China’s Emergency Management: Theory, Practice and Policy [1st ed.] 978-981-13-9139-2;978-981-13-9140-8

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xiv
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks, Disasters and Crises (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 3-40
Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework: Mass Incident Management (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 41-67
Front Matter ....Pages 69-69
Perception, Amplification and Communication: A Case Study of Food Safety Risks (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 71-115
China’s Emergency Planning System: A Case Study of Road Transportation (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 117-161
Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity: A Case Study of Shenzhen (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 163-202
Front Matter ....Pages 203-203
Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation and Stability Maintenance (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 205-219
Building a Better Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 221-244
A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 245-257
Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Policies (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 259-282
Social Risks and Their Prevention (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 283-309
Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision: A Case Study of Food Safety (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 311-322
Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management (Xing Tong, Haibo Zhang)....Pages 323-334
Back Matter ....Pages 335-348

Citation preview

Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path

Xing Tong Haibo Zhang

China’s Emergency Management Theory, Practice and Policy

Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path Project Director Xie Shouguang, President, Social Sciences Academic Press Series Editors Li Yang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Li Peilin, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Academic Advisors Cai Fang, Gao Peiyong, Li Lin, Li Qiang, Ma Huaide, Pan Jiahua, Pei Changhong, Qi Ye, Wang Lei, Wang Ming, Zhang Yuyan, Zheng Yongnian, Zhou Hong

Drawing on a large body of empirical studies done over the last two decades, this Series provides its readers with in-depth analyses of the past and present and forecasts for the future course of China’s development. It contains the latest research results made by members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. This series is an invaluable companion to every researcher who is trying to gain a deeper understanding of the development model, path and experience unique to China. Thanks to the adoption of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the implementation of comprehensive reform and opening-up, China has made tremendous achievements in areas such as political reform, economic development, and social construction, and is making great strides towards the realization of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. In addition to presenting a detailed account of many of these achievements, the authors also discuss what lessons other countries can learn from China’s experience.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13571

Xing Tong Haibo Zhang •

China’s Emergency Management Theory, Practice and Policy

123

Xing Tong School of Government Nanjing University Nanjing, China

Haibo Zhang School of Government Nanjing University Nanjing, China

ISSN 2363-6866 ISSN 2363-6874 (electronic) Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path ISBN 978-981-13-9139-2 ISBN 978-981-13-9140-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8 Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press The print edition is not for sale in China. Customers from China please order the print book from: Social Sciences Academic Press. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Series Preface

Since China’s reform and opening began in 1978, the country has come a long way on the path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Over 30 years of reform efforts and sustained spectacular economic growth have turned China into the world’s second largest economy, and wrought many profound changes in the Chinese society. These historically significant developments have been garnering increasing attention from scholars, governments, and the general public alike around the world since the 1990s, when the newest wave of China studies began to gather steam. Some of the hottest topics have included the so-called “China miracle”, “Chinese phenomenon”, “Chinese experience”, “Chinese path”, and the “Chinese model”. Homegrown researchers have soon followed suit. Already hugely productive, this vibrant field is putting out a large number of books each year, with Social Sciences Academic Press alone having published hundreds of titles on a wide range of subjects. Because most of these books have been written and published in Chinese, however, readership has been limited outside China—even among many who study China—for whom English is still the lingua franca. This language barrier has been an impediment to efforts by academia, business communities, and policy-makers in other countries to form a thorough understanding of contemporary China, of what is distinct about China’s past and present may mean not only for her future but also for the future of the world. The need to remove such an impediment is both real and urgent, and the Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path is my answer to the call. This series features some of the most notable achievements from the last 20 years by scholars in China in a variety of research topics related to reform and opening. They include both theoretical explorations and empirical studies, and cover economy, society, politics, law, culture, and ecology, the six areas in which reform and opening policies have had the deepest impact and farthest-reaching consequences for the country. Authors for the series have also tried to articulate their visions of the “Chinese Dream” and how the country can realize it in these fields and beyond.

v

vi

Series Preface

All of the editors and authors for the Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path are both longtime students of reform and opening and recognized authorities in their respective academic fields. Their credentials and expertise lend credibility to these books, each of which has been subject to a rigorous peer review process for inclusion in the series. As part of the Reform and Development Program under the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People’s Republic of China, the series is published by Springer, a Germany-based academic publisher of international repute, and distributed overseas. I am confident that it will help fill a lacuna in studies of China in the era of reform and opening. Xie Shouguang

Contents

Part I 1

2

Theoretical Innovation

A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks, Disasters and Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Motives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 2008 Winter Storm in Southern China . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Problems Revealed in Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . 1.1.3 New Consensuses in Disaster Management Research Call for New Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Intellectual Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Three Research Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Three Core Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Trend Towards Disaster-Centered Integration . . . . . . 1.3 Internal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 From Disaster to Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 The Continuum of “Risk–Disaster (Emergency)– Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 Whole-Process Response System: “Risk Management–Disaster (Emergency) Management– Crisis Management” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1 Risk Warning in Sociology and Crisis Management in Public Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2 Integration of Research Ideas and Contents . . . . . . . 1.4.3 Integration of Research Methods and Research Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

3 3 3 6

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

9 11 11 12 15 17 17

..

19

.. ..

21 23

.. ..

23 31

..

36

Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework: Mass Incident Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Mass Incidents as a Special Class of Public Crises . . . . . . . . . .

41 41

vii

viii

Contents

2.2

2.3

2.4

Part II 3

2.1.1 Mass Incidents as a Special Class of Public Crises . 2.1.2 General Characteristics of Mass Incidents . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Causes of Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Dynamic Model of Unorganized Mass Incidents . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Case Study: “Unorganized, with Demands” . . . . . . 2.2.2 Case Study: “Unorganized, Without Demands” . . . 2.2.3 General Dynamic Model for Unorganized Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Logic of Risk Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Composition of Risk Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Risk Strategy and Risk Behavior: How Risk Fields Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mass Incidents Governance: Strategies and Approaches . . . 2.4.1 Mass Incidents Are Not “Sudden Events” . . . . . . . 2.4.2 “Governance”, Rather Than “Response” or “Management” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Mass Incident Governance Is Not Static, but Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.4 Prioritize Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

41 42 42 44 44 46

... ... ...

48 49 49

. . . .

. . . .

51 60 62 62

...

63

... ...

64 66

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 71 71 72 73 73 74 75 76 76 83 87 90

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. 90 . 95 . 100 . 104

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . .

Empirical Studies

Perception, Amplification and Communication: A Case Study of Food Safety Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Research Background and Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Research Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Research Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Analytical Framework and Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Core Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 “Risk Amplifiers” of Food Safety Incidents . . . . . 3.3.2 “Risk Amplification Mechanism” . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 “Ripple Effects” of Food Safety Incidents . . . . . . 3.4 Main Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Main Factors Influencing Public Perception of Health Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Stigmatization in Food Safety Risks . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Health Anxiety and Risk Communication Barriers 3.4.4 Prerequisites for Risk Amplification . . . . . . . . . .

Contents

3.5

4

5

ix

Policy 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4

Suggestions: Communication Is Key . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition of Risk Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . Significance and Functions of Risk Communication Channels of Effective Communication . . . . . . . . . . Measures for Effective Communication . . . . . . . . .

China’s Emergency Planning System: A Case Study of Road Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 China’s Emergency Planning System: Evolution and Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 From the 1990s to the SARS Outbreak in 2003: Specialized Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 From 2003 to 2008: Building of an Emergency Planning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 From 2009 to Present: Routine Management of Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Emergency Planning for Road Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Before the Introduction of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Within the Framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Implementation and Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Implementation of Jiangsu Province’s Emergency Plans in 2008 Snow Storms and Recommended Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Revision of the National Emergency Plan for Road Transportation After the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Evaluation of China’s Emergency Planning System 4.4.2 How to Improve China’s Emergency Planning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity: A Case Study of Shenzhen . . . 5.1 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Theory . . . . . 5.1.1 A Multidimensional Approach to Emergency Response Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Multidimensional Interpretation of the Assessment . 5.2 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Reality . . . . . 5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

107 108 109 111 114

. . . 117 . . . 118 . . . 118 . . . 118 . . . 120 . . . 120 . . . 120 . . . 122 . . . 124

. . . 124

. . . 129 . . . 147 . . . 147 . . . 155 . . . 163 . . . 164 . . . 164 . . . 168 . . . 169 . . . 170

x

Contents

5.3.1

5.4

5.5

5.6

Part III 6

Positioning of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Three Types of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Three Phases of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preparedness Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 International Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Preparedness Assessment in Bao’an District, Shenzhen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3 Problems Revealed in the Preparedness Assessment . 5.4.4 Assessment Methods of Local Governments’ Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Implementation Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 What to Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 Problems in Emergency Implementation in Bao’an District, Shenzhen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Preliminary Design of Implementation Assessment . . Outcome Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 Connotation of Outcome of Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2 Bound Variables of Outcome and Restrictive Rules for Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 170 . . 171 . . 172 . . 174 . . 177 . . 177 . . 179 . . 181 . . 184 . . 188 . . 188 . . 191 . . 194 . . 197 . . 198 . . 199

Policy Priorities

Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation and Stability Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Risks for Disasters and Crises Are Essentially Insidious and Persistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 For the Foreseeable Future, Natural Disasters Tend to Occur More Frequently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 For the Foreseeable Future, Social Risks Tend to Occur More Frequently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 For the Foreseeable Future, Social Contradictions Tend to Occur More Frequently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Strategic Management: Changing Standards for Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Emergencies Should Be Managed Strategically . . . . 6.2.2 Strategic Management of Emergencies Should Meet Four Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 205 . . 205 . . 205 . . 209 . . 210 . . 211 . . 211 . . 213

Contents

xi

6.2.3

6.3

7

8

Strategic Management of Emergencies Requires a Three-Pronged Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Three Steps for Strategic Management of Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Institutionalization of Emergency Management . . . . 6.3.1 Legislation for Emergency Management . . . . . . 6.3.2 Creating a Funding Mechanism for Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Creating a Mechanism for Social Mobilization . .

. . . . . 214 . . . . . 215 . . . . . 217 . . . . . 217 . . . . . 218 . . . . . 219

Building a Better Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Learning from Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 Dedicated Agency for Emergency Management . . . . 7.1.2 Unified Emergency Command System . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3 Cross-Regional Emergency Response Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.4 Systematic Legislation for Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.5 Practical Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Research Trends and Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Research Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Suggestions for Improving China’s Emergency Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Building a Better Integrated Emergency Plan System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Think Systematically to Improve Classified and Hierarchical Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Improving the Emergency Management System Toward Unified Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4 Involving All Stakeholders in the Building of Emergency Management Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . 7.3.5 Further Improving the Legal System of Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency Management More Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.1 Digitalization of Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Building Emergency Rescue Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

221 221 221 222

. . 223 . . . . .

. . . . .

224 224 225 225 226

. . 229 . . 229 . . 230 . . 230 . . 231 . . 232 . . 232 . . 232 . . 238

A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 8.1 Designing Public Policy for a High-Risk Society . . . . . . . . . . . 245

xii

Contents

8.1.1

8.2

8.3

9

Pushing Back the Traditional Boundary of Public Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.2 Changing the Agenda-Setting Model for Public Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.3 Changing the Evaluation Criteria of Public Policy . . Including Social Risk Assessment in Policy-Making and Construction Project Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.1 Raising the Status of Social Stability Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2 Identifying the Entity of Risk Assessment for Social Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.3 Improving the Methods of Risk Assessment for Social Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.4 Strengthening Accountability in Risk Assessment for Social Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educating the Public: Risk Awareness and Risk Culture . . . . 8.3.1 Strengthening Public Participation in Safety Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.2 Establishing a Long-Term Mechanism for Emergency Education in Primary and Secondary Schools . . . . . . 8.3.3 Fostering a Safety Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.4 Popularizing Knowledge of Self-help and Mutual Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.1 Response Failure in Drought Management . . . . . . 9.1.2 Response Failure in Disaster Prevention and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Upgrading Emergency Management and Focusing on Proactive Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2 Adjusting Government Relations in Disaster Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.3 Improving the Accountability System for Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.4 Changing Growth Model and Properly Handling the Relationship Between Social Vulnerability and Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 246 . . 247 . . 248 . . 249 . . 250 . . 251 . . 252 . . 252 . . 253 . . 253 . . 256 . . 257 . . 257

. . . . 259 . . . . 259 . . . . 260 . . . . 262 . . . . 267 . . . . 268 . . . . 269 . . . . 270

. . . . 271

Contents

xiii

9.2.5

9.3

Leveraging Market Mechanisms More in the Prevention and Management of Disaster Risks . . . 9.2.6 Intensifying Efforts to Identify and Protect Vulnerable Groups and Improving Efficiency in Disaster Prevention and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . Promoting Public Participation in Environmental Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1 Advantages of Public Participation in Dealing with Environmental Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2 Specific Measures to Improve Public Participation

. . . . 272

. . . . 274 . . . . 275 . . . . 277 . . . . 279

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Importance of Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . 10.1.1 What Is NIMBY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.2 NIMBY Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.3 Strategic Framework for Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2.1 Temporal Analysis of Labor Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2.2 Response to the Risk of Work-Related Injury . . . . . 10.2.3 Temporal Analysis of Work-Related Injury Risk . . . 10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution . 10.3.1 Improve the Mechanism and Effectiveness of Handling Petitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3.2 Give Full Play to Mediation and Enhance Mediation Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3.3 Boost Legal Education and Increase Conflict Settlement Capability of the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3.4 Promote the Integration of Various Dispute-Solving Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision: A Case Study of Food Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Understanding the Current Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.1 Potential Self-interest of Regulatory Authorities . . . 11.1.2 Limited Capacity of Regulatory Authorities . . . . . . 11.1.3 Inadequacy of Information Gathered by Regulatory Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Regulating Food Safety Through Stakeholder Participation Stakeholder Participation is a Possible Way Out . . . . . . . . . 11.2.1 The Necessity of Democratic Regulation . . . . . . . . 11.2.2 The Feasibility of Democratic Regulation . . . . . . . 11.3 Facilitating Stakeholder Participation by Establishing Institutions and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

283 283 284 284

. . 287 . . . . .

. . . . .

290 291 293 297 302

. . 303 . . 305 . . 307 . . 308 . . . .

. . . .

311 312 312 313

. . . 314 . . . 315 . . . 315 . . . 316 . . . 317

xiv

Contents

11.3.1 11.3.2 11.3.3 11.3.4 11.3.5 11.3.6 11.3.7

Establishing the Concept of Popular Sovereignty Developing Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Creating a Check and Balance Mechanism . . . . . Improving the Food Safety Standard System . . . Implementing Strict Food Safety Certification . . Implementing Food “Traceability” Management . Establishing a Social Credit System for Food Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

317 318 318 319 320 321

. . . . . 321

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Holding the Government to Account in Public Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Three Types of Public Crises and Differential Management Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 Reducing Government Response Failures by Holding Officials Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.1 Introducing the Administrative Accountability System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.2 Stressing Accountability for Response as Well as Prevention and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.3 Holding Officials as Well as Related Party and Government Leaders Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 Risk Management: Key to Reducing Institutional Deficiency in the Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 323 . . 324 . . 326 . . 328 . . 328 . . 329 . . 330 . . 331

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

Part I

Theoretical Innovation

Chapter 1

A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks, Disasters and Crises

1.1 Motives Early warning and emergency management is a comprehensive and integrated system that deals with all sorts of emergencies, risks and crises, and involves various sectors of society and government departments. A consistent and holistic approach, however, has previously been lacking in both research and practice. Scholars of natural sciences and social sciences address the subject differently, so do academics and practitioners; and compartmentalization often characterizes different regions, departments and organizations’ responses to emergencies. These problems are particularly clearly manifested in the catastrophic winter storm that hit southern China in 2008.

1.1.1 2008 Winter Storm in Southern China The winter storm in question was a series of heavy snows and low temperature events that started on January 10, 2008 and caused serious social consequences in large parts of southern China. A typical occurrence in a high-risk society, it is significant in the following ways. First, it is an external manifestation of accumulated risk, and like the world’s many other extreme weather events caused by global climate change, it points to the trend that disasters have become more common. Second, it reflects the change in risk structure. It has far greater social implications than ordinary natural disasters, and is closely related to political and social processes such as urban-rural dualism and the provision of public services. Yet another event of systemic tension following the SARS outbreak in 2003, it attracted nationwide attention. Finally, its social implications were uncertain and difficult to predict based on previous experiences.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_1

3

4

1.1.1.1

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Progression of Disaster

The progression of the winter storm in 2008 followed six independent paths as shown in Fig. 1.1. (1) The heavy snows caused the collapse of buildings in urban areas and, more worsely, deaths and injuries in rural areas. Some people were displaced and lived a difficult life. (2) The heavy snows, ice and low temperatures directly affected the crops and the lives of farmers, disrupting the balance in demand and supply of agricultural products and pushing up the cost of living in urban areas. (3) The heavy snows, ice and low temperatures disrupted road transportation. Numerous passengers heading home for the Spring Festival were stranded, putting more security pressure on the stations and surrounding areas. Freight transportation was also affected, leading to the shortage and rising cost of necessities. (4) The accumulation of snow on transmission lines led to massive blackouts. As most trains were powered by electricity after railway electrification, power outages disrupted rail services, leaving a large number of passengers stranded. Apart from hardship to passengers, this also increased security pressure on railway stations and surrounding areas. Snow and ice also impeded freight transportation. The impact of power outage on the production and transportation of coal, an important source of electricity, further worsened the power shortage. Industrial production was hampered, causing imbalance in supply and demand and eventually pushing up prices. Moreover, failures in power grids, which are essential to all sectors nowadays, disrupted water supply, telecommunications, and financial services, among others, affecting people’s lives and posing a threat to social stability in some disaster-stricken areas. (5) Rising prices caused by multiple factors made the lives of some people even more difficult. (6) Difficulties in living and disruptions of public service exerted pressures on the political system, so did social disorder on the social system, and rising prices and disruptions of thermal coal production and transportation on the economic system. Together they resulted in the tension in the entire political, economic and social systems.

1.1.1.2

Impacts of the Disaster

The six paths described above represent in a nonlinear pattern the systemic risks posed by the storm. Such factors as population, environment, technology, and socioeconomic structure affected the spread of risks in a way that made the consequences of the storm unpredictable. (1) Population: The 2008 winter storm coincided with Chunyun, a travel rush that, beginning 20 years ago, would take place around the time of Spring Festival and

1.1 Motives

Fig. 1.1 Progression of the 2008 winter storm in southern China and its social impact

5

6

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

last over 40 days. The travel season saw nearly two billion passengers, including migrant workers, students and other people, travel by sea, air, and land for tour and for family reunion. Apart from busy passenger transportation, freight traffic also peaked. (2) Environment: The 2008 winter storm, the worst over the past fifty years, included four waves of heavy rain and snow, and was extremely rare in southern China in terms of the sphere of influence, duration, and snowfall intensity. Such extreme weather was a result of global environmental degradation. (3) Technology: Apart from road closure, the winter storm also caused lengthy delays in rail transportation. This is mainly because electric locomotives had replaced most diesel locomotives due to technological advances and the rail system’s dependence on power grids aggravated systemic risks. (4) Socioeconomic structure: The socioeconomic structure has multi-faceted influence on risk. Chunyun, which was affected by the 2008 winter storm, is typical of China’s urban-rural dualism. The failures in power grids were partly attributed to the lack of high-standard power supply equipment, an epitome of structural inadequacy of public spendings in rural areas. The commitment to “bringing every migrant worker back home for family reunion during the Spring Festival” is for the purpose of social integration, a wise decision given the current political, economic and social structures.

1.1.2 Problems Revealed in Disaster Response The winter storm of 2008, the worst over the past 50 years, alarmed us to an array of problems in the social system that had been deemed reasonably structured, wellfunctioning, effectively coordinated and efficiently managed. Factors contributing to these problems include the classification of academic disciplines, division of labor, poor coordination in disaster response, and urban-rural dualism.

1.1.2.1

Research on Early Warning and on Emergency Management Are Kept Separate

Research on the early warning system in society, which is largely confined to the sociological sphere, has long concentrated on risks such as fractured society, social tension and conflicts, but paid insufficient attention to natural disasters and their risks. Likewise, emergency management research, which falls within the scope of administrative management, has highlighted how unexpected crises are and how government responds to them, while ignoring the early phases of natural disasters and their attendant crises. That explained why foresight was lacking in related studies and why neither sociologists nor administrative management scholars warned of the winter storm or provided any contingency plan.

1.1 Motives

1.1.2.2

7

Natural Sciences and Social Sciences Treat Disasters Differently

For long, it is natural sciences and engineering technology that have contributed most to disaster-related discourse and research and management tools, whereas social sciences have played a less important role. In natural-science studies of disasters, the theory of “disaster chain”, a chain of disastrous events where one event typically leads to the next, is widely accepted as a basic analytical tool.1 The 2008 winter storm, however, posed a challenge to the theory. The existence of hundreds of millions of migrant workers due to China’s unique household registration (hukou) system and urban-rural dualism from cities to their rural homes, the large-scale movement of people driven by the tradition of family reunion and the heavy dependence of modern rail transportation on power grids made the “chain effect” of the winter storm more complicated and augmented the disastrous consequences, and these could hardly be explained by natural factors and the linear path of the traditional “disaster chain” theory. In other words, natural disasters are more than “natural”;they also have social attributes, including the social environment where disasters occur and actions taken for disaster relief and mitigation. Obviously, natural sciences alone cannot fully explain the social attributes of disasters.

1.1.2.3

Academics and Practitioners Approach Problems Differently

In general, academics focus on explaining or analyzing problems while practitioners concentrate on solving problems. Amid the great social changes in China, social problems have increased exponentially, and practitioners’ problem-solving mentality can easily cause them to seek the quickest rather than the best solutions. This will inevitably result in short-sightedness in policy formulation. As a matter of fact, research and practice cannot be completely cut off from each other. Now that research is increasingly geared to the practical needs of the country and researchers are warned against the danger of being divorced from reality, it is all-important to carry out forward-looking, systematic and strategic research within a new comprehensive analytical framework. However, 1 As

early as the 1980s, Ma Zongjin founded a comprehensive disaster mitigation team, which brought together experts in earthquake, water conservancy, meteorology and agriculture. As an important part of their research output, the team introduced the concept of “disaster chain”. Ma put forward three kinds of “disaster chains”: “heavy rain (typhoon)–rainstorm–disaster avoidance— mudslide–flood–farmland, road and building damage–drowning deaths, etc.”; “earthquake–(rain and snow)–collapse–sand surge–damage to buildings (housing, factories, lifeline)–transportation disruptions–communications disruptions–gas leakage, fire, etc.”; and “drought–dust storm–heat wave–water shortage–damage to crops, forests and grasses–shrouded rural and urban communities”. On this basis, Shi Peijun proposed the “disaster chain” of cold wave: “cold wave–snow disaster (frost, cold temperature)–biological effects of cold and frost (mechanical failure, structural damage, damage to agricultural and pastoral areas)”. The theory of “disaster chain” has become one of the main guidelines in the field of natural disaster reduction. See: Ma Zongjin. Some thoughts on emergency response to natural disasters in China. China Emergency Management, 2007 (2); Shi Peijun. Theory and dynamics of disaster research. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2002 (3).

8

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

just as academics often criticize practitioners for lack of long-term vision in policy fragmentation, practitioners often accuse academics of rendering no immediate and practical help. A lack of cooperation between them was also shown in their response to the winter storm of 2008.

1.1.2.4

Emergency Response of Different Regions, Departments and Organizations Are Poorly Coordinated

During the winter storm of 2008, the expressway authority was always the first government department to respond and the action they took was invariably shutting down the roads. While road closure did prevent serious traffic accidents, the closure of the expressway system, which is unprecedently important to our society today, would have a crippling effect on the entire social system—especially after the disruption of the rail network. Poor coordination also hindered emergency management. For example, the provincial government of Guangdong and the municipal government of Guangzhou were sometimes at odds with China Railway Guangzhou Group, the local arm of the National Railway Administration. They couldn’t effectively coordinate their actions and operations, and foot-dragging occurred at times. After the trunk line of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway was closed due to the power grid failure in Chenzhou City of Hunan Province, the provincial government of Guangdong encouraged migrant workers to stay in Guangdong for the Spring Festival instead of returning to their hometown; the local railway authority, however, asked the Guangzhou Railway Station to continue to sell tickets of the Beijing-Guangzhou line. As a result, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers swarmed around the railway station, causing public safety concerns and disturbing the residents nearby. The fact that the provincial government of Guangdong and the municipal government of Guangzhou could not give instructions to the local railway authority and railway station was a hindrance to emergency response efforts. Noticeably, the winter storm coincided with the “two sessions” in more than ten southern provinces, when the governments, the provincial people’s congresses and the provincial committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) were holding elections.2 China is a typical “government-guided society”, where the government leads economic development, and emergency management, too. During the 2008 winter storm, as local governments were busy with the “two sessions” and elections, they can hardly have enough time and effort to cope with the disaster, missing out on the best time for disaster mitigation and relief.

2 Likewise,

when Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) swept across Guangdong at the beginning of 2003, the province was holding the “two sessions” and elections; when the virus spread to Beijing in early March, the national “two sessions” were taking place there, and the NPC, the State Council and the CPPCC were also busy with elections.

1.1 Motives

9

1.1.3 New Consensuses in Disaster Management Research Call for New Theory 1.1.3.1

Two Consensuses

As disasters are increasing in frequency and intensity, disaster management research has attracted more attention and made new progress. The following two consensuses have been reached. First, disasters are a result of interactions between nature and society. The Environment as Hazard, first published in 1978, for the first time extends the scope of disaster mitigation from natural hazards and protective works to human reactions to disasters, pointing out that the influence of and losses incurred by disasters can be reduced by adjusting human behavior.3 Second, the social attributes of disasters begin to predominate over their natural attributes. As Anthony Giddens put it, “In all traditional cultures, one could say, and in industrial society right up to the threshold of the present day, human beings worried about the risks coming from external nature—from bad harvests, floods, plagues or famines. At a certain point, however—very recently in historical terms—we started worrying less about what nature can do to us, and more about what we have done to nature. This marks the transition from the predominance of external risk to that of manufactured risk.”4 The above consensuses show that disaster management, as an integrated system, has two important implications. The first is comprehensive management, meaning we should manage both the natural and social attributes of disasters; the second is whole-process management, that is, managing not only the hazard-inducing social environment but also the social consequences caused by disasters. This is because the social attributes of the disaster include the hazard-inducing social environment and also disaster mitigation and relief operations. The two aspects influence each other and together determine the social consequences of the disaster. This undoubtedly poses great challenges to research in social sciences since natural sciences and engineering technology have long provided more of the discourse system and analytical tools for disaster research and management. Of course, Western social scientists have made their efforts in this area. In Europe where formulation of theory has been a traditional strength, and the theory of risk society, which was developed by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, has gained influence as an explanation of the world’s disasters. In the United States, Enrico Quarantelli established the world’s first Disaster Research Center (DRC) in the field of social sciences at Ohio State University in 1963. The research center has so far carried out nearly six hundred field studies and obtained a wealth of research results useful for policymaking. Although China has suffered from frequent disasters since ancient 3 Ian

Burton, Robert W. Kates & Gilbert F. White. The Environment as Hazard. New York: The Guilford Press, 1993. 4 Anthony Giddens. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (trans. Zhou Xiaohong). Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 23.

10

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

times and has practical experiences in dealing with them, theoretical research on disasters is inadequate, especially in the field of social sciences. Therefore, it is essential to construct a new analytical framework to provide intellectual support for explaining and responding to disasters.

1.1.3.2

Three Questions

From a methodological point of view, whether a theoretical framework is well developed mainly depends on how well it may be used to explain the reality or to make predictions. A theoretical framework for disaster management should focus on addressing the following three questions. First, social dimension. This means that the theoretical framework, based on the basic concepts and ideas of social sciences, should provide an explanation about the social attributes of disasters and be helpful to disaster management. Second, integrated approach. The theoretical framework should be built on the basis of research findings in both social sciences and natural sciences. Only in this way can the framework produce public knowledge that faithfully reflects reality and meet the requirements of integrated disaster management. Third, local relevance. The theoretical framework should ultimately provide valuable analytical tools for disaster management in China, and whether the tools are effective depends on how well they can be used to explain China’s problems. This, however, does not mean rejecting international dialogues. The existing conceptual system and theoretical paradigm in China’s disaster research are not capable of addressing the three questions at the same time. Because of the classification of academic disciplines, disaster research in the field of social sciences lacks a holistic approach. Representative studies fall into three different fields and span three different periods. First, beginning in the early 1990s, sociologists paid attention to social risks in China’s reform and opening up. Some focused on quantitative risk analysis and prediction, and some on diagnosis and criticism of structural transformation. Second, given the challenges faced by governments around the world after the September 11 attacks in 2001, researchers in political science showed growing interests in how the Chinese government conducted crisis management against the backdrop of governance reform in the transition period. Third, after the SARS outbreak in 2003, researchers and practitioners in administrative management, driven by national needs, carried out intensive and large-scale research on the institutions, mechanism and legal framework governing government crisis management. Research in these three fields has different focal points: sociological research, on the basis of observation of social phenomena, tries to predict trends through the index system and structural diagnosis; research in the political sphere, on the basis of international comparison, pays close attention to how policy makers could benefit from international good practices and how the political consequences of disasters would propel governance reform; and research in administrative management, driven by the practical needs, emphasizes the design and operation of

1.1 Motives

11

general rules and principles and the immediate control of disasters. On the whole, research in the three fields focuses on one of the three different phases, rather than the whole process, of disasters and disaster management. How then should we go about constructing an analytical framework for studying disaster management that does justice to the social dimension of disasters, brings together the social and the natural sciences, and is applicable to the Chinese context? This study tries to answer the following questions: first, how can we, drawing on both research findings in natural sciences and the concepts and theories of social sciences, establish a platform for communication across disciplines such as sociology, politics and administrative management? Second, how can the platform benefit integrated disaster management, facilitating comprehensive and whole-process analysis of disasters and the formulation of a corresponding management framework? Third, given the global challenges of disasters China is facing and its own pain of transition, how can we provide a well-substantiated explanation for this reality?

1.2 Intellectual Genesis 1.2.1 Three Research Traditions Human beings have been concerned about disasters since ancient times. Over the past several millennia, people have been faced with all kinds of disasters, and never stopped fighting and studying them. Noah’s Ark in The Old Testament of the Bible is one of earliest myths about flood. The Chinese civilization is generally believed to begin from the era when Yu the Great tamed the flood. During the long years of disaster research, three traditions have persisted. 1. “Engineering–technology” tradition This is the oldest of the three research traditions, as the mankind’s first collective experience of fear came from natural disasters. Before science could provide reasonable explanations, people developed a set of symbols and rituals such as offering sacrifices to protect themselves from disasters. With the advances in natural sciences, people got a better understanding of natural disasters. They tried to find out the causes of disasters, and took engineering and many other means to deal with them, such as embanking and weather forecasting. In the industrial era, explosion, gas leakage and other man-made disasters increased, so countermeasures such as fire extinguishers and gas masks were created. Most researchers who hold to this tradition work in the fields of natural sciences and engineering. They generally believe and are optimistic that disasters can be prevented and controlled through engineering, education and enforcement. 2. “Organization–system” tradition During the Cold War, people realized that international conflicts may bring even greater harms than natural disasters and decision-makers, depending on the organi-

12

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

zational or institutional settings, could have an impact on foreign relations.5 Humanity was facing the question of survival. A case in point is the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After that, disasters such as the 1979 Three Miles Island accident in the United States, the 1984 Bhopal disaster in India, and the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion brought people’s fear and concern from international conflicts to the everyday world. Underlying all these disasters are problematic organizational management and flawed institutional design. Researchers who uphold this tradition mostly have a research focus on management. Also optimistic about the future, they try to prevent, identify, isolate, tackle and manage disasters by strengthening organizational management and improving institutional design.6 3. “Politics–society” tradition Since the 1980s, far-seeing researchers have come to realize that the greatest disaster is the self-destruction of modernity. As Ulrich Beck pointed out, in the process of modernization, the incredible productivity gains have given rise to unprecedented dangers and hazards.7 “The possibility of nuclear war, ecological calamity, uncontainable population explosion, the collapse of global economic exchange, and other potential global catastrophes provide an unnerving horizon of dangers for everyone”.8 Most of the researchers upholding the tradition work in social sciences, especially sociology and politics. They believe that the root of the problem lies in modernity per se—reflexive modernity,9 and the way out is political and social transformation. However, that is not going to be easy. It will be held back by the inertia of society and the people, and meet resistance from the vested interest. Therefore, researchers in this field are generally pessimistic.

1.2.2 Three Core Concepts Each of the three research traditions has at its core a concept that defines its research perspective and approach.

1.2.2.1

“Disaster” in the “Engineering–Technology” Tradition

It is difficult to verify when “disaster”, as a strictly defined concept, became a new subject of study. Nonetheless, it has been widely agreed over the years that: (1) there 5 Charles F. Hermann. Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1969, p. 14. 6 Steven Fink. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: Backinprint.com, 2000. 7 Ulrich

Beck. Risk Society (trans. He Bowen). Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2004, p. 15. Giddens. The Consequences of Modernity (trans. Tian He). Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2000,

8 Anthony

p. 125. 9 Ulrich

Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (trans. Zhao Wenshu). Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001.

1.2 Intellectual Genesis

13

are both natural and man-made disasters; (2) natural disasters include floods, earthquakes, hurricanes (typhoons), droughts, mudslides, sandstorms, ice and snow, and cold waves, and man-made disasters include work–related accidents, environmental pollution, epidemics, toxic food, and so on; (3) the main consequences of disaster are casualties, property losses, and social disorder; (4) natural and man-made disasters both fall into three categories by severity: everyday emergency, community disaster, and catastrophe; and (5) the basic coping strategy is to understand the root causes of disasters, warn people about them, get prepared and respond to disasters through engineering and other technological means. Among natural disasters, earthquakes and floods are most extensively researched. Through systematic research on the mechanical mechanism of the earth’s lithosphere at the macro and micro levels, and analysis of numerous real cases, researchers have made it possible to give early warning of earthquakes and apply risk assessment results to architectural designs. Japan has been taking the lead worldwide in seismological research, seismic design of building structures, and earthquake engineering. Researchers in Europe and the United States excel in flood simulation and risk assessment, and they try to monitor and control floods by studying flood dynamics and flood forecasting models. In the field of man-made disasters, work-related accidents have been the most researched area.

1.2.2.2

“Crisis” in the “Organization–System” Tradition

American scholar Charles F. Hermann is generally acknowledged as the first researcher to provide a rigorous definition of “crisis” and make it a specialized area of study. He defined crisis as a situation that “(1) threatens high-priority values of the organization goals, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a decision can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization”.10 This definition, which points out crisis management is essentially about decision making, had greatly influenced crisis research before the 1980s. Graham Alison, based on the case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, proposed three influential models of decision making in crises: (1) rational actor model; (2) organizational procedure model; and (3) governmental politics model.11 On the basis of the “bounded rationality” idea of Herbert Simon, Irving Janis studied the process and conditions of decision making from psychological and individual perspectives, and put forward three rules about decision making: (1) cognitive decision; (2) affiliative decision; and (3) self-serving and emotive decision.12 After the 1980s, while tensions between countries began to ease, tensions within a social system emerged. Against this backdrop, crisis was refined as a serious threat to the basic structure and core values of a social system, in which key decisions are 10 Charles F. Hermann. Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1969, p. 14. Allison. Essence of Decision. Boston, Mass.: Little Brown & Company, 1971. 12 Irving L. Janis. Crucial Decision: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management. New York: The Free Press, 1981. 11 Graham

14

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

required because of the high uncertainty and time pressure (Uriel Rosenthal et al. 1989).13 Later, more researchers started to explore a broader range of crisis management issues, and paid attention to the whole process of crisis and crisis management. For example, Steven Fink divided the crisis life cycle into four stages: prodromal, breakout or acute, chronic, and resolution. Norman R. Augustine identified six stages of crisis management: avoid crises, prepare to manage crises, recognize a crisis, contain the crisis, resolve the crisis, and profit from the crisis. And Robert Heath proposed the 4R model: reduction, readiness, response, and recovery.

1.2.2.3

“Risk” in the “Politics–Society” Tradition

Originally, “risk” was a term in insurance, meaning the probability of losses. Frank Knight then defined it as an economic term by differentiating risk from uncertainty, and used uncertainty to explain where profit comes from and what the nature of businesses is.14 Apart from substantive definitions of “risk”, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have also developed constructive definitions of the term. According to sociologist Nicklas Lumann, what’s opposite to risk is not security but danger. The distinction between the two notions is that risk depends on how people perceive it, so does the risk associated with it, while danger precedes human decision or behavior, and the loss associated with it is determined by external factors.15 Psychologist Paul Slovic holds that risk is subjectively defined by individuals who are subject to influence by psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors. With well-designed surveys, these factors and their relationships can be measured through quantitative and modelling methods.16 He, together with Sarah Lichtenstein and Brauch Fischhoff, established a measurable model for risk perception. Risk is not only related to individual perception, argued anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, but more importantly, should be seen as a “joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most desired prospects”.17 On this basis, they divided risks into three categories: social and political risk, economic risk, and natural risk, and attributed the evolution of social fabric to three distinct cultural types: hierarchical culture that sees social and political risk as the greatest risk, market individualistic culture that views economic risk as the greatest, and marginal culture that regards natural risk as the greatest.

13 Uriel Rosenthal, Charles Michael & Paul Hart, eds. Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Pub. Ltd., 1989, p. 10. 14 Frank Knight. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (trans. An Jia). Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007. 15 Niklas Lumann. Risk: A Sociological Theory. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993, p. 9. 16 Paul Slovic. “Perceptions of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric paradigm”, in Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding, eds., Social Theories of Risk. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 120. 17 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky. Risk and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 5.

1.2 Intellectual Genesis

15

Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens made “risk” a general term. In their statements about risk society, risk, as a basic feature of society and what is inherent in modernity, fundamentally changes the operational rules, dynamics and basic structure of industrial society. Beck argues that from the historical perspective of social evolution, risk distribution will overlap with and ultimately merge with wealth distribution.18 Modern risks have shaken up the relationship between the present, the past and the future. It is no longer the past, but the risk of the future, that determines our choice today.19 While in some areas and lifestyles, modernity has reduced the overall risk, but it has also introduced some new risk parameters that people had known little or nothing about in the past, and these parameters involve high-consequences risks deriving from the globalization of modern social system.20 As Beck further pointed out, people may, for the first time, feel the sense of a kind of common destiny, because the threat is amplifying infinitely, the everyday consciousness of cosmopolitanism is awakened, and even the boundaries between mankind, animals and plants may be eliminated: whereas risk would contribute to the formation of risk society, global risk contributes to a global risk society.21

1.2.3 Trend Towards Disaster-Centered Integration The research traditions represented by the three core concepts, though relatively independent of each other, show a trend towards integration. In 1945, Gilbert White published his influential dissertation titled “Human Adjustment to Floods”, starting to study natural disasters from the angle of human behavior. In 1978, he co-authored The Environment as Hazard with Ian Burton and Robert Kates, which for the first time shifts the focus of disaster mitigation from hazards and engineering to human reactions to disasters, pointing out that adjusting human behaviors helps relieve the impacts of and losses from disasters. Such transition not only has great influence on disaster research in natural sciences, but also given rise to a surge in social science research on disaster. Enrico Quarantelli, an influential American disaster scholar and founder of the Disaster Research Center (DRC), concluded after reviewing disaster research in the West in the past four decades that (1) the classification system that distinguishes between natural and man-made disasters cannot explain the social attributes of disasters, and it is better to divide disasters into consensus type and dissensus type. Consensus-type disasters are those where there is an agreement on the meaning of the situation, the norms and values that are appropriate, and priorities that 18 Ulrich

Beck. Risk Society (trans. He Bowen). Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2004, p. 1. Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (trans. Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1998. 20 Anthony Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (trans. Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1998. p. 4. 21 Ulrich Beck. What is Globalization? (trans. Chang Hefang; eds. Xue Xiaoyuan). Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2008, p. 43. 19 Anthony

16

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

should be followed. The dissensus-type disaster means there are sharply contrasting views of the nature of the situation, what brought it about, and what should be done to resolve it.22 (2) Except in those extremely vulnerable areas, people generally pay little attention to disasters before they happen, whereas in regions frequently struck by disasters, relevant organizations and their activities will promote the formation of a disaster sub-culture. (3) Disasters usually cause visible psychological reactions such as insomnia, lack of appetite, and irritability, but these effects are non-clinical, selfhealing, and last for a short period. The victims rarely show functional inadaptability at home, school or work, and many of them could demonstrate similar syndromes even if the disaster had not happened. (4) Written emergency plans, though legally necessary, are by no means as important as emergency procedures. (5) The greater the disaster, the more likely new organizational structure and functions, hence greater difficulty in coordination. Hence, the key to catastrophe response is coordination. (6) The media play double roles, both as outsider and part of the emergency response system. These two roles are difficult to integrate.23 According to Quarantelli, the Western social science studies of disaster have been very fruitful, though there are also serious challenges. For example, as scholars oriented in different disciplines join the disaster research, it is even difficult for them to agree on the definition of disaster; the differences in their understanding of basic concepts and assumptions tend to cause confusion and inconsistency. Quarantelli holds that it is necessary to get a big picture of the research subject by creating a new paradigm for disaster research. In this new paradigm, disaster is a type of crisis scenario, and theoretical analysis of risk will to a great extent influence the orientation of the disaster research in social sciences.24 As for the trends of crisis and crisis management, Rosenthal thinks that future crisis will be essentially complex, a causal relationship full of uncertainty and a “self-perpetuating circle”, and the key trends include transnationality, media, scientific and technological advances, and dissipation of government authority.25 These views echo the theory of risk society. Over time, researchers have got a deeper insight into reality, and new traditions and concepts have emerged and started to dominate. New traditions and concepts extend the study in breadth and depth, rather than replace the three original traditions and the three core concepts. Still, we include the three concepts of disaster, crisis and risk into disaster research, and refer to the product of such infusion as the social science disaster research out of the following considerations: first, compared with crisis research and risk research, disaster research has a longer history and is more fruitful; second, disaster research, which used to fall into the scope of natural sci22 Enrico L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes. Response to Social Crisis and Disaster. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1977, pp. 23–49. 23 Sue McNeil & Enrico L. Quarantelli. Past, Present and Future: Building an Interdisciplinary Disaster Research Center on a Half-Century of Social Science Disaster Research, paper at international conference on Risk, Crisis and Public Management, Nanjing, 2008. 24 Enrico L. Quarantelli. What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question. London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 268–270. 25 Uriel Rosenthal, Arjen Boin & Louise K. Comfort, eds. Managing Crisis: Treat, Dilemmas, Opportunities. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Pub. Ltd., 2001, pp. 11–14.

1.2 Intellectual Genesis

17

ences and engineering, began to shift its focus to the social attributes of disaster and social governance, and social science scholars are encouraged to engage in crisis and risk research; third, an inherent link exists between the three core concepts of disaster, crisis and risk, with disaster (or more accurately, “emergency”, a term closely associated with “disaster”) at the core. Whereas “disaster” (emergency) refers to all sorts of natural and man-made events that cause great losses, “crisis” refers to the impacts these events have produced on the closely interconnected, ever-changing and complicated world and “risk” refers to the causes of the disaster and crisis. Currently, disaster research in social sciences still needs the underpinning of the three core concepts.

1.3 Internal Logic26 1.3.1 From Disaster to Emergency In China, “disaster” is a term that draws widespread attention. In traditional Chinese culture, the idea of “interaction between heaven and man” has huge influence, and “disaster” is always connected with “heaven”, and is believed to reflect the will of heaven. The traditional concept of “disaster” is now facing challenges. First, though the classification of disaster into natural and man-made allows a wide array of events to be included, it is increasingly difficult for the tradition concept of disaster to cover some types of event such as mass incidents. In this regard, Robert Stallings proposed that disaster should be considered as not only a natural or technical risk, but also an exception to the society’s operational norm.27 While Western countries can use the natural and man-made disaster classification to increase the scope of disaster, the Chinese term of “man-made misfortune” is inappropriate, and the term “natural calamity” is even more so. Second, it is necessary to think out of the traditional concept of “disaster” and to understand disasters and disaster response from a broader and longer-term perspective. Given these considerations, a more appropriate concept should be “emergency”, or “public emergency” which means the same in this book. In fact, “emergency” is not a strictly defined academic concept, but compared to “disaster”, it has at least two advantages. First, it is highly abstract, comprising all kinds of incidents, whether they are a natural disaster, a human-induced accident, or even “an exception to the society’s operational norm”. Second, it is neutral. Disasters are no longer classified

26 See: Tong Xing & Zhang Haibo. An Analytical Framework of Disaster Management in the Context of China. Social Sciences in China, 2010 (1): 132–146. 27 Robert A. Stallings. “Disaster and the Theory of Social Order”, in Enrico L. Quarantelli, eds. What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question. London: Routledge Press, p. 137.

18

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

as external, man-made, and unusual. They are all sudden and unexpected. Given the current political and social context of China, the concept of “emergency” is more acceptable to people. This change can be seen in both practice and institutional arrangements. China’s disaster management has gone through several stages, from disaster relief, disaster prevention and mitigation, to comprehensive disaster reduction, and is moving towards the stage of emergency management. In the face of disasters, in addition to primitive rituals, the most natural reaction of mankind is disaster relief. Early measures included rescue, tax relief, relocation, transfer of grain, and compensation. Later, measures such as building water conservancy facilities, adjusting plans and storing grain were developed for the purpose of disaster prevention and mitigation. At the stage of comprehensive disaster reduction, man-made disasters, in addition to natural disasters, were also included in the scope of disaster prevention and mitigation. From the 1950s, disaster management in China focused on disaster relief and disaster prevention at the early stage. The government successively set up disaster management agencies such as the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Disaster Relief Committee and the Ministry of Civil Affairs. After China joined the UN’s program of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in 1990, the concept of comprehensive disaster reduction gained popularity. After the close of the program, China International Disaster Reduction Commission established during the decade was renamed China National Commission for Disaster Reduction, and remains the country’s top agency for natural disaster reduction. However, limited progress was made in comprehensive disaster reduction. For example, a majority of man-made disasters in China were work–related accidents, and the highest authority dealing with them was the State Administration of Work Safety, instead of the National Commission for Disaster Reduction. This situation did not change until the SARS outbreak in 2003. In response to the threats of new infectious diseases and frequent occurrence of other emergencies, the Chinese government decided to establish an emergency management system, at the core of which is a comprehensive strategy for emergency response that consists of plans, institutions, mechanisms and rules and regulations. In this system, “disaster” is replaced by the more abstract concept “emergency”, which is broadly defined as “a sudden natural disaster, accident, public health incident or public security incident that has caused or may cause serious social consequences, and warrants immediate action”, and response to such emergencies is referred to as “emergency management”. Since then, at the institutional level, China has directly moved from the stage of disaster prevention and mitigation to comprehensive emergency management.

1.3 Internal Logic

19

Fig. 1.2 Logical relationship between risk, emergency (disaster) and crisis

1.3.2 The Continuum of “Risk–Disaster (Emergency)–Crisis” While the transition from “disaster” to “emergency” addresses the conceptual issue concerning “disaster”, the subsequent problem is how to place “emergency” in the “closely interconnected, ever-changing and complicated world “, which requires a look at the relationship between emergency, risk and crisis. Evidently, the same is true of “risk” and “crisis”. If risk prediction cannot be translated into management strategy, its significance will be quite limited; as to crisis, a “full-fledged theory” is needed to explain the causes and evolution of different types of crises and the pattern of crisis evolution so as to better understand crisis or crisis management. The relationship between risk, emergency (disaster) and crisis is shown in Fig. 1.2. “Emergency” is a broader term than “disaster”, but its logical relationship with risk and crisis remains unchanged. At the conceptual level, risk has become a general term, “marking the beginning of a new era”; crisis has become part of our everyday world, and an emergency is a public incident. This indicates that the three concepts are consistent in terms of publicness. As to the logical relationship between risk and crisis, at the level of publicness, risk refers to a kind of uncertainty that can result in large-scale losses, and is, in essence, a possibility; crisis refers to the political and social consequences caused by some kind of loss, and is, in essence, a fact. Therefore, risk precedes crisis, and there is a causal relationship between the two; in other words, the fundamental cause of the consequences of crisis is risk. Thus, we can make the following inferences. Inference 1: The nature of risk determines the nature of crisis. The causal relationship between risk and crisis, however, is only potential. Such implicit causality only becomes explicit through emergency. Certainly, experts in specific fields are aware of such underlying causal relationship. Once “emergency”, like a trigger, occurs, the explicit causal relationship between risk and crisis will

20

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

become an iron-clad fact that the general public and even headstrong leaders have to admit. In reality, explicit causal relationship manifests itself in two kinds of situations. (1) Sometimes one large-scale emergency can expose the underlying causal relationship between risks and crisis, which is suddenly cast under the spotlight, attracting the attention of many. (2) A number of small-scale, little-noticed emergencies gradually expose the underlying causal relationship between risk and crisis, a slow process that is not easy to perceive. The two different paths from risk to crisis correspond to the classification of crises in the West: instant crisis, and creeping crisis. Based on the above causal chain, the following two inferences, which have important implications for emergency management practice, can be drawn. Inference 2: The root cause of crisis is risk, not emergency. Inference 3: The real consequence of risk is crisis, not emergency. In the symmetric causal chain, emergency stands between risk and crisis. The distance between emergency and risk denotes the degree of risk accumulated, and a longer distance means a greater degree of risk; the distance between emergency and crisis can be interpreted as the severity of crisis, and a longer distance indicates that the crisis is less serious. Thus, another two inferences can be made. Inference 4: The greater the accumulated risks, the more serious the crisis. Inference 5: The less the accumulated risks, the less serious the crisis. It goes without saying that risk and emergency cannot be separated. Risk can amplify the consequences of emergency. A small emergency, after risk amplification, can become a large-scale one. This leads to another inference. Inference 6: The greater the accumulated risks, the more serious the consequences of emergency. Since the consequences of emergency are subject to the influence of social risk, another inference can be made. Inference 7: The nature of an emergency is decided by that of risk. Under the premise that risk has been created systematically, emergency itself is a kind of risk mitigation, and serves as a “safety valve” or “buffer” as called in conflict theory in social sciences. This leads to the eighth inference. Inference 8: Emergency is a bad thing, but can be a good one as well. There is no denying that the SARS outbreak in 2003 was a disaster, but it upended China’s obsession with GDP, and became one of the reasons the central government put forward the Scientific Outlook on Development in the autumn of that year. Since then, emergency management has practically become a source of management

1.3 Internal Logic

21

Fig. 1.3 Logical relationship between disaster management, emergency management, risk management, and crisis management

innovation in China. For example, the administrative accountability system began with the dismissal of then Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang and Mayor of Beijing Meng Xuenong, who were held accountable for ineffective response to the SARS outbreak. After that, it is common that officials are held accountable in the wake of emergencies. During the SARS outbreak, local authorities were required to report the number of confirmed cases, suspected cases, recovered patients and deaths and other data every day, and this promoted the establishment of the government information disclosure system. In addition, the approach of combining the institutions, mechanisms and rules and regulations to address major issues also originated from emergency management.

1.3.3 Whole-Process Response System: “Risk Management–Disaster (Emergency) Management–Crisis Management” Judging from management practices, the original “disaster management” should be extended to “emergency management”, which comes after risk management and precedes crisis management. Their relationship is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. While the scope of emergency management is limited to the emergency situation per se, the so-called whole-process response system represents a holistic approach to the problem. According to Inference 2, emergency management cannot effectively reduce the crises the government has to deal with. The most fundamental problem China is facing is risk, rather than emergency. Only the whole-process response system integrating risk management, emergency management and crisis management

22

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

can help eliminate risk and shake off crisis. In view of this, we may refer to the “wholeprocess response system” as “emergency management” in the broader sense, and have it incorporated into the national framework for the optimization of governance structure. The integrated risk, emergency and crisis management system should have the following features. First, systematic management. Risk management, emergency management and crisis management are all an indispensable part of the system, and they work together to keep the events under control, reduce losses, restore government image, strengthen political legitimacy, promote social reform, improve governance structure and mitigate risks, so as to ensure long-term social stability. Second, dynamic management. Ideally, corrective action needs to be taken before any risk evolves into a real emergency. In reality, however, such action may easily run into difficulty because of resistance and the lack of motivation. Therefore, emergency management can be taken as opportunity to promote crisis management, and then to propel risk management and crisis management. Third, proactive management. Proactive management should take priority. Emergencies, after all, can cause casualties, loss of property, social disorder and other consequences, and there is no guarantee that every emergency can be kept under control. To achieve integrated risk, emergency (disaster) and crisis management, there are three options or paths: first, focus on emergency (disaster) management, and further improve the emergency (disaster) management system; second, proceed from emergency (disaster) management to crisis management, and propel policy adjustment and reform; and third, advance risk management, and improve social fabric to fundamentally reduce uncertainty. Considering the four types of emergencies in China, the paths can be selected in line with the following principles: for natural disasters and public health incidents, the first path is advised, with the other two playing a complementary role; for accidents, the second path should be given priority; and for public safety incidents, the third path should take the lead. In practice, a three-step approach can be taken to achieve integrated risk, emergency and crisis management: in the near future, take path one by improving emergency (disaster) management and the system as a whole; in the medium term, take path two, advancing crisis management and promote policy adjustment and reform; in the long term, take path three, advancing risk management and optimizing social fabric to reduce uncertainty.

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

23

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research 1.4.1 Risk Warning in Sociology and Crisis Management in Public Administration Based on the comprehensive analytical framework proposed above, the research on risk warning in sociology and that on crisis management in public administration can be integrated in the following ways.

1.4.1.1

Conceptual Integration

Theoretical research starts with defining concepts. Even for the same research subject, different disciplines may use different concepts due to different disciplinary backgrounds and research traditions. (1) Risk From an interdisciplinary perspective, Ortwin Renn sums up seven approaches to the conception and assessment of risk: the actuarial approach, the toxicological and epidemiological approach, the engineering approach, the economic approach, the psychological approach, social theories of risk, and cultural theory of risk.28 The seven approaches can be roughly divided into two categories: the first is technical orientation, which regards risk as a probability and usually uses the statistical method of expected frequency, such as the life table in insurance; the other is economicsocial-cultural orientation, which sees risk as a social consequence and usually uses the formula “R (risk) = P (probability) × H (hazard)”. These are also two divergent definitions of risk the UN recommends for the assessment of chemical toxicity.29 (2) Social risk Frank Knight holds that a random state that can be expressed in probability is risk, while one that cannot be expressed (or at least under current conditions) is uncertainty. This dichotomy lays the foundation for the modern insurance industry to calculate risks, and also implies the nature of social risk.30 Social risk is usually incalculable and cannot be expressed in probability and in essence, is a kind of uncertainty. 28 Ortwin Renn. “Concepts of Risk: A Classification”. Social Theories of Risk. Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 56. 29 Mary Douglas. Risk Acceptability According to the Social Science. London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 20. 30 Risk that can be expressed in probability is also called “calculable risk”, and risk that cannot be expressed in probability is called “incalculable risk”. This classification of risk has important practical significance, and gives rise to two different ways of handling risk. “Calculable risk” is usually handled by insurance companies, which conducts “centralized management” of scattered risk. A typical example is compulsory traffic insurance. For “incalculable risk”, insurance companies refuse to provide protection with the excuse of “force majeure”, so the government has to take over by conducting “decentralized management” of concentrated risk. A case in point is

24

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

(3) Crisis People often interpret the concept of “crisis” from two perspectives: “process”, and “event”. The former tends to regard “crisis” as a non-routine, or “crisis”, while the latter tends to see “crisis” as an “emergency” or a series of “emergencies”. Scholars usually take the “process” perspective and use the term “crisis”, while policymakers generally take the “event” perspective and use “emergency”. There are substantial differences between the two perspectives: the “process” perspective describes crisis as a continuous curve with “peak, “valley” and a complete life cycle, implying the possibility to prevent, control and warn against crisis; the “event” perspective regards crisis as a “point” and identifies whether or not a crisis will occur based on the specific state of events, and because this is simple in terms of operation, it is often adopted by government departments. (4) Public crisis Currently, Uriel Rosenthal’s definition of crisis has been universally recognized in Chinese academia. According to him, crisis is a serious threat to the basic structure and core values of a social system, in which key decisions are required because of the high uncertainty and time pressure. Crisis is a general term, and public crisis is a particular form of crisis. At present, most researchers do not distinguish between “crisis” and “public crisis”, but with time, the two should be separated. The former mainly appears in the study of corporate governance and management studies, while the latter gets a foothold in discussions about public governance and public administration. From the above analysis, it can be seen that risk and crisis are different from each other and also connected. Risk refers to the possibility of loss, and crisis is the loss incurred; if without intervention, risk will eventually evolve into crisis. In other words, there is a causal relationship between risk and crisis; risk is the early form, crisis is the subsequent manifestation, and between risk and crisis is a “continuum”. At the social level, risk logically turns into social risk and crisis into public crisis. Therefore, there is a causal relationship between social risk and public crisis, and between the two is also a “continuum”. (5) Early warning and emergency management While studies of risk, social risk, crisis, and public crisis focus on risk and crisis per se, early warning and emergency management studies focus on the management approaches. Early warning is considered as the main approach to managing social risk, in the same way as emergency management to managing public crisis. The

the Wenchuan earthquake. This “incalculable risk” struck areas from Wenchuan to Qingchuan, and evolved into a public crisis. Relying on local governments and local resources alone was not enough to address the severe consequences, so the CPC Central Committee and the State Council designated 19 provinces (municipalities) including Guangdong, Shandong and Jiangsu to provide targeted assistance for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction of 17 seriously affected counties (cities) such as Wenchuan, Beichuan and Mianzhu.

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

25

Fig. 1.4 “Social risk–public crisis” integrated conceptual framework

process from social risk to early warning and from public crisis to emergency management also conforms to logical inference. The logical relationship between the six core concepts and their causal relationships in practice are shown in Fig. 1.4. As can be seen from Fig. 1.4, social risk and public crisis are, respectively, the front end and back end of the same study. Social risk research and public crisis research are particular forms of the general risk research and crisis research, and early warning research and emergency management research are particular forms of social risk research and public crisis research. Traditional social risk and early warning research concentrated in sociology only involves the front end, while public crisis and emergency management research mainly in the sphere of public administration only involves the back end. Logical inevitability and practical causality both require the combination of social risk and early warning research with public crisis and emergency management research. The main topic of front-end research is how to identify, warn against and reduce social risk, but not all social risks can be accurately identified, timely warned against, or effectively reduced, and a considerable part of them will still evolve into public crises. In this case, the research in sociology can be of little help. In contrast, emergency management research in public administration only involves the back end. However, at the core of crisis management is the principle of “prevention outweighs control”, and public administration research rarely addresses

26

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Fig. 1.5 “Social risk–public crisis” integrated research framework

social risk. Therefore, equal emphasis should be placed on the two: public crisis management must start from social risk management, and social risk management should be followed by public crisis management.

1.4.1.2

Theoretical Integration

Due to the practical causality between risk and crisis and their mutual transformation at individual, organizational and societal/public levels, the process of risk and crisis management should include at least two stages and three levels (Fig. 1.5). The two stages are the stage of social risk management and of public crisis management. The three levels include individual risk and individual crisis management, organizational risk and organizational crisis management, and social risk and public crisis management. Social risk management includes three stages: risk identification, early warning, and risk mitigation. Risk identification is to identify and confirm social risks that pose threat to the normal operation of society, and grade them according to the degree of danger; early warning is to establish an early warning mechanism to grasp the accumulation of social risk and risk tolerance of society in a timely manner, and is the core link of social risk management; risk mitigation is to release and channel social risk close to the risk tolerance of society. Public crisis management includes two stages: emergency management and recovery. Emergency management is to make decisions in response to public crisis evolved from social risk, and allocate resources to minimize casualties and other losses, and it is the core link of public cri-

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

27

sis management; recovery refers to the diagnosis and restoration of areas affected by public crisis, including the reconstruction of infrastructure, reconstruction of management mechanisms, restoration of social order, and psychological interventions. It is obvious that social risk and public crisis management research should be an integrated study that cuts across many disciplines, such as economics, management, psychology, sociology and public administration. Throughout the process of social risk and public crisis management, the most important is early warning about risks and response to public crisis. Prevention takes precedence over control, so early warning is a top priority. Nonetheless, social risk in essence is uncertainty, and early warning is never omnipotent. Therefore, once social risk turns into public crisis, emergency management procedures should be initiated immediately. Research on social risk and public crisis management is mainly concentrated in the fields of sociology and public administration.31 Some influential theoretical studies including those on social risk, risk society, anomie, social transformation and social control are essentially sociological research with a focus on description and explanation. Other important studies such as emergency management, crisis management and governance basically focus on countermeasures and applications from the perspective of public administration. Among them, social risk research and social control theory are interdisciplinary and address both social risk at the front end and public crisis at the back end. Some domains of their discourse fall into the scope of public administration, and others the scope of sociology. Though no important public crisis theories have been developed, researchers may draw on the above theories in order to achieve theoretical innovation (Fig. 1.6).

1.4.1.3

Methodological Integration

Different research methods of various disciplines can be integrated in a risk/crisis management study. (1) Index method In the 1960s and 1970s, because of American sociologist Romand Bauer’s book, Social Indicators, the use of indicators gained ground in early warning research. In 1972, the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, a research report that gives a warning of the development model of mankind and has been regarded as a classic in the study of early warning indicators for social risk. Since China adopted the reform and opening up policy in 1978, Chinese scholars have started to use indicators to 31 This is not always true. Risk research involves a wide range of fields such as actuarial science, economics, environmental science, toxicology, and epidemiology. Crisis research involves business management, journalism and communication, and public relations. The relationship between risk, social risk, crisis and public crisis as discussed earlier shows that it is difficult to separate these fields absolutely. However, it is justifiable to say that the existing theoretical achievements in social risk and public crisis research are concentrated in the two disciplines of sociology and public administration.

28

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Fig. 1.6 Theoretical synthesis and innovation of public crisis management

study social risk warning. The index method is straightforward and operable, and thus liable to draw attention from policymakers. This research approach, however, faces two major challenges: one is the lack of convincing evidence in the selection of indicators and the assignment of weights, and the other is that it has not been validated by empirical facts. The basic presupposition of the index method is that risk is objective and quantifiable. In practice, researchers usually use the Delphi method to select indicators and assign weights, which in effect views risk as subjective, and this is logically conflicting. Moreover, the social system is too complicated to be compared to the computational system. A seemingly independent event in the social sphere may eventually lead to a big mess, while the comprehensive index system may not be ready to respond at all. In order for the index method to play a greater role in the study of public crisis management, new methods must be developed to meet these challenges. (2) Psychometric paradigm The psychometric paradigm is based on the assumption that risk is inherently subjective and is constructed by society. Since risk is subjectively defined by individuals

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

29

who may be influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional, and cultural factors, many of these factors and their interrelationships, with appropriate design of survey instruments, can be quantified and modeled. Through quantitative research, the psychometric paradigm reveals three basic dimensions of public risk perception: fear of risk, unknown risk, and exposure to risk. These risks can be described with the following opposing variables: observable–not observable, known to exposed–not known to exposed, effect delayed–effect immediate, new–old, known to science–not known to science, controllable–uncontrollable, dread–not dread, global catastrophic–not global catastrophic, certain not fatal–certainly fatal, equitable–not equitable, individual–catastrophic, low risk to future generations–high risk to future generations, easily reduced–not easily reduced, risk decreasing–risk increasing, and voluntary–involuntary. Research finds that risk perception and attitude of the general public is closely related to the above variables.32 (3) Analogy By analogy with combustion, social combustion theory points out that the process in which a social system moves from order to disorder and eventually a major public crisis occurs is essentially a process from quantitative change to qualitative change.33 Social combustion theory classifies the factors of social instability into external disturbances and internal contradictions, which, under the dual accumulation of quantity and quality and ignited by the “social trigger threshold”, evolve into issues in focus. After sudden changes and fluctuations, two kinds of results will be produced: the original system will either collapse or hold on. In empirical research on social amplification of risk, some researchers applied the electronic model of 128 crises to database analysis, and to in-depth case study of risk-related community experiences. These analogies have been widely used in social risk research, but also aroused controversy and criticism. Analogy can stimulate researchers’ imagination, but is difficult to reveal the inherent nature of the object of study. (4) Case study Since public crisis is manifested as a series of events, case study of the whole process of events is obviously an important method of public crisis research. However, the fact that social phenomena cannot be replicated makes it impossible to reconstruct the crisis. Although many researchers use case study as a research method to account for the process of public crisis management, it is of limited help to predict social risk and improve public crisis management.

32 Paul Slovic. “Perception of Risk Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm”. Social Theories of Risk. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. 33 Niu Wenyuan. The Social Physics and the Warning System of China’s Social Stability. Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2001 (1).

30

1.4.1.4

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Integration of Topics

An interdisciplinary research platform extending from social risk to public crisis should be set up. Currently, most studies on public crisis management only discuss how the government should respond to public crisis at the national level, but seldom dive into the mechanism of public crisis, especially the portents at the social level. Research on the “continuum” from social risk to public crisis can get a grip on the occurrence and evolution of public crisis through the process, and is therefore conducive to interdisciplinary collaboration and theoretical innovation. For policymakers, such research is clearly more effective and useful than simply considering issues from the perspective of public administration. The key to the “continuum” research lies in how to establish an integrated response mechanism which requires an interdisciplinary research platform integrating early warning and emergency management. The response mechanism should first be based on risk classification, that is, targeted risk management should be conducted according to the types of risk; second, the mechanism should be based on risk grading, that is, emergency management should be geared to the different levels of early warning; third, it should also be based on crisis stages, that is, crisis management should vary depending on the different stages of crisis. The classified, tiered and phased risk and crisis response system should at least consist of the early warning mechanism, information mechanism, command mechanism, and collaboration mechanism. Prevention outweighs control, so it is necessary to strengthen front-end research on public crisis. With the proposition of concepts such as “sustainable development”, “Scientific Outlook on Development”, “harmonious society” and “inclusive growth”, a risk culture is taking shape in China in the process of social transformation. Now that social risks have been brought about by institutional factors, the focus should now be on how to understand, choose and avoid these risks. Changes in concepts can in turn mitigate objective social risks. The central government and local governments are now transforming the development model that places disproportionate emphasis on GDP growth, and paying more attention to social justice, wealth gap and environmental quality, and the government and official performance evaluation indicators are also changing. Attention should be given to the creation of case study database and recovery from a public crisis. Often, high-tech on-site command equipment is wrongly believed to be what the public crisis emergency response system is all about. In fact, the more important part of the public crisis emergency management system is “software”, that is, targeted emergency plans and emergency response drills. For local governments, an urgent task is to establish a case database for public crisis management, which, through the analysis of the emergency handling process of similar public crises, can provide empirical guidance for on-site decision-making. In addition, post-crisis recovery is also important, especially psychological recovery, which is now a blind spot in public crisis management at the local level. For example, after the gas well blowout accident of China National Petroleum Corp. in Kaixian

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

31

County of Chongqing in 2003, smooth progress was made in emergency response and post-accident compensation; however, due to the neglect of social and psychological recovery, the local public morals declined dramatically after the disaster, and many people could not find the right direction of life for a long time.

1.4.1.5

Integration of Research Resources

In order to strengthen research on social risk and public crisis management, and achieve the integration of concepts, theories, methods and topics as mentioned above, research resources also need to be pooled together. At the national level, a common platform for early warning research in sociology and emergency management research in public administration should be established to promote an interdisciplinary approach that fosters exchange, involvement and integration. The teams of sociology, political science and management of the National Social Science Fund of China have taken initial steps in this regard by organizing cross-cutting research projects, providing mutual support for fund winners, and encouraging research teams to engage researchers from all relevant disciplines. The Department of Management Sciences of the National Natural Science Foundation of China has also started to provide funds for scholars conducting research in sociology and political science. At the micro level, research institutes, if conditions permit, can set up research centers for social risk and public crisis management, organize scholars from sociology, public administration, economics, psychology, environmental science and other relevant disciplines to carry out research projects together, which are preferably headed by those with both sociology and public administration (including administrative management) backgrounds.

1.4.2 Integration of Research Ideas and Contents34 A theoretical framework is the “skeleton” that supports the research ideas and contents of a social science study of disaster. The three core concepts of disaster, crisis and risk are interrelated. Crisis is the consequence of disaster; risk is the fundamental cause of disaster and crisis; risk and crisis are basically different stages of the same phenomenon and have a causal relationship: the former is the cause, and the latter is the result. Certainly, this kind of causality is implicit unless it is exposed by the occurrence of disaster. In view of the whole research process and in order of precedence, the social science study of disaster can be divided into three parts: risk research, disaster research and crisis research.

34 See: Tong Xing & Zhang Haibo. Social Science Disaster Research: Possibility of Interdisciplinary

Integration. China Emergency Management, 2009 (3).

32

1.4.2.1

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Risk Research

On the one hand, risk is objective. The insurance industry, from which the term originates, and the risk society theory of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, among others, all hold that risk is an objective existence, no imagination. What is different is that risk, as an insurance term, refers to the possibility of losses individuals may suffer, while risk in risk society theory refers to the uncertainty that people in a specific area of the world may suffer losses. On the other hand, risk is also subjective. Objective risk and subjectively perceived risk are usually not consistent. As Francis Ewald said, anything is not a risk in itself, and the world has no risk, but anything can be a risk, depending on how people analyze the dangers and consider the events.35 In other words, risk exists objectively, but the degree to which they are perceived by people is subject to social construction, which directly determines how people deal with risks. Therefore, risk research should answer the following four questions: (1) What particular risks exist in a specific area of the world? (2) How are these particular risks perceived by people, and what are the different perceptions? (3) How do these different perceptions turn into human effort to reduce risk? (4) To what extent can human effort reduce risk authentically? In a word, risk research includes four main aspects: risk identification, risk perception, risk reduction, and risk reduction assessment. When trying to answer these questions, China’s disaster research in social sciences should consider not only the geographical location but also the period of transition China is now in. At present, the country is facing both the “uncertainty of modernity” in the sense of global risk society and the “uncertainty of modernization” specific to a transitional country.36 Modernization implies basically the same thing as national transition. China’s transformation has brought about significant changes in the four dimensions of economy, politics, society and culture. The old system centered on control and planning has gradually been shaken up, while the system centered on regulation and market has not yet been fully established. On the whole, a country’s transformation is characterized by growing uncertainty, which largely accounts for social risk in the transition period. Corresponding to the four dimensions of national transformation, this uncertainty mainly takes four forms: the “by-product” of industrialization, regulatory loopholes, intense relationships, and value ambiguity. Their interactions with incidental factors have resulted in major disasters in China: environmental pollution, mining accidents, mass conflicts, and unsafe food.

35 Francis Ewald. “Insurance and Risk”, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Hemel Hemstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. Cited from: Yang Xuedong. Risk Society and Order Reconstruction. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006, p. 12. 36 It is generally acknowledged that modernization is the process to achieve modernity, that is, modernity is the goal of modernization, and modernization is the process toward modernity.

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

1.4.2.2

33

Disaster Research

Disaster research concentrates on how to reduce the loss caused by disaster through adjusting human behavior, which is usually divided into four stages: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. (1) Disaster mitigation Risk identification is the prerequisite of disaster mitigation, meaning disaster mitigation is only possible when risks are perceived at an early stage. This is where risk research and disaster research meet. Mitigation is not necessarily to “eliminate risk”, but to reduce loss to an acceptable level. Even in the United States, mitigation is still one of the weakest links in disaster management practices. There are mainly two reasons. First, mitigation measures are generally proposed by academics rather than policymakers, and it is not easy to turn research issues into policy issues; second, mitigation measures need to be implemented down to earth, but general management departments lack the motivation to do so, because it is disaster management departments, not them, that will be responsible for the consequences of inadequate mitigation. Thus mitigation is not merely a technological issue. Only by reflecting on the negative consequences of social action from time to time and internalizing them can individual behavior and habits, organizational social responsibility and government policy preferences be developed, and a risk culture be fostered. Therefore, how to cultivate a risk culture is an important issue that derives from mitigation. (2) Disaster preparedness Emergency preparedness has been institutionalized in most countries, but two issues still need to be addressed: (1) From a qualitative perspective, what emergency management structure can achieve optimal efficiency and minimize casualties, property losses and social disorder in the wake of disasters? (2) From a quantitative perspective, what extent of disaster preparedness is sufficient to meet the needs of emergency management, without causing any waste of resources? The quantity of emergency resources should be “cost-effective” and also depends on emergency management structure. On the one hand, the cost of emergency preparedness is definitely lower than the consequences of disasters, since governments at all levels need to provide funds for many undertakings apart from emergency management. On the other hand, emergency management structure featuring regional cooperation can enable the sharing of resources, and to some extent help increase emergency resources available and reduce costs. (3) Disaster response The core of disaster response is coordination. Past experience suggests that the greater the disaster, the more likely there will emerge new behavioral structures and functions at the crisis time. A fourfold typology captures the phenomena well. Type I organizations are established ones that do not markedly change their general structure and functions at times of crises (e.g. many police and fire departments maintain

34

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

their traditional forms and spheres of activity). Type II organizations are expanding ones that have new structures but old functions, such as the Red Cross. Type III organizations are extending ones that have old structures but new functions (e.g. a construction company using its traditional group structure to undertake building or street debris clearance). Finally, Type IV groups are new entities that carry out new disaster functions, such as informal search and rescue teams, or damage assessment groups. It appears that the greater the disaster, the more likely there is an increasing involvement of the organized entities going from Type I through Type IV. An ordinary, everyday emergency could be handled only by Type I organizations, but a catastrophic disaster will require the presence of all four types of organized behavior. It goes without saying that the presence of many such groups of differing structures and functions creates major problems of coordination at the community level.37 Just like the long-standing disputes over regional cooperation and hierarchical response in the above-mentioned government emergency structure, opinions are divided over which coordination mode is better: command-control, or cooperation. While the United States, where the cooperation mode dominates, has seen signs of the rise of the “command-control” mode, China should, in addition to sticking to the government-led “command-control” mode, make better use of the cooperation mode characterized by timely and flexible response. The cooperation mode can be adopted not only in dealing with everyday emergencies and community disasters but also in responding to catastrophes, as government agencies themselves may be paralyzed after the occurrence of a catastrophe. For example, after a devastating earthquake hit Wenchuan of Sichuan Province on May 12, 2008, a large number of non-governmental organizations, public interest organizations, and volunteers worked with government departments in disaster relief, playing an irreplaceable role in early disaster response. (4) Disaster recovery The key to disaster recovery lies not only in physical reconstruction and psychological recovery, but also in the formation of a learning mechanism, so that mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery can form a circular rather than a linear process. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the performance of disaster mitigation, preparedness and response, and include it into the government performance appraisal system.

1.4.2.3

Crisis Research

Crisis results from the interaction between disaster and the four factors of globalization, network, media and politicization, so a subjective perspective is more important than an objective perspective in crisis research. Emphasizing the constructive nature of crisis, Ajren Boin put forward a “political-symbolic” interpretative framework, 37 Sue McNeil & Henry Quarantelli. “Past, Present and Future: Building an Interdisciplinary Disaster Research Center on a Half-Century of Social Science Disaster Research”, http://dspace.udel.Edu: 8080/dspace/handle/19716/3561.

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

35

thinking that this framework can explain why people see certain events as crises, but at the same time rest easy with other events that look more threatening.38 This is also the main dividing line between crisis research and disaster research. Generally, disasters that are badly managed are most likely to evolve into crises, and “being badly managed” indicates that they are artificially constructed. The network on which the dissemination and spread of crisis depends is the structural factor that determines the constructive attribute of crisis. The main nodes of the network include the general public, the media, business organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. In this network, the media play a great role, and to some extent, define crises.39 The media determine how people view crisis, and this ultimately affects the substantive attribute of crisis. In 2007, China promulgated the Emergency Response Law, which provides a legal basis for the news media to get engaged in emergency management, explore the policy, system and structural factors and values behind an incident, and propel reform accordingly. When the draft of the law was submitted to the National People’s Congress for second deliberation, a widely controversial provision was deleted, which states that “in the event that the news media publish without authorization information on the handling of emergencies and state of incidents or report false information, and if the circumstances are serious or serious consequences are caused, they shall be imposed a penalty of RMB50,000 to RMB100,000 by the local government”.40 This implies that the legislation encourages, rather than limits, the role of the media in emergency management. The emergence and rise of the Internet has strengthened this logic. The Internet features anonymity and interactivity that the traditional media cannot match. The Internet allows users to express their views on policy issues more freely. Different from the traditional media, on the Internet, everyone can publish information, and information is disseminated in a multi-directional way and can spread to every corner of the world in an instant. These characteristics make it more difficult to control information, and as ordinary Internet users have a bigger say than ever before, the definition of crisis is no longer a matter that rests with just a few. There is a logical relationship between risk research, disaster research and crisis research: risk identification serves disaster response, disaster response drives crisis dissemination, and crisis dissemination in turn propels risk identification, thus forming a cycle. In this case, disaster is not merely “misfortune”, but shows a positive side: it can dynamically and continuously promote better performance of emergency management, so it follows that people no longer impracticably attempt to “prepare” for all risks.

38 Arjen

Boin. “Lessons from Crisis Research”. In Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century. International Studies Review, 2004 (6). 39 Uriel Rosenthal. “21st Century Mega-Crises: New Challenges to Crisis Management”. Conference Paper, 2008. 40 See: The 10th NPC Standing Committee Conducts Second Deliberation on Draft Law on Emergency Response. China Emergency Management, 2009 (6).

36

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

1.4.3 Integration of Research Methods and Research Techniques To answer these questions and construct the knowledge system of the social science study of disaster, corresponding research methods and techniques are required

1.4.3.1

Methods and Techniques Specific to Certain Areas and Problems

As risks are divided into natural risks and those induced by human activities, forecasts were first made about natural risks, and great progress has been made in the forecasts of meteorological disasters which can be very accurate today. Another catastrophic risk is earthquake, the forecast of which still remains a worldwide challenge today. Out of risks of man-made disasters, the identification and prediction of visible hazards is relatively mature, as exemplified by risk prediction in workplace safety and work environment. In the early 1980s, China began to attach importance to the evaluation and control of major hazards, and in 2000, promulgated the National Standard for Identification of Major Hazard Installations (GB18218-2000). With regard to environmental risk monitoring, water and air pollution monitoring has become a common practice. The 2002 Work Safety Law and 2007 Emergency Response Law both include hazard monitoring as a basic system. Researchers in social sciences have explored the unpredictable, invisible hazards in human-induced risks in order to develop intuitive measurement models. In political science, the political system risk is simplified into the relationship between several variables; in economics, finance and trade risks are frequently assessed; in sociology, a variety of early warning indicators have been developed, and on this basis, the use of “social indicators” has gained ground. Generally, whether it is the identification of tangible, visible hazards or the prediction of intangible, invisible man-made hazards, the core of traditional methods includes two aspects: one is the type of risk, i.e. which factors may cause harmful consequences; the other is the level of risk, i.e. the probability of such harmful consequences. A general assumption about risk type is that all kinds of risk exist in a stable form, and can be accurately identified with in-depth surveys; and a general assumption about risk level is that risk is measurable, and with appropriate methods, the level of risk can be accurately described. But both assumptions are now facing challenges. First, few risks stay unchanged; instead, they often have a “ripple effect”. Therefore, natural disaster researchers have developed the “disaster chain” approach and put forward four “disaster chains” in China: (1) (typhoon)–rainstorm–disaster avoidance–mudslide–flood–farmland, road and building damage–drowning deaths, etc.; (2) earthquake–(rain and snow)–collapse–sand surge–damage to buildings (housing, factories, lifeline)–transportation disruptions–communications disruptions–poison gas, fire, etc.; (3) drought–dust storm–heat wave–water shortage–damage to crops,

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

37

forests and grasses–shrouded rural and urban communities41 ; and (4) cold wave–snow disaster (frost, cold temperature)–biological effects of cold and frost (mechanical failure, structural damage, damage to agricultural and pastoral areas.42 This approach has the following shortcomings: the “disaster chain” only considers natural factors while overlooking social factors, but risk is embedded in social fabric and obviously socially constructed, and the impact of social factors can change the path of the “disaster chain” and the consequences of disaster, resulting in more complicated forms. Moreover, although the “disaster chain” theory believes risks are changing rather than in stable form, its study of risk dynamics still follows a linear pattern. Judging from the reality and future trends, risk is becoming more and more nonlinear. Demography, the environment, technology and socio-economic structure have transformed traditional risk, but have given risen to new risks, changed the vulnerability of populations to risk, and transformed how impact spreads, leading to some kind of comprehensive impact.43 Second, risk is becoming more difficult to measure. In traditional risk measurement models, actuaries of insurance companies usually use loss frequency and degree as well as expected value and standard deviation of loss in a given period of time to measure loss probability distribution. Loss frequency is defined as the number of loss occurrences over a given time interval. If historical data of risk units are available, the probability of loss per risk unit can be estimated by dividing the number of risk units into loss frequency; and the degree of loss represents the scale of loss caused by an incident.44 Now, risk has become a general term and essentially unmeasurable. According to Beck, nuclear risk, chemical product risk, genetic engineering risk and ecological calamity risk have completely destroyed the four pillars of risk calculation.45 Specifically, first, these catastrophes often cause irreparable global damage that makes monetary compensation in risk calculation meaningless; second, in the worst-case scenario, the safety concepts endowed by risk calculation, including damage control and early-warning and monitoring of the consequences, are also meaningless; third, the spatial-temporal scopes and boundaries of disaster disappear completely, making calculation impossible; finally, the impact of disaster no longer has a conventional form, so risk calculation would have no result. Certainly, this does not mean that researchers should abandon risk calculation altogether. Anyway, risk calculation is always better than nothing, as long as we do not blindly believe the results of risk calculation or take it as the only standard of risk management.

41 Ma Zongxiang. Reflections on Natural Disaster Response in China. China Emergency Management, 2007 (2). 42 Shi Peijun. Theory and dynamics of disaster research. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2002 (3). 43 OECD. Emerging Risks in the 21st Century: An Agenda for Action. 2003. 44 Scott E. Hanigton & Gregory R. Niehaus. Risk Management and Insurance (2nd edition; trans. Chen Bingzheng, Wang Jun & Zhou Fuping), Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2005, p. 42. 45 Ulrich Beck. “Survival Issues, Social Structure, and Ecological Enlightenment”, in Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society. NJ: Humanities Press, 1995, p. 23.

38

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

Since risk is socially constructed, it is not enough to simply define risk by type and level. Researchers in psychology have developed measurement methods to assess how different types and levels of risk are perceived by people. The most representative approach is quantitative risk perception of Paul Slovic. How to deal with disasters has become a core issue in the field of disaster research. Three branches of management have responded differently: researchers in managerial science and engineering try to answer some specific technical questions, such as the optimal algorithm for emergency facilities site selection and emergency resources dispatch; business management researchers work to provide effective management tools for enterprises, such as how to deal with operational difficulties as a result of product quality defects; and public administration researchers seek to provide the government with optimal institutional design, such as disaster response regulations. The core of disaster response is coordination, and the prerequisite of coordination is consensus on issues among different types and levels of organizational actors. Distributed cognition is such a methodological exploration. As a “social-technical” approach, it demonstrates a systematic effort to improve the structured learning process to support decision makers in taking coordinated action in the face of threats. It is an interdisciplinary task in itself, in which anthropology extends cognition beyond individuals, psychology explores the cognitive process by giving meaning, network analysis provides methods for understanding cognitive structures in complex environments, and computer science provides technological means for computational simulation of complicated information exchange between networks.46 To answer the question of what optimal emergency structure is, a set of emergency performance evaluation methods must be developed. Based on case studies and quantitative evaluation, a high-quality case database should be established and emergency performance of each case be calculated in order to compare the performance of different emergency structures. As to what optimal resource allocation is, research methods must be introduced to work out optimal resource allocation schemes. It goes without saying that resource allocation is not just a technical issue, but needs to bring in research approaches of political science and public policy. Then how to integrate risk research and disaster research methods? On the one hand, risk identification makes disaster response possible, as the type and level of risk defined through risk identification provides the basis for disaster response; on the other hand, disaster response must be based on risk identification, because both optimal structure and optimal resource allocation of disaster response can be boiled down to “ability” which is a relative concept based on specific risk types and risk levels. It is not advisable to require communities to have the ability to cope with catastrophes, or provincial governments to deal only with ordinary disasters. Combining

46 Louise Comfort. “Distributed Cognition: The Basis for Coordinated Action in Dynamic Environ-

ments”. Conference Paper, 2008.

1.4 A Basis for Integrated Research

39

risk research with disaster research makes the calculation of value at risk meaningless.47 Instead of judging the best time for intervention by calculating value at risk, we are now trying to deal with risk through building emergency response capacity. The main purpose of crisis research is dissemination and communication, so we need to establish the means of dissemination and the discourse system, especially those that fit the Internet era. To this end, research methods need to be updated, and research literature should go beyond books, papers, objects and other traditional materials; analysis of Internet resources should be encouraged, and Internet-based methods should be developed accordingly.

1.4.3.2

Interdisciplinary Approaches and Techniques

System theory argues against examining a social phenomenon in isolation and advocates a holistic and systematic approach from the beginning. In 1972, the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, a research report written by Dennis Meadows and other young scientists. They used system dynamics models and high-speed computers to simulate the complicated relationships among twelve factors, including demography, energy, the environment, water, health and economic development. On this basis, the report predicts that the world systems may collapse because of the energy crisis, and growth may come to a halt in 2100. This is a prediction of catastrophe for mankind as a whole and has had significant impacts worldwide. Ilya Prigogine’s dissipative structure theory is based on uncertainty. It holds that an open system can absorb negative entropy flow from the outside by exchanging materials and energy, thus reducing its own entropy and forming a far-from-equilibrium orderly structure called dissipative structure. French mathematician Rene Thom created catastrophe theory to describe the stable and unstable states of a system. Social scientists should borrow the dissipative structure theory and catastrophe theory to study the catastrophe and collapse of the complex system of society. Systems theory and information theory use the concept of entropy to represent the degree of disorder of a system: the greater the disorder, the higher the entropy. They also use entropy to define the amount of information, and put forward that the amount of information is negative entropy. When the system acquires information, disorder, or entropy, decreases; the more information acquired, the greater decrease in disorder (entropy); and a decrease in system disorder (entropy) means an increase in order and organization of the system. In the social science study of disaster, risk means the possibility and uncertainty of loss, and crisis is the loss after such possibility and uncertainty become reality. Loss, in essence, is a disturbance to the order of social system and people’s normal lives. Therefore, the social science study of disaster will benefit a lot from borrowing the concept of entropy and relevant knowledge from natural sciences.

47 This

is also a bottleneck that has existed for long in traditional risk early warning research.

40

1 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework for Risks …

By comparison, the two approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. The former has direct explanatory power over particular issues but cannot meet the requirements for transdisciplinary research. The latter has universal explanatory power over general issues and is transdisciplinary per se, but is too abstract. Therefore, how to make the former applicable to general issues and the latter to particular issues is a main task of methodological innovation in the social science study of disaster.

Chapter 2

Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework: Mass Incident Management

2.1 Mass Incidents as a Special Class of Public Crises In recent years, China has seen a sharp increase in mass incidents. Although no political turmoil or social unrest has been triggered, governments at all levels and relevant departments, admittedly, lack effective solutions and are often found unprepared when a mass incident occurs.

2.1.1 Mass Incidents as a Special Class of Public Crises While natural disasters, accidents and public health incidents are basically “external risks”, mass incidents belong to “internal risks”, which are more difficult to handle than external risks. In other words, natural disasters, accidents and public health incidents are “consensus-type crises” where there is an agreement on the meaning of the situation, and on the norms and values that should be prioritized and followed. In contrast, mass incidents are “dissensus-type crises” where there are sharply contrasting views of the nature of the situation, what brought them about, and what should be done to resolve them. Evidently, dissensus-type crises are more difficult to deal with. Natural disasters, accidents and public health incidents generally won’t pose a fundamental challenge to the core systems, mainstream values and fabric of a society. Mass incidents, however, present greater threats because they are often directed against the core systems, mainstream values or social fabric, and challenge the legitimacy of the existing order. From the perspective of research, natural disasters, the risk accumulation and occurrence of accidents and public health incidents, which are “external risks” or “consensus-type crises”, are generally independent of the consciousness and behavior of people, especially researchers, and the objective laws independent of man’s will are more liable to be grasped by researchers. By compar© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_2

41

42

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

ison, as mass emergencies are “internal risks” and “dissensus-type crises”, their risk accumulation and occurrence are directly related to people’s behavior: the behavior of some members of society is mitigating risk accumulation to prevent the outbreak of crises, while that of others is aggravating risk accumulation, which propels the outbreak of crises. The game between the two and the abruptness of these crises are more notable, while the regularity is more difficult to detect. Therefore, how to identify and deal with mass incidents has become a “hot potato” for academia and governments at all levels.

2.1.2 General Characteristics of Mass Incidents Mass incidents that have occurred in China in recent years, according to their causes, can be divided into three types. The first results from internal problems, including labor disputes, rural land expropriation, urban demolition and reorganization of enterprises. The second type of mass incidents is instigated by the reactionary forces within and outside of the Chinese territory, such as the “Falun Gong” cult. The third type is caused by international conflicts, such as the spontaneous or organized mass incidents in response to the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and the territorial dispute over the South China Sea. Among the three types, the first makes up a large part of mass incidents at the present time and is also a primary target in mass incident management. Depending on whether the events are organized and whether specific demands are made by participants, mass incidents can be classified into four categories: “organized, with demands”, “organized, without demands”, “unorganized, with demands”, and “unorganized, without demands”. Organized mass incidents generally have clear purposes, relatively stable forms and relatively definite scope of influence, making it easier to detect them early and take precautionary measures. Unorganized mass incidents, in contrast, are much harder to detect and manage. Especially in unorganized mass incidents without specific demands, the participants often take these incidents as a chance to vent their feelings, and such incidents may take various forms and have unpredictable influence. They may escalate or subside in a short period of time. In general, mass incidents have the following characteristics (Fig. 2.1). This book focuses on unorganized mass incidents caused by internal problems (“unorganized, with demands”, and “unorganized, without demands”), which are key incidents in China and a major difficulty in mass incident management.

2.1.3 Causes of Mass Incidents 2.1.3.1

Existing Research

Based on existing research, there are three typical views on how to perceive and deal with mass incidents: (1) regard mass incidents as a kind of public crises and emphasize

2.1 Mass Incidents as a Special Class of Public Crises

43

Fig. 2.1 General characteristics of mass incidents

government response and emergency efforts; (2) take mass incidents as a product at a particular development stage, which will gradually disappear with the selfimprovement of the political system; and (3) attribute mass incidents to imbalances in social fabric, and propose to coordinate the relations between different groups by easing structural tension. These represent the views of public administration, political science, and sociology, respectively.

2.1.3.2

Analysis Based on the Comprehensive Analytical Framework

From the perspective of public administration, we try to understand mass incidents by using the comprehensive analytical framework of risks, disasters and crises. (1) Mass incidents are more of a process than an incident, reflecting a dynamic process in which a social risk evolves into a public crisis. Social risks are accumulative, dynamic, and nonlinear, and to prevent them from magnifying is the focus of risk management. (2) Mass incidents are not isolated; they are a system where various modern factors interact on a global scale. For developing countries, the situation may be more complicated because there are conflicts of interest in the process of modernization, and also all kinds of risks and crises brought by modernity itself. (3) Mass incidents involve not only governments but also other stakeholders. Businesses, the media, and the public across the globe are the stakeholders that help shape the situation. (4) When understanding and managing mass incidents, subjective perspectives are more important than objective perspectives. In other words, the subjective perception of all stakeholders, especially the two parties in conflict, is more important than the attributes of mass incidents per se.

44

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

2.2 A Dynamic Model of Unorganized Mass Incidents 2.2.1 Case Study: “Unorganized, with Demands” Case 1: “The Toughest Nail Household” in Chongqing (“Chongqing Incident”) A two-storied brick building stood alone in a construction pit near Hexing Road of Jiulongpo District of Chongqing, where two local real estate companies, Chongqing Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. and Chongqing Zhirun Real Estate Co., Ltd., were gearing up for the redevelopment. The owners of the lone house, a couple named Yang Wu and Wu Ping, had refused to move out, even though all their neighbors, the 280 other households, had been relocated since demolition started in September 2004. In October 2004, their water supply was cut off, and so was electricity in February 2005. After the construction team entered the area, the roads leading to the outside were blocked, making the house an isolated “islet”. In February 2005, the real estate companies applied to the housing authority of Jiulongpo District for an administrative adjudication proceeding to order the couple to move out before a deadline. The housing authority issued an award on January 11, 2007, and an application for forced relocation was submitted to the district court on February 1, which accepted the case. On March 21, 2007, the owner Yang Wu climbed up to the top of his “islet”, waving a national flag. The incident was widely covered in domestic and foreign media, and was even broadcast live. In an instant, “the toughest nail household” in Chongqing went viral online, drawing wide attention from the media and the public. On April 2, 2007, Chongqing Zhirun Real Estate Co., Ltd. reached an agreement with the couple, who accepted a new apartment located elsewhere and a cash compensation of RMB900,000. That afternoon, the couple voluntarily moved out of the isolated house. Demolition started at 19:00 that evening, and the house was finally torn down by 22:36. This is a typical mass incident caused by demolition, but its impact goes beyond the incident itself. With the urban sprawl as a result of rapid urbanization, forced demolition and the incomplete property rights system, demolition has become one of the most “typical” phenomena in the transition period, and mass incidents because of demolition have become a unique public crisis facing China. But unlike similar incidents in the past, two other factors—the Property Law and the media—largely determined where the incident would go. On March 19, 2007, the Property Law was promulgated. According to the provisions, the isolated “islet” of Wu Ping and Yang Wu was not subject to the Property Law as it shall take effect from October 1, 2007, but still, the “Chongqing Incident” would be undoubtedly construed as a symbol of how the Property Law was interpreted. If the house was demolished with force, it would be considered a disregard for the authority of the Property Law; if it was not demolished, it would inevitably result in discontent from households that had moved away, and later demolition would be even more difficult. So, the local

2.2 A Dynamic Model of Unorganized Mass Incidents

45

government was caught in a dilemma. The Property Law is an important symbol of a law-based society and a key component of modernity, while demolition (whether urban demolition or rural land expropriation) is an important way to move from tradition to modernity. Thus, the risk of modernity and the risk in the transition from tradition to modernity were added together. The “Chongqing Incident” therefore had implications of what Arjen Boin calls politicization and was somewhat related to China’s endeavor to promote democracy and rule of law; in the course of nature, it became an “open-ended crisis”. Traditional media and the Internet exposed this crisis to the public in an unprecedented way. When the scene of Yang Wu waving the national flag appeared in newspapers, TV programs and websites, and was even broadcast live on the Internet, the participants in the “Chongqing Incident” were no longer limited to the local government, real estate development companies and the couple, but also included the media and the public around the world, and where the incident would go was no longer in the hands of the first few parties. Moreover, the profound background should be taken into consideration. As Beijing 2008 Olympic Games was approaching, foreign media were given greater freedom to report, and this directly associated “Chongqing Incident” with globalism. How the media and the public defined the “Chongqing Incident” became the key to interpreting and solving this public crisis. The “Chongqing Incident” follows a clear route of progression: social risk (demolition)—trigger events (the promulgation of the Property Law, and the coverage of Yang Wu waving the national flag by the media and websites)—public crisis (“the toughest nail household” in Chongqing). In fact, similar demolition incidents are common phenomena in the process of urbanization in recent years, and the resultant social conflicts are one of the major risks facing China in the transition period, but not every incident would evolve into a public crisis. In view of the dynamic evolution of the “Chongqing Incident”, the trigger events that turned social risk into a public crisis are the promulgation of the Property Law and the involvement of the media. If the two are taken as the divide, it takes nearly three years for social risk to evolve, but only a dozen days for public crisis. This suggests that we should shift the focus to the management of social risks. Case 2: “Private Loan Association” Incident in Fu’an of Fujian (“Fu’an Incident”) In May 2004, “private loan associations” collapsed one by one in Fu’an, Fujian Province. After Li Zhu, head of one of such associations, gave himself up to the police, hundreds of “private loan associations” fell apart just within two weeks, involving tens of thousands of members. It was estimated local people had more than RMB6,000 tied up per person on average, and a number of violent attacks occurred. According to statistics, the amount of money involved in the incident could exceed RMB900 million. Most local households were involved in the incident, and many went bankrupt because of it. Many heads and members of these bankrupt associates absconded with the funds. To get their money back, some people resorted to violence, posing a serious threat to public safety.

46

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

This is a typical mass incident caused by illegal financing in rural areas. “Private loan associations”, as a form of mutual aid organization, are popular in rural areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. A “private loan association” is formed when someone short of funds asks people around them to join the association to raise money. “Private loan associations” appeared as a way of private lending a long time ago and exist for various reasons. Due to the lack of government regulation, however, risks may accumulate and result in serious public crises. In the “Fu’an Incident”, illegal private fundraising events prevailed and attracted a large number of households to contribute; the trigger event that the head of associations turned himself into the police due to the funding shortage created a chain reaction, bringing about unpredictable consequence. In this incident, the evolution from social risk to public crisis was not triggered by the administrative action of the government, but a delayed reaction to it. In fact, if the government intervened before the social risk reached its critical point, the mass incident might have not caused so severe social consequences. It is true that mass incidents associated with rural illegal financial activities, such as the “Fu’an Incident”, have something to do with the ability and response of the government, but it is the lack of risk awareness among the participants that is the decisive factor of risk. Participating in “private loan associations” is in fact a process of trial and error for them. When they realize that the expected risks are higher than expected returns, they are likely to consciously manage the risks. The reality is that rural community-level organizations are unable to regulate such lending risks at all; when social risk turns into public crisis, government-intervened debt payment often creates new problems. This is why “private loan associations” have been banned many times but have kept coming back. The government should strengthen risk communication with the public, focus on education and guidance to enhance the public’s risk awareness, pay attention to the accumulation and amplification of social risks, improve relevant mechanisms, and guide people affected to resort to other means than violence in the case of a liquidity crisis. Only in this way can such mass incidents be effectively managed.

2.2.2 Case Study: “Unorganized, Without Demands” Case 3: “Chizhou Incident” in Anhui At about 14:30 on June 25, 2005, a Honda with a non-local license plate hit Liu Liang, a native young man of Chizhou, Anhui Province. During the quarrel, Liu was beaten by the Honda owner’s bodyguard. At 14:41, some onlookers followed the police officers who had arrived at the scene to the local police station; around 15:30, things got chaotic due to the poor communication between the head of the police station and the crowd; around 18:00, the Honda was smashed; by 18:50, there were nearly 10,000 onlookers, and the chaotic scene worsened; at 19:00, police cars were pushed to the gate of the police station, and the situation started to get out of control. At 19:25, the police station was smashed and put to the torch; at 19:40, a promotional

2.2 A Dynamic Model of Unorganized Mass Incidents

47

vehicle and a police car parking on Cuibo Road were set on fire; at 20:03, rioters surrounded a supermarket nearby and broke into loot. By then, the situation was completely out of control. Case 4: “Wanzhou Incident” in Chongqing The incident took place on Shuangbai Road of Wanzhou District, Chongqing. At about 13:00 on October 18, 2004, a woman named Zeng Qingrong, who was walking together with his husband Hu Quanzong, a part-timer worker of a fruit market, was knocked by the carrying pole of a migrant worker Yu Jikui. The two sides started to quarrel, and then fight. Yu Jikui was wounded by Hu Quanzong, who claimed he was a civil servant and could get everything down with his money. What Hu said angered the onlookers, who called the police. When the police officers of the Baiyan Road police station arrived and were going to take the couple and the migrant worker away, the conflicts intensified as the onlookers tried to stop the police car from leaving. After three and a half hours, the three people were finally taken away by the police officers. At about 18:00, a police car driving on Xincheng Road was smashed and set on fire by some onlookers at the instigation of a young man. As it was the rush hour, the incident attracted thousands of passers-by. Around 20:00, hundreds of onlookers, incited by a few people, gathered around the building of the district government at Gaosuntang Square, and squashed the glass doors of the government building. At about 3:00 a.m. the next day, the rioters who broke into the government building were taken away. These incidents seem accidental, but when they are analyzed in combination with similar incidents in other regions in recent years, it can be seen that behind these mass incidents without demands are the same or similar logic. In the “Chizhou Incident”, an ordinary traffic incident evolved into a large-scale riot within five hours. The amplification of social risks implies that: (1) social risks spread in a nonlinear way, but the enforcement personnel on the spot were not aware of this and failed to solve the problem resolutely and flexibly, thus resulting in serious consequences; (2) social risks are not isolated incidents but an interactive system, and in the “Chizhou incident” and other incidents, the ordinary people in the transition period may take them as an outlet to vent their feelings; (3) the public may play a greater role than the government in determining the status of the incident, and the involvement of a large crowd caused the situation to lose control; and (4) the subjective signal the incident sent is more important than the incident itself given the public’s perception was that “the government always shields non-local merchants”, and this to a large extent determined the direction of the incident. In the “Wanzhou Incident”, it was surprising that a slight quarrel could turn into such a large riot. This is similar to the “Chizhou Incident”, but the “Wanzhou Incident” highlighted the decisive role of the general public’s social risk perception in the context of crises. Although the batter was in fact not a civil servant, what the onlookers perceived was that a civil servant wounded a migrant worker. Therefore, these people, though without demands themselves, found a way to vent their discontent with society, resulting in severe consequences.

48

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

2.2.3 General Dynamic Model for Unorganized Mass Incidents At the first glance, the “unorganized, with demands” type of mass incidents represented by the “Chongqing Incident” and “Fu’an Incident” and the “unorganized, without demands” type of mass incidents represented by the “Chizhou Incident” and “Wanzhou Incident” seem different, in that the former undergo the process of evolution and the latter are accidental. From the perspective of integrated public crisis management, however, they are both the trigger events in the dynamic evolution of social risks to public crises, and behind the social risks are the structural differences between the rich and the poor, between classes, between urban-rural areas and between regions. These social risks can accumulate or mitigate and evolve into public crises driven by the trigger events. On the basis of case study, we try to establish a general model to illustrate the dynamic nature of unorganized mass incidents (Fig. 2.2). In this model, mass incidents are just the trigger events in the process of dynamic evolution from social risk to public crisis. There are two ways of triggering: the first is mass incidents with demands, where the process of dynamic evolution from social risk to public crisis is clear. The second is mass incidents without demands, where the process of dynamic evolution is implicit and often presents in differentiated ways. “Without demands” does not mean there is no conflict, but there is “group vs group” conflict, as in a conflict between two sides, the bystanders will automatically divide and take sides based on their identity, status and interests.1 Therefore, mass incidents with demands and those without demands are essentially the same; although they take different forms, they both result from the structural differences between the rich and the poor, between classes, between urban-rural areas and between regions. The evolution from social risk to public crisis is a process of not just risk amplification

Fig. 2.2 General dynamic model for unorganized mass incidents 1 Sun

Liping, Li Shi & Luo Chuliang. China Reform Evaluation Report 2007. China Institute for Reform and Development. Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 2007.

2.2 A Dynamic Model of Unorganized Mass Incidents

49

but also risk mitigation. Social conflicts to some extent serve as the “safety valve” of social security. Venting social emotions via certain channels can relieve the tension of social fabric and is conducive to the stable operation of society. This, of course, depends on two preconditions: first, the occurrence of social risk is within the tolerance zone of the social system, and second, society has a sound learning and error correction mechanism.

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field With rapid economic growth and prosperity, it seems that more and more people have become risk-conscious; they stay vigilant about every hazard and sometimes may overreact. People tend to live a more cautious life and often think about worstcase outcomes. Some events or social incidents, though seemingly insignificant at first, turned out to draw widespread attention from society and brought serious social impact, the depth and scope of which can hardly be predicted and controlled through ordinary risk management efforts. Risk issues are complicated, due in part to the complexity and uncertainty of the world itself and in part to the fact that risks are shaped by how people react to them. Research on risk-related phenomena has caused growing controversy. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu refers to the setting in which agents and their social positions are located as “field”, and holds that all fields are a result of social forces and factors associated with the interactions of particular agents, and each sub-field has its own logic and rules.2 Accordingly, we can refer to the particular setting where an incident brews up, breaks out and involves as “risk field”, and use it to describe the positions and interactions of agents that influence risk and risk management decisions. Here we take two typical public safety incidents as examples to illustrate how interest groups respond to risks, and the practical logic of institutional behavior and non-institutional behavior in risk fields.

2.3.1 Composition of Risk Fields 2.3.1.1

Sources of Risk

Case 1: Songhua River Pollution Incident On November 13, 2005, an explosion occurred at the diphenyl plant of PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company. As a result, highly toxic substances such as benzene and its compounds flew into the Songhua River, which passed through more than ten cities, posing a serious threat to the drinking water safety of people nearby. 2 Pierre

Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (trans. Li Meng & Li Kang). Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1998, p. 138.

50

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

Local governments, the company concerned and the official media, however, did not gave timely warning, and water supply was suspended in related cities for many days, resulting in a large-scale social panic. The then State Environmental Protection Administration did not initiate emergency response, triggering diplomatic disputes between China and Russia. Case 2: Collapse Accident at Hangzhou Metro Construction Site On November 15, 2008, a ground collapse accident happed at the construction site of Xianghu Station of Hangzhou Metro Line 1, Zhejiang Province. The subsided area was then submerged by muddy water, causing the sinking of eleven cars and twenty-one deaths. Half an hour after the collapse, an online news website of Zhejiang (http://www.zjol.com.cn/) posted the first report titled “Netizens: Hangzhou Fengqing Avenue collapsed, seven cars stuck in foundation pit”, which immediately drew a lot of media attention around the country. During this period, the construction contractor China Railway Group, the proprietor Hangzhou Metro and the municipal government of Hangzhou were debating heatedly over the responsibility for the accident. Later, disputes escalated, and the impact of the construction accident went far beyond the incident itself.

2.3.1.2

Agents Involved

Agents are the core elements of risk fields. They are the institutions, groups and individuals who want to protect their own interests or try to change policy orientation under critical conditions. Because of the distribution of risk that cuts across classes, everyone in society will be involved in the risk environment to varying degrees. Moreover, some groups in society keep a close eye on the real world, and are responsible for detecting hazards, interpreting risks and communicating information to people. They are active participants in risk fields. In work-related accidents, the main agents relevant to risks and interests include: responsible enterprises, the government (and its staff), the media (including local news media, central news media, overseas media, and other local media), and the general public concerned about the situation.

2.3.1.3

Available Resources in Risk Fields

In order to gain dominance and protect their own interests, any group and individual involved in a risk field must have sufficient resources. These resources can be used to allocate materials to avoid risks, and to seek sympathy and attention from the general public, and can be transformed into power of discourse to change the rules of the risk field, and to redefine and interpret risks culturally. In risk fields formed by emergencies, the resources used by agents often include three forms.

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

51

The first is economic resources, which provide incentives or supplements for action and can be used to gain understanding, support and trust. The mediums via which economic resources play a role include but are not limited to capital payment and economic compensation. The second is political resources, mainly power, which are a kind of resources to implement one’s will and create social relations characterized by dominance and obedience. Power demands obedience and rules, while the mediums constitute authority and violence. Other groups obey power out of fear of punitive measures, while those in power implement their will by exerting influence on others or having exclusive access to risk information. The third is social resources, including social influence and value commitment, which can generate trust, prestige and cultural solidarity. Social influence, an important resource, can operate by means of social prestige and public opinion. Even if some behaviors intended to manage and avoid risks cannot be immediately understood by the other sides, social prestige can still bring some trust. For some experts and authoritative media, public trust in them embodies people’s acceptance and recognition of their expertise.

2.3.2 Risk Strategy and Risk Behavior: How Risk Fields Work When danger comes, people do not always act in haste. Once social behaviors about risk are examined in a specific field, it can be found that the government, enterprises, the media and individuals all become agents who are actively engaged in the power game relating to risk assessment, risk control and other issues. At this time, the risk field demonstrates the complicated relations between agents, resources and power. While bringing danger, incidents also generate opportunities to reshape the structure of the field. Organizations, individuals or groups in the field will employ all kinds of strategies and resources to maintain or improve their existing positions, and the ultimate goal of their action is to create an action structure and establish institutional rules that are most advantageous to themselves so as to redefine and avoid risks.

2.3.2.1

Risk-Mitigation Game Between Enterprises and the Government

(1) Cover-up or disclosure After the occurrence of accidents, most enterprises will downplay them. Especially at the beginning, they generally choose to shirk responsibility and conceal the truth. This puts relevant government departments in dilemma, forcing them to either help the responsible enterprises defuse the crisis or hold the enterprises accountable to divert public attention and absolve themselves from the responsibility for inadequate oversight. Such “risk mitigation action” between enterprises and the government

52

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

incurs greater risks, because hiding truth and shirking responsibility cannot last long, nor can they help tackle the problem timely and effectively. The truth will eventually be made known under the supervision of the media (including international media organizations) and the central government. In short, the risk-mitigation action taken by the enterprises concerned and local governments will lead to greater adverse social impacts. [Songhua River Pollution Incident] At the press conference on November 1, 2005, a vice mayor of Jilin told the media that the explosion, according to expert estimates, would not cause large-scale water contamination. In fact, the investigations by the State Environmental Protection Administration found that the pollution was very serious. Before the pollution spread to other regions from Jilin City, relevant departments notified the governments of Changchun City, Harbin City and Heilongjiang Province of the pollution, which, regretfully, did not timely release the information to the media and the public. At 14:00 on November 21, 2005, the municipal government of Harbin issued a notice on suspending water supply for the overhaul of urban water supply networks, telling its citizens that water supply would be cut off for four days. It can be seen that both enterprises and local governments were trying to hide the fact. [Collapse Incident at Hangzhou Metro Construction Site] From November 16 to 19, 2008, a video clip of Zhao Tiechui, deputy minister of the State Administration of Work Safety, denouncing the chief of the construction contractor was broadcast repeatedly by the local media, and the leaders of the Party organizations and government agencies of Hangzhou also criticized the contractor on many occasions. At the press conference on January 1, 2009, however, Mei Xiaofeng, executive deputy general manager of the Xianghu Station project department of China Tiesiju Civil Engineering Group Co., Ltd. (CTCE Group), said that the collapse incident was due to a variety of factors such as subjective decision making, pursuit of cost reduction, tight deadlines, and priority of leaders’ opinions over scientific decision-making, as well as the special soil of the construction site. Both incidents are public safety incidents, but the governments, as regulators, and the enterprises concerned responded differently. In the river pollution incident, the enterprise and local governments had shared interests and “joint liability”; not only the persons directly responsible for the accident but also their supervisors in the enterprise and the leaders of relevant government departments shall be held accountable. Because of shared interests and “joint liability”, the local government and enterprise formed an alliance and responded jointly to higher-level governments’ directives, supervision and inspection. In the ground collapse accident, the construction contractor CTCE Group was not affiliated to the municipal government of Hangzhou, so instead of helping conceal the truth, the local government openly blamed the contractor. This stands in sharp contrast to how the local government reacted in the river pollution incident. Obviously, neither concealing nor criticizing can evade the risks and losses, and both will inevitably draw attention from the public and the media and even aggravate risk dissemination.

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

53

(2) Government performance and supervision If accidents cause serious casualties or huge economic losses and have tremendous impacts, they will definitely affect the performance appraisal of local governments, resulting in tighter safety supervision from the central government and relevant local officials being held accountable. Such a relationship between the central government and local governments is highlighted in emergency response. Generally, the central government, with their political and judicial authority, will impose administrative or disciplinary penalties on local government officials and enterprises concerned. [Songhua River Pollution Incident] On December 6, an investigation taskforce of the State Council for the “November 13” explosion incident at the diphenyl plant of PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company was set up, which consisted of a technical team, management team and general affairs team, and also included personnel from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Earlier, the then minister of the State Administration of Environmental Protection resigned because of the Songhua River pollution incident. On November 25, 2006, the State Council announced penalties on relevant officials, including records of demerit on the deputy general manager and Party Leadership Group members of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and senior vice president of PetroChina; Party and administrative discipline sanctions on nine persons in charge such as the chairman and general manager of PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company, and the head of the diphenyl plant; records of serious demerit and intra-Party warning on the director-general and the Party Leadership Group Secretary of the Environment Protection Department of Jilin Province, and administrative warning on the chief of the Jilin City Environmental Protection Bureau. After that, debates on the river pollution incident gradually subsided. The penalties on relevant officials imposed by the central government based on its “absolute authority” greatly won back public trust and were widely acclaimed by the general public. This suggests that political power, especially the authority of the central government, serves as the arbiter and controller of resource redistribution. When social crises caused by the accidents pose a threat to the legitimation of political power, risk managers will reshape the authority and prestige of the central government through administrative and juridical means. The ultimate goal of the joint action taken by local governments and enterprises is to evade risks or minimize the political influence of threats brought about by risks, especially after risk amplification. The central government, however, is aware of this in its supervision over local governments and enterprises. This can be seen from the composition and way of work of the investigation taskforce. The collaboration in administrative and technical links between workplace safety, environmental protection, judicial and other departments to a large extent contained the risk mitigation action taken by local governments for the sake of their own interests, and therefore prevented greater economic losses and casualties due to inadequate social protection measures.

54

2.3.2.2

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

Fight for Power of Discourse and Shift the Risk Topics

In the context of risks, power not only plays a role in the political sphere but also penetrates into all areas of society. Discourse is power in itself. Power is required when defining and interpreting risks and mobilizing the people. Therefore, who participates in and dominates the discourse becomes a critical issue. To maintain social stability, get the power over risk explanations and thus win social support and trust is the ultimate goal of all sides in risk fields. This is because the rules of “speaking” in the urgent and temporary risk fields of emergencies are not predetermined; instead, they are gradually established in the debate, negotiation, squeeze and compromise between all groups, organizations and individuals that have the opportunity to speak and compete with each other for the space of discourse. (1) Competition for power over risk discourse between experts and governments To dominate risk discourse is the basis and point of departure for the constant operation and updating of risk fields. In this sense, the formation and construction of risk fields are determined by the relationship between agents dominating the risk fields, and such relationship is subject to change with the shifts in the positions and attitudes of individuals or groups. When technical experts and government officials belong to different interest groups, they, in face of the same incident, will participate in the competition for dominance over risk discourse in different ways. Competition between the two sides is liable to enhance the public perception of risk and uncertainty, and thus causes greater concerns about whether the risk is fully understood by the administrative departments. [Collapse Incident at Hangzhou Metro Construction Site] On November 17, 2008, Wang Mengshu, Academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said in an interview with the News 1+1 program of China Central Television (CCTV) that human factors such as “decision-making mistakes” were the fundamental causes of the accident at the construction site of Hangzhou Metro. He pointed out that there were problems at the planning and design stages of the Xianghu Station, and the leadership and government of Hangzhou should take responsibility. In response, relevant departments of Hangzhou lashed Wang that “his remarks were at odds with the facts, and could confuse the public and interfere with on-site rescue and handling of the incident”. According to the materials provided by the municipal government of Hangzhou, although the feasibility study for the subway project began as early as in 1989, the city’s rail transit network planning passed the inspection by the expert panel headed by Academician Zhou Ganshi in 2004, and every examination and approval procedure met due requirements, rather than based on “the decision of leaders”. On November 19, an open letter written in the name of the executive deputy manager of the Hangzhou Metro Line 1 Project Department to a CCTV host went viral on the Internet, denying having said that “the responsibility lies with us, the construction contractor”. Academician Wang’s role as deputy chief engineer of China Railway Tunnel Group (which is under the same corporation as CTCE Group) was also exposed on the Internet, triggering disputes over the responsibilities of technical experts of enterprises and the powerful government departments.

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

55

It can be seen that once the issue of risk arising from accidents becomes a social concern, individuals involved will essentially be affected by the nature of their institutions, organizations and even groups. Their identity as members of the organization will largely determine their views about risk. In many cases, to identify the liability for incidents requires the support of “evidence”, but the “authenticity and validity” of the evidence is often controversial, leaving room for social debate on risk. “Experts” and governments, with different identities, are often polarized in the “debates” over liability, and debates from different perspectives will be more intense, attracting more people to participate. As a result, the competition for dominance in risk discourse will eventually form a social alliance, affecting people’s risk perception and decision-making. (2) Risk topics changed by the media The media serves as the intermediary of information in modern society. Modern technology enables the media to dive deep into society extensively, and to overcome the temporal and spatial limitations of information dissemination to a larger extent than ever before. The application of computers, the Internet, satellites, optical fiber and other tools makes it easier for the media to obtain, edit and disseminate any riskrelated information. Mass media coverage not only describes certain incidents but is also likely to redefine risk and interpret related risk issues. In addition to “quantity”, the media devotes much effort to the positions, perspectives, contents and metaphors of coverage in order to guide and construct risk discourse. a. Response from the official media as the government’s “mouthpiece” With the innate “news sensitivity” and modern technological means, the media has an enormous amount of risk-related information and the valuable asset of public trust, which gives it a “quasi-expert” status. In view of this, news media such as television stations, radio stations, and Party newspapers is generally positioned as the “mouthpiece” of the Party and the government in China. In the event of major emergencies, the official media would strictly abide by the press discipline, publish and disseminate risk-related information selectively according to the government’s intentions, and even “downplay” the incidents that have occurred or are about to occur at the request of the government, resulting in the compromise of the risk warning function that the media should perform. In extreme cases, the local mainstream media may “turn a blind eye to” to the big “news and incidents” under their noses in order to help the enterprises and local governments to block and hide relevant information. [Songhua River Pollution Incident] After the explosion at the diphenyl plant of PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company, Jilin Daily published reports about the on-site deployment of provincial leaders, orderly progress in handling the incident, normal production of the plant, effective measures of contingency plans, and so on, calling for efforts to learn the lessons and strengthen production safety. All these reports, however, kept silent about the water contamination of the Songhua River in Jilin, and simply mentioned that the explosion would not cause air pollution. In this case, the media, instead of telling the truth of pollution, misled the public by reporting the incident in a “positive” way, i.e. focusing on the “orderly progress” and

56

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

Table 2.1 Titles of media reports on the Hangzhou Metro construction site incidenta Date

Title

Media

November 16, 2008

Hangzhou government confirms three dead and one missing

http://www.zjol.com.cn/

November 18, 2008

Why is subway construction still risky today? “Safety” should take precedence in subway construction

Legal Daily Guangzhou Daily

November 19, 2008

“Procedure” should not be pretext Five questions about Hangzhou metro incident: who shall be responsible for the loss of eight lives

http://www.xinhuanet.com/ http://www.chinanews.com/

November 20, 2008

China’s RMB4 trillion investment: Lesson from collapse incident in Hangzhou Hangzhou metro incident: Inadequate government supervision

International Herald Leader China Business News

November 25, 2008

Hangzhou government and academician in heated debate: No one claims responsibility

China Youth Daily

a http://zcxx.People.com.cn/OpinionShow.aspx?id=163

“effective measures”. This suggests that in covering risk topics, the media does not always adhere to the basic values and interpretative models of journalism and communication, but instead would construct risk topics based on the cultural prejudices and “internal regulations” of the organizations and groups. It goes without saying that how the media constructs risk topics varies with their relationship, including shared interest, with the risk creator. At the early stage of the river pollution incident, the local media diluted the fact of pollution with the seemingly positive risk disposal action of the government by “filtering” relevant information. This stands in sharp contrast with the active coverage of the local media in the Hangzhou Metro construction site incident. b. Shift from risk topics In media coverage of accidents, what is disclosed first is information about the casualties, and most media organizations want to get the number or list as soon as possible. The casualty data is the risk-related information first disseminated by the media. The public judges the degree of risk according to casualty data released by the media. The next topic the media focuses on following casualties is “who is responsible for the incident”. The disclosure of casualty data is then shifted to the subjective identification of liability for the incident and to the guidance of public opinion. Table 2.1 outlines the titles of reports by traditional media about the Hangzhou Metro construction site incident.

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

57

As can be seen from the table, the most important function of the media in risk fields is the construction of risk discourse. In most cases, the process in which society handles risks involves the media’s language control, interpretations of symbols and political competition regarding specific risk issues. The media’s selective coverage of the physical process of accidents, the handling of incidents and the identification of responsibility may redefine risk issues, which can be disseminated to the public in the form of text, audio, photos and others. The advantage of selectively constructing risk issues is that media coverage can maintain or even strengthen the power of the media, increase the value of their resources, and draw public attention. Media of different types try their best to distinguish themselves from the government and enterprises concerned, and to have a discourse monopoly over risk characteristics. In this process, the media guides public opinion and assessment of risk events.

2.3.2.3

Resistance from the Weak: Rumors and Social Panic

The general public does not have access to sufficient economic and political resources. As individuals, they always become the victims and bearers of various risks, and are described by the government, the media and risk management experts as “blind and irrational” in the face of risks. Many ordinary people at a disadvantage in risk fields, however, will not yield to risks completely, let alone sit still awaiting their doom when danger comes. They will respond to risks in their own way, and protest, with words and actions, against the social construction of risk by the dominator of the risk field. Such protests, as described in Weapons of the Weak, require little or no coordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms.3 Indeed, in the face of emergencies, people will create rumors about risk events, and spread and process them quickly in order to confront the cover-up and information blockade of the government and enterprises, and show seemingly irrational social panic behavior intentionally or unintentionally. These actions, in essence, are intended to send a clear signal of distrust in the government, enterprises and even the media, thus generating strong public opinion and forcing the original dominators in the risk field to adjust action and policy. The so-called “the weak” turn their protests into action through discussion, connection and mutual support; in many cases, they cannot only succeed in promoting social introspection but also achieve the unexpected effect of non-institutionalized supervision. (1) Concealment of truth and prevalence of rumors Work-related accidents, especially serious ones, often result in casualties. Except those caused by force majeure, these incidents can be attributed to human errors. For this reason, the government imposes severe punishment on those held account for these accidents. Even so, local governments and enterprises, driven by economic 3 James

C. Scott. Weapons of the Weak (trans. Zheng Guanghuai, Zhang Min & He Jiangshui). Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2007.

58

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

benefits, tend to be negligent in detecting and eliminating safety hazards. Once an incident occurs, they would “instinctively” conceal relevant information, and even provide false information about how the incident occurs. In doing so, they just pass the buck for one moment; in most cases, the threat posed by the incidents will not disappear with the “information blockade” of the enterprises and governments concerned. When people cannot obtain information from formal sources, gossip or even rumors will sneak in, so the incidents may bring about more serious social consequences. [Songhua River Pollution Incident] The river pollution crisis sparked earthquake rumors. Water contamination caused by the explosion at the chemical plant was a covert disaster. The local governments of Jilin and Heilongjiang and even the State Administration of Environmental Protection didn’t disclose to the public any authoritative information on water contamination within nearly ten days after the explosion. In this case, earthquake rumors started to spread in Harbin. The rumors had three versions: a 5.3-magnitude earthquake would strike Harbin between 20:00 and 22:00 on November 22, 2005; a 5.7-magnitude earthquake would hit the city between 22:00 and 23:30 on November 22; and a 7-magnitude earthquake would happen between 0:00 and 3:00 a.m. on November 23. The earthquake rumors have the general characteristics of rumors. Urgency of incident. Water is a necessary resource of daily life. An unexpected notice on long-time urban water supply cutoff made the public feel their basic survival under threat. Ambiguity of information. Local governments did not disclose to the public any reliable information on water contamination within days after the explosion, leaving room for rumors. Rumor inducers. In the Songhua River water contamination incident, there were some seemingly reasonable factors that led to earthquake rumors. On July 25, 2005, a 5.1-magnitude earthquake hit a village of Daqing City, and was felt across Harbin, which ordinary people could remember vividly even three months later. As the authorities gave no response to the public’s concerns, the rumors continued to evolve: because of the long-term oil production in Daqing, the disintegrated strata would sooner or later collapse and cause an earthquake, which would also affect Harbin. Obviously, rumors that arise in emergencies are to some extent a form of spontaneous resistance from “the weak”. Factors such as urgency of incident, absence of authoritative information and ambiguity of information together give rise to an urgent need of a self-decompressing interpretative system for people to justify their subsequent behavior. (2) Risk perception and social panic Work-related accidents directly threaten the health and lives of the people concerned, and with the amplification of physical consequences of the incidents, they will pose a threat to a wider range of people. If risk signals are easy to detect, people will take immediate action to avoid risks. When physical harm is potential and difficult to identify, and agencies knowing the truth deliberately conceal information and reduce protection by adopting circuitous strategies, the prevalence of risk-related

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

59

rumors will lead to a higher degree of risk perception among the public, triggering panic behavior. Such panic not only derives from instinctive self-protection, but is also a result of “inference” in the absence of reliable and authoritative information. [Songhua River Pollution Incident] Panic buying of water. When water contamination posed a threat to people’s safety, the municipal government of Harbin decided to suspend tap water supply for days. Once the notice was issued, the public’s first reaction was to rush into the supermarket to buy bottled water. People at work called their families and friends to rush for any products related to drinking water, such as fresh milk, beer and other beverages. The purchasing power of a big city with a population of 3.496 million was overwhelming. “More than 500 boxes of mineral water on November 21 were snapped up within an hour”, said a supermarket manager. On November 21 alone, people of Harbin purchased sixteen thousand tons of bottled water, 100 times that of usual daily sales. Risk aversion by going out of town. Panic buying of drinking water and earthquake rumors soon led to risk aversion behaviors such as running away from the city. Some people lived with their relatives and friends in other cities, and some stayed in hotels. In Dalian, a city far away from Harbin, the hotels were swarming with people “escaping” from Harbin, and the parking lots were full of vehicles there. The coach stations were crowded with people intending to leave the city, and air tickets sold out. During the several days before and after the notice, the number of passengers exceeded that of the “Golden Week”. Social anxiety and panic caused by public safety incidents is an instinctive reaction of people who are feeling insecure in the risk society. When people feel anxious and lost in modern life, they will question the validity of the legal system, political system and various security arrangements on which modern society is based, and even attempt to take back the power over policymaking and risk explanation from tech bureaucrats. Rumors and panic are a form of individual self-help, as well as a way for public opinion to construct and shift risk topics as mentioned above. In any case, they reflect the demands of ordinary people for security and other personal interests, which contain strong social trust and commitment to the legitimacy of the ruling party. It is through similar actions that more and more people in risk fields have changed and even narrowed the scope of public policy options of powerful institutions such as governments and economic groups. With the adoption of crisis management measures, the subsequent more transparent information disclosure, and timely removal and prevention of physical hazards, the panic of the general public will ease off, enabling social order to restore rapidly. The frequent occurrence of the same or similar incidents has urged risk managers to make institutional improvements in policy design. For example, the implementation of the Emergency Response Law and the provisions on protecting the media’s right to report and the public’s right to know in the Ordinance on Government Information Disclosure have fundamentally changed the resource mix in social fields and the spatial relationship between risk participants. This indicates that the operation of risk fields is not determined by a single agent alone; no agents or institutions, though dominant in a field, can take action of their own accord without calculating the strength and resources of other agents. The spread

60

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

of rumors and social panic also reflect that the power of the government is not omnipotent, and given the complexity and uncertainty of risks, it is impossible to rely on administrative power alone to manage risks. Government departments should take into account public support and public opinion when mobilizing and allocating resources. Especially when emergency response requires cooperation from all sectors of society, opportunities to reshape the power structure may arise. At this time, subordinate groups with a smaller say, if any, may seize the opportunities to gain new resources and power to change their social position in the risk field and seek greater interests.

2.3.3 Summary 2.3.3.1

Predicament of Risk Evidence

Once an emergency occurs, tricky issues such as the definition of risk, safety range, countermeasures, and responsibility for risk dissemination will become the focus of social debates. It is never easy for different agents (groups/institutions) to reach an agreement on these controversial issues. If standardized approaches such as evidence authentication are used for validation, illustration and persuasion strategies, the uncertainty and urgency of the risk event itself often makes it difficult to deduce and make well-informed decisions. More often than not, there are other evidence or optional methods to validate evidence and evade risks, and choosing one strategy always means forsaking the others; as a result, the final consequences will vary wildly in risk assessment. It may take much longer than ordinary people can wait to reject a strategic option or even falsify a risk claim, and the damage spread of physical hazards and public demands for social security will not allow for long discussions. Most people are perplexed in face of different risk definitions, explanations and avoidance measures from different sources. They are often exposed to different views from the government, the media and technical experts: one view is that in face of risks and crises, any explanation is in fact a sign of shirking responsibility, and the government and enterprises must take their due responsibility for disasters; the other view maintains that risk, in some cases, is a “by-product” in the course of human civilization, and an inevitable outcome of social progress, and it is no surprise that some risks are even acceptable. To play a role, the public tend to respond conservatively and ease their sense of insecurity by amplifying risk-related information, thinking that security is much better than regret, and believing what they want to believe. In addition, risk can spark widespread debates at all levels (between people, on the Internet, on television, etc.). When no agreement can be reached quickly in the debates and the spread of risk cannot be curbed, the public will feel frustrated and indignant due to the lack of the sense of security. Such indignation can turn any risk issue into a public opinion and moral issue. People may question the motivation of risk communication of the government, enterprises and even the media, lose patience to continue to cooperate with risk management organizations, no longer have trust

2.3 The Logic of Risk Field

61

in them, and condemn the behaviors of risk makers. This will result in more serious social risk consequences, and even affect the legitimation of the regime.

2.3.3.2

Symbolism of Risk Debate

Social debates aroused by incidents come down to ineffective risk communication. As everyday communication channels are replaced by increasingly sophisticated professional knowledge and the rule of administrative power, people’s ability to grasp and understand modern affairs will weaken, and the foundation of social identity will fade away as people are unable to concern themselves with or study public affairs based on institutionalized procedures, which ultimately leads to crises in the public sphere. Many risk-related debates and the resultant social conflicts may go far beyond the risk issues themselves, and various risk-related symbolic extensions are the crux. Risk-related social debates result from the perception of risk by different social groups and institutions, and risk behaviors induced by risk perception are closely related to the social and cultural backgrounds. Behavior in risk fields is not as simple as the “stimulus-response” model. Those perceived risks are infused with symbolism through social amplification and explanation, and risk issues therefore can easily be transformed into political issues and moral judgments such as social justice, public responsibility, and legitimacy. Risk-related debates, when going deep, tend to take risk as a substitute for other social problems, and may bring about changes to the interest and power structure of the risk fields under the influence of social networks and mass media, and even reshape the fundamental structure of the whole society. In the risk field, the agent or organization that can mobilize greater amounts of resources is more likely to gain a dominant position, including more power (pertaining to the definition and explanation of risk) and broader public support, and to pursue its interests through the process of risk-related debates, decision-making, and eventually management policies. When the dominant one succeeds in crushing the resistance from the dominated and when all social movements are carried out in a top-down manner, the effect of dominance will be strengthened. However, when an unexpected event arises, breaking the temporal and spatial limitations previously imposed by society, the participants in the risk field are afforded the opportunities to enter the arena anytime and anywhere and give voice to their opinions. The interactions between the participants, or speakers, are marked by diversity, heterogeneity and intersubjectivity, making it possible for these speakers to regain the right to define and interpret a particular risk, which would eventually deepen the public’s understanding of the risk and promote their awareness of it. How individuals and groups compete for dominance over risk discourse depends on their position in risk fields and also their perception of fields, and the latter depends on their standpoint about fields. The action strategy in risk settings is like a social function. The position structure shaped by the quantity and type of the original resources and power of the participants, active or passive, can evolve into the opportunity of new actions over time. People engage themselves in dialogues and communication on risk issues they are concerned about; discussions are not

62

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

limited to orthodox, professional, and authoritative issues, and the participants can even be free from the influence of social views. By contrast, the general public and the media are trying to break the dominance and power over risk explanation of the authority and technical experts, and to establish a new decentralized mode of operation. The inherent logic of risk fields demonstrates that to resolve risk issues and especially the debate over the right to speak requires the whole society to reconsider the importance of communication. After all, social value conflicts are not just about divided views and different standpoints, but more importantly, result from the fact that the foundation of common beliefs and the basis of social development are eroded. In terms of risk management, the solution is not to rely merely on administrative, judicial and even ideological control, but to reflect on the past and to promote pluralism in contemporary society.

2.4 Mass Incidents Governance: Strategies and Approaches Within the comprehensive analytical framework of social risk and public crisis and from the perspective of integrated public crisis management, administrators must consider and handle mass incidents based on new concepts.

2.4.1 Mass Incidents Are Not “Sudden Events” As mentioned above, mass incidents are trigger events in the process of social risk evolving into public crisis and break out when social risk accumulates to a certain extent. Mass incidents, whether demands are made or not, are in essence a realistic manifestation of social risks caused by the structural differences between the rich and the poor, between classes, between urban-rural areas and between regions. Global risk society is by no means just a horrifying concept, and the systematic risk of modernity is bound to emerge. In China, due to the imbalances in development, the situation will be even more complicated, which can be reflected in the hazards of modernity on the one hand, and the inevitable cost of attaining modernity on the other. With the deepening of reforms and the end of the era of “universal benefits” for all sides at the earlier stage, every round of reform now is a redistribution of interest, which will inevitably lead to fierce contests between interest groups. In the next few years, structural differences between the rich and the poor, between classes, between urban-rural areas and between regions will remain, and mass incidents because of them will therefore occur. Administrators must view mass incidents as inevitable, rather than “sudden”, events from a dynamic perspective. Since mass incidents are inevitable, a learning system must be established. At present, there are mainly two ways of dealing with mass incidents: first, for mass incidents with demands such as “petitions” (shangfang), institutional arrangements for complaint reception and the like are used, and in general, local governments

2.4 Mass Incidents Governance: Strategies and Approaches

63

are responsible for handling petitions made to higher authorities according to a set of established measures, although the effects and necessity of such measures are met with great skepticism. Second, for mass incidents without demands, due to the uncertain time, location and form, governments at all levels are required to develop contingency plans and make preparations. Either way, an effective learning system is absent. In other words, failure to draw on the experience in handling previous incidents has partly contributed to the repeated occurrence of the same or similar incidents later. This, to a large extent, has something to do with the current press system and information communication system. Currently, most mass incidents are not allowed to be made public by the media; instead, relevant information is restricted to a few departments and within a small scope, let alone the sharing of experiences in handling them. Some progress has been made though. The provision that “the news media shall not release information on incidents without authorization” was deleted from the draft Emergency Response Law, a move intended to constrain “compartmentation” and local protectionism and to ensure information is shared to the largest extent possible. This will obviously be conducive to the formation of the learning system.

2.4.2 “Governance”, Rather Than “Response” or “Management” As to public crisis, Uriel Rosenthal takes a step forward by replacing “response” with “management”. Compared to immediate response, management is an institutionalized behavior. But this is not enough. It is still necessary to advance from “management” to “governance”. According to the definition in the report titled “Our Global Neighborhood” released by the UN Commission on Global Governance in 1995, “governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.” Governance has four characteristics: (1) it is not a set of rules or a kind of activity, but a process; (2) the basis of governance is not control, but coordination; (3) governance involves both the public sector and the private sector; and (4) governance is not a formal system, but continuing interactions.4 This is exactly applicable to mass incidents. The main task of mass incident governance is not to strengthen the role and position of the government, but to underline the interactions and communication between the government and the people, because in mass incidents, what the people think is much more important than what government officials hold. Mass incident governance should be about seeking balance between 4 The

Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighborhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 2–3.

64

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

different groups. This has two meanings. The first is balance in rights, that is, to ensure moderate political expression and engagement of non-governmental groups; the second is balance in responsibility, that is, while emphasizing government responsibility, it is important to define the responsibilities of other sides, and enable them to identify and mitigate risks proactively, instead of passively responding to risks in random ways.

2.4.3 Mass Incident Governance Is Not Static, but Dynamic According to the whole-process response system within the new analytical framework, the dynamic governance of mass incidents should at least consist of three parts.

2.4.3.1

Social Risk Governance

Social risks are rooted in structural tensions between classes, between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural areas, and between regions. For this reason, the key to mitigating social risks is to improve the governance structure. First, it is of paramount importance to have a large, substantive middle class in order to make the social structure more flexible, and to prevent direct conflicts between people at the bottom and the elite holding state power. As recent studies in China have shown, there are now three types of new middle classes, namely, the “administrative middle class” generated by empowerment and administrative access, the “market-based middle class” generated by market exchange relationships and market entry, and the “social middle class” generated by social capital and social networks; due to the strong heterogeneity among the three classes and in particular, the power dependence and restriction between the “social middle class” and the “market-based middle class”, the internal integration and social identity of the new middle class is very difficult.5 How to engage the various players of the new middle class in the effort to ease social problems holds key to optimizing the structure of social governance. Second, a sound social mobility mechanism must be put in place to prevent class solidification. A healthy society should ensure that most occupations are capable of upward mobility, but the reality is that all kinds of qualifications and professional thresholds (especially the restrictions set by the household registration system) have hindered normal social mobility, and the growing tendency of “compartmentation” also deserves attention. For individuals, the possibility of upward mobility can keep them more or less rational, but class solidification and the loss of hope for people at the bottom may lead to irrational collective action, i.e. mass incidents. Only with a

5 Zhang

Wanli, Li Wei & Gao Ge. Composition of China’s New Middle Class. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2004 (6).

2.4 Mass Incidents Governance: Strategies and Approaches

65

large middle class and a sound social mobility mechanism can a society ensure that people at all levels have a sense of security and fulfillment.

2.4.3.2

Trigger Event6 Governance

Trigger event governance involves at least two aspects. First, cultivate a social risk culture and make it internalized into the behavior of law and regulation enforcement personnel, so as to eliminate disregard of individual interests, oversimplification and crudeness, and bureaucratism in the process of enforcing laws and regulations. Second, put in place the emergency management system for mass incidents to reduce the time of response and cost of inter-departmental collaboration, prevent the escalation of incidents, and minimize their impact on the social system. The key to the building of emergency management system lies not in emergency plans, but emergency exercises. Frequent emergency exercises should be carried out according to emergency plans, which should be revised in light of the actual situation. Only in this way can emergency plans work well when mass incidents occur.

2.4.3.3

Public Crisis Governance

Public crisis governance also requires efforts in at least two aspects. First, advance the political system reform. Public crisis has led to a state of tension of government departments facing huge uncertainty and time pressure, and this should be a motivation for government reform. In particular, the development of public crisis now increasingly depends on the balance of power among multiple sectors such as the government, the media, businesses and citizens, and political engagement and expression of different groups is necessary to solve public crisis. Second, strengthen the government’s public relations. The end of handling a trigger event does not mean the end of a public crisis. How disastrous incidents interact with psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors will strengthen or mitigate risk perception and shape risk behaviors, and these behaviors will lead to new social or economic consequences that may go far beyond direct impacts on human health or the environment, and involve more severe indirect influence, such as liabilities, insurance costs, loss of confidence in systems, stigmatization, and disengagement from community affairs. Therefore, the government should well manage public relations to get rid of those indirect influences.

6 This

is basically equivalent to “emergency” in the comprehensive analytical framework.

66

2 Application of the Comprehensive Analytical Framework …

2.4.4 Prioritize Mass Incidents In risk management, risks are usually prioritized according to the frequency and severity of risks: high-frequency, high-severity risks are given top priority, followed by low-frequency, high-severity risks, high-frequency low-severity risks, and then low-frequency, low-severity risks. Social risks are in nature different from others risk as they are incomputable, and their frequency cannot be calculated, but their general patterns of occurrence, other social conditions being unchanged, can still be deduced through the observation of previous phenomena. If the number of occurrences of mass incidents is approximately deemed as their frequency and the impact of mass incidents on the legitimacy of the regime as their severity, mass incidents can be prioritized as follows. First, internal problems are the main social risks in China in the transition period, with high frequency and great social impacts, so the governance of mass incidents caused by internal problems should be given top priority. Second, mass incidents instigated by the reactionary forces within and outside the Chinese territory, such as the “Falun Gong” cult have relatively low frequency but enormous impacts, so the governance of these mass incidents should be number two priority. Third, mass incidents caused by international conflicts have relatively low frequency and generally won’t lead to severe consequences, and sometimes can even promote social integration and enhance social cohesion, so they take the third place in the governance of mass incidents.7 Georg Simmel distinguishes between “conflict as a means” and “conflict as an end”. When it comes to mass incidents, organized mass incidents with demands, such as petitions, are “conflicts as a means”. Such mass incidents are regarded as a means for participants to pursue their ends. Once the ends are achieved, or either party makes concessions, or other means can be adopted, the mass incident will be over. Unorganized mass incidents without demands are “conflicts as an end”, meaning that the conflict itself is the purpose and there are no alternative ways and room for coordination. In addition to the complexity of the incident itself, the capability of the authority is also a defining factor of the severity of the incident. Small incidents beyond the scope of experience and capability of the authority can have more serious impacts than large incidents within the scope. Therefore, unorganized mass incidents without demands are more harmful than organized incidents with demands. As to the number of occurrences, although organized incidents with demands make up the majority of mass incidents, unorganized incidents without demands have shown

7 This

approach to prioritizing mass incidents is mainly applicable to local governments. For the central government, especially national security departments at different levels, the order should be different. Obviously, mass incidents caused by international conflicts are of special significance to the central government, and national security departments at all levels should give top priority to mass incidents instigated by the reactionary forces within and outside of the Chinese territory, such as the “Falun Gong” cult and the “Urumqi incident”.

2.4 Mass Incidents Governance: Strategies and Approaches

67

an upward trend. Generally, in terms of governance of internal problems facing China, unorganized mass incidents without demands should be given top priority, followed by unorganized incidents with demands, and then by organized incidents with demands. Only when mass incidents are prioritized will it be likely to deal with them in a targeted and comprehensive manner.

Part II

Empirical Studies

Chapter 3

Perception, Amplification and Communication: A Case Study of Food Safety Risks

3.1 Research Background and Significance 3.1.1 Research Background In recent years, China has seen a rapid increase in public health incidents, among which food safety incidents have drawn the most attention. Every major food safety incident is a challenge to the safety warning line and leads to various social consequences in addition to economic losses. Food is the first necessity of the people, and food safety is of paramount importance. Any incident concerning food safety will spark public concern, and if not properly handled, may cause social panic. According to the results of 2006 and 2008 surveys by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the sense of security about food was at the lowest level compared with that about other factors. This shows that the public have long been concerned about food hygiene and safety, as evidenced in food safety incidents exposed since September 2008 such as the use of melamine in milk and chicken feed. Just as the negative effects of the “Fuyang inferior milk powder incident” were lingering, the 2008 milk scandal again exacerbated the public’s health concerns. In face of risks, what the people care about the most is not how to precisely measure risks, but whether their own survival and safety is threatened. Therefore, as to the public’s question of “to what extent can safety be guaranteed”, risk managers and decision-makers should address the issue from a cultural perspective, and explore the internal logic of risk behavior, so as to shed light on the social and cultural process that shapes risks and draw conclusions that are useful for food safety management.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_3

71

72

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

3.1.2 Research Significance On a theoretical level, this research focuses on the serious consequences except casualties and property losses in food safety incidents, and regards these consequences as social consequences, which are deeper-level impacts of the incidents. This is a way to correct the shortcomings of “cost effectiveness” analysis, which underestimates the negative effects of incidents. To study the social dynamics of risk perception and amplification is to provide such a correction mechanism for risk analysis and decision-making. On the one hand, it is necessary to prevent the exaggeration of a particular risk from heightening individual or social risk perception and causing overreaction from the public. On the other hand, it is also important to prevent people from underestimating and “understating” the risk and thus responding inadequately when a risk is intentionally or unintentionally neglected. The social consequences of risks and incidents should neither be underestimated nor deliberately exaggerated; instead, risks should be assessed in an accurate and holistic manner. In this way, the concept of social amplification or attenuation of risk can be separated from individual experience and social intention, which will help to understand risks more comprehensively. From a practical perspective, China has seen a number of major food safety incidents in recent years, which pose a huge threat to public health, property safety and social order. These incidents generally raise great concerns and cause serious social consequences that often go beyond the existing capabilities of the government and society. Therefore, in-depth case studies are required. By reconstructing typical cases in specific social and historical contexts, and analyzing their occurrence mechanism and the influence of cultural and social process on them, these studies can shed light on how the relationship between mainstream culture and group subculture affects the process of social amplification or attenuation of risk, and demonstrate the social process of dealing with risks, such as the interaction between the riskrelated experiences of individuals and society. Only by strengthening case studies on food safety incidents and exploring the path of social amplification of risk can we better understand the meaning of shaping a society’s risk-related experience, enhance people’s sense of risk, transform the governance structure of emergencies, and improve emergency management of the government. The purpose of this study is to explain, using the framework of social amplification of risk, the mechanisms and modes of interaction between different incidents and psychological, social and cultural factors in contemporary China, so as to provide theoretical explanations that suit China’s risk governance experience.

3.2 Analytical Framework and Research Methods

73

3.2 Analytical Framework and Research Methods 3.2.1 Core Concepts 3.2.1.1

“Risk” and “Perceived Risk”

“Risk” is closely related to “hazard”. “Risk” generally refers to the substances and incidents that pose threats to human beings and their habitat and manmade facilities, as well as some scenarios that threaten the survival and development of mankind. In most contexts, risk is construed as an undesired incident. Technically, risk can be quantified as the product of the probability of the undesired incident and the scale of particular consequences. In contrast, cultural studies think that risk, in nature, is constructed, and risk perception is people’s judgement and assessment of the hazards that are affecting or may affect them, including their health, life, property and living environment. The effects of such judgement and assessment may be amplified or attenuated in social settings, and bring about other social consequences. Most people has a more comprehensive understanding of risk than the aforesaid “product”, and some aspects of risk, such as voluntariness, weighing of interests, and destructiveness and potentiality of risk, all have influence on people’s perception of and response to risks. This indicates that no matter how risk is defined scientifically, only risks that are generally perceived by people in particular social contexts are “real”. In fact, risk research is a scientific activity and also a kind of cultural explanation. The complexity of world determines that risk research and risk assessment and management are becoming more and more complicated. Technical measurements and the approaches of cultural studies should be combined. This can extend the concept of risk, and help to better understand how people experience, assess and respond in face of risks. Therefore, risk can be regarded as the probability of the consequences that people’s action, a scenario or an incident may result in. Risk, on one part, is partly an objective threat to people, and on the other part, is a product of culture and social experiences. This implies the causality between different incidents (actions), and that losses and damages are always substantial; meanwhile, the risk-related experiences brought by such losses and damages to the public are “embedded” into cultural, social and psychological fabrics.

3.2.1.2

“Risk Amplification”

“Amplification” originates from the analogy of electronic signals. The effects of risk amplification can be divided into direct effects (physical amplification) and indirect ripple effects (social amplification). The former will bring about health injury, property loss and other adverse consequences, and the latter, a result of interactions between the direct consequences and social handing process of risks, will lead to changes in medical costs and social emergency response costs, stigmatization of

74

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

social organizations, group conflicts, cover-up and whitewash of social contradictions, decline in collective morality, and so on. Specifically, natural disasters mainly give rise to the direct amplification of physical energy, while public health incidents and social security incidents mainly result in indirect ripple effects. A concept related to social amplification is social attenuation. Due to social amplification of risk, the effects caused by emergencies will lead to additional institutional responses and protective actions, while in the case of social attenuation of risk, individuals and society will underestimate and underreact to risks and thus reduce protective actions. When physical amplification and social amplification are considered together, risk amplification or attenuation is regarded as the expansion or reduction of the ripple effects of particular incidents. Amplification or attenuation turns the direct effects of incidents into the ripple effects. In this process, the impact of risk goes beyond when and where an incident occurs and gets into a broader social field.

3.2.1.3

“Risk Amplifier”

The intermediary that disseminates the energy and information of the initial incident into the society is called “amplifier”. In the process of risk amplification, riskrelated information is aggregated and reinterpreted through the social process in which people or groups communicate information with others. The individuals or organizations that gather and respond to risk-related information are called “social amplifiers” of risk. They mainly include news media, government, experts, enterprises, personal networks, and individual actors (including direct stakeholders and non-direct stakeholders). Risk amplifiers can be divided into “physical amplifiers” and “social amplifiers”. Physical amplifiers include natural amplifiers and man-made amplifiers, whose functions are magnified or attenuated through social amplifiers. As this part focuses on food safety risks in public health incidents, only discusses “social amplifier” of risk is discussed here.

3.2.2 Analytical Framework The social dynamics analytical framework of risk amplification used in this study portrays an intriguing risk landscape, where the information processing by individuals and organizations, institutional structure and responses, behaviors of social groups and individual activities together shape the social experiences, and ultimately affect the consequences of risk. Many of these consequences are not expected by risk managers. As shown in Fig. 3.1, risk is absolutely real, and is also determined by society and culture. When we study risks, we should no longer merely argue about “objective, real risks” or “subjective, distorted risks”. Only when people consider the relationship between the world and themselves, the so-called risk is meaningful. The basic analytical framework of this study can be likened to the surface of a pond

3.2 Analytical Framework and Research Methods

75

Fig. 3.1 Risk amplification and its potential impacts

rippling when a stone is thrown into it. As far as risk is concerned, those first affected are the direct victims or people who pay close attention to it; then the behaviors, communication and responses of different groups and individuals, not just the directly affect groups, may bring about new, second-level consequences; these consequences will in turn be perceived by other groups, and then another risk amplification process starts and may lead to third-level consequences. Such continuous amplification effects, in extreme cases, may penetrate into other sectors and remote areas, or even into social core values, and institutional and policy orientation.

3.2.3 Research Methods 3.2.3.1

“Process-Event Study”

The “process-event study” approach is a new attempt to get rid of the traditional methods of structural analysis or institutional analysis. It looks beyond the formal structure, organization and institutional framework of society and dives into the events and processes formed by social actions to shed light on social phenomena and social processes. This study no longer regards incidents as a result, but takes the evolution of incidents as a relatively independent explanatory variable for causal analysis. Causal analysis is not to simply pile up post-incident materials, but to describe the mechanisms of how the social consequences of incidents take shape, evolve and are mitigated, and highlight the process in which risks are explained, disseminated, exchanged, interpreted and controlled by various “amplifiers”. This process demonstrates some important features of a particular incident, and reveals the complex relationship between different factors of the incident, and the social and cultural significance of unexpected changes as a result of the incident in different settings. In a word, the “process-event study” approach is chosen to analyze incidents because it can help to understand risk itself in the established social culture, and highlight the social construction process of risk while examining the characteristics of social and organizational structure.

76

3.2.3.2

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

Literature Research and Case Study

Literature research is a research method to explore social behavior and social relations by collecting and analyzing materials in the form of texts, symbols, pictures and others. According to the purpose and nature of this study, we use “content analysis” and “secondary data analysis, two methods of literature research, to illustrate the social mechanism and process of risk communication. “Content analysis” mainly targets at information on the media, especially major newspapers, radio, television, and the internet, and the “consonance of media reporting”1 between them, so as to describe the content of risk communication of incidents objectively, systematically and quantitatively, and in particular, to shed light on the interpretative mechanism of risk representation through analyzing the changes in the quantity and content of relevant information after an incident. “Secondary data analysis” is mainly to study and analyze the existing data released by the governments and academic systems. This research mainly uses the official statistical data available on the “public opinion channel” of people.cn as the primary data, and connects in new and heuristic ways the scattered and isolated information about risk dissemination and amplification to recreate data, and thus draw new conclusions. Literature on incidents and risk communication provides the basic background and empirical support for this research, and analysis of media texts, and government and public decision-making and performance, among others, is all based on literature.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses 3.3.1 “Risk Amplifiers” of Food Safety Incidents 3.3.1.1

“Social Amplifiers”

Food safety concerns the health of every person, so people pay close attention to the behaviors of the industry and can quickly detect and respond to relevant topics. Inevitably, they will choose some features and specific aspects of the incidents and interpret them based on their own understanding and planning, and then process theses interpretations and put them on their agenda. The organizations and groups that oversee and respond to the information serve as the “risk amplifiers” of food safety incidents. Among the most important risk amplifiers are the institutionalized governments, enterprises, and news media.

1 “Consonance

of media reporting” refers to that if an incident or topic reported by a medium has certain influence, it will be rapidly covered by other media in similar ways. See: Elisabeth NoelleNeumann and Rainer Mathes. “The Events as Events and the Events as News: The Significance of Consonance for Media Effects Research”. European Journal of Communication, 1987, 2 (4): 391–414.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

77

(1) Quick response from the media The media make it easier to expose risks to the society. As the “uncertainty” of risk aggravates the eagerness and anxiety about information at every level of society, the media are endowed with important responsibilities for fighting risks, exposing risk and visualizing risks. In modern society, the media play an inherent role in supervision, and have the capacity of steering public attention. Especially, the authoritative media with official backing are better at affecting the public and enjoy greater public trust. Any incident, with the engagement of the mainstream media, will soon have an “amplification effect”. [Fuyang inferior milk powder incident] In 2004, two reports, one titled “The Calamity of Inferior Milk Powder in Fuyang” by Shanghai-based Dongfang Daily on April 16, and the other titled “Who Killed Those Infants: An Investigation in Fuyang Fake Formula Incident” by Xinmin Weekly on April 17, revealed the substandard infant milk scandal in Fuyang of Anhui Province. The two articles were soon reposted by official news portals such as xinhuanet.com, drawing high attention across the country. On April 19, an influential program of China Central Television (CCTV) reported the incident, and for the first time released the names of the infant victims, provoking strong indignation of the general public. [Melamine-tainted milk powder incident] On July 30, 2008, Western Business Daily published an article titled “Half a Bottle of Kidney Stones in Eight-monthold Infants” by journalist Zhang Yuncai, which states that “too much calcium may lead to stones in the body of babies, which may be related to their milk powder”. After the electronic edition of the newspaper published the article at 8:55 a.m., it was successively reposted by Tencent, Netease and xinhuanet.com between 8:55 and 11:11 a.m. On that day, more than 2000 netizens posted comments on Tencent. On September 9, Lanzhou Morning Post reported that the kidney stones of fourteen babies suffering from in Gansu might be associated with long-term consumption of some brand of infant formula. After the report was released on the electronic version of the newspaper at 8:26, it was reposted by thirteen websites including Netease, Tencent, and Gansu Channel of xinhuanet.com by 6:33 a.m., September 10. On September 11, yahoo.com.cn published a report titled “Anonymity of Milk Powder Brand Suspected of Causing Kidney Stones in Infants Provokes Public Indignation”, drawing public attention to the producer of the problematic milk powder. On September 11, a report by Jian Guangzhou of Dongfang Daily revealed that the brand of milk powder that might have caused kidney stones in fourteen babies in Gansu was Sanlu, which soon came under fire from the public. Major news outlets such as Sohu, Sina, Yahoo, Tencent and Netease reposted the article. After September 11, a slew of domestic television and radio stations began to report that infants and young children suffering from kidney stones were fed tainted milk powder. On the evening of September 12, the scandal was for the first time broadcast in Xinwen Lianbo, a well-known, authoritative daily program of CCTV. On September 13, Xinwen Lianbo announced that in response to the Sanlu contaminated milk powder incident, the State Council decided to initiate the Level-I emergency plan for major food safety incidents. From September 12–23, the daily

78

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

program reported a total of 25 pieces of news on the incident, including five on September 17 alone. All the mainstream media put in a lot of manpower and material resources to follow up on the major news event. The clues about the incident, after being sorted out and rearranged by the media, were presented to the audience. For a period of time, people were frequently bombarded with and became more sensitive to information related to the melamine-tainted milk powder incident. Many people also took action, such as requesting refunds and compensations. (2) Engagement of authorities Any individual or organization in social life can become a “risk amplifier”. Because of their different positions and roles in social life, however, their roles in amplifying or attenuating risk signals vary widely. It goes without saying that in Chinese society, the government plays a bigger role than any other organization, and government employees play a bigger role than ordinary citizens. When government leaders and government employees participate as representatives of authority in the handling of incidents, their credible, institutionalized and organized actions will significantly amplify the risk signals. a. Instructions from senior officials All major incidents in China can get instant results once state authority steps in, and food safety incidents are no exception. After learning of the Fuyang infant formula scandal, then Premier Wen Jiabao gave three important instructions: first, thoroughly investigate into the sources, marketing channels and sales regions of the inferior milk powder, and provide appropriate medical treatment for the affected children; second, on the basis of finding out the facts, people concerned shall be held responsible, and those convicted of crime shall be severely punished according to law and be exposed; and third, food and drug safety would be the focus of the year’s efforts to keep the market economy in order, so as to ensure the people’s food safety and protect their health. According to the Premier’s instructions, the State Council enjoined the State Food and Drug Administration, together with relevant departments and local governments, to set up a team to conduct comprehensive investigations into the incidents in Fuyang and other regions and deal with them in a timely manner. “Instructions” from leaders have high administrative effectiveness in China, and in particular, “instructions” from senior officials can reach government departments at all levels and give a boost to their administrative efficiency. [Fuyang inferior milk powder incident] After Premier Wen gave instructions, a taskforce of the State Council immediately went to Fuyang of Anhui and formed a joint investigation team together with the provincial government of Anhui to find out and deal with the incident by combining administrative investigations and expert appraisals such as investigating the market, tracking the sources, conducting rural infant nutrition examinations, checking out the cases in hospitals, and testing the products.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

79

b. Intervention by joint investigation teams and attention from the WHO For major food safety incidents that have huge influence, relevant departments of the State Council would generally set up joint investigation teams to investigate and deal with the incidents on site. With growing importance to its international image and social prestige, the Chinese government would communicate with the World Health Organization (WHO) on major public health incidents, and keep other member countries informed. This to a large extent accelerates risk dissemination of the incidents and expands the scope of their influence. [Melamine-tainted milk powder incident] The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine sent a team to the plants of Sanlu to find out the causes of the incident and conducted special inspections on similar products nationwide. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce strengthened supervision and inspection over infant formula. The Ministry of Health set up a taskforce to investigate and deal with the incident, conducted a comprehensive investigation on the potential effects on infants and babies across the country, and organized experts to develop treatment plans. The Ministry also required medical systems to timely report similar cases, and also informed the WHO and relevant countries of the situation. c. Launch of the national emergency plan In January 2006, China released the National Emergency Plan for Public Emergencies, and a series of specific plans as a response to all kinds of emergencies. After the SARS outbreak in 2003, China accumulated certain experiences in responding to public health emergencies. The massive melamine-tainted milk powder incident turned out a good opportunity to test the food safety emergency plan. [Melamine-tainted milk powder incident] On September 13, 2008, the State Council initiated the Level-I emergency plan for major food safety incidents, and set up an emergency response team led by the Ministry of Health and composed of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Security, the State Food and Drug Administration, and provincial government of Hebei. The national health system and medical professionals provided screening and diagnosis services and free medical treatment for the affected infants and young children. All of the ten-plus national testing centers within the quality supervision, inspection and quarantine system worked 24 hours a day to test all infant formulas on the market, and local quality supervision, inspection and quarantine departments and testing systems were required to extend the scope of supervision and inspection to all dairy products. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce, together with relevant departments, sealed up 2,176 tons of in-stock infant milk powder of Sanlu Group, recalled all of its infant milk powder products from the market, and destroyed tens of thousands of tons of tainted milk powder under the supervision of the quality supervision, inspection and quarantine departments.

80

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

On September 14, the Ministry of Agriculture announced to conduct fresh milk quality safety inspections in fifty targeted counties of Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Beijing and other major dairy-producing regions. The localities would also carry out such inspections. The public security authorities inquired, investigated and collected evidence from the criminal suspects in an effort to solve the case as soon as possible. On the basis of solid evidence, those involved were transferred to the procuratorial authorities. The fact that the State Council immediately set up a taskforce and initiated the Level-I emergency plan for major food safety incidents reflects that the government attached high attention to the incident and was determined and took measures to deal with it. It should be noted that the intervention of state authority heightened the attention of the general public, making them believe that the incident was far more serious than they previously thought. When the signal of “instructions” from the top leaders published by the media became a focus of conversations among the public, the risk property of the melamine-tainted milk powder incident was exacerbated. (3) Large companies’ response Companies are production organizations of society and conduct close material and information exchanges with others. In particular, the products of large food producers have a bearing on public health, and the reliability of their production technology and the quality of their products draw high attention from all sectors of society, especially the media and the quality supervision and inspection authorities. Once companies are involved in public safety incidents, whether they try to cover up the problems and shirk responsibility, or clarify fallacies and rebuild their brand, they will inevitably attract wider public attention and media coverage, which will take risk-related information to a new level and speed up the public’s perception of risks. [Fuyang inferior milk powder incident] Due to some mistake of the Disease Prevention and Control Center of Fuyang, Sanlu infant milk powder was considered “substandard” after tests. This test result appeared in Yingzhou Evening News on April 22, 2004 and was reposted by other domestic media. As a result, Sanlu milk powder was removed off shelves and sealed up around the country. From April 22 to 26, the sales of Sanlu plunged 80%, causing a loss of RMB20 million. On the day when the test result was announced, the senior executives of Sanlu Group immediately got in contact with relevant departments of the local government. Then the investigation taskforce of the State Council held a press conference to clear up the situation. Later, Sanlu Group, together with a dozen well-known dairy producers in China, released the dairy industry integrity declaration in a number of cities, pledging that they would never produce and sale substandard dairy products. [Melamine-tainted milk powder incident] On September 9, 2008, Lanzhou Morning Post reported that fourteen infants in Gansu suffering from kidney stones were fed the same brand of infant formula. The report was quickly reposted by other news media, including websites. On September 11, an article by Jian Guangzhou of Dongfang Daily revealed that the fourteen infants were all fed milk powder produced by Sanlu Group, which came under national spotlight again in negative news.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

81

At 10:00 a.m. on the same day, Sanlu Group declared via people.com.cn that as a well-known milk powder brand, it produced qualified products in strict accordance with national standards, and there was no evidence linking the kidney diseases of those infants with its products. At 20:50, the Ministry of Health announced that after investigations, it was strongly suspected that the infant formulas produced by Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group Co., Ltd. were contaminated by melamine, which can lead to stones in the urinary system. At 21:30, Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group Co., Ltd. announced a recall, saying that after self-inspections, it found that about seven hundred tons of infant milk powder that went to market before August 6, 2008 was tainted by melamine, and to be responsible to consumers, it decided to recall all these batches. On September 13, Gao Qiang, Party chief of the Ministry of Health, pointed out at the press conference that the “Sanlu infant formula incident” was a severe food safety incident. On September 17, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine conducted emergency inspections on the use of melamine in infant formulas around the country, and later released the interim inspection results showing that sixty-nine batches of products produced by twenty-two enterprises, including large dairy enterprises like Mengniu, Yili and Shengyuan, contained varying amounts of melamine. It is neither a coincidence nor a plot that Sanlu, a well-known dairy producer, was the leading role of both food safety incidents. It is the company itself that was the main factor in the incidents. In particular, companies as large as Sanlu inherently have spotlight effects, and consequently, any relevant information can be focused on by the media and perceived by the media at a higher speed. Public tip-offs and media reports soon made dairy quality a risk topic in society, and all brands related to substandard products came under fire from the public. Then people turned their concern about food safety into actions to request refunds and compensations and boycott home-made dairy products.

3.3.1.2

“Market-Based Amplifiers”

Nowadays, many kinds of foods are mass-produced, especially milk powder which requires relatively high technology. Market plays an indispensable role throughout the process from the production of raw materials to sales of products. Therefore, the “risk amplifiers” of these products basically coincide with the organizations along relevant industry chains ranging from the production, processing and transportation of raw materials to the production, transportation and sales of products. In other words, the reason why food safety risks can spread quickly and widely is the high degree of integration of trade, industry and agriculture. In the melamine-tainted milk powder incident that caused huge harm and severe social impacts, the “market-based amplifiers” mainly include the following organizations.

82

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

(1) Melamine producers In the 2008 milk powder scandal, the chemical product blamed for contamination is called melamine, also known as “protein powder”. In China, most melamine is directly sold to factories manufacturing acrylic molds, decorative sheets and the like, or to qualified distributors. Melamine residues are sold to distributors and mainly used by the feedstuff industry. (2) Chemical product traders After high-temperature disinfection and processing, these traders turn melamine residues into “protein powder”. Melamine residues, which contain 20–30% protein content, are sold at RMB350–RMB700 per ton; in contrast, “protein powder” contains as much as 60% protein, and can be sold at RMB3,600–RMB3,800 per ton. (3) Protein feed suppliers After buying “protein powder” from chemical product traders, protein feed suppliers turn the powder into protein feeds after simple packing. Generally, these suppliers set up plants in rural areas or small towns and locate their offices in cities, and recruit marketing personnel to sell products. (4) Feed producers Protein feed suppliers sell protein feeds to feed producers, which must keep protein content in feeds within a set range. The higher the content of crude protein, the more expensive the feeds. Therefore, in pursuit of higher profits, some feed producers add the less expensive “protein powder” to reduce costs. (5) Numerous dairy farmers and milk collection depots A large amount of raw milk used by dairy companies is purchased from dairy farmers or in the mode of “companies + farmers”. Dairy farmers feed cows with feeds that contain “protein powder”, and provide fresh milk to milk collection depots, which then supply the raw milk to dairy companies. (6) Dairy product companies In the 2008 melamine-laced milk powder scandal, twenty-two dairy product companies were exposed by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, including Sanlu Group of Hebei, Yashili and Gucheng of Shanxi, Yili and Mengniu of Inner Mongolia, Qingdao Shengyuan, Shanghai Panda Dairy, Jiangxi Bright Dairy, Baoji Huimin, Torador, and Nanshan Dairy of Hunan. Some of them were well-known large companies in China. (7) Dairy product wholesalers and retailers Wholesalers sell products and services to other resellers, retail enterprises and manufacturing enterprises rather than end users. Retailers sell products and services directly to consumers. According to their scope of business, retailers can be divided into general stores, specialized stores, supermarkets, large department stores, and

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

83

superstores. Retailers directly serve final consumers, so they are scattered in different places depending on the population and market status. In the milk powder scandal, contaminated milk power entered numerous households through a vast network of retailers in urban and rural areas.

3.3.2 “Risk Amplification Mechanism” 3.3.2.1

Exposure of Incidents and Risk Attributes

(1) Exposure of risks With inadequate regulation, some public health incidents come to the surface accidentally. It can be found after careful analysis that these contingencies are exactly the key inducers of risks and the spread of their consequences. [Fuyang inferior milk powder incident] On April 16, 2004, a report titled “The Calamity of Inferior Milk Powder in Fuyang” by Shanghai-based Dongfang Daily claimed that the “big-headed” infants died of long-term consumption of substandard infant formula. The report was reposted by major web portal Sina and then by other media organizations, and attracted attention from leaders of the central government. At this time, the milk powder scandal came into public view. [Melamine-tainted milk powder incident] Before the report about the infants with kidney stones on September 11, 2008, the contamination of Sanlu milk powder was a secret. Although similar cases appeared successively in Gansu and other regions after the first infant with kidney stones was diagnosed in Nanjing in March 2008 and complaints about problematic milk powder were posted on the website of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the incident didn’t draw sufficient attention from relevant departments and individuals. It didn’t get wide media coverage until early September 2008 when Lanzhou Morning Post published the conversation with Zhang Wei, director of the urinary surgery department of the PLA No. 1 Hospital, and revealed the cases of the affected infants. The report was soon reposted by major news websites. On September 11, a report by Dongfang Daily pointed to Sanlu, and the truth of the milk powder scandal was finally exposed. On September 12, the police of Shijiazhuang summoned seventy-eight suspects, and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine launched a national investigation. (2) Basic characteristics of food safety incidents a. Threat to health and life There are strict requirements on food safety. Food may not contain any substances or unsafe factors that may harm or threaten people’s health, lead to acute or chronic poisoning or infectious diseases, or pose any hazards to the health of individuals and their offspring. Such stringent safety requirements stem from the special relationship between food and health. Food is essential to the metabolism in the human body. If

84

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

there are toxic and harmful substances in food, it will damage the normal function of the human body and even endanger the life. After all, nothing can cause greater anxiety than the threat to people’s life. From May 2003 to April 2004, thirteen children died of malnutrition symptoms due to inferior milk powder in Fuyang alone, with a mortality rate of 7.6%. The melamine-tainted milk powder incident was even more severe. From September 12 to 8:00, September 17, 2008, a total of 6,244 clinical cases were reported around the country, and 1,327 children remained in hospital for further observation and treatment. Among the clinical cases, eighteen suffered from acute respiratory failures, leading to three deaths. b. Direct victims of incidents Unqualified food can directly affect the human body, and infants are more vulnerable to the hazards due to their relatively low immunity. “Big-headed dolls” and “kidney stone babies”, the victims of the milk powder scandals, were mostly infants under one. Their symptoms included overly large heads, disproportionate bodies, growth retardation, and different degrees of kidney dysfunction and stones in the urinary system. Heart-wrenching pictures of these infants released by the media and the suffering of these innocent victims provoked public compassion for the young lives and indignation at the outrageous lawbreakers. c. Sensitivity of incidents concerning people’s livelihood Issues about people’s livelihood, especially rural issues, have for years been the focus of attention of the government and the public. The CPC Central Committee has stressed time and again that no organization or individual is allowed to harm the interests of farmers and has taken various measures to promote rural development. In China, “people’s livelihood” and “rural issues” are not just economic issues, but more importantly, they concern political stability. For any incidents that have baneful influence and seriously harm the vital interests of the people, all sectors of society, especially the central government, are bound to step in. At a time when the underprivileged rural areas needed more support from urban areas, the damage of inferior and toxic milk powder to the health of infants in urban and rural areas undoubtedly increased the sensitivity of the incidents. d. Wide influence The development of the food industry depends on the improvement of modern business and circulation systems. Although the highly complicated social division of labor can drive social progress and improve people’s quality of life, the omnipresent modern marketing system also facilitates the spread of counterfeit and inferior products. Once loopholes appear in the complex industry chain, risks will penetrate into numerous households through the modern systems of trade, industry and agriculture, posing a threat to everyone’s life and health. It is the highly integrated but extremely vulnerable production and marketing chains of the food industry that have expanded the influence of risks.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

3.3.2.2

85

Behavior Choices in Risk Amplification

Social amplification and attenuation of risk are pronounced in food safety incidents. Social amplification of risk will lead to additional institutional responses and protective actions, while in the case of social attenuation of risk, governments, organizations and individuals will reduce protective actions. Whether the organizations or individuals act to amplify or attenuate risk signals depends on their perception of the incidents and their interest considerations. Extra demands will give rise to “excessive action”, which, like “behavioral dislocation” associated with risk attenuation, will result in many unexpected social consequences. (1) Overreporting by the media Overreporting is mainly reflected in the stigmatization of domestic milk powder. Once any individuals, organizations or incidents are labeled “alien”, “unpopular” or “dangerous” and such labels are constantly reinforced by the media, they will be repulsed by more people. This process is called stigmatization. The media can play different roles, such as objectively covering, beautifying or stigmatizing what they report, depending on the perspective chosen by the media and the expression of interests. When it comes to food safety incidents, the media often overreport, which practically leads to stigmatization of the incidents and people or organizations concerned. Stigmatization of milk powder. Milk powder was the “protagonist” of the Fuyang milk powder scandal. The specific process of its stigmatization can be seen from the modifiers of milk powder used by the media. Initially, Xinhua News Agency reported that the infants had fallen victim to “non-nutritive milk powder”, to which Dongfang Daily and Xinmin Weekly referred as “shell milk powder” and “fake milk powder”. With the articles being reposted and quoted by other media, there were more terms blaming the inferior quality of milk powder, such as “poisonous milk powder”, “black-heart milk powder”, or “killing milk powder”. Later, law enforcement authorities around the country found more unqualified milk powder, and because some contained excessive ingredients that may turn into carcinogens, some media called it “carcinogenic milk powder”. From “non-nutritive milk powder” to “carcinogenic milk powder”, the media had heightened the hazards of inferior milk powder to an appalling level. Runaway numbers. With the continuous stigmatization of milk powder, the numbers about unqualified domestic milk powder reported by the media also mounted. On April 20, 2004, the provincial government of Anhui published a list of forty-five types of inferior milk powder found in Fuyang. On April 23, a Beijing media reported that fifty-five types of inferior milk powder were involved, and some media even claimed that there were hundreds. The number of brands and amount of inferior milk powder were horrifying in media reports, which professed that the amount of unqualified milk powder found in Guangdong, Henan, Hebei, Sichuan and elsewhere reached tens of thousands each. In fact, in early May 2004, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine published a list of thirty enterprises whose products had been qualified as shown in spot checks, and made up 80% of

86

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

the total milk powder output in China, indicating that the quality of milk powder produced by domestic formal enterprises was stable. Such authoritative information from state authorities, however, carried little weight in comparison with the “craze to expose scandals” set off by the media. The principle of “objectivity and truthfulness” that news reports should follow was shattered by the stigmatization of domestic milk powder by some media. Risk signals were amplified over and over again in media reports, and a large amount of information, accurate or not, was received and reorganized by the general public. Media exaggeration of risks may conceal rational and critical voices, and generate some kind of interest-oriented dominant discourse that can turn the public into a passive audience and risk communication into superficial risk perception, resulting in the spread of social panic and distrust. (2) Risk attenuation behavior of local governments After the exposure of incidents, local governments usually will take steps to deal with the imminent crisis. Their approaches may be proactive and targeted, or passive and circuitous. Subjectively, local governments try to minimize the negative effects of the incidents, and often take various measures to attenuate risk signals. In the above-mentioned two milk powder incidents, the attitudes and behaviors of local governments were mostly positive; they timely released relevant information and conducted risk communication with the news media and the public. Still, under pressure of public opinion and in face of the unquestionable “accountability” mechanism of state authorities, a few local government departments and their responsible persons somewhat got into a muddle. “False dismissal” farce. In the Fuyang milk powder scandal, dozens of officials were held accountable. A county-level bureau of industry and commerce in Fuyang announced the decision to dismiss two employees on the ground of neglect of duty. Later, however, it was founded that the decision was never implemented. This “false dismissal” incident implies that in fact of sudden risks, some local governments got panic-stricken, and attempted to alleviate the pressure of accountability by resorting to the traditional strategy of “giving up a pawn to save a castle”. Unfortunately, such actions can only aggravate risk dissemination, because what a responsible person said or did will inevitably touch the “nerve” of the “sensitive” public at that time, triggering multi-level spread of risk signals. Embarrassing “free treatment”. The investigation team of the State Council suggested the municipal government of Fuyang take measures to improve the health status of infants with mild and moderate malnutrition in an all-round way. The municipal government of Fuyang also pledged to provide “free treatment”. Yet the promises made under intense pressure turned out to be unreliable, as reflected in the local government’s Guidelines on the Treatment of Infant Malnutrition Caused by Inferior Milk Powder. The Guidelines does not provide normal reference values for judging malnutrition or specify how laboratory test data support the diagnosis malnutrition. The vague assessment standards made it difficult to identify the responsibility, and the consequent buck-passing led to a delay in treatment for some young patients who were in fact entitled to free treatment.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

87

Cover-up and prevarication. In the melamine-tainted milk powder incident, the attempts to cover up before the incident was exposed, together with the prevarication and downplaying after the incident occurred, constituted the typical “risk attenuation” behaviors of local government departments. The senior executives of Sanlu Group made two written reports to the municipal government of Shijiazhuang on August 2 and 29, 2008, respectively. After receiving the reports, the municipal government immediately sent a taskforce to Sanlu Group to deal with relevant issues. A month later, however, the government neither required Sanlu Group to recall the products and stop production, nor reported the major food safety incident to higher authorities as required. Consumer complaints began to surge in March 2008, nearly half a year had passed before the government initiated the Level-I emergency plan for major food safety incidents on September 13, missing the best time to deal with the crisis. Inappropriate actions of local governments. Local governments may take inapt approaches to dealing with the incidents because of the lack of experiences or in consideration of medical costs and social costs. Whatever the reason, the local governments’ “circuitous” action strategy is intended to attenuate the risk signals and prevent the incidents from escalating, but truth cannot be concealed forever, and the attempts to cover up can backfire, resulting in greater adverse effects on a larger scale.

3.3.3 “Ripple Effects” of Food Safety Incidents The “ripple effects” of food safety incidents like the milk power scandals are first reflected in the decline of public trust in the enterprises involved. For example, the inferior milk powder incidents dented the consumers’ long-time trust in famous domestic brands. Second, food safety incidents can have influence on the local economy, resulting in a decrease in the enterprises’ assets and recession of the industry. Third, food safety incidents can also bring political and social pressure and prompt the public to make more political demands. In addition, food safety incidents can reduce the public’s trust in the quality inspection and supervision capacity of the enterprises and authorities, and may affect other industries, departments and regions with similar problems.

3.3.3.1

Judicial and Administrative Effects

From the time the “big-headed babies” were first reported to August 2005, four dens that produced and sold fake milk powder in Fuyang were uncovered, and fortytwo suspects were put in detention. Among them, twenty-four people were arrested with the approval of the procuratorate, and five defendants were later sentenced to four to eight years. According to the regulations on the CPC disciplinary actions and the Provisional Regulations on Public Servants, as well we the suggestions of the Ministry of Supervision, the provincial government of Anhui imposed severe

88

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

administrative and disciplinary punishments on the mayor of Fuyang and chiefs of industry of commerce, health and other municipal departments. The melamine-tainted milk powder incident in 2008 had even more significant judicial and administrative effects, and extremely severe punishments were inflicted on Sanlu Group. The principal responsible persons were sentenced to imprisonment for life, given death sentence with reprieve, or even put to death; twenty-four persons of the provincial and municipal Party committees and governments were subjected to severe penalties.

3.3.3.2

Economic Losses and Influences on Industries and Regions

After the Fuyang milk powder scandal was exposed, the industry and commerce administrations of twenty-six provincial regions successively smashed a handful of dens that produced and sold fake milk powder, and sealed up batches of substandard milk powder. The sales of domestic milk powder plunged. In May and June 2004, the sales of domestic milk powder dropped 25% compared to the same period in the previous year. According to the Dairy Association of China, the incident had “disastrous consequences” for the emerging dairy industry of the country, in that it not only came as a terrible blow for domestic dairy companies, but also undermined the consumers’ trust in domestic milk powder. In contrast, the sales of imported milk powder surged about 20% in the two months after the incident was exposed. The melamine-tainted milk powder incident in 2008 had even far more extensive and profound influences than general food safety incidents. In September 2008, Sanlu Group was ordered to stop production and sales. On December 18, 2008, the Shijiazhuang Intermediate People’s Court decided to accept the application of the creditor Heping Road Branch of Shijiazhuang Commercial Bank for bankruptcy liquidation of Sanlu Group. By December 31, 2008, Sanlu Group, which was unable to pay its debts, was declared bankrupt according to law. The effects of the incident did not stop after the bankruptcy of Sanlu Group, but spread to other areas. (1) The dairy industry suffered huge losses. With the reorganization of Sanlu Group shortly after its insolvency, the brand, which was worth up to tens of billions yuan, disappeared overnight. The whole domestic dairy industry suffered a terrible blow. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine revoked the “famous milk brand” certification mark of Mengniu, Yili, and Bright. The domestic dairy industry saw a substantial decline in business performance. The market value of major dairy companies shrunk dramatically by more than RMB21 billion in total as share prices plummeted. (2) Agriculture, animal husbandry and other food industries were seriously affected. For example, the egg industry saw a sharp reduction in egg prices. The daily wholesale volume of Guangzhou Chatou Egg Market, the country’s largest egg wholesale market, dropped from 1,500 to 500 tons, down two-thirds.

3.3 Case Descriptions and Analyses

89

(3) The entire food industry chain slumped. Under the impact of the melaminetainted milk powder incident, many food enterprises were shut down. For example, the sales of cellulose ether, an important additive in the food industry, plummeted, and the prices dropped by 30–50%.

3.3.3.3

Contribution to the Risk Governance Mechanism

On February 28, 2009, the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress adopted the Food Safety Law, which came into effect on June 1. Food safety accidents have prompted the country to improve the institutional setup and the risk assessment system, which is mainly reflected in the following aspects. (1) The State Council set up the Food Safety Committee, a high-level body responsible for coordinating and guiding food safety supervision. (2) The responsibilities of departments relevant to food safety supervision of the State Council were clarified. The quality supervision, industry and commerce, and food and drug authorities shall supervise and administrate food production, food circulation and catering services in accordance with the Food Safety Law and the responsibilities prescribed by the State Council. The health authorities are responsible for coordinating work on food safety, including assessing food safety risks, setting food safety standards, releasing relevant information, certifying food testing and inspection agencies, drawing up inspection regulations, and organizing investigations into major food safety incidents. In the case that agriculture, quality supervision, industry and commerce, and food and drug authorities discover any food safety incident or receive relevant tips, they should notify the health authorities immediately. (3) Food safety risk monitoring and evaluation has been strengthened. A complete food safety risk monitoring system, including the formulation, release, implementation and adjustment of food safety risk monitoring plans, has been put in place, to better monitor foodborne diseases, food contamination and harmful factors in food. A sound food safety risk assessment system covering the launch, specific operations, and use of results of food safety risk assessment has been developed. When food safety hazards are found through food safety risk monitoring or tip-offs, risk assessments on biological, chemical and physical hazards in food and food additives will be conducted. (4) Supervision over food additives has been tightened. The health authorities shall, in accordance with the results of food safety risk assessment, timely adjust the varieties, scope of use and dosage standards of food additives, and ensure that no other chemicals than food additives or any substances harmful to human health are used in food production. (5) Food inspection has been strengthened. It is made clear that food safety supervision and administration departments may not exempt institution from food inspection.

90

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

(6) The food recall system has been improved. When a food producer discovers that their food products are below food safety standards, they shall immediately stop production, recall the products on the market, notify relevant traders and consumers, and put the recall and notification on record. If a food producer or trader fails to recall products or stop production in accordance with the relevant regulations, quality supervision or industry and commerce authorities above the county level can order them to do so. (7) Management of food advertisements has been tightened. Food advertisements shall be true and legal and shall not claim or imply in any form that the food can prevent or treat diseases. Food safety supervision and administration departments or food inspection agencies, food industry associations, and consumer associations shall not recommend any kind of food to consumers by advertising or other means. If the legitimate rights and interests of consumers are harmed because of the food recommended by organizations or individuals in false advertising, the said organizations or individuals shall be jointly and severally liable with the food producers and traders. (8) Management of small food production or processing workshops and food vendors has been strengthened. Local governments at or above the county level should encourage and support small food workshops to improve their production conditions, and food vendors to operate in fixed places such as markets and stores. To engage in food production or trade, a small food production or processing workshop or a food vendor shall meet the food safety requirements of the Food Safety Law suitable for its production or trade scale and conditions, and ensure that the food which it produces or deals in is hygienic, nontoxic, and innocuous. The food and drug authority shall strengthen supervision and administration over them.

3.4 Main Conclusions 3.4.1 Main Factors Influencing Public Perception of Health Risks The judgement, assessment and attitudes of people based on uncertainty in a particular context are risk perception. In everyday life, people receive and process all kinds of information, including information concerning the potential consequences of future activities and events. Based on the received information, individuals or organizations will form their own opinions and attitudes towards the sources and consequences of risks, and act accordingly. According to this logic, what an emergency brings is the information about health hazards. Once the threats posed by physical and social impacts to what people value, such as health, life and property, cannot be controlled effectively, people’s fear will become so intense that it will result in a series of chain reactions. In this sense, risk perception is not so much

3.4 Main Conclusions

91

a product of personal experiences as a product of social interactions. Our research shows that in emergencies with physical hazards, the public’s risk perception and the occurrence of social panic are directly related to the following attributes of risk.

3.4.1.1

Degree of Familiarity

The physical hazards of emergencies are mostly objectives and facilities people are familiar with. When people get to know that an everyday object contains substances that harms their health or even can cause cancer or the infrastructure they depend on becomes a hazard, the mixed feelings of familiarity and unfamiliarity will greatly raise their sense of panic. The influence of the degree of familiarity on risk perception can be illustrated in the following aspects. (1) Invisibility In general, people find it harder to accept invisible risks than visible risks because they tend to become accustomed to familiar, visible risks but overestimate unfamiliar, invisible risks. For example, the food additives or chemicals in food are quite unfamiliar to the general public, but they are added to food and water such as infant formula and tap water, which people are all familiar with. Once they are described as a threat to health, lack of knowledge of how they are produced, spread and how hazards are caused will significantly aggravate the public’s fear and anxiety about the risks. Most people would shudder to associate familiar, indispensable food and water with complex, toxic chemicals. (2) Degree of exposure When people feel or think they are at risk and they and their families are exposed to a dangerous environment or toxic substances, a natural response for most people is fear, which will intensify their assessment of other aspects of risks. Especially in the areas of food hygiene or workplace safety which are directly related to people’s lives, they will be even more vigilant against those chronic, potential health hazards. For example, when harmful substances (melamine) directly or indirectly appear in milk powder for infants and young children, the public would feel that their innocent children were exposed to risks, leading to fear that no one could be free from a toxic environment. (3) Difficulty in detection Because of their confidence in life experiences, people usually use their everyday life skills to detect certain dangerous situations and substances, and gauge the degree of danger through “emotional heuristics” to avoid danger. If risks themselves are obvious and conspicuous or the harms they cause are direct, people can discover some clues of the risk signals with daily knowledge and human sense organs, and then anxiety about risks will be greatly alleviated. As far as food is concerned, however, it is often difficult to distinguish the beneficial and harmful substances. For example, many harmful chemicals can be easily dissolved in drinking water and

92

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

cannot be detected by human sense organs. When people are unable to detect whether food additives are harmful by “looking” or “smelling”, that will inevitably result in anxiety and panic.

3.4.1.2

Controllability

Controllability is about what measures people can take to prevent themselves and their families from risks and to reduce losses. Whether people can control the results of interactions between their behavior and objects is a defining factor for their interests, health and safety. The influence of controllability on people’s panic and anxiety about risks can be explained in the following three aspects. (1) Availability People tend to think that things easier to produce and obtain are more liable to be misused. Based on this logic, the general public believe that goods easy to produce and widely used are mostly cheap and involve safety hazards. The development of the chemical industry makes it easier to produce food ingredients, which therefore become more prone to misuse. Chemicals such as melamine and benzene are easy to produce and have evident chemical effects, so the controllability of risk is greatly reduced. (2) Complexity of risk systems Isolated risk events are considered to be controllable and less harmful. For this reason, people’s risk perception of them is relatively moderate. In contrast, systematic risks involving complicated chains of production, processing, transportation, storage, sale and use are generally thought to be more difficult to control. It is found that there is a positive relationship between the length of chains of risk systems and the urgency of risk perception. (3) Specialization of risk control Because of the complexity of modern society, it is necessary to establish specialized agencies for risk control, draw up detailed risk control regulations, and implement strict measures to protect people’s safety and enhance public trust. The more specialized risk warning and control, the more likely it is to alleviate people’s fear. On the contrary, if the agencies, regulations and measures for risk control in a more complicated society are not in place or believed by the public to be flawed, that may result in the spread of perceived risk. Chemicals like melamine and benzene are not supposed to appear in food and drinking water, let alone be used as food additives. But such things have been happening. As a result, the public become more concerned about food safety and is inclined to think that the authorities conduct inadequate supervision over the food and health industry or even are negligent in doing so. The fact that relevant departments frequently issue notices on strengthening supervision is tantamount to telling the public that specialized efforts to control such problems are not sufficient, thus leading to the spread of panic about food safety.

3.4 Main Conclusions

3.4.1.3

93

Disaster Tendencies

Toxic, carcinogenic, and rapidly diffusible substances that are hard to prevent and can stay for a long time will undoubtedly exacerbate people’s fear and sense of impending disaster. (1) Lethality Foreign research shows that people tend to overestimate the risks of incidents with low probability but high mortality, and incidents that are instantaneous and destructive.2 Fatal incidents, substances or environments are most likely to cause risk perception and panic behavior. For an ordinary person, nothing is more precious than their life, and nothing is more frightening and agitating than a threat to health. The high pathogenicity and high mortality of risk events are the most significant signals for people in risk interpretation. Many misused additives are prohibited substances, which are medically categorized as Group-II carcinogens and can endanger human health. To the eye of most people, cancer means death, and perception of cancer risk will overpower rational analysis and response. (2) Wide distribution The spatial distribution of risk events also has influence on risk perception. In general, the spatial distribution of environmental pollution, ecological pollutant discharge and the like show particular characteristics due to the restrictions of natural conditions. Such health-threatening substances are transmitted through wind, air and natural water sources, and become less harmful as they spread farther. In contrast, the substances that gradually affect human health through metabolism of the human body are not apt to change with the natural environment. Moreover, manufactured food is stored and sold via a wide range of channels. Problematic food can enter various supermarkets, stores and markets in urban and rural areas through the modern logistics system, and then be bought by numerous households. Thus, people feel that these harmful substances can penetrate through so extensive channels that it is unlikely to keep away from them. (3) Time lags The time lag of risk perception is related to its spatial extensiveness. If a risk event affects a large area in multiple ways and has long-lasting impacts that can hardly be eliminated in the short term or even be harmful to future generations, then it is more likely to cause public anxiety and fear. Modern medical research suggests that with the change in the living environment, especially the exposure to a harsh environment or long-term exposure to dangerous substances, the internal physiological environment of the human body will also change, and such accumulated change will lead to genetic disorders and eventually an irreversible genetic disaster, even posing a threat to the health of their offspring. Such risks will gradually emerge by means of 2 Paul Slovic

& Ellen Peters. The Importance of Worldviews in Risk Perception. Risk Decision and Policy, 1998, 3 (2), pp. 165–170.

94

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

metabolism that features subtle and insignificant physiological changes. This is the case for substandard, unsafe food and harmful substances discharged by enterprises, which are believed to alter the body’s cellular structure and metabolic processes and gradually cause diseases. As people have extreme fear about such intangible but pernicious substances, the exposure of their insidious, gradual effects and the possibility of causing long-term consequences and hereditary diseases will significantly elevate the perceived level of risk.

3.4.1.4

Knowledge

Due to the lack of professional knowledge and discernment, people tend to follow like sheep and panic in face of risk warnings. (1) Expert knowledge Since the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, the worship of science and technology has become an irresistible global trend. The discourse power of scientism has spurred public trust in all kinds of expert knowledge. Expert knowledge, a representative of science, is regarded as a safety valve for warning against and preventing risks. The inertial thinking of “science and technology can solve all problems” has led the public to blindly believe in the ability of experts. If the experts claim that an particular risk can be avoided and solved, then it generally won’t cause social panic, and the perceived level of risk is relatively low to most people; on the contrary, if the experts say that “the causes are unknown” or “the crux of the problems has not been found”, the incident is often perceived by the people as potentially risky, and the perceived level of risk will be higher. In face of the opinions of different experts, the public feels that things are not so simple and the risks are far beyond what they can control, so they had better be cautious. This will unavoidably lead to panic. (2) Personal knowledge If the public has a comprehensive knowledge of a particular risk event and can objectively perceive the outcomes of the event, receive information from multiple rather than single aspects, and rationally view and assess the impacts of the event on themselves and the society, they can make appropriate behavioral responses, or even engage in some public interest activities to eliminate or reduce the impacts on the whole society. In practice, however, the public is convinced that they do not have the specialized knowledge and analytical ability of technical experts. Therefore, when a risk event occurs, few people can respond based on rational analysis and careful judgment, whereas most people simply “go with the tide” and “spread false information”. This will profoundly affect people’s psychological and behavioral responses in risk situations.

3.4 Main Conclusions

95

3.4.2 Stigmatization in Food Safety Risks Among the consequences of a risk or crisis is more or less stigmatization, a phenomenon in which relevant objects, people, systems, environments and even institutional culture are labeled “harmful”, warning others to keep away. At the same time, stigmatized objects can arouse repulsion and rejection, which, if escalating, may cause social panic and even trigger a public crisis. After the melamine-tainted milk powder incident was exposed, the dairy boycott as a result of a few types of “problematic milk powder” swept through the food industry, and creditability of all dairy-related products, production and marketing enterprises, and regulatory arrangements were widely questioned. Consequently, the dairy enterprise responsible, which had performed well for decades and was worth over RMB10 billion, collapsed overnight; the “toxic milk powder” led to property depreciation and compensation litigation, and other enterprises were also disparaged and boycotted. It can be seen that the consequences of stigmatization go far beyond the direct damage to people’s health or living environment, and exceed the technical capacity of the previous management mechanism, posing a greater challenge to those responsible for risk and crisis management.

3.4.2.1

The Nature and Characteristics of Stigmatization

(1) The nature of stigmatization Stigmatization is a process in which the society attaches a derogatory or abusive label to certain individuals or groups, thereby subjecting them to social injustice and other consequences. Due to the concerns of modern society about growing risks, the objects being stigmatized have extended from groups or individuals to anything considered dangerous, including technologies, organizations, and even institutional settings. Stigmatization in incidents can be understood in the following three aspects. First, stigmatization can dent the image. Stigmatization is not just about causing casualties and property losses, but can damage the image of things, people or systems by tagging them as “alien” or “dangerous”, which can lead to unimaginable cultural, economic and political consequences. Second, stigmatization derives from the failure to ensure people’s right to know. Stigmatization occurs only when information about key people or things is blocked and the truth is “distorted” to such an extent that their reputations are disparaged by the public, bringing irrepressible fears. When people’s demands for explanations of some ambiguous facts are not satisfied, the objects, people or systems that cause such ambiguities will become the focus of the public, and will be redefined and reinterpreted, and given a negative tag. Anxiety, fear, and ultimate disappointment will pervade the society, and the extreme tension will erode the foundation of rational judgment, prompting people to find a “scapegoat” to alleviate fear.

96

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

Third, stigmatization reflects social concern. Stigmatization in fact reflects the widespread concern about some risks in society, and is often used by people to justify such concern. When the same or similar incidents happens repeatedly over a certain period of time, and the risk management measures fall short of expectations, the public will feel that the safety of themselves and their families is always under threat, and thus become more vigilant of possible risks. An approach to dealing with hazards is to take a “cautious” attitude towards any negative status perceived by the individuals themselves or society. Any traces relevant to the hazards are likely to touch the sensitive nerve of people. Naturally, they will justify their concern by “attaching and spreading the stigma”. (2) Characteristics of stigmatization The first is destructiveness. Stigmatization will distort people’s normal risk perception structure, and cause devastating damage to the image of objects, people or systems concerned. In severe cases, the general criteria for justice and safety will be irrationally subverted as what most people care about is simply how abnormal the incidents and how shameful the consequences are. At this time, the public will spontaneously condemn the ability of those responsible for managing and dealing with risks, and even shake the basis of legitimacy of risk management, resulting in chaos in social, economic and political spheres. The second is rapid contamination. The objects being stigmatized are endowed with unpleasant features that set them apart from other objects. In extreme cases, the objects will be considered a “synonym” for “terrible” and “dangerous”. The characteristic of rapid contamination gives them a widespread and shameful influence, and their stigma, based on particular risk perception, can spread quickly before many dangerous outcomes are testified. Moreover, with modern communication networks, the tag of “dangerous” will quickly spread to the same or similar things or people, and will even affect the entire industry, sector and region. Third, it is not easy to eradicate stigma. Stigma can be easily distinguished, and this can eventually evolve into cultural prejudice that can barely be eliminated over a short period of time. In other words, stigma formed in society is liable to turn into structuralized “cultural fixedness”; if giving attention to stigmatized objects becomes part of everyday life, then no area of life can escape its influence. Eventually, it would be quite difficult for relevant systems, even if they mobilize a mass of social, economic and political resources, to remove stigma.

3.4.2.2

The Formation Mechanism of Stigmatization

(1) Process of stigmatization In the process of stigmatization there are five interrelated components: labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination.3 With regard to the stigmatization of risk events, the co-occurrence of these components is also subject to the 3 Bruce

G. Link & Jo C. Phelan. Conceptualizing Stigma. Annual Review of Sociology, 2001 (27).

3.4 Main Conclusions

97

influence of social culture. The construction process generally includes the following four steps. First, risk exposure and a “heuristic” approach to risk perception. When a disaster occurs, individuals or groups sensitive to risks will “mark” the objects they think will bring danger. After the exposure of the milk powder scandal, the source of the risk was attached a striking warning label, and the “toxic milk powder” and any factors associated with it drew public attention. A large number of risk signals were soon perceived by more people with media coverage. In everyday life, people have developed a “simplified mechanism” to deal with health risks. Once they receive certain risk-related information, their “common sense and intuition” begin to process information about health risks and help them to make inferences. This information processing process is called “intuitive heuristics”. A “heuristic” is quite effective in dealing with hazards spontaneously. It connects intuitive judgment with the probabilistic mechanism by which people handle risk-related information in social contexts: if the probability of losses is high, people tend to avoid risks, and if the probability of gains is high, people are inclined to take risks.4 When people are really in danger, the “heuristic” of risk perception can lead to some obvious errors that aggravate the stigmatization of certain objects: first, events that quickly come to mind are believed to be more likely to occur than those that are more difficult to remember, so information about unsafe food is more likely to cause panic; second, a risk’s probability of occurrence can vary with the importance of available information or perceived information. The more reports the media make on toxic food and the more access people have to these reports, the more likely most people think the health risks are to occur. Third, the unique events that individuals experience in particular circumstances will be magnified and spread as typical events. Finally, if some information constitutes a challenge to the existing risk judgement, such information will either be ignored or rejected. For example, no matter how the authorities publicized that traces of melamine in milk powder were unavoidable and harmless, the public still believed that such propaganda was unreliable and refused to buy domestic dairy products. Second, risk identification and interpretation. In the process of stigmatization, the seriousness and higher order impacts of an unfortunate event is determined, in part, by what that event signals or portends.5 As shown in Table 3.1, symbolic interpretation of certain risk-related information is more intended to illustrate the emergence of a new type of risk or a greater risk than previous ones. A variety of factors influence people’s interpretation, of which a critical one is the public’s familiarity with the risk situation, that is, risk identifiability. If an event that is harmful to health or even life-threatening is familiar to the public, such as a traffic accident and even smoking, then it will only attract very limited attention (probably just from the victims’ families). If the event is unfamiliar to the public, it will have much greater impacts. For example, the melamine-tainted 4 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 1979 (47), pp. 263–292. 5 Paul Slovic. Perception of Risk. Science, 1987 (236), pp. 280–285.

98

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

Table 3.1 Signal values in the milk powder scandal Incident (official or enterprises’ statement)

Signal value (symbolic interpretation by the public or media)

Use of melamine to make up for inadequate protein

A new food safety hazard, posing a greater threat

Officials were held accountable or resigned for reasons of conscience

The authorities were covering up risks, and not trustworthy

Expert debates over pathogenic factors

The experts had a reputation unwarranted by any real learning

The authorities claimed that only young children were most affected, and risks could be reduced by timely treatment or drinking more water

The authorities didn’t care about the affected children, and knew nothing about the long-term effects of chemicals on the human body

milk powder incident gave rise to much imagination of the complexity of the food industry. Unfamiliar terms such as protein content testing and melamine were considered difficult to understand and control. This, coupled with public technical debate over risk management and some ineffective propaganda, increased public confusion and mistrust about the risk assessment system. Social information identification and over-interpretation of a food safety incident can initiate a process in which the importance of that incident is examined. As long as the incident is considered a portent of something bad, those interpretations will produce a higher order social consequence—stigma. With the publication of “unsafe food” lists by groups or individuals closely concerned with society, the stigma becomes a risk label that can be used by other groups, and direct subsequent risk response behaviors. Third, separation and status loss. If stigmatized objects are separated as “dangers” by the cultural system, then these factors will be regarded as “alien”, and no longer be a due component of “our” society. Such cultural separation, in emergencies, can lead to evasion on a social and even global scale, such as eliminating risk factors, keeping away from hazards, isolating hazards, and withdrawing from unsafe organizations and regions. This is precisely how an incident involves in practice. The public’s aversion to one milk powder brand will spread to other brands, and the rejection of milk powder can evolve into doubts about all dairy products, refunding, compensation claims, and even judicial proceedings. This proves that the deepest fears and social actions arise when a good situation suddenly turns dangerous.6 In the milk powder scandal, worries and doubts about the safety of milk powder spurred fundamental changes in people’s attitudes towards the domestic dairy industry, and the bankruptcy and the decline of business performance of large companies represented a loss of credibility of the dairy industry as a whole. With the deepening of stigmatization, the stigma of milk powder gradually turned to protests against and demands for overhauls of institutional arrangements such as food quality supervision and 6 Robin

Gregory, James Flynn & Paul Slovic. Technological Stigma. American Scientist, 1995, 83 (3), 220.

3.4 Main Conclusions

99

quarantine. When the tension was at its peak, public opinion was directed at functional departments such as the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, Ministry of Health, and China Food and Drug Administration, as well as their deficient rules and regulations. People no longer trusted the national food safety supervision system, and got disappointed at the system. In the process of risk-related information being interpreted, people not only had an aversion to milk powder on the shelves of supermarkets, but also criticized and derogated milk powder producers, raw material suppliers (dairy farmers), intermediaries, logistics enterprises, and all other businesses related to the production, circulation and sale of milk powder. As a result, the objects being stigmatized would lose many opportunities and see a slump in their social positions. For example, well-known brands might lose their market value, enterprises might be at risk of delisting or even withdrawing from market competition permanently, public figures might lose their social reputation or even face imprisonment, and government bodies might lose the basis of legitimacy and authoritative position. All these reflect the serious consequences of intense stigmatization. Fourth, cultural fixedness and determination of order. Concentrated derogation and rejection of the stigmatized objects by individuals and groups will mitigate over time, but this does not mean that people forget the hazards; instead, they “archive” the labels of “alien” and “dangerous” in their cultural memory, so that they can make safer responses quickly in the same or similar situations. This stage is the ultimate result of stigmatization. In this sense, stigmatization is in fact a process of culturally positioning risk in order in society. When a stigmatized object is strictly defined as an “anomaly”, the profile that it does not belong to the existing system is established. With the process of stigmatization, new risks are named and identified, and enter the classified cultural archives at faster paces, thus reducing intellectual confusion. (2) Gradients of stigmatization Social harm caused by stigmatization is deepened with the risk experiences and risk assessment of the whole society. It has a gradient structure, which is closely related to the perceived level of risk in a particular environment. First, stigma of things. As risk events generally result from physical changes, what people are primarily concerned about are the things causing widespread anxiety. For example, the focuses of concern are tricky viruses or the hosts of viruses (animals and plants) in public health incidents, poisonous and harmful food, and floods and earthquakes in natural disasters. These physical hazards are the source of crises. Now that they bring risks and threats, it is only natural that people identify and mark them. Especially in the field of health, once food products are alleged to contain substances that pose a threat to human health, people will dispraise all aspects of the industry chain including processing, production, transportation, and sale, and avert them in behavior. Attaching stigma is the beginning of the entire whole process of stigmatization, and has a self-evident purpose, that is, to arouse special attention to the incidents from other groups. Second, stigma of people and systems. In risk society, materialized risks are always associated with human activities. Any individual or group directly related to

100

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

an event, such as vested interests (producers, local governments) and spokespersons that communicate with the public on behalf of the government, may find themselves stigmatized. The public generally believes that many of the risks in society come from industrial organizations possessing high and new technologies. Therefore, the public’s attitudes towards these practical or potential risk makers will become more negative as the image of their products gets worse; this is even true of technical experts that have the power to interpret risks. For experts who have a government background and lack independent research, their authority to interpret risks will be questioned by the public and the media, and their interpretations can even be attacked for being a pretext to help certain systems and organizations shirk responsibilities. Third, stigma of systems. Generally, people’s sense of security and trust are guaranteed by the institutional settings they are familiar with in everyday life. The political and expert systems on which people rely are the important sources of sense of security.7 When technical experts and government systems are widely doubted, these systems can barely steer clear. The stigma of systems is reflected in social chaos and large-scale social panic as a result of widespread doubts about whether the government’s risk decision-making process is just and effective, and the lack of confidence in whether the new institutional arrangements can bring security expectations. Some improper actions of the government, the main actor of risk aversion systems, will to varying degrees tarnish the image of systems, which will spark more public doubts and worries through risk amplification, eventually leading to the loss of public trust in social systems.

3.4.3 Health Anxiety and Risk Communication Barriers 3.4.3.1

Health Anxiety as a Way of Life

Frequent food safety incidents have caused great panic among the public, so “safety comes before regret” become a fundamental principle in daily life. The living environment of modern people is portraited as perilous, and even life itself becomes a problem. It seems that people are facing new risks every day, from toxic milk powder to counterfeit medicine. Once the concern about risk becomes part of everyday life, no area of life can escape it influence. The weakening of ability to take control of one’s life has increased the sense of insecurity. “Being at risk” is described as a way of life and is widely accepted by people. The weakening of control even proclaims the most basic human activity to be a risk. Such cultural settings undoubtedly heighten doubts about strange people and things, and fears about events that seemingly threaten people’s safety. In a culture where nothing is taken for granted, the inherent sense of insecurity will automatically turn into awareness of risk, and doubts about the problem-solving ability of society makes it more vulnerable. The 7 Anthony

Giddens. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen, trans.). Sanlian Press, 1998.

3.4 Main Conclusions

101

intertwining of these worries, anxieties, doubts and vulnerabilities gives people every reason to be cautious. The formation of risk culture as a cautious way of life is exactly a result of introspection and reflection on risk society.8 With the advent of global risk society, everyone living in risk society feels the realistic or potential threats. Previous experiences are not enough to justify current behavior, and the risk attributes of modern society have changed the operation logic of society at institutional and cultural levels. When risk becomes a buzzword and penetrates into daily life, it will turn into social consciousness and a cultural atmosphere characterized by insecurity about real life.

3.4.3.2

Risk Communication Barriers

The spread of panic in society will seriously weaken the countermeasures adopted by risk management departments and responsible organizations and in particular, make it difficult to achieve the goal of risk communication fast. As can be seen in the case studies, the obstacles to risk communication are mainly manifested in two aspects. The first is the discrepancies between risk-related debates. Once an emergency occurs, tricky issues such as the definition of risk, safety range, countermeasures, and responsibility for risk dissemination will become the focus of social debates. It is never easy for different actors (groups/systems) to reach an agreement on these controversial issues. If standardized approaches such as evidence authentication are used for validation, illustration and persuasion strategies, the uncertainty and urgency of the risk event itself often makes it difficult to deduce and make well-informed decisions. More often than not, there are other evidence or optional methods to validate evidence and evade risks, and choosing one strategy always means forsaking the others; as a result, the final consequences will vary wildly in risk assessment. It may take much longer than ordinary people can wait to reject a strategic option or even falsify a risk claim, and the damage spread of physical hazards and public demands for social security will not allow for long discussions. Risk communication agencies often complain that laypeople cannot deal with risks rationally and the media just “spread hearsay”, unable to accurately perceive and judge the risks. In contrast, the general public and the media are often skeptical about the effectiveness of the risk management process of the government and expert systems, arguing that government officials, large enterprises and experts do not always have a thorough understanding of the safety issues people are concerned about and are reluctant to address them heads on. These two tit-for-tat viewpoints indicate that each side’s perception and understanding of risk is complex, confusing, sporadic or even incomplete, which often leads to intensified conflicts between the two sides and a sense of distrust in risk communication. Therefore, how to reconcile the perceptual differences among technical bureaucrats, expert systems and the general public is a primary obstacle to overcome for the purpose of smooth risk communication. 8 Scott

Lash. Risk Culture (Wang Wulong, trans.). Marxism & Reality, 2002 (4).

102

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

The second is the communication predicament caused by the complexity of risk systems. The term “risk” implies the probability of some hazards in reality, of which harmful and undesirable consequences may occur as a result of natural or human activities. The definition of probability denotes complexity and uncertain causality. Such causality will neither become immediately apparent nor be grasped arbitrarily and in most cases, is difficult to explain and estimate. Risk systems, like other complex systems in the world, are inherently unpredictable, which makes it less likely to make accurate predictions. The fast changes of risk systems go far beyond what mankind can manage. More worryingly, after risk and its consequences exert an impact on society, it will also be subject to the influence of social and cultural structure. These human activities increase the uncertainty of risk, and human interventions are more complicated than physical changes. The ineffectiveness of institutionalized governance measures often brings many consequences that exceed what can be expected in risk management and decision-making. At this time, people will often hear different views from the government, the media and technical experts: one view is that in face of risks and crises, any explanation is in fact a sign of shirking responsibility, and the government and enterprises must take their due responsibility for disasters; the other view maintains that risk, in some cases, is a “by-product” in the course of human civilization, and an inevitable outcome of social progress, and it is no surprise that some risks are even acceptable. To play a role, the public tend to respond conservatively and ease their sense of insecurity by amplifying risk-related information, thinking that security is much better than regret, and believing what they want to believe. In addition, risk can spark extensive debates at all levels (between people, on the Internet, on television, etc.). When no agreement can be reached quickly in the debates and the spread of risk cannot be curbed, the public will feel frustrated and indignant due to the lack of sense of security. Such indignation can turn any risk issue into a public opinion and moral issue. People may question the motivation of risk communication of the government, enterprises and even the media, lose patience to continue to cooperate with risk management organizations, no longer have trust in them, and condemn the behaviors of risk makers. This will result in more serious social risk consequences, and even affect the legitimation of the regime. Because of such changes, risk communication actions usually lag behind the complicated and variable risk experiences of people, and those responsible for risk management find it difficult to control the pace of risk governance and risk communication, resulting in misunderstanding among the public.

3.4.3.3

Factors Influencing Effective Communication

The first is the public’s misunderstanding and limitations of understanding. It is extremely risky in itself to persuade and educate the public to understand risks and judge risks rationally, and even to use their discretion and respond to risks properly. The risk perception of ordinary people is often inaccurate. Generally, when perceiving and judging current events, the public mainly relies on information that is easy

3.4 Main Conclusions

103

to extract from memory. In this process, they are liable to be disturbed by some recent information. For example, the frequent occurrence of food safety incidents will conjure up memories concerning food safety, especially those dreadful and painful memories, which will be artificially amplified and thus affect people’s risk judgment. Social interpretations of risk-related information can also arouse new fears. Most people in society are not directly involved in local incidents, but obtain relevant information indirectly. It is a regret that some organizations and individuals, as information intermediaries, fail to accurately assess the types of risks and possible consequences, and their risk interpretations do not always follow the fact-based professional ethics, but are full of exaggerated, dramatically processed and alarming predictions. Consequently, public anxieties will spread to other areas, and disappointment shrouding the society will be played up infinitely. Strong and biased impressions are hard to change. In face of sudden disasters, people will feel somewhat threatened amid fears, worries, horrors or other emotions, resulting in cognitive bias. People’s attention span will be disturbed, causing errors in identifying different types of risks. Bad impressions will persist once they are formed, and are inclined to be used to construct subsequent explanations. Irrelevant, preconceived stereotypes may become the basis of cognition and judgment at the next step. As a result, when risk communication agencies present new evidence to help clarify the facts, the “stubborn” public will filter the new evidence: evidence consistent with their inherent beliefs is accepted, while that not is rejected as sophistries and pretexts. In addition, for any risk issue involving sophisticated technology or professional knowledge, the general public, due to the lack of professional knowledge, may overreact or demonstrate other irrational attitudes and behaviors. Knowledge information gap may also hinder the public’s chances of understanding risk. The second is the vulnerability of risk assessment. The premise of modern risk communication is sound risk assessment, which provides factual basis and technical support for communication. Nonetheless, risk assessment is so complex a system that many research systems and researchers, with strong financial support from the government, cannot fully grasp it. There are still divergences in risk terminology and technical definitions between different disciplines. Moreover, it is unlikely to overcome the limitations of existing technologies in a short period of time, or integrate the divided opinions of experts in different research paradigms. This inevitably leads to communication barriers on conflicting issues such as risk definition, risk dissemination, and risk prevention. As enterprises, technical experts, academics and the government view risks in different ways, it is often seen in TV programs, expert interviews and newspaper columns and on online forums that technical experts “of different schools”, celebrities and officials pass the buck and attack each other’s credibility, data and authority, making the nascent area of risk assessment more vulnerable. As a result, what the public sees is not well-grounded and eloquent warnings, but the dissemination of inconsistent information over which the government and experts are divided. Predictably, without the provision of proper information, there would be no effective risk communication.

104

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

The third factor is the inequality in actual status of the audience and their limited engagement. Ideally, communication should be conducted on the premise that all sides face no pressure and are equal. In risk situations, however, the ongoing state of urgency usually puts the senders of information at an advantage over the recipients. This is because, on the one hand, the government and experts have greater access to first-hand information than the public and the media, and are also more technologically adept at risk assessment; on the other hand, backed by public authority, the government and expert systems are superior to the general public in terms of the status and participation opportunities in communication actions. With a superior status, the administrators are inclined to ignore the actual requests of other participants and become “bureaucratic”. In the above-mentioned cases, the senders of information not only failed to accurately judge the degree of attention the recipients were paying to the risks, but also couldn’t identify which aspects of the risks were more important to the recipients. As a result, the public receiving information kept asking for information, while the government agencies, without a real understanding of the feelings and needs of the public, were always giving irrelevant answers. Consultative risk communication emphasizes the status of all sides, but neglects the engagement of the audience. This makes the idea of keeping the public informed and engaging the public in decision-making an empty talk. None of government departments, enterprises or media organizations truly regard the public as a partner, reducing the effectiveness of communication. Even if the public are granted limited opportunities on some occasions, there is another tricky issue: how to determine the individuals or groups that are stakeholders and must be engaged in the discussions. While the issues can be discussed, the urgency of risks and crises leaves little, if any, room for consultation among all participants. Given the time limit for making every risk governance decision, there is little chance for more consultation and greater public engagement in decision-making. No matter how hard it is to overcome the difficulties, necessary and sufficient public engagement will help to ensure the public’s right to know, and to build public trust in the government.

3.4.4 Prerequisites for Risk Amplification At least one key element is needed in each round of risk amplification to initiate and sustain the continuous process of risk. Only when an isolated event becomes a public concern and causes social consequences can the process be called social amplification of risk. To launch the process and make it last for a period of time requires multiple factors, such as the concerned public, the active media, stakeholders, institutional engagement of the government, and worrying, new and constantly evolving natural and manmade hazards.

3.4 Main Conclusions

3.4.4.1

105

Attention from Individuals: A Sufficient Condition of Risk Amplification

The social construction of risk derives from risk-related experiences of individuals. Any event, if without wide attention from individuals, is unlikely to enter the social context for sense reconstruction. Every individual in modern society is a potential or practical “risk amplifier”. In daily life, individuals experience risks in two ways: one is direct experience, which is considered “intuitive”, “natural”, and “instinctive”, while and the other is considered “analytical”, “conscious” and “rational”. In fact, emotional process is intertwined with rational analysis in all normal minds.9 Individuals deal with danger signals in the surrounding environment with feelings and values. In general, individuals’ perception of certain risks is considered a deliberate or even rational analytical approach to information processing, but when navigating in a complicated, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world, relying on emotions is undoubtedly a quicker, simpler and more efficient way.10 In the social context of risk, rational analysis is highly dependent on intuitive thinking and is guided by the emotional process. When a valuable signal is sent, individuals will make a preliminary judgment of the event to assess the attributes of risk such as controllability, destructiveness, lethality, and impartiality. Once an event is regarded unknown, dreadful, and unfair by every individual, it is likely to draw close attention and spread quickly through the most direct personal networks.

3.4.4.2

Media Coverage: Intermediary in Risk Amplification

In risk events, traditional print media including newspapers and modern electronic interactive media such as television, the internet and mobile phones are all active in monitoring the real world. The media gather any valuable social issues at any time, especially disastrous events, and then choose some attributes of these events, interpret them according to their news worthiness, and publish the reprocessed information through modern channels, which are an important source for the public to obtain risk-related information. Admittedly, the presentation of risk issues depends on the media, and mass communication increases the “social visibility” of risk situations. As the uncertainty of risk intensifies the demand for information of people from all walks of life, coverage over any risk event by the mainstream media will bring about a rapid “risk amplification effect”, directly affecting people’s perception of risk. The media is always inclined to hype up or downplay particular risks, and take an active role in affecting the public’s risk perception. Dissemination of incomplete information or concealment of facts by the media, coupled with ineffective communication channels, will lead to doubts, worries and fears among the audience. Overreporting 9 Antonio R. Damasio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon,

1994. 10 Paul

Slovic. The Perception of Risk (Feng Xin, Lin Tuyao, trans.) Beijing Publishing House, 2007, p. 14.

106

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

over certain phenomena, even misleading situations, can make the public feel that danger is everywhere. The degree of media attention and the amount of information released by the media is undoubtedly a strong signal for people’s risk perception. Moreover, intensive media coverage will stimulate social mobilization. In certain cases, continuous, large-scale media coverage will undoubtedly cause public concern and pronounced risk amplification.

3.4.4.3

Institutional Participation: An Essential Attribute of Risk Amplification

The coordination and orderly management of modern society is highly dependent on all kinds of social systems, which are supposed to operate in a timely and effective way to ensure people’s safety. When people’s “ontological security” is threatened by risks, the systems will get engaged in various ways and with various attitudes, and actively or passively intervene in the process of risk amplification. Firstly, under institutional arrangements, some members of the organizations will participate in risk activities, in which government officials play a major role. It goes without saying that the officials not only take necessary steps in their personal capacity, but more importantly, interpret risks in accordance with their responsibilities and authority. At this time, institutional participation is mainly represented by government spokespersons and senior officials, who demonstrate the risk stance of systems with their words and deeds. In emergencies, however, there will be conflicts between the personal beliefs of government officials and the institutional rules, resulting in “misunderstandings” between the government and the public, the distortion of information and dissemination of information in larger fields. Second, the systems, backed by national power, will initiate social mobilization to cope with sudden risks. This approach itself is intended to spread risk signals, so that all people can feel the urgency of risks and be motivated to unite and cooperate. The top-down issuance and execution of administrative instructions can quickly dispatch human, material and financial resources, enabling the public to take action relying on government-led forces. Third, institutional risk participation also involves the mechanism of rewards (promotion, pay raises and honors) and punishments (demotion, pay cuts, and even judicial disposal) for responsible persons in order to safeguard the seriousness and fairness of the systems and ensure their legitimacy for risk control. Fourth, the systems will adapt to the social consequences of risk amplification and improve and update themselves accordingly, so as to guide, organize and coordinate risk management activities more effectively.

3.4.4.4

Effectiveness of Emergency Management and Trust: Inhibitors of Risk Amplification

In order for a risk amplification process to last for some time, there are another two important factors: the effectiveness of management and the degree of trust. Timely and effective management measures, especially the effect of emergency response and

3.4 Main Conclusions

107

the handling of the aftermath, will inhibit the amplification of risk. There are two types of inhibition. One is temporary inhibition. At the micro level, competent authorities mostly respond to emergencies passively and in haste; they neither do a good job in early warning before the occurrence of events, nor reasonably allocate resources or conduct effective risk communication in the evolution process of events. Instead, they deal with problems only when they occur, hoping that the risks can be suppressed and subside as soon as possible. The other is proactive and sound risk management with contingency plans. Risk decision makers and management should constantly absorb the latest results of foreign crisis and risk research, draw on the advanced and successful risk management experiences of foreign countries, conscientiously sum up the domestic experiences and lessons in dealing with major emergencies, timely correct errors in system design, and improve management methods. In this way, they can to the greatest extent keep the situation stable, calm public anger, and motivate the public to coordinate with the government’s emergency measures, thus achieving good governance effects. The effectiveness of risk management, in the final analysis, is based on social trust. The interaction between risk perception and trust has a bearing on the effect of risk management. Pre-existing trust and the credibility of risk management measures allow risk management agencies to “extract” the trust reserve accumulated in the past to deal with sudden events. The premise is that the administrators and risk management agencies have accumulated a lot of “trust” earlier. In a period of profound social transformation, ever-changing interest patterns and more serious “social imbalance and fracture”, social relations of various types become unstable and public trust is weakened. Our study shows that emergencies that witnessed the greatest extent of risk amplification mainly occur in social environments with no or little public trust. When there is a climate of distrust among the public, businesses, governments and experts, risk communication efforts will seldom work well. In China, the foundation of public trust in the central government is still solid. This, on the one hand, can be attributed to the long-standing trust reserve of the Party and the government, and on the one hand, is underpinned by the policies and actions benefiting the people. Therefore, whenever the local governments and enterprises are unable to control the consequences of any major emergencies, the central government and its agencies will step in through administrative and other approaches, and formulate plans and take measures based on a broad mass base and public trust, which, to a large extent, will reduce the scope of risk amplification and the depth of influence.

3.5 Policy Suggestions: Communication Is Key In new social risk contexts, now that risks are inevitable, to reduce the influence of risks on social life becomes a primary objective of risk management. If the public’s fears of hazards are mitigated through the risk communication efforts of relevant agencies, then the behaviors of stigmatization will decrease substantially. In strategic

108

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

choice of response to risk amplification and stigmatization, the role of risk communication should be underscored.

3.5.1 Definition of Risk Communication Risk communication is a process of accurately explaining and conveying the information obtained after risk assessment to the concerned public, organizations and the international community, and getting feedback from them. Risk communication involves three aspects. (1) Notification. The initiator of risk communication provides important information about the risks to the public and the media, and informs individuals of the existence, severity and other consequences of the risks. Communicators should be able to interpret complex risks in the simplest words possible. (2) Empowerment. How to define risk, explain risk, control risk and evade risk when danger comes is a tough issue, because it involves the fundamental interests of different groups and individuals. When most people feel that they are in danger, their opinions are not expressed and their interests not valued, there is a good chance that biases and behavioral conflicts will arise. Risk communication should mediate the opinions and interest disputes from different standpoints, shift from regulation to empowerment, and resolve disputes on the basis of mutual understanding and engagement. Passive groups should be allowed and encouraged to voice their own opinions, make demands, and exchange views on a relatively open platform, so as to improve social relations and enhance social engagement and cooperation. (3) Reconstruction of relations. In the current global risk environment, the occurrence, amplification and control of risks, whether they are natural disasters, accidental disasters, or public health and social accidents, are all new issues facing Chinese society. There are no experiences at the ready to draw on, or once-for-all solutions. Given that risk has disturbed the existing social relations, risk governance needs to start with the reconstruction of social relations, and effective risk communication should be based on mutual trust and respect for long-term relationships. In order to rebuild harmonious social relations, the public, the media, enterprises and the government all need to participate in risk governance, strengthen communication in mutual learning, enhance trust on the basis of mutual understanding, and repair damaged social relations in the process of information exchange.

3.5 Policy Suggestions: Communication Is Key

109

3.5.2 Significance and Functions of Risk Communication 3.5.2.1

Significance

From the perspective of policy making, risk governance actually includes communication activities the government conducts with the public with an open attitude and the attention to the voice of different interest groups. The purpose is to make rational use of the government’s decision-making power, transform the government from an administrator to a coordinator, and establish a long-term communication and coordination mechanism to resolve risk disputes and achieve the maximum social consensus. It can be seen that risk communication and risk governance complement each other. On the one hand, in order to achieve sound risk governance, the government should fully respect the opinions of different groups in society, be inclusive of diverse social actors and public representatives, devise different communication strategies, rationally interpret, understand and have public discourse, and finally arrive at a temporary definition and understanding of controversial risk issues. On the other hand, effective risk communication can cultivate social tolerance for conflict, and provide risk management agencies with the basis and institutional assessment tools for resolving risk debates. In policy making, effective risk communication can not only promote understanding between stakeholders and social groups, but also enable risk assessors and managers to better understand the people’s voices and their concerns. From the perspective of the policy implementation process, risk communication is an action to make “governance policy” clearly known to and understood by the public. As risk communication covers a wide range of social and cultural perceptions and controversial perspectives, it becomes part of the overall risk governance process from the very beginning, and is an important referable step throughout the process from the definition of the risk framework, risk assessment and democratic risk decision-making to risk control, and affects other steps in a circular way. Risk communication is considered to play a core role in circular interactions with risk assessment, disaster identification, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy assessment. In this sense, risk communication is the “soul” of risk governance, while risk assessment and risk control, among others, are the “flesh and bones”.

3.5.2.2

Functions

(1) Protection. In face of danger, individuals or groups will make protective or defensive behaviors. The stronger the danger signals they feel, the more rigorous the protective measures will be. Except those experiencing risks personally, people’s protective behaviors mostly come from indirect experiences, of which information disclosure by the government, media reports and interpersonal communication will to a large extent raise the perceived level of risk. Under the pressure of risk, people’s ability and effectiveness of dealing with

110

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

external information will also be reduced. Emotional arousal and anxiety caused by a strong sense of threat will prompt the public to instinctively opt for “selfdefense” to avoid risk. It should be pointed out that when risk management agencies and administrators should publish and disseminate to the public any risk-related information in a reasonable and moderate way, and guide the public to take appropriate protective actions to reduce harm. (2) Education. Risk management agencies should timely publish information on incidents and disasters, inform the public of the types of risks, preventive measures and possible consequences, and have a tolerant attitude towards people’s behavior. In doing so, they can educate the public by disseminating necessary knowledge about risk, promoting risk awareness, and clarifying the acceptable risk range. An important goal of risk communication is to tell the public that: first, scientific knowledge and risk assessment can provide guidance for decision-making; second, the decisions, no matter how logical they are, cannot give the ultimate answers to all risk issues, which are not just technical issues about avoiding risk, but also intertwined with political, social and cultural factors. Therefore, in risk communication, it is necessary to lower the public’s unrealistic expectations of informed decision-making, thereby reducing the public and the media’s misunderstanding of government agencies, and increasing mutual understanding and trust. (3) Mediation. Modern risk communication emphasizes interaction and public participation, and sees multilateral engagement in policy making as a major advance in democracy. Risk communication differs from risk dissemination in that it pays attention to the feedback and feelings of the audience, and no longer regards the public as a passive recipient of information. Instead, it gives the public the opportunity to express their own views, and mediates conflicts of interest through proper empowerment. Taking risk communication as one of the tools for the government to balance various interests also highlights the coordination function of risk communication in the process of public policy implementation. Since risk issues are unavoidable in modern society, it is paramount to strike a balance between policymakers and the public by means of risk communication. The government, enterprises and other organizations should not ignore relevant risks, and the public need not overreact to any risks. When risk governance decisions normalize and institutionalize risk communication, the society has found the way to define the acceptable risk range and better reduce risks, thus capable of coordinating the conflict between those who create risks and who bear risks. Fourth, trust and confidence booster. In emergencies, people always wish to get support and backup. Effective risk communication first can demonstrate an open attitude of risk management agencies to the public and the media, and make a good impression on the audience. Then, after a series of actions such as the implementation of crisis management measures, the release of risk-related information, and the response to queries from the media and opinion leaders, the public’s tension, anxiety and panic will be greatly alleviated, and they will restore confidence in overcoming difficulties, and become more dependent government’s risk management

3.5 Policy Suggestions: Communication Is Key

111

system. Once people have confidence in institutionalized risk governance mechanisms, public trust that has been dented in emergencies will be restored to a certain extent.

3.5.3 Channels of Effective Communication 3.5.3.1

Communicator and the Audience

The government is the communicator in risk communication. Once an emergency occurs, the government, which possesses an abundance of public resources and public power, will automatically become the vanguard of social order and public security, and one of its primary responsibilities is to do a good job in risk assessment, information disclosure, and interpretation. The risk attributes of major emergencies and serious consequences such as risk amplification brought about by improper communication determine that the government must take the initiative to play a leading role in risk communication. The government should release information to targeted groups or the public as a whole in a planned way, select suitable channels of information release, oversee the effects of information release, and explain the information released, so as to educate the public and guide and reconstruct the public’s risk perception and action. Before conducting risk communication, risk governance decision-making bodies should get prepared, including identifying potential difficulties and stakeholders. These stakeholders include not only individuals, groups and organizations directly affected by the incidents, but also those who may bear the risks, as well as any other individuals and organizations that have to deal with the risks. According to the range of ripple effects of risk amplification, there are three types of audiences in risk communication. The first is “primary audience”, referring to the main groups of people who are going to be affected by risk-related information, and a great deal of information in risk communication is designed for them. The primary audience includes direct victims of incidents, local residents, and enterprises and other organizations based in the locality. They constitute the group in the most urgent need of safety. Whether their right to know can be ensured through effective risk communication will have influence on the effect of the subsequent risk amplification. The second type is “secondary audience”, including those likely to be affected by risks in addition to the “primary audience”. The secondary audience consists of the residents, groups and organizations outside of the core threatened areas, and even government agencies and economic organizations outside the territory. Because they are far from the core areas of incidents and cannot directly feel the physical damage of risks, their risk perception is based on imagination and indirect experiences, and they may also play the biggest role in spreading rumors, making them the most unstable part of risk amplifiers. The third type of audience is “medium audience”. Though the medium audience is not the main targeted group of risk communication, information needs to be transmitted through them to the first and second types of audience.

112

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

The medium audience includes reporters, online opinion leaders, and so on. They play a decisive role in risk communication and social amplification of risk. They pass on risk-related information and knowledge from top to bottom, and can also construct bottom-to-top risk issues and perform the responsibility for risk education and risk communication.

3.5.3.2

Risk Communication Channels

The paths of social amplification of risk can also be used as communication channels in risk governance. When risk management agencies ignore the effect of social amplification of risk, these channels become a passage for spreading rumors and anxieties; and when the agencies are aware that risk amplification can bring serious and harmful consequences, these channels can be transformed into a pathway to release accurate information, adopt proper suggestions, and take coordinated action. First, official channels. Information on major domestic incidents at critical moments is issued by the authorities through official channels. The voices and intentions of the government can be transmitted via several channels: first, the press conferences of the State Council (including its ministries and commissions); second, the meeting resolutions of the CPC Central Committee and its Political Bureau are released by the authoritative media including the Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily and CCTV; third, the instructions and on-site guidance of the leaders at central and provincial levels, which allow them to directly interact with the public, listen to the views of the grass-roots, and respond quickly and efficiently. Second, news dissemination. Risk communication has to make risk issues visualized by presenting them. In this process, the mass media serves as an important bridge between issues and the public, and the intermediary for the public to understand risk issues. People obtain risk-related information mainly via the mass media (television, radio, networks, and newspapers), of which television is regarded as the most important and reliable channel by the general public. Third, the Internet. The new media represented by the Internet is of growing importance for the dissemination of information. The Internet has become an important node in social amplification of risk, and certainly a key link in risk communication. With an enormous amount of information, the Internet is becoming a main source of public opinion. The netizens can express their views on public affairs and social phenomena through information networks and in multiple ways, such as posting comments on hot news on web portals, discussing on online forums or BBS, writing and reposting blogs, and exchanging information via instant messaging services. Today, risk management agencies have attached growing importance to the role of online public opinion in risk governance, and started to solicit opinions from the public online, and advocate internet-based supervision over public affairs. Fourth, interpersonal communication. Interpersonal communication in risk communication is different from “hearsay”, to say nothing of “rumors”. It is an organized action grounded in fact, and a behavior of self-conscious risk learning, risk early warning and risk education of the residents under the guidance of the government,

3.5 Policy Suggestions: Communication Is Key

113

in which disaster-related information and mutual aid signals are disseminated and shared mainly through friends and relatives. Fifth, other channels. When some scientific, agreed conclusions are drawn in risk assessment, risk management agencies can promote correct concepts and knowledge through advertising, public meetings, environmental and health consultations, performances, safety brochures and so on. Risk communication conducted in popular and easy-to-understand ways can often achieve unexpected results.

3.5.3.3

Risk Communication Principles

Timeliness. Risk communication should precede “hearsay” and rumors. The fact that some incidents evolve into public crises and cause unexpected consequences is because authoritative risk communication comes too late and may even be put off deliberately. The principle of timeliness requires that risk-related information should be released as early as possible. Transparency. To release all “details” that can be made public is a significant test of the managerial ability of risk management agencies. It is the practice of concealing risks on purpose of some primary-level government departments that has resulted in more serious consequences. The disclosure of risk-related information and risk response details is based on the progress in risk assessment and investigations. It is an irresponsible behavior to make public any information without scientific verification and strong evidence in that it will cause greater panic and suspicion in society. Initiative. Seeing incidents as “bad things”, the administrators mostly take the approach of “risk attenuation” to reduce communication with the public and the media, but this is not the best policy. True risk communication should be based on long-term relationships characterized by mutual trust and respect. Risk communication, in essence, is to give official reply to public demands. Modern risk management requires the administrators to take the initiative to assess risks, contact the media to release information, understand the actual needs of people, and mobilize more social resource for joint risk governance efforts. Moderation. Risk communication is not simply pouring out all the information to the public and the media. In fact, the primary concern of people in face of risks is the severity of hazardous events, and then they pay attention to specific countermeasures and other information. This forms a tiered attention model centered on the levels of risk. Therefore, risk communication should take into consideration the levels of perception of the public, and be conducted in an orderly, appropriate and gradual manner. Equality. Because there are obvious differences in risk perception and understanding among technocrats, risk experts, the general public and the media, and the existing expert systems always voice their opinions on behalf of their own organizations, the public will feel disadvantaged in terms of status. Though “absolute equality” is impossible in real communication, risk management agencies and experts should keep an open mind, think things from the perspective of the threatened sides, allow public opinion and online public opinion leaders to express their views, and

114

3 Perception, Amplification and Communication …

encourage participation of the residents at the community level. Such equal participation may better meet public expectations.

3.5.4 Measures for Effective Communication 3.5.4.1

Enhancing Public Understanding of Risk

It is necessary to strengthen public understanding of certain risks, and correct incorrect information. The key to this, in addition to increasing risk awareness and holding science outreach activities, lies in mass communication that releases massive, accurate and systematic positive information. Meanwhile, it is also essential to overcome the uncertainty and ambiguity brought by risks, develop necessary risk response practices, and improve personal scientific literacy.

3.5.4.2

Improving Media Coverage

Given the limitations of the media itself and the interests associated with risk issues, the biases and unilateral risk construction of the media are no surprise. For this reason, it is necessary to improve the media’s performance in risk communication. For example, the media should improve the ability to understand risks and identify the sources of risks, improve the practitioners’ communication skills, constantly sum up lessons from past experiences, and help the public better understand and clarify risk issue. A sound news information cooperation and exchange mechanism should be developed so that the practitioners can get in touch with experts and scholars who are willing to cooperate so as to make reasonable and relatively consistent judgments. News organizations can share information to make their reports more reliable. Moreover, the media should put the interests of the public at the core, listen to the voice of the people, and highlight public interests and reflect the public’s safety demands in their reports.

3.5.4.3

Rebuilding Public Trust in the Government

Public trust in institutions holds key to addressing the problems associated with risk perception. It is the basis for properly handling the negative consequences caused by risk perception. Rebuilding government credibility is core to curbing social amplification of risk. Now that many risks derive directly or indirectly from the government, governments at all levels, in face of risks and crises, should release information in a timely and accurate manner, guide public expectations about risks, engage the public

3.5 Policy Suggestions: Communication Is Key

115

in risk management, and put in place just institutional arrangements to handle those directly responsible for creating risks. Only in this way can government credibility be rebuilt in a social climate of distrust, and social forces be mobilized to jointly cope with the risks and crises that are ongoing or may occur.

Chapter 4

China’s Emergency Planning System: A Case Study of Road Transportation

Following the SARS outbreak in China in 2003, the Chinese government introduced a comprehensive strategy for emergency response that consists of four components: plans, institutions, mechanisms and rules and regulations. Emergency planning takes priority in this system mainly for two reasons. The first reason lies in the internal logic of the strategy. The emergency response institution mainly refers to the organizational system of emergency management, the mechanism is the process by which emergency management takes place, and the rules and regulations are the legal framework governing emergency response. Emergency planning, however, is the action system which is the product of interactions between the other three elements—the organizational system, the process and the rules and regulations. The second reason rests with the practical effect of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. As emergency planning exerts direct influence on emergency management and connects the policies with practices, it inevitably takes a central role in emergency management. In the seven-year period (2004–2010) when China endeavored to build the emergency management policy system, the most significant progress was made in emergency planning, as evidenced by full and thorough coverage and a series of regulations on the compilation, review, release, and revision of emergency plans and the organization of emergency exercises. Given the importance of emergency planning, the research team worked with the national transportation authority to conduct research on the building, operation and management of the emergency planning system. The transportation department is an important participant in the management of major public emergencies as well as a key department that applies the principle of “categorized management” in the emergency management system featuring “unified leadership at the national level, overall coordination, categorized management, assignment of responsibilities to different levels, and emphasis on localized administration”. The case study of the emergency planning system for the transportation department would provide us with a glimpse of the whole picture in the country.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_4

117

118

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

4.1 China’s Emergency Planning System: Evolution and Framework Over the past two decades, China’s emergency planning system has experienced a three-stage development.

4.1.1 From the 1990s to the SARS Outbreak in 2003: Specialized Emergency Plans Emergency plans were drawn up to satisfy the practical needs of workplace safety. In the early 1980s, the Chinese government began to attach importance to the assessment and control of major hazard sources. In 2000, national standard Identification of Major Hazard Sources (GB18218-2000) was issued. In 2002, Workplace Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated. In accordance with Article 17 of the Law, the major persons-in-charge of business entities shall organize the formulation and execution of emergency rescue plans for work–related accidents. Article 68 of the Law provides that governments at the county level and above shall organize relevant departments to formulate emergency rescue plans for the especially serious work-related accidents within their respective administrative jurisdictions, and establish their own emergency rescue systems. In addition, there are public emergency plans in other fields. According to the statistics of the Emergency Plan Working Group of the General Office of the State Council, the relevant departments of the State Council had a total of 194 emergency plans as of 2004, including eighteen for natural disasters, fifty-two for accidents, forty-four for public health emergencies, and eighty for public safety incidents. Moreover, another ninety-two emergency plans were being prepared at the time. However, these plans were mostly departmental emergency plans, some of which were even formulated by enterprises and institutions affiliated to ministries. These emergency plans were formulated to clean up their own messes without communicating or collaborating with others, and thus were scattered and disorganized. Few of them featured overall coordination. Moreover, there was no timely assessment of the performance of these plans.

4.1.2 From 2003 to 2008: Building of an Emergency Planning System Shortly after the SARS crisis in 2003, the State Council set up an emergency plan working group to compile overall emergency plan, organize various ministries and commissions of the State Council to draw up specialized plans and departmental plans, and guide provincial and municipal governments to formulate emergency

4.1 China’s Emergency Planning System: Evolution and Framework

119

plans. On April 17, 2005, the National Contingency Plan for Public Emergencies was promulgated and issued to provincial governments for implementation. On January 8, 2006, it was unveiled to the general public. In accordance with the National Contingency Plan for Public Emergencies, governments at county level or above, their departments and affiliated enterprises and institutes shall compile emergency plans for all large-scale activities. As of March 2006, a total of twenty-five specialized emergency plans and eighty departmental emergency plans at national level had been formulated in addition to the National Contingency Plan for Public Emergencies. By the end of 2006, more than 1.35 million emergency plans of various types had been formulated nationwide. All provinces (municipalities directly under the Central Government and autonomous regions), 97.9% of prefecture-level cities, 92.8% of county-level cities, and all of central enterprises had formulated overall emergency plans. A vast majority of the enterprises above designated size in high-risk industries also compiled emergency plans.1 On June 15, 2006, the State Council issued the Opinions on Comprehensively Strengthening Emergency Management, stressing to enhance emergency management in an all-round way with the focus on primary-level organizations like communities, villages, schools and enterprises, give full play to the role of primary-level organizations in emergency management, further clarify the responsibilities of administrators, legal representatives, persons in charge of communities or village-level organizations in emergency management, designate full-time and/or part-time staff or agencies for emergency management, increase investment in primary-level emergency management, compile various emergency plans in light of actual conditions, and improve capabilities to prevent and deal with all types of public emergencies in the first place. Communities should draw up viable emergency plans for potential public emergencies in the lives of the people. In June 2007, the State Administration of Work Safety required all types of enterprises to complete the formulation of emergency plans before the end of 2007. On August 7, 2007, the General Office of the State Council issued the Opinions on Strengthening Primary-level Emergency Management, proposing that all sub-districts, communities, villages, and all enterprises and public institutions should strive to finish the compilation of emergency plans before the end of 2008. Later assessment shows that the goal has been achieved. In short, the evolution of the emergency planning system can be summarized as follows: firstly, it’s a process from the enterprises to governments and then to the society; secondly, it’s a process from industrial regulations to public policies and then to national laws.

1 Emergency

Management Office of the State Council. China’s Response to Public Health Emergencies in 2006. China Emergency Management, 2007 (7).

120

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

4.1.3 From 2009 to Present: Routine Management of Emergency Plans On September 25, 2009, the Emergency Management Office of the General Office of the State Council issued the Guideline on Emergency Exercises for Unexpected Events to promote the exercises of emergency plans, explicitly requiring that “the organizations carrying out exercises should adopt timely measures to overcome the problems exposed during the exercises and revise and improve the emergency plans accordingly”. Governments at all levels have carried out exercises, and revised and improved emergency plans. Following the full coverage of the nation, the emergency planning system has entered the stage of routine management, with the main tasks of exercises, revisions and filing management of the emergency plans.

4.2 Emergency Planning for Road Transportation 4.2.1 Before the Introduction of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response Under the current governance structure featuring compartmentalization, the management of industries is still very important. The transportation management authority performs four basic functions of construction, maintenance, management, and collection of tolls, instead of the single function of transportation supervision. Therefore, the Workplace Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China promulgated in 2002 applies to the transportation management system as well. It goes without saying that the transportation management system has been undergoing reform. With the gradual improvement of the road network system, the authority’s function in construction has weakened and its function in maintenance has been separated step by step and grown increasingly market-oriented. Before the country started building the emergency planning system in 2004, the transportation system had already formulated quite a few emergency rescue plans. Nanjing, for example, had a total of 41 transportation emergency plans, including nine key emergency rescue plans, seven devised by public institutions of transportation, fifteen by transportation enterprises, and ten by transportation bureaus at district and county levels. See Table 4.1 for details. The above emergency plans were formulated in accordance with the Workplace Safety Law, Highway Law, Road Traffic Safety Law, Port Law, Fire Control Law, Regulations on the Management of Inland Waters, Regulations on Road Transport, Regulations on the Control over Safety of Dangerous Chemicals, Regulations on the Control over Safety of Construction Projects, and others. Judging from the type and the name, these emergency plans mostly focused on accidents, including plans both for emergency rescue and prevention and covering

4.2 Emergency Planning for Road Transportation

121

Table 4.1 Original Emergency plans of the Nanjing municipal transportation system Type

Plan

Key Emergency Rescue Plans

Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Workplace Accidents in Nanjing Municipal Transportation System Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in the Inland Waters Traffic in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Highway Accidents in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in Road Construction Projects in Nanjing Emergency and Precautionary Plan for Major Accidents in Hazardous Goods Transport by Road in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in Ports and Docks in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in the Inland Waterway of Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Workplace Accidents in Banqiao Auto Ferry of Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Unexpected Accidents in Nanjing Transportation Building

Emergency Rescue Plans of Public Institutions in Transportation

Response Plan for Violent and Illegal Behaviors Response Plan for Major Violations, Emergencies and Major Traffic Accidents in Road Inspection in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Traffic Accidents School Campus Emergency Rescue Plan Emergency Response Plan for Waterway Liability Accidents Maintenance Plan of Waterways in Dry Season Typhoon Control and Emergency Plan

Emergency Rescue Plans of Transportation Enterprises

Safety Accidents’ Prevention, Pre-Control and Emergency Rescue Plan Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents and Incidents at Hanzhongmen Coach Station in Nanjing Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Ship Accidents Emergency Response Plan for Xiaguan Coach Station Safety Preparedness and Emergency Rescue Plan for Road Passenger Transport Emergency Rescue Plan for Parking Areas Emergency Plan for Road Transport of Hazardous Chemicals Nanjing Transportation Group Emergency Response Plan Emergency Plan for Major Taxi Accidents Emergency Plan for Fire Accident at Golden Port Hotel Emergency Plan for Fire Accidents at Nanjing North Coach Station Emergency Plan for Collapse of Bridges’ Cast-in-Place Bracket Emergency Rescue Plan for Accidents at Construction Sites of Roads, Bridges and Docks Windproof Plan for Ship Constructions Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Workplace Accidents (continued)

122

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Table 4.1 (continued) Type

Plan

Emergency Rescue Plans of transportation bureaus at district and county levels

Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in Inland River Traffic in Jiangning District Emergency Plan for Accidents in Road Transport of Dangerous Chemicals in Jiangning District Prevention and Emergency Plan for Major Accidents in Inland River Traffic in Liuhe District Emergency Response Plan for Major Accidents in Road Transport of Dangerous Goods in Yuhuatai District Emergency Rescue Plan for Accidents and Incidents in the Maintenance and Construction Sites in Qixia District Emergency Response Plan for the Water and Land Transportation Safety of the Transportation System of Qixia District Emergency Rescue Plan for Major and Extraordinarily Serious Accidents of Transportation System in Pukou District Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in Water Transportation in Lishui County Emergency Rescue Plan for Major Accidents in Inland River Traffic in Gaochun County Emergency and Precautious Response Plan for Major Accidents in Road Transport of Dangerous Goods in the Industrial Development Zone along the Yangtze River

both emergencies and major accidents. However, these emergency plans failed to form an organic system.

4.2.2 Within the Framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response In accordance with the National Contingency Plan for Public Emergencies, the Ministry of Transportation issued Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation (hereinafter referred to as the “2005 Plan”) in June 2005. As the Emergency Response Law hadn’t been issued at the time, the 2005 Plan was compiled in accordance with Highway Law, Road Traffic Safety Law, and Regulations on Road Transport, Flood Control Law, Environmental Protection Law and others. The 2005 Plan describes the emergency command system for road transportation and its responsibilities, determination of the alert levels in road transportation, requirements for emergency response and post-emergency actions, supporting operations for emergency response and other matters. In accordance with the above-mentioned Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation and the Overall Contingency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Public Emergencies, the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation issued the Contingency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Public Emergencies in Road and Water-

4.2 Emergency Planning for Road Transportation

123

Table 4.2 Specialized emergency plans for road and waterway transportation of Jiangsu Province No.

Specialized plan

Formulated by

1

Public Emergency Response Plan of Jiangsu Province for Road Transportation

Highway Bureau of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation

2

Emergency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Inland Waterways Traffic Accidents

Jiangsu Provincial Maritime Safety Administration

3

Plan of Jiangsu Province on Transportation Support for Public Emergency Response

Transport Bureau of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation

4

Plan of Jiangsu Province on Navigation Lock Response in Public Emergencies

Waterway Administration of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation

5

Emergency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Major and Extraordinarily Severe Port Accidents

Jiangsu Provincial Port Authority

6

Emergency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Major Accidents in Transportation Construction Projects

Quality Supervision Station of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation

7

Emergency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Mass Transportation Incidents

General Office of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation

way Transportation in 2006 that clearly defined the system of specialized plans for public emergencies in road and waterway transportation of Jiangsu Province. Please refer to Table 4.2 for details. In 2007, all the affiliated organizations to the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation compiled the above emergency plans in accordance with the Contingency Plan of Jiangsu Province for Public Emergencies in Road and Waterway Transportation. The research team participated in the formulation, assessment and revision of Public Emergency Response Plan of Jiangsu Province for Road Transportation organized by the Highway Bureau of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation. This plan was officially published on November 9, 2007, requiring the compilation of detailed plans for road network traffic control, response to special situations in road administration, maintenance and security, and toll station security, and emergency plans for road transportation at city and county levels. To provide guidance for the compilation of emergency plans by road authorities at city and county levels, the Highway Bureau of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation issued the Guidelines for the Compilation of City-level Public Emergency Response Plans for Road Transportation in November 2008. In the same year, thirteen cities of Jiangsu Province, including Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong, Lianyungang, Suqian, Huai’an, Yancheng, and Xuzhou, as well as all the counties under them completed the compilation of Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation.

124

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

4.3 Implementation and Revisions 4.3.1 Implementation of Jiangsu Province’s Emergency Plans in 2008 Snow Storms and Recommended Revisions In 2008, the snow storms in southern China affected 156 road sections with a length of 8,457 km and the trunk highway of nearly 4,000 km in the road transportation network of Jiangsu Province, posing an unprecedented severe test to the road transportation of the province. The road authorities launched emergency plans and carried out emergency response actions accordingly. In March 2008, the research team investigated and evaluated the emergency response operations in Shanghai—Nanjing Expressway, Runyang Yangtze River Bridge and Nanjing Ring Road during the snow storms and proposed targeted countermeasures.

4.3.1.1

Strengths of Emergency Plans

Emergency plans worked well in the following aspects. (1) Organizational system of emergency response. In accordance with the emergency plan, an emergency command system involving emergency command center of Jiangsu Provincial Department of Transportation, Jiangsu Provincial Highway Bureau, local highway authorities, and on-site command organizations was established. It is worth noting that Jiangsu Province started to build an Emergency Command Center for Highway Management and Service in 2006, providing reliable support for highway authorities to understand the operation of road network in a timely manner, give instructions on transportation control and improve the snow removal efficiency. (2) Preparation of resources for emergency response. According to incomplete statistics prior to the snow storms, all organizations of the system had, as required by emergency plans, prepared 215,000 tons of supplies and over 4,700 pieces of equipment and signed cooperation or service agreements with some 3,400 management agencies, maintenance enterprises, professional service providers, special-purpose equipment rental organizations and others, which contributed to the success of road emergence response to a certain extent. Shortly after the snow storm broke, the highway authority of Jiangsu Province set up an emergency rescue team according to the emergency plan, involving staff members of all road maintenance, administration, and construction organizations, and pooled various machinery and equipment and anti-skid and antifreeze materials. It invested over RMB151.56 million, dispatched more than 229,000 persons and some 31,000 vehicles (machinery), removed snow covering thirty million m2 of road, and used over 188,000 tons of emergency response materials like stone and yellow sand and some 221,000 straw bags.

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

125

(3) Sound information platform. The provincial highway authority utilized the platform of Jiangsu Provincial Highway Information Service Center to collect information on road networks and disaster relief in a timely and all-round manner, and the accurate information was used to inform decision-making regarding emergency response. In addition, the latest information on the provincial road network and disaster relief work of the highway departments was disclosed to the public through newspapers, TV and radio programs, websites and other channels in a timely manner and all phone calls of inquiries were answered.

4.3.1.2

Flaws of Emergency Plans

(1) Insufficient emergency preparedness. A handful of organizations and individuals were not prepared for emergencies and underestimated the influence of the snow storms at the early stage. Quite a few organizations didn’t have enough disaster relief equipment due to the lack of resource mobilization mechanism and encountered difficulty in mobilizing resources in a short time. Some organizations weren’t equipped with snow-removal machines and tools. The majority of organizations had no prepared anti-skid chains for vehicles, reducing the capacity and safety of driving on rainy, snowy or icy roads. Some organizations had to purchase a good deal of industrial salt (snow-melting agent), anti-skid materials, straw bags, equipment, etc. in a short time, lowering the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster relief. (2) Lack of professional emergency response team. The basic machinery of highway departments mainly comprises tractors, small and medium-sized road rollers, a few loaders, and dumpers. The maintenance team’s capability is limited to general maintenance. The emergency force can only meet the demands for such general road events like road collapse and damage and are only capable of regular maintenance. The occurrence of such large-scale, high-intensity and long-term snow storms, worsened by increasing difficulty in removing snow and ice, highlighted a series of problems, including the weakness of the emergency rescue teams, poor professional maintenance, severely inadequate machinery for road maintenance, and extremely limited capability to deal with unexpected disasters. (3) Improper emergency response operations. During the period of snow storms, the highways in the province were closed at a high frequency and for a long time due to snow, traffic accidents or other reasons. It followed that the snow on highways got thicker and lower temperature made it more likely to freeze, which held up traffic to a certain extent, putting more traffic pressure on ordinary national and provincial highways and making it more difficult to remove snow and ice for smooth traffic afterwards. In the meanwhile, the improper operations of vehicles to spray salt and snow-melting agents and remove ice resulted in damaged roads and bridges, disappeared road markings, damaged guardrails, destroyed green belts and other problems on many sections of highways. In

126

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

fact, large-scale, continuous and thorough cleaning of roads should have been organized at the beginning of the snow storms. (4) Insufficient comprehensive support for emergency response. In spite of relatively sound information gathering mechanism of the highway system, highway monitoring and surveillance devices were not fully equipped, and thus the channels to collect information were limited. Telephone and on-site visit were the main channels to collect information based on which response plans were drawn up. The lack of monitoring and command platform led to poor capability for early warning and less timely disclosure of information. In particular, the information about closing or opening highways across provinces and regions cannot be sent to disaster-relief command and decision-making departments, passengers and drivers. The above flaws are related to the practicability and feasibility of the emergency plan itself, but the main problem lies in the shortcomings of the system and mechanism of emergency response. For example, the management of roads and bridges by multiple departments made unified command and unified deployment difficult in the face of disaster. The lack of coordination mechanism between the government and the business community, between local government leaders and industry leaders led to poor communication and varied commands and deployments from various departments. The nationwide mobilization mechanism in time of disasters hasn’t been established. The emergency mechanism to facilitate coordination between departments is incomplete. Some organizations lack the awareness of public responsibilities. All these factors decreased the efficiency of emergency response.

4.3.1.3

Suggestions for Improvement

(1) Continue to promote the building of emergency management system. Firstly, the highway department should make institutional regulations on the emergency command management system, emergency plan formulation, emergency supplies reserve, specialized emergency funds, emergency mobilization and other matters. At the same time, governments at all levels should devote more energy to publicize the Emergency Response Law and compile and issue local laws and regulations on emergency response as soon as possible. In particular, such local laws and regulations should clearly define enterprises and institutions’ social responsibilities and key responsibilities in disaster prevention and relief, providing legislative and regulative guarantee for promoting emergency management. Secondly, it’s advised to improve the monitoring network in line with the principle of “putting prevention first and integrating prevention with emergency response” and by virtue of various channels like inspection, establishment of monitoring stations and test of professional institutions, so as to collect and sort out information on a regular basis, get a full picture of the highway conditions within their jurisdictions, improve the capability of monitoring and early warning of major disasters, win some time for emergency preparedness, and

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

127

increase the capability of scientific decision-making, resource allocation and emergency response in an all-round way. Thirdly, emergency reserve fund and emergency equipment reserve management mechanism should be established in the principle of putting people first and putting social benefits first while pursuing economic returns. The emergency reserve fund should be mainly used for professional disaster-relief team, mobilization of social forces, emergency purchase of disaster-relief materials and equipment, and post-disaster reconstruction. Emergency equipment could be reserved by the highway department in line with the requirements. Or, the maintenance enterprises affiliated to the highway department could reserve a certain number of emergency materials, equipment and machinery for production in normal times and for disaster relief in emergency. Or, the highway department could sign cooperation or service agreement with private enterprises or social forces capable of disaster relief in exchange for economic compensations at market price afterwards. Meanwhile, the emergency management system, emergency plan formulation, emergency preparedness exercises and drills, training of professional teams, reserve and utilization of emergency materials and equipment should be managed in accordance with the requirements for combat readiness, while improving the level and quality of daily emergency preparedness as well as actual combat capacity in disaster relief. (2) Establish unified and highly efficient emergency command bodies. In the principle of “unified leadership by the government and localized administration”, in response to major road transportation emergencies, the government should establish headquarters for transportation emergency response, with principle leaders of governments at all levels as commander-in-chief, other leaders as deputy commander-in-chief and administrative leaders in departments of transportation, public security, meteorology, public health and enterprise engaged in highway business as team members. In line with the needs for emergency response, a few working groups could be set up. In this way, a unified, authoritative and highly efficient emergency disaster-relief command body could be established to enhance coordination and interaction between government departments and social forces and build an emergency management mechanism featuring unified command, quick response, complete functions, great coordination, and efficient operation. At the same time, in case of major disasters, an emergency mechanism for the whole society and an emergency mobilization plan should be devised to ensure that the whole society could be mobilized to fight the disaster in the first time. Guided by the principle of unified leadership, hierarchical management, overall planning, and step-by-step implementation, the highway department should accelerate the building of provincial and municipal emergency rescue command centers and sub-centers at county (regional) level to form an emergency command body featuring the integration of four functions information collection, road network control, public service, and emergency command. The Highway Bureau Emergency Center should interface with the emergency management information platform for road transportation with other relevant departments at provincial and municipal levels. In this way, an emer-

128

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

gency management information command platform for the highway system featuring coordination at all levels, unified leadership and efficient command will come into being, so as to ensure that primary-level organizations and enterprises could report information in a timely, prompt and accurate manner and that the headquarters could summarize and analyse information timely, make quick decisions and carry out efficient command. (3) Further improve the ability to cope with emergencies. To begin with, conduct extensive publicity activities and training on emergency rescue. Publicity activities in various forms should be conducted to enhance the highway system personnel’s awareness of unexpected development and sense of responsibilities to defend against major disasters, raise public awareness that everyone bears his share of the responsibility and should participate in disaster relief, enhance publicity of universal law about disasters’ occurrence and general knowledge in response to disasters, and help the public understand the basic knowledge and skills of self-rescue, in a bid to establish an emergency management mechanism for disaster relief and self-rescue that makes all well-prepared. In the meanwhile, it’s suggested to strengthen professional training for emergency response in disaster relief, set up an expert database in emergency response and improve the capability of scientific response. Secondly, increase investment in emergency maintenance equipment. Currently, despite the constantly increasing mileage and width of highway, the level of overall maintenance mechanization is low, which restricted the emergency response capacity of mechanical equipment reserves to a large extent. In the case of major emergencies in particular, manpower and general machinery cannot satisfy the needs for prompt response. Therefore, the highway department needs to increase investment to improve the equipment on the whole. Meanwhile, in light of the characteristics of road transportation emergency response, the highway department should purchase some necessary large-scale equipment reserved for emergency response, such as snow shovel, grader, bulldozer, mobile vehicle monitor, aerial work vehicle, emergency lighting vehicle, tractor, etc. Thirdly, step up efforts in emergency information management and road network information release. The highway department should enhance relations, communications and coordination with governments at all levels and departments of public security, meteorology, earthquake and others to expand sources of disaster information, establish a scientific, accurate, timely, advanced and standardized platform for collection, processing and release of emergency information. To coordinate with the building of the road network command and control system and facilitate the better-coordinated management of expressway and general national and provincial trunk highway, the information about the traffic on the expressway and provincial road network should be timely passed on to the general national and provincial trunk road, so that the affected vehicles could be bypassed to avoid intensification of traffic congestions. Road network and emergency information could be released constantly via multiple channels, including television, radio, phone text message, newspaper, and public announcement. Moreover, variable message signs should be set up at the junctions of national highway and state highway and

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

129

the junctions of general trunk highway and expressway to help passing vehicles arrange an appropriate driving route or change plans timely, so as to improve the road traffic efficiency. In accordance with the research group’s evaluation and the revised Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation in 2009, the competent department of road transportation of Jiangsu Province made revisions to the provincial emergency response plan accordingly.

4.3.2 Revision of the National Emergency Plan for Road Transportation After the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake After the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the Ministry of Transport revised the emergency plan for road transportation based on the plan’s application in disaster relief of the snow storms in Southern China and Wenchuan Earthquake, issued a new version of Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation (“2009 Plan” in brief) in April 2009 and abolished the “2005 Plan” at the same time.

4.3.2.1

Outstanding Effects of the “2009 Plan”

The revision of the National Emergency Plan for Road Transportation mainly focused on the following five aspects and has achieved remarkable results. (1) It clarified the positioning of the emergency plan. The applicable conditions of the plan are clearly defined in the “Scope of Application”, that is, the plan is applicable to the response to extraordinarily serious (Level I) road transport emergencies that involve cross-provincial administrative divisions, or go beyond the capacity of the provincial-level transportation authority, or are instructed by the State Council for the Ministry of Transport to take in charge. In addition, it’s highlighted in the emergency planning system that the plan constitutes a departmental plan of the State Council, the overall emergency plan for the road transport emergencies at the highest level across the country, as well as the general principles for the national emergency planning system for road transport. (2) It got the emergency planning system into shape. The road transport emergency planning system is divided into national and local levels. The emergency planning system at the national level includes overall plan (the 2009 Plan) and specialized plan for some certain type(s) of road transport emergencies. The emergency planning system at the local level comprises emergency plans for road transportation at provincial, municipal (prefectural) and county levels, specialized plans and enterprise plans for various events. (3) It clarified the composition and responsibilities of the emergency management organization. In light of the disaster-relief experience in snow storms in Southern

130

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

China and Wenchuan Earthquake, the temporary emergency response organization established by the Ministry of transport was more clearly defined, stating that the road transport emergency management organizations at ministerial-level should contain emergency response leading group, emergency working group, routine management unit, expert advisory group and on-site working group. The newly added emergency working group made up for the lack of a specific unit for the emergency response in the original plan. The emergency working group is composed of eight working groups in overall coordination, emergency road maintenance, transport support, communication support, news & publicity, logistics support, restoration & reconstruction, and summary & assessment which are led and placed under the responsibility of the relevant departments of the Ministry of Transport. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transport could prepare to set up Highway Management & Emergency Response Center for routine management, dedicated to monitoring national expressway and important truck highways, gathering and processing relevant information, and providing road travel information service to the society. The plan clearly defined the startup mode and responsibilities of the above-mentioned emergency management organizations as well as the transition between routine management and emergency management. (4) It improved the operability and executive power of the emergency plan. With the focus on four factors of “when, who, what and how”, it clarified the main bodies of accountability and their responsibilities, working processes, an interface and transition between different processes at all links of road transportation emergency response, which got the operational mechanism of the overall workflow for emergency response by Ministry of Transport. (5) It strengthened the capacity building for emergency support. Featuring the contents on three new areas of building emergency response teams, technical support and fund guarantee that were not included in the “2005 Plan”, it developed a comprehensive emergency support system. In addition, in response to the lack of details and operability in the original plan, it gave specific instructions on construction method, principles, standards, implementation of functions, related administrative policies and others. In short, compared with the “2005 Plan”, the “2009 Plan” is much more feasible in the following aspects. Firstly, it set out the judging criteria for early warning and demands for corresponding upstream and downstream information, proposed the landmark event for the launch, release and termination of early warning and emergency response, and made the early warning and emergency response more feasible. Secondly, it established the workflow and measures for each phase of emergency response of Ministry of Transport, added contents about command and coordination, transference of emergency supplies, inter-provincial support and information report, and clarified the working interfaces and connections between. Thirdly, it set up national road transport emergency supplies’ reserve management and compensation mechanism, clarified the conditions and procedures for the transference of reserved national road transport emergency supplies, and proposed relevant mech-

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

131

anism and principles for compensation. Fourthly, it put forward the compensation requirements for the requisition of emergency supplies of Ministry of Transport. In the principle of “compensation by users”, it clarified the application procedures for requisition compensation and enhanced the promptness of road emergency rescue and requisition of transport support supplies. Fifthly, it designated the organization responsible for information release, pointed out the connections between contents and its news release and clarified the channels to release emergency information of Ministry of Transport, which meets the requirements on timely and open information release.

4.3.2.2

Difference Between the “2009 Plan” and the “2005 Plan” in the Emergency Organization System

(1) Difference in structure of the organizational system In terms of the structural system alone, comparison shows that the emergency organization system in the “2009 Plan” is more reasonable, for it contains specialized emergency response organizations and a sound emergency management system. By contrast, the function of emergency management in the “2005 Plan” are mostly performed concurrently by general office, Department of Restructuring, Laws and Regulations, Highway Department, or other department of Ministry of Transport, which is not professional, clear or prominent about its emergency functions (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). (2) Difference in the functions of leading emergency organization From the perspective of the emergency organization’s functions, the “2009 Plan” made a key improvement to distinguish responsibilities at ordinary times from that at state of emergency in addition to more clearly defined responsibilities. It properly addressed the transition from routine management to emergency management, which happens to be the difficulty in the current emergency management system (Fig. 4.2). To be specific, the “2005 Plan” defined the responsibilities of the leading group for road transport emergency response as follows: Firstly, examine and approve emergency plan for road transportation and its related policies and plans. Secondly, make decisions to launch or terminate the state of emergency and emergency rescue activities for road transport and deal with especially serious emergencies for road transport that Ministry of Transport assumes responsibility for. Thirdly, if necessary, work with National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Health, State Environmental Protection Administration, State Administration of Work Safety and other relevant departments to formulate and implement joint action plan for road transport emergency, while supervising the implementation of emergency plan. Fourthly, in case of emergencies under the unified command by emergency response body of the State Council, the leading group for emergency response should follow the instructions of the State Council and take corresponding emergency actions. In case of emergencies addressed by emergency bodies at provincial level, the leading group for emergency response

132

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Fig. 4.1 Organizational system of emergency response outlined in the “2005 Plan”

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

Fig. 4.2 Organizational system of emergency response outlined in the “2009 Plan”

133

134

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

should provide emergency guidance or take coordinated actions in line with the requests of emergencies bodies at provincial level. Fifth, examine and approve the budget for contingency provision. Sixth, cope with other relevant major issues. The “2009 Plan” distinguishes the duties at ordinary times from those at state of emergency and defines the responsibilities for the national leading group for road transport emergency response at ordinary times as follows: First, examine and approve relevant emergency plan for road transportation and its related policies and plans. Secondly, examine and approve budget of contingency provision. Third, cope with other relevant major issues. The responsibilities at state of emergency are defined as follows. First, make decisions to start and terminate the state of emergency and emergency response to Level-I road transport emergency. Secondly, assume the unified leadership of emergency response to Level-I road transport emergency, give command and dispatch orders, and supervise and inspect the implementation. Third, in accordance with the State Council’s requirements or the needs for emergency response, designate the establishment of on-site working group and dispatch the group to the scene for emergency response. Fourth, if need be, cooperate with relevant departments of the State Council to formulate the joint action plan for emergency response and supervise its implementation. Fifth, in case of emergencies under the unified command by the State Council, the leading group for emergency response should follow the instructions of the State Council and take corresponding emergency actions. Sixth, deal with other related major issues. (3) Composition and responsibilities of the new Emergency Working Group The “2009 Plan” contains the contents about Emergency Working Group and clearly defines its composition and responsibilities, which is absent from the “2005 Plan”. After the leading group for emergency response decided to launch the early warning and emergency response to Level-I road transport emergency, the Emergency Working Group should be set up automatically by relevant departments of the Ministry of Transport and undertake designated emergency response work under the unified leadership of the leading group for emergency response. Emergency Working Group is comprised of eight teams. First, overall coordination team. The team is headed by the director of General Office, with leaders of the Highway Department and Department of Work Safety as deputy heads and other relevant staff from the General Office, Highway Department and Department of Work Safety as team members. The team is responsible for drafting important reports and comprehensive documents, submitting documents on emergency work to the CPC Central Committee, the State Council and other relevant departments in line with the requirements of leading group for emergency response and other emergency working groups, and undertaking other work assigned by the Emergency Working Group. Second, emergency road maintenance team. The chief, deputy head and other relevant staff members will respectively serve as the head, deputy head and team members. The team is responsible for organizing the repair and restoration of highway, coordinating for the trans-provincial transference of emergency response teams

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

135

and emergency machinery and materials, developing trans-provincial detour route and its implementation, mobilizing social forces to participate in the emergency rescue activities, drafting rescue and disaster-relief subsidy plan, and coping with other tasks assigned by Emergency Leading Group. Third, transport support team. The Director-General, Deputy Director-General and other relevant staff members of the Department of Road Transportation will respectively serve as the head, deputy head and team members. The team is responsible for organizing and coordinating the emergency transport support of personnel and materials, coordinating for combined transport, drafting emergency transport requisition compensation subsidy program, and coping with other work assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Fourth, communication support team: The team is headed by the Director-General of the Science and Technology Department, with leaders from the General Office and Communication Center as the deputy heads and other relevant staff members from the Science and Technology Department, General Office and Communication Center as team members. The team is responsible for the guarantee of telecommunications of the information system, video and telephone conference, fax and information transmission from the Ministry of Transport to local emergency management bodies for road transportation, as well as other works assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Fifth, news and publicity team: The Director-General and Deputy DirectorGeneral of the Department of Policies, Laws and Regulations respectively serve as the head and deputy head of the team, with other relevant staff members from the Department of Policies, Laws and Regulations and liaison man from the Information Office as team members. The team is responsible for collecting and processing relevant news reports, timely eliminating negative impacts caused by false reports, preparing for a press conference in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Leading Group to inform the society about the impact of emergency and the progress of emergency response, convening relevant news media to report exemplary deeds and role models in emergency response, guiding the local emergency management bodies to release the news, and handling other work assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Sixth, logistics support team. The Director, Deputy Director and other relevant staff members of the Service Center of Ministry of Transport respectively serve as the head, deputy head and team members. The team is responsible for 24-hour logistics service during the emergency period and handling other tasks assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Seventh, restoration and reconstruction team. The Director-General of the Comprehensive Planning Department heads the team, with leaders from the Highway Bureau, Department of Finance and Quality Supervision Station as deputy heads and other relevant staff members from Comprehensive Planning Department, Highway Bureau, Department of Finance, and Quality Supervision Station as team members. The team is responsible for gathering information about the devastation of the disaster, organizing post-disaster investigation and research, drafting post-disaster

136

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

restoration and reconstruction plans, ensuring the implementation of the plan, and handling other tasks assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Eighth, summary and assessment team. The team is headed by the chief of Highway Bureau and composed of other relevant members from other emergency working groups, expert advisory group and R&D institutes directly under Ministry of Transport. The team is responsible for compiling chronicle of events in emergency response, summarizing and evaluating major achievements and problems in emergency and its response, proposing suggestions for further work, submitting summary and assessment report to the Emergency Leading Group, and coping with other tasks assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. Judging from the structure of the above eight teams, the “2009 Plan” has made it clear that the road transport department is mainly responsible for emergency road maintenance and transport support in emergency response. The overall coordination team ensures the cooperation between road transport department and other departments, since road transport department is usually one of the main participants in response to major emergencies and needs to coordinate with other departments to carry out emergency response. The communication support team and logistics support team provide emergency resources for emergence road maintenance and road transportation. The establishment of restoration and reconstruction team and summary and assessment team highlighted the importance attached to post-disaster recovery mechanism and to some extent changed the general practice of “emphasizing emergency response while neglecting post-disaster recovery”. (4) Newly added routine emergency management bodies and its responsibilities In accordance with the “2009 Plan”, the Ministry of Transport set up Highway Management & Emergency Response Center as a national-level routine management body for road transportation emergency. Its day-to-day responsibilities are defined as follows: First, monitor the operations of national expressway, general national trunk highway and key passenger transport hubs, collect and process relevant information, and release road travel information to the public. Second, communicate with the related emergency management departments of the State Council and local emergency management bodies for road transportation, report information to higher levels and make it known to lower levels. Third, draft and revise various emergency plans for road transportation and related rules and regulations. Fourth, provide guidance for the compilation and implementation of local emergency plans for road transportation. Fifth, organize training and exercises on road transportation emergency response. Sixth, organize the research and development of emergency-related technology and participate in related international cooperation. Seventh, put forward suggestions on annual emergency budget. Eighth, participate in the compilation of emergency plans for road transportation. Ninth, guide or coordinate emergence responses in line with the requests of local emergency management bodies for road transportation. Tenth, supervise the building and management of road transportation emergency response resource reserve. Its responsibilities at state of emergency are defined as follows. First, answer alarms on a 24-hour basis. Second, receive and process information about forecast

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

137

and early warning by emergency coordination departments, follow up emergencies related to road transportation, and put forward suggestions to the Emergency Leading Group about the launch of Level-I early warning and emergency response. Third, gather and summarize information on the development of emergency and responses of the emergency working groups and compile daily report on emergency work. Fourth, in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Leading Group and emergency working groups, cope with specific daily work of emergency response and send emergency work documents to local emergency management bodies for road transportation. Fifth, handle other tasks assigned by the Emergency Leading Group. By comparison, the “2005 Plan” simply specified that “the Highway Department of the Ministry of Transport serves as the national-level routine management body for road transportation emergency” with the following responsibilities. First, organize the drafting and implementation of policies and measures for prevention, early warning and response to road transport emergencies and for emergency transport support. Second, organize the compiling and revision of various road transportation-related emergencies. Third, provide guidance for the compilation and implementation of local emergency plans for road transportation. Fourth, organize training and exercises on road transportation emergency response. Fifth, organize the research and development of emergency-related technology and participate in related international cooperation. Sixth, draft the annual emergency budget. Seventh, gather and process relevant information in routine emergency management work. Eighth, coordinate with the General Duty Office of the Ministry of Transport on answering alarms on a daily basis about road transportation emergencies. In short, the “2005 Plan” only specified the responsibilities of Highway Department of Ministry of Transport as routine management body at ordinary times, which directly reduced the operability and practicability of the emergency plan in practice. By contrast, the “2009 Plan” clarified the responsibilities of Highway Management & Emergency Response Center as routine management body at ordinary times and at emergency state respectively.

4.3.2.3

Difference in Emergency Mechanism of the “2009 Plan” and the “2005 Plan”

(1) Differences in early warning mechanism In the “2005 Plan”, the early warning of road transportation emergencies is categorized into four levels: Level I (especially serious), Level II (serious), Level III (relatively serious) and Level IV (common), which shall be indicated respectively in red, orange, yellow and blue. It’s consistent with the color indication of warnings in the Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies. For example, Level-I warning should be issued in the following emergencies. First, Level-I alert or response is launched in accordance with national specialized emergency plans, such as National Flood Control and Drought Relief Emergency Plan, National Emergency

138

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Plan for Destructive Earthquake. Second, the mainstream water levels of the large rivers rise above warning levels or there is major danger or breach in the embankment, major landslides caused by rain storms, bad weather like sudden blizzards or prolonged dense fog, or other situations that may cause serious damage or interruption of expressway and national trunk highways. Third, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.5 or above struck large and medium-sized cities or densely populated areas, or caused broken highway, bridge or tunnel, or resulted in heavy casualties and huge economic losses that require transportation of emergency supplies. Fourth, accident in the highway construction projects, road transportation and passenger and freight station severely threatened the life and property safety of the people and caused the death of more than thirty people or endangered the lives of more than fifty people. Fifth, leakage of highly toxic products may cause environmental pollution on roads and ecological damage that led to the loss of the regional functions, severely affected the normal production of life in the region, caused heavy causalities and huge economic losses, or severely damaged the living environment of the endangered species. Sixth, large-scale and far-reaching public health incident that involves a large number of people, leads to a large number of patients or multiple deaths and causes severe damages. Seventh, it should be issued for events that caused panic shopping and market chaos due to shortage in supply and violent fluctuations in price and required Ministry of Transport to organize the transportation of emergency materials. Eight, other special circumstances. If these emergencies could or might result in broken expressway or national trunk highways that need no less than forty-eight hours of rush repair and affect the traffic capacity of neighboring provinces, or that urgently need the State Council or Ministry of Transport to coordinate with relevant local departments, military departments and armed police for joint rescue, or that require the Ministry of Transport to organize and conduct national emergency materials transportation or adopt measures for epidemic prevention in transport, Level-I early warning should be issued. In the “2009 Plan”, the criteria for early warnings are more stringent. For instance, the criterion for Level-I early warnings was revised from “48-hour traffic disruption” to “24-hour traffic disruption”. The criterion for Level-II early warnings was revised from “24-hour traffic disruption” to “12-hour traffic disruption”. The criteria for Level-III and Level-IV early warnings were to be defined by provincial departments in charge of transport in line with local conditions. On the one hand, such change increases the initiative in emergency response. Judging from the snow storms in Southern China in 2008, the criterion of “48-hour traffic disruption” is too loose indeed. In a modern society with accelerated mobility, a “48-hour traffic disruption” in expressway and national trunk highways could severely affect social order. On the other hand, the redefined grading of early warnings is more commensurate with reality. The Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies explicitly stipulates that the grading of early warnings should be determined by the State Council and related departments, which led to the same grading system of early warnings regardless of different local risks. The snow storms in Southern China in 2008 showed that the same snow could cause quite different economic and social losses in Southern China and Northern China. The long-term low temperature, rain or

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

139

snow that’s common in Northern China could be a huge disaster in Southern China. Therefore, it’s more practical to authorize the provincial departments in charge of transportation to define criteria for Level-III and Level-IV early warnings. Moreover, the “2009 Plan” simplified the criteria for early warnings of emergencies, paid more attention to consequences than concrete forms and made further clarifications accordingly. For instance, the criteria for Level-I early warnings were simplified as follows. First, the emergency may cause damage, disruption or block of traffic in national trunk highways, or lead to a large number of stranded vehicles and people, or affect the traffic capacity of neighboring provinces, requiring no less than twenty-four hours of rush repair. Second, the emergency may interrupt the operation of important passenger terminals to get a large number of passengers stranded, requiring no less than 48 h for resumption of operation and evacuation. Third, the emergency triggered by lack in critical supplies or violent price fluctuations may severely affect the overall economic operation and normal life of the people in the whole country or large areas and goes beyond the capacity of provincial departments in charge of transportation. Fourth, other emergencies that may need the emergency support from Ministry of Transport. What’s worth mentioning in particular is that “the emergency that may interrupt the operation of important passenger terminals to get a large number of passengers stranded, requiring no less than 48 h for resumption of operation and evacuation” is a revised criterion based on the lessons learned from the snow storms in Southern China in 2008. The revision reflects improvement in three aspects. Firstly, risk analysis is more targeted. The “2005 Plan” contained no such criteria regardless of the risk’s existence in reality, which shows that the risk analysis in the “2005 Plan” was poorly targeted. Secondly, it attaches more importance to the social attributes of risks. The snow storms in Southern China in 2008 posed a systematic risk. The interruption of passenger terminals in railway and civil aviation increased pressure on highway passenger transportation. Therefore, in addition to analyze the risks facing the road system, it also required an analysis of risk transmission from the entire social system to the highway system. Thirdly, the departments in charge of transportation are undergoing reform. The Civil Aviation Administration of China has been made a subsidiary of the newly created Ministry of Transport. Therefore, important passenger terminals not only include highway passenger terminals, but also refer to a wider range of terminals. The criteria for early warnings in the “2009 Plan” are as shown in Table 4.3. More importantly, the “2009 Plan” clarified the specific procedures for issuing early warnings, including the procedures, mode, time limit, subject and other matters concerning the release of early warnings. The “2005 Plan” contained no contents in this aspect that have improved the operability of the “2009 Plan”. The “2009 Plan” defined the procedures to issue the early warnings as follows. Firstly, the road network center proposes to issue the Level-I early warning for a road transportation emergency. Secondly, the Emergency Leading Group determines within two hours whether to issue the Level-I early warning for the road transportation emergency. If yes, the Emergency Leading Group should sign and issue the official document to launch the Level-I early warning and report to the Emergency Management Depart-

140

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Table 4.3 Criteria for grading of early warnings in road transportation emergencies Level

Description

Color indication

Criteria

Level I

Especially Serious

Red

Emergency that may cause damage, disruption or block of traffic in national trunk highways, or lead to a large number of stranded vehicles and people, or affect the traffic capacity of neighboring provinces, requiring no less than 24 hours of rush repair Emergency that may interrupt the operation of important passenger terminals to get a large number of passengers stranded, requiring no less than 48 h for resumption of operation and evacuation Emergency triggered by lack in critical supplies or violent price fluctuations that may severely affect the overall economic operation and normal life of the people in the whole country or large areas and goes beyond the capacity of provincial departments in charge of transportation Other emergencies that may need the emergency support from Ministry of Transport

Level II

Serious

Orange

Emergency that may cause damage, disruption or block of traffic in national trunk highways, or lead to a large number of stranded vehicles and people, requiring no less than 12 h of rush repair Emergency that may interrupt the operation of important passenger terminals to get a large number of passengers stranded, requiring no less than 24 hours for resumption of operation and evacuation Emergency triggered by lack in critical supplies or violent price fluctuations that may severely affect the overall economic operation and normal life of the people in the province Other emergencies that may need the emergency support from provincial departments in charge of transportation

Level III

Relatively Serious

Yellow

To be defined by provincial departments in charge of transportation in line with local situations and by reference to the criteria for Level-I and Level-II early warnings

Level IV

Common

Blue

To be defined by provincial departments in charge of transportation in line with local situations and by reference to the criteria for Level-I, Level-II and Level-III early warnings

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

141

ment of the State Council, while getting the emergency working groups of Ministry of Transport ready to jump in. Thirdly, within one hour after the issuance of the document to launch the early warning, the road network center shall issue the document to relevant provincial-level emergency management organizations for road transportation and make calls to confirm the reception. Fourthly, in light of actual conditions, the Emergency Leading Group shall decide whether to issue the Level-I early warning to the public. If yes, the Emergency Leading Group shall contact the related collaboration departments within one hour and jointly sign and issue the document. Fifthly, the news and publicity team shall contact news media to release the jointly signed document for the launch of Level-I early warning to the public. Sixthly, the road network center shall immediately carry out emergency monitoring, report the early warning information to higher levels, follow and report the latest updates of the situation, establish a daily report system for the emergency development, and increase the frequency of early warning reports in line with the Emergency Leading Group’s requirements. Seventhly, the emergency working groups of the Ministry of Transport prepare for emergency response, while the emergency road maintenance team and transport support team prepare for the requisition of emergency supplies. (2) Difference in response mechanism The “2005 Plan” classified emergency response into four levels accordingly. Commensurate with the level of early warning, the emergency response at the corresponding level will be made. The Ministry of Transport adopts the following procedures for emergency response. Firstly, after the Ministry of Transport activates the emergency plan, the Emergency Leading Group shall set up Emergency Duty Office in the routine emergency management body (the Highway Department) as needed. The Emergency Duty Office shall provide 24/7 service until the end of the emergency state, keep in touch with on-site command post, gather information on emergency response, disseminate instructions from the Emergency Leading Group, and report relevant information to the State Council in a timely manner. Secondly, if the Ministry of Transport is in charge of emergency response, its Emergency Leading Group could dispatch a working group to the site or set up a command team on the site. Thirdly, if the local transport departments are not adequately equipped to reinforce, repair and smooth the traffic of the damaged roads, the Ministry of Transport shall enlist the support of other provinces. Fourthly, if need be, organize and invoke the inter-provincial forces for rush transportation. Fifthly, issue related measures for emergency response as needed. Sixthly, make decisions to lower the level of emergency response or terminate the state of emergency in line with the development of the situation. The “2009 Plan” specified the procedures to activate emergency response at length. For instance, the procedures to activate Level-I emergency response are defined as follows. Firstly, the road network center proposes to launch the Level-I emergency response for road transportation. Secondly, the Emergency Leading Group determines within two hours whether to launch Level-I emergency response. If yes, the Emergency Leading Group should sign and issue the official document to launch the Level-I emergency response, report to the State Council, and convene a telephone or

142

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

video conference of related departments of the State Council and local departments in charge of transportation within 24 h. The head of the Emergency Leading Group shall officially announce the launch of Level-I emergency response. The news and publicity team shall release the document to launch Level-I emergency response to the public. Thirdly, following the announcement of activating Level-I emergency response, the Emergency Leading Group shall set up on-site working group as needed and rush to the site for the command of the emergency response. Fourthly, following the announcement of Level-I emergency response, the road network center and emergency working groups shall immediately activate 24/7 service and carry out emergency responses in accordance with the emergency plan. In addition, the “2009 Plan” set out the procedures to terminate emergency response. Firstly, based on the information at hand, the road network center proposes to terminate Level-I emergency response to the Emergency Leading Group after confirming that the normal traffic on road has been resumed and that the road transportation emergency has been eliminated. Secondly, the Emergency Leading Group makes decisions about whether to terminate Level-I emergency response. If yes, sign and issue official document to terminate Level-I emergency response, put forward opinions on follow-up actions and report to the State Council and relevant departments within 24 h. Thirdly, the news and publicity team declares the termination of Level-I emergency response to the public, reports the measures that had been taken and their effects, and explains the measures that will be taken afterwards. The above comparison shows that the “2009 Plan” specified in detail the main body, procedures, time limit, measures and duties to activate and terminate emergency response, which made it much more feasible and operable than the “2005 Plan”.

4.3.2.4

Improvements in Resources Redeployment and Compensation, Professional Emergency Team and Information Release

In the emergency response operations in road transportation during the snow storms in Southern China and Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008, the problems concerning resource transference, requisition and compensation, professional emergency team and information release were quite prominent. The “2009 Plan” made supplements and clarifications on these issues. (1) Resources redeployment and compensation The emergency resources could be obtained through transference and/or requisition. The former refers to the use of national emergency materials reserve for road transportation, while the latter refers to the use of enterprises’ or civilian materials. In regard to the transference of emergency resources, the “2009 Plan” provided that when it’s necessary to transfer resources from the national emergency materials reserve for road transportation because of limited provincial reserve in quantity, type, time, geographical conditions or other aspects, the provincial emergency management body for road transportation shall file an application for the approval of the Emergency Leading Group. After being approved, the road network center shall

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

143

issue instructions on the transference of resources from national emergency materials reserve for road transportation. Within forty-eight hours after receiving the road network center’s notice on transference, the emergency materials reserve management bodies shall get the reserve materials delivered. In case of Level-I emergencies handled by Ministry of Transport, the national emergency materials reserve for road transportation could be “used without compensation”. The departments in charge of transportation of the place that uses the emergency materials reserve shall be responsible for the recycling, cleaning, disinfection and packaging of recyclable emergency materials. The storage organization shall check the materials and put them in storage. The consumed and damaged materials shall be supplemented by Ministry of Transport. In the case of Level-II, Level-III and Level-IV emergencies, the use of national emergency materials reserve for road transportation approved by Ministry of Transport shall be compensated by users in accordance with the relevant provisions. In regard to the requisition and compensation of emergency resources, the “2009 Plan” stipulated that the competent transportation departments at all levels shall be responsible for the requisition and compensation of emergency support resources for road transportation at their corresponding levels and the work report to the superior transportation departments. Following the end of emergency response operations for road transportation, the requisitioned organization/individual could submit an application for compensation for emergency requisition to the competent transportation departments who, after receiving the application, shall issue a receipt notice for administrative compensation in accordance with the relevant regulations, review the application based on the relevant requisition record and post-event survey and evaluation, issue the notice of compensation for emergency requisition after the application is approved, and make compensations in accordance with the relevant regulations. The administrative requisition could be compensated through cash, fiscal tax and fee deduction and exemption, replacement in kind, and others. (2) Set up professional teams There are two types of professional emergency response teams for road transportation: the emergency road maintenance team and the transport support team. Emergency road maintenance team: The transportation corps of the People’s Armed Police is brought into the system of the national emergency rescue forces to serve as the national emergency road maintenance team. The forces should be deployed in accordance with the relevant provisions. The emergency management bodies for road transportation at provincial and municipal levels are responsible for the establishment and daily management of the emergency road maintenance team mainly composed of maintenance & management departments for expressway and general national and provincial trunk highways, road administration departments, road operation and management organizations, and road maintenance engineering companies. In line with the size, structure and geographical distribution of the road network, the emergency management bodies for road transportation at provincial and municipal levels shall select road maintenance engineering enterprises through open bidding facing the whole society, sign cooperation contracts with the selected enterprises, and clarify the technical management requirements, conditions and pro-

144

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

cedures for emergency requisition, standards and procedures for requisition compensation, liabilities for breach of contract, and others, in a bid to normalize the emergency road maintenance activities for road transportation and protect the interests of enterprises participating in the emergency road maintenance. Transport support team: Local competent transportation department is responsible for the establishment of emergency transport team within its jurisdiction. On the principle of “combining routine operation with emergency response, assigning responsibilities to different levels, selecting the best, and following unified command”, the local competent transportation department shall build up emergency transport capacity reserve within its jurisdiction, select road passenger and cargo transport companies that meet the standards, sign emergency transport capacity transference agreement through consultation, and clarify the tonnage or number of seats, type and technical conditions of vehicles for emergency transport capacity reserve, requirements on transport personnel and vehicle management, conditions and procedures for emergency requisition, standards and procedures for requisition compensation, liabilities for breach of contract and others, in a bid to normalize the emergency transportation support activities for road transportation and protect the interests of enterprises participating in the emergency transport support. The “2009 Plan” also made it clear to keep a record of technical conditions of emergency equipment and emergency transportation capacity. For instance, the technical grading of emergency transport support vehicles is required to reach Level-II technical standards or above, with a service life of no more than five years or a travelled distance of no more than 150,000 km. A technical file system for emergency transportation vehicles is required to be set up to understand the technical conditions of the vehicles in a timely manner. The owner of emergency transportation vehicles is responsible for keeping these vehicles in good technical condition and enhancing daily maintenance of these vehicles. The emergency management bodies for road transportation and the emergency transportation support organizations are required to select qualified personnel for emergency transportation, including on-site managers, drivers, supercargo and loaders. In principle, the emergency transportation personnel should be aged between twenty and fifty-five, boasting good health, outstanding political calibre and good knowledge of relevant policies, laws and regulations. While performing the task of emergency transportation, they will be provided with permit card and necessary supplies by emergency management boy for road transportation. It’s also required to establish a corresponding file for emergency transportation capacity reserve, including the organization, vehicles and their tonnage (seats), type, and number of personnel, and report to superior emergency management organization for road transportation to put the file on record. In addition, it’s required to annually review the technical conditions, organizational and personnel changes of the reserve capacity, adjust and supplement the transportation capacity reserve in a timely manner, and report in time to the superior emergency management departments to update the file on record.

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

145

(3) Improve information release Problems concerning information release were revealed during the snow storms in Southern China and Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008. During the snow storms in Southern China in 2008 in particular, the information release affected the public judgment of road traffic and choice of travel mode, which is the best manifestation of cooperation between citizens and governments in emergency response. But in fact, a serious shortcoming in the emergency management at the time lied in that the public had no timely access to traffic conditions, resulting in a huge number of passengers in passenger terminals like the railway stations and bus stations, which intensified traffic pressure. Therefore, information release and acquisition are equally important. The “2005 Plan” only included provisions on acquisition and submission of information. “Emergency agencies for road transportation at all levels should timely gather and analyse the information about early warnings for possible road transportation incidents from various emergency monitoring agencies and timely report to the higher authorities as required. After receiving information on early warning, the emergency agencies for road transportation at all levels should verify and confirm the occurrence of traffic emergency and immediately report to superior transportation department. In case of Level-I and Level-II emergencies, emergency agencies for road transportation at all levels should report to the State Council and its Workplace Safety Committee within no more than two hours while coping with the emergency.” The “2009 Plan” contained provisions not only on information submission, but also on information release. “The road network center is responsible for the information release of especially serious emergencies of road transportation. The emergency management bodies for road transportation at all levels are responsible for the information release of other road transportation emergencies. The channels for information release include internal business system, website of Ministry of Transport, service websites managed by road network center, and news media authorized by Ministry of Transport. The information release on road transportation emergencies should enlist the coordination and communication with news & publicity team to provide the relevant information in time.” In accordance with the requirements on information disclosure in the Emergency Response Law, the “2009 Plan” contained more detailed provisions on news release. “The news & publicity team shall be responsible for the news release and publicity of the Level-I emergencies in road transportation, undertaking specific work concerning news release. Local emergency management bodies of road transportation shall be responsible for the news release of Level-II, Level-III and Level-IV emergencies as well as required timely report to the superior competent management departments of road transportation to be filed on record. The news and publicity team is responsible for organizing and publishing the press release on road transportation emergencies, announcement to launch the emergency plan, announcement to activate early warning and emergency response, and announcement to terminate the early warning and emergency response, providing the latest updates on the emergency, explaining problems related to the emergency, clarifying and responding to mistaken reports on the emergencies, giving publicity to the work progress on the road transporta-

146

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

tion emergency management, and convening press conference attended by various organizations and departments related to the emergency.” The news shall be mainly released via television, newspaper, radio and website in the form of press conference, news briefing, interviews by multiple media or an exclusive media, press release, and others. The materials for news release on the Level-I emergency of road transportation comprise speech at press conference, press release, references for Q&A and others. These materials shall be provided by other emergency working groups in a timely manner and reviewed by the news and publicity team. In particular, the materials for news release on the Level-I emergency of road transportation must be examined and reviewed by the Emergency Leading Group. In case of foreign-related emergencies, the Ministry of Transport shall hold consultation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs to jointly take in charge of the publicity and news reports, enlist the help of other relevant departments to establish a multi-department joint information release mechanism, and specify it in the form of meeting minutes or other normative documents. In contrast, the “2005 Plan” only made following provisions on news release. “Following the occurrence of a road transportation emergency, in line with the level of the emergency, the Emergency Leading Group shall be responsible for the news release on especially serious emergencies and the Department of Restructuring, Laws and Regulations of Ministry of Transport shall be responsible for the news release on serious emergencies. For the interview requests from reporters from foreign countries, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, the relevant departments shall consult the State Council Information Office for decision. For the foreign-related road transportation emergencies, the Ministry of Transport shall consult Ministry of Foreign Affairs to jointly cope with issues concerning news release. For the information on traffic interruption or long-term congestion on expressway, national or provincial highways, local highway departments and related operation and management bodies shall announce to the public through news media in the first time.” By comparison, the “2005 Plan” only contained the general principles, while the “2009 Plan” specified the main body of accountability and procedures for the work. In addition, in terms of emergency plan management, the “2009 Plan” clearly stated that the emergency plan could be revised under the following conditions. Firstly, the laws and regulations that serve as the emergency plan’s foundation are adjusted or modified, or the state introduces new laws and regulations related to emergency management that require updates of the emergency plan. Secondly, based on the lessons from routine emergency exercises and drills and the especially serious emergency responses of road transportation, the emergency plan needs to be revised. Thirdly, the emergency management bodies are restructured due to institutional reform. Moreover, the “2009 Plan” stipulated the frequency to revise the emergency plan. In principle, the emergency plan should be revised and improved biennially, while the data on the emergency road maintenance, emergency transport support team and emergency materials should be updated annually. The “2005 Plan” simply stipulated that “competent authorities of transportation at all levels should consult relevant departments to check the implementation of the emergency plans for road transportation, identify problems, come up with suggestions for improve-

4.3 Implementation and Revisions

147

ment, and timely report to the Ministry of Transport who will revise and update the emergency plan in line with the circumstances.” What’s worth mentioning in particular is that after the snow storms in Southern China and Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008, the Ministry of Transport developed a better understanding about the essence of emergency plan. In the Notice of Ministry of Transport on Issuing Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation (No. 296 [2005]) announced on 1 July 2005, Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation was marked as “confidential”. However, the Public Emergency Response Plan for Road Transportation (2009 version) was formulated after extensive consultations and the finalized version was released to the public on a press conference on June 3, 2009, together with detailed explanation on the background, priorities and implementation of the emergency plan. The “2009 Plan” also contained a special clause on publicity and training related to the plan. “The road network center and other relevant departments shall organize the compilation of unified textbooks and materials for the training of emergency response, illustrated popular books that are friendly to readers, convenient to carry and easy to find, improve the effectiveness of publicity and training, and strengthen the publicity of road transportation emergency support through multiple channels like radio, television, website, newspaper, magazines, and books. Competent departments of transportation at all levels shall incorporate the emergency publicity and training into daily management, make it an indicator for annual assessment and conduct emergency training on a regular basis. In principle, emergency support personnel should receive training on emergency response at least once every two years. Their training record and test scores shall serve as the reference for the dynamic management of emergency personnel, in a bid to improve the quality and professional skills of emergency support personnel for road transportation.”

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System 4.4.1 Evaluation of China’s Emergency Planning System It can be seen from the operation of the emergency planning system for road transportation in the snow storms in Southern China and Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 that the core problem of the system lies in the poor practicability. In fact, it is more a common problem facing the whole emergency planning system than a problem limited to the emergency planning system for road transportation. To be specific, there exist the following main problems in China’s emergency planning system. Some plans are similar in the format and contents and divorced from their respective realities. Some plans go on at considerably great length to even more than 100 pages, making it inconvenient to look up and translate into practice. Plans at different levels and in various types are not connected or integrated enough and lack in standardized interactive procedures. Some plans pay more attention to the format and neglect con-

148

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

tents on emergency plan management, like training, exercises and drills. Some other plans are based on low level of technology, with inadequate advanced measures.2 All these affect the effective implementation of the plans.

4.4.1.1

External Reasons

Poor practicability of the emergency planning system can be partially attributed to external reasons. (1) Random compilation The Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies stipulated the composition of emergency planning system and put forward rigid requirements for the “existence or absence” of the emergency plan. The Emergency Response Law stipulated the composition of emergency plan and put forward normative requirements on the emergency plan’s contents, requiring the plan to “be specific about the organizational setup of emergency management bodies, the duties of administration, the mechanism for prevention and early warning, the procedure for emergency handling, the emergency support measures, the measures for post-emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction, etc.”. However, neither the Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies nor the Emergency Response Law imposed requirements on the procedures to compile emergency plans. It follows that almost all of the emergency plans were in fact copied from the ones formulated by the departments at a higher level. The overall plan was copied by the departments of the State Council and then departments at the provincial, municipal and county level successively. Likewise, specialized plans and departmental plans were copied by each successively lower level in the same industry or system. Therefore, in spite of large quantity of plans, most of them are similar in contents. If the initial plan is poorly operable, the entire emergency planning system won’t be practical. (2) Misunderstanding about emergency planning Within the framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, emergency planning takes a central role. It is often mistaken as the easiest task of the four components of the strategy as emergency response institutions involve institutional setup and staffing, the emergency response mechanism is shaped by the emergency response institutions, and the formulation of rules and regulation takes an even longer time. Moreover, given that the emergency plan falls under the administrative plan and lacks rigid binding force, quite a few organizations and departments don’t pay enough attention to the emergency plans. They fail to see the connection between the plans and emergency response institutions, mechanisms and rules and regulations, and perceive the emergency plan as a document that must be prepared to report to the leadership rather than an indispensable part of the emergency response 2 Liu

Tiemin. Compilation and Management of Public Emergency Plans. China Emergency Management, 2007 (1).

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

149

system. Therefore, many organizations and departments just put the emergency plans aside after formulating them. (3) Lack of drills Compared with the compilation of the emergency plan, the emergency drills are much more complicated. Since emergency drill targets a specific emergency, it’s necessary to simulate the occurrence of the emergency. This is particularly true for the drills of the emergency plans for road transportation. Assuming a bridge collapse or a damaged road, the normal traffic should be interrupted, followed by far-reaching effects, which made it difficult in practice. That’s also why there lacks in emergency drills in reality. Even there were a handful of emergency drills, they were conducted as a mere formality. (4) Preferences based on personal experience Preferences caused by personal experience still play a role in emergency operations. In scenarios of pressure, the administrators are used to making initial decisions on the basis of previous experience. In addition, since the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response has not been put in place for a long time, quite a few organizations and departments are accustomed to traditional method of convening meetings to coordinate emergency response activities. Of course, it may also be that due to the poor operability of emergency plans, administrators have to stick to the traditional method. That’s also why the launch of emergency plan lags behind emergency actions in reality, for it didn’t occur to administrators to launch the emergency plan before taking emergency actions.

4.4.1.2

Internal Reasons

The more important reasons rest with the emergency plan and emergency planning system. (1) Functional positioning Does the emergency plan apply to all emergencies? To answer this question, we need to clarify the functional positioning of the emergency plan first. Emergency plan needs to be based on the hazard identification. The emergency plan comes with the identified hazard. No identified hazard, no emergency plan. Only the emergency plans based on the hazard identification are targeted. To be more specific, the emergency plan applies to the identified hazards, but it’s difficult to apply the emergency plan to the hazards that can’t be identified currently. The emergency plan also applies to easily identifiable hazards, but it’s difficult to apply to hazards that are difficult to identify. Among the four types of hazards of natural disaster, accidental disaster, public health incident and social security incident, the potential hazards of the former three types are relatively easy to identify, but the potential hazards of the social security incidents are difficult to identify. Therefore, the emergency plan’s applicability to the social security incidents is inevitably low.

150

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Even in case of easily identifiable hazards like natural disaster, accidental disaster and public health incidents, the emergency plan doesn’t apply to all circumstances. In normal conditions, hazard identification shall distinguish “eliminable hazards” from “non-eliminable hazards”. The eliminable hazards should be eliminated immediately, instead of preparing an emergency plan and waiting for the occurrence of such hazards. However, appropriate and targeted emergency plans should be compiled for the “non-eliminable hazards” for precaution and preparation. Therefore, judging from functional positioning, the emergency plan is not omnipotent and doesn’t apply to all types of risks and risk scenarios, and thus should be used in a targeted manner. Indiscriminate and undifferentiated emergency plans could lead to overly passive emergency management or less targeted emergency preparedness and create a false impression for administrators to believe that they’ve been fully prepared and thus drop their guards or slacken their vigilance. In this way, instead of serving the function of prevention and preparation, the emergency plan might backfire instead. (2) Structural system Under the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, the previously isolated emergency plans turn into an emergency planning system. In this regard, the building of the emergency planning system could be seen as the popularization and expansion of the manufacturing enterprises’ mature methods for safety management to emergency management in natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents. Seen from the perspectives of function and applicability, the emergency plan could be categorized into comprehensive plan, specialized plan, on-site plan and individual plan. The comprehensive plan, also known as overall plan, describes emergency principles and ideas, emergency organizations and their responsibilities, general emergency procedures and others. It’s the top design of the emergency planning system. The specialized plan distinguishes different characteristics of specific risks and specifies the emergency organization, procedures and measures in response to a specific type of emergency, making the plan more targeted. The on-site plan is compiled based on the specialized plan to satisfy the specific needs of the situations, usually for riskier places or important protected areas, make it more operable. The individual plan is a temporary emergency plan compiled for large-scale public gatherings or high-risk construction activities and loses effect with the end of these activities. The Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies accordingly specified the fundamental structure of China’s emergency planning system: overall plan, departmental plan, local plan and public service organizations’ plan, covering plans classified in terms of functions and applicability as well as plans classified in terms of main body of compilation. Compared with the separate emergency plans prior to the launch of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, the emergency planning system features that the overall plan’s function is above the total functions of other plans. The fulfillment of the overall function of the emergency planning system depends on the practicability of individual emergency plans on the one hand and the matching and cooperation between emergency plans on the other hand. As far as the latter is concerned, it can be divided into two situations. First, the emergency plans that are

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

151

supposed to be in close cooperation lack a substantial cooperation mechanism and maintain independent from each other, and thus cannot form a joint force in emergency response and hinders the fulfillment of the system’s overall function. Second, the emergency plans that are supposed to be in close cooperation conflict with each other, which not only impedes the fulfillment of the overall function, but also inhibits the fulfillment of the individual plan’s functions. The main reason for the first situation lies in that it neglects the relationship between specialized plan and departmental plan, leaving the emergency planning system in a loose structure. The second situation could be mainly attributed to the insufficient integration of the emergency response institution that leads to conflicts between departmental plans. In the snow storms in Southern China in 2008, the exacerbating disaster of frozen rain and snow on expressway was directly linked to the conflicts in emergency plans of road transportation department and traffic police department. In accordance with the Public Emergency Response Plan of Jiangsu Province for Road Transportation issued in 2007, the highway administrative department and maintenance department shall clean up the snow cover on expressway in the first time. In accordance with the emergency plan of the traffic police department, however, the expressway covered by snow shall be closed. Therefore, when both departments made emergency responses in line with their respective plans, there occurred a functional conflict. In fact, this is the direct reason for the long-term and large-scale interruption of traffic on expressway in the snow storms in Southern China in 2008, for that the snow-covered national and provincial trunk highways during the same period allowed vehicles to pass at low speed and no vehicles were stranded. When multiple expressways were hit by heavy snow in 2009, the traffic police department learned the lesson and, instead of closing the expressways, allowed vehicles to pass at low speed and ensured smooth traffic. No similar situation of long-term and large-scale interruption in 2008 happened. In this case, the conflicts of emergency plans don’t lie in the plan itself, but in the complexity of the road transportation management system. Therefore, due to the loose structure of the system, the departmental plans cannot form a joint force and are even likely to conflict with each other, undermining the overall performance of the emergency planning system. (3) Mechanism of action The fulfillment of the emergency planning system’s function relies on the system structure as well as the achievement of individual plans’ functions. How to give full play to the functions of individual plans? That requires in-depth analysis of emergency plan’s mechanism of action. Whether it’s expressed as “emergency” or “unexpected public event”, its primary feature is being “public” followed by the secondary feature of being “unexpected”. In this case, the main purpose of emergency response is to avoid the loss of public interest, which is the responsibility of all administrative departments. Due to artificial division of departments and interest conflicts between departments, almost all administrative affairs have to go through various departments. That’s why administrative center at all levels came into being, with the purpose of solving the problems of segmented responsibilities. In contrast to daily administrative

152

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

management, emergency management emphasizes quick response and attaches more importance to the integration of administrative power. Therefore, the core of emergency response lies in collaboration. Generally speaking, the response to a large-scale emergency requires the interactive mobilization of at least thirteen functions: receiving alarm and issuing notice, command and control, alarm and emergency announcement, communications, detection and assessment of latest development, guard and control, evacuation of crowds, shelters for evacuees, medical service and public health, public relations, safety of emergency personnel, fire control and rescue, and on-site recovery, involving collaboration between eight departments in emergency command center, security supervision, public security, public health, environmental protection, civil affairs, radio and television, and transportation.3 So what is the essence of emergency collaboration? Since there already exists collaboration between government departments, what is the essential difference of daily collaboration from emergency collaboration? In short, the difference lies in the time limit for collaboration. The time limit for collaboration in daily administrative affairs is less bonding and more flexible, with enough time for repeated interest negotiations. In contrast, the time limit for emergency cooperation is more bonding and less flexible, leaving no time for buck passing. Therefore, the best solution is to predict the conditions that would require collaboration between departments and define in advance their respective rights and responsibilities, in a bid to establish a force of constraint in the form of contract. The contract shall take effect the moment that the predicted conditions for collaboration emerge. Then the relevant departments shall, in accordance with the contract, collaborate with each other to make quick response to the utmost. In this way, the requirement of the emergency’s primary feature of “being public” are met, followed by satisfying the need of the emergency’s secondary feature of “being unexpected”. The contact here is the emergency plan formulated in advance. Therefore, emergency collaboration is regulated through emergency plan. Then, what’s the condition to launch the emergency plan? It is the occurrence of the conditions that require emergency collaboration, or to say, the predicted conditions that require collaboration. This condition depends on the severity of the emergency’s damages to public interest. When the damage reaches a certain level, a signal to activate the emergency plan can be sent. This is actually an idea for early warning of emergency. “Early warning is a transitional measure from normal state to emergency state. It’s an emergency measure based on response experience or progressive development of events…Once the emergency situation announced by early warning occurs, the government could enter the state of emergency immediately. In this case, the announcement of early warnings and the occurrence of emergency situation could serve as common conditions to activate emergency management. In case of events that can’t be warned in advance, the government’s declaration of emergency shall serve as the signal to transit from routine management to emergency man-

3 Liu

Tiemin. Compilation and Management of Public Emergency Plans. China Emergency Management, 2007 (1).

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

153

agement.4 ” Therefore, though emergency warning doesn’t constitute a part of the emergency response, it’s still necessary to specify the emergency warning system in the emergency plan, for it’s the condition to activate the emergency plan. In the end, how to regulate emergency operations? To answer the question, it’s a must to understand the essential difference between emergency operation and routine administrative activities, which is also the difference between emergency management and daily administration. The Emergency Response Law mainly aims to increase the discretionary power of emergency operation. If the emergency operation is regarded as the combination of people with things, the discretionary power has been increased in the following aspects. To begin with, it increases people’s subjective initiative. The emergency commander could act within the scope authorized by law. For instance, the commander could isolate a specific group of people and restrict their freedom of movement. Secondly, it expands the types of emergency resources and enhances the emergency operators’ capability to allocate resources, so that the emergency commander can mobilize their own resources as well as social resources through legal requisition or other ways. Therefore, the regulation on emergency operation should focus on the actions of emergency commander and allocation of emergency resources, which constitute main contents of the emergency plan. In this way, a reaction logic could be established between emergency plan and administrative departments. When the emergency’s threat to public interest rises to a certain level, an early warning is issued, triggering the launch of emergency plan that brings the cooperation contract between administrative departments into effect. Then, the emergency commander allocates emergency resources to various departments based on the knowledge and experience on emergency and coordinates the departments’ emergence response actions. Therefore, the emergency plan’s mechanism of action works in the following way. On the basis of risk analysis, the response to a specific risk requires integration of emergency resources from various departments and coordinated emergency actions. In a bid to improve the efficiency of emergency actions, it’s necessary to reach an agreement between various departments on resource allocation and operational procedures. In this sense, emergency plan is essentially the cooperation agreement reached by various departments in advance to address a specific risk. Therefore, specialized plan for a specific risk is quite important, with immediate impact on the emergency responsibilities and obligations shared by specific risk management department and other related departments. In reality, however, due to the professional nature of emergency plans, a majority of departments are unfamiliar with emergency plans and don’t really understand the functions of emergency planning system and specialized plans. Therefore, they only copied the emergency plan’s format, but not the mechanism of action. One of the important manifestations is that there lacks a multi-departmental cooperation mechanism for the compilation of emergency plans. As each department compiles the emergency plan separately, they can only describe the functions of their own department, without reference to the 4 Yu

An. Theoretical Framework for the Enactment of Emergency Response Law. Law Science Magazine, 2006 (4).

154

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

functions of other departments. In fact, it made emergency management equivalent of daily administration. (4) Insufficient data In accordance with the Emergency Response Law, the emergency plan constitutes the most important prevention and preparation mechanism. Then, how to give full play to the emergency plan’s role in prevention and preparation? In theory, it mainly rests with three factors. First, where’s the “ineliminable risk”? At the current cognitive level, adequate analysis and imagination of “ineliminable risks” are the prerequisite to leverage the emergency plan’s role in prevention and preparation. Secondly, where are the requisite and available resources to cope with “ineliminable risks”? The requisite resources are essential condition for handling of “ineliminable risks”, while available resources are sufficient condition. The two are usually not completely consistent and sometimes there might be a large difference. Thirdly, what are the operational procedures to distribute available resources and requisite resources? If these resources are from different areas or departments, it’s necessary to reach an agreement in advance on the resources’ allocation so as to save time for emergency response, quickly allocate resources and control the situation as soon as possible. The three factors are all linked with one another in a progressive manner. The types and quantity of the requisite resources can be determined only after the initial status, evolution path and predicted consequence of “ineliminable risks” are clarified. Then, the types and quantities of available resources must be known, so as to analyze the difference between requisite resources and available resources. Only on the basis of such analysis, the operational procedures of resource allocation can be established and the resource allocation plan can be formed. It’s for sure that the above three factors and the entire process depend on the active participation of the operators. Therefore, in addition to operational procedures, the emergency plan must specify “ineliminable risks” and requisite and available resources, all of which are prerequisite for the smooth operation of the procedures. Otherwise, the practicability of the emergency plan will be greatly weakened. At present, however, nearly all emergency plans lack fundamental data on risks and resources, mainly due to insufficient and incomplete fundamental data. The establishment of a risks and resources database is a fundamental job that relies on an institution for long-term implementation. In the snow storms in Southern China in 2008, this problem was quite prominent. The dispersion of emergency resources and discrepancy of information severely impaired the effectiveness of emergency operation. The subsequent investigation by the research team shows that there was a large quantity of anti-skid chains lying in a warehouse somewhere while the stranded vehicles on road were in urgent need of them. It’s the same case in “Wenchuan Earthquake”. Without access to comparative data on the geographic information from before and after the earthquake, it’s difficult to understand the disaster situations and resource demands of different areas hit by earthquake, which impaired the efficiency in resource allocation. Under the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, the institutions, mechanism and rules and regulations of emergency response advance at a slower

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

155

pace than emergency planning, which also affects the performance of the emergency planning system. As emergency planning reflects emergency response institutions, mechanism and rules and regulations which in turn decide how well the plan is implemented.

4.4.2 How to Improve China’s Emergency Planning System 4.4.2.1

The Meaning of Management Optimization

The management optimization of the emergency planning system incorporates three levels of meaning. (1) Overall optimization In addition to improve the practicability of individual emergency plans, it’s also necessary to optimize the internal structure of the emergency planning system and improve the overall performance of the system. Given the relation between its components, it’s also necessary to enhance the overall performance of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. (2) Continuous optimization Emergency plan starts from a hypothetical specific risk. It goes without saying that there always exist differences between real emergency and hypothetical specific risks. Therefore, the optimization of the emergency planning system is a continuous process with a starting point but no ending point. It should be revised and improved from time to time in line with the risk changes, resource distribution and the reform of administrative departments. (3) Scientific optimization The optimization of the emergency planning system should be based on objective understandings of the emergency plan’s functions. “The-more-the-better principle” doesn’t apply to the emergency plan, nor does “the-more-complex-the-better criteria” apply to the emergency planning system. The necessity of individual emergency plans and the scale of the emergency planning system depend on the quantity of specific risks.

4.4.2.2

Management Optimization of Emergency Plan

(1) Clarify the positioning of the plan and begin the plan’s preparation with the risk analysis that emphasizes social attributes. Targeted emergency plans should be based on risk survey to identify “ineliminable risks”, conduct risk analysis and clarify the initial status, evolution path and predicted consequences of risks. The risk analysis should pay special attention to “ripple

156

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

effects” of risks. For natural disasters, “disaster chain” is a relatively mature analytical tool. After a long-term research, the academics have summed up four types of “disaster chains” in catastrophe: rainstorm (typhoon)—rainstorm—disaster prevention—mudslide—flood—destruction of farmland, road and house—inundation and death; earthquake—(rain and snow)—collapse—sand boils—damaged urban buildings (houses, factories and life line)—traffic congestion—communication breakdown—gas leak, poisoning, fire, etc.; drought—sand and dust—sudden heat—water shortage—damaged farmland, forest and grassland—buried village and congested city; cold-air outbreak—snow storm (frost, low temperature)—biological freezing disaster (mechanical failure, structural damage, damage to agricultural and pastoral areas).5 These four types of disaster chains are composed of first-episode disasters like rainstorm, earthquake, drought, and cold-air outbreak, secondary and derivative disasters. The analytical method can also be applied to other types of emergencies. It’s important to point out that China has entered into a high-risk society. The social attributes of risks have overtaken the natural attributes. And thus, the risk analysis should stress the social attributes of risks in particular. (2) Streamline the system structure to improve the collaboration and compatibility between emergency plans. In terms of the most simplified structure, under the guidance of “hierarchical management”, the emergency planning system’s structure in theory is shown in Fig. 4.3, covering all types of emergency plans at all levels of the State Council, province, municipality and county. To begin with, the emergency planning system could be divided into two categories: temporary plan system and normal plan system. The former refers to the plan for a risk activity that loses its effect with the end of the activity. Therefore, the temporary plan should be on-site plan, that is, an emergency response plan formulated in line with the imagined risks that might happen at the scene. For large-scale events like Olympic Games or World Expo that cover wide areas, last for a long term and involve a wide range of risks, emergency plans should be compiled in line with the normal plan system. Secondly, within the normal emergency planning system, there should be a generic relationship between overall plan and specialized plans as well as between specialized plans and departmental plans. Guided by the principle of “unified leadership” and “categorized management”, given the necessity and rationality of the professional command centers’ existence, the structure of optimized normal plan system is shown in Fig. 4.4. In regard to the generic relation between the overall plan and specialized plans, it’s necessary to pay attention to the following points. First, with the focus on unified command, various specialized plans for natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents should share the same organizational system and workflow mechanism for professional command centers. Due to differences in the attributes of the four types of risks, the degree of emphasis on the four 5 Ma

Zongjin. Some Thought on China’s Emergency Response to Natural Disasters. China Emergency Management, 2017 (2). Shi Peijun. The Third Paper on Theory and Practice of Disaster Research. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2002 (3).

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

157

Fig. 4.3 Optimized structure of emergency planning system

stages of prevention & preparation, early warning & monitoring, rescue & response, and rehabilitation & recovery may be different. For instance, the emergency plan for natural disasters puts more emphasis on early warning, while the emergency plan for accidental incidents places much more stress on rehabilitation and recovery. Secondly, if a specific emergency goes beyond the scope of a specialized plan but still fits into a category of the event, the relevant specialized plans for such category of the event should be initiated. The specialized plans still share the same organizational system and workflow mechanism of the professional command center for such category of event. Thirdly, if a specific emergency goes beyond the scope of a specialized plan and doesn’t fit into a category of the event, the relevant specialized plans for other categories of events should be initiated. These specialized plans share the same organizational system and workflow mechanism in the overall emergency plan. Should a specific emergency involve more than two categories of events, it must be a large-scale emergency and requires unified response from the government at the corresponding level. In this case, the overall plan should be initiated. In regard to the generic relation between specialized plans and departmental plans, it’s necessary to pay attention to the following points. Firstly, if a specific risk requires

158

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

Fig. 4.4 Structure of optimized emergency planning system

response from only one department, the specialized plan for such a risk is a departmental plan. If a specific risk requires joint responses from multiple departments, these departments should jointly compile a specialized plan for the risk and formulate their own departmental plans under the specialized plan. Secondly, since a department may participate in the compilation of multiple special plans and need to prepare a departmental plan under each special plan, it follows that a department may have a number of departmental plans. In this case, these departmental plans should be integrated into one. (3) Strengthen coordination and establish a cooperation mechanism for emergency plans Specialized plans constitute the core of the emergency planning system. A specialized plan targets a specific risk. Based on the risk analysis report, the relevant departments responsible for dealing with the risk should be specified and jointly draw up the specialized plan. In the preparation of the plan, each department should, in line with the evolution path and predicted consequences of the risk, clarify the responsibilities and actions to be taken by each department after the occurrence of the emergency. They have to check and determine the type, attributes and storage place of their emergency resources in advance, so as to know the total amount, order of transference and optimal logistics route of emergency resources. Only in this way can the information asymmetry be eliminated to the maximum extent, in a bid to ensure resource sharing and mutually complementary support, improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of emergency response. After each department’s responsibilities, joint action procedure

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

159

and resource sharing plan are worked out and all departments reach a consensus, the specialized plan comes into being. Then, each department further refines its responsibilities, actions and resource requirements in line with the specialized plan, arrives at a consensus on the departmental plan and ensures the operability of the plan. The core of the process is to establish a multi-departmental cooperation mechanism on emergency plans. It first relies on the design of organizational system to make it clear that the comprehensive department should organize and conduct a special risk assessment. Based on the risk assessment report, the comprehensive department should convene related departments for discussion and in case of divergent views, coordinate the authority-responsibility relationship and conflict of interest in a bid to facilitate a consensus. In the current situation, only the emergency offices of the people’s governments at all levels can assume this responsibility. Therefore, it’s necessary to increase the staffing level of emergency offices and redesign their functions to organize risk assessment and joint compilation of emergency plans, instead of the current pure function of filing plans on record. (4) Establish a database of risks and resources to lay a solid foundation In fact, the Emergency System Development Plan during the 11th Five-Year Plan period has imposed definite requirements on the development of risk database. The urgent priority is to actively promote the establishment of various risk databases in accordance with the requirements, complete the establishment as soon as possible and make them important supports for specialized plans. Meanwhile, emergency resource databases are equally important. Firstly, the relevant departments involved in the specialized plans need to check and find out the type, quantity, attributes, storage places and other information about emergency resources before setting up a database. Secondly, the emergency resource databases of the relevant departments involved in a specialized plan should be integrated. Thirdly, the emergency resource databases for various specialized plans should be merged and reclassified to form databases of classified local emergency resources. If there exists a regional cooperation mechanism for emergency management, the databases of classified local emergency resources should be merged to form databases of classified regional emergency resources. (5) Establish an emergency plan management system to standardize the preparation and revision of emergency plans Neither the Overall Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies nor Emergency Response Law has provided for the preparation and revision of emergency plans. Therefore, it’s urgent to set up an emergency plan management system to specify the procedures to prepare and revise emergency plans. On the one hand, given that the existing emergency planning system is too large in scale and difficult for retrieval, it needs to be streamlined. On the other hand, with the emergence of new risks, new understanding about the existing risks may come into being, which requires new emergency plans. In this way, it’s necessary to adopt new procedures for the preparation of the emergency plan, incorporating risk analysis, cooperative discussion, resource investigation, and release of review report into the legal procedures for the preparation of emergency plans. It’s also necessary to set up a rigid

160

4 China’s Emergency Planning System …

constraint mechanism and expand the main body of emergency plan preparation, which means an end to the practice of preparing emergency plan by a single department. In the new practice, the emergency offices of the people’s governments at all levels are in charge of unified organization and coordination to hire external expert panels for professional risk analysis and assessment, carry out resource investigation, registration and classification within the organization, convene multiple departments for repeated consultations before reaching a consensus, and send the finalized plan to a third-party agency for independent review and approval, before making the plan public and widely publicizing it. For the emergency plans that have been completed and are in effect, the revision management shall be strengthened by specifying the minimum frequency of revisions within a certain period, establishing an interactive mechanism between emergency plan revisions, emergency drills, institutional reform and changes of resource stock, followed by clarifying the time and frequency to revise the emergency plan in line with the changes concerning emergency drills, institutional reform and resource stock. (6) Strengthen comprehensive drills of emergency plans and improve the effectiveness of drills The emergency plan drill is a direct means to improve the practicability of the emergency plan and thus should focus on the actual results, instead of making it just a show. It requires to simulate a real scene and aims to find out the problems with the emergency plan, rather than to show the expected effects of the emergency plan. In terms of the organizers of the drills, the drills could be divided into two categories: departmental drills and comprehensive drills. Departmental drills are small in scale and could be used as reference for the revisions of the departmental plan. Comprehensive drills cover a wide range of areas and departments and can be used as reference for the revisions of specialized plans. If the specialized plan is revised, departmental plan should be revised accordingly. In other words, departmental drills cannot expose the problems in specialized plans, but comprehensive drills could help identify problems with departmental plans. Due to the high cost of emergency drills, the focus should be put on strengthening comprehensive drills to ensure the economic efficiency of the investment in emergency drills. Therefore, it’s important to clearly define the minimum frequency of emergency drills for specialized plans within a certain period. And most particularly, emergency plan drills can only reveal problems in feasibility of the plans, but it’s difficult to find out the plan’s shortcomings in applicability to the real situation, since emergency plan drills are conducted in accordance with the presupposed scenarios in the emergency plan. In the risk scenes simulated in line with the emergency plan, the emergency drill aims to test the reasonability of emergency procedures, availability of emergency resources and effectiveness of emergency measures in practice. Therefore, the risk scenes for the emergency plan drills are determined by the emergency plan, and not vice versa. In reality, however, it’s the risk scenes that serve as the starting point of the emergency plan.

4.4 Improving China’s Emergency Planning System

161

(7) Conduct overall planning and promote the coordinated development of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response Since the emergency response institutions, mechanism and rules and regulations lag behind emergency planning, it’s imperative to accelerate their development while promoting coordinated development of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. The following measures could be adopted to improve the emergency plan’s performance. Firstly, enhance the professionalism of the emergency response institutions by establishing an institutional emergency organizational system, providing corresponding staffing and financial support, and clearly defining the emergency organizational system’s responsibilities respectively in routine and emergency situations. Secondly, refine the operational procedures of the emergency response mechanism, clarify the conditions, main body, procedures, format and duties concerning the release of early warnings and activation of emergency plan, and establish a rigid constraint mechanism. Thirdly, push forward the localization of the legal framework of emergency response, establish the regulations and rules on risk identification, classification, registration and announcement, incorporate risk management into emergency management legislation, and set up an accountability system accordingly.

Chapter 5

Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity: A Case Study of Shenzhen

From the perspective of policy process, its five stages of agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation constitute a policy cycle. It applies not only to a single policy but also to a policy system. At the macro level, since China’s emergency management policy system has entered the stage of policy implementation, policy evaluation will inevitably become the focus of emergency management at next stage. This is an essential requirement of the policy process’s internal logic. As far as emergency management in reality is concerned, at the micro level, some local governments have developed almost sound emergency management policy system, but they still need improvements at several stages and urgently need to set up an emergency response capacity assessment system to provide targeted guidance on building emergency response capacity. Therefore, emergency management assessment is a current necessity for emergency response capacity building. Based on this, the research team has worked with Shenzhen Municipal Emergency Command Center, Futian District Emergency Command Center and Bao’an District Emergency Command Center in Shenzhen to promote emergency response capacity assessment and improve emergency management policy system. At the forefront of reform and opening-up endeavor, Shenzhen features a large migrant population, prominent social contradictions and frequent occurrence of emergencies. That’s why Shenzhen Municipal Government lays great store by emergency management and is among the first batch of local governments to carry out professional emergency management. It established Emergency Command Center as early as in the 1990s. After the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response was launched, Shenzhen has attached more importance to emergency management and has taken the lead in this area. In 2009, a reform was undertaken in Shenzhen to establish greater government departments. At the level of municipal government, Emergency Command Center, Administration of Workplace Safety and Office of Civil Affair Defence were merged to form Shenzhen Municipal Emergency Management Bureau, with an approved staffing level of one hundred and fifty, the highest among emergency management departments at the same level in China. Therefore, the research on Shen© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_5

163

164

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

zhen’s practice in the emergency response capacity assessment is forward-looking and has demonstrative value for other local governments (especially those of large cities) to improve emergency response capacity.

5.1 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Theory Emergency response capacity assessment, as the name describes, refers to the judgement and evaluation of the government’s emergency management capacity. Its complexity depends on the complexity of emergency response capacity’s connotations and evaluation.

5.1.1 A Multidimensional Approach to Emergency Response Capacity Emergency response capacity is a dimension of government capacity. Against the backdrop of globalization, government capacity is often defined as “the key to acquire and maintain competitive edge” due to the cross-industrial flow of resources and information. Therefore, government “capacity” is equivalent to government “competitiveness” in general. In emergency management, however, the target of the “capacity” is not a competitor, but a wide array of emergencies. In other words, the difference in government emergency response capacity is not reflected in governments, but in types of emergencies. The meaning of emergency response capacity depends on the characteristics of emergencies. In China’s current emergency management policy system, the emergencies’ characteristics are interpreted from three perspectives: categorized, hierarchical and phased management.

5.1.1.1

Emergency Response Capacity and Categorized Management

Under the principle of categorized management, emergencies are classified into four categories: natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents. Although the emergency management of all these four categories comprises four stages of prevention & preparation, early warning & monitoring, rescue & response, and rehabilitation & recovery, the specific emergency measures for each category are different, so the requirements for emergency response capacity differ as well, which indicates different connotations of emergency capacity. For example, in the face of natural disasters, accidental disasters and public health incidents, the main measures serve the purpose of rescue, imposing higher requirements on the supply of emergency resources. In the face of social security incidents, the main measures are restrictive measures, with different requirements on the emer-

5.1 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Theory

165

gency response capacity. Therefore, in this sense, the capacities in response to natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents, and social security incidents constitute the fundamental connotation of the emergency response capacity.

5.1.1.2

Emergency Response Capacity and Hierarchical Management

In the study of disasters in the Western social sciences for more than five decades, emergencies are usually classified into three types in terms of their severity: everyday emergency, community disaster, and catastrophe.1 Different degrees of severity require different emergency response capacities. For example, daily emergencies like fire disaster usually need the response of firefighting and police departments, community disasters require the participation of medical, water, and power supply departments, while in case of catastrophe, the government is likely to be destroyed and thus military and social forces need to be mobilized for disaster relief. China’s emergency management also follows the principle of “hierarchical response”, but slightly different. That is to say, the “common emergencies” (Level IV) are handled by the county-level government of the disaster-hit area, “relatively serious” emergencies (Level III) are taken over by its municipal government, the “serious” emergencies (Level II) are taken over by the provincial government, while “especially serious” emergencies (Level I) fall under the united leadership of the State Council. In addition, both the Emergency System Development Plan during the 11th Five-Year Plan period issued in 2006 and the Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Strengthening Primary-Level Emergency Management issued in 2007 imposed requirements on building emergency response capacity at the level of villages and communities, which promoted the development of emergency response capacities at the level of villages and communities. In this sense, there exist emergency response capacities of the state (at the level of State Council), local governments (at the provincial, municipal and county levels), as well as villages and communities, which together constitute the basic connotations of the emergency response capacity. Moreover, there’s regional emergency response capacity. In the US emergency system, emergency mutual aid agreements between state governments and local governments are widespread and legally guaranteed. The federal or state government will get involved only when the mutual aids are not enough to handle the emergencies. Regional emergency management cooperation should develop into a formal system that’ll bring about at least two advantages. Firstly, handy assistance accelerates response. Secondly, resource sharing reduces emergency cost. More importantly, since the spread of emergencies wouldn’t be limited to a certain administrative area, they are more likely to affect the whole region. For instance, the 2005 Jilin Chemical Plant explosion caused water pollution in the Songhua River. Therefore, if effi1 Sue McNeil and Henry Quarantelli. Past, Present and Future: Building an Interdisciplinary Disaster

Research Center on a Half-Century of Social Science Disaster Research. http://dspace.udel.edu: 8080/dspace/handle/19716/3561.

166

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

ciency and cost are taken into account, regional emergency cooperation may be more efficient and economical than the current “County–Province–State” system. Moreover, such cooperation should be based on a formal cooperation agreement between local governments rather than a request to higher authority, in a bid to minimize the response time. In short, we cannot require the county-level government to be capable of dealing with “especially serious” emergencies, nor should we be satisfied with a provincial government that’s only capable of handling “common emergencies”. Therefore, the emergency response capacity’s connotations are different for emergency management organizations at different levels. To be more specific, the emergency response capacities at the village and community level are mainly reflected in identification of hidden dangers, information report and early warning, early response, building of primary-level emergency teams, and risk awareness education. The emergency response capacities of local governments are mainly reflected in emergency command and coordination, resource allocation, information sharing, and building of professional emergency teams. The regional emergency response capacities should take the ability of information and resource sharing and obtaining external resources into account on the basis of municipal emergency response capacity. The national emergency response capacity needs to consider the ability concerning the emergency legislation, strategic reserve and production of emergency materials, national mobilization, and others on the basis of metropolitan and regional emergency response capacities.

5.1.1.3

Emergency Response Capacity and Phased Management

In addition to the above static perspectives, emergency management is also seen as a dynamic process. For example, emergency management in the United States goes through four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In accordance with the Emergency Response Law, the emergency management goes through four phases as well: prevention & preparation, monitoring & early warning, rescue & relief, and rehabilitation & recovery. These two methods are very similar in nature, except that compared with “prevention & preparation”, “mitigation” puts more emphasis on taking the initiative to prevent risks from developing into crisis. Therefore, emergency response capacity can be divided into prevention & preparation capacity, monitoring & early warning capacity, rescue & relief capacity, and rehabilitation & recovery capacity, which together constitute the basic connotations of emergency response capacity. The requirements and focus on emergency response capacity differ with the change of phases of emergency management. For example, higher requirements are imposed on the risk identification and analysis capacity at the prevention & preparation phase, information integration capacity at the monitoring & early warning phase, capacity of emergency interactions at the rescue & relief phase, and urban planning capacity at the rehabilitation & recovery phase.

5.1 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Theory

5.1.1.4

167

Government’s Emergency Response Capacity and General Capacity

Generally speaking, the government capacity could be interpreted from two perspectives. First, from the absolute perspective, it refers to the government’s capacity to translate its goals into reality.2 Second, from the relative perspective, it refers to the government’s capacity to adapt to the environment. The two perspectives are different but not contradictory. They usually merge into one to be reflected in the government’s potential to achieve its goals on the one hand and the government’s delivery of services to the society on the other hand. The same is true of the government’s emergency response capacity. It’s manifested through the progress in building emergency management system proposed by the state, that is, absolute capacity, such as the preparation of emergency plans. It’s also shown in the local governments’ capacity to deal with specific risks, that is, relative capacity, such as the special ability to cope with floods in the areas vulnerable to flood disasters. In comparison, relative capacity is particularly important, for the reason that for primary-level governments, emergency response capacity targets the specific risks and vulnerability of the area. In addition, as a dimension of government’ capacity in a high-risk society, emergency capacity requires the support of government’s general capacities. In this sense, emergency response capacity is divided into actual capacity and potential capacity. The former refers to the capacity directly related to emergency functions, while the latter refers to the capacity indirectly linked to emergency functions. The larger is the scale of emergency, the more important is the potential emergency response capacity. Currently, the functions of potential emergency response capacity are greater than those of actual emergency response capacity. The goal for the next step is to give full play to the actual emergency response capacity first and activate potential capacity only when the actual capacity cannot solve the problem. In fact, both actual and potential emergency response capacities serve for the purpose of emergency management, and the order of activation is only based on considerations of emergency efficiency and cost, without any indication of the failure in emergency management. In general, the efficiency of fulfilling potential emergency response capacity is lower than that of actual capacity, in addition to higher cost. Therefore, the prober order should give priority to actual emergency response capacity. Current researches have paid little attention to potential emergency response capacity. In fact, however, exploring the potential emergency response capacity and trying our best to transform it into actual capacity would improve emergency efficiency and reduce emergency cost. The above two dimensions may overlap sometimes, giving rise to four “ideal types” of government’s emergency response capacity (Fig. 5.1). Type 1: “Absolute–Actual” Capacity. As the core of the entire emergency management system, the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response is the most directly related to the emergency functions. It’s proposed by the central government and implemented by all levels of governments. Therefore, the progress in the 2 Wang

Shaoguang & Hu Angang. A Study of China State Capacity. Liaoning People’s Publishing House. 1993.

168

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

“Absolute—Actual” Capacity

“Relative—Actual” Capacity

“Absolute—Potential” Capacity

“Relative-Potential” Capacity

Fig. 5.1 Four “ideal types” of government’s emergency response capacity

establishment of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response by local governments has serves as the representation of “absolute–actual” capacity. Type 2: “Relative–Actual” Capacity. The existence of an emergency plan doesn’t justify its applicability. Therefore, the quantity and quality of emergency functions for specific risks serve as the representation of “relative–actual” capacity. Type 3: “Absolute–Potential” Capacity. If need be, the government’s overall fiscal capacity and the production capacity of emergency materials both are the representations of “absolute–potential” capacity. Type 4: “Relative-Potential” Capacity. For instance, both the government’s effort to transform the economic development mode and financial input to environmental governance, energy conservation and emission reduction are indicative of “relativepotential” capacity. Some argue that the emergency response capacity of government is a concept different from that of urban system or social system.3 In fact, it’s not true. Emergency management definitely belongs to public affairs and should be led by government. The “government emergency management” actually means that to the extent permitted by law, the government mobilizes all available forces to participate in emergency management. In this sense, the government’s emergency response capacity is in fact not limited to the management capacity concerning the administration’s rights and responsibilities, but also refers to the government departments’ capacity to use and mobilize various social forces, especially in China.

5.1.2 Multidimensional Interpretation of the Assessment In general, there are multiple ways to interpret the assessment.4 (1) In terms of the objects being assessed, there exist assessments measuring the input, outcome and process. The assessment measuring the input is also referred to as “pre-assessment” that’s most widely applied to a program or a plan. The assessment measuring the outcome is also referred as “post-assessment”, covering every aspect about understanding and acknowledging a plan, project intervention, or implemented policies, as well as comparison and judgement of the 3 Han

Chuanfeng & Ye Cen. Comprehensive Evaluation for Government Emergency Response Capability. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2007 (4). 4 Zhang Huan. Emergency Management Evaluation. China Human Resources & Social Security Publishing House, 2010, pp. 15–24.

5.1 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Theory

169

differences between objective and expected effects of these actions. The assessment measuring the process mainly focuses on the implementation of the entire activity or policy. (2) In terms of the purpose of assessment, there are formative assessment and summative assessment. The former is usually conducted to provide guidance on development or improvement of the objects being assessed. The formative assessment can be divided into implementation assessment and progress assessment. The implementation assessment aims to determine whether the objects being evaluated is developing in a way as expected or planned. The progress assessment aims to analyse the operation of the objects being assessed during each process or phase of the life cycle. The summative assessment serves the purpose of motivation or accountability, providing a more holistic evaluation of the objects being assessed. (3) In terms of the assessment method, there are quantitative assessment and qualitative assessment. Quantitative assessment is more applicable to clarifying the causality than understanding the object being assessed thoroughly. Qualitative assessment applies to the actual process of developing a thorough understanding of the objects being assessed, but it’s difficult to be generalized. Both methods have their merits and shortcomings. In reality, a majority of assessments adopt both methods.

5.2 Emergency Response Capacity Assessment in Reality The Emergency Response Law has imposed preliminary requirements for the assessment in emergency management. The Article 59 stipulates that after finishing the emergency response work, the people’s government performing the duty of unified leadership shall immediately arrange for the assessment of the losses caused by the emergency, organize rapid restoration of production, normal life and work and social order in the affected areas, make rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and report the same to the people’s government at the next higher level. The Article 61 stipulates that the people’s government performing the duty of unified leadership shall, in a timely manner, ascertain the cause and the process of development of the emergency, sum up experience and lessons from the emergency response, introduce measures for improvement, and report the same to the people’s government at the next higher level. It can be seen from the above that the Emergency Response Law involves three types of assessments. First, the assessment of the losses caused by the emergency (hereinafter referred to as “loss assessment”). Second, the assessment of the causes of the emergency (“cause assessment”). Third, the assessment of experience and lessons from the emergency response work (“response assessment”). All the three types have their own strengths. To be specific, the “loss assessment” provides information for emergency operation and allocation of emergency materials, conducive to more targeted emergency response; the “cause assessment” provides guidance on

170

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

the prevention of emergencies, conducive to more targeted emergency preparedness; while the “response assessment” provides information on how to best improve emergency measures and operations, conducive to more targeted emergency operation. Therefore, in a broad sense, all the three assessments are related to emergency management and fall under the assessment in emergency management. In a strict sense, however, only the emergency “response assessment” evaluates the emergency management itself. In reality, the emergency management personnel of local governments have multiple understandings of the emergency management assessment mentioned in the Emergency Response Law, which to some extent made the implementation of emergency management assessment policies more difficult. In the practice of assessment in fact, the main body of assessment comes as the prime consideration, rather than the object being assessed, assessment goals or methods which wouldn’t exist without the main body. The object being assessed, assessment goals and methods differ with the change of the main body of assessment. Under the current emergency management policy system in China, the emergency response offices, as the professional emergency management bodies of local governments, are only qualified to arrange emergency “response assessment” and have difficulty in convening “loss assessment” or “cause assessment”. The reason is that the emergency “response assessment” is usually conducted within the emergency management policy system, for which the emergency response offices have the corresponding responsibilities and powers. However, “loss assessment” and “cause assessment” often go beyond the emergency management policy system and require the coordination of multiple forces and resources.

5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity 5.3.1 Positioning of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment On the one hand, the governments’ emergency response capacity assessment should start from the theory to clarify the meaning of emergency response capacity and abide by the general law of policy assessment. On the other hand, the governments’ emergency response capacity assessment must proceed from the reality to consider the actual conditions of the assessment and address the actual needs of local governments’ emergency response capacity assessment. In regard to the meaning of emergency response capacity, it’s important to make the following clarifications. Firstly, seen from the level of emergency management, this study focuses on the emergency response capacity at the level of local governments. Secondly, the local governments’ emergency response capacity in this study mainly refers to actual capacity, excluding potential emergency response capacity. Thirdly, the local governments’ emergency response capacity in this study refers to

5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

171

the comprehensive capacity, which is a combination of capacities in response to four categories of emergencies, including natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents, a mix of emergency response capacities at four phases of the emergency management, including prevention & preparation, monitoring & early warning, rescue & relief, and rehabilitation & recovery, as well as an integration of absolute and relative emergency response capacities.

5.3.2 Three Types of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment In line with the law of policy evaluation, the local governments’ emergency response capacity assessment could be divided into three categories, including input assessment, process assessment and outcome assessment. To be specific, the input assessment evaluates the absolute emergency response capacity, while the process assessment and the outcome assessment evaluate the relative emergency response capacity. In China, the local governments’ absolute emergency response capacity is reflected through the progress in the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, which in fact is the emergency preparedness capacity. The local governments’ relative emergency response capacity is manifested as the actual capacity of coping with specific emergencies in line with the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, including both the emergency implementation capacity and the ultimate effects, or to say, the performance of emergency management. Therefore, in the emergency management policy system in China, the local governments’ emergency response capacity assessment involves three types of assessments, including preparedness assessment, implementation assessment and performance assessment. These three types of assessments serve different purposes. Preparedness assessment is a formative assessment that aims to identify imperfections in the emergency management policy system. Implementation assessment could be a formative assessment to identify deficiencies in the emergency management processes and actions and accordingly provide guidance for improvement, as well as a summative assessment to examine the implementation of the emergency management processes and actions and accordingly provide incentives or ensure accountability. Performance assessment is principally a summative assessment to reach an overall judgment of emergency management performance, which could also be used as reference for incentive and accountability. These three types of assessments follow different methods. Preparedness assessment evaluates the policy system within the framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, measuring its soundness and perfection without involving the actual effects of its application. Therefore, it’s more a quantitative assessment than a qualitative assessment. Implementation assessment evaluates the implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, requiring a combination of qualitative assessment, such as the assessment to check whether the

172

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

specified emergency actions are carried out, with quantitative assessment, such as the assessment to examine how much of the specified actions have been carried out. Performance assessment evaluates the final effects of the emergency operations, involving quantitative assessment, such as the assessment of the emergency operations’ economic cost, as well as assessment that’s difficult to quantify. For example, the emergency operations’ political and social benefits should be measured mainly by qualitative assessment.

5.3.3 Three Phases of Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity Assessment For local governments, the above three types of assessments correspond to three phases of emergency response capacity building that needs to be carried out step by step, instead of simultaneously. On a macro level, the formation of local governments’ emergency response capacity goes through the following three phases. First, establish a sound emergency management policy system to form emergency preparedness capacity. Second, apply the emergency management policy system to the specific emergencies within the jurisdiction to form emergency implementation capacity. Third, the application’s final effects on local politics, economy, society and culture form the emergency management performance. On a micro level, in case of a specific emergency, the above three types of assessment respectively correspond to emergency preparedness capacity prior to the event, emergency implementation capacity during the event and post-event emergency response effects. Therefore, the local governments’ emergency response capacity has its distinctive features. For the country, the main responsibility for emergency management is to establish the emergency management policy system, instead of directly handling emergencies, and thus the country only has emergency preparedness capacity, without emergency implementation capacity and emergency management performance. Of course, in the face of especially serious emergencies, the country shall need to make response, but in this case, the main responsibility of the country lies in national mobilization, which belongs to potential emergency response capacity that’s not within the scope of this study. Under such circumstances, emergency management shall still be the responsibility of local governments. For villages and communities, the main responsibility of emergency management is to participate in partial emergency management processes, like risk investigation and information report. Since they don’t participate in the whole process of emergency management, there’s no emergency implementation capacity in the full sense, and thus no implementation assessment or performance assessment. It’s in this sense that the theme of the local governments’ emergency response capacity is explored. This means that currently, not all local governments are in a position to conduct preparedness, implementation and performance assessments. This is related to the establishment of the emergency management policy system that has gone through

5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

173

two generations since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The first generation is the single disaster prevention and mitigation system and the second generation is the comprehensive emergency management system. We’re now at the first phase of establishing the second-generation system. As the sporadic emergency resources are being integrated, the most evident feature of the current comprehensive emergency management system is “generalization”, which is shown in the following four aspects. First, the isomorphism of the emergency system. The emergency organizational structures of central government and local governments are strikingly similar, as they are copied by the departments of the State Council and then departments at the provincial, municipal and county level successively. Governments at all levels established emergency office, a comprehensive coordination office for emergency management, which had mostly been the duty room of the governments. Second, the standardization of the emergency regulative system. At each administrative level, the emergency procedure has been formalized into four phases: prevention & preparation, monitoring & early warning, rescue & relief, and rehabilitation & recovery. The categorization and grading of emergencies are defined by the State Council and its authorized ministries or commissions and are applicable nationwide. Third, generalized legal framework of emergency response. As a general law, the Emergency Response Law clarifies the general principles of emergency management but lacks detailed provisions and detailed explanations about specific issues in emergency management. Fourth, universalized emergency plans. As a direct basis of emergency management, emergency plan is required to have full and thorough coverage, including communities, enterprises, rural areas and schools. Therefore, for local government, the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response simply sets up a framework of the emergency management policy system and needs to be further transformed into the local governments’ emergency response capacity. The difference in the speed of transformation produces disparities between local governments’ emergency response capacities. To begin with, it produces differences in emergency preparedness capacity. The local governments’ Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response come into being at different times. Secondly, there will be differences in emergency implementation capacity. The Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response simply provides a comprehensive and overall policy framework, and thus still very rough and not detailed enough for the specific emergency management in reality. The local governments need to establish rules in line with the actual local conditions under the framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, so as to regulate the emergency management of specific emergencies. Thirdly, the differences in emergency preparedness capacity and emergency implementation capacity inevitably lead to differences in emergency management performance. The absence of specific rules for emergency management will result in the lack of standards for emergency response capacity assessment. Without standards, the emergency response capacity assessment can’t be carried out, not even to mention the implementation assessment or the performance assessment. Therefore, from a national perspective, not all local governments are in a position to conduct a whole set of emergency response capacity assessment. In fact, a majority of local governments are suitable for preparedness assessment,

174

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

while a few local governments are in a position to conduct implementation assessment. As for the performance assessment, there lacks necessary conditions for its policy practice. To sum up, here are the essences of these three types of assessments for local governments. First, preparedness assessment measures, by the standards of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response, the soundness and perfection of local governments’ emergency management policy system. Second, implementation assessment measures, by the standards of local governments’ emergency management policy system, how much of the system has been translated into specific emergency actions. Third, performance assessment measures, by the standards of specific emergency actions, the rationality of input-output ratio of emergency operations.

5.3.4 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ Emergency Response Capacity For a certain local government, these three types of assessments are progressive and jointly constitute the policy framework for local governments’ emergency response capacity assessment. Among them, implementation assessment is a further development from preparedness assessment. The critical step for the development lies in the risk analysis to form the emergency management rules system of local governments. Performance assessment is a further development from implementation assessment. The critical step for the development is the cost calculation to form the emergency management constraint mechanism of local governments. Currently, the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response established by the Emergency Reponses Law is mainly to grant authorization of emergency management but a constraint mechanism for it is yet to be put in place (Fig. 5.2). To be specific, the key factors for assessing local governments’ emergency response capacity are shown in Table 5.1. (1) Target of assessment: The target of preparedness assessment is policy and rule system. Implementation assessment evaluates emergency procedure and operation. Performance assessment measures emergency cost and benefit. (2) Goal: The goal of preparedness assessment is to improve the emergency management policy system, increase emergency preparedness capacity and strengthen

Fig. 5.2 Correlation between preparedness assessment, implementation assessment and performance assessment

5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

175

Table 5.1 Factors for assessing local governments’ emergency preparedness, implementation and management performance Factor/Type

Preparedness assessment

Implementation assessment

Performance assessment

Target of assessment

Policy and rule system

Emergency procedure and operation

Emergency cost and benefit

Goal

Improve the policy system and normalization

Improve emergency procedure, operation and professionalism

Reduce emergency cost and make it more scientific

Method

Quantitative

Quantitative and qualitative

Mainly qualitative

Timing

Before the event

During the event

After the event

Applicability

Abstract emergencies

A certain type of emergencies

Specific emergencies

Condition

National emergency management system

Local governments’ emergency management rules

Cost accounting mechanism

Difficulty

Relatively small

Medium

Relatively great

Subject of assessment

Emergency management bodies

Emergency management bodies

External experts

Scope of assessment

Internal assessment

Internal assessment

External assessment

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

the normalization of emergency management. Implementation assessment aims to improve emergency procedure and operation, improve the emergency response capacity and promote more professional emergency management. The goal of performance assessment is to reduce emergency cost, improve emergency management performance and boost more scientific emergency management. Method: Preparedness assessment mainly adopts the quantitative method. Implementation assessment requires both quantitative and qualitative methods. Performance assessment can only adopt the qualitative method for the time being. Timing: Preparedness assessment doesn’t target a specific emergency and is generally conducted before the event. Implementation assessment is conducted during the event and requires observation and record of emergency procedures and operations. Performance assessment is conducted after the event. Applicability: Preparedness assessment only involves abstract emergencies. Implementation assessment applies to a certain type of emergency. Performance assessment is applicable to specific emergencies. Conditions: The prerequisite for preparedness assessment is the establishment of a national emergency management policy system, that for implementation assessment is the establishment of local governments’ emergency management

176

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Fig. 5.3 Policy framework for assessing emergency response capacity under the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response

rules system and that for performance assessment is the establishment of a cost accounting mechanism. (7) Difficulty: Preparedness assessment is the least difficult, implementation assessment is difficult, while the performance assessment is the most difficult. (8) Subject of assessment: The main body for both preparedness assessment and implementation assessment can be emergency management organization, but performance assessment should be conducted by external experts. (9) Scope of assessment: Both preparedness assessment and implementation assessment can be internal assessments and the assessment results are mainly used for improvement of internal work. Performance assessment belongs to external assessment and the assessment results should be made public. These three assessments serve different functions and can form a dynamic cycle to achieve continuous improvement of emergency response capacity. Judging from the implementation path of the assessments, the national emergency management policy system of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response constitutes the basis for the local governments’ emergency management policy system and preparedness assessment before the event that serves as the basis for implementation assessment during the event. Only on the basis of preparedness assessment and implementation assessment can the post-event performance assessment be carried out. Judging from the feedback path of assessment results, the results of implementation assessment give feedback on the emergency preparedness, conducive to identify the loopholes in emergency preparedness and step up institution building in emergency preparedness. The results of performance assessment not only provide direct feedback on emergency preparedness and implementation, but also give feedback on the entire emergency management policy system, as shown in Fig. 5.3. Judging from the above factors, the majority of local governments have been qualified for preparedness assessment but haven’t done so. Therefore, the study on preparedness assessment can provide policy guidance in a general sense. A few

5.3 General Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

177

local governments are in a position for implementation assessment, but they are still in the research phase to make attempts at policy practice. Therefore, the study on implementation assessment is significant for making forward-looking policies. The study on performance assessment is still at the stage of academic research.

5.4 Preparedness Assessment 5.4.1 International Experiences In 1997, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) of the US jointly developed the Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR), a system for assessing the emergency readiness and capability that applies to the states, territories and insular areas of the US. In the same year, FEMA conducted a comprehensive assessment of fifty-six states, territories and insular areas of the United States. In 2000, FEMA and NEMA jointly revised CAR, redesigned the indicator system and conducted a second assessment survey. Moreover, on the basis of CAR, the FEMA developed Local Capability Assessment of Readiness (LCAR) mainly for assessing the emergency preparedness capacity of county-level governments.5 The CAR is a pioneering system for the emergency response capacity assessment, not only laying a foundation for the emergency preparedness capacity assessment in the United States, but also providing significant reference to the practice of emergency preparedness capacity assessment in other countries, including China. The CAR is the most instructive in its assessment method. CAR adopts a selfassessment indicator system consisting of thirteen Emergency Management Functions (Level-I indicators), 209 attributes (Level-II indicators) and 1,014 characteristics (Level-III indicators). The assessment results of Level-III indicators serve as reference for accurate self-assessment of Level-II indicators and don’t need to be forwarded to FEMA. States had the option to assess Level-II indicators without referring to Level-III indicators. The final assessment results in 1997 showed that 71% of Level-II indicators were scored based on the scoring of Level-III indicators and that the rest 29% were scored directly. Each “attribute” or “characteristic” was scored on a scale of one to three or Not Applicable (N/A). The score of three means “always or consistently meeting attribute/characteristic”, the score of two means “normally meeting attribute/characteristic” and the score of one means “additional work needed to meet the attribute/characteristic”. In addition, N/A can be put for those attributes or characteristics that do not apply to the program. To better understand on what basis States were making their responses, States were required to indicate whether the assessment of an attribute/characteristic was based on the following “Value Derived From” modifier: RW (real-world experience), EE (exercise 5 Zhang

Huan. Emergency Management Evaluation. China Human Resources & Social Security Publishing House, 2010, p. 103.

178

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

experience) and UT (untested). The assessment report in 1997 showed that the scores for 87% of indicators derived from RW, 4% from EE and 9% UT. All indicators were given equal weight. To foster consistency in CAR’s implementation, FEMA conducted a live Emergency Education Network satellite broadcast to assure uniform training between State and FEMA Regional staff and address questions concerning implementation of the process and the assessment instrument. Based on the scores, the emergency preparedness capacity was divided into three areas marked in different colors. A score of 1–1.5 is marked in red, representing “areas needing improvement”; a score of 1.5–2.5 in green, representing “areas meeting criteria”; and a score of 2.5–3 in blue, representing “areas of strength”. In this way, the national and states’ scores for the thirteen Emergency Management Functions and 209 attributes were based on calculations, providing relatively accurate information on the status of national and states’ emergency response capacity. There are two similar policy practices in China. First, commissioned by the Disaster Prevention and Response Council of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, the Chinese Fire Protection Safety Center (Taiwan) proposed that the assessment system for emergency response capacity both at the “Central” level and local-government level should be composed of four basic programs: disaster relief, maintenance, emergency response and recovery, supported by nineteen sub-programs of “territory” preservation, transportation & communication, lifeline maintenance, building maintenance, equipment for disaster prevention, response mechanism, disaster analysis and strategies, search & rescue & medical care, evacuation shelters and transportation strategy, emergency recovery & maintenance, public information and support, exercises and training, emergency mechanism, support & assistance, national defense, recovery goal, emergency recovery, rebuilding of victims’ lives, and restoration of industrial economy.6 Second, China Academy of Safety Science and Technology undertook the task of developing the “assessment system for urban emergency response capacity”, one of the National Key Technology R&D Programs of China during the 10th Five-Year Plan period, and initially proposed a set of indicators for urban emergency response capacity assessment, comprising eighteen Level-I indicators, including legal system, management structure, emergency center, professional teams, full-time teams and volunteers, risk analysis, monitoring & early warning, command and coordination, disaster prevention and mitigation, post-event response, communication & information support, decision support, equipment and facilities, financial support, training, exercise, publicity & education, and preparation of emergency plan. These eighteen indicators are subdivided into seventy-six level-II indicators and further subdivided into four hundred and five level-III indicators.7

6 Shi

Bangzhu. Research on Performance Assessment of Disaster Prevention and Response Work (2003). 7 Deng Yunfeng, Zheng Shuangzhong, Liu Gongzhi & Liu Tiemin. Study on Urban Emergency Response Capacity Assessment System. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2005 (6).

5.4 Preparedness Assessment

179

5.4.2 Preparedness Assessment in Bao’an District, Shenzhen From July 1 to August 23, 2008, Bao’an District Emergency Command Center in Shenzhen conducted surveys on the implementation of the “One Plan with ThreeTier Design” through questionnaires, symposiums and other means, covering urban sub-district offices in Xin’an Street, Xixiang Street, Fuyong Street, Shajing Street, Songgang Street, Shiyan Street, Guanlan Street, Dalang Street, Longhua Street, and Minzhi Street, as well as a functional department respectively in education, civil affairs, water resources, agriculture, forestry, fishery, urban development, political and legal affairs, workplace safety, food and drug supervision, labour, environmental protection, trade and industry, homeland, public security, transportation, public health and urban management. The survey results are shown as follows.

5.4.2.1

Emergency Plan

The street offices and organizations directly affiliated to Bao’an District formulated a total of 353 emergency plans, covering over sixty emergencies of four categories. The Bao’an District Emergency Command Center organized and guided the preparation of concise and practical emergency plans by communities, schools and enterprises. Under the principle of being “concise, convenient and practical”, each emergency plan contains graphical representations. The emergency planning system in the district has basically taken shape. To better satisfy the actual needs in reality, Bao’an District Government and street offices conducted drills to test the emergency plans.

5.4.2.2

Emergency Response Institution

After over three years of hard work, Bao’an District has initially set up an emergency management system featuring “unified leadership, overall coordination, categorized management, assignment of responsibilities to different levels, and emphasis on localized administration” and built a three-tier emergency network incorporating district, streets and communities. In November 2004, Bao’an District Emergency Command Center was established, followed by permanent or temporary leading groups or command groups for emergency response successively built by functional departments of the district. The street offices set up street emergency response committees in succession and corresponding offices named “Street Emergency Command Center” were established. Thanks to the commitment to emergency management in communicates, all the fifteen communities in Bao’an District have set up Emergency Management Office and appointed full-time or part-time emergency response personnel.

180

5.4.2.3

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Emergency Response Mechanism

a. The standardization of emergency on-duty shifts All organizations are required to strictly adhere to the rules for on-duty shifts. The standards for physical and institutional building of the General Duty Office at the district and street levels were clarified, added by fourteen internal management regulations, including Regulation of On-duty Shifts in Duty Office and Document Filing Regulation. A 24-hour duty system engaging street leader, middle-level cadres and staff of duty offices has been established in all streets. The emergency on-duty shifts in Bao’an District have been gradually standardized. b. The increasingly regulated emergency information report It has specified main body of accountability, standards and time requirement for the district emergency information report and developed an emergency messenger system covering the whole district. The street offices and organizations directly affiliated to Bao’an District Government have implemented the regulations of the district committees and government and established corresponding information report system. The District Emergency Command Center has provided regular trainings for messengers. c. Widespread dissemination of emergency knowledge The newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other news media were utilized to increase public awareness of the laws and regulations on emergency response and disseminate general knowledge on emergency prevention, risk avoidance, selfhelp, mutual help, disaster mitigation and others. Six thousand brochures of general knowledge on emergency, titled What To Do When You’re In Danger, were prepared and distributed to the public for free. Three thousand sets of posters (ten pieces for each set) on general emergency knowledge were displayed in public places. In different seasons, early warnings against gas poisoning while keeping out the cold, early warnings against landslides in flood prevention and reminders about sunstroke prevention were timely released to the public. d. Extensive emergency management training In 2007, the District Emergency Command Center despatched twenty-plus workers from street emergency command centers to go to General Duty Office of the district for trainings in rotation. In the first half of 2008, the District Emergency Command Center assigned three batches of emergency workers in the streets and district to participate in the training session on “the long-term mechanism for workplace safety and knowledge on hazard identification” conducted by State Administration of Work Safety, added by training conferences held in the district, such as Meeting on the Preparation and Revision of Emergency Plans, Emergency Messengers’ Symposium, Emergency Information Report Meeting and so on.

5.4 Preparedness Assessment

181

e. Continuous improvement of emergency support capacity First, progress has been made in the building of emergency teams. Preliminary statistics show that there are one hundred and two emergency teams with a total number of eighteen thousand personnel and seven specialist emergency teams with a total number of sixty-six specialists in Bao’an District. In addition, emergency teams mainly composed of emergency militia members (with two thousand-plus members in the district) has been set up in all streets. Second, the capability to provide emergency materials has been improved. The District Emergency Command Center has conducted two investigations on more than thirty types of emergency resources of four categories and kept a registration of all the resources. Statistics show that a total of about four hundred thousand pieces of emergency materials were in stock, including lifeboats, lifebuoys, medical equipment, sandbags, fire extinguishers and others. Third, the building of emergency command information platform is going well.

5.4.2.4

Legal Framework of Emergency Response

The Bao’an District Government has implemented the tasks required by the Emergency Response Law in phases and specified the deadline for each phase.

5.4.3 Problems Revealed in the Preparedness Assessment The main problems exposed in the assessment are shown as follows.

5.4.3.1

Emergency Plan

(1) Some organizations’ emergency plans are not targeted or operable enough. There’s a lack of specified and detailed provisions on the power and responsibilities of street offices and functional departments, leading to overlap of functions. The relationship between leading department and coordination departments hasn’t been completely straightened out, resulting in ignorance of duties and buck-passing situation between some functional departments. (2) At present, the handling of emergencies often relies on the authority of the leadership to coordinate the actions of various departments, rather than on the instruction of the emergency plan. If there is no leader on the site of the emergency, everything will be in disorder.

182

5.4.3.2

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Emergency System

(1) The emergency organizations don’t have standardized structures or haven’t been set up. A majority of street emergency management organizations are affiliated to “Office of Party and Political Affairs” or “Office of Stability Maintenance and Comprehensive Management”. Some functional departments only set up temporary office for emergency management. Some functional departments haven’t built official organization and assigned a certain office to be in charge of emergency management. Besides, the names for emergency organizations are not unified. (2) Some street offices and main functional departments’ emergency organizations have no officially budgeted posts, leading to great mobility of emergency workers featuring differentiated competences and poor professionalism. (3) The management system for specialist emergency teams hasn’t been established.

5.4.3.3

Emergency Response Mechanism

(1) The lack of the special emergency reserve fund system has led to insufficient fund for daily emergency work and complicated procedures for application and allocation of emergency fund. In the absence of officially budgeted posts, the daily work expenditures of the street emergency command centers cannot be included in the annual financial budget of the organization and have to be secured in other ways. The insufficient fund for daily work resulted in inadequate publicity and failure to identify, assess, check and register the hazards. A uniform special emergency reserve fund system at the street level is yet to be set up, which affected the efficiency of emergency response. When the street offices or functional departments need to use the emergency fund for emergency response, they have to follow the same procedures for the application of government funds in normal times, such as bidding procedures, which reduced the efficiency of emergency response to a certain extent and delayed the recovery and rebuilding process. (2) There’s a lack of emergency equipment. The street offices’ monitoring instruments for the dangerous sources in natural disasters are small in quantity and poor in performance, making it impossible to conduct real-time monitoring and early warnings of various hazards. Five street emergency command centers in Bao’an District had no emergency vehicles; the other five street centers’ emergency vehicles were borrowed from other departments by the street offices’ leaders. The similar problems also exist in the functional departments. (3) Emergency teams are not capable enough. First, they are not professional enough. They haven’t mastered the basic skills in emergency response and thus cannot deal with some professional or technical emergencies. Second, the emergency teams are poor in management capacity, work performance and sense of service. Third, the temporary staff accounted for a larger proportion, with great

5.4 Preparedness Assessment

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

183

mobility and differentiated competences, which lowered the efficiency of emergency response. Fourth, the accident insurance for emergency rescue personnel hasn’t been put in place. There’s insufficient reserve of emergency resources. First, the small reserve isn’t enough to cope with serious or especially serious emergencies. Second, the emergency reserve method is unitary, mainly through contract reserve. Third, inadequate efforts in management and maintenance led to waste of resources. The information reporting system is yet to be standardized. First, the information wasn’t submitted in accordance with the prescribed procedures. After receiving the emergency information, some departments in charge assumed that their leaders had reported the information to the upper level and hence there’s no need for the operating department to follow the procedures to report the information to the emergency command center, ending up in a passive situation. Second, the information wasn’t submitted in time. After the emergency occurrence in some streets, some staff members in charge are not responsible or sensitive enough to submit the information immediately, and some staff members in charge of information submission are not capable enough to submit the information within the time limit. Third, some information was concealed or omitted. For fear that submitting accurate and complete information on the emergency would negatively affect their performance or bring about leaders’ doubts about their capability, some street offices, organizations and relevant departments concealed or omitted some crucial statistics on purpose. In this way, the information on the same event reported by different departments is quite different from the actual situation. Some departments lack experience to make correct judgements on the nature of the emergency or predict the development of the emergency, but they flattered themselves as capable of dealing with the emergency and concealed the information, which delayed the response at the perfect timing. The emergency shelters are not qualified. First, the management system for the emergency shelters hasn’t been straightened out. The functions, powers and responsibilities of the Civil Affairs Bureau, Education Bureau, Sports Bureau and other organizations related to the emergency shelters management in the District were not well-defined. Second, there exists conflict between emergency shelter and normal order at schools. Since sixty-three percent of shelters in the district are located at schools, the emergency refuge would affect the normal order at school. Third, there’s no guarantee of maintenance fund for the shelters and the expenditures for shelter work were not officially budgeted. Fourth, some shelters are not qualified for taking refuge. Fifth, the types of shelters are not diversified, with the locations mostly at schools and the main purpose of sheltering people from natural disasters. Sixth, the staff wasn’t well-trained, with poor quality of work, service capability and sense of service. There are various weak links in the identification and prevention of risks and hazards. Due to the material, technical, financial and institutional reasons, there exist various weak links in the street offices and functional departments’ work in the identification and prevention of risks and hazards.

184

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

(8) There’s a lack of a system for post-event investigation, assessment and accountability. A unified set of indicators for disaster assessment has yet to be established, without standard procedures or methods for assessment. The absence of the accountability system impaired the effectiveness of emergency plans. The survey report shows that there exist problems concerning emergency preparedness, such as special emergency reserve fund management system and shelters management system, as well as emergency implementation, such as concealed or omitted information report. Therefore, it’s necessary to analyse these two types of problems separately.

5.4.4 Assessment Methods of Local Governments’ Emergency Preparedness It can be seen that even in Shenzhen where the importance of emergency management is highly valued, the development of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response of the district, streets, communities and relevant functional departments varies in progress. From the academic perspective, the assessment could be researchbased and the criteria for assessment are open for discussion. From the practical perspective, however, the assessment must be feasible and the criteria for assessment must be based on consensus and conform to the law and regulations. This means that the criteria for assessment must be established before conducting policy assessment, while the assessment is to check the implementation of policies against the criteria. In this respect, the Emergency Response Law set up a criterion for preparedness assessment. For local governments, the preparedness assessment is to evaluate the local development of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response proposed in the Emergency Response Law. Given that policies must be passed on from higher level of administrations to lower level and thus implemented from level to level, the local governments should conduct preparedness assessment respectively at the levels of city, district, street and community, to evaluate their development of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. This also means that prior to the Emergency Response Law, there’s no precondition for conducting the preparedness assessment in terms of the policy practice. Without mandatory and unified criteria, the local governments don’t need to enhance emergency preparedness capacity to fulfil unified requirements, not even to mention to conduct assessments as required. It’s for sure that all academic research on preparedness assessment at this stage will provide insights into its policy practice. In addition, there’s a flexible criterion for preparedness assessment, that is, the pressure caused by the anticipated emergency that requires corresponding emergency preparedness. This is unique in two ways. First, in practice, the emergency response capacity building is usually pressure-driven. Frequent occurrences of a certain type of emergencies would surely help build higher capacity to cope with this type of emergency. This is the conventional way of passive and fragmented practice. Second, in

5.4 Preparedness Assessment

185

China, as the government has access to sufficient resources, it’s possible to manage and control the emergency even without the help of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. In this case, you cannot conclude that government’s emergency response capacity is low. It’s true that in line with the categorization in this study, this belongs to potential emergency response capacity that’s beyond the scope of the policy framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response. Therefore, if the preparedness assessment is based on the anticipated emergency response capacity, there will be a lack of unified criteria across the country and thus not practicable. This actually leads to the most difficult part in assessment technique: consistency of assessment. That is, how to make sure the assessors measure the capacity of the object against the same criteria. If this problem cannot be solved, the significance of the assessing results will be greatly impaired. For local governments in China, how to devise an indicator system for assessing the emergency preparedness capacity under the framework of the Comprehensive Strategy for Emergency Response? In association with the policy practice of Bao’an District in Shenzhen, the study proposed the “Indicator System for Assessing the Local Governments’ Emergency Preparedness” as shown in Table 5.2. This indicator system was devised to assess the local governments’ emergency preparedness at district and county levels strictly in accordance with the Emergency Response Law. Given that the Emergency Response Law only puts forward the fundamental requirements, local governments have to clarify the relevant details to fulfil these requirements within the jurisdiction through preparations concerning emergency plan, organization, staffing, personnel, place, device, system, method, plan, database (map), equipment and other static forms, which constitute emergency preparedness. The assessment of local governments’ emergency preparedness in accordance with the indicator system in Table 5.2 suggested that even in Shenzhen where emergency management is highly valued, there are still many areas for improvement. The indicator system provides a forward-looking guidance on the preparedness assessment of other local governments in China. It’s important to note that the above assessment method is relatively objective and could ensure the consistency of assessment to a certain extent. However, the indicator system still has two shortcomings. First, it’s too crude, without involving some key aspects of emergency preparedness. Second, some specific rules required by the unified system are not applicable or poorly effective. Therefore, it’s necessary to conduct implementation assessment to find out the problems and deficiencies of these rules in reality on the one hand, and to provide feedback for the revision of the rules or propose some new rules on the other hand.

186

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Table 5.2 Indicator system for assessing local governments’ emergency preparedness (for governments at district and county levels) Object of assessment

Level-I indicator

Level-II indicators

Remarks

Emergency plan

Category

Does it cover all categories of emergencies?

Number of emergency plans for each category

Level

Does it cover all the three levels of district, street and community?

Number of emergency plans at each level

Structure

How many specialized emergency plans does it include?

Quality

Has the emergency plan straightened out departmental relationship?

Command authority

Does it cover all levels and all relevant departments of the government? Is it a permanent body?

Responsible organizations

Does it cover all levels and all relevant departments of the government? Is it an independent body? Number of officially budgeted posts Are there dedicated office place and hardware?

Shelter

Is there a shelter management system?

Risk identification

Is there a risk identification system? Is there a risk map?

Training

Is there an emergency training management system?

Emergency response institution

Emergency response mechanism

Covering all the four categories of emergencies

(continued)

5.4 Preparedness Assessment

187

Table 5.2 (continued) Object of assessment

Level-I indicator

Level-II indicators

Emergency teams

Is there a professional emergency rescue team?

Remarks

Are there personal insurances for emergency rescue staff? Is there a database of emergency response personnel? Publicity and education

There an annual publicity plan? Is the emergency management knowledge included in the school education?

Financial support

Is there a special emergency fund management system?

Materials reserve

Is there an emergency materials reserve system? Is there a database of emergency materials?

Emergency equipment

Are there sufficient professional emergency equipment? Is there a database of emergency equipment?

On-duty shifts

Is there a system of on-duty shifts in emergencies?

It specifies the personnel and on-duty requirements

Information report

Is there an information report system?

It specifies requirements on information report

Early warning

Is there a platform to share information? (continued)

188

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Table 5.2 (continued) Object of assessment

Level-I indicator

Level-II indicators

Remarks

Is there a system to release early warnings?

Legal framework of emergency response

Emergency response

Is there a system for pre-event response? Is there a system for on-site command?

Rehabilitation and recovery

Is there a system for information release? Is there a system for pose-event investigation?

Emergency laws and regulations

Are there regulations on local emergency response?

5.5 Implementation Assessment 5.5.1 What to Assess By the end of December 2009, Bao’an District Government had established a relatively complete emergency management system in accordance with the Emergency Response Law, providing the conditions for implementation assessment. In December 2010, the research group conducted a survey on the improvement and implementation of the Bao’an District emergency management system and pushed forward its implementation assessment. The survey results are shown as follows.

5.5.1.1

Emergency Response Institution

The Bao’an District Government set up an Emergency Command Center (at the division level) in September 2004, followed by the establishment of the District Emergency Response Committee in 2005 and the formulation of Working Rules for the Bao’an Emergency Response Committee Service Regulations in 2008. In 2006, Street Emergency Response Committee and Street Emergency Command Center were set up successively in all streets. In January 2008, the District Commission (Office) of Public Sector Reform solved the staffing problem of the Street Emergency Command Center and set it as an administrative organization at the deputy-section level. The Community Duty Room was set up in all communities of the district for 24-hour duty shifts. In June 2008, Bao’an District began to develop all-round emergency management in “communities, schools and enterprises”.

5.5 Implementation Assessment

5.5.1.2

189

Emergency Response Mechanism

Bao’an District Government issued ten normative documents on the development of emergency management mechanism and made the following achievements. First, a working mechanism that combines the online with the real-time monitoring and early warning was put in place. Second, emergency system for duty shifts was further standardized. Third, an emergency information messenger team of eighty members was built to gather information from a wider range of grassroots sources. Fourth, the emergency management was incorporated as a factor to assess the performance of street offices and relevant departments of district government. If there were a need for accountability in emergency response, investigations shall be conducted and relevant person/office shall be held accountable. In terms of publicity and training mechanism, Bao’an District has continued to develop emergency management in “communities, schools and enterprises” by vigorously promoting emergency response publicity through various channels, raise crisis awareness and popularize general knowledge of emergency response. First, Bao’an District Government is engaged in publicity work through news media, such as radio and television, and preparation of brochures of general emergency knowledge that were distributed to the public for free. Second, three thousand sets of posters (ten pieces for each set) on general emergency knowledge were prepared for free distribution in the district. Third, in 2008, two hundred thousand-plus citizens participated in the “General Emergency Knowledge Quiz Show”. Fourth, the general emergency knowledge was incorporated into the regular curriculum of primary and secondary schools, the publicity and education campaign was conducted for personnel in highrisk industry, and all-round and multi-layered emergency management trainings for public officials were provided. In terms of emergency rescue team, under the principle of “assignment of responsibilities to different levels, categorized management, practice based on actual circumstances, and on-demand establishment”, a team of 239 specialists in public safety emergency has been set up and 408 emergency rescue teams have been refashioned and established, involving more than twenty-two thousand people. A relatively complete emergency rescue team system at district, street and community levels has taken shape. As regards the emergency materials, China’s first emergency material reserve plan covering a whole district has been issued by Bao’an District. The district government allocated a fund of RMB47.22 million for materials reserve to satisfy the need for materials in emergency response. The district has built a basic disaster relief material reserve worth nearly ten million yuan, enough to help two hundred thousand disasterstricken victims to last three days. In addition, Bao’an District Government has learned from the foreign experience on emergency management to actively explore and promote the regional cooperation mechanism on emergency management and sign cross-regional emergency management cooperation agreement. By virtue of information sharing, resource integration, coordinated response, and joint conference system, it’s hoped to leverage the regions’ respective strengths and improve the emergency response capacity across the region.

190

5.5.1.3

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Emergency Response Rules and Regulations

Bao’an District Emergency Response Committee issued The Opinions of Bao’an District Government on Implementing the Emergency Response Law to divide the responsibility into eighteen tasks, assign them to relevant departments and supervise the implementation. The “2009-2013” Plan for Emergency Response Institution Building in Bao’an District was formulated to better coordinate the building of emergency response institution in the district.

5.5.1.4

Emergency Plan

Two years after the issuance of Regulations on Emergency Plan Management in Bao’an District of Shenzhen, an emergency planning system consisting of 415 plans (excluding the emergency plans formulated by grassroots organizations such as communities, schools and enterprises that are not affiliated to the district government) has been set up, featuring a full and thorough coverage. The District Emergency Command Center also compiled Guidelines for Emergency Response in Bao’an District of Shenzhen and Emergency Response Cards for Common Emergencies to make the emergency plan concise, simple and easy to remember and implement. In 2009, the emergency planning system was further perfected with the release of Regulations on Emergency Plan Management in Bao’an District of Shenzhen, Framework for Compiling Specialized Emergency Plan in Bao’an District of Shenzhen and Framework for Compiling Departmental (Organizational) Emergency Plan in Bao’an District of Shenzhen. At the same time, regular meetings were convened to discuss the preparation of emergency plans and drills for emergency plans were enhanced, evidenced by one thousand-plus exercises and drills involving seven hundred thousand people in the district since 2009. It’s important to note that the Bao’an District Government also developed corresponding emergency systems for specific local risks. The statistics on the emergencies in Bao’an District from 2005 to 2009 are shown in Fig. 5.4. Figure 5.4 shows a significant increase in frequency of various emergencies in Bao’an District, indicating a trend of increase year by year. On the one hand, this could be explained by the continuous improvement of the emergency management system. Due to the increasingly standardized information reporting system, more and more emergencies were reported and recorded. On the other hand, it indicated increasingly tough challenges to the public security in Bao’an District. Among all types of emergencies, the social security incident is the most obvious and has been on the top list of emergencies from 2005 to 2009, indicating that the social security incident is an overriding social risk in Bao’an District. The main culprit for this is labor dispute, while the 2008 global financial crisis also exacerbated the risk. In response, Bao’an District Government drew up Measures for Early Warnings and Emergency Responses of Enterprises (Trial), serving as the foundation for emergency management of social security incidents arising from labor disputes and poor operation of enterprises against the backdrop of global financial crisis. For instance, it lays down

5.5 Implementation Assessment

191

Fig. 5.4 Number of emergencies in Bao’an District, 2005–2009

the following conditions for the release of early warnings for business. First, a general warning shall be issued under the condition that the enterprise has been two months behind in the payment of wages, or plans to lay off no less than thirty and no more than two hundred employees at one time, or gets involved in a collective labor dispute case or petition from more than thirty and less than one hundred people and the demanded amount of money is not high. Second, a major early warning shall be issued under the condition that the enterprise has been three months behind in the payment of wages; or plans to lay off more than two hundred employees and less than five hundred at one time or within three months; or gets involved in collective labor dispute case or petition from more than one hundred and less than three hundred people and the demanded amount of money is relatively high. Third, an emergency warning shall be issued under the condition that the enterprise has been over three months behind in the payment of wages; or plans to lay off more than five hundred employees at one time; or gets involved in a labor dispute case or petition from more than three hundred people and the demanded amount of money is high; or may get involved in unstable events like strike, crowd gathering and roadblocks because of the failing business. This shows that Bao’an District has had the basic conditions to carry out implementation assessment, including risk analysis and system of rules.

5.5.2 Problems in Emergency Implementation in Bao’an District, Shenzhen During the survey, the research team analyzed the existing problems concerning the emergency implementation in Bao’an District of Shenzhen.

192

5.5.2.1

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

Prevention and Preparedness

Except for natural disasters, the risk assessment mechanisms for accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents haven’t been built, while the efforts in risk identification and prevention were inadequate. This could be attributed to the unsound system of rules and thus falls under the problems in emergency preparedness.

5.5.2.2

Monitoring and Early Warning

In spite of clear rules for information reporting in Bao’an District, there exist following problems in the implementation of information reporting. First, the information reporting didn’t follow the prescribed procedures. Second, due to limited knowledge of messengers or poor sensitivity of information reporters, the phenomenon of late reporting or underreporting occurred from time to time. Third, the reporter exaggerated or understated the facts sometimes, which severely affected the emergency response and decisions of higher authorities. In addition, the Bao’an District Government hasn’t put in place an institutionalized information exchange and sharing platform covering all streets, functional departments and even different districts, including exchanges of information on hazards identification and remediation, reporting of information about early warnings and monitoring, disclosure and release of emergency response information, and information sharing that runs through the whole process of handling emergency. Insufficient channels for transmission, communication and exchange of information about emergencies have objectively restricted the initiative and effectiveness of emergency response and impaired the effectiveness of emergency response. This is also a problem in emergency preparedness.

5.5.2.3

Rescue and Response

The relevant emergency plans, Guidelines for Emergency Response in Bao’an District of Shenzhen and Rules for On-site Emergency Response in Bao’an District of Shenzhen all imposed explicit requirements on pre-disaster operations and on-site command. However, the survey found that there still exist many problems in predisaster operations. First, the response wasn’t quick enough. Some organizations or individuals failed to rush to the scene in the first time after receiving the instructions and delayed the response. Second, the response team wasn’t professional enough. Some leaders were on suspicion of shirking their responsibilities, with a lack of authority and professionalism, which negatively affected the response speed and implementation of decisions. Third, in regard to news release, the personnel responsible for receiving and serving the reporters were slow in response and showed even later than reporters, which prevented the media from knowing the complete truth of the emergency in the first time. In this way, the media cannot guide the public opin-

5.5 Implementation Assessment

193

ions in a timely, active and positive manner, undermining the quality of emergency information release. Therefore, it may be concluded that the pre-operation problems fall under the scope of emergency implementation. The same is true for on-site response. The Overall Emergency Plan of the Bao’an District Government made explicit demand for setting up on-site command post, enriched by relevant requirements in Guidelines for Emergency Response in Bao’an District of Shenzhen, relevant specialized emergency plans and Rules for On-site Emergency Response in Bao’an District of Shenzhen. But there are still problems in reality. On the one hand, there lacks unified coordination of on-site emergency response between different departments, especially when the leaders of the departments at the same level arrived before the leader of higher authority. On the other hand, the on-site command post hasn’t adequate authority. For instance, the commanders designated by the organizations in the district and the organizations directly affiliated to the district government didn’t cooperate; some personnel didn’t follow the commanders’ decisions and instructions because they’re dispatched by higherlevel departments or institutions, which impeded the on-site operations and impaired the effectiveness of the operations. Moreover, the on-site registration system is yet to be implemented. These are problems in emergency implementation. The emergency measures are still relatively random, regardless of the provisions in relevant emergency plans. On the one hand, this is due to the poor feasibility of emergency plans, with a lack of explicit and detailed rules and regulations on emergency response. This is a problem in emergency preparedness. On the other hand, the emergency response often relies on the leaders’ authority to coordinate the operations of various departments, instead of the instructions of emergency plans. This is a problem in emergency implementation. In response to mass incidents, in particular, the results varied greatly due to different persons in charge. The same mistakes have occurred repeatedly. The absence of a leader at the scene will cause disorder. Since the on-site emergency response needs to change with the development of the situation, the criteria for assessing emergency measures couldn’t be set in advance. In fact, such criteria are difficult to be set scientifically in advance. It’s only feasible to comb through the reports on the same type of emergencies based on implementation assessment and emergency performance assessment to figure out the key and effective operation in response. Therefore, in the early stage of implementation assessment, the criteria for emergency measures are relatively general, but with the progress of implementation assessment, the criteria should get more and more specific.

5.5.2.4

Rehabilitation and Recovery

The survey found that the rehabilitation and recovery in Bao’an District were perfunctory. For some organizations and departments, rehabilitation means to wind up the emergency response, without conducting in-depth discussion, study and analysis of the reasons and processes of the emergency or making up the deficiencies at the technical level of emergency response. Without effective rehabilitation, the emer-

194

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

gency cannot be solved fundamentally and might conclude without concrete results, leading to repeated occurrences, especially the social security incidents. In this way, the work load was increased unnecessarily, and hidden dangers arouse. This is mainly due to the lack of relevant rules and is a problem in emergency preparedness.

5.5.3 Preliminary Design of Implementation Assessment 5.5.3.1

Assessment Rules

(1) Assessment purpose: The assessment aims to identify the weak links in emergency management procedures and operations, further institutionalize emergency procedures and operations and standardize emergency management. (2) Scope of application: It’s applicable to all emergencies in the district, including natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents. (3) Focus of assessment: It focuses on the four procedures of prevention & preparedness, monitoring & early warning, response & rescue, and rehabilitation & recovery, as well as the crucial emergency actions in the procedures. (4) Applicability of assessment results: The assessment results can serve as reference for internal work, not to be made public. (5) Assessment criteria: The assessment of emergency procedures and operations should be based on the established rules for emergency management in the district. (6) Organizational structure for assessment a. The leading organization for implementation assessment is the District Emergency Response Committee. The District Emergency Command Center is responsible for organizing and carrying out the assessment, with the participation of the departments in charge of emergency responses to natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents and social security incidents. b. Following the launch of implementation assessment, in case of relatively serious or worse emergencies and cross-street emergencies, the leader of the District Emergency Command Center shall take the lead in organizing and setting up the district investigation and assessment team; in case of common emergencies, the leader of the Street Emergency Command Center shall take the lead to organize and set up the street investigation and assessment team. The team leader shall be served by the leader in charge or appointed ad hoc. c. The investigation and assessment team consists of five to seven members selected by the team leader from experienced personnel in emergency responses that have gone through assessment, emergency personnel in the street or district, business representatives, experts and others. The list of

5.5 Implementation Assessment

195

assessment team members shall be reported to the District Emergency Command Center for filing. d. As required by work and as fund or other conditions permit, the investigation and assessment team could invite, designate or hire other personnel to participate in the investigation and assessment. e. In case of relatively serious or worse emergencies and cross-street emergencies, the implementation assessment should be completed in two weeks and cannot last longer than three weeks. In case of common emergencies, the implementation assessment should be completed in one week and cannot last longer than two weeks. (7) Assessment procedures a. Within one week after the fulfillment of emergency responses, the emergency management body in charge shall submit a report on the emergency response to District/Street Emergency Command Center. b. Within one week after receiving the report on the emergency response, the District/Street Emergency Command Center shall initiate the corresponding implementation assessment. c. Following the launch of implementation assessment, the implementation assessment team shall evaluate the emergency management procedures one by one in accordance with the Indicator System for Implementation assessment in Bao’an District of Shenzhen, by means of literature review, interview, field survey, group discussion, workshop and others. d. The investigation and assessment team produces the investigation and assessment report and submit it to District/Street Emergency Management Committee for review and application. (8) Structure of the assessment report a. Introduction. It introduces the basic situation of the emergency, assessment methods and procedures. b. Overall assessment. It provides an overall evaluation of the emergency procedures and operations. c. Item-by-item assessment. It evaluates the emergency procedures and operations one by one, providing necessary depictions and analysis. d. Problems and suggestions. It points out the weak links in emergency procedures and operations and proposes solutions or measures for improvement accordingly. (9) Application of the assessment report a. After the assessment report is submitted, the District/Street Emergency Management Committee shall review and approve the report before filing it on record for reference. In this process, the District Emergency Management Committee could request relevant departments to conduct supplementary or further investigations.

196

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

b. Regarding the proposals made in the assessment report, the relevant departments shall take necessary measures for improvement and make a written response to be submitted to District/Street Emergency Command Center. The written response shall be made within six months after the end of investigation and assessment. c. If need be, the assessment report can be used as the reference for accountability or performance assessment. d. The annual implementation assessment report shall be used as the foundation for revisions and drills of emergency plan, emergency management work plan, relevant emergency management planning, government work planning, or other types of plans in the following year.

5.5.3.2

Assessment Methods

(1) KPI. The assessment adopts KPI (Key Performance Indicators) to evaluate the key performances in the emergency procedures, to which SMART principle is applicable. SMART stands for “Specific” (a specific emergency operation), “Measurable” (a measurable operation), “Attainable” (a realistic indicator), “Relevant” (an indicator closely related to emergency performance) and “Time bound” (an indicator with a deadline attached). (2) Behavioral observation. The assessment indicator is the rating scales for behavioral observation. The observer observes and records the emergency operational procedures by means of participant observation. The observer shall record not only the presence or absence of a certain emergency operation, but also the persons, time, objects, contents and effects of the operation. The operations prior to the emergency that fall under the emergency management procedures should also be incorporated for implementation assessment. To confirm the implementation of such operations, the observer could request relevant supporting materials. (3) Categorized assessment. Though the emergency management procedures for natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents, and social security incidents are the same, the key performances for each category are different, so are the criteria for implementation assessment. Therefore, only the categorized assessment is appropriate.

5.5.3.3

Indicator System

The indicator system was devised in the following steps. First, are the emergency procedures complete? In other words, have the Level-I indicators incorporated the key procedures in prevention & preparedness, early warning & monitoring, rescue & response, and rehabilitation & recovery, as explicitly specified in the Emergency Response Law? Second, does the emergency operation conform to the standards? To be specific, have the Level-II indicators incorporated requirements made in the

5.5 Implementation Assessment

197

emergency plans, work norm and workbook, as clearly stated in the emergency plans, methods, and policy provisions of the Bao’an District. Third, is the emergency operation effective and proper? To be specific, does the description cover the four factors of time, actor, object and effect of the operation? Fourth, in the remarks, we should note that some operations are targeted. For instance, some operations specially target especially serious emergencies. The second step is crucial to the development of the indicator system. It means to tease out the code of conduct from a mass of the plans, policy documents, rules and regulations on emergency management in Bao’an District. In other words, any requirements that haven’t been explicitly stated in the existing policy documents on emergency management in Bao’an District cannot be used as criteria for assessment, so as to avoid controversies during implementation. The third step is difficult, because the operation’s validity, adequacy and appropriateness are difficult to be specified in advance. It’s only possible to record the operation’s factors and make analysis through seminars afterwards. The indicator system for implementation assessment consists of eighteen Level-I indicators and eighty-two Level-II indicators in case of natural disasters, eighteen Level-I indicators and eighty-four Level-II indicators in case of accidental disasters, eighteen Level-I indicators and eighty-one Level-II indicators in case of public health incidents, and eighteen Level-I indicators and seventy-two Level-II indicators in case of social security incidents (the details and reference values are omitted here).

5.6 Outcome Assessment Outcome of emergency management, the result of the emergency management policies, procedures and operations, is the ultimate embodiment of emergency response capacity. At present, as the domestic research in this area is still in its infancy, the meaning of outcome of emergency management remains to be clarified. As for the policy practice of outcome assessment, the existing attempts and discussions don’t count as substantive outcome assessment. Seen from its development path, the substantive implementation of the policy practice on outcome assessment requires at least two prerequisites. First, the connotation of outcome of emergency management needs to be clarified and a consistent concept orientation needs to be set. Second, the key bound variables of outcome of emergency management need to be well defined and restrictive rules should be developed for emergency operation. Only the outcome assessment on such basis is of substantial significance and capable of providing feedback on the policy practice of emergency management to promote the substantive improvement of emergency response capacity. Therefore, we believe that the conditions for substantive outcome assessment are not mature yet, but we can conduct forward-looking research on this aspect.

198

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

5.6.1 Connotation of Outcome of Emergency Management Understanding and defining the connotation of outcome of emergency management is the logical starting point for conducting outcome assessment. Performance is about results, not processes. Therefore, as a dimension of government performance, the same is true for outcome of emergency management. It also focuses on the results rather than the processes of emergency management. Article 51 of the “Regulations on Emergency Responses in Guangdong Province” promulgated in June 2010 stipulates that the people’s government at or above the county level shall incorporate the prevention of and response to emergencies into the annual performance appraisal of the principal and relevant responsible persons of the administrative organs, set up an indicator system for emergency management work and improve the accountability system. This is the first time that the concept of “outcome of emergency management” is mentioned in legislation. Prior to this, Bao’an District had begun to try to incorporate emergency management into government performance appraisal. The indicator system for government performance appraisal in Bao’an District in 2009 rated the outcome of emergency management at four levels. 1. Excellent: proactive emergency prevention; timely and accurate reporting of emergency information, no late reporting or underreporting; no errors concerning emergency responses throughout the year. 2. Good: serious implementation of preventive measures for emergency; relatively timely and accurate reporting of emergency information, no more than 5% of late reporting or underreporting and without bad consequences; no obvious errors concerning emergency responses throughout the year. 3. Medium: relatively good implementation of preventive measures for emergency; relatively timely and accurate reporting of emergency information, no more than 10% of late reporting or underreporting and without bad consequences; no major errors concerning emergency responses throughout the year. 4. Poor: failure to take preventive measures for emergency as required that results in unexpected incidents; failure in timely and accurate reporting of emergency information, over 10% of late reporting or underreporting; failure to adopt timely measures as required or improper emergency response that causes serious consequences. This is an innovative attempt, but it reveals an inadequate understanding of the outcome of emergency management. To be accurate, either “late reporting” or “underreporting” is simply an intermediate process of emergency management, not a result of emergency management. The indicator of “no errors in emergency response” refers to the control of the process, rather than the results of emergency management. Then, what is the result of emergency management? It depends on the consequences of the emergency. Generally speaking, emergencies lead to three types of consequences: causalities, property losses and social disorder. Therefore, the results of emergency management are correspondingly manifested as the achievement in preventing or saving the causalities, property losses and social disorder, incorporating the performance of both emergency response and emergency prevention and constituting the outcome of emergency management in a complete sense. Since the prevention of an emergency from

5.6 Outcome Assessment

199

happening means no casualty, property loss or social disorder, no occurrence of emergencies is also a performance of emergency management. In general, the results of emergency management may include: 1. Effective prevention and no occurrence of emergencies; 2. Casualties reduced by emergency management; 3. Economic losses recovered by economic management; 4. Social disorder avoided by emergency management (can be measured through the time used to restore the social order). In this aspect, the research by Zhang Fenghua and other scholars is quite enlightening. They used casualties, economic losses and time for post-earthquake restoration as the criteria for measuring the urban capacity of earthquake prevention and mitigation. They also proposed six major factors of the indicator system for assessing urban capacity of earthquake prevention and mitigation, namely seismic hazard analysis capabilities, seismic monitoring and forecasting capabilities, seismic resistance of engineering facilities, socio-economic resilience in disaster, and emergency response and restoration capacity, added by twenty-plus level-II indicators and seventy-seven level-III indicators to measure and evaluate the six major factors.8 In this sense, prevention is the greatest performance. At present, however, even in the United States where emergency management is relatively mature, it is extremely rare to be held accountable because preventive measures are not in place. This is especially true in China. “Obscure efforts to avoid a crisis earn nothing, but conspicuous efforts to solve a crisis make heroes.” Therefore, it is vital to make prevention the primary performance of emergency management. A consensus on this concept would be able to reshape the process of emergency management, change the current situation of “priority of emergency response over prevention” and solve the problem of unbalanced authority and responsibility in accountability. Currently, since the emergency response institution isn’t sound yet, it’s difficult to give priority to prevention in reality. For instance, in the policy practice outcome assessment in Bao’an District, the “proactive emergency prevention” is used as a criterion for excellent performance, but the absence of a long-term risk assessment system has made “proactive emergency prevention” empty talk. This also suggests that under the current circumstance of “priority of emergency response over prevention”, the concept of outcome of emergency management in the policy practice isn’t complete. In fact, there’s still a lack of concept and institution to carry out outcome assessment.

5.6.2 Bound Variables of Outcome and Restrictive Rules for Emergency Management Despite various approaches of outcome assessment in different institutional environments, the outcome assessment generally incorporates the dimensions of efficiency, effectiveness, quality, cost, and satisfaction. Emergency management is a public

8 Zhang

Fenghua, Xie Lili & Fan Lichu. Study on evaluation of city’s ability reducing earthquake disasters. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2004 (3).

200

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

service with the purpose of improving public safety. Therefore, the performance objectives of general public services also apply to emergency management, such as quality, appropriateness, fairness, and cost.

5.6.2.1

Quality of Emergency Management

Are there differences concerning the quality of emergency management? The answer is yes. There has been no way to precisely define the quality by now, but it’s quite easy to assess the quality of a specific procedure in emergency management. For example, the emergency rescue in response to the Chile mining accident of 2010 was globally recognized as a high-quality emergency management. Not only all thirtythree miners were rescued, but some operations in the rescue process were quite humane. To ensure the health of the trapped miners, nutritionists developed special recipes to limit a daily calorie intake of no more than twenty-two hundred for each miner. The rescuers provided miners with socks made of sterilized cooper fiber so that they wouldn’t get athlete’s foot. After spending a long time in the dark, miners were offered a pair of USD450 sunglasses to protect their eyes when they were brought back to the surface. To be specific, the four procedures of the emergency management differ in quality. For instance, in the monitoring and early warning procedure, the arrival rate of early warning information can be used as an indicator for quality. Currently, the understanding of outcome of emergency management is limited to “the release of information”. However, the release of information isn’t equal to the arrival of information. The method, channel and timing of information release could all affect the information reception. Prior to the “heavy downpour on July 5, 2010” in Guangzhou, the emergency management department did issue early warnings through SMS two hours in advance, but as it’s issued in the early morning when most people were asleep, the effect of the early warning was impaired.

5.6.2.2

Appropriateness of Emergency Management

The appropriateness of emergency management should also be used as a criterion for outcome assessment. In 2010, after the Emergency Response Measures of Sichuan Province (Draft) was announced to solicit public opinion, a major controversy arose over the provision on the “requisition of organizational and personal properties when necessary”. This is what the appropriateness of emergency management is about. The Emergency Response Law emphasized the “proportional principle” and “the principle of minimizing government enforcement”, requiring governments to adopt emergency measures commensurate with the nature, severity and scope of social damages that might be caused by the emergency. When there are multiple measures, the government shall select the measures that would maximize the protection of rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations. But in reality,

5.6 Outcome Assessment

201

the Emergency Response Law has been perceived to “grant authorization” rather than “restrain power”. Especially in case of inadequate prevention and preparedness, local governments and its departments might adopt excessive emergency measures under pressure, resulting in damage to civil rights.

5.6.2.3

Fairness of Emergency Management

As a public service involving resource allocation, the emergency management concerns fairness. For example, in the emergency management of natural disasters, controversies often arise over the fairness in distributing relief supplies and donations. During the “2008 Wenchuan Earthquake”, social disputes erupted because of the private use of tents for disaster relief. Issues concerning fairness of emergency management grew more prominent during the post-disaster restoration and reconstruction. Different levels of exposure lead to differences in donations received by the affected areas. The affected areas with the most media coverage received more donations than other areas. In fact, during the phase of restoration and reconstruction after Wenchuan Earthquake and Yushu Earthquake, the issues concerning the fairness in resource allocation have emerged gradually and became one of the major headaches for post-disaster reconstruction.

5.6.2.4

Cost of Emergency Management

In the long run, emergency costs should also be incorporated into the outcome assessment system and become a restrictive rule for emergency management. In China, as the national system has made it possible to pool resources to solve major problems through extensive social mobilization, we are capable of coping with any major disasters. But in the long run, it’s only rational to obtain the benefits of emergency management at a reasonable cost, which also conforms to the “proportional principle” established in the Emergency Response Law. Meanwhile, the emergency management has its own particularity and should put people first and save lives at all costs. But still we need to reflect on the emergency management “at all costs” with the focus on the following two aspects. First, the emergency management gets excessively politicized and symbolized. In a certain sense, emergency management has become the backbone of the so-called “the China model”. It’s easily over-symbolized, leading to excessive investment. In fact, during the post-disaster restoration and reconstruction, there are some vanity projects that would undoubtedly increase the cost of emergency management. Second, the reluctance to invest in disaster mitigation and prevention increases the cost of emergency responses. The United States has figured out a principle in emergency management, that is, “one-cent investment in prevention saves one dollar in emergency response”. China still makes a low investment in the emergency prevention. In accordance with the Budget Law, “reserve funds in government budgets at various levels shall be established at a ratio of 1–3% of the budgetary expenditures at the corresponding level”. However, in fear that such funds would

202

5 Policy Framework for Assessing Local Governments’ …

hinder the economic growth, the local governments are often reluctant to increase investment in active prevention, evidenced by a reserve fund of less than 3% of its budgetary expenditures. When an emergency occurs, since the relevant laws and regulations don’t contain the specifications on the use of emergency funds, or to say that there are no detailed accounts in the budget or a cap for expenditures of emergency management, it’s very likely for the government to take charge of all things or continuously upgrade emergency measures out of political reasons, resulting in significant increase of expenditures. To sum up, the current emergency management is not mature yet and follows encouraging rules most of the time. In the long run, however, the restrictive rules should be taken into consideration to carry out the substantive outcome assessment and promote the connotative development of the emergency response capacity based on the feedback from the outcome assessment. Currently, the conditions to conduct the substantive implementation of the policy practice on outcome assessment are not mature yet, but we can carry out researches to clarify the connotation of outcome of emergency management, analyze the logical relationship between emergency response capacity and outcome, duly improve the requirements on outcome of emergency management in the areas with relatively mature emergency management, and attempt to conduct outcome assessment for a specific emergency for the purpose of accumulating experience.

Part III

Policy Priorities

Chapter 6

Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation and Stability Maintenance

Previous chapters focus on theoretical innovation and empirical studies, putting aside the discussion of policy and measure suggestions. In this chapter, we will focus on the concepts, systems, mechanisms, laws and regulations, and a series of policies, and on making suggestions in the areas of risk management, emergency management, and crisis management. First of all, we must know that emergency response, disaster mitigation, and stability maintenance are essentially insidious and persistent.

6.1 Risks for Disasters and Crises Are Essentially Insidious and Persistent 6.1.1 For the Foreseeable Future, Natural Disasters Tend to Occur More Frequently According to a research program launched by China Earthquake Administration in 1994, disasters caused high death tolls (more than one million deaths per year) and low economic losses (nearly ten billion yuan) from 1949–1976; then, starting from 1977, the disasters caused lower death tolls (about two thousand per year), but higher economic losses (hundreds of billions of yuan) (see Fig. 6.1). The research team believed that with the development of the economy and the enhancement of national strength, investment in disaster prevention and mitigation would increase and the future trend would be fewer deaths and lower economic losses (or at least a lower economic losses to GDP ratio). However, the research later revealed that from 2005 onward, disasters tended to cause higher death tolls and economic losses. Especially in the last three years (2008–2010), not only in China but also around the world, extreme weather conditions and catastrophic disasters have been frequent. Various explanations have emerged. Some scholars believe that from the perspective of the relationship between man and nature , the globalization of capitalist © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_6

205

206

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

Fig. 6.1 Time distribution of catastrophes in China and corresponding ODP in recent 60 years (*As cited in Gao Jianguo. The Problems of and Policy Recommendations for Emergency Response Mechanism for Disaster mitigation. In working papers of the Committee of Experts, China National Commission for Disaster mitigation.)

economy has changed the features of the Earth, the geological structures, and the ecological environment, bringing catastrophic results. Some scholars, from the point of view of global warming, argued that frequent extreme weather conditions would be inevitable. Other scholars, based on situations in China, pointed out that the unsustainable GDP-first development model had destroyed the balance between economic development and environmental protection and the harmony of population, resources, and the environment. All of these explanations have some truth. However, the first two explanations intend to cover too much in time and space, while the third one is too narrow. An interpretation of the situations that falls into the middle range is the “La Madre Phenomenon”. This phenomenon, first discovered by American oceanographer Steven Hill in 1996, is known as “Pacific Decadal Oscillation” (PDO) in meteorology and oceanography. Preliminary research indicates that PDO has a close relationship with the Pacific Ocean equatorial current “El Niño”1 and “La Niña” phenomena,2 and is thus referred to as the “mother” of “El Niño” and “La Niña.” 1 “El Niño”: Also known as “El Niño current,” is a climate phenomenon caused by the loss of balance

between the ocean and the atmosphere in the Pacific Equatorial Zone, resulting from the eastward movement of the Walker circulation. Normally, the monsoon current in the tropical Pacific Ocean moves from the Americas to Asia, keeping the surface of the Pacific warm and bringing tropical rains around Indonesia. However, this pattern is disrupted once every two to seven years, reversing the wind direction and ocean currents. The heat flow in the surface of Pacific Ocean shifts eastward toward the Americas, taking away tropical rains, as a result, the El Niño phenomenon occurs. 2 “La Niña,” “the little girl, or the Virgin” in Spanish, is the reverse of the “El Niño” phenomenon. It refers to a phenomenon, in which the water temperature in the eastern Pacific around the equator is abnormally declining. It is manifested by the apparent cooling in the East Pacific, accompanied by a state of global climate chaos that always occurs after the El Niño phenomenon. Meteorologists and

6.1 Risks for Disasters and Crises Are Essentially Insidious and Persistent

207

The La Madre periods currently known to us are: 1890–1924 (cool phase), 1925–1945 (warm phase), 1946–1976 (cool phase), 1977–2004 (warm phase), and 2005–around 2035 (cool phase). In a warm phase, the weather is generally favorable; in a cool phase, disastrous. The period from 1977 to 2003 was a warm phase when China was making smooth progress in its reform and opening up. This period saw fewer natural disasters, with floods only in 1981 and 1998, and fewer major earthquakes (one 7.6-magnitude earthquake and a 7.2-magnitude one in Lancang and Gengma, Yunnan, respectively, in 1988; a 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Lijiang, Yunnan, and a 6.4-magnitude earthquake in Baotou, Inner Mongolia, in 1996). That was a time when “heaven helps those who help themselves.” We are currently in a cool phase, that is, a period of frequent disasters, not only in China but also in other parts of the world (see Fig. 6.2).3 The following is a summary of the “Top Ten Natural Disasters of the Year” of the last few years sponsored by the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation and organized by the National Disaster mitigation Center of China and the Disaster mitigation in China magazine (see Table 6.1). The table shows that in recent years, natural disasters that have caused huge losses of lives and property and caused severe damage to social production and life in China are mainly floods, droughts, typhoons, earthquakes, and snowstorms. The natural disaster bulletin of 2010 released by the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation reads: “In 2010, natural disasters in China were frequent and the losses were extremely serious. The natural disasters of all kinds affected

Fig. 6.2 Increasing risk coverage of natural disasters in China

oceanographers use it to refer to specifically the phenomena of continuous abnormal cooling in large areas of the eastern and central parts of the equatorial Pacific Ocean (where the temperatures of the sea surface are more than 0.5 °C below the climatological average and last longer than 6 months). “La Niña” is also known as the “anti-El Niño” phenomenon. 3 As cited in Gao Jianguo. The Problems of and Policy Recommendations for Emergency Response Mechanism for Disaster mitigation. In working papers of the Committee of Experts, China National Commission for Disaster mitigation.

208

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

Table 6.1 Major natural disasters in China, 2006–2010 No.

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

1

Typhoon Saomai

Huaihe River flood

May 12 Wenchuan earthquake

Blizzard in 16 provinces

Yushu earthquake

2

Tropical storm Bilis

Severe thunderstorm in Chongqing

Winter storms

Serious summer drought in 9 provinces in North, Northeast, and Northwest China

Extraordinarily serious flash flood and debris flow in Zhouqu, Gansu

3

Drought in Chongqing and Sichuan

Jinan cloudburst

Typhoon Hagupit

Widespread winter and spring droughts in parts of North and Northwest China and the Yellow River and Huaihe River basins

Extraordinary autumn, winter, and spring droughts in Southwest China

4

Floods in 9 southern provinces

Typhoon Sepat

Floods in the south

Typhoon Morakot

Rainstorm and floods in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River

5

Sandstorm in 13 northern provinces

Earthquake in Pu’er, Yunnan

Drought in Xinjiang

6.0-magnitude earthquake in Yao’an, Yunnan

Floods in the northeast

6

Earthquake in Zhaotong, Yunnan

Storm tide in the north

Autumn floods in the Yangtze River basin

Two consecutive heavy rainfalls in the earthquakestricken Wenchuan, Sichuan

Flash floods and debris flows in Ankang, Shaanxi

7

Typhoon Prapiroon

Floods in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan

Earthquake in Panzhihua and Huili

Heavy rainfalls in 12 cities in Hunan

Landslide in Guanlin, Guizhou (continued)

6.1 Risks for Disasters and Crises Are Essentially Insidious and Persistent

209

Table 6.1 (continued) No.

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

8

Typhoon Kaemi

Rainstorms in 7 southern provinces

September torrential rains and debris flows in Sichuan

Strong convective weather such as gales and hailstorms in Anhui and Henan

Typhoon Fanapi

9

Forest fire in Daxing’anling

Storms and floods in Sichuan

Drought in Ningxia

Debris flow in Kangding, Sichuan

Blizzards in northern Xinjiang

10

Snowstorms in Inner Mongolia

Severe summer drought in the northeast

Snow disasters in Tibet

Landslide in Zhaotong, Yunnan

Sea ice in Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea

430 million people, 7,844 people were killed or missing due to the disasters, and 18.584 million people were relocated. The area of crops affected by the disasters was 37.426 million hectares, of which 4.863 million hectares suffered total crop failure. In addition, 2.733 million houses collapsed, 6.701 million houses were damaged, and RMB 533.99 billion of direct economic losses were caused. Overall, the year 2010 is among the worst years and second only to the year 2008 in two decades. Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jilin, Xinjiang, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guizhou provinces/autonomous regions were the more severely affected areas.”4

6.1.2 For the Foreseeable Future, Social Risks Tend to Occur More Frequently The theory of risk society reveals that even if a country has completed its modernization process, it can still encounter many new and unknown risks because the origin of modern risks is “reflexive modernity”. According to Samuel Huntington’s theory, risks and social unrest take place only at a certain stage in the process of modernization, and the future will be bright once this stage is over. However, Beck and Giddens’ theory of risk society indicates that although modernity reduces the overall risk in some areas and lifestyles, it also introduces new risk parameters that are previously unknown or insufficiently understood, including the risks of serious consequences, which were derived from the characteristic of the globalization of modern social systems.5 “The exponential 4 China News Service: Ministry of Civil Affairs: In 2010, 430 million people were affected by various

natural disasters nationwide. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/01-14/2788271.shtml. 5 Anthony Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity. Trans. Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen. Joint Publishing,

1998, p. 4.

210

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

growth of productivity in the process of modernization gives rise to potential risks and threats of an unprecedented magnitude.”6 “What accompanies the advent of the era of risk culture may be numerous terrors and trembles of mankind, not a small amount of fear and anxiety.”7 In the current period of social transformation, both Huntington’s “risk of modernization” and the “risk of modernity” in the theory of risk society exist in China. Although the former is receding, the latter is rising. Therefore, for quite some time in the future, China will see both great opportunities for development and frequent risks.

6.1.3 For the Foreseeable Future, Social Contradictions Tend to Occur More Frequently In 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided to stop taking class struggle as the main theme and instead take economic development as the central task. The CPC Central Committee with Deng Xiaoping as the core emancipated the mind by seeking truth from facts, and put forward a series of guidelines, principles, and policies for reform and opening up, which directly brought about progress and development of the Chinese society. The driving force at this time came top down from the central government. All kinds of new ideas, new policies, and new initiatives were based on the wise leadership of the central government. The main theme of society was “reform”. After Deng Xiaoping delivered his speech during the Southern China Tour in 1992, the theme of society became development, and the driving forces were mainly from the elites at the middle level of society, that is, the officials, elites, and “capable persons” from all regions, departments, and organizations. They were fully motivated to work for economic development (higher GDP, fiscal resources, profits, etc.) and made great contributions to economic development. They were also the first group of people to become rich in China. From 2003 on, the CPC Central Committee put forward the Scientific Outlook on Development, the core of which is to put people first, as well as the goals of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and building a harmonious society. Greater efforts were made to promote social progress by improving people’s lives and involving all stakeholders. Equality was promoted in economic and political spheres and in social life. A number of laws and regulations represented by the Property Law and the New Relocation Regulations effectively protected the legitimate rights of the people. At that time, the main theme of the society became “sharing”, which meant that everyone was to benefit from the reform and development. The driving forces behind social progress and development then came from the general public. In this 6 Ulrich 7 Scott

Beck. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications, 1992. p. 20. Lash, “Risk Society and Risk Culture.” Trans. Wang Wulong. Marxism & Reality, 2002, 4.

6.1 Risks for Disasters and Crises Are Essentially Insidious and Persistent

211

context, social contradictions, especially the contradiction between the elites and the general public, or between those who got reach first and those asking for their share, were bound to intensify. Grievances emerged among middle-level elites. A saying goes that “people-oriented policy make unruly people get rude and officials kneel down for a harmonious society.” In the meantime, the lower strata of society came up with arrogant sayings like “there would be no new China without forced demolition,” and “but for our county Party secretary’s efforts, you intellectuals would be emptybellied.” These give a vivid portrayal of what happened in the second phase, but such attitudes will in no way meet the new requirements of the third phase. Therefore, it is no wonder why in recent years, each execution of emergency response measures has gave rise to even more emergencies, so did efforts to maintain stability, or mitigate disasters. This does not mean that the emergency response, stability maintenance, and disaster mitigation efforts were not effective. Efforts to manage risks, disasters and crises should be insidious and persistent, not spontaneous. In addition, risks, disasters and crises never come alone, and this complicates the management process. The occurrences of natural disasters have been increasingly associated with those of accidents, public health incidents, and public security incidents. Natural disasters often lead to a series of secondary or derived accidents or incidents. For example, the 2008 winter storms and the Wenchuan earthquake destroyed some lifeline projects and information networks, paralyzing partially or temporarily economic and social activities and causing serious economic losses. Moreover, natural disasters usually have strong social and political attributes, and this is especially the case as China’s economic and social development has entered a critical new when the economic system, social structure, interest pattern and people’s thoughts are all going through profound changes. Thus, natural disasters may intensify instable, uncertain, and insecure factors, especially when they are coupled with ethnic and religious issues. Furthermore, people are now significantly more aware of their legitimate rights and the power of public opinion and public supervision has increased to a level that is never seen before. Therefore, they tend to pose higher demand for public safety. It is becoming more and more important and urgent to ensure the safety and health of the public in disaster prevention and reduction, emergency response, and stability maintenance work in the current stage.

6.2 Strategic Management: Changing Standards for Emergency Response 6.2.1 Emergencies Should Be Managed Strategically The object of emergency management is an “emergency.” It can be an unexpected public incident that breaks out or an accident that involves the interests of the public. But, in reality, these incidents and accidents are in some way becoming “normal.” In this case, can emergency management still be called emergency management? In state

212

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

governance and government administrative systems, emergency management sets apart from daily management because it is emergencies that it aims to manage. Once emergencies become normal and show no distinction from day-to-day happenings, the existence of emergency management itself is seriously challenged from both the conceptual and the institutional perspectives. From another point of view, emergency management must have come into being in the first place because traditional day-to-day management is insufficient to cope with these unexpected incidents and it became necessary to transfer part of the management responsibilities. In fact, in management practice, it is rather difficult to distinguish between daily management and emergency management, because an unexpected incident usually does not break out from nowhere. It has signs and comes out only after certain potentials build up. However, during the dynamic and continuous evolution process, people often do not know when to apply day-to-day management and when to shift to emergency management. Consequently, it is necessary to understand, from a higher level, the problems that China is facing today and the management concepts and systems that deal with the problems. It is undeniable that China is facing unprecedented challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, the complexity of the problems is unprecedented, including not only the instability caused by modernization, but also the uncertainty brought about by modernity.8 On the other hand, the government is very capable of temporarily taming problems. The Chinese national mobilization system has received more and more attention, and administrators at all levels of governments are increasingly confident in this approach to handling problems. However, we need to carry out more in-depth analysis into the issues. At present, natural disasters continue to occur, social tensions and unsafe foods are rampant, new infectious diseases come and go, environmental and ecological conditions deteriorate, and production accidents happen despite all kinds of tightened rules. Although these are global problems, there are problems unique to China. There are both long-standing abuses and problems that have aroused concerns in recent years. Obviously, a single national emergency management system cannot be fully competent to solve all these problems. Moreover, an emergency management system that focuses on short-term solutions is in nature not suitable to bear such responsibility. If we are satisfied with temporary solutions with blind self-confidence, we may very well miss the opportunity to truly settle the problems. That is why we have succeeded in “emergency response” once and again, but problems keep coming out and seem to be growing. The overarching concept here is the strategic governance of emergencies. It emphasizes two main points. First, we must think strategically in the face of emergencies. Second, responses to emergencies must evolve into the governance of unexpected incidents. Strategic thinking, as oppose to tactical thinking, is different from the macro considerations in the face of specific matters. As the old Chinese saying goes, “those who do not plan for future generations are not competent to plan for a short period of time, and those who do not plan out the whole of a situation are 8 As

for the relationship between modernization and modernity, the book takes the view of the majority in academia that modernization is the process of acquiring modernity.

6.2 Strategic Management: Changing Standards for Emergency Response

213

incapable of planning for a part of it.” In other words, emergency management is currently just tactical thinking specific to the matter at issue and lacks consideration of the overall background that China is currently in the process of globalization and transformation. Actually, almost none of China’s current emergencies can be explained without taking these two historical processes into the picture. According to the definition made by the Commission on Global Governance, “governance is not a set of rules or an activity, but a process; the process of governance is not based on control, but on coordination; it involves both public and private sectors; it is not a formal institution, but continuing interaction.”9 Governance is ubiquitous. “All of them can do without government by the State, but not without governance.”10 Governance, when applied to emergency responses and problem solving, emphasizes cooperation between and participation by multiple stakeholders.

6.2.2 Strategic Management of Emergencies Should Meet Four Requirements First, emergency management should be global. We should not treat emergencies as isolated cases, but identify the interrelationships among emergencies, find their common origins and general laws behind them, and resolve them fundamentally. Second, emergency management should be forward-looking. We should not deal with emergencies passively. We should not “deal with emergencies on an ad hoc basis” or “proceed without a plan.” Instead, we should set, in advance, the ultimate goal of emergency management, or at least a clear strategic goal. Third, emergency management should be programmatic. It is necessary to have a blueprint as a frame of reference when managing emergencies, clearly marking out the path toward the ultimate goal (or strategic goal) and possible deviations. Fourth, emergency management should be preventive. We should integrate emergency management with day-to-day management. By increasing multi-stakeholder participation and cooperation in day-to-day management, on the one hand, we can raise the public’s risk awareness, and on the other hand, minimize the government’s risk behavior and social risks, and thus minimize the occurrence of emergencies.

9 Our Global Neighborhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford University Press, 1995. As cited in Yu Keping. “Governance and Good Governance.” Marxism and Reality, 1999 (5). 10 Yu Keping. Governance and Good Governance. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2000, p. 6.

214

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

6.2.3 Strategic Management of Emergencies Requires a Three-Pronged Approach According to the above comprehensive analytical framework for risks, disasters and crises, the strategic management of emergencies includes three processes, i.e. the management of social risks, emergency management (i.e. management of emergent incidents), and the management of public crises. The relationship between the three is as follows. The first choice is to take proactive measures to manage social risks and reduce the occurrence of emergencies fundamentally. The second best choice is to advance first the management of public crises through emergency management, and then the management of social risks, to reduce uncertainty. A simple emergency management can only be the third choice for it offers no fundamental solution. Emergencies in China currently occur mainly in the areas of workplace safety, environment, food quality, and social security. Typical cases that are likely to evolve into public crises are mining accidents, pollution accidents, toxic foods, and mass incidents. According to the data of the State Administration of Work Safety, 188 major coal mine accidents, resulting in more than ten deaths each, occurred from 2001 to 2004, one incident per 7.4 days on average. In 2004, fourteen major accidents happened, each resulting in thirty deaths or more. Among them, six were mining accidents, accounting for 42.8%. In the first half of 2005, the state invested RMB 3 billion in the technical adaptation of coal mining, and the State Bureau of Work Safety was upgraded to the State Administration of Work Safety. However, the situation was still grim. The fatalities in the first half of the year rose by 3.3% from the same period last year to 2,672. As the largest coal-producing country in the world, China’s coal output accounted for one-third of the global total, yet the death toll resulted from mining accidents accounted for 80% of the world total. China’s ratio of deaths per million tons of coal production stood at 3.96. By comparison, the ratio in the U.S. was 0.039, only one percent of that of China. This figure for India, Russia, and South Africa was 0.42, 0.34, and 0.13, respectively and the average of moderately developed countries was 0.4. Pollution incidents have also been. Of the 7,555 large-scale heavy industrial projects, 81% are located in environmentally sensitive areas such as river basins and densely populated areas, 45% are major risk sources with defective prevention mechanisms. Environmental accidents are frequent as a result, seriously endangering public health and social stability. In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration handled 108 environmental incidents, with an average of one incident per working day. In recent years, food quality and safety have been seriously threatened, as evidenced by the appearance of poisonous rice, poisonous oil, poisonous fungus, poisonous flour, poisonous tea, poisonous melon seeds, poisonous pork, poisonous sausages, etc. It seems that no food out there is completely safe. Mass incidents have also shown a clear upward trend. To solve these problems effectively requires a three-pronged approach to strategic management. The specific meanings are as follows. First, systematic management. Social risk management, emergency management, and the management of public crises form an integral whole and must be carried

6.2 Strategic Management: Changing Standards for Emergency Response

215

out in good coordination. The core of emergency management is a comprehensive emergency response system that has four components, namely plans, institutions, mechanisms, and rules and regulations. This system provides an important basis for emergency response and plays an important role in maintaining social stability and social harmony. However, it is worth noting that emergency management cannot stop at “tactical thinking,” and instead it must go on to promote policy adjustments and institutional changes. It is also necessary to take an emergency as an opportunity to improve governance structure and achieve long-term peace and stability in society. Second, dynamic management. Social risk management, emergency management, and the management of public crises must go on in uninterrupted cycles. In theory, the ideal is to manage social risks proactively, but in practice, public crises are often the starting point of emergency management. Therefore, officials engaged in emergency management must have a dynamic perspective, not only to improve the emergency management system, but also to promote the management of public crises through emergency management, and in turn, to advance the management of social risks through the management of public crises, so as to reduce the occurrence of emergencies fundamentally. Third, proactive management. Proactive management of social risks should be the first priority. Because, after all, unexpected incidents themselves will cause objective, harmful consequences, and there is no guarantee that any of the incidents can be kept within the affordable range of influence.

6.2.4 Three Steps for Strategic Management of Emergencies To adopt a three-pronged approach to strategic emergency management means that three steps can be taken. In the short term, emergency management should be the starting point to improve an established emergency management system. In the medium term, the emergency management system should provide further impetus for the management of public crises, including policy adjustments and institutional changes. In the long term, the management of public crises should advance the management of social risks for an improved social structure, fundamentally reducing uncertainty.

6.2.4.1

Improving Emergency Management System

After the SARS outbreak in 2003, an emergency management system was established. It was a comprehensive emergency response system with all four core components in place. It featured “unified leadership, comprehensive coordination, classified management, hierarchical responsibility, and location-based management.” Specifically, the people’s governments at all levels are responsible for command, governments and their emergency response offices are responsible for coordination, relevant government departments are responsible for cases that fall into their scope, and local governments should take the lead in responding to an emergency once it

216

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

occurs and transfer the responsibility to the upper level government once the situation goes beyond what it can handle. Mechanisms are in place for prevention and preparation, monitoring and early warning, rescue and disposal; rehabilitation and recovery. Governments at all levels are required to identify hazard sources, prepare emergency response plans, establish emergency support mechanisms, and strive to take timely measures to avoid the expansion of damage before the occurrence of an emergency, and to respond quickly and timely after it occurs. In terms of rules and regulations, there is the Emergency Response Law to follow for emergency management. As for planning, as of 2009, some communities have devised emergency plans of full coverage and sufficient depth. During the snowstorm in southern China in 2008, the emergency management system underwent practical tests and some problems were found. First, a principal organ for emergency response was absent. Compared with the system created in response to the SARS outbreak, the biggest change in the emergency system was the establishment of an emergency response office, but the system still failed to meet the needs of reality. A formal and dedicated emergency management agency is thus necessary. Second, the emergency response mechanisms were to be detailed. For example, China Meteorological Administration released an orange alarm for blizzard as early as January 11. However, no rule was available to turn such technical warnings into practical warnings that made sense to the local government. Therefore, it was necessary to refine various emergency mechanisms. Third, the legal framework of emergency response was still not sound. Emergencies usually occur in local areas. Governments at all levels should formulate emergency laws and regulations that are appropriate to the local conditions in accordance with the Emergency Response Law, as soon as possible. Finally, the emergency plans were not practical. It is urgent that we improve emergency response planning and optimize the structure and logical coherence of our emergency response plan portfolio.

6.2.4.2

Promoting the Management of Public Crises

Public crises, in nature, are pressure on the legitimacy of the government, which cannot be resolved by emergency management alone. The government must change the public policy model, conforms to public opinions, reduce social risks from the origins, and fundamentally prevent public crises. Therefore, after emergency management ended, administrative accountability should be carried out in accordance with the Emergency Response Law. This will be an opportunity for us to reflect on and correct the policies, systems, structures, and values that may have played a role in causing the public crisis along with the administrative inaction or administrative malpractice dealt with during the emergency management phase. The driving force behind this process is the political expression and political participation of multiple stakeholders in society. The occurrence of emergencies and the rise of the Internet have provided an unprecedented opportunity for improving political participation and political expression.

6.2 Strategic Management: Changing Standards for Emergency Response

6.2.4.3

217

Proactively Managing Social Risks

Fundamentally, the current social risks are mainly derived from the transformation of society which leads to less certainty and more uncertainty. Economic transformation has increased the side effects of “industrialization.” Political transformation has created a large number of regulatory loopholes. Social transformation has led to tensions in social relations. Cultural transformation has brought about value dilemmas. Although further transformation may not eliminate the uncertainty resulted from modernity, it may eliminate the uncertainty created in the course of modernization. Therefore, transformation is likely to reduce the total quantity of social risks. Consequently, proactive management of social risks needs to proceed from the historical process of transformation, and to reflect on and take steps to rectify the situation of abundant uncertainties in the economic, political, social, and cultural fields. Possible approaches include promoting energy conservation and emission reduction, optimizing industrial deployment, facilitating industrial upgrading, changing the concepts and methods of the governance and performance evaluation, restructuring governmental institutions, strengthening regional comprehensive governance, building up public financial resources, improving rural public utilities, improving interest distribution, expanding the middle class, expediting social mobility, establishing dialogue mechanisms, using police forces more prudently, regulating administrative enforcement, reshaping governments’ understanding of governance, emphasizing corporate social responsibility, and cultivating citizens’ public spirit.

6.3 The Institutionalization of Emergency Management Since risks, disasters and crises tend to occur frequently in the long term, it is necessary that we institutionalize risk management, disaster management, and crisis management. In other words, ad hoc emergency management practices should be institutionalized. This institutionalization process may involve the following aspects.

6.3.1 Legislation for Emergency Management To institutionalize emergency management, we first and foremost need to find sound legal basis for emergency management. The foundation is law-based execution of administrative power independent from the influence of the leadership and political climate. Local governments may all have emergency plans, institutions, mechanisms and regulations in place, but their ability to respond to real emergencies can still vary greatly. One of the important reasons for this difference is that leaders attach different levels of importance to emergency management. In reality, instructions from leaders are still a key variable affecting how much effort is made for emergency response. The effort intensifies once the leader gives his word. This is actually not conducive to

218

6 Thinking Long-Term: Emergency Response, Disaster Mitigation …

the institutionalization of emergency management, because the leadership’s attitude can change easily due to its tenure and the shift of attention. Emergency management is far less stable if it is at the discretion of the leadership compared with being based on laws and regulations. Therefore, legislation for emergency management is crucial in the long run. The effort to promote law-based emergency management should focus on improving the legal framework of emergency management. For the time being, the Emergency Response Law is in effect, but there is not yet an Emergency Law. Making the Emergency Response Law first does not mean that the Emergency Law is not necessary. Based on our experience of managing major disasters such as the 2008 winter storms and the Wenchuan earthquake, the emergency law should be high on the legislative agenda. An emergency law means distinction between emergency management and crisis management. The Emergency Response Law applies to emergency management, while the Emergency Law applies to crisis management. If we only have the Emergency Response Law for both emergency management and crisis management, there will inevitably be excessive power of discretion in emergency management and too much influence of the leadership’s attitude and the overall political climate.

6.3.2 Creating a Funding Mechanism for Emergency Management To institutionalize emergency management, we also need a regular funding for emergency management At present, the organizational system of emergency management has been preliminarily established, and the staffing and functional design have been defined. However, in order to continuously promote risk management, and emergency prevention and preparedness, it is necessary to put in place a funding mechanism for emergency management. Current practice is that once a disaster occurs, funds for disaster relief can be quickly and timely raised in a highly centralized political system. However, the funding needs of post-disaster recovery, which is a long-term process, may not be met in this way and the advancement of post-disaster recovery may be hampered. More importantly, the lack of regular emergency management funding may make disaster mitigation measures difficult to implement, even in the face of disaster risks. Surveys on the community level show that due to the lack of day-to-day or earmarked funds for emergency response, the relevant authorities have to comply with the same procedure of using ordinary government funds, or work around to obtain funds, when dealing with emergencies. As a result of this, the efficiency of emergency response is affected. In addition, responding to emergencies with makeshift funding arrangements can result in waste and cause problems such as lack of supervision, corruption, malfeasance, and embezzlement. Therefore, it is necessary to allocate a special budget for emergency management.

6.3 The Institutionalization of Emergency Management

219

6.3.3 Creating a Mechanism for Social Mobilization Social mobilization has been significantly enhanced and charitable donations have become an important source of funding for disaster relief and reconstruction after major natural disasters such as the winter storms and the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, and the Yushu earthquake and the Zhouqu mudslide in 2010. However, it is worrying that a mechanism for social mobilization has not yet been established, and that the spontaneous enthusiasm for charitable donation is difficult to sustain after overstimulation. To create a mechanism for social mobilization, we need to develop nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Due to the long-term policy restrictions, NGOs are still in their early stage in China. Through social mobilization, more than 300 NGOs and more than three million people participated in the disaster relief operations after the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 in affected areas. Optimists even take the year 2008 as the inaugural year of the Chinese civil society. However, the reality is that by April 2009, less than fifty NGOs and less than fifty thousand volunteers remained in the affected areas. Therefore, only by developing NGOs and engaging them in emergency management, can the mechanism for social mobilization of emergency management be established.

Chapter 7

Building a Better Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics

7.1 Learning from Other Countries Emergency management has become one of the important administrative functions of governments in all countries of the world. In most countries, emergency management is based on existing administrative systems. There are both special characteristics and common grounds and experience may be shared.

7.1.1 Dedicated Agency for Emergency Management The Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) of the United States provides a model that other countries follow. Its core is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to effectively combat terrorism, and FEMA became part of the DHS. Ex-post investigations and assessments showed that although the establishment of the DHS strengthened response to terrorism, the integration of FEMA into the DHS weakened the management of natural disasters, and the low efficiency of FEMA’s interaction with other federal departments hindered the effective use of federal resources in emergency management. Therefore, the U.S. government sought to reform FEMA within the institutional framework of the DHS and gave FEMA new functions to enhance the DHS’s ability to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from various risks and threats. The changes include: (1) in a state of emergency, FEMA is directly accountable to the President; (2) it continues to be part of the DHS and responsible for the preparation for, response to, and recovery after terrorist attacks; (3) 800–900 more people will be hired on the basis of the existing 2,200 employees.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_7

221

222

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

Structurally, FEMA consists of the Office of the Administrator, Office of Chief Counsel, National Preparedness Administration, Office of National Security Coordination, DHS Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships, Office of Equal Rights, and Office of Inspector General. Under the Office of the Administrator, there are seven entities: (1) Office of Response and Recovery (Office of Federal Disaster Coordination) is comprised of Response Directorate, Recovery Directorate, Logistics Management Directorate, and Field Operations Directorate; (2) Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration is comprised of Risk Management Directorate, Mitigation Directorate, Federal Insurance Directorate, and Fund Management Directorate; (3) U.S. Fire Administration is comprised of National Fire Academy, National Fire Programs, National Fire Data Center, and NETC Management, Operations and Support Services Division; (4) Office of External Affairs is comprised of Congressional Affairs, Disaster Operations, Intergovernmental Affairs, Private Sector, and Public Affairs, Strategic Communications, Coordination and Business Operations; (5) Office of the Chief Information Officer is comprised of Office of Planning, Architecture, and Governance, Service Operation Division, System Development, Engineering, and Integration Division; (6) Mission Support Administration is comprised of Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer, Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Officer of the Chief Administrative Officer; (7) Office of National Capital Region Coordination is responsible for coordinating the operations of several regional offices in cities such as Washington D.C., New York, and Chicago. Compared with FEMA of the United States, the Emergency Management Office of China has a rather simple organizational design, and needs to be further standardized and developed into a dedicated emergency response agency. In fact, due to the lack of sufficient personnel, especially professionals, the Emergency Management Office, at present, serve only to gather and disseminate information, not to perform the function of comprehensive coordination. The Emergency Management Office is often overloaded with emergent jobs that are no one’s responsibility or outside its jurisdiction, as assigned by some government leaders. With the frequent occurrence of emergencies, there should be a dedicated agency for emergency management.

7.1.2 Unified Emergency Command System One of the important lessons of the 9/11 incident is that the response was hamstrung by duplicated leadership and scattered information. Therefore, in 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush issued Presidential Decree No. 5 (HSPD-5) and requested the newly established Department of Homeland Security to establish the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It stipulates uniform standards and norms for all levels of government in the United States to respond to emergencies, with the aim of providing a unified national approach for federal, state, and local governments to enable them to prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from various types of accidents in a coordinated, rapid, and efficient manner. NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology and technologies applicable to the system as a whole,

7.1 Learning from Other Countries

223

including multi-sectoral coordination systems, joint command, training, resource validation and management (including resource classification systems), granting and certificating qualifications, and collecting, tracking, and reporting emergency information and resources. NIMS has two features, flexibility and standardization. The former provides a reliable, flexible, and adaptable national framework, within which governments and private companies can work together to address domestic emergencies, regardless of the cause, size, location, and complexity of these incidents. The latter provides a standardized set of organizations, such as emergency command systems, multi-sector coordination systems, and public information systems, as well as methods, procedures, and systems to improve interoperability among different regions and sectors, such as training and resources management, personnel qualification and certification, equipment certification, communication and information management, technical support, and continuous system improvement. In contrast, the system in China lags far behind its U.S. counterpart in terms of unified command. There are multiple command agencies in the four major areas of natural disasters, accidents, public health incidents, and public security incidents. For example, in the case of a natural disaster, there are different command agencies at the national level, including the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation, the National Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, the National Earthquake Disaster Relief Headquarters, and the National Forest Fire Command. They use different standards and terminology. It is difficult to achieve unified command with so many different authorities having their say in emergency management, and information will be scattered. In addition, these authorities collocate with certain administration or ministry, and it is very difficult for one ministry to coordinate with the various other ministries at the same administrative level. Some ministries or administrations, such as National Development and Reform Commission, is represented in every advisory and coordinating body, and the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Agriculture are also nearly omnipresent. It is indeed difficult to coordinate between all these authorities at the same high level. Existing emergency management agencies are mainly set up for emergencies in a specific field, and the communication between the various agencies is insufficient. It is difficult for them to response as one after receiving early warning of a possible emergency.1

7.1.3 Cross-Regional Emergency Response Coordination Emergencies often involve different regions, resulting in trans-boundary crises. Therefore, it is essential to establish a cross-regional coordination mechanism for emergency response efforts, and it is a common practice in countries with mature 1 Development Research Center of the State Council, Project Group. “Problems and Thoughts on the

Administrative System of Emergency Management in China.” China Development Observation, 2008 (3).

224

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

emergency management systems. Cross-regional coordination lowers the costs and improves the efficiency of emergency response operations. China has made attempts of cross-regional emergency coordination, but currently in the initial stage, the efforts is limited to the exchange of experience and joint meetings of responsible persons, and has not yet achieved much. Therefore, we need to draw on the experience of the United States and Japan in this regard and promote cross-regional cooperation in emergency response in order to meet the future requirements of emergency response.

7.1.4 Systematic Legislation for Emergency Management Japan is one of the countries most frequently hit by natural disasters in the world. It has thus established the most comprehensive and meticulous legal system for disaster response. This system is composed systematically of fifty-two laws in five categories, including the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, disaster prevention plan, disaster emergency response, post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation, and disaster management organizations. The United States also has a relatively complete set of laws relating to emergency management. By comparison, China’s emergency legislation needs to be improved to form a more systematic whole. Although the Emergency Response Law has been enacted, it stipulates more principles than practical measures in relation to the different types of emergencies and their management. Although there are a bunch of relevant laws and regulations, such as Flood Control Law, Disaster Prevention and Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Law, Work Safety Law, and Nuclear Accident Control Regulations, the technical means, management measures, and response plans stipulated in them are not compatible, and fail to match the stipulations in the Emergency Response Law.

7.1.5 Practical Emergency Plans From a macro perspective, increasing scalability and inclusiveness is the development trend of the emergency plan system. For example, after the 9/11 incident in the United States in 2001, the National Response Plan (NRP) was introduced to provide a complete set of national emergency action plans for responding to major national disasters. Emergency response extended from the federal government down to the local level to form cooperative actions, and the emergency management coordination between state and the local governments is fully integrated into the national emergency response system. In 2008, the U.S. government issued a National Response Framework (NRF) to amend and supplement the NRP. The framework is flexible, scalable, and adaptable, and it integrates all kinds of organizations from the federal, state, and local governments and their departments down to NGOs and the private sector and assign clear

7.1 Learning from Other Countries

225

responsibilities for them to act in response to emergencies. It provides practical tools for immediate response and emergency management for practitioners at all levels. From the micro perspective, emergency plans need to be more operable. For example, Disaster Preparedness Tokyo contains a clear time sequence of emergency operations, and the rules are rather specific, complete, and operable. By comparison, China’s emergency plan system needs to be improved in terms of its framework and operability. The framework needs to be more flexible, different plans within the system should be more compatible, and the rules need to be more detailed for principles offer no instruction as for the time sequence of emergency plans.

7.2 Research Trends and Directions 7.2.1 Research Trends 7.2.1.1

Diverse Research Subjects and Teams and Integrated Methodology

Emergency management research has diverse subjects in that it covers a broad range of categories as well as the three levels of micro-level research, country-specific research, and international research. The entities engaging in emergency management research also tend to diversify. Party and government organizations, colleges, research institutes, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations all engage in emergency management research, and they tend to cooperate more closely. Because the research methods are comprehensive and the fields involved in emergency management are wide and professional, it is impossible for one researcher to take on every research, even he or she is an expert in a certain field. Therefore, many research institutes are modern think tanks that bring together talents from all walks of life. It is precisely because of the convergence of the talents of all aspects that they can be in an objective and impartial position and use their own expertise to make recommendations for the government’s crisis management activities.2

7.2.1.2

Expanded Scope and High Complexity

At present, there are many new contradictions in the natural environments and social life, and as a result, public incidents are characterized by rapid formation, wide range of influence, and easy multiplication. This will inevitably lead to an expansion of the scope of emergency management research, and in the face of situations that 2 Xiao

Pengying. “The Status Quo and Development Trends of Contemporary Crisis Management Research.” Guizhou Social Sciences, 2007 (4).

226

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

are more complex, research needs to go deeper. The existing research includes the establishment of prediction and early warning mechanisms for public crises, performance assessment for existing emergency management agencies and their work, vision design for the strategic planning of emergency management, the quantitative analysis of specialized relevant intelligence, and recommendations for specific crisis resolutions. Special attention was also paid to the combination of domestic and foreign situations, the combination of short-, medium-, and long-term research, qualitative research, and quantitative research, so that research findings can better serve the needs of the government’s decision-making in all aspects.

7.2.1.3

Global Perspective and Collaboration in Research

With the acceleration of globalization, the links among countries in the world are becoming increasingly close. A global perspective and international cooperation are usually necessary to solve problems well. Some of today’s outstanding researchers with a vision beyond the limits of nation states predict and prevent crises, and establish emergency management systems from a global perspective. For example, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, SRI International, RAND Corporation, Canada Social Development Institute, the Russian Economic Research Institute, the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, and relevant institutions in France and India all focus on conducting studies of special forecast, predicting possible economic crises, and proposing countermeasures. In addition, global warming, cross-border pollution, and other environmental issues have become focal points of international cooperation as well.

7.2.2 Research Directions In the course of building an emergency management system, we should, based on previous experience and lessons, pay close attention to the key and difficult issues in the current practices of emergency management and further facilitate the research on emergency management. Moreover, we should build the research system of emergency management and promote emergency management in China in close connection with the reform of public governance structure and by utilizing institutional methods and technology.

7.2.2.1

Facilitating Research on the Discipline System of Emergency Management and Multidisciplinary Cooperation

Crises occur in diverse and complex forms and research in this field requires theories and methodology of political science, economics, management science, sociology, behavioral science, communication, psychology, history, and many other humanities

7.2 Research Trends and Directions

227

and social disciplines. In addition, the knowledge and methods of natural sciences, such as engineering science, information science, safety science, urban science, ecology, geology, and meteorology should also be brought into the picture. A narrow perspective restricts innovation and future research in new fields. Some social sciences scholars have begun to pay attention to the progress of natural sciences and basic sciences. For example, some scholars combine the theory of principal contradiction in philosophy with the theory of inflection point in mathematics and the catastrophe theory to analyze the key links of the emergency management system. Natural science researchers also need to borrow from social sciences which are more practical. The National Natural Science Foundation of China held, in 2006, a seminar on scientific issues in the management of public emergencies. Participants agreed that emergency management is a typical topic that involves multiple levels and sectors, and is highly comprehensive. It calls for the integration and combination of different disciplines to provide new ideas, theories, and methods. Some scholars have proposed three key scientific issues in the emergency response of major crises, namely, the comprehensive risk assessment theory for major crises, the dynamic evolution mechanism of major crises, and the characteristics of individual and organizational behavior in major crises. It will take long-term endeavor to resolve these problems in emergency management. We should strengthen coordination and cooperation with relevant research teams. Because a single project cannot solve all problems, it is necessary to communicate and coordinate with other project teams so as to solve our problem in a holistic, systematic, and scientific way.

7.2.2.2

Integration with the Studies of Administrative Management System

The building of the emergency management system and the deepening of relevant research must be based on China’s national conditions. We must move forward in an all-round manner, and combine our work with the reform of the administrative management system, the optimization of public policies, the innovation in government management, and the promotion of the rule of law.3 The organic integration of the construction of emergency management system with the transformation of government functions is bound to greatly increase the country’s incentive to strengthen emergency management and its coordination with the administrative management system. The creation of the emergency management function in the government reflects not only the actual needs of government management, but also a shift in governance approach. Emergency management, as one of the important functions of the government, should be studied in the framework of the reform of political system and administrative management system, so as to grasp the basic characteristics and general laws.

3 Gao

Xiaoping. Achievement and Development of Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics. Chinese Public Administrative, 2008 (11).

228

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

We should promote the development of emergency management through an effective reform of the administrative management system. To construct a new emergency management structure that involves the whole society, we should define the rights and responsibilities of various stakeholders and the relationship between them in a reasonable manner and these stakeholders may include the government, society, and the public. The general idea is to form a multi-level and all-round new emergency response network that embraces both institutional and ad hoc mechanisms by shifting the focus of emergency response to an earlier stage, delegate relevant responsibilities to lower levels, and set management themes that is out of the emergency itself. The final goal is to create an emergency pattern where people rely on themselves in small disasters, on an organization in a mid-scale one, and on the government in a major one. This will lay a solid institutional and social foundation for comprehensively promoting emergency management.4

7.2.2.3

Conducting Basic Research in Emergency Management

Much research work has been done in China on the practices and at the application level for emergency management. However, a thorough understanding of how a crisis forms and evolves is still absent at the basic and theoretical level. It still cannot provide effective support for the sustainable development and improvement of emergency management technology. Therefore, it is urgent to carry out targeted basic research. Because public emergencies have various types, we should focus on the common and comprehensive requirements of emergency management of public incidents, take into account the reality, combine virtual and real factors, identify basic scientific problems, and carry out basic scientific research in a forward-looking, open and creative way. Research can start from typical and urgent practical issues, and then extend to interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral issues.

7.2.2.4

Strengthening the Performance Assessment of Emergency Management

Decision-making in today’s emergency management is usually largely spontaneous and based on personal experience. The decisions made, therefore, are likely to be unwise. Therefore, it is necessary not only to facilitate the scientific research on emergency management, but also to enhance the research on performance assessment of emergency management. We should take advantage of various information technologies, artificial intelligence technologies, and decision-making techniques and methods, such as operations research, planning, countermeasures, and system analysis, to quantify the process and performance of emergency management. Some scholars have pointed out that performance assessment is the foundation of emer4 Zhong

Kaibin. Retrospect and Prospect: Building of Emergency Management System in China. CASS Journal of Political Science, 2009 (1).

7.2 Research Trends and Directions

229

gency management. We should establish a scientific, objective, and standardized evaluation system to assess regularly the emergency response capabilities of various regional agencies, administrations, and ministries.5

7.2.2.5

Combining Research and Practice

Emergency management highly comprehensive and practical discipline. Emergency management research must be down-to-earth and problem-oriented, targeting at and originating from the practical needs of emergency management. Specifically, emergency management research for the time being should answer questions related to resource management, plan management, education and training, the evacuation of people, quantitative methods and models for online decision-making assistance, etc.6 This is how the theoretical research of emergency management can solve real problems and effectively meet the urgent needs of emergency management practices.

7.3 Suggestions for Improving China’s Emergency Management System The basic idea for further developing and improving the emergency management system is to promote integration, system building, specialization, coordination, and standardization.

7.3.1 Building a Better Integrated Emergency Plan System In the practice of responding to major public emergencies, the emergency planning is still imperfect. For example, some emergency plans were less practical, or operational, and they all look identical, that is, in the same shape and same appearance. Some emergency plans from the grassroots of organizations lacked specified, detailed requirements and specifications for stakeholders to follow. Some emergency plans were partial toward specific departments, and plans could not connect to each other, vertically or horizontally, or both. A department may not have close communication with other departments, or local governments. The coordination of emergency plans did not play out, leaving everyone skin his own skunk. The emergency plans for particularly serious public emergencies were not considered sufficiently well. Many top incidents lacked targeted plans. In the face of these problems that are preva5 Deng

Yunfeng, Zheng Shuangzhong, & Liu Tiemin. On Assessment of Emergency Response Capability and Characteristics. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2005 (5). 6 Qi Mingliang, Chi Hong, et al. Research Status and Prospects of Emergency Management of Public Incidents. Management Review, 2006 (4).

230

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

lent in the emergency planning, we should further enhance the comprehensiveness, scientificity, pertinence, and operability of the plans in accordance with the requirements of integration.

7.3.2 Think Systematically to Improve Classified and Hierarchical Management In China, public emergencies are classified into four categories: natural disasters, accidents, public health incidents, and public security incidents, according to scientific bases. However, the classification of public emergencies is relative. They may overlap in many cases. In particular, extreme natural disasters often produce secondary public emergencies, doubling the effects of a disaster. In the formulation and implementation of an emergency plan, if the classification is followed rigidly, it may affect the recognition of the complexity of public emergencies, hamper systematic disaster relief, and constrain the ability to maneuver. Therefore, it is necessary for us to be fully prepared for more complex, compound modern public emergencies in terms of our thoughts, institutions, work force, and materials. In formulating emergency plans and responding to emergencies, we should divide public emergencies into four levels, “extraordinary”, “significant”, “large”, and “general”, according to factors such as the degree of social hazard, controllability, and the scope of influence, to quantify progressively each level of different types of public emergency incidents. The practical advantage is that such a classification makes it easy to grasp the peak values and of effectiveness in allocating emergency resources for dealing with public emergencies within defined limits. Similarly, the grading of public emergencies is also relative and the problem is that we emphasize too much on quantity and give less recognition to the quality aspects. Especially, when the situations of many public events are in the midst of change, it is often difficult to classify an incident in the early stage. Therefore, it is essential to make the classification of public emergencies understandable and to further create a set of new definitions.

7.3.3 Improving the Emergency Management System Toward Unified Command In “Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Administrative System”, the CPC Central Committee points out that according to the principle of being simple, unified and efficient and the requirements of check balance and coordination among decisionmaking, execution, and supervision, we should focus on the functional transformation and straighten out the relationship between functions and responsibilities. Furthermore, we should optimize the organizational structures of governments, standardize institutional layout, and explore the implementation of an integrated super-ministry

7.3 Suggestions for Improving China’s Emergency Management System

231

system that organically unify functions. The establishment of emergency management agencies also needs to strengthen further the integration and professionalization of the emergency management system in accordance with the overall requirements of the Integrated Super-ministry system. First, it is recommended to replace the ad hoc institution with a standing committee of national emergency management as the commanding body of the central government to deal with particularly major public emergencies. We should change the Emergency Management Office to an administrative body of the Emergency Management Committee to handle the daily work, and appropriately upgrade its administrative level, to facilitate comprehensive coordination. Second, we should properly integrate the emergency management functions that are still dispersed in various departments, while establishing and enriching the emergency rescue teams, based in the existing departments, according to the characteristics of public emergency classification and the focuses of the management.

7.3.4 Involving All Stakeholders in the Building of Emergency Management Mechanisms The emergency management mechanisms also have their problems. These include poor external coordination, strong spontaneity, and low capabilities in prediction and early warning. We should straighten out the relationships between central, local, and basic-level governments, between emergency command headquarters and operation organizations, between decision-making at a higher level and location-based management, and between the general emergency management authorities and professional institutions. It is imperative to establish mechanisms for unified information management, well-coordinated management, sharing of resources, and effective coordination in emergency management to mobilize all forces for emergency management. In addition, we should appropriately pool resources from multiple departments for streamlined management in emergency management, and design a mechanism to put a single department in charge of coordination with all relevant departments. This should also be taken seriously. Other perspectives that need to be further strengthened include information aggregation and research mechanism for public emergency forecasting and early warning, the mechanism of media information release, the mechanism of international cooperation, the impact assessment of public emergencies, the assessment of emergency capability, and the performance evaluation of emergency management. We should further develop and standardize the mechanism for volunteers’ orderly participation, in order to bring social organizations into full play in crisis relief. In particular, it is necessary to play their roles of controlling and reducing casualties, and providing life and psychology services, in the situations when the aid forces are not able to rush to the first site and the last mile of the incidents.

232

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

7.3.5 Further Improving the Legal System of Emergency Management The Emergency Response Law has been in effect for only a short period, and it is not advisable to rush to revise it. However, it can still be supplemented with detailed implementation rules, and can be revised after the conditions are mature. We encourage local governments and departments to introduce the implementation norms of the Emergency Response Law to make up for the shortcomings of the law within the scope permitted by law. The implementation documents should focus on the procedural norms for solving key issues in public emergency response, and clarify the steps, processes, and methods of implementing emergency management at all levels of government to make up for the defects of “emphasizing entities but ignoring the procedures”. In addition, the institutions involved but not perfected in the Emergency Response Law should be supplemented. For example, to existing rules for property expropriation compensation, we should add provisions of restricted compensation for property and provisions of compensation for non-property interests. Provisions should be made on the legal framework of the pluralistic governance structure of the society, and on the organization and professional training of volunteers in emergency work. At the same time, we should put the Emergency Law on the legislative agenda as soon as possible, and initiate relevant legislative procedures to complement the Emergency Response Law.

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency Management More Effective 7.4.1 Digitalization of Emergency Plans 7.4.1.1

Emergency Plans Should Be Made Digital

After the SARS outbreak in 2003, the Chinese government started working on an emergency management system with that centers on emergency plans, mechanisms, institutions, and legislation. The most effective was the effort to make emergency plans which achieved full coverage and penetration to the lowest level. However, the emergency plans clearly do not have as good effectiveness as their coverage. Although there is still a lack of quantitative assessment of the performance of emergency plans, performance problems are easily visible. First, there are no specific rules on how to prepare emergency plans as required by the Emergency Response Law, Work Safety Law, and National Plan for Response to Public Emergencies, among other legal and administrative documents. This leads to a considerable number of copycat emergency plans and rashly made ones, having neither overall design of emergency response systems and emergency response

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

233

mechanisms, nor effective provisions for revising an emergency plan and for emergency drills. Second, due to the lack of a sound scientific basis, a considerable number of the emergency plans are unusable in reality. In particular, it usually remains unclear as for who should initiate the emergency plan and under what circumstances. Between the covers, there is almost nothing in the emergency plans. Responsible persons rely mainly on their instincts and experience to handle emergencies. Even if an emergency plan is initiated, no one acts according to it. Third, the performance of emergency plans needs to improve. The Emergency Response Law became effective on November 1, 2007. Emergency plans are a basic component of the system for emergency prevention and preparedness. But only two months later, when the snowstorm occurred in southern China in 2008, the problems of emergency plans were exposed: Most of the emergency plans were virtually useless. If the emergency plans are to be developed in two phrases, now we have only completed the first phase—establishing the making of such plans as an institution from scratch. The second phase is to improve the effectiveness of the emergency plans and it shall never end because the emergency plans need to be improved from time to time and revised regularly as the situation changes. The digitization of the emergency plans is the starting point of the second phase and is a must for the continuous improvement of the plans. It is necessary for the following reasons. First, the existing large numbers of emergency plans need to be stored in a simple and easy-to-manage format. It is roughly estimated that there are nearly ten million emergency plans around the country. If all the plans are still kept in printed forms, cataloguing and retrieval would be extremely difficult. Second, the linkage among emergency plans can only be achieved through digitization. If emergency plans were scattered before the SARS outbreak with no interconnections, then the emergency plans after that form systems and need to be linked. Moreover, emergencies increasingly cause a ripple effect, and require initiating multiple emergency plans. If all emergency plans are paper texts, linkage and rapid retrieval would be very difficult. Third, content sharing between different emergency plans also requires digitization. In reality, emergency responders are often decentralized but emergency response requires coordinated action. This requires the establishment of distributed cognition among different responders, and the content sharing of the emergency plans is an essential element to establish common cognition. If the emergency plans are kept in paper text, content sharing would be difficult to achieve. Fourth, the characteristics of emergencies also determine that emergency plans must be digitized. Emergency response allows for no delay. Once an emergency occurs, the emergency commander must be on the scene in no time. Only a digital emergency plan can achieve fast reading across time and space and provide immediate and sufficient information for emergency commanders. Fifth, emergency management currently has hardware but not software. Governments at all levels have paid great attention to the hardware construction of emergency command, and almost all have put in place video communication systems and even

234

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

entire command systems for emergency command. Software for emergency command is scarce. Digitization of emergency plans can provide software support for the hardware systems of the emergency command. Sixth, e-government is the trend of the times. Currently, the basic law regulating emergency management is the Emergency Response Law, which is an administrative law that requires administrative agencies to respond to emergencies within the scope of administrative power. Emergency management is an important part of government administration. An emergency plan itself is also an administrative guidance document; therefore, its digitization is in line with the development trend of e-government.

7.4.1.2

Basic Principles of Digitalizing Emergency Plans

The digitization of emergency plans is not simply to convert the emergency plans from printed versions to electronic versions. It involves an overall optimization of the emergency plan system. In other words, the digitization of emergency plans is an opportunity and a means for the overall optimization of the emergency plan system. Specifically, the digitization of the emergency plans needs to be carried out in two steps. One is to improve the quality of the emergency plans, and the other is to digitalize the content and form of the emergency plans. The former is the foundation, without which the second step would not make sense at all. In Chap. 4, we have discussed the management optimization of the emergency plan system in detail. To recapitulate it, we should take risk identification as the basis of emergency plans, make emergency plans as the core of the emergency plan system, and improve the applicability of each individual plan.

7.4.1.3

A Digital Emergency Plan Platform and Its Operation

A digital emergency plan platform should include at least three basic databases, i.e., emergency plan library, emergency response resource pool, and emergency response case bank. Their respective functions and elements are as follows. (1) Emergency plan library The emergency plan library is not a simple collection of all the plans. The emergency plans can be divided into institutional plans and temporary plans. The former refers to those that need long-term compliance and regular revision, while the latter refers to those that are temporarily prepared for large-scale activities and do not need to be digitized. Institutional emergency plans can be divided into various types, such as comprehensive plans, special plans, on-site plans, and individual plans, based on their applicability and scopes. Among them, only the special plans are aimed at specific emergencies, and their preparation needs to consult relevant government departments and even enterprises, reflecting the relationship of emergency cooperation. According to the National Plan for Response to Public Emergencies, the emergency plan system also includes departmental plans, corporate plans, and public

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

235

institution plans. They can be regarded as special sub-emergency plans, which should be the refinement and decomposition of the responsibilities and obligations determined jointly in the special plans among departments, enterprises, and institutions. Because the same department, enterprise, or institution may participate in a number of special emergency plans, it can make a concentrated plan, which leads to problems, such as too few special emergency plans, too many departmental emergency plans, or ambiguous relations between departmental plans and special plans. Therefore, the emergency plan library should be indexed by the special plans, and decompose the content of departmental/corporate plans, to restore the corresponding relationship between the special emergency plans and departmental/corporate emergency plans. (2) Emergency response resource pool The concept of resources for emergency response is vague. In the broad sense, almost all resources can be regarded as resources for emergency response. But some resources are realistic, while others are potential. So, what kinds of resources should be included in the emergency response resource pool? We may change our thinking and regard the resources of the administrative departments, or enterprises and institutions, involved in a special emergency plan as emergency resources. They are the resources most relevant to emergency operations. Even so, the creation of the emergency response resource pool requires a lot of effort, because most of the current emergency plans do not point to clearly defined types, quantities, attributes, and geographical locations of emergency resources. This requires various administrative departments, enterprises, and institutions to register the emergency resources and their statistics and classifications. Generally, emergency resources are nothing more than people, money, and supplies. The most important are people and supplies. According to the Emergency Response Law, the human resources for emergency response include full-time emergency teams, amateur emergency teams, and volunteer emergency teams. The supplies for emergency response are mainly materials and equipment. In addition to the materials in the central reserve and the provincial reserves, the urgently needed materials for each type of emergency can be included in the emergency resources, such as drugs for public health emergencies, excavation machinery for natural disasters, etc. At this stage, the main source of funds is the government’s financial investment, accounting for more than 90%.7 Most of the government’s financial input comes from the total reserve funds, which is generally based on 1–3% of the budgeted expenditure, although the proportion of total reserve funds is low. However, under the slogan of “stability beyond all,” the investment in emergencies can be whatever the cost, even if the total reserve funds are not enough, it can also be allocated from general administrative fees and business expenses. Therefore, the establishment of the emergency resource pool should be based on the investigation of emergency resources, which is itself an optimization of emergency plans.

7 Jia

Kang & Liu Shangxi. Public Finance and Public Crises. China Financial & Economic Publishing House, 2004.

236

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

(3) Emergency response case bank Another important factor constraining the performance of emergency response is the decision-making ability of emergency commanders, in addition to predetermined emergency procedures and available emergency resources. Therefore, even if a specific emergency can be fully anticipated in an emergency plan, a lot of uncertainties remain in reality. The emergency commander needs to exert initiative, adaptability, and flexible decisions based on the emergency plan, in order to improve emergency performance. American scholar Irving L. Janis found in his research that policymaking at critical moments is usually subject to three rules, namely, cognitive decision rules, affiliative decision rules, and self-serving and emotive rules.8 In other words, an emergency decision-making ultimately depends on the emergency commander’s cognition, position in the structure, and personality motivation. Among them, the emergency commander’s cognition can be improved through experiential learning, simulation exercises, case studies, and other means. Therefore, the emergency response case library is an important auxiliary means to improve the performance of emergency plans. Figure 7.1 shows the composition of a digital platform for emergency planning. For a specific emergency X, the emergency plan library retrieves the corresponding special plan X by matching the characteristics of the emergency, and outputs a standardized action plan. At the same time, the emergency plan library retrieves the administrative department A, the administrative department B, and the administrative department C involved in the special emergency plan, while the emergency resource response pool retrieves the available resource a, resource b, resource c, and resources d, and outputs resource allocation scheme. In addition, the emergency response case library retrieves similar cases and the corresponding reference 1, reference 2, and reference 3, by matching the characteristics of the emergency with those of cases in the library, and outputs awareness improvement plan. The digital emergency plan platform is only a tool and must be integrated into the emergency management system. Currently, the dedicated government authorities for emergency management are the emergency management offices, which have been set up under the State Council as well as at provincial, municipal, and county levels. According to the Emergency Response Law, the emergency management system is defined as a system with “unified leadership, comprehensive coordination, classified management, hierarchical responsibility, and location-based management”. The only substantial change is the establishment of comprehensively coordinated emergency management offices. Therefore, if the core of emergency management is emergency coordination, then the establishment of the emergency management offices should address the core issues. Since the foundation of the digital emergency plan platform is the special emergency plans, emergency management offices are most suitable to run the digital emergency plan platform. Other departments of classification management are not suitable for this job because they are not in the position for comprehensive coordination and have to deal with a large number of day-to-day administrative tasks. 8 Irving

Janis. Crucial Decision: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management. New York: The Free Press.

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

237

Fig. 7.1 Composition of the digital platform for emergency planning

To put it another way, the emergency management offices also need this job to enhance their actual functions in emergency management. The functions of the emergency management offices have not been maximized in the emergency management of major natural disasters such as the snowstorm in southern China and the Wenchuan earthquake. One of the important reasons is that the emergency management offices lack the means and tools to promote emergency response work. The digital emergency plan platform just provides such a good means and tool. Emergency management offices can establish substantive links with various departments, enterprises, and institutions involved in classified emergency management through the digital emergency plan platform, and enhance their emergency coordination capability. Only the emergency management offices can build the digital platform for emergency planning. According to the Emergency Response Law, in the central government, the State Council is the highest administrative body leading emergency management. At the local level, the people’s governments are the administrative bodies for emergency management in the local area, and are responsible for the management of various emergencies in their respective administrative areas. Leadership is expressed as the command and coordination power based on the corresponding responsibilities in emergency management. Therefore, for governments at a certain level, there is only one emergency commander. This is in line with the international trend of unified management of emergencies. In reality, emergency command is realized through the emergency management offices. As the office of the local emergency management committee, an emergency management office undertakes the on-duty tasks and information gathering and dissemination, while emergency command and emergency decision-making cannot be done without necessary information.

238

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

Fig. 7.2 Digital platform for emergency planning connected to video communication system for emergency command

As the most important supporting software for emergency command, the digital emergency plan platform can be connected to the hardware platform (video communication system), which is located in the Emergency Management Office or Emergency Command Center, as shown in Fig. 7.2. The video communication system of the emergency command provides real-time information on the situation, and the digital emergency plan platform produces a schedule for emergency response actions, and the two ultimately translate into an emergency command decision at the disposal of the emergency commander. The creation of this digital emergency plan platform can start from building a small prototype: (1) from a small one to a big one. First, optimize a small number of special emergency plans, wait until it is feasible, and then carry out large-scale optimization and digitization of special emergency plans; (2) from a simple platform to a complex one. First build basic databases of the emergency plan library, emergency resource pool, emergency case bank, and then add, for example, the geographic information system when conditions are ripe; (3) from the bottom to the top. It is best to choose a city or county to carry out a pilot project first, and then gradually promote the system to higher levels and larger scopes.

7.4.2 Building Emergency Rescue Teams Among the many elements of emergency management, human factors always dominate. Articles 25–28, of the Emergency Response Law deal with the requirements for building emergency rescue teams, which shows the importance attached to this task. In 2009, the General Office of the State Council issued the “Opinions on Strengthening the Establishment of Community-level Emergency Teams” to rectify the problems of non-standard organizational management, unclear tasks, and unbalanced

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

239

progress in the establishment of community-level emergency rescue teams. Therefore, building emergency rescue teams will be one of the key components of the endeavor to improve the emergency management system in the future.

7.4.2.1

General Emergency Rescue Teams

Article 26 of the Emergency Response Law stipulates that the people’s governments at or above the county level shall integrate emergency resources and establish or designate a general emergency rescue team. Judging from the current situation, it is a feasible option to build a general emergency rescue team consisting of firefighting personnel. In the United States, Japan, and European countries, emergency rescues account for more than 90% of firefighters’ missions. In addition to undertaking firefighting tasks, the fire brigades also deal with civil defense, nuclear pollution, traffic accidents, gas leakage, and chemical accident disposal. According to statistics, during the ten years from 2000 to 2009, the number of emergency response operations and rescues in which firefighting organizations in China were involved increased by 1.95 times and 6.15 times respectively, and the proportion of rescues increased exponentially, from 24% in 2000 to 75.8% in 2009. This shows that to build a general emergency rescue team based on firefighting personnel is an international trend. Especially, we should attach importance to building general emergency rescue teams at the county level, based on fire brigades. Under the conditions of financial power moving up the government level, but execution responsibilities moving down, provincial and municipal financial strength is relatively strong, while county-level finance is relatively weak. Because of this, many policies implemented at county level easily become formalistic. As far as the establishment of general emergency rescue teams at community level is concerned, we have to resolve the original contradiction that community-level tasks are heavy but the police power is relatively insufficient. At the same time, because we have to maximize fire brigades’ functions of the comprehensive emergency rescue, the original contradiction will become an urgent problem to be solved in the establishment of general emergency rescue teams at the county level. Therefore, it is urgent to invest more in the development of police force. If the contracted firefighters constitute the majority of the rescue team, it is necessary to improve combat effectiveness. It is urgent to maintain the stability of the contracted fire brigade, select outperformers from the active fire officers and soldiers, and pay them more and train them so as to enhance the core competences of general emergency rescue teams.

7.4.2.2

Specialized Emergency Rescue Teams

According to Article 26 of the Emergency Response Law, the relevant departments of the people’s governments may set up specialized emergency rescue teams according to actual needs. For a long time, specialized emergency rescue teams are mainly distributed in the top ten systems of public security, fire protection, earthquakes,

240

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

floods, nuclear accidents, forests, maritime affairs, mining, chemicals, and healthcare. At present, the existing specialized emergency rescue teams show two major problems. First, their professionalism is insufficient, and they are not capable of carrying out emergency rescue under complex conditions. Second, the system of specialized emergency rescue teams is imperfect. In the 2008 snowstorm in southern China, the existing emergency rescue team could only remove snow and ice manually, which was inefficient. Even the medical rescue teams with a high degree of specialization face new challenges. The existing urban medical rescue teams are professional teams that mainly solve the daily emergency tasks of sudden illness, and they had hard times to cope with the rescue work of major disasters. When major disasters or emergencies occur, staff often face many unknown situations and are required to make decisions quickly. In addition, the emergency first aid and disaster relief requires rescuers with both rich medical experience and considerable physical strength and energy, which are new challenges that have been put forward for the establishment and development of medical specialized emergency rescue teams. At the same time, the professional rescue system needs to be expanded. During the rescue phase of Wenchuan earthquake, 428 aircraft and helicopters were dispatched, and more than 8,000 disaster relief flights were made. In the Yushu earthquake, aviation rescue also played a huge role. Obviously, aviation rescue has played an irreplaceable role in the emergency rescue of catastrophes. However, in these rescues, the number of rescue helicopters available was small, and most of them were of low tonnage. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen the professionalism of the existing specialized emergency rescue teams. On the other hand, we must constantly improve the professional rescue team system to meet the actual needs of emergency rescues that continuously evolve.

7.4.2.3

Specialized Emergency Teams in the Army

In all countries of the world, the military is an important force for emergency rescues, especially in catastrophes, the status of the specialized emergency force of the military is irreplaceable. Therefore, Article 28 of the Emergency Response Law stipulates that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, and the militia organizations should organize special training for emergency rescues. The military’s specialized emergency forces played an important role in the rescue operations in the southern China snowstorm and the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 and the Yushu earthquake and the Zhouqu mudslide in 2010. The Chinese military’s specialized emergency response forces have initially formed a system, including eight national-level teams involving 50,000 persons, i.e. a flood emergency rescue team, an emergency rescue team for earthquake disasters, a nuclear and chemical emergency rescue team, an air emergency transport service team, a traffic emergency rescue team, a maritime emergency search and rescue team, an emergency mobile communication support team, and a medical and epidemic prevention and rescue team, as well as provincial-level teams of 45,000 people.

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

241

It is necessary to give full play to the role of the military’s specialized emergency forces. However, we have to solve two problems. First, we have to clarify the legal conditions for the military’s specialized emergency forces to participate in rescues, and second, to strengthen the professionalism of the army’s rescue forces. Article 29, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution stipulates that the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China belong to the people. Their mission is to consolidate national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland, defend the people’s peaceful labor, participate in the nation’s construction cause, and strive to serve the people. It is far from clear whether the specified construction and service to the people involved disaster relief. Articles 22, Paragraphs 2–4 of the National Defense Law respectively stipulate that the active forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are the standing army of the Chinese government and are mainly responsible for defensive operations. If necessary, they may assist in maintaining social order in accordance with the law. The Reserve Forces are usually trained in accordance with the regulations. If necessary, they can assist in maintaining social order in accordance with the law. In the wartime, they will be converted into active duty organizations according to the mobilization order issued by the government. Under the leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force is responsible for the security and security tasks assigned by the government and maintaining social order. Under the command of military organs, the militia is responsible for combat readiness and defense, and assisting in maintaining social order. It stipulates that the military can “help maintain social order,” but it still belongs to the use of the armed forces of the military, and has nothing to do with the use of unarmed forces such as disaster relief. Article 14 of the Emergency Response Law stipulates that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, and the militia organizations shall participate in emergency rescue and disposal of emergencies in accordance with the provisions of this Law and other relevant laws, administrative regulations, military regulations, and the orders of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Although the military’s participation in emergency rescue and disposal of emergencies has been clearly defined here. However, the problem is that for the military’s “participation in emergency rescue and disposal of emergencies,” the order of the State Council and the order of the Central Military Commission are required, or only one is required? Article 7 of the Regulations on Military Participation in Disaster Relief jointly formulated by the State Council and the Central Military Commission in 2005 provides that the military participated in rescue and disaster relief should carry out the tasks under the unified leadership of the people’s government. The specific tasks are assigned by the rescue and disaster relief command organization, and the troops’ rescue and relief operations are under the command of the military. Although the regulations separate the leadership and command of the army participated in disaster relief, the leadership belongs to the local government, and the Army commands the troops. But because the regulations are only a military law, the National Defense Law does not have clear regulations for the State Council to lead the army to carry out rescue and

242

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

disaster relief.9 Therefore, the laws and regulations for the military to participate in emergency rescue have yet to be improved. At the same time, because non-military operations are not the military’s expertise, the military’s emergency professional forces also urgently need to strengthen their professionalism. This requires troops with disaster relief functions to have usual training targeted at strengthening the active service and actualization of training on counter-terrorism, stability sustaining, disaster relief, safeguarding rights, security, and guard, international peacekeeping, international rescue, nuclear and biochemical rescue, etc. Meanwhile, we should also consider properly extending the military service period of the military emergency professional team in order to retain a group of trained and practical, high-level professional backbone.

7.4.2.4

Volunteer Rescue Teams

Article 26 of the Emergency Response Law stipulates that a people’s government at or above the county level and its relevant departments may establish an emergency rescue team composed of adult volunteers and all organizations shall establish a full-time or part-time emergency rescue team composed of employees. Currently, the establishment of volunteer teams for emergency rescue lags far behind and needs to be strengthened in two aspects. (1) Relaxing policy restrictions and encouraging the establishment of volunteer organizations for disaster relief Volunteers cannot go without sound organizational structure, and should be incorporated in volunteer organizations, and regularly trained and drilled on emergency rescue knowledge, so that they can truly contribute to emergency rescue operations. Due to the stricter policy restrictions on the establishment and development of NGOs, volunteer organizations are currently underdeveloped in China. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, although social mobilization led to the participation of more than three hundred NGOs and more than three million people in frontline disaster relief operations and optimists even call the year 2008 the inaugural year of the Chinese civil society, the reality, however, was that by April 2009, there were probably fewer than fifty NGOs and fewer than 50,000 volunteers in the affected areas. On the contrary, in many other countries, volunteers have become an important or major players in emergency rescue operations.10 Therefore, we should appropriately relax the policy restrictions on volunteer organizations, encourage the establishment of them for disaster relief or emergency management, and give full play to volunteers in emergency management.

9 Hu

Jinguang & Wang Kai. Rethinking the Exercise of Right to Promotion Based on the 5.12 Wenchuan Earthquake. http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=42973. 101 This refers only to emergency rescue volunteers, not including volunteers who are engaged in other social services.

7.4 Digitalization and Responder Training: Keys to Making Emergency …

243

(2) Establishing an access mechanism for volunteers to participate in emergency rescue In the emergency rescue of major natural disasters, volunteers showed great enthusiasm and played their role. But they also caused serious disorder, lowered the efficiency of emergency rescue, and even burdened local governments. In the wake of the Yushu earthquake, a large number of poorly-organized volunteers rushed to the affected area, causing a traffic jam of fifty kilometers long in the small Jiegu Town and traffic was not restored until three days later. There were also a few people who committed illegal acts in the name of volunteer service. Therefore, while encouraging volunteers to participate in emergency rescue, it is also urgent to establish an access control mechanism for participation in emergency rescue. Most developed countries have relatively clear regulations and mature practices for volunteers to participate in emergency rescue, which we may borrow. Therefore, it is urgent to strengthen the building of relevant legal framework and mechanisms, and establish an access mechanism for volunteers to participate in emergency rescue.

7.4.2.5

Equipment, Training, and Drills for Emergency Rescue Teams

To build and develop an emergency rescue team, we must also improve the equipment, training, and drilling. The “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster mitigation in the 11th Five-Year Plan Period” clearly states that we should focus on innovation in and promotion of technologies, instruments, equipment, relief supplies, and medical and epidemic prevention supplies for disaster mitigation, promote the application of high-tech rescue equipment, communication equipment, watersaving irrigation, and drought resistance technologies, and advance the comprehensive utilization of information collection, acquisition, transmission, and analytical processing technologies in the field of disaster mitigation, raising the level of technology for disaster mitigation. Ten aspects are emphasized in the “National Plan for Building an Emergency Response System for Public Emergencies during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period”, including monitoring and early warning, information and command, emergency team, material security, emergency transportation, communication guarantee, restoration and reconstruction, technology support, training and drills, and emergency management demonstration. At least six of the ten aspects are related to emergency equipment. Currently, the level of emergency preparedness is still rather low with few technologies employed. In addition, the emergency response industry is just taking shape and is yet to be developed. The training and drills of the emergency teams should focus on two points. First, we must pay attention to actual results. Emergency training and drills should be carried out for real-world tests. The general emergency rescue teams established by and based in fire departments should carry out practical training and drills to upgrade their firefighting ability and emergency rescue capabilities. It is also necessary to promote the construction of emergency training bases, and to create

244

7 Building a Better Emergency Management System …

real-life scenarios for emergency drills by learning from the 179 rescue training bases of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Texas Fire Training Base, and Korea’s 119 Training Base. Second, we should emphasize joint and coordinated drills. Emergency rescue usually requires multiple rescue teams to work together. Therefore, the performance of emergency rescue depends not only on the capability of a single team, but also on the collaboration between multiple teams.

Chapter 8

A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

As mentioned in previous chapters, in order to better prevent or even eliminate disasters and crises, it is necessary to move the focus of emergency management to an earlier stage and manage risks from the very beginning. The comprehensive promotion of risk management means to advance risk management not only on the government level, i.e. to increase the role of risk assessment in public policy formulation and implementation, but also among the general public, i.e. to improve people’s risk prevention capabilities and foster a safety culture to fundamentally influence people’s behavior.

8.1 Designing Public Policy for a High-Risk Society The concept of a “high-risk society” has spread widely in China and has become the mainstream discourse of people in explaining current disasters. However, the theory of high-risk society is a set of judgments about “what society has become,” while what we now actually need is to answer “what we should do”, which is one step forward from what society has become. There is no doubt that a high-risk society contains all kinds of changes, affecting individuals, families, communities, governments, the entire country, and even the world as a whole. The changes that need to be made accordingly should also be comprehensive. The key is the change in public policy, because the theory of highrisk society is mainly concerned with public security issues which can boil down to public affairs in a basic and pure sense. So, how does a high-risk society affect public policy? What adjustments should be made? What else should be done before the introduction of public policies and the approval of public works programs? These are all issues that we have to figure out. The advent of a high-risk society challenges the existing idea of public policy as well as the public policy system. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_8

245

246

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

8.1.1 Pushing Back the Traditional Boundary of Public Policy One of the immediate consequences of a high-risk society is that it pushes back the traditional boundary of public policy so that all policies are directly or indirectly presented as public policies. If the previous public policy focused on solving existing problems, then today’s public policy should be forward-looking or preventive. There is almost no policy other than public policy, and all policies have the potential to bring about public consequences. Historically, the first sector and the third sector have been where public policies are shaped, while the second sector has been where policies about the private sector are framed. It is different now. As interaction among the sectors of the social system increases, policies in the private sector should also emphasize public accountability, that is, a risk caused by the private sector means that it is no longer considered to be something unrelated to politics.1 In recent years, incidents of public consequences due to companies’ lack of social responsibility are legion, and Sanlu’s melamine milk powder is a typical example. Therefore, we should attach importance to the public impacts of risk policies in the private sector and incorporate them into the framework of public policy. A considerable number of emergencies that have caused major political and social impacts in recent years have resulted from improper risk policies adopted by the private sector. If we only focus on the policies of the public sector, i.e. the government, and the third sector, we may not be able to alleviate the grim situations of emergencies. The government cannot effectively reduce the frequency of emergencies, even if its emergency management system can perform its functions to the maximum. This is because emergency response, in nature, offers no permanent solution, and many problems do not originate from the government or the third sector. For example, the 12/23 gas well explosion in Chongqing in 2003 resulted in 234 deaths. When conducting the investigation of responsibility afterwards, the safety management system of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was the first to bear the brunt. The operating procedures clearly stipulate that when a blowout occurs, any fire should be kept away to protect the wellhead and equipment.2 From the perspective of the CNPC management, the risk policy will undoubtedly help to protect CNPC’s property and equipment. However, if we think out of CNPC’s box, this policy caused the delay of the blowout, leading to the massive leak of toxic gases and eventually, a large number of deaths. In addition, CNPC failed to inform local people about the danger and educate them about how to escape, which is also a typical example of making a risk policy for the company alone. Therefore, in a high-risk society, incorporating risk policies of the private sector into the framework of public policies will help to respond to risks comprehensively and effectively and improve the efficiency of risk management. In recent years, the concept of corporate social responsibility has 1 Ulrich

Beck. The Politics of Risk Society (trans. Liu Ningning & Shen Tianxiao). Marxism & Reality, 2005 (3). 2 Xu Kai. Institutional deficiency at the center of debate in the court hearing for the gas well blowout accident in Kaixian County. 21st Century Business Herald, July 19, 2004.

8.1 Designing Public Policy for a High-Risk Society

247

attracted attention but no substantial progress has been made. Integrating corporate risk policy into the framework of public policies is one of the ways to fulfil corporate social responsibility.

8.1.2 Changing the Agenda-Setting Model for Public Policy The second immediate consequence of a high-risk society is that it transforms the agenda-setting model for public policy. When it comes to making public policies, people usually focus on the process of public policy formulation. However, the more important question is what issues are on the agenda? The government has limited resources, while various interest groups have diverse demands. As a result, the government has to make choices when formulating public policies. American political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz pointed out in 1962 that influencing the decision-making process is one aspect of power, while the influence on agendasetting is the more important aspect of power.3 Wang Shaoguang proposes six models of agenda-setting: the closed model, internal reference model, letter-submitting model, mobilization model, leveraging model, and external pressure model.4 A high risk society usually employs the last one, i.e. the external pressure model. “In this model, issues are first proposed by NGOs, fully expanded, moved onto the public agenda, and finally made an item on the institutional agenda… If they have the necessary political resources and skills to overcome or oppose the supporters of other bills with strategies and tactics, they can successfully push their bills into the formal agenda.”5 In a high risk society, the occurrence of emergencies can attract the attention of the whole society, and the social risk exposure creates strong pressure on the government. It makes various interest groups, government officials, the media, and the general public have an intuitive feeling about the existing problems, which make an agreement easy to reach despite the dispute of interests, thus forcing policy makers to quickly adjust the policy agenda.6 Therefore, we should enhance public participation in policymaking, and especially, we should respect the legal status of online public opinion in the setting of the public policy agenda. At present, there are few channels for people to participate in policy agenda setting, so the role of online public opinion is important. If the reform of the detention and repatriation system initiated by the “Sun Zhigang Incident” is the first manifestation of online forces in policy formulation, then today, the power of the Internet is already very strong. In recent 3 Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz. “Two Faces of Power.” The American Political Science Review,

1962 (4). 4 Wang Shaoguang. Bring Peace and Stability: The Goals and Approaches of National Transforma-

tion. Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Joint Publishing, 2007 edition, p. 141. Howlett & M. Ramesh. Studying Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Trans. Pang Shi et al. Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Joint Publishing, 2006 edition, pp. 194–195. 6 John W. Kingdon. Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed. New York: Harper Collins, 1995. 5 Michael

248

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

years, many issues have made their way into the public policy agenda and brought about policy adjustments after an outbreak of a risk event and the intervention of online public opinions.

8.1.3 Changing the Evaluation Criteria of Public Policy The third immediate consequence of a high risk society is the change in the evaluation criteria of public policy. If the previous criterion for policy evaluation is the “costbenefit” ratio, then the criterion for current and future policy evaluation is the “profitrisk” ratio. First, the increase in real-world risk enhances people’s perceptions of risk, and any policy thus must take into account the risks that ensue. This has two implications. One is that people see emerging risks come. Giddens’ theory of risk society indicates that although modernity has reduced the overall risk in some areas and lifestyles, it also introduces new risk parameters that were previously poorly known or completely unknown, including risks of serious consequences, which were derived from the characteristics of globalization of a social system’s modernity.”7 The other implication is that people recognize risks unknown to them before. For example, the means used to solve problems has become new problems. An overall consequence of the rise of risk culture is that risk semantics are gradually overshadowing economic semantics and become a main feature of contemporary society.8 Second, the increase in risk perception makes the acceptance of risk no longer a matter of course, and people have every reason to choose to accept or reject a risk. This means that policies are no longer taken for granted. People may refuse to accept a policy because of the risk it brings. If a lot of people choose to reject a policy, the policy may be abandoned. A typical case is the American Environmental Justice Movement of the 1970s. The slogan of civil rights activists was “Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY).” Third, the acceptance of a risk depends on people’s cognition and attitude toward risks, which makes any policy appear to be a consensus reached by people with different cognition of risk. A measurement model of risk perception finds that people’s attitude toward risk does not depend on the degree of physical harm of the risk, but whether the degree of harm can be accepted. For example, if an accident that takes many people’s lives occurs in a familiar and well-understood system (such as a train derailment), it may produce a relatively minor social disruption. If it were a small accident but occurred in a strange system (such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA experiment), it will be seen as an ominous sign, which will have a huge social

7 Anthony Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity (trans. Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen). Joint Publishing,

1998, p. 4. Zhanchao. Introduction to the Studies of Contemporary Western Risk Society. Marxism & Reality, 2003 (3).

8 Zhou

8.1 Designing Public Policy for a High-Risk Society

249

impact.9 When scientific and institutional rationality is negated, no policy comes as the result of unanimous support, and every policy is a compromise between the parties concerned about the degree of risks involved. Therefore, there is no best policy, only acceptable policies. Therefore, the evaluation criteria for public policy should be re-examined, and the policy acceptable to the most relevant groups of interests should be regarded as a good policy. In recent years, the process of policy formulation and implementation has been relying heavily on expert discourse and scientific rationality. Policies have been enforced in spite of regardless of whether the general public accepts the risks, causing social discontent. A typical manifestation is that “forced evictions” continue despite repeated prohibition in various places. For local governments that implement “forced evictions”, the criteria for measuring policy quality is still the comparison of cost and benefit. The risk, which involves the government’s legitimacy, brought about by the forced eviction is intentionally or unintentionally ignored. As expert opinions come out in large amounts when they are actually not welcomed, the credit of experts diminishes, and experts were ragged about being “brick-heads”. For any public policy at this stage, the biggest risk is social injustice, which can overrun any benefits gained from the implementation of the policy. To prevent this greatest risk from happening, it is necessary to allow or even encourage public participation in the policy making process.

8.2 Including Social Risk Assessment in Policy-Making and Construction Project Planning Since the boundary of public policy have been pushed to cover enterprises and the evaluation criterion for public policy has been transformed from a cost-benefit analysis to a benefit-risk analysis, important policies made by the government, the third sector, or even enterprises should be assessed against the risks they bring to social stability. Given public policy’s extensive impact and the fact that the Chinese society is a typical government-led society, we can start such assessment with some public policies that have a wide scope of impact and a great influence on the public. Policies, as well as major construction projects that are sponsored or approved by the government and carried out by private companies, should be assessed for the social stability risks before a decision is made or the project is approved. Suining, Sichuan Province, and Shanghai have taken the first step in this aspect. Beijing and Shenzhen have also begun similar explorations in certain major construction projects. However, they are only individual cases, and it is urgent that we

9 Paul

Slovic. Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm. In Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding eds. Social Theories of Risk. Greenwood Press, 1992. p. 125.

250

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

spread the experience of these pilot projects to more localities and sectors.10 Since public policies and social stability risk assessment of major construction projects are still in the pilot and exploration stage, much remains to be improved, especially in the following aspects.

8.2.1 Raising the Status of Social Stability Risk Assessment Is social stability risk assessment for major policies and construction projects a procedural routine or a basis for decision-making? Is the assessment of meagre importance or of strategic significance? This is the first question that needs to be clarified. According to the practice of pilot projects, generally, decisions are made before carrying out the risk assessment for social stability of major policies and construction projects. Social stability risk assessment of relevant policies and construction projects rarely comes before making decisions. That is, generally, a risk assessment is a supplementary procedure that can be taken seriously but it is no more than merely a procedure. A risk assessment is rarely considered as the basis of making decisions, let alone an “important basis.” Therefore, the current risk assessment for social stability in the pilot stage, at best, of meagre importance rather than “strategic significance.” This is of course not enough. Second, according to the pilot scheme, if serious potential social stability risks are identified in the risk assessment of social stability, countermeasures are limited to the following. If it is a construction project, the development and reform authority requests the project administration authority to organize the relevant project teams to improve the construction plan of the project and then report it to the relevant authorities. (Remarks: According to current practice or unspoken rules, allowing a second report means that it will be approved in the end. Why can’t we terminate or cancel the construction project?) If the decision is made by the government at the same level, the undertaker shall make recommendations on whether the decision is to be implemented or suspended, and make recommendations to the competent authority. (Remarks: Why can’t we enjoy a one-vote veto?) If the government on a higher level makes the decision, the Social Stability Maintenance Office organizes related departments to revise and improve the emergency plan, and then “brazen it out”. (Remarks: Why can’t we recommend the superior to postpone the implementation or change the decision?) Currently, the right choice should be to explicitly propose to change or cancel the decision, and terminate, or cancel, the relevant project. For decisions made by superiors, it is also advisable to reach the higher-level authority for a suspension or change of decision. The objective of further efforts should be to clearly require decision-making after the submission of the risk assessment of social 10 Fortunately, according to the 12th Five-Year Plan announced at the beginning of 2011, all localities and sectors have been explicitly required to implement social stability risk assessments for major policies and major construction projects.

8.2 Including Social Risk Assessment in Policy-Making …

251

stability, in order to make social stability risk assessment truly an important basis and necessary step for a major policy or construction project to be approved.

8.2.2 Identifying the Entity of Risk Assessment for Social Stability Theoretically, it is not difficult to conclude that the risk assessment for social stability should not be done by the department that makes the relevant decisions or the organization that undertakes the relevant construction project. Instead, it should be carried out by an independent third party. If the same department is responsible for both the introduction of major policies and the assessment and determination of whether a policy would affect social stability, the outcome can be expected that the final risk assessment would often be affirmative rather than negative of the policy decision and the construction project. The situation will be the same for construction projects. Such risk assessment becomes formalistic, a procedural routine, and even positive feedback in cybernetics. That is, the feedback information output by the evaluator further strengthens the instruction information of the decision-makers, and the decision-makers and the evaluators exert influence on the same direction, which makes it impossible to predict in advance and even strengthen the major social stability risks brought by policies and construction projects. Regrettably, the current pilot projects often rely on traditional inertia. Major decision-makers are designated or allowed to become the organizers of the risk assessment of social stability for major decisions they made. Project construction organizations and their administrative departments are designated or allowed to be responsible for guiding, coordinating, and pre-examining their own projects’ risk assessment of social stability. If the departments and organizations that have both the decision-making and assessment powers considered necessary, they may ask for, rather than mandatorily request, stability sustaining and letters and calls departments to participate. Of course, some pilot projects also stipulate that “a social intermediary agency may be entrusted to carry out the risk assessment of social stability of key construction projects,” that “an intermediary agency may be entrusted to assess the social stability risk during the evaluation of a project feasibility,” and that “an intermediary may also be entrusted to assess social stability risks separately.” However, such terms as “may entrust” and “may also entrust” obviously is not mandatory, and they don’t have to be binding.

252

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

8.2.3 Improving the Methods of Risk Assessment for Social Stability It is true that you can learn a series of methods for risk assessment regularly conducted by various enterprises, because their current risk assessment methods are mature and they have rich experience. However, enterprises aim at maximizing profits, and their risk assessment takes into account the loss and uncertainty of their own economic interests. Even if non-economic risks are involved, their worries are about the probability of losing clients, which ultimately leads to the loss of economic benefits. The risk assessment for public policy, on the contrary, mainly considers social stability risks and the loss of popular support and government credibility. Because of such discrepancy in objective, the assessment methods cannot be exactly the same. Since social stability risk assessment for major policies and construction projects are new to China, explorations are needed in practice, and it is impossible to elaborate it systematically here. It is worth pointing out, though, that we should carefully draw on a series of methods adopted by developed market economies and countries with fully developed rule of law. By combining their experience with China’s national conditions, we can carry out bold experiments including public opinion polls, hearings, stakeholder consultations, economic compensation, giving full play to the various types of media, especially the Internet, and so on.

8.2.4 Strengthening Accountability in Risk Assessment for Social Stability We must pay attention to accountability in risk assessment for social stability, in order to ensure that the risk assessments of major policies and construction projects are carried out perfunctorily. Accountability should be based on a clear delineation of responsibilities for decision-making and assessment. The main body and persons responsible for the risk assessment for social stability shall be held accountable, if the assessment concluded that there would be no risk involved, but the implementation of policies and projects caused large-scale mass incidents and serious social instability. The decision-makers should be hold accountable, if the risk assessment found and raised the problems truthfully, but the decision-makers did not address them and led to large-scale mass incidents and serious social instability. In addition, we should commend and reward the main bodies who actively conducted the risk assessment of social stability.

8.3 Educating the Public: Risk Awareness and Risk Culture

253

8.3 Educating the Public: Risk Awareness and Risk Culture According to Japanese scholars, among 35,000 people in need of assistance after the Osaka-Kobe Earthquake in 1995, nearly 27,000 were rescued by neighbors, accounting for 77%, and about 8,000 were rescued by the police force, fire brigade, or self-defense forces, accounting for 23%. In the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, Mai Khao Beach was one of the few beaches having no casualties. Tourists were evacuated to a safe place in time before the tsunami reached the beach. The miracle was created by an 11-year-old British girl named Tilly Smith who saved more than a hundred lives with the knowledge of the tsunami that she learned in class. In the 9/11 attacks in the United States, tens of thousands of people were working in the offices in the World Trade Center, but the death toll was only about 3,000. The experience is that everyone followed the instruction on “keeping to the right,” and was evacuated in an orderly and disciplined manner, which was the key to the survival of the majority of people. Especially, in the 2011 T¯ohoku earthquake and tsunami, which caused nuclear leakage, the composure, good order, self-help, and mutual assistance actions of Japanese nationals have aroused deep reflections among people around the world. By contrast, the awareness and ability of Chinese citizens to save themselves and others are still very low and need to be raised. Drawing on the experience of other countries, we can focus on the following aspects to improve people’s awareness and ability to help themselves and others.

8.3.1 Strengthening Public Participation in Safety Management In countries with more mature emergency management, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, community participation is an essential means to enhance people’s awareness and ability of self-help and mutual rescue. The establishment of safe communities is an effective means they use. Safe communities and community intervention models are the result of the combination of safety science, preventive medicine, disaster science, sociology, and other related disciplines since the 1970s. It was mainly applied to injury prevention and control in the field of public health. Rather than merely evaluating the security status of a community, a safe community cares about whether a community has established a comprehensive set of procedures and frameworks that enable it to achieve its safety objectives. A World Health Organization (WHO)-recognized safe community must meet the six criteria. 1. A safe community should establish an interdepartmental and cross-disciplinary organization responsible for preventing accidents and injuries, and to implement community safety promotion in the region in a friendly and cooperative manner. 2. It must have long-term objectives and continue to implement various outreach programs for the safe community. These programs should also be designed and implemented for different ages, genders, environments, and conditions. 3. It should have special

254

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

programs for high-risk people, high-risk environments, and the safety and health of vulnerable groups. 4. It should establish analytical systems and information systems for studying the frequency and causes of accidents and disasters. 5. It should set up evaluation methods to assess the process and effectiveness of promoting the programs. 6. It should actively participate in the exchange of experiences between local and international safe community networks. The first safe community in the world appeared in Sweden. The community achieved results in less than two and a half years after the implementation of the injury prevention plan. In the community, traffic injuries were reduced by 28%, home injuries by 27%, and work-related injuries by 28%, and injuries to preschool children decreased by 45%. At present, more than 100 communities around the world have been certified as safe communities by the WHO Collaborating Centre on Community Safety Promotion. Each of them has a population of a few thousand to several million. The establishment of safe communities in China began in 2002. In 2006, the Youth Park Sub-district Office of Huaiyin District, Jinan City, Shandong Province, was named a safe community by the WHO Collaborating Centre on Community Safety Promotion. The State Administration of Work Safety has promulgated the basic standards for the establishment of safe communities—Basic Requirements for establishing access Safe Community (AQ/T9001-2006). The requirements integrate the WHO Safe Community Guidelines with the prevention measures for various types of accidents and injuries occurred in China. Taking the community hazard identification, risk assessment, grading monitoring, emergency rescue, and safety planning for land use as the technical route, the requirements consist of twelve elements. First, the institution and its responsibilities for establishing a safe community. An organization should be established to work across departments, integrate all kinds of resources within the community, work together for community safety promotion, and ensure effective implementation and operation of safe community building. Second, information exchange and full participation. A safe community should establish an information exchange mechanism for accident and injury prevention and a full participation mechanism. Third, the identification and evaluation of accident and injury risks. Efforts should be made to establish and maintain an identification and evaluation system for accident and injury risks, identify the risk origins, and search and investigate hidden troubles of hazards, accidents, injuries, etc., in order to provide a basis for the formulation of safe objectives and planning. Fourth, objectives and plans for accident and injury prevention. Safety objectives should be based on the actual situations of the community and the results of accident and injury risk identification and evaluation, including objectives at different levels and different projects, and accident and injury control. Furthermore, accident and injury prevention plans should be developed according to the requirements of the objectives. Fifth, safety promotion projects. In order to achieve accident and injury prevention objectives and to implement plans, the community should organize the implementation of various forms of projects to promote safety. Sixth, publicity, education, and training. The community should have safety education and training facilities, and often carry out publicity, educational, and training activities to create a safe cultural atmosphere.

8.3 Educating the Public: Risk Awareness and Risk Culture

255

The community should formulate corresponding plans for publicity, educational, and training activities to improve the safety awareness and ability requirements of different levels of people, and enhance the community personnel’s safety awareness and ability to prevent accidents and injuries. Seventh, emergency plan and response. Prepare corresponding plans and procedures for major accidents and emergencies that may occur, implement preventive measures and specific emergency response measures, ensure training and drills for emergency plans, to reduce or eliminate accidents, injuries, property losses, and environmental damage. Eighth, monitoring and supervision. Different levels and forms of safety monitoring and methods should be developed in order to monitor the implementation of objectives and plans of accident and injury prevention. Administrative supervision of the government and relevant departments within the community should be introduced. The mechanisms for public supervision of enterprises, mass organizations, and residents, in addition to media supervision, should be created to create an atmosphere of building and co-managing the community. Ninth, accident and injury reporting. An accident and injury reporting system should be established, and the channels of accident and injury information collection identified, to provide a basis for continuous improvement. Tenth, records about the building of safe communities. Standardized and complete records about the building of safe communities should be kept so that information about the whole process can be found. Eleventh, corrective and preventive measures. Preventive and corrective actions for safety monitoring, supervision, and investigation of accidents, injuries, incidents, and non-conformances should be developed and implemented. Twelfth, review and continuous improvement. A safe community should develop safety promotion projects, workflows, and review methods for safety performance, and conduct regular reviews to provide a basis for the continuous development of the safe community. After the 9/11 attacks, the government of the United States has also proposed the concept of Disaster Prevention Community. The establishment of disaster prevention communities in China began in 2007. According to the requirements of the “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster mitigation in 11th Five-Year Plan Period,” the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the Standards for Model Disaster Mitigation Community to organize activities nationwide for building model communities in disaster prevention and mitigation. In addition, efforts were made to build other types of communities focusing on various themes such as peaceful communities, culturally advanced communities, and green communities, which is associated with emergency management to some extent. Apparently, the building of safe communities and disaster-prevention communities in China is just getting started, and it is necessary to increase investment and speed up the move. More importantly, it is necessary to enhance the participation of community residents and the awareness and ability of people to save themselves and help others. Although communities are currently nominally autonomous, community organizations are still largely dominated by the government and assume a large number of government functions. Public participation in the building and management of communities is insufficient. Therefore, to strengthen the participation of

256

8 A Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

communities and citizens in emergency management depends on the improvement and development of community management system and social management system.

8.3.2 Establishing a Long-Term Mechanism for Emergency Education in Primary and Secondary Schools The cultivation of the awareness of self-help and mutual rescue and the ability to carry out such actions are not a one-off effort, and we need to start it from a young age. Japan, as the country with the best disaster prevention education in the world, starts its disaster management education from primary and secondary schools. The cultivation of citizens’ awareness of disaster prevention starts from an even younger age. In recent years, China has also begun to attach importance to school education on emergency response, which mainly relies on traditional moral teaching such as “safety awareness” and “life education”. They are formulistic and mostly based on simple preaching and show-style exercises, bearing little practical results. Therefore, it is urgent to establish a long-term mechanism for emergency education in primary and secondary schools. (1) Advance legislation. In March 2006, the National Academy of Education Administration conducted a questionnaire survey of two hundred primary and secondary school principals from different regions on the “current status of crisis management in primary and secondary schools”. The findings are that more than half of the respondents believe that the biggest difficulty in crisis management education in primary and secondary schools is that the laws and regulations relevant to the education are not perfect. (2) Set standards. The standards to be set should cover various facilities for disaster preparedness and prevention, the grading of disasters, and the mechanisms of disaster management. (3) Improve teachers’ competence. Existing surveys show that the teachers of primary and secondary schools in China generally lack the knowledge and skills of safety education, especially, in dealing with natural disasters. Naturally, students cannot be educated effectively about safety. (4) Standardize course materials. Most primary and secondary schools do not have standardized safety education materials about natural disasters. Therefore, there is an urgent need to organize efforts in the development of teaching materials. (5) Strengthen simulation and drills. The training plans should be arranged and integrated into the education and teaching activities to enhance the effectiveness, on the basis of different ages, regions, and the characteristics of each school.

8.3 Educating the Public: Risk Awareness and Risk Culture

257

8.3.3 Fostering a Safety Culture We need to put forward the concept of a safety culture. When every individual in the workplace acts with high safety awareness, a safety culture is created and people’s ability to save themselves and help each other will improve. The development of safety culture should start with the government. For example, although the argument that “human wisdom can prevail over nature” is out of fashion today, the government is still keen on carrying out major constructions that severely alters the nature. Although it has achieved some economic benefits, it has destroyed the natural ecosystem, and the gains do not make up for the losses in the long run. Holding nature in awe is a safety culture itself. Second, enterprises are the mainstay of market economy and the main body of safety culture development. Although many enterprises have security management departments, they lack authority and motivation, which makes safety management impracticable. It is often the case that the security management departments do not have a say until a security incident occurs in the enterprise. Third, the safety culture in the construction sector is also very important. China is a country of large quantities of construction projects and also a country where construction accidents are frequent. On the surface, construction accidents are technical problems. However, deep down, many construction accidents have their cultural origins, and it is urgent to promote safety culture in the construction sector based on relevant spirit, ethics, and values.

8.3.4 Popularizing Knowledge of Self-help and Mutual Rescue In the short term, it is necessary to distribute educational materials, enrich the forms of education, and build education centers, to disseminate knowledge of self-help and mutual rescue, and thus improve people’s awareness and ability to save themselves and help others. These are also common practices in other countries of the world. Some cities in China have also promoted education on self-help and mutual rescue among the general public. It should be noted that the dissemination of emergency knowledge should not be short-lived and not be carried out perfunctorily. The focus should be on the effectiveness and regularization of emergency knowledge dissemination.

Chapter 9

Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Policies

9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response China, one of the countries that have the most serious natural disasters in the world, has frequent occurrences of disasters varying in type. They are distributed widely and often cause heavy losses. Floods, droughts, typhoons, hails, thunderstorms, blizzards, heat waves, sandstorms, earthquakes, mudslides, storm surges, red tides, forest and grassland fires, and crop blight have all occurred. More than 70% of cities and 50% of the population are in areas prone to severe meteorological, geological, and marine disasters, earthquakes, or other natural disasters. In each of the past fifteen years, natural disasters affected an average of 300 million people, collapsed about three million houses, and displaced about eight million people, causing direct economic losses of nearly RMB200 billion.1 Today, the trend of global warming and natural disaster risks have aroused great concern in the international community, and governments and research institutes have increased research input. Relevant research shows that the impacts of global warming on the distribution and occurrence of disasters in China will be all-round and multi-leveled. Severe typhoons will be more frequent, storms and floods will increase, and river basin wide heavy floods will be more likely. Local heavy rainfall will lead to more geological disasters such as flash floods, landslides, and mudslides. The possibility of extreme low temperature and severe winter storms in northern China will increase. The seasonal distribution of rainfall will be more uneven, persistent drought in the north will intensify, and the possibility of high temperature heat waves and major droughts in the south will increase. Forest and grassland fires are more likely to occur. The trend toward desertification in the north may intensify. The scope of agricultural and forestry pests and diseases may expand, the possibility of marine disasters such as storm surges and red tides will also increase. These mean that natural disaster risks will continue to increase and 1 Ministry of Civil Affairs. 2007 Statistical Report on the Development of Civil Affairs. http://jzs. mca.gov.cn/article/zjz/200,801/20080100009537.shtml.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_9

259

260

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

the scope of influence will expand. If the government and social organizations fail to timely warn against disasters and improperly deal with the aftermath, disasters will easily lead to secondary disasters and other serious risk consequences.

9.1.1 Response Failure in Drought Management Drought is classified as natural disaster, but unlike other natural disasters and manmade disasters, it has its specific characteristics. Correspondingly, drought management has its particularity. In the autumn and winter of 2009 and the spring of 2010, five provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) in southwest China, namely Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Chongqing, and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, experienced a major drought once in a hundred years. Up to 111 million mu of farmland was affected, 22.12 million people fell short of drinking water supply and the direct economic losses registered more than RMB 35 billion.2 The huge indirect losses and negative impacts on social and economic development are more difficult to estimate. This disaster showed that the capability of the emergency management system fell short of expectations in the face of disasters such as drought, and exposed the major drawback of this emergency management system, i.e. placing greater emphasis on emergency response than on risk management.

9.1.1.1

Drought: A Special Form of Natural Disaster

Compared with other natural disasters (earthquakes, typhoons, floods, mudslides, etc.), droughts have their own particularities, mainly reflected in the following aspects. First, they last for a longer time. Other natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons cause great damage within a short period, while droughts adversely affect lives for at least a month or two, and the losses caused correlate to the duration. Second, the formation of a drought is slow and its effects are often not noticeable. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods often occur instantly, while droughts form gradually over a long time. Third, droughts’ impacts are non-structural and cover wide geographical scopes. The catastrophes created by earthquakes, floods, mudslides, etc. are often restricted in a local area, within which it is hard for anyone to escape. The areas affected by a drought are extensive. Capable people living in the disaster areas tend to take it on the lam in order to stay away from harm. People at the bottom of society, especially farmers, because they have nowhere to go, are affected by the drought more heavily. It can be said that a drought that hit vulnerable groups. Fourth, it is complicated by the fact that there are many ways to define a drought. There are multidisciplinary definitions of drought, which define droughts from different perspectives, including physics, biology, and socioeconomics, among other 2 NetEase

News: “News Specials—Focus on the Great Drought in the Five Provinces of Southwest China”, http://news.163.com/special/00014868/drought2010.html2010-5–22.

9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response

261

disciplines. It is precisely because of the existence of various perspectives that the components of a drought have become ambiguous and an accurate understanding of drought is hard, leading to deviations in policy formulation and drought management.

9.1.1.2

Emergency Management Does Not Apply to Drought Prevention

The slow-forming and undetectable nature of a drought makes its management complex. Emergency response shows its merits in the face of emergencies that break out instantly, such as earthquakes, floods, mudslides, typhoons, and the like. However, the measures inevitably lead to malfunction, when dealing with a drought. The response failure in the management of a drought refers to the phenomenon that emergency response is initiated after a drought has formed and evolved into an economic and social crisis. The failure exposes the management’s bias toward managing crises and ignoring risk management, making the management passive, high-cost, and inefficient. According to the Natural Disasters and Relief Work in 2010 issued by the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation, “At the beginning of the year, the five southwestern provinces experienced a major drought that lasted from last autumn, through winter, to the spring. Its long duration, extensive coverage, high severity, and extent of damage are once in a hundred years. Crops of 6,1119,000 ha were affected, and 26.553 million people suffered temporary drinking water shortage. The major disaster indicators exceeded the average of nearly twenty years by more than 40%. Production, life, and economic and social development have been seriously affected. It was no less disastrous than the Yushu earthquake in Qinghai and the mudslides in Zhouqu, Gansu.” However, in the “Disaster Relief Section,” in addition to giving national statistics on “doing the best of disaster emergency response and ensuring the basic livelihood of the affected people,” it only highlights the emergency relief for the Yushu earthquakes and the Zhouqu mudslides (including assessment of the disaster situation, arrangement of central disaster relief funds, the dispatch of disaster relief materials, the repair and reconstruction of damaged houses, the donations received, etc.), and the restoration and reconstruction of Wenchuan earthquake-stricken areas. It does not specifically address the relief of the drought in Southwest China.3 We could only see, from the news media, the scene that Premier Wen Jiabao, who visited the drought-stricken areas in the southwestern region, was anxious, squatting in the dry farmland and handing over boiled water to victims. It was far less exhilarating and stirring the hearts of people than Premier Wen’s heroic attitude in guiding the emergency rescue in the Wenchuan earthquake-stricken areas.

3 China

National Commission for Disaster mitigation. Natural Disasters and Relief Work in 2010, the working paper compiled by Expert Committee of the same Commission.

262

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

9.1.2 Response Failure in Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Response failure exists not only in the prevention and control of drought, but also in many other fields of emergency management of natural disasters, especially in disaster prevention and mitigation. The main reasons for the occurrence of response failure are as follows.

9.1.2.1

Insufficient Understanding of the Concept of Risk, Which Is Considered Impossible to Manage

At first, humans viewed disasters as the act of god, or unmanageable supernatural power.4 Academically, the term risk is considered multidisciplinary, and is understood differently from the perspectives of economy, politics, culture, society, science and technology. For quantification reasons, the risk of disaster is mainly understood from the perspective of technology in the fields of such as geography, engineering, etc. Although sociology has a sufficient explanatory power for risks, it is difficult for it alone to advise risk management without the help of political science and public administration. With the growing multi-disciplinary and multi-perspective studies of risk, the concept of risk and related concepts also present a new face, based especially on the social science research on the basic concepts of disaster, risk, and hazard. Hazards refer to extreme events capable of causing disasters and there are natural hazards, technological hazards, and social hazards. The introduction of hazards makes risks manageable. In addition, by introducing the concept of social vulnerability, the management of risk becomes significant and possible. Vulnerability generally means that the nature of people or things can be easily harmed or hurt, and there are dozens of definitions of vulnerability to disaster. Some scholars believe that social vulnerability in disasters refers to the characteristics of individuals and groups and the social systems, to which they belong, affect their ability to withstand, respond to, and recover from disasters.5 The definition is explanatory and practical and enhances the manageability of risks, because it integrates micro with macro perspectives, covers the influence from the highest to the lowest levels, includes the availability of resources from individuals, or within groups, and takes in to account the social context, such as social, economic, political, and cultural factors. Based on this paradigm,6 risk is an indicator of the 4 Richard Terry Sylves. Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Secu-

rity. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008. p. 4. 5 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Danvis. At Risk: Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters. London: Routledge, 2004. p. 11. 6 David A. McEnie considers social vulnerability a new paradigm for disaster research. However, it is controversy, because some think this is just a new form of expression of the same old thing, which has been included in studies before or has already covered it in practice. See David A. McEntire. “A Comparison of Disaster Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic Policy Guide.” Administration

9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response

263

Fig. 9.1 Logical relationship among related concepts and its framework

degree of exposure after the interaction of hazards with social vulnerability, and it can be expressed as risk = hazards x social vulnerability. Combining this with the aforementioned “risk—disaster—crisis” evolution paradigm, we propose the following conceptual framework with policy operability (see Fig. 9.1). The core logic, in Fig. 9.1, is that risk is the result of interaction between hazards and social vulnerability. Risk is the origin of crises. The trigger events are the conditions that transform a risk into a crisis, but a trigger does not always cause a crisis. In the face of the same danger, areas with low social vulnerability may not see a crisis but areas with high social vulnerability may see one. For example, if two earthquakes of the same intensity occur respectively in Japan and Haiti, the result may be different. Risk management and crisis management, including trigger event management, are the concepts that correspond to risks and crises. They correspond to risks, crises, and trigger events, each representing a different stage of disaster management. The main objective of risk management is to reduce social vulnerability, or to reduce risk or mitigate disaster. Therefore, the manageability of risk is reflected in the intervention of risk management in social vulnerability. The importance of risk management in a drought disaster is prominent due to the particularity of a drought. Hydrological monitoring, the construction of regular disaster prevention facilities, disaster mitigation education, and construction planning are all essential means and measures to reduce social vulnerability and timely identify and solve the problems caused by a drought. Currently, due to the vague concept of risk in disaster management, misunderstanding of risk manageability is one of the important factors that cause response failure.

Review, 2002 (3); Siambabala Bernard Manyena. “The Concept of Resilience Revisited.” Disasters, 2006 (4): 433–450.

264

9.1.2.2

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

The Social Construction of Risk May Cause Distortion and Lead to Policy Failure

There have been debates over whether a risk is an objective or subjective construction. The social constructionism of risk is apparently more powerful in explaining the relationship between social background, risk output, and policy offering. A hazard is objective and does not incur specific value orientation. This is why the social constructivism of risk does not deny it. In addition, the factors of social background influence people’s perception of risk. These influencing factors include political will, interest groups, knowledge, economic conditions, social culture, and other factors. These social factors are active in the understanding of the hazards, affecting people’s perception and assessment of risk through a series of social processes, and in turn affect the supply of risk management policies. Response failure due to the offside and absence of risk management are related to the social construction of risk. As shown in Fig. 9.2, hazard, the source of risk, is objective, but it outputs risk after people perceive it, and furthermore affects the policy supply. From the perspective of the social construction process of risk perception, hazards are influenced by politics, economy, culture, society, knowledge, and other factors. The results produced by these factors can be roughly classified into two types, correct perception of risk and risk distortion. Risk distortion can be further divided into risk amplification, where risk is amplified in extent by society, and risk filtration, where the risk is misunderstood and underestimated in extent and only partially perceived. When these different situations of risk perception reach into the field of policy formulation, they will lead to appropriate policy, excessive policy control, and absence of policy respectively. The theory of policy window also reveals the relationship between policy process and risk perception. In the case of response failure, excessive policy and absence of policy exist simultaneously. Because of its risk preference, the government may pay more attention to the hazards that are related to its own interests. If a government pays too much attention to a hazard, its risk perception will be magnified. The government will

Fig. 9.2 Relationship between the social construction of risk and the policy of risk management

9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response

265

inevitably allocate too many resources to the hazard, in order to deal with such exaggerated risks. The resulted policies of risk management will clearly be excessive. On the contrary, certain risks that are not correctly identified and recognized, especially those that have little to do with the government’s own interests, are often cast aside without doing anything, and the resulted risk response policies are inevitably insufficient. This explains why the government and the public amplify natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods, and turn away from other risks such as those of droughts. This also explains why there is failure in emergency planning. If emergency planning does not start from the basis of risk management and lacks a localized mechanism of risk management, local emergency plans would be all of a piece. In addition, risks are dynamic rather than static, and the constant change of risks is one of the important origins for risk management. As time changes, the hazards are also changing and the risk response specified by the emergency plan may become something of an anachronism.

9.1.2.3

Incompetent Local Authorities and Lack of Coordination Among Governments in the Risk Management of Natural Disasters

China has put in place an integrated system of response to various public emergencies. The system features four-level response, and has a hierarchical structure consisting of four committees and one emergency management office. Currently, the departments responsible for dealing with natural disasters include the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation and the emergency management offices (or command centers) at all levels. The functions of the China National Commission for Disaster mitigation are to study and formulate guidelines, policies, and plans for national disaster mitigation; coordinate major disaster mitigation activities; guide local disaster mitigation efforts; and promote international exchange and cooperation on disaster mitigation. Emergency management offices at all levels undertake emergency measures in the face of emergencies to cope with natural disasters and accidents, public health incidents, public security incidents, and other emergencies. In other words, the China National Commission for Disaster Reduction is responsible for the disaster mitigation phase in the management of natural disasters. Emergency management offices at all levels are responsible for the preparedness, response, and recovery phases. It appears that these two organizational structures and policy systems have improved natural disaster emergency management. However, the combination of the two structures is the organizational root cause of the response failure in natural disaster management. First, lack of coordination among government bodies. Vertically, the emergency management organizations at all levels have similar functions and lack flexibility and division of labor. “Governments at lower levels rely on their superiors, and local governments are at the central government’s nod.” Local governments at all levels follow the central authorities’ steps. In such a vertical political system, disaster miti-

266

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

gation has become a single top-down passive response process, and local government departments lack the initiative in natural disaster risk management. In addition, this vertical management relationship also constrains horizontal communication between different departments of the local government. Information must be passed and used through the coordination of the higher-level authorities. Horizontally, a multi-sectoral risk management network is absent. Disaster management requires close cooperation and coordination among the government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The risk management of natural disasters requires coordination among various government departments in order to have final policy outputs. This may involve land use, urban planning, and meteorological authorities. The government also needs to work with non-governmental organizations and the private sector to facilitate the effective implementation of disaster mitigation activities, such as disaster insurance and volunteer activities. The lack of flexibility in the vertical relationship leads to “the lack of good horizontal cooperation among various government departments, and the involvement of a higher government organization for coordination.” Without intervention from a higher level authority, institutions at the same level will not cooperate.7 Second, the absence and incompetence of local disaster mitigation committees make disaster mitigation efforts irregular and impractical. First of all, disaster mitigation committees are usually absent at the local level. China National Commission for Disaster mitigation does not have counterparts at the local level in many places. At present, the local emergency management offices carries out all-hazards management. A local emergency management office faces different risks of various natures and assumes responsibility for risk management, emergency response, and recovery. Compared with the power and resources it has, the workload is heavy. In essence, a local emergency management office is an administrative agency that focuses more on emergency response. But risk management should be institutionalized, and it is difficult for a local emergency management office to attend to capacity building in all aspects of disaster mitigation. The absence of a local disaster mitigation agency is actually the absence of the disaster mitigation function at the local level. Second, even in the area where a local disaster mitigation committee is established, it in fact is a policy-making body that aims to make emergency plans through multi-sectoral coordination. The implementation of the emergency plans and policies features poorly-coordinated multi-sector operations. In addition, there is a lack of corresponding organizations responsible for monitoring and evaluation. This makes the local disaster mitigation committee more likely to focus on the formulation of emergency plans rather than their implementation.

7 Shi Peijun. Local Incompetent Commission for Disaster mitigation. China Economic Weekly, 2010,

August 16.

9.1 Failures in Natural Disaster Response

9.1.2.4

267

Local Political Will and Economic Factors Make Disaster Mitigation Policies Difficult to Implement

The government can use insurance, land regulation, risk assessment, and other means to prevent response failure in disaster mitigation. However, these policy tools are not widely used. Disaster mitigation is a good policy that may benefit many generations in the future but local governments tend to wink at the importance of disaster mitigation because they know that the central government will help them out when a disaster occurs. So it is necessary that we analyze local officials’ political will and the influence of local economic development. Disaster mitigation is a long-term issue, and its benefits are not immediately evident. The current mechanism for assessing local governments’ performance focus on short-term benefits so local officials seek only short-term returns. How much political will is there to drive them to focus on the implementation of disaster mitigation policies? There is doubt about this. Under the development mode focusing on economic growth, local governments direct their financial resources toward economic development, and they lack economic motivation for disaster mitigation, for it offers no short-term returns. Dennis Mileti and his team, who have made significant contributions to the study on the complex relationship between disasters and sustainable development, argue that development may lead to disasters, which hinder development, and better development measures can prevent disasters. If we focus on economic growth and neglect environmental protection and land use regulation, social vulnerability of will likely increase, and the impact of disasters will be even more severe.8 In addition, the cost is also an important reason for the lack of menas on the part of local governments to mitigate disasters. The central and western regions of China are highly prone to natural disasters, and local governments in these areas have limited financial resources. Building large-scale disaster mitigation facilities requires huge funds, which is beyond the local governments’ financial capacity, while central government is unlikely to fund small-scale local projects. The cost of developing disaster mitigation facilities is an important economic factor that has kept local governments from disaster mitigation.

9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation In recent years, there have been more and more calls for upgrading the emergency management system. To avoid response failure in natural disaster management is inevitable in the process of upgrading the system. In other words, in order to upgrade

8 Mileti,

Dennis S. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. 1999. pp. 155–207.

268

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

the system fundamentally, we need to start from avoiding response failure, strengthen risk management, straighten out governmental relations, and change the growth model.

9.2.1 Upgrading Emergency Management and Focusing on Proactive Risk Management 9.2.1.1

Risks Are Manageable

Disasters occur because of not only external forces, but also social vulnerability in the development process. Risks are formed and transformed into disasters under the combined effects of the two. The manageability of risks is reflected in the intervention of risk management on social vulnerability. Social, cultural, and political factors all have an impact on social vulnerability. Therefore, we can reduce social vulnerability by conducting a series of manageable behaviors to improve cultural and economic development, and administrative systems. Therefore, reducing social vulnerability is the main goal of risk management.

9.2.1.2

Creating Scientific, Dynamic, and Local Risk Management Mechanisms for Different Target Groups and Involving Different Stakeholders

Risk analysis is an important part of risk management and must be based on a series of scientific measurements. We must also pay attention, in risk management, to the impact of social background on various groups’ social vulnerability, especially, when it is coupled with the influence of local social, political, and economic systems. In addition, risk management is also a process of joint governance. The government sector, non-government sector, and private sector should all be involved. To implement appropriate government policy, bringing together diverse stakeholders is a good way to solve policy failures caused by risk perception.

9.2.1.3

Managing Disaster Risks Based on Social Vulnerability Assessment

Vulnerability is an intermediate concept between risk and hazard. The scope of social vulnerability directly affects the occurrence and extent of disasters. The concept of vulnerability helps to make disaster risk management more scientific, dynamic, and local for different target groups and involving different stakeholders. Vulnerability analysis is a combination of natural and social sciences, and fully takes into account of the social and natural attributes of disasters. We recognize that the large-scale water

9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

269

conservancy has developed rapidly over the years, since the introduction of the land contract responsibility system in rural areas. Especially, the divide-and-conquer policy that “the central government manages the rivers, and local governments administrate the network of distributary” has been carried out effectively. However, most of the small and medium-sized water conservancy facilities are in disrepair, which increases the social vulnerability in the face of drought and flood. That has led to the frequent and severe disasters in recent years. Fortunately, in 2011, the No. 1 document issued by the central government specified the task of promoting water conservancy nationwide aiming at reducing such vulnerability for disaster prevention and mitigation.

9.2.2 Adjusting Government Relations in Disaster Management 9.2.2.1

Adjustment of Vertical Relationships

Vertically, we should improve the current top-down emergency response system and rearrange resources and responsibilities among governments at different levels. In the top-down system, disaster response is carried out passively, and does not have corresponding organizations to implement and supervise the implementation of mitigation measures. The local governments should become the main players in emergency management, and resources for disaster mitigation should be assigned to a lower level to improve local resilience and let local governments bear their responsibilities. In doing so, we will not only improve local governments’ ability, but also enhance their initiative. The main tasks of community-level governments are to formulate emergency plans and prepare for disasters, promote community disaster mitigation, and coordinate between the government and other organizations on disaster mitigation. Provincial governments should be responsible for disaster mitigation within their jurisdiction. In addition to performing the functions of community-level governments, they should also be responsible for guiding their disaster mitigation efforts and coordinating between community-level governments and the central government. The central government should take the responsibility for developing plans for major projects across the country and cross-regional disaster mitigation efforts, and guiding the disaster mitigation efforts of local governments.

9.2.2.2

Improvement of Horizontal Relationship

To improve horizontal relations is mainly to strengthen the coordination among government bodies at the same level, among different government departments, and between the government and social organizations. Local governments at all levels in disaster mitigation need to establish coordinated mechanisms for developing cross-

270

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

regional disaster mitigation facilities and communicating disaster information, and such communication and coordination mechanisms are also needed among different departments at the same level of governments. We should establish a coordination platform for the committees of disaster mitigation at all levels to build a communicating network in the horizontal system, in order to share information, complement resources, optimize disaster mitigation policies of various departments and governments, and create policy synergies. The government also needs to be a facilitator of the disaster mitigation management network, give full play to the advantages of the market mechanism and social mechanism, and promote the development of efficient disaster mitigation by utilizing various policy tools, such as disaster insurance and engagement of NGOs.

9.2.3 Improving the Accountability System for Crisis Management We should resolve the issues about political will through administrative means, because it is a key factor affecting the implementation of disaster mitigation policies. The focus of accountability should be administrative inaction or administrative misconduct in risk management, in terms of the relations among risks, emergencies, and crises. If we shift our focus of accountability to risk management, we first need to identify who or what are the risk makers. It is undeniable that human factors exist in the development of any risk, but the main sources of risk are the factors of social structure, system, policies, and values, not any individual. Therefore, if we turn our focus of accountability to risk management, then the structure, the system, the policies, and values, instead of individuals, should bear the responsibility.9 We can draw similar conclusions from the perspective of social vulnerability. On the surface, unsafe conditions, such as unreasonable urban deployment, lack of building protection, economic backwardness, lack of effective emergency preparedness and mitigation measures, and hazards make disasters cause damages. The underlying cause of insecurity is the rights of affected groups and the poor availability of resources, which in turn are caused by political and economic systems. Consequently, the process of formulating disaster mitigation policies and the status and effects of various departments in the implementation of disaster mitigation policies should be the focuses of accountability. It is worth noting that people have long been distinguishing between natural and man-made disasters and administrative accountability has long been biased. It is often the case that leaders who are held accountable are dismissed after major accidents, disasters, public health incidents, and public security incidents. But this seldom happens after a natural disaster. In the end, to a certain extent, it frees government officials at all levels from the responsibility for disaster mitigation and prevention. 9 For

details on this issue, see the final chapter of this book about the improvement of the accountability of officials and the promotion of risk accountability.

9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

271

After the outbreak of a public incident, if it is an accident, public health incident, or public security incident, the incident is often covered up or not reported. If it is a natural disaster, on the contrary, the situation and the losses caused will probably be exaggerated in reports. For example, after a natural disaster in a certain place, the first thing that relevant leaders did was not sending emergency teams to rescue people, but ordering people around to protect the scene. Therefore, we should include the responsibilities of relevant leaders in disaster mitigation and prevention in the assessment and accountability.

9.2.4 Changing Growth Model and Properly Handling the Relationship Between Social Vulnerability and Economic Development The concept of sustainable development is now widely accepted and applied, and disaster researchers use sustainability to link relief work with development and complement disaster mitigation efforts. Dennis Mileti believes that changes in culture (values, attitude, behavior, etc.) are essential for sustainable development and disaster mitigation. Along this line of reasoning, he rethought about the relationships between the global and local societies and between hazards and disasters. He opposes shortsighted behaviors, pays attention to the role of social forces in disasters, and advocates the fundamental principles of sustainable development.10 To emphasize the process of disaster mitigation is to pay attention to daily activities, which is an important feature of the paradigm of disaster mitigation. In the course of implementing the scientific outlook on development, we pursue harmony between people and harmony between man and nature. Then, in the course of pursuing economic development, we should continuously integrate disaster mitigation with the development in all places, and should not allow disasters to hold down economic development. We cannot aggravate the damages caused by urban construction for economic growth. We should not allow some socially disadvantaged groups to stay in their difficult situations where their rights are deprived and resources are not available. Moreover, we must not allow disasters to make it harder for people to live their life or to expose people to more risks. In other words, we should emphasize scientific development and invulnerability development, attach importance to social equity, pool resources for development, let all people share the benefit, and promote social harmony. In this context, the government must raise the awareness of risk management. With an open and flexible way of thinking, we can identify the possible sources and consequences of various risks in an all-round way, and emphasize the overall relevance, instead of being obsessed with professionalism. We should comprehensively improve risk management capabilities and sense of responsibility, 10 Mileti,

Dennis S. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1999. pp. 26–30.

272

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

to find a position in a risk society and take reasonable measures to alleviate risks and their consequences.

9.2.5 Leveraging Market Mechanisms More in the Prevention and Management of Disaster Risks Two consecutive natural disasters in China in 2008, namely the winter storms in southern China and the Wenchuan earthquake, gave the people a painful experience, and caused the government and all other sectors to rethink about our disaster response system. Today, there is still no commonly accepted definition of a catastrophe. Scholars in different fields and disciplines have understandings of catastrophe. There is no uniform standard of classification. However, their understanding of the main features of a catastrophe is the same: a catastrophe causes large casualties, property losses, and has a wide range of impacts, affecting vast areas, causing extensive damage to infrastructure and/or social disorder. Based on this and a series of serious and catastrophic disasters that have occurred in China in recent years, such as the Tangshan earthquake in Hebei in 1976, the floods in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River in 1998, the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the winter storms in southern China and the Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, Shi Peijun et al. defined catastrophe as a major disaster triggered by disaster-inducing factors that happens once in a century and results in large casualties, property damage, and a wide range of influences. In the event of a catastrophe, people in the affected area are unable to cope with it on their own and must rely on assistance from the outside. Generally, a catastrophe meets two or more of the following conditions: more than 10,000 deaths, more than RMB100 billion of direct economic losses, and an affected area of more than 100,000 km2 .11 By this standard, there have been four catastrophes in China in the past decade or so. They are the 1998 floods in the Yangtze River Basin (162 deaths, 223,000 km2 of land affected, and a total economic loss of RMB248.4 billion), the 2003 SARS outbreak (336 deaths, about five million square kilometers of land affected, and a total economic loss of RMB210 billion), the 2008 winter storms in southern China (nineteen deaths, four missing persons, about one million square kilometers of land affected, and a total economic loss of RMB151.65 billion), and the Wenchuan earthquake (69,227 deaths, 17,923 missing persons, about 500,000 km2 of area affected, and a total economic loss of RMB850–900 billion). The Yushu earthquake in Qinghai and the Zhouqu mudslide in Gansu that occurred in 2010 both caused a death toll of more than one thousand people. Afterwards, all flags were flying at half-mast to express public sadness at the victims in the two disasters, which was also done for the Wenchuan earthquake. Although these two disasters do not meet the quantitative 11 Shi

Peijun et al.: “Classification Standards and Catastrophe Insurance of Catastrophes Based on the Cases of Wenchuan Earthquake and 2008 Chinese Winter Storms,” Analecta of National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Sustainable Development Forum (Vol. I), 2010 May.

9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

273

standards of a catastrophe, they far exceeded the response capabilities of the affected areas, and therefore, the central government needed to respond. This also shows that as the concept of “people-oriented” governance gains strength, the loss of life will carry heavier weight in the definition of a catastrophe. The current organizational system of disaster prevention and mitigation cannot ensure that all resources are effectively dispatched in response to a catastrophe. The current law has identified the people’s governments at all levels as the command bodies for disaster response, and the integration of capabilities within the governments has been initially achieved. However, under the scenario of a catastrophe, it is still impossible to dispatch uniformly the disaster response resources that are under the control of various public authorities. The current law does not provide a streamlined approach and necessary space for non-governmental entities to participate in response efforts. Only the government has the right of dispose in disaster response under the current system. Public utilities enterprises in electric power, energy, transportation, communications, etc. would face obstacles when it is necessary to mobilize resources due to the lack of legal authorization. During the 2008 winter storms in southern China, when power grid operators tried to repair power facilities located at high altitudes, some inevitable damage was caused to some cultivated land, trees, and crops in order to open up rescue channels. Since the law does not grant power grid companies the right of administrative expropriation in an emergency, the companies were sued and paid huge sums of compensations. It is difficult to secure the resources required for catastrophe preparedness. Catastrophe response requires far more resources than other disasters, but the probability of a catastrophe is extremely low. Most of the resources prepared for the long run are not used when they have to be replaced or eliminated. Therefore, such resource input is hard to ensure. In particular, financial instruments such as insurance have not played a role in catastrophe response. The winter storms that occurred in southern China in early 2008 caused direct economic losses of RMB151.65 billion, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs. According to the data released by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, as of the end of 2008, compensation from the insurance industry for the disaster reached RMB5.5 billion, accounting for only 3.62% of the direct economic losses. A large proportion of losses were still borne by the government. The 1998 Yangtze River flood caused direct economic losses of RMB248.4 billion and the insurance payment totalled RMB3.35 billion, only 1.34% of the losses. In the past ten years, the insurance industry in China has developed rapidly, as evidenced by the growth in total assets, the number of insurance companies, and the scale of insurance premiums. However, the development of catastrophe insurance has been slow and its contribution to disaster risk sharing is still extremely limited. The direct economic losses caused by the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 were nearly RMB 1 trillion, and the compensation from property insurance was a merely drop in a bucket. The risk transfer function that the insurance industry should have has not been duly performed. The two rare catastrophes in 2008 directly triggered a strong demand for a catastrophe insurance system and various financial instruments to transfer and share the risk of catastrophes. The current disaster risk transfer and sharing mechanism in

274

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

China features the division of power between the central and local governments in disaster relief, as well as public cooperation in disaster management. As an emerging form of disaster risk transfer, the financial insurance mechanism can greatly alleviate the impacts of catastrophe risks on people’s work and life. With the function of financial instruments in catastrophe relief increasingly attracting attention, the public’s overall awareness of insurance is enhanced. New forms of financial instruments, such as catastrophe rescue insurance, special disaster relief lottery, and catastrophe bonds have emerged one after another. The establishment of the catastrophe insurance system is gradually on the agenda. To strengthen the function of financial instruments in risk sharing, we should emphasize the following: legally supporting the formation and development of the catastrophe insurance system, establishing a multi-tiered decentralized risk underwriting system to spread catastrophe risks through insurance, reinsurance, and more financial derivatives, promoting the application of risk analysis and assessment in catastrophe insurance, drawing upon the experience of other countries in the development and operation of a catastrophe risk insurance system and exploring the catastrophe insurance system with Chinese characteristics. Some risks are calculable while others are not. For calculable risks, insurers often come forward and handle them with the approach of “centralized management of dispersed risks”. For incalculable risks, insurers use force majeure as an excuse for inadmissibility. Most catastrophes are incalculable risks, and the principle of handling them can only be to “decentralize the management of the centralized risks”. In the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council assigned the responsibility of recovering the losses caused in the affected areas and rebuilding these areas to nineteen provinces. However, such losses are still only borne by the government. We should find ways to engage non-governmental entities in the response to the concentrated risks, that is, catastrophe. For example, we should establish the reinsurance mechanism for disaster relief. The public (natural persons) and the organizations (legal persons) take out insurance policies from insurance companies, and the insurance companies take out insurance policies from reinsurance companies (group). Currently, many insurance companies often emphasize that people and units must be risk-aware and actively insured, but they do not reinsure, which means that they themselves lack risk awareness. We should change this situation.

9.2.6 Intensifying Efforts to Identify and Protect Vulnerable Groups and Improving Efficiency in Disaster Prevention and Mitigation We must pay attention, in risk management, to the impact of the background factors on various social groups’ social vulnerability, especially the dynamic operation of local social, political, and economic systems at that time. We should establish disaster risk management based on social vulnerability assessment and vulnerability assess-

9.2 Improving Emergency Management, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

275

ment indicators that are in line with local characteristics to improve the effectiveness of disaster mitigation policies. The Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) created by Susan L. Cutter has the most extensive influence on the development of vulnerability indicators. Her study attempted to divide social vulnerability into multiple dimensions for measurement. These dimensions are personal health, age, building density, economic dependence of individual sectors, housing and leasehold, gender, ethnicity, occupation, family structure, education, and public facilities dependence. These are the building blocks of the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI).12 Based on the analysis of local social vulnerability, the disaster mitigation and prevention policy is the policy design basis for identifying and protecting vulnerable groups. The definition of vulnerable groups of disasters directly determines the scope of social group interventions for disaster mitigation policies. Here, the vulnerable groups of disasters are not only the old, the weak, the sick, the disabled, and the poor. We should also include other people in high-risk areas. These groups are also sensitive to disasters because of lack of equipment, knowledge, and training. The efficiency of the disaster mitigation policy lies in the effectiveness of the efforts in mitigating possible outcomes caused by the occurrence of disasters. Apparently, we should include people in high-risk areas in the scope of disaster mitigation policy considerations, and design more targeted disaster mitigation policies based on risk analysis and assessment.

9.3 Promoting Public Participation in Environmental Risk Management The risks of natural disasters are closely related to environmental risks. The losses caused by frequent natural disasters are closely related to environmental problems. With the sustained and rapid development of the Chinese economy, the long-standing environmental problems have finally become prominent and have emerged under certain conditions. In the past few years, the State Environmental Protection Administration (predecessor of the Ministry of Environmental Protection) once pointed out that the environmental situation is grim. “Three peaks” will arrive at the same time. First, the peak of environmental pollution have arrived. Second, the incidence of sudden environmental incidents have peaked and national environmental security faces threats. Third, mass environmental incidents have shown a rapid upward trend, and pollution has become an issue undermining social stability.13 From 2004 to 2009, more than seven hundred environmental incidents occurred in the country, show-

12 Susan L. Cutter, Bryan J. Boruff, and W. Lynn Shirley. Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards. Social Science Quarterly, 2003 (2): 242–261. 13 Xinhuanet. Administrator of State Environmental Protection Administration: three systems respond to three peaks. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-02/15/content_4181148.htm.

276

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

ing an upward trend.14 The major pollution incident in Songhua River in 2005, the frequent outbreaks of cyanobacteria in the Taihu Lake, Dianchi Lake and Chaohu Lake in 2007, the sewage leakage of Fujian Zijin Mining Group, and the explosion of a chemical plant in Qixia District, Nanjing, all show that China has entered a stage marked by intensive outbreaks of environmental incidents. Environment is a matter of life or death in many environmentally fragile areas. Due to the scarcity of resources and ecological fragility in these areas, people add to the environmental burden to fulfill their basic living needs, leading to ecological damage. In addition, even in areas with large environmental capacity, pollution caused by rapid industrialization and urbanization has damaged the foundation of some people’s development and caused great economic losses. The situation is even more acute for the majority of farmers who rely on planting and breeding for their livelihood. With the deterioration of environmental situations, the public’s awareness of environmental protection is growing, and so is their demand for environmental rights. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, since 1995, the number of petition letters and calls received by the environmental protection authorities has been on the rise. Especially, since 2002, although the number of environmental pollution and damage accidents has decreased, the number of petition letters and calls has increased by 13% per year.15 This shows that more and more people are paying attention to the quality of their living environment and safeguarding their own environmental rights and interests. When rights and interests are infringed, they are more inclined to take practical actions to express their dissatisfaction and seek compensation. In addition, environmental pollution accidents are increasingly exposed by the media, which have caused the public to suffer from enormous property losses and life threats, while feeling the panic, which is psychologically difficult to calm down for a long time. Therefore, difficulties in environmental disaster management are how to reduce the loss of public property caused by environmental disasters and the number of affected people, how to protect their personal safety, and finally how to eliminate people’s fear. If we do not simply ignore or even suppress the public’s claims of environmental rights, but make more just, reasonable, and effective institutional arrangement in the process of seriously responding to the public’s growing demands for environmental rights, then, we can actually incorporate the public into the practice of environmental governance. With the help of the power of public rights protection, we can continuously improve the effectiveness of environmental governance.

14 China

is in the midst of high incidence of environmental issues, industrialization brings acute environmental pressure, http://www.ce.cn/macro/more//01009/02/t20100902_21782596.shtml. 15 As cited in Hong Dayong. Promoting Environmental Governance by Taking Advantage of the Public’s Power of Rights Protection. http://www.sociologyol.org/yanjiubankuai/xuejierenwu/ hongdayong/2209-01-18/7129.html.

9.3 Promoting Public Participation in Environmental Risk Management

277

9.3.1 Advantages of Public Participation in Dealing with Environmental Risk The public is direct stakeholders in environmental disasters. The risk of environmental disasters threatens the public’s life, property, and even safety of lives. Therefore, it is unreasonable to exclude the public from environmental disaster management. In addition, the process of environmental disaster management also involves the government, the public, private organizations, among others; it is a gaming process among multiple political powers. However, for a long time, the government has only regarded environmental disasters as purely natural, ecological issues and an issue of governance techniques, rather than a public issues, and has always resorted to the mechanisms of administrative governance. However, administrative governance is simple and inefficient, and there are many problems. It is difficult to satisfy the public. And the public is in the position of a constrained object under administrative control, and as a result, it seriously affects the public’s initiative and enthusiasm for participating in environmental management. Because the public and the government, enterprises, and other social groups lack the necessary communication and exchange, many measures of environmental disaster management are not understood and supported by the public. As a result, the cost of policy implementation is high and the effectiveness is low. At present, the government does not have a clear understanding of the predicament of environmental disaster management. It simply blames the difficulties on the ineffectiveness of the original mechanism and considers the environmental protection authorities not to have enforced laws and punished law breakers strictly”. The practice of continual upgrading and strengthening the original environmental protection mechanism failed to change the situations of environment disasters. The costs of implementing new measures continued to rise. The administrative enforcement, due to the lack of scientific and sustainable approaches, has been met with more disasters. Environmental problems has become a vicious circle of “crash solutions—quick effects—repeated problems—crash solutions again—repeated problems again,” which caused a bad social impact. In fact, handling environmental disasters, from occurrence to resolution, is a multi-party process involving governments, enterprises, the public, and some nongovernmental organizations. It is not possible to rely solely on administrative measures of the government to maximize the benefits of society. The public are the direct victims of environmental disasters. Their demands for the proper resolution of environmental disasters are the most urgent and affecting many people, and they should be at the core of the entire process. Compared with enterprises’ appeal or some organizations’ subjective inference, their pragmatic demands have important economic and social significance for government policies.16 If the public are involved, it will be 16 Tu Xiaofang & Zhang Xin: The Dilemma of Citizen Participation in Public Crisis Management in China: An Analysis of Countermeasures. Journal of the Provincial Level Party School of CPC Sichuan Provincial Committee, 2008 (4).

278

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

a major improvement in dealing with the current dilemma of environmental disaster management. In the field of environmental disaster management, public participation has at least the following advantages compared with administrative governance.

9.3.1.1

Improve the Public’s Crisis Awareness and Ability to Respond to Environmental Disasters

Environmental disasters have profound impacts on people’s mental states, lifestyles, and values, as they cause the loss of life, property and other materials to the country and the people. As a unified whole, the general public has the widest range of social resources, and are fully capable of participating in environmental disaster management. For the government-led environmental disaster management system to be effective, the public must be engaged. Their understanding of and support for the various disaster management measures adopted by the government can make these measures effective. Normally, the public are the direct victims of environmental disasters, and they suffer from the most widespread and direct impacts. We should guide the public to participate in environmental disaster management in an orderly manner and help them to truly understand that participating in environmental disaster management is both an obligation and part of their right. Therefore, we should establish the public as major players in environmental disaster management and unleash their enthusiasm more. More importantly, citizens’ orderly participation in environmental disaster management can improve their ability to respond to environmental disasters in the future, organize self-help and mutual assistance activities actively, and minimize losses caused by environmental disasters.

9.3.1.2

Effectively Contain Rumors and Ensure Social Order and Stability

Since the public is the direct targets of environmental disasters, they inevitably propose the most specific and practical goals and requirements for environmental disaster management. The public will demand the government to resolve environmental disasters as soon as possible, and demand to understand and grasp the progress and current situation, and express their opinions and ideas on the resolution of environmental disasters. The public’s participation in environmental disaster management can facilitate the expression and communication of their demands of all aspects through reasonable channels and methods, building a bridge between the government and the public. Meanwhile, public participation help the public understand the truth of environmental disasters, prevent unnecessary fear, reduce uncooperative behaviors, such as credulity, the dissemination of rumors, and the looting in crisis scenes, thereby effectively maintaining good social order.

9.3 Promoting Public Participation in Environmental Risk Management

9.3.1.3

279

Ensure the Resolution of Environmental Disasters Oriented Toward Public Interests

Maximizing public interest is a logical starting point for governments’ political decision-making and behaviors. Environmental disaster management aims to provide public safety and protect and maintain the interests of the public. The government expects to maximize the protection of public interests in environmental disaster management. Public participation in the process of environmental disaster management can establish an effective mechanism of social supervision. The public no longer passively accept and implement the whatever decision the government makes, but has the opportunity to participate and the right to know. Through public participation, we can establish a strong bottom-up social supervision network and timely and effectively supervise and control decision-making in environmental disaster management and tackle errors that may arise.

9.3.1.4

Enhance the Efficiency of Government Administration and Reduce the Cost of Environmental Disaster Management

After an outbreak of environmental disasters, the government must, under the constraints of limited information, resources, and time, find a relatively reasonable and satisfactory way to respond and solve problems in a timely and effective manner. Public participation in the management of environmental disasters helps the government and various social organizations to understand fully and value the basic interests and aspirations of the people. At the same time, scientific and reasonable decisionmaking can be achieved in a timely manner, so that the decisions can be implemented promptly. The orderly participation of citizens in the process of environmental disaster management can provide abundant material and human resources in a timely manner and effectively alleviate the physical and mental damages caused by the disasters, thereby greatly reducing the cost of environmental disaster management.

9.3.2 Specific Measures to Improve Public Participation 9.3.2.1

Organize Public Participation to Reduce the Cost of Participation by Individuals

The cost here refers to not only economic costs, but also time and technical costs in more developed regions. What the government can do now is to organize public participation as a way of amplifying the public’s voice in environmental disaster management. The reason why public participation can be effective is not that the public can enforce the law, but that the public can pass more accurate and effective information to the government. Information cannot be transmitted by simply making a phone

280

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

call or sending a letter. It requires lasting communication between people and the government or enterprises. This costs a lot of time and money. This cost is rarely acceptable to the public. Without organized public, the calculations of gains and losses made according to the opinions of ten or one hundred people are no different from that made based on what one person thinks fit. Decisions are based not as commonly believed, on the sum of the opinions of all. Moreover, people are usually unwilling to participate and may even show only reluctant support to policies that are beneficial to them. This is because they are afraid of those who lose vested interest and these interest groups may even include some local government officials. We cannot blame the public for this, because the benefits a government policy are actually very thin when spread to everyone and it is therefore quite understandable that people won’t bother to go out and offend those interest groups for such small benefits. The losses caused by such policy implementation to those interest groups, however, are enormous, so they have enough enthusiasm to resist public participation and boycott the policy. In other words, unorganized individuals have too little interest at stake for them to exert effective influence in the process of environmental disaster management and decision-making. Only by organizing people can we effectively reduce the cost of public participation by each individual and facilitate long-term public participation. Experience shows that in the face of interest competition in the process of environmental disaster management, the majority of unorganized individuals usually either do nothing under a “free-rider” mentality, or practice “Brownian motion” in the process of participation. By bringing together the previously scattered interests, the organizations, on behalf of the interests of the same nature, participate in the management of environmental disasters, and their participation can improve to a large extent the imbalance in the structure of the representative interests. This is because, once the dispersed interests are aggregated through mobilization and organization, the previously scattered small interests become huge benefits in the aggregate. Huge interests mean strong motivation to participate, driving the stakeholders to take substantive participatory actions. The magnifying effect after the aggregation of interests will also prompt the administrative authorities and other stakeholders to consider and treat these interests seriously. In other words, the greater interests and appeals of the aggregates are more likely to attract the attention of the authorities. In addition, once dispersed interests are put together, the emotions of the “rabble” can be overcome and the disadvantage of the general public in terms of resources, information, and policy influence can be shored up.

9.3.2.2

Widen the Channels of and Disclose More Environmental Information

In order to reflect the public’s interests in the final decisions of environmental disaster management, there must be a smooth channel for the public to have their voice heard by final decision-makers in the central government. The voice then become important information for decision-making. The information that the central govern-

9.3 Promoting Public Participation in Environmental Risk Management

281

ment relies on in the decision-making for environmental disaster management has always come all the way from local authorities through a long reporting hierarchy. The accuracy is worrisome. Because there are at least four steps to make before a piece of information reaches the central government. It first come from the public to the county-level government, then it is passed on successively to the municipal level, provincial level, and finally, the central government which is the fifth stop. Even under ideal conditions, you cannot expect the information to remain accurate after so long a a transmission process. Information must be processed as it passes through each level. Among the myriad of information, what am I going to pay attention to? What am I not going to pay attention to? What do I keep and what do I ignore? Do I provide sufficient or insufficient information? Shall I tell the truth or not? What aspects are to be emphasized and what to hide? What is the mainstream and what are the branches? Is the information clear or not? Officials at all levels face these choices every day. This is to say, information transmission itself can amplify or diminish the information transmitted and the process can always be selective depending on the various interests of the local governments. Although the central government has an advantage in power and decision-making, local governments have an advantage in offering information. Because there are too many levels for the information to go through, the number of stakeholders involved increases along the way. This leads to the fact that the delivery of real information is sometimes costly, and it is very easy to make a fake message. This means that it is difficult for the central government to collect real information about environmental disasters, and the ultimate basis of decision-making is the information that has been filtered by various levels of the government, and the information has sometimes even been changed beyond recognition. How valuable can such information still be for decision-making? Therefore, the government must broaden the channels for collecting information and, if necessary, directly collect information from the public. For example, efforts can be made to improve the environmental disaster research organization within the system, and empower these research institutions with independence and flexibility, develop research organizations outside the system, including private research organizations, so that they can fully participate in environmental disaster management, reduce media censorship so that the media can be politically and economically independent of the government, and make full use of community-level organizations and the third sector, in the disaster management process. Information from different sources can be compared to check the authenticity of the information through multichannel information disclosure. We should also minimize the intermediate links of information transmission, improve efficiency, reduce the deviation in the process of information transmission, and be free from the interference of political interests. The information collected in this way will reflect the true will of the people and the demands of the people in the decision-making of environmental disaster management. The cost of transmitting the public’s real information will be greatly reduced, which will greatly encourage and promote public participation. In addition, for the public to actively and enthusiastically convey their will and participate in the management of environmental disasters, the government must grasp a large amount of basic information which is easily available to local governments but

282

9 Improving Environmental Risk Management Through Better Disaster …

often kept undisclosed. The main reasons for this are regulatory deficiencies, weak public demand, and government concerns. Regulatory deficiencies are found not in the formulation of regulations, but in implementation, which finds its root in our traditions thousands of years old. For example, when a person encounters a problem, the first thing that comes to the person’s mind is to solve the problem by pulling some strings, not through a legal process. That is, the definite results that the law can introduce may be replaced by an accidental result due to a particular relationship network or connection to influential persons. This way of thinking is deeply ingrained in the minds of the people, and it is very difficult to change in the short term. Therefore, the government must strictly enforce the law to win over the trust of the people and to establish the authority of the law, in order to change fundamentally the traditional way of thinking among government officials and ordinary people, and to realize truly the rule of law. In addition, the officials of local governments will conceal environmental information, more or less, intentionally or unintentionally, in order to maintain their authority or social stability. They also seem to have legitimate reasons for concealing information. For example, if the situation is urgent, there is no time for soliciting the opinions of the people. The result of this is that the decisions made in the disaster management process often deviate from the will of the people and cause unnecessary waste of resources. In order to change the situation completely, it is necessary to institutionalize and legalize the disclosure of environmental information, and specify what and how much should be disclosed. At the same time, we should establish relevant responsibility system and supervise local governments’ implementation of the responsibility system. In addition, it is necessary to eradicate the bureaucratic thinking of administrative staff, and cut back their room for profiting information, so that public information can be gradually incorporated into the formality, and ultimately promote the public’s participation. In addition, we also can foster a culture that encourages public participation in politics and raise citizens’ awareness of their role as participants. Overall, only through continuous exploration can public participation be boosted, and the enormous economic and social benefits it brings gradually emerge and finally be accepted by all people. Public participation will become integral part of their public life.

Chapter 10

Social Risks and Their Prevention

If natural disasters are mainly caused by hazards and social vulnerability, then public security incidents are mainly caused by social risks brought about by social transformation and development, including focusing on a single social development goal, unbalanced social structure, imbalance of interest relations, and proliferating social conflicts. At present, many social conflicts and mass incidents are often associated with NIMBY facilities, employee-employer relationship, and community-level conflicts. Dealing with these problems, coordinating these relationships, and resolving conflicts at their rudimentary stages are of great positive significance for easing social conflicts and resolving social risks.

10.1 Importance of Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents In modern human society, both the rich and the poor, despite their different social status, are threatened by natural disasters and man-made technological risks. However, it is undeniable that, inequality in class and stratum brings about a completely different logic of distribution. With the advancement of urbanization and technology, many facilities of public utilities have been built to meet the needs of the public in social life, including waste treatment plants, sewage treatment centers, crematoriums, energy supply systems, and substations. These public facilities, while improving the quality of people’s lives, also create negative externalities for residents in the vicinity of them, that is, the benefits are enjoyed by all, while the cost is borne by a small number of people. This type of facilities is known as NIMBY facilities. Usually a NIMBY facility is built in places with the least resistance. However, when the externalities of these public facilities reach a certain level or people’s awareness of their legitimate rights increases, these cost bearers will have stronger motivation and higher organizational capacity to oppose NIMBY facilities, according to the collective action logic. This type of mass incidents is referred to as NIMBY incidents. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_10

283

284

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

10.1.1 What Is NIMBY “Not in My Back Yard” (NIMBY), is sometimes expressed as LULU, that is, “Locally Unwanted Land Use”. The term NIMBY is often used in urban planning, and relevant research has emerged in large quantities since the 1980s. In the 1980s, M. Dear proposed that the NIMBY phenomenon is an important form of urban conflict,1 and this led to in-depth discussion about NIMBY. In general, although people have different expressions, the NIMBY syndrome is in fact a kind of resistance mentality and action strategy represented by residents who want to protect their own life and living standard. Vittes has pointed out several connotations of NIMBY syndrome. First, NIMBY is an across-the-board attitude of rejecting public facilities that are considered to be harmful to the right to life and the environment. Second, the NIMBY syndrome is an environmentalist assertion, which emphasizes the use of environmental values as criteria for screening projects before building public facilities. Third, the development of the NIMBY syndrome does not allow any technical, economic, or administrative rationality, and is an emotional response.2 The public’s resistance to NIMBY facilities is mainly due to these facilities’ potential threats to their quality of life and property, resulting in hostile behavior and attitudes.

10.1.2 NIMBY Mass Incidents With urbanization continuing to deepen, facilities such as waste treatment plants, nuclear power plants, sewage treatment plants, incinerators, mental hospitals, infectious disease prevention centers, and street dweller service centers have been built one after another. These facilities, while producing positive externalities for the society as a whole, also have created negative externalities for the people in the vicinity of the facilities, which has led to mass protests. That is, due to the construction of the NIMBY facilities, collective petitions, gatherings, stall-ins, blockading party and government organs, staging sit-ins, and creating disturbances, and so on, affecting the government’s administration and social order. NIMBY mass incidents are caused by internal contradictions among the people, that is, it is the dissensus type of crises. Such incidents are the main body and governance focuses of mass emergencies. They may jeopardize the core institutions, mainstream values, or social structure, challenging the legitimacy of the existing order. Furthermore, the subtypes of NIMBY mass incidents are related to the types of NIMBY facilities. The classification NIMBY facilities can be based on the scale and 1 Dear,

M. Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome. Journal of the American Planning Association, 1992, Vol. 58, pp. 288–300. 2 Vittes, M. E., Pollock, P. H., and Lilie, S. A. Factors Contributing to NIMBY Attitudes. Waste Management, 1993, Vol. 13, pp. 125–129.

10.1 Importance of Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents

285

grade of the facilities, and the damage and hazard they may bring. The former criterion divides NIMBY facilities into regional NIMBY facilities (such as highways), inter-city NIMBY facilities (such as garbage disposal facilities, slaughterhouses, and funeral homes), citywide NIMBY facilities (such as sewage treatment facilities, and substations), and neighboring NIMBY (such as gas stations).3 The latter divides NIMBY facilities into polluting facilities, space friction facilities, uncomfortable facilities, and aversive facilities.4 Drawing on the classification of NIMBY facilities, we classify NIMBY mass incidents into four categories: pollution, risk clustering, stigmatization, and annoying. They are the four subtypes of NIMBY incidents (Table 10.1). The level of risk of a mass incident caused by various types of NIMBY facilities varies. At present, among NIMBY incidents, the pollution type and the risk-clustering type caused more conflicts than the stigmatization type and the annoying type. Putting the four types in the quadrants of expected loss-uncertainty can further explain the current status and causes of the NIMBY mass incidents (Fig. 10.1). The four quadrants are: I-high expected loss-low uncertainty; II-high expected loss-high uncertainty; III-low expected loss-low uncertainty; and IV-low expected loss-high uncertainty. Pollution-related NIMBY mass incidents are typical of type I, which have high expected losses. People have high expectations for the damage caused by pollution. The uncertainty of the losses caused by such incidents is very low. As a result, people tend to act in the face of such incidents with high mass mobilization. In type II, when faced with high uncertainty and high expected loss, people also tend to act, such as in the mass incidents caused by the risk clustering

Fig. 10.1 Types of NIMBY mass incidents 3 Ho, Chi Fang. A Study of the NIMBY Effect of the Urban Service Facilities

(Unpublished master’s thesis). Department of Land Economics, Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. 4 Tan Hongren & Wang Junlong. NIMBY and Risk Society: A Case Study of Ankeng Ash Landfill in Xindian. Journal of Geographical Research, Department of Geography, Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan. 2005, No. 4.

286

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

Table 10.1 Main types of NIMBY mass incidents and representative incidents in recent years Type

Meaning

Resent representative incidents

Pollution

Facilities that may generate air, water, soil, and noise pollution during operation (such as highways, truss bridges, garbage disposal facilities, sewage treatment facilities, etc.), which cause public opposition because of potential danger or pollution

Panyu waste incineration incident in Guangdong in 2009; thousands of residents in Longgang, Shenzhen blocked roads to protest the construction of waste incineration power plant in 2009; Beijing Liulitun landfill incident in 2007, etc.

Risk clustering

This type of facilities is highly risky, such as substations, gas stations, gas stations, power plants, nuclear power plants, etc., but has low probability of occurrence. However, once the risk occurs, it will inevitably cause huge loss of people and property, thus causing opposition

Residents of Songnan Road, Luochong, Guangzhou, opposed the construction of gas stations in 2006; residents of Wangjing West Park in Beijing protested the incident of building a gas station nearby in 2003; more than 1000 people gathered to protest the construction of Nanjingyuan substation incident in Guangzhou in 2009, etc.

Stigmatization

Due to the stigma attached to certain groups, people oppose the clustering of such people (such as drug rehabilitation centers, psychiatric treatment institutions, infectious disease treatment institutions, prisons, aid agencies for the homeless, etc.)

Yucai Community of Chengdu was worried about infectious diseases and therefore, against the construction of a nearby hospital in 2008; residents of Xicheng Nianhua Community in Hangzhou opposed the construction of a psychiatric hospital in the community in 2009; Fuxin Building owners protested the construction of a psychiatric treatment institution Guangzhou in 2006, etc.

Annoying

Some types of unpleasant facilities (such as crematoriums, funeral homes, cemeteries, etc.) have a service function that meets the needs of the community, but make the nearby residents feel uncomfortable. People therefore initiate protests to prevent possible physical or potential harm to the body or property

Residents of Longdu Tiandu Community in Yubei District of Chongqing requested the relocation of a nearby funeral parlor in 2008; Taiwan Pingtung residents protested the location of the municipal funeral parlor in 2009; Residents of Vanke Qingqing Home in Beijing protested the nearby graveyard in 2009, etc.

of NIMBY facilities. These facilities are highly uncertain. The people involved may not trust the government due to information asymmetry and subjectively constructed the risk of NIMBY facilities. They are subject to rumors, hearsays, and misinterpretation of relevant information. Therefore, it is easy to trigger a collective action. In type III, people’s expected losses may not be directly life threatening. It has less expected loss than the first two types. Annoying facilities obviously cause people to feel uncomfortable. However, the uncertainty of its losses is low. Similarly, in type

10.1 Importance of Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents

287

IV, under the low expectation of loss, the damages caused by stigmatized NIMBY facilities are potential and indirect. It can be seen that the losses caused by type I and type II are direct and obvious, and people mostly fight for the right to health. The losses caused by type III and type IV are mostly in economic interests, and their impact tends to be potential and indirect, such as the depreciation of real estate. As Dear mentioned, those who oppose NIMBY facilities are often concerned with three things: the threat to real estate values, personal security, and the comfort of the community.5

10.1.3 Strategic Framework for Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents In the transitional, high-risk society of China, the solution to NIMBY mass incidents cannot be only one-sided. Instead, we should develop a comprehensive framework, i.e. the aforementioned comprehensive analytical framework for risks, disasters, and crises. We should not limit the management of mass incidents to emergency management after crises. We should include social risk management, thereby “managing the origins” of mass incidents. Therefore, the strategy of managing NIMBY mass incidents should include at least two parts: the NIMBY risk management and the NIMBY incident management.

10.1.3.1

NIMBY Risk Management

We should strive to achieve the strategic goal of risk reduction through risk assessment, risk communication, political participation, the advocacy of risk rationality, and other means. The whole process, dynamics, and initiative are important trends. In urban planning, decision-making plays an important role in the generation of NIMBY risks and the occurrence of crises. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the decision-making of certain NIMBY facilities. In the process of building certain public facilities, the government must first cultivate a sense of risk rationality, i.e. the government should establish a platform for political participation, optimize decisionmaking methods, and fully consider the concerns of stakeholders. The government should make full use of risk assessment, risk communication, and other risk management tools to build trust and reach consensus. The mechanisms for cultivating risk rationality, the intervention of the third sector, and risk management are important for managing the origins of NIMBY risks. First, the cultivation mechanism of risk rationality. The motivation of modern risk management is to emphasize the risk rationality of communication to build collective awareness of risk perceptions and attitudes by using risk communication and 5 Dear M. Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome. Journal of the American Planning

Association. 1992, Vol. 58, pp. 288–300.

288

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

assessment. We should select appropriate risk management methods to address various modern social risks. In an open and flexible mode of thinking, the government should establish a sense of risk management, identify the possible sources and consequences of various risks in an all-around way, and emphasize the overall relevance, instead of being obsessed with professionalism. Therefore, in the landscape of risk society, we can identify our own positioning and take reasonable measures to reduce risks and their consequences. In the face of the impact of risk society on government management, the government needs to be a risk regulator, a direct intervener (service provider), its own risk manager, and the leader of a governing network for risk cooperation. Second, the mechanism for introducing the third sector. The introduction of the third sector is important for risk reduction and is based on two main reasons. First, in the construction process of most NIMBY facilities, the government is mostly a decision-maker of constructing the facilities and is in a position of conflict with the residents near the NIMBY facilities. How to find a third party that both of the opposite parties trust? This third party must also be professional and independent and can objectively evaluate the government’s policies. Second, in the context of uncertainty, the subjective construction of risk is strong, and the professional knowledge of expert groups has also been questioned by the people, and the lack of trust will make the environmental assessment measures in the risk reduction path lose effect. However, the third sector, with impartiality, professionalism, and community-level nature, is easy to be trusted by both parties and can play important roles in resolving conflicts between the two sides. “It is also a long-term and institutional consideration for resolving conflicts and reducing social costs.”6 Third, risk management mechanism. According to the definition of risk management by the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, “risk management involves processes that identify, assess, and judge risks, take action, and monitor the entire process.”7 Risk management includes not only the risk management process (risk recognition, risk assessment, decision execution, evaluation, etc.), but also the sum of a series of risk reduction activities. In the management of NIMBY mass incidents, the establishment of the NIMBY facility requires risk identification and analysis of all aspects of the psychological and behavioral expectations of the surrounding residents. The purpose is to incorporate possible risks into the decision-making process, optimize the decision-making, make active risk management beforehand, and then reduce the NIMBY risks to the lowest possible situation.

6 Tang Jingping. Institutions and Strategies for NIMBY Environmental Conflict Management: The-

oretical Analysis of the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant and the Case of Bayer Investment Based on Rational Choice and Transaction Cost. Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, 1999, No. 10. 7 Strategy Unit of Cabinet Office. Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/su%20risk% 20summary-pdf, 2002.

10.1 Importance of Managing NIMBY Mass Incidents

10.1.3.2

289

Management of NIMBY Incidents

The purpose is to achieve relevant agreements and calm down the situation by coordinating the interests of stakeholders and through the internalization of externalities, compensation, risk reduction, and relocation. The interests of stakeholders in NIMBY mass incidents are relatively clear. After an incident, the government first uses emergency measures to calm things down, and the key here is to initiate incident management. But more importantly, there must be timely and effective ways to solve problems, such as compensation, risk reduction, public participation, relocation, etc., and a flexible approach to resolve conflicts flexibly. First, compensation mechanism. Based on the internalization of externalities, the core is to form an acceptable incentive package,8 in order to evaluate and compensate for losses that have occurred or are likely to occur, and reduce the losses of residents around the facility to reduce residents’ resistance. Compensation is made in two major categories: monetary and non-monetary. Monetary compensation includes tax and fees reduction, direct payment of money, health insurance, etc. Non-monetary compensation includes the provision of public facilities, health care services, guarantees of real estate prices, employment, and improvement of community environment. The compensation mechanism is based on the economic, rational hypothesis of maximizing self-interest to calculate and plan the causes of the risks, the results of the losses, and the methods of prevention and control. This is more effective for the loss part of NIMBY-typed incidents that are easy to calculate. Second, risk reduction mechanism. In order to prevent possible adverse effects, we should minimize possible pollution and its level of contamination, take into account the possibility of negative impacts of the facilities, reduce the fear and anxiety of residents and weaken the resistance, by providing residents with insurance measures to cope with possible damages. Under the risk reduction mechanism, it becomes necessary to establish safety assurance and environmental protection standards, environmental monitoring, and environmental protection agreements. Third, citizen participation mechanism. Environmental issues involve not only the consideration at the technical level (including professionalism, uncertainty, and high risk), but also strong value judgment components, for example, the public’s assessment of risk, the willingness to accept risks, the trade-off between environmental protection and economic development, etc. Therefore, deliberately depoliticizing such decision-making processes and simplifying them into technical problems will create more struggles that are evasive and will increase difficulties in policy implementation in the future. The bottom-up voluntary approach and the facilitation of the political dialogue help to resolve the dilemma of NIMBY. If lacking relevant supporting system of the participating and the people’ trust in the expert groups and relevant government departments in the face of constructing NIMBY facilities, people are not satisfied with the existing formal channels of participation, but prefer collective 8 Luloff,

A. E., Stan L. Albrecht, and Lisa Bourke. NIMBY and the Hazardous and Toxic Waste Siting Dilemma: The Need for Concept Clarification. Society and Natural Resources, 1998, 11 (1): pp. 81–90.

290

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

Fig. 10.2 Strategic framework for managing NIMBY mass incidents

actions to arouse social attention and to form social pressure on relevant departments and groups to solve the problems faced. However, public participation provides a platform for understanding and communicating with all parties involved in NIMBY conflicts (including people, government officials, professionals, etc.), and the gap of trust can be solved through rational communication to facilitate the resolution of contradictions (Fig. 10.2).

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection At present, most mass incidents are public security incidents. A considerable number of mass incidents are caused by labor relations disputes resulting from work-related accidents. The biggest difference between modern industrial labor and traditional agricultural labor is that the risk in labor is very different. In the agricultural society, people worked from the sunrise to the sunset. The pace was slow because what they did was manual labor. There were few incidents of work-related injuries, poisoning, disability, or death. In the industrial society, on the contrary, life goes on fast like water instantly running, machines are always on with roaring noises and smoke billowing. During World War II, the average number of casualties per month for the U.S. military was 21,245, while the average number of casualties, maiming, and deaths in the industrial sector at home was as high as 160,947 per months, almost eight

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

291

times the number of casualties on the battlefield. In the 1990s, experts at International Labor Organization estimated that an average of about 10,000 cases of work-related injuries occurred each year in the world, causing more than 20 million deaths and injuries.9

10.2.1 Temporal Analysis of Labor Risk According to Marx’s theory of the duality of labor, “all labor, on the one hand, is the physiological cost of the human labor. As the same or abstract human labor, it forms the value of goods. All labor, on the other hand, is the consumption of the human labor in a special form with a certain purpose. As a specific useful labor, it produces the use value.”10 Value and value creation reflect social-economic relations or social relations of economic activities. The use value and wealth creation reflect the relationship between man and nature, or the natural relationship of economic activities. The economic activities of any society are the unity of social relations and natural relations. Marx focused on the analysis of the capitalist economic system and the social relations in labor, but did not rule out the study of the relationship between man and nature in labor. Labor is first and foremost a process of interaction between man and nature. It is the process, by which people use their own activities to cause, adjust, and control the material transformation between man and nature. A human being itself, as a natural force, is opposite to natural matter. When he works through nature and changes nature, it also changes its own nature. If we make a summary based on the relationship of the natural aspect of labor, labor is the process that people consciously change the physical or chemical state of the object of labor to meet their specific needs. In this process, the object of labor reacts to the laborer in its own physical or chemical state.11 This kind of reaction may cause physical or chemical damage to the laborer. When this damage is serious, they become work-related injuries or occupational diseases. In the process of production, the relationship in the social aspect is also parallel to the relationship in the natural aspect. Marx pointed out that (the capitalist) has already purchased all the factors needed for the labor process in the commodities market: the material factor and the human factor, i.e. the means of production and the labor. The capitalist then begins to consume what he purchased, the labor, that is, and let the worker, who delivers the labor, consume the means of production through his labor. From the moment the worker enters the capitalist’s workshop, the

9 Hou

Wenruo. Social Insurance. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2005, p. 224. Karl. Capital (Vol. I), People’s Publishing House, 1975, p. 60. 11 The object of labor here should be understood in a broad sense, including both narrow-sensed object of labor and as intermediary labor information between laborers and narrow-sensed object of labor. 10 Marx,

292

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

use value of his labor, that is, the use-labor, belongs to the capitalist.12 It is clear that the possibility of combining workers with the means of production, the distribution of income, and the state of social security, and they all operate in the social-aspect relationship, reflecting the social distribution of employment opportunities and value and wealth. The combination of laborers from the natural aspect and the means of production in different institutional arrangements in different societies. This institutional arrangement is the labor system. A labor system is mainly embodied as a relatively complete, restricting, and normative system that influences labor behavior and relations, consisting of four branches of the employment, i.e. the employment system, the personnel system, the wage system, and the labor insurance and protection system.13 According to the labor system, the relationship elements/risk status of the natural and social aspects of labor can be expressed as follows (Fig. 10.3). In terms of timing, the first big problem that workers face is whether or not they can be combined with means of production, or employment. After solving this problem and entering the production process, workers are exposed to the risk of injuries caused by physical and chemical effects of the objects of labor, resulting in work-related injuries (including occupational diseases). In the event of a workrelated injury, a worker may stop working and have no income, while facing high medical expenses. Of course, the risks faced by workers are much more than that. They also have problems with old-age care. As shown in Fig. 10.4. In terms of timing, the relationship among unemployment, industrial injury, and old-age care risks in labor is that the risks occurred before, during, or after labor. That is, the risk of unemployment occurs when a worker intended to find a job, but not be able to work, and the risk is before labor. Industrial injuries appear during labor. The problem of old-age care will not occur until the end of the working age. While

Elements of relationship of the social aspect: the possibility of integration, the fairness of wages, and the state of social security Laborer—means of production Elements of relationship of the natural aspect: length of labor, conditions of labor protection Fig. 10.3 Relationship between natural and social aspects of the labor process

Risks of Unemployment→Risks of Industrial Injury→Risks of Old-age Care Fig. 10.4 Work-related risks from temporal perspective 12 Marx, 13 Tong

Karl. Capital (Vol. I), People’s Publishing House, 1972, pp. 209–210. Xing et al. The Sociology of Labor, Nanjing University Publishing House, 1992, p. 377.

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

293

unemployment is a major issue for factory workers and rural migrants in urban areas, the latter faces limited risk of unemployment because the vast majority of them work in part-time jobs. And they cannot get any unemployment insurance compensation unless they first pay the premium for a specified period of time. Old-age care is of cause a big problem. However, for migrant workers who are mainly young and middle-aged, the issue of old-age care is still far away. The risk of work-related injury is a different story, because it is immediate. Once work-related injury occurs, the injured is immediately in trouble, and there will be trouble for the employer when the injured claim their rights.

10.2.2 Response to the Risk of Work-Related Injury 10.2.2.1

How Other Countries Respond to the Risk of Work-Related Injury

Historically, compensation for work-related injuries has gone through three stages.14 In the first stage, the injured bore the losses of risks on their own. In the 18th and early 19th centuries when the capitalist economy was in the early stage of laissezfaire and industrialization, in the face of issues of compensation for disability caused by frequent work-related accidents, Adam Smith, founder of British classical economics, responded that a worker has the freedom to sign a labor contract with an employer, and the labor contract already contains compensation factors for the danger of the job, that is, dangerous jobs gave higher wages. Therefore, a worker who has signed the contract should bear all the losses he suffered as a result of workrelated injuries on the job. In the second stage, the employer bore the responsibility. With the development of industrialization, work-related injuries occurred frequently, and workers were suffering. They kept struggling and won initial victory. European countries no longer forced workers to take responsibility for accidents at work and pushed employer responsibility systems. In the third stage, social insurance covers work-related injury. In the 1880s, Germany took the lead in formulating and implementing a social insurance system for work-related injuries, and began to implement the principle of “compensation regardless of fault”. According to this principle, an insured person who is injured, poisoned, maimed, or killed by in a case of workrelated injury is entitled to compensation for economic losses regardless of who or what caused the case. Since then, the principle of compensation regardless of fault has been welcomed by the working people and soon became popular as an ironclad principle in the work-related injury insurance system. Any occurrence of work-related accidents, especially major work-related injuries, can easily enrage the working masses, trigger strikes and demonstrations, cause social unrest, and even lead to anti-government political incidents. 14 Mu Huaizhong. Comparing Social Security Countries. China Labor and Social Security Publish-

ing House, 2002, pp. 262–263.

294

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

In view of work-related injury’s immediacy of risk and easiness to lead to antigovernment political incidents, the introduction of work-related injury insurance legislation and insurance system came earlier than other social insurance programs in most countries with a social security system. According to the statistics released by the International Social Security Association (ISSA) in the 1980s, 98% of countries in the world had social insurance policies, and 95% of countries issued laws on work-related injury insurance earlier than laws on other insurance programs.15 At the 26th ISSA Conference, the ISSA announced that of the nearly 200 countries in the world, 172 have established social security systems, fourteen had work-related injury insurance programs, and more than thirty other countries have legislation related to work-related accidents.16

10.2.2.2

Practices in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, China

The insurance benefits of industrial injury were provided in the Labor Insurance Regulations enacted as early as 1951. It has played a positive role in safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of employees of enterprises, calming the society and promoting economic development. In February 1957, the Ministry of Health formulated and promulgated the Regulations for the Occupational Diseases and the Treatment of Occupational Patients and determined the treatment of occupational diseases. However, since then, the regulations have not been supplemented and amended, and have obvious institutional defects in regard to work-related injury insurance. For example, the coverage is narrow, there is no social mutual aid program and risk sharing, the eligibility requirements are ambiguous, the specified compensation payout amount is outdated, and there is a lack of uniform criteria for identifying disability grades. In August 1996, based on the experience of pilot programs in various places, the Ministry of Labor issued the “Trial Measures for Industrial Injury Insurance for the Employees of All Enterprises”. However, because it was a departmental regulation formulated by the Ministry of Labor and is not legally binding. Most of foreign, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese investors and private enterprises were reluctant to participate in the insurance. The work-related injury insurance covered mainly some state-owned and collective enterprises. Most of the state-owned enterprises that did not participate in the social pooling for work-related injury insurance continued with the work-related injury benefits stipulated in the 1951 labor insurance system. The employees of non-state-owned enterprises lacked the necessary insurance coverage for work-related injuries. It was not uncommon that foreign-funded enterprises, private, and township enterprises entered into life-anddeath contracts with workers, though such practice has been repeatedly prohibited. A large number of compensations were low-costed for workers injured at work. 15 Hou Wenruo. Social Insurance. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2005, p. 225. 16 Development Trends of International Industrial Injury Insurance. See China Labor Advisory Network, http://www.511abour.com/labour-law/show-5949.html.

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

295

Under this circumstance, it became quite common for the injured to resort to violent means to get the compensation to which they believed themselves entitled, and how seriously a dispute was taken and how satisfactorily it was settled often depended on how far the injured workers were willing to go in their violent pursuit of compensation: the further they went, the more they got, and if one did nothing, one got thing.” Being the first to reform and open up, Guangdong Province began to reform the work-related injury insurance system in 1984. The Shenzhen Municipal Labor Bureau first organized the investigation and research to start a work-related injury insurance reform plan. At the end of 1988, at the suggestion of the Department of Insurance and Welfare of the Ministry of Labor, Guangdong Province and the Ministry of Labor jointly held the first national symposium in Shenzhen to explore basic ideas of the reform of work-related injury insurance system in some provinces and municipalities. At this symposium, Guangdong Province initially proposed the outline of establishing a social insurance system for work-related injuries, and decided to carry out gradually a pilot scheme in the province. In December 1989, Dongguan Municipal Government promulgated the Provisional Regulations for Work-related Injury Insurance. In February 1990, the city implemented the Provisional Regulations, formally establishing a work-related injury insurance system. Dongguan City focused on promoting compensation for work-related injuries, under the situations that no regulation on jobs and the disabled’s urgent need for compensation. In the mid- to late 1980s, Dongguan focused on economic development, and the enterprises of “three types of processing and compensation trade”17 and three types of foreign-funded enterprises had emerged in large numbers. The manufacturing industry sprang up in an instant. Enterprise management had not been standardized. Among the risks of unemployment, work-related injury, medical care and old-age care, the risk of immediate work-related injury was the most prominent. At that time, the first generation of migrant workers had low safety awareness and the rate of participation in insurance was low. The benefit claims after work-related injuries were mainly based on compensation. In this context, Dongguan City’s workrelated injury insurance began to take off. First of all, the government “forcefully” launched a social insurance program for work-related injuries. Social insurance for work-related injury has been closely related to government behavior since its birth. It is compulsory in many countries. The essence is that when there is a work-related injury in the natural aspect of labor, the government has pre-arranged the definition of responsibility and the distribution of rights and interests between enterprises and laborers in the social aspect of labor. The Dongguan Municipal Government seized all the favorable opportunities and even the lessons of blood to push for the implementation of work-related injury insurance and the payment of relevant compensation. For example, after the explosion at Dongguan Second Factory of Fireworks and Firecrackers in November 1990 and the catastrophic fire at Dongguan Shipai Xingye Garment Factory in May 1991, in which seventy-two 17 Processing on Order, Processing with Foreign Designs, Assembling Parts Supplied by Clients, and Compensation Trade.

296

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

people died and forty-seven people were injured, the city government promoted the work-related injury insurance forcefully and made the development of work-related injury insurance far exceeded the old-age, medical, unemployment, and maternity insurance schemes. The basic work-injury insurance system based on compensation was soon established and accepted, and the problems of immediate labor risk was solved.18 Second, the municipal social security authority took every possible way to expedite the development of the work-related injury insurance system. As the functional department responsible for the development of the work-related injury insurance system within the government, the authority alone did not have sufficient power and promotional efforts were made in cooperation with other departments. In 1990, Dongguan’s Social Security Department, with the help of the authority of Dongguan Customs and the Foreign Affairs Office, required all the enterprises engaged in processing and trade to sign contracts or go through relevant formalities to obtain social insurance certificates. In 2000, the city’s industry and commerce authority required all private enterprises and privately or individually owned businesses to change their business licenses and a valid social insurance registration certificate and the recent social insurance payment records were required for getting the new license. In 2002, the city started to pilot programs for the management of the work-related injury rehabilitation agreements in cooperation with some rehabilitation organizations. In 2006, with the help of the Provincial Work-related Injury Rehabilitation Center, the city reshaped its work-related injury rehabilitation system. In 2007, with the help of the Municipal Construction Bureau, the city formulated a plan to promote the workrelated injury insurance system among construction workers, which better solved the problem of the work-related injuries in the construction industry characterized by short construction period, high mobility, and complicated wage payments, and low insurance coverage rage. In 2007, the city created an inter-departmental coordination mechanism for work-related injury prevention soon after Zhang Dejiang, Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, gave the instruction that the prevention of work-related injury should be strengthened during his inspection visit to Houjie in Dongguan. Third, the Social Security Department and other agencies have formed synergy to promote the establishment and improvement of the work-related injury insurance system. In 1996, the Social Security Department and the social medical institutions collaborated to establish a medical team for the identification of labor ability, in order to carry out the labor ability identification, developing a standing mechanism to start the labor ability appraisal. In 2004, the Social Security Department and the Municipal Health Bureau jointly formulated relevant regulations on the medical treatment of work-related injuries and solved most of the work-related medical problems to curb the excessive growth of medical expenses for work-related injuries. In 2007, the Social Security Department and the Municipal Safety Supervision Bureau jointly established an work-related injury prevention task team at the municipal and 18 See Guo Rongxin. The Research and Construction of the Three-in-one Industrial Injury Insurance System. Dongguan Social Security Department, 2010 April.

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

297

municipal levels to integrate departmental functions, establish a long-term mechanism, carry out the publicity for work-related injury prevention, injury prevention training, key enterprise inspection and rectification, and other work injury prevention tasks, creating a new model for work-related injury prevention. The city achieved the goal of “reducing annual total incidents by 20% and reducing total incidents of the key industries by 30%” in the same year. Dongguan City has pushed the work-related injury insurance system forward at several key points along the way, building capacity, taking opportunities, and joining hands with other departments. The number of people participating in work-related injury insurance increased from 56,000 at the beginning to 808,100 at the end of 1992, and to 1.5 million in 2001, covering every people that should be insured. The collection of work-related injury insurance fund in Dongguan city is executed according to the principle of “meeting the need and keeping a small reserve,” so as to ensure that the amount of fees collected is reasonable and does not impose too much burden on enterprises. All kinds of enterprises in Dongguan accepted the workrelated injury insurance, especially those from Taiwan and Hong Kong, because there are similar practices in regard to work-related injury insurance in those two regions. The implementation of work-related injury insurance in Dongguan set an example for how compensation for work-related injuries successfully changed from a corporate behavior to a social behavior, which is conducive to the transformation of state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises. It has played a positive role in promoting the development of the socialist market economy and laid a solid, practical foundation for the legislation of work-related injury insurance in Guangdong Province.

10.2.3 Temporal Analysis of Work-Related Injury Risk In the early stages of the implementation of work-related injury insurance in many countries, the treatment of work-related injury was only used as a means of compensation to protect the livelihood of the injured after work-related injuries. With the passage of time, people gradually realized that the work-related injury insurance system should intervene in advance of occupational injury accidents and occupational diseases to encourage employers to strengthen protection of laborers and improve their working conditions. In this way, it is possible to restrict the behavior of the employer, protect the worker from being harmed, and reduce the pressure on the compensation fund faced by the work-related injury insurance system itself. The first legislation establishing the link between work-related injury insurance and occupational injury was the On the Issues of Wages of Casualties and of Preventing Casualties during Employment issued by the Massachusetts State in 1912. France and Australia also enacted similar acts in 1946 and 1955, respectively. The intervention of a work-related injury insurance system in the prevention of work-related injuries integrates occupational safety with the payment of insurance compensations, and the effect was far better than before. Among Western European countries, Germany does the best in preventing work-related accidents and

298

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

occupational diseases. Its organizational guarantee is occupational insurance associations at all levels which are responsible for labor protection to prevent work-related accidents and occupational diseases. The premium rate of work-related injury insurance is reduced, and a safety return fee is given as a reward. In other words, the work-related injury insurance in Germany not only pays attention to the economic compensation payment to injured workers, but also emphasizes prevention before any injury occurs. In 1963, special provisions were made to require enterprises to designate safety officers responsible for accident prevention and for ensuring employer compliance with the relevant government decrees. The state also submits disaster prevention reports every year and dispatches thousands of people to directly exercise supervision over disaster prevention.19 Such practices of insurance plus prevention have reduced the incidence of work-related accidents to the lowest level. In 1975, the accident rate was 0.73 per 1,000 people, and the death rate was 0.11 per 1,000 people; the figures were 0.57 and 0.06 in 1985, and 0.47 and 0.04 in 1995.20 In Germany, safety return fees, which is rewarding in nature, accounted for 7% of the expenditure of work-related injury insurance fund.21 Here, the work-related injury insurance itself contains a time sequence, as shown in Fig. 10.5. If we center on work-related injury compensation payment, work-related injury prevention goes before it and work-related injury rehabilitation comes after it. If work-related injury prevention is insufficient, pressure will be heavy on work-related injury compensation and rehabilitation. On the contrary, if work-related injury prevention has been done well, the pressure on work-related injury compensation and rehabilitation will be much less. In the late 1990s, the economic development in Dongguan gradually came on track. The employment system and enterprise management were gradually standardized, and the employed people were mostly second-generation migrant workers with higher overall quality. The work-related injury insurance has experienced several rounds of large-scale expansions and achieved basically universal coverage, and the compensation system for work-related injuries has been improved greatly after several adjustment. With the continuous improvement of the management Work-related Injury Prevention→Work-related Injury Compensation→Work-related Injury Rehabilitation Fig. 10.5 Work-related injury from temporal perspective 19 The concept of disasters used by the international community often includes both natural and manmade disasters, such as accidents in production. However, since ancient times, Chinese distinguish natural disasters from man-made disasters, the concept of disasters only refers to natural disasters. 20 Liu Yansheng. The Origins, Development, and Choice of Social Security, Law Press, 2001, pp. 179–180. 21 Li Xiaoqin, et al. The Development Model of Foreign Industrial Accident Insurance and Its Enlightenment to China. Coal Economic Research, 2006 (5).

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

299

of work-related injury insurance and the maturity of various conditions, Dongguan began to explore the establishment of a higher level of protection for work-related injuries. In 1998, Dongguan established its Work-related Injury Rehabilitation Center, and conducted a practical exploration of the work-related injury rehabilitation through the establishment of a pilot scheme of Work-related Injury Rehabilitation Agreement Agency, which laid the foundation for the development of the workrelated injury rehabilitation. In early 2006, with the continuous development of the economy and society, Dongguan proposed the development concept of “dual transformation of economy and society”. The quality of enterprise management and staff has been considerably improved, and society is paying more attention to work-related injury insurance. At this time, social insurance management in Dongguan has also evolved into a new stage. The time is ripe for the building of a comprehensive “three-in-one” workrelated injury insurance system that integrates prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation. Therefore, according to the 2004 National Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations and the Guangdong Provincial Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations, Dongguan vigorously promotes the establishment of a work-related injury insurance system. The city put the construction of a “three-in-one” work-related injury insurance system in an important position and actively explore the mechanism of injury prevention and rehabilitation. So far, the framework of the “three-in-one” work-related injury insurance system established by the city for prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation has been clearly defined. In the area of work-related injury prevention, the city adopted a mechanism that combines macro regulation and control with micro implementation and started to work on it with the help of a joint preventive mechanism involving various departments at both city and town levels. In January 1998, the city established an incentive mechanism for social work-related injury insurance and production safety, to reward model enterprises for sound production safety and for offering work-related injury insurance. In 2007, the Municipal Social Security Bureau and the Municipal Safety Supervision Bureau jointly established the city’s work-related injury prevention working group, formulated the rules and regulations and annual working plans, and held several coordination seminars to study the tasks. According to statistics, the incidence of work-related accidents in the city dropped significantly in 2008, reaching the set target. Since 2009, the city has carried out medical examinations of occupational diseases for work-related injury prevention, in order to grasp the health status of the insured workers in high-risk industries, and establish their health records. In the area of compensation for work-related injuries, a complete system from entry to exit has been established, including insurance premium payment, injury identification, injury medical management, labor ability appraisal, and issuance of compensation treatment. A set of standardized, informed, and social force-based management mechanisms has been established to ensure the smooth progress of the treatment and payment.

300

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

For the rehabilitation of work-related injuries, a management mechanism has been established. The Municipal Social Security Bureau is responsible for coordination, and branches are responsible for tracking and grading. It is a management mechanism that each unit performs duties, respectively. By the end of 2009, Dongguan City had completed 1,080 work-related injury rehabilitation cases, and 83.03% of the people involved in work-related injury cases applied for work-related injury rehabilitation during hospitalization or within thirty days after discharge.22 At a symposium organized by Dongguan Municipal Social Security Bureau held at Humen Town Rehabilitation Center, we learned that because the Municipal Social Security Bureau had developed the “three-in-one” work-related injury insurance system, the combination of compensation and prevention has led companies to take the initiative to strengthen injury prevention. This includes measures to improve machinery, enhance training, and improve accountability; thus, it significantly reduced workrelated accidents. With the country’s economic and social development, Dongguan’s work-related social insurance has changed its single-handed tactics, and has organically integrated with other social insurances such as medical care and pension. As of the end of October 2009, the number of insured persons in the city totalled 20.0852 million, up 21.95% from the end of 2008 and an increase by 19.62% from the end of June 2009. Among them, the number of persons participating in the basic pension insurance for employees was 3,079,100; the unemployment insurance, 2,563,700; the work-related injury insurance, 4,414,900; the social basic medical insurance, 5,367,900; and the maternity insurance, 4,659,600.23 The number of persons participating in workrelated injury insurance is far higher than the number of people participating in basic pension insurance and unemployment insurance.24 In other words, the coverage of risk protection in labor is wider than the coverage of risks before and after working. At present, the work-related injury insurance is still the bright spot of Dongguan’s social security system. It has solved the immediate problems of labor risks and protected the vital interests of the majority of workers. On the contrary, the old-age insurance that has long been carried out to resolve the long-term risks of workers has encountered a large number of withdrawing by migrant workers at the end of each year, because the system lacks the conditions of national transfer and continuation. People can only take away the money in their personal accounts, and leave most of the money in the corporate pooling account of the unit they work for. This indicates that before

22 See Guo Rongxin. The Research and Construction of the Three-in-one work-related Injury Insurance System. Dongguan Social Security Department, 2010 April. 23 Dongguan City Social Security Bureau. 2009 Dongguan City Social Security Work Progress and 2010 Work Arrangement. 2009 January. 24 The social basic medical insurance and maternity insurance are offering services to people in the whole society, not only limited to enterprise laborers; therefore, the number of insured persons is more than the number of people participating in work-related injury insurance.

10.2 Work-Related Injuries: Risk Reduction and Insurance Protection

301

solving the institutional obstacles to the national transfer of insurance, the promotion of the endowment insurance does not meet the vital interests and actual needs of the majority of migrant workers. It is better to realize full coverage of all work-related injury insurance for migrant workers as soon as possible. From the perspective of the whole country, this has been reflected, but there is still a big gap in the actual demands. For example, as of the end of 2009, the number of workers participating in work-related injury insurance was 148.96 million, an increase of 11.09 million from the end of the previous year. Among them, the number of rural migrant workers participating in work-related injury insurance was 55.87 million, an increase of 6.45 million over the end of the previous year. The number of people participating in unemployment insurance nationwide was 127.15 million, an increase of 3.15 million from the end of the previous year. Among them, the number of rural migrant workers participating in unemployment insurance was 16.43 million, an increase of 940,000 from the end of the previous year. The number of people participating in urban basic medical insurance was 401.47 million, an increase of 83.25 million from the end of the previous year. Among them, the number of rural migrant workers participating in medical insurance was 43.35 million, an increase of 690,000 from the end of the previous year. In addition, the number of people participating in urban basic endowment insurance was 235.5 million, an increase of 16.59 million from the end of the previous year. The number of rural migrant workers participating in basic endowment insurance was 26.47 million, an increase of 2.31 million from the end of the previous year.25 Zheng Bingwen, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out, “As far as the national average is concerned, as of the end of 2009, the ratio of the number of people participating in work-related injury to the number of people participating in the pension insurance was 1:1.6. Dongguan saw exactly the opposite, with a ratio of 1:0.7. Different provinces and municipalities can formulate different policies according to their own situations, and different approaches can be taken. Even within the coverage of the Regulations on Work-related Injury Insurance, institutional innovation can be carried out… Local governments should take on more responsibility for work-related injury insurance.”26 The work-related injury insurance system of Dongguan city has been in operation for twenty years and has fully proved that it is scientific and rational implementation. In particular, the practice of the “three-in-one” work-related injury insurance for prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation proposed and operated by Dongguan in recent years should be a good reference and have promotion value for the establishment of the national work-related injury insurance system.

25 See

China Internet Information Center. “2009 Statistical Bulletin on the Development of Human Resources and Social Security,” http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2010-05/22/content_ 20094749_2.htm. 26 Comments on “Work-related Risk Prevention from Temporal Perspective”. Social Science, 2010, No. 9.

302

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution As mentioned earlier, from a dynamic perspective, unorganized mass incidents without direct demands are extreme manifestations of social contradictions. The focus of prevention and resolution is to avoid transforming an organized mass incident with direct demands into an unorganized one without direct demands. Therefore, we should focus on resolving organized mass incidents with direct demands in the governance of mass incidents. This is also the focus of the current social contradictions. The key to resolve organized mass incidents with direct demands is to satisfy reasonable demands raised by people in a timely and effective way, cracking the abnormal logic of resorting to violent means to get compensation. It is necessary to create an innovative a system and mechanism to resolve social contradictions and to improve the efficiency of resolving social contradictions. In general, there are three main channels for resolving social contradictions: petition (letters and visits), mediation, and litigation.27 As social contradictions are still increasing, we must let all three play their roles to the best, and form synergy so as to minimize the accumulation of social contradictions. This is the integrated solution of social contradictions. Currently, people are more and more inclined to “believe in petition, not the law,” and petitions grow rapidly. But stability is paramount in performance evaluation, efforts to maintain stability at the basic level are likely to become control and coercion for stability. This will not resolve social conflicts and may even accumulate and intensify conflicts. Therefore, the solution is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of petition handling and to give better play to mediation and litigation so that petition will not be the only way people resort to. In the long run, petitioning through letters and visits as an administrative means is not in line with the concept of “rule of law”. It is the general trend to open up judicial channels, solve the social contradictions by means of the rule of law with mediation as a supplement to resolve contradictions at the community-level level and in an early stage. However, in the short term, it is not realistic to cancel the letters and visits, when the improvement of mediation and judicial channels is needed to resolve social contradictions efficiently. In addition, a large number of current social contradictions are caused by policy issues and conflicts between the people and local governments and their departments. It is also unrealistic to solve the conflict between the people and the government and its departments mainly through judicial channels, when the independence and impartiality of the judiciary still needs to be improved. To sum up, the key ways to integrate social conflicts are as follows.

27 The

litigation here is in a broad sense, including both judicial proceedings and arbitration by relevant government agencies.

10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution

303

10.3.1 Improve the Mechanism and Effectiveness of Handling Petitions In addition to the argument that the letters and visits system should be abandoned altogether, there are three other ideas concerning the reform of the system. The first suggest reinforcing it. It advocates pooling petition information resources to rebuild the framework of the petition system and create the pattern of “greater letters and visits,” and establish an efficient supervision and inspection mechanism for letters and visits through legislation to standardize the procedures of letters and visits. The second arguments is to dwindle letters and visits. There are two branches. The first suggests strengthening the petition system as a channel for pubic political participation, but removing the function of civil rights relief. The goal is to let petition’s play its original role as channel of public opinion expression, but cease to assume judicial and administrative relief functions, in order to establish and highlight the authority of judicial relief. The second branch suggest abolishing the petition agencies at all levels of the government and moving letters and visits authorities to the people’s congress which is the supervisor of the people’s government, court, and procuratorate through. The third idea takes the path in between, suggesting neither to strengthen nor to weaken the system of letters and visits, only regulating it. In fact, these three reforms are not contradictory to each other. Their cores are to improve the effectiveness of the petition system. In this regard, we propose the following targeted recommendations.

10.3.1.1

Organizational Optimization, and the Combination of the Right Expansion and Assessment Mechanisms Changing of Letters and Visits

Petition incidents are mostly caused by policy issues. Therefore, the organizational structure of the petition system should be optimized into an oval shape, that is, building it up at the municipal level while dwindling it at all upper and lower levels. In this way, on the one hand, we can avoid the county (district) and township governments’ dual roles of the makers of and the resolvers of the petitions. On the other hand, we can alleviate the problems caused by a petition organization’s top-heavy structure, which leads to visits bypassing the appropriate level to reach the highest level directly and actively cracks the abnormal logic of resorting to violent means to seek compensation. It is necessary to integrate the resources of letters and visits, and appropriately expand the powers of the petition system to cover inspection, supervision, and the proposal of a recall, official assessment, overall planning, and commendation. Standing administrative law enforcement departments such as urban demolition and enterprise transformation should be established, one-stop reception processing implemented, courts and procuratorial organs introduced into the reception hall of letters and visits, and registration points for letters and visits set up. Joint meetings, administrative arbitration, petition hearing, and other systems should be

304

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

put in place. In this aspect, Yima City, Henan Province, has carried out preliminary attempts and can be a significant model. In 2005, the Yima city Government established the first “Mass Work Bureau” in the country. On this basis, in 2006, established the “Mass Work Department” of the Municipal Party Committee, of which Standing Committee of Yima Municipal Party Committee and the Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee serve as the Heads of the Mass Work Department. In terms of functional positioning, it is clear that the Mass Work Department (Bureau) is an important component of the municipal Party committee and municipal government. The Mass Work Department (Bureau) is directly mandated to supervise, to evaluate major decisions, to examine the reward and punishment, and so on, which have achieved good results. It is also necessary to change the current number-based petition assessment mode into a conclusion-based assessment mode as the main criteria, in order to avoid the community-level government’s use of stability sustaining as an excuse to suppress and crack down on petitions, which may aggravate and intensify social contradictions. What needs to be pointed out is that, optimizing the structure of letters and visits, moderately petitioning and expanding powers, and changing the mechanism for assessing letters and visits require a simultaneously implementing a three-pronged approach to truly improve the effectiveness of letters and visits to resolve conflicts.

10.3.1.2

Actively Piloting the System of Government Executives Hearing Petitions and Accessing the System of People’s Congress Deputies Visiting Petitioners: A Combined System

In view of the current situation, people’s congress deputies are far less popular than government executives. This is because the executive leadership of the government in accepting visits and letters has a decisive effect, which can make decisions on the spot and solve problems immediately. However, it is difficult for the government to adhere to a long-term, institutionalized executive leadership’s visit to victims, and therefore it easily becomes formalistic. Therefore, overall, people’s congress deputies’ visits to victims are a relatively viable option. On the one hand, the deputies’ visiting for hearing, and representing the public opinion; and supervising the government administration are important functions of the people’s congress in the first place, different from the administrative functions of the government. On the other hand, people’s congress deputies do not need to deal with a large number of administrative matters and therefore, it is easier for them to adhere to long-term practices. Of course, this requires full-time people’s congress deputies (or members of the standing committee of people’s congress) at all levels of the people’s congress to establish have full-time deputies to visit the victims. Combining the government executive leadership’s visit with the NPC deputies’ visit can be a standing mechanism to resolve social contradictions proactively.

10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution

10.3.1.3

305

Introducing Legal Service Mechanisms

In dealing with petition through letters and visits, efforts should be made to combine letters and visits with legal services and legal aid. We should mobilize relevant legal experts, lawyers, and other legal workers to participate in the reception of letters and visits, and mobilize them to provide legal advice to letters and visits authorities. It should be obligatory to help petitioners by answering law-related questions, to transfer the procedural legal issues reported by the petitioners to the relevant departments, and provide legal aid to the petitioners who are eligible.

10.3.1.4

Introducing a Petition Hearing System

For some influential, typical, difficult, or recurring petitions, we can hold hearings. Under the auspices of the relevant agencies, the petitioner can present their issues and demands. The responsible agency should show how they handle the case and what are the results. There should be open interrogation and replies with relevant evidence, relevant policies and legal basis announced. Representatives from all walks of life may give comments in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and policies to reach a result at the hearings. This not only has a guiding effect on petitioners, but also applies to the incidents of stalking and trouble-making visits. It can curb professional petitioning to a certain extent.

10.3.1.5

Changing the Concept and Skills of Handling Petitions

We should warmly receive any petitioner and first ease their negative emotions. We cannot exclude collective visits, repeated visits, and visits that bypass the appropriate level of authority. Especially, for collective visits, we cannot rashly dispatch the police force to take public security control measures. We should focus on communication and education. We should control the situation in order to reduce antagonism. Second, we must improve the reception skills. In addition to scheduled reception, according to the type of issues involved, we can also arrange some listeners to whom visitors can vent their feelings. Third, it is necessary to supervise the petition cases in a timely manner, and timely provide feedback on how the situation has been handled to the visiting masses and make information public.

10.3.2 Give Full Play to Mediation and Enhance Mediation Capacity According to the statistics from the Ministry of Justice, since 2004, among the cases that were submitted to court after written agreements had been reached through mediation, 81% had the same result as the mediation in accordance with the law.

306

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

This indicates that mediation is an important means to resolve social contradictions. In recent years, mediation has been playing a growing role in resolving social contradictions. According to statistics, as of the end of 2009, there were more than 823,000 people’s mediation organizations in the country and full coverage had been achieved. In the past five years, the National People’s Mediation Organization handled or helped the community-level people’s government handle more than 29 million cases of civil dispute, and solved 27.95 million or 96% of them. Mediation has prevented more than 100,000 suicides caused by civil disputes, and prevented more than 250,000 civil disputes from turning into criminal cases.28 On January 1, 2011, the People’s Mediation Law was officially enacted, providing legal basis for mediation to serve as a way to resolve social contradictions. Currently, preliminary attempts have been made in some places, and their practices and experience can be learned and promoted. For example, Nantong of Jiangsu Province began to explore a “big mediation” model in 2003. Within seven years, mediation accumulatively resolved more than 240,000 conflicts of various types, effectively prevented more than 2,000 cases from “turning from civil disputes to criminal cases,” more than 4,000 petitions to higher-level authorities, and more than 3,500 mass incidents. In February 2008, Nantong city established the first doctor-patient dispute mediation center of Jiangsu Province and it handles doctor-patient disputes that occur the city’s gradeII or higher-grade hospitals. Over two years after its establishment, the center has directly accepted and successfully resolved more than 400 major medical disputes, none reversed. More than RMB 5 millions of compensation was secured for parties involved, and more than 1,500 visits were received. According to a survey, 92% of the people in Nantong city expressed their trust in the mediation center.29 While the function of meditation grows, the scope of mediation extends from common civil disputes regarding marriage, family issues, and neighborhood strife to disputes arising from the reform and development, including labor disputes, doctor-patient disputes, road traffic accidents, land acquisition and house demolition, and property management. This also puts forward higher demands on the mediation skills of the mediators. Therefore, to expand the mediation channels requires the improvement of the professional quality of mediators which is to be achieved through training. By combining professional mediation techniques with traditional mediation methods, mediators can achieve the best results.

28 Xinhuanet.

The People’s Mediation Law is Formally Implemented, and It Plays a Fundamental Role in Resolving Social Contradictions. http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/13636765.html. 29 Js.chinanews. Documentary Report on Jiangsu’s Innovative Development of Big Meditation Mechanism for Resolving Social Contradictions. http://www.js.chinanews.com/news/2010/0126/ 14505.html.

10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution

307

10.3.3 Boost Legal Education and Increase Conflict Settlement Capability of the Court At present, litigation is limited to a very minor role in resolving social contradictions. On the one hand, people have low legal awareness and tend to “believe in petition, not the law.” On the other hand, litigation has a very high threshold, less independence, and susceptibility to interference. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary that we continue with common legal education, continuously improve citizens’ legal awareness, establish a long-term mechanism for legal education and publicity in communities and sub-districts to enhance the legal awareness of residents, and guide them to adopt legal and reasonable ways to solve problems and use legal channels to resolve existing contradictions and disputes. On the other hand, it is necessary to lower the threshold of a litigation, expand its scope, and consider delaying the payment of, reducing or cancelling litigation fees for cases closely related to people’s lives. The people’s courts should give priority to civil cases related to public security, letters and visits, social stability, mediation, and agreements. Judicial proceedings have rigid evidence requirements and time limits. The parties involved also need to hire lawyers and to pay litigation fees. Such high cost poses restrictions on the function of litigation to resolve social contradictions. To make things worse, courts in some places have raised the threshold of litigation, making it even more difficult to have a case accepted and handled by the court. In particular, disputes arising from land acquisition and housing demolition are rejected for unjustifiably reasons since they are usually disputes between people relocated forcefully and the local government. The high litigation threshold is also one of the important reasons for the tragedy of Tang Fuzhen’s self-immolation. To this end, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Opinions on Protecting the Right of Action of Administrative Litigation Parties” on November 15, 2009. It strictly forbids anyone to use any illegal grounds as an excuse and refuse to accept certain types of administrative cases that should be accepted according to law. One should understand accurately and strictly implement the Administrative Litigation Law and related “judicial interpretations” about the provisions on the conditions of prosecution, the qualifications of litigation, the time limit for prosecution, etc. Other conditions limiting the parties’ prosecution may not be specified in addition to the provisions of the law. One should correctly handle the relationship between the right to sue and the right to win. This means that no party should be deprived of their right to submit a litigation simply because its claims obviously do not hold water. We should understand the relationship between pre-suit coordination and case-based trials correctly. It is necessary to give full play to the role of pre-suit coordination, and not to make it an additional condition that keeps the parties from exercising their right to appeal.30 In addition, it is necessary to increase the resources of the judiciary, and establish a system that the important personnel and funds for the courts and procuratorates are managed and guaranteed by the higher-level courts and procuratorates, in order to 30 People’s

Daily Online. Supreme People’s Court Issued a Document to Protect the Public’s Complains. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10380237.html.

308

10 Social Risks and Their Prevention

ensure the independence of the judiciary, reduce the interference from the administration sector, and establish the authority of the national judiciary, guiding people to seek solutions through litigation.

10.3.4 Promote the Integration of Various Dispute-Solving Channels To perfect the existing mechanisms for letters and visits, mediation, and judicial (litigation) resolution of disputes, we should combine existing mechanisms in various ways, including the combination of letters and visits and meditation, prosecution and mediation, public security organs and meditation organizations, lawsuit and meditation, and “discipline inspection and meditation, in order to strengthen the status of mediation in resolving social contradictions and realize the transformation from simple mediation to comprehensive mediation. The combination of letters and visits and with meditation emphasizes strengthening the liaison between the mediation and letters and visits departments, smooth two-way information transmission channels, facilitate information exchange and case transfer, and let the two complement each other in dealing with social contradictions and disputes. The combination of prosecution and mediation encourages the settlement of prosecution cases that arise from letters and visits when it is permitted by law, so as to maximize dispute resolution and expand settlement through mediation. The combination between public security organs and meditation organizations establishes a two-way interaction mechanism to facilitate information exchange and coordination between public security organs and mediation centers, to better deal with unexpected collective disputes. It connects mediation centers with 110 call centers to improve the rapid response capability, and ensure timely and effective mediation for various disputes. The combination between litigation and meditation promotes mediation as a way to settle administrative compensation cases, minor criminal cases of private prosecution, and criminal plus civil cases. It establishes systems for mediation guidance, case assignment, agreement verification, information feedback, regular work meetings, and personnel training. The combination of discipline inspection and meditation strengthens communication between mediation organizations and the discipline inspection and supervision departments, to increase effectiveness monitoring, facilitate the mediation center’s response to letters and visits involving Party members and leaders violation of discipline, and promptly transfer the cases to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities for handling. The combination and integration of various settlement channels give better play to the advantages of each channel and enable them to complement one another and to help improve the efficiency of dispute settlement. In addition, mediation can be combined with social risk assessment of policies to carry out “pre-meditation” of contradictions, which enables “pre-control” of an incident’s hidden risk in the early stage. For example, in response to the occurrence of increasing demolition contradictions in recent years, government mediators can

10.3 A Multiple-Pronged Approach to Social Conflict Resolution

309

actively intervene to monitor the development of the situation in the coordination period of demolition and relocation. If they find any problems, they can promptly remind responsible persons and help resolve the problems, in order to prevent the bias of administration, the intensification of contradictions, and the deterioration of the situation.

Chapter 11

Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision: A Case Study of Food Safety

Natural disasters result from hazards and social vulnerability and public security incidents are caused by social risks arising from social transformation and development, while accidents, disasters, and public health incidents occur mainly due to deficiencies in government regulation. According to the Emergency Response Law, public emergencies are classified into two categories, “accidents” and “public health incidents”, and both categories involve safety regulatory authorities, such as those in work safety supervision, quality inspection and supervision, environmental protection and supervision, and food and drug supervision. Clearly, the management of workplace accidents represented by mining accidents has not been effective, counterfeit products abound on the market, various pollution incidents have greatly deteriorated the living environment of the people, and food safety incidents occur one after another. The variety, wide coverage, and bad consequences of problematic foods have reached a point where people turn pale at the mention of food. The frequent occurrence of incidents concerning workplace safety, product quality, the environment, and food has raised doubts about the effectiveness of regulatory efforts in these fields. The resignation of high-ranking officials in recent years, such as Governor of Shanxi Province Meng Xuenong due to a mining accident, Director General Li Changjiang of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine due to the Sanlu melamine milk powder incident, and Director General Xie Zhenhua of the State Environmental Protection Administration due to the water pollution incident on the Songhua River, and in particular, the sentence of Director General Zheng Xiaoyu of the State Food and Drug Administration to death for neglect of duty and accepting bribes, have aroused even more serious doubts. Taking food safety for example. According to the “Decision on Further Strengthening Food Safety” issued by the State Council, starting from January 1, 2005, agricultural authorities are responsible for supervising the production of primary agricultural products, quality inspection authorities are responsible for supervising food production and processing, health authorities are responsible for supervising consumer-related activities such as the operations of catering businesses, food and © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_11

311

312

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

drug administration authorities are responsible for supervising food safety and coordinating response efforts to major incidents, agricultural, development and reform, and commerce authorities play their respective roles in managing business operations in crop farming, factory farming, food processing, distribution, and consumption. This is a typical decentralized supervision system in which different authorities are responsible for different parts of the food chain so most regulatory efforts are segmented and only a few are targeted at specific food. The drawback is that each regulatory authority only acts within the scope of its own responsibilities and there is a lack of cooperation and absence of supervision in some aspects. But blaming the ineffectiveness of food safety supervision on the decentralized system only touches the surface of the problem. We need to explore the deeper reasons. The discussion on food safety supervision here is also instructive for the supervision of work safety, product safety, and environmental security. Many lessons can be learned by analogy.

11.1 Understanding the Current Model With a closer look at the decentralized food safety supervision system, we can find that many regulatory authorities are governmental departments and the entire regulatory process is run by the government so it is completely under government control. The government is the only regulatory body. What to supervise, how to supervise, and to what extent are all determined by the single regulatory body of the government. The government has monopolized the entire regulatory process, and no other entities are involved. The reason why this model is prevalent is that many people often regard market failure as a justification for government monopoly. However, market failures in the field of food safety are only necessary conditions for government-monopolized supervision, rather than sufficient conditions. It does not mean that the government alone will be effective in conducting the activities of supervision. There is no reason to believe that the market and enterprises cannot solve the problem and that the government’s exclusive regulation is the best or even the only choice.

11.1.1 Potential Self-interest of Regulatory Authorities The first problem of government-monopolized supervision is reflected in the inconsistency between the objectives of regulatory authorities and public interest. On the one hand, some government regulators are no nobler than those in the private sector. There is no reason to believe that an individual who pursues personal interests in the private sector automatically become a public interest pursuer when working for the government. In fact, the administrative staff in the government regulatory departments also have pursued their own interests. Anthony Downs once pointed out that bureaucrats act at least partly according to their own interests, and some officials are

11.1 Understanding the Current Model

313

only driven by their own interests.1 Since the clients (or owners) and the market are much stricter to the managers than the NPC, superior governments, procuratorate, court, and general public to regulatory authorities. Therefore, administrative staff in the government regulatory departments often have more opportunities to seek their own interests than the managers have in the private sector. On the other hand, government regulatory agencies are not organizations that naturally pursue the public interest, but rather the interests of government agencies. Douglass North, one of the representatives of new institutional economics, stressed that the existence of the state is the key to economic growth, but the state is the root cause of artificial economic recession. This is the famous North Paradox.2 “North Paradox” points out that because of the autonomy and self-interest of government institutions, government agencies are not transcendent and they also have their own special interests. Maximizing the budget of a government agency has become a way for staff members of the agency to realize their personal interests. It is in turn a way to transform the staff’s personal interests into the interests of government agencies. In summary, food safety problems keep coming up partly because of the interest pursuit of certain administrative personnel in the regulatory authorities and government agencies’ interests. It is worth noting that regulatory authorities and their administrative staff have the power and are in the open, and the supervised are thousands and scattered under cover. It is inevitable that some of the supervised will bribe regulators to evade supervision. It is also inevitable that some regulators will use their power to solicit bribes, and use public rights to seek personal gains. Once this situation arises, government supervision will inevitably be in vain.

11.1.2 Limited Capacity of Regulatory Authorities The problem of government-monopolized supervision is also reflected in the limited capacity of regulatory authorities. A government’s capacity is the resources and energy that it can use in the process of performing its own functions and managing public affairs, providing the public with a wide range of public goods and public services. The level of a government’s capacity depends on the amount of resources it has, such as human resources, financial resources, power, authority, cultural resources, and structural resources. These elements of resources are embodied in the structure of the government’s ability system in the form of manpower, financial strength, power, credibility, cultural power, and structural strength (institutional power). Although we have been moving toward a market economy from a planned economy, the traditional way of thinking typical to the planned economy era still prevails in the field of food safety. As the sole regulatory body, the government should 1 Anthony

Downs. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 83, 262. North. “Structure and Change in Economic History.” Translated by Chen Yu, Luo Hua et al. Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1991, p. 20.

2 Douglass

314

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

fully consider what to supervise and how to do it. The complexity of the problem lies in the variety of food types. Different types of foods are different in processing, distribution, consumption, and other aspects, which are complicated and technical, putting a considerable demand on the regulatory capacity of the authorities. Unfortunately, government regulators are not omnipotent gods; they have limited capacity as evidenced by the limited human resources, financial resources, power, authority, and cultural resources controlled by regulatory authorities. Regulatory efforts beyond the authorities’ capacity will inevitably lead to frequent food safety incidents.

11.1.3 Inadequacy of Information Gathered by Regulatory Authorities The problem of government-monopolized supervision is also reflected in the inadequacy of information gained by regulatory authorities. Food safety supervision poses high technical and professional requirements on the regulatory body, and it requires that regulation be sustainable and long-term. But today, with the explosion of information, regulatory authorities are unlikely to have all the information they need for supervision. Since the supervised have an advantage of information cost in terms of technology, regulatory authorities often do not have access to all the information about food quality and ingredients from food producers and distributors. And such information is necessary to enhance the food safety and to protect public interest. In addition, since the information comes from frontline staff in regulatory authorities. All the information submitted by the staff members must be collated and analysed by middle- or high-level officials of the authorities. However, due to the limited authority to make decisions, the government regulatory agency at a certain level is likely to need to transmit the information to a higher-level authority. Such a process incurs enormous costs, which include not only expenditures, but also the delay in transmission, the distortion of information during transmission, and the resultant slow decisionmaking. Much of the information does not last long. If you don’t respond quickly, the information you get will soon become useless. Due to the cost and requirement for timeliness, much of the information collected by frontline staff members may never have been delivered to middle- or high-level officials. Much of the information from lower-level regulatory authorities will never reach a higher-level regulatory agency. Although technological advances can speed up the collection of information, in the information age, the amount of information grow exponentially, and this information gap will not shrink but expand. In addition, due to the influence of systemic and manmade factors, the information submitted by frontline government staff members and lower-level regulatory authorities is likely to have been altered or even false. As a result, regulatory authorities often have to make decisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information. Regulatory authorities, relying on incomplete and inaccu-

11.1 Understanding the Current Model

315

rate information to supervise food production and sales enterprises, will inevitably be unable to fully, reasonably, and effectively perform their regulatory duties and protect consumers’ rights.

11.2 Regulating Food Safety Through Stakeholder Participation Stakeholder Participation is a Possible Way Out 11.2.1 The Necessity of Democratic Regulation First, stakeholder participation brings an external force to check public power. Public power is the political power that the people give to public institutions and their staff to manage public affairs. However, regulatory authorities entrusted with public power are of bounded rationality and are motivated to maximize their own interests. When developing and implementing a food safety regulatory system, they have to consider costs and benefits. They may ignore individual and public interests for the benefit of the government, or even directly harm individual and public interests. Therefore, in reality, public power is not always exercised for the public. In order to keep public power in line with the will of the people and public interests, it is necessary to maximize public participation in decision-making, because the public are the best defenders of their own interests. Citizens’ participation in the formulation and implementation of food safety regulation policies can strengthen the restriction on the use of public power to avoid distorted value orientation of public power and guarantee the policies’ public nature. Such a participatory constraint extends the scope pf power constraining entities to the entire social domain. The right of citizens to participate in public affairs is respected and they are also given the right to express their opinions. In this case, the scope of restriction is undoubtedly much broader than the checks between powers, and its effectiveness will be greatly enhanced. Second, the mechanism of stakeholder participation can make up for the insufficiency of the government’s capacity. With the improvement of the market economy system, major changes in the social structure and the emergence of multiple stakeholders have broken the monopoly of the government in the management of public affairs. The public sector, the private sector, the third sector, and even individual citizens can play a part in public administration. The private sector, the third sector, and the public can take over some of the regulatory tasks for government regulators and to a certain extent, reduce their burden, so that they can focus more on supervision. The participation of multiple stakeholders in food safety supervision also contributes to the direct and accurate expression of diverse interests and preferences, making regulation better targeted and more responsive to public needs. In addition, dialogue and cooperation are also conducive to the sharing of human, financial, and other resources, and the collection of complete and authentic information, thus reducing the uncertainty in decision-making and contributing to timely and effective policy implementation.

316

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

Third, stakeholder participation helps to gather more information and generate more ideas. In the field of food safety, the democratic participatory mechanism requires that every citizen affected by the food safety decisions be able to express their own views on issues of common concern, and to exchange information freely and openly. It means equality in participation, agenda setting and decision-making. The public directly face various food safety problems, and have a deep understanding of how the problems arise and evolve. Therefore, participation offers every citizen an opportunity to express their views based on their own experiences, which can help understand the problems, and help the government make well-informed decisions. Without freedom of expression, we run the risk of losing right ideas and leaving the wrong ones unquestioned. After all, a view cannot be all wrong. Active public participation can provide a wealth of information on food safety supervision issues in different aspects, especially detailed information closely related to public life. This broadens the scope of regulatory information collection, curbs the irrational impulses of public power, and makes food safety policies more effective in dealing with practical problems.

11.2.2 The Feasibility of Democratic Regulation An important precondition for introducing democratic participation in food safety supervision is that the public must show great willingness to participate. Surveys show that with China’s progress in democracy development in recent years, Chinese people now have a stronger awareness of participation and are keen in participating in public affairs directly related to their own interests, which is particularly true in for food safety. Despite the growing enthusiasm, the public’s expectations for gains from participation are low. Therefore, to reform the current model of food safety supervision is to engage more people in the government’s regulatory process for food safety issues, and ensure that the public are the real supervisors of policy implementation. According to the theories of deliberative democracy and procedural democracy, democratic regulation is government regulation based on democratic consultation. This requires the participation of all stakeholders, including regulatory authorities, food producers and sellers, and consumers, in the entire process of food safety supervision. Effective food safety supervision is premised on the extensive participation of all parties mentioned above, and the equal status of all participating parties, reflecting the substantive democracy in the form of cooperation.3 In other words, to adopt democratic regulation means to break the “core-periphery” relationship between regulatory authorities and the public, and to establish an equal partnership. All of the above parties (except food safety authorities) must participate extensively in government regulation and need to fully understand the regulatory information concerning 3 Zhang

Kangzhi. Exploring the Democratization of Public Administration. Journal of Chinese Academy of Governance, 2007 (2).

11.2 Regulating Food Safety Through Stakeholder …

317

food safety. Therefore, it is important to broaden the channels for these parties to obtain regulatory information and increase the transparency of regulation. This is also conducive to the public supervision of regulators. Consumers are at a disadvantage in the current model of food safety supervision, compared with other stakeholders such as government regulators, and food producers and sellers. Moreover, in the traditional regulatory model, the regulated stakeholders would seek to participate in the formulation of related policies through such means as rent-seeking (according to the “regulatory capture” theory). However, this type of participation is different from the democratic participation. In the latter case, all stakeholders can express their views through open, equally accessible, and normal channels, and be involved in the formulation of regulations and policies. In this process, the regulated shift play not a passive role but an active one.

11.3 Facilitating Stakeholder Participation by Establishing Institutions and Mechanisms 11.3.1 Establishing the Concept of Popular Sovereignty To replace the government monopoly in food safety supervision with democratic regulation, we must first make the shift from being people-oriented to embracing the concept of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is the theoretical cornerstone of democratic regulation. According to the theory of popular sovereignty developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the people are truly the masters of the country, and the people themselves manage state power. Compared with absolute monarchy, the idea of being people-oriented is a huge step forward. However, it is still based on the idea that people are to be managed and fails to grasp where the power comes from. Therefore, the inevitable result of being people-oriented is to conclude that the government should be the master of the people. Obviously, the idea of being the master of the people cannot meet the intrinsic requirements of the democratic regulation model for food safety. Only democracy that is derived from the concept of popular sovereignty is consistent with the model. Only under the guidance of this concept can we cultivate public spirit in China and transform the regulators who are people-oriented from administrators to service providers or public servants, and the people from the managed to real masters. Therefore, government agencies responsible for food safety supervision and their staff should embrace the concept of popular sovereignty, seek to maximize public interest, and be supervised by all stakeholders while assessing service performance to improve the efficiency of government regulation.

318

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

11.3.2 Developing Civil Society To develop civil society, efforts should be made in the following aspects: first, accelerate the reform of the administrative system, improve government functions, and expedite the process of democracy promotion to foster benign interactions between the government and civil society; second, improve the market economic system, standardize market operations, and promote the development and maturity of contractual rules to prepare the thinking and conduct necessary for the development of civil society; third, develop the third sector or non-governmental organizations (such as food industry associations, various social groups, etc.) to encourage the growth of civil society entities (civil society also includes modern rural residents who have embraced market economy and modern democracy, in addition to modern urban citizens so special attention should be given to rural autonomy and democratic management and urbanization); fourth, accelerate political and cultural reforms, cultivate citizenship among members of society, and build their awareness of equality, freedom, competition, and participation to strengthen the initiative of civil society.

11.3.3 Creating a Check and Balance Mechanism Efforts should be made in three aspects to create a check and balance mechanism for government regulation. First, reshape regulatory power. Now the responsibility of food safety supervision is divided between food and drug, agriculture, quality inspection, health, industry and commerce, and environmental protection authorities. Supervision is not targeted at specific food but at different stages of the food chain. Such a system is prone to problems such as ambiguous power boundaries, compartmentalization, and overlapping regulation power, as well as complete absence of regulation, poor supervision, market disorder, and low regulatory efficiency. Therefore, to promote democratic regulation, the regulatory power needs to be restructured. Horizontally, food safety regulation should be separated from the regulation of other related industries, and an independent and specialized food safety regulatory agency should be set up on the basis of existing institutions. The Food Safety Law (Draft), which was going through the third review as of October 2008, emphasizes the implementation of whole-process food safety supervision based on the current regulatory system, in light of the impact on the current administrative system and path dependence of reform. It clarifies that the responsibility for comprehensive coordination of food safety supervision shall be borne by the health authority under the State Council while quality supervision, industry and commerce, and food and drug authorities under the State Council shall supervise food production, distribution, and catering services respectively in accordance with the responsibilities prescribed in the law and the requirements of the State Council. However, considering such factors as the comprehensive coordination capacity of the health authority under the State Council (the low level of the internal coordination) and the affiliation relationship between local

11.3 Facilitating Stakeholder Participation …

319

health authorities and local governments, it is advisable to establish a food safety coordination committee under the State Council for comprehensive coordination for food safety supervision, according to the U.S. experience in food safety supervision. This is a better way to avoid responsibility overlapping among different departments and to promote coordination among them. Vertically, to avoid cross-regional spillover effects of food safety supervision and local governments’ “GDP first” policy interventions, a vertically integrated regulatory system directly managed by a central authority should be put in place. The central authority may also set up local branches when necessary to prevent food safety problems caused by local protectionism. Second, introduce a judicial review system. Its focus is to check for abuse of discretionary power by regulatory bodies. To determine the extent of discretion is a major challenge for regulators. In this regard, it is necessary to introduce institutional innovations in the case law system and the jury system. Third, create a performance assessment mechanism involving the general public. In designing this mechanism, the assessing organization should be clearly defined. It can be either the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress or the State Council, depending on the overall structure of the governmental regulation system. A performance assessment system involving the public will help promote democratic regulation and thus improve the efficiency and quality of government regulation in the field of food safety.

11.3.4 Improving the Food Safety Standard System A food safety standard system is a whole body of feasible and connected standards that cover key factors in all aspects of the whole process of food production, processing, distribution, and consumption that affect food safety and quality and their control. The food safety standard system can be used to achieve effective monitoring of food safety and improve the overall level of food safety. The hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) system has been applied to the regulation of various foods since the advent of the system in the 1960s. It has proven to be a rigorous preventive control system that can identify almost all possible hazards, and establish preventive measures on scientific basis to ensure food safety. HACCP is a sound system for analyzing and controlling physical, chemical, and biological hazards, and verifying control effectiveness for the entire food chain, including the production of raw and auxiliary materials, food processing, distribution, and even consumption. It is a management system based on risk assessment and risk management. In 1997, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) of the United Nations further defined the seven principles of HACCP, namely conducting a hazard analysis, determining the critical control points, establishing critical limits, establishing monitoring procedures, establishing corrective actions, establishing verification procedures, and establishing record-keeping and documentation proce-

320

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

dures. Global practices show that the HACCP system is by far the most economical and effective means of controlling foodborne hazards.4 Currently, China has a relatively complete national food safety standard system consisting of basic standards, product standards, behavioral standards, and testing method standards. However, compared with the current international standards, there is still a certain gap. Only 40% of national standards are identical or equivalent to international standards. In the food industry, only 14.63% of related international standards are adopted. These coverages are far from enough. The food quality standard system is the basis of food safety management. We should adjust all current standards as soon as possible. Focusing on specific problems, we should gradually establish a food quality standard system that is in line with international standards by adding, revising, and abolishing various standards.5

11.3.5 Implementing Strict Food Safety Certification Food safety certification is an effective method for evaluating food safety and food production systems, and governments around the world adopt it for food safety supervision. It is about developing and implementing standards based on actual resources and technical conditions to ensure consumers’ health and safety. With collaboration among all relevant parties, the standards are adopted for the management and supervision of the whole process of production, processing, storage, transportation, and sales of products, in accordance with the principles of unity, simplification, coordination, and selection. Implementing food safety certification and aligning with the international food safety certification system is one of the important means to break through the green barriers to trade. Currently, food quality safety (QS) certification in China consists of hazard-free agricultural product certification, organic food certification, green food certification, HACCP food safety management system certification, and food production and market access system certification. Although there are many types of certifications, none is carried out on a large scale, and certification by different departments may constitute a barrier, to a certain extent, between departments. Food safety certification can not only help people change their spending habit but also urge food producers and processors to improve the quality and safety of food. In addition, clearly defining the responsibilities of food enterprises and related government departments helps to improve the effectiveness of government supervision of food quality and safety, and ensure food safety at the lowest costs.

4 Xie Bing. The Impact of Environmental Pollution on Food Safety. Journal of Chongqing University of Science and Technology (Natural Science Edition), 2005 (2). 5 Zhang Xinglian et al. Causes and Countermeasures for Food Safety Problems in China. Food Science and Technology, 2005 (5).

11.3 Facilitating Stakeholder Participation …

321

11.3.6 Implementing Food “Traceability” Management The United Nations Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) define “traceability” as “the ability to verify the history, location, or application of an item by means of documented recorded identification”. Traceability means the capacity to use recorded identification to trace the history of a product (including origins of raw materials and ingredients), its application and location, or similar products or activities. In reality, traceability involves an information and documentation system on the composition and flow of food in a food supply system. A traceability management system should be established, and data collection should cover the entire food chain, from the origin of raw materials through the processing of the products to the end users. Since the 1990s, there has been growing interest in traceable products. This is partly because end products tend to contain more complicated technologies today, making the raw materials almost unrecognizable. In addition, the production process often involves a number of specialized companies in different locations. In most cases, consumers are only exposed to products and have no control over the production and processing processes. Therefore, they have expressed the need for a way to ensure the environmental friendliness of animal husbandry and product safety. Experts predict that in the industry chain related to animal products, traceability is an inevitable trend, and it will become a potential driving force for the development of agricultural trade. The traceability management of livestock products in China is still in the research stage. On May 24, 2002, the Ministry of Agriculture issued Decree No. 13 on the Measures for Administration of Immunization Labels for Animals, requiring the use of immunization ear tags for pigs, cattle, and sheep, and the establishment of an immunization filing system. Some cities in China have preliminarily established traceability systems for agricultural products, such as the IC card-based quality and safety supervision system for agricultural products in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province.

11.3.7 Establishing a Social Credit System for Food Safety The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China required efforts to “establish order in the market economy and improve the social credit system for a modern market economy”. The Third Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee also proposed to “heighten public awareness about credit and develop a social credit system based on ethics, property rights and law”. In 2003, the State Council requested that a basic framework and an operational mechanism of the social credit system be established within about five years. In this context, the establishment of a food safety credit system is imperative for China. It is to put in place a sound social credit system for food safety, and a credit management system featuring credit rating, credit report, and credit disclosure of food enterprises, based on risk analysis,

322

11 Strengthening Stakeholder Involvement in Safety Supervision …

credit service, and food safety records. The corporate credit system in China has been in operation for more than ten years, but it is still far from meeting the needs of a market economy. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine should lead efforts to establish a sound credit supervision system for food safety and quality based on enterprise quality database, and develop a corresponding service system consisting of an inquiry system, an evaluation system, and a feedback system, in order to promote the booming of the food market and economic development. In brief, government-monopolized supervision can no longer ensure the effective fulfilment of the government’s function in food safety supervision. We should introduce a consultation and dialogue mechanism to allow stakeholders, such as businesses and consumers, to participate fully in the regulatory process, so that the government, the business community, and interest groups can work together on the supervision front. This makes up for the deficiencies in government capacity, and reduces the probability of the government being taken advantage of by the regulated. Experience show that it is practical to introduce democratic regulation for food safety, given the public’s great enthusiasm for participation in the regulation of food, healthcare, and other aspects that are closely related to their own interests. The complexity of the problem is that compared with government-monopolized supervision, although democratic regulation can provide external assistance for the regulatory authority and thus enhance the effectiveness of regulation, it also imposes restrictions on the regulatory authority and may prevent it from seeking benefits. In this case, the regulatory authority may not be motivated to implement democratic regulation. Therefore, it is not easy to introduce democratic regulation to food safety supervision. Its success depends on not only the encouragement of higher-level authorities, especially the central government, but also the pressure from a strong civil society. In this sense, China still has a long way to go in changing the model of food safety supervision.

Chapter 12

Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

The SARS outbreak in 2003 underlined the significance of risk management and brought about a series of institutional changes, including the promotion of administrative accountability, establishment of an emergency plan system, and enactment and implementation of the Emergency Response Law. The institutional changes, with their respective emphases, have played an important part in increasing China’s capacity for handling public crises. Administrative accountability has unique effects on the management of public crises. First, introducing the administrative accountability system marks an institutional innovation while the emergency plan system marks an improvement since emergency plans had already been widely used in the management of workrelated accidents and natural disasters. Furthermore, the adoption of the Emergency Response Law is not the beginning of national disaster mitigation and relief legislation. The Flood Control Law and the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters had been enacted earlier. Second, administrative accountability is a punitive mechanism. By contrast, emergency plans and the Emergency Response Law are both intended to bring about improvements. In the current administrative system of China, the former ensures that due attention is given to emergency management from the central government to governments at basic level. Third, the administrative accountability system has the most significant effects. Whenever an emergency occurs, everyone wants to find out who is to blame, so that the media would often use words such as “accountability storms” to describe the intensity of investigation and affixation of responsibility. In particular, the cases of high-level officials being held accountable, one after another, for various incidents serve a warning to leaders at all levels and make them not dare to slack off. Emergency plans have covered operations in all aspects and at all levels but need to be improved in terms of pertinence, practicality, and operability. The Emergency Response Law is more future-oriented and provides an ideal framework for governments at all levels to improve the system and capabilities of emergency response. Fourth, the administrative accountability system was implemented at the earliest and directly contributed to the victory over SARS. The emergency plan system was not established until 2004, and the Emergency © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8_12

323

324

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

Response Law was not enacted and enforced until 2007. Fifth, the administrative accountability system provokes the strongest public response. The general public pay close attention to officials’ accountability in every case of emergency and the “comebacks” of disgraced officials. Therefore, the accountability system provides a special perspective to look at the management of public crises in China.

12.1 Holding the Government to Account in Public Crisis Management The management of public crises is closely connected with China’s endeavor to deepen reform and the transformation of government functions. To some extent, they can be considered the same historical process in a specific social context. Starting from the fight against SARS in 2003, many important institutional and policy changes introduced in China are all driven by one or a series of serious incidents, i.e. public crises. Examples include the SARS outbreak and ensuing administrative accountability, the incident of Sanlu melamine milk powder and ensuing Food Safety Law, March 14 Lhasa incident and ensuing information disclosure about foreignerrelated emergencies, the issues of agriculture, rural areas, and farmer and ensuing initiative to build a new socialist countryside, and the issues of “limited access to and high cost of medical services” and ensuing “new healthcare reform”. This type of changes was particularly evident in the international financial crisis that began in 2008, when ensuing formulation and change of almost all major policies revolved around how to deal with this crisis. Therefore, a public crisis can be both a kind of danger and an opportunity. Public crises serve as catalysts for governance reform. They offer an opportunity to solve long-standing problems, change policies for the public good, and strengthen social integration and solidarity. It corroborates the predictions made by the theorists of risk society that risks are becoming the major driving forces behind social development and future public policies will be geared toward social risks. The term “public crisis” is often used to refer to a negative and tense status, which is often associated with words such as disaster or emergency, and is even used without distinction. Therefore, we should first distinguish between public crisis, disaster, and emergency in order to clearly define the essential attributes of a public crisis. Disasters include natural disasters, such as earthquakes and typhoons, and man-made accidents, such as explosions and mining accidents. A disaster itself is not a crisis, because the victims of a disaster are individuals while the victims of a crisis are various organizations ranging from private groups to government bodies.1 But the improper handling of a disaster may lead to a crisis. For example, the poor disaster relief provided by the Ma Ying-jeou administration when typhoon Morak hit Taiwan in 2009 and that by the Bush administration when hurricane Katrina hit 1 Thomas

A. Birkland. Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006. p. 5.

12.1 Holding the Government to Account in Public Crisis Management

325

the United States in 2005 both provoked widespread criticism among the public, exposing the governments to crises. On the contrary, if disaster relief efforts are effective, a disaster may not necessarily cause a crisis, and the success of relief work may win the trust from the public. For example, the successful relief operations in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake won the Chinese government great reputation. An “emergency” refers to a sudden public incident, so the concept is an extension of disaster. Emergencies include public health incidents and public security incidents, such as new infectious diseases and terrorist attacks, in addition to natural disasters and man-made accidents. Therefore, the relationship between an emergency and a public crisis is equivalent to that between a disaster and a public crisis. In other words, an emergency itself is not a crisis, but the improper response to an emergency may trigger a crisis. For example, the Chinese government’s handling of the SARS incident in 2003 was in stark contrast to that of the H1N1 flu in 2009. If an emergency is caused by an organization’s misconduct, then the emergency itself is a crisis for the organization, such as the incident of Tonghua Iron and Steel Group riot that occurred in Jilin. When the concept of disaster is expanded to cover emergencies, it includes the disasters caused by organizational misconduct. Therefore, a crisis is specific to an organization, and the crisis for one organization may not be a crisis for other organizations. Organizations are usually classified into three categories, namely, the first sector, i.e. the government, the second sector, the enterprises, and the third sector, i.e. NGOs, non-profits or civil society organizations. In China, the third sector is underdeveloped, so the government and enterprises are the main stakeholders. In this case, the crisis incurred by an enterprise is often called a crisis, and the crisis suffered by the government or the third sector can be called a public crisis. The two may overlap. If the scope of a corporate crisis exceeds the scope of the business itself, it may evolve into a public crisis, such as in the Sanlu melamine milk powder incident. According to Rosenthal, a public crisis is “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system”2 and a process “unfolding as manifold forces interact in unforeseen and disturbing ways”,3 then spreading to the world of everyday life. Thus, a public crisis usually means the destruction of existing order, which is bound to challenge the defender of the existing order—the government. More importantly, individual safety is one of the most fundamental needs of individuals, and especially, when humans encounter a special circumstance, such as war, disease, disaster, etc., the demand for safety will dominate. Consequently, public security based on individual safety is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental and major needs of the entire society. Because a public crisis poses serious threats to the safety of both individuals and the public, it becomes the government’s primary responsibility to ensure individuals’ safety and public security. In some Western countries, the market or the third sector provides many public services, but even if it only has limited liability, the government 2 Uriel

Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul T. Hart eds. Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1989. p. 10. 3 Uriel Rosenthal, R. Arjen, and Louise K. Comfort eds. Managing Crisis: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 2001. p. 6.

326

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

at least provides public security, one of the basic public services that are kept to the government to provide. In China, the government is almost the only body representing the public spirit, and the public also depend heavily on the government. Although a public crisis may not only involve the government, the government will become the ultimate stakeholder in the public crisis. Although a public crisis is not always caused by the government, the government must always “pay the bill”. Therefore, public crises have become crises facing the government. The government must be made answerable for public crises.

12.2 Three Types of Public Crises and Differential Management Approaches The government faces or will face mainly three types of public crises. The first type includes those cases in which public dissatisfaction with the government is caused by the latter’s failure to respond to an emergency effectively. The second type of crisis includes emergency situations caused directly by the government’s underlying institutional deficiencies. The third type of crises are those triggered not by conduct of the government per se but by inappropriate behaviors of individual government officials. Data indicate that the incidence of crises caused by government response failure has decreased, while crises remain frequent, and associated crises have risen rapidly. Induced crises were once the majority of public crises in China. However, after encountering SARS in 2003, the Chinese government vigorously promoted the emergency management system featuring emergency plans, emergency response institutions, mechanisms, and relevant laws and regulations, and standardized the administrative actions in emergency management through the emergency plan system and the Emergency Response Law, greatly reducing emergency-induced government crises. Except for a few local governments, the central government and most local governments have gained experience in emergency response. They are able to make emergency response and disclose information according to law, thereby significantly reducing the frequency of government response failure induced crises. Institutional deficiency induced crises mostly involve the government’s governance philosophy, administrative approaches, and power structure. Before these are effectively improved, such crises will only increase. Officer misconduct induced crises have risen rapidly in recent years with the help of the Internet. It is noteworthy that this type of public opinion crises in the virtual world is as damaging to the image of the government as the crises in the physical world. The former is even more widespread than the latter, and cause even greater harm. For government response failure induced crises, the emergencies often have much to do with politics, and involve the most fundamental public services that a government should provide—public security. As Daniel Bell said, in the context of

12.2 Three Types of Public Crises and Differential Management Approaches

327

modernity, “the key issue of any political systems is the legitimacy of the system”.4 Legitimacy refers to “the ability of the governmental system to enable people to produce and uphold the idea that the existing political system is the most appropriate institution for the society”.5 Therefore, the government’s failure in dealing with emergencies will seriously damage its credibility and weaken the public’s confidence in the government. In the case of institutional deficiency induced crises, the government is actually the maker of the crises. Public crises are caused by social risks. There are two major types of social risks—imported global risks and risks arising from the transformation process. The latter is the majority. Compared with the bottom-up transformations found in Western history, the transformations in China are mostly top-down and begins with economic transformation initiated by the change in political culture, in which the government is the initiator. At one time in the process of transformation, GDP growth was the only concern of the government. Party and government organizations became enterprises, Party secretaries became board chairmen, and administrative heads became general managers. In many cases, government power was excessively, insufficiently or unduly used, leading to widespread corruption, the use of public power for personal gains, and social deprivation, and aggravating social injustice and the gap between the rich and the poor. These are the root causes of institutional deficiency induces crises. These crises are the most harmful to the government’s legitimacy, undermining trust in the government. A typical example is that the public always have doubts about official statistics, which should be authoritative. The prevalence of sayings that describe the fact that people’s perception of the situation goes against what official figures present reflects the lack of trust in the government. As for officer misconduct induced crises, the root cause lies in institutional deficiencies. Doubts over the government posted on the Internet obviously say something about the low credibility of the government. Therefore, there are three options for the management of public crises. First, improve the emergency management system to reduce the occurrence of government response failure induced crises. Second, reform the political and administrative system to reduce the frequency of institutional deficiency induces crises. Third, follow public opinion closely and respond actively to reduce officer misconduct induced crises. In reality, however, there are only two options, because the root of the third type of crises is still in the government itself, and the response to public opinion will ultimately be translated to the reform of the existing political and administrative systems.

4 Daniel Bell. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Trans. by Zhao Yifan et al. Life, Reading,

and New Knowledge Joint Publishing, 1996, p. 132. Lipset. Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics. Trans by Zhang Shaoxing. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1997, p. 55.

5 Seymour

328

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

12.3 Reducing Government Response Failures by Holding Officials Accountable 12.3.1 Introducing the Administrative Accountability System The frequent occurrence of emergencies is the immediate reason why we should establish an officials’ accountability system. According to available statistics, the total economic losses caused by various emergencies since 2003 have exceeded RMB600 billion, accounting for 6% of China’s GDP.6 In the 2003 SARS outbreak, then Mayor of Beijing Meng Xuenong and Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang were dismissed for incompetence. In August 2003, the first administrative accountability regulation in China, the Interim Measures for the Administrative Accountability System of the Changsha Municipal People’s Government, was promulgated to launch an administrative accountability system. In January 2004, Tianjin also promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administrative Accountability System of the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government, further clarifying the targets, contents, methods, and procedures of administrative accountability. In July 2004, Chongqing officially started to implement the Interim Measures for the Accountability of Chief Executives of the Chongqing Municipal Government, which is considered a breakthrough attempt at institutionalizing accountability. Heads of administrative departments are held accountable for failure to perform or improperly perform statutory duties, and may receive admonishment, criticism, suspension from work for self-examination, and suggested resignation as punishment, if they are held accountable for any of seven situations through any of 18 means of investigation. The targets of accountability include the administrative heads and deputy heads of various departments of the Chongqing Municipal Government, and the heads of affiliated institutions. In addition to the mayor’s decision, an accountability procedure can also be initiated based on reports and accusations from citizens, legal persons, and other organizations; materials exposed by the news media; and accountability recommendations submitted by people’s congress deputies, CPPCC members, judicial organs, arbitration institutions, deputy mayors, or secretaries-general, and the result of job performance evaluation.7 In addition, Hainan, Chengdu, Zhejiang, Shenzhen, Hebei, Guangxi, and Gansu have also issued regulations on administrative accountability. In terms of the content of accountability, local accountability systems all emphasize three accountable situations related to emergencies: first, failure to respond to natural disasters, major incidents or epidemics promptly and effectively in accordance with relevant regulations and superiors’ requirements, causing serious consequences or losses; second, withholding of, failure to disclose, or late disclosure of information, or disclosure of misinformation on major emergencies; and third, illegal decision to 6 People’s

Daily Online. “First Interpretation: Public Emergencies, How We Respond.” http://gov. people.com.cn/GB/46737/3895401.html. 7 Wen Yan. The Storm of Accountability Is Blowing into China’s Politics. Economic Forum, 2005 (1).

12.3 Reducing Government Response Failures by Holding Officials Accountable

329

take major administrative measures, leading to large-scale or repeated petitions, or triggering other activities that undermine social stability. The first two items have been effective in the emergency management practice in recent years and have made governments at all levels attach great importance to emergency management. Most local governments can disclose emergency information and reduce the frequency of government response failure induced crises. However, the third item has provoked officials to cover up petitions, increased the cost of maintaining stability, and intensified social contradictions.

12.3.2 Stressing Accountability for Response as Well as Prevention and Recovery However, the officials’ accountability system at this time mainly focuses on accountability in the aftermath, not before the occurrence, of emergencies. At this stage, due to the lack of experience and inadequate preparation, government departments at all levels had limited understanding of emergency management and their focuses are limited to emergency response. Therefore, administrative accountability only focuses on neglect of duty, rather than the accountability for the occurrence and prevention of emergencies. Since 2005, the government has been fully promoting the emergency response work and defined emergency management as administrative activities including prevention and preparation, early warning and monitoring, disposal and rescue, and rehabilitation and recovery. The scope of administrative accountability has also been expanded accordingly. In addition to the above three situations, the Emergency Response Law clearly emphasizes the administrative accountability in prevention and recovery: (1) failure to take required preventive measures, resulting in an emergency, or failure to take necessary precautions, resulting in a secondary or derivative incident; (2) failure to issue emergency alarms and take early warning measures in accordance with regulations, resulting in damages; (3) failure to organize production, self-rescue, recovery, and reconstruction in time; (4) interception, misappropriation, division of the spoils, or embezzlement in disguised form of emergency funds and materials; (5) failure to return the property of any requisitioned unit or individual in a timely manner, or failure to compensate the requisitioned unit or individual for the requisitioned property, according to regulations. Moreover, the Emergency Response Law upgrades accountability from administrative responsibility to the level of legal liability, and provisional regulations to national policy. Previously, the enforcement of officials’ accountability was often influenced by the political climate. Studies have shown that between 2003 and 2006, strict disciplinary forms, such as dismissal, accounted for 42%, but in 2006, when the occurrence of incidents was frequent, the proportion fell to 24%.8 Although the current Emergency Response 8 Song Tao. An Empirical Study of the Development of Accountability of Chinese Officials. Chinese

Public Administration, 2008 (1).

330

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

Law only provides broadly expressed conditions for the application of administrative accountability in emergency management, the occurrence of induced crises can be reduced to a certain extent if accountability is strictly enforced in accordance with the law.

12.3.3 Holding Officials as Well as Related Party and Government Leaders Accountable With the development from the introduction of local interim regulations to the enactment of the Emergency Response Law, the time frame and scope of accountability are extended, but the accountability system faces a dilemma in reality. It has been difficult to determine who is accountable for an emergency, because in reality there are often a complicated mix of collective decisions and leaders’ decisions. The responsibility was limited to the response phase in the interim regulations on administrative accountability. It was the administrative departments’ responsibility to carry out response, and therefore, it was reasonable to investigate and see if they are accountable. But the accountability system is not limited to response, but also includes prevention, preparation, rehabilitation, etc., in the institutional framework established by the Emergency Response Law. These are not all the responsibility of administrative departments, but the leadership of Party committees (decisionmaking), and the competent authorities (executing). It is obviously unfair if only the administrative departments are held accountable. In this regard, Nanjing made the first attempt to introduce the Interim Measures for the Accountability of Party and Government Leaders on March 11, 2009, and identified Party and government leaders as the targets of accountability. However, there was no breakthrough in the content of accountability. The accountability for emergencies was still concentrated on emergency response, information disclosure, and mass petitions. On July 12, 2009, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the Interim Provisions on the Accountability of Party and Government Leaders. Four of the seven accountable situations listed are directly relevant to emergencies: (1) dereliction of duty that caused major accidents, incidents, and cases in the region, the department, the system, or the unit, or the occurrence of consecutive major accidents, incidents, or cases in a short period that caused significant losses or adverse effects; (2) a poorly managed and supervised government department that caused major accidents, incidents, and cases within its scope of responsibility, or caused consecutive major accidents, incidents, and cases in a short period, resulting in significant losses or adverse effects; (3) abusing powers, forcing, or inspiring the implementation of illegal administrative actions, or inaction, in administrative activities that triggered mass incidents or other major incidents; (4)

12.3 Reducing Government Response Failures by Holding Officials Accountable

331

mismanagement of mass incidents or emergencies that leads to deterioration of the situations and adverse effects. The Interim Provisions expand the scope of accountability to include the leaders of Party committees at all levels and the content of accountability to cover the responsibilities for prevention and mass incidents.

12.4 Risk Management: Key to Reducing Institutional Deficiency in the Government The enforcement of Party and government leaders’ accountability has effectively curbed the growth of government response failure induced crises. However, it is not enough to alleviate or even eradicate institutional deficiency induced crises if we rely solely on accountability of officials. We must have new measures. Institutional deficiency induced crises in the current phase are the concentrated release of transformation-incurred risks. The transformation of every system incurs risks. In the transition from planned economy to market economy, a large number of market failures and externalities are brought about, such as environmental pollution, ecological disorders, and large-scale proliferation of toxic substances. In the political sphere, the command-based control system collapsed, but the new regulatory system has not yet matured, resulting in a large number of regulatory loopholes. The distribution of resources is unbalanced and inequality is increased, leading to social tensions. The original value orientation in the cultural system is negated, while the new value orientation is not clearly established. A considerable number of people are disoriented and conduct themselves improperly. If we focus only on the accountability of officials, the person who directly causes a crisis may be held accountable, but institutionally, the person who causes a latent crisis may escape unscathed. Despite the dismissal of relevant officials, similar crises continue to emerge. Therefore, accountability for risks is also required. That is, we have to reflect on the course of transformation and manage risks at the source, such as policies, institutions, structures, and values, in order to reduce primary crises. Fortunately, the Interim Provisions on the Accountability of Party and Government Leaders has extended accountability to decision-making and policy formulation. This type of expansion should not be limited to mass incidents. The enforcement of accountability is a means, not an end, and it is intended to reduce emergencies and the crises faced by the government. Therefore, it is an inherent requirement of the management of public crises to proceed from administrative accountability to the accountability of Party and government leaders and from accountability for response to accountability for prevention. It is also inevitable to hold persons, policy-makers, institutions, structures and values accountable, i.e. accountability for risks. Specifically, accountability in policy-making, institutions, structures, and values can be clearly designed in the following aspects: First, the target of accountability, i.e. who is to be held accountable. The ultimate goal of risk accountability is not to hold an official accountable, but to identify ineffective policy-making, improper institutions, imbalanced structures, or absence

332

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

of moral or ethical values. Therefore, the accountability for risks is to encourage changes in policy-making, institutions, structures, and values. Second, the content of accountability, i.e. what is in the responsibility. Risk accountability puts the emphasis on the causes, not on responsibility. What is the policy, institutional, structural or value cause of the emergency? Is there anything wrong? Can improvements be made? Therefore, the investigation and evaluation work after an emergency should be prudent and responsible. Third, the enforcement of accountability, i.e. how can we introduce accountability for risks. Accountability for risks is not brought in through the rights and responsibility systems among administrative departments, but through policy agenda, institutional adjustment, structural optimization, and value reconstruction. Therefore, in order to enforce accountability for risks, we should change the way policy agenda is set and listen to the public opinion. Attention should be given to not only the formal political system and institutions, but also various decisions relevant to people’s life, moving to the politics of life from the politics of liberation.9 Fourth, the conclusion of accountability, i.e. what should we do after holding someone accountable. The conclusion of accountability, in addition to the resignation or deposition of officials, or disciplinary actions, should be the development of new policies or amendments, the establishment of or adjustment to institutions or systems, the satisfaction of the needs the interest of a certain class of people, and the spread of some values. Therefore, the enforcement of accountability for risks should focus not only on the staying or leaving of responsible officials, but also on the substantive changes in policies, institutions, structures, and values, as well as follow-up activities. Fifth, the time of exercising accountability, i.e. when to enforce accountability for risks. The enforcement of accountability for risks emphasizes the identification of the underlying causes of an emergency, rather than simply holding someone responsible. Therefore, we should regularize the enforcement of accountability for risks, instead of making it expedient. Sixth, the entities in accountability for risks, i.e. who are involved in the enforcement of accountability for risks. The entities involved in the enforcement of accountability for risks refer to not only the superior departments of the officials held accountable, the people’s congress, and the judiciary, but also the media and the public. Therefore, the introduction of accountability for risks also requires the improvement of political participation. On the one hand, the extensive and continuous attention and discussion of the public and the media enable key policy issues to be brought into the agenda of legislative bodies to drive changes. Emergencies always capture attention of the public and the media. People are motivated to effect changes. On the other hand, emergencies damage the government’s image and the legitimacy of governance. The government has a strong incentive to restore its image and legitimacy. The participation of all the stakeholders makes changes possible. According to published information about emergencies in recent years, the response to the blue-green algae bloom in the Taihu Lake in Jiangsu in 2007 is 9 Anthony Giddens. Runaway World. Trans. by Zhou Hongyun, Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2001, pp. 164-165.

12.4 Risk Management: Key to Reducing Institutional Deficiency …

333

not entirely satisfactory but it is closer to the enforcement of accountability for risks. Policy adjustments included the implementation of projects to protect the sources of drinking water and to restore ecological systems. The government pushed forward the institutional changes of restricted approval of environmental impact assessment for the construction projects in basin areas and introduced the regulations on the centralized treatment of domestic sewage and domestic garbage. Institutional changes included the closure of small chemical companies, the ban on ships’ and businesses’ direct discharge of sewage into Taihu Lake, the removal of livestock and poultry farms in the Taihu level-1 protected area.10 The changes also led to the reflection on the Southern Jiangsu Model for developing township enterprises. The enforcement of accountability for risks, including changes in policies, institutions, structures, and values, should build on the accountability of officials. Accountability would be baseless if officials, who represent the government, are not held accountable for administrative risks. The enforcement of administrative accountability keeps constant pressure on government officials to motivate them to continue effecting changes. If no officials are held accountable and dismissed or disciplined when an emergency occurs, it is conceivable that the power to maintain the status quo would outweigh the power to reform. “A new broom sweeps clean.” The resignation or punishment of the predecessors would create pressure and motivation for newly appointed officials, offering the possibility of changes. In addition, we should prevent the effects of complacency and substitution brought about by the enforcement of officials’ accountability. The road of reform is full of obstructions. On the one hand, people may be satisfied temporarily because of someone being held accountable for an emergency and give up further questioning, weakening the motivation for further changes. On the other hand, the government may shift the public’s attention by dismissing and replacing officials, and ascribe its policy, institutional, and structural responsibility to individuals in order to evade the deeper reforms. People normally evade the difficult and take the easy way, that is, “pinching only soft persimmons” in a Chinese proverb. Comparatively, the enforcement of officials’ accountability faces fewer challenges and less resistance so it is easy to make progress. However, the enforcement of accountability for risks faces many obstacles and resistance, resulting in indifference. A policy adjustment, institutional change, structural optimization, or value reshaping challenges the vested interests and clashes with the social networks of relationship. It takes the courage of “risking universal condemnation” and the aspiration of “being the first person to bear hardships” in addition to the willingness to be lonely and persistent. The current situations prove to be true. In the event of a serious emergency, some officials are dismissed or punished, and the enforcement of accountability seems smooth. However, the subsequent policy adjustments and institutional changes are slow. Structural optimization and value reshaping can hardly be seen. The unheralded officials who try to prevent crises do not get rewarded while the officials who solve the crises are recognized as heroes. 10 See “The Decision of the CPC Wuxi Municipal Committee and the Wuxi Municipal People’s Government on the ‘699’ Campaign to Manage Taihu Lake and Protect Water Source” issued by the CPC Wuxi Municipal Committee on June 10, 2007 (x.W.F. [2007] No. 5).

334

12 Accountability and Its Role in Risk Management

If this continues, there will be only fewer and fewer people who work hard to stop crises at the source. Consequently, when the fire departments try to specialize their capacities, they develop techniques to extinguish fires but not the ability to prevent them. So do the police departments. They focus on pursuing criminals rather than helping the community to prevent crimes. The environmental protection agencies should be able to understand quickly the superiority of prevention. Somehow, they find themselves spend most of their funds on cleaning up pollution.11 Therefore, the government is both motivated to change and prevented from changing in the event of an emergency. It is a painful experience to change but it must be done. How can we construct a dynamic mechanism to make the power of change greater than the resistance and to promote continuous policy adjustment, institutional reform, structural optimization, and value reshaping? The key to this is to transform the relationship between the government and society. It means to change the traditional pattern of “strong government and weak society” and strike a moderate balance between government power and social power. We should strengthen the society’s supervisory power over government power, and improve channels for the public’s political expression so that more social actors can participate in political reform and assist the government in transforming itself. The rise of the Internet has boosted political participation and helped to balance government power and social power. Some of the discussions on the Internet have contributed to institutional and policy adjustments, while others are conducive to structural optimization and the clarification and reshaping of values. Therefore, the step forward from officials’ accountability to accountability for risks is far more significant than reducing primary crises.

11 David

Osborne and Ted Gabriel. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. Trans. by Zhou Dunren, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1996.

References

References in English Alison, G. Essence of Decision. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Company, 1971. Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review, 1962, (4). Beck, U. “Survival Issues, Social Structure, and Ecological Enlightenment.” In Ecological Enlightenment: Essays to the Politics of the Risk Society. NJ: Humanities Press, 1995. Birkland, T. A. Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006, p. 5. Boin, A. “Lessons from Crisis Research.” In Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century, International Studies Review, 2004, (6). Boin, A. “Preparing for the Transboundary Crises: A Review of Pitfalls, Best Practices and Critical Design Parameters.” Conference paper, 2008. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., & White, G. F. The Environment as Hazard, New York: The Guilford Press, 1993. Comfort, L. K. “Distributed Cognition: The Basis for Coordinated Action in Dynamic Environments.” Conference paper, 2008. Covello, V. T., Sandman, P. M., & Slovic, P. Risk Communication, Risk Statics, and Risk Comparisons: A Manual for Plant Managers. Washington D. C.: Chemical Manufacturers Association. 1988. Damasio, A. R. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon, 1994. Dear, M. “Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome.” Journal of the American Planning Association, 1992 (58): 288–300. Douglas, M. Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Downs, A. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Ewald, F. “Insurance and Risk.” In G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Hemel Hemstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. FEMA & NEMA. State Capability Assessment for Readiness, 1997. Fink, S. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: Backinprint.com, 2000. Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity. California: Stanford University Press, 1990. Gurr, T. R. Why Men Rebel. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8

335

336

References

Hermann, C. Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. Janis, I. L. Crucial Decision: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management. New York: The Free Press, 1981. Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P. et al. “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework.” Risk Analysis, 1988 (8). Kingdon, J. W. Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed., New York: Harper Collins, 1995. Krimsky, S., & Golding, D. Social Theories of Risk. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992. Lumann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993. McNeil, S., & Quarantelli, H. “Past, Present and Future: Building an Interdisciplinary Disaster Research Center on a Half-Century of Social Science Disaster Research.” Conference paper, 2008. OECD, Emerging Risks in the 21st Century: An Agenda for Action, 2003. Pauchant, T. C., & Douville, R. “Recent Research in Crisis Management: A Study of 24 Author’s Publication from 1986 to 1991.” Organization & Environment, 1993, Vol. 7 (1): 43–66. Porfiriev, B. “Managing Crises in the EU: Some Reflections of a Non-EU Scholar.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2005 (13): 145–152. Pye, L. W. Aspects of Political Development: An Analytic Study. Boston: Litter, Brown & Company 1966. Quarantelli, E. L. “The Future Is Not the Past Repeated: Projecting Disasters in the 21st Century from Current Trends.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1996 (4): 228–240. Quarantelli, E. L. What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question. London: Routledge, 1998. Quarantelli, E. L., & Dynes, R. R. “Response to Social Crisis and Disaster.” Annual Review of Sociology, 1977, Vol. 3. Raynor, S., & Cantor, R. “How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Societal Technology Choice.” Risk Analysis, 1987 (7): 3–9. Rosenthal, U. “21st Century Mega-Crises: New Challenges to Crisis Management.” Conference paper, 2008. Rosenthal, U., Charles, M. T., & Hart, Paul T. eds. Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Pub. Ltd., 1989. Rosenthal, U., Boin, R. A., & Comfort, L. K. eds. Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Pub. Ltd., 2001. Schively, C. “Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena: Reassessing Our Knowledge Base and Informing Future Research.” Journal of Planning Literature, 2007, 21 (3): 255–266. Slovic, P., Lichtenstein S., & Fischhoff, B. “Modeling the Societal Impact of Fatal Accidents.” Management Science, 1984, (30). Slovic, P., & Peters, E. “The Importance of Worldviews in Risk Perception.” Risk, Decision and Policy, 1998, 3 (2): 165–170. Swiss Reinsurance. “Natural Catastrophes and Man-made Disasters in 2004.” Sigma, No. 1/2005. Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management.” Strategic Management Journal, 1997, Vol. 18, pp. 509–533. The Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighborhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lesson Learned. 2006. Thomas, W. I., & Thomas, D. S. The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928, p. 572. Vittes, M. E., Pollock, P. H., & Lilie, S. A. “Factors Contributing to NIMBY Attitudes.” Waste Management, 1993 (13): 125–129. White, G. F. Human Adjustment to Floods. Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research paper No. 29, 1942, Published 1945. Wildavsky, A., & Dake, K. “Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?” Daedalus, 1990 (119): 41–68.

References

337

Translated Works Beck, U. Risk Society 《风险社会》. Translated by He Bowen. Yilin Press, 2004. Beck, U. “The Post-9/11 World Risk Society” [“9•11”事件后的全球风险社会]. Translated by Wang Wulong. Marxism & Reality, 2004, No. 2. Beck, U. The Cosmopolitan Perspective or: War is Peace 《世界主义的观点:战争即和平》. Translated by Yang Zuqun. East China Normal University Press, 2008. Beck, U. “The Politics of Risk Society” [风险社会政治学]. Translated by Liu Ningning & Shen Tianxiao. Marxism & Reality, 2005, No. 3. Beck, U. What is Globalization? Globalism is Misinterpreted – Dearling with Globalization 《什么是全球化?全球主义的曲解一应对全球 化》. Translated by Chang Hefang. East China Normal University Press, 2008. Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order 《自反性现代化:现代社会秩序中的政治、传统与美学》. The Commercial Press, 2001. Bell, D. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 《资本主义文化矛盾》. Translated by Zhao Yifan et al. SDX Joint Publishing, 1989. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 《实践与反思一反思社 会学导引》. Translated by Li Meng & Li Kang. Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1998. Cooper P. J. Public Administration for the Twenty-First Century 《二十一世纪的公共行政:挑战 与改革》 Translated by Wang Qiaoling. Renmin University of China Publishing House, 2006. Douglas, M. Purity and Danger 《洁净与危险》. Translated by Huang Jianbo, Lu Chen, & Liu Boyun. The Ethnic Publishing House, 2008. Dye, T. R. Understanding Public Policy 《理解公共政策》. Translated by Peng Bo et al. Huaxia Publishing House, 2004. Einstein, A., & Infeld, L. The Evolution of Physics 《物理学的进化》. Translated by Zhou Zhaowei. Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 1962. Foucault, M. Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison 《规训与惩罚:监狱的诞生》. Translated by Liu Beicheng and Yang Yuanying. Joint Publishing, 1999. Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality (enlarged edition) 《性经验史(增订版)》. Translated by She Biping, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2002. Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age 《现代性与自 我认同:现代晚期的自我与社会》. Translated by Zhao Xudong & Fang Wen. Joint Publishing, 1998. Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity 《现代性的后果》. Translated by Tian He. Yilin Press, 2000. Giddens, A. Runaway World 《失控的世界》. Translated by Zhou Hongyun. Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2002. Goffman, E. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 《污名:受损身份管理札记》. Translated by Song Lihong. The Commercial Press, 2009. Henry, N. Public Administration and Public Affairs 《公共行政与公共事务》. Translated by Xiang Long. Huaxia Publishing House, 2002. Howlett, M. P., & Ramesh, M. Studying Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems 《公共政策 研究——政策循环与政策支持子系统》. Translated by Pang Shi et al. SDX Knowledge Joint Publishing, 2006. Huntington, S. Political Order in a Changing Society 《变化社会中的政治秩序》. Translated by Wang Guanhua, Liu Wei et al. Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2008. Knight, F. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 《风险、不确定性与利润》. Translated by An Jia. The Commercial Press, 2007. Lash, S. “Risk Society and Risk Culture.” Translated by Wang Wulong. Marxism & Reality, 2002, No. 4.

338

References

Le Pen, G. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind 《乌合之众》. Translated by Feng Keli. Guangxi Normal University Press, 2007. Lewis, A. Development Planning 《发展计划》. Translated by He Baoyu. Beijing College of Economics Press, 1989. Lipset, S. M. Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology 《一致与冲突》. Translated by Zhang Huaqing et al. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1995. Lipset, S. M. Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics 《政治人:政治社会的基础》. Translated by Zhang Shaoxing. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1997. Maslow, A. Motivation and Personality 《动机与人格》. Translated by Xu Jinsheng et al. Huaxia Publishing House, 1987. North, D. Structure and Change in Economic History 《经济史中的结构与变迁》. Translated by Chen Yu, Luo Huaping et al. Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 1999. Osborne, D., & Gabriel, T. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector 《政府改革——企业精神如何改革着公营部门》. Translated by Zhou Dunren et al. Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1996. Renn, O., & Rohrmann, B. (Eds.). Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies 《跨文化的风险感知:经验研究的总结》. Translated by Zhang Hubiao & Zhao Yandong. Beijing Publishing House, 2007. Rifkin, J., & Howard, T. Entropy: A New World View 《熵:一种新的世界观》. Translated by Lv Ming & Yuan Zhou. Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987. Scott, J. C. Weapons of the Weak 《弱者的武器》. Translated by Zheng Guanghuai, Zhang Jiao, & He Jiangde. Yilin Press, 2007. Scott E. Harrington, S. E., & Niehaus, G. R. Risk Management and Insurance 《风险管理与保 险》 (2nd ed.). Translated by Chen Bingzheng, Wang Jun, & Zhou Fuping. Tsinghua University Press, 2005. Shively, W. P. The Craft of Political Research (6th ed.) 《政治科学研究方法》. Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2006. Slovic P. The Perception of Risk 《风险感知》. Translated by Feng Xin, Lin Yao, & Zhao Yandong, Beijing Publishing House, 2007. Tocqueville. Old Regime and the Revolution 《旧制度与大革命》. Translated by Feng Tang, The Commercial Press, 1992.

Works in Chinese Cheng, Meidong. 《透视当代中国重大突发事件 (1949–2005)》 [An Insight into Major Emergencies in China (1949–2005)]. Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2008. Duan, Huaming. 《城市灾害社会学》 [Sociology of Urban Disasters]. People’s Publishing House, 2010. Fang, Jiangshan. 《非制度政治参与一一以转型期中国农民为对象分析》 [Non-institutional Political Participation: An Analysis of Chinese Farmers in Transition Period]. People’s Publishing House, 2000. Guo, Ji, ed. 《政府应急管理实务》 [The Practical Emergency Management of the Government]. CPC Central Party School Press, 2004. Hong, Dayong, & Liu, Shucheng. 《经济周期与预警系统》 [Economic Cycles and Early Warning System]. Science Press, 1990. Hou, Wenruo. 《社会保险》 [Social Insurance]. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2005. Hu, Ningsheng, Zhang, Chengfu et al. 《中国政府形象战略》 [The Image Strategy of China Government]. CPC Central Party School Press, 1998.

References

339

Jia, Kang, & Liu, Shangxi. 《公共财政与公共危机》 [Public Finance and Public Crises]. China Financial & Economic Publishing House, 2004. Jin, Lei, ed. 《城市安全之道》 [The Way Toward Urban Safety]. China Machine Press, 2007. Jin, Lei, & Zhou, Youmang, eds. 《国外最新安全减灾管理方法与应用》 [The Latest Foreign Methods and Applications of Safety and Disaster mitigation Management]. Tianjin University Press, 2006. Li, Peilin. 《农民工:中国进城农民工的经济社会分析》 [Migrant Workers: Economic and Social Analyses of Migrant Workers’ Moving into Cities]. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2003. Li, Peilin, Zhang, Yi, Zhao, Yandong, & Liang, Dong. 《社会冲突与阶层意识:当代中国社会矛 盾问题研究》 [Social Conflict and Class Consciousness: A Study of Social Contradictions in Contemporary China]. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2005. Liu, Yansheng. 《社会保障的起源、发展和道路选择》 The Origins, Development, and Choice of Social Security]. Law Press, 2001. Lu, Xueyi. 《当代中国社会阶层研究报告》 [Research Report on Contemporary Chinese Social Classes]. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2001. Ma, Zongjin, ed. 《中国重大自然灾害及减灾对策(总论)》 [Major Natural Disasters and Disaster Mitigation Countermeasures in China (General)]. Science Press, 1994. Mu, Huaizhong. 《社会保障国家比较》 [Comparing Social Security Countries]. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2002. Sun, Guangde, & Dong, Keyong. 《社会保障概论》 [An Introduction to Social Security]. Renmin University of China Press, 2000. Sun, Liping. 《断裂:20世纪九十年代以来的中国社会》 [Fracturing: Chinese Society since the 1990s]. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2003. Sun, Liping. 《转型与断裂:改革以来中国社会结构的变迁》 [Reinventing and Fracturing: Changes in Social Structure since the Reform in China]. Tsinghua University Press, 2004. Sun, Liping, Li, Shi, & Luo, Chuliang. 《2007中国改革评估报告》 [2007 China Reform Assessment Report]. China Institute (Hainan) for Reform and Development. China Economic Press, 2007. Tong, Xing. 《社会管理学概论》 [An Introduction to Social Management]. Nanjing University Publishing House, 1991. Tong, Xing. 《世纪末的挑战一当代中国社会问题研究》 [Challenges at the Sunset of the Century: A Study of Contemporary Social Issues in China]. Nanjing University Press, 1995. Tong, Xing, & Zhang, Haibo. 《中国转型期的社会风险及识别:理论探讨与经验研究》 [Social Risks and Identification during China’s Transition: Theoretical Discussion and Empirical Research]. Nanjing University Press, 2007. Tong, Xing, & Zhang, Haibo. 《灾害与公共管理》 [Disasters and Public Management]. Nanjing University Publishing House, 2010. Tong, Xing et al. 《劳动社会学》 [The Sociology of Labor]. Nanjing University Publishing House, 1992. Wang, Shaoguang. 《安邦之道:国家转型的目标与途径》 Bring Peace and Stability: The Goals and Approaches of National Transformation. SDX Joint Publishing, 2007. Wang, Hongwei. 《重大突发事件应急机制研究》 [Research on the Mechanisms of Major Emergencies]. Renmin University of China Press, 2010. Wang, Shaoguang, & Hu, Angang. 《中国国家能力报告》 [China State Capacity Report]. Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1993. Wang, Shaoyu, & Feng, Baixia. 《城市灾害应急与管理》 [Urban Disaster Responses and Management]. Chongqing Press, 2005. Wu, Liangfu. 《运作、决策、信息与应急管理:美国地方政府应急管理实例研究》 [Operations, Decision-making, Information, and Emergency Management: A Case Study of Emergency Management of Local Governments in the United States]. Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2004.

340

References

Wu, Jiang, ed. 《公共危机管理能力》 The Capabilities of Public Crisis Management. National School of Administration Press, 2005. Wu, Zongzhi, ed. 《安全社区建设指南》 [The Guide to the Construction of Safe Community]. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2005. Xia Baocheng, ed. 《西方公共安全管理》 [Public Safety Management in Western Countries]. Chemical Industry Press, 2006. Xue, Lan, Zhang, Qiang, & Zhong, Kaibin. 《危机管理:转型期中国面临的挑战》 [Crisis Management: China’s Challenges during the Transition Period]. Tsinghua University Press, 2003. Yan, Yaojun. 《现代实证性社会预警》 [Modern Empirical Social Early Warning]. Social Science Academic Press, 2005. Yang, Xuedong. 《风险社会与秩序重建》 [Risk Society and Order Re-establishment]. Social Science Academic Press, 2006. Yao, Guozhang. 《日本灾害管理体系:研究与借鉴》 [Japan’s Disaster Management System: Research and Reference]. Peking University Press, 2009. Yao, Qinghai. On the Compensation Mechanism of Catastrophic Losses and on the Role of Government and Market in Catastrophe Risk Management. China Financial & Economic Publishing House, 2007. Yuan, Fang et al. 《中国社会结构转型》 [The Structural Transformation of Society in China]. China Social Press, 1988. Zhang, Chengfu, & Tang, Jun. 《政府应急管理能力评估一知识框架与指标体系研究》 [Capability Assessment of the Government’s Emergency Management: A Study on Knowledge Framework and Indicator System]. Renmin University of China Press, 2009. Zhang, Chengfu, Tang, Jun, & Xie, Yifan. 《公共危机管理理论与实务》 [Theory and Practice in Managing Public Crises]. Renmin University of China Press, 2009. Zhang, Huan. 《应急管理评估》 [The Assessment of Emergency Management]. China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2010. Zhao, Chenggen. 《国外大城市危机管理模式研究》 [A Study on Crisis Management Models of Foreign Metropolises]. Peking University Press, 2006. Zhao, Dingxin. 《社会与政治运动讲义》 [Lectures on Social and Political Movements]. Social Science Academic Press, 2006. Zheng, Hangsheng, Li, Qiang et al. 《当代中国社会结构和社会关系研究》 [A Study on Social Structure and Relations in Contemporary China]. Capital Normal University Press, 1997. Zhu, Qingfang. 《社会指标的应用》 [Applications of Social Indicators]. China Statistics Press, 1992.

Journal Articles Bai, Yunfeng et al. 《畜产品安全的可追溯管理》 [“The Traceability Management of the Safety of Livestock Product”]. Food Science, 2005, No. 8. Cao, Hailin. 《乡村社会交换的演变及其生成逻辑》 [“The Evolution of a Rural Social Exchange and Its Initiative Logic”]. Journal of Humanities, 2003, No. 2. Chen, Lixin. 《论土地征用中失地农民的权益保护》 [“On the Protection of Land-losing Farmers’ Rights and Interests in Land Expropriation”]. Seeker, 2004, No. 2. Chen, Yongan. 《当前政府建立应对突发事件应急管理系统的思考》 [“On the Government’s Establishing a System for Managing Emergency Responses”]. Journal of Yunnan Administration College, 2003, No. 4.

References

341

Chen, Youhua. 《雪灾、“春运”与自由迁徙一论“春运”难题的制度性建构与长期的统筹解决 方案》 [“Winter Storm, ‘Spring Festival Travel’ and the Freedom of Migration: On Institutional and Long-term Coordinated Solutions to the ‘Spring Festival Travel’”]. In 《“风 险、危机与公共管理”国际学术会议论文集》 [Proceedings of the International Academic Conference on Risk, Crisis and Public Management]. Nanjing, China, 2008. Deng, Weizhi. 《关于社会风险预警机制问题的研究》 [“A Study on the Issues of Early-Warning Mechanisms for Social Risks”]. Social Science, 2003, No. 7. Deng, Yunfeng, Zheng, Shuangzhong, Liu, Gongzhi, & Liu, Tiemin. 《城市应急能力评估体系 研究》 [“On Assessment of Emergency Response Capability and Characteristics”]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2005, No. 6. Emergency Management Office of the State Council. 《2006年我国突发公共事件应对情况》 [“2006 Situations of Responses to Public Emergencies in China”]. China Emergency Management, 2007, No. 7. Fan, Weicheng. 《突发公共事件应急信息系统总体方案的构思》 [“Ideas of the Overall Plan for the Information System of Emergency Response to Public Emergencies”]. Informatization Construction, 2005, No. 9. Fang, Qing et al. 《我国食品安全标准体系的现状与展望》 [“The Status and Prospects of the System of Food Safety Standard in China”]. Food Safety, 2004, No. 12. Feng, Jikang. 《“三农”难题成因:历史嬗变与现实探源》 [“The Causes of Issues Relating to Agriculture, Rural Areas and Farmers: History and Realistic Tracing”]’ China Soft Science, 2004, No. 9. Gao, Xiaoping. 《中国特色应急管理体系建设的成就和发展》 [“Achievement and Development of Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2008, No. 11. Gao, Xiaoping, & Hou, Liyan. 《危机管理方法论初探》 [“A Preliminary Study on the Methodology of Crisis Management”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2005, No. 5. Gao, Xiaoping, & Liu, Yihong. 《我国应急管理研究述评》 [“An Review on the Research of Emergency Management in China”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2009, No. 8 and 9. Geng, Hong. 《民主化管制:转轨期中国政府管制改革的重要取向》 [“Democratized Supervision: Important Orientations toward the Government’s Reform of Supervision during China’s Transition”]. Journal of Humanities, 2007, No. 4. Gu, Linsheng. 《东京大城市防灾应急管理体系及其启示》 [“The System and Inspiration Coming from the Emergency Management of Tokyo Metropolitan Disaster Prevention”]. Journal of Institute of Disaster-prevention Science and Technology, 2005, No. 2. Guo, Rongxin. 《“三位一体”的工伤保险体系建设与研究》 [The Research and Construction of the Three-in-one Work-related Injury Insurance System]. Dongguan Social Security Department, 2010 April. Han, Chuanfeng, & Ye, Cen. 《政府突发事件应急能力综合评价》 [“A Comprehensive Assessment of the Governments’ Capabilities to Handle Emergency Responses”]. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2007, No. 4. Han, Xu, & Han, Shuli. 《我国居民收入差距变动分析一基于1978—2003年时间序列分析》 [“Analysis of the Change in Residents’ Income Gap: Based on Time Series Analysis from 1978 to 2003”]. Research on Financial and Economic Issues, 2006, No. 10. Hu, Lianhe, & Hu, Angang. 《贫富差距如何影响社会稳定的?》 [“How Does the Gap Between the Rich and the Poor Affect Social Stability?”]. Jiangxi Social Science, 2007, No. 9. Hu, Lianhe, Hu, Angang, & Wang, Lei. 《关于我国社会不稳定因素变化态势的实证分析》 [“An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Trends in the Factors of Social Instability in China”]. Probe, 2007, No. 6. Hu, Lianhe, Hu, Angang, & Wang, Lei. 《影响社会稳定的社会矛盾变化态势的实证分析》 [“An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Trends in Social Contradictions That Affect Social Stability”]. Social Science Front, 2006, No. 4.

342

References

Hu, Xiangming, & Zhang, Zhixin. 《“应急管理与政策创新”学术研讨会综述》 [“A Summary of the Symposium on “Emergency Management and Policy Innovation”]. Theoretical Research, 2007, No. 1. Hua, Jianmin. 《准确把握新形势新任务,进一步推进应急管理工作》 [“Accurately Grasp the New Situation and Tasks, and Further the Effort to Promote Emergency Management”]. China Emergency Management, 2008, No. 1. Jin, Lei. 《中国综合减灾立法体系研究》 [“A Study on the Legislation System of Integrated Disaster mitigation”]. Journal of Chinese Academy of Governance, 2004, No. 6. Li, Chunling. 《当前中国人的社会分层意识》 [“Current Chinese Consciousness of Social Stratification”]. Social Sciences in Hunan, 2003, No. 5. Li, Chunling. 《各级层的社会不公平感比较分析》 [“Comparative Analysis of Social Feeling of Unfairness at Different Levels of Stratification”]. Chinese Cadres Tribune, 2005, No. 9. Li, Husheng, Jiang, Chuansheng, & Liu, Tiemin. 《重大危机事件应急关键科学问题及其研究 进展》 [“Key Scientific Issues and Research Progress of Major Crisis Incidents”]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2008, No. 5. Li, Lulu. 《社会变迁:风险与社会控制》 [“Social Change: Risk and Social Control”]. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2004, No. 2. Li, Qiang. 《我国出现四大利益群体》 [“The Four Major Interest Groups Appear in China”]. Review of Economic Research, 2002, No. 23. Li, Qiang. 《“倒丁字型”社会结构与“结构紧张”》 [“A Social Structure in ‘Reversed T-shape’ and its ‘Structural Tension’]. Sociological Studies, 2005, No. 2. Li, Shumei. 《中国社会转型的特殊方式与人的发展》 [“The Special Ways of Social Transformation and the Evolution of Human Resources in China”]. 《Social Science Front, 2005, No. 3. Li, Xiaoqin et al. 《国外工伤事故保险发展模式及对我国的启示》 [“The Development Model of Foreign Work-related Accident Insurance and Its Enlightenment to China”]. Coal Economic Research, 2006, No. 5. Li, Yongzhan. 《如何克服“邻避”(NIMBY)并发症》 [“How to Overcome the Complications of ‘Not in My Back Yard’ (NIMBY)]. People and Land (Taiwan), 1994, No. 16. Li, Youmei. 《从财富分配到风险分配:中国社会结构重组的一种新路径》 [“From Wealth Distribution to Risk Distribution: A New Path for Restructuring Society in China”]. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 2008, No. 6. Liao, Weijian. 《2008年广州火车站春运雪灾危机政府信息传播分析》 [“Analysis of the Dissemination of the Government’s Information at Railway Station of Guangzhou during 2008 Chinese Winter Storms”]. Proceedings of the International Academic Conference on Risk, Crisis and Public Management. Nanjing, China, 2008. Liu, Jianguo, & Wulin. 《谈合同制消防队伍建设和发展》 [“On the Establishment and Development of Contracted Fire Brigades”]. Fire Science and Technology, 2009, No. 5. Liu, Tiemin. 《突发公共事件应急预案编制与管理》 [“Preparation and Management of Contingency Plans for Public Emergencies”]. China Emergency Management, 2007, No. 1. Liu, Tiemin, Li, Husheng, & Deng, Yunfeng. 《突发公共事件应急信息系统平战结合》 [“The Peacetime-Wartime Integration of the Information System of Public Emergency”]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2005, No. 5. Liu, Yan. 《“风险社会”三论及其应用价值》 [“Three Theories of ‘Risk Society’ and Their Practical Values”], Zhejiang Social Sciences, 2009, No. 3. Liu, Yan, & Kang, Zhongyuan et al. 《我国城市减灾管理综合评价指标体系研究》 [“A Study on the Indexing System of Comprehensive Evaluation of Urban Disaster Mitigation Management in China”], Journal of Natural Disasters, 1999, No. 2. Liu, Yiqiang. 《游民政治:社会风险与群体性事件的结构背景》 [“Vagrant Politics: The Structural Background of Social Risks and Mass Incidents”], Journal of Central China Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 2009, No. 6. Ma, Zongjin. 《对我国自然灾害应急行动的一些思考》 [“Some Thoughts on the Emergency Actions on Natural Disasters in China”]. China Emergency Management, 2007, No. 2.

References

343

Mo, Jihong. 《中国紧急状态法的立法状况及特征》 [“The Legislative Status and Characteristics of China’s Emergency Response Law”]. Legal Forum, 2003, No. 4. Mo, Yuchuan. 《我国的公共应急法制建设一非典危机管理实践提出的法制建设课题》 [“The Establishment of the Legal System of Public Emergency in China: The Institutional Establishment Inspired by the Practice of SARS Crisis Management”]. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2003, No. 4. Niu, Wenyuan. 《社会物理学与中国社会稳定预警系统[“Social Physics and the Early Warning System of Social Stability in China”]. Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2001, No. 1. Qin, Dahe. 《全球和我国气候变化及其影响》 [“Global and China’s Climate Changes and Their Impacts”]. Proceedings of the National Forum on Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Sustainable Development (Vol. 1), 2010 May. Qiu, Liping. 《上海社会稳定指标体系论纲》 [“The Outline of the Social Stability Indexing System of Shanghai”]. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 2002, No. 12. Qiu, Zeqi. 《群体性事件与法治发展的社会基础》 [“The Social Basis of Mass Incidents and the Development of the Rule of Law”]. Journal of Yunnan University, 2004, No. 5. Research Group of Chinese Public Administration Society. 《建设完整规范的政府应急管理框 架》 [“A Framework for Establishing the Government’s Complete and Standardized Emergency Management”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2004, No. 4. Research Group of Chinese Public Administration Society. 《我国转型期群体性突发事件主要 特点、原因与政府对策研究》 [“The Main Characteristics and Causes of Mass Emergency Incidents and Countermeasures during China’s Transition Period”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2002, No. 5. Research Group of Chinese Public Administration Society. 《政府应急管理机制研究》 [“A Study on the Government’s Mechanism for Emergency Management”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2005, No. 1. Research Group on Comprehensive Research on Social Development. 《我国转型期社会发展状 况的综合分析》 [“A Comprehensive Analysis of the State of Social Development in the Transitional Period of China” (Abstract)]. Sociological Studies, 1991, No. 4. Shan, Chunchang. 《切实加强应急预案体系的建设》 [“Strengthening the Establishment of Contingency Planning System”]. City and Disaster mitigation, 2005, No. 5. Shan, Chunchang. 《建立突发公共事件应急机制的探讨》 [“Exploratory Discussions on Establishing the Mechanism of Emergency Response for Public Emergencies”]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology], 2005, No. 2. Shen, Ronghua. 《非政府组织在应急管理中的作用》 [“The Role of NGOs in Emergency Management”]. Expanding Horizon, 2005, No. 5. Shi, Peijun. 《三论灾害研究的理论与实践》 [“On Theory and Practice of Disaster Research: The Third Argument”]. Journal of Natural Disasters, 2002, No. 3. Shi, Peijun et al. 《从中国汶川地震和南方雨雪冰冻灾害看巨灾划分的标准和巨灾保险》 [“Classification Standards and Catastrophe Insurance of Catastrophes Based on the Cases of Wenchuan Earthquake and 2008 Chinese Winter Storms”]. Proceedings of the National Forum on Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Sustainable Development (Vol. I), 2010 May. Shi, Peijun et al. 《建立中国综合风险管理体系》 [“Establishing a Comprehensive Risk Management System in China”]. Disaster mitigation in China, 2005, No. 2. Song, Linfei. 《社会风险指标体系与社会波动机制》 [“The Indicator System of Social Risk and the Mechanism of Social Volatility”]. Sociological Studies, 1996, No. 6. Song, Linfei. 《观念、角色、社会结构的三重转换》 [“Triple Transformations: The Concepts, Roles, and Social Structures”]. Jianghai Academic Journal, 1994, No. 2. Song, Linfei. 《中国社会风险预警系统的设计与运行》 [“The Design and Operation of the Early Warning System of Social Risks”]. Journal of Southeast University (Social Science Edition), 1999, No. 2. Song Linfei. 《农业劳动力转移的新阶段及其基本对策》 [“The New Stage of the Transformation of Agricultural Labor and Its Basic Countermeasures”]. 《Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 1998, No. 2.

344

References

Song Tao. 《中国官员问责发展实证研究》 [“An Empirical Study of the Development of Accountability of Chinese Officials”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2008, No. 1. Tang, Jingping. 《邻避性环境冲突管理的制度与策略一以理性选择与交易成本理论分析六 轻建厂及拜尔投资案》 [“Institutions and Strategies for NIMBY Environmental Conflict Management: Theoretical Analysis of the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant and the Case of Bayer Investment Based on Rational Choice and Transaction Cost”]. Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, 1999, No. 1. Tang, Tiehan. 《我国开展行政问责制的理论与实践》 [“The Theory and Practice of the Enforcement of Administrative Accountability System in China”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2007, No. 1. Tong, Xing. 《熵:风险危机研究新视角》 [”Entropy: A New Perspective on the Study of Risk Crises”]. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2008, No. 6. Tong, Xing. 《社会学风险预警研究与行政学危机管理研究的整合》 [“Integration of Research on the Early Warning of Social Risk and on Administrative Crisis Management”]. 《Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University, 2008, No. 2. Tong, Xing, & Qiu, Jianxin. 《科层制悖论的制度性诊断:以崇川镇民间标会为例》 [“Institutional Diagnosis of Bureaucratic System Paradox: A Case Study of a Folk Private Loan Association at Chongchuan Town”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2006, No. 2. Wan, Jun, & Wang, Jun. 《应急管理中的政府责任和权力综述》 [“An Overview of Government Responsibility and Power in Emergency Management”]. Journal of Lanzhou, 2004, No. 4. Wang, Cijiang. 《群体性事件的类型化及发展趋势》 [“The Typification and the Development Trends of Mass Incidents”]. Yangtze Tribune, 2010, No. 4. Wang, Erping. 《基于公众态度调查的社会预警系统》 [“A Social Early Warning System Based on Public Attitude Survey”]. Science, Technology, and Society, 2006, No. 2. Wang, Erping. 《社会预警系统与心理学》 [“Social Early Warning System and Psychology”]. Advances in Psychological Science, 2003, No. 4. Wang, Lefu, Ma, Jun, & Guo, Zhenglin. 《公共部门危机管理体制:以非典型肺炎事件为例》 [“The Crisis Management System of Public Sector: A Case Study on SARS”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2003, No. 7. Wang, Lei, & Hu, Angang. 《经济发展与社会不稳定之间关系的实证研究一基于跨国数据的 比较分析》 [“An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Economic Development and Social Instability: Based on Comparative Analysis of Transnational Data”]. Comparative Economic & Social Systems, 2001, No. 1. Wang, Xianghong. 《美国的环境正义运动及其影响》 [“The Environmental Justice Movement in the United States and Its Impact”]. Journal of Fujian Normal University, 2007, No. 4. Wang Yongqing. 《〈突发事件应对法〉的几个问题》 [“Several Issues of the ‘Emergency Response Law’”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2007, No. 12. Wang, Zhiqiang, & Ma, Baobin. 《突发公共事件的应急管理探讨》 [“Exploratory Discussions on Emergency Management of Public Emergencies”]. Changbai Journal. 2004, No. 2. Wen, Yan. 《问责风暴刮向中国政坛》 [“The Storm of Accountability Is Blowing into China’s Politics”]. Economic Forum, 2005, No. 1. Wu, Zhongmin. 《社会问题预警系统研究》 [“A Study on the Early Warning System of Social Issues”]. Dongyue Tribune, 1996, No. 4. Xi, Xingjun et al. 《中国食品安全认证制度的问题与建议》 [“Issues and Suggestions on the Food Safety Certification System of China”]. Food Safety, 2004, No. 9. Xie, Bing. 《环境污染对食品安全的影响》 [“The Impact of Environmental Pollution on Food Safety”]. Journal of Chongqing University of Science and Technology (Natural Science Edition), 2005, No. 2. Xie, Xiaofei, & Xu, Liancang. 《风险性质的探讨—一项联想测验》 [“Exploratory Discussions on the Nature of Risks: An Association Test”]. Journal of Psychological Science, 1995, No. 6.

References

345

Xu, Yong. 《“接点政治”农村群体性事件的县域分析 个分析框架及以若干个案为例》 [“A County-level Analysis of ‘Contact-Point Politics’ in Rural Mass Incidents: An Analysis Framework and Cases”], Journal of Central China Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 2009, No. 6. Xue, Lan. 《从更基础的层面推动应急管理一将应急管理融入和谐的公共治理框架》 [“Promoting Emergency Management from a Fundamental Level: Integrating Emergency Management into a Framework of Harmonious Public Governance”]. China Emergency Management, 2007, No. 1. Xue, Lan, & Zhang Yang. 《构建和谐社会机制治理群体性事件》 [“Establishing a Harmonious Society Mechanism to Govern Mass Incidents”]. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2006, No. 4. Yan, Qiang, & Chen, Dongjin. 《当代中国社会转型与社会危机管理》 [“Contemporary Chinese Social Transformation and Social Crisis Management”]. Journal of Nantong Teachers College (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2004, No. 1. Yan, Xinming, & Tong, Xing. 《基于时间向度的劳动风险防范一以东莞工伤社会保险实践 为例》 [“Prevention of Labor Risk Based on Time Dimension: A Case Study of the Practice of Social Insurance of Work-related Injury in Dongguan”]. Social Science, 2010, No. 9. Yang, Min. 《拷问官员责任制:问题与对策》 [“A Responsibility System by Interrogating Officials with Torture: Issues and Countermeasures”]. Chinese Cadres Tribune, 2006, No. 6. Yao, Jie, Ji, Lei, & Chi, Hong. 《突发事件应急管理中的动态博弈分析》 [“A Dynamic Game Analysis in Emergency Management of Emergency Incidents”]. Management Review, 2007, No. 3. Ying, Songnian. 《巨灾冲击与我国灾害法律体系的改革》 [“The Impact of Catastrophe and the Reform of China’s Disaster Legal System”]. Proceedings of the National Forum on Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Sustainable Development (Vol. 1), 2010 May. Yu, An. 《制定〈突发事件应对法〉的理论框架》 [“The Theoretical Framework for Formulating the ‘Emergency Response Law’”]. Law Science Magazine, 2006, No. 4. Yu, An. 《突发事件应对法着意提高政府应急法律能力》 [“The Emergency Response Law Is Intended to Improve the Government’s Legal Power of Emergency Management”]. China National People’s Congress, 2006, No. 14. Yu, Jianrong. 《从刚性稳定到韧性稳定 关于中国社会秩序的一个分析框架》 [“From Rigid Stability to Resilient Stability: An Analytical Framework for Social Orders in China”]. Study & Exploration, 2009, No. 5. Yu, Jianrong. 《当前我国群体性事件的主要类型及其基本特征》 [“The Main Types and Characteristics of Current Mass Incidents in China”]. Journal of CUPL, 2009, No. 6. Yu, Jianrong. 《目前农村群体性事件原因分析》 [“Analysis of the Causes of Current Mass Incidents in Rural Areas”]. Decision-Making & Consultancy, 2003, No. 5. Yu, Jianxing, & Yang, Shengyi. 《政府征地与农民利益之紧张关系》 [“The Tension between the Government and Farmers: Land Expropriation and Farmers’ Interests”]. Marxism & Reality, 2003, No. 5. Zhang, Chengfu. 《公共危机管理:全面整合的模式与中国的战略选择》 [“Public Crisis Management: A Model of Comprehensive Integration and China’s Strategic Options”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2003, No. 7. Zhang, Chunshu. 《大城市社会发展预警研究及应用初探》 [“A Preliminary Study and Application on Research to Early Warning and Application of Social Development in Metropolises”]. Forecasting, 1995. No. 1. Zhang, Fenghua, Xie, Lili, & Fan, Lichu. 《城市防震减灾能力评估研究》 [“A Study on Evaluation of Urban Capability to Mitigate Earthquake Disasters”]. Acta Seismologica Sinica, 2004, No. 3. Zhang, Haibo. 《社会风险研究的范式》 [“The Research Paradigm of Social Risks”]. Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy • Humanities • Social Science Edition), 2007, No. 2.

346

References

Zhang, Haibo. 风险社会与公共危机 [“Risk Society and Public Crises”]. Jianghai Academic Journal, 2006, No. 2. Zhang, Heping. 《论施密特的“马克思的自然观”》 [“On Alfred Schmidt’s The Concept of Nature in Marx”]. Journal of Northwest Normal University, 2007, No. 1. Zhang, Kangzhi. 《探索公共行政的民主化》 [“Promoting Democracy in Public Administration”]. Journal of Chinese Academy of Governance, 2007, No. 2. Zhang, Kangzhi. 《民主的主张:走社会主义民主之路》 [“Advocacy of Democracy: Towards Socialist Democracy”]. Journal of Beijing Administrative Institute, 2008, No. 1. Zhang, Le. 《信息放大与社会回应:两类突发事件的比较分析》 [“Information Amplification and Social Response: A Comparison of Two Types of Emergencies”]. Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition), 2009, No. 6. Zhang, Le. 《文化视域下的风险解读》 [“Interpretation of Risks in the Perspective of Culture”]. Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 2009, No. 5. Zhang, Lirong, & Leng, Xiangming. 《协同学语境下的公共危机管理模式创新探讨》 [“Innovation of Models of Public Crisis Management in the Context of Synergetics”]. Chinese Public Administration, 2007, No. 1. Zhang, Wanli, Li, Wei, & Gao, Ge. 《现阶段中国社会新中间阶层的构成特征》 [“The Constitutive Features of the New Middle Class in Chinese Society at the Present Stage”]. Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2004, No. 6. Zhang, Xiaoguang. 《劳动的社会关系和自然关系的区分及意义》 [“The Distinction and Significance of the Social and Natural Relations of Labor”]. Journal of Lanzhou, 2004, No. 2. Zhang, Xinglian et al. 《我国食品安全问题产生的原因及对策》 [“Causes and Countermeasures for Food Safety Issues in China”]. Food Science and Technology, 2005, No. 5. Zhang, Xinmei et al. 《我国应急管理体制的问题及其发展对策的研究》 [“A Study on the Issues and the Countermeasures of Development of the Emergency Management System”]. China Safety Science Journal, 2005, No. 2. Zheng, Hangsheng, & Hong, Dayong. 《中国转型期的社会安全隐患与对策》 [“The Hidden Dangers and Countermeasures of Social Security during China’s Transition Period”]. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2004, No. 5. Zheng, Zhenyu. 《从应急管理走向公共安全管理——应急管理发展的必然趋势》 [“From Emergency Management to Public Safety Management: An Inevitable Development Trend of Emergency Management”]. Journal of Fujian Administration Institute, 2008, No. 6. Zhong, Kaibin. 《回顾与前瞻:中国应急管理体系建设》 [“Retrospect and Prospect: Construction of Emergency Management System in China”]. CASS Journal of Political Science, 2009, No. 1. Zhong, Kaibin, & Zhang, Jia. 《论应急预案的编制和管理》 [“On the Preparation and Management of Contingency Plans”]. Gansu Social Science, 2006, No. 3. Zhou, Xueguang. 《基层政府间的“共谋现象”一个政府行为的制度逻辑》 [“The Collusion among Grassroots Governments: An Institutional Logic of Government Behavior”]. Sociological Studies, 2008, No. 6. Zhou, Zhanchao. 《当代西方风险社会理论研究引论》 [“Introduction to the Studies of Contemporary Western Risk Society”]. Marxism & Reality, 2003, No. 3. Zhu, Mingfen. 《浙江失地农民利益保障现状调查及对策》 [“Investigation and Countermeasures: The Status Quo of Land-losing Farmers’ Interest Protection in Zhejiang”]. Chinese Rural Economy, 2003, No. 3. Zou, Ming, & Yuan, Yi. 《中国的综合减灾》 [“Comprehensive Disaster Mitigation in China”]. Proceedings of the National Forum on Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Sustainable Development (Vol. 1), May 2010.

Afterword

After going through a full set of bidding procedures and fierce competition at the end of 2006, the research group, in which I served as Chief Expert and Zhang Haibo, Academic Secretary, was selected to undertake one of the National Social Science Fund’s major research projects, “Establishing a Sound Early Warning Mechanism and Emergency Management System” (Project Approval No.: 06&ZD025). Over the past four years, the whole team of researchers have dedicated their efforts to work closely with the Emergency Management Office of Bao’an District, Shenzhen, the Highway Bureau of Transportation Department of Jiangsu Province, and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of XX District, Nanjing in conducting researches and investigations. We have organized large-scale academic conferences, including an international symposium on “risks, crises, and public administration”, a forum on “disasters and public administration” involving three universities from the mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and a forum on disaster sociology as part of the Annual Conference of Chinese Sociological Association. In addition, we have published a series of research findings, and submitted a number of research reports and advisory reports for decision-making to relevant departments of the government. The Planning Office of the National Social Science Fund received and approved the conclusions of our project. Thus, we have successfully completed the research tasks of a major project. Zhang Haibo and I had the honor to lead the project. Now what we present in front of readers is the project’s results in the form of monograph, which is a collection of the research group’s wisdom. I would like to thank all the friends for offering us support and help during the research stage. Especially, I express my sincere thanks to the Social Sciences Academic Press for publishing our research results in the “Research on the Management of Risks, Disasters and Crises” series.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2020 X. Tong and H. Zhang, China’s Emergency Management, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9140-8

347

348

Afterword

At the time when the manuscript of this book was completed, I was shocked by the grievous news that a collision of two trains caused heavy casualties in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. I deeply felt that although the topic has been closed in the book, its research is far from being completed, and that it is a long-term and arduous task to strengthen the management of risks, disasters, and crises to ensure people’s safety. Tong Xing July 23, 2011