Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era (Understanding China) 9811611556, 9789811611551

Table of contents :
Preface: China’s World Ideal and Its Realization
The Rise of Great Powers and Their World Ideals
Approaches to the World Ideals of Western Major Powers
The World Ideal of Ancient China and Its Realization
How China Formed a New World Ideal
Exploring for Path to a Community of Shared Future for Mankind
References
Contents
1 China’s New Era: The Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years and an Important Period of Strategic Opportunity for China
1.1 The Interplay Between the World Situation and China’s National Conditions in an Era of the Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years
1.2 Dialectical Understanding of China’s Interaction with the World
1.3 China Is at a Critical Juncture in Shaping a New Period of Strategic Opportunity
References
2 China’s Grand Strategy: Xi Jinping’s New Ideas, Concepts and Strategies for the Governance of China
2.1 China’s Global Positioning and Strategic Direction
2.2 Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China
2.3 International Influence of Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China
References
3 Innovations and Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era
3.1 Theoretical System of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era
3.2 Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era
3.3 Theoretical and Practical Features of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era
References
4 Optimizing the Concept of National Security and Creating a Path to National Security with Chinese Characteristics
4.1 Opportunities and Challenges for China’s National Security
4.2 Phased Goals for China’s National Security
4.3 Innovation of China’s National Security Concept
4.4 Establishing the NSC and Improving the Top-Level Design
4.5 Improving China’s National Security Strategy and Pursuing Bottom-Line Thinking
References
5 The BRI and China-World Interactions
5.1 New Characteristics of China’s Interaction with the World in the New Era
5.2 The BRI Helps Shape China’s New Key Period of Strategic Opportunity
5.3 The BRI and Layout of China’s National Development
5.4 The BRI and Interaction Between China and the World
5.5 The BRI and Interaction Between China and Other Regions
References
6 China’s New Strategy for Dealing with Global Governance Crisis and Reform
6.1 The Response to Global Governance Crisis: History and Theory
6.2 The Contemporary Global Governance Crisis and the Response to It
6.3 China’s Approaches to Global Governance Crisis
6.4 China’s Strategic Orientation for Promoting the Transformation of Global Governance
References
7 Pushing China’s Opening up in the New Era
7.1 The Ideological Innovation of China’s Opening up
7.2 China’s Strategic Focuses on Opening up
7.3 Propelling China’s Opening up to the New Era
References
8 China’s Strategic Approach to the USA in the New Era
8.1 China and the US in the New Era of Strategic Competition
8.2 Judgments on China-U.S. Relations
8.3 Basic Framework of China’s Strategic Approach to the United States
References

Citation preview

Understanding China

Xi Xiao Honghua Men

Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era

Understanding China

The series will provide you with in-depth information on China’s social, cultural and economic aspects. It covers a broad variety of topics, from economics and history to law, philosophy, cultural geography and regional politics, and offers a wealth of materials for researchers, doctoral students, and experienced practitioners.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11772

Xi Xiao · Honghua Men

Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era

Xi Xiao School of International and Public Affairs Jilin University Changchun, Jilin, China

Translated by Wen’an Chen Ningbo University Ningbo, China

Honghua Men School of Political Science and International Relations Tongji University Shanghai, China

Xi Xiao Jilin University Changchun, Jilin, China

ISSN 2196-3134 ISSN 2196-3142 (electronic) Understanding China ISBN 978-981-16-1155-1 ISBN 978-981-16-1156-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface: China’s World Ideal and Its Realization

A world ideal is a powerful driving force for the advancement of the times. It provides not only important conceptual support but also strategic guidance for the rise of great powers. Existing studies on the rise of great powers have primarily investigated the influence of many factors such as economy, security, and geopolitics, but few have shed light on their soft power, let alone their world ideals. The “Greater Odes of the Kingdom” (Daya) section in the Book of Songs (Shijing) has it that “even an established nation like Zhou still regards self-renewal as its mission.” China has been known for its world ideal, which has evolved from “Tianxia” (“All Under Heaven”), “a harmonious world”, to today’s “a community with a shared future for mankind”.1 The community with a shared future for mankind proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping is an accurate expression of China’s world ideal. It embodies the combination of Chinese cultural traditions and Marx’s “Theory of World History” and is therefore worthy of in-depth study. The author will probe into the evolution of China’s world ideal and its realization based on a comparative analysis of overall domestic and international situations, investigate the formation of China’s new world ideal since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, analyze the connotation of and the way to build a community with a shared future for mankind from the perspective of the “Theory of World History”, and explore how China can achieve strategic transcendence over three Western hegemonies (the Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana), and how China can make discourse contributions to the vision of a better world, based on which suggestions on China’s strategies after its rise are provided. The book will (1)

(2)

1 Men

explore the relationship between the rise of great powers and their world ideals from the perspective of Marx’s “Theory of World History” and set up an analytical framework; examine the building of the three hegemonies of the Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana, how they sustain their hegemonic status and achieve their world ideals, and what inspirations they bring; (2019a). v

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(3) (4)

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analyze the world ideal of ancient China, its realization, and relation with traditional Chinese culture and seek to draw inspirations for today’s practices; investigate the evolution and formation of China’s new world ideal since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, analyze the significance of and the way to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and propose a strategy for accomplishing China’s world ideal that transcends hegemony, with an aim to provide an ideological reference for China’s diplomacy in the new era.

The Rise of Great Powers and Their World Ideals An ideal is a transcendental reflection of the relation of a human subject to a realistic object and the subject itself. It predictably reflects a future that is not the result of natural realistic development, but is created by humans using their abilities to fulfill one possibility of realistic development they choose among various ones.2 It is a reasonable imagination of the future and a form of consciousness that is derived from reality but also beyond reality. Once formed, it will become a strong spiritual force inspiring people to keep moving forward.3 Ideals and ideas are closely associated. They, respectively, manifest will and imagination, and their historical role is “no less significant than that of science and technology.”4 A country has always been supported by its ideals. For example, the traditional Chinese ideal, which combines the national ideal (“Dayitong” or the “Great Systemic Whole”), the social ideal (“Datong or Great Unity”), and the world ideal (“Tianxia” or “All Under Heaven”), is the essential spiritual force that has sustained the Chinese civilization over five millennia. The rise of a country is driven by its national ideal, and its rise to become a power of world influence is undoubtedly guided by its world ideal. Therefore, it is self-evident that a sense of mission is very important. At the national level, the sense of mission means a kind of extreme pride, confidence, or even arrogance a country has, which is generated by linking the meaning, value, and purpose of its own existence to a certain sacred cause, thereby forming a certain grand or sacred “narrative.” Once formed, it will become a spiritual pillar for the country to make self-improvement and inspire every individual in the country to devote themselves to the sacred national cause.5 For some countries, the sense of mission is inherent in their social fabric, such as China’s ideal of “Tianxia” and America’s “Manifest Destiny.” By contrast, some nations develop their sense of mission as they rapidly rise. For example, Britain has developed its “Liberal Imperialism.” A world ideal cannot be realized without realistic support. What ancient Rome and China created are not world empires, but “Pax Romana” and “Pax Sinica,” 2 Xue

(1989). and Dou (1985). 4 Donglai (2004). 5 Yue et al. (2017). 3 Yu

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respectively, in the Mediterranean area and East Asia. The realization of a great power’s world ideal is closely associated with the creation of “World History” and its strategy after its rise, in which the establishment of order has a vital significance. In other words, world ideals can only be accomplished in the context of “World History”. Marx’s “Theory of World History” for the first time clarifies the concept of “World History,” which holds that history did not exist always.6 Marx explained “World History” as the history since the sixteenth century propelled by industrial development and exchanges among various nationalities. It emphasizes the interaction and interdependence of nations and the development and ultimate emancipation of human beings.7 Marx looked at the “all-round development of human beings” from a global perspective and investigated its relation with “World History.” He believed that the development of any individual in any country is linked to the all-round development of all individuals in the world, because “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”8 Marx and Engels revealed the objective nature of “World History” by analyzing the development of productive forces and emphasized the importance of two basic forms of human activities: production and intercourse. They pointed out, “Only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established.”9 The establishment of universal intercourse results in the creation of “World History”. It shows how “World History” is formed and manifested. In other words, the condition for the formation of “World History” is that productive force development and universal intercourse driven by industrial progress come side by side. “The further the separate spheres, which interact on one another, extend in the course of this development, the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse and the division of labor between various nations naturally brought forth by these, the more history becomes ‘World History’.”10 The universal development of the productive forces and the universal intercourse among various nationalities are the driving forces for destroying isolation and breaking national barriers to make the world into a connected whole, creating the world market, and transforming history into “World History.” Marx, therefore, pointed out, “This transformation of history into ‘World History’ is not indeed a mere abstract act on the part of the ‘self-consciousness’, the world spirit, or of any other metaphysical specter, but a quite material, empirically verifiable act.”11 Based on this, Marx analyzed the forms of a community. He proposed that the true community, that is, a “community of freely associated individuals,” is evolved from an “illusory community,” the capitalist “abstract community,” and the “illusory community” of the capitalist society. In other words, the building of a “community of freely associated individuals” is 6 Anthologies

of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 28. (2012), Zhao (2006). 8 Anthologies of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 294. 9 Anthologies of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 86. 10 Anthologies of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, pp. 88–89. 11 Anthologies of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 169. 7 Hu

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the ultimate goal of a community.12 Marx’s “Theory of World History” and his idea of community have provided guidance for understanding the world ideals of great powers and their realization. Particularly, they have provided philosophical guidance for a comparative analysis of Chinese and Western world ideals. In summary, the rise of a great power is the result of various domestic and foreign factors. While material factors such as geography, economic strength, and military power play a fundamental, critical role, ideas, and ideals are also indispensable. A great power may rise and fall rapidly, and perhaps it is the world ideal that serves as a major driving force for its rise and helps maintain its global status.

Approaches to the World Ideals of Western Major Powers Hegemony is as ancient as human beings.13 Its main goal is to achieve peaceful rule by establishing order.14 Hegemonic transition also brings about shocks. As Henry Kissinger pointed out, “Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values.”15 The Roman hegemony, British hegemony, and American hegemony, or called “Pax Romana”, “Pax Britannica,” and “Pax Americana”, were the three hegemonic forms in Western history. Only the three hegemons had their strong world ideals, coupled with positive willingness and strategic practices to pursue a peaceful rule16 and established a relatively peaceful and secure international order in the arenas and geographic regions where their hegemonies spanned.17 All the three hegemons possessed the form and mindset of an empire, considering themselves as the builders of the universal order who took on the mission of promoting the development of mankind.18 Rome, as the first global hegemon in the west, boasted the military predominance of the agricultural civilization and was a land-based hegemon that commanded both land and naval forces. By the second century B.C., the Roman civilization took the lead in world civilization with unrivaled dominance. During a period of 300 years, Rome wrote splendid pages in its conquering history by beating all its neighboring

12 Liang

(2003). (1998, p. 4). 14 Men (2005a). 15 Kissinger (1994, p. 17). 16 Immanuel Wallerstein emphasizes that the rise and fall of a hegemony can be better examined through a comparison of countries such as the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA. See Wallerstein (2002). 17 Nye Jr. (1990). 18 Men (2006). 13 Brzezinski

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city–states and emerging as the supreme ruler of the Italian Peninsula.19 Its achievement of building a sprawling empire from a single city–state dwarfed any other ancient city–state, and it was second to none in the entire ancient world in terms of both imperial territory and duration.20 At its height, the Roman Empire spanned the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Its frontiers extended to Armenia and Mesopotamia in the east, the Sahara Desert in the south, Great Britain in the west, and the Rhine and Danube rivers in the north. “Essentially and in idea, the empire, in the minds of the Romans, was world-wide.”21 However, the Roman Empire was not worldwide; at the same time, there were other unconnected empires in other regions of the world, such as the Persian Empire and the Chinese Empire. Yet in the minds of Romans living in that era, Rome was the center and sum of the world, a city that amounted to their world.22 This bears much resemblance to one of the core meanings encoded in China’s ancient world ideal—“That all the lands in the world belong to the King, and all the humans living within the lands’ boundaries are the King’s subjects”. In conquering the splendid ancient Greek civilization, the Romans, veteran fighters as they were, only managed to triumph on the military front. Greek philosophy, arts, and academic achievements marched into Rome and reshaped the military nation. The combination of Roman strength and Greek influences constituted the laws, government agencies, and organizations that fit the new global empire. And thus, the world ideal which was later strengthened by Christianity began to take shape: a global country that provides a common home for human beings and security for universal peace. This world ideal had long dominated West Europe and served as the essential driver for its foreign conquests. However, Rome achieved its world ideal by adopting an aggressive and brutal approach of military conquest, expanding its hegemony by constantly starting wars. Apparently, this strategic approach stood in stark contrast to China’s path toward its ancient world ideal, which relied on spreading cultural influences and introducing preferential trade policies. The Roman Empire built itself on primitive realism. It employed ironfisted policies and military conquest on the conquered, who received Roman citizenship as the greatest bounty from their conquerors.23 The empire set as its goal the direct governance over the conquered regions. It adopted a hub-spoke pattern of rule and extended its reach over the periphery through overlapping sources of control. Roadway construction and shipbuilding facilitated the flow of political influence and resources between the imperial center and its distant areas. The Romans introduced a system of governance that deployed large troops in the conquered regions and enforced military governance; meanwhile, they also sent some groups of Romans to help assimilate conquered people and encouraged them to take on a Roman identity and way of life. They regarded assimilation as a much cheaper and more effective way to extend 19 Beesley

(2019). (2017). 21 Russell (1986), Xia (2007). 22 Markus (1988), Xia (2007). 23 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Three Hegemonies”, pp. 357–361. 20 Wang

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control than coercion. Of course, the well-trained legions provided considerable deterrence.24 In Roman times, hegemony began to be associated with empire, where it was translated as “imperium.”25 Although the Romans occasionally resorted to the alliance strategy to tackle the temporary problems during the expansion and ruling of the empire, military conquest and confrontation remained the consistent tactics for Rome to establish and maintain its hegemony. The reason behind such a strategic choice is not only associated with the historical conditions at that time, but also partly lies in the fact that Rome lacked a real rival or a major power that was worth its efforts. And consequently, a range of domestic reasons behind this strategic choice, including the constant wielding of military forces, the corrupted discipline among the ranks, the waning culture, split political power, and drained finances, led to the fall of the empire, while the barbarian invasion added the deadly blow to its collapse. The Great Britain was the first real-world hegemon in the Western world. Building its power on the ocean and the colonies, it established itself amid the rapid transition from the traditional agricultural economy to the modern industrial economy. At the height of its power and splendor, the British Empire covered most of North America, a large part of the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the entire Indian subcontinent, Australia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region and even once controlled most of the Middle East. The population and land that the British Empire held sway even exceeded the total numbers of France, Germany, Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Denmark, Russia, Turkey, China, and the USA combined. With the population reaching 345 million and the land spanning 96 times of Great Britain itself,26 it was called “the Empire on which the sun never sets.” However, during the period of “Pax Britannica”, the British Empire did not enjoy exclusive hegemony: 1815–1853 was an era of power shared between Britain and Russia, 1853–1871 was about European balance of power, and for the period 1871–1914, the British Empire shared its dominating power with Germany. In the course of its development, the British hegemon gradually came up with the world ideal of a “free empire”. The so-called free empire laid emphasis on the outward extension of the spirits of freedom, justice, and constitutional government and on educating its colonies with the universal values, which helped to build a rational governing mechanism enforced with discretion to safeguard order inside the empire.27 The dominant idea behind British rule was the imperialism of free trade. In the 1850s, when Adam Smith’s idea of economic freedom became the reality, the British Empire not only sat on the throne of world economic hegemon, but also introduced the principles of free trade to other European countries and its colonies. The British Empire used its advantage in economic predominance to acquire raw materials and sell products anywhere around the world at its own will, working its way toward a global country. With the intangible help from the trade, legal system, and culture, the 24 Charles

(2002). and Kelly (2001). 26 Pastor (2001). 27 Zhou and Tan (2017). 25 Lebow

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Great Britain managed to bridge different parts of its vast colonial empire, reducing its expenses on claiming formal responsibilities of its colonies while at the same time pushing forward the commercial principles advocated in liberalism. Free trade offered an opportunity to replace weapons with products, soldiers with businessmen, naval forces with steamboats and warships, and aristocrats with industrialists, while the British Empire offered the world a brand-new development mode of politics.28 Thus, the two constituted the main concept behind its hegemony. In addition, for a country like the British Empire who set its mind on reaping commercial profits, the thought of realism also played a part in its basic strategic concepts. The Great Britain was able to build a hegemon on the preconditions that Europe formed and maintained a balance of power and the British Royal Navy ruled the ocean. The Great Britain abandoned its previous plan of conquering Europe as early as the end of the eighteenth century. It picked the strategic choice of maintaining the power balance on the European continent and focusing on overseas expansion.29 For this purpose, to prevent any single country from controlling the European continent, the Great Britain formed alliance with France and other countries against Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, teamed with Prussia and others to contend with France from the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century, and fought by the side of France and other countries against Germany between the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, all the time bearing in its mind that interference should come with commanding force.30 The British overseas expansion was based on its predominance over the sea, with its general guidelines being “controlling the sea and world trade, thus seizing the global wealth at hand.”31 On the basis of the maritime strength, the Great Britain concerned itself with a harder challenge than other European states. It was determined to balance the forces on the continent and took the standard practices of free economy, including free trade, gold standard system, and free flows of capital and people, as the underlying principles in the negotiations of interests, and established the first international liberal economic order.32 This economic order had the characteristics of a multilateral system, but instead of making it institutional, the Great Britain only laid the grounds for the preliminary construction of an international financial system. As for national defense, the island country boasted a powerful navy and was easy to defend, therefore reducing the necessity of forming a multilateral alliance with other countries. That was why the defense alliances with the Great Britain as a member were mostly temporary and were aimed for acquiring interests. Only when its power was on the wane did the Great Britain become a long-term ally of Japan. To sum up, in terms of overseas expansion tactics, the Great Britain tended to start with military expansion, carry out direct governance on politics, economy, and culture, and consequently grab control across the board over the conquered land. Meanwhile, in regions which it failed to 28 Howe

(2002). (2003). 30 Kissinger (1994, p. 89). 31 Bi (1994). 32 Latham (1997). 29 Maddison

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turn into its colonies yet, the Great Britain sought to set up military bases, trying to control the strategic sites that had a major sway on connecting the Indian Oceans and sending troops to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, and other places. However, in terms of managing its colonies, the Great Britain showed no intention of imposing its domestic political layout onto global politics and seldom displayed the impetus of advertising its domestic governing practices to the world. This was in sharp contrast to the later American hegemony. The USA is the first global, comprehensive hegemon, and also a world hegemon of predominance in both land and sea. Since its founding, the American people have been regarding their country as a unique, civilized entity, calling it “a city upon a hill of the world,”33 “a beacon of freedom, opportunity, and peace,”34 and viewing themselves as “God’s chosen people.” Not only does the USA want to act as a beacon of its domestic democratic lives that sets an example for other nations, but the country is also keen on standing out as a moralist superior to others in ethics of how to behave on the international stage.35 The Americans hold the firm belief that the “manifest destiny” means “spreading ideas like freedom and social justice to all people and leading the human race from the road of crime to the ‘New Jerusalem’ in the human world,” that they shoulder the mission to revolutionize and rejuvenate civilizations according to God’s will and unite the west and reshape the world with their cultural values. Such a logic leads to the conclusion that the American democracy is better than what other countries have, that the world’s destiny should be left to America’s discretion, and that other countries should “commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions.”36 When put into action, it is called “to export democracy,” the concept of which could lead to a wide range of interpretations. Narrowly speaking, it means that the USA demands other countries to passively accept the American democratic system; broadly speaking, it tells that the USA wants to spread its cultural values to other countries.37 Building a new world order has irresistible charms to the USA, whose Great Seal bears the inscription “novu sordo seclorum,” meaning “a new order of the ages.” The “new order” here not only refers to the political order of the civil society established since the American Revolution with people’s sovereignty, republicanism, federalism, the system of checks and balances, and the protection of basic rights of citizens as contents, but also the international political order.38 The dominant idea of the American hegemony is neoliberalism. For a hegemon, neoliberalism retains some features of liberalism, such as pursuing foreign trade and open markets while emphasizing the importance of international rules, thus making the construction of global order and international institutions the main approach to pursuing 33 Boorstin

(1987). (1997). 35 Schlesinger (1986). 36 Huntington (1996). 37 Men (1999). 38 Wang (2003). 34 Clinton

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hegemony. In proving this, the USA inherited the liberal economic principles upheld by the Great Britain and stressed the openness of international market. Meanwhile, on another front, it further developed the gold standard system that the Great Britain used to maintain the international financial order into the Bretton Woods system and then upgraded it into the Jamaican system to keep pace with the development trends of the international economy. The design of the US global system also reflects the domestic experience of the USA to a large extent, with the most important feature being the diversity of American society and political system.39 We admit that extreme selfishness and signs of realism of not excluding military interference from consideration are not absent from the dominant ideas of American hegemony. The USA was able to establish hegemony mainly by building an international system in various fields of global politics and economy and by forming solid alliances in important geopolitical regions. Link these institutional arrangements with one another, and a US-centered international system is established. Compared with Roman hegemony and British hegemony, the USA does not rely on conquering others by pure force of arms, such as territorial conquest, taking control of the governments of other countries, and plundering resources. Instead, it emphasizes taking other nations by force of ideas.40 It mainly seeks measures on the institutional scale to reap absolute benefits, such as cooperation with other nations, economic control, mandatory imposition of democratic system, and military containment, and to establish a world order dominated by American-style political, economic, and cultural systems.41

The World Ideal of Ancient China and Its Realization As the Chinese saying goes, “Rulers who don’t consider reigning for perpetuity would fail to command the situation at hand.”42 And to reign for perpetuity, a ruler needs a world ideal. The earliest world ideal known in history is China’s thought of “Tianxia” (“All Under Heaven”). This ancient world ideal can be traced back to the pre-Qin Period (2100–221 BC). In the Confucian classics written during that period, such as the Book of Changes (Yijing), Book of Songs (Shijing), Book of Documents (Shangshu), Analects (Lunyu), Mencius (Mengzi), Great Learning (Daxue), and Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong), “Tianxia” refers to the space where the human world and the nature overlap and to the combination of China in the middle with the four quarters of peripheral territories.43 “Tianxia” represents a concentric circle without limits, continuously expanding outward into the barbarian lands. China claimed itself to be the center of civilization, establishing the tributary system to govern its relations with neighboring states and setting up other institutions on the 39 Brzezinski

(1998, p. 33). (1935). 41 For analysis of the characteristics of American hegemony, see Men (2001, 2005b). 42 Chen Danran (Qing), Wu Yan II—On Moving the Capital to Jinzhou. 43 Chen (2008). 40 Weiberg

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governance of its domestic border regions, such as the bestowment awarding system (赐封), the autonomous administrative system (羁縻制), and the native chieftain system (土司制度).44 Xu Jilin held the idea that the nature of the thought of all under heaven lies in a set of universal values and culture. It acknowledges that every ethnic group has its own history and makes its own choices, but eventually they will all develop to the same common destination.45 In this sense, the traditional system of China’s international relations with the thought of all under heaven at its basis presented features distinct from those of the west world.46 The ancient China boasted a time-honored history and developed its own system, based on which China formed its imperial system in East Asia. This empire ruled with China’s Confucian social and political order, a unified scenario of the world where “all the lands in the world belong to the King, and all the humans living within the lands’ boundaries are the King’s subjects.”47 From this social and political order generated the so-called tributary system, or China’s ritual system, or the Sino-barbarian system, or we may call it “Pax Sinica.”48 The tributary system, born of such a vision of the unification of all under heaven, “completed a concentric and hierarchical world system.”49 As an important form of order in ancient East Asia,50 and the tributary system viewed the culture of China as the only law governing the real world. The Chinese emperors had righteous virtues to civilize and educate all men under heaven, and China stood in the middle of the world while the neighboring states in different parts of the world were barbarians.51 The neighboring states became tributary states of China by regularly sending envoys to China to convey their obedience and subordination, acknowledging their position as inferior in front of the Chinese Emperor and handing in their tributes; China would bestow gold or silver seals on the kings and rulers of the tributary states who acknowledged China’s “royal decree,” award them tokens for approval, and give them the official title of “King” of their states,52 as well as offering political acknowledgment, preferential trade, and cultural guidance. The tributary system advocated that the foreign states served China as their superior regime, longed for China’s culture and education, and trudged arduous journeys to prove to China their respect and their rigorous observation of 44 Xu

(2010). (2012). 46 Zhao (2011). 47 Men (2004, 2015, p. 54). 48 Kurth and Cronin (1996). 49 Fairbank (1985). 50 Huang Chih-Lien pointed out, “Before the 19th century, that is, before the rise of Western culture, Western countries, and Western colonial imperialism, there was a prominent regional order here, centered on the Chinese feudal dynasty (the so-called ‘Celestial Empire’) and operating on ceremony, etiquette, propriety, and ritualism. It played a role in maintaining stable bilateral and multilateral relations between China and its neighboring countries and regions), hence the name ‘Celestial System of Rule by Rituals’.” See Huang (1992a, b). 51 Mencius said, “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians.” 52 Yamamoto (1993). 45 Xu

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tributary duties, while the system demanded that China would provide governance and guidance for all the tributary states, treat them on an equal footing, teach them manners, and help them abandon their barbarian rituals and beliefs. It is obvious to see that behind these contents are the theoretical framework and principles the Confucian thoughts have constituted for the Chinese Empire to deal with diplomatic relations. This framework tried to bring about such an ideal scenario that the foreign states beyond China’s borders would flock to the Chinese Empire to serve the central country and make progress under its governance, like the stars subordinating under the North Star, and the sunflowers turning their heads to the sun. In this way, every state and the Chinese Empire could enjoy a peaceful and prosperous world together under this centripetal and vertical system, all living in the international peace of the Chinese mode.53 It is safe to say that the tributary system put soft power at front and hard power at its back. It was a system of foreign relations that dealt with the interests between countries and dynasties (more of obedience and reverence the tributary states hold for the master country governing them) and also an international order built upon the complementary combination of diplomacy and trade exchanges, which was more in the form of cultural universalism. Such an order presents itself in demands and in virtual manifestation as a stark contrast with the Western hegemonic order, and its guiding influences in the cultural arena have distinct Eastern characteristics. The tributary system originated from China’s ancient thought of the Kingly Way and its political practices. Historian John King Fairbank pointed out, “From this agelong contact with the barbarians roundabout, the Chinese were impressed with one fact: that their superiority was not one of mere material power but of culture. Such things as the Chinese written language and the Confucian code of conduct were signs of this culture and so great was their virtue, so overwhelming the achievements of the Middle Kingdom in art and letters and the art of living, that no barbarian could long resist them. Gradually but invariably the barbarian in contact with China tended to become Chinese, by this most flattering act reinforcing the Chinese conviction of superiority.”54 The neighboring nations and states were fascinated by the Chinese culture, and they “wanted to be associated with the Chinese style and benefit from the annual rewards.”55 The ancient Chinese civilization with Confucianism at its core spread radially toward the neighboring nations and became the center of East Asian civilization. That is why Confucianism has long been the dominant cultural concept in most Northeastern Asian countries.56 While respecting the existence of other nations, China has gradually established an international cultural circle that affected the entire East Asian region, and the majority areas of Southeast Asia have also been “sinicized”.57 The tributary system had its origin in the traditional thought of the Kingly Way, which advocated governing the peripheral regions with virtues. 53 Fangchuan

(1998). (1942). 55 Ma (1988). 56 Yu (2001). 57 Cha (2005). 54 Fairbank

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It is a natural expansion of the rational political order of the Chinese nation. Behind it lies the concept of all under heaven that features inclusiveness and transcends the differences between nations and races. In practice, the tribute system was adapted from the “Jifu System” (畿服制) of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties (twentyfirst century–256 BC). The “Offices of Spring” (Chunguan) section of the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli) writes: “(the constituent states) meeting the King in spring is called presenting”; in the section “Tribute of Yu” (Yugong) in the Book of Documents (Shangshu), it writes: “Yu marked out the nine provinces; followed the course of the hills, and deepened the rivers; defined the imposts on the land, and the articles of tribute.”58 The Jifu System reveals itself both as part of the system of country– region relations in ancient China and as a form of the system of enfeoffment. It embodies the essential concept that the Emperor of China directly governed the region around the capital and some strategic locations, while the rest of the country was divided and awarded to the regional rulers. The regional rulers were enfeoffed by the Emperor of China according to the distance and closeness of relationship with the regional rulers, forming a kind of hierarchy of inferiority and superiority with different titles and statuses.59 Behind this hierarchy was the universal Sinobarbarian dichotomy. However, the Sino-barbarian distinction differentiated China from outsiders in a cultural sense, not by blood or by ethnic group. That is to say “the Chinese nation and the barbarian nations differ not in the land they live on or the ethnic group they belong to, but in the ways they follow. Therefore, a man of the Chinese nation following the rituals of a barbarian nation becomes a barbarian; and a man of the barbarian nation who enters China and uses Chinese rituals becomes a Chinese.”60 Thus, inherited by successive dynasties, the Sino-barbarian distinction was put into practice to become the tributary system, and the tributary order was established. The tribute is not only a sign of political subordination but also a special form of taxation or exchange relationship in the economic sense.61 In other words, it is about “increasing the rewards without considering the actual values of their tributes, and imposing glorious titles on them without demanding the burdensome etiquette.”62 Also, due to the same reason, the concept of “China” embodies an entity that has never been strictly defined in history, and its sovereignty and borders are not specified.63 Therefore, John Fairbank raised the idea that China’s tributary system is a world system, not just an international or interstate system.64 The tributary system can be traced back to the pre-Qin Period when the Chinese nation living in the central plain area established their advantageous status and to the time when “Jifu System” (a system where China classifies other states by region 58 Tribute, “An offering to one’s superior of something unique that they do not naturally produce.” See Zhengyi (1980). 59 Xue (2004). 60 See Chen (1996). 61 Ma (2000). 62 Tuotuo et al. (1977). 63 Luo (1996), Xu (1999). 64 Fairbank (1968).

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and distance from its own center) was implemented. Since the Qin Dynasty (221– 206 BC), a period when both the county system and feudal system ran in parallel, the Chinese nation has settled themselves on this land. They incorporated vast areas of East Asia into the governance of one mature country via the outward extension of the county and feudal systems and started to build the tributary system in which the Chinese emperor bestowed investitures upon neighboring states and received their tributes. From then on, under the influence of Confucianism, China, and other East Asian countries gradually formed a consensus on their relations, with China bestowing large rewards and receiving small tributes, attracting the respect and obedience of barbarian tribes with righteous virtues, and the small states subordinating under the bigger country and enjoying a peaceful rule. The Japanese historian Takeshi Hamashita thought that “the tributary system with China at its core and connecting the entire Asia was a historical system that only existed in Asia. One has to think from this perspective time and again to detect the internal connections in Asian history.”65 The basic features of the tributary order included that China did not interfere with the domestic affairs of a tributary state, China gave far more generous rewards than receiving tributes, and that China protected the peace and security of its tributary states.66 The system also offered regional public goods, which can be seen in the following aspects: China guaranteed the security of all its tributary states under heaven and the majority of internal disputes in the tributary regions did not have to be solved by force of arms; commercial transactions under the system were imposed with “zero tariff,” opening up business opportunities for the outside world; the tributary system also served as a mechanism for cultural and trade exchanges. In the preferential trade system between China and its tributary states, the exchanges were especially beneficial to the vulnerable side.67 It is evident that this feature differs the Chinese system distinctly from the British and American hegemonies, and it reveals that China has never generated the concept of building a commercial empire. Frankly speaking, the tributary system had the non-egalitarian component of China being at the center and other countries as subordinates and was the institutional form of a hierarchy.68 But in its nature, the system was not mandatory, neither was it founded on the basis of a predominant power and territorial expansion.69 “Though the relationship between the Chinese Empire (the ruling country) and the tributary states (the subordinating states) was one between the governor and the governed, the ruling country did not in principle interfere with the domestic affairs of the tributary states.”70 The unequal feature of this relationship mainly lay in the formalities and a cumbersome set of etiquette, more in name than in reality. In comparison, the Roman, British, and American Hegemonies all presented strong features that they valued the reality and mandatory facts. Therefore, Prof. Wang Tieya pointed out, “In 65 Hamashita

(1999). (1998). 67 Katzenstein (2007). 68 Rozman (2003). 69 Shambaugh (Winter 2004/2005). 70 Shinobu (1982). 66 Fangchuan

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the Emperor’s eyes, this system mainly had the function of upholding the security and inviolability of the ‘central country’. The tributary states received more benefits than China. The Emperor bestowed the investiture on their rulers and made them legitimate, increasing their prestige in their people’s minds. They received protection from the Empire, they were protected from the invasion of foreign countries, and they were entitled to ask for help when stricken with natural disasters. Because of the tributes they paid, they received bountiful awards from the Emperor, and more importantly, they were allowed to trade with China in a way beneficial to them. For the tributary states, the activity of handing in tributes had real economic benefits; while for China, the system was a means to keep the tributary states in subordination.”71 John Fairbank believed that the system worked both like an agency that dealt with trade and diplomatic relations and as a religious ritual proving the universal prevalence of the Confucian order. Such a relationship between China and its tributary states could not be properly covered in words like “international” or “interstate.” We would rather call it China’s world order.72

How China Formed a New World Ideal The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the establishment of regional order based on sovereignty, international law, and balance of power in the European continent and its expansion to Asia. As the colonists advanced to the east by encroaching on the edges of China’s tributary system since the beginning of the sixteenth century, they moved onto China’s coastal areas. During the 1840s and 1850s, the Western colonists waged two opium wars against the core of that tributary system—the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), turning it into a semicolony, shattering the tributary system, and unveiling a hundred-year history of humiliation for China. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Western powers began to seek their own spheres of influence in China while Japan, which just had Meiji Restoration, became an aggressive power invading China. It took Ryukyu Islands by force in 1871, invaded Taiwan in 1874, and launched the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894. In 1895, Japan made the Qing Dynasty recognize the independence of Korea, which was the last member of China’s tributary system. The 2,000-year-old tributary system came to its end, giving place to the colonial system in East Asia.73 In 1899, the USA initiated a term “Open Door Policy”, became an active participant in East Asian affairs, and started to compete against Japan in East Asia for superiority. Later in the 1940s, as Japan pursued the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,”74 the world order and East Asian order underwent dramatic changes by the end of World War II. America rose to the top position and took over the Asia-Pacific after Japan and European imperialist 71 Wang

(1991). (1991). 73 Fangchuan (1998). 74 Men (2015, pp. 61–71). 72 Tao

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powers fell into pieces.75 Right after the war, the USA is based on its global strategy upon the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank and adopted policies centered on Europe. Politically, it launched the Truman Doctrine to curb the Soviet Union; economically, it initiated the Marshall Plan to revive Western European nations; military-wise, the USA established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nevertheless, Asia was not ignored, but America’s focus of attention was primarily on controlling the expansion of communist influences. The USA backed Chiang Kaishek during that time to ensure its position in East Asia. It then went on to support Japan after Chiang was defeated. Since the founding of the PRC, the USA launched the “Domino Theory” by establishing special bilateral relationships, especially military relationships, with individual Asian countries to contain China and the Soviet Union.76 With the international background as such, the founding of the PRC was destined to make a huge difference to the world. The once-falling China took its step into a new world and an era marked by “the profound changes unseen in a thousand years.”77 The first half of the twentieth century saw China at the bottom of an unstable international system seeking to resume its independence and sovereignty lost in the nineteenth century. Since the PRC was founded, and especially since the reform and opening up policy was launched in 1978, China has braced for a historic rise. A prosperous country and a revitalized nation become realistic aspirations. China becomes more involved in the international system and tries to build itself into a country that is responsible, constructive, and highly expected. China’s rise is consistent with the transformation of the world, which brings both exciting opportunities and tremendous impacts. As China continues to integrate itself into the world, its view toward the world is also developing and its strategy keeps being adjusted. China has quit the idea of challenging the international system with its ideology, moved from being a passive bystander to an active participant in the system, and started to play leading roles in global governance. China’s new world ideal came into being during the process. Mao Zedong was the first Chinese leader that proposed the new world ideal. He claimed that China’s contribution to the world should be regarded as responsibility that the Chinese nation must shoulder and the pathway to achieving that is to build an industrialized socialist country.78 To make it consistent with foreign policies, China initiated the idea of seeking common ground while leaving aside differences and upheld the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. During the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao announced, “The Chinese people have stood up.” And that unveiled the beginning of China’s socialist modernization. On September 15, 1956, in the opening address at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Chairman Mao stated, “Close integration of Marxist-Leninist

75 Rongqu

(1995). (2002). 77 Hu et al. (2003). 78 Hu and Li (2018). 76 Ikenberry

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theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution is the ideological principle consistently followed by our Party.”79 Furthermore, he proposed the idea of learning from the peoples of the world and achieving national rejuvenation. The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, states that the mission of the CPC is to build China into a great, wealthy, and advanced socialist country with a strong modern industry, modern agriculture, modern transportation, and modern national defense. On November 12, 1956, Mao Zedong published the article “In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” stating that “at the beginning of the 21st century, China will have undergone an even greater change. It will have become a powerful industrial socialist country. And that is as it should be. China is a land with an area of 9,600,000 km2 and a population of 600 million, and it ought to make a greater contribution to humanity.”80 Mao Zedong paid close attention to world trends and put forward the “intermediate zone theory” and the “three worlds theory,” making it China’s firmest strategic direction to attach importance to the work of the “intermediate zone” beyond the “two poles,” and to unite with the majority of countries. In February 1974, Chairman Mao set forth his strategic thinking of the division of the three worlds. He observed, “I hold that the US and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World.”81 In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping elaborated this strategic idea at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which attracted the world’s great attention. In January 1975, Zhou Enlai summed up this strategic idea in his Report on the Work of the Government: “We should ally ourselves with all the forces in the world that can be allied with to combat colonialism, imperialism and above all superpower hegemonism. We are ready to establish or develop relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”82 The division of the three worlds represents China’s far-reaching consideration of building a united front against hegemony, based on economic and military power rather than ideology or national class attributes, and becomes a realistic strategy for realizing its world ideal. The “three worlds” are, so to speak, the real world. Deng Xiaoping inherited and developed Marx’s “Theory of World History” and creatively proposed a new idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics, pushing China to seize the wave of globalization and spread its interests, strength, and influence in the world. Deng Xiaoping stressed that China is a firm force for maintaining world peace and development and that “the stronger China grows, the better the chances are for preserving world peace.”83 He said more than once, “China is of special international importance; what happens here can affect world stability and

79 Collected

Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999, p. 116. (1999). 81 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and CCCPC Party Literature Research Office (1994). 82 Wang (1999). 83 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 104. 80 Mao

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security.”84 He also stressed that China must first and foremost run its own affairs well, develop and build China well, and demonstrate the sophistication of China’s socialist system, so that it can fulfill its internationalist obligations and make a greater contribution to humanity.85 Deng Xiaoping paid close attention to changes in the world pattern. On March 4, 1985, when meeting with a Japanese delegation, he pointed out, “The two really great issues confronting the world today, issues of global strategic significance, are: first, peace, and second, economic development.”86 On December 21, 1988, when Deng Xiaoping met with visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, he pointed out, “There are two major issues in the world today: one is peace and the other is development… We should therefore regard the problem of development as one that concerns all mankind and study and solve it on that level. Only thus will we recognize that it is the responsibility not just of the developing countries but also of the developed countries.”87 The introduction of the theme of the era being peace and development is a turning point in the reawakening of China’s interaction with the world. Deng Xiaoping inherited and developed Mao Zedong’s “Three Worlds Theory” and advocated the idea of peaceful development as the theme of the times, on the basis of which he proposed the “east–west and north–south issues” and actively promoted north–south dialog and south–south cooperation. As the world developed and China grew stronger, promoting the establishment of a new international political and economic order became the strategic focus of Deng Xiaoping’s; in 1988, Deng clearly proposed that as for the new international order, “we should take the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as norms for international relations.”88 This is a theoretical sum-up of the vision of the world. Based upon this, Deng Xiaoping proposed and led the implementation of the reform and opening-up strategy. Deng Xiaoping, with the wisdom of the entire party and the credit of his life, formulated a three-step development strategy for the basic modernization of China and established a comprehensive plan for reform and opening up,89 which built a strong foundation for an open and prosperous China. Deng Xiaoping’s great achievements have been highly praised at home and abroad. Ezra Feivel Vogel pointed out that when Deng came to power in 1978, Mao had already completed national unification, established a strong ruling system, and introduced modern industry, all of which were advantages Deng could make use of. But if in the absence of a strong leader who can unite the country and provide it with a strategic direction, all the favorable conditions that China had in 1978 were not enough to transform this vast and chaotic civilization into a modern state. When Deng 84 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, pp. 82, 360. 85 Liu

(2007). Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 56. 87 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, pp. 281– 282. 88 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, pp. 282– 283. 89 Jiang (2006). 86 Selected

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Xiaoping left the political scene in 1992, he accomplished a mission that no Chinese leader had accomplished in the past 150 years. That is, he and his colleagues have found a way to improve the people’s living standards and strengthen the country. In reaching this goal, Deng Xiaoping has led China for a fundamental transformation, both in its relationship with the world and in its own governance structure and society.90 In August 2014, at a symposium to commemorate the 110th birth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping stated, “It is because of the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the reform and opening up that Deng Xiaoping vigorously advocated and promoted that socialism with Chinese characteristics can flourish, that the Chinese people can live a moderately prosperous life, and that the Chinese nation and the People’s Republic of China can stand with a new posture in the world. Deng Xiaoping’s contribution has changed not only the historical destiny of the Chinese people, but also the course of “World History”... Deng Xiaoping’s merit in building an illustrious history for his country and its people lies in his ability to see the world’s and China’s development, to understand the deep aspirations of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, to grasp the historical laws of China’s development, and to rely closely on the Party and the people to build an unprecedented historical feat.”91 The third generation of the Chinese Communist Party, with Jiang Zemin at its core, was formed at a time when the evolution of the world landscape was at an important turning point, with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries undergoing dramatic changes that led to the disintegration of the bipolar pattern and the end of the Cold War; after the end of the Cold War, with a serious imbalance of international power and the sole superpower, the USA, seeking to establish a unipolar world, the Western countries shifted the focus of their policies on peaceful evolution to China. At this important moment in history, the CPC Central Committee, with Jiang Zemin at its core, was able to assess the situation, remain calm and collected, correctly analyze the emerging complex international environment, deepen Deng Xiaoping’s thinking that peace and development are the two major issues in the contemporary world, and promote China’s full integration into the world and its growth into a major economic and strategic force in the world. On this basis, Jiang Zemin proposed the idea of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Jiang Zemin insisted on and deepened Deng Xiaoping’s concept of the theme of the times, emphasizing that the world theme and the theme of the times both refer to peace and development as the “two major issues” of the contemporary world, which are “global and strategic” in nature; and that safeguarding peace and promoting development have become what the contemporary world is about and the specific features of the development of the times. At the same time, Jiang Zemin paid great attention to the development of the international situation after the Cold War and believed that there were rising uncertainties affecting peace and development. “China is a positive and firm force in maintaining regional and world peace. … China is committed to the modernization of socialism while pursuing an independent and peaceful foreign 90 Vogel 91 Xi

and Feng (2013). (2014).

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policy, and the fundamental principles of our domestic and foreign policies will never change.”92 Based on that, Jiang Zemin was committed to shaping the new pattern of China’s foreign relations after the Cold War, focusing on the formation of a new international political and economic order, proposing and actively implementing a new security concept, promoting the construction of strategic partnerships with major powers, and treating the integration process into East Asia as a fundamental strategic task, thus realizing a grand pattern in which China’s regional and global strategies run parallel to each other. Under this strategic arrangement, China seized the strategic opportunity to join the WTO and actively implemented the “going global” strategy, forming a complete sense of opening up to the outside world.93 Meanwhile, China promoted the concept of “responsible great power,” advocated the diversity of world civilizations and the democratization of international relations, and promoted the theory of common interests, laying down a solid material and conceptual foundation for its active participation in the international community. As we enter the twenty-first century, China’s relation with the world has undergone historic changes. China’s destiny is increasingly tied to that of the world, which sees a developing China that has an increasing impact worldwide. The stance and manner that China takes toward the world are also a concern for multiple countries. Under this circumstance, Hu Jintao led China to expand on the world stage with a steady and innovative strategic posture and put forward the concept of a “harmonious world.” The “harmonious world” is built on the basis of the path of peaceful development, with the scientific outlook on development and a harmonious society as the conditions for domestic support, and the concept of a new order and a mutually beneficial win–win opening-up strategy as the conditions for international support. In so doing, it promotes the harmonious philosophy as the ruling philosophy of the central leadership with Hu Jintao as General Secretary. In December 2005, China issued a white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” in which it clearly put forward the idea of a peaceful path to development, stressing: “To take the road of peaceful development is to unify domestic development with opening to the outside world, linking the development of China with that of the rest of the world, and combining the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples throughout the world.”94 The essence of the peaceful development road is to develop oneself with a peaceful international environment and to promote world peace with development.95 Hu Jintao extended the traditional ideal of a harmonious society to the handling of international issues, clearly proposed the concepts of a harmonious world, a harmonious Asia and a harmonious region, and emphasized that a harmonious society and a harmonious world are mutually conditional. The reference to a harmonious world represents an 92 Jiang

(2002). (2018). 94 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Peaceful Development Road”, see: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm, visited on January 19, 2020. 95 Yang (2008). 93 Men

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ideal sense of China’s international strategy, and harmony is a commitment, both to China at home and to the world at large. This commitment has evolved into responsibility and has become a self-strategic constraint for the Chinese Government as a “responsible power.” It means that Chinese leaders are clearly aware of the impact of China’s development on the international community, and they see a harmonious world as a strategic intermediate point for integrating internal harmony and external cooperation. The idea of a “harmonious world” is the most direct theoretical resource and ideological impetus for the idea of a community of shared future for mankind.96 On the basis of the abovementioned philosophy, Xi Jinping has proposed and enriched the strategic connotation of the “community of shared future for mankind,” promoting the ultimate formation of China’s new world ideal. Xi Jinping’s profound exposition of the community of shared future for mankind demonstrates China’s ideology and future aspirations, as well as the philosophical thinking that drives China’s positive interaction with the world. The report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC emphasizes that there is only one earth for mankind; that all countries live together in one world; and that it is necessary to promote a sense of community of shared future for mankind. In a speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, Xi Jinping said, “It is a world where countries are linked with and dependent on one another at a level never seen before. Mankind, by living in the same global village in the same era and on the same earth where history and reality meet, has increasingly emerged as a community of common destiny in which everyone has in himself a little bit of others.” At the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2015, under the theme of “Asia’s New Future: Towards a Community of Common Destiny,” Xi Jinping delivered a speech entitled “Towards a Community of Common Destiny and a New Future for Asia”, explaining the four major connotations of a community of shared destiny: mutual respect and equality among nations; win–win cooperation and common development; achieving common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; and inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations. On July 1, 2016, in his speech at the ceremony marking the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Xi pointed out that today’s mankind is better qualified than ever before to achieve the goal of peace and development together. In the interest of peace, we need to foster a keen sense of a global community of shared future.97 On September 28, 2015, Xi Jinping attended the general debate of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly and delivered a speech in which he proposed the path of building a community of shared future for mankind: to build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation, and show mutual understanding; to create a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution, and shared benefits; to promote open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits all; to increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences; and to build an ecological system that puts Mother Nature and green development first.98 On January 18, 96 Wang

and Yin (2018). (2017c). 98 Xi (2015). 97 Xi

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2017, at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech entitled “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind” at the high-level meeting on the theme of “Jointly Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation.” He advocated the joint promotion of the great process of building a community of shared future for mankind that is based on dialog and consultation, joint efforts and shared benefits, win–win cooperation, exchanges and mutual understanding, as well as green and low-carbon development, so as to build a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and cleanness and beauty.99 In the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping also mentioned the goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind is to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.100 Building a community of shared future is the forward-looking thinking of the CPC Central Committee on the basis of its insight into the international situation and the general trend of the evolution of the world pattern and is in line with and complementary to the idea of building a new model of international relations.101 The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has made top-level design for China’s diplomacy in the new era, focusing on promoting the establishment of a new model of international relations and the building of a community of shared future for mankind. The community of shared future is the masterpiece of China’s world ideals over the past 70-plus years, and that the five worlds involved, namely lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and cleanliness and beauty, are the centralized expression of that ideal world.

Exploring for Path to a Community of Shared Future for Mankind As soon as the idea of a community of shared future for mankind was put forward, it immediately became a topic of global interest and was regarded as an ideal in the new era and a strategic vision beyond hegemony. Premised on reflecting the modernization drive in recent times, the concept emphasizes the need to progress from the past conquering civilization to a new civilization of mutual cooperation in the new era.102 It is the world’s ideal concept that transcends hegemony and stands in a stark contrast with the appeals of three major Western hegemonic powers. As Xi Jinping insightfully pointed out, “Keeping up with the times, one cannot live in the 21st century while thinking in the old fashion, lingering in the age of colonial expansion 99 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote Speech at the High-Level Meeting of ‘Jointly Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation’”, People’s Daily, January 19, 2017, p. 3. 100 Xi (2017, p. 58–59). 101 Wang (2016). 102 Li (2019).

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or with the zero-sum mentality of the Cold War.”103 The idea of a community of shared future for mankind is the latest achievement of the localization of Marxism in China in the new era. On the one hand, it responds to the trend of expanding world markets in the process of transition from “history” to “World History”; on the other hand, it denies aggressive expansion and hegemonic wars in the formation of world markets and reflects China’s major theoretical and practical innovations as it seeks common interests and common values of humanity in the new era. From the perspective of theoretical innovation, the concept of a community of shared future for mankind can be described as an integration of the traditional Chinese idea of “Tianxia” (All Under Heaven) with Marx’s Theory of World History, reflecting both the strategic revival and application of the traditional world view after the rise of China and the new development of Marx’s idea of community under contemporary conditions.104 Furthermore, the concept has given new interpretations to “World History” theory of Marx and Engels 170 years ago and the idea of community in the new era; it has “compressed” to the greatest extent the temporal and spatial distance between the materialistic historical concept of Marx’s “community of freely associated individuals” and the current historical reality of the world; it has realized the creative combination of the materialistic historical concept and the reality of modern society, thus is an important theoretical achievement of the development of Marxism in China in the twenty-first century.105 The concept enriches Marx’s idea of a “true community” and has found a logical and historical intermediary for humanity to move from an “abstract, illusory community” to a “true community.” From the perspective of practical innovation, in an era where two systems, two civilizations, and two values of socialism and capitalism compete and rival with each other, the idea of a community of shared future for mankind is committed to contributing Chinese wisdom, Chinese philosophy, and Chinese solutions to the world’s problems and is also a Chinese prescription for overcoming the “Thucydides Trap.” Although the new world calls for the building of a community of share future for mankind, it requires path exploration to turn the concept into reality and lay foundation for it. A reasonable and practical way should be from a community of shared interests to a community of shared responsibility where countries assume global responsibilities together and to a community of shared future where countries share weal and woe. Countries should seek a development path in line with their national realities, forming a diversified and harmonious pattern of global development and building a new platform leading to the community of shared future for mankind. As Xi Jinping stressed, “Building a community of shared future is an exciting goal, and it requires efforts from generation to generation.”106 We believe that the practice of realizing the goal should focus on the following aspects.

103 Selection of Important Documents Since the 18th CPC National Congress (Volume One), Beijing:

Central Party Literature Press, 2014, p. 260. and Deng (2017). 105 Tian (2018). 106 Xi (2017c, p. 548). 104 Zhang

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First, better understand the idea of and preemptively create the period of strategic opportunity. Historically, human society is in an era of great development, great transformation and major changes which, as Xi Jinping pointed out, are “the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years.” In this increasingly multipolar, economically globalized, digitized, and culturally diversified world, the trend toward peace and development has become stronger, and reform and innovation are gaining momentum. Never have we seen such close interdependence between countries as today, and such a fervent desire of people for a better life, and never have we had so many means to prevail over difficulties. In terms of reality, we find ourselves in a world fraught with challenges. Global economic growth requires new drivers, development needs to be more inclusive and balanced, and the gap between rich and poor needs to be narrowed. Flashpoints in some regions are causing instability, and terrorism is rampant. Deficits in the spheres of peace, development, and governance have posed daunting challenges to humanity.107 The world has entered a transition period, with the rise of a “deglobalization” trend.108 While the world is undergoing difficulties in a period of “systemic disorder,” socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered the new era.109 China’s development has a far-reaching impact on the world, and the stark contrast has stimulated the strategic nerves of many people. On December 28, 2017, Xi Jinping made his first public reference to “the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years” at a working conference of Chinese diplomatic envoys to foreign countries.110 Changes are normal in the world, but the General Secretary’s strategic judgment of the situation has a specific meaning. Since the end of the Cold War, we have long been guided by the theme of peace and development, emphasizing that the world has undergone profound changes and is in the midst of great transformation and adjustments; we have closely monitored the impact of global changes on China’s development, thus adjusting our diplomacy correspondingly. From the perspective of human history, Xi Jinping has taken the pulse of the times and made the strategic judgment that the world today faces “the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years.”111 He put forward at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in June 2018: “China has been in the best period of development since modern times, while the world is undergoing the most unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years. … Today, the world is changing. It is a world in which new opportunities and new challenges keep emerging, a world in which the international system and international order are going through a profound adjustment and a world in which the balance of international forces is shifting steadily in favor of peace and development.”112 At the APEC CEO Summit in November 2018, Xi stressed: “The changes we are encountering in the world are unseen in a hundred years. Changes create opportunities, but more 107 Xi

(2017b). (2017). 109 Zhou (2017). 110 Zhang (2019). 111 Wang (2019). 112 Xi (2018a). 108 Lin

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often than not, they are accompanied by risks and challenges. Mankind has once again reached a crossroads.”113 At the Central Economic Work Conference held at the end of 2018, he further emphasized that the world is facing the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, which produce both challenges and opportunities, including the opportunity for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.114 The world economy is in a period of profound adjustment, global governance is in a period of transformation and new changes in international environment present new opportunities. The flourishing new technological revolution, the global expansion of multinational corporations, and the strong appeals of the developing world are all important opportunities for China’s further development and strategic opportunities for China to promote opening across the board.115 Against the counterflow of globalization, China has been widely acclaimed by the international community for actively promoting economic globalization and creating strategic opportunities through its own efforts.116 This is also an important condition for China to usher in a period of strategic opportunity. As the world is in the midst of the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, China is in the best period in recent times, and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is at a crucial juncture, and the interaction of the three will inevitably create new challenges and opportunities. Against this backdrop, conditions for China’s period of strategic opportunity have shifted from stable and spontaneous ones to more fragile and positive ones.117 While China continues to enjoy an important period of strategic opportunity, it has also inevitably entered a period of strategic challenges, with unprecedented risks and challenges.118 In view of this, China in the period of strategic opportunity in the new era has seen significant changes in both domestic and foreign conditions and ways of controlling them, which require in-depth observation and positive actions. Second, promote the global expansion of national interests and cooperate in steering changes in international governance. China is building a strategic framework for peaceful development with integration–transformation–shaping as the core, and focus will be given to shaping the world’s future through peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefits to achieve China’s peaceful rise, peaceful development, and post-rise planning. The idea of a community of shared future for mankind is a new concept of international order, adhering to Lao-zi’s world perception of “looking at the world with the world in view,” matching the development trend that countries share weal and woe, and echoing Marx’s ideal vision of a true community. Globalization is giving rise to changes in global governance, and the moral strength of the international community lies in promoting a democratic, just, transparent and fair global governance. China should actively participate in global governance and work 113 Xi

(2018b).

114 “The Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, December 22, 2018,

p. 1. 115 Long

(2018). (2017). 117 Xu (2014). 118 Yu (2011). 116 Zhang

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to lead the world in setting up right concepts. At present, globalization has entered a new stage where international norms and rules have become the core elements of competition and cooperation between major powers. In the face of transformation of globalization, there are signs of a competition between the west led by the USA and the developing world led by China.119 At present, the USA seems to have been tired of “leading” the world and may withdraw from world affairs. As a result, some encourages China to fill the gap and assume the mantle of leadership.120 We must be highly vigilant and cautious about this. In fact, during the battle over the direction of globalization’s transformation, China has been pointed the finger at.121 We must understand that globalization is the general trend since it is in line with the requirements of productivity development and the interests of all parties, so globalization is irreversible. However, in the face of the “double-edge sword effects” of globalization, countries are making increasingly diverged and complex choices.122 In view of this, China should cooperate with the world’s major powers to carry out top-level design and assume the historical mission to promote the new type of globalization, thus promoting trade liberalization, investment liberalization, and service facilitation. As such, the country can promote reform through opening up, seek development through reform, and achieve prosperity through development. On the other hand, the country must seek for consensus and compromise, remain open to cooperation in dealing with common threats including international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other advanced technologies, failed states, and climate change, negotiate with the USA to promote a new type of globalization, make joint efforts in the transformation and development of global governance, and refrain from strategic confrontation. At the same time, as the USA makes an enemy of the whole world in terms of multilateral issues and forces countries to make strategic adjustments, and it brings a good opportunity for China to play a constructive role in global affairs. We should play an active role in global governance and free trade and advance the institutionalization of China’s global interests. Third, focus on the strategic expansion of East Asia to build a new regional order. The formation of the world’s two major powers—the UK and the USA—has provided an important historical lesson: to have both global and regional vision and be committed to the consolidation of regional advantages. The breaking of power balance on the European continent lay at the root of the collapse of Britain’s hegemony. Historically, every major power grew from its dominance in regional affairs in the first place. Traditionally, the regional strategies of great powers are based on national strength and aim to gain regional dominance; in the context of globalization and regional integration, the regional strategies of great powers have shifted to the pursuit of regional common interests, with open regionalism as a strategic tool, regional institutional building as the main area of cooperation, and regional order

119 Men

(2019b). (2017), He (2018). 121 Xu (2018). 122 Huang (2017). 120 Zongze

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forming as the vision of cooperation.123 China is still a major Asia-Pacific power with significant global influence and with East Asia and its neighbors at its core. It is in the process of growing from a global power to a world power, during which the most crucial thing is to establish its position as a leading power in the region, with East Asia becoming increasingly pivotal. In fact, building a community of shared future with neighboring countries should be considered a top priority of China’s international strategy. The building of East Asian order is closely linked to China’s strategy.124 As we have ushered in the twenty-first century, China is committed to an institutional framework for comprehensive cooperation in East Asia based on its relation with neighboring countries and to strengthening its capability to shape geopolitical and economic landscapes. The East Asian cooperation mechanism promoted by China represents a new way of thinking about Chinese diplomacy, that is, to cultivate and establish a regional order of equality, cooperation, mutual benefit, and mutual assistance based on common interests in regions where China has a stake, to eliminate long-established barriers and grievances in the course of constructive interactions, and to explore and gradually establish new norms for interstate and international relations. China’s active efforts in regional cooperation have both facilitated the sharing of China’s development experience and achievements by countries in the region and enhanced China’s agenda-setting capacity. China’s efforts in building regional order provide a paradigm to be followed in transforming the international order. Looking forward, as the shift of East Asian order is accelerated, and all countries in the region and beyond are committed to promoting their own East Asian order structures in their interest, and regional competition intensifies, it is high time for China to focus on expanding its East Asian strategy and improve its strategic framework for building regional order. Fourth, focus on building the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and reshaping China’s relationship with the world. The BRI is China’s grand strategic plan during the critical period of reform and opening up and deepening adjustments of the international order. It is also a strategic vision integrating global vision, regional focus, and national foundation. From a certain point of view, a comparison between the BRI with the US’s Marshall Plan that helped it establish global hegemony after WWII reveals the differences in approaches adopted by the two nations to realize global goals. Historically, the USA, relying on its economic foundation and vast domestic market, steadily advanced from neighboring areas through foreign trade and investment, complemented by political coordination and security instruments. It also seized opportunities to build its system and became a benefit provider, a cooperation supporter and a rule maker. Considered an “American classic,” the Marshal Plan has been compared by many scholars to China’s BRI. In the author’s opinion, US expansion in Latin America and East Asia also deserves in-depth research. On the one hand, the BRI focuses on Asia, particularly on the expansion of regional cooperation by both land and sea routes; on the other hand, it is extended to Europe and Africa, thus with a global vision. In this process, America’s hegemony from Latin 123 Men 124 Xiao

(2017a). (2010).

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America to East Asia and Western Europe provides enlightenment. Policy researchers have often regarded the initiative as the “Chinese Version of the Marshall Plan.” In fact, there are fundamental differences between the two, with the former committed to common development achieved through equality, mutual benefit, and practical cooperation, with the aim to achieve shared benefits through joint consultation and common efforts; the latter is essentially a political and security strategy, with which the USA kicked off the Cold War with the Soviet Union through assistance with attached strings.125 The experience to be drawn from the Marshall Plan is that China can make careful planning in accordance with the economic needs and characteristics of different regions and countries along the route and formulate plans and policies that meet the interests and needs of their markets; promote them in a focused and phased manner according to the degree of maturity of conditions; under the overall plan, strive to establish bilateral cooperation mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation, while making full use of existing multilateral cooperation mechanisms and institutions.126 The lesson to be learned, of course, is that the Marshall Plan that sought dominance over European affairs through institutional arrangements and rule-making was resented and resisted by European elites, thus stimulating the unity of European countries and brewing the strategic competition between Europe and the USA. In contrast, China should work to advance a new type of international relations and actively put into practice the concept of a community of shared future for mankind, so as to achieve win–win cooperation. Globally, the BRI has pointed the way for China to accelerate the formation of an all-round pattern of international cooperation that integrates land and sea and mutual assistance between east and west and has provided opportunities for the countries involved to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, achieve common development, and promote common prosperity. Focusing on Southeast Asia and Central Asia, and connecting three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, the initiative opens up a new path for China to move toward a wider international market.127 The initiative is a pan-Asian regional strategy proposed by China to develop both land and sea routes, rely on Asia, radiate to the neighboring areas, and influence the world.128 It reflects China’s thinking on building an open and inclusive regional cooperation mechanism. The initiative is a regional cooperation arrangement that focuses on Asian countries, takes the form of building economic cooperation corridors on land and at sea, links up transport corridors, is based on connectivity and is characterized by a diversified cooperation mechanism, and aims to build a community of shared future.129 On the other hand, it demonstrates China’s new international positioning as a global power that does not limit its interests to Asia, but seeks institutionalized regional cooperation on a global scale. Therefore, the BRI represents both a regional 125 Jin

(2015). and Sun (2016). 127 Hu and Xing (2017). 128 Research Group of the Class for Provincial/Ministerial-level Officials Pursuing Further Studies at the Party School of The CPC Central Committee (2015). 129 Ma (2015). 126 Hong

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strategy and a global strategic vision. It is a major strategy for China to promote economic cooperation with the rest of the world and achieve economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region through land and sea and is an important measure for China to respond to domestic and international predicaments, grasp the right to formulate international rules, and build a system of international discourse under new situations. It is a sure thing for China to explore with the countries along the route the establishment of cooperation mechanisms, including merchandise trade, investment facilitation, financial risk prevention, mutual assistance in economic development, and currency and exchange rate coordination.130 The BRI aims to achieve international synergy in development through coordination of national policies and plans and to promote economic globalization through innovation in cooperation paths and methods, while also promoting China’s historic transformation and upgrading of its open development layout.131 It is fair to say that the BRI goes beyond the traditional framework of development cooperation and rises to the level of domestic and global governance.132 It is an organic combination of China’s openness, regional cooperation, and global development and is China’s strategic focus and core path to realize its new world ideal. Fifth, stay committed to building an open world economy by employing economic instruments as the main strategy for expansion. China upholds the concept of economism, which encompasses both domestic strategic arrangements centered on economic development and an international strategic design that expands national strategic interests through economic means. China should actively participate in economic globalization and vigorously expand its economic strategic interests, and economic instruments are probably the most important means of achieving win–win results through interaction with the international community.133 According to George Modelski, the world’s major powers are first and foremost the world’s leading economic powers with large economic size and high level of affluence. Their dominant industrial sectors flourish during technological innovation, and they are active participants and the growth centers of the world economy.134 Because of the inherent logical flaws of economic globalization itself, China is living in an era where the development and instability are unseen in human history. In such times, the priority of human development should be given to the enhancement of national strength, which stems not only from the development and cultivation of the domestic market, but also from the support of strategic resources in the context of globalization. China cannot rely entirely on domestic resources to support its huge economy and achieve sustained and rapid growth to meet the material and spiritual needs of more than 1 billion people. This determines that China must base itself on the domestic market, gear to the needs of the world, obtain more international resources, capital, markets, and technologies on a larger scale, and achieve the optimal allocation of 130 Chen

and Chen (2015). (2017). 132 Gu and Zhai (2017). 133 Men (2017b). 134 Modelski (1998). 131 Zhang

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resources globally. It is in this sense that Xi Jinping has profoundly articulated the strategic idea of maintaining and developing an open world economy. Xi Jinping pointed out that countries will grow if their economies are open and conversely decline if their economies are closed. He said, “We should take a long-term view, strive to shape a world economy in which all countries enjoy development and innovation, growth linkage and integration of interests, and firmly maintain and develop an open world economy.”135 In the report to the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping even made it clear that “China will support multilateral trade regimes and work to facilitate the establishment of free trade areas and build an open world economy,” and that “We should stick together through thick and thin, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all.”136 From an open Chinese economy to an open world economy, China has actively taken on world responsibilities, realizing its world ideals and finding important consensus and a feasible path for their realization. Sixth, emphasize the strategic values of mutual learning between civilizations and consolidate China’s soft power. The strengthening of national power must be marked not only by a steady rise in hard power, but also, equally important, by the strengthening of soft power, and China needs to make the enhancement of soft power, especially the international influence of national culture, one of the core elements of strengthening national power. China has focused on hard power growth for many years, partially neglecting soft power enhancement, and the mismatch between the two has to a considerable extent damaged China’s potential. Globally, China is generally weak in attracting other countries to follow suit, changing their positions, raising issues, setting agendas, and guiding public opinions in international affairs and has not yet had a strong voice in the international community. The building-up of soft power is about how China will coordinate between domestic and international affairs and how will it showcase its capability on both domestic and international stages. It not only requires China to spread its excellent culture, development model, and diplomatic ideas to the world for understanding and acceptance by other countries, but also emphasizes how China can achieve appealing development and innovation in such areas as the shaping of mainstream social values, the improvement of governmental governance, and the cultivation of civil society, which is a fundamental and key issue. Xi’s concept of “common values of humanity” blazes a trial for this. In September 2015, at the UN General Assembly, Xi called on all countries of the world to take “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy, and freedom” as core values and to build common values for mankind in a spirit of openness and tolerance.137 The idea of a community of shared future for mankind requires us to actively explore the values of fine civilizations in the progress of human civilizations and, in particular, to actively assimilate the advances of cosmopolitanism in all civilizations. Politically guided by the concept, we should overcome our national limitations and 135 Xi

(2018c). (2017, pp. 59–60). 137 Xi (2015). 136 Xi

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effectively address the global crises and challenges facing humanity in the twentyfirst century.138 In particular, it is important to realize that current values across the globe serve mainly the narrow interests and short-term needs of states and are highly characterized by state-centrism. The community of shared future for mankind, while respecting the differences between countries and the diversity of the world, has transcended narrow national conflicts of interests, ideological disputes, and geocivilizational differences, demonstrating an accurate grasp of world trends and a profound reflection on human destiny.139 As a Chinese methodology for the transformation of the global governance system, the value implications of the concept have transcended the capitalist economic globalization path, the hegemonic global governance system, and the Western cultural centrism.140 In view of this, the cultural basis for building a community of shared future for mankind lies in a profound understanding of the cultural implications of the concept and the strategic values of mutual learning between civilizations and in the promotion of China’s soft power. Changchun, China Shanghai, China

Xi Xiao Honghua Men

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Xi J (2018b) Jointly charting a course toward a brighter future—keynote speech at the APEC CEO summit. People’s Daily, November 18, 2018, p 2 Xi J (2018c) Xi Jinping: the governance of China (volume one). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pp 335–337 Xia D (2007) ‘Habent Mutationes Terrena Regna’: Augustine on the ‘Romanum Imperium’. Historical Research 6:132–147 Xiao X (2010) The transformation of East Asian order after the cold war and the East Asian strategies of China and the United States. Jilin Univ J Soc Sci 1:34–41 Xu J (2012) Cosmopolitanism, the debate of the civilized and the uncivilized, and their variations in modern times. J East Chin Normal Univ (Phil Soc Sci) 6:66–75 Xu J (2014) Rethinking China’s period of strategic opportunity. Int Stud 2:53 Xu J (2018) The U.S. policy adjustment towards China and three major risks in China-U.S. relations. Int Stud 4:1–18 Xu Z (1999) Chinese culture and world culture. Guizhou People’s Publishing House, p 42 Xu Z (2010) Self and other: the internal-external differentiation in Chinese history. SDX Joint Publishing Company, Beijing, p 20 Xue S (1989) Philosophical reflections on the nature of the ideal. J Fujian Normal Univ (Phil Soc Sci) 4:30–36 Xue X (2004) The Sino-Barbarian dichotomy and the national defense of ancient China. J Humanit 3:140–145 Yamamoto Y (1993) Theory of international politics. SDX Joint Publishing Company, Shanghai, p 46 Yang J (2008) China’s diplomacy since reform and opening up. Qiushi 18:35 Yang J (2016) Firmly establish a community of shared future for mankind. Qiushi 1:60–62 Yu C, Dou Y (1985) Philosophical reflections on ideals. Phil Trends 10:22–23 Yu G (2001) Influx of the west into the east: a comparative study of China and Japan in embracing western culture. The Commercial Press, Beijing, pp 18–19 Yu Z (2011) Thoughts on China’s entry into a period of strategic challenges. Int Rev 6:1–7 Yue W, Zhang M, Zhao Y (2017) The rise of nations, sense of mission and the call of the times. Dongyue Tribune 11:69–75 Zhang H, Deng S (2017) The revelation of Marxist thought on community for the construction of a community of shared future for mankind. Stud Marxism 11:29–37 Zhang Y (2017) ‘The belt and road’ initiative: international development synergy and global governance innovation. Studi Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Theor 5:88–94 Zhang Y (2017) New characteristics of China’s international status in the new era and the new driving force for common development of the world. World Econ Stud 12:24–28 Zhang Y (2019) The unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years: what to change (I). World Affairs 12:72 Zhao S (2006) The world history and harmonious development: contemporary research on Karl Marx’s theory of world history. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 117 Zhao T (2011) The Tianxia system: an introduction to the philosophy of world institution. China Renmin University Press, Beijing, p 13 Zhengyi S (1980) A commentary on the book of documents, vol 6. Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing Zhou J, Tan H (2017) The value plight of colonies and British empire: Burke’s idea of the ‘free empire’. J SW Univ (Soc Sci) 5:5–16 Zhou W (2017) Socialism with Chinese characteristics—a new path towards modernization for developing countries. Finan Econ 12:8–13 Zongze R (2017) Trump’s ‘new vision’ and China’s diplomatic options. Int Stud 2:1–14

Contents

1 China’s New Era: The Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years and an Important Period of Strategic Opportunity for China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Interplay Between the World Situation and China’s National Conditions in an Era of the Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Dialectical Understanding of China’s Interaction with the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 China Is at a Critical Juncture in Shaping a New Period of Strategic Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 China’s Grand Strategy: Xi Jinping’s New Ideas, Concepts and Strategies for the Governance of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 China’s Global Positioning and Strategic Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 International Influence of Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

3 9 14 18 21 22 35 45 48

3 Innovations and Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era . . . . 3.1 Theoretical System of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era . . . . . . . . 3.2 Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Theoretical and Practical Features of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51 53 69 77 80

4 Optimizing the Concept of National Security and Creating a Path to National Security with Chinese Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Opportunities and Challenges for China’s National Security . . . . . . 4.2 Phased Goals for China’s National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Innovation of China’s National Security Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4.4 Establishing the NSC and Improving the Top-Level Design . . . . . . . 4.5 Improving China’s National Security Strategy and Pursuing Bottom-Line Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The BRI and China-World Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 New Characteristics of China’s Interaction with the World in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The BRI Helps Shape China’s New Key Period of Strategic Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The BRI and Layout of China’s National Development . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The BRI and Interaction Between China and the World . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The BRI and Interaction Between China and Other Regions . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90 92 96 97 98 102 104 108 111 113

6 China’s New Strategy for Dealing with Global Governance Crisis and Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Response to Global Governance Crisis: History and Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The Contemporary Global Governance Crisis and the Response to It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 China’s Approaches to Global Governance Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 China’s Strategic Orientation for Promoting the Transformation of Global Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

137 140

7 Pushing China’s Opening up in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Ideological Innovation of China’s Opening up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 China’s Strategic Focuses on Opening up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Propelling China’s Opening up to the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

143 144 151 159 169

8 China’s Strategic Approach to the USA in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 China and the US in the New Era of Strategic Competition . . . . . . . 8.2 Judgments on China-U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Basic Framework of China’s Strategic Approach to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

171 172 175

117 118 123 128

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Chapter 1

China’s New Era: The Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years and an Important Period of Strategic Opportunity for China

The rise of China goes hand in hand with the transformation of the world, giving China tremendous strategic space, fueling the advent of China’s new era and creating great development opportunities for the world. In the era of globalization, how to handle relations with the world reflects not only the strength, capacity and influence of a great power, but also its strategic orientation and the charm of its values. How to look at China and the rest parts of the world, as well as how to recognize and promote the benign interactions between them is the starting point of China’s foreign strategy in the new era, and is also the key to in-depth study of Xi Jinping’s thought on diplomacy. On July 26, 2017, Xi Jinping made an important speech at a study session attended by leading officials at the provincial/ministerial level, stressing: “In planning and promoting the work of the Party and the country, we must conduct in-depth analyses and make an accurate judgment of the current situation as it affects the world, the nation and the Party”.1 On October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping pointed out in the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that after long-term efforts, socialism with Chinese characteristics has embraced the new era, which is a new strategic orientation for China’s development. It means that the Chinese nation, which since the onset of modern times had suffered so much for so long, has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation. “Chinese socialism’s entrance into the new era is, in the history of the development of the People’s Republic of China and the history of the development of the Chinese nation, of tremendous importance. In the history of the development of international socialism and the history of the development of human society, it is of tremendous importance.” It can be said that a profound analysis of the changes in China’s national and world conditions, as well as a proper understanding and proper handling of the new situations and problems that have emerged during China’s course of development, is the fundamental starting point for the study of Xi Jinping’s strategic thinking on diplomacy. 1 Xi

(2017a).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_1

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Standing at the height of history of human evolution, Xi Jinping has taken the pulse of the times and made the strategic judgment that the world today faces “the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years”.2 On December 28, 2017, Xi Jinping made his first public reference to “the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years” at a working conference of Chinese diplomatic envoys to foreign countries.3 Changes are normal in the world, and Xi Jinping’s strategic judgment of the situation is of specific significance. Since the end of the Cold War, China has long been upholding peace and development, emphasizing that the world has undergone profound changes and is in the midst of great transformation and adjustments; we have closely monitored the impact of global changes on China’s development, and adjusted our diplomacy correspondingly. The Work Report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized that “the world today is undergoing profound and complex changes,” and the Work Report of the 19th National Congress stated that “the world is undergoing major developments, transformation and adjustment”. Xi proposed at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in June 2018: “China has been in the best period of development since modern times, while the world is undergoing the most profound and unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years … Today, the world is changing. It is a world in which new opportunities and new challenges keep emerging, a world in which the international system and international order are going through a profound adjustment and a world in which the balance of international forces is shifting steadily in favor of peace and development.”4 At the APEC CEO Summit in November 2018, Xi remarked: “The changes we are encountering in the world are unseen in a hundred years. Changes create opportunities, but more often than not, they are accompanied by risks and challenges. Mankind has once again reached a crossroads.”5 At the Central Economic Work Conference held at the end of 2018, he further stressed that the world is facing the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, bringing both challenges and opportunities, including the opportunity for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.6 At present, the world is in the midst of the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, China has been in the best period of development since modern times, and China is at the critical stage to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The three are mutually reinforcing, enabling us to have a better understanding of the global and national conditions, probe into the challenges and opportunities, and make better top-level design and overall layout of China’s diplomacy in the new era.

2 Wang

(2019). (2019). 4 Xi (2018a). 5 Xi (2018b). 6 “The Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, December 22, 2018, p. 1. 3 Zhang

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1.1 The Interplay Between the World Situation and China’s National Conditions in an Era of the Unprecedented Changes Unseen in a Hundred Years The world is undergoing the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, which is attributed to a number of factors, such as the changes in the international scene since the end of the Cold War, the rise and fall of great powers and the rise of developing countries, the transformation of the West in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, and the acceleration of the new round of sci-tech revolution to reshape the world. Some experts believe that the short-term drivers of the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years are the maverick actions of Trump Administration and the domestic politics of the United States, the medium-term drivers are the liquidation a decade after the international financial crisis, the long-term drivers are the 30-year evolutionary changes in the world economy and politics after the end of the Cold War, and that the fundamental drivers are globalization of the economy and multipolarization of the world.7 The world order is changing from Western-centric to non-Western centric, or dual-centric—Western and Non-western. The world is now at a stage where adjustment of globalization, shift in power structures and incubation of the scientific revolution are overlapping. The change just begins and will take a long time to complete.8 Since the end of the Cold War, and especially the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world has ushered in a period of comprehensive transformation, with fundamental changes in the rise and fall of great powers, the rise of non-Western countries as a group and the decline of Western countries. The transformation of the world takes the forms of power shift, problem shift and paradigm shift. The socalled power shift refers to the dramatic change in the composition of actors and their power, which is best manifested in the collective rise of non-Western countries and indisputable decline of Western powers. Traditional and emerging powers are beginning to accommodate each other while competing and cooperating with each other and their interaction is shaping new international core power mix and strategic postures. Second, with the relative decline in power of state actors, the rise in power of non-state actors, and the redistribution of power between the state, the market, and civil society, even the most powerful states in the world find that the market and international public opinions are compelling them to follow particular norms more often. The power shift has led to a strategic problem shift, as manifested in the proliferation of global problems, the enrichment of the international agenda, the generalization of security, the rise of non-traditional security as one of the dominant factors of the international agenda, and the democratic deficit of international institutions as a derivative of the expanding international agenda.9 The problem shift has also led to an inevitable reorientation of the national strategy, with survival no longer being the 7 Qiu

(2019). (2019). 9 Keohane (2001). 8 Huang

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sole focus of the state, and development and prosperity gaining further importance in the national strategy. The above-mentioned power shift and problem shift lead to a paradigm shift in international relations. At the macro level, international relations have been greatly enriched and become increasingly interdependent, and global challenges require the concerted efforts of all countries to address them, which has, to a certain extent, led to a global sense of coexistence and co-prosperity among all countries, a more resilient and inclusive international system and a stronger sense of global governance. From a mesoscopic view, economic globalization and regional integration have become the strategic straitjackets of great powers, and the pursuit of national interests by each country is no longer absolute but relative. Power relations between countries are no longer entirely a zero-sum game as positive results and even win–win situations can occur. Cooperation among states is encouraged, and cooperation based on the common good has a more fundamental role and is giving rise to a new international order based on the common good. In the micro sense, the strategic planning of the country itself is more fundamental. Since the new international system can be formed by mainly relying on the enhancement of its own comprehensive national power, it is crucial to grasp the strategic interests of the country in a dynamic situation where competition and cooperation coexist and competition is getting more intense.10 Xi Jinping pointed out that the international situation continues to experience profound and complex changes, with significant development in multipolarization and economic globalization. Cultural diversity and IT application are making constant progress while readjustment is accelerating in international landscape and order.11 A new round of scientific, technological and industrial revolution is on the way, new momentum for growth is accumulating, the interests of all countries are deeply integrated, and peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit are the trend of the times. At the same time, the deep-rooted contradictions in global development have long accumulated and remain to be solved effectively. The foundation of global economic growth is not strong enough, trade and investment are sluggish, economic globalization has encountered setbacks, and development imbalances have intensified. Issues such as wars and conflicts, terrorism, and large-scale flows of refugees and immigrants have a significant impact on the world economy.12 The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that the global economic recovery is sluggish, local conflicts and turbulences are frequent, global problems are intensifying, the international situation is undergoing profound and complex changes, and China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development, with bright prospects and severe challenges. The world is undergoing major developments, transformation, and adjustment, but peace and development remain the call of our day. The trends of global multi-polarity, economic globalization, IT application, and cultural diversity are surging forward; changes in the global governance system and the international order are speeding up; countries 10 Men

(2008). (2015a). 12 Xi (2017b). 11 Xi

1.1 The Interplay Between the World Situation and China’s National …

5

are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent; relative international forces are becoming more balanced; and peace and development remain irreversible trends. And yet, as a world we face growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors. Global economic growth lacks energy; the gap between rich and poor continues to widen; hotspot issues arise often in some regions; and unconventional security threats like terrorism, cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread. As human beings we have many common challenges to face.13 According to Zhu Yunhan, over the past few centuries, the shift of the global center of productive activities to the non-Western world has accelerated, and the world we used to be familiar with is about to undergo a radical change, and human society is now at a watershed in history that will not be seen for centuries. This is an era in which the familiar historical coordinates are rapidly disappearing, and it is also an era in which historical trends we take for granted have begun to take a turn.14 State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi of the PRC stated: “The challenges facing world peace and development are increasingly becoming crosscutting, overarching and long-term. No country is immune and all must stand together to cope with challenges head on. Such is the reality we find ourselves in, which puts into perspective the vision for this new type of international relations of win–win cooperation.”15 These changes are indicative of the prospects for global governance and, in a sense, provide the ideological and material basis for the socialist model to rise again in the world. At the same time, the dense network of transnational and international social relations has reshaped countries’ perceptions of the world and their place in it, and as global issues have come to the fore, the core issues of concern to the international community are changing, as are the modes of dealing with public issues, with cooperation and coordination among countries becoming the usual approach to international affairs. This process has opened up enormous strategic space for China’s rapid rise, and further highlights the internal and external constraints on its rise. China is in the process of moving from a regional power to a global power, and from a global power to a world power, and its national strategic interests are rapidly expanding globally.16 The rise of China goes hand in hand with the transformation of the world, and China has become one of the core forces driving world change and the center of world attention. China is standing out from a world order of many major powers dominated by one superpower, and its international influence is beginning to overtake that superpower. China’s strategic planning to become a world power has become the focus of attention of the international community, especially the major powers, and has led to the strategic adjustment of the world powers. Xi Jinping said during the first group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee: “The primary stage of socialism is the paramount

13 Xi

(2017c). (2015a, b, pp. 3–5). 15 Wang (2015). 16 Men (2013). 14 Zhu

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reality and the most important national condition in contemporary China.”17 On April 1, 2014, Xi Jinping emphasized in a major speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, that “to observe and understand China properly, one needs to bear in mind both China’s past and present and draw reference from both China’s accomplishments and the Chinese way of thinking.”18 Xi Jinping stressed that the primary stage of socialism is the basic point to understand China’s national conditions, and that a dialectical view of China’s national conditions should be encouraged. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China gave a new account of China’s national conditions: “As socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved. What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life. China has seen the basic needs of over a billion people met, has basically made it possible for people to live decent lives, and will soon bring the building of a moderately prosperous society to a successful completion. The needs to be met for the people to live better lives are increasingly broad. Not only have their material and cultural needs grown; their demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are increasing. At the same time, China’s overall productive forces have significantly improved and in many areas our production capacity leads the world. The more prominent problem is that our development is unbalanced and inadequate. This has become the main constraining factor in meeting the people’s increasing needs for a better life … The evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society does not change our assessment of the present stage of socialism in China. The basic dimension of the Chinese context—that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not changed. China’s international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.” We need to realize that China’s economy is in a gearshift phase from high-speed growth to medium–high-speed growth, a painful period of structural adjustment, and an early stage where we must absorb the adverse effects of previous economic stimulus policies and overcome difficulties of transition to new growth drivers. On the other hand, China’s international standing has been greatly enhanced, as evidenced by its unprecedented proximity to the center of the world stage and to the goal of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, its unprecedented ability and confidence to achieve that goal, and its greater contribution to human development. At the same time, the world is undergoing major developments, transformation, and adjustment. Although the trend of peace and development is irreversible, the world is facing outstanding instability and uncertainty, and human beings have many common challenges to face. The aforementioned new realities of China and the world bring better prospects, while the heavy task of reforming, developing and maintaining stability, the many contradictions, risks and challenges, and the great test of CPC’s governance also take on characteristics unseen before.

17 Xi 18 Xi

(2012). (2014).

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After more than 40 years of rapid development since China’s reform and openingup in 1978, China has accumulated abundant material wealth as well as various difficult problems. On the positive side, China faces significant opportunities for further development. China has made remarkable achievements in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, with its economic aggregate ranking second in the world and its people’s livelihood constantly improving. China has laid out clear-cut medium- and long-term development goals, as follows: From the present to 2020, China aims to secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and embarking on a journey to fully build a modern socialist country; from 2020 to 2035, on the basis of building a moderately welloff society, it will strive for 15 more years to basically modernize socialism and reach the level of a moderately developed country, with the goal of a beautiful China basically realized; from 2035 to 2050, on the basis of basic modernization, it will strive for 15 more years to build China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful, becoming a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence. The vision of the “Chinese Dream” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation embodies the greatest consensus of the Chinese people and charts the course for China’s future development. At the same time, under the guidance of its peaceful development strategy, China has made significant progress in its relations with major powers, neighboring countries and developing countries, and has deepened its interdependence with the world. With increasing influence in the world, China is the largest trading partner of more than 130 countries and the country with the largest number of trading partners. China’s development provides a rare opportunity for the world and a majority of countries are looking forward to benefiting from China’s development and sharing the development and prosperity with China. At present, the reform of global economic governance provides a rare opportunity for China to participate in the formulation of international rules. The global economic downturn and the financial crisis in developed economies have provided a rare opportunity for China to expand its overseas interests (including low-cost mergers and acquisitions, access to advanced technology, international channels and international space), and the need for infrastructure construction in the world has brought about a global infrastructure boom, which is conducive to China’s export of high value-added manufacturing products such as project contracts, machinery and equipment. In a nutshell, China has ushered in a new opportunity for joint development with the world. On the negative side, China’s period of strategic opportunity overlaps with the challenging period of reform and the golden period of development intertwined with contradictions. Over the past 40 years or so, China has traversed the path that Western countries have traveled for hundreds of years. While achieving great achievements in modernization, China sees various contradictions come out in a short period of time, some of which were never heard of before. Over the years, China has accumulated deep economic and social contradictions. Xi pointed out that China has entered a decisive stage of building a moderately well-off society in all its aspects, that China’s reform endeavors have entered a crucial stage where tough challenges must be met, that the international situation is complex and volatile, and that the CPC is facing an

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arduous task of reforming, sustaining development and maintaining stability and that there are unforeseeable risks and challenges on the way ahead.19 Xi said: “China’s development faces a series of prominent dilemmas and challenges and there are quite a number of problems and difficulties on its path of development: Unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development remains a big problem. We are weak in scientific and technological innovation. The industrial structure is unbalanced and the growth mode remains inefficient. The development gap between urban and rural areas and between regions is still large, and so are income disparities. Social problems are markedly on the rise … To solve these problems, the key lies in continuing the reform.”20 Xi Jinping further pointed out in the report of the 19th CPC National Congress: “Some acute problems caused by unbalanced and inadequate development await solutions; and the quality and effect of development are not what they should be. China’s ability to innovate needs to be stronger, the real economy awaits improvement, and we have a long way to go in protecting the environment. In work on public wellbeing there are still many areas where we fall short; and poverty alleviation remains a formidable task. There are still large disparities in development between rural and urban areas, between regions, and in income distribution; and our people face many difficulties in employment, education, health-care, housing, and elderly care. The level of civic-mindedness needs further improvement. Social tensions and problems are intertwined, much remains to be done in seeing the country’s governance is based in law, and China’s system and capacity for governance need to be further strengthened. Ideological struggle is still complicated, and in national security we face new developments. Some reform plans and major policies and measures need to be better implemented. Many dimensions of Party building remain weak. These are all problems that demand our full attention to resolve.” Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China has launched a process of rebalancing its economic structure. How to achieve sustainable development of the Chinese economy under the new normal is the core problem that confronts China’s development. According to Cai Fang, China will go through a slowdown in economic growth during the upper-middle-income stage, and should attach great importance to the widening income disparity so as to achieve the goal of avoiding the middleincome trap and reducing income disparity.21 Justin Yifu Lin noted that China’s sustained and rapid economic growth has completely changed China’s position in the global economy, but the gradual dual-track transformation is a double-edged sword that inevitably brings about many structural problems, especially imbalances in income distribution, consumption and savings, and the balance of payments.22 Hu Angang noted that China is still at the stage of economic take-off and the general trend has not changed. But we must be aware of the deep-rooted factors that have 19 “Xi Jinping Stresses Resolutely Fighting the Battle of Poverty Alleviation and Development, and Accelerating the Economic and Social Development of Ethnic Areas During His Inspection Tour in Yunnan Province”, People’s Daily, January 22, 2015, p. 1. 20 Xi (2018c, pp. 71–72). 21 Cai and Wang (2014). 22 Lin (2013).

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long constrained China’s development, as well as the acute problems encountered in reality. We must be aware of the increasing pressure of economic downtown, acute social contradictions and human-nature contradictions, and must actively respond to and properly deal with them, and through innovation-driven development, leap over the “middle-income trap”, and consciously adhere to the socialist path and break through the “Western democracy trap”.23 At the same time, what confronts China is a more complex international strategic environment. “China Threat” and “China Responsibility” are intertwined, and there is a gap between China’s willingness and ability to assume international responsibility and the expectations of the international community, and the international community’s doubts about China’s rise have increased. Developed countries have stepped up their efforts to establish new international rules, and their intention to besiege China is clear. China’s surroundings have become more complex, and some neighboring countries are in doubt and fear of China’s rise, stepping up their alliance with the United States. It can be said that with rapid development, China is confronted with increasing international doubts, worries, difficulties and challenges. In general, the world today faces important choices between openness and conservatism, cooperation and closure, change and fogyism. On the one hand, the international community’s call for the maintenance of peace has further strengthened, the tide of change is becoming stronger, and international forces are moving in a more balanced manner; on the other hand, the world economy is recovering slowly, regional patterns are evolving faster, the international situation is turning volatile with accidents occurring more frequently and terrorist forces spreading, and the idea of “de-globalization” is becoming increasingly apparent. At a time of great changes in China and in the world, how to understand the international situation, respond to international risks and seize international opportunities is of great and urgent practical significance and theoretical value.

1.2 Dialectical Understanding of China’s Interaction with the World Xi Jinping pointed out that to have a good grasp of global developments and follow the underlying trend of the times is a constant and crucially important task that requires our abiding attention if China is to move forward. It is important to have a global perspective, grasp the pulse of the times, make a sound, accurate and thorough assessment of the changing international environment, and dissect complex phenomena to uncover the essence, and, in particular, have a good understanding of long-term trends. Furthermore, we should be fully mindful of the complexity of the evolving international situation, and we should also recognize that the growing trend towards a multipolar world will not change. We should be fully aware that the ongoing global economic adjustment will not be smooth sailing; we also need to 23 Hu

(2015).

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recognize that economic globalization will not stop. We should be fully alert to the grave nature of international tensions and conflicts; we also need to recognize that peace and development, the underlying trend of our time, will remain unchanged. We should be keenly aware of the protracted nature of contest over the international order; on the other hand, we need to recognize that reform of the international system will not change its course. We should fully recognize the uncertainties in China’s neighboring environment, but we should also realize that the general trend of prosperity and stability in the Asia–Pacific region will not change. Xi Jinping stressed that today’s world is changing. It is a world in which new opportunities and new challenges keep emerging, a world in which the international system and international order are going through a profound adjustment and a world in which the balance of international forces is shifting steadily in favor of peace and development. In observing the world, we should not allow our views to be blocked by anything intricate or transient. Instead, we should observe the world through the prism of historical laws.24 He believes that the world is going through a historical process of accelerated evolution. The light of peace, development, and progress will be powerful enough to dispel the clouds of war, poverty and backwardness. The movement towards a multipolar world and the rise of emerging markets and developing countries have become an irresistible trend of history. Economic globalization and the advent of an information age have greatly unleashed and boosted productive forces. They have presented unprecedented development opportunities while giving rise to new threats and challenges which we must face squarely.25 He stressed that this is an inevitable process of restructuring and changing the international landscape, which, in addition to new challenges, also contains many new opportunities. All factors considered, we can see that China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity in which much can be accomplished. Our biggest opportunity lies in China’s steady development and the growth in its strength. On the other hand, we should be mindful of various risks and challenges and skillfully defuse potential crises and turn them into opportunities.26 In the report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping gave a more philosophical summary of the international situation: “Our world is full of both hope and challenges.” He noted that the world is undergoing major developments, transformation, and adjustment, but peace and development remain the call of our day. The trends of global multi-polarity, economic globalization, IT application, and cultural diversity are surging forward; changes in the global governance system and the international order are speeding up; countries are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent; relative international forces are becoming more balanced; and peace and development remain irreversible trends. And yet, as a world we face growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors. Global economic growth lacks energy; the gap between rich and poor continues to widen; hotspot 24 “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1. 25 Xi (2015b). 26 “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1.

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issues arise often in some regions; and unconventional security threats like terrorism, cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread. As human beings we have many common challenges to face. Zhang Yunling believes that China’s relationship with the world is undergoing new changes, and the most prominent feature is the amplification of the China factor and multi-faceted interpretation of China. We see such a contradiction: While China’s relations with the outside world are developing rapidly, the doubts, suspicions and even dissatisfaction of many countries towards China are also increasing; the outside world portrays China as an aggressive superpower with an aggressive nature. Such a judgment is difficult for China to accept. It could lead to the Chinese people’s distrust and even hostility towards the outside world.27 Cai Fang sees this as a new issue that comes with China’s changing international status, reminding people that they must pay attention to the “Thucydides Trap”, observe the reactions of other countries in the light of China’s problems and changes, and especially understand the inevitable reactions of the great powers, so as to formulate corresponding international strategies and coping tactics.28 Tang Yongsheng holds that China’s rising comprehensive strength will cause hegemonic countries and other dominant countries to be alert and countercheck, and that mishandling may become the focus of contradictions in the system transformation, and that the next decade or so will be a critical period of in-depth interaction and friction between China and the outside world.29 Barry Buzan, a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, has compared the similarities and differences between the peaceful rise of China and the United States, and he is optimistic that the current situation facing China may be more favorable than that when the United States made the “peaceful rise”.30 In this regard, Xi Jinping gave a thought-provoking reminder: “This means that the overall environment for open development is more favorable than ever before, but the conflicts, risks, and contests we are facing are also unprecedented, setting delicate traps for any potential negligence.”31 Xi Jinping pointed out that profound changes are taking place in China’s relations with the rest of the world and that China’s links and interactions with the international community is getting closer than ever before. Therefore, in projecting and adopting plans for reform and development, we must give full consideration to both domestic and international markets, both domestic and foreign resources, and both domestic and international rules, and use them judiciously.32 Xi said: “We should enhance our strategic thinking and confidence, and better balance China’s overall domestic and international interests. We should pursue mutually beneficial development featuring

27 Zhang

(2013). (2014). 29 Tang (2014). 30 Buzan and Cox (2013). 31 Xi (2016). 32 “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1. 28 Cai

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openness and cooperation, develop China by securing a peaceful international environment and, at the same time, uphold and promote world peace through our own development. We should continuously improve China’s overall national strength, make sure that the people share the benefits of peaceful development, and consolidate the material and social foundations for pursuing peaceful development.”33 It can be said that the strategic thinking of taking both the domestic and international situations into consideration is proposed and upheld by the CPC Central Committee for a long period of time. Of course, balancing the domestic and international contexts is also a common theoretical problem in world politics, and no country can clearly cut domestic problems from international problems. Zhu Yunhan stressed that “China’s world” and “China in the world” are not two mutually exclusive propositions, but constitute a dialectical relationship of cause and effect and mutual pull.34 By taking China’s overall domestic and international interests into consideration, China has integrated itself into the international community in a progressive and determined manner. With the successful experience of reform and opening up for more than 40 years, China has well fulfilled the mission of “building socialism with Chinese characteristics”, gradually formed new ideas, thoughts and assertions of socialism with Chinese characteristics, established a relatively stable path, developed a socialist market economy and socialist democratic politics simultaneously, and successfully opened up a new road of socialism for peaceful development.35 China expert David Shambaugh in the U.S. has analyzed China’s domestic and international challenges and expressed deep concerns about China’s future development.36 In contrast, Kerry Brown, a professor at King’s College London, is optimistic that Xi Jinping, as a leader with an international outlook, has made expanding China’s global influence a strategic priority, balancing the domestic and international contexts, that China is becoming increasingly open as an independent and autonomous global political player, and that the leaders are pragmatically prioritizing national interests while engaged in international exchange.37 The CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, while maintaining its judgment on the zeitgeist of peace and development and its cautious optimism about the world situation, has stressed the need to fully assess the sharpness of international conflicts and struggles and expressed a strong sense of apprehension. Xi said: “China has entered a decisive stage of building a moderately well-off society in all its aspects, China’s reform endeavors have entered a crucial stage where tough challenges must be met, the international situation is complex and volatile, and the CPC is facing an arduous task of reforming, sustaining development and maintaining stability and there are unforeseeable risks and challenges on the way ahead”.38 Xi’s views on the theme of the times and the world situation are in line with the Marxist materialistic 33 Xi

(2013). (2015b, p. 194). 35 Men (2013). 36 Shambaugh (2013). 37 Brown (2016). 38 Xi (2015c). 34 Zhu

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dialectics, that is, things form the unity of oppositeness: While seeing peace and development as the theme of the times and the trend of the world, we should also see the twists and turns of maintaining world peace and development. We should be firm with the strategy and see the complexity and twists of the practical process of achieving the goals. In the light of the theme of peace and development, how to maintain and achieve this theme is a major strategic issue for the CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, to think seriously about. In a nutshell, the world is facing a rapidly rising China that is more confident and open,39 and China is facing a world where the situation is more complex, changes more profound, and opportunities and challenges coexistent. “China Threat” and “China Responsibility” are intertwined, and there is a gap between China’s willingness and ability to assume international responsibility and the expectations of the international community, and the international community’s doubts about China’s rise have increased. Developed countries led by the U.S. have stepped up their efforts to establish new international rules and strategic measures, with a clear intention to besiege China. China’s surroundings have become more complex, and some neighboring countries are in doubt and fear of China’s rise, stepping up their alliance with the United States. It can be said that a further developing China is confronted with increasing doubts, worries, difficulties and challenges. To face up to challenges from home and abroad, seize international opportunities and sustain development, China is constructing a strategic framework for peaceful development with integration– transformation–shaping (integrating into the world, transforming itself and shaping the world) as the core, and how to shape the future of the world through peace, development, cooperation and win–win approaches has become China’s strategic focus to achieve peaceful rise, enrich the peaceful development and plan for things after its rise. Xi Jinping stressed that whether we will succeed in our pursuit of peaceful development hinges to a large extent on whether we can turn opportunities in the rest of the world into China’s opportunities and China’s opportunities into those for the rest of the world so that China and other countries can engage in sound interactions and make mutually beneficial progress. In this way, we can both promote China’s domestic development and open the country wider to the outside world and advance both China’s development and the development of the world as a whole, as well as the interests of both the Chinese people and other peoples.40 Xi Jinping pointed out that despite the profound and complex changes in both international and domestic environments, our assessment that China is in the midst of an important period of strategic opportunity for development still stands. “Today, we are closer than at any time in history to attaining the goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we have greater confidence in and capability for achieving this goal than ever before”.41

39 Hu

(2014). (2013). 41 Xi (2018c, pp. 35–36). 40 Xi

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1.3 China Is at a Critical Juncture in Shaping a New Period of Strategic Opportunity The historical experience of China’s development shows that understanding the international environment and taking hold of the period of strategic opportunity are the keys to success. The so-called period of strategic opportunity usually refers to a particular historical period when a combination of internal and external factors can provide good opportunities or conditions for the economic and social development of a country and have an overall, long-term and decisive impact on its historical destiny.42 The period of strategic opportunity is characterized by the long time period, the openness of space and the global nature of impact,43 and strategic opportunities often go hand in hand with strategic challenges, which are always two sides of the same coin.44 Seen from the history of China’s development, especially in the first decade of the twenty-first century, almost every strategic breakthrough China has made has been closely linked to the transformation of major crises into development opportunities.45 Crisis indeed entails opportunity. If you are able to take advantage of the situation under certain conditions, you can turn pressure into motivation and challenges into opportunities. This is a successful lesson learned from history. However, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, China seems to have suddenly fallen into a strategic dilemma, facing severe and sudden pressures in security, economic and political fields.46 Since Donald Trump took office, China has been seen as a strategic adversary. The intent to contain and besiege China is manifest. There is a wide range of opinions with regard to whether a period of strategic opportunity exists for China. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, China seized the period of strategic opportunity to develop the economy rapidly, which has propelled China into the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics. China now stands on a new historical starting point. At present, China’s relations with the world are gradually shifting from “learning” and “benchmarking” to “leading”, which will bring greater opportunities and challenges to China, and China will fully demonstrate its charm as a great power on a broader stage and lead the world, which is a new period of strategic opportunity for China.47 With major changes in the domestic and international conditions, it is increasingly critical to seize the period of strategic opportunity. Xi Jinping has proposed a new march to build a moderately well-off society and build a modern socialist country in all its aspects, planning a three-step strategy for the new era: The period from now to 2020 is decisive in finishing the building of a moderately prosperous society 42 Zhang

(2014). (2016). 44 Lu (2015). 45 Zheng (2013). 46 Yuan (2011). 47 Yu and Tang (2017). 43 Qin

1.3 China Is at a Critical Juncture in Shaping a New Period …

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in all respects; the period from the 19th National Congress of the CPC to the 20th National Congress will be the period in which the timeframes of the two centenary goals converge. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the international and domestic environments and the conditions for China’s development, China has drawn up a twostage development plan for the period from 2020 to the middle of this century. In the first stage from 2020 to 2035, China is intent on working for the goal of basically realizing socialist modernization. In the second stage from 2035 to the middle of the twenty-first century, China will be determined to become a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.48 The realization of the aforementioned strategic goals is vital to the establishment of a new pattern of opening-up on all fronts. Xi Jinping said: “To achieve national rejuvenation, it was imperative to follow the tide of the times, respond to the wishes of the people, and have the courage to reform and open; and this awareness created a powerful force for advancing the cause of the Party and the people.” “We must actively participate in and promote economic globalization, develop an open economy of higher standards”, and “build an open world economy.”49 The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC proposed the roadmap of making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts: China is to pursue the Belt and Road Initiative as a priority, give equal emphasis to “bringing in” and “going global,” follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, increase openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity and break new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea.50 To achieve these strategic goals, China is faced with both important strategic opportunities and grave challenges. Chinese leaders are highly concerned about the important period of strategic opportunity. In 2002, the report of the 16th National Congress of the CPC stated: “An overview of the situation shows that for our country, the first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunities, which we must seize tightly and which offers bright prospects.” This is a major strategic judgment made by the CPC Central Committee in the face of profound changes in the domestic and international situations, and provides a basis for understanding the top-level design and planning of China’s strategy. In 2012, the report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC said: “An examination of both the current international and domestic environments shows that China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved”, and “we need to have a correct understanding of the changing nature and conditions of this period, seize all opportunities, and respond with cool-headedness to challenges”. Xi Jinping is highly concerned about the important period of strategic opportunity. On October 24, 2013, at a conference on the work of neighborhood diplomacy, Xi pointed out that diplomacy with neighboring countries requires us to “maintain and make best use of the strategic opportunities we now enjoy” and “strive 48 Xi

(2017d, pp. 28–29). (2017d, pp. 14, 22, 60). 50 Xi (2017d, p. 35). 49 Xi

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for a sound regional environment for our development, apply our own development for the benefit of neighboring countries, and achieve common development with them”, thus helping “to achieve the Two Centenary Goals and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. In November 2014, in the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, Xi said: “China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity in which much can be accomplished. Our biggest opportunity lies in China’s steady development and the growth in its strength. On the other hand, we should be mindful of various risks and challenges and skillfully defuse potential crises and turn them into opportunities.” He once again stressed the importance of seeking and seizing opportunities. At the Central Economic Work Conference in December of the same year, Xi stressed that “China has entered the new normal of economic development. This does not alter the fact that we have a strategic opportunity to accomplish great deeds; what it changes is the content and conditions of this strategic opportunity.” He clearly proposed that China should identify, seek and make good use of the period of opportunities in the new domestic and international environments. In February 2017, at a meeting on national security, Xi Jinping demanded that national security work must be planned “by taking advantage of the current period of strategic opportunities”. The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC pointed out: “Both China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development; the prospects are bright but the challenges are severe.”51 This is an important strategic judgment made by the CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, on the development of the domestic and international situations, and is an important basis for the drawing up of China’s strategy. China enjoys an important period of strategic opportunity, which is based on its own sustained development. As Zheng Bijian has pointed out, the period of strategic opportunity should be seized from both domestic and international contexts, and it should be fully anticipated that one of the increasingly important variables that will continue to influence world trends is China’s own development, which is the fundamental basis for a new and important period of strategic opportunity in the second decade of the twenty-first century and beyond.52 At the same time, the world economy is in a period of deep adjustment, global governance is in a period of change and new changes in the international environment entail new opportunities. Be it the raging new technological revolution, the global expansion of multinational corporations or the strong development aspirations of the developing world, they are all important opportunities for China’s further development and strategic opportunities for China to promote all-around opening-up.53 With the tide of de-globalization surging, China’s position of actively promoting economic globalization and creating strategic opportunities through its own efforts has been widely recognized by the

51 Xi

(2017d, p. 2). (2012); “Promote the Common Development of China and the World at the Strategic Opportunity”, Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, Issue 12, 2012, pp. 1–3. 53 Long (2018). 52 Zheng

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17

world,54 which also serves as an important condition for China to have a period of strategic opportunity. On the other hand, China’s development has to face serious challenges. China’s period of strategic opportunity is undergoing a major contextual shift, that is, the international landscape has stepped into a period of comprehensive restructuring and China’s economic and social undertakings have ushered in a transition period. Against this backdrop, the conditions for the generation of China’s period of strategic opportunity have shifted from one of relative stability and spontaneity to one of relative fragility and greater reliance on proactive shaping capabilities.55 Xi Jinping said: “Profound changes are taking place in international economic cooperation and competition, and major adjustments are under way in the global economic governance system and rules. Global communication is becoming more profound, more extensive, and more frequent, and the pressure to cope with external economic risks and maintain national economic security is unprecedented … We are not opening up wide enough; we lack the ability to use domestic and foreign markets and resources; we are weak in dealing with international trade friction, in exerting influence on the international economy, and in applying international rules.”56 At present, the world is facing multiple risks and challenges, such as a lack of growth impetus, sluggish demand, recurrent volatility in financial markets, and a sustained slump in international trade and investment,57 serious peace deficits, development deficits and governance deficits, a surge of de-globalization thinking, the rise of unilateralism and protectionism,58 and the policies and strategies adopted by the Trump Administration of the United States, which tend to increase uncertainty and instability in the world. China’s economy has entered a new normal, the goals and dynamics of economic development are being transformed, economic growth should be achieved at medium to high speed, the industrial structure should be upgraded to medium–high end, and the new development strategy under the guidance of the “five concepts” puts forward new requirements for opening up. China’s opening up to the outside world faces a “three-phase superposition”, namely, the period of deep adjustment and repair of the world economy after the financial crisis, the period of change in global economic governance and the construction of a new round of economic and trade rules, and the period of transformation in China’s foreign economic relations, especially its comparative advantage, and the connotation of the period of strategic opportunity has changed.59 As Xi Jinping gave a thought-provoking reminder: “The overall environment for open development is more favorable than ever before, but the conflicts, risks, and contests we are facing are also unprecedented, setting delicate traps for any potential negligence … I hope we continue to explore and practice, enhance our conscientiousness and capabilities to address the overall situation both domestically and internationally, and improve the effectiveness and level of opening 54 Zhang

(2017). (2014). 56 Xi (2017e). 57 Xi (2017f). 58 Zhong (2018). 59 Long (2016). 55 Xu

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up.”60 In view of this, China’s period of strategic opportunity in the new era has undergone significant changes in both domestic and international conditions and in the way it is controlled, requiring in-depth observation, good understanding and proactive shaping, and now China is ushering in a critical juncture in shaping an important period of strategic opportunity.

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Chapter 2

China’s Grand Strategy: Xi Jinping’s New Ideas, Concepts and Strategies for the Governance of China

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, has led the entire Party and the people of all ethnic groups to embark on a new journey of reform, opening up and modernization in China. Xi has made numerous speeches on the governance of China, put forward a series of new thoughts, views and assertions, formed new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China and opened up a new realm of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which had a significant impact on the international community and provided basic guidelines for us to achieve new goals at a new historical starting point. Xi attaches great importance to strategic judgment, design and implementation. He noted: “Strategic issues are fundamental to a political party and a country. Accurate judgment and sensible planning help us gain the strategic initiative crucial to the success of the cause of the Party and the people.”1 The gist of Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches and the strategic layout of his governance of China are based on the theme of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and peaceful development. The strategic layout is to implement the Five-point Strategy (promote balanced economic, political, cultural, social and ecological progress), push forward the Four-pronged Strategy, fully advance the building of a moderately prosperous society, and strive to achieve the “Two Centenary Goals”. To complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all aspects by 2020, as scheduled, is the first goal of the Party’s centennial struggle; the period of the Thirteenth Five-year Plan is decisive in finishing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all aspects.2 The strategic arrangements for the “Two 15-year Periods” proposed in the report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC have further delineated the road map for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

1 Xi 2 Hu

(2014f). et al. (2016), p. 1.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_2

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Xi Jinping stressed: “Conceptual innovation is to maintain the acuity and openness of thought, to break the traditional thinking and to work hard to open up new situations with new leaps in thinking and understanding”.3 Concept is a guide to action and idea is a guide to strategy. The most important innovation mechanism in China lies in the innovation in ideas and concepts. The CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, is committed to conceptual innovation and ideological guidance, aligning the ideas and actions of the entire CPC and people with the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and thus forming the theoretical basis for masterminding a new strategy.

2.1 China’s Global Positioning and Strategic Direction China’s rise has gone hand in hand with the world’s transformation, and China has emerged from a pattern of major powers dominated by one superpower to become the center of the current global transformation. How to understand China’s role in the world, steadily expand China’s national interests and enhance China’s international influence has become an issue of great concern to the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core. In the era of globalization, defining one’s national positioning, promoting national integration on the basis of that positioning, and participating in world affairs with a complete and defined identity in the international community have become the core issues for a country to preserve its dignity and fulfill its historical mission. China’s national positioning is, to a large extent, a reflection of its relationship with the world. China was one of the most developed countries in the agrarian era, and the Chinese civilization, with Confucian values at its core, is the only civilization in the world that has recorded its history in the same language for over 5000 years. Therefore, China has long been a cultural center in the world. In the mid-nineteenth century, China became a victim of international power transfer, and once declined into a failing state; the advanced technology represented by gunboats of the great powers, and the Western ideas represented by the Christian civilization, found their way into China through coercive means, turning China into a semi-colonial society. In the twentieth century, the feudal imperial system, which had lasted for thousands of years in China, collapsed, opening up the trail for China’s national transformation. China went through the unsuccessful experiments of bourgeois constitutionalism and bourgeois democracy before finally choosing the socialist system. For China, the twentieth century is a truly great era: in the first half, China was still at the bottom of an unstable international system, and the first thing it sought was to regain the independence and sovereignty lost in the nineteenth century; in the second half, China ushered in a historic rise. To achieve great prosperity of the country and the people as well as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation became realistic expectations; especially in

3 Xi

(2013b).

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23

the last two decades of the twentieth century, China seized the new wave of globalization, took the initiative to start the process of integrating into the international system, and began to reshape its national positioning, gradually becoming a responsible, constructive and predictable shaper of the international system, and gradually demonstrating its willingness to act constructively in the international community. China is becoming a beneficiary of the international power transfer.4 In the twentyfirst century, especially since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the European and American debt crises, the rise of China has accelerated, having brought positive global effect and aroused global controversy and great concern. China’s national positioning is based on its knowledge of the history of civilization over the past 5000 years, the history of humiliation over the past century and the rise of China, reflecting the clear pursuit of great power status. Since 1982, China’s national positioning has been in a state of flux, from a traditional major power to a modern one, from a closed big country to an open major power and from a general major power to an important major power. This is mainly reflected in the following aspects: First, China’s institutional positioning is that of a new socialist power. China is the only socialist country among the existing major powers, and this institutional positioning highlights its characteristics. At the same time, China is not a socialist power in the traditional sense. Instead, it has gradually enriched the basic connotations of socialism with Chinese characteristics through its inheritance of Chinese traditions, its grasp of world trends, its reflection on the development of socialist countries and its pursuit of national development goals: “The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the way to reach the goal, the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics offers a guide to action, and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics provides a fundamental guarantee”,5 thus establishing the distinctive characteristics of a new socialist power. (1)

4 Men

A peaceful socialist power. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and an independent foreign policy of peace represent the peaceful nature of China’s positioning. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping has resolutely changed the outdated strategic judgments and concepts, liberated China’s strategic thinking from the framework of war and revolution, and incorporated it into the new track of peace and development; China’s strategic culture has changed from a concept that emphasizes struggle as the core to one that tends towards cooperation as the core; China has completed the transformation from a revolutionary country to a status quo country, from an opponent of the international system to a reformer and even a defender.6 Deng Xiaoping pointed out that we “advocate socialism that favors peace” and that the only way to deal with the anti-socialist forces, apart from the necessary struggle with good reason, to our advantage and with restraint,

(2017a). (2012), p. 13. 6 Johnston (2001), pp. 48–53; Men (2016b). 5 Hu

24

(2)

(3)

(4)

2 China’s Grand Strategy: Xi Jinping’s New Ideas, Concepts …

“is to answer them with the constant strengthening of friendship and cooperation”.7 Taking the collapse of the former Soviet Union as a lesson, China is committed to its own peaceful development, abides by the concept of peaceful diplomacy and promotes world peace, cooperation and harmony through its own development. The path of peaceful development is an incarnation of this idea. A developing socialist power. China’s policy makers are well aware that China “will remain in the primary stage of socialism for a long time” and that “China’s international position as the largest developing country in the world has not changed. We must bear in mind under any circumstances the paramount reality that China remains in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so”.8 They stress the need to concentrate on nation-building, and believe that the most important and best contribution a socialist country can make to the world is to build itself up and fully demonstrate its institutional advantages in the political, economic, cultural, social and ecological fields. It is of fundamental strategic importance to focus on building one’s own country, to live in peace with all countries, including capitalist countries, and to work together for world peace and development. A socialist power opening up on all fronts. China started from breaking through conceptual barriers and institutional constraints, transformed itself from a nearly closed country to an active participant in the global market, and established an all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging opening pattern. As China is rapidly growing into an open world power, its complex interdependence with the international community is deepening and its ability to shape the international system growing. In a certain sense, China’s peaceful development began with domestic economic reform, and the spirit of reform and related measures spilled over to the international level, while China’s openness has moved from being mainly open to the outside to being fully open to both the inside and the outside. It can be said that China is consolidating its fundamental strategic position of opening up to the outside world on its path to peaceful development and ushering in an era of all-round opening up. A socialist power committed to market economy. The development from the planned economy to the commodity economy and then to the market economy is the basic path of economic system reform that China has followed. China’s understanding of the market economy is a key step in truly and fully integrating into the international community, and integration into the international system is the way to development. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping, in his talks he made on his tour to South China, stressed: “The proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism”.9 On this basis, China formed the theory of socialist market economy and embarked

7 Selected

Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, pp. 328, 349. (2012), p. 16. 9 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, p. 373. 8 Hu

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(5)

25

on the drive of developing the socialist market economy, thus achieving the sublimation of socialist theory and promoting socialism into a new stage. A socialist power committed to common prosperity. China’s reform and opening up began with the theory of “some people getting better-off first”. Deng Xiaoping realized that China was backward and had long been influenced by “leftism”, that opening up could not be fully rolled out and that a breakthrough must be made for economic revitalization, thus forming the main idea from “some people getting better-off first” to “common prosperity”. Deng stressed: “We should study when to raise this question and how to settle it. I can imagine that the right time might be the end of this century, when our people are living a fairly comfortable life”.10 Upon entering the twenty-first century, the state leaders of China made a sober judgment that China is in a period of strategic opportunity for development with all kinds of contradictions, and clearly put forward the strategic idea of “constantly promoting social harmony”, emphasizing the in-depth implementation of the scientific outlook on development and the construction of a harmonious socialist society and a moderately well-off society, abandoning the theory of “Some people getting better -off first” and taking the path towards common prosperity.

“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is inextricably linked to the features of globalization and China’s actual situation. China adheres to the basic principles of socialism, but differs from the socialist model envisioned by Marx and Engels and Soviet models. China draws on the fruits of capitalist civilization and the market economy model, but has not been assimilated by capitalism. Socialism with Chinese characteristics represents the pursuit of a new type of socialist power. In constant adjustment and improvement, it is a system model that integrates the advantages of socialism and capitalism. The pursuit of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit represents China’s confidence in its future development. China’s positioning as a new socialist power is confronted with both domestic and international challenges: the former is reflected in the understanding of the essence of socialism and the institutional arrangements for common prosperity, while the latter in Western countries’ deliberate efforts to highlight institutional differences and ideologically tout the “China Threat”. While intensifying efforts to advance the Five-point Strategy, China emphasizes the concept of “harmony without uniformity” in interacting with Western countries, pursuing a world featuring harmony without uniformity, difference without conflict, coexistence and growth, and difference with mutual complementarity. Second, China’s economic and social positioning is that of a major developing country. Generally speaking, developing countries are those with relatively low level of economic and social development and low living standards, and still in the process of transition from traditional agricultural society to modern industrial society.11 With studies going deeper, the indicators for analyzing the level of development are no longer limited to the traditional per capita GDP and GDP, but 10 Selected 11 Liu

Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, p. 374. et al. (2011).

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2 China’s Grand Strategy: Xi Jinping’s New Ideas, Concepts …

new indicators such as international competitiveness, the Human Development Index (HDI), and the balance of development are included. Among them, GDP per capita and GDP indicators focus on economic factors and the overall economic scale; the International Competitiveness Index looks at a country’s efficiency, endurance and development trend rather than a fixed level of development; the balance of development focuses on sustainable development; and the HDI consists of three indicators: life expectancy, adult literacy rate and GDP per capita, laying more emphasis on a combination of social development factors. As early as the early 1980s, there were sharp contradictions between China and Western countries over whether China should join the GATT as a developing country or a developed country, and tough negotiations lasted for more than a decade. China acceded to the WTO in 2001, and it is clear from the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China that China has not been granted full developing country status and that the scope of its benefits has been limited.12 In the twenty-first century, as China has become the most economically powerful emerging country, the developed countries have clearly requested China to give up its status as a developing country and stop being the biggest “free rider”. For example, since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, there have been such sayings as “socialism saved China in 1949”, “China saved socialism in 1989” and “China saved capitalism in 2009” in the international community. There were words of fulsome praise about China and many people believed that China had become a world power, a quasi-superpower, calling on China to abandon the status of a developing country. The World Trade Organization conventionally defines a country as a developing country only if its GDP per capita is below US$ 3000. In 2008, China’s per capita GDP reached US$ 3315, ranking 106th in the world; in 2009, US$ 3678, the 97th; in 2010, US$ 4520, the 90th; in 2011, US$ 5414, the 89th; in 2012, US$ 6100, the 87th; in 2013, US$ 6800, the 84th; in 2014, US$ 7485, the 81st; in 2015, US$ 7990, the 76th; in 2016, US$ 8113, the 74th; in 2017, US$ 8582, the 74th; in 2018, US$ 9377, the 72nd; in 2019, over US$ 10,000, reaching a moderately high level. It can be said that China’s GDP per capita is growing at an incredible rate. On the other hand, we must see an overall increase in the world average GDP per capita. For example, in 2010, it was US$ 8985, with that of China reaching half of the amount; in 2016, it was US$ 10,038, with China still lagging way behind; and in 2019, it was US$ 11,300, with China still lagging behind. In addition, we also need to be aware of the severity of the development imbalances in China, where, for example, tens of millions of people are to be lifted out of poverty according to the UN poverty line of US$ 1 per day. Despite the fact that more than 700 million people in China have succeeded in lifting themselves out of poverty during the 40 years of reform and opening up, there are still more than 30 million people living in poverty below the current standards, and there are still some severely impoverished areas where the incidence of poverty is high, making it very difficult to lift people out of poverty. In view of this, in terms of economic and social attributes, China has soberly positioned itself as a major developing country. The Report of the 18th National 12 Xu

(2012).

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27

Congress of the CPC reiterated that “China’s international position as the largest developing country in the world has not changed.” The Report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC stressed that, although socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered the new era, China has ushered in an era in which it is moving closer to the center of the world stage and making greater contributions to humankind, and the Chinese nation, which had endured great hardships since modern times, has made a great leap from “standing up”, to “getting richer” and to “becoming stronger”, “our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism, and China’s international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.” Undoubtedly, China has always pursued and is on the road to prosperity, but the process is not a smooth one; rather, it is characterized by complexities. For a developing country, the process of industrialization and modernization is the process of eradicating poverty and backwardness and thereby raising the level of development and achieving prosperity. China’s modernization and industrialization is an everaccelerating process, a process in which underdevelopment and development go hand in hand; it consists of two parallel processes: first, the rapid reduction of and extrication from underdevelopment; and second, the rapid expansion and marked enhancement of development. This is a dynamic process of continuous quantitative change and qualitative improvement, and represents China’s struggle to move from a developing country to a moderately developed country and then into the ranks of developed countries. China’s GDP has been the second largest in the world since 2010, and in terms of international competitiveness China is the only BRICS country to join the top 30. These two indicators mean that China’s economic status is among the top in the world and it is indeed difficult to position it as a developing country in the general sense. Additional indicators say that China is among the later ranks of development in the world. For example, judging from economic and social development balance, the internal development of developed countries is more balanced, with smaller disparities between urban and rural areas and between regions; China, however, is still at a stage where development imbalances are prominent, with larger disparities between urban and rural areas, regions and social strata, and even widening disparities in some areas, which are typical of developing countries. There are a host of underdeveloped characteristics with China’s rural areas and many regions, while there are increasing characteristics of a developed country with the urban and coastal areas, which rival developed countries on an ever-increasing scale. From the human development index, China is only in the middle and back ranks of the world. In summary, many respects of China’s economic, social, political and cultural developments reflect the salient features of the primary stage. The above analysis shows that the characteristics of the primary stage are not static either. China is no longer a developing country in the typical sense of the term, nor is it a developed country or a moderately developed country; underdevelopment and developed characteristics coexist; the scope of underdevelopment is shrinking and that of development is expanding. China is a developing country that is rapidly developing into a central one, so looking at China’s problems from the perspective of a general

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developing country would leave a lot to be desired and could affect the formulation and implementation of major economic and financial policies in China. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, there have been more and more factors of modernization and an increasingly modern atmosphere in people’s lives and social development. China is trying to pass through the “intermediate point” of the primary stage at a quick and steady pace. Currently, China is undergoing a comprehensive economic, political, social and cultural transformation. The clear direction of China’s transformation is the establishment of modern state institutions and the completion of the modernization process; the characteristics of the country’s situation make it difficult to achieve these goals, and it has become increasingly urgent to improve the development concept, optimize the development model and adjust the development strategy; in particular, China must realize the transformation from unsustainable to sustainable development, from inequitable to equitable development and from unbalanced to balanced development. Third, China’s cultural positioning is that of a cultural power rich in traditional resources. China has an innate advantage in cultural soft power, which is not only reflected in the cultural sophistication of ancient China, with Confucianism at its core, and its enormous influence on the surrounding areas, but also in the promotion of Confucian culture in a wave of rise in East Asia (Japan, the Four East Asian Tigers, the four ASEAN countries, China, etc.). Over the past 100-plus years, Western civilization has posed a great challenge to Eastern civilization, but marked by China’s significant achievements in reform and opening up and the transfer of international power to the Asia–Pacific region, Chinese civilization is actively promoting its traditions, while Western civilization is entering a stage of reflection and adjustment, and the integration of Eastern and Western civilizations will unfold a new page, and China is becoming a center of intersection of Eastern and Western cultures. As Wang Meng has pointed out, traditional Chinese culture has well met the serious challenge, stepped out of the shadow of lagging behind the world trend and has become an increasingly vibrant culture capable of communicating with the mainstream, modern and advanced cultures, complementing other cultures and keeping pace with the times.13 On the other hand, Chinese culture has got its own inherent problems. China’s failure to engage in modern industrialization and the gradual erosion of the material support of traditional Chinese culture, especially the series of disastrous failures since the mid-nineteenth century, have prompted a process of rethinking and reconstruction of Chinese culture. Why did the once-so-great state fall and become so backward? Some Chinese people with lofty ideas began imitating the Western technology of warships and gunboats and reflecting on traditional Chinese culture. Since then, the reflection has never ceased. The issues with keywords of “Chinese, Western, Substance and Application” have been heated topics among scholars. In the twentieth century, marked by the Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth Movement in 1919, China began the process of modernization. How to look at the traditional culture became the dividing line, with the New Culture Movement making an incisive critique 13 Wang

(2011).

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29

of traditional culture and putting forward the basic idea of Total Westernization. This critical viewpoint was brought into full play in the so-called “Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius” Campaign during the Cultural Revolution. The proposition of Total Westernization appeared and disappeared now and then in Chinese history of development, leading to repeated political turmoil in China. Another school of thought is the traditional one represented by philosopher Liang Shuming, who argued that “the future of world culture is the revival of Chinese culture”.14 This view continues to the present day, mainly in the non-political academic field. However, owing to the decline of the country’s overall strength in history, China is no short of blind cultural imitations or has even recklessly embraced foreign civilizations. Self-denial has always been a tradition of Chinese culture. Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China has begun to open up to and bring in the Western material civilization and culture on a large scale. To the West, China’s reform and opening up is a process of Westernization; to China, this process is the convergence of Chinese and Western civilizations, and harmony without uniformity remains what it is in the future. China has caught hold of the new wave of globalization through reform and opening up, and destroying the old and establishing the new has become a prominent cultural feature of China. China has achieved a material rise, which runs parallel with the rapid economic development of Asia, leading the world to re-examine the enormous energy of traditional Chinese culture featuring Confucianism. Chinese traditional culture has begun to show positive integration values in reshaping the international political and economic order, resolving escalating international conflicts, freeing itself from the cultural shackles of material omnipotence, and coping with the increasingly prominent crisis of spiritual belief and other contemporary world problems. Chinese policy makers are well aware of the core value of culture in the country’s positioning and emphasize the role of culture in leading fashion, educating the people, serving society and promoting development. On the other hand, the problem of modernizing China’s traditional culture still remains, and how to inherit and develop the rich traditional cultural resources is a major strategic issue confronting China. The risks inherent in Chinese culture are mainly the vanishing of social values and traditional social ethics, which has brought about serious social problems. The essence of traditional culture needs to be promoted and the fine traditions need to be tapped further. China faces the urgent task of modernizing its traditional culture. The external risks confronting Chinese culture lie in the fact that Western culture has the gene of infiltrating and transforming other cultures, and the promotion of values through cultural penetration is one of the major goals of Western countries. China is in the process of transforming into a modern industrial society, consciously or unconsciously accepting Western culture and its values. In particular, the negative aspects of Western culture—such as extreme egoism and money worship, chaotic value orientations, and non-moral tendencies— are subverting the fine traditions of Chinese culture, creating a powerful impact on

14 Liang

(1989).

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the appeal of traditional morality and the cohesion of Chinese culture, and posing grave threats to China’s cultural security. In recent years, Chinese policy makers have woken up to the lagging nature, urgency and strategic significance of cultural construction and have made great effort to promote cultural development. Xi Jinping said in the Report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC: “Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong. Without full confidence in our culture, without a rich and prosperous culture, the Chinese nation will not be able to rejuvenate itself.” China is committed to the strategy of rejuvenating the country through culture, emphasizing Marxism as a guide, holding fast to cultural selfconfidence, adhering to Chinese cultural traditions, promoting traditional culture, advancing the reform of cultural industries, promoting the construction of a cultural power, and advocating dialogue among civilizations, so as to usher in an era of great development in Chinese cultural modernization and cultural construction. Fourth, China’s international political positioning is that of a responsible power. Taking international responsibility is the fundamental requirement placed on all countries in the era of globalization. The proliferation of global problems and their resolution require all countries, large or small, strong or weak, to assume responsibility, which is not limited to the provision of domestic public goods, compliance with international norms, maintenance of international standards and fulfillment of international obligations. As the world’s second-largest economy and one of the most powerful countries in the East, China has an important responsibility to safeguard the common interests of all humanity. A “responsible major power” is a national demand and construction that responds to trends and takes the initiative to assume responsibility. China needs to take on more important international responsibilities in order to realize its national interests, which means China shall play a bigger role in the international community and China’s national interests are beyond the national borders. A responsible major power indicates China’s new positioning in the international community. Sun Yat-sen noted that: “If we want China to rise to power, we must not only restore our national standing, but we must also assume a great responsibility towards the world”.15 China’s being positioned as a responsible power is related to the reform and opening-up process, corresponding to the extent of China’s integration into the international community, complementary to China’s participation in international institutions, and compatible with the enhancement of its national strength and the expansion of its international influence. In the 1980s, China forsook the judgment that the world would be at war or revolution and started the process of integrating into the international community, changing from being an opponent and a floater to an active participant and builder of the international system.16 China shall play an active part in building a just and equitable new international order, continue to

15 Selected

Works of Sun Yat-sen, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. 691. (2001), p. 52; Qin Yaqing, National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on the Interaction Between China and the International Community, pp. 10–15.

16 Johnston

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integrate into the international system, and be committed to establishing pragmatic partnerships with other major countries. Opening up to the outside world and further participation in international institutions are mutually reinforcing, and China has undergone a process of gradual adaptation and deepening that goes in line with its domestic development and needs. Since the early 1980s, China’s active participation in international economic organizations has had a positive spillover effect, which has not only brought in new ideas and influenced China’s foreign policy-making model, but also promoted China’s participation in other international institutions.17 Deng Xiaoping’s talks on his trip to South China in 1992 signaled the advent of the era of China’s full participation in international institutions. Since then, China’s participation in international institutions has embodied the basic characteristics of a comprehensive, strategic and long-term nature, and it has basically endorsed almost all the important international institutions in the current international system. Since the end of the Cold War, China has continued to fast track its economic development, accelerated the process of political democratization and assumed an increasingly important international role. As China develops, its desire and ability to assume international responsibility grows. The report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC said: “China will get more actively involved in international affairs, play its due role of a major responsible country, and work jointly with other countries to meet global challenges”. The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC further stated: “China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance”; “China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit and uphold its fundamental foreign policy goal of preserving world peace and promoting common development. China remains firm in its commitment to strengthening friendship and cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and to forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win–win cooperation.” Xi Jinping has stated that China will assume the mission of a responsible great power to benefit the Chinese people, the people of the world and future generations by building a peaceful and prosperous China.18 With China’s development, China will better play its role as a responsible great power. China will be more active in maintaining world peace, advocating a common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable concept of security and working towards the peaceful settlement of disputes through consultations and negotiations.19 He stressed the need to focus on shaping China’s national image, highlighting the image of China as a civilized country featuring deep historical roots and unity of diversified ethnic groups with varying cultures; an Oriental power with honest and capable political administrations, developed economy, thriving culture, stable society, unified people and splendid 17 Men

(2005). (2015c). 19 Xi (2014b). 18 Xi

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landscapes; a responsible great power that is committed to peaceful development, common growth, international fairness and justice, and contributions to mankind; and a socialist power opening its door wider to the outside world, full of hope, vigor and vitality.20 At the same time, he also emphasized the necessity of cooperation in assuming international responsibilities. He noted that the economic recovery in the world is tortuous and there are frequent international and regional hotspots and intensifying challenges such as terrorism, cyber security, climate change and major infectious diseases. In the face of unprecedented challenges, no country is immune. All the nations should stand together and take coordinated actions in a responsible manner.21 Acting as a responsible great power means that China has seen changes in its positioning, with the traditional positioning of a sovereignty-centric, independent and autonomous power changing into the new one as a responsible power, and state behaviors being increasingly regulated by international institutions. China sees itself as an active and responsible participant in international institutions, further shaping the image of a responsible great power and actively providing global and regional public goods. The future of China is closely tied with that of the world and they rely on each other for development. China plays its role in the international community. It’s of positive significance for China, the growing major power, to undertake the international responsibility on its own initiative. For one thing, China has the capability and responsibility to make greater contributions to humankind, and the era featuring global governance calls for the cooperation of all the major powers to overcome the world crises. For another, a responsible posture helps enhance its international image. China is committed to its national positioning as a “responsible great power”, adhering to the philosophy of advocating the new international relationship, mutual benefit and peaceful development. In practice, China advances constructive participation in international community and emphasizes sharing, common prosperity and mutual benefit to avoid zero-sum games in the handling of international affairs. Meanwhile, it actively provides public goods for regions and the globe, offers assistance to developing countries within its means and increases material investment in international organizations. China has developed from a taker into a giver and taken an active part in maintaining the international security. Linked to the sense of great power responsibility is the further demonstration of China’s sense of active participation. It can be said that in China national rationality has taken root, and openness and a sense of participation are unstoppable. Looking ahead, China will be sober-minded in evaluating its international status, proactively undertake and rationally expand international responsibilities, and seek

20 Xi 21 Xi

(2014a). (2015e).

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for common interests with other countries. Moreover, it will better balance the capabilities and responsibilities in international affairs, and demand to increase corresponding international rights. While working with other countries to promote international cooperation, China should continue to emphasize a strategic layout that takes domestic construction as the core so as to achieve balanced development. Fifth, China is strategically positioned as a major power in the Asia–Pacific region developing into a world power. At present, China’s international influence has extended to the entire Asia–Pacific region. China has possessed many conditions to become a world power and it will vigorously promote world peace and sustainable development, and become an active shaper and leader in global economic governance and a global strategic player in the new era. China has always been a great country throughout history, even in the declining Qing Dynasty. As Napoleon said, China is a sleeping lion, and “when she wakes she will move the world.”22 Since China’s reform and opening-up in 1978, China’s national strength and international influence have been growing, and China’s rise has been internationally recognized. Thus, China’s world positioning is an important factor for the international community to judge its strategic direction. Most strategic analysts believe that it is only a matter of time for China to become a world power. Since the outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1997, China has been assuming its international responsibilities, and its role as a major power has received more attention from the international community. Since 2006, the world has begun hyping up the “G2 theory” (China-US theory), in which China is seen as a world power. This topic continues unabated, especially in 2010 when China’s GDP surpassed Japan’s to be the second largest in the world. Currently, the debate on China’s world status mainly focuses on what kind of big power China is, such as the East Asian power, influential Asia–Pacific power and world power. Much has been said in academia about the measurement of world powers. The German historian Leopold von Ranke noted that a world power “must be able to maintain itself against all others, even when they are united.”23 According to Wang Jun of the Ministry of Finance of China, a world power should have the following characteristics: (1) powerful national strength. It should have stronger economy and military power, more vigorous culture and extensive territory than other countries at the same stage of history; (2) extensive influence on other countries. It should be capable of making the times take on a new look, and influencing and even controlling the course of world civilization; (3) far-reaching historical impact. The impact should span time and space and last a long time.24 Experts led by Michael Oksenberg have pointed out that a qualified world power should be at the forefront in economic development, possess leading military power, and have worldwide cultural and political influences.25 As Brzezinski put forward, a world power “must imply cutting-edge superiority of a truly global military capability, significant international

22 Khanua

(1999). Ranke (1973). 24 Wang (2003). 25 Funabashi et al. (1994). 23 von

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financial and economic influence, a clear-cut technological lead, and an appealing social lifestyle—all of which must combine to create world-wide political clout.”26 In the light of these references, we believe that China has historically been a great country in East Asia and even in the whole Asia. The Tianxia thinking and tributary system represented its historical glory. However, China never became a world power since there weren’t any until the nineteenth century when the rise of European powers stood in stark contrast to China’s decline. The founding of the People’s Republic of China stopped the country’s centennial decline and rapidly established China’s status as a political and military power. The reform and opening up program initiated in 1978 has led to a sharp rise of China’s economic status and overall strength. With its national strength on the rise, China attaches great importance to maritime interests; its international influence extends to the entire Asia–Pacific region and increases in the world arena. Today, it would be difficult to see satisfactory results in dealing with major issues in the Asia–Pacific region without the active participation of China. China boasts many conditions to become a world power: China is a veritable resource power as it is the third largest country in land area and the first in terms of population; in terms of political influence, China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and has great influence in the International Monetary Fund and the G20; in terms of economy, trade and foreign investment, China is a veritable world power; in terms of military power, China is a great power, and its defense spending and military modernization are the focus of world attention. China, with favorable conditions to be a world power, is advancing world peace and sustainable development, and has become an active builder and leader in global economic governance as well as a global strategic player in the new era. Geopolitically located at the heart of Asia, China is the representative of oriental civilization. With the increasing economic interdependence of neighboring countries, China has become the geo-economic center of the Asia–Pacific region, surpassing the US and Japan in leading regional economic development. In recent years, based on its own national strength and strategic arrangements, China regards East Asia, the Asian hinterland, as the primary region to assume its responsibilities. In the meantime, China has extended its strategic interest tentacles to elsewhere in the world. A peaceful and stable regional environment is the prerequisite for China’s modernization. Seeing East Asia and neighboring countries as the core partners, China continues to pursue an expansion of global responsibilities. To sum up, China pursues all-around opening-up, transformation and development with building a new type of socialist power as its core. China is devoted to innovating the institutions and development model and creating a new world culture featuring the revival of traditional Chinese culture and the reflection on Western culture. Obviously, stabilizing China’s national positioning is pivotal. By doing so, China can retain a good continuity, innovation and resilience in its basic system, core values and national image, which will effectively strengthen the cohesion of people, unity of society and spreading of international influence. The above review 26 Brzezinski

(2000).

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35

of China’s national positioning shows that its overall strategy is to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit; follow the path of scientific development domestically and peaceful development internationally in the pursuit of harmonious development at home and abroad; strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and grow into a world power recognized by the Chinese people and the international community. The accelerating world transformation and China’s peaceful development at the critical stage have connected the domestic and international situations more closely, posing challenges to its global positioning from both within China and the world. The domestic challenges lie not only in the understanding of socialist essence and the institutionalization for common prosperity, but also in the lack of nationalist impulses and the mature mindset as a great power; the international challenges are from the US and other countries who deliberately highlight differences in institutional positioning and tout the “China Threat” to contain China. These challenges deeply reflect the “dilemma of a rising power” confronting China, and the fermentation of the Thucydides Trap theory is a “myth” against China. During this period, China confronts more uncertainties in international environment and bilateral relations with other countries, and higher risks of a particular crisis breaking out. However, there are also opportunities for it to improve the status and reshape the international order. China’s future direction depends on the Chinese people’s ability to understand and seize opportunities.

2.2 Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China Proposed by Xi Jinping, the Chinese Dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation embodies China’s ideals in the new era. Featuring rich elements and broad visions, the Chinese Dream maps out the blueprint for China and mobilizes the entire country to further modernize itself. The Chinese Dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation, with prosperity for the country, renewal of the nation and happiness for the people as its fundamental elements, is the core of the spirit of Xi’s key speeches and his new concepts, ideas, and strategies for the governance of China. The Chinese Dream which we cherish will not only serve the Chinese people but benefit people throughout the world.27 To realize the Chinese Dream, “we must take our own path, which is the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics; we must foster the Chinese spirit, which is the national spirit with patriotism at its core, and the spirit of the times with reform and innovation at its core; we must pool China’s strength, that is, the strength of great unity among the people of all ethnic groups”.28 The Chinese Dream runs through the past, present and future of China, connects the destiny of China, the Chinese nation and every Chinese, and embodies their prosperity, rejuvenation and 27 Xi 28 Xi

(2013d). (2013a).

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happiness.29 From a global perspective, the Chinese Dream is a dream of peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation; from the perspective of China and the Chinese nation, the Chinese Dream is to make the country prosperous and strong, rejuvenate the country and improve people’s well-being; from the perspective of the Chinese people, the Chinese Dream is to build an equal and just society where all people do their best, find their proper places in society, live in harmony and pursue excellence.30 The Chinese Dream represents China’s responsibility for the destiny of the world and its understanding of the future of the country and nation. It ties the development of China closely to that of the rest of the world and proves wrong the outdated logic that a country will invariably seek hegemony when it grows strong.31 China’s reform strategy is formulated based on both long-term and short-term goals, but mostly on the latter. As Xi has mentioned in Explanatory Notes to the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform, reform tasks are planned in accordance with a timetable before the end of 2020. Therefore, China’s reform strategy is a comprehensive plan to achieve moderate prosperity across the board by 2020. In the report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi made the conclusion and judgment that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered the new era. According to Xi, China’s development strategy can be summed up as follows: By 2020, a moderately prosperous society in all respects will have been realized, ushering in a new journey of comprehensively building a modern socialist country; from 2020 to 2035, built on a moderately prosperous society, socialist modernization will be basically realized, which will be on a par with moderately developed countries, and the goal of building a beautiful China will be achieved; by 2050, 15 years after China’s modernization, it will have been built into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful, leading the world in overall national strength and international influence. Based on the promotion of confidence in our path, theory and system, Xi lays special emphasis on the confidence in our culture, saying that we should strive to present the unique appeal of Chinese culture. This suggests that the Communist Party of China not only carries forward the heritage of Marxism, but traditional Chinese culture. Then he set forth the idea of building a community with a shared future for mankind, which manifests his profound ideals and deep feelings for the whole world. While deepening domestic reforms across the board, China also works in the interests of the world, and China’s strategic plans to become a global power have become the focus of attention of the international community, especially major countries. Led by Xi, the formulation of new concepts, ideas, and strategies for the governance of China represents his understanding of the trend of the times, meets practical requirements and responds to people’s expectations. As the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to China’s conditions, they enriched and developed the theory of 29 Li

(2013), Wang (2015). (2016). 31 Yaguang and Xiaocheng (2016). 30 Han

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socialism with Chinese characteristics, and marked the formation of China’s grand strategy in the new era. Focused on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and sticking to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and peaceful development, Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China feature an overall strategic plan to implement the Five-point Strategy, push forward the Four-pronged Strategy, fully advance the building of a moderately prosperous society, and strive to achieve the Two Centenary Goals. It was emphasized at the 18th CPC National Congress that the basic foundation for building socialism with Chinese characteristics is that China is in the primary stage of socialism, that its overall plan is to seek economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress, and that its main objective is to achieve socialist modernization and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Xi has made a series of new requirements and arrangements regarding the Five-point Strategy, and voiced a rich body of new ideas, conclusions and measures concerning work on national defense, military building and diplomacy, which offer new guidance to the adherence to and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.32 The Four-pronged Strategy consists of four tasks: to complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects, to further reform, to advance the rule of law, and to strengthen Party discipline. The relationship between the Five-point Strategy and Four-pronged Strategy became a hot subject of research after the latter was put forth. Xi pointed out that the Four-pronged Strategy was created to meet the practical needs of national development, to meet the highest expectations of the people, and to solve the prominent problems we are facing.33 He then suggested that the Five-point Strategy and the Four-pronged Strategy promote each other and develop together, and that we should carry them forward in an integrated way, with a fundamental focus on economic development, then simultaneously developing the socialist market economy, political democracy, an advanced culture, a harmonious society, and ecological conservation so as to create a better life for the people and make China into a prosperous and beautiful nation.34 The Four-pronged Strategy addresses the pressing problem of unbalanced development, with building a moderately prosperous society in all respects as its development goal; it tackles deep-rooted problems in development, with deepening reform in all areas as its driving force; it focuses on the inadequacy and inconsistency in the implementation of the rule of law, with law-based governance in an all-round way as the fundamental means of national governance; it solves problems in the political environment, with Party discipline as the key area for breakthroughs. In terms of logic, the Four-pronged Strategy serves as a strategic plan to implement the Five-point Strategy. “To complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects” is the objective of the Five-point Strategy, “to further reform” its momentum, “to advance the rule of law” its fundamental strategy, and “to strengthen Party discipline” its political guarantee.35 The Four-pronged Strategy paints a clear 32 Xu

(2015). (2015a). 34 Xi (2016b). 35 Zhou (2015). 33 Xi

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picture of the governance of China, captures key governance areas, demonstrates new governance strategies, and spells out China’s strategic objectives, focus and main problems confronting China.36 The Four-pronged Strategy, it is fair to say, clearly identifies the strategic priorities for the Five-point Strategy in the new era. Zhenis Kembayev, a scholar from Kazakhstan, considers the Four-pronged Strategy as new guidelines for China’s development and a profound theoretical breakthrough.37 The CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core is committed to creating the new era of deeper reform and opening up, making profound strategic adjustments in various areas including politics, economy, society, culture, ecology, security, diplomacy and national defense to form a medium-and long-term development plan. The specifics are as follows: First, in terms of improving its institutions, China endeavors to further develop its national governance system and combats corruption to lay a foundation for the country’s long-lasting stability. National governance system is a system of institutions within which the country is governed with the leadership of the CPC. It comprises economic, political, cultural, social and ecological as well as Party-building systems and mechanisms, laws and regulations.38 Xi said, “Compared with China’s needs for social and economic development and our people’s expectations, and compared with today’s increasingly intense international competition, and the need to ensure prolonged stability at home, we still have many shortcomings to overcome in improving our national governance system and capacity. Our institutions are not mature and well-defined enough, and some aspects even become major factors hampering our development and stability.”39 According to relevant research, the national governance system covers seven areas: market governance in the field of economy, government governance in the field of political administration, governance of culture and ethics in the field of culture, social governance and the community-level self-governance in the social field, ecological governance in the field of ecological progress, governance of armed forces in the field of national defense, and governance of the ruling party in the field of Party building.40 There are four cores in the modernization of national governance, namely fundamental national political system, value system of national governance, national governance system and national governance capacity.41 As such, in formulating and advancing the Four-pronged Strategy in a coordinated manner, the CPC Central Committee should continue to enhance the Party’s leadership, adjust the way the Party exercises leadership and governance, and strive to modernize the national governance system and capacity.42 How fast the building of national governance system and capacity lags behind the structural disintegration of social interests is closely related 36 Hao

(2016). (2015). 38 Xi (2014c). 39 Xi (2014e). 40 Xu (2014). 41 Lan (2014). 42 Chen (2016a). 37 Zhenis

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39

to China’s catch-up in its modernization drive.43 In promoting the modernization of China’s national governance system and capacity, we must adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics, update governance concepts, enrich governance objectives, have clear strategic focus, innovate governance methods, pursue coordinated and diversified governance, and properly address fundamental relations involved in national governance.44 The task of continuing reform in all areas was brought up in the report delivered in the 18th CPC National Congress. With the key focus on new measures to further reform, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee drew a blueprint for China’s future reform, which introduced the arrangement of the main tasks and important measures for continuing the reform in six aspects—the economy, politics, culture, society, ecology and national defense/armed forces. On this basis, the CPC Central Committee established the National Security Commission to enhance China’s national security system and strategy in ways that national security is guaranteed. The Leading Group for Continuing the Reform Comprehensively was also set up to ensure the design, coordination, promotion and implementation of the reform. With the goal of advancing the rule of law, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee accelerated and improved the institutional arrangement that the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China must be the basis of the governance of the country and the exercise of state power, breaking new ground in judicial reform. Guided by the objective of “promoting political integrity” introduced in the 18th CPC National Congress, China is launching a campaign against corruption on the largest scale and at the highest level ever to crack down on deep-rooted corruption and cleanse political environment. The report to the 19th CPC National Congress emphasized: “We must uphold and improve the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and continue to modernize China’s system and capacity for governance. We must have the determination to get rid of all outdated thinking and ideas and all institutional ailments, and to break through the blockades of vested interests. We should draw on the achievements of other civilizations, develop a set of institutions that are well conceived, fully built, procedure based, and efficiently functioning, and do full justice to the strengths of China’s socialist system.” Second, in terms of social and economic strategies, China, under the new normal in economy, makes great efforts to promote reform of economic system, guarantees and improves people’s livelihoods, ensures social prosperity and stability, and takes precautions against the middle-income trap. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China’s economy has been shifting from a high to a medium–high rate of growth, from a growth model that emphasized scale and rate to one that emphasizes quality and efficiency, from an economic structure in which economic growth was mainly fueled by the increment and increased industrial capacity to one in which the existing capacity is adjusted and the increment is put to best use, and from being driven by production factors such as resources to being driven by innovation. Facing such a changing picture, the CPC Central 43 Zhou 44 Bixin

(2014). (2014).

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Committee was quick to make clear that we should adapt to, grasp and steer the new normal in economic development. Xi pointed out that understanding, adapting to, and steering the new normal is an essential logic in the present and future stages of our economic development.45 The new normal in China’s economic development exhibits the following characteristics: first, the shift from a high to a medium–high growth rate; second, continual upgrading of economic structure, the leading role of the tertiary industry and consumption in economic growth, narrowing rural–urban gap, higher income of rural and urban residents, and wider availability of development gains to the public; third, the shift from production factors and investment to innovation as growth driver. The new normal will present new development opportunities to China.46 As China began to re-balance its economic structure, it will see a drop in potential economic growth rate in the coming decade. Xi once said, “The slowdown of the Chinese economy is an intended result of our own regulatory initiatives. This is because, according to a thorough calculation done at the time we set our mid-and longterm development goals to double the 2010 GDP and per capita income by 2020, it is judged that a 7% annual growth rate would suffice. Moreover, we have recognized that to ensure long-term economic development China has to press ahead with structural reform, even if this requires some sacrifice of pace. In whatever undertaking, one has to look far and plan wisely to take care of both short-and long-term needs. Killing the goose to get the eggs or draining the pond to catch the fish is no formula for sustainable development.”47 The characteristics of China’s economic development in the current stage, as Xi summarized, are “the new normal”. Characterized by medium–high growth rate, structural upgrading, new growth driver and multiple challenges, China’s new normal means that China must no longer take the GDP growth rate as the sole criterion for success. Instead, the focus should be put on improving the quality and efficiency of growth and initiating the reform of economic system. We will take it as our core task to properly handle the relationship between the government and market, letting the market play a decisive role in allocating resources, and ensuring that the government fulfills its functions in a better way.48 Meanwhile, we will promote a law-based country, government and society, take safeguarding social stability as our basic task, promoting social fairness and justice as our core values, and ensuring a happy life for our people as our fundamental target, and press ahead with reform of social undertakings and management. The new normal presents the bright prospects of skipping the middle-income trap and bringing economic development to a new level, but they need correct guidance. That includes fostering innovation-driven growth engines, giving play to market’s decisive role in structural adjustments, opening up further and wider,

45 “The

Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, December 22, 2015, p. 1. 46 Xi (2014g). 47 Xi (2013c). 48 Xi (2018), p. 116.

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pursuing economic growth while improving the environment, and realizing inclusive growth.49 In the face of notable changes in the relation between supply and demand and structural imbalance, the CPC Central Committee has adopted targeted measures to tackle the mismatch between supply-side adjustments and demand structural upgrading, making decisive moves to initiate supply-side structural reform so that factors of production can be allocated to areas with effective demand and midto high-end areas. To fulfill the urgent task of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, the CPC Central Committee has implemented targeted poverty alleviation, sounding the bugle to win the battle against poverty. The proposal of new development concepts is a milestone during this process. The five new development concepts, which are innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development, point out the sure way to push china’s development forward towards higher quality and efficiency, and greater fairness and sustainability. They are a profound reform bearing on the overall development of our country. The five concepts play a comprehensive, decisive and far-reaching guiding role, and are meant to be a strategic program that will guide China forward.50 They embody China’s development ideas, direction and focus during the l3th Five-year Plan period or even longer, and manifest our development experience over more than four decades of reform and opening up. These concepts reflect the Party’s new understanding of the laws governing development, make clear the fundamental idea and method in steering the new normal in economic development, achieving all objectives in the 13th Fiveyear Plan period, and building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.51 The five development concepts, according to Hu Angang, constitute a grand development framework, which follows strict logic and a practical approach to development, and in which innovative development is the driving force, coordinated development the art, green development the model, open development the boost, and inclusive development the goal. The core and final objective are to promote well-rounded personal development.52 These new development concepts, as Li Junru pointed out, show the fundamental approach to various difficulties in the new normal, are a plan to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects, a strategy to advance the Four-pronged Strategy, and a guide to achieve the Two Centenary Goals.53 Another crucial aspect in coping with the new economic normal is to step up economic cooperation with foreign countries. Xi said that as China’s economic development has entered a new normal, greater openness is required to address the difficulties and challenges in the country’s social and economic development.54 He emphasized that we should embrace the trend of China’s economic integration with the rest of the world, pursue a more open economy, take an active part in global governance, and work towards an equal, fair and mutually beneficial international 49 Li

and Zhang (2015). Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, Xi (2016a), pp. 130–133. 51 Chen (2016b). 52 Hu et al. (2016), pp. 9–10. 53 Li (2015). 54 Xi (2014f). 50 The

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economic order.55 It was reiterated in Xi’s report delivered at the 19th CPC National Congress that “we must actively participate in and promote economic globalization, develop an open economy of higher standards, and continue to increase China’s economic power and composite strength.” In areas of market resources, international affairs and governance rules, China is taking graduate steps to transition from a country that depends on others, actively participates and passively accepts to one that is mutually dependent with other countries, actively leads and interacts internationally. China’s interaction with the world deepens, its position in global financial system continues to rise and its voice in global governance system is ever stronger.56 China quickened its pace of the building of an open economic system, implemented the Belt and Road Initiative, proposed the establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), accelerated the building of free trade zones and free trade ports, and further internationalized the Renminbi. With initiative to pursue openness, China gains the initiative to develop and compete with other countries. China has launched a string of initiatives of international cooperation, which delivered fruitful results and produced far-reaching impacts. Third, in terms of cultural development, we uphold core socialist values and pay special attention to revitalizing traditional culture. China’s decision makers are well aware of the importance of strengthening national soft power, and the inner relationship between traditional culture and core socialist values. Xi stressed that enhancing national cultural soft power has to do with the realization of the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. To strengthen national cultural soft power, we will showcase the unique charm of Chinese culture.57 Xi’s report at the 19th CPC National Congress dedicated a chapter to the significance of cultural confidence and prosperity of socialist culture. Xi said, “Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong. Without full confidence in our culture, without a rich and prosperous culture, the Chinese nation will not be able to rejuvenate itself.” He also emphasized that core values are the soul of cultural soft power, and that “core socialist values represent the contemporary Chinese spirit”, and that cultivation and promotion of core socialist values must be based firmly on traditional Chinese culture. Traditional Chinese culture is in the genes of the Chinese nation, and it’s deep-rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people, with subtle influence on the way we think and behave. We advocate and carry forward the core socialist values through absorbing the rich nourishment of Chinese culture, so as to increase its vitality and broaden its influence. We must never forget our history; only then can we open up the new era. We should know how to inherit before we become good at innovation. Fourth, in terms of security strategy, we’ve put forward a holistic view of national security and made improvements to the country’s national security system. As China sees its all-round rise, tasks and challenges in national security are ever more diverse and complicated, and that calls for coordination from the National 55 Xi

(2015b). and Zhang (2014). 57 Xi (2014d). 56 Bi

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Security Commission to improve China’s national strategic system for enduring peace and growth in this globalized world, and to strength the country’s capacity to plan for the overall interests and make strategic decisions. To enhance national security system and strategy and ensure national security, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided to establish the National Security Commission in November 2013. On April 15, 2014, Xi said in his speech at the first meeting of the National Security Commission that we need to acquire an accurate understanding of new developments and trends of the situation of national security, adhere to a holistic view and develop national security with Chinese characteristics.58 On May 21, 2014, Xi delivered a speech at the Fourth Summit of Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), advocating common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia, which represents China’s holistic view of national security in a global context.59 On January 23, 2015, the Outline of National Security Strategy was adopted by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. On July 1, 2015, the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress. Xi said in his report to the 19th CPC National Congress, “We must put national interests first, take protecting our people’s security as our mission and safeguarding political security as a fundamental task, and ensure both internal and external security, homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China’s own and common security. We will improve our systems and institutions and enhance capacity-building for national security, and resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests”. As China is becoming a global power, the core objective of the country’s national security strategy is to improve national security, actively participate in safeguarding international security, and protect and expand China’s security interests. The next decade will be a crucial period for China’s transition to a global power and a time of toughest trials to China’s national security. China’s main objectives in national security are: safeguarding the rights and interests of national territory and territorial waters; opposing independence, promoting reunification, and protecting territorial integrity; creating and maintaining an international environment conducive to China’s peaceful development; safeguarding and expanding the scope of national strategic interests; and strengthening military forces to safeguard national security. Fifth, in terms of foreign policy, China seeks to expand its national strategic interests and focus on opening the new era of diplomacy with “common interests”, “mutual benefit” and “China’s responsibility” at its core. In the face of an unpredictable and changing international environment, China conducts diplomacy in a more proactive manner. Chinese leaders have voiced their strong desire to work with the rest of the world, stated their position to take a more active part in international order and global governance, proposed a series of important initiatives, and reached consensus on many important matters. All of these have a direct impact on 58 Xi 59 Xi

(2018), pp. 200–201. (2018), p. 354.

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the pattern of regional interests, thus bringing about shifts in global landscape and increasing China’s voice in international affairs. The world is going through a historical process of accelerated evolution, with profound changes in the global governance system and contests among different institutions and development paths. To seize opportunities in a changing world environment and gain the initiative amid fierce global competitions, we need to bear in mind the bigger picture and plan for the overall interests.60 Xi pointed out that with the increase in global challenges, there is a growing demand for strengthening global governance and transforming the global governance system.61 Therefore, China will, together with people from all other countries, actively participate in the construction of a global governance system, trying to contribute China’s wisdom to implementing global governance, and push global order and governance to develop in a fairer and more reasonable way.62 Xi said that the global governance system is at a historical turning point, pointed out China’s position and responsibility in pushing forward reform of the global governance system, and offered China’s plan to promote the reform. Now, as the world is yet to enter a period of thorough transformation, China’s integration with the world is deeper and wider than ever, and its leading role is ever more prominent. China’s confidence and responsibility as a major country is fully manifested through improving global governance, safeguarding regional and global security, and addressing major country relations. Guided by its world ideals, China contributed its wisdom and plan to solving problems facing all mankind. In such an era of uncertainty, China has emerged as an anchor of stability, advocate of global peace and development, and strategic leader.63 With foresight, Xi put forth a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting China’s role as a major country, innovated peaceful development philosophy, advocated new international relations, upheld the sound values of justice and benefit, promoted the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, and provided China’s ideas and plans of global governance, all of which contributed to the forming of Xi’s thoughts on diplomacy. Fully understanding the impact of its rise on the world, China will hold on to the belief that “when prosperous, one should contribute to the wellbeing of all”, adhere to the strategic thinking of mutual benefit and win–win cooperation, work with other countries on the basis of common interests, do its best to shoulder more international responsibilities, and, along with other countries, build and develop a community of shared interests, shared responsibility and shared future. As a champion of the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, China has put forward new initiatives including the establishment of a new model of major-country relations and the Belt and Road Initiative. It sticks to the sound values of justice and benefit, putting justice before benefit in its exchanges with other developing countries. It also aligns its national development strategies with those of neighboring countries and developing countries so as to deepen mutual trust 60 The

Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, Xi (2016a), pp. 42–43. (2015d). 62 Xi (2016b). 63 Men (2017c). 61 Xi

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and cooperation with them. In practice China firmly upholds the Party’s leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, adheres to its own development path and values, follows, enriches and develops the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and focuses on the top priority of development, reform and opening up. In doing so, China breaks a new path to prosperity different from those taken by other global powers.64

2.3 International Influence of Xi’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China have become a subject of heated discussions, drawing the attention of many foreign commentators. Vladimir Petrovsky, an expert on China’s issues from the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that Xi’s new thoughts on governance are crystallized on the basis of China’s experience of the reform and opening up and China’s national conditions, and that they are of strong guidance on China’s development. Simon Chu, Associate Director of Economic Development Council under Department of Economic and Social Affair of United Nations, commented that the new concepts, thought and strategy were proposed at the right time, and that they will help boost China’s economic growth and allow China to continue its role as the world’s economic engine.65 David M. Lampton believes that the new governance model not only helps China handle domestic and periphery security affairs, but is a new attempt in global and transnational governance.66 Famous Chinese American scholar James C. Hsiung emphasized that Chinese leaders often resort to China’s traditional governance approach to its handling of international relations and uphold international justice, instead of following the deeply criticized western imperialist model and the Great-Power Chauvinism model.67 Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China have gained more and more acclaim. According to Francis Fukuyama, state power, rule of law and democratic accountability are three pillars, with state power the basis in the establishment of political order, in which China is doing a good job.68 The mainstream view in western academic and political spheres considers Xi the Chinese leader with the highest profile after Deng Xiaoping. The English version of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China serves as a window that allows other countries to understand the ideas of China’s leadership and western elites to learn about socialism with Chinese 64 Men

(2016a), Men (2017b).

65 “Making China’s Development More Vibrant—International Observers Highly Appraise the CPC

Central Committee’s New Concepts, Thought and Strategy for the Governance of China”, People’s Daily, March 3, 2016, p. 3. 66 Lampton (2015). 67 Hsiung (2016), pp. 232–235. 68 Fukuyama (2014).

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characteristics. Published by the Foreign Languages Press on November in 2017, the second volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China includes a compilation of 99 of Xi’s spoken and written works from August 18, 2014 to September 29, 2017, depicts the great practice of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core in uniting and leading the whole Party and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, and chronicles the development and outlines the main content of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It helps people understand and grasp Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress, and is well-received both at home and abroad.69 In January, 2020, compiled by the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee, A Compilation of Discourses of Xi Jinping on Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics was published by the Central Party Literature Press, containing 504 discourses extracted from more than 190 speeches, talks, reports, articles and letters by Xi from December 2012 to November 2019. There is a lot of positive assessment of China’s governance model coming out of the mainstream western intelligentsia, including traditional western media like The Times, which unusually called on the west to learn China’s ideas about governance.70 Carlos Magariños, former Director General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), pointed out that China is a contributor to the accountability of global governance and a major force in dragging the world out of the financial crisis.71 Christopher Johnson, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), believes that the Belt and Road Initiative represents a China with vitality and embodies Xi’s Chinese Dream to promote national rejuvenation and cement China’s position as a global leader.72 Xi’s emphasis on upholding the UN Charter and adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is positively viewed by Shinji Yamaguchi from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan, who believes that China is no challenger to the existing international order.73 There is no doubt that some from the international community still have misinterpretation, misreading, misgivings and suspicions about Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China, with some even misinterpreting the Chinese Dream as a dream for hegemony and making up the new “China Threat”. Some people in the west have been watching closely the challenges China’s regional cooperation poses to global political and economic order, thereby claiming that China is secretly taking over the world.74 Professor Amako Satoshi from Waseda University said that the proposal of the Chinese Dream indicates Xi’s intention to define China as a superpower, and the amity, sincerity, mutual

69 Xi

(2017). (2013). 71 Magariños (2013). 72 Johnson (2016). 73 Yamaguchi (2016). 74 For example, Cardenal and Araujo (2013), Howard (2015). 70 Liu

2.3 International Influence of Xi’s New Concepts, Thought …

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benefit and inclusiveness of China’s diplomacy point to China’s strategic consideration to expand the country’s influence and establish the Greater China area.75 Some western scholars, however, claim that as China’s national strength continues to rise, China’s foreign policy is showing signs of a tough and arrogant stance, referring to the so-called “New Assertiveness”, and that this will create new security dilemma.76 In response, James C. Hsiung went straight to the point, saying that the “China Threat”, in essence, stems from their fear of China’s rejuvenation.77 Michael Pillsbury, senior fellow at Hudson Institute, reflected on the prejudice and misjudgment in research on contemporary China conducted in the West and said that western analysts always depict China as they like, and that the conclusions and projections of some Chinarelated research are quite the opposite of the truth, which end up misguiding western policy toward China.78 On the whole, many have aired objective views about Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China and offered their substantive suggestions. For instance, Professor William A. Callanhan from the London School of Economics and Political Science said that China’s governance model holds more and more appeal to other countries, posing a challenge to western soft power, most notably the US.79 Canadian scholar Robert Ware emphasized that China is seeking international cooperation in the ideological fields of Marxism and socialism, and that China will not merely import ideas mechanically.80 According to Elisabeth Economy, senior researcher from the Council on Foreign Relations, China is growing from strength to strength in diplomacy and security, but the country has a long way to trek in its economic reform. Out of consideration for the interests of the US, she suggested that the US should encourage China to join TPP while maintaining America’s military power in the Asia–Pacific Region.81 Former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and senior fellow at Brookings Institution Michael O’Hanlon said that China and the US should follow interactive, transparent and flexible principles, respect each other’s core interests and, building on this, establish a new type of relation of mutual trust.82 To conclude, Xi’s new concepts, thought and strategy for the governance of China have drawn close attention and in-depth research from the international community, and become the source of ideas and the logical starting point for understanding and dissecting China’s foreign strategies in the new era.

75 Amako

(2015). and Harold (2013), Yahuda (2013), Rudd (2013). 77 Hsiung (2016), p. 160. 78 Pillsbury (2014). 79 Callahan (2013), Section 1. 80 Ware (2014), pp. 57–62. 81 Economy (2014). 82 Steinberg and O’Hanlon (2014). 76 Scobell

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References Amako S (2015) China’s view of international order in the 21st century. Foreign Theor Trends 5:63–70 Bi J, Zhang Z (2014) China’s interaction with the world economy deepens. China Finance 10:64–66 Bixin J (2014) On the basic issues of national governance’s modernization. J Central South Univ (Soc Sci) 139–148 Brzezinski (2000) Living with China. Strategy Manag (3):12–13 Callahan WA (2013) China dreams: 20 visions of the future. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, Section 1 Cardenal J, Araujo H (2013) China’s silent Army: the pioneers, traders, fixers and workers who are remarking the world in Beijing’s image Chen B (2016a) Taking China’s political reform to new depths. Qiushi 5:31–33 Chen B (2016b) Understanding and grasping the new development concepts from a strategic overall perspective. People’s Daily, Mar 11, p 7 Economy E (2014) China’s imperial president: Xi Jinping tightens his grip. Foreign Aff 93(6):80–91 Fukuyama F (2014) Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, p 132 Funabashi Y, Oksenberg M, Weiss H (1994) An emerging China in a world of interdependence. The Trilateral Commission, New York, p 2 Han Q (2016) The thought of people’s co-creation and sharing: systematic analysis of the new thought of the CPC central committee on state governance. J Party School Central Committee of the C.P.C (1):15–27 Hao L (2016) The strategic layout and development concept for practicing socialism with Chinese characteristics. Contemp China Hist Stud 1:5–9 Howard W (2015) French. How a million migrants are building a new empire in Africa, China’s Second Continent Hsiung JC (2016) China into its second rise. Hubei Education Press Hu J (2012) Firmly March on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects—report to the Eighteenth national congress of the communist party of China (8 Nov 2012). People’s Publishing House, Beijing Hu A et al (2016) China’s new concepts: five major developments. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House Johnson C (2016) President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. A Report to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, No 3 Johnston AI (2001) An overview of american scholars’ studies on the relationship between china and international organizations. World Econ Politics (8) Khanua RP (1999) Impact of China’s ambition to be a regional power. Asian Defense J 6(9):9 Lampton D (2015) Xi Jinping and the national security commission: policy coordination and political power. J Contemp China 24(95):759–777 Lan X (2014) Top-level design and moving on hardly: the path of China’s state governance modernization. J Public Manag 4:1–6 Li J (2013) Meaning, connotation and dialectical logic of the Chinese dream. Stud Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theor 7:14–17 Li J (2015) New ideas of development and the great trend of China. Theor Horiz 12:14–15 Li Y, Zhang X (2015) The new normal: the logic and perspective of economic development. Econ Res J 5:4–19 Liang S (1989) The complete works of Liang Shuming, vol 1. Shandong People’s Publishing House, Jinan, pp 543–546 Liu X (2013) Observations and reflections on the dilemma of western capitalism. People’s Daily, 12 Apr, p 3

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Liu S et al (2011) How to correctly understand the controversy over the identity of China as a developing country. China Develop Obs 7:6–10 Magariños C (2013) G20’s future and China’s role in G20. Soc Sci Abroad 6:23–27 Men H (2005) Pressure, perception, and international image: a historical analysis of China’s strategy for international institutions. World Econ Polit 4:17–22 Men H (2016a) Building a new type of international relations: China’s responsibility and undertakings. World Econ Polit 3:4–25 Men H (2016b) China’s strategic culture: a research program. Teach Res 1:57–63 Men H (2017a) China’s grand strategy: a framework analysis, 2nd edn. Peking University Press, p 2 Men H (2017b) New philosophy, new thought, and new strategy for China’s governance under CPC central committee: an international agenda. World Econ Polit 1:5–29 Men H (2017c) The China solution—promoting the positive interaction between China and the world. Chinese Social Sciences Today, 14 Sept, p 1 Pillsbury M (2014) Misunderstanding China, 17 Sept. https://wwwhudsoNo.rg/resear-ch/10623misunderstanding-china Rudd K (2013) Beyond the pivot: a new road map for US–Chinese relations. Foreign Aff 92(4):9–15 Scobell A, Harold SW (2013) An ‘Assertive’ China? Insights from interviews. Asian Secur 9(2):111–131 Steinberg J, O’Hanlon M (2014) Strategic reassurance and resolve: US-china relations in the twentyfirst century. Princeton University Press, Princeton von Ranke L (1973) The theory and practice of history. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, p 86 Wang J (2003) Big power in every era—an analysis of how world powers flourished and its inspiration to China’s development. Rev Econ Res 49:2–16 Wang M (2011) Traditional Chinese culture and soft power. People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), 2 Nov, p 6 Wang W (2015) Contemporary theoretical achievements in the sinicization of Marxism—study the spirit of general secretary Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches. Soc Sci China 10:4–28 Ware R (2014) Reflections on Chinese Marxism. Foreign Theor Trends 4:57–62 Xi J (2013a) Address to the first session of the 12th national people’s congress. People’s Daily, 18 Mar, p 1 Xi J (2013b) Bear the big picture in mind and keep in line with the trends to enhance publicity and theoretical Work. People’s Daily, 21 Aug, p 1 Xi J (2013c) Deepen reform and opening up and work together for a better Asia Pacific—speech at the APEC CEO summit. People’s Daily, 8 Oct, p 3 Xi J (2013d) Follow the trend of the times and promote global peace and development—speech at the Moscow state institute of international relations. People’s Daily, 24 Mar, p 2 Xi J (2014a) Calls for building china into a socialist cultural power and enhancing China’s cultural soft power at the 12th group study session of the political bureau of the CPC central committee. People’s Daily, 1 Jan, p 1 Xi J (2014b) Gives a joint interview to the media of four Latin American countries. People’s Daily, 15 July, p 1 Xi J (2014c) Align our thinking with the guidelines of the third plenary session of the 18th CPC central committee. People’s Daily, 1 Jan, p 2 Xi J (2014d) Build China into a socialist cultural power and enhance China’s cultural soft power People’s Daily, 1 Jan, p 1 Xi J (2014e) Improve and develop the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and modernize our national governance system and capacity. People’s Daily, 18 Feb, p 1 Xi J (2014f) Quicken the pace of implementing the free trade zone strategy and building an open economic system. People’s Daily, 7 Dec, p 1 Xi J (2014g) Seek sustained development and fulfill the Asia-Pacific dream—speech at the opening ceremony of the APEC CEO summit. People’s Daily, 10 Nov, p 2

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Xi J (2014h) Speech at the seminar commemorating the 110th anniversary of the birth of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. People’s Daily, 21 Aug, p 2 Xi J (2015a) Gathers with prominent non-CPC individuals to celebrate the spring festival. People’s Daily, 13 Feb, p 1 Xi J (2015b) Adhering to the dialectical materialist worldview and methodology to improve the ability to solve the basic problems of China’s reform and development. People’s Daily, 25 Jan, p 1 Xi J (2015c) Let engineering science and technology create a better future for humankind—keynote speech at the international conference on engineering science and technology 2014. People’s Daily, 4 June, p 2 Xi J (2015d) Promoting a more just and rational global governance system will create favorable conditions for China’s development and world peace. People’s Daily, 14 Oct, p 1 Xi J (2015e) Work together to promote openness, inclusiveness and peaceful development—speech at dinner hosted by the Lord Mayor of the City of London. People’s Daily, 23 Oct, p 2 Xi J (2016a) Series of key speeches of general secretary. Xuexi Publishing House and People’s Publishing House, pp 42–43 Xi J (2016b) Speech at the ceremony marking the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC (1 July, 2016). People’s Daily, 2 July, p 1 Xi J (2017) The governance of China (vol two). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing Xi J (2018) The governance of China (vol one). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing Xu C (2012) The rise of new emerging countries and the construction of a new international economic order: a perspective from the Chinese path. Soc Sci China 10:186–204 Xu Y (2014) Illustration on Xi Jinping’s thoughts about modernization of national governance. J Shanghai Adm Inst 4:17–22 Xu G (2015) New theory and practice of adhering to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics—reflections on studying general secretary Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the governance of China. Qiushi 18:8–11 Yaguang J, Xiaocheng Y (2016) A study of Xi Jinping’s thought on the peaceful development path. Theor J 2:4–10 Yahuda M (2013) China’s new assertiveness in the South China sea. J Contemp China 22(81):446– 459 Yamaguchi S (2016) The continuity and changes in China’s perception of the international order. NIDS J Defense Secur 18(2):45–63 Zhenis K (2015) The Four-pronged strategy is a far-reaching theoretical breakthrough. People’s Daily, 12 Apr, p 5 Zhou G (2014) An effective path to promote modernization of national governance: democratization of decision-making. Theor Invest 5:5–10 Zhou M (2015) The four-pronged strategy and the five-point strategy in a comparative perspective. J Party Sch Tianjin Committee CPC 3:10–15

Chapter 3

Innovations and Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era

China’s theoretical and practical innovations in its foreign strategic ideas are based on a sober understanding of China’s status, a calm judgment of world trends, a profound grasp of China’s interaction with the world, and an innovative understanding of China’s responsibilities that are closely related to the demand to improve and enrich the socialist theoretical system with Chinese characteristics. In the face of the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years, China must stand firmly for peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes, give overall consideration to domestic development and international situation, and adopt a holistic approach to development and security. China must focus on the overriding goal of peaceful development and national rejuvenation. China must safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests, foster an international environment that is friendly to its peaceful development, and take advantage of this important period of strategic opportunity. These efforts will ensure the realization of the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. China has reached a new historical starting point. It is a new starting point for China to deepen reform across the board and foster new drivers of economic and social development. It is a new starting point for China to adapt its economy to a new normal and transform its growth model. It is a new starting point for China to further integrate itself into the world and open itself wider to the world.1 At a critical juncture when China’s rapid rise and the world’s rapid transformation are parallel, China has defined its global strategic positioning: a participant, beneficiary, builder and contributor to the current international system; an advocate of international cooperation; a practitioner of peaceful development; a promoter of common development; a defender of the multilateral trading system and a constructive participant and active leader in global economic governance . Specifically, China

1 Xi Jinping, “A New Starting Point for China’s Development, A New Blueprint for Global Growth—

Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit”, People’s Daily, September 4, 2016, p. 1. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_3

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should not only seize the opportunity of the current era of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit to further develop itself, but should also strive to do its part and make more contributions to world peace and development; actively assuming international responsibilities and obligations is the very meaning of China’s foreign policy in the new era. That requires us to adhere to the path of peaceful development, to commit ourselves to unifying domestic development and opening up to the outside world, to linking China’s development with that of the world, to combining the interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples, and to expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries; it also requires us to insist on the democratization of international relations, to insist on the equality of all countries, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth, and to uphold justice in international affairs; it requires us to actively provide all countries with opportunities and space for common development, and to welcome everyone to board China’s express train of development and share the dividends of its development. With that idea in mind, the CPC Central Committee with Xi at its core upholds socialism with Chinese characteristics, exercises overall leadership and coordinates efforts from all sides in building Xi Jinping thought on diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era in an attempt to make China’s diplomacy more global in outlook, more enterprising and more pioneering, and to demonstrate to the world its firm, confident and enterprising Chinese style and its open, tolerant, humble and generous Chinese characters, and to actively promote theoretical innovation in foreign strategic thinking. The thought is primarily about upholding the authority of the CPC Central Committee as the overarching principle and strengthening the centralized, unified leadership of the Party on external work; advancing major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics to fulfill the mission of realizing national rejuvenation; taking preserving world peace and pursuing common development as the purpose to promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind; enhancing strategic confidence with the socialism with Chinese characteristics as the support; forging ahead the Belt and Road construction in the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration; following the path of peaceful development on the basis of mutual respect and win-win cooperation; developing global partnerships while advancing diplomatic agenda; leading the reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice; taking national core interests as the bottom line to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests; and nurturing a distinctive style of Chinese diplomacy by combining the fine tradition of external work and the characteristics of times.2 The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in June 2018 established the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. In the light of our in-depth study and understanding of Xi Jinping’s important speeches, we have made the following preliminary summary of the theoretical and practical innovations in China’s diplomacy in the new era: to stand at the strategic height of balancing China’s overall domestic and international interests, with the ideal 2 “Xi Jinping Thought

on Diplomacy is a Fundamental Guideline for the Major-County Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”, People’s Daily, June 24, 2018, p. 1.

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of realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation as guidance; to take peaceful development as a strategic choice, adhere to the concept of peaceful development, innovate the idea of peaceful development and consolidate the foundation of peaceful development; to make shaping a new model of international relations a strategic goal and building a community with a shared future for mankind a world ideal; to adopt win-win cooperation as a strategic path and place equal importance on both development and security; to seek a breakthrough in new model of majorcountry relations based on stability; to reshape neighborhood relations by bearing in mind amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness; to innovate developing country relations by upholding the sound values of justice and benefit; and to promote multilateral cooperation by improving a global network of partnerships, participating actively in global governance and advocating the “Belt and Road Initiative”.

3.1 Theoretical System of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era Core elements of the system are as follows: First, balance China’s overall domestic and international interests from a strategic perspective. It is pointed out in the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC that “we must keep in mind both our internal and international imperatives”, which is actually a universal theoretical problem in world politics.3 By considering both domestic and international situations, China has been integrating itself into the international community since the reform and opening up over 40 years ago, and has actively answered the important proposition of “building socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It has gradually formed new ideas, thoughts and assertions about socialism with Chinese characteristics and established a relatively stable road pattern with a socialist market economy and socialist democratic politics developing simultaneously, and has successfully opened up a new socialist road to peaceful development. Under current circumstances, only by better balancing China’s overall domestic and international interests can we comprehensively understand and grasp the theoretical height of Xi Jinping’s new philosophy of governance, new ideas and strategies, and lay a solid foundation for building a theoretical system of diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. As Xi Jinping stressed, we should “enhance our strategic thinking and confidence, and better balance China’s overall domestic and international interests. We should pursue mutually beneficial development featuring openness and cooperation, develop China by securing a peaceful international environment and, at the same time, uphold and promote world peace through our own development. We should continuously improve China’s overall national strength, make sure that the people share the benefits of peaceful development, and consolidate the material and social

3 Pu

Xiaoyu, “Status Signals, Multiple Audiences and China’s Diplomacy Repositioning”, Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 25–38.

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foundations for pursuing peaceful development”.4 The CPC Central Committee will continue to adopt a holistic approach to both the domestic and international situations, consciously place diplomatic work in the overall context of the work of the Party and the State, and better balance domestic development and opening up to the outside world. In addition, the CPC Central Committee will link China’s development with that of the world, combine the interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples, safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and maintain world peace and promote common development. Second, take the ideal of realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation as guidance. The Chinese Dream is a condensation of the people’s beautiful pursuit, national development goals and the long-cherished aspiration for national revival. The Chinese Dream is about revitalizing the nation and bringing a happy life to its people, about peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation. It is consistent with the dreams of people around the world.5 Xi Jinping has illustrated the international implications of the Chinese Dream and thinks that “by growing stronger through development, China will bring about more opportunities, instead of threats, to the world. The Chinese Dream which we cherish deeply will not only serve the Chinese people but benefit the people throughout the world”.6 He also put forward the world ideal of the new era—a community with a shared future for mankind, stressing that China has entered a crucial stage in realizing the great renewal of the Chinese nation, and that under the new circumstances, diplomatic efforts should preserve and extend the important period of strategic opportunity for China’s development and provide strong guarantees for the realization of the Chinese dream. Third, take peaceful development as a strategic choice, adhere to the concept of peaceful development, innovate idea of peaceful development and consolidate the foundation of peaceful development. China is committed to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It has proposed that peaceful development is the world’s major theme, and put forward the path of peaceful development and the building of a harmonious world, reflecting its consistent pursuit of peace. As Xi Jinping clearly points out, China will stay firm in pursuing peaceful development and upholding world peace so that it can develop itself while safeguarding world peace; achieve development both by promoting reform and innovation on its own and opening up to the world and learning from other countries’ strengths; always take the fundamental interests of the country and the Chinese people as the starting point and ultimate goal of diplomatic work, and at the same time insist on combining the interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of people around the world, and never seek hegemonism nor engage in expansion. Xi Jinping further points out that China’s 4 Xi

Jinping, “Better Balance China’s Overall Domestic and International Interests, and Strengthen the Foundation for Pursuing Peaceful Development”, People’s Daily, January 30, 2013, p. 1. 5 Wang Yi, “Breaking New Ground Amidst Turbulent Storms”, People’s Daily, December 26, 2014, p. 17. 6 Xi Jinping, “Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Global Peace and Development—Speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations”, People’s Daily, March 24, 2013, p. 2.

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path of peaceful development is an organic unity of self-confidence in thought and practical consciousness, and it must move forward in a spirit of healthy interaction with all countries in the world and mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. China is pursuing peaceful development, and so are other countries. While pursuing peaceful development, we will never sacrifice our legitimate rights and interests or China’s core interests.7 These innovative ideas have deepened China’s understanding of the path of peaceful development, broadened the space for peaceful development in China, helped to advance the cause of peaceful development in the world, and opened up a new realm of strategic thinking on peaceful development. At the same time, China is aware of the shock that China’s rise has brought to the world. With the mindset that “when prosperous, one should contribute to the wellbeing of all”, China affirms its willingness to follow the path of peaceful development. It will adhere to the strategic thinking of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation; emphasize cooperation with all countries on the basis of convergence of interests; actively assume more international responsibilities within its capacity; and establish a community of shared interests, shared responsibility and shared future. As Xi Jinping said, “Whether we will succeed in our pursuit of peaceful development to a large extent hinges on whether we can turn opportunities in the rest of the world into China’s opportunities and China’s opportunities into those for the rest of the world so that China and other countries can engage in sound interactions and make mutually beneficial progress”.8 China’s new exploration for a peaceful development path has received close attention from the research community at home and abroad. In this regard, Zheng Bijian believes that the second decade of the twenty-first century will be an important period for China to further explain its path of peaceful development, and that the idea of “community” can gain more consensus internationally.9 Fourth, make a new model of international relations based on mutual respect, justice, fairness, and win-win cooperation a key goal. China will hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and benefit for all, and stick to the foreign policy of maintaining world peace and promoting common development. China remains firm in its commitment to strengthening friendship and cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and to forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.10 China is an active explorer in promoting the establishment of a new model of international relations, which can be named an important label for China’s foreign strategy. As early as the founding of the PRC, 7 Jinping

(2018). Yi, “Adhere to the Path of Peaceful Development and Foster a Favorable International Environment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 8–23. 9 Zheng Bijian, “China’s Path of Peaceful Development and Construction of a Community of Shared Interests”, Jiefang Daily, March 24, 2013, p. 7. 10 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, People’s Daily, October 28, 2017, p. 1. 8 Wang

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China was committed to seeking a new model of relations with various countries of the time (including socialist countries, capitalist countries, emerging nations), and the formulation and implementation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is an important result of this effort. Even during the Cold War era, when ideology was so prominent, China did not give up on the necessary efforts, and there was no shortage of explorations of a new model of major-country relationship between China and the United States, from confrontation to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the publication of the Shanghai Communiqué were important attempts to establish a new model of majorcountry relationship between China and the United States during the Cold War period, and at every critical moment since then, China and the United States have always found a way to transcend their differences and innovated in building a new model of major-country relationship.11 Since China’s reform and opening up, it has been China’s inevitable aspiration to integrate into the international community and shape a new model of international relations. The Non-Aligned Strategy and the independent foreign policy of peace established in 1982 is an important milestone. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has embarked on a journey of full integration into the international community and has actively explored with all major countries the new ways in which great powers can get along.12 As the path of peaceful development was established and the world keeps changing, it all comes down to the question of China’s relationship with the world.13 How to shape the future of the world in a cooperative and win-win manner while integrating into the international community has become an inevitable strategic demand of China. Just as Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it, “The development of international relations, and the forming of the international system, at each period, bears a unique mark of the time. We all need to move on and keep abreast of the times to make the international relations and international system of our times effective and relevant to the world we live in”.14 Chinese policy makers have inherited the theoretical accumulation and practical explorations from the predecessors, and have put into practice international ideas that meet the needs of the times and forge a global consensus, which is the need for China’s sustainable development and what the world expects of China. Since 2012, Chinese leaders have proposed and focused on the proposition of establishing a new model of major-country relationship between China and the United States, and have made in-depth preparations for the expansion of the idea of a new model of international relations. On March 23, 2013, during Xi Jinping’s 11 Men Honghua, “China’s View on the Mainstream Strategy of the United States”, International Review, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 69–82. 12 Yang Jiechi, “Great Innovation and Fruitful Achievements: Review and Prospects of China’s Diplomatic Work in the Past Ten Years”, Qiushi, Issue 20, 2012, pp. 20–22. 13 Yuan Peng, “Thinking about the Great Era and the Grand Strategy—On the Ten Relationships Needed by China’s Diplomacy in the New Era”, Contemporary World and Socialism, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 11–15. 14 Wang Yi, “Toward a New Type of International Relations of Win-Win Cooperation”, International Studies, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 1–7.

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visit to Russia, he elaborated on the idea of promoting a new model of international relations featuring cooperation and mutual benefit and pointed out, “In the face of the profoundly changed international landscape and the objective need for the world to rally together like passengers in the same boat, all countries should join hands in building a new model of international relations featuring cooperation and mutual benefit”. He also proposed the sharing of dignity, fruits of development and security by all countries and peoples.15 In late November 2014, Xi spoke at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, “We should continue to pursue win-win cooperation, promote a new model of international relations based on such cooperation, follow the mutually beneficial strategy of opening up and adopt the win-win approach to our external relations in the political, economic, security, cultural and other fields”.16 Since then, Chinese policy makers have clearly taken it as a guiding principle of China’s diplomatic thinking in the new period to promote the establishment of a new model of international relations with cooperation and mutual benefit at the core. At the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly held on September 28, 2015, Xi Jinping made a speech entitled “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”, in which he detailed the goals of a new model of international relations: to build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in extensive consultation, and enhance mutual understanding; to create a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint efforts, and shared interests; to promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all; to increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences; to build an ecosystem that puts Mother Nature and green development first.17 The foundation of the new model of international relations is China’s adherence to the path of peaceful development, its commitment to becoming a new type of great power and its pursuit of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics; its core is win-win cooperation, that is, to achieve a win-win situation through cooperation, build a community of shared future for mankind and work together for a better world; its essence is to follow the world trend, reject the zero-sum game mentality, avoid unilateral hegemony, promote the realization of national goals through a constructive path of openness and tolerance, and promote the optimization of international relations through a constructive approach of coordinated cooperation. On October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping proposed in the report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China “forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation”. 15 Xi Jinping, “Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Global Peace and Development”, People’s

Daily, March 24, 2013, p. 1. 16 “Xi Jinping Calls for Standing Firmly for Peace, Development, Cooperation and Win-Win Outcomes at an Important Address at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs”, People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), December 1, 2014, p. 1. 17 Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind—Statement at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly”, People’s Daily, September 29, 2015, p. 1.

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A new model of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation, originates from China’s ideological and cultural traditions and is a contemporary promotion of the Chinese ideology of peace and harmony. In today’s world, every country with a long intellectual and cultural tradition contributes to and shares the common intellectual heritage of humankind.18 A country’s theory of thought on international relations is inherently of the nature of ultimate concern for all humanity, but it is rooted in the history, culture and way of thinking of that country, with all the characteristics of its own culture. China’s spiritual and strategic thinking has been nurtured by thousands of years of Chinese intellectual and cultural traditions. In philosophical terms, the idea of “the unity of heaven and man” constitutes the spiritual core of traditional Chinese thinking on international relations, shaping the essential characteristic of inclusiveness in traditional Chinese thinking on international relations. On this basis, China formed political ideologies such as “benevolent rule” and “golden mean” and a diplomatic philosophy centered on “harmony”,19 which shows the thinking on international relations characterized by “seeking harmony without uniformity”. In terms of political philosophy, traditional Chinese culture pursues the ideal of “universal harmony”. This ideal, which advocates the political law of “dwelling in the wide house of the world, standing in the correct seat of the world, and walking in the great path of the world,”20 and emphasizes the political aspiration that “helping all the people around the world is not wrong”,21 has shaped China’s traditional thinking of openness and tolerance in international relations, reflecting the Chinese people’s ultimate concern for world order and human well-being. The concepts of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity, which are emphasized in traditional Chinese culture, can accordingly provide norms for the conduct of the state.22 With regard to the concept of interests, traditional Chinese culture emphasizes the concept of “caring about the whole society”, which reflects the plain concept of common interests. The “equality and mutual benefit” in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the openingup strategy aiming to achieve “mutual benefit and win-win results”, and the recent concept of upholding the sound values of justice and benefit all reflect the importance of common interests in the ideology and theory of China’s international relations. As for security philosophy, China’s traditional ideology and culture emphasize “peace for all” and “harmony for all”, and do not emphasize conquest by force, but rather the role of morality and cultural inspiration. Confucius said, “If remoter people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so”.23 Lao-zi also said, “Those sharp weapons are instruments of 18 Sun Xiaochun, “The China’s Traditional Political Thought in the Perspective of Comparison”, Study & Exploration, Issue 10, 2013, pp. 53–58. 19 Xi (2013). 20 Mencius: Duke Wen of Teng. 21 Mencius: King Hui of Liang. 22 Yu Zhengliang, “The Fine Traditional Chinese Culture and New International Political Order”, Study & Exploration, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 73–76. 23 Analects: Chief of the Ji Clan.

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evil omen, and not the instruments of the superior man;—he uses them only on the compulsion of necessity. Calm and repose are what he prizes”.24 Although China has maintained a central position of superiority over its neighbors for thousands of years, it has never emphasized conquest by force. In terms of strategic culture, traditional Chinese culture pursues the realm of “victory without war”, and unity, stability and peace have always been the main themes of traditional Chinese strategic culture.25 Strategy is underpinned by and rooted in ideology and culture, while moralism is an important character of traditional Chinese strategic culture. China’s traditional thinking and culture are vast and profound, and the above summary is quite superficial, but it demonstrates China’s ideological and cultural orientation with “peace and harmony” as the core value, that is, the emphasis on the essence of “harmony generating vitality”, abiding by the value of “preserving harmony”, emphasizing that “a just cause enjoys abundant support”, and pursuing the realm of “seeking harmony without uniformity” and “harmony for all nations”. A new model of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation gives expression to the vision of peace and harmony, and emphasizes that “it is natural for things to be different”.26 It carries a generous attitude that “the more that he expends for others, the more does he possess of his own; the more that he gives to others, the more does he have himself”. It sticks to the sound values of justice and benefit and follows the path of win-win cooperation. It seeks to build a community of shared interests, responsibility and future and shoulder more international responsibilities and duties.27 It is an active promotion of traditional Chinese thought and culture in a modern era. On the other hand, a new model of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation is an innovation for traditional theories of international relations, which is a distillation of China’s rich diplomatic practices and points out a new path of state relations.28 At a time when the world is in transition and China is on the rise, China’s leaders advocate the establishment of a new model of international relations, representing China’s ideals and aspirations for the world in the future, as well as China’s sense of responsibility. This has important theoretical significance and practical value. Shaping a new model of state relations is the key demand and core path of the theoretical system of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, and represents a new level of China’s understanding of its interaction with the world. Building a new model of international relations includes the following aspects that deserve further exploration and analysis.

24 Tao

Te Ching: Chapter Thirty-One. Honghua, “China’s Strategic Culture: A Research Program”, in Teaching and Research, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 57–63. 26 Mencius: Duke Wen of Teng said, “It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality.”. 27 Yang Jiemian, “Exploration and Innovation of Theories, Strategies and Practices in China’s Diplomacy in the New Period”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 17–28. 28 Wang Yi, “Breaking New Ground Amidst Turbulent Storms”, People’s Daily, December 26, 2014, p. 17. 25 Men

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First, take a community of shared future for mankind as a world ideal. An ideal can innovate norms, guide directions, and shape behavior. As a beacon, it is particularly valuable at a time of world transformation. China has always had a world ideal, which is unceasing, with the concept of “harmonious world” in the history and the innovative idea of “a community of shared future for mankind” right now. The white paper on China’s Peaceful Development, published in 2011, was the earliest document to point out that the world has turned into “a community of common destiny in which the members are closely interconnected”. The report delivered at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasizes that mankind has only one earth to live on, and countries have only one world to share and that we must advocate a community of shared future. During his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, Xi Jinping said, “It is a world where countries are linked with and dependent on one another at a level never seen before. Mankind, by living in the same global village in the same era where history and reality meet, has increasingly emerged as a community of common destiny in which everyone has in himself a little bit of others”. At the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2015, under the theme of “Asia’s New Future: Towards a Community of Common Destiny”, Xi Jinping delivered a speech entitled “Towards a Community of Common Destiny and a New Future for Asia”, explaining the four major connotations of a community of shared destiny: mutual respect and equality among nations; win-win cooperation and common development; achieving common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; and inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations. On July 1, 2016, in his speech at the at the ceremony marking the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Xi pointed out that today’s mankind is better qualified than ever before to achieve the goal of peace and development together. In the interest of peace, we need to foster a keen sense of a global community of shared future.29 On September 28, 2015, Xi Jinping attended the general debate of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly and delivered a speech in which he proposed the path of building a community of shared future for mankind: to build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation and show mutual understanding; to create a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits; to promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all; to increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences; and to build an ecological system that puts Mother Nature and green development first.30 On January 18, 2017, at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech entitled “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind” at the high-level meeting on the theme of “Jointly Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation”. He advocated the joint promotion of the great process of building a community of shared future for mankind that is based 29 Jinping

(2017). Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind—Statement at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly”, People’s Daily, September 29, 2015, p. 2. 30 Xi

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on dialogue and consultation, joint efforts and shared benefits, win-win cooperation, exchanges and mutual understanding, as well as green and low-carbon development, so as to build a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness, cleanness and beauty.31 The report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China also mentioned the goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind is to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.32 The major principles and paths are as follows: respect each other, discuss issues as equals, resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics, and take a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication, not confrontation, and with partnership, not alliance; commit to settling disputes through dialogue and resolving differences through discussion, coordinate responses to traditional and non-traditional threats, and oppose terrorism in all its forms; stick together through thick and thin, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all; respect the diversity of civilizations and replace estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence in handling relations among civilizations; be good friends to the environment, cooperate to tackle climate change, and protect our planet for the sake of human survival. Building a community of shared future for mankind is the forward-looking thinking of the CPC Central Committee on the basis of its insight into the international situation and the general trend of the evolution of the world pattern, and is in line with and complementary to the idea of building a new model of international relations.33 The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has made the top-level design for China’s diplomacy in the new era, focusing on promoting the establishment of a new model of international relations and the building of a community of shared future for mankind. Xi Jinping’s profound exposition of the community of shared future for mankind demonstrates both the progressive path and development vision of the major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics as well as its depth of thought and future aspirations on the philosophical dimension. Furthermore, in contrast to the old concept of traditional international relations, which is self-interest-centered, the sense of community of shared future for mankind is a conceptual breakthrough and innovation in human understanding of the world, and advocates a new concept to create a better future for humanity and to meet

31 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote Speech at the High-Level Meeting of ‘Jointly Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation’”, People’s Daily, January 19, 2017, p. 3. 32 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, People’s Daily, October 28, 2017, p. 1. 33 Wang Yi, “2015: A Year of Flying Colors for Pursuing Major-Country Diplomacy with Distinctive Chinese Features”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 1–8.

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common challenges.34 Linking China’s development with that of the world is the key to integrating both domestic and international situations, and is also an important guarantee for the implementation of the five major development concepts; the “community of shared future for mankind” is precisely an extension of the domestic development concept at the international level. This concept, as soon as it was put forward, has elicited significant feedback in the world and is regarded as China’s most important international strategic concept after Mao Zedong’s “Three Worlds Theory”. This idea is based on the fact that the fates of the peoples of the world have never been more intertwined than they are today.35 The idea of a community of shared future for mankind embodies the innovation of China’s theory of international cooperation, and building a community of shared future requires our commitment to establish a new model of international relations, upholding the sound values of justice and benefit, and ushering in the new era of diplomacy in which “common interests”, “mutual benefit and win-win cooperation” and “responsibility of great powers” are at the core.36 Second, seek breakthroughs in building a framework for major country relations featuring overall stability and balanced development. Major countries are the main actors in international relations, which to a considerable extent determine the direction of the international system. China’s advocacy of a new model of majorcountry relations is another shock to Western dominance by non-Western countries, contributing to the formation of a new discourse system.37 China strives to establish a new type of relations of long-term stability and sound growth with other major countries. It is committed to transforming the international system in a peaceful way by enhancing mutual trust, focusing on the common ground and putting aside differences, avoiding conflicts and doing win-win cooperation. China works to transcend the historical destiny of conflict between the emerging powers and the established powers, to avoid and overcome the negative factors of mutual mistrust, hostility, exclusion in the old relations among major powers, to enhance mutual trust and respect, to pursue win-win cooperation, to establish a new model of win-win cooperation, to improve risk management mechanisms and to bring positive energy to the development of international relations. Third, adhere to the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness and the policy of forging friendship and partnership with neighbors to reshape relations with neighboring countries. China realizes the significance of developing relations with neighboring countries and is committed to building friendship and partnership with its neighbors and fostering an amicable, secure 34 Wang Gonglong and Han Xu, “On the Four Dimensions of the Thought of Human Community with a Common Future”, The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 96–104. 35 Xu Bu, “From the Theory of America’s Decline to the Theory of China’s Free Riding”, World Affairs, Issue 18, 2014, pp. 19–21. 36 Men Honghua, “Building a New Type of International Relations: China’s Responsibility and Undertakings”, World Economics and Politics, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 4–25. 37 Yang Jiemian, “A New Type of Great Power Relationship: Constructing Theory, Strategy and Policy”, in International Studies, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 9–19.

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and prosperous neighborhood environment.38 Amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness, which can be called the “Proverb of Four Words” to reshape China’s relations with neighboring countries, are an innovative overview of the theory and practice of China’s neighborhood diplomacy and reflect the new development of the CPC Central Committee’s diplomatic philosophy. Chinese decision-makers have laid down a grand blueprint for further expanding diplomacy in the neighborhood, proposing major initiatives such as the upgrading of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the development of the “Belt and Road Initiative” to enhance strategic cooperation with neighboring countries. The “Belt and Road Initiative” is committed to building a new type of international relations from the regional and peripheral perspectives, while the “Belt” focuses on speeding up the implementation of the westward strategy and the “Road” focuses on the construction of maritime powers, both of which constitute China’s first moves in opening up its new layout to the outside world. It embodies China’s strategic intention to take the initiative and leadership in promoting economic cooperation among neighboring countries and to build a community of shared interests, future and responsibility for mutual political trust, economic integration and cultural tolerance. The core concept of the “Belt and Road Initiative” is to strengthen economic and trade cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and South-East Asia, enhance interconnection and communication, draw on each other’s strengths, develop together for common benefit, and lay a more solid foundation for the consolidation of China’s strategic reliance zone. According to the report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening-up and pursues development with its doors open wide and actively promotes international cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for international cooperation to create new drivers of shared development.39 Fourth, develop innovative policies in building relations with developing countries based on sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith as well as the sound values of justice and benefit. China’s rise and the world’s deep transformation are advancing in parallel, propelling the dawn of the new era. China has emerged from the “one superpower, many great powers” landscape to become the central force driving world change and the focus of world attention. China is thinking about how to deal with international relations and the world is watching. In an era of uncertainty, the world looks to China to be the anchor of world stability and the front-runner of development, to benefit from China’s development and to share development and prosperity with China. Upholding the sound values of justice and benefit is China’s answer and a positive response to the world’s observations and 38 Jinping

(2018). Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, People’s Daily, October 28, 2017, p. 1. 39 Xi

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expectations. It is derived from Chinese cultural traditions and based on the process of interaction between China’s rise and the world’s transformation, embodies the values and strategic directions of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. It is an important expression of China’s new thinking in handling its relations with the world, as well as a clear answer to such important questions as “What kind of power is China” and “How should China handle its relations with the outside world”.40 How to deal with developing countries is a core element of the global strategy of a major power and a touchstone for its values of justice and benefit. In retrospect, the strong will of a rising power toward hegemony is regarded as the natural logic of international politics; colonialism and hegemony are rarely used in a pejorative sense in Western culture; power politics and having spheres of influence are rampant; political slavery, economic plunder and cultural infiltration are even more common strategic methods; the competition for interests by Western powers has affected the so-called “marginal areas” and developing countries; most of the wars in the Cold War period were fought on the territory of developing countries, which illustrates the interests and value orientation of the dominant and hegemonic powers at the time. China sticks to the sound values of justice and benefit, placing “friendship and justice” at the core of its thinking and addressing problems based on morality, fairness and justice. China believes that seeking benefit must be based on justice. That means putting justice before gaining benefit, gaining benefit legally, and striking a balance between benefit and justice because only by doing so can we achieve mutual benefit. The sound values of justice and benefit do not recognize the law of the jungle, reject hegemonism, oppose bullying the less powerful and advantaged, and emphasize mutual respect, win-win cooperation and common development. This contrasts sharply with the ideas—“interest first” and “we have no eternal allies but eternal and perpetual interests” that are expected in Western international relations. At present, interests of all countries are more closely intertwined than ever before, and various global issues are becoming more and more prominent. As China is the second largest economy that is rising rapidly, its diplomatic philosophy of justice and benefit is of global concern. As Xi Jinping pointed out, “justice” refers to a philosophy of communism and socialism that we uphold to wish for common development of the world, and accelerated development in developing countries; “benefit” means sticking to the principle of seeking mutual benefit and win-win result, rather than taking a zero-sum approach. We have an obligation to provide assistance to poor countries within our own capacity. Sometimes we even give priority to “justice” over “benefit” and sacrifice the latter for the former. As for neighboring and developing countries, it is only by adhering to the sound values of justice and benefit that we can do our work well and receive positive feedback from the other people. Politically, we must uphold justice and fairness; economically, we must pursue mutual benefit and common development, and give more consideration to the interests of neighboring and developing countries that have been friendly to our country for a long time but 40 Qin Yaqing, “The Correct Outlook on Justice and Gain: A New Principle in China’s Diplomacy”, Qiushi, Issue 12, 2014, pp. 55–57.

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have a difficult time in their own development. And when we work with them, we must give more and take less and never feather one’s nest at the expense of others or beggar neighbors.41 The sound values of justice and benefit are oriented towards common development, shared development and win-win results, highlighting the responsibility and obligation of a major power. This expression of responsibility and obligation is based on China’s stage of development and special status, with developing countries and neighboring regions as the focus and an extension of shared responsibility with other major countries. At present, China’s characteristics of underdevelopment and development coexist, with the scope of underdevelopment shrinking and the scope of development expanding; China is a major developing country and is becoming a major power; the main contradiction and characteristic of today’s world pattern is the interaction between developed and developing countries, while China is in the middle of a combination of the two, which can be described as a bridge between developed and developing countries; this stage of development and special status are the core elements that influence China’s strategic orientation. Because of that, China’s relations with the world primarily focus on relations with neighboring countries and developing nations. As we uphold the sound values of justice and benefit, we have an obligation to provide assistance to poor countries within our capacity, sometimes even giving priority to “justice” over “benefit” and sacrificing the latter for the former. Only by adhering to the sound values of justice and benefit can we do our work well and receive positive feedback from neighboring and developing countries. Politically, we must uphold justice and fairness; economically, we must pursue mutual benefit and common development, and give more consideration to the interests of neighboring and developing countries that have been friendly to our country for a long time but have a difficult time in their own development. And when we work with them, we must give more and take less and never feather one’s nest at the expense of others or beggar neighbors. We must also prepare to just give and take nothing. The sound values of justice and benefit embody the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation and the value orientation of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, further enriching and developing China’s diplomatic philosophy and becoming a unique symbol of China’s soft power. On the other hand, the proposal of sound values of justice and benefit signifies that China has linked its own development with that of the world, combined the interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of peoples around the world, and combined the Chinese dream with the world dream, providing the ideological basis for building a more just and reasonable world order.42 This reflects the strategic planning of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core for China’s future international status and role, meaning that China will never be a “hitchhiker” in the international system, but rather, in 41 Yang Jiechi, “Endeavor to Open a New Horizon of Chinese Diplomacy in the Complicated International Situation”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 1–7. 42 Qin Yaqing, “The Correct Outlook on Justice and Gain: A New Principle in China’s Diplomacy”, Qiushi, Issue 12, 2014, pp. 55–57.

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the interest of world peace and development, will participate in international affairs in a more active manner, persist in being a practitioner of peaceful development, a promoter of common development, a defender of the multilateral trading system and a participant in global economic governance, and play a greater role in promoting the cause of human progress.43 The sound values of justice and benefit are an important grip for China to shape a new model of international relations, embodying the strategic aspiration of win-winism. As China rises in a comprehensive way, its core approach to relations with the world has been to promote the establishment of a new model of international relations with win-win cooperation as the core, to adhere to a mutually beneficial strategy of opening-up, and to infuse the idea of win-win cooperation into all aspects of foreign cooperation. China holds a major-country mindset that “The more he assists others, the more he has; the more he gives to others, the more he gains”, emphasizes the strategic aspiration of “providing assistance to the world in every way”, seeks to build a community of shared interests, shared responsibility and shared future with all countries in the world, and expresses its commitment to assume more international responsibilities and obligations. The sound values of justice and benefit aim to replace confrontation with cooperation and win-win results with monopoly, and advocate that each country should take into account the legitimate concerns of others in pursuing its own interests, promote common development among countries in the pursuit of its own development and promote the establishment of a new, more equitable and balanced development partnership. On this basis, China’s diplomacy embarks on a new journey to innovate international relations. The Belt and Road Initiative has set sail and China’s relations with the world have further developed positively. The world’s expectations of China are being fulfilled, and China’s vision for the world is being realized. Fifth, develop state-to-state relations with communication, not confrontation, and with partnership, not alliance, in an effort to forge a global network of partnerships. As an old Chinese saying goes, “Nothing, not even mountains and seas, can separate people with common goals and ideals.” China is committed to expanding its circle of friends around the world, and building a global network of partnerships is an important manifestation and foundation of China’s goal of establishing a new model of international relations.44 Since the establishment of China’s strategic partnership with Brazil in 1993, China has been optimizing its partnership strategy, and to date it has established various forms of partnerships with more than 100 countries and international organizations, covering major powers, neighboring and developing countries and achieving positive results at the global, regional, bilateral and national levels. China’s partnership strategy is strategically based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 43 Wang Yi, “Upholding the Sound Values of Justice and Benefit and Actively Playing the Role of a Responsible Great Nation”, People’s Daily, September 10, 2013, p. 7. 44 At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held on November 28, 2014, Xi Jinping pointed out: “We should make more friends while abiding by the principle of nonalignment and build a global network of partnerships.” See “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1.

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Coexistence, with safeguarding national interests and expanding international influence as its strategic direction. Political mutual trust, economic interdependence, cultural integration, social interaction and security support serve as strategic means to drive the expansion of the country’s global strategy through the improvement of bilateral relations. Taking the realization of common interests as its benchmark, the promotion of mutual benefit and win-win results as its goal, and international cooperation as its path, the partnership strategy represents China’s peaceful, cooperative and win-win development path. Its most intuitive global significance lies in providing a strategic framework for communication and cooperation, thus providing a model for a new type of international relations. As a bilateral and global strategic deployment, China’s partnership strategy has a role to play in maintaining international strategic balance, promoting world peace and development, democratizing international relations and promoting multi-polarization in the world. The global network of partnerships is an example of interaction between big countries and between big countries and small countries, and the development of such a new type of win-win or even multi-win international relations will have far-reaching implications for world politics and international order.45 Sixth, follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in engaging in global governance, take an active part in reforming and developing the global economic governance system, and keep contributing Chinese strength to global governance. Improving the global economic governance system and mechanism is an important area where China can actively take responsibility and demonstrate leadership. In coping with the global financial crisis and the European and American debt crises in recent years, China has worked together with the international community to promote the reform of the global economic governance mechanism, resolutely helped Europe deal with the sovereign debt crisis, and been invited to increase its financial contribution to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international organizations to promote the development of the global governance system and mechanism in a more just and reasonable direction. China’s peaceful development path requires the necessary international institutions to guarantee it, and improving the international institutions to ensure peaceful development is an important value in China’s diplomatic pursuit, which is demonstrated in its contribution to the G20. The implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative also reflects the efforts made by China to make international economic relationships more institution-based. Xi Jinping pointed out that global economic governance should be based on equality and better reflect the new realities of the world economic landscape, increase the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries and ensure that all countries have equal rights, opportunities and rules to follow in international economic cooperation. Global economic governance should embrace openness. It should be based on open concepts, open policies and open mechanisms so as to adapt to the changing situation. It should be open to constructive suggestions and the recommendations and aspirations of different quarters of society. It should 45 Men Honghua and Liu Xiaoyang, “Partnership Strategy of China: Progress, Evaluation and Prospects”, World Economics and Politics, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 65–95.

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encourage active participation and integration of various parties, reject exclusive arrangements and avoid closed governance mechanisms and fragmentation of rules. Global economic governance should be driven by cooperation, as global challenges require global responses, and cooperation is the necessary choice. Countries need to step up communication and coordination, accommodate each other’s interests and concerns, and work together to discuss the rules, build mechanisms and meet challenges. Global economic governance should be a mechanism of sharing. It should be about participation by all and benefits for all. Instead of seeking dominance or winnertakes-all results, it should encourage the sharing of interests and win-win prospects. In particular, global economic governance should focus on the following: jointly ensure equitable and efficient global financial governance and uphold the overall stability of the world economy; jointly foster open and transparent global trade and investment governance to cement the multilateral trading regime and unleash the potential of global cooperation in economy, trade and investment; jointly establish green and low-carbon global energy governance to promote global green development cooperation; and jointly facilitate an inclusive and interconnected global development governance to implement the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and jointly advance the well-being of mankind.46 Seventh, focus on both development and security, propose a holistic view of national security, advocate an international security view that is shared by all, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable so that the establishment of a new model of international relations could be secured. The National Security Commission was set up to improve the national security system and national security strategy. The National Security Commission is committed to researching major strategic issues related to national security, such as territory, territorial waters, diplomacy, military, resources, economy and people’s livelihood, formulating relevant major strategic decisions, overseeing the implementation of national security strategies, and responding efficiently to domestic and international emergencies. Xi Jinping called for innovative security concepts, a new structure for regional security and cooperation, and joint efforts to build a path for Asia’s security that is shared by and mutually beneficial to all, which reflect the international application of China’s holistic approach to national security and the innovation China made in the field of international security when building a new model of international relations. As it was emphasized in the report at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, “We must pursue a holistic approach to national security. We must put national interests first, take protecting our people’s security as our mission and safeguarding political security as a fundamental task, and ensure both internal and external security,

46 Xi Jinping, “A New Starting Point for China’s Development, A New Blueprint for Global Growth—Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit”, People’s Daily, September 4, 2016, p. 1.

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homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China’s own and common security. We will improve our systems and institutions and enhance capacity-building for national security, and resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests.”47

3.2 Practices of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era In light of tremendous changes unprecedented in a hundred years, China makes active exploration for a strategic transformation.48 As Wang Yi mentioned, “One of the most distinctive features of Chinese diplomacy over the past few years has been its proactive and enterprising approach … to participate in international affairs in a more active manner, to propose China’s solutions for maintaining world peace and promoting common development, and to contribute China’s wisdom and strength to the world”.49 In practice, China has improved its diplomatic planning and layout, highlighted the priorities of diplomatic work, achieved many results, exerted its efforts with precision, and delivered a positive impact comprehensively.50 As a result, a richer and more varied picture is taking shape. First, develop the economy by opening up further in an effort to improve both overall strength and international influence. Opening up is the only way to achieve peaceful development. China remains committed to the mutually beneficial strategy of opening up and takes measures to significantly ease market access and build an open economy. As Xi Jinping said, “We will open up new areas and enable deeper access”.51 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform passed in the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee stresses that we should conduct a new round of high-level and all-around opening-up to the outside world, and foster new advantages in participating and leading international economic cooperation. The outline of the Thirteenth Five-year Plan puts forward specific work arrangements, namely, improving the strategic layout of opening up to the outside world, improving the new system of opening up to the outside world, advancing 47 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, People’s Daily, October 28, 2017, p. 1. 48 Zhu Feng and Wu Haibao, “The Two Transformations of China’s Diplomacy and Their Internal Logic over the 40 Years of Reform and Opening-Up”, Theory and Review, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 31–42. 49 “New Achievements and Experiences in China’s Diplomacy since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, Dang Jian Yan Jiu, Issue 6, 2017, pp. 23–26. 50 Xi Jinping, “Adhere to the Guidance of the Thought on Diplomacy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and Strive to Break New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics”, People’s Daily, June 24, 2018, p. 1. 51 Xi Jinping, “China’s Economy Maintains Sustained and Healthy Development and China Will Improve the Openness of Economy”, People’s Daily, April 9, 2013, p. 1.

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the “Belt and Road Initiative”, actively participating in global economic governance and actively assuming international responsibilities and obligations in five key areas. China is committed to upholding the multilateral trading system and has taken the initiative to shoulder the historic responsibility of promoting globalization and development as a major power. China vigorously improves its investment layout, actively introduces foreign capital and advanced technology, supports enterprises to increase investment abroad, promotes the export of equipment, technology, standards and services, and enhances China’s position in the global value chain. And in doing so “China’s opening up could reach a better balance between bringing in and going global.”52 China will open up further to the outside world, significantly ease market access and create a more attractive investment environment. China will also better protect intellectual property and increase imports. We hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea, and by promoting balanced development among regions. We will improve the balance in opening our different regions with the Belt and Road Initiative as the guide and coordination with national strategies such as the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze Economic Belt, and the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area so as to promote balanced regional development. Moreover, China will establish and develop free trade experimental zones, explore the construction of free trade ports, accumulate development and innovation experience for an open world economy, and provide a testing ground that brings together the common interests of all parties.53 Second, develop major-power relations that are dynamically stable and balanced. The second decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed dramatic changes in relations among the major powers, from “passengers in the same boat” to “pushing each other out the same boat”, and that has given China the opportunity to significantly adjust its relations with other major powers. First of all, maintaining stable development of China-Russia relation is an important condition for China to cope with changes in major power relations. In the face of many changes, such as the changing attitudes of the US, Brexit, the Syrian crisis, and trade protectionism, the strategic collaboration between China and Russia has always been maintained. It has been functioning at a high level, with the two maintaining close communication on major international and regional issues, advancing relations between the two countries to a deeper level and gradually expanding the scope of cooperation. In June 2019, China and Russia announced the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era. The two sides will closely coordinate with each other in aligning their development strategies, promote the deep integration of development interests, and strive to meet the wishes and needs of the two peoples. Secondly, China has remained calm in dealing with the differences between China 52 Xi

Jinping, “Speech at a Study Session on Implementing the Decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Attended by Officials at the Provincial/Ministerial Level”, People’s Daily, May 10, 2016, p. 3. 53 Pei Changhong and Liu Hongkui, “An Economic Analysis of Xi Jinping Thought on Opening up for a New Era”, Economic Research Journal, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 4–19.

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and the United States and prevented their competition and conflict from causing global shocks. China-US relations are teetering on the edge of the “Thucydides Trap”. Given the strategic competition that has developed between the two countries, how to appropriately manage differences, strengthen crisis management and prevent risks in one area from spreading over to the relationship as a whole has become particularly crucial. Sino-American diplomacy has gone through several ups and downs, and has continued to explore the development of a new model of major country relations. Although there is a search for a new model of major country relations centered on “coordination, cooperation, and stability”, the serious differences between the two sides on many issues cannot be hidden. The key to U.S.-China relations is to strengthen the sense of strategic management and to coordinate high-level exchanges at the macro level, cooperation in functional areas at the meso level and crisis management at the micro level; at the same time, it is necessary to strengthen the management of major differences and prevent the escalation of conflicts from leading to security dilemmas. Thirdly, in its relations with Europe, China is actively promoting “diplomacy of treating no countries as enemies” and the balanced development of its relations with major European countries. At present, Sino-European relations have undergone structural changes, with accelerated changes in the balance of power, greater changes in policy orientation and increased influence from the international environment. It has greatly influenced the policy objectives and practices of both sides and has strongly shaped the structure of China-EU relations.54 China is actively promoting the overall development of China-EU relations and is committed to building China-EU partnership of peace, growth, reform and civilization so as to improve the pattern of relationship in all directions, at all levels and in a wide range. At the same time, China’s relations with major European countries have achieved new development. China and the United Kingdom have worked together to overcome the difficulties caused by the Dalai Lama’s inappropriate visit, and have defined a global comprehensive strategic partnership for the twenty-first century, thus entering a “golden time” in their ties. The UK became the first Western power to apply for membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the first developed country to issue sovereign RMB bond and establish China’s first RMB clearing center outside Asia. China-Germany relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2010 and to an all-round strategic partnership in 2014, with China and Germany leading the ways of cooperation in EU. In 2019, Italy became the first Western power to sign a memorandum of understanding with China to join the “Belt and Road Initiative”, with positive European and even global effects. Fourth, China-Japan relationship entered the phase of “strong powers meeting each other”.55 China has steadily responded to the strategic challenges from Japan, promoted the establishment of a bottom line in the relations between the two countries, pushed 54 Cui Hongjian, “Structural Changes and Prospects of China-EU Relations”, International Studies,

Issue 1, 2018, pp. 41–59. 55 Bao Xiaqin and Huang Bei, “Japan’s Hedging Strategy in the South China Sea and Its Evaluation:

From the Perspective of Abe Administration’s Policy towards China”, Japanese Studies, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 42–63.

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Sino-Japanese relations to stabilize and gradually return to a rational and pragmatic path of development. It has opened the new era in which competition gives way to coordination, and made preparations for dealing with the comprehensive strategic competition against the United States. Fifth, we should ensure the stable development of China-India relations and consider the overall situation of multilateral cooperation between major developing countries in promoting common development. The parallel rise of China and India has had a significant impact on bilateral relations and on the global landscape. Both countries are striving to avoid the pitfalls of a rivalry, stabilize the overall direction of their development-oriented partnership through frequent visits of their leaders to each other, properly manage differences and pursue common development. In view of the close interactions between the abovementioned major powers, China is committed to gradually building a system that focuses on addressing the realities of China-US strategic competition and the risks of strategic confrontation in order to maintain the dynamic stability of the global strategic landscape. Third, build a regional foundation for China’s rise by developing more stable and deeper relations with neighboring countries. China attaches great importance to its neighbors and “has always been a leader in regional cooperation and a guardian of regional peace and development.”56 In 2009, the “China Threat” emerged, and so did the noise of China’s “assertive policy”. The U.S. announced that it would join the TPP negotiations and implement a strategic shift to the East, which added complication of the situation in East Asia. At the same time, Japan is turning to “the right”, and the regional competition between China and Japan is intensifying. Southeast Asia and other areas around China are in turmoil, and territorial and maritime disputes are increasing in East Asia. China’s neighboring security environment has borne the brunt of complex and serious challenges rarely seen in many years. China has been aware that only by stabilizing South-East Asia and its surroundings can it consolidate regional support for its comprehensive rise. In October 2013, the convening of the Central Committee’s symposium on neighborhood diplomacy introduced a motto of “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness”, which marked the beginning of the new era for China’s neighborhood diplomacy. With the new adjustment in strategy, Xi Jinping has made it clear that he will be more energetic in pushing forward neighborhood diplomacy to secure a sound surrounding environment. The previously proposed Belt and Road Initiative is an important tool for promoting regional cooperation. China attaches great importance to the value of Southeast Asia and the demonstration effect of China-ASEAN cooperation in the development of regional cooperation and peripheral relations in East Asia. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have visited ASEAN countries for many times, promoting the stable development of China and ASEAN through summit diplomacy and other forms of diplomacy, and pushing for the formation of a strategic partnership in all directions, at all levels and in a wide range.57 The successful advancement of China-ASEAN relations has 56 Wang Yi, “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era: Opening up New Horizons with a New Outlook”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 1–13. 57 “Li Keqiang Attends the 21st China-ASEAN Summit”, People’s Daily, November 15, 2018, p. 3.

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a good demonstration effect on the development of East Asian integration. China has proposed working with ASEAN to build a China-ASEAN community of shared destiny and has established the “ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030”. In addition, the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund has been established to work with ASEAN countries to build the twenty-first century “Maritime Silk Road” and to create a better version of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the BangladeshChina-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, promoting ASEAN countries’ participation in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by steering the direction of regional arrangements. In this way, it could help ASEAN countries adapt to China’s rise, ease ASEAN’s doubts, align common interests, and turn China-ASEAN relations into a strong foundation for regional peace and stability.58 At the same time, China has actively responded to the two East Asian “powder kegs”: the South China Sea and North Korean nuclear issues. China has de-escalated the situation in the wake of the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling and improved China-Philippines relations, actively deepened inter-party exchanges and strategic coordination with Viet Nam, and initially stabilized the situation in the South China Sea. Relations between China and the DPRK have warmed up strongly, in which the leaders of the two countries have exchanged close visits, and China’s constructive role in the Korean peninsula is highly valued by all sides. These developments demonstrate that, at a time when the strategic competition between China and the United States is deepening, China’s neighborhood strategy is based on the principle of openness and inclusiveness and oriented towards cooperation and development. Fourth, deepen institutional cooperation with developing countries and establish new cooperation mechanisms. Developing countries take a fundamental position in China’s strategic layout. China’s new position as a bridge between the developing world and the developed countries by upholding the sound values of justice and benefit is undoubtedly a new way to innovate relations among developing countries. China’s diplomatic practice has been innovative, and institutionalized cooperation has become an important direction for China to deepen its relations with developing countries. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation initiated in 2000, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in 2004, the China-CEEC Cooperation Forum in 2012, and the China-CELAC Forum in 2014 are all new “one-to-many” cooperation mechanisms They, along with the China-EU cooperation mechanism and the China-ASEAN cooperation mechanism, constitute a framework for China’s foreign cooperation covering the major regions of the world, while the BRICS is a mechanism for major developing countries to cooperate with each other. The new platform for institutionalized cooperation among major countries reflects a new transcontinental character. It can be said that the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism and the BRICS mechanism are outstanding examples of South-South institutionalized cooperation. 58 Men

Honghua, “Building a New Type of International Relations: China’s Responsibility and Undertakings”, in World Economics and Politics, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 4–25; Lu Guangsheng and Nie Jiao, “China-ASEAN Relations in the Background of Sino-US Trade War: Impacts, Risks and Countermeasures”, Southeast Asian Affairs, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 1–10.

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In 2000, China and African countries jointly initiated the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which has become an important platform for collective dialogues and pragmatic cooperation between the two sides; the Forum follows the principles of extensive consultation, joint development, and shared benefits, highlighting its efficient and pragmatic features, and the initiatives proposed at each session of the Forum reflect Africa’s urgent needs.59 The global economic crisis that erupted in 2008 was a major external impetus for close cooperation between China and Africa, which has increased every year since then. What is more symbolic is that in the beginning of 2013, Xi Jinping chose Africa for his first trip after taking office. During his visit, he proposed building a China-Africa Community with a Shared Future and the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith in developing China-Africa relations. In January 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Africa and proposed that “upholding the sound values of justice and benefit is a banner of China’s diplomacy in the new era.” The Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2015 decided to upgrade China-Africa relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership and proposed that China and Africa should jointly implement “ten major cooperation plans”. The 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held, with leaders discussing cooperation and talking about the future around the theme of “Towards an Even Stronger China-Africa Community with a Shared Future”, which would help the in-depth development of China-Africa comprehensive strategic partnership and become a grand event to promote China-Africa cooperation in the new era. Founded in 2012, the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism (marked by official meetings of national leaders) is a new type of mechanism. It is not only a successful practice of China’s cooperation with sub-regions, but also a positive attempt to work together with developed and developing countries. It is quite noteworthy that there are currently 12 EU member states out of 17 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) (announced at the 8th Summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries in April 2019, which welcomed Greece becoming a full participant in the cooperation mechanism). The rest of the countries also put joining EU as an important national policy and future development direction. Therefore, China’s cooperation with the Central and Eastern European Countries must be carefully considered in relation to the EU and we should be beware of noises that “China tries to divide Europe”. Xi Jinping pointed out in 2015 that China-CEEC cooperation is an important component of and an addition to the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership. It is fully capable of contributing to the building of the China-EU partnership of peace, growth, reform and civilization. At present, all the 17 Central and Eastern European Countries have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, highlighting the positive attitude of the Central and Eastern European region in the process of building the Belt and Road. At present, the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism reflects the positive interaction between government-led and private participation. It is rich in contents, communicated in a pluralistic manner, and has great effects. 59 He Wenping, “China-Africa Community with a Shared Future: Historical Basis, Realistic Conditions and Development Direction”, Journal of United Front Science, Issue 5, 2018, pp. 89–96.

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In 2001, the idea of BRICs was formulated; in 2006, the BRICs held their first foreign ministers’ meeting; the first BRIC Summit was held in June 2009, and the BRICs mechanism was fully activated. In 2010, South Africa formally joined the organization, and the BRICS cooperation mechanism officially entered the stage of history. The BRICS mechanism is a brand-new cooperation mechanism centered on major developing countries. In the 10 years since its establishment, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has made a historic leap from nothing to something, from small to large, and formed a multi-tiered structure led by the leaders’ meeting and supported by the meeting of senior representatives for security affairs, meeting of foreign ministers and other ministerial meetings. The BRICS mechanism is undergoing a transformation from a forum for dialogues that focus on economic governance and principles to an all-encompassing coordination mechanism that gives equal importance to political and economic governance, and discusses both principles and concrete matters, in which the 2017 Xiamen Summit has played a strategically functional role. The Xiamen Summit established the concept of cooperative governance based on common grounds, integration, cooperation and sustainability. It proposed the “Second Golden Decade” as a time for cooperation. In addition, it took the lead in initiating and implementing the “BRICS Plus” concept, emphasizing the creation of an upgraded three-wheeled system of economic and financial cooperation, political security, and people-to-people exchanges. During the Xiamen Summit, China for the first time held a dialogue between emerging-market countries and developing countries, inviting leaders from five representative countries around the world, such as Egypt and others. Focusing on implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and deepening cooperation with African, Latin American, Middle East and Eurasian countries, the dialogue has built a new platform for South-South cooperation with global impact.60 Fifth, actively participate in global governance and build a global network of partnerships. The financial and debt crises that broke out in the United States and Europe in 2008 have triggered the most comprehensive global governance crisis. As a result of the financial crisis, the United States, which used to dominate the world, is gradually losing its position of absolute dominance, and the competition among major countries in terms of the concepts of global governance and strategies is incredibly fierce. There was a deep recognition by developed countries of the need to work together to overcome difficulties. They allowed emerging powers to play a greater role in key global institutions so that their positions could be secured. In response to the crisis in global governance, major countries have made a series of efforts to enhance policy coordination and cooperation, the most important of which is the G20 summit, and the rising influence of emerging powers in agenda setting is a key achievement of G20 governance.61 The response to the global governance crisis since 2008 has provided China with a rare opportunity to play a constructive role in regional 60 Wang Yi, “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era: Opening up New Horizons with a New Outlook”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 1–13. 61 John J. Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized World, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2015, p. 484.

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and global affairs. Active participation in global governance is seen as the only way for China to become a global power. China has seized the opportunity to respond to the crisis in global governance, and has vigorously promoted the construction of a national strategic system and the improvement of its national governance capacity. It has enhanced international cooperation at both the international and regional levels, and particularly in economic governance, it is playing an increasingly important role as an engine for global governance. The G20 Summit at Hangzhou in 2016 is a benchmark. The CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, has not only focused on China’s own development, but has also put China’s development into a global perspective and put forward a series of “Chinese approaches” to a number of issues for the peaceful development of the world.62 The “Chinese approach” has the improvement of the global governance mechanism as its primary goal, with a global vision of partnership network and with East Asia and areas surrounding China as its regional focus. It centers on economic and financial areas with which China is familiar and in which China has advantages to drive global governance. China will promote the transformation and development of global governance, with the concept of building a community of shared future and a new model of international relations as the guideline, and building a network of partnerships as the key and basis. China is committed to building a global network of partnerships, continuing to expand its circle of friends, providing a richer framework for bilateral dialogue and cooperation, and producing positive results in terms of political mutual trust, mutual economic dependence, cultural integration and social interaction. Xi Jinping believes that countries, with or without agreement, could all be partners. We hope that parties may, by acting along the trend of the times, explore a new type of partnership that is more inclusive and constructive, that is not targeted at a hypothetical enemy or against a third party.63 China’s global network of partnerships is built for the purpose of mutual benefit based on the above-said. Sixth, build the “Belt and Road” together and coordinate cooperation in surrounding areas, developing countries as well as global cooperation. The Belt and Road Initiative, which is closely related to changes in domestic and international conditions, is an expression of national and global ideals of China that is entering the new era for socialism. At a time when the world is in deep transformation, China is embedded in globalization to an unprecedented depth and breadth, and its leading role is all the more prominent in a time of uncertainty. China has become an anchor of world stability and an active promoter and strategic leader of world peaceful development. The successive formulation of the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the world dream of a community of shared future is the

62 Zhou Wen and Bao Weijie, “China’s Approach: A Contemporary Response to Neo-Liberalism”, Comparative Economic & Social Systems, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 1–9. 63 Wang Yi, “Toward a New Type of International Relations of Win-Win Cooperation”, International Studies, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 1–6.

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expression of China’s future-oriented ideals. The Belt and Road Initiative is a practical expression of these ideals.64 The Belt and Road Initiative is aimed at carrying forward the spirit of the ancient Silk Road of mutual learning, and living in harmony and coexistence. It expands mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields between China and Eurasian countries, and is the core concept of China’s foreign cooperation in the new era, creating opportunities and achievements for all countries in the world and serving the common interests of all humankind.65 Xi Jinping pointed out that we must make continued efforts to enhance the complementarity and synergy between the Belt and Road cooperation and the development strategies and agenda at national, regional and international levels. Through bilateral, tripartite and multilateral cooperation, we need to encourage the full participation of more countries and companies, thus expanding the pie of common interests.66 Through the First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2019, the “Belt and Road” has been transformed from being something abstract to something detailed and concrete, which starts a new journey of promoting high-quality development of the “Belt and Road”. It has become the most popular international public product in the world today.67

3.3 Theoretical and Practical Features of China’s Diplomacy in the New Era The theoretical and practical work of China’s diplomacy in the new era features inclusiveness. It not only shows the decision-makers’ strategic planning ability to follow the tide of the world, face up to challenges at home and abroad and achieve sustainable growth in light of national realities, but also demonstrates their courage to shape the world’s future through peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit. In general, with a core goal of realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation and focused on building a new model of international relations, China’s diplomacy in the new era is defined by the following features: taking Chinese characteristics as the foundation, a major country’s position as the cornerstone, pacifism as the principle, cooperation as the path, and benefits for all as the direction. To put it specifically: First, take Chinese characteristics as the foundation. China’s distinctive diplomacy aims at emphasizing China’s unique institutional basis and time-honored civilization and exploring a path towards prosperity different from that of traditional 64 Men Honghua, “Rule-Making Power in the Development of the Belt and the Road: A Strategic Analysis”, World Economics and Politics, Issue 7, 2018, pp. 19–40. 65 Yang Jiechi, “Working for a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind by Promoting International Cooperation and Multilateralism”, International Studies, Issue 2, 2019, pp. 1–6. 66 Xi Jinping, “Promoting High-Quality Development of Belt and Road Cooperation—Opening Remarks at the Leaders’ Roundtable of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, People’s Daily, April 28, 2019, p. 2. 67 Wang Yi, “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era: Opening up New Horizons with a New Outlook”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 1–13.

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major powers. China takes a clear-cut stand in upholding the leadership of the Party and the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is also confident in its path, theory, system, and culture and is committed to the fine tradition of upholding an independent foreign policy of peace, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. What’s more, it speaks up for justice, works for equality, takes serving domestic development and reform and opening up as the top priority in an open, inclusive, and sublime spirit. In doing so, it explores a new path of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics for win-win cooperation.68 The Chinese characteristics are also embodied in the strategy of peaceful development and the pursuit of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, and the fact that China is committed to breaking out of the Thucydides Trap, which is different from the past when great powers competed for hegemony, and to building a community of shared interests, responsibilities and future so as to achieve win-win and shared prosperity. Second, take a major country’s position as the cornerstone with an emphasis on charisma and bearing. As Lao-zi said, “To him who holds in his hands the Great Image (of the invisible Tao), the whole world repairs. Men resort to him, and receive no hurt, but (find) rest, peace, and the feeling of ease.” China strives to usher in the new era of deepening reform and opening up in an all-round way by making profound strategic adjustments in politics, economy, society, culture, ecology, security, foreign affairs, and national defense. It aims to gradually form a new conception, idea, and strategy for China’s medium and long-term development in the future and take solid strides in becoming a global power. In light of these facts, China considers both domestic and international situations, proposes the construction of a new mode of international relations centering on win-win cooperation, responds to questions and doubts, and adheres to its peaceful development strategy. These efforts show China’s positive and constructive international cooperative capability and its hopes to advance world peace and development through win-win cooperation. At the same time, as the world’s second-largest economy, an Oriental power leading in overall national strength, China starts by actively shouldering more and more important international responsibilities so that it can play a greater role in the international community. Third, take pacifism as the principle. Peace is the cornerstone of a country’s development and the ultimate pursuit of human development. China unswervingly follows the path of peaceful development, a choice made by the Chinese government and people in light of the trend of the times and basic interests. The path of peaceful development is based on China’s profound culture and is the preservation and development of the Chinese nation’s excellent civilization. China rejects the old path of the rise of western capitalist countries and traditional socialist countries. By drawing on the experience of its national development since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it proposes a new national development strategy guided by Marxism. The strategy guides China in handling domestic and foreign affairs, 68 Wang Yi, “Breaking New Ground Amidst Turbulent Storms”, in People’s Daily, December 26, 2014, p. 17; Wang Yi, “2014 in Review: A Successful Year for China’s Diplomacy”, International Studies, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 1–10.

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and points out the direction and path of China’s future development for the Chinese people and the world. As a long-term national development strategy, the path of peaceful development serves China and the times well. Xi Jinping has pointed out, “China will unswervingly pursue peaceful development, because it is good for China, good for Asia and good for the world. Nothing can ever weaken China’s commitment to peaceful development”.69 “Mutual trust brings neighboring countries together and goodwill brings distant countries together”, said Chinese thinker Chuang-tzu. The path of peaceful development is China’s declaration of acting on its beliefs. Fourth, take cooperation as the path. International cooperation is the core theme of international relationships and one of the drivers of international community development. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the trends of multi-polarity and economic globalization have continued to deepen; cultural diversity on a global level has increased; our society has continued to be reshaped by information technology; and the extent to which countries rely on each other and share common interests has become unprecedented in both depth and scope. At the same time, global issues such as economic and financial crisis, climate change, and resource and energy security have become increasingly prominent, posing new, severe challenges to world peace, common development and win-win cooperation. Currently, there are more and more countries taking part in global governance and the increasingly powerful China is expected to engage in. What China is confronted with is how to play an active, positive, and constructive role with the trust of the international community. Therefore, under the new international situation, China must think hard about how to deal with other countries and reach international cooperation. Since the 1970 s, China has paved a path of peaceful development in cooperative manners in the course of integrating into, influencing and shaping the world. These abundant experiences and practices enable China to form its international cooperation theory. Based on national reform and following the path of integration into the international community step by step, the theory serves China well in launching and furthering international cooperation. It embodies the prudence and bearing of a late-coming power. While integrating into the international community, China has clarified its strategic positioning, put forward the important thought of win-win cooperation, and improved its theoretical structure. In fact, cooperation is the well-established strategic pathway in China. Fifth, take benefits for all as the direction. Xi Jinping pointed out that we should continue to pursue win-win cooperation, promote a new model of international relations based on such cooperation, follow the mutually beneficial strategy of opening up and adopt the win-win approach to our external relations in the political, economic, security, cultural and other fields.70 The core thought, underlying his remarks, is to replace confrontation with cooperation, monopoly with “benefits for 69 Xi Jinping, “Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation—Speech at the Commemorative Ceremony Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Release of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”, People’s Daily, June 29, 2014, p. 2. 70 “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1.

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all”, thus promoting concerted efforts. The following strategies all demonstrate the direction of securing benefits for all: underscoring the spirit of mutual benefit, calling for building a community with a shared future for mankind, advocating taking the legitimate concerns of other countries into account while pursuing its own interests, promoting the common development of all other countries while advancing its own development, and calling on the establishment of a more equal and balanced global partnership. The strategic orientation of securing benefits for all is based on a complex domestic environment and reality. According to Hu Angang, a pioneer in the studies of Chinese realities, while it moves towards a modern socialist country, China not only calls for building a well-off society of a higher standard in an all-round way to the benefit of well over one billion people but also moves on to all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country delivering prosperity for all. For this reason, China advocates the mutually beneficial strategy, and its core target is to make joint efforts with other countries and regions to create a better world.71

References Jinping X (2017) The governance of China (Volume Two). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing Jinping X (2018) The governance of China (Volume One). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pp. 249, 297 Xi X (2013) Traditional harmony culture and Chinese Diplomacy. Men Honghua, ed., China Strategy Report I: Strategic Thinking of China’s Soft Power. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, pp 100–118

71 Hu

Angang, “Why China Can Breaks the Logic of ‘A Power Must Hegemonize’: Objectives and Connotations of Xi Jinping’s Thought of ‘Win-Win’ Theory, in People’s Tribune, Issue 15, 2015, pp. 48–54; Hu Angang, “Xi Jinping’s Win-Win Thought: China and the World”, Ziguangge, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 45–47.

Chapter 4

Optimizing the Concept of National Security and Creating a Path to National Security with Chinese Characteristics

Xi Jinping pointed out, “Our Party should make national security its top priority”. National security is the core of national strategic decision and policy planning. To a certain degree, the successful rise of China lies in its safeguard of national security and expansion of strategic interests. As China is transforming from a major country to a world power, its strategic interests are expanding across the world. At the same time, China draws more attention from the international community and speeds up its domestic transformation. The growing interaction between internal and external factors has blurred the boundary between China’s national security and the international situation. As a result, China is confronted with more complex and diversified challenges.1 The structural problem of China’s national security lies in the increasingly complicated national security environment, the expansion of national interests, and relatively weak capacity in safeguarding its national interests. Its vulnerability and sensitivity have further surfaced, and the maintenance of China’s national security interests is therefore subject to more and more constraints and challenges. How to strengthen national security strategy is a major strategic issue facing us now. Xi Jinping noted, “We must stand firmly for peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes, give overall consideration to domestic development and international situation, and adopt a holistic approach to development and security; we must focus on the overriding goal of peaceful development and national rejuvenation; we must devote ourselves to safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, foster an international environment that is friendly to our peaceful development, and take advantage of this important period of strategic opportunity for China; these efforts will ensure the realization of the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”2 Under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core, taking the inception of the National Security 1 Men

(2015). Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, 2014, p. 1. 2 “The

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_4

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Commission as the opportunity, China introduced a holistic view of national security and was committed to innovating the idea, adjusting the plan and improving the strategy of national security. In line with domestic and international situations, China should be forward-looking in studying the international situation, and soberly aware of both internal and external threats and challenges faced in promoting national security. On this basis, it should make an objective assessment of the national security and put forward corresponding policies and proposals, which is the core issue of the strategic decision of national security.

4.1 Opportunities and Challenges for China’s National Security China’s rise is parallel with world transformation, and China has become the center of world change.3 It stands out from the structure of “one superpower and multigreat powers” and its strategic plan to be a world power is the focus of attention of the international community, especially the major powers. Also, the improvement of China’s development strategy and the enhancement of its national strategy are the drivers of the strategic adjustment of world major powers. As a result, the issues of China’s national security see a rapid increase, and the external threats and challenges grow more complex. As China’s national interests are expanding globally, China has shifted from a provider of domestic interests to a sharer of international interests. Its competition with other countries especially the major powers for strategic interests is a fierce one and substantial changes play out in the contrast of national power between China and its neighbors. What’s more, China’s future strategic direction and planning are deemed sensitive. Global powers intentionally coordinate their responses to China’s rise, some neighboring countries try hard to seek key gains for themselves before China develops into a world power, and domestic destabilizing factors such as separatism work closely with international anti-China forces. China is thus challenged by the trilogy aiming at disrupting China’s plan, stemming its prospect, and impacting China’s progress by making its peaceful reformation the disruptive factors. With the extension of China’s national interests, the major political, economic and security hotspot issues in the current world are all within the dimension of China’s national security, and they tend to be closely related. First of all, at the global level, the expansion of China’s national interests is in conflict with the traditional strategic interests of western powers. In particular, there are structural problems between China and the United States that do not share common strategic interests. The United States pursues a policy of con-gagement with China in an increasingly friendly and coercive manner. The United States has stepped up efforts to build containment belts and breakwaters around China through military, economic 3 Men

and Zhong (2019).

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and trade cooperation, and security coordination.4 At the same time, China is integrated into the world economy, forming an interdependent relationship. Its ability to impact the world economy and thus generate spillover effects is improving, and its economic and financial security has become quite subject to external factors. As globalization speeds up, global issues, especially non-military factors and strategic factors, increasingly restrict and threaten China’s security. Second, at the regional level or in terms of the security conditions of the neighboring countries, China, as the strategic entity with the most Asian neighbors and the most geopolitical conflicts, faces an increasingly complex and severe security situation in Asia, especially in East Asia. The reasons behind include historical factors, realistic conflicts of interests and strategic considerations for the future. Traditional geopolitical thinking remains dominant, and the idea of containing and preventing China plays an important role. China has long been in conflict with its neighbors in border issues as it demarcated no land border in the past. The resulting territorial disputes come to the forefront globally in recent years and the conflicts of interests would persist for a long time. Also, China’s national security is confronted with the new challenges of powerful external factors such as the United States. Third, at the domestic level, although foreign invasion no longer exists, China is increasingly influenced by external destructive factors. And external forces are more active in utilizing ethnic separatist forces in various forms to threaten China’s national security. These factors are in tune with the characteristics of China in a comprehensive transition period, making the maintenance of cultural security and social stability respectively become the long-term concern and immediate concern of China’s national security. Xi Jinping keenly noted, “National security and social stability form the basis for further reform and progress.5 China is now at a critical moment of implementing the Four-pronged Strategy that consists of four tasks: to complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects, to further reform, to advance the rule of law, and to strengthen Party discipline. The task for China to safeguard national security and social stability is an arduous one as the security and development situation is complicated and volatile, and both predictable and unpredictable risks are increasing.”6 The above external threats and challenges to China’s national security suggest that its national security strategy can be improved in many aspects given the following facts: First, the overall national strategy for a long time gives full play to the leading role of economy, which determines the insufficiency of China’s comprehensive strategic planning. A national security strategic concept, culture and security framework towards the prospect of a world power in the mid-twenty-first century are far from existence. In view of this, the overall passivity persists although the initiative 4 Men

(2014). (2013). 6 “Xi Jinping stressed the solid and in-depth implementation of a holistic approach to national security and creating a new situation of national security work that keeps pace with the times during his meeting with representatives for the National Review and Commendation Conference of State Security Organizations”, People’s Daily, May 20, 2015, p. 1. 5 Xi

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of China’s national security strategy has played out in recent years. Second, China’s national security is fixed in East Asia, but its regional deployment is not prominent, and it has not upgraded the East Asia strategy to the core position. East Asian affairs are managed by the United States, Japan, India and ASEAN. Yet countries such as the United States, Japan and India deem China as the most vital strategic competitor, and especially increase their strategic deployment in the east and south of China, thus forming a soft strategic encirclement against China and making China passive in East Asia. Third, China still lacks explicit maritime strategic planning without much experience and defense depth in this field, and therefore its maritime interests suffer from serious restrictions. Fourth, China’s national interests have extended to all corners of the world as the country’s national power increases, and the supporting role of military power grows more and more important. However, as China’s military strategy has long been subordinate to and serving economic strategic deployment, its military force fails to play enough supporting role in national interests, and its ability to cope with and break through strategic containment lacks great improvement. Fifth, in the era of complex interdependence between countries, conflicts of interests should not be addressed solely by diplomacy, but by a combination of diplomatic, military, economic and cultural means. In this regard, China’s strategic means are somewhat inadequate, and its comprehensive ability to use them is particularly weak.

4.2 Phased Goals for China’s National Security China’s overall strategic vision is to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, domestically take the path of scientific development and pursue peaceful development with other countries. It commits to an interconnected peaceful development at home and abroad to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation and become a world power living up to its own expectations and garnering recognition of the international community. This vision requires China to shift from a peaceful development strategy that mainly serves its own development interests to a strategy that seeks common development and security with other countries. This strategic change is made by actively participating in international affairs and strengthening international cooperation and aims at expanding China’s strategic interests and playing the role of a responsible major country. As an important part of the national grand strategy, the overall strategic objectives and tasks of China’s national security strategy are to steadily promote national security, actively participate in the maintenance of international security, and safeguard and expand China’s security interests towards a global power. The next decade will be a crucial period for China to grow into a world power and a time when its national security will be tested the most. China’s national security objectives are as follows: First, safeguarding China’s territorial and maritime rights and interests. With peace and stability on land borders as a strategic basis, we will launch competition and cooperation with major powers on maritime borders, consolidate and promote China’s security interests and improve China’s strategic environment. In

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2020, we should gain and ensure the initiative in territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, ensure that we have our say in the realm of this issue, and break the First Island Chain deployed by the US peacefully. In 2025, we will make a strategic breakthrough in pushing China towards a maritime power. When territorial and marine rights and interests are effectively safeguarded, measures will be taken to reduce the intensity of disputes over territorial waters in the South and East China Seas. In doing so, we want to ensure the relevant countries’ understanding of our national strategy trend, clarify our bottom line in security maintenance and set an image that we do not make trouble, but when it comes, we will not back away. Second, opposing independence, promoting reunification, and protecting territorial integrity. We will continue to promote consensus through political, economic and cultural means and oppose Taiwan independence through military means to create conditions for reunification. All necessary means will be taken to defeat separatist attempts, especially their violent acts for “Xinjiang independence” and “Tibet independence”. In 2020, we should maintain initiative in Cross-straits relations to ensure Taiwan does not move towards independence, effectively curb the three pro-independence forces in the northwest, and prevent the Dalai Lama clique from interfering with the development and stability of Tibet. In 2025, We will steadily promote economic interdependence with Taiwan and carry out innovative cooperation in cultural integration, so as to create more favorable conditions for the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. We will institutionalize and stabilize security cooperation with Central Asian countries and Russia, and create conditions for addressing the Xinjiang issue at its origin through further territorial planning. In doing so, especially tackling the Qinghai (a province to the northeast of Tibet) issue well, we will provide conditions for and make full preparations for the stability of Tibet in the post-Dalai era. Third, maintaining and shaping an international environment conducive to China’s peaceful development. We should avoid the cycle of confrontation, containment, and cold war with the United States, avoid neighboring countries making an alliance hostile towards China, and avoid hot issues in China’s neighborhood getting out of hand. In 2020, we will actively launch comprehensive cooperation with ASEAN countries to ensure their goodwill and neutral stand towards China on security issues. We should prevent the United States, Japan, Australia, and India from forming institutionalized coordination on security issues through economic means and make every effort to stop the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam from establishing a security alliance against China on security issues. Also, we should prevent the re-occurrence of North Korean nuclear issue which might induce security disputes in Northeast Asia. In 2025, we will actively launch strategic security dialogues with the United States and reach a tacit understanding with the United States on safeguarding East Asian security. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) will be established and effectively reduce the intensity of conflicts in the South China Sea. We will also reach a positive consensus with ASEAN countries on East Asian security. What’s more, we will restore the multilateral consultation mechanism on

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the Korean nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula issue in a positive way to take a leading position in northeast Asia’s security. Fourth, safeguarding and expanding the scope and space of China’s strategic interests. We should promote multilateral security cooperation, engage in and under certain circumstances play a leading role in building a security system for China’s neighbors, participate in building an international security system, and expand China’s security interests. In 2020, the overall security theory should be improved and spread to make it a mainstream security theory understood by major powers, accepted by developing countries and implemented by neighboring countries. We will actively promote international security cooperation with the United Nations Security Council at its core, vigorously promote security cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, properly respond to territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and stabilize the security situation in Northeast Asia. In 2025, an open security coordination mechanism in East Asia will be initially established based on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in line with deepening economic cooperation in East Asia. Its inception will effectively curb the dominance of the United States in East Asian security affairs. Also, we will actively engage in safeguarding national security and expanding its interests. Fifth, developing military forces and ensuring national security. Given national security, China must steadily increase its military spending, vigorously promote the new military revolution, establish a reliable strategic deterrent force, and advance the modernization of its conventional armed forces. At the same time, we should further strengthen military cooperation and exchanges with other countries, emphasizing the peaceful mission of the Chinese armed forces and appropriately displaying China’s military power. In 2020, solid steps will be made in the new military revolution, the effective upgrading of conventional weapons, further research and development of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a reliable strategic deterrent force. By 2025, we will initially complete the goal of building a deep blue navy and set up China’s aircraft carrier fleet to provide solid military support for national security. Xi Jinping emphasized, “We should keep in mind that the military option will always be the ultimate guarantee. Greater efforts have to be invested in military modernization to meet national security demands. The PLA still lags far behind the world’s leading militaries and we should make sure that every minute counts to catch up with them. The PLA should be fully aware of the new situation and challenges facing China’s security and development, as well as the important position and role of national defense and the armed forces. The entire military must shoulder the crucial responsibility of protecting the country’s sovereignty, security, and development interests and be more mindful of potential dangers and crises, and enhance its sense of mission. In line with the deployment of the 18th CPC National Congress, they should keep working hard to leapfrog in modernization of national defense and armed forces to provide a strong guarantee for the realization of the Chinese Dream.”7 7 “At

the plenary meeting of the delegation of the People’s Liberation Army, Xi Jinping stressed that we must adhere to the Party’s goal of military development under the new circumstances and

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4.3 Innovation of China’s National Security Concept The view of national security is a country’s subjective perception of security. From 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established to the late 1970s, China’s national security has been basically determined by geographical boundaries. China’s awareness of national security mainly serves for its safe survival. Since the 1980s, as international situation develops, various factors threatening human existence have crossed national borders, and become security problems facing all countries as they spin out of the control of single countries, so it is fair to conclude that the boundaries of national security have been broken, and that security threats are a pervasive presence. Such changes urge all countries to look at national security in a new light, and view and tackle national security issues from perspectives of global security, comprehensive security, and cooperation security. Given that, China’s attention to national security goes beyond traditional concepts such as political security, which is in line with the trend of the times. The “new security concept” and “the holistic view of national security” represent the innovation of China’s national security concept. Since the Second World War, the world has undergone drastic changes. Under such volatile circumstances, security becomes the overriding concern for all countries. Also, anarchy serves as the starting point to get to know international politics. With security dilemma confronting countries around the globe, powerful nations prosper, whereas weak states suffer. Methods including self-help, alliance, and collective security are available for countries to maintain their own security. However after the end of WWII, globalization has accelerated markedly, the content of international relations has been greatly enriched, and international relations are becoming increasingly multi-polarized, institutionalized and ordered; non-state actors are exerting growing influence and are thus attached more importance; countries are becoming more and more interdependent on each other, and the concept of sharing pain and glory is recognized widely. This, in terms of security issues, can be witnessed in less appearance of large-scale international conflicts, and zero-sum confrontations; win-win results multiply as international cooperation shows up. Since the end of the Cold War, international cooperation has been the major content of international relations, and a country’s national security has also been increasingly related with the peace and security of the international community, with cooperative security, global security and other concepts springing up. As globalization develops, security issues involve more countries, and concern more fields, not just traditional aspects like military, political, and economic security, but non-traditional security fields such as society, environment, and culture. Globalization has not only highlighted the significance of a country’s economic security interests, but updated the content of security interests to include science security, information security, and ecological security. As a result, cooperative security plays an important role in safeguarding international security, which requires all countries to expand their cooperation fields, seek more common interests to improve their strive to build people’s armed forces that follow the party’s commands, are able to win battles and have fine conduct”, People’s Daily, March 12, 2013, p. 1.

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competence and efficiency against threats and challenges. Peace can only stand on mutual and win-win security interests, and common security serves as the final goal of maintaining international security. Previously, China was afraid of its own security getting threatened. Entering the 1990s, neighboring countries and major global powers have misgivings about whether China’s rise would pose a threat. Due to the interaction between internal and external situations, China’s leader put forward a new outlook on security that features mutual trust, reciprocity, equality and cooperation in 1997. The outlook was adopted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and was expanded into the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. The new security concept is a three-dimensional one that emphasizes not only external changes in national security (e.g., extending to non-military areas such as economic security and financial security), but also internal changes in domestic security such as political prosperity and social stability. It reflects the comprehensive consideration of both international and domestic strategies. Also, defensive realism embodied in the new security concept represents China’s further concern about security issues, international recognition, and cooperative strategic culture. As China rises, its national strategic interests expand, and constant progress is made in terms of the depth and breadth of national security. The concept of security in the context of globalization can be described as all-encompassing, and the means adopted by countries to maintain their national security have become more diverse. However, there is an increasing difficulty in safeguarding national security. On April 15, 2014, Xi Jinping stated at the first meeting of the National Security Commission of the CPC Central Committee that we should acquire an accurate understanding of new developments and trends of the situation of national security, maintain a holistic view of national security, take the people’s security as our ultimate goal, achieve political security as our fundamental task, regard economic security as our foundation, with military, cultural and public security as means of guarantee, and promote international security so as to establish a national security system with Chinese characteristics. To implement a holistic view of national security, we should attach equal importance to internal and external security—promoting development, reform and stability and building China into a safe country domestically, while seeking peace, cooperation and mutual benefit and building a harmonious world internationally. Homeland security and the people’s security are equally important. We must follow the principle of people first, insist that everything done for national security is for the sake of the people, should rely on the people, and gain the support of the people. We must pay close attention to both traditional and non-traditional security, and build a national security system that integrates such elements as political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technology, information, ecological, resource and nuclear security. We should pay close attention to both development and security. The former is the foundation of the latter while the latter is a precondition for the former. A wealthy country may build a strong army, and a strong army is able to safeguard the country. While paying close attention to our own security, we must also pay attention to the common security of the world, and contribute our effort to turning the world into a secure place for all nations. We should urge all parties to work hard for the goals of mutual benefit and common security. On May 21, 2014, Xi

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Jinping delivered a speech at the Shanghai Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), advocating common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security in Asia. He emphasized that we need to innovate our security concept, establish a new regional security cooperation architecture, and jointly build a road for security of Asia that is shared by and win-win to all,8 which fully reflects the international version of security concept inspired by that of China. Xi also pointed out that “common security” means respecting and ensuring the security of each and every country, sharing interests, security and dangers, and demonstrating equality and tolerance; “comprehensive security” means upholding security in both traditional and non-traditional fields; “cooperative security” means promoting the security of both individual countries and the region as a whole through dialogue and cooperation; “sustainable security” means focusing on both development and security, so that security will be durable. On January 23, 2015, the Outline of China’s National Security Strategy was approved by the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee; on July 1, 2015, the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress. The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC reads that we must put national interests first, take protecting our people’s security as our mission and safeguarding political security as a fundamental task, and ensure both internal and external security, homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China’s own and common security; we will improve our systems and institutions and enhance capacitybuilding for national security, and resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. The holistic view of national security put forth by Xi Jinping underscores the integration between development and security. That is to say, we must follow the approach of enhancing security for the sake of development and promoting development by upholding security, and bring the goals of development and security in alignment with each other.9 At the same time, Xi attached great importance to preserving security through international cooperation and noted, “In the age of economic globalization, the security of all countries is interlinked and they impact each other. No country can maintain absolute security by its own efforts only, neither can any country achieve stability by destabilizing other countries.10 Also, he said, “Security must be universal. We cannot have the security of just one or a few countries while leaving the rest insecure, in no way can we accept the so-called absolute security of one at the expense of the security of others.11 We should engage in sincere and in-depth dialogue and communication to increase strategic mutual trust, reduce mutual misgivings, seek common ground while resolving differences, and live in harmony with each other. We should bear in mind the common security interests of all countries, and start with low-sensitivity areas to build the awareness of meeting security challenges through 8 Xi

(2014a). (2014b). 10 Xi (2015). 11 Xi (2014a). 9 Xi

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cooperation. We should expand the scope and means of cooperation and promote peace and security through cooperation”.12 What’s more, he stressed that the security interests of all countries are intertwined, so the narrow-minded mentality of conceit, seeking benefits for oneself at the expense of the interests of other countries and shifting one’s troubles onto others should be abandoned. Each side should follow the principle of seeking positive outcomes for all, and develop a mutually beneficial security path while seeking personal security without sacrificing others’. Each country should foster new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security and make joint efforts to respond to various security challenges. Also, each country should seek security and stability through cooperation, promote peace and development through security, and be committed to creating an enduring and stable security environment for all people in the world.13

4.4 Establishing the NSC and Improving the Top-Level Design Along with China’s overall rise, the tasks and challenges confronting China’s national security have become more diverse and complex, requiring the National Security Commission (NSC) to coordinate. To make more systematic and forward-looking decisions on major strategic issues, China needs to improve the decision-making mechanism and integrate its diplomacy, military, economy, intelligence and publicity strength. Besides, on such strategic issues as territory, territorial sea, resources, social stability and national unification, China’s national security faces severe challenges. In the era of globalization, it is necessary for China to improve the national strategic system for the enduring peace and stability and continuous growth, and strengthen its overall planning and strategic decision-making ability. On November 12, 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided to establish the National Security Commission with Xi Jinping as its chairman, Li Keqiang and Zhang Dejiang as its vice chairmen, and several members of its standing committee and other members nominated.14 Xi pointed out, “To secure its leadership role and unite the country in upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, our Party should make national security its top priority. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided to establish the NSC. This is a pressing requirement for modernizing the national governance system and enhancing our governance capacity, and for achieving longterm political stability. This will provide a strong guarantee for building a moderately

12 Xi

(2014a). (2017). 14 “The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee Decided to Establish the National Security Commission”, November 12, 2013, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2013/1113/c1011-235 21979.html (visited on January 1, 2014). 13 Xi

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prosperous society in all respects, and for fulfilling the Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the nation. The aim of the establishment of the NSC is to better handle new developments and new tasks in the realm of national security, and build a national security system which is centralized, integrated, highly efficient and authoritative, so as to improve the leadership over national security.”15 The NSC, as a decisionmaking, deliberation and coordination agency of the CPC Central Committee on national security work, is responsible to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and is to coordinate important work on national security. Xi pointed out, “The main responsibilities of the National Security Commission are to formulate and implement national security strategy, promote national security legislation, design principles and policies for national security work, and discuss and resolve key issues concerning national security”.16 According to our research, focusing on major strategic issues including territory, territorial sea, diplomacy, military affairs, resources, economy and people’s well-being, the NSC makes major strategic decisions, supervises the implementation of national security strategies, and responds to domestic and international emergencies efficiently and effectively. The establishment of the NSC reflects the fact that with the rapid growth of China’s national strength, the challenges from foreign strategies, foreign policies and national security are becoming increasingly complex and diverse. There is an urgent need to have an institution that is capable of centralizing high-level authority and coordinating relevant departments. The NSC, under the leadership of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, realizes the CPC Central Committee’s overall control on major issues, open research and cooperation among all parties in terms of national security.17 To build a national security system with Chinese characteristics, it makes full use of the decision-making superiority and draws on the setups of the existing foreign national security commissions. Based on both domestic and international changes, the setting up of the NSC is consistent with China’s medium-and-longterm national development strategy and achieves unity in national security decisionmaking. With these principles, institutionalization, substantialization, professionalization and further expansion and improvement of the Central Leading Group for National Security are basic methods to build the NSC. The NSC is committed to elevating national security and foreign affairs to the political level of the top decisionmakers. As a powerful tool for the CPC Central Committee to exercise its leadership and decision-making power in national security, the NSC coordinates relationships 15 “Xi

Jinping presides over a symposium on national security work, emphasizing that we must pursue a holistic view of national security and strive for new progress in our endeavor to ensure our national security”, People’s Daily, February 18, 2017, p. 1. 16 Xi (2013). 17 While expounding working methods, Mao Zedong pointed out: “Concentrate important powers in one hand; diffuse less important ones. Decisions are to be taken by party committees and to be carried out by all concerned.” See Mao Zedong, “Sixty Points on Working Methods (Draft)”, Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7, p. 355.

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among politics, military affairs, diplomacy, internal affairs, economics and intelligence under the overall objective and framework of national security so as to form a horizontal and vertical integration mechanism. To protect national security and secure long-term interests, the commission performs such key functions as overall planning, strategic coordination and crisis management. The NSC is positioned as an agency for strategic planning, coordination and crisis management. Under the leadership of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, it is a cross-cutting governance body that plays an advisory role in making national security decisions and also a key department in the system of the Party and the country. Here are its basic functions: Firstly, strategic planning and advisory functions. The NSC is responsible for the long-term panning of the strategy and policy for national security. On the basis of in-depth analysis of domestic and international security trends, it develops deeper strategic thinking on China’s long-term interests and national security objectives, makes general policies and security strategies, provides recommendations to the President on national security and foreign policy, and makes strategic assessments and policy recommendations on important matters in China’s national security field. Secondly, communication and coordination functions. The NSC makes overall plans of China’s security matters, coordinating and managing the planning work of security strategies and polices, and supervising their implementation. It also coordinates the work of relevant departments to ensure that decisions about national security are carried out, organizing open research and collaboration of all parties, as well as strategic coordination meetings attended by relevant officers and experts. Thirdly, crisis management and control functions. The NSC provides emergency response mechanisms and technical support for crisis decision-making, responsible for information collection and warning analysis, and establishment of effective emergency response mechanisms. It coordinates agencies related to national security to carry out trans-department cooperation and take coordinated action to deal with crises, so as to arrive at efficient counseling, forceful decision-making and prompt implementation.

4.5 Improving China’s National Security Strategy and Pursuing Bottom-Line Thinking At present, China’s national security situation is stable. Focusing on improving national strength, China is now at a moderate pace of striding forward and maintains momentum. With the increase of the national strength, the threat of military invasion has long gone. The improvement of the economic influence enhances China’s ability to ensure economic security. As the acceleration of overall transition, China is forming a large-country mindset and manner, modest but sticking to the principle. Looking into the future, China’s strategy for national security will continue to improve the national strength and transform it into international influence while

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ensuring domestic security. China will keep a mind of modesty and peace, bear the weight of responsibility, be committed to building a peaceful and developing international environment and adhere to peaceful rise.18 Guided by these ideas, China’s national security strategy should stick to the following principles. Firstly, attaching equal importance to key points and overall situation, with the former as the priority. In the next decade, China’s strategy for national security should focus on East Asia (current China-centric), extending to the Asian-Pacific region (future world-centric) and the whole world (especially developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America). In cooperation with countries rich in resources and developing countries, China should do everything possible to manage its territorial sea and exclusive economic zones. Undertaking international responsibilities, China will play a more active role in global issues and extend its national strategic interests. While forming a new type of international relations, China should also pay close attention to the strategic orientation of established and emerging powers, especially to the establishment of institutions for the new model of major-country relationship between the US and China. Secondly, giving equal weight to formal development of security institutions and flexible partnerships, with greater emphasis on the role of international allies. In recent years, China has actively developed its strategic partnerships on the basis of an overall grasp of the international situation and its national development strategy, and under the guidance of its foreign policy of peace and its new model of major-country relationship. In addition to multilateralism, China should continue to develop bilateralism. To be specific, China is committed to establishing multilateral security institutions, improving its new security concept and putting forward Chinese ideals and designs on security mechanism building to show the mindset of the Chinese people. China will further highlight the importance of bilateral coordination among countries, promoting multilateral arrangements that are beneficial to China and guarding against those multilateral arrangements that are detrimental to China. Thirdly, laying equal emphasis on international prevention and cooperation, with greater emphasis on the ability to set agendas for international cooperation. In the face of an increasingly complex security situation, we must strengthen the capacity for prevention and bear in mind that “peace comes from power”, which is a lesson drawn from historical experience. Of course, international cooperation is an important path to realizing China’s security interests, and we should not only focus on international cooperation, but also refine our agenda-setting capabilities, seize China’s initiative in international cooperation, and push international cooperation to the substantive level. In order to promote the common interests of all mankind, the world peace, development and stability, China should cooperate with other countries and build communities of common interests in different fields and at different levels.19

18 Xi

(2011). (2004).

19 Men

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Fourthly, focusing on both traditional and non-traditional security threats, with greater emphasis on diversification of responses to non-traditional security instruments and target malleability.20 The traditional threats and challenges to China’s security come mainly from territorial disputes and ethnic separatist forces, which are of great importance and shall never be compromised. With economic globalization deepening, China’s rapid integration into the world and the expansion of its national interests, China is faced with more and more non-traditional security threats. Addressing non-traditional security challenges requires both international cooperation and the resolve of the major powers. China should take this opportunity to further temper its ability to maintain security and take multiple means to expand the objectives of its national security. Close attention should be paid to the interaction between the society and the national policy to prevent the impact of extreme nationalism on the rationality of national security strategies. Fifthly, laying equal importance on land defense and coastal defense and focusing more on the management of coastal areas and territorial seas. Frontier defense and coastal defense are the core issues of China’s border strategy. China has a long-standing tradition of placing greater emphasis on the defense of its borders than on the defense of its seas; however, in the current security situation, the importance of maritime defense should be emphasized. We must conceive a feasible and forwardlooking maritime security strategy to break the dilemma of having the seas without the ocean and ensure a strategic maritime line of defense. At the same time, we must strengthen military patrols in the East China Sea and South China Sea to ensure that sovereignty rests with us. Sixthly, laying equal stress on diplomacy and military means and further strengthening our diplomatic capacity and the coordination of foreign affairs departments. While strengthening military preparations and military deterrence, we should emphasize the status of diplomacy as the main channel for resolving problems and enhance our diplomatic capacity, while at the same time working to strengthen the close cooperation of various foreign-related departments and internal and foreign affairs departments, so as to form an all-in-one picture of domestic and foreign affairs and work together to safeguard and expand our national interests. The implementation of these principles also requires us to have a sound understanding of China’s national conditions and global trends, and to pursue the principle of combining top-level design and bottom-line thinking, which is reflected in particular in the following aspects: First, a prudent and objective judgment on China’s national strength. National strength is what is behind national security strategy. It is not only an integral part of the system of strategic national security objectives, but also a means of achieving them and the starting point for the formulation of national security strategy. The assessment of national strength should emphasize the great influence of the era of globalization and the information revolution, the relative and dynamic nature of

20 Xi

(2010).

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national strength, the importance of international comparison in the objective understanding of national strength, and the sense of self-restraint in the use of national strength. Second, a comprehensive statement of China’s national strategic interests. National strategic interests are the ultimate embodiment of the survival and development of a sovereign state with economic, political and security interests as its basic core. International and social interests are becoming more and more important and overseas interests have become a new research focus. In general, in analyzing national interests a ranking approach is often adopted. It is a common international practice to prioritize national interests in order to achieve an integrated and focused approach. On the other hand, the realization of national interests is a dynamic process where the focuses differ in different periods. National strategic interests as a whole consist of economic, security, political, social and international interests, which are fundamental and complementary to each other. They work differently at different periods in different domestic and global contexts. All the five are indispensable for the achievement of China’s national security objectives. Not only are they of additive relationship with each another, but there is also a sort of multiplicative relationship between them. Of course, there are certain contradictions and conflicts between different strategic interests, and in coordinating their relations, it is necessary to consider both domestic and international factors and influences and to deal with them flexibly, taking into account the overall situation and long-term interests. The protection of national interests, with emphasis on fundamental and long-term strategic interests, should reflect the vision, courage and demeanor of a great nation. Third, an in-depth study into a holistic view of national security. China’s inherent national security dilemma is coming to the fore, while the transnational and comprehensive nature of security issues is becoming increasingly prominent. We should deeply study Xi Jinping’s holistic view of national security from the perspective of theory and practice, and establish a theoretical system on that basis so as to guide the national security strategy. Fourth, a prudent assessment of the risks of national security. The Chronicle of Zuo (Zuo Zhuan) said: “You should think of danger in time of peace. To think so can lead to preparation and preparation averts calamities.” China must build an assessment and regulation system for its strategic national security objectives on the basis of combining the world trends and its basic national conditions. We should make a deep and comprehensive analysis of national security, especially of the medium- and long-term risks, identify key factors and key geographic areas that affect national security, and strengthen the tracking and assessment of strategic postures and the focused monitoring of security risks.

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References Men H (2004) New concept of security, interest community and strategic thoroughfare: an explanation to China’s security interest. Teach Res 8:54–58 Men H (2014) China’s view on the mainstream strategy of the United States. Int Rev 1:11–24 Men H (2015) Starting the new era of comprehensively deepening reform and expanding opening-up in China—on the trend of China’s grand strategy in the next decade. Study Explor 8:40–44 Men H, Zhong F (2019) The history, status quo and prospect of the study of China’s overseas interests. Foreign Aff Rev 5:56–71 Xi X (2010) Non-traditional security of Northeast Asia: its problem domain and cooperation model. Northeast Asia Forum 2:42–48 Xi X (2011) Considerations on China’s security strategy. Theor Horiz 6:51–54 Xi J (2013) Explanatory notes to the ‘Decision of the central committee of the communist party of China on some major issues concerning comprehensively continuing the reform’. People’s Daily, p1 Xi J (2014a) New Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation—remarks at the fourth summit of the conference on interaction and confidence building measures in Asia. People’s Daily, p 2 Xi J (2014b) Speech at the nuclear security summit in The Hague, the Netherlands. People’s Daily, p2 Xi J (2015) Working together to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and create a community of shared future for mankind—statement at the general debate of the 70th session of the UN general assembly. People’s Daily, p 2 Xi J (2017) Adhering to cooperation, innovation, the rule of law and win-win results and promoting global security governance—speech at the opening ceremony of the 86th interpol general assembly. People’s Daily, p 2

Chapter 5

The BRI and China-World Interactions

China’s interaction with the world is a historical process with Chinese characteristics. It is the history of the two worlds feeling out and colliding with each other, of China’s traditional “world order” being broken, and of China’s being forcibly integrated, struggling and gradually adapting to the West-dominated international system. It is also a history of China’s integration into the world and shaping the world.1 This interaction has accelerated the change of China and the transformation of the world. China’s rapid development is not only an important part of the world’s transformation, but also a driving force.2 China has gradually become the center of the world’s transformation. In the new era, China is committed to contributing its thoughts, ideas and culture to the peaceful development of the world and the establishment of a community with a shared future for mankind. It aims to provide new drivers for the world, promoting sustainable development and providing public goods for the world’s peaceful development. With Chinese wisdom and solutions, we will promote the building of a new model of international relationship and a new international order based on equality, inclusiveness and cooperation,3 and the BRI is a strategic lever to boost positive interaction between China and the world. The BRI is an important development initiative put forward by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the face of complex domestic and international situations, and is regarded as a strategic ladder for China to build a community of shared future for all humankind, after taking stock of the overall situation and weighing the situation from various perspectives.4 With the active participation of more than 100 countries and international organizations, the BRI has become the most influential cooperation initiative in the world today, representing China’s

1 Men

(2016). (2011). 3 Zhang (2018). 4 Xing (2014). 2 Yang

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_5

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March towards a major world power.5 The BRI is aimed at realizing synergy in international development through the coordination of policies and plans of countries along the Belt and the Road and is committed to promoting the economic globalization with innovative means of cooperation. It is also aimed at promoting the historic transformation and upgrading of China’s open development layout.6 It is fair to say that the BRI has transcended the traditional scope of development cooperation and risen to the level of domestic and international governance,7 representing the organic integration of China’s opening up, regional cooperation and global development. The BRI is a strategic approach to the positive interaction between China and the world. The main contents are to analyze thoroughly the changes and characteristics of China’s relations with the world in the new era, and discuss whether China’s important period of strategic opportunity still exits and how to grasp and shape it; dialectically understand the strategic positioning of the BRI, explain the logical relationship among national strategy, regional strategy and global strategy from the perspective of building a national strategic system, and further discuss the interaction between the BRI and the national, regional and global strategies.

5.1 New Characteristics of China’s Interaction with the World in the New Era The model of China’s interaction with the world has drawn great attention. In contrast to the tributary system in ancient China and the impact-response model in modern and contemporary China, China’s relationship with the world has undergone fundamental and historic changes. Forty years of reform and opening up has facilitated China’s benign interaction with the world, making China closely tied to the world. China cannot afford to be isolated from the world and the world cannot shake off the influence of China.8 Entering the new era, China’s omnibearing influence on the world is even more evident. As the interests of China are often in conflict with that of the world and China is confronted with both more opportunities and challenges, it is necessary and urgent to have an in-depth study of China’s interaction with the world in the new era. Reform and opening up is the central force to drive the historic change in China’s relationship with the world. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee signified the onset of China’s reform and opening-up program. It is a historic turning point in China’s modernization drive and an important milestone in its development process. Since then, China has ended its close-door policy and has actively participated in economic globalization and regional integration. The rise of China comes with the transformation of the world, instilling infinite vitality 5 Li

(2016). (2017). 7 Gu and Zhai (2017). 8 Su (2012). 6 Zhang

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to the world economy. China is accelerating its pace of convergence with international standards and rapidly rising to become a major economic, trading and opening power, contributing a lot to the world peace. China’s ideas, thoughts, wisdom and solutions are arresting more and more world attention. China has grown into a cooperative, responsible, constructive and promising shaper of the international system, playing a significant or even leading role in world affairs.9 China has propelled the unprecedented changes of the world. One of the most obvious changes is the growing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world. In such an interdependent world, no country can distance itself or remain immune from challenges. Win-win cooperation is no longer an option, but the only choice.10 Xi Jinping pointed out that from the historical perspective, mankind has ushered in an age of great progress, great transformation and profound change. In this increasingly multi-polarized, economically globalized, digitized and culturally diversified world, the trend towards peace and development has become stronger, and reform and innovation are gaining momentum. Never have we seen such close interdependence between countries as today, and such a fervent desire of people for a better life, and never have we had so many means to prevail over difficulties. In reality, we find ourselves in a world fraught with challenges. Global economic growth requires new drivers, development needs to be more inclusive and balanced, and the gap between the rich and the poor needs to be narrowed. Regional hotspots continue to be volatile and terrorism is rampant. Deficits in peace, development and governance have posed daunting challenges to humanity.11 Humanity is also in an era of numerous challenges and increasing risks. Global growth is sluggish, the impact of the financial crisis lingers on, and the development gap is widening. Armed conflicts occur from time to time. Cold War mentality and power politics still exist. Nonconventional security threats, particularly terrorism, refugee crises, major communicable diseases and climate change, are spreading.12 On the one hand, we find interconnection and interdependence between countries are crucial for human survival. The forces of peace far outweigh factors causing war, and the trend of our times towards peace, development, cooperation, and win-win outcomes has gained stronger momentum. On the other hand, we need to be aware that the world has entered a period of transformation and there is a serious de-globalization trend. The difficulty of macro policy coordination among countries has increased. To accelerate economic recovery, the differences in national interests and policies among countries have been more obvious. Protectionism and trade barriers are growing. Some countries and interest groups, wrongly blaming globalization for the unequal distribution of benefits and the growing gap between the rich and the poor, are becoming the main force against globalization.13 As Xi Jinping pointed out, 20 or even 15 years ago, the major propellants of economic globalization were the US and other Western countries. Today, however, 9 Men

(2019). (2012). 11 Xi (2017). 12 Xi (2017). 13 Lin (2017). 10 Le

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China is considered the biggest driver of global trade liberalization and facilitation, resisting various forms of Western protectionism. The overall environment for open development is more favorable than ever before, but the conflicts, risks, and contests we are facing are also unprecedented, setting delicate traps for any potential negligence.14 At present, deficits in the spheres of peace, development and governance have posed daunting challenges to humanity. Mankind has once again come to a crossroad, having to make a right choice.15 When the world is in a dilemma and entering a period of “systemic dislocation”, Chinese socialism has entered the new era16 and China’s development has brought extensive and profound impact on the world. The stark contrast fiddles the nerves of many. While enjoying dividends that have come along with China’s development, some countries are becoming ambivalent and even hostile towards China’s growing influence,17 showing increasing doubts, suspicions and even dissatisfaction with China.18 The challenge of world transformation for China’s rejuvenation is clear. China’s interaction with the world has entered a more sensitive period. With its new strategic framework surfacing, China has conceived and implemented new international institutions such as the BRlCS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and has launched the BRI. The international community is observing closely to see whether China is working hard to change the international order and to be a shaper, or even challenger.19 At present, China is on the rapid rise, appearing more confident and open to the world while the world is becoming more complicated, with changes more profound and opportunities and challenges coexisting.20 What requires our close attention is the fact that China is big and not powerful yet. We need to have a clear understanding of the deep-rooted factors that have long hindered China’s development, as well as the prominent contradictions and problems encountered in reality. China needs to deal with them actively and appropriately. The snag is that with “China Threat” and “China Responsibility” interwoven, there exists a gap between China’s willingness and ability to take international responsibilities and the expectations from the international community, which increases their misgivings about China. Developed countries have stepped up their efforts to establish new international rules, and their intention to besiege China is clear. China’s surroundings have become more complex, and some neighboring countries are in doubt and fear of China’s rise, stepping up their alliance with the United States. It can be said that with rapid development, China is confronted with increasing international doubts, worries, difficulties and challenges. From a regional perspective, the new era of economic revival is unfolding in East Asia, and China is not only the leader, but also likely to be the biggest beneficiary, and the opportunities 14 Xi

(2017). (2017). 16 Zhou (2017). 17 Du (2014). 18 Zhang (2013). 19 Men (2016). 20 Hu (2014). 15 Qu

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and challenges for China’s future development in East Asia cannot be underestimated. On the negative side, globalization can bring in capital and technology quickly, but not good economic systems and market management capabilities, but rather great challenges. For East Asian integration, which relies on a market-driven rather than an institution-driven approach, a holistic institutional framework is still difficult to establish in the short term, and any future institutionalized arrangement that moves towards regionalism may have long-term negative impacts. If China only relied on opening up to the outside world without a profound transformation of its internal institutions and without domestic integration as a strategic underpinning, China’s integration with the rest of the world would be a kind of bubble-like opening up. The so-called opportunities of globalization can only be seized through deep reforms of domestic institutions, and that is the essence of the construction of a new open economic system. In other words, the interaction among states, regions and the world will promote China’s optimization of its national strategic system. To square up to domestic and international challenges, grasp international opportunities and achieve sustainable development, China is building a peaceful development strategy with global integration, self-revolution and shaping the world at its core, committed to enriching peaceful development and planning for things after its rise. 21 Today, the globalization is at a crossroads. The eyes of the world are on China, and China must not be a spectator or follower, but a participant and leader.22 With the principle of achieving shared growth through negotiation and collaboration, the BRI has been in line with economic globalization, global multi-polarity, cultural diversity and is aimed to build a world of interconnectivity, inclusiveness and mutual benefit. By drawing upon its own development experience, China will contribute its wisdom to solving the world’s development problems, representing a new force of safeguarding and promoting globalization.23 At the same time, the unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable nature of China’s development needs to be addressed urgently; how to combine the “bringing in” and “going global” and build a new model of development; how to adhere to a problem-oriented approach in opening up, use openness to fuel reform, make good use of both domestic and international markets and resources, integrate economic factors and allocate development resources on a global scale, and promote the realization of mutual benefit and win-win outcomes and the building of a community of shared future for humankind are major tasks before us. In a nutshell, China and the world in the new era are faced with the core issue of how to achieve benign interaction.

21 Men

(2016).

22 “Quicken the Pace of Implementing the Free Trade Zone Strategy and Building an Open Economic

System”, People’s Daily, December 7, 2014, p. 1. 23 Lin (2017).

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5.2 The BRI Helps Shape China’s New Key Period of Strategic Opportunity The Belt and Road Initiative plays an important part in maintaining and expanding a new period of strategic opportunity for China. “I have come up with this Belt and Road Initiative based on my observation of and reflection on the situation of the world,” said Xi Jinping. In today’s world of interdependence and global challenges, it is difficult for individual countries to stand alone and solve the common problems confronting the world. Only by coordinating national policies with each other and integrating economic factors and development resources on a broader global scale can we create synergy and promote world peace and development.24 This indicates that the BRI is a major strategic initiative put forward by China at a time when it is facing international changes, and it is a strategic move that integrates the domestic and international situations. The BRI is China’s core strategic design in the new era; it has a bearing on the success or failure of China’s reform and opening-up, as well as on the prospects for world peace and development. The BRI is a derivative of China’s opening-up strategy in the new era. The BRI is an objective need to implement a more proactive strategy of opening up to the outside world. As a new type of international economic cooperation platform under China’s all-round and proactive opening-up strategy, the BRI takes strategic coordination as a concrete implementation goal and promotes the formation of a global open economic system with China at its center and its periphery as its hinterland, reflecting the oriental wisdom of openness, inclusiveness, flexibility and pragmatism.25 The BRI is China’s ideal pursuit of and realistic path towards a new type of world power. The BRI emphasizes the organic integration of China’s openness, regional cooperation and global development. China calls for the joint promotion of the great process of building a community with a shared future, and advocates developing a new type of international relations. The new type of international relations is based on China’s adherence to the path of peaceful development, its commitment to becoming a new type of major power, its pursuit of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and its pursuit of win-win solutions through international cooperation, and its common endeavor to work for a better world. The BRI is aimed to explore for a model of international cooperation. The construction of the Belt and Road is based on the coordination of the development plans of countries along the route, with emphasis on economic and trade cooperation, especially the enhancement of connectivity, and with trade and investment liberalization and facilitation as the link, promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in various forms among governments, enterprises, social institutions and NGOs, and building a multi-subject, all-round and cross-sectoral cooperation platform.26 The 24 Xi

(2017). (2015); Jin (2015); Xia (2016). 26 Wang (2017). 25 Yu

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BRI embodies a new model of international cooperation based on common development as the core, openness and inclusiveness as its characteristics, and macroeconomic policy coordination and market-driven development as its two wheels. China, deeply aware of the global shock brought about by China’s rise, affirms its firm will to pursue peaceful development, and welcomes other countries to board China’s train of development, committed to developing friendly and cooperative relations with other countries, and emphasizing the equal status of collaborators. Besides, China is dedicated to sharing the dividends of development, appropriately surrendering non-strategic interests and actively assuming the responsibilities of a major power.27 The above-mentioned strategic positioning shows that the BRI actively meets China’s major needs in shaping a period of strategic opportunity, and has become an important strategic lever to promote China’s deepening of domestic reform and opening up to the outside world on all fronts. Compared with the “Marshall Plan”, its internal strategic meanings are richer and its external strategic means are more diversified. The Five-pronged Approach of policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties not only represents the richness of strategic channels, but also reflects openness and inclusiveness.28 The BRI aims, first and foremost, to create a more complete market economic system and a more formative external environment, and is committed to shaping a new order and pattern of international peace, development and win-win cooperation.29 It marks China’s transformation from a participant in economic globalization into a facilitator, providing support and dynamism for the advancement of economic globalization with China’s strength and capacity,30 and demonstrating a positive willingness to provide more public goods and opportunities for free-riding.31 As Xi Jinping has pointed out, focusing on China’s own development, the BRI offers an opportunity for more countries to board China’s express train of development and helps them achieve their development goals. While developing our own interests, we should give more consideration to the interests of other countries. We should stick to the sound values of justice and benefit, with high priority given to justice. We should not seek quick successes and instant benefits, nor should we engage in short-term behavior. It is necessary to take into account the common interests and respective interests and concerns of China and other countries along the Belt and Road, find more areas for converging interests and mobilize the enthusiasm of the participating countries.32 The conceptualization and implementation of the BRI demonstrate that the path to shaping China’s new period of strategic opportunity is to be domestically based, globally oriented and focused on countries along the route, reflecting a strategic vision that integrates the national, regional and global dimensions and constituting 27 Men

(2017). (2015). 29 Lin (2017). 30 Xie (2016). 31 Liu (2018). 32 Xi (2017). 28 Yu

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the main vein of China’s national strategic system in the new era. China’s national strategic system is based on the coordination of national and international strategies, and consists of three mutually reinforcing levels: national strategy is the foundation of the national strategic system, which is based on basic national conditions and has as its core objective the improvement of the domestic strategic layout; global strategy reflects the macroscopic vision of the national strategic system, with participation and sharing as its basic aspiration and the active assumption of international responsibilities and obligations; and regional strategy is the geopolitical underpinning of the national strategic system, with the building of regional institutions as the main vein of regional cooperation and the building of regional order as the vision of regional cooperation.33 Arguably, the BRI takes the shaping of China’s strategic opportunity period as the core direction, and takes the national layout, global vision and regional centers as the basic layout.

5.3 The BRI and Layout of China’s National Development The BRI is closely related to regional coordinated development and optimization of national development layout. The Belt and Road construction is based on the domestic market, the formation of which requires effective development, and prioritizing the domestic market is an important cornerstone for the BRI.34 As an important move to establish a new pattern of open economy in China in the new era, the BRI covers the eastern, central, western, southern and northern regions, and different areas of provinces, cities and counties, and bears the historical responsibility of driving the regional opening-up, reform and development. In the long period to come, all parts of the country, whether coastal developed areas or inland underdeveloped areas, provincial administrative regions or municipal administrative districts, should take an active part in the Belt and Road construction according to local conditions to improve their own open economy. The building of the Belt and Road brings various opportunities and challenges to different regions, which undertake different functions and tasks in advancing the BRI. The three major regional development strategies—the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Yangtze River Economic Belt and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, with different strategic objectives and priorities, have assumed the important functions of coordinating the eastern, central and western regions, as well as the northern and southern regions, and playing as pioneers of demonstration. The above three are major strategic initiatives to promote coordinated regional development in China. Promoting their in-depth coordination and integrative interaction with the BRI is of great significance to comprehensively expanding China’s opening-up to the outside world and promoting coordinated regional development in the new era.35 33 Men

(2018). and Li (2016). 35 Gao et al. (2018). 34 Huang

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On the other hand, the BRI has given China an international vision of coordinating regional development, and one of its objectives is to coordinate regional development in China through international cooperation, which has greatly expanded the room for maneuver of China’s economic activities and provided a new engine for China’s economic growth.36 In alignment with the BRI, an important part of China’s development is to open up land and sea routes in China’s southwestern, western and northern regions, so as to overcome the geographical disadvantages of these regions and create conditions for the realization of open development.37 The BRI promotes China’s opening-up process to the western regions and to the sea in the east, helping to make the inland and border areas the frontiers of opening up to the outside world. While developing the six major economic corridors including China-Mongolia-Russia, New Eurasia Land Bridge, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia and other border provinces have become the frontier and bridgehead group for a new round of opening up, which has made China’s past inland border areas the focus and breakthrough point of the country’s opening-up strategy in the new era.38 China must rely more on domestic conditions to support its peaceful development process and strive to achieve coordinated domestic and international development, the most important element of which is to achieve domestic integration.39 China’s relative backwardness in domestic integration is due to both profound historical reasons and the greater influence of its policy preference for openness to the outside world. China’s reform and opening up started with the theory of allowing some people to get rich first, but Deng Xiaoping once clearly pointed out that, “The coastal areas, which comprise a vast region with a population of 200 million, should accelerate their opening to the outside world, and we should help them develop rapidly first; afterwards they can promote the development of the interior. The development of the coastal areas is of overriding importance, and the interior provinces should subordinate themselves to it. When the coastal areas have developed to a certain extent, they will be required to give still more help to the interior. Then, the development of the interior provinces will be of overriding importance, and the coastal areas will in turn have to subordinate themselves to it.”40 Since the onset of the twenty-first century, China has greatly optimized its strategy of coordinated regional development. The report to the 19th CPC National Congress has charted a blueprint for “strengthening measures to reach a new stage in the large-scale development of the western region, deepening reform to accelerate the revitalization of old industrial bases in the northeast and other parts of the country, helping the central region rise by tapping into local strengths, supporting the eastern region in taking the lead in pursuing optimal development through innovation and putting in place new, effective mechanisms to 36 Zhang

(2018). (2017). 38 Chen (2017). 39 Men (2018). 40 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, pp. 277–278. 37 Zhang

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ensure coordinated development of different regions”,41 which is a core strategy for realizing regional overall development. The regional opening-up layout in the new era is led by the BRI, which is in line with national strategies such as the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, and the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, so as to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea.42 Admittedly, the BRI is an essential and a regional coordination strategy that plays a leading role. The implementation of the BRI will give full play to the advantages of various regions in China. China will follow a more proactive opening up strategy, and strengthen interaction and cooperation between the east and the west, so an open economy shall be improved in an all-around way. In this way, a new model of opening up will be created, forming a four-pronged open pattern in the east, west, north and south, covering the land, the sea, the air and the cyberspace, with the Belt and Road linking all regions and the two powerhouses leading.43 The BRI is dedicated to creating two core areas in Xinjiang and Fujian, strengthening the cooperation between the western, central and eastern regions, coordinating the development of the northwestern, northeastern, southwestern and coastal areas, and enhancing the cooperation between Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and inland areas. The Initiative is a nationwide integrated strategy that covers the whole country, adapts to local conditions, and engages all parties to cooperate. It is a grand concept advocated by the state and participated by all regions and departments. The BRI is the most successful initiative for external economic cooperation put forward by the central government to attract local participation, with more than 20 provinces actively participating. No other economic diplomacy initiative has ever attracted so many provinces to participate in before.44 Since the launch of the BRI, various localities have paid great attention to it and taken the initiative to align with it. Based on China’s advantages in capital, production capacity and technology, the BRI is committed to promoting the transformation of the China’s eastern region and the development of the central and western parts of the country, so as to establish a new layout of opening up. The BRI has opened up a new realm for China’s opening up, and with the advancement of the BRI, the central and western parts of China have moved from the marginal areas to the forefront of opening up.45 China’s western region has long lagged behind the eastern and central regions in terms of the overall economic development and openness to the outside world, and the gap is increasingly widening, which is detrimental to China’s stable and sustainable development. The implementation of the BRI has provided a major historical opportunity for the development of an open economy in the western regions.46 The report of the 41 Xi

(2017). (2019). 43 Qu (2017). 44 Song (2015), Men (2017). 45 Zhong (2018). 46 Wang (2016). 42 Men

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19th CPC National Congress paid great attention to the development of the western region, making it a top priority to optimize regional layout.47 At present, China is working with countries along the Belt and Road to promote the construction of the six major economic corridors. The western region of China should speed up infrastructure construction and connectivity, and facilitate trade and investment in line with the overall BRI layout. China shall do a good job in building pilot free trade zones, economic and technological development zones, high-tech industrial development zones, special customs supervision zones, border economic cooperation zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones, do the best to cultivate export-oriented industrial clusters with distinctive advantages, continuously improve the capability of undertaking industrial transfer, and open up new space for the development of the export-oriented economy.48 In relation to this, the central region is located in the middle of the East-West region and can make full use of its geographical advantages to develop.49 The BRI is expected to promote economic ties and cooperation between the western, central and northeastern regions and the coastal areas of China, so as to facilitate the establishment of a new opening-up pattern for coordinated regional development. It will make China focus more on outward connectivity in terms of territorial spatial development and open up the gateways to the world in the south, north and west, on the basis of the opening up of the eastern coast. The BRI will not only facilitate the formation of several metropolitan economic areas and open economic highlands in inland areas, but also highlight the roles of the domestic development axes in alignment with the international transport routes, thus to form a territorial space pattern that is open to the outside world on all fronts. While further enhancing the competitive edge of coastal areas, the BRI has potential to accelerate the development of border cities and major ports in inland and border areas, open up new space for land development and boost the development of border areas.50 The BRI is also expected to promote the economic restructuring and improve the modernized economic system, which will be conducive to the establishment of a new open economy. At the same time, the provinces and municipalities will take the Belt and Road construction as an opportunity to make use of their respective regional, geographical and other advantages to promote the regional development along the route, giving full play to its growth poles’ driving and demonstration effect, and thus forming a good situation of competitive development.

47 Xi

(2017). (2018). 49 Zhang (2017). 50 Liu et al. (2015), Chi (2018). 48 Wu

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5.4 The BRI and Interaction Between China and the World Lao-zi said, “View the world with a world view”. Xi Jinping stated, “I have come up with this Belt and Road Initiative based on my observation of and reflection on the situation of the world. …It involves countries in different regions, at different development stages and with different cultures. It is a platform of open and inclusive cooperation and a public good we jointly provide to the world. While the Belt and Road Initiative focuses on the Asian and European continents, it is open to all likeminded friends; it does not exclude or target any party. In pursuing international cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, the parties follow the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, and join hands to meet global economic challenges. Aiming to draw on each other’s strength and deliver win-win results, the parties will explore new opportunities, seek new drivers and expand new space for development, moving closer toward a community of shared future for mankind.”51 Judging from the implementation results over the past five years, the BRI has substantially promoted China’s interaction with the world. The BRI embodies China’s strategic pursuit and ideological innovation. The BRI is seen by many as China’s roadmap to becoming a world power.52 “The BRI is guided by the ideal of building a community with a shared future for mankind, with the establishment of a new type of international relations as the path, the development of a network of partnerships as the focus and the win-win benefits as the goal. The “community with a shared future for mankind”, which is rich in content, systematically answers the major question of what kind of world to build in the new era. Xi Jinping made clear in the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC that the people of all countries should work together to build a community with a shared future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.53 The “community with a shared future for mankind”, which closely links China’s development prospects with the world’s common aspirations, points the way to a new type of globalization and to the common prosperity of all humankind. China advocates a new type of international relations and is committed to breaking the predicament confronting the rise of major powers through win-win cooperation to avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap. To achieve a new type of international relations, China should follow a path of peaceful development, forge a new model of major-country relations and remain firm in pursuing major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. The core is to build a community with a shared future for mankind and create a better world through win-win cooperation. In essence, China should keep with the times, abandon zero-sum mentality, and avoid unilateral hegemony. It should seek open and inclusive development to achieve its goals and optimize its international relations with other countries through coordination and cooperation.54 China emphasizes 51 Xi

(2017). (2015). 53 Xi (2017). 54 Men (2016). 52 Ma

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developing global partnerships and expanding the convergence of interests with other countries. To date, China has established various forms of partnerships with more than 100 countries and blocs and achieved positive results at the global, regional, bilateral and national levels. China’s partnership strategy takes the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as its foundation, safeguarding national interests and expanding international influence as its direction, political mutual trust, economic interdependence, cultural integration, social interaction and security support as its strategic means, and the improvement of bilateral relations as the way to expand the country’s global strategy. The most obvious global significance of China’s partnership strategy lies in providing a strategic framework for dialogue and cooperation, thus creating a model for a new type of international relations. China emphasizes mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, comprehensively implements a mutually beneficial strategy of opening-up, and calls for cooperation to replace confrontation and win-win cooperation to replace monopoly so as to promote mutual assistance and progress among countries. China lays stress on the spirit of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, calling for a sense of a community of shared future for mankind, and advocating that all countries in the world take into account the legitimate concerns of others while pursuing their own national interests, and promote the common development of all other countries while advancing their own development. At the same time, it calls for a renewed, more equitable and balanced global partnership. This strategic thinking reflects the strategic direction of win-winism. The above-mentioned conceptual innovations, along with the practice of the Belt and Road construction, embody the traditional Chinese philosophy of viewing knowledge and action as a unity. The BRI is expected to promote the transformative development of global governance and has become an important force leading a new type of globalization. The BRI, stemming from the deep thinking of Chinese policymakers on the process of globalization and anti-globalization ideology, enjoys the attributes of being the right remedy for the problem. From the perspective of global governance, the BRI draws on past experience in the management of global crises, breaks through the bottlenecks in global economic development in a peaceful manner and leads global governance towards a more equitable and rational direction.55 The BRI embodies the Silk Road spirit featuring peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit, adheres to the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in response to the inherent requirements of the transformation of the global governance system, and demonstrates the sense of building a community of shared future for mankind featuring cooperation and the division of responsibilities. It is a cooperative version of international economic governance, a win-win version of economic globalization and a Chinese version of international public goods, providing new ideas and solutions for the improvement of the global economic governance.56 The path of pluralistic governance and consultative governance under the BRI principle and the goal of building a community of shared future for mankind profoundly embody the new global governance ideology of 55 Liu

and Wang (2016). (2018).

56 Zhong

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extensive consultation, joint development and shared benefits, and represent China’s choice of the path of peaceful development, openness and cooperation, as well as its responsibility and commitment to promoting the common development, prosperity and security of the world.57 The BRI reflects China’s endeavors in shaping the institutions of international economic relations, and it has become an important strategic deployment that is regionally based and demonstrates a global perspective. The BRI takes on a pragmatic development orientation, exploring new modes of cooperation, which will lead to a new union of the developing world. The BRI has expanded the scope of China’s opening-up for cooperation with developed countries to include developing countries as well, and is committed to promoting China’s full opening up to the developing world and the opening of the Southern countries to each other, with development strategy coordination as the main focus, which is an important milestone in the optimization of China’s international strategy and a major step in the deepening of China’s development strategy. It is meanwhile an important manifestation of the strategic vision of Xi Jinping that “common development is the very foundation of sustainable development”.58 The partners involved in the BRI are mainly the underdeveloped economies of Asia and Africa. The Belt and Road runs through the Eurasian continent, and the vast hinterland between East Asia and Europe. These countries are rich in resources but relatively under-developed, and are the focus of China’s further opening up, a major destination for China’s exploration of international markets and an important source of resources and energy. The BRI shall be able to integrate China’s high quality production capacity, technology and price advantages with the markets, labor forces and needs of transformation in Asian, European and African countries. Through strategic coordination at all levels, China can build a global value chain with shared benefits so that production factors under the law of market economy can freely flow in these countries, which will help to establish a new global value chain with China at its core. In the form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRI promotes mutually beneficial cooperation between governments, enterprises, social institutions and NGOs, and aims to establish all-around cooperation platforms for multiple parties across various sections and mobilize their participation.59 In view of this, strategic coordination will be the core means and path of the BRI. Strategic coordination should be based on the development strategies of other participating countries, coordinating the BRI and their development strategies. It will be realized through policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration and closer people-to-people ties, embodying the principle of extensive consultation, joint development and shared benefits, and profound strategic innovation. The BRI does not follow the old path of “system first, commitment first”. Instead, it is advanced through equal consultation and project cooperation. By doing so, there will be no pressure on participating countries to commit to greater openness,60 thus 57 Qin

and Wei (2018). (2014). 59 Wang (2017). 60 Qin and Wei (2018). 58 Xi

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creating a solid foundation for a substantial new united front for development. The BRI has contributed substantially to the positive interaction between China and the developing world and has given impetus to the integrated development across Asia, Europe and Africa. It is reshaping the world’s economic geography61 and making a positive contribution to global development.

5.5 The BRI and Interaction Between China and Other Regions To overcome challenges arising from the rise of China, the BRI seeks to reconstruct China’s original geopolitical and economic strategy62 . As such, the BRI should, first and foremost, be viewed as China’s new regional strategy. Throughout the course of “World History”, there has not been a single power that has not thrived on its existing dominance in its regional affairs.63 Generally speaking, one who fails to plan for the whole situation is incapable of planning for a partial area. However, amid the trends of economic globalization and regional integration, it is not possible to look at the whole picture without looking at one area. At a time when regional cooperation is in full swing, and economy and trade, security and politics are being reorganized within a regional framework, we are ushering in the new era of regional integration as countries are making policy and strategic adjustments to facilitate regional cooperation. Countries are acutely aware that in an era of economic globalization and regional integration in parallel, the prosperity of each country can only be secured by the that of the wider region it belongs to.64 In general, under the influence of historical inheritance, China tends to characterize regional relations as its relations with neighboring areas, and countries along the Belt and Road can be taken together as an expansion of regions and neighboring areas. The countries that the Belt and Road pass through basically cover China’s neighboring areas. The countries involved in the BRI span across Asia, Europe, and Africa, extending from Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia to Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, leading all the way to Central and Eastern Europe and North Africa. They have a vast territory, abundant resources, and many development opportunities. On the other hand, most of these countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, and even Central and Eastern Europe, boast important geo-strategic value, which attracts major powers’ attention.65 At present, China is facing both great opportunities to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and political relations with these countries and regions, and mounting geopolitical 61 Chen

(2017). and Li (2015). 63 Men (2014). 64 Lee (2004). 65 Zhou (2018). 62 Li

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pressure and suppression from the East and the West. China must achieve sustainable development by breaking through the geo-strategic blockade and expanding the scope for development cooperation. Through the BRI, China’s strategy towards the west and south can offset the suppression coming from the east, alleviate the strategic pressure exerted by the United States and other countries in the field of free trade negotiations to isolate China, and forestall their plans. We will expand development scope on both land and sea, building international land routes and maritime supply lines to obtain more overseas strategic fulcrums, so as to break the U.S. strategic soft containment and lay a solid foundation for improving China’s overall strategic environment.66 Of course, we are more deeply aware of the value of East Asia’s strategic support for China, which is a strategic opportunity for China to shift from a regional power to global power and thus fulfill its global responsibilities.67 As the world’s strategic center of gravity moves eastwards, China will, undoubtedly, focus its strategy on the region of East Asia and propose a systematic strategy. 68 The BRI constitutes a strategic plan focusing on East Asia and China’s neighboring areas with a global view. By providing regional public goods, China works to reconstruct the geo-pattern of China and Eurasian countries and its surrounding maritime countries. The BRI is a regional arrangement that is manifested by the construction of economic cooperation corridors on land and sea, connected by transportation routes, built on inter-connectivity and characterized by a diversified cooperation mechanism, and its goal is to build a community of shared future for all mankind. Asian countries feature high on the agenda, with Southeast Asia and Central Asia being the core areas. As Xi Jinping pointed out, the Belt and Road both trace their origins to Asia, and they will find support in Asia.69 The significance of Southeast Asia and Central Asia is self-evident given that they are situated on China’s mainlines of connectivity with the west and south. On the other hand, considering the wide range of the BRI, some geographical pivots are required to function as strategic fulcrums connecting regions involved. In terms of geography, the South China Sea and surrounding areas are the strategic bases of the Maritime Silk Road, and Myanmar and Pakistan are respectively the eastern and western anchors of the Maritime Silk Road. Central Asia is the commercial center of the ancient Silk Road, and Kazakhstan is at a crucial position, and Russia is the bridge of the ancient Silk Road.70 From a broader geographical perspective, Australia, Germany, Poland, Egypt, Turkey, and other countries all reflect the important value of strategic fulcrums, which are worthy of our attention. Given the diversity of participating countries and regions, China actively promotes inclusive cooperation and highlights common development through win-win cooperation.71 Complementary to this, the innovative value of the BRI lies in the initiative of coordinating development of countries in the region, which means achieving 66 Lu

and Li (2016). and Zhou (2006). 68 Yu (2012). 69 Xi (2017). 70 Du and Ma (2015). 71 Duan (2017). 67 Dai

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common development by having common understanding of development and jointly creating soft and hard conditions for regional development. Synergy is neither a binding commitment to countries nor an external condition difficult to grasp, but a variety of measures and projects that are tangible and jointly determined.72 The BRI has expanded the space for regional cooperation, accelerated the process of regional cooperation, promoted the interconnection between and within regions, and raised the level of regional integration. Some landmark achievements have been made. China has built five free trade zones with 13 countries along the Belt and Road, signed an economic and trade cooperation agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, completed the joint feasibility study of the Eurasia Economic Partnership Agreement between China and Russia, and vigorously promoted the negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). These achievements have accelerated the building of a network of high-standard free trade enterprises involving China’s neighboring areas, covering regions along the Belt and Road and embracing the world.73 With continuous in-depth development of the BRI, the policy coordination of countries along the Belt and Road based on connectivity and common development is becoming ever more institutionalized, and China’s leading role has been respected and supported by those countries. A new model of international rule-making has taken shape. What deserves our attention is that the geopolitical objectives of the BRI have aroused various worries in the United States, Japan, India, and Europe, and the geopolitical competition among Europe, Asia and Africa is heating up. Similarly, neighboring countries do have their share of concerns about China’s strategic direction. They hope to be a recipient of not only benefits, but also goodwill. Because of the large number of participating countries and the considerable difference in the level of socio-economic development, the construction of the Belt and Road will not be accomplished overnight, and bilateral, sub-regional and regional cooperation should be carried out based on the reality at different levels and in different fields. It should be done step by step and seek breakthroughs accordingly.

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Chapter 6

China’s New Strategy for Dealing with Global Governance Crisis and Reform

Global governance is initiated by globalization. It is based on interdependence and guided by theories of a shared community for mankind and common interest.1 It follows the path of coordination of major powers and international cooperation. It is also an important source of forces driving the changes of the times. In particular, the outbreak of and response to every global governance crisis is an opportunity for the reform of the international order, and often an opportunity to build a new type of international relations. In the twenty-first century, when the impacts of globalization as a double-edged sword are increasingly felt, the rise and fall of great powers have accelerated, and the world has ushered in the new era of global governance development and transformation. Especially amid the responses to the European and American financial and debt crises, global governance reform has become a strategic issue that all countries were concerned about. This wave of global governance reform is centered on crisis response, which involves not only the redistribution of international power and international interests but also that of international responsibilities, and the clash of different global concepts, leading to fierce competition among major powers. Great changes took place in the balance of power between developed countries in Europe and America and emerging powers. At the same time, global governance expanded from local to global, coupled with the emergence of new global problems. Both the international rules and institutional arrangements in the field of global governance are severely challenged and the governance of new fields of problems urgently require the making of rules and institutional arrangements. The combination of global governance crisis and reform as well as the development has brought great challenges and rare opportunities to the strategy of the major countries. The crisis, transformation and development of global governance provide rare strategic opportunities for China to be fully integrated into the international community and to participate in global governance. They are also an important international condition for China to promote its comprehensive rise and make post-rise plans. At 1 Cai

(2004).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_6

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present, China’s involvement in the global governance is deepening. China participates in international affairs in all respects, actively promotes international cooperation and innovation, and plays an increasingly important role in the resolution of global affairs and regional issues. Chinese thought and solutions have attracted worldwide attention. On the other hand, different countries prefer different and conflicting governance ideas and models, and cooperation in the face of crisis may give way to confrontation. In the coming five to ten years, we still see fierce competition among different governance models.2 As the United Nations Commission on Global Governance points out, global governance is a broad, dynamic and complex process, and “the creation of adequate governance mechanisms will be complicated because these must be more inclusive and participatory–that is, more democratic–than in the past. They must be flexible enough to respond to new problems and new understanding of old ones. There must be an agreed global framework for actions and policies to be carried out at appropriate levels.”3 Based on this, the core objective of China’s global governance strategy should be to seize the opportunities presented by the crisis, transformation and development of global governance, actively participate in and promote the construction of the global governance system, so as to become the designer shaping the future global governance system, make constructive contributions to a new governance model,4 and, ultimately, create a better international environment for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

6.1 The Response to Global Governance Crisis: History and Theory The United Nations Commission on Global Governance noted that governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements. Based on this, global governance is a mechanism for solving global problems through international cooperation, carrying out institutionalized cooperation to respond to shared problems and challenges, and seeking common interests. Efforts should be made to overcome difficulties and share rights and interests. It’s necessary to jointly manage and regulate the world in which we live.5 Global governance is deeply connected to international norms and mechanisms: Only by forming international norms can it be possible to restrain the will and behavior of countries and to reach cooperation through negotiation and compromise, and only by establishing 2 He

et al. (2013). and Ramphal (1995). 4 Xue and Yu (2015). 5 He (2015, p. 1). 3 Carlsson

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international mechanisms can the institutionalization of global governance be guaranteed. Due to the lack of unified authority in the international community, global governance is fundamentally different from domestic governance. It lacks a generally recognized authority to formulate governance rules and implement them effectively. Therefore, on one hand, global governance is a multi-level system involving diverse participants; on the other hand, it is a power and authority framework dominated by cooperation and competition among sovereign states.6 Despite this, the introduction of the concept of global governance is still epoch-making, and it is a direct challenge to the traditional theory of international relations, for global governance, which views the world as a whole, is a product of the development of globalization to a certain stage. Global governance was inaugurated by globalization, the first wave of which in human history began with the creation of capitalist industry during the Industrial Revolution. As Marx and Engels noted, “Modern industry has established the world market … given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.”7 Hu Jian pointed out that the global governance that emerged after capital initiated the course of “World History” was to serve the largest surplus-value, and global governance with capital as its tool and means was an abnormal order based on non-moral values.8 Ren Jiantao believed that broadly speaking, global governance emerged amid the process of capital creating “World History” and the resulting cross-border and cross-ethnic relations. Today’s global governance suffers from alienation in terms of both facts and value, which is plagued by the lack of resources and a serious deficit in value.9 Global governance developed along with the tide of globalization and the response to global governance crisis. The former globalized warfare and brought the international system from Europe to the world; the latter gave rise to globalized international institutions, especially the institutionalized arrangements of international order that emerged after the Second World War. This marked the beginning of a global governance system in the true sense. However, the opening chapter of global governance was hegemonic politics, especially the US-Soviet contention for hegemony, which actually paved the way for partial global governance. This meant that only some countries participated, and that only some problematic areas were involved in global governance. Both the participants and the problematic areas were at the mercy of hegemonic politics. As such, western countries and hegemonic powers conveniently seized the opportunity in terms of the formulation of rules and allocation of resources.10 In the 1960s, the Western colonial system collapsed and the once marginal regions claimed independence one after another. A strong force was congregating in the third world, which changed the bipolar hegemonic world landscape but 6 Xun

(2016, p. 64). of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 114. 8 Jian (2016). 9 Jiantao (2004). 10 For the relevant analysis, see Zhang (2013). 7 Anthologies

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also stirred up global problems. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United Nations was gradually reduced to a tool for the two superpowers’ hegemonic competition. With the decline of US economic leadership and more frequent global economic governance crisis, the handling of international affairs needed a new international mechanism, and thus the Group of Seven (G7) was established. During the Cold War, constrained by the bipolar system, the G7 mainly aimed to discuss economic issues, coordinate macroeconomic policies of western countries and unite against the Soviet Union. Although it was also concerned with global issues, its influence was mainly confined to the capitalist countries in Europe and America. Since the 1990s, the G7 gradually evolved from maintaining and being controlled by the bipolar hegemonic structure to promoting and shaping a new international structure. To address its shortcomings in tackling global challenges, the G7 gained new members, established new agenda and deepened institutions. By doing so, it undertook institutional reforms, facilitated the negotiation mechanism for developed and developing countries, and sought to upgrade itself to be a center of effective global governance.11 At the same time, the simultaneous rise of major developing countries created a conducive climate; this, together with the flourishing of regionalism, meant that significant reforms to the international landscape were in the making. Reforms to the United Nations were on the agenda. With the outbreak of and response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, existing international institutions appeared threadbare amid an increasingly globalized world,12 so reform of the international financial system was put on the agenda. These reforms paved the way for the new era of global governance. The outbreak of the financial crisis and the response to it in Europe and America in 2008 was a landmark event in the history of global governance. It showed that the existing international system and governance mechanisms were unable to adapt to the new global situation or cope with new challenges and problems brought by the rapid development of globalization in a world with profound and complex changes in political, economic, diplomatic and military landscapes. New ideas and paths should be explored for global governance in the new era. The G20 summit, first held in November 2008 in Washington, set a precedent for the transformation and development of global governance as China and other emerging powers entered the central decision-making circle of global governance. Participating states reached an important consensus on global development cooperation, economic governance reform, promotion of global economic growth, and opposition to trade protectionism, and established the role of G20 in global governance as a platform for making rules, 11 In 1997, Russia was formally admitted to the Group of Seven, and the expanded Group of Eight (G8) has moved towards a role of contributing to the formation and shaping of a new international system. The transformation had been stronger and the pace to building a new center of power had been faster. Subsequently, the G8 intensified its dialogue with emerging countries, leading to the formation of a more regular “G8+5” dialogue mechanism in 2005, which has become a new form of engagement of developing countries in international affairs. However, the “G8+5” mechanism has not substantially changed the pattern of inequality featuring “the dominance of developed countries and subordination of developing countries”. See He (2015, pp. 30–32). 12 Kirton (2015, pp. 485–486).

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sorting out priorities and setting trends. Building on this, remarkable progress was made in handling global governance crisis, which has laid a solid foundation for global governance transformation. On the other hand, the current architecture of global governance was built on various international institutions after the WWII, which were once set up and are now skillfully run by the United States. However, each country has its own grievances and the urge to change and improve that architecture, so does the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has become ever more multi-polarized, and the global political and economic landscape has been redrawn. Financial and economic crises have broken out one after another, especially in Latin America, Russia, Asia and even core areas of developed countries such as Europe and the United States, calling the “Washington Consensus” into doubt. Neoliberalism brought about global turmoil, making global governance reform imperative. As the world witnessed the collective rise of countries on the periphery and their integration into the central decisionmaking mechanism of global governance, the traditional governance mechanism based on the dominant roles of the United States and European countries could no longer suffice. At the same time, new global governance paradigm has not yet formed. Global governance crisis is impossible to eliminate completely. The current global governance which is threatened by growing dangers, and the prospect of new governance models, give us an opportunity both to reflect on existing theories and build new theoretical models. First and foremost, there have been frequent global governance crises, most notably in the United States and Europe, urging us to reinterpret the theory of hegemonic stability. Hegemonic stability theory was put forward by Charles Kindleberger when he analyzed the conditions for sustaining free trade and the Great Depression from 1929 to 1939. Thus, it was regarded as the answer explaining the driving force of global economic development.13 Kindleberger has pointed out that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer—one stabilizer.”14 He highlighted that the altruism and far-sightedness of the leading hegemonic power is the core condition for protecting the world’s interests.15 The basic proposition of hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemonic power establishes a hegemonic system and formulates the basic principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures of the system. The hegemonic power’s strength and prestige are important prerequisites for other countries’ acceptance of these international institutions. By sustaining this hegemonic system with these institutions, the hegemonic power seeks to maximize its own interests. In order to maintain the system, it can offer public goods to other countries within the system and tolerate free riders. Any decline or drastic change in the hegemonic power will lead to a corresponding change in the international institutions of the system.16 The hegemon first creates stable international institutions for free trade, and then moves on to assume dominance in the establishment of international institutions in problematic 13 Grunberg

(1990). (1973). 15 Stein (1984). 16 Hasenclever et al. (1997). 14 Kindleberger

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areas to bring stability to international economic order. The decline of hegemony will surely cause global instability.17 The theory of hegemonic stability is mainly based on material resources of power, and its inability to explain other dimensions of power often comes under criticism.18 The traditional global governance system is caught up in hegemonic politics and is often a captive to hegemonic powers. This is the main reason for the weakening of the United Nations’ global governance standing and the fragmentation of global governance mechanisms. Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, the selfish United States has shown its true color. Its ability and willingness to provide public goods have greatly dropped, and it has been half-hearted about coordinating a joint response to challenges with other powers. Hegemonic instability itself disturbs global stability. It poses a threat to the existing global governance system, becoming one of the main causes of the lingering crisis affecting global governance. Secondly, the outbreak of global governance crisis and its response have highlighted the failure of individual-centered neoliberalism, reflecting the strategic value of great power coordination and the necessity of rebuilding international institutions. Robert Gilpin has contended that the decline of hegemony and the growth of emerging powers have resulted in a decisive redistribution of power. To rebalance the system, there are two routes that a hegemon could follow. On the one hand, it could seek the resources needed for maintaining its international status and bearing international obligations. On the other hand, it could reduce the present responsibilities to protect its status from collapse. Furthermore, to prevent the transfer of hegemony, the dominant power could adopt the following specific strategies. First, it could address the root cause of the problem by waging a preventive war to eliminate or weaken emerging challengers; Second, it could seek to reduce the costs of maintaining its position through further expansion; and third, it could reduce or give up some of its foreign commitments, allying itself with or seeking peaceful relationships with less threatening countries, and making concessions to the rising power to appease its ambitions.19 Going on, Robert Gilpin puts forward the theory that hegemony and policy coordination of major powers are co-existent, emphasizing the value of multilateral management and policy coordination.20 As a representative of neoliberal institutionalism, Robert Keoghan thoroughly criticized the hegemonic stability theory, stressing that cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have been established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is also possible.21 His theory of the stability of international institutions holds that an international institution has a life of its own; the growing interdependence of the international community means that the international institution will continue to develop in a way that is not entirely dependent on the will of the

17 Kindleberger

(1981), Snidal (1985). (1989), Stein (1984). 19 Gilpin (1994a). 20 Gilpin (1994b). 21 Keohane (1984). 18 Ikenberry

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hegemonic country.22 Keoghan is deeply aware of the limitations of neoliberalism, pointing out that globalization depends on effective governance, but effective governance is not a sure thing. The effective governance of a partially globalized world requires a broader international institution to prevent the stagnation or reversal of globalization, hence the need for governance arrangement conducive to cooperation and resolution of conflicts. His prescription is the combination of rational strategic behavior and beliefs and values.23 Once again, the response to the global governance crisis calls for new ideas and new rules that could lay an important practical foundation for new theories to emerge. On the one hand, the existing rules of global governance lag far behind the realities of globalization, unable to keep up with the rapid globalization and numerous global problems that have cropped up.24 On the other hand, although the collective rise of emerging powers has become a central force driving global peaceful development, these countries have not yet achieved their due status and influence in the international system. The above factors, together with accumulated experience in tackling global governance crisis, contribute, from our perspective, to a theory of international cooperation based on new concepts. This theory is built on the basis of the reshaping of international coordination and global governance in recent years, and further emphasizes the common interests of mankind and the reality of all being in the same boat, stressing our shared future of winning or losing together and the prospect of overcoming contemporary challenges together and seeking common development.

6.2 The Contemporary Global Governance Crisis and the Response to It Since the end of the Cold War, world transformation has mainly been displayed by power shift, problem shift and paradigm shift. Power shift refers to the tremendous changes in actors in international relations and in their power composition, specifically manifested in the rise and fall of great powers, the transfer of power resources from the west to the east and from the state to the non-state actors. Most importantly, power shift is demonstrated by the rise and fall of great powers, which means a collective rise of large developing countries, including the stunning growth of China and India, a decline in US leadership, and a weakening of EU’s role as the center of gravity. Second, as both the result and the cause of power shift, such groupings of states as the EU and ASEAN, jointly influence regional and global patterns, becoming a core element that must be included in the strategic design of major powers. Third, regional and global organizations, as well as non-state actors, are in an attempt to carve up power, posing a challenge to traditional dominance of countries. The so-called “problem shift” means the focus of the problems countries 22 Keohane

(1989). (2001). 24 Cai (2015). 23 Keohane

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are confronted and concerned with has changed. Power shift leads to an inevitable adjustment of national strategy. Survival is no longer the only focus of the state, and development and prosperity feature more prominently in national strategy. Ideological competition is no longer as fierce as it was during the Cold War. Instead, it has gone on backstage, leaving some main factors on the surface: The proliferation of global issues and the increasingly diversified international agenda concern the interests of all parties and it’s impossible to be solved in a unilateral way; security tends to generalize and non-traditional security has risen to be one of the leading factors on the international agenda; the rise and fall of major powers has put the development and strategic adjustments of the United States and China under global spotlight, and the flourishing Chinese research represents this trend to a certain extent; the “democratic deficit” of international institutions has become more acute. Power shift and problem shift have further promoted world transformation, which is parallel to China’s rise, pushing the world into a new strategic era. China’s strategic adjustment has become the focus of world attention, and China’s commitment to peaceful development and win–win cooperation contributes to the paradigm shift of international relations. This is shown by the fact that cooperation between countries has become crucial. This basic demand has driven substantial enhancement of the democratization of international relations and the idea of global governance. Meanwhile, the power relationship between countries is no longer a downright zero-sum game, positive or even win–win results will be yielded, and cooperation between countries based on common interests enjoys a more fundamental role. The factors above are not only root causes of the global governance crisis since 2008, but also great forces tackling global governance crisis and promoting the transformation and development of global governance. There are reasons for the global governance crisis to have erupted in world’s political and economic centers since 2008. Global governance is currently at a critical stage of development. Racial conflicts, infectious diseases, terrorism and a new round of global challenges are emerging to the central stage.25 Global challenges and problems such as geopolitics, the clash of civilizations, financial and economic crisis, food and water resources security, energy security, environmental deterioration, climate change and global migration are becoming more pronounced and acute. Global issues and risks have also challenged the state-centered global governance system,26 which is increasingly characterized by fragmentation and polycentricity, making it difficult to determine and implement holistic solutions to global governance.27 Various global summits and international powers have sprung up, and the international community strives to forge consensus to solve global issues. However,

25 The

National Intelligence Council and European Union Institute for Security Studies,Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture, Digest of Foreign Social Sciences, Issue 3, (2011), pp. 4– 12. 26 Yang and Wang (2015). 27 He et al. (2013, pp. 19–39), Lu (2014).

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countries have incompatible demands for interests, and global governance mechanism is too outdated and antiquated to adapt to burgeoning globalization and multipolarization. Globalization has spawned a pile of problems, even to an extent where there’s no room for effective governance.28 Countries are well aware of the strategic divergence between developed and major developing countries. Now the developed economies holding the issuance of international reserve currency and international rule-making power are struck in a debt crisis.29 Since the outbreak of global governance crisis, a prolonged slump in developed countries and sustained high-speed growth in major emerging countries have become an irresistible long-term trend. This conflicting shift has brought legitimacy and effectiveness crises to existing institutions of global governance, meaning that the old model of global governance dominated entirely by developed countries cannot continue. This shows the structural dilemma of the traditional global governance system. On the other hand, the traditional mechanism for global governance mainly deals with traditional issues such as maintaining peace and stability among countries, yet as global challenges are mounting, it can no longer cope with new problems, thus creating a process dilemma. This dilemma will certainly be accompanied by increasing diversification of global governance participants and decentralization of global governance value, which points to an ideological dilemma in global governance system. In this case, the difficult situation of global governance system is at stagnation. The existing international rule system is unable to effectively manage global affairs or to cope with global challenges, resulting in the emergence and accumulation of problems affecting the whole world, which eventually plunge world order into chaos.30 These dilemmas are major sources of the global governance crisis. Having faced American and European debt crises and global financial crisis since 2008, countries have become better aware of the importance of reform. With the outbreak of financial crisis, the United States, which used to be a global hegemon, is gradually losing its absolute superiority, and more countries have started to look inward at their own interests. Meanwhile, the idea of global governance has received unprecedented attention. The financial crisis and the following shrinking economic growth facing countries further expose the profound contradiction between capitalist system, national state system and globalization. It’s a hard-won consensus that the only way to solve the internal contradiction lies in strengthening global governance, and promoting governance at national level as well as international coordination and cooperation. Besides, major powers still compete fiercely with each other on concepts and strategies of global governance. Different interests and perspectives on how to deal with the new and long-term issues on the international agenda have split world politics.31 The US and Europe are less capable and willing to provide global public goods,32 yet both are targeting the role of developing countries, especially China, in the reform 28 Pang

(2015), He (2015, p. 4). and Zhang (2013, pp. 7–8). 30 Qin (2013, pp. 4–18). 31 Zhu et al. (2014, pp. 1, 25). 32 Huang (2009, pp. 21–22). 29 Li

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of global governance system. They claim that those countries, as free-riders, have benefited too much from the international system. Although they advocate emerging countries to jointly cope with the damages caused by financial crisis and the everincreasing global problems for a more integrated world order, their own interests are increasingly what they consider first in making strategies. This has resulted in an increasingly sharp contradiction between traditional major powers that dominate the global governance and emerging ones that are trying to reform the existing global governance.33 Some developed countries, keenly aware of the importance to overcome difficulties together, have sought to maintain their legitimacy by satisfying the demands of emerging powers for a greater role in key global institutions. In response to the global governance crisis, major countries have made a series of efforts for better policy coordination and cooperation, the most significant of which is the G20 Summit attended by leaders of both developed and emerging powers. The topics discussed at the G20 Summit have evolved from coordination of economic stimulus schemes following the financial crisis, to medium-to-long term global economic issues and the design of reforms to international economic organizations. The G20 has emerged as the core of global economic governance mechanism, and has formed consensus on the reforms to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.34 The main functions of the G20 include agenda setting, consensus establishment, policy coordination, knowledge exchange and norm enactment.35 The rising influence of emerging powers in agenda setting is a key achievement of the governance of the G20,36 and is a central contributor to its success. The G20, with a balanced proportion of developed and developing countries, transcends the limitations of ideology. With the coordination of major countries as its core function, the G20 wins supports from a series of international economic and financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and Financial Stability Forum (FSF), compatible with such new global trends as diversified development of world economy and growing strength of developing countries.37 The G20 is on its way to becoming a club highly valued by member countries and the hub of global governance network.38 Looking ahead, how to transform from the crisis response mechanism into the long-term governance mechanism is the crux of keeping G20 effective over a long term. On the other hand, developed countries relapse into their old rut as soon as the crisis is initially relieved. Although constrained by its relatively diminished power 33 Kahler

(2014). 2010, the International Monetary Fund adopted a program to shift six percent of quota shares to developing countries and emerging markets. The new quota came into effect in January 2016, with the US retaining more than 15% of the veto power over major decisions. China moved into third place, and India, Russia and Brazil all ranked among the top 10 in quota shares, marking an increase in the voice of large developing countries in global governance. For detailed analysis, see Xin (2016). 35 Nye (2012). 36 Kirton (2015, p. 484). 37 He (2015, p. 37). 38 Kirton (2015, p. 19). 34 In

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and capacity to provide public goods,39 the US intends to maintain its leading position in traditional international institutions (such as its veto power in the IMF with over 15% of the body’s total votes) through the reformulation of rules and stepping up international institutional arrangements. In the meantime, the US is committed to the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (PPP) agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement excluding the second largest economy of China from the new system. By means of promoting multilateralism with respect for the global system and cultural diversity, the EU strives to establish a world order characterized by cooperation to ensure its hegemonic position in international rules and provide a feasible option for solving or at least alleviating problems for developing countries.40 Despite of some merits the EU plan may have, the EU faces a worsening crisis, and Brexit is, to some extent, a sign of the ebb of regionalism, prompting us to reflect on the effectiveness of regional governance mechanisms. Emerging powers make different strategic choices in response to global governance crisis. China and India have become the most successful developing countries in the world, for they did not embrace the Washington Consensus, the failure of which and market fundamentalism also served as counterexamples to these emerging powers in their search for a unique path.41 On the one hand, they actively participate in the G20 governance in an effort to expand their influence; on the other hand, they are committed to the BRICS summit and regional cooperation alliances.42 Without regional characteristics, the BRICS serves as a true global network spanning several continents around the world beyond Asia. Compared with the G20, the BRICS has no participation of western countries, so its agenda is not confined to economic matters. Its future agenda can involve all aspects of global governance with great flexibility,43 playing a leading role in the top-level design of reform in global and regional governance mechanisms. The above-mentioned situation shows that when faced with the global governance crisis, major powers seek in-depth cooperation while fierce competition still exists. With regard to promoting the transformation and development of global governance, different countries have different opinions and solutions. The fundamental problems of the existing governance have not been resolved, including underrepresentation, insufficient accountability, inadequate inclusiveness and effectiveness, etc. David Held pointed out, “The fundamental problems of today’s global governance lie in participation deficits and accountability deficits. As far as participation deficits are concerned, on the one hand, the existing governance structure fails to fully express the opinions of many state and non-state actors, many of which have no access to global governance; on the other hand, many actors are not interested in participating in the global governance system. In the case of the accountability deficits, without any supranational entity to regulate the supply and use of global public goods, many 39 Patrick

(2010), Liu (2012). and Liu (2013). 41 David and Kevin (2012). 42 Kahler (2014). 43 Xun (2016, p. 23). 40 Yun

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actors tend to become free riders rather than seeking lasting collective solutions to many pressing problems.”44 There is a fierce dispute on the concept and value of governance among various countries. Since global governance is different from state governance in practice in terms of history, scope, complexity and flexibility, it faces a theoretical dilemma yet to be solved,45 and the inclusiveness of global governance system is questioned. The above problems will be the main concern for all countries striving for more voice on global governance reform, which will directly affect the efficiency of global governance.

6.3 China’s Approaches to Global Governance Crisis China is an active participant in global governance. Since the reform and opening up, China’s rapid development has been in step with the transformation and development of global governance, which has witnessed China’s integration into the global governance system and its growing influence on the reform of the global governance system. The Asian governance crisis in the 1990s and the global governance crisis since 2008 provided precious strategic opportunities for China to play a constructive role in regional and global affairs. Active participation in global governance is regarded as the only way for China to become a world power. Based on the social ideal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, China pursues the national ideal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the global ideal of building a community with a shared future for mankind. The prospect of this ideal major country is closely related to the future of global governance. Holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and win–win results, and vigorously promoting international cooperation are China’s inevitable strategic options in response to the crisis and changes of global governance. The theory of international cooperation with Chinese characteristics is taking shape.46 Carlos Magarinos, former Director General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,

44 David

(2005). (2016). 46 China’s thinking on international cooperation takes self-reform as the basis, integration into the international community as the path, gradualism as the core approach, and internal and external cultivation as the method to promote international cooperation, which reflects the prudence and magnanimity of China as a major power. China’s theory of international cooperation is based on a community with a shared future, with common interests as the prerequisite, mutual benefit as the objective and the active assumption of great power responsibilities as important conditions. China, deeply aware of the global shock of China’s rise, affirms its firm will to pursue peaceful development, and welcomes other countries to board China’s train of development, committed to developing friendly and cooperative relations with countries around the world, and emphasizing the equal status of collaborators. Besides, China is dedicated to sharing the dividends of development, appropriately surrendering non-strategic interests and actively assuming the responsibilities of a major power. 45 Wu

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pointed out, “China has chosen to be a responsible contributor to Global Governance and a positive economic force to pull the world economy out of its crisis.”47 The CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, focuses not only on China’s own development, but also sees China’s development from a global perspective, contributing a series of Chinese approaches to many issues of world peace and development.48 With the central objective of improving global governance mechanism, the Chinese approach adopts a global perspective in its partnership network, focuses on East Asia and China’s neighboring regions and relies on the implementation of the BRI. The Chinese approach deeply grasps the new pattern created by the rise of China and the transformation of the world. It puts development issues at the core of the global macro policy framework, contributes Chinese wisdom to a new globalized world, and it is also the key to the building of a community of shared future for mankind and a better world. (1)

The Backdrop of China’s Participation in Global Governance

Engels pointed out: “The theoretical thinking of each era is a product of history, which has completely different forms and completely different contents in different times.”49 In the twenty-first century, facing the transformation and development of global governance, Chinese policy makers have been determined to innovate, proposing and putting into practice new ideas and strategies for governance. Those ideas and strategies are strategic assessment and proactive planning made by Chinese leaders based on national and global conditions so as to stay away from the “Middle Income Trap” and “Thucydides Trap”. On the one hand, China’s development has been a huge success. China has been the world’s second largest economy since 2010 and the largest importer and exporter of goods and trade. Indeed, never before has China been so close to the center of the global market stage, so important a member in the global governance, so involved in global governance, and drawn so much attention. On the other hand, China’s economy, though large in size, is not strong. The development of China’s economy, society, politics, culture and many other aspects still bears distinct features of the primary stage of socialism. At present, China has entered the new normal in economic development with rapid economic growth. The overall direction has not changed, but we must be aware of the deepseated factors that have long restricted China’s development, as well as the prominent contradictions and problems encountered in reality. In the period of mounting downward economic pressure, prominent social contradictions and conflicts between man and nature, we must take proactive and appropriate counter-measures. At the same time, the interaction between China and the world has become more intimate and sensitive. The world is undergoing an accelerated transformation as a result of multi-polarization, economic globalization, cultural diversification and informatization of society. As such, the international community pays closer attention to the trajectory of China’s rise. As China’s new grand strategic framework is gradually 47 Magariños

(2013). and Bao (2017). 49 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 9, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, (2009), p. 436. 48 Wen

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taking shape, new international institutions like the New Development Bank and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank have been established, and the BRI has been proposed and implemented, the international community now examines and views China’s rise through the prism of whether China intends to change, shape or even challenge the existing world order.50 Currently, the world is facing a rapidly rising China with greater confidence and openness, while China is facing a world with more complex situation and more profound changes, in which opportunities and challenges coexist.51 “China Threat” and “China Responsibility” are intertwined, and there is a gap between China’s willingness and ability to assume international responsibility and the expectations of the international community, and the international community’s doubts about China’s rise have increased. Developed countries have stepped up their efforts to establish new international rules, and their intention to besiege China is clear. China’s surroundings have become more complex, and some neighboring countries are in doubt and fear of China’s rise, stepping up their alliance with the United States. It can be said that with rapid development, China is confronted with increasing doubts, worries, difficulties and challenges. To face up to challenges from home and abroad, seize international opportunities and achieve sustainable development, China is constructing a strategic framework for peaceful development centered on integrating itself into the world, transforming itself and shaping the world. In terms of taking its peaceful rise forward, enriching its peaceful development and planning for things after its rise, China’s strategic focus lies in shaping the future of global governance together with other countries through peaceful development and win–win cooperation.52 China’s rise goes hand in hand with the transformation of the world, and China is at the center of global transformation. China has seen speedy growth in its comprehensive national strength, most notably after the 2008 global financial crisis, which differs China from the US and other major countries. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping has proposed “the Chinese dream of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and has made known China’s national ideals. The “Chinese Dream” offers an ideal blueprint for China with its rich connotation and grand vision, which boosts the nation’s morale in moving towards a higher stage of modernization. Later on, Xi Jinping proposed to build “a community with a shared future for mankind”, demonstrating positive sentiments of cosmopolitanism. China has laid emphasis on deepening reforms comprehensively and expanding global interests. Its grand strategy of growing into a world power has become the focus of attention of the international community, especially the major powers.53

50 Men

(2016, pp. 63–93). (2014, p. 184). 52 Men (2016, pp. 4–25). 53 Men (2015, pp. 40–44). 51 Hu

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(2)

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Strategic Thinking and Top-level Design for China’s Participation in Global Governance

As China is moving to the center stage of the world, international doubts, even tinged with suspicions, about China’s future direction are on the rise. So, how to respond to these doubts and suspicions positively and reduce the external resistance to China’s development is a question that must be faced. At the same time, facing the rapid development of economic globalization, increasing competition for comprehensive national power and a complex and ever-changing international situation, China must rely on reform and opening-up to seize opportunities, meet challenges and achieve greater development.54 On the other hand, great changes are taking place in this world. Today, the world is changing. It is a world in which new opportunities and new challenges keep emerging, a world in which the international system and international order are going through a profound adjustment and a world in which the balance of international forces is shifting steadily for peace and development. We are closer than ever before to the center of the world stage and to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China’s connection and interaction with the international community has become closer than ever before. Therefore, we must stand firmly for peace, development, cooperation and win–win outcomes, give overall consideration to domestic development and international situation, and adopt a holistic approach to development and security. We must focus on the overriding goal of peaceful development and national rejuvenation. We must devote ourselves to safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, foster an international environment that is friendly to our peaceful development, and take advantage of this important period of strategic opportunity for China. These efforts will ensure the realization of the “Two Centenary Goals” and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. China is at a new historic starting point. For China, this new starting point means to deepen its reform across the board and increase new drivers for its economic and social development, to adapt its economy to a new normal and transform its growth model, to further integrate itself into the world and open itself wider to the world.55 At this time of China’s rapid rise and the world’s rapid transformation, China has defined its global strategic position: a participant, beneficiary, builder and contributor, an advocate of international cooperation, a practitioner of peaceful development, a promoter of common development, a defender of the multilateral trading system and an active agent of global governance. China should seize the current opportunities for peace, development, cooperation and win–win outcomes to further improve itself, and strive to fulfill its obligations and contribute more to world peace and development by actively taking international responsibilities, participating in global governance to provide opportunities and room for common development for all countries. China welcomes other countries to board China’s express train of development and to share dividends of China’s development. China attaches great importance to global governance issues. It was clearly stated in the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC that it is necessary to improve 54 Xi 55 Xi

(2018, p. 100). (2016).

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our capacity for participation in global governance, take the initiative to participate in the global governance process, deepen cooperation on governance with emerging countries and attach importance to the role of regional governance. Xi Jinping paid close attention to global governance and stressed that the reform of the global governance system is at an epoch-making point. With the increase of global challenges, strengthening global governance and promoting the reform of the global governance system is an inevitable trend that concerns not only dealing with global challenges but also setting rules and directions for the international order and the international system. This is related not only to the contention for commanding heights of development but also to the status and roles of all countries in the long-term institutional arrangements of the international order and system. He has also clearly pointed out China’s position and responsibility, and provided “Chinese Approaches” as it participates in promoting the reform of the global governance system. On October 12, 2015, when presiding over the 27th group study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi pointed out that the reform of global governance system cannot be carried out without the guidance of philosophy, and more just and reasonable rules of global governance cannot be set without assimilating the outstanding achievements of various human civilizations. We need to promote the innovative development of the concept of global governance, actively explore the common points between the positive philosophy of life and concept of governance in Chinese culture and the current era, continue to enrich the ideas such as building a community with a shared future for mankind, and promote the concept of global governance based on extensive consultation, joint development and shared benefits. On September 27, 2016, while presiding over the 35th group study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi stated that we should actively participate in global governance and shoulder international responsibilities. On October 16, 2016, while attending the 8th BRICS Summit in Goa, India, Xi delivered a speech entitled “Cement Confidence and Seek Common Development”, in which he stated, “We should continue to be participants, facilitators and leaders of the transformation process of global governance, continue to elevate the representativeness and voice of emerging market countries and developing countries, continue to be guardians of international peace, and promote the establishment of a new type of international relations of win–win cooperation.” On May 14, 2017, Xi delivered a keynote speech pointing out that addressing the deficit is a serious challenge for the world at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. He appealed to promote peaceful cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit as the core of the spirit of the silk road, and put forward the strategic idea of jointly building an extensive community of shared interests.56 On October 18, 2017, in the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi pointed out, “China follows the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in engaging in global governance. China stands for democracy in international relations and the equality of all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. China supports the United Nations in playing 56 Xi

(2017, p. 1).

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an active role in international affairs, and supports the efforts of other developing countries to increase their representation and strengthen their voice in international affairs. China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance.” Based on the above-mentioned strategic judgments, China has established its basic position of pushing global governance out of the predicament and promoting transformation and development: a concept leader, a contributor of wisdom, a provider of solutions and a proactive actor. A new type of international relations is an important label for China’s push for change in global governance. It is based on win–win cooperation and is committed to establishing partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in extensive consultation, and enhance mutual understanding; creating a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint efforts, and shared interests; promoting open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits all; increasing inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences; and building an ecosystem that puts Mother Nature and green development first.57 To establish a new type of international relations featuring win–win cooperation is a major innovation in the traditional theory of international relations, and a sublimation of China’s rich diplomatic practice, pointing out a new approach to international relations.58 At a time when the world is in transition and at a critical stage of China’s rise, Chinese leaders have advocated the establishment of a new type of international relations, which represents China’s vision and aspiration for the world in the future and reflects China’s responsibilities. It can be said that shaping a new type of international relations represents a new height of China’s understanding of its interaction with the world and is the key to promoting the transformation of global governance. (3)

China’s Approaches to Global Governance Crisis

Vigorously pushing forward the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity is a fundamental measure for China to deal with the global governance crisis. China interacts closely with the world, and the global and national governance complement and reinforce each other. China’s domestic governance is of significance for global governance in nature, and the country’s role in global governance depends largely on its domestic governance. As the world’s largest developing country, China’s ability to govern a country that has one-fifth of the world’s population is in itself a huge contribution to global governance; on the other hand, China can also introduce its successful experience in domestic governance to the world and provide lessons for other countries. China is aware of the tremendous changes in its national realities, and stresses that the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects has entered a decisive stage, and the country’s reform is sailing in uncharted waters with tough challenges. As the international situation is complex and changing, China faces unprecedented major tasks of reform 57 Xi 58 Yi

(2015, p. 1). (2014, p. 17).

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and development, risks and challenges. Based on the above understanding, China vigorously promotes the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity. Specifically, the plan is as follows: In terms of institutional development, while vigorously promoting the improvement of national governance system, China is committed to fighting corruption with strong resolve and tenacity to ensure the long-term stability of the country; socio-economic strategy wise, China has put forward the judgment of “New Normal”, vigorously advancing the reform of its economic system, actively safeguarding and improving people’s livelihoods, and ensuring social stability; culturally, China adheres to core socialist values, while emphasizing the revival of traditional culture; in terms of security strategies, China has put forward “a holistic approach to national security”, and improved the national security mechanisms. On this basis, China promotes all-round economic, political, cultural, social and ecological development in accordance with the overall arrangements for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and has formed and actively promoted the comprehensive strategy of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, deepening reform in every field, advancing law-based governance in all fields, and exercising strict governance over the Party. At the same time, China has put forward the five concepts of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development, indicating the fundamental path for solving various problems under the new economic normal.59 We need to attach equal importance to both developed and developing countries,60 actively serving as a bridge between them and promoting the implementation of the Chinese governance philosophy at the global level. This is China’s global strategy for dealing with governance crisis. China, on the one hand, emphasizes the shaping of a new model of major-country relations that is stable and healthy in the long term, and is committed to enhancing mutual trust, seeking common ground while putting aside differences, avoiding confrontation and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation to preserve the peaceful transformation of the international system, to break away from the historical cycle of inevitable conflicts between the emerging and the established powers, to avoid and overcome negative factors of mistrust, mutual hostility, mutual rejection and mutual enmity in the old relations between the major powers and to enhance mutual trust, respect and cooperation. In so doing, new models of win–win cooperation, improved risk management mechanisms and positive energy could be introduced into the development of international relations; on the other hand, upholding the sound values of justice and benefit, China innovates relations among developing countries, and is committed to the greater good of world peace and development. The country will participate in international affairs in a more active manner, and act as a practitioner of peaceful development, promoter of common development, guardian of multilateral trading system and participant in global economic governance. It will play a greater role in advancing the cause of human progress.61

59 Hu

et al. (2016, pp. 9–10); Li (2015, pp. 14–15). (2006, pp. 38–39). 61 Yi (2013, p. 7). 60 Caio

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China upholds the global governance concept of extensive consultation, joint development and shared benefits, proposes the shaping of a new type of international relations, and promotes the optimization of global governance system through building a global network of partnerships and participating in the construction of G20 mechanisms. The creation of a global network of partnership is an important manifestation of China’s efforts to build a new type of international relations and an important foundation for the sustainable development of such relations.62 China’s partnership strategy has improved and yielded positive results at the global, regional, bilateral and national levels. With the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as its strategic basis, the protection of national interests and the expansion of international influence as its strategic direction, and mutual political trust, economic interdependence, cultural integration, social interaction and security support as its strategic means, China develops its partnership strategy and drives the expansion of its global strategy through improving bilateral relations. With the realization of common interests as the benchmark, the promotion of mutual benefit as the goal, and international cooperation as the path, China’s partnership strategy represents the country’s peaceful, cooperative and win–win development path. The most visible global significance of China’s partnership strategy is that it provides a strategic framework for dialogue and cooperation, thus serving as a model for the new type of international relations. In bilateral and global strategic deployment, China’s partnership strategy plays a great role in maintaining the international strategic balance, promoting world peace and development, and facilitating the progress of worldwide multi-polarity and the democratization of international relations. China’s global network of partnerships is an example of interactions among big countries and between a big country and some small ones. Development of this new type of win–win international relations, whether bilateral or multilateral, will have a far-reaching impact on world politics and the international order.63 At the same time, China has worked with the international community to overcome difficulties, promoted reform of global economic governance mechanisms, helped Europe to cope with sovereign debt crisis, increased its financial contribution to the IMF and others upon invitation and pushed the global governance system and mechanisms towards a more just and reasonable direction. China’s path of peaceful development requires necessary international institutions to guarantee, and improving international institutions that ensure peaceful development constitutes an important part of China’s diplomacy. China’s active participation in the G20 reflects the above-mentioned will, and the implementation of the BRI reflects China’s institutional efforts to shape international economic relations. The BRI has become an important strategic deployment on a regional basis and with a global perspective. China stresses that global economic governance should be based on equality, better reflect the new realities of the world economic landscape, increase the 62 At

the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held on November 28, 2014, Xi Jinping pointed out: “We should make more friends while abiding by the principle of nonalignment and build a global network of partnerships.” See “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, November 30, (2014), p. 1. 63 Men and Liu (2015, pp. 65–95).

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representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries and ensure that all countries have equal rights, equal opportunities and equal rules to follow in international economic cooperation. Global economic governance should embrace openness. It should be based on open concepts, open policies and open mechanisms so as to adapt to the changing situation. It should be open to constructive suggestions and the recommendations and aspirations of different quarters of society. It should encourage active participation and integration of various parties, reject exclusive arrangements and avoid closed governance mechanisms and fragmentation of rules. Global economic governance should be driven by cooperation, as global challenges require global responses, and cooperation is the necessary choice. Countries need to step up communication and coordination, accommodate each other’s interests and concerns, and work together to discuss the rules, build mechanisms and meet challenges. Global economic governance should be a mechanism of sharing. It should be about participation by all and benefits for all. It should encourage the sharing of interests and win–win prospects. Global economic governance should focus on the following: jointly ensure equitable and efficient global financial governance and uphold the overall stability of the world economy; jointly foster open and transparent global trade and investment governance to cement the multilateral trading regime and unleash the potential of global cooperation in economy, trade and investment; jointly establish green and low-carbon global energy governance to promote global green development cooperation; and jointly facilitate an inclusive and interconnected global development governance, and advance the well-being of mankind.64 China is aware of the basic role and exemplary significance of regional governance for the transformation and development of global governance, and is committed to improving its relations with neighboring countries and promoting the establishment of a new order in East Asia. China’s rise has shaken the region, and the competition among such great powers as China, America, and Japan revolves around East Asia, but the game of regional governance is one of “nine dragons ruling the waters” (indicating fragmented roles and responsibilities), which poses a profound challenge to China that cannot be underestimated. China actively promotes friendship and partnership with its neighbors, fosters an amicable, secure and prosperous environment, and highlights the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.65 The four principles for reshaping China’s relations with neighboring countries are an innovative summary of the theory and practice of China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and reflect the new development of the diplomatic philosophy of the CPC Central Committee. To further expand neighborhood diplomacy, China has drawn up a grand blueprint and proposed such major initiatives as the upgrading of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the development of the BRI, to actively promote strategic cooperative relations with neighboring countries. In constructing the East Asian order, China has been fully aware that the complexity of the East Asian regional mechanisms is mainly derived from the interacting influence and constraints among the four forces 64 Xi 65 Xi

(2016). (2018, p. 297).

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of China, America, Japan and ASEAN. At present, the biggest challenge facing the order construction in East Asia is that the four strategic forces are playing a new game, and it is difficult to reach an agreement on the future goals, and even there are more and more different considerations on regional stability and prosperity. In light of this, China must fully understand the regional impact of China’s rise, improve the Chinese discourse of the East Asian community, and promote the top-level design of regional institutions. The government should be committed to building an open East Asian community on the basis of converging common interests. Through institutionalized cooperation, China will gradually and patiently develop a community of shared interests and responsibilities in East Asia, promote the establishment of a community of shared future in East Asia, pursue open regionalism, and actively assume the responsibilities of a major power. East Asia has a long history of governance with intertwined interests and intense competition among major powers. It is crucial for China to maintain its openness and inclusiveness in a constructive manner.

6.4 China’s Strategic Orientation for Promoting the Transformation of Global Governance Promoting the transformation of global governance aligns with China’s strategic aspirations. In recent years, China has seized the opportunity to tackle global governance crisis, vigorously advanced the construction of national strategy system, improved national governance capacity, promoted innovation in international strategic thoughts, and strengthened cooperation in both global and regional levels. Economically in particular, China is playing an increasingly important role as an engine and has become a positive driver of global governance, providing “Chinese Approaches” for the reform of global governance system. China’s active role in global governance has arrested worldwide attention. The author believes that China considers promoting the transformation of global governance as the only way for it to grow into a world power, and as important international support for its all-round rise and post-rise planning. The next 5 to10 years will be a critical period for the transformation and development of global governance and for China’s overall rise. So we should put knowledge into practice and adhere to the close integration of theory and practice. We should deepen the study of the new globalization and global governance and put forward governance philosophy, theory and strategic design as “Chinese Approaches”, which should be widely adopted in the construction of national governance systems, and the governance of East Asian region, the world at large and some areas where we have advantages. These efforts will make China become a theoretical flag bearer and practical leader in the new globalization era, and lay a more solid foundation for the country to grow into a world power. In view of this, China’s major strategic plan for the transformation and development of global governance is as follows:

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First, we need to deepen research on new globalization and strengthen the sense of China’s historical responsibility and historical mission. Both sides of globalization are highlighted, and the de-globalization and anti-globalization trends reflect a deep concern about the effects of established globalization. We must be well aware that globalization is in line with the requirements of the development of productive forces and in the interests of all parties, which is the general trend; therefore, there is no possibility of globalization retreating, but in the face of the double-edged sword effect of globalization, countries are confronted with increasing diverse and complex choices.66 In view of this, in advancing globalization, China should not only coordinate with major powers to devise master plans, but also have the courage to shoulder the historical mission of promoting new globalization, consciously raise high the banner of new globalization, and actively promote trade liberalization, investment liberalization, and service facilitation. China should stay committed to opening-up to promote reform, seek development through reform and gain prosperity through development. Second, we need to deepen studies on global governance, put China’s diplomatic thinking into practice, and develop a “Chinese Approach” that conforms to the world trend and China’s strategic interests. In promoting global governance, China has committed itself to innovation in strategic thinking and has gradually developed a theoretical framework of major county diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. This is to stand at the height of the overall domestic and international situations and to take the realization of the Chinese dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation as the ideal; take peaceful development as a strategic choice, adhere to the concept of peaceful development, innovate the idea of peaceful development and consolidate the foundation for peaceful development; establish the strategic goal of shaping a new type of international relations, the ideal of building a community of shared future for mankind and the strategic path of win–win cooperation. Meanwhile, development and security should be pursued simultaneously, and we should make a breakthrough in developing healthy and stable relations between major countries. Our relations with neighboring countries should be based on the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. Guided by the principle of upholding the sound values of justice and benefit, we will innovate relations with developing countries. We will continue to promote multilateral cooperation by improving a global network of partnerships, actively participating in global governance and advocating the BRI. The above-mentioned innovations in diplomatic thinking can also be seen as China’s road map for promoting the transformation and development of global governance, and we need to study them in depth if we are to put them into practice and form a global governance solution that truly concerns the overall situation. Third, China should further strengthen the building of its national governance system and lay a solid foundation for its comprehensive and active promotion of the transformation and development of global governance. China’s reform and opening up drive has signaled the start of internationalization at home, and transnational

66 Huang

(2017, pp. 40–42).

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cooperation has blossomed.67 China attaches great importance to coordinating the two major situations at home and abroad and stresses that the building of national governance system and the improvement of governance capacity are the basic conditions for better participation in the global governance process. At present, China focuses on the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, adheres to socialism with Chinese characteristics and peaceful development, and implements the Five-point Strategy to promote economic, political, cultural, social and ecological progress, as well as the Four-Pronged Strategy to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects, deepen reform, advance the rule of law and strengthen Party discipline. The formulation and implementation of the aforementioned strategic thinking of national development has provided a clear direction and identified the core elements for strengthening the national governance system. Fourth, we need to define China’s global strategic positioning in promoting global governance transformation and enhance its capacity for global governance. China has become a full participant and active builder of global governance, with an increasingly prominent role as an agenda advocate. On this basis, China should gain a deep understanding of its own shortcomings in global governance, clearly establish a strategic framework for participation in global governance that is commensurate with its overall strength and symmetrical in power and responsibility and conforms to the principle of developing common interests and promoting its own interests,68 and set the goal of win–win cooperation with other major countries on global governance agenda. In advancing the transformation of global governance, China should rely more on the UN and the G20, two global governance platforms in which China is in a predominant position, and vigorously build a united front on global issues through menu-like cooperation and ad hoc issue coalition.69 China should, on the one hand, strengthen the development of a new type of relations between major powers, properly implement the goal of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win–win management, focus on promoting cooperation among major powers on the global governance agenda, and, on the other hand, strengthen communication and coordination with emerging major powers in order to jointly promote the reform of global governance system so that it will develop in a fair, balanced and effective direction. Fifth, we need to address East Asia’s demands, steadily advance economic and security governance in East Asia, and put forward China’s propositions and proposals for East Asia governance. East Asian cooperation has become irreversible, but there is no strong political consensus to promote regional cooperation at a higher level. East Asian cooperation may continue to promote functional cooperation, maintain and develop the framework of regional cooperation dialogue, conduct dialogue, communication and consultation on major issues and improve regional relations. China has put forward a series of initiatives for East Asia, such as the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, the China-ASEAN Community with a Shared Future, the upgraded 67 Cai

(2014). Group of Guangdong Institute for International Strategies (2014). 69 He (2015, p. 178). 68 Research

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ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor as well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China is committed to developing open, region-wide cooperation by steering the direction of regional arrangements, alleviating East Asian concerns, highlighting common interests and deepening regional identity. China needs to be fully aware of the fact that East Asia is highly open and permeable, as well as the fact that its economy and security are both separate and highly interrelated. Thus it means a lot to deepen regional governance through economic cooperation. China needs to deepen its understanding of regional public goods, work with other countries to set the goal of regional peace and development, and objectively evaluate the fundamental interests of regional countries. It should not only provide timely assistance for other countries, but also achieve shared prosperity with them, so as to deepen the sense of a community with a shared future in East Asia and reshape the East Asian order. Sixth, we should focus on priorities and deepen global governance in areas with which China is familiar with and in which China has advantages. The transformation and development of global governance involves many aspects, and it is both impossible and inexperienced for China to fully promote its transformation. Given that, China should give priority to economic and financial spheres with which it is familiar and in which it has advantages. The 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit further established China’s core position in this global economic governance platform, and economic and financial governance are still the most important tasks of global governance. We should vigorously promote the transfer of G20 from a crisis response platform to a long-term governance mechanism, from focusing on short-term policies to emphasizing both medium- and long-term policies so as to ensure China’s voice, initiative and dominant right in global economic governance. Seizing the opportunity of the collapse of the international financial order and the urgent need to rebuild it, China has taken the lead in preparing for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to promote change in the international financial order and to respond to the international community’s demand for China to play a greater role and assume greater responsibility. China should continue to put greater efforts and accumulate experience in this sector, so as to improve the global financial governance mechanism.

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Chapter 7

Pushing China’s Opening up in the New Era

The greatest dream of the Chinese people since modern times is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In order to realize this dream, the CPC led the people of China in a quest and finally found the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which takes on the most distinctive feature of reform and opening up. In 1978, the CPC convened the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which was of great historical significance and started the new era of reform and opening up. In this new period, the most distinctive feature is reform and opening up, the most remarkable achievement is rapid development, and the most prominent sign is keeping pace with the times. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, in the face of complex changes in the domestic and international environment, the CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, has led the people of China in staying committed to reform and opening-up. China has achieved historic achievements in reform and opening-up and socialist modernization, and is marching into the new era of socialist development with its head held high. As an integral part of China’s reform and opening up strategy, opening to the outside world is the core path for China to handle its relationship with the world. It has really contributed to the benign interaction between China and the world, and has become an essential attribute of the peaceful development path pioneered by China. Opening up to the outside world and domestic reform are complementary to each other, which is the crucial decision that determines the destiny of contemporary China, the powerful driving force for the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the inevitable path for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. From 1978 to the present, opening up to the outside world has been the main path to positive interaction between China and the world, and China has taken the initiative to start integrating into the international system and grow into a cooperative, responsible, constructive and predictable builder of the international system. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, has exercised overall leadership and made scientific decisions. Based on the consideration of changes in international and domestic environment,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_7

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as well as the “Two Centenary Goals” and the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, the CPC Central Committee has proposed a series of new concepts, thought and strategy and measures to govern the country. These efforts have allowed China to promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity, fully integrate into the international community and strive to exert greater international influence, and embark on a new journey of reform, opening up and modernization. Besides, Xi’s economic thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is mainly based on the new development concepts, has been formed to chart the course for further opening up to the outside world and making new ground in pursuing opening up on all fronts.

7.1 The Ideological Innovation of China’s Opening up Xi Jinping clearly stated, “In response to new developments in economic globalization, we must implement a more proactive opening up strategy and improve the open economy so that it promotes mutual benefit and is diversified, balanced, secure and efficient” and “make China’s open economy become better structured and expand in scope and yield greater returns”. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Xi took stock of the situation and summarized China’s practical experience in opening up to the outside world, and put forward higher requirements for opening up and development in six areas, including improving the strategic layout of opening up to the outside world, forming a new regime of opening up to the outside world, advancing the BRI, deepening cooperation between the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, actively participating in global economic governance, and assuming international responsibilities and obligations. China should open up to the outside world on a broader scale, in a wider range of fields and at a higher level, so as to gain new development advantages and have more say in the formulation of global rules. On January 18, 2016, Xi delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of a study session on implementing the decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee attended by officials at the provincial/ministerial level, in which he stressed, “Practice has proved that to develop and grow stronger, we must comply with the trend of economic globalization, adhere to opening up, and make full use of advanced scientific achievements and management experience. We must continue to explore and practice, enhance our conscientiousness and capabilities to address the overall situation both domestically and internationally, and improve the effectiveness and level of opening up.”1 The above-mentioned ideas represent a new proposition for China’s comprehensive opening-up in the new era. On October 18, 2017, Xi formally proposed in the report of the 19th CPC National Congress to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. He emphasized that China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening-up and pursues development with its doors open wide. 1 Xi

(2016).

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China will actively promote international cooperation through the BRI. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for international cooperation to create new drivers of shared development. Besides, China will support multilateral trade regimes and work to facilitate the establishment of free trade areas and build an open world economy.2 The thought and practice on comprehensive opening-up for the new era has created a brand-new landscape in opening-up. Xi has repeatedly stressed that China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening-up and that China’s door of opening-up will not be closed and will only open even wider. After the 18th National Congress of the CPC, Xi chose Guangdong, the opening up pioneer province, as his first stop on a local inspection tour, clearly stating that “we must not stop our pursuit of reform and opening up—not for one moment”,3 sending a clear signal to the world that China will continue to open up wider to the outside world. And on this basis, he put forward a series of new ideas and proposals after in-depth thinking, forming thoughts on all-around opening-up with distinctive contemporary characteristics. Xi proposed a creative strategic concept of open development. He said, “Concept is the precursor of action, and likewise, certain developments are led by certain concepts. Concepts decide, in a fundamental manner, the success of results”.4 In the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for the 13th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development, he introduced the concepts of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development. These development concepts are the centralized expression of China’s development thinking, direction and focus for the 13th Five-year Plan and beyond, as well as the centralized expression of China’s development experience over the past 40 years of reform and opening-up, reflecting the Party’s new understanding of China’s development laws. Hu Angang believes that the five concepts themselves form a grand development framework, strict logic, and pragmatic ideas in which innovative development is the driving force, coordinated development is a kind of art, green development is the model, open development is the boost and inclusive development is the goal. The core and ultimate objective is to achieve holistic human development.5 Li Junru pointed out that the new development concepts make clear the fundamental path to solve the various problems under the new economic normal, and constitute a plan to secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. They are also a guideline for promoting the coordinated implementation of the Four-Pronged Strategy and achieving the “Two Centenary Goals”.6 Xi

2 Xi

(2017a, p. 60). Party Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (2014). 4 Xi (2017b, p. 197). 5 Hu et al. (2016). 6 Li (2015). 3 The

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stated, “Open development prioritizes interactions between China and the international community. We must uphold the basic national policy of opening up, implement an opening-up strategy characterized by mutual benefit, strengthen cultural exchange, and improve the layout of opening-up regions, of foreign trade, and of investment. With such efforts we can form a new system for opening up, develop an open economy at a higher level, and drive innovation, reform and development. The Belt and Road Initiative is a major strategic measure to boost opening up and provide a top-level design for economic diplomacy. We should identify areas where breakthroughs are most likely to make, promote our experience to wider areas and consolidate progress step by step to achieve final success. We should help to improve the global economic governance system, play a leading role in developing the global economic agenda, maintain a multilateral trade system, speed up the implementation of a free trade strategy, and actively undertake our international responsibilities and obligations commensurate with our ability and status.”7 Xi stressed that we should adhere to open development and let the fruits of development benefit all parties. In the age of economic globalization, all countries should keep their doors wide open and allow factors of production to flow more freely and smoothly across the world. It is important for all countries to uphold the multilateral trading system, build an open economy, and come to share the benefits through extensive consultation and joint collaboration. Besides, we should respect each other’s development choices, learn from each other’s development experience, let different development paths lead to success, and let the fruits of development be shared by all peoples.8 Xi Jinping put forward a strategic idea of maintaining and developing an open world economy. On September 5, 2013, Xi gave a speech on the world economic situation at the first-stage meeting of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, and he proposed the idea of “jointly maintaining and developing an open world economy”. Xi pointed out that countries will grow if their economies are open, and conversely decline if their economies are closed. “We should take a long-term view, strive to shape a world economy in which all countries enjoy development and innovation, growth linkage and integration of interests, and firmly maintain and develop an open world economy.”9 Xi clearly stated in the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC, “China will support multilateral trade regimes and work to facilitate the establishment of free trade areas and build an open world economy” and “we should stick together through thick and thin, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all”.10 Xi stressed the importance of China accelerating the establishment of a new open economy system. He said, “We will follow a more proactive opening-up strategy, improve the open economy which is mutually beneficial, diversified, balanced, secure and efficient, encourage coastal, inland and border areas to draw on each other’s strengths in opening up, develop open areas that take 7 Xi

(2017b, p. 199). (2015a). 9 Xi (2018, pp. 335–337). 10 Xi (2017a, pp. 59–60). 8 Xi

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the lead in global economic cooperation and competition, and establish pilot open areas that drive regional development.”11 Xi proposed the idea of full participation in global governance. During the twentyfirst century, with the further emergence of the double-edged sword effect of globalization, the rise and fall of great powers has accelerated, and the world has ushered in the new era of global governance development and transformation. The crisis, transformation and development of global governance not only provide rare strategic opportunities for China to be fully integrated into the international community and participate in global governance, but also create an important international condition for China to promote its comprehensive rise and plan for things after its rise.12 At present, China’s involvement in the global governance is deepening. China fully participates in international affairs, actively promotes international cooperation and innovation, and plays an increasingly important role in the resolution of global affairs and regional issues. Chinese ideas and approaches have attracted worldwide attention. China attaches great importance to global governance issues. The report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC clearly pointed out that we should improve our capacity for participation in global governance, take the initiative in participating in the global governance process, deepen the governance cooperation of emerging countries, and attach importance to the role of regional governance. Xi pays high attention to global governance, pointing out that the transformation of the global governance system is at a historical turning point, and that it is imperative to strengthen global governance and promote the transformation of the global governance system, which is not only a matter of responding to various global challenges, but also a matter of setting rules and directions for the international order and international system, as well as a matter not only of fighting for the high ground of development, but also of the position and role of each country in the long-term institutional arrangements of the international order and system. He has also clearly pointed out China’s position and responsibility, and provided “Chinese Approaches” as it participates in promoting the transformation of the global governance system. On October 12, 2015, when presiding over the 27th group study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi pointed out that the reform of global governance system cannot be carried out without the guidance of philosophy, and more just and reasonable rules of global governance cannot be set without assimilating the outstanding achievements of various human civilizations. We need to promote the innovative development of the concept of global governance, actively explore the common points between the positive philosophy of life and concept of governance in Chinese culture and the current era, continue to enrich the ideas such as building a community with a shared future, and promote the concept of global governance based on extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. On September 27, 2016, at the 35th group study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, he said that China should actively participate in global governance and take the initiative in assuming international responsibilities. On October 16, 2016, Xi attended the 8th BRICS Summit in Goa, 11 Xi

(2018, p. 374). (2017a).

12 Men

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India, and made a speech entitled “Cement Confidence and Seek Common Development”, pointing out that “We should continue to be participants, facilitators and leaders of the transformation process of global governance, continue to elevate the representativeness and voice of emerging market countries and developing countries, continue to be guardians of international peace, and promote the establishment of a new type of international relations of win–win cooperation.” On May 14, 2017, Xi delivered a keynote speech pointing out that addressing the deficit is a serious challenge for the world at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. He appealed to promote peaceful cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit as the core of the spirit of the silk road, and put forward the strategic idea of jointly building an extensive community of shared interests.13 On the basis of these strategic judgments, China has established its basic position of being a concept leader, a contributor of wisdom, a provider of solutions and a proactive actor in pushing global governance out of its predicament and in its transformation. Xi has innovatively proposed and enriched the strategic content of the community of shared future for mankind. China has always had a world ideal. The concept of Tianxia (“All under Heaven”) has lasted through the ages, with the idea of harmonious world in the past followed by today’s innovative thought of the community of shared future. Xi’s remarks on a community of shared future demonstrate China’s ideals and aspirations, and reflect the philosophical thinking that promotes positive interaction between China and the world. The report of the 18th CPC National Congress emphasized that humankind has only one planet and all countries live together in one world, so it is necessary to advocate a community of shared future. During Xi’s speech at Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, he mentioned, “It is a world where countries are linked with and dependent on one another at a level never seen before. Mankind, by living in the same global village in the same era and on the same earth where history and reality meet, has increasingly emerged as a community of common destiny in which everyone has in himself a little bit of others.” At the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2015, under the theme of “Asia’s New Future: Towards a Community of Common Destiny”, Xi delivered a speech entitled “Towards a Community of Shared Future and a New Future for Asia”, explaining the four major connotations of a community with a shared future: mutual respect and equality among nations; win–win cooperation and common development; achieving common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; and inclusiveness and mutual understanding among civilizations. On July 1, 2016, in his speech at the ceremony marking the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Xi pointed out that today’s mankind is better qualified than ever before to achieve the goal of peace and development together. In the interest of peace, we need to foster a keen sense of a global community of shared future.14 On September 28, 2015, Xi attended the general debate of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly and delivered a 13 “Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, People’s Daily, May 15, 2017, p. 1. 14 Xi (2017b).

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speech in which he proposed the path of building a community of shared future for mankind: to build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation and show mutual understanding; to create a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits; to promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all; to increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences; and to build an ecological system that puts Mother Nature and green development first.15 On January 18, 2017, at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Xi delivered a keynote speech entitled “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind” at the high-level meeting on the theme of “Jointly Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation”. He advocated the joint promotion of the great process of building a community of shared future that is based on dialogue and consultation, joint efforts and shared benefits, win–win cooperation, exchanges and mutual understanding, as well as green and low-carbon development, so as to build a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and cleanness and beauty.16 The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC also mentioned the goal of building a community of shared future is to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.17 Building a community of shared future is the forward-looking thinking of the CPC Central Committee on the basis of its insight into the international situation and the trend of the evolution of the world, which is consistent with and complementary to the idea of fostering a new model of international relations.18 The 19th National Congress of the CPC has made top-level design for China’s diplomacy in the new era, focusing on promoting the establishment of a new model of international relations and the building of a community of shared future for mankind. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, a tide of comprehensively deepening reform has surged forward. The CPC Central Committee adheres to the problemoriented approach, starts with the institutions, and makes overall plans for reform tasks involved in the Five-point Strategy and the Four-Pronged Strategy. It provides theoretical guidance for uniting the society in thinking, and effectively enhancing the full confidence in the path, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Breakthroughs have been made in important fields and at key links. Opening up to the outside world is an important step towards deepening reform and opening up in the new era. As Xi Jinping stressed, “Promoting reform and development through opening up is our successful experience. Reform and opening up are complementary and mutually reinforcing; reform inevitably requires opening up, and vice versa. We should adhere to the fundamental national policy of opening up, 15 Xi

(2015b).

16 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote Speech at the High-Level Meeting of ‘Jointly Building a Commu-

nity of Shared Future for Mankind Through Consultation’”, People’s Daily, January 19, 2017, p. 3. 17 Xi (2017a, pp. 58–59). 18 Yi (2015).

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pursue a more proactive strategy of opening-up, develop an open economy of higher standards, continue to introduce foreign capital and technologies, and unswervingly improve the systems and mechanisms for opening up. China’s reform is always carried out in parallel with opening-up in a bid to inject fresh impetus, add new vitality into and expand new space for economic development.”19 The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC proposed a systematic and comprehensive strategy. We should pursue the Belt and Road Initiative as a priority, give equal emphasis to “bringing in” and “going global,” follow the principle of achieving shared growth through joint discussion and collaboration, and increase openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity. With these efforts, we hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. We will expand foreign trade, develop new models and new forms of trade, and turn China into a trader of quality. We will adopt policies to promote high-standard liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment. We will implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board, significantly ease market access, further open the service sector, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors. All businesses registered in China will be treated equally. We will improve the balance in opening our different regions, and open the western region wider. We will grant more powers to pilot free trade zones to conduct reform, and explore the opening of free trade ports. We will develop new ways of making outbound investments, promote international cooperation on production capacity, form globally-oriented networks of trade, investment and financing, production, and services, and build up our strengths for international economic cooperation and competition.20 Guided by these innovative principles, the basic connotation of the opening-up strategy in the new era can be summarized as follows: We should focus on the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, with the development of a community with a shared future as the universal value. We will stay on the path of peaceful development and act as a responsible major power to promote the common development of all countries and regions in the world under the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, with the coordinated development of the domestic development and opening up as the center. We will build a bright future for all mankind to share and develop in the course of realizing the Chinese Dream.

19 “Xi

Jinping presided over the 16th meeting of the Leading Group for Continuing the Reform Comprehensively under the CPC Central Committee, emphasizing the importance of opening up wider to the world and deepening reform to raise the level of the open economy with resolute determination”, People’s Daily, September 16, 2015, p. 1. 20 Xi (2017a, pp. 34–35).

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7.2 China’s Strategic Focuses on Opening up Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China’s opening-up strategy has been adjusted in dramatic fashion.21 The key points of China’s opening-up strategy in the new era are: First, establish a new open economic system and make new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform passed in the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly proposed the establishment of a new open economic system. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, “opening up” was listed as one of the five development concepts, marking the beginning of a new round of opening up that is proactive, bi-directional, fair, comprehensive, win–win and high-quality. The 19th CPC National Congress emphasized making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts.22 The core task of China’s opening up in the new era is improving the open economy, establishing a new open economic system and making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts. As Xi Jinping said, “We will promote the all-round enhancement of China’s open economy on a larger scale, in broader areas and at a deeper level”.23 “On a larger scale” means that we should not only continue to promote economic ties with developed countries, but also strengthen economic exchanges with emerging countries and backward areas in Africa and other places. On the one hand, the process of global economic integration should be advanced and, on the other hand, connectivity with neighboring countries should be given higher priority. “In broader areas” means to promote mutual opening up in more fields between China and other countries. We will further expand China’s opening up in the fields of finance, telecommunications, medical service, education, sports, culture, logistics, and relax restrictions on foreign investment access in the fields of accounting and auditing, providing for the aged and raising children, and electronic commerce. At the same time, we also hope that foreign countries will further open their doors to China. “At a deeper level” means to improve the level of cooperation and promote a deeper integration of Chinese and foreign resources and markets. We need to make substantial efforts in the establishment of an open economic system. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee adopted the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform, which clearly put forward a programmatic policy framework for the building of a new open economic system, that is, to implement a new round of high-level opening up (including promoting trade and investment liberalization, setting up pilot free trade zones, forming a high-standard network of free trade areas oriented to the world, promoting bilateral investment 21 Zhou

(2017). (2018a). 23 Xi (2013). 22 Yang

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agreements, and accelerating negotiations on new rules and issues of trade and investment), to make new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts (including further opening up inland and border regions, promoting the development of inland industrial clusters, and stepping up efforts to implement the BRI), and to foster new strengths in participating and leading the international economic cooperation. We will work to ensure that opening up domestically and opening to the outside world reinforce each other, better integrate the “bring in” and “go global” strategies, facilitate the orderly flow of domestic and international factors of production, the efficient allocation of domestic and international resources, and the deep integration of Chinese and foreign markets, and work faster in cultivating new international competitive edges, with a view to promoting reform through further opening up.24 The Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly claimed that the new open economic system will have basically taken shape by 2020. On May 5, 2015, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the PRC passed the Opinions on Building a New Open Economic System. It was clearly stated that the new open economic system would be mutually beneficial, diversified, balanced, secure and efficient. Besides, it also should be featured with the establishment of a management model that is in line with advanced international standards for investment and trade rules, the formation of a mechanism for participation in international coordination on macro-economic policies, a highly-integrated, mutually beneficial network, an improved national security review system for foreign investment, and an improved system responding to trade conflicts, thus laying a solid foundation for developing China into an open economic power. The Outline of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the PRC put forward specific work arrangements in five key areas, namely, to improve the strategy for opening up, to improve the new system of opening up, to facilitate the advancement of the BRI, to actively participate in global economic governance, and to assume international responsibilities and obligations. It also included a series of new programs, including making more effective use of foreign capital and promoting outbound investment, boosting international cooperation on production capacity and equipment manufacturing, advancing bidirectional opening up in the financial sector, strengthening services for opening up, etc.25 The strategic thinking and design mentioned above provide a road map for China’s further opening up. China would accelerate the transition from a large to a major trading power, consolidate its traditional strengths in foreign trade, foster new competitive edges, expand the development space of foreign trade, and actively increase imports. Xi Jinping put forward a series of requirements as follows: “We should proactively adapt to the new normal and take innovation and further opening up as a driving force. We should consolidate traditional competitiveness, and move faster to foster new competitive edges, to ensure continuity and stability of processing trade policies. We should see that enterprises are the main players. We should strengthen industrial chains and the related division of labor, while improving the position of China’s processing trade in the global value chain. We should upgrade and 24 Wang 25 Sheng

(2014). and Li (2017).

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optimize the development of coastal area, while encouraging processing trade to shift to the inland areas. We should orderly conduct international industrial cooperation, deepen the reform of the processing trade mechanism, and establish a sound management structure for an open economy. The opening up pattern should gradually change from importing and exporting on a large scale to importing and exporting to our best advantage. We should accelerate China’s transition from a large trading country to a major trading power”.26 On the other hand, China is firm in upholding the multilateral trading system and shouldering its historic mission by delivering development and prosperity to all. China had made full use of international platforms such as the G20 to strive to have more say in the formulation of global rules, champion the development of a community with a shared future for mankind, and build an innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive world economy, making positive and constructive efforts in dispersing the shadow of global financial crisis. In light of this, China’s economy would remain an anchor of the global economy. China has strengthened efforts in improving investment layout, worked proactively to bring in foreign capital and advanced technology, supported enterprises in increasing outbound investment, and encouraged more of China’s equipment, technology, standards, and services to go global, so that Chinese products and China’s service sector can move up the global value chain. This is to “promote China’s opening up to the outside world into a better balance between bringing in and going global”.27 In the meantime, China will open wider to the world, significantly expand market access and foster a more attractive investment environment. According to the requirements of the report to the 19th CPC National Congress, China will focus on significantly easing market access in service sector and will open its financial market wider.28 On April 10, 2018, Xi Jinping announced at the Boao Forum for Asia four landmark major openingup initiatives, including China’s dramatic easing of market access, creating a more attractive investment environment, strengthening intellectual property protection, and proactively expanding imports. The National Development and Reform Commission later officially announced the specific timetable for easing foreign equity restrictions in auto, aviation and ship industries. Fierce as the China-Us trade frictions are, China has never stopped deepening opening-up. The white paper titled “China and the World Trade Organization” published by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China in June 2018 states that in March 2018, China abolished all non-administrative approvals, cutting administrative approvals compared to March 2013 by 44%, and the number of enterprise investment projects approved at the central government level has been reduced by 90% in total. China has comprehensively reformed its systems for business registration and registered capital, rolled out the subscribed capital registration system, and revoked 87% of the items subject to examination and approval preceding the industrial and commercial registration, reducing business start-up time by more than one-third.

26 Xi

(2015c). (2016). 28 Rui (2017). 27 Xi

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Second, by focusing on deepening the balanced development among different regions, we hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China has stepped up efforts to open up its border areas in order to promote balanced regional development. In particular, the construction of the Belt and Road makes the border areas seem even more important. The goals of “increasing openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity and making new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea”, as stated in the report to the 19th CPC National Congress, have further pointed out the direction for development among regions. This requires us not only to “insist on a better combined opening up of coastal, inland and border regions”, but also to “optimize the regional layout”. In the meantime, the opening up of the region should be innovative, and while emphasizing the opening up of the coastal and inland areas, we should gradually focus on the opening up of oceans to form a new pattern of all-round opening up. While optimizing the regional layout, accelerating the revitalization of old industrial bases in the northeast and other parts of China, helping the central region rise by tapping into local strengths, and supporting the eastern region in taking the lead in pursuing optimal development through innovation, we have intensified efforts to open up and develop the regions where we have advantages to promote the coordinated development of both Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and the Yangtze River Economic Belt, making them a new focus. In March 2015, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee reviewed and approved the Outline of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Coordinated Development Plan and issued the Outline of Cooperation and Development in the Bohai Rim Region in September of the same year, proposing that the regional integration pattern should be basically formed in 2030. On April 1, 2017, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council decided to establish the Xiong’an New Area in Hebei to explore new models for the priority development of densely populated areas and cultivate new engines for innovationdriven development. In July 2013, Xi proposed a request to strengthen cooperation along the Yangtze River. In January 2016, a symposium on the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt was held in Chongqing. Subsequently, he chaired the meeting of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs under the CPC Central Committee, emphasizing the concept of building the Yangtze River region into a golden economic belt. In September that year, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the Outline of the Yangtze River Economic Belt Development Plan, proposing to build the Yangtze River Economic Belt into a leading demonstration belt for ecological progress, an innovation-driven belt leading the transformation and development of the country, an inland river economic belt with global influence, and an coordinated development belt of the East-Middle-West interactive cooperation according to the four-pronged strategic positioning. The top-level design and implementation of the above regional development plan is an important measure to expand domestic demand and lay a solid foundation for domestic development in the face of drastic changes in the international situation. At the same time, in May 2016, in order to deeply implement the Several Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the Construction of an Open Economic System, the Ministry

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of Commerce published a list of comprehensive pilot areas for the construction of a new open economic system, and selected Nanchang, Jinan, Tangshan, Zhangzhou, Dongguan, Fangchenggang, Shanghai Pudong New Area, Chongqing Liangjiang New Area, Shaanxi Xixian New Area, Dalian Jinpu New Area, Wuhan City Circle, Suzhou Industrial Park, etc. to carry out two years of comprehensive pilot reforms. It will lay a solid foundation for the basic formation of a new open economic system and the creation of an all-round pattern of opening up during the13th Five-year Plan period. In a nutshell, China’s regional opening-up layout in the new era will be led by the Belt and Road Initiative, and in line with such national strategies as the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, and the development of the Guangdong-Hong KongMacao Greater Bay. With these efforts, we will actively promote balanced regional development and opening up, and gradually make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea.29 Third, establish and develop pilot free trade zones and explore new ways of opening up. The establishment of pilot free trade zones is a major strategic plan of the CPC Central Committee to build a new open economic system and form a fully open economy under the new normal.30 According to Zhang Youwen, the pilot free trade zone has initiated the strategic upgrading process of opening up, committed to promoting the formation of a new pattern of opening up with unified national policies and different functions.31 On August 22, 2013, the State Council approved the establishment of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, with the overall goal of accelerating the transformation of government functions, actively expanding the opening up of service sectors and promoting the reform of foreign investment management through two or three years of pilot reforms. Meanwhile, it is to expedite the exploration of capital account convertibility and the all-round opening up of financial services sector, foster an international and law-based business environment, and build a pilot free trade zone with international standards for investment and trade facilitation, free currency exchange, efficient and convenient supervision, and standardized legal environment. In December 2014, Premier Li Keqiang presided over an executive meeting of the State Council, during which the pilot experience of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone was introduced, and three more free trade zones were planned in Guangdong, Tianjin and Fujian. In March 2017, the State Council officially approved the establishment of seven new pilot free trade zones in Liaoning, Zhejiang, Henan, Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan and Shaanxi, forming a flying geese pattern of all-round institutional innovation in the eastern, central and western regions. The report of the 19th CPC National Congress proposed that we should grant more powers to pilot free trade zones to conduct reform and explore the opening of free trade ports. In April 2018, Xi announced the establishment of Hainan Free Trade Port at a meeting celebrating the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Hainan Special Economic

29 Li

(2018). and Yu (2015). 31 Zhang (2016). 30 Pei

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Zone. The construction of pilot free trade zones and free trade ports is of great significance. Pei Changhong believes that the construction of pilot free trade zones will deepen China’s reform and opening up, provide replicable and extensible reform experience for a wider range of regions, explore the experience of development and innovation for an open world economy, and provide a test site for gathering common interests of all parties. And exploring free trade port construction further deepens the development potential of global interest integration.32 Some scholars conclude that the 40-year history of China’s reform and opening up is, in a sense, a history of institutional change from traditional special economic zones to modern free trade zones. Special economic zones were established in the early stages of reform and opening up to reduce the cost and avoid major social shocks. As the “window” and “test field” of the reform and opening up, special economic zones focused on how to break through the shackles of the traditional planned economy system and explore the market economy system conducive to economic and social development. If the establishment of special economic zones reflects Chinese characteristics, that is, the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, then the establishment of free trade zones clearly reflects its universality, that is, China, on the premise of adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, has integrated into the world in an all-round way and become the leader of globalization in the new era.33 Fourth, promote the Belt and Road Initiative and foster the optimization of China’s grand strategy. In September and October 2013, Xi put forward the BRI. In 2014, the BRI was formally incorporated into the policy agenda of the CPC Central Committee and became a major national strategic policy, and relevant strategic plans were immediately formulated and implemented. China’s leaders have promoted the “Belt and Road” cooperation through international diplomatic forums, with ministries and commissions formulating plans for the implementation of the BRI in their respective areas of responsibility, and the relevant provinces and municipalities formulating plans for the implementation of the strategy, setting targets and promoting an overall picture of linking the two major domestic and international markets, utilizing international and domestic resources, and promoting the common development of both domestic and international markets. The BRI has received great attention from the international community. The BRI and its core concepts have been written into the United Nations and other outcome documents. And China has signed 200 cooperation documents with 168 countries and international organizations. As of the end of 2019, China had established smooth trade work groups with 8 countries, investment and cooperation work groups with 40 countries, e-commerce cooperation mechanisms with 22 countries, and cooperation mechanisms of trade in services with 14 countries; and had signed cooperation documents for the third-party market with 14 countries, initially forming a global FTA network with the neighboring countries as the basis and radiating out through the Belt and Road. The BRI is China’s major strategic plan in the face of the critical period of China’s reform and opening-up and the period of deep adjustment of the international order, 32 Pei

and Liu (2018). and Zhu (2018).

33 Luo

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and it is a strategic concept that closely integrates the global perspective, regional focus and national cornerstones. The BRI provides a Chinese solution for the internal and external interaction of China’s open economy and the open world economy. It is the first step in making new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea, and an important starting point for solving the problem of unbalanced and insufficient spatial distribution of China’s opening up. As one of China’s major strategic initiatives to expand opening up and the top-level design of economic diplomacy, the BRI focuses on Asia, Europe, and Africa, and opens to all countries at the same time, unfolding a new world, enriching the new connotation, and creating a new realm of opening up. The BRI, with the border areas as the frontier, the key inland economic zones as the hinterland, and the developed eastern coastal areas as the lead, will align with the national strategies for coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, providing historic opportunities for the eastern, central and western regions to open up in a coordinated way and implement the strategy of coordinated regional development.34 Fifth, actively participate in global economic governance and lead global open cooperation. China attaches great importance to global governance issues. The report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC pointed out that it is necessary to strengthen the capacity for participation in global governance, take the initiative to participate in the global governance process, deepen governance cooperation among emerging countries and attach importance to the role of regional governance. Promoting the improvement of the global economic governance mechanism can be regarded as an important area where China can actively assume responsibilities and demonstrate leadership. It was emphasized in the report to the 19th CPC National Congress that China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, take an active part in developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese proposals and strength to global governance. In coping with the global financial crisis and the European and American debt crises since 2008, China has worked together with the international community to promote the reform of the global economic governance mechanism, resolutely helped Europe deal with the sovereign debt crisis, and been invited to increase its financial contribution to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international organizations to promote the development of the global governance mechanism in a more just and reasonable direction. At present, the world economy is still in a period of profound adjustment after the international financial crisis, and there are more unstable and uncertain factors.35 China has played a key role in the activities of the G20, and has put forward a series of initiatives for the improvement of global economic governance and took the lead to put them into practice, accumulating rich experience for the country to promote international cooperation. At the same time, faced with the collapse of the international financial order, of which the reconstruction was in

34 Shi 35 Xi

(2017). (2015d).

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urgent need, China led the creation and practice of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to play a more significant role and assume greater responsibility as the international community expected. Financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are responsible for various tasks such as social development, poverty alleviation, and financing. But the AIIB is focused on infrastructure construction financing, which can effectively fill the existing financing gap of infrastructure construction and alleviate the burden on the current financial system. The AIIB also helped promote the reform of the international financial system, enabling it to meet the financial needs of countries more effectively.36 To sum up, since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core is determined to deepen the reform and opening up. It covers various fields such as foreign investment promotion, investment in foreign countries, and import–export trade, with an aim to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea with the obvious characteristics of being comprehensive, multilevel, and wide-range.37 China’s opening-up is moving towards a new stage of institutional opening-up. Through various pilot tests such as the establishment of free trade pilot zones and free trade ports, the expansion of the opening up of the service sector and comprehensive pilot tests for the new open economic system, China has carried out systematic reforms in business registration, trade supervision, financial opening and innovation with institutional innovation as the core, focused on strengthening system integration, gradually improved the law-based, internationalized and convenient business environment, and drove opening-up to a higher level through opening up institutions systematically.38 At the same time, China’s opening-up has also become comprehensive and proactive. China has accelerated the establishment of a new open economic system, vigorously promoted the BRI, and actively participated in the reform and construction of the global governance system, opening new horizons for its participating in and leading global open cooperation.39 The strategic path of China’s opening up to the outside world is proof of a simple path: a boat sailing against the current will fall back if it does not advance. In 1978, faced with the Cultural Revolution, growing capitalism and the Sino-Soviet split, China adopted the reform and opening-up policy determinedly. After 1989, though confronted with domestic political turmoil, collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, and western sanctions, China deepened the reform and opening-up under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, without any retrogression. In 1997, as the financial crisis swept Asia, China dealt with the danger calmly, establishing an image of a responsible major country. When the world was exposed to terrorism in 2001, China joined the WTO with resolution, promoting global peace and economic prosperity with all its strength. Also, China’s peaceful development has received thumb-ups. In 36 Xin

(2016). (2017). 38 Fang (2016). 39 Bi and Li (2018). 37 Shi

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2008, when the debt crisis and financial crisis in the United States and Europe ravaged the world, China actively participated in global economic governance, showing its wisdom and reliability as a responsible major country. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, in the face of global changes, China has been determined to deepen the reform and opening-up to push the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics into the new era. It has become a leader in global openness and cooperation, and has embarked on a new journey from a global power to a world power. As China develops, the convergence of the interests of China and the world has reached an unprecedented breadth and depth. Attaching great importance to international cooperation and emphasizing solidarity and mutual benefit40 have become important international discourse of China. At present, China’s global strategy is based on the basic concept of creating a better world, reflecting the basic characteristics of responsibility, constructiveness and predictability, with dialogue and consultation, win–win cooperation, seeking common ground while reserving differences, inclusiveness and openness as the main strategies, and the pursuit and expansion of common interests as the goal. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China has been active on the world stage with a new outlook, transforming itself from a participant in international affairs to an active leader. China has launched a series of far-reaching Chinese initiatives and approaches in global politics, economics, security, culture and ecology, and is making a historic transformation from a participant in international affairs to an active leader.41 China has made an open world economy a strategic goal in the process of promoting global economic recovery. The emphasis on the notion of global openness is clearly broader than that of domestic openness since 1978. In the political report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China clearly stated that “we will oppose protectionism in all its forms”, and this is the first time that the issue of the world’s openness has been written in the CPC’s political report.42 In recent years, the promotion of an open world economy has become a great innovation in China’s opening-up strategy, and the world’s attention to China has become increasingly focused. Thus, how to handle China’s relationship with the world is a major theoretical and practical issue.

7.3 Propelling China’s Opening up to the New Era In the face of complex domestic and international situations, China’s opening up takes on more crucial value for the country. Xi Jinping once pointed out, “We must review and apply the useful experience we have gained in reform and opening up,”43 “comply with the trend of economic globalization, adhere to opening up, and make full use 40 Xi

(2018, p. 250). (2017b). 42 Zhong (2014). 43 Xi (2018, p. 67). 41 Men

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of advanced scientific achievements and management experience.”44 He stressed in the report to the 19th CPC National Congress that “to achieve national rejuvenation, it was imperative to follow the tide of the times, respond to the wishes of the people, and have the courage to reform and open; and this awareness created a powerful force for advancing the cause of the Party and the people”. “We must actively participate in and promote economic globalization, develop an open economy of higher standards”, and “build an open world economy”.45 The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC proposed the road map of making new ground in pursuing opening up on all fronts: We should pursue the BRI as a priority, give equal emphasis to “bringing in” and “going global,” follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, and increase openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity. With these efforts, we hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. We will expand foreign trade, develop new models and new forms of trade, and turn China into a trader of quality. We will adopt policies to promote high-standard liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment; we will implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board, significantly ease market access, further open the service sector, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors. All businesses registered in China will be treated equally. We will improve the balance in opening our different regions, and open the western region wider. We will grant more powers to pilot free trade zones to conduct reform, and explore the opening of free trade ports. We will develop new ways of making outbound investments, promote international cooperation on production capacity, form globally-oriented networks of trade, investment and financing, production, and services, and build up our strengths for international economic cooperation and competition.46 The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC put forward the important task of making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts, indicating that China’s opening-up has entered a period of high-level competition and high-quality development, and demonstrating that China will become a firm advocate and strong promoter of a new round of economic globalization and play a leading role in building an open world economy. This is a major strategic deployment that the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core has made on the basis of accurately evaluating the changing international landscape and deeply understanding the new requirements for domestic reform and development, in a bid to adapt to the new trend of economic globalization.47 Firstly, upholding integrity and innovation, and implementing the concept of open development. Openness to the outside world is the core strategic thinking and fundamental path for China to achieve the great rejuvenation of the nation, and openness is a fundamental value and an important feature of China’s path of 44 Selected Important Speeches of General Secretary Xi Jinping, Beijing: Central Party Literature Press & Party Building Books Publishing House, 2016, p. 399. 45 Xi (2017a, pp. 14, 22, 60). 46 Xi (2017a, p. 35). 47 Wang (2017).

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peaceful development. Looking to the future, we have reached a consensus to make new ground in pursuing opening up on all fronts. The achievement of this goal requires further expansion not only in the orientation and level of openness, but also in the ideology, structural layout and institutional mechanism of openness.48 For the future, the basic framework of China’s opening-up strategy is as follows: to make new ground in pursuing opening up on all fronts is the goal; to build a new open economic system is the foundation; to form new international competitive advantages is the key; and to shape international economic governance is the support. In view of this, China must optimize its national development strategy, strengthen its regional cooperation strategy and deepen its global development strategy so as to build a sound national strategic system aimed at the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. What constitutes its core support is how to adhere to innovation and implement the concept of open development. The five concepts of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development reflect the CPC Central Committee’s growing understanding of the laws of economic and social development. They were put forward on the basis of a profound summary of the lessons learned from domestic and international development and an in-depth analysis of the general trend of development at home and abroad. Xi Jinping said, “Open development prioritizes interactions between China and the international community. …. We must uphold the basic national policy of opening up, implement an opening-up strategy characterized by mutual benefit, strengthen cultural exchange, and improve the layout of opening-up regions, of foreign trade, and of investment. With such efforts we can form a new system for opening up, develop an open economy at a higher level, and drive innovation, reform and development. The Belt and Road Initiative is a major strategic measure to boost opening up and provide a top-level design for economic diplomacy. We should identify areas where breakthroughs are most likely to make, promote our experience to wider areas and consolidate progress step by step to achieve final success. We should help to improve the global economic governance system, play a leading role in developing the global economic agenda, maintain a multilateral trade system, speed up the implementation of a free trade strategy, and actively undertake our international responsibilities and obligations commensurate with our ability and status.”49 Xi also stressed the importance of implementing open development and reiterated that “we should adhere to open development, follow the trend of China’s deep integration into the world economy, pursue the mutually beneficial strategy of opening up, and develop an open economy of higher standards.”50 The implementation of open development requires us to “follow the trend of the times and propel historical progress”. “As long as we consciously support the trend of

48 “The Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing”, People’s Daily, December 21, 2017, p. 1. 49 Xi (2017b, p. 199). 50 “Xi Jinping Meets with Kissinger and Other U.S. Delegates to the U.S.-China Track Two Highlevel dialogue”, People’s Daily, November 3, 2015, p. 2.

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global development, we can grow stronger and lead world development.”51 Of course, we should also take the initiative to open up to the outside world, emphasizing that the design of the opening-up strategy should serve the overall national development goal of building a modern and powerful country, and at the same time be fully prepared to take the initiative to propose new issues that are in line with advanced global concepts and development trends in some advantageous areas.52 We believe that in order to implement the concept of open development, it is necessary to adhere to the mutually beneficial strategy of opening up, implement the concept of a new type of international relations, commit ourselves to building a community of shared future for mankind, form an open and inclusive pattern of development that integrates the domestic and international situations, and make great endeavor to build a new open economic system and an open world economy. The 19th National Congress of the CPC made a top-level design for China’s diplomacy in the new era, which focuses on forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win cooperation, building a community of shared future for mankind, and building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.53 The proposition of a community of shared future expands the existing concept of common interests into the trinity of interests, responsibilities and destiny, and emphasizes cooperation with all countries on the basis of common interests. It calls for countries to actively assume more international responsibilities within the capacity, establish a community of shared interests and a community of responsibility shared by all countries with big powers taking the largest share. China advocates building a community with a shared future for mankind, upholds justice in the process of pursuing shared interests, works for a new model of international relations and seeks to coordinate development strategies of various countries in an effort to deepen international cooperation. This demonstrates China’s responsibility and compassion with an eye to the prospects of world powers. Secondly, optimizing the national strategy and improving the layout of allround opening up. The national development strategy is the foundation of the national strategic system. The medium- and long-term goals of China’s national development strategy are to achieve socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and, on the basis of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, to turn China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by the middle of this century in two steps. At present, China’s economy has shifted from a stage of high-speed growth to a stage of high-quality development, and is in a critical period of transforming its development mode, optimizing its economic structure and fostering new drivers of growth; building a modern economic system is an urgent requirement for surmounting the hurdle and a strategic goal for stable development. We must adhere to the principle of giving priority to quality and efficiency, 51 Xi

(2017b, pp. 210, 212). and Li (2016). 53 Xi (2017a, p. 58). 52 Sun

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take supply-side structural reform as our main task, and promote changes in the quality, efficiency and dynamics of economic development; we must improve total factor productivity, accelerate the construction of an industrial system in which the real economy, sci-tech innovation, modern finance and human resources develop in tandem, and build an economic system with effective market mechanisms, dynamic micro-entities and sound macro-regulation, so as to continuously enhance the innovativeness and competitiveness of China’s economy. To achieve this strategic goal, we need to optimize our opening-up strategy, make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea, comprehensively improve the quality and level of opening-up, and commit ourselves to building a new open economic system that is mutually beneficial and win–win, diversified, balanced, safe and efficient. (1)

(2)

54 He

We will focus our effort on institutional reform, balance domestic and international considerations, break down resolutely all institutional obstacles to opening up, and promote institutional arrangements conducive to fostering new comparative and competitive advantages. At present, as China’s comprehensively deepening reform has gradually moved from a shallow-water zone to a deep-water zone, its complexity, arduousness and sensitivity have obviously increased. The focus of comprehensively deepening reform is to correctly handle the relationship between the government and the market, further expand the breadth and depth of opening up, introduce external impetus for comprehensively deepening reform, break through the blockades of vested interests, accelerate the transformation of government functions, simplify administrative examination and approval procedures, promote trade and investment facilitation, and bring into play the fundamental role of the market in allocation of resources, so as to create a favorable environment for China’s economic and social development.54 We should deepen reform at the institutional and regulatory levels, push forward the reform of institutional mechanisms, including easing market access, accelerating the construction of free trade zones and expanding the opening up of inland and border areas, improve the legal system for market access and regulation, the protection of property rights and the credit system, focus on creating a business environment that is stable, fair, transparent, rule-based, predictable, more open and internationally competitive, fully implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list, and post-establishment national treatment, conduct a scientific and rational evaluation of the existing negative list, eliminate invisible barriers and remove unfair industrial protections.55 We will make new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts and cultivate new advantages for participation in international competition. To consolidate the foundation of all-round opening up, it is necessary to change from the previous trade-oriented pattern to a pattern valuing both trade and investment, from the previous trade in goods to a model emphasizing trade both (2016). (2018, p. 29) and Liu (2018).

55 Long

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in goods and services, from the previous “bringing in” to a mode with equal emphasis on “bringing in” and “going global”, and from the previous introduction of investment to the introduction of investment and brains. At the same time, it is necessary to expand the areas of opening up, from the opening up of the economic and trade sector to the financial sector, from the real economy to the rules and governance sector, and to expand the entities of opening up, with a shift from the previous focus on developed economies to an equal emphasis on both developed and developing economies. On this basis, it is imperative to further open the service sector to the outside world. There is a need to make the significant easing of market access in the service sector the focus of a new round of opening up, while at the same time actively improving the service sector, vigorously developing trade in services and enhancing the international competitiveness of the service sector.56 We can take pilot free trade zones and ports as the highlands for the opening up of the service sector, and, in line with the rules and standards of free trade zones of developed economies and international free ports, give full play to their demonstration and driving effect to promote China’s service sector and upgrade the industrial structure. At the same time, we aims to achieve a benign interaction between attracting foreign investment and guiding enterprises to directly invest abroad. We will promote China’s technological progress and innovation, intensify efforts to encourage Chinesefunded multinational companies and vigorously make outbound investment, so as to provide endogenous support for China’s long-term economic development and promote the transformation of China’s economy from epitaxial growth to endogenous growth.57 We will coordinate regional development to bring opening up to a new level. The report to the 19th CPC National Congress says, “We will strengthen measures to reach a new stage in the large-scale development of the country’s western region; deepen reform to accelerate the revitalization of old industrial bases in the northeast and other parts of the country; help the central region rise by tapping into local strengths; and support the eastern regions in taking the lead in pursuing optimal development through innovation. To this end, we need to put in place new, effective mechanisms to ensure coordinated development of different regions”.58 This is a core strategy for realizing regional overall development. The regional opening-up layout in the new era is guided by the BRI, which is in line with such national strategies as the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, and the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, so as to make new ground in opening China further through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. The coastal areas in the east should appropriately adjust the original strategy from being export-oriented to import-oriented, further consolidate an open economy, and

56 Long

(2018, pp. 28–29). (2017). 58 Xi (2017a, p. 33). 57 Shao

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at the same time strengthen investment in the central-western and northeastern regions; while the central-western and northeastern regions should emphasize export orientation and prioritize opening up to the eastern coastal regions so as to actively open up to the world. We will coordinate domestic development with opening up to improve regional development quality. In the meantime, we will strengthen the integration and coordination of national strategies such as the BRI and regional development strategies, and further promote the integration of the new round of opening up with the initiatives of the large-scale development in the western region, the revitalization of the northeast, the rise of the central region, the trailblazing development of the eastern region, and the development and opening up of border areas.59 Thirdly, strengthening regional strategies to promote the building of a regional community of shared future. East Asia is China’s strategic support zone and the core of China’s regional strategy. China should fully understand the regional effects brought about by its rise, effectively reduce the negative impact of its rise, promote regional stability and common development, develop a community of shared interests in East Asia through institutionalized cooperation, create a community of responsibility shared by all countries with great powers taking more shares, vigorously promote a community of shared future in East Asia, and nurture and consolidate an equitable, cooperative, mutually beneficial, mutually supportive and open East Asian order based on common interests. The deepening of China’s East Asian strategy lies in the transition from promoting multi-parallel East Asian integration and cooperation to advancing the institutionalization of the East Asian community, and achieving a higher level of strategic design and strategic operation. The core of building a community of shared future in East Asia is to promote the East Asian community of shared interests and responsibility based on common interests. To this day, East Asia has established a moderately effective institutional framework at the sub-regional, regional and super-regional levels, which represents the convergence and institutionalization of common interests. With East Asia entering a phase of institution building and identity seeking, common interests have become the basis and starting point for problem-solving on the part of countries in the region. As China further integrates into East Asian regional cooperation, China’s regional influence is strengthened, and the country is seeking and expanding common interests. China is prepared to take a lead in establishing the East Asian community of shared interests. China should envisage a strategic framework based on common interests and work with other countries in East Asia to promote the building of East Asian community of shared interests. As an important stakeholder in East Asia, it is time for China to contribute more to regional peace and development and assume regional responsibility. China assumes regional responsibility and aims at making a difference in its utmost efforts. At the same time, regional affairs are complicated and the interests of countries vary. Only by gradually establishing a community of responsibility shared by all countries, with great powers bearing the most responsibility, can regional cooperation be strongly 59 Yang

(2018b).

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built on institutions, and the sense of a regional community of shared future be strengthened. In view of this, China should deepen its understanding of regional public goods, join hands with other countries to establish goals for regional peace and development. China should objectively assess the fundamental interests of countries in East Asia to be able to give timely help and promote shared prosperity, thereby deepening the sense of East Asian community of shared future and realizing the reshaping of East Asian order. The strategic deployment of China in East Asia emphasizes politics, economy, security, humanities, etc. In politics, China should work to promote the political consultation in regional cooperation, pursue cooperation and advancement, actively make contributions, and strengthen the political identity among all countries to alleviate and resolve conflicts that have occurred or may occur. China should adhere to the regular leadership meetings and deepen the coordination on relevant political issues; strengthen the regular exchanges between affairs officers and ministerial officials, and develop cooperation between countries at the department level; and give its support for the regular leadership meetings and the coordination of major issues. At the same time, China should strengthen exchanges and cooperation with countries in East Asia on global and other regional affairs, so as to deepen political trust and cultivate regional identity and awareness. Fourthly, deepening the global strategy to promote the building of a community of shared future for mankind. The global strategy reflects the macro vision of the national strategic system. China should not only seize the opportunities of peace, development and win–win cooperation in the current era to further develop itself, but should also strive to fulfill its obligations and make more contributions to world peace and development, actively shoulder its international responsibilities and obligations, actively participate in global governance and provide opportunities and space for common development for all countries, and welcome every country to board China’s express train of development and share the dividends of China’s development. China actively affirms its will to pursue the path of peaceful development, adheres to a strategic approach based on mutual benefit and win–win result, emphasizes cooperation with other countries on the basis of convergence of interests, actively assumes more international responsibilities within its capacity, and establishes and develops a community of shared interests, responsibility and future with other countries. From the perspective of opening up, China’s global strategy shall focus on the following aspects: (1)

Fully participating in the formulation of international institutions and rules, and actively promoting changes in the international order. China should seek common interests within the international system in order to smash the “China Threat” and clarify misinterpretations on China’s diplomacy, stabilize the outside world’s expectations of China’s international strategy and dispel concerns about China’s development, and demonstrate to the world the charm of traditional Chinese thinking and constructive initiatives, so as to enhance China’s international influence and assume more leading responsibilities for world peace and development; China should safeguard its sovereignty

7.3 Propelling China’s Opening up to the New Era

(2)

(3)

60 Men

and territorial integrity within the international system, realize national unity and rejuvenate the nation; it should actively participate in the improvement of international institutions, take the country’s national interests as the basis, and contribute to building a new, clean and beautiful world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness. The above efforts must be closely linked to promoting changes in the international order. The main path of China’s participation in the reshaping of the international order is to lay stress on improving the basic rules of international institutions, attempt to actively participate in the reshaping of the international financial order, accumulate experience in the reshaping of the international order on this basis, and focus on the reshaping of the East Asian order to gradually strengthen its agenda-setting capacity in building the international order.60 Leading a new type of globalization, promoting the transformation and development of global governance and demonstrating China’s sense of responsibility. The next 5–10 years will be a critical period for the transformation and development of global governance and for China’s overall rise. China should not only cooperate with major countries in joint top-level design, but also have the courage to take up the historical mission of promoting a new type of globalization, consciously hold high the banner of a new type of globalization, actively boost trade liberalization, investment liberalization and service facilitation, promote reform through opening up, seek development through reform and win prosperity through development. We should deeply realize that the globalization led by China is a new type, with the goal of overcoming the shortcomings of the existing economic globalization. The new type of globalization is one of balanced, inclusive and sustainable development, embodying the characteristics of openness, inclusiveness, balance and mutual benefit, and it is necessary not only to “make the cake bigger”, but also to “share it fairly” and to focus on resolving issues of fairness and justice.61 Actively developing a network of partnerships and expanding China’s new global vision. China values the overall stable and balanced development of relations with major powers, and stresses the progress of relations with major powers. At the same time, it attaches importance to relations with developing powers, and vigorously promotes the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, making it a model of win–win cooperation for emerging powers.62 In dealing with bilateral relations with neighboring countries, China should continue to implement the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in our relations with neighboring countries, and promote friendship and partnership with its neighbors for the establishment of a community of shared future. At the same time, China pursues the greater good and shared interests when conducting mutually beneficial cooperation with other developing countries, and promotes economic growth through developing trade and

(2016). (2017). 62 Zhou and Feng (2018). 61 Li

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investment. Meanwhile, it will actively increase its support to developing countries, especially by expanding foreign aid, and take the lead in exchanging governance experiences among countries of the South and developing new capacities, so as to provide them with more conditions and opportunities to benefit from China’s development. On this basis, China will continue to expand its circle of friends, establish and expand a global network of partnerships, provide a more direct framework for bilateral dialogue and cooperation, and seek positive results in mutual political trust and economic interdependence, cultural integration, and social interaction. At the global level, China strives to establish free trade zones with a majority of emerging economies, major developing countries, major regional economic blocs, and some developed countries, and build large markets for BRICS, emerging economies, and developing countries.63 Appropriately handling the differences between China and the USA, and preventing competition and conflict between the two countries from causing global shocks. The Sino-US relations, which are the core factor to determine the general trend of international relations and mankind’s pathway towards peace, have touched the nerves of the world.64 The current Sino-US relations are on the verge of the “Thucydides Trap”. Given the strategic competition between the two countries has taken shape, it is crucial to properly manage differences, strengthen crisis management and prevent risks in one area from spilling over into the overall relationship. China and the U.S. have serious differences on many issues. The trade conflict is just one concentrated manifestation. It is currently spilling over into cross-strait relations, which is a sign of extreme danger. The key to Sino-US relations lies in strengthening the awareness of strategic management, and coordinating high-level exchanges at the macro level, functional cooperation at the medium level and crisis management at the micro level. At the same time, we should strengthen the management and control of major issues to prevent escalation of conflict resulting in security dilemmas. The basis for the proper management of differences between the two countries lies in the principle of seeking common ground while putting aside differences, and in the conviction that the wide Pacific Ocean and dynamic globalization are sufficient to accommodate the legitimate interests of China and the United States.

(4)

Fifthly, focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative and promoting benign interaction between China and the world. The BRI framework has pointed out the direction for China to accelerate the formation of an opening-up pattern through links running eastward and westward, across land and over sea. It also brings about opportunities for countries along the belt and road to strengthen mutually-beneficial cooperation and achieve common development. The BRI emphasizes the organic combination of China’s opening up, regional cooperation and global development, integrating domestic, regional and global issues, and is an important means of promoting positive 63 Li

and Wang (2017). (2012).

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interaction between China and the world. The BRI is an important lever for setting international rules, with its core elements related to the reshaping of international rules. In promoting the construction of a system of international rules for the BRI, China should emphasize the principles of fairness, reasonableness, inclusiveness, transparency, openness and win–win results, and act as an advocate and leader in the rule-making process, committing itself to creating and developing an open platform for cooperation, an open world economy, and an environment conducive to open development.

References Bi J, Li W (2018) Innovation and improvement of China’s all-round opening-up pattern. Stud Socialism Chin Characteristics 1:42–49 Fang A (2016) Creating the new era of China’s opening up and development. Foreign Investment China (12):16–18 He L (2016) The inner logic and practical path of adhering to open development under the new situation. Contemp World Socialism (2):31–36 Hu A et al (2016) China’s new concepts: five major developments. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, pp 9–10 Li J (2015) New ideas of development and the great trend of China. Theor Horizon (12):14–15 Li X (2017) The costs and benefits of China’s leading economic globalization in the context of ‘anti-globalization’. China Indus Econ (6):30–35 Li G (2018) New era: making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts. Intertrade (1):4–8 Li G, Wang R (2017) Achievements in the construction of China’s free trade zones and future key directions for development. Intertrade 7:4–6 Liu J (2018) Pushing China into the new era of opening up to the outside world. Finance Account Int Commer (5):3–6 Long G (ed) (2018) Establishing a new system for an open economy. Guangdong Economy Publishing House, Guangzhou Luo Q, Zhu S (2018) From special economic zones to free trade zones: the deductive logic of the path and goal of China’s reform and opening up drive. J Shenzhen Univ (Humanities & Social Sciences) (1):33–41 Men HH (2012) A critical moment: China, the United States and the world in the eyes of American elites. Soc Sci China (7):182–202 Men HH (2016) China’s rise and changes in the international order Q J Int Polit (1):63–93 Men HH (2017a) China’s approach to dealing with crisis and change in global governance. Soc Sci China (10):36–46 Men HH (2017b) China’s international strategy since the 18th national congress of CPC: overall arrangements and achievements. J Soc Sci 8:16–30 Pei C, Liu H (2018) An economic analysis of xi jinping thought on opening up for a new era. Econ Res J (2):4–19 Pei C, Yu Y (2015) One belt and one road’ construction and the further opening-up of China. Int Econ Trade Res (10):4–17 Rui Z (2017) Building a new system of opening up to the outside world oriented to upgrading. Shanghai Enterp (12):42–43 Shao Y (2017) FDI, OFDI, domestic technology progress. J Quant Tech Econ (9):21–38 Sheng B, Li F (2017) What’s new in china’s new open economy system? Int Econ Rev 1:129–140 Shi Z (2017) Embrace the world with a more open posture—achievements of China’s opening-up since the 18th CPC national congress. Economy (16):16–18

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Sun Q, Li L (2016) New thinking on china’s all-round opening-up strategy. J Peking Univ (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 2:24–27 The Party Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (ed) (2014) Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s talks on comprehensively deepening reform. Central Party Literature Press, p 31 Wang Z (2014) Promoting reform through opening up: innovation of the theory of opening up to the outside world. Reform Econ Syst (1):7–9 Wang Y (2017) Making new ground in pursuing opening-up on all fronts. People’s Daily, Nov 10, p4 Xi JP (2013) China’s economy maintains sustained and healthy development and china will improve its open economy. People’s Daily, Apr 9, p 1 Xi JP (2015a) Seeking sustainable development together as win-win partners. People’s Daily, Sept 27, p 2 Xi JP (2015b) Working together to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and create a community of shared future for mankind—statement at the general debate of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. People’s Daily, Sept 29, p 2 Xi JP (2015c) Comprehensively Implementing the spirit of the fifth plenary session of the 18th CPC central committee: relying on reforms to provide sustained momentum for scientific development. People’s Daily, Nov 10, p 2 Xi JP (2015d) Jointly build partnership for bright future—speech at the 7th BRICS summit. People’s Daily, July 9, p 1 Xi JP (2016) Speech at a study session on implementing the decisions of the fifth plenary session of the 18th CPC central committee, attended by officials at the provincial/ministerial level. People’s Daily, May 10, p 3 Xi JP (2017a) Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era—delivered at the 19th national congress of the communist party of China People’s Publishing House, Beijing Xi JP (2017b) Xi Jinping: the governance of China (volume two). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, p 197 Xi JP (2018) Xi Jinping: the governance of China (volume one). Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pp 335–337 Xin B (2016) China’s contribution to global governance. China Machine Press, Beijing, p 52 Yang D (2018a) Patterns and experience of china’s four decades of opening-up. China Econ (4):68– 95 Yang D (2018b) Promoting the formation of new pattern of all-round opening up in the new era. Reg Econ Rev (3):5–13 Yi W (2015) A year of flying colors for pursuing major-country diplomacy with distinctive Chinese features. Int Stud (1):1–8 Zhang Y (2016) The strategic and theoretical implications of pilot free trade zone. World Econ Stud (7):3–12 Zhong F (2014) New type of great power relationship, mutual development and China’s new diplomatic concept. Int Forum (1):34–39 Zhou T (2017) Overcoming the development trap: a breakthrough reform program to promote medium to high economic growth. China Fortune Press, Beijing, pp 294–295 Zhou W, Feng W (2018) Promoting New South-South cooperation in all-round opening up. China Open J 3:38–42

Chapter 8

China’s Strategic Approach to the USA in the New Era

In 2017, both China and the USA stated they had entered “the new era.” On October 18, 2017, the 19th National Congress of the CPC was convened, at which Xi pointed out that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has crossed the threshold into the new era. This is a new historic juncture in China’s development”, “it will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind” and “we are closer, more confident, and more capable than ever before of making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality”.1 On December 18, 2017, the White House released the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, and on the same day the White House website published a report entitled “A New National Security Strategy for a New Era”, which announced that “the era of great power competition has returned,” and positioned China as the top-ranked “strategic competitor” and “economic aggressor”, proposing the use of American power to deter and constrain the revisionist powers of China and Russia that seek to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.2 The aforementioned new-era positioning and the subsequent frequent frictions and conflicts between the two sides in trade and other areas have exerted a shocking impact on the world. China-US relationship, the most complicated and challenging one around the world, has become the core part in the world transformation, whose prospect not only decides the well-being of the two countries, but influences and shapes the future of the world.3 Sino-US relations are the core element that influences the overall trend of international relations and determines whether humankind will move towards peace or not. If well managed, they will be a blessing for the world; if

1 Xi

(2017). White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C., the United States, December 2017. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, p. 25. 3 Men (2014). 2 The

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 X. Xiao and H. Men, Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era, Understanding China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1156-8_8

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not, a curse for the world.4 At present, Trump Administration has strengthened the competition in economy and trade, investment, finance and others, and pushed the bilateral relations to the crossroad that decides the future of the two countries and the world. Before 2010, the conflict between China and the USA was relatively homogeneous and concentrated, but the ongoing one involves almost every aspect of the bilateral relations, and is more intensive, frequent, and intertwined with various issues. How to manage the rising strategic competition and friction between the two countries, prevent the outbreak of a full-scale trade war or even a full-scale confrontation, and maintain the relative stability of China-US relations is a major strategic challenge for China. Related to this, the U.S.-China relationship is also a top priority for U.S. diplomacy, and only by addressing this issue properly can we maintain stability and sustain the global economy.5 The relationship between the two countries impacts the world. As Kevin Michael Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, said, “There is no greater strategic issue at stake for the world today than the future relationship between the United States and China”.6 The China-US relationship is going into the new era, with the strategic competition as the prominent feature. The American factor is the last hurdle to China’s rise and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,7 and no other country impacts China more than the USA. How to determine China’s strategy towards the USA in the new era is a major topic worthy of in-depth discussion. This book examines the strategic effects of China’s increased economic power and international influence since the reform and opening-up, especially since the 18th CPC National Congress, and uses this as a basis for discussing how the era of Sino-U.S. strategic competition has come about and how the U.S. is responding to China’s diplomacy in the new era. Furthermore, the basic trend of Sino-US relations is evaluated, and constructive suggestions on China’s strategic approach to the USA in the new era are put forward.

8.1 China and the US in the New Era of Strategic Competition The 40 years of diplomatic relations between China and the United States coincide with China’s 40 years of reform and opening up. With China’s active integration into the world, cooperation has become the main line of Sino-US relations. Over the past 40 years, the debate about whether China is a “partner” or “opponent” and whether China should be “contained” or be “engaged” has never ceased in the United States.8 In the twenty-first century, China’s rapid rise has aroused the attention and 4 Men

(2012). (2017). 6 Rudd (2015). 7 Xu (2018). 8 “Forty Years of Diplomatic Relations Between China and the United States: Pressing Ahead Despite Turns and Twists”, People’s Daily Overseas Edition, January 3, 2019, p. 1. 5 Cohen

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high vigilance from the United States. The unease towards China’s rise has been growing these years, changing from expecting China’s peaceful rise in the beginning to fearing the threat of China’s peaceful rise. The Sino-US strategic scholars have put forward various new ideas such as “strategic reassurance”, “Chimerica”, “co-evolution”, “G2”, and “Fourth Communiqué” in an attempt to establish a new framework for Sino-US relations and replenish the existing framework supported by the “three joint communiqués and three joint statements”.9 However, none of these has been incorporated into official policies. The outbreak of the debt crisis in Europe and the United States in 2008 was a landmark event that marked a major shift in Sino-U.S. relations, and China, which had seized the opportunity to expand its interests around the world, became a thorn in the side of the United States. China’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia, have aroused the high alert of the United States, which has stepped up its “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy and launched a strategic containment campaign against China. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, with the rapid increase in national strength, China has emphasized the construction of an innovative country, proposed and implemented the “Made in China 2025” program; in diplomacy, it has shown an increasingly proactive stance, and become more proactive than before not only on such issues as maintaining security in its territorial waters, but also on political and economic issues such as development in other parts of the world and participation in global economic governance.10 Words like “energetic”, “proactive” and “innovative” are becoming the new qualities of China’s diplomacy.11 China strongly supports the process of globalization, actively participates in global economic governance, advocates the BRI and takes the lead in promoting the BRI and the establishment of the AIIB. China’s global influence is becoming increasingly prominent.12 China’s growing power and increasingly assertive behavior has raised concerns in the United States13 , which has felt significant competitive pressure and potential threats from the “Made in China 2025” Program and BRI.14 Although Chinese leaders have put forward the concept of a new model of major-country relations and are committed to a peaceful rise and the maintenance of world peace, they have failed to gain the U.S. recognition and have instead triggered a heated debate on the U.S. policy toward China. According to Harry Harding, the U.S. strategic community, in the face of new changes in China’s development and diplomatic posture since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, has been engaged in the “most heated debate” on policy toward China in the past 50-plus years. The debate culminated in 2015 and continued until the release of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America at the end of 2017. U.S. strategists tend to believe that an accelerating rise of China is the greatest long-term threat confronting the United States, and advocate changing 9 Peng

(2018). (2017). 11 Wang (2016). 12 Song (2017). 13 Zuo (2018). 14 Pan and Zhou (2018). 10 Liu

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U.S. policy toward China from engagement to containment. Even the former US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and David Lampton, who have always kept a mild attitude towards China, also believed that Sino-US relations had reached a tipping point and there was a threat of further deterioration or even all-around confrontation.15 In the course of the debate, it became increasingly clear that both the pro-establishment camp and the anti-establishment camp, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, liberals and conservatives, policy makers and industry insiders, believe that the rise of China posed unprecedented pressures and challenges to the American national interests. The report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC has sparked a new wave of “losing China” debates, a serious misjudgment of China’s aspirations for the new era on the U.S. side, and misinterpretation that the Report is a plan for China’s future global hegemonic domination, and that China intends to implement geopolitical expansion and export ideology; it will seek to replace the “old era” of the United States with a “new era” of China and promote a “new tribute” strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.16 The illusion that the United States is shaping China’s direction through its engagement policy has been shattered, and China is heading down a path that is contrary to what the U.S. expected, and exporting its own model to the world.17 Based on this misjudgment and distortion, the U.S. strategy towards China has been tilted on all fronts. Trump’s victory in election once gave China illusions and hope that China and the United States would build a new framework for major country relations. But it turns out that the above optimistic expectations were just wishful thinking.18 In his overall strategic reorientation, Trump clearly sees China as a primary, comprehensive and global strategic competitor, and his policy approach to China has shown an all-around tough turn.19 The results of the aforementioned debates are reflected in three key security documents, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America released by the White House, the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America and the Nuclear Posture Review released by the U.S. Department of Defense successively from December 18, 2017. The three reports unanimously conclude that the era of great power competition has returned, and that U.S. power is to be used to deter and restrain the revisionist states of China and Russia.20 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America stresses that China is a strategic competitor and economic aggressor for the United States. This is the first time since the end of the Cold War that the U.S. government has defined “great power competition” in an official document as a feature of the new 15 Harding

(2015), Tao (2016), Xinbo (2018). (2018). 17 Ni (2018). 18 Peng (2018). 19 Zhao (2018). 20 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017; The Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., the United States, January 2018; Office of the Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C., the United States, February 2018. 16 Denmark

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era, with China as the number one “strategic competitor”.21 The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America states, “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in particular, clearly sets out the strategic vision of the United States in the Asia Pacific Region, which is committed to counterbalancing China’s expanding influence in the Asia Pacific Region through political, economic and security means, and maintaining a regional balance in favor of the United States. On January 30, 2018, Trump delivered his State of the Union Address to the U.S. Congress, positioning China and Russia as rivals and further highlighting their negative significance. At the same time, the U.S. strategy towards China began to take a major turn, with the tone shifting from engagement to decoupling, counterbalancing and confrontation, and the U.S. making frequent high-intensity and high-frequency outbursts against China in many fields, including trade and commerce, Taiwan, the South China Sea, cultural exchanges and military exchanges. U.S.-China relations are getting increasingly tumultuous.

8.2 Judgments on China-U.S. Relations The United States believes that the strategic competition between China and the United States is expanding in scope and depth, and the challenges from China are not only on economic interests and security, but also on ideology, institutions and culture.22 Thereinto, economy and trade is the most competitive area at the current stage, involving tit-for-tat fight. This suggests that the interdependence in SinoU.S. economic interests is being replaced by a competitive relationship, and the buffering mechanism and constraining effect of economic interdependence on SinoU.S. strategic competition is plummeting. The motives of the US trade war with China include not only the strategic intention of containing the emerging of China’s capability of independent innovation and catching-up in technological innovation, but also the reality demands of the United States for seeking a larger share in China’s highquality economic development. All of these determine that the trade war tends to be protracted, involving both confrontation and negotiation.23 China has taken a combination of measures to deal with the United States. While responding positively and fighting back quickly, China has also taken a series of innovative measures including expanding opening-up and deepening reform, and actively promoted trade negotiations and consultations, which made Trump’s attempt of a quick victory impossible. In the future, the two sides will negotiate while fighting, and expand into the security and geopolitical fields. The United States may even stir up troubles by utilizing

21 Xia

(2018). and Chen (2018). 23 Zhang (2018). 22 Wang

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issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea to undermine China’s national security and curb the BRI. More obviously, the strategic competition between China and the United States is closely related to the struggle for dominance in East Asia. In the future, the danger that the US challenges China on the issues of the South China Sea and East China Sea will increase dramatically. Judging from the trend of US policy toward China, the competition between China and the US is intensifying and becoming more comprehensive. If the United States used to focus on different problem domains at different stages in its relations with China, it is now beginning to focus on the challenges from China in a comprehensive way and take measures to deal with them.24 Aggressive US and unbowed China have pushed bilateral relations to encounter unprecedented challenges.25 As a result, the trade conflict is but the beginning of a broader conflict between the United States and China, and a strategic competition between the two countries seems inevitable. Moreover, we should be clear that it is impossible for China-US relations to return to the past. On October 4, 2018, Mike Pence, Vice President of the United States delivered a speech on China at the Hudson Institute, which has been dubbed the onset of a “New Cold War”, arguing that “China is also applying this power in more proactive ways than ever before, to exert influence and interfere in the domestic policy and politics of this country. Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States has taken decisive action to respond to China with American action, applying the principles and the policies long advocated in these halls.” This speech makes clear the position of the U.S. Government. China and the United States are locked in confrontation over a range of issues, including trade, technology, espionage, and control of the South China Sea. It is obvious that the deep-rooted antagonism of the US cannot be resolved by lowering tariffs on cars or buying more soybeans on the part of China. According to Tao Wenzhao, China-US relations are undergoing the most profound adjustment in the past 40 years, but it is too early to say that the relations have undergone qualitative changes.26 Zhang Yuyan and other scholars argue that ChinaUS relations have entered a period of qualitative change, which can be summarized as the adjustment of US policy toward China from “engagement” to “confinement”, that is, regulating China’s behavior, locking in China’s economic growth space and level, and confining China’s development direction and growth to be unable to threaten or challenge the US dominance.27 We believe that the strategic direction of China-US relations has yet to be shaped and that avoiding a new cold war should be most important for both sides. At present, China-US relations are at a new crossroads, where the old consensus has collapsed, but the new policy framework has not yet taken shape.28 This may be a necessary stage in the reconstruction of bilateral stability between a rapidly 24 Xinbo

(2018). et al. (2018). 26 Tao (2018). 27 Zhang and Feng (2018). 28 Wei (2018). 25 Cui

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rising China and a decline anxiety-ridden United States. We have seen that although the United States has focused on the trade war with China and challenged China’s bottom line on issues such as Taiwan, it has not completely broken the overall stability of China-US relations, but still has a deep coordination on the North Korea issue, and has taken a parallel strategic initiative of “decoupling” and “coupling” with China. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America also argues, “Competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict. The United States stands ready to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries (China and Russia).”29 On the other hand, US policy toward China could be adjusted. As Stephen Roach points out, China and the United States are economically interdependent, and changes on either side could seriously affect the other’s development… If the United States really oppresses China, not only will the most important economic partnership in today’s world break down, but other countries will suffer as well. These pitfalls speak to the critical role of China, without which the US prosperity is unimaginable.30

8.3 Basic Framework of China’s Strategic Approach to the United States The world is undergoing the unprecedented changes unseen in a hundred years. The reshaping of China-US relations is both an integral part of these changes and a core force driving them. Scarcely has the US seen such a strategic competitor like China, and “the challenge of China is much subtler than that of the Soviet Union.”31 For China, the United States will remain the most powerful country in the world for a long time to come, with numerous and comprehensive advantages over China in terms of its military, technology, and international institutions. Even if China’s economy surpasses that of the United States in the 2020s and 2030s, the gap in overall national strength with the United States will by no means be bridged in the short term. From the dialectical view, having such a super-competitor is more than a challenge for China’s strategic goal of achieving the great rejuvenation of the nation; it could even turn into a benchmark for driving China to deepen reform and encourage it to move faster.32 The strategic competition between China and the United States has its own historical inevitability. We must maintain strategic focus and vision, neither be tempted by reputation or frightened by slanders nor be blindly arrogant or look down upon ourselves. We should cope with the situation in a calm and sober manner.

29 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, December 18, 2017, pp. 2–3. https://

www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (2017). 31 “A Conversation with Henry Kissinger”, The National Interest, September/October 2015, pp. 12– 17. 32 Jianqun (2018). 30 Roach

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The basic framework of China’s strategic approach to the United States in the new era consists of the following core elements: First, we will adhere to the path of peaceful development, focus on economic development and nation-building, exert all-out efforts to improve our comprehensive national strength and lay a solid material and spiritual foundation for China’s all-round rise. The overall national strength is the foundation of a country’s strategic plan, and it hinges on both the material elements and the immaterial factors including institutions, environment, society, national spirit, etc. If a country does not have an economic structure, management system, social environment or national cohesion that is compatible with its economic strength and resources, or lacks the adaptability to the international environment change, it cannot form a strong comprehensive national strength system. Comprehensive national strength refers to the integrity and systematization of national power, that is, the systematic effect produced by the joint efforts of various forces such as economy, science and technology, military, politics, culture, diplomacy and the quality of the entire population. The competition for greater overall national strength emphasizes a mix of competition and coordination in different historic periods. Against the backdrop of a rapid economic globalization and regional economic integration process, competition coexists with cooperation, and they complement each other. This trend has been embedded in the current theoretical research on comprehensive national strength and its implementation.33 For China, the overall improvement of its comprehensive national strength is the first priority and the fundamental way to deal with the strategic competition between China and the United States. The strengthening of comprehensive national strength stems not only from the development and cultivation of the domestic market, but also from the acquisition of strategic resources under the conditions of globalization; it is not only marked by the steady rise of hard power, but must also be based on the strengthening of soft power, and China must regard the enhancement of soft power, especially the international influence of national culture, as one of the cores of the strengthening of national power. We must be deeply aware of the wide gap between China and the United States in comprehensive national strength, and of the difficulties in China’s further development, emphasize the strategic value of putting economic development at the center, and commit ourselves to improving the quality of economic growth, promoting the transformation of the mode of economic development, building an independent innovation system with Chinese characteristics, continuously raising the per-capita income and further improving human development indicators by deepening reform and opening up to the outside world on all fronts. In this way, the Chinese people will be able to enjoy a higher quality of material life, more comprehensive human development, more secure human security and a more beautiful ecological environment, with the completion of a moderately prosperous society in all respects as the basis for further development, and the capacity to respond positively to external risks and challenges will be comprehensively enhanced.

33 Men

(2017).

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Second, we will grasp the opportunity to deepen reform and advance opening up in an all-round way. One of the undeniable reasons for the intensification of economic competition and strategic gaming between China and the United States is that we have not yet completed reform in some areas, reform and opening-up in specific areas is lagging behind, and local governments and certain government agencies in China have engaged in behaviors and phenomena that violate the principle of fair market competition and WTO rules. We need to face up to these problems and further deepen reforms in state-owned enterprises, marketization of factor prices, the land system, financial markets and other aspects.34 On the other hand, expanding and promoting comprehensive opening up to the outside world is the fundamental driving force for China’s future development, the most effective way to deal with international frictions, and the best way to resist the impact of the U.S. trade war on China. China will remain committed to institutional reform, balance domestic and international considerations, resolutely remove all institutional obstacles to opening up, promote institutional arrangements conducive to fostering new comparative and competitive advantages, advance institutional reforms, including easing market access, accelerating the construction of free trade zones and expanding the opening up of inland and border areas, and improve legal institutions on market access and regulation, property rights protection and credit system. In addition, China will focus on creating a business environment that is stable, fair, transparent, law-based and predictable, with a higher level of openness and international competitiveness, fully implementing the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board, and implementing post-establishment national treatment, as well as carrying out scientific and rational assessments of the existing negative list, in a bid to eliminate invisible barriers and remove unfair industrial protection.35 We will actively form a new pattern of comprehensive opening up to the outside world, on the basis of which we will cultivate new advantages for participating in international competition, take pilot free trade zones and free-trade ports as the highlands for opening up the service sector, benchmark the rules and standards of free trade zones in developed economies and international free ports, and exert a demonstration effect to promote the development of China’s service sector and upgrade its industrial structure. At the same time, we will achieve a good interaction between attracting foreign investment and guiding foreign direct investment by enterprises, promote China’s technological progress and innovation, intensify efforts to cultivate Chinese-funded multinational corporations and vigorously make outbound investment, with a view to providing endogenous support for China’s long-term positive economic development and promoting the transformation of China’s economy from epitaxial growth to endogenous growth.36 Third, we will advance the BRI to realize the strategic innovation in China’s international cooperation. Promoting the BRI and broadening the flexible strategic space are of great significance to the overall layout and focus of China’s international cooperation. The establishment and maintenance of good economic and trade 34 Li

and Lu (2018), Zhang (2018). (2018). 36 Shao (2017). 35 Long

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relations with countries along the Belt and Road will help gradually reduce the concentration of trade between China and the United States, disperse the systemic risks in China’s foreign trade, eliminate the concerns and doubts of countries and regions whose interests are involved in the trade friction between China and the United States, and effectively mitigate the uncertainty in international economic and trade relations.37 More importantly, the BRI is an important initiative put forward by the CPC Central Committee after taking stock of the overall situation and weighing the situation from various perspectives in the face of the complicated domestic and international situations, and is regarded as a strategic ladder for China to build a community of shared future with the international community.38 Proposed by China, the BRI is a pan-Asian regional strategy that is based in Asia and dedicated to facilitating land and maritime connectivity, making its impact felt in surrounding areas and exerting global influence.39 It reflects China’s thinking on building an open and inclusive regional cooperation mechanism. The “Belt and Road” is, first and foremost, a regional economic concept aimed at promoting the common development of all countries and supported by the Eurasian economic integration. The BRI is a regional cooperation arrangement focusing on Asian countries, taking the form of building land and maritime economic cooperation corridors, using transport corridors as links, based on connectivity, featuring diversified cooperation mechanisms and aiming at building a community with a shared future.40 On the other hand, it is an indication of China’s new international positioning as a global power that does not limit its self-interest to Asia, but extends its international influence in Asia, Europe, Africa, etc., and seeks institutionalized cooperation on a global scale. The BRI is one of China’s major strategies for seeking foreign economic cooperation and achieving economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region through land and sea, and is an important measure for China to respond to domestic and international difficulties under the new circumstances.41 Fourth, we will adhere to the principle of combining peace and struggle with the USA, and strengthen bilateral control and complex interdependence. China must make every effort to prevent the dilemma and danger of being drawn into an escalating confrontation with the USA. We must be acutely aware that for a hegemonic power like the United States, any cooperation is earned through struggle, not begging; we must be resolute in our struggle on the one hand, and be committed to seeking cooperation, on the other, in order to maintain the equilibrium of fighting without breaking. We need to be acutely aware of the profound differences and confrontational elements that exist between China and the United States, and realize that the USA is the country that may harm China’s core interests greatly. For this 37 Deng

et al. (2018). (2014). 39 Research Group of the Class for Provincial/Ministerial-level Officials Pursuing Further Studies at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee: “On the Risks, Challenges and Countermeasures of ‘the Belt and Road’ Initiative”, Theoretical Horizon, Issue 8, 2015, pp. 43–46. 40 Ma (2015). 41 Chen and Chen (2015). 38 Guangcheng

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reason, we must clearly draw China’s strategic bottom line on such core strategic issues as national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and resolutely safeguard our core national interests. Given the prominence of structural contradictions between China and the United States, it is crucial to strengthen bilateral control. At the same time, we should deeply understand the source of the United States’ worries, appease the United States and work to dispel misunderstandings and miscalculations. There is fierce strategic competition between China and the United States, as well as an urgent need to strengthen cooperation. Joseph S. Nye’s article “The Cooperative Rivalry of U.S.-China Relations”, which was published on November 7, 2018, points out that the transnational challenges facing China and the United States cannot be solved without participation of the other, and that climate change and rising sea levels obey the laws of physics, not politics. As borders become more porous to everything from illegal drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, the largest economies will have to cooperate to address these threats. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter wrote in the Washington Post on December 31, 2018 that the two countries could cooperate on global issues such as the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, combating terrorism and extremism, tackling climate change, and especially promoting development in Africa. Given the declining US control over global and regional affairs and Trump’s lack of interest in international affairs, it is highly likely that the US will seek China’s cooperation on many global and regional issues in the future, and China should be adept at responding to Trump’s “decoupling” approach with a “coupling” strategy, seeking to promote coordination and cooperation in major strategic areas where there is a risk of conflict between the two sides. Currently, Trump is linking the China-US economic and trade issues to security issues and the North Korean nuclear issue to trade issues, which is an opportunity that China can make good use of.42 At the same time, we need to deepen cooperation in many low-political areas. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted, “There are also many areas where the United States and China can work together for mutual benefit, such as commercial, academic and educational exchanges. China and the United States can cooperate more extensively in environmental protection, clean energy use, national social security, and the construction of a medical system”.43 Fifth, on economic and trade issues, we should hold our ground and be adept at resolving conflicts through cooperation and compromise, while at the same time continuing to expand the space for economic cooperation around the world and actively seeking to occupy the strategic high ground. Given Trump’s commitment to reinvigorating the U.S. economy with an economic nationalist approach, the U.S. and China will focus more on their respective economic development and strength gains, and the two countries will compete more prominently at the national level.44 The United States’ trade policy prioritizes the U.S. interests, emphasizing trade fairness rather than simple trade balance; China’s trade policy focuses on the

42 Zuo

(2017). (2016). 44 Xinbo (2017). 43 Cohen

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transition from a large to a major trading power so as to change the existing international economic order including trade order. Therefore, the space for policy coordination is very limited45 , and the China-US trade conflict is bound to be a strategic protracted war. China should actively respond to the trade conflict between the two countries by deepening reform, opening up wider to the outside world and driving innovation, resolve the unbalanced and inadequate development of China-United States economic and trade relations, continuously expand the space for common interests and cooperation, and rebuild the economic foundation for the overall stability of China-United States relations.46 On the other hand, the layout of global economic cooperation should be studied in depth, and it should be deeply understood that China’s economic power space has expanded from neighboring countries to Eastern Europe, West Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania and Africa, and that the focus of the Sino-American economic game is concentrated in coastal areas of Europe, coastal areas of South Asia, the Middle East, and extending to the east coast of Latin America. China should moderately increase its strategic investment in these areas, and actively seek to occupy the strategic commanding height.47 Sixth, we should be prudent on security issues and prevent the recurrence of conflicts in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The security competition between China and the United States is regional, not global, and the focus is on East Asian dominance. The Asia-Pacific strategy was born when the United States, fearing that China would elbow it out of East Asia, sought to introduce more regional power to counterbalance and encircle China. East Asia is the region where the interests of China and the United States overlap the most, where common interests are most fully reflected, and where conflicts between the two countries are most likely to arise. Both China and the United States have a strong initiative in reshaping the East Asian strategic landscape. China should make it clear that it has no intention of adopting a Chinese version of the “Monroe Doctrine” that excludes the United States, welcome the US presence in the region and its efforts for regional peace and development, and urge the US to adopt an objective and fair attitude in pushing the countries concerned to take concrete actions and play a positive role in maintaining regional peace, stability and prosperity. Xi Jinping has proposed the concept of a “common circle of friends between China and the United States”,48 and we suggest that a thematic study be conducted to promote openness and cooperation between China and the United States in the Asia Pacific Region, with a view to attracting all countries to join the circle and working together to contribute to regional peace, stability and prosperity. As the American scholar Randall Schweller pointed out, “If prudence prevails on both sides, a stable regional balance of power will emerge among the local states—one nested within an even more stable Sino-American bipolar system that, unlike its US–Soviet predecessor, is not rooted in a zero-sum battle between 45 Yi

(2018). (2018), Zhao (2018). 47 Yang et al. (2017). 48 “Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump Jointly Meet the Press”, People’s Daily, November 10, 2017, p. 2. 46 Li

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the totalist ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Western-style democratic capitalism”.49 At present, among the various differences in Sino-US relations, the most dangerous is the competition between the two countries in the western Pacific Ocean.50 We should be highly vigilant against this, actively and steadily promote exchanges between the Chinese and US armed forces, strengthen the building of crisis management and control mechanisms, and avoid military miscalculation and direct collisions. Seventh, we should jointly promote a new type of globalization and seize the opportunity to advance the global configuration of national interests. International norms and rules have emerged as the core content of competition and cooperation among major powers as globalization has entered a new stage, which has led to the strife between Western powers led by the United States and developing powers headed by China. At present, it seems that the United States is tired of leading the world, or will withdraw from world affairs, and China is being encouraged to fill the void and take over the leading role.51 In this regard, we must be highly vigilant and cautious about it. In fact, China has been well recognized as a major player to lead globalization transformation.52 We must commit ourselves to seeking consensus and compromise, advance opening up and cooperation in dealing with common threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other advanced technologies, failed states, and climate change, and work with the United States to negotiate a new type of globalization that will lead to a shared evolution and prevent a strategic confrontation. At the same time, we see that Trump has made enemies of the world in multiple fields, which is nothing less than an invitation for China to play a constructive role. China needs to play an active role in global governance and free trade, among other things, to advance the institutionalization of China’s global interests. Eighth, we will actively promote the construction of a framework for majorcountry relations featuring overall stability and balanced development, and the formation of a stable system that balances and counterbalances the strategic hedging of the United States. Major country relations remain a constant focus of China’s diplomacy, and stable and balanced development of major-country relations as a whole is an important element of China’s international strategic layout in the new era. The current international situation has changed dramatically, leading to a drastic adjustment in relations between major countries. At a time when the strategic competition between China and the United States is intensifying, it is all the more important for us to manage our relations with other established and developing powers, commit ourselves to maintaining the peaceful transformation of the international system through enhancing mutual trust, seeking common ground while putting aside differences, avoiding confrontation and cooperating for mutual benefit,

49 Schweller

(2018). (2014). 51 Zongze (2017), He (2018). 52 Xu (2018). 50 Tao

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enhance mutual respect, pursue win-win cooperation, establish a new model of winwin cooperation and improve risk management mechanisms to inject positive energy into the development of international relations. We have to be sober-minded that the United States will inevitably intensify its strategic interaction with its existing allies and thus form a “menu-like alliance” against China, or even a strategic coercive combination of gangs to contain China. We need to respond calmly, quickly and effectively according to the current situation and deal with alliances with a network of global partnerships. At the same time, we should also note that when looking at the Sino-US trade war, Japan, India and other countries did not follow the logic of realism and rearrange their economic and trade relations with China based on their relations with the United States;53 instead, China-Japan relationship has warmed up in the smoke of Sino-US trade war. The reality shows that in today’s world of profound transformation, all countries have their own deep strategic considerations. We should seize the opportunity of this profound transformation, promote the construction of a framework of major country relations featuring balanced development, and strive to promote the strategic pattern of stable transformation of the world, so as to balance and counterbalance the strategic hedging of the United States.

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