China’s Foreign Relations and Security Dimensions 9780815368724, 9780429507496

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Foreword
Preface
List of abbreviations
1 China’s foreign policy: an overall understanding of debates and policy orientation
2 Understanding Sino-Indian foreign relations in contemporary times
3 Revisiting Sino-Indian relations: conflict and cooperation
4 Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia: an appraisal of problems and potentials for India
5 Assessing the comparative political economy of India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP
6 The internal situation in China and its impact on China’s foreign policy: an analysis
7 China’s drive for energy security: impact on its foreign policy behaviour
8 China’s north-west frontier: a historical perspective
9 The great Asian security complex: China’s security concerns and its responses towards the South China Sea
10 China’s two-level game in the climate change negotiation
11 China’s military modernisation: an overview
Glossary
Index

Citation preview

China’s Foreign Relations and Security Dimensions

China is the world’s second largest economy and a key player in world politics. This book looks at China’s foreign policy from a macro perspective. It analyses China’s peripheral and regional policy as well as its relations with other major powers – India and Russia. It offers insight into the historical security concerns of China and the linkages of internal domestic issues with external diplomacy which reshape its relations with neighbouring countries. The volume also examines President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy orientations and aspirations for the future. In the face of growing global concern on China’s hegemonic ambitions in the region, the book gauges the tensions between China and Japan in the South China Sea as well as the apprehensions of several smaller Asian countries that may perceive China’s strategic and geo-economic advantages and military strength as a threat. This book will be useful to scholars and researchers of China studies, politics, foreign policy, international relations, military and strategic studies, defence and security studies, area studies, and political studies. Geeta Kochhar is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She received her PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and is fluent in Mandarin Chinese. She was awarded the Asia Fellowship to undertake research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. She was also awarded the India–China Bilateral Cultural Exchange Scholarship (September 1995 to July 1997) by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, for pursuing advance studies in China. She has co-edited three books: Unique Asian Triangle: India, China, Nepal (2016); India–China–Nepal: Decoding Trilateralism (2016); and Nepal’s Foreign Policy and Her Neighbours (2016). She has also authored 1000 Powerful Chinese Lexicon: Chinese, English, Hindi (2017). She has presented many papers at national and international conferences on China, published several papers in journals and organised conferences.

China’s Foreign Relations and Security Dimensions Edited by Geeta Kochhar

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Geeta Kochhar; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Geeta Kochhar to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-6872-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-50749-6 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Contributorsvii Forewordix KERRY BROWN

Prefacexi List of abbreviationsxix   1 China’s foreign policy: an overall understanding of debates and policy orientation

1

GEETA KOCHHAR

  2 Understanding Sino-Indian foreign relations in contemporary times

20

SHREYASI GHOSH

  3 Revisiting Sino-Indian relations: conflict and cooperation

30

PRERANA BHADULI

  4 Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia: an appraisal of problems and potentials for India

50

BAWA SINGH AND PARVAIZ AHMAD THOKER

  5 Assessing the comparative political economy of India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP

65

TILAK JHA

  6 The internal situation in China and its impact on China’s foreign policy: an analysis TENZIN TSULTRIM

78

vi  Contents   7 China’s drive for energy security: impact on its foreign policy behaviour

98

ARNAB DASGUPTA

  8 China’s north-west frontier: a historical perspective

117

POOJA PINGUA

  9 The great Asian security complex: China’s security concerns and its responses towards the South China Sea

133

SHIV KUMAR AND SHABAZ HUSSAIN SHAH

10 China’s two-level game in the climate change negotiation

145

ANMOL MUKHIA

11 China’s military modernisation: an overview

163

UMESH KUMAR GUPTA

Glossary187 Index189

Contributors

Prerana Bhaduli is Assistant Professor at the Mahatma Gandhi Central University, Bihar, India. She is also pursuing her doctoral research in Russian and Central Asian Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Arnab Dasgupta is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Chandernagore Government College, West Bengal, India. His article ‘Emerging Strategic Equations in West Asia: Impact on India’s Energy Security’ was published in JAIR Journal of International Relations. His areas of interest include India’s and China’s energy strategies. Shreyasi Ghosh is a Guest Faculty at the Department of Political Science, Sarojini Naidu College for Women, India. Her research interests are in the areas of political thought, global politics, social movements, gender, and media. Umesh Kumar Gupta is Assistant Professor of Chinese, Amity University, Rajasthan, India. He has completed his master’s degree in Chinese from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and has qualified for the UGC-NET. He has recently published a Chinese textbook for professional learners. His research interests are India-China relations and border issues. Tilak Jha is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Geeta Kochhar is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She received her PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and is fluent in Mandarin Chinese.

viii  Contributors Shiv Kumar is a doctoral candidate at the School of Global Relations, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. His research interests include Asian security architecture and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region. Anmol Mukhia is a doctoral candidate at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University, China. His research interests include security studies, climate change, China–India, and China–North Korea. Pooja Pingua is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Her research interest is Xinjiang and she has worked on the ‘Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang, 2001–2013’. Shabaz Hussain Shah is a doctoral candidate at the School of Global Relations, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. His research interests include South Asian power politics and Indo-Russian affairs. Bawa Singh is Assistant Professor and officiating Head of the Department, Centre for South and Central Asian Studies, School of Global Relations, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. He has published many articles in reputed journals and contributes articles to Modern Diplomacy, Diplomat, Eurasian Review, and South Asian Monitor. Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for South and Central Asian Studies, School of Global Relations, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. Tenzin Tsultrim is Research Fellow, Tibet Policy Institute, Dharamshala, India. He earned his PhD in History from the University of Madras. He has published research articles and commentaries including in Tibet Policy Journal, Strategic Analysis, Think India Quarterly, and World Focus. His research interests are on India–China relations and developments in Tibet.

Foreword

One of the great gaps that exists in literature about China now is for authoritative statements of Indian perspectives on their neighbour. This collection of essays by young scholars in India starts to address this. It covers issues from the South China Sea to internal decision making on foreign policy and, of course, perspectives on India–China relations. What is striking about this collection is the sense of history that the contributors all display. These writers do have a strong notion of how ancient and deep the links between their two countries are, and how these operate in some areas as an advantage and in others as a hindrance. India scholars are knowledgeable, on the evidence presented here, of the development of the People’s Republic of China after its foundation in 1949 and of the very particular route it took – economically autarkic prior to Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and focused on its own immense domestic issues, and then, from 1978, open to the world and pursuing a path which inevitably had an impact on both the region it is located in and, increasingly, the wider world. Like many others, they wrestle to find a coherent framework within which to locate China. It is good to know that there are some confusions that we all share! India clearly does have a unique perspective on China in the era in which it is becoming an increasingly global player, however, and one that needs to be better understood and appreciated. That is why the voices in this collection are the ones that deserve a wider audience. We, the outside world, need to know better what India feels about China, how it understands China, and in some areas how we might learn from it in its strategies of engagement with its huge neighbour. Whether readers agree or disagree with the arguments of the various writers in this work, at least now there is a proper presentation of Indian scholarship on China’s current status and its international

x  Foreword relations. This collection also makes very clear the diversity of attitudes within the Indian scholarly community. That is important. Assuming a monolithic attitude is dangerous. Clearly, as with others elsewhere, Indian attitudes towards China are dynamic, evolving, and changing. That is only testament to the fact that China is a different prospect even to that which existed when it entered the World Trade Organization in 2001. Static approaches to it simply won’t work. Contributors to this volume offer some data that illustrates this difference – the increase, for instance, in military spending and trade figures. But there are differences that are harder to capture, on, for instance, the attitudes people in China have, and their aspirations and ambitions. Hopefully this volume will mark the start of a greater engagement by the world with Indian perspectives on China. It is an important initiative and one that needs supporting. I am happy to commend this volume, and thank the authors for the work they have put into explaining to the outside world their important perspectives and knowledge. Kerry Brown Professor, Chinese Studies, and Director, Lau China Institute, King’s College London and Associate Fellow, Chatham House, London

Preface

Foreign policy of a country is mainly driven by its core interests that relate to the security and sovereignty of the state. China is no exception. However, the variables that influence China’s foreign policy decisions have changed over decades. The relations China makes with other countries at bilateral, multilateral, regional or sub-regional levels are shaped by its choices of geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages. In the making of choices, various actors and variables play a decisive role in the policy making process. Many scholars have studied the phenomenon of the transformation of China from a closed-door country to an open-door economy. This transformation is also marked by the change in the highest controlling authority directing the policy orientation, a shift from Mao Zedong as the core of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to Deng Xiaoping as the mainstay. The continuum of change with the shift of the core leadership at different intervals and periods of time resulted in the reformulation of the foreign policy direction but with the guiding principles remaining the same. Mao Zedong had perceived the world configuration as a capitalist dominated structure and confrontational to China. Hence, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao closed the doors to the outside world in the belief that China was self-­ sufficient and capable of dealing with its own problems. His approach was mainly focused on China’s need to adapt to rapid industrialisation with strong military might to counter any foreign threat. Besides, as China suffered being a semi-colonial power, hence it needed to initiate revolutions to fight all foreign powers. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, realised that the world has undergone tremendous change in the past few decades. New structures of power have established notions of the ‘responsible state’ and there is no further need to engage in ‘continuous revolution’ and wars to protect sovereignty. President Hu Jintao

xii  Preface further mooted the notion of harmonious coexistence with peaceful rise. He proposed the idea of ‘harmonious world’ with a shared set of responsibilities and active engagement to create a conducive international environment. With the rapid economic rise of China, its identity as a foreign policy actor to revamp the balance of power in the newly defined international world order is pertinent. However, as China vociferously marches ahead to create a bigger space and role for itself, the other external powers and actors will inevitable exert influence on China to redirect its path. The issue of greater significance is whether China will pursue the spirit of peaceful rise or whether its assertive posture will make it a hegemonic power. Will China become a responsible regional and global power? In the region, as threat perceptions loom large, will China be able to root out difference to engage in constructive cooperation with the other rising powers of the region? What will be China’s role as an Asian economic powerhouse in reshaping the economic prosperity of the Asian region? What is China’s vision of a multipolar world and the actors that will play a greater role? In the Asian region, will China allow other big powers to share power equations – specifically, will India and the other big powers in Asia be able to bargain for sharing power in the region? The book is a preliminary disposition of enquiry into China’s foreign policy mindset, behaviour, and emerging patterns in the changing world. At a time when calls of multipolarity are becoming prominent, with China emerging as an obvious power to challenge the hegemonic position of the US, the book has collected works of many young scholarly minds to dissect the foreign policy orientation of China. Many scholars have over time discussed the subject in detail, which gives a solid foundation to envision the future of China. As regards China’s rise and other emerging powers, Zhu Liqun believes that the world is under transition towards full multipolarity, and as of now there is ‘One superpower and multiple poles’ (一超多强 yichao duoqiang). The two main proponents – the ‘peaceful risers’ and the nationalists – regard that it is an era of both unipolar and multipolar world coexisting (Zhu, 2010: 26). The crucial issue for China is to acknowledge the ‘poles’ in this multipolar setup, identify the hierarchy of each pole, establish each one’s role and relation to other poles, and define China’s relation with each pole. Some Chinese scholars are suspicious of the support the US and Japan will provide to China in Asia. They consider India as a pole along with US and Japan, China, the European Union, and Russia; while for some India has the potential with the

Preface xiii requisite attributes, it has yet to earn the position (Zhu, 2010: 32). Hence, India–China relations and their evolution in the future carry greater significance. There is a debate that the world is undergoing transformation, which many prefer to call a transitional period, whereby the rising powers are defining their position in the world system and assert themselves on a global scale without engaging in a revolutionary attitude to reshape the entire structure. Some scholars believe that China is adopting a prudent strategy to rearrange the international setup with its policy of inevitable global acceptance of its comprehensive strength. Interestingly, some scholars also proposed a new structure with the concepts like ‘Two powers and multiple poles’ (两超多强) or G2, etc., with the US and China taking the lead as superpowers and other rising powers as pillars of a multipolar world. These concepts also had resonance with the Chinese leadership, with President Xi Jinxing talking of ‘a new model of big power relations’ (新型大国关系 Xinxing daguo guanxi). However, the Western scholars have showed suspicion over China’s rise, speculating the possibility of China choosing the path of becoming a hegemonic power (国强必霸) or establishing a new regional political structure with an ‘East Asia Tribute System’ that was prevalent during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). In the book Unhappy China, published in 2009, the authors echoed the sentiments of many Chinese scholars and policy makers who want China to not just focus on economic strength but also to increase its military might. Basing on the Chinese nationalistic feelings, the book calls upon the state to delineate from the influence of Western powers and to recognise its own national strength. The authors regard that China is already a superpower and hence it should act accordingly. They also emphasise the need for China to ‘incorporate retribution and punishment’ into its diplomatic strategy. Looking at the existing literature on China’s foreign policy, very clear orientation is on issues of nationalism, identity, and international relations based on realism and constructivism. In discussing the internal debates on foreign policy in China, Zhu Liqun has focused on three main aspects: Shi (势), Identity, and strategy. The Chinese term shi, referring to strength, looks at the overall configuration of the world order. The second core concept highlighted is the issue of ‘identity’, as China perceives itself being humiliated by colonial powers in the midnineteenth century and hence, historical shame is the vantage point of China’s regional and global behaviour. The other crucial aspect is of the ‘strategy’, i.e. the goals, principles, and values of China’s foreign policy behaviour (Zhu, 2010: 11).

xiv  Preface Prof. Qin Yaqing, a renowned scholar in international relations theory, identifies three distinct schools of thought on international relations (IR) studies in China: liberalism, realism and social constructivism. His study is based on 1,124 articles published in five Chinese leading journals from 1978 to 2007: World Economics and Politics, European Studies, Foreign Affairs Review, International Review and Contemporary International Relations. Marc Lanteigne, in his book Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, argues that China is already a great power, but is not yet become a ‘global power’ or a ‘superpower’. However, it demonstrates the same distinct great power patterns in its foreign policy relations with other states like the US and Soviet Union. In addition, China is not only undergoing a process of ‘expansion’ (扩展 kuozhan) but also of ‘reconstruction’ (重建 chongjian). The significant aspect of this reconstruction is that ideas of international relations are being reconstructed among government and other actors. China’s internal debates on foreign policy have greatly focused on the US, its hegemony, other rising powers, and the multipolarity issue of late. With regards to American hegemony, China maintains that it will not become a hegemonic power like the US. As China has suffered foreign aggression and humiliation at the hands of Western powers during the Opium War of 1840, Chinese scholars and official discourse use the term ‘hegemony’ in a very derogatory manner with strong criticism. Besides the US, the other major powers considered by China are EU, Russia, Japan, and now India in that order. Traditional philosophy of China made a distinction between ‘rule by force’ (霸道 ba dao) and ‘rule by virtue’ (王道 wang dao). As for the Chinese, a hegemonic rule by virtue can be pursued. The term has resonance to what G. John Ikenberry calls ‘benign hegemony’ (Ikenberry, 2001: 28). However, very recently Prof. Yan Xuetong in his book highlighted the need for China to adopt ‘rule by virtue’. In October 2014, at the Asian Dynamics Conference in Copenhagen, Prof. Xin Qiang from Fudan University in Shanghai argued that Chinese behaviour in relation to the maritime territorial disputes in the region has developed from ‘restrained reactiveness’ to ‘assertive reactiveness’ (Sorensen, 2015: 62). It can be construed that the three sub-regional economic communities – the new Silk Road with Central Asia, the Maritime Silk Road with South East Asia, and the economic corridor through South Asia – as well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiative are attempts to shape the further development or integration in regional economics, politics and security (Sorensen, 2015: 63).

Preface xv The literature had thus focused on many diverse aspects of internal debates that shaped and defined foreign policy in China. However, at a time when Xi Jinxing orders to curtail the outburst of nationalist sentiments on social media, it is significant to weigh the impact of nationalists in China’s foreign policy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to shift its diplomatic strategy from ‘hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time’ (韬光养晦) to ‘striving for achievement’ (奋发有为), which is a more proactive engagement strategy (the other terms used are ‘Gengjia Jiji’ [更加积极, ‘be more active’], ‘Gengjia Zhudong’ [更加主动, ‘take greater initiative’], and ‘Jiji Jinqu’ [积极进 取, ‘actively go in’]). President Xi Jinxing put forth foreign policy principles for the neighbouring countries as being ‘close, sincere, favour, accommodate’ and establish relationships based on ‘rational, just and cooperation based on win-win’. Hence, China’s foreign policy is now moving from overemphasis to faraway relations with great powers to strengthening neighbourly relations. This change seems to be an imperative of China’s domestic and economic needs. Alongside, it will give impetus to China’s status and position in the region and reemphasise its ‘responsible state’ proposition. This book looks at China’s foreign policy from a macro perspective. As the geopolitics of the region is changing, it is imperative to understand the role of the major regional player: China. In this pursuit, it incorporates chapters on China’s peripheral and regional policy as well as its relations with other big powers: India and Russia, specifically. The book comprises 11 chapters. As it mainly a scholarship from Indian scholars, the initial few chapters focus heavily on India. The next few chapters look at the internal situation in China and its foreign policy impact, and then move to China’s energy needs that derive. The last few chapters dwell on security issues, addressing the overall understanding of Chinese military that is reshaping Chinese strategic moves and will continue to do so. Geeta Kochhar provides an overall understanding of the debates in China relating to the foreign policy orientation. Highlighting the fact that it is not the geopolitical landscape that is changing, she argues that the geoeconomics are changing state-to-state relations and are the foundation for future change of the international order. She dwells on the issue of the kind of power China will become, emphasising that it is unlikely that China will become a hegemonic power; instead new great power relations will redefine global order. She presents the theoretical discourses within China that have an impact on Chinese foreign policy making, especially the change possible after the rise of President Xi Jinping.

xvi  Preface Shreyasi Ghosh looks at the China–India relations focusing on the changes evolving after 1980. She argues that there is an ever-growing development in the relationship, which can help do the ‘rebalancing’ and ‘redefinition’ during critical periods. Prerana Bhaduli discusses the dimension of robust and sustainable relations between China and India, although the mistrust and potential areas of conflict continue to exist. She stresses that there is transformation of the relationship to wide-ranging engagement, which can be considered as the most remarkable geopolitical development of the post-Cold War era. Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker examine the current leadership priorities in South Asia, a paradigmatic shift in China’s foreign policy goals from geopolitical interests to economic ones towards the international community in general and South Asia in particular. They argue that China will pose serious geopolitical and geoeconomic problems despite expanding economic engagements. Tilak Jha explores India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP that will reshape the new power structures in the world. This chapter makes an assessment of how decisively India and China should be able to shape up the emerging regional and global political–economic equations despite the existing gap in their economic might and systemic inefficiencies and disadvantages among themselves and with the developed world. It also looks at whether in the newly evolving context, the long-argued theory about politics being trumped by economic interdependence holds good in case of India–China or not. Tenzin Tsultrim looks at the internal imperatives that reshape China’s foreign policy. He takes a historic tour of the past events that have resulted in changing China’s foreign policy from a weak and isolated nation to an opening of diplomatic channels. However, he argues that China’s international position is still under strain due to the rise of civil society in China. Arnab Dasgupta explores the rise of China to its growing energy needs, especially hydrocarbon resources. In highlighting that since 1993, China has become a net importer of hydrocarbon resources, Dasgupta stresses the fact that by 2030 China is going to account for the largest share in the global energy demand. This chapter deals with China’s strategies to securitise energy supplies and its impact on the Chinese foreign policy establishment. Pooja Pingua expounds on the history of Xinjiang and its geostrategic relevance to China’s foreign policy. Keeping in view the importance of the region, Chinese authorities have devised a policy towards the region, which has very substantial impacts on the region as a whole. She looks at the traditions in China’s north-western frontier which

Preface xvii were both sustained and transformed during the late imperial period and provides a brief overview of the contemporary situation. Taking the perspective of historical traditions, she dwells on the critique of the traditions to find the continuity in time in order to revoke the propositions of Chinese government having glorious traditions for building present-day neighbourly ties. Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah study the background of the Asian Super Complex (ASC) theory that cemented the regional security architecture under the new security framework. The chapter highlights the new dynamics which have been occurring in the South China Sea over the last two decades. They analyse China’s territorial disputes with the ASEAN countries as well as China’s economic and maritime security concerns in the region. They outline China’s upcoming diplomatic and geostrategic efforts to increase its active involvement in the region. Anmol Mukhia focuses on climate change negotiations that have hit China’s relations with the developed world. He states that at the international level, national government seek to maximise its own ability to satisfy domestic pressure while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign development. In case of China, the domestic game is a ‘ratification game’, where the contribution does not exceed those in a benchmark without domestic constraints. Thus, the chapter uses the process of the tracing method, tracing the links between possible causes and observing outcomes focusing on sequential processes. Umesh Kumar Gupta provides an overview of the Chinese military. He looks at the history, development, visions and ambitions of the PLA that have far-reaching impact regionally and globally. He points out that Chinese defensive and offensive cyber strategy has evolved over the past decade as part of the PLA’s ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ doctrine and ‘Local War under Conditions of Informatisation’ concept. The PLA is working to improve battle space situational awareness by linking all the military branches into one common operating platform. This has significance, as Chinese President Xi Jinxing is initiating military reform, which may not only impact the internal setup of the PLA, but will also reorient the PLA to the path of Communist goals for the entire region. In the wake of China’s assertive positions in dealing with international issues, this reorientation may have far-reaching impact.

References Lanteigne, Marc. 2009. Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, London: Routledge.

xviii  Preface Sorensen, Camilla T. N. 2015. ‘The Significance of Xi Jinxing’s “Chinese Dream” for Chinese Foreign Policy: From “Tao guang yang hui” to “Fen fa you wei” ’, Journal of China and International Relations, 3 (1): 53–73, at https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/viewFile/1146/967 (accessed 14 January 2017). Zhu Liqun. 2010. China’s Foreign Policy Debates, Chaillot Papers, September. EU Institute for Security Studies at www.is.europa.eu (accessed 13 March 2013).

Abbreviations

ACWF AIIB ANG-KP ANG-LCA APEC APP ARF ASA ASAT ASC ASEAN BCIM EC BCM BP BPD BRICS C4I CARs CDM CBMs CICA CMI CNOOC CNPC CNR

All China Women’s Federation Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank Ad Hoc Working Group on Kyoto Protocol Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperation Action under the Convention Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate ASEAN Regional Forum Asian Security Architecture anti-satellite weapon test Asian Super Complex Association of South East Asian Nations BCIM Economic Corridor (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) billion cubic metres British Petroleum barrels per day Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa command, control, communications, computers and intelligence Central Asian Republics clean development mechanism confidence building measures Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia civil-military integration China National Offshore Oil Corporation China National Petroleum Corporation China Northern Railway Cooperation

xx  Abbreviations COPs CPC CPEC DoD EEZ ETIM ETR EU FDI FENC FTA FTAAP G7 GASC GDP GRCN GWDP IEA IMF IOR IPC IPCC IPEEC IT ITBP LA21 LAC LDCs LNG MEP MilES MoU MSR NBD NDRC NGO NOC NSEC NSG NSR

Conference of Parties Communist Party of China China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Department of Defense (US) Exclusive Economic Zone East Turkistan Islamic Movement East Turkistan Republic European Union foreign direct investment Far Eastern Naval Command Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific Group of Seven Nations Great Asian Super Complex gross domestic product Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Great Western Development Programme International Energy Agency International Monetary Fund Indian Ocean Region Iran–Pakistan–China project Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation information technology Indo-Tibetan Border Police Local Agenda 21 Line of Actual Control lesser developed countries liquefied natural gas Ministry of Environmental Protection Millennium of East Asian Strategic Review 2015 Exceptional Synergy memorandum of understanding Maritime Silk Road New Development Bank National Development and Reform Commission non-governmental organisation national oil companies Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor Nuclear Suppliers Group Northern Sea Route

Abbreviations xxi One Belt One Road OBOR OFDI outward foreign direct investment PRC People’s Republic of China PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PMS preparation for military struggle PoK Pakistan-occupied Kashmir RMB renminbi ROC Republic of China SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCS South China Sea SED Strategic Economic Dialogue SEZ Special Economic Zone SHADE Shared Awareness and Deconfliction SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLOCs sea lines of communication SMS science of military strategy SOE state-owned enterprises SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve SREB Silk Road Economic Belt SSF Strategic Support Force SU Soviet Union TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership UAE United Arab Emirates UNCHE United Nations Conference on Human Environment UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNSC United Nations Security Council UPA United Progressive Alliance US United States of America USPACOM United States Pacific Command USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VLCC very large crude carriers XRG Xinjiang Regional Government XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

1 China’s foreign policy An overall understanding of debates and policy orientation Geeta Kochhar

The People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) is land linked to 14 countries, namely Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan in Central Asia; Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea in Inner Asia and North East Asia; Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos in South East Asia; and Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bhutan in South Asia. It also shares maritime boundaries with Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. This makes China the only country except Russia to have close proximity with such a vast majority of nations. In addition, China has diplomatic relations with 173 countries of the world and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with recognition of being a nuclear power state. Historically speaking, China had claimed suzerain authority over many adjacent areas. However, by the nineteenth century, many foreign powers took over these controls: Japan took over Korea and the Ryukyus (Park, 2009: 40–50); Britain took control over Upper Burma and Nepal; France took over Vietnam; Russia took control of Siberia; and China continued to have suzerain control over Tibet, which Tibetans never recognised. In Chinese perception and documentation of historical records, each of these transfers of control is defined as ‘humiliation’ by external and imperialist powers. This ‘humiliation’ has formed the basis of China’s guiding principle of foreign relations in the post-liberation era. This has also become the underlying factor for China’s greater emphasis on adhering to the ‘One China’ policy for all countries establishing diplomatic ties with China, especially since 1971, whereby China wants to regain control of territories it claimed to have historical control. The unparalleled rise of China since 1978 has shifted global attention towards China. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘reform and opening up’ was premised on reassessing the internal conditions of China and the change in international environment. The strategies adopted henceforth not only placed China to the highest international ranking

2  Geeta Kochhar in terms of economic power, but have also realigned China’s global position in the international order. Although there is no great change in the geopolitical landscape, mere economics has formed the basis for China to re-define state-to-state relations. This has compelled the international community to look at various aspects of China’s rise and to study the China model that can create great powers. Deng Xiaoping, the leader widely acknowledged as the architect of China’s rise, actually reoriented the path of China’s development and also laid the foundation for its active engagement with the outside world. This was a clear break from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai’s principal stand of ‘war and revolution’ and countering all imperialist forces. This new position of China in international system creates ‘fear’, ‘tension’, and ‘threat’ to many existing major powers and challenges the existing international order. The path China chose for diplomatic engagements entailed a heated debate within China. The dissection from post-liberation to prereform, and the continuum from post-reform to present, is a long journey of readjustment and realignment in China’s foreign policy. However, with the rise of President Xi Jinping and the recent assertive posture of China on various bilateral disputes, there is a new discourse unfolding in China relating to the future course and international position of China. The role China should play in the international system, the responsibilities it should shoulder, the status and position it should gain, and the path it should adopt to continue its rise have all become central issues in China. The narrative of multipolarity, where other rising and emerging nations will challenge the existing system and probably pose competition to the leadership position China is aspiring to in the region or on the global stage also has resonance within China. Yet, the focus of debates remains on the West propagating the hegemonic position China is likely to take, while the Chinese have all along defied hegemony and hegemonic powers. This opens up a plethora of issues China is dealing with internally as well as externally. Hence, the questions before us are: What is China’s current position and will there be a change in its foreign policy? Will China share global leading position with the US or replace the US? What are the possible future major powers, and what is the probability of power sharing among rising powers along with China? In the current global scenario and the regional distrust for China, it is unlikely that China will become a hegemonic superpower, but there are possibilities of a new kind of great power relations reshaping the world order. The chapter looks at the various internal debates with regard to China’s foreign policy orientation and the direction in which the discourses will reshape Chinese foreign policy making.

China’s foreign policy 3

Internal theoretical discourse In understanding the Chinese foreign policy approaches, there has been a Western lens of theories that show the developmental orientation of Chinese diplomacy. More often than not, the Western scholarship views China as a power that has been silent and has risen with a practical approach to take over the world. The ‘dragon’, as it is often referred to, is a figure of power, anger, and arrogance that entails the strength of destruction. Although there is no clear history of Chinese expansionist tendencies, Western scholars have explored the possibilities and potentials of China for the future. Prof. Qin Yaqing, a renowned scholar in international relations theory, examined the influence of Western scholarship of international relations theory and its impact on Chinese policy making. After analysing 1,124 articles related to international relations theory published in five Chinese leading journals (World Economics and Politics, European Studies, Foreign Affairs Review, International Review and Contemporary International Relations) from 1978 to 2007, he concluded that the Chinese international relations theory studies can be split into three distinct schools of thought: liberalism, realism, and constructivism. He further states that along with the Western understanding of Chinese international relations, Chinese scholars have evolved their own school of thought with traditional Chinese philosophy (Qin, 2009: 185). These theories have shaped the leaders’ approach to policy making and reoriented China’s global posture. Hence, since 1978 there has been a debate within China to view world as characterised by ‘war and revolution’ or to embark on a ‘reformist path’ of opening to the outside world. The orthodox proponents supported the traditional view and were hesitant to engage with the outside world, yet the reformists were able to win over the debate and convince that the only path for China was to develop relations with other countries through opening doors for interaction and engagement. The reformists also mooted the idea that the international environment has become more peaceful and China’s interest lies in finding a legitimate position in the global system. Since the 1990s, the discourse has shifted between the realists and the liberals, which was also followed by the end of the Cold War era. The realists believed in emphasising national power to achieve China’s long term goals, while the liberals advocated participation in international institutions. This was also joined by the constructivist approaches that advocated China’s peaceful rise. However, the main component of the constructivist theory in China was the ‘identity’ factor. Prof. Yan Xuetong believes that the constructivist theory was upheld in China as it

4  Geeta Kochhar relates to Chinese philosophy of I Ching (Change), which advocates that both identity and behaviour are changeable (Qin, 2009: 185). The turn of the century saw yet another discourse in China over the ‘peaceful rise’ concept. As China’s overall strength accentuated, scholars within and outside dwelt on the kind of power China will become in future. Realists believed that no major power can rise peacefully but only through violence, while the liberals and the constructivists advocated the argument for pro-peaceful rise through tangible benefits derived from joining the international institutions and by remaining a responsible member of the international community (Qin, 2011: 231). The debate culminated in President Hu Jintao proposing the concept of building a ‘harmonious world’. Alongside, the role of nationalist forces within China and the rising nationalist sentiments culminated in another narrative over the power of public discourse to reshape Chinese foreign policy. This was also underlined by the rapid spread of advance technologies and the activeness of youngsters on social media. All issues of national unity, sovereignty, and disputes with other countries became the central themes in social media discussions. The seeds of nationalism were visible in the 1996 publication, China Can Say No, and also in Unhappy China, published in 2009 (Song Xiaojun, 2009; Zhang Zangzang, 1996). The authors, while questioning the power of China, called upon countering the West while emphasising national unity. The books have stressed the proposition that the West has been pursuing a policy of containment towards China and China should be ready to counter such tendencies. This has culminated in a greater exploration of issues of Chinese nationalist sentiments, nationalism, and China’s aspirations to be a hegemonic power, as there was political rhetoric of ‘rejuvenation of Chinese Nation’ (振兴中国). On 29 November 2012, President Xi Jinxing’s proposition of ‘China Dream’ (中国梦) created waves, both internally and externally, deciphering the aspiration of China. President Xi himself advocated that ‘China Dream’ was a desire to realise the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’ (中华民族伟大复兴) (GRCN). In 1997, the term ‘National Rejuvenation’ (民族复兴) was replaced with ‘GRCN’, and in 2002 then President Hu Jintao gave a deeper explanation of it. President Xi expressed that the desire was to realise two ‘100 years’ objectives: first, to complete the task of building a well-off society at the 100th anniversary of establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), i.e. by 2021 (1921 + 100 = 2021); and second, to realise the dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation at the 100th anniversary of establishment of New China, i.e. by 2049 (1949 + 100 = 2049). The discourse since then has been to find ways to realise these two grand

China’s foreign policy 5 objectives. China, as envisaged by Deng, was to become a moderately developed country by 2050. As China has walked on the path of creating an economically, militarily, and politically strong nation, the challenge now is to locate its right position in the global world order and to design a path by which it can amalgamate with global institutions attaining a leadership position. As Professor Yan, a proponent of realism, stated that China should build military alliances in the region rather than just be an economic aid provider (Yan, 2015), scholars in China have engaged in debating over the possibility of creating a Chinese renaissance, mainly depending on the traditional Chinese philosophy and the experience of Imperial rule in China. Prof. Yan further called on establishing strong morale charisma of Chinese diplomacy while abandoning Deng’s policy of non-alignment. He was advocating to establish a ‘Rule by Virtue’ (王道 wangdao) rather than a ‘hegemonic’ rule (霸道 badao) (VoA, 2016). Prof. Yang Peng, a visiting scholar at the Asia Centre of Harvard University, counters Prof. Yan’s proposition stating that China has yet to resolve the problem of modernisation for more than half of its population. The international environment is fraught with war based on nationalist sentiments to gain hegemonic positions, and there is no need for China to incite international conflicts (VoA, 2016). Many other scholars believe that China under Xi Jinxing is retreating to Mao’s era perceptions and following Lenin’s doctrine in foreign policy formulations. However, there is consensus understanding that countries have a lack of trust in China, and hence alliances cannot be formed. There is one constant that China needs friends, but the state’s behaviour and interests are changeable variables in all relations. In the past, China has had conflicts with its own alliances (Soviet Union and Vietnam), and therefore, the need is for China to build foreign relations based on universal values, make adjustment to its global posture, portray a cooperative engagement attitude, and seek long-term friends and partners. Moreover, some scholars opine that if China actually wants to establish alliances instead of conflicting for position with the US (as the Soviet Union did in the past), it should form an alliance with the US (VoA, 2016).

China’s foreign policy after the establishment of the PRC In 1861, China established something analogous to the Foreign Ministry to deal with Western incursions (Kissinger, 2011: 17). After the establishment of the PRC, China formed a Ministry of Foreign Affairs

6  Geeta Kochhar of the People’s Republic of China as an executive agency responsible for foreign relations with other countries. However, it is widely acknowledged that the foreign policy decisions were concentrated in the hands of a few individuals like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. After the 1980s, the then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping initiated steps to institutionalise the decision making system dissecting it from personal authority, which task was never finished (Worden, 1987). Even though many organisations and ministries were set up since the 1980s, the crucial decisions on foreign policy remained in the hands of the executive committee of the Central Committee, i.e. the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) (Jakobson, 2016: 103). The other actors like the State Council, PLA, NPC, Premier, Leading Small Groups, and so forth had a crucial role in the entire decision making process. During the era of President Hu Jintao, public discourse through social media was considered as another actor playing an influential role in foreign policy–related matters. However, with the rise of President Xi Jinping to power in 2012, there has been a reverse shift of decision making authority, and President Xi is seen as amassing more powers than his predecessors, Hu Jintao (2002–12) and Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) (Jakobson, 2016: 108). Hence, with the overall control of Mao and Zhou in the post-­ liberation era, the foreign policy was a creation, orientation, and direction of how the two leaders perceived the world and how they wanted to pursue certain goals for power consolidation. The ideological inclination of the leaders was a Marxist-Leninist vision of the world and establishment of communist rule to counter imperialist forces. Mao pursued a path of revolution as for him the imperialist forces outside and imperialist linkages inside need to be overthrown so as to create an ideal socialist society. Mao even crafted a clear distinction of what constituted ‘inside’ and what was ‘outside’ – a divide that closed outer intervention to sustain sovereignty. A notion of inspiring the spirits of all Chinese against all those who humiliated was established and hence needed to be discarded. According to Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea (1998), similar was an internal and external blurring of lines created to personify the internal and external enemies of China: Influenced by Marxism, Mao superimposed on this conventional divide, a structure of systemic unity between elements belonging to the traditional domestic and elements belonging to the traditional external. . . . This conjoining blurred the line separating the conventional domestic and external of China, as it did for all other states . . . from the conventional perspective, all of Japan was the

China’s foreign policy 7 external enemy of all within China’s domestic world. At the same time, however, Japanese imperialism had breached the traditional domestic to find a support base within China. This consisted of more than the traitors or collaborators that every war or revolution has known. They were, in Maoist analysis, social groups and classes, the seedlings of domestic imperialism within China – the comprador classes or elements. Together with Japanese imperialism they constituted for Mao, a new non-conventional ‘outer’ of China. As a counterpoint, the revolutionary ‘inner’ comprised the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces within China that, in like manner, had systemic links with similar forces within the conventional domestic of Japan and of other imperialist countries. The linkages Mao and Zhou made relied on choosing the world bloc, where the communist bloc was a better option than the imperialist forces. Hence, China linked with the Soviet Union and pursued three broad policy guidelines, namely ‘lean to one side’ (一边倒), ‘starting anew’ (另起炉灶), and ‘putting the house in order before inviting guests’ (打扫干净屋子再请客). The basic premise of this was abrogating all unequal treaties, getting rid of the remains of imperialism, and rejecting the diplomatic relations the Kuomintang government had established with foreign countries (Yu, 2007). In the mid-1950s, the strategy was to join hands with newly independent states of Asia, to advocate anti-colonial rule, and to establish a more ‘democratic’ international system. The signing of the 1954 Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) agreement in Bandung highlighted the norms of state behaviour China advocated to avoid interference of external forces in its internal affairs. It was also a regained confidence of the Chinese leaders with the victory over the Japanese forces that China will not again become a colony of any imperialist power. However, with the ‘revisionism’ approach of the Soviet Union, China came under pressure to again choose between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. Hence, in the 1960s China changed its policy of ‘lean to one side’ and adopted a posture of striking with two fists with ‘two lines’ opposition, i.e. opposing US imperialism as well as opposing the Soviet Union revisionism. In the 1970s, China moved closer to the US and implemented a diplomatic strategy of ‘One line’ (一条线), of uniting with the US to contain the Soviet Union. This followed Mao’s propounding of the ‘Three world’ thesis (三个世界) (US and Soviet Union as the first, middle-ranking developed countries as second, and the developing world as the third) and paved its way for

8  Geeta Kochhar China joining the Second and Third World countries, calling it unity with ‘one large area’ (一大片). Pre-reform China continued to visualise the external world full of struggle and domination, whereby China had to carve its own unique identity. As Bhattacharjea points out: In Mao’s perception, the international arena continued to be marked by interstate struggle that could be moulded into an interworld struggle which, in turn, would lead to fresh possibilities of creating a united front against imperialism, now conceived as hegemonism. The possibility flowed from two fault lines that he two super-powers and their friends and allies. Both fault lines also created large areas of possible unity among states on the other side of the line.

Post-reform change Following China’s entry into the UNSC in 1972 and improvement in its ties with the US, China began establishing diplomatic ties with nearly 70 countries, which some scholars term the ‘third wave of high tide’ in China’s diplomatic ties (Wang Xiaobo, 2010: 4). However, the rise of Deng Xiaoping saw a change in the ‘One line’ approach of China. He pursued an independent nonalignment policy. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and change in the international environment, Deng Xiaoping propagated a 24-character strategy of ‘observe calmly, secure position, cope with affairs calmly, hide from light and nourish obscurity, maintain low profile, and never claim leadership position’ (冷静观察，稳住阵脚，沉着应付，韬光养 晦，善于守拙，决不当头), later adding ‘making contributions’ (有所 作为) (Annual Report to Congress, 2006). The translation and interpretation of these 24 Chinese characters has evolved a new meaning for Chinese diplomatic strategy. Xiong Guangkai, the former PRC general, in an article in Public Diplomacy Quarterly argued that the translation of ‘韬光养晦’ as ‘hide our capacities and bide our time’ was grossly wrong and was manipulated by the West. He said that Deng Xiaoping never mentioned anything regarding the ‘time’ factor. Hence, some later suggested to translate it as ‘hide from light and nourish obscurity’. In fact, the literal translation of the 24 characters as translated above also reflect that Deng was emphasising building capabilities with calm posture, rather than becoming arrogant to claim global positions. The phrase ‘hide from light and nourish obscurity, and making contributions’ became the core of Chinese foreign policy. Western scholarship has, however, always looked at Deng’s diplomatic

China’s foreign policy 9 strategy to keep a low profile and wait for an opportune time to show their capabilities. This was also linked to China’s domestic policies, which emphasised building economic and military capabilities and avoiding engaging in full-fledged wars that drain the economy. This was more in conjunction with the wave of globalisation spreading across countries. As the dynamics of global powers shifted, China also repositioned itself in the international arena. Soon after the end of the Cold War in 1990s, China put forth a ‘new security concept’ focused mainly on using diplomatic and economic engagements as a strategy to deal with other countries, rather than competing and having animosity with nations. The upgraded version of this strategy was formulated in China’s proposition of ‘peaceful rise’ (和平崛起), which was later changed to ‘peaceful development’ (和平发展). Thereafter, China became proactive in world affairs. It established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established a strategic partnership with European Union (EU) member states, signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, and joined ASEAN, ASEAN + 3, BRICS, and many such agreements and regional groupings. Hence, it followed a path of ‘being good and establishing partnership with neighbours’ (与邻为善、以邻为伴). This strategic shift was clearly reflected in President Hu Jintao’s 2009 summary on Chinese policy making, where he highlighted five points: (1) profound transformation, (2) a harmonious world, (3) common development, (4) shared responsibility, and (5) active engagement. He advocated that the world has profound changes and the need of the hour for China is to integrate with the outside world. China not only needs to seek common development but assume greater responsibility in building a ‘harmonious world’ (Hu, 2009).

From geopolitics to geoeconomics China’s meteoric rise on the international stage and becoming the world’s second largest economy has shown that economic strength can alter power structures greatly and can help in gaining international status. Probably Deng Xiaoping understood this logic long back and shifted the focus on strengthening the economic might of China. The US National Intelligence Council 2008 report Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World pointed out that there is an unprecedented transfer of wealth from West to East, which will bring revolutionary changes in the entire international system that has existed since the end of World War II (US NIC, 2008). The new emerging economies with players like

10  Geeta Kochhar Brazil, Russia, India, and China will set the new rules. With China’s rise and the emergence of BRICS as potential rising economies, there was a global consensus on power shifting towards the East, although the pace, speed, and nature of this shift was still debatable. In the 1960s, many Asian and African countries got rid of colonial rule and completed the preliminary stage of industrialisation. Thereafter, they moved to explore marketisation and took steps towards economic liberalisation. The result was, first, the rise of ‘Four Asian Tigers’ (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) as economic powerhouses. Then, there was the rapid rise of Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela) bringing a golden period of economic robustness in the world. By the 1980s, there was the rise of another ‘Four New Asian Tigers’ (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia), creating a regional miracle. After the end of the Cold War, the socialist states of Eastern Europe (Serbia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) moved towards capitalist market structures. However, all these miraculous economic successes were limited to particular regions and groups. There was no greater global impact in terms of changing the global structures. With the march towards the twenty-first century, there is an expansion in the emerging economies ranging from Asia and Africa to Latin America. There are new concepts looking at potential economic powers like BRICS (金砖五国), including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; the VISTA countries (展望五国 or 远眺五国), including Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Argentina; and the Next Eleven (新钻 11 国), including Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, the Philippines, South Korea, Iran, Bangladesh, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Vietnam. These concepts put the thrust on the potential change economically powerful countries will bring to global political power structures. In recent years, the international community has also shifted its focus on rearranging global powers in the international structure based on their comprehensive national power, whereby the economic strength, military strength, political strength, foreign policy strength, Science and technology strength, and strength of natural resources are taken into consideration to assess the overall capabilities and potential of a sovereign state. The final list of global powers in terms of major powers, middle powers, and so forth are compiled in relation to the overall assessment of the strength of a nation. However, an increasingly major component of this overall assessment is the economic factor. It is interesting to see that political ability and diplomatic power are based on the economic development of a country. No matter whether it is the engagement of a state in international affairs or the strategic

China’s foreign policy 11 influence of a country, economic strength has become a prerequisite. Besides, the strength and weakness in terms of Science and technology and resources is also reflected through the economic channel, thereby emphasising the role of economic might (Ding Gong, 2012: 24). The division, reorganisation, and restructuring of emerging economies has complicated the pluralisation of the global interest groups and their structure. Major power relations are now defined on the driving force between the ‘leading states’ in emerging economies and on the engagement between ‘emerging and rising’ powers (新兴和崛 起大国). ‘One superpower and multiple powers’ (一超多强) remains unchanged; however, there has been a constant change in the strength, position, and status of powers. The multiple powers (EU, China, Russia, Japan, India, Brazil) have altered the balance of power in relation to the superpower (US), and have also moved towards equalising and redistributing the power structure of ‘strongest power’ and ‘multiple powers’. The new groupings formed in the world are challenging the leading positions, and US power seems to be on a decline. Hence, the BRICS and the G7 (西方七国) industrialised countries are increasingly reshaping the decision making structure of international order. With the balance of power structure changing and strategic readjustment, there is re-organisation at multiple levels in big power relations, unfolding new varieties of competition and cooperation. China has become central to all these rearrangements in the global order.

From a middle power to a risen power China is increasingly regarded as transitioning from a ‘middle power’ to a ‘risen power’. However, the issue is, what is the basis of placing China at this position. In 1947, G. D. Glazebrook expounded on the middle powers in reference to the roles they play in the United Nations. He elaborated on the principle of functionalism and the status of middle power. In his work, he identified a few nations that can have influential ability, such as Canada, Australia, India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Netherlands, Brussels, and Poland. However, he failed to recognise the ability of a state and the factors that influence a state’s power. In 1966, Canadian scholar J. King Gordon, in his work Canada’s Role as a Middle Power, highlighted the characteristics of the foreign policy of middle powers as moderate, neutral, mediator, and multilateralism with reference to Canada as a middle power. In 1984, Carsten Holbraad, in his book Middle Power in International Relations, analysed the definitions and role of middle powers in the UN. He further

12  Geeta Kochhar expounded on the resources middle powers need to prepare for its policy, mainly from four perspectives: unilateral system, bipolar system, trilateral system, and multipolar system. In 2003, Eduard Christiaan Jordaan developed a distinction of newly emerging middle powers (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and traditional middle powers (Canada, Australia, Spain, Sweden, and Norway). These researchers paved the way for defining a middle power in a very broad sense. However, nothing concretely defined China’s role as a middle power. Yet, it is clear that based on the assessment of power of a state, it is placed in a certain position in the global system. In the twenty-first century, this is divided on the basis of three levels (big power, middle power, and small power) and five categories (superpower, major power, middle power, medium-sized or ordinary power, and small or weak power). Here, US is now the sole superpower; China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Russia, India, Brazil, Italy, and Canada are 10 major powers; Spain, Mexico, Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Poland, Argentina, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Egypt, Pakistan, and Nigeria are regarded as 15 middle powers; Argentina, Israel, Ukraine, Venezuela, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Chile, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, Vietnam, Serbia, and so forth are regarded as 35 medium-sized powers; and the remaining 132 are small powers (Yu, 2007). Hence, China is already placed in the world’s major power position and is regarded as the No. 2 in economic terms, having the potential to surpass the US as a superpower or be a parallel power. In China, scholars have debated over the role and status of China in the global system. They have mainly placed two factors central to becoming a global strong power: ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP) (综合国力 Zonghe guoli) and the ‘strategic configuration of power’, or ‘Shi’ (势). CNP evaluates and measures China’s national strength in relation to other powers. This includes qualitative and quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic power, diplomatic influence, domestic government, military capability, and cultural influence. Shi is based on the ‘alignment of forces’ in the world (Annual Report to Congress, 2006). Hence, China’s quest to power especially since the 1980s greatly emphasised enhancing overall strength with a concentration on both the traditional military and economic aspects of power. The national strategy is adjusted on the basis of the international security environment that challenges China’s position and the economic opportunities that can benefit relations with other countries.

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China to be a hegemonic power or benign power? With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the bipolar structure of ‘US-SU conquest’ changed to ‘One superpower, multiple powers’ international structure. Being the sole superpower, the US led the development and transformation of the international political structure for a long period of time. With the new century, especially since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, there has been a new change in the international structure. This of course is also marked by the rise of many developing countries, especially China as the leading economic powerhouse. The decline in power of the US and the rapid increase of China’s influential ability also affected the foreign policy orientation of China. In 2007, Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about the eight-point diplomatic philosophy of China, more on the lines of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that evolved during Mao’s era. He states: 1 China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony. 2 China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries’ internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries. 3 China maintains all countries, big or small, should be treated equally and respect each other. All affairs should be consulted and resolved by all countries on the basis of equal participation. No country should bully others on the basis of strength. 4 China will make judgment on each case in international affairs, each matter on the merit of the matter itself and it will not have double standards. China will not have two policies: one for itself and one for others. China believes that it cannot do unto others what they do not wish others do unto them. 5 China advocates that all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter and norms governing international relations. China advocates stepping up international cooperation and is against unilateral politics. China should not undermine the dignity and the authority of the U.N. China should not impose and set its own wishes above the U.N. Charter, international law and norms. 6 China advocates peaceful negotiation and consultation so as to resolve its international disputes. China does not resort to force, or threat of force, in resolving international disputes. China maintains

14  Geeta Kochhar a reasonable national military build-up to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not made to expand, nor does it seek invasion or aggression. 7 China is firmly opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China is a responsible member of the international community, and as for international treaties, China abides by all them in a faithful way. China never plays by a double standard, selecting and discarding treaties it does not need. 8 China respects the diversity of the civilisation and the whole world. China advocates different cultures make exchanges, learn from each other, and complement one another with their own strengths. China is opposed to clashes and confrontations between civilisations, and China does not link any particular ethnic group or religion with terrorism. (The Washington Times, 2007) As the change happened in the global environment, some scholars in China also put forth the concept of ‘Two superpowers and multiple powers’ (两超多强), G2 grouping, and so forth to reflect the global change happening with the rapid rise of China as the second largest economic structure in the world. President Xi endorsed these ideas during his 17 February 2017 speech at the National Security Seminar in Beijing, where he indicated that China should take the task to ‘guide’ the international community. His approach was interpreted as the world needs ‘Two Guides’ (两个引导) to create a new world order and to safeguard international security, referring to the joint responsibility of the US and China (CCLN, 2017). Alongside, many Western scholars made speculation over the future of China. Some opine that as the US replaced the UK, China will also replace the US and become a hegemonic power after becoming the strongest economic power (国强必霸). Others contend that China will eventually establish a new regional political structure with an ‘East Asia Tribute System’ that was prevalent during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Hence, the larger issue is whether China will become a hegemonic power or not. If not, what is the path China will choose in a leading position? Due to the suffering of the Chinese people as a result of Western power politics at the time of the Opium War of 1840, the term ‘hegemony’ in the Chinese discourse has been perceived as unacceptable and an unethical rule of power instead of being an objective description of power. In recent discussions, however, a distinction is made between hegemony and hegemonism. It is argued that the existence of a

China’s foreign policy 15 hegemony guarantees basic security and is a provider of public goods, acting as a stabilising force, which is where American hegemony is regarded as a new type of hegemony that was crucial for establishing international institutions (Zhu, 2010: 24). Although some scholars contend with this proposition, many have opposed the view arguing that the US is no more a provider of international public goods, further adding that single hegemony is unsustainable (Zhu, 2009: 120). As the centrality of argument over hegemony and hegemonic rule is on governance of international society, there are voices on the kind of rule China can provide to the world amid sounds of ‘China Threat’ theories looming large. Prof. Yan Xuetong in his book puts forth the idea of ‘moral realism’ (道义现实主义). He advocated the concept of ‘rule by virtue’ (王道) to counter the argument of China becoming a ‘hegemonic power’. China in traditional times accepted the existence of hegemonic rule, but made a distinction between ‘rule by force’ (霸道) and ‘rule by virtue’ (王道). Hegemonic rule realised by virtue was highly praised and to be pursued. The term ‘rule by virtue’ is somewhat similar to G. John Ikenberry’s concept of ‘benign hegemony’ (Ikenberry, 2001). Prof. Yan talks of the old Chinese morals to rule, where a ruler is to rule with benevolence and needs to appease people with virtue (君主以仁义治天下，以德政安抚臣民). He further points out that in 2013, President Xi Jinping put forth the shift in China’s diplomatic strategy from ‘hide from light and nourish obscurity’ (韬光养晦) to ‘striving for achievement’ (奋发有为). The essence of the strategy is to establish relations with neighbouring countries on the principle of ‘proximity, sincerity, benefit, tolerance, fair and just, cooperation based on win-win’ (亲、诚、惠、容 和 公平正义、合作共赢). Prof. Yan believes that this is the political foundation for realising a ‘rule by virtue’ strategy. In ‘rule by virtue’, he proposes to establish ‘fairness, justice, and build a civilisation’ (公平，正义，文明) (Yan, 2016). Many Chinese scholars have, however, countered Prof. Yan’s proposition of becoming a ‘humane authority’. Although the Western scholars take historical perspective to bring about the possibilities of China resorting to a tributary system, scholars in China elaborate the Chinese world order in terms of the ‘all under the heaven’ (天下, tianxia) concept in dealing with state to state relations. The model is compared with the Westphalian system. It is stated that the Westphalian order has negative attributes, such as the international system is anarchic, nation states compete against each other in zero-sum games, and wars and conflicts result from the absence of an ethical code of conduct (Qin, 2005; Zhao, 2005). On the contrary, the proposition is that tianxia provides a hierarchical but stable alternative blueprint for

16  Geeta Kochhar the twenty-first century (Zhao, 2005). Zhao Tingyang believes that the tianxia concept can be a good model for ‘world governance’. The decline of the nation state can result in the resurgence of empires as predicted by Hardt and Negri (2000). Contrary to the state-centric approaches, Zhao states that the ‘world’ needs a commonly agreed upon ‘world institution’ as its control centre, whereby the power centre is not democratically elected but is legitimated through its compliance with moral and ethical values (Noesselt, 2012: 20). This overarching stress on ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ values to lead the world is not accepted even within China, though there is consensus that China will not become a hegemonic power. In countering the opinion that China will be a hegemonic power, Western scholars advocated the rise of multiple powers in the world, thereby propagating that China is not the only country rising and the rise of China has also slowed down, while at the same time other developing countries are emerging as potential powers. Hence, multipolarity will redefine the international structure. However, realists in China believe that even among the developing countries, there are not many countries that can form as a group of major powers to challenge the position of the US. Prof. Yan states that although there is talk of decline of the West and the rise of other powers, the other rising powers are not capable of challenging the authority of the US. Although BRICS was seen as a group of emerging economies, even among them Russia, Brazil, and even South Africa are not able to sustain their economic growth (Yan, 2016). Hence, it will not be a group of countries, i.e. poles substituting the power of the US, but just one pole, i.e. China. It is only China’s rise that will result in changing the configuration of international structure. The change in international structure will most likely be from unipolar to bipolar, with a definite shift from the West to East Asia (Yan, 2016). This has led to questions within China over the path China should follow as the rise of China is bringing greater responsibility as well as power. In the White Paper on Peaceful Development published in 2011, China put forth the concept of ‘community of common destiny’ to evoke the sense of China becoming a non-hegemonic power having shared prosperity as a vision. The assertion of this is further consolidated in its strategy of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), a revival of the old Silk Route, whereby China has actively engaged in seeking economic alliances linking 60 Asian and European countries. With the new strategy of OBOR in place, China is looking at its closest neighbours and placing stress on regional status. It has also offered a contribution of USD 50 billion for the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank

China’s foreign policy 17 (AIIB) for support to the regional economy, an initiative to change the regional image of China. Although suspicions exists over China’s real intentions, with accusations of China creating dependencies of states, the Chinese have clearly indicated interests to seek deeper cooperation among states to build a prosperous and harmonious world. At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), President Xi stated, It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. . . . The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation. It was widely interpreted as China’s desire to break the dominance and alliances of the US in the region (Bader, 2016: 13). However, the focus on Asia is noticeable in China’s foreign policy, whereby the regional position and status has become the baseline for China taking over the global position.

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18  Geeta Kochhar Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hu Jintao. 2009. ‘Five China’s Propositions of the Times’ (时代观的五大中 国主张), Liaowang News Weekly (了望星闻周刊), 24 November, Chinese Communist Party News Web (中国共产党新闻网), at http://cpc.people. com.cn/GB/64093/64387/10439546.html (accessed 20 November 2016). Ikenberry, G. J. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jakobson, Linda, and Ryan Manuel. 2016. ‘How Are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China’, Asia and Pacific Policy Studies, Special Issue, 3 (1) (January): 101–110, at (accessed 20 December 2016). Jordaan, Eduard Christiaan. 2003. ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’, South African Journal of Political Studies, 30 (2): 165–181. Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China, New York: Penguin Press. Noesselt, Nele. 2012. ‘Is There a “Chinese School” of IR?’, German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers, (March): 88, at www.gigahamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp188_noesselt.pdf (accessed 20 November 2016). Park, Young. 2009. Korea and the Imperialists: In Search of a National Identity, AuthorHouse. Qin Yaqing. 2005. ‘Theoretical Problematic of International Relationship Theory and Construction of a Chinese School’, Social Sciences in China: 62–72. Qin Yaqing. 2009. ‘Development of International Relations Theories in China’, International Studies, 46(1–2): 185–201, at www.researchgate. net/publication/233028642_International_Relations_Theory_in_China (accessed 20 November 2016). Qin Yaqing. 2011. ‘Development of International Relations Theories in China: Progress Through Debates’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 11 (2): 231–257, at https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/11/2/231/711597/ Development-of-International-Relations-theory-in (accessed 20 November 2016). Song Xiaojun, et al. 2009. Unhappy China: The Grand Time, Grand Vision, and Our Challenges (中国不高兴 － 大时代，大目标 及我们的内有外患), Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press. United States National Intelligence Council (US NIC). 2008. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, at www.foresightfordevelopment.org/sobi pro/55/758-global-trends-2025-a-transformed-world (accessed 18 November 2016). Voice of America (VoA). 2016. ‘Focal Discussion: Chinese Scholar Put Forth the Rule by Virtue Has to Begin from Internal Politics’ (焦点对话： 中国学者提王道外交，先从内政做起), 19 February, at www.voachinese. com/a/VOAWeishi-ProandCon-20160219-1/3197987.html (accessed 20 November 2016).

China’s foreign policy 19 Wang Xiaobo (王晓波). 2010. ‘A Review on the Division of Contemporary China’s Foreign Policy’ (当代中国外交历史分期问题述评), Journal of Yanbian University (延边大学学报, 社会科学版), 43 (6) (December) at Cinki Database. The Washington Times. 2007. ‘Beijing Likens Cheney Criticism to Nosy Neighbour’, 1 March, at www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/01/ 20070301-104826-2978r/ (accessed 10 February 2017). Worden, Robert L., et al. 1987. China: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library Congress, at http://countrystudies.us/china/126.htm (accessed 20 December 2016). Xiong Guangkai. 2010. ‘The Diplomatic Meaning of the Translation of Chinese Lexicon “Hide from Light and Nourish Obscurity” ’ (中文词汇“韬光 养晦”翻译的外交战略意义), Public Diplomacy Quarterly (公共外交季刊), 2 June, cited in China Network, at www.china.com.cn/international/ zhuanti/2010-06/02/content_20170102.htm (accessed 20 December 2016). Yan Xuetong. (阎学通). 2015. The Shift of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition (世界权力的转移 – 政治领导与战略竞争), Beijing: Beijing University Press. Yan Xuetong. 2016. ‘The Strategy of China’s Rise and Changing International Environment’ (中国崛起战略和国际环境变化), Talk in Beijing University, at www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgBENAIlAg (accessed 28 July 2016). Yu Huamin. 2007. ‘ “Three Major Policy” and Independent New China Diplomacy’ (“三大政策”与独立自主的新中国外交), History of Anhui Studies (安徽史学), Issue No. 5, at http://jds.cass.cn/UploadFiles/ztsjk/2010/11/ 201011111017293291.pdf (accessed 20 December 2016). Zhang Zangzang, et al. 1996. China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post Cold-War Era (中国可以说不:冷战后时代的政治与情 感抉择), Beijing: China Industrial and Commercial United Press (中华工商 联合出版社). Zhao Tingyang. 2005. The ‘All Under the Heaven’ System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution (天下体系：世界制度哲学导论), Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Press (江苏教育出版社). Zhu Jiejin. 2009. ‘G8 and the Accumulation of Global Public Goods: A Perspective on Collective Hegemony’ (八国集团与全球性公共产品的共计：集 体霸权的视角), Research in International Politics (国际政治研究), 1: 120– 121, cited in Zhu Liqun. 2010. Zhu Liqun. 2010. China’s Foreign Policy Debates, Chaillot Papers, September. EU Institute for Security Studies, at www.is.europa.eu (accessed 13 March 2013).

2 Understanding Sino-Indian foreign relations in contemporary times Shreyasi Ghosh

The increasing international interdependence between each sovereign nation state has always promoted national interest and the need to have a proper foreign policy, as every nation strongly endeavours to conduct its relations with other states and to effect adjustment with the global environment through the instrument of foreign policy. Interestingly, the term ‘foreign policy’ in this regard refers to a state’s international goals and its strategies to achieve those goals. Foreign policy makers in such cases follow the same five steps with which public policy gets made, that is through agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Foreign policy is the bundle of principles and practices that regulate the intercourse of a state vis-à-vis other states. Through foreign policy a state seeks to achieve a variety of objectives. The objectives sought to be attained by a state are of different types and categories, yet there are certain objectives which are uniformly pursued by all states, i.e. political independence and territorial integrity, economic well being, and prestige and status of a nation. They have been classified into short-range, middle-range, and long-range objectives. As most eminent scholars claim that the international regimes are built on instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof, bilateralism in this respect refers to the political, economic, or cultural relations between two sovereign states. It is in contrast to unilateralism or multilateralism, which refer to the conduct of diplomacy by a single state or multiple states, respectively. Usually, economic agreements, such as free trade agreements (FTA) or foreign direct investment (FDI), signed by two states, are a common example of bilateralism, and since most economic agreements are signed according to the specific characteristics of the contracting countries to give preferential treatment to each other, not a generalised principle but a situational differentiation is needed. Thus,

Sino-Indian foreign relations 21 through bilateralism states can obtain more tailored agreements and obligations that only apply to particular contracting states. However, the states will face a trade-off because it is more wasteful in transaction costs than the multilateral strategy. In a bilateral strategy, a new contract has to be negotiated for each participant, so it tends to be preferred when transaction costs are low and the member surplus, which corresponds to ‘producer surplus’ in economic terms, is high. Moreover, this will be effective if an influential state wants control over small states from a liberalism perspective, because building a series of bilateral arrangements with small states can increase a state’s influence (Thompson & Verdier, 2014: 5).

Historical development of Sino-Indian foreign relations China and India share a very old history and relationship, as throughout the first millennium they were the centres of spiritual and religious activities. The two countries suffered from Western colonialism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, political contacts between them were few, and culturally it was mostly from India to China. The two countries emerged as independent sovereign states on the world map almost simultaneously after World War II, and regardless of a history filled with conflicts and a contemporary competition over regional influence of the two Asian powers, they managed to increasingly deepen their economic ties. Even though the relationship seems to be moving in a more peaceful direction of mutual understanding and cooperation, it was believed to have a very fragile relationship before. The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. As the two powers grow, they are bound to change the current international system with profound implications for themselves, the US, and the world, and whether they agree on the changes that are to be made, especially when it comes to their relationship with the West, will definitely influence the system’s future character.1 Their combined size and population makes them the largest geographical and human resource mass on the planet. India and China have had cultural, religious, and trade links going back centuries. They also came into being as nation states almost simultaneously in this century and also share a past of colonial and imperialist subjugation from which freedom had to be won with a major struggle. Paradoxically enough, the two countries fought a war with each other over disputed frontiers, which most of the scholars view as the continuing border dispute between the two countries,

22  Shreyasi Ghosh and China’s rapid growth in military power not unsurprisingly creates anxieties about their future relationship. China’s aggressive foreign policy postures also do not encourage a benign view. There are enough strategic thinkers in India who reckon China to be the major future threat to India. Historically the two most populous countries of the world, India and China – despite having a geographical barrier like the Himalayan frontier – have maintained intimate relations since ancient times dating to the third century. We can never deny the visits of Chinese monks such as Fa-Hsein, Yuang Chwang, and T-Sins to Buddhist sites in India. Even Indian scholars such as Dharmarakshaka, Kumarajiva, Gunavarma, and Dharmagupta visited China to translate Buddhist writings into the Chinese language, although with the invasion of Islamic rulers Buddhism seemed to virtually disappear from India. Eventually relations with China were severed, which were revised again during the early part of the twentieth century with India’s effort to support China’s struggle against foreign domination. Especially when Japan captured Shanghai and Manchuria and further invaded Jehol (1931– 33), many leaders from India condemned Japanese imperialism and expressed sympathy with China.2 Any discussion on bilateral relationship of countries evokes a proper understanding of schools of thought, and thus most scholars like Roy and Banyan prefer to point out that there are two schools of thought that often start with the debates about Sino-Indian relations. The first takes a ‘realist’ point of view, arguing that each of the two emerging powers would fight for dominance in the Asian continent. It tends to describe relations between the two countries as hostile. This could even lead to military confrontation between the two nations, or at least to an even greater militarisation of the region. War is only contained because both countries have nuclear weapons and are increasing and modernising their capabilities in conventional warfare. India belongs to the group of major importers of military technology. The second school of thought takes a liberal perspective, viewing China and India as two major emerging markets in an increasingly interdependent world where trade and commerce sustain peaceful coexistence. Observing the Indian media, it seems that the ‘China threat’ theory dominates in most news broadcasts.

Emerging changes in Sino-Indian relations Sino-Indian relations have undergone dramatic changes over the past five decades, ranging from deep hostility in the 1960s and 1970s to

Sino-Indian foreign relations 23 rapprochement in the 1980s and a readjustment since the demise of the Soviet Union.3 Both countries have realised the imperative need for cooperation in diverse areas, especially in the trade and economic domains, in the long-term interest of peace and stability in Asia, and for faster economic development and prosperity at home. China’s and India’s sustained economic growth fuels their increasing geopolitical and military influence. Despite their developmental similarities, their bilateral strategic rivalry means that China and India have competing priorities on most major global issues. Sino-Indian differences are considerable on issues relating to the non-proliferation system, Asian security, regional stability in Southern Asia, and security in the maritime commons, space, and cyberspace (Sharma, 2011). The two rising powers broadly agree on matters relating to the international economic system, energy security, and the environment. Beijing’s and New Delhi’s divergent behaviours are shaped by the unique histories governing their formation as modern states, the stark contrasts in their respective political regimes, and their ongoing territorial disputes and geopolitical rivalries (Athwal, 2007).

Issues of cooperation In recent years, Sino-Indian relations have maintained good momentum in their development, with co-operation the key factor. The two sides have sought to continue raising the level of mutual political trust and promoting the in-depth development of bilateral co-operation. The current situation suggests that co-operation between the two countries has mainly focused on economic areas of interest, although pragmatic co-operation has also been gradually promoted in the areas of politics, boundary negotiation, and non-traditional security. India’s relation with China has recently been improving with the high-level contact between two countries. On a number of contentious issues, a joint working group has been set up. Now both countries want to utilise each other’s full potential in every field like trade, defence, information technology, science and technology, and nuclear – especially after the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China had been seen to bring a sea change in the policy of China towards Sikkim. As a result, China no longer recognises Sikkim as independent country, and so each wants to solve the contentious issues through dialogue. Most significantly, the US factor has also become important in the chequered history of the Sino-Indian relationship as discussions centre on changing global equations. The changing Indo-US relations, at a time when American ties with China show strain, are a cause of

24  Shreyasi Ghosh concern for China. There are frequent hints of Washington’s interest in building India as a counterweight to China or of using New Delhi as part of its policy to contain Beijing which has brought about a changed approach towards India in recent times. The Sino-Indian clash served to confirm the suspicion that China had grown drunk with power because the boundary question was opened by the Chinese when it was strong enough to inflict its will upon India. Till then the Chinese refused to be drawn into discussion on the ground that the time for the negotiations was not ripe (Sharma, 2011).

Issues of conflicts Several issues have plagued Sino-Indian relations in past years, and the most important of them were the concerns of the emergence of Jammu and Kashmir as a new issue area between the two. The Chinese decision to provide stapled visas for Indians from the State of Jammu and Kashmir that indicated it considers it ‘disputed’ – in line with Pakistan’s position – has become a major diplomatic problem. This problem was compounded in August 2010 when China denied a visa to Lt. Gen. Jas Pal, Commander, Northern Command, since he is based in Jammu and Kashmir. The lack of diplomatic sensitivity and protocol on the Chinese side was stark since the lieutenant general was invited by the PLA. India has suspended all high-level military exchanges with China in retaliation till the issue is sorted out to its satisfaction. It also cancelled the visits of Chinese high-level military visits to India. Again, a second issue again linked to Jammu and Kashmir was the active involvement of China, largely through the PLA, in carrying out various projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Legal sovereignty over PoK belongs to India, yet this has been systematically been set aside by China since it signed the 1963 ‘border agreement’ with Pakistan settling the PoK Xinjiang territorial division. India has always considered it ‘illegitimate’. But this has since then been further compromised by Chinese military activities, including road and infrastructure building, military transportation, and so forth in PoK. Earlier in the year the Chinese had opposed an Asian Development Bank project in Arunachal on the ground that the territory is ‘disputed’, and that India must not undertake even official state visits of the prime minister and president or allow the Dalai Lama to visit the area. By its own logic China should not be undertaking any such projects in ‘disputed’ PoK. But logic has not been Beijing’s strong point; power politics is. Even on a stronger note, China’s relation with India has caused many misperceptions which China needs to address sincerely through talks, especially with

Sino-Indian foreign relations 25 the Tibetans in exile and their leader the Dalai Lama for overcoming the dominant view that this problem can be overcome simply by waiting out. It is quite possible that complexities could increase as human rights and other cultural autonomy issues gain more salience in international diplomacy and Chinese domestic affairs. China, however, tried to push through a supply of additional nuclear power reactors to P ­ akistan – a known proliferator of nuclear weapons technology – bypassing the Nuclear Suppliers Group regulations and restrictions despite being a member. While the projects have not come through as yet and did not materialise even during the recent Pakistan visit of Wen Jiabao, the very fact that it has been attempted has not left a negative impression in India and elsewhere. China’s Pakistan fixation has been further reflected in its failure to condemn the perpetrators of the dastardly Mumbai terrorist attacks, its opposition in the UN to sanction the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, and its calculated silence on mentioning Pakistan, even indirectly, as a state that needs to be responsible and control international terrorist attacks from its territory and punish the guilty. The Chinese stance has had been widely viewed negatively in the Indian media and political circles, to the detriment of Sino-Indian diplomacy and confidence building. Finally, China has acknowledged, after being in denial for many years, that it is constructing a hydropower plant on the Tsangpo or the Brahmaputra and is also planning other projects that could affect the quantum of water flow into lower riparian India and Bangladesh during the lean period. No river water agreement exists between India and China, and water flows in both Sutlej and Brahmaputra are involved. Under the present arrangement China provides water flow data during the monsoon and not year-round. Its dam-building activities on the Mekong have been a diplomatic issue with the Sino-Indian states. The failure to be upfront with India on the hydro-project issue has therefore raised public concern, especially in the north-east. Aksai Chin is one of two major controversial border regions whose ownership is claimed by both India and China, with Arunachal Pradesh being the other one. The etymology of Aksai Chin is uncertain. Although ‘Aksai’ is a Turk term for ‘white brooks’, it is widely believed that the word ‘chin’ has nothing to do with China. As per the Indian version of cartography, the region is marked under the Ladakh district of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. However, in reality China administers the region as a part of Hotan County of Xinjiang Autonomous Region and negates India’s claim to cede the land to India. This high-tension Sino-Indian border dispute has led both the nations witness a short skirmish in 1962, which resulted in status quo

26  Shreyasi Ghosh ante. In 1993 and 1996, India and China signed a treaty to respect the Line of Actual Control. However, there are reports about the Chinese military personnel involved in border infringement, especially in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (Articles on India-China).

Recent trends in Sino-Indian relationship Overall, India’s relationship with China is poised at the crossroads. It can go in several directions depending on how the two deal with each other’s concerns and their ability to reach a reasonable settlement on some of the pending issues. Both need a stable, sensitive, productive, and working relationship as their status and power in the world changes. The rest of Asia too wants to see peace and stability maintained in this major relationship of the twenty-first century. But the relations could also deteriorate if the sincerity of engagement falters. Wen’s visit would have played a positive role if it contributed to lessening the complexities that have emerged, resolved some of the pending issues, and helped forge a stronger understanding of the interests that tie the two countries. If we go through the present engagements and emerging trends in their relationships, we see multi-polarisation in global politics and economics as a trend that China has dreamed about for decades that is now becoming more of a reality. China still sees its national interests hampered by the present system, most certainly because of Western dominance and the gradual erosion of developing countries’ sovereignty. Presently China is the second-largest economy in the world. Under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 1 and UPA 2 regimes, Sino-Indian bilateral relations flourished a lot. By 2012 bilateral trade volume was $66.47 billion in which China exported $46.47 billion and imported only $18.8 billion. This figure itself reveals that the Indian side is in a trade deficit. In fact, imports from China to India exceed Indian exports to China. Since India and China are exemplars of the changes brought on by globalisation, they are two of the fastest growing economies in the world and possess two of the largest domestic markets by number of consumers. However, continued liberalisation, when done strategically and carefully, may be an important source for maintaining prolonged economic growth.

Narendra Modi’s attempt for reconstruction of foreign policy As of now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi attempts to reconstruct the foreign policy of India, where he specially stresses an ‘Act East’ policy,

Sino-Indian foreign relations 27 ‘Neighbourhood first’ policy, and ‘Indian Ocean outreach’ policy. The main concern of the Sino-Indian bilateral relation is thus the security and strategic issues and the border disputes. Modi’s visit to China in May has opened a new horizon in the bilateral relation. Modi’s development agenda is similar to that of the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and he is prepared to collaborate with China to improve bilateral economic ties. During his just concluded visit to China, business agreements worth $22 billion were signed between the two sides, with the focus being on infrastructure. These deals will definitely create many job opportunities in India and help to narrow the large trade gap between the two countries, which has grown from $36 billion last year to $48 billion (of a total trade of $71 billion) this year. Thus, Modi in this regard is seen to be determined to make India a country that counts in the Asian balance of power, which is characterised by shaping the foreign policy in a way that would strengthen the country’s economy. Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping get along well and respect each other as partners for closer cooperation. They already have a cooperative relationship in the China-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In addition, China has agreed to support India’s bid for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group. There is, therefore, much scope for deeper relations between the two Asian giants, especially because Asia has very few multilateral organisations to address such common problems as pollution, global warming, and security. And as Modi takes steps to implement his ‘Act East’ policy, China seems to have grasped this opportunity to build even stronger economic and strategic ties with India. But challenging bilateral relations are issues such as the border dispute, China’s strategic ties with Pakistan, and India’s relations with Japan. The future of Asia actually depends on how India and China address these challenges. It was specifically highlighted that China’s support for a permanent seat for India at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Indian membership of export control regimes would be helpful to the relationship (Zhong & Walter, 2015).

Conclusion For the foreseeable future, Sino-Indian ties still seem to remain fragile and as vulnerable as ever to sudden deterioration as a result of misperceptions, accidents, and eruption of unresolved issues. Simmering tensions over territory, overlapping spheres of influence, resource scarcity, and rival alliance relationships ensure that relations between

28  Shreyasi Ghosh the two rising Asian giants will be characterised more by competition and rivalry than cooperation for a long time to come. In the short to medium term, neither New Delhi nor Beijing will do anything that destabilises their bilateral relationship or arouses the suspicions of their smaller Asian neighbours. Their efforts will be aimed at consolidating their power and position while striving to resolve more pressing domestic problems. But instability in Tibet, coupled with China’s military links with Pakistan and Myanmar, will pose a continuing complication in Sino-Indian relations. At the same time, both will continue to monitor closely each other’s activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region and will attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. India, like China, would prefer to avoid entangling alliances so as to maximise its options and freedom of action. We have seen how during the earlier days the tension between the two countries was minimised and initiatives were taken for improvement in relations, and since the end of the Cold War relations between the two countries have steadily improved and also strengthened in various fields of mutual interest. Continuous visits between the heads of state and officials have always proved to strengthen relations and various issues including the border issues have been in discussion for resolution by mutual cooperation. But relations could also deteriorate if the sincerity of engagement falters. In this sense, Narendra Modi’s visit has been regarded by most researchers to be significant and might play a positive role in the arena of global politics if it contributes to lessening the complexities that have emerged in these years, resolving some of the pending issues, and helping to forge a stronger understanding of the interests that tie the two countries. Realistically, the fast-changing economic and strategic milieu punctuated by uncertainty brought about by globalisation in macro terms has in fact created challenges as well as opportunities for both India and China to free themselves of historical baggage in terms of bilateral relations. Perceptions do matter both in the realms of Sino-Indian diplomacy and for the people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. Positive perception of India and its leadership most likely will impact Chinese tourism to India, garner more respect for business prospects in India, and induce recommendations from government officials to take India seriously (Sen, 2015). It is also noticed that the progress that has been made in Sino-Indian relations in recent years is said to enhance all-round development, even with the growing number of inherent drivers and external factors that are viewed to impact the bilateral relations which can bring a critical time for ‘rebalancing’

Sino-Indian foreign relations 29 and ‘redefinition’. Thus, through both cooperation and conflict they maintain a balance in their relationship, as diplomats regard China as a unique and irreplaceable partner for India’s development. So creating a climate conducive to the fostering of trade and investment from China should be the main focus of India’s diplomacy in the near term. The peace and tranquillity on the border provides the necessary platform for sustained economic diplomacy.

Notes 1 According to V. R. Raghavan, it is never less than a challenge to attempt to understand the cultural factors which influence a nation’s conduct in the international arena. When that nation is China and the subject of introspection is its relations with India, such an endeavour can at best be fraught with far too many variables. The two have had the longest uninterrupted existence as nations. 2 Later, during Nehru’s visit to the country in 1939, he stressed on the importance of Sino-Indian cooperation, and eventually both the countries with a gradual pace emerged as independent states on the world map almost simultaneously in the post–World War II era. 3 The post–Cold War era has offered enormous opportunities to New Delhi and Beijing to move in the direction of a ‘productive relationship’.

References Articles on India-China. Psychedelicalo, at https://psychedelicalo.wordpress. com/tag/india-china-relations/ (accessed 12 March 2013). Athwal, Amardeep. 2007. China – India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics, New Delhi: Routledge. Sen, Tansen. 2015. ‘The Optics Matter in India-China Relations’, Times of India, 28 May, at http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/china-man/theoptics-matter-in-india-china-relations/ (accessed 11 January 2013). Sharma, Reetika, et al. 2011. India and the Dynamics of World Politics, New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley India, Pearson Education India. Thompson, Alexander, and Daniel Verdier. 2014. ‘Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Regime Design’, International Studies Quarterly, 58 (1): 15–28, at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/athompson/Lateralisms.pdf (accessed 23 September 2013). Zhong Zhengming, and Walter Andersen. 2015. ‘Modi’s China Trip Marks His “Act East” Policy’, China Daily, 19 May, at www.chinadaily.com.cn/ opinion/2015-05/19/content_20755574.htm (accessed 18 October 2013).

3 Revisiting Sino-Indian relations Conflict and cooperation Prerana Bhaduli

I long for the real friendship between China and India based not on economics or politics but on irresistible attraction. Then will follow real brotherhood of man. —Mahatma Gandhi, 1945

The strategic and gradual development of India and China, two Asian neighbours, has altered the gravity of international politics in Asia and turned the vision of ‘Asian Century’ into reality. The two Asian giants are usually thought of as geopolitical rivals. The relationship is steadily becoming one of the keys to peace and prosperity in Asia, as Asia is increasingly the geopolitical and economic nerve-centre of the world. Therefore, the relations are crucial to international order. Indian strategist Jairam Ramesh coined the term ‘Chindia’ (Ramesh, 2005) to describe the potential between the two. However, the shared Asian vision seems to be sinking due to the increasing contention in Sino-Indian bilateral relations. China has been nettlesome to India on several fronts like Pakistan and its terrorism, border issues, India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees, visas, and more recently its obstructive role in India’s efforts to bring back JeM’s Masood Azhar, blocking its membership to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), undercutting its aspiration for a UN Security Council membership, and menacing India in its own backyard, the Indian Ocean. Despite wide-ranging socio-economic engagements, both countries stand juxtaposed on several international and regional concerns. Both are ancient civilisations reincarnated as modern republics in the mid-twentieth century and are now evolving powers. Both have nuclear weapons, burgeoning economies, escalating military budgets, and huge pools of manpower, and seem to be striving for influence in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, Africa, Central Asia, and East

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 31 Asia. This stage of mistrust and rivalry mainly commenced after the advent of the Tibetan revolution.

Historical contacts between India and China Being the oldest civilisations, India and China shared friendly and cooperative relations for centuries. The bilateral relationship between the two are believed to date back to ancient times. Even before the formation of any kind of political interactions, both countries enjoyed varied spans of economic and cultural relations. A trade relation as well as religious ties between India and China was flourishing through the ancient ‘Silk Road’ corridor which stretched back to the first century ad, which eventually became the vital link of Sino-Indian cultural exchanges. Numerous Buddhist monks moved to China to spread the message of Buddhism, and hundreds of Chinese pilgrims travelled into India and learnt Buddhism in Nalanda University. These age-old ties even relentlessly continued to thrive during the middle, modern, and colonial periods. After independence, these ancient relations progressed further when India offered its absolute assistance to the Chinese freedom struggle and extended its diplomatic reorganisation to China. However, these historic ties only lasted up to the commencement of the Tibetan uprising of 1959 and began to shrink after the advent of the Tibetan crisis. Then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had constantly considered Indian independence and the Chinese revolution as parallel manifestations of resurgent Asian nationalism. Kishore Mahbubani, the distinguished Asian thinker from Singapore, described India-China relations as ‘the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st Century’ (Banerjee, 2010: 1). Indeed, historically, civilisationally, and from the perspective of economic benefits to the region or from peace and security in Asia and the world, this is a relationship that is likely to shape the global future. Not much has changed in the rhetoric of Sino-Indian relations since Mao Zedong, speaking in 1951 in honour of the first anniversary of India’s constitution, declared that ‘excellent friendship’ had existed between the two countries ‘for thousands of years’ (Malone & R. Mukherjee, 2010: 137–158). In his highly controversial first visit to China in 1924, Tagore said at a lecture in Shanghai: I want to win your heart, now that I am close to you, with the faith that is in me of a great future for you, and for Asia, when

32  Prerana Bhaduli your country rises and gives expression to its own spirit – a future in the joy of which we shall all share. (Banerjee, 2010: 1) Tagore visited China purely as a poet, yet his words set the tone and trend for India-China relations till the 1950s. The Congress Party sent a small medical mission led by Dr Kotnis to assist the Eighth Route Army in its War of Resistance in 1938. This team’s commitment and service to the People’s Liberation Army left a deep imprint in the minds of the members of the Long March generation. This was the backdrop in which Nehru reached out to China in the 1950s. Both Tagore and Kotnis played a major role in the smooth starting off with the relations between the two.

The modern Sino-Indian relationship has been marked by two distinct phases Cold War phase Purported friendship and ideological resemblance around anti-­ imperialist foreign policy objectives from 1950 declined into a vicious yet concise border clash in 1962, followed by a Sino-Indian ‘Cold War’. While border talks began in 1954, the border dispute seethed throughout the 1950s due to a large number of aggravations by both belligerent nations: China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950; India’s alleged assistance for the Khampa rebels in Tibet after 1956 and provision of sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala after 1959; India’s detection of an accomplished Chinese road proceeding through the Aksai Chin region in 1958; and India’s expansion of its defence perimeter and ‘forward policy’ of stationing military outposts in disputed areas in 1959. Skirmishes throughout 1962 exploded into full-fledged war. Bilateral normalisation efforts after 1976 led to efforts to tackle differences through negotiation, which was by no means easy. In 1998, India asserted China as the justification for its second round of nuclear tests (the first had taken place in 1974). Although this might have been estimated to generate considerable tensions between the two nations, economic relations have since deepened. Nonetheless, the period from 1998 onward remains one of uncertainty and occasional resentment, marked by China’s advent as a world power and the courting of India by other major powers, not least the US, as a vital nation not just in its own respect

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 33 but also as a potential counterweight to Chinese power and regional influence (Malone & R. Mukherjee, 2010: 137–158). Few relationships are as essential for peace and stability in Asia as between India and China. The course of India-China reconciliation received a great impetus by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to China in December 1991, therefore breaking the prolonged strategic deadlock. This established an increasing confidence on the part of the political leadership of both sides to address all the matters which had bedevilled the relationship between the two Asian powers. The post-1991 period has seen momentous developments in the bilateral relations. The crucial factors which outline the domestic as well as foreign policies of both the nations in the post-1991 period are their views of the changing contours of global politics, consensus on various concerns, the yearning for friendship based on domestic priorities, and accommodating alterations occurring in the global arena. China’s foreign policy stresses military security, national sovereignty, and economic growth. A new chapter was written during the War of Resistance and World War II in the history of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. In the face of Chinese defeat at the hands of the Japanese, the episode affected India also. During 1905–47, India and China rendered support, assistance, and sympathy to each other in their mutual struggle against colonialism. It was Nehru’s vision that after the war, the vast and immense potentials of economic cooperation in the New World would essentially bring India and China closer to each other in the near future (Deepak, 2001: 12–16). India and China started off on friendly footing soon after their independence from their imperialist past and further formation as republics. This 1950s entente, epitomised by the popular Hindi slogan ‘Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai’ (Indians and Chinese are brothers), was based on the nations’ shared sense of having cast off the burden of the imperialist yoke through prolonged, albeit completely different, struggles. Both advocated a shared responsibility to lead the Third World countries in a quest for peace and prosperity against the treacherous backdrop of Cold War contention. As late as 1962, at the height of the India-China border dispute, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reminded Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: ‘Our two peoples’ common interests in their struggle against imperialism outweigh by far all the differences between our two countries. We have a major responsibility for Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and Asian peace.’

34  Prerana Bhaduli The post-liberation history of Sino-Indian relations has been that of friendship, setback, and normalisation. India was the first country in the non-communist bloc to recognise China and establish diplomatic relations. India attained independence on 15 August 1947 after a prolonged and nonviolent nationalist movement. China attained independence on 1 October 1949 in the culmination of the Chinese Civil War (1945–49). There was a concise period of cooperation from 1949 to 1957 where diplomatic relations were formally established (1 April 1950) and high-level visits were exchanged (Athwal, 2008: 20). The birth of communist China was welcomed by Nehru in October with great pomp and show. In a rare gesture, India demonstrated excessive zeal in backing for China’s membership in the United Nations. American insight that communism was a danger to international peace and stability was not believed by the then prime minister; on the contrary, Nehru considered that Western hatred of communism might boomerang since nationalism in China was stouter and stronger than communism. Nehru was convinced that Chinese nationalism performed a far better significant part than communism and that Chinese civilisation was too old to yield totally to Marxist dogma. Nehru’s India and Mao’s China found common causes in anti-colonialism, socialism, adherence to strict notions of national sovereignty, and equality in international affairs. The initial stage of bilateral relations was marked by a close friendship, despite China’s military invasion of Tibet in 1950. Nehru chose to deal with monolithic China diplomatically by keeping it in check and isolating it from the USSR rather than coming into open confrontation with it. This strategy paid off. India was able to preserve peace and tranquillity on its north-eastern borders for over a decade (Jain, 2004: 254). In 1954, India and China signed a contract on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and had an exchange of notes. India therefore signed away all its hereditary and traditional privileges in Tibet by virtue of initial deals. The five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheel) and the Bandung Conference were the foci of Sino-Indian cooperation. However, the cooperation did not last as grave differences started to emerge between the two, specifically over the un-demarcated border issue by the late 1950s. The unresolved territorial border dispute hence led to a full-fledged war by 1962 (Athwal, 2008: 20). Zhou Enlai categorically denied accepting the McMahon line as the final Line of Control (LAC) between India and the PRC, as the latter argued that local Tibetan authorities had no legal rights to conclude any border treaty with the British, further

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 35 countering Indian claims. Moreover, China regarded the disputed Aksai Chin area as part of the Chinese province of Sinkiang and not Tibet. To the contrary, India contested that Chinese maps had never shown Sinkiang to extend south of the Kuentun range, which separated it from Tibet. Ultimately, border clashes led to the large scale Sino-Indian war in October 1962 (Eekelen, 1967: 160). Following the conflict of 1962, India-China relations were frozen into a state of hostile coexistence. Although both the countries continued to uphold diplomatic relations but the impasse sustained for a long time. The year 1965 witnessed one of the lowest ebbs in the bilateral relations due to the Pakistan factor. Between 1962 and 1969, Sino-Indian relations continued to remain in a state of crisis. Inspired by its easy victory over India, China introduced bitter and aggressive propaganda against India which even further deepened India’s suspicion of China. India’s mistrust about China was further confirmed when China befriended Pakistan and started offering military and political aid to the country. China on the contrary fundamentally viewed Indo-Soviet friendship as an anti-China ploy. In the wake of humiliating defeat, when India rendered high importance to its armed forces, China blamed India for militarism. According to Wang’s analysis, militarism raised its head in India after the 1962 war. This tragic episode made it essential for India to bolster as well as strengthen its armed forces. When India sought US and Soviet assistance, India was labelled as a stooge of US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and social imperialism (Deepak, 2001: 275). From mid-1966 onwards, the domestic conditions of both India and China were in a state of neverending flux. The Cultural Revolution brought China in the midst of socio-economic turmoil and acute leadership struggle (1966–69). The new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was an untried and untested leader. Besides, she faced many problems like famines due to extensive drought. India-China relations further worsened in June 1967 with the elimination of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on alleged charges of espionage. The winter of 1967 witnessed skirmishes on the India-China border. On 11 September, Chinese troops attacked Indian troops on the Sikkim border across the Nathula and opened heavy mortar and artillery fire. After frequent Indian protest and proposal for ceasefire, by 15 September there was a virtual cessation of all antagonistic activities. The Chinese again fired on the Indian positions at Chola on 1 October and both sides took heavy casualties. Thus the condition between the two nations continued to deteriorate.

36  Prerana Bhaduli Mrs Gandhi strived to normalise relations with Beijing, and by the end of 1967, in a discussion on external affairs, Mrs Gandhi stated: China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us – carries an anti-Indian propaganda not only against the Indian Government but against the whole of our democratic functioning and even our national integrity. But I would like to say that we do not harbour any evil intention towards the Chinese people, and we do hope that a day will come when they will also realise that it is in the interests of all the countries of South East Asia that we should be friends and that each country should be able to devote its strength to solving the very major problem of combating poverty and backwardness. India-China relations entered into a new segment with the ‘pathbreaking’ visit to Beijing in December 1988. This historic visit to China saw a remarkable improvement in the bilateral relations therefore, making it more pleasant than at any time since the mid-1950s. India has always been sceptical about China’s close ties with Pakistan. They are long-standing natural allies and share a time-tested friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistanis like to say, tested by hardship, which has come in the form of regime changes and upheavals in both countries, central realignments in the international system, and war. Pakistan played a major and significant part in China’s strategy for coping with India and, following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union. Rajiv Gandhi’s momentous December 1988 visit to China was a considerable success, as it was the first visit by an Indian prime minister to China since Nehru’s 1954 visit. The new dimension of India’s China policy implied a willingness to further increase consultation and cooperation with China on a wide range of international concerns, such as the creation of a New International Economic Order, disarmament, and pollution, thereby renewing the old friendship (Garver, 1996: 323–325). Post–Cold War phase The culmination of the Cold War gave a new dimension to the SinoIndian relationship when the peace process was accelerated with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in 1991. During the visit, agreements on resuming consulate-generals, memoranda on resuming border trade, and on cooperation in science and technology for the peaceful uses of outer space were signed (Panda, 2003: 1–15).

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 37 Against the backdrop of the modification on its national security in general and with respect to India particularly, China has embraced unwavering attempts to elevate more friendly and stable relations with India since the conclusion of the Cold War. From 1991 to the eve of India’s nuclear tests, China embarked on a series of moves in this regard as follows: fostering political proximity between China and India by virtue of the bilateral economic cooperation and cultural exchange; exploiting CBMs and security negotiations to boost mutual trust and to create a congenial environment for the resolution of the India-China boundary dispute; preserving a balance between its relations with Pakistan and India; and urging India to keep its promises on the Tibetan issue through low-level political pressure. In 1996, Indian President Shankar Dayal Sharma told visiting Chinese President Jiang Zemin that ‘India seeks a relationship of constructive co-operation with China.’ He said ‘friendship between India and China was dictated by the logic of history and the needs of the present.’ It would not only serve the core interests of both parties but also contribute to the peace and tranquillity both in the regional and global spheres. Coming out of the shadow of India’s nuclear tests, China-India relations have entered into a new phase since mid-1999. Irrespective of their certain expectations from this relationship, as the twin emerging powers China and India converged at the point that stable and cooperative relations between them would best serve their own national interests in the new century. The post–9/11 development has totally altered the Chinese attitude towards terrorism and specifically after 13 December 2001. One important cause behind China’s eventual altered stance is the ongoing ethnic and religious upheaval in Xinjiang province as well as the military presence of the US in South Asia through Pakistan. India has therefore become strategically significant to China because India could be a reliable partner in its attempt to denounce hemispheric supremacy by any one power. Second, India’s technological lead in computer software will be a vital sector for Sino-Indian collaboration. ‘The fast changing global strategic environment will be the defining paradigm for the exchange of plans of action between China and India. Presently however, the issue of terrorism has been the defining paradigm of its relation with India vis-a-vis Pakistan.’ The current attitude of China is in favour of the US coalition against the war on terrorism in which Pakistan has to play a major role. It cannot nullify the US-Pakistan tie-up, and therefore it is cautious that India should not be dragged into the US diplomatic tangle. Reformulation of its policy towards India is one of the outcomes, although by historical

38  Prerana Bhaduli legacy it had played the Pakistan card to restrict India playing a predominant role in the region (Panda, 2003: 1–15). During Indian President K. R. Narayanan’s visit to China in 2000 and Li Peng’s visit to India in 2001, China chose to avoid any mention of the unpleasant memory of the recent past. In fact, there was no reference to the nuclear issue at all. This was seen as ‘the Chinese approach that nothing would be allowed to mar the general air of goodwill and the future prospects of the relationship’ (Dogra, 2015). Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006 indicated an ongoing rapprochement in relations between Asia’s two major powers. After several long years of tension, both emerging Asian superpowers continue to deepen their relationship in the economic and political arenas. However, a tinge of mutual suspicion still persists between the two fuelled by historical memory, a long common border, continued territorial disputes, potential competition for energy resources, military rivalry, and overlapping aspirations for regional influence (Mitchell & Chietigj Bajpaee, 2007: 151–168). During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit, India signed the Shared Vision on the 21st Century, attained a wide consensus on further pushing forward the Strategic Cooperative Partnership between the two nations in civil nuclear energy and essentially to combat climate change and develop energy security, and the two countries jointly agreed to promote the making of a harmonious world featured by endless peace and common prosperity. In 2008, bilateral trade exceeded $51 billion, with an increase of 34 per cent over 2007. Not only economic but security and defence exchanges became a focal point in Sino-Indian bilateral relations. The Chinese Navy Marshal visited India for the first time and the two nations held the second round of consultation on defence and security. In December 2008, China and India successfully conducted Join Hands-2008 in India, a joint army training exercise on combating terrorism. Bilateral cooperation in international and regional matters was further bolstered. China and India maintained close coordination on concerns such as climate change, the Doha Round talks, energy and food security, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. They worked together for constructive results at the financial summit of the G20 held in Washington in November 2008. In October 2013, the two countries signed a momentous border defence cooperation agreement, which is a move towards confidence building measures and lessening the trust deficit to guarantee rift-free frontiers. Taking a longer prospective, the two leaders have agreed to carry on with the boundary dialogue and negotiations which remained struck for a long period of time.

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 39 The new triangular relation between China, India, and the US is built due to various reasons. China shares a cordial relation with the US in the upcoming times as much for economic reasons as it is to avert the US-India partnership to contain China and also to contain India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. Beijing continues to provide aid and assistance to Pakistan because a weak Pakistan would enhance India’s supremacy in the region. India needs a better relationship with the US to contain China’s ambitions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. The US too needs India along with Australia and Japan to create a power arrangement that would counterbalance the sceptical ascent of Chinese predominance. At the moment, the following significant factors outline the national interests of both the nations: • • • •

Promotion of export-oriented trade Guard against terrorist attacks Domestic stability and prosperity Cooperation rather than confrontation in foreign relations. (Panda, 2003: 1–15)

Regional influence A deep anxiety has been conveyed over China’s rising influence and further advent as a player in the subcontinent. The signs have not only been seen in its upholding of a robust political and military relationship with India’s rival Pakistan, but also in its widespread political, economic, and security relationship with Burma; growing relations with Bangladesh and Nepal; and expansion in naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s entrance as an observer to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in November 2005, with New Delhi’s reluctant consent, has been cited as the indication for the want of India’s smaller neighbours to draw China into the region as leverage. India’s joint naval exercises in the South China Sea – with Vietnam in 2000 and so forth – have sparked concerns in Beijing. The Indian Navy, the world’s fifth largest, has also set up a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands to expand its presence in the Strait of Malacca and potentially counterbalance Chinese naval exercises in the region. Such an aggressive attitude could result in Chinese-Indian naval contention in and around the Indian Ocean over time.

40  Prerana Bhaduli Pakistan factor China’s persistent backing for Pakistan has long been a source of friction in China-India relations. The China-Pakistan relationship has been described as an ‘all-weather relationship’ by both states, with President Hu Jintao attaining hyperbolic heights when he described it as ‘higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean, and sweeter than honey’ during his November 2006 visit to Islamabad (Mitchell & Chietigj Bajpaee, 2007: 151–168). In April 2005, China and Pakistan signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourly Relations, which binds both signatories to cease from joining ‘any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side’. In this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan took place in April 2015 – postponed from September 2014 due to insecurity in Islamabad – and had yielded $46 billion in infrastructure projects in connectivity through Gilgit and Baltistan towards Gwadar and in the energy sector. Indeed, according to a latest report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China had become the largest arms supplier to Pakistan, accounting for more than 40 per cent of the Pakistani inventory. To top it, Pakistan currently had been toying with the plan of giving a contract to China for eight conventional submarines, in the largest ever arms purchase from Beijing. China had also already agreed to sell more than 110 JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter aircraft in addition to four frigates. These developments suggest that China intends to continue with its balancing approach in South Asia, irrespective of improvement in ties with New Delhi. There is also the nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad that India could hardly overlook. Chinese military aid to Pakistan has severe implications for India’s security. In current times, China’s engagement with Pakistan has been further driven by Beijing’s willingness to spread its influence into South and Central Asia in order to sustain a stable periphery; gain major access to markets, natural resources, and raw materials; and uphold amicable relations with the Islamic world to alleviate support and assistance for the Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang province. In recent times, however, China has embraced a more balanced approach toward its relationship with Pakistan and India, stimulated by Beijing’s wish to preserve amicable relations with all states along its periphery, its recognition of India’s growing economic and strategic ability, especially in the wake of improving US-India relations, growing concern over Pakistan’s future viability, and China’s shared concerns with India over Islamic

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 41 extremism and separatism. Beijing’s unwillingness to admit India to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) while supporting Pakistan’s bid, and its proposal to assist Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program following the culmination of the US-India nuclear deal, implies that China has not entirely forsaken its traditional loyalty to Pakistan (Mitchell & Chietigj Bajpaee, 2007: 151–168). US as a factor India is considerably closer to the US for ‘defending their shared values of democracy, freedom and pluralism’ and preserving its policy of broad-based engagement with the US specifically in view of the terrorist attacks. Mounting US-India military-to-military cooperation, most particularly in the Indian Ocean, has brought about Chinese suspicion as Beijing’s oil demand has increased over time which transits through the Indian backyard. China, moreover, revealed its disappointment over the March 2006 US-India civil nuclear agreement, which in content recognised India as a nuclear weapons state and granted India assistance for its civilian nuclear program in exchange for India’s assurance to open its civil nuclear facilities to international inspection and safeguards. In the end, India will preserve its strategic freedom to pursue a multi-layered approach combining both cooperation and competition with China in a way that serves its own unique political, economic, and security interests (Mitchell & Chietigj Bajpaee, 2007: 151–68). Indeed, India and China has lived close to each other throughout history, as different civilisations, with distinct identities and simultaneously as emerging world powers. Yet, our civilisational experience has also skilled us to resolve our differences through carefully balancing each other’s concerns and interests and through that procedure guaranteeing a peaceful strategic atmosphere in Asia and the world. The similarities between the two Asian giants’ outlooks, ambitions, policies, and interests are indeed striking, despite their differing political systems. Both desire a new international status that is proportionate with their size, strength, and potential. Both classify the current pattern of international relations with a world order designed to continue the global domination of Western powers. Both see Asia’s rise on the international stage as bringing about the termination of Western dominance. Though uncomfortable with the US dominance in global affairs, both are courting Washington to help balance their relationships with each other unless and until they are stout enough to do so on their own. Both resist the status quo: China in terms of territory,

42  Prerana Bhaduli power, and influence; India in terms of status, power, and influence. Both desire a truly multi-polar world that would offer them the space for growth and freedom of action that suits great powers. Both have practiced ‘tilted nonalignment’ – during the Cold War China tilted toward the US (1971–89) and India toward the USSR (1971–91) – while advocating independent, nonaligned foreign policies. Both compete for influence in Central, South, and South East Asia and for leadership positions in global and regional organisations. Each puts forward proposals for multilateral cooperation that consciously eliminates the other (Malik, 2009: 1146–1147). China and India also share noteworthy similarities in economic outlooks and policies. Both are concentrating on growing comprehensive national power on a concrete economic-technological base. Both are chief players for foreign investment, capital, trade, resources, and markets. Burgeoning economic ties between the world’s two fastestgrowing economies have become the most noticeable feature of their bilateral relationship. Both have started to act like normal neighbours – permitting trade and investment and promoting people-topeople contact. Bilateral trade flows are increasing rapidly (from a paltry $350 million in 1993 to $30 billion in 2007) and could cross $60 billion in 2009 and double again by 2015. Numerous joint ventures in power generation, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, IT, and telecommunication are in the pipeline. Each is striving for reintegrating its neighbourhood with its national economy (Malik, 2009: 1146–1147). Although each has its weak point – regional conflicts, poverty, and religious divisions for India; the contradiction between a capitalist economy and communist politics for China – both are afflicted with internal linguistic, ethno-religious, and politico-economic troubles that could lead to a major crisis if not managed properly. Relations under the Modi government India’s ‘Look East’ policy has placed special importance on the neighbouring countries. The concept of ‘connectivity’ is the key to the ‘neighbours first’ policy which has three strategic meanings: (1) bringing about deep connectivity with the North Eastern Region of India, which is landlocked and geographically isolated from the rest of the country; (2) building a mutually beneficial relationship with neighbouring countries, overcoming controversial matters such as distribution of water resources and transit, through cooperation in developing infrastructure and transport networks; and (3) checking and balancing

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 43 the growing influence of China (Izuyama, 2015: 171–196). During the three-day visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India beginning on 17 September 2014, agreements reached were put into practice. Prime Minister Modi violated normal protocol by receiving Xi at the Gujarat capital of Ahmedabad (The Hindu, 12 September 2016), where agreement was reached for China to construct two industrial parks (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 2014): one in the state focusing on the power sector, and the other in Maharashtra focusing on the automobile sector. The joint declaration was a promise of $20 billion worth of Chinese investment in India over a five-year period in industrial and infrastructural development projects (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 2014). Perhaps the figure of $100 billion was not reached since India did not agree to join the MSR or the AIIB initiatives, as India would aspire to wait for greater clarity on the economic as well as geostrategic implications of the two initiatives before deciding to join them. The joint declaration attempts to rectify the trade imbalance between the two countries, which is of a major concern to India. Modi himself celebrated the success of Xi’s visit to India by coining the catchphrase ‘Inch towards Miles’ (The Hindu, 17 September 2014), which represents an abbreviation of the phrases ‘India and China’ (InCh) towards a ‘Millennium of East Asian Strategic Review 2015 Exceptional Synergy’ (MilES). At the same time, however, Modi was firm about the border disputes. On 13 September 2014, just before Xi’s visit to India, some 300 to 800 soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) allegedly made an intrusion across the LAC in the Chumar Sector of Ladakh. Although a flag meeting was held four days later on 17 September by the troop commanders of both sides at the spot, China did not withdraw its forces back across the line. In reply, President Xi stated that he expected an immediate resolution of the border disputes, including the demarcation of the frontier, in a speech given the same day (The Hindu, 18 September 2014). The positive impetus gained in the previous years and the primacy of the development agenda of both the nations expects to reorganise the bilateral relations. Therefore, this visit was hoped to give a ‘directional change’ as far as the mutual relations were concerned. The political impetus in the bilateral relations made both India and China quickly reach out to one another after the new governments came to power in their respective capitals. India and China, along with Myanmar, celebrated the 60th anniversary of the signing of Panchsheel in the summer of 2014. Therefore, it is suitable to call this a highly anticipated visit. Xi Jinping’s personal communique of 17 September is perhaps

44  Prerana Bhaduli the first-ever attempt in pursuing China’s relations with a majoritarian country. The main focus was on China’s dedication of realising the dream of national progress; the opening of China’s markets to India’s IT and pharma sector; and Beijing’s expectations to push its new generation APC 1000 nuclear reactors. It also stated the development of the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road to increase trade and commerce in South East Asia and Indian Ocean nations as well as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor were fundamental and that no genuine Asian Century was possible without the development of China and India (Lamba, 2014: 1–3). Both sides agreed to diversify bilateral trade and economic cooperation and take ‘positive steps towards rebalancing the bilateral trade and address the structural imbalances’ (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 2014). The agreement also agreed to enlarge the scope of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) to include issues like clean energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, high-tech industry, and sustainable urbanisation. Both the sides further agreed to cooperate on up gradation of the Indian railways infrastructure in speed increase, heavy haul training and building up of a railway university in India (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 2014). One of the most vital consequences of the visit has been the agreement on initiation of a civil nuclear energy dialogue between India and China. India and China want to diversify their energy baskets to reduce dependence on coal, in order to pressure on the issue of climate change. India would perhaps look to learn from China’s adaptation and indigenisation of technologies as well as development of high potential reactors. Equally worth mentioning is the start of cooperation on the peaceful use of space. Mumbai and Shanghai also entered into a sister city relationship during this visit. China also agreed to open a new route through Nathu La Pass for the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. In addition, both sides agreed to expand cooperation on transborder rivers (Godbole, 2014: 140–145). The state visit of Prime Minister Modi on 14–16 May 2015 has led to a further signing of 26 business agreements/MoUs between the business leaders of the two countries. The total value of the agreements/ MoUs is more than USD 22 billion. These agreements span a broad range of industries including power infrastructure, renewable energy, steel, and small and medium enterprises. On the boundary question, the Joint Statement notes, ‘The two sides affirmed that an early settlement of the boundary question serves the basic interests of the two countries.’ It also emphasises the necessity

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 45 of a ‘political settlement’ of the boundary question in a ‘proactive manner’. Knowing that boundary is a key concern between India and China, there is certainly a requirement of intensifying the process of boundary settlement. Prime Minister Modi highlighted ‘the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realizing full potential of our partnership’ (Kumar, 2015). The visit sets a high level of economic partnership between the two countries. The prime minister said, ‘This industrial partnership of China and India can bring about greater investment, employment and satisfaction of our people.’ The large numbers of business agreements signed in Shanghai are an indication of the keen interest of Chinese companies to invest in India and contribute towards the ‘Make in India’ programme launched by the new government in India. However, there was no essential advancement on the matter of India’s huge (USD 40 billion) trade deficit with China. The issue of market access for India and removal of non-tariff barriers for Indian products, such as pharmaceuticals and IT, needs to be worked upon. It is recommended that India-China Joint Economic Group mechanisms should work for macro-economic coordination between the two countries (Kumar, 2015). In terms of concrete outcomes, 24 agreements/MoUs relating to varied areas of cooperation between diverse departments of the two governments were signed. They included establishment of consulategenerals at Chengdu and Chennai; an action plan for improving cooperation in the railway sector, space, in the field of education including vocational education and skill development; establishment of a State/ Provincial Leaders’ Forum, sister-state/province and sister-city relations, and India-China think-tank forum; and cooperation in the field of mining and mineral resources, science and technology, climate change, and disaster management (Kumar, 2015). The willingness to correct the trade imbalance, establishment of industrial parks, and cooperation in improving the railway infrastructure should work towards strengthening economic cooperation. In addition, initiation of cooperation on nuclear energy, dialogue, peaceful use of space and maritime cooperation should assist in strategic trust building to a greater extent. Strengthening and diversification of cooperation should help India-China relations in the long period of time. The territorial dispute must be discussed upon and reflected upon at length to evolve options for forward movement. With the much wanted comprehension and resolve to drive common concerns, the ‘MoXi’ dynamic can truly rebalance the India-China engagement towards greater stability and prosperity.

46  Prerana Bhaduli Assessing from the actions of the Modi government so far, the direction of India’s policy toward China can be summarised as follows. First, as far as the strengthening of economic relations and cooperation on international issues are concerned, the Modi government will follow its predecessor, while responding sensitively to any gap in the relative gains. For example, regarding the BRICS Development Bank (now known as the New Development Bank, or NDB), agreed to by the five countries participating in the BRICS Summit of July 2014, India took the position of revealing the mutual cause with China regarding the point of challenging the existing international financial order comprising of the IMF, the World Bank, and the like. At the same time, however, India joined Russia and Brazil in blocking China becoming the bank’s largest shareholder, leading to an agreement by which each of the five countries would contribute an equal share of the capital. Also, it is worthy to note that even though the joint declaration released during Xi Jinping’s Indian visit signified cooperation among the four countries of Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar within the framework of the BCIM Economic Corridor, not a single reference was made to any India ‘connectivity’ between China and India. Second, the Modi government is likely to make a solid and straightforward response to any intrusion across India’s borders. Specifically, it will make no compromise regarding the territorial dispute with China about the sovereignty of Arunachal Pradesh, which rose in 2008. In October 2014, Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh announced that 54 new border posts would be built for the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and that INR 1.75 billion would be allocated in the national budget for constructing infrastructure, such as roads, along the border in Arunachal Pradesh. Third, India is trying to neutralise China’s maritime progress by modernising its navy. Special attention has been paid to the steps taken by China in order to strengthen its relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. A noteworthy incident of growth being made in maritime cooperation in the backdrop of China’s advances is India’s relationship with Vietnam.

Conclusion The significance of the bilateral relationship cannot be overemphasised, as Prime Minister Modi stated, ‘Harmonious partnership between India and China is essential for economic development and political stability of Asia’ (Kumar, 2015). Despite dim forecasts about the inevitability of rivalry between China and India, cooperation between

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 47 Asia’s two evolving powers is possible. In recent times, strategic and diplomatic relations between China and India are overburdened with complications, tensions, and misgivings on both sides upon the historical legacies. Much of the mistrust originated from the legacy of the 1962 war between the two countries (Arif, 2013: 129–137). Since then, relations have been ambivalent, marked by a cold peace featuring diplomatic upheavals and moments of crisis. Though the internal and domestic forces of China have pushed it towards India, the external factors still continue to play a viable role in determining the future course of their relationship. The relations of the two Asian giants with the former superpowers US and Russia will have a decisive influence in determining their future relationship. India’s nuclear programme, the disputed borders, the direction of its future pursuit of strategic partnership with the US and Russia, the future of Tibet and Tibetan émigrés, and more presently India’s announcement to hold naval exercises in the South China Sea will determine the future course of the Sino-Indian relationship. For the foreseeable future, despite ever-increasing trade volumes, there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India. On almost all counts, the two Asian heavyweights clash or compete, and they are vulnerable to any deterioration in relations. Their burden of history, long bitter memories, deep-rooted prejudice, tensions over unresolved territorial disputes, and global competition for natural resources and markets add to mutual distrust and tensions. India-China ties will remain tenuous and as vulnerable as ever to sudden decline as an outcome of misperceptions, accidents, and eruption of unresolved issues. Simmering tensions over territory, overlapping spheres of influence, resource scarcity, and rival alliance relationships guarantee that relations between the two emerging Asian powers will be classified more by contention and rivalry than cooperation for a long time to come. Their attempts will be intended to consolidate their power and position while trying hard to settle more pressing internal problems. But instability in Tibet, coupled with China’s military links with Pakistan and Myanmar, will cause a continuing complication in Sino-Indian ties. Simultaneously, both will carry on to keep a check on each other’s activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region and will make an effort to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. India, like China, would prefer to avoid entangling alliances so as to maximise its options and freedom of action. While they are contenders for power and influence in Asia, China and India also have mutual interests in preserving regional stability

48  Prerana Bhaduli (for example, combating the growing Islamic fundamentalist sector), exploiting economic opportunities, upholding access to energy sources and markets, and enhancing regional cooperation. Cooperation could allow them to balance US influence and increase their bargaining positions with the sole superpower. On economic, environmental, and cultural matters, they may have far more cause to cooperate than to collide. Increasing tourism, trade, and commerce should ultimately raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. Continuing with historic animosities is not the best foundation for national policy. In the realpolitik world of the twenty-first century, we will need to carefully craft a balance between our concerns and interests and encourage a cooperative relationship. Cooperation is the only rationale that both can choose for their mutual benefit. The potentiality of the two nations to preserve long-term regional stability will depend on their capacity to manage competing strategic and economic interests.

References Arif, Mohammad Sheikh. 2013. ‘A History of Sino-Indian Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation’, International Journal of Political Science and Development, 1 (4): 129–137. Athwal, A. 2008. China – India Relations Contemporary Dynamics, New Delhi: Routledge. Banerjee, Dipankar, 2010. ‘India-China Relations: Negotiating a Balance’, IPCS Issue Brief, No. 160, December, at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125998/ IB160-Banerjee-India-China.pdf (March 18, 2016) Deepak, B. 2001. India – China Relations in the First Half of the 20th Century, New Delhi: A.P.H. Dogra, Rajesh. 2015. ‘The Changing Contours of India-China Relations’, World Focus, December, at http://www.worldfocus.in/articles/india-andchina-relations/the-changing-contours-of-india-china-relations/ (accessed 15 April 2016). Eekelen, W. V. 1967. Indian Foreign Policies and Border Dispute with China, The Hague: Martinus Nihoff. Gandhi, M. 1969. ‘Letter to Professor Tan Yun Shan, April 29, 1945’, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. W. 1996. ‘Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Garver, J.  Entente’, Political Science Quarterly, 111 (2): 323–325. Godbole, Avinash. 2014. ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to India: An Assessment’, CLAWS Journal: 140–145. The Hindu, ‘Modi Sets Own Protocol to Receive Xi in Ahmedabad’, September 12, 2016.

Revisiting Sino-Indian relations 49 The Hindu, ‘India, China Vow to Pursue Early Solution to Border Issue’, 18 September 2014. ‘India: The Foreign and Security Policy Under the Modi Government’, East Asian Strategic Review 2015: 171–196. Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 2014. ‘Joint Statement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership’, 19 September, at http://mea.gov.in/ SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/24014/Press+Statement+by+Prime+Minister+ during+the+visit+of+President+Xi+Jinping+of+China+in+New+Delhi++Sep tember+18+204 Izuyama, Mari. 2015. ‘India: The Foreign and Security Policy Under the Modi Government’, East Asian Strategic Review, Chapter 5. Jain, B. M. 2004. ‘India-China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends’, The Round Table, 93 (274): 253–269. Joint Statement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership, 19 September 2014, para. 6, at www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+ Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+ of+China+on+Building+a+Closer+Developmental+Partnership Kondapalli, Srikanth. 1999. ‘China’s Response to the Kargil Incident’, Strategic Analysis, 23 (6): 1039–1044. Kumar, Sanjeev. 2015. Significance of PM Modi’s Visit to China, Indian Council of World Affairs Viewpoint, 21 May, at www.icwa.in/pdfs/VP/2014/ pmvisittochina21052015.pdf Lamba, Arvinder. 2014. ‘India-China Relations: The “Mo-Xi” Dynamic’, Viewpoint, 1 (5): 1–3. Malik, Mohan J. 2009. India-China Relations, London: Berkshire Publishing Group. Malone, M. David, and Rohan Mukherjee. 2010. ‘India and China: Conflict and Cooperation’, Survival, 52 (1): 137–158. Mitchell, J. Derek, and Chietigj Bajpaee. 2007. China and India, Chapter 8: 151–168, at file:///C:/Users/Prerana/Downloads/090212_08china_ india.pdf Panda, Snehalata. 2003. ‘Sino Indian Relations in a New Perspective’, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, 27 (1): 1–15. Ramesh, J. 2005. Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India, New Delhi: India Research Press.

4 Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia An appraisal of problems and potentials for India Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker China’s leadership has actively engaged in South Asia for the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean from the perspectives of external trade, political, and cultural relations among many ancient nationalities. However, after India attained independence, China found it beneficial to establish relations with South Asian countries, particularly with the major player India. These relationships don’t last long, and after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, China focused on Pakistan against India, and furthermore such bilateral friendship had achieved the status of ‘all-weather friendship’. During the Cold War era, India’s tilt towards the USSR was viewed carefully by the Chinese leadership, which mostly focused on the maintenance of the status quo in the region. The post–Cold War changed the whole landscape, not only of the entire world but also of the South Asian region. China realised the importance of having economic and political ties with the area in which the US started influencing in military and political aspects. Accordingly, with India, the second most populous nation and one of the biggest economies of the world, China has realised the fact of finding vast markets for its finished products. On one hand, China has established strong ties with nearly all the South Asian countries, but on the contrary, Sino-Pakistani ambitions are viewed with much suspicion by the regional countries, particularly by India. Overall, Indo-Chinese relations are overladen with mistrust and distrust. Against this backdrop, the current leadership under Xi Jinping has come up with a new policy under which the region has achieved a significant position. The primary motive of Xi Jinping’s South Asia policy is undoubtedly economic, but the regional security has also figured as a vital segment. To realise these essential goals, the Chinese president has paid regular visits to the South Asian region and thereby laid stress on interconnectivity projects to achieve the dream of hassle-free trade and to ensure economic prosperity in the region. Undoubtedly,

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 51 in a similar manner, Xi Jinping also visited the geoeconomically and geopolitically viable country of India. Nevertheless, this visit proved distant from India’s prospects due to less investment and other unresolved crucial issues. Among the Sino-Indian economic giants, there exist multifaceted opportunities in political, economic, trade and commercial, security, and other areas. Nonetheless, these opportunities are accompanied by several challenges also, including continuing SinoIndian border disputes and China’s extreme preference to Pakistan, the long-standing rival of India.

India and China relations: cordial to conflict China, a close neighbouring country of India, shares ancient civilisational relations with India as recorded in several accessible literatures. The famous Han dynasty is credited with establishing flourishing bilateral contacts with India as evident from the fact that people in many provinces in China were wearing clothes brought from Sindhu (India) (Wang, 2012:13). It indicates that India and China were having trade and other commercial relations since the second century bc. Literature in the form of Qian Hanshu (early Han Annals) mentions that there was a sea route between the two nations through which trade of products like pearls, blue semi-precious stones, corals, and other related products was taking place (Yang, 2013: 82). Ban Gu, an author of Qian Hanshu, while writing on Kashmir (Jibin state) argues that bilateral trade existed during the fifth and sixth centuries ad through the sea route with the exchange of products that were in demand in the respective countries (Kumar, 2005). Therefore, the trade relations were accompanied by other cultural and social relations as well. The subsequent dynasties in China – specifically the Tang (618– 907), Song (960–1278), and Yuan (1279–1368) – were marked with the further advancement in bilateral trade relations with the exchange of sugar manufacturing technology, medicine, music, and dance from India; silk remained the main item from the Chinese side. Apart from commercial relations, religious believers, mainly the followers of Buddhist ideology, visited each other’s territories to spread the message of Buddhism (Lahiri, 1997: 267). Hence, the India-China bilateral ties in the ancient period were not only economic and commercially built but accompanied by the other geocultural aspects as well. Apart from the sea route, the famous trade of silk from China took place through the so-called Silk Route. China fought for its independence from the neighbouring state of Japan, which occupied China because of political instability that had

52  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker arisen out of civil war among the nationalists and the communists. In this context, the Chinese leader Sun Yat-Sen was in good contact with many influential freedom fighters of India like M. N. Roy, Barakatullah, Surinder Mohan Bose, Rash Behari, and Lala Lajpat Rai, which in turn assured all possible help for their sacred cause (Deepak, 2005). The success of mass movement against British rule led by Mohandas K. Gandhi became a role model for Chinese revolutionaries. The bonds of relationship were strengthened by the visit of Nehru to China in 1939, and further the mutual cause of freedom from suppression was rendered through support and sympathy among the people of China and India (Acharya, 2008). Nehru’s vision of the world brought the people from both sides closer to lay the foundation for the massive bilateral economic partnership. Therefore, the cooperation during the freedom struggle assisted both India and China to gain sovereign status in 1947 and 1949, respectively. After independence, India became the first country to recognise China, and thus established diplomatic ties through the exchange of higher official visits. The American perception of communism was not accepted by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed that Chinese nationalism is much stronger than communism. The Chinese armed conquest of Tibet in 1950 was not taken seriously by the Indian administration, for which Nehru faced heat from the opposition (Curtis, 2011). The landmark agreement was the signing of the Panchsheel in 1954 and through its various principles of peaceful coexistence resulted in sorting out all disputes and paving the way for economic cooperation. However, the success of the landmark agreement did not last long, as the last years of the 1950s witnessed several disputes, mainly the border dispute. The leadership of China was not in the mood to accept the McMahon Line as the final boundary line between the two countries. Instead China claimed the Aksai Chin as its territory. Hence, the border disputes ultimately led to the major Sino-Indian War in October 1962, in which India faced defeat accompanied by the loss of vast areas near the border (Panda, 2003). The war froze the bilateral relations for a long period, affecting the economic development in both South Asian countries.

Post-war era The 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted in deterioration of relations, and thus China moved closer to India’s rival Pakistan by supporting the republic in military and political fields. Moreover, India’s tilt towards the Soviet Union was also hated by China, and as a reaction against

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 53 this, substantial changes were made by the Chinese regime in its policy towards India. Nehru’s vision of a strengthening relationship with China was carried forward by the next prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi. It seemed that by the end of 1967, Indira Gandhi strove hard to normalise bilateral relations with Beijing, which became apparent through one of her discussions regarding China where she stated, China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us – carries an anti-Indian propaganda not only against the Indian Government but the whole of our democratic functioning and even our national integrity. But I would like to say that we do not harbour any evil intention towards the Chinese people, and we do hope that a day will come when they will also realise that it is in the interests of all the countries of South East Asia that we should be friends and that each country should be able to devote its strength to solving the very major problem of combating poverty and backwardness. (Arif, 2013: 129–137) The leadership of India was profoundly enthusiastic for the revival of relations with neighbouring China. This dream was dealt a severe blow with the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war for the liberation of East Pakistan, during which Pakistan had full military support from China. After the war of 1962, Sino-Indian relations remained sharp for nearly 14 years, and after the fall of the Indira Gandhi government, the mission was carried forward by the Janata Party led by Morarji Desai through sending the diplomatic mission to Beijing in 1979. After an extended period, Sino-Indian bilateral relationship received impetus with the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China, where he tried to forget the past and look forward to cooperation. Rajiv Gandhi was credited to putting new energy in the strained relations through his visit to China in 1988 (Guruswamy, 2009). In this way, from the Rajiv Gandhi era up to the period of India’s greatest achievement in the field of nuclear fission technology in 1998, some agreements were signed through the frequent visits by higher officials from both countries. Both the sides reached the conclusion of several agreements to reduce the long-standing border disputes to maintain a peaceful environment along the vast border area. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to China, a joint communiqué, Shared Vision for the 21st Century, was signed to fight against the adverse effects of climate change and to ensure energy security (Malone, 2010: 137–158). This visit opened new economic opportunities for both countries.

54  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker Bilateral trade has increased exponentially between them. In the year 2008, both sides conducted joint military training to combat terrorist activities in the region to maintain peace and stability. Through various ups and downs, Sino-Indian bilateral relations entered into a new era by opening the new gateway for enormous economic and political opportunities. Former Chinese Premier Hu Jintao considered this as the best period in the course of overall development. Chinese President Xi Jinping willingly adopted the ‘trilateralism’ covering China, India, and other vital countries from the South Asian region. On the other side, the foreign policy of Xi Jinping tries to focus on balancing Indian influence by providing full support to Pakistan. In fact, China under the new leadership of Xi Jinping seeks to create a balancing order around its vicinity that will be favourable to it (Ho, 2014).

Xi’s vision of South Asia The recent policy of China is aimed at the peaceful coexistence of all the South Asian countries. Focusing on the economic development of the region, Xi favours the reliable and hassle-free trade and ­commercial-related connectivity. Proposals like the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) along the Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea are to be established. China is enthusiastic to have maritime connectivity for trade facilitation, and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is considered to cover this aspect. These projects are going to provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean to move closer to South and Central Asia. Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) will facilitate the various infrastructure projects in China. Pakistan, a long-standing ally of China, is being provided economic, political, and military support to further various construction projects like roads, railways, pipelines, fibre-optic cables, power facilities, and economic development zones through the massive investment of USD 46 billion (Yoon, 2015: 40). China is the world’s most populous nation, and thus the energy demand is escalating. China is therefore aware of the fact that the balance in South Asia and better road connectivity is crucial to act as the transit route for various energy supply routes. Xi Jinping has therefore turned his focus towards economic achievements under a peaceful, stable, and balanced South Asia. Following his predecessors, Xi Jinping similarly showed much tilt towards Pakistan among all the South Asian countries. China considers

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 55 Pakistan as vital to put the check on India, as both are rivals and hence China is favoured to play a role of regional hegemony. Xi Jinping, while highlighting the importance of his economic policy towards South Asia, reiterated at Islamabad what he already mentioned during his visit to India: A peaceful, stable and prosperous South Asia conforms to China’s interests and that China is willing to align its development strategies with those of South Asian countries to achieve mutually beneficial development and common prosperity. New however has been Xi’s observations on the occasion that “the Chinese side is willing to, within the framework of SouthSouth cooperation, offer assistance and support to South Asian countries within its own capacity and that China-Pakistan economic corridor project will bring prosperity in all parts of Pakistan and the region, The Silk route project is a significant move on the part of China to fully open up.” (Rajan, 2015)

In 2013, China and Pakistan announced plans to construct an economic corridor to connect Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with the south-western Pakistani port of Gwadar. Together with the proposed BCIM Economic Corridor (BCIMEC), the CPEC extends to South Asia the broader trend of Asian regional economic integration through economic corridors. Another landmark primary initiative of Chinese recent foreign policy is the One Belt One Road (OBOR) plan. This initiative has five main objectives like policy coordination, facilities connectivity, investment and trade cooperation, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds (Nataraj & Sekhani, 2015: 67). As a result, the Sino-Indian trade partnership could be affected to a larger extent through China’s excessive inclusive support to Pakistan. Chinese military troops are also present in PoK, and New Delhi frequently raised the same issue and in this regard expressed its concerns with Beijing. Apart from Pakistan, the other South Asian countries also figure prominently in Xi Jinping’s South Asian policy. The ‘String of pearls’ for establishing bases all across South China sea to Sittwe in Myanmar and then across various other South Asian countries like Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka) to Gwadar (Pakistan) (Kabraji, 2012). Xi Jinping’s policy is also based on enhancing investment in the South Asian region by the extra focus on free trade agreements. During Jinping’s latest visit to Sri Lanka, 27 different agreements were signed to ensure economic prosperity.

56  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker China also has large-scale economic and infrastructure projects as well as deep ports in one of the weak economies, Bangladesh. China is also planning to build a road link that will connect Kunming in China to Chittagong in Bangladesh. Nepal, a close neighbour of China, finds the utmost importance in Xi Jinping’s foreign policy through largescale investment by China in Nepalese energy and transportation sectors including Pokhara Regional International Airport. These projects include a USD 1.6 billion hydropower plant and a USD 1.9 billion railroad project that will connect Lhasa and Kathmandu. Also, China has also initiated a large number of roads, container depots, major bridges, and other vital missions in the country (Brunjes, 2013). In fact, China is trying hard to make its position strong in all the South Asian countries. Perhaps obtaining the membership of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is perceived to accomplish Xi’s South Asia mission. Right now, China is an observer state of SAARC and has expressed its desire to obtain its full-fledged membership to emerge as the sole superpower in the region. Only India could challenge Chinese economic and political dominance in the region and therefore, regarding India, Jinping’s approach is somewhat different. As president of China, Xi Jinping visited India for the first time from 17–19 September 2014, just four months after historic electoral success by Narendra Modi. India had high expectations for Xi Jinping’s visit, but many scholars are of the belief that it fell short of such expectations (Lampton, 2014). On the one hand, Prime Minister Modi is keen to establish relations with all the neighbouring countries, and China figures at the top in this framework as recently it has emerged the largest trading partner of India. It was expected that Xi’s visit would bring over USD 100 billion in investment opportunities, but instead 16 agreements worth only USD 30 billion were signed. During Xi’s visit, intrusion by Chinese troops along the border region in Ladakh also affected the predictable outcome of the visit. So far as China’s insight regarding India is concerned, it holds both traditional and contemporary views. Traditionally, apart from several ups and downs, India and China have remained close regarding political and economic matters. However, the contemporary vision of the Chinese president towards India is based on the latter’s strategic reconciliation with the US, the prominence of the Indian Ocean to China’s economic and strategic interests, and India’s ‘Look East’ policy. Therefore, based on these two views, China’s dilemma is whether to consider India as a backward country or a possible rival (July, 2010). The Sino-Indian border tension, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama seem to be obstacles in soothing bilateral relations.

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 57 On the contrary, many scholars are of the conviction that India’s ineffective role as a big brother in the region compelled South Asian countries to look towards China, and China is taking advantage of the situation. Besides, China desires India to play a significant role in its Maritime Silk Route and other vital inter-connectivity projects in the region (Singh, 2014). Xi Jinping recognises the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of India, and therefore desired that the several initiatives taken by China to result in stability accompanied by economic affluence would be welcomed by India. Regarding the involvement of China in India’s neighbouring Nepal, Xi Jinping is of the belief that the country should act as a bridge between two economic giants of the region. Further, China’s policy shift was also seen when the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) agreed to extend full membership to India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is said that current trade volume among China and India will expand further and numerous options in other sectors would open their doors once the latter gains membership in a geostrategically significant forum: the SCO (Emmott, 2009).

Xi’s new vision of South Asia: Indian opportunities China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in the year 2010 and thus provoked concerns that it could surpass the US economy as well. China has been desperately useful in maintaining a remarkable growth rate and similar is the case with India that also witnessed rapid economic growth. As per the report of 2015 (Index of Economic Freedom), China has been ranked the 139th and the 30th freest economy at global and regional levels, respectively. As per 2013 data, China has an unemployment rate of 4.6 per cent, GDP (PPP) of $13.4 trillion, inflation (CPI) at 2.6 per cent, FDI inflow of $123.9 billion, and public debt at 22.4 per cent of GDP (Miller, 2015). China has been successful in sustaining its economic growth which stood at 7.7 per cent in 2013 and at present moves nearly at a similar pace (Morrison, 2014: 461–93). Regarding military power, China has the world’s largest standing military and also purchases weapons and military technology from Russia. In recent years, China has increased its defence budget by 10 per cent, worth $145 billion in 2015 as per National People’s Congress spokeswoman Fu Ying (Petroff, 2016). In fact, China’s versatile progress is a result of its inclusive long-term approach with globalisation as a catalyst to raise its power and stature. India consistently desires to have peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries, and hence the new regime under Modi invited heads of neighbouring countries during his swearing-in ceremony.

58  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker India has made a remarkable economic growth and has the potential to beat the China’s rapid economic growth. The overall GDP growth rate in the first half of 2014–15 is 5.5 per cent as compared to previous 4.9 per cent, and is predicted to be 8.5 per cent in 2015–16 (Economic Survey, 2015). The industrial sector witnessed rapid growth during the last couple of years, as has the hotel industry, tourism, steel manufacturing, and so forth. As per the Reserve Bank of India, the foreign exchange reserves touched a record of USD 330.2 billion for the week ending 6 February 2015 (Mohan & Kapur, 2015). The growing economy of the two major countries is opening a sea of opportunities. India can take an economic advantage through Xi Jinping’s vision of Shared Destiny through channelling funds from the AIIB, of which India is already a member. As Xi’s policy is aimed at ‘New Asian Order’ of which China is going to play the decisive role, and without cooperation from India, the dream cannot be achieved. As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year Book 2015, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, India ranks first among arms importer countries and China at third both regarding imports and exports of arms (Wezeman, 2015). Therefore, arms sales is a potential area where both can cooperate and also both possess large standing armies and do regular joint military exercises. Both nations are facing the menace of terrorism on their soil, and hence mutual strategies are required to curb such threat. Recently, the bilateral visits by some prominent officials distinctly indicated that the countries have devoted greater importance to bilateral relations. Both sides have also realised the fact that they cannot ignore each other to recognise their influence at the international level. The energy-rich Central Asian Republics (CARs) have captured the attention of India and China as both are starving for energy. Hence, the region which is rich in oil and natural gas could provide another platform to both nations for cooperation instead of rivalry. China along with the US and Russia is considered a significant player in the New Great Game through the large investment in many energy projects and this left little space for regional players including India. Therefore, India is considered a vital player by Xi Jinping in maintaining the Asian Order and also may ask for collaboration in new energy deals in Central Asia. China is not interested to see the robust Indo-US alignment in South Asia together with Asia Pacific region (Fu, 2010: 17–22). India possesses inordinate interests in the South China Sea, but China claims the whole region and thus the area has turned into a conflicting zone. Xi Jinping’s visit to Taiwan in 2015 is seen as a step in favour of India as China’s ambition is based on engaging India

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 59 to avoid Indo-US ties in the Asia Pacific region. China is enthusiastic to see the active participation of India in Xi’s OBOR since 2013. Therefore, the OBOR initiative could strengthen the Indian economy through increasing trade and investment opportunities. During summer 2014, India, China, and Myanmar celebrated the 60th anniversary of the most significant agreement: the Panchsheel. During the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and ­Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi impressed upon the Asian states to abandon the old security concepts and focused on cooperation among them to ensure their own security. The new Chinese leadership also envisioned Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) to boost the regional economies. During his latest visit to India, Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed about two dozen relevant agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU) (Kher, 2012). The most important agreements signed between India and China will open doors for the investment of USD 20 billion in the upcoming five-year period. Both sides also reached an agreement on this point to enhance the scope of Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) that will cover issues like clean energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, high-tech industry, and sustainable urbanisation (Nathan, 2015). The important agreement was signed to have cooperation in Indian railways to increase speed and heavy haul training and to establish a railway university in India. Another important outcome of Xi Jinping’s visit was the signing of the agreement on civil nuclear energy to share adaptation and indigenisation of technologies from China to establish large-capacity nuclear reactors to reduce dependence on thermal energy. Both China and India have agreed to conduct joint military exercises, as both parties have conducted numerous naval and military exercises in the past (Lu, 2016). These military cooperation agreements will help to reduce Sino-Indian border tension as well, since both have long-standing border disputes between them. Apart from the aforementioned contracts, Xi Jinping’s visit to India is considered by scholars as a vital step in enhancing inclusive opportunities in political, economic, and other critical sectors to provide the additional boost to their economies. Further, it is also suggested that both economic giants should peacefully resolve all their bilateral disputes to ensure peace and stability both at regional and global levels.

Challenges Among the various problems that India is facing from China, the border dispute figures at the top. It was the main cause of the Sino-Indian

60  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker War of 1962, and China still claims many Indian territories as its own. Even during Xi Jinping’s visit to India, there occurred a fresh incursion from the Chinese Army in the Ladakh sector along the Indo-Chinese border. This invasion left a shadow upon Xi Jinping’s visit where India was expecting an investment of USD 100 billion; instead China agreed to invest only USD 20 billion during the next five years. Therefore, Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia seems to pay not much attention to India’s ambitions and various concerns. The main focal point of Xi Jinping’s policy towards South Asia is revolving around Pakistan and other vital regional countries to maintain Asian Order. China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea where India possesses vital interests, and the picture is going to be more dangerous within the context of China’s new foreign policy. The prominence of the South China Sea (SCS) to India is vital so far as trade and other security related issues are concerned, and hence the Indian Navy has reached the Eastern Pacific region as well (Yahuda, 2013: 446–459). In contrast, China uses all its energies to block India’s passage to the economically viable East Asia and the Pacific. Regarding the maritime dispute, the attitude of India and China looks like that they are countering each other in the Indian Ocean Region. China has invested an enormous amount to the developed ports in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka that intensified the maritime border dispute with India. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region is perceiving a situation of balance of power between China and the US; India is acting as an ally of the latter, and hence the former tries to encircle India in South Asia and also to reduce its active influence in the Pacific Region as well (Gojree, 2013: 48–54). India has maintained a strong position on economic and political grounds, but Indian policy towards the region is trapped amid China’s realistic place and several attempts by the US to occupy the status of superpower in the region. The main motivating factor behind Xi Jinping’s South Asia policy is obviously economic. In this regard, China foresees India to be an active player in its various interconnectivity projects like OBOR, maritime and surface Silk Route plans and other vital corridors. Nonetheless, India has denied being a part of these projects on various grounds like lack of transparency and inclusiveness. Further, Sino-Pakistani cooperation under the banner of OBOR and China’s huge investment worth USD 46 billion for CPEC is worrying India (Jalil, 2008: 29–68). On the other hand, India-China trade has disclosed a bulging deficit of 34 per cent to USD 48 billion in the year 2014–15 as compared to USD 36.21 billion during 2013–14, with India’s exports to China

Xi Jinping’s vision of South Asia 61 standing at USD 11.95 billion and imports at USD 60.39 billion during 2014–15 (Farooqui, 2016: 117–128). The Chinese presence in disputed PoK further increases the SinoPakistani border dispute. China’s huge investment in the Gwadar port is also a major concern for India, as it will not only reduce India’s influence in the Indian Ocean but also will challenge India’s sovereignty through linking Gwadar with China passing through the PoK. Many scholars also consider the port as a part of China’s String of Pearls, of which the primary motive is to curtail India (Hamid & Hameed, 2016). Therefore, we can say that India has not found its right place in the new policy of Xi Jinping towards South Asia. India is one of the dominant countries in the region and is also becoming more influential at the global level, hence any development initiative in South Asia would have a significant bearing on her effective role. In the post–Cold War period, India’s inclination towards the US is not appreciated by the Chinese policy makers, and in this regard the Indo-US civil nuclear deal was also viewed with much suspicion from China. Further, China is still following the policy of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ by considering Pakistan as an all-weather friend, since the latter is the longstanding enemy of India. Therefore, China’s increasing investment in Pakistan is not going to be in favour of the Sino-Indian friendship, and if Xi Jinping really tries to bring the Asian Order, India should then figure at a substantial position in China’s new vision of South Asia.

Conclusion At the last, it can be concluded that China under the new leadership of Xi Jinping is following the similar track of his predecessors. The economic motive has remained the focal point of China’s foreign policy since antiquity, and hence it is the main reason that its economy is growing in a workable and constant manner. The foreign policy of the current Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping appears to emphasise the South Asian region by interlinking the whole region through various maritime and vital regional surface corridors. However, this regional connectivity is in favour of China to achieve the required natural resources and also to act as necessary transit routes. Moreover, to exploit economic opportunities in India, China has been following a unique South Asian policy. The Chinese leadership is well aware of the fact of the importance of India in South Asian matters, and therefore Xi Jinping’s recent visit to India initiated a new beginning in resolving the undecided bilateral disputes to start multilateral cooperation. Xi

62  Bawa Singh and Parvaiz Ahmad Thoker Jinping has shown his keen interest in having a decisive role in South Asia. On the one hand, it is engaging India in economic terms while keeping the bilateral issues at bay. On the other hand, it is supporting Pakistan in a multifaceted fashion to preoccupy India in the region to create its preponderance. At any rate, it is complementary to each other, as Chinese policy not only opens the sea of opportunities but also several challenges as well.

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5 Assessing the comparative political economy of India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP Tilak Jha

Three decades of relentless growth has pushed China to a position (Xinhua, 2014) where it is able to lend billions of dollars to bail out an economy of the size of the eurozone (Casarini, 2012), and also in a way the US, out of continuing financial crisis and slowdown (Moore, 2008). China has moved fast to capitalise over its new-found confidence after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and its economic weight in getting its share of say on issues relating from Iraq to Syria and from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. China’s booming military budget and marches in critical technology like space and defence further announce its arrival to the world. Despite all this, China’s contribution and decisive power in global institutions of governance remains overshadowed by the US-led Western world. Somehow, the key to this remains in the post–Bretton Woods international economic institutions (Bretton Woods System, 1999). This has resulted in China exhibiting an ambitious agenda to build parallels of the US-dominated financial institutions (Heilmann et al., 2014) to increase its leverage in the global arena and conscious efforts to establish the renminbi (RMB) as a global currency (The Economist Online, 2014). It is in these respects that the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) – aimed at creating one of the biggest free trade areas of the world – needs to be assessed. India, on the other hand, is yet to put its house in order. Compared to China, which was similar to it in most socio-economic parameters until about 30 years ago (Srinivasan, 2004), India has for decades seriously faltered on critical linkages that take an economy to a higher path of growth (OECD, 2013). Infrastructure bottlenecks, power scarcity, basic governance issues, lack of sufficient economic reforms, and political issues have left India’s opening up a half success (Ribeiro, 2007). Militarily, successive governments have failed to move towards self-reliance in defence productions, and economically reforms have mostly received an insufficient level of political push. Nevertheless,

66  Tilak Jha being an economy with a huge demographic dividend and many other potentials, India continues to grow (Khambatta, 2013). However, it was never going to be enough with China’s giant economic-military strides touching its shores from the Himalayas in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south. Still, even amid these otherwise underwhelming circumstances over the years, the big additions have been India’s growing soft power on the back of Bollywood movies and technological revolution in Bangalore, not to ignore the increasing maturity of West-like institutions, primarily courts, elections, right to information, civic society, and the rule of law, among others. With a new momentum under the Modi government on reinvigorating the Indian economy as a manufacturing destination, India still remains in the race to the top (Hassan, 2016). The following discussion is primarily divided in three sections. The first two dwell on polity-economy and specific issues relating to India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP. The last section analyses their joint stakes in it all and their potential with respect to global institutions and associations, before concluding the findings.

India: polity-economy – winds of change Despite a credible and respected electoral tradition and the government playing a strong role in matters of state, overall India remains not a strong state – all the least when it comes to committing itself towards long-term social, political, and economic goals (Tripathi, 2007). It is particularly chronic when it comes to defence and foreign policy. The problem has been compounded due to the absence of a unanimous coordinated policy framework and of strong commitment towards nation building (Chandler, 2013: 4). The gap is partially addressed whenever top leadership of the country has been in real command, though leadership alone cannot be a substitute for an all-round failure of polity that survives on politics of subsidy and victimhood (Victor, 2009). For too long Indians chose to remain caught in trying to evenly distribute scarcely available opportunities on the basis of caste, region, and religion. That was never going to happen with an ever-widening mismatch between demand and supply. Economically India had to force open itself in the 1990s after more than four decades of rather futile socialist non-aligned policies. As if that was not enough, except largely occasional successes, India had far but few active and consistent directions either in domestic or in international matters until recently. Being a big country, India’s weight on the global platform continues to grow, but that is never going to be worth the world’s largest democracy and a geopolitical player (Efstathopoulos, 2016: 239–259).

India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP 67 That situation started changing towards the end of the twentieth century, with economic reforms raising GDP growth out of the precarious Hindu rate of growth until the 1980s (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004) and India going nuclear in 1998. The economy soon picked up, and India got the historic exception from the tightly controlled Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2005 after signing the historic Indo-US nuclear deal. India achieved little more from the deal other than getting it inked because of a nuclear liability bill which soon followed under domestic pressures from the left constituents of the then central government (Sundarama, 2016). Similar trends were reflected in other matters of economy and polity, and changes can only come slowly in the Indian system. Still, incremental progress has been registered in opening up insurance, banking, defence, and retail sectors, among others, liberalising labour laws, freeing up oil and gas prices from APM (Administered Price Mechanism) to protect the domestic market from a sharp rise in the international market leading to huge subsidy bill, and generating consensus on tax and administrative reforms (Srivastava, 2015). The famed labyrinthine pace of Indian bureaucracy and poor law and order continues to play the spoilsport, although things are improving dramatically under the new central government (Rana, 2012). The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Narendra Modi heralded a new era in Indian polity in May 2014 by becoming the first and the only non-Congress party to win a majority of seats in the Indian Parliament on its own. This remarkable shift came after nearly three decades of alliance politics that would be best known for compromises and compulsions of a kind that left critical policy decisions at the mercy of small, regional, and feudal parties. Within months of assuming office, Modi government has generated unparalleled energy and enthusiasm for India among Indians and others all across the world. From sanitation to security and from the ‘Make in India’ campaign to the policy of ‘India First’, Modi is probably the first Indian prime minister who is clearly articulating and implementing the right set of policies both on the domestic and the international fronts. In China, Modi is possibly the best-known Indian after Aamir Khan. Modi has an honourable legacy to retain and build upon, as India has a respectable identity on every global platform today.

India: ‘ACT East’ No defence and foreign policy can succeed without sufficient economic power. Nor should economic power be a substitute for military power (Baldwin, 2000: 172). That stands even truer for a country that had to

68  Tilak Jha get into nearly five wars in less than seven decades of its existence despite a tradition of peace and tolerance. In any case, both China and Pakistan chose to wage wars against India more for ideological than territorial gains. Economic rationality in the form of enhanced trade and connectivity will not alone deter these two to desist from ‘psychological war and creeping annexation tactic[s]’ in the near future (Virmani, 2014). The context of South Asia has become increasingly complex due to the de facto negative role played by China with enough support from Pakistan (Scott, 2008), so much so that India cannot extract a proper free trade agreement out of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In the last concluded SAARC meeting in Nepal, regional power, tourism, and connectivity-related agreements that are critical for the prosperity of the entire subcontinent were almost scuttled by Pakistan even as it was being persuaded to do so by all other SAARC members. Pakistan, meanwhile, actively lent its voice to get China an enhanced role in the regional association (Ghimire & Roy, 2014). Pakistan recently opted out of the broadly welcomed proposal of SAARC satellite projects. The fact remains, however, that India itself cannot be absolved of its failure to enhance its participation in nearly every other regional association (Bhashin, 2016). A classic case of this is India’s ‘Look East Policy’ which is yet to see a proper road being built across Myanmar – India’s doorway to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is all the more shocking given that the kind of political resistance from Pakistan in SAARC or in India’s objective to connect to Afghanistan, Central Asia, or Iran is completely absent in this entire region. Rather, many countries like Singapore have been actively advocating a far greater role for India than it had been willing to play (Brewster, 2009: 608). It has been nearly 25 years since India earmarked the need to engage with South East Asian countries to develop its landlocked north-east and its overall prospects with one of the most successful regional communities. For such an important project, all but 40 insignificant dutyfree items travel along the badly built World War II–era road from the Indian state of Manipur’s capital Imphal to Myanmar’s Moreh (The Economist Online, 2014). In between came the rechristening of the ‘Look East Policy’ to ‘Act East Policy’ by Prime Minister Modi during his visit to the ASEAN summit in Myanmar on 12–13 November, signalling the new dynamism regarding the region in Indian priority. The policy to ‘Act’ was well articulated by the title of a newspaper story regarding the long overdue physical connectivity project (Sasi, 2014): ‘Trilateral Highway

India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP 69 Gets Modi Push.’ Come 2016 and India’s north-eastern states might be entering a golden era of lasting growth with the completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Project and the India-MyanmarThailand trilateral highway. Indeed, India’s ‘Act East’ policy goes far beyond its north-eastern neighbours until Japan, Vietnam, and even Australia, among others – all countries with whom Modi’s immediate predecessor government chose to maintain a subdued relationship not to touch self-presumed Chinese sensitivities (Raja Mohan, 2014). Modi, however, has sought to set the record straight with a whirlwind tour of Japan and Australia that generated much political, economic, strategic, and social capital as well. Since his ascendancy to India’s most powerful office, his government has sent warships to the Philippines, renewed the state-run oil giant ONGC’s (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) rights for two South China Sea oil blocks off Vietnam’s coast contested by China, and extended a line of credit for Vietnam to repair military aircraft and buy patrol boats from India (The Economist Online, 2014). Over the last decade, amid China’s growing clamour for influence and maritime territory across the South China Sea, India and South East Asian countries have consciously upgraded their economic ties to the military and the strategic (Godbole, 2015: 240). That the new dispensation has been able to inject strategic vigour in India’s East Asian policy remains beyond doubt. By a long overdue visit to Australia, the Modi government has clearly underlined its sight over the South Pacific. Ultimately, with the invitation to the US president to be the chief guest on Indian Republic Day – the first ever – within a very short time this government has left a countable mark upon India’s maritime strategy towards playing a larger role in the very near future under ‘Act East’. It has got a further edge by the recent signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US. The hard-headed pragmatism shown by the Modi government despite differences with the US regarding its Pakistan policy among others can only further strengthen Indo-US mutual leverages (Raja Mohan, 2016).

China’s polity-economy – towards the rule of law and enhanced role for market China has an enviable track record of developing a strong economic relationship independent of its security relationship. A good example is the Sino-US relationship; especially since the historic rapprochement between the two in 1972, Sino-US goods and services trade alone has reached nearly USD 600 billion (United States Census Bureau, 2016).

70  Tilak Jha Doing away with the political hiccups over the bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy in 1999 and the EP-3 incident in 2001, China soon grabbed the opportunity to improve ties with the US after 11 September 2001. Similarly, with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and India – all countries China continues to have serious territorial and historical issues with – trade has witnessed a quantum leap over the years (Sato, 2013). As well, the rise of China as a global manufacturing hub has been a phenomenon. As William A. Joseph writes, ‘China has become a quintessential “trading state”, whose international commerce has dramatically increased its national power.’ Today, China is a leading trade partner of more than 120 countries (Joseph, 2014: 276). A one-party system, a strong party-state, and stable leadership have brought great prosperity to the Chinese nation even as sociopolitical opening up falters behind its economic counterpart (Callick & Rowan, 2007). Successive leaders have deepened the Chinese imprint on the global geopolitical map on the back of a burgeoning economy and huge improvement on socio-economic parameters. That China has substantial trade with every next country has only helped them further despite all the negative coverage by the Western media. A big factor in China’s rise has been the huge stress on improving physical connectivity and other infrastructure bottlenecks – a factor that puts severe constraints on the growth of the Indian economy. China today is the world’s largest spender on infrastructure and has built the world’s longest network of expressways and high-speed railways that has hugely enhanced the mobility of the Chinese economy (Zhai, 2012: 84). Over the past two decades or so, China has spent an average of 8.5 per cent of its GDP on infrastructure of all sorts (McKinsey & Company Report, 2016). The economic might that China has today on the back of three decades of unassailable economic momentum was unimaginable as recently as until the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. But what proved to be a crisis for most of the world including India was used by China as a political opportunity to arrive on the world stage. While India kept struggling for economic growth and greater say in global institutions, China continued to clock strong growth with strong stimulus from the state and seized one initiative after another (Kupchan, 2012; Hardy & Budd, 2012). The assuming office of the powerful presidency of Xi Jinping and talks of ‘China Dream’ spilling over into the China’s increased rhetoric over the South and East China Sea disputes has soured the goodwill that China built over the years following Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s remarkable strategy was ‘Coolly observe, calmly deal with things,

India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP 71 hold your position, hide your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible.’ The successive leadership called China’s resurgent momentum to be of peaceful rise (heping jueqi) and was further watered down during Hu Jintao’s tenure as ‘harmonious world’ (The Economist Online, 2010; Chang, 2013: 7). Xi began his tenure on an assertive note for the outside world, although domestically the effort was to present a soft and humane image strengthened further by his famous singer wife Peng Liyuan. During the first Third Plenum after he assumed presidency, Xi along with his economist Prime Minister Li Keqiang went the extra mile to signal an enhanced role for market-led and innovation-led growth. The Plenum also announced steps like boosting social security measures to fuel consumption and lead China to a sustainable growth momentum. After more than a year of dealing with both corrupt tigers and flies, during the just concluded fourth plenary session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, rule of law has been the catchphrase. China today is more assured about its strength than any time since its 1894 defeat at the hands of the Japanese. However, as Xi pushes internal party reforms and unsettles vested interests, his job in all likelihood poses one of the most difficult challenges for the CPC. Nonetheless, by ensuring the prosecution of someone like former internal security chief Zhou Yongkang, Xi’s leadership has clearly underscored that the fight against corruption is not for media consumption. His success is critical for China to achieve the next stage of socio-politico-economic reforms and a more engaged global role (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012: 3).

China: FTAAP – towards a China-led world order? After waiting for more than two decades to acquire its rightful place on the United Nations Security Council, which was earlier represented by Taiwan (Republic of China) due to the US, few countries would know what it takes to have real power. Four and a half decades since, China is acutely aware of the leverage that the US enjoys in global decision making. An unparalleled economic, technological, and military dominance; decades-old strong alliances; overwhelming soft power; and historical factors all contribute towards the hegemony that US enjoys today in a global system that was effectively created under its watch. For China, even after being the world’s second foremost economy, the journey is far from complete. In any case, China – or for that matter, no other country – will ever have the kind of domination that the US had for much of the twentieth century, for the simple

72  Tilak Jha fact that the world is never going to be so economically or militarily unilateral or bipolar as a multitude of countries now have deterrent capacity. As it appears now, in the near future China has the option to go on creating political-economical embankments to secure a voice for itself in the existing system. Amid such a context, the Beijing AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit provided the Middle Kingdom a window to re-emerge by claiming leadership of FTAAP. That the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) remains stalled gave further opportunities for the Chinese to go aggressively on FTAAP and testing American ambivalence and declining effectiveness as on other issues including security (Glaser, 2013). The political economy of trade agreements especially in the case of aspiring economies like China can rarely be about trade alone, even though trade negotiations have increasingly come to be shielded from political compulsions. In any case, according to liberalists, trade and strong economic ties have a direct and critical role in lowering political tensions (Copeland, 1996; Polacheck, 1980). Chinese objectives as well, via a series of banking, trade, and infrastructure projects announced in recent years, go deep beyond ushering in economic prosperity alone. China has been following this agenda for decades and has been relentless in its advocacy of a new world order in which it occupies a pole position unconstrained by the current West-dominated global institutions. FTAAP is also a logical extension following China’s successes with ASEAN. After being shaken by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN has emerged as a formidable economic force, although many of its member states are caught between China and the US over the South China Sea issues. Nonetheless, for China FTAAP is an important feat, as it comes on the back of a host of banking mechanisms parallel to the World Bank and the IMF, and physical connectivity projects especially the Silk Road and One Belt One Road initiatives. China is in a leading role in two new banks, namely the BRICS bank (now called the New Development Bank or NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The NDB has an equal share from all the member countries of USD 10 billion each. However, in AIIB, China has provided initial capital of USD 50 billion. These two banks will help fund critical infrastructure projects in Asia and beyond, and will ramp up both China’s hard and soft power. On the connectivity front, China has come up with a series of ambitious projects to trump up nearly every other initiative. They include the Silk Road Economic Belt, the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road, Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridors (THECs), BCIM Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through

India’s Act East and China’s FTAAP 73 Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and the recently conceptualised China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor. It has already announced a USD 40 billion Silk Road Fund to support breaking the ‘bottleneck in Asian connectivity’. The aforementioned projects hold great promise not only for Chinese influence but also for the rest of Asia and beyond, as they will provide many countries alternative routes to fund and support their development initiatives.

India and China: paths and potentials India is one of China’s major trade partners, and was the 11th largest in 2004 (Acharya, 2014). However, little benefit of the booming business ties appears to have spilled over in the domain of their strategic trust towards each other. The border remains ‘peaceful’, although cases of ‘different perceptions’ leading to ‘peaceful’ confrontations are too well known to be ignored, so much so that in recent years Chinese leaders appear to have developed a taste of harping over Indian sensitivities, including letting the PLA push along the unmarked Line of Actual Control (LAC) every time they have to visit New Delhi (Ranade & Jayadeva, 2014). Despite serious efforts to keep trade away from politics, their mutual geopolitical ambitions and willingness to let border conflicts persist has curbed the potential India and China possess to benefit from each other in the realm of trade, geopolitics, and beyond. The India-China political-economic ties remain stuck in a time warp after registering initial success towards the turn of the current century (Press Trust of India, 2014). India is the world’s largest democracy and has a long history of non-interference and tolerance. For much of the period since its independence, India maintained a foreign policy of non-alignment. India’s appeal to the West, its familiarity with the English language, and its track record of non-militarism positions it well to touch many hearts and minds. Not surprisingly, India’s Bollywood has a niche identity of its own after Hollywood, and India is on course to emerge as the software hub of the world. If we take the case of ASEAN or East Asia, India enjoys high credibility there, although the potential remains unrealised more because of India’s own reluctance and the attractiveness of China’s ability to deliver (Raja Mohan, 2013: 8). Chinese President Xi Jinping yet had enough reasons to invite Prime Minister Modi to attend the APEC summit meeting in Beijing in November 2014 during their meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. He also invited India to be a founding member of the AIIB and to play a greater role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). That the Chinese want India on board is only more logical

74  Tilak Jha since India happens to be ‘within its broader geo-strategic plans’ (Panda, 2014). The lure of India is also natural as it is the world’s second-­fastest growing economy and third largest in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), offering a big market for Chinese products and investments. As a country welcomed by both ASEAN and the US, India’s deepening engagement with ASEAN, and the possibility of being a party to the upcoming Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) only add to the charm of India that looks poised to gain further momentum under the new leadership. In the end, while China has clearly arrived on the world stage and is making giant strides, India is yet to get its basics right. India’s ‘Act East’ is promising, but it is too early to call it a success. Under Xi Jinping, China is poised to become world’s top economy. However, before China can claim to be a global power, it has to keep building on its FTAAP initiative momentum.

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6 The internal situation in China and its impact on China’s foreign policy An analysis Tenzin Tsultrim The current perception of China’s international relations, which was decided by a very centralised and cloistered elite in Beijing, is no longer valid as it used to be, as the number of actors who participated in the formation of the country’s foreign policy had grown within the Chinese government as well as outside it (Lanteigne, 2009: 19). China’s domestic politics and its foreign policy have been effectively influenced in recent years by the people’s political demands in the form of changing of political culture and new forms of political participation, namely demonstrations and passive resistance (Quansheng, 1992: 162). The history of China is replete with periods where people played a great role in the political events in the course of time. From the Taiping Rebellion to the Boxer Rebellion, from the May Fourth Movement to the Tiananmen Square Movement, whenever the common people stood up against the Chinese empire, the Chinese government reminded them of their true duties to the people and the country. There are many events in China which influenced its foreign policy with its neighbouring countries. After the establishment of the PRC, under the leadership of Mao, China began a five-year plan. After the failure of the first five-year plan, the second five-year plan under the name of ‘Great Leap Forward’, launched in 1958, was vigorously pushed forward, resulting in millions of deaths due to starvation and other reasons. It was a campaign to dramatically accelerate China’s economic development. It was based on Mao’s firm belief that human will power and effort could overcome all obstacles. However, from 1959 to 1961, China experienced an economic depression. Even present Chinese scholars agree that the famine during the Great Leap Forward caused tens of millions of deaths. Chang and Halliday, co-authors of the critically acclaimed book Mao – The Unknown Story, argued that during this period roughly half of 30 million Chinese died. An official estimate by Hu Yaobang in 1980 put the death

The internal situation in China 79 toll at 20 million (Schram, accessed on 17 July 2016). Historian Stuart Schram validated Chang and Halliday’s figure to 37.67 million. Hence the people’s reaction against the government about the failure of the Great Leap Forward began to grow. The Chinese felt that an attempt to divert popular attention from the difficulties at home would be useful. Since India had quite a bit of political clout and was popularly believed to be reasonably strong militarily, such an adventure would be a worthwhile diversion (Tsultrim, 2010: 45). The existence of diversionary theory in international relations also states that leaders who are threatened by domestic turmoil occasionally initiate an international conflict in order to shift the nation’s attention away from internal troubles. In other words, it shows that domestic turmoil in the country can have its strong influences on the foreign policies of China.

The architect of China’s foreign policy, Mao Zedong: a weak economy generated a weaker foreign policy under Mao Economic conditions are another domestic factor that could affect foreign policy. For example, China’s foreign debt increased from zero in 1979 to $16 billion in 1985, $40 billion in 1988, and more than $50 billion in 1990 (Kim, 1990: 248). Such a development may give conservatives sufficient leverage to alter China’s international borrowing policy substantially and thus dramatically slow the pace of China’s integration into the world capitalist market (Quansheng, 1992: 173). Since China lacked the capital and technology to build many large industrial plants, the government appealed to the people to build small factories in the countryside. These rural factories were not well planned, however, and goods they made were often of poor quality. The production goals of the Great Leap Forward could not be met (Perry et al., 1992: 736). After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese economy was in great disorder. More than 30 million people had lost their lives. Like India, the fate of China was mainly decided and determined by Mao Zedong, who was an indispensable leader of China, and for a long time China’s foreign policies were determined only by him. The first two paramount leaders of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, had consolidated power to the point where they were central to much decision making in both domestic and international relations policy (Lanteigne, 2009: 19). On the one hand, the era of a single leader dominating the foreign policy decisions was over; instead most decisions on the international level must be made through ministerial and bureaucratic consultation.

80  Tenzin Tsultrim Further, non-governmental actors, including businesses, NGOs, and lobby groups, have been transformed from irrelevant actors to stronger players in Chinese foreign policy (Lanteigne, 2009: 24). From 1978 to 1985, for example, there were long-lasting debates about Soviet socialism among think tanks (Central for International Studies and the Institute of Contemporary International Relations), as well as intellectuals and government bureaucrats. These debates fostered the internal preparations necessary for Beijing to normalise its relations with Moscow by the end of the 1980s (Quansheng, 1992: 171). After the debacle of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese economy was completely in bad shape. Tons of food grains were imported from other countries because of the failure of crops. In the 27 years under Maoist rule (1949–76), China’s doors were closed to the outside world, especially the West. Hence China was more interested in strengthening its economy than trying to meddle or interfere in other countries’ affairs. Because of this, for a few decades China entered into self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world in strengthening its economy as well its political structures. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China received lots of aid from the Soviet Union in different fields. However, their relations were later strained, and help from the Soviet Union was automatically stopped. This put further pressure on China, as China needed the help of a developed country to acquaint them to the know-how of new science and technology for the development of Chinese economy. Table 6.1 shows the increase in output of main farm produce (unit = 10,000 tons). There was a remarkable growth from 1949 to 1978 in all of the farm produce. For instance, there was a threefold growth in grain as Table 6.1 Increase in output of main farm produce Variety

1949

1978

2000

2001

Grain Cotton Oil-bearing crops Sugarcane Beets Cured tobacco Tea Fruit Meat Aquatic products

11,318 44.4 256.4 264.2 19.1 4.3 4.1 120.0 220.0 45

30,477 216.7 521.8 2,111.6 270.2 105.2 26.8 657.0 856.3 465.4

46,218 441.8 2,954.8 6,628 807 223.8 68.3 6,225.1 6,124.6 4,278.5

45,262 532.0 2,872.0 7,700.0 1,090.0 204.0 69.0 6,536.0 6,340.0 4,375.0

Source: Sreemati Chakrabarti, China (National Book Trust: New Delhi, 2007), p. 158.

The internal situation in China 81 compared to 1949. Among all the products, the production of sugarcane witnessed a phenomenal growth rate. Thus for many years, China was fully concentrating on the development and the growth of its weak economy. In fact, alleviating widespread and deep poverty, promoting economic development and industrialisation, and strengthening internal national unification were the primary concerns of the leaders of both India and China (Garver, 2001: 4–5). During that period, both countries were involved in the development and strengthening of their economies. Hence, due to the weak economy, China decided to remain isolated from the rest of the world, and it also didn’t have any diplomatic relationships with any countries other than a few communist countries. Thus, because of the weak economy, China was not confident enough to have a say in international affairs, and this also led to a weaker foreign policy. Following the start of the economic reforms of the late 1970s, and especially after joining the World Trade Organization at the turn of the century, China’s effect on the global economy has been staggering, and both scholars and economists have noted the increasing percentage of global trade coming from the country and its increasing stockpiles of foreign exchange and gradual development of Chinese brands for sale internationally (Lanteigne, 2009: 39). After its economic development, China slowly began to act on its foreign policy and started having diplomatic relations with other nations. Opening to the outside world has greatly promoted the development of China’s foreign trade. Between 1979 and 1999, China’s foreign trade volume increased by 15.3 per cent annually (Ni, 2015: 349). In 2000, the three targets directly related to import and export trade all exceeded the USD 200 billion mark for the first time (Chakrabarti, 2007: 178). Hence, with the development of its economy China began to have relations with the rest of the world and began to have a say in international politics.

Cultural Revolution under Mao and its impact on China’s foreign policy By the mid-1960s, the Communists had broken with many Chinese traditions, expanding education and women’s rights and giving higher status to workers and peasants. Mao feared that the original spirit of the revolution was being lost. In 1966, he launched the Cultural Revolution to purge China of ‘The Four Olds’: old thoughts, old culture, old customs, and old habits (Perry et al., 1992: 737). For many, the Cultural Revolution was the year of struggle and oppression where millions of Chinese were sent to labour camps and those higher officials

82  Tenzin Tsultrim who were against Mao’s ideology were also made to suffer greatly. Jung Chang mentioned in her semi-autobiography that at that time, no one had any idea that the cult of Mao and the emphasis on class struggle were part of Mao’s plans for a showdown with the president, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, the general secretary of the party. Mao was unhappy about what Liu and Deng were doing. Since the famine they had been liberalising both the economy and the society. To Mao, their approach smacked of capitalism rather than socialism. Hence it was argued that Mao’s control over the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people was decreasing. In order to reclaim and strengthen his legitimacy over China, he launched the Cultural Revolution. Optimistic individuals played a disproportionate role in shaping the lives of people. Their decisions made a difference; they were inventors, entrepreneurs, and political and military leaders – not average people. They were prepared for seeking challenges and taking risks, their experience of success having confirmed their faith in their judgement and in their ability to control events. Their selfconfidence is reinforced by the admiration of others. This reasoning leads to a hypothesis: that the people who have greatest influence on the lives of others are likely to be optimistic and overconfident, and they would take more risks than others (Kahneman, 2011: 256). Mao was confident that the Chinese people would listen to his outcry over the deterioration of revolutionary spirit and they would follow him. In fact, China plunged into what Henry Kissinger termed ‘A Decade of Crisis’. During the upheaval, many long-time party members were ousted. People who were thought to be corrupted by class privileges or Western ideas were sent to work on the communes or in factories. Others were jailed or killed. Artists were forced to glorify the common people. Paintings, poems, and songs were ‘beautiful’ only if they were politically correct (Perry et al., 1992: 737). There was an overall destruction of many important things of China. In Beijing, the Red Guard’s assaults destroyed 4,922 of the capital’s 6,843 designated ‘places of cultural or historical interest’. The Forbidden City itself was reportedly saved only by Zhou Enlai’s personal intervention (Kissinger, 2012: 194). This is how the result was best elaborated by long-time watcher of China, Henry Kissinger, in his book On China: The result was a spectacular human and institutional carnage, as one by one China’s organs of power and authority –including the highest ranks of the Communist Party –succumbed to the assaults of teenage ideological shock troops. China – a

The internal situation in China 83 civilisation heretofore known for its respect for learning and erudition –became an upside-down world, with children turning on parents, students brutalising teachers and burning books, and professionals and high officials sent down to farm and factories to learn revolutionary practices from illiterate peasants. Scenes of cruelty unfolded across the country, as Red Guards and citizens allied to them – some simply picking a faction at random in the hope of surviving the storm – turned their fury on any target that might conceivably augur a return of the old ‘feudal’ order to China. (Kissinger, 2012: 193–194) The whole nation turned into an atmosphere of civil war; there was complete breakdown of law and order. The country was engulfed in the turmoil, and soon its impact began to show in other areas as well. The kind of atmosphere developed in China, engulfing almost everyone – even Foreign Minister Chen Yi became its victim. It was best described by Henry Kissinger: China’s diplomatic posture came unhinged. The world was treated to the nearly incomprehensible sight of a China raging with indiscriminate fury against the Soviet bloc, the western powers, and its own history and culture. Chinese diplomats and support staff abroad harangued the citizens of their host countries with calls to revolution and lectures on ‘Mao Zedong Thought’. In scenes reminiscent of the Boxer Uprising seventy years earlier, throngs of Red Guards attacked foreign embassies in Beijing, including a sack of the British mission complete with the beating and molestation of its fleeing staff. When the British Foreign Secretary wrote to Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi, suggesting that Britain and China, ‘While maintaining diplomatic relations . . . withdraw their mission and personnel from each other’s capital for the time being.’ He was met by silence; the Chinese Foreign Minister was himself being ‘struggled’ against and could not reply. Eventually all but one of China’s ambassadors – the able and ideologically unimpeachable Huang Hua in Cairo – and roughly two-thirds of embassy staff were called home for re-education in the countryside or participation in revolutionary activities. China was actively embroiled in disputes with the governments of several countries during this time. It had genuinely positive relations with just one – the People’s Republic of Albania. (Kissinger, 2012: 194–195)

84  Tenzin Tsultrim During the Cultural Revolution period, because of the domestic turmoil, there was a complete breakdown of China’s diplomatic relations with other countries and hence its foreign relations were affected badly in many ways. China’s return to active diplomacy raised new questions about the direction of its foreign policy. After four years in which internal preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed its foreign relation, Beijing was now moving to repair its international image and to exploit the new opportunities (United State Intelligence Board, declassified on May 2004: 1).

The era of Deng Xiaoping and China’s foreign policy: Tiananmen Square tragedy and its impact on China’s foreign policy The participation of students in political movements began with the May Fourth Movement. The immediate cause of the outbreak of this movement was the outcome of the Paris Peace talks. The May Fourth movement was the outcome of national indignation of China. It was a movement in which both scholars and the literary figures and common men contributed. This movement was also an expression of discontentment against economic policies of exploitations being followed by the Western imperialist powers and latitude given by the national government to feudal lords (Chaurasia, 2012: 154–155). It was a protest against both Western powers and national government. The students were awakened and inspired by the writings of the literary figures and scholars and they started organising the movement. The May Fourth Movement marked the beginning of the students’ movement in the history of China. In 1977, Deng returned to power after having been purged by Mao Zedong and his radical left-wing supporters in 1975. Almost immediately he began a process of sweeping change of China’s goals, policies, methods of governance, and international relationships that can hardly be overstated in terms of their impact on the people of China (Suettinger, 2003: 14). All of a sudden, China began to open up to the world, and its selfimposed isolation was broken. Deng’s reforms were aimed at giving people greater incentives to work. The communes were broken, people were encouraged to start small businesses, and local officials were given a freer hand in economic matters. The government turned to Japan and the West for help in improving technology and management. Despite efforts at modernisation, by the early 1990s China was in the middle of a series of economic slowdowns. Many millions of people had no jobs: in fact, unemployment was said to be at its highest level since the

The internal situation in China 85 Communist takeover in 1949 (Perry, 1992: 737). With this background, student activism was taking shape in China. In 1986, disappointed by the pace of social and political reforms, tens of thousands of Chinese students marched in protest. Millions of students who had graduated were unemployed, and there was rampant corruption in China. Party officials criticised Hu Yaobang for not publicly condemning the 1986 student protests, and he was forced to resign from office. Zhao Ziyang became the CCP general secretary, and hard-liner Li Peng was appointed PRC premier. On 15 April 1989, Hu Yaobang died suddenly. Because of Hu’s death, students began gathering in large numbers in different locations to pay tribute to him. However the memorial gatherings became increasingly emotional and political, and soon thousands of students moved towards Tiananmen Square to show their condolences to the leader who was expelled and disgraced from the Chinese Communist Party for his sympathies towards the students’ movement. On 18 April, Beijing University students led an enormous march through the city to Tiananmen Square. The Beida procession reached the square at about four in the morning. Student leaders met at the heroes’ monument, surrounded by the other marchers. Zhang Boli and others announced that students were forming their own autonomous (student-run and not under official control) organisations. They had drawn up a petition of demands and would send elected students leaders to negotiate with the government. The petition included seven items. The list had grown out of common student grievances. It also included some basic civil rights, such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. The seven demands were that the government should: 1 Re-evaluate its treatment of Hu Yaobang and announce that his views on democracy had been correct; 2 End the campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalisation; 3 Publish the salaries and other assets of government leaders and their families; 4 End government censorship of the press and allow the publication of privately run newspapers; 5 Increase government spending on higher education and increase wages for intellectuals; 6 Decrease government restrictions on demonstrations in Beijing; 7 Hold democratic elections to replace corrupt or ineffective government officials who had been appointed by the CCP. (Kerns, 2011: 49)

86  Tenzin Tsultrim From the demands of the students, it was clear that there were widespread socio-economic problems, which Chinese leaders failed to address. The continued widespread corruptions among the government leaders and practices of favouritism and nepotism in the appointments and promotions further alienated the common people from the Chinese Communist Party. The students in Beijing and other cities took the opportunity to voice their frustration with corruption, inflation, press restrictions, university conditions, and the persistence of party ‘elders’ ruling informally behind the scenes (Kissinger, 2012: 409). Thus, demands of the students reflected the Chinese common people’s demands, and hence during the Tiananmen demonstrations thousands of Beijing workers and local people joined the demonstrations in different ways. After hesitating for seven weeks and exhibiting serious divisions within its ranks over the use of force, the Chinese leadership cracked down decisively on 4 June. After weeks of internal debates, Deng and a majority of Politburo members ordered the PLA to clear Tiananmen Square. A harsh suppression of the protests followed – all seen on television, broadcasted by media that had come from all over the world to record the momentous meeting between Gorbachev and the Chinese leadership (Kissinger, 2012: 411). Soon it was watched all over the world. People around the world were shocked to witness the atrocities and brutalities by which the demonstrators were cleared from Tiananmen Square, and soon they began to pressure their governments to take action against China. After the Tiananmen Square Movement, China was diplomatically isolated. Most of the Western countries froze high-level contacts with the Beijing authorities for around two years. Some discreet visits took place in order to keep diplomatic channels open and to reassure the Chinese leadership that there was no Western plan to destabilise the People’s Republic. But relations between China and its most important partners – the US, the major European nations, and Japan – were marred by the former’s opposition to the asylum given by the latter to a large number of political refugees, as well as the latter’s public condemnation of the former’s fierce repression of any political dissent (Beja, 2011: 194). After the Tiananmen incident, there was a downturn in Sino-US bilateral relations. The MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), however, has been seen as having worked hard within its jurisdiction to improve relations with the US (Quansheng, 1992: 166). During that time, the Chinese government accepted the visit of Richard Schifter, the US assistant secretary of state for human rights, in December 1990. This visit itself was regarded as a compromise by Chinese authorities since Beijing has always insisted that human

The internal situation in China 87 rights issues are internal affairs and no foreign power should intervene (Quansheng, 1992: 166). This development clearly shows that due to domestic instability in China, Chinese authorities have to change their political stand, thus compromising their foreign policy. It was mainly because the event caught the attentions of millions of people around the world about the atrocities and brutalities by which the demonstration was stopped. The Chinese government had employed the services of the People’s Liberation Army to remove the thousands of students from the Tiananmen Square. Governments around the world started to take action against China. Under pressure from the outraged public, the governments of the leading industrial countries (the G7) imposed sanctions on China. These included suspension of high-level diplomatic contacts, restriction of exports of military equipment and military related technologies, and suspension of cultural exchanges, bilateral aid, and loans. Under the US leadership, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank temporarily suspended loans. Negotiations on China’s accession to the World Trade Organization came to a halt that lasted for three years. Many countries started severing their ties with China. In the case of Chinese relations with India, for the first time, after a gap of 31 years, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India and pledged to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultations. This shows that China with its unstable internal situation tried to stabilise its relationship with other countries and mostly tried to improve its relationship with its neighbours.

China’s insecurity dilemma under Xi Jinping China unveiled another double-digit rise in military expenditure in March 2013 at the opening Parliament’s annual meeting, but for a third year in a row the defence budget will be exceeded by spending on domestic security, highlighting Beijing’s concern about internal threats (Blanchard & Ruwitch, 2013). The Dalai Lama was quoted by Shishir Gupta in the book, The Himalayan Face-off, as saying ‘This shows that they have more enemies inside rather than outside, which was matter of shame.’ The spiritual leader was not far from the truth, as China’s internal security, headed by none other than President Xi, has an estimated budget of $110 billion as compared to a defence budget of $106 billion (Gupta, 2014: 195). The amount China spent on internal security was exponentially high. The Chinese Communist Party was always wary of the people’s reactions and opinions, and there are always some mechanisms to monitor the feelings of the Chinese people. The players that help

88  Tenzin Tsultrim ensure China’s domestic stability, such as the PLA, the People’s Armed Police and the Ministry of Public Security, often speak with a stronger voice in policy debate. The successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, as well as the need to maintain control in ethnic regions, have led to more funds and prestige being given to these hard-line actors (Zhu, 2011: 189). In fact, total expenditure on domestic public security increased so sharply in 2011 that it surpassed the national defence budget (The State Statistical Bureau, 2011). This increase was meant to guarantee the availability of funds to public security agencies and departments in poorer areas (Yue, 2013: 80). Thus, it clearly shows the importance of domestic stability for China’s national security and Chinese authorities’ special treatment towards those who are in charge of handling its core issues. Dr Xie Yue, a professor at the School of Politics and International Relationship, Tongji University, elucidated the concerns of Chinese Communist Party in the following way: China’s rapid economic growth in recent decades has put it in the global spotlight, yet this growth has also been troubled by an accompanying rise in the number of economic and social grievances. In some cases, aggrieved citizens are resorting to criminal actions and protests against local governments and the state. These often violent protests are seen by the Chinese Communist Party to be harmful not only to economic growth but also to its political rule. Driven by this perception, the Party has ceaselessly strengthened domestic coercive institutions to make weiwen (preserving stability) a priority, resulting in the need for greater expenditure on maintaining security. (Yue, 2013: 80) Thus, it highlighted the preservation of stability as a growing concern of the Chinese Communist Party, making it as a priority. According to Eric Li, a Chinese entrepreneur in his speech at TED (Technology, Entertainment and Design), one of the biggest clients of the largest public opinion survey company of China is the Chinese government. Even the city governments, provincial governments, and local governments utilised the services of the Public Opinion Survey Company. The survey was taken mainly to know whether the Chinese people were satisfied with the basic services provided by the Chinese government both at the central and local levels. In his speech, Eric mentions that it is this mechanism through which Chinese government is involving its citizens to express their views. However, it directly or

The internal situation in China 89 indirectly shows that the Chinese government was worried about the change of people’s views and opinions on the government, and hence a survey was conducted to know it in advance. The insecurity of Chinese government can be seen from different dimensions. In fact, these situations did not allow China to have any interference in the internal situation of the neighbouring countries and particularly with India. According to Michael Anti in his speech at TED, there are two nets in this world: the internet and Chinanet. By this he meant that in China, people didn’t have access to Western-origin websites. There were few words which were completely censored in Chinanet. China had banned many popular social networks, and later the Chinese government developed or rather cloned similar social networks in China. The main purpose of developing their own social networks was to effectively monitor the online activities of internet users. The Chinese government can monitor if the server is in Beijing; hence the government was wary of Chinese netizens (a person who spends considerable time on the internet). Currently more than 2,600 websites are blocked in mainland China under the country’s policy of internet censorship. There was an international conference from 3–5 December 2012 titled ‘Participation, Contestation and Legitimation in Chinese Politics’ organised by the China Studies Centre and the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT Madras), co-funded by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, Taiwan. The titles of most papers were related to the contestation and legitimatisation in Chinese politics. However one interesting aspect was the title of the first paper, ‘Will Chinese Communist Party Collapse?’, presented by Prof. Zheng Yongnian, director of the East Asian Institute (NUS), Singapore. He said that the Chinese Communist Party was not a party but an organisation wrapped in the cover of a political party. According to him, the old objective of the CCP was to destroy capitalism. Now they have already turned into crony capitalism, much more authoritarian than Western capitalism, where there was no say for public views and demands. This, despite the fact that Chinese leaders were always wary of mass public uprisings like Tiananmen Square. Susan Shirk, currently professor emeritus and chair of the 21st Century China Program at the School and one of the most influential experts working on US-China relations and Chinese politics, emphasised the importance of public opinion in her book, China: Fragile Superpower, stating: Public opinion carried much more weight than it did in the past. Any sign of popular disaffection that could imperial stability will count against the current leaders and it would raise the risk of

90  Tenzin Tsultrim leadership splits. Traditionally, the leaders got their information about public views from an elaborate system of internal intelligence gathering through bureaucratic channels, which, not surprisingly, told officials what they wanted to hear and therefore didn’t entirely believe. (Shirk, 2007: 44) Hence as indicated earlier, now the Chinese government is increasingly getting information through public opinion surveys undertaken by the survey company and through monitoring of the internet. According to Dr Peter Thomas, without ideology there is no legitimacy. The Chinese government is increasingly dependent on good economic development to ensure the internal stability of the country. Not only that, the Chinese government is also increasingly dependent on evoking nationalism among the Chinese people to engage them politically. Through this, the Chinese government is indirectly securing its waning legitimacy from the Chinese people. From the Communist Party leader’s perch in Beijing, Chinese society looks like a cauldron boiling over with unrest. The leaders follow closely – and nervously – the increasing frequency, scale, and violence of protests throughout the country. Under their direction, the sociologists and public security bureaucracies have undertaken remarkably frank scholarship on the incidence and underlying causes of social protest. Everything they do – in both foreign and domestic policy – is aimed at trying to keep the lid on (Shirk, 2007: 56). This indicates that Chinese leaders are always on alert and in actions for the prevention of any kind of unrest, which has potential to turn into huge demonstration such as Tiananmen Square. Linda Jakobson, former director of the SIPRI China and Global Security Programme, has lived and worked in China for over 15 years and is fluent in Chinese. Currently, she is an independent researcher, and her views on public opinion are as follows: The role of public opinion in shaping China’s foreign policy is a hotly debated phenomenon both inside and outside China. While there are numerous cases in which public opinion openly has had a direct impact on domestic policy, in the realm of foreign policy it is more difficult to unequivocally make the same link. Yet, it is increasingly apparent that within the Chinese media and online community there are groups that strive to influence the formulation of foreign policy. (Jakobson & Knox, 2010: 41)

The internal situation in China 91 Contrary to the common misperception that the Chinese state is monolithically controlled by the Communist Party, China has become an increasingly diverse and dynamic society in which many players are competing for influence in national politics. While the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC)’s Politburo still has the final say in Chinese politics, a growing number of players – from high-ranking government officials and military officers to scholars, researchers, businesspeople, the media, large energy companies, and netizens – are increasingly involved in China’s foreign policy making (Zhu, 2011: 188–189). China has the highest number of internet users in the world – around 500 million. Hence, it is very likely that people’s opinions in the cyberspace will have considerable effects in China. Today Chinese officials have less and less ability to hide news from the public. In addition, citizens have the option to express their views on a host of issues which would have been unimaginable a few decades back. The dramatic spread of internet use in China has greatly accelerated the speed with which both domestic and international news reaches ordinary citizens. There were more than 384 million Chinese internet users in 2009, making them by far the largest virtual community in the world. A growing number of internet forums are dedicated to international affairs. One of the most popular of these, the Strong Nation Forum, has more than 2.17 million registered users, with the highest number of browsers at 3.5 million per day (Shambaugh, 2012: 132). Not only they are ordinary citizens increasingly voicing their opinions on the internet, many CPC intellectuals (e.g. Yu Keping), former ambassadors (e.g. Hua Liming), and active foreign policy officials (e.g. Gao Yusheng) write about foreign affairs on their blogs (Jakobson & Knox, 2010: 42). Chinese government has realised the potential of using netizens in their own favour. Public interest in world affairs is also growing. The Chinese netizen population had reached over 485 million by mid-2011, creating the largest pool of online discussions and opinions. Chinese leaders including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly surf the internet to get a feeling of the growing nationalism as a result of China’s patriotic education in the 1990s and its remarkable economic performance in the past 30 years – sometimes Chinese policy may be hijacked by public opinion. Anger over perceived affronts to China’s national honour or encroachment on vital Chinese interests often quickly turns to criticism of the Chinese government’s failure to defend the country’s interests (Zhu, 2011: 190). In 2012, I found that in Mumbai’s Chinese Consulate website there was a virtual map of the disputed islands between China and Japan

92  Tenzin Tsultrim (Diaoyu or Senkaku), where Chinese citizens were encouraged to plant a virtual national flag of China in the virtual map. It was an act of evoking nationalism among the Chinese netizens who were very active in cyberspace. Thus, both the Chinese leaders and their people are trying to influence each other depending on their interests. Linda Jakobson further mentions the complexities in the formulations of China’s foreign polices: When assessing the question of public opinion’s impact on Chinese foreign policy formulation it is worth noting that there are multiple channels of influence at play between several foreign policy actors. The Internet sets the agenda when there is breaking news, forcing officials, as well as the print and television media, to react. In turn, officials and foreign policy actors on the margins also do their best to influence the media, netizens and each other. Such complex connections between foreign policy actors, the media and the public – along with the unruly nature of the Internet in general – are all part of the omni-directional influences that weigh on Chinese foreign policy formulations. Moreover, actions online that are taken to the extreme in the form of cyber-attacks can have real-world consequences. (Jakobson & Knox, 2010: 43) Unlike earlier, today Chinese people are more vocal and active in the formulations of foreign policy. The CCP can no longer keep people ignorant of statements from Japanese or Taiwanese politicians, no matter how inflammatory they may be to mainland sensibilities. Foreign Ministry officials and CCP leaders react publicly to international news because the Chinese public is now aware and interested. Leaders feel under pressure from the public to take strong stances, especially in dealing with Japan, Taiwan, and the US – the three international relationships that are objects of fascination to the Chinese public (Shirk, 2010: 248). In the formulation of domestic policies as well, Chinese netizens have influenced many important decisions. According to Michael Anti, there are around 300 million micro-bloggers who are very active in voicing their criticism against the local and central governments. In July 2011, there was a train crash in China. When the Railway Ministry tried to hide the incidents, people came to know about this and became furious; within a few days, more than 10 million netizens voiced their anger over the incident. Because of this, the Railway Minister was sacked and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. This is one

The internal situation in China 93 such incident where Chinese people have influenced the decision of the central leaders. Table 6.2 shows that the number of protests in China has increased in recent years. In 1993, the number of protests in China was 8,700, which means that in an average day there were about 23 protests in China. In 1994 there were 10,000 protests, making it 27 protests per day. In 1999, there was a threefold increase in public protests in China, which means that in an average day 87 public protests had occurred. In 2003, there were 58,000 protests in China, which indicates that in an average day there were 158 protests. These numbers are very high as compared to India. According to the data released by Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), around 25,740 protests and demonstrations were held across India in 2007, and around 1,680 protests had occurred in the North-East region. There has been a 32.2 per cent decrease in the number of agitations from 2006 (37,946) to 2007 (25,740). During 2007, in a total of 25,740 agitations, 59 civilians and Table 6.2 Number of protests in China Incidents of social unrest in China 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

–

8,700 10,000 11,500 12,500 15,000 24,500 32,500 40,000 50,400 58,000 74,000 87,000 90,000

– 127,000 – 1,80,000

Source: Adapted from George Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprising Vol. 2. 2013, Daniel Kubler, Lisheng Shong, Urban Mobilization and New Media in Contemporary China (2014), Alan Taylor, Rising Protests China, atlantic.com, 2012.

94  Tenzin Tsultrim six policemen were killed, whereas 509 civilians and 1,324 policemen were injured. Agitations are collective expressions of dissatisfaction with the state authorities and others on a variety of issues like education, essential services, transport facilities, wages, and so forth (Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2007: 121). In 2004, the number of protests reported in China was 74,000, thus in an average day there were 202 protests. Mass incidents have become a major problem for social stability. For example, between June 2006 and August 2010, there were 53 large-scale protests in China involving 5,000 people, according to the New York–based NGO Human Rights in China; 39 protests occurred in poorer provinces as compared to 14 in more developed provinces. As a result, coercive departments in central and western China received a greater amount of funding from higher-level government than their wealthier counterparts in more developed areas, accounting for 50–90 per cent of their total budgets. Public Security Bureau Minister Zhou Yongkang said in July 2005, ‘Their number is on the increase and scale is constantly expanding the trend towards the greater organisation is clear’ (Shirk, 2007: 56). This clearly proved that the Chinese leaders are realising the significance of these increasing protests throughout China, which if not checked can in future sow the seeds of mass uprising. When today’s Chinese leaders make foreign policy, they have to keep in mind the reactions of the groups upon whom their political power depends: other leaders, the massive public, and the military. When it comes to economic policy and routine matters of foreign policy, politicians do what works – that is what makes the economy grow at 7 per cent per year or more. If they don’t improve living standards and keep unemployment low, they believe that they will meet the same fate as their former comrade in the Soviet Union (Shirk, 2007: 77).

Conclusion In authoritarian states such as China, government spending on social welfare is not generally viewed as a basic entitlement for citizens, but rather as one of the government’s measures to reduce potential political instability (Yue, 2013: 94). Hence, in China, whatever good or bad happens, mostly Chinese people’s gratitude or grievances tend to be state-centred and therefore Chinese authorities are always on their toes to monitor the changing social environment in China, where a spark neglected can slowly envelop the whole of China. China has the largest population in the world, with nearly 1.4 billion people, which accounts for 19.24 per cent of the world’s population. China was not

The internal situation in China 95 only invaded many times by nomadic people from outside its borders but was also turned upside down many more times by its own citizens, mainly the peasants. In all, there were 1,109 main military conflicts between the Chinese and the northern nomads from 215 bc to ad 1684, and as many as 225,887 recorded armed rebellions between 210 bc and ad 1900 (Deng, 2000: 7). Through the pages of history, one can understand that China has witnessed more conflicts within its borders than outside. The recent anti-corruption campaign championed by Xi Jinping is not something he wants, but he needs it to stay in power. As Xi remarked at the party’s 2012 Plenum, ‘The problems among our party members and cadres are corruption, taking bribes, and being out of touch with the people – which must be addressed with great effort. Only when corruption is minimised or eradicated if at all, then the smooth political and other reforms in China could be possible.’ Thus Xi knows that it is corruption that has always driven Chinese people to act and react (Tsultrim 2015: 70). China is always more cautious about development within China than outside, which is clearly visible in its rising expenditure on domestic public security as well as on the social welfare of Chinese people. Today, China is known for its many remarkable feats in the world, breaking record after record. However, there are certain records which China prefers to shy away from and remain ignorant about. At present, China is the one of most censored countries in the world, monitoring every activity, which in its definition risks the social and political stability of China. On 5 October 2015, the state media People’s Daily proudly announced the Chinese capital of Beijing is now completely covered by surveillance cameras which watch ‘over every corner of the city’. Beijing has the highest number of CCTV cameras, numbering 470,000 after London (UK) at 420,000 and Chicago (US) at 17,000. Hence in China, Chinese people are being monitored from public space to cyberspace, restricting their freedom of expression in every space. On 27 December 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislative body, enacted a counterterrorism law which took effect on 1 January 2016. According to article 3 of chapter I, ‘Terrorism’ as used in this law refers to propositions and actions creating social panic, endangering public safety, violating person and property, or coercing national organs or international organisations, through methods such as violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives. The article clearly emphasises the importance of social stability in China. Regime survival is the core of the notion of political security. To party officials, state security equates

96  Tenzin Tsultrim to the CCP’s smooth functioning in governing (institutions and structures). Even a minor disruption in public administration due to unexpected accidents may lead to a colour revolution and threaten state security (Ji, 2016: 179). However, a major unrest in China, crippling its social stability and economy, could have an adverse impact on the rest of the world. In China, there are more than 250 million people, a floating population, a rapidly growing population migrating to urban areas from rural areas for their livelihood. Hence, another impact, which is likely to occur if there is major social unrest in China, would be that millions in this floating population would flee to neighbouring countries to seek better prospects (Tsultrim, 2015: 70–71). In the coming days, the development happening inside China will further shape China’s foreign policy, because the real threat for Chinese authorities lies within China.

References Ban Blanchard, and John Ruwitch. 2013. ‘China Hikes on Defense Budget, to Spend More Internal Security’, Reuters, 5 March, at www.reuters.com/ article/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305 (accessed 17 July 2016). Beja, Jean Phillippe. 2011. The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, New York: Routledge. Bureau of Police Research and Development. 2007. Annual Report, New Delhi. Chakrabarti, Sreemati. 2007. China, New Delhi: National Book Trust. Chaurasia, R. S. 2012. History of China, Delhi: King Book Educational. Communist China’s International Posture, Director of Central Intelligence, Communist China’s International Posture, United State Intelligence Board. 1970. (Declassified on May 2004). Deng, Kent G. 2000. ‘A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 53 (1): 1–28. Garver, John W. 2001. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gupta, Shishir. 2014. The himalayan Face off: The Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte. Gurgaon: Hachette Book Publishing. Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. 2010. New Foreign Policy Actors of China, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Ji, You. 2016. ‘China’s National Security Commission: Theory, Evolution and Operations’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25 (98): 178–196. Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Allen Lane. Kerns, Ann. 2011. Who Will Shout If Not Us? Student Activists and the Tiananmen Square Protest, China 1989, Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publishing Group.

The internal situation in China 97 Kim, Samuel. 2015. ‘Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen’, Current History, (September 1990): 245–248. Kissinger, Henry. 2012. On China, New York: Penguin. Lanteigne, Marc. 2009. Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, New York: Routledge. Ni Anna. 2015. Building Business-Government Relations: A Skills Approach, New York: Routledge. Perry, Marvin et al. 1992. History of the World: The Modern Era, Boston: Houghton Company. Quansheng, Zhao. 1992. ‘Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 519 (1): 158–175. Schram, Stuard. 2007. ‘Review of Mao: The Unknown Story by Jung Chang Jon Halliday’, at http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/chinesepolitics/changhalliday_files/schram-UnknownMao.pdf (accessed 27 May 2016). Shambaugh, David. 2012. The Tangled Titans: The United States and China, New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Shirk, Susan. 2007. China Fragile Superpower: How an Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise, New York: Oxford University Press. Shirk, Susan. 2010. Changing Media, Changing China, New York: Oxford University Press. Suettinger, Robert. 2003. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000, Washington: The Brooking Institution. Tsultrim, Tenzin. 2010. ‘India-China Relations (1914–1962) A Study’, Unpublished M. Phil. Dissertation, Madras University. Tsultrim, Tenzin. 2015. ‘How Internal Are China’s Internal Problems?’ Tibet Policy Journal, 3: 49–71, at http://tibetpolicy.net/comments-briefs/howinternal-are-chinas-internal-problems/ (accessed 27 May 2016). Yue, Xie. 2013. ‘Rising Central spending on Public Security and the Dilemma Facing Grassroots Officials in China’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 42 (2): 79–109. Zhu, Zhiqun. 2011. ‘Chinese Foreign Policy: External and Internal Factors’, China: An International Journal, 9 (2): 188–189.

7 China’s drive for energy security Impact on its foreign policy behaviour Arnab Dasgupta

Energy has generally been considered as a politicised commodity by states in the international order. However, it is not certain whether states will cooperate or compete over this vital strategic aspect of national security. In the future, most of the global energy demand rise will be caused by developing Asia, with China being the prime mover. If the stages of development of the developed countries are to be studied particularly, then it will be discerned that a special juncture of national development comes when the rate of energy consumption starts to rise corresponding to the economic growth. According to the Asian Development Bank, the income elasticity of oil consumption has historically been about 0.5 – that is, 1 per cent economic growth translates into 0.5 per cent growth in oil consumption (Hong, 2009: 378). China experienced a high average GDP growth rate of 9.9 per cent during 1978–2007 (Hong, 2009: 377). Accordingly, China witnessed a tremendous growth in both consumption and import of oil. The government seems to have put an emphasis on keeping the domestic middle class quiescent in the short term rather than going for the environmentally friendly option in the long term (Ziegler, 2006: 7). In a corresponding way, this prioritisation of energy (hydrocarbon resources for all practical purposes) has impacted China’s foreign policy behaviour as well. The chapter will look into the causes of China’s drive for energy security and its fallout on China’s international behaviour. The chapter starts with an energy profile of China, then discusses its drive for energy security and analyses the strategies in achieving that goal. It also looks into the threat perceptions about China’s energy security and seeks to analyse China’s response in this regard.

China’s drive for energy security 99

China’s energy profile Oil According to the British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy of 2015, China has recorded the lowest growth in energy consumption since 1998 due to stalled growth in the domestic market. Nevertheless, China is still the largest energy growth market in the world. China has witnessed the highest growth rate in primary energy consumption in the world (BP, 2015: 2). According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016, China is now the second-largest oil consumer in the world after the US, consuming around 12 million barrels per day (BPD), which is about 12 per cent of the total global consumption demand (BP, 2016: 9). The average annual rate of oil demand growth in China is expected to be 2.2 per cent until 2035 (Hoeven, 2013: 12). On the other hand, the reserves-to-production ratios have been steadily decreasing on a year-to-year basis (Jian, 2011: 10). Domestic production will become stagnant as most of its existing oilfields have passed their peak production level, leaving imports as the only choice. At the same time, delinking economic growth from energy consumption has been a strategy for the Chinese energy regime (Shen, 2001: 718). The central government has taken up various measures to reduce energy intensity by 20 per cent from its 2005 levels. The Chinese government has ensured energy conservation awareness by emphasising lifestyle change, education, and adoption of new technologies (Hong, 2009: 382–383). China’s auto market has witnessed a steady growth; increasing the number of personal vehicles along with a supply shortage has led China to become a net diesel importer in 2009 and 2010 (Ding 2013: 541). In 2008, China set up the National Energy Administration within the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) for the overall management of the energy sector both at home and abroad. The energy industry is dominated by the national oil companies (NOCs). China started its journey as a net oil importer in 1993. China’s reliance on imported oil supplies reached 54.8 per cent of its overall energy demand in 2011 (Zhang, 2011: 7612) and rose to 59 per cent in 2013; again, that is expected to rise to 82 per cent by 2035 (Hoeven, 2013: 12). Nevertheless, this will have a steady growth in the years to come, and this signifies that China will be equally vulnerable to any rupture in the international energy market. This is so because,

100  Arnab Dasgupta according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s share of imported oil in the overall oil consumption in 2030 will be 75 per cent (Zhang Jian, 2011: 8). China’s oil import has been much more diversified as it imported 46 per cent from West Asia, 22 per cent from Africa, 10 per cent from Russia-Central Asia, 3 per cent from the Atlantic Basin, and 19 per cent from other sources (Zhang Jian, 2011: 17). However, it is not only the supply of energy but also the price of energy that has become a major concern. Natural gas According to a report of the IEA, entitled ‘Are We Entering a Golden Age of Gas?’, developing countries like China are fast opting for natural gas as a primary fuel. Thus, natural gas is a viable option for China’s energy security as well as carbon reduction. Natural gas consumption was projected to be around 8.3 per cent of the total primary energy consumption by 2015 under the Twelfth Five Year Plan [2011– 15] (IEA, 2011: 14). The demand for gas may reach 331 billion cubic metres (BCM) by 2030 (Gautam, 2011: 596). China started importing natural gas in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2006. Alongside, it has taken due care to enhance its domestic gas production by 2030. China is going to become one of the largest growth markets in gas/LNG, and that will naturally attract many players in the international energy market. Coal and other sources China has a huge reserve of coal, which gives it considerable energy autonomy. Most of this reserve is used for power generation, and that causes significant pollution. China became a net coal importer in 2003 (Jian, 2011: 8). China is seriously pursuing measures to reduce its use of coal and thereby the resulting pollution. Although China is sitting on the largest estimated recoverable shale gas reserves in the world (Evans 2013/2014: 42), technical issues have curbed the development of coal bed methane and shale oil and gas (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 2012: 7). Another reason may be the predominance of the NOCs, which abound in conventional energy resources. China is also developing its alternative energy sources. By 2010, it had become the leader in the clean energy sector (Bracken et al., 2012: 3). The country now accounts for almost 50 per cent of all manufacturing of solar modules and wind turbines in the world.

China’s drive for energy security 101

Drive for energy security If an analysis is made of the energy strategies of China since 1949, it will show some distinct stages in that direction. Immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s energy sector was marked by self-sufficient production and consumption trends. The development of the Daqing oil field in the 1960s was the hallmark of China’s energy self-reliance. However, noticeable change in this direction was witnessed only in the wake of the opening of the economy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping since 1978. In the post-reform era, at the initial stage from 1978 to 1992, China had continued a policy of energy self-reliance or self-sufficiency (Jian, 2011: 6). That strategy has gradually undergone changes in the wake of the overall economic reforms initiated since 1978. The reforms facilitated a labour-intensive manufacturing sector which in turn raised the GDP and accumulated the urban population in the coastal zones (Jian, 2011: 6). These developments led to the rising demand for oil for an ascendant economy as well as concerns for sustained energy supplies. This followed the rising efficiency in the dominant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the current rising profile of the NOCs. China’s growing import has been one of the main reasons behind its urgent securitisation of energy or, for that matter, hydrocarbon resources. While China was importing only 1 per cent of its daily oil consumption in 1993, in 2004 it began to import 48 per cent of its daily consumption. In 1993 China became a net exporter of oil, and in 2003 it surpassed Japan as the second-largest consumer of oil in the world. The rising standard of living among the ever-increasing middle class is evident in the increased use of air-conditioning, personal vehicles, air travel, and so forth. Land and air transportation have increased manifold. The amount of oil used in the transportation sector amounts to 38 per cent of total oil consumption; by 2020 it will reach almost 50 per cent of the total consumption. In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, China has taken a calculated step of enhancing the stakes of its NOCs at a low price situation. The Chinese NOCs have garnered huge experience in the global financial markets by virtue of their international presence and competition. In the wake of the financial crisis, China has encouraged its SOEs to go for outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), both financial and non-financial. The latter includes greenfield and brownfield investments (Jian, 2011: 25). China has huge foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese have a strong balance of payments, and also the share of its energy import

102  Arnab Dasgupta (inclusive of petroleum, crude, and refined products) in its total import is much lower. These have helped in its energy security drive. One way of hedging against energy supply insecurity is the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs). The NDRC set up China’s first SPR. However, the hike in international oil prices slowed down the building of further such platforms. China has decided to take 15 years in three phases to complete the construction since 2007. The first phase is equivalent to 12 days of China’s oil consumption at the 2009 level and was completed in 2009. By the time the second and third phases are complete, China will have a total storage capacity of 85 million tons, which will be tantamount to about 78 days of China’s eight million barrels per day oil import in 2020; that will still be short of 90 days’ storage as recommended by the IEA. Apart from that, China has relied heavily upon the overland energy pipelines as well as maritime energy supply routes. Apparently, the former seems to be more secured; nevertheless, China must depend on sea-bound import in the long term despite importing a large amount through pipelines.

Strategies to securitise energy supplies The emphasis on energy security as a vital Chinese national interest has gained momentum since the 1990s, when massive-scale industrialisation and export-led growth replaced the previous land reforms–based growth pattern. Earlier, the whole notion of the ‘Daqing Method’ was made a question of national pride and self-sufficiency in the 1960s in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet technological support. The ‘Great Leap Forward’ changed the course of the Soviet-assisted model of capital-intensive growth and instead hinged on a labour-intensive growth pattern. The Daqing model was showcased as the new ‘Maoist’ method of development, bereft of foreign technological assistance and capital resources (Kambara & Howe, 2007: 14). Later on, in the post-reform era, Chinese domestic supplies fell short of the ever-rising required volume and that made energy a vital area of concern for the Chinese state. The fear of interdiction by the US Navy in the strategic choke points has made China wary and has made it opt for alternatives to that. China has gone for military modernisation, especially a new avatar of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in strengthening China’s vital national interests. Any sudden disruption in energy supplies will create havoc in terms of rising fuel prices and resulting stagflation in a Tiananmen-like incident. China has taken a geostrategic approach rather than an economic approach to energy security; such strategies will definitely affect the attempts on the part

China’s drive for energy security 103 of the Western states to create a transparent and accountable regime in the resource-rich countries. With a long history of foreign domination, China has been averse to the notion of conceding Chinese control and being dependent on a single source. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–05) emphasised the zou chu qu or the ‘going out’ strategy as a wholesome approach. By virtue of their ‘going out’ strategy, the Chinese NOCs in 2010 had an equity share of 1.36 million barrels per day, which was nearly one-third of China’s 2009 net imports. China’s ‘going out’ energy strategy since 1993 has three target areas, namely, West Asia and Africa, Russia and Central Asia, and Latin America. In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Chinese authorities have adopted the policy to arrange for loans-for-oil with the major energy-producing states outside West Asia. Significant among them is the energy deal with Russia. The deal provided Russia with an alternative supply route as well as the much-needed credit to the Russian energy giants (Zhang, 2011: 7614). China, like other importers in the world, has been heavily dependent upon West Asia. Therefore, diversification has been suggested by the researchers as a way out from supply disruption due to market concentration. However, diverting the energy import source from West Asia to Africa or South America would not be very helpful because of the geographical distance and increased freight charges (Chatterjee, 2012: 162). China is no longer confined to its role as the arms supplier to the Gulf countries and is no longer considered as the fence-sitter in the region. China has put emphasis on economic performance as a platform for national power projection. It is to be noted here that China’s energy linkages with the Gulf must not overshadow the simultaneous Chinese strategy of capturing the Gulf market for Chinese products (Calabrese, 1998: 358–359). It is to be seen whether the typical politics in West Asia compels the Chinese state to drop its policy of non-intervention. It is really very hard not to take sides in the region for long without sacrificing one’s own interests (Simpfendorfer, 2009: 50). Co-opting China as a force for regional stability might ensure greater solidarity as is already evident to some extent in the Iranian nuclear programme. Beijing’s energy security strategy in Africa can be identified as a three-step approach. The first step can be analysed as the strong one, i.e. aggressively pursuing big producers like Angola in a resources-for-aid approach. The second one is weak, namely pursuing countries that have lesser quantity and quality of energy resources. The third step is neither strong nor weak, i.e. gathering intelligence about energy resources in the African countries through the media of Chinese overseas institutions (Caceres & Ear, 2013: 68). One basic

104  Arnab Dasgupta problem that China has faced in the course of its complex and varied engagement with Africa is its lack of experience in dealing with the polyethnic African civil society groups (Liang, 2010: 168). It is definitely going to be a litmus test for China’s ascendance as a responsible international player. Again, China has shown keen interest in the energy sector in the Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. China has chosen Russia as its strategic partner in the region in view of the future prospects of the bilateral relations (Huasheng, 2009: 476). China has put its strategy of securing its twin objectives to safeguard its geoeconomic as well as geopolitical interests in the geoeconomic void of Central Asia and Latin America (Li, 2012: 164). Chinese aid and energy cooperation with Uzbekistan and Myanmar or Sudan, for that matter, have drawn flak from the global community because of the poor human rights records of these countries (Christoffersen, 2013: 193). The Chinese overtures to the energy-rich Latin American states have also raised eyebrows in the West; nevertheless, Chinese energy diplomacy has been very active in tapping that market as well. On the other side of the globe, the melting of Arctic ice has paved the way for a greater maritime passage through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Although the NSR is navigable only during the summer season, the Arctic can emerge as a prospective energy hubcum-transportation route. That is why China has been forthcoming in developing the NSR and using the Arctic as a future energy lake. There are some who have opposed the ‘going out’ policy as a solution to China’s energy security. They have argued that relentless drive on part of the Chinese NOCs has made Chinese foreign policy the hostage of the former and has also led to increased competition across the globe. They have also argued that this policy has put Chinese stakes in some pariah regimes like Sudan. This was the reason that the NDRC in 2007 excluded Sudan from the list of countries where Chinese oil companies were encouraged to invest. Nevertheless, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired stakes in that country. China has been loath to join the IEA because that would reduce its autonomy in terms of the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and would necessitate a more transparent energy regime within the country. There are also debates over the role of the PLAN, whether to perform mere access denial or comprehensive sea control. Some experts argue that the greatest challenge lies not outside but within China, and that is a non-war, non-adversarial internal energy security challenge. The fourth-generation Chinese leaders called for a broader new energy security concept that hinged upon international cooperation, domestic demand control, and sustainable and resource-conserving

China’s drive for energy security 105 development. China does not have much trust on the existing international energy regime. It would therefore be imperative for the present stakeholders like the US to enhance China’s trust in the bodies like the IEA and pave for more international cooperation on energy (Kennedy, 2010: 148). Thus the Chinese leadership has to go for pragmatic options while securing vital energy supplies. Four basic strategies can be identified in this context. The first strategy is reliance on the world market. Chinese NOCs have considerable autonomy with regard to their business interests and take decisions in their corporate capacity without acting as the instruments of state interests. Therefore, the celebrated ‘going out’ strategy can be attributed to business opportunities for these NOCs rather than as something imposed upon them by the Chinese policy makers to go for an expansionist drive. However, the Chinese equity oil shares are minuscule compared to the global oil production (2 per cent of the total) as well as China’s net energy imports (30 per cent of the total imports). The second strategy has been that of free-riding. Here, China draws common global benefits availed by the other stakeholders but at the cost of the US security apparatus. For instance, China has relied on the US security regime for the secured energy supplies from West Asia or, for that matter, the security of the sea-bound energy supply routes. The third strategy of the Chinese authorities has been to diversify the sources of supply and the transportation routes. However, by 2010, an aggressive ‘going out’ campaign by the Chinese NOCs has resulted in the desired diversification process. The fourth strategy has been the emphasis on Ditan Jingji, or low carbon development, or on renewables. However, China’s main energy supplies would still be hydrocarbons in the long term, as renewables have never been the driving force behind any large-scale economic system in the world. Thus, a communist China does not want to ‘maximise’ its energy security; rather it seeks ‘enough security’ for its energy supplies. The rise of China in a peaceful way has symbolic similarity with the rise of the US in the aftermath of World War II (Mayer & Wubbeke, 2013: 298). The reasons for success of the Chinese NOCs have been manifold. First, there is an integrated energy strategy in China which shows the government’s determination to coordinate energy policies and decisions. Second, apart from direct and indirect financial assistance, policy assistance, and other sorts of arrangements on the part of the Chinese state help these NOCs overcome many problems. Third, thanks to its financial, political, and strategic capital, China has been able to inject a positive strength into its NOCs’ overseas activities. Lastly, China has solved border disputes with all its neighbours barring India, and

106  Arnab Dasgupta has relied on overland energy supplies from the neighbouring region (Hong, 2009: 387).

Threat perceptions China’s drive for energy security is caused by some threat perceptions. Likewise, China’s security has also created some threat perception among the other stakeholders. There are considerable debates as to whether China has created potential threats or not. Since 1993 China has pursued an aggressive energy security policy and has directed its multi-pronged diplomatic efforts to secure better ties with the energysupplying states in West Asia. This has attracted US wrath. China received a rude shock in Iraq in 2003 when the US-led assault led to the scrapping of energy supply deals between China and Iraq. An almost similar thing happened again in 2012 in Libya. This was the direct fallout of the Arab Spring on China’s core national interests. China’s friendship with Iran has also delivered the Chinese great advantages which the US can only dream about. Were there any military clash in the Strait of Hormuz, China was to lose the most by virtue of its sheer dependence on Iranian crude. Iran is the third-largest energy supplier for China after Saudi Arabia and Angola. In case the Iranian supplies were to be stopped, the Saudis could make that up. In a worst-case scenario, the Saudi supplies could also be choked in case the strait was to be totally closed. That would make China’s nightmare come true. In the wake of the US-led sanctions, China has had to cut its energy imports from Iran. However, its reduction was the smallest among the countries which enjoyed exemption. China has always been opposed to any stringent sanctions against Iran, as it has larger energy and military stakes with Iran. Beijing is developing the North Pars gas field and is also constructing an LNG plant in Iran. According to a report by the SIPRI, China has been the second-largest arms supplier to Iran, after Russia, from 2006 to 2011. Again, China’s quest for an incessant flow of energy has been met by fierce competition in both the immediate and extended neighbourhoods. That is why the South East Asian countries, despite having strong trade relations with China, have shown the utmost eagerness to collectively counter China’s claims over the Spratlys in the South China Sea (Sevilla, 2013: 100). Since this is an issue of sovereign jurisdiction, China would not mind flexing its military muscle. The 2008 Chinese defence White Paper also attested this while describing the essential duties of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Sevilla, 2013: 99). China, therefore, has opted for a vigorous defence modernisation programme. The Chinese spending spree

China’s drive for energy security 107 has prompted these nations to reciprocate according to their limited capacity. The US would also become wary of the Chinese power projection in the region which would have a greater impact on the global scene. The Chinese position was reflected in its assertion of the South China Sea dispute as its core national interest, which previously covered only Taiwan and Tibet. This necessitated the US reciprocal policy of the Asian pivotal strategy. China has preferred the bilateral mechanism whereas the ASEAN member states have always championed the cause for collective and multilateral negotiation on the dispute. Lately, in 2012, there emerged a rift among the ASEAN members. Thus, this South China Sea dispute has a potential of escalation which has wider implications for the greater regional balance. The Chinese threat perceptions include three strategic locations, namely the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the South China Sea. The Strait of Malacca dilemma was first articulated by President Hu Jintao in November, 2003. In accordance with the strategy to deal with that dilemma, the Chinese Ministry of Transport in 2005 declared that China should build a merchant vessel fleet to transport about 50 per cent of its sea-bound energy import in Chinese hulls. Although there are pros and cons of such a proposal, taking only one path and discarding the rest is not going to be very easy for the Chinese policy makers (Gautam, 2011: 603–604). Only very large crude carriers (VLCC) can transit through the strait, and in terms of China’s energy necessity, two VLCC tankers going through the strait daily would cater to that need. About 80 per cent of China’s energy imports pass through it. Like the Strait of Malacca dilemma, China is also faced with the challenge associated with the Strait of Hormuz. About 20 per cent of the global oil demand is supplied through the strait. In 2010, 40 per cent of China’s energy supplies passed through it. On the other hand, the South China Sea is located strategically between two choke points, namely the Strait of Malacca and the Taiwan Strait. Over half of international shipping tonnage and $5.3 trillion of trade passed through the South China Sea in 2012. In 2012, 80 per cent of China’s and 90 per cent of Japan’s and South Korea’s oil import have been transported through this route. The Paracels are completely occupied by the Chinese whereas the Spratlys are dominated by the both the Chinese and the Vietnamese. The South China Sea dispute gets much more complicated because of the estimated energy reserves in the region. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the real worth of the region lies in its natural gas reserve, which is estimated to be 900 trillion cubic feet or 25 trillion cubic metres. The Arab Spring posed some serious challenges to the

108  Arnab Dasgupta net energy importers in East Asia. This has made countries like China more aggressive in their pursuit of energy security and has made them desperate enough to use even military means to secure its energy supplies. This was reflected in the hardened Chinese position on the South China Sea dispute. Some scholars, especially those from China, are of the opinion that China’s thirst for energy has been peaceful as it has calculated very diligently between options to best serve its national interests without harming any other’s. They have opined that it is not China but the US which is a bigger threat to the international energy regime. They cite the example, on the basis of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, that from 1995 to 2005 US oil imports increased by 4.42 million barrels per day whereas China’s share was 2.95 million barrels per day. Therefore, China alone cannot be held accountable for the rising graph of the international oil market. The three primary interests for the Chinese foreign policy are, first, to maintain legitimacy of the government through spectacular economic growth; second, to keep the East Asian region free from interference; and third, to avoid being drawn into any military confrontation while safeguarding national economic interests. Under such circumstances, the Chinese leadership has chosen the cheapest ways to safeguard their national interests. The Chinese arms supplies have not been specific to those countries with substantial energy resources except Iran. Again, the Chinese support to the authoritarian regimes is much less compared to the same by the US administration. Moreover, Chinese assistance to the oil-rich nations does include infrastructural development projects. China has presented itself as a responsible major power by committing a sizeable contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The Chinese involvement in the so-called rogue states like Sudan or Myanmar are not aimed at supporting those illegitimate regimes; rather they are signs of China struggling to create a niche for itself in the international energy regime. Even from its overseas assets, China does not bring home a significant portion of the oil produced, instead selling it on the international market. Therefore, a conclusion can easily be drawn that Chinese energy security drives are neither harmful nor inimical to global peace. In fact, China has two basic ways of dealing with international problems: one warm and the other cold. Whereas the Chinese have followed the latter in case of the South China Sea, they have pursued the former in the rest of the global disputes. On the other hand, not surprisingly, the China Threat Theory has no fewer takers in the West, and the impact was felt in the case of denying the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) from

China’s drive for energy security 109 acquiring stakes in Unocal in 2005. In 2012, the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted a testimony on Investigating Chinese Threat and its military and economic fallout. The US scholars are of the opinion that if China advances in the energy market in the Western Hemisphere, then that would jeopardise US energy interests in that part of the world and would result in heavier US reliance on West Asian energy supplies. However, all these probabilities will undergo significant change in view of the shale energy revolution in the US. Overall, the Chinese policy makers have adopted a strategic outlook insofar as energy policies are concerned, and this has resulted in the enmeshing of energy security with the vital notion of national security. This has the effect that Chinese energy policies are more government-driven than those of the US. China does not rely much on the market factor insofar as energy security is concerned, as the market is considered not to be neutral and totally economics driven. This has its impact on the renewed emphasis on state control upon the domestic energy infrastructure. The West therefore accuses China of adopting a mercantilist approach. The same allegation was hurled against Japan in the 1980s. China believes that business is business and politics is politics. So far as Chinese NOCs are concerned, they have adopted a ‘going out’ strategy because of commercial interests. This is so because when domestic capital develops to a certain extent where the competition becomes fiercer and the market smaller, capital transfer then has to be made to areas having lower costs and rich resources. The Chinese claim that they have no plan to attack US vested interests in energy fields; rather the perceived threat is the mere reflection of the collateral damage of their intended energy strategy across the producing regions. There is also the US dilemma: a tussle between the core foreign policy objective and foreign energy policy objectives. The foreign policies of the US have always had a negative and destabilising effect on West Asia and thereby adversely affect the international energy regime. That is why the scholars argue that it is the US, not China, which is a big threat to the international energy regime (Lei & Xuejun, 2007: 230).

Impact on Chinese foreign policy behaviour In case of a short-term supply disruption, China can withstand the challenge by virtue of its SPRs, but the global spot trading prices would skyrocket and the insurance companies will also not provide security to the Chinese tankers to carry oil along international waters. Therefore, prolonging such a disruption would be disastrous for China. China has concentrated on collaborative development of oil

110  Arnab Dasgupta infrastructure across the globe and long-term purchase contracts to hedge against spot price volatility. However, the prospect of China cooperating with other energy-consuming nations will be put to some serious test in case of China’s posture towards its Asian contenders, such as Japan and India; till now there has not been any remarkable success yet. Chinese strategic culture has been dominated by a parabellum strategic cultural outlook which implies that conflicts are inevitable due to human nature, such conflicts are zero-sum, and therefore require application of violence to win over the adversary. There are three stages of China’s rise, the first at the regional level, the second at the international level, and at the third stage China would plan and operate global issues (Paul, 2010: 53). It is to be noted that every powerful state has tried to control natural resources of other countries at their respective stages of rise, be it Britain, France, or Germany over the Afro-Asian regions in the colonisation period, or the US, for that matter, over Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s and also in West Asia during the same time. Accordingly, the Chinese PLAN seems to be following the Second Islands Chain Defence strategy in the South China Sea where it will exercise the sea denial policy in any possible future threat from the US Marines. For the Chinese, the Offshore Defence policy has evolved into the Far Sea Defence (Blazevic, 2012: 88). This called for a blue water navy. The strategy is two-pronged: one is the access denial to the South and East China Sea for foreign vessels; the other is the security of the energy supply lines through the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. However, the South China Sea provides a unique case wherein the balance between the economic might of China and the military strength of the US is sought after by the littoral states (Ranjan, 2012: 9). For China, the so-called string of pearls option is not a very suitable one, as this step will be counterproductive in the Indian Ocean Region. There has to be a fine balance between political cooperation and military hedging in the high seas insofar as its energy supply lines are concerned (Ji, 2007: 482). In 2011, China published its first-ever foreign aid policy (Provost, 2011), and this has revealed that Chinese aid has primarily targeted the oil-producing regions of the world. In 2009, Africa and Asia were the main beneficiaries, receiving 45.7 and 32.8 per cent, respectively (Xinhua, 2011). There have been three main types of aid, namely grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. The China EXIM Bank and the China Development Bank usually grant the recipient country a concessional loan securitised by the natural resources of that country. China has devised a separate aid policy which was evolved following a series of African visits by Zhou Enlai. This is known as the

China’s drive for energy security 111 Eight Principles Governing China’s Aid to other countries, which basically hinges upon mutual benefits and a ‘no-strings-attached’ policy (Bracken et al., 2012: 6). Interestingly enough, whenever a Chinese leader has visited a country, be it the Chinese president or the premier, they are accompanied by a large number of industrialists, businessmen, and technocrats. Their aim is to sign big business and infrastructure deals in that country, as they mean business. In the case of Central Asia, Chinese assistance takes the form of concessional loans in large infrastructure projects like building gas pipelines, high-speed rail connections, and oil refineries. The Chinese EXIM Bank has taken the lead in most of the cases. Another aid strategy has been the aid-for-oil policy, whereby the Chinese in 2009 financed oil deals of the Kazakh national oil company to purchase stakes in an Indonesian energy producer at a time when the international oil prices were moderate. In the case of Africa, China’s assistance in building road infrastructure has benefited China in the long run, as this has facilitated the transfer of natural resources in the recipient country for Chinese industries and also paved the way for Chinese products in that country. Of course, there have emerged problems like the huge number of Chinese expatriate labourers and Chinese monopoly over the construction industry. Again, the whole picture of Chinese aid to the developing states is not very transparent, as the Beijing government is worried about the possible fallout of the actual revelation of aid provided to other countries when a large segment of Chinese population is still living in poor conditions. Chinese activities in the energy-rich countries have also developed resentment there. However, the overall absence of democratic governance and the resulting lack of alert opposition and media have made it easier for the Chinese to go ahead with their strategy. However, the Chinese loans have been proved to be counter-effective for the recipient countries in the long term. In some cases, the recipient countries have become so burdened by debt that it has become impossible for them to qualify for new IMF loans. On the other hand, there apparently emerges a possibility of a healthy competition between the Chinese and the Western companies for the development projects in the developing world, which in turn may prove to be a boon for them. In addition, China built up a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia during the visit of President Jiang Zemin in 1999. Lately, the bilateral relations have taken a new turn whereby China has allowed Saudi companies to participate in the Chinese downstream sectors and the Chinese construction firms and other companies are also working in Saudi Arabia. It shows China’s eagerness to maintain a stable relation with the major energy supplier in the region. Besides, China has

112  Arnab Dasgupta some stable energy relations with the other energy producers in the region such as Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others. China’s long-held relationship with Iran is also evidence of that. China is wary of the Strait of Malacca dilemma, but actually there are alternatives, however costly they may be, to that strategically important route. The alternatives can be the Sunda, Lombok, and the Makassar Straits. However, these are not very wide and entail a long distance. The possibility of choking these straits altogether is unimaginable, as Japan and South Korea will also be affected due to that. An overland alternative has been suggested in the form of the Strategic Yunnan Pathway (Yunnan da tongdao). Accordingly, the MyanmarChina pipeline has been operationalised. Beijing’s 1987 blue-water maritime strategy has had an elaborate plan to acquire power for efficient sea control, with gradual progress to the status of a powerful regional navy with global reach in 2050, for the defensive purpose of protecting its own supply lines along the sea lanes of communications. The Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea can be a possible hedge against the probable disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Another hedge can be that the Sino-Russian pipeline is a branch of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline. Again, if one compares the cost of building a new pipeline with that of purchasing a second-hand or third-hand VLCC, it would be clear that the last option is more profitable (Sharan & Thiher, 2011: 16). Therefore, it becomes clear that building pipeline infrastructure is not a sufficient hedge against possible energy supply disruptions. Insofar as the South China Sea dispute is concerned, the ASEAN member states have signed a code of conduct with China in 2002 and have resolved to peacefully settle the issue of territorial disputes, but to no avail. Vietnam and China have had a history of frequent strife over the South China Sea territories. China has warned other Asian states (read India) of getting involved in this imbroglio. Both China and Vietnam are facing an increasing energy threat. However, it would be in the mutual benefit of China and Vietnam to abide by the wise observation by Deng Xiaoping to ‘set aside disputes and jointly develop the resources’ (Blazevic, 2012: 95). This would facilitate an image makeover for China as well as a positive impression for a resurgent Vietnam. There have been attempts to forge multilateral cooperative mechanisms, such as the Five Country Ministerial comprising China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the US (Christoffersen, 2010: 879). In June 2008, at the G8 Energy Ministers’ Summit in Japan, cooperation between IEA and non-IEA countries was sought to be institutionalised through the mechanism of the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC). Another such mechanism is the Asia

China’s drive for energy security 113 Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). This was initiated by the US and it includes China, India, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and Canada. It is meant to complement rather displace the Kyoto Protocol. China has also expressed its interest to engage actively with the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group and to provide leadership role in such counter-piracy mechanisms in the Indian Ocean (Paul, 2010: 67). Thus, energy security may provide China opportunities for greater power projections in the Indian Ocean Region. Today’s China nurtures geostrategic ambitions on pace with its greater role as the Eurasian pivotal power. This is more reflected in its One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy. Its prime objectives are enhancement of regional connectivity, increased financial integration, and infrastructural cooperation in the hinterland of the OBOR. Actually, these are China’s responses to the US-led multilateral mega-economic blocs like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This strategy of OBOR must be considered with another strategy, that of ‘Made in China 2025’. The OBOR, thus, would be a fitting solution to the problem of slow economic growth at home (Saran, 2015: 3). This is in line with President Xi Jinping’s pledge that the Chinese economy would move away from the investment-driven manufacturing sector to a more sustainable mode focused on services and consumption (Jacobs, 2013/2014: 24).

Conclusion It is evident that the impact of China’s drive for energy security has been profound in international politics. This has put some serious challenges to the Chinese foreign policy establishments. The time has come that China makes a fine but clear balance between vital national interests and international responsibilities. It is true that China, for all practical purposes, shall require free flow of energy and shall, accordingly, pursue that; in what fashion and at what cost are to be witnessed in the days to come. Moreover, China’s drive for energy security has to be contextualised in terms of its overall force projection capabilities across the globe.

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8 China’s north-west frontier A historical perspective Pooja Pingua

Historical and political analysis of the frontier Xinjiang is located at the frontier of north-western China. It covers vast land inhabited by various ethnic minorities. Different historical and geographical conditions have resulted in the development of unique cultural traditions among minorities (Han, 2011: 939–943). The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region (XUAR) is rich in resources such as coal, oil, and natural gas, and natural resources such as ironstone, manganese, chromium, nickel, copper, and lead. Geographically, the Xinjiang region is 1.65 million km2, which is around one-sixth the size of all China. Xinjiang additionally imparts the borders to India, Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These borders stretch over 5,600 km and represent a quarter of Chinese border land. Xinjiang is strategically a very important area for China’s national security (Mifune, 2010: 223–224). The nineteenth century marked the beginning of the demise of Xinjiang centrality in Eurasian politics. By 1884, Russian armies had completed their quest over the wealthy and powerful independent kingdoms of Central Asia and to a large extent had designated the manoeuvrability of large and powerful nomadic groups in the steppes. Russia now claimed for the tsar all the geographical area up to Xinjiang. But Xinjiang remained the bone of contention, as the area was reconquered by Zuo Zongtang’s armies and was formally proven as a Chinese province. After more than 2,000 years of internal strife, the number of competitors for power and resources in the region were divided into three: the China-based Qing dynasty, Russia, and to a lesser extent Britain, which controlled present-day India and Pakistan to the south-west (Kinzley, 2013: 141). Fight for the new region and resources by colonial empires cast a deep impact on the centrality of Xinjiang in Central Asia. Constant

118  Pooja Pingua political strife between the three empires and the channelling of trade to benefit them transformed the polity and economy of Xinjiang. There was perpetual confrontation between Russia and China regarding the ownership of the region and the exact demarcation of its boundary till the twentieth century. But no matter who was successful in taking possession of it, Xinjiang would be the frontier borderland either part of China’s north-west 2,000 miles west of Beijing, or Russia’s east 2,000 miles east of Moscow (Kinzley, 2013: 141). Turning back the pages of history, Xinjiang was an officially designated province in 1884 as a frontier of the Qing empire. But after the downfall of the dynasty in 1911, it became a border region attached to the western edge of the Chinese nation. Since 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party rose to power, there has been a widespread attempt to transform Xinjiang politically, economically, and socially by bending it closer to China’s mainland. The security considerations, national pride, socio-economic factors, and the presence of critical natural resources like oil, coal, and natural gas have played an important role in determining this policy direction. In the past 60 years, Chinese leaders have witnessed an unprecedented growth in the population of Han Chinese settlers immigrating to Xinjiang, and at the same time have invested heavily in economic development and transportation infrastructure linking the region more closely to China’s mainland. Since the reform and opening up of China beginning in 1978, these processes have accelerated, and this former ‘pivot’ of Eurasia, as Owen Lattimore once described, Xinjiang is now more than a periphery (Kinzley, 2013: 141).

Importance of territory from geostrategic point of view In Xinjiang’s west there is the Great Tianshan mountain range, which rises in the northern part of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and enters Xinjiang just north of Kashgar, dominating the region with an area 250– 300 km wide and 1,700 km long. It is China’s largest glacial area, with 6,890 glaciers covering some 7,790 km2. These glaciers in Xinjiang provide as an important source of water, supplying water for the irrigation system and feeding some of the region’s landmass (Benson & Ingvar, 1998: 11–13). Xinjiang’s international border is 5,600 km long, which comprises one-fourth of China’s total land border of about 22,000 km. Xinjiang is located in the far north-west of China, bounded on the north-east by Mongolia; on the north by Russia; on the west by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; and on the south by Afghanistan, Pakistan,

China’s north-west frontier 119 and India. Furthermore, on the east and south Xinjiang borders the Chinese province of the western region: Tibet, Qinghai, and Gansu (Rackzka, 1998: 374). China’s relationship with Xinjiang reflects historical factors of conflict between successive Chinese dynasties and people inhabiting the Xinjiang region. The centrality of the Xinjiang while framing the Silk Road policies under the PRC reflects the importance of the state to the Beijing’s conception of national interest. Xinjiang is ample in natural resources, including oil and natural gas, which have seen as the basis of China’s financial improvement. Xinjiang’s vital area in Central Asia has been of specific significance to China’s policies. To further keep the region under control and to make it an inalienable part of China, the Chinese government has attempted to use the US-led anti-terrorism campaign as legitimisation for the concealment of Islamic separatists in Xinjiang, even to the extent of linking it to Osama bin Laden in the Xinjiang separatist movement (Potter, 2010: 350–351).

History of Xinjiang China’s connections with Central Asian countries goes back to the Han dynasty (203 bc–ad 220), during which Chinese military power extended to the region (Fletcher, 1968: 207). Under this spell of exploration of the West, the Han dynasty was the first to establish influence over the area. During the Han era, military campaigns which took place under the leadership of Ban Chou led to the Tarim Basin and also the southern part of Xinjiang coming under Chinese control. This fear resulted in the Turkish tribes migrating westwards, leaving their Mongolian homeland. But due to fear of being looted or caught, they were forced to take the northern route through the Tianshan Mountain to avoid the Chinese armies (Dillon, 2004: 8–9). Chinese control of Xinjiang during the Han period fulfilled two purposes: (1) providing a protective buffer zone from the attacks of the raiders and (2) ensuring continuation of lucrative commercial trade with the West. In recent times, Han dynasty remnants have been discovered by Chinese archaeologists in the Lop Nor region in northwest Xinjiang, which argue that remnants of the Chinese dynasty were found in Kashgar, which can corroborate that the region was under Chinese rule in ancient times (Debata, 2007: 42). During Tang rule, China extended and consolidated its rule in the western region and captured the region dominated by the Sui dynasty. It is also evident that the Chinese army conquered important cities in the region such as Kucha, Khotan, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Turpan

120  Pooja Pingua between 630 and 640 ad during the rule of Li Shi-min. The significant development during the Tang period in administration was that they developed separate systems of administration for the Han and other ethnic groups in Xinjiang, which later became the baseline of Chinese policy towards the ethnic minorities of the region. They adopted a different type of administrative system in the Han-dominated inland areas of Tingzhou, Xuzhou, and Yizou, which were based on the notes of bifurcation of the prefecture, sub-prefecture, county, township, and village levels. The last few years of Tang rule in Xinjiang, up till the beginning of Manchu Qing rule, were very eventful because Islam made an entry into the region during this time (Debata, 2007: 43–44). The Arabs, who entered into Central Asia to preach and spread Islam in the region, invaded Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent and even crossed the Oxus River in ad 654. The Arabs defeated the Tang army at the battle of Talas River in the Farghana valley in ad 751, which paved the way for establishment of Islam in the region (Debata, 2007: 43–44). The influence of Islam in Xinjiang is found in Yusuf Khaas Hajib’s book on Uyghur, Kutadgu Bilig or Wisdom of Royal Glory.1 Xinjiang is believed to have come under the Islamic influence in the middle of the fourteenth century, and from this period Kashgar had remained the nerve centre of Islamic religious and literacy activity and continued to flourish till the twentieth century (Debata, 2007: 46). By the mid-fifteenth century, the Turkic speakers of the Tarim Basin Oases had converted to Islam (Starr, 2004: 326). Islam Xinjiang incorporated itself in regard to the local beliefs that persisted in the Xinjiang province. The regional thinking and lifestyle in regard to this had a great impact in the way Islam has regenerated in the region, which can also have seen in the Tarim Basin, where Buddhism influenced it to quite a great extent (Shichor, 2005: 122). Another example would be the way the proximity to the Kazakh steppes have led to Islam being affected by the forces of Shamanism, resulting in its influence by the ritual healing and prophecy, which got incorporated along with Sufism (Kressing, 2007: 9). In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Mongol empire expanded from Eastern Europe to Russia. The greatest leader of this empire, Genghis Khan (1162–1227) was known as the Universal ruler. The Xinjiang region came under the Mongols in 1215 and 1276 under the regime of Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan, leading to a more powerful Mongol empire. Mongols gave importance to trade and commerce, and pushed for the revival of the caravan trade by encouraging

China’s north-west frontier 121 merchants and missionaries to travel from Europe through Asia due to which crafts, techniques, and inventions were transmitted from one part of Asia to another. The evidence about Islam establishing a firm foothold in the region and becoming an important aspect of the Chinese culture in the fifteenth century had adduced from Al Tabriz’s translation of the major commentary on the Qur’an in the Persian language, which has produced in Bukhara under the Samanids (Debata, 2007: 44–45). After the fall of the Mongol empire, Zhu Yuanzhang captured the key areas of the region, established the Ming dynasty, and became its first emperor in 1368. Ming incorporated the oasis societies of Central Asia into China as part of their ambitious expansion plan, which was later fully realised under the Qing rule. During the Manchu Qing rule, the entire Xinjiang region, including Zhungaria, Eastern Turkistan, the principalities of Hami and Turpan, and the state of Oirates, were brought under Chinese rule (Debata, 2007: 47). During this period, a Kokandi general, Yakub Beg, established an Islamic republic in Kashgar for a short period. During his rule in Kashgar from 1867 to 1877, Yakub received help from Russia and the British and Ottoman Empires for his efforts to establish an independent republic. Even the Ottoman emperor provided men and material to Yakub to successfully establish Islamic rule in Xinjiang (Debata, 2007: 47–50). However, he could not last for long, and he failed to deter the Qing to establish control in Xinjiang. With this, Xinjiang – otherwise known as ‘New Territory’, ‘New Land’, and ‘New Dominion’ – finally became an integral part of China in 1884 with Urumchi as its capital. The decline of the Qing empire created a mess in the region. At that point of time, Tsarist Russian rulers were interested in capturing this region to checkmate any advance by the British from India. In 1911, when China was declared a republic, three Chinese warlords from Manchuria ruled the region till 1949, for a period of nearly four decades. Yang Tseng Sin, the first governor of republican Xinjiang, could never clearly balance the various ethnicities which existed in the region, which led to chaos among them as well as his assassination in 1928 (Millward & Nabijan, 2004: 70). During his rule, the USSR was established after the Great October Revolution, which wanted to continue the Tsarist legacy in Xinjiang. Soviets did manage to convince the Chinese warlords and established their influence till the independence of China in 1949 (Forbes, 1986: 108). After Yang, Jin Shuren declared himself as a provincial governor in 1928. His rule was very eventful. On 12 November 1933, the Uyghurs came up to establish an East Turkistan Republic (ETR) in the Kashgar

122  Pooja Pingua region, claiming the territory which has spread over the Aksu along the Tarim Basin to Khotan in the south (Millward & Nabijan, 2004: 71). Another important highlight of this period was the Soviets gaining influence in the region. Sheng Shicai, who came up in 1934 with Soviet support, was the last warlord to rule over the area (Gillbert, 1969: 240, 12–13; Forbes, 1986: 106; Wang, 1999: 202–205). His state witnessed ETR establish in 1944–49 after the ‘Three Districts Revolution’2 (Debata, 2007: 55). However, the second ETR could not last long. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took control over Xinjiang in 1949 after the victory of the communists over the nationalists. Xinjiang’s administration has entrusted to the PLA First Army under General Wang Zen (Millward & Nabijan, 2004: 86). In a new phase in the history of Xinjiang, Chinese warlords came forward to rule over Xinjiang. The rule of the Chinese warlords brought economic misery for the people and the suppression of religious freedoms of the Muslims. They annexed semi-autonomous domains, which later led to revolt against Chinese rule (Debata, 2007: 51). In the meantime, PLA control entered Xinjiang from the eastern part in the winter of 1949–50, and incorporated the 30,000-strong East Turkistan Army consisting of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Russians, and other minorities as the fifth army (Debata, 2007: 55). PLA’s control over the region provided leeway to the Chinese Communist Party to create new government at the regional level. Xinjiang was liberated on 25 September 1949 and the provisional people’s government was set up at Urumchi on 17 December 1949. In the 1950s, the Chinese leadership invited eight prominent leaders of the East Turkistan movement to discuss the relationship of Xinjiang and the PRC. These Uyghur leaders were killed in an air crash; the Uyghurs claim that the Chinese authorities masterminded their killing in the Panfilov town of Kazakhstan at the order of Russia’s leader, Joseph Stalin (Millward & Nabijan, 2004: 34–35). Recognising Xinjiang’s special ethnic countenance, Beijing gave it the status of an autonomous region (XUAR) on 1 October 1955, with the principle group (Uyghur) as the determinant (Debata, 2007: 56).

Present situation in Xinjiang After the boundary agreement, China and Pakistan agreed to jointly build a road connecting Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and western China through Khunjerab Pass. It was propagated as an economic project with the stated aim of enhancing communication links, improving trade and economic relations between the countries, and developing

China’s north-west frontier 123 regional trade linkage. However, its political and strategic significance was a hotly and widely debated issue at that time. It was common knowledge that the Chinese were more interested in the project than Pakistan. The reason behind Chinese interest was the territorial vulnerability of its western part. The western part of China, which at the time incorporated Shaanxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Tibet, and Chongqing, was considered the weakest part of China. For the Chinese, Karakoram Highway was primarily aimed, but not exclusively restricted, to strengthen in the western part of the country (Shukla, 2013: 219–220). The construction of a modern road started in 1964, by 1969 it was roughly completed, and by 1978 it was declared open to the country. It is the most astounding international road in the world, which connects Kashgar (XUAR of China) with Gilgit Baltistan (the Pakistanoccupied territory of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir). The highway is deliberately situated among Eurasian and Indian plates from where China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan come surprisingly within 250 km of each other. The highway has undoubtedly strengthened Pakistan’s and China’s hold over the illegally occupied territories of India, and has provided China an opportunity to send overt military and other suppliers to strengthen Pakistan against its archrival China (Shukla, 2013: 220). Former President Pervez Musharraf, in his autobiography, clearly mentions that given the terrain back in the 1970s, the under construction Karakoram Highway was called the ‘eighth wonder of the World’. His advent to power as president of Pakistan, after the fourth military coup in October 1999, coincided with China’s ‘open up the west’ or ‘go west’ strategy, which was primarily aimed at reducing the fast growing socio-economic development gap between the weak western wing and well-off but faraway coastal provinces. Leaders of both countries frequently refer to ‘Friendship Highway’ during their official discussion and speeches to highlight its importance in their relationship. On 21 May 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, while making a speech of thanks at Musharraf’s dinner party, said: China and Pakistan are close neighbours; two thousand years ago, the Silk Road served as a bridge for our friendly exchange. Today we are closely linked up by Karakoram Highway. For 50 years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-Pakistan Friendship and Cooperation have continued to develop thanks to our joint efforts. (Shukla, 2013: 220–221)

124  Pooja Pingua China and Pakistan have kept up an ‘all-weather’ friendship in view of the basic favourable position in guaranteeing their outskirts against and checking the effect of their enemy neighbouring country, India. The Karakoram Highway, a 500-mile partitioned highway is associated with Kashgar in China’s XUAR with Islamabad. The road was developed to cultivate trade and individual construction for the verifiable reason to encourage trade and people contact, and the specific inspiration driving redesigning both political and vital control over their frontiers and capacity to make outside and inner security threats. Upon its fruition, China’s then representative head Premier Li Xiannian unreservedly communicated that the free expressway ‘allows China to give military aid to Pakistan’ (Haider, 2005: 522). The utility and the typical estimation of the expressway for Pakistan and China trade along its length all through the 1990s constituted of arms, drugs, and religion, comprehensively blurring the countries’ friendship due to the road’s impact on the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Pakistan’s links with these Uyghurs have strained Islamabad’s significant political-economic ties with Beijing. China considers Xinjiang having abundant resources and its importance as it is the area just adjoining Central and South Asia. China’s endeavour towards keeping up and combining control over its ‘wild west’ has been an essential and cruising sensitivity towards Beijing. Unsteadiness in Xinjiang rises up out of the Uyghurs, sentiments of otherworldly, cultural, and political alienation, as a Turkic Muslim people start from the definitively atheist, Han Chinese–dominated PRC (Haider, 2005: 523). China engaged in strategic cooperation with Pakistan since 1965 and provided nuclear assistance too, but Dr A. Q. Khan raised concerns about the pro-American stance of its partner. Since the allweather 3,000 km Karakoram Highway connects Urungi in Xinjiang province with Gilgit in the PoK, Beijing must contemplate the consequence of an increased American involvement in the area in proximity to China as far as its interest in Central Asia is concerned (Subramanian, 2005: 51). China has firmed up its arrangement to develop a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kashgar and connect it by major rail with the PoK along the Karakoram Highway. Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, during his visit to China in early July 2010, urged the China Northern Railway Cooperation (CNR) to concretise the planned rail network linking Kashgar and Pakistan (Warikoo, 2013: 99). Pakistan Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf visited China to push economic ties as ‘all-weather’ partners are taking a forward arrangement to assemble a railroad line from western China through PoK. The

China’s north-west frontier 125 Pakistani ambassador to China, Masood Khan, in an interview given in July 2010 unveiled that the ‘pre-feasibility work on the proposed rail line has been completed.’ This rail line runs from Kashgar, the old Silk Road town in China’s far eastern region of Xinjiang, through the Khunjerab pass in PoK and on to Havelin, where it joins the Pakistan railway network. The Chinese work on site is almost complete and the train is running up to Kashgar and Hotan. China was augmenting and repaving the Karakoram Highway, which keeps running from Kashgar through PoK to Pakistan. It is attempting to make it an all-weather road – the highway is shut for around six months consistently amid the winter, and has been damaged by late flooding. While the Chinese side highway has been complete, it is helping Pakistan in a $ 500 million effort to repave and broaden the highway in Pakistan and in PoK. Recent reports suggest that the China has taken over the management of Gwadar port in Pakistan. As such, China is implementing its plan to have direct access to the Arabian Sea through the Karakoram Highway and Pakistan. China has thus secured an alternative route to its trade with West Asia (Krishnan, 2012: 4). The only official proposal which the British had ever formally made in Beijing with regard to defining the borders in this region was one made during 1899. That proposal had sought to define China’s boundaries with British India along the Mustagh-Karakoram-­Laktsang Line including the Lingzhithang plains, but it did not claim the north-­ eastern Aksai Chin. This is where China has built its strategic Karakoram Highway in Pakistan, which was to become the first major bone of contention linking China to Kashmir. This was, of course, followed by the Dalai Lama being granted asylum along with thousands of his followers, thereby reinforcing China’s security-centric South Asian vision as well as enhancing its interest in the Kashmir question (Singh, 2003: 77). In this reaction, Beijing has diminished border trade, held up solid dissent with the Pakistan government, and even shut the expressway for a short period. While Islamabad had truly embraced a tolerant state of mind toward the Uyghur nearness in Pakistan and never got a handle on their separatist cause, it has taken measures since the late 1990s to finish China’s fear. Along with the opening of the highway to Pakistan, Beijing’s conceding the Uyghurs is noteworthy a socioeconomic issue in the region. The Soviet-Afghan war and the rise of the Taliban and radical Islam turned into a constraint in Xinjiang. Meanwhile, Pakistan has expressed its willingness to be a partner in China’s ‘war on terror’, keeping in mind the end goal to spare their all-weather friendship and protect its own national advantage. Also,

126  Pooja Pingua in 2005 Pakistan joined as a spectator in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is a regional partner with counter-terrorism oppression (Haider, 2005: 523–524). At the point when Gwadar port and Kashgar city connected through the Karakoram Highway, two enormous supply and consumer markets will get physically related to making Balochistan and Xinjiang (two moderately reserved and restive regions) the centre points of territorial exchange and financial movement. The nearby vital, social, and political relations between the two neighbours are progressively forming into exchange, and economic cooperation and vistas are opening for development the wake of plan for headway of Gwadar port and Kashgar as a SEZ. Pakistan’s ‘Look East’ and China ‘Go West’ policies arrangement give the relationship advance significance. Ordinarily valuable relations with China are the establishment of Pakistan’s ‘Look East’ policy, while the ‘Go West’ policy predominately goes for building up landlocked and anxious Xinjiang by creating framework in Pakistan and giving outlet for trade and energy transportation. The essentialness of the area of Gwadar port and Kashgar city, the geofinancial significance of activities for Pakistan and China, have a definitely effect on provincial exchange in general and bilateral trade in particular (Ahmad Khan, 2013: 87–100). The Great Western Development Programme (GWDP) (Xibu da Kaifa) concentrates on the improvement of the entire north-­western area of Xinjiang. The program lays weight on the hard and fast advancement of the territory for which trade and economic cooperation with the neighbouring region is particularly basic. Now, Xinjiang borders with Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and even Pakistan (Debata, 2012: 84–85). Recently, trade between India and Xinjiang has reached USD 47 million by 2011 (Krishan, 2011). In order to strengthen business relations with India, there has been trade appointments from Kashgar, which is welcomed by the Indian business groups (Debata, 2012: 85). Afterward, in June 2004, the experts in Xinjiang promoted an across the country battle to accomplish economic integration of Kashgar (Rajan, 2006), a town known for its notable part in matters of China’s trade through the ancient Silk Route, with eight nations in Central and South Asia. The primary purpose of Kashgar’s economic integration with Central and South Asia is to ensure security, stability, and prosperity of the volatile region of Xinjiang (Rajan, 2006). In 2009, Kashgar completed a SEZ on the model of Shenzhen and Guangdong (Debata, 2007: 85).

China’s north-west frontier 127 In 2010, the city of Shenzhen and the provinces of Guangdong were separated by the Central government to give development help to Kashgar, and have brought scores of business social occasions and improvement activities Kashgar. Since the foundation of the SEZ is exactly at its rising stage, in this way were dealing with the general advancement plan and infrastructure construction (Yuan, 2013: 28–29). In the South Asian setting, the proposition for Kashgar’s economic integration with the outside world assumes greater significance. As a subsequent activity to the economic integration of Kashgar, a sixmember appointment driven by the governor of Xinjiang, Ismail Tiliwaldi, visited India in October keeping in mind the end goal to resuscitate old ties and promote bilateral connection with India. Both sides made recommendations for an India-Xinjiang interface, air course (Delhi-Kashgar), laying a natural gas pipeline from Xinjiang to India through Ladakh, and reciprocal participation in four fields: agriculture and processing, customary solution and herbs, energy and oil production, and tourism (Rajan, 2006). Beijing trusted that the Karakoram Highway links with Xinjiang and Pakistan. It has been encouraging the impact of the Islamic belief system into Xinjiang and the radical Uyghur militant movement (Haider, 2005: 523). In 2010, a SEZ was set up in the city, performing as a centre point for Kashgar and neighbouring counties with Pakistan and Kazakhstan. A twin tower building is to fill in as a five-star hotel and give obligation-free shopping. The new financial specialists to the metropolis may be frightened away by these detached episodes. The attack will just influence society temporarily, yet as an SEZ, Kashgar’s potential is promising (Jai, 2013: 5–6). China recently pointed the accusing finger at Pakistan after an attack in Yecheng, Xinjiang, on 28 February 2012. The chairman of the Xinjiang Regional Government (XRG) remarked a week later, on 7 March 2012, that the attackers had ‘one thousand and one links’ with Pakistan. China further indicted Pakistan when profiles of six Uyghurs from China who allegedly operate in ‘South Asia’ as members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) were published on the website of China’s Ministry of Public Security on 6 April 2012 (Krishan, 2011). The regional government of China in the far western Xinjiang region is quick to revive the frontier trade with India that once flourished along the disputed western segment of the border and is including India’s contribution wanting to build up a SEZ in the border of

128  Pooja Pingua Kashgar. Governor Nur Bekri of the XUAR has visited New Delhi and Mumbai. The regional government has looked to make light of its part as an extension for China’s interest in neighbouring PoK, which fills in as a critical land link between China and Pakistan (Krishan, 2011). When Premier (Chancellor) Li Keqiang visited Pakistan, the economic corridor project connecting Kashgar in China’s XUAR to the south-western Pakistan part of Gwadar was proposed as an imperative assertion between two nations. These specialists forecasted that the projects may incorporate road and railway, notwithstanding fibreoptic connections and even pipelines. The working of the corridor would help China in accomplishing the revival of the Pakistan economy, which is crucial to its Asian dream. Shamshad Ahmed, a former foreign secretary of Pakistan, and Ambassador Masood Khalid both acknowledge that the corridor project is of great significance as it fits China’s needs in developing the far west’s regional stability as well as its economic integration (Xinhua, 2013). The corridor will be associated with Gwadar port in Balochistan (Pakistan) to Kashgar in north-western China, and it will make Gwadar completely operational and furthermore a critical remote ocean seaport in the region. When the corridor project is completed, it will help as an essential entryway for exchange between China and the Middle East and Africa. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a far-reaching improvement program that connections Gwadar port to China’s north-western region of Xinjiang through highway, railroad, oil and gas pipeline, and fibre-optic joins. This major framework incorporates 27,000 km of highway stretching from Kashgar to Gwadar through Khunjerab and railway connect for cargo preparation among Gwadar and Khunjerab. This rail connection is vital because it connects China and has conceivable system connectivity with Afghanistan, Iran, India, and the Karachi-Lahore motorway. The projects will also incorporate the recuperation and the expansion of the Karakorum Highway that connects Xinjiang (China’s western province) with Pakistan and China, and furthermore conceives building up a few economic corridor zones (Sail, 2016). From 2020, Xinjiang will have a four rail portal to inland China, addition to four circular lines interfacing all the real urban areas in the region. In any case, the neighbourhood individuals are additionally excited about arrangement to construct a railroad to interface Kashgar in Xinjiang with the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan might want to manufacture another achievement like rail, roads connection to Kashgar, and build

China’s north-west frontier 129 up a Sino-Pakistani economic corridor. The China abroad Port Holding Company assumed control over the administration of Gwadar, a profound water port on the shores of the Arabian Sea and arranged nearly to the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian border. On the off chance that overland associates were to be built up, Gwadar port would turn into the beginning stage for the conveyances of oil and natural gas in Xinjiang (Jai, 2013: 5–6). Xinjiang was once a prominent region along Silk Road, 2,000 years ago, and is attempting to reposition itself as the epicentre of exchange among China and Eurasian countries. The exhibition endeavours to wind up distinctly for participation in the Eurasian region by utilising Xinjiang’s favourable topographical position (Xiaoyan, 2014: 14).

Conclusion The Xinjiang region is 1.65 million km2, which is about one-sixth the size of all China. Xinjiang is bordered by eight countries including India, Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. These borders stretch over 5,600 km and represent a quarter of the Chinese borderland. China and Pakistan have kept up an ‘all-weather’ friendship fellowship in light of their common advantage in securing their borders against the influence of their rival neighbour, India. The Karakoram Highway, a 500-mile highway, connects Kashgar in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Islamabad. The highway was built for the express reason for encouraging exchange and individual-to-individual contact, and the certain motivation behind upgrading nation political and calculated control of both countries their frontiers and capability to manage with external and internal security threats. The social, political, and economic relations between the two neighbours are dynamically shaping into trade and economic cooperation, and vistas are opening for development in the wake of the plan for improvement of Gwadar port and Kashgar as a Special Economic Zone. Pakistan’s ‘Look East’ and China ‘Go West’ strategies give the relationship encourage profundity. The new and ambitious scholarly projects funded by the government and the aggressive attempts to diverge from the historical party line have played an important role in this process and have strengthened the impression of Xinjiang from a straightforward and harsh, remote place tacked on to China’s western edge. However, ample attention is required to elevate Xinjiang into a prosperous and progressive region.

130  Pooja Pingua

Notes 1 Kutadgu Bilig or Wisdom of Royal Glory was written in Kashgar in 1069 and placed by its translator Robert Dankoff in the category of ‘Mirrors for Prince’, which is a guide to rulers on administration, justice, manner, and so forth. For details, see Michael Dillon (2004), p. 11. 2 According to a historical dictionary of Xinjiang, the ‘Three Districts Revolution’ was an armed uprising against the reactionary rule of the nationalist Kuomintang, mainly by Uyghurs and Kazakhs in three north-western districts of Xinjiang: Ili, Techeng, and Ashan (now Altai) in north-western Xinjiang. These three districts had the majority of the region’s Kazakh population. For details, see Dillon (2004), p. 32; and Colin Mackerras (2003), p. 98.

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132  Pooja Pingua Wang, David. 1999. Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944–1949, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Warikoo, K. 2013. ‘Central Asia-China Co-operation: Lesson for India’, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 17 (3–4) (July–December): 95–109. Yuan, Yuan. 2013.’Location, Location, and Location: Kashgar Is China’s Portal to Eurasian Trade’, Beijing Review, 18 July, pp. 28–29. Xinhua. 2013. ‘Economic Corridor Link China, Pakistan Dream’, China Daily, at http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-09/02/content_16937130. htm (accessed 15 December 2016). Xiaoyan, Zhou. 2014. ‘In the Footstep of History: A Proposed Economic Belt Along the Ancient Silk Road Aims to Lift Regional Economic, Notwithstanding the Many Obstacles in Its Path’, Beijing Review, 27 March, p. 14.

9 The great Asian security complex China’s security concerns and its responses towards the South China Sea Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah Background of the South China Sea dispute The multi-factor complexities and overlapping jurisdictional claims on the strategic archipelago of the SCS (South China Sea) made the region more volatile and disputed in global politics. There are two main disputed archipelagos, the Spratly (Nansha Qundao) and Paracel (Xisha Qundao in Chinese) Islands, that increase the territorial and jurisdictional claims among the littoral states of the SCS. The SCS is described as part of the Pacific Ocean, from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan together with the Korean Peninsula. The SCS has geostrategic importance due to the encompassing of maritime routes between the Pacific and the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). It is the largest semi-enclosed region in the world which covers almost 3.5 million square kilometres (Shicun, 2013: 4). The region has various dimensions related to maritime communication routes and matters of security concern with littoral states. There are different aspects of maritime security in the region such as maritime terrorism, sea piracy, narcoterrorism, and illegal trafficking of arms through sea routes. However, all claimant states have also worried about transnational issues such as environmental protection, marine biodiversity, and management of natural resources in terms of jurisdictional and equal distribution among all states (Shicun, 2013: 6). The region has core concerns related to providing the safety for navigational activities and the maritime interests of littoral states. Currently, the region is facing serious maritime disputes due to conflicts on two strategic archipelagos: the Paracel Islands in the northwest and the Spratly Islands in the South. The Paracel Islands include 130 small coral islands, banks, and reefs. The region has been occupied by the PRC (People’s Republic of China) since the battle between

134  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah China and Vietnam in 1974. However, the Paracel Islands have also been strongly claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan (the Republic of China) in the last two decades (Bouchat, 2014: 2) The PRC has also occupied some of the Spratly Islands after this major battle. The Spratly Islands conflict is the most important maritime conflict between China and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) in present SCS politics. However, China and Vietnam have claimed possession of the Spratly Islands to ensure their historical linkage of territorial claims by earlier dynasties. The Philippines and Malaysia have also claimed the Spratly Islands after 1970. The disputes among the littoral states were increased due to the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) in 1982 which restricted the area of 200 nautical miles (nm) for the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) (Shicun, 2013: 4). The Republic of the Philippines commenced international arbitral proceedings in January 2013 against the PRC. It was initiated under article 287 of the UNCLOS. The case challenges the sovereignty and legality of the PRC’s claims over the SCS Islands and regards the issues of living and non-living natural resources exploitation over the islands. The Philippine government has submitted its report including 10 volumes and 4,000 pages with the descriptive detail over jurisdictional claims in the SCS (Liu & Spangler, 2016). In this matter, it determined and strengthened the involvement of other littoral states for jurisdictional claims over the islands of the SCS. There are five other major claimant parties other than China: Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei (Liu & Spangler, 2016). However, China claimed approximately the entire SCS, and it has strong strategic and military presence over the disputed islands. China vociferously claimed the entire SCS after the disintegration of the former USSR. The executive of Yuan province under the ROC (Republic of China) approved the policy guidelines for the management of its territorial claims on 13 April 1993. In terms of History, Geography, International law and facts, the Nancha Islands (Spratly Islands), Shisha Islands (Paracel Islands), Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Islands), Tungsha Islands (Pratas Islands) are part of inherent territory of the ROC; the sovereignty over those islands belongs to the Republic of China. The South China Sea area within the historical water limit is the maritime area under the jurisdiction of the ROC, where the ROC possesses all rights and interests. (Hu Alfred, Nien-Tsu & McDorman, 2013: 4)

The great Asian security complex 135 Therefore, claimant states became uncomfortable towards Chinese strategies due to its unfavourable conduct over the maritime disputes in the SCS. In consequence, ASEAN countries, mainly the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, are greeting the US Asia-Pivot policy and crafting the strategic appearance of the US troops around the SCS. On the other hand, other regional powers such as India, Australia, and Japan are also increasing their strategic and political engagement with ASEAN countries. However, China has also territorial disputes over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands with Japan. Therefore, the Japanese foreign policy paradigm has shifted towards the US and its alliances in the region. Japan again joined the Indo-US Malabar annual naval exercises in July 2014. These countries have also planned to increase their comprehensive strategic mechanism with ASEAN countries to join the Malabar naval exercises series in the region (Kumar, 2015: 19). Therefore, the number of claimants such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and PRC created uncompromising complexities among the interests of each party in the region. Currently, the region has been called as the ‘mother of all territorial disputes’ due to major complexities among the claimant parties (Beukel, 2010: 8–9). China is outward for its strategic appearance in the region due to its multi-complex disputes with littoral states of the SCS. Therefore, it has maritime security concerns in the region due to the long dependency of its trade and commercial activities in the SCS.

The Great Asian Super Complex: understanding China’s strategic vision in the South China Sea To understand the Chinese geostrategic and political hallucination in the region, it is necessary to understand the post–Cold War Chinese global emergence and its commitment towards the visualisation of the ‘peaceful rise of China’ in world politics. Therefore, to identify Chinese vision in the SCS, it is obligatory to understand the framework of the theory of ASC (Asian Super Complex) that was given by Barry Buzzan to understand the security instrumentation on the Asian continent. Since the Cold War period the security architecture of the Asia Pacific came under the different regional complexities. The region faced different Regional Security Complexes due to antagonism between two superpowers (US and USSR) in the region. Barry Buzzan understands the regional security complexes to find some systematic framework for the securitisation of the regional security subsystem which confined around the precise geographical region (Buzzan, 1988: 3–4).

136  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah During the Cold War period, there were different regional security frameworks in the different regions such as South West Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, and North East Asia to understand the regional and sub-regional complexities within a regional framework (Danner, 2016: 3). In the Cold War period, the security of the South East Asian region under the regional complexities due to internal security complex (one communist-led group of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea; another Western-oriented group of Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia) within the region. The region faced internal security complexes due to lack of resilient regional security arrangements within the regional mechanism. Further, due to China’s rapid military rise and its inimical nature in the SCS inducement, the regional security interests of the South East Asia and North East Asia regional complexes toward strategic proximity in the region. On the other hand, India has also faced the security challenges from China due to its expansionist nature around the Himalayan boundaries. Therefore, India pitched its ‘Look East Asia’ policy to strengthen its strategic proximity with South East Asian and North East Asian nations to counter Chinese resentment in the region. It is also worried about the Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ policy around the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). Therefore, there was an amalgamation of interests enlarged among diverse regional security complexes due to China’s unfavourable dealing among the SCS littoral states. All these contexts were strengthened to raise the theory of ASC (Buzzan, 2003: 172– 174). Barry Buzzan and Ole Weaver have scrutinised the concept of regional security architecture in the context of China’s rapid rise in the global politics. They have analysed the expansions of Chinese strategic policies towards the Indo-Pacific region and its naval appearance over the disputed islands in the SCS. However, China started to increase its war competencies after the Cold-War period. The PLA (People Liberation Army) has pitched the viewpoint of white papers in 2000 and 2001 heading the Beijing actual security reality in the twenty-first century. China conducted the ASAT (Anti-satellite Weapon Test) on 11 January 2007 to upsurge the war capabilities of the PRC (Prathibha, 2014: 587–588). Beijing has increased its naval capabilities by launching its first aircraft carrier in 2012, the Liaoning. China also has future plans to build the second aircraft carrier in the Dalian shipyard, intending to finalise its construction by 2018. The People Liberation Army (PLA) has also aimed to complete a flotilla of four carriers by 2020 (Thompson, 2014: 1). Therefore, Beijing is increasing its strategic and naval presence to confirm the maritime claim and safety of its natural resources in the SCS. In this series of

The great Asian security complex 137 small footsteps, China is trying to design strategic machinery to reduce the negligible resistance in the littoral states of the SCS. Therefore, Beijing’s energetic naval engagement in the SCS has jeopardised the region toward more security complexities. These new complexities strengthened the status quo of ASC in global politics. On the one hand, littoral states have a suspicion about Chinese naval modernisation and its inimical approach toward the SCS. On the other hand, some of the ASEAN countries, especially the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, are increasing their military and defence engagement with the US due to Beijing’s unfavourable maritime claim in the SCS. However, the US troops have a long security and defence settlement in the region from the Cold War period. The Obama administration was tilted toward the Pacific lateral after the announcement of the ‘Asia-Pivot policy’ (2011) to rebalance its strategic and military engagement with its Pacific alliances. The US has avowed its ‘Asia-Pivot policy’ with its soaring naval capabilities, fragmented from the current 50/50 to 40/60 by 2020 between the Antarctic and Asia-Pacific, respectively (Hilal, 2013: 78). It is increasing its realignment of powers among its Pacific alliances in the region. The central aim behind this strategic pivot is to strengthen its geostrategic, political, and military alignments with the ASEAN countries and creating the new security arrangement in the SCS. The security mechanism of the region carried by the USPACOM (US Pacific Command) which covered almost 50 per cent of earth surface and 60 per cent of the population in the world. USPACOM covers the near area from Alaska to Madagascar and India to the South Pacific region (Vaughan, 2007: 2, 4). Washington has intensified its strategic and defence proximity to mark the balance of power in contrast to Chinese speculation in the SCS. It is playing an active role to retain the security framework in the region. On the other hand, other regional powers such as Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea are coming forward to the establishment of new strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific region. However, there are other South East Asian middle players such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore which have diplomatic and military strength to endure a power equilibrium in the SCS. For example, in the year 2013, India, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia have a combined GDP of almost USD 9.13 trillion and a collective defence expenditure of USD 127.80 billion. By contrast, the Chinese economy was USD 9.18 trillion and defence expenditure was USD 188.46 billion (Rory & Mohan, 2014: 2). Therefore, these powers have the potential to strengthen their economic, political, and strategic proximity to mark the ‘middle

138  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah power coalition’ for the power equilibrium in the region. These powers have dissimilar opportunities to carry strategic policies within the new security mechanism. Furthermore, these regional powers are increasing their regional and multilateral approaches in the region. And some are carrying non-alignment approaches to solve regional complexities (Rory & Mohan, 2014: 11). For instance, there is strategic correspondence between India’s ‘Look East Policy’ (now called ‘Act East Policy’) and Australia’s ‘Look West Policy’ to increase their regional inducement among the ASEAN countries (Scott, 2012: 168), although the US ‘Asia-Pivot policy’ has an equivalent vision to boom the geostrategic, political, and defence engagement among the Pacific alliances. Therefore, there is strategic symmetry among the US, India, and Australian foreign policies towards the South East Asian region. These countries are increasing their strategic proximity in the region. There are other key factors such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam also playing a major role to increase the geostrategic proximity in the region. Therefore, all these entire complexities strengthen the ASC, shift the regional security concerns towards the GASC due to new symmetries of power politics among regional and great powers in SCS. Therefore, new regional security complexities in the region are shifting the paradigm of power toward the building of new institutional mechanisms in the SCS.

China’s security concerns in the South China Sea China has long-term security concerns in the South China Sea. It is concentrating its maritime security due to its maritime disputes with littoral states and most recently the US pivot in the region. However, the nationalist government of the PRC was demarcating its maritime boundaries in a U-shaped series of maps from 1947. It was prepared by a Chinese internal government report in 1935 to define their limitations of maritime boundaries in the region. Therefore, after the establishment of communist regime (1949) under Mao Zedong, the claim was keeping powerfully due to Beijing expansionist policies. However, PRC clarifies its sovereignty over the region after ratified its territorial low in the Contiguous Zone after 1992. Beijing legitimised its territorial claims within the U-shaped line in the SCS (Dutton Peter, 2011: 47–54). Further, it increased its naval activities in the region and signified itself with strong strategic and political fantasy for permanent claim over the SCS.

The great Asian security complex 139 On the other hand, other littoral states were opposed to the Chinese territorial claims over the SCS, especially after the UNCLOS in 1982. Although China continuously increased its naval illustration in the SCS to show its military strength in the region. Chinese political fantasy has pushed the region toward ASC due to security complexes over all island disputes. Currently, in the case of China, it has serious security concerns within new security arrangements in the region. It is uncomfortable about its maritime security due to defence and security strengthening between the US and its Pacific alliances. Further, there is another middle power coalition generating the strategically solemn arrangement of power in the region. All these anxious circumstances are leading the Great Asian Super Complex within the region, for which China has traditional or non-traditional security concerns. • Beijing is very solemn about its non-traditional security threats in the region. It is aware of its jurisdictional claim over the disputed islands for securitisation of their interests and protects the living and non-living natural resources in the SCS. It also has non-traditional security concerns such as sea piracy (Bateman and Emmers, 2008: 2), narcoterrorism, climate change, maritime crimes, terrorism, and saving the biodiversity of the SCS (Shicun, 2013: 67–78). Therefore, China has strong security concerns in the region due to more availability of natural resources in the region. • Being an emerging economic power in the Asian continent, China needs to secure its maritime silk routes and its oil shipping routes in the SCS to secure its commercial and trade security in the region. China’s prime coastal sea routes are around the South China Sea, East China Sea, and south of Taiwan. The intact sea lines of the region are under the US domination due to its naval presence in the region. Hence, China is suspicious about the US presence in the SCS and its defence engagement with its Pacific alliances such as Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and so forth. China has maritime security suspicions due to the US pivot and its defence rearrangement within the regional security framework. Therefore, within the theatre of GASC, China is keen-sighted itself insecure in term of the status quo of power politics in the SCS. • The Asia Pacific region under the new strategic measurements due to power landscape toward the Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region. The region is the fulcrum of power politics due to new regional security arrangements in the region. There is an amalgamation of interests between the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Pacific Ocean regional countries, to secure their maritime interests

140  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah within the common framework. Nowadays the region is called the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region for acknowledgment of world politics. The Indo-Pacific countries are increasing their strategic, economic, and defence proximity in the region, especially in the case of Japan, India, Australia, and the US with its Pacific-alliances. The new power arrangement among these powers is building the ‘IndoPacific’ regional security architecture, which formed the ‘security dilemma’ for China’s ambitious dream for ASA (China-centric Asian Security Architecture).

China’s strategic and diplomatic responses in the South China Sea China has the substantial importance of the SCS due to its traditional and non-traditional security concerns in the region. It is worried about its maritime security due to the intervention of external powers in the region and internationalisation of the SCS disputes. For instance, the US-Asia pivot policy and its defence engagement with other Pacific alliances in the region created new security suspicions for Beijing. China perceived the SCS as a ‘throat’ of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Region because SCS is connected to the Strait of Malacca to the south-west and Taiwan Strait to the north-east region of China. The Chinese population density in the southern regions and its commercial interdependence on the region tilted its strategic policies toward the SCS. China is uncomfortable due to new security complexities under the GASC in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it is cementing its national security interests in the region through its geostrategic and military appearance in the SCS. It is responding to the new symmetry of power rearrangement within GASC. Currently, it is following the dissimilar strategic and diplomatic policies to normalise the new security complexities with littoral states and to mitigate the security threats in the SCS. •

Reviving the earliest MSR (Maritime Silk Route) is the latest Chinese response to counter the regional security complexities in the SCS. Chinese policy makers are optimistic for this new global strategy, to reshape the China’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region. China has a strong shift on reviving the MSR for visualisation of regional cooperation and stability in the SCS. The MSR project will upsurge Chinese connectivity with West Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, and the African continent, and strengthen the Chinese position in the world politics (Chaturvedy, 2014). As part of this, China wants to show its global commitment for its ‘peaceful rise’

The great Asian security complex 141 and provide the development opportunities for Asian countries with the posture of ‘win-win diplomacy’ in the region. Beijing’s strategic bid is mainly concerned with the US pivot and beside the argument of ‘string of pearls’ policy in the region. The main intention behind this strategic move is that China wants to normalise the conflicts in the SCS and build the joint infrastructure for the enhancing maritime economic and security cooperation in the region. • Currently, Beijing is diversifying energy routes to normalise its dependency on the Persian Gulf and Strait of Malacca due to more commercial dependency and US naval dominance. As part of this, Beijing is proposing new routes for the fulfilment of its energy requirements in the region. For instance, Myanmar-China gas pipelines, IPC (Iran-Pakistan-China) project, Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor, and most recently the ambitious Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from the Gwadar port of Pakistan to the Chinese Xinjiang province. China has a strong determination to fulfil its energy hunger with the addition of diverse energy routes in Asia as well as the world. China has also taken a step to connect the Eurasian region with its ‘One Belt One Road’ strategic vision to fulfil its commercial and energy hunger in the region. • Since the Cold War period, China is trying to make the Chinacentric Asian security architecture. It announced for the first time the new concept of security in the PLA newspaper Jiefang Junbao in 24 December 1997. It included security in terms of military, political, cultural, social, scientific, and technological aspects of the nations. The Chinese president clarified the Chinese concept of security in the Conference on Interaction and CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia) in June 2014 in Shanghai. He announced that ‘Security in Asia should be maintained by Asia themselves’ (Keck, 2014). Ultimately, he rejected the US involvement in the Pacific region, especially in the SCS. China is trying to construct the new kind of notion about the Asian security architecture, which mitigates the outside interference in the SCS. • China built the artificial islands in October 2015, which cover 3,000 acres on seven coral reefs, of the Spratly Islands in the southern part of the SCS. These ocean activities are under international observation regarding the issues of sovereignty, geopolitics, and environmental security of the region. Further, China is also growing its naval activities in the region without any external

142  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah interruption. PLA launched the first aircraft carrier in 2012, and it has the plan to complete four other aircraft carriers in 2020. Therefore, on the one hand, PLA is increasing its naval potential to counter the new security complexities in the region. • China’s policy makers suggested the idea of regional integration to reflect the ‘ripe fruit’ strategy to increase the promising maritime security environment, to freeze the disputes, and to mark the favourable conditions for commercial and trade activities in the region. Continuously, it is supporting the major infrastructural development projects such as NSEC (Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor) and rail connectivity among the major cities such as Nanning, Hanoi-Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore to increase the regional transportation and communication in the region (Prasad, 2016). Beijing policies are shifting toward fulfilling its energy hunger through the cooperation with ASEAN countries rather than antagonism within the region. • Beijing policies are shifting from a bilateral to multilateral approach to solving the SCS disputes with littoral states. It wants to explore its vision of ‘peaceful rise of China’ to solve the bilateral issues with littoral states. For example, it increased its active involvement in ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), APEC (AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation), and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) to increase the multilateral approach in the SCS. It is increasing its commercial and trade proximity with the ASEAN countries from the last two decades. Therefore, China is moving toward the multilateral approach for solving the SCS disputes with littoral states.

Concluding note To conclude the investigation on existing issues in the SCS disputes, it is clear that there is a need for jurisdictional arrangement by the international community on the concerning issues. The permanent court of arbitration has given the one side decision on 12 July 2016 in favour of the Philippines on the Scarborough Shoal dispute in the South China Sea. The court has been denied the historic rights on natural resources and building the islands on Mischief Reef by Beijing, because it vindicated that it is violating the Philippines’ sovereignty and its rights on exploiting the natural resources within the EEZ. The court has also denied the Chinese waters encircled by the ‘Nine-Dash Line’ had no legal basis according to UNCLOS. It has increased the strong hand

The great Asian security complex 143 for other claimant states on the matter of sovereignty and natural resources claims in the SCS. However, China has strongly opposed the one-sided decision by the arbitration court. Due to this, Beijing has also acquired the strong regional message from regional actors as to how it should responsible about regional peace and prosperity. To neutralise the disputes with these countries, Beijing needs to move towards military dialogue among the claimant states and increase the multilateral engagement with the ASEAN countries, and open the people-to-people communication and bilateral and multilateral talks among the think tanks of both sides to share ideas on regarding issues. Therefore, the concerning maritime issues can be solved on the basis of win-win diplomacy rather than following bilateral conflicts and territorial claims in the region.

References Bateman, Sam, and Ralf Emmers, eds. 2008. Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, Washington, DC: Routledge. Bouchat, J. Clarence. 2014. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea, Strategic Studies Institutes and United States Army War College Press, at http://cimsec.org/paracel-islands-u-sinterests-approaches-south-china-sea/23960 (accessed 13 November 2014). Buzzan, Barry. 1988. ‘Southeast Asian Security Complex’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 10 (1): 1–16. Buzzan, Barry, and Weaver Ole. 2003. Regions and Powers the Structure of International Security, New York: Cambridge University Press. Chaturvedy, Ranjan Rajeev. 2014. ‘Reviving the Maritime Silk Route’, The Hindu, 11 April, p. 8. Danner, Karl Lukas. 2016. A Regional Security Complex Account of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Conflict, Florida International University, at http:// epublications.bond.edu.au/eassc_publications/ (accessed 2 December 2016). Dutton, Peter. 2011. ‘Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and South China Sea’, Naval War College Review, 64 (4): 43–64. Erik, Beukel. 2010. ‘China and the South China Sea: Two Faces of Power in the Rising China’s Neighborhood Policy’, Danish School of International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen, Denmark, at www.ciaonet.org/attach ments/16129/uploads (accessed 18 November 2016). Hilal, Ramzan. 2013. ‘India Obama’s Asia Pivot Policy: An Assessment’, International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research (IJMR), 2 (6): 77–80. Hu, Alfred, Nien-Tsu and Ted L. McDomain, eds. 2013. Maritime Issues in the South China Sea: Troubled Waters or A Sea of Opportunity, USA: Routledge.

144  Shiv Kumar and Shabaz Hussain Shah Keck, Z. 2014. ‘China’s Growing Hegemonic Bent’, The Diplomat, at http:// thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-bent/ (accessed 23 Decem­ber 2016). Kumar, Shiv. 2015. ‘Realignment of Powers Between Sino Russian Relations in the Asia Pacific Region: India’s Prospects and Response’, International Research Journal of Social Sciences, 4 (10): 17–24. Liu, Fu-kuo, and Jonathan Spangler. 2016. ‘South China Sea Lawfare: Legal Perspectives and International Responses to the Philippines V. China Arbitration Case, Taipei: South China Sea’, Think Tank/Taiwan Center for Security Studies, at www.scstt.org/Publications/South-China-Sea-Lawfare.pdf (accessed 15 November 2016). Prasad, Jayant. 2016. ‘All at the South China Sea’, The Hindu, 28 July, pp. 7–8. Prathibha, M.S. 2014. ‘China’s 2010 Defense White Paper: An Analysis’, World Focus, 32 (9): 584–590. Rory, Medcalf, and Mohan C. Raja. 2014. ‘Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, at www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/respond ing_to_indo-pacific_rivalry_0_0.pdf (accessed 22 December 2016). Scott, D. 2012. ‘India and the Allure of the “Indo-Pacific” ’, International Studies, 49 (3–4): 165–188. Thompson, M. 2014. ‘China Doubling Its Aircraft Carrier Fleet’, Time Subscribe, at http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/20/china-doubling-its-air craft-carrier-fleet/ (accessed 12 December 2016). Vaughan, Bruce. 2007. ‘US Strategic and Defense Relationships in the AsiaPacific Region’, Congressional Research Service for Congress, Washington, DC, at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf (accessed 18 December 2016). Wu, Shicun. 2013. Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, New Delhi: Chandos.

10 China’s two-level game in the climate change negotiation Anmol Mukhia

Why is China more concerned about climate change? Where does China stand in climate change negotiation? Climate change as one of the crucial issues has hit developing countries such as China, where the focus is on the environmental dilemma – carbon technology to be used for further development or to compromise with the protocol called by the climate change regime.1 Beijing was listed as one of the most polluted cities in 2015 due to its smog blanket. However, China came up with the innovative idea at the Paris Climate talks in November 2015 for the commitment of cutting power sector emissions to 60 per cent by 2020. China says it will cut CO2 emissions from coal power by 180 tons by 2020. Moreover, leaders like Le Keqiang say that the policies of state have to be changed from ‘war on terror’2 to the ‘war on pollution’. Theoretically, neoclassical realism explains that states are still dominant according to its domestic capabilities in the international system. Robert Putnam’s two-level game explains that at the national level domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among groups. At the international level, the national government seeks to maximise its own ability to satisfy domestic pressure while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign development. In the case of China, the domestic game is a ‘ratification game’,3 where the contributions do not exceed those in a benchmark without domestic constraints. Thus, the chapter uses the process tracing method by tracing the links between possible causes and observing outcomes focusing on sequential processes. Climate change in China is an important factor in the contemporary studies which are to be studied beyond the limitation of environment and politics. Tony Eggleton, in his book The Short Introduction to Climate Change, argues that the most famous evidence for global warming came from a 1998 paper published in the major scientific journal Nature by Michael Mann, then a post-doctoral fellow at the

146  Anmol Mukhia University of Massachusetts, with Professors Raymond Bradley and Malcolm Hughes (Eggleton, 2012: 4). The Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 shows that ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’, which highly indicates the threat where global greenhouse gas emissions rose 70 per cent since the 1970s. Vaclav Smil published his book, China Environmental Crisis, which shows that the 1990s was the worst scenario and China was the leading producer of greenhouse gases before the year 2010 (Smil, 1993: 135). Haidong Kan argues that emissions per person in China are at the global average, where China surpassed the US as the highest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter in 2007. He further shows that China is a large emitter of ‘methane and black carbon’, the other two major contributors to global warming4 (Kan, 2011: A60). Human activities are affecting the climate, while carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere had reached 379 parts per million by 2005, 35 per cent higher than pre-industrial levels, and the average temperature has risen by 0.76 degrees Celsius since the late 1800s – resulting in extreme weather, changing weather patterns, witness of flood, drought, glacial and Arctic ice melt, sea level rise, and reduced biodiversity.5 In China, the surface temperature has risen between 0.5 and 0.8 degrees Celsius within the past hundred years and will further rise by 3 to 4 degrees Celsius by the end of this century (Lewis, 2009: 1195–96). This indicates that it is high time to think and act according to its choice in its foreign policy giving emphasis to both material capabilities and its environment. China, to be a major power in the future, has to start focusing in both domestic and international matters where climate change is a major topic of discussion.

Research methodology Process tracing methods6 will be used, which attempts to trace the links between possible causes and their observed outcomes by focusing on sequential processes (George & Bennett, 2004: 6–13). George and McKeown assert that the primary objective of process tracing is ‘intended to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes’. Process tracing can involve either an inductive or deductive approach. Thus, ‘successful process tracing requires the use of a plethora of sources’ (Verma, 2013: 24). Stone (1981) defines the analytical narrative as the ‘organisation of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story’ (Verma, 2013: 24).

China in climate change negotiation 147 However, climate change itself is a process which is gradually moving the whole planet towards a catastrophic scenario. Countries like China have realised the degradation process through the use of nonrenewable fossil fuels in the case of the emission process. The chapter looks into the rising threats from the omnipresent environmental hazard which raises insecurity for the state to balance both internal and external threats in case of climate change. In this process, China is negotiating in both the domestic and international systems for its security.

Theoretical analysis of two-level game James Rosenau was one of the first to call attention to the area of linkage politics (Putnam, 1988). Peter Katzenstein and Stephen Krasner showed the importance of domestic factor in foreign economic policy, where a state must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international pressures. However, Robert Putnam (1988) came up with the two-level game strategy, where national- and internationallevel negotiations take place in each state’s foreign policy decision making. At the national level, domestic groups achieve their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and the elite or politicians seek power by constructing coalition among groups. At the international level, the national government seeks to maximise its own ability to satisfy domestic pressure while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign development.7 Schelling’s (1960) ‘conjecture’8 implies that domestic constraints give the government of a country involved in international negotiation a higher ability as compared to a case without domestic constraints (Kroll & Shogren 2008: 564). A nation has a common interest to protect them; they also have a private incentive to decrease pollution as they see fit, which might not match what is best for the globe. A case of Kyoto Protocol shows that China was included in non-annexure-I9 which meant the less developed countries were not supposed to reduce gas emissions, when the various sources show that during 2006 China surpassed the US in carbon emissions. This also creates an incentive for one country to free ride and cooperate, but a government interacts with another government on the international level, however it must address their domestic audience. Former President Hu Jintao’s idea of a ‘harmonious society’ or scientific development outlook is the classic case where China wanted to seek an ‘ecological civilisation’ (CCICED, 2008). China realises that to influence in international politics it has to address the domestic politics as well. Therefore, China gave emphasis

148  Anmol Mukhia to both domestic politics and international pressure, giving priority to its domestic environment. Environmental factors play a crucial factor in people’s suffering, where the state is solely responsible for the policies. Thus China wanted to merge both environment and economic model with the new polices to make the public secure with the new policies. This is because the government still needs to secure ratification of its own country, but multiple interests exist in a country as the preferential choice where domestic audience constraints the action of the international negotiation. The real world insight gained from using a game. A theoretical framework comes from the ability to separate credible from incredible threats. A threat is credible if a country proposes unilateral action that does not decrease pay off, otherwise the threat is considered incredible and unlikely to be played.10 Neoclassical realism theory explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables drawn into the thought of insight of classical realist thought, as scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven by the international system and relative power material capabilities. The impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level (Gideon, 1998). Government does not behave as the traditional free riding model; now the international level can be seen as an incredible threat given domestic constraints. Schelling’s conjecture holds if the home country makes the offer the domestic constraints only work to lower domestic payoff. In the Kyoto Protocol, Fredrikssin and Ujhelyi (2006) include the number of ‘veto players as a variable’, whereas Jensen and Spoon (2007: 580) explicitly investigate the impact of ‘parties preferences’ and their position in government. States are rational actors which calculate their costs and benefits for survival. The realist paradigm is concerned with the study about war and peace for security. However, only few neoclassical realists have highlighted that climate change are taken into account by the state during the domestic politics such as bargaining during the time of election. But they are still unaware of the facts that relation of military power and environments are also tangible. In addition, states also use its military power for the environmental purposes (environmental security), which are ignored by the previous realist. The environmental disaster, whether anthropogenic or natural, are concerned towards citizens and thus calculate to provide their military to either protect from disaster or to provide them first aid.11 Example, China’s military budget has outgrown its demand for self-defence – China spent USD 68.09 to protect each of its citizens on the average also in terms of natural disasters (Yuan, 2012). During the Sichuan

China in climate change negotiation 149 earthquake relief efforts, Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police (Defence News Report, 2015).

Evolution of climate change in China Chinese history in relation to climate change can be traced back to as early as the era of Chairman Mao, when China sent its delegation in 1972 to a United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm (Economy Elizabeth, 2010). Mao was also aware of the resources importance – such as controlling rivers (Mandate from Heaven)12 by gigantic dams as monuments to progress (Shapiro, 2001). The Chinese Science Bulletin found that from the late Tang dynasty to the Qing dynasty, 70 to 80 per cent of war activity took place in cold phases resulting into decline of productivity of land, straining of resources, and driving conflicts (Dian et al., 2005: 137). However, it is to be noted that there are some changes in policies, but the starting point of Chinese position in negotiation is the same in this juncture. The Chinese delegation in the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) gave emphasis to 10 points in their document, which clearly highlight the role of superpowers in the destruction of the human environment. They further elaborated that it was the imperialist aggressive nature of war that put various sanctions and destroyed the human environment.13 Moreover, at the Rio Conference (1992), China’s position was the same – developed countries are responsible for the environmental hazard – and bargained by saying that China should not talk about the responsibility for the global environmental degradation. However, after Deng Xiaoping (1978) there was an open door policy for the economy and China started exchange with the rest of the world. In the following year, the National People’s Congress approved China’s first draft Law on Environmental Protection. Progressively, the second national conference on environmental protection (1984) establish the Environmental Protection Commission and formed the Environmental Protection Bureau to the National Environmental Protection Bureau. Lester Ross (1998) examined in the Environmental Policy in China, that it is because of the Soviet policy, guidance and ideology, the trade and international relations expanded. In 1989 China came up with its first Environmental Protection Law and the National Environmental Protection Bureau as an independent department from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction. This led China to actively participate in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at the Rio Convention.

150  Anmol Mukhia After the Cold War, the global environment was recognised in the concept of national security. Thomas Homer Dixon found that environmental scarcity is the outbreak of armed conflict, and in the case of China unequal distribution of resources in large population may cause the country’s fragmentation (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Lester Brown argues China’s demand for resources has global implications, such as rising food prices, land scarcity, and water scarcity, which will affect the world entirely (Brown, 1995). Daniel Deudney says a resources war between countries is unlikely, especially between developed countries (Deudney, 1990: 474). Robert Kaplan argues that resource depletion along with urbanisation and population increase to undermining already fragile government in the developing countries (Kaplan, 2000). Some also go further to consider that war with China over carbon dioxide is unlikely. Elizabeth Economy (2004), in The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenges of China Future, shows China has increased its international engagement and struggle to balance domestic concern with international responsibilities (Economy, 2004: 96). Moreover, China has already ratified the Kyoto Protocol and has been participating in various climate conferences, showing the concern for climate change and its effects. But by 2008, only the US had not ratified. The Kyoto system classified China as a non-Annex I, which means a developing nation that is not required to set emissions caps on any greenhouse gases. However, the developing nations agreed to conduct emission measurement and submit report regularly to the UNFCCC, while developed committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide technology and funding to the lesser developed countries (LDCs).14 Thus, the politics of climate change begins by the negotiation of accusation of who polluted more and who are responsible for the whole environmental hazard and degradation.

Domestic pressure and international negotiation The United Nations Climate Summit held on 23 September 2014 in New York involved the major topics of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, where Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli stressed that China is committed to working with international partners to respond actively to the challenge of climate change (China Story Year Book, 2014). China cannot escape from the environmental issues where domestic politics is involved – where people are asking for justice and seeking for aid. Thus Chinese scholars started pressurising the government with its scientific studies.

China in climate change negotiation 151

Learning from the past Learning from the past is also part of the Chinese agenda, as with the end of century of humiliation and the establishment of the PRC in 1949. At the founding moment, ‘national humiliation’ was linked to ‘national salvation’ when Mao Zedong famously declared from the Gate of Heavenly Place, ‘Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.’15 In terms of rebellion, there were many rebellions in the past in the name of climatic issues. One of the domestic reasons which states face the most is the internal rebellion against the government. For example, one government after another in disparate parts of the former Soviet Union was swept away in what were called the ‘colour revolutions’16 – populist upheavals against old-style authoritarian regimes. Other types of revolutions are the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia (2003), the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine (2004), and the ‘Pink’ or ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan (2005). In 2011, similar protests erupted in North Africa, resulting in what we called the Arab Spring (Klare, 2013). In the case of China, the study of UN climate negotiation in Durban shows that climate change will affect young people the most. Thus a group of students from China and the US, however, is trying to challenge this with a shared vision for the future (Schwägerl, 2011). The various studies of Chinese history show that China has suffered from climate change since its dynastic era. During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), there were famines, droughts, and floods on the Yellow River, which resulted in a bubonic plague pandemic and other natural disasters. Millions of people died, and these disasters indicate that the Yuan dynasty had lost the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. The earthquake in Shaanxi in 1556 is thought to be the deadliest natural disaster in the history of China. It is thought that approximately 800,000 people died then. The earthquake killed about 30 per cent of the people in Xian and in the first half of the 1600s; famines became common in northern China because of unusually dry and cold weather that shortened the growing season. Because of the climatic disaster economy collapse, people believed that the Ming court had lost the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. Thus, the ancient political doctrine encouraged people to rebel. During the 1350s, there were almost 20 years of rebellions (China Highlights). Yasuda studies shows that during the cold period of ad 180, the Yellow Turban Rebellion17 led to Late Han dynasty collapsed in ad 220. Suzuki (2000) concluded that the fall of the Han Empire already begun during the abnormal climate conditions in ad 100–130 (Yasuda, 2013: 450). Also the Taiping Rebellion, which nearly toppled the Qing

152  Anmol Mukhia dynasty 50 years earlier, bears the strongest warnings for the current government which exploded out of southern China during the early 1850s in a period marked, as now, by climatic condition, economic dislocation, and corruption (Platt, 2012). The online news magazine the Guardian shows that since 2008–09, incidents of heavy metal pollution have been frequent. In January, cadmium threatened the drinking water safety of 1.4 million people in Guangxi province. Jin Jiaman, minister of environmental protection, said that China had seen more than 30 major incidents of heavy metal pollution since 2009. The effects of global warming have been increasing. In the past 50 years, glaciers in north-west China shrank by 21 per cent. By 2050, glaciers in western China are estimated to shrink by about 27 per cent. Some lakes relying on melting water from glaciers are shrinking, and water shortages in Gansu, Ningxia, and other north-western areas are becoming fiercer. He elaborated that whether people can participate in the whole decision making process instead of having bargaining power when it comes to implementation will be the biggest challenge. People are becoming more and more conscious of their political and social rights (The Guardian, 2012).

Domestic concern and capabilities China’s leading climate change scientists stated ‘it is very likely that future climate change would cause significant adverse impacts on the ecosystem, agriculture, water resources and mainly in coastal zones in China’ (Lewis, 2009: 1997–98). These impacts include extended drought in the north, extreme weather events and flooding in the south, glacial melting in the Himalayas, and decreasing crop yields and rising sea levels in the highly populated coastlines. China’s Special Ambassador for Climate Change Yu Qingtai stated, ‘Climate Change is a fact . . . which involves the security of agriculture and food, water resources, energy ecology, public health and economic competitiveness . . . and future of earth might be impacted’ (Lewis, 2009: 1997– 98). Some of the scientific analyses are as follows. In terms of rivers: precipitation may decline by 30 per cent in the Huai, Liao, and Hai River regions in second half of this century. Climate change could decrease river flow in northern China, which is already known for water scarcity, and increase in southern China, where flooding and heavy rains are a problem. Since the 1950s, the six largest rivers in China are in declining. Also 150 km2 of cultivated land is lost annually because of desertification. In the case of deltas: the Yellow River delta, the Yangtze River delta, and the Pearl River delta are vulnerable coastal regions. Moreover,

China in climate change negotiation 153 climate change also increases hot temperatures and increases infectious diseases like malaria and dengue fever (Lewis, 2009: 1997–98). Since the 1950s, sea levels have also risen at the rate of 0.0014 to 0.0032 metres per year in the coastal line. Further, they will rise between 0.01 and 0.16 metres by 2030 and between 0.4 and 1 metre by 2030. A 1-metre rise in China will destroy all the cities of the coastal regions, while China’s 12 coastal provinces contain 42 per cent of the population – which contribute 73 per cent of its GDP (Vanchani, 2014). In the quantitative analysis of the Yongding River (which is one of the major source of Beijing) economic growth and the increasing population demand for agriculture, industrial and domestic use. However, the result data from Yongding River basin shows that climate change is estimated to account for 10.5 to 12.6 per cent of the reduction in annual runoff, and human activities are the driving factors for climate change (Xia et al., 2014: 1794). Young Kim argues that, as a fast-growing economy and the largest CO2 emitter, China has a relatively higher rate of people awareness of global warming at 78 per cent, as compared to other developing countries. Also China shows a relatively higher level of public awareness of climate change (72 per cent) (Kim, 2011: 231). Climate change is not restricted to science but has also been reflected by Chinese artists. The Central Academy of Art in Beijing and Nanjing University consecutively hosted ‘Unfold’, a travelling exhibition of climate change, where the relationship between the character ‘people’ (人 ren) and ‘nature-heaven’ (天 tian) was also a theme in the exhibition Landscape: the Virtual, the Actual, the Possible18 (China Story Year Book, 2014). However, in 2005 former President Hu Jintao articulated a new policy titled ‘harmonious society’.19 President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao adjusted the growth at all priority costs to deal with environment degradation. There was resistance to this idea by the elite groups in Shanghai and coastal cities who had been benefited from growth strategy. However, the Chinese Communist Party adopted the new harmonious direction. The 11th Party Plan (2006) clearly recognised that climate change could lead to social unrest when environmental disasters such as earthquakes or floods were perceived by citizens as a failure of government policy (McCarthy, 2010). In 2009, a Chinese government initiative united China, Brazil, South Africa and India in BASIC. BASIC is a collective of newly industrialised countries committed to acting jointly on climate change (China Story Year Book, 2014). This also led to formulate various action plans in china to counter the environmental problem within the larger framework of climate change.

154  Anmol Mukhia Local Agenda 21 China was first to formulate a Local Agenda (LA21) in response to the UN Agenda 21, a framework for international sustainable development. It is for combating climate change that includes research, strengthening the emissions measurement infrastructure, and increasing efficiency in energy production and consumption, as domestic factors play an important role. Domestically, the All China Women’s Federation20 (ACWF) has been involved in the process of formulation and implementation of China’s Agenda 21 and its associated priority programmes. Chinese women have taken an active part in the adoption of sustainable practices with concrete results, and Chinese women’s organisations have also made substantial contributions to protecting the environment. In Benxi City, a Women’s Sustainable Development Centre was set up that disseminates knowledge to rural women and helps urban women to start new careers with gender-relevant knowledge (UN Report, 1997). National Eleventh Five-Year Plan In 2007 the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) published the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection – policies to control the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in each province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the state council. However, from the Eleventh Five-Year Plan China has softened and been willing to cooperate adhering to the ‘principle of common but different responsibilities’.21 Also, the online news Xinhuanet shows that Xie Zhenhua, China’s special representative on climate change, repeats that a 2015 deal should reflect the principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CDR) and ‘respective capabilities’ (Xinhuanet, 2015). National climate change plan In 2007, the 62-page document that details China’s plan to mitigate and adapt to global warming was published. The key obstacle outline is to increase the proportion of renewable energy to 10 per cent by 2010, increase extraction of coal bed methane to 10 per cent billion cubic metres, stabilise nitrous oxide emissions at 2005 level by 2010, and reduce CO2 emissions through 20 per cent reduction of energy consumption per unit GDP by 2010. This was illustrated by the counsellor of the Chinese mission to the United Nations, Bai Yongjie, in her 2008 address to the Roundtable

China in climate change negotiation 155 on ‘Environmental Sustainability of the United Nations High-level Event’ on Millennium Development Goals.

International negotiation China primarily blamed the ‘north’ on the historical grounds of equity in the initial climate negotiation. China also strongly opposed a legally binding emission reduction target for developing countries and emphasised the industrial countries to fund for technology and aid focusing on the rights of developing countries. China also realised the Tiananmen incident in 1989 which resulted in isolation in the 1990s. On the other hand, China opposed a new protocol on the grounds of scientific uncertainty such as ‘joint implementation’ programs, while crucially bargaining so that developed countries can come to the level of negotiation. Thus, China gradually changed its bargaining level with the international talk in progress in the following Conference of Parties (COPs) to the UNFCCC, paving the way for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Chen, 2008: 149–150). The Kyoto Protocol is the first international legally binding treaty for industrialised nations to reduce their greenhouse emissions. China appealed to ratify the protocol after completing its domestic ratification in 2002. The Kyoto Protocol came in effect in 2005 with the requirement of 38 industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012 by the level of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels. This negotiation provided profit to China to gain diplomatic ground and also economic lucre under the Clean Development Mechanism (CBM), which helped to improve its country’s domestic environment. Thus it also helped in gaining and accepting international norms of environmental protection (Chen, 2008: 150). Thus, China started focusing on the domestic part at first to negotiate in international politics. Copenhagen China’s position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in May 2009 focused on four basic principles. The principles were ‘The UNFCC and its Kyoto Protocol as the Basis and the Mandate of the Bali Roadmap as the Focus’, ‘The Principle of Common but Different Responsibilities’, ‘The Principle of Sustainable Development’, and ‘Mitigation, Adaptation, Technology Transfer and Financial Support on the same footing and equal priorities.’ China has bargained with the other negotiators (especially the US) on the grounds that developed states have different responsibilities to provide aid and technology to the LDCs.

156  Anmol Mukhia Tianjin and Cancun On 4–9 October 2010, the United Nations Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperation Action under the Convention (ANG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under Kyoto Protocol (ANG-KP) met in Tianjin. The official UN meeting was followed by G77 (BASIC). BASIC statement reiterated the constitution insistence that both COP16 in Cancun and the COP17 in South Africa should be legally binding outcome to the Bali Roadmap. After meeting in Tianjin, climate negotiator Su Wei blamed the lack of progress on a coalition of US-led countries to abolish the Kyoto Protocol. Progressive Paris COP21 2015 In 2014 China produced 9.98 billion tonnes of CO2 per year (tCO2/ year) accounting for 28 per cent of total global carbon emissions at 36.1 billion tCO2/year (Carafa, 2015: 9). However, the US and China announced a joint climate agreement in the Paris COP21 (2015), which limits global warming to a target of 2 degrees Celsius. On 12 November 2015, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping announced a bilateral agreement on climate in Beijing (Carafa, 2015:9). Shannon Tiezzi (2015) writes in an online article in The Diplomats that China signed climate change agreements with the US, and France submitted an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to the UN, pledging to have emissions peak by 2030; and committed RMB 20 billion ($3.1 billion) to help developing countries deal with climate change. The recent COP21 also shows China submitted an early report with the claim of reducing emissions up to 60 per cent.

Critical appraisal and conclusion Climate change is a slow, gradual process but the structural malaise has a debilitating effect. China has been experiencing slow progress with its side effects, where China realises that Beijing is the highest polluted city under municipality in 2015. However, it can be said that when the process of industrialisation expands in remote parts of the provinces, more pollution is seen in the country, which will not only affect China but also its neighbouring countries at large, resulting in a hostile situation because of various security reasons. China realises properly the situation of climate effect since the era of Hu Jintao when he came up with his agenda of ‘harmonious society’ and peaceful world.

China in climate change negotiation 157 The state according to its capabilities is acting with the international system. China was rapidly growing in economy with 10.6 per cent in 2006, while at the same time China surpassed the US in carbon emission and became the leading polluter of the world. The state capabilities justify the behaviour of the state and its action of defensiveness. China will hugely suffer in environmental factors in the future if it ignores the present scenario of climate change. The scientific investigation clearly indicates that there will be misbalances in rivers, plateaus, and coastal areas of China. This will create huge disparities and people will obviously turn rebellious, which China fears the most. But by the inclusion of non-Annex I to China, it gave an opportunity to further bargain in the international climate conferences. The Chinese government from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping also shows the progress of government being concerned about domestic climate issues and international norms. Neoclassical realism shows that the state is concerned about climate change negotiation according to its capabilities. China was in the economic growing phase during 2006 and was fully aware of its economic strength. When China was included in the non-Annex I, it fully supported the norms of the international system in following the rules of climate change. Leaders like Le Keqiang saying that the policies of state have to change from the ‘war on terror’ to the war on pollution, where state perceptions are to deal with the environment as the primary concern. This clearly indicates that the negotiation has benefited China in many ways, such as playing the leadership role in less developed countries, and to challenge the developed countries to directly bargain before witnessing a future climate catastrophe. Lastly, nuclear green energy gives the only alternative to nuclear states to fight against climate change issues. In comparison, even in 2040 under its most optimistic scenario, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates just 2.2 per cent of energy will come from wind and solar. Today almost 80 per cent comes from fossil fuels. Green energy, which is 17.8 per cent (nuclear, etc.), is more expensive than fossil fuels. However, instead of pouring money in inefficient wind and solar energy, it would be far better off supporting research and development of green energy technologies to make them cheaper and faster. The International Atomic Energy Agency agreed at COP21 2015 to work towards the use of innovative solutions for the efficient production of energy through nuclear material. China, being one of the nuclear states, can focus on environmental security instead of diverting towards the hard-core nuclear security issues to be one of the leading environmental states.

158  Anmol Mukhia

Notes 1 A ‘global climate regime’ is a global framework which aims to regulate the interaction of human activity with the global climate system to mitigate global climate change. 2 The term ‘war on terror’ was first coined by US President George W. Bush to fight against the terrorist state after the 9/11 attacks. However, the Chinese leader borrowed the concept towards addressing the climate issues of China. See: www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-pollutionidUSBREA2405W20140305 3 The ratification model is important for political decision making. The outcome of an international negotiation over climate protection is not the end of the game. Government still needs to secure ‘ratification’ of the agreement within its own country, and ratification on the domestic level is not a minor outcome when multiple interests exist in a country. See Putnam (1988). 4 The research on sustainability shows that cutting black carbon and methane emissions would slow the rate of warming up until about 2040. The study was supported by the UN Environment Programme, the World Meteorological Organization, and the Stockholm Environment Institute. Chemicals like methane are precursors to ozone because they are emitted by the same processes like biomass burning that produce black carbon. Like black carbon, methane and ozone are potent albeit short-lived greenhouse gases. Black carbon, for example, lingers in the atmosphere for weeks, compared to carbon dioxide, which can last for centuries to millennia. All these can damage human health, while ozone can lower crop yields. See: www.scientificamerican.com/article/ cutting-black-carbon-methane-immediate-climate-change/ 5 Common Challenge, Collaborative Response: A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change shows a scientific consensus that human-induced climate change is well underway and poses grave economic and environmental risks to the world. See: http://e360.yale.edu/ images/features/us-china-roadmap.pdf; see also: annual issue of Human Activity and the Environment www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-201-x/16-201x2007000-eng.pdf 6 Process tracing is a method used to evaluate and develop theories in psychology, political science, or usability studies. In process tracing studies, multiple data points are collected in comparison to simple input-output methods, where only one measurement per task is available. 7 Robert Putnam (1988), in Diplomacy and Domestic Politics pp. 430, 431, 438, emphasises the two-level game, i.e. domestic and international pressure faced by the state in foreign policy decision making. 8 The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling (1960) suggested what Helen Milner (1997: 68) has called the ‘Schelling conjecture’: in international negotiations, the ability of a negotiator to credibly say to his or her counterpart that ‘anything we sign here has to be ratified by my country’s legislature’ provides a bargaining advantage that this person would not otherwise have. Schelling wrote, ‘Something similar occurs when the United States Government negotiates with other governments on, say, the uses to which foreign assistance will be put, or tariff reduction. If the executive branch is free to negotiate the best arrangement it can, it may be unable to make any position stick and may end by conceding controversial

China in climate change negotiation 159 points because its partners know, or believe obstinately, that the United States would rather concede than terminate the negotiations. But, if the executive branch negotiates under legislative authority, with its position constrained by law . . . then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners.’ See: www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/ seminars/tarar.pdf 9 United Nations Framework on Climate Change list of non-Annex I. See: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php 10 Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren, in an edited volume The Politics of Climate Change: Environmental Dynamics in International Affairs, highlight the key approach to sustainable knowledge with the separation incredible threat out of credible threat. The government is constrained by the credible threats but is unfettered by the incredible threats. 11 The state’s main concern is security whether it is in the form of military guard or in the form of aid. This concept adds to the scholarship of realism that the state plays an important role in the form of environmental security. 12 The Zhou dynasty created the Mandate of Heaven with the idea that there could be only one legitimate ruler of China at a time and that this ruler had the blessing of the gods. They used this mandate to justify their overthrow of the Shang and subsequent rule. 13 The premise of Chinese foreign policy starts from the national humiliation caused by the imperialist power. 14 A least developed country (LDC) is a country that, according to the United Nations, exhibits the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, with the lowest Human Development Index ratings of all countries in the world. For a list of LDCs, see: www.un.org/en/development/ desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf 15 Fox Butterfield’s (1976) article, ‘Mao Tse-Tung: Father of Chinese Revolution’, was published in the New York Times on 10 September 1976, showing the patriotic slogan of Mao in mobilising the masses. 16 The colour revolution (sometimes called the coloured revolution) is a term that was widely used by worldwide media to describe various related movements that developed in several societies in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans during the early 2000s. Those revolutions toppled the governments by either demanding a new regime or by rebelling against the current regime. 17 ‘The Yellow Turban Rebellion’, also translated as the ‘Yellow Scarves Rebellion’, was a peasant revolt in China against the Han dynasty. The uprising broke out in the year 184 during the reign of Emperor Ling. 18 Those arts bring consciousness that people are aware of the changing nature of climate in china and its world. 19 ‘Harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) is a concept that was introduced by President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a vision or objective for the country’s future socioeconomic development. 20 The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), formerly the All-China Democratic Women’s Foundation (1949–57), and the Women’s Federation of the People’s Republic of China (1957–78), the official state-sponsored organisation representing women’s interests in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Founded on 3 April 1949, the basic mission of the ACWF is to represent and safeguard the rights and interests of women and promote gender equality. ACWF is under the direct supervision of the Chinese

160  Anmol Mukhia Communist Party (CCP) committee at its own level. See also: www.britan nica.com/topic/All-China-Womens-Federation 21 The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ evolved from the notion of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and is a manifestation of general principles of equity in international law. This is one of the starting points of Chinese negotiations in climate change issues. See: http:// cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) is one of the cornerstones of sustainable development. It emerged as a principle of International Environmental Law and was explicitly formulated in the context of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. It finds its origins in equity considerations and equity principles in international law. It informs in particular the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. See also: www.eoearth.org/view/article/151320/

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11 China’s military modernisation An overview Umesh Kumar Gupta

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on 1 October 1949. In a period of 67 years after establishment, China made remarkable progress in all fields and emerged as a global economic superpower and a major regional military power in the Asia Pacific. China has set its national strategic goal to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by 2049. ‘China’s dream’ is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and to make the country strong. China’s armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. China’s military modernisation is a strong means to achieve Chinese dream of ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. A strong military power is essential for ensuring peaceful development and safeguarding its overseas economic interests. With this aim, China is intensively engaged in a rapid modernisation of its armed forces, and as a result they are becoming stronger day by day. China is emerging as a major military power in the region and even the entire world. The aim of this chapter is to give a brief account of China’s military modernisation after the 1980s.

Brief history of PLA modernisation The Chinese People’s Liberation Army was founded by the Communist Party of China (CPC) on 1 August 1927. In the past 90 years, the PLA has undergone tremendous changes from a peasant guerrilla force into a strong and modernised armed force. The People’s Liberation Army started its military modernisation program in the late 1970s. It had three major thrust areas: first, to strengthen party control over the military and to disengage the armed

164  Umesh Kumar Gupta forces from the politics; second, to achieve improved combat effectiveness through organisational, doctrinal, educational, training, and personnel reforms including recruitment, promotion, and demobilisation; and third, to transform the defence establishment into a system capable of independently sustaining modern military forces. In the beginning of the 1980s, the PLA tried to gradually transform itself from a land-based power centred on a vast ground force to a smaller, mobile, high-tech military capable of launching defensive operations beyond its coastal borders. In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping began to redefine PLA orientation radically, beginning with a reassessment of the overall international security environment in 1985 that lowered the probability of a major or nuclear war. Instead, Deng asserted that China would be confronted with limited, local wars on its periphery. The natural consequence of this sweeping reassessment was an equally comprehensive reorientation of the Chinese military. The number of military regions was reduced from 11 to seven, and the 37 field armies were restructured to bring ‘tank, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineer, and NBC defence units under a combined arms, corps-level headquarters called the Group Army’ (Mulvemon, 2003: 111). Between 1985 and 1988, the 37 field armies were reduced to 24 group armies, and thousands of units at the regimental level and above were disbanded. In the late 1980s, PLA forces consisted of the various arms of the ground forces and the air force, navy, and strategic missile force. The ground forces were divided into group armies and regional forces (military district). Ground force equipment was largely of Soviet design and obsolete, although some weaponry had been upgraded with foreign technology. The air force had serious technological deficiencies despite incremental improvements of aircraft. The navy was developing a blue-water capability and sea-based strategic forces. China possessed a small but relatively credible nuclear deterrent force with an incipient second-strike capability. Paramilitary forces consisted of the militia, reserve service system, Production and Construction Corps, and People’s Armed Police Force.

Chinese strategy The People’s Republic of China is a developing country with a fastgrowing economy. The Chinese strategy is the dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Chinese strategy decides all the other aspects of China’s military development, but China’s strategic documents are not very reliable as they are much more political

China’s military modernisation 165 in nature. China’s summary of the PLA’s strategic goals in its 2015 defence white paper, ‘China’s Military Strategy’, do provide broad insights into strategic goals: China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary. It is a Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. China’s armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. China’s armed forces mainly shoulder the following strategic tasks: • To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea; • To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland; • To safeguard China’s security and interests in new domains; • To safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests; • To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack; • To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace; • To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability; and • To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development. (Cordesman et al., 2015: 25)

Shift in China’s military doctrine, strategy, and tactics After the establishment of the PRC, its military doctrine, strategy and tactics have undergone constant changes as per the need of the hour. From the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, ‘people’s war’ remained China’s military doctrine. The nuclear weapons, artillery, combat aircraft, and tanks were included in the military, however the concept of

166  Umesh Kumar Gupta people’s war remained the same. In the late 1970s, Chinese military leaders began to modify PLA doctrine, strategy, and tactics under the rubric of ‘people’s war under modern conditions’. Elaborating on Mao’s concept of ‘active defence-tactically offensive action with a defensive strategy’, Chinese strategy was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion before it could penetrate deeply into China. Chinese strategists envisaged a forward defence, i.e. near the border, to prevent attacks on Chinese cities and industrial facilities, particularly in north and north-east China. The PLA emphasised military operations using modernised, combined arms tactics for the dual purpose of making the most effective use of current force structure and of preparing the armed forces for more advanced weaponry in the future. The doctrine of ‘people’s war under modern conditions’ also incorporated the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. China’s own nuclear forces, which developed a second-strike capability in the early 1980s, provided Beijing with a credible, though minimum, deterrent against SU or US nuclear attack. China repeatedly has vowed never to use nuclear weapons first, but it has promised retaliation against a nuclear attack. Chinese strategists also evinced an interest in tactical nuclear weapons, and the PLA has simulated battlefield use of such weapons in offensive and defensive exercises. Shortly after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Central Military Commission (CMC) established the military strategic guideline of active defence, and later, in line with the developments and changes in the national security situation, had made a number of major revisions. In 1993, the military strategic guideline of the new era was formulated, which took winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology, as the basic point in making preparation for military struggle (PMS; 军事斗争准备 Jūnshì dòuzhēng zhǔnbèi). In 2004, the guideline was further substantiated, and the basic point for PMS was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationisation (打赢信息化条件下局部战争 Dǎ yíng xìnxī huà tiáojiàn xià júbù zhànzhēng). However, now it has finally changed to winning local informationised wars (打赢信息化局部战争 Dǎ yíng xìnxī huà júbù zhànzhēng). China’s new military strategy: ‘winning informationised local wars’ China has changed its military strategy many times. Starting with the ‘people’s war’, now it is transformed into ‘winning informationised

China’s military modernisation 167 local wars’. This new military strategy is well described in the article of M. Taylor Fravel: In November 2013, the report of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress hinted that China might adjust its national military strategy. The Plenum’s Decision outlined the need to ‘strengthen military strategic guidance, and enrich and improve the military strategic guideline for the new period’. In May 2015, the new Defence White Paper, China’s Military Strategy (中国的 军事战略 Zhōngguó de jūnshì zhànlüè), reveals that China has now officially adjusted its military strategy. This follows previous practice, such as when the 2004 strategic guideline was publicly confirmed in China’s defence white paper published in December 2004. In China’s approach to military affairs, the military strategic guideline represents China’s national military strategy. It provides authoritative guidance from the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for all aspects of the People’s Liberation Army’s combat-related activities. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China has issued eight strategic guidelines (军事战略方针 Jūnshì zhànlüè fāngzhēn). The 2015 Defence White Paper reveals that a ninth change has occurred. The new guidelines shift the goal of China’s military strategy from ‘winning local wars under the conditions of informationisation’ to ‘winning informationised local wars’. The change in the strategic guidelines reflects an evolution of the existing strategy, not a dramatic departure. Two key assessments serve as the basis for the change in strategy. First, what the Chinese military calls the ‘form of war’ or conduct of warfare in a given period of time, has changed. The application of information technology in all aspects of military operations is even more prominent. Second, China faces increased threats and challenges in the maritime domain, including over disputed islands and maritime jurisdiction in waters close to China as well as through the growth of interests overseas in waters far from China. (Fravel, 2015: 16–17)

Main features of China’s military modernisation China is carrying out its modernisation in the different arms and services and other key areas. It has changed the objectives for its arms and services, and set the military force building measures. China’s

168  Umesh Kumar Gupta 2015 White Paper officially provides some broad insights into the reasons why China is making key changes in its forces. The White Paper notes that: In the implementation of the military strategic guideline in the new situation, China’s armed forces must closely center around the CPC’s goal of building a strong military, respond to the state’s core security needs, aim at building an informationised military and winning informationised wars, deepen the reform of national defence and the armed forces in an all-round way, build a modern system of military forces with Chinese characteristics, and constantly enhance their capabilities for addressing various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks. Development of the Services and Arms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) In line with the strategic requirement of mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense and defence, the PLA Army (PLAA) will continue to reorient from theater defence to trans-theater mobility. In the process of building small, multi-functional and modular units, the PLAA will adapt itself to tasks in different regions, develop the capacity of its combat forces for different purposes, and construct a combat force structure for joint operations. The PLAA will elevate its capabilities for precise, multi-dimensional, trans-theater, multifunctional and sustainable operations. In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defence and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defence’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defence’ with ‘open seas protection’, and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvres, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defence and comprehensive support. In line with the strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) will endeavour to shift its focus from territorial air defence to both defence and offense, and build an air-space defence force structure that can meet the requirements of informationised operations. The PLAAF will boost its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strike, air and missile defence,

China’s military modernisation 169 information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection and comprehensive support. In line with the strategic requirement of being lean and effective and possessing both nuclear and Conventional missiles, the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) will strive to transform itself in the direction of informationisation, press forward with independent innovations in weaponry and equipment by reliance on science and technology, enhance the safety, reliability and effectiveness of missile systems, and improve the force structure featuring a combination of both nuclear and conventional capabilities. The PLASAF will strengthen its capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack, and medium- and long-range precision strikes. In line with the strategic requirement of performing multiple functions and effectively maintaining social stability, the PAPF will continue to develop its forces for guard and security, contingency response, stability maintenance, counter-terrorism operations, emergency rescue and disaster relief, emergency support and air support, and work to improve a force structure which highlights guard duty, contingency response, counterterrorism and stability maintenance. The PAPF will enhance its capabilities for performing diversified tasks centering on guard duty and contingency response in informationised conditions. Force Development in Critical Security Domains The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power. Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponisation of outer space have appeared. China has all along advocated the peaceful use of outer space, opposed the weaponisation of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active part in international

170  Umesh Kumar Gupta space cooperation. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security. Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security. As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces. Being one of the major victims of hacker attacks, China is confronted with grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure. As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defence, support for the country’s endeavours in cyberspace and participation in international cyber cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability. The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a selfdefensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature. China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimise its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. (MND of PRC, 2015: 11)

Recent military modernisation drives PLA’s modernisation process has reached an important phase and set the time frame, i.e. to achieve certain objectives by 2020. China under the leadership of Xi Jinping launched the reorganisation of the force structure to achieve the aim of informationisation of the military. Recent reorganisation in the force structure and other modernisation drives are well summarised here in this article of Yevgen Sautin: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in the midst of the biggest reorganisation and reform effort since the 1980s.

China’s military modernisation 171 Among the major changes announced, the country’s primary nuclear deterrent, the Second Artillery Corps, was upgraded to a separate service branch called the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). In addition, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was set up to bolster space, cyber, electronic warfare, and other high-tech military capabilities. Finally, the ground forces received their own, separate headquarters to improve combat effectiveness. In February 2016, China consolidated seven military regions (大军区 Dà jūnqū) into five brand-new theater commands (战区 Zhànqū). Perhaps most importantly, the PLA plans to cut 300,000 personnel. More changes are expected in the next few years; the PLA’s military education system, command structure, and logistics and supply systems are all likely to be overhauled. The reorganisation accompanies and complements a modernisation program intended to create a 21st century fighting force that is better equipped, modular and able to meet a wide range of objectives. Personnel Reforms China has closely followed the evolution of Western armies and there is speculation that China will transition from a mixed division/brigade structure toward one predominantly made up of brigades. In 1999, two divisions within the 20th Group Army, the 58th Mechanised Infantry Division and the 60th Motorised Infantry Division, were reorganised into brigades. Hardware Modernisation Another daunting aspect of the reforms is the need to replace outdated weapons systems and equipment. Despite the growth in defence spending and procurement, many PLA units continue to use Cold War–era relics. In the crucial sphere of air-defence, despite making gains in the last fifteen years, China still suffers from inadequate capabilities. The Chinese HQ-9 (红旗-9) SAM system has been billed to be an improvement over the U.S. MIM104 Patriot and the Russian S-300, but China has struggled to attract foreign buyers. China’s Research & Development China’s R&D allocations have grown from $3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated $40 billion in 2013 amidst an almost exponentially growing defence budget, but China continues to trail both

172  Umesh Kumar Gupta Russia and the United States in crucial technologies such as stealth and aircraft engines. One area where Chinese manufacturers have been able to make gains is in guided missile technology; according to Chinese sources, Chinese know-how now surpasses that of the Russians. China is also ahead in developing a fifth-­ generation fighter plane, the J-20. Overall, China’s defence industry is encountering a similar problem to Russia’s: more spending does not necessarily result in the procurement of new equipment in the quantity needed for true re-armament. With the Russian armament industry backed-up with domestic orders, the PLA will have to largely rely on Chinese capacity to meet ambitious refurbishment goals. One area where decades-long doctrinal views may finally shift is in regard to foreign bases. The Chinese anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa demonstrated the difficulty of repairing and supporting ships out at sea, and to that end China has already reached an agreement with Djibouti to establish its first foreign base. Traditional reluctance notwithstanding, China’s growing naval capabilities, coupled with growing international responsibilities and interests in potentially unstable developing countries, may result in a more active Chinese global military presence. (Sautin, 2016: 13)

The strategic support force: China’s information warfare service China aims at building an informationised military which could win local wars. The elements required for this type of modernisation were present in the earlier force structure; however, while restructuring its armed forces China created a brand new service known as the Strategic Support Force. The features of this service are well described in this article: On December 31, 2015, Xi Jinping introduced the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF; 火箭军 Huǒjiàn jūn), Strategic Support Force (PLASSF; 战略支援部队 Zhànlüè zhīyuán bùduì), and Army Leadership Organ. The move came just within the Central Military Commission’s dead-line to complete the bulk of reforms by the end of the year. Most media coverage has focused on the Rocket Force, whose reorganisation amounts to a promotion of the PLA Second Artillery Corps (PLASAF解放军第二炮兵 部队 Jiěfàngjūn dì èr pàobīng bùduì) to the status of a service on

China’s military modernisation 173 the same level of the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, by far the most interesting and unexpected development was the creation of the SSF. According to official sources, the Strategic Support Force will form the core of China’s information warfare force, which is central to China’s ‘active defence 积极防御 Jījí fángyù’ strategic concept. This is an evolution, not a departure from, China’s evolving military strategy. It is a culmination of years of technological advancement and institutional change. In the context of ongoing reforms, the creation of the SSF may be one of the most important changes yet. Consolidating and re-structuring China’s information forces is a key measure to enable a number of other state goals of reform, including reducing the power of the army, implementing joint operations, and increasing emphasis on hightech forces. Yin noted that the SSF will embody the PLA’s vision of real joint operations. In Yin’s view, military operations cannot be divorced from ‘electronic space’, a conceptual fusion of the electromagnetic and cyber domains. The SSF will integrate ‘reconnaissance, early warning, communications, command, control, navigation, digitalised ocean, digitalised land, etc. and will provide strong support for joint operations for each military service branch’. Indeed, this view was also echoed by Shao Yongling (邵永灵), a PLARF Senior Colonel who is currently a professor at the PLA’s Command College in Wuhan. She suggested that the SSF was created to centralise each branch of the PLA’s combat support units, where previously each service had their own, resulting in ‘overlapping functions and repeat investment’. Consolidating these responsibilities in a central force would allow the military to ‘reduce redundancies, better integrate, and improve joint operational capabilities’. Integrated Information Warfare The Strategic Support Force will form the core of China’s information warfare force, which is central to China’s strategy of preemptive attack and asymmetric warfare. China’s new military reforms seek to synthesise military preparations into a ‘combined wartime and peacetime military footing’. These ‘strategic presets’ seek to put China’s military into an advantageous position at the outset of war in order to launch a preemptive attack or quickly respond to aggression. This allows China to offset its disadvantages in technology and equipment through preparation and

174  Umesh Kumar Gupta planning, particularly against a high-tech opponent – generally a by-word for the United States in PLA strategic literature. (Costello, 2016)

Building an informationised military China’s military modernisation has ushered into a new era of informationisation. This strategy is adopted to be capable of winning local informationised wars. This complex issue is described in a US DoD report, which states: Chinese military writings describe informationised warfare as an asymmetric way to weaken an adversary’s ability to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during war, and discuss its use as a way to force an adversary to capitulate before the onset of conflict. The PLA conducts military exercises simulating operations in complex electromagnetic environments, and likely views conventional and cyber operations as a means of achieving information dominance. The GSD Fourth Department (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) would likely use EW, cyberspace operations, and deception to augment counter space and other kinetic operations during a wartime scenario to deny an adversary’s attainment and use of information. ‘Simultaneous and parallel’ operations would involve strikes against U.S. warships, aircraft, and associated supply craft and the use of information attacks to impact tactical and operational communications and computer networks. These operations could have a significant impact upon an adversary’s navigational and targeting radars. Cyber operations are a key component of informationisation and could serve Chinese military operations in three key areas. First, they allow data collection for intelligence and potential offensive cyber operation purposes. Second, they can be employed to constrain an adversary’s actions or slow response time by targeting network-based logistics, communications, and commercial activities. Third, they can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during times of crisis or conflict. Developing cyber capabilities for warfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings, which identify information warfare as integral to achieving information superiority and an effective means for countering a stronger foe. These writings detail the effectiveness of information warfare and offensive cyber

China’s military modernisation 175 operations in conflicts and advocate targeting adversary C2 and logistics networks to affect their ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. They portray the enemy’s C2 system as ‘the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.’ Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Modernisation China continues to prioritise C4I modernisation as a response to trends in modern warfare that emphasise the importance of rapid information sharing, processing, and decision-making. The PLA seeks to modernise itself both technologically and organisationally to command complex, joint operations in near and distant battlefields with increasingly sophisticated weapons. The PLA views technological improvements to C4I systems as essential to its broader goals of informationisation, which seeks to improve the speed and effectiveness of decision-making while providing secure and reliable communications to fixed and mobile command posts. The PLA is fielding advanced automated command systems like the Integrated Command Platform (ICP) to units at lower echelons in each of its military services and military regions. The adoption of the ICP enables multi-service communications necessary for joint operations. Moreover, the new C4I technologies enable instantaneous information-sharing, and robust and redundant communications networks – intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather reports, which give commanders improved situational awareness. In particular, the transmission of ISR data in near-realtime to commanders in the field can facilitate the commander’s decision-making process, shortening command timelines, and ­ making operations more efficient. The PLA also seeks to improve its C4I capabilities by reforming its joint command institutions at the national and regional levels. The 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the 18th CPC Congress explicitly called for ‘soundly setting up the joint operations command organ of the CMC and the theater joint operations command institutions.’ If adopted, these reforms would be the most significant changes to the PLA’s command organisation since 1949. (DoD, 2015: 37–38)

176  Umesh Kumar Gupta

Chinese campaign doctrine Chinese campaign doctrines have also undergone a sea change with due emphasis on the integrated joint operations, integrated fire power operations, cyber warfare, information warfare, and so forth. China is now carrying out military exercises in a joint operation manner and also started inter-services appointments of senior officials. HUOLI2014–like military exercise practiced and manifested the joint fire power of different arms and services. In Chinese Strategy and Military Modernisation in 2015, Cordesman et al. state: Active Defence, Local Wars, and People’s War describe how China intends to shape its force posture, develop its forces, and fight at the strategic level. Operationally, or in the Chinese terminology, at the campaign level, the PLA has developed doctrines and principles of warfare that it believes will enable China to win Local Wars even against technologically superior adversaries. While every element of PLA campaign doctrine cannot be discussed in this limited overview, the campaign doctrines most necessary for evaluating Chinese modernisation are included below. Integrated Joint Operations Chinese military writings describe joint operations as a critical component of future military operations and a necessary means of defeating technologically superior adversaries. PLA doctrine holds that joint operations, or cooperation at the operational level between multiple services, are an essential means of augmenting combat power at the operational level and a necessity for success in Local Wars. Identifying future combat as a confrontation between military systems, the PLA believes multi-service cooperation, such as the use of SAF forces at the operational level to support PLAAF operations, will enable the PLA to achieve its objectives in a highly complex and lethal environment. Information Warfare One of the main principles of the Local Wars concept is that Information Warfare (IW) will play a central role in future warfare. Within the realm of IW, the PLA must be capable of quickly seizing and retaining information supremacy, or the ability to access

China’s military modernisation 177 and process information in effective C4ISR networks while denying the enemy the same ability. Consequently, the PLA believes that advantages in collecting, transmitting, and processing information will lead to significant advantages at the operational and even strategic level. Chinese Cyber Warfare Chinese defensive and offensive cyber strategy has evolved over the past decade as part of the PLA’s ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ doctrine and ‘Local War Under Conditions of Informatisation’ concept. Cyber warfare is becoming a major aspect of Chinese modernisation and has triggered a growing US, ROK, and Japanese response. Cyber warfare has become a concern of China’s most senior leaders, as witnessed by Chinese President Xi Jinping becoming personally involved. Upon taking charge of the Central Internet Security and Informatisation Leading Group in early 2014, the state-run Xinhua News Agency stated that President Xi Jinping sees Internet security as ‘a major strategic issue concerning a country’s security and development as well as people’s life and work’. The President went further when he stated that, ‘efforts should be made to build our country into a cyber power.’ Later in 2014, President Xi Jinping issued official guidelines on the necessity to develop cyber defensive capabilities in his Opinion on Further Strengthening Military Information Security. Integrated Firepower Operations PLA doctrine states that integrated firepower comes from artillery, air forces, and missile strikes, supported by IW operations. As technology improved, the PLA identified four characteristics of modern firepower: • It is capable of attacking the enemy simultaneously at all depths on the battlefield. • It can be used at any phase of the campaign. • It can be highly effective (i.e. accurate) allowing for fewer platforms (aircraft, ships, artillery tubes, etc.) to deliver fewer munitions to achieve results faster and with fewer civilian casualties than in previous wars.

178  Umesh Kumar Gupta • It can be delivered in a joint manner by a diverse set of weapon systems from all the services appropriate to the type of target. The PLA believes that fewer munitions are needed as a result of modern weapons being more accurate than previous ‘dumb’ weapons. Nevertheless, the PLA expects to expend a large quantity of precision-guided munitions in the event of conflict. The PLA has actively trained its forces in joint operations exercises that integrated its firepower in various live fire evolutions, such as JOINT ACTION (Lianhe xingdong) in 2014 and later, as the DoD 2015 report notes: FIREPOWER (Huoli) 2014 included ten large-scale evolutions primarily with artillery and air defence brigades from at least six military regions and significant participation by military academies. Key objectives included joint planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support, and command and control of integrated joint fire power against opposition forces. Mobility and Comprehensive Support PLA doctrine envisions campaign mobility as its basic method of defeating forces that technologically superior to its own. Although comprehensive support is necessary to provide manoeuvrability and operational deception, the PLA hopes to achieve a local superiority of force to defeat an otherwise stronger adversary. In addition, manoeuvring enables the PLA to disrupt an adversary while avoiding an enemy’s strength. (Cordesman et al., 2015: 117–127)

Military expenditure trends The US Department of Defense Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 states: On March 5, 2014, China announced a 9.3 percent inflationadjusted increase in its annual military budget to $131 billion, continuing more than two decades of sustained annual defence spending increases. Analysis of data from 2005 through 2014 indicates China’s officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the

China’s military modernisation 179 period. China has the fiscal strength and political will to support defence spending growth at comparable levels for the foreseeable future. In 2015, the Chinese government’s official defence spending figure was $146 billion, an increase of 11% from the budget of $136 billion in 2014. In 2016 the budget has been announced to be 954.35 Billion Yuan which is about US$147BN, raised 6–7% above last year’s estimates. Estimation of China’s Actual Military Expenditures Using 2014 prices and exchange rates, the DoD estimates that China’s total military-related spending for 2014 exceeds $165 billion U.S. dollars (USD). However, it is difficult to estimate actual PLA military expenses due to China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition from a command economy. China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure, such as procurement of foreign weapons and equipment, and research and development. 2014 Defence Budget Comparison (Adjusted for Inflation)

Billion (USD)

China (Official Budget) Russia (National Defence Budget) Japan India Republic of Korea Taiwan

$136.3 $76.3 $47.6 $38.2 $33.4 $10.3 (DoD, 2015: 49–50)

Counter-space strategies On the topic of Chinese counter-space strategies, both the 2014 and 2015 US DoD reports stated the following: PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems – and to deny adversaries access to space-based systems – as central to enabling modern, ‘informationised’ warfare. Although PLA doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational ‘campaign’, space operations form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and would serve a key role in

180  Umesh Kumar Gupta enabling A2/AD operations. A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable ‘informationised’ warfare, claiming that ‘space is the commanding point for the information battlefield.’ PLA writings emphasise the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance . . . and communications satellites’, suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy’. The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations also states that ‘destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors . . . will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and make it difficult for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play. The 2015 report went on to state: The PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities, which includes advances with the Beidou navigation satellite system and space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in space. China is seeking to utilise space systems to establish a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and to enhance command and control in joint operations. On July 23, 2014, China conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. China claimed this test was for a missile defence system. A previous destructive test of this system in 2007 created substantial space debris that continues to present a danger to the space systems of all nations, including China. In 2013, China also launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory that took it near geosynchronous orbit, but the launch profile was not consistent with traditional space launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research. It could, however, have been a test of technologies with a counter space mission in geosynchronous orbit. The United States and several public organisations expressed concern to Chinese representatives and asked for more information about the purpose and nature of the launch. China has thus far refrained from providing additional information. (Cordesman et al., 2015: 37)

Improvement in PLA training practices PLA is giving due emphasis to the training with the aim of winning local informationised wars. In the last two decades, the PLA has made

China’s military modernisation 181 a sustained effort to improve the quality and realism of the training received by its personnel. In addition, it has augmented its scenariospecific training, especially for situations that require specialised forces. Joint operations, ‘integrated joint operations’, joint command and control, and C4ISR and information technology are the key features of modernised training.

Assessment of Chinese PLA modernisation Chinese military modernisation is keenly analysed and assessed by defence experts of various countries in their own way on the basis of various sources, and they try to find out their implications for the security of their own country. China’s well-equipped tunnel (the underground Great Wall), ‘interstellar’ weapons, carrier-killer hypersonic missiles, and so forth are a few startling achievements in this direction. Integrated joint operations have enhanced PLA’s striking power manifold. Development of long-range nuclear bombs is making the US uneasy. Building a new type of force and the recruitment of 2,000 college graduates as non-commissioned officers indicates the seriousness of China’s modernisation drive. Civil-military integration is another significant aspect of the modernisation, in which a mechanism is being developed to use civilian technology and resources for military purposes. Conduct of hundreds of joint operational exercises and trainings in 2015 shows the magnitude of preparations. China’s development of ‘black technology’, solar UAVs, and enhancement of Beidou navigation capabilities are in fact suspicious space programs. PLA is focusing on the development of airships and aircraft used in the execution of various military tasks. The latest weapons of China’s military are even more advanced than those of the US and other developed countries. China is developing anti-aircraft carrier capabilities and anti-satellite weapons. PLA overcomes difficulties in the core technology of laser weapons. Such news in the Chinese media, even foreign media articles about China republished in Chinese media, give piecemeal information about China’s military modernisation, but the exact status remains a riddle for guessing and speculation. The US Intelligence Community’s Assessment of Chinese PLA modernisation states: The U.S. view of Chinese modernisation has focused on the key developments that affect U.S. interests. The U.S. intelligence community summarised its views on the objectives of China’s military modernisation as follows in testimony before Congress in 2015. Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, Director of the DIA stated:

182  Umesh Kumar Gupta China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is building a modern military capable of defending China’s ‘core interests’ of preserving its political system, protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty (China views these to include Taiwan and other contested claims to land and water), and ensuring sustainable economic and social development. The PLA remains focused on transforming the army into a fully mechanised force. The PLA is converting its divisions into brigades to increase lethality and improve combat capabilities. China’s national-level training focus has been on brigade-level exercises that stress unit combat mission capabilities under realistic conditions, long distance mobility, and command and control. We expect these trends to continue. The PLA Navy continues to expand its operational and deployment areas. China’s first aircraft carrier, commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full potential until it acquires a fully operational fixed-wing air regiment, but we expect the navy will make progress toward its goal this year. The South China Sea (SCS) remains a potential flashpoint. Overlapping claims among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei – exacerbated by large-scale construction or major steps to militarise or expand law enforcement – has increased tensions among claimants. This has prompted an increase in defence acquisition, to include submarine capabilities, in some of these countries. In 2014, China twice deployed submarines to the Indian Ocean. The submarines probably conducted area familiarisation to form a baseline for increasing China’s power projection. China continues production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We expect China to conduct its first nuclear deterrence patrols this year. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is approaching modernisation on a scale unprecedented in its history. China now has two stealth fighter programs – the third and fourth J-20 prototypes, which conducted their first flights in March and July 2014. Further PLAAF developments are anticipated. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50–60 ICBMs. China is adding more survivable road-mobile systems, enhancing its silo-based systems, and developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent. They are also augmenting more than 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-16, which will improve China’s ability to strike regional

China’s military modernisation 183 targets. China continues to deploy growing numbers of the DF21D anti-ship ballistic missile and is developing a tiered ballistic missile defence system, having successfully tested the upper-tier capability on two occasions. (Cordesman et al., 2015: 177–178)

The future prospects of China’s military modernisation China is modernising its armed forces at a fast pace, arousing much speculation about its future course and destination. An article by Assistant Professor Robert Farley well analyses the future perspectives of China’s military modernisation. The article reads: ‘Ultimately how much powerful will Chinese military become in 2025?’ In recent 15 years, the People’s Liberation Army and its services have undergone dramatic changes. Theory, equipment, training, strategic directions, all have undergone a tremendous change, and now the armed forces look very different from those in the 1990s, when the Chinese military was using obsolete equipments, and continue to believe that the threat is from the north rather than east. The People’s Liberation Army has made rapid development in the past 10 years. Just as it made rapid development in its previous decade. How will it change in next 10 years? We’ll see what kind of Chinese troops will continue the momentum? Increase combat experience: China is still far behind the United States in combat experience. Now, China has intensified efforts to gain experience; it has adopted the methods like strengthening the real combat training and more overseas deployment of troops. More emphasis on joint operations: The services in the United States armed forces could link more closely in every war, formed a strong team playing the role of required procedures and communication liaison skills. Chinese troops will set up a highly sophisticated anti-access system relying on the services joint actions to prevent the US military controlling China’s coastal areas. The system can function well only if the relevant organisations do concerted actions. Viewing from a number of indications, Chinese military leaders seem to understand that the services to promote the linkage among them and let them see future wars from the same perspective. China will gradually reduce dependence on foreign countries. In the next 10 years, China is expected to significantly reduce the

184  Umesh Kumar Gupta current dependency on foreign military technology and equipments. Russia also seems to understand that it can’t continue to maintain the leading position on a technical level with respect to China, so its concerns about the transfer of technology are eased. China is improving in the field of engine; electronic components installed on the weapons are also coming more and more from the country’s domestic vibrant technology fields not from Russia. The contact between Russia and China in the military field is quite long and extremely complex; frequently interrupted by political and technological revolution. However in the next 10 years, Chinese military industry will eventually rise out of the shadow of Russia. At the same time, China’s dependence on Russian supplies of equipment and technology will also end. China will become the export center. In the next 10 years, we may see that China will be among the top arms exporter in the world. It is possible to take the place of Russia in a number of key technology areas. Chinese infantry fighting vehicles, small boats, submarines, fighter jets have recently made a high success in the international arms export market. The sale of these weapons will not only earn close friends for China, but will almost certainly help the Chinese military to establish long-term political and economic ties with military forces around the world. Similar with the United States, Russia and France, China can take advantage of this relationship to seek not only the economic gains, but political gains as well. In the next 10 years, Chinese military will continue to change and will adapt to the status quo. Impact generated by this approach will not confine to US-China relations, but also affect the Chinese government’s mode of interaction with Russia, Japan, India and Southeast Asian countries. (Farley, 2016: 1–3)

Conclusion China is one of the fastest developing countries in the world. It has grown to the second-largest economy in the world and is further heading towards the target of being the largest economy in the near future. Its economic interests are now not only confined to its territories but are spreading all over the world. Chinese leaders are striving to attain the Chinese dream, i.e. the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The support of a strong military is the prerequisite for realising the Chinese dream. With this aim in mind, China is carrying out a

China’s military modernisation 185 fast-paced modernisation of its military and developing capabilities in special domains such as cyberspace, space, informationisation, and so forth. Since China is not very transparent in its strategy and modernisation drives, the study in this field remains incomplete, and may be supplemented by continuous deep analysis of these changes from the Chinese media. China claims these modernisation drives are for peaceful development of Chinese nation, however rapid modernisation at a large scale and at a high magnitude creates suspicion in the minds of defence analysts all over the world. Increasing defence budgets and China’s quest for power projection will definitely transform China’s military into an informationised force capable of winning local wars and much more beyond that.

References Cordesman, Anthony H., Steven Colley, and Michael Wang. 2015. Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis, October, CSIS, Burke Chair in Strategy, Washington, DC, the United States, at http://csis.org/files/publication/150901_Chinese_Mil_Bal.pdf (accessed 2 April 2016). Costello, John. 2016. ‘The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service’, China Brief, XVI (3) (8 February), Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, at www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/ ?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45075&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=828 &no_cache=1#.VxhDbdR97IU (accessed 2 April 2016). Department of Defense, USA. 2015. Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, April, at www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_ Power_Report.pdf (accessed 5 April 2016). Farley, Robert. Assistant Professor at Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Business, University of Kentucky, article published in ‘the National Interest’ magazine of United States, same article republished by Chinese website military.cn entitles 美媒：2025年中国军队到底会变得多 强大？‘Just How Strong Will China’s Military be in 2025?’ Chinese Article Translated by the Author of This Paper on Apr 20th 2016, at www.mili taryy.cn/html/73/n-137573-2.html (accessed 14 April 2016). Fravel, M. Taylor. 2015. ‘China’s New Military Strategy: “Winning Informationized Local Wars” ’, China Brief, XV (13) (23 June), Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, at www.jamestown.org/programs/china brief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44072&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=789&no_cache=1#.VxhAx9R97IU (accessed 2 April 2016). Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. China’s Military Strategy, 26 May, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenceNews/2015-05/ 26/content_4586748.htm (accessed 2 April 2016).

186  Umesh Kumar Gupta Mulvemon, James C. 2003. ‘The PLA Army’s Struggle for Identity,’ in The PLA and China in Transition, INSS/NDU. Sautin, Yevgen. 2016. ‘The Influence of Russian Military Reform on the PLA Reorganization’, China Brief, XVI (6) (24 March), Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/ ?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45236&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=828&no_ cache=1 (accessed 2 April 2016).

Glossary

Badao Chen Chen zhe yingdui Chongjian Dao guang yanghui

霸道 诚 沉着应付 重建 韬光养晦

Dao yi xianshi zhuyi Dazao ganjing wuzi zai qingke Fenfa youwei Gengjia Jiji Gengjia zhudong Gongping zhengyi Guo qiang bi ba

道义现实主义 打扫干净屋子 再请客 奋发有为 更加积极 更加主动 公平正义 国强必霸

Heping fazhan Heping jueqi Hexie Shehui Hezuo gongying

和平发展 和平崛起 和谐社会 合作共赢

Hui Jiji Jinqu Jin zhuang wu guo Jue bu dang tou

惠 积极进取 金砖五国 决不当头

Jun zhu yi renyi zhi tianxia Kuozhan Leng jing guan cha

君主以仁义治 天下 扩展 冷静观察

Hegemonic rule Sincerity Cope with affairs calmly Reconstruction Hide from light and nourish obscurity Moral realism Putting the house in order before inviting guests Striving for achievement Be more active Take greater initiative Fair and Just Seek hegemony after becoming strong Peaceful development Peaceful Rise Harmonious Society Cooperation based on win-win Benefit Actively go in BRICS Never claim leadership position A ruler is to rule with benevolence Expansion Observe calmly

188  Glossary Liang chao duo qiang Liang ge yindao Ling qi lu zao Minzu fuxing Qin Ren Rong San ge shijie Sang yu shou chou Shi

两超多强 两个引导 另起炉灶 民族复兴 亲 人 容 三个世界 善于守拙 势

Tian Tianxia Wangdao Wenzhu chenjiao Xifang qiguo Xinxing daguo guanxi Xinxing he jueqi daguo Xin zuan 11 guo Yi ban dao Yi chao duo qiang

新兴和崛起 大国 新钻 11 国 一边倒 一超多强

Yi da pian Yi de zheng anfu chenmin Yi tiao xian You suo zuo wei Yu ling wei shang, yi ling wei ban

一大片 以德政安抚 臣民 一条线 有所作为 与邻为善、以 邻为伴

Zhan wang wu guo/ Yuan tiao wu guo Zhenxing Zhongguo

展望五国/远眺 五国 振兴中国

Zhongguomeng Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing Zonghe guoli

中国梦 中华民族伟大 复兴 综合国力

天 天下 王道 稳住阵脚 西方七国 新型大国关系

Two superpowers, multiple powers Two guides Starting anew National Rejuvenation Proximity People Tolerance Three World Maintain low profile Strategic configuration of power Heaven All under the heaven Rule by Virtue Secure position Group of Seven (G7) A new model of big power relations Emerging and rising powers Next 11 Lean to one side One superpower, and multiple powers One large area Need to appease people with virtue One line Making contributions Being good and establishing partnership with neighbours VISTA Rejuvenation of Chinese Nation China Dream Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Comprehensive National Power

Index

Act East policy 26 – 27; political economy of 65 – 74 Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under Kyoto Protocol (ANG-KP) 156 Ahmed, Shamshad 128 All China Women’s Federation (ACWF) 154 Al Tabriz 121 American hegemony 15 Anti, Michael 89, 92 APC 1000 nuclear reactors 44 Arab Spring 106 – 107, 151 ASAT (Anti-satellite Weapon Test) 136 ASEAN see Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN + 3 9 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 142 Ashraf, Raja Pervaiz 124 Asian Development Bank 24, 87, 98 Asian Financial Crisis 72 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 16 – 17, 27, 43, 54, 58, 72, 74 Asian nationalism 31 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 142 Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) 112 – 113 assessment of Chinese PLA modernisation 181 – 183

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 9, 68, 72, 73 – 74, 107, 134 – 135,  137 Azhar, Masood 30 Bai Yongjie 154 Bandung Conference 34 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) 44, 46, 55, 72 – 73, 141 BASIC 153, 156 Beg, Yakub 121 Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 72 Beijing Olympics 88 Beijing University 85 Bekri, Nur 128 benign hegemony 15 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 67 Bhattacharjea, Mira Sinha 6, 8 bin Laden, Osama 119 Bose, Surinder Mohan 52 Boxer Rebellion 78 Bradley, Raymond 146 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 9 – 11, 16, 72 BRICS Development Bank 46; see also New Development Bank (NDB) British Petroleum (BP): Statistical Review of World Energy of 2015 99; Statistical Review of World Energy of 2016 99

190 Index Buddhism 22, 31 Buzzan, Barry 135 – 136 Canada’s Role as a Middle Power (Gordon) 11 Cancun: climate change negotiation 156 Central Academy of Art, Beijing 153 Central Asian Republics (CARs) 58 Central for International Studies 80 Central Military Commission (CMC) 166 Chen Yi 83 Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, Taiwan 89 China: cordial to conflict 51 – 52; evolution of climate change in 149 – 150; historical contacts between India and 31 – 32; information warfare service 172 – 174; insecurity dilemma under Xi Jinping 87 – 94; military invasion of Tibet 34; number of protests in 93; paths and potentials 73 – 74; polity-economy of 69 – 71; post-war era 52 – 54; research & development (R&D) allocations 171 – 172; String of Pearls 61; towards the rule of law and enhanced role for market 69 – 71 China Can Say No 4 China Development Bank 110 China Dream 4 China Environmental Crisis (Smil) 146 China EXIM Bank 110 – 111 China: Fragile Superpower (Shirk) 89 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 108 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 104 Chinanet 89 China Northern Railway Cooperation (CNR) 124 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 73, 128 China Studies Centre 89

China Threat Theory 108 Chinese campaign doctrines 176 – 178; Chinese cyber warfare 177; Information Warfare (IW) 176 – 177; integrated firepower operations 177 – 178; integrated joint operations 176; mobility and comprehensive support 178 Chinese Civil War 34 Chinese Communist Party (CPC) 4, 85 – 89, 91 – 92,  118 Chinese cyber warfare 177 Chinese foreign policy: energy security and 109 – 113 Chinese nationalism 34, 52 Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 141 Chinese philosophy of I Ching (Change) 4 Chinese renaissance 5 Chinese Science Bulletin 149 Chinese strategy 164 – 165 Chinese Strategy and Military Modernisation in 2015 176 Clean Development Mechanism (CBM) 155 climate change, artists and 153 climate change negotiation: China’s two-level game in 145 – 157; Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 155; critical appraisal and conclusion 156 – 157; domestic concern and capabilities 152 – 155; domestic pressure and international negotiation 150; evolution of climate change in China 149 – 150; international negotiation 155 – 156; learning from the past 151 – 152; Local Agenda 21 (LA21) 154; national climate change plan 154 – 155; National Eleventh Five-Year Plan 154; Progressive Paris COP21 2015 156; research methodology 146 – 147; theoretical analysis of two-level game 147 – 149; Tianjin and Cancun 156 Cold War 3, 9, 10, 28, 33, 36 – 37, 42, 136, 141, 150; Sino-Indian relations 32 – 36

Index  191 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Modernisation 175 communism 34, 52 Communist Party of China (CPC) 163 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 17, 59 conflicts: between Chinese and northern nomads 95; Sino-Indian foreign relations and 24 – 26 Congress Party 32 Contemporary International Relations 3 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 155 counter-space strategies 179 – 180 Cultural Revolution 35, 82, 84 cyberspace: force development in 170 Dalai Lama 24 – 25, 30, 32, 56, 87, 125 Deng Xiaoping 1 – 2, 5, 6, 8; as architect of China’s rise 2; China’s foreign policy and 84 – 87; energy policy under 101; ‘One line’ approach 8; PLA orientation and 164; policy of ‘reform and opening up’ 1; post-reform change and 8; ‘reform and opening up’ policy of 1 – 2; Tiananmen Square tragedy and 84 – 87 Desai, Morarji 53 Deudney, Daniel 150 Dharmagupta 22 Dharmarakshaka 22 Diplomats, The 156 Ditan Jingji 105 Dixon, Thomas Homer 150 East Asia Tribute System 14 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 127 Economy, Elizabeth 150 Eggleton, Tony 145 energy profile, China 99 – 100; coal 100; natural gas 100; oil 99 – 100

energy security: coal and other sources 100; drive for 101 – 102; energy profile 99 – 100; impact on Chinese foreign policy behaviour 109 – 113; natural gas 100; oil 99 – 100; strategies to securitise energy supplies 102 – 106; threat perceptions 106 – 109 Environmental Policy in China (Ross) 149 Eric Li 88 European Studies 3 European Union (EU) 9 Fa-Hsein 22 Farley, Robert 183 force development in critical security domains: cyberspace 170; nuclear force 170; outer space 169 – 70; seas and oceans 169 Foreign Affairs Review 3 foreign policy, of China: after establishment of the PRC 5 – 8; china as hegemonic power or benign power 13 – 17; China’s insecurity dilemma under Xi Jinping 87 – 94; Cultural Revolution under Mao and its impact on 81 – 84; Deng Xiaoping and 84 – 87; from geopolitics to geoeconomics 9 – 11; internal situation, impact on 78 – 96; internal theoretical discourse 3 – 5; Mao Zedong and 79 – 81; from a middle power to risen power 11 – 12; Modi’s attempt for reconstruction of 26 – 27; post-reform change 8 – 9; Tiananmen Square tragedy and its impact on 84 – 87 Four New Asian Tigers 10 Fravel, M. Taylor 167 Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) 65 – 66, 71 – 73; political economy of 65 – 74; towards a China-led world order 71 – 73 Fu Ying 57 Gandhi, Indira 35 – 36, 53 Gandhi, Mohandas K. 52

192 Index Gandhi, Rajiv 33, 36, 53 geoeconomics 9 – 11 geopolitics 9 – 11 Glazebrook, G. D. 11 Global Financial Crisis 13, 38, 65, 70, 101, 103 globalisation 26 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World 9 Gorbachev, Mikhail 86 Gordon, J. King 11 great Asian security complex 135 – 138 Great Asian Super Complex (GASC) 138, 140 ‘Great Leap Forward’ 78 – 80, 102 Great October Revolution 121 ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’ (GRCN) 4 Great Western Development Programme (GWDP) 126 green energy 157 Guardian 152 Gunavarma 22 Gupta, Shishir 87 Haidong Kan 146 Hajib, Yusuf Khaas 120 Han dynasty 51, 119 – 120 Han Empire 151 Himalayan Face-off, The (Gupta) 87 Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) slogan 33 Holbraad, Carsten 11 Hollywood 73 Hughes, Malcolm 146 Hu Jintao 4, 6; China-Pakistan relationship and 40; on Chinese policy making 9; ‘harmonious world,’ concept of building 4, 71, 147, 153, 156; India visit of 38; ‘National Rejuvenation’ 4; Strait of Malacca dilemma and 107 Hu Yaobang 78, 85 Ikenberry, G. John 15 IMF 46, 72 India: challenges 59 – 61; cordial to conflict 51 – 52; historical contacts between China and 31 – 32;

opportunities 57 – 59; paths and potentials 73 – 74; political economy of 66 – 67; post-war era 52 – 54; problems and potentials for 50 – 62 India-China Joint Economic Group 45 India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway 69 Indian Institute of Technology (IIT Madras) 89 Indian Navy 39 Indian Ocean outreach policy 27 Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) 46 informationised local wars 166 – 167 informationised military 174 – 175 Information Warfare (IW) 176 – 177 information warfare service 172 – 174 Institute of Contemporary International Relations 80 integrated firepower operations 177 – 178 integrated information warfare 173 – 174 integrated joint operations 176 internal theoretical discourse 3 – 5 International Atomic Energy Agency 157 International Energy Agency (IEA) 100, 102, 104 – 105, 157 International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) 112 International Review 3 Islam 120 Jaish-e-Mohammad 25 Jakobson, Linda 90, 92 Japanese imperialism 22 Jiang Zemin 6, 37, 111 Jiefang Junbao 141 Jin Jiaman 152 Jin Shuren 121 Join Hands-2008 38 Jordaan, Eduard Christiaan 12 Joseph, William A. 70 Jung Chang 82

Index  193 Kailash Mansarovar Yatra 44 Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Project 69 Kaplan, Robert 150 Katzenstein, Peter 147 Khalid, Masood 128 Khan, Aamir 67 Khan, A. Q. 124 Khan, Genghis 120 Khan, Kublai 120 Khan, Masood 125 Kissinger, Henry 82 – 83 Krasner, Stephen 147 Kumarajiva 22 Kutadgu Bilig or Wisdom of Royal Glory (Hajib) 120 Kyoto Protocol 113, 147 – 148, 150, 155, 156 Landscape: the Virtual, the Actual, the Possible (exhibition) 153 Lashkar-e-Taiba 25 Le Keqiang 145, 157 Lenin, Vladimir 5 Li Keqiang 71, 128 Line of Actual Control (LAC) 34, 73 Li Peng 36, 38 Li Shi-min 120 Liu Shaoqi 82 Local Agenda 21 (LA21) 154 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) 69 Look East policy 56, 68, 136, 138 Look East’ policy 42 Mahbubani, Kishore 31 ‘Make in India’ campaign 45, 67 Mann, Michael 145 Mao – The Unknown Story (Chang and Halliday) 78 Mao Zedong 2, 5, 6 – 7; China’s foreign policy and 79 – 81; Cultural Revolution under 81 – 84; five-year plans under 78; SinoIndian relations since 31; United Nations Conference on Human Environment and 149; ‘war and revolution’ stand of 2; weak economy generated a weaker foreign policy under 79 – 81

Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 43, 44, 54, 57, 72 Maritime Silk Route 140 May Fourth Movement 78, 84 McMahon Line 34, 52 Middle Power in International Relations (Holbraad) 11 military expenditures: estimation of China’s actual 179; trends 178 – 9 military modernisation, China: assessment of 181 – 183; brief history of PLA modernisation 163 – 164; Chinese campaign doctrines 176 – 178; Chinese strategy 164 – 165; counter-space strategies 179 – 180; emphasis on joint operations 183; export center, becoming 184; future prospects of 183 – 184; highly sophisticated anti-access system, setting up 183; improvement in PLA training practices 180 – 181; increasing combat experience 183; informationised military, building 174 – 175; information warfare service 172 – 174; main features of 167 – 170; military expenditure trends 178 – 179; PAPF, development of the services and arms of 168 – 169; PLA, development of the services and arms of 168 – 169; recent military modernisation drives 170 – 172; reducing dependence on foreign countries 183 – 184; shift in China’s military doctrine, strategy, and tactics 165 – 167; strategic support force 172 – 174 military modernisation drives 170 – 172; hardware modernisation 171; personnel reforms 170; research & development (R&D) allocations 171 – 172 military strategy 166 – 167; ‘winning informationised local wars’ 166 – 167 Ming dynasty 14, 121 Modi, Narendra 56; ‘Act East Policy’ 26 – 27, 68 – 69, 138;

194 Index attempt for reconstruction of foreign policy 26 – 27; China visit of 27 – 28, 44 – 45; ‘Make in India’ campaign 45, 67; Sino-Indian relations under 42 – 46 Mumbai terrorist attacks 25 Musharraf, Pervez 123 Nalanda University 31 Nanjing University 153 Narayanan, K. R. 38 national climate change plan 154 – 155 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China 99, 102 National Energy Administration, China 99 Nature 145 Nehru, Jawaharlal 31, 32 – 34, 33, 52 – 53 Neighbourhood first policy 27 neoclassical realism 148, 157 New Development Bank (NDB) 46, 72; see also BRICS Development Bank Northern Sea Route (NSR) 104 north-west frontier, of China: historical and political analysis of 117 – 118; importance of territory from geostrategic point of view 118 – 119; Xinjiang, history of 119 – 122; Xinjiang, present situation in 122 – 129 NSEC (Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor) 142 nuclear force: force development in 170 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 25, 27, 30, 67 Obama, Barack 156 OBOR 59 – 60 oceans: force development in 169 On China (Kissinger) 82 One Belt One Road (OBOR) 16, 55, 72, 113 ‘One China’ policy 1 ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) 69 Opium War 14

Orange Revolution 151 outer space: force development in 169 – 170 Pakistan: border agreement with China 24; China’s military links with 28, 47, 124 – 125; CPEC and 55, 60, 128, 141; Indo-Pakistani war 53; OBOR and 60; SAARC satellite projects and 68; and SinoIndian relations 40 – 41; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourly Relations 40; Wen Jiabao visit of 25 Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) 24, 55, 61, 73, 122, 124 – 125, 128 Panchsheel 34, 43, 52 Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) agreement 7, 13 Paracel Islands 133 – 134 Paris COP21 2015 156 Peng Liyuan 71 People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 168 – 169 People’s Daily 95 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 87, 122; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Modernisation 175; development of the services and arms of 168 – 169; modernisation 163 – 164; modernisation, assessment of 181 – 183; modernisation, brief history of 163 – 164; training practices 180 – 181 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 102, 104 Pink Revolution 151; see also Tulip Revolution PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 182 Pokhara Regional International Airport 56 polity-economy: of China 69 – 71; of India 66 – 7 Port Holding Company 129 post–Cold War phase: Sino-Indian relations 36 – 39 post-reform change 8 – 9

Index  195 Public Diplomacy Quarterly 8 Public Opinion Survey Company 88 Putnam, Robert 145, 147 Qian Hanshu 51 Qin Gang 13 Qing dynasty 149 Qin Yaqing 3 Rai, Lala Lajpat 52 Ramesh, Jairam 30 Rash Behari 52 Red Guard 82 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 74 regional influence: Sino-Indian relations and 39 – 42 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (DoD) 178 Reserve Bank of India 58 Rio Conference 149 River Runs Black, The: The Environmental Challenges of China Future (Economy) 150 Rosenau, James 147 Rose Revolution 151 Ross, Lester 149 Roy, M. N. 52 Schifter, Richard 86 Schram, Stuart 79 seas: force development in 169 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 9, 27, 41, 57, 74, 126, 142 Shanghai World Expo 88 Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) 113 Sharif, Nawaz 128 Sharma, Shankar Dayal 37 Shirk, Susan 89 Short Introduction to Climate Change, The (Eggleton) 145 Silk Road 72, 129 ‘Silk Road’ corridor 31 Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 54, 72 Silk Route 16, 51, 60, 126 Singh, Manmohan 38, 53

Singh, Rajnath 46 Sino-Indian foreign relations: Cold War phase 32 – 36; cordial to conflict 51 – 52; emerging changes in 22 – 23; historical contacts between India and China 31 – 32; historical development of 21 – 22; Indian opportunities 57 – 59; issues of conflicts 24 – 26; issues of cooperation 23 – 24; Modi’s attempt for reconstruction of foreign policy 26 – 27; Pakistan factor 40 – 41; post–Cold War phase 36 – 39; postwar era 52 – 54; recent trends in 26; regional influence 39 – 42; relations under Modi government 42 – 46; revisiting 30 – 48; US as a factor 41 – 42 Sino-Indian War of 1962 50, 52 Sino-Pakistani border dispute 61 Smil, Vaclav 146 South Asia: Indian opportunities 57 – 59; Xi’s new vision of 57 – 59; Xi’s vision of 54 – 57 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 39, 56, 68 South China Sea: China’s security concerns in 138 – 140; China’s strategic and diplomatic responses in 140 – 142; China’s strategic vision in 135 – 138 South China Sea (SCS) 60 South China Sea dispute: background of 133 – 135 Soviet Union 7; Afghanistan, occupation of 36; colour revolutions in 121; disintegration of 8, 13, 23; India and 52 – 53; linking with China 5, 7, 80; ‘revisionism’ approach of 7 Spratly Islands 133 – 134 Stalin, Joseph 122 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 40, 58 Strategic Cooperative Partnership 38 Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) 44, 59 Strategic Yunnan Pathway (Yunnan da tongdao) 112

196 Index strategies to securitise energy supplies 102 – 106 Sun Yat-Sen 52 Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 146 Taiping Rebellion 78, 151 Taliban 125 Tang dynasty 149 terrorism 14 Third World countries 8, 33 Thomas, Peter 90 Threats: energy security 106 – 109 Tiananmen Square Movement 78, 85 – 86; China’s foreign policy, impact on 84 – 87; Deng Xiaoping and 84 – 87 Tianjin: climate change negotiation 156 Tibetan uprising of 1959 31 Tiezzi, Shannon 156 Tiliwaldi, Ismail 127 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 113 Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridors (THECs) 72 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 72, 113 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourly Relations 40 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 9 T-Sins 22 Tulip Revolution 151; see also Pink Revolution UN Agenda 21 154 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) 134, 139, 142 Unhappy China 4 United Nations 11, 34 United Nations Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperation Action under the Convention (ANG-LCA) 156 United Nations Charter 13

United Nations Climate Summit, New York 150 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 149 United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) 149 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 150, 155 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1, 71 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 26 Unocal 109 UN Security Council (UNSC) 8, 27 US: Asia-Pivot policy 135, 138, 140 – 141; decline in power of 13; imperialism 7, 35; Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and 69; military presence in South Asia 37 – 39; and Sino-Indian relations 41 – 42; Tiananmen incident and 86 – 89,  92 US Department of Defense 178 US Energy Information Administration 107 US Marines 110 US National Intelligence Council 9 US Navy 102 USPACOM (US Pacific Command) 137 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 23 very large crude carriers (VLCC) 107 VISTA countries 10 War of Resistance 32, 33 war on terror 145 Weaver, Ole 136 Wen Jiabao 25, 91 Western capitalism 89 Western colonialism 21 White Paper on Peaceful Development 16 World Bank 46, 72, 87 World Economics and Politics 3

Index  197 World Trade Organization 81, 87 World War II 9, 21, 33, 105 Xie Yue 88 Xie Zhenhua 154 Xi Jinping 2; China’s insecurity dilemma under 87 – 94; cyber warfare and 177; India visit of 43, 46, 51, 55 – 56, 59 – 61; Modi and 27; new vision of South Asia 57 – 59; Pakistan visit of 40; Paris COP21 (2015) and 156; rise of 2, 6; shift in China’s diplomatic strategy under 15; Taiwan visit of 58; trilateralism 54; vision of Shared Destiny 58; vision of South Asia 50 – 62 Xi Jinxing 4, 5 – 6 Xinhuanet 154 Xinjiang: China’s relationship with 119; historical and political analysis of 117 – 118; history of 119 – 122; importance of territory from geostrategic point of view 118 – 119; international border of 118; Islam in 120; present

situation in 122 – 129; Silk Road and 119 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 55, 117, 129 Xiong Guangkai 8 Yang Peng 5 Yang Tseng Sin 121 Yan Xuetong 3, 5, 15 Yellow Turban Rebellion 151 Young Kim 153 Yuan dynasty 151 Yuang Chwang 22 Yu Qingtai 152 Zardari, Asif Ali 124 Zhang Boli 85 Zhang Gaoli 150 Zhao Tingyang 16 Zhao Ziyang 85 Zheng Yongnian 89 Zhou Enlai 2, 6 – 7, 33 – 34, 82, 110 Zhou Yongkang 71, 94 Zhu Rongji 123 Zhu Yuanzhang 121 Zuo Zongtang 117