng 儒家之基本性格及其限 定與新生 [Confucianism’s basic character, delimitation and rebirth]” (1 May 1952). In Xu Fuguan, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan 儒家政治思想與 民主自由人權 [Confucian political philosophy, democracy, liberty, and human rights], edited by Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義, 43–92. Taipei: Bashi niandai chubanshe, 1979. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 10 (May 1952). Xu Fuguan. “Wenhua de Zhong yu Xi: da youren shu (2) 文化的中與西:答友人書 (二) [Culture in Chinese and Western context: a reply to a friend (2)].” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 19 (September 1952): 24–25. Xu Fuguan. “Cong xianshi Zhong shouzhu renlei pingdeng ziyou de lixiang 從現實中 守住人類平等自由的理想 [Defending the humankind’s ideals of equality and freedom in the reality]” (1 January 1953). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 2, 13–32. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 1 (January 1953). Xu Fuguan. “Zhengzhi yu rensheng 政治與人生 [Politics and life]” (16 January 1953). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 95–100. Originally published in Rensheng 4, no. 6 (January 1953). Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo de zhidao 中國的治道 [The way of ruling in China]” (1 May 1953). In Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, edited by Xiao, 215–42. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 9 (May 1953). Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de lishi xingge ji qi lishi de mingyun 中國知識份 子的歷史性格及其歷史的命運 [The historical personality of Chinese intellectuals and their historical destiny]” (16 April 1954). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 177–97. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 5, no. 8 (April 1954).

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Xu Fuguan. “Lun zhengzhi lingdao de yishu 論政治領導的藝術 [On the art of political leadership]” (31 March 1954). In Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan zawen: ji suosi 徐復觀雜 文—記所思 [Miscellaneous articles by Xu Fuguan: a record of what I have thought], edited by Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義, 206–09. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxiangongsi, 1980. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao 華僑日報 [Overseas Chinese daily], 31 March 1954. Xu Fuguan. “Qian Daxin lun Liang Wudi: bao tianxia bi zi najian shi 錢大昕論梁武 帝—保天下必自訥諫始 [Qian Daxin’s discussion of Emperor Wu of Liang: accepting criticism is the first step of maintaining one’s rule]” (15 June 1955). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 178–83. Originally published in Ziyouren 自由人 [The free man], no. 447 (June 1955). Xu Fuguan. “Rujia zai xiuji yu zhiren shang de qubie ji qi yiyi 儒家在修己與治人上的 區別及其意義 [The difference between the Confucian concepts of self-cultivation and the governance of others and its meaning]” (16 June 1955). In Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, edited by Xiao, 197–214. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 6, no. 12 (June 1955). Xu Fuguan. “Zhengzhi shang de shi yu liang 政治上的識與量 [Understanding and magnanimity in politics]” (2 September 1955). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 327–30. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 2 September 1955. Xu Fuguan. “Zai Su’e ‘sixiang gongshi’ xia ziyou zhuyizhe de fanxing 在蘇俄「思想攻 勢 」下自由主義者的反省 [Reflections of a liberal in response to the Soviet Union’s ‘ideological offensive’]” (19 March 1956). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 3, 141–48. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 13, no. 12 (March 1956). Xu Fuguan. “Guren zai weinan zhong de zhihui 古人在危難中的智慧 [The wisdom of our ancestors at times of crisis]” (16 May 1956). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 184–89. Originally published in Rensheng 12, no. 1 (May 1956). Xu Fuguan. “Weisheme yao fandui ziyou zhuyi 為什麼要反對自由主義 [Why does the government oppose liberalism?]” (1 November 1956). In Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, edited by Xiao, 283–93. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 7, no. 21 (November 1956). Xu Fuguan. “Beifen de kangyi 悲憤的抗議 [Furious protest]” (12 February 1957). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 491–96. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 12 February 1957. Li Shi 李實 (Xu Fuguan). “Lishi wenhua yu minzhu ziyou: duiyu ruma women zhe de dafu 歷史文化與自由民主:對於辱罵我們者的答覆 [History, culture, and liberal democracy: a reply to those who have condemned us]” (16 May 1957). In Xu, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian, 525–41. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 8, no. 10 (May 1957).

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Xu Fuguan. “Fanduidang zuida de zeren shi zai fandui de yanlun 反對黨最大的責任是 在反對的言論 [The most important duty of an opposition party is to maintain its voice of opposition]” (1 August 1957). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 6, 218–22. Originally published in Minzhu chao 7, no. 15 (August 1957). Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan 徐復觀、張君勱、唐君 毅、牟宗三. “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan—women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言—我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與 世界文化前途之共同認識 [A manifesto to the people in the world on Chinese culture: our common understanding of Chinese scholarly research, Chinese culture and the prospects for world culture]” (1 January 1958). Minzhu pinglun 9, no. 1 (January 1958): 2–21. Hsu Foo-kwan, Carson Chang, Tang Chun-I, and Mou Chung-san. “A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.” Translated by Robert P. Kramers. Ching Feng 2, no. 2 (May 1958): 1–21. Xu Fuguan. Zhongguo sixiang shi lunji 中國思想史論集 [Collected essays on Chinese intellectual history]. Taichung: Zhongyang shuju, 1959. Hsu Foo-kwan, Carson Chang, Tang Chun-i, Mou Chung-san, and Hsieh Yu-wei. “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Culture Outlook.” In Tang Chun-i (Tang Junyi), Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Culture, 492–562. Taipei: Taiwan Student Book, 1991. Originally published in Chinese Culture 3, no. 1 (October 1960): 1–71. Xu Fuguan. “Yishu yu zhengzhi 藝術與政治 [Fine Arts and Politics]” (8 September 1961). In Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan wencun, 218–20. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 8 September 1961. Xu Fuguan. “Lun chuantong 論傳統 [On tradition]” (March 1962). In Xu Fuguan, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui 徐復觀文錄選粹 [Selected essays of Xu Fuguan], edited by Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義, 105–16. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980. Originally published in Dongfeng 東風 [Easterly wind] 2, no. 6 (March 1962). Xu Fuguan. “Sheme shi chuantong? 什麼是傳統？ [What is tradition?]” (1 April 1962). In Xu, Xu Fuguan zawen bubian, edited by Li and Li, vol. 1, 168–71. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 1 April 1962. Xu Fuguan. “Chuantong yu wenhua 傳統與文化 [Tradition and culture]” (8 April 1962). In Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, edited by Xiao, 97–100. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 8 April 1962. Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo wenhua de cengjixing 中國文化的層級性 [The hierarchical nature of Chinese culture]” (22 September 1962). In Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, edited by Xiao, 117–20. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 22 September 1962. Hsu Fo-kwan, Carsun Chang, Tang Chun-I, and Mou Tsung-san. “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.” In Carsun Chang

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(Zhang Junmai), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, vol. 2, 455–83. New York: Bookman Associates, 1962. Xu Fuguan. Zhongguo renxinglun shi: Xian Qin pian 中國人性論史:先秦篇 [History of the discourse on human nature in China: the pre-Qin era]. Taichung: Tunghai University, 1963. Xu Fuguan. “Benkan jieshu de hua 本刊結束的話 [Last words of the Democratic Review].” Minzhu pinglun 17, no. 9 (August 1966): 22–23. Xu Fuguan. “Kongzi dezhi sixiang fawei 孔子德治思想發微 [An examination of Confucius’ philosophy of the rule of virtue]” (28 August 1966). In Xu, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan, edited by Xiao, 93–114. Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo wenhua fuxing de ruogan guannian wenti 中國文化復興的若干 觀念問題 [Some conceptual problems on Chinese cultural revival]” (1 January 1967). In Xu, Xu Fuguan wencun, 174–81. Originally published in Chuban yuekan 出版月刊 [Publication weekly] 2, no. 8 (January 1967). Xu Fuguan. “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de zeren 中國知識份子的責任 [Responsibilities of Chinese intellectuals]” (December 1968). In Xu, Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui, edited by Xiao, 212–15. Originally published in Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [University magazine], no. 12 (December 1968). Xu Fuguan. “Tong dao wu di, tong dao wu you 痛悼吾敵‧痛悼吾友 [Sorrowfully mourn for my enemy, sorrowfully mourn for my friend]” (22 September 1969). In Yin Xia Junlu 殷夏君璐 et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji 殷海光紀念集 [Essays in memory of Yin Haiguang], 77–85. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Originally published in Huaqiao ribao, 22 September 1969. Xu Fuguan. “Dui Yin Haiguang xiansheng de yinian 對殷海光先生的憶念 [My recollection of Mr. Yin Haiguang]” (15 February 1970). In Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Xu Fuguan zawen: Yi wangshi 徐復觀雜文:憶往事 [Commentaries of Xu Fuguan: remembering the past], 168–79. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1982. Originally published in Renwu yu sixiang 人物與思想 [Figures and thought], no. 35 (February 1970). Xu Fuguan. Xu Fuguan wenlu 徐復觀文錄 [Collected works of Xu Fuguan]. Taipei: Huanyu chubanshe, 1971. Xu Fuguan. Liang Han sixiang shi 兩漢思想史 [Intellectual history of the two Hans]. Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo, 1972. Xu Fuguan. Xu Fuguan wenlu xuancui 徐復觀文錄選粹 [Selected essays of Xu Fuguan], edited by Xiao Xinyi 蕭欣義. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980. Xu Fuguan. Xu Fuguan zawen 徐復觀雜文 [Commentaries by Xu Fuguan]. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1980. Xu Fuguan. Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhi jian 學術與政治之間 [Between scholarship and politics]. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1980.

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Xu Fuguan. Xu Fuguan zawen bubian 徐復觀雜文補編 [Supplementary commentaries of Xu Fuguan], edited by Li Hanji and Li Minghui 黎漢基、李明輝. Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2001.



Works by Yin Haiguang (in Chronological Order)

Yin Fusheng 殷福生 (Yin Haiguang). “Yizhi ziyou wenti de jiantao 意志自由問題底檢 討 [A review on the question of the freedom of the will]” (1 January 1935). Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 [Eastern miscellany] 32, no. 1 (January 1935): 57–67. Yin Haiguang. “Guangming qian zhi hei’an 光明前之黑暗 [The darkness that precedes the light]” (December 1945). In Yin Haiguang, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha 中國共產黨之觀察 [Observations on the Chinese Communist Party], 3–65. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009. Originally published as Yin Haiguang, Guangming qian zhi hei’an. Chongqing: Guangming chubanshe, 1945. Yin Haiguang. “Zhengzhi ziyou yu wuzhuang baodong 政治自由與武裝暴動 [Political freedom and armed insurrections].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 21 April 1947. Yin Haiguang. “Zhongguo minzhu yundong de zhengque fangxiang 中國民主運動底正 確方向 [The correct direction of the Chinese democratic movement].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 29 June 1947. Yin Haiguang. “Zhongguo wenhua jianshe zhi lu 中國文化建設之路 [The road of Chinese cultural construction].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 10 August 1947. Yin Haiguang. “Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhi sichao 中國現代政治思潮 [Political thought currents in modern China].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 10 October 1947. Yin Haiguang. “Lun ziyou zhuyi zhe ji qi renwu 論自由主義者及其任務 [On liberals and their mission].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 25 January 1948. Shelun 社論 [Editorial] (Yin Haiguang). “Ziyou zhuyi de zuiren 自由主義的罪人 [The sinners against liberalism].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 22 April 1948. Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Zhiye xuesheng zhi zhiye 職業學生之職業 [The profession of professional students].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 18 June 1948. Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Wusi yu jinri 五四與今日 [May Fourth and today].” Zhongyang ribao (Nanjing), 22 June 1948. Yin Fusheng 殷福生 (Yin). “Women zou na tiao lu? 我們走那條路？ [Which route should we take?]” (September 1948). In Yin Haiguang, Zhengzhi yu shehui 政治與社 會 [Politics and society], vol. 1, 5–23. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Originally published in Qingnian zazhi 青年雜誌 [Youth magazine] 1, no. 2 (September 1948). Yin Haiguang. “Wo dui Guo Gong de kanfa 我對國共的看法 [My views on the Guomindang and the Communist Party]” (2 October 1948). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu

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shehui, vol. 1, 25–29. Originally published in Chuangjin zhoukan 創進週刊 [Creation and progress weekly] 1, no. 12 (October 1948). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Wusi yundong yu kexue minzhu 五四運動與科學民主 [The May Fourth Movement and science and democracy].” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 4 May 1949. Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Minzhu yu kuanrong 民主與寬容 [Democracy and tolerance].” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 28 May 1949. Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Niuzhuan cuowu, huidao yuanlu 扭轉錯誤，回到原 路 [Correct the errors, return to the original route].” Minzu bao 民族報 (Taipei), 1 June 1949. Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou zhuyi zhe yu Zhongguo de weilai 自由主義者與中國底未來 [Liberals and the future of China].” Minzu bao, 26 June 1949. Yin Haiguang. “Jiaotiao zhuyi yu sixiang ziyou 教條主義與思想自由 [Dogmatism and freedom of thought].” Minzu bao, 10 July 1949. Yin Haiguang. “Zhuyi bingfei guojiao 主義並非國教 [An ism is not a national religion].” Minzu bao, 16 July 1949. Yin Haiguang. “Lun Guomindang de gaizao yundong 論國民黨底改造運動 [On the Guomindang reform movement].” Zhongyang ribao (Taipei), 23 July 1949. Yin Haiguang. “Zheng sixiang ziyou de lishi juliu 爭思想自由的歷史巨流 [The giant historical currents of striving for the freedom of thought]” (16 September 1949). In Yin Haiguang, Xueshu yu sixiang 學術與思想 [Scholarship and thought], vol. 1, 73–92. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Originally published in Ziyou shiji 自由世紀 [Liberal century] no. 2 (September 1949). Yin Haiguang. “Sixiang ziyou yu ziyou sixiang 思想自由與自由思想 [Freedom of thought and free thought]” (20 November 1949). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 83–93. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國 [Free China] 1, no. 1 (November 1949). Yin Haiguang. “Zhanzheng yu ziyou 戰爭與自由 [War and freedom]” (1 February 1950). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 151–64. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 3 (February 1950). Yin Haiguang. “Zhengjiao heyi yu sixiang ziyou 政教合一與思想自由” [Unification of politics and religion and the freedom of thought] (16 February 1950). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 665–84. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 1, no. 17 (February 1950). Yin Haiguang. “Lun quanti zhuyi ji qi tongzhi xingtai: ziyou minzhu de zuida dihai 論 全體主義及其統治形態:自由民主的最大敵害 [On collectivism and its form of ruling: the greatest enemy of freedom and democracy]” (1 April 1950). Ziyou shiji, no. 15 (April 1950): 3–7. Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou zhuyi de yunhan 自由主義底蘊涵 [The implications of liberalism]” (1 August 1950 and 16 August 1950). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 189–216. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 3, no. 3 (August 1950). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Yin Haiguang. “Minzhu zhengzhi 民主政治 [Democratic politics]” (1 January 1951). In Yin Haiguang, Shuping yu shuxu 書評與書序 [Book reviews and prefaces], vol. 1, 51–58. Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2010. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 4, no. 1 (January 1951). Yin Haiguang. “Kexue jingyan lun de zhengxing ji qi piping 科學經驗論底徵性及其批 評 [The characteristics and criticisms of scientific empiricism]” (February 1951). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 93–120. Originally published in Guoli Taiwan daxue wenshizhe xuebao 國立臺灣大學文史哲學報 [National Taiwan University journal of literature, history and philosophy], no. 2 (February 1951). Yin Haiguang. “Yijiu basi nian 一九八四年 [Year 1984]” (16 July 1951). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 97–104. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 2 (July 1951). Yin Haiguang. “Jiquan duiyu minzhu ziyou de weixie 極權對於民主自由的威脅 [The threat to democracy and freedom from totalitarianism]” (1 September 1951). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 105–12. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 5 (September 1951). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Yanlun ziyou de renshi ji qi jiben tiaojian 言論自由的認識 及其基本條件 [An understanding of and prerequisites for freedom of speech]” (1 October 1951). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 241–45. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 7 (October 1951). Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou ren 自由人 [Free man]” (1 December 1951). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 139–52. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 5, no. 11 (December 1951). Mei Yunli 梅蘊理 (Yin Haiguang). “Wo suo renshi zhi ‘zhenzheng de ziyou ren’ 我所 認識之「真正的自由人」 [‘The true free man’ as I know him]” (16 January 1952). Ziyou Zhongguo 6, no. 2 (January 1952): 10–13. Yin Haiguang. “Wo weishenme fan Gong? 我為什麼反共？ [Why do I oppose Communism?] (16 June 1952).” In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 247–67. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 6, no. 12 (June 1952). Yin Haiguang. “Jingji zhengce yu jingji xueli 經濟政策與經濟學理 [Economic policy and scholarly principles of economics]” (16 August 1952). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 207–19. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 4 (August 1952). Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou ren de fanxing yu zaijian 自由人的反省與再建 [The self-reflection and re-establishment of a free man]”. Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 17 (August 1952): 3–13. Yin Haiguang. “Meiguo qulai 美國去來 [Back from the United States]” (16 March 1953). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 1, 243–54. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 8, no. 6 (March 1953). Yin Haiguang. “Shizhenglun daoyin 實徵論導引 [Introduction to empiricism]” (15 September 1953 and 1 October 1953). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 221–46. Originally published in Minzhu pinglun 4, no. 18–19 (September–October 1953). Yin Haiguang. “Zhengzhi zuzhi yu geren ziyou 政治組織與個人自由 [Political organization and individual freedom]” (16 January 1954). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 297–332. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 2 (January 1954). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Yin Haiguang. “Minzhu de shijinshi 民主的試金石 [The touchstone for democracy]” (3 January 1955). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 355–73. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 8, no. 13 (January 1955). Yin Haiguang. “Ziyou de zhenyi 自由的真義 [The true meaning of freedom]” (24 January 1955). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 375–95. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 4 (January 1955). Yin Haiguang. “Chuantong de jiazhi 傳統底價值 [The value of tradition]” (21 February 1955). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 269–92. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 8 (February 1955). Yin Haiguang. “Lun minzhu yu kexue 論民主與科學 [On democracy and science]” (March 1955). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 293–319. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 9, no. 10–11 (March 1955). Shelun 社論 (Yin Haiguang). “Geren wei guojia zhi ben 個人為國家之本 [Individuals are the basis of the state]” (5 March 1956). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 397–404. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 14, no. 5 (March 1956). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Jiaoyu buzhang Zhang Qiyun de minzhu guan: junwang de minzhu 教育部長張其昀的民主觀:君王的民主 [Minister of Education Zhang Qiyun’s view on democracy: the democracy of a monarch]” (1 October 1956). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 405–13. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 7 (October 1956). Yin Haiguang. “Zailun junwang de minzhu 再論「君王的民主」[Further discussion of the ‘democracy of a monarch’]” (20 October 1956). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 415–20. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 8 (October 1956). Yin Haiguang. “Luoji jingyan lun daoshi 邏輯經驗論導釋 [A guide to logical positivism]” (November 1956). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 391–457. Originally published in Xiandai xueshu 現代學術 [Modern scholarship] 1, no. 1 (November 1956). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Chongzheng wusi jingshen 重整五四精神 [Revitalise the May Fourth spirit]” (5 May 1957). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 455–63. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 16, no. 9 (May 1957). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Jinri de wenti (2): Fangong dalu wenti 「今日的問題」(二):反 攻大陸問題 [Today’s problems (2): the problem of launching a counteroffensive on the mainland]” (1 August 1957). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 509–21. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 17, no. 3 (August 1957). Yin Haiguang. “Guanyu ‘fangong dalu wenti’ de wenti 關於「反攻大陸問題」的問題 [With regard to ‘the problem of launching a counteroffensive on the mainland’]” (1 September 1957). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 523–34. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 17, no. 5 (September 1957). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Genzhe wusi de jiaobu qianjin 跟著五四的腳步前進 [Advancing in the footsteps of the May Fourth Movement]” (1 May 1958). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 1, 571–78. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 18, no. 9 (May 1958). Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Ziyou minzhu shi fan Gong de huolu 自由民主是反共的活路 [Liberty and democracy was the live way out in the struggle against Communism]” (20 July 1958). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 635–46. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 19, no. 2 (July 1958). Yin Haiguang. “Lun ‘dadan jiashe, xiaoxin qiuzheng’ 論「大膽假設，小心求證」[On ‘hypothesize boldly and verify carefully’]” (18 August 1958 and 25 August 1958). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 701–37. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 23, no. 8–9 (August 1958). Shelun (Yin Haiguang). “Renqing dangshi xingshi, zhankai zixin yundong 認清當時 形勢，展開自新運動 [Understanding the present situation clearly, and launching the campaign of self-renewal]” (20 October 1958). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 725–37. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 19, no. 8 (October 1958). Yin Haiguang. “Kexue ji qi jiben 科學及其基本 [Science and its basics]” (1 February 1959). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 9–21. Originally published in Wenxing 文星 [Literary star], no. 16 (February 1959). Yin Haiguang. “Kexue he weiwulun 科學和唯物論 [Science and dialectical materialism]” (May 1959). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 837–80. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 26, no. 7–8 (May 1959). Yin Haiguang. “Zhongguo wenhua fazhan de xin quxiang 中國文化發展的新取向 [New trends of the development of Chinese culture]” (20 July 1959). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 851–60. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 21, no. 2 (July 1959). Yin Haiguang. “Zenyang yanjiu luoji? 怎樣研究邏輯？[How to study logic]” (1 January 1960). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 881–93. Originally published in Daxue shenghuo 3, no. 7 (January 1960). Yin Haiguang. “Jingyan kexue de jiben ciwei 經驗科學的基本詞謂 [Basic terminology of empirical science]” (April–May 1960). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 895–935. Originally published in Zuguo zhoukan 30, no. 3–5 (April–May 1960). Yin Haiguang. “Luoji jingyanlun de zai renshi 邏輯經驗論底再認識 [Revisiting logical positivism]” (16 May 1960). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 2, 937–56. Originally published in Daxue shenghuo 大學生活 [University life] 6, no. 1 (May 1960). Yin Haiguang. “Wo duiyu zaiyedang de jiben jianyi 我對於在野黨的基本建議 [My basic suggestions for an opposition party]” (16 July 1960). In Yin, Zhengzhi yu shehui, vol. 2, 943–969. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 23, no. 2 (July 1960). Yin Haiguang. Zenyang panbie shifei 怎樣判別是非 [How to distinguish between truth and falsehood]. Taipei: Wenxing shudian, 1962. Yin Haiguang. “Sixiang yu fangfa zaiban xuyan 《思想與方法》再版序言 [Preface to the second edition of Thought and method]” (1 May 1965). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 2, 557–61. Originally published in Wenxing, no. 91 (May 1965). Yin Haiguang. “Haiyeke lun ziyou chuangzaoli (dai xu): cong ‘wuzhilun’ chufa 海耶克 論自由創造力(代序):從「無知論」出發 [Hayek on free creativity (for preface): to start off with the ‘theory of ignorance’]” (18 October 1965). In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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vol. 3, 1201–12. Originally published in Shi yu chao 時與潮 [Time and tide], no. 198 (October 1965). Yin Haiguang. “Rang women xishou congshi wenhua chuangjian 讓我們攜手從事文化 創建 [Let’s participate in cultural construction together]” (1965). In Yin Haiguang, Chuncan tusi: Yin Haiguang zuihou de huayu 春蠶吐絲:殷海光最後的話語 [Spring silkworm spitting silk: the last words of Yin Haiguang], edited by Chen Guying 陳鼓 應, 159–68. Taipei: Yuanjing chubanshe, 1978. Yin Haiguang. “Youguan Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang de jige wenti 有關《中國 文化的展望》的幾個問題 [On the several issues in The prospects for Chinese culture]” (15 July 1966). In Yin, Haiguang. Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang 中國文化的 展望 [The prospects for Chinese culture], vol. 2, 653–68. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009. Originally published in Si yu yan 4, no. 2 (July 1966). Yin Haiguang. “Wo beipo likai Taiwan daxue de jingguo 我被迫離開臺灣大學的 經過 [How I was forced to leave Taiwan University]” (20 December 1966). In Yin Haiguang, Zayi yu suibi 雜憶與隨筆 [Random memories and casual writings], 155– 68. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Yin Haiguang. “Haiguang wenxuan zixu 《海光文選》自敘 [Preface of Selected Works of Haiguang]” (21 August 1968). In Yin, Shuping yu shuxu, vol. 2, 567–69. Yin Haiguang. Chuncan tusi: Yin Haiguang zuihou de huayu 春蠶吐絲:殷海光最後的話 語 [The spring silkworm spits silk: the last words of Yin Haiguang], edited by Chen Guying 陳鼓應. Taipei: Shijie wenwu gongyinshe, 1969. Yin Haiguang. Yin Haiguang xuanji: zhenglun pian 殷海光選集:政論篇 [The selected works of Yin Haiguang: political commentaries]. Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1971. Yin Haiguang. Yin Haiguang shuxin ji 殷海光書信集 [The correspondence of Yin Haiguang]. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Yin Haiguang. Zhongguo Gongchandang zhi guancha 中國共產黨之觀察 [An observation of the Chinese Communist Party]. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009. Yin Haiguang. Zhongguo wenhua de zhanwang 中國文化的展望 [The prospects of Chinese culture]. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009.



Works by Zhang Junmai (in Chronological Order)

Zhang Junmai. “Guoxianyi 國憲議 [Suggestions for the national constitution]” (1922). In Zhang Junmai, Xianzheng zhi dao 憲政之道 [The way of constitutional politics], 1–110. Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2006. Zhang Junmai. Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu jichu 民族復興之學術基礎 [The academic foundation of national revival]. Beiping: Zaisheng she, 1935.

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Zhang Junmai. Mingri zhi Zhongguo wenhua 明日之中國文化 [Tomorrow’s Chinese culture]. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936. Zhang Junmai. Liguo zhi dao 立國之道 [The way to found the nation]. Guilin: s.n. 1939. Zhang Junmai. “Zhongguo zhanshi xianzheng shishi ji qi buzou 中國戰時憲政實施及 其步驟 [The implementation of Chinese wartime constitutionalism and the steps thereto].” Zaisheng (Chongqing edition), no. 32 (1939): 3–5. Zhang Junmai. “Lun duodang yidang wenti 論多黨一黨問題 [On the multiparty / oneparty problem].” Zaisheng (Chongqing edition), no. 43 (1940): 1–4. Zhang Junmai. “Renquan wei xianzheng ji ben 人權為憲政基本 [Human rights are the basis of constitutionalism]” (9 August 1946). In Zhang Junmai, Zhonghua minguo minzhu xianfa shijiang 中華民國民主憲法十講 [Ten lectures on the democratic constitution of the Republic of China], 23–38. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947. Originally published in Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 125 (August 1946). Zhang Junmai. “Minzhu fangfa 民主方法 [Methods of democracy]” (12 October 1946). Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 134 (October 1946): 2–4. Zhang Junmai. “Minzhu shehui dang de renwu (3) 民主社會黨的任務 (三) [The mission of the Democratic Socialist Party (3)]” (17 May 1947). Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 164 (May 1947): 2–4. Zhang Junmai. “Liguo zhi dao xin ban xu 《立國之道》新版序 [Preface to the new edition of The Way to Found the Nation]” (7 December 1947). Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 193 (December 1947): 17–18. Zhang Junmai. Zhonghua Minguo minzhu xianfa shijiang 中華民國民主憲法十講 [Ten lectures on the constitution of the Republic of China]. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947. Zhang Junmai. “Minzhu shehui zhuyi zhi zhexue Beijing (5) 民主社會主義之哲學背 景 (五) [The philosophical background of democratic socialism (5)]” (August 1948). Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 225 (August 1948): 3–5. Zhang Junmai. “Shijie wenhua zhi weiji 世界文化之危機 [The crisis of world culture]” (23 October 1948). In Zhang Junmai, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji 中西印哲學文集 [Collected essays on Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophy], edited by Cheng Wenxi 程文熙, vol. 1, 207–14. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1981. Zhang Junmai. “Xiandai wenhua zhi weiji 現代文化之危機 [The crisis of modern culture]” (23 October 1948). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 215–17. Zhang Junmai. “Ouzhou wenhua zhi weiji ji Zhongguo xinwenhua zhi quxiang 歐洲文 化之危機及中國新文化之趨向 [The crisis of European culture and the prospects for China’s new culture].” In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 218–27. Zhang Junmai. “Cong ziyou zhuyi dao shehui zhuyi 從自由主義到社會主義 [From liberalism to socialism]” (17 January 1949). Zaisheng (Beijing edition), no. 247 (January 1949): 3–5. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

204

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Zhang Junmai. “Yifeng buji xin: ze Feng Zhisheng一封不寄信—責馮芝生 [An unsent letter: reproaching Feng Zhisheng]” (23 June 1950). Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 274 (September 1950): 12–13. Zhang Junmai. “Zhonghua minzu zhi jingshen: qijie 中華民族之精神—氣節 [The spirit of the Chinese: integrity]” (16 October 1951). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 597–628. Originally published in Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 301 (October 1951). Chang, Carsun (Zhang Junmai). The Third Force in China. New York: Bookman Associates, 1952. Chang, Carsun (Zhang Junmai). “Wang Yang-ming’s Philosophy.” Philosophy East and West 5, no. 1 (April 1955): 3–18. Zhang Junmai. Zhonghua Minguo duli zizhu yu Yazhou qiantu 中華民國獨立自主與亞 洲前途 [The independence and autonomy of the Republic of China and the prospects for Asia]. Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1955. Zhang Junmai. “Qiaotuan dui Yin kangyi yiwai de jiji banfa 僑團對印抗議以外的積 極辦法 [Positive measures apart from protest that Overseas Chinese organizations can adopt against India]” (25 December 1956). In Zhang Junmai, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji 一九四九年以後張君勱言論集 [Collected works of Zhang Junmai after 1949], edited by Xue Huayuan 薛化元, vol. 1, 15–16. Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1989. Originally published in Shijie ribao, 25 December 1956. Zhang Junmai. “Taiwan zai zaocheng wenziyu 台灣在造成文字獄 [Taiwan is having a literary inquisition]” (12 January 1957). In Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, edited by Xue, vol. 1, 9–10. Originally published in Shijie ribao, 12 January 1957. Zhang Junmai. “Junyuan gonggu Taiwan zhuanzhi 軍援鞏固台灣專制 [Military assistance has consolidated the autocracy in Taiwan]” (28 May 1957). In Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, edited by Xue, vol. 1, 25–26. Originally published in Shijie ribao, 28 May 1957. Zhang Junmai. “Taiwan yu dalu fanduidang wenti 台灣與大陸反對黨問題 [The problem of organizing an opposition party on Taiwan and the mainland]” (21 September 1957). In Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, edited by Xue, vol. 1, 55–56. Originally published in Shijie ribao, 21 September 1957. Zhang Junmai. “Fanduidang yu zhengfu zhi guanxi 反對黨與政府之關係 [The relationship between the opposition party and the government]” (14 November 1957). In Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, edited by Xue, vol. 1, 75–76. Originally published in Shijie ribao, 14 November 1957. Chang, Carsun (Zhang Junmai). The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957–1962. Zhang Junmai. Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物主義駁論 [Refutation of dialectical materialism]. Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1958. Zhang Junmai. “Xiandai shijie fenluan yu rujia zhexue de jiazhi 現代世界紛亂與儒 家哲學的價值 [The turbulence of the modern world and the value of Confucian Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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philosophy]” (1 March 1959). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 2, 813–20. Originally published in Minzhu Zhongguo 2, no. 5 (March 1959). Zhang Junmai. “Shehui zhuyi fangxiang de zhuanbian: wei Ziyou Zhongguo shi zhounian jinian zuo 社會主義方向的轉變:為《自由中國》十周年紀念作 [Changes in the direction of socialism: in celebration of the tenth anniversary of Free China]” (16 November 1959), in Zhang, 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji, edited by Xue, vol. 5, 401–09. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 21, no. 10 (November 1959). Zhang Junmai. “Xinrujia zhexue zhi jiben fanchou 新儒家哲學之基本範疇 [Basic categories of New Confucian philosophy]” (25 June 1960). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 518–42. Originally published in Rensheng 人生 [Human life], no. 232 (July 1960). Chang, Carsun (Zhang Junmai). Wang Yang-ming: Idealist Philosopher of Sixteenthcentury China. Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John’s University Press, 1962. Zhang Junmai. “Xin rujia sixiang shi xie wan yihou 新儒家思想史寫完以後 [After the completion of The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought]” (16 March 1963). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 2, 801–12. Originally published in Rensheng, no. 297 (March 1963). Zhang Junmai. “Ruxue zhi fuxing 儒學之復興 [The revival of Confucian studies]” (16 June 1964). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 571–77. Originally published in Rensheng, no. 327 (June 1964). Zhang Junmai. “Xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue 新儒家政治哲學 [Political philosophy of New Confucianism]” (2 March 1965). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 376–92. Originally published in Ziyou zhong 1, no. 3 (May 1965). Zhang Junmai. “Zhongguo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang fuxing 中國現代化與儒家思 想復興 [China’s modernization and the revival of Confucian thought]” (1965). In Zhang, Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji, edited by Cheng, vol. 1, 578–96. Zhang Junmai. Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji 中西印哲學文集 [Collected essays on Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophy], edited by Cheng Wenxi 程文熙. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1981. Zhang Junmai. Xin rujia sixiang shi 新儒家思想史 [The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought]. Taipei: Hongwenguan chubanshe, 1986. Zhang Junmai. Zhongguo zhuanzhi junzhu zhengzhi zhi pingyi 中國專制君主政制之評 議 [A critique of autocratic monarchy in China]. Taipei: Hongwenguan chubanshe, 1986. Zhang Junmai. Shehui zhuyi sixiang yundong gaiguan 社會主義思想運動槪觀 [An overview of socialist thought and movements]. Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1988. Zhang Junmai. 1949 nian yihou Zhang Junmai yanlunji 一九四九年以後張君勱言論集 [Collected works of Zhang Junmai after 1949], vols. 1–5, edited by Xue Huayuan 薛化元. Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1989. Kenneth Kai-chung Yung - 978-90-04-46604-3 Downloaded from Brill.com05/10/2023 03:19:02AM via University of Hong Kong

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Other Published Materials (in Alphabetical Order)

Alitto, Guy S. The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Arblaster, Anthony. The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. Banzi 班兹 (Barnes, Harry E.), Jiquan duiyu minzhu ziyou de weixie 極權對於民主自由 的威脅 [The threat to democracy and freedom from totalitarianism]. Translated by Li Xingwu 李省吾. Hong Kong: Huaguo chubanshe, 1951. “Basic Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.” In Twentieth-Century Europe, edited by John W. Boyer and Jan Goldstein. Vol. 9 of University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, edited by John W. Boyer and Julius Kirshner, 528– 39. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Bergère, Marie-Claire. Sun Yat-sen. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998. Bloom, Irene, trans. Mencius. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Busky, Donald F. Democratic Socialism: A Global Survey. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000. Cao Yongxiang 曹永祥, ed. Xu Fuguan jiaoshou jinian wenji 徐復觀敎授紀念文集 [Collected essays in memory of Professor Xu Fuguan]. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1984. Cao Yongyang. “Xu Fuguan xiansheng nianpu 徐復觀先生年譜 [Chronology of Mr Xu Fuguan].” In Xu Fuguan jiaoshou jinian wenji 徐復觀敎授紀念文集 [Essays in memory of Professor Xu Fuguan], edited by Cao Yongyang, 561–67. Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxiangongsi, 1984. Chan, N. Serina. The Thought of Mou Zongsan. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Chan, Wing-tsit trans. and ed. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Chang, Hao. Liang Ch‘i-ch‘ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Chang, Hao. “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China.” In The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, 276–302. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. Chapman, Frank Miller and Paul Henle. The Fundamentals of Logic. New York: Charles Scribner’s sons, 1933. Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀. “Benzhi zuian zhi dabianshu 本誌罪案之答辯書 [Our response to the charges against the periodical].” Xin qingnian 新青年 [New youth] 6, no. 1 (January 1919): 10–11. Chen Duxiu. “Kexue yu rensheng guan xu 《科學與人生觀》序 [Preface of Science and views of life].” In Kexue yu rensheng guan 科學與人生觀 [Science and views of

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life], edited by Yadong tushuguan 亞東圖書館 [East Asian library], 1–8. Shanghai: Yadong tushuguan, 1925. Chen Pingjing 陳平景. “Yin Haiguang zhuanji 殷海光傳記 [Biography of Yin Haiguang].” In Yin, Chuncan tusi, 169–240. Taipei: Yuanjing chubanshe, 1978. Chen Ruilin 陳瑞麟. “Taiwan kexue zhexue de shouhang: Yin Haiguang de kexue zhexue 台灣科學哲學的首航:殷海光的科學哲學 [Pioneer in philosophy of science in Taiwan: Yin Haiguang’s philosophy of science].” Guoli zhengzhi daxue zhexue xuebao 國立政治大學哲學學報 [National Chengchi University journal of philosophy], no. 10 (July 2003): 1–33. Chen Wanqian 陳宛茜. “Bushuo shenhua, bushuo guihua, dashi zhishuo renhua 不 說神話 不說鬼話 大師只說人話 [The master speaks neither divine nor ghostly language, but only human language].” Lianhe bao 聯合報 [United daily news], 28 June 2008, A12. Chen Zhengmao 陳正茂. Zhongguo qingniandang yanjiu lunji 中國青年黨研究論 集 [Essays on the Chinese Youth Party]. Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2008. Cheng Wenxi 程文熙. “Zhang Junmai xiansheng nianbiao jianbian chugao (I) 張君勱 先生年表簡編初稿(上) [Draft of the abridged chronology of Mr. Zhang Junmai (I)].” In Zhang Junmai zhuanji ziliao 張君勱傳記資料 [Biographical materials of Zhang Junmai], edited by Fang Shiduo 方師鐸, vol. 2, 251–60. Taipei: Tianyi chubanshe, 1979. Originally published in Zaisheng 再生 [National renaissance] (Taipei edition) 2, no. 2 (February 1972). Chow, Tse-tsung. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch’ien. Chin-ssu lu: Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology. Translated and compiled Wing-tsit Chan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Cua, A.S. The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming’s Moral Psychology. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982. Dai Duheng 戴杜衡. “Cong jingji pingdeng shuoqi 從經濟平等說起 [Discussion commencing from economic equality].” Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 8 (October 1952): 12–16. Davies, Gloria. Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007. Davis, Walter W. “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment.” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (October 1983): 523–48. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. “Confucian Liberalism and Western Parochialism: A Response to Paul A. Cohen.” Philosophy East and West 35, no. 4 (October 1985): 399–412.

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De Bary, Wm. Theodore. “Introduction.” In Confucianism and Human Rights, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, 1–26. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. The Liberal Tradition in China. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983. Dickson, Bruce J. “The Lesson of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan.” The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 56–84. Dunstan, Helen. “Premodern Chinese Political Thought.” In Handbook of Political Theory, edited by Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, 320–37. London: Sage, 2004. Elstein, David. Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2015. Fairbank, John K. The United States and China, 1st edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948; 2st edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. Fan Hong 范泓. Zai lishi de touying zhong 在歷史的投影中 [In the projection of history]. Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2008. Fang Shiduo 方師鐸, ed. Zhang Junmai zhuanji ziliao 張君勱傳記資料 [Biographical materials on Zhang Junmai]. Taipei: Tianyi chubanshe, 1979–81. Feige 菲格 [Feigl, Herbert]. “Ziran sixiang yu renwen sixiang 自然思想與人文思想 [Naturalism and Humanism],” translated by Yin Haiguang. In Yin, Xueshu yu sixiang, vol. 1, 321–51. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 12, no. 6–7 (March–April 1955). Feigl, Herbert. “Naturalism and Humanism.” American Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer 1949): 135–48. Feng Youlan 馮友蘭. “Canjia tugai de shouhuo 參加土改的收穫 [The fruits of participating in the land reform].” In Feng Youlan, Sansongtang quanji 三松堂全集 [Complete works of the hall of three pines], vol. 14, 401–10. Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 2001. Originally published in Xuexi 學習 [Learning] 2, no. 2 (April 1950). Feng Youlan. “Tugai de jiaoyu gongyong 土改的教育功用 [The educational function of the land reform].” In Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 415–18. Originally published in Jinbu ribao 進步日報 [Progressive daily] (Tianjin), 27 March 1950. Feng Youlan. “Tugai gongzuo zhong de qunzhong luxian 土改工作中的群眾路線 [The mass line in land reform work].” In Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 411–14. Originally published in Guangming ribao 光明日報 [Brightness daily] (Beijing), 23 March 1950. Feng Youlan. “Yinian xuexi de zongjie 一年學習的總結 [A summary of learning in the past year].” In Feng, Sansongtang quanji, vol. 14, 396–400. Originally published in Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s daily] (Beijing), 22 January 1950. Flynn, Tom, ed. The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2007.

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Fu Dawei 傅大為. “Kexue shizheng lunshu lishi de bianzheng: cong jindai xifang qimeng dao Taiwan de Yin Haiguang 科學實證論述歷史的辯證:從近代西方啟蒙到 臺灣的殷海光 [The historical dialectics of the discourse on scientific empiricism: from the Enlightenment in the modern West to Yin Haiguang in Taiwan].” Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan 台灣社會硏究季刋 [Taiwan quarterly in social studies] 1, no. 4 (December 1988): 11–56. Fu Zheng 傅正, ed. Lei an shimo: Lei an fengbo 雷案始末:雷案風波 [An account of the case of Lei Zhen: The turbulent case of Lei Zhen]. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989. Fung, Edmund S.K. “Chinese Nationalism and Democracy during the War Period, 1937–1945: A Critique of the jiuwang–qimeng Dichotomy.” In Power and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu, edited by Billy K.L. So et al., 201–20. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003. Fung, Edmund S.K. In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 1929–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Fung, Edmund S.K. “Nationalism and Modernity: The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Republican China.” Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2009): 777–813. Fung, Edmund S.K. “New Confucianism and Chinese Democratization: The Thought and Predicament of Zhang Junmai.” Twentieth-century China 28, no. 2 (April 2003): 41–71. Fung, Edmund S.K. “The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural Conceptions and Dual Responsibilities.” Modern China 32, no. 4 (October 2006): 453–82. Fung, Edmund S.K. The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Furth, Charlotte. “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism.” In The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, 22–53. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. Gao Changshou 高昌壽. “Jingji de ziyou zhuyi 經濟的自由主義 [Economic liberalism].” Ziyou Zhongguo 4, no. 3 (February 1951): 93–96. Gao Qi 高奇. Zhongguo xiandai jiaoyu shi 中國現代敎育史 [A history of modern Chinese education]. Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1985. Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 2. Dublin: printed for William Hallhead, 1781. Gordon, Leonard H.D. and Sidney Chang. “John K. Fairbank and His Critics in the Republic of China.” Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (November 1970): 137–49. Graham, A.C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989. Gray, John. Liberalism. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995.

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Grieder, Jerome B. Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917–1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Groot, Gerry. Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony. New York: Routledge, 2004. Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇. Ruxue yu ruxue shi xinlun 儒學與儒學史新論 [New discussion of Confucian studies and the history of Confucian studies]. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002. Guy, R. Kent. “Zhang Tingyu and Reconciliation: The Scholar and the State in the Early Qianlong Reign.” Late Imperial China 7, no. 1 (June 1986): 50–62. Hayek, Friedrich A. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Hayek, Friedrich A. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. Haiyeke 海耶克 [Hayek]. Dao nuyi zhi lu 到奴役之路 [The road to serfdom], translated by Yin Haiguang. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chubanshe, 2009. He Xinquan 何信全. Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu: dangdai xinrujia zhengzhi zhexue yanjiu 儒學與現代民主:當代新儒家政治哲學硏究 [Confucian Studies and Modern Democracy: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Present-day New Confucians]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001. He Zhuo’en 何卓恩. “‘Wusi zhi zi’ Yin Haiguang de ‘wusi’ qingjie yu ‘wusi’ guannian 「五四之子」殷海光的「五四」情結與「五四」觀念 [The ‘May Fourth’ complex and ‘May Fourth’ conception of the ‘son of May Fourth’ Yin Haiguang].” Renwen zazhi 人文雜誌 [Humanities magazine] Year 2010, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 120–28. He Zhuo’en. Yin Haiguang yu jindai Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi 殷海光與近代中國自由主義 [Yin Haiguang and modern Chinese liberalism]. Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2004. He Zhuo’en. “Zi you Zhongguo” yu Taiwan ziyou zhuyi sichao: weiquan tizhi xia de minzhu kaoyan 《自由中國》與臺灣自由主義思潮 : 威權體制下的民主考驗 [Free China and liberal thought currents in Taiwan: a challenge for democracy under authoritarianism]. Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 2008. Holzhey, Helmut and Vilem Mudroch. The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010. Hook, Sidney. Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. New York: Cosimo Inc., 2009. Howland, Douglas. Personal Liberty and Public Good: The Introduction of John Stuart Mill to Japan and China. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. Hsiao, K.C. (Xiao Gongqian 蕭公權). A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975. Hu Shi 胡適. “Cong Dao nuyi zhi lu shuoqi 從《到奴役之路》說起 [Discussion commencing from The Road to Serfdom].” Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 6 (March 1954): 4–5. Hu Shi. Hu Shi riji quanji 胡適日記全集 [The complete diaries of Hu Shi], vol. 8. Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2004.

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Hu Shi. “Sanbai nian lai shijie wenhua de qushi yu Zhongguo ying caiqu de fangxiang 三百年來世界文化的趨勢與中國應採取的方向 [The trend of world culture in the last three hundred years and the direction that China should take].” Ziyou Zhongguo 8, no. 3 (February 1953): 4–6. Hu Shi. “Zhixue de fangfa yu cailiao 治學的方法與材料 [The methods and materials of scholarship] (1928).” In Hu Shi, Hu Shi quanji 胡適全集 [Complete works of Hu Shi], edited by Ji Xianlin 季羡林, vol. 3, 131–43. Hefei: Anhui jiao yu chu ban she, 2003. Huang, Chun-Chieh (Huang Junjie 黃俊傑). Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts. Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2010. Huang Junjie. Dong Ya ruxue shiyu zhong de Xu Fuguan ji qi sixiang 東亞儒學視域 中的徐復觀及其思想 [Xu Fuguan and his thought within East Asia’s Confucian horizons]. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2009. Huang Junjie. Ruxue yu xiandai Taiwan 儒學與現代台灣 [Confucian studies and modern Taiwan]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001. Huang, Max Ko-wu. The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008. Huang Yuhe 黃宇和. Sun Yixian zai Lundun, 1896–1897: sanmin zhuyi sixiang tanyuan 孫逸仙在倫敦, 1896–1897:三民主義思想探源 [Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896–1897: the intellectual origins of the Three Principles of the People]. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2007. Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強. “Weida shijia yanzhong de weida lishirenwu: Xu Fuguan ping Jiang Jieshi 偉大史家眼中的偉大歷史人物:徐復觀評蔣介石 [A great historical figure from the eyes of a great historian: Xu Fuguan’s commentaries on Chiang Kai-shek].” Dongwu lishi xuebao 東吳歷史學報 [Soochow journal of history], no. 30 (December 2013): 115–71. Huang Zhaoqiang. “‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan zhi caoni ji kanxing jingguo biannian yanjiu 〈中國文化與世界〉宣言之草擬及刊行經過編年研究 [A chronological study of the drafting and publication of the manifesto on ‘Chinese culture and the world’].” In Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie: Zhongguo wenhua xuanyan wushi zhounian jinian lunwenji 中國文化與世界:中國文化宣言五十週年紀念論文集 [Chinese culture and the world: collected essays in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the manifesto on Chinese culture], edited by Li Ruiquan 李瑞全 and Yang Zuhan 楊祖漢, 65–121. Zhongli, Taiwan: Zhongyang daxue wenxueyuan ruxue yanjiu zhongxin, 2009. Huang Zongxi. Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. Translated by Wm. Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Hurley, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2008. Hutchinson, John. Modern Nationalism. London: Fontana Press, 1994.

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Hutchinson, John. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. Israel, John. “Politics on Formosa.” The China Quarterly, no. 15 (September 1963): 3–11. Ivanhoe, Philip J. trans. Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2009. Jeans, Roger B. Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: The Politics of Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1906–1941. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. Jian Minghai. “Ziyou zhongguo wusi guan de xingsu yu yunyong 《自由中國》五四觀 的型塑與運用 [The formation and usage of Free China’s view on the May Fourth Movement].” Si yu yan 思與言 [Thought and word] 47, no. 2 (June 2009): 79–133. Jiang Lianhua 蔣連華. Xueshu yu zhengzhi: Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu 學術與政治:徐復 觀思想研究 [Scholarship and politics: a study of Xu Fuguan’s thought]. Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2006. Jiang Rixin 江日新. “Zhang Junmai yu ‘Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie’ xuanyan: qi xiangfa ji suqiu 張君勱與「中國文化與世界」宣言:其想法及訴求 [Zhang Junmai and the manifesto on ‘Chinese culture and the world’: his ideas and demands].” In Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, edited by Li and Yang, 43–63. Jiang Yihua 姜義華. “Lun Hu Shi yu renquan wenti de lunzhan 論胡適與人權問題的 論戰 [On Hu Shi and the debate on human rights issues].” In Hu Shi yu xiandai Zhongguo wenhua zhuanxing 胡適與現代中國文化轉型 [Hu Shi and cultural transformation in modern China], edited by Liu Qingfeng 劉靑峰, 73–112. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1994. Jiang Yuntian 蔣勻田. Zhongguo jindaishi zhuanlidian 中國近代史轉捩點 [Turning points in modern Chinese history]. Hong Kong: Youlian chubanshe, 1976. Jing Zhiren 荊知仁. Zhongguo lixianshi 中國立憲史 [A history of constitution-making in China]. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1984. Jordan, Z.A. “The Dialectical Materialism of Lenin.” Slavic Review 25, no. 2 (June 1966): 259–86. Ju Zheng 居正. “Sifa danghua wenti 司法黨化問題 [The question of partifying the judiciary].” In Ju Zheng 居正. Ju Zheng xiansheng quanji 居正先生全集 [Complete works of Mr. Ju Zheng], edited by Chen Sanjing 陳三井 and Ju Mi 居蜜, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1998), 241–58. Originally published in Zhonghua faxue zazhi 中華法學雜誌 [Chinese journal of legal studies] 5, no. 11/12 (December 1934). Kenworthy, E.W. “China Expert Says U.S. Is Overreacting to Peking: Advises Senators to Give Regime an Open Door While Standing Firm.” New York Times, 11 March 1966. Khrushchev, N.S. Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956.

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Kirby, William C. “Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943–1958.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990): 121–41. Kirby, William C. “Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928–1937.” In Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, edited by Wen-hsin Yeh, 137–60. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Lao Siguang 勞思光. “Zhongguo wenhua zhi weilai yu ruxue jingshen zhi chongjian 中國文化之未來與儒學精神之重建 [The future of Chinese culture and the reestablishment of Confucian spirit].” Minzhu pinglun 3, no. 22 (November 1952): 10–17. Lardy, Nicholas R. “Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan” In The People’s Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965, edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank. Vol. 14 of The Cambridge History of China, edited by Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, 144–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Lau, D.C. The Analects. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1992. Lei Zhen 雷震. Lei Zhen huiyilu: “Wo de muqin” xubian 雷震回憶錄:「我的母親」續編 [The memoirs of Lei Zhen: my mother (part 2)]. Hong Kong: Qishi niandai zazhishe, 1978. Lei Zhen. Lei Zhen riji 雷震日記 [The diary of Lei Zhen]. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989. Lei Zhen. “Women de taidu 我們的態度 [Our attitude].” In Lei, Lei Zhen yu zi you Zhongguo, 73–94. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 15, no. 10 (November 1956). Lei Zhen. “Women weisheme poqie xuyao yige qiang you li de fanduidang 我們為什 麼迫切需要一個強有力的反對黨 [Why do we urgently need a strong and powerful opposition party?].” In Lei Zhen, Lei Zhen yu zhengdang zhengzhi 雷震與政黨政治 [Lei Zhen and party politics], 97–113. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1989. Originally published in Ziyou Zhongguo 22, no. 10 (16 May 1960). Li Ao and Wang Rongzu 李敖、汪榮祖. Jiang Jieshi pingzhuan 蔣介石評傳 [A critical biography of Chiang Kai-shek]. Taipei: Shangzhou wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1995. Li Hanji 黎漢基. Yin Haiguang sixiang yanjiu: you wusi dao zhanhou Taiwan, 1919–1969 殷海光思想硏究:由五四到戰後臺灣, 1919–1969 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s thought: from May Fourth to postwar Taiwan, 1919–1969]. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 2000. Li Minghui 李明輝. Dangdai ruxue de ziwo zhuanhua 當代儒學的自我轉化 [Selftransformation of contemporary Confucian studies]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001. Li Minghui. Rujia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang 儒家視野下的政治思想 [Political thought from a Confucian perspective]. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005.

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Li Shuzhen 李淑珍 (Su-san Lee). “Ziyou zhuyi, Xinrujia yu yijiu wuling niandai Taiwan ziyou minzhu yundong: cong Xu Fuguan de shijiao chufa 自由主義、新儒家與一九 五零年代臺灣自由民主運動:從徐復觀的視角出發 [Liberalism, New Confucianism and the liberal democratic movement in Taiwan in the 1950s: an analysis from Xu Fuguan’s perspective].” Si yu yan 思與言 [Thought and words] 49, no. 2 (June 2011): 9–90. Li Weiwu 李維武. Xu Fuguan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 徐復觀學術思想評傳 [A critical account of Xu Fuguan’s scholarly thought]. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2001. Li Weiwu, ed., Xu Fuguan yu Zhongguo wenhua 徐復觀與中國文化 [Xu Fuguan and Chinese culture]. Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1997. Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰. Taiwan minzhu yundong sishi nian 台灣民主運動四十年 [Forty years of democratic movement in Taiwan]. Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe, 1988. Li Zehou 李澤厚. “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou 啟蒙與救亡的雙重 變奏 [The dual variation of enlightenment and national salvation].” In Li Zehou, Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shilun 中國現代思想史論 [Discourse on Modern Chinese Intellectual History], 3–46. Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1996. Liang Hejun 梁和鈞. “Fei Zhengqing gaizao le Mao Zedong? Mao Zedong gaizao le Huashengdun 費正清改造了毛澤東? 毛澤東改造了華盛頓? [Has Fairbank reconstructed Mao Zedong? Has Mao Zedong reconstructed Washington?].” Zhengxin xinwenbao 徵信新聞報 [Credit Newspaper], 28 June 1966. Lin, Yü-sheng. The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979. Lin Yusheng 林毓生. Zhengzhi zhixu yu duoyuan shehui: shehui sixiang luncong 政治 秩序與多元社會:社會思想論叢 [Political order and pluralist society: discussion on social thought]. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1989. Lin Yusheng. Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua 中國傳統的創造性轉 化 [Creative transformation of Chinese tradition] (Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2011). Liu, Honghe. Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal: Hsu Fu-kuan’s Critical Examination of the Confucian Political Tradition. New York: Peter Lang, 2001. Liu, Lydia H. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900–1937. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Liu Shu-hsien. “Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical Review of Contem­ porary Neo-Confucian Thought.” In Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-dragons, edited by Tu Wei-ming, 92–118. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: University Press, 1970. Loewe, Michael. “The Structure and Practice of Government.” In The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, edited by Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe. Vol. 1 of

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Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1978. Tang Junyi. “Zhong Xi shehui renwen yu minzhu jingshen 中西社會人文與民主精 神 [The humanities and the democratic spirit in Chinese and Western societies]” (February 1953). In Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之 重建 [The reconstruction of the spirit of the humanities], 396–419. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1978. Tao Dongfeng 陶東風. “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi: Zhongguo wenhua jiangou de disan tiao daolu 保守自由主義:中國文化建構的第三條道路 [Conservative liberalism: the third road of China’s cultural construction].” In Zhishi fenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang 知識分子立場:激進與保守之間的動盪 [The stance of intellectuals: the turbulence between radicalism and conservatism], edited by Li Shitao 李世濤, 475–85. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Tao Hengsheng 陶恒生. “Liushi niandai de Taiwan Zhong Xi wenhua lunzhan 六十年 代的臺灣中西文化論戰 [The Taiwan-based literary battle between Chinese and Western culture in the 1960s].” Zhuanji wenxue 傳記文學 [Biographical literature] 83, no. 3 (September 2003): 15–31. Thompson, Noel. Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism, 1884–2005. London: Routledge, 2006. Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland. Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1982. United States Department of State, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943 China. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957. Vincent, Andrew. Modern Political Ideologies. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Wang Juntao 王軍濤. “Confucian Democrats in Chinese History.” In Confucianism for the Modern World, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong, 69–89. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Wang Xiaobo 王曉波. “Wo bu fenxiang zhege shidai de jiazhi: jinian Yin Haiguang xiansheng shishi ershi zhounian 我不分享這個時代的價值:紀念殷海光先生逝世二 十周年 [I don’t share the values of this era: in memory of the twentieth anniversary of Mr. Yin Haiguang’s death].” In Yin Xia Junlu et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji, 499–504. Wang Yangming 王陽明. Chuanxilu 傳習錄 [A record for practice]. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 2001. Wang Yuxiu 王聿修. “Ziyou jingji biran pingdeng 自由經濟必然平等 [A free economy is bound to be equal].” Ziyou Zhongguo 10, no. 11 (June 1954): 7–9. Wang Zhongjian 王中江. Lianyu: Yin Haiguang pingzhuan 煉獄:殷海光評傳 [Purgatory: a critical biography of Yin Haiguang]. Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe, 2003. Wei Zhengtong 韋政通. “Liangzhong xintai, yige mubiao: Xinrujia yu ziyou zhuyi guannian chongtu de jiantao 兩種心態，一個目標:新儒家與自由主義觀念衝突的檢討

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[Two mentalities and one goal: a review of the conceptual conflict between New Confucianism and liberalism].” In Sanshi nianlai woguo renwen ji shehui kexue zhi huigu yu zhanwang 三十年來我國人文及社會科學之回顧與展望 [Reviewing and envisioning the development of the humanities and social sciences in our country in the past thirty years], edited by Lai Zehan 賴澤涵, 35–66. Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1987. Wei Zhengtong. “Yin Haiguang yu Xinrujia 殷海光與新儒家 [Yin Haiguang and the New Confucians].” In Yin Haiguang xueshu sixiang yanjiu: haixia liang’an Yin Haiguang xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 殷海光學術思想硏究:海峽兩岸殷海光學術 硏討會論文集 [Studies of Yin Haiguang’s scholarship and thought: proceedings of the cross-strait conference on Yin Haiguang], edited by Zhang Binfeng and Zhang Xiaoguang 張斌峰、張曉光, 9–14. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 2000. Wei Zhengtong et al. Ziyou minzhu de sixiang yu wenhua 自由民主的思想與文化 [Liberal and democratic thought and culture]. Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe wenhua chubanbu, 1990. Wen Liming 聞黎明. “Xinan lianda ‘wusi’ jinian shulun 西南聯大“五四”紀念述論 [Discussion of the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement at the National Southwestern Associated University].” In Wusi de lishi yu lishi zhong de wusi: Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong 90 zhounian guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 五四的歷史 與歷史中的五四:北京大學紀念五四運動90 周年國際學術研討會論文集 [History of the May Fourth Movement and the May Fourth Movement in history: proceedings of the International Conference at Peking University to Commemorate the Ninetieth Anniversary of May Fourth], edited by Niu Dayong and Ouyang Zhesheng 牛大勇、歐陽哲生, 565–86. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009. Weng Hekai 翁賀凱. “Zhang Junmai wannian rujia sixiang fuxinglun zai tanxi 張君 勱晚年儒家思想復興論再探析 [A reappraisal of Zhang Junmai’s theory of reviving Confucian thought in his later years].” Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu 中國文化研究 [Studies of Chinese culture], no. 2 (Summer 2009): 28–37. Weng Qingping 翁青萍. Minzhu zhengzhi de shehui jingji sixiang 民主政治的社會經濟 思想 [Socio-economic ideals in a democratic political system]. Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1952. Weng Songran 翁松燃. “Yin Haiguang xiansheng de minzhu guan 殷海光先生的民主 觀 [Mr. Yin Haiguang’s view on democracy].” In Wei Zhengtong et al. Ziyou minzhu de sixiang yu wenhua, 228–53. Taipei: Zili wanbaoshe wenhua chubanbu, 1990. Wu Haiyong 吳海勇. “1928 nian zhi 1948 nian Zhongyang ribao dui wusi yundong de pinglun 1928 年至1948 年《中央日報》對五四運動的評論 [Central Daily’s commentaries on the May Fourth Movement, 1928–1948].” Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian 上海黨史與黨建 [Shanghai party history and party construction] (May 2009): 15–18.

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221

Xia Daoping 夏道平. “Jinian Yin Haiguang xiansheng 紀念殷海光先生 [Commemo­ rating Mr. Yin Haiguang].” In Yin Xia et al., Yin Haiguang jinian ji, 239–46. Xiao Bin 蕭濱. Chuantong Zhongguo yu ziyou linian: Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu 傳統 中國與自由理念:徐復觀思想硏究 [Traditional China and the concept of liberty: a study of Xu Fuguan’s thought]. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999. Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權. “Zhongguo junzhu zhengti de shizhi 中國君主政體的實 質 [The substance of China’s monarchical political system].” In Xiao Gongquan, Xianzheng yu minzhu 憲政與民主 [Constitutionalism and democracy], 65–79. Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2006. Xie Xiaodong 謝曉東. Xiandai xinruxue yu ziyou zhuyi: Xu Fuguan Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue bijiao yanjiu 現代新儒學與自由主義:徐復觀殷海光政治哲學比較研究 [Modern New Confucianism and Liberalism: A Comparative Study of Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang’s Political Philosophy]. Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 2008. Xu, Aymeric. “Mapping Conservatism of the Republican Era: Genesis and Typologies.” Journal of Chinese History 4, no. 1 (January 2020): 135–59. Xu Gang. “Symbolism in Chinese Poetry on History.” Monumenta Serica 48 (2000): 1–18. Xu Jilin 許紀霖. “Xiandai Zhongguo de ziyou zhuyi chuantong 現代中國的自由主義 傳統 [Liberal tradition in modern China].” Ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀 [Twenty-first century], no. 42 (August 1997): 27–35. Xu, Xiaoqun. Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-century China, 1901– 1937. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008. Xue Huayuan 薛化元. Minzhu xianzheng yu minzu zhuyi de bianzheng fazhan: Zhang Junmai sixiang yanjiu 民主憲政與民族主義的辯證發展:張君勱思想硏究 [The dialectical development of constitutional democracy and nationalism: a study of Zhang Junmai’s thought]. Taipei: Daohe chubanshe, 1993. Xue Huayuan, ed. Taiwan lishi nianbiao: zhongzhan pian 台灣歷史年表:終戰篇 [A chronology of Taiwanese history: the postwar era]. Taipei: Zhang Rongfa jijinhui: Guojia zhengce yanjiu ziliao zhongxin, 1990. Xue Huayuan, ed. “Ziyou Zhongguo” quan 23 juan zong mulu ji suoyin 自由中國全23 卷總目錄暨索引 [Table of contents and index for all twenty-three volumes of Free China]. Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 2000. Xue Huayuan. Ziyou Zhongguo yu minzhu xianzheng: 1950 niandai Taiwan sixiang shi de yige kaocha 自由中國與民主憲政:1950 年代臺灣思想史的一個考察 [Free China and constitutional democracy: a study of Taiwanese intellectual history in the 1950s]. Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe 1996. Yan Binggang 顏炳罡. Dangdai xinruxue yinlun 當代新儒學引論 [Introduction to contemporary New Confucianism]. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1998. Yan Binggang. Zhenghe yu chongzhu: Dangdai daru Mou Zongsan xiansheng sixiang yanjiu 整合與重鑄:當代大儒牟宗三先生思想研究 [Integration and remolding:

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a study of the thought of Mr. Mou Zongsan, the present-day Confucian]. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1995. Yang, C.K. A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition. Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959. Yang Tianshi. “The Third Force in Hong Kong and North America during the 1950s.” In Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-century China, edited by Roger B. Jeans, 269–73. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. Yang Yongqian 楊永乾. Zhonghua Minguo xianfa zhifu: Zhang Junmai zhuan 中華民國 憲法之父:張君勱傳 [Father of the Republic of China’s constitution: A biography of Zhang Junmai]. Taipei: Published by the author, 1993. Yang Yunyuan 楊允元. “Zai Yindu jiangxue shi de Zhang Junmai 在印度講學時的張 君勱 [Zhang Junmai during his lecture tour in India].” Zhuanji wenxue 傳記文學 [Biographical literature] 19, no. 1 (July 1971): 35–37. Yeh, Wen-Hsin. The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919– 1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990. Yin Xia Junlu 殷夏君璐 et al. Yin Haiguang jinian ji 殷海光紀念集 [Collected essays in memory of Yin Haiguang]. Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1990. Yu Jiyuan. “The ‘Manifesto’ of New-Confucianism and the Revival of Virtue Ethics.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3, no. 3 (2008): 317–334. Yu Pingfan 于平凡 (Xu Guansan 許冠三). Zhongguo minzhu ziyou yundong shihua 中國民主自由運動史話 [A history of the movement for democracy and liberty in China]. Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1950. Yu Yingshi 余英時. Minzhu zhidu de fazhan 民主制度的發展 [Development of democratic political system]. Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954. Yu Yingshi 余英時. “Qian Mu yu Xinrujia 錢穆與新儒家 [Qian Mu and New Confucianism].” In Yu Yingshi 余英時. Xiandai ruxue lun 現代儒學論 [On modern Confucianism], 103–58. River Edge, N.J.: Bafang wenhua qiye gongsi, 1996. Yu Yingshi 余英時. “Wo zou guo de lu 我走過的路 [The road that I have walked].” In Yu Yingshi 余英時, Xiandai xueren yu xueshu 現代學人與學術 [Modern scholars and scholarship], edited by Shen Zhijia 沈志佳, 474–76. Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2006. Yu Yingshi 余英時. Ziyou yu pingdeng zhi jian 自由與平等之間 [Between freedom and equality]. Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1955. Yu Zhi 雨止. “Du Zhang Junmai Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 讀張君勵「辯證唯物 主義駁論」 [Reading Zhang Junmai’s Refutation of dialectical materialism].” Su E wen ti yan jiu 蘇俄問題研究 [Studies of the problems of Soviet Russia] 13, no. 6 (June 1972): 42–44. Zeng Xubai 曾虛白. “Ziyou, minzhu, shehui san zhuyi helun 自由、民主、社會三主 義合論 [An integrated discussion of liberalism, democracy, and socialism].” Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 6 (March 1950): 14–16.

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223

Zhai Zhicheng 翟志成. “Wenhua jijin zhuyi VS wenhua baoshou zhuyi: Hu Shi yu Gang Tai xinrujia 文化激進主義 VS. 文化保守主義: 胡適與港臺新儒家 [Cultural radicalism versus cultural conservatism: Hu Shi and the New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan].” Xinya xuebao 新亞學報 [New Asia journal] 26 (January 2008): 125–96. Zhang Binfeng and Zhang Xiaoguang 張斌峰、張曉光 ed. Yin Haiguang xueshu sixiang yanjiu: haixia liang’an Yin Haiguang xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 殷海光學術 思想研究:海峽兩岸殷海光學術研討會論文集 [Studies of Yin Haiguang’s scholarly thought: collected papers of the cross-strait academic conference on Yin Haiguang]. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 2000. Zhang Chunlin 張春林. Yin Haiguang zhengzhi zhexue sixiang yanjiu 殷海光政治哲 學思想研究 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s political philosophy]. Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2008. Zhang Foquan 張佛泉. Ziyou yu renquan 自由與人權 [Freedom and human rights]. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1993. Zhang Hao 張灝. You’an yishi yu minzhu chuantong 幽暗意識與民主傳統 [Dark consciousness and democratic tradition]. Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1989. Zhang Jiansheng 張健生. “Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun duhouzhi 「辯證唯物主義 駁論」讀後誌 [Book review of Refutation of dialectical materialism].” Zaisheng (Taipei edition) 6, no. 1 (January 1976): 15–20. Zhang Qing 章清. Yin Haiguang 殷海光. Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1996. Zhang Qiyun 張其昀. “Minzhu zhengzhi sanda zhendi 民主政治三大真締 [The three great true principles of democratic politics].” Zhenglun zhoukan 政論周刊 [Political commentary weekly], no. 88 (September 1956): 1–2. Zhang Shuya 張淑雅. “Meiguo dui Tai zhengce zhuanbian de kaocha, 1950 nian 12 yue– 1951 nian 5 yue 美國對臺政策轉變的考察，1950 年12 月–1951 年5 月 [A study of the changes in the United States’ policy towards Taiwan, December 1950–May 1951].” Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan 中央硏究院近代史硏究所集刊 [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica], no. 19 (June 1990): 469–86. Zhang Zhongdong 張忠棟. “Minzhu pinglun yu Ziyou Zhongguo 《民主評論》與《自 由中國》 [Democratic review and Free China].” Lishi yuekan 歷史月刊 [Historical monthly], no. 23 (December 1979): 126–30. Zhang Zhongdong. Ziyou zhuyi renwu 自由主義人物 [Figures of liberalism]. Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1998. Zheng Dahua 鄭大華. Zhang Junmai xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 張君勱學術思想評傳 [A critical biography of Zhang Junmai’s scholarship and thought]. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999. Zheng Dahua. Zhang Junmai zhuan 張君勱傳 [Biography of Zhang Junmai]. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1997.

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“Zhongguo Tongmenghui geming fanglue 中國同盟會革命方略 [Guidelines for revolution of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance].” In Sun Zhongsan quanji 孫中山全 集 [Complete works of Sun Yat-sen], edited by Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo 中國社會科學院近代史硏究所 [Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], vol. 1, 296–318. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981. “Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng xuanyan 中國自由民主戰鬥同盟宣 言 [The Manifesto of the Chinese Fighting League for Freedom and Democracy].” Zaisheng (Hong Kong edition), no. 327 (November 1952): 14–16. Zhou Dewei 周德偉. “Duiyu Haiguang xiansheng pingjie Jingji zhengce yu jingji xueli zhi shangque 對於海光先生評介《經濟政策與經濟學理》之商榷 [Feedback on Mr. Yin Haiguang’s critical introduction of Economic policy and scholarly principles of economics].” Ziyou Zhongguo 7, no. 5 (September 1952): 29–30. Zhou Dewei. “Jieshao Haiyeke gei Zhongguo zhishi qunzhong 介紹海耶克給中國知識 群眾 [Introducing Hayek to intellectuals in China].” In Zhou Dewei 周德偉, Zhou Dewei shehui zhengzhi zhexue lunzhu 周德偉社會政治哲學論著 [Zhou Dewei’s works on society, politics, and philosophy], 313–27. Taipei: Zundexing zhai, 1968. Zhou Dewei. “Haiyeke xuepai de shehui sixiang de yanjiu 海耶克學派的社會思想的研 究 [Introduction to the social thought of the school of Hayek].” In Zhou, Zhou Dewei shehui zhengzhi zhexue lunzhu, 328–47. Taipei: Zundexing zhai, 1968. Zhou Zhiping 周質平. “Qijie yu xueshu: lun Feng Youlan de daoshu bianqian 氣節與學 術:論馮友蘭的道術變遷 [Integrity and scholarship: the evolution of Feng Youlan’s scholarship].” Ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀 [Twenty-first century], no. 66 (August 2001): 95–101. Zi Youren 資友仁. “You zhengzhi minzhu dao jingji pingdeng 由政治民主到經濟 平等 [From political democracy to economic equality].” Ziyou Zhongguo 2, no. 4 (February 1950): 15.



Unpublished Materials (in Alphabetical Order)

Chak, Chi-shing. “The Contemporary Neo-Confucian Rehabilitation: Xiong Shili and His Moral Metaphysics.” PhD diss.: University of California, Berkeley, 1990. Chen Xiaohui 陳曉慧. “You shang er xia de geming: Zhongguo Guomindang gaizao yundong zhi yanjiu (1950–1952) 由上而下的革命:中國國民黨改造運動之研究 (1950–1952) [A top-down revolution: a study of the Guomindang Reorganization Movement (1950–1952)].” PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2000. Chun, Michael Hon-chung. “The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong 1949–1997: A History.” PhD diss., The Australian National University, 2010.

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225

Evans, Paul M. “Fairbank: Intellect and Enterprise in American China Scholarship, 1936–1961.” PhD diss.: Dalhousie University, 1982. He Guangwei 賀廣巍. “Yin Haiguang ziyou sixiang yanjiu 殷海光自由思想研究 [A study of Yin Haiguang’s liberal thought].” M.A. thesis, National Chengchi University, 1996. Jian Minghai 簡明海. “Jiuwang yu qimeng de kunjing: Yin Haiguang sixiang zhuanbian zhi yanjiu 救亡與啟蒙的困境:殷海光思想轉變之研究 [Dilemma between salvation and enlightenment: a study of the transformation of Yin Haiguang’s thought].” M.A. thesis, Tunghai University, 1997. Lai Lisheng 賴理生. “Xu Fuguan sixiang zhi yanjiu 徐復觀思想之研究 [A study of Xu Fuguan’s thought].” M.A. thesis, National Chengchi University, 1988. Lai Weiliang 賴威良. “Rujia chuantong yu minzhu zhengzhi: yi Xu Fuguan sixiang de quanshi weili 儒家傳統與民主政治:以徐復觀思想的詮釋為例 [Confucian tradition and democracy: an interpretative study of Xu Fuguan’s thought].” M.A. thesis, National Central University, 1995. Lee, Su-san. “Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation.” PhD diss., Brown University, 1998. Li Hanji 黎漢基. “Jingzhu quanwei: liuwang zhishi fenzi zhengzhi sixiang de bijiao yanjiu 競逐權威:流亡知識分子政治思想的比較硏究 [Competing for authority: a comparative study of émigré intellectuals’ political thought].” M.A. thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. Li Hanji 黎漢基. “Lun Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang: xiandai Taiwan zhishi fenzi yu yishi xingtai yanjiu (1949–1969) 論徐復觀與殷海光:現代台灣知識分子與意識形態硏究 (1949–1969) [On Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang: a study of intellectuals and ideology in modern Taiwan (1949–1969)].” PhD diss., Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. Lutze, Thomas D. “New Democracy: Chinese Communist Relations with the Urban Middle Forces, 1931–1952.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996. Wan Lijuan 萬麗鵑. “Yijiu wuling niandai de Zhongguo disan shili yundong 一九五 零年代的中國第三勢力運動 [The Chinese Third Force Movement in the 1950s].” PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2000. Weng Hekai 翁賀凱. “Xiandai Zhongguo de ziyou minzu zhuyi: Zhang Junmai minzu jianguo sixiang yan jiu 現代中國的自由民族主義:張君勱民族建國思想研究 [Liberal nationalism in modern China: a study of Zhang Junmai’s thought on nationbuilding].” PhD diss., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2006. Weng Zhizong 翁志宗. “Ziyou zhuyi zhe yu dangdai xinrujia zhengzhi lunshu zhi bijiao: yi Yin Haiguang, Zhang Foquan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan de lunshu wei hexin 自由主義者與當代新儒家政治論述之比較:以殷海光、張佛泉、 牟宗三、唐君毅、徐復觀的論述為核心 [The Political Discourse of the Liberals and Present-day New Confucians: A Comparative Study of Yin Haiguang, Zhang

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Selected Bibliography

Foquan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan].” PhD diss., National Chengchi University, 2002. Zheng Huijuan 鄭慧娟. “Chuantong de duanlie yu yanxu: yi Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang guanyu Zhongguo chuantong wenhua de bianlun weili 傳統的斷裂與延續:以徐復 觀與殷海光關於中國傳統文化的辯論為例 [The fracturing and continuity of tradition: a case study of the debate between Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang on traditional Chinese culture].” M.A. thesis, National Taiwan University, 1992.

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Index 1958 [Joint] Manifesto 149, 176–177, 180–181 absolute truth 114–116 abstract world 139 Academia Sinica 2, 31, 39, 99, 111 academic integrity 111 academician 99 accomplice of totalitarianism 108n.121 Agrarian Reform Law 67 agricultural cooperation 68 American Seventh Fleet 39 Analects (Lunyu 論語) 119 Anarchism 91 Anarchist 106 ancient studies 104 anomie 117, 123 anti-authoritarianism 88, 123 anti-Communism 31, 37–38, 57, 61 anti-conservative 92 anti-Marxist 4 antiquarianism 170 anti-sceptical 102 antithesis 116 anti-totalitarian 16 anti-traditionalism 7, 89, 129 anti-traditionalist 6–7, 87, 110, 125, 129, 162 anti-utopian 16, 52, 57, 81 anxiety over future uncertainties 118, 166 arbitrariness 62, 87, 120 atheism 73 atheist 172 Australia 61 authentic feeling 134 authoritarian rule 22, 95, 98 authoritarianism 59, 88 authority 10, 70, 88, 89, 106, 129, 131, 134 autocracy 92, 96, 129, 152 autocratic monarch 152 autonomy of rationality 138–139 Barnes, Harry E. (1889–1968) 94 base 74 Beijing 66, 85, 90–91 benevolence 120, 156 benevolent heart 158

blueprint 16, 36, 52, 66, 69–70, 122, 186 body representative of public opinion  145–146 Bolshevik 115 Bolshevism 17 Book of rites (Liji 禮記) 140 bourgeoisie 65, 73, 90, 103 Britain 21, 38, 53n.12, 59, 77, 153 British Labor Party 61, 153 Buddhism 74, 121, 125, 180 Bukharin, Nikolai (1888–1938) 64 burning of books 158 burying of scholars 158 campaign 29, 36, 41–42, 89, 98, 135 capacity to “let go of everything” 177 capitalism 5, 12, 22, 55–56, 61, 63, 77 censorial system 80 Central Asia 74 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 74 Central daily (Zhongyang ribao 中央日報)  34–37, 86–87, 89, 91–92, 183 Central Intelligence Agency 46, 48 Central Reorganization Commission 39 Chapman, Frank 85 Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) 84, 115 Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 (1910–1988) 33 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887–1975) adopting Principle of the People’s Livelihood 54 concluding remarks 183–185 connection with Xu Fuguan 8, 29–34 relationship with Yin Haiguang 6, 35, 37–38, 41 relationship with Zhang Junmai 42–43 Xu Fuguan’s view on Chiang 160, 162, 181 Yin Haiguang’s view on Chiang 83–84, 88, 95 chief writer 36 China weekly (Zhongguo yizhou 中國一周)  106–107 Chinese Communist government 100 Chinese Communist Party 13, 17, 47, 55, 87, 90–91, 132

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228 Chinese Communists 15, 39, 46, 67, 77–78, 87, 90–91, 135, 150, 176 Chinese culture and Chinese intellectuals 167–168 and debate between liberals and New Confucian 100–101, 105 and Guomindang’s partification 110–111 and John K. Fairbank 175–177 and national reconstruction 128–130 and student spies 87 and the New Confucian manifesto  168–173, 179, 181–182 and the New Confucian manifesto 77–79 and Xu Fuguan’s cultural ideals 162–163 and Xu Fuguan’s political ideals 149–151 as an aid to modernization 137, 146 concluding remarks 186–187 relationship with Xu, Yin and Zhang 5–10, 25, 42, 64 Yin Haiguang’s reappraisal of 117–118, 124 Chinese democracy 6, 8, 13, 26, 49, 83, 90, 154, 156–160 Chinese Democratic Constitutionalist Party 46 Chinese Democratic League 43 Chinese enlightenment 84 Chinese Fighting League for Freedom and Democracy 44–49, 66–70, 72, 184–186 Chinese mainland and attack on Chinese culture 182 and Communist domination 52, 98, 149, 161, 167 and counterattacks 39–40, 83 and free economy 154 and future democracy 50 and future liberal culture 124 and national salvation 1, 4, 6, 13, 20–21, 25–27, 29 and the Third Force 44–45, 66 concluding remarks 183–184 escape from 81, 99 future marginalization of Marxism 148 Chinese nation and future democratic ideals 1, 3, 28, 35, 49, 53, 85–86, 125, 185

Index and national salvation 17, 27, 29, 93, 132, 183 and national spirit 12 and Xu Fuguan’s Confucian ideals  149–150, 162–163, 168, 172 Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) and Free China magazine 41 and John K. Fairbank 174 and partification 108–110 and the Third Force 46 opposition from Luo Longji 19 relationship with Yin, Xu and Zhang 6, 8, 15, 183 rivalry against Chinese Communists 17, 54–55 Xu’s view on the party 29–31, 34–35, 150 Yin Haiguang’s relationship with the party 36–39, 86, 89, 93–94, 99–100, 105–107, 110–111, 120, 122, 125 Zhang Junmai’s criticism 43–44 Chinese society 7, 19–20, 47, 92, 103, 121, 124, 139, 156, 158, 161, 181 Chinese State Socialist Party 2, 21, 43, 69 Chinese thought 23, 103, 117, 140, 176–177 Chinese tradition and its revitalization 22–23, 25 and the Confucian manifesto 79–80, 173–176 opposition to individualism 19 relationship with democracy 3, 24, 26, 35 relationship with modernization 26, 88, 188 relationship with liberalism 10 Xu Fuguan’s view on 9–10, 149–150, 162, 182, 186 Yin Haiguang’s attack on 6–7, 86–89, 99–100, 102–104, 107–108, 110, 125, 186 Yin Haiguang’s reappraisal of 119, 125–126 Zhang Junmai’s view on 127, 129–131, 137–139, 186 Chongqing 35, 43, 86, 174 Christianity 74, 121, 177, 179–180 civic education 105 civil liberties 39 Civil War 67, 86, 89, 135, 175 class struggle 54, 65, 73–74, 77, 133–134, 150

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Index classical liberalism 30 cognitive meaning 112, 114, 116 Cold War and Cold War currents 15–17, 26, 51–52, 76, 81–83 Chinese liberal tradition 14, 27, 183, 186–189 legacy of Chinese intellectuals 188–189 national salvation 29 relevance to contemporary China 13 revitalization of Confucianism 76 Xu Fuguan’s relationship with 11, 161 Yin Haiguang’s relationship with 6, 8, 11, 20, 60–61, 89, 94, 123 Zhang Junmai’s relationship with 4, 6, 11, 20–22, 63, 69, 76, 182, 188 Cold War currents 14–15, 17, 26–27, 51–52, 76, 81–82, 183, 187–188 Cold War liberalism 6, 15, 17, 27, 57, 60–61, 69 collectivism 18, 93 Communism and Cold War currents 16, 51, 76, 81, and cultural conservatism 22 and national salvation 27, 29–30, 48, 132, 183 and New Confucian manifesto 78–79, 177, 180 Chinese liberal tradition 186, 188 Xu Fuguan’s view on 30–31, 34–35, 77–79, 150, 153–154 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6, 37–40, 52–53, 55, 57, 60–61, 86–87, 89–90, 92–94, 117, 125, 184 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4, 44, 48, 64–67, 74, 132–133, 138–139, 185 Zhang Qiyun’s view on 105 Communist China 25 Communist dictatorship 38, 63, 93 Communist International 77 community 9, 11, 17, 24, 45–46, 48, 98, 104, 131, 159 conception of the nation 132 conceptual motive power for world progress 92 concerned consciousness 8 Confucian democracy 9, 27, 161 Confucian liberal 10, 130–131, 150–151, 186

229 Confucian liberalism 10, 24, 129–130, 150 Confucian manifesto 194 Confucian political concepts 155, 187 Confucian studies 8, 78, 132, 135–136, 150, 161 Confucian tradition 8, 24, 27, 77–79, 81, 127, 129–131, 149–150, 155, 160, 176, 187 Confucianism and Cold War currents 17, 27, 76, 188 and liberalism 24 and New Confucian manifesto 78–79, 81–82, 168, 170–172, 180, 182, 186 as New Confucianism 23 John K. Fairbank’s view on 174 relevance to contemporary China 13, 49 Xu Fuguan’s view on 8–9, 30, 150, 154, 161, 168, 175–176, 187 Yin Haiguang’s view on 8, 119–120, 125 Zhang Junmai’s view on 5–6, 25, 127–132, 136–138, 140–143, 146–148 Confucius 孔子 (551 BC–479 BC) 75, 120, 139, 142, 175 Congressional hearing 174, 176 consciousness of individuality 157 consciousness of the self 156 conservatism 5, 13, 14, 18, 22–24, 28, 82–83, 89, 99, 129, 186 conservative liberal 127, 129, 131 conservative liberalism 129, 132 Conservative Party 153 constitution 2, 29, 31, 36, 41, 43, 59, 64, 74, 80, 91–92, 146, 185 constitutional democracy 29, 36, 44, 131, 145, 184 constitutionalism 2, 21, 43, 156, 184 continuity 49, 72, 82, 164 controlled economy 57–58, 61 corresponded with facts 113 crisis 4, 10, 63, 94, 123, 130–131, 154, 167, 178, 186 cult of ritualized subordination 84 cultivation of persons 139 cultural chauvinism 177 cultural conservatism 5, 13–14, 18, 24, 28, 82–83, 186 cultural elite 8, 149, 162, 166–168, 181–182 cultural ideals 39, 84, 124, 162–163, 181–182, 185

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230 cultural identity 132 cultural nationalism 131–132, 138, 168, 176–177, 181, 186 cultural nationalist 9, 127, 131–132, 137, 148, 150, 172 cultural ruffian 162 cultural values 123 cultural vanguard 87 cultural worker 167–168 culture of partification 108, 110 Dai Duheng 戴杜衡 (1907–1964) 61 decision-making power 37, 70 Declaration of Independence 142 democracy and Cold War currents 17, 27, 52 and conservatism 22 and national salvation 14–15, 29, 186 and New Confucian manifesto 79, 168, 170, 177 early development in China 1–5 in Chinese liberal tradition 14, 24, 186 relevance to contemporary China 13, 189 Xu Fuguan’s view on 8–10, 149–161, 163, 167–168, 170, 177, 185 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6–7, 10, 26, 36– 42, 52, 55–58, 60–62, 83–96, 99–100, 103, 105–107, 110, 120–121, 123–124, 184 Zhang Junmai’s view on 44–50, 63–66, 73, 75, 127–131, 133, 143, 145, 147, 185 Democracy of the Proletariat 153 democratic China 26, 61, 73, 142, 149, 154, 180 democratic enterprises 67, 69, 71 democratic form 71, 81, 153 democratic governance 8, 64, 105 Democratic review (Minzhu pinglun 民主評論) 30, 99, 152, 170, 184 democratic socialism 11, 52–53, 56–57, 61, 63, 66, 153–154 Democratic Socialist Party 70 democratic spirit 9, 92–93, 158, democratic state-building 29, 42, 51, 66, 127, 180, 186 democratic thought 79, 81, 130, 177 democratic tradition 59, 158, 183 democratization and Cold War currents 27

Index and national salvation 26, 29, 48 and New Confucian manifesto 180 and the Third Force 70 early development in China 3 relevance to contemporary China 23, 49–50 Xu Fuguan’s view on 168, 180, 185 Yin Haiguang’s view on 35, 38–40, 53, 83 Zhang Junmai’s view on 42, 48, 127, 141, 187 demonstration 90–91 Department of Central Propaganda 36 Department of Defense 34 Department of Education 111 de-politicization 66 destiny of man 114 determinism 75 dialectical materialism 74, 76, 115–116, 133 dignity of personality 133 Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 (1887–1936) 1–2, 104 direct rights of citizens 145–146 dissident 31, 33, 35, 94, 108, 119, 159, 185 distinction [between right and wrong] through reason 133 disturbance 14, 60, 87, 91, 134 Doctrine of the Mean 5, 140 dogma 93 dogmatism 120 dual character 93 Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865–1936) 43 Eastern miscellany (Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌) 85 economic ability 58 economic advantage 115 economic equality 53, 56–57, 60–62, 153–154, economic freedom 58 economic ideals 68, 70 economic inequality 12, 61–62, 66 economic policy 66 economic power 62, 70 economic relations 74 economic self-sufficience 55 economic socialization 53 education 61, 85, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 111 educational function 135

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Index egoism 120 émigré intellectual and Cold War currents 14, 17, 27, 81–82 and departure from China 1, 25, 183 and national salvation 15, 26–27, 48–49, 183 and the quest for democracy 26–27, 48–49 and Third Force 4, 49 and Xu Fuguan 167 and Yin Haiguang 37, 83 and Zhang Junmai 4, 46, 48, 63, 70, 147 in Chinese liberal tradition 27, 160, 183, 188 relevance to contemporary China 11, 13, 188 émigré liberal 27, 162, 183, 187 Emperor Dezong of Tang 32, 160 Emperor Wu of Liang 32 empiricism 6, 64, 112–113, 121, 125–126 empiricist 10, 104–105, 120, 140 empiricist’s attitude 104–105, 120 emptiness 178 endless exploration 178 Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895) 75 Enlightenment 84, 142–143 equality 53, 56–57, 60–62, 92, 94, 121, 154, 157, 159 equalization of land ownership 53–54 ethics 103, 115, 119–121, 139, 171 eugenics 61 Europe 18, 63–64, 73, 142 European 18, 64, 137, 142–143, 172, 177 exclusive 74, 87, 96, 102 exemplary person 3 existence of the universe 139 experimental 113 external freedom 95 factional relationship 110 Fairbank, John K. (1907–1991) 111, 174–177 false equality 60 Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052) 167 fatherly image 103, 110 feeling of mildness and commiseration or compassion 179 Feigl, Herbert (1902–1988) 104 Feng Congde 封從德 (b. 1966) 13

231 Feng Dao 馮道 (882–954) 136 Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) 85, 132, 135–136 feudalism 90 Fichte, Johann G. (1762–1814) 75 Fighting League 44–49, 66–70, 72, 184–186 firm will 133–134 forces of production 115 Ford Foundation 45, 48 formalism 110 four sprouts 139 fraternity 104 Free China (Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國) and Chinese liberals 52 and Cold War currents 27, 61–62, 81, 95 and democratic socialism 56–57 and Outside the Party Movement 49 and Yin Haiguang 37–39, 60, 93, 95, 183 and Zhang Junmai 73 crackdown by the Nationalist government 117, 185 criticism of the Nationalist government 39, 41, 88–89, 93, 99, 105, 184 debate with New Confucians 99–100, 162, 187 founding of the magazine 19, 183 free economy 62, 154 free election 63 Free man (Ziyouren 自由人) 100 free will 95, 98 freedom and Cold War currents 17, 187 and conservatism 89, 129, 186  and democratic socialism 57 and liberals on Taiwan 62 and national salvation 29, 185  and revisionist democracy 4 and the Third Force 66, 69, 71–72 in Chinese liberal tradition 14–15, 17, 19, 25, 185–186 national reconstruction 1–2 relevance to contemporary China 49, 188 Tang Junyi’s view on 158 Xu Fuguan’s view on 9–10, 151, 154–156, 160, 164, 184

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232

Index

Gao Changshou 高昌壽 (dates unknown)  57 generality 113 Germany 73, 98 Gibbon, Edward (1737–1794) 74 governing people 24 grand duty of loving the nation 134 grassroots culture 163–166 great commonwealth 148 Great Leap Forward 117 Great learning (daxue 大學) 139 great man 136 Gu Mengyu 顧孟餘 (1888–1972) 44, 47 Guangdong 47, 67 guerrilla 46 Guomindang Central Standing Committee  46

and Chinese liberal tradition 82 and Cold War currents 81, 187–188 and debate between New Confucians and liberals 100, 162 and moderate socialists 70, 72, and national salvation 29, 52, 68 and New Confucian manifesto 78–79, 170, 173 and Taiwan 83 and Tang Junyi 173 and Third Force 184 and Xu Fuguan 30, 162 and Yin Haiguang 37 and Zhang Junmai 4, 11, 42, 44–50, 184 relevance to contemporary China 50 Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China 50 Hongmen 46 Hook, Sidney (1902–1989) 75 Hu Qiuyuan 胡秋原 (1910–2004) 111 Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) 1–2, 10, 37, 46, 61, 99, 101, 104, 114, 117 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) 24, 130 human happiness 65 human life 121, 124 human nature 8–9, 77–78, 87, 100, 118, 139–140, 151, 156, 163, 166 human rights 1–3, 9, 19–21, 24, 40–41, 64–66, 71, 73, 95, 151–152, 156–157 human society 115 humaneness 139 humanism 104, 121 human-rights economy 71

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1899–1992) 7, 16, 51–52, 59–62 He Lin 賀麟 (1902–1992) 23, 169 heart of self-confidence 134 helmsman of Chinese liberalism 125 Henan 68 Henle, Paul 85 hierarchy 163 high-level tradition 165–166, 168 historical determinism 75 historical materialism 65 Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) 98 Hong Kong and Chinese intellectuals 1, 21, 25–26, 29

ideological offensive 77 ideological strand 14, 18, 148, 150 ideology 5, 21, 76, 91 immovable as a mountain 134 impediment 26, 83, 87–88, 102, 125, 129, 186 imperialism 14, 90 imported innovation 110 inalienable rights 64 inborn qualities 62 independent personalities 20 individual and Chinese liberal tradition 18–19, 28 and New Confucian manifesto 81, 173, 179

freedom (cont.) Yin Haiguang’s view on 7, 20, 37–38, 41, 53, 58–60, 84–87, 89, 91–98, 123–124, 183 Zhang Junmai’s view on 2–3, 20, 44, 63–64, 73, 129–130, 135, 145 freedom of assembly 156 freedom of dexing and zhixing 151 freedom of speech 3, 20, 41, 63, 155–156, 160 freedom of the state 96–98 freedom of the will 85 French Revolution 92 Fu Sinian 傅斯年 (1896–1950) 2, 37 Fudan University 90 fundamental constituent 143

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233

Index Luo Longji’s view on 21 Xu Fuguan’s view on 31, 152, 156, 158–159 Yin Haiguang’s view on 20, 59, 94, 97, 123 Zhang Junmai’s view on 20, 64, 76, 129–131, 134, 143–144, 147, 187 individual freedom 2, 19–20, 71, 73, 92, 97–98, 124, 129, 156, 186–187, individualism 19, 63–64, 92 individualist 18 individuality 76, 93, 96–97, 157–158, 178 individual-society-state relationship 131, 143, 147, 149, 187 innate inequality 61 inner content of reason 158 institution of ceding the throne to the wise young 81 insurrection 91 integration and Chinese intellectuals 169 and Chinese liberal tradition 28, 49, 187–188 and New Confucian manifesto 149, 169 and Three Prnciples of the People 56 Xu Fuguan’s view on 9, 149, 160, 187–188 Yin Haiguang’s view on 84, 100, 117, 120–121, 125–126, 140, 147, 187–188 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4, 8, 128, 138–139, 143–144, 147, 149, 187–188 integration of Eastern and Western ethics 120 integrity 75, 80, 111, 133, 167 intellectual and Chinese liberal tradition 13, 83, 183–187 and Cold War currents 15–17, 27, 51, 62, 81–82, 187 and conflict with the Guomindang 99 and conservatism 22–24, 161, 169, 177 and debate between New Confucians and liberals 10, 99–100, 111, and departure from China 1–3, 83 and liberalism 18–20, 52 and moderate socialism 20–22, 63 and national salvation 14–15, 26–27, 29, 48–49, 83, 128, 167, 183, 185 and New Confucian manifesto 80, 178

and relevance to contemporary China 11–13, 49–50, 188–189 and Xu Fuguan 8, 25, 149–151, 156, 162–163, 167, 181–182 and Yin Haiguang 6, 25, 37, 57, 83, 112, 117–118, 120–125, 181–182 and Zhang Junmai 4–6, 45–46, 48, 63, 69–70, 128–137, 147–148, 181–182 intellectual [human] nature 151 intellectual legacy 95 intellectual resources 5, 130–131, 150 intellectual resources of liberty 130–131, 150 intellectual tradition 13, 17, 24, 80, 186, 189 intelligence 4, 14, 30, 46, 48, 61, 124, 134 interactive triad 17, 82 internal freedom 95 international obligation 98 international stability 98 inward composure 119 Italy 98 Japan 42, 46–47, 55–56, 63, 69 Japanese invasion 5, 54, 63, 68 Jesus Christ (4 BC–c. AD 33) 75, 134 Jiaotong University 90 Jin Yuelin 金嶽霖 (1895–1984) 85, 100 Ju Zheng 居正 (1875–1951) 109 judiciary of party doctrines 109 judiciary of party members 109 June Fourth Massacre 50 Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) 161, 188 keeping states in order 139 keeping the world at peace 139 Kerensky, Alexander (1881–1970) 65 Khrushchev, Nikita (1894–1971) 77 kindness 121, 180 knowledge 16, 104, 112, 114, 121, 124, 130, 137–138, 141, 158, 163, 167–168 Korean War 39, 98 Kramers, Robert P. (1920–2002) 170 Labor Party 61, 153 laissez-faire liberalism 18–19, 57, 105, 144 Laski, Harold J. (1893–1950) 19 learning of the mind and the nature 171 Lei Zhen 雷震 (1897–1979) 19, 37–41, 49, 95, 101, 117

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234 Lenin, Vladimir (1870–1924) 17, 64–65, 74 Li Daming 李大明 (1904–61) 46 Li Weichen 李微塵 (1903–77) 47 Li Xingwu 李省吾 (date unknown) 94 Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) 1, 19, 42–43, 161, 169, 177, 188 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) 3, 15, 68, 161, 169, 177 liberal Confucian 9, 130–131 liberal democracy 14, 22, 24, 96, 110, 127, 131, 156, 158–159 liberal democratic values 26, 131, 150, 155, 186 liberal education 85 liberal-minded 52 liberal-scientific 26, 140, 187 liberal tradition 6, 13–14, 20–21, 24–25, 27, 82, 150, 160, 169, 183, 186–189 liberalism and Chinese liberal tradition 13, 28, 83, 186 and Cold War currents 15–17, 27, 57, 61, 69, 82 and conservatism 24, 129–130 and debate between New Confucians and liberals 100, 102 and history in China 18–20 and moderate socialism 21 and relevance to contemporary China 11 Xu Fuguan’s view on 8–10, 150–151 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6, 8, 57, 61, 92–93, 96, 125 Zhang Junmai’s view on 69, 132 Lin Juemin 林覺民 (1887–1911) 106 Literary Battle between Chinese and Western Culture 122 literary inquisition 170 living nation 172–173 Locke, John (1632–1704) 64 logic 85, 104, 113–114, 119, 126 logical empiricism 6, 112, 121, 125–126 logical empiricist 10 logical studies 85, 104, 113 lone fellow 32 lone king 33 love of the state 107 low-level tradition 164–166, 168 Lu Zhi 陸贄 (754–805) 160

Index Luo Hongzhao 羅鴻詔 (1897–1956) 101 Luo Longji 羅隆基 (1898–1965) 2–3, 15, 19, 21, 43, 132n.27 Luo Mengce 羅夢冊 (1906–1991) 70–71 MacIver, Robert M. (1882–1970) 123 mainland China 12, 134 Manchu 110 mandate of heaven 79 man-eating 115 Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance  53 Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976) 90, 159, 174–175 Marshall, George C. (1880–1959) 45 martyrdom 133–134, 137 Marx, Karl (1818–1883) 65, 74, 76, 116, 144 Marxism 12, 25, 54, 63–64, 74, 76–77, 112, 115–117, 125, 136, 148, 186, 188 Marxism-Leninism 90 Marxist 12, 54, 75–76, 91, 103, 115–116 mass line 135 materialist 74–76, 115–116, 172, 177 May Fourth iconoclasm 7 May Fourth Movement 26, 84–89 May Fourth Spirit 83–88, 100, 102, 125, 129, 186 Mei Yunli 梅蘊理 100 Mencius 87, 120, 133, 139n.57, 140–143 metabolic replacement 100, 103 metabolism 121 metaphysical 95, 103–104, 112, 114–116, 152 metaphysical foundation of logic 104 metaphysics 14, 104, 113–115 method of defining and classification  146 methodology 85, 113–114, 120, 145 middle of the road policy 175–176 middle parties 90 mind 9, 16, 74–76, 88, 92, 95, 103, 133–134, 138–139, 148, 171–172, 174, 178 Ming dynasty 128 minority rights 64 misconception 98, 169–170, 186 mixing different schools 140 mode of production 65, 75 model of Sino-Western cultural integration  138, 160

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Index moderate socialism and Chinese liberal tradition 13–14, 18, 20–21, 24, 25, 28, 83 and Cold War currents 27, 187–188 and conservatism 25 Yin Haiguang’s view on 8, 52, 57, 61–62 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4–5, 70, 73–74, 81–82, 147 modern democracy 8, 100, 147, 152, 155, 159–160 modernity 8, 57 modernization and Cold War currents 27 and conservatism 22 and New Confucian manifesto 171–173, 180 and relevance to contemporary China 12 and the Guomindang 108 Liang Shuming’s view on 3 Xu Fuguan’s view on 9, 181 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6, 26, 87–88, 104 Zhang Junmai’s view on 127–128, 131–132, 137–138, 140–141, 143, 147–148, 187 Mongol 75, 134 monist 102 monopoly 41, 66 monumental simplicity 116 moral [human] nature 151 moral innovator 131–132, 148 morality 8, 10, 63, 80, 123–124, 137–138, 141, 143–144, 148, 152, 171 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) 8, 77–78, 100–101, 132, 137, 152, 157, 161, 168–169, 186 multiparty competition 64 Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945) 98 Mutai Risaku 務台理作 (1890–1974) 165 myth of rule by virtue 174–175 Nanjing 36, 68, 108–109 National Assembly 43 national bourgeoisie 90 national defence 55 National Defence Council 33 National Economic Committee 72 national independence 5, 66, 93

235 National Qinghua University 35, 85 national reconstruction 5, 66, 127–128, 147, 154 national renaissance 5, 133 National renaissance (Zaisheng 再生) 133 nation-saving 83 national salvation 1, 7, 26–27, 29, 39, 42, 48, 51–52, 68, 83, 132 national scale 59–60 national self-sufficiency 69 National Southwestern Associated University 35, 75 National Taiwan University 37, 110, 117 national will 128 nationalism 56, 131–132, 138, 168, 176–177, 181, 186 Nationalist government and freedom 2 and John K. Fairbank 175 and moderate socialists 72 and national salvation 15, 29 and New Confucian manifesto 173 and Tprinciple of the People’s Livelihood 54 Xu Fuguan’s view on 31, 33–35, 154, 184 Yin Haiguang’s view on 36–38, 40, 55, 86, 88–89, 93, 95, 98–99, 108, 110, 125, 184, 186 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4, 43–46, 48, 68, 185 Nationalist regime 38, 83, 111, 154 nationalization 54, 66, 72n.119 natural rights 142 naturalism 104, 172 nature of dual protagonists 152, 155 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964) 77 Neo-Confucian 23, 130, 138 Neoliberal 12, 13 New Asia College 70 New Confucian and Chinese liberal tradition 24 and Cold War currents 27, 52, 76, 78, 81, 187 and conservatism 23 and cultural nationalism 132, 187 and debate with liberals 100–102, 125, 162 and New Confucian manifesto 78–81, 137, 150, 168–182

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236 New Confucian (cont.) and relevance to contemporary China 11–13, 161 and rule of virtue 158–160 and Western democracy 157–158 contribution to the development of Confucianism 8, 161 Xu Fuguan’s view on 25, 162 Yin Haiguang’s view on 87–88, 99, 102–104 Yu Yingshi’s view on 146 Zhang Junmai’s view on 5, 25, 130–131, 135 New Confucianism 23–24, 30, 102, 146, 168 New Democracy 90–91, 153 New Left 12, 13 new system of slavery 60 New Youth (Xin qingnian 新青年) 84 New Zealand 61 non-absolute 113 non-action 81, 159 non-democratic political organization 98 non-Marxist 183 objectivized 155 obstinacy 33, 120 official 4, 33, 38, 45, 80, 99, 106, 109–110, 133, 136, 144–146, 155 official historiographer 80 old possession 142, 155 omniscient 102 one-party dictatorship 36, 63 opportunity 21, 41, 52, 56, 60, 111, 184 organization 29, 41, 45, 47, 69–70, 97–98, 109, 185 Oriental thought 177–178 Orwell, George (1903–1950) 17, 58 Outside the Party Movement 49 outward extension of reason 157 parent-officials 106 parliament 64, 70, 144–145, 152, 155 parliamentary democracy 73, 160 parliamentary election 61 partification 108–110 partify the judiciary 109 party platform 54 past and the present existing together 165

Index peaceful coexistence 77 Peking University 2 people of action 122–123 people of ideas 122–123 People’s Political Council 43 perseverance 178 Persia 172 person of unyielding character 133 personality 33–34, 47, 61, 92, 100, 122, 133 petty bourgeoisie 90 phenomenal world 139 phenomenon and substance 139 philosophy Confucian 8 and New Confucian manifesto 137, 140, 171, 178 and Xu Fuguan 149, 156, 161 and Yin Haiguang 35–37, 58, 60, 85, 89n.29, 112–115, 126 and Zhang Junmai 74, 130, 135–136, 147 physical strength 61, 143 planned economy 58, 61–62, 66, 70, 72, 105 planned education 106 political agitator 111 Political Consultative Conference 43 political content 153–154 political democracy 56, 58, 60–62, 153n.12 political democratization 53 political figures 155 political form 153–154, 157 Political Information Society 42 political institution 63, 130 political meaning 61 political philosophy 60, 89n.29, 115, 156, 161 political platform 36, 73, 153 political power 16, 62, 152, 154–155, 159 political strategies 132 political structure 115 political system 12, 24, 80, 96, 115, 130–131, 145, 147, 150, 152 politics and Cold War currents 17 and liberalism 18 and moderate socialism 21 and New Confucian manifesto 173 and relevance to contemporary China 13 Lei Zhen’s view on 40

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Index Mao Zedong’s view on 90 Xu Fuguan’s view on 151–152, 155, 167–168 Yin Haiguang’s view on 33, 35, 40, 96, 103, 107 Zhang Junmai’s view on 2, 42, 49, 74, 129–130, 144, 146 Zhang Qiyun’s view on 105 Popper, Karl R. (1902–1994) 7, 16–17, 51–52, 58–60, 62, 124, 187 positivist discourse 126 posteriori 116 posthumous title 80 post-May-Fourthian 84 power holders 62, 88 principle of [being] people-based 152 Principle of the People’s Livelihood 53–56 priori 116 private business 66, 70 private enterprises 73, 105, 154, 186 private ownership 18, 66, 186 private property 66 progressive 54, 162–164 progressive culture 162 proletarian dictatorship 65, 144 proletariat 63, 73, 90, 153 property ownership 66 propriety 139 protagonist of politics 152, 155 protest 47, 90–91 Putai Island 46 putting the laws in order 24 Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) 76, 99, 145–147 Qing government 110 quantitative 113 rationalism 92, 142–143, 172 rationality 20, 63, 138–139, 142, 144 reason 75, 133, 143, 152, 157–158, 178 reconciliation 127, 140, 154 Red Scare 16 regularity 74, 164 regulation of families 139 relations of production 63, 74, 115 religion 41, 74, 87, 94, 115, 120, 129, 142, 165, 170–171 religious spirit 171

237 representative democracy 152, 154–155 representative government 160 Republic of China 2, 6, 44–45, 105, 107, 176 Republican China 17, 82 Republican era and Chinese liberal tradition 13, 17, 21, 24, 27, 183, 186, 188 and Cold War currents 82 and liberalism 19 and moderate socialism 20, 57 and national salvation 14 and New Confucian manifesto 169, 174, 177 and relevance to contemporary China 189 and Third Force 45 and Yin Haiguang 83, 89 and Zhang Junmai 4, 128, 132, 184 Reconstruction of Chinese nation 1 respect for renxing 159 restorationist 88, 162 revisionist democracy 4 revolution 15, 18, 63, 65, 76, 90, 92, 105, 129, 134, 177 revolutionary change 22 revolutionary education 106 revolutionary-democratic party 36 revolutionism 93 right to vote 41, 65 righteousness 120–121, 134, 139 rights-and-duties-based democracy 149 role model for intellectuals 120 Roman Empire 74 rule by non-action 81 rule of law 2, 8, 13, 18, 63, 127, 141, 146, 156, 160 rule of rites 3 rule of the great unity 3 rule of virtue 8, 26, 131, 142, 157, 160, 175 rural reforms 68 Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970) 7, 85, 121 Russia 38, 63, 65, 74, 77, 91, 98 sage-worshipping 102 San Francisco 46, 127 sceptical 24, 102, 113 School for the Study of Many Languages  42

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238 science and conservatism 23 and liberals 52 and New Confucian manifesto 171, 176, 178 and the Guomindang 108–109 science versus metaphysics controversy 14 Xu Fuguan’s view on 20 Yin Haiguang’s view on 26, 84–85, 88–89, 92, 100, 103–104, 110, 112–117, 119–121, 123, 126, 186 Zhang Junmai’s view on 75 science versus metaphysics controversy/ debate 14, 104, 115 scientific and New Confucian manifesto 173–174, 176 innovation 2 method 17 Yin Haiguang’s view on 26, 84–85, 88, 102–104, 112–117, 120–121, 124–126, 147, 181, 186–187 Zhang Junmai’s view on 75, 140–141 scientific humanism 121 scientific knowledge 112, 114, 124 scientific laws 75 scientific model of cultural integration 147 scientific principles 103–104, 113, 117, 181 scientific values 84, 126 Second World War 16, 77, 90 seeds of democratic thought 79, 81, 130 seeking compromise 140 self-consciousness 74, 149, 158–160, 163–166 self-consciousness of high-level tradition 166 self-consciousness of the individual 158 self-criticism 100, 135–136 self-emancipation 84 self-exile 1, 183 self-exiled 3 self-interest 120–121 self-reflection 139 self-sufficiency 22, 67, 69 sense of anxiety over future uncertainties 166 sense of duty 141 sense of loss 121, 123

Index sense of responsibility 141, 166 sense of security 178 Shanghai 42, 90 Shen Junru 沈鈞儒 (1875–1963) 15 Shi Fuliang 施復亮 (1899–1970) 15 Shun 81, 159 simple certainty 116 Sino-Japanese War 4, 21, 30–31, 35, 43, 54, 68, 173–174 Sinologist 168, 170, 172 Sinology 171 slaves 60 social class 54, 65–66, 92 social contract 156–158 social engineering 59, 124, 187 social justice 20, 73, 145 social order 18, 88, 103, 144 social standing 102 social welfare system 66, 105 socialism and Chinese liberal tradition 13–14, 18, 24, 28, 83, 186 and Cold War currents 17, 27, 57–58, 62, 81–82, 187 and liberalism 8 and moderate wing 20–21, 56–57, 63 and relevance to contemporary China 11 and the middle parties 90 Xu Fuguan’s view on 153–154 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6, 52–53, 58–61, 81, 187 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4–5, 21, 25, 65–66, 69–70, 73–74, 81, 143, 145, 147–148, 188 socialist heaven 115 socialist state 2, 21, 43, 61–62, 69, 148 socialist system 60, 70 societal identity 130 Socrates (470 BC–399 BC) 75 solitary one 32–33 son of May Fourth 84 Song dynasty 128 Song of the Upright Spirit 133 Song-Ming Confucianism 172 source of political power 152, 155 Soviet Communist Party 77 Soviet Union 63, 65–66, 73–74, 77, 93, 106, 115, 135, 188

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Index spirit of “appreciating what is at the present moment” 177 spirit of freedom 151 spirit of liberalism 151 spirit of martyrdom 133–134, 137 spirit of objectivity 120 spirit of the mind 178 spiritual condition of liberal life 156 spiritual freedom 129–130 spiritual life 118, 171, 179 spiritual state 119 St. John’s University 90 Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953) 17, 77, 98 state capitalism 55–56 state planning 66 state-building 22, 29, 42, 51, 66, 68–69, 81, 127–128, 132, 139, 147, 162, 180, 186–187 state-owned corporations/enterprises 72, 105 Stuart, John Leighton (1876–1962) 45 student spies 87, 91 Sun Baoyi 孫寶毅 (dates unknown) 70 Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925) 36, 38, 53–54, 56–57, 105, 107, 183 superstructure 74, 115 suppression 62, 94, 159 supreme god 172 supreme power 94, 110 synthesis 5, 25, 116 system of democratic centralism 36 system of state chancellorship 80 Taiping Rebellion 110 Taiwan and Chinese liberal tradition 82 and Cold War currents 57, 81–82 and democracy 15 and Hong Kong 49–50 and liberals 19 and national salvation 15, 26–27, 29–50 and New Confucian manifesto 78–79 and relevance to contemporary China 23–24, 49–50 arrival of Chinese intellectuals 1, 21, 25–26, 52 Weng Qingping’s view on 72 Xu Fuguan’s view on 8–10, 25, 30–35

239 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6, 35–42, 57, 60–61 Zhang Junmai’s view on 4, 11, 25, 42–48 Taiwan Strait 24, 39, 98, 168 Talmon, J.L. (1916–1980) 58, 96 Tan Hu 譚護 (date unknown) 46 Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) and Xu Fuguan 8 and debate with liberals 101, 103 and New Confucian manifesto 78–79, 137, 168–170, 173–174, 182, 186 criticism of Hu Shi 99 view on democracy 152, 157–158, 160–161 Tao Xisheng 陶希聖 (1899–1988) 35 Taoism 125, 180 technology 92, 124, 141, 176 Temporary Provisions 31, 36, 38, 43 testimony 173–174 the self 113, 118, 156 theory of heavenly principles 142 theory of human nature (renxinglun) 8 theory of the virtuous nature 139 thesis 55, 116 thinking and the function of mind 138 Third Force 4, 42–47, 49, 128, 184–185 Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) 142–143 Thorez, Maurice (1900–1964) 63 thoughts of possession 179 Three Principles of the People 36, 53–54, 56, 89, 93–94, 109, 183 Tianjin 91 tolerance 38, 76, 93–94 Tong Guanxian 童冠賢 (1894–1981) 44 Tongji University 90 totalitarian democracy 96 totalitarianism 16–17, 38, 57–58, 89, 93–97, 108, 174, 177 tradition and Chinese liberal tradition 13–14, 17, 20–21, 25–27, 35, 183, 186–189 and Cold War currents 14, 77–78 and conservatism 22–25 and liberalism 19–20 and moderate socialism 20, 57, 59 and national salvation 14 and New Confucian manifesto 79–82, 173–176, 186

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240 tradition (cont.) and relevance to contemporary China 176 relationship with modern values 3 Xu Fuguan’s view on 8–11, 149–150, 155, 158, 160–169, 182 Yin Haiguang’s view on 6–7, 86–89, 99–105, 107–108, 110–111, 117, 119–121, 125–126 Zhang Junmai’s view on 73, 127–131, 137–139, 145, 148 traditionalism 102, 186 traditionalist 10–11, 52, 102, 110–111 tragic sense of insecurity 123 Training Institute for Judges 109 transcendental existence 113 transformation 10, 130 united front 43, 77 United States and Chinese intellectuals 29 and John K. Fairbank 174–176 and Korean War 39 and middle parties 90 and New Confucian manifesto 173–176 and Red Scare 16 and Tang Junyi 79n.151, 169 and the Soviet Union 77 and Xu Fuguan 159 and Yin Haiguang 7, 38 and Yu Yingshi 1 and Zhang Junmai 21, 25, 45–48, 69, 83, 127, 134, 142, 169–170 United States Office of Strategic Services 174–175 unity and Free China 39 and liberalism 18 and New Confucian manifesto 150, 168, 171, 177, 180, 186 the rule of great unity 3 Xu Fuguan’s view on 34, 159, 164–165 Zhang Junmai’s view on 26, 48, 127–128, 131, 138, 141–144, 147, 149, 187 Zhang Qiyun’s view on 105 unity of knowledge and action 138, 141 unity of knowledge and morality 141

Index unity of virtue and law 26, 127, 131, 142–144, 147, 149 universal 18, 49, 113, 180 universal characteristics of human nature 139 universal values of humankind 124 universalist 18 University of Nanking 36 unlimited pursuit 178 unscientific 16, 102–103, 112, 116, 186 upper-class culture 163, 165–166 upright citizen 20 utopian 16–17, 51–52, 57, 59, 89, 124, 187 value judgment 114, 163 value standard 63 value system 96, 115 value-free 113 vast flowing energy 133 village compact 3 virtue rule of virtue 8, 26, 142, 157, 160, 174–175 unity of virtue and law 26, 143–144, 147, 149 Xu Fuguan’s view on 32, 155, 157, 159–160, 175 Yin Haiguang’s view on 117, 120, 126, 147 Zhang Junmai’s view on 26, 74, 127, 131, 139, 141–144, 147, 187 virtues of a ruler 32, 155 vital force 139 vitality 10, 130–131, 150 Voice of China (Zhongguo zhi sheng 中國之聲) 47 Wang Dan 王丹 (b. 1969) 13 Wang Juntao 王軍濤 (b. 1958) 13 Wang Shijie 王世杰 (1891–1981) 111 Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) 128, 138, 141 Wang Yuxiu 王聿修 (dates unknown) 62 warlord 90 Waseda University 42 Washington, George (1732– 1799) 171 Washington D.C. 45 way of a ruler 155 way of an official 155

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241

Index Wen Tianxiang 文天祥 (1236–1283) 75, 133–134 Weng Qingping 翁青萍 (1902–1951) 72 West German socialist 73–74 Western civilization 3, 73, 92, 161 Western culture 100–101, 110–111, 141, 171, 176–179 Western philosophy 140 Westernized liberal 10, 130 Westernized liberalism 10, 130 whole world becoming a commonwealth  81 whole world is a single family 180 will to power 179 wisdom of being curvilinear and spiritual  178 wisdom of how to make culture long-standing 179 world culture 63, 78–79, 101, 160 World daily (Shijie ribao 世界日報) 127 world progress 20 world unity 150, 168, 177 Wu Minxiong 伍民雄 (date unknown) 118 Wuhan 68 Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權 (K.C. Hsiao, 1897–1981) 147 Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) 3, 30, 149, 161, 169 Xishui 30 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982) and Confucianism 8–9, 24, 26–27, 187 and New Confucian manifesto 78, 137 and relationship with Chiang Kai-shek 8, 184 and relationship with Yin Haiguang and liberals 83, 87, 99, 101, 117–118, 125–126 and Zhang Junmai 131, 142, 147, 185 Chinese liberal tradition 13–14, 20, 186 Cold War currents 77–78, 183 Confucian ideals 149–182 life in Taiwan 25 national salvation 15 national salvation 29–35, 48, 183 quest for Chinese democracy 3, 26–27, 48 relevance to contemporary China 11, 188

Xu Gaoruan 徐高阮 (1911–1969) 111 Xunzi 荀子 (c. 310 BC–c. 235 BC) 140 Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921) 1, 19, 37, 188 Yao 81, 159 Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969) and economic quality 153 and his model of a democratic China 26, 83–126, 147, 149 and liberalism 19–20 anti-traditionalism 7 appreciation of Confucian values  117–124, 187 Chinrese liberal tradition 13–14, 25, 186 Cold War currents 6, 27, 51–62, 187 debates with New Confucians 9 departure from China 3 national salvation 15, 29, 35–42, 48–49, 183–185 relationship with Xu Fuguan 162 relevance to contemporary China 11, 188 rule of law 8 Yu Yingshi 余英時 (b. 1930) 1, 146–147, 188–189 Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916) 42, 159 Zeng Xubai 曾虛白 (dates unknown)  56–57 Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973) 2, 43, 132n.27 Zhang Fakui 張發奎 (1896–1980) 44–47 Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1907–1994) 2, 19, 95, 101 Zhang Guotao 張國燾 (1897–1979) 47 Zhang Jian 張謇 (1853–1926) 161 Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (Carsun Chang, 1887–1969) and Chinese liberal tradition 13–14, 25, 125–126, 186 and Cold War currents 27, 187–189 and Confucianism 8, 186–1878 and his model of a democratic China 128–148, 160, 181–182 and liberalism 20 and moderate socialism 2–5, 20–21, 26, 63–76, 81, 153–155, 186 and national salvation 15, 29, 42–49, 83, 183–184

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242 Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (cont.) and New Confucian manifesto 78, 168–173, 182 and relationship with Xu Fuguan 149 and relevance to contemporary China 11, 21 and Third Force 4, 44–50, 185

Index Zhang Qian 張騫 (164 BC–114 BC) 74 Zhang Qiyun 張其昀 (1901–1985) 105, 111 Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (1893–1986) 85 Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1881–1973) 169 Zhou Dewei 周德偉 (1902–1986) 51, 62 Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) 139 Zi Youren 資友仁 56

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